## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS OF TE XAS
N O . P D - 0462- 07 TH E ST A TE O F T EX A S

v . D A V I D M O R A LE S, A ppe l l ant ON S TATE ’ S PET I TI ON FOR DI S CRETI ON ARY REVI EW FROM THE EI GH TH CO URT O F AP PEALS

EL P ASO CO UNTY P RI CE , J. , de l i ve r e d t he opi ni on o f t he C our t i n w hi c h K EL LER , P. J. , and M E YE RS , J OHNS ON , K EASLE R , H ERVEY , H OL C OM B and C OCHRAN , J J ., jo in e d . W OMACK , J. , f i l ed a c onc ur r i ng o pi ni on. O P I N I O N T he appe l l antw as i ndi ct ed fort he off ens es of aggr avat ed s exual as s aul t of a c hi l d and i ndece ncy w i t h a chi l d. I n a si ngl e t r i al , a j ur y found t he appe l l antgui l t yof bot h offe ns es and

a ss e ss e d h is p u n ish m e n t a t th irty -f iv e y e a rs’ c o n f

in e m e n t f

o r th e a g g ra v a ted se x u a l as sa u lt offe n s e a n d t wen t yy e a r s ’ c o n f i n e me n t f

o r t h e i n d e c e n c yo f

f e n s e . Th e a p p e l l a n t a p p eal ed his con vict i on based on t he t ri al cou rt ’s refusal t o grant a chall eng e for c a u se againstMorales — 2

1 The appellant

r a is e d thr e e p o ints o f

e r r o r o na p p e a l. F ir s t, h e a s s e rte d

th at t h e tria l c ourt err ed in deny

ing theappellant’ s challeng e for causeag ainst Wy att. Second, the appellant claimed that the trial cour

t erre d in de nying his moti on for ne w trial alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel on the groun d s th at trial counsel f ailed to exercise a

pere mptory

challeng e on Wyatt and ther eby failed to pre serve the trial court’s de nial of the c halleng e for causefor a

ppeal. F inally , the appe llant c la ime d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l ba se d o n h is t

ri a l c ouns e l’ s fa ilure , amon goth e r t hin g s, to use a pe remptory challeng e ag ainst Wyatt beca use trial counsel failed to re ad her juror questionnaire which, the a

ppellant claimed, c ontained information that should h av e aler ted trial counse l (for re a so ns a pa rt from he r e mpl oy

me nt a s an a ssi sta

nt dis tric t atto rn e y

) t hat it wo uld be a pp ro priate to e x e r c i s e a p e r e mp t o r

y c h a l l e n g e t o k e e p W yatto f f o f th e j ur y. 2 Mo ra le s v . S tate , 217 S.W .3d 731 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2007). 3 T EX . R. A PP . P. Rul e 66.3(c ). p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r R o b yn W ya t t , a n E l P a s o C o u n t y a s s i s t a n t d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y, a n d , s e c o n d l y, he makes a cl ai m of i neff ect ive assistan ce of couns el on t he par t of hi s t r i al at t or ney s for fai l i ng t o pr es er ve t he cha l l enge f or caus e for appea l

. T he Ei ght h C our tof A ppeal s r ever s ed 1
t he t r i al court ’s ju d g m entof convi ct i on bas ed on t he appe l l ant ’ s i neff ect i ve as s i s t ance of

c o u n se l cla im , an d re m a n d e d th e c a u se f o r a n e w trial. 2 W e gr ant ed t he St at e Pr os ecut i ng A t t or ney ’ s [SPA ] pet i t i on fordi s cr et i onar yr evi ew t o det er m i ne w het heran ass i s t antdi s t r i ctat t or neyw ho has not been s how n t o be di s qual i fi ed t o s er ve on t he j ur ybeca us e of a ctual bi as i s never t hel es s di s qual i fi ed t o s er ve bec aus e of a n im p li ed b ias. A lt ern ati v ely , w e g ran ted d iscreti o n ary rev iew to d eterm ine w h ethe r t h e c o u rt

o f ap p ea ls erred in f

ail ing to co n side r w h ethe r t ri al co u n sel’s fa il u re to u se a p ere m p tory

c h a l l e n g e a g a i n s t Wy a t t wa s a s t r a t e g i c d e c i s i o n . Wi t h o u t r e a c h i n g t h e f i r s t q u e s t i o n , we 3 hol d t hatt he cour t of appe al s er r ed i n hol di ng, atl eas t on t he bas i s t hati t di d, t hatcouns elMorales — 3

4 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 35.16. 5 Alle n v . S tate , 108 S.W. 3d 28 1, 28 2 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 20 03 ); Fe ldm an v . S tate71 S.W .3d 738, 744 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). re n d e re d in e f

f e c tiv e a ss ista n c e o f

c o u n se l. F ACT S AND P ROCE DURAL P OS TU RE

A t T ri al O n e o f t h e p r o s p e c t i v e j u r o r s s u m m o n e d f o r t h e j u r y t r i a l i n t h i s c a s e w a s R o b yn W y a t t , wh o wa s a p r o s e c u t o r i n t h e El P a s o Co u nt y D i s t r i c t At t o r n e y ’ s Of f i c e , t h e s a me offi ce t hatw as pr os ecut i ng t he appe l l ant
. D u ri n g v o i r di r e, W y at t m ai nt ai ned w i t hout cont r adi ct i on t hats he coul d be fa i r and i m par t i al des pit e h erempl oy m entand her acqua i nt ance w i t h t he St at e’ s pr os ecut or s , i nves t i gat o rs, l aw enfor cement per s onnel , t he j udge, and def

ens e couns el

. A ddi t i onal ly , W y att s t at ed t hats he had notw or ked on t he appel l ant ’ s cas e. T he appel l ant , how ever , chal l enged W y at t for caus e, ar gui ng t hats he w as

an ac t ual par t y t o t he cas e beca us e s he w as a m ember of t he di s t r i ctat t or ney ’ s offi ce. T he t r i al j udge de n ied the appel l ant ’ s chal l enge, not i ng t hatW y at t w as not s how n t o be bi as ed and t hatA r t i cl e 35. 16 of t he C ode of Cri m i nal Pr ocedur e does not m ake he r s ubj ectt o a

c h a l l e n g e f

o r c a u s e b a s e d s o l e l yu p o n h e r o c c u p a t i o n a s a n a s s i s t a n t d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y . As 4 th e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls no ted , th e a p p e llan t d id n o t p ro p e rly p re se rv e e rro r, if a n y , b e c a u se h is t r i al couns el di d not exer ci s e a per empt or y chal l enge on W y at t
. W y at t s ubs equent l ys er ved 5

a s th e p re sid in g ju ro r o n th e ju ryth a t co n v icte d th e a p p e llan t.Morales — 4

T h e a p p ell an t fi led a m o ti o n fo r ne w tr ial in w h ich h e a ll e g e d , in te r a lia , t hatt r i al

couns el w er e i neff

ect i ve i n fai l i ng t o pr es er ve t he t r i al cour t ’ s er r or i n deny i ng hi s chal l enge fo r ca u se a g ains t W y att
. A tt ac h ed to the m o ti o n w ere af fid av it s fro m b o th o f th e a p p ell an t’ s t r i al at t or ney s i n w hi ch t hey s ai d t hat t hey “l eft [W y at t ] on t he j ur yw i t hout l ooki ng at ” her juro r qu esti o n n aire. L ea d co u n sel ex p lai n ed in h is aff idav itthat h e f

ail ed to ex am ine W y att ’s ques t i onnai r e bef

or e t r i al beca us e he a s s um ed t hat s he w oul d “aut om at i cal l y ” be s t r uck b e c a u se o f

h e r sta tu s a s a n a ss ista n t d istric t atto rn e y b u t th a t th e y“ w e re c o n f ro n ted w ith

s ever al bad choi ces w hen [t hey ] had t o m ake t he s t r i kes ” at t he end of vo ir d ir e, an d t hey

m ade t he choi ce t o r et ai n heron t he j ur y
— agai n, w i t hout fi r s t exami ni ng herques t i onnai r e. H e m a in tain e d th a t h a d h e re a d W y a tt’s q u e stio n n a ire , h e w o u ld h a v e e x e rc ise d o n e o f h is per empt or ychal l enges agai ns t herbeca u se o f the “magni t ude” of herconnec t i ons t o l aw enfor cement ( herfat herhad bee n a pol i ce of fi cerfor33 y ear s , and s he had “m any , m any fri end s” i n law enfo rcem ent, according t o her q uest i on nair e), and becau se of t he fa ct (al so cont ai ned i n W y at t ’ s ques t i onnai r e) “t hats he w as r epea t edl yt he vi ct i m of num er ous cr i m es ( i ncl udi ng s ex cr i m es ) [. ] ” B ot h at t or ney s s ai d i n t hei r aff i davi t s t hat t hei r fai l ur e t o s t r i ke W y a tt h a d a m o u n ted to in e f f e c tiv e a ss ista n c e o f

c o u n se l. T he t r i al cour t hel d a hear i ng on t he mot i on fornew t r i al

. B ot h of t he appe l l ant ’ s t r i al at t or ney s t es t i fi ed. L ead c ouns el t es t i fi ed t hat h e u n d erstood t he pr oces s of pr es er vi ng a

c h a llen g e f

o r c a u s e f

o r a p p e a l w e ll an d c o u ld e a silyh a v e p re se rv e d th e d e n ial o f h is

c h a llen g e f

o r c a u se a g a in st W y a tt b yp e re m p to rilyc h a llen g in g h e r, e x h a u stin g h isMorales — 5

per empt or i es , and i dent i fy i ng s ever al j ur o rs w hom he found obj ect i onabl e. H e coul d not expl ai n hi s fai l ur e t o per empt or i l y chal l enge W y at t : “I t w as a dec i s i on t hatI ki nd of m ade in a v ac u u m . * * * [B ]ec au se I h a d d ec ided that sh e w o u ld b e struc k an y w ay , I ne v er— I

m ade t h e mi s t a k e o f n e v e r , e v e r l o o k i n g a t h e r s h e e t
. ” He a s s u me d h i s c o - c o u n s el had exami ned W y at t ’ s ques t i onnai r e. H e deni ed t hat t he deci s i on t o r et ai n W y at t on t he j ur yhad been a “s t r at egi c” one , t hough he r eadi l y admi t t ed on cr os s - exami nat i on t hat he “di d m ake a dec i s i on t hatday , cl ear l y , t o not s t r i ke her

. ” “I j us t

— I can’ t r eal l yunder s t and how w e l eft heron t he j ur y . ” H e opi ned t hatforanydefe ns e couns el t o l eave “a l aw y erfort he St at e” on

a c ri m in a l ju ry w a s “ p e r s e , in e f f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e o f

c o u n s e l.” F o r he r pa rt , co -co u n sel t esti fied that sh e h ad n o t l o o k ed at W y att ’s qu esti o n n aire eit h er an d had s i m pl ydefe r r ed t o l ead c ouns el ’ s i m pr om pt u deci s i on not t o exer ci s e a p e re m p to ryc h a llen g e a g a in st h e r. S h e a lso d e n ied th a t th e re h a d b e e n a n ystra teg ic j us t i fi cat i on forr et ai ni ng W y at t on t he j u ry . E ven w i t hout havi ng l ooked atW y at t ’ s j ur or q u e stio n n a ire , co -c o u n se l f irst a ss e rte d , sh e sh o u ld h a v e “ in sis ted ” th a t th e yp e re m p to rily

c h a llen g e h e r, an d sh e b e liev e d th a t sh e h a d re n d e re d in e f f e c tiv e a s s is ta n c e o f

c o u n se l in fa il ing to d o so . B u t sh e co n ce d ed o n cro ss-ex am ination that W y att ’s reten ti o n o n the ju ry h a d n o t b e e n a p ro d u c t o f a c c id e n t o r in a d v e r ten c e , b u t a c o n sc io u s c h o ice . A n d it w a s in fai l i ng t o r ead t he ques t i onnai r e, s he m ai nt ai ned on cr os s - exami nat i on, t hatt heyhad er r ed. “M yer r or w as t hatI di d not poi nt out t o [l ead c ouns el ]

— beca us e I had n o t read t he [qu e s t i o n n a i r e ] , I d i d n o t p o i n t o u t t o h i m t h a t we wer e l e a v i n g a p e r s o n o n t h e p a n el w hoMorales — 6

6 Judg e Medrano was actua lly the elected judge of the 409 Judicial District Court, in which th the appe llant was tried. Howeve r, he did not actua lly preside over the appellant’ s trial. Instead, the Honora ble Judg e Peter

S. Peca, Jr., presided. h a d e x p e ri e n c e w ith s e x o f f e n s e s .” T h e S tate c a lled Ju d g e S a m M e d ra n o , J r. to th e sta n d

. M e d ra n o tes tifie d th a t w h ile 6 th e ju ry w a s d e lib e ra tin g a t th e g u iltp h a se o f th e a p p e llan t’s tria l, l e a d c o u n se l ca m e in to h is chamber s and st r uck up a conver s at i on, w onder i ng w hyt he j ur yw as del i ber at i ng fors o l ong. M e d ra n o re p lied th a t “w h e n a p ro se c u to r is th e p re sid in g ju ro r, I w o u ld a ss u m e it’s g o in g to t ake a w hi l e bef

or e t heycome back w i t h ques t i ons or a ver di ct [. ] ” M edr ano t hen t es t i fi ed: A

. He i n d i c a t e d t o me t h a t i t was a d e c i s i o n o n t h e i r p a r t t o l eave [ W y a tt] o n th e ju ry . T h e re w e re c e rta in f a c to rs th a t w e re tak e n in to a c c o u n t. H e in d ica ted , a n d I d o n ’t k n o w th e n a m e o f th e ju ro r th a t h e ’s ta lk in g a b o u t, but t hat t her e w as a m al e j ur or w ho w as col l ege- educa t ed fr om L oui s i ana a nd w as a R epubl i can, and t hat w as a per s on t hat t hey fel t t hey neede d t o str ike m or e t han R oby n W y at t , and t hatM s . W y at t w as a pr os ecut or t hatt heyhad deal t w i t h i n t he off

i ce w ho w as as fai r a pr os ecut or as t hey ’ ve ever deal t w i t h, and t hatt heyfel t co m fo rt ab l e w i t h herbei ng a j ur or i n t hi s cas e bec aus e of their w o rkin g relati o n sh ip w it h h er a s a p rose cu tor. Q

. So he t ol d y ou t hat he had t aken i nt o acc ount t he fa ctt hats he w as a p rose cu tor an d m ad e a d ec isi o n to leav e h er o n as a juro r? A

. Y es. * * * A . H e in d ica ted th a t sh e w a s o n e o f th e f e w p ro se c u to rs th a t h e ’s d e a lt w i t h t hathe cons i der ed t o be fa i r - m i nded. O n cr os s - exami nat i on, M edr ano ac know l edged t hat , w er e he a ct i ng i n t he capa ci t yof a defe ns e l aw y er , “t he onl y r eas on I w oul d l eave s om eone w i t h [W y at t ’ s ] ques t i onnai r e on [aMorales — 7

7 As of the time of the hea ring , May 12, 2005, a trial c ourt was not per mitted to sum marize, discuss, or comment on the e videncein ruling on a motion for new tria l. Seeformer T EX . R. A PP . P. Ru l e 2 1

. 8 (b) (“In rulingon a motion for new trial, the cour

t must notsummarize, discuss, or comment on evidenc e.”) . The rulehas since be en ame nded, ef fec tive J anuar

y 1, 2007, to allow the tria l c ourt to m ake or a l or

writt e n f inding s o f f

a c t. cr i m i nal j ur y ] i s i f I had s om e per s onal i ns i ght into t hatper s on t hat ’ s not i ncl uded i n t he q u e s tio n n a ir e .” R eca l l ed t o t he s t and, l ead c ouns el admi t t ed t hathe had made t he expl anat i on t o J udge M edr ano. B ut he el abor at ed:

A

. I h o n estl y d o n o t k n o w w h y w e did no t str ike [ W y att ]. I j u st do n ’t know

. I s t i l l , t o t hi s day

— [co- couns el ] and I have s atdow n and t al ked about i t
. T her e w er e ot herpeopl e w e s t r uck i ns t ead, i ncl udi ng, per haps , t he per s on t h a t J u d g e M e d r a n o wa s me n t i o n i n g wh o I c a n n o t e v e n r e me mb e r n o w. B u t th e th in g is, is th a t w e d id m a k e a d e c isi o n n o t to strik e h e r, b u t I do not bel i eve, bet w een [ co- couns el ] and I , t her e w as anyext ended di s cus s i on or any t hi ng abouti t
. W e’ r e j us t t her e r i ght i n fr ont of t he C o u rt , and I t hi nk I s ai d t o [co- couns el ] , “Let ’ s s t r i ke som eone el s e, t hi s ot herguy , I gues s , ” and t hat ’ s w hat

— s he s ai d okayand t hat ’ s w hathappene d. I t h ink I w as less th an ca n d id to Ju d g e M ed ran o b e c a u s e I w asn ’t t es t i fy i ng and I w as n’ t

— I w as j us t t r y i ng t o put t he bes t fac e on i t t hat I coul d. A ft erhear i ng ar gum ent , t he t r i al cour t deni ed t he appe l l ant ’s m o ti o n fornew t r i al w i t hout

c o m m e n t. 7 O n A ppeal F o r th e f irst tim e o n a p p e a l, th e a p p e ll a n t b e g a n to a rg u e th a t th e trial c o u rt sh o u ld have gr ant ed t he cha l l enge f or caus e aga i ns t W y at t beca us e her s t atus as an as s i s t antdi s t r i ct at t or neyr ender ed herbi as ed as a mat t erof l aw and t hatheri nclus ion on t he j ur ydepr i vedMorales — 8

8 Neither during voir dire nor in his motion for new tria l did the appellant expressly invoke e ith e r o f t he se c on sti tut ion a l prov isi on s a s a uth ority fo r h is c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e a g a ins t Wyatt. 9 Mo ra le s v . S tate , su pra , at 733. 10 Id . at 736. 11 Id

. 12 Nominally , the cour

t of appe als sustained both the appe llant’s second a nd third points of error, inasmuch a s eac h ra i s eda cla im of ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel. Id . But the c ourt of appea ls simply did not addre ss the appe llant’s further contention, made a s a par t of his third point t he appe l l antof hi s r i gh t to an i m par t i al j ur yas guar ant eed byt he Si xt h A m endment and A r t i cl e I, Sect i ons 10 and 15 of t he T exas C ons t i t ut i on. T he cour t of appe al s r ej ect ed t he 8

a p p e llan t’s c o n ten tio n th a t th e trial c o u rt’s d e n ial o f th e c h a llen g e f

o r c a u se w a s itse lf

r ever s i bl e er r or beca us e t r i al couns el fai l ed t o pr es er ve t hater r or byper empt or i l ys t r i ki ng W y at t
. B ut t he cour t of appea l s pr ocee ded t o hol d t hatW y at t w as , i n fac t , i m pl i edl ybi as ed

9

a s a m a tter o f

law , an d th a t trial c o u n se l re n d e re d d e f icie n t p e rf

o rm a n c e “ b y f

a ili n g to pr es er ve t he erro r of t he deni al of hi s chal l enge f or caus e. ” B eca us e t hatdefi ci ent

10 p erf o rm an ce “re su lt ed in a tr ial b ef o re a p arti al ju ry , ” the ap p ell an t suf fe red p rejud ice. In 11

com ing to this r es ul t , t he cour t of appe al s di d not expr es s l yaddr es s t he mer i t s of t he appel l ant ’ s t hi r d poi nt of er r or , i n w hi ch he a r gued t hathi s t r i al couns el w er e al s o i neff ect i ve i n f a i l i ng t o us e a pe r e mpt or y c ha l l e ng e t o s t r i ke W y a t t , no t j us t be c a us e of he r st at us as a pr os ecut or , but al s o beca us e of t he i nfor m at i on cont ai ned on her j ur or ques t i onnai r e, about

w h ich trial c o u n se l w e re ig n o ra n t. 12Morales — 9

of er ror, that tria l counsel would havepere mptorily challeng ed Wyatt, quite i n d ep en d ently of her status as a prose cutor, on the ba sis of her ties to law e nforc ement and he r criminal victimi zation, had they known about those c ircumstance s from reviewing her que stionnaire, and that failingto rea d that qu e sti onna ir e wa s it se lf

a manif e statio n of ine ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Ind e e d, it wa s ma inl y in s up po rt

of thi s latte r c onte nti on th at th e app ella nt p ro ff e re d h is a ff

ida vit s and te sti mony

in h is mot ion fo r ne w tri a l. H e did

no t be g in e xpre ssl y

to a rgue thedo c trineof

“ imp lie d b ia s” untila

pp e a l. 13 455 U.S. 209 (1982). 14 Id. at 222. 15 Id. I n hol di ng t hat t r i al couns el per for m ed defi ci ent l y by al l ow i ng W y at t t o s er ve on t he j ur yw hen hers t atus as a pr os ecut or r ender ed her bi as ed as a mat t erof l aw undert he i m pl i ed bi as doct r i ne, t he cour t of appe al s r el i ed hea vi l yupon J us t i ce O ’ C onnor ’ s concu r r i ng opi ni on i n Sm i t h v. P hi l l i

ps . T h e re , J u stic e O ’C o n n o r n o ted th a t, ev e n th o u g h a h e a rin g w ill u su a lly 13

s a t i s f yt h e d i c t a t e s o f

d u e p r o c e s s i n f

e r r e t i n g o u tb i a s e d j u r o r s , s h e b e l i e v e d “ s o me e x t r e me

s i t uat i ons . . . w oul d j us t i fya fi ndi ng of i m pl i ed bi as . ” I n t hatevent , no s how i ng of ac t ual 14 b ias w o u ld be requ i red t o just i fyt he ex erci se of a ch al l eng e for cause. O ne such exam p le t ha t J u s t i c e O’ Con n o r g a v e o f a n i mpl i e d b i a s was a j u r o r who i s a n e mpl o y e e of t he pr os ecut i ng agenc y . U ndert he doct r i ne of im p li ed bi as , a pr os pect i ve j ur or m us t be 15

ex cus ed fr om j ur ys er vi ce e ven i f he c ons i s t ent l ym ai nt ai ns t hathe coul d be fa i r and i m par t i al , as W y at tdi d. In its p e tit io n f

o r d isc re tio n a ryre v iew , the S P A n o w a rg u e s th a t th e c o u rt o f a p p e a ls

er red t o hol d t hatW y at t w as chal l engea bl e forcaus e undert he i m pl i ed bi as doct r i ne. T heMorales — 10

16 T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 35.16(a)(9) (“A challeng e for cause may be made by either the state or the de fe n s e f

o r any o n e o f th e f

o ll o w in g r e a s o n s : * * * 9

. T h at th e ju r o r h a s a bias or prejudicein favor of

or ag ainst the defe ndant.”)

. 17 Id . art. 35.16(c )(1) (“Achalleng e for causemay

be madeby

the def ense f or a ny of the follow in g r e a s o n s : 1

. T h at h e is r e late d w it h in th e th ird d e gr e e o f c o n s an gu in it y o r a f finity , as deter mined under Chapte r 573, Gove rnment Code, to the person injured by the commission of the SPA ar gues i n t he al t ernat i ve t hat , even a cce pt i ng t he i m pl i ed bi as doct r i ne, t he co ur t of appea l s er r ed t o hol d t hatt r i al couns el coul d not have made a l egi t i m at e s t r at egi c dec i s i on t o for ego an a ppel l at e cl ai m s t em m i ng fr om t he deni al of hi s chal l enge f or caus e i n t he i nt er es t of obt ai ni ng an over al l j ur ym or e t o hi s l i ki ng. W e agree w i t h t he SPA ’ s l at t er

ar gum ent ; t her efor e, w e r ever s e and r emand. A N A L Y S IS T he Si x t h A m endm ent D oct ri ne of I m pl i ed B i as A rt i cl e 35

. 16 of the T exas C od e of C ri m i nal P rocedu re per m i t s chal l eng es for cause to th e p a rties in a c rim in a l p ro se c u tio n u n d e r c e rta in , sp e c if ied c irc u m sta n c e s. E ith e r p a rty

m aychal l enge a pr os pect i ve j ur or forcaus e, forexampl e, i f “t he j ur or has a bi as or pr ej udi ce i n favorof oragai ns t t he d efendant [. ] ” T he appe l l antm ade no s how i ng i n t hi s cas e t hat 16 W y at t w as actual l ybi as ed aga i ns t hi m . A nybi as on herpar t w oul d t here fo re have t o be pr es um ed byvi r t ue of he r r el at i on t o the p rosecut i ng ent i t y . A r t i cl e 35. 16 does r ecogni ze

s om e ca t egor i es of pr es um ed or im pl i ed bi as as a bas i s fora cha l l enge f or caus e. For i ns t ance , t he def

ens e may chal l enge a pr os pect i ve j ur or for caus e w ho “i s r el at ed w i t hi n t he t hi r d degr ee of cons angui ni t y or aff i ni t y . . . t o any pr os ecut or i n t he cas e[

. ]” A s the t r i al 17Morales — 11

offe nse, or to any

prosec utory

in the case [.] ”). 18 In h is c on c ur

ri ngop ini on , J ud g e Woma c k d isa gre e s. In h is v ie w, pr os pe c tiv e juror Wyatt was c halleng eablefor c ause unde r Article35.16(c) (1). See not e 1 7, an te . W yattwa s , i nJ u d ge Womack’s view, “ related in the zero degree of consanguinity to a prosec utor in the ca se—she was a prose cutor in the c ase, a s was eve ry other prosecutor in the Dis trict Attorney ’s offic e.” We do not rea d the statutory provision this way . In our view the provision refe rs to the elec ted District Attorney and any assistant distr i ctattorneys actively involved in prosecuting“the c ase”at trial. I f the L eg islature had intended to make all assistant district attorney s challeng eable for cause , we do not think it would have chosen to do so in such a n indirect wa

y
— i n a provision that refe rs to fam ily re latio ns hip s o f p ro sp e c tiv e juror s to thepa rt ie s o n tria l. We note that, up until the 1965 Code of Criminal Procedure , a def endant c ould challeng e for c a u s e any p r o s p e c t i v e j ur o r wh o w a s “ r e l at e d w i th i nth e th i r d

d e gr e e o f c o n s an gu i n i ty o r

a f f i n i ty . . . to the private pr osecutor, if there be one.” SeeAr

t. 6 16 (1 92 5 Co de of

Crimi na l Pr oc e dure ); Ar

t. 6 9 2 (1911 Code of Criminal Proce dure) ; Art. 673 (1895 Code of Criminal Proce dure) ; Art. 636 (1879 Code of Criminal Proce dure) ; Art. 576 (1857 “Old Code” of Criminal Proce dure) . Effe ctive J anuar y 1, 1966, Article 35.16( c)( 1) wa s amende d to r ead as it c urre ntly does. SeeActs 1965, 59 th L eg ., ch. 722, p. 449, ef

f. Jan. 1, 1966. Thus, up until 1966, no prospec tive juror who wa s relate d to a pr os e c uto r who wa s r e gula rl y e mpl oye d b y

thedis tric t atto rn e y

(a s o pp os e d to a

“ private pr os e c uto r”) wa s ma de e xpre ssl y c ha lle ng e a

blefo r c a us e un de r t

he statut e . I f w e we reno w t o con s tru e th e 1 966 amendment to cove r eve ry prosec utor in a district attorney ’s offic e, then the defe ndant could succ essfully challeng e for

causeas impli ed l y

biased, for

example, the nephew

of the wife of a brand- new attorney in the appellate s ection of the El Paso County District Attorney ’s office—an attorney

who would haveno conce ivable involvement in the trial of “ the ca se” at all. See T EX . G OV ’ T C ODE §§ 573.025 and 573.023(c). Given the history of the provision, we do not thi nk the L eg islature could have intended suc h a broa d sweep. j udge not ed her e, how ever , not hi ng i n A r t i cl e 35. 16 expr es s l y r equi r es a t r i al cour t t o gr ant a cha l l enge f

or caus e agai ns t a pr os pect i ve j ur orw ho i s an as s i s t antdi s t r i ctat t or neyi n t he

s ame offi ce t hat i s pr os ecut i ng t he defe ndant , but w ho has no per s onal i nvol vement i n t hat pr os ecut i on. N or w as W y at t even a r guabl ys how n t o b e ch all en geabl e forcaus e on t he

18 bas i s of anyot herpr ovi s i on of A r t i cl e 35. 16. So, w hi l e i t coul d per haps be ar gued t hatt he trial c o u rt c o u ld

hav e exerci sed i t s di scr et i on t o g rantt he ap pell ant’ s chal l eng e for cause agai ns t W y at t , i t does not appea r t hat t he t r i al cour t abus ed i t s di s cr et i on i n anyw ayt o denyMorales — 12

19 It h a s b e e n d e b ate d wh e th e r Arti c le 3 5
. 1 6 p r o v id e s an e xc lu s iv e list. Co mp a re Moorev. Sta te , 542 S.W .2d 664, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), an d M as on v . S tate , 9 0 5 S. W. 2 d

5 7 0 , 5 7 7 ( T e x. Crim. App. 1995) (c ontendingthat Article 35.16 is not an e x clusive list), with Bu tle r v. S tate , 830 S.W .2d 125, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (decl ar ing that Article 35.16 is an e x clusive list). The instant writer ha s expressed the view that Article 35.16 is not an exclusive list. See M aldonado v. Sta te , 998 S.W .2d 239, 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (Price, J ., concur ring ). In any

event, wehave he ld t hat a tria l c ou rt is n ot required

to gra nt a c ha lle ng e fo r c a

us e that is no t e nu

me ra te d in Ar tic le 35.16. Id. at 248. Se eals o M as on v . S tate , 905 S.W .2d 570, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (citing Allri dge v . S

tate , 8 50 S.W. 2d

47 1, 48 4- 85 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 19 91 ); Nic ho ls v . S tate , 754 S.W .2d 18 5, 19 3 (T e x. Crim. Ap p. 19 88 )) (“ Cha lle ng e s whic h a reno t ba se d u

po n a ny gro un d s pe c if

ic a lly enumer ated in the statutes a re ordinarily

addre ssed to the sound discre tion of the trial judg e.”)

. 20 U. S. C O N ST . ame nd . V I& XIV, § 1 ; Duncan v . Louisi ana , 391 U.S. 145 (1968). 21 455 U.S. 209 (1982). su ch a c h all en g e— at l ea st as a statuto rym att er. 19 B u t t h a t i s n o t t h e l a s t w o r d

. T h e S i x t h A m e n d m e n t p r o m i s e o f “ a n i m p a r t i a l j u r y” appl i es t o t he s t at es . R egar d less o f w hatA r t i cl e 35. 16 pr ovi des , a s t at e cour t w oul d be 20 b o u n d to g ran t a ch all en g e f o r ca u se if the fa il u re t o d o so w o u ld resu ltin a b iased jury

. If t he Si xt h A m endment di ct at es t hat t he ser vi ce of a pros pect i ve j ur or i n a cr i m i nal cas e w ho is an a ss ista n t d istric t a tto rn e y w o rk in g in th e sa m e o f f ice a s the p ro se c u to r in th e c a se w o u ld

nece s s ar i l ycaus e t he j ur yt o be bi as ed, t hen a c hal l enge f or caus e on t hat bas i s ought t o be g ra n ted w h e th e r th e sta tu te w o u ld re q u ire it o r n o t. For t hi s r eas on, t he cour t of appe al s focus ed on the Si xt h A m endment doct r i ne of

“ im p lied b ias ,” to a sk w h e th e r W y a tt’s sta tu s a s a ss ista n t d istric t atto rn e ya u to m a tica lly

r ender ed t he appe l l ant ’ s j ur yi m par t i al

. A nd, m or e par t i cul ar l y , t he cour t of appe al s zer oed i n on J us t i ce O ’ C onnor ’ s s epar at e conc ur r i ng opi ni on i n Sm i t h v. P hi l l i ps . In th a t c a s e , a 21Morales — 13

22 Id . at 212. 23 Id . at 212-13. 24 Id . at 215. 25 Id . at 215-17. 26 Id . at 21 5 (“ Th is Court ha s long he ld that the re me dy fo r al le g atio ns of juror pa rt ia lity is a hearing in whic h the def

endant ha s the opportunity to prove a ctual bias.” ). j ur or i n a cr i m i nal t r i al appl i ed for a j ob as an i nves t i gat or w i t h t he D i s t r i ctA t t or ney ’ s O ffi ce t hatw as pr os ecut i ng t he cas e. T he pr os ecut or s di s cover ed t hi s fac t dur i ng t r i al , but di d not 22 di s cl os e i t t o Phi l l i ps ’ s at t or ney s unt i l aft ert he j ur y had r etur ned a ver di ct
. Phi l l i ps ar gued 23
t hathi s convi ct i on s houl d be r ever s ed, n o tw it hs t andi ng t he pr os pect i ve j ur or ’ s as s ur ance s dur i ng voi r di r e t hathe coul d be fa i r and i m par t i al. A cc o r di ng t o Phi l l i ps , w hen t he prospecti ve j uror subsequ entl y app l i ed for em ploy m ent i n t he prosecut or’ s off i ce, h is

a s s u r a n c e s c ou l d no l on g e r b e t r u s t e d , a n d h e s h o u l d b e p r e s u me d b i a s e d

. Th e S u p r e me 24 C o u rt h e ld th a t, at lea st a s a m a tter o f th e D u e P ro c e ss C lau se ’s g u a ra n tee o f a f a ir tr ia l, it

w as not n ec ess ar yt o pr es um e t hatt he pr os pect i ve j ur or had bee n par t i al

. A l l t hatw as 25

n e c e ss a ryto sa tisf

yd u e p ro c e ss w a s a n o p p o rtu n ity , af ter th e f a c t, fo r P h ill ip s to d e m o n stra te that t he pr os pect i ve j ur or had ac t ual l ybeen bi as ed on ac countof hi s appl i cat i on for

e m p lo y m e n t. 26 J us t i ce O ’ C onnor j oi ned t he maj or i t yopi ni on i n Sm i t h v. P hi l l i ps , b ut w rote s e p a ra tely t o expr es s hervi ew t hatt he due- p roc ess h o l di ng cont ai ned t her ei n di d not “for ecl os e”Morales — 14

27 Id . at 221. 28 Id . at 222. 29 Id

. 30 464 U.S. 548, 556-57 (1984) ( Bla ckmun, J ., joined by Stevens and O’ Con n o r, J J ., c on c ur ri ng ) ( “ it r e ma ins wi thi n a tria l c ourt ’s op tio n, in d e te rm ini ngwh e the r a jur y wa s b ia se d, to or de r a po st- tria l he ari ng at wh ic h the mov ant h a s th e op po rt un ity to d e mon str ate a c tua l bi a s o r, in e xcepti on a l c ir c ums tanc e s, tha t th e fa c ts a

resu c h that bia s is to b e inf e rr e d. ” ); id . at 558 (B renna n, J., jo ine d b y

Mars ha ll, J., c on c ur

ri ng ) ( “ fo r a

c ourt to d e te rm inepr op e rl y

wh e the r b ia s e xists , it

mus t consider at least two questions: are the re a ny fac ts in the case sug g est i n g th atbias should be conclusively

presumed; and, if not, is it m ore probable than not that the jur or wa s actua lly biased ag ainst the litigant.” ). a p p lica tio n o f

th e S ix th A m e n d m e n t d o c trin e “ o f ‘im p lied b ias ’ u n d e r a p p ro p ria te

c irc u m sta n c e s.” S h e p o in ted o u t th a t so m e tim e s a p ro sp e c ti v e ju ro r’s o w n a b ili tyto 27

o b jec tiv e lyg a u g e h is im p a rtiali ty m a y b e im p a ire d , o r h e m a ye v e n h a v e a m o tiv e n o t to di s cl os e i t
. She cont i nued:

28 W hi l e ea ch ca s e m us t t ur n on i t s ow n fac t s , t her e ar e s om e ext r eme si t uat i ons t hatw oul d j us t i fya fi ndi ng of i m pl i ed bi as . Som e exa m pl es m i ght i ncl ude a r evel at i on t hatt he j ur or i s an actual empl oy ee of t he pr os ecut i ng agenc y , t hat t he j ur or i s a cl os e re l at i ve of one of t he par t i ci pant s i n t he t r i al or t he cr i m i nal t r ans act i on, or t hat the j ur or w as a w i t nes s or s om ehow i nvol ved i n t he cr i m i nal t r ans act i on. W het her or not t he s t at e pr ocee di ngs r es ul t i n a fi ndi ng of “no bi as , ” t he S i xt h A m endment r i ght t o an i m par t i al j ur y s houl d not al l ow a verdi ct t o st and un der such cir cum st ances. 29 J u s t i c e O’ Con n o r ’ s v i e w t h a t t h e Si x t h Am e n d me n t d o c t r i n e o f i mpl i e d b i a s s u r v i v e d t he

m aj or i t y ’ s due- pr oces s anal y s i s i n Sm i t h v. P hi l l i ps w as l at erendor s ed byfi ve mem ber s of t he C our t , al bei t i n s epar at e opi ni ons , i n McD onough P ow erE qui pm ent , I n c . v . Gr e e n w ood

. 30 I ndeed, t he Si xt h A m endment doct r i ne ca n be t r ace d back at l eas t as faras 1936, w henMorales — 15

31 United States v. W

ood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936). Se eFran k lin v . S tate , 138 S.W .3d 351, 363-64 (Te x . Crim. App. 2004) (Cochra n, J ., dissenting)

. 32 See United States v. Haynes , 3 9 8 F. 2 d 9 8 0 , 9 8 3 -9 8 4 (2 C i r. 1 9 6 8 ), ci t i n g United States v. nd Bu rr , 25 Fe d.Cas. 49 (C.C.Va. 1807). Without e x pressly invoking the Six th Amend m en t , C hief Justice Mar shall observe d in Bu rr , su pra , at 50: The e nd to be obtained is an impar tial jury ; to s ec ure this end, a man is prohibited from s e rv ingon

it who se c onne xion w itha pa rt y is s uc h a s to ind

uc e su sp ic ion

of his p art i a l i ty. T h e r e l at i o n s h i p m ay b e r e m o t e ; th e p e r s o n m ay n e v e r h av e s e e nth e p arty; he may de c larethat hefe e ls n o p re judice in t

he c a se ; and

ye t th e law c a

uti ou sly inc a pa c itate s h im f

ro m se rv ing on the jur

y be c a us e it su sp e c ts pr e

judic e , b e c a

us e in g ener al per sons in a simil ar situation would fe el pre judice. 33 Th e Se c on d, F if

th, Se ve nth , Ni nt h and

Te nth Cir c uit s se e m to have a c c e pte d th e Sixth Amendment implied bias doctrine w ithout qualification. E.g. , United States v. Torres , 128 F.3d 38, 45 -6 (2 Cir . 1 99 7) ; Brooks v. D retke , 4 4 4 F
. 3 d 3 2 8 ( 5 C i r . 2 0 0 6 ) ( O p i n i o no nr e h e ari ng ); So lis nd th v . Co c k re ll , 3 42 F .3 d 3 92 , 3 95 (5 Cir . 2 00 3) ; Un it ed Sta tes v. Sc ott , 854 F.2d 697, 700 ( 5 Cir. th th 19 88 ); Un ite d States v . Ne ll , 52 6 F .2 d 12 23 , 12 29 (5 Cir . 1 97 6) ; United States v. Poliche mi , 219 th F .3 d 6 98 , 704- 05 (7 Cir . 2 00 0) ; Hunley v . Godinez , 9 75 F .2 d 3 16 , 3 18 -1 9 ( 7 Cir . 1 99 2) ; Fields th th v . B ro wn , 503 F.3d 755, 770 ( 9 Cir. 2007), cert. de nied __ U.S. __, No. 07-8724 (April 14, 2008); th United States v. Gonzalez , 2 14 F .3 d 1 10 9, 11 12 (9 Cir . 2 00 0) ; Dye r v. Calderon , 151 F.3d 970, th 981-82 (9 Cir . 1 99 8) ; Tin sle yv . B or g , 8 95 F .2 d 5 20 , 5 26 -2 9 ( 9 Cir . 1 99 0) ; United States v. th th Eubanks , 5 91 F .2 d 5 13 , 5 17 (9 Cir . 1 97 9) ; United States v. Allsup , 5 6 6 F
. 2 d 6 8 , 7 1

- 7 2 ( 9 Cir. t h th 19 77 ); U n ite d S ta te s v . Ce rra to
-R e

yes , 17 6 F .3 d 1 25 3, 12 60 -6 1 ( 10 Cir . 1 99 9) ; Gonzales v. th Thomas , 9 9 F .3 d 9 78 , 9 87 (1 0 Cir . 1 99 6) ; Burton v. Johnson , 948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10 Cir. 1991). th th Ino n e o f th e s e c a s e s , o b s e r

v in gth at “ [t ]h e c o n c e p t o f im p li e d b ia s is w e ll

- e s ta

b li s h e d in th e la w [, ]” th e S e v e nthC i r c u i tC o urto f Ap p e a l s h e l d th at a 1 5

- ye ar e mp l o ye e o f th e Un i t e d S t at e s A tt o r

n e ys t he Supr eme C our t obs er ved t hat “[t ] he [Si xt h] A m endment pr es cr i bes no s peci fi c t es t s . T he bi as of a p rosp ec ti ve j ur or m aybe ac t ual or i m pl i ed; t hati s , i t m aybe bi as i n fac t or bi as concl us i vel ypr es um ed as a mat t erof l aw . ” Som e have t r ace d i t s genes i s t o C hi ef J us t i ce 31 M ar s hal l ’ s 1807 s emi nal opi ni on as a ci r cui t j udge i n t he A ar on B ur r t r eas on t r i al i n U ni t ed Stat es v. B urr . W hat everi t s pr ovenanc e, t he doct r i ne of i m pl i ed bi as has been r ecogni zed 32 and appl i ed bym anyof t he fe der al ci r cui t cour t s of appeal s , and by s om e of t he cour t s of 33Morales — 16

Offic e wa s biased as a

matter of la

w notwithstanding he r asse rtions that s h e could be f air a nd impartial. United States v. Poliche mi , su pra , at 705. 34 Ru ckma n v. St ate , 1 09 S.W. 3d 52 4, 52 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —T yle r 2 00 0, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Harve y v. Sta te , 123 S.W .3d 623, 631 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. re f’d)

. 35 The F ourth and Six th Circuits have tenta tively sug g ested that the implied bias doctrine might have be e n a

br og ate d, but the y have avo ide d re so lvi ng the iss ue by ho ldi ngthat it

wo uld no t a pp ly in any event to the fa cts prese nted in any of the c ases be forethem. E.g. , Con no r v . Polk , 407 F.3d 19 8, 20 6 n .4 (4 Cir . 2 00 5) ; Jones v . Cooper , 3 11 F.3 d 30 6, 31 2- 13 (4 Cir . 2 00 2) ; Fitzgerald v. th th Gree ne , 1 50 F .3 d 3 57 , 3 65 (4 Cir . 1 99 8) ; Person v. M iller , 854 F.2d 65 6 , 6 6 4 (4 Cir. 1988); t h th Johnson v. Luoma , 42 5 F .3 d 3 18 , 3 26 -2 7 ( 6 Cir . 2 00 5) ; Un ite d S tates v . F ro st , 125 F.3d 346, 380 th (6 Cir. 1997). th a p p e a l s i n T e x a s . A f e w o f t h e f

e d e r a l c i r c u i t c o u r t s h a v e p o i n t e d o u t t h a t t h e S u p r e me 34 C our t has neve r a ctual l yr ever s ed a c onvi ct i on on t he bas i s of i m pl i ed bi as and have ques t i oned w het hert he doct r i ne s ur vi ved S m i t h v. P hi l l i ps , not w i t hs t andi ng J us t i ce O ’ C onnor ’ s concur r i ng opi ni on. T hos e cour t s have ne ver t hel es s a s s u me d ( wi th out deci di ng) th a t th e d o c trin e re m a in s v ia b le , b u t h a v e h e ld th a t itd id n o t ap p lyto e sta b lish a S ix th A m endment vi ol at i on on t he par t i cul arfac t s pr es ent ed. 35 U l t i m at el y , w e nee d not deci de w het hert he Si xt h A m endment embra ces t he doct r i ne of i m pl i ed bi as ; nor do w e nee d t o deci de w het her , as J us t i ce O ’ C onnor bel i eves , t he i m pl i ed bi as doct r i ne w oul d r equi r e t he excl us i on fr om j ur y s er vi ce of a pros pect i ve j ur or w ho i s an empl oy ee of

t he pr os ecut i ng agenc y , as W y att w as. I n our vi ew , even a s s um i ng t hatt he

ans w ert o bot h ques t i ons w er e af firm ati v e, thatdoes not m ean t hatt he appe l l ant ’ s t r i al

couns el coul d not have made a l egi t i m at e t act i cal deci s i on not to exe rcise a p ere m p tory chal l enge i n or der t o pr es er ve t he t r i al cour t ’ s er r or i n over r ul i ng hi s chal l enge f or caus e forMorales — 17

36 Strickland v. W

ashington , 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 37 Id

. 38 Id . at 689. a p p e a l. W e h o ld th a t, i f th e e x ig e n c ie s o f

trial c a ll u p o n trial c o u n se l to m a k e a d if f icu lt ch o i c e b e t wee n e x e r c i s i n g a s c a r c e p e r e mpt o r y c h a l l e n g e t o p r e s e r v e s u c h a n er r or for app eal , o n th e on e han d, and exerci si ng t hat per em ptor ychall eng e for som e other pu rpose in o rde r to s ecur e a pe r cei ved adva nt age a t t r i al , on t he ot her , i t does not vi ol at e t he d e f e n d a n t’s S ix th A m e n d m e n t r ig h t to th e e f f e c tiv e a ss ista n c e o f c o u n se l f o r tria l co u n se l to

o p t fo r t h e latt er. I nef f ect i ve A s s i s t ance of

C ounsel A cl ai m of i neff

ect i ve as s i s t ance of couns el ent ai l s t w o component s . T he appe l l ant 36

m us t es t abl i s h bot h t hathi s t r i al couns el per fo rm ed defi ci ent l yand t hatt he def i ci ency oper at ed t o pr ej udi ce hi m . I n eval uat i ng the firs t component , r evi ew i ng cour t s m us t not 37

s econd- gues s l egi t i m at e s t r at egi c ort act i cal deci s i ons m ade byt r i al couns el i n t he m i ds t of t r i al , but i ns t ead “ m us t i ndul ge a s t r ong pr es um pt i on t hatcouns el ’ s conductfal l s w i t hi n t he

w i de rang e of reasona ble pr ofessi on al assi st ance[

. ]” T his m eans t hat unl ess t here i s a 38

r ecor d s uffi ci entt o demonst r at e t hat couns el ’ s conduct w as not t he pr oductof a s t r at egi c or t ac t i c a l d e c i s i o n , a r e v i e wi n g c o u r t s h o u l d p r e s u me t h a t t r i a l c o u n s e l ’ s p e r f o r ma n c e was

cons t i t ut i onal l yadequa t e “unless the chal l enged c onductw as s o out r ageous t hatnoMorales — 18

39 Go od sp e e d v . S tate , 187 S.W .3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (interna l quotation marks omitted).

40 De lri o v . S

tate , 840 S.W .2d 443, 445 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). 41 Id

. (“w e have rec ognized [the constitutional gua rante e of a

n impartial jury] t o be a right of the ac cused, which must be presse d in some fashion at trial be forereve rsal of his convic tion may be predic ated on its brea ch. Were this not the case, the court of a ppeals c ould simpl y

have r ever sed the conviction in the ca

use beca use a juror serve d who was not fa ir and impartial, irr espec tive of whe ther counsel took positive steps to preve nt it.”).

42 Id

. at4 4 6 , n . 4 , ci t i n g T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 3 5 .16(9) a nd (11) ( “No juror

shall be impaneled wh e n it a

p p e ar s th at th e ju

r o r is s u b je c t to th e s e c o n d , th ird o r f o urth gr o un d s for compet entat t or neyw oul d have e ngaged i n i t
. ” W e do not r egar d t he r ecor d i n t hi s cas e as 39

s uffi ci entt o s how t hat , i n fai l i ng t o exer ci s e a pe r empt or ychal l enge a gai ns t W y at t i n or der t o pr es er ve er r or forappea l , t r i al couns el act ed out side the bounds of w hatanycompet ent at t or neyw oul d have done

. F or purpo ses of a rg u m e n t , w e w i l l assum e t hat W y at t w as chal l eng eable for cause

u n d e r th e im p lied b ias d o c trin e . M o re o v e r , w e re c o g n ize th a t w h e n a c o n stitu tio n a l cla im of j ur or par t i al i t yi s pr oper l ypr es er ved forappea l and bor ne out byt he appe l l at e r ecor d, t he

se rv ice o f

e v e n “ a s in g le p a r tia l ju ro r w ill v iti a te a c o n v ictio n .” E v e n so , the S ix th 40 A m endment r i ght t o an i m par t i al j ur yi s j us t t hat

— a r i ght

. W e have hel d t hatt he r i ght t o t r i al by i m par t i a l j u r y , l i k e a n yo t h e r r i g h t , i s s u b j e c t t o wai v e r ( o r e v e n f o r f e i t u r e ) b yt he d efen dan t i n t he i nter est of overal l t ri al st rat egy . Indeed , t he L egis l at ure ha s e x p re ss ly 41

m ade a defe ndant ’ s r i ght t o chal l enge a pr os pect i ve j ur or forcaus e on t he bas i s of an a ctual bi as s ubj ectt o w ai ver . I t i s not t o be r egar ded, t her efor e, w i t hi n t he rubr i c of M ar i n v. 42Morales — 19

ch a ll e n g e f

o r c a u s e s e t f o rth a b o v e , a lt h o u gh b o th p arti e s ma

y c o n s e nt. A ll o th e r

g rounds for challeng e may

be wa ived by

the par ty or parties in whose favor such grounds of c halleng e exist.”). 43 851 S.W .2d 275, 279 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). 44 Id . at 280 (“ Of c ourse, the system also includes a number of re quirements and prohibitions wh ic h are e sse nti a lly ind e pe nd e nt of the lit ig ant’ s wi sh e s. Impl e me ntatio n o f t he se re qu ir e me nts is no t op tio na l and

c ann ot, therefo re, be waive d o r f or fe ite d b y

thepa rt ie s. * * * F ina lly , a

bs olute requir em en t s and prohibit ions, like rights whic h arewaivableonly , areto be observe d without part i s an re qu es t. But unlike wa ivable rights, they can’ t lawfully

be avoide d even w ith partisan consent.” ).

45 840 S.W .2d at 447 (interna l quotation marks omitted). Se eals o Jacks on v . S tate , 877 S.W .2d 768, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

46 Id . at 444-45. S ta te , as a fundament al fea t ur e of t he s y s t em w hi ch i s not opt i onal w i t h t he par t i es . A nd

43 44 beca us e i t i s a r i ght w hi ch i s t o be exe r ci s ed at t he opt i on of t he defe ndant , i t i s al s o s ubj ect t o t he l egi t i m at e s t r at egi c or tacti ca l deci s i on- m aki ng pr oces s es of def ens e couns el dur i ng th e c o u rse o f

trial. A ccor di ngl y , i n D e lrio v . S ta te , w e s ai d: W ai ver of [t r i al couns el ’ s ] cl i ent ’ s r i ght t o i ns i s t t hatever yj ur or i n t he ca s e be i n al l t hi ngs fai r and i m par t i al m ay i n couns el ’ s bes t pr ofes s i onal j udgm ent have be en an a c c e p t abl e gambl e. C ons i s t entw i t h St r i ckl and , we mu s t p r e s u me t hatco u n sel i s bet t erpos i t i oned t han t he appe l l at e cour t t o j udge t he pr agmat i s m of t he par t i cul arcas e, and t hathe made al l s i gni fi cantdecisi ons in th e e x e rc ise o f

re a so n a b le p ro f

e ss io n a l ju d g m e n t. 45 O f cour s e, i n D e lrio , t he pr os pect i ve j ur or w ho w as not chal l enged f or caus e admi t t ed dur i ng

v oi r di r e t o an act ual b i a s . Hi s b i a s d i d n o t h a v e t o b e p r e s u me d o r i mpl i e d , as does 46 W y at t ’ s i n t hi s cas e. Y etw e hel d t hat D el r i o’ s defe ns e at t or ney coul d l egi t i m at el ym ake aMorales — 20

t act i cal deci s i on, cons i s t ent w i t h t he Si xt h A m endment guar ant ee of eff ect i ve as s i s t ance of

cou nsel , no t t o ch al l eng e a prospecti ve jur or for cause w ho w as a c tu a lly b ias e d a g a in st h is cl i ent. If i t i s perm i ssi ble for t ri al cou nsel t o ret ai n a jur or w ho i s act ual l y b ias e d f

o r stra teg ic

or t act i cal r eas ons , t hen a fort i ori , t r i al couns el m us t be per m i t t ed t o m ake a str ateg ic or t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n t o r e t a i n a j u r o r w h o i s o n l y p re su m a b ly bi as ed by vi r t ue of hers t atus as an

a s s i s t a n t d i s t r i c t a t t o r n e y. H er e, unl i ke i n D e lrio , t he appe ll an t’ s t r i al couns el i ni t i al l ychal l enged W y at t for

caus e. I t w as onl y l at er , w hen i t came t o exer ci s i ng hi s per empt or ychal l enges , t hathe w as put t o t he choi ce w het hert o pr es er ve t he er r or ( i f any ) i n t he t r i al court’s d en ial of t hat ch all en g e f

o r ca u se b yp ere m p tori lystr iking h er, or instead to ex h au st al l of h is pe rem p tory ch all en g es a g ains t othe r pro sp ec ti v e ju ro rs w h o m h e d ee m ed , fo r w h atev er rea so n s, m o re obj ect i on able. E ven so, t he deci si on t o r et ai n W y at t i n spit e of the earl i er chal l eng e for cause coul d w el l have be en a r eas onabl e t act i cal choi ce, al bei t a di ffi cul t one. T he r ecor d does not

s how ot her w i s e. T he appe l l ant ’ s l ead t r i al couns el admi t t ed t hathe w as w el l aw are of t he pr ocedur e forpr es er vi ng a deni al of a c hal l enge orcaus e forappea l and t hathe had made a “dec i s i on” ( how ever del i ber at e) not t o per empt or i l ychal l enge W y at t
. A ccor di ng t o J udge M ed ran o ’s t esti m o n y , lead tr ial co u n sel ad m it ted to h im that they h ad left W y att o n the ju ry beca us e t heybel i eved s he w as pr efe r abl e t o at l eas t one ot her pr os pect i ve j ur or and t hatt hey

w er e “c om for t abl e” w i t h herr emai ni ng on t he j ur ybeca us e s he w as “as fai r a pr os ecut or as th e y ’v e e v e r d e a lt w ith .”Morales — 21

47 It is not completely beside the point to reme mber in this context that, re g ardle ss of whethe r a pr os e c uto r i s o r o ught t o b e su bje c t to theSixth Ame ndme nt doc trine of imp lie d bia s, in Te xas i t is, after all, “the primary

duty of all prosec uting attorney s . . . not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . art. 2.01.

48 It sh ou ld b e re c a lle d th at, at th e tim e of thehe ari ngon

themot ion

fo r n e w tri a l, t

ri a l c ourt s wer e prohibited from commenting on thefac ts. Seen o t e 7 , an te . Under these c ircumstance s, we have he ld, “appe llate cour ts must defer to any

rea sonable implied fac tual finding s that the trial court might have made in deny ing a motion for new tria l.” Cha rle s v . S tate , 1 4 6 S. W. 3 d

2 0 4 , 2 1 1 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2004). Fr om t hi s t es t i m ony , t he t r i al cour t coul d r at i onal l yi nfer that t he appe l l ant ’ s t r i al at t or ney s m ade a di ffi cul t t act i cal deci s i on t o l eave W y at t on t he j ur y beca us e, even t hough sh e w as a n assistan t d ist ri ct att o rne y , sh e w as st il l p ref era b le to t h e o ther p rosp ec ti v e juro rs agai ns t w hom t hey exer ci s ed t hei r al l ot t ed per empt or y chal l enges . E ven t houg h lead 47

couns el deni ed t he s t r at egi c natur e of hi s deci s i on t o r et ai n W y at t and t r i ed t o di s countt he

s i gni fi canc e of hi s comm ent s t o J udge M edr ano, t he t r i al cour t coul d have rejected t r i al

c o u n se l’s d e n ials a n d c re d ited Ju d g e M e d ra n o ’s a c c o u n t. R e v iew in g c o u rts a re b o u n d to d e f e r to su c h im p licit f

in d in g s o f

f a c t. 48 CO NC L US I ON W e t her efor e r ej ectt he cour t of appeal s ’ s concl us i on t hat , beca us e t he appe l l ant ’ s t r i al

a tto rn e y s f

a iled to e x e rc ise a p e re m p to ryc h a llen g e a g a in st W y a tt an d th e re b yf a iled to p rese r ve t hei r chal l enge f or caus e aga i ns t herforappea l , t heynece s s ar i l yper for m ed defi ci ent l yi n cont empl at i on of St r i ckl and

. E ven i f it is appr opr i at e t o r egar d W y at t as im p lied lyb ias e d u n d e r th e S ix th A m e n d m e n t, th a t d o e s n o t ip so fa c to es t abl i s h t hatt r i alMorales — 22

49 This issue was raised in the appellant’s third point of err or on appe al. Although the cour t of a pp e a ls no min a lly gra

nte d re lie f on the ba sis of bo th the a pp e lla nt’ s se c on d and third p oi nt s, it never addre ssed the appe llant’s argument that counsel wa s i n ef fe ct ive in reta ining Wyatt without discoveringthe information (be yond the m ere fac t of her status as an assistant district attorney ) that was c ontained in her

juror questionnaire , v iz ., he r o wn vic tim izatio n a

nd he r e xten siv e c onta c ts w ith law enf orce ment. Seenote 12, an te . Moreove r, in that third point of err or, the appe llant also alleg ed oth e r i ns tanc e s o f i ne ff

e c tiv e ne ss o f h is tri a l c ouns e l th at th e c ourt of a pp e a ls d id n ot a dd

re ss. c o u n s e l c o u l d n o t m a k e a l e g i t i m a t e t a c t i c a l d e c i s i o n t o k e e p h e r o n t h e a p p e l l a n t ’ s j u r y . We t her efor e r ever s e t he cour t of appe al s’s j udgm ent
. W e r emand t he ca us e t o t he cour t of appea l s t o addr es s w het hert he t r i al cour t er r ed t o r ej ect t he appel l ant ’ s cl ai m i n hi s m ot i on f o r n e w t ri al t hat his t ri al at t orney s w ere i neff ect i ve i n m aking t he deci si on n o t to per empt or i l ys t r i ke W y at t w i t hout fi r s t havi ng r evi ew ed herj ur or ques t i onnai r e. 49

D el i ver ed: M ay14, 2008 P ub l i sh