2022 IL App (4th) 200357 

NOS. 4-20-0357, 4-20-0358 cons. 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE CHAMPAIGN-URBANA PUBLIC HEALTH 

DISTRICT,

Petitioner,

v. 

THE ILLINOIS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, and 

PATRICIA HUNT, 

Respondents. 

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) 

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) 

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Petition for review of orders 

of Illinois Human Rights 

Commission

Nos. 05SF2282 

 07SF1305 

 JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Justices DeArmond and Holder White concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 This case stems from a series of employment decisions between the parties and 

raises the question of whether they were racially motivated. The first decision, in 2004, involved 

a demotion and decrease in salary. The second decision, in 2006, involved a series of failures to 

promote an ostensibly qualified applicant. 

¶ 2 I. INTRODUCTION

¶ 3 A. The Demotion Case 

¶ 4 Patricia Hunt, an African American, was a long-time public health nurse at the 

Champaign-Urbana Public Health District (District). In November 2004, Hunt’s job title was 

program coordinator of community health nurses. As part of a restructuring that same month, the 

District eliminated Hunt’s program coordinator position and demoted her back to her prior 

FILED

April 14, 2022 

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL
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position, which was public health nurse I. 

¶ 5 In January 2005, Hunt filed a charge of racial discrimination against the District in 

the Department of Human Rights (Department) based on the demotion, alleging (1) that she 

continued to perform the duties of a program coordinator but at a decreased salary and (2) a 

similarly situated white employee, when her coordinator position was eliminated in 2003, (a) also 

continued to perform the same (program coordinator) duties but (b) was demoted to a public health 

nurse II (a higher paying job title) without a decrease in salary. 

¶ 6 B. The Failure To Promote Case

¶ 7 In 2005 and 2006, Hunt twice applied for a nursing services manager position and

twice applied for a public health nurse II position. In January 2006, the District hired a white 

applicant, Sylvia Link, for the nursing services manager position. In June 2006, the District again 

hired a white applicant, Jamie Perry, for the nursing service manager position (which was 

unexpectedly vacated by Link). 

¶ 8 Later in June 2006, the District hired a white applicant, Ellen Weise, for a public 

health nurse II position. When Weise also unexpectedly left, the District hired Andrea Taylor, 

another white applicant, to fill the public health nurse II position. 

¶ 9 In December 2006, Hunt filed additional charges of racial discrimination with the 

Department against the District based on these four hiring decisions, in which she alleged she was 

more qualified than the white applicants. Hunt retired from the District in 2007.

¶ 10 C. Common Procedural History 

¶ 11 Both the demotion case and the failure to promote case proceeded to separate 

evidentiary hearings in front of the same administrative law judge (ALJ). In January 2014, in the 

demotion case, the ALJ entered a recommended order and decision (ROD) concluding Hunt failed 
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to demonstrate a prima facie case of race discrimination and recommended dismissal. In February 

2015, the ALJ entered a similar ROD with similar findings in the failure to promote case. 

¶ 12 In both cases, Hunt filed exceptions to the RODs with the Illinois Human Rights 

Commission (Commission) challenging the ALJ’s findings. The District filed responses to Hunt’s 

exceptions. 

¶ 13 In 2017, the Commission reviewed the ROD in each case and voted not to adopt 

the recommendations, concluding instead that Hunt had proved her charges of race discrimination.

In May 2019, the Commission entered two separate remand orders, explaining its findings and 

remanding to the ALJ for determinations as to damages. 

¶ 14 In 2019, the ALJ entered supplemental RODs in which the ALJ challenged the 

Commission’s authority to enter the remand orders because the terms of office of some of the 

commissioners who entered the remand orders had expired before those orders were entered. In 

2020, the Commission sua sponte struck the supplemental RODs, reaffirmed its prior remand 

orders, and remanded again for damages determinations. 

¶ 15 Later in 2020, the ALJ entered second supplemental RODs awarding damages. In 

the demotion case, the ALJ awarded Hunt $7629 in back wages, plus attorney fees and costs. In 

the failure to promote case, the ALJ awarded $40,987 in back wages, plus attorney fees and costs. 

Neither party filed any exceptions to the second supplemental RODs, which, by law, became the 

final orders of the Commission. 

¶ 16 In this court, the District sought direct administrative review of the final orders in 

each case, and this court consolidated the cases on appeal.

¶ 17 D. The Parties’ Arguments and Our Holdings 

¶ 18 The State respondents—namely, the Commission and the Department (hereinafter
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collectively the State)—argue this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Commission’s decisions 

because the District did not exhaust its administrative remedies. Alternatively, the State argues 

that the Commission’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 19 The District, meanwhile, argues that the Commission’s remand orders are void 

because they bear the signatures of commissioners whose terms had expired when the orders were 

issued. In the alternative, the District contends the Commission’s findings were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence in each case because Hunt failed to (1) establish a prima facie

case of race discrimination and (2) demonstrate that the District’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for taking actions against Hunt were a pretext for race discrimination.

¶ 20 We address each argument in turn and conclude as follows: (1) the State has not 

demonstrated that the District failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, (2) the Commission’s 

remand orders were valid, (3) the Commission’s finding of race discrimination in the demotion 

case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (4) the Commission’s finding in the 

failure to promote case was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 21 II. BACKGROUND 

¶ 22 As an initial matter, we note that the arguments in this case relate only to the 

Commission’s ultimate findings and their validity. Accordingly, we begin where the parties begin

in their briefs, with the evidentiary hearings in each case. 

¶ 23 A. The Demotion Case 

¶ 24 In August 2011, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing on Hunt’s charge of race 

discrimination in her 2004 demotion. Hunt alleged that in November of 2004 she was demoted 

from program coordinator of community health nurses (a management position) to a public health 

nurse I, which resulted in a decrease in salary, while a similarly situated white employee, Karen 
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McKinzie, was demoted in July 2003 from a program coordinator position to a public health nurse 

II position with no change in salary. The District admitted that Hunt (1) was a member of a 

protected class, (2) was meeting job performance expectations, and (3) suffered an adverse 

employment action—namely, a demotion with a decrease in salary. The District denied that

McKinzie was a similarly situated employee and maintained that Hunt was demoted because her 

position was eliminated as part of the District’s restructuring effort to increase the efficiency of its

services.

¶ 25 1. The Primary Evidence at the Administrative Hearing

¶ 26 a. David King 

¶ 27 David King testified that he was the administrator of the District from August 1999 

to 2005. In that position, King was essentially the executive director of the agency and reported to 

the Champaign-Urbana Board of Health (Board), who were elected officials. King explained that 

the District provided a variety of services to the public such as immunizations, physicals, and 

diagnosis and testing of sexually transmitted diseases. It also provided educational information 

geared towards preventative care.

¶ 28 When he began as administrator, the District was separated by profession. In other 

words, there were divisions of nutritionists, nurses, and social workers, among other divisions. 

King wanted to reorganize the District by what services were being provided, which he believed 

would help increase efficiency and cooperation, thereby providing better services. (We note King 

testified that, over a period of years, several reorganizations took place that created new divisions 

and moved various personnel. As a result, division names and job titles frequently changed without 

the job duties or division responsibilities changing. Additionally, the witnesses testified that 

although their formal job titles changed, as a practical matter, they did not change the terminology 
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of the various jobs.) 

¶ 29 In the fall of 2002, the District hired Sylvia Coronado-Romero as director of human 

resources. At King’s and the Board’s request, Coronado-Romero undertook an in-depth review of 

the job and salary structure at the District. As part of this effort, the division directors and their 

managerial staff reviewed, updated, and rewrote the job descriptions at the District so they could

reorganize employee classifications into a new cohesive scheme. Eventually, the directors and 

Coronado-Romero put together a recommendation of new job descriptions, titles, and salaries to 

be applied to all the positions in the District, which the Board approved and implemented in July 

2003. 

¶ 30 Under the new arrangement, if a reclassified employee moved to a position with a 

higher salary, that employee would receive that higher salary. Employees reclassified into 

positions with lower pay would maintain their current salary but would not receive increases until 

the periodic cost of living adjustments caught up to their current salary. Five employees, including 

Hunt, were reclassified into positions with lower pay. 

¶ 31 King explained that before reorganization, the District had two types of nurses: 

“public health nurses,” which required a bachelor’s degree in nursing, and “clinic nurses,” which 

only needed an associate’s degree in nursing. (We note that these distinctions were less meaningful 

than they appear. Public health nurses performed a wide variety of very different functions, 

including doing some clinical work (e.g., flu shots). Clinic nurses worked primarily in clinical 

settings, assessing patient health, performing medical testing, and administering immunizations.) 

¶ 32 The July 2003 reclassifications eliminated the titles of public health nurse and clinic 

nurse. Instead, all nurses were reclassified as a public health nurse I or II, which were newly 

distinguished by job responsibilities rather than education. (Again, we note that the title changes 
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and job reclassifications were formal matters that did not change how employees described their 

jobs. For instance, although they were now formally public health nurse I’s, the District continued 

to informally distinguish between community health nurses (like Hunt) and clinic nurses.) 

¶ 33 In the fall of 2003, Cindy Noa, the director of community health nursing and 

clinical services (commonly known as the director of nursing), asked King to create a program 

coordinator of community health nurses position. The program coordinator position was designed 

to help Noa focus on her administrative and policy writing duties by having Hunt supervise the

community health nurses under Noa, coordinate their schedules, and coordinate with other 

divisions (who used the same office space, materials, and sometimes shared nurses). King 

promoted Hunt into that position upon Noa’s recommendation. 

¶ 34 In December 2003, King learned Noa was leaving the District at the end of January 

2004. Noa recommended that Hunt become the interim director of nursing. King asked Hunt if she 

was willing to do so, and Hunt said she was. King and Hunt agreed to discuss any potential increase 

in pay at a later date. King stated they discussed salary several times but could not reach an 

agreement. As a result, King assumed the position of interim director until a new director, Marsha 

Atkins, was hired in June 2004. King asked Hunt to continue her program coordinator duties while 

he was interim director and did his best to supervise the community health nurses. He denied, 

however, telling Hunt that she had to keep performing these duties to protect her job. 

¶ 35 King testified that Hunt did not perform any significant additional duties while she 

served as interim director because he took over those duties within two weeks “to the extent that 

she started them.” King explained that, as program coordinator, Hunt already supervised most of 

the people in the division. The interim position required her to be the coordinator for the clinical 

nurses and the vision and hearing technicians. King stated that Hunt “likely” did not attend 
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directors’ meetings or manage the division because he never formally promoted her to interim 

director before he took over the position. 

¶ 36 In November 2004, the District’s clinic nurses were split into two groups and 

reorganized into the division of family health and division of HIV/STD in an attempt to improve 

the clinical services in both divisions. That way, each division’s directors would have direct 

supervision of the nurses. King stated that the reorganization significantly reduced the size of the 

division of community health nursing because five or six clinic nurses were moved into other 

divisions. 

¶ 37 At that time, King eliminated the program coordinator positions for community 

health nursing, held by Hunt, and clinical services, which was vacant. (King never explained what 

the program coordinator of clinical services position entailed or who, if anyone, ever held the 

position.) Because of the decrease in employees, Marsha Atkins, the director of nursing, said she 

could now supervise the community health nurses and would take over Hunt’s program 

coordinator responsibilities. Hunt returned to her prior position of community health nurse

(formally designated as public health nurse I) and her prior salary. 

¶ 38 King denied ever discussing race as part of the decision to demote Hunt. 

¶ 39 b. Karen McKinzie

¶ 40 McKinzie testified that she worked for the District as the HealthWorks program 

manager. HealthWorks was a medical case management program for children in foster care. 

HealthWorks employed case managers who monitored the health of children in foster care to 

ensure they received regular and adequate medical care, such as physicals, immunizations, hearing 

and vision screenings, and dental exams. 

¶ 41 McKinzie testified she started at the District in 1995 as a case manager before 
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becoming the program manager. McKinzie explained that the program manager position was 

essentially the same as a program coordinator position at the District and she performed the same 

or similar functions as other program coordinators in the District. 

¶ 42 McKinzie testified that she was the program manager in July 2003 when she was 

reclassified as a public health nurse II. McKinzie testified that she did not consider the 

reclassification as a demotion, her job responsibilities and salary did not change, and in practice, 

her title did not change; she was still called a program manager. McKinzie stated that before the 

reorganization, there were two case managers in HealthWorks who handled (1) Department of 

Child and Family Services (DCFS) wards, (2) Adverse Pregnancy Outcome Reporting System

(APORS) infants, and (3) pregnant DCFS wards and their children. After the reorganization, 

McKinzie got all the pregnant DCFS wards and their children and all wards that were APORS. 

McKinzie considered it to be an increase in workload. 

¶ 43 McKinzie explained APORS as follows: “basically it’s the high-risk babies, some 

have been in neonatal [intensive care], some have not been in neonatal but have been drug 

exposed.” Completion of a pediatric assessment course (learning how to do physical exams on 

babies) was necessary to manage those cases. She would have to conduct home visits periodically 

depending on the child’s age. For example, visits occurred at age 2 weeks, between 2 and 4 months, 

6 months, 1 year, 18 months, and 2 years. Home visits also occurred with pregnant wards with 

children. McKinzie explained the work she performed was more administrative than patient 

focused. 

¶ 44 McKinzie stated that Les Hitchens was the director of the family health division. 

HealthWorks was in that division, and Hitchens was McKinzie’s director. Prior to her 

reclassification, McKinzie supervised two other workers in HealthWorks by keeping track of 
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vacation time and sick days and conducting evaluations. She was also involved in hiring and firing 

decisions. McKinzie no longer performed those duties after July 2003. McKinzie testified that, in 

2003, King was her direct supervisor and signed her time and activity logs. At some point in time, 

Hitchens became her supervisor and signed the logs. 

¶ 45 c. Patricia Hunt

¶ 46 Hunt testified that she began working for the District as a clerk typist in 1977. She 

became a registered nurse (RN) after graduating in 1991with an associate degree in nursing. She 

then became a clinic nurse working in the communicable diseases division. She performed testing 

and lab work designed to discover if individuals in the community had HIV/AIDS, hepatitis, 

tuberculosis, and other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs). In 1995, Hunt worked in the 

HealthWorks department as a case manager dealing with DCFS wards and APORS infants. She 

obtained the necessary certifications to evaluate and perform developmental assessments of 

infants, which she would perform periodically during home visits. She also educated foster parents 

and conducted workshops. 

¶ 47 In 1998, Hunt received a bachelor’s degree in nursing and was reassigned to the 

community health nursing division as a public health nurse. In 2002, she received a master’s degree 

in public administration. 

¶ 48 Between 1998 and 2003, Hunt performed various nursing-related activities, 

including making home visits to elderly residents to assist them with medication, health 

assessments, and remaining in their homes. Hunt also worked as the Heart Smart for Women 

Facilitator, running the program by complying with grant requirements, organizing speakers and 

educational sessions, and recruiting participants. Hunt helped with the Illinois Breast and Cervical 

Cancer Program, performing case management, assisting with grant provisions, collaborating with 
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participating physicians, and scheduling appointments for participants. Hunt also worked as a Teen 

Parent Services case manager, which required that she case-manage pregnant teens and teen 

parents, as well as conduct workshops and home visits. Hunt served as the coordinator for the lead 

program and ran the entire program. She was trained to do home visits to test children’s blood for 

lead. She would then coordinate with another division at the District, the division of environmental 

health, to go to the home and test paint and materials to determine where the lead was. 

¶ 49 In November 2003, Hunt was promoted to program coordinator for community 

health nursing. Hunt described her job as essentially being an assistant director to Noa. Hunt 

supervised around 10 people: 8 nurses and 2 staff. Hunt explained, “I did the benefit packages for 

the people I was over. I did chart reviews. I even did some evaluations. I sat in on interviews. I 

submitted reports.” Hunt also had her normal patient caseload and was responsible for setting up 

various off-site health clinics and flu-shot clinics. Hunt supervised two people in the vision and 

hearing division. Hunt testified that she continued in that role until November 2004. 

¶ 50 In February 2004, Noa left the District, and Hunt became the interim director of 

nursing. Hunt continued to perform her program coordinator duties and then was also in charge of 

a range of new responsibilities—namely, overseeing additional employees and coordinating with 

other divisions. 

¶ 51 Hunt testified that she had four to five conversations with King about a pay increase 

but King kept saying they would talk about it later. After three weeks, King eventually made an 

offer that was “not very much more than what [Hunt] was already making.” King said he would

look into it, but sometime later informed Hunt that “he didn’t have to pay [her] any additional 

monies, that he could get [her] to do the work anyway because one of his co-workers told him that 

he had the authority to do that.” 
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¶ 52 Hunt maintained that King took over the title of interim director of nursing in June 

2004 but Hunt continued to perform all of those duties. Hunt testified that in July 2004, when the 

District hired Atkins as director of nursing, Hunt’s responsibilities and duties did not change. Hunt 

was required to orient Atkins and help her learn the job. Hunt also said that she trained Atkins on 

various duties which took Atkins longer than normal to learn. At some point, Atkins’s focus shifted 

to clinical nursing services, and Hunt continued to provide Atkins significant help to complete her 

director responsibilities. Hunt acknowledged that Atkins did take over some of the director duties. 

In particular, Hunt stopped supervising the community health nurses in November 2004. 

¶ 53 Hunt maintained she continued to perform these duties until Atkins left in April or 

May 2005. At that time, King told Hunt that “in order to not jeopardize [her] job [Hunt] had to do 

it,” meaning “[a]ll the tasks and responsibilities” of the director. 

¶ 54 Hunt acknowledged at one point that she was reclassified as a public health nurse I 

in July 2003. Hunt explained that in November 2004, the District moved clinical nurses to a 

different division. However, that reorganization had an impact on what she was doing “only *** 

in words. It didn’t impact anything that I was doing. I continued to do what I was doing for a big 

portion of the time.” 

¶ 55 Hunt described her learning of the demotion as follows. On November 8, 2004, she 

was called into a conference room with King and Atkins. King handed Hunt a letter with a smile 

on his face and told her to read it. The letter indicated Hunt’s program coordinator position was 

being eliminated because the clinic nurses were no longer in the community health nursing division 

and Hunt was being returned to the public health nurse I position at a decreased salary. King told 

her to “note” the last sentence, which asked her to continue “providing important community 

health nursing services in [her] new role,” and said, “I’m sure you will continue your duties and 
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do the best of your abilities for us. Right?” Hunt said she should be a public health nurse II, and 

King said he would have to talk to the human resources director. King later told Hunt that, 

according to Coronado-Romero, Hunt’s duties were not sufficiently high risk to be considered a 

public health nurse II. Every time Hunt complained, King said she would have to keep doing what 

she was doing if she did not want to jeopardize her job. 

¶ 56 d. Staci Rossman

¶ 57 Staci Rossman testified that she started working for the District as an administrative 

assistant in 2004. For a time, she “functioned as an executive assistant for the administrator.” She 

held that position in late 2005. The administrator at that time was Vito Palazzolo. She attended all 

Board meetings, was responsible for the minutes, and helped with the scheduling of interviews 

and posting of jobs. 

¶ 58 Rossman recalled that someone from management staff (“It could’ve been Dave 

King. It could’ve been Vito Palazzolo, or it could’ve been Sylvia Coronado-Romero.”) said Hunt 

would never get promoted no matter what job she applied for. Rossman also recalled someone 

saying, “[Hunt] was the typical black woman that felt she deserved something because she was 

black.” Rossman believed Palazzolo made that comment but could not be sure. She also believed 

the comments were made at the end of 2005 or during 2006, but she could not recall. She believed 

the comment was made after Hunt had applied for a position and before a decision had been made.

¶ 59 e. Julie Pryde 

¶ 60 Julie Pryde was part of the committee for job reclassification and explained that the 

distinction between public health nurse I and II was based on what the nurses actually did in their 

jobs. Her understanding was that public health nurse IIs were running programs in addition to their 

nursing duties. Because every nurse performed public health nurse I duties, something more was 
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required for a public health nurse II position, such as running a program or taking care of high-risk 

clients or some other additional duties and work. Pryde testified that job reclassification decisions 

were all made by consensus of the directors. She never heard any racial comments or discussions 

during meetings, let alone about Hunt. 

¶ 61 Pryde recalled that McKinzie was a program manager or coordinator and became a 

public health nurse II because she was running the HealthWorks program. “[N]othing was 

different. We just changed her title.” 

¶ 62 f. Damages

¶ 63 The parties presented testimony and documentary evidence relating to Hunt’s 

alleged lost wages as a result of her demotion. However, the amount of damages is not an issue on 

review.

¶ 64 2. The ALJ’s ROD

¶ 65 In January 2014, the ALJ issued a recommended order and decision (ROD). The 

ALJ concluded that Hunt failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she 

had not established a proper “comparator.” Specifically, Hunt had argued that McKinzie was a 

similarly situated employee who was not a member of a protected class and was treated more 

favorably than Hunt. The ALJ concluded that McKinzie’s job duties—providing more 

administrative services and monitoring high-risk infants and youths—were too different from 

Hunt’s, which were primarily conducting in-home visits with the elderly and, on occasion, homes 

of children where the presence of lead paint was suspected. Similarly, when McKinzie was named 

a public health nurse II in July 2003, she maintained her existing duties but took over the entire 

caseload of another case manager.

¶ 66 Alternatively, the ALJ concluded that Hunt failed to demonstrate that the District’s 
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explanation for adverse treatment was a pretext for race discrimination. The ALJ described the 

District’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for eliminating Hunt’s program coordinator 

position as (1) the need to reorganize the nurses within the agency to provide more specialized

training and (2) a need to economize after the assumption of Hunt’s duties by the director of 

nursing. 

¶ 67 The ALJ noted that Hunt was classified as a public health nurse I in July 2003 and 

she did not contest that reclassification at the time. Instead, she was promoted to a program 

coordinator position in November 2003. Although she continued to do those duties, and some of 

the interim director of nursing duties, the District hired a new director of nursing, Atkins, in July 

2004. The testimony showed that Atkins took over Hunt’s program coordinator duties in 

November 2004 when the position was eliminated and Hunt was returned to her prior position as 

a public health nurse I. The ALJ found that (1) Hunt presented no evidence that the reorganization 

and elimination of her position was a pretext and (2) Hunt’s demotion was not comparable to 

McKinzie’s reclassification in 2003 because Hunt lost substantial responsibilities while McKinzie 

took on more. 

¶ 68 3. The Remand Order

¶ 69 Subsequently, Hunt filed exceptions to the ALJ’s ROD, and the District filed a 

response. The Commission agreed to review the case and conducted oral arguments in June 2017. 

The case was heard by a three-commissioner panel consisting of Nabi Fakroddin, Hermene 

Hartman, and Eleni Bousis. After oral arguments, the panel discussed the case in a closed session. 

Immediately thereafter, the panel voted on the record to (1) reject the ALJ’s ROD as against the 

manifest weight of the evidence, (2) enter an order finding in favor of Hunt, and (3) remand the 

case for a determination on damages.
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¶ 70 In May 2019, the Commission entered a written remand order signed by Hartman, 

Fakroddin, and Beth Gash. Footnotes on the first page of the order indicate that the order “is 

entered in conformity with a vote cast by [each commissioner] during her term.” In its order, the 

Commission wrote the following: 

“ALJ Robinson asserted that Ms. Karen McKinzie was not a satisfactory 

‘comparative’ because she was a nurse in a different division, when demoted, they 

returned to the original positions: McKenzie [sic] back to a Public Health Nurse II; 

and the Complainant [(Hunt)] back to a Public Health Nurse I. And the severity and 

complexity of the work involved in the duties associated with each role varied.

However, the Commission does not agree with ALJ Robinson’s assessment. 

Here, the Commission finds that the Complainant did, in fact, establish a 

prima facie case of race discrimination and that McKinzie was a proper 

‘comparative’. In accessing the Complainant’s long tenure with the Respondent 

[District], the Commission found that the Complainant performed many of the same 

duties and successfully managed the same responsibilities than McKinzie. For 

example, the Commission examined the Complainant’s history with the 

Respondent and learned that during her tenure with the Respondent, the 

Complainant achieved great academic success by earning her RN license in May 

1991, her Bachelor’s degree in Nursing in 1998, and a Master’s Degree in Public 

Administration in 2002. 

During these years, the Complainant handled various nursing-related 

activities, including, but not limited to, service as a case manager with the children 

in the Adverse Pregnancy Outcome Reporting System (‘APORS’) where she made 
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periodic visits to the homes of high-risk infants; service as a Public Health Nurse 

in the Community Health Nursing Department where she made home visits to 

elderly residents in an effort to assist them in remaining in their homes; handling 

additional duties in the Heart Smart for Women Program, Illinois Breast and 

Cervical Cancer Program, and the Lead Program. In addition to obtaining academic 

success, the Complainant also became a Teen Parent Services Case Manager, which 

required that she case manage pregnant teens and teen parents, as well as conduct 

workshops and home visits. 

These are duties the Complainant performed and responsibilities she carried 

out since her time with the Respondent, which are related and ‘comparative’ to what 

McKinzie handled as a Public Health Nurse II and Coordinator prior to her 

demotion. Thus, the Commission concludes that the Complainant did establish a 

prima facie case of race discrimination at the hands of the Respondent. 

Next, ALJ Robinson concluded that the Respondent articulated a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment decision, namely, a need to 

reorganize the nurses within the agency to provide better specialized training, as 

well as a need to economize through the elimination of the Complainant’s 

Coordinator position and the assumption of Complainant’s supervisory duties by 

the Director of Nursing. [Citations.] 

However, the Commission does not concur with ALJ Robinson that the 

Respondent articulated a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for its adverse action 

but said reason may be pretextual for race discrimination at the Complainant’s cost. 

Pursuant to the Complainant’s successful work history with the Respondent, and 
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the various academic degrees she attained during her tenure, coupled with the 

variety of experiences and roles she successfully undertook during her time with 

the Respondent, many of which delineated in the posted job vacancy notices the 

Respondent posted for the Nursing Services Manager and Public Health Nurse II 

positions, to eliminate the Complainant’s Coordinator Nurse position, demote her 

back to a Public Health Nurse I role with a cut in her salary without cutting the 

salary of any other nurse demoted to a lower role is pretextual for race 

discrimination.”

¶ 71 The order concluded by reiterating that it did not adopt the ALJ’s recommendations 

and found that Hunt established a prima facie case. The Commission remanded the case back to 

the ALJ for a hearing on damages. 

¶ 72 4. Subsequent Proceedings

¶ 73 In October 2020, the ALJ issued a supplemental ROD. We note that the ALJ did 

not conduct a new hearing because evidence of damages was provided at the prior hearing. In the 

supplemental ROD, the ALJ questioned the validity of the remand order, arguing that the tenures

of the commissioners who signed the order had expired prior to its entry. Additionally, one of the 

commissioners that signed the order was not the same commissioner who heard the oral arguments. 

The ALJ further questioned the reasoning of the remand order, contending it conflicted with prior

Commission precedent and was inconsistent with the evidence presented. 

¶ 74 The ALJ recommended a new panel of commissioners hear the case and reconsider 

its prior decision for the reasons stated in the supplemental ROD. Alternatively, the ALJ made 

findings as to the damages and costs to which Hunt was entitled. 

¶ 75 Hunt filed exceptions to the supplemental ROD, and the District filed a response. 
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In January 2020, the Commission, on its own motion, sua sponte struck the supplemental ROD in 

a written order. That order stated as follows: 

“The Commission has reviewed [the panel’s] Remand Order decided on July 17, 

2017[,] and entered on May 29, 2019, and the Commission rejects ALJ Robinson’s 

[supplemental] ROD in its entirety as noncompliant and inconsistent with the 

Remand Order. The Commission does not reach the merits of the arguments in ALJ 

Robinson’s [supplemental] ROD, will not provide any further clarification or 

justification for the Remand Order or [the panel’s] authority to enter it, and will not 

take any of the actions ALJ Robinson recommended relating to the Remand Order.” 

¶ 76 The panel ordered that “the Remand Order from July 17, 2017[,] and entered on 

May 29, 2019[,] stands. As Complainant established a violation *** by a preponderance of the 

evidence, ALJ Robinson is ordered, again, to determine damages.” 

¶ 77 In February 2020, the ALJ issued a second supplemental ROD, awarding Hunt 

$7629 in back wages, $22,806.25 in legal fees, and $674.97 in costs. Neither party filed exceptions, 

and in June 2020, the Commission sent out a notice explaining that the second supplemental ROD 

had become the final order of the Commission as a result. 

¶ 78 B. The Failure to Promote Case 

¶ 79 Hunt alleged that in 2005 and 2006, she twice applied for a nursing services 

manager position and twice applied for a public health nurse II position. The District hired four 

white applicants for those positions. Hunt asserted that she was qualified for those positions and 

she was not promoted because of her race.

¶ 80 The District denied that race played a part in its hiring decisions. Regarding the 

nursing services manager positions, the District asserted that (1) Hunt was not a qualified candidate 
- 20 - 

because she did not have sufficient relevant experience and (2) the District hired the most qualified 

candidates. Regarding the public health nurse II positions, the District conceded that Hunt was 

qualified but likewise maintained that it hired more qualified candidates.

¶ 81 1. The Administrative Hearing

¶ 82 In June 2012, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing. Hunt presented testimony 

on her own behalf and from Charlene Stevens, a fellow long-time public health nurse with the

District. The District presented testimony from several witnesses who were involved in the 

interviewing and hiring process. The ALJ admitted into evidence (1) the job postings, (2) the job 

descriptions and qualifications, (3) the applicants’ resumes, and (4) the interviewers’ notes and 

evaluations. All of the witnesses denied that race was discussed or considered as part of any of the 

interviews or hiring decisions. 

¶ 83 The evidence generally showed the following. 

¶ 84 a. Hiring of the Nursing Services Manager Position

¶ 85 In the fall of 2005, the District advertised that it was hiring for a nursing services 

coordinator position. (We note that this position was subsequently renamed nursing services 

manager but was functionally identical.) The job posting provided as follows: 

“The Coordinator will be responsible to develop, plan, coordinate, evaluate & 

monitor standard nursing practices, protocols, procedures & services. Candidates 

should have a demonstrated ability to develop outcome-based performance 

standards, provide recommendations to directors on nursing, clinical, medical & 

privacy protocols & programs, conduct training for all staff on medical, nursing & 

privacy related matters.” 

The job posting further provided that candidates were required to have a bachelor’s degree in 
- 21 - 

nursing or a closely related field, a current license as an RN, and “[f]ive y[ea]rs exp[erience] in 

nursing programs eval[uation], quality assurance, nursing performance measurement, 

development of nursing protocols & procedures or related exp[erience].” 

¶ 86 Witnesses for the District testified that the District implemented a new process for 

interviewing candidates. The human resources department would gather the candidates’ resumes. 

Then, a panel of interviewers, comprised of directors and their program coordinators in the relevant 

divisions, reviewed the resumes and compared them to the job descriptions for the posted position. 

The panel would ask each candidate questions from a prewritten list of questions. The interviewers 

would score the candidates’ responses on a scale of one to three, based on how well the interviewer

thought the candidate answered. The scores were then totaled, and the panel discussed which 

candidates it believed were best suited for the position. The candidate with the highest score was 

offered the position. 

¶ 87 In 2006, Brandon Meline, Julie Pryde, and Larry Rodgers were all division 

directors, and all served on the interview panel for the nursing services manager position. They 

testified that the District was looking for a nursing services manager to write standard practices 

and procedures for all of the nurses in the District to ensure those nurses were following best 

practices in the nursing profession. They further testified that hospital and clinical experience were 

important for the position. 

¶ 88 Rodgers testified the District was “pretty weak in terms of written established 

protocols that exposed them to risk management issues.” He believed the best candidate would 

have (1) a breadth of experience in a variety of settings of the nursing practice, (2) extensive 

experience in supervising nurses, and (3) experience writing policies relating to risk management 

and setting up standard procedures. Moreover, Rodgers thought experience in the hospital setting 
- 22 - 

was valuable for developing standard protocols because hospitals have “a certain way that you do 

pretty much everything, and it’s written, and the skills are verified and monitored pretty closely.” 

The District was looking for something similar.

¶ 89 Pryde and Meline also testified that the District wanted someone who could develop 

necessary competencies, train nurses, and periodically evaluate them for those competencies. (We 

note that “competencies” referred to a nurse’s ability to properly perform various clinical tasks on 

patients at a minimum skill level.) This was necessary because there was no clinical supervision 

of the nursing staff, and no training, to make sure they were able to perform all of the clinical 

components of public health nursing. 

¶ 90 Pryde explained that because each division was going to have nurses and the agency 

was getting bigger, the nursing services manager would need to be able to supervise and evaluate 

all of the nurses in each division to ensure that the nurses were competent at their nursing functions 

and following best practices. This would require broad experience as it would include evaluating 

for competencies on tasks ranging from performing pelvic exams, to drawing blood, giving shots, 

and working with microscopes. Pryde testified that she also wanted the nursing services manager 

to be familiar with the (1) Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA) (29 U.S.C. § 651 

et seq. (2018)) standards and (2) Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996

(HIPAA) (42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2018)). Additionally, the District was expanding lab services 

and needed someone to implement the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988

(CLIA) (42 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2018)) standards, which included calibrating machines and 

training staff. 

¶ 91 Pryde and Meline both believed that hospital experience was preferable because 

hospitals had the highest standards of care and were heavily regulated. Meline further explained 
- 23 - 

that nurses in hospitals were using clinical skills every day, while public health nurses—who 

performed mainly case management—may go months without giving an injection. He testified 

that hospital experience was “significantly” considered because the District “needed to solidify 

policies and evaluation criteria for competencies, quality assurance type activities to make sure, 

you know, that we’re following up and testing competencies and procedures on a regular basis.” 

To accomplish this, Meline testified that the “real world clinical experience, working with 

providers in multi-disciplinary teams kind of in a clinical setting was important” to him as a 

panelist.

¶ 92 In sum, the testimony showed that the District’s desired skillset for the nursing 

services manager position was primarily (1) writing standard operating procedures, (2) developing 

and performing competency assessments, and (3) experience managing, supervising, and training 

nurses. 

¶ 93 i. Sylvia Link

¶ 94 In the fall and winter of 2005, the District interviewed Sylvia Link and Hunt, among 

others. Link’s résumé showed that she had bachelor’s and master’s degrees in nursing and a Ph.D. 

in “Educational Leadership, Administration, and Foundations.” Link began working as a nurse in 

1992, and also had many years of experience teaching nurses at various colleges and universities, 

where she provided various levels of nursing students with classroom, laboratory, and clinical 

instruction. Link also managed, supervised, and evaluated both nursing students and licensed 

nurses for several years. She had three years of experience managing licensed nurses in (1) a 

mental health unit and (2) a Veteran Affairs health care center, which was multidisciplinary. 

¶ 95 Link’s interview notes reflected that the panel valued her knowledge of nursing 

competencies and practice standards, training in multiple disciplines, extensive background in 
- 24 - 

nursing education and evaluation, and experience developing policies and procedures. The 

interview notes further indicated that Link had experience with CLIA procedures. Meline testified 

he liked Link’s breadth of experience as a nurse both in clinical settings as well as teaching and 

supervisory experience. Meline further liked her quality assurance, competency testing, and 

assessment experience. Meline also liked the fact that she had a Ph.D. and had experience writing 

protocols. 

¶ 96 Pryde remembered interviewing Link and believing she was the best candidate 

because “[s]he had a lot of experience doing the things we were looking for. The OSHA, the CLIA, 

the writing standard operating procedures, things like that, things that we needed to be—needed 

done.” “She had a lot of experience writing—writing standard operating standards, and she knew 

all kinds of stuff about CLIA.” 

¶ 97 Hunt’s résumé showed that she joined the District in 1977. Hunt started in the 

Women, Infants, and Children program as a receptionist and later became a clerk typist. She got 

her RN in 1991 and began working in infectious diseases as a clinical nurse, which involved some 

lab work. In 1995, she moved to HealthWorks and worked as a case manager for three years, 

working with high-risk infants and families. In 1998, she earned her bachelor’s degree in nursing 

and moved to community health nursing. She was a case manager at Teen Parent Services, worked

with the Illinois Breast and Cervical Cancer Program updating grants, and ran the Heart Smart for 

Women program, which focused on teaching low income and African American women to be 

more health conscious with diet and exercise. Hunt also began the lead program, a grant program 

she ran that required her to develop policies and procedures to comply with the grant. In 2002, 

Hunt received a master’s degree in public administration. 

¶ 98 Hunt’s résumé further showed that from November 2003 to November 2004, she 
- 25 - 

was the program coordinator for community health nursing, in which she supervised, managed, 

and evaluated several nurses and some staff in the vision and hearing division. In that role, Hunt

was on several committees that interviewed, hired, and fired personnel. For several months, first 

in 2004 and then again in 2005, Hunt was the interim director of nursing, which required her to be 

in charge of the community nursing and clinical services division, including the Illinois Breast and 

Cervical Cancer Program, clinical services, vision and hearing, and the community nursing 

division. In 2005, Hunt began teaching certified nursing assistant (CNA) students at Parkland 

College. 

¶ 99 The interview notes explained that Hunt was marked down because she had no 

hospital experience, had only one year experience of supervising nurses, had not developed a 

quality control plan, and had limited experience with HIPAA and no experience with CLIA. Hunt 

also gave short, general, and nonspecific answers to questions and became argumentative when 

discussing why the nursing services manager position had changed. 

¶ 100 Meline remembered Hunt had a long history working in various positions at the 

District. However, Meline noted that she had limited clinical experience, particularly outside of 

the public health context, especially compared to Link. Meline stated that the difference in ability 

to write policies and test competencies were also reasons Link was chosen over Hunt. 

¶ 101 In January 2006, the District hired Link. Just 21⁄2 months later, Link resigned from 

her position because her husband got a new job and her family had to relocate. 

¶ 102 ii. Jamie Perry

¶ 103 In March 2006, the District posted substantially the same job opening for a nursing 

services manager, but this time specifically requested candidates have experience with OSHA, 

CLIA, and HIPAA. The posting did not state that hospital experience was necessary or preferred.
- 26 - 

The District also added new requirements to the interview process because, according to Pryde,

Link “wasn’t very good at writing.” Pryde testified that the District was happy with Link’s teaching 

“and getting the stuff down, but we actually needed written standard operating procedures, and so 

we put that in there to see if—you know, to make sure that somebody actually could write.” For 

the spring 2006 interviews, the District required applicants to perform two writing exercises and 

leave a voicemail that complied with HIPAA. One of the writing exercises was to write a protocol 

for giving an immunization of the candidate’s choice. 

¶ 104 In May 2006, the District again interviewed Hunt and also Jamie Perry. Perry had 

been a staff nurse with the University of Illinois McKinley Health Center since 1995. Perry 

previously served as the director of an emergency department for 21⁄2 years and as a nurse manager 

in an emergency department at a local hospital for two years. Before that, she was a head nurse 

and responsible for training and supervising nurses for 11 years. 

¶ 105 Perry’s résumé showed that she had many years of experience (1) writing nursing 

standard practices, (2) training nurses, (3) supervising nurses, and (4) evaluating nurses’ 

performance. She also had extensive administrative experience with OSHA and HIPAA. The 

interview panel noted that Perry had a broad knowledge base and a balance between clinical, 

trauma, and emergency experience and management. The panel believed Perry would be a good 

bridge between staff and management at the District. 

¶ 106 Rogers remembered Perry’s interview “very clearly” “because she was such an 

outstanding candidate” and “impressed [him] a lot.” Specifically, Rogers was impressed by her 

relaxed presence in the interview and that she “exuded a lot of confidence.” Perry was professional 

and clear with her responses. Perry also had the background “on paper and in terms of what she 

discussed about the work that she had done that went down the list for me of these are the 
- 27 - 

characteristics that I’m looking for, this person has the experiences, the competence, and the 

training to do what it is that we’re trying to get done.” “What stood out for me was the breadth of 

environments that she had functioned in and the functions that she had carried out.” 

¶ 107 Meline testified that Perry had a lot of experience writing policies, performing 

assessments, and determining nursing competency, which was what the District was looking for. 

“[Perry] had a couple of decades of nursing experience. She had a strong—very strong clinical 

nursing management background. She had worked at various clinical entities in the area. *** [S]he 

had a long history of clinical nursing and clinical nursing management again with policy writing, 

competency, assessments. She had, you know, great skills for that position as well.” “The breadth 

of experience, the managerial experience. [Perry] had several years of management experience in 

the nursing field, and just those experiences and again the clinical work from my perspective 

were—would make her a more valuable candidate [than Hunt and the other candidates] for the 

type of job function that we had in mind.” 

¶ 108 The interview notes and materials showed that Hunt was marked down for a lack 

of management experience and clinical practice. She also performed poorly on the written portion 

of the interview, misspelling words and needing editing for style, content, and grammar. Hunt’s 

voicemail allegedly did not comply with HIPAA. By contrast, Perry’s writing portion had no errors 

and needed no correction. 

¶ 109 Meline testified that Hunt had no experience writing policies, procedures, and 

competencies in a hospital or clinical setting. Regarding Hunt, Rogers remembered that she did 

not have any experience with risk management or policy development. 

¶ 110 In June 2006, the District hired Perry for the nursing services manager position. 

¶ 111 b. Hiring of the Public Health Nurse II Position
- 28 - 

¶ 112 Also in June 2006, the District posted a job for public health nurse I and II. 

Witnesses for the District testified that they were looking for an APORS nurse and were 

interviewing for both positions at the same time. The purpose of the position was to follow up with 

infants who had spent time in neonatal intensive care by conducting home visits and performing 

physical assessments of infants and children. Hunt asked the person in charge of collecting 

applications to use the résumé she had just submitted for the June 2006 management position to 

apply for this position. 

¶ 113 Cathy Ito testified she was the program coordinator for the maternal child health

division. Ito had worked at a hospital in obstetrics for two years before coming to the District, 

where she worked as a case manager for DCFS children and APORS for several years before 

becoming a program coordinator. She participated in the interviews for the public health nurse I 

and II positions available in the summer and fall of 2006. 

¶ 114 Ito considered hospital experience important because that “experience *** help[s] 

you to identify some of the very subtle signs and symptoms, and so that is very important.” Ito 

explained, “[T]hat kind of experience you don’t get it from books, you have to learn like in the—

in the kind of acute unit to really—really learn from that.” Ito believed APORS nurses in hospitals 

had experience that would help parents to communicate with doctors. If a nurse did not have 

hospital experience dealing with acute care, Ito believed that would make it harder for an APORS 

nurse to perform well at public health. “If you only have Public Health without acute unit 

experience, that will hinder some of the assessment skills.” 

¶ 115 In June 2006, the District interviewed just one candidate, Ellen Weise, who had 19 

years of experience working with high-risk infants in a neonatal intensive care unit (NICU). She 

also had experience teaching and educating parents about how to care for themselves and infants 
- 29 - 

and about the developmental needs for neonatal infants. Meline testified that he found important

Weise’s 8 to 10 years of experience in perinatal care, postpartum care, and emergency NICU 

because the APORS nurse would deal with high-risk infants. Weise was offered the position of a 

public health nurse II even though she interviewed for a public health nurse I because of her level 

of experience. 

¶ 116 Weise accepted the position but left the District after just a few of months to return 

to hospital work. 

¶ 117 In August 2006, the District posted another job vacancy for the same public health 

nurse II position. In addition to a panel interview with standard questions, the District again had

the candidates perform a writing test. The District interviewed Hunt and Andrea Taylor. 

¶ 118 Taylor was currently working as a public health nurse I with the District. The

interviewers noted that Taylor had very applicable work experience due to her pediatric home 

health experience working with medially and developmentally at-risk children. She interviewed 

well and had over 10 years of experience in acute, pediatric hospital settings. She also had strong 

nursing technique and assessment skills. Ito testified that Taylor was working with a pediatrician 

at the District when she was interviewed and, in that role, was performing both clinical services 

and home visits. 

¶ 119 Hunt was not highly thought of because she had no clinical pediatric or high-risk

medical experience and no applicable clinical experience. Hunt lacked acute pediatric training 

compared to the other applicants. Ito did not recall if or how much experience Hunt had with 

APORS but knew both Weise and Taylor had much more experience, as well as hospital 

experience. It was Hunt’s lack of “acute unit experience” that made her a less qualified candidate.

¶ 120 c. Other Relevant Testimony
- 30 - 

¶ 121 i. Larry Rogers

¶ 122 Rogers testified that the administrator of the District in 2006 was Vito Palazzolo. 

Rogers reported directly to Palazzolo and was in meetings with him weekly. Rogers described 

Palazzolo’s “style of management was terror *** if you keep people in enough fear and you make 

them afraid of you, you will get what you want.” Rogers testified that he left his job because he 

was experiencing adverse health consequences resulting from the stress of working with Palazzolo 

every day. 

¶ 123 Rogers testified that Palazzolo was hostile towards the community nursing staff, 

and he opined that Palazzolo would have liked Hunt to be fired but he never asked Rogers to do 

so. Hunt “was one of the most visible in terms of her opinion, and assertiveness is why I would 

think” that Palazzolo wanted Hunt fired. “[I]f Vito had a hit list, she would have probably made 

the top ten.” Rogers denied hearing Palazzolo make racially motivated statements about Hunt. 

¶ 124 ii. Patricia Hunt

¶ 125 In rebuttal, Hunt testified about her work experience in the areas valued by the 

interviewers—namely, evaluating nursing competencies and compliance with OSHA, CLIA, and 

HIPAA. Hunt maintained that she worked with prior directors of nursing on “develop[ing] the 

proficiencies for the competency skills test” used in hiring nurses. She further maintained that she 

did chart reviews to make sure nurses were keeping correct records and frequently attended 

trainings through the Illinois Department of Public Health. Hunt also testified that she was trained 

in CLIA and tested for competencies on related lab work. She then implemented that training when 

working in the STD division. She updated the policies and procedures for the lead program, which 

she managed.

¶ 126 Hunt testified that the nursing services manager position was actually lower, 
- 31 - 

organizationally, than the director of nursing position she twice performed for the District. Hunt 

maintained that she had actually performed all of the job functions of the nursing services manager 

at the District, which no other candidate had done. 

¶ 127 Regarding the APORS nurse (public health nurse II) position, Hunt testified at 

length about the diversity of her experience handling APORS cases as well as those similar to 

APORS, like pregnant teens, STD clients, and the elderly. She believed her experience actually 

performing the public health job was more valuable than hospital experience because hospital 

nurses only dealt with newborns and did not follow infants as they grew older. (Hunt called

Charlene Stevens who testified to substantially the same.)

¶ 128 Hunt believed she was discriminated against based on race because Staci Rossman 

told Hunt that the District administrator said Hunt would not get a promotion no matter what she 

applied for. Hunt’s experience of applying for positions she was clearly qualified for and not being 

hired lined up with that statement. Further, she had actually worked as the director of nursing, she 

had held every nursing position in the District, and she had performed all of the tasks listed in the 

job descriptions. She also commented that the District had a long history of hiring people directly 

out of college, like Meline, among others, and promoting them up with minimal qualifications and 

limited experience, again like Meline.

¶ 129 iii. Charlene Stevens

¶ 130 Stevens testified that she worked at the District as a community health nurse for 

several years and had performed APORS work. Before that, she worked in a hospital setting. 

Stevens agreed with Hunt that experience working with APORS as a nurse in a hospital was not 

very valuable because those nurses only dealt with newborns while public health nurses followed 

their APORS children up to age two. Stevens further testified that the District did not have periodic 
- 32 - 

evaluations, which she found surprising because, in the hospital setting, Stevens was repeatedly 

and periodically evaluated on competencies. 

¶ 131 iv. Julie Pryde

¶ 132 Pryde testified that the yearly performance evaluations of employees did not test 

for skills or competencies. Instead, job performance related to behavior at work, such as timeliness 

and getting along with others. 

¶ 133 2. The ALJ’s ROD

¶ 134 In February 2015, the ALJ entered a written ROD finding Hunt had failed to 

establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination in failure to promote. Specifically, the ALJ 

looked extensively at the resumes, interview notes, and scores entered in the record and compared 

Hunt to the applicants who had been awarded the positions. The ALJ found that Hunt did not have 

the necessary five years of supervisory experience required for the nursing services manager 

position. Further, Link and Perry had far more supervising experience and clinical experience. 

Because Hunt did not establish that she was the most qualified applicant, she did not show race 

discrimination.

¶ 135 The ALJ further wrote the following: 

“Complainant, though, notes that she was qualified for the Nursing Services 

Manager position because she served as Respondent’s Interim Director of Nursing 

for a period of months, as well as served in a Coordinator’s position that called for 

some supervision of nurses as well. *** However, Respondent’s witnesses 

explained that: (1) the Nursing Services Manager was going to be performing 

essentially new duties that had not been performed before that called for the drafting 

and implementation of nursing protocols and procedures, as well as the continual 
- 33 - 

testing of Respondent’s nurses as to such protocols and procedures to ensure that 

all nurses were performing in a competent manner; and (2) the performance 

evaluations that had been performed by the Director of Nurses did not essentially 

test nurses on their competency to perform their nursing skills on an ongoing basis.”

The ALJ noted that even Hunt’s witness, Stevens, testified about the lack of competency 

evaluations. 

¶ 136 Regarding the public health nurse II position, the ALJ agreed that Hunt made a 

prima facie case that she was qualified for the position and white applicants were selected over 

her. However, the ALJ believed the District had set forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 

for hiring Weise and Taylor—namely, they were more qualified. The résumés and interviews 

demonstrated that Weise and Taylor were more qualified for the position, and Hunt did not present 

any evidence of pretext. 

¶ 137 The ALJ recommended that Hunt’s claim be dismissed. 

¶ 138 3. The Remand Order

¶ 139 Hunt filed written exceptions to the ALJ’s ROD, and the District filed a response 

thereto. The Commission agreed to review the case.

¶ 140 In January 2017, the Commission reviewed the case. The minutes of that meeting, 

approved March 14, 2017, indicated that the panel (Fakroddin, Hartman, and Gash) voted to reject

the ALJ’s ROD and remand the case for a determination of Hunt’s damages. 

¶ 141 In May 2019, the Commission issued its remand order, signed by Fakroddin, 

Hartman, and Gash, indicating that the commissioners had voted during their terms. The 

Commission, like the ALJ, summarized the résumés and interview notes of Hunt and the people 

hired for each position: Link, Perry, Weise, and Taylor. The Commission pointed out that the 
- 34 - 

District was very critical of Hunt’s interviews, writing samples, and lack of experience. 

Meanwhile, the District praised the other applicants on these same metrics.

¶ 142 The Commission rejected the ALJ’s findings that Hunt failed to establish (1) a 

prima facie case of race discrimination for the nursing services manager position and (2) the 

qualifications rationale was pretext for racial discrimination.

¶ 143 The Commission noted that in its ROD, the ALJ stated that Hunt needed to 

demonstrate that her qualifications “were at least ‘not inferior’ ” to those of the successful 

applicants. The Commission rejected that view and wrote the following: 

“However, the Commission does not agree with ALJ Robinson’s 

assessment of the improper application of the McDonnell Douglass [sic] standard 

establishing a prima facie case of race discrimination. Here, the Commission 

determines that the Complainant did, in fact, establish a prima facie case of race 

discrimination. In assessing the Complainant’s long tenure with the Respondent, 

the Commission finds that the Complainant was more than qualified for the Nursing 

Services Manager position, as well as the Public Health Nurse II role. For example, 

the Commission has examined the Complainant’s history with the Respondent and 

learned that during her tenure with the Respondent, the Complainant achieved great 

academic success by earning her RN license in May 1991, her bachelor’s degree in 

Nursing in 1998, and a master’s degree in Public Administration in 2002. 

During these years, the Complainant handled various nursing-related 

activities, including, but not limited to, service as a case manager with the children 

in the Adverse Pregnancy Outcome Reporting System (‘APORS’) where she made 

periodic visits to the homes of high-risk infants; service as a Public Health Nurse 
- 35 - 

in the Community Health Nursing Department where she made home visits to 

elderly residents in an effort to assist them in remaining in their homes; handling 

additional duties in the Heart Smart for Women Program, Illinois Breast and 

Cervical Cancer Program, and the Lead Program. In addition to obtaining academic 

success, the Complainant also became a Teen Parent Services Case Manager, which 

required that she case manage pregnant teens and teen parents, as well as conduct 

workshops and home visit.” 

¶ 144 The Commission next addressed and rejected the ALJ’s finding that the District 

provided a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for not promoting Hunt—namely, that the District 

wanted to hire the most qualified candidate, and Hunt was not the most qualified. 

“Pursuant to Complainant’s history with the Respondent, and the various academic 

degrees she attained during her tenure, coupled with the variety of experience and 

roles she successfully undertook during her time with the Respondent, many of 

which were delineated in the posted job vacancy notices the Respondent posted for 

the Nursing Services Manager and Public Health Nurse II positions, the 

Commission concludes that the Complainant was the most qualified candidate for 

these positions, and the Respondent electing not to hire the Complainant for these 

employment opportunities based on the reason articulated was pretext for race 

discrimination.” 

¶ 145 After finding in favor of Hunt, the Commission remanded the case for the ALJ to 

determine damages.

¶ 146 4. Subsequent Proceedings

¶ 147 Just as in the demotion case, on remand in the failure to promote case, the ALJ 
- 36 - 

issued a supplemental ROD questioning the commissioners’ authority to enter the remand order. 

Likewise, in January 2020, the Commission sua sponte entered a nearly identical order vacating 

the ALJ’s supplemental ROD, reaffirming its remand order, and ordering the ALJ to determine 

damages.

¶ 148 In February 2020, the ALJ entered a second supplemental ROD awarding Hunt 

$40,987 in back wages, $28,275 in attorney fees, and $2822.06 in costs. Because neither party 

filed any exceptions to the second supplemental ROD, the Commission sent a notice in June 2020, 

informing the parties that the second supplemental ROD had become the order of the Commission.

¶ 149 The District then sought direct administrative review of both cases in this court. 

¶ 150 III. ANALYSIS

¶ 151 The State argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the Commission’s 

orders because the District did not exhaust its administrative remedies. Alternatively, the State 

argues that the Commission’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 152 The District, meanwhile, argues that the Commission’s remand orders are void 

because they bear the signatures of commissioners whose terms had expired when the orders were 

issued. In the alternative, the District contends the Commission’s findings were against the 

manifest weight of the evidence in each case because Hunt failed to (1) establish a prima facie

case of race discrimination and (2) demonstrate that the District’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reasons for taking actions against Hunt were a pretext for race discrimination. 

¶ 153 We address each argument in turn and conclude as follows: (1) the State has not 

demonstrated that the District failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, (2) the Commission’s 

remand orders were valid, (3) the Commission’s finding of race discrimination in the demotion 

case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and (4) the Commission’s finding in the 
- 37 - 

failure to promote case was against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 154 A. Exhaustion of Remedies 

¶ 155 The State argues that the District failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by 

not filing exceptions to the ALJ’s damages awards. It is well settled that, generally, a party may 

not seek judicial review of an administrative decision “without first pursuing all available 

administrative remedies.” Goral v. Dart, 2020 IL 125085, ¶ 37 (citing Castaneda v. Illinois Human 

Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1989)). The State claims the District 

was required to file exceptions to both the liability findings (the ALJ’s original RODs) and the 

damages awards (the second supplemental RODs after remand). However, the District filed 

exceptions only to the former and not the latter. Because the Illinois Human Rights Act (Act) (775 

ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2018)) and the Commission’s procedural regulations contained in the 

Illinois Administrative Code (see 56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300) say that if no exceptions are filed, then 

the decision is not subject to review, the State asserts that the District’s failure to file any 

exceptions to the damages awards means administrative remedies were not exhausted.

¶ 156 We disagree. The Act and the associated regulations demonstrate that exceptions 

were not required to preserve earlier adjudicated liability findings after the ALJ’s supplemental 

orders on damages following remand. Further, the Act and regulations do not provide for a way to 

challenge the Commission’s findings as to liability only. And the purposes of the exhaustion 

requirement are not served by requiring a party to file exceptions in this case, as demonstrated by 

analogous situations in civil practice generally.

¶ 157 First, the Act and regulations do not support the State’s position. True, both the Act 

and regulations say that if a party does not file exceptions to an ALJ’s ROD, then that ROD shall 

become the decision of the Commission without further review. 775 ILCS 5/8A-103(A) (West 
- 38 - 

2018); 56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.910 (1996). However, the regulations also provide for limited 

remand proceedings (56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.1040 (1985)) and the filing of responses to 

exceptions (56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.930 (1992)), as does the Act (see 775 ILCS 5/8A-103(B) 

(West 2018)). 

¶ 158 Paragraph (B) of section 8A-103 of the Act provides that a party may file responses 

to exceptions within 21 days. Id.; 56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.930 (1992). Paragraph (E) then provides 

that the Commission shall consider the ALJ’s ROD, any exceptions, and any responses thereto. 

775 ILCS 5/8A-103(E) (West 2018). Accordingly, the filing of a response may be sufficient to 

preserve an issue for appellate review. See Williamson v. Asher, 2013 IL App (1st) 122038, ¶ 23, 

993 N.E.2d 967 (concluding the plaintiff preserved an issue for review by raising it in her response 

brief before the trial court); see also Huang v. Brenson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123231, ¶ 22, 7 N.E.3d 

729 (“[Plaintiff’s] responsive briefing [in the trial court] was sufficient to preserve the issue for 

our review.”); Ivey v. Transunion Rental Screening Solutions, Inc., 2021 IL App (1st) 200894, 

¶ 60. 

¶ 159 Section 1040 of the regulations, providing for remands to an ALJ, further supports 

our conclusion. That section provides that the Commission may (1) remand a case, in part, to an 

ALJ and (2) determine the scope of the remand proceeding. See 56 Ill. Adm. Code 5300.1040 

(1985) (stating if a remand is deemed necessary, the Commission “shall specify the nature and 

scope of the proceedings to be had”). The ALJ then must conduct a further hearing in accordance 

with the Act (775 ILCS 5/8A-103(D) (West 2018)) and the regulations (56 Ill. Adm. Code 

5300.1040 (1985)). The exception requirement is likewise applicable on remand. 775 ILCS 

5/8A-103(D) (West 2018). 

¶ 160 Here, because the ALJ originally issued RODs finding in favor of the District, the 
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District had no reason to file exceptions. However, after Hunt filed exceptions, the District filed 

responses to those exceptions as provided in the Act and implementing regulations. Id. § 8A103(B). The District’s written responses contain all of the same arguments it now makes on appeal 

to this court. The Commission agreed to review the RODs and heard oral arguments from the 

parties on them. The Commission then reversed the ALJ’s findings, found in favor of Hunt on the 

issue of liability, and remanded the cases to the ALJ for the limited purpose of determining 

damages.

¶ 161 The Act makes clear that the District could have filed an application for rehearing, 

but it was not required to do so in order to exhaust its remedies. See id. § 8A-103(F)(1) (“The 

failure to file an application for rehearing shall not be considered a failure to exhaust administrative 

remedies.”). On remand, the ALJ was not free to reexamine the Commission’s liability findings 

because the Commission had limited the scope of the remand proceedings to determining damages. 

Indeed, when the ALJ did revisit the issue of liability and the Commission’s authority to enter its 

remand orders, the Commission sua sponte vacated the ALJ’s supplemental RODs because they 

were not authorized by the remand orders. 

¶ 162 When the ALJ issued its second supplemental RODs on damages, the District was 

not required to reraise the issue of liability by filing exceptions despite not having any complaints 

about the damages determinations. Had the District attempted to do so, the Commission could 

have and should have rightly declined to consider the issue of liability because that issue had 

already been decided. Instead, the District had two options for challenging the Commission’s 

liability findings against it. First, the District could have asked for a rehearing of the Commission’s 

earlier remand orders, which was not required to exhaust its remedies. Second, it could have sought 

judicial review in this court but only after the damages awards were entered; the District could not 
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have sought judicial review of the liability findings and remand orders when the Commission 

entered them because they were not final orders. The District chose the second option and sought 

judicial review once the Commission entered final orders. The District is not barred on appeal from 

raising the same arguments it raised in its responses to Hunt’s exceptions to the ALJ’s RODs 

finding in the District’s favor. 

¶ 163 This result becomes immediately clear when one considers the inverse of the 

circumstances in this case. Suppose the ALJ had initially found liability in favor of Hunt. In that 

case, it would have entered an ROD setting forth its findings as to liability and damages. Suppose 

further that the District filed exceptions and Hunt filed responses. If the Commission reversed the 

ALJ and found in favor of the District, Hunt could not then file exceptions to the Commission’s 

decision; exceptions can only be filed against an ALJ’s findings. See id. § 8A-103(A). And, by 

statute, Hunt would not be required to seek rehearing. Id. § 8A-103(F)(1). In this circumstance, it 

would be absurd to suggest that Hunt could not, on appeal, make the same arguments she made to 

the Commission merely because she did not file any exceptions to the ALJ’s ROD in Hunt’s favor.

¶ 164 Indeed, many cases follow this fact pattern. See, e.g., Irick v. Human Rights 

Comm’n, 311 Ill. App. 3d 929, 933-34, 726 N.E.2d 167, 171 (2000) (ALJ recommended finding 

for the employee and set damages; the Commission reversed, and the employee appealed); Clark 

v. Human Rights Comm’n, 312 Ill. App. 3d 582, 586, 728 N.E.2d 582, 586 (2000) (same); Milan 

v. Human Rights Comm’n, 169 Ill. App. 3d 979, 982-83, 523 N.E.2d 1155, 1157-58 (1988) (same).

¶ 165 To the extent the State claims exceptions to damages findings after remand orders 

present a unique situation, we disagree. For example, although exhaustion was not raised as an 

issue, several other cases follow the fact pattern in this case. Chas. A. Stevens & Co. v. Human 

Rights Comm’n, 196 Ill. App. 3d 748, 753, 554 N.E.2d 976, 979 (1990) (Commission reversed and 
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remanded for a damages hearing and then affirmed the damages award); Sangamon County 

Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 375 Ill. App. 3d 834, 841-42, 875 N.E.2d 

10, 16 (2007) (same); All Purpose Nursing Service v. Human Rights Comm’n, 205 Ill. App. 3d 

816, 821-23, 563 N.E.2d 844, 847-48 (1990) (same); Warren v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 

2021 IL App (5th) 200289-U, ¶¶ 16, 21, 24-25 (oddly similar fact pattern to the one in this case); 

see also Pinnacle Ltd. Partnership v. Human Rights Comm’n, 354 Ill. App. 3d 819, 825-26, 820 

N.E.2d 1206, 1211-12 (2004) (the Commission reversed the ALJ’s liability finding, the employer 

appealed, and on appeal, this court did not mention damages at any point in its opinion). The 

prevalence of these cases suggests that there is nothing unique or different about cases that result 

in remands instead of outright reversals. If exceptions to the damages awards were required as the 

State claims, we would expect to have seen a court of review addressing that issue before now. 

¶ 166 By comparison to civil cases, the reasons why the District did not have to file an 

exception are well established. In civil cases, making an argument in a response brief submitted to 

the trial court is sufficient to preserve it for review. See, e.g., Huang, 2014 IL App (1st) 123231, 

¶ 22. And when a trial court enters summary judgment on liability and then conducts a jury trial 

on damages, a posttrial motion is not required to preserve the issues raised in the summary 

judgment proceedings. Mohn v. Posegate, 184 Ill. 2d 540, 547, 705 N.E.2d 78, 81 (1998) (“[A] 

party need not raise in a post-trial motion any issue concerning the pretrial entry of summary 

judgment as to part of a cause of action in order to preserve the issue for review.”). Because the 

issues raised at summary judgment are purely legal and are fully considered by the trial court, 

nothing about the damages proceedings affects the court’s prior analysis on liability. Id. at 546. 

Accordingly, the only thing preventing the losing party from appealing is the lack of a final order. 

Such is the case here.
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¶ 167 And this conclusion makes sense. The purposes of the exhaustion requirement have 

been fulfilled when, as here, the Commission (1) makes a finding based upon the arguments of 

both the parties and the recommendations of the ALJ as to the issue of liability and (2) remands 

the case for the limited purpose of determining the separate issue of damages. In Castaneda v. 

Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 132 Ill. 2d 304, 308, 547 N.E.2d 437, 439 (1989), the Illinois 

Supreme Court wrote the following: 

“Requiring the exhaustion of remedies allows the administrative agency to fully 

develop and consider the facts of the cause before it; it allows the agency to utilize 

its expertise; and it allows the aggrieved party to ultimately succeed before the 

agency, making judicial review unnecessary. [Citations.] The doctrine also helps 

protect agency processes from impairment by avoidable interruptions, allows the 

agency to correct its own errors, and conserves valuable judicial time by avoiding 

piecemeal appeals.”

¶ 168 Here, the District raised all of the arguments in support of a finding in its favor 

before both the ALJ and the Commission. Accordingly, the Commission had the opportunity to 

fully consider those arguments, apply its expertise to the case, and correct any mistakes by the 

ALJ. And the Commission did just that, reversing the findings of the ALJ because they were 

against the manifest weight of the evidence and remanding to the ALJ to consider the separate 

issue of damages for the first time. The damages proceedings did not have any effect on the liability 

finding, nor could they. When the ALJ revisited liability, the Commission sua sponte vacated the 

ALJ’s orders, examined its prior remand order, and reaffirmed that order, again remanding the 

case for damages awards.

¶ 169 The purposes of the exhaustion requirement would be defeated if the District and 
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other similarly situated litigants before the Commission were required to reassert arguments 

pertaining to liability by filing exceptions to a damages award that was entered after remand from 

an adverse liability finding by a Commission that rejected those same arguments in the first place. 

Such a requirement would extend litigation and impose greater costs by forcing the agency to 

spend valuable resources relitigating issues already decided by the same panel of commissioners 

that entered the remand order even though the party filing the exceptions takes no issue with the 

damages proceedings and would not otherwise seek further agency review.

¶ 170 The proceedings in this case have already taken years, and requiring the filing of 

exceptions in these circumstances would extend them even further. No justification for such a 

requirement exists, considering that the District takes no issue with the damages proceedings. 

¶ 171 This court would not tolerate a litigant who, after a remand for further limited 

proceedings, attempted to raise issues already decided regardless of whether that party filed a 

petition for rehearing earlier. 

¶ 172 Accordingly, we conclude that the District exhausted its remedies as to the liability 

determination by timely filing responses to Hunt’s exceptions with the Commission. 

¶ 173 To be clear, the District is barred from challenging anything related to damages. 

However, the District does not raise any issues about damages. 

¶ 174 B. The Validity of the Commission’s Remand Orders 

¶ 175 The District argues that the Commission lacked the authority to enter the 2019 

remand orders because they were signed by commissioners whose terms had expired at the time 

the orders were signed. Even assuming the District were correct (a proposition we highly doubt 

but need not consider), the Commission reaffirmed its prior remand orders in January 2020. 

¶ 176 “While it is a jurisdictional requirement that three commissioners form a panel to 
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hear oral arguments and a majority of that panel approve the resulting order, the writing and filing 

of the Commission’s order is a ministerial act and does not impact the jurisdictional validity of the 

Commission’s ruling.” Dig Right In Landscaping v. Illinois Workers’ Compensation Comm’n, 

2014 IL App (1st) 130410WC, ¶ 25, 16 N.E.3d 739 (citing Zeigler v. Industrial Comm’n, 51 Ill. 

2d 137, 142, 281 N.E.2d 342, 345 (1972)); see also Zeigler, 51 Ill. 2d at 143 (“[T]here is no reason 

why these acts must be performed by a Commission composed of the same members.”)). 

¶ 177 Here, the record in each case demonstrates that the panel of the Commission that 

struck the ALJ’s supplemental RODs and reaffirmed the original panels’ votes and remand orders

made those determinations while those commissioners were duly appointed. The District does not 

challenge the authority of the commissioners who signed the second remand orders to enter those 

orders. Nor does the District challenge the authority of the original commissioners who actually 

voted to reject the ALJ’s RODs and remand the cases for damages proceedings. Accordingly, we 

conclude that the Commission’s orders finding in favor of Hunt and against the District were valid. 

¶ 178 C. Whether the Commission’s Liability Findings Were Against the Manifest 

Weight of the Evidence 

¶ 179 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 180 a. The Standard of Review 

¶ 181 When reviewing decisions from the Commission, “the reviewing court examines 

the actual determination of the Commission as if the Commission were the original fact finder.” 

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Pinnacle Ltd. Partnership, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 828. “[O]ur 

review of the Commission’s decision is limited to determining whether it was against the manifest 

weight of the evidence.” Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department v. Illinois Human Rights 

Comm’n, 233 Ill. 2d 125, 142, 908 N.E.2d 39, 48 (2009). A finding is against the manifest weight 

of the evidence if no rational trier of fact could have agreed with the agency’s decision (Wal-Mart 
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Stores, Inc. v. Human Rights Comm’n, 307 Ill. App. 3d 264, 267, 717 N.E.2d 552, 554 (1999)) or 

the opposite conclusion is clearly evident (MIFAB, Inc. v. Illinois Human Rights Comm’n, 2020 

IL App (1st) 181098, ¶ 40, 164 N.E.3d 1252). “ ‘If the record contains any evidence supporting 

the Commission’s decision, we must sustain the decision on review.’ ” Sangamon County Sheriff’s 

Department, 233 Ill. 2d at 142 (quoting Pinnacle Ltd. Partnership, 354 Ill. App. 3d at 828). 

¶ 182 b. Reviewing Discrimination Claims

¶ 183 Illinois courts have accepted the three-part analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas 

Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for establishing discrimination claims. Zaderaka v. Illinois 

Human Rights Comm’n, 131 Ill. 2d 172, 178-79, 545 N.E.2d 684, 687 (1989). The Illinois Supreme 

Court set out that analysis as follows: 

“First, plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie

case of unlawful discrimination. If a prima facie case is established, a rebuttable 

presumption arises that the employer unlawfully discriminated against plaintiff. 

Second, to rebut the presumption, the employer must articulate, not prove [citation], 

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. 

Finally, if the employer carries its burden of production, the presumption of 

unlawful discrimination falls and plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of 

the evidence that the employer’s articulated reason was not its true reason, but was 

instead a pretext for unlawful discrimination.” Id.

¶ 184 “Illinois courts have found it appropriate to examine federal decisions when 

construing the Act.” Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 233 Ill. 2d at 138 (finding it not

appropriate in that case).

¶ 185 2. The Demotion Case
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¶ 186 The District argues that Hunt failed to establish a prima facie case because 

McKinzie was not a similarly situated employee. The District asserts that McKinzie and Hunt were 

in different divisions being supervised by different people performing significantly different 

functions. It further contends that their employment actions cannot be compared because they 

occurred 18 months apart. We disagree.

¶ 187 a. The Applicable Law

¶ 188 First, the employee must establish a prima facie case of unlawful discrimination. 

Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 178-79. To do so, the employee must establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was meeting her employer’s 

legitimate business expectations, (3) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (4) the 

employer treated similarly situated employees outside of the class more favorably. Owens v. 

Department of Human Rights, 403 Ill. App. 3d 899, 919, 936 N.E.2d 623, 640 (2010). If the 

employee establishes a prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption arises that the employer 

unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179. 

¶ 189 Second, to rebut that presumption, the employer must articulate a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its decision. Id. “The employer has only the burden of production, 

not the burden of persuasion on this element.” Sola v. Human Rights Comm’n, 316 Ill. App. 3d 

528, 537, 736 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (2000). 

¶ 190 Third, if the employer articulates such a reason, the presumption of discrimination 

disappears, and the employee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer’s 

reason was untrue and was a pretext for discrimination. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179. The burden 

of proving that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the petitioner remains with the 

petitioner at all times. Id. “The fact finder’s disbelief of the reasons put forward by the employer 
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may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional 

discrimination.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 3d at 270 (citing St. Mary’s Honor Center v. 

Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993)). 

¶ 191 The Second District recently set forth the definitive word on when an employee is 

similarly situated in Lau v. Abbott Laboratories, 2019 IL App (2d) 180456, ¶ 46, 127 N.E.3d 1056, 

in which it wrote the following: 

“The similarly-situated analysis calls for a flexible, common-sense examination of 

all relevant factors. [Citation.] 

There must be enough common factors...to allow for a meaningful 

comparison in order to divine whether intentional discrimination was at 

play. [Citation.] *** In the usual case a plaintiff must at least show that the 

comparators (1) dealt with the same supervisor, (2) were subject to the same 

standards, and (3) engaged in similar conduct without such differentiating 

or mitigating circumstances as would distinguish their conduct or the 

employer’s treatment of them. [Citation.] This is not a magic formula, 

however, and the similarly-situated inquiry should not devolve into a 

mechanical, one-to-one mapping between employees. [Citation.]

Whether a comparator is similarly situated is usually a question for the fact-finder 

***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

¶ 192 b. The Evidence Supporting the Commission’s Finding 

¶ 193 The District argues that Commission’s finding that McKinzie was a similarly 

situated comparator was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The District asserts McKinzie 

and Hunt were not supervised by the same person. Further, McKinzie was reclassified in July 2003 
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whereas Hunt was demoted in November 2004. We disagree. 

¶ 194 McKinzie testified that King was her direct supervisor at some point in 2003 or 

2004. Similarly, Hunt was frequently directly supervised by King. Further, although the timing 

was spread out, King was still the administrator during that period and made the decisions with 

respect to each employee after conferring with their division director. Additionally, both were 

performing similar work. 

¶ 195 McKinzie was not demoted to her prior position in July 2003 because the District 

did not have the public health nurse I and II designations; it only had “public health nurse,” and 

McKinzie was classified as one. Instead, McKinzie was reclassified as a public health nurse II, a 

higher position, because her workload increased. When Hunt was demoted in November 2004, she

was performing job duties similar to the ones McKinzie was performing after her reclassification

in July 2003. Just like McKinzie, Hunt’s “demotion” was primarily about title and not about job 

responsibilities. 

¶ 196 Hunt testified that she continued to perform all of the coordinator duties even after 

her November 2004 demotion. However, unlike McKinzie, Hunt did receive a decrease in salary 

and was returned back to her prior job title, public health nurse I, rather than to the job title that 

actually described the duties and responsibilities she was then performing, which, as the 

Commission found, amounted to a public health nurse II. Accordingly, McKinzie was a proper 

comparator and the Commission’s finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 197 The Commission identified the District’s justification for demoting Hunt as cost 

savings and reorganization. True, by cutting Hunt’s salary the District saved money. But the same 

is true any time an employer decreases an employee’s salary. Cost savings, without more, is not a 

per se legitimate nondiscriminatory motivation. 
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¶ 198 Importantly, Hunt testified that she continued to perform all of the same duties she 

performed as program coordinator. Accordingly, the Commission could have concluded that the 

District’s decision to reduce Hunt’s salary was not motivated by a desire to decrease costs by 

eliminating redundancies. 

¶ 199 The District argues that Hunt needed to do more than prove the reason for demoting 

her was pretextual. However, it is well settled that a fact finder may rely on the prima facie case 

and the evidence of pretext to find intentional discrimination. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 307 Ill. App. 

3d at 270. The same is true here. Because Hunt proved (1) her prima facie case and (2) that the 

elimination of her position was a pretext, the Commission was free to infer that race discrimination 

was a motivating factor in the decision. 

¶ 200 3. The Failure To Promote Case

¶ 201 The District argues the Commission erred by finding (1) Hunt was the most 

qualified applicant for the 2006 job openings and (2) Hunt proved the District’s desire to hire the 

most qualified applicant was pretext for intentional race discrimination. The State and Hunt argue 

that the Commission’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 202 We agree with the District.

¶ 203 a. The Applicable Law

¶ 204 “To establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination, a petitioner must 

show: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for the position;

(3) he was rejected despite his qualifications; and (4) the position remained open and the employer 

sought other applicants from persons of petitioner’s qualifications.” In re C.R.M., 372 Ill. App. 3d 

730, 733, 866 N.E.2d 1177, 1180 (2007). “An employer need not hire an applicant just because 

she is in a protected class if she is only equally or less qualified than an applicant who is hired.” 
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Stone v. Department of Human Rights, 299 Ill. App. 3d 306, 315, 700 N.E.2d 1105, 1112 (1998). 

“ ‘Rather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the 

decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.’ ” Id. (quoting Texas Department of Community 

Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981)). As a result, federal courts have held that the 

employee must prove “someone outside the protected class who was ‘not better qualified’ was 

hired instead” (Barnes v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois, 946 F.3d 384, 389 (7th 

Cir. 2020)), and we agree that the same holding applies under Illinois law. 

¶ 205 Under the McDonnell-Douglas framework, if the employer provides a legitimate, 

nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the employee must prove the employer’s reason is merely 

pretextual. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d at 179. To do this, the employee must show the articulated reason

(1) has no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer’s decision, or (3) was 

insufficient to motivate the employer’s decision. Sola, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 537. The employee must 

do more than merely discredit the employer’s stated reason and instead “must present sufficient 

evidence to permit a finding that the employer’s proffered reasons masked intentional racial 

discrimination rather than some other legitimate, though not necessarily commendable, motive.” 

Christ Hospital & Medical Center v. Human Rights Comm’n, 293 Ill. App. 3d 105, 111, 687 

N.E.2d 1090, 1094 (1997). “[T]he plaintiff must present sufficient evidence to allow a jury to infer 

that [race] was a motivating factor in the employer’s decision.” Sola, 316 Ill. App. 3d at 538. 

¶ 206 “[W]hether an employer’s articulated reason is pretextual is a question of fact” and 

will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Zaderaka, 131 Ill. 2d

at 180. A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence if the opposite conclusion is clearly 

evident. MIFAB, Inc., 2020 IL App (1st) 181098, ¶ 40. 

¶ 207 b. The Commission’s Finding That Hunt Was the Most Qualified Applicant Was 

 Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence 
- 51 - 

¶ 208 For the purposes of our analysis, we accept the Commission’s finding that Hunt 

met the qualifications for the nursing services manager position. The Commission’s remand order 

was unclear regarding whether it found the District’s asserted nondiscriminatory reason for not 

promoting Hunt was (1) not legitimate or (2) merely a pretext. We make clear that the District 

stated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to promote Hunt. Hiring someone who the 

employer believes is better qualified for the position is a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for 

action. Scruggs v. Garst Seed Co., 587 F.3d 832, 838-39 (7th Cir. 2009); Barnes, 946 F.3d at 389 

(same).

¶ 209 As an initial matter, we note that the Commission appeared to be confused 

regarding the correct rule of law to apply in this failure to promote case. The ALJ relied on a 

Commission decision that required the claimant to show she was not “less qualified” than other 

applicants. The Commission rejected this formulation as against the McDonnell-Douglas 

framework and concluded that Hunt need not make such a showing. However, the Commission 

went further to find, as a factual matter, that Hunt was the most qualified applicant. Such a finding 

rendered the ALJ’s legal standard irrelevant. This legal confusion gives this court pause over the 

soundness of the Commission’s ultimate determination. 

¶ 210 Nonetheless, as set forth above, we conclude that Hunt was required to show she 

was the most qualified applicant in order to prove her race discrimination claim. See Stone, 299 

Ill. App. 3d at 315. Because the Commission found Hunt to be the most qualified applicant, we 

review that finding to see if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. After an exhaustive 

review of the record, we conclude that the Commission’s finding was against the manifest weight 

of the evidence. We cannot find any evidence in the record that would support the Commission’s 

position, and the opposite conclusion, that Hunt was not more qualified than the other applicants, 
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is clearly evident. 

¶ 211 i. Nursing Services Manager

¶ 212 The Commission determined that Hunt was the most qualified applicant based on 

her education and her prior experience at the District. In its remand order, the Commission wrote 

the following: 

“Pursuant to the Complainant’s history with the Respondent, and the various 

academic degrees she attained during her tenure, coupled with the variety of 

experience and roles she successfully undertook during her time with the 

Respondent, many of which were delineated in the posted job vacancy notices the 

Respondent posted for the Nursing Services Manager and Public Health Nurse II 

positions, the Commission concludes that the Complainant was the most qualified 

candidate for these positions, and the Respondent electing not to hire the 

Complainant for these employment opportunities based on the reason articulated 

was pretext for race discrimination.”

¶ 213 However, the entirety of the Commission’s remand order reads as a detailed 

explanation for why the District believed Hunt was not the most qualified. The Commission sets 

forth Hunt’s poor evaluations in interviews, poor writing skills, and lack of experience in the most 

important aspects of the job. Tellingly, nothing in the Commission’s remand order contradicts the 

ALJ’s findings—which are overwhelmingly supported by the testimony and documentary 

evidence—that Hunt did not have any experience (1) writing standard operating procedures,

(2) developing or performing competency assessments, or (3) managing or supervising nurses 

more than a single year. 

¶ 214 The District’s witnesses repeatedly testified that the above three factors were the 
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most important aspects of the nursing services manager position. The entire point of creating the 

nursing services manager position was to develop and implement standard operating procedures

and a quality assurance regime across all divisions of the District in order to comply with 

applicable laws, cultivate and foster best practices, and manage risk so the District could continue 

to expand and improve its quality of services for the community. 

¶ 215 The Commission failed to point to any evidence in the record supporting Hunt’s 

qualifications in these areas. As we are required, we have scoured the administrative record in an 

effort to locate “any evidence supporting the Commission’s decision” but have come up empty.

(Emphasis added and internal quotation marks omitted.) Sangamon County Sheriff’s Department, 

233 Ill. 2d at 142. 

¶ 216 Certainly, one could argue that the District appeared to think Hunt was capable of 

fulfilling the duties of a nursing services manager. After all, just three months after concluding 

Hunt lacked the desired experience, the District nonetheless granted her another interview 

notwithstanding the fact that her work experience was unchanged. 

¶ 217 Such a conclusion as to Hunt’s potential, had the District made it, would have been

entirely reasonable. Hunt had performed every nursing role at the District, suggesting she 

understood which competencies and procedures were required to adequately perform the 

responsibilities of those roles. Hunt also had management experience at the District, serving as the 

interim director of nursing not once but twice. (We note that, in that interim position, Hunt never 

performed the critical policy development and evaluation duties needed for the nursing services 

manager position.) And Hunt’s employment history demonstrated that she had started, continued, 

or participated in many differentservice programs—oriented toward educating and providing other 

services to the public—that required her to coordinate with various divisions of the District, other 
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public health agencies, and community entities, like hospitals and schools. 

¶ 218 Based on the foregoing, a reasonable person could conclude that Hunt would be 

able to apply that knowledge in a new way (for her) to satisfy the duties of the nursing services 

manager. But the District was not required to make that conclusion and select Hunt over a 

candidate who not only had the necessary knowledge but also had the actual, real-world experience 

of performing the duties the District required. “Rather, the employer has discretion to choose 

among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.” 

Burdine, 450 U.S. at 259. 

¶ 219 (a) Education 

¶ 220 The Commission concluded that Hunt “achieved great academic success by earning 

*** her bachelor’s degree in nursing in 1998, and a master’s degree in public administration in 

2002.” However, Link had both a bachelor’s and master’s degree in nursing, as well as a Ph.D. in 

“Educational Leadership, Administration, and Foundations.” Perry had also earned a bachelor’s 

degree in nursing in 1995. Although Perry did not have a master’s degree, the Commission did not 

explain, and the record does not show, how Hunt’s master’s degree was relevant to the nursing 

services manager position. 

¶ 221 (b) Prior Relevant Experience

¶ 222 The District needed a head of nursing who could develop standards for the nurses 

in all the District’s divisions and then implement those standards through training and competency 

evaluations. Link had many years of experience educating, training, and evaluating clinical nurses

at colleges and universities in addition to clinical settings. Link’s diverse clinical background in 

obstetrics, neonatal care, dentistry, mental health, and primary care was far greater than Hunt’s 

experience performing public health clinical work but not supervising that work. Perry similarly 
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had a broad clinical background, and Perry had over 15 years of training and supervising nurses in 

emergency departments. Critically, both Link and Perry wrote protocols, trained nursing staff, and 

evaluated that staff for competency. 

¶ 223 Contrary to the State’s claims, Hunt was not performing these functions when she 

was the interim director of nursing. Indeed, Meline, Pryde, and Rogers testified that the primary

reason the District needed to create the nursing services manager position was because it did not 

have (1) agency-wide procedures for periodic competency evaluation or (2) standard operating 

procedures for all clinical nursing functions. 

¶ 224 (c) Interview Performance

¶ 225 Federal law suggests that plaintiffs in a failure to promote case face a major hurdle 

when the legitimate nondiscriminatory purpose was based on qualifications. For instance, the 

Seventh Circuit has held that “where a plaintiff in a promotional denial case relies solely upon a 

gap in credentials between himself and the successful candidates, the gap must be so substantial 

[as to] slap you in the face.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Hudson v. Chicago Transit 

Authority, 375 F.3d 552, 562 (7th Cir. 2004). “Evidence of [the plaintiff’s] qualifications only 

would serve as evidence of pretext if the differences between her and [the hired candidate] were 

so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial 

judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 2009). “If the employer 

honestly believed the reason it proffers for its employment decision [(hiring the most qualified 

candidate)], the reason is not pretextual.” Scruggs, 587 F.3d at 839. 

¶ 226 Under any of these standards, Hunt’s claim clearly fails, but we need not adopt 

these standards to resolve this case. Even under the standard set by this court in Stone, if the 
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candidates are equally qualified, the employer is not required to hire the protected class member;

“ ‘[r]ather, the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided 

the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria.’ ” Stone, 299 Ill. App. 3d at 315 (quoting Burdine, 

450 U.S. at 259). 

¶ 227 Here, at most, the argument can be made that Hunt was equally qualified as Link 

and Perry for the nursing services manager position. Even making that assumption, Hunt failed to 

show that the District’s reasoning was a pretext for racial discrimination. Nothing in the record 

suggests racial animosity, particularly because Rodgers described Palazzolo as having animosity 

towards several white nurses, in addition to Hunt, that he wanted to see fired (although they never 

were). Every witness to testify at the hearing said race was not discussed, considered, or a factor 

in the hiring process. Hunt was the only one who expressed her belief that she did not get the job 

because she was Black. But Hunt could not support this with any evidence other than her 

prima facie case. Because the District’s nondiscriminatory reason was legitimate, and because 

Hunt could not show that she was more qualified than the other applicants, no reasonable person, 

after considering this record, could properly conclude that she did not get promoted, in part, 

because of race discrimination. In short, even viewing all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to her, Hunt failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she was not 

promoted because of her race. 

¶ 228 We conclude that the Commission’s finding that Hunt was the most qualified 

applicant was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, she was not entitled to a 

liability finding, and we reverse the Commission’s finding on that claim. 

¶ 229 ii. Public Health Nurse II 

¶ 230 Regarding the APORS nurse position, Hunt clearly failed to demonstrate that she 
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was more qualified than those hired. At most, the evidence shows she was equally qualified. Hunt 

had three years of experience working as a case manager in HealthWorks, which included APORS, 

and had the requisite certification. Weise had 19 years’ experience in the clinical setting dealing 

with neonatal and postpartum care. Taylor in particular had the most diverse and recent experience. 

She both worked in the hospital setting and, most recently, was employed by the District as a 

pediatric nurse who sometimes performed home visits. Ito stated that clinical practice was the only 

way to gain the acute care experience necessary to be fully prepared for APORS. Public health 

work alone was not enough. 

¶ 231 Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Hunt, the record at most 

shows that she was just as qualified as Weise and Taylor for the job. But the employer still has 

discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, so long as the decision is not based on

unlawful criteria. Hunt had no evidence to support her claim that race was a factor in the District’s 

decision. Each of the interviewers stated that race was not a factor and was not discussed. Hunt 

was never fired or demoted by Palazzolo despite some evidence that he had animus for her, but

none of that evidence suggested the animus was based on race. 

¶ 232 IV. CONCLUSION

¶ 233 For the reasons stated, we affirm the Commission’s order in case No. 4-20-0357 

and reverse the Commission’s order in case No. 4-20-0358. 

¶ 234 No. 4-20-0357, Affirmed. 

¶ 235 No. 4-20-0358, Reversed.
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No. 4-20-0357

Cite as: Champaign-Urbana Public Health District v. Illinois Human 

Rights Comm’n, 2022 IL App (4th) 200357 

Decision Under Review: Petition for review of order of Illinois Human Rights Commission, 

Nos. 05-SF-2282, 07-SF-1305. 

Attorneys

for

Appellant:

Ruth E. Wyman, of Ruth E. Wyman Law Office LLC, of Urbana, 

for petitioner.

Attorneys

for

Appellee:

Kwame Raoul, Attorney General, of Chicago (Jane Elinor Notz, 

Solicitor General, and David E. Neumeister, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel), for respondents Illinois Human Rights Commission and Department of Human Rights.

Donald R. Jackson, of Peoria, for other respondent.