Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida 

Opinion filed June 26, 2024.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D22-1455

Lower Tribunal No. 16-14752

________________

SafePoint Insurance Company,

Appellant,

vs.

Eligio Castellanos and Isabel Siles,

Appellees.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C. 

Miller, Judge.

Bickford & Chidnese, LLP, and Patrick M. Chidnese and Frieda C. 

Lindroth (Tampa), for appellant.

The Monfiston Firm, PA, and Daniel Monfiston, for appellees.

Before FERNANDEZ, SCALES, and GORDO, JJ. 

GORDO, J. 
2

SafePoint Insurance Company (“SafePoint”) appeals from a postjudgment order awarding attorney’s fees and costs to The Monfiston Firm, 

PA and Daniel L. Monfiston (collectively, “Monfiston”).

1 We have jurisdiction. 

Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(A). We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand

for recalculation of the fee award.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Insureds filed a complaint against SafePoint following the denial 

of their January 2016 hurricane damage claim. At the end of 2019, the 

parties settled the substantive claims, leaving only their claim for entitlement 

to fees. The Insureds sought statutory attorney’s fees pursuant to thencontrolling section 627.428, Florida Statutes,

2 and based on the Quanstrom

and Rowe lodestar factors.3 The trial court ultimately entered an order 

granting entitlement to attorney’s fees, to be followed by an evidentiary 

hearing on the amount. 

At the evidentiary fee hearing, Monfiston asked for a statutory lodestar 

amount and additionally requested a 2.0 contingency fee multiplier. 

1 Counsel for Eligio Castellanos and Isabel Siles (collectively, “Insureds”). 2 The applicable statute at the time of this litigation, section 627.428(1), 

Florida Statutes, and the Rules Regulating the Florida Bar, required that all 

fees awarded by the court be reasonable.

3 Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990); Fla.

Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985).
3

SafePoint agreed with the statutory fee entitlement but opposed the request 

for a multiplier, arguing that Monfiston had not shown the required necessity 

to apply a multiplier considering the contingency fee arrangement between 

the Insureds and their counsel. SafePoint also objected to specific billing 

entries that its expert contended were excessive, duplicative or improperly 

billed. 

Monfiston argued his rate of $600 per hour was reasonable as a result 

of his acceptance of a contingency case under current market conditions. As 

to the contingency fee multiplier, Monfiston argued that a 2.0 multiplier in a 

contingency case was “supported by case law,” and the purpose of 

multipliers is to “balance the playing field.” 

SafePoint’s counsel responded that the Insureds’ counsel had a 

guarantee of payment when he took the case and pointed out that there are 

many lawyers in the area who would take a first-party insurance dispute 

without the guarantee of a multiplier. SafePoint’s counsel further noted that

the Insureds’ fee expert did not testify to the unavailability of competent 

counsel absent a multiplier. SafePoint’s counsel asserted that the issues 

involved were not novel or complex such that a multiplier was warranted and 

disputed the Insureds’ expert’s testimony that the purpose of a multiplier was 

necessary to “send the insurance companies a message.”
4

After hearing arguments from counsel and testimony from both parties’ 

expert fee witnesses, the trial court awarded Monfiston $650 per hour, for a 

lodestar amount of $73,881.50. In the final judgment, the trial court 

additionally concluded that the evidence presented met the standards set 

forth in Citizens Property Insurance Corporation v. Laguerre, 259 So. 3d 169 

(Fla. 3d DCA 2018) and applied a 2.0 multiplier. The order awarded costs 

to the Insureds of $9,684.85, entering final judgment in the amount of 

$157,447.85. 

On rehearing, SafePoint argued there was no evidence that the market 

required a multiplier in order to obtain competent counsel in this first-party 

insurance case and that the Insureds failed to present any evidence about 

the novelty of the issues involved or whether acceptance of this employment 

would preclude Monfiston from other employment such that a multiplier was 

warranted. Further, SafePoint argued the $650 per hour awarded to the 

Insureds’ attorney was an arbitrary deviation upward from the amount 

requested. The trial court summarily denied the motion for rehearing. This 

appeal followed. 

ANALYSIS

Both the fee award and application of a multiplier are reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. Attorney's Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Landa-Posada, 984 
5

So. 2d 641, 643 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Babun v. Stok Kon + Braverman, 335 

So. 3d 1236, 1240 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021); United Auto. Ins. Co. v. Padron, 775 

So. 2d 372 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). This Court reviews evidentiary findings 

regarding an attorney's fee award for competent substantial evidence. 

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Deshpande, 314 So. 3d 416, 420 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2020); Pazmino v. Gonzalez, 273 So. 3d 1056, 1059 (Fla. 3d DCA 

2019). 

I. Lodestar Determination

Where entitlement to an attorney’s fee award is warranted, the 

“lodestar” method4 provides the criteria to be applied by the trial court in 

calculating a reasonable attorney's fee. Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co., 

228 So. 3d 1122, 1126 (Fla. 2017). The trial court is required to determine 

a “lodestar figure” by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended 

on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate for the services of the prevailing 

party's attorney. Id. (citing Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151). The party requesting 

the fee bears the burden of presenting satisfactory evidence to establish that 

the requested rate accords with the prevailing market rate and that the hours 

are reasonable. Id. at 1150–51. We find the record contains competent

substantial evidence to support a lodestar determination that Monfiston’s 

4 See Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1145. 
6

$600 hourly rate is reasonable given his expertise and current market 

conditions. We do not, however, find any justification for the trial court’s 

award of $650 per hour—an extra $50 per hour than what Monfiston 

requested. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the fee order finding that 

$650 was a reasonable hourly rate and remand for recalculation of the 

lodestar based on an hourly rate of $600. 

II. Multiplier Determination

In Quanstrom, the Florida Supreme Court provided three factors a trial 

court must consider in determining whether to apply a contingency fee 

multiplier: 

(1) whether the relevant market requires a contingency fee 

multiplier to obtain competent counsel; (2) whether the attorney 

was able to mitigate the risk of nonpayment in any way; and (3) 

whether any of the factors set forth in Rowe are applicable, 

especially, the amount involved, the results obtained, and the 

type of fee arrangement between the attorney and his client.

Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d at 834. Importantly, “[e]vidence of these factors must 

be presented to justify the utilization of a multiplier.” Id. “While the trial 

court's determination to apply a multiplier to the lodestar amount is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion, the trial court's findings as to the multiplier must 

be supported by competent, substantial evidence.” Deshpande, 314 So. 3d 

at 420. 
7

Although the time and labor required was argued by the parties during 

the evidentiary hearing, there was no testimony from the Insureds that they 

had any difficulty retaining counsel to litigate this insurance dispute with or 

without a multiplier, and the trial court failed to make any findings regarding 

the novelty and difficulty of the question involved or whether the client could 

find any other competent attorney in the relevant market to handle the case. 

“If there is no evidence that the relevant market required a contingency fee 

multiplier to obtain competent counsel, then a multiplier should not be 

awarded.” USAA Cas. Ins. Co. v. Prime Care Chiropractic Centers, P.A., 93 

So. 3d 345, 347 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012). Similarly, there was no evidence that 

Monfiston could not mitigate against the risk of nonpayment, and the trial 

court made no findings regarding the skill required to perform these particular

legal services properly or the likelihood that the acceptance of this particular 

employment would preclude other employment by Monfiston. Although the 

Insureds’ underlying case took three years to litigate, there was no testimony 

that Monfiston was entirely dependent on the outcome of this case and could 

not take other cases. Monfiston’s rationale for applying a multiplier is not 

supported by case law or any evidence in the record. See Certain 

Underwriters at Lloyd's London v. Candelaria, 339 So. 3d 463, 471 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2022) (holding that because the evidence and testimony presented at 
8

the evidentiary hearing wholly failed to address whether “the plaintiffs [could] 

afford a retainer or hourly fees,” the Insureds failed to present competent 

substantial evidence as to “whether the attorney was able to mitigate the risk 

of nonpayment in any way”) (citations omitted). 

Because the record is devoid of competent substantial evidence that 

the relevant market required a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent 

counsel and because the trial court failed to make any specific findings to 

support the application of one, we reverse the trial court's application of the 

2.0 contingency multiplier. Deshpande, 314 So. 3d at 421; Impex Caribe

Corp. v. Levin, 338 So. 3d 13, 16 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (reversing contingency 

fee multiplier where no evidence was presented to show that the relevant 

market required a contingency fee multiplier to obtain competent counsel). 

III. Withdrawal of Attorney Glezil’s Time

As a final matter, we note that the trial court granted Attorney Glezil 1.5 

hours billed at $375 per hour although the record shows that the parties 

conceded that Attorney Glezil’s time had been withdrawn and, therefore, his 

time was not compensable. We reverse that portion of the fee order. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude the trial court abused its discretion by gratuitously 

increasing counsel’s hourly rate and by applying a contingency multiplier 
9

unsupported by competent substantial evidence. We therefore affirm that

portion of the July 21, 2022, final fee judgment determining the lodestar 

amount of fees to which Monfiston is entitled, but reverse the portion of the 

lodestar fee order granting Monfiston $650 per hour and remand with 

instructions to recalculate based on $600 per hour. We additionally reverse 

that portion of the fee order applying a contingency fee multiplier, as well as 

the 1.5 hours at $375 per hour billed for Attorney Glezil.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded for further 

proceedings.