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Special Report 158 January 2006

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Contents 

Introduction 2

Processes, Turning Points, and Trends 3

State Building 6

Peacemaking 7

Role of Public Opinion in the Peace Process 12

Policy Implications 15

About the Report

The United States Institute of Peace’s Project on ArabIsraeli Futures is a research effort designed to anticipate 

and assess obstacles and opportunities facing the peace 

process in the years ahead. Stepping back from the dayto-day ebb and flow of events on the ground, this project 

examines deeper, over-the-horizon trends that could 

foreclose future options or offer new openings for peace. 

The effort brings together American, Israeli, and Arab 

researchers and is directed by Scott Lasensky, a senior 

research associate at the Institute.

In this report, Khalil Shikaki analyzes survey data gathered 

from dozens of polls conducted over the past decade 

and identifies long-term trends in Palestinian public 

opinion and related policy implications. Shikaki’s study is 

essential reading for policy planners on all sides. The first 

study in the series, The Future of the Israeli-Palestinian 

Conflict: Critical Trends Affecting Israel, by Yossi Alpher, was 

published in September 2005.

Khalil Shikaki is one of the foremost authorities on 

Palestinian public opinion and Palestinian national politics. 

The director of the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 

Research (PSR) in Ramallah, Shikaki holds a PhD from 

Columbia University. He has served as senior consultant to 

the Independent Task Force on Strengthening Palestinian 

Public Institutions and has written numerous essays in 

leading publications around the world.

Khalil Shikaki

Willing to Compromise

Palestinian Public Opinion and the Peace 

Process

Summary

•	 Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; to 

the contrary, over time the Palestinian public has become more moderate. Palestinian 

willingness to compromise is greater than it has been at any time since the start of 

the peace process. This increased willingness to compromise provides policymakers 

with greater room to maneuver.

•	 For the first time since the start of the peace process, a majority of Palestinians support a compromise settlement that is acceptable to a majority of Israelis. Therefore, 

the time is ripe to deal with permanent-status issues. In order to frame such a process 

more positively for Palestinians, any vision of a final settlement needs to have an 

Arab, as well as an international, stamp of approval.

•	 Palestinian opposition to violence increases when diplomacy proves effective. Public 

support for violence increases in an environment of greater pain and suffering and 

decreases when threat perception is reduced.

•	 Palestinian misperception of Israeli public attitudes is evident even when it comes to 

one of the core elements of the peace process: the two-state solution. Lack of normal 

personal interaction, because the only Israelis most Palestinians encounter are soldiers or armed settlers, encourages misperception and the desire to portray the other 

side negatively. 

•	 All major transformations in Palestinian politics were preceded or accompanied by 

changes in public attitudes. The 1993 Oslo accords led to greater public willingness 

to oppose violence and support peace, negotiations, and reconciliation with Israel. 

Islamists lost much of their public support during this period. 

•	 With the collapse of Oslo in 2000, Hamas reemerged as a credible alternative to the 

nationalist Fateh movement and the peace process. Recent years have also witnessed 

a significant decline in public support for the nationalist old guard, and the ascendance of a new young guard.
About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created 

by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets 

its congressional mandate through an array of 

programs, including research grants, fellowships, 

professional training, education programs from 

high school through graduate school, conferences 

and workshops, library services, and publications. 

The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by 

the President of the United States and confirmed 

by the Senate.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, ACCION 

International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder 

and former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. • 

Holly J. Burkhalter, Director of U.S. Policy, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic 

Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, 

Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, 

Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University 

• Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State 

Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S. 

Air Force; President, National Defense University • Barry 

F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

•	 By reducing threat perception, political and security stability has the advantage of 

reducing the appeal of violence and improving the prospects for Palestinian democracy. But only progress in the peace process can sustain such stability.

•	 In the absence of progress toward sustained stability, it is highly unlikely that Palestinians will find their way to democracy and good governance. If they do manage to 

produce a democracy under such adverse conditions, it will be one dominated by the 

rise of Hamas and a declining prospect for peace with Israel.

•	 The post-Arafat era shows more public optimism about the peace process and more 

willingness to compromise. Support for violence against Israelis, while still high, is 

declining. This period is also characterized by tougher competition between Fateh 

and Hamas, with the latter benefiting from weaker Palestinian Authority legitimacy 

at the local level, while corruption emerges as a weakness for Fateh and traditional 

nationalists.

Introduction

All major transformations in modern Palestinian politics were preceded or accompanied by 

changes in public attitudes. In the 1970s, universities, schools, and Israeli economic and 

security policies helped to shift power from the traditional commercial and feudal classes 

to the nationalists. By 1976, when the first Palestinian local elections took place in the 

West Bank, the nationalists were already in control of the Palestinian masses; the election 

outcome only confirmed that. The first Palestinian intifada, in the late 1980s, brought 

about a second transformation, leading to the emergence of political Islam as a mobilizing force, and the parallel emergence of nationalist young guards who gradually came to 

pose a challenge to the dominance of the PLO’s old guard in exile. As the first intifada 

was winding down, almost one-third of the public favored Islamist groups such as Hamas 

and Islamic Jihad. The third transformation reflected the impact of the 1993 Oslo peace 

process and the creation of the Palestinian Authority (PA), leading to greater public willingness to oppose violence and support peace, negotiations, and reconciliation with the 

state of Israel. In the midst of this phase, the Islamists lost much of their public support. 

The fourth transformation began with the eruption of the second intifada, in September 

2000, and led to the reemergence of Hamas, this time as a credible political and security 

challenge to the dominance of the nationalist Fateh and to the peace process. The second 

intifada also brought about a significant decline in the influence of the nationalist old 

guard, and the ascendance of the young guard. 

Findings throughout 2005 show that the post-Arafat environment is already shaping 

the formation of Palestinian public attitudes, which in turn are likely to influence the 

outcome of the next transformation in Palestinian political life. The post-Arafat era is 

characterized by a much tougher competition between Fateh and Hamas, with the latter 

benefiting from weaker PA legitimacy at the local level, with corruption emerging as a 

major weakness for the nationalists. Moreover, the post-Arafat era shows more public optimism about the peace process and more willingness to compromise. Support for violence 

against Israelis, while still high, is declining. 

This report examines major trends in Palestinian public opinion during the past two 

transformations: the one heralded by the Oslo peace process and the one brought about 

by the second intifada. It also examines the immediate effects of the death of Arafat, 

and the future trajectory this major event is likely to generate in public attitudes. The 

study first describes the basic process and turning points during the past decade and then 

outlines the basic trends in attitudes related to state building and peacemaking. It concludes with an assessment of the role of Palestinian public opinion in the peace process, 

and an examination of the policy implications that can be inferred from reviewing the 

basic trends in Palestinian attitudes. The study is based on more than one hundred polls 
conducted during the past eleven years by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey 

Research, under the author’s supervision, among Palestinians in the West Bank and the 

Gaza Strip.1

Two basic trends in state building are clear: the PA has gradually lost much of its 

popular legitimacy, and the competition between the nationalists and the Islamists has 

become fierce, with the dominance of Fateh becoming a thing of the past. Peacemaking 

trends have been mixed: over time, confidence in diplomacy dropped and support for 

violence increased, but surprisingly, willingness to compromise and support reconciliation 

continued to increase over time. In fact, Palestinian willingness to accept a two-state 

solution along with territorial and other compromises has never been as great as it is 

today. 

One should not underestimate the role of public opinion. Despite a narrow tolerance 

of dissent during the past decade, Palestinian public opinion played a significant role in 

empowering and constraining leaders. It gave or deprived them of legitimacy to act in 

ways that significantly affected the prospects for peacemaking and state building. But 

public opinion has also been subject to manipulation and framing and has fallen victim at 

times to misperception and ignorance. The realities on the ground constrained its ability 

to play a more positive role in the peace process. Heightened threat perception increased 

public support for violence, while progress in the peace process and state building generated optimism, leading to greater moderation. 

A policy aimed at articulating and promoting a permanent-status vision, reducing 

threat perception, and encouraging democratic norms and practices in the PA creates an 

environment conducive to progress in Palestinian state building and Palestinian-Israeli 

peacemaking. This conclusion is based on the following lessons, drawn from a review of 

past trends:

• By reducing threat perception, political and security stability has the advantage of 

reducing the appeal of violence and improving the prospects for Palestinian democracy. But only progress in the peace process can sustain such stability. 

• Palestinian public opinion is not an impediment to progress in the peace process; 

to the contrary, its increased willingness to compromise provides policymakers with 

greater room to maneuver. When progress is attained, it is likely to further reduce 

the appeal of violence, weaken radical groups, and consolidate Palestinian democratic 

tendencies. 

• A Palestinian transition to democracy is likely to increase tolerance for dissent, reduce 

misperception, and thereby positively contribute to the goal of peacebuilding. 

• Yet, in the absence of progress toward sustained stability, it is highly unlikely that 

Palestinians will find their way to democracy and good governance. 

• And if they do manage to produce a democracy under such adverse conditions, it 

will be one dominated by the rise of Hamas and a declining prospect for peace with 

Israel. 

The Political Context: Processes, Turning Points, and Trends

Two interacting processes have dominated Palestinian public life during the past decade: 

state building and peacemaking. The two processes have proved to be wholly interdependent—simply put, one could not succeed without the other. The dynamics of state 

building have affected two major issues: perception of PA legitimacy, and the domestic 

balance of power between nationalists and Islamists. Two major issues have been affected 

by the dynamics of peacemaking: perception of the role of violence, and the public’s 

willingness to support compromise in permanent-status issues such as borders, refugees, 

and Jerusalem.

Two basic trends in state building are clear: the PA has gradually lost much of its popular 

legitimacy, and the competition 

between the nationalists and the 

Islamists has become fierce, with 

the dominance of Fateh becoming a thing of the past.

Palestinian public opinion is not 

an impediment to progress in 

the peace process; to the contrary.

The United States Institute of Peace 

and Arab-Israeli Relations

The Institute is a leader among nongovernmental organizations working 

toward a peaceful resolution of the 

Arab-Israeli conflict. It has supported 

the work of more than two dozen 

resident scholars and fellows, provided 

more than 150 grants in this area 

totaling over five million dollars, published dozens of books and reports, and 

facilitated high-level dialogue between 

Israeli and Palestinian political and religious figures. The Institute also serves 

as a forum for promoting new thinking 

about U.S. policy and operates a variety 

of educational and professional training 

programs in the region.
The state-building trends, over the past decade but especially during the five years of 

the second intifada, have been negative on two counts: the PA has lost much of its popular legitimacy, and the domestic balance of power has shifted in favor of the Islamists. 

The turn to nationalism, which began in the 1970s and was first threatened during the 

first intifada, is now threatened much more forcefully; the primacy of nationalism can no 

longer be taken for granted. 

Three dynamics dominated state building during the second intifada: the empowerment 

of the Islamists, the fragmentation of the nationalist Fateh, and the gradual disintegration of the PA. The failure of the PA to build strong public institutions, combat corruption, respect human rights, and deliver good governance was responsible in part for its 

loss of legitimacy. But other factors also contributed to this outcome. The old guard of 

the Palestinian national movement failed to integrate the young guard nationalists into 

the political process, leading to rising internal dissent and fragmentation within Fateh. 

The inability of the nationalists to deliver an end to occupation at the end of the interim 

period led the public to shift loyalty to the Islamists, who opposed the peace process and 

believed in armed struggle. The Israeli restrictions and retaliatory measures against the 

PA security services and institutions during the second intifada further weakened the PA’s 

ability to deliver services at a time of extreme need. The Islamists proved more effective 

in providing various types of social services. By mid-2004, the combined Islamist strength 

of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists in the combined West Bank and Gaza 

Strip was greater than that of Fateh. For the first time since its establishment in 1987, 

Hamas became the largest political faction in the Gaza Strip, gaining the support of 29 

percent of Gazans, compared with 27 percent for Fateh. 

The rise of Hamas, an organization opposed both to a Palestinian-Israeli peace based 

on a two-state solution and to a nationalist-secularist Palestinian state, represented a 

threat to the two processes of state building and peacemaking. While Hamas’s integration 

into the Palestinian political process during the past few years has driven the movement 

toward adopting a more moderate view regarding these two processes, its views on the 

substantive nature of a peace agreement with Israel and its sociopolitical agenda remain 

highly problematic to most Palestinians. Nonetheless, the threat Hamas poses to the dominance of the nationalists provides a significant impetus to Palestinian democracy because 

it provides the political system with a serious political opposition for the first time since 

the creation of the PA. 

The death of Yasir Arafat in November 2004 gave the PA and the national movement 

the opportunity to reassess their performance and recapture some of the lost public 

confidence. But in the absence of Arafat, the Islamists were emboldened to challenge 

the dominance of Fateh at all levels, local and national. The competition between the 

two factions gained added momentum. The smooth transition of power in the PLO and 

PA hierarchies, despite gloomy expectations, created a more positive environment for 

the nationalists to take the lead and hold national elections, leading to the election of 

Mahmud Abbas by a large margin. Hamas’s decision to boycott the elections helped to 

weaken its standing among Palestinians. Meanwhile, however, public concern about PA 

corruption remained high, with the death of Arafat making the public even more doubtful 

of the nationalists’ capacity to deliver clean governance. PSR exit polls have shown that 

in local elections in December 2004 and in January and May 2005, in about 120 localities in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, voters rewarded Hamas candidates, perceived as 

uncorrupt, and punished those of Fateh, perceived as part of PA corruption. While at the 

national level voters’ considerations were similar to those of Fateh (focusing on revival 

of the peace process, improvement of the economy, and restoration of law and order), at 

the local level voters’ considerations tended to favor the Islamists (with a focus on clean 

government and efficient delivery of services). 

The peacemaking trends over the past decade have indicated both progress and reversals. While the first half of the decade witnessed progress toward peace and reconciliation, 

the second half saw a dramatic increase in the level of support for violence. Nonetheless, 

The failure of the PA to build 

strong public institutions, combat corruption, respect human 

rights, and deliver good governance was responsible in part 

for its loss of legitimacy.

The threat Hamas poses to the 

dominance of the nationalists 

provides a significant impetus 

to Palestinian democracy. 
the trends during the whole decade continued to be positive regarding public willingness 

to compromise. It is worth noting that despite the rise of the Islamists, the unprecedented levels of support for violence, and the increased public perception during the second 

intifada that violence pays, willingness to compromise, and support for reconciliation, 

have not been negatively affected. Indeed, over time the public has become more moderate. The death of Arafat has positively affected these trends. The post-Arafat changes 

are still fragile, but they point to a more optimistic outlook, more support for the peace 

process, and more willingness to compromise. Public perception of the role of violence, 

however, has been slow in changing. While 63 percent of voters elected Mahmud Abbas 

as the new president, only half supported his call to put an end to the “militarization” 

of the intifada. Indeed, most Palestinians continued to view the armed confrontations of 

the intifada as serving Palestinian national interests in ways that negotiations could not. 

Nonetheless, with a cease-fire in place in early 2005, public support for suicide attacks 

against Israelis dropped to less than half what it was six months before. 

As table 1 indicates, of the major turning points under consideration, the initial successes of the Oslo process have been the most effective in influencing state building 

and peacemaking throughout the past decade. Oslo positively affected the psychological 

environment of the Palestinians, encouraging moderation and reducing the appeal of 

violence. The PA quickly gained public legitimacy, the Islamists who boycotted the first 

Palestinian elections in 1996 suffered the consequences in public rejection, and the 

nationalists gained the lion’s share of public sympathy. The collapse of the Camp David 

II negotiations and the eruption of the second intifada have been highly negative in all 

aspects of state building. These setbacks also negatively affected peacemaking by making 

violence legitimate and popular. The Israeli unilateral disengagement policy—building a 

separation wall and withdrawing from Gaza without negotiations—only confirmed in the 

public mind the belief that violence pays, and, in doing so, rewarded the Islamists while 

making the PA more irrelevant than ever. Initial findings in the aftermath of Arafat’s 

death show changes in all aspects of the processes under discussion: some restoration of 

PA legitimacy; a tougher competition between Fateh and Hamas, with the nationalists 

regaining some of their lost support; an increase in support for the peace process and the 

willingness to compromise; and a decrease in the level of support for violence. 

Table 1. Impact of Turning Points on the Processes of State Building and Peacemaking 

(1993–2005)

Turning Points State-Building Process Peacemaking Process

PA Legitimacy Balance of Power Support for 

Violence

Willingness 

to 

Compromise

Oslo 1993–2000 Increased

Nationalists gain 

and Islamists lose 

in early period; 

later, nationalists lose, Islamists 

remain stable 

Decreased Increased

Camp David II and Intifada: July 2000–2004 Decreased Nationalists lose; 

Islamists win Increased Increased

Post-Arafat: November 

2004–December 2005 Increased

Nationalists win; 

Islamists lose some 

support 

Decreased Increased

To understand the apparent contradictions in the trends that point to higher support 

for Islamists and increased appreciation for violence at a time when willingness to compromise is on the rise, it helps to examine public motivation. Analysis of polling findings 

The Israeli unilateral disengagement policy only confirmed in 

the public mind the belief that 

violence pays.

Despite the rise of the Islamists, 

the unprecedented levels of 

support for violence, and the 

increased public perception during 

the second intifada that violence 

pays, willingness to compromise, 

and support for reconciliation, 

have not been negatively affected.
shows that the increase in support for the Islamists and violence does not necessarily 

reflect an ideological transformation—toward radical positions—that would be difficult 

to reverse. Rather, it demonstrates an angry response to the pain and suffering inflicted 

by Israeli occupation policies and retaliatory measures since the start of the second 

intifada. The anger led people to demand revenge and to support all types of violence 

against Israelis, including suicide attacks against civilians inside Israel. In other words, 

the increase in the level of support for violence and for the Islamists is correlated with 

the heightened threat perception. 

State Building

As indicated earlier, the dynamics of state building affected perception of PA legitimacy 

and the domestic balance of power. The trend over the past decade, but especially during 

the past five years, has been negative on both counts. Legitimacy has been measured by 

observing public responses since 1996 to four issues: status of PA democracy, measured by 

the level of positive public evaluation; PA performance, measured by the level of positive 

evaluation of overall performance by the PA’s various branches; existence of corruption in 

the PA, measured by public perception of corruption in PA institutions; and the popularity 

of the PA president. The domestic balance of power has been measured by tapping public 

support since 1993 for the different Palestinian factions and political parties. While not 

always occurring in parallel, shifts in the domestic balance of power showing disapproval 

of nationalists was associated with depreciation of PA legitimacy. 

As figure 1 shows, the year 1996, which witnessed the first Palestinian national elections, was the best year for PA legitimacy. However, by 2000, just before the eruption of 

the second intifada, all indicators were negative, with the PA losing much of its popular 

legitimacy. One year after the eruption of the intifada, further erosion in PA legitimacy 

could be detected. Legitimacy stabilized after the first year of the intifada, even though 

the perception of corruption continued to worsen. The post-Arafat era witnessed significant changes, restoring some elements of PA legitimacy. Positive evaluation of Palestinian democracy and PA performance increased considerably in less than a year. In his 

first year in office, Mahmud Abbas enjoyed greater popularity than Arafat did during his 

last four years. Perception of corruption, however, seems to be the PA’s Achilles heel, 

with the overwhelming majority 

of Palestinians believing in the 

existence of corruption in the PA. 

Similar majorities of voters in each 

of the rounds of local elections in 

December 2004, January 2005, 

and May 2005 have indicated that 

the incorruptibility of candidates 

has been the most important consideration, with candidates’ political affiliation coming fifth, after 

education, religiosity, and position on the peace process. Voters 

in these elections elected more 

Hamas than Fateh candidates in 

the Gaza Strip, and slightly fewer 

in the West Bank. 

The loss of PA legitimacy, the 

failure of the PA old guard to integrate the young guard nationalists 

into the political process, leading 

Perception of corruption seems 

to be the PA’s Achilles heel.

The increase in the level of support 

for violence and for the Islamists 

is correlated with the heightened 

threat perception.

Figure 1. Governance and Legitimacy (1996–2005)
to rising internal dissent and fragmentation within Fateh, and the failure of the PA to 

deliver an end to occupation at the end of the interim period or to deliver needed services 

during the second intifada led the public to abandon the nationalists and gradually shift 

loyalty to the Islamists. The Islamists, who opposed the peace process and advocated 

armed struggle against the Israeli occupation, proved uncorrupt and more effective in 

providing various types of social services. As figure 2 indicates, the Islamists, who suffered 

a severe blow when the peace process first started, regained the initiative with the eruption of the second intifada. Just before Arafat’s death, the Islamists became more popular 

than Fateh for the first time in Palestinian history. Only the death of Arafat reversed the 

trend, with the nationalists regaining much of their lost support.

The competition over local elections became fierce throughout 2005, leading to the 

emergence of a two-party system dominated by Hamas on the Islamist side and Fateh on 

the nationalist. Hamas, which has been the largest Islamist faction throughout the period 

under review, became even stronger within the Islamist camp, mainly because of electoral 

politics. Small Islamist groups, such as Islamic Jihad, were exposed as ineffective when 

competing against Fateh in elections. Fateh and Hamas won more than 90 percent of 

local council seats. 

Figure 2. Support for Fateh versus the Islamists in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip: 

1993–2005

2000: Poll taken in July 2000, before eruption of the second intifada

2001–2005: Support averages for each year 

Islamists include three groups: Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and independent Islamists

The dramatic decline in support for Fateh between 1996 and 2000 was accompanied 

by a significant decrease in public approval of Palestinian democracy and PA performance.

Support for Arafat dropped by one-third while perception of PA corruption increased by 

55 percent. The significant shift in the balance of power favoring the Islamists one year 

after the eruption of the second intifada was accompanied by continuation of the same 

pre-intifada trends.2

Peacemaking

Of the two major issues of peacemaking, one, perception of the role of violence, has 

seen significant fluctuations while the other, willingness to compromise, has seen steady 

progress toward moderation. Public support for violence and the belief that violence pays

declined during the first few years of the peace process. The stagnation in the political 

Just before Arafat’s death, the 

Islamists became more popular 

than Fateh for the first time in 

Palestinian history. 

The dramatic decline in support for Fateh between 1996 

and 2000 was accompanied by 

a significant decrease in public 

approval of Palestinian democracy 

and PA performance.

Of the two major issues of 

peacemaking, one, perception 

of the role of violence, has seen 

significant fluctuations while 

the other, willingness to compromise, has seen steady progress 

toward moderation.


process under the Israeli government of Netanyahu (1996–99) led to a gradual increase in 

support for violence. The eruption of the second intifada prompted a further increase. During 2003 and 2004, calls for a mutual cessation of violence increased significantly, accompanied by a slight drop in support for violence, but the belief that the armed intifada has 

helped Palestinians achieve national rights remained very strong. Once a cease-fire was in 

place in early 2005, support for suicide attacks against Israelis dropped significantly. The 

second issue of the peace process, willingness to compromise, was clearly evident in issues 

of borders and settlements, Jerusalem, and security. Moreover, Palestinians have gradually 

shown significant willingness to recognize the Jewish nature of the Israeli state and to 

accept an end to the conflict. Support for reconciliation based on a two-state solution 

remained solid despite the past five years of armed confrontations. 

In the mid-1990s the Oslo process helped change the psychological environment of 

the Palestinians, creating confidence in diplomacy and reducing the appeal of violence

and of the militant groups that continued to employ it. As figure 3 indicates, support for 

armed attacks on Israeli civilians, such as the suicide attacks of February and March 1996, 

did not exceed 20 percent. The Netanyahu period witnessed serious deterioration in the 

peace process, with little implementation of existing agreements on Israeli redeployment 

of forces out of Palestinian territories. The opening in September 1996 of a tunnel along 

parts of the Western Wall of al-Haram al-Sharif (Temple Mount), which was followed by 

several days of Palestinian-Israeli armed confrontations, heightened threat perceptions, 

raised questions about the value of diplomacy, and increased Palestinian support for violence. The failure of the Camp David summit and the eruption of the second intifada were 

followed by an increase in support for violence. This increase is correlated with greater 

threat perception on the part of Palestinians. The Israeli use of military force, including 

tanks, helicopter gunships, and F-16 bombers, against Palestinians inside populated areas, 

the Israeli imposition of collective punishment measures (such as closures, checkpoints, 

and restrictions on movement), the continued buildup of Jewish settlements in the occupied Palestinian territories, and the building of the separation barrier of concrete walls and 

barbed-wire fences inside the West Bank are examples of threats the Palestinians had to 

endure during the years of the second intifada. The anger generated by these measures led 

people to demand revenge and to support all types of violence against Israelis, including 

suicide attacks against civilians inside Israel.

Figure 3. Public Support for Violence against Israeli Civilians inside Israel (before and after 

the Second Intifada)

In fact, the level of support for the specific suicide attacks that took place in October 

2003 and September 2004 (75 percent and 77 percent, respectively) was much greater 

In the mid-1990s the Oslo process 

helped change the psychological 

environment of the Palestinians, 

creating confidence in diplomacy 

and reducing the appeal of violence.
than the level of support for the general idea of attacking civilians, measured at exactly 

the same periods (54 percent and 50 percent, respectively). The post-Arafat environment 

witnessed a gradual decrease in the level of violence and in Israeli collective punishment 

measures, as well as agreement on a cease-fire, which in turn significantly altered the 

prevailing trend, with a majority of Palestinians expressing opposition to attacks against 

Israeli civilians, including suicide attacks. Support for the Tel Aviv suicide attack that 

took place in March 2005 received the support of 29 percent and the opposition of 67 

percent. It is clear that once a mutual cease-fire was instituted, Palestinian threat perception diminished, and so did the level of support for violence and suicide attacks. In 

June 2005, in the wake of Israeli official announcement of plans to build thousands of 

housing units in Israeli settlements in the West Bank, support for violence against Israeli 

civilians increased again, reflecting increased Palestinian threat perception. Indeed, the 

June survey found a significant negative correlation between the belief that more Israeli 

settlements would be built in the West Bank in the future and a willingness to support 

collection of arms from armed Palestinian factions: 59 percent of those respondents who 

believed most settlements would be evacuated supported collection of arms, compared 

with only 28 percent of those who believed that many settlements would be added. 

Palestinian attitudes regarding the role of violence have been measured not only by 

gauging support for attacks against Israeli civilians but also by determining how widespread are (1) the belief that armed confrontations have helped achieve national rights 

in ways that negotiations could not, and (2) the perception of disengagement as a victory for armed struggle. A majority of Palestinians, responding to the July 2000 failure of 

the Camp David summit, believed that if Palestinians resorted to “confrontations” with 

the Israelis, such confrontations would help them achieve national rights in ways that 

negotiations could not.3 During the same period, the Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, 

seen by the public as an Israeli retreat under Hezbollah fire, provided the public with an 

alternative model to end the Israeli occupation. The public viewed positively the idea of 

emulating Hezbollah’s methods.4 Throughout the five years of intifada, a majority continued to view armed confrontations as helping Palestinians achieve national rights in ways 

that negotiations could not. The post-Arafat period saw no change in public perception 

on this matter. 

When the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan was first presented by Prime Minister 

Sharon, two-thirds of Palestinians viewed it as a victory for armed resistance. This perception was further consolidated throughout 2004 and 2005. Remarkably, respondents’ attitudes are almost identical with respondents’ perception of the prevailing public mood. In 

other words, the view that disengagement is a Palestinian victory is not only the attitude 

of respondents as individuals but also the normative attitude of society.5 It should be 

pointed out, however, that the belief that disengagement is victory is not leading more 

Palestinians to support violence against Israelis. Disengagement has helped change the 

order of priorities, with economic well-being, instead of ending occupation, gaining the 

top position. The changing perception of priorities has decreased the appeal of violence 

even as disengagement confirmed its value. 

Despite the increased support for violence during the second intifada and the increased 

belief among the majority in the positive utility of violence, support for the peace process 

among Palestinians has remained strong. Moreover, the increased public support for the 

Islamists has not diminished the public’s willingness to support compromise. The change 

in views regarding violence and the Islamists does not reflect an ideological transformation toward radical positions. Rather, it demonstrates an angry response to the pain and 

suffering inflicted by Israeli occupation policies and retaliatory measures, particularly 

since the start of the second intifada. Indeed, an examination of the views of Hamas supporters during 2003–2004 shows them divided on fundamental issues such as acceptance 

of the two-state solution (including the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state), the Road 

Map, the Geneva initiative, and reconciliation with the Israeli people. In other words, once 

the level of Hamas support increased, the group was no longer homogenous, because many 

of the new converts maintained their moderate views on the peace process.

Once a mutual cease-fire was 

instituted, Palestinian threat 

perception diminished, and so 

did the level of support for 

violence and suicide attacks.

When the Israeli unilateral disengagement plan was first presented 

by Prime Minister Sharon, two-thirds 

of Palestinians viewed it as a 

victory for armed resistance.
Moderation, particularly willingness to support compromise, can be seen in the consistent support for reconciliation based on a two-state solution and in the moderation of 

views on the core issues of the permanent-status agreement. When Palestinian respondents assumed the existence of a Palestinian state—recognized by the state of Israel and 

emerging as an outcome of a peace agreement between Palestine and Israel—support for 

reconciliation, between July 2000 and September 2005, ranged between two-thirds and 

three-quarters. In December, one month after Arafat’s death, support for reconciliation 

jumped to 81 percent.6

Indeed, a majority of Palestinians are willing to accept the two-state solution, even 

when this entails a formula whereby Palestinians recognize Israel “as the state of the 

Jewish people” and Palestine “as the state of the Palestinian people.” In June 2003, 52 

percent supported and 46 percent opposed this formula, and by September 2005 support 

rose to 63 percent and opposition dropped to 35 percent. 

Support for the different compromises of the permanent-status settlement has steadily 

increased since the start of the peace process. A further significant increase in willingness 

to support these compromises has been reported in the post-Arafat era. Figure 4 shows the 

change in attitudes during the past nine years on six issues: a demilitarized Palestinian 

state, final borders with territorial exchange, Jerusalem, refugees, security arrangements, 

and end of conflict. Compromises on each of these issues were presented to the Palestinian public as part of different packages. The first package was that of the Abu Mazin–Beilin, presented to the public in 1996. The second package was first discussed after the 

end of the Camp David summit in July 2000. The third was presented in December 2003 

as the Geneva Initiative, a package arrived at through nonofficial negotiations involving 

Palestinian and Israeli politicians and former negotiators. The fourth package contained 

the same compromises as those in the Geneva Initiative but was presented unlabeled, 

defined simply as a permanent-status package. Figure 4 shows that while the first package 

received the support of a small minority of 20 percent, the third received the support of 39 

percent, while the fourth received a majority support of 54 percent. No data is available 

on the second package, the Palestinian Camp David offer, but the levels of support for its 

components indicate that only a minority would have supported it. 

Figure 4. Support for the Compromises of the Core Elements of the Permanent Settlements 

as Outlined in the Abu Mazin–Beilin Plan in 1996, the Reported Palestinian Offer at Camp 

David in 2000, the Geneva Initiative in 2003, and a Proposed Permanent Settlement 

(Identical to the Geneva Initiative) in 2004

Although the compromises in the first three packages were not identical, most were 

similar. The essential compromises included a Palestinian state without an army; final 

10

A majority of Palestinians are willing 

to accept the two-state solution, even 

when this entails a formula whereby 

Palestinians recognize Israel “as the 

state of the Jewish people” and 

Palestine “as the state of the 

Palestinian people.”
borders along the 1967 lines, with a small area of settlements annexed to Israel in return 

for an equal area of Israel proper annexed to the Palestinian state; a division in Jerusalem whereby Palestinian neighborhoods and al-Haram al-Sharif (or Temple Mount) come 

under Palestinian sovereignty and the Jewish neighborhoods and the Wailing Wall come 

under Israeli sovereignty; a solution to the refugee problem based on UN resolution 194, 

whereby refugees are settled into the Palestinian state; security arrangements allowing 

a temporary Israeli military presence along the Jordan Valley; early-warning stations 

on mountaintops; and use of Palestinian airspace for training purposes. The security 

arrangements also called for the deployment of international forces in specific areas in 

the Palestinian state, particularly in the Jordan Valley.7

While surveys have consistently shown an overwhelming demand for an Israeli recognition of the refugees’ right of return, surveys among refugees have shown that only a 

small minority are interested in exercising that right by returning to the state of Israel.

PSR surveys, conducted in 2003 among 4,500 refugee families in the West Bank and Gaza 

Strip, Jordan, and Lebanon, found that only 10 percent of all refugees wanted to return 

to Israel and only 1 percent wanted Israeli citizenship. As figure 5 shows, the rest of the 

refugees preferred to exercise the right of return in the Palestinian state (31 percent) or 

in “swapped” areas, that is, areas now in Israel that would be transferred to Palestinian 

sovereignty in a permanent settlement (23 percent), for a total of 54 percent of refugees 

preferring to live in a Palestinian state. Only 17 percent of all refugees preferred to remain 

in a host country, almost all of them in Jordan, and 2 percent preferred to go to a third 

country such as Canada, a European country, the United States, or Australia. The surveys 

found that 13 percent of the refugees in all three locations polled refused any of these 

choices. Most of those wanted to go back to their homes but refused to do so as long as 

it meant having to live in Israel. While these surveys alone are not sufficient to make farreaching conclusions about future refugee behavior, they clearly indicate that refugees’ 

strong attachment to Palestinian national identity greatly reduces their motivation to live 

in a Jewish state or elsewhere outside a Palestinian state.

Figure 5. Refugees’ First Choice (Total Refugees in WBGS, Jordan, and Lebanon), January–

June 2003

The post-Arafat period witnessed additional changes to those already described above. 

The most interesting change is the rise in optimism among Palestinians in the West 

Bank and the Gaza Strip. This optimism may have been generated by public expectations that the man who replaced Arafat, Mahmud Abbas, is a moderate leader opposed 

to the violence of the intifada and is perceived positively by Israel, the United States, 

and the international community. Public perception of Arafat has probably been partly 

colored by Israeli and American portrayal of him as a hard-liner who was committed to 

violence. Optimism is best illustrated by public expectations regarding (1) the possibility 

of reaching a peace agreement with the current Israeli leadership, (2) the continuation 

11

Surveys among refugees have 

shown that only a small minority 

are interested in exercising that 

right by returning to the state 

of Israel.

The most interesting change is 

the rise in optimism among Palestinians in the West Bank and 

the Gaza Strip.
12

of violence and the return to negotiations, and (3) the chances of achieving reconciliation 

between the Israeli and Palestinian people.

On the first issue, the public was asked to express its views about four questions: (1) 

the way Arafat’s death would affect the chances for a peace agreement between Palestinians and Israelis; (2) the possibility of reaching a compromise with the current Israeli 

leadership of Ariel Sharon; (3) if a compromise is reached, the capacity of the current 

Israeli leadership to convince the majority of Israelis to support it; and finally, (4) the 

ability of the current Palestinian leadership (after Arafat) to convince the Palestinians to 

accept a compromise. A majority responded that Arafat’s death would lead to a greater 

chance for a peace agreement. Similarly, a majority responded affirmatively to the other 

three questions. For example, 53 percent believed that compromise with the current 

Israeli leadership is indeed possible, and only 34 percent believed that it is impossible. It 

is worth noting that in July 2001, ten months after the start of the second intifada, 46 

percent said the peace process had come to its end. 

Optimism is also evident in the change, after Arafat’s death, in public expectations 

and attitudes on (1) a return to negotiations and an end to violence, (2) the chances 

of reconciliation between the Israeli and the Palestinian peoples, and (3) the chances 

for implementation of the Road Map. Expectations that the two sides will soon return 

to negotiations almost doubled to 30 percent between September and December 2004. 

The expectations that the two sides will not return to negotiations and that violence will 

increase dropped dramatically to 12 percent. The percentage of those believing that reconciliation is not possible ever dropped from about half to one-third, and the percentage 

of those believing that reconciliation can be achieved in anywhere from a few years to 

one generation increased by a third to 39 percent. The belief that the Road Map can still 

be implemented increased by almost two-thirds to 46 percent.8

Most of these changes, however, did not last long. By mid-June 2005 optimism began 

to give way to a more somber assessment: expectations regarding a return to negotiations 

with no violence dropped to 23 percent, and belief that reconciliation between the two 

peoples will never be possible rose again to 46 percent. The perceived lack of progress in 

the peace process in the first half of 2005 (with Israeli army deployment in Palestinian 

areas hardly changed, settlement construction in the West Bank accelerating, closure and 

checkpoints remaining in place, and the separation barrier continuing to be built) damaged public optimism by lowering expectations. Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 

September 2005 restored some of the lost optimism, but not to levels seen nine months 

earlier.

The Role of Public Opinion in the Peace Process

Palestinian public opinion has at times been a driving force influencing policy changes 

in the PA as well as in the different Palestinian factions. At other times, however, it was 

shaped by events and fell victim to the harsh reality on the ground or to the deliberate 

framing of interest groups. Looking back at the record of the past decade, it is evident 

that Palestinian public opinion has been effective in several ways. It has given legitimacy 

to leaders and institutions and provided them with the political will to crack down on 

those who commit violence. In the second intifada, it deterred Palestinian leaders from 

cracking down on violence and gave political and social support and comfort to those 

who resorted to violence, and indeed voted them into office. The first Palestinian elections in January 1996 created a new political system just two months before the eruption 

of a series of suicide bombings against Israeli civilians inside Israel. Armed with new 

legitimacy, the new PA was able to crack down forcibly on the Islamists who organized 

the violence. The PA was further comforted by the fact that most Palestinians supported 

its crackdown. But during the second intifada the opposite was true. Lacking political 

Optimism is also evident in 

attitudes on (1) a return to 

negotiations and an end to 

violence, (2) the chances of 

reconciliation between the Israeli 

and the Palestinian peoples, and 

(3) the chances for implementation of the Road Map. 

Palestinian public opinion has at 

times been a driving force influencing policy changes. At other 

times, however, it was shaped by 

events and fell victim to the harsh 

reality on the ground or to the 

deliberate framing of 

interest groups.
13

legitimacy and confronted by a strong popular opposition committed to violence against 

Israelis, the PA found it hard to resort to the same methods it had used in 1996. The rise 

of Hamas during the second intifada, and its electoral victories in local Palestinian elections in 2004–05, are examples of the efficacy of public opinion. In the near future, public 

opinion may be called on to play an even more important role. Palestinian parliamentary 

elections in January 2006 are likely to introduce Hamas as a major parliamentary bloc. 

Palestinian public opinion can play a more direct role in peacemaking. We have seen 

in the previous sections that despite the rising militancy and the increased support for 

Islamists, Palestinians remained nonetheless supportive of a two-state solution; indeed, 

public willingness to compromise increased significantly. If the Palestinian leadership 

does hold a referendum on a permanent-status agreement, as Palestinian President 

Mahmud Abbas told a meeting of the Fateh Revolutionary Council in November 2004 he 

would, the public will most likely support it.

But public opinion is not always in the driver’s seat. At times it is subject to influences 

it has little control over. Any attempt to focus on the role of public opinion as a main 

driver to promote peace and reconciliation will have to contend with four constraints/

opportunities that influence that role. 

First, peacemaking and peacebuilding remain essentially a state-to-state and elite/

leadership business. The reasons for this are obvious. For one, the ability of public opinion to change the course of events (for example, to stop the cycle of violence and push 

toward moderation) is constrained by existing perceptions that the threats and stakes are 

high and existential (reducing motivation and willingness to challenge existing policies) 

and by mass pain and suffering and exposure to violence (eliciting emotional rather than 

rational responses, thus creating demands for revenge rather than forgiveness, which in 

turn increase the popularity of militant groups that are able to meet those demands by 

supplying the violence). Second, the Palestinian public has shown a willingness to defer 

to leaders of historical stature and to the collective wisdom of the state, believing that 

leaders, particularly those enjoying legitimacy derived from the legacy of the national 

movement, know best. Such beliefs reduce trust in private and civil society initiatives, 

particularly when leaders refuse to embrace them. The third factor making peacebuilding 

essentially a state-to-state and elite/leadership enterprise is that although Palestinians 

now exhibit greater political pluralism, tolerance of dissent, particularly as it relates to 

the prolonged and indeed historic conflict with Israel, is limited. Failure by the PA to create a democratic political system during the nineties, and its inability to enforce law and 

order, further inhibited free and honest debate on sensitive subjects such as the refugee 

problem and the resort to violence against Israeli civilians.

Second, misperceiving the views of the other side as hard-line reduces the motivation to moderate one’s views. Similarly, ignorance of the moderate views of one’s own 

side reduces the expectation that peace is possible.9 For most Palestinians, their only 

interaction with Israelis is the one imposed at gunpoint by soldiers and armed settlers. 

Lack of normal personal interaction feeds misperceptions and the desire to portray the 

other side negatively. Palestinian misperception of Israeli public attitudes is evident even 

when it comes to one of the core elements of the peace process: the two-state solution. 

Palestinians tend to perceive Israelis as having a hard-line position and being reluctant to 

embrace the peace process. When Palestinians were asked in June 2003 what they believe 

the majority of Israelis think about a two-state solution, whereby Palestinians recognize 

Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Israel recognizes Palestine as the state for 

the Palestinian people, only 37 percent believed that most Israelis support such a solution. (See figure 6 below.) In fact, a survey conducted among Israelis simultaneously with 

the Palestinian survey showed 65 percent of Israelis supporting the two-state solution. 

Misperceiving the views of the Israelis as hard-line relieves the Palestinians of having to 

press their own leadership for peace and makes them more disposed to blame the other 

side for failure to reach a peace agreement.

The rise of Hamas during the 

second intifada, and its electoral 

victories in local elections in 

2004–05, are examples of the 

efficacy of public opinion. 

If the Palestinian leadership does 

hold a referendum on a permanentstatus agreement, the public will 

most likely support it. 

For most Palestinians, their only 

interaction with Israelis is the one 

imposed at gunpoint by soldiers 

and armed settlers. 
14

Ignorance of the moderate views of one’s own majority prevents such views from 

becoming normative and thus reduces one’s hopes for peace, leading to more pessimistic 

expectations for the future. Such ignorance impedes efforts of leaders to capitalize on 

existing public moderation. When asked what they think the majority of Palestinians 

think about the two-state solution described above, a majority of Palestinians thought 

that most would reject it, and only 40 percent thought most would accept it. In fact, as 

figure 6 below indicates, a majority of 52 percent supported the two-state solution.

Figure 6. Support and Opposition to a Two-State Solution, Based on Israel as the State 

for the Jewish People and Palestine as the State for the Palestinian People (Palestinian 

respondents, June 2003)

Third, the Palestinian public is vulnerable to efforts by leaders and groups to shape its 

preferences by framing the debate on specific issues in the pubic domain.10 This framing 

can be most effective when it comes from individuals and groups enjoying legitimacy 

in the eyes of the public. One example of the impact of framing is the change in the 

Palestinian public response to a similar or identical refugee compromise. In April 2003, 

a majority of 52 percent supported a solution to the refugee problem presented to the 

public as one that was discussed at the Israeli-Palestinian Taba negotiations in January 

2001. In December 2003, a similar compromise, presented to the public as part of the 

larger Geneva Initiative, received the support of only 25 percent. While some of the disparity is due to the minor differences between the two solutions, the big difference was 

probably caused by the negative framing that met the release of the Geneva Initiative by 

refugee groups and several senior Palestinian leaders. One year later, when Palestinians 

were presented with the same compromise as that of December 2003, support increased 

to 46 percent. The December 2004 survey presented the compromise as part of a possible 

proposal for a permanent-status solution; no mention was made of the Geneva Initiative. 

It is clear that omitting the reference to the Geneva Initiative has been in part responsible for the change in public attitude. Moreover, it is possible that one year later the 

framing effect may have become much less potent. 

Finally, optimism and pessimism play a role in shaping Palestinian public attitudes. 

PSR surveys have shown that the more optimistic the Palestinian public is, the more willing it is to accept compromise. Optimism and pessimism in this case have been measured 

by responses to questions regarding expectations of “what will happen now?” Optimists 

are those who expect Palestinian-Israeli negotiations to resume and violence to stop, and 

pessimists are those who expect violence to continue and believe the two sides will not 

return to negotiations. A sizable group falls in the middle, between the optimists and 

the pessimists. Optimism creates hope, which can in turn motivate the public to better 

articulate, aggregate, and promote its more moderate views. Pessimism darkens one’s 

horizon, reduces the willingness to take risks, and pulls the public to the sideline. 

Ignorance of the moderate views 

of one’s own majority reduces one’s 

hopes for peace, leading to more 

pessimistic expectations for 

the future.
15

Policy Implications

Three trends of long-term significance and three related policy implications emerge from 

this study. First, Palestinians are becoming more willing to compromise. Today, willingness 

to compromise is greater than it has been at any time since the start of the peace process. 

That this trend persisted even during the worst days of the second intifada attests to its 

depth. Second, public demand for violence is not stable; it responds to threat perception, 

to the level of pain and suffering imposed by the policies and actions of Israel. Positive 

stimuli that take measures to end the Israeli occupation produce greater rejection of 

violence, while steps that seek to inflict punishment increase support for violence. Third, 

processes of state building and peacemaking are highly interdependent. Therefore, any 

attempt at understanding the failures and successes of peacemaking in the PalestinianIsraeli conflict requires full awareness of the interplay between the two processes: state 

legitimacy and democracy facilitate peacebuilding and must not be sacrificed for the sake 

of short-term security gains.

The first policy implication should be obvious: the time is ripe for a permanent-status 

agreement. For the first time since the start of the peace process, a majority of Palestinians support a compromise settlement that is acceptable to a majority of Israelis.

Leadership is needed to articulate a clear permanent-status vision, educate the public, 

and positively influence the framing process. The Bush administration can take the lead 

in this regard by articulating its own vision for permanent peace, perhaps by announcing 

“the Bush parameters.” Giving the permanent-status vision an Arab, as well as a general 

international, stamp of approval can help frame it in a positive light for the Palestinians. 

A greater involvement of the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United 

Nations, and Russia) in formulating that vision could also reduce negative framing effects. 

Greater communication among Palestinians, obtainable through greater democracy and 

greater tolerance for dissent, would reduce collective ignorance. In other words, success 

in producing greater Palestinian democracy can facilitate peacemaking and peacebuilding. Greater exchange between Palestinians and Israelis is likely to reduce misperceptions 

and increase each side’s willingness to compromise and take risks. Projects aiming at 

promoting free exchange between Palestinians and Israelis, people-to-people, can help 

reduce the negative effects of misperceptions. 

The second policy implication relates to the role of violence. Public support for violence increases in an environment of greater pain and suffering and decreases when 

threat perception is reduced. Moreover, opposition to violence increases when diplomacy 

proves effective. In other words, measures of collective punishment and humiliation, such 

as those used by the Israelis during the past five years, are counterproductive. The United 

States and the international community can help change Palestinian public perceptions 

regarding the role of violence by advising Israel to put an end to its closure regime, stop 

the humiliation at checkpoints, freeze settlement construction, and cease land confiscation and house demolitions. Termination of negotiations when violence erupts leaves 

the public dependent on violence as the only means to address grievances and deliver 

gains. Unilateral steps, when taken in the middle of the violence, as was the Israeli disengagement plan, strengthen public confidence in violence. The United States and the 

international community can reduce the negative consequences of Israeli unilateral steps 

by pressing Israel to negotiate future disengagement plans with the Palestinian Authority. 

This can be done by embedding such disengagement plans into the Quartet Road Map. 

The third policy implication focuses on the link between democracy and the peace 

process. The overwhelming majority of Palestinians embrace both democratic political 

values and the peace process. Moreover, it has become evident over the past decade that 

lack of good governance has led to weak political institutions, widespread corruption, and 

the exclusion of the Islamists and young guard nationalists from the political process. As a 

result, weak PA institutions have failed to deliver on Palestinian peace commitments, just 

as they have failed to deliver vital services to the Palestinian public. Gradually the PA lost 

Today, willingness to compromise 

is greater than it has been at 

any time since the start of the 

peace process. 

The time is ripe for a permanentstatus agreement. 

Success in producing greater Palestinian democracy can facilitate 

peacemaking and peacebuilding.

The United States and the international community can help 

change Palestinian public perceptions by advising Israel to put 

an end to its closure regime, stop 

the humiliation at checkpoints, 

freeze settlement construction, 

and cease land confiscation and 

house demolitions.

The overwhelming majority of 

Palestinians embrace both democratic political values and the 

peace process.
much of its legitimacy, which in turn emboldened its opposition to challenge its authority, 

leading to the creation of a state within a state. Perceiving a diminishing legitimacy, the 

PA leadership has lost the political will to enforce law and order or bring to account those 

who refuse to respect its security obligations. Moreover, the Islamists, who are perceived 

by the Palestinian public as uncorrupt, have managed to gain greater public credibility and 

respect, leading to a significant change in the domestic balance of power, which weakened 

the nationalists, who remain the backbone of the peace process. 

It is clear today that only by creating a more open and inclusive political system, one 

that fights corruption while integrating Islamists and young guard nationalists into itself, 

can the Palestinians finally deal effectively with violence and empower their leadership 

to enforce its security commitments in the peace process. As the Palestinians examine 

their security commitments under the Road Map, it is clear that the quickest and most 

effective security reforms are those that seek to provide the Islamists the means to influence public policy from within, rather than from outside, the political institutions. Any 

attempt to forcibly disarm the Islamists and dissolve their militias is likely to fail the test 

of public support. Only by fighting corruption, including the removal of many of the top 

security officials, can the nationalist PA regain the support of the majority of the Palestinian public. Concerns about the impact of anticorruption steps on the PA’s ability to deliver 

short-term security should not be allowed to paralyze the PA, since that might lead to 

greater insecurity in the mid and long term.

Notes

1. Data used in this study are taken from polls by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research 

(PSR). These surveys were conducted among Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Average sample 

size in each survey is about 1,300, and the margin of error is 3 percent. The questionnaires for some of the 

surveys used in this piece were designed by Yaacov Shamir, professor of communication and journalism at Hebrew 

University and formerly at the United States Institute of Peace, and Khalil Shikaki. The surveys were conducted 

jointly with the Truman Institute at Hebrew University. All surveys used in this study can be found at the PSR 

Web site: http://www.pcpsr.org/survey/index.html.

2. See figure A1 at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158/appendix.html. 

3. See figure A2 at ibid.

4. In July 2000, 63 percent of Palestinians believed that the Hezbollah model should be emulated. 

5. See figure A3 at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr158/appendix.html.

6. See figure A4 at ibid.

7. See table A1 at ibid.

8. See table A2 at ibid.

9. See Jacob Shamir and Khalil Shikaki, “Public Opinion in the Israeli-Palestinian Two-Level Game,” Journal 

of Peace Research 42, no. 3 (May 2005): 311–28).

10. Ibid.

The quickest and most effective 

security reforms are those that 

seek to provide the Islamists the 

means to influence public policy 

from within, rather than from 

outside, the political institutions.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found at our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.