Filed: March 12, 2002

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 01-1975(L)

(CA-01-107, CA-01-139)

Christopher Langdon,

Plaintiff - Appellant,

versus

J. J. Swain, et al.,

Defendants - Appellees.

ORDER

The court amends its opinion filed February 20, 2002, as

follows:

On page 2, section 1, line 3 -- “Lacy H. Thornburg, District

Judge;” is added.

For the Court - By Direction

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

 

CHRISTOPHER LANGDON,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

J. J. SWAIN; JACK MURDOCK; F. D.

No. 01-1975

MARTIN; DAVE HENDERSON, All

Current or Former Employees of the

North Carolina Department of

Transportation,

 Defendants-Appellees.

 

CHRISTOPHER LANGDON,

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 v.

J. J. SWAIN; JACK MURDOCK, F. D.

MARTIN; DAVE HENDERSON, And All

Current or Former Employees of the

N.C. Department of Transportation;

LYNDO TIPPETT, Secretary of

No. 01-2019

Transportation of the State of North

Carolina; NORTH CAROLINA

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION;

ROY COOPER, Attorney General of

North Carolina; NORTH CAROLINA

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; THE

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF

NORTH CAROLINA,

 Defendants-Appellees.

 
Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Western District of North Carolina, at Asheville.

Lacy H. Thornburg, District Judge;

Max O. Cogburn, Magistrate Judge.

(CA-01-107, CA-01-139)

Submitted: January 31, 2002

Decided: February 20, 2002

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

____________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

____________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Christopher Langdon, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Orr Crawford, III,

NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Raleigh, North

Carolina; Lisa Carol Glover, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT

OF TRANSPORTATION, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellees.

____________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See

Local Rule 36(c).

____________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

 In these consolidated appeals, Christopher Langdon appeals

the

district court's dismissal of his two civil actions against the

Appellees, seeking 1) to invalidate the state statutes of limitations

relied on

as defenses to his previous state actions against the Appellees

arising

2
from a 1995 landslide on his property, and 2) monetary damages

for

a taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Having reviewed the

parties' filings, the district court's opinion and orders, and the

record

on appeal, we affirm. Additionally, we grant the Appellees'

motion

to file supplemental materials, deny Langdon's motions for

sanctions,

deny Langdon's motion to strike Appellees' informal brief, and

deny

Langdon's motion for default judgment.

 Turning to the merits of Langdon's appeal, we find his actions

were properly dismissed by the district court. As the district

court

noted, Langdon's prior state actions named the North Carolina

Department of Transportation ("NCDOT") as defendant and

addressed issues arising from the same incidents at issue here.

However, in federal court Langdon named only the NCDOT in the first

complaint and four employees of the NCDOT in the separate complaint alleging an improper taking. We find Langdon's first action

was properly subject to dismissal on the basis of res judicata.

Bockweg v. Anderson, 428 S.E. 2d 157, 161 (N.C. 1993); Caswell Realty

Assoc. I, L.P. v. Andrews Co., 496 S.E.2d 607, 610 (N.C. Ct. App.

1998). Further, because takings actions sound against

governmental

entities rather than individual state employees in their

individual

capacities, see Monell v. Department of Social Services of the

City of

New York, 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978); see also Kentucky v. Graham,

473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985), Langdon's second federal suit was

properly

subject to dismissal either based on res judicata, in light of the

complete identity of the parties and issues involved, see Bockweg,

428

S.E. 2d at 161; Caswell, 496 S.E.2d at 610, or for failure to state

a

claim. Accordingly, we find no error in the district court's

dismissal

of Langdon's actions as frivolous or malicious under 28 U.S.C.A.

§ 1915(e)(2) (West Supp. 2001).*

 Langdon also raises two additional assignments of error,

which we

also find to be meritless. First, we find no abuse of discretion in

the

district court's denial of Langdon's motion to recuse the district

court

judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994). See United States v.

DeTemple, 162 F.3d 279, 283 (4th Cir. 1998). Second, we find no

____________________________________________________________

 *We reiterate the district court's warning that continuing to

file frivolous or malicious pleadings in this Court or the district court

could lead

to the imposition of sanctions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11.

3
abuse of discretion in the court's granting Appellees' motion to

reopen the period for filing their answer pursuant to Fed. R. Civ.

P.

6. See Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates

Ltd.,

507 U.S. 380, 392 (1993); Mendez v. Elliot, 45 F.3d 75, 79 (4th Cir.

1995).

 For these reasons, we affirm the dismissal of Langdon's civil

actions and dispense with oral argument because the facts and

legal

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court

and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

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