United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

C o n t rolling We a p o n s

of Mass Destruction

Findings fro m

USIP-Sponsored Pro j e c t s

Edited by Deepa M. Ollapally
Peaceworks No. 41. First published September 2001.

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone.

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UN I T E D ST A T E S IN S T I T U T E O F PE A C E

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Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202-457-1700

Fax: 202-429-6063

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Web: www.usip.org
C o n t e n t s

Introduction by Deepa M. Ollapally 1

Part I: Approaches to Nonproliferation

1. Striving for Nuclear Nonproliferation 6

by David Albright and Kevin O’Neill

2. Redressing Deficiencies in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 10

by John Simpson

3. Technology and the Development of New Regimes: 15

Lessons from the Missile Technology Control Regime

by Richard Speier

4. Managing Technology Transfers in a Proliferation Environment: 19

The Case of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

by Jean Pascal Zanders

5. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) Experience 25

by Jean Krasno and James S. Sutterlin

Part II: Regional Contexts to Nonproliferation

6. Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia 32

by Shaun Gregory

7. Iran and Nuclear Weapons: The Road Ahead 37

by Geoffrey Kemp

8. Nu clear and Missile Ex port Con trols in Ru s s i a : Policies and Practi ce s 44

by Vladimir A. Orlov

9. Explaining Chinese Coopera ti on in In tern a ti onal Sec u ri ty In s ti tuti on s 49

by Alastair Iain Johnston

Part III: Weapons of Mass Destruction

and New Th re at s

10. Management of Surplus Nuclear Material in Russia 54

by Gary Bertsch and Igor Khripunov

11. Between Prudence and Paranoia: The Middle Ground in the 60

Weapons-of-Mass-Destruction Terror Debate

by Jessica Eve Stern

About the Contributors 65

About the Institute 67
I n t ro d u c t i o n

More than thirty years after the passage of the Nuclear Nonproliferation

Treaty (NPT), the record is mixed on the effectiveness of the nonproliferation regime. The end of the Cold War gave rise to a flurry of

nonproliferation and arms control initiatives in the 1990s, including the Chemical

Weapons Convention of 1994, the indefinite and unconditional extension of the

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty of

1996, and the ongoing negotiations for the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Along

with the declared U.S.-Russian commitments to deep cuts in their nuclear arsenals,

these moves may be seen as contributing to the creation of a less dangerous world.

At the same time, however, there are both persistent and new threats to peace,

particularly the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction through covert and

overt means in potentially serious theaters of regional conflict. There are also uncertainties regarding the possible proliferation repercussions of the national missile defense system under consideration in the United States, the U.S. failure to ratify the

Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Russia’s mixed signals on nuclear

weapons under the leadership of Vladimir Putin.

The Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace has attem pted to make a limited but important contri buti on to furt h ering the understanding of s ome of the most cri tical gl obal and regi on a l

i s sues su rrounding we a pons of mass de s tru cti on and arms con tro l , pri m a ri ly thro u gh its

grant progra m . Si n ce its incepti on ,the In s ti tute has spent $2,190,372 on rel a ted top i c s ,

a i m ed at shaping intell ectual deb a te and informing po l i c ym a k i n g.This Pe a cewo rk sreport

h i gh l i ghts some of the recent key In s ti tute - su pported work in this con n ecti on , with a vi ew

to of fering the most significant findings and po l i c y - rel evant con clu s i on s .

The po s s i ble direct or indirect links bet ween nu clear we a pons and con f l i ct ,p a rti c u l a rly

as manife s ted by dangerous arms rac i n g, u n su s t a i n a ble levels of m i l i t a ri z a ti on at the co s t

of s ocial and econ omic devel opm en t , nu cl e a ri z a ti on by unstable or failing state s ,i ll i c i t

tra f f i cking in nu clear tech n o l ogy and materi a l s , and safety lapses in nu clear we a pons contro l ,a ll have to be taken seri o u s ly wh et h er deterren ce is bel i eved to work or not. In ad d iti on , em er ging ch a ll en ges from ch emical and bi o l ogical we a pons pose other dangers ,

p a rti c u l a rly asthey rel a te to terrori s m .

The cen terp i ece of the non pro l i fera ti on regi m e , the NPT, con ti nues to face a seri o u s

ch a ll en ge in the wake of the 1998 nu clear tests by India and Pa k i s t a n .While the prec i s e

i m p act of In d i a’s and Pa k i s t a n’s nu clear tests on the ef fectiveness of the NPT is open to interpret a ti on since nei t h er of the two co u n tries is a sign a tory, the tre a ty ’s inabi l i ty to res pond to the new status of these co u n tries in any meaningful way could call into qu e s ti on

its rel eva n ce under ch a n ging con d i ti on s . Is rael ’s undecl a red nu clear status con ti nues to

pose a dilemma for the NPT as well . Cri tics of the NPT argue that the tre a ty not on ly is

d i s c ri m i n a tory but also has been overt a ken by even t s . Its advoc a tes co u n ter that, a l t h o u gh

the NPT may be an imperfect instru m en t , it is the on ly instru m ent ava i l a bl e . 1

by

Deepa M. 

O l l a p a l l y
While this particular deb a te , wh i ch is at on ce legal and po l i ti c a l , is not likely to be sett l ed anytime soon , the thrust of U. S . - l ed gl obal non pro l i fera ti on ef forts has divers i f i ed in

recent ye a rs beyond the NPT, ra n ging from the military sancti ons re s ponse in the case of

Iraq to the more econ omic incen tive – b a s ed approach taken tow a rd North Kore a . Th ere is

also an array of i n formal and formal arra n gem ents fashion ed by the nu clear we a pon

s t a tes that seek to dampen pro l i fera ti on thro u gh tech n o l ogy denial regimes and ex port

con trols su ch as the Missile Tech n o l ogy Con trol Regime and the Waassanaar Agreem en t ,

wh i ch su pers eded the Cold Wa r – ori en ted Coord i n a ting Com m i t tee for Mu l ti l a teral Export Con trols (COC O M ) .With the end of the Cold Wa r, the main targets of these measu res are the so-call ed states of con cern (form erly du bbed “rogue state s” ) . De s p i te these

ef fort s ,t h ere is a lingering feeling that current regimes are not fully ad d ressing some of t h e

most cri tical issues su ch as the NPT holdo ut s ,s t a tes of con cern that are NPT sign a tori e s ,

and the do u bl e - ed ged sword of tech n o l ogy diffusion . The need for new thinking may be

gre a ter than ever.

In an ef fort to en co u ra ge innova tive thinking, the Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace has

su pported proj ects that rel a te to the functi onal aspects of n on pro l i fera ti on , as well as

those that are more regi on a lly foc u s ed .The el even proj ects fe a tu red in this report have

been parti a lly or fully funded by the Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace , but by no means do

t h ey con s ti tute the en ti rety of the In s ti tute’s activi ty in this are a , wh i ch com prises ei gh ty -

t wo grants over the past fo u rteen ye a rs . (A list of In s ti tute - f u n ded proj ects on arms control and deterren ce from 1986 thro u gh 2000 can be found online at w w w. u s i p. or g / gra n t s

/ Fu n ded _ Proj ect s / F P- Arm s _ Con tro l . h tm l .) These el even proj ects have been sel ected

ch i ef ly on the basis of t h eir ti m eliness and/or salien ce to current con cern s , with the inten t

of con tri buting to on going deb a tes in the fiel d .The sel ecti on has also sought to ach i eve a

regi onal balance .In ad d i ti on , because the proj ects showc a s ed here are drawn from su ccessful grant aw a rd s , the spectrum of topics covered is inevi t a bly limited . For ex a m p l e ,a lt h o u gh the deb a te over the nati onal missile defense sys tem is on the rise at the mom en t ,

t h ere is at pre s ent no grant proj ect that looks direct ly at this issue and its implicati ons for

a rms con tro l . This is likely to ch a n ge in the futu re ,p a rti c u l a rly as proj ects that focus on

s ec u ri ty in East Asia and Russia con s i der the impact of U. S . missile defen s e s .G en era lly,

this publ i c a ti on has attem pted to be as wi dely repre s en t a tive of the broader pool of gra n t s

as po s s i bl e . It should also be recogn i zed that the proj ect su m m a ries by the proj ect directors in this Pe a cewo rk sreport provi de on ly a glimpse into the larger body of re s e a rch being undert a ken by them , mu ch of wh i ch is likely to re sult in publ i s h ed arti cles and boo k s

or has alre ady done so.

This report begins with a con s i dera ti on of the va ri ed approaches and tools that have

been devel oped to meet the ch a ll en ges po s ed by we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .D avid Albri gh t , pre s i dent of the In s ti tute for Scien ce and In tern a ti onal Sec u ri ty, and Kevin O’ Nei ll ,

dep uty director, t a ke stock of the overa ll ach i evem ents of n on pro l i fera ti on ef forts and

pron o u n ce it a rel a tive su ccess story. Th ey note that de s p i te Pre s i dent John F. Ken n edy ’s

pred i cti on that more than twen ty co u n tries would have the nu clear bomb by the 1970s,

the re a l i ty is that on ly ei ght co u n tries are curren t ly known to possess nu clear we a pon s .Yet

Al bri ght and O’ Nei ll cauti on against undue com p l acen c y, e s pec i a lly in the face of po tential devel opm ents that could well throw of f co u rs e ,i f not revers e , the app a rent mom en2 Introduction
tum for arms redu cti on s .As they see it, t wo cri tical probl ems are looming in the backgro u n d : Ru s s i a’s on going econ omic crisis and its implicati ons for Ru s s i a’s sec u ri ty stance ,

and the nati onal missile defense sys tem being pon dered in the Un i ted States that co u l d

s ti mu l a te other co u n tries to add to their ars enals or to devel op co u n term e a su re s .

John Si m p s on ,h e ad of the Programme to Prom o te Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on (PPNN)

at the Un ivers i ty of So ut h a m pton in the Un i ted Ki n gdom , con cen tra tes on the NPT,

vi ewed by many as the linchpin of n on pro l i fera ti on ef forts to date . Si m p s on high l i gh t s

s everal key weaknesses of the NPT stru ctu re , wh i ch he sees as deriving mostly from the

l ack of a ny perm a n ent insti tuti ons for mon i toring and veri f i c a ti on and for providing secret a riat and inform a ti on servi ces to mem ber- s t a te s . In place of su ch insti tuti on s , a con feren ce of the parties meets every five ye a rs for assessment and revi ew. Si m p s on de s c ri be s

h ow PPNN attem pts to bri d ge this insti tuti onal gap thro u gh its publ i c a ti ons and sem in a rs . The aut h or su ggests that the work of the NPT Revi ew Con feren ce in May 2000,

wh i ch held particular sign i f i c a n ce as the first Revi ew Con feren ce since the 1995 indef i n i te

ex ten s i on of the NPT, was espec i a lly aided by the prep a ra tory work of P P N N .

Denial of tech n o l ogy to wo u l d - be pro l i fera tors is an approach that has been used exten s ively, but it poses a con ti nuing dilemma for all sides given the “du a l - u s e” ( i . e . ,c ivi l i a n

a n d / or military) natu re of adva n ced tech n o l ogi e s . Ri ch a rd Spei er, form erly with the Off i ce of the Un der Sec ret a ry of Defense for Policy in the U. S . Defense Dep a rtm en t ,w a s

d i rect ly invo lved in the va rious phases of the mu l ti l a teral talks that led to the Missile Techn o l ogy Con trol Regime (MTC R ) . He takes a close-up look at the nego ti a ti ons behind the

M TC R , an informal agreem ent among key su pp l i ers of missile tech n o l ogy that appe a rs

i n c re a s i n gly to be taking on the force of a tre a ty. S pei er first focuses on the stru ggl e s

within the U. S . govern m ent to hammer out an accept a ble po s i ti on before get ting others to

s i gn on and then disti lls a set of l e s s ons for the devel opm ent of n ew regimes in the futu re .

On tech n o l ogy tra n s fers ,Jean Pascal Za n ders of the Stockholm In tern a ti onal Pe ace Res e a rch In s ti tute (SIPRI) in Sweden ex tends the discussion to bi o l ogical we a pons of m a s s

de s tru cti on ,s pec i f i c a lly the stru ctu re of the futu re pro tocol to the 1972 Bi o l ogical and

Toxin We a pons Conven ti on . This pro tocol wi ll have to stri ke a balance bet ween en su ri n g

that states are not impeded from access to important tech n o l ogi e s , on the one hand, a n d

c re a ting ef fective safeg u a rds against illicit tra n s fers , on the other hand. Za n ders de s c ri be s

the difficulty of maintaining this fine balance under the twin impera tives of gl ob a l i z a ti on

and the bi o tech n o l ogy revo luti on in the con tem pora ry peri od and su ggests how new

m echanisms of con trol may be de s i gn ed .

Jean Krasno and James S. Sut terlin of Un i ted Na ti ons Studies at Ya l e ,Yale Un ivers i ty,

provi de an account of the Un i ted Na ti on s’ u n preceden ted foray into phys i c a lly el i m i n a ting a mem ber- s t a te’s capac i ty to produ ce we a pons of mass de s tru cti on thro u gh the

Un i ted Na ti ons Special Com m i s s i on (UNSCOM) in Ira q . The aut h ors look caref u lly at

U N S C O M ’s inform a ti on ga t h ering and intell i gen ce functi on s , wh i ch came under incre a sing scruti ny over ti m e . Th ey eva lu a te UNSCOM’s ex peri en ce and con s i der its uti l i ty as a

n ew model for futu re non pro l i fera ti on acti on . Th ey con clu de that while UNSCOM was

l a r gely su ccessful in ach i eving its obj ective s , it is high ly do u btful that the con s tell a ti on of

forces that all owed UNSCOM to be cre a ted wi ll be rep l i c a ted anytime soon .

Introduction 3
While we a pons of mass de s tru cti on are a cause for con cern in any con tex t ,t h eir actu a l

or po ten tial pre s en ce in regi ons that are alre ady plagued by vo l a ti l i ty, u n dem oc ra tic govern a n ce , and ex tremist ten dencies cre a tes a sense of ad ded urgen c y. The second part of t h i s

Pe a cewo rk sreport pre s ents re s e a rch and analysis con du cted by gra n tees with regi on a l

ex perti s e ,who at times of fer findings that do not nece s s a ri ly accord with conven ti on a l

wi s dom .

The qu e s ti on of s tra tegic stabi l i ty in a nu cl e a ri zed So uth Asia is cl o s ely analy zed by

Shaun Gregory of the Un ivers i ty of Brad ford in the Un i ted Ki n gdom , with particular atten ti on given to the qu e s ti on of wh et h er a su f f i c i en t ly robust command and con trol system that meets the requ i rem ents of s t a ble deterren ce can be put into place in India and

Pa k i s t a n . Gregory finds that the simplicity of the two co u n tri e s’ nu clear po s tu re gre a t ly redu ces the demands on their command and con trol arra n gem en t s . For ex a m p l e , wi t h o ut

the need for NATO - s tyle com p l ex targeting and precise escalati on con trol inherent in a

f l ex i ble re s ponse approach ,India and Pakistan can fashion a limited sys tem within thei r

m e a n s . Nevert h el e s s , Gregory puts forth a nu m ber of propo s i ti ons from his re s e a rch that

su ggest that nei t h er Delhi nor Is l a m a b ad should be espec i a lly sanguine or rel a xed abo ut

t h eir re s pective nu clear ars en a l s .

The po s s i bi l i ty of nu clear we a pons in the Persian Gu l f regi on con ti nues to cre a te a

good deal of a n x i ety, and Geof f rey Kem p, d i rector of the Regi onal Stra tegic Program at

the Ni xon Cen ter, con s tru cts several scen a rios for the futu re of Ira n’s nu clear we a pons cap a bi l i ty, with an eye tow a rd how the regi onal and intern a ti onal envi ron m ents might interp l ay with Iranian dom e s tic po l i tics in determining the directi on of po l i c y.Kemp poi n t s

o ut that Ira n’s regi onal threat percepti on s ,p a rti c u l a rly its fe a rs abo ut U. S . , Is rael i ,a n d

Iraqi military po ten ti a l , wh i ch are cri tical in driving its nu clear po l i c y, a re likely to conti nue no matter who is in power in Teh ra n . One of Kem p’s main con clu s i ons is that

a po l i tical ra pproch em ent bet ween the Un i ted States and Iran is likely to provi de the

“breathing space”for any regime in Iran to seri o u s ly recon s i der the ben efits of exerc i s i n g

a nu clear opti on .

Russia has been a key con duit of nu clear and missile tech n o l ogy to the devel op i n g

world ,i n cluding regi ons of i n s t a bi l i ty, and the issue of Ru s s i a’s evo lving ex port po l i c i e s

on sen s i tive tech n o l ogies is taken up by V l adimir A .O rl ov, fo u n der and director of t h e

Mo s cow - b a s ed Cen ter for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Cen ter ) .O rl ov assesses Ru s s i a’s

decl a ra tory ex port policies against actual practi ce , with the aim of finding ways to narrow

the gaps that ex i s t . A major ob s t acl e ,O rl ov bel i eve s , is that in the tra n s i ti on from a command econ omy to a com peti tive market sys tem , Russia is vi ewing the defense tech n o l ogy

ex port market as one of its few com p a ra tive econ omic adva n t a ge s .He su ggests that we a k

en forcem ent of the law, s h ort a ges of technical equ i pm en t , and a lack of a non pro l i fera ti on

c u l tu re at most en terprises toget h er work against the ef fectiveness of ex port re s tri cti on s

that do ex i s t . In ad d i ti on ,O rl ov notes that at the broader level one of the most difficult

probl ems to tackle is the brain drain from Ru s s i a .

As a mem ber of the nu clear clu b, China has ten ded to send mixed signals abo ut its parti c i p a ti on in regi onal and gl obal nu clear arms con tro l ,as exem p l i f i ed by its ambiva l en t

beh avi or du ring the CTBT nego ti a ti on s .Alastair Iain Jo h n s ton , profe s s or of govern m en t

at Ha rva rd Un ivers i ty, explains Ch i n a’s shift from re s i s t a n ce to ulti m a te accept a n ce of t h e

4 Introduction
C T BT by app lying a soc i o l ogical approach ra t h er than the conven ti onal realist model .

Jo h n s ton portrays Chinese stra tegies vi s - à - vis the CTBT as being con s i s tent with Ch i n a’s

s en s i tivi ty to social pre s su res affecting issues of rep ut a ti on ,s t a tu s ,h on or, and pre s ti ge ;h ad

China been driven purely by stra tegic argumen t s , it would not have accepted the CTBT,

wh i ch is likely to free ze Chinese warh e ad modern i z a ti on at a stage that could impinge on

its futu re ref i n em en t . Soc i a l i z a ti on into the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty then may be seen as

h aving gre a ter import than bel i eved , even wh en osten s i bly vital sec u ri ty interests are at

s t a ke .

One cri tical but uncertain ch a ll en ge that tends to con cern the public and po l i c ym a kers

a l i ke is the po s s i bi l i ty of we a pons of mass de s tru cti on (WMD) falling into the hands of

terrori s t s .A less public but no less ac ute probl em rel a tes to the sec u ri ty and con trol of t h e

s tockpile and flow of we a pon s - grade fissile material in the aftermath of the co llapse of t h e

Sovi et Un i on . The third part of this Pe a cewo rk sreport con s i ders the pro s pects of t h e s e

em er ging but ambiguous thre a t s .

G a ry Bert s ch and Igor Kh ri p u n ov at the Un ivers i ty of G eor gia paint a grim pictu re of

c u rrent Russian safeg u a rds of su rp lus nu clear materi a l ,n o ting that in the past the sys tem

h ad rel i ed heavi ly on“g u a rd s , ga te s , and guns,”as well as on the high pre s ti ge accorded to

workers , in order to en su re that material was not ill ega lly diverted . The econ omic uph e avals beginning in the 1990s, toget h er with the shrinking of the co u n try ’s social safety

n et ,h ave cre a ted an en ti rely different envi ron m en t , one marked by low morale and soc i a l

u n rest at nu clear fac i l i ti e s . Bert s ch and Kh ri p u n ov trace the path sto l en material migh t

t a ke in Rus s i a ,f rom nu clear com p l exes to customs servi ces and overs e a s , and find little

room for con f i den ce in the abi l i ty of l egal and physical safeg u a rds to halt the theft of nuclear materi a l . The aut h ors argue that the ch a ll en ge of con tro lling Ru s s i a’s su rp lus fissile

m a terial should be a gl obal con cern and call for gre a ter forei gn assistance ,e s pec i a lly from

the Un i ted State s , in meeting that ch a ll en ge .

Jessica Eve Stern’s re s e a rch on terrorism and we a pons of mass de s tru cti on su ggests that

the deb a te on this issue needs to move aw ay from the two ex treme ends of the spectru m :

the optimism that terrorists wi ll never use su ch we a pons and the pessimism that large -

scale attacks are inevi t a bl e .S tern ,b a s ed at Ha rva rd Un ivers i ty, con s i ders several cri teri a

that groups that are candidates for using unconven ti onal we a pons must possess and finds

that the motiva ti on a l , or ga n i z a ti on a l , and technical con s traints against the use of W M D

a re erod i n g. Yet WMD attacks have been ra re , and Stern of fers a nu m ber of po s s i ble exp l a n a ti on s . She con clu des that terrorists are most likely to rely on low - tech opera ti ons and

a s s a s s i n a ti ons ra t h er than on the catastrophic attacks that we worry most abo ut .

This overvi ew is on ly indicative of the broad backing that the Un i ted States In s ti tute of

Pe ace has provi ded to sch o l a rs and policy analysts ac ross the world who gra pple with the

s eem i n gly intract a ble but vital probl em of we a pons of mass de s tru cti on . The In s ti tute bel i eves that a re a l i s tic and dispassion a te understanding of the issu e , wh i ch tends to sto ke

deep fe a rs and passion s , is a prerequ i s i te for devel oping ef fective policies and co u n term e asu re s . De s p i te the en orm i ty of the ch a ll en ge , it seems impera tive that su ch re s ponses be

both con s i s tent with ch a n ging re a l i ties and accept a ble to the larger intern a ti onal com mun i ty. The pri m a ry obj ective of this Pe a cewo rk s is to report on some of the ways in wh i ch

the In s ti tute is playing a part in shaping the outcomes of this deb a te .

Introduction 5
O n e

Striving for Nuclear Nonpro l i fe rat i o n

David Al b ri ght is the pre s i d ent of the In s ti tu te for Sci en ce and In tern a tional Securi ty

( I S I S ) , and Kevin O’ Nei ll is the depu ty dire ctor of I S I S . Lo c a ted in Wa s h i n g to n , D. C . ,

ISIS is a nonpa rti s a n ,n o n profit orga n i z a tion that provides te ch n i c a l , sci en ti f i c , and pol i c y

a n a lysis rel a ted to national and intern a tional se c u ri ty. The proje ct funded by the Un i ted

St a tes In s ti tu te of Pe a ce seeks to iden tify and eva l u a te previ ou s ly su cce s sful nonprol i fera ti o n

s tra tegies and to su ggest new approa ches to prevent prol i fera tion and redu ce the threat of

nu cl e a r- a rm ed grou p s . The proje ct en ga ges an intern a tional group of sci en tists and pol i c y

s pe cialists in ord er to draw from a va ri ety of sou rce s . Al b ri ght and O’ Nei ll ’s discussion here

provides an overvi ew of the probl em of n o n prol i fera tion and sets the stage for the more

fo c u sed ch a pters that foll ow.

The Relat i ve Success of Nonpro l i fe ration Initiat i ve s

Si n ce the beginning of the nu clear age ,m ore than twen ty - f ive co u n tries have had nu cl e a r

we a pons progra m s , but on ly abo ut nine or ten co u n tries ever obt a i n ed nu clear we a pon s

t h ro u gh an indigenous progra m .An o t h er three states inheri ted nu clear we a pons fo ll owing the breakup of the Sovi et Un i on , but all of these co u n tries gave up these we a pons and

j oi n ed the Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) as non nu clear we a pon state s . An o t h er

f ive or so co u n tries may have had plans of obtaining nu clear we a pon s .

Cu rren t ly, ei ght co u n tries are known to have nu clear we a pon s — Bri t a i n , Ch i n a , Fra n ce ,

In d i a , Is rael , Pa k i s t a n , Ru s s i a , and the Un i ted State s . So uth Af rica dismantled its nu cl e a r

a rs enal du ring the early 1990s in what remains a unique step. De s p i te having sign ed the

N P T, North Korea may have one or two nu clear we a pon s . Iran and Iraq are su s pected of

s eeking the wh erewithal to build nu clear we a pon s , even though they are sign a tories to the

N P T.A few other co u n tri e s , su ch asAl geri a ,L i bya , So uth Kore a , and Ta iw a n ,a re not

vi ewed as having active nu clear we a pons progra m s , but their dom e s tic or regi onal sec uri ty circ u m s t a n ces raise con cerns abo ut wh et h er they wi ll seek nu clear we a pons in the

f utu re .

The pre s ent situ a ti on is alarm i n g, a l t h o u gh the nu m ber of co u n tries that have obt a i n ed nu clear we a pons is far small er than ori gi n a lly ex pected . Du ring the early 1960s, for

ex a m p l e , Pre s i dent John F. Ken n edy said that more than twen ty nati ons might have the

bomb by the 1970s.

6

Part I: Approaches to

N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n

by

D avid A l b r i g h t

a n d

Kevin O’ N e i l l
Why were the nu m bers so mu ch small er than ex pected? Pa rt of the answer lies in the

f act that co u n tries have ex peri en ced unex pected technical difficulties in cre a ting the indu s trial infra s tru ctu re to make nu clear we a pon s . The most important re a s on ,h owever,

why so few co u n tries have obt a i n ed nu clear we a pons is the con ti nuing devel opm ent of

n a ti onal and intern a ti onal ef forts to stop the spre ad of nu clear we a pons and to ach i eve

nu clear disarm a m en t . These ef forts have incre a s ed the po l i tical and econ omic costs of

pro l i fera ti on and made co u n tries think twi ce abo ut seeking nu clear we a pon s . Thu s ,m a ny

co u n tries that started nu clear we a pons programs have su b s equ en t ly abandon ed them .

Non pro l i fera ti on initi a tives inclu de the NPT, the In tern a ti onal Atomic Ener gy Agen c y

(IAEA) and its recent stren g t h ening of its intern a ti onal inspecti on , or “s a feg u a rd s ,” s ystem , the Nu clear Su pp l i ers Group (NSG), bi l a teral and mu l ti l a teral arms con trol agreem en t s ,d i p l om a tic ef forts to redu ce regi onal riva l ri e s ,n a ti onal reg u l a ti on s , bi l a tera l

d i s c u s s i on s , and govern m ent po l i c i e s . Co ll ectively, these ef forts are of ten call ed the intern a ti onal non pro l i fera ti on regi m e .

Pe rsisting Gaps and Pitfa l l s

Su ccess should not ob s c u re how to u gh the fight has been or how many probl ems rem a i n .

In fact , nu clear pro l i fera ti on con ti nues to pre s ent one of the most significant threats to intern a ti onal pe ace . Com p l acency abo ut the spre ad of nu clear we a pons must be avoi ded .

Several devel opm ents bode ill for the nu clear non pro l i fera ti on regi m e .

Iraq remains an ac ute pro l i fera ti on ri s k . Its su ccess in con cealing important parts of i t s

nu clear we a pons and other we a pon s - of - m a s s - de s tru cti on programs from UN Sec u ri ty

Co u n c i l – m a n d a ted inspecti ons has worn down intern a ti onal su pport for intru s ive ins pecti ons in Ira q . In essen ce ,s t a tem ents by inspectors abo ut the “l ack of evi den ce of

b a n n ed Iraqi progra m s”a re incre a s i n gly being misu n ders tood as “evi den ce of no banned

activi ti e s .”

In Decem ber 1999 the UN Sec u ri ty Council adopted (in Re s o luti on 1284) a new ins pecti on plan for Iraq that would retu rn inspectors to Iraq after more than a ye a r ’s abs en ce .However, con cerns exist that po l i tical su pport for these inspecti ons is lacking in key

co u n tri e s ,p a rti c u l a rly Fra n ce and Ru s s i a , that wish to end econ omic sancti ons aga i n s t

Iraq and ren ew lu c ra tive com m ercial con tracts with Iraq as qu i ck ly as po s s i bl e .Iraq has

not all owed inspectors to retu rn to Iraq under the Decem ber 1999 re s o luti on , and thu s

the ch a n ces are growing that it wi ll sec ret ly recon s ti tute its nu clear we a pons progra m ,

s om ething that Iraq has the knowl ed ge , ex perti s e , and determ i n a ti on to do qu i ck ly. Moreover, t h ere is also the con cern that Iran has inten s i f i ed its nu clear we a pons ef forts in res pon s e . The re sult could be a dangerous nu clear arms race that could seri o u s ly thre a ten

U. S . policies in the Persian Gu l f regi on and the rest of the Mi d dle East.

Al t h o u gh the U. S . – North Korean Agreed Fra m ework “f roze”North Kore a’s nu cl e a r

we a pons progra m , it has been difficult to implem ent the other con d i ti ons in the agreem en t , in particular the providing of North Korea with two ligh t - w a ter re actors that wo u l d

su b s ti tute for its frozen re actors . Progress on the agreem ent con ti nues to requ i re high -

l evel po l i tical interven ti on , but erra tic atten ti on by the Cl i n ton ad m i n i s tra ti on , pers i s ten t

c ri ticism by some mem bers of Con gre s s , and North Korean provoc a ti ons seri o u s ly del ayed

Striving for Nuclear Nonproliferation 7
the i m p l em en t a ti on of the agreem ent and peri od i c a lly cast do u bt on its futu re . The newly

i n s t a ll ed Bush ad m i n i s tra ti on has yet to tip its hand on how it wi ll ad d ress the situ a ti on .

Is rael , Pa k i s t a n , and India remain out s i de the NPT fra m ework ;t hus there are curren t ly

few pro s pects to redu ce their nu clear ars en a l s ,l et alone el i m i n a te them .The nu clear te s t s

by India and Pakistan in May 1998 vivi dly dem on s tra ted that not everyone is intere s ted in

taking part in the ex i s ting non pro l i fera ti on regi m e . Ot h er co u n tri e s ,i n cluding mem bers

of the NPT, m ay even dec i de to fo ll ow the examples of India and Pa k i s t a n . Moreover, t h e

“on - a ga i n , of f - a ga i n” m i l i t a ry clashes bet ween India and Pakistan over the status of t h e

Kashmir regi on show that the po s s e s s i on of nu clear we a pons does not prevent conventi onal con f l i ct . In deed , these clashes have the po ten tial to escalate into a full-scale war, i n

wh i ch one or both sides may dec i de to use nu clear we a pon s .

More recen t ly, the October 1999 rej ecti on by the U. S . Sen a te of the Com preh en s ive

Test Ban Tre a ty (CTBT) undermines a key obj ective of the NPT’s en h a n ced revi ew

proce s s ,n a m ely, the implem en t a ti on of the CTBT. The CTBT’s defeat dra m a ti c a lly alters

the non pro l i fera ti on landscape ,p a rti c u l a rly by calling into qu e s ti on the NPT’s cen tra l

b a r ga i n , wh ereby the nu clear we a pon states agree to redu ce their rel i a n ce on nu cl e a r

we a pons for their sec u ri ty. Some ex perts and close U. S .a llies have alre ady su gge s ted that

con f i den ce in the NPT regime has been shaken by the Sen a te’s vo te . Some of these of f i c i a l s

worry that the pri ce for wi t h d rawing from the tre a ty is decl i n i n g, wh i ch may en co u ra ge

one or more states to leave the tre a ty because they envi s i on few serious con s equ en ce s .

Ot h er recent devel opm ents have also underm i n ed nu clear non pro l i fera ti on ef fort s .In d i a ,

Ira n , North Kore a , and Pakistan have pursu ed med ium- and lon g - ra n ge missile progra m s

in tandem with their nu clear we a pons progra m s . In the wake of NATO’s military vi ctory

in Yu go s l avia in early 1999, s ome forei gn leaders rem a rked that the on ly way to deter U. S .

conven ti onal forces is by acqu i ring nu clear we a pons or o t h er we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .

C o u n t e rs t rat e gies by Potential Pro l i fe rat o rs

S tra tegies used by those who seek nu clear we a pons are also evo lvi n g, and wo u l d - be pro l i fera tors have learn ed to re s pond cre a tively to ef forts to halt pro l i fera ti on .With the disintegra ti on of the Sovi et Un i on , the po s s i bi l i ty of a fri gh tening shortc ut to nu clear we a pon s

has become all too re a l .S t a tes or terrorist groups could try to obtain poorly pro tected

Russian nu clear we a pon s ,s tocks of p luton iu m , or high ly en ri ch ed ura n iu m .

Co u n tries con ti nue to seek ways of evading ex port con tro l s . Some co u n tries devo te

great ef fort to searching for weak links in the intern a ti onal con trol regi m e . For ex a m p l e ,

an Iraqi doc u m ent from 1986 adverti s ed a lectu re spon s ored by the Iraqi Atomic Ener gy

Com m i s s i on at Al Tuwaitha Nu clear Re s e a rch Cen ter on“deceptive tech n o l ogical po l i c i e s”

to furt h er i llicit proc u rem ent ef fort s c a rri ed out overs e a s . Al t h o u gh ex port con trols cannot

prevent pro l i ferati on ,t h ey buy time for other rem edies to work . Ex port con trols remain effective on ly if t h ey are con s t a n t ly improved . Ot h erwi s e ,t h ey wi ll ,in fact ,become we a ker.

Ru s s i a’s on going econ omic crisis has wors en ed fe a rs that its weak en forcem ent of export con trols on sen s i tive nu clear or nu clear dual-use items wi ll cre a te new po s s i bi l i ti e s

for pro l i fera tors ,p a rti c u l a rly Iraq or Ira n ,to cl a n de s ti n ely and ch e a p ly obtain know - h ow

or equ i pm ent for nu clear we a pons progra m s .Irre s pon s i ble or de s pera te companies or ind ivi duals may seek to capitalize on these opportu n i ti e s .

8 Striving for Nuclear Nonproliferation
Over the hori zon , the pictu re remains uncert a i n . At some point soon the Un i ted State s

wi ll have to dec i de wh et h er or not to dep l oy a limited nati onal missile defense (NMD)

s ys tem to defend against a small attack launch ed by North Kore a , Ira n , or other so-call ed

rogue regi m e s . That the Un i ted States is even con s i dering an NMD sys tem has alre ady

come under cri ticism by Ru s s i a , Ch i n a , and Fra n ce ,t h ree co u n tries the Un i ted States mu s t

work with on a broad spectrum of n on pro l i fera ti on ef fort s .In ad d i ti on , an NMD may

gre a t ly diminish the ch a n ce that the nu clear we a pon states wi ll ach i eve deep nu clear redu cti ons or disarm a m en t ,f u rt h er we a kening the NPT. Should a missile defense be dep l oyed , pro l i fera tors are likely to intensify their ef forts to build nu clear we a pons and ei t h er

to devel op ef fective co u n term e a su res against missile defenses or to find other ways than

missiles of del ivering we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .

C o n c l u s i o n

As we en ter the twen ty - f i rst cen tu ry, m a ny pro l i fera ti on ch a ll en ges rem a i n .E f forts to

s tren g t h en the non pro l i fera ti on regime have not el i m i n a ted opportu n i ties for co u n tri e s

s eeking nu clear we a pon s . However, the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty is bet ter inform ed abo ut

the risks of nu clear pro l i fera ti on , and non pro l i fera ti on ef forts are more soph i s ti c a ted than

ever before . Na ti on s ,p a rti c u l a rly the Un i ted State s , can build on half a cen tu ry of c ra f ti n g

s o luti ons to these difficult ch a ll en ge s . As the past has taught us, h owever, su ccess wi ll not

come easily.

Striving for Nuclear Nonproliferation 9
Two

R e d ressing Deficiencies in the Nuclear

N o n p ro l i fe ration Tre at y

John Si m p son is the pro gram dire ctor of the Pro gramme to Pro m ote Nu clear No n prol i feration (PPNN). PPNN is an intern a tional netwo rking orga n i z a tion with its administrative

ba se at the Mou n tba t ten Cen tre for In tern a tional Stu d i e s ,theUn ivers i ty of S ou t h a m pto n,

in the Un i ted Ki n g d o m . It seeks to gen era te new ideas for stren g t h ening the NPT and to

i n trodu ce these ideas to intern a tional fo ru m s . PPNN has used funding from the Un i ted

St a tes In s ti tu te of Pe a ce to mount major intern a tional sem i n a rs to bri ef senior nati o n a l

of f i cials from around the wo rld and to provide them with rel evant info rm a tion and

d o c u m en t a ti o n .T h e se sem i n a rs took pl a ce short ly befo re the meeti n gs of the Prepa ra to ry

Co m m i t tee for the 2000 NPT Revi ew Co n feren ce in 1998 and 1999 as well as the 2000

co n feren ce itsel f .The following discussion points to the role of PPNN in broader

nonproliferation efforts.

The NPT’s Institutional We a k n e s s e s

Most recent intern a ti onal arms con trol tre a ties have formal mechanisms for mon i tori n g

and veri f ying their implem en t a ti on and for providing sec ret a riat and inform a ti on servi ce s

to states parti e s . The Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) , wh i ch was sign ed in 1968

and remains the corn ers tone of the nu clear non pro l i fera ti on regi m e , has no su ch perm an ent insti tuti on s . Ra t h er, it relies on the inadequ a te functi onal su b s ti tute of a con feren ce

of the parti e s , wh i ch meets every fifth year to revi ew its opera ti on s , and it uses veri f i c a ti on

s ervi ces provi ded by the indepen dent In tern a ti onal Atomic Ener gyAgency (IAEA) to

m on i tor states parti e s’ pe aceful use of the fissile materials within their terri tori e s .

This absen ce of a ny perm a n ent tre a ty mechanisms has two major implicati ons for the

vi a bi l i ty of the NPT. F i rs t , the IAEA has on ly limited veri f i c a ti on re s pon s i bi l i ties in re s pect

of this tre a ty.Al t h o u gh the agency is ch a r ged with veri f ying the fulfill m ent of a state’s

obl i ga ti ons under the NPT with a vi ew to “preven ting divers i on of nu clear en er gy from

pe aceful uses to nu clear we a pons or other nu clear ex p l o s ive devi ce s ,” it is not re s pon s i bl e

for mon i toring wh et h er other aspects of a state’s obl i ga ti ons under the tre a ty are bei n g

f u l f i ll ed . These obl i ga ti ons inclu de non nu clear we a pon states (NNWS) not acqu i ring nuclear we a pons or other nu clear ex p l o s ive devi ces from nu clear we a pon states (NWS) or

en ga ging in the process known as we a pon i z a ti on (i.e., devel oping the non nu clear com pon ents of nu clear we a pons indigen o u s ly ) . Thu s , while the 1995 NPT Revi ew and Ex ten s i on

Con feren ce con f i rm ed that the IAEA is the com petent aut h ori ty to verify that the NPT’s

s a feg u a rds agreem ents with states parties are not being bre ach ed , it remains unclear wh o

should verify com p l i a n ce with other aspects of the tre a ty.

1 0

by

John Simpson 
The second major implicati on is that there is no inter govern m ental body ei t h er to

m on i tor the health of the tre a ty and its rel a ted regime or to provi de foc u s ed inform a ti on

to states on events con n ected with the mu l tiple facets of nu clear non pro l i fera ti on . Th e s e

i n clu de areas su ch as nu clear disarm a m en t , pe aceful uses of nu clear en er gy, nu clear su pp l i er regi m e s , nu clear we a pon – f ree zon e s , and sec u ri ty assu ra n ce s . Devel opm ents in all of

these areas impinge on the vi a bi l i ty of the NPT. Al s o, the NPT has no technical groups of

ex perts to provi de inform a ti on that could improve the tra n s p a rency of the regi m e , or a

s t a te’s abi l i ty to dem on s tra te com p l i a n ce with it. In some cases, this lack of access to obj ective po l i tical and technical inform a ti on could thre a ten to undermine con f i den ce in the

regime by denying to a state party the tools to eva lu a te the com p l i a n ce of o t h ers with the

tre a ty. In su ch circ u m s t a n ce s ,m i su n ders t a n d i n gs could arise con cerning the acti ons of

su ch state s , and lead to inappropri a te acti ons with rega rd to the tre a ty itsel f .

Two obvious qu e s ti ons are why do states parties them s elves not cre a te an or ga n i z a ti on

to perform these tasks for NPT mem bers , and why do they not ask the Un i ted Na ti ons or

the IAEA to undert a ke these tasks? Th ere are three main answers for the first qu e s ti on :t h e

tre a ty is very difficult to amen d ; com p l ete con s en sus on the natu re , powers , and com po s iti on of su ch a tre a ty or ga n i z a ti on would be needed among the 187 states parties before it

could be cre a ted ; and many states are relu ctant to agree to the cre a ti on of a body that

m i ght be used to make ju d gm ents on their own com p l i a n ce with the tre a ty. Thus the nece s s a ry su pport to cre a te su ch a tre a ty or ga n i z a ti on is unlikely to be fort h com i n g. As for

the Un i ted Na ti ons and the IAEA undertaking these tasks, both contain non p a rties to the

NPT and thus are seen as inappropri a te to provi de a sec ret a riat for those who are . However, both or ga n i z a ti ons have a role to play in NPT con feren ce s , with the Un i ted Na ti on s

being con tracted by the parties to provi de the venue and su pport staff for them at an

a greed pri ce .

B r i d ging the Gap: PPNN’s Role

Non govern m ental or ga n i z a ti ons are unlikely to have the re s o u rces to fill the gaps that exist in the scope of the veri f i c a ti on mechanisms assoc i a ted with the NPT. Th ey co u l d ,h owever, t ackle the ch a ll en ges that exist with re s pect to mon i toring the regi m e , provi d i n g

i n form a ti on to the states parti e s ,f ac i l i t a ting meeti n gs of NPT parti e s , and gen era ting new

i deas for implem en ting the tre a ty. It is these needs that PPNN has been seeking to fulfill

for NPT states parties for over a dec ade .

To undert a ke these tasks, PPNN has access to a group of ex perts on the NPT and the

nu clear non pro l i fera ti on regime who repre s ent the geogra phical spre ad of NPT parti e s ;

who have the knowl ed ge , ex peri en ce , and abi l i ty to devel op new ideas to implem ent the

tre a ty; and who have the aut h ori ty to bri ef s en i or nati onal officials on past and curren t

NPT revi ew activi ties and issu e s . This group of ex perts is known as the PPNN Core

Gro u p.It curren t ly com prises indivi duals from ei gh teen co u n tri e s .

The role of m on i toring the regime and providing inform a ti on on devel opm ents wi t h i n

it has been mainly perform ed by PPNN’s publ i c a ti on progra m , com prising its qu a rterly

News b ri ef ,B ri efing Book s , and Is sue Revi ews . The News b ri ef s eeks to keep the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty inform ed of events affecting all aspects of the nu clear non pro l i ferati on regi m e , while each ed i ti on of the annual B ri efing Book s provi des inform a ti on on

Redressing Deficiencies in the NPT 1 1
devel opm ents within the regime and reprodu ces perti n ent doc u m en t a ti on rel a ting to it.

Is sue Revi ews provi des inform a ti on and analyses rega rding specific issues con f ron ting the

regi m e , and in particular the NPT Revi ew Con feren ces and their Prep a ra tory Com m i t tee s

( Prep Com s ) . All of these materials are important and useful to those devel oping state s

that lack libra ry and other re s e a rch fac i l i ti e s .

The role of f ac i l i t a ting NPT meeti n gs is perform ed in part thro u gh PPNN’s inform ati on progra m , but more parti c u l a rly thro u gh its provi s i on of forums at wh i ch po ten ti a l

n a ti onal del ega tes can meet inform a lly to discuss issues and seek soluti ons to probl em s .

This work cen ters on its intern a ti onal meeting progra m , wh i ch has sought to assist NPT

s t a tes parties in recognizing their com m on interests in maintaining su pport for the tre a ty.

G iven that there are 187 states parties with a very wi de ra n ge of vi ews and pers pective s ,

PPNN does not, and could not, a t tem pt to advoc a te particular ways of ad d ressing issu e s .

Its work is prem i s ed on the bel i ef that broad and inform ed parti c i p a ti on of s t a tes parti e s

in the NPT revi ew process bo l s ters the legi ti m acy of dec i s i ons made within that proce s s ;

that a va ri ety of a pproaches to probl ems can usef u lly be discussed ahead of the form a l

m eeti n gs , before nego ti a ting instru cti ons and diplom a tic pro tocol preclu de ef fective deb a te ; and that pers onal rel a ti onships bet ween diplomats can en co u ra ge deeper unders t a n d i n gs of o t h er state s’ po s i ti ons and assist in making com promises in the tense and

s om etimes high ly ch a r ged atm o s ph ere of a Revi ew Con feren ce itsel f .

P P N N ’s meeting program has con s i s ted of i n tern a ti onal bri efing sem i n a rs , Core

Group meeti n gs , and work s h op s . The bri efing sem i n a rs have invo lved mem bers of

P P N N ’s Core Group and other rel evant ex perts informing those sen i or nati onal of f i c i a l s

l i kely to head del ega ti ons to NPT meeti n gs abo ut the issues that might arise there and

providing them with analyses to help them ad d ress probl em s . At the same ti m e , these forums all ow these officials to discuss the issues that most con cern them . Su ch discussion s

t a ke place not on ly in the more formal sessions but also, and perhaps more import a n t ,i n

i n formal con tex t s . In su ch discussion s , officials can talk fra n k ly and open ly with their oppo s i te nu m bers in different del ega ti ons and form pers onal rel a ti onships that can incre a s e

the flex i bi l i ty of t h eir state in formal NPT meeti n gs .

At its Core Group meeti n gs and work s h ops PPNN draws toget h er diplomats and res e a rch ers to analy ze particular issues and seek ideas for soluti ons that can later be pres en ted to the wi der intern a ti onal com mu n i ty. In ad d i ti on ,m em bers of P P N N ’s Core

Group have a role at PPNN sem i n a rs and in NPT meeti n gs as an insti tuti onal mem ory

for those diplomats who are new to the field of n on pro l i fera ti on . More parti c u l a rly,

PPNN has sought since 1995 to en co u ra ge analysis and deb a te on how the “s tren g t h en ed ”

revi ew proce s s ,a greed on at the same time the tre a ty was made perm a n en t , could be most

ef fectively implem en ted .

P P N N ’s latest bri efing seminar was held in Ma rch 2000 in Pri n ceton , New Jers ey, a n d

was targeted at diplomats stati on ed at the Un i ted Na ti ons in New York and at the Con feren ce on Di s a rm a m ent in Gen eva . The seminar em ph a s i zed the nega tive con s equ en ces of

not agreeing on a con s en sus produ ct from the con feren ce , as this event would call into

qu e s ti on the agreem ents re ach ed in 1995 on the indef i n i te du ra ti on of the tre a ty and the

s tren g t h en ed revi ew proce s s . The seminar also ad d re s s ed the su b s t a n tive issues on wh i ch

s t a tes parties would have to for ge a con s en su s , su ch as how to bring non p a rties into the

1 2 Redressing Deficiencies in the NPT
tre a ty, n ew nu clear disarm a m ent initi a tive s ,a ll ega ti ons of n on com p l i a n ce with the tre a ty

and how to deal with them , proposals for new nu clear we a pon – f ree zon e s ,s tren g t h en ed

s ec u ri ty assu ra n ces for NNWS ,i n i ti a tives to stren g t h en the IAEA safeg u a rds sys tem ,

pe aceful-use issues su ch as agreem ents not to attack nu clear fac i l i ti e s ,m a ri time tra n s port

of nu clear materials and waste , and con trols over nu clear ex ports to non p a rti e s .

The Impact of PPNN at the 2000 NPT Rev i ew Confe re n c e

The impact of those PPNN activi ties that can be seen to su b s ti tute to some ex tent for the

N P T’s lack of exec utive and sec ret a rial mechanisms is hard to qu a n ti f y. The main focus of

P P N N ’s work before April 2000 was to en co u ra ge a su ccessful outcome to the NPT Revi ew Con feren ce in that ye a r. To this en d ,f rom 1997 to 2000 PPNN bri efed more than

250 diplomats from over sixty co u n tries on issues that were likely to be ad d re s s ed by the

NPT Revi ew Con feren ce and its Prep Com s . It produ ced four ed i ti ons of vo lumes I and II

of its B ri efing Book , wh i ch were distri buted to all del ega ti ons of s t a tes parti e s ; ei ght ed iti ons of its Is sue Revi ews perti n ent to the NPT Revi ew Con feren ce ; and fo u rteen ed i ti on s

of its News b ri ef. Copies of the latter two publ i c a ti ons were distri buted to approx i m a tely

t wen ty - f ive hu n d red ad d re s s ees on PPNN’s mailing list.

At meeti n gs of the NPT Revi ew Con feren ce and its Prep a ra tory Com m i t tees the direct

ef fects of P P N N ’s activi ties were fivefo l d .F i rs t , PPNN staff m em bers distri buted key

PPNN publ i c a ti ons at the meeti n gs , giving all del ega ti ons factual inform a ti on on wh i ch to

base their policies in the very fluid and ra p i dly evo lving con text of an intern a ti onal conferen ce .PPNN staff m em bers at the con feren ce provi ded furt h er inform a ti on and advi ce

wh en requ e s ted . Secon d , ei ght mem bers of its Core Group atten ded the con feren ce as delega tes and were thus able to play an influ en tial role in its outcom e . Th i rd , a large nu m ber

of key del ega tes alre ady knew each other pers on a lly thro u gh their atten d a n ce at PPNN

m eeti n gs , and this may have hel ped some del ega ti ons to adopt a more flex i ble stance .

Fo u rt h ,P P N N ’s rep ut a ti on as a knowl ed ge a ble and obj ective or ga n i z a ti on led the pre s ident and his com m i t tee ch a i rm en to seek advi ce from PPNN staff m em bers before and

du ring the con feren ce , wh i ch may have influ en ced their planning and con du ct of i t .F in a lly, and perhaps most import a n t , those del ega tes who had atten ded the PPNN meeti n gs

came to it with an en h a n ced understanding of the sign i f i c a n ce of the NPT, the import a n ce of the Revi ew Con feren ce for the nu clear non pro l i fera ti on regi m e , the difficulti e s

that they were likely to face , and va rious ways in wh i ch those difficulties might be add re s s ed .Its meeti n gs may also have en co u ra ged some states to seek agreem ent on major

i s sues of con ten ti on before the con feren ce , ei t h er indepen den t ly or thro u gh the pre s i den t ,

and thus smoo t h ed the path to the first NPT Final Doc u m ent since 1985.

C o n c l u s i o n

Most del ega tes attending the 2000 NPT Revi ew Con feren ce deem ed it su ccessful pri m a ri ly because it agreed by con s en sus on a forw a rd - l ooking “Acti on Plan”for nu clear disarm a m en t . It also minimized the impact of the procedu ral difficulties that had thre a ten ed

to dom i n a te the proceed i n gs by ei t h er tackling them before the con feren ce or su cce s s f u lly

n avi ga ting around them .Agreem ent was also re ach ed on how to handle a nu m ber of

t h orny su b s t a n tive issues that had thre a ten ed to make a con s en sus outcome impo s s i bl e ,

Redressing Deficiencies in the NPT 1 3
su ch as those rel a ting to the Mi d dle East, Ira q , So uth As i a , and a U. S .n a ti onal missile

defense sys tem .All were ei t h er re s o lved or put to one side for the sake of a su cce s s f u l

con feren ce .

PPNN thus bel i eves that its work con tri buted to the su ccessful outcome of the con feren ce by helping states parties to overcome their inabi l i ty to agree on the cre a ti on of a formal tre a ty or ga n i z a ti on . The likel i h ood that a perm a n ent or ga n i z a ti on for the NPT wi ll be

e s t a bl i s h ed in the futu re is sti ll rem o te , and the inform a ti on needs PPNN has sought to

ad d ress seem likely to pers i s t . In the meanti m e , PPNN is seeking to con ti nue its work

by focusing its activi ties on how to implem ent the new NPT Acti on Plan on nu cl e a r

d i s a rm a m en t .

1 4 Redressing Deficiencies in the NPT
Th re e

Te c h n o l o gy and the Development of

N ew Regi m e s

Lessons from the Missile 

Te c h n o l o gy Control Regime

This proje ct draws heavi ly from the author’s decade-long wo rk in the Of f i ce of the Un d er

S e cret a ry of Defen se for Policy while the Missile Te ch n ol o gy Co n trol Regime (MTCR) wa s

being negoti a ted . The proje ct inve s ti ga tes the negoti a tions that led to the MTC R , fo c u s i n g

on the pro cess and su b s t a n ce of the talks. Spei er also relies on documents rel e a sed to the

author in 1995 under the Fre edom of In fo rm a tion Act for the histo ry of t h e se negoti a ti o n s .

The Dilemmas of Dual-Use Te c h n o l o gy

Missile non pro l i fera ti on is different from most other “n on pro l i fera ti on s .”While the va s t

m a j ori ty of govern m ents would like to see the world en ti rely free of ch emical and bi o l ogical we a pons—and ulti m a tely of nu clear we a pon s — t h ere are “good ” and “b ad ”m i s s i l e s .

Some are defen s ive ,s ome are uti l i zed for scien tific or com m ercial purposes (and are call ed

sounding rockets or space launch veh i cles wh en they are used for the latter ) , and som e —

l i ke U. S .c ruise missiles—del iver conven ti onal mu n i ti ons with su ch prec i s i on that they

can avoid hitting non m i l i t a ry target s .

Moreover,the equ i pm ent and tech n o l ogy used to make missiles of ten have import a n t

c ivilian app l i c a ti on s . The Global Po s i ti oning Sys tem , a con s tell a ti on of s a tell i tes and

equ i pm ent that provi de aston i s h i n gly precise loc a ti on and time inform a ti on , is used

not on ly by missiles but also by airline pilots, su rveyors ,h i kers , and drivers of lu x u ry

a utom obi l e s .

Th erefore , missiles and the tech n o l ogy they em body are examples of dual-use item s ,

i tems that cannot en ti rely be banned wi t h o ut losing va lu a ble functi on s .The intern a ti on a l

ex port con trol policy (and assoc i a ted practi ces) to con trol missile pro l i fera ti on is the Mi ssile Tech n o l ogy Con trol Regi m e .The natu re of the regime and the nego ti a ti ons that led to

it of fer lessons in how the pro l i fera ti on of dual-use items may be con tro ll ed .

N e g o t i ating the MTCR

The intern a ti onal nego ti a ti ons leading to the MTCR were con du cted in sec recy for fo u r

and a half ye a rs ,f rom late 1982 to early 1987. On April 16, 1 9 8 7 , the We s tern Econ om i c

Summit (G-7) partn ers announced the po l i c y — d i rected against the pro l i fera ti on of

“nu cl e a r- c a p a bl e”m i s s i l e s . The regime had its ori gins in U. S . con cern s , beginning in the

1 9 6 0 s , with the gradual spre ad of missiles and their tech n o l ogy to po ten tial nu clear pro l i fera tors . Ma ny of the issues invo lved the devel opm ent of s p ace launch veh i cles (SLV s ) , 1 5

by

R i chard Speier
a perfect example of dual-use tech n o l ogy.With a ch a n ge of p ayl oads and guidance ins tru cti on s ,t h ey can serve as lon g - ra n ge ball i s tic missiles.

In 1982 the Re a gan ad m i n i s tra ti on promu l ga ted Na ti onal Sec u ri ty Dec i s i on Di rective

50 (NSDD-50), wh i ch set forth nearly twen ty obj ectives for keeping “pe acef u l ”s p ace coopera ti on pe acef u l . NSDD-50 with its rel a tively scattered policies of fered no useful guida n ce for preven ting missile pro l i fera ti on . That came later in 1982 with NSDD-70.

NSDD-70 had a single obj ective ,that is, to “h i n der ” the pro l i fera ti on of nu cl e a r- c a p a bl e

m i s s i l e s . It def i n ed these to inclu de ball i s tic and cruise missiles as well as “o s ten s i bly civi li a n”vers i ons of t h em . It directed rel evant U. S .a gencies to work with other su pp l i er govern m ents tow a rd this obj ective .

The U. S . prep a ra ti ons for su ch talks fe a tu red a theme that pers i s ted du ring mu ch of t h e

n ext four and a half ye a rs : a love - h a te rel a ti onship bet ween the State Dep a rtm ent and the

Dep a rtm ent of Defense (Do D ) . (The aut h or worked for DoD on these nego ti a ti ons du ring this peri od.) The State Dep a rtm ent wanted an agreem ent and was wi lling to make

com promises on the po l i c y. DoD wanted uncom promising non pro l i fera ti on , with or

wi t h o ut a formal agreem ent with the other mem bers of the G-7.

As an ex a m p l e ,S t a te began with a draft policy on missile ex port con trols that all owed

every dec i s i on to be made on a case-by-case basis, with mu l tiple obj ectives for each dec is i on . DoD re s pon ded with a “s h ort list of den i a l s” that enu m era ted a few items (inclu d i n g

m i s s i l e s ,s p ace launch veh i cl e s , and their major com pon ents and produ cti on fac i l i ti e s )

that would be su bj ect to a total ex port em b a r go. Moreover, DoD set forth a technical def in i ti on of u n m a n n ed sys tems that would be su bj ect to su ch draconian con tro l s . This became the “Ca tegory I”l i s t — u n m a n n ed sys tem s , rega rdless of p u rpo s e , that are capable of

del ivering a 500-kilogram payl oad to a ra n ge of 300 kilom eters .

Within mon t h s , Do D’s Ca tegory I list was accepted by the seven su pp l i er govern m en t s

as the focus of the regime being nego ti a ted . Ot h er dual-use items were placed into a

l on ger “Ca tegory II”l i s t , a list of i tems su bj ect to case-by-case ex port dec i s i on . Th ere was a

po ten tial for weakness in the Ca tegory II con tro l s , but this was minimized by the requ i rem ent that su ch ex ports not con tri bute to Ca tegory I sys tem s .

Su b s equ en t ly, the con ten tious issue became the rules that should app ly to Ca tegory I

ex port s .S t a te and DoD locked horn s , with State insisting that an em b a r go was non n egoti a ble and DoD insisting that nothing less was wort hwh i l e . For nearly a year du ring 1984

the other mem bers of the G-7 waited in puzzlem ent while the Un i ted States app a ren t ly

did nothing—except to wage intense intera gency warf a re . The issue ulti m a tely moved

i n to the intern a ti onal arena—not to be re s o lved until 1986. The soluti on was to place a

total pro h i bi ti on on ex ports of produ cti on fac i l i ties for Ca tegory I items and to establish a

“s trong pre su m pti on to deny ” ex port of o t h er Ca tegory I item s — with stri ct rules for the

con d i ti ons under wh i ch su ch “ra re”ex ports could be made .

An o t h er pers i s ting qu e s ti on rel a ted to the perennial dual-use dilemma of S LV s .O n ce

S LVs made the Ca tegory I list, s ome nego ti a ting partn ers became uneasy abo ut app lyi n g

the same rules to them as to ball i s tic missiles. It took one and a half ye a rs before these govern m ents ad m i t ted that the laws of physics of fered no other approach .

In short ,m a ny of the most important MTCR nego ti a ti ons took place within the U. S .

govern m en t .The dual-use natu re of s ome of the item s , su ch as SLV s , forced an en orm o u s

1 6 Technology and New Regimes
amount of a t ten ti on to be given to the interp l ay of con trols and the list of i tems to be contro ll ed .

The MTCR’s A p p roach to Dual-Use Contro l s

Some of the approaches em bod i ed in the MTCR ref l ected the ex peri en ce of the on ly other

n on pro l i fera ti on regime then in ex i s ten ce—that dealing with nu clear we a pon s . Just as

the Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) pro s c ri bed the furt h er spre ad of nu cl e a r

we a pon s , so the MTCR pro s c ri bed the furt h er spre ad of missiles capable of del iveri n g

t h em .Just as the NPT set ti ght con trols over “pe aceful nu clear ex p l o s i on s”—the civi l i a n

equ iva l ent of nu clear we a pons—so the MTCR set ti ght con trols over SLV s . And just as the

nu clear regime (including the Nu clear Su pp l i er Gu i delines) set loo s er con trols over du a l -

use ex port s ,so did the MTC R .

But there were differen ce s . The MTCR establ i s h ed a “n o - u n derc ut ru l e” u n der wh i ch a

govern m ent that den i ed an ex port would so notify the other mem bers of the regi m e ,a n d

e ach other mem ber would issue similar denials unless it first con su l ted with the ori gi n a l

denying party. This innova ti on was attractive because it re a s su red ex porters that any sac rif i ces they made would not be neutra l i zed by other regime mem bers . The innova ti on

m ade so mu ch sense that the no-underc ut rule was adopted in the Nu clear Su pp l i er

Gu i delines wh en they were ex ten ded furt h er into the dual-use area in the early 1990s. Th e

n o - u n derc ut rule and the other MTCR re s tri cti ons were to be kept alive by frequ ent inform a ti on exch a n ges among regime mem bers in order to en co u ra ge a com m on apprec i a ti on

of the prevailing el em ents of the missile pro l i fera ti on thre a t .

The MTC R’s Ca tegory I list and its corre s ponding con trols set a standard for de a l i n g

with the most lethal com m od i ti e s . But , perhaps because of the difficulty in nego ti a ti n g

t h em ,t h ey have not been ref l ected in su b s equ ent non pro l i fera ti on ef fort s . Nevert h el e s s ,

wi t h o ut su ch stri n gent Ca tegory I provi s i on s , the MTCR could lose its focus and becom e

little more than a ge s tu re .

Fo ll owing the Persian Gu l f Wa r, the MTCR covera ge was broaden ed from nu cl e a rc a p a ble missiles to missiles capable of del ivering nu cl e a r, ch em i c a l , or bi o l ogical we a pon s .

The regi m e’s mem bership grew from the ori ginal seven to the pre s ent thirty - t h ree , wi t h

Is rael unilatera lly ad h ering to its guidelines and China issuing ra t h er ambiguous formu l ati ons of its com m i tm ent to ob s erve the MTC R’s “g u i delines and para m eters .” To date , of

the major su pp l i ers of missile tech n o l ogy, on ly North Korea has rem a i n ed aloof f rom the

M TC R’s provi s i on s .

Even wi t h o ut North Kore a’s parti c i p a ti on ,the MTCR can claim credit for curt a i l i n g

s everal progra m s , su ch as the Ar gen ti n e - Egypti a n - Iraqi Con dor II missile program (a

cl one of the Pershing II based on tech n o l ogy ex ported by We s tern Eu ropean firm s ) ;t h e

So uth Af rican ball i s tic missile/SLV progra m ; and the Cen tral Eu ropean Scud and SS-23

progra m s .In ad d i ti on , as a re sult of a U. S .s a n cti ons law en forcing MTCR obj ective s ,

m a ny other missile programs have been con t a i n ed . Recent ye a rs have seen some spect ac ular examples of missile pro l i fera ti on , but wi t h o ut the MTCR in place , it would undo u btedly have been far wors e .

A frequ ent cri ticism of the MTCR has been that, because it is not en s h ri n ed in a tre a ty,

it can re ad i ly be ign ored . However, a tre a ty or a policy (the MTCR is the latter) is as stron g

Technology and New Regimes 1 7
as its en forcem en t .As long as govern m ents back the regime com m i tm ents with inform ati on exch a n ge s ,d é m a rch e s , and even sancti on s ,t h ere is no re a s on why a policy cannot

f u n cti on as ef fectively as a tre a ty.Dual-use tech n o l ogy con tro l s , with inherent flex i bi l i ty

in their app l i c a ti on ,would be ex trem ely difficult to formu l a te as inflex i ble tre a ty

com m i tm en t s .

Lessons Learned for Future Negotiat i o n s

A few of the most outstanding fe a tu res of the approaches to MTCR nego ti a ti ons were the

fo ll owi n g :

wA cl ear obj ec tive . The MTCR def i n ed Ca tegory I items with en gi n eering prec i s i on

and foc u s ed its most powerful re s tri cti ons on their ex port . Even the du a l - u s e

Ca tegory II con trols were keyed to the Ca tegory I obj ective . This gave teeth to the

regime in a way that seven teen obj ectives and case-by-case dec i s i on making on all

ex ports could never have don e .

wRules app rop ri a te to the obj ec tive .It would have been easy to put dual-use SLV s

on the Ca tegory I list and then all ow their ex port under minimal re s tri cti on s . But at

the cost of pro l on ging the nego ti a ti on s , this was re s i s ted and a con s i s tent regi m e

c re a ted .

wA no-agreem ent opti on .DoD provi ded strong backing to the U. S . po s i ti on by

i n s i s ting that it would be bet ter to have no agreem ent—and to oppose missile prol i fera ti on by indivi dual démarches not based on an intern a ti onal policy—than to

h ave a weak agreem ent that som eh ow legi ti m i zed su ch ex ports as those of S LV s . It

is essen tial to resist the urge to re ach agreem ents “at any co s t .”

wU. S .l ea ders h i p. The Un i ted States is the ei gh t - hu n d red - pound gori lla in intern ati onal nego ti a ti on s .O n ce it takes a po s i ti on and advoc a tes it stron gly, o t h er nati on s’

“po l i tical con s tra i n t s” tend to melt aw ay.

wEternal vi gi l a n ce .The details made a differen ce . By indef a ti ga bly attending to them

over four and a half ye a rs , the nego ti a tors of the MTCR cre a ted a wort hwhile intern a ti onal standard .

1 8 Technology and New Regimes
Fo u r

M a n a ging Te c h n o l o gy Tra n s fe rs in a

P ro l i fe ration Enviro n m e n t

The Case of the Biological and To x i n

We apons Convention

Jean Pa scal Za n d ers dire cts the Chemical and Biol o gical Wa rf a re Proje ct of the Sto ck h ol m

In tern a tional Pe a ce Re se a rch In s ti tu te (SIPRI) and he is the pri n ci pal inve s ti ga tor for a

joint proje ct by the Fed era tion of Am erican Sci en tists (FAS) and SIPRI under wh i ch this

re se a rch has be en done. Za n d ers expl o res the exi s ting regimes and mechanisms of te ch n olo gy tra n sfers rel evant to the Biol o gical and Toxin We a pons Co nven tion and inve s ti ga te s

h ow they affe ct the po s s i bi l i ty of of fering gains to poten tial mem ber- s t a te s . He also looks at

po s s i bi l i ties to verify that the tra n s a ctions are not misu sed for pu rpo ses proh i bi ted under

the co nven ti o n .

Te c h n o l o gy Tra n s fe rs and Economic Deve l o p m e n t :

D eveloped- ve rsus Developing-Country Vi ew s

The indu s tri a l i zed world has recast arms con trol and disarm a m ent as not on ly ends in

t h em s elve s , but as two mechanisms among several policy instru m ents for stemming the

pro l i fera ti on of u n conven ti onal we a pon s . This points in part to the incre a s ed import a n ce

of econ omic interacti ons (in the form of dual-use tech n o l ogy tra n s fers ) . A similar shift of

em phasis has occ u rred among indu s trializing co u n tri e s . The 1972 Bi o l ogical and Tox i n

We a pons Conven ti on (BTWC) and the 1993 Ch emical We a pons Conven ti on (CWC) are

true disarm a m ent tre a ties in the sense that they el i m i n a te an en ti re class of we a pon ry and

possess mechanisms to prevent the use and acqu i s i ti on of su ch we a pon ry.Yet the indu strializing co u n tries have incre a s i n gly ju d ged the rel eva n ce and su ccess of su ch agreem en t s

by the con tri buti on they make to the devel opm ent of t h eir soc i eti e s . The fact that in most

cases these co u n tries do not have any stockpiles to de s troy or do not face an immed i a te

t h reat with the we a pon ry under con s i dera ti on on ly rei n forces the vi ewpoi n t .

The inserti on of an econ omic dimen s i on (in the form of a promise of devel opm en t )

has a long history in the con trol of a rm a m en t s . Pe ace and intern a ti onal coopera ti on are

p a rt of the core purposes and principles of the Un i ted Na ti ons and are con s equ en t ly ref l ected in the arms con trol agreem ents ach i eved under its auspice s .Arti cles II and III of

the Statute of the In tern a ti onal Atomic Ener gy Agency (wh i ch en tered into force on Ju ly

2 9 , 1957) em ph a s i ze the accel era ti on and en l a r gem ent of the con tri buti on of a tomic ener gy to pe ace ,h e a l t h , and pro s peri ty thro u gh o ut the worl d . The wording of the provi s i on s

in Arti cles III and IV of the 1968 Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) to avoid hampering the econ omic and tech n o l ogical devel opm ent of s t a tes parties and their ri ght to 1 9

by

Jean Pa s c a l

Z a n d e r s
p a rti c i p a te in scien tific and tech n o l ogical exch a n ges is repe a ted almost verb a tim in Arti cl e

X of the BTWC and ref l ected in Arti cle XI of the CWC . As the re ach of these agreem en t s

is gl ob a l , it is inevi t a ble that the interests of s t a tes parties may differ depending on thei r

geogra phical loc a ti on .

Moreover, a rms con trol and disarm a m ent tre a ties should not form a pretext to con s o li d a te a mon opo ly over the po s s e s s i on of a particular tech n o l ogy by a single state or a

group of s t a te s . This was part of the ph i l o s ophy of the New In tern a ti onal Econ omic Order (NIEO), as it was en s h ri n ed in the Ch a rter of E con omic Ri ghts and Duties of S t a tes in

Decem ber 1974. Al t h o u gh it was con troversial and its implem en t a ti on ulti m a tely bl ocked

by the po l i tical swing to the ri ght in most indu s tri a l i zed nati ons at the end of the dec ade ,

it had a del ayed impact on the BTWC . Mem bers of the Non - Al i gn ed Movem ent (NA M )

i nvo ked the NIEO principles at the peri odic revi ew con feren ces in the 1980s and thu s

con tri buted to deepening the understanding of Arti cle X of the BTWC . In i ti a lly, h owever,

the argument (with re s pect to the BTWC) appe a red form a l i s tic as the NAM co u n tri e s

ra i s ed the point on ly at the qu i n qu ennial revi ew con feren ces and not du ring the peri od s

in bet ween .

An o t h er argument that hel ped to shape the deb a te was the bel i ef a m ong the indu s tri a lizing state s , and the NAM mem bers in parti c u l a r, that the reversal of the co s t ly arms race s

would free up mon ey to invest in the devel opm ent of poorer nati on s .The noti on of general and com p l ete disarm a m ent was thus linked to soc i a l , econ om i c , and tech n o l ogi c a l

devel opm ent in the 1960s. Al t h o u gh disarm a m ent has meanwhile proved to be ex pen s ive

in mon et a ry term s , an underlying ex pectancy of a utom a tic financial or tech n o l ogy tra n sfers as an integral part of a disarm a m ent tre a ty is sti ll pre s ent in the mind-set of m a ny devel oping co u n tri e s .

Not on ly are these el em ents rel evant to the furt h er devel opm ent of the NPT and CWC

regi m e s , but they also play a significant role in the current nego ti a ti on on a pro tocol ad d iti onal to the BTWC . With the CWC , the deb a te on tech n o l ogy tra n s fers ,a s s i s t a n ce ,a n d

devel opm ent has become perm a n ent and insti tuti on a l i zed . The ex peri en ce of the conc rete implem en t a ti on of Arti cle XI of the CWC is a major com pon ent of the deb a te on

h ow to or ga n i ze a meaningful implem en t a ti on of Arti cle X of the BTWC .

The Biotechnology Revolution and

Its Impact on the Debat e

One of the re a s ons why the BTWC was ach i eved was the wi de s pre ad vi ew in the early

1970s that bi o l ogical warf a re was impracti c a l . Si n ce then bi o l ogy and bi o tech n o l ogy have

m ade great leaps forw a rd . The current deb a tes on the em er ging bi o l ogical we a pons (BW)

t h reat interact with other issu e s , su ch as em er ging and reem er ging diseases or envi ronm ental degrad a ti on , that to u ch soc i eties in all parts of the worl d . Because of the ro l e

bi o tech n o l ogy plays and wi ll play in the devel opm ent of a soc i ety, the futu re BTWC

regime wi ll also affect the sectors of econ om i c , po l i ti c a l , and soc i etal sec u ri ty. The intere s t

of m a ny co u n tries in parti c i p a ting in the futu re BTWC regime would then be determ i n ed

not by threats from BW, but by, for ex a m p l e , the ri ght to parti c i p a te in intern a ti onal exch a n ges and to have access to the new bi o tech n o l ogies that could help co u n tries to

2 0 Managing Technology Transfers
co u n ter soc i etal threats and to en h a n ce their econ om i c , envi ron m en t a l , and po l i ti c a l

s ec u ri ty.

The goal of u n ivers a l i ty for the futu re pro tocol to the BTWC implies the accom m od ati on of the va rious sec u ri ty interests (econ om i c , envi ron m en t a l ,m i l i t a ry, po l i ti c a l , or soc ietal) states parties may deem important based on the natu re of t h eir interacti ons wi t h

o t h er state s ,t h eir geogra phic loc a ti on , and their level of devel opm en t . From this angl e ,

m e a n i n gful implem en t a ti on of Arti cle X of the BTWC thro u gh Arti cle VII of the pro toco l

wi ll be cru c i a l .Arti cle VII of the pro tocol corre s ponds to Arti cle X of the BTWC . Arti cl e

VII rel a tes direct ly to “s c i en tific and tech n o l ogical exch a n ges for pe aceful purposes and

tech n o l ogical coopera ti on .”Moreover, the ben efits must be real and, at a minimu m , be

a ble to of fs et the financial cost a state wi ll incur by becoming a party to the pro tocol (e.g. ,

to finance the futu re intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti on ) .

Some of the measu res under con s i dera ti on for Arti cle VII of the draft pro tocol inclu de

a s s i s t a n ce with nati onal implem en t a ti on of the pro toco l , tech n o l ogy and scien tific exch a n ge s , regi onal sem i n a rs , the establ i s h m ent of a bi o tech n o l ogy database and com mu n ic a ti ons net work , disease su rvei ll a n ce , and the cre a ti on of a Coopera ti on Com m i t tee

within the futu re Orga n i z a ti on for the Pro h i bi ti on of Bi o l ogical and Toxin We a pons to

or ga n i ze and overs ee the implem en t a ti on of these coopera tive activi ti e s .

However, Arti cle VII may have on ly a limited appeal to states to join the pro toco l : s t a te s

can obtain many of the pro s pective ben efits thro u gh other intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti ons or

a rra n gem en t s , su ch as the World Health Orga n i z a ti on , theWorld Trade Orga n i z a ti on ,a n d

the Conven ti on on Bi o l ogical Divers i ty. Fu rt h erm ore ,m a ny states argue that they alre ady

h ave programs running that can be con s i dered as con c rete implem en t a ti on of Arti cle X of

the BTWC . Rel evant tech n o l ogies are also tra n s ferred on the level of companies ra t h er

than states thro u gh the establ i s h m ent of su b s i d i a ri e s ,d i rect inve s tm en t ,l i cen s i n g, or parti c i p a ti on in a va ri ety of l ocal initi a tive s .Wh a tever the motives or the con tent of the tra n sacti on s , the tra n s fers are taking place . If the pro tocol is to ach i eve univers a l i ty, the cru c i a l

qu e s ti on thus becomes what ex tra ben efits states may obtain under Arti cle V I I .The CWC

contains an ad d i ti onal incen tive :n on s t a te parties are den i ed access to certain listed tox i c

ch em i c a l s , wh i ch may have important com m ercial or indu s trial app l i c a ti ons (Arti cle V I ) .

A similar provi s i on in the futu re pro tocol to the BTWC may be obj ecti on a ble on et h i c a l

gro u n d s ,e s pec i a lly if it would rel a te to human health, food sec u ri ty, and so on .

The BTWC is a typical Cold War agreem en t . Wh en it en tered into force in 1975 the dynamics of the intern a ti onal sys tem foc u s ed on the gl obal ideo l ogical stru ggle bet ween the

Sovi et Un i on and the Un i ted State s . The disappe a ra n ce of a principal or ganizing force on

the gl obal level re su l ting from the end of the bi polar riva l ry has con tri buted to the regi ona l i z a ti on of con f l i ct managem ent and re s o luti on . A we a kening of the com m i tm ent to

gl obal en ga gem ent by the larger powers ,s ave in the case of s trong and immed i a te nati on a l

i n tere s t s , has rei n forced the tren d . The ste ady diffusion of k n owl ed ge and tech n o l ogy ena bles regi onal state actors to en l a r ge their po l i ti c a l ,i n du s tri a l , and military capabi l i ti e s ,

wh i ch , in tu rn , wi ll affect regi onal power balance s . These devel opm ents have rei n forced

ex i s ting con cerns abo ut pro l i fera ti on .

The re s ponse of m a ny indu s tri a l i zed nati ons has been to stren g t h en non pro l i fera ti on

m e a su re s . Evi den ce of the invo lvem ent of m a ny We s tern companies in Ira q’s and Libya’s

Managing Technology Transfers 2 1
ch emical we a pons programs prom pted the introdu cti on of ex port con trols on certain key

ch emicals needed to manu f actu re the warf a re agen t s . Some We s tern co u n tries bega n

m eeting inform a lly in the so-call ed Au s tralia Group to coord i n a te their nati onal ex port

con trol po l i c i e s . The com m on lists of con tro ll ed goods gradu a lly ex p a n ded to cover

equ i pm ent and tech n o l ogies rel evant to BW. The initial goal of the Au s tralia Group was to

s l ow down the pro l i fera ti on process until the con clu s i on of the nego ti a ti on of the CWC .

Tod ay, the ra ti onale has shifted and the arra n gem ent has acqu i red a more perma n en t ,i f

s ti ll inform a l ,s t a tu s . Its con trol lists contain tech n o l ogies not covered by the ex port control mechanisms of the CWC as well as tech n o l ogies of rel eva n ce to the manu f actu re of

BW. The BTWC has no ex port con trol provi s i ons at all .

Tod ay, n obody denies the rel eva n ce of the non pro l i fera ti on clauses in the CWC and the

BTWC . However, the ex i s ten ce of ex port con trol mechanisms out s i de the disarm a m en t

tre a ties direct ly ch a ll en ges the assu m pti ons that ori gi n a lly led to the inclu s i on of econ omic and devel opm ent assistance into arms con trol and disarm a m ent tre a ti e s . Devel oping co u n tries have a strong sense that nati onal ex port con trol reg u l a ti on s , wh et h er or not

coord i n a ted among a nu m ber of s t a te s ,i n trodu ce arbi tra riness into their abi l i ty to have

access to rel evant tech n o l ogies and that their com m i tm ent to disarm a m ent is not rew a rded .Progress tow a rd re s o luti on of the issue is not hel ped by the fact that the disarm am ent tre a ties grant states parties on ly the ri gh t of access to su ch tech n o l ogies (and not an

obl i ga ti o n of tra n s fer) for non pro h i bi ted purpo s e s . Fu rt h erm ore ,while the tre a ties contain a non pro l i fera ti on cl a u s e , as of tod ay they do not indicate how states parties mu s t

con c retely implem ent the provi s i on . Th ey do not state that on ly tre a ty provi s i ons can

form the basis for non pro l i fera ti on measu re s ,n or do they state that measu res out s i de the

tre a ty regime are pro h i bi ted . The qu e s ti on is therefore high in ideo l ogical con ten t , a qu a li ty that con s i dera bly hinders the finding of an equ i t a ble soluti on .

P reliminary Findings

A key finding is that in the po s t – Cold War envi ron m en t , with its incre a s ed atten ti on on

pro l i fera ti on , the con cept of veri f i c a ti on needs to be ex p a n ded ,i f not recon s i dered .Veri f ic a ti on mechanisms in arms con trol and disarm a m ent are trad i ti on a lly tailored to certi f y — depending on the type of tre a ty—the absen ce or pre s en ce of tre a ty - con tro ll ed item s

and their de s tru cti on if so requ i red .In ad d i ti on ,o t h er veri f i c a ti on mechanisms can be inclu ded to mon i tor the use or con su m pti on of certain goods that may pose a threat to the

tre a ty obj ective s . Un der the futu re BTWC regi m e , an important part of the veri f i c a ti on

process wi ll have to focus on keeping tech n o l ogy tra n s fers as tra n s p a rent as po s s i ble (and

t h ereby con tri bute to the building of con f i den ce ) . Because of the natu re of bi o tech n o l ogy

and the minute amounts of p a t h ogens needed to start up re s e a rch , devel opm en t , and produ cti on , it is high ly unlikely that a mechanism of acco u n ting of m a terial balances like the

one used under the nu clear safeg u a rds sys tem can be ad a pted to mon i tor BTWC - rel eva n t

tra n s fers . (The model alre ady proves to be probl em a tic under the CWC . )

Pro l i fera ti on studies focus pri n c i p a lly on the tra n s fer patterns of t a n gi ble obj ect s , su ch

as agents and equ i pm en t , and the threat of the immed i a te re a l i z a ti on of the dual-use poten tial of these obj ect s , wh ereby the rec i p i ent co u n tries (or su b s t a te actors) of con cern acqu i re tech n o l ogy devel oped for civilian use and instantly app ly it for the purpose of

2 2 Managing Technology Transfers
acqu i ring BW. Yet at the core of the bi o tech n o l ogical revo luti on is inform a ti on : data co ll ecti on and proce s s i n g, k n owl ed ge , tech n i qu e s , and skill s . Moreover, bi o tech n o l ogy produ ces en a bling tech n o l ogies for many civilian app l i c a ti ons that con tri bute to futu re

i n form a ti on acc u mu l a ti on and produ ct and process improvem en t s . This inform a ti on

core perm e a tes the soc i ety in wh i ch the devel opm ent takes place . However, with tod ay ’s

gl ob a l i z a ti on and growing interdepen den ce it inevi t a bly diffuses ac ross nati onal borders .

While lateral pro l i fera ti on processes are unden i a bly taking place , the gre a test ch a ll en ge to

the futu re BTWC regime may actu a lly come from a su d den massive app l i c a ti on of c ivi l i a n

bi o tech n o l ogy for the purpose of acqu i ring a bi o l ogical warf a re capabi l i ty within a state

p a rty that faces a serious sec u ri ty thre a t .

If the pro tocol to the BTWC is to remain rel evant for many dec ades to com e , it wi ll requ i re new mechanisms to deal with this po s s i bi l i ty of instant re a l i z a ti on of the du a l - u s e

po ten tial of bi o tech n o l ogy within a state party. In ad d i ti on to the trad i ti onal veri f i c a ti on

and mon i toring of the de s tru cti on and non produ cti on of BW in states parti e s , it wi ll have

to incorpora te an understanding of bi o tech n o l ogy and tech n o l ogy tra n s fer processes that

goes beyond mere produ cts (agen t s , produ cti on equ i pm en t , etc . ) . The aim of this new set

of tools is to ren der tra n s p a rent tech n o l ogy tra n s fers bet ween econ omic units (e.g. ,i n d ivi du a l s ,l a bora tori e s , and companies) within a mem ber- s t a te and bet ween econ omic units

ac ross nati onal bo u n d a ries (including states and tra n s n a ti onal companies and or ga n i z ati on s ) .All econ omic units invo lved in a tra n s acti on wi ll share the re s pon s i bi l i ty of

en su ring that the dual-use po ten tial of the tech n o l ogies is not re a l i zed . The explicit comm i tm ent by the econ omic unit, wh et h er a su pp l i er or a rec i p i en t , to uphold this re s pon s ibi l i ty wi ll then become a key com pon ent for gra n ting the tra n s fer licen s e . The pri n c i p l e

also applies to scien tific and stu dent exch a n ges as in-depth back ground knowl ed ge wi ll

en h a n ce the tra n s p a rency of the insti tute’s and the indivi du a l ’s activi ti e s . The nati onal aut h ori ties and the intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti on to be set up under the pro tocol wi ll mon i tor

the tra n s p a rency of a ll rel evant tech n o l ogy tra n s fers . This mechanism of s h a red re s pon s ibi l i ties bet ween su pp l i ers and rec i p i ents can fac i l i t a te assistance to co u n tries su ch as Ru ssia as con f i den ce in the com p l i a n ce with the BTWC grows , while making it mu ch harder

for futu re Iraqs or repre s en t a tives of terrorist or ga n i z a ti ons to acqu i re the BW- rel eva n t

tech n o l ogi e s .

This set of tools wi ll non et h eless have to be su pp l em en ted with ex ten s ive po s i tive sec uri ty guara n tees in order to redu ce the disproporti on a te military adva n t a ge a state party

m i ght gain from defecting from the tre a ty. These guara n tees do not on ly entail the ri ght of

access to assistance and pro tecti on (su bj ect to the tra n s p a rency con d i ti ons men ti on ed ) ,

but also invo lve dynamic dec i s i on-making procedu res to all ow states parties to re s pon d

s wi f t ly and dec i s ively in the case of a ra p i dly devel oping cri s i s . If adequ a tely implem en ted ,

the mechanisms to en h a n ce the tra n s p a rency of tech n o l ogy tra n s fers may be able to provi de su f f i c i ent adva n ce warning of an impending massive tra n s fer of c ivilian tech n o l ogy

for pro h i bi ted purpo s e s .

A second key finding is that the con cept of s ec u ri ty can no lon ger be limited to “m i l it a ry sec u ri ty.”It invo lves several layers su ch as pers onal sec u ri ty, econ omic sec u ri ty (for

com p a n i e s ,s t a te s , etc . ) ,s oc i etal sec u ri ty (including health issu e s , food , and water sec uri ty ) , po l i tical sec u ri ty (regime su rviva l ) , envi ron m ental sec u ri ty, and so on .One on ly has

Managing Technology Transfers 2 3
to look at the AIDS disaster in some Af rican co u n tries to understand how these differen t

l evels are intert wi n ed . The futu re BTWC regime wi ll impact on each of these levels as a

con s equ en ce of the dual-use po ten tial of bi o tech n o l ogy, on the one hand, and the fastgrowing impact of bi o tech n o l ogy on the qu a l i ty of the human con d i ti on , on the other

h a n d . This implies that the opera ti on of the intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti on for the pro h i bi ti on

of bi o l ogical and toxin we a pons to be cre a ted under the futu re pro tocol wi ll have to be integra ted in the broader set of i n tern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti ons active in the va rious dimen s i on s

of s ec u ri ty, su ch as the World Health Orga n i z a ti on , theWorld Trade Orga n i z a ti on ,a n d

the Un i ted Na ti ons Devel opm ent Progra m m e .

2 4 Managing Technology Transfers
F i ve

The United Nations Special Commission

(UNSCOM) Experience

Jean Krasno is the asso ci a te dire ctor of Un i ted Na tions Studies at Ya l e , Yale Un ivers i ty, a n d

James S. Su t terlin is disti n g u i s h ed fell ow in the pro gra m . This proje ct eva l u a tes the experien ce of the Un i ted Na tions Spe cial Commission (UNSCOM) establ i s h ed to inve s ti ga te

and el i m i n a te Ira q’s we a pons of mass destru cti o n . There se a rch is ba sed on pri m a ry docum ents from the Un i ted Na tions and el sewh ere , as well as intervi ews with UNSCOM pa rti ci pa n t s , In tern a tional Atomic En ergy Agency (IAEA) staff, and ot h er involved pa rti e s .

The Security Council’s Unprecedented A c t i o n

In adopting Re s o luti on 687 on April 8, 1 9 9 1 , the Un i ted Na ti ons Sec u ri ty Council emb a rked on an unpreceden ted program to deprive perm a n en t ly, by force if n ece s s a ry, a

m em ber- s t a te of we a pons of mass de s tru cti on . Fo ll owing World Wa rs I and II, the vi ctors

el i m i n a ted or severely limited en ti re military establ i s h m ents of the defe a ted powers wi t ho ut the latters’ con s ent and wi t h o ut con cern for their soverei gn ty or, in most cases, t h ei r

borders . By con tra s t , in demanding the el i m i n a ti on of Ira q’s we a pons of mass de s tru c -

ti on (W M D ) , the Sec u ri ty Council acted on beh a l f not on ly of the vi ctors but also of a ll

m em ber- s t a te s , while at the same time affirming their com m on com m i tm ent “to the

s overei gn ty, terri torial integri ty and po l i tical indepen den ce . . . of Ira q .”

Un der the coerc i on of d i s a s trous defeat and the threat of ren ewed attack ,Iraq was

bro u ght to accept the terms of the Sec u ri ty Co u n c i l ’s re s o luti on . The case can therefore be

m ade that the con d i ti ons of pe ace were not “ i m po s ed ” as in the case of the Tre a ty of Vers a i ll e s .Yet the council made clear that, in adopting the punitive measu res of Re s o luti on

6 8 7 , it was acting under Ch a pter VII of the UN Ch a rter. Th ro u gh this acti on , the co u n c i l

decl a red , in ef fect , that the po s s e s s i on of we a pons of mass de s tru cti on by Iraq con s ti tuted ,

and would con ti nue to con s ti tute , a threat to intern a ti onal sec u ri ty. Fu rt h erm ore , by imp l i c a ti on ,the council would be ju s ti f i ed in taking forceful measu re s , in ad d i ti on to the

s a n cti ons alre ady in ef fect ,should Iraq fail to com p ly with the provi s i ons of the re s o luti on . What the re s o luti on did not do was to limit in any way the military force of Ira q

o t h er than its we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .

Re s o luti on 687, in its disarm a m ent provi s i on s , contains con trad i cti ons that were nece s s a ry for both its adopti on and its ef fectiveness but were de s ti n ed to cause probl ems if, a s

it tu rn ed out ,a ll of the obj ectives of the re s o luti on were not ex ped i ti o u s ly accom p l i s h ed .

The perm i t ted reten ti on by Iraq of a strong conven ti onal military force ref l ected the intent to all ow Iraq to maintain its indepen den ce , but hardly its soverei gn ty as prom i s ed in

the pre a m ble to Re s o luti on 687. Ira q’s con c u rren ce in the re s o luti on’s provi s i ons gave the

2 5

by

Jean Krasno

a n d

James S.

S u tt e r l i n
re s o luti on som ething of the qu a l i ty of a tre a ty agreem ent bet ween two parti e s , but it was

n o t , and is not, a tre a ty bet ween equ a l s .

These con trad i cti ons afforded Iraq en dless opportu n i ties to claim that va rious UNa ut h ori zed acti ons were in vi o l a ti on of its soverei gn ty that had been assu red by the Sec uri ty Co u n c i l . Ul ti m a tely, the con trad i cti on would en gen der de s tru ctive disagreem ent in

the council wh en the Un i ted States and the Un i ted Ki n gdom app l i ed military force wi t ho ut specific council en dors em ent in an ef fort to force Iraq to com p ly with disarm a m en t

provi s i ons to wh i ch it had earl i er agreed .

A Novel Disarmament Instrument

The va rious dep a rtm ents and agencies in Wa s h i n g ton that took the lead in set ting the

terms for a formal ce a s e - f i re with Iraq were determ i n ed to accomplish the perm a n en t

el i m i n a ti on of Ira q’s we a pons of mass de s tru cti on and, in the proce s s , to we a ken Sad d a m

Hu s s ei n’s po s i ti on to the gre a test ex tent po s s i bl e . Th ere was little unders t a n d i n g, h owever,

on how the Un i ted Na ti ons could fac i l i t a te these purpo s e s . The Am erican who knew be s t

h ow to go abo ut the probl em was the U. S . perm a n ent repre s en t a tive to the Un i ted Nati on s , Tom Pickeri n g. The task fell pri m a ri ly on him to draft and, toget h er with his Bri ti s h

co ll e a g u e , Sir David Ha n n ay, obtain agreem ent on the disarm a m ent provi s i ons of Re s o luti on 687 (Secti on C). It was a rem a rk a bly deft job given the lack of precedents and the

s po t ty, and som etimes false, i n form a ti on ava i l a ble in Wa s h i n g ton and other capitals on

the ex tent of Ira q’s WMD ars en a l . Th ere was wi de knowl ed ge that Iraq had a sign i f i c a n t

ch emical we a pons capac i ty and a su pp ly of l on g - ra n ge Scud missiles since Iraq had emp l oyed them both against its en em i e s . The De s ert Storm forces con clu ded — m i s t a ken ly —

that they had de s troyed most of the Scud missiles and ren dered harmless the main

ch emical we a pons install a ti on .The Un i ted States and pre su m a bly its NATO partn ers had

re a s on to su s pect that Iraq was trying to acqu i re a nu clear capac i ty, but they were unaw a re

of the progress that Saddam Hu s s ein had made tow a rd this goa l . Nothing was known of

Ira q’s bi o l ogical we a pons progra m .

It is rem a rk a ble that under these circ u m s t a n ces Secti on C of Re s o luti on 687 is so compreh en s ive and fore s i gh ted . The stru ctu re of UNSCOM is left vague and the rel a ti on s h i p

bet ween the IAEA and UNSCOM would seem to invi te fri cti on (as for a while it did).

However, t h ree essen tial obj ectives were accom p l i s h ed : (1) all we a pons of mass de s tru cti on to be el i m i n a ted were cl e a rly iden ti f i ed , wh et h er their ex i s ten ce was known or on ly

su s pected ; (2) UNSCOM, in the plan su bm i t ted by Sec ret a ry - G en eral Javi er Pérez de

Cu é llar as call ed for in Re s o luti on 687, was establ i s h ed with a ch a i rman having exec utive

powers , meaning he was free to make all essen tial dec i s i ons rega rding UNSCOM’s operati ons wi t h o ut con su l ting the other mem bers of the com m i s s i on ; and (3) the re s o luti on

de s i gn a tes the director- gen eral of the IAEA (not the IAEA as an or ga n i z a ti on) to carry out

the inspecti ons of Ira q’s decl a red nu clear capabi l i ties and any ad d i ti onal sites iden ti f i ed by

U N S C O M . Thus the director- gen eral was indepen dent of the geogra ph i c a lly repre s en t ative IAEA Boa rd of G overn ors and needed to work cl o s ely with UNSCOM since on ly

UNSCOM was aut h ori zed to iden tify undecl a red sites wh ere nu clear equ i pm ent might be

h i d den .

2 6 The UNSCOM Experience
UNSCOM as Model and Pre c e d e n t

UNSCOM devel oped a nu m ber of i n n ova tive con tri buti ons to the process of a rms control thro u gh tech n o l ogical means, rec ru i tm ent of ex pert s , and analytical met h odo l ogy.

For the inspecti on procedu re , the IAEA, because of its nu clear ex perti s e ,was ch a r ged wi t h

u n covering and de s troying Ira q’s nu clear we a pons capac i ty as decl a red by the Iraqi govern m ent and as iden ti f i ed by UNSCOM. Al t h o u gh it was pri m a ri ly re s pon s i ble for the

el i m i n a ti on of l on g - ra n ge missiles and ch emical and bi o l ogical we a pon s , UNSCOM (and

on ly UNSCOM) had the mandate to iden tify su s pect undecl a red sites for inspecti on .

Thus the IAEA was to a significant ex tent depen dent on , and su bord i n a te to, U N S C O M

in the search for nu clear we a pons and equ i pm en t .L i ke the assign m ent of the nu cl e a r

m a n d a te direct ly to the IAEA director- gen era l , this was done so that the IAEA’s Boa rd of

G overn ors would not be able to com promise the indepen den ce of the IAEA mission .

Because the missile del ivery sys tem tech n o l ogy of ten overl a pped with nu clear re s e a rch

and devel opm en t ,i n s pecti on teams of ten inclu ded both IAEA and UNSCOM pers on n el .

Coopera ti on was initi a lly preju d i ced by the low op i n i on wi dely held in UNSCOM of t h e

ef fectiveness of IAEA inspecti on procedu re s , wh i ch had failed to detect the divers i on of

nu clear fuel for military purpo s e s .The IAEA director- gen eral qu i ck ly ti gh ten ed procedu re s ,h owever, and the two or ga n i z a ti ons su b s equ en t ly worked ef fectively toget h er.

UNSCOM devel oped its own indepen dent In form a ti on As s e s s m ent Unit (IAU) at UN

He ad qu a rters in New York . Th ere UNSCOM staff m em bers were able to piece toget h er

f ra gm ents of i n form a ti on from myri ad sources and fit them bit by bit into a pictu re puzzle of Ira q’s ars enal of we a pons of mass de s tru cti on and its met h ods of con ce a l m ent and

decepti on . The UNSCOM opera ti onal process can best be de s c ri bed as falling into three

c a tegori e s :(1) the recepti on and or ga n i z a ti on of i n form a ti on from its own inspectors plu s

con tri buting source s ,i n cluding govern m en t s ,i n du s trial su pp l i ers , and defectors ;(2) the

uti l i z a ti on of technical means of i n form a ti on ga t h eri n g ; and (3) the analysis carri ed out

by UNSCOM’s IAU. Kn owl ed ge of Ira q’s WMD program improved as layers of i n form ati on acc u mu l a ted . UNSCOM invi ted the worl d ’s top ex perts on each aspect of we a pon -

i z a ti on to parti c i p a te in the inspecti on proce s s . This was the first time that su ch a poo l i n g

of ex pertise was bro u ght toget h er for arms con trol veri f i c a ti on . The first inspecti ons ever

u n dert a ken on bi o l ogical we a pons were carri ed out in Iraq under UNSCOM auspice s .

(The su pp ly of ex perts in this field was very limited.) 

UNSCOM devel oped a unique discovery and mon i toring proce s s . On the gro u n d ,

UNSCOM had its intern a ti onal teams of i n s pectors , wh i ch inclu ded ex perts ch o s en for

s pecific tasks, for ex a m p l e , missile and ch emical or bi o l ogicalwe a pons inspecti on s . Hel icopters were used to back up the inspecti ons with aerial ph o togra phy, vi deo t a p i n g, a n d

re a l - time over- s i te vi s i bi l i ty to keep ground inspectors inform ed on movem ents aro u n d

the site in the event that material was being rem oved . In ad d i ti on to the technical means

provi ded by the hel i copters , UNSCOM obt a i n ed the servi ces of U. S . - opera ted U2 planes

with high - a l ti tu de ph o togra phy, wh i ch of fered gre a ter geogra phic covera ge and an el em ent of u n pred i ct a bi l i ty not provi ded by the low - f lying hel i copters (even though the U2

f l i ghts were decl a red in adva n ce ) . The U2 ph o togra phs provi ded high ly revealing inform a ti on on WMD install a ti ons and on the movem ent of suspicious obj ects before and after a visit by the inspectors .

The UNSCOM Experience 2 7
A fo u rth layer of i n form a ti on came from satell i te imagi n g, wh i ch of fered a very wi de

vi sual field as well as gre a ter unpred i ct a bi l i ty and sec rec y.It was difficult for the Iraqis to

k n ow wh en a satell i te would be flying over and thus wh en they should hide their movem en t s . U. S . su pport and coopera ti on were essen tial for the U2 ph o togra phy as well as the

s a tell i te inform a ti on and, in fact , the Am ericans were the on ly oneswi lling and able to

provi de this back u p.While the Un i ted States alw ays flew the U2 mission s , the planes were

de s i gn a ted as UN property. UNSCOM was able to set the tasks for the overf l i gh t s . Th e

Un i ted States would hand over the prints and later the ro lls of film to UNSCOM for

a n a lysis by their ex pert s , a process in wh i ch Is raeli intell i gen ce was even tu a lly inclu ded ,

l e ading to su b s t a n tial ben ef i t . Sa tell i te imagery was ex trem ely useful and could be downl oaded at the Ba h rain “G a tew ay ” cen ter run by the Un i ted State s , the Un i ted Ki n gdom ,

and Au s tra l i a . Di s tri buti on was stri ct ly limited ,h owever, to the exec utive ch a i rm a n , te a m

l e aders , and U. S .s t a f f m em bers . The satell i te ph o togra phs were held under U. S . con tro l

and could not be carri ed into Iraq by inspecti on te a m s . If UNSCOM saw som ething od d

in a satell i te or U2 ph o to, it could send hel i copters in for a cl o s er loo k . All this was uniqu e

to UNSCOM.

UNSCOM built on - s i te labora tories to test ch emical and bi o l ogical su b s t a n ces and

o t h er materials in a ti m ely manner. Some materials were sent to a labora tory in Ba h ra i n

for analysis and to high ly soph i s ti c a ted labora tories in Ru s s i a ,the Un i ted State s , and el s ewh ere for more sen s i tive te s ti n g.UNSCOM became the preem i n ent source of ex perti s e

on Ira q . Because of t h eir acc u mu l a ted knowl ed ge and ex peri en ce , the ex perts in New York

k n ew what to look for in the ph o tos and what qu e s ti ons to ask ob s ervers and defectors .

Iraq had cre a ted an ex tra ord i n a ry mechanism of con ce a l m en t , and UNSCOM had to inn ova te con s t a n t ly in order to ferret out Ira q’s sec ret materials and progra m s .

The Significance of Intelligence

Un der Re s o luti on 687, Iraq was requ i red to decl a re the loc a ti on , type s , and amounts of a ll

ch emical and bi o l ogical we a pon s ;a ll stocks of a gen t s ; a ll rel a ted su b s ys tems and com pon en t s ;a ll re s e a rch devel opm en t , su pport , and manu f actu ring fac i l i ti e s ;a ll ball i s tic missiles

with a ra n ge gre a ter than 150 kilom eters and rel a ted part s , rep a i r, and produ cti on fac i l iti e s ; and all of its nu clear capabi l i ti e s . It was wi dely ex pected that Iraq would make the

n ece s s a ry decl a ra ti ons in good faith, in order to be free of on erous econ omic sancti on s ,

and the inspecti on and de s tru cti on tasks of UNSCOM and the IAEA could be ex ped iti o u s ly accom p l i s h ed . Non et h el e s s , Am b a s s ador Ro l f E keu s , the first exec utive ch a i rm a n

of U N S C O M , very early recogn i zed that the va l i d i ty of Ira q’s statem ents would need to be

con f i rm ed .As one of his first acts he sent inqu i ries to more than one hu n d red mem bers t a tes asking for any inform a ti on they might have rel a ting to the pre s en ce of we a pons of

mass de s tru cti on in Ira q . UNSCOM was to have an ever- i n c reasing need for su ch “ i n form a ti on ,” as it became app a rent that Iraq was intent on decepti on and con ce a l m ent wi t h

the evi dent intent of pre s erving a WMD capac i ty. For UNSCOM’s purpo s e s ,“ i n form ati on”qu i ck ly became indisti n g u i s h a ble from “ i n tell i gen ce .”

In ad d i ti on to the intell i gen ce sources men ti on ed earl i er, UNSCOM had access to el ectronic intercept s . The mass of i n form a ti on from all these sources was pieced toget h er to

provi de the leads for the UNSCOM teams to fo ll ow in pursuit of t h eir mission s . The 

2 8 The UNSCOM Experience
UNSCOM opera ti on en t a i l ed three broad tasks. The firs t , wh i ch was dominant du ri n g

most of U N S C O M ’s history, was to search out hidden we a pon s , su pp l i e s , and equ i pm en t ;

to de s troy what had not alre ady been de s troyed ; and to com p ute on the basis of t h e s e

f i n d i n gs and ava i l a ble intell i gen ce what rem a i n ed unacco u n ted for. The second and more

con troversial mission was thro u gh intru s ive and caref u lly aimed incurs i ons to iden tify the

con ce a l m ent mechanism used by Saddam Hu s s ein and to prove that con ce a l m ent and decepti on con ti nu ed . The third mission was to establish a mon i toring sys tem that wo u l d

perm a n en t ly prevent Iraq from devel oping or acqu i ring we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .

Wh en the Iraqi repre s en t a tive asserted in the Sec u ri ty Council that in repe a ted raids led

by Scott Ri t ter, nothing incri m i n a ting had been fo u n d , he was correct . The purpo s e ,h owever, h ad of ten been not to captu re material but to force the hasty rem oval of tell t a l e

equ i pm en t ,l i ke ra bbits from a lair, in order to ob s erve , of ten by hel i copter, what was rem oved and by wh om .An o t h er obj ective was to find out ,i f po s s i bl e ,h ow the Iraqis may

h ave learn ed abo ut the raid in adva n ce .

The use of i n tell i gen ce from every ava i l a ble source in pursuit of the mandates def i n ed

for UNSCOM and the IAEA in Re s o luti on 687 was so paten t ly ju s ti f i ed that it was ra rely

su bj ect to cri ticism in the Un i ted Na ti ons (except by the Ira q i s ) .Claims that UNSCOM

was being used by govern m en t s ,p a rti c u l a rly the Un i ted State s ,to ga t h er intell i gen ce for

t h eir nati onal purposes po s ed a far more serious probl em and con tri buted ulti m a tely to

a loss of con f i den ce in UNSCOM that the aut h ors bel i eve was unju s ti f i ed .Yet it was also

prob a bly inevi t a bl e .

A nu m ber of qu e s ti ons need to be answered :

wDid some UNSCOM technical ex perts come from U. S . or other intell i gen ce agencies? The answer is ye s . The exec utive ch a i rman needed tra i n ed technicians in rel atively exo tic fiel d s . These ex perts were ava i l a ble on ly from co u n tries su ch as the

Un i ted State s , Ru s s i a , Fra n ce , Sweden , and the Un i ted Ki n gdom that were tech n i -

c a lly adva n ced in these fields and (unlike some) wi lling to admit it. Su ch ex pert s

h ad almost inevi t a bly spent some time in one or another intell i gen ce or defen s e

a gen c y, a l t h o u gh their main em p l oym ent may have been in univers i ties or re s e a rch

i n s ti tute s .

wWere su ch ex perts spec i f i c a lly placed in UNSCOM to spy for their govern m en t s ?

According to our re s e a rch , the answer is, with very few po s s i ble excepti on s ,n o.

wDid the exec utive ch a i rman of UNSCOM caref u lly eva lu a te each technical ex pert

su pp l i ed to him to determine wh et h er he or she had ever had an intell i gen ce background? The answer again is no. Am b a s s ador Ro l f E keu s , to the ex tent po s s i bl e ,

chose pers ons with wh om he was pers on a lly acqu a i n ted , of wh i ch there were many

because of his back ground in disarm a m en t . But as the opera ti on became larger and

the technical requ i rem ents more com p l ex , this became less and less po s s i bl e . He

accepted pers ons of proven technical capac i ty and ex pected they would be loyal to

U N S C O M , rega rdless of previous assoc i a ti on s , in accord a n ce with the undert a k i n g

t h ey made on reporting for duty.

The UNSCOM Experience 2 9
wDid the ex perts working with UNSCOM, in the co u rse of t h eir duti e s , acqu i re inform a ti on that was ex tra n eous to the UNSCOM mandate but of su b s t a n tial interest to

n a ti onal govern m ents? The answer is obvi o u s ly ye s . If , as was the case, it was determ i n ed that Saddam Hu s s ei n’s Rep u blican Gu a rd was cen tral to Saddam Hu s s ei n’s

con ce a l m ent mech a n i s m , it was cl e a rly de s i ra ble to know wh ere the Gu a rd was at

a ny given ti m e , who was in ch a r ge of s pecific mission s , and wh ere its head qu a rters

were loc a ted . Su ch inform a ti on could be va lu a ble for purposes other than the discovery of we a pons of mass de s tru cti on . So could the con tent and layo ut of the soc a ll ed pre s i den tial palace s , for ex a m p l e . So could su ch an obvious thing as the

amount of de s tru cti on that re su l ted from the bom bing in De s ert Storm . Su ch inform a ti on was not inclu ded in the reports that UNSCOM su bm i t ted to the Sec u ri ty

Co u n c i l . A nu m ber of UNSCOM staff h ave stated that it was reported back to

n a ti onal aut h ori ties of s everal co u n tries as a matter of co u rs e . We do not do u bt it.

wDid the Un i ted States seek to uti l i ze UNSCOM to obtain inform a ti on to assassinate

Saddam Hu s s ein? The aut h ors have found nothing cred i ble to su b s t a n ti a te the cl a i m

that the Un i ted States sought inform a ti on from Am ericans or other nati onals in

UNSCOM to use in targeting Saddam Hu s s ein or to underm i n e , in other ways ,h i s

regi m e .

wWere nati onal govern m ents able to gain inform a ti on from com mu n i c a ti on intercept

devi ces planted as part of the UNSCOM opera ti on? The Un i ted States reportedly

tri ed but wi t h o ut mu ch su cce s s .

U N S C O M ’s Heritage

The UNSCOM-IAEA mission was limited to the el i m i n a ti on of Ira q’s capabi l i ty to maint a i n , produ ce , or acqu i re we a pons of mass de s tru cti on . To an impre s s ive ex ten t , this miss i on was accom p l i s h ed . A full account of we a pons and materi el de s troyed may be fo u n d

in the UNSCOM report of Ja nu a ry 29, 1 9 9 9 , a report of 234 pages (S/1999/94). The fo ll owing su m m a ry list gives an idea of U N S C O M ’s impact :

wMi s s i l e s : 48 opera ti onal lon g - ra n ge missiles; 14 conven ti onal missile warh e ad s ;

6 opera ti onal mobile launch ers ; 28 opera ti onal fixed launch pad s ; 32 fixed launch

p ad s ; 30 ch emical warh e ad s ; a va ri ety of a s s em bl ed and non a s s em bl ed “su per- g u n”

com pon en t s .

wCh emical wea pon s : 38,537 fill ed and em pty ch emical mu n i ti on s ; 690 tons of ch em i c a l

we a pons agen t s ;m ore than 3,000 tons of prec u rs ors ch em i c a l s ; 426 pieces of ch em i c a l

we a pons produ cti on equ i pm en t ; 91 pieces of rel a ted analytical instru m en t s . Iraq was

forced to admit that it had produ ced as mu ch as 4 tons of the de adly V X ,one of the most

toxic ch emical we a pon s , and had placed a sti ll unknown qu a n ti ty in del ivery sys tem s .

wBi o l ogical wea pon s : the en ti re main bi o l ogical we a pons produ cti on fac i l i ty plus a

va ri ety of bi o l ogical we a pons produ cti on equ i pm ent and materi a l s .

wNu cl ear wea pon s :the IAEA has con clu ded that the military nu clear capabi l i ty of

Iraq has been el i m i n a ted .

3 0 The UNSCOM Experience
This list does not take into account the large qu a n ti ty of we a pons and equ i pm ent that

Iraq de s troyed to prevent it from falling into UNSCOM hands. The UNSCOM-IAEA opera ti on , in bri ef , has left Iraq a va s t ly we a ken ed military power wi t h , for the pre sen t , i n su ff i c i ent access to we a pons of mass de s tru cti on to pose a threat to intern a ti onal sec u ri ty.

De s p i te these accom p l i s h m en t s ,s erious con cerns rem a i n .Iraq claims to have independen t ly de s troyed a specific nu m ber of its lon g - ra n ge missiles. Proof has not been fo u n d

that all were el i m i n a ted .A nu m ber remain unacco u n ted for. In ad d i ti on , Iraq is bel i eved

to retain several tons of VX and VX ingred i ents and a capac i ty to produ ce other forms of

ch emical and bi o l ogical we a pon s . The perm a n ent mon i toring sys tem that UNSCOM put

l a r gely in place to en su re that Iraq does not again em b a rk on a WMD program bec a m e

i n opera tive on ce UN inspectors were preven ted from en tering Ira q . Thu s , this one aspect

of the arms con trol provi s i ons of Re s o luti on 687 is not being met , wh i ch could pose grave

d a n gers for the futu re .

C o n c l u s i o n

As a UN opera ti on , UNSCOM dem on s tra ted that, u n der proper leaders h i p, an intern ati onal staff with adva n ced technical ex pertise can be assem bl ed ex ped i ti o u s ly and that a

su bord i n a te or ga n i z a ti on establ i s h ed by the Sec u ri ty Council (Arti cle 29 of the UN Ch a rter) can opera te with a high degree of i n depen den ce . The appoi n tm ent of an exec utive

ch a i rman to head su ch a su bord i n a te body can be high ly instru ctive for futu re opera ti on s .

Fu rt h erm ore , UNSCOM dem on s tra ted that to accomplish an agreed - on obj ective ,

m em ber- s t a tes wi ll provi de sen s i tive intell i gen ce material and that a UN or ga n i z a ti on

can handle su ch material with full discreti on .

Th ere were prerequ i s i tes for UNSCOM’s su cce s s .F i rst and forem o s t ,its nece s s a ri ly intru s ive

opera ti ons could be carri ed out on ly in a co u n try with severely limited capac i ty to re s i s t .Equ a lly

i m port a n t ,t h ere must be su f f i c i ent unanimity among the perm a n ent mem bers of the Sec u ri ty

Council to obvi a te the exercise by any one of t h em of t h eir veto ri gh t .In ad d i ti on ,t h ere must be

broad ,i f not to t a l , su pport for the undertaking among the non perm a n ent mem bers .F in a lly, the opera ti on must be under stron g, s k i llful leaders h i p. If a ny one of these prerequ is i tes we a ken s , the opera ti on wi ll be preju d i ced .This is what happen ed to UNSCOM.Th e

perm a n ent mem bers of the council ulti m a tely disagreed on the app l i c a ti on of en forcem en t

m e a su res and on the met h odo l ogy of i n s pecti on s . Su pport among other mem bers faltered ,

in part because of the adverse hu m a n i t a rian ef fect of econ omic sancti on s , in part bec a u s e

of su s p i c i ons that one or more states were using UNSCOM for nati onal purpo s e s , and in

p a rt because of the military acti ons by the Un i ted States and the Un i ted Ki n gdom in su pport of U N S C O M . A ch a n ge in UNSCOM leadership en gen dered con troversy within and

o ut s i de the opera ti on . Taking adva n t a ge of these circ u m s t a n ce s , Iraq found means to re s i s t

com p l eti on of m e a su res to wh i ch it had agreed in accepting Re s o luti on 687.

It is do u btful wh et h er the prerequ i s i tes that perm i t ted the establ i s h m ent of U N S C O M

and its impre s s ive accom p l i s h m ents can be re s tored .The or ga n i z a ti on establ i s h ed to su cceed UNSCOM has not been able to begin opera ti ons in Ira q . Yet while UNSCOM co u l d

not com p l ete its mission and may never be du p l i c a ted , its or ga n i z a ti on , opera ti onal procedu re s , and the tech n i ques and technical means of a rms con trol that it devel oped wi ll remain significant and can provi de useful lessons wh en futu re circ u m s t a n ces requ i re .

The UNSCOM Experience 3 1
3 2

Part II: Regional Contexts to 

N o n p ro l i f e r a t i o n

S i x

Nuclear Command and Control in South A s i a

Shaun Grego ry is senior lectu rer in pe a ce studies at the Un ivers i ty of B ra d fo rd in the

Un i ted Ki n g d o m . This proje ct co n s i d ers the state of command and co n trolcapa bi l i ties in

S outh Asia in a co m preh en s ive fashion, d rawing on intervi ews in India and Pakistan wi t h

m i l i t a ry, pol i ti c a l , te ch n i c a l , and academic perso n n el and on ot h er pri m a ry sou rce s .

N u c l e a r i z ation in South Asia and the Question of Stability 

The level of i n tern a ti onal atten ti on foc u s ed on So uth Asia in the wake of the 1998 In d i a n

and Pakistan nu clear we a pons tests provi des evi den ce that the risks of the use of nu cl e a r

we a pons or even nu clear war are wi dely perceived to be genu i n e . Mu ch intern a ti onal anxiety

has crys t a ll i zed around a percepti on of India and Pakistan and their re s pective nu clear programs that seems tailor- m ade to underline the disti n cti ons bet ween the ack n owl ed ged nuclear powers (the N-5 — the Un i ted State s , Ru s s i a ,Ch i n a , the Un i ted Ki n gdom ,and Fra n ce )

and the So uth Asian nu clear “u p s t a rt s .”Loo s ely sketch ed , this percepti on is one of econ om ic a lly, po l i ti c a lly, and tech n o l ogi c a lly limited states stru ggling to come to terms with the novel ty of m a n a ging nu clear we a pons tech n o l ogy in the con text of rh etorical hosti l i ty, a history

of bi l a teral warf a re , and a degree of po l i tical instabi l i ty on both side s ,overs h adowed by the

ti n derbox of the on going terri torial and soverei gn ty con f l i ct in the con te s ted regi on of Ka s hm i r. India is ch a racteri zed as incre a s i n gly assertive and casu a lly indifferent to the sec u ri ty of

its su bcon ti n ental nei gh bors ; Pakistan as unstable and risk taking. Wh en India and Pa k i s t a n

a re vi ewed in this way, it is difficult to see how a stable bi l a teral deterrent rel a ti onship can

em er ge and com p a ra tively easy to con ju re up a mu l ti tu de of su perf i c i a lly plausible scen a ri o s

by wh i ch So uth Asia could de s cend ra p i dly into nu clear ch a o s .

In many important re s pects this analysis oversimplifies the situ a ti on ,p ays insu f f i c i ent atten ti on to balancing factors , and smu ggles in a nu m ber of u n fo u n ded assu m pti on s . Le avi n g

a s i de su ch qu e s ti ons as wh et h er ei t h er state ought to divert precious re s o u rces to nu cl e a r

we a pons given the needs of t h eir re s pective peoples or the implicati ons of In do - Pa k i s t a n i

pro l i fera ti on for the Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) , the point at issue here is

wh et h er a stable nu clear rel a ti onship can be con s tru cted in So uth As i a .

Mu ch of the answer to this qu e s ti on rests on wh et h er robust command and con trol (C2)

a rra n gem ents can be put into place to meet the requ i rem ents of s t a ble deterren ce . These are

pri m a ri ly assu red high - l evel (prefera bly po l i tical) con trol of nu clear force s ; the preven ti on of

acc i den t a l ,i rra ti on a l , or unaut h ori zed use of nu clear we a pon s ; the assu ra n ce of nu cl e a r

by

Shaun Gregory
we a pons opera ti ons to meet the requ i rem ents of s tra tegy; and arra n gem ents for escalati on

con trol and nu clear war term i n a ti on . Re s e a rch on this is scanty and there is little publ i s h ed

m a terial to draw on ,a l t h o u gh interest is cl e a rly ri s i n g.

Evi den ce from the regi on su ggests that these requ i rem ents can be met and that most are

pre s en t ly in the process of being met on both side s . This does not mean there are no ri s k s ,

ga p s , or po ten tial instabi l i ti e s , but it does su ggest that the nu clear situ a ti on is more stabl e

and the probl ems more su btle (though no less demanding) than the foregoing simplificati ons all ow.

E volution of India’s and Pa k i s t a n ’s Nuclear Po s t u re s

The idea that India and Pakistan are new nu clear states is mislead i n g. Both have had civi l

nu clear programs since the 1950s, India deton a ted a nu clear devi ce in 1974, and both In d i a

and Pakistan we a pon i zed their nu clear devi ces in the late 1980s.The tests in 1998 therefore

repre s ent an important step in the evo luti on of the bi l a teral nu clear rel a ti onship but not the

geopo l i tical tra n s form a ti on some have argued .Con s equ en t ly both parties have alre ady

m a n a ged a functi onal bi l a teral nu clear rel a ti onship for more than a dec ade and have steered

this rel a ti onship thro u gh the crises of the 1990s, i n cluding the serious conven ti onal con f l i ct

a round the Ka s h m i ri town of Ka r gil bet ween May and Ju ly 1999 that began wh en two thousand Pakistani militants cro s s ed the Line of Con trol into Indian terri tory.

Secon d ,while hostile rh etoric ref l ects bi l a teral ten s i ons and also serves nati onal po l i ti c a l

p u rpo s e s , it may con tri bute to deterren ce thro u gh threat and ambi g u i ty and undo u btedly

d raws intern a ti onal po l i tical atten ti on .More import a n t , it also masks the true degree of pol i tical and military realism in the re s pective nati onal el i tes and ob s c u res the ex tent of bi l a teral po l i tical and military dialogue in place (albeit su s pen ded tem pora ri ly in the wake of

Ka r gi l ) .

Th i rd ,it is evi dent that in ad d i ti on to direct technical assistance both India and Pa k i s t a n

h ave ben ef i ted gre a t ly from ref l ecti on on the ex peri en ces of the N-5 powers as they em er ged

as stable nu clear states in circ u m s t a n ces that in almost all re s pects were tech n i c a lly inferi or

to those of l a te - t wen ti et h - cen tu ry India and Pa k i s t a n .This ref l ecti on en compasses a ri ch understanding of nu clear deterren ce , nu clear doctri n e ,s tra tegy,po s tu re , command and con tro l

a rra n gem ents and the role of a rms con trol and con f i den ce - building measu re s . It su gge s t s

that while India and Pakistan may not escape all the em er gent nu clear probl ems en co u ntered by the N-5, n ei t h er are they doom ed to repeat them .

L a s t , and perhaps most sign i f i c a n t , both states have shown con s i dera ble skill in fashioning a nu clear po s tu re and command and con trol arra n gem ents in line with the limits of

t h eir nati onal con d i ti on s .With rel a tively few nu clear we a pons in their re s pective nu clear ars en a l s ,the two states have esch ewed el a bora te doctrine and stra tegy and prem i s ed deterren ce on assu red ret a l i a ti on and co u n ter- c i ty targeti n g.India has open ly decl a red a

n o - f i rst-use policy of m ore than rh etorical va lue and, while Pakistan keeps this opti on open ,

both states have rej ected nu clear war- f i gh ting opti ons as provoc a tive ,e s c a l a tory, and beyon d

t h eir deterren ce need s .

The simplificati on of t h eir nu clear po s tu res in this manner has gre a t ly redu ced the demands on Indian and Pakistani command and con trol arra n gem en t s .Both state s ,f ac i n g

t h em a tic ch a ll en ges similar to those of the N-5, a re devel oping Am eri c a n - s tyle hiera rch i c a l

Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia 3 3
C2 sys tems(though minus the po l i tical el em ent in Pa k i s t a n’s case).However, given that

t h ere is no need for the com p l ex targeting and precise escalati on con trol of ,for ex a m p l e ,

NATO’s flex i ble re s pon s e ; given that missile flight times to city targets are a matter of s i x

m i nutes or less; and given that assu red ret a l i a ti on is underwri t ten in the med ium term by

d i s pers a l ,decoys , and redundant com mu n i c a ti on sys tem s ,m a ny of the more demanding C2

ch a ll en ges su ch as stra tegic and tactical warn i n g, maintaining high levels of a l ert , and provis i ons for launch - on - w a rning or launch - u n der- a t t ack are peri ph eral or simply irrel eva n t .

Moreover, in these circ u m s t a n ces key C2 requ i rem ents su ch as the impo s i ti on of h i gh - l evel

con trol can be ad d re s s ed by rel a tively low - tech procedu ral means su ch as the two - pers on

rule (rei n forced by command aut h ori ty sep a ra ti on) and the ex ped i ent of keeping warh e ad s

and del ivery sys tems sep a ra ted until requ i red .

Su ch measu res also ad d ress many of the anxieties abo ut acc i den t a l ,i rra ti on a l ,and unaut h ori zed use, relyi n g,as does the Un i ted Ki n gdom , on the integri ty and obed i en ce

of of f i cers ,the sep a ra ti on of procedu re s , ch ecks to con trol those with access to nu cl e a r

we a pon s , and the requ i rem ent for the co ll a bora ti on of mu l tiple indivi duals to carry out nuclear activi ti e s . The of t - repe a ted regi onal demand for N-5 assistance with perm i s s ive acti on

link or PA L- type tech n o l ogy to stren g t h en high - l evel con trol trades on intern a ti onal anxiety

and derives largely from the legi ti m acy that would be tra n s ferred to India and Pakistan wi t h

su ch tech n o l ogy (assuming a way around the NPT could be found) ra t h er than from a

pressing technical need . Meeting the opera ti onal requ i rem ents of nu clear first-use make s

few ri gorous demands on command and con tro l ,n or does measu red ret a l i a ti on ,s i n ce neit h er side can be con f i dent of dec a p i t a ting or even sign i f i c a n t ly degrading the other ’s nu cl e a r

i n f ra s tru ctu re .

The Dynamics of Escalation 

The claim that Kashmir or a crisis like Ka r gil could provi de the spark for the use of nu cl e a r

we a pons or even nu clear war is usu a lly prem i s ed on many easy assu m pti ons abo ut the dynamics of e s c a l a ti on from a low - l evel con f l i ct to a cro s s - border war and from a cro s s - border

war to crossing the nu clear thre s h o l d .In fact the history of con f l i cts bet ween India and Pa kistan shows a high degree of i n trawar escalati on con tro l , a repe a ted propen s i ty to bi l a tera l

po l i tical and military dialogue to contain con f l i ct , and an avers i on to sys tem a ti c a lly attack i n g

c ivilian targets (wh i ch both Indians and Pakistanis con trast with We s tern practi ce evi den ced

f rom Gu ernica in the 1930s via Dre s den ,Hi ro s h i m a , and Vi etnam to Serbia in 1999).In the

nu cl e a ri zed con text since the late 1980s the evi den ce su ggests gre a ter cauti on sti ll in con t a i ning con f l i cts at the lower level s , a point of ten overl oo ked wh en Ka r gil is pre s en ted as eviden ce that nu clear we a pons do not con s train conven ti onal con f l i ct .

At least three other factors have to be ad ded to this analys i s : (1) the noti on that the assu red mutual de s tru cti on of c i ties (in Pakistan there are but three target s : Is l a m a b ad /

Raw a l p i n d i ,L a h ore , andKa rachi) is a powerful deterrent against nu clear risk taking; (2) the

dem ogra phic re a l i ties that parti ti on in 1947 divi ded families and peop l e s , and that there are

m ore Muslims in India than in Pa k i s t a n ,with all that this implies abo ut the threat of ei t h er

to the pop u l a ti on of the other; and (3) the sen ti m en t , wi dely ex pre s s ed in the regi on , that a

s erious war with even a wh i f f of s erious nu clear risk would bring the intern a ti onal com mun i ty and parti c u l a rly the Un i ted States swi f t ly into the situ a ti on . This third factor indeed may

3 4 Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia
be a core el em ent of Pa k i s t a n’s nu clear policy (mu ch as it was of So uth Af ri c a’s in the 1980s),

and may help to explain its refusal to rule out firs t - u s e .

This analysis does not mean that there is no risk of nu clear use or nu clear war in So ut h

Asia or that there is no risk of e s c a l a ti on from the conven ti onal to the nu clear level .It doe s ,

h owever,su ggest that re s e a rch and the prom o ti on of bi l a teral dialogue and stabi l i ty in the

regi on should seek to avoid the assu m pti ons and simplificati ons that ob s c u re many of t h e

regi on’s real nu clear uncert a i n ti e s . From this proj ect’s prel i m i n a ry work in the regi on there

a ppear to be at least six issues that nei t h er overs t a te the probl ems nor unders t a te the ri s k s .

1 .Bi l a teral percepti on s .A clear ob s t acle to ach i eving a stable nu clear rel a ti onship is the

po l a ri zed percepti on of the other evi dent in each state . For In d i a , the locus of nu cl e a r

risk lies in the Pakistani military. It is seen as undem oc ra tic and thus unacco u n t a bl e

po l i ti c a lly for its acti ons and insu l a ted in important re s pects from the wi der, and by

i m p l i c a ti on more level - h e aded , el i te disco u rse in Pa k i s t a n . It is seen also as risk taking

in su pporting Kashmir sep a ra tism and regi onal “terrori s m” and in its past history of

going to war with India de s p i te the prepon dera n ce of Indian military power. Th e

t h reat for India is thus that the Pakistani military may initi a te an overa m bi tious conven ti onal con f l i ct that it su b s equ en t ly feels it has to defend by nu clear means.

For Pa k i s t a n , the locus of nu clear risk lies in an incre a s i n gly hard-line and assertive

India con f i dent of growing U. S . su pport (not least in rel a ti on to China and the

Muslim world) and thus prep a red to exercise conven ti onal and nu clear pre s su re on its

n ei gh bors in a process of regi onal “ F i n l a n d i z a ti on .”As the underlying fundamen t a l s

f avor In d i a , and as In d i a’s nu clear we a pons program is less thre a ten ed by intern a ti on a l

s a n cti ons than that of Pa k i s t a n , the fear of the latter is that it may be su bj ect to conven ti onal and nu clear bl ackmail and thus forced to defend its vital interests to the

point of a nu clear exch a n ge .

The core issue here is that these pers pectives point up the po l a ri z a ti on of bi l a teral percepti ons and thus provi de insight into the ri gi d i ty of the re s pective internal deb a tes that make cre a tive thinking difficult and the implem en t a ti on of n ovel

i deas even harder.

2 .Percepti ons of ri s k . A rel a ted issue is that at pre s ent there appear to be on ly limited

regi onal percepti ons of the shared bi l a teral risks of nu clear war (notwi t h s t a n d i n g

s ome rel evant bi l a teral agreem ents and el em ents of the pre s en t ly su s pen ded Lahore

Decl a ra ti on) and thus little recogn i ti on of the need to rec a l i bra te other nati onal stra tegic pri ori ti e s — n a ti onal defense and Kashmir in particular—in rel a ti on to the overri ding stra tegic impera tive of avoiding nu clear war.The issue is com p l i c a ted furt h er by

the asym m etry bet ween Pa k i s t a n’s preocc u p a ti on with India in its sec u ri ty thinking

and In d i a’s focus on a ra n ge of s ec u ri ty qu e s ti on s , of wh i ch Pakistan is but on e .

3 .Command and con trol ch a ll en ge s .De s p i te learning from the ex peri en ce of the N-5,

both India and Pakistan sti ll face the technical ch a ll en ges of devel op i n g, dep l oyi n g,

and maintaining a robust nu clear command and con trol sys tem in a novel envi ronm en t . Su ch ch a ll en ges inclu de the costs of p aying for adequ a te sys tem s , phasing in the

s ys tems wi t h o ut cre a ting instabi l i ties or vu l n era bi l i ti e s ,h a n dling tra n s i ti onal failu re s

and malfuncti ons before sys tems become rel i a bly opera ti onal in situ , and sys tem

Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia 3 5
i m p l em en t a ti on in the con text of a degree of i n f ra s tru ctu re fra gi l i ty evi den ced , for

ex a m p l e , in both co u n tri e s’ i n term i t ten t ly functi oning power and tel ecom mu n i c a ti on s

s ys tem s .

4 .Civi l - m i l i t a ry rel a ti on s .A furt h er ten s i on bet ween India and Pakistan is the oppo s i n g

ch a ll en ges each faces in moving tow a rd an appropri a te civi l - m i l i t a ry balance in the

m a n a gem ent of nu clear force s . For Pakistan the task in the con text of the military

dom i n a n ce of nu clear we a pons is one of “c ivi l i a n i z a ti on ,” that is, bri n ging po l i tical el em ents into nu clear dec i s i on making and implem en t a ti on in a manner that properly

ref l ects the public good and the wi ll of the peop l e . For In d i a , the task is ef fectively the

revers e : to “m i l i t a ri ze” a nu clear po s tu re that at pre s ent is dom i n a ted by the governm ent and civil or ga n i z a ti ons to en su re that the military is fully integra ted in nu cl e a r

dec i s i on making and fully functi onal opera ti on a lly.

5 . Dyadic co u p l i n g . Th ere appe a rs as yet to be little accept a n ce of the idea that in a conf l i ctual con text the nu clear we a pons of t wo pro t a gonists become in certain re s pect s

co u p l ed with one another, not least thro u gh the interacti on of t h eir re s pective command and con trol sys tem s . Con s equ en t ly it is appropri a te in rel a ti on to some issues to

con ceptu a l i ze the situ a ti on not as two nati onal sys tems but as one co u p l ed dyadic system . The accept a n ce of this idea has important implicati ons for nati onal sys tems and

bi l a teral dialogue and managem en t , while its negl ect carries risks of u n ex pected and

po ten ti a lly de s t a bilizing interacti on .

6 . E s c a l a ti on con tro l . No t withstanding the arguments against rapid or inevi t a ble escalati on to the nu clear level in the event of conven ti onal con f l i ct ,t h ere remain escalati on

i s sues around the perform a n ce and vu l n era bi l i ty of command and con trol sys tems in

the con text of a serious conven ti onal con f l i ct as the con tro l - re adiness trade - of f s h i f t s

tow a rd the po s s i bi l i ty of nu clear use. One important point is the risk that the dep l oym ent of nu clear we a pons and the command and con trol sys tems to su pport them

m ay erode the “d i s t a n ce” bet ween low - l evel con f l i ct and the po s s i bi l i ty of nu clear use

( su ch an ero s i on could occ u r, for ex a m p l e ,i f lu c ra tive nu clear target s — su ch as stora ge

f ac i l i ties or cri tical C2 node s — were vu l n era ble to preem ptive conven ti onal or nu cl e a r

s tri ke ) . A second point is an evi dent lack of regi onal atten ti on to de - e s c a l a ti on and war

term i n a ti on , both of wh i ch requ i re preplanning and bi l a teral provi s i ons if t h ere is to

be any con f i den ce in their ef f i c acy du ring a con f l i ct or fo ll owing nu clear use.

In su m , these issues add up to a form i d a ble ch a ll en ge for India and Pa k i s t a n , and for the

i n tern a ti onal com mu n i ty hamstrung by the provi s i ons of the NPT and by the need to avoi d

being seen to legi ti m i ze nu clear pro l i fera ti on . Su ch issues nevert h eless demand urgent attenti on . Ma ny regi onal com m en t a tors on both sides now see a con f lu en ce of f actors — i n clu ding the release of Ka s h m i ri leaders fo ll owing the Air India hijacking around wh om a more

con certed push for Ka s h m i ri indepen den ce may coa l e s ce , a growing instabi l i ty in Pakistan as

the military govern m ent stru ggles to meet the co u n try ’s econ omic and po l i tical need s , and a

h a rdening of the Indian atti tu de in see k i n g,in the wake of Ka r gi l ,to impose high er costs on

Pakistan for “adven tu ri s m” — posing the real risk of a dangerous con f ron t a ti on bet ween India and Pakistan in the near term .

S eve n

3 6 Nuclear Command and Control in South Asia
S eve n

I ran and Nuclear We a p o n s

The Road Ahead

Ge of f rey Kemp is the dire ctor of the Regional Stra tegic Pro gram at the Ni xon Cen ter. T h i s

proje ct examines Ira n’s pu t a tive nu clear we a pons pro gram and the approa ches to en cou ra ging Ira n’s adheren ce to the provisions of the Nu clear No n prol i fera tion Tre a ty. The proje ct

taps into the Ni xon Cen ter ’s ongoing studies on U. S . - Iranian rel a ti o n s , wh i ch are establishing wi d e - ra n ging co n t a cts with senior Iranians who su ppo rt unof f i cial talks with the

Un i ted St a te s .

I ra n ’s Nuclear A m b i t i o n s

It is wi dely accepted in most circles in the U. S . govern m ent and the analytic com mu n i ty

that the Islamic Rep u blic of Iran is su pporting a nu m ber of progra m s ,s ome overt ,s om e

covert , that wi ll provi de it with the opti on of devel oping and dep l oying a nu clear we a pon s

c a p a bi l i ty. Con cern abo ut Ira n’s nu clear programs can be bro ken down into three com pon en t s : the civilian re s e a rch and power re actors that are opera ti n g, being bu i l t , or planned ;

ef forts by Iran to cl a n de s ti n ely devel op a cen tri f u ge ura n ium en ri ch m ent program and

po s s i bly a fac i l i ty for pluton ium sep a ra ti on (reproce s s i n g ) ; and attem pts by Iranian agen t s

to ill ega lly purchase fissile material and dual-use items that can be used for nu cl e a r

we a pons devel opm ent from forei gn source s , pri m a ri ly, but not exclu s ively, in Eu rope and

the form er Sovi et Un i on .

1 The deb a te abo ut Ira n’s nu clear we a pons also rel a tes to Ira n’s

po l i ti c a l - m i l i t a ry inten ti ons and the scope ,m a gn i tu de , ti m i n g, financial co s t , and stra tegi c

ben efits and liabi l i ties of a nu clear progra m .

A dec i s i on by Iran to proc u re and dep l oy nu clear we a pons would have far- re ach i n g

and unsettling con s equ en ces for the sec u ri ty and stabi l i ty of the gre a ter Mi d dle East. It s

i m p act would be felt far beyond the Persian Gu l f and would influ en ce events in the Eastern Med i terra n e a n , the Ca u c a su s , and So uth and Cen tral As i a .In ex trem i s , fe a rs that Ira n

wi ll introdu ce nu clear we a pons into its ars enal could lead to preem ptive military acti on

by co u n tries su ch as Is rael or even the Un i ted State s .Iranian nu clear we a pons mounted

on med iu m - ra n ge su rf ace - to - su rf ace missiles would have mu ch gre a ter sign i f i c a n ce than

the dep l oym ent of ch emical or bi o l ogical we a pons because of t h eir proven stra tegic va lu e .

Th erefore ,h ow to prevent an Iranian nu clear we a pons program must be a high pri ori ty

for the Un i ted State s . Wh et h er this obj ective is attainable and, i f s o, wh et h er it is be s t

ach i eved by con c i l i a tory or con f ron t a ti onal policy or a mixtu re of both are important factors in the deb a te abo ut U. S . policy tow a rd Ira n .

Th ere are several re a l i ties that must be ack n owl ed ged wh en revi ewing Ira n’s nu cl e a r

we a pons opti on s .F i rs t , wi t h o ut access to high ly cl a s s i f i ed intell i gen ce data, t h ere are limits

3 7

by

G e o ff r ey Ke m p
to how far analysts can spec u l a te abo ut the precise natu re of Ira n’s activi ty. Secon d ,t h ere

is an incre a s i n gly vi gorous deb a te in the Iranian press and among Iranian policy analys t s

con cerning the wi s dom of Ira n’s current po s tu re on nu clear we a pon s . Th i rd , the su bs t a n ce of the deb a te is pri m a ri ly abo ut how nu clear we a pons rel a te to the vi c i s s i tu des of

Iranian forei gn policy ra t h er than to technical or military issu e s . Fo u rt h ,t h ere is little public discussion in Iran con cerning a nu m ber of reports and statem ents in the West stati n g

that the Islamic Rep u blic has initi a ted a nu m ber of covert initi a tives to proc u re tech n o logy that has direct uti l i ty in the con s tru cti on of a nu clear we a pons devi ce .

Ira n’s procl ivi ty to con s i der a nu clear we a pons opti on has been pre s ent since the 1960s

wh en the pro - Am erican regime of the shah had great ex pect a ti ons for Ira n’s role in the

regi on and the worl d . However, it was the bl oody war with Iraq from 1980 to 1988, i ncluding Ira q’s use of ch emical we a pons and Ira n’s sense of i s o l a ti on from the world commu n i ty, that gave rise to the most intense discussions within the regime on the merits of a

nu clear capabi l i ty. The nu clear tests con du cted in May 1998 by India and Pakistan have

rei n forced the arguments of those in Iran who con s i der nu clear we a pons to be an essential ingred i ent for nati onal defen s e . Fu rt h erm ore , the ex i s ten ce of Is rael ’s nu clear capabi li ty and lon g - ra n ge missiles adds to Ira n’s sense of vu l n era bi l i ty.

However, Iran faces major con s traints if it wishes to fo ll ow in the steps of India and

Pakistan or even Is rael . Un l i ke these three co u n tri e s , Iran is a state party to the Nu cl e a r

Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) and, as su ch , is su bj ect to In tern a ti onal Atomic Ener gy

Agency (IAEA) inspecti ons of its ex i s ting nu clear fac i l i ties that are pre s en t ly ge a red

tow a rd re s e a rch but wi ll inclu de a major nu clear power re actor at Büshehr on ce its

con s tru cti on is com p l eted . Any gross vi o l a ti on of its NPT agreem ents could tri gger intern a ti onal sancti on s ,i n cluding an oil em b a r go—an event that would have deva s t a ting imp l i c a ti ons for the Iranian econ omy, wh i ch is alre ady su f fering from mismanagem en t ,

corru pti on ,i n f l a ti on , and unem p l oym en t . Lega lly, Iran could wi t h d raw from the NPT after giving three mon t h s’n o ti ce and proceed with a progra m . However, on ce Iran had ann o u n ced its inten ti ons to wi t h d raw from the tre a ty, it would be vu l n era ble to a nu m ber of

p u n i tive preem ptive acti on s ,i n cluding military force .Yet given the dangerous nei gh borh ood Iran finds itsel f i n — one that fe a tu res ten s i ons with Afgh a n i s t a n , the con ti nu i n g

regime of Saddam Hu s s ein in Ira q , and a hostile U. S .f l eet dep l oyed in the Persian Gu l f

and ad jacent waters — pru dent ob s ervers should assume that there are circ u m s t a n ces in

wh i ch Iran would be prep a red to pay the pri ce nece s s a ry for what it perceives to be a vi t a l

n a ti onal sec u ri ty intere s t .

Impact of an Iranian W i t h d rawal from the NPT

In anti c i p a ting the con d i ti ons of an Iranian wi t h d rawal from the NPT as well as the co s t s

and the ben efits that might com pel an Iranian regime to do so, we must distinguish bet ween those con d i ti ons that may seem ju s ti f i ed according to stra tegic logic and those that

m ay be more rel a ted to Ira n’s sense of i m port a n ce , its de s i re for intern a ti onal statu s ,a n d

its wish “to be taken seri o u s ly.”How the ex ternal worl d ,i n cluding Ira n’s regi onal nei ghbors ,would re act to an Iranian wi t h d rawal would be sign i f i c a n t ly influ en ced by the state

of rel a ti ons bet ween Iran and the rest of the world at the time su ch a dec i s i on was made .

For instance , could it be argued that it would be easier for Ira n’s nei gh bors to accept an

3 8 Iran and Nuclear Weapons
overt nu clear force devel oped by a coopera tive nati onalist Iranian regime for pre s ti ge purposes than a force devel oped by a militant regime in the face of s erious stra tegic thre a t s ?

In this con tex t , it is instru ctive to vi ew the intern a ti onal re s ponses to evi den ce that Ira q ,

North Kore a , In d i a , Pa k i s t a n , and Is rael were devel oping nu clear we a pon s .The ex trem ely

h o s tile re acti on to Ira q’s and North Kore a’s beh avi or can be ex p l a i n ed on ly in part by the

f act that they vi o l a ted their NPT com m i tm en t s . The re acti on was also con d i ti on ed by the

bell i gerent beh avi or of these two regimes and the genuine fear that ei t h er regime was cap a ble of using nu clear we a pons against one or more of its nei gh bors .

A ra t h er different intern a ti onal re acti on has accom p a n i ed evi den ce that Is rael , In d i a ,

and Pakistan are nu clear powers . Al t h o u gh Is rael has never form a lly ack n owl ed ged its nuclear capabi l i ty, it has been known for many ye a rs that the co u n try has the bom b, t h o u gh

t h ere has been a deb a te abo ut how many devi ces it possesses and wh ere they are dep l oyed ,

as well as their means of del ivery. Nevert h el e s s ,a l t h o u gh the Is raeli bomb causes gre a t

po l i tical anxiety in several Arab capitals, n o t a bly Ca i ro, and is perhaps cause for genu i n e

con cern in Ba gh d ad and Teh ra n , the rest of the world has been unprep a red to sancti on

Is rael in vi ew of its sec u ri ty probl ems and the unre s o lved Ara b - Is raeli con f l i ct .

Th ere has been a more vi s ceral and proactive re acti on to the Indian and Pa k i s t a n i

bom b s , but less than would have been anti c i p a ted a dec ade ago. Wh en both co u n tries deton a ted nu clear devi ces in May 1998, the law dem a n ded that the Un i ted States and Ja p a n

a pp ly sancti on s , but this was seen in retro s pect to be overly penalizing Pa k i s t a n , wh i ch is

less able to withstand the impact . Fu rt h erm ore , the sancti ons rem oved mu ch of t h e

Un i ted State s’b a r gaining power with Pa k i s t a n . It would have to be said that tod ay, wh i l e

t h ere is great con cern abo ut the stabi l i ty of the su bcon ti n en t ,t h ere is no de s i re orwi ll

to impose gl obal sancti ons on ei t h er co u n try and this atti tu de is unlikely to ch a n ge soon .

G iven these ex a m p l e s , i n to wh i ch category would Iran fall? Had the Iranians ann o u n ced a nu clear we a pon at the hei ght of the war with Iraq and the crisis with the

Un i ted States wh en Aya to llah Kh om eini was sti ll talking abo ut ex porting revo luti on ,t h e

i n tern a ti onal re s ponse might have been ex trem ely punitive even if Iran had announced its

formal wi t h d rawal from the NPT. In con tra s t ,i f the forces of m odera ti on con ti nue to ga i n

m ore power in Teh ran and show that they are wi lling to be coopera tive with the West and

to re s o lve their outstanding differen ces with the Un i ted States over terrorism and the

Ara b - Is raeli pe ace proce s s ,t h en indeed it may be easier to to l era te some form of nucl e a ri z a ti on of Ira n ,p a rti c u l a rly if o t h er aspects of the rel a ti onship are going well .

If Iran were to su cceed in dep l oying nu clear we a pons and was able to avoid preem ptive

a t t acks and sancti on s , the geopo l i tical balance in the regi on would ch a n ge .While there

cou l d be circ u m s t a n ces in wh i ch an Iranian nu clear we a pons capabi l i ty would not be

de s t a bilizing to the nei gh borh ood—the em er gen ce of a new modera te regime or the cons o l i d a ti on of power under the current pre s i den t , Mo h a m m ad Kh a t a m i ,would be po s i tive

s teps in this directi on—the down s i des of a nu clear dep l oym ent are so serious that it is

n ece s s a ry to con s i der a ra n ge of opti ons de s i gn ed to deter Iran from moving in this

d i recti on .

Iran and Nuclear Weapons 3 9
I ra n ’s Arms Control Considerat i o n s

Ira n’s put a tive we a pons programs must be ex a m i n ed within the con text of broader universal and regi onal arms con trol con s i dera ti on s .At the diplom a tic level ,Iran con s i ders its el f a leader of the Th i rd World and argues that it is inheren t ly unfair that co u n tries in

com p l i a n ce with the NPT, that is, s i gn a tory co u n tries that are reg u l a rly inspected by the

IAEA and found to be fully in com p l i a n ce , be den i ed civilian nu clear tech n o l ogy since this

is ex p l i c i t ly perm i t ted under Arti cle IV of the NPT. Ira n ,h owever, has been sys tem a ti c a lly

den i ed this by most of the su pp l i ers ,i n cluding China and, in some are a s , Ru s s i a . Th ere is

an inherent con trad i cti on in the language of the NPT and the unilateral acti ons taken by

the nu clear su pp l i er group to limit tra n s fers . This has become a Nort h - So uth issue wi t h

Iran leading the argumen t , as India has done for many ye a rs , that the nort h ern co u n tri e s

a re trying to deny tech n o l ogy to the sout h ern co u n tri e s .

Com pounding Iranian anger over tre a tm ent on the nu clear issue is the so-call ed do uble standard that the Un i ted States app l i e s . The Un i ted States re ach ed an agreem ent wi t h

North Korea to provi de it with ligh t - w a ter re actors in exch a n ge for giving up its nu cl e a r

c a p a bi l i ties that could con tri bute to the manu f actu ring of nu clear we a pon s ;h owever, t h e

Un i ted States refuses to con s i der a similar deal for Ira n . Most bl a t a n t ,f rom the Ira n i a n

point of vi ew, is the refusal of the Un i ted States to ack n owl ed ge or say anything abo ut Israel ’s nu clear we a pons program in vi ew of the fact that it is univers a lly accepted that Is rael

has nu clear we a pons and Is rael is not a sign a tory of the NPT.

Ru s s i a’s import a n ce to Iran is underl i n ed by not on ly the form er ’s su pp ly of the latter ’s

c ri tical ingred i ents for its nu clear and missile progra m , but also the sale of adva n ced conven ti onal we a pon s ,i n cluding su bm a rines and ship-borne su rf ace - to - su rf ace missiles.

Russia and Iran also share com m on stra tegic interests in the Caspian regi on ,e s pec i a lly at a

time wh en it is U. S . policy to deny Iran access ro utes for en er gy pipelines thro u gh its territory and to margi n a l i ze Ru s s i a’s abi l i ty to market Caspian en er gy. Nevert h el e s s , over ti m e

t h ere wi ll be po ten tial con f l i cts of i n terest bet ween Russia and Ira n . Si n ce both co u n tri e s

a re natu ral egress ro utes for Caspian Basin oil and ga s ,i f Iran and the Un i ted States were

to repair their rel a ti onship and Iran were perm i t ted to become a key egress ro ute , it wo u l d

run into direct com peti ti on with Ru s s i a . Si m i l a rly, a bu i l dup in Iranian military capabi l iti e s ,p a rti c u l a rly if it were to invo lve lon g - ra n ge missiles and we a pons of mass de s tru cti on ,

could even tu a lly pose a threat to Ru s s i a .

Hen ce , the qu e s ti on ari s e s , why is Russia helping Iran in its military acqu i s i ti ons? Th e

a n s wer is to be found in the con f u s ed and con f l i cting state of a f f a i rs in Mo s cow.As wi t h

o t h er forei gn policy issu e s ,i n cluding rel a ti ons with Ch i n a , Russian policies seem to contrad i ct one another. The Forei gn Mi n i s try and the Mi n i s try of Defense are of ten at od d s

with aggre s s ive lobbies pushing for arms sales and tech n o l ogy tra n s fers .Ru s s i a’s hu ge oi l

and gas companies (Lu koil and Gazprom) have great cl o ut in Mo s cow and in many ways

opera te their own forei gn po l i c i e s . This issue comes up frequ en t ly in the con text of i n d ivi dual Russians and small Russian companies that have been aiding Iran in the devel opm ent of its missile progra m . On each occ a s i on , wh en approach ed by U. S . of f i c i a l s ,t h e

Russians deny that there is any formal govern m ent policy in favor of su ch hel p ; this wo u l d

be a vi o l a ti on of the Missile Tech n o l ogy Con trol Regime (MTC R ) , wh i ch Russia has

s i gn ed . However, s i n ce the Iranians want to build this missile sys tem a ti c a lly and are not in

4 0 Iran and Nuclear Weapons
a hu rry, t h ey wi ll undo u btedly con ti nue the program with or wi t h o ut Russian su pport .

Un derstanding the Russian pers pective on Iran remains a crucial com pon ent of a ny overa ll stra tegy of the Iranian nu clear we a pons progra m .

Taking Ira n ’s Security Needs Seriously

To con s i der practical steps that can be taken to help convi n ce Iran that its ad h eren ce to the

NPT remains in its interest means taking into account Ira n’s legi ti m a te sec u ri ty need s ,i ncluding its fe a rs abo ut U. S . , Is rael i , and Iraqi military po ten ti a l ; its sense of gri eva n ces over

a t tem pts to limit its devel opm ent of nu clear power infra s tru ctu re for pe aceful purpo s e s ;

and its long-standing obj ecti ons to the so-call ed do u ble standard app l i ed to its mem bership in the NPT.

Ira n’s regi onal threat percepti ons are likely to con ti nue no matter who is in power in

Teh ra n . Tod ay Ira n’s sec u ri ty is pri m a ri ly foc u s ed on a defen s ive stra tegy — u n l i ke in the

e a rly days of the revo luti on , wh en Kh om eini talked abo ut overrunning the Ara bi a n

pen i n sula and toppling the corru pt mon a rch s . Iran must deal with unrest and civil war in

s everal of its nei gh boring state s , most seri o u s ly in Afgh a n i s t a n . Iraq is in danger of bei n g

f ra gm en ted , and until recen t ly Iraqi Ku rds opera ted in an auton omous safe haven in

n ort h ern Ira q . The Ca u c a sus is also a hotbed of c ivil stri fe ,with the Arm enian and Azerb a ijan war over Na gorn o - Ka ra b a k h ,the con f l i ct in Geor gia over Ab k h a z i a , and Ru s s i a’s

s tru ggles within its own sout h ern regi on s . Fa rt h er to the east, Iran has become diplom a tic a lly caught up in the chaos and figh ting in Ta j i k i s t a n ,the one Cen tral Asian co u n try

whose pop u l a ti on is predom i n a n t ly Persian speaking and of S h i i te faith.

The regi on cl e a rly contains nu m erous unre s o lved con f l i cts that have important milit a ry dimen s i ons and are likely to en co u ra ge the furt h er pro l i fera ti on of we a pons of m a s s

de s tru cti on and their del ivery sys tem s . In vi ew of the incre a s ed ra n ge and acc u racy of t h e

l a t ter, the interregi onal linkages bet ween theaters of con f l i ct are becoming more app a ren t .

For instance ,l on ger- ra n ge missiles dep l oyed in Is rael and Saudi Ara bia and po s s i bly soon

to be dep l oyed in India and Iran ex tend each co u n try ’s stra tegic re ach far beyond its imm ed i a te nei gh borh ood .

Iran has argued that in vi ew of its ex peri en ce with missile attacks du ring the Ira n - Ira q

war and the re a l i ty that many states around its borders dep l oy missiles and lon g - ra n ge

s tri ke airc ra f t , Iran natu ra lly would want a similar capabi l i ty. Un a ble to afford the most

ex pen s ive lon g - ra n ge stri ke airc raft (and unable to buy We s tern model s ) , Iran gets a modicum of deterren ce from su rf ace - to - su rf ace missiles, wh et h er arm ed with conven ti onal or

u n conven ti onal warh e ad s . Si n ce there is pre s en t ly no assu red defense against missile att acks even in the battlef i el d , su ch we a pons also pose a threat to U. S . and all i ed forces based

in the Persian Gu l f .

Ira n’s conven ti onal force stru ctu re su f fers from significant weaknesses and is hampered

by a lack of financial re s o u rce s . Th erefore , it is likely to pursue what has been call ed a

“n i che stra tegy.”For instance , by proc u ring kilo-class su bm a rines from the Russians and

p u rchasing cruise missiles from Ch i n a ,the Iranian Navy has ga i n ed the atten ti on of t h e

U. S . Navy in the Persian Gu l f .Iran is capable of using its mari time power to ch a ll en ge the

Un i ted States in the Gu l f , ra t h er than defeat it. Iran is also devel oping the capabi l i ty to disru pt the Gu l f with mines and shore - b a s ed missiles.According to U. S . Cen tral Com m a n d

Iran and Nuclear Weapons 4 1
( C E N TCOM) analys t s , Iran has been get ting “s te a l t h i er ”in its mining capabi l i ty and can

use su bm a rines as mobile mining devi ces for deep - w a ter mining. However, s i n ce Ira n’s

own oil ex ports must go to intern a ti onal market thro u gh the Strait of Hormu z , it is unl i kely that Iran would ever attem pt to close down the strait except in a dire em er gen c y.

Iran is more intere s ted in the abi l i ty to con trol the stra i t .

I ra n ’s Likely Strat e gy

Against this back d rop of i n s ec u ri ty Iran wi ll most likely con ti nue to pursue a nu clear insu ra n ce stra tegy. In other word s , it wi ll seek to devel op the infra s tru ctu re and pers on n el to

permit it to devel op we a pon s - grade material if and wh en “ex tra ord i n a ry even t s” convi n ce

it that it has no opti on but to devel op the bom b. O f co u rs e ,h ow its leaders would dec i de

to define or interpret “ex tra ord i n a ry even t s”is a key qu e s ti on . Would the de s i re to have

the bomb out wei gh the hu ge costs they would have to pay if t h ey form a lly wi t h d rew from

the NPT? Th ere is no do u bt that a “l ega l ” Iranian nu clear we a pons program would be almost as serious as an “ i ll ega l ” program and the pre s su re for sancti ons equ a lly hars h ,

t h o u gh not as bi n d i n g.

Because a dec i s i on by Iran to proceed with a major nu clear we a pons program would put

great strains on the Iranian econ omy and its rel a ti ons with nei gh bors and the intern a ti on a l

com mu n i ty,it would prob a bly be made on ly under the most dire circ u m s t a n ce s .Wh a t

could these circ u m s t a n ces be? Several are po s s i bl e ,l i s ted in likely order of i m port a n ce :

wthe reem er gen ce of a nu cl e a r- a rm ed Iraq free from intern a ti onal sancti ons and UN

we a pons inspecti on s ;

wa sharp deteri ora ti on in rel a ti ons with the Un i ted States and Is rael accom p a n i ed by

rec i procal and escalating military threats and rh etori c ;

wa crisis with a nu cl e a r- a rm ed Pakistan tri ggered by con f l i ct over Afghanistan or

Su n n i - S h i i te riva l ry;

wa new, bell i geren t , and anti - Iranian regime in Saudi Ara bi a ;

wa pro l on ged crisis with Azerb a ijan and Tu rkey over minori ty and en er gy - rel a ted

i s su e s ;a n d

wa po s s i ble crisis with a more nati on a l i s t ,a n ti - Islamic leadership in Mo s cow.

It is also nece s s a ry to con s i der some of Ira n’s altern a tive ch oi ces for implem en ting a nuclear we a pons progra m :

wan announcem ent that Iran m i ght co n s i d er wi t h d rawi n g f rom the NPT if its sec u ri ty

n eeds are ign ored ;

wan announcem ent that Iran would form a lly wi t h d raw from the NPT after the prerequ i s i te three - m onth waiting peri od and would then co n s i d er wh et h er or not to

proceed with a nu clear we a pons progra m ;

wan announcem ent that Iran would wi t h d raw from the NPT in three months and

pro ce ed to dep l oy a nu clear we a pons progra m ;

4 2 Iran and Nuclear Weapons
wan ambiguous dep l oym ent of nu clear we a pon s ,n ei t h er con f i rm ed nor den i ed —

equ iva l ent to Is rael ’s op a que nu clear we a pons po l i c y; a n d

wa su rprise nu clear te s t ,p a ra ll el ed by a statem ent that Iran po s s e s s ed a small ars en a l

of w a rh e ads and missiles.

C o n c l u s i o n

A revi ew of Ira n’s nu clear opti ons su ggests a nu m ber of prel i m i n a ry con clu s i on s :

wThe po l i ti c a l , econ om i c , and stra tegic costs to Iran of vi o l a ting its NPT com m i tm ents or form a lly wi t h d rawing from the tre a ty could be con s i dera bl e . This would be

a clear red line. Ab s ent a real and pre s ent danger from an advers a ry su ch as Ira q ,t h e

Iranian leadership would need to think long and hard abo ut the risks of su ch a ventu re . This su ggests that the most pru dent policy would be to con ti nue to devel op the

i n f ra s tru ctu re for a we a pons capabi l i ty but to avoid crossing the red line in the hope

that a more stable regi onal sec u ri ty envi ron m ent em er ge s .

wIf ,n evert h el e s s , Iran were to cross the red line it would then need to wei gh caref u lly

the costs and ben efits of devel oping altern a tive force s . A small force wi ll be easier

and ch e a per to devel op than a med iu m - s i ze force , but its uti l i ty against major

advers a ries would be more qu e s ti on a bl e . On the other hand, i f the pri m a ry purpo s e

of the force is statu s , it might su f f i ce .

wPerhaps the more important va ri a ble in the equ a ti on is the natu re of the Ira n i a n

regi m e . A modera te regime that has rep a i red rel a ti ons with the Un i ted States wo u l d

be more likely to be part of regi onal sec u ri ty discussions and might be less in need

of a nu clear force . A hard-line regi m e ,a n t a gon i s tic to the Un i ted States and Is rael ,

would likely con ti nue to be isolated and feel a gre a ter need for a deterren t . Yet the

risks of co u n term e a su res against the regime would be mu ch gre a ter were it to

u n dert a ke su ch a proj ect .

wA po l i tical ra pproch em ent bet ween the Un i ted States and Iran would prob a bly provi de a breathing space for any regime in Teh ran to reeva lu a te the ben efits of exerc i sing a nu clear we a pons opti on . Cl e a rly, its dec i s i on on this issue would be influ en ced

by improvem ents in the regi onal sec u ri ty envi ron m ent and Ira n’s inclu s i on in

Caspian en er gy proj ect s .

N o t e

1. These issues are covered in great detail in Rodney W. Jones et al., Tracking Nuclear

Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1988 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 1998), 169–182.

Iran and Nuclear Weapons 4 3
E i g h t

Nuclear and Missile Export Contro l s

in Russia

Policies and Pra c t i c e s

Vladimir A .O rl ov is the fou n d er and dire ctor of the Cen ter for Policy Studies in Ru s s i a

(PIR Cen ter ) , ba sed in Mo scow. An indepen d en t ,n o n profit insti tu tion fou n d ed in 1994,

the PIR Cen ter is co n s i d ered by many to be the leading nongovern m ental orga n i z a ti o n

wo rking on arms co n trol and nonprol i fera tion in Ru s s i a . The pu rpo se of this proje ct is,

f i rs t , to descri be Ru s s i a’s decl a ra to ry expo rt co n trols pol i cies (pa rti c u l a rly in the areas of

nu clear and missile expo rts but also in ot h er areas rel a ted to sen s i tive tra n sfers of m a teri a l s

and te ch n ol o gies); se co n d , to iden tify gaps betwe en the pol i cies and expo rt co n trols pra cti ces; and third , to prepa re policy re co m m en d a tions on how to narrow this ga p.

I m p l e m e n t ation of Controls in a New Market Economy

Si n ce the early 1990s, ex port con trol probl ems have incre a s i n gly become one of the key issues in U. S . - Russian rel a ti ons and have frequ en t ly su rf aced du ring bi l a teral dialogue bet ween Russia and a nu m ber of o t h er devel oped co u n tri e s . Beginning in the mid-1990s,

i s sues rel a ted to ex port con trol vi o l a ti ons have also appe a red in the lists of dom e s tic sec uri ty con cerns of the Russian po l i tical leaders h i p. Af ter the breakup of the Sovi et Un i on in

l a te 1991, Russia had to establish a new ex port con trol sys tem ,i nvo lving legi s l a ti on ,l i cen sing procedu re s ,c u s toms reg u l a ti on s ,l aw en forcem en t , and intera gency coord i n a ti on .

A com bi n a ti on of f actors has led to an inevi t a ble gap bet ween the legi s l a ti on and decl a ra tory po l i c y, on the one hand, and the actual implem en t a ti on of ex port con tro l s , on

the other hand. In the tra n s i ti on from a command and con trol sys tem to a market economy, the market has been unders tood by many as all owing the freedom to make mon ey

rega rdless of l aws and, in parti c u l a r, to ex port wi t h o ut any limits. Within this con tex t

t h ere are ex port pre s su res from a large nu cl e a r, ch em i c a l , bi o l ogi c a l , and missile indu s try

that trad i ti on a lly foc u s ed on defense and faced , in the 1990s, a profound cri s i s . A lack of

wi ll by the po l i tical leadership to en force the legi s l a ti on and to impose intera gency coord in a ti on has com po u n ded the probl em , while other officials have been corru pted by cri m in a l i z a ti on of the soc i ety and of the econ omy (including the military - i n du s trial sector ) .

Weak en forcem ent of the law, s h ort a ges of technical equ i pm en t , and lack of a non pro l i fera ti on cultu re at most en terprises have also con tri buted to the gap bet ween policy and

practi ce .

4 4

by

Vladimir A .

O r l ov
Russian Declaratory Export Control Po l i cy 

Ba s ed on the stu dy of m a ny Russian po l i tical doc u m en t s , we bel i eve Ru s s i a’s stated po l i c y

in the non pro l i fera ti on area lacks co h eren ce . However, the Russian leadership gen era lly

proceeds from the assu m pti on that Ru s s i a , as a nu clear we a pon state (NWS ) , has a vi t a l

i n terest in con tri buting to a strong nu clear non pro l i fera ti on regi m e . Russia espec i a lly doe s

not wel come the em er gen ce of n ew states with modern lon g - ra n ge del ivery sys tem s , given

the prox i m i ty of l i kely pro l i fera tors to Ru s s i a’s borders .

On the one hand, a nu clear non pro l i fera ti on policy can hardly be call ed a Russian pol i tical pri ori ty. On the other hand, Russian po l i ti c i a n s ,m i l i t a ry leaders , and diplom a t s

s tron gly bel i eve that circ u mven ti on of the intern a ti onal nu clear non pro l i fera ti on regi m e

is dangerous for Ru s s i a .It wi ll not on ly undermine Ru s s i a’s pre s ti ge and cause more tens i on with the Un i ted State s , but also set free a dangerous gen i e .It wi ll be more difficult to

rebottle this gen i e , and one day it may hit Russia from the terri tory of Iran or North Kore a . Russian thinking is influ en ced by a “China syndrom e” ; Sovi et assistance to China in

devel oping the A- bomb en a bl ed the latter to accomplish this task ten to fifteen ye a rs earl i er than would have been po s s i ble with a purely indigenous progra m .

Am ong the po l i tical and military el i te as well as among ex port - ori en ted ministries and

s t a te - own ed com p a n i e s ,t h ere are people who insist that Russian ex port policy should go

beyond purely econ omic motives to adva n ce a nu m ber of forei gn policy mission s . Al on g

this line of re a s on i n g, the pri m a ry task would be to pre s erve or to revive Ru s s i a’s influ en ce

in vacuum zon e s — su ch as Ira q , Ira n , Syri a , North Kore a , Su d a n , and Cu b a — by tra n s ferring sen s i tive materials and tech n o l ogy spec i f i ed by intern a ti onal tri gger lists. This re a s oning could account for Ru s s i a’s rel a ti onship with India and China as a means of com p l i c a t -

ing the U. S . forei gn policy envi ron m en t . This influ en tial minori ty tri e s ,t h o u gh mostly

u n su cce s s f u lly, to get Russia to use non pro l i fera ti on to pursue its “Cold Pe ace” con f ron t ati on with the Un i ted State s . Overa ll ,t h en , the majori ty remains su pportive of ex port controls as a non pro l i fera ti on tool but is also suspicious of U. S .m o tives for em phasizing that

i s su e .

The key doc u m ent for nati onal ex port con trols is now the Law on Ex port Con tro l s

( wh i ch became ef fective in Ju ly 1999). The important el em ents of the Russian ex port controls establ i s h ed by this law are as fo ll ows .

wFor the first ti m e , a def i n i ti on of “ex port con tro l s” has been establ i s h ed and

a pproved . This def i n i ti on covers materia l s ,i n form a ti on , work s ,s ervi ce s , and re su l t s

of i n tell ectual activi ties that may be used for WMD produ cti on , means of t h ei r

del ivery, and other types of a rms and military equ i pm en t .

wThe law decl a res the goals of ex port con trols as (1) pro tecti on of Russian Federa ti on

i n tere s t s ; (2) com p l i a n ce with intern a ti onal tre a ties sign ed by Russia in the area of

n on pro l i fera ti on and ex port con tro l s ; and (3) cre a ti on of con d i ti ons for integra ti n g

the Russian econ omy into the world econ omy.

wThe ex port con trols lists are sign ed by the pre s i dent and should be devel oped wi t h

the joint parti c i p a ti on of p a rl i a m en t a ri a n s ,i n du s tri a l i s t s , and re s e a rch insti tute s .

Export Controls in Russia 4 5
wThe law pays special atten ti on to con tro lling the ex port of i n tell ectual produ ct s ,

tech n o l ogy, and dual-use materi a l s .

wSa n cti ons against companies and indivi duals that vi o l a te the ex port con trol rules are

i n trodu ced .

wThe law calls for harm on i z a ti on of Russian ex port con trol lists and procedu res wi t h

i n tern a ti on a lly recogn i zed norm s .

wTra n s p a rency of i n form a ti on on ex port con trols and easy access to it are decl a red as

a “principle of s t a te policy of ex port con tro l s .”

wE s t a bl i s h m ent of an internal com p l i a n ce program at Russian companies invo lved in

produ cti on or re s e a rch and devel opm ent (R&D) in the defense area and having regular ex port opera ti ons is decl a red obl i ga tory. S t a te licensing of companies wi t h

e s t a bl i s h ed internal com p l i a n ce programs is introdu ced .

wThe law establishes a det a i l ed plan of acti on against companies su s pected of vi o l a ting the ex port con trols legi s l a ti on ,i n cluding financial auditi n g, a ny nece s s a ry ch eck s

of doc u m en t a ti on , and so on .

wA catch a ll principle is establ i s h ed for the first time in pri m a ry Russian legi s l a ti on .

Although it is cl e a rly an important step forw a rd , the Law on Ex port Con trols should not

be vi ewed as a cri tical su cce s s . The road to preven ting ex port con trol vi o l a ti ons is too lon g

in Russia to ex pect that improvem ents wi ll bear fruit overn i ght or even in a few mon t h s .

The qu e s ti on of wh et h er the law wi ll work or wi ll be on ly a piece of p a per is not an

easy one to answer. On the one hand, even some U. S .d i p l omats who have trad i ti on a lly

been cri tical of Russian ex port con trols have recogn i zed that in a short peri od of ti m e

con s i dera ble su ccess has been ach i eved by Russia in improving ex port con trol practi ce s .

On the other hand, a nu m ber of ex i s ting internal probl em s , wh i ch , practi c a lly spe a k i n g,

cannot be solved in a short peri od of time but on ly in ye a rs ,m a ke any opti m i s tic forec a s t

prem a tu re .

The key probl ems inclu de poor intera gency coord i n a ti on , govern m ent corru pti on and

pen etra ti on by ex port intere s t s ,financial and technical probl em s ,l ack of an ex port con tro l

c u l tu re ,weak punishment of vi o l a ti on s , and loopholes cre a ted by regi onal factors .

Risks of Pro l i fe ration from Sensitive Russian Exports 

We should recogn i ze that some states con ti nue to seek Russian materials and tech n o l ogy

that can be used to cre a te WMD or their del ivery sys tem s . We can also pre sume that the

i n tern a ti onal criminal com mu n i ty and terrorist groups are intere s ted in ex p l oi ting flaws

in Ru s s i a’s ex port con trol sys tem in order to acqu i re sen s i tive materials and tech n o l ogy.

For the most part , the probl em is not missile material ex port con trol vi o l a ti on s . Th e

probl em of i llicit ex port of fissile materials does en du re , but it should be qu a l i f i ed as “ very

h i gh ri s k , very low prob a bi l i ty.” The ex port of missile com pon ents remains more sign i f ic a n t , but it should be categori zed as “ very high prob a bi l i ty, rel a tively low ri s k .” Ma teri a l s

should not be the pri m a ry con cern any w ay. The threat of u n a ut h ori zed ex port of du a l -

use tech n o l ogy (parti c u l a rly, bi o tech n o l ogy that can be used in devel opm ent of bi o l ogi c a l

4 6 Export Controls in Russia
we a pon s ) ,s c i en tific knowl ed ge , and be a rers of this knowl ed ge (scien tists and en gi n eers )

should be con s i dered mu ch more grave .

The co u n tries that display the gre a test interest in sen s i tive Russian materials and techn o l ogy are Ch i n a , Ira n , Ira q , In d i a , North Kore a , Syri a , and So uth Kore a . Ru s s i a’s rel a ti onship with each of these states va ri e s . China is a nu clear we a pon state ,a n d ,t h erefore ,i t s

con s tru cti on of a cen tri f u ge plant for ura n ium en ri ch m ent raises no con cerns abo ut the

vi o l a ti on of the non pro l i fera ti on regi m e .At the same ti m e ,l e a k a ge of s ome Russian du a l -

use tech n o l ogy to China would be a serious bl ow to Russian nati onal sec u ri ty and to the

i n tern a ti onal sys tem of ex port con trol on the wh o l e .

As for con t acts with Ira q , Russia has impo s ed an em b a r go on the shipm ent of s en s i tive

m a terials to this co u n try. That said, we have alre ady wi tn e s s ed serious Iraqi initi a tives to

gain access to Russian missile equ i pm ent com pon en t s , corre s ponding tech n o l ogy, a n d

perhaps bi o tech n o l ogy.In our op i n i on , the building of the Russian nu clear power stati on

in Büsheh r, Ira n , does not vi o l a te ex port con trol reg u l a ti on s . On the con tra ry, it meets the

requ i rem ents of Arti cle IV of the Nu clear Non pro l i fera ti on Tre a ty (NPT) , wh i ch calls for

a s s i s ting the devel opm ent of pe aceful nu clear tech n o l ogi e s . At the same ti m e , Ira n’s striving to acqu i re Russian missile tech n o l ogy to devel op its ambi tious missile program has

become a serious probl em in recent ye a rs .

Russian coopera ti on with India in the nu clear field is du bious from the legal standpoi n t , and it runs co u n ter to the practi ce of s tren g t h ening the non pro l i fera ti on regi m e ,

because India is not an NPT sign a tory.One issue is the nu clear power stati on con s tru cti on in Ku d a m k u l a m . A second issue is Ru s s i a’s inten ti on to su pp ly India with nu cl e a rpowered su bm a rines (although this is not an ill egal bre ach of i n tern a ti onal com m i tm en t s

or Russian nati onal legi s l a ti on ) .

The active invo lvem ent of “rogue state” s ec ret servi ces stands as a serious probl em , because su ch agencies possess soph i s ti c a ted met h ods of proc u ring sec ret tech n o l ogy and

m a terials from defense indu s tries and usu a lly share this tech n o l ogy. For instance , for a few

ye a rs ,Iranian sec ret servi ces were active in finding ways to purchase stra tegic com pon en t s

for the Iranian missile program at Russian en terpri s e s . Su ch activi ties were finally preven ted by the Russians and su b s equ en t ly made publ i c . The so-call ed missile chain pro l i fera ti on has also become very inten s ive : for ex a m p l e , missile com pon en t s ,tech n o l ogi e s ,

s c i en tific inform a ti on , and scien tists and en gi n eers them s elves are being tra n s ferred from

North Korea to Libya , and then to Syri a , or from North Korea to Iran via Pa k i s t a n .

According to PIR Cen ter ’s esti m a te s , the probl em of ex port con trol vi o l a ti on thro u gh

i ll egal tra n s fer of equ i pm ent remains the most seri o u s .

1 U. S .a s s i s t a n ce to Ru s s i a’s State

Cu s toms Com m i t tee (GTK), wh i ch establishes the “s econd line of defen s e” for nu cl e a r

m a terials in Russia ch a n n el ed thro u gh the Nu n n - Lu gar Progra m , is cri tical for minimizing the risk of s mu ggling sen s i tive materials from Russia to rogue states and to non s t a te

actors su ch as major intern a ti onal terrorist groups or the intern a ti onal or ga n i zed cri m i n a l

com mu n i ty.

Conclusion

A Russian ex port con trol sys tem and nati onal ex port con trol regime pre s en t ly ex i s t , so that

Russia now has a full - s cope legal basis for reg u l a ting ex port con trol issu e s . The Law on 

Export Controls in Russia 4 7
Ex port Con trols logi c a lly com p l eted the process of c re a ting su ch a legal basis. Thu s ,the most

a l a rming matter is not the legal basis for or decl a ra tory intent of the Russian ex port con tro l

po l i c y,but its practical implem en t a ti on .If we take into con s i dera ti on the many probl ems conn ected to implem en t a ti on ,it would be naive or irre s pon s i ble to say that current legal doc um ents can by them s elves prevent the ill egal tra n s fer of goods and tech n o l ogy from Ru s s i a .

Moreover, the foremost probl ems are leaks of k n owl ed ge and the brain dra i n .

However, it is po s s i ble to improve implem en t a ti on .In parti c u l a r, it is nece s s a ry to est a blish in Russia a mu l ti phase sys tem of p u n i s h m ent for ex port con trol vi o l a ti ons as soon

as po s s i bl e . The sequ en ce ,w a rn i n gs – f i n e s – ad m i n i s tra tive sancti on s – c riminal pro s ec uti on , decl a red by the Law on Ex port Con trols must be put into practi ce . The pro s ec utor ’s

G en eral Office and its su bord i n a te units should con du ct appropri a te inve s ti ga ti ons and

m a ke their re sults known to the publ i c .

Bri n ging practical ex port con trol policy into con form i ty with nati onal legi s l a ti on

would en a ble Russia to accomplish its forei gn policy tasks, and working to make ex port

con trols more ef fective both dom e s ti c a lly and intern a ti on a lly would con tri bute direct ly to

Russian nati onal sec u ri ty while rem oving a con ten tious issue from its diplom a tic rel a ti on s

with other key co u n tri e s .

One cannot rule out the po s s i bi l i ty that Pre s i dent V l adimir Puti n’s “pra gm a ti c”a pproach to Russian forei gn policy may in the futu re mean gre a ter wi ll i n gness to devel op

nu clear coopera ti on , even if t h ere is a danger of vi o l a ting or not com p lying fully with intern a ti onal com m i tm en t s . However, su ch coopera ti on would be undert a ken on ly wi t h

those states that are rega rded as Ru s s i a’s lon g - term stra tegic partn ers (e.g. , In d i a ) , not wi t h

those seen as po ten tial sources of t h reats to Russian sec u ri ty.

N o t e

1. In the framework of the project, PIR Center staff managed to examine in detail the mechanism of illicit export of missile components from Russia to Iraq (1993–95). To summarize, a

Russian defense and conversion enterprise known as NIIKhSM and located in Sergiev Posad

(Moscow region) founded a dummy company (SPM-Sistema) in 1994 and signed a contract

with an Iraqi representative, Wi’am Gharbiya. The deal concerned the shipment of strategic gyroscopes—a key element of guidance systems for Iraqi missiles and much desired by the regime of

Saddam Hussein. To deal with the customs problems, the partners chose a Nigerian-led firm,

Nisov Pie, incorporated in Moscow. It succeeded in passing all customs barriers (calling the

commodity some kind of “electronic equipment”), and the gyroscopes successfully left Moscow

Sheremetyevo-2 airport and arrived in Amman, Jordan. The gyroscopes were later confiscated in

Jordan. Russian authorities had to launch an investigation of the gyro smuggling case, which

identified who the buyers and sellers were, but which failed to lead to the prosecution of Russian

s m u g g l e r s .

4 8 Export Controls in Russia
N i n e

Explaining Chinese Cooperation in

I n t e r n ational Security Institutions

Alastair Iain Joh n s to n , profe s sor of govern m ent at Ha rva rd Un ivers i ty, a t tem pts to expl a i n

the va ri a tion in Chinese pa rti ci pa tion in gl obal and regional arms co n trol pro ce s ses by

d evel oping and te s ting so - c a ll ed so ci ol o gical arg u m en t s . This proje ct expl o res the micropro ce s ses of so ci a l i z a tion by examining China’s pol i cies towa rd regional se c u ri ty insti tuti o n s ,s tra tegic nu clear arms co n trol , and land mines. Joh n s ton of fers China’s experi en ce in

the Co m preh en s ive Test Ban Tre a ty (CTBT) as ill u s tra ting the broa d er set of c a ses stu d i ed

in the proje ct , wh i ch relies on intervi ews , i n s ti tu tional analys i s , and pri m a ry materi a l s .

S o c i o l o gical Environments ve rsus Economistic Boxe s

Th ere has been a growing interest in recent ye a rs in so-call ed soc i o l ogical approaches as

oppo s ed to econ omic or material wel f a re–maximizing approaches to intern a ti onal rel ati on s . In the stu dy of the ef fects of i n tern a ti onal insti tuti ons on inters t a te coopera ti on ,t h i s

u su a lly means ju x t a posing norm a tive ,“s oc i a lly con s tru cted ”m o tiva ti ons (e.g. ,s oc i a l

obl i ga ti on) with econ omic or material motiva ti ons (the ef fects of beh avi or for an actor ’s

a bi l i ty to opti m i ze some material wel f a re ) .

In re a l i ty both the soc i o l ogical and econ om i s tic approaches are fairly diverse and more

com p l ex than their stereo typical portrayal of ten su gge s t s ;t h ere are ,h owever, d i s ti n ctive

m et a ph ors that may be used to captu re the differen ces bet ween the two broad pers pective s .E con om i s tic approaches (e.g. , con tractual insti tuti onalism) gen era lly vi ew insti tuti ons via a “con t a i n er ”m et a ph or, that is, as co ll ecti ons of rules and norms that “box in”

s t a te actors thro u gh material sancti ons or rew a rd s .New inform a ti on may alter bel i efs

a bo ut how to con du ct stra tegic interacti on but wi ll not alter the underlying goals and des i res of the actors . No theoretical re a s ons are given to ex pect that stra tegic interacti on

a m ong optimizing actors wi ll ch a n ge their basic preferen ce s . The functi onalist natu re of

this approach means that there are “obj ectively ”certain types of i n s ti tuti onal de s i gns that

a re optimal for certain kinds of coopera ti on probl em s . The issue is to en su re that actors

h ave the inform a ti on and re s o u rces to harm on i ze the coopera ti on probl em with the instituti onal de s i gn . Ot h erwi s e ,o utcomes wi ll be su bopti m a l .

Soc i o l ogical approach e s , on the other hand, vi ew insti tuti ons as “envi ron m en t s” of s ocial interacti on , ra t h er than as “boxe s”of m a terial con s tra i n t s . This parad i gm ex a m i n e s

the non m a terial factors (e.g. ,p s ych o l ogi c a l ,a f fective ,i deo l ogical) gen era ted by human interacti on that produ ce pro - group beh avi or. In other word s , it holds that social interacti on

can ch a n ge an actor ’s de s i re s ,w a n t s , and preferen ces or bring new ones into play.

The main probl ems with soc i o l ogical approaches to date are twofo l d .F i rs t ,t h ere has

been a rel a tive negl ect of the microprocesses by wh i ch social interacti on inside intern ati onal insti tuti ons actu a lly leads to con form i ty with group norm s . Secon d , the cases of

s oc i a l i z a ti on have ten ded to be rel a tively “e a s y ” and the issues at stake have ten ded not to

4 9

Nine

by

A l a s tair Iain

Jo h n s t o n
rel a te to rel a tive power capabi l i ti e s . That is, t h ere have been rel a tively few studies of t h e

h a rd (or “least likely”) case of s ec u ri ty po l i c y — wh ere one might plausibly argue that soc i a l i z a ti on processes have led to com p l i a n ce with group norms even wh en su ch com p l ia n ce has con s tra i n ed or promises to con s train rel a tive power. D rawing from soc i o l ogy

and social psych o l ogy, h ere I app ly one of the major microprocesses of s oc i a l i z a ti on — s ocial influ en ce—and then examine the ef fects of s ocial influ en ce on Chinese coopera ti on

on an issue that cl e a rly implies some con s traints on rel a tive power, the CTBT.1

Social Influence: The Pull to Confo r m

Social influ en ce refers to a class of m i c roprocesses that elicit pro - n orm a tive beh avi or

t h ro u gh the distri buti on of s ocial rew a rds and punishmen t s . The rew a rds and punishm ents are social because on ly groups can provi de them , and on ly groups whose approva l

an actor va lues wi ll have this influ en ce . Thus social influ en ce rests on the “ i n f lu en ced ” actor having at least some pri or iden ti f i c a ti on with a rel evant referen ce gro u p. Social influen ce invo lves con n ecting extant intere s t s ,a t ti tu de s , and bel i efs in one “a t ti tu de sys tem”to

those in some other atti tu de sys tem ; for ex a m p l e ,a t ti tu des tow a rd coopera ti on get conn ected to seem i n gly sep a ra te atti tu des tow a rd social standing, s t a tu s , and sel f - e s teem in

w ays that had not previ o u s ly occ u rred to the actor.

Th ere is con s i dera ble evi den ce that iden ti f i c a ti on with a group can gen era te a ra n ge of

cogn i tive and social pre s su res to con form . But the microprocesses of s ocial influ en ce are

mu l ti p l e , com p l ex , and sti ll the su bj ect of mu ch deb a te .G en era lly, h owever, the litera tu re

on social influ en ce has isolated the fo ll owing po s s i bi l i ti e s . As wi ll be evi den t , the bo u n da ries bet ween these microprocesses are blu rry.

The first clu s ter of a r g u m ents comes from social iden ti ty theory (SIT) . Th ere is powerful evi den ce in SIT that mere sel f - c a tegori z a ti on as a mem ber of a particular group gen era tes strong internal pre s su res to con form to the gro u p’s norms and practi ce s . Iden ti f i -

c a ti on with a group leads to ex po su re to pro to typical traits of this category or iden ti ty.

Group mem bers hang their sel f - e s teem on appe a ring to be pro - group (leading to more

ex treme pro to typical group norms over ti m e ) .

A second po s s i bi l i ty has to do with social liking. Liking typ i c a lly means that an indivi dual ex peri en ces a sense of com fort interacting with others with wh om she or he is perceived to share tra i t s .The actor wi ll be more likely to beh ave in ways preferred by the liked

pers on or group of pers ons wh en in their pre s en ce .

A third po s s i bi l i ty comes from con s i s tency theory. Th ere is con s i dera ble ex peri m en t a l

and field re s e a rch that su ggests people are loath to appear incon s i s tent with pri or beh avi or or publ i cly affirm ed bel i efs . Th ey ex peri en ce discom fort wh en being perceived as incon s i s tent or hypoc ri tical and, convers ely, ex peri en ce po s i tive mood wh en being vi ewed as

con s i s tent with past com m i tm en t s . Mem bership in a group usu a lly entails “on - t h e -

record ”s t a tem ents or beh avi ors of com m i tm ent that, even if rel a tively minor, e s t a blish a

b a s eline or threshold iden ti ty su ch that beh avi or that diver ges from these iden ti ty markers

gives rise to discom forting incon s i s ten c i e s .

F i n a lly, the de s i re to maximize statu s ,h on or, pre s ti ge—diffuse rep ut a ti on or image —

can be another driver behind gro u p - con forming beh avi or, or its obvers e , the de s i re to

avoid a loss of s t a tu s , shaming or hu m i l i a ti on , and other social sancti on s . Th ere are many

5 0 Explaining Chinese Cooperation
re a s ons to maximize statu s .O f ten status bri n gs with it power, we a l t h , and deferen ce ,a n d

vi ce vers a , but , just as of ten ,s t a tus markers and immed i a te material gains are not correl a ted . Recogn i ti on and a high status image may be va lu ed in and of t h em s elve s ; these are

traits that nece s s a ri ly depend on pu bl i c a f f i rm a ti on of on e’s social worth by a rel evant aud i en ce . Overa ll ,s ocial influ en ce processes requ i re a forum or insti tuti on that ren ders conform i ty, n on con form i ty, and status to be publ i c , ob s erva ble act s .

When Does Social Influence Wo rk ?

These con d i ti ons su ggest certain specific hypotheses abo ut the rel a ti onship bet ween intern a ti onal insti tuti onal de s i gn and social influ en ce on actors at the level of n a ti onal forei gn

policy agen c i e s . These hypotheses depend on sys tem a tic con ceptu a l i z a ti on of va ri a ti on in

i n s ti tuti onal de s i gn ,that is, a typo l ogy of i n s ti tuti onal forms or insti tuti onal social environ m en t s . Un fortu n a tely none exists in intern a ti onal rel a ti ons re s e a rch at the mom en t .

But one could imagine at least several dimen s i ons for coding insti tuti ons as social environ m en t s . Here I am borrowing and expanding on the typo l ogy of dom e s tic insti tuti on s

devel oped by Ronald Rogows k i :

1 .m em bers h i p : s m a ll and exclu s ive or large and inclu s ive ;

2 . dec i s i on ru l e s :u n a n i m i ty, con s en su s ,m a j ori ty, su perm a j ori ty;

3 . ma n d a te :to provi de inform a ti on , to del i bera te and re s o lve ,to nego ti a te and legi s l a te ;

4 .a uton omy of a gents from pri n c i p a l s : l ow thro u gh high .

Di f ferent insti tuti onal de s i gns (com bi n a ti ons of m e a su res on these four dimen s i on s )

would thus cre a te different kinds of s ocial envi ron m en t s ,l e ading to differen ces in the likel i h ood and degree of group influ en ce . Social influ en ce is more likely to be preva l ent in

i n s ti tuti ons in wh i ch mem bership is large (this maximizes the acc u mu l a ti on of b ack -

p a t ting/shaming markers ) ; dec i s i on rules are majori t a rian (beh avi or is on record and

con s i s tency ef fects may be stron ger ) ; the mandate invo lves nego ti a ti ons over the distri buti on of ben ef i t s ; and the auton omy of a gents is low (agents have to repre s ent pri n c i p a l s ,

t hus reducing the ef fects of persu a s i on on agen t s ) .

2

China and Social Influence: Evidence from the CTBT

Ch i n a’s dec i s i on to sign the Com preh en s ive Test Ban Tre a ty in 1996 may be vi ewed as a

“h a rd ” case from the pers pective of s oc i a l i z a ti on theory. It was clear from the start that

Ch i n a’s dec i s i on makers were not espec i a lly intere s ted in a test ban tre a ty. In parti c u l a r, t h e

nu cl e a r- te s ting com mu n i ty was oppo s ed to any agreem ent that would free ze the asym m etries in Chinese nu clear warh e ad de s i gns and those of the two nu clear su perpowers ,t h e

Un i ted States and Ru s s i a . The CTBT was a high - prof i l e , mu l ti l a teral nego ti a ti on envi ronm ent in wh i ch bargaining beh avi or and dec i s i ons were rel a tively app a rent and the issu e s

at stake were distri butive .A great deal of i n tern a ti onal atten ti on ,p a rt ly maintained by

n on govern m ental or ga n i z a ti on s ,was directed at the nego ti a ti ons and at China in parti c ular because main ob s ervers recogn i zed the con cerns China had with the tre a ty proce s s .

Ch i n a’s bargaining po s i ti on at the start of n ego ti a ti ons in 1994 was de s i gn ed to buy

time for the te s ting program and, i f po s s i bl e , to en su re that the re s tri cti ons on warh e ad

Explaining Chinese Cooperation 5 1
5 2

m odern i z a ti on and the intru s iveness of the veri f i c a ti on procedu res were minimal. Thu s ,

for instance , China initi a lly propo s ed that a test ban tre a ty all ow states to con du ct pe acef u l

nu clear ex p l o s i ons for scien tific and econ omic purpo s e s .

By the end of 1 9 9 5 ,h owever, it appe a red that the Chinese leadership had dec i ded that a

tre a ty was high ly likely by mid-1996, and that China would be obl i ged to sign . From that

point onw a rd , the bargaining foc u s ed on specific issues su ch as on - s i te inspecti on , not on

the main fe a tu res of the test ban itsel f . The Chinese tri ed to en su re that on - s i te inspecti on

would be as difficult as po s s i bl e ,m a i n ly to prevent what they bel i eved might be the abu s e

of demands for on - s i te inspecti on , by the Un i ted States in parti c u l a r, to score po l i tical and

d i p l om a tic poi n t s . By late su m m er of 1 9 9 6 , the Un i ted States and China had worked out a

com promise on on - s i te inspecti on s , cl e a ring the way for formal sign a tu re .

The puzzle the CTBT pre s ents is that by most acco u n t s ,b a s ed on intervi ews with 

Chinese nu clear we a pons specialists and U. S .s pecialists on Chinese nu clear we a pon s ,t h e

tre a ty has in fact frozen Chinese warh e ad modern i z a ti on at a stage that could impinge on

Ch i n a’s abi l i ty to modern i ze its nu clear force s ,p a rti c u l a rly in an era of n a ti onal missile defense in the Un i ted State s . The com m on ref rain is that the CTBT was a sac ri f i ce , wi t h

m a ny in the nu cl e a r- te s ting com mu n i ty and in some parts of the Peop l e’s Libera ti on

Army being unhappy with Ch i n a’s sign a tu re . The Cox Report ,the high - profile con gre ss i onal report on Chinese nu clear and missile devel opm en t , is itsel f con trad i ctory on

wh et h er Ch i n a’s last warh e ad - te s ting series was su ccessful in devel oping the kinds of des i gns needed for a next gen era ti on of b a ll i s tic missiles.3 Thus it is simply not clear that by

the end of 1995 (wh en China was sti ll two tests aw ay from the end of the series) the Ch inese leadership had evi den ce that it could be high ly con f i dent of the su ccess of a ny new

w a rh e ad de s i gn .The leadership appe a rs ,t h en , to have agreed to a militari ly con s tra i n i n g

a greem en t , in an era of u n i po l a ri ty wh en realist theori e s , at least, would ex pect China to

be an excepti on a lly jealous guardian of its rel a tive power. In ad d i ti on , the dec i s i on to sign

on to the tre a ty was made before there was su b s t a n tial evi den ce that India would not joi n

the tre a ty. Thus China could not initi a lly count on In d i a’s oppo s i ti on to the tre a ty to del ay

en try - i n to - force . Be s i de s ,the Chinese re a l i zed that sign a tu re , even wi t h o ut formal en try -

i n to - force , means that China is stron gly norm a tively bound not to act in ways incon s i stent with the goals of the tre a ty. Th ere were also no su b s t a n tial of fers of m a terial side

p aym en t s ,n or threats of m a terial sancti ons (after 1994, a f ter all , the U. S . Con gress was 

e s s en ti a lly oppo s ed to the CTBT) to com pel Chinese sign a tu re .

On the basis of a nu m ber of i n tervi ews with arms con trol specialists and officials in the

Chinese policy process and in forei gn govern m ents who were nego ti a ting with the Ch in e s e , it seems that one of the more powerful con s i dera ti ons in the Chinese dec i s i on was

prec i s ely the con cern abo ut diffuse image . The language used by Chinese interl oc utors to

discuss joining and then signing was status ori en ted .The CTBT was a “great intern a ti on a l

tren d ” ;t h ere was a nebulous “p s ych o l ogical pre s su re” to join on ce the Un i ted State s , Ru ss i a , the Un i ted Ki n gdom , and Fra n ce had com m i t ted them s elve s , and there was cl e a r,

s trong su pport among devel oping state s . Ch i n a’s signing was con s i s tent with its being a

“re s pon s i ble world power,” and joining the tre a ty was part of a “gl obal atm o s ph ere” su ch

that China would have been isolated had it ign ored this atm o s ph ere . One of the mem bers

of the Chinese CTBT del ega ti on argued publ i cly in a report wri t ten for Stanford Un iverExplaining Chinese Cooperation
s i ty ’s Cen ter for In tern a ti onal Sec u ri ty and Coopera ti on (the first statem ent of this kind as

far as I am aw a re) that one of the key re a s ons why China en ded up su pporting the CTBT

was “op i n i on” a m ong devel oping state s : “Taking into account its historical fri en dly rel ati ons with them , China had to maintain its image in third - world co u n tri e s . Ch i n a’s image

as a re s pon s i ble major power is reportedly moving to the fore . The nece s s i ty of m a i n t a i ning its intern a ti onal image was a re a s on for Ch i n a’s dec i s i on to ad just its po s i ti on on the

C T BT nego ti a ti on s .”4 These are unu su a lly direct ad m i s s i ons of the impact of this form of

“ i n tern a ti onal pre s su re” f rom a regime that has trad i ti on a lly publ i cly cl a i m ed that diplom a tic pre s su re on China is co u n terprodu ctive . That the Chinese barga i n ed hard over verif i c a ti on issues—in particular on - s i te inspecti on — even in the face of con s i dera ble dismay

a m ong del ega ti on s , does not undermine the argument abo ut social influ en ce . Ba r ga i n i n g

to dilute the veri f i c a ti on el em ents of the tre a ty in the last months of n ego ti a ti ons was

prem i s ed on the ex i s ten ce of a basic accept a n ce of the core “d i s tri buti on a l ”fe a tu res of t h e

tre a ty.

Conclusion: The Value Added of Socialization Th e o r y

Soc i a l i z a ti on theory is a prom i s i n g, i f u n derdevel oped ,n ew approach to the analysis of

the ef fects of i n tern a ti onal insti tuti ons on state beh avi or. It need not be an ex p l a n a ti on

com peti tive with trad i ti onal econ om i s tic con tractual insti tuti onalist accounts of cooperati on in or ga n i z a ti on s . Le aders dec i de to coopera te for a nu m ber of d i f ferent re a s on s ,m aterial and soc i a l .

But soc i a l i z a ti on theory does in some cases pre s ent a ch a ll en ge to trad i ti onal con tractual theory. For ex a m p l e ,i f s ocial influ en ce is at work in insti tuti on s , it su ggests that contra ry to the con tractualist assu m pti on abo ut group size and co ll ective acti on probl em s ,

l a r ger groups may help redu ce probl ems of coopera ti on because of the opportu n i ties for

gen era ting more back - p a t ting incen tives and opprobrium disincen tive s . The case of Ch inese coopera ti on in the CTBT process is but one important example su gge s ting the va lu e

of tre a ting intern a ti onal insti tuti ons as social envi ron m en t s .

N o t e s

1. The other microprocesses are persuasion and mimicking. Space does not permit a detailed

discussion of these processes.

2. Persuasion—fundamental changes in actors’ cause-effect understandings of the world—is

more likely to occur under opposite conditions, namely, when membership is small, decision

rules are by consensus, the mandate is deliberative, not distributive, and the autonomy of agents is

h i g h .

3. The Cox Report is known formally as the Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S.

National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People’s Republic of China (May

1 9 9 9 ) .

4. Zou Yunhua, China and the CTBT (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University, Center for

International Security and Cooperation, December 1998).

Explaining Chinese Cooperation 5 3
Te n

Management of Surplus Nuclear

M aterial in Russia

Ga ry Bert sch and Igor Kh ri pu n ov are ba sed at the Cen ter for In tern a tional Trade and Sec u ri ty at the Un ivers i ty of Ge o rgi a . This proje ct addre s ses the co n se q u en ces of d i s a rm am ent and dem i l i t a ri z a tion in Ru s s i a . It also examines how su rplus nu clear material is

m a n a ged , i n cluding sales met h od ol o gi e s , thetypes of s to ck p i l ed materi a l , and approa ch e s

to su rplus managem ent that wi ll pro m ote pe a ce and se c u ri ty. The proje ct was faci l i t a ted

with a wo rk s h op.

R u s s i a ’s Nuclear Achilles’ Heel:

N o n weaponized Fissile Mat e r i a l

It is esti m a ted that abo ut 1,350 metric tons of we a pon s - grade pluton ium and high ly enri ch ed ura n ium are scattered ac ross Russia in three hu n d red bu i l d i n gs and fifty site s .

Ro u gh ly half of this material is incorpora ted in we a pon s ; the other half is in va ri o u s

form s , su ch as met a l s , ox i de s ,s o luti on s , and scra p.With some excepti on s , the bulk of

this material bel on gs to the Mi n i s try of Defense and the Mi n i s try of Atomic Ener gy

( M I NATO M ) — f rom wh om the Mi n i s try of Defense proc u res nu clear we a pon s .

Th ro u gh o ut their servi ce life nu clear we a pons ch a n ge hands bet ween MINATO M , as the

m a nu f actu rer re s pon s i ble for their mainten a n ce , and the Mi n i s try of Defen s e , as the

a gency in ch a r ge of opera ting nu clear we a pon s . Both ministries have spec i a lly aut h ori zed

pers on n el with mutu a lly accept a ble cl e a ra n ces who have access to each other ’s fac i l i ti e s .

An nu a lly, t h ey are requ i red to fo ll ow a procedu re wh ereby their regi s tra ti on logs are thoro u gh ly ch ecked to see to it that all nu clear we a pons tra n s ferred from one ministry to ano t h er are acco u n ted for. M I NATO M ,l i cen s ed by the govern m ent in 1999 to become the

sole agency to use nu clear en er gy for defense purpo s e s , is re s pon s i ble for nu clear we a pon s

d i s m a n t l em ent and stora ge of fissile materi a l .

The most vu l n era ble part of Ru s s i a’s we a pon s - grade fissile material is the nonwe a pon i zed com pon en t ,m o s t ly in MINATO M ’s custody. According to a prel i m i n a ry

s tu dy by the Los Alamos Na ti onal Labora tory, Russia has at least fo u rteen sites wi t h

we a pon s - grade pluton iu m ; nine sites with we a pon s - grade ura n iu m ;s even teen sites wi t h

f re s h - f u el high ly en ri ch ed ura n iu m ; fo u rteen sites with nu clear fuel in decom m i s s i on ed

n aval core s ;t wen ty - s even sites with high ly en ri ch ed ura n iu m ;t h ree sites with neptu n iu m ; 5 4

Part III: Weapons of Mass 

Destruction and New Th r e a t s

by

G a ry Be r t s ch

and Igor

K h r i p u n ov

Ten
t wo sites with re actor- grade pluton iu m ; and nine sites with spen t - f u el high ly en ri ch ed

u ra n iu m . Te s ti f ying on Febru a ry 3, 2 0 0 0 , before the Sen a te Arm ed Servi ces Com m i t tee ,

CIA director Geor ge Ten et said that while there was no evi den ce to su ggest there had ever

been a divers i on of a nu clear we a pon from Ru s s i a , it was fissile material that he was more

worri ed abo ut . Most com m i t tee mem bers ech oed his con cern . The discussion in the comm i t tee implied that non s a feg u a rded su rp lus fissile material in Russia was being ra i s ed to

the level of a serious threat to U. S .n a ti onal sec u ri ty.

The threat of “l oose nu ke s”in the form er Sovi et Un i on has been thoro u gh ly covered by

nu m erous reports and boo k s .In Febru a ry 2000 a report en ti t l ed Ma n a ging the Gl obal Nuclear Ma terials T h re a t was issu ed by the Wa s h i n g ton , D. C . – b a s ed Cen ter for Stra tegic and

In tern a ti onal Studies (CSIS). Led by form er sen a tor Sam Nu n n , the CSIS task force ass erted that nothing could be more cen tral to intern a ti onal sec u ri ty than en su ring that

the essen tial ingred i ents of nu clear we a pons did not fall into the hands of terrorists or

nu cl e a r- pro l i fera te state s . However, s ec u re stora ge of Ru s s i a’s fissile materi a l , wh i ch was

the main focus of the report ,should not be the sole obj ective . Con c u rren t ly, t h ere should

be more ef forts to ef fectively deal with the hu ge su rp lus of we a pon s - grade material by 

reducing or making it irrevers i bly unu s a ble for the we a pons purpo s e . This du a l - track 

a pproach would serve the important goal of preven ting the divers i on or theft of we a pon s -

grade material in the immed i a te futu re . In ad d i ti on , given Ru s s i a’s vo l a tile po l i tical situ ati on and econ omic hard s h i p s , this approach could be a safeg u a rd against a rapid retu rn to

the produ cti on of thousands of nu clear we a pons if m i l i t a ri s tic forces hostile to the We s t

prevail in Ru s s i a .

In Ja nu a ry 2001, the Russia Task Force , a bi p a rtisan group coch a i red by Lloyd Cut l er

and How a rd Ba ker, del ivered the re sults of its ye a rl ong stu dy of Dep a rtm ent of E n er gy

( DOE) non pro l i fera ti on programs in Ru s s i a . The task force revi ewed seven DOE progra m s ,i n cluding Ma terial Pro tecti on Con trol and Acco u n ting (MPC&A), wh i ch was the

f i rst program to be establ i s h ed as a re sult of the Nu n n - Lu gar initi a tive , to assess their effectiveness and pro s pects for lon g - term su s t a i n a bi l i ty. The report referred to the MPC&A

program as “the first line of defen s e”in com b a ting pro l i fera ti on and recom m en ded that

its goal of s ec u ring all fissile materials in Russia be pursu ed “a ggre s s ively.”The task force

con clu ded that funding for the MPC&A program should be sign i f i c a n t ly incre a s ed over

the FY 2001 level of $173 mill i on in order to expand the scope and increase the pace of

the progra m .

O u t d ated Safety Systems and Insider Th re at s

The co llapse of the Sovi et Un i on has made dangero u s ly anti qu a ted wh a tever sys tem of

s a feg u a rding nu clear material ex i s ted in the past. In the form er Sovi et Un i on , em ph a s i s

was given pri m a ri ly to “g u a rd s , ga te s , and guns”to con trol nu clear materials and to en su re

these materials did not leave their loc a ti on s . The preem i n ent role of the KGB in con tro lling Sovi et soc i ety, as well as in screening and su pervising the fac i l i ti e s’ pers on n el , vi rtu a lly

el i m i n a ted the threat of d ivers i on or theft sch emes made by insiders .In ad d i ti on ,the loya l ty and patri o tism of those in the em p l oym ent of the Sovi et nu clear we a pons com p l ex

was en h a n ced by the high ly pre s ti gious status they en j oyed .With the disintegra ti on of t h e

Sovi et Un i on and a demand for nu clear material on Ru s s i a’s bl ack market , the situ a ti on

Management of Surplus Nuclear Material in Russia 5 5
has ch a n ged dra m a ti c a lly. In s i ders , whose salaries dropped and who faced incre a s ed uncert a i n ty in their profe s s i onal careers because of econ omic crisis and overa ll down s i z i n g

of the nu clear com p l ex , found them s elves in po s s e s s i on of va lu a ble inform a ti on . Hypot h eti c a lly, most of t h em could pass this inform a ti on on to out s i ders ,d ivert material thems elve s , or assist others by providing access or by disabling alarm s .

Several other factors con tri buted to an envi ron m ent su s cepti ble to su ccessful divers i on s . Most Sovi et nu clear fac i l i ties were built in the 1950s and 1960s in re s ponse to sec uri ty requ i rem ents different from those of tod ay and have not been overh a u l ed to ad just to

pre s ent re a l i ti e s . For ex a m p l e , the con s tru cti on de s i gn of these fac i l i ties had been foc u s ed

on easy and less co s t ly mainten a n ce ra t h er than on sec u ri ty impera tive s .

Because of econ omic uph e avals in the 1990s, Ru s s i a’s nu clear indu s try lost most of i t s

c ad res at the mid-level managerial stra t a ,who moved to other indu s trial sectors ,i n clu d i n g

priva te com p a n i e s .This led to an accel era ted aging process among the leadership and

h en ce low pers on n el mobi l i ty.As a re su l t , em p l oyees stayed at the same of f i ce for ex ten ded

peri ods of ti m e , devel oping rel a ti onships of mutual trust and pers onal fri en d s h i p. Th i s

s i tu a ti on fac i l i t a ted easier criminal co llu s i on among insiders and, convers ely, h a m pered

m eticulous com p l i a n ce with internal reg u l a ti on s .

Social unrest at nu clear fac i l i ties has become a powerful de s t a bilizing factor. The nuclear indu s try ’strade union , whose mem bership covers both the nu clear we a pons comp l ex and its civilian sector, has aut h ori zed nu m erous stri kes and sit-ins in pro test aga i n s t

the del ays in salaries and the shrinking social safety net .O r ga n i z a ti ons loc a ted in cl o s ed

nu clear cities have establ i s h ed their own assoc i a ti on to coord i n a te their campaign inside

the nu clear we a pons com p l ex . The current sch eme of downsizing wi t h o ut adequ a tely

f u n ded convers i on proj ects to com pen s a te for the loss of j obs has led to low morale and

an unstable psych o l ogical envi ron m ent in the nu clear defense com p l ex .

In 1995 Ru s s i a’s Nu clear and Rad i a ti on Sa fety Overs i ght Aut h ori ty (GAN) rel e a s ed a

report on known and doc u m en ted divers i ons and thefts in Ru s s i a .All of the cases pres en ted had been made po s s i ble by inside opera tive s . For ex a m p l e ,in October 1992,

1.5 kilograms of h i gh ly en ri ch ed ura n ium were sto l en from the scien ce and produ cti on

a s s oc i a ti on Lu ch , wh i ch is under the ju ri s d i cti on of M I NATOM and sti ll has sizable stockpiles of nu clear materi a l . An o t h er well - p u bl i c i zed case invo lved a total of 2 kilograms of

36 percen t – en ri ch ed ura n ium sto l en in Ju ly 1993 from the An d reeva Gubai naval base

( Ru s s i a’s navy is an indepen dent custodian of nu clear fuel for prop u l s i on purpo s e s ) . Th e

final report of the technical inve s ti ga ti on indicated that the sto l en items were parts of

t h ree new assem blies of the BM-4AM-type su bm a rine nu clear re actor. The perpetra tors

were two navy of f i cers and two priva tes who wanted to make mon ey by selling the item s

on the bl ack market of nu clear materi a l s . The stora ge fac i l i ty was equ i pped with a pro tecti on sys tem against nu clear attack , wh i ch inclu ded a con trol sys tem against a sel f -

sustaining nu clear chain re acti on , a fire preven ti on sys tem , and a flood alarm sys tem .

However, t h ere was no ef fective sys tem install ed to prevent an act of i n s i der thef t .

One of the most recen t ly reported insider- i n s ti ga ted incidents was the theft of a qu a nti ty of tra n su ra n ium el em ent californ ium 98, wh i ch came from a nu cl e a r- powered icebre a ker in a fac i l i ty under the ju ri s d i cti on of the Shipbuilding Mi n i s try. The perpetra tors

i n ten ded to sell the material to an or ga n i zed crime group in St. Peters bu r g, wh i ch app a r5 6 Management of Surplus Nuclear Material in Russia
en t ly wanted to possess a high ly rad i oactive su b s t a n ce for carrying out hired con tract

k i ll i n gs ; a vi ctim ex po s ed to a powerful rad i a ti on source in the of f i ce or a car would eventu a lly die wi t h o ut arousing mu ch su s p i c i on .

Corrupt Customs Officials and Smuggling

If fissile material has been sto l en ,t h ere are grounds to bel i eve that it could be easily smu ggl ed out of Ru s s i a ,whose customs servi ce is lacking both soph i s ti c a ted equ i pm ent and

tra i n ed pers on n el . What is of even gre a ter con cern ,h owever, is the rampant corru pti on

a m ong customs of f i cers . According to Russian govern m ent source s ,c riminal proceed i n gs

were insti tuted in 1999 against thirty - f ive customs em p l oyee s ,i n cluding ei gh teen of f i c i a l s

of the Mo s cow - b a s ed cen tral staff. Th i rty percent of t h em invo lved groups of c u s toms off i cers acting in co llu s i on and accepting bri bes in exch a n ge for let ting undoc u m en ted

i tems in or out of the co u n try. As long as corru pti on preva i l s ,t h ere is no need to try to bypass the customs servi ce ;s to l en material can be lega lly shipped inside con t a i n ers for rad i oactive su b s t a n ces while corru pt officials waive cumbers ome veri f i c a ti on procedu re s .

An nu a lly, s everal thousand new customs officials are rec ru i ted thro u gh o ut Ru s s i a . Th e

s c reening process determ i n ed that at least ei gh teen applicants out of a total of m ore than

t h ree thousand were to be planted inside the customs servi ce by major criminal groups in

1 9 9 9 .

Ot h er than thro u gh corru pt customs of f i c i a l s ,t h ere are several other ways to smu ggl e

su cce s s f u lly. Ru s s i a’s borders with the form er Sovi et rep u blics are poro u s . In s i de those rep u bl i c s ,t h ere are nu m erous inten s ive or low - i n ten s i ty con f l i cts in areas that are reportedly

u s ed for ill egal tra n s s h i pm ent (Abkhazia and So ut h ern Ossetia in Geor gi a ; Ch ech nya ,

G ornyi Al t a i , and In g u s h etia in Ru s s i a ; Tra n s d n e s tria in Mo l dova , and Na gorn o - Ka ra b a k h

in Azerb a ija n ) .

The Roles of MINATOM and GAN

Th ere are many re a s ons why safeg u a rding fissile material is sti ll a probl em in Russia and,

in fact , it would be su rprising if it were otherwise in the midst of Ru s s i a’s econ omic rece ss i on and uph e ava l s . Bu d get a ry all oc a ti ons have been negl i gi ble while a legal and reg u l atory basis for the con trol of nu clear material is on ly in the making. Un der the ex i s ti n g

d ivi s i on of l a bor, M I NATOM has the aut h ori ty for acco u n ting and con trol and shared res pon s i bi l i ty for physical pro tecti on , while GAN performs overs i ght functi ons in this are a .

Both MINATOM and GAN parti c i p a te in the dra f ting of federal reg u l a ti on s — for governing material acco u n ting and con trol as well as physical pro tecti on — toget h er with other

a gencies su ch as the Defense Mi n i s try, In teri or Mi n i s try, E con omics Mi n i s try, and Ju s ti ce

Mi n i s try.As far as physical pro tecti on is con cern ed ,M I NATOM serves several ro l e s : it coord i n a tes the rel evant activi ty of o t h er agen c i e s , acts as the nati onal aut h ori ty and con t act

point in the fra m ework of the Physical Pro tecti on Conven ti on (adopted in the fra m ework

of the In tern a ti onal Atomic Ener gy Agen c y ) , overs ees com p l i a n ce with Ru s s i a’s obl i gati ons stemming from its mem bership in the In tern a ti onal Atomic Ener gy Agen c y, acts as

the lead agency for en su ring nu clear and rad i a ti on safety du ring tra n s port a ti on of nu cl e a r

m a teri a l s , and certifies all technical means used for physical pro tecti on purpo s e s .

Management of Surplus Nuclear Material in Russia 5 7
5 8 Management of Surplus Nuclear Material in Russia

In the acco u n ting and con trol are a , the role of M I NATOM is even more perva s ive .

M I NATOM was de s i gn a ted as the agency re s pon s i ble for managing the federal acco u n ting and con trol sys tem in rega rd to rad i oactive su b s t a n ces and waste .M I NATOM is also

re s pon s i bl e ,a m ong other things ,for co ll ecti on and eva lu a ti on of rel evant inform a ti on at

the regi onal and dep a rtm ental level s , R&D activi ty for improving the reg u l a tory sys tem ,

opera ti on of a federal inform a ti on and analytical cen ter for acco u n ting and con tro l , coopera ti on in the fra m ework of i n tern a ti onal agreem ents and progra m s , and other rel a ted activi ti e s .

The evo lving legal basis sti p u l a ting that nu clear materials are su bj ect to physical pro tecti on , and acco u n ting and con trol at all level s , is not, h owever, a model of cl a ri ty.Vague and

a m biguous language leaves room for interpret a ti on on specific roles and aut h ori ti e s .

Moreover, the statutes of s ome agencies dealing with nu clear materials do not have specific provi s i ons reg u l a ting their use and coord i n a ti on with other agen c i e s . The overa ll

Russian legal sys tem — con s i s ting of federal laws , pre s i den tial dec ree s , govern m ent re s o luti on s , and dep a rtm ental orders — of ten adds to the con f u s i on . Th ere are con ti nuous tens i ons in the rel a ti onship bet ween MINATOM and GAN.

R a d i o a c t i ve Materials and Russia’s Criminal Code

An ad d i ti onal disincen tive should be provi ded by Ru s s i a’s Criminal Code .According to its

Arti cle 221, s tealing or ex torti on of rad i oactive materials (no disti n cti on is made bet ween

we a pon s - grade and nonwe a pon s - grade materials) is punishable by a fine ra n ging from

the equ iva l ent of 700 to 1,000 minimal salari e s ; or to an aggrega te salary or other incom e s

of the convi cted pers on for a peri od from seven months to one ye a r; or by impri s on m en t

for up to five ye a rs . The same arti cle provi des for more harsh punishment (up to ten ye a rs

of i m pri s on m ent) if s pec i f i ed aggrava ting circ u m s t a n ces are proved .It remains to be seen ,

h owever, wh et h er the Russian govern m ent is prep a red to punish the crimes of d ivers i on

and theft to the fullest ex tent of this arti cl e . A major hu rdle to reg u l a ti on is that no acc ura te inven tory of Ru s s i a’s fissile material stockpiles has been made .As a re su l t ,a ny co u rt

proceed i n gs have to be based on physical evi den ce of an actual theft ra t h er than discrepancies bet ween inven tori ed qu a n ti ties and past record s .In other word s , in order to be

convi cted , perpetra tors must be caught red - h a n ded .

U. S. Role in Upgrading Russian Safety Systems

G iven the financial and other limitati ons the Russian govern m ent is faced with in safeg u a rding its fissile materi a l ,s i n ce 1994 the DO E’s MPC&A Program has been work i n g

with forty nu clear sites in Russia to upgrade their sys tem s . The program started with Ru ss i a’s civilian nu clear fac i l i ties (re s e a rch insti tutes and power plants) and since then has exp a n ded to inclu de the co u n try ’s nu clear we a pons com p l ex and some of the Ru s s i a n

Nav y ’s nu clear fac i l i ti e s . The proj ects of the program have invo lved the install a ti on of

m odern safeg u a rd sys tems that inclu de sec u ri ty fen ce s ,b a rri ers and ga te s , pers on n el and

veh i cle portals and mon i tors ,l ock s ,i n teri or and ex teri or moti on sen s ors , vi deo camera s ,

a l a rm com mu n i c a ti on and display equ i pm en t ,t a m per- i n d i c a ting devi ce s ,n on de s tru ctive

a s s ay equ i pm en t ,s c a l e s , bar code s , com p uteri zed acco u n ting sys tem s , and bad ging and

access con trol equ i pm en t . An o t h er U. S . govern m ent program invo lves the building of t h e
Fissile Ma terial Stora ge Fac i l i ty (FMSF) at Maya k , Ch elya binsk obl a s t . The fac i l i ty is des i gn ed to accom m od a te the bulk of we a pon s - grade pluton ium rel e a s ed from Ru s s i a’s

nu clear we a pons as a re sult of the disarm a m ent proce s s . This bi l a teral proj ect is managed

by the Dep a rtm ent of Defense and is sch edu l ed for com p l eti on in 2002.

In 1995 U. S . officials of the MPC&A program esti m a ted that the en ti re job, that is, s ec u ring nu clear materials at ei gh ty to one hu n d red fac i l i ti e s , would cost ro u gh ly $800 mill i on thro u gh 2002, or abo ut $10 mill i on per fac i l i ty. However, s i n ce these assu m pti on s

were made , the MPC&A program managem ent has gre a t ly ex p a n ded knowl ed ge abo ut

and access to sites and bu i l d i n gs containing we a pon s - grade nu clear materi a l s . As a re su l t ,

m a ny now re a l i ze that the probl em is larger and more com p l ex than ori gi n a lly unders tood . Th ere are at least twen ty - f ive more sites than initi a lly iden ti f i ed , over three hu n d red

m ore bu i l d i n gs than ori gi n a lly planned , and approx i m a tely 30 percent more nu clear material than earl i er esti m a tes had pred i cted . Moreover, the program managem ent recogn i zed a need to prom o te the abi l i ty of these sites to sustain the upgrade s , that is, t h ei r

a bi l i ty to fully opera te and maintain the sys tem over the long term using site re s o u rce s .

Is sues of l on g - term su s t a i n a bi l i ty of these sys tems were not alw ays anti c i p a ted and add re s s ed while the sys tems were being install ed . An important thrust of the su s t a i n a bi l i ty

ef fort is to insti ll the MPC&A cultu re among Russian officials and managers in the nuclear indu s try. To ref l ect these new re a l i ti e s , Pre s i dent Cl i n ton’s Ex p a n ded Th reat Redu cti on In i ti a tive propo s ed for the fiscal 2001 bu d get inclu ded an ad d i ti onal $100 mill i on for

a va ri ety of DOE proj ects in Ru s s i a ,i n cluding the safeg u a rding of its nu clear materi a l s .

P rospects for the Future: Need for Dive rs i fi c at i o n

The ch a ll en ge of pro tecti n g, acco u n ting for, and con tro lling Ru s s i a’s su rp lus fissile materials cl e a rly goes beyond Ru s s i a’s nati onal intere s t s ; it is also in the U. S . and gl obal intere s t s . Forei gn assistance ,m o s t ly from U. S . - s pon s ored progra m s , can and is, i n deed ,

making a differen ce . This assistance must be incre a s i n gly divers i f i ed to cover not on ly the

MPC&A area but also the con s o l i d a ti on and redu cti on of s tock p i l e s , the non produ cti on

of we a pon s - grade materi a l s , defense convers i on , and other rel a ted activi ti e s .

It is of p a ramount import a n ce to iden tify and prom o te more com m ercial proj ects that

could en ga ge Ru s s i a’s nu clear indu s try, t hus gen era ting ad d i ti onal revenues and making it

m ore re s pon s ive to forei gn partn ers . Ru s s i a , for its part , should invest more mon ey and 

ef fort tow a rd indigenizing and sustaining the MPC&A progra m , wh i ch is curren t ly fin a n ced and su pported mostly by out s i de don ors . Mu ch has been accom p l i s h ed in the past

dec ade . Mu ch more remains to be don e .

Management of Surplus Nuclear Material in Russia 5 9
E l eve n

B e t ween Prudence and Pa ra n o i a

The Middle Ground in the We ap o n s - o f - M a s s -

Destruction Te r ror Debate

Jessica Stern , ba sed at Ha rva rd Un ivers i ty, co n s i d ers the dangers of terro rism in the Un i ted

St a tes from nu cl e a r, ch em i c a l , and bi ol o gical we a pons in light of the repo rtedly expa n d i n g

opera tions of tra n s n a tional terro rist groups and the increasing sop h i s ti c a tion and enh a n ced po s s i ble access to we a po n s - of - m a s s - d e s tru ction co m po n en t s . The re se a rch attem pt s

to devel op a fra m ewo rk for analyzing the scope of the probl em and to expl o re the ra n ge of

policy re s po n se s .

Optimists and Pe s s i m i s t s

Wi ll terrorists use unconven ti onal we a pons? Deb a te abo ut this qu e s ti on tends to be condu cted in ex trem e s . Optimists argue that terrorists “want a lot of people watching not a

lot of people de ad ,” that they prefer “p a ti ent hara s s m en t”to large-scale mu rder and are

u n l i kely to tu rn to we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .

1 Pe s s i m i s t s , on the other hand, a r g u e

t h a t , because of the growing ava i l a bi l i ty of u n conven ti onal we a pon s , acts of m ac ro terror

re su l ting in hu n d reds of thousands or even mill i ons of deaths are all but inevi t a bl e .

Trends in terrorism su ggest that the truth lies bet ween these two ex trem e s . On the on e

h a n d , using unconven ti onal we a pons to cre a te mass casu a l ties appe a rs to be far more difficult than the popular litera tu re su gge s t s .The terrorists would need to dissem i n a te or

deton a te the we a pon s , pre s en ting technical and or ga n i z a ti onal ob s t acles that few gro u p s

would be able to su rm o u n t . Moreover, rel a tively few terrorists would want to kill mill i on s

of peop l e , even if t h ey co u l d .

On the other hand, s everal recent examples su ggest that some terrorists do want a lot

of people de ad or inju red , and that they are incre a s i n gly con s i dering unconven ti on a l

we a pons with this goal in mind. To tu rn Brian Jen k i n s’s famous ph rase aro u n d — s om e

terrorists appear to be attracted to unconven ti onal we a pon s , not to kill large nu m bers , but

to get more people watch i n g. Ch em i c a l , bi o l ogi c a l , and rad i o l ogical we a pons evo ke dre ad

o ut of proporti on to their let h a l i ty, making them su i ted for theatrical acts of vi o l en ce calc u l a ted to attract atten ti on .

Groups that are candidates for using unconven ti onal we a pons su cce s s f u lly must po ssess three ch a racteri s ti c s : (1) the de s i re to use unconven ti onal we a pons de s p i te form i d a bl e

po l i tical ri s k s ;(2) the capabi l i ty of acqu i ring the agents and a dissem i n a ti on devi ce (however cru de ) ; and (3) an or ga n i z a ti onal stru ctu re that en a bles the covert del ivery or diss em i n a ti on of the agen t .

With rega rd to motiva ti on s , terrorist attack s ,while growing less frequ ent in recen t

ye a rs ,a re reportedly growing more let h a l , su gge s ting that moral con s traints against kill i n g

l a r ge nu m bers may be erod i n g, at least for some gro u p s . In a po s s i bly rel a ted devel op- 6 0

by

Je s s i c a

E ve Stern
m en t , rel i gi o u s ly motiva ted groups are reportedly becoming more com m on and incre a si n gly vi o l en t .O f el even intern a ti onal terrorist groups iden ti f i ed by RAND in 1968, n on e

were cl a s s i f i ed as being rel i gi o u s ly motiva ted . By 1995, h owever, rel i gious groups acco u n ted for 25 percent of i n tern a ti onal terrorist incidents and 58 percent of the to t a l

nu m ber of f a t a l i ti e s .Terrorists are also showing gre a ter interest (not nece s s a ri ly com bi n ed

with technical or or ga n i z a ti onal capac i ty) inwe a pons of mass de s tru cti on . Before the

Aum Shinri kyo attack and the Oklahoma Ci ty bom bi n g, the FBI typ i c a lly en co u n tered

a bo ut a dozen incidents a year invo lving thre a t s , boa s t s , or actual attem pts to acqu i re or

use we a pons of mass de s tru cti on .Now the FBI is handling several hu n d red su ch cases per

ye a r, most of wh i ch are hoa xe s .

Would-Be Te r ro r i s t s ?

The litera tu re provi des a nu m ber of examples of groups or indivi duals who have dem ons tra ted (or de s c ri bed) their interest in acqu i ring ch emical or bi o l ogical agen t s . The Am erican cult call ed the Coven a n t , the Sword , and the Arm of the Lord (CSA) is one ex a m p l e .

2

This group acqu i red cya n i de with the aim of c a rrying out mass-casu a l ty attack s . Th e

gro u p’s obj ective was to hasten the retu rn of the Messiah by “c a rrying out God ’s ju d gm en t s”a gainst unrepentant sinners . Its plan was not work a bl e , and the FBI pen etra ted the

group before opera tives could attem pt to carry the plan out . The cult is pri m a ri ly of i n terest because of what is now known abo ut its motiva ti on s .

Four factors appear to have played a role in freeing CSA mem bers from the moral and

po l i tical con s traints that app a ren t ly hold most terrorist groups back .F i rs t , the group was

persu aded that Arm a ged don was imminen t . Th erefore ,t h ey felt mora lly obl i ga ted to

c a rry out God ’s ju d gm en t s , to “pour out the seven bowls of the anger of G od upon the

e a rt h ,” to inflict wounds upon the sinners who are marked by the beast and worship his

i m a ge .

Secon d ,CSA mem bers were not parti c u l a rly fe a rful of a govern m ent crack down . Th ey

f l o uted the govern m en t’s aut h ori ty by acqu i ring military we a pon s ,s elling hate litera tu re

at gun shows , and wri ting anti govern m ent arti cles in the local paper.

Th i rd ,t h ey were not fe a rful of of fending a con s ti tu en c y. James Ell i s on , the gro u p’s

l e ader, cl a i m ed to be del i bera tely trying to shock the people into becoming “a tool that we

could use.”And their racist ideo l ogy made them feel that their inten ded vi ctims were su bhu m a n , and that killing them was therefore not a sin.

Fo u rt h , group mem bers displayed many sym ptoms of “po l i ti c i zed para n oi a” as def i n ed

by Robert Robbins and Jerrold Po s t .

3 Th ey su f fered delu s i ons of gra n deu r, cen tra l i ty (the

bel i ef that they and their acti ons were of i n tense interest to everyon e , e s pec i a lly their en em i e s ) , profound su s p i c i on of the govern m en t , and prem on i ti ons of doom .

An o t h er example is Larry Ha rri s , who in April 1995 acqu i red the bacterium that causes

bu bonic plague. Ha rris cl a i m ed to be planning to devel op his own medical co u n term e asu re s , but he shared CSA’s racist ideo l ogy, gra n d i o s i ty, p a ra n oi a , and prem on i ti ons of

doom . These ch a racteri s tics appear to be com m on among the rel a tively small nu m ber of

groups that have acqu i red or attem pted to use ch emical or bi o l ogical agen t s .

4

In a su b s equ ent incident in Febru a ry 1998, Ha rris boa s ted to an informant that he had

en o u gh “m i l i t a ry - grade anthra x ” to “ wi pe out”a ll of Las Vega s . Ei ght bags marked

The WMD Terror Debate 6 1
6 2 The WMD Terror Debate

“bi o l ogi c a l ” were found in the back of a car he and his accom p l i ce were drivi n g. Severa l

d ays later, federal aut h ori ties learn ed that the “m i l i t a ry - grade anthra x ” Ha rris had bro u gh t

to Las Vegas was a vaccine strain not harmful to human health, but the incident fri gh ten ed a lot of people in Las Vegas and around the co u n try. Ta bl oids in New York ran stori e s

with headlines like “Su bw ay Plague Terror ” and “ Feds Nab 2 in Toxic Terror.” The inciden t

s p a rked an astonishing pro l i fera ti on of a n t h rax hoa xes and threats in the second half of

1 9 9 8 , con ti nuing into 1999. Perpetra tors inclu de Iden ti ty Ch ri s tian and other anti governm ent gro u p s , ex torti on i s t s ,a n ti a borti on activi s t s , and pre su m ed pro - ch oi ce gro u p s . In

m a ny cases the perpetra tor ’s motives were unknown , but some incidents appear to have

been carri ed out as stu dent pra n k s , dem on s tra ting the ex tent to wh i ch the threat of a nt h rax has en tered Am eri c a n s’ con s c i o u s n e s s .

D e c e n t ralized Netwo rks and Te c h n o l o gical Deve l o p m e n t s

With rega rd to insti tuti onal con s tra i n t s , terrorist groups have begun or ganizing thems elves as net works or vi rtual net works ra t h er than large or ga n i z a ti on s , of ten with the explicit purpose of evading law - en forcem ent detecti on . Dom e s tic ex tremists in the Un i ted

S t a tes are incre a s i n gly opera ting according to the principle of “l e aderless re s i s t a n ce ,”

wh i ch invo lves “ph a n tom cell s” or indivi duals opera ting on their own , wi t h o ut com mu n ic a ting direct ly with the leadership of the movem ent that inspires them . In ad d i ti on to

making it more difficult for law - en forcem ent aut h ori ties to mon i tor anti govern m ent activi ti e s , vi rtual net works en a ble indivi duals who are soc i a lly ill at ease to work toget h er on

a com m on cause, wi t h o ut having to meet face - to - f ace . In tern a ti onal terrorist or ga n i z ati on s ,s i m i l a rly, a re forming loose affiliati ons that opera te ac ross nati onal bo u n d a ri e s ,

making them harder to iden ti f y, pen etra te , and stop.

In the area of tech n o l ogy, a nu m ber of devel opm ents may make it easier for terrori s t s

or their spon s ors to acqu i re unconven ti onal we a pon s .Adva n ced ferm en ters make it easier

to opti m i ze growth of bi o l ogical or ga n i s m s , and new tech n o l ogies for coa ting and aero -

solizing micro - or ganisms make dissem i n a ti on less ch a ll en gi n g. In adequ a tely sec u red

WMD materials in the form er Sovi et Un i on , and inadequ a te pay for WMD scien ti s t s ,

m ay even tu a lly lead to significant leakage of WMD or rel a ted ex perti s e .

In su m m a ry, m o tiva ti on a l , or ga n i z a ti on a l , and technical con s traints are erod i n g, a n d

t h ey have been eroding for some ti m e . Why, t h en ,h ave unconven ti on a l - we a pons attack s

been so ra re? Ex p l a n a ti ons inclu de the po s s i bi l i ty that the groups that are now or ga n i zed

to evade law - en forcem ent detecti on are not yet capable of overcoming technical cons tra i n t s ; and that those who do have access to WMD may have been stopped by law -

en forcem ent aut h ori ties or fear of ret a l i a ti on or may be incapable of d i s s em i n a ting the

we a pons covert ly.

The Aum Shinri kyo cult’s To kyo su bw ay attack is of ten held up as a waters h ed event in

the history of terrori s m . Ma ny analysts assu m ed that copycat nerve - a gent attacks wo u l d

i m m ed i a tely fo ll ow. So far, those pred i cti ons have not been borne out . The cult’s su cce s s e s

and failu res are both instru ctive in this rega rd . De s p i te its size (esti m a ted at tens of t h o usands of m em bers ) , its wealth (reportedly over $1 bi ll i on ) , and its tra i n ed pers on n el (including doctors ,s c i en ti s t s , and workers at Russian nu clear fac i l i ti e s ) , the cult’s attem pts to

acqu i re work a ble nu clear and bi o l ogical we a pons failed . However, the group did su cceed
in carrying out ch emical attacks using cru de equ i pm ent for dispersing ga s e s .Its su cce s sful attacks were low - tech opera ti ons and assassinati ons that re su l ted in rel a tively small

nu m bers of f a t a l i ti e s . If terrorists con ti nue to use unconven ti onal we a pon s , as I bel i eve

t h ey wi ll ,these are the kinds of a t t acks that are prob a bly most likely, not the catastroph i c

a t t acks of ten de s c ri bed in the litera tu re .

Conclusion: “Dual-Use” Solutions

A nu m ber of a n a lysts have com p l a i n ed that mon ey is being thrown at the probl em and

that govern m ent is su cc u m bi n g, in the words of E hud Spri n z a k , a leading Is raeli sch o l a r

on terrori s m , to a “great su perterrorism scare .”5 Th ere has been no analysis to date of

the ri s k - versu s - rew a rd trade - of fs that po l i c ym a kers are making, and the po s s i ble negative reperc u s s i ons of a n ti terrorism policies for human health, c ivil liberti e s , forei gn po li c y, and the prob a bi l i ty of terrorism itsel f .These studies are needed .

In the meanti m e , it is incumbent on govern m ents to re s pond with pru den ce ,n o t

p a ra n oi a . It would be irre s pon s i ble to ign ore the dangers of c a t a s trophic attack s , given

the eroding con s traints de s c ri bed .But it is equ a lly irre s pon s i ble to ign ore the more likely

t h re a t s , wh i ch invo lve conven ti onal we a pon s ,a t t acks perpetra ted by insiders at indu strial or food - processing fac i l i ti e s , and the use of c ru de devi ces to del iver CB agents or indu s trial poi s on s . Because the magn i tu de of the catastrophic threat is so difficult to

c a l c u l a te , it makes sense to focus on “du a l - u s e”rem ed i e s . These inclu de pursuing medical co u n term e a su res that wi ll improve human health, rega rdless of wh et h er major bi ol ogical attacks ever occ u r; i m proving ep i dem i o l ogical su rvei ll a n ce for hu m a n ,a n i m a l ,

and plant diseases; i n c reasing com p l i a n ce with the Cen ters for Disease Con tro l ’s reg u l ati ons rega rding “report a bl e” diseases and labora tory safety and sec u ri ty; u pgrading sec uri ty at border cro s s i n gs ; and finding altern a tive em p l oym ent for form er Sovi et W M D

s c i en ti s t s .

N o t e s

1. The idea that terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead, was popularized by Brian Jenkins in “International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict,” in I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Terrorism and World Security, ed. David Carlton and Caolo Schaerf (London: Croom Helm,

1975), 15.

2. This discussion of the CSA summarizes Jessica Stern, “The Covenant, the Sword, and the

Arm of the Lord,” in Toxic Terror, ed. Jonathan Tucker (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000).

3. Robert S. Robbins and Jerrold M. Post, Political Paranoia (New Haven, Conn.: Yale

University Press, 1997), 140.

4. The material on Larry Harris is taken from Jessica Stern, “Larry Wayne Harris,” in T o x i c

T e r r o r , ed. Tucker.

5. Ehud Sprinzak, “Terrorism, Real and Imagined,” Washington Post, August 19, 1998.

About the Contributors

The WMD Terror Debate 6 3
6 5

David Albright isthe president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C.

Gary Bertsch is a professor and director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the

University of Georgia in Athens, Georgia.

Shaun Gregory is a senior lecturer in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.

Alastair Iain Johnston is a professor of government at Harvard University in Cambridge, Massac h u s e t t s .

Geoffrey Kemp is the director of the Regional Strategic Program at The Nixon Center in Washington, D.C.

Igor Khripunov is the associate director of the Center for International Trade and Security at the

University of Georgia in Athens, Georgia. 

Jean Krasno is the associate director of United Nations Studies at Yale, Yale University, in New

Haven, Connecticut, and executive director of the Academic Council on the United Nations System (ACNUS).

Deepa Ollapally is a program officer in the Grant Program and an expert on nuclear nonproliferation and South Asian security affairs at the United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C.

Kevin O’Neill is deputy director of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, D.C.

Vladimir Orlov is the founder and director of the Center for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR Center)

in Moscow.

John Simpson is the program director of the Programme to Promote Nuclear Nonproliferation at

the University of Southampton in the United Kingdom.

Richard Speieris an independent consultant on the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their delivery systems. He is based in Reston, Virginia.

Jessica Eve Stern is a lecturer at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

James Sutterlin is distinguished fellow in United Nations Studies at Yale, Yale University, in New

Haven, Connecticut, and director of the Yale Oral History Project on the United Nations.

Jean Pascal Zanders is the director of the Chemical and Biological Warfare Project of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Sweden.

About the Contributors
6 6

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