UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: 

Stephen G. Burns, Chairman 

Kristine L. Svinicki 

Jeff Baran 

_________________________________________ 

 ) 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) Docket No. 11006187 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ) 

 ) 

(Export of 93.20% Enriched Uranium) ) License No. XSNM3757 

 ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

CLI-16-15 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

I. INTRODUCTION 

Dr. Alan J. Kuperman requests leave to intervene and a hearing on an export license 

application filed by the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration 

(DOE/NNSA).1 DOE/NNSA seeks to export 130 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) to 

France—specifically to the Compagnie pour l’Etude et la Réalisation de Combustibles 

Atomiques (CERCA) facility. Dr. Kuperman does not seek denial of this requested license; 

rather, he requests a full and open public hearing, and he asks the NRC to limit the amount of 

uranium DOE/NNSA can export so that DOE/NNSA does not send a multi-year supply of HEU 

 

1 See Petition of Alan J. Kuperman for Leave to Intervene and Request for Hearing (Mar. 18, 

2015) (Petition); Application to Export Enriched Uranium to the Institut Laue-Langevin for use as 

Fuel in the High-Flux Reactor (to France), License No. XSNM3757 (Dec. 18, 2014) (ADAMS 

accession no. ML14357A012). 
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to France. For the reasons discussed below, we deny Dr. Kuperman’s request for a hearing 

and direct issuance of the requested license. 

II. BACKGROUND 

DOE/NNSA submitted a license application to export up to 130 kilograms of HEU 

(enriched up to 93.20%) to CERCA, which will fabricate the HEU into fuel and then transfer the 

fuel to the Institut Laue-Langevin for use in its High-Flux Reactor. This proposed export would 

take place under the auspices of the U.S. – Euratom Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful 

Uses of Nuclear Energy, and the European Commission has confirmed that the French 

recipients are authorized to receive this type of nuclear material. DOE/NNSA plans to export 

this HEU using a military transporter. 

The ultimate end user—the Institut Laue-Langevin—is a research center that specializes 

in neutron science. It uses a high-flux reactor to produce neutrons that, in turn, are used in a 

variety of research settings. This High-Flux Reactor operates continuously during a 

50-day cycle, followed by a shutdown after each cycle.2 Typically there are four cycles per 

year, and each cycle requires a single fuel element containing approximately ten kilograms of 

HEU.3 The reactor therefore uses about forty kilograms of HEU per year; this proposed export 

constitutes a three-to-five year supply of HEU. 

The operator cannot currently use low-enriched uranium to fuel this reactor and produce 

the neutrons it needs. Although the operator agreed in 1998 to study the feasibility of 

converting its reactor to a low-enriched uranium reactor, that work remains ongoing, with 

conversion to low-enriched uranium now expected in the 2027-28 timeframe. 

 

2 https://www.ill.eu/en/reactor-environment-safety/high-flux-reactor (last visited August 18, 

2016). 

3 https://www.ill.eu/en/reactor-environment-safety/safety/faq-reactor-safety/what-are-thetechnical-specifications-of-the-ills-reactor/ (last visited August 18, 2016). 
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All fuel for the Institut’s High-Flux Reactor is first fabricated at the CERCA facility. As 

noted in the correspondence providing the Executive Branch’s views, the Institut’s current fuel 

inventory will last only until September 2019. CERCA requested an extended lead time for this 

HEU due to uncertainties related to possible post-Fukushima refurbishments at its fabrication 

facility. Once exported, and after fabrication, this 130 kilograms of HEU would provide enough 

fuel to allow the High-Flux Reactor to operate until approximately 2023. 

In accordance with section 126 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA),4

and 10 C.F.R. § 110.41, the NRC submitted DOE/NNSA’s application to the Executive Branch 

on January 20, 2015, for review. The State Department provided the NRC with the Executive 

Branch’s views on this export application by letter dated May 4, 2016.5 The Executive Branch 

recommended that the NRC make all the required statutory determinations and issue the 

requested license to DOE/NNSA. The Executive Branch supplemented its views in a letter 

dated June 3, 2016.6 The June letter provided additional information and context regarding 

DOE/NNSA’s application and reiterated the Executive Branch’s recommendation that the NRC 

issue the proposed license. 

The NRC also published a notice of opportunity to request a hearing on the application.7 

Dr. Kuperman thereafter filed an intervention petition. Dr. Kuperman seeks, first, a hearing on 

DOE/NNSA’s export application and, second, that the Commission not issue a multi-year export 

 

4 42 U.S.C. § 2155. 

5 Letter from Richard J.K. Stratford, U.S. Department of State, to Brooke G. Smith, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (May 4, 2016) (ML16126A052) (non-public). 

6 Letter from Richard J.K. Stratford, U.S. Department of State to Brooke G. Smith, U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (June 3, 2016) (ML16158A026) (non-public). 

7 Application for a License to Export High-Enriched Uranium, 80 Fed. Reg. 8711 (Feb. 18, 

2015). 
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license for HEU to CERCA and the Institut Laue-Langevin in excess of demonstrated need.8 As 

discussed below, we deny Dr. Kuperman’s request for a hearing. But we respond to his views 

as we consider the statutory and regulatory determinations we must make before issuing this 

license, treating his views as written comments pursuant to 10 C.F.R. § 110.81. Finally, we 

direct the issuance of the license. 

III. DR. KUPERMAN’S HEARING REQUEST 

Dr. Kuperman seeks an oral hearing in which (1) all pertinent information and data are 

made available for public inspection and analysis and (2) the public is afforded a reasonable 

opportunity to present oral and written testimony to the Commission.9

A. Statutory and Regulatory Requirements for a Hearing on an Export License 

Application 

Pursuant to section 304(b) of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978, the NRC 

established procedures that allow for “public participation in nuclear export licensing 

proceedings when the Commission finds that such participation will be in the public interest and 

will assist the Commission in making the statutory determinations required by the [AEA], 

including such public hearings and access to information as the Commission deems 

appropriate.”10 These procedures, which govern hearing requests and petitions to intervene on 

an export license application, are contained in 10 C.F.R. Part 110, Subpart H, and they 

“constitute the exclusive basis for hearings in nuclear export licensing proceedings.”11 Our 

regulations also require us to review the Executive Branch’s views on the export application 

 

8 Petition at 18-21. 

9 Id. 20, 22. 

10 42 U.S.C. § 2155a. 

11 Id.; see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.80. 
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before reaching a decision on the hearing request or petition to intervene.12 If we determine that 

a hearing should be granted, we may order either an oral hearing or a hearing consisting of 

written comments.13 In addition to these hearing procedures, our regulations also provide for 

non-adjudicatory public participation. Specifically, our regulations expressly encourage the 

public to provide written comments on export license applications, which we consider and 

respond to as appropriate.14

Under our regulations—and consistent with section 304(b) of the Nuclear NonProliferation Act—hearing requests in export cases must “explain why a hearing or an 

intervention would be in the public interest and how a hearing or intervention would assist the 

Commission in making the [statutory] determinations.”15 Once we receive an intervention 

petition on an export application, therefore, we must determine whether a hearing is in the 

public interest and would assist us in making the required determinations.16

Our regulations further provide that a hearing request must “specify, when a person 

asserts that his interest may be affected, both the facts pertaining to his interest and how it may 

be affected.”17 Section 110.84 further explains: “If a hearing request or intervention petition 

asserts an interest which may be affected, the Commission will consider: 

(1) The nature of the alleged interest; 

(2) How that issue relates to issuance or denial; and 

 

12 10 C.F.R. § 110.84(d). 

13 Id. § 110.84(g). 

14 Id. § 110.81(a). 

15 Id. § 110.82(b)(3). 

16 Id. § 110.84(a). 

17 Id. § 110.82(b)(4) (emphasis added). 
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(3) The possible effect of any order on that interest, including whether the 

relief requested is within the Commission’s authority, and, if so, whether 

granting relief would redress the alleged injury.”18

We first consider Dr. Kuperman’s assertion of an interest and then address whether Dr. 

Kuperman has shown that a hearing would be in the public interest and would assist us in 

making the required statutory and regulatory determinations. 

B. Analysis

Dr. Kuperman’s petition includes a section discussing his interests.19 Dr. Kuperman 

provides biographical information describing his past and ongoing professional work on nonproliferation issues and his organization’s institutional interests in the topic.20 Dr. Kuperman 

asserts that these institutional interests related to public information and education programs 

concerning arms control, proliferation risks, nuclear terrorism, and the use of HEU “would be 

significantly and adversely impaired” unless we hold a “full, open, and independent review” of 

the issues.21

Consistent with 10 C.F.R. § 110.84(b), we find that although Dr. Kuperman has 

articulated the nature of his interests, his interests do not have a sufficient nexus to the 

proposed export of HEU to France to satisfy the other elements we consider when assessing an 

 

18 Id. § 110.84(b). As we have explained, persons without an affected interest are not as likely 

as persons with an affected interest to contribute to our decisionmaking and show that a hearing 

would be in the public interest and assist us in making the statutory determinations. See U.S. 

Department of Energy (Plutonium Export License), CLI-04-17, 59 NRC 357, 367 (2004). 

19 Petition at 3-5. 

20 Id. at 3-4. Dr. Kuperman notes that he is the Coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation 

Prevention Project, which engages in “research, debate, and public education to ensure that 

civilian applications of nuclear technology do not foster the spread of nuclear weapons to states 

or terrorist groups.” Id. at 3. 

21 Id. at 4. 
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asserted interest that may be affected by a proceeding.22 Specifically, Dr. Kuperman has not 

shown that issuing this export license will hinder his ability to continue his educational activities 

and continue his activities related to arms control, nuclear weapons, proliferation, terrorism, and 

the use of HEU. As a result, we conclude that Dr. Kuperman has not demonstrated that he 

possesses an interest that may be affected by this proceeding. 

Additionally, Dr. Kuperman has not demonstrated that granting the hearing or 

intervention would be in the public interest and would assist us in making the required statutory 

and regulatory determinations.23 We consider both factors when evaluating whether to grant a 

hearing or intervention.24 To satisfy these factors, a petitioner must specifically identify how a 

hearing would bring new information to light.25

Here, although Dr. Kuperman “does not necessarily oppose the granting of the license 

application for some portion of the HEU sought, assuming the requisite need can be 

demonstrated,”26 he argues that the NRC should not approve an export of HEU that exceeds 

the demonstrated needs of the applicant.27 Dr. Kuperman asserts that the NRC should not 

 

22 See Transnuclear, Inc. (Export of 93.15% Enriched Uranium), CLI-94-1, 39 NRC 1, 5 (1994) 

(explaining that merely asserting an “institutional interest in providing information to the public” 

is insufficient for showing an affected interest.) 

23 The statutory determinations can be found at 42 U.S.C. § 2156, 42 U.S.C. 

§ 2160d(a) and 42 U.S.C. § 2077(c). The regulatory determinations are found at 10 C.F.R. 

§§ 110.45 and 110.42(a)(1-5, 7-9). 

24 10 C.F.R. § 110.84(a). 

25 See U.S. Department of Energy, CLI-04-17, 59 NRC at 369 (“Petitioners have already 

submitted detailed information as to the basis for their position. We do not believe a hearing will 

result in significant new information that is not already available to and considered by the 

Commission in making the requisite statutory determinations.”); see also Transnuclear, Inc.

(Export of 93.3% Enriched Uranium), CLI-00-16, 52 NRC 68, 72 (2000) (explaining that nothing 

in the petitioner’s filings indicates it will be able to “present significant information not already 

available to and considered by the Commission”). 

26 Petition at 18. 

27 Id. 
- 8 - 

authorize a license to export a multi-year supply of HEU because of proliferation and terrorism 

risks and because of the impact on U.S. common defense and security.28 Specifically, 

Dr. Kuperman articulates three reasons to support this argument: (1) approving exports in 

excess of need would provide a disincentive to converting European facilities to non-HEU fuel;29

(2) approving a large export would aggravate the risk of interception;30 and (3) the nonproliferation risks outweigh the benefits to the applicant when approving an export in excess of 

need.31 Dr. Kuperman further argues that “only a public hearing in which issues related to the 

appropriateness of exporting HEU are fully aired and subjected to public scrutiny can serve to 

resolve legitimate public questions concerning both the need for granting this license application 

and the risks associated with such action.”32

Notwithstanding Dr. Kuperman’s extensive knowledge of non-proliferation issues and the 

points he makes in his petition, he has not adequately explained how a hearing would be in the 

public interest and assist us in making the required statutory and regulatory findings in this case. 

Dr. Kuperman has identified portions of the license application that, in his view, raise important 

public policy questions. But that is not sufficient to obtain a hearing. He must also identify how 

a hearing would provide new information to us, and how this information links to the findings that 

we must make. His petition does neither. Dr. Kuperman does not explain how a hearing would 

add to the points already made in his petition. Nor does he pinpoint which NRC export licensing 

determinations a hearing would address.33 Dr. Kuperman’s arguments regarding breaking up 

 

28 Id. at 19. 

29 Id. at 15-16, 19. 

30 Id. at 19-20. 

31 Id. at 20. 

32 Id. at 21. 

33 10 C.F.R. §§ 110.42 and 110.45 provide these criteria. 
- 9 - 

the proposed HEU export are plain on the face of his petition and can be readily understood on 

that basis.34 As a result, we deny Dr. Kuperman’s intervention petition and hearing request. 

Even though Dr. Kuperman has not met the threshold for obtaining a hearing, we still consider 

his views on DOE/NNSA’s export license application as written comments on the application.35 

We turn next to our determination on the application, taking into account Dr. Kuperman’s views. 

IV. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY DETERMINATIONS

Before granting an export license for HEU to a nuclear weapon state (like France), we must 

make the following determinations: 

 The proposed export satisfies AEA § 127’s nonproliferation criteria;36

 The proposed export satisfies the “Schumer Amendment,” which is found in AEA 

§ 134;37

 Finally, under AEA § 57c(2), the proposed export will not be “inimical to the common 

defense and security” of the United States.38

We address each in turn, responding to Dr. Kuperman’s written views when appropriate. 

 

34 Cf. EnergySolutions, LLC (Radioactive Waste Import/Export Licenses), CLI-11-3, 73 NRC 

613, 623 (2011) (“Petitioners’ written views are on the record. We therefore need not devote 

adjudicatory resources on providing an oral hearing on Petitioners’ grievances when they have 

been unable to articulate material issues that require litigation at a hearing[.]”). 

35 10 C.F.R. § 110.81(a). 

36 42 U.S.C. § 2156; see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.42(a)(1-5). 

37 42 U.S.C. § 2160d; see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.42(a)(9). 

38 42 U.S.C. § 2077(c)(2); see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.42(a)(8). Additionally, our regulations 

require that we find any export “of more than 0.003 effective kilograms of special nuclear 

material . . . would be under the terms of an agreement for cooperation.” Id. § 110.42(a)(7). 

As noted above, the proposed export would be under the term of the U.S. – Euratom Agreement 

for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy. 
- 10 - 

A. Section 127 Criteria 

Section 127 of the AEA lists five applicable non-proliferation criteria that govern exports 

of special nuclear material.39 None of these criteria are the subject of Dr. Kuperman’s petition, 

and on the basis of the Executive Branch’s views and the record, we find that these nonproliferation criteria have been satisfied. 

B. Section 134 Criteria 

Section 134 of the AEA requires the NRC to make additional findings before authorizing 

an applicant to export HEU.40 Specifically, section 134(a) requires the NRC to determine that: 

(1) there is no alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target enriched in the isotope 235 to a 

lesser percent than the proposed export that can be used in the reactor; 

(2) the proposed recipient of that uranium has provided assurances that, whenever an 

alternative nuclear reactor fuel or target can be used in that reactor, it will use that 

alternative in lieu of highly enriched uranium; and 

(3) the United States Government is actively developing an alternative nuclear reactor fuel 

or target that can be used in that reactor. 

 

39 42 U.S.C. § 2156; see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.42(a)(1-5). Section 127 lists a sixth criterion, but 

that sixth criterion applies only to exports of nuclear technology and is not applicable to an 

export of nuclear material. In abbreviated form, the five applicable criteria are: 

(1) IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] safeguards will be applied with respect to 

any such material proposed to be exported; 

 (2) No material proposed to be exported will be used for any nuclear explosive device or 

 for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device; 

(3) Adequate physical security measures will be maintained with respect to such material 

proposed to be exported and to any special nuclear material used in or produced 

through the use thereof; 

 (4) No material proposed to be exported will be re-transferred to the jurisdiction of any 

 other nation or group of nations unless the prior approval of the United States is 

 obtained for such re-transfer; 

 (5) No material proposed to be exported and no special nuclear material produced 

 through the use of such material will be reprocessed, and no irradiated fuel elements 

 containing such material removed from a reactor shall be altered in form or content, 

 unless the prior approval of the United States is obtained. 

40 42 U.S.C. § 2160d; see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.42(a)(9). 
- 11 - 

The Executive Branch states that these three criteria have all been satisfied. Specifically, 

Argonne National Laboratory has confirmed that there is no low-enriched uranium fuel currently 

available that can be used in the Institut Laue-Langevin’s High-Flux Reactor. The Institut LaueLangevin (the recipient) has repeatedly confirmed its intent to convert the High-Flux Reactor so 

that it can use low-enriched uranium. And NNSA is currently cooperating with its European 

counterparts to develop low-enriched uranium fuel for this reactor. 

Dr. Kuperman does not identify in his petition how this export violates section 134(a). 

Instead, he maintains that failing to limit the export would undermine the general policy 

underlying the Schumer Amendment by exacerbating the risk that European operators will 

continue to delay conversion to low-enriched uranium.41 Dr. Kuperman asserts that authorizing 

such a large export of HEU is contrary to the spirit of the Schumer Amendment (if not the 

technical criteria) because it could be viewed as promoting HEU use in Europe. 

As previously noted, NNSA and its European counterparts already have an active 

program—the “HERACLES” program—under way to develop low-enriched uranium that can be 

used in research reactors such as the Institut Laue-Langevin’s High-Flux Reactor. But this 

alternative fuel will not be ready until 2027, as technical efforts to develop low-enriched fuel for 

this High-Flux Reactor are ongoing. Because this proposed export would supply the reactor 

until only 2023, the reactor will not be receiving all the HEU it needs prior to conversion. Dr. 

Kuperman’s concern, therefore, that this export could push back the date of the expected 

conversion is misplaced—even after this export the Institut Laue-Langevin will still need more 

HEU. Nor would this export provide the Institut Laue-Langevin or Europe as a whole with a 

disincentive to convert to low-enriched uranium. The Executive Branch’s views confirm that the 

Institut Laue-Langevin and its European partners are fully committed to converting to lowenriched uranium fuel. 

 

41 Petition at 15-16, 19. 
- 12 - 

Further, in December 2014, DOE and the Euratom Supply Agency entered into a 

Memorandum of Understanding whereby Euratom committed to further minimize HEU use in 

Europe by either sending excess un-irradiated HEU back to the United States or downblending 

it in Euratom member states. The Executive Branch’s views note that under the auspices of this 

2014 agreement—as well as the Joint Statement issued at the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit— 

Europe will offset this proposed export by returning a greater amount of HEU back to the United 

States.42 Therefore, from an HEU-minimization standpoint, the proposed export does not 

undermine the Schumer Amendment’s objective of shifting away from HEU use oversees for 

non-military purposes. Accordingly, we are not persuaded by Dr. Kuperman’s view that this 

export undermines the Schumer Amendment, and we find that the section 134 criteria are 

satisfied. 

C. Noninimicality Finding 

Finally, we must also determine under section 57c(2) of the AEA that the proposed 

export will not be “inimical to the common defense and security” of the United States.43 Here, 

Dr. Kuperman raises two arguments that suggest inimicality concerns with this proposed export. 

First, Dr. Kuperman asserts that Commission approval of the pending export application would 

lead to unnecessary risks resulting from shipping a large quantity of weapons-grade nuclear 

material.44 This, Dr. Kuperman states, raises the risk that terrorists or “rogue states” could 

attempt to intercept the export. Second, Dr. Kuperman maintains that this export could lead to a 

 

42 The text of the Joint Statement can be found here: http://www.nss2016.org/document-centerdocs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-eu-us-heu-exchange (last visited August 18, 2016).

43 42 U.S.C. § 2077(c)(2); see also 10 C.F.R. § 110.42(a)(8). 

44 Petition at 19-20. 
- 13 - 

stockpiling of HEU abroad and thus be contrary to longstanding U.S. foreign policy objectives.45 

We address each argument in turn. 

Dr. Kuperman is correct that any shipment of weapons-grade nuclear material entails 

some risk of diversion. Yet we note that the diversion or interception risk is especially minimal 

when the shipment is being conducted by a military transport, as is the case here. Further, 

upon close inspection, we conclude that increasing the number of HEU shipments—as Dr. 

Kuperman prefers—would serve to increase those risks rather than decrease them. Additional 

shipments increase the amount of planning effort and would therefore increase the risk that 

sensitive shipment information could be compromised. Increasing the number of shipments 

could also establish a pattern that would enable potential adversaries to collect intelligence and 

then execute an attempt to intercept a subsequent shipment. And additional shipments would 

increase the probability of equipment failure. This conclusion is buttressed by the Executive 

Branch’s views, which likewise conclude that breaking this proposed export into many 

shipments would increase security risks. Accordingly, we do not agree that this export poses 

unreasonable diversion risks. 

Dr. Kuperman further argues that the proposed export of a multi-year supply of HEU is 

significantly in excess of the end user’s needs and raises stockpiling concerns. Dr. Kuperman, 

therefore, asserts that this export would be contrary to previous Commission precedent and 

longstanding U.S. foreign policy objectives.46 As a preliminary matter, Dr. Kuperman notes 

previous export licenses that authorized only a one-year supply of HEU.47 Yet those export 

 

45 Id. at 16-17, 19-20. 

46 Id. at 19. 

47 Id. at 11. Specifically, Dr. Kuperman references License Nos. XSNM-3708, XSNM-3726, 

XSNM-3729, XSNM-3730, XSNM-3745, XSNM-3730-1, XSNM-3729-1, XSNM-3752, XSNM3755, and XSNM-3756. 
- 14 - 

licenses were for medical-isotope targets rather than research reactor fuel. Fuel for research 

reactors entails longer fabrication timelines. And research reactors’ fuel requirements tend to 

be more stable and predictable over longer periods of time compared to medical-isotope 

targets—thereby rendering research reactors more suitable to large shipments of HEU 

compared to medical-isotope production. In fact, we previously decided to authorize the export 

of a three-to-five year supply of HEU to the Institut Laue-Langevin’s High-Flux Reactor.48

Although Dr. Kuperman is correct that our precedent generally discourages exports in 

excess of the end user’s actual needs,49 we disagree that this proposed export would actually 

exceed the reactor’s needs and lead to stockpiling. The High-Flux Reactor’s core features a 

single element composed of several hundred thin involute plates manufactured to exact 

tolerances. The associated fuel fabrication process is therefore highly complex—and it contains 

the very real possibility that some fuel will either be rejected during fabrication or fail during 

reactor operation. Fuel contingencies, therefore, serve as a reasonable hedge against fuel 

failure and provide a basis for exporting more than a one-year supply of HEU. Further, as noted 

above, the reactor will require HEU until at least 2027. Even assuming that no fuel failure 

occurs, this export would not be sufficient to satisfy the Institut Laue-Langevin’s annual 

requirement for HEU until it is able to convert to LEU; accordingly, this proposed export would 

not result in excess HEU that is susceptible to misuse. 

Finally, Dr. Kuperman expresses concern that the reactor could shut down prematurely, 

thus leaving a stockpile of HEU in Europe that could be used to undermine U.S. non-

 

48 License No. XSNM-3633 authorized the export of almost 150 kilograms of HEU to the Institut 

Laue-Langevin’s High-Flux Reactor—DOE/NNSA shipped this material in 2012. 

49 See Transnuclear, Inc., CLI-00-16, 52 NRC at 76 (noting that the requested export license 

gave the Commission the ability to monitor the conversion process and thus adjust the license 

as necessary to avoid the potential accumulation of HEU fuel significantly in excess of the 

reactor's actual needs). 
- 15 - 

proliferation policy.50 This, Dr. Kuperman states, provides an additional reason to limit the 

export to a one-year supply. We recognize the possibility that a nuclear reactor may need to 

shut down before planned decommissioning.51 But Dr. Kuperman’s second point—that an 

unexpected reactor shutdown would necessarily lead to a stockpile of fuel in Europe—does not 

necessarily follow from the first. At the 2016 Nuclear Security Summit, the United States and 

European Union issued a Joint Statement on HEU Exchange.52 This Joint Statement 

significantly enhanced United States-European cooperation efforts so that Europe now has a 

strong incentive to repatriate any excess or unused HEU back to the United States in the 

unlikely event of a premature shutdown. Given this cooperative international framework, the 

possibility that other European end users could end up obtaining and using this fuel due to the 

High-Flux Reactor shutting down is very low.53

For these reasons, we find that the proposed export would not be inimical to the 

common defense and security of the United States. 

 

50 Petition at 16-17. 

51 According to the Executive Branch views, the Institut Laue-Langevin’s High-Flux Reactor is a 

relatively young reactor with a strong safety record, well-defined mission, and strong financial 

backing, which reduces the likelihood of an unexpected shutdown. 

52 The text of the Joint Statement can be found here: http://www.nss2016.org/document-centerdocs/2016/4/1/joint-statement-on-eu-us-heu-exchange (last visited August 18, 2016). 

53 The incident that Dr. Kuperman references on pages 11-12 of his petition occurred before this 

recent strengthening of U.S.-European cooperation regarding HEU. 
- 16 - 

VI. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons stated above, we find that a hearing in this matter would not be in the 

public interest and would not assist us in making the required statutory and regulatory 

determinations. We further determine that the proposed export satisfies all applicable exportlicensing criteria and that issuing this export license would not be inimical to the common 

defense and security of the United States. Accordingly, we deny Dr. Kuperman’s request for a 

hearing and petition to intervene and direct the Office of International Programs to issue License 

No. XSNM3757 to DOE/NNSA for the export of up to 130 kilograms of highly enriched uranium. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

For the Commission 

NRC SEAL /RA/ 

 ____________________________ 

 Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

 Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 

this 5th day of October 2016. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ) 

 ) 

 ) Docket No. 11006187 

(High-Enriched Uranium Export License) ) 

 ) 

 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

 

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI16-15) have been served upon the following persons by Electronic Information Exchange.

Office of Commission Appellate 

 Adjudication 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

E-mail: ocaamail@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Mail Stop O-16C1 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Hearing Docket 

E-mail: hearingdocket@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the General Counsel 

Mail Stop - O-15 D21 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Email: ogcmailcenter.resource@nrc.gov

 

Zachary R. Stern, Esq. 

National Nuclear Security Administration 

Office of the General Counsel 

1000 Independence Ave., S.W. 

Washington, DC 20585 

E-mail: zachary.stern@nnsa.doe.gov

Alan J. Kuperman, Ph.d. 

University of Texas at Austin 

Austin, TX 78712 

E-mail: akuperman@mail.utexas.edu

[Original signed by Herald M. Speiser ] 

 Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 

this 5th day of October, 2016