Best Practices for 

Behavioral Observation 

Programs at Operating 

Power Reactors and Power 

Reactor Construction Sites

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

NUREG/CR-7183
NRC Reference Material 

As of November 1999, you may electronically access 

NUREG-series publications and other NRC records at 

NRC’s Public Electronic Reading Room at 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm.html. Publicly released 

records include, to name a few, NUREG-series 

publications; Federal Register notices; applicant, 

licensee, and vendor documents and correspondence; 

NRC correspondence and internal memoranda; bulletins 

and information notices; inspection and investigative 

reports; licensee event reports; and Commission papers 

and their attachments. 

NRC publications in the NUREG series, NRC 

regulations, and Title 10, “Energy,” in the Code of

Federal Regulations may also be purchased from one 

of these two sources. 

1. The Superintendent of Documents

 U.S. Government Printing Office

Mail Stop SSOP

Washington, DC 20402–0001

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov

Telephone: 202-512-1800

Fax: 202-512-2250 

2. The National Technical Information Service 

Springfield, VA 22161–0002

www.ntis.gov

1–800–553–6847 or, locally, 703–605–6000 

A single copy of each NRC draft report for comment is 

available free, to the extent of supply, upon written 

request as follows:

Address: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

 Office of Administration 

Publications Branch

 Washington, DC 20555-0001

E-mail: DISTRIBUTION.RESOURCE@NRC.GOV

Facsimile: 301–415–2289 

Some publications in the NUREG series that are 

posted at NRC’s Web site address 

http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs 

are updated periodically and may differ from the last 

printed version. Although references to material found on 

a Web site bear the date the material was accessed, the 

material available on the date cited may subsequently be 

removed from the site.

Non-NRC Reference Material 

Documents available from public and special technical 

libraries include all open literature items, such as books, 

journal articles, transactions, Federal Register notices, 

Federal and State legislation, and congressional reports. 

Such documents as theses, dissertations, foreign reports 

and translations, and non-NRC conference proceedings 

may be purchased from their sponsoring organization. 

Copies of industry codes and standards used in a 

substantive manner in the NRC regulatory process are 

maintained at—

The NRC Technical Library

Two White Flint North

11545 Rockville Pike

Rockville, MD 20852–2738 

These standards are available in the library for reference 

use by the public. Codes and standards are usually 

copyrighted and may be purchased from the originating 

organization or, if they are American National Standards, 

from—

American National Standards Institute

11 West 42nd Street

New York, NY 10036–8002

www.ansi.org

212–642–4900 

AVAILABILITY OF REFERENCE MATERIALS

IN NRC PUBLICATIONS

Legally binding regulatory requirements are stated only 

in laws; NRC regulations; licenses, including technical 

specifications; or orders, not in NUREG-series 

publications. The views expressed in contractorprepared publications in this series are not necessarily 

those of the NRC.

The NUREG series comprises (1) technical and 

administrative reports and books prepared by the staff 

(NUREG–XXXX) or agency contractors (NUREG/CR–

XXXX), (2) proceedings of conferences (NUREG/CP–

XXXX), (3) reports resulting from international 

agreements (NUREG/IA–XXXX), (4) brochures 

(NUREG/BR–XXXX), and (5) compilations of legal 

decisions and orders of the Commission and Atomic and 

Safety Licensing Boards and of Directors’ decisions

under Section 2.206 of NRC’s regulations (NUREG–

0750).

DISCLAIMER: This report was prepared as an account 

of work sponsored by an agency of the U.S. 

Government. Neither the U.S. Government nor any 

agency thereof, nor any employee, makes any warranty, 

expressed or implied, or assumes any legal liability or 

responsibility for any third party’s use, or the results of 

such use, of any information, apparatus, product, or 

process disclosed in this publication, or represents that 

its use by such third party would not infringe privately 

owned rights.
Best Practices for 

Behavioral Observation 

Programs at Operating 

Power Reactors and Power 

Reactor Construction Sites

Manuscript Completed: June 2014 

Date Published: June 2014

Prepared by: 

J. R. Crockett

S. S. Wagner

D. B. Greenhalgh

Oak Ridge National Laboratory

Oak Ridge, TN 37831

J. R. Crockett, Principal Investigator

P. Harris, NRC Project Manager

NRC Job Code: N4116

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

NUREG/CR-7183

 

iii

ABSTRACT

This NUREG report discusses a research and comparative study sponsored by the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory. The 

report identifies best practices associated with behavioral observation programs (BOPs) used 

by a cross section of Federal agencies and private entities, discusses the need for effective 

BOPs at power reactors, and power reactor construction sites, and presents insights and 

recommendations to improve BOP performance.

The observations and recommendations identified in this report will inform the NRC’s regulatory 

inspection, licensing, and oversight of activities at NRC-licensed facilities during the application, 

construction, and operational phases. The results will also help inform applicants and licensees 

of best practices for BOPs. As a result, applicants and licensees have an opportunity to 

implement enhanced policies, procedures, and training to improve their identification of 

personnel unfit for duty or behaving in a manner that warrants additional attention and to 

efficiently and effectively conduct behavioral observations without undue burden. The outcome 

of this report contributes to reasonable assurance that NRC licensee facility operation and 

construction activities will not be inimical to public health and safety or the common defense and 

security.

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Section Page

ABSTRACT................................................................................................................................iii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... vii

FOREWORD .............................................................................................................................ix

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.............................................................................................................xi

ACRONYMS............................................................................................................................ xiii

1. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................1

Background.......................................................................................................................... 1

Objective.............................................................................................................................. 4

Risk Factors ......................................................................................................................... 4

Drug or Alcohol Use .................................................................................................... 5

Psychological Conditions............................................................................................. 5

Fatigue ........................................................................................................................ 5

Criminal Activities ........................................................................................................ 5

Terrorism..................................................................................................................... 6

Scope................................................................................................................................... 6

Organization of Report ................................................................................................ 6

2. LITERATURE REVIEW.........................................................................................................7

2.1 Behavioral Observation Studies and Articles ............................................................... 7

2.2 Behavioral Collection Techniques and Data ...............................................................11

2.3 Other Behavioral Observation Programs ....................................................................12

2.4 Governmental Reports Related to Behavioral Observation Programs.........................13

2.5 Related Literature.......................................................................................................16

3. COMPARATIVE PROGRAMS ............................................................................................21

3.1 Descriptions................................................................................................................21

3.1.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission...............................................................21

3.1.2 Nuclear Energy Institute ...................................................................................23

3.1.3 U.S. Department of Energy...............................................................................27

3.1.4 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Building Operation ..................32

3.1.5 Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration ..........33

3.1.6 North Dakota State University ..........................................................................35

3.1.7 Kansas Department of Health and Environment ...............................................35

3.1.8 Canadian Air Transport Security Authority........................................................36

3.1.9 International Drug Evaluation and Classification Program ................................36

3.2 Program Comparison..................................................................................................38

3.3 Regulation or Requirement BASIS..............................................................................39

3.4 Procedures and Methods............................................................................................40

3.5 Roles and Responsibilities..........................................................................................42

3.6 Training and Requalification .......................................................................................43
vi

4. RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES................................................................................45

5. CONCLUSIONS..................................................................................................................51

6. REFERENCES ...................................................................................................................53
vii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) considers the behavioral observation program 

(BOP) to be one of the cornerstones of the Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) Program, the physical 

protection program, as well as the Insider Mitigation Program (IMP). A robust BOP is an 

important element of FFD and site security. The NRC Office of Nuclear Security and Incident 

Response (NSIR) is responsible for the development of regulations and guidance associated 

with FFD and BOP requirements, and the NRC’s regulatory oversight of these programs.

This report explores BOPs across multiple industries and reviews ongoing research in 

behavioral observation, in part, because new plant construction presents several unique 

challenges associated with BOP implementation when compared to BOP at an operating power 

reactor facility. This is primarily due to different safety, security, and workforce considerations 

between an operating nuclear facility and one being constructed. An effective BOP helps

improve the defense-in-depth provided by the insider mitigation, physical security, and the FFD 

programs. The best practices recommended in this report often go beyond regulatory 

requirements; they are suggestions that, if implemented, would be expected to improve current 

BOPs. 

This report discusses a research and comparative study conducted by Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory (ORNL), and includes research of various BOPs used in Federal agencies, industry, 

and academia. These programs, their application, and the resulting lessons learned are 

compared and contrasted to formulate recommendations and to develop elements of best 

practice for a robust BOP within the overall framework of FFD programs at operating nuclear 

power reactors and power reactor construction sites. 

ORNL identified 18 best practices, that are listed below in summary form and that are discussed 

in more detail in section 4 of this report.

(1) The BOP should have a clearly stated purpose. 

(2) The scope, performance objectives, methods, and application for a robust BOP within 

the FFD program should be identified.

(3) The characteristics or observable traits and behaviors related to the identified threat or 

threats should be defined.

(4) The BOP is just one layer of defense within comprehensive FFD, physical protection, 

and IMP programs.

(5) The BOP for construction should be scalable.

(6) The BOP should identify areas where safety and security are of elevated concern, and 

should increase behavioral observation activities in those areas.

(7) The BOP should have a clearly stated operational process. 

(8) Each BOP should have a strong procedural basis for implementation. 
viii

(9) The BOP should have adequate assurances for objectivity and fidelity. 

(10) There should be appropriate stewardship of the personal information in the BOP.

(11) Complete and accurate documentation is an important attribute of a BOP. 

(12) A BOP should reflect a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities. Personnel 

need to understand they are responsible for reporting unusual behavior and that

reporting unusual activities or behavior is everyone’s responsibility. 

(13) A BOP should be subject to ongoing independent program assessments. 

(14) The BOP should be layered with multiple observations across time. For example, 

observations of an individual only at the morning safety briefing or plan of the day 

meeting should not be the sole basis for making a determination that the individual is or 

is not fit for duty. 

(15) Employees should be protected from repercussions when reporting unusual or suspect 

behavior concerning personnel at the job site. 

(16) Initial and refresher training should be part of a BOP. 

(17) The BOP’s effectiveness should be continually verified. 

(18) Performance metrics should be used to determine the BOP’s effectiveness. 

The best practices described above collectively represent the results of the program 

comparisons and literature review. Implementing some or all of these best practices would 

serve to strengthen any BOP and create a safe and secure environment.
ix

FOREWORD

This NUREG report discusses a research and comparative study sponsored by the U.S. 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that was conducted by Oak Ridge National Laboratory

to compare and contrast behavioral observation programs (BOP) and methods to enhance the

BOP implemented at operating and construction sites of commercial nuclear power facilities. 

The research was undertaken because few reports aggregate BOP implementation information 

that could be used to enhance the BOP at operating power reactor or power reactor 

construction sites. Furthermore, marked differences exist between a BOP implemented at an 

operating facility and one at a construction site, such as differences in the size and transient 

nature of the workforces, which prevent the direct application at a power reactor construction 

site of a BOP designed for implementation at an operating power reactor site.

In its review, the staff found that the lessons learned and insights gained in this research could 

also enhance the BOP if implemented at other commercial nuclear facilities, such as Category II 

and III fuel cycle facilities or other materials licensees. Therefore the scope of this report, while 

initially targeting reactor construction sites, was broadened to include the transition from a 

facility under construction to a site in full operation. Regardless of the site, a BOP should 

effectively assess personnel behavior during the conduct of regulated activities and not be 

limited to activities associated with a particular mode of operation. These activities would 

include those activities necessary for safe and secure construction, operating, maintenance, 

testing, and security of a facility and its individual safety- and security-related structures, 

systems, and components. Additionally, a BOP would be applicable to the assessment of 

persons who are afforded certain types of access to licensees SSCs, information, or radioactive 

materials and to those persons who perform certain emergency response activities. In 

summary, a BOP should be written and implemented based on personnel, activities, and facility 

access. To help ensure the continuing effectiveness of a BOP, it should be revised as 

considerations change, to maintain assurance that persons are trustworthy, reliable, fit for duty, 

and will not contribute to conditions adverse to safety or security.

xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This work was performed under contract with the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), 

Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response, Division of Security Policy (DSP) under Job 

Code Number (JCN) N4116. The authors would like to thank the staff of the Security Programs 

Support Branch for its review and comments.

Notice: This manuscript has been authored by UT-Battelle, LLC, under Contract No.: DEAC0500OR22725 with the U.S. Department of Energy. The United States Government retains 

and the publisher, by accepting the article for publication, acknowledges that the United States 

Government retains a non-exclusive, paid-up, irrevocable, world-wide license to publish or 

reproduce the published form of this manuscript, or allow other to do so, for the United States 

Government purposes.

ACRONYMS

AA access authorization

BDO behavior detection officer

BOP behavioral observation program

BPR behavior pattern recognition

CATSA Canadian Air Transport Security Authority

CFR Code of Federal Regulations

C/V contractors and vendor

COL combined license

CP construction permit

DARPA Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

DEC Drug Evaluation and Classification Program

DHS U.S. Department of Homeland Security

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

DOE U.S. Department of Energy

DOS U.S. Department of State

DRE Drug Recognition Expert

DS diplomatic security 

DSS Diplomatic Security Service

DUI driving under the influence

EAP employee assistance program

EOF Emergency Operations Facility

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

FAM Foreign Affairs Manual

FFD fitness for duty

GAO Government Accountability Office

HRP human reliability program

IACP International Association of Chiefs of Police

IMP insider mitigation program

KAs knowledge and abilities

KDHE Kansas Department of Health and Environment

LAPD Los Angeles Police Department

LWA limited work authority

MRO Medical Review Officer

NEI Nuclear Energy Institute

NHTSA National Highway Traffic Safety Administration

NRC U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

NDSU North Dakota State University

NSIR Nuclear Security and Incident Response

ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory

PNNL Pacific Northwest National Laboratory

PRP personnel reliability program

QA quality assurance

QNSP questionnaire for national security positions

SAE substance abuse expert

SLAC Stanford Linear Accelerator Center
SOMD site occupational medical director

SPOT screening passengers by observation techniques

SSC structures, systems, and components

TSA Transportation Security Administration

TSC Technical Support Center

UA unescorted access

UAA unescorted access authorization

WAJ West Ambler Johnson (residence hall)
1

1. INTRODUCTION

Background

The NRC’s fitness-for-duty (FFD) requirements are in Part 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” of

Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR). The regulations at 10 CFR 26.3(c) state 

the following: 

Before the receipt of special nuclear material in the form of fuel assemblies, the 

following licensees and other entities shall comply with the requirements of this 

part, except for subpart I; and, no later than the receipt of special nuclear 

material in the form of fuel assemblies, the following licensees and other entities 

shall comply with the requirements of this part: (1) Combined license applicants 

(under 10 CFR Part 52) who have been issued a limited work authorization under 

§ 50.10(e), if the limited work authorization authorizes the applicant to install the 

foundations, including the placement of concrete, for safety- and security-related 

structures, systems, and components (SSCs) under the limited work 

authorization; (2) Combined license holders (under 10 CFR Part 52) before the 

Commission has made the finding under § 52.103(g); (3) Construction permit 

applicants (under 10 CFR Part 50) who have been issued a limited work 

authorization under § 50.10(e), if the limited work authorization authorizes the 

applicant to install the foundations, including the placement of concrete, for 

safety- and security-related SSCs under the limited work authorization; 

(4) Construction permit holders (under 10 CFR Part 50); and (5) Early site permit 

holders who have been issued a limited work authorization under § 50.10(e), if 

the limited work authorization authorizes the early site permit holder to install the 

foundations, including the placement of concrete, for safety- and security-related 

structures, systems, and components (SSCs) under the limited work 

authorization.

Section 26.3(d) provides the following:

Contractors/vendor (C/V) who implement FFD programs or program elements, to 

the extent that the licensees and other entities specified in paragraphs (a) 

through (c) of this section rely on those C/V FFD programs or program elements 

to meet the requirements of this part, shall comply with the requirements of this 

part.

Behavioral Observation Program (BOP) requirements are stated in 10 CFR 26.33,

26.407, and 73.56(f). The 10 CFR 73.56(f)(1) provision states as follows: 

Licensee and applicant access authorization programs must include a behavioral 

observation program that is designed to detect behaviors or activities that may 

constitute an unreasonable risk to the health and safety of the public and 

common defense and security, including a potential threat to commit radiological

sabotage. Licensees, applicants and contractors or vendors must ensure that the 
2

individuals specified in paragraph (b)(1) and, if applicable, (b)(2) of this section 

are subject to behavioral observation.

The regulation at 10 CFR 26.33 identifies behavioral observation as a program element of an 

FFD program, as follows:

Licensees and other entities shall ensure that the individuals who are subject to 

this subpart are subject to behavioral observation. Behavioral observation must 

be performed by individuals who are trained under § 26.29 to detect behaviors 

that may indicate possible use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs; use or 

possession of alcohol on site or while on duty; or impairment from fatigue or any 

cause that, if left unattended, may constitute a risk to public health and safety or 

the common defense and security. Individuals who are subject to this subpart 

shall report any FFD concerns about other individuals to the personnel 

designated in the FFD policy.

Additionally, the BOP element of an FFD program is applicable to those licensees and other 

entities under 10 CFR Part 26, Subpart K, “FFD Programs for Construction” as stated in 

10 CFR 26.407, “Behavioral Observation”:

While the individuals specified in § 26.4(f) are constructing or directing the construction 

of safety- or security-related SSCs, licensees and other entities shall ensure that these 

individuals are subject to behavioral observation, except if the licensee or other entity 

has implemented a fitness monitoring program under § 26.406.

The NRC considers the BOP as one of the cornerstones of the FFD Program, the access 

authorization (AA) program, and the insider mitigation program (IMP). The BOP focuses on 

personnel who have been authorized unescorted access to operating power reactor sites, and 

power reactor construction sites, and the activities they perform. An acceptable BOP provides 

reasonable assurance that individuals subject to the program are appropriately trained to watch 

for and react to behavioral factors in individuals that may result in a risk to public health and 

safety or the common defense and security. Behavioral observation objectives associated with 

Part 26 have traditionally been focused on drug and alcohol use, mental health issues, and 

fatigue issues. Behavior observation objectives associated with 10 CFR 73.56 are focused on 

risks to the common defense and security, whereas the focus under Part 26 is on risk to public 

health and safety. Following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the NRC increased its 

focus on the threat of terrorism. Alcohol, drug abuse, mental health, fatigue, and, to some 

extent, even criminal behavior have frequently recognizable behavioral indicators. However, 

behavior associated with terrorism may be less recognizable. Since the research on terrorism 

and terrorist behavior continues, the BOP should be flexible in order to look at fundamental 

behavioral factors that indicate a possible risk and, based on the results of new research, have 

the capability to adapt to new factors or methodologies that might improve detection, 

assessment, and determination processes.

The construction environment at nuclear plants provides unique and substantial challenges for 

FFD programs and, in particular, for the BOPs implemented at these sites. Such challenges 

include the transient workforce, and the fact that construction consists of several phases that 

require workers of different skill sets at different construction phases. . These phases typically 
3

occur at different times and particular locations throughout the construction site. Lastly, 

according to the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, the construction 

workforce has a turnover rate of almost twice the average rate1 of an operating nuclear plant. 

This construction workforce instability is generally predictable based on the scheduling of site 

activities; however, such instability can adversely affect several elements of the FFD program 

and the BOP. To counter this workforce instability, licensees need to review the scope, 

efficiency, and effectiveness of these programs. 

FFD program elements affected by a high turnover rate include the drug and alcohol testing 

program. Although the chances for a single individual to be selected randomly are the same for 

everyone at any affected NRC facility subject to 10 CFR Part 26, the chance for selection in a 

given year is dependent on a number of considerations, for example: how long an employee is 

employed, the total number of chances that he or she has to be randomly selected, and the

percentage of time the employee is onsite compared to time spent offsite. Specifically, a 

construction worker who works at a site for 10 weeks will have 10 chances to be selected if the 

site does weekly random tests, whereas a permanent employee is subject to being selected 52 

times in a year. A construction site entity, as described in NEI 06-06, “Fitness for Duty Program 

Guidance for New Nuclear Power Plant Construction Sites,” may increase the percentage of 

personnel tested above the 50 per cent random testing rate, thus increasing the likelihood for 

selection in random testing. Alternatively, to enhance the detection of adverse performance 

without increasing drug and alcohol testing, the BOP oversight of the construction site workforce

may be increased.

A high turnover rate also affects a supervisor’s time to assess an employee’s behavior, thus 

increasing the difficulty in determining a baseline behavior for an individual. A change in 

personality may be more difficult to detect because of the short duration of contact a supervisor 

and co-workers may have with a given employee.

The construction of nuclear plants also poses unique challenges to physically protecting safetyand security-related SSCs. During construction, integral parts of a nuclear plant may be easier 

to access without detection, and the number of construction workers who have or can have 

proximity access to a particular SSC on a construction site can significantly exceed that of an 

operational unit. For example, fluid systems, pumps, and valves are exposed during 

construction; electrical panels, switchgear, and controls are de-energized and fully accessible; 

and protection and alarm systems that have control and monitoring circuitry during operation do 

not have tamper indication features while the SSCs are under construction. The IMP and the 

BOP and are important tools during construction needed to prevent potential industrial sabotage 

and to reduce the possibility of an adversary inserting latent conditions that could result in future 

vulnerabilities. 

A comprehensive BOP, working in conjunction with a robust quality assurance (QA) program, 

can help lessen the possibility of sabotage of safety- and security-related SSCs. The QA 

program at nuclear plants under construction provides a systematic process of checking to see 

whether an installation, product, or service under development is meeting specified 

requirements. QA personnel have duties related to the oversight of installation and construction 

of different aspects of a nuclear plant. Part of these duties may include the observation of 

equipment installation or fabrication. As part of these observation duties, the QA personnel 

provide reasonable assurance that installation and fabrication of SSCs is done properly and 
4

within required standards. QA personnel are responsible for identifying improperly installed 

items and equipment whether through intentional action or because of poor performance or 

craftsmanship. Notably, the BOP is also applied to these same personnel, who are responsible 

for installing SSCs on site. In other words, the BOP concerns itself with the behavior of the 

personnel doing the installation, whereas the QA program is concerned with the proper 

fabrication and installation of the equipment or item under construction. One of the goals of the 

BOP is to ensure that the personnel installing the equipment or item do not pose an 

unreasonable risk to the public health and safety and common defense and security; one of the 

goals of the QA program is to ensure that SSCs do not fail because of a poor installation. The 

two programs are similar in that they each provide for oversight of licensee activities that are 

designed to protect the public health and safety.

In a letter dated December 2, 2009 (Agency-wide Documents Access and Management System 

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML092880812), to the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the NRC staff 

stated that it found NEI 06-06, Revision 5, sufficient to pursue formal NRC endorsement via the 

Regulatory Guide process. The staff also provided information to NEI for current and 

prospective applicants of a combined license under 10 CFR Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, 

and Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” or a construction permit or limited work authorization 

under 10 CFR Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities,”2 that may 

be of assistance to licensees and applicants in the development of an FFD program during 

construction. The letter and its enclosure provide a suitable reference for use in the 

development of site-specific applications of the FFD program.3

 In addition, by letter to NEI 

dated June 4, 2013, the NRC staff deemed NEI 06-06, Revision 6 acceptable, with one 

exception, for the NRC staff to begin the process of formally endorsing it via a Regulatory Guide 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13084A172). Future revisions of this document may occur and be 

endorsed by the NRC in a Regulatory Guide.

Objective

Having a robust BOP implementation is important at a construction site as well as operating 

sites because the program contributes directly to public health and safety and common defense 

and security. The Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response has responsibility for 

ensuring that guidance for implementing comprehensive BOPs provide industry with optimum 

performance opportunities. New plant construction presents several unique challenges to the 

safety and security of any nuclear facility. This report explores BOPs across industries and 

reviews research in the behavioral observation field. The best practices recommended in this 

report often go beyond regulatory requirements, and suggest ways to improve current BOPs. A 

comprehensive BOP may help mitigate the risk factors mentioned in this report and may thus 

reduce the overall risk level at a given facility. 

Risk Factors

Discussion of the following risk factors can also be found in Section V “Summary of Public 

Comments Submitted on Proposed Rule” and in Section VI “Section-by-Section Analysis of 

Substantive Changes “ of the Final Rule published in the Federal Register on March 31, 2008

(73 FR 16966).
5

Drug or Alcohol Use 

Drug or alcohol use or the adverse physiological or psychological impact of prescription drug 

abuse at a reactor construction or operating site is a safety and security concern. Use of drugs 

or alcohol often results in impaired judgment, impaired motor skills, and diminished mental 

capacity during safety- or security-significant work activities. In addition, even the proper use of 

prescription drugs may result in diminished mental and emotional abilities, whereas the failure to 

use prescription medication properly (including the lack of use) could result in unstable mental 

processes or erratic emotional behavior. As a result, impairment caused by legal or illegal 

substances may result in either immediate or delayed effects on safety- or security-significant 

work activities. 

Psychological Conditions

Psychological conditions, such as emotional, mental, and personality disorders, can cause 

significant deficiency in a person’s psychological, occupational, and social functioning. These 

disorders are of concern because they may predispose an individual to a defect in judgment, 

reliability, or stability. Such defects may result in poor work performance, accidents and injuries, 

increased worker conflict, or other negative consequences. In addition, psychological 

conditions that affect work performance may reasonably affect the safety and security of a 

nuclear plant construction or operating site.

Fatigue

Fatigue can have a significant adverse effect on workers’ abilities to safely and competently 

perform their assigned duties at nuclear facilities. Fatigue can impair problem-solving, decisionmaking, and communications skills of persons who are required to remain alert and to be 

cognizant of the tasks that they are performing, monitoring, or directing. For example, acute or 

cumulative fatigue can result in the occurrence of micro-sleeps that can have significant harmful

consequences. 

Criminal Activities

Individual involvement in criminal activities can pose a threat to the construction of nuclear 

facilities, or threaten facility operation. The theft of materials and tools can cause construction 

delays and can have a significant impact on schedules and project costs. Even the minor theft 

of personal property on a construction or operating site can affect the morale and productivity of 

the workforce. More dangerous criminal activities such as workplace violence can devastate 

the safety and security afforded to the workforce. Workplace harassment, intimidation, and 

bullying can erode individual performance to a point where the person affected takes adverse 

actions against the employer, the facility, or the perpetrator.

An individual’s criminal history is used as a means to assess the likelihood that an individual’s 

future behavior(s) may threaten the safe and secure operation or construction of nuclear 

facilities. An effective AA program, when applied at a construction site, would assist with the 

mitigation of potential threats. Reliance on other programs (such as those described within the 

IMP and industrial physical security practices) provides an additional level of assurance that 

criminal activities can be prevented at a site. 
6

Terrorism

Terrorism is a worldwide threat to the safe and secure construction and operation of a nuclear 

facility. A credible threat of action against a nuclear facility would be enough to challenge public 

confidence in the protection of these facilities, and a resulting attack, even if successfully 

mitigated, would lead to questions regarding the continued operational viability of such a 

high-value target. During construction of commercial nuclear facilities, a terrorist posing as a 

legitimate site worker could conduct activities (e.g., intelligence collection activities, the 

sabotage of equipment, and the staging of items for possible use in an attack) that threaten 

future operations. 

A committed terrorist would be hard to detect without a robust IMP that includes the structure 

and content of a BOP and an AA program, because the terrorist will make a concerted effort to 

comply with onsite requirements, fit into cultural norms, and not engage in risky behavior that 

would draw attention. This type of individual also would typically not be exposed in 

pre-employment or random programs designed to detect drug and/or alcohol use. 

Scope

The ORNL study discussed in this report provides research of various BOPs used in Federal 

agencies, industry, and academia. These programs, their application, and the resulting lessons 

learned are compared and contrasted to formulate recommendations and to develop elements 

of best practice for a robust BOP within the overall framework of FFD and security programs at 

operating nuclear reactors and power reactor construction sites.

Organization of Report

The following sections summarize the programmatic elements of a BOP and its application at 

commercial nuclear power reactors, and power reactor construction sites. Related literature is 

presented and discussed along with relevant additional federal, state, and related entities’ BOPs 

and their legal bases. In addition, studies are compared and contrasted and lessons learned 

from these programs are provided. Finally, this report presents conclusions and 

recommendations with a list of best practices.
7

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

A literature review of behavioral observation-related studies was conducted to support an 

analysis for the comparative programs. Note that some of the studies had overlapping 

relevance among the different categories listed below. The review provided a foundation for 

delineating the best practices discussed later in this report. The literature review fell into the 

following five basic categories: 

(1) Behavioral Observation Studies and Articles. These studies and articles focused on 

specific behavioral characteristics, especially terrorist characteristics, although they also 

explored drug, alcohol, mental health, and criminal activities.

(2) Behavior Collection Techniques and Data. These studies reviewed research and 

analysis methods.

(3) Other BOPs. This category specifically looked at programs other than those included in 

the comparative analysis below and focused largely on programs using behavior pattern 

recognition (BPR).

(4) Governmental Reports Related to the BOP. These articles focused on Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) reports related to the Transportation Security Administration 

(TSA) BOP.

(5) Other Related Literature. This category assessed case studies (the most notable is the 

2007 Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech) shooting and 

other academic literature.

Below is a synopsis of the most relevant literature. Although all literature reviewed provided a 

solid background for an assessment of BOPs, some articles are not directly relevant to the 

BOPs in place at commercial entities subject to 10 CFR Part 26. However, they do provide 

insight for best practices and lessons learned.

2.1 Behavioral Observation Studies and Articles

This portion of the assessment looked specifically at what behavioral characteristics could 

indicate actions or behaviors that could constitute an unreasonable risk to public health and 

safety and the common defense and security. The literature review indicated that all programs 

listed below had good behavioral indicators for drugs, alcohol, and mental health issues but that 

they all seemed to lack behavioral indicators for terrorist activities. This section discusses some 

of the relevant research on psychological traits and behavioral indicators of terrorist and terrorist 

activities.

The Center for International Research on Terrorism separates related research into the 

following four main groups:

(1) The first attempts to explain common psychological traits of terrorists. 

The aim was to distinguish the terrorists’ shared psychological 

characteristics and to draw a certain terrorist profile in general. However, 
8

research showed that no accurate terrorist personality or common 

psychic attributes that can be referred to as terrorist manners exist 

(Borum 2004,4 Hudson 1999,5 McCormick 20036

). Moreover, according 

to this research, terrorists are not psychotic; rather, they are disturbingly 

normal (Borum 2004,4 Hudson 1999,5 McCormick 20036

).

(2) The second group of research posited that terrorism derives from 

frustration and aggression. According to the frustration and aggression 

hypothesis, aggression is always a consequence of frustration (Dollard et 

al. 19397

, as cited in Berkowitz 19898). 

(3) Other researchers attempted to explain the psychological sources of 

terrorism using a narcissism-aggression model (McCormick 2000).9

 

Narcissistic injury of individuals, such as lack of self-esteem and 

self-respect, can motivate people to join terrorist organizations that they 

believe can help meet their psychological needs (Borum 20044

, 

Hudson 19995

, McCormick 20036).

(4) The fourth group of research suggested a developmental model. The 

results of this research can be briefly summarized as “terrorists do not 

become terrorists overnight.” Becoming a terrorist and then committing a 

violent act is a gradual process. “The manner of terrorist behavior is 

learned over time” (Wasmund 198310). In this respect, organizations and 

environment play roles in shaping the psychological behavior of 

individuals (Alkan 200211, Borum 20044

, Hudson 19995, and 

McCormick 20036

). The developmental model justifies that individuals 

refrain from self-condemnation and makes killing and being killed a 

plausible cause of action. In this way, immoral behaviors such as killing 

innocent people are easily transformed into moral attitudes.

12

In the Anthony Stahelski article, “Terrorists Are Made, Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using 

Social Psychological Conditioning”, Stahelski suggested that terrorist groups use cult-like 

conditioning techniques to convert normal individuals into terrorists. He further suggested there 

are three necessary elements to such conversions: (1) a charismatic leader; (2) isolation during 

the conditioning process; and (3) in the case of an Islamic terrorist, having first been educated in 

fundamentalist religious schools with other Islamic youth.13

In the article entitled, “Unmasking Terrorists—Two Critical Characteristics,” Joseph Navarro 

noted two critical characteristics of terrorists: 1) subscribing to an uncompromising ideology, 

which is a set of conscious and unconscious ideas that constitute one's goals, expectations, and 

actions and which seeks to use violence to achieve its goals and 2) isolation, where the prototerrorist senses that he is different and that society is not indulgent of his thoughts and ideas, 

and thus begins the isolation and withdrawal process. Mental isolation transforms into spatial 

and social isolation. Navarro applied these characteristics to domestic terrorists Timothy 

McVeigh and Theodore Kaczyniski and to foreign-born terrorists.14

Both the Stahelski and Navarro articles indicated that being isolated and holding a strong 

uncompromising ideology, are indicators of possible terrorist leaning. Although these indicators
9

help paint a picture of terrorists, they do not easily translate into BOPs. A discussion of these 

indicators should be included in the training curriculum of comprehensive BOPs.

A Library of Congress report entitled, “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who 

Becomes a Terrorist and Why?” stated:

In profiling the terrorist, some generalizations can be made on the basis of this 

examination of the literature on the psychology and sociology of terrorism published over 

the past three decades. One finding is that, unfortunately for profiling purposes, there 

does not appear to be a single terrorist personality. This seems to be the consensus 

among terrorism psychologists, as well as political scientists and sociologists. The 

personalities of terrorists may be as diverse as the personalities of people in any lawful 

profession. There do not appear to be any visibly detectable personality traits that would 

allow authorities to identify a terrorist.

Another finding in the Library of Congress report was that the terrorist is not necessarily 

diagnosable as psychopathic or mentally sick. Contrary to the stereotype that the terrorist may 

be a psychopath or otherwise mentally disturbed, the terrorist is actually quite sane, although 

deluded by an ideological or religious way of viewing the world.

The Library of Congress report further stated in this regard:

Certain psychological types of people may be attracted to terrorism. In his 

examination of autobiographies, court records, and rare interviews, Jerrold M. 

Post (1990:27) found that “people with particular personality traits and tendencies 

are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers.” Authors such as Walter 

Laqueur and Post have characterized terrorists as “action-oriented, aggressive 

people who are stimulus-hungry and seek excitement.” Even if Post and some 

other psychologists are correct that individuals with narcissistic personalities and 

low self-esteem are attracted to terrorism, the early psychological development of 

individuals in their pre-terrorist lives does not necessarily mean that terrorists are 

mentally disturbed and that they can be identified by any particular traits 

associated with their early psychological backgrounds.5 15 16

A review of other relevant literature revealed that there are similarities in criminal and terrorist 

activities. The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) and the American Public Transit 

Association have both identified activities that can be related to terrorism. However, basic 

observation of activities can help identify possible terrorist and criminal threats, as was 

evidenced by the behavior of the Tsarnaev brothers in the several minutes before the Boston 

Marathon bombing on April 15, 2013. 

Each of the following activities and/or behaviors on their own may be innocent ones, but

consider this list compiled by the LAPD which were observed during terrorism surveillance:

• Multiple sightings of the same suspicious person, vehicle, or activity, 

separated by time, distance, or direction.

• Individuals who stay at bus or train stops for extended periods while 

buses and trains come and go.
10

• Individuals who carry on long conversations on pay or cellular telephones.

• Individuals who order food at a restaurant and leave before the food 

arrives or who order without eating.

• Joggers who stand and stretch for an inordinate amount of time.

• Individuals sitting in a parked car for an extended period of time.

• Individuals who do not fit into the surrounding environment because they 

are wearing improper attire for the location or season.

• Individuals drawing pictures or taking notes in an area that is not normally 

of interest to a tourist; or showing an unusual interest in, or 

photographing, security cameras or guard locations; or watching security 

reaction drills and procedures.

• Individuals who exhibit suspicious behavior, such as staring or quickly 

looking away from individuals or vehicles as they enter or leave facilities 

or parking areas.17

Similarly, the perpetrators of the Boston Marathon bombing displayed behaviors inconsistent 

with the surrounding environment. Specifically, the Tsarnaev brothers were not interested in the 

activities associated with the marathon race, but were more interested in people watching the 

race. The types of activities summarized above should be viewed and analyzed in a holistic 

context to assess their usefulness as potential predictors of terrorist activities.

Other organizations, such as the National Terrorist Alert Response Center, the Oklahoma 

Information Fusion Center, and the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security, provide similar 

checklists and behaviors for suspicious activity, including terrorist and criminal activities. A 

checklist of activities and behaviors could be developed from a literature review. However, a 

structured checklist is not functionally suitable for use in a comprehensive BOP at an operating 

power reactor or power reactor construction site. Unlike classroom checklists used for the 

assessment of task completion and determination of behavior in children, adults in a dynamic 

and physically diverse or widespread workplace cannot be similarly observed. Adults in these 

types of environments are mobile and must be observed while performing a wide range of tasks, 

in wide-ranging locations, while they are involved with and integrate with broadly diverse 

populations. Therefore, the training provided for observing behavior must be sufficient in scope

to provide observers with the recognition skills necessary to effectively implement the BOP. 

Checklists are a useful tool in training and post assessment activities.

Although checklists are useful in developing training attributes, they do not offer insight into the 

personality makeup of a terrorist. The checklists may provide an activity-based indication of 

potential terrorist characteristics. These activities or characteristics may include personnel 

showing undue interest in the security features of the site or unusual interest in operational 

activities beyond their assignment area or an indication of surveillance activities before an 

actual terrorist event. In some Federal agencies, this type of observation is supported by an 

operational security program, which is designed to deny adversaries access to information 

about sensitive activities by examining day-to-day activities from an adversary’s point of view.
11

The key behaviors of alcohol, drug abuse, and mental health issues have been well studied and 

are easier to identify than potential terrorist activities. Often these issues result in overt 

behavior that is readily identifiable. Terrorist behaviors are often more subtle and more closely 

related to criminal and espionage activities.

2.2 Behavioral Collection Techniques and Data

This review examined a variety of behavioral collection techniques and research and analysis 

techniques. The review also included an evaluation of emerging technology, such as behavioral 

identification using cameras and artificial intelligence.

The book entitled, “Protecting Individual Privacy in the Struggle against Terrorists: A 

Framework for Program Assessment,”18 makes several recommendations for a robust data 

collection program. Although many of these recommendations are designed around protecting 

privacy, they provide insight for any BOP.

The study identified the following criteria for effective programs:

• The program should have a clearly stated purpose.

• The program and each of its components should have a sound rational basis.

• The program and each of its components should have a sound experimental basis.

• The program should be scalable.

• The program should have a clearly stated set of operational or business processes.

• The program should be capable of being integrated in practice with relevant systems 

and tools inside and outside the organization.

• The programs should be robust.

• The program should adequately guarantee that the data on which it depends are 

appropriate and reliable.

• The program should provide appropriate data stewardship—a term that refers to 

accountability for the program resources being used and protected appropriately 

according to the defined and authorized purpose.

• The program should provide adequate guarantees of objectivity in the testing and 

assessment of the program.

• The program should be subject to ongoing assessments. No system, no matter how 

well designed or tested, will be perfect.

• The effectiveness of the program and its compliance should be documented.
12

Most of these criteria listed are sound practices that can be transferred to any BOP to enhance 

its capabilities.

The book entitled, “Protecting Airline Passengers in the Age of Terrorism,” discussed the use of 

behavior pattern recognition (BPR). The Israelis use BPR to identify the possible terrorist by 

studying the demeanor of passengers and asking simple questions concerning travel details. 

This assessment allows security officers to determine whether passengers are potential security 

risks. BPR uses cognitive and emotional clues to identify suspicious behavior. The cognitive 

clues center on the thought process and language of deception, whereas the emotional clues 

center on facial expressions, body language, and voice patterns. The authors point out that 

“formally investigating and training personnel in behavioral recognition with an eye to the 

science is a new approach to security.” The authors also state, “To date there is no better tool 

to detect suspicious human behavior than another human being.”19

Airports around the world are using BPR. The Israelis have been using BPR for 4 decades with 

zero hijackings or airport-based attacks. This success indicates that the use of BPR might be 

effective at an operating nuclear power plant or a power reactor construction site.

There are several research projects involving technology and behavioral observation. One 

example is a project called the “Mind’s Eye,” under development at the Defense Advanced 

Research Projects Agency (DARPA); this project is aimed at developing a visual intelligence 

capability for unmanned systems. DARPA hopes to use artificial intelligence to assess human 

visual tasks to indicate areas of concern.20

In addition to ongoing research, tools and products are being developed for testing and 

application. S.S.B.I. Exports, Pvt. Ltd., sells a product called the Automated Behavior Pattern 

Recognition System, a crime-prevention system that uses a combination of 

psycho-physiological indications and cross-referencing of these indications with additional 

objective information.21 The product appears to provide a quick and seemingly accurate screen 

to identify potential suspicious behavior. Although the product looks promising, no objective 

studies were found to verify the effectiveness of the technology. In addition, an examination of 

the technology would be necessary to ensure its effectiveness and to determine any legal 

ramifications involving its use.

A Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) study and subsequent publication entitled, 

“Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation,” may have applications for a BOP, even 

though it is focused on the cyber-security threat. The PNNL study discusses a modeling system 

to help minimize the insider threat. The predictive modeling approach incorporates both cyber 

and psychosocial data. Evaluations of the predictive model used case studies and additional 

data sets (some fabricated to test specific aspects of the model and some generated by 

simulation software). The model automates the detection of high-risk activities on which to 

focus.22 The model certainly has cyber-security-related applications and, if proven effective, 

could be useful in other aspects of the BOP.

2.3 Other Behavioral Observation Programs

Further review considered programs that were not included in comparative analysis because of 

insufficient program information or because the data were part of the TSA comparison 
13

discussed below in Section 3.1.4. The review looked at the use of behavior pattern recognition 

(BPR) in the airport setting.

El Al Airlines uses BPR, as does Miami International Airport23 and Logan International Airport.24 

As discussed earlier, BPR is a process that assesses certain behavior as suspicious. This 

behavior could be an indication of criminal or terrorist activity. BPR should not be confused with 

racial profiling. The 1972 terrorist act carried out by Japanese nationals is a good example of 

the limitations of racial profiling. This was the worst attack to date on the Ben Gurion Airport.25

Security at the Ben Gurion Airport now has a multi-level defensive strategy, starting at the 

perimeter of the airport and working inward to the boarding process. Security personnel, highly 

trained in the BPR technique, have several opportunities to observe a passenger during the 

lengthy boarding process. Any passenger can be denied access to a flight for suspicious 

behavior.

Miami International Airport is currently utilizing BPR to screen passengers. Although Miami 

does not employ behavioral detection to the extent that the Israelis do, plans exist to train other 

airport personnel and create a more multi-layered assessment process to observe individuals.

Boston Logan International Airport utilizes Massachusetts State Police to help with airport 

security. These troopers are trained in BPR to help determine suspicious behavior.

The key elements in these programs are personnel dedicated to behavioral observation, in

depth focused training, layered defense, and the use of BPR. Such personnel are dedicated to 

observe behavior, are well trained to recognize suspect behavior, and are trained to handle 

those who exhibit such behaviors. Multiple layers of security working in concert toward the same 

goal ensure the existence of multiple opportunities to stop any terrorist or criminal activity before 

or after it occurs. The integration of programs and personnel in these layers enhances the 

opportunities to thwart potential adversaries.

2.4 Governmental Reports Related to Behavioral Observation Programs

In May 2010, the GAO released a report entitled, “Efforts to Validate TSA’s Passenger 

Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, but Opportunities Exist to Strengthen 

Validation and Address Operational Challenges.”26 The GAO commissioned this report to 

review the program called Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT). GAO 

analyzed (1) the extent to which TSA validated the SPOT program before deployment, 

(2) implementation challenges, and (3) the extent to which TSA measures SPOT’s effect on 

aviation security. GAO analyzed TSA documents such as strategic plans and operating 

procedures, interviewed agency personnel and subject matter experts, and visited 15 airports 

which have implemented the SPOT program.

The GAO report stated:

Although the [U.S.] Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is in the process of 

validating some aspects of the SPOT program, TSA deployed SPOT nationwide without 

first validating the scientific basis for identifying suspicious passengers in an airport 

environment. A scientific consensus does not exist on whether behavior detection 

principles can be reliably used for counterterrorism purposes, according to the National 
14

Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences. According to TSA, “no other 

large-scale security screening program based on behavioral indicators has ever been 

rigorously scientifically validated.”

The GAO report further stated:

TSA is experiencing implementation challenges, including not fully utilizing the 

resources it has available to systematically collect and analyze the information 

obtained by BDOs [Behavior Detection Officer] on passengers who may pose a 

threat to the aviation system. TSA’s Transportation System Operations Center 

has the resources to investigate aviation threats but generally does not check all 

law enforcement and intelligence databases available to it to identify persons 

referred by BDOs. Utilizing existing resources would enhance TSA’s ability to 

quickly verify passenger identity and could help TSA to more reliably “connect 

the dots.” Further, most BDOs lack a mechanism to input data on suspicious 

passengers into a database used by TSA analysts and also lack a means to 

obtain information from the Transportation System Operations Center on a timely 

basis. Providing BDOs or other TSA personnel with these capabilities could help 

TSA “connect the dots” to identify potential threats.

The GAO report also stated that “although TSA has some performance measures related to 

SPOT, it lacks outcome-oriented measures to evaluate the program’s progress toward reaching 

its goals. Establishing a plan to develop these measures could better position TSA to determine 

if SPOT is contributing to TSA’s strategic goals for aviation security. TSA is planning to 

enhance its evaluation capabilities to more readily assess the program’s effectiveness by 

conducting statistical analysis of data related to SPOT referrals to law enforcement and 

associated arrests.”

The GAO provided the following 11 specific recommendations for the SPOT program:

• The U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security should convene an 

independent panel of experts to review the methodology of the DHS 

Science and Technology Directorate study on the SPOT program to 

determine whether the study’s methodology is sufficiently comprehensive 

to validate the SPOT program.

• Conduct a comprehensive risk assessment to determine the effective 

deployment of SPOT.

• Perform a cost-benefit analysis of SPOT.

• Revise and implement the SPOT strategic plan using risk assessment 

information.

• Study the feasibility of using airport checkpoint-surveillance video 

recordings to enhance its understanding of terrorist behaviors.
15

• Provide guidance in the SPOT standard operating procedures or other 

directives to BDOs or other TSA personnel on how to input data into the 

Transportation Information Sharing System database.

• Develop a standardized process to allow BDOs or other designated 

airport officials to send information to TSA’s Transportation Security 

Operations Center about passengers whose behavior indicates that they 

may pose a threat to security and to provide guidance on how designated 

TSA officials are to receive information back from the center. 

• The Transportation Security Operations Center utilizes all the databases 

available to it when conducting checks on passengers who rise to the 

level of an LEO [law enforcement organization] referral against 

intelligence and criminal databases.

• Establish a plan with objectives, milestones, and timeframes to develop 

outcome-oriented performance measures for BDOs.

• Establish controls for SPOT data.

• Establish time frames and milestones to systematically evaluate the 

SPOT training program on a periodic basis.28

In response to the May 2010 GAO report to develop a plan for outcome –based 

performance measures, TSA completed a performance metric plan in November of 2012

and took action on all of GAO’s 11 recommendations. GAO, in their November 2013 

report, acknowledged that the SPOT validation study was a useful initial step and had

addressed issues raised in GAO’s May 2010 report, but that methodological weakness

still limited its usefulness. TSA has efforts underway to better define the behavioral 

indicators currently used by BDOs, and to complete an inter-rater reliability study. The 

inter-rater reliability study could help TSA determine whether BDOs can consistently and 

reliably interpret the behavioral indicators, which is a critical component of validating the 

SPOT program’s results and ensuring that the program is implemented consistently. The 

November 2013 GAO report also concluded that providing scientifically validated 

evidence that demonstrates that behavioral indicators can be used to identify 

passengers who may pose a threat to aviation security is critical to the implementation of 

TSA’s behavior detection activities.

Although not all the information that appears in the GAO reports is directly applicable to BOPs 

at operating nuclear plants or power reactor construction sites, the reports do provide some 

recommendations that, if implemented, would enhance BOPs. The following are some 

significant points that may be applied to BOPs at operating nuclear power plants and power 

reactor construction sites:

• Conduct a risk assessment to determine the best way to deploy a BOP. The risk 

assessment should identify SSCs that might require enhanced security during 

construction. The risk assessment should identify what security features can be 

enhanced (including, but not limited to, the BOP) to better protect these SSCs.
16

• Provide a means to share and document behavioral observations.

• Establish controls for BOP data. In this case, controls refer to the consistency of how 

the data are collected and analyzed.

• Periodically and systematically evaluate training to ensure that it is effective and is easily 

understood.

The TSA program is primarily used as a deterrent. The GAO report states in this regard:

TSA notes that one purpose of the SPOT program is to deter terrorists, but that proving 

that it has succeeded at deterring terrorists is difficult because the lack of data has 

presented challenges for the SPOT program office when developing performance 

measures. We agree that developing performance measures, especially outcome 

measures, for programs with a deterrent focus [is] difficult. 28

Appendix II, “Contractor-Reported Challenges to Completing State Construction Projects,” to 

GAO Report No. 09-48, “Embassy Construction: Additional Actions Are Needed to Address 

Contractor Participation,” indicated that finding qualified workers who are cleared is a major 

challenge. The report notes some of the same turnover issues prevalent in the U.S. 

construction labor market, such as employees leaving for more money and for a more favorable 

location.27

The Congressional Research Service report to Congress entitled, “Securing General Aviation,” 

describes the Airport Watch Program. This program relies on the cooperation and participation 

of pilots, airport tenants, and airport workers to observe and report suspicious behavior. The 

report pointed out that training material is made available to the participants in the program but 

that they are relatively untrained in detecting suspicious behavior. This was cited as a limitation 

in the program. The report stated that the implementation of BPR techniques was one possible 

solution to this limitation. The report noted that line and maintenance personnel could be 

trained in BPR to become an integral part of security instead of relying on a few security 

personnel.28

2.5 Related Literature

A review was performed of other literature related to BOPs, including case studies and other 

academic literature. Synopses of the most relevant documents are provided below.

On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho murdered 32 and injured 17 students and faculty in two 

related incidents on the campus of Virginia Tech. Cho was a student of Virginia Tech majoring 

in English. The governor empowered an independent panel to investigate the shooting in 

August 2007; the panel produced the report entitled, “The Virginia Tech Review Panel Report.” 

This report contained several key findings related to the shooting incident, some of which are 

listed below: 

1. Cho exhibited signs of mental health problems during his childhood. His 

middle and high schools responded well to these signs and, with his 

parents' involvement, provided services to address his issues. He also 

received private psychiatric treatment and counseling for selective mutism 
17

and depression. In 1999, after the Columbine shootings, Cho’s middle 

school teachers observed suicidal and homicidal ideations in his writings 

and recommended psychiatric counseling, which he received. During this 

counseling he received medication for a short time. Although Cho’s 

parents were aware that he was troubled at this time, they state they did 

not specifically know that he thought about homicide shortly after the 

1999 Columbine school shootings.

2. During Cho's junior year at Virginia Tech, numerous incidents occurred 

that were clear warnings of mental instability. Although various 

individuals and departments within the university knew about each of 

these incidents, the university did not intervene effectively. No one knew 

all the information and no one connected all of the dots.

3. University officials in the Office of Judicial Affairs, Cook Counseling 

Center, campus police, the Dean of Students, and others explained their 

failures to communicate with one another or with Cho’s parents by noting 

their belief that such communications are prohibited by the federal laws 

governing the privacy of health and education records. In reality, federal 

laws and their state counterparts afford ample leeway to share 

information in potentially dangerous situations.

4. The Cook Counseling Center and the university’s Care Team failed to 

provide needed support and services to Cho during a period in late 2005 

and early 2006. The system failed for lack of resources, incorrect 

interpretation of privacy laws, and passivity. Records of Cho’s minimal 

treatment at Virginia Tech’s Cook Counseling Center are missing.

5. There was widespread confusion about what federal and state privacy 

laws allow. Also, the federal laws governing records of health care 

provided in educational settings are not entirely compatible with those 

governing other health records.

6. Cho purchased two guns in violation of federal law. The fact that in 2005 

Cho had been judged to be a danger to himself and ordered to outpatient 

treatment made him ineligible to purchase a gun under federal law.

7. Virginia at this time was one of only 22 states that report any information 

about mental health to a federal database used to conduct background 

checks on would-be gun purchasers. But Virginia law did not clearly 

require that persons such as Cho—who had been ordered into out-patient 

treatment but not committed to an institution—be reported to the 

database. 

8. Some Virginia colleges and universities are uncertain about what they are 

permitted to do regarding the possession of firearms on campus.

9. The Virginia Tech police may have erred in prematurely concluding that 

their initial lead in the double homicide was a good one, or at least in 
18

conveying that impression to university officials while continuing their 

investigation. They did not take sufficient action to deal with what might 

happen if the initial lead proved erroneous. The police reported to the 

university emergency Policy Group that the “person of interest” probably 

was no longer on campus.

10. The Virginia Tech Police Department erred in not requesting that the 

university’s Policy Group issue a campus-wide notification that two 

persons had been killed and that all students and staff should be cautious 

and alert.

11. Senior university administrators, acting as the Emergency Policy Group, 

failed to issue an all-campus notification about the West Ambler Johnson 

(WAJ) killings until almost 2 hours had elapsed. University practice may 

have conflicted with written policies.

12. Cho’s motives for the WAJ or Norris Hall shootings are unknown to the 

police or the panel. Cho’s writings and videotaped pronouncements do 

not explain why he struck when and where he did.29

The review of the Virginia Tech shootings offers the following important lessons for any BOP:

• A comprehensive BOP should be able to identify behaviors related to all threats, 

including mental instability.

• Personnel need to be properly trained to identify these behaviors and must be willing to 

take appropriate action. The training should include a discussion of federal and state 

laws pertaining to privacy act information and health records.

• A clear set of procedures on how to handle BOP reporting is critical to the success of the 

BOP. No doubt should exist on how to handle behavioral observation information.

• All data from all sources need to be reviewed. The reviewing official of a BOP should 

have all information available in order to make an informed decision.

• Documentation is a key element of a program. Without proper documentation, detecting 

behavioral patterns of concern may be impossible.

• A comprehensive BOP needs to be an integrated site activity. All of these elements 

need to have clear lines of communication.

Scott D. Sagan’s article entitled, “The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear 

Security Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security,” discusses redundancy in nuclear security. 

Sagan’s article stated that “redundancy can backfire when diffusion of responsibility leads to 

‘social shirking.’” He discusses the case study of the 1964 murder of Kitty Genovese in Queens 

Borough, New York City, where 38 witnesses to the murder failed to report or intervene in the 

act.30
19

Sagan’s observations about “social shirking” have been validated by other researchers and 

these observations may have direct implications for the fundamental concepts of behavioral 

observation. Although the “social shirking” phenomenon can adversely impact a BOP, some of 

the following actions can serve as mitigation:

• Develop comprehensive and consistent training that emphasizes the responsibility to 

report behavior. This training should include periodic refresher classes and continual 

security education through, for example, electronic or other visual media, morning 

briefings, and handouts.

• Produce a clear and concise policy statement that is communicated frequently to all 

employees. This policy statement should be communicated to the employees during 

employee orientation to the site and periodically (at least annually) to help ensure the 

policy is understood by employees. 

• Establish clear and concise procedures for the BOP.

• Institute oversight of the program to examine lessons learned from the internal BOP and 

other BOP programs.

The article entitled, “The Behavior Observation Instrument: A Method of Direct Observation for 

Program Evaluation,” discussed limiting factors of BOPs in clinical settings. The most notable 

elements impacting behavior observation are cost, manpower, and training.31 Each of these 

factors influences a BOP, but it will typically be the cost of the program that determines the 

extent to which manpower and training are applied. Any adopted changes should have proven 

benefit to the BOP to decrease the risk to public health and safety or the common defense and 

security.

21

3. COMPARATIVE PROGRAMS

3.1 DESCRIPTIONS

Sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 below discuss, respectively, the NRC regulatory requirements for 

establishing a BOP as an element of the FFD and AA programs, and relevant NEI guidance.

Subsequent sections compare the NRC requirements and NEI guidance on BOPs to other 

federal, state and international programs. 

The requirements in 10 CFR Part 26, “Fitness for Duty Programs,” as well as NEI guidance 

documents NEI 03-01, “Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program,” and NEI 06-06, 

“Fitness for Duty Program Guidance for New Nuclear Power Plant Construction Sites” (both of 

which are discussed below in Section 3.1.2), provide a framework that can be utilized to develop 

a BOP. Note, however, that this existing NEI guidance for Part 26 does not fully address all of 

the regulatory requirements, because there are provisions in 10 CFR Part 73 (“Physical 

Protection of Plants and Materials”) that also need to be considered in developing a BOP. The 

relevant 10 CFR Part 26 and Part 73 provisions are discussed below in section 3.1.1. The 

NRC’s goal in this NUREG report is to provide recommendations that will help the regulated 

community address both sets of NRC requirements in their BOPs. In this regard, it is important 

to be familiar with the relevant Part 26 and Part 73 BOP requirements. 

A best practice discussed in other programs is additional training for reviewing officials, 

supervisors, and managers. These personnel should be able to review documentation and 

make key decisions based on described behavior, personal observations during face-to-face 

interviews and other associated documentation or information. Although it is easy to make a 

determination on a positive drug test, combining several small incidents and painting a mosaic 

about an individual and his or her behavior can be much more difficult. Clear policy, 

procedures, training and experience can make this process more uniform and can eliminate 

false positive reports and, perhaps more importantly, false negative reports. As such, having 

properly trained supervisors and managers, as well as reviewing officials if applicable, at 

operating reactors and reactors under construction is a key component of a successful BOP. 

Of the BOPs reviewed, performance indicators were not well defined in regulations or guidance. 

As discussed in Section 2 of this report, defining performance for a deterrent program is difficult. 

Although a trend, such as an increase in the number of positive drug tests, is an empirical 

measure and can be useful as a performance measure, the cause of the increase is also 

important. In this case, an increase in positive results could indicate an increase in drug use or 

it could be attributed to a larger panel of drugs being tested or simply a higher percentage of the 

population being tested. Performance indicators for any program, whether a BOP or a safety 

program, help determine how a program is functioning.

3.1.1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

The BOP is a vital and supporting element of the FFD, IMP, and AA programs. For example, 10 

CFR 73.56 contains the AA requirements applicable to personnel at nuclear power plants, and 

includes BOP provisions. In this regard, 10 CFR 73.56(f)(1) states that a BOP must be 
22

“designed to detect behaviors or activities that may constitute an unreasonable risk to the health 

and safety of the public and common defense and security, including a potential threat to 

commit radiological sabotage.” Additionally, 10 CFR 73.56(f)(3) states that personnel who are 

subject to an AA program must report any concerns arising from behavioral observation, 

including, but not limited to, concerns related to any questionable behavior patterns or activities 

of others to the reviewing official, his or her supervisor, or other management personnel 

designated in their site procedures. This provision further requires that, upon receipt of any 

such reports, the reviewing official must reassess the reported individual’s unescorted access or 

unescorted access authorization status; if the individual’s trustworthiness or reliability is thereby 

called into question, the reviewing official is required to terminate the individual’s access 

authorization.

With respect to maintaining FFD authorization, 10 CFR 26.71(a)(3) requires that individuals

remain “subject to a behavioral observation program that meets the requirements of § 26.33.”

In turn, 10 CFR 26.33 states in relevant part as follows:

Behavioral observation must be performed by individuals who are trained under § 26.29 

to detect behaviors that may indicate possible use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs; 

use or possession of alcohol on site or while on duty; or impairment from fatigue or any 

cause that, if left unattended, may constitute a risk to public health and safety or the 

common defense and security.

In accordance with the 10 CFR 26.29(a) training requirements, licensees and other entities must 

ensure that individuals who are subject to subpart B of Part 26 have the following knowledge 

and abilities (KAs):

(1) Knowledge of the policy and procedures that apply to the individual, the 

methods that will be used to implement them, and the consequences of violating 

the policy and procedures;

(2) Knowledge of the individual’s role and responsibilities under the FFD 

program;

(3) Knowledge of the roles and responsibilities of others, such as the Medical 

Review Officer (MRO) and the human resources FFD and Employee Assistance 

Program (EAP) staffs;

(4) Knowledge of the EAP services available to the individual;

(5) Knowledge of the personal and public health and safety hazards associated 

with abuse of illegal and legal drugs and alcohol;

(6) Knowledge of the potential adverse effects on job performance of prescription 

and over-the-counter drugs, alcohol, dietary factors, illness, mental stress, and 

fatigue;

(7) Knowledge of the prescription and over-the-counter drugs and dietary factors 

that have the potential to affect drug and alcohol test results;
23

(8) Ability to recognize illegal drugs and indications of the illegal use, sale, or 

possession of drugs;

(9) Ability to observe and detect performance degradation, indications of 

impairment, or behavioral changes; and,

(10) Knowledge of the individual’s responsibility to report an FFD concern and the ability 

to initiate appropriate actions, including referrals to the EAP and person(s) designated by 

the licensee or other entity to receive FFD concerns.

However, these KAs do not address potential criminal or terrorist behaviors – which are covered 

by the 10 CFR 73.56 provisions discussed above. Similarly, the focus of 10 CFR 26.189, 

“Determination of Fitness,” is on mental health, drug, and alcohol issues; criminal and terrorist 

activities can and do fall outside these areas. Consequently, 10 CFR Part 26 does not require 

or address the qualifications of personnel who are required to make determinations concerning 

criminal and terrorist activities. However, 10 CFR Part 26 can be used to evaluate the fitness of 

licensee personnel (e.g., that an individual is mentally stressed, or is exhibiting behavioral 

changes calling into question the individual’s fitness to safely and competently perform assigned 

duties). 

As indicated above, behavioral observation can be utilized to determine whether a person is fit 

for duty. In this regard, 10 CFR 26.189(c) states:

A determination of fitness that is conducted for cause (i.e., because of observed 

behavior or a physical condition) must be conducted through face-to-face interaction 

between the subject individual and the professional making the determination. 

Electronic means of communication may not be used.

Also relevant in this regard are the 10 CFR 26.406(c) fitness monitoring provisions, stating that 

licensees and other entities must “establish procedures that monitors shall follow in response to 

the indications and actions specified in paragraph (b) of this section and train the monitors to 

implement the program.”1 Similar training issues are discussed below in Section 3.1.2.

NUREGs and other guidance documents (discussed below in Section 3.1.2) may also be used 

in developing and implementing more comprehensive and universally consistent BOPs among 

those licensees and other entities that are required to have BOPs. Note, however, that while 

guidance documents can help determine acceptable means of complying with NRC regulatory 

requirements for a BOP, they cannot be used to impose substantive new requirements.

3.1.2 Nuclear Energy Institute

Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance document NEI 06-06, Rev. 6 “Fitness for Duty Program 

Guidance for New Nuclear Power Plant Construction Sites,” April 2013, describes a process for 

construction site entities “to authorize and maintain a worker’s status in the construction site 

entity’s FFD Program in order to allow an individual to work on a construction site.” Licensees 

or applicants may choose alternative means of complying with applicable requirements. Entities 

implementing NEI 06-06 guidance may include NRC licensees; contractor/vendors (C/V); 

applicants for, or holders of, a Combined License (COL), Construction Permit (CP), or Limited 

Work Authorization (LWA); or other entities authorized by the NRC. The defined process

“applies only to construction activities on safety- and security-related SSCs that are performed 
24

on the site where the new power reactor will be installed and operated.”32 Furthermore, 

licensees or applicants need not follow NEI 06-06 if they have alternative means of complying 

with applicable requirements.

NEI 06-06 further states:

The construction site entity’s Behavioral Observation Program is the primary 

means to detect behavior that may indicate possible use, sale, or possession of 

illegal drugs; use or possession of alcohol on site or while on duty; or any 

physical impairment or any cause that, if left unattended, may constitute a risk to 

public health and safety or the common defense and security. Management and 

oversight personnel that are responsible for observing individuals subject to a 

Behavioral Observation Program shall report any FFD concerns about individuals 

to the personnel designated in the construction site entity’s policy.

Management and oversight personnel who are responsible for observing 

individuals subject to the Behavioral Observation Programs must be trained to 

have sufficient awareness and sensitivity to detect degradation in performance 

which may be the result of being under the influence of any substance, legal or 

illegal, physical or mental impairment which in any way may adversely affect their 

ability to safely and competently perform their duties.

While these statements are broad enough to cover criminal and terrorist activities, they do not 

require that these topics be covered. Language that includes the impact on site security and 

critical infrastructure and systems is necessary to address these activities and focus BOP 

observations.

Further discussion of training in NEI 06-06 includes a general statement of reporting 

responsibilities with specific training roles, knowledge, and skills remaining undefined. “Training 

shall communicate the expectation of promptly reporting noticeable changes in behavior or FFD 

concerns about other individuals to the construction site entity designated personnel for 

appropriate evaluation and action in accordance with the FFD policy.”

NEI 06-06 recommends that management and oversight personnel be notified if any “for cause” 

behavior is observed. “For cause” behavior, as used in NEI 06-06 and defined in 10 CFR 

26.405(c)(2), is any observed behavior or physical condition creating a reasonable suspicion of 

possible illegal activity or physical or mental impairment.

Construction site entity procedures should provide reasonable assurance that personnel are fit 

to safely and competently perform their duties. NEI 06-06, Section 7, Behavioral Observation 

Program, states the process to be followed if an individual’s behavior or condition raises a 

concern while performing, constructing, or directing the construction of safety- or 

security-related systems. Observations should detect impairments from any cause “which could 

adversely affect the individual’s ability to safely and competently perform his or her duties.”

NEI 03-01, “Nuclear Power Plant Access Authorization Program,” Revision 3, May 2009, 

endorsed by NRC staff (ADAMS) Accession No. ML13177A260 and Regulatory Guide 5.66,

(ADAMS) Accession No. ML112060028 describes the BOP as the primary means of 
25

determining continued trustworthiness and reliability of covered individuals. NEI 03-01describes 

the objectives of a BOP as follows:

(a.) To detect and report behaviors that may indicate possible use, sale or 

possession of illegal drugs, use or possession of alcohol on site or 

possession of illegal drugs, use or possession of alcohol on site or while 

on duty; or impairment from fatigue or any cause that, if left unattended 

constitute a risk to public health and safety or the common defense and 

security.

(b.) To report and evaluate legal actions taken by a law enforcement authority 

or court of law which the individual has been subject that could result in 

incarceration or court order that requires a court appearance, including 

but not limited to an arrest, an indictment, the filing of charges, or a 

conviction, but excluding minor traffic violation such as parking or 

speeding tickets; and,

(c.) To detect and report other behavior that may constitute an unreasonable 

risk to health and safety of the public, including a potential threat to 

radiological sabotage. This includes behavior instances addressed in the 

licensee or C/V disciplinary process leading to unfavorable termination or 

resignation in lieu of termination.

NEI 03-01 defines which employees are subject to a BOP, as follows:

1. Any individual to whom a licensee intends to grant unescorted access

(UA) to nuclear power plant protected vital areas or any individual for 

whom a licensee authorizes unescorted access authorization (UAA);

2. Any individual who is required by a licensee to physically report to the 

licensee’s Technical Support Center (TSC) or Emergency Operations 

Facility (EOF) as specified within the licensee emergency plans and 

procedures;

3. Any individual whose duties and responsibilities permit the individual to 

take action by electronic means, either on site or remotely, that could 

adversely impact the licensee’s operational safety, security, or emergency 

response capabilities;

4. Any individual who has a responsibilities for implementing a licensee’s 

protective strategy, including, but not limit to, armed security force 

officers, alarm station operators and tactical response team leaders:

5. The licensee access authorization program reviewing official or contractor 

or vender access authorization program reviewers; and

6. Other individuals, at the licensee’s discretion, including employees of the 

contractor or a vender who are designated in access authorization 

program procedures. 
26

NEI 03-01 also provides training recommendations for personnel subject to the BOP. 

Individuals covered by BOP should be instructed to comply with the policy and procedures of 

the licensee’s FFD program. The training recommendations are as follows:

a. The licensee and if appropriate C/V must develop a training plan that 

results in reasonable assurance that licensee and C/V personnel have 

sufficient awareness and sensitivity to detect degradation in performance 

which may be the result of being under the influence of any substance, 

legal or illegal, physical or mental impairment which in any way may 

adversely affect their ability to safely and competently perform their 

duties. All C/V training plans must be licensee approved.

b. The training program shall address the knowledge and abilities necessary 

to detect behavior or activities that have the potential to constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the public health and safety and the common 

defense, including the potential to commit radiological sabotage and 

communicate the requirement of promptly reporting noticeable changes in 

behaviors, activities or FFD concerns about other individuals to the 

licensee or C/V’s management-designated personnel for appropriate 

evaluation and action in accordance with regulatory requirements and the 

licensee approved FFD policy.

c. The training program must also provide for instruction in techniques 

related to recognition of behaviors adverse to the safe operation and 

security of the facility, (e.g., unusual interest in or predisposition towards 

security or operations activities outside the scope of one’s normal work 

assignments, or frequent unexplained absence from work assignments.)

d. Behavioral observations must be performed by individuals who are 

trained to detect behaviors that may indicate possible use, sale, or 

possession of illegal drugs; use or possession of alcohol on site or while 

on duty; or impairment from fatigue or any cause that, if left unattended, 

may constitute a risk to public health and safety. 

e. All individuals will be trained to the same level on their behavioral 

observation responsibilities.

f. All individuals identified in Section10.b [NEI 03-01] shall undergo initial 

BOP training. The initial training shall include a comprehensive 

examination addressing the requirements of Section 10.a.1 (a)-(c) 

[NEI 03-01]. BOP refresher training shall be completed on a nominal 

annual basis and shall be documented as required by licensee or C/V 

procedures. In lieu of refresher training, a comprehensive examination 

may be administered. 
27

g. Remedial training and re-testing are required for individuals who fail to 

satisfactorily complete the comprehensive examination.

h. Initial and refresher training may be delivered using a variety of media 

(including, but not limited to, classroom lectures, required reading, video, 

or computer-based training systems). The licensee or C/V shall monitor 

the completion of training. 

NEI 03-01 describes the specific responsibilities of personnel subject to the BOP as follows:

1. Observing personnel for behavior traits and patterns that may reflect 

adversely on their trustworthiness or reliability;

2. Awareness of behavior that might be adverse to safe operations;

3. Reporting observed behaviors of individuals that may adversely affect the 

safety or security of a licensee’s facility, or that may constitute an 

unreasonable risk to the public health and safety or the common defense and 

security including a potential threat to commit radiological sabotage; and

4. Reporting those observations to the appropriate licensee or C/V management 

in accordance with the licensee’s or C/V’s procedures.

3.1.3 U.S. Department of Energy

The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) Human Reliability Program (HRP) is designed to provide 

an additional level of oversight and assurance of responsible action of personnel in designated 

positions at DOE sites. In this regard, the DOE’s 10 CFR Part 712, “Human Reliability 

Program,” states:

The HRP is a security and safety reliability program designed to ensure that individuals 

who occupy positions affording access to certain materials, nuclear explosive devices, 

facilities, and programs meet the highest standards of reliability and physical and mental 

suitability. This objective is accomplished under this part through a system of 

continuous evaluation that identifies individuals whose judgment and reliability may be 

impaired by physical or mental/personality disorders, alcohol abuse, use of illegal drugs 

or the abuse of legal drugs or other substances, or any other condition or circumstance 

that may be of a security or safety concern.”33

As reflected in DOE policy, DOE line management is responsible for safeguards and security of 

DOE assets. The DOE policy also requires that there be clear and unambiguous lines of 

authority and responsibilities for ensuring safeguards and security at all DOE and contractor 

organizational levels. Each individual is required to have the knowledge, skills, abilities, and 

experience to fulfill his or her responsibilities.34
28

Initial requirements of the HRP are as follows:

• DOE Q Security Clearance (access authorization)

A DOE Q clearance is a type of security clearance granted by DOE that indicates that 

the recipient is approved for access to the following levels of classified matter on a 

need-to-know basis: Top Secret, Secret, Confidential Restricted Data, National Security 

Information, and Formerly Restricted Data.

• Questionnaire for National Security Positions (QNSP), Part 2

The annual submission of the QNSP enables DOE to update the personnel security file

for the individual, which is reviewed annually.

• Signed Releases, Acknowledgments, and Waivers

Personnel must review and sign documents to facilitate the collection and dissemination 

of information, performance of medical assessments, and drug and alcohol testing.

• Completion of HRP Instruction

Individuals must complete HRP instruction for initial certification and annual 

recertification. The instruction includes the following elements:

– HRP objectives;

– roles and responsibilities of each HRP-certified individual, including recognizing 

and responding to behavioral change and aberrant or unusual behavior that may 

result in a risk to national security or nuclear explosive safety, recognizing and 

reporting security concerns, and reporting prescription drug use;

– requirements for returning to work after sick leave;

– the HRP continuous evaluation process; and,

– a detailed explanation of duties and safety requirements for those who have 

nuclear explosive responsibilities.

• Counterintelligence Evaluation

Individuals who occupy certain HRP positions may be required to successfully complete 

a counterintelligence evaluation; however, it is no longer a general requirement because 

of revisions to 10 CFR Part 709, “Counterintelligence Evaluation Program.” Under the 

revised regulation, each site will designate positions in accordance with the regulation’s 

criteria.

• Completion of Reviews, Evaluations, and Assessments
29

The following reviews, evaluation, and assessments must be completed:

– Supervisory Review. Each supervisor of an HRP candidate or HRP-certified 

individual must conduct an initial and annual review to evaluate information 

(including security concerns) relevant to that individual’s suitability to perform 

HRP tasks in a reliable and safe manner.

– Medical Assessment. The medical assessment is performed for initial 

certification and then annually for recertification. A medical assessment may be 

performed more often if required by the site occupational medical director 

(SOMD). The designated physician, under the supervision of the SOMD, is 

responsible for the medical assessment of HRP candidates and HRP-certified 

individuals. In performing this responsibility, the designated physician or the 

SOMD must integrate the medical evaluation, the available test results, the 

psychological evaluation, a review of current legal drug use, and any other 

relevant information. This information is used to determine if a safety or security 

reliability concern exists and if the individual is medically qualified for HRP duties.

– Psychological Evaluation. As part of the medical assessment, a psychological 

evaluation must be conducted for initial HRP certification. This evaluation 

consists of a psychological assessment (test) and an interview. For 

recertification, the evaluation consists of an interview, but a psychological test 

may also be conducted, if warranted. Every third year, the psychological 

evaluation includes a psychological test.

– Management Evaluation. The HRP management official considers the results of 

the supervisory review, medical assessment, drug and alcohol test results, and 

any other information relating to an individual’s reliability and trustworthiness and 

makes a recommendation regarding certification.

– Personnel Security Review. A DOE personnel security specialist will perform a 

personnel security file review upon receipt of the individual’s supervisory review,

medical assessment, and management evaluation and recommendation. 

Security concerns identified at any stage of the certification process will be 

evaluated and resolved in accordance with DOE regulations for access to 

classified matter or special nuclear materials in 10 CFR Part 710, “Criteria and 

Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special 

Nuclear Material.”

• Drug and Alcohol Testing

The following drug and alcohol testing must be conducted:

– Initial. All HRP candidates will be tested for the use of alcohol and illegal drugs 

before HRP certification is granted.

– Random Drug Test. HRP-certified individuals are selected randomly, at least once in 

every 12-month period as required by the DOE HRP Handbook, for unscheduled and 

unannounced testing for the presence of illegal drugs. A confirmed positive drug test 
30

is considered a security concern that will result in the individual’s immediate removal 

from HRP duties and adjudication under the criteria and guidelines in 10 CFR 710.7, 

“Application of the Criteria,” and 10 CFR 710.8, “Criteria.”

– Random Alcohol Test. HRP-certified individuals are selected randomly, at least once 

in every 12-month period, for unscheduled and unannounced testing for the 

presence of alcohol. A positive test is an alcohol concentration of 0.02 or greater on 

a confirmatory test. A person who tests positive will be sent home and will not be 

allowed to perform HRP duties for 24 hours. The management official will be 

notified.

• Other Requirements

Other requirements include the following:

– The individual shall not have used a hallucinogen (lysergic acid diethylamide

(LSD)) in the preceding 5 years and shall not have experienced a flashback 

resulting from the use of LSD more than 5 years before applying for certification 

or recertification.

– Individuals performing nuclear explosive duties, and others in designated 

positions, are prohibited from consuming alcohol within an 8-hour period 

preceding scheduled work.35

Initial screening is reinforced with behavioral observation of at-risk behavior. Personnel are 

trained to recognize and respond to behavioral changes and aberrant or unusual behavior that 

may result in a risk to national security. Individuals assigned to HRP duties must report any 

observed or reported behavior or condition of another HRP-certified individual that could 

indicate a “reliability concern.” Concerns include, but are not limited to, the following conditions:

• psychological or physical disorders that impair the performance of assigned 

duties;

• conduct that warrants referral for a criminal investigation or results in an arrest or 

conviction;

• indications of deceitful or delinquent behavior;

• attempted or threatened destruction of property or life;

• suicidal tendencies or attempted suicide;

• use of illegal drugs or abuse of legal drugs or other substances;

• alcohol use disorders;

• recurring financial irresponsibility;

• irresponsibility in performing assigned duties;
31

• inability to deal with stress or the appearance of being under unusual stress;

• failure to comply with work directives, hostility or aggression toward fellow 

workers or authority, uncontrolled anger, violation of safety or security 

procedures, or repeated absenteeism; and, 

• significant behavior changes, moodiness, depression, or other evidence of loss 

of emotional control.

An individual may be tested for alcohol or drugs if he or she is involved in an incident, unsafe 

practice or occurrence, or if reasonable suspicion exists that he or she may be impaired. 

Reasonable suspicion must be based on an articulable belief drawn from facts and reasonable 

inferences that the person is under the influence or in possession of an illegal drug or alcohol. 

This suspicion may be based on observations of use or possession of illegal substances or 

physical symptoms of being under the influence of illegal substances. Abnormal conduct or 

erratic behavior can also provide a basis for reasonable suspicion.

Supervisors are required to submit for assessment those employees who exhibit unusual 

conduct. Unusual conduct may include behavior that raises doubts about the person’s 

allegiance to national security or interests.

DOE facilities and sites develop programs to meet the requirements in 10 CFR Part 712, 

“Human Reliability Program,” and supplemental DOE guidance. Under DOE, the Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory (ORNL) HRP program is designed to reduce “insider” risks to national 

security through the close and continuous evaluation, selection, and monitoring of individuals in 

HRP-designated positions. Observations provide a determination on possible impairment by 

physical disorders, emotional disorders, use of controlled substances, or use of alcohol to 

excess. All ORNL supervisors receive training entitled, “Free from the Influence for 

Supervisors.” This training includes recognition of employee behavior, physical appearance, 

and job performance. Specific behaviors and performance indicators are listed with 

observations to note for action, reporting, and documentation.

The Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC) is a DOE facility that implements the above 

HRP policies. The FFD program at SLAC includes training supervisors and managers to 

observe worker behavior commonly associated with alcohol or substance abuse. The program 

describes supervisor roles and responsibilities to observe and monitor employee attendance, 

performance, and behavior. Specific actions are identified as trigger points to evaluate the 

employee for FFD. These actions include dexterity, coordination, concentration, memory, 

alertness, vision, and speech. Other behaviors include improper interactions with coworkers or 

an inappropriate reaction to criticism.

Procedures and training outline a sequence of actions when behavior indicates that the 

employee may not be fit for duty. The first action is to remove the employee from his or her 

duties. Subsequent actions include notifying employee relations or security, asking the 

employee to meet in a private area, informing the employee of concerns, informing the 

employee that he or she will be referred for a medical assessment, and documenting the 

observation and following actions.
32

U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) requirements are similar to those of DOE in support of 

national security while protecting public health and safety and the environment. The Personnel 

Reliability Program (PRP) is outlined in DOD Instruction 5210.42, which states that “only those 

personnel who have demonstrated the highest degree of individual reliability for allegiance, 

trustworthiness, conduct, behavior, and responsibility shall be allowed to perform duties 

associated with nuclear weapons, and they shall be continuously evaluated for adherence to 

PRP standards.”36

Discussion of U.S. Department of Energy Behavioral Observation

DOE addresses behavioral controls in a graded approach. It requires security awareness 

training for all employees and subcontractors and includes the responsibility to report specific 

behavior or actions outside of authorized activity. Site access is strictly controlled by the various 

area requirements. Areas include property protection areas, controlled construction areas, 

limited security areas, protected areas, and material access areas. Personnel are escorted in 

areas in which security controls exceed their specific clearance. Escorts are trained to monitor 

the movement and behavior of the escorted personnel.

Some of the strengths of the HRP program are as follows:

• The HRP program stresses drug and alcohol testing to ensure that each employee is 

randomly tested at least once a year.

• In addition to the management review, DOE Personnel Security reviews all HRP 

personnel annually. These reviews include the annual submission of the QNSP (Part 2) 

by HRP personnel.

• The HRP program conducts annual psychological and medical reviews.

The increase of drug and alcohol testing gives a greater assurance of a drug- and alcohol-free 

workplace. The security review by DOE security personnel provides added assurance that 

relevant security information receives an additional review. Annual medical and psychological 

reviews help ensure that any potential mental or physical factors that may constitute an 

unreasonable risk to public health and safety and the common defense and security are 

discovered before an incident occurs.

The HRP includes employees assigned to sensitive positions, who are subject to additional 

levels of training and observation requirements. The HRP requires training and clearly defines 

the roles and responsibilities of the HRP official, medical authority, managers, supervisors, and 

participating employees.

3.1.4 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Overseas Building Operation

Volume 3 of the Foreign Affairs Manual (FAM) “Fitness For Duty Requirements For Law 

Enforcement/Security Personnel in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS),” dated 

December 16, 2009, describes U.S. Department of State (DOS) FFD requirements for law 

enforcement and security personnel in the Bureau of Diplomatic Security. The policy “is 

intended to provide a mechanism for the assessment of an employee’s mental, emotional, and 

neuro-cognitive ability to perform...and to indicate to a reasonable person that continued service 
33

by the employee may (1) pose a threat to public safety, (2) jeopardize the safety of other 

employees, (3) jeopardize the safety of the particular employee, or (4) interfere with the 

Department’s ability to fulfill its mission.”

Volume 3 of FAM 4912 describes the process to determine continuing fitness. DOS requires all 

supervisory employees to remain alert to any indication of an employee’s mental, emotional, 

physical, or neuro-cognitive impairment and provides specific indicators as potential factors in 

determining FFD. The policy clearly describes the responsibility of any DOS employee to notify 

the observing employee’s supervisor. Volume 3 of FAM 4913, 4914, and 4915 describe actions 

following the observation of circumstances that indicate employee impairment.37

In monthly project performance reviews, senior managers discuss the security management of 

ongoing projects and HR as a part of project planning and execution. Civil unrest and the hiring 

of persons representative of the local population are contributing factors with a potential impact 

on projects. The Bureau of Overseas Building Operation provides additional training for its 

headquarters and field staff to better manage the embassy construction program. Construction 

contractors report that finding and keeping qualified workers (both cleared and uncleared) is a 

challenge to completing DOS projects.

Discussion of DOS Bureau of Overseas Building Operation Behavioral Observation

DOS provides guidance in the rule to address behavioral observations; however, a primary

focus is largely on the security of the job site. Of note is that attention to access control and 

security is not directly tied to FFD and behavioral observations. Furthermore, observations are 

defined to note the physical and mental state of the employee. The monthly reviews focus on 

resource availability rather than on a potential security threat by existing personnel. Training is 

similar to the NRC’s FFD-related training.

3.1.5 Federal Aviation Administration, Transportation Security Administration

TSA claims that the screening passengers by observation techniques (SPOT) program has 

been so successful that it now has more than 2,000 behavioral detection officers patrolling 

concourses and departure lounges for unusual, anxious, or otherwise “suspicious” passenger 

behavior. This program is a derivative of other successful behavioral observation and analysis 

programs developed and used domestically and internationally.

Behavior detection officers (BDOs) are trained to detect involuntary physical and physiological 

reactions that may indicate stress, fear, or deception and “discount nervousness, irritation, and 

confusion that many travelers experience. SPOT provides TSA a nonintrusive, behavior-based 

method to identify potentially high risk individuals through identification of individual’s actions, 

patterns, or trends of behavior.” TSA insists that the officers do not use racial, ethnic, or 

religious profiling.38

BDOs collect two categories of information in the SPOT program. Information is collected 

through firsthand observation or from other’s witnessing at-risk behavior. Other sources of 

information may include that provided by law enforcement officers, airport personnel, and 

members of the general public. 
34

The first category of SPOT information includes first hand observations; these observations are 

recorded without any personally identifiable information and are entered into a database. 

Individuals whose behavior exceeds an identified threshold make up the second category of 

information. These identified individuals may be referred for additional screening.39

The SPOT program and trained BDOs are recognized as leaders in the behavioral observation 

arena. For example, BDOs were teamed with local police to provide additional security 

screening at the 2009 Super Bowl held in Tampa, FL. In addition to supplying officers for the 

event, TSA provided a 4-hour training overview to Tampa-area law enforcement officers.40

The SPOT program was assessed by GAO in May 2010. GAO identified a finding that TSA had 

not adequately evaluated the program before its implementation. The TSA response was that 

no other large-scale, behavior-based screening program has been rigorously scientifically 

validated.

Another TSA behavior awareness program is in development through the TSA Science and 

Technology Directorate. This project will “provide to bus operators a behavioral observation and 

security awareness training package that could potentially significantly mitigate the risk of 

terrorist attacks against public bus transportation in the United States.”41

Discussion of the SPOT Program

Unlike many other BOPs, the SPOT focus specifically targets behavior related to criminal and 

terrorist activities. According to GAO Report No. 10-763, from May 29, 2004, through 

August 31, 2008, the SPOT program led to 1,100 arrests. The majority of these arrests were 

reported as illegal aliens, outstanding warrants, possession of fraudulent documents, and 

possession of a suspected illegal drug. GAO examined the travel of key individuals allegedly 

involved in six terrorist plots. It determined that at least 16 of the individuals allegedly involved 

in these plots moved through eight different airports in which the SPOT program had been 

implemented on at least 23 different occasions. These statistics tend to suggest mixed results 

for the SPOT program. 

In a subsequent GAO report No.14-158T released in November 2013, GAO found that “there is 

a statistically significant relationship between the length of time an individual has been a BDO 

and the number of SPOT referrals the individual makes. This suggests that different levels of 

experience may be one reason why BDOs apply the behavioral indicators differently.” TSA has 

efforts underway to better define the behavioral indicators currently used by BDOs, and to 

complete an inter-rater reliability study. The inter-rater reliability study could help TSA determine 

whether BDOs can consistently and reliably interpret the behavioral indicators, which is a critical 

component of validating the SPOT program’s results and ensuring that the program is 

implemented consistently. According to TSA, the current contract to study the indicators and 

the inter-rater reliability study is to be completed in 2014. (Reference #42)

The SPOT program is just one piece of the overall security program, and it works in conjunction 

with other screening techniques, such as baggage and passenger searches. The SPOT 

program is also dependent on information provided by a variety of sources concerning criminal 

and terrorist activities, such as watch lists and law enforcement alerts. This supplemental 

information is key to the success of the SPOT program and air transportation security. Finally, 
35

the SPOT program is under constant review, has evolved since its inception, and continues to 

improve SPOT techniques and application.

3.1.6 North Dakota State University

The North Dakota State University (NDSU) policy for FFD provides a mechanism to identify and 

intervene when individuals pose a threat to others or to property. Behavioral observation is 

defined as “reliable report: self-disclosure or third-party opinion about an employee’s possible 

lack of fitness for duty which is assessed as reasonable by the manager/supervisor considering 

such factors as the relationship of the reporter to the employee, the seriousness of the 

employee’s condition, the possible motivation of the reporter, and how the reporter learned the 

information.” The manager’s or supervisor’s responsibility is to observe the attendance, 

performance, and behavior of employees. Observed behavior that warrants action requires the 

supervisor to interview the employee and refer him or her for medical evaluation as appropriate.

At the NDSU, procedures describe the process to address a triggering event. Specific 

behaviors are identified as potential triggering events and include, but are not limited to, manual 

dexterity, coordination, alertness, speech, concentration, and interactions or responses to 

others.42

Discussion of the NDSU FFD Program

The NDSU implements a risk scale to help inform the risk evaluation performed by the manager 

or supervisor. This is a four-tiered scale and ranges from no risk to severe risk. Manager or 

supervisor protocol defines measures in the event of actionable behavior. This program also 

defines a triggering event and includes such elements as alertness, speech, response to 

criticism, threats of suicide, odor of alcohol or marijuana, and interactions with coworkers and 

supervisors. Employees who voluntarily seek assistance (for physical, mental, or emotional 

problems) before their work or attendance is adversely affected will not have their employment 

status jeopardized for seeking assistance. The triggering event elements did not appear to be 

adequately tied to the risk category.

3.1.7 Kansas Department of Health and Environment

The Kansas Department of Health and Environment (KDHE) is the primary State health care 

agency for the State of Kansas and is the provider for the State employee health program. The 

KDHE HealthQuest FFD program addresses changes in the behavior of State employees who 

may pose a potential threat to themselves or others in the workplace; it does not address 

chronic disciplinary or performance problems. This program includes circumstances when an 

employee’s emotional stability or ability to perform work safely might be in question. The 

program describes factors or indicators for at-risk behavior and appropriate notifications and 

action if negative behavioral signs are observed.

Discussion of the KDHE FFD Program

The KDHE FFD program establishes that identified risk potential is related to the number of 

recognized warning signs. The warning signs include, but are not limited to, suicidal behavior, 

personal expressions of mental instability, and statements or behaviors that would indicate 
36

potential violence. The KDHE FFD program also establishes a single point of contact is 

provided for FFD decisions. 

An evaluation under this program is comprised of a detailed medical and psychosocial history, a 

current mental status, and substance abuse evaluation. The evaluation also includes 

psychological testing, and in most instances, a psychiatric consultation and/or a visit to the 

employee’s primary care physician. The Psychological testing component of the evaluation 

process usually includes a combination of the following instruments (test descriptions below:

a) Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2)

b) Hilson Career Satisfaction Index (HCSI)

c) Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF)

d) Structured Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS)

e) SSASI (Substance Abuse)

f) MAST (Substance Abuse)

3.1.8 Canadian Air Transport Security Authority

The Canadian Air Transport Security Authority (CATSA) is responsible for pre-board passenger 

and random non-passenger screening, whereas third-party “service providers” train, manage, 

and employ the screening officers. CATSA uses x-ray machines to verify the contents of all 

carry-ons, as well as metal detectors, explosive trace detection equipment, and random physical 

searches of passengers at the pre-board screening points. To determine whether passengers 

could be criminals or terrorists, security personnel at Canadian airports now study air travelers’ 

facial expressions and body movements using BPR. Beginning in 2010, some air travelers 

were, and continue to be, “scrutinized by airport ‘behavior detection officers’ for physiological 

signs of hostile intent—in other words, screening for dangerous people rather than just for 

dangerous objects.”40

Discussion of the CATSA Passenger Screening Program

CATSA is moving toward a program similar to the FAA/TSA SPOT program. It has conducted 

training and is implementing the program with plans to expand the application. The cost for 

additional screening (called an air traffic security charge) is being passed on to the customers in 

fares.

3.1.9 International Drug Evaluation and Classification Program

The Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) originated the Drug Evaluation and Classification 

(DEC) Program in the early 1970's. During the 70’s, LAPD officers noticed that many of the 

individuals arrested for driving under the influence (DUI) had very low or zero alcohol 

concentrations. The officers reasonably suspected that the arrestees were under the influence 

of drugs, but lacked the knowledge and skills to support their suspicions. In response, two 

LAPD sergeants collaborated with various medical doctors, research psychologists and other 

medical professionals to develop a simple, standardized procedure for recognizing drug 

influence and impairment. Their efforts culminated in the development of a multi-step protocol 

and the first Drug Recognition Expert (DRE) program.43
37

Discussion of the DEC Program

The LAPD program attracted the attention of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 

(NHTSA's) in the early 1980's. The two agencies collaborated to develop a standardized DRE 

protocol, which led to the development of the DEC program. During the ensuing years, NHTSA, 

and various other agencies and research groups examined the DEC program. These various 

studies demonstrated that a properly trained DRE can successfully identify drug impairment and 

accurately determine the category of drugs causing such impairment. In 1987, NHTSA initiated 

DEC pilot programs in Arizona, Colorado, New York and Virginia. The states of Utah, 

California, and Indiana were added in 1988. In 1989, the International Association of Chiefs of 

Police (IACP) and NHTSA began to expand the DEC program across the country. Currently 44 

states, the District of Columbia, and Canada participate in the DEC program.

Borrowing extensively from medicine, psychiatry, physiology, toxicology, and associated fields, 

a drug categorization system has been developed that places the primary drugs of abuse into 

seven categories. These categories are not based on shared chemical structures, nor on their 

legality, or on the user's subjective experience. Rather, this categorization system is based on 

the premise that each drug within a category produces a pattern of effects, known as signs and 

symptoms. A "sign" is detectable by an observer. Signs include bloodshot eyes, horizontal gaze 

nystagmus (involuntary eye movement), pulse rate, impaired coordination, etc. A "symptom," 

on the other hand, is by nature subjective. It is experienced by the individual, and may be 

conveyed to an observer. For example, a feeling of nausea is a symptom. Hallucinations are 

symptoms, although they may elicit behavioral signs. It is the pattern of effects, rather than a 

specific effect, that is unique to the category.

44 Attachment A, Drug Influence Evaluation and 

Symptomology Matrix, provides a useful tool that summarizes use and abuse characteristics 

that can be used by personnel as a resource for reasonably concluding that further evaluation 

may be necessary.

DEC Program applicability in regulated BOP programs

Options exist in BOPs for the implementation of a wide variety of measures that go above 

minimum requirements and therefore not required, yet provide for significant and 

comprehensive programmatic BOP development and implementation opportunities. Of 

significant importance among these options is the implementation of BOP training that includes 

many, if not all, of the individual evaluation symptomology found in Appendix A. While random 

testing achieves a level of deterrence, the functional importance of the BOP is that the 

behavioral characteristics of those under the influence of illegal substances are recognizable, 

and are reported to proper licensee personnel when recognized. At a minimum, BOP training 

programs should include from Attachment A, a focus on training taken from the general 

indicators and duration of effects sections, to ensure that the BOP training curriculum provides 

the greatest opportunity for program success.

Synthetic Cathinones (Bath Salts), Synthetic Marijuana and Ecstasy (MDMA)

There is a growing concern in the industry for drugs being abused that are outside the required 

panel of substances tested [Section 26.31(d)]. In particular, Bath Salts, Synthetic Marijuana 

and MDMA are growing in popularity as an alternative to the five panel drugs currently being 

tested for. Further, alternative drug users knowingly use these drugs to subvert the licensee’s 

drug testing program. Although these drugs are not currently being tested, the resulting effects 
38

could pose a safety concern to the individual and site personnel. It is for this reason that an 

awareness of them and their resulting effects are worth discussion.

The energizing and often agitating effects reported in people who have taken bath salts are 

consistent with other drugs like amphetamines and cocaine that raise the level of the 

neurotransmitter dopamine in brain circuits regulating reward and movement. A surge in 

dopamine in these circuits causes feelings of euphoria and increased activity. A similar surge of 

the transmitter norepinephrine can raise heart rate and blood pressure. Bath salts have been 

marketed as cheap and until recently, legal substitutes for those stimulants. A recent study 

found that MDPV—the most common synthetic cathinone found in the blood and urine of 

patients admitted to emergency departments after bath salts ingestion—raises brain dopamine 

in the same manner as cocaine but is at least 10 times more potent.45

Synthetic marijuana, also known as K2 or Spice, comes in a wide variety of herbal mixtures that 

produce experiences similar to marijuana (cannabis). Spice users report experiences similar to 

those produced by marijuana—elevated mood, relaxation, and altered perception—and in most 

cases the effects are even stronger than those of marijuana. Some users report psychotic 

effects like extreme anxiety, paranoia, and hallucinations. So far, there have been no scientific 

studies of the effects on the human brain, while there is evidence that the cannabinoid 

compounds found in these products act on the same cell receptors as THC, the primary 

psychoactive component of marijuana. Some of the compounds found in synthetic marijuana

however, bind more strongly to those receptors, which could lead to a much more powerful and 

unpredictable effect. Because the chemical composition of many products sold as synthetic 

marijuana is unknown, it is likely that some varieties also contain substances that could cause 

dramatically different effects than the user might expect.46

MDMA, popularly known as Ecstasy, is a synthetic, psychoactive drug that has similarities to 

both the stimulant amphetamine and the hallucinogen mescaline. It produces feelings of 

increased energy, euphoria, emotional warmth and empathy toward others, and distortions in 

sensory and time perception. The hallucinatory effects often reported in users of bath salts are 

consistent with other drugs such as MDMA or LSD that raise levels of another neurotransmitter, 

serotonin. A recent analysis of the effects in rats of mephedrone and methylone showed that 

these drugs raised levels of serotonin in a manner similar to MDMA.47

3.2 PROGRAM COMPARISON

The programs described herein apply to specific and somewhat different needs for behavioral 

observations. The concerns and focus vary from protecting special nuclear materials and 

screening passengers at airports, to monitoring personnel on campus and providing an avenue 

for industry to identify employees who pose a risk to themselves or others. Programs included 

in this comparison range from general observation plans to formal HRPs.

Table 1 shows the general comparison of programs and behavioral observation attributes. 

Attributes are compared and contrasted in the following Table 1.
39

Table 1- Comparison of Programs and Behavioral Observation Attributes

PROGRAM

ATTRIBUTES

NRC

NEI

DOEDOS

FAA/TSA

NDSU

KDHE

CATSA

ORNL and 

SLAC

DEC

Regulations ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Procedures/Method

s

● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Roles ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Training ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ●

Overall programs reviewed provide some procedural basis and some degree of training for 

personnel implementing the BOPs. NDSU and KDHE programs reflect the organizational policy

and comply with Federal and State statutes, which implement various elements of a BOP. Not 

all programs, however, define the observational elements of BOP as an independent program 

element, or provide detailed criteria for behavioral observation. This comparison analyzed the 

various programs based on the information that was made available for review, and that was 

available through public sources.

3.3 REGULATION OR REQUIREMENT BASIS

The NRC Behavior Observation and DOE Human Reliability programs have similar 

requirements as described in 10 CFR Parts 26 and 73, and in the DOE’s 10 CFR Part 712. 

These requirements define personnel positions, roles, and responsibilities and implementation 

requirements at facilities regulated by the NRC and DOE, respectively. The goal of the 

requirements is to ensure that adequate safety and security is maintained at these facilities. 

These NRC and DOE programs also define elements of personnel activity and behavior that 

require management attention or intervention. For example, 10 CFR 73.56.(f)(1) states: 

“Licensee and applicant access authorization programs must include a behavioral observation 

program that is designed to detect behaviors or activities that may constitute an unreasonable 

risk to the health and safety of the public and common defense and security, including a 

potential threat to commit radiological sabotage.”48

The 10 CFR 26.407 regulation specifically addresses behavior observation at a power reactor 

construction site: “While the individuals specified in § 26.4(f) are constructing safety- or 
40

security-related SSCs, licensees and other entities shall ensure that these individuals are 

subject to behavioral observation, except if the licensee or other entity has implemented a 

fitness monitoring program under § 26.406.”

Programs described by SLAC and ORNL both follow DOE guidance and regulations outlined in 

10 CFR Part 712 and DOE orders and manuals. Implementation guides for use with DOE 

orders describe the requirement for a continuing evaluation of each employee’s judgment and 

reliability (10 CFR 710.7) to determine his or her eligibility for access to classified matter or 

special nuclear materials. Furthermore, similar to the NRC regulations, a security concern that 

involves a person in the human reliability program must be immediately reported.

NEI presents FFD guidance for new nuclear power plant construction sites in accordance with 

the requirements in 10 CFR Part 26. Furthermore, NEI 06-06 provides a standard approach in 

creating and applying an FFD program for new reactor construction personnel.

DOS addresses FFD requirements by providing “a mechanism for the assessment of an 

employee’s mental, emotional, and neuro-cognitive ability to perform....”49 The regulations in 

Volume 12 FAM 040 DS Fitness Programs, are governed by other Federal laws and acts, 

including the Foreign Service Act, Public Law 84-885, and Volume 16 FAM 110. Observations 

are made by supervisors and other employees, but the final decision to order an FFD evaluation 

is the responsibility of the Director of Diplomatic Security Service (DS/DSS).

NRC Management Directive 12.1, “NRC Facility Security Program,” dated September 14, 2011, 

states, “Protective measures must be taken to prevent loss, damage, or destruction that might 

result from theft, vandalism, arson, sabotage, or other unlawful acts at unclassified NRC 

facilities. The measures taken must be adequate to provide reasonable assurance of 

protection.”50

DOD Directive 5210.42(3) states that “only those personnel who have demonstrated the highest 

degree of individual reliability for allegiance, trustworthiness, conduct, behavior, and 

responsibility shall be allowed to perform duties associated with nuclear weapons, and they 

shall be continuously evaluated for adherence to PRP standards.” 

TSA SPOT requirements evolved quickly after the 2001 terrorist attacks, and are based on 

U.S. Code, Title 14, “Aeronautics and Space,” and the Aviation and Transportation Security Act. 

This law requires the screening of all individuals before entry into a secured area of an airport in 

the United States, to ensure the safety and integrity of persons and facilities.

3.4 PROCEDURES AND METHODS

As discussed above, NRC regulations in 10 CFR Parts 26 and 73 are implemented at each site 

through site-level procedures. These procedures outline who is included in the FFD program, 

and by extension the BOP program, and include: (a) the objectives of the program, (b) 

responsibilities of the employees and supervisors, (c) training, (d) indicators or observed 

conditions that could affect safety and security at the site, and (e) actions for negative 

indicators, testing, assessment, consequences, rights, documentation, and approving 

authorities. 
41

The FFD program outlined in NEI 06-06 provides guidance for FFD programs and behavioral 

observation site procedures at commercial power reactors under construction. Licensees at 

sites regulated by the NRC apply the requirements in 10 CFR Part 26, and may use the 

implementing guidance in NEI 06-06, in developing their FFD programs and behavioral 

observation procedures. These site procedures describe the program, responsibilities, training 

requirements, specific relative policies, and the steps and techniques necessary to implement 

the policy as it applies to activities related to safety- and security-related construction.

DOE regulations and guidance include a description of the process used to establish and 

implement an HRP. Procedures are specific to each site and follow DOE orders and guidance. 

Site procedures describe requirements, roles and responsibilities, program administration, 

reviews, and training.

Site procedures at DOE facilities provide a step-by-step process for implementing an HRP. The 

process includes behavioral observation. Trained managers, supervisors, and personnel must 

observe and report “unusual conduct” for further evaluation. Inappropriate conduct is described 

and includes a pattern of abnormal conduct, erratic behavior, indications of illegal use of drugs, 

habitual use of alcohol, or association or sympathy with individuals or groups that advocate 

unlawful acts or with individuals or groups that have as their goal to alter or overthrow the 

U.S. Government.

The DOE supervisor is responsible for observing and monitoring employee performance and 

behavior. When knowledge or circumstances reveal that an employee may be unfit for duty, the 

supervisor must implement the policy and procedures in a fair manner. Observation of unfit 

behavior is cause for immediate reporting of the behavior with the potential for subsequent 

medical or security evaluations. Reported individuals are immediately removed from duties and 

access until an investigation is completed and final resolution is determined. Observations, 

actions, and reasons for action are documented.

DOS procedures describe conditions, factors, and appropriate responses and actions to 

address observed behavioral concerns. A DOS behavior observation evaluation must also be 

objective and reasonable. Supervisors are trained and responsible for observing employees to 

monitor their ability to perform. Changes or specific indicators in observed employee behavior 

can cause concern. Indicators are listed but are not inclusive of all possible observations. 

Supervisors must promptly address indications of possible physical, mental, or emotional 

impairment.

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires screening procedures and states, in part, 

that airports ‘‘shall establish procedures to ensure the safety and integrity of... (i) all persons 

providing services with respect to aircraft providing passenger air transportation or intrastate air 

transportation and facilities of such persons at an airport in the United States described in 

section 44903(c).”51

KDHE uses HealthQuest protocol for behavior observation referrals to address behavioral 

changes in employees that may pose a potential threat to themselves or others in the 

workplace. The HealthQuest vendor service is a managed network of diagnosticians and 

caregivers who see employees quickly, analyze their situations, and develop treatment plans.
42

KDHE provides behavior observation criteria to be used in its fitness determinations. If an 

individual’s behavior meets one or more of the criteria, the supervisor prepares a description of 

his or her actions to remove the employee from the work situation and to investigate further. 

The employee can be referred to the EAP if he or she is not eligible for family medical leave. 

The HR department maintains documentation of behavior observation and FFD cases.

NDSU procedures provide guidance for identifying and addressing FFD issues discovered by 

behavioral observation. The manager assesses the potential risk and is encouraged to contact 

HR for assistance as needed. University police are contacted if there is an indication of 

significant risk. Methods of behavioral observation for NDSU rely on a reliable report or direct 

observation of an employee. Observations that indicating potential issues are listed and 

include, but are not limited to, coordination, alertness, and interactions with others. Issues can 

also be self-reported.

CATSA procedures and methods for behavioral observation (screening) are similar to 

procedures used by TSA. Selected Canadian airport security personnel are trained in BPR. 

BDOs study travelers’ facial expressions and body movements for signs of hostile intent. The 

airport deploys BDOs throughout the airport to look for unusual, anxious, or suspicious 

behavior. Training includes awareness of typical nervousness, anger, or confusion that 

travelers often experience. Internal procedures are in place to ensure the further investigation 

of people exhibiting unusual behavior.

3.5 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

The NRC requires licensees to implement a FFD program that utilizes a BOP or a fitness 

monitoring program while constructing safety- or security-related SSCs. However, as of the 

publication of this report, all affected entities have implemented a BOP in lieu of a fitness 

monitoring program. Specific roles and responsibilities of C/Vs are described in site 

procedures.

Consistent with 10 CFR 26.821(b), NEI 06-06 states, “Each construction site entity is 

responsible to the NRC for ensuring that the applicable FFD program/program elements of 

10 CFR Part 26 are implemented and effective at their construction sites, including those 

implemented by a C/V.”32 Similarly, NEI 03-01 provides an acceptable method for meeting the 

BOP requirements at operating commercial power reactors.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) describes responsibilities related to FFD and behavioral 

observations in TVA procedure, FFD010/000, “Fitness for Duty,”52 This document describes 

policy and program elements in detail, outlining the responsibilities of employees. All trained 

employees must report any observed behavioral or physical conditions indicating possible 

substance abuse. The document defines the roles for the medical review officer and HR staff. 

This procedure also addresses supervisory responsibilities.

At DOE facilities, contractors implement DOE orders and policies at the site level. Site-specific 

FFD-related procedures discuss roles and responsibilities that include behavioral observation. 

Employees are trained and empowered to act and report on FFD and behavior observation 

related concerns. The supervisor is responsible for observing and monitoring attendance, 

performance, and behavior; following FFD policies and procedures; and, implementing the 

policies and procedures in a fair and consistent manner. The medical department is responsible 
43

for assessing all employees referred for cause or possible impairment. HR is responsible for 

maintaining case files and for advising supervisors and employees as needed. The supervisor, 

the medical department, and HR must provide case documentation.

12 FAM 040, Diplomatic Security Fitness Programs, describes the responsibilities related to 

DOS FFD and behavioral observation. The position responsibilities described in this document 

include the roles of the DSS Director, the DOS employee’s supervisor, medical service, and the 

employee.

The FAA administrator’s authority, with respect to programs related to the testing of airport 

security screening personnel, is transferred to the Under Secretary of Transportation for 

Security. The procedures and training materials describe the duties and responsibilities of 

employees who have security-sensitive functions.

The KDHE protocol for the FFD and behavior observation referrals program defines the roles 

and responsibilities of the HR Director, the care manager, and the EAP counselor.

NDSU defines the responsibilities of employees and managers or supervisors in the policy 

manual.

3.6 TRAINING AND REQUALIFICATION

Selection of personnel for training differs according to the program and agency. Some 

programs require training of all personnel; other programs introduce behavioral observation 

awareness with FFD training for which supervisors and management receive more extensive 

training. The § 26.33 “Behavioral Observation” requirements is an element of the NRC’s

10 CFR Part 26 FFD Program. 10 CFR 26.33 states that behavioral observation must be 

performed by personnel who are trained under § 26.29 “to detect behaviors that may indicate 

possible use, sale, or possession of illegal drugs; use or possession of alcohol on site or while 

on duty; or impairment from fatigue or any cause that, if left unattended, may constitute a risk to 

public health and safety or the common defense and security.” Similarly, all DOE personnel in 

the HRP are trained on program requirements and responsibilities for both self-reporting and 

reporting of at-risk behavior in others. Periodic retraining is standard for both FFD and behavior 

observation programs.

Knowledge and abilities (KA) are listed in 10 CFR 26.29(a), and include the knowledge of 

policies, procedures, roles, responsibilities, and potential adverse effects, and the ability to 

observe and detect performance degradation. An 80-percent score on a comprehensive 

examination is required by 10 CFR 26.29(b) for both initial and refresher training and must be 

completed annually.

The TSA program for hiring and training security screening personnel was established under 

direction of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security. The training program standards 

include meeting qualifications, obtaining satisfactory scores on examinations, and 

demonstrating FFD on a daily basis. The program requires annual proficiency reviews and 

documents the training and reviews. TSA requires extensive training for the SPOT program that 

includes techniques to detect behaviors exhibited in response to a fear of discovery.
44

Miami International Airport changed its training procedures in 2006 when Ron Stover’s 

company, New Age Security Solutions, trained 150 airport police to identify potential threats 

through BPR. At Mr. Stover’s urging, Miami International Airport later committed to training all 

airport workers in the method. “Employees such as parking lot attendants, ramp workers, gate 

agents and food service employees are extremely good at detecting suspicious behavior,” 

Stover explains. “It’s all about noticing irregularities, and you have to know what’s regular to be 

able to spot what’s irregular.”53

Based on the scope of this review, industry and private organizations with more basic programs 

often rely on required reading or acceptance of procedures with limited formal training, or on the 

retraining of managers or supervisors. Furthermore, some FFD programs are outsourced to 

service providers and the training of supervisors, managers, and HR personnel was often 

handled as a part of the contracted service.
45

4. RECOMMENDED BEST PRACTICES

The following are recommended best practices for a BOP:

• The BOP should have a clearly stated purpose. The purpose should explain why the 

program is necessary and should include the program objectives. The policy and 

program objectives should be clearly communicated to all employees and reviewed and 

updated periodically. Reinforce the purpose to all employees periodically through 

training and security education programs. As an example, DOE’s operational security 

program contains posters that encourage positive security activities, including reporting 

suspicious activities.

• Define the scope, performance objectives, methods, and application of the BOP. For 

nuclear power plant construction, this program applies to all facets of the construction of 

safety- and security-related SSCs and the integration of these SCCs into the nuclear 

power plant. A BOP at an operating power reactor or power reactor construction site 

should clearly describe its scope and applicability, including clearly identifying

performance objectives. These performance measures should be measurable, 

quantifiable, realistic, and achievable. All covered employees should fully understand 

the need for such a program (i.e., to establish a drug-free workplace, to prevent criminal 

activity or terrorist acts, or to prevent fatigue-related accidents). An effective program 

will also ensure that procedures and policies detail the methods used to achieve 

established performance objectives. 

• Define the characteristics or observable traits and behaviors related to the risk or risks to 

guard against. Clearly communicate to employees that these characteristics or 

observable traits and behaviors may correspond to specific threats to safe and secure 

plant operations or to personal safety. The comparative study and literature review 

showed that BOPs are typically focused on five aspects of behavior: (1) drug and 

alcohol use, (2) fatigue, (3) mental and emotional conditions, (4) criminal activities, and 

(5) terrorist activities. Once the threats are defined, educate the workforce on the threat 

and the behavioral indications of these signs. However, while a checklist of behaviors is 

helpful, a BOP should not assign a quantitative analysis to behavior indicators 

(“x” number of behavior indicators triggers an action by the BOP). A single behavior 

indicator may be enough to cause concern. Note that workers are the frontline of 

defense against the insider threat.

• BOPs are just one layer of a comprehensive security program. BOPs should be an 

integral part of all activities at an operating power reactor or power reactor construction 

site and interwoven with effective physical security practices. In addition, behavioral 

observation and QA have overlapping goals (leveraging each other’s efforts) to ensure 

that construction is completed correctly and safely. The BOP should pay close attention 

to behavioral characteristics that may affect quality issues during construction, as well as 

during normal operations, and determine the cause for those issues. When protecting 

safety- and security-related SSCs, a comprehensive security program should use a 

graded approach to assess the construction and operational activities that may cause 

the greatest risk to public health and safety or the common defense and security, and 
46

should adjust security, behavioral observation, and supervision based on the particular 

activities being conducted. 

• The BOP for construction should be scalable. Guidance for scaling an FFD and 

behavior observation program during construction was provided in the enclosure to the 

NRC’s letter to NEI dated December 2, 2009.

3

 As the number (or types) of activities 

increases during site construction, the BOP should expand accordingly. A site may have 

areas in which the risk or the sensitivity of construction requires greater attention. Plan 

and implement the program to be flexible enough to provide an adequate BOP both 

during peak construction, and when construction activities subside.

• The BOP should identify areas during operation and construction for which health, 

safety, and security are of elevated concern. For instance, a BOP could provide for an 

increased number of behavioral observations in such areas when safety- or 

security-related SSCs are being constructed. During construction in these areas, such a 

BOP would likely increase awareness of behavioral observation among employees.

Also, SSCs requiring inspections, tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria may need 

special attention. During construction, these SSCs do not have the level of security and 

protection that they will have after construction is completed, and these SSCs will be 

more accessible to the general plant population than during operation of the plant. As 

with most programs, BOPs are limited by time and resources. A BOP should focus on, 

and consciously allocate its resources to, those areas that are of most concern during 

construction. 

• A BOP should have a clearly stated operational process. This process should identify 

how and to whom behavioral observation reports are made. Clearly define the 

procedures for coordination and compilation of reports. Establish a clear and concise 

process to evaluate reports, and clearly define that process. In some of the most recent 

incidents involving violent behavior described earlier, the existence of behavioral keys 

could have alerted the public to potential violence. In the case of Virginia Tech shooter 

Seung Hui Cho, several incidences of his aberrant behavior could have led to an 

intervention that may have prevented the April 2007 shootings. The university had no 

clear-cut guidelines for intervention. Although professors had recommended that Cho 

voluntarily receive counseling, he never attended counseling sessions. There were 

several warning signs of a potential mental breakdown, but the university took no 

definitive action.

• Each BOP should have a strong procedural basis for implementation. The following 

outline provides a method of approach to procedure development:

– Begin with a clear statement explaining the need for the BOP. 1

– Include a detailed statement of purpose. Examples of the purpose for having a 

BOP are provided in 10 CFR 26.33, such as the need to detect behaviors that 

may indicate the use of illegal drugs that would constitute a risk to public health 

and safety or the common defense and security.
47

– Identify all personnel and personnel categories included in the BOP’s scope, and 

any exclusions or exceptions.

– Provide behavioral observation guidelines that include specific indicators in 

observed employee behavior that may cause concern. The observation and the 

basis for referral for assessment or evaluation should be objective and 

reasonable.

– Identify all procedures related to post-observation actions. The following 

circumstances and site-specific procedures will dictate the actions and the order 

of the actions:

o If there is no immediate threat to personnel, or SSCs at the work site, further 

action can be delayed to await additional guidance. In this event, notify 

management or other appropriate personnel as described in procedures of 

the possible need for an FFD assessment by the substance abuse expert 

(SAE) or Medical Review Officer (MRO) that could potentially lead to the

employee’s removal from duty and revocation of unescorted access. The

following steps should be taken if the employee is removed from duty:

1. Notify the employee that he or she is being removed from duty.

2. Discuss details in a private setting.

3. Provide the employee a written statement providing the basis for the 

removal from duty.

4. Notify management or other appropriate personnel as described in 

procedures of the circumstances.

5. Inform the employee that an FFD assessment may be required by the 

SAE.

6. If the circumstance involves a bargaining unit employee, inform the 

bargaining unit representatives.

7. Document observations and reasons for the FFD assessment. 

8. Provide details to the appropriate personnel as described in procedures

for the FFD assessment.

• The BOP site procedures should include the process for returning to duty if the FFD 

assessment results identify an FFD issue, or if follow up actions (such as suspension, 

referral for treatment, or dismissal), are determined to be appropriate. Document all 

actions taken, and consider adopting the following related practices: 

– A comprehensive BOP should have adequate checks and balances to promote 

objectivity (i.e., that behavioral observations are free of bias). As with any 

program, dealing with subjective factors should be minimized. Examine and 
48

evaluate all reports of suspicious or inappropriate behavior. The policy and 

procedures of a comprehensive program should define who reviews reports and 

what actions should be taken. When practical, the BOP program should consider 

a second reviewer of any suspicious or inappropriate behavior. This would help 

ensure that the program’s objectivity is maintained. 

– There should be appropriate stewardship of the personal information in the BOP.

Handle behavioral observation reports and actions with the privacy of individuals 

as a priority. Because behavioral observation can be subjective, the probabilities 

of false positive results are of higher probability than the probabilities in more 

objective programs, such as drug testing. What happens with records of the 

resolved observation? Are they maintained in the personnel file? The BOP 

should have a defined process and policy to protect the individual’s privacy.

• Complete and accurate documentation is an important attribute of a BOP. Document 

and record observations and, more importantly in the case of criminal and possible 

terrorist activities, analyze observations. One isolated action may be insignificant. For 

instance, a worker is noted to be in an area in which they have no assigned work or 

reason to be present. This circumstance may be innocent, in that he or she reported to 

the wrong place. However, coupled with previous reports that the same individual had 

been in other unauthorized places, any new report has added significance, and may be 

a pattern that indicates intelligence collecting or possible future criminal or terrorist 

actions. Documentation is often an important element in periodic personnel reviews 

and in the reconstruction of the event. As such, consider the following practices: 

– A BOP should reflect a clear understanding of roles and responsibilities.

Personnel should understand they are responsible for reporting unusual behavior

and that reporting unusual activities or behavior is everyone’s responsibility. The 

supervisor or trained individual who observes, or receives reliable information, 

that an employee may be unfit for duty should be prepared to take immediate 

action to remove the employee from his or her duties, and notify appropriate 

personnel of such action. Further, the supervisor should document the action 

and the reasons for conducting an evaluation. The tendency is to assume that 

someone else will report that a coworker has been acting strangely. 

• Reporting unusual activities or behavior is everyone’s responsibility. A key to a good 

program is having every worker commit to the program. Workers should understand that 

the security and safety of their coworkers, the community, and themselves are at stake. 

The consequences of a deliberate act, or an accident caused by fatigue, drugs, or 

alcohol could result in an accident that injures or kills an employee. A terrorist or 

sabotage event has the potential not only to injure or kill employees but also to affect the 

community at large. In his article, Sagan points out the problem of social shirking when 

observing behavior. He uses the well documented case of the 1964 murder of Kitty 

Genovese in Queens Borough, New York City, in which multiple eyewitnesses failed to 

report her murder.30 Everyone should understand the importance of reporting anomalies 

in behavior, and such reporting duties should be emphasized in training. As such, 

consider the following practices:
49

– A BOP should be subject to ongoing independent program assessments. The 

indications of alcohol use, drug abuse, criminal activities, mental health, and 

fatigue are easier to identify than are insider activities, and have been 

researched extensively. Indications that sabotage and terrorist activities are 

being planned are harder to identify. Research into behaviors that might indicate 

an individual is planning such acts is ongoing. One criticism of the SPOT 

program utilized by TSA is its lack of empirical data. The BPR program utilized 

by Miami International Airport, El Al Airlines, and other entities has shown 

promising results, but empirical data about this program are limited. Anecdotal 

evidence, such as the success shown by El Al Airlines and Israeli security 

personnel, indicates that BPR may be a viable option in the operating nuclear 

power plant or power reactor construction setting. Once the technology for BPR 

for cameras and infrared cameras has been proven, it could provide another tool 

for a BOP. Consider applying such technology in a comprehensive BOP once it 

has been proven effective. 

– BOPs should be layered with multiple observations made by multiple personnel. 

For example, a single observation of an individual made at the morning safety 

briefing or plan of the day meeting should not be the sole basis for making a 

determination that the individual is or is not fit for duty. Personnel who are 

involved in implementing the BOP should make multiple observations in the 

actual working environment every day. One of the successes attributed to the El 

Al Airlines BOP is that multiple personnel are involved in screening personnel

and that these personnel range from security personnel to ticket-counter 

personnel. This multiple-layered approach provides several opportunities for 

behavioral observation. A BOP should consider having personnel observers and 

activity observers, and, in certain instances, this could be done in conjunction 

with the QA program.

– An employee should not have any fear of reporting unusual or suspect behavior 

concerning any personnel at the job site. It should be clear from the licensee’s 

policy statement and training that management will not tolerate repercussions, 

reprisals, or bullying for reporting unusual or suspect behavior concerning 

anyone at the job site. Management should be sensitive to the reluctance of new 

employees and junior personnel (such as union apprentices, trainees, and 

interns) to report unusual or suspect behavior. Emphasis should be placed on 

ensuring these employees that repercussion, reprisals, or bullying for reporting 

activities will not be tolerated. Personnel should feel it is their responsibility to 

report any activity that poses a threat to the safety or security of the plant. A 

comprehensive program will ensure that the reporting of behavior will not resort 

in retaliation, even if it involves anomalous or suspicious behavior in supervisors 

and security personnel.

– Initial and refresher training should be part of a BOP. Personnel making 

behavioral observations should be trained in a consistent manner. Training 

should be ongoing and should be updated to keep up with the changes and 

innovations in behavioral observation. As noted above, the use of behavioral 

observation to discover potential terrorist activities is a fairly new area of 

research, especially in the United States. It is important that organizations and 
50

trainers stay abreast of changes and update training accordingly. A BOP should 

consider levels of training: (1) training for management, (2) training for 

supervisors and observers, and (3) training for personnel. A comprehensive 

BOP training program should include a training checklist similar in content to the 

checklist provided in Appendix A.

– Continually verify the effectiveness of the program. When a drug or alcohol test 

is positive, especially if in a post-accident situation, examine why the BOP did not 

identify the behavioral problem before the accident. Were there multiple 

opportunities for observation? Why did coworkers not report a problem? In 

addition, capture lessons learned and learn from them. If the BOP discovered an 

individual under the influence, what led to the discovery? Is there something 

learned in the incident that could be added to training?

– Develop performance metrics to indicate how well a program is operating. Based 

on the literature review, measuring the success of a deterrent program is difficult; 

however, meaningful performance indicators are helpful in determining program 

performance and improvement. Consider these performance indicators carefully 

and develop them to ensure appropriate metrics with suitable parameters. As an 

example, the mere increase or decrease of positive drug tests may be influenced 

by other factors, such as the number of tests performed. A good performance 

indicator will be significant and measurable. However, GAO Report No. 10-763 

noted the difficulty in developing performance measures, especially outcome 

measures, for programs with a deterrent focus. 26 Still, performance indicators 

can measure certain aspects of the BOP.
51

5. CONCLUSIONS

All BOPs at NRC-licensed facilities subject to Part 26 and Part 73 have common elements that 

are part of an organization’s FFD program that is used to screen, monitor/observe, and test

workers at operating nuclear power reactors or power reactor construction sites. Personnel 

subject to subpart B of Part 26 are required to monitor the behavior of others to detect at-risk 

conduct or factors. The programs reviewed vary in specific application, training, and methods.

NRC regulations do not include specific requirements on how to implement a BOP. The content 

of BOP implementation procedures is thus at the discretion of the licensee or other entity. 

Attention to alcohol and drug abuse, even fatigue management, addresses safety concerns and 

cross cuts to security when combined with a BOP and IMP. Effective behavioral observation 

practices have been found to include the training of management, supervisors, employees, and 

contract construction personnel, and involve full implementation of detailed screening and 

observation procedures.

Adequately protecting against threats to a site’s structural integrity, or its protective systems,

includes consideration of an adversary who is dedicated to his or her cause, will not abuse 

drugs or alcohol, and who will appear average or above average. A standard drug and alcohol 

program will not detect this threat and therefore, an effective BOP and IMP should be 

implemented. Furthermore, the average turnover rate for construction workers is 20 percent

and highly transient which challenges effective program implementation and increases hiring 

opportunities for the potential adversary.

An HRP designed and implemented as described in 10 CFR part 712, better addresses this 

potential threat but at a greater cost. Psychological evaluation, polygraph tests, random testing, 

and a well-defined training program for management, supervisors, and workers increase costs 

and reporting requirements. Although the 10 CFR part 712 HRP provides improved 

identification of at-risk personnel, it does not guarantee human reliability.

Training employees, supervisors, and managers in human behavior patterns with clear 

guidance on expectations yields a more robust program with higher probability of success in the 

identification of impaired behavior, and in the observation of potential threats by individuals who 

exhibit at-risk actions.

The best practices described above collectively represent the program comparisons and 

literature review. Implementation of some or all of these best practices would serve to 

strengthen any BOP.

53

6. REFERENCES

1 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, “Energy,” Part 26, “Fitness for Duty 

Programs.”

2 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, “Energy,” Part 50, “Domestic Licensing of 

Production and Utilization Facilities.”

3 Corriea, R.P., U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, letter to Roe, J.W., Nuclear Energy 

Institute, December 2, 2009. (Agencywide Documents Access and Management 

SystemAccession No. ML092880812)

4 Borum, R., “Psychology of Terrorism,” University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, 2004.

5 Hudson, R.A., “The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist 

and Why?” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, September 1999.

6 McCormick, G.H., “Terrorist Decision Making,” Annual Review of Political Science, 

6:473–507, June 2003.

7 Dollard, J., et al., “Frustration and Aggression,” Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 

1939.

8 Berkowitz, L., “The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis: An Examination and 

Reformulation,” Psychological Bulletin, 106:59–73, 1989.

9 McCormick G.H., and Owen G., “Security and Coordination in a Clandestine 

Organization,” Mathematical and Computer Modeling, 31, 2000.

10 Wasmund, K., “The Political Socialization of Terrorist Groups in West Germany,” Journal 

of Political and Military Sociology 11:195–222, 1983.

11 Alkan, N., “Youngsters and Terrorism,” TEMUH Head Office, Publication No. 9, EGM 

[Expert Group Meeting] Catalog No. 323, 2002.

12 Center for International Research on Terrorism, Psychology of Terrorism, Web page at 

http://www.terrorismresearchcenter.org/psychology-of-terrorism.html.

13 Stahelski, A., “Terrorists Are Made, Not Born: Creating Terrorists Using Social 

Psychological Conditioning,” March 2004. (http://www.homelandsecurity.org/ 

journal/Articles/stahelski.html)

14 Navarro, J., “Unmasking Terrorists—Two Critical Characteristics,” Psychology Today, 

December 2009. (http://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/spycatcher/200912/unmaskingterrorists-two-critical-characteristics?page=2)
54

15 Post, J., “Current Understanding of Terrorist Motivation and Psychology: Implications for 

a Differentiated Antiterrorist Policy,” Terrorism, 13, No. 1, 1990.

16 Laqueur, W. The Age of Terrorism, Little, Brown, Boston Massachusetts,1987.

17 Los Angeles Police Department, “Characteristics of Terrorist’s Surveillance,” 

February 2011. (http://www.lapdonline.org/home/content_basic_view/27436)

18 National Research Council of the National Academies, Committee on Technical and 

Privacy Dimensions of Information for Terrorism Prevention and Other National Goals, 

Committee on Law and Justice, Committee on National Statistics, Division on Behavioral 

and Social Sciences and Education, Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, 

and Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences, “Protecting Individual Privacy in the 

Struggle against Terrorists: A Framework for Program Assessment,” National 

Academies Press, Washington, DC, pp. 48–51, 2008.

19 Frank, M.G., Maccario, C.J., and Govindaraju, V., “Protecting Airline Passengers in the 

Age of Terrorism,” Seidenstat, P., and Splane, F.X., eds., Greenwood Publishing Group, 

Westport, CT, pp. 87–90, 2009.

20 DARPA News Release, January 4, 2011. 

(http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2011/2011/01/04_DARPA_Kicks_Off_Mind

%E2%80%99s_Eye_Program.aspx)

21 Indiamart Product and Services, “Automated Behavior Pattern Recognition System.” 

(http://www.indiamart.com/ssbiexports/recognition-system.html)

22 Greitzer, F. et al., “Predictive Modeling for Insider Threat Mitigation,” Pacific Northwest 

National Laboratory, Richland, WA, April 2009.

23 Miami International Airport Web page at http://www.miami-airport.com/home.asp.

24 Massport News Release, “Massport Establishes Special Anti-Terrorism Unit at Logan; 

Elite Team To Receive Extensive Training; Conduct Preemptive Initiatives,” 

Massachusetts Port Authority, April 1, 2002. (http://www.massport.com/newsroom/News/MassportEstablishesSpecialAnti-TerrorismUnitatLogan.aspx)

25 Security Solutions Web page at 

http://securitysolutions.com/news/security_exposing_hostile_intent/.

26 Government Accountability Office (GAO) Report No. 10-763, “Aviation Security: Efforts 

to Validate TSA’s Passenger Screening Behavior Detection Program Underway, But 

Opportunities Exist To Strengthen Validation and Address Operational Challenges,” 

May 2010.

27 GAO Report No. 09-48, “Embassy Construction: Additional Actions Are Needed To 

Address Contractor Participation,” January 2009. 
55

28 Elias, P., “Securing General Aviation,” Congressional Research Service Report to 

Congress, p. 23, March 3, 2009.

29 Virginia Tech Review Panel, “Mass Shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007, Report of 

the Review Panel.” (http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index.html)

30 Sagan, S.D., “The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security 

Forces May Produce Less Nuclear Security,” Risk Analysis, 24:4, 2004.

31 Alevizos, P., et al., “The Behavior Observation Instrument: A method of Direct 

Observation for Program Evaluation,” Journal of Applied Behavior Analysis, II:243–257, 

Summer 1978.

32 NEI 06-06, “Fitness for Duty Program Guidance for New Nuclear Power Plant 

Construction Sites,” Nuclear Energy Institute, Washington, DC, April 2013.

33 U.S. Code of Federal Regulations, Title 10, “Energy,” Part 712, “Human Reliability 

Program.”

34 U.S. DOE Policy, P 470.1, “Integrated Safeguards and Security Management (ISSM)

Policy.”

35 U.S. DOE Human Reliability Program Handbook. (http://www.hss.doe.gov/ 

DepPersonnelSec/hrp/flash/handbook/handbook.html).

36 DOD, Instruction, 5210.42, Nuclear Weapon Personnel Reliability Program, July 16, 

2012.

37 DOS Volume 12 FAM 040 , Diplomatic Security Fitness Programs, U.S. Department of 

State, Washington, DC, July 9, 2012.

38 Homeland Security Newswire, August 2009. 

(http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/behavioral-observation-comes-canadasairports)

39 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Privacy Impact Assessment for the Screening of 

Passengers by Observation Techniques Program, August 5, 2008.

40 Frank, T., USA Today, January 30, 2009.

41 Jenkins, B., Project No. 2982, Mineta Transportation Institute, National Transportation 

Security Center of Excellence.

42 North Dakota State University Policy Manual, Section 161, October, 2007.

43 The International Drug Evaluation and Classification Program -DECP 

515 N. Washington Street, Alexandria, VA 22314, Telephone 703.836.6767 

info@decp.org © 2000-2013 IACP http://www.decp.org/about/
56

44 Los Angeles Police Department, August, 2013

http://www.lapdonline.org/special_operations_support_division/content_basic_view/1038

45 National Institute on Drug Abuse, November 2012

http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/synthetic-cathinones-bath-salts

46 National Institute on Drug Abuse, December 2012

http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/spice-synthetic-marijuana

47 National Institute on Drug Abuse, December 2012

http://www.drugabuse.gov/publications/drugfacts/mdma-ecstasy

48 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical Protection of Plants and Materials,” U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Washington, DC.

49 DOS Volume 12 FAM 040, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC, July 9, 2012.

50 Management Directive 12.1, “NRC Facility Security Program,” Part III(B)(1), 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, September 14, 2011.

51 Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Public Law 107-71, November 19, 2001.

52 Procedure FFD010/000, “Fitness For Duty,” Tennessee Valley Authority, June 12, 2009.

53 Douglas, R., “Nontraditional Methods Increase Security at Miami International,” Airport 

Improvement Magazine, January–February, 2010.
57

APPENDIX A

Drug Influence Evaluation – Symptomology Matrix

Major 

Indicators

CNS 

Depressants

CNS 

Stimulants Hallucinogens Dissociative Anesthetic

Narcotic 

Analgesic Inhalants Cannabis

HGN Present None None Present None Present None

Vertical Gaze 

Nystagmus

Present

(High Dose) None None Present None Present(High Dose) None

Lack of 

Convergence Present None None Present None Present Present

Pupil Size Normal (1) Dilated Dilated Normal Constricted Normal (4) Dilated (6)

Reaction to 

Light Slow Slow Normal (3) Normal Little or None Visible Slow Normal

Pulse Rate Down (2) Up Up Up Down Up Up

Blood 

Pressure Down Up Up Up Down Up or Down (5) Up

Body 

Temperature Normal Up Up Up Down Up, Down or Normal Normal

Muscle Tone Flaccid Normal/Rigid Normal/Rigid Rigid Normal/Flaccid Flaccid/Normal Normal

General 

Indicators

Uncoordinated

Disoriented

Sluggish

Thick, Slurred 

Speech

Drunk-like 

Behavior

Gait Ataxia

Drowsiness

Droopy Eyes

Fumbling

*NOTE With 

Methaqualone: 

Pulse will be 

elevated and 

body tremors will 

be evident. 

Alcohol, 

Quaaludes 

elevate pulse. 

SOMA and 

Quaaludes dilate 

pupils

Restlessness

Body Tremors

Excited

Euphoric

Talkative

Exaggerated 

Reflexes

Anxiety

Grinding Teeth

 (Bruxism)

Redness to 

Nasal Area

Runny Nose

Loss of 

Appetite

Insomnia

Increased 

Alertness

Dry Mouth

Irritability

Dazed Appearance

Body Tremors

Synesthesia

Hallucinations

Paranoia

Uncoordinated

Nausea

Disoriented

Difficulty in Speech

Perspiring

Poor Perception of

 Time and 

Distance

Memory Loss

Disorientation

Flashbacks

*NOTE: With LSD 

horripilation (Goose 

Bumps; hair 

standing on end)

Perspiring

Warm to the 

Touch

Blank Stare

Very Early Angle 

of

 HGN Onset

Difficulty in 

Speech

Incomplete 

Verbal 

Responses

Repetitive 

Speech

Increased pain

 Threshold

Cyclic Behavior

Confused

Agitated

Hallucinations

Possibly Violent 

and/or

 Combative

Chemical Oder

“Moon Walking”

Droopy Eyelids

 (PTOSIS)

“On the Nod”

Drowsiness

Depressed 

Reflexes

Low, Raspy, 

Shallow

 Speech

Dry Mouth

Facial Itching

Euphoria

Fresh Puncture 

Marks

Nausea

*NOTE: 

Tolerant users 

exhibit 

relatively little 

psychomotor 

impairment.

Residue of 

Substance

 Around Mouth

Odor of 

Substance

Possible 

Nausea

Slurred Speech

Disorientation

Confusion

Bloodshot, 

Watery

 Eyes

Lack of Muscle 

Control

Flushed Face

NonCommunicative

Intense 

Headaches

*NOTE: 

Anesthetic 

gases cause 

below normal

blood pressure; 

volatile 

solvents and 

aerosols cause 

above normal 

blood pressure.

Marked 

Reddening of

 the 

Conjunctiva

Odor of 

Marijuana

Marijuana 

debris in

 Mouth

Body Tremors

Eyelid tremors

Relaxed 

Inhibitions

Increased 

Appetite

Impaired 

Perception of

 Time and 

Distance

Disorientation

Possible 

Paranoia
58

Duration of 

Effects

Barbiturates:

 1-16 hours

Tranquilizers:

 4-8 hours

Methaqualone:

 4-8 hours

Cocaine:

 5-90 minutes

Amphetamines:

 4-12 hours

Ecstasy

 3-6 hours

Duration varies 

widely from one 

Hallucinogen to 

another.

Onset: 1-5 

minutes

Peak Effects:

 15-30 minutes

Exhibits Effects:

 Up to 4-6 

Hours

Heroin:

 4-6 Hours

Methadone:

 24 Hours

Others vary

Most Volatile 

Solvents:

 6-8 Hours

Anesthetic 

Gases and

 Aerosols:

 very short 

duration

Exhibit 

Effects:

 2-3 Hours

Impairment 

may last up to 

24 hours 

without 

awareness of 

effects.

Usual Methods 

of 

Administration

Oral

Injected 

(occasionally)

Insufflation 

(snorting)

Smoked

Injected

Oral

Oral

Insufflation

Smoked

Injected

Transdermal

Smoked

Oral

Insufflation

Injected

Eye drops

Injected

Oral

Smoked

Insufflation

Insufflation

Historically 

Taken Orally.

Smoked

Oral

Overdose 

Signs

Shallow 

breathing

Cold Clammy 

Skin

Pupils Dilated

Rapid Weak 

Pulse

Coma

Agitation

Increased Body

 Temperature

Hallucinations

Convulsions

Long Intense Trip Long Intense 

Trip

Slow, Shallow

 Breathing

Clammy Skin

Coma

Convulsions

Coma Fatigue

Paranoia

FOOTNOTES: These indicators are the most consistent with the category. Keep in mind that there may be variations due to individual reaction, dose taken 

and drug interactions.

1) Soma or Quaaludes usually dilate pupils; 2) Quaaludes and ETCH may elevate; 3) Certain psychedelic amphetamines cause slowing; 4) Normal but may 

be diluted; 5) Down with anesthetic gasses but up with volatile solvents and aerosols; 6) Pupil size possibly normal.





UNITED STATES

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, DC 20555-0001

------------------

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NUREG/CR-7183 Best Practices for Behavioral Observation Programs at Operating Power 

Reactors and Power Reactor Construction Sites