United States Institute of Peace • www.usip.org • Tel. 202.457.1700 • Fax. 202.429.6063

UNITED STats inst

© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

“ [President Robert] 

Mugabe’s latest maneuver 

adds evidence that power 

sharing does not work when 

one partner holds the balance 

of power and lacks sincere 

commitment to cooperate.”

November 3, 2010 

Zimbabwe: Power-Sharing Deal 

Under Stress

Summary

•	 Zimbabwe’s coalition government is increasingly dysfunctional, mainly due to a defeated 

incumbent ruler’s unwillingness to surrender real executive authority to a popular opposition.

•	 The latest dispute over the president’s unilateral exercise of appointment powers threatens to 

escalate into a constitutional crisis that seems likely to be resolved only through fresh elections. 

•	 International actors can help to bring Zimbabwe’s transition to a peaceful and democratic conclusion by guaranteeing power sharing, supervising elections, and maintaining 

targeted sanctions.

Introduction 

The fragile power-sharing deal between Zimbabwe’s political parties is close to breaking down. 

A deep rift has developed between the main protagonists: President Robert Mugabe and Prime 

Minister Morgan Tsvangirai. Frustrated with deadlock in the country’s “unity” government, each 

has publicly called for fresh elections in 2011 as the only way forward. Yet the prospect of a new 

round of political campaigning raises the specter of a return to state-sponsored violence. 

The latest stalemate risks a constitutional crisis that could ruin the coalition. The precipitating 

events were the president’s decisions to appoint provincial governors and ambassadors without 

informing the prime minister or seeking his consent. These unilateral acts are the most recent 

in a string of violations of the terms of a unity agreement struck two years ago. Mugabe’s latest 

maneuver adds evidence that power sharing does not work when one partner holds the balance 

of power and lacks sincere commitment to cooperate.

Background to Zimbabwe’s Power-Sharing Arrangement

In 2008, Zimbabwe was in crisis. Due to disastrous mismanagement, the country’s economy had 

shrunk by half over the decade. The national currency was beset by hyperinflation. And a cholera 

epidemic was abroad throughout towns and the countryside. 

To make things worse, the incumbent party had blatantly stolen a national election. In the 

March 2008 parliamentary contest, the two wings of the opposition Movement for Democratic 

Change (MDC) together had won a majority of seats in the lower house, displacing Mugabe’s 

Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) for the first time since independence 

Michael Bratton

E-mail: mbratton@usip.org

Phone: 202.429.3881

peaceBrieF
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Zimbabwe: Power-Sharing Deal Under Stress

page 2 • PB 66 • November 3, 2010

in 1980. After a suspicious five-week delay, the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission hesitantly 

announced that Tsvangirai had also beaten Mugabe in the first round of the presidential vote, 

but not by the absolute majority necessary to avoid a runoff. Turning to his close allies in the 

security forces, Mugabe engineered a vicious crackdown that resulted in hundreds of deaths and 

thousands of displacements. When, in a bid to end violence, Tsvangirai withdrew from the secondround election, Mugabe cruised to a pyrrhic victory. 

But the illegitimate government could not stand. The disputed election alienated even strong 

supporters of the ZANU-PF elsewhere in Africa. Thus, a regional negotiating team, headed by thenPresident Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, forced the contending parties to compromise. Following 

rocky negotiations, three principals—Mugabe, Tsvangirai and the leader of an MDC splinter group, 

Arthur Mutambara—signed a so-called Global Political Agreement (GPA) in September 2008. It 

stipulated the formation of a transitional government in which executive power would be shared 

between the president and prime minister, and other appointments would be distributed proportionally. The GPA was put into effect by a constitutional amendment (No. 19) in December 2008 

and by the formation of a transitional government of national unity (GNU) in February 2009.

Yet power sharing was nobody’s first choice. Accustomed to unchallenged dominance, the 

ZANU-PF was dead set against making concessions to rivals that it regarded as upstarts who never 

participated in Zimbabwe’s liberation war, unlike Mugabe, who is regarded throughout the region 

as a legendary war hero. The ZANU-PF entered the agreement mainly to attract much-needed 

foreign assistance (including the lifting of targeted sanctions on its leaders) and to buy time to 

regroup politically. For its part, the MDC, especially Tsvangirai’s wing, was profoundly reluctant to 

get into bed with Mugabe, who was committed to clinging to power and notorious for going back 

on his word. Yet they had learned from experience that, as an opposition, they could win elections 

and still not accede to office. Thus, half a loaf seemed better than none. 

A Growing Impasse

To be sure, the power-sharing arrangement has brought benefits. Zimbabwe in 2010 enjoys a 

modicum of peace. The brutal widespread violence of the last election campaign—which involved 

murder, abduction and rape—has subsided for the moment, though arbitrary arrests and farm 

invasions continue sporadically. The economy has regained a measure of stability due to the adoption of foreign currencies, which has tamed inflation and brought goods back onto the previously 

empty supermarket shelves. 

Politically, however, the country remains polarized. From the outset, power in the GNU was 

divided rather than shared. And the division was never equal. The ZANU-PF retained control of the 

core instruments of state coercion: the ministries of defense and justice as well as the intelligence 

service. The MDC gained leadership of the ministries of finance, education and health. So, while 

the MDC has taken on the demanding responsibility of ensuring socioeconomic recovery (which it 

calculates will rebound to its electoral advantage), the ZANU-PF has concentrated on shoring up its 

apparatus of political control and national security (also in preparation for forthcoming elections). 

In practice, the president—aided by a small entourage of hard-line party and security officials 

who have benefited from his patronage—has attempted to disrupt, even sabotage, the GNU. A 

donor-sponsored study in late 2009 found that the unity government had implemented only four 

out of two dozen GPA clauses. The agreement (now embedded in the constitution) requires that, 

on important decisions—such as, appointing top officials or announcing government policy—the 

president is bound to consult the prime minister. Yet Mugabe has repeatedly behaved as if he 

retains the powers of an absolute ruler by failing to honor the consultation requirement. He has 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

Zimbabwe: Power-Sharing Deal Under Stress

page 3 • PB 66 • November 3, 2010

treated Tsvangirai with disdain, refusing him the chairmanship of the Cabinet in the president’s 

absence and condoning the refusal of army and police chiefs to salute the prime minister. The 

fledgling prime minister’s office and inexperienced MDC parliamentary delegation have yet to find 

ways to block these ZANU-PF power plays.

Politics in Africa often centers on struggles to capture the personal benefits of state power and 

Zimbabwe is no exception. Thus, appointments to official positions have prompted the bitterest 

disputes. Even before the GNU had been sworn in, President Mugabe assigned his own loyalists 

to the strategic positions of attorney general and Reserve Bank governor. Then, in May 2010, he 

took it upon himself to independently swear in five new Supreme and High Court judges. In July, 

he designated six ambassadors, again without consultation. These high-handed actions took place 

alongside the president’s refusal to appoint to the Cabinet the MDC’s designee for deputy minister 

of agriculture, who was legally persecuted even after a trumped-up treason charge was dismissed. 

The Current Dispute

Yet, the latest abuse of power is a step too far. In early October 2010, Mugabe unilaterally reappointed ZANU-PF governors to Zimbabwe’s 10 provinces in direct violation of an earlier understanding that these posts would be shared proportionally with the MDC. Once again, the president 

failed to inform the prime minister or to seek the latter’s consent.

In response, Tsvangirai raised the political stakes. He framed the issue as a constitutional dispute 

that threatened the viability of the coalition government. In a carefully worded public statement on 

October 7, 2010, the prime minister confessed that “the events of the past few months have left me 

sorely disappointed in Mr. Mugabe and in his betrayal of confidence.” Not only had Mugabe initially 

“reappointed himself president in breach of the Constitution of Zimbabwe” but he disregarded the 

need “to appoint new governors according to the law.” He called upon the Senate to refuse to seat 

the governors, the Chief Justice to void the promotions of illegally-appointed judges, and the diplomats to reject the credentials of new ambassadors. While boycotting a cabinet meeting, Tsvangirai 

concluded that “neither I, nor the MDC, can stand back any longer and just allow Mr. Mugabe and 

ZANU-PF to defy the law, to flaunt the Constitution, and to act as if they own this country.”

Predictably, Mugabe reacted sharply, denouncing “foolish and stupid” the events unfolding 

within the government. He declared that the power-sharing experiment was only meant to last for 

two years and called for an end to the unity government with fresh elections by mid-2011. A ZANUPF spokesman claimed that the president had acted within the constitutional scope of his office.

This war of words between the president and prime minister must be understood in context. 

Partisan enmity arises against a background of a dysfunctional GNU, preparations for elections on 

both sides, and threats of rekindled political violence. The MDC’s newfound resolve to stake out 

a position on the rule of law is motivated in good part by the party leadership’s disappointment 

with the previous disruption of efforts to launch the constitutional reform process mandated by 

the GPA. The work of a parliamentary committee to elicit popular views on a new constitution 

ended abruptly in September 2008 when ZANU-PF thugs broke up public hearings in the heart of 

the capital city. As a result, any new constitution will likely be the product of an elite bargain rather 

than the “people-driven” document for which many had hoped. 

The Way Ahead

These recent developments provide sober lessons for Zimbabwe’s next elections. While political 

parties are gearing up for voting in 2011, none of the contenders are ready to run an effective 
© USIP 2010 • All rights reserved.

USIP provides the analysis, training and 

tools that prevent and end conflicts, 

promotes stability and professionalizes 

the field of peacebuilding.

For media inquiries, contact the office 

of Public Affairs and Communications, 

202.429.4725

About This Br

Michael Bratton, a Jennings 

Randolph senior fellow at the 

U.S. Institute of Peace, wrote 

this Peace Brief based on press 

monitoring and interviews in 

Harare, Zimbabwe, Washington, 

D.C., and elsewhere between May 

and October 2010.

campaign. The ZANU-PF garners only minority support in opinion surveys about vote preferences 

and Tsvangirai’s wing of the MDC must first rebuild local party structures decimated in 2008. All 

other parties—including Mutambara’s MDC, Simba Makoni’s Mavambo Kusile Dawn (MKD), and a 

revived Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)—risk poor showings at the polls.

Given the uncertainty that now surrounds the constitutional reform process, it is unclear 

whether the elections will be held under old rules or new. While minor electoral reforms have 

been introduced, the laws still allow leeway to the authorities to conduct surveillance of the vote. 

Moreover, as of now, the official electoral management body is ill-prepared to guarantee a free and 

fair contest. While the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) has new and more balanced leadership, its staff is still composed of old-guard elements, including from the military and intelligence 

services. Most importantly, militia leaders loyal to the ZANU-PF are already warning would-be 

voters in rural areas that violence will befall anyone who dares to vote for the MDC. 

In all probability, and despite stresses and strains, the “unity” government will limp along. 

Neither the ZANU-PF nor the MDC has any other political refuge. The most likely scenario is that 

Mugabe and his party will continue to try to provoke Tsvangirai and his supporters into leaving 

the alliance, but the latter will refuse to take the bait – and the blame that would go with it. At the 

same time, given the unworkable arrangement of a divided political executive, the Zimbabwe GNU 

is unlikely to accomplish much going forward in the way of meaningful political or policy reform. 

Recommendations

•	 The African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) should 

insist on the full implementation of all provisions of the 2008 GPA.

•	 As guarantors of the GPA, the AU and SADC should prepare to comprehensively supervise 

general elections in Zimbabwe. They should insist that the election date be agreeable to 

both the president and the prime minister, and refuse to recognize any electoral results 

gained through violence. They should take active measures to ensure a peaceful electoral 

environment, free campaigns, a fair and accurate count and a transfer of governmental 

authority to the electoral victors.

•	 The United Nations and European Union, along with affected countries—Italy, Sweden, 

Switzerland and South Africa—should refuse to accept the diplomatic credentials of any 

unconstitutionally-appointed ambassador from Zimbabwe.

•	 The United States and European Union should continue to maintain targeted sanctions 

against individuals, civilian and military, in the top leadership of the ZANU-PF until such 

time as all signatories implement all GPA provisions and/or conduct free and fair elections.

Zimbabwe: Power-Sharing Deal Under Stress

page 4 • PB 66 • November 3, 2010