Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives 

United States General Accounting Office 

GAO

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EST 

Wednesday, April 2, 2003 TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 

Status of the F/A-22 

Program 

Statement of Allen Li, Director 

Acquisition and Sourcing Management 

GAO-03-603T 
In the past several years, we have reported on a range of problems affecting 

the development of F/A-22. Specifically: 

• F/A-22 estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, 

maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and range in 

searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems 

have surfaced related to overheating during high-speed flight-testing, 

reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, navigation, 

identification and electronic warfare functions as well as excess 

movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to some 

test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, 

testing in some areas is restricted. 

• Each year since 1998, we have reported that assembly of the test aircraft 

was requiring more time than planned and that this was causing the test 

aircraft to be delivered late to the test center for flight-testing. We have 

also reported annually since 2000 that flight-test program efficiency—the 

amount of flight-testing accomplished—has been less than planned. 

• Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since development 

began in 1991. Since 1997, the Air Force’s estimated cost to develop the 

F/A-22 has increased by $3.2 billion bringing the total estimate to $21.9 

billion. In addition, over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 

billion in estimated production cost growth bringing the total 

estimate to $42.2 billion---which exceeds the congressionally 

mandated production cost limit of $36.8 billion. Further, 

modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. 

Actions to offset estimated cost growth have had mixed success. 

These problems have dramatically affected the F/A-22 program. Cost 

increases, in part, have forced the Air Force to substantially decrease the 

number of aircraft to be purchased—from 648 to 276. Delays in testing also 

have significant consequences. Continuing to acquire aircraft before 

adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could serve to further increase 

production costs. 

Moreover, F/A-22 problems have limited DOD’s ability to upgrade its aging 

tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original goals, the 

Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22 aircraft over 7 

years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft until late 2005 

at the earliest. The rate of replenishment will be substantially lower, due to 

the decrease in the number of new aircraft to be purchased. As a result, 

DOD will have to continue to use tactical aircraft that contribute to 

increased operating and support costs and it will have to wait longer than 

anticipated to have access to the advanced capabilities to be offered by the 

F/A-22. 

The Air Force is developing the 

F/A-22 aircraft to replace its fleet of 

F-15 air superiority aircraft. The 

F/A-22 is designed to be superior to 

the F-15 by being capable of flying 

at higher speeds for longer 

distances, less detectable, and able 

to provide the pilot with 

substantially improved awareness 

of the surrounding situation. 

The National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

1998 requires us to annually assess 

the F/A-22 development program 

and determine whether the 

program is meeting key 

performance, schedule, and cost 

goals. We have issued six of these 

annual reports to Congress. We 

have also reported on F/A-22 

production program costs over the 

last 3 years. Most recently, we 

reported on F/A-22 production and 

development in February and 

March 2003 respectively. 

This testimony summarizes our 

work on the F/A-22 program, 

covering performance, cost, and 

scheduling issues. 

GAO is not making 

recommendations in this 

testimony. However, 

recommendations in several prior 

GAO reports have stressed the 

need for the Air Force to not 

increase annual production rates 

until greater knowledge is achieved 

through the completion of testing. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-603T.

To view the full testimony, click on the link 

above. 

For more information, contact Allen Li at (202) 

512-4841 or Lia@gao.gov. 

Highlights of GAO-03-603T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air 

and Land Forces, House Committee on 

Armed Services 

April 2, 2003

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT 

Status of the F/A-22 Program 
Page 1 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Chairman Weldon, Ranking Member Abercrombie, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on the F/A-22 

development and production programs. Today’s hearing occurs at a 

critical time—with the Department of Defense (DOD) conducting 

operations overseas while seeking to respond to changes in security 

threats and still meeting the challenge of transforming the military. DOD is 

spending an average of $150 billion annually on acquisition to support its 

current missions and to invest in future capabilities. The magnitude of this 

investment, combined with fiscal pressures across the government and the 

public’s growing expectations for demonstrable results, clearly requires 

DOD to be as efficient and effective as possible in obtaining new weapons 

systems. 

The F/A-22 Raptor, designed to be superior to any known or projected 

adversary aircraft, is a key component in DOD’s modernization strategy as 

it is designed to replace the F-15 fighter. As you know, the Air Force 

started developing the F/A-22 in 1991. While it plans to complete 

development in July 2004, important operational test and evaluation 

activities have yet to be completed. Low-rate production was approved in 

August 2001, and the Air Force plans to procure a minimum of 276 aircraft 

for $42.2 billion. 

As requested, I will discuss our past and recent findings related to the F/A22 program. Specifically, I will highlight the Air Force’s progress in (1) 

addressing performance issues and the status of actions to address them, 

(2) resolving delays in flight-testing and (3) dealing with cost growth. I will 

also identify risks in the Air Force’s acquisition plan. Problems in these 

areas have dramatically affected the program. For example, cost increases 

have been a factor in the Air Force substantially decreasing the number of 

aircraft to be purchased—from 648 to 276. Performance problems, which 

are now being addressed, have limited the Air Force’s ability to test the 

aircraft. Delays in testing have significant consequences. Continuing to 

acquire aircraft before adequate testing is a high-risk strategy that could 

serve to further increase production costs. 

Together, these problems have rippling effects on DOD’s ability to upgrade 

its aging tactical aircraft fleet. If the F/A-22 program had met its original 

goals, the Air Force could have been replacing older aircraft with F/A-22 

aircraft over 7 years ago. Now, however, it will not begin replacing aircraft 

until late 2005 at the earliest. Moreover, the rate of replenishment will be 

substantially lower, due to the decrease in the number of new aircraft to 
Page 2 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

be purchased. As a result, DOD will have to continue to use tactical 

aircraft that contribute to increased operating and support costs and it will 

have to wait longer than anticipated to have access to the advanced 

capabilities offered by the F/A-22. 

The Air Force is developing the F/A-221

 aircraft to replace its fleet of F-15 

air superiority aircraft. The F/A-22 is designed to be superior to the F-15 by 

being capable of flying at higher speeds for longer distances, less 

detectable, and able to provide the pilot with substantially improved 

awareness of the surrounding situation. 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 19982

 requires us 

to annually assess the F/A-22 development program and determine 

whether the program is meeting key performance, schedule, and cost 

goals. We have issued six of these annual reports to Congress. We have 

also reported on F/A-22 production program costs over the last 3 years. 

Most recently, we reported on F/A-22 production and development in 

February and March 2003, respectively.3

Following a history of increasing cost estimates to complete the 

development phase of the F/A-22 program, the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 established a cost limitation for 

both the development and production programs.4

 Subsequently, the 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 eliminated the 

cost limitation for the development program but left the cost limit for 

production in place.5 The production program is now limited to $36.8 

 1

 “F/A” stands for fighter/attack aircraft. The Air Force changed the designation from F-22 

to F/A-22 in September 2002 to reflect the aircraft’s air-to-surface attack capability. 

2

 P.L. 105-85, section 217, Nov. 18, 1997. 

3

 See U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs to Better Inform 

Congress about Implications of Continuing F/A-22 Cost Growth, GAO-03-280

(Washington D.C.: Feb. 28, 2003) and Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Reconsider Decision 

to Increase F/A-22 Production Rates While Development Risks Continue, GAO-03-431

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2003). 

4

 P.L. 105-85, section 217, Nov. 18, 1997. 

5

 P.L. 107-107, section 213, Dec. 28, 2001. 

Background 
Page 3 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

billion.6 The current cost estimate of the development program is $21.9 

billion. 

In the past several years, we have reported on a range of performance 

issues that have arisen during the development of the F/A-22. F/A-22 

estimated performance in the areas of supercruise, acceleration, 

maneuverability, radar observability, combat radius, and radar range in 

searching targets have so far been met or exceeded. However, problems 

have surfaced related to some overheating concerns during high-speed 

flight-testing, reliability, avionics that perform radar, communication, 

navigation, identification and electronic warfare functions as well as 

excess movement of the vertical tails. Modifications are being made to 

some test aircraft to address some of these problems. For now, however, 

testing in some areas is restricted. 

In 2001, we reported on continuing increases in aircraft weight and that 

more frequent maintenance than planned on the aircraft was being 

required. We also reported on structural inadequacies in the aft (rear) 

fuselage and on problems with the separation of some materials within the 

horizontal tail section and cracking of the clear section of the canopy. In 

2002, we again reported that the F/A-22’s performance could be affected by 

increased aircraft weight and maintenance needs as well as a potential 

problem with “buffeting”, or excessive movement, of the aircraft’s vertical 

tails. We also continued to report on problems with the separation of 

materials within the horizontal tail section and cracking of the clear 

section of the canopy. 

We reported last month that the F/A-22 developmental program did not 

meet key performance goals established for fiscal year 2002 and continues 

to confront numerous technical challenges, specifically: 

• Avionics instability: Software instability has hampered efforts to integrate 

advanced avionics capabilities into the F/A-22 system. Avionics control 

and integrated airborne electronics and sensors are designed to provide an 

increased awareness of the situation around the pilot. The Air Force told 

us avionics have failed or shut down during numerous tests of F/A-22 

aircraft due to software problems. The shutdowns have occurred when the 

pilot attempts to use the radar, communication, navigation, identification, 

 6

 The cost limitation, before adjustment under the act’s provisions, was $43.4 billon. 

Performance Issues 
Page 4 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

and electronic warfare systems concurrently. Although the plane can still 

be flown after the avionics have failed, the pilot is unable to successfully 

demonstrate the performance of the avionics. Therefore, the Air Force has 

had to extend the test program schedule. 

The Air Force has recognized that the avionics problems pose a high 

technical risk to the F/A-22 program, and in June 2002 the Air Force 

convened a special team to address the problem. According to the team, 

the unpredictable nature of the shutdowns was not surprising considering 

the complexity of the avionics system. The team recommended that the 

software be stabilized in the laboratory before releasing it to flight-testing. 

The team further recommended conducting a stress test on the software 

system architecture to reduce problems and ensure it is operating 

properly. The Air Force implemented these recommendations. Further, the 

Air Force extended the avionics schedule to accommodate avionics 

stability testing and it now plans to complete avionics testing in the first 

quarter of 2005. However, Air Force officials stated they do not yet 

understand the problems associated with the instability of the avionics 

software well enough to predict when they will be able to resolve this 

problem. 

• Vertical fin buffeting: Under some circumstances, the F/A-22 experiences 

violent movement, or buffeting, of the vertical fins in the tail section of the 

aircraft. Buffeting occurs as air, moving first over the body and the wings 

of the aircraft, places unequal pressures on the vertical fins and rudders. 

The buffeting problem has restricted the testing of aerial maneuvers of the 

aircraft. In addition, unless the violent movement is resolved or the fins 

strengthened, the fins will break over time because the pressures 

experienced exceed the strength limits of the fins. This could have an 

impact on the expected structural life of the aircraft. Lockheed Martin has 

developed several modifications to strengthen the vertical fins. 

• Overheating concerns: Overheating in the rear portions of the aircraft has 

significantly restricted the duration of high-speed flight-testing. As the F/A22 flies, heat builds up inside several areas in the rear of the aircraft. 

Continued exposure to high temperatures would weaken these areas. For 

example, a portion of the airframe that sits between the engines’ exhausts 

experiences the highest temperatures. This intense heat could weaken or 

damage the airframe. To prevent this heat buildup during flight-testing, the 

aircraft is restricted to flying just over 500 miles per hour, about the same 
Page 5 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

speed as a modern jet liner, and significantly below the supercruise7

requirement. Currently, the F/A-22 flies with temperature sensors in those 

areas of the aircraft and slows down whenever the temperature 

approaches a certain level. The Air Force may incorporate a modification 

that adds copper sheets to the rear of the aircraft to alleviate the problem. 

The Air Force began these modifications in January 2003 and plans to 

complete them by July 2003. 

• Horizontal tail material separations: F/A-22 aircraft have experienced 

separations of materials in the horizontal tail and the shaft, which allow 

the tail to pivot. Because the separations reduce tail strength, the Air 

Force restricted flight-testing of some aircraft until it had determined that 

this problem would not affect flight safety during testing. The Air Force 

and the contractor initially believed that improvements to the aircraft’s 

manufacturing process would solve this problem. However, the Air Force 

has determined that it could only solve this problem by redesigning the 

aircraft’s tail. The Air Force plans to conduct flight-testing of the 

redesigned tail between February 2004 and April 2004. 

• Airlift support requirements: The Air Force estimates it will not meet the 

F/A-22 airlift support requirement—a key performance parameter.8

 The 

airlift support requirement is that 8 C-141 aircraft or their equivalents 

would be sufficient to deploy a squadron of 24 F/A-22s for 30 days without 

resupply. Today, the Air Force estimates that 8.8 C-141 equivalents will be 

necessary. 

• Impact of maintenance needs on performance: The F/A-22’s performance 

may also be affected by maintenance needs that exceed established 

objectives. The Air Force estimates that the F/A-22 should, at this point in 

its development, be able to complete 1.67 flying hours between 

maintenance actions and 1.95 flying hours by the end of development. 

However, aircraft are requiring five times the maintenance actions 

expected at this point in development. As of November 2002, the 

development test aircraft have been completing only .29 flying hours 

between maintenance actions. Therefore, the development test aircraft are 

spending more time than planned on the ground undergoing maintenance. 

 7

 Supercruise is the aircraft’s ability to travel at high speeds for long ranges. The F/A-22’s 

supercruise requirement is approximately 1,000 miles per hour. 

8

 U.S. General Accounting Office, Tactical Aircraft: F-22 Delays Indicate Initial 

Production Rates Should Be Lower to Reduce Risks, GAO-02-298 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 

5, 2002). 
Page 6 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Testing is instrumental to gauging the progress being made when an idea 

or a concept is translated into an actual product that people use. DOD 

divides testing into two categories: developmental and operational. The 

goal of developmental tests is to determine whether the weapon system 

meets the technical specifications of the contract. The goal of operational 

testing is to evaluate the effectiveness and suitability of the weapon 

system in realistic combat conditions. Operational testing is managed by 

different military test organizations that represent the customers, such as 

the combat units that will use the weapons. The results of operational 

tests are provided to Congress as well as the Secretary of Defense and 

senior service officials. 

Our reviews over the years have underscored the importance of not 

delaying tests too late in development—when it is more difficult, costly, 

and time consuming to fix any problems discovered. Yet, we have been 

reporting on delays of flight tests for the F/A-22 and that these delays have 

contributed to scheduling and cost problems affecting the program. 

F/A-22 flight-testing began in late 1997. Each year since 1998, we have 

reported that assembly of the test aircraft was requiring more time than 

planned and that this was causing the test aircraft to be delivered late to 

the test center for flight-testing. We have also reported annually since 2000 

that the flight-test program efficiency—the amount of flight-testing 

accomplished—has been less than planned. 

In March 2003, we reported that F/A-22 flight-testing was slower than 

expected in 2002 in all test areas according to Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) testing officials. Consequently, the Air Force extended 

flight test schedules and reduced the number of flight tests. Many tasks 

originally planned for 2002 were rescheduled for 2003. Further, the Air 

Force now plans to conduct more developmental flight-testing 

concurrently with operational testing. 

Continuing technical problems were the primary reasons for the most 

recent delay in flight-testing. In addition, late delivery of development 

aircraft to the flight-test center continued to be a contributing problem. 

Late deliveries were due not only to technical problems but also to 

ongoing problems associated with the manufacture and assembly of 

development aircraft by the prime contractor. 

With the new schedule, the Air Force delayed the beginning of operational 

testing for 4 months, until the portion of developmental testing required to 

begin operational testing could be completed. Operational testing is now 

Flight Test Schedule 

Delays 
Page 7 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

planned to begin in August 2003. Table 1 shows the changes in key F/A-22 

schedule events. 

Table 1: Schedule Changes for Key F/A-22 Test Program Events 

Key Events Prior Schedule

Revised 

Schedule

Change in 

months 

Completion of development flight 

testing necessary prior to 

operational testing Apr. 2003 Aug. 2003 4 

Start of operational testing Apr. 2003 Aug. 2003 4 

Completion of operational testing Dec. 2003 Jul. 2004 7 

High-rate production decision Mar. 2004 Mar. 2004 0 

Source: U.S. Air Force. 

Further, according to OSD officials involved in operational testing, there is 

a high risk of not completing an adequate amount of development flighttesting before operational testing is scheduled to begin. Indeed, we believe 

that it is unlikely that the Air Force will be able to complete all necessary 

avionics flight-testing prior to the planned start of operational testing. 

Based on F/A-22 flight test accomplishment data and current flight test 

plans, we project that the start of operational testing might be delayed 

until January 2004. As a result, operational testing could be delayed by 

several months beyond the current planned date of August 2003. 

Cost increases have plagued the F/A-22 program since it began in 1991. 

They have spurred Congress to impose spending limits and have forced 

the Air Force to scale back production. Nevertheless, the Air Force is still 

contending with cost increases in three principal areas: development, 

production, and modernization. 

Since 1997, the Air Force’s estimated cost to develop the F/A-22 has 

increased by $3.2 billion. Figure 1 highlights development cost limitation 

and estimate increases during the past 6 years. 

Cost Increases 

Development Costs 
Page 8 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Figure 1: Development Cost Limitation and Estimate Increases Since 1997 

Increases prior to 1998 have prompted limitations on spending from 

Congress. While the Air Force held the position that these limitations 

could be met until recently, our reviews showed that there was a potential 

for additional increases because of delays. Table 2 presents a time line of 

congressional limitations, our findings and DOD’s positions. 
Page 9 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Table 2: Chronology of Development Cost Growth 

a

Adjusted to reflect conferee direction and reduced effect of inflation. 

b

Adjusted for inflation. 

The initial congressional limitation of $18.688 billion established in 1997 

followed an Air Force team’s review of estimated development and 

production costs. That team concluded in 1997 that additional time would 

be required to complete the development program and estimated that 

costs would increase from $17.4 billion to $18.688 billion. The team 

recommended several changes to the development program’s schedule, 

including slower manufacturing than planned for a more efficient 

transition from development to low-rate initial production and an 

additional 12 months to complete avionics development. 
Page 10 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 then 

established this $18.688 billion amount as a cost limitation for the 

development program.9

 Congressional direction in fiscal year 2000 

legislation shifted six production representative test aircraft to the 

development program and caused the cost limitation to be adjusted 

upward to $20.4 billion. In September 2001, DOD acknowledged that the 

cost to complete the development program would exceed the cost 

limitation by $557 million. This increase brought the development cost 

estimate to $21 billion. Subsequently, in December 2001, the National 

Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2002 eliminated the development 

cost limitation. 

In March 2003, we reported that the Air Force estimated that development 

costs had increased by $876 million, bringing total development cost to 

$21.9 billion. This increase was due to the technical problems and 

schedule delays related to avionics and vertical fin buffeting discussed 

earlier. 

Over the last 6 years, DOD has identified about $18 billion in estimated 

production cost growth during the course of two DOD program reviews. 

As a result, the estimated cost of the production program currently 

exceeds the congressional cost limit. The Air Force has implemented cost 

reduction plans designed to offset a significant amount of this estimated 

cost growth. But the effectiveness of these cost reduction plans has varied. 

During a 1997 review, the Air Force estimated cost growth of $13.1 

billion.10 The major contributing factors to this cost growth were inflation, 

increased estimates of labor costs and materials associated with the 

airframe and engine, and engineering changes to the airframe and engine. 

These factors made up about 75 percent of the cost growth identified in 

1997. 

In August 2001, DOD estimated an additional $5.4 billion in cost growth for 

the production of the F/A-22, bringing total estimated production cost to 

$43 billion. The major contributing factors to this cost growth were again 

due to increased labor costs and airframe and engine costs. These factors 

totaled almost 70 percent of the cost growth. According to program 

 9

 P.L. 105-85, section 217, Nov. 18, 1997. 

10 Based on a plan to procure 438 aircraft. 

Production Cost Growth 
Page 11 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

officials, major contractors’ and suppliers’ inability to achieve the 

expected reductions in labor costs throughout the building of the 

development and early production aircraft has been the primary reason for 

estimating this additional cost growth. 

The Air Force was able to implement cost reduction plans and offset cost 

growth by nearly $2 billion in the first four production contracts awarded. 

As shown in table 2, the total offsets for these contracts slightly exceeded 

earlier projections by about $.5 million. 

Table 3: Comparison of Planned Versus Implemented Cost Reduction Offsets for 

Awarded Production Contracts 

(Dollars in millions) 

Production lot 

Planned 

offsets 

Implemented 

offsets Difference 

Fiscal Year 1999 (2 aircraft) $199.0 $200.5 $1.5 

Fiscal Year 2000 (6 aircraft) $329.3 $336.4 $7.1 

Fiscal Year 2001 (10 aircraft) $580.2 $611.1 $30.9 

Fiscal Year 2002 (13 aircraft) $827.2 $788.2 $(39.0) 

Total $1,935.7 $1,936.2 $.5 

Source: Air Force. 

Cost reduction plans exist but have not yet been implemented for 

subsequent production lots planned for fiscal years 2003 through 2010 

because contracts for these production lots have not yet been awarded. If 

implemented successfully, the Air Force expects these cost reduction 

plans to achieve billions of dollars in offsets to estimated cost growth and 

to allow the production program to be completed within the current 

production cost estimate of $43 billion.11 However, this amount exceeds 

the production cost limit of $36.8 billion. 

In addition, while the Air Force has been attempting to offset costs 

through production improvement programs (PIP), recent funding cutbacks 

for PIPs may reduce their effectiveness. PIPs focus specifically on 

improving production processes to realize savings by using an initial 

government investment. The earlier the Air Force implements PIPs, the 

greater the impact on the cost of production. Examples of PIPs previously 

 11 The F/A-22 President’s budget for fiscal year 2004 would transfer $876 million in 

production funding to help fund estimated cost increases in development. As a result, the 

current production cost estimate is $42.2 billion. 

Mixed Success With Cost 

Reduction Plans 
Page 12 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

implemented by the Air Force include manufacturing process 

improvements for avionics, improvements in fabrication and assembly 

processes for the airframe, and redesign of several components to enable 

lower production costs. 

As shown in figure 2, the Air Force reduced the funding available for 

investment in PIPs by $61 million for lot 1 and $26 million for lot 2 to cover 

cost growth in production lots 1 and 2.12 As a result, it is unlikely that PIPs 

covering these two lots will be able to offset cost growth as planned. 

Figure 2: Planned Versus Actual F/A-22 Production Improvement Program 

Investment for Production Lots 1 (Fiscal Year 2001) and 2 (Fiscal Year 2002) 

Figure 3 shows the remaining planned investment in PIPs through fiscal 

year 2006 and the $3.7 billion in estimated cost growth that can potentially 

be offset through fiscal year 2010 if the Air Force invests as planned in 

these PIPs. 

 12 Production lot 1 was awarded in fiscal year 2001 and production lot 2 was awarded in 

fiscal year 2002. 
Page 13 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Figure 3: Planned Offsets to Cost Growth From Investing in and Implementing PIPs 

In the past, Congress has been concerned about the Air Force’s practice of 

requesting fiscal year funding for these PIPs but then using part of that 

funding for F/A-22 airframe cost increases. 13 Recently, Congress directed 

the Air Force to submit a request if it plans to use PIP funds for an 

alternate purpose. 

Modernization costs have increased dramatically in recent years. In fiscal 

year 2001, the Air Force plan was to spend a total of $166 million for 

upgrades to enhance the operational capabilities of the F/A-22. Currently, 

Air Force plans in 2004 call for spending almost $3 billion through fiscal 

year 2009 for modernization projects. (See fig. 4). Most of the recent 

increase in modernization funding is necessary to provide increased 

ground attack capability. Other modernization projects include upgrading 

avionics software, adding an improved short-range missile capability, 

upgrading instrumentation for testing, and incorporating a classified 

project. 

 13 Report 107-298, Nov. 19, 2001. 

Modernization Cost 

Increases 
Page 14 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Figure 4: Planned Modernization Funding Increases, Fiscal Year President’s 

budgets for 2001-2004 

The cost increases experienced by the F/A-22 program have, in part, 

forced the Air Force to reduce its planned procurement over time by more 

than half (see fig. 5). Such a decrease, in turn, has jeopardized the Air 

Force’s ability to modernize its fleet of tactical aircraft. 

In late 2001, in the face of a significant cost overrun in the estimated cost 

to produce the F/A-22, the total aircraft to be produced was reduced. At 

the same time, DOD requested that Congress remove the production cost 

limit. While the congressional limit on production costs remains in effect, 

DOD transferred production funding to help offset $876 million in 

development cost growth. The net effect was another decrease in total 

aircraft to be produced—now estimated at 276. 

This reduction may have a negative effect on Air Force plans to modernize 

its tactical aircraft fleet. The F/A-22 is designed to be a replacement for the 

F-15 aircraft, but the F/A-22 quantity reductions that have occurred since 

1991 tend to exacerbate the increasing trend in the average age of current 

Air Force fighter aircraft. In 2001, we reported that the average age of Air 

Force tactical fighters would continue to increase until the fleet reached 

an average age of 21 years in 2011. This is almost twice the average age 

Broader Effects of Cost 

Increases 
Page 15 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

goal of the Air Force. Aging equipment contributes significantly to 

increased operating and support costs. 

Figure 5: Aircraft Quantity Reduction Since 1991 

Despite continuing development problems and challenges, the Air Force 

plans to continue acquiring production aircraft at increasing annual rates. 

For example, the Air Force plans to acquire 20 aircraft during 2003, rather 

than the maximum of 16 Congress allowed without DOD’s submittal of a 

risk assessment and certification.14 Since 2001, we have reported that this 

is a very risky strategy because the Air Force runs the chance of higher 

production costs by acquiring significant quantities of aircraft before 

adequate testing is complete. Late testing could identify problems 

requiring costly modifications to achieve satisfactory performance. 

As shown in figure 6, the Air Force is committed to acquiring 73 

production aircraft (26 percent) before operational and development 

testing is complete. We believe that this is an overly optimistic strategy 

given the remaining F/A-22 technical problems and the current status of 

testing. As we have noted, acquiring aircraft before completing adequate 

testing to resolve significant technical problems increases the risk of 

costly modifications later. If F/A-22 testing schedules slip further—as we 

believe is likely—even more aircraft will be acquired before development 

 14 DOD justified this strategy in the December 2002 risk assessment and certification it 

submitted to Congress. 

Risks in the F/A-22 

Acquisition Plan 
Page 16 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

and operational testing is complete, and the risk of costly modifications 

will increase still more. 

Figure 6: Number of Production Aircraft on Contract Prior to Completion of Operational Testing 

The F/A-22 has the potential for being the most advanced air superiority 

aircraft ever to join the Air Force’s inventory—using several advanced 

technologies and capabilities. But performance problems, schedule delays, 

and cost overruns threaten the program’s success as well as DOD’s ability 

to modernize its tactical aircraft fleet. Moreover, uncertainties about some 

of the performance capabilities have increased the risk that the Air Force 

will have to modify a larger quantity of aircraft after they are built. For 

these reasons, our recommendations have stressed the need for the Air 

Force to (1) avail itself of all opportunities for gaining manufacturing 

efficiencies during production, (2) find ways to fund cost reduction plans 

that require initial government investment instead of using funding to 

cover cost growth in earlier aircraft lots, and (3) reconsider its decision to 

increase the annual production rate beyond 16 until greater knowledge on 

any need for modifications is established through operational testing. 

Moreover, we have also recommended, in light of the high risk nature of 

the program, that Congress be informed about the amount of cost 

reduction plans identified to offset cost growth, the potential cost of 

production if cost reduction plans are not as effective as planned, or the 

quantity of aircraft that can be produced within the cost limit. Congress 

would be able to use this information to help exercise proper program 

oversight. 

Conclusions 
Page 17 GAO-03-603T Status of the F/A-22 Program 

Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement. I will be happy to respond to 

any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee may have. 

Contacts and Acknowledgements 

For future questions regarding this testimony, please contact Allen Li, 

(202) 512-4841. Individuals making key contributions include Marvin E. 

Bonner, Edward Browning, Cristina Chaplain, Gary Middleton, Sameena 

Nooruddin, Don M. Springman, and Ralph White. 

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