IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2020 WY 140

OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2020

November 6, 2020

MERRY CANDELARIA,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

MAHESH KARANDIKAR, M.D.,

Appellee

(Defendant).

S-20-0066

Appeal from the District Court of Natrona County

The Honorable Kerri M. Johnson, Judge 

Representing Appellant:

Bernard Q. Phelan, Attorney at Law, Cheyenne, Wyoming

Representing Appellee:

Scott P. Klosterman of Williams, Porter, Day & Neville, P.C., Casper, Wyoming

Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. 

Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, 

Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before 

final publication in the permanent volume.
1

DAVIS, Chief Justice.

[¶1] Merry Candelaria filed a complaint against Mahesh Karandikar, M.D., which 

alleged that he negligently treated her spinal condition. The district court found that her 

complaint was barred by the statute of limitations and granted Dr. Karandikar’s motion for 

summary judgment. We affirm.

ISSUE

[¶2] Ms. Candelaria presents a single issue on appeal, which we restate as:

Did the district court correctly rule on summary judgment that 

Ms. Candelaria’s complaint against Dr. Karandikar was barred 

by the statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107?

FACTS

[¶3] Merry Candelaria began seeing Dr. Karandikar at Mountain View Regional Hospital 

in Casper in October 2013, and her treatment with him continued until March 16, 2016. 

During that time, he performed seven surgeries on her spine, several of which were done 

to repair or replace failing hardware. In the midst of these multiple surgeries, on April 28, 

2015, Ms. Candelaria sought a second opinion from Dr. Timothy Wirt in Colorado. 

Concerning that consultation, she testified:

A. His first statement to me was, “I reviewed this.” He said, 

“Your back is an absolute mess.”

Q. Okay.

A. And I said, “Well, I understand that. That’s why I came 

for a consult.”

And he said to me that he would not – he said, “There’s

nothing I can do for you.” He said, “Your back is just an 

absolute mess.” He said, “I won’t touch it.”

Q. Okay.

A. He said, “It’s too much to try to fix.”

Q. Okay. And so did he make any other comments?
2

A. Yes. He stated to me that when I returned to Casper –

he said, “You need to run as far as you can from him,” he said, 

“because he’s going to kill you before it’s over.”

Q. Okay.

A. He said, “He is doing this. You are just money to him.”

[¶4] On her return, Ms. Candelaria contacted other surgeons in Casper, but none would 

see her, so she continued her care with Dr. Karandikar. Her final two surgeries with him 

were in January and February 2016. The January surgery was done to repair a dislodged 

rod and to re-fuse part of her spine. The February surgery was done to clean out an 

infection that developed in that same surgical wound. 

[¶5] On March 15, 2016, Plaintiff saw Dr. Mark Dowell, an infectious disease specialist 

in Casper. Concerning that visit, she testified:

Q. Okay. And you saw him on March 15th, 2016. So that’s 

the day before your last appointment with Dr. Karandikar?

A. Correct.

Q. All right. And when you met with him, I think you told 

me some things that he said. And I’d like to go back over that –

* * * *

Q. . . . You mentioned to me that upon examination, he 

asked you, “Who did this to your back?”

A. Correct.

Q. And you said Dr. Karandikar, and he was swearing.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did he say to you that Dr. Karandikar had done 

something wrong?

A. He had stated to me that the washout was not done 

correctly because “If it would have been,” he said, “you would 

not be here right now.”
3

Q. Okay.

A. He said, “I would not have drained a liter and a half of 

infection out of your back.”

Q. Did you conclude at that point that Dr. Karandikar had 

treated you inappropriately and committed malpractice?

A. Yeah. I had – yes. And I had thought that before I seen 

Dr. Dowell.

[¶6] On March 16, 2016, Ms. Candelaria saw Dr. Karandikar for the final time and 

terminated their doctor/patient relationship. On March 29, 2016, on referral from Dr. 

Dowell, she saw Dr. Clayton Turner, a surgeon with Advantage Orthopedics & 

Neurosurgery in Casper. 

Q. Did Dr. Turner tell you that Dr. Karandikar had done 

something wrong?

A. He did not state a doctor’s name. He just stated that the 

– he said, “I’ve never seen such a mess. What was he trying to 

do?”

And I said, “I can’t answer that because I don’t know.”

He just used the term “he.” He didn’t state a name.

Q. Okay. So did you take that to mean Dr. Karandikar—

A. Yes.

* * * *

Q. So at this point, you felt, based upon what Dr. Wirt, Dr. 

Dowell, and Dr. Turner had said to you, that Dr. Karandikar 

had erred in his care –

A. Yes.

Q. – of you?

A. Mm-hmm.
4

[¶7] On March 12, 2018, Ms. Candelaria filed a claim against Dr. Karandikar with the 

Wyoming Medical Review Panel, and on May 22, 2018, the Panel dismissed her claim due 

to Dr. Karandikar’s waiver of review. On June 29, 2018, she filed a complaint against Dr. 

Karandikar and Mountain View Regional Hospital, alleging that Dr. Karandikar did not 

meet the applicable standard of care in his performance of the surgeries on her and in her 

after care.1

[¶8] Dr. Karandikar moved for summary judgment on the ground that the complaint was 

barred by the statute of limitations, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107.2 The district court granted 

Dr. Karandikar’s motion. It reasoned that Ms. Candelaria knew or had reason to know of 

her claim against Dr. Karandikar “when she visited Dr. Wirt in 2015, attempted to obtain 

second opinions from Casper Orthopedics and Wyoming Medical Center and visited Dr. 

Dowell regarding the infection in her back.” The court then applied the continuous 

treatment rule, and based on that rule found that the statute of limitations began to run on 

March 16, 2016, the date of her last appointment with Dr. Karandikar. 

[¶9] The parties agreed that the filing of the claim with the Medical Review Panel on 

March 12, 2018 tolled the running of the statute of limitations until thirty days after the 

Panel’s dismissal order, or until June 21, 2018. The court then added the four days that 

Ms. Candelaria had remaining before filing with the panel and established June 25, 2018 

as the date on which the limitations period expired. Because the complaint was not filed 

until June 29, 2018, the court concluded that it was untimely. 

[¶10] Ms. Candelaria filed a timely notice of appeal from the district court’s order granting 

summary judgment. 

1 The record indicates that counsel for Ms. Candelaria first mailed the complaint from Cheyenne to the 

district court in Casper on June 24, 2018, and then made a second attempt on June 28. In a cover letter that 

accompanied the second filing, Ms. Candelaria’s counsel wrote: 

On June 24, 2018, I sent to your office a complaint identical to the 

complaint enclose[d] with a check for the filing fee of $70.00, Check no. 

3469. I addressed it to your street address but without the Suite No. Today 

I have been informed that it has not yet arrived.

I enclose another check in the amount of $70.00 drawn on the 

same account [and] a complaint and a copy. Please file the complaint as 

soon as it is received. If the first complaint and check arrive please r[e]turn 

to me or destroy the check. Please provide me with a stamped copy of the 

filed complaint in the enclosed self addressed and stamped envelope.

Ms. Candelaria does not rely upon counsel’s initial mailing of the complaint on June 24, and it is therefore 

not an issue on appeal. 

2 During summary judgment proceedings, the parties agreed that Mountain View Regional Hospital was no 

longer a party and that Ms. Candelaria would submit an order formally dismissing it from the action. 
5

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶11] Our review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment is de novo. 

We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment 

de novo and afford no deference to the district court’s ruling. 

Thornock v. PacifiCorp, 2016 WY 93, ¶ 10, 379 P.3d 175, 179 

(Wyo. 2016). This Court reviews the same materials and uses 

the same legal standard as the district court. Id. The record is 

assessed from the vantage point most favorable to the party 

opposing the motion ..., and we give a party opposing summary 

judgment the benefit of all favorable inferences that may fairly 

be drawn from the record. Id. A material fact is one that would 

have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element 

of the cause of action or defense asserted by the parties. Id.

Varela v. Goshen County Fairgrounds, 2020 WY 124, ¶ 12, 472 P.3d 1047, 1052 (Wyo. 

2020) (quoting Kaufman v. Rural Health Dev., Inc., 2019 WY 62, ¶ 15, 442 P.3d 303, 308 

(Wyo. 2019)).

[¶12] With respect to the application of a statute of limitations, we have said that “[i]f the 

material facts are in dispute, the application of a statute of limitations is a mixed question 

of law and fact; otherwise, it is a question of law.” Estate of Weeks by and through Rehm 

v. Weeks-Rohner, 2018 WY 112, ¶ 30, 427 P.3d 729, 737 (Wyo. 2018) (quoting Carnahan 

v. Lewis, 2012 WY 45, ¶ 27, 273 P.3d 1065, 1073 (Wyo. 2012)). This appeal also presents 

a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. Life Care Center of 

Casper v. Barrett, 2020 WY 57, ¶ 12, 462 P.3d 894, 898 (Wyo. 2020) (quoting Sullivan v. 

State, 2019 WY 71, ¶ 7, 444 P.3d 1257, 1259 (Wyo. 2019)). 

DISCUSSION

[¶13] Generally, a medical malpractice claim must be brought within two years of the date 

of the alleged act, error, or omission. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i) (LexisNexis 2019). 

The statute provides as follows in relevant part:

(a) A cause of action arising from an act, error or 

omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional 

or health care services shall be brought within the greater of 

the following times:

(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged 

act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may 

be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery 
6

of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 

establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(A) Not reasonably discoverable within a 

two (2) year period; or

(B) The claimant failed to discover the 

alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) 

year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a).

[¶14] The exceptions found in subsection 107(a)(i)(A) and (B) incorporate the discovery 

rule, meaning that if the exceptions apply, the statute of limitations is triggered under them 

when a claimant knows or has reason to know of his or her cause of action. Pioneer 

Homestead Apartments III v. Sargent Engineers, Inc., 2018 WY 80, ¶ 17, 421 P.3d 1074, 

1079 (Wyo. 2018) (citing Adelizzi v. Stratton, 2010 WY 148, ¶ 16, 243 P.3d 563, 567 

(Wyo. 2010); Robert L. Kroenlein Trust v. Kirchhefer, 2015 WY 127, ¶ 16, 357 P.3d 1118, 

1124 (Wyo. 2015)). We have also adopted the continuous treatment rule, which provides 

that “where the defendant physician has provided a continuing course of care for the same 

or related complaints, the cessation of treatment completes the ‘act’ which starts the 

running of the statutory period for filing suit.” Nobles v. Memorial Hosp. of Laramie 

County, 2013 WY 66, ¶ 18, 301 P.3d 517, 522 (Wyo. 2013) (quoting Metzger v. Kalke, 

709 P.2d 414, 417 (Wyo. 1985)).

[¶15] The parties agree that the continuous treatment rule applies, and that under that rule, 

March 16, 2016 (the date that Dr. Karandikar last treated Ms. Candelaria) was the date of 

the alleged act, error, or omission. Ms. Candelaria contends, however, that that is not the 

date from which the limitations period runs. She argues that the date of actual discovery 

triggers the statute of limitations, and that since she discovered her claim on March 29, 

2016 when she saw Dr. Turner, that is the date from which the two-year period runs. In 

support of her argument, she points to our holdings in Metzger and to the language of Wyo. 

Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a). We will address each argument in turn and then address the 

statute’s application to the undisputed facts in this case.

A. Metzger Holdings

[¶16] Ms. Candelaria first contends that in Metzger, this Court held that the statute of 

limitations for a medical malpractice claim is triggered when the plaintiff discovers her 

claim, not when the claim is reasonably discoverable. We disagree with this reading of the 

decision.
7

[¶17] In Metzger, Carolyn Metzger and her husband sued two physicians for their failure 

to diagnose a pituitary tumor when she was under their care during her pregnancy. 

Metzger, 709 P.2d at 415-16. Ms. Metzger last saw one of the defendant physicians, 

Ruqaiya Hussain, M.D., on May 12, 1981, and the other defendant physician, Hein Kalke, 

M.D., on September 28, 1981. Id. at 415. She and her husband filed their action against 

the defendant physicians on September 13, 1983. Id. at 416. The Court adopted the 

continuous treatment rule, and with respect to the claim against Dr. Kalke, it held that the 

complaint was timely filed because it was filed within two years of his last treatment of 

Ms. Metzger. Id.

[¶18] With respect to the claim against Dr. Hussain, the plaintiffs made no attempt to rely 

on the discovery exception incorporated into Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i)(A) and (B), 

and instead asserted that they actually discovered the alleged act or omission of Dr. Hussain 

in the second year after his last treatment of Ms. Metzger on May 12, 1981. Metzger, 709 

P.2d at 417-18. They contended that they were therefore entitled to an additional six 

months to file their claim under subsection 107(a)(iv), which provides that “[i]f under 

paragraph (i) . . . of this subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is discovered during 

the second year of the two (2) year period from the date of the act, error or omission, the 

period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by six (6) months.” Id. at 418. The

Court agreed and interpreted section 107(a)(iv) to apply as follows:

Subsection (a)(iv) speaks of the time of discovery of the 

“alleged act, error or omission,” which simply means the date 

on which the plaintiff first learns of the wrongdoing which 

forms the basis of his complaint. Whether the injured party 

should have learned or had reason to know of the wrongful act 

at an earlier date is irrelevant for purposes of this portion of 

the statute.

Metzger, 709 P.2d at 418 (emphasis added).

[¶19] The Court completed its analysis by first defining what constitutes actual notice of 

a medical malpractice claim. Metzger, 709 P.2d at 418-20. It then concluded that the 

plaintiffs did not have actual notice until the second year after the date of last treatment,

and that they were therefore entitled to the six-month extension of the limitations period 

provided under subsection 107(a)(iv). Id. at 420. 

[¶20] The Court did not hold that the discovery rule does not apply to medical malpractice 

claims or that the statute of limitations for such claims always runs from the date of actual 

notice. The holding addressed only the application of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(iv), 

when a plaintiff discovers her claim in the second year after the alleged act, error, or 

omission. Here, Ms. Candelaria concedes that she discovered her claim less than two 
8

weeks after her last treatment with Dr. Karandikar, not in the second year, and therefore 

subsection 107(a)(iv) and the Metzger holdings interpreting that provision do not apply. 

B. Language of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a)

[¶21] Ms. Candelaria next points to section 107(a), which states, “A cause of action 

arising from an act, error or omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional 

or health care services shall be brought within the greater of the following times,” as a 

basis to measure the limitations period from the date of discovery. Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-

107(a) (emphasis added). She argues that the emphasized language means that the statute 

of limitations will run from either the date of the act, error, or omission, or from the date 

of discovery, whichever results in a longer limitations period. This reading finds no 

support in the statute and is contrary to our precedent.

[¶22] When interpreting a statute, we look to the plain meaning of the words used and 

consider the statute as a whole, “giving effect to every word, clause, and sentence according 

to their arrangement and connection.” Life Care Center, ¶ 16, 462 P.3d at 898-99 (quoting 

Sullivan, ¶ 10, 444 P.3d at 1259-60). Section 107(a) reads in relevant part:

(a) A cause of action arising from an act, error or 

omission in the rendering of licensed or certified professional 

or health care services shall be brought within the greater of 

the following times:

(i) Within two (2) years of the date of the alleged 

act, error or omission, except that a cause of action may 

be instituted not more than two (2) years after discovery 

of the alleged act, error or omission, if the claimant can 

establish that the alleged act, error or omission was:

(A) Not reasonably discoverable within a 

two (2) year period; or

(B) The claimant failed to discover the 

alleged act, error or omission within the two (2) 

year period despite the exercise of due diligence.

(ii) For injury to the rights of a minor, by his 

eighth birthday or within two (2) years of the date of the 

alleged act, error or omission, whichever period is 

greater . . . .

* * * *
9

(iii) For injury to the rights of a plaintiff suffering 

from a legal disability other than minority, within one 

(1) year of the removal of the disability;

(iv) If under paragraph (i) or (ii) of this 

subsection, the alleged act, error or omission is 

discovered during the second year of the two (2) year 

period from the date of the act, error or omission, the 

period for commencing a lawsuit shall be extended by 

six (6) months.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107(a) (emphasis added).

[¶23] It is undisputed that section 107(a)(i) is the provision that applies to Ms. 

Candelaria’s claim. By its plain terms, it requires that a claim be filed within two years of 

the alleged act, error, or omission, except in the case of a claim that was not discoverable 

in that two-year period. If the claim was discovered or reasonably discoverable within 

those two years, it must be filed within either two years of the act, error, or omission, or 

two years plus six months if section 107(a)(iv) applies. In other words, if the act, error, or 

omission is discovered within two years, the date of actual discovery does not affect the 

running of the limitations period unless section 107(a)(iv) applies to extend the period.3 

[¶24] As to the meaning of section 107(a)’s phrase, “within the greater of the following 

times,” the more reasonable interpretation is that it refers to the provisions that immediately 

follow it, which are subsections (i) thru (iv). Each subsection provides a method to 

calculate the date from which the statute of limitations will run under a specified 

circumstance, and it is apparent that more than one subsection may apply in a given case. 

In those cases where more than one of the section 107(a) subsections applies, section 107(a) 

allows application of the one that provides the longer limitations period.

[¶25] This interpretation fits with the way in which we have consistently applied the 

statute of limitations under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107. For example, in Vance v. Wyomed 

Laboratory, Inc., the plaintiff sued a breath testing lab for negligent testing, and we upheld 

the dismissal of his claims as time barred. 2016 WY 61, ¶¶ 1-3, 375 P.3d 746, 747 (Wyo. 

2016). Applying section 107, we explained:

3 Section 107(a)(iv) in fact illustrates the unreasonableness of Ms. Candelaria’s proffered interpretation. If 

the date of actual discovery was the event that triggered the statute of limitations in all cases, there would 

be no need to extend the limitations period by six months for those claims discovered in the second year. 

See Hayse v. Wyo. Bd. of Coroner Standards, 2020 WY 4, ¶ 9, 455 P.3d 267, 272 (Wyo. 2020) (“This Court 

will not interpret a statute in a way which renders any portion of it meaningless or in a manner producing 

absurd results.”) (quoting Adekale v. State, 2015 WY 30, ¶ 13, 344 P.3d 761, 765-66 (Wyo. 2015)).
10

Each of Mr. Vance’s claims is based on an “act, error or 

omission” which occurred on December 5, 2012. Mr. Vance 

asserts that he discovered the facts supporting his claims sixtynine days later, on February 12, 2013. Because he discovered 

those facts within the first year after December 5, 2012, § 1–

3–107(a) required that Mr. Vance bring those claims within 

two years of the act, error or omission, which was December 

5, 2014. Mr. Vance did not do so.

Vance, ¶ 16, 375 P.3d at 749.

[¶26] In Lucky Gate Ranch, L.L.C. v. Baker & Assocs., Inc., we upheld summary judgment 

in favor of the defendant on the ground that the plaintiff’s breach of contract claim was 

time barred. 2009 WY 69, ¶ 1, 208 P.3d 57, 59 (Wyo. 2009). In so holding, we rejected 

the same argument Ms. Candelaria makes in this case.

The “act, error or omission” that provides the basis for 

Lucky Gate’s cause of action is the breach of contract that 

occurred in May 2004. Lucky Gate learned definitively, in the 

fall of 2004, that Baker had not submitted the petition to the 

State Engineer’s Office. Based upon the plain language of the 

statute, Lucky Gate’s claim was barred when litigation was not 

commenced within two years of the contractual breach. The 

limitation period would have expired in May 2006. From a

practical perspective, the fact that Lucky Gate learned in the 

fall of 2004 that the petition had not been filed with the State 

Engineer’s Office does not change the expiration date of the 

limitation period. If the alleged “act, error or omission” was 

discovered in the second year, “the period for commencing a 

lawsuit shall be extended by six (6) months.” Wyo. Stat. Ann. 

§ 1-3-107(a)(iv). Because Lucky Gate discovered the breach in 

the first year, however, the limitation period is still measured 

from “the date of the alleged act, error or omission.” Wyo. Stat. 

Ann. § 1-3-107(a)(i).

Lucky Gate, ¶ 15, 208 P.3d at 64.

[¶27] Finally, in Metzger, the plaintiffs’ claim against defendant Dr. Kalke was 

discoverable in December 1981 at the earliest or July 1982 at the latest. Metzger, 709 P.2d 

at 418. This Court held:

[T]he limitation period established by § 1-3-107(a) began to 

run with respect to appellants’ claims against Dr. Kalke on 
11

September 28, 1981, the date he last treated Carolyn Metzger. 

Appellants timely filed their complaints against Kalke and the 

Medical Center for Women on September 13, 1983, within the 

two years allowed by subsection (a)(i).

Metzger, 709 P.2d at 417.

[¶28] Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 1-3-107 and our precedent are thus clear. If a claim is discovered 

within the first year following an alleged act, error, or omission, the limitations period is 

two years from the date of the alleged act, error, or omission. If a claim is discovered in 

the second year, the limitations period is two years and six months from the date of the 

alleged act, error, or omission.

C. Application of the Statute of Limitations to Ms. Candelaria’s Claim

[¶29] Under the continuous treatment rule, the “act, error or omission which starts the 

running of the statute of limitations against malpractice actions” is “the termination of the 

course of treatment for the same or related illnesses or injuries.” Nobles, ¶ 33, 301 P.3d at 

526 (quoting Metzger, 709 P.2d at 417). That undisputed date in this case was March 16, 

2016, the date on which Dr. Karandikar last treated Ms. Candelaria. Because Ms. 

Candelaria discovered her claim on March 29, 2016, at the latest, she discovered it within 

the first year following the termination of treatment, and the limitations period thus began 

running on March 16, 2016.4

[¶30] Ms. Candelaria does not challenge the district court’s calculation of the date on 

which the statute of limitations expired after she terminated Dr. Karandikar’s care, which 

took into account the tolling attributable to Ms. Candelaria’s filing of her claim with the 

Medical Review Panel. We therefore affirm the court’s finding that the statute of 

limitations expired on June 25, 2018 and its conclusion that Ms. Candelaria’s complaint 

was untimely filed on June 29, 2018. 

[¶31] Affirmed.

4 Arguably, Ms. Candelaria’s claim was reasonably discoverable when Dr. Wirt told her that her spine was 

a mess and that she should not return to Dr. Karandikar’s care. We need not address this, however, because 

it would not change the result we reach based solely on Ms. Candelaria’s admitted date of discovery.