NO. 07-08-00478-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO
PANEL D DECEMBER 14, 2010

R. WAYNE JOHNSON, APPELLANT

v. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, WYLIE HEARN, APPELLEES

FROM THE 223RD DISTRICT COURT OF GRAY COUNTY; NO. 35376; HONORABLE LEE W. WATERS, JUDGE

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant R. Wayne Johnson, acting pro se , appeals the trial court’s dismissal of his civil suit against the Te xas Department of Criminal Justice and Wylie Hearn. 1 We will affirm.

1 Johnson’s original petition states he is incarcerated in the Clements Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, whic h we judicially notice is located in Potter County. His petition describes Wylie Hearn as “unit wa rden.”2 Background

Johnson filed suit in the 233 rd District Court of Gray County, asserting the defendants were violating Article I, Se ction 7 of the Texas Constitution 2 by maintaining chapels on state property, and vi olating his rights under Articl e I, Section 6 of the Texas Constitution 3 by holding chapel services on Sunday rather than on Saturday. Johnson’s petition also complained that warden Hearn’s permitting a Methodist to conduct worship services on Sunday rather than Saturday 4 constituted the promotion of false and “fraudulent” religion. His petit ion asked for injunctive relief to enjoin the defendant’s “unconstitutional practices,” and asked that Hearn individually be assessed $2.5 million in damages for fraud.
The trial court dismissed Johnson’s suit by an order that cites both Chapter 11 and Chapter 14 of the Civil Prac tices and Remedies Code. As the trial court’s order states, Johnson has been declared a vexatious litigant, and the 156 th district court of Bee County entered a prefili ng order requiring that he obtain permission of a local administrative judge before filing new litigation in a Texas court. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 11.101 et seq . (Vernon 2002); In re R. Wayne Johnson , No. 07-09- 0035-CV, 2009 Tex. App. Lexis 6831, *4-5 (T ex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 27, 2009, orig. proceeding) (per curiam, mem. op.). The tria l court’s dismissal order found that Johnson

2 Tex. Const. art. I, § 7.

3 Tex. Const. art. I, § 6.

4 Johnson’s petition refers to Saturday as “his Sabbath” and asserts the position Saturday worship is required by Scripture.3 had neither sought nor received permission from t he local administrative judge to file his petition. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Re m. Code Ann. § 11.103(a) (c lerk may not file suit of vexatious litigant subject to prefiling order unless litigant obtains order from local administrative judge permitting filing). The trial court’s dismissal order also found that Johnson’s claim had no arguable basis in law, citing section 14. 003 of the Civil Practice an d Remedies Code. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003 (Vernon 2009).
Johnson filed a notice of appeal fr om the trial court’s dismissal order. After filing his brief in this Court, Johnson later fil ed a document asserting that the Bee County district court’s prefiling order is void. We have considered that document as a supplement to Johnson’s brief.
Analysis
We generally review a trial court's dism issal of an inmate's suit under Chapters 11 and 14 for abuse of discretion. See Wilson v. Texas Dep't of Crim. JusticeInstitutional Div., 268 S.W.3d 756, 758 (Tex. App.--Waco 2008, no pet.) ;Thompson v. Texas Dep't of Crim. Justice-Institutional Div., 33 S.W.3d 412, 414 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied) (Chapter 14); Scott v. Tex. Dep’t of Crim. JusticeInstitutional Div., No. 13-07-00718-CV, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 8941, *5 (Tex.App.-- Corpus Christi Nov. 20, 2008, no pet.) (Chapter 11). A trial c ourt abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without refe rence to guiding rules or principles. Garcia v. Martinez , 988 S.W.2d 219, 222 (Tex . 1999). When reviewing4 matters committed to the trial court's disc retion, we may not substitute our own judgment for that of the trial court. Walker v. Packer , 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992).
We will begin by addressing Johnson’s cont ention the Bee County district court’s prefiling order is void. He ar gues the order is void because it was obtained by Attorney General John Cornyn in litigation in the district court of Bee County, and the Attorney General by statute lacks authority to represent the State of Texas in district court. Johnson has made the same argument previously in this Court. In re R. Wayne Johnson , No. 07-07-0431-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXI S 5795 (Tex.App.--Amarillo July 27, 2009, orig. proceeding). We addressed and rejected the argument on that occasion, and reject it here for the same reasons.
Johnson’s appellate brief asserts the tria l court abused its di scretion by entering its dismissal order. 5 His argument in support of the issue, however, also repeats contentions we have addressed previously. Johnson does not challenge the trial court’s finding he failed to seek and obtain permission fo r the filing of his pet ition, but generally argues Chapter 11 of the Civ il Practice and Remedies Co de contravenes the United States Constitution and thus is made void by the Supremacy Clause. We previously have considered and rejected these sa me contentions by Johnson. In re R. Wayne Johnson, No. 07-09-0035-CV, 2009 Tex.App. LEXI S 6831 (Tex.App.--Amarillo Aug. 27, 2009, orig. proceeding); In re R. Wayne Johnson, No. 09-0008-CV, 2010 Tex.App. LEXIS 3584 (Tex.App.--Amarillo May 11, 2010, orig. proceeding); In re R. Wayne

5 In places in his brief, Johnson seems to argue the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant him permission to file hi s original petition. This argument is misdirected. Johnson did not ask the trial cour t, or the local admini strative judge, for permission to file his petition.5 Johnson, No. 07-07-0245-CV, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 5110 (Tex.App.--Amarillo July 9, 2008, orig. proceeding). We have examined hi s appellate brief and find nothing new in the contentions he presents in this appeal. We see nothing to be gained by reiterating here our previous holdings on chal lenges Johnson has brought against the constitutionality of Chapter 11, and we overrule his appellate issues for the reasons we have stated previously.
Except for one general reference to “state laws,” which may include Chapter 14, Johnson’s brief does not menti on the trial court’s finding his suit was properly dismissed under that chapter. 6 In any event, because we have overruled his challenges to application of chapter 11 in this case, further discussion of the application of chapter 14 is unnecessary to disposition of the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1. 7

Accordingly, the trial court’s dismissal order is affirmed.
James T. Campbell Justice

6 We note also that Johnson filed a sworn statement in the trial court asserting his indigence, but did not file the affidavit required by § 14.004, identifying other suits he has filed. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.004 (Vernon 2009). His failure to do so provides another basis for the tr ial court’s dismissal of his suit. See Clark v. J.W. Estelle Unit, 23 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex.App.—Houston [1 st Dist.] 2001, pet. denied) (court may presume claim is substantially si milar under § 14.003(b)(4) to previous claim filed by inmate in absence of affidavi t describing previous claims).

7 Johnson’s brief contains also other c onclusory statements, including assertions that the trial court’s applicat ion of chapter 11 violates t he separation of powers under the Texas Constitution and that the trial court’ s order constitutes a crime. We read these statements as additional argu ments in support of Johnson’ s premise that the dismissal order is violative of the constitution. To any extent they are additional appellate issues, they are overruled.