a

GAO

United States General Accounting Office

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2002 INFORMATION 

TECHNOLOGY

DOD Needs to 

Improve Process for 

Ensuring 

Interoperability of 

Telecommunications 

Switches

GAO-02-681
Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense

(DOD) requires that its

communications systems be

interoperable: that is, that they

work together seamlessly so that

the right information gets to the

right people at the right time.

GAO was asked to examine

DOD’s process for certifying and

authorizing interoperability; how

the process was being applied,

including whether contracting

laws and regulations have been

violated; and the impact of DOD’s

application of the process on

competition.

June 2002

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

DOD Needs to Improve Process for

Ensuring Interoperability of

Telecommunications Switches

This is a test for developing Highlights for a GAO report. The full report, including GAO's objectives, scope, methodology, and analysis is available

at www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-681. For additional information about the report, contact Randolph C. Hite (202-512-3439). To provide comments

on this test highlights, contact Keith Fultz (202-512-3200) or e-mail HighlightsTest@gao.gov.

Highlights of GAO-02-681, a report to Congressional Requesters.

What GAO Recommends

To assist DOD in achieving its

goal of ensuring network

interoperability, GAO

recommends short- and long-term

actions that focus on the

department’s need to revise its

switch certification and

authorization process to ensure

that it is complete, current,

transparent to stakeholders, and

enforceable.

DOD concurred with the

recommendations and stated that

their implementation should

improve the department’s

certification process for telecom

switches.

United States General Accounting Office

What GAO Found

DOD does not have a well-defined process, including clear requirements,

for certifying and authorizing telecommunications (telecom) switches.

DOD’s process is not fully documented, current, or complete.

Additionally, the process lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. As

a result, DOD is increasing the risk that its certification and authorization

process will be applied inconsistently and that the department’s

telecommunications will experience future interoperability problems.

DOD attributed these weaknesses to the fact that the process is relatively

new and still evolving.

Further, DOD has not applied its telecom switch certification and

authorization process consistently across vendors, and it has in some

cases violated the department’s interoperability policy. For example,

while the Army required one vendor to remove its uncertified switch

from one location, it allowed another vendor to install its uncertified

switch at two locations, which violated the policy. However, in reviewing

this and other examples of DOD’s application of the interoperability

certification and authorization process, GAO did not find that contracting

laws and regulations had been violated.

Moreover, DOD’s application of its telecom switch certification and

authorization process is influencing vendors’ plans for competing for the

department’s business. For example, one of five vendors we interviewed

stated that it has stopped doing business with DOD for economic reasons

(the costs associated with testing and certification exceed potential

business opportunities). Another vendor stated that it is reconsidering its

participation because of the department’s inconsistent application of the

process. Within the department itself, positions are mixed regarding the

impact of the process on DOD’s goal to encourage vendor competition.

Overview of department’s process for certifying and authorizing telecom switches. Each of the

seven process areas consists of multiple steps and decision points.

Install and 

connect switch to 

the network

Authorize

installation and 

connection of 

switch to the 

network

Validate test 

results

Appeal test 

results

Test 

switch 

Request interim authority to operate

Schedule switch 

for testing or

meeting to request 

an interim 

authority to 

operate

Install and 

connect switch to 

the network

Authorize

installation and 

connection of 

switch to the 

network

Validate test 

results

Appeal test 

results

Test 

switch 

Request interim authority to operate

Schedule switch 

for testing or

meeting to request 

an interim 

authority to 

operate

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

G A O

Accountability Integrity Reliability

Highlights
Page i GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

Contents

Letter 1

Recommendations for Executive Action 2

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 3

Appendixes

Appendix I: Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing to Staffs of 

Senators Helms and Warner 6

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense 93

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 96

GAO Contact 96

Staff Acknowledgments 96

Abbreviations

C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

DOD Department of Defense

telecom telecommunications
Page 1 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

United States General Accounting Office

Washington, D.C. 20548

A

June 28, 2002 Letr

The Honorable Jesse Helms

The Honorable John Warner

United States Senate

In November 1992, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a policy 

requiring systems to be interoperable.1

 In May 2000, the department began 

to enforce this policy for telecommunications (telecom) switches,2

requiring them to be tested and certified for interoperability before being 

installed for operational use within the DOD network. In response to your 

request, we determined (1) DOD’s process for certifying and authorizing 

the interoperability of telecom switches; (2) how the process is being 

applied, including whether contracting laws and regulations have been 

violated; and (3) how the process affects vendor competition.

On April 19, 2002, we briefed your staffs on the results of our review. This 

report transmits to the Secretary of Defense the briefing materials and the 

recommendations that we specified in the briefing. The full briefing, 

including our scope and methodology, is reprinted in appendix I. In 

summary, we made three major points:

• DOD does not have a well-defined process, including clear 

requirements, for certifying and authorizing telecom switches. DOD’s 

process is not fully documented, current, or complete. Additionally, the 

process lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. Without a welldefined process and effective enforcement, DOD increases the risk that 

its certification and authorization process will be applied inconsistently 

and that the department’s telecommunications will experience future 

interoperability problems. DOD officials attributed the weaknesses to 

the process being relatively new. 

• Second, DOD has not applied its telecom switch certification and 

authorization process consistently across vendors, and it has in some 

cases violated policy. For example, while the Army required one vendor 

to remove its uncertified switch from one location, it allowed another 

1

Interoperability is the ability of systems to work together effectively and efficiently so that 

the right information gets to the right people at the right time.

2 Telecom switches are hardware and software designed to send and receive voice, data, and 

video signals across a network.
Page 2 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

vendor to install its uncertified switch at two locations, which violated 

the department’s policy. However, in reviewing this and other examples 

of DOD’s application of the interoperability certification and 

authorization process, we did not find that contracting laws and 

regulations had been violated. Again, DOD attributed these 

inconsistencies to the process being relatively new and still evolving.

• Third, DOD’s application of its telecom switch certification and 

authorization process is influencing vendors’ plans for competing for 

the department’s business. One of five vendors we interviewed stated 

that it has stopped doing business with DOD for economic reasons (i.e., 

the costs associated with testing and certification exceed potential 

business opportunities). Another vendor stated that it is reconsidering 

its participation because of the department’s inconsistent application of 

the process. Within DOD, positions are mixed on the impact of the 

department’s interoperability goal on competition. 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

To ensure network interoperability and address the potential impact on 

competition for telecom switch vendors, we recommend that the Secretary 

of Defense advance the state of maturity of DOD’s telecom switch 

certification and authorization process by directing the Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the DOD authority responsible for the process, to 

take the following near-term and long-term actions to improve the process. 

In the near term, 

• use the process flowcharts provided in the following briefing to assist in 

fully documenting the existing certification and authorization process, 

and 

• make this fully documented process available to DOD and vendor 

process stakeholders within 60 days.

In the longer term, revise the existing process (including switch 

requirements) to ensure that it is complete, current, transparent to 

stakeholders, and enforceable by the Joint Staff, and issue a revised 

process to all stakeholders within 180 days. In doing so, the Chairman 

should

• work jointly with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, 

Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I), since this organization 
Page 3 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

is responsible for the interoperability policy and for providing guidance 

and oversight;

• solicit DOD and vendor input on needed process changes; and

• seek DOD and vendor comments on a draft of the revised process 

before it is issued in final form.

We also recommend that the Secretary direct the Director of the Defense 

Information Systems Agency, as the DOD authority responsible for 

certifying the interoperability of switches, to complete its ongoing 

inventory of switches installed in the Defense Switched Network. We 

further recommend that the Secretary direct the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for C3I, in collaboration with the Chairman, to use this inventory 

to assess the level of interoperability risk associated with having 

uncertified switches on the network and to develop and implement a risk 

mitigation strategy to address any risks identified. 

Agency Comments and 

Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report (see appendix II), the Director 

of Architecture and Interoperability, Office of the Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for C3I, stated that the department agreed with our 

recommendations and that implementing the recommendations should 

improve its certification process for telecommunications switches. The 

department also described recently completed, ongoing, and planned 

efforts to address each of the recommendations. The department then 

stated that it strongly believes that its existing technical approach for 

certifying known telecommunications switches is sufficient. We do not 

question this statement because our review focused on DOD’s management 

of its certification process and the implementation of this process. It did 

not address the technical testing environment and standards for certifying 

switches.

The department also did not agree with our position that the Army’s 

installation of an uncertified switch both at the Funari and Coleman 

Barracks in Germany is an example of inconsistent application of existing 

DOD interoperability policy and procedures. In both of these instances, 

according to DOD’s comments, uncertified switches were only temporarily 

connected for testing purposes and were not operationally deployed. This 

comment is inconsistent with the position of officials representing Army’s 

Communications-Electronics Command Systems Management Center, 

which is responsible for installing and operating these switches. According 
Page 4 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

to these officials, the switches installed at these two locations were 

operationally deployed without having the required interim authority to 

operate or certification. As a result, we did not change the report to reflect 

this comment.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen and Ranking Minority 

Members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services; Subcommittee on 

Defense, Senate Committee on Appropriations; House Committee on 

Armed Services; and Subcommittee on Defense, House Committee on 

Appropriations. We are also sending copies to the Director, Office of 

Management and Budget; the Secretary of Defense; the Secretary of the 

Army; the Secretary of the Navy; the Secretary of the Air Force; the 

Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I/Chief Information Officer; the Joint 

Staff Director for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer 

Systems; the Director of Interoperability for the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; and the Director of the 

Defense Information Systems Agency. We will also make copies available to 

others upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 

on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.
Page 5 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

Should you or your staff have questions on matters discussed in this report, 

please contact Randolph Hite at (202) 512-3439 or Keith Rhodes at (202) 

512-6412. We can also be reached by E-mail at hiter@gao.gov and 

rhodesk@gao.gov, respectively. A GAO contact and key contributors to this 

report are listed in appendix III. 

Randolph C. Hite 

Director, Information Technology Architecture 

and Systems Issues

Keith A. Rhodes

Chief Technologist, Applied Research and 

Methods
Page 6 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing to Apendxies

Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner ApendxiI

1

Information Technology: DOD Needs to Improve

Process for Ensuring Interoperability of

Telecommunications Switches

Briefing for the Staffs of

The Honorable Jesse Helms

and 

The Honorable John Warner

United States Senate

April 19, 2002
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 7 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

2

• Introduction

• Objectives

• Scope and Methodology

• Background

• Results in Brief

• Results

• Certification and Authorization Process Is Not Well-Defined

• Process Has Been Inconsistently Applied, But Contracting Laws and

Regulations Were Not Violated

• Process Application Is Causing Vendors to Reevaluate Decision to

Compete

• Conclusions

• Recommendations

• Agency Comments

Briefing Outline
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 8 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

3

Introduction

DOD policy requires systems to be interoperable. Interoperability can be

viewed as the ability of systems to work together effectively and efficiently

so that the right information gets to the right people at the right time.

Within DOD, the inability of systems to effectively and efficiently share

information can have severe consequences. As we previously reported:

• A lack of basic interoperability led to problems in 1991 during the

Persian Gulf war [1].

• Interoperability problems also arose in 1999 in Kosovo, which limited

DOD’s ability to rapidly identify and strike time-critical targets [2].

Accordingly, DOD’s policy is that its communications systems, including

telecommunications (telecom) switches, must be certified as interoperable

[3].

[1] Joint Military Operations: Weaknesses in DOD’s Process for Certifying C4I Systems’ Interoperability, GAO/NSIAD-98-73

(Washington, D.C.: March 13, 1998).

[2] Joint Warfighting: Attacking Time-Critical Targets, GAO-02-204R (Washington, D.C.: November 30, 2001).

[3] Telecom switches are hardware and software designed to send and receive voice, data, and video signals across a

network. For this briefing, the term “switch” refers to hardware and/or software installations for new switches or upgrades to

existing switches.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 9 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

4

As agreed with the offices of Senators Helms and Warner, our objectives

were to determine

• DOD’s process for certifying and authorizing the interoperability of

telecom switches,

• how the process is being applied, including whether contracting laws

and regulations have been violated, and

• how the process affects vendor competition.

Objectives
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 10 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

5

To accomplish our objectives—

• We reviewed policy and procedures governing systems interoperability to

obtain an understanding of the department’s certification and authorization

process for telecom switches (see appendix I for the policy and a list of the

procedures).

• We assessed DOD’s application of the process to five switch vendors’

products to determine whether certification testing procedures were being

followed and the requirements were being met.

• We selected vendors whose products had been or currently were being

tested for interoperability certification, and one vendor who had elected

not to participate in the certification process. These vendors were

• AG Commercial Systems,

• Avaya,

• Lucent Technologies,

• Nortel Networks, and

• Siemens.

Scope and Methodology
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 11 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

6

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• In assessing DOD’s application of the process, we

• obtained and reviewed test plans and results, request for and

denial of a waiver, requests for and approvals of interim

authorities to operate, certification letters, and supporting

documentation when instances of noncompliance and/or

deviations from the policy or process were identified; and

• analyzed three awarded contracts and associated delivery

orders.

• Selected contracts awarded by the Army, Navy, and Air

Force because, according to a key official responsible for

enforcing the process, the military departments are the

dominant purchasers of telecom switches.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 12 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

7

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• Selected delivery orders awarded for the European component

of DOD’s telecom switch modernization project. Specifically, we

reviewed the following contracts and delivery orders:

• Army’s Digital Switched Systems Modernization Program

contract and the Defense Information Systems

Network–Europe (DISN-E) delivery order,

• Air Force’s Worldwide Integrated Digital Telecom Systems

contract and the Spangdahlem (Germany) Switch Relocation

and Upgrade delivery order, and

• Navy’s Voice, Video, and Data contract and the

Replacement of Navy Defense Switching Network

Telephone Switches (Italy) delivery order.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 13 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

8

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• Selected the Army’s DISN-E delivery order for more detailed

evaluation because, according to Army officials, it was the first

delivery order that included the department’s interoperability

certification requirement. Specifically,

• Reviewed the statement of requirements, which defined the

requirements to be met by vendors competing for the award of

this delivery order, including those related to interoperability.

• Reviewed the results of Army’s evaluation of the various

vendors’ proposals, including the technical solutions and price

proposals.

• Reviewed the winning vendor’s technical proposal, which

addressed its product’s ability to meet DOD’s requirements.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 14 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

9

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

• Interviewed source selection and contract management officials

responsible for evaluating the proposals and selecting the

winning vendor to discuss

• how the evaluation was conducted, and

• whether the selected vendor met the interoperability

requirements within the timeframe outlined in the statement

of requirements.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 15 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

10

Scope and Methodology (cont.)

To augment our document reviews and analyses, we interviewed officials

from various DOD organizations, including

• the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control,

Communications, and Intelligence (C3I)/Chief Information Officer,

• the director, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers

Systems Directorate, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,

• the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), including the Joint

Interoperability Test Command and the Defense Switched Network

Program Office,

• Army’s Office of the Chief Information Officer,

• Army’s Communications-Electronics Command Systems Management

Center,

• Army’s 5th Signal Command in Europe,
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 16 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

11

• Navy’s Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control

Directorate within its Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and

• Air Force’s single manager for telecommunications at the Ogden Air

Logistics Center, Space and C3I Directorate.

We also interviewed representatives of the five telecom switch vendors to

obtain their perspectives on DOD’s certification and authorization process,

DOD’s application of the process, and the effect on their plans to compete

for future business.

We did not independently validate the cost information we obtained during

this review.

Scope and Methodology (cont.)
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 17 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

12

As agreed with the requesters’ offices, we did not review contracts and

delivery orders for switches for intelligence systems or switches that are

installed in tactical operations centers [4] or on board ships.

We conducted our work at DOD headquarters offices in Washington, D.C.;

DISA’s Joint Interoperability Test Command in Fort Huachuca, AZ; and

Army’s Communications and Electronics Command Systems

Management Center in Fort Monmouth, NJ. The work was performed from

August 2001 through April 2002 in accordance with generally accepted

government auditing standards.

[4] Tactical operations centers are fixed and relocatable command posts where commanders and their staffs prepare,

monitor, and alter the execution of battle plans.

Scope and Methodology (cont.)
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 18 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

13

Background

In November 1992, DOD issued a policy requiring systems, including

telecom switches, to be tested and certified before approval is granted for

installation in operational environments.

• In 1992 and 1995, DOD issued procedural instructions that were

intended to document the process to be followed to achieve the

policy’s objective, and in 2000, it established the prioritization of

systems to be tested and certified [5].

[5] For example, systems to be used to communicate nuclear warnings were to receive the highest priority. Those being

acquired by individual defense agencies, but not used for this purpose, were to receive the lowest priority, because according

to DOD, they are less critical to the department’s primary mission.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 19 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

14

Background (cont.)

In May 2000, almost 8 years after the original policy, the department began

to enforce the policy for telecom switches.

• At that time, DOD began requiring that vendors’ telecom switches be

tested against and be certified as meeting interoperability requirements

before being installed and connected to its network.

In fiscal year 2001, the military services reported that they spent

approximately $90.8 million to acquire new telecom switches and upgrades

to existing switches. In fiscal year 2002, the military services plan to spend

about $78.6 million.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 20 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

15

Background (cont.)

Telecom Switch Requirements

DOD telecom switches are commercial products that are modified as

necessary by the switch vendor to incorporate military-unique features.

• Military-unique features are requirements or capabilities that are not

satisfied by a commercial product, but that DOD needs to accomplish a

mission. Multilevel precedence and preemption is an example of such

a feature [6].

• The military-unique features are documented in the department’s

Generic Switching Center Requirements. The latest version of these

requirements is dated March 1997.

[6] This feature provides specific users with the capability to interrupt ongoing phone calls during emergency or crisis

situations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 21 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

16

Background (cont.)

Defense Switched Network

The Defense Switched Network provides telephone, data, and videoteleconferencing services for U.S. military bases and other DOD locations

throughout the world. The network is under the operational direction and

management control of DISA. The network is designated as a primary

communication system during peacetime, periods of crisis, and the preattack, nonnuclear, and post-attack phases of war.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 22 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

17

Background (cont.)

Figure 1: Simplified Diagram of the Defense Switched Network

Outside Continental

United States

Continental United States

Switch

A

Switch

N

Switch

B

Switch

A

Switch

N

Switch

B

Defense Switched Network

United States

Public

Switched

Network

International

Public

Switched

Network

DOD Site DOD Site

Source: GAO analysis of DOD material.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 23 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

18

Background (cont.)

Prior Review of Interoperability Certification Process

In March 1998, we reported that the department did not have an effective

process for certifying existing, newly developed, and modified systems for

interoperability, resulting in noncertified systems. We also reported that the

department did not know how many systems required certification [7]. We

concluded that noncompliance with this requirement stemmed from

weaknesses in the certification process itself and that continued

noncompliance could jeopardize lives, equipment, and the success of joint

military operations.

[7] GAO/NSIAD-98-73.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 24 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

19

Background (cont.)

We recommended, among other things, that the department

• enforce its requirement that systems be tested and certified for

interoperability before production and fielding unless official waivers are

granted;

• develop a process for prioritizing systems for testing and certification; and

• develop a formal process for addressing interoperability problems

observed during testing, and inform organizations that systems must be

tested for interoperability.

DOD generally concurred with our recommendations and has taken steps to

improve its interoperability certification process. Specifically, DOD has

• updated its policy and guidance to address enforcement weaknesses

(e.g., established policies and procedures for validating systems’

interoperability certification),

• developed criteria for prioritizing systems for testing and certification, and

• established some processes for addressing interoperability issues and

monitoring waivers.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 25 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

20

Results in Brief

Objective 1: DOD does not have a well-defined process, including

clear requirements, for certifying and authorizing switches.

• DOD’s telecom switch certification and authorization process is not

fully documented, current, or complete. Additionally, the process lacks

an effective enforcement mechanism.

• DOD officials attributed these weaknesses to the immaturity of the

process.

• Without a well-defined process, DOD increases the risk that the

certification and authorization of switches will not be done consistently

and that its certification policy will not be met.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 26 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

21

Results in Brief (cont.)

Objective 2: DOD has not applied its telecom switch certification and

authorization process consistently across vendors, which in some

cases violated policy. However, based on the scope of our work, we

did not find that the department has violated contracting laws and

regulations.

• The Army required one vendor to remove its uncertified switch from

one location. At the same time, it allowed another vendor to install its

uncertified switch at two locations, which violated the department’s

interoperability certification policy.

• Three of the five vendors we surveyed stated that DOD is not applying

its process consistently.

• DOD officials agreed, attributing the inconsistency to the immaturity of

the process.

• Based on the scope of our work, we did not find that the department

has violated contracting laws and regulations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 27 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

22

Results in Brief (cont.)

Objective 3: DOD’s telecom switch certification and authorization

process is causing some vendors to reevaluate the department as a

strategic customer.

• One of the five vendors we surveyed stated that it has stopped doing

business with DOD because of this process and its implementation.

• Another vendor stated that it is reconsidering its participation in the

DOD market because of perceived inequities in the department’s

application of the process.

• According to a Joint Staff official responsible for enforcing the process,

the department’s implementation of this process will not negatively

affect competition.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 28 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

23

Results in Brief (cont.)

Recommendations

To assist DOD in achieving its goals of ensuring network interoperability

and promoting competition among telecom switch vendors, we are

recommending that the secretary of defense take specific near-term and

longer term actions that are intended to strengthen the department’s switch

certification and authorization process.

In commenting on a draft of this briefing, DOD officials agreed with our

findings and largely agreed with our conclusions and recommendations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 29 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

24

DOD does not have a well-defined process, including clear interoperability

requirements, for certifying and authorizing telecom switches.

Results

Objective 1: Process

Prudent management suggests that for a process to be effective and

efficient, it should be (1) documented, (2) current, (3) complete, and

(4) enforceable.

DOD’s telecom switch certification and authorization process does not fully

satisfy any of these four tenets, because according to department officials,

the process is relatively new, having until recently been assigned a

relatively low priority.

Until these four process weaknesses (discussed in detail on the following

pages) are corrected, DOD increases the risk of inconsistently applying the

process and of experiencing future interoperability problems.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 30 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

25

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Process Not Fully Documented

Process effectiveness and efficiency depend in part on whether the

process is fully documented.

The department’s process for certifying and authorizing telecom switches

is not fully documented. Therefore, using available documentation,

supplemented by interviews of the process stakeholders identified on page

27, we graphically documented the process (see pages 28 through 34). In

documenting the process, we divided it into seven process areas, each

consisting of multiple steps and decision points.

• Out of the seven process areas (schedule product, test, validate,

authorize, appeal, install and connect, and request interim authority to

operate), DOD had documented less than half the process steps for

three of the areas: test, validate, and appeal.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 31 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

26

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

• In the test area, for example, DOD had documented only 1 of the 10

major steps that we defined in depicting the process.

• Further, with respect to appealing test results, while DOD instructions

identify the organizations that hear appeals when issues arise during

testing, they do not document the procedures to be followed nor the

expected outcome of successful appeals (that is, whether switches

receive certifications or interim authorities to operate). Moreover, one

of the five vendors was unaware that an appeals process existed.

DOD officials agreed that the process was not fully documented and stated

that our representation was an accurate depiction.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 32 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

27

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Table 1: Process Stakeholders’ Roles and Responsibilities

Plan, program, budget, and provide resources for interoperability

testing programs, and implement the interoperability policy and

procedures.

Heads of DOD component organizations

Coordinates testing activities, appeals test results, requests

interim authorities to operate, and requests connection of switch

to the network. Implements the interoperability policy and

procedures if designated as the program’s decision authority.

Program Manager (PM)

Military Communications-Electronics Board Resolves issues if the IPTP is unable to do so.

Resolves interoperability policy and testing issues and hears

appeals.

Interoperability Policy and Test Panel (IPTP)

Joint Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Enforces the interoperability policy and procedures.

Computers Systems Directorate

Establishes operational procedures for certifying and authorizing

interoperability.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Authorizes the installation and connection of switches to the

DSN.

DISA’s Defense Switched Network (DSN) program

office

DISA’s Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC) Tests and certifies switches for interoperability.

Maintains the interoperability policy and provides guidance and

oversight. Implements the interoperability policy and procedures

if designated as the program’s decision authority.

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Command, Control, Communications, and

Intelligence (C3I)/Chief Information Officer

Organization Responsibility/function
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 33 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

28

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Legend:

IATO: Interim Authority to Operate

Note: Dashed boxes indicate areas of the process that DOD has not documented. Information related to

these process areas was obtained through interviews with DOD process stakeholders and review of

documentation on specific switch certification and authorization actions produced as a result of the process.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

Vendor installs

switch; PM

requests switch

connection;

DSN program

office connects

switch to the

network

DSN program

office authorizes

installation and

connection to

network

Joint Staff

validates JITC’s

test results

PM appeals test

results to IPTP;

stakeholders,

vendor, and JITC

provide input to

IPTP

JITC tests the

vendor’s switch

with PM and

vendor

involvement

PM requests IATO from IPTP;

stakeholders and JITC provide input to IPTP

PM or vendor

schedules switch

for testing or PM

schedules meeting

with IPTP

Certification and Authorization Process Overview
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 34 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

29

JITC prepares and sends

certification letter to

• Joint Staff for validation and

• applicable DOD

organizations and vendor for

notification

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Vendor sets up

equipment at JITC and

provides engineering

support

PM or vendor schedules

switch testing with JITC

JITC tests

switch

Problems

found in

testing?

Yes

No

JITC generates

test discrepancy

reports (TDRs) and

discusses

problems with

vendor and

program manager

Yes

No

A

Vendor

addresses

TDRs?

B

JITC

finalizes

report

documenting

test results

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

page 30

page 31

Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 35 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

30

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

• If there is a PM, PM decides whether or not

to appeal JITC’s test results to IPTP. If PM

decides not to appeal, vendor must address

TDRs and retest.

• If there is no PM, vendor, who cannot appeal

to IPTP, has option of addressing TDRs and

retesting to achieve certification.

JITC prepares and sends certification

letter to

• Joint Staff for validation and

• applicable DOD organizations

and vendor for notification

B

C

A

JITC

finalizes

report

documenting

test results

No

Yes

Critical

requirements

met?

JITC does not certify and if

requested provides PM and

vendor an assessment report

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

page

32

page 31

Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 36 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

31

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Joint Staff has

15 days to

validate JITC’s

certification

Joint Staff

receives 3-year

certification letter

from JITC

Yes

Joint Staff signs

and distributes

validation memo

JITC and Joint Staff meet to

discuss reasons for nonvalidation

Joint Staff

decides to

validate?

No

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

Problems

resolved?

Yes

No

Joint Staff goes to

IPTP for resolution

Decision made

to rescind

certification?

Joint Staff signs and

distributes validation memo

No

Yes

JITC

distributes

memo

rescinding

certification

B

D

D

page

33

page 33

Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 37 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

32

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

IPTP reviews

case and

determines

potential

operational

impact of

installing switch

PM presents its case

and test results to IPTP;

stakeholders, vendor,

and JITC provide input

Yes

IPTP informs PM and JITC of its

decision. JITC does not issue a

certification letter.

PM may

• accept IPTP’s decision and agree

to resolve TDRs or

• appeal to Military

Communications-Electronics

Board. No

IPTP has option of issuing an IATO or a memo to JITC asking it to issue

a certification letter.

• According to a JITC official, JITC would require a written document

from IPTP detailing agreements reached before issuing a certification

letter.

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

PM decides to

appeal test

results to IPTP

C

IPTP determines

that outstanding

TDRs present a

significant risk?

E

page

33

Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal

Validate

Test Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal

Validate

Test
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 38 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

33

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied evidence.

DSN program office

authorizes connection

of switch to network

DSN program office

connects switch to

network

DSN program office

receives certification

letter from JITC or an

IATO from IPTP

D

F

E

Vendor installs

switch; PM requests

connection to

network

Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 39 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

34

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

IPTP issues IATO for a

period not to exceed

1 year

PM schedules meeting with

IPTP by submitting an IATO

application for a specific

vendor’s switch at a specific

location

PM meets with IPTP to

discuss the request;

stakeholders and JITC

provide input

IPTP approves IATO? 

Yes

No

IPTP does not issue an IATO.

PM can appeal to Military

Communications-Electronics

Board by submitting the IATO

application

Note:

An IATO may be granted if there is an immediate need for a switch to be installed,

and the operational risk to the network of installing this uncertified switch is minimal.

The vendor’s switch is to proceed through the certification process during the time

the IATO is in effect; 90-days before IATO expiration, JITC notifies the PM, who can

request a new IATO if the switch will not be certified before the IATO expires. Source: GAO analysis of DOD-supplied

evidence.

F page 33

Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test Authorize

Requests IATO

Schedule

Certification and Authorization Process

Install and 

connect

Appeal 

Validate

Test
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 40 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

35

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Switch Requirements Are Outdated

For a process to be implemented effectively and efficiently, it should be

current.

According to DOD policy, switch requirements that define the militaryunique features are to be revised every 2 years. However, this has not

occurred.

• The latest version of the requirements is dated March 1997.

• DOD has posted a draft of its updated requirements on its website and

is soliciting vendors’ comments. DOD plans to issue the revised

requirements in final form in September 2002.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 41 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

36

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Switch Requirements Are Not Complete

For a process to be implemented effectively and efficiently, it should be

complete.

DOD’s switch requirements are incomplete in that they either have not

been defined with a sufficient level of detail or are not defined at all. For

example,

• Our review of the requirements showed that while there was sufficient

detail for testing major switches, such as multifunctional switches [8],

the requirements did not address other types, such as remote

switching units. In addition, the requirements currently do not address

new technology, such as voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) [9], which

is currently being installed throughout DOD’s services and agencies.

[8] A multifunction switch provides both local and long-distance services.

[9] VOIP is an efficient, cost-effective way of transporting voice traffic across Internet networks.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 42 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

37

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

• Vendors stated that the requirements for the military-unique features

are not complete in that they do not always have the level of detail

required for designing and developing military-unique features, and

that they do not exist in other cases, such as for remote switching units

and VOIP technology [10].

• JITC officials agreed that there are test scenarios for which the

requirements do not provide enough detail to enable JITC to design

and execute related test plans; they also confirmed that requirements

do not exist for certain switch types (e.g., remote switching units) and

advances in technology (e.g., VOIP).

• Further, JITC officials reported that current revisions to these

requirements will not address all the vendors’ concerns.

• Army officials reported that the certification of one vendor’s switch was

held up for months because there were no defined requirements for

that switch type.

[10] Remote switching units are controlled by a host switch, but are located separately from the host.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 43 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

38

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Process Does Not Provide an Effective Means for Enforcing

Process effectiveness and efficiency depend on whether enforcement

mechanisms are in place and functioning as intended.

The Joint Staff [11] is responsible for enforcing the process; however,

these officials told us that their ability to enforce is limited to making all

process stakeholders aware of the interoperability certification requirement

and directing the DSN Program Office to connect only certified switches to

the network.

The Director of DISA stated that the current enforcement process can be

strengthened.

[11] The Joint Staff, Command, Control, Communications, and Computers Systems Directorate.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 44 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

39

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

According to officials in the DSN program office, it is difficult to enforce the

interoperability certification policy, because the DSN program office does

not monitor all switch installations or upgrade activities, and is not always

informed by the military services or defense agencies of installations of

new switches or upgrades to existing switches to the network. The DSN

program office knows with certainty only about the switch installations or

upgrades that require it to make modifications to the network.

• Currently, DISA is surveying the military services and agencies to

compile an inventory of existing switches connected to the network to

obtain a baseline.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 45 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

40

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Consequences of Process Not Being Well-Defined and Enforceable

Because the process is not well-defined, it is also not well understood by the

DOD participants and vendors. For example,

• The term “certification,” which is not specifically defined within the policy

and procedures, has been interpreted differently by different stakeholders.

One vendor told us it means global certification (i.e., the switch complies

with all applicable requirements and can be installed at any U.S. base

worldwide). However, DOD officials told us that there can be degrees of

certification (e.g., limited certification, in which case the switch cannot be

globally installed, but can be installed within certain operational

environments).

• The process is set up so that only a department representative can appeal

test results. The process also allows a vendor to submit its product for

testing without a DOD sponsor. Thus, in this case the process would not

permit a vendor to appeal the test results, because the vendor would lack

a DOD representative to present the appeal. Army officials and vendors,

who were aware of the appeals process, did not know this.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 46 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

41

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

• The Joint Staff recently issued a memorandum that is being interpreted

by Army and vendors as a certification letter that recommends global

use of a specific switch. However, under the process, only JITC can

certify a switch. In this instance, JITC has not issued a certification

letter recommending global use of this switch. Moreover, DISA has not

decided whether it will authorize connection of the switch based on this

memorandum or if it will need JITC to issue a certification letter.

• According to the Joint Staff official who signed the memorandum, it

was issued in response to an inquiry by a DISA official regarding

the operational risks of installing a specific switch that still had

unresolved deficiencies. The memorandum was not intended to

globally certify the switch, since only JITC can certify switches as

having met the interoperability requirements.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 47 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

42

Results

Objective 1: Process (cont.)

Because there is no effective enforcement mechanism, DOD has

increased its risk of inconsistently applying the process and of

experiencing future interoperability problems.

To fill the gaps in its process, DOD is currently reviewing the procedures

governing the process.

• DOD has not established a time frame for when the procedures

supporting the policy will be revised and issued.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 48 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

43

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process

DOD has not consistently applied its telecom switch certification and

authorization process, at times treating different vendors differently and

violating its interoperability certification policy.

• For example, the Army required one vendor to remove its uncertified

switch from one location, while at the same time allowing another

vendor to install its uncertified switch at two locations.

• Further, Army allowed another vendor to install its uncertified switch,

and this vendor has since stated that it has no plans to test its switch

with JITC.

DOD has not applied its interoperability certification and authorization

process for switches consistently across all vendors, which in some cases

violated policy. However, based on the scope of our work, we did not find

that it has violated applicable contracting laws and regulations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 49 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

44

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Also, three of the five vendors we interviewed stated that the process is not

being applied consistently.

• Two vendors stated that DOD has allowed competitors to install

uncertified products while requiring them to have switches certified

before installation.

DOD acknowledged inconsistencies in the application of the process and

stated that these inconsistencies were due to the process being new and

evolving.

Among other things, this inconsistency has resulted in uncertified switches

being connected to DOD’s network, which increases the risk of potential

service disruptions.

Despite the inconsistency in the process’ application, the switch contracts

and delivery orders that we reviewed did not show that DOD has violated

contracting laws and regulations in implementing this requirement.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 50 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

45

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Inconsistent Application: Compliance with Interoperability Policy

The Army allowed one vendor to install an uncertified version of a switch

on DSN (the switch was at the time undergoing certification testing). When

DISA verbally notified the Army that there were testing concerns, the Army

required the vendor to remove this version of the switch pending

certification and to install the prior version of the switch. Once the new

version was certified, the Army authorized the vendor to install it.

The Army has also installed another vendor’s switches that were either

certified or had been issued IATOs at various locations.

The Navy and Air Force installed only certified switches for the locations

we reviewed.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 51 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

46

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Inconsistent Application: Noncompliance with Interoperability Policy

The Army allowed one vendor to install an uncertified upgrade to a switch.

While this version of the switch had been installed before the Army began

enforcing the interoperability certification requirement, the upgrade was

subject to the requirement, and it had not been granted an IATO. After

installation, the vendor elected not to seek certification of its switch because of

the expense involved.

• According to Army officials,the upgraded switch was not removed because

the upgraded version had been installed at other locations before DOD

began enforcing its certification requirement, and it was performing

satisfactorily.

• DISA officials agreed that it was appropriate to waive the interoperability

certification requirements for these installations.

The Army also installed another vendor’s uncertified switch without an IATO at

two other locations. The switch was installed before JITC completed

certification testing. After installation, an IATO was requested and granted for

these two locations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 52 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

47

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Inconsistent Application: Noncompliance with Interoperability Policy

(cont.)

The Army also allowed another vendor to install an uncertified switch

without an IATO at another location. While an IATO had been previously

granted, the IATO was for an earlier version of the switch, not the actual

version installed. The Army later requested and received an IATO for the

actual version of the switch that was installed.

The Army installed still another vendor’s switch at three locations that had

neither been certified nor granted an IATO.

• DISA officials agreed with the Army that it was appropriate to waive the

interoperability certification requirements for these installations, since

the switches were acquired via fiscal year 2000 delivery orders and

already installed at other locations within the DSN.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 53 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

48

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Inconsistent Application: Noncompliance with Interoperability Policy

(cont.)

The Joint Staff has issued a memorandum that is being interpreted by

Army and vendors as validating global certification of one vendor’s switch

with certain restrictions [12]. However, according to DOD’s certification and

authorization process, JITC must certify the switch before the Joint Staff

can validate the certification. In this instance, JITC has not certified the

switch for global use because the switch has not met the requirements for

global certification.

• According to Joint Staff officials, the memorandum was not intended to

validate global certification for this switch.

• Three vendors stated that this action by the Joint Staff undermines the

integrity of DOD’s interoperability certification process.

[12] Memorandum for Defense Information Systems Agency, Attn: Congressional Affairs, Elektronisches Waehl System

Digital (EWSD) Release 18 Test Issues, January 2, 2002; signed by General Croom.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 54 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

49

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Inconsistent Application: Noncompliance with Interoperability Policy (cont.)

According to DOD officials, some services and agencies (e.g., Navy, DISA) are

installing voice over Internet protocol (VOIP) switches at locations (e.g., the

Washington Navy Yard and DISA headquarters) without meeting requirements for

interoperability testing and certification.

• The reason for not complying with the policy is that requirements for

implementing and testing requirements for VOIP switches have not been

defined.

• One vendor is currently testing its VOIP switch and assisting JITC in

establishing the requirements.

• At the same time that one vendor is testing its VOIP switch, another vendor is

being allowed to install VOIP switches without certification.

In instances where requirements do not exist, the process provides for requesting

an IATO until such time as the requirements are defined and testing can begin.

However, DOD officials acknowledged that until recently this had not been done

and that in the above cases IATOs were not issued.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 55 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

50

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Joint Staff and DISA officials acknowledged that there have been

inconsistencies in the application of the process and stated that these

inconsistencies were due to the process being new and evolving.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 56 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

51

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Compliance with Contracting Laws and Regulations

Federal laws and regulations allow the government to take action other

than termination when a vendor does not meet requirements. In such a

case, the government is required to obtain consideration from the vendor.

Such consideration might include reductions in payment to offset the

reduction in the contractor’s obligation.

On the basis of the switch contracts and delivery orders that we reviewed,

the Navy and Air Force have consistently included interoperability as a

contractual requirement. Specifically,

• The Navy and Air Force awarded delivery orders to one vendor whose

switch was already certified and authorized.

Army included the requirement for interoperability certification as a

contractual requirement and, based on the scope of our work, complied

with contracting laws and regulations in implementing this requirement.

Specifically,
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 57 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

• The Army awarded a delivery order to a vendor whose product has not

yet met the global certification requirement.

• However, in this case, the Army received consideration from the

vendor for failure to perform, as required under federal law.

• The vendor’s product did not pass the initial 30-day evaluation

of its interoperability capabilities, as required. As consideration

for this, the Army negotiated a new payment schedule that was

advantageous to the government.

• The vendor’s product did not receive global certification within

270 days of the delivery order award as required. Again, the

Army received consideration, including, among other things,

extended warranties and free equipment and training.

• According to the Army, this vendor’s product was still the best

value because of this consideration, and no other vendors’

products were certified at that time.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 58 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

53

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

When contracts are competed, federal laws and regulations generally

require the government to provide vendors an equal opportunity to be

awarded the contract, referred to as “full and open competition.” However,

laws and regulations are more flexible for the award of delivery orders

under existing contracts. When delivery orders are competed, the

government must provide vendors a “fair opportunity to be considered,”

which is a much less stringent standard. For example,

• When delivery orders are competed, contracting officers may exercise

broad discretion, including

• using streamlined procedures, such as oral presentations, and

• not contacting or holding discussions with each awardee under the

contract before selecting an awardee for the delivery order.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 59 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

54

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

For delivery orders under the Digital Switched Systems Modernization

Program contract including DISN-E, the Army defined specific procedures

for the source selection process. These included specifying that

• vendor selection be determined using a “best value” approach that

would consider, among other things, the technical solution being

proposed by the vendors (hardware and software) and the cost to the

government; and

• the department consider any special circumstances, such as urgency

for requirements and/or funding constraints, that could prevent some

requirements from being competed between multiple contractors.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 60 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

55

Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

Based on the scope of our work, the Army’s implementation of the source

selection process for the DISN-E delivery order did not violate federal laws

and regulations. For example:

• Although the Army allowed the winning vendor to change its original

proposed product late in the source selection process and did not

conduct a further evaluation of the newly proposed product, this was

not a violation of federal laws and regulations because (1) revisions of

proposals are permitted in the negotiation process, (2) the Army was

following streamlined procedures applicable to delivery orders, and

(3) the Army found that the change in proposed product did not

materially affect the vendor’s technical proposal.

According to Army officials, the vendor’s switch that was selected provided

the “best value” among competing vendors’ proposals.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 61 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Results

Objective 2: Application of Process (cont.)

In appendix II, we provide a timeline showing the sequence of the relevant

events involved in DOD’s establishment of its telecom switch certification

and authorization process and the department’s application of the process

to the vendors’ products included in our review, as described in the

previous slides.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 62 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Results

Objective 3: Competition

The department’s goals are to ensure that its interoperability requirements

are met and to promote competition among telecom switch vendors in

doing so.

Four of the five telecom switch vendors we interviewed supported DOD’s

goal of ensuring switch interoperability. However, questions are emerging

relative to the second goal because vendors are reconsidering their plans

for having DOD as a strategic customer.

• The one vendor that has not stated its support of DOD’s goal has

chosen not to participate for economic reasons (i.e., the costs

associated with testing and certification exceed potential business

opportunities with DOD).

• Another stated that it is re-evaluating its decision to participate in this

process because of concerns about DOD’s inconsistent application of

the process.

DOD’s application of its interoperability certification and

authorization process is influencing vendors’ plans for competing.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 63 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Results

Objective 3: Competition (cont.)

Questions are also surfacing within the department as to the impact of the

process on competition. For example:

• An Army telecom program manager stated that he expected other vendors

to cease doing business with the department because of the cost and

problems associated with the certification and authorization process.

Positions within the department are mixed on the impact of DOD’s

interoperability goal on competition. For example,

• DISA’s congressional liaison official stated that the department is not

concerned that some vendors, especially 1 or 2, may elect not to compete

as a result of the department’s implementation of this process. This official

noted that this could in fact strengthen competition by eliminating those

vendors who are less willing to comply with the department’s

requirements.

• Army officials stated that the loss of any vendors would have a negative

effect on competition.

• A Joint Staff official responsible for enforcing the process stated that the

department’s implementation of this process will not negatively affect

competition.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 64 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Conclusions

DOD’s process for ensuring that telecom switches are interoperable before

being installed for operational use on its network can be improved. As

currently defined and implemented, this process permits uncertified

switches to be installed, thus risking network performance shortfalls that

could impair DOD’s ability to meet mission objectives. Better definition and

enforcement of the process would reduce the risk of network

interoperability problems and potentially increase competition.

The weaknesses in the process can be traced to several factors, including

the following:

• the process is only partially documented, and switch certification

requirements are outdated and incomplete, and

• the process does not provide for effective enforcement.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 65 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Conclusions (cont.)

Given these limitations, DOD has not consistently applied the process to

telecom switch vendors. While some of this inconsistent application was

not outside the bounds of the process as it is defined, some of it was, such

as when DOD required one vendor to remove its uncertified switch, while

at the same time allowing another vendor to install its uncertified switch.

Such actions were, in our view, the product of bad decisionmaking by the

service that implemented the process. While these actions violated DOD’s

policy, they did not however, based on the scope of our work, constitute

any violations of contracting laws and regulations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 66 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Recommendations

To ensure network interoperability and address the potential impact on

competition for telecom switch vendors, we recommend that the secretary

of defense advance the state of maturity of DOD's telecom switch

certification and authorization process by directing the chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, as the DOD authority responsible for the process, to

take the following near-term and long-term actions to improve the process.

In the near term,

• use the process flowcharts provided in this briefing to assist in fully

documenting the existing certification and authorization process, and

• make this fully documented process available to DOD and vendor

process stakeholders within 60 days.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 67 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Recommendations (cont.)

In the longer term, revise the existing process including switch

requirements to ensure that it is complete, current, transparent to

stakeholders, and enforceable by the Joint Staff, and issue a revised

process to all stakeholders within 180 days. In doing so, the chairman

should

• work jointly with the assistant secretary of defense for C3I since this

organization is responsible for the interoperability policy and for

providing guidance and oversight,

• solicit DOD and vendor input on needed process changes, and

• seek DOD and vendor comments on a draft of the revised process

before it is issued in final form.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 68 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Recommendations (cont.)

We also recommend that the secretary direct the director of DISA, as the

DOD authority responsible for certifying the interoperability of switches, to

complete its ongoing inventory of installed DSN switches. Using this

inventory, we further recommend that the secretary direct the assistant

secretary of defense for C3I, in collaboration with the chairman, to assess

the level of DSN interoperability risk associated with having uncertified

switches on the network and to develop and implement a risk mitigation

strategy to address any risks identified.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 69 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

64

Agency Comments

We provided a draft of this briefing to DOD officials representing the Office

of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I (ASD/C3I), the Joint Staff, the

Defense Information Systems Agency (including the Joint Interoperability

Test Command and the Defense Switched Network Program Office), and

Army’s Communications-Electronics Command Systems Management

Center. Among these officials were ASD/C3I’s chief of information

interoperability and Army’s Project Manager for its Defense

Communications and Army Switched Systems.

In commenting on the draft, these officials agreed with our findings and

largely agreed with our conclusions and recommendations.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 70 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

65

Agency Comments (cont.)

The officials did however provide clarifying information and suggested

refinements to one of our conclusions on the effect of process

weaknesses, which we have incorporated as appropriate. They also stated

that our draft recommendation regarding the need to establish a policy

governing situations when switch requirements have not been defined was

not needed because the process already addresses this. We agreed with

their position and thus are no longer making the recommendation.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 71 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix I:

DOD Policy and Procedures

Department of Defense Directive 4630.5, Compatibility, Interoperability,

and Integration of Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

Systems (November 12, 1992; revised January 11, 2002), states that all IT

systems are to be designed for joint use, with interoperability requirements

defined in the initial stages of IT system development. This directive also

outlines responsibilities of DOD components within the interoperability

process, including the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s responsibility

for ensuring compliance with interoperability certification requirements.

Department of Defense Instruction 4630.8, Procedures for Compatibility,

Interoperability, and Integration of Command, Control, Communications,

and Intelligence Systems (November 18, 1992; currently being revised),

further details DOD components’ responsibilities for the interoperability

certification process.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 72 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

67

Appendix I:

DOD Policy and Procedures (cont.)

Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 6212.01, Interoperability

and Supportability of National Security Systems and Information

Technology Systems (June 30, 1995; revised May 8, 2000), establishes

procedures for the certification and validation of IT systems. It also

establishes the DOD chief information officer as the focal point for ensuring

the interoperability of systems throughout the department.

Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 6215.01, Policy for the

Department of Defense Voice Networks (February 1, 1995; revised

September 23, 2001), states that the Defense Switched Network is to be

designed with the capability to permit interconnection and interoperability.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 73 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix I:

DOD Policy and Procedures (cont.)

Military Communications-Electronic Board reference guide, Organization,

Mission and Functions (January 1, 2002), lists the organizations, mission,

and functional aspects of the panels and working groups of the Military

Communications-Electronic Board. This board acts as the senior resolution

body in the certification process.

The Interoperability Policy and Test Panel Charter (June 6, 2001; reissued

January 1, 2002, in the Military Communications-Electronic Board

reference guide, Organization, Mission and Functions) outlines interim

authority to operate procedures and describes the general functions of the

panel, including identifying, coordinating, and resolving interoperability

policy and testing issues.
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 74 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

Pre1997

November 12, 1992

DOD issues directive

requiring all information

technology systems to be

interoperable

November 18, 1992

DOD issues instruction

detailing responsibilities for

interoperability certification

process

February 1, 1995

Chairman of Joint Chiefs of

Staff (CJCS) issues

instruction requiring similar

components of Defense

Switched Network (DSN) to

be interoperable

June 30, 1995

CJCS issues instruction on

interoperability process

November 6, 1996

DISA issues request for

information (RFI) for the

Defense Information

Systems Network-Europe

(DISN-E)

1997 January 10

Initial RFI response

deadline

February 7

Extended RFI response

deadline

February 7

Lucent responds

to RFI

February 7

Nortel responds to

RFI

February 7

Siemens

responds to RFI
Appendix I

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to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 75 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

1998 September 11

Army issues statement of

requirements (SOR) for

DISN-E

December 2

Army decides to pay testing

costs for DISN-E winning

vendor

1999 January 6–7

Source selection panels

hear oral presentations from

vendors for DISN-E SOR

January 8

Source selection panels

begin reviewing proposals

for DISN-E SOR

January 4

Lucent submits

proposal for

DISN-E contract

January 4

Nortel submits

proposal for

DISN-E contract

January 4

Siemens submits

proposal for

DISN-E contract

February 12

Siemens switches

product from

European to

American

standards

February 24

Source selection panels

complete proposal reviews

March 4

Army awards contract to

Siemens

March 4

Siemens wins

DISN-E award
Appendix I

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to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 76 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

1999

(cont.)

April 7–22

Army conducts limited test

and evaluation of Siemens’

EWSD switch

April 26

Army issues show cause

letter to Siemens,

threatening contract

cancellation

April 22

Siemens receives

"unsatisfactory"

result on 30-day

limited test and

evaluation of

switch

May 5

Siemens

responds to show

cause letter, 2

days after

deadline

June 14–15

Siemens

demonstrates

required capability

to Army’s

satisfaction

June 21

Army rescinds show cause

letter based on Siemens’

demonstration of switch

capability
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 77 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

1999

(cont.)

July 16

Army and DISA establish

eight minimum

requirements for Siemens'

EWSD switch certification

July 27

Army agrees to contract

considerations made in

response to Siemens' test

failure

July 27

Siemens agrees

to contract

considerations

after failing test

September 9

Army awards delivery order

to General Dynamics (a

Nortel distributor) for switch

upgrades in Korea and

Japan

October 12

Siemens starts

testing at JITC of

EWSD switch, rel.

16

October 20

Nortel starts

testing MSL11 at

JITC

December 8

Army & DISA direct JITC to

stop testing of EWSD rel. 16

due to significant problems

December 8

Siemens stops

testing rel. 16 with

JITC
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 78 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

1999

(cont.)

December 17

Siemens fails to

meet 270-day

certification

requirement as

outlined in

contract

2000 March 27–29

Army and Siemens agree to

“get well” plan as remedy

for Siemens’ failure to meet

the 270-day certification

requirement

March 27–29

Army and

Siemens agree to

“get well” plan as

remedy for

Siemens’ failures

to meet the 270 –

day certification

requirement

May 1

Joint Staff issues memo

stating that upgrades to

DSN must be interoperable

May 8

CJCS revises instruction

further detailing

interoperability process

June 21

Army agrees to contract

considerations made in

response to Siemens' failure

to meet 270-day deadline

June 21

Siemens agrees

to contract

considerations in

response to failure

to meet 270-day

deadline
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 79 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2000

(cont.)

July

DISA orally authorizes Army

to install uncertified EWSD

switches at 2 sites

July 21

Army directs Nortel to

remove uncertified MSL12

switch at Qatar

July 11

Nortel installs

uncertified MSL12

at Qatar

July 28

Army sends letter to

General Dynamics halting

installation activities for

Korea and Japan

July 31

Nortel starts

testing MSL12 at

JITC

August 2

Navy awards delivery order

to General Dynamics to

upgrade switches in Italy

August 4

Nortel receives

certification of

MSL11

August 9

Nortel deinstalls

uncertified switch

at Qatar
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 80 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2000

(cont.)

August 30

Army authorizes AGCS to

install uncertified switch

upgrades at Sierra Army

Depot and Fort Gordon

August 25

Avaya installs

uncertified switch

at Pine Bluff

Arsenal

August 18

Siemens installs

uncertified EWSD,

rel. 16, at Funari,

Germany

September 20

Air Force issues upgrade

order for DSN switch in

Germany to Nortel, which

was only certified switch

available to DOD

September 25

Military CommunicationsElectronics Board requests

that the Joint Staff review

DOD’s need for militaryunique requirements

September 30

AGCS installs

uncertified

upgrade at

Sierra Army

Depot

September 22

Siemens installs

uncertified EWSD,

rel. 16, at

Coleman

Barracks,

Germany
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2000

(cont.)

October 6

Senator John

Warner asks

Secretary of

Defense for

information

regarding

uncertified

hardware and

software connected

to DSN

October 20

DISA issues formal memo

stating support of EWSD

switch installation at Funari

and Coleman Barracks.

Memo also states that

EWSD switch must be fully

certified before

recommended fielding of

remaining switches

October 31

Avaya starts

testing Definity

G3R, rel. 8.2, at

JITC

November 1

IPTP grants IATO to Army

for EWSD, rel. 16, for

installation in Mannheim,

Germany

November 3

Nortel starts

testing MSL14 at

JITC

November 1

Siemens receives

IATO for EWSD,

rel. 16, effective

Jan 2001–Jan

2002
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 82 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2000

(cont.)

November 7

Army authorizes installation

of Nortel MSL12 in Korea

and Japan with Joint Staff

approval of JITC test

results. Testing completed

October 27th, certification

letter pending

November 8

Army grants Nortel

permission to reinstall

MSL12 in Qatar 

November 10

Avaya installs

uncertified switch

at Rock Island

Arsenal

November 14

Nortel begins to

install MSL12

switch in Korea

and Japan

December 2

AGCS installs

uncertified

upgrade at Fort

Gordon

December 12

Nortel completes

installations of

MSL12 switch in

Korea and Japan

December 14–15

Nortel installs

certified switch at

Spangdahlem,

Germany, Air

Force base

December 26

Nortel receives

certification of

MSL12
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 83 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2001 January 3

Senator Warner's

staff issues letter

regarding Siemens'

EWSD switch

January 4

Avaya installs

uncertified switch

at Aberdeen

Proving Ground

January 9

Siemens starts

testing EWSD, rel.

18, at JITC

January 18

Senator Warner's

staff meets with

DOD on

interoperability and

connectivity

process

January 30

Nortel reinstalls

MSL12 at Qatar

March 1

IPTP issues IATO to Army

for Lucent 5ESS, rel. 14, for

Fort Bragg

March 1

Lucent receives

IATO for Fort

Bragg, effective

Feb 2001–Feb

2002, for 5ESS,

rel. 14

April 5

Army issues memo

eliminating precedence calls

for Army units in Europe

that do not require this

capability. Memo effective

for 1-year period ending

April 5, 2002
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 84 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2001

(cont.)

April 19

JITC issues interim status

report on result of EWSD

switch testing

April 25

General Officers meeting to

discuss Siemens'

certification status

April 27

Army responds to Senator

Warner's letter regarding

EWSD certification

April 27

JITC issues limited

certification of EWSD, rel.

18

April 27

Siemens receives

limited certification

of EWSD, rel. 18

April 30

DOD briefs

Senators Helms’

and Warner’s staff

on status of DISNE award and

Siemens’ switch

certification

April 30

DOD officials brief

congressional staff on

status of DISN-E award and

Siemens’ switch certification

May 11

Senators Warner

and Helms ask

GAO to review

DOD's certification

process and its

application of the

process
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 85 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2001

(cont.)

May 25

GAO meets with

congressional staff

to discuss request

June 21

AGCS requests

that certification

requirements

be waived for

its switch

upgrade based

on past

performance

June 29

Avaya installs

switch with IATO

at Edgewood

Arsenal

June 19

Nortel starts

testing MSL15 at

JITC

July 11

DISA requests guidance

from Joint Staff on EWSD

certification issues

July 13

Army appeals EWSD limited

certification to IPTP

July 17

IPTP surveys military

departments regarding

capability of EWSD

. July 23

Joint Staff informs AGCS

that all DSN switches must

be certified

July 23

Lucent starts

testing 5ESS, rel.

15 at JITC

July 19

Nortel installs

certified switch at

Capodichino Navy

facility in Italy
Appendix I

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to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2001

(cont.)

August 1

IPTP survey responses

received show that military

departments, except Army,

do not support global

certification of EWSD

August 2

Nortel installs

certified switch at

Gricignano Navy

facility in Italy

August 8

GAO meets with

Senator Helms'

staff to agree on

job design

(concurrence was

obtained from

Senator Warner’s

staff at a later date

via e-mail)

August 6

Acting Assistant Secretary

of Defense for C3I informs

AGCS that certification

requirements for switch

upgrades will not be waived

August 10

JITC sends intent to certify

e-mail to Avaya for Definity

G3R, rel. 8.2, which can be

used pending receipt of the

certification letter

August 10

Avaya receives

intent to certify email for Definity

G3R, rel. 8.2

August 9

Nortel installs

certified switch at

Gaeta Navy

facility in Italy

September 5

Avaya starts

testing Definity

G3R, rel. 9.2, at

JITC

September 6

Avaya installs

certified switch at

Fort Detrick
Appendix I

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to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2001

(cont.)

September 13

DISA on behalf of Air Force

issues a work stoppage in

Europe that affects General

Dynamics and Nortel

September 13

Nortel distributor

(General

Dynamics) stops

work activities

associated with

switch

installations/

upgrades in

Europe

September 25

Avaya installs

certified switch at

Fort Detrick

September 28

Lucent completes

testing 5ESS, rel.

15; certification

not received

September 21

Nortel receives

certification of

MSL14

September 26

Siemens ends

testing of EWSD,

rel. 18

October 15

AGCS tells

GAO it will no

longer compete

for DOD

contracts

because of

interoperability

requirements
Appendix I

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to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2001

(cont.)

November 14

GAO meets with

congressional staff

to provide status

update

November 11

Joint Staff meets with

Siemens regarding EWSD

certification

November 27

IPTP chairman meets with

Siemens regarding EWSD

certification

November 30

Joint Staff completes its

MLPP study, confirming

MLPP as most costeffective way for DOD to

ensure connectivity within

the DSN

November 10

Lucent installs

5ESS, rel. 15, at

Fort Bragg without

an IATO or

certification

December 6

Avaya installs

certified switch at

Fort McCoy

2002 January 2

Joint Staff validates global

use of the EWSD switch

with certain restrictions 9

months after JITC issued its

certification letter (i.e.,

limited certification). This

validation memo also

changed the certification

status from limited to global

January 3

Avaya installs

certified switch at

U.S. Military

Academy at West

Point
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

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Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2002

(cont.)

January 11

DOD revises directive

requiring all IT systems to

be interoperable

February 1

JITC sends intent to certify

e-mail to Avaya for Definity

G3R, rel. 9.2, which can be

used pending receipt of the

certification letter

February 1

Avaya receives

intent to certify email for Definity

G3R, rel. 9.2

February 4

Avaya receives

certification of

Definity G3R, rel.

8.2

February 12

IPTP grants IATO for

Lucent 5ESS, rel. 15,

effective Feb 2001–Feb

2002

February 14

Avaya installs

certified switch at

Fort A.P. Hill

February 21

GAO meets with

Senator Helms'

staff to discuss

product type and

issuance date

(concurrence was

obtained from

Senator Warner’s

staff at a later date

via e-mail)

February 19

JITC starts testing of voice

over Internet protocol

technology with Avaya

February 19

Avaya starts

testing of voice

over Internet

protocol

technology at

JITC
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 90 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

85

Appendix II

Timeline (cont.)

Vendors

Year Congress DOD AGCS Avaya Lucent Nortel Siemens

2002

(cont.)

March 6

GAO meets with

Senators Helms'

and Warner’s staff

to discuss product

type and issuance

date

March 25

Senators Helms’

and Warner’s staff

concur to product

issuance date

change.

March 8

Avaya installs

certified switch at

Fort Gillem

April 5

Army’s memo eliminating

precedence calls for Army

units in Europe that do not

require this capability

expires

April 4

Avaya installs

certified switch at

Fort Belvoir
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 91 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

86

Appendix III

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AGCS AG Commercial Systems

C3I Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DISA Defense Information Systems Agency

DISN-E Defense Information Systems Network–Europe

DOD Department of Defense

DSN Defense Switched Network

EWSD Elektronisches Waehl System Digital

IATO interim authority to operate

IPTP Interoperability Policy and Test Panel
Appendix I

Briefing Slides from April 19, 2002, Briefing 

to Staffs of Senators Helms and Warner

Page 92 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

Appendix III

Abbreviations and Acronyms (cont.)

JITC Joint Interoperability Test Command

Lucent Lucent Technologies

Nortel Nortel Networks

PM program manager

RFI request for information

SOR statement of requirements

TDR test discrepancy report

Telecom telecommunications

VOIP voice over Internet protocol
Page 93 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense ApendxiI
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 94 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches
Appendix II

Comments from the Department of Defense

Page 95 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches
Page 96 GAO-02-681 Interoperability of Telecom Switches

Appendix III

GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments ApendxiI

GAO Contact Cynthia Jackson, (202) 512-5086

Staff 

Acknowledgments

In addition to the person named above, other key contributors to this 

report were Naba Barkakati, Harold Brumm, Barbara Collier, Felipe Colón, 

Frank Maguire, Madhav Panwar, and Teresa Tucker.

(310238)
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