UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

COMMISSIONERS: 

Stephen G. Burns, Chairman 

Kristine L. Svinicki 

William C. Ostendorff 

Jeff Baran 

_________________________________________ 

 ) 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR 

 ) 50-286-LR 

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3) ) 

_________________________________________ ) 

CLI-16-07 

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 

This proceeding concerns the application of Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. to renew 

the operating licenses for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Units 2 and 3. Following an 

evidentiary hearing, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued Partial Initial Decision 

LBP-13-13, resolving nine contentions.1 The State of New York petitioned for review of 

LBP-13-13 to the extent that the decision resolved contention NYS-12C, an environmental 

contention.2 New York also petitioned for review of a subsequent Board order that declined to 

reconsider LBP-13-13 or reopen the hearing record on NYS-12C.3 Earlier this year, we granted 

 

1 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC 246 (2013). 

2 State of New York Petition for Review of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Decision 

LBP-13-13 with Respect to Consolidated Contention NYS-12C (Feb. 14, 2014) (Petition). 

3 State of New York Petition for Review of Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s April 1, 2014 

Decision Denying the State’s Motion to Reopen the Record and for Reconsideration of the
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review of New York’s petitions for review and, given the complex technical arguments involving 

NYS-12C, we directed the parties to provide further briefing on several questions.4 Our decision 

today is focused on the Board’s resolution of NYS-12C.5 As discussed below, we reverse 

LBP-13-13 as it relates to NYS-12C and direct the Staff to supplement the Indian Point Severe 

Accident Mitigation Alternatives (SAMA) analysis with sensitivity analyses. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Below we describe briefly the purpose and nature of the SAMA analysis, New York’s 

arguments challenging the analysis, and the Board’s decision. 

A. The Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis 

In NYS-12C, New York challenged the SAMA analysis for the Indian Point license 

renewal application. A SAMA analysis is a mitigation analysis performed pursuant to the 

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NRC environmental regulations for license renewal 

require a site-specific severe accident mitigation alternatives analysis if one was not previously 

performed.6

 

Board’s November 27, 2013 Partial Initial Decision Concerning Consolidated Contention 

NYS-12C (Apr. 28, 2014) (Petition for Review of April 1, 2014 Board Decision). 

4 See CLI-15-2, 81 NRC 213 (2015). 

5 We likewise took review of LBP-11-17 and LBP-10-13, both of which addressed Contention 

NYS-35/36; we will address those appeals in a separate decision. We also received petitions 

for review of LBP-13-13 insofar as the decision resolved two other contentions, NYS-8 

(regarding transformers) and CW-EC-3A (regarding environmental justice). Our decision in 

CLI-15-6 addressed those contentions. See CLI-15-6, 81 NRC 340 (2015). 

6 See 10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L). The NRC’s Generic Environmental Impact Statement 

(GEIS) for license renewal contains a generic analysis of the environmental impacts of severe 

accidents. The GEIS analysis is bounding for all reactors, and therefore license renewal 

applicants need not provide a site-specific analysis of severe accident environmental impacts. 

The complete GEIS is included in the record as Exs. NYS00131A-I, “Generic Environmental 

Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants,” NUREG-1437 (May 1996). The 

generic severe accident impacts analysis appears at id., Vol. 1, Main Report, Final Report, at 

5-12 to 5-116. The NRC issued a revised GEIS in June 2013, after the evidentiary hearing. 
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A SAMA analysis seeks to identify additional measures—hardware or procedures—that 

could be installed or implemented to reduce severe accident risk. The Staff’s practice to date 

has been to conduct this NEPA mitigation analysis in the form of a quantitative cost-benefit 

analysis, comparing the benefits (e.g., averted accident risks) of specific mitigation measures 

against their implementation costs. The Staff’s practice also has been to conduct the analysis 

as a probabilistic risk assessment, where the probabilities of different accident scenarios are 

taken into account. The SAMA analysis, therefore, is a probability-weighted assessment of the 

benefits of mitigation alternatives that may reduce risk by reducing the probability or 

consequences (or both) of potential severe accidents. These probability-weighted benefits are 

then compared with the implementation costs of the mitigation alternatives. 

Of note, none of the mitigation alternatives evaluated in the SAMA analysis are 

measures the agency has deemed necessary for safety. They are supplemental to mitigation 

capabilities our safety regulations already require. As an ongoing matter, the NRC oversees the 

safety of reactor operations pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and may 

require licensees to implement new mitigation measures whenever warranted to assure 

adequate protection of public health and safety. The NEPA mitigation analysis conducted for 

license renewal helps to identify additional measures that may further reduce plant risk beyond 

that necessary for adequate protection of public health and safety. 

Probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) is used in the SAMA analysis to calculate the 

probabilities and consequences of severe reactor accidents. PRA is carried out at three levels. 

The first is a probabilistic risk assessment of accident sequences that may lead to reactor core 

damage (Level 1 PRA). The second takes the output of the Level 1 PRA and examines 

accident progression leading to failure of the containment and release of radionuclides to the 

environment (Level 2 PRA). The third takes the results of the Level 2 PRA and goes on to 

estimate the potential offsite consequences (Level 3 PRA). 
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For the Level 3 portion of the SAMA analysis, the Staff has long used the MACCS2 

computer code to calculate estimated offsite consequences (population doses and economic 

losses) for a spectrum of hypothetical severe reactor accidents modeled in the Level 1 and 

Level 2 PRA. In the case of Indian Point, for example, eight different categories of accidents or 

“bins” were modeled in the offsite consequence portion of the SAMA analysis, each 

representing a particular mix, amount, and timing of source term release.7 For each designated 

accident category, the code models how the released radioactive material would be transported 

and dispersed in hypothetical severe reactor accidents occurring at any time over a year of 

potential weather scenarios (based on site-specific weather data for a representative year). 

Typically, the SAMA analysis follows NRC cost-benefit analysis guidance documents.8

Consequences are evaluated over a 50-mile radius area surrounding the nuclear power plant, 

divided into sixteen compass wind directions, and further divided into sequential rings reflecting 

incremental distances from the plant. For each accident scenario run, the MACCS2 code 

calculates the estimated concentration of the radioactive isotopes that would be deposited in 

each sector or “grid element” of the 50-mile radius map.9 This mapping is run for all of the 

potential hourly weather that might occur over the course of a year. A representative year of 

site-specific hourly weather data (e.g., wind velocity and direction, atmospheric stability 

category, and precipitation intensity) are entered as inputs. 

Data inputs for the offsite consequence analysis also include the population data for the 

50-mile radius region (projected for the year 2035 for Indian Point), reactor core radionuclide 

 

7 See Environmental Report, attached as Appendix E to License Application (Exs. ENT00015AB), at E.1-93, E.3-87) (accident categories modeled with MACCS2 code ranged from NCF (no 

containment failure) to EARLY HIGH (early and high release)). 

8 See NUREG/BR-0058, Rev. 4, “Regulatory Analysis Guidelines” (Sept. 2004) (ML042820192); 

NUREG/BR-0184, “Regulatory Analysis Technical Evaluation Handbook” (Jan. 1997) 

(ML050190193). 

9 See, e.g., Tr. at 1929-31. 
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inventory data, source term and release characteristics, and a large number of economic input 

data, including average county-wide farm wealth and non-farm wealth, population evacuation 

and relocation costs, depreciation costs for interdicted property, losses from banned agricultural 

products, and decontamination costs. Applying the population data, economic cost data, and 

other relevant inputs to the results of the plume modeling, the code calculates the estimated 

offsite costs (population dose and economic consequences) for the spectrum of accident 

scenarios evaluated. Population dose is converted to a monetary value through use of an NRCrecommended monetary conversion value (currently $2,000 per person/rem). All accident costs 

estimated in the analysis are probability-weighted, and therefore the frequencies of the various 

accident scenarios occurring (e.g., the particular combination of accident scenario, source term 

release, and weather) are factored into the analysis results. 

We have emphasized that the SAMA analysis results are not based on either best-case 

or worst-case accident scenarios, but on “mean accident consequence values, averaged over 

the many hypothetical severe accident scenarios (with an additional uncertainty analysis also 

performed).”10 More specifically, for each accident category evaluated, the SAMA analysis 

takes the mean annual consequences (mean total offsite dose and mean total offsite economic 

costs) over the examined 50-mile radius and multiplies these by the estimated frequency of the 

accident scenario occurring to obtain the population dose risk (PDR) and offsite economic cost 

risk (OECR), which the Board appropriately identified as the “key risk values of interest for 

determining potentially cost-beneficial SAMAs.”11 To identify those mitigation measures that 

may be cost-beneficial to implement, the SAMA cost-benefit analysis compares the cost of 

 

10 See, e.g., Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim 

Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-15, 75 NRC 704, 708 & n.12 (2012). 

11 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 461; Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear 

Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station), CLI-12-1, 75 NRC 39, 53-54 (2012). 
- 6 - 

implementing a new mitigation measure with its assessed potential to reduce severe accident 

risk. 

B. Decontamination Modeling 

Of particular interest in the Indian Point SAMA litigation are two inputs to the MACCS2 

code: TIMDEC and CDNFRM. The TIMDEC input value defines the time required for 

completing decontamination to a specified degree or level. The longer the TIMDEC, the longer 

evacuated residents would remain away from their homes pending decontamination efforts and 

the more dose decontamination workers would receive, both of which entail costs assessed in 

the SAMA analysis. The CDNFRM input parameter defines the cost (on a per person basis) of 

decontaminating non-farmland to a specified level. To obtain the cost of decontaminating nonfarmland areas, the code multiplies the specified CDNFRM parameter by the population residing 

in the areas (“grid elements”) requiring decontamination.12

Both decontamination time and decontamination cost are used in conjunction with 

specified levels of decontamination called dose reduction factors (DSRFCT).13 

Decontamination levels specify the effectiveness of the decontamination effort. A dose 

reduction factor of 3, for example, means the population dose will be reduced by a factor of 3 

(approximately 66%) compared to the radiological dose before cleanup. Similarly, a dose 

reduction factor of 15 reflects a reduction in population dose by a factor of 15 (approximately 

93%) compared to the dose before cleanup.14 As the MACCS2 code user’s guide describes, 

 

12 See Ex. NYS000243, “Code Manual for MACCS2, User’s Guide,” NUREG/CR-6613, Vol. 1 

(May 1998), at 7-9 to 7-11 (MACCS2 User’s Guide). The decontamination costs relating to 

farmland are assessed on a per hectare basis and were not challenged in this proceeding. 

13 Id. at 7-9. Decontamination levels sometimes are referred to as decontamination factors 

(DF). See id. at 7-3. In this case, the Staff and New York often referred to the decontamination 

levels as decontamination factors. 

14 Id. at 7-11. 
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the “objective of decontamination is to reduce projected doses below the long-term dose 

criterion in a cost-effective manner.”15 Each decontamination level modeled in the code 

“represents an alternative strategy” for reducing population dose.16

The more heavily contaminated an area, the greater the decontamination effectiveness 

will need to be to reduce the projected radiological doses to a habitable level. Areas that are 

less contaminated may only require decontamination to achieve a DSRFCT of 3 to reduce 

population doses enough for the population to return, while more heavily contaminated areas 

may require decontamination to a DSRFCT of 15 or more to reduce doses sufficiently to 

achieve the specified habitability criterion. Several factors may bear on the effectiveness of 

decontamination, including the radionuclides to be removed, the type of material being cleaned, 

the methods used, and weather conditions. 

In the code modeling, each decontamination effectiveness level is assigned an 

associated decontamination time and an associated cost. Higher decontamination levels 

typically are assigned a higher decontamination cost, under the assumption that it will cost more 

to achieve a greater degree of cleanup. The code user can specify up to three decontamination 

levels (ranging from 1 to 100) for each accident category analyzed. The Indian Point analysis 

used two decontamination levels (dose reduction factors): 3 and 15, for all of the accident 

categories analyzed, as has been the Staff’s practice for SAMA analyses. We assume those 

levels below. 

In a nutshell, the modeling of decontamination costs involves the following steps. The 

code—by its atmospheric transport and dispersion module—will first model the deposition of 

radionuclides over the 50-mile radius map, depicting concentrations of the different isotopes. 

 

15 Id. at 7-9. 

16 Id. 
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Based on the radionuclide concentrations shown, the modeling will show which grid sectors, if 

any, may be uninhabitable following the particular kinds of accidents analyzed.17 If there are 

uninhabitable sectors, a progressive series of events are modeled. The code will next model, 

for example, what areas if any would be habitable after the lighter decontamination effort of 3 

has reduced population dose by approximately 66%. If the lightest decontamination effort is 

insufficient, the code will go on to model what areas would be habitable following the next 

decontamination level—here level 15, where 93% of the dose is reduced. 

Where even the heaviest decontamination effort specified would be insufficient to reduce 

doses enough to allow residents to return, the code can model an interdiction period, during 

which residents and businesses remain gone and the processes of decay and weathering act to 

reduce dose. If modeling shows that property in an area would not return to a habitable dose 

level even within a maximum interdiction period of 30 years, or, if decontamination and 

interdiction would be more expensive than outright property condemnation, then the code will 

assume that the property is condemned and will assess a cost for the total loss of the property. 

C. Decontamination Time and Cost Inputs Used in the Indian Point SAMA Analysis 

The Indian Point SAMA analysis assumes that to clean up a non-farmland area to a 

decontamination level of 3 will require an average of 60 days at a per person cost of $5,184.18 

To achieve the higher decontamination level of 15, the analysis assumes an average 

decontamination time of 120 days at a per person cost of $13,824.19 It is undisputed that these 

time and cost values were consistent with values used in the NRC-sponsored severe accident 

study NUREG-1150, “Severe Accident Risks: An Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power 

 

17 The code user specifies the habitability criterion (e.g., the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

standard of 2 rem the first year, 0.5 rem for years 2 through 5). 

18 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 459-60. 

19 Id. 
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Plants,” published in 1990.20 NUREG-1150 assessed the risks of severe accidents at nuclear 

power plants by performing probabilistic risk analyses for five plants of varying reactor and 

containment designs (Surry, Zion, Sequoyah, Peach Bottom, and Grand Gulf). 

NUREG-1150 assumed the decontamination times of 60 and 120 days, respectively, for 

the lighter (DSRFCT of 3) and heavier (DSRFCT of 15) decontamination efforts modeled. For 

non-farmland decontamination cost, NUREG-1150 assumed values of $3,000 per person and 

$8,000 per person, respectively, to achieve a DSRFCT of 3 and a DSRFCT of 15. For the 

SAMA analysis, Entergy adjusted these decontamination cost values to account for changes in 

the Consumer Price Index (CPI) from 1986 (during the time of NUREG-1150’s drafting) to 2005, 

when Entergy prepared its Environmental Report.21

D. New York’s Challenge to Decontamination-Related Inputs 

The Board’s decision in LBP-13-13 outlines the procedural history of NYS-12C, which 

we do not repeat here.22 As litigated, NYS-12C read as follows: 

Entergy’s severe accident mitigation alternatives (SAMA) for Indian Point 2 and 3 

does not accurately reflect decontamination and clean up costs associated with a 

severe accident in the New York Metropolitan Area and, therefore, Entergy’s 

SAMA Analysis underestimates the cost of a severe accident in violation of 

10 C.F.R. § 51.53(c)(3)(ii)(L).23

New York argued that the Indian Point SAMA analysis underestimated the economic 

costs of a severe reactor accident at Indian Point by underestimating the costs of 

decontamination. New York presented one expert witness, Dr. François Lemay. Dr. Lemay 

 

20 See, e.g., id. at 460, 463, 469; Tr. at 1951; Ex. NYS00252A-C, “Severe Accident Risks: An 

Assessment for Five U.S. Nuclear Power Plants,” NUREG-1150 (Dec. 1990) (NUREG-1150). 

21 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 463; Tr. at 1951. 

22 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 450-51. The Board’s decision also provides a detailed summary 

of key hearing exhibits and witness testimony. See id. at 454-65. 

23 Id. at 450. 
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argued that the SAMA analysis inappropriately used generic input values taken from a Sample 

Problem in the MACCS2 Code User’s Guide. He stated that the User’s Guide contains fourteen 

sample problems intended for testing whether the code is properly installed, and that the Indian 

Point SAMA analysis adopts “all but three of the MACCS2 input values related to 

decontamination” from Sample Problem A, only adjusting “those inputs for inflation” from 1986-

based dollars to 2005-based dollars.24 He stated—and no party disputes—that Sample 

Problem A “incorporates site-specific data for the Surry” reactor site in Virginia, data that was 

used in the NUREG-1150 severe accident study.25

Dr. Lemay testified that the generic values adopted from NUREG-1150 were unrealistic, 

“given current known decontamination data and the complexities of an urban to hyper-urban 

area such as that surrounding” Indian Point.26 He pointed to the accidents at Chernobyl and 

Fukushima as examples of the complex and time-consuming nature of large-scale 

decontamination following a severe reactor accident.27 Dr. Lemay claimed that the 

decontamination times assumed in the Indian Point SAMA analysis are “unreasonable and have 

not been justified with supportive evidence.”28 He further argued that the underlying factual 

basis for the non-farm decontamination cost parameters used in NUREG-1150 and adopted for 

the Indian Point SAMA analysis comes from a document that “does not appear to exist in a 

 

24 See Ex. NYS000241, Pre-Filed Written Testimony of Dr. Francois J. Lemay Regarding 

Consolidated NYS-12C (Dec. 21, 2011), at 21-22 (New York Testimony). 

25 Id. As Entergy’s experts described, “Entergy relied on Sample Problem A [input] values 

insofar as those values are based on, and coincide with, the relevant values in NUREG-1150”; 

Entergy “updated those input values using the CPI ratio for 1986 to 2005.” Ex. ENT000450, 

Testimony of Entergy Witnesses Lori Potts, Kevin O’Kula, and Grant Teagarden on 

Consolidated Contention NYS-12C (Mar. 30, 2012), at 59-60 (Entergy Testimony). 

26 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 462. 

27 Id.; Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 52-54. 

28 Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 54. 
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published form” and is unavailable for review, and therefore is “not a reliable source upon which 

experts . . . would base any findings.”29

Dr. Lemay stated that International Safety Research, Inc. (ISR) performed a sensitivity 

analysis to determine the MACCS2 code offsite consequence inputs most likely to have an 

impact on the Indian Point SAMA analysis’s offsite economic cost risk.30 Based on ISR’s 

analysis, Dr. Lemay testified that “decontamination costs are the dominant factor in the . . . 

remediation costs following a severe accident,” and that the “most sensitive input parameters 

related to decontamination costs include [the] decontamination factor, non-farm 

decontamination cost, and decontamination time.”31 Dr. Lemay claimed that the SAMA analysis 

underestimates the total economic costs of a severe accident at Indian Point “largely due to 

Entergy’s use of costs and times for decontamination” that are unrealistic for the site.32

Dr. Lemay also claimed that where “there is very little data on actual severe reactor 

accidents in a hyper-urban area such as NYC, research must be done” to determine an 

appropriate range of input values.33 He stated that ISR developed a methodology and used four 

different approaches to calculate a reasonable range of input values for the Indian Point 

analysis “by extrapolating data from other types of nuclear accidents, field radiological 

decontamination work, and actual decontamination experiments.”34 Dr. Lemay claimed that the 

 

29 Ex. NYS000420, Pre-Filed Written Rebuttal Testimony of Dr. François J. Lemay Regarding 

Consolidated Contention NYS-12C (June 29, 2012), at 24 (New York Rebuttal Testimony). 

30 Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 23-27; LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 462 n.1504. Dr. 

Lemay is a Vice President of ISR. 

31 Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 27. 

32 Id. at 9-10. 

33 Id. at 20. 

34 Id. 
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ISR report’s alternative ranges of input values were not “intended to be an alternative SAMA 

analysis” for Indian Point, but reflected a comparative “benchmarking” exercise to assess the 

reasonableness of the decontamination cost inputs used in the SAMA analysis by comparing 

them to “values calculated from data produced by other analysts in the field.”35 Dr. Lemay 

stated that under all four methodology approaches the results showed much higher per person 

decontamination cost values than those used in the Indian Point analysis.36

As to decontamination time, Dr. Lemay testified that based on decontamination plans 

and reports from Fukushima, a “minimum TIMDEC of 1 year is justifiable by the recent reports” 

for light decontamination, and a “minimum TIMDEC of 2 years for heavy decontamination is also 

reasonable,” while upper bound maximum decontamination times for light and heavy 

decontamination could be 15 years and 30 years, respectively.37 Dr. Lemay claimed that an 

“average” time value for severe accident decontamination would fall “somewhere between” 

these proposed minimum and maximum time values.38

In response to New York, Staff experts testified that NYS-12C did not raise any “valid 

issues that would materially impact the Indian Point” SAMA analysis.39 Dr. Nathan Bixler of 

Sandia National Laboratories claimed that Dr. Lemay’s methodology and estimated 

decontamination costs for Indian Point “tend to be biased toward the worst accident scenarios 

 

35 Ex. NYS000420, New York Rebuttal Testimony, at 5-6. 

36 See Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 31-51; Ex. NYS000430, “Revisions to Tables in 

ISR Report 13014-01-01” (June 29, 2012), at Table 13 (New York Revised Tables). 

37 See Ex. NYS000420, New York Rebuttal Testimony, at 48-51. 

38 Id. at 51. 

39 See Ex. NRC000041, NRC Staff Testimony of Nathan E. Bixler, S. Tina Ghosh, Joseph A. 

Jones, and Donald G. Harrison Concerning NYS’ Contentions NYS 12/16 (Mar. 30, 2012), at 

12-14 (Staff Testimony). 
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and for the worst environmental conditions.”40 The Staff and Entergy criticized as overconservative or otherwise inappropriate assumptions made in all four of the modeling 

approaches used in the ISR report to estimate decontamination cost values for the Indian Point 

area.41 The Staff’s experts stated that “Dr. Lemay’s suggested clean-up times are skewed to 

the worst case severe accident scenarios under some of the worst case conditions for 

implementing a clean-up and cannot represent the multitude of clean-up scenarios modeled in a 

SAMA analysis.”42

The Staff and Entergy explained that they chose the same decontamination time 

parameters and same (unescalated) non-farm decontamination cost parameters that had been 

used in the NUREG-1150 severe accident study.43 Entergy described NUREG-1150 as a 

seminal study that “greatly enhanced the understanding of risk at nuclear power plants,” was 

used to support the NRC’s Generic Environmental Impact Statement for license renewal, and 

along with its supporting technical documentation in NUREG/CR-4551, “continue[s] to be used 

as appropriate benchmarks today for PRA in the U.S. commercial power reactor industry.”44

Entergy also highlighted the “peer review quality of the work” involved with the NUREG1150 study.45 Entergy called the “use of the NUREG-1150/Sample Problem A values at issue 

here . . . standard for Level 3 PRA studies (including SAMA analyses) performed in the U.S.”46 

 

40 Id. at 31. 

41 See id. at 69-88. 

42 Id. at 90. 

43 See Tr. at 2241, 2247, 2249, 2250. 

44 See Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 22. 

45 See Tr. at 2034; 2369-71; Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 13. 

46 Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 61. 
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In short, Entergy claimed that these are “values with a well-established technical pedigree that 

is widely recognized and accepted by the PRA community” and that “warrants their continued 

use in NRC-related PRA/SAMA analysis applications.”47

E. Board’s Decision in LBP-13-13 

The Board’s decision focused on the TIMDEC and CDNFRM input parameters because 

Dr. Lemay had stressed that they were the most significant of the challenged inputs and indeed 

were the “crux of the matter.”48 The Board found the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values 

“reasonable and appropriate for Indian Point,” satisfying the requirements of NEPA.49 The 

Board also found the SAMA analysis reasonably site-specific, given that the non-farm 

decontamination cost parameter is applied on a per capita basis, an approach the Board found 

reasonably accounted for the “site-specific high population density of New York City and the 

correspondingly high density of buildings.”50

In addressing the reasonableness of the decontamination time inputs, the Board traced 

the “genesis” of the 60-day and 120-day decontamination time values to a 1984 report, 

NUREG/CR-3673, “Economic Risks of Nuclear Power Reactor Accidents,” issued by Sandia 

National Laboratories.51 As the Board described, NUREG/CR-3673 estimated that it would take 

an average of “90 days with approximately 46,000 workers” to “restore habitability to an area 

after the most severe type of reactor accident.”52 The Board went on to explain that, based on 

 

47 Id. at 13, 61. 

48 Tr. at 2054-55; LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 459, 462 n.1504. 

49 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 465. 

50 Id. at 467. 

51 Id. at 469; see also Tr. at 2241-46; Ex. NRC000058, “Economic Risks of Nuclear Power 

Reactor Accidents,” Sandia National Laboratories, NUREG/CR-3673 (May 1984). 

52 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469; see also Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 6-25. The 

category of accident referenced was an “SST1” accident, described as a “severe core-melt 
- 15 - 

this 90-day estimate, the NUREG-1150 study “adopted 60 days and 120 days . . . as the 

average times to be expected to achieve dose reduction factors of 3 and 15, respectively, when 

examining a wide spectrum of severe accident scenarios.”53

Concluding that “the NRC has examined decontamination times for more than 37 years” 

and “the origin of the 90-day decontamination time (and the related 60-day and 120-day values) 

is known and reviewable and based upon an average over a wide spectrum of severe accident 

scenarios,” the Board found it appropriate for the SAMA analysis to have used the “60-day and 

120-day average decontamination time values from NUREG-1150.”54 The Board stressed that 

the SAMA analysis is not intended to “model a single radiological release event under specific 

conditions at a single moment in time,” but to “estimate annual average impacts for the entire 

50-mile radius study area.”55 Citing to Staff testimony, the Board found the time values 

reasonable “given the need to develop a decontamination time representative of all possible 

severe accident scenarios.”56 The Board did not address New York’s arguments on 

decontamination times at Fukushima, but it found inappropriate New York’s example of 

decontamination times from the Chernobyl accident because Chernobyl represented “a single 

scenario of an extreme case,” and “[i]f it were possible to use it along with case/scenario-

 

accident which results in a rapid, large release of radioactive material to the environment,” and a 

“release of approximately 100% of the reactor core inventory of noble gases and ~50% of the 

volatile radionuclides in a very short time period.” See Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 2-

7. 

53 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469. 

54 Id. at 469-70. 

55 Id. at 470 (quotation omitted). 

56 Id. 
- 16 - 

specific [decontamination times] its inclusion in the SAMA analysis would require weighting it by 

its low probability of occurrence.”57

The Board also found reasonable the non-farm decontamination cost (CDNFRM) 

parameters, although the underlying “source” of those values was unavailable for review.58 The 

Board described how the CDNFRM values used in NUREG-1150 ($3,000/person for 

decontamination level of 3 and $8,000/person for decontamination level of 15) stem from 

decontamination cost estimates provided in NUREG/CR-3673, the same 1984 economic risk 

study referenced in support of the decontamination time inputs.59 In turn, NUREG/CR-3673’s 

cost estimates were “taken from a detailed review of decontamination effectiveness and costs 

performed at Sandia National Laboratories.”60 The Board specified that this review was an 

“unpublished report by Robert Ostmeyer and Gene Runkle” (Os84 or the Ostmeyer Report). 61 

None of the parties were able to locate Os84. 

Citing to Staff and Entergy expert testimony, the Board stated that the CDNFRM 

parameters used in NUREG-1150 are “standard for SAMA analyses,” “all prior NRC license 

renewal applicants have used these same values (as appropriately escalated) in their SAMA 

analyses,” and “the key economic inputs were vetted before their inclusion in NUREG-1150.”62 

The Board concluded that the economic input parameters were “reviewed and a best estimate 

 

57 Id. at 469. 

58 Id. at 471. 

59 Id. at 472; see also Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 4-15, 4-17 to 4-19. 

60 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 472 (quoting Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 4-15). 

61 Id. The full citation to the review is “Ostmeyer, R.M., and G.E. Runkle, ‘An Assessment of 

Decontamination Costs and Effectiveness for Accident Radiological Releases,’ Albuquerque, 

N.M.: Sandia National Laboratories, to be published.” See Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, 

at 8-8 (referencing “Os84”). 

62 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 471. 
- 17 - 

was recommended during the NUREG-1150 peer review process,” and the Staff was “justified in 

relying on the secondary peer reviews of the economic cost variables.”63 The Board moreover 

stressed that Entergy and Staff witnesses had testified that they also specifically had considered 

and deemed appropriate use of the NUREG-1150 values in the Indian Point SAMA analysis.64 

Noting that not “all uncertainties” needed to be resolved in a NEPA analysis, and highlighting 

the “level of review of NUREG-1150 and its predecessor documents,” the Board found the 

CDNFRM values reasonable.65

II. ANALYSIS 

In CLI-15-2, we granted review of the Board’s decision as to NYS-12C, and directed the 

parties to provide additional briefing on specific questions.66 While typically we decline to 

second-guess the Board on its fact-specific conclusions, here the decision contains obvious 

material factual errors and could be misleading, warranting clarification.67 We find that the 

SAMA analysis and the Board’s decision insufficiently address uncertainty in the Indian Point 

CDNFRM and TIMDEC inputs—uncertainty shown by New York to have a potential to affect the 

SAMA analysis cost-benefit conclusions. We conclude, as a NEPA matter, that the analysis 

should be buttressed by additional sensitivity analysis. 

 

63 Id. at 473. 

64 Id. 

65 Id. at 474. 

66 We also allowed the State of Connecticut to file an amicus brief in response to our questions, 

which it did. Connecticut’s Response to the Commission’s Memorandum and Order of February 

18, 2015 (CLI-15-2), Regarding Contention NYS-12C (Mar. 30, 2015). We have reviewed 

Connecticut’s brief. Those claims that fell within the scope of this proceeding are encompassed 

by our decision. See also Amicus Brief of the Attorney General of Connecticut (Feb. 14, 2014).

67 See, e.g., Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc. (Millstone Power Station, Unit 3), CLI-02-22, 56 

NRC 213, 222 (2002); see also 10 C.F.R. § 2.341(b)(4). 
- 18 - 

This decision involved a balancing of considerations. As the Board noted, not all 

uncertainties need be resolved. Further, there is no requirement in NEPA or our SAMA rule for 

the Staff to perform a detailed three-level PRA analysis for the license renewal SAMA analysis, 

although that is how the Staff by longstanding practice and guidance has conducted the 

analysis. Having performed such an analysis, however, the Staff’s choice of input values is 

subject to challenge under NEPA standards. 

We long have emphasized that the SAMA analysis computer modeling involves 

thousands of code inputs, and that it will always “be possible to conceive of yet another” 

alternative input “that could have been used, and in fact “many different inputs and approaches 

may all be reasonable choices” for the analysis.68 That the analysis can be performed with 

more conservative inputs, therefore, does not render it deficient. NEPA is satisfied so long as 

the analysis that was done is reasonable. “[W]here appropriate, full disclosures of any known 

shortcomings in available methodology, disclosure of any incomplete or unavailable information 

and significant uncertainties, and a reasoned evaluation of whether and to what extent these . . . 

considerations credibly could or would alter” the SAMA analysis conclusions should be 

provided.69

Although we are mindful of and reiterate our frequent admonition against needless 

agency effort merely to “fine-tune a NEPA mitigation analysis,”70 here we conclude that NEPA’s 

information-disclosure purpose was not satisfied. New York’s concerns about the TIMDEC and 

CDNFRM input values were not meaningfully addressed in the final supplemental environmental 

impact statement (FSEIS) or the Board’s decision. Our conclusions follow. 

 

 

68 Pilgrim, CLI-12-1, 75 NRC at 57. 

69 Pilgrim, CLI-10-22, 72 NRC at 202, 208-09. 

70 See Pilgrim, CLI-12-1, 75 NRC at 57. 
- 19 - 

A. Input Values and the Spectrum of Modeled Releases 

First, on the issue of decontamination time (the TIMDEC input), the Board erroneously 

refers to an “input requirement of the MACCS2 code for a single average decontamination time 

as an input value”—a single time “which is representative of all possible severe accident 

scenarios.”71 The Board incorrectly emphasized a need for the “selected TIMDEC values” to 

“represent all the modeled severe accidents including ones that require little decontamination.”72 

Yet as we earlier described, the MACCS2 code by design permits a user to select up to three 

different decontamination times—linked to up to three different decontamination effectiveness 

levels—for each of the modeled accident releases or “bins.” 

Simply put, there is no code requirement to use the same decontamination times for the 

entire spectrum of modeled accident categories, from least to most severe. The Staff’s 

longstanding practice has been to use the same two decontamination levels (3 and 15) with the 

same two respective decontamination times (60 days and 120 days) and apply these inputs to 

all of the modeled accident scenarios, but the option exists to select longer decontamination 

times (up to 365 days) for the accident categories that depict higher source term releases. 

Decontamination times longer than the 60-day and 120-day values—up to one year—readily 

could have been applied to the larger accident categories modeled.73 In short, the Board erred 

in concluding that the decontamination time inputs had to represent an “average over all the 

modeled severe accidents.”74

 

71 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470 (emphasis added). 

72 Id.

73 The code as designed allows the user to select TIMDEC values up to 365 days. See Ex. 

NYS000243, MACCS2 User’s Guide, at 7-10. Values longer than a year would require code 

revision. 

74 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470. 
- 20 - 

Much of the testimony in this case indeed revolves around the subject of “averages” and 

“averaging,” a topic warranting clarification. SAMA analysis results necessarily will reflect an 

averaging of sorts because for each modeled accident category the analysis estimates the 

mean consequences over the 50-mile radius area and multiplies those consequences by the 

mean estimated frequency of the accident scenario occurring to calculate the accident risk.75 

This frequency-weighting is performed after the calculation of consequences (population doses 

and economic costs). The frequency-weighted results for the separate modeled accident 

categories are then added together to compute the total risk. By this process the analysis will 

take into account and appropriately weight the very low probabilities of the most severe 

categories. Choosing larger TIMDEC or CDNFRM values (where appropriate) for the larger 

releases does not improperly skew the analysis to more extreme scenarios because the lower 

frequencies of the large releases will be factored in, as Dr. Lemay testified.76

Decontamination time and cost inputs, therefore, should reflect reasonable estimates for 

the level of decontamination effectiveness specified and for the releases that are modeled. 

There is no requirement for the Staff to use a “universal set of average” TIMDEC and CDNFRM 

inputs for modeled scenarios ranging from no containment failure to scenarios involving 

radiological releases comparable to or exceeding that of the Fukushima accident.77 Instead, the 

 

75 Accident frequency for each release scenario modeled is determined in the earlier Level 1 

and Level 2 PRA analyses, whose results feed into the Level 3 offsite consequence portion of 

the analysis. See Tr. at 2194. 

76 See id. at 1937 (inputs “should be best estimate appropriate for the release category we’re 

trying to simulate”), 2178-79, 2186 (“decontamination time ideally should change with the 

release category to make sure that we use reasonable assumptions”). 

77 See NRC Staff’s Response to the Commission’s Memorandum and Order of February 18, 

2015 (CLI-15-2), Regarding Contention NYS-12 (Mar. 30, 2015), at 29 (Staff Response to 

Commission Questions). Judge McDade posed an appropriate question: “At one . . . end of the 

spectrum say you have a Three Mile Island-type of severe accident, at the other end of the 

spectrum you have a Chernobyl-type severe accident, and how, if at all, are the differences 

between those factored into these numbers, or into the SAMA analysis generally.” See Tr. at 
- 21 - 

appropriate consideration is whether the value used with each modeled release reflects a 

reasonable estimate of the average decontamination time or cost that would be associated with 

that release (and decontamination level). 

Further, New York presented evidence that while the most severe releases modeled in 

the Indian Point analysis have the lowest probabilities of occurring, the estimated consequences 

from these releases drive most of the overall offsite economic cost risk calculated in the Indian 

Point analysis. In other words, while the estimated frequencies of these most severe releases 

are quite low, the cost and time inputs assigned to them have a potential to affect the analysis 

results because it is the large economic consequences of the larger release categories that 

contribute the most to the offsite economic cost risk portion of the analysis.78

The Staff argues that because the Indian Point SAMA analysis “modeled severe 

accidents with larger releases than Fukushima,” New York’s “actual complaint appears to be 

that severe accidents should have been accorded greater weight in the SAMA analysis.”79 But 

New York did not challenge the frequency-weighting of the large releases. It challenged the 

choice of the inputs (i.e., the 120-day TIMDEC for heavy decontamination) applied to those 

larger, low-probability releases. New York argued that unless the TIMDEC (and CDNFRM) 

inputs used with the larger releases reflect reasonable estimates for those release scenarios the 

overall calculated consequences may be skewed too low.80 The Board’s decision did not reach 

 

1978 (McDade, J.). The answer, as we discuss here, is that different input values can be 

applied to the different accident categories modeled. 

78 See, e.g., Petition at 28-29; Tr. at 2179-80, 2196. 

79 See NRC Staff’s Answer to “State of New York Petition for Review of Atomic Safety and 

Licensing Board Decision LBP-13-13 with Respect to Consolidated Contention NYS-12C” (Apr. 

28, 2014), at 20 (Staff Answer to New York Petition). 

80 See Tr. at 2196 (“we can’t average the time it takes to decontaminate a trivial or benign 

accident with the time it takes to decontaminate these more severe accidents”); Ex. 

NYS000420, New York Rebuttal Testimony, at 15-16 (“[t]he suggestion by NRC Staff that is 

acceptable to average input parameters over all release categories is wrong.”); Petition at 30 
- 22 - 

this claim because the Board incorrectly assumed that only one set of inputs must be used with 

all modeled releases. 

Whether using larger TIMDEC (and CDNFRM) values with the larger releases modeled 

actually would affect the results of the Indian Point analysis and if so, to what degree, cannot be 

discerned from the current case record. The Staff suggests that there would be no “substantial 

differences” once the low frequencies of such releases are factored in.81 We find, however, that 

New York provided sufficient evidence of a potential for a material effect on the Indian Point 

cost-benefit results if larger values were used for the larger releases. 

B. Evidence on the Input Values 

We turn next to the evidence on the TIMDEC inputs used in the analysis: 60 days for 

light decontamination (effectiveness level 3) and 120 days for heavy decontamination 

(effectiveness level 15). Both were used in the NUREG-1150 severe accident study. As the 

Board described, Staff witnesses testified that these inputs are based on a 90-day “mean” 

decontamination time estimate described in the 1984 report on economic risks of reactor 

accidents, NUREG/CR-3673.82 That report estimated consequences from an “SST1 accident,” 

a category of severe accident defined as resulting in a “release of approximately 100% of the 

reactor core inventory of noble gases and ~50% of the volatile radionuclides in a very short time 

period.”83 The relevant passage from NUREG/CR-3673 reads as follows: 

 

(citing Tr. at 2179-80); State of New York Reply in Support of Petition for Review of Atomic 

Safety and Licensing Board’s November 27, 2013 Partial Initial Decision Concerning 

Consolidated Contention NYS-12C (May 22, 2014), at 10 (New York Reply in Support of 

Petition) (“[u]sing a small TIMDEC value for the severe accident scenarios involving larger 

releases artificially minimizes the accident costs flowing from those scenarios”). 

81 See Staff Response to Commission Questions at 30. 

82 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469. 

83 See Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 2-7. 
- 23 - 

A total of ~11,000 man-years of effort is involved in the decontamination program 

to reduce population exposure from the accident. Based on a mean time to 

completion of 90 days for the decontamination efforts, this program would require 

a work force of ~46,000 men . . . . However, manpower limitations may force an 

extended period for completion of the offsite decontamination program after large 

releases of radioactive material.84

Stressing that the “origin of the 90-day decontamination time” is “known and reviewable” 

and “based upon an average over a wide spectrum of severe accident scenarios,” the Board 

found it “reasonable for Entergy to have adopted the 60-day and 120-day average 

decontamination time values from NUREG-1150 for dose reduction factors of 3 and 15, 

respectively.”85 But NUREG/CR-3673 does not identify the underlying data and reasoning—the 

factual underpinning—for this key 90-day estimate.86 Nor did the Staff or Entergy describe the 

basis of the 90-day time estimate. Contrary to the Board’s conclusion, the actual origin of the 

90-day estimate was never presented or explained. 

Citing to Staff testimony, the Board went on to stress that a “1990 report (i.e., 

NUREG/CR-4551),” which was a companion document to the NUREG-1150 study, “reviewed 

the MACCS2 input parameters used in NUREG-1150, including TIMDEC, and again concluded 

that an ‘average cleanup was expected to take 90 days . . . for this most severe type of reactor 

accident.”87 But the Board failed to identify any part of NUREG/CR-4551 that describes a 

 

84 Id. at 6-25. 

85 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 469-70. Entergy’s experts testified that the 60-day and 120-day 

periods selected for NUREG-1150 essentially reflected lower and upper bound sensitivity cases 

for the 90-day average decontamination period described in NUREG/CR-3673. See, e.g., Ex. 

ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 85-86; Tr. at 2242-43. 

86 The source of the 90-day estimate may be the earlier-referenced Ostmeyer Report, given that 

NUREG/CR-3673 also contains estimates of decontamination labor costs and manpower needs 

that were taken from the Ostmeyer Report, and these labor and manpower estimates bear a 

relationship to decontamination time. See Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 4-19. 

87 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 470 (emphasis added); Ex. NYS000248, “Evaluation of Severe 

Accident Risks: Quantification of Major Input Parameters,” NUREG/CR-4551, SAND86-1309, 

Vol. 2, Rev. 1, Part 7 (Dec. 1990) (NUREG/CR-4551). 
- 24 - 

confirmation of the 90-day decontamination estimate or that reviewed the TIMDEC inputs used 

in NUREG-1150. 

NUREG/CR-4551’s introduction states that it contains a review of “most input 

parameters” used in the offsite consequence analysis of NUREG-1150, and further, that for 

“each parameter reviewed, a best estimate value and an uncertainty range were estimated.”88 

Neither the Staff nor Entergy, however, identified any section of NUREG/CR-4551 that reviews 

or explains the TIMDEC (or CDNFRM) values. We also could not locate any such review. 

Apparently, NUREG/CR-4551 merely lists NUREG/CR-3673 among its references.89 And Dr. 

Lemay stressed that he had found “no description” in NUREG/CR-4551 of how the TIMDEC or 

CDNFRM values were derived.90 We therefore agree with New York that it was a factual error 

for the Board to have relied on NUREG/CR-4551 as support for the TIMDEC values.91

Regarding the non-farmland decontamination cost values (CDNFRM), the Board 

similarly found that the Staff was “justified in relying on the secondary peer reviews of the 

economic cost variables.”92 The Board again relied on NUREG/CR-4551, quoting its 

introduction as evidence that the CDNFRM values specifically were “reviewed and a best 

estimate was recommended during the NUREG-1150 peer review process.”93 Again, however, 

while NUREG/CR-4551 explains most of the MACCS input parameters selected for the 

NUREG-1150 study, no evidence was presented of a review or vetting of the CDNFRM inputs. 

 

88 Ex. NYS000248, NUREG/CR-4551, at 1-1 (emphasis added). 

89 See id. at 5-9 to 5-10. 

90 See Tr. at 2005; see also Ex. NYS000420, New York Rebuttal Testimony, at 21. 

91 See Petition at 20. 

92 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 472. 

93 Id. 
- 25 - 

We know from the case record that the challenged CDNFRM and TIMDEC input values 

were taken from NUREG-1150, and that in turn the NUREG-1150 values were based on 

estimates reported in the earlier study, NUREG/CR-3673. Yet none of the parties were able to 

describe the underlying foundation for these values. The difficulty here is not only that old 

documents such as the referenced Ostmeyer Report were never located, but that no witness 

could provide the technical basis—e.g., the assumptions made and data considered—for key 

economic inputs selected for this cost-benefit analysis.94

Repeatedly, the Staff and Entergy rely on the estimates and related reasoning contained 

in NUREG/CR-3673.95 That reliance is why the missing underlying assumptions for 

NUREG/CR-3673 are relevant. In support of the CDNFRM values, for example, Mr. O’Kula 

testified that the NUREG/CR-3673 decontamination cost estimates incorporated a “multitude of 

possible [decontamination] methods . . . and have been weighted to account for residential, 

commercial and industrial and public use land areas [based] on national average statistics.”96 

But as Judge Kennedy remarked, this “open[s] up the question” of “what type of land use was 

used in this study.” 97 The Staff and Entergy experts did not describe what “average statistics” 

 

94 The Board stated that NUREG/CR-3673 was not “necessarily an unreliable source,” given 

that the authors “had access to the Ostmeyer report when they prepared” it and that “Dr. 

Ostmeyer provided technical assistance and advice during the preparation of NUREG/CR3673.” See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 472-73. But this tells us only that the NUREG/CR-3673 

authors understood the Ostmeyer Report conclusions. It does not shed light on the basis for 

those conclusions or their continued applicability to the Indian Point analysis today. 

95 See, e.g., Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 57, 84-85, 87-88; Ex. NRC000041, Staff 

Testimony, at 90; Tr. at 2014. 

96 See Tr. at 2244 (referencing Ex. NRC000058, NUREG/CR-3673, at 4-17). 

97 Tr. at 2245 (Kennedy, J.). As New York states, the “geographic location . . . or [the] size of 

the area” considered are not known. See State of New York Response to Commission Order 

CLI-15-2 Requesting Further Briefing on Contention NYS-12C Concerning Site-Specific Severe 

Accident Mitigation Alternatives (Mar. 30, 2015), at 7 n.27 (New York Response to Commission 

Questions). 
- 26 - 

were used, what decontamination methods were considered, or how the weighting was done. 

In short, we do not know how the specific per person cost parameters were derived, although 

these are the parameter values (only adjusted for inflation) that were multiplied by the Indian 

Point area’s site-specific population to obtain decontamination cost estimates for the SAMA 

analysis. 

Moreover, quite apart from the fact that NUREG/CR-3673 relies on a study (Os84) that 

has not been located, NUREG/CR-3673 itself highlights the uncertainty in its conclusions: 

The cost and effectiveness estimates for decontamination contain large 

uncertainties, and results of future experimentation with decontamination 

techniques should be used to update models for decontamination.98

Large uncertainties were said to exist because the decontamination cost conclusions were 

based on experimental data and “little data” was considered “directly applicable” to the “small 

particle sizes” and “soluble materials which are anticipated in releases from most severe [lightwater reactor] accidents.”99

Nonetheless, Staff and Entergy experts—who include MACCS2 code modeling 

experts—offered their professional opinion that the challenged inputs are reasonable for this 

analysis.100 Much of their testimony is rooted in confidence in NUREG-1150 and peer reviews 

of that study. For example, Mr. O’Kula asserted confidence in the “nature and breadth and 

depth of the work that was done” for NUREG-1150, and what he described as an 

“unprecedented” level of review of the study.101 Entergy experts also testified that the input 

values had been “judged appropriate” and “sufficiently applicable to each of the [five] sites” 

 

98 Ex. NRC000059, NUREG/CR-3673, at 4-15. 

99 Id. 

100 See Tr. at 2037, 2039, 2274. 

101 See id. at 2371-72, 2034. 
- 27 - 

evaluated in NUREG-1150, which included a site located near a large urban city—the (now 

decommissioned) Zion plant, located approximately 37 miles from Chicago.102 The Staff stated 

that it has been examining decontamination times for 37 years.103 And Entergy repeatedly 

referred to the “well-established pedigree” of these inputs.104

While we do not discount their expertise, neither Staff nor Entergy experts provided any 

documented review or analysis (independent or internal), from the time of NUREG-1150 or 

more recently, that examines, reassesses, or otherwise explains the underlying basis for these 

parameters. It is possible that the NUREG-1150 peer reviews or other secondary reviews may 

have thoroughly vetted the TIMDEC and CDNFRM inputs, but we lack record evidence of such 

vetting.105 Neither the Staff nor Entergy put into evidence any portions of the NUREG-1150 

peer reviews or other reviews of NUREG-1150 that they referenced.106 We cannot make factual 

determinations based on items never introduced for review into the case record or otherwise 

confirmed.107

 

102 See id. at 1951-53, 2246. 

103 See, e.g., Ex. NRC000041, Staff Testimony, at 89. 

104 See, e.g., Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 13, 72; see also Tr. at 2054, 2286. 

105 NEPA does not require peer-reviewed analyses, but here it is the Staff and Entergy that 

reference the NUREG-1150 peer reviews as a basis for their confidence in the challenged 

values. The limited information presented in the record directly pertaining to reviews of the 

decontamination costs portion of NUREG-1150 were comments critical of a draft version of the 

study. See, e.g., Petition at 37; Tr. at 2024-26. 

106 Tr. at 2375-76 (Board inquiring whether any reviews were submitted as exhibits). We do not 

mean to minimize the significance of the NUREG-1150 study and its continued relevance to 

PRA-based analyses today. Our focus is only on two inputs, as specifically challenged in this 

proceeding, taken from the offsite consequence portion of NUREG-1150, an extensive threelevel PRA study involving thousands of inputs. 

107 Because the derivation of the values was not explained in NUREG-1150 or its companion 

document, NUREG/CR-4551, Dr. Lemay suggested that the challenged values are “a very 

specific part of the economic cost assessment” that “was not peer reviewed.” See, e.g., Tr. at 

2175. 
- 28 - 

Moreover, NUREG-1150’s final version did not discuss economic losses due to severe 

accidents and was not a cost-benefit analysis.108 NUREG-1150’s overall focus was on doses 

and health effects of severe accidents to determine whether the plants studied met the NRC’s 

safety goals. Economic costs were calculated in the individual plant studies to determine 

whether individuals could return to their homes or would stay relocated (and their property 

condemned)—factors relevant to assessing long-term population doses and health risks for 

comparison to the NRC’s safety goals. In contrast to NUREG-1150, the Indian Point SAMA 

analysis is a cost-benefit analysis, where a primary focus is economic costs given the need to 

compare the avoided costs of accidents with the implementation costs of risk reduction 

strategies. 

The Staff and Entergy also cite to the NRC’s SOARCA (State-of-the-Art Reactor 

Consequence Analysis) study, published in 2012, as evidence and confirmation that the 

TIMDEC and CDNFRM values are reasonable for the SAMA analysis.109 Mr. O’Kula explained 

that while the SOARCA study was not a SAMA analysis or a PRA analysis, the “model had to 

be set up and run as if it [were] a SAMA-type analysis” to show “when to bring populations back 

onsite to their residences in terms of cleanup criteria.”110 SOARCA analysts adopted the 

NUREG-1150 decontamination times (60 and 120 days) and base decontamination costs 

($3,000/person and $8,000/person) for decontamination levels of 3 and 15, respectively.111

 

108 See, e.g., id. at 2035. 

109 See, e.g., Applicant’s Answer Opposing the State of New York’s Petition for Review of the 

Board’s Partial Initial Decision (LBP-13-13) (Apr. 28, 2014), at 37-38 & n. 213 (Entergy Answer 

to New York Petition); Tr. at 2241, 2274, 2374-75. 

110 See Tr. at 2373. 

111 See id. 
- 29 - 

But a recent report describing the SOARCA study’s parameter selection makes clear 

that these decontamination-related parameters “were not reviewed for SOARCA because 

SOARCA did not calculate economic consequences.”112 As was the case with NUREG-1150, 

the SOARCA “cost decisions were only used to support the habitability decisions in the 

model.”113 MACCS code users therefore are directed to “review the basis and applicability of 

the decontamination and cost parameters for site-specific analyses.”114 As New York claims, 

SOARCA’s limited use of the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values “does not represent a vetting of 

those values.”115

 

112 “See “MACCS Best Practices as Applied in the State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence 

Analyses (SOARCA) Project,” NUREG/CR-7009, Sandia National Laboratories, Bixler, N., 

Jones, J., Osborn, D., Weber, S., § 4.7, at 4-43 (Aug. 2014) (ML14234A148). NUREG/CR-7009 

is publicly available but post-dates the Board’s decision. The document was not material to our 

decision, but helps to make clear the limited purposes behind the use of the decontamination 

cost-related values in the SOARCA study. 

113 Id. 

114 Id.

115 See State of New York Reply to Entergy’s and NRC Staff’s Responses to Commission Order 

CLI-15-2 Requesting Further Briefing on Contention NYS-12C Concerning Site-Specific Severe 

Accident Mitigation Alternatives (Apr. 29, 2015), at 5-6 (New York Reply Brief Re: Commission 

Questions). While it was not entered into the record, we further note that the SOARCA peer 

review addressed the “[a]ssumptions and input data associated with decontamination and 

cleanup of economic assets.” See “Summary Report: Peer Review of the State-of-the-Art 

Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) Project,” Sandia National Laboratories (May 2012), 

at 47 (ML121250032). Although these were found “acceptable for achieving the overall goals of 

the SOARCA project,” the peer reviewer—one of Entergy’s experts in this case—stated that “the 

approach taken for decontamination in the mid-to late eighties isn’t consistent with a state-ofthe-art analysis.” See id. The SOARCA peer review was published several months before the 

hearing and authored by one of the Staff’s experts in this case. Although the peer reviewer’s 

comment is not directed to a NEPA analysis and does not suggest that use of the inputs is 

unacceptable, it reflects a consideration of the NUREG-1150 decontamination-related input 

values in a recent peer review—and a core Staff and Entergy argument before the Board and 

before us is that peer review vetting confirmed the reliability of the values. See, e.g., Entergy 

Answer to Petition at 26. We note, additionally, that while the SAMA analysis need not be stateof-the-art it is a cost-benefit analysis, which the SOARCA study was not. 
- 30 - 

The Board also refers to evidence of “Entergy technical reviewers [who] considered the 

applicability of the NUREG-1150 values and concluded that they were reasonable values” for 

the Indian Point analysis specifically.116 The Board cited to the testimony of Entergy expert Ms. 

Potts and referenced an Entergy response to a Staff Request for Additional Information (RAI), 

said to “describe[] the bases” for the Entergy SAMA analysis reviewers’ conclusions regarding 

why the NUREG-1150 inputs are appropriate for Indian Point.117 The RAI response, however, 

describes the CDNFRM input, without more, as a “NUREG/CR-4551 default value[]” that was 

scaled to a current dollar value.118 Neither the RAI response nor the cited pages of Ms. Potts’s 

testimony reveal additional considerations beyond that of a practice to use default CDNFRM 

values escalated for inflation.119 We have emphasized that an “expert opinion that merely states 

a conclusion . . . without providing a reasoned basis or explanation for that conclusion is 

inadequate because it deprives the Board of the ability to make the necessary, reflective 

assessment of the opinion.”120

 

116 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 473. 

117 Id. at 473 n.1584; see also Entergy Answer to New York Petition at 25. 

118 See Ex. ENT000460, NL-08-028, letter from Fred Dacimo, Vice President, Entergy, to NRC, 

“Reply to Request for Additional Information Regarding License Renewal Application—Severe 

Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis, Attach. 1 at 37-38 (Feb. 5, 2008); see also Tr. at 

2325-27. 

119 See Tr. at 2067-70. At the hearing, Ms. Potts stated that the reviewers “looked to see if [the 

CDNFRM value] passes the smell test,” but did not indicate what factors were considered in 

making that determination. See id. at 2068. Mr. Teagarden added that the CDNFRM values 

are “judged to have applicability across . . . reactor plants and sites, and now I need to escalate 

them appropriately [to current dollar values] for my site-specific analysis.” See id. at 2069. 

120 See, e.g., USEC, Inc. (American Centrifuge Plant), CLI-06-10, 63 NRC 451, 472 (2006). We 

note, additionally, that Entergy’s expert, Mr. Teagarden, described the non-farm 

decontamination per person cost value of $13,824 for heavy decontamination as equating to 

approximately a cost of “some $41,000” to decontaminate a “household of three,” $55,000 for a 

“household of four,” and for “an apartment building housing 200 people, . . . $2.7 million to cover 

decontamination costs for that and nearby spaces.” See Tr. at 2040; see also id. at 2122. But 

he did not provide corroborative evidence that these are reasonable decontamination cost 

estimates for these types of buildings, whether speaking generally or in the specific context 
- 31 - 

C. Other Evidence Regarding CDNFRM Values Not Addressed by the Board 

The Board left unaddressed other Staff or Entergy arguments made in support of the 

CDNFRM values. These claims merit acknowledgement, although we conclude that they are 

insufficient to serve as a basis on which to find the CDNFRM values reasonable for the Indian 

Point SAMA analysis. 

The Staff argues, for example, that “New York’s own expert confirmed the 

reasonableness of the [SAMA analysis] selected inputs through his independent analysis.”121 In 

effect, the Staff claims that if Dr. Lemay’s assumptions are altered to the degree that the Staff 

considers appropriate, his results become comparable or even conservative compared to the 

values used in the Indian Point analysis. More specifically, and as we earlier described, Dr. 

Lemay used four different approaches (designated A, B, C, and D) to calculate alternate ranges 

of CDNFRM values for Indian Point. In Dr. Lemay’s view, the “most appropriate method in [the] 

whole set of data” that he used was a decontamination cost methodology from the United 

Kingdom called CONDO, which focuses on reactor accident cleanup and which he used in his 

Approach “C.”122 As pertinent here, Staff and Entergy experts testified that when they 

considered Dr. Lemay’s CONDO-related methodology in light of qualifications or corrections that 

they considered necessary, Dr. Lemay’s analyses indeed served to confirm the reasonableness 

 

relevant here: namely, achieving a 93% reduction in public dose in an average of 120 days. 

Similarly, Mr. Jones (whose resume indicates decontamination experience) testified for the Staff 

that he did not have any “cesium-related characterization or cost-data” from his decontamination 

work experience, which was performed for the Department of Energy. See id. at 2100-01. 

121 See Staff Answer to New York Petition at 26; see also id. at 34-35. 

122 See Tr. at 2108; see also id. at 2110-11, 2151-52. Based on the CONDO methodology, Dr. 

Lemay’s suggested input values for CDNFRM range from $15,422 to $23,952 per person for 

light decontamination (level 3), and from $71,255 to $112,856 per person for heavy 

decontamination (level 15). 
- 32 - 

of the Indian Point analyses.123 The Staff therefore argues that “New York’s own analysis, as 

corrected, suggests that the values selected by Entergy, accepted by the Staff, and approved by 

the Board in LBP-13-13 are conservative.”124

We need not, however, parse the extensive, highly technical, and contentious testimony 

on New York’s alternate methodologies and proposed alternate ranges of CDNFRM inputs. 

Much of the hearing was diverted to an inquiry over the soundness of New York’s methods and 

assumptions—none of which the Board addressed in its decision. As the Board ultimately 

stated in LBP-13-13, “New York was not required to develop reasonable alternative CDNFRM 

values.”125

More importantly, it should not be necessary—nor would it be sufficient—to rely on 

“informal” and “rough” consideration of New York’s CONDO methodology-based results to find 

the Indian Point CDNFRM values reasonable.126 Here, neither the Staff nor Entergy offered any 

updated examination of decontamination costs or benchmarking analyses of their own. And Dr. 

Lemay stressed that while he made his analyses available for the Staff’s and Entergy’s review, 

he was not afforded the same opportunity to review and challenge the underlying technical 

 

123 See Staff Answer to Petition at 25 n.111, 26, 29-31. More specifically, Mr. Jones testified 

that once he removed various multipliers and factors Dr. Lemay’s analysis had applied, the 

result was a CDNFRM value of $16,778 for heavy decontamination, which came “reasonably 

close to” the value used in the Indian Point SAMA analysis ($13,824). See Ex. NRC000041, 

Staff Testimony, at 82-83; see also Tr. at 2251-52. 

124 See Staff Answer to New York Petition at 35. 

125 LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 473. 

126 Mr. O’Kula explained, for example, that he took a “quick glance” and an “informal look” at Dr. 

Lemay’s spreadsheets for the CONDO-based analyses, and after reducing various multipliers 

that Dr. Lemay had used to account for particular numbers of surfaces to be decontaminated, 

the results “became much like those applied in the Entergy SAMA analysis.” See Tr. at 2365-

66; see also Staff Response to Commission Questions at 22 (“after applying very rough and 

basic corrections to Dr. Lemay’s analysis the Staff’s experts concluded that New York’s analysis 

supported the selected input variables”). 
- 33 - 

basis and assumptions for the CDNFRM values because these were not made available.127 

The Staff, moreover, discounted the CONDO methodology cost-estimation values, stating that 

they “cannot be technically substantiated.”128 Given the record as a whole, informal 

extrapolations from New York’s alternate analyses, without more, are not a sufficient ground on 

which to find the SAMA analysis reasonable. 

The Board also did not address a cost comparison described in the FSEIS as lending 

support for the CDNFRM values. The Staff in the FSEIS states that it requested the Sandia 

National Laboratories to compare the non-farmland decontamination cost values used in the 

Indian Point analysis with “decontamination cost factors derived from” a 1996 study of site 

restoration costs for a plutonium-dispersal accident in Albuquerque, New Mexico.129 In using 

this weapons-related cleanup study (referenced as the Site Restoration Study), Sandia made 

various assumptions including that the heavy decontamination level (dose reduction factor 15) 

considered in the SAMA analysis would be most comparable to the Site Restoration Study’s 

analysis of “moderate plutonium” decontamination.130 Applying the Site Restoration Study’s 

estimated cost for cleanup of “moderate plutonium” contamination to the population of New York 

City, Sandia derived an estimated non-farmland decontamination cost value of $14,900 per 

person.131 The FSEIS noted that this value is comparable to the CDNFRM value assumed in 

 

127 See, e.g., Tr. at 2134, 2138, 2042. 

128 See Ex. NYS000041, Staff Testimony, at 88. 

129 See Ex. NYS000133I, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of 

Nuclear Plants: Regarding Indian Point Nuclear Generating Unit Nos. 2 and 3, NUREG-1437, 

Supp. 38, Vol. 3, Final Report, app. G, at G-23 (Dec. 2010) (FSEIS) (referencing Ex. 

NYS000249, “Site Restoration: Estimation of Attributable Costs from Plutonium Dispersal 

Accidents,” SAND96-0957, Chanin, D., and Murfin, W. (May 1996)). 

130 Ex. NYS000133I, FSEIS, at G-23 to G-24. 

131 Id. at G-24. 
- 34 - 

the SAMA analysis for heavy decontamination ($13,824 per person for decontamination level of 

15).132 The FSEIS additionally noted that the calculated value was not scaled to 2005 dollars, in 

which case the per capita cost would be greater, but “within a factor of about 2” (e.g., the scaled 

value could be twice the estimated $14,900 or approximately $30,000 per person). 

In CLI-15-2, we asked the parties to address the extent to which the cost comparison 

substantiates the non-farm decontamination cost parameters used in the Indian Point analysis, 

particularly given that the FSEIS also describes the Site Restoration report as “not relevant” to 

reactor accident cleanup.133 In its response, the Staff maintains that “weapons accidents do not 

provide a good analogue for estimating decontamination costs or times.”134 The Staff explains 

that it “tr[ied] to adjust the costs for a weapons accident to a reactor accident” in order to 

respond to comments received on the Draft SEIS, and that the “roughly comparable costs 

determined by this alternative method reinforced the Staff’s conclusion that the costs used by 

Entergy were reasonable.”135 Entergy stresses that the 1996 Site Restoration Report “has no 

direct relevance” to the Indian Point SAMA analysis.136 And for its part, New York disputes the 

assumptions that the Staff made in using the Site Restoration Study.137

Neither the Staff nor Entergy principally relies on the cost comparison and both further 

state that the Site Restoration Study is not relevant or reliable as a tool for estimating reactor 

 

132 Id. 

133 Id. at G-23. 

134 See Staff Response to Commission Questions at 37 & n.226. 

135 Id. at 39-40. 

136 See Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc., Initial Brief in Response to Commission Questions in 

CLI-15-2 Concerning Contention NYS-12C (Mar. 30, 2015), at 37-38. 

137 See New York Response to Commission Questions at 37; New York Reply Brief Re: 

Commission Questions at 17. 
- 35 - 

accident decontamination costs for the Indian Point analysis. Therefore, while intimating no 

opinion on the merits of the cost comparison, we find only that we have insufficient basis to 

conclude that the cost comparison confirms the Indian Point CDNFRM values. 

D. Conclusions on the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values 

Stepping back from the details, we reach the following conclusions. First, the Board’s 

decision relies on several significant factual errors, both relating to SAMA analysis computer 

modeling and to the content of the evidence presented. Second, while the evidence does not 

establish that the Indian Point SAMA analysis non-farm decontamination costs are unduly low or 

wrong,138 it reveals potentially significant uncertainties in the non-farm land and property 

decontamination cost and the decontamination time input values. The Staff and Entergy could 

not explain the underlying technical basis for these values. And they presented no updated 

analysis that revisited and confirmed the values in light of any more recent decontamination 

data. Given the passage of time, it is not surprising that the individuals most acquainted with 

the work that produced these cost and time estimates may no longer be available to explain 

their analyses, but unfortunately none of the parties could provide a documented description 

outlining the technical foundation of the estimates (e.g., the experiments, data, size of area, or 

other factors considered).139

In this circumstance, running sensitivity analyses for the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values 

is appropriate. Sensitivity analyses are a common method of addressing uncertainty in specific 

inputs used in PRA analyses and as such they are a common practice in SAMA analyses. 

 

138 Merely because New York’s analyses resulted in higher values did not show that the Staff’s 

values were unreasonable. New York’s own estimated ranges of values varied widely 

depending on which of the four different approaches and information sources were used; the 

entire range of estimated CDNFRM values based on approach “A” was much higher than the 

entire range obtained with approach “C.” 

139 See, e.g., Tr. at 2006-09 (paper trail “end of the line” is NUREG/CR-3673); 2026 (“unable to 

trace the origin” of decontamination costs). 
- 36 - 

Sensitivity analyses help demonstrate whether and to what extent variations in an uncertain 

input value might affect the overall cost-benefit conclusions. Indeed, the MACCS2 code was 

designed to accommodate sensitivity analyses, and Entergy already has performed sensitivity 

analyses for other input values in the Indian Point analysis.140 And recently, the SAMA analyses 

performed and accepted for the Byron and the Braidwood facilities’ license renewal reviews 

included sensitivity analyses for the CDNFRM, TIMDEC, and other generic economic input 

values.141

The NEPA record in this case is not yet closed. The Staff is in the process of 

supplementing the Indian Point FSEIS in regard to other matters.142 We therefore direct the 

Staff to supplement the SAMA analysis with sensitivity analyses for the CDNFRM and TIMDEC 

values. We leave up to the Staff to determine (if it so chooses) whether there are particular 

ranges of input values that it considers appropriate to use. In any event, however, the Staff at a 

minimum should include sensitivity runs for the maximum allowable values in the code—one 

year (365 days) for the TIMDEC values, at least (but not limited to) the four most severe 

 

140 See Ex. NYS000243, MACCS2 User’s Guide, at 1-2 (MACCS code is intended to facilitate 

the “evaluation of sensitives and uncertainties”); Tr. at 2078-79, 2039 (regarding sensitivity 

analysis for tourism and lost business); New York Response to Commission Questions at 16 

(regarding sensitivity analysis relating to population). 

141 See “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for License Renewal of Nuclear Plants: 

Regarding Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2,” NUREG-1437, Supp. 55, Final Report, app. F, at 

F-18 to F-20 (Nov. 2015) (ML15314A814) (citing Braidwood Station Environmental Report, 

SAMA Analysis, Rev. 2, app. F, at F-340); “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for 

License Renewal of Nuclear Plants: Regarding Byron Station, Units 1 and 2, NUREG-1437,” 

Supp. 54, Final Report, app. F, at F-20 (July 2015) (ML1516A263) (citing Byron Station 

Environmental Report, SAMA Analysis, Rev. 2, app. F, at F-292)). 

142 The Staff issued a draft second supplement (Volume 5) to the FSEIS in December 2015, 

and expects to issue a final supplement in September 2016. See NRC Staff’s 50th Status 

Report in Response to the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board’s Order of February 16, 2012 

(Apr. 1, 2016), at 3. 
- 37 - 

accident categories modeled; and $100,000 for the CDNFRM values for heavy 

decontamination, at least (but not limited to) the four most severe accident categories modeled. 

Running the analysis to the maximum values allowed will provide a better understanding 

of whether and to what extent uncertainty in these challenged values may alter the SAMA 

analysis cost-benefit conclusions. Use of a $100,000 CDNFRM value for heavy 

decontamination falls within New York’s suggested range of CDNFRM values for the Indian 

Point analysis: $71,255 to $112,856 for heavy decontamination, based on Dr. Lemay’s 

Approach “C” using the CONDO cost-estimating methodology (which Dr. Lemay described as 

the “most appropriate” of his analyses) and which was calculated taking into account his 

conclusions regarding the types of buildings and building density in the 50-mile radius area for 

Indian Point.143 A $100,000 CDNFRM value may prove to be over-conservative, but in a NEPA 

analysis that seeks to identify potentially cost-beneficial mitigation alternatives,144 it is not 

inappropriate, where the basis for a given input value is uncertain, to err on the side of 

conservative values when conducting a sensitivity analysis for that input.145

As to decontamination time, New York claims that the SAMA analysis “should at a 

minimum account for the possibility of decontamination times of one year.”146 Given that it is 

 

143 See Ex. NYS000430, New York Revised Tables, at tbl. 11; Tr. at 2108, 2111, 2137-38, 2150. 

144 See generally Ex. NYS000133I, FSEIS, app. G.

145 Entergy does argue that “simple” (or “independent”) sensitivity analyses would not be 

“appropriate,” reasoning that TIMDEC, CDNFRM, and the decontamination factors are 

interrelated. Entergy Response to Commission Questions at 25. We do not deny that these 

inputs are interrelated, and our decision does not preclude the Staff from considering 

interrelationship of inputs when choosing values for the sensitivity analyses or from discussing 

the topic within the FSEIS supplement. In any event, with no sufficient explanation in the record 

for how the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values were derived, the record leaves us similarly 

uncertain as to the impacts of these interrelationships. The sensitivity analyses we are requiring 

here are intended to inform our understanding of how material these uncertainties are to the 

SAMA analysis conclusions. 

146 See New York Response to Commission Questions at 30. 
- 38 - 

undisputed that three out of the eight release categories modeled in the Indian Point analysis 

reflect cesium releases relatively comparable to (or greater than) those experienced at 

Fukushima, we agree with New York that it is inappropriate to discount altogether the example 

of the Fukushima accident as an irrelevant “extreme” or “worst case” scenario, as the Staff and 

Entergy argue.147 While we may not yet have a full understanding of what aspects of the 

Fukushima decontamination experience might be applicable to NRC severe accident analyses 

including (as relevant here) environmental analyses, the Fukushima experience highlights the 

potential need for extended decontamination periods following a severe accident with offsite 

consequences. At least in regard to the more severe releases modeled in the Indian Point 

analysis, a sensitivity analysis using a TIMDEC value of one year is reasonable. 

Current code limitations do not permit the use of TIMDEC values longer than one year 

(nor of CDNFRM values greater than $100,000 per person). And here we agree with the Staff 

and Entergy that revising the code to accept TIMDEC and CDNFRM values outside of the 

currently allowed ranges would require a complex effort, necessitating expert validation and 

verification, including testing by independent laboratories.148 As discussed below, NEPA does 

not require such an effort here. 

Much of the evidence presented in this case, including much of New York’s own 

evidence, relates to experimental data or to decontamination cost data from incidents or 

accidents that may have limited relevance.149 Dr. Lemay’s own testimony from late 2011 

 

147 See Petition at 24; Staff Answer to New York Petition at 19; Entergy Answer to New York 

Petition at 32. 

148 Staff Response to Commission Questions at 33; see also Staff Answer to New York Petition 

at 18; Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 15, 74-76. 

149 See Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 20 (alternate decontamination cost values 

based on “extrapolating data from other types of nuclear accidents, field radiological work,” and 

experiments). 
- 39 - 

stressed how “very little data” existed at the time on decontamination following “an actual severe 

reactor accident” in an urban environment.150 Recent real-world data emerging from the 

Fukushima accident will provide significantly more relevant modern-day sources for assessing 

the decontamination times and costs of a severe reactor accident with offsite consequences. 

The accident involved cesium releases on the order of those modeled in the Indian Point SAMA 

analysis, for example, and an extensive cleanup effort remains under way. Data based on inthe-field decontamination work ultimately will allow for the review and updating, where 

warranted, of decontamination cost-related estimates that historically may have been based on 

experimental data or on smaller-scale radiological accident cleanup.151

Notably, as testimony in this case described, the CDNFRM and TIMDEC values are 

inter-connected, and they additionally relate to the decontamination effectiveness level, and to 

other input values in the SAMA analysis. A number of complex considerations would be 

involved in properly selecting alternate CDNFRM and TIMDEC values (or ranges of values) for 

a SAMA analysis.152 Conclusions would need to be reached, for example, on the effectiveness 

 

150 Id. 

151 In an unrelated context, the NRC Staff recently informed us that “Research efforts are 

underway to evaluate newly emerging information from the Fukushima accident recovery 

experience, and in particular develop MACCS decontamination plan input parameters based on 

Fukushima.” See Draft Regulatory Basis for Containment Protection and Release Reduction for 

Mark I and Mark II Boiling Water Reactors (10 CFR Part 50) (May 2015) at 84, enclosure to 

“Evaluation of the Containment Protection and Release Reduction For Mark I and Mark II 

Boiling Water Reactors Rulemaking Activities (10 CFR Part 50) (RIN-3150-AJ26),” Commission 

Paper SECY-15-0085 (June 18, 2015) (ML15042A218) (package). The specific input 

parameters under review “include the costs to decontaminate, the dose reductions achieved 

[e.g., dose reduction factors or decontamination levels], and the times required to perform 

decontamination.” See id. at 85. In short, the TIMDEC and CDNFRM values litigated in this 

case are now under review by the Staff. Such a review likely will require an extended time to 

complete, as we note above. 

152 See, e.g., Tr. at 2201-03, 2247 (“cost is linked to the time, which is linked to the dose 

reduction factor”), 2273 (if decontamination time is “long enough, it could be that just radioactive 

decay and weathering would have gotten you below the habitability level, and you wouldn’t need 

to decontaminate” an area); Staff Answer to Petition at 17-18. 
- 40 - 

of different decontamination strategies on different kinds of materials, and on the costs and time 

scales necessary to achieve the different levels of decontamination effectiveness. Sufficient 

data would need to be gathered and analyzed to reach such conclusions, including data on the 

sizes of areas cleaned, workforce and resource needs, decontamination methods used, and 

even waste disposal considerations. 

An EIS, however, is not a “research document reflecting the frontiers of scientific 

methodology, studies, and data.”153 And NEPA does not require the NRC to stop and await 

internationally-based research and potential code modifications that could take years to 

complete. Otherwise the NEPA process would effectively “become unending,” particularly given 

the NRC’s frequent long-term research to improve severe accident consequence modeling.154 

NEPA requires only a “reasonably complete” mitigation analysis.155 Our decision mandating 

sensitivity analyses to the full extent of the code strikes a reasonable balance between 

disclosure of uncertainties (and their potential to affect the cost-benefit results) and what we 

reasonably can conclude and apply to the Indian Point analysis today.156

 

 

153 See Entergy Nuclear Generation Co. and Entergy Nuclear Operations, Inc. (Pilgrim Nuclear 

Power Station), CLI-10-11, 71 NRC 287, 315 (2010) (citing Town of Winthrop v. FAA, 535 F.3d 

1, 11-13 (1st Cir. 2008)). 

154 See Massachusetts v. NRC, 708 F.3d 63, 82 (1st Cir. 2013). 

155 See Citizens Against Burlington Inc. v. Busey, 938 F.2d 190, 206 (D.C. Cir. 1991); see also 

Pilgrim, CLI-10-22, 72 NRC at 208-09 & n.40. 

156 Moreover, we have generically determined, based on probability-weighted consequences, 

that the environmental impacts from severe accidents at plants operating under renewed 

licenses are expected to be “small”—our lowest impact category. See 10 C.F.R. pt. 51, subpt. 

A, app. B, tbl. B-1 (codifying license renewal GEIS finding on environmental impacts of 

postulated severe accidents). Under basic NEPA principles, it is reasonable to tailor the degree 

of mitigation analyses to the significance of the impact to be mitigated. See 10 C.F.R. 

§ 51.45(b)(2) (“Impacts shall be discussed in proportion to their significance.”); 40 C.F.R. 

§ 1502.2 (same). 
- 41 - 

III. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES TO LBP-13-13 

A. Other Challenged Input Values 

New York also argues that the Board erred in limiting its consideration only to the 

TIMDEC and CDNFRM inputs, when New York had also challenged other economic input 

values in the analysis.157 New York refers to the following five other economic input values: 

POPCST, VALWNF, DSRATE, FRNFIM, and DPRATE. 

The Board focused its decision only on the decontamination time and non-farm 

decontamination cost values because Dr. Lemay testified that “CDNFRM and TIMDEC were the 

most important ones, and the rest had minimal impact on the calculation of the offsite economic 

cost.”158 Values with only a minimal effect on the offsite economic cost risk are not likely to 

change the SAMA cost-benefit analysis conclusions, especially considering that economic cost 

risk is only one portion of the offsite risk analysis, the other major portion being population dose 

risk. As to the DSRATE, DPRATE, and FRNFIM values, Dr. Lemay stated that using the 

alternate values that he considered more appropriate would have a “negligible” overall effect on 

the offsite economic cost risk.159

In regard to VALWNF, which represents a per capita value of non-farm wealth, Dr. 

Lemay characterized his proposed change to scale up the SAMA analysis values from 1997 

dollars to 2004 dollars a “minor correction” and agreed with the Board that it did not warrant 

 

157 Petition at 58. 

158 Tr. at 2054-55 (emphasis added); LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 459. 

159 Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 61-62. DSRATE defines the expected rate of 

return from land, buildings, equipment, etc. DPRATE defines the property depreciation rate 

(from lack of habitation and maintenance), and FRNFIM defines the fraction of non-farm wealth 

due to improvements. See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 459. The values for these cost categories 

also were taken from the “Sample Problem A” values outlined in the MACCS2 code user’s guide 

and taken from the NUREG-1150 study. See id. at 459 & n.1479. 
- 42 - 

much examination at the hearing.160 According to Dr. Lemay’s analysis, the proposed 

adjustment would increase the final offsite economic cost risk by approximately 18%, not a 

major revision in light of such an extensive NEPA analysis.161 Nonetheless, given that in this 

decision we remand the SAMA analysis for sensitivity analyses, the Staff should consider taking 

the opportunity to examine the sensitivity of this input by scaling up the VALWNF dollar values, 

if appropriate. 

The last additional economic input value that New York references is POPCST, which is 

defined as the per capita cost of temporary or permanent relocation of population and 

businesses in a region rendered uninhabitable during the modeled “long-term phase” period.162 

As described in the MACCS2 code user’s guide, the value should be derived in a fashion that 

“takes account of both personal and corporate income losses for a transitional period as well as 

moving expenses.”163 The parties here agreed that moving expenses would not contribute 

much to the value given that most of the belongings of relocated individuals would be 

contaminated and therefore would not be moved.164 Apart from moving expenses, the rest (and 

most) of the value represents an average “personal income per day” multiplied by a “number of 

days of lost wages” considered appropriate.165

Dr. Bixler, for the Staff, described the POPCST value as a “one-time relocation cost,” to 

“account for [wage] losses” that would be incurred until “for example, . . . a new job” were 

 

160 See Tr. at 2212. 

161 See Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 58-59. 

162 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 459. In the Indian Point SAMA analysis, the “long-term phase” 

begins following an initial seven-day “emergency phase” and extends 30 years. 

163 See Ex. NYS000243, MACCS2 User’s Guide, at 7-14. 

164 See Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 60; Tr. at 1974, 2213. 

165 See Tr. at 2213. 
- 43 - 

found.166 The POPCST value used in the SAMA analysis is $8,640 per person. It is derived 

from a NUREG-1150 value of $5,000 per person, escalated by use of the Consumer Price Index 

to $8,640.167 The value reflects a “per capita lost income of $61.70/person-day” and an 

estimated unemployment period of 140 days (or 20 weeks).168 The value is not intended to 

reflect a “permanent loss of salary,” but was described by Entergy expert Mr. Teagarden as a 

“disruption cost” that “reflects primarily a transition period of some loss of income for a period of 

time.”169 Staff expert Mr. Jones stated the POPCST value is applied per person for anyone 

relocated, regardless of age or whether employed, and therefore would reflect a cost of “just 

over $40,000” for a family of five.170

New York’s proposed higher range of POPCST values is based on the view that while 

“New York State unemployment benefits normally last 26 weeks (182 days),” unemployment 

benefits “extended to 93 weeks (651 days)” during the 2008 economic crisis.171 New York’s 

proposed range of POPCST values—$10,640 to $49,857 per person—are based on a minimum 

of 140 days to a maximum of 651 days of unemployment benefits, and Dr. Lemay agreed an 

average value within that proposed range would be approximately $25,000 per person.172 New 

York’s proposed larger POPCST value is essentially an argument for a more conservative 

 

166 See id. at 1972-73. 

167 See Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 125 (citing description of value in NUREG/CR4551). NUREG/CR-4551 explains how the NUREG-1150 value of $5,000 was derived. It is 

mostly based on a $14,600 per capita income value from 1986, and the assumption of 140 days 

of lost wages. See id.; Ex. NYS00248, NUREG/CR-4551, at 5-3. 

168 See Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, at 125; Tr. at 1975, 2213. 

169 Tr. at 1979. 

170 Id. at 1972. 

171 See Ex. NYS000241, New York Testimony, at 60; Tr. at 2213-14. 

172 Tr. at 2213-14. 
- 44 - 

unemployment benefits timeframe given that an “extended benefit” was provided “following the 

crash in 2008.”173 New York does not show that the 140-day value used in the analysis is 

unreasonable or otherwise in error. In short, the Board’s failure to address these input values at 

most amounts to harmless error. 

B. Decontamination Levels 

New York’s appeal additionally challenges the decontamination levels assumed in the 

Indian Point analysis. New York claims that Dr. Lemay’s benchmarking analysis calculations, 

“for the purposes of comparison . . . used the same decontamination factors as Entergy” (3 and 

15), but that “Entergy’s values are likely unrealistic.”174 New York argues that “real world 

experience demonstrates that decontamination of an entire building to a level greater than 10, 

i.e., 90%, may not be possible or realistic” at all to achieve.175 But the Staff and Entergy 

provided evidence (including by Mr. Jones, who has decontamination work experience) that 

decontamination to a level of 15 potentially may be achievable with current decontamination 

technologies.176 In the future, data from Fukushima will bring a greater understanding of 

decontamination methods and their effectiveness for different kinds of materials, and help to 

verify (or refute) these effectiveness assumptions, but we find that adequate evidence exists in 

the record for the values used. 

 

 

173 Id. at 2214. 

174 Petition at 50. 

175 Id. 

176 See, e.g., Ex. NRC000041, Staff Testimony, at 43-44; Ex. ENT000450, Entergy Testimony, 

at 71. 
- 45 - 

C. Other Costs the SAMA Analysis Do Not Consider 

New York also argues that the Board’s decision failed to recognize that the MACCS2 

code does not account for “all of the costs associated with a severe accident.”177 New York 

further claims that there is “no requirement, regulatory or otherwise, that the MACCS2 code be 

used in a SAMA analysis.”178 The NRC, however, has never represented that the SAMA 

analysis encompasses “the entirety of the environmental impacts that could realistically be 

associated with a severe reactor accident.”179 Nor is the SAMA analysis intended to serve as 

the severe accident environmental impacts analysis for Indian Point, as we earlier stressed. 

The generic bounding environmental impacts analysis contained in the NRC’s License Renewal 

GEIS applies to Indian Point. 

As a mitigation analysis, the SAMA cost-benefit analysis need not include every potential 

accident impact and cost conceivable. It is well known that the SAMA analysis does not include 

various categories of costs, including for example, hospitalization or other medical costs (the 

analysis instead assesses costs based on radiological dose the population receives), loss of tax 

revenues, deployment of the National Guard, and litigation expenses. NEPA requirements are 

“tempered by a practical rule of reason.”180

Further, New York’s arguments raise claims beyond the scope of the admitted 

contention. The Board admitted the contention “to the extent that it challenged the 

reasonableness of the “cost data for decontamination and clean up used in MACCS2.”181 And 

 

177 See Petition at 51. 

178 Id. 

179 See id. at 52. 

180 See Pilgrim, CLI-10-22, 72 NRC at 208 (citation omitted). 

181 See LBP-13-13, 78 NRC at 451. 
- 46 - 

as to use of the code, Dr. Lemay stressed that “use of the MACCS2 code is not in question,” 

and “it’s the right tool for doing this job.”182

IV. NEW YORK’S PETITION FOR REVIEW OF APRIL 1, 2014 DECISION 

We also have before us New York’s petition for review of the Board’s April 1 decision.183 

New York sought to have the Board reopen the record on NYS-12C and reconsider its decision 

in LBP-13-13 based on the Staff having used a 365-day decontamination time (for both light and 

heavy decontamination levels) in a spent fuel pool consequence study that was issued in 

2013.184 New York claimed that the Staff’s use of the 365-day period contradicted the Staff’s 

testimony regarding a standard and ongoing practice of using the 60-day and 120-day 

decontamination time values. The Board denied New York’s motion, concluding that New 

York’s claims likely would not have led the Board to reach a materially different result.185

In seeking our review, New York’s petition calls the Board’s April 1, 2014 order 

“inextricably linked to, and part of, the Partial Initial Decision.”186 Among other claims, New York 

argues that the Board overlooked New York’s evidence that using a “365 day TIMDEC for the 

four most severe accidents Entergy modeled (while maintaining Entergy’s values for all other 

parameters) would almost double the offsite economic cost risk.”187 While we granted review of 

both related Board decisions, we need not reach the various arguments on the Board’s April 1, 

 

182 See Tr. at 2175. 

183 See Petition for Review of April 1, 2014 Board Decision. 

184 See State of New York Motion to Reopen the Record and for Reconsideration on Contention 

NYS-12C (Dec. 7, 2013). 

185 See Order (Denying New York’s Motion to Reopen the Record; Setting Deadline for New or 

Amended Contention) (Apr. 1, 2014) (ML14091A319) (unpublished), at 3. 

186 Petition for Review of April 1, 2014 Board Decision at 12. 

187 See id. at 16. 
- 47 - 

2014 decision. Our decision already encompasses New York’s principal arguments on the 

TIMDEC values, which New York reiterates in its second petition for review.188 Here, it is 

undisputed that the Staff used a 365-day TIMDEC value in the spent fuel pool consequence 

study. That fact is not material to our conclusions relating to the Board’s decision in LBP-13-13. 

Reopening the record on Contention NYS-12C is unwarranted given the conclusions we reach 

today. 

We conclude with two comments. First, our decision today is not about flyspecking. It is 

instead about responding with appropriate scrutiny and reasoned explanations to “opposing 

views,”189 which includes being able to explain and make available underlying assumptions in 

our environmental analyses. Second, while the sensitivity analyses we direct the Staff to 

provide may identify additional potentially cost-beneficial mitigation measures, these would be 

additional alternatives for consideration to further reduce risk. NEPA does not require that a 

“mitigation plan be actually formulated and adopted.”190 NEPA seeks to “guarantee process,” 

not any “specific outcomes.”191 

V. CONCLUSION 

With respect to Contention NYS-12C, we reverse the Board’s decision in LBP-13-13 in 

regard to the TIMDEC and CDNFRM input values, and direct the Staff to run sensitivity 

analyses for those values, as indicated. New York’s petition for review of the Board’s April 1, 

 

188 See id. at 5-8. 

189 See 10 C.F.R. § 51.91(b). 

190 Robertson v. Methow Valley, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989). 

191 Massachusetts v. NRC, 708 F.3d at 78. NEPA does not, for example, require agencies or 

third parties to effect mitigation measures. See, e.g., Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship 

v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 503 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Citizens Against Burlington, 938 F.2d at 

206). 
- 48 - 

2014 decision is denied. Our decision today becomes part of, and serves to supplement, the 

environmental record of decision for this matter.192

IT IS SO ORDERED.193

 For the Commission 

NRC SEAL /RA/ 

 ____________________________ 

 Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

 Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, 

this 4th day of May, 2016. 

 

192 See, e.g., Louisiana Energy Services, L.P. (National Enrichment Facility), CLI-06-15, 63 NRC 

687, 707 n.91 (2006). 

193 Chairman Burns did not participate in this matter. 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 

In the Matter of ) 

 ) 

ENTERGY NUCLEAR OPERATIONS, INC. ) Docket Nos. 50-247-LR 

 ) and 50-286-LR 

(Indian Point Nuclear Generating, ) 

 Units 2 and 3) ) 

 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby certify that copies of the foregoing COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-16-07) 

have been served upon the following persons by Electronic Information Exchange. 

 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of Commission Appellate Adjudication 

Mail Stop O-7H4M 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

ocaamail@nrc.gov

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Mail Stop O-16C1 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

hearingdocket@nrc.gov 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel 

Mail Stop T-3F23 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Lawrence G. McDade, Chair 

Administrative Judge 

lawrence.mcdade@nrc.gov

Richard E. Wardwell 

Administrative Judge 

richard.wardwell@nrc.gov 

Michael F. Kennedy 

Administrative Judge 

michael.kennedy@nrc.gov 

Alana Wase, Law Clerk 

alana.wase@nrc.gov 

Julie Reynolds-Engel, Law Clerk 

Julie.Reynolds-Engel@nrc.gov 

Catherine L. Scott, Esq. 

Beth N. Mizuno, Esq. 

David E. Roth, Esq. 

Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. 

Brian Harris, Esq. 

Anita Ghosh, Esq. 

Christina England, Esq. 

Catherine E. Kanatas, Esq. 

Joseph Lindell, Esq. 

John Tibbetts, Paralegal 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Office of the General Counsel 

Mail Stop O-15D21 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

catherine.scott@nrc.gov; 

beth.mizuno@nrc.gov; sherwin.turk@nrc.gov; 

brian.harris.@nrc.gov; 

david.roth@nrc.gov; 

anita.ghosh@nrc.gov; 

christina.england@nrc.gov; 

catherine.kanatas@nrc.gov; 

joseph.lindell@nrc.gov; 

john.tibbetts@nrc.gov 

OGC Mail Center 

OGCMailCenter@nrc.gov 

William B. Glew, Jr. 

Organization: Entergy 

440 Hamilton Avenue, White Plains, NY 10601 

wglew@entergy.com 
Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR 

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-16-07) 

2

Elise N. Zoli, Esq. 

Goodwin Proctor, LLP 

Exchange Place, 53 State Street 

Boston, MA 02109 

ezoli@goodwinprocter.com 

Daniel Riesel, Esq. 

Victoria Shiah Treanor, Esq. 

Adam Stolorow, Esq. 

Natoya Duncan, Paralegal 

Counsel for Town of Cortlandt 

Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C. 

460 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10022 

driesel@sprlaw.com; vtreanor@sprlaw.com 

astolorow@sprlaw.com; nduncan@sprlaw.com 

Kathryn M. Sutton, Esq. 

Paul M. Bessette, Esq. 

Martin J. O’Neill, Esq. 

Brooke McGlinn, Esq. 

Grant Eskelsen, Esq. 

Ryan Lighty, Esq. 

Lesa G. Williams-Richardson, Legal Secretary 

Doris Calhoun, Legal Secretary 

Mary Freeze, Legal Secretary 

Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP 

1111 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

ksutton@morganlewis.com 

martin.oneill@morganlewis.com 

bmcglinn@morganlewis.com 

grant.eskelsen@morganlewis.com 

rlighty@morganlewis.com 

lrichardson@morganlewis.com 

dcalhoun@morganlewis.com 

mfreeze@morganlewis.com 

Melissa-Jean Rotini, Esq. 

Assistant County Attorney 

Office of Robert F. Meehan, 

Westchester County Attorney 

148 Martine Avenue, 6th Floor 

White Plains, NY 10601 

mjr1@westchestergov.com

Matthew W. Swinehart, Esq. 

Covington & Burling LLP 

1201 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 

Washington, DC 20004 

mswinehart@cov.com 

Manna Jo Greene, Environmental Director 

Steven C. Filler 

Peter A. Gross 

Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. 

724 Wolcott Ave. 

Beacon, NY 12508 

mannajo@clearwater.org; 

stephenfiller@gmail.com; 

peter@clearwater.org 

Andrew Reid, Esq. 

Organization: Hudson River Sloop 

Clearwater, Inc. 

Ved Nanda Center for International and 

 Comparative Law 

1075 Waite Drive 

Boulder, CO 80303 

lawyerreid@gmail.com 

Richard Webster, Esq. 

Public Justice, P.C. 

For Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. 

1825 K Street, NW, Suite 200 

Washington, D.C. 20006 

rwebster@publicjustice.net

Michael J. Delaney, Esq. 

Director, Energy Regulatory Affairs 

NYC Department of Environmental Protection 

59-17 Junction Boulevard 

Flushing, NY 11373 

mdelaney@dep.nyc.gov

Robert D. Snook, Esq. 

Assistant Attorney General 

Office of the Attorney General 

State of Connecticut 

55 Elm Street 

P.O. Box 120 

Hartford, CT 06141-0120 

robert.snook@po.state.ct.us
Docket Nos. 50-247-LR and 50-286-LR 

COMMISSION MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (CLI-16-07) 

3

David A. Repka, Esq. 

Victoria Hsia, Esq. 

Carlos L. Sisco, Paralegal 

Winston & Strawn 

1701 K Street NW 

Washington, DC 20006 

drepka@winston.com 

vhsia@winston.com 

CSisco@winston.com 

Paul Gallay, Esq. 

Deborah Brown 

Ramona Cearley, Secretary 

Riverkeeper, Inc. 

20 Secor Road 

Ossining, NY 10562 

pgallay@riverkeeper.org 

dbrown@riverkeeper.org 

rcearley@riverkeeper.org

John J. Sipos, Esq. 

Lisa S. Kwong, Esq. 

Brian Lusignan, Esq. 

Mihir Desai, Esq. 

Assistant Attorneys General 

Teresa Manzi, Legal Assistant 

Siobhan Blank, Legal Assistant 

Office of the Attorney General 

 of the State of New York 

The Capitol, State Street 

Albany, New York 12224 

john.sipos@ag.ny.gov 

lisa.kwong@ag.ny.gov 

brian.lusignan@ag.ny.gov 

mihir.desai@ag.ny.gov

teresa.manzi@ag.ny.gov 

siobhan.blank@ag.ny.gov 

Kathryn M. DeLuca, Esq. 

Laura Heslin, Esq. 

Assistant Attorneys General 

Office of the Attorney General 

 of the State of New York 

120 Broadway, 26th Floor 

New York, New York 10271 

kathryn.deluca@ag.ny.gov 

laura.heslin@ag.ny.gov 

 

Sean Murray, Mayor 

Kevin Hay, Village Administrator 

Village of Buchanan 

Municipal Building 

236 Tate Avenue 

Buchanan, NY 10511-1298 

smurray@villageofbuchanan.com

administrator@villageofbuchanan.com

 [Original signed by Herald M. Speiser ] 

 Office of the Secretary of the Commission 

Dated at Rockville, Maryland 

this 4th day of May, 2016