In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-16-00225-CR

CHARLES JOSEPH BANDY, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 354th District Court

Hunt County, Texas

Trial Court No. 30,872

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess
2

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Charles Joseph Bandy was indicted on two counts of sexual assault of a child, both seconddegree-felony offenses. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(f) (West Supp. 2017). He pled 

guilty to, and was convicted of, one count of the lesser-included offense of indecency with a child. 

The trial court sentenced Bandy to seven years’ imprisonment. 

In his sole point of error on appeal, Bandy argues that the trial court erred in accepting his 

plea because it was not freely and voluntarily made. Because we are without jurisdiction to address 

this issue, we must dismiss Bandy’s appeal. 

The record reflects that (1) Bandy was indicted on two counts of sexual assault of a child, 

both second-degree-felony offenses; (2) Bandy and the State executed a document titled “Agreed 

Punishment Recommendation” in which the State agreed to prosecute Bandy for only one count 

of the lesser-included offense of indecency with a child, also a second-degree felony;1(3) the State 

dismissed the second count alleging sexual assault of a child; and (4) Bandy simultaneously 

executed a waiver of the right to appeal the issue of guilt/innocence.2 Thus, the State and Bandy 

entered into a charge bargain, which “involves questions of whether a defendant will plead guilty 

to the offense that has been alleged or to a lesser or related offense, and of whether the prosecutor 

will dismiss, or refrain from bringing, other charges.” Shankle v. State, 119 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2003). 

 

1See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.11(d) (West Supp. 2017).

2The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that a presentence waiver of the right to appeal is proper when the State 

has given adequate consideration for the waiver. Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697–98 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2009). 
3

Under the Court of Criminal Appeals’ reasoning in Shankle and its progeny, “chargebargaining affects punishment . . . [and] effectively puts a cap on punishment at the maximum 

sentence for the charge that is not dismissed.” Id. Accordingly, the charge bargain constitutes a 

plea agreement for purposes of Rule 25.2(a)(2). See id.; Kennedy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 338, 339 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The Texas Legislature has granted a very limited right of appeal in plea

bargain cases. Rule 25.2(a)(2) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure details that right as 

follows:

(2) . . . . In a plea bargain case—that is, a case in which a defendant’s 

plea was guilty or nolo contendere and the punishment did not exceed the 

punishment recommended by the prosecutor and agreed to by the defendant—a 

defendant may appeal only:

(A) those matters that were raised by written motion filed and 

ruled on before trial, or

(B) after getting the trial court’s permission to appeal.

TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

The trial court’s certification of right of appeal filed in this matter shows that this was a 

plea bargain case in which Bandy had the right to appeal matters affecting punishment only. The 

notice of appeal also states that Bandy wishes to appeal from his sentence. However, the sole point 

of error on appeal is related only to guilt/innocence. Because the trial court’s certification does 

not grant Bandy the right to appeal matters unrelated to punishment, we are without jurisdiction 

over the sole point of error raised by Bandy on appeal. 
4

Accordingly, we dismiss this appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Ralph K. Burgess

Justice

Date Submitted: October 16, 2017

Date Decided: December 6, 2017

Do Not Publish