In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 01-1616

United States of America,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

David Vera,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 98 CR 515--Robert W. Gettleman, Judge.

Argued January 9, 2002--Decided January 22, 2002

 Before Flaum, Chief Judge, and Harlington

Wood, Jr., and Easterbrook, Circuit Judges.

 Easterbrook, Circuit Judge. Only one

issue in this criminal appeal justifies

treatment in a published opinion: Whether

the holding of Apprendi v. New Jersey,

530 U.S. 466 (2000), requires matters

relevant to criminal forfeiture to be

established beyond a reasonable doubt.

Like the other circuits that have

considered this question, we hold that

Apprendi does not disturb the rule that

forfeiture is constitutional when

supported by the preponderance of the

evidence. See United States v. Cabeza,

258 F.3d 1256, 1257 (11th Cir. 2001);

United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 543,

550-51 (6th Cir. 2000).

 Following his conviction of drug-related

offenses, David Vera was sentenced to

life imprisonment and ordered to forfeit

$600,000 in cash plus three parcels of

real estate. See 21 U.S.C. sec.853(a)

(providing forfeitures for drug

offenses). In special verdicts, the jury

determined that forfeiture is warranted

and specified the cash and property to be

forfeited. The judge told the jury to

make these decisions according to the

preponderance of the evidence. Vera

contends that this violated the

Constitution, in light of Apprendi. But

what the Supreme Court held is not that
everything bearing on a sentence must be

found beyond a reasonable doubt. It held,

rather, that "[o]ther than the fact of a

prior conviction, any fact that increases

the penalty for a crime beyond the

prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a

reasonable doubt." 530 U.S. at 490.

Judges (and less commonly juries)

traditionally have selected sentences

within a statutory range; increasing the

maximum penalty, Apprendi held, is enough

like convicting of a different and more

serious crime that the increase must be

justified beyond a reasonable doubt.

 Determining the forfeitable proceeds of

an offense does not come within

Apprendi’s rule, because there is

no"prescribed statutory maximum" and no

risk that the defendant has been

convicted de facto of a more serious

offense. Section 853(a) is open-ended;

all property representing the proceeds of

drug offenses is forfeitable. Forfeiture

has long been a civil remedy as well as

a criminal sanction, handled by a

preponderance standard in either event--

and usually by the judge rather than the

jury. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.2.

Restitution, another open-ended component

of both criminal and civil judgments, is

not affected by Apprendi because there is

no "statutory maximum." See United States

v. Behrman, 235 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir.

2000). Forfeiture is governed by the same

principle and thus may be decided by the

judge on a preponderance standard. See

Edwards v. United States, 523 U.S. 511

(1998).

 Vera’s other arguments are addressed in

an unpublished order issued

contemporaneously with this opinion.

Affirmed