americanchemistry.com®

 700 Second St., NE | Washington, DC 20002 | (202) 249.7000 

Sent Electronically

March 30, 2012

Air and Radiation Docket and Information Center

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Re: Docket ID No. EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435, National Emission Standards for Hazardous 

Air Pollutant Emissions: Group IV Polymers and Resins; Pesticide Active Ingredient 

Production; and Polyether Polyols Production (77 Fed. Reg. 1268, January 9, 2012)

Dear Sir or Madam:

The American Chemistry Council (ACC) 1is pleased to submit these comments on EPA’s 

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions: Group IV Polymers and 

Resins; Pesticide Active Ingredient Production; and Polyether Polyols Production (77 Fed. Reg. 

1268, January 9, 2012). ACC represents the leading companies engaged in the business of 

chemistry, and ACC members operate facilities subject to these subparts. ACC is also a member 

of and fully supports the comments of the SSM Coalition and the Residual Risk Coalition (R2C).

Thank you in advance for your consideration of ACC’s comments. If you have any questions, or 

need clarification on any of our comments, please contact me at 

lorraine_gershman@americanchemistry.com or 202-249-6411.

Sincerely yours,

Lorraine Krupa Gershman, P.E.

Director, Regulatory/Technical Affairs

Attachment

 

1

The American Chemistry Council (ACC) represents the leading companies engaged in the business of chemistry. 

ACC members apply the science of chemistry to make innovative products and services that make people's lives 

better, healthier and safer. ACC is committed to improved environmental, health and safety performance through 

Responsible Care®, common sense advocacy designed to address major public policy issues, and health and 

environmental research and product testing. The business of chemistry is a $720 billion enterprise and a key 

element of the nation's economy. It is one of the nation’s largest exporters, accounting for ten cents out of every 

dollar in U.S. exports. Chemistry companies are among the largest investors in research and development. Safety 

and security have always been primary concerns of ACC members, and they have intensified their efforts, working 

closely with government agencies to improve security and to defend against any threat to the nation’s critical 

infrastructure.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The American Chemistry Council (ACC) is pleased to submit comments on the Environmental 

Protection Agency‟s (EPA or Agency) proposed National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 

Pollutant (NESHAP): Group IV Polymers and Resins (P&R IV); Pesticide Active Ingredient 

Production (PAI); and Polyether Polyols Production (PEPO). ACC member companies operate a 

number of facilities that will be subject to the proposed provisions.

ACC strongly objects to the proposed monitoring requirements for pressure relief devices 

(PRDs) in all three subparts. ACC sees nothing in Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (CAA) that 

provides EPA the authority required to justify its proposed, onerous PRD monitoring 

requirements. Further, EPA has provided no data to support its contention that PRD releases are 

not being identified, and has similarly provided no data to support the contention that releases are 

not being controlled in a timely manner. Finally, EPA has grossly underestimated the costs of 

installing such monitors.

The proposal to mandate monitoring of pressure relief devices is all the more unreasonable since 

the Agency has acknowledged (in another rulemaking) that PRD monitors are not expected to 

result in any emission reductions. As there is no legal basis for this proposal, and no record 

adequate to ground the proposal to require PRDs to be monitored, EPA should withdraw these 

requirements. 

ACC also recommends that EPA revise the proposed standards for startup and shutdown to 

reflect that facilities will not be able to comply with production based standards in subpart JJJ 

during startup and shutdown, and to provide work practice standards instead. 

ACC is concerned about the mandatory use of the Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT), particularly 

at this time when relevant test methods are not yet incorporated into the ERT. Without an 

opportunity to review the ERT data submittal requirements for each test method, ACC is unable 

to provide meaningful comments at this time on the impacts of the requirement. 

Finally, ACC urges EPA to allow for a periodic excused excursion where the loss of parameter 

monitoring data occurs and the applicable emission limit is not exceeded. 
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Table of Contents

I. Executive Summary................................................................................................................. i

II. Proposed Standards For Startup and Shutdown...................................................................... 1

A. Emission Ratio Standard .................................................................................................. 1

B. Destruction / Capture Efficiency Limit............................................................................ 1

C. Use of Alternative or Backup Controls............................................................................ 2

III. Malfunctions and Affirmative Defense ............................................................................... 3

IV. EPA Should Withdraw the Proposed Pressure Relief Device Monitoring requirements.... 4

A. EPA Lacks Authority and Justification for the PRD Requirements ................................ 6

B. EPA Lacks Record Support.............................................................................................. 7

C. If EPA Moves Forward with Standards for PRDs, the Agency Must Follow the 

Statutory Requirements for Standard Setting................................................................. 11

D. If EPA Moves Forward with the PRD Requirements, Numerous Changes Are 

Necessary ........................................................................................................................ 12

1. All PRDs should not be subject to release standards.................................................. 12

2. The rules should apply to a “pressure release” and not “any release” ....................... 14

3. EPA should add alternative monitoring approaches for PRD releases ...................... 16

4. EPA must clarify that other parameters can be estimated .......................................... 25

5. Recommended rule language...................................................................................... 25

6. EPA must include a compliance date for existing sources to implement any new 

monitoring requirements............................................................................................. 26

V. Other Issues With the Proposed Rules.................................................................................. 26

A. The Reference to FIFRA Form 3540-16 Must Be Corrected in Subpart MMM ........... 26

B. Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT)................................................................................... 27

1. Anticipated Benefits................................................................................................... 27

2. Methods supported by the Electronic Reporting Tool................................................ 28

3. The timing and methods for including Method 18 have not been determined or shared 

with the regulated community .................................................................................... 29

4. Without formal notice of changes to the ERT, the regulated community is at risk of 

non-compliance .......................................................................................................... 29

5. Use of the ERT does not reduce the burden on the regulated community and makes 

timely report submittal more difficult ........................................................................ 29

6. There is no mechanism for obtaining extensions for special circumstances.............. 30

7. As the requirements for Method 18 reports are unknown, so are the costs................ 30
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C. The Burden Imposed by the Affirmative Defense Standards Has Been Greatly Under 

Estimated by EPA. ......................................................................................................... 30

D. Excused Excursion Comments for Subparts JJJ and PPP.............................................. 31

1. Subpart JJJ - EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semi-annual 

reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to the environment. 31

2. Subpart PPP - EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semi-annual 

reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to the environment. 32

E. Subpart MMM Should Be Revised to Make It Consistent with Subpart JJJ. ................ 32

ATTACHMENT A – AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE COST ESTIMATE...................................... 33
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II. PROPOSED STANDARDS FOR STARTUP AND SHUTDOWN

EPA notes in the preamble that “in proposing the standards in these rules, the EPA has taken into 

account startup and shutdown periods and has not proposed different standards for those periods 

because we expect the difference in emission levels during periods of startup and shutdown are 

insignificant and that facilities in these source categories should be able to comply with the 

standards during these times.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1284.) However, this expectation does not hold true 

for all facilities, particularly those subject to Subpart JJJ. 

A. Emission Ratio Standard

The current emission standard for Subpart JJJ is expressed as a unit of emission per unit of 

production ratio. During startup and shutdown, compliance with these emission standards 

becomes difficult to demonstrate in some scenarios and impossible in others. For example, a 

continuous PET production process using terephthalic acid complying with § 63.1316(b)(2)(i) 

would be subject to mass emission limits expressed as 0.04 kg HAP per Mg of polymer produced 

for the raw material section and 0.04 kg HAP per Mg of polymer produced for the esterification 

section. Similar limits are also established for DMT-based PET production under § 

63.1316(b)(1)(i). Compliance for these PET production processes is demonstrated using 

performance testing at maximum emission loading conditions. Maximum emission loading 

conditions normally occur when production rates are also at a maximum. As polymer production 

processes are also regulated under new source review permits, the emission points are also 

limited to maximum hourly and annual emission rates. The combination of restrictions 

effectively limits the source. 

Under startup and shutdown conditions, the polymer production rate is either at zero or is near 

zero, which forces the ratio of emission rate to production to infinity. Emissions begin as 

equipment is being filled and the reactions are initialized; however, measureable polymer 

production does not occur for hours after the introduction of feed materials to the production 

process. As a result, during the initial hours of startup, the denominator of the rate equation is at 

zero, which forces any emission value to infinity.

ACC believes that an effective remedy is for EPA to establish a work practice standard that 

requires the use of the same emission limiting practices for startup and shutdown conditions that 

are used to demonstrate compliance with the standard.

B. Destruction / Capture Efficiency Limit

Compliance with the 98% destruction / capture efficiency standard allowed under 40 CFR 

63.1316(b)(1)(v) or (2)(v) / 40 CFR 63.113(a)(1) and (2) is not always possible under situations 

during startups or shutdowns. 

Achieving high destruction efficiencies from combustion of dilute gas streams is increasingly 

difficult as the incoming organic concentration approaches zero. In the case of startup where 

equipment is at ambient conditions and material transfers are being initially made, the emissions 

from the initial filling of vessels of heavy liquid fluids can be quite dilute. For example, the 

vapor pressure of ethylene glycol as supplied from an ambient, atmospheric storage vessel is 
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0.0026 psia (18.3 Pa at 30oC per Design Institute for Physical Property Research, American 

Institute of Chemical Engineers (DIPPR)). At full saturation, the maximum concentration of 

ethylene glycol in vapors expelled from vessel filling would be only 180 ppmv. To achieve 

greater than 98% destruction efficiency would require the exit concentration to be less than 3 

ppmv, which may not be practically achieved.

Unfortunately, the conditions that create this scenario effectively eliminate the practical ability of 

industry to capture the data to consistently demonstrate the actual impacts. Startups and 

shutdowns are limited in number as the success of polymer production is dependent upon 

consistent operation with the minimum number of production outages. Even for planned 

production outages, the window of opportunity to gather data is exceptionally limited by both the 

duration of the startup / shutdown condition and the knowledge of the facility to predict exactly 

the time of occurrence. In addition, executing performance testing during a startup or shutdown 

is an unnecessary distraction. Distractions during non-steady-state operations are highly 

undesirable in regards to safe operating practices. Therefore, ACC believes that the value of such 

data is both negligible and overly burdensome. 

ACC believes that an effective remedy is to establish an allowance for a work practice standard 

that requires the routing of emissions to a destruction or capture device that has been 

demonstrated to achieve the 98% efficiency or less than 20 ppmv emissions standard during 

continuous steady state operations.

C. Use of Alternative or Backup Controls

One ACC member company facility operates two continuous PET production lines that use 

emission control devices capable of providing backup emission controls. Each is equipped with 

an organic destruction unit to control emissions. Each destruction unit is capable of destroying 

emissions from the esterification section of one line and the polymerization reaction section of 

both lines as operated under normal, maximum production rate conditions. 

An alternative control scheme is possible where the esterification section can be operated in a 

manner to minimize vapor emissions enough to allow a single destruction unit to handle both 

lines. The use of this scheme is managed under the facility‟s operating procedures and in 

accordance with the existing provisions for startups, shutdowns and malfunctions as defined in 

subpart JJJ. During the period where the operating modes are switched, process parameters vary 

significantly from steady state conditions. Although the goal for every switch between methods 

is to completely route all emissions through the single destruction unit, the variation experienced 

can dictate that a portion of vent gas is routed to a secondary vent for pressure control. The 

duration of the event is measured, and emission values are estimated and reported via the state‟s 

emission inventory program as well as under the Title V permit program.

The potential to emit from these activities has been established through performance testing and 

is limited by a new source review permit. The limits are expressed in both hourly and annual 

rates. The state within which the facility operates maintains an air toxics program. The emissions 

of hazardous air pollutants under this permit were evaluated by the state for impacts and the 

impacts were found to be acceptable. 
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By eliminating the startup, shutdown and malfunction plan provisions, the alternative control 

option is potentially eliminated and emissions that have been evaluated for impacts and found to 

be acceptable are potentially converted into excess emission events. ACC respectfully requests 

that the provision be modified to allow the safe operation and transfer of operations from one 

operating mode to a secondary operating mode. We suggest that the following language be 

included in the final rule, perhaps at the end of §63.1335(b)(1)(A):

Emissions experienced from the transfer of operations from a primary emission control 

mode to a secondary control mode are not excess emissions where such emissions have 

been predicted and included in the facility’s new source review permit and where such 

emissions when added to emissions experienced from the primary emission control 

scenario are not in excess of the relevant control standard on a 12-month rolling sum.

III. MALFUNCTIONS AND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE

ACC is a member of an ad hoc coalition of trade associations and business organizations, the 

“SSM Coalition, which was formed to review and comment on EPA‟s approach to startup, 

shutdown and malfunction (SSM) events since the vacatur of the SSM exemption in the 40 CFR 

part 63, Subpart A General Provisions in 2008. Sierra Club v. EPA, 551 F.3d 1019 (D.C. Cir. 

2008), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 1735 (2010). The SSM Coalition is filing lengthy comments on 

this proposed rulemaking and ACC adopts and incorporates those comments herein through 

reference. ACC would like to highlight some of the overarching concerns expressed in those 

comments.

ACC believes that EPA has misinterpreted the Sierra Club decision, and is basing it proposed 

approach to SSM events in this rulemaking on unreasonable and insufficiently supported 

assumptions about the nature of SSM and emissions during those periods. EPA‟s requirements 

that sources meet emission standards established for normal operations “at all times”, including 

SSM events, is not compelled by the Clean Air Act nor case law, including the Sierra Club 

decision. This is particularly true when dealing with a malfunction event.

ACC believes that the following Agency‟s conclusions are meritless and self-serving: 

 That EPA need not consider emissions during a malfunction when developing emissions 

standards; 

 it need not consider malfunctions in determining the level of emission reduction 

“achieved” by the best performing sources; and, 

 it can disregard dealing with malfunction events because doing so presents “significant 

difficulties”1

EPA has for decades recognized that technology based standards, whether promulgated under the 

Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, or other federal statute have inherent limitations. So too have 

the courts: a “technology based standard discards its fundamental premise when it ignores the 

limits inherent in technology.” NRDC v. EPA, 859 F 2d. 156, 208 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Even in this 

proposed rulemaking, EPA concedes that “even equipment that is properly designed and 

 

1

77 Fed. Reg. 1268, 1284 (Jan. 9, 2012). 
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maintained can sometimes fail and that such failures can sometimes cause an exceedance of the 

relevant emission standard.”2

Since the 2008 vacatur of the SSM exemption in the General Provisions, in comments on a 

number of proposed NESHAP rules ACC has advocated that the Sierra Club ruling does not 

preclude EPA from adopting a §112 emission standard for SSM periods that is different from a 

§112 emission standard established for normal operations. Specifically, a §112(h) work practice 

standard would be perfectly suited for achieving maximum emission reductions during a 

malfunction event. ACC fails to understand why the Agency continues to resist exercising the 

discretion given to it by Congress in § 112(h) to establish a work practice standard if it is not 

feasible for the Agency to prescribe or enforce a numeric emission standard.

Instead of addressing malfunction events through the § 112 standard setting process, EPA 

proposes that sources must meet the same strict emission limitations established for normal 

operations during a malfunction, but may raise an “affirmative defense” to civil penalties for 

exceedances of those emission limitations during a malfunction. One would presume that the 

“affirmative defense” would be in response to an EPA enforcement action, but that is not the 

case. EPA would disallow a source from raising an “affirmative defense” unless the source (1) 

notifies EPA no later than 2 business days after the malfunction has occurred and (2) submits a 

lengthy written report documenting that it has met all of the required factors established by EPA 

in the affirmative defense provisions of each subpart. EPA therefore is shifting the burden to the 

source to show that it has met each and every factor required (some of which are overly broad, 

ambiguous and bear little relation to the malfunction event) and the source must present all of 

this evidence to EPA before the Agency has even initiated an enforcement action.

It is unclear where EPA finds the legal authority to substitute this “affirmative defense” for its 

obligation under § 112 to establish emission standards based on emission reductions “achieved” 

by best performing sources, including the emission reductions that are “achieved” through a 

work practice standard or other requirements during a malfunction event. Moreover, the 

affirmative defense provisions are so unreasonable and impracticable that even EPA believes it 

will be asserted by sources rarely, i.e., 1 or 2 instances for all sources subject to subparts JJJ, 

MMM and PPP over the 3-year period covered by this ICR. 77 Fed. Reg. at 1305. 

We discuss EPA‟s cost estimates associated with a source raising the affirmative defense at the 

end of these comments. 

IV. EPA SHOULD WITHDRAW THE PROPOSED PRESSURE RELIEF DEVICE 

MONITORING REQUIREMENTS

For all three MACT standards addressed in this rulemaking, EPA proposed - at §63.1331(a)(9) 

for Group IV Polymers and Resins, §63.1363(b)(4) for Pesticides Active Ingredients, and § 

63.1434(c) for Polyether Polyols – to establish that “[a]ny release to the atmosphere from a 

pressure relief device in organic HAP service constitutes a violation.” To monitor such releases, 

facilities would be required to “install, maintain and operate release indicators” to identify and 

 

2

Id.
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record each pressure release and notify operators that a pressure release has occurred. 77 Fed. 

Reg. 1308. 

ACC strongly objects to these proposed requirements. As discussed in the following sections, 

EPA has provided neither proper legal authority nor an adequate record basis for its proposed 

monitoring requirements for pressure relief devices (PRDs). Therefore, EPA must withdraw 

these proposed requirements. Only after collecting relevant information and identifying an 

appropriate legal authority can EPA proceed with rulemaking to address releases from PRDs. 

This proposal suggests a lack of understanding of the role of PRDs in chemical plants and the 

complexity of issues that are addressed through good engineering practices applied in designing 

systems that are specific to the processes in which they are employed. PRDs play an essential 

role in ensuring the safety of a chemical plant. PRDs are designed and installed to prevent 

equipment from exceeding maximum allowable working pressures during upset conditions such 

as power failures, fires, process operating upsets, and other situations outside of the operators‟ 

control. PRDs prevent catastrophic breaches of process equipment, which would result in far 

higher emissions than those resulting from a release from a PRD. PRDs minimize the loss of 

process materials to the surrounding environment and the operation of a PRD is typically the last 

line of defense in cases where multiple layers of protection have been executed but have failed to 

keep an overpressure situation under control. 

The systems that are protected by pressure relief systems vary widely across the chemical 

industry due to the demands of the processes which they protect and the hazards posed by the 

chemicals used in those processes. For example, systems can range in operating pressures from 

slightly above atmospheric to many multiples of atmospheric pressures. Some systems must 

manage the potential for explosive decomposition. Some must manage sticky materials such as 

hot glue. Some must manage multiphase systems of gas/liquid or even gas/liquid/solid streams. 

The choices typically are made through a systematic evaluation of the risk posed by the system 

specific situations. A variety of tools such as Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), Fault Tree 

Analysis, or Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA) are available for identifying the risks. The 

precise design of the overall system includes not simply the PRD but the overall processes, 

procedures, monitoring systems and controls which are used to minimize the potential for a 

release.

Although the Agency may view its proposal against any PRD release as an incentive to 

preventing releases, it may result in unintended consequences. By establishing that any release is 

a violation of the Clean Air Act, EPA is essentially asking plant operators to choose either to 

allow the release to occur resulting in a violation, or prevent the release thus creating the 

potential for a catastrophic breach that will endanger both the lives of the plant employees and 

the community neighbors. Any standard prohibiting releases to the atmosphere from PRDs must 

include appropriate routes to demonstrate the legal status of the vent without prejudging the 

owner/operator by a presumption of non-compliance.

The EPA also appears to fail to consider that due to the importance of PRDs to process safety, 

these devices are part of the site preventive maintenance program and are routinely 
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tested/inspected by a trained third party or on-site personnel. Such testing and maintenance 

reduce the potential of PRD malfunctions and premature opening.

A. EPA Lacks Authority and Justification for the PRD Requirements

First, and most fundamentally, EPA fails to identify adequate statutory authority for its PRD 

proposal. EPA cannot impose such requirements without explicit authority as EPA is “a creature 

of statute,” that has “only those authorities conferred upon it by Congress.” Michigan v. EPA, 

268 F.3d 1075, 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, EPA at most references general authority under 

CAA § 112, 77 Fed. Reg. 1270, for these expansive requirements. However, upon closer 

examination, nothing in Section 112 provides the authority required to justify proposing these 

PRD requirements. 

CAA § 112(d)(6) 

First, CAA § 112(d)(6) cannot provide authority for EPA to establish a new emission or work 

practice standard for PRDs, as that provision is limited by its own terms to adjusting existing

standards. Section 112(d)(6) authorizes EPA only to “revise as necessary ... emission standards 

promulgated under this section.” CAA § 112(d)(6). Since there are no “emission standards 

[already] promulgated” regarding emissions from PRD releases, there is nothing that EPA can 

“revise” in pursuit of its goal of imposing an entirely new set of standards.3

Even if EPA were to argue that its actions could somehow be authorized under § 112(d)(6), EPA 

has taken no steps to demonstrate that its proposed actions are warranted under that provision. 

Section 112(d)(6) does not provide EPA broad latitude to establish novel regulatory regimes, but 

instead sets out specific and precise criteria EPA must apply for determining whether a revision 

of an emission standard should be made. Specifically, EPA is obligated to “tak[e] into account 

developments in practices, processes, and control technologies.” Id. EPA has provided no 

information in the record to demonstrate that it has critically examined any “practices, processes, 

[or] control technologies,” much less that the information indicates that a new standard is 

warranted. In fact, as the data and information ACC discusses below demonstrate, there is no 

factual basis to take such actions.

CAA § 112(d)(3)

By providing that any “release events would be violations of the emissions standards,” 77 Fed. 

Reg. 1285, EPA is effectively establishing a new zero emissions NESHAP limit for PRDs. 

Section 112(d)(3), however, identifies specific requirements for EPA to follow in setting such a 

new standard, including certain benchmarking analysis EPA has not performed here. 

Specifically, § 112(d)(3) requires EPA first to identify the best performing sources in a particular 

source category and then set standards based on the performance of a certain number of those 

sources. There is no evidence that EPA has taken any steps to identify best performers, much less 

to calculate an emission limit based on the performance of those sources. 

 

3

 ACC notes that 40 CFR 63.165 establishes leak detection and repair work practice standards for PRDs in 

gas/vapor service. The regulatory requirements clearly distinguish a “release” from a “leak.”
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CAA § 112(f)

EPA makes clear that its proposed standards for PRDs are not being promulgated under § 

112(f)‟s residual risk authority. EPA explains that the PRD provisions are ones that are being 

done separately “[i]n addition to the [Residual Risk and Technology Review] performed 

regarding the NESHAP.” 77 Fed. Reg. 1283 (emphasis added). Further, the record is devoid of 

any suggestion that EPA engaged in the “Benzene NESHAP” two step analysis required to 

promulgate a standard for PRDs under § 112(f). See 77 Fed. Reg. 1270-71 (explaining EPA‟s 

two-step process). As discussed below, EPA lacks the basic information necessary to conduct 

such an analysis.

B. EPA Lacks Record Support

EPA also has failed in its fundamental task of ensuring that it bases its actions on informed 

decision-making regardless of statutory authority. The requirements for agency rulemaking are 

clear: the Supreme Court requires that an “agency [] examine the relevant data and articulate a 

satisfactory explanation for its action including a rational connection between the facts found and 

the choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 

103 S. Ct. 2856, 77 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1983) (citation omitted). The agency must show that it has 

taken a “hard look at the salient problems before it.” Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FERC, 890 

F.2d 435, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (quotation marks and citations omitted). EPA‟s proposal, 

however, does not meet these basic rulemaking standards. Far from being based on an 

“examin[ation of] the relevant data” or reflecting a “hard look,” EPA‟s proposal is premised 

purely on the Agency‟s vague “concern” that there “may” be a large number of PRD releases. 77 

Fed. Reg. 1285. EPA has not gathered, much less reviewed, information sufficient to justify the 

action it is proposing. Thus, the agency has failed to “demonstrate a reasonable connection 

between the facts on the record and the resulting policy choice.” Small Ref. Lead Phase-Down 

Task Force v. EPA, 705 F. 2d 506, 520 (1983) (citation omitted).

EPA Did Not Supply Supporting Data. EPA states as justification for the proposed PRD 

monitoring requirements that “we are concerned that a large number of these releases that occur 

may emit large quantities of HAP, may not be identified and controlled in a timely manner and 

may be due to repeat problems that have not been corrected.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1285) EPA cannot 

base a proposed requirement on something that “may” occur without any data to support the 

concern, especially when the Agency is proposing a requirement that will result in the enormous 

costs discussed below.

EPA has provided no data to support the contention that releases are not being identified. EPA 

has provided no data to support the contention that releases are not being controlled in a timely 

manner. Further, EPA has provided no reports, affidavits, or testimonies of agency inspectors 

where a single instance of an unidentified release has occurred. In fact, EPA has not provided 

any information related to a single PRD release.

If there are data to support its claims, then EPA is obliged to present the data for public 

examination and comment prior to initiating a regulatory action. EPA‟s “justification” for its 

proposed PRD monitoring requirements is less than transparent and provides no basis for the 

imposition of new and costly requirements.
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The regulated industry already provides reports for unpermitted releases of hazardous materials. 

The burden falls clearly and plainly on reporting facilities to provide accurate and timely reports. 

There are a number of regulations that require the reporting of these emissions. These include the 

PVC NESHAP (40 CFR 61, Subpart V), the HON (40 CFR 63, Subparts F, G, H), Group IV 

Polymers and Resins NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart JJJ), Polyether Polyol NESHAP (40 CFR 

63, Subpart PPP), Pesticide Active Ingredient NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart MMM), MON (40 

CFR 63, Subpart FFFF), Polymers and Resins I NESHAP (40 CFR 63, Subpart U), NESHAP for 

Equipment Leaks – Control Level 2 (40 CFR 63, Subpart UU), Title V Reporting, EPCRA, and 

CERCLA.

The regulated community is well aware of PRD events that result in emission releases, and takes 

action both to report and correct such events. However, EPA neither collected nor analyzed any 

of this information. By failing to provide any data, EPA falls short in demonstrating that new and 

additional reporting requirements for releases from PRDs are justified. 

Therefore, if EPA finalizes these proposed PRD requirements, ACC believes its actions will be 

arbitrary and capricious as the Agency has “entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the 

problem” and has “offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence 

before the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43. The information that ACC 

provides in its comments below shows that EPA‟s concern is unwarranted and its proposed 

actions are unnecessary.

ACC Collected Data Regarding PRD Releases. During the comment period, ACC collected data 

from a few member companies regarding releases from PRDs in the chemical sector. The 

information collected addresses PRDs in the chemical sector and is not limited to the seven 

chemical sector source categories addressed in this proposal. 

The information collected from ACC member companies represents 40 chemical sector sites. 

The information gathered included the total number of PRDs, the number of releases, the amount 

of pollutant released, the methods for indicating a pressure release has occurred, causes for the 

pressure release, and the mechanism used for reporting the release. At these 40 sites, there are 

over 14,000 PRDs in service. The number of PRDs range from 1 PRD on a specific process unit 

to 2,300 at an entire facility. Most of the data are for 2011. It is important to note that almost all 

of the data reported to ACC by member companies had already been reported to EPA or its 

delegated authorities. 

Below are summaries of our preliminary findings:

PRD Releases Are Identified Using a Variety of Methods. EPA claims that PRD 

releases may not be identified and controlled in a timely manner. ACC strongly 

disagrees with this claim. Several monitoring methods are commonly used by 

companies to identify PRD releases. In fact, the goal is to identify the conditions 

that lead to the potential for the activation of PRDs before they occur, and to 

execute the responses appropriate to the situation. This measured, multi-faceted 

approach provides layers of protection. It typically includes the use of multiple 

monitoring systems and alarms that also may include automatic shutdown 
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9

sequences for certain portions of the operation to prevent any release from the 

PRD.

Releases were primarily identified using a variety of methods that measure 

pressure: pressure indicators, pressure transmitters, and pressure gauges. In many 

cases, the indicators have high pressure alarms to notify operators. In addition, 

PRD releases were identified through fixed area monitors, upstream rupture disks, 

monitoring with an OVA, and routine visual inspections. Current leak detection 

and repair programs contain methods for using audio, visual and olfactory 

detection of PRD releases. These methods are typically sufficient to detect a 

venting PRD due to the oft accompanied loud noise from a high pressure relief.

PRD Releases to the Atmosphere Are Extremely Infrequent. For the 14,139 PRDs 

represented by the ACC data, a total of 181 releases were identified. Therefore, a 

little more than 1 percent of the PRDs at these chemical plants had a release. 

This clearly is inconsistent with EPA‟s unsupported claim that such releases are 

common.

PRD Releases are Typically of Short Duration. Not only do chemical plant

operators identify releases in a timely manner, they also correct them as soon as 

possible. EPA appears not to recognize that when a PRD releases, it typically 

indicates an issue that needs to be quickly resolved in order to continue normal 

process operation. Failure to do so can result in safety issues and production 

losses. Therefore, even without any requirement to detect PRD releases and 

correct them, it is in the best interest of a plant operator to do so promptly.

For those situations when a release did occur, the ACC information collected 

shows that over 75 percent of the releases lasted for a period of less than 30 

minutes. In fact, almost 40 percent of the releases had durations of less than 1 

minute.

Emissions to the Atmosphere from PRD Releases Are Usually Small. EPA 

maintains that releases may emit large quantities of HAP. As discussed in the 

previous section, operators have significant incentive to identify PRD releases and 

correct the situation as soon as possible. This has the effect of limiting the 

quantity of both HAP and VOC released without the need for additional 

regulation. In the data collected from member companies, the emissions per 

release were generally small. Almost 80 percent of the releases resulted in 

emissions of less than 500 pounds. Additionally, over 20 percent of the releases 

resulted in emissions of less than 1 pound.

However, the data collected from ACC member companies do show that 

emissions to the atmosphere from PRD releases are not always insignificant. 

Given that PRD releases are usually the result of a build-up of excess pressure in 

the system, the high pressure high flow rate streams can result in higher levels of 
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emissions. Approximately 11% of the releases reported resulted in emissions of 

over 1 ton of HAP or VOC.

As stated before, PRDs minimize emissions by preventing failure of equipment 

and loss of containment. It is logical to conclude that the emissions identified 

would be even greater without the application of layers of protection and 

installation of PRDs that are specifically designed for their application.

It is important to note that the circumstances where higher emissions occurred 

were identified through existing monitoring methods. Further, the facilities 

worked to correct the release as quickly as possible. The proposed requirements 

would not provide any additional information to owners and operators related to 

the occurrence of these higher emission releases. Further, it would not result in 

faster resolution of the situation. 

In conclusion, chemical plant owners and operators already engage in a variety of effective 

procedures to identify when PRDs release and emit to the atmosphere. When a release does 

occur, safety considerations and process economics ensure that the release and resolution of 

issues is addressed as soon as possible. 

Data Regarding PRD Releases From Petroleum Refineries Was Available from the South Coast 

Air Quality Management District. EPA references the “Proposed Amended Rule 1173 – Control 

of Volatile Organic Compound Leaks and Releases from Components at Petroleum Facilities 

and Chemical Plants” from the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) as a 

source for information related to PRD monitoring. Information was gathered by the SCAQMD to 

support this rulemaking. While the data only represented Petroleum Refineries in the District, it 

does provide additional information regarding PRD release frequency and emissions. Refineries 

reported a total of 770 atmospheric PRDs (565 in gas/vapor service and 205 in liquid service) to 

SCAQMD. A total of 42 releases were reported over a 4 year period from these 770 PRDs, or an 

average of 10.5 releases per year. Therefore, just over 1 percent of the PRDs released each year. 

If one conservatively assumed that every one of these releases occurred on a PRD in gas/vapor 

service the result would be that each gas/vapor PRD releases, on average, around once every 

54 years. This does not seem to support EPA‟s statements regarding a “large number of 

releases.”

Of the data reported from these South Coast refineries, 62 percent of the releases resulted in 

emissions of less than 500 lbs. No information was provided related to the duration of each 

release. As noted above, this data is only represented for Petroleum Refineries and is not 

representative of the chemical sectors subject to this proposal.

Despite the fact that EPA used cost information from SCAQMD in estimating the financial 

impacts of the PRD monitoring requirement, EPA appears to have ignored the data regarding the 

amount of the emissions from PRD releases.

In addition, EPA failed to acknowledge that the SCAQMD rule allows for different types of 

monitoring methods for PRDs. In fact, only petroleum facilities are required to install an 
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electronic monitor on each PRD in that rule. Chemical plants can install either a tamper-proof 

electronic valve monitoring device or utilize electronic process controls that provide continuous 

parameter monitoring.

We do not believe it is appropriate for EPA to cite the SCAQMD data as supportive of this 

proposal without discussing the applicability of the SCAQMD 1173 rule, and the SCAQMD 

data. 

C. If EPA Moves Forward with Standards for PRDs, the Agency Must Follow 

the Statutory Requirements for Standard Setting

The proposed amendments to all three subparts state that “[a]ny release to the atmosphere from a 

pressure relief device constitutes a violation of this rule.” As stated earlier in these comments, 

EPA effectively is proposing to establish a zero emissions standard for PRD releases. However, 

it is unclear what legal authority is being used for this proposed NESHAP standard. As ACC 

explained in the comments above, EPA cannot use § 112(d)(6) because this proposal is not a 

revision to an “existing” standard and EPA cannot use § 112(d)(3) if it is not going to follow the 

statutory requirements established therein, i.e., identify the best performing sources and establish 

a standard based on what emission reductions are being achieved in practice by the best 

performers..

If EPA is determined to develop an emission limit for releases to the atmosphere from PRDs, it 

must follow the statutory requirements established in § 112 of the CAA.

EPA has not previously established separate standards for malfunctions as “malfunction” events 

were exempted from meeting the emission limits established for normal operations. In the 

preamble, EPA explains the difficulties in establishing emission standards for malfunctions –

“Applying the concept of „„best controlled‟‟ or „„best performing‟‟ to a unit that is 

malfunctioning presents significant difficulties, as malfunctions are sudden and 

unexpected events. Further, accounting for malfunctions would be difficult, if not 

impossible, given the myriad different types of malfunctions that can occur across 

all sources in the category and given the difficulties associated with predicting or 

accounting for the frequency, degree and duration of various malfunctions that 

might occur. As such, the performance of units that are malfunctioning is not 

„„reasonably‟‟ foreseeable.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1284)

While this argument may be reasonable when considering the entire universe of 

malfunctions that could possibly occur, the release of a PRD is unique in that the 

“release” is an inherent function of the device. ACC believes that EPA, working with 

ACC and SCAQMD data, could have established a work practice standard for PRD 

releases pursuant to its authority under § 112(h). We urge the Agency to strongly 

consider this approach.
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D. If EPA Moves Forward With The PRD Requirements, Numerous Changes 

Are Necessary

If EPA chooses to move forward with its proposed approach for PRD releases, it must clarify 

that not all releases to the atmosphere from a PRD are a violation. For example, EPA must 

clarify that fugitive releases that are already managed by established leak detection and repair 

(LDAR) regulations are not violations. Additionally, EPA should eliminate the situation where 

releases of liquids or gas/vapors that only result in minimal losses to the atmosphere would be 

classified as automatic violations. In addition, the rules should only apply to PRDs in organic 

gas/vapor service that vent to the atmosphere.

ACC objects to the proposed monitoring and alarm requirements for those PRDs that would be 

covered. EPA should allow current methods that are successfully being utilized at chemical 

plants to identify PRD releases to continue to be used. EPA must also clarify that the monitoring 

devices/methods only are required to determine that the PRD has released. Note that, if EPA 

starts over and creates reasonable and legally defensible standards for PRD releases, ACC does 

not question the need to identify PRD releases or to maintain records of these releases. ACC also 

does not object to the requirement to report PRD releases in periodic reports.

1. All PRDs should not be subject to release standards

The definition of pressure relief device that applies for these three subparts is as follows: 

“Pressure relief device or valve means a safety device used to prevent operating 

pressures from exceeding the maximum allowable working pressure of the 

process equipment. A common pressure relief device is a spring-loaded pressure 

relief valve. Devices that are actuated either by a pressure of less than or equal to 

2.5 pounds per square inch gauge or by a vacuum are not pressure relief devices.”

This definition includes a wide universe of PRDs, not all of which should be subject to standards. 

ACC recommends that the following PRDs not be subject to release standards:

 PRDs not in gas/vapor service,

 PRDs in systems with little potential for loss to the atmosphere (e.g., chemicals with very 

low vapor pressures),

 PRDs that are routed to a closed vent system and control device, and

 PRDs that are routed to a process.

The requirements should only apply to PRDs in gas/vapor service. The PRD requirements are 

being imposed irrespective of cost or benefit. EPA should exempt PRDs where a release would 

only result in the release of liquids. For example, the release of liquid ethylene glycol into a 

catchment or spill containment vessel would not result in atmospheric impacts since the material 

is a heavy liquid with exceptionally low vapor pressure at ambient conditions. Liquid phase 

pressure relief systems typically have secondary containment systems to ensure capture and to 

minimize loss. A fully filled liquid system may also only require a very small amount of liquid to 

pass the relief valve to relieve the overpressure situation. PRDs in liquid service should not be 

included.
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EPA has long recognized that PRDs in gas/vapor service were the ones that warranted 

regulation. For instance, the HON LDAR provisions for PRDs in § 63.165 only apply to PRDs in 

gas/vapor service. Further, in the Uniform Standards regulations signed by the EPA 

Administrator on February 24, 2012, the PRD provisions in §§ 65.424(a) and (b) only apply to 

those in gas/vapor service. Therefore, EPA should modify the proposed requirements in §§

63.1331(a)(9), 63.1363(b)(4), and 63.1434(c) to apply only to PRDs in gas/vapor service.

The requirements should also include de minimis values to exclude systems with little potential 

for loss to the atmosphere. For example, in polyethylene terephthalate production, one of the 

primary HAPs is ethylene glycol. At ambient conditions, it is a heavy liquid exhibiting a very 

low vapor pressure. It is well known that a leak of hot ethylene glycol vapor rapidly condenses 

upon exposure to ambient conditions. The resulting condensed ethylene glycol typically pools 

and may be collected for appropriate treatment and disposal. It would be difficult to create a 

scenario where ethylene glycol vapors could exit a production site without notice and in 

sufficient quantities to impact surrounding communities. Such an event would be large and easily 

identified, yet this standard imposes the same requirement for a PRD in ethylene glycol (or other 

heavy liquid) service as might be imposed for a highly volatile, highly toxic hazardous air 

pollutant.

To further illustrate the problem EPA creates with its proposed broad prohibition, take the 

scenario where a vessel filled with low molecular weight polyethylene terephthalate and ethylene 

glycol is protected from over-pressurization via a PRD. If the pressure is relieved via the 

expelling of this liquid to a secondary vessel, or possibly, to a catchment or wastewater treatment 

sewer, the vast majority of the material would be liquid. If even a thousand gallons release of 

liquid occurs, a miniscule amount of ethylene glycol could vaporize, and yet, the blanket 

prohibition against any release results in a violation. ACC notes that in other permitted activities, 

ethylene glycol is commonly stored in fixed roof vessels without any additional emission 

controls simply because it has a low vapor pressure and poses little potential to emit. 

ACC suggests that EPA set a de minimis reporting value equal to the reportable quantity (RQ) 

values in EPCRA and/or CERCLA. The RQ values vary from chemical to chemical, and the RQ 

value is typically lower for more hazardous and/or volatile chemicals. See EPA‟s “List of Lists” 

for RQs for a number of EPA programs.4

PRDs that release to closed vent systems and control devices should not be subject to the 

monitoring requirements. The proposed rule exempts PRDs that route releases to a closed vent 

system and control device from the release indicator requirements. EPA‟s intention that releases 

from these PRDs would not be violations is relatively clear, as the proposed rules indicate that 

only releases from a PRD “to the atmosphere” are a violation. However, in order to avoid 

potential confusion, EPA should clarify not only that PRDs that route releases to a closed vent 

system and/or control device are exempt from the release indicator requirements, but that such 

PRD releases are not subject to standards and thus, are not violations. 

 

4

http://www.epa.gov/emergencies/docs/chem/list_of_lists_revised_7_26_2011.pdf
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PRDs that release to a process should be exempt. EPA should clarify that PRDs that release “to a 

process” are exempt. While it could be argued that these situations do not “vent to the 

atmosphere” and therefore would not be subject to the proposed requirements, it would be 

helpful to the regulated community if EPA could clearly identify this in the regulation to avoid 

any potential for misinterpretation.

2. The rules should apply to a “pressure release” and not “any release”

The proposed language in §§ 63.1331(a)(9), 63.1363(b)(4), and 63.1434(c) indicates that “any 

release to the atmosphere from a pressure relief device in organic HAP service constitutes a 

violation of this rule.” This requirement is unreasonable and technically infeasible as it 

establishes an unachievable condition of zero emissions from equipment that is inherently 

capable of leakage by the existence of a seal that is designed to open and close. This zero 

emission requirement also could be interpreted to apply to any fugitive emission that does not 

meet the definition of a “leak” thereby conflicting with existing leak detection and repair 

(LDAR) requirements.

Pressure relief systems face widely varying process conditions and in response, a wide variety of 

pressure relief devices are in service in the chemical industry. The most common relief devices 

are rupture disks and pressure relief valves. Rupture disks have the disadvantage of permanently 

opening the process to atmosphere upon actuation. Pressure relief valves (PRV) are preferred due 

to their ability to close after actuation. To prevent loss of process material through the valve, the 

valve seat and valve are finely machined to create a tight seal. A spring applies pressure to close 

the valve against the seat. Unless the sealing surfaces match perfectly, gas or liquid can pass 

through the valve. Current regulations require that PRVs achieve a seal that produces less than an 

established leak rate but that leak rate has never been placed as a blanket prohibition against

emissions because it is technically infeasible to achieve such a standard for all relief systems. 

PRDs in gas/vapor service at chemical processing facilities are currently subject to LDAR 

regulations. The three subparts incorporate the HON LDAR requirements in 40 CFR 63, subpart 

H. Specifically, § 63.165 requires PRDs to be operated so that emissions are less than 500 ppm 

above background except during pressure releases. Further, each PRD must be monitored within 

5 days of a pressure release to verify the PRD has returned to an operating condition with 

emissions less than 500 ppm above background. (§ 63.165) The most commonly accepted 

method for verifying this concentration is EPA Method 21.

EPA Method 21 provides examples of locations to monitor for potential leaks. Section 8.3.1.4 of 

the method states that sampling/monitoring for leaks from PRDs should occur at the sealing seat 

interface. However, it is common for PRDs to be equipped with enclosed extensions that prevent 

sampling at this interface. In those instances, Method 21 suggests sampling/monitoring at the 

“center of the exhaust area to the atmosphere.” Any reading below 500 ppm above background 

conditions found at these points of the PRD would be in compliance with the existing LDAR 

requirements.

Further, a reading above 500 ppm is not a “deviation” unless the leak is not corrected per the 

work practice standard. As noted above, process conditions vary widely in the chemical industry. 

The materials which pass the valve during a pressure release event may defeat perfect sealing 
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15

either through erosion, corrosion, or the adherence of process material to the seat of the valve.

Seal performance cannot be anticipated prior to actuation. 

In these proposed requirements, any release could be considered a violation. This could be 

interpreted to include “allowable emissions” under the LDAR requirements, as defined as an 

instrument reading less than 500 ppm above background. Therefore, a facility in compliance 

with the applicable LDAR provisions could be in violation of these proposed requirements if 

there was the slightest concentration measured from the PRD. The literal writing of this 

requirement also could be interpreted by an enforcement agency as including fugitives from any 

part of the PRD, such as the flanges of the device. In other words, the proposed language could 

result in a violation for any fugitive emissions on any component determined to be associated 

with a PRD above detection level of the instrument.

Treating a “release” as synonymous with a “leak” is extremely problematic and will lead to 

absurd results. For example, if a PRD fails to completely reseal and exhibits a slight leak (i.e., 

fugitive emission are above the “less than 500ppm above background” leak threshold in §

63.165), the owner/operator may believe the production line needs to be immediately shutdown 

to address the “release” and repair the PRD. If this is a polymer production line, full shutdowns 

and re-starts can generate thousands of pounds of waste or off-specification polymer. So, in order 

to avoid exacerbating a potential violation because of a “release,” these requirements as written 

may force manufacturers to create thousands of pounds of waste. ACC does not believe this is 

EPA‟s intent and for that reason strongly urges EPA to distinguish between a “leak” and a 

“pressure release.”

ACC believes that EPA intended for this new requirement to apply solely to emissions from an 

actual pressure release, and not allowable fugitive emissions “releases.” The definition of 

“pressure release” that applies for 40 CFR 63, Subparts JJJ and MMM is the same as that found 

in the HON (40 CFR 63, Subpart H). There is no reference to this definition or an alternative 

definition in 40 CFR 63 Subpart PPP. ACC urges EPA to add this reference to § 63.1423 for 

consistency.

Pressure release means the emission of materials resulting from the system 

pressure being greater than the set pressure of the pressure relief device. This 

release can be one release or a series of releases over a short time period due to a 

malfunction in the process. (40 CFR 63.161)

ACC believes that EPA‟s discussion in the preamble supports the conclusion that it only 

intended to cover pressure releases. EPA states that “pressure release events may be associated 

with unplanned, nonroutine discharges.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1285). EPA further states that the 

“proposed provisions will clarify that such release events would be violations of the emissions 

standards of these rules.” 

Therefore, EPA should modify the proposed language and replace the words “any release” with 

“any pressure release.” This would clarify that PRDs operating in compliance with §63.165 

would not be subject to a potential violation for a “release.” 
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Comments by the American Chemistry Council

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3. EPA should add alternative monitoring approaches for PRD releases

A “one-size fits all” approach is not justified and is counter-productive. The proposed regulations 

require that owners or operators install, maintain and operate “release indicators” on each 

pressure relief device that will indicate when an emission release has occurred. Further, the rules 

require that each indicator be equipped with an alert system that will notify an operator 

immediately and automatically when the pressure relief device is open. In addition, this alert 

must be located such that the signal is detected and recognized easily by an operator.

This design requirement that “a release indicator” must be properly installed on “each pressure 

relief device” is a “one-size fits all” approach that is impractical, potentially infeasible, and 

inappropriate. Design of pressure relief systems and the associated monitoring systems should 

be governed by good engineering practices in accordance with considerations for risks and 

hazards along with the practical aspects of the specific system.

It is possible to create a more hazardous situation by making process operations more complex. 

Complexity can divert attention from more important parameters. PRD specific units can be 

prone to false positives (i.e., burst indicators which may provide a false indication that the 

rupture disk has burst simply due to a wiring short). The addition of alarms should be made in 

careful consideration of the hazards against the potential benefits; this is accomplished through 

careful design and application of good engineering principles including the use of process 

hazards analysis. Establishing blanket requirements across an entire industry is contradictory to 

good engineering practice.

No one design standard can possibly work in the variety of conditions that exist in the chemical 

processing industry. PRDs come in a variety of sizes and come from a number of different 

manufacturers. It is not practicable to require a single type of system to alert operators of their 

release. Within a single process, conditions can vary from the processing of light vapors to sticky 

resins. What may work in one area may not work in another especially if a quantitative measure 

of release is made mandatory. There are significant differences in measuring liquid, vapor and/or 

two-phase flow accurately, particularly in transient flow situations. It is impractical to assume 

one type of design will be adequate.

Polymer and resin production processes are not amenable to monitors that can be coated, plated 

or plugged in ambient conditions. Post-PRD vent systems (i.e., the piping downstream of the 

PRD) are typically under ambient conditions and cannot easily be made to mimic process 

conditions for the purpose of preventing solids accumulation. Entry of a solid, resinous or 

polymeric material into the vent header can easily defeat monitoring units by solidification. Once 

defeated, the monitoring unit becomes useless, or worse, a potential source of misinformation for 

the operator. The performance of ultrasonic monitoring units in these types of services is not yet 

known and may not prove to be sufficiently reliable. It is unknown if a technically feasible 

solution is available to address the design requirements alluded to by the proposed requirements.

The emphasis on the imposition of an individual monitoring system that is specific to a single 

PRD without allowance for process specific conditions is impractical. Safe design of pressure 

relief device systems should allow the consideration of all aspects of the process so that the most 

effective system can be used. A one-sized fits all approach to release indicators is inappropriate.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

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One large ACC member company determined that currently available technology that could be 

used to comply with the proposed regulation would be based on one of the following devices: 

 A pressure switch located downstream of the relief valve;

 An on-line acoustic monitoring system;

 A low pressure burst indicator; or 

 A “tell tail” (a weighted sock) on the relief valve discharge.

This company‟s experience with these devices is that they all have very poor reliability to 

operate when there is a PRD release. All these devices, except the low pressure burst indicator, 

are located downstream of the PRD and will only be called on to operate when the PRD opens. 

Since PRDs release so rarely, the device may be in place for many years before needing to 

operate. It may be difficult to ascertain reliability when the alarm is rarely, if ever, used. 

Another ACC member company experienced with low pressure burst indicators found that they 

are prone to give false alarms. These low pressure burst indicators are affected by small pressure 

changes, exposure to process temperature changes, and decay of the electronic systems used to 

sense if the indicator has been violated. The company has found that these devices are not 

reliable enough to be trusted to be the sole indication that a PRD has opened, as they tend to fail 

and give false alarms.

Devices used to accomplish EPA‟s goal are best designed specifically for that process. For 

example, one ACC member company indicated that a pressure transmitter located close to the 

process side of the PRD with a pressure span exceeding the release set pressure is the best option

for its facility to detect PRD releases. These devices have proven to be reliable indicators of PRD 

openings in many situations and are common in the industry. As noted above, chemical operators 

already utilize such monitoring, along with inspections and a variety of other methods, to 

successfully identify when PRDs release. Additionally, PRD releases have a distinct pressure 

trend that can be observed by other process instruments. These other instruments are important to 

control the pressure before a release occurs and can be used to help determine if a release 

occurred. EPA must acknowledge this and allow alternatives, especially in light of the 

unjustified impacts discussed below.

The blanket design requirements potentially increase hazards. The physical arrangement of the 

PRD vent may pose significant hazards to personnel attempting to access equipment placed in or 

on the vent stack. Often, PRDs are located in a remote location near the top of process equipment 

(i.e., PRDs at the top of a distillation column). Their physical location limits the potential for 

personnel exposure as the PRD discharge point is not near a normally occupied location. 

Servicing the PRDs is normally only done when the process is depressurized such as during a 

facility maintenance turnaround. 

Placing monitoring equipment directly into the vent of a PRD has the potential to create 

additional work which could cause individuals to be placed in a position of greater than normal 

hazard either due to new work at elevated heights or potential exposure to an unplanned release 

event. For physical arrangements where this might occur, this is contrary to safe design practices 
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and should be avoided. The use of existing, normally monitored process parameters (e.g. system 

pressure) avoids placing personnel in elevated risk scenarios. Additionally, placement of a 

monitoring device in the outlet piping of a PRD will result in a decrease in cross-sectional area 

for flow. In extreme cases this may adversely impact the device‟s ability to pass the requisite 

flow.

It is possible to create a more hazardous situation by making process operations more complex. 

Complexity can divert attention from more important parameters. As discussed earlier, some 

PRDs can be prone to false positives. The addition of alarms should be made in careful 

consideration of the hazards against the potential benefits; this is accomplished through careful 

design and application of good engineering principles including the use of process hazards 

analysis. Blanket requirements across an entire industry are contradictory to good engineering 

practice.

EPA‟s impacts assessment is severely flawed. In Table 21 of the preamble (77 Fed. Reg. 1303), 

EPA estimated the capital costs of the PRD monitoring devices to be over $14.5 million for all 

seven source categories, and annual costs just over $2 million/year. In an attempt to understand 

these costs, ACC tried to obtain information from the docket which led to a tangled maze that 

does not appear to support these estimates. The preamble references a document “Draft Cost 

Impacts of the Revised NESHAP for 7 Source Categories” for PRD costs. This document5

provides the PRD costs in Table 21 of the preamble, except there is a discrepancy in the costs for 

the Polyether Polyols source category that is not explained. This document explains that the 

estimated costs of a PRD monitoring system were developed assuming capital costs of $188,913 

per facility and annual operating and maintenance costs of $26,897 per year per facility. These 

costs were based on an estimated average facility, which was assumed to have 134 PRDs. To 

estimate the PRD monitoring system costs for the source categories addressed by these three 

NESHAPs, EPA indicates that it applied the same estimates that were originally developed in 

conjunction with the PVC NESHAP analysis. The supporting documentation for these PVC PRD 

costs6 was obtained and reviewed by ACC.

Consistent with what was quoted in the “7 Source Categories” cost document, this PVC costs 

document estimates that the total capital cost for a PRD monitoring system at 16 of the 17 

facilities subject to the PVC MACT is $188,913. This information is presented in Table 6-1 of 

the document. Further, Table 6-1 also shows that these same 16 facilities would incur annual 

costs of $26,897 for a PRD monitoring system, also consistent with the values used for the seven 

source categories addressed in this proposal. Attachment K of this PVC document is then 

referenced as providing more detail of the cost calculations. However, no additional information 

is presented in the attachment to explain the calculations. A footnote is provided as a reference 

for the PVC PRD cost calculations that states, “EPA supplied cost factors from 

“PVC_PRV_Cost_reductions_110310” option 4, average facility.” However, this document is 

 

5 Memorandum. Lesley Stobert, EC/R Incorporated, to Paula Hirtz, EPA/OAQPS/SPPD, and Nick Parsons, 

EPA/OAQPS/SPPD. Draft Cost Impacts of the Revised NESHAP for 7 Source Categories. November 7, 2011. 

Docket Item EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435-0027.

6 Memorandum. Eastern Research Group, Inc. to Jodi Howard, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. “Costs and 

Emission Reductions of the Proposed Standards for the Polyvinyl Chloride and Copolymers (PVC) Production 

Source Category.” April 13, 2011. (Docket item no. EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0037-0102).
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Comments by the American Chemistry Council

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not included in the docket for public review. Further, there is nothing in this PVC cost document 

related to the 134 PRDs per facility cited in the 7 Source Category Cost document.

In association with the final PVC NESHAP, which was signed by the Administrator on February 

12, 2012, EPA posted another spreadsheet related to PRD costs in the PVC docket7on February 

24, 2012. This spreadsheet presents information related to “wireless monitors” and references a 

SCAQMD document8as the source of the PRD monitoring device costs. Chapter 6, Section B of 

this SCAQMD document states that costs were estimated by industry representatives to range 

from $5,000 to $10,000 for a wireless monitoring device for each individual PRD. This range of 

costs included the device parts, installation, and maintenance. 

In this above noted spreadsheet, the facility-wide capital costs listed for the average facility are 

again listed by EPA as $188,913. Unlike the previous PVC cost memo, this spreadsheet does 

identify the assumed number of PRDs per model facility, with the average-sized facility showing 

134 PRDs. The reference for the source of the PRD counts is “Table 2-1” of a 1984 EPA 

document.9 ACC obtained this document, and the identified table does include equipment counts 

for model chemical facilities. However, none of the model facilities contains 134 PRDs. In fact, 

all 3 of the model units identified in this table contain less than 134 PRDs, with estimates of 11, 

42, and 130 PRDs for model units A, B, and C, respectively. Therefore, there is no reliable 

reference for the number of assumed PRDs at EPA‟s model plants used for this cost analysis. 

If the total capital cost per facility in the 2012 PVC spreadsheet ($188,913) is divided by the 

assumed number of PRDs (134), the cost per PRD is calculated as approximately $1,400. This is 

much less than the range of $5,000 to $10,000 presented in the SCAQMD document that EPA 

references as the source for costs. In fact, the costs for each wireless monitor on average would 

be 5 times higher than the amount used to justify the requirements for this proposed rulemaking. 

Therefore, EPA used a monitoring system cost that averages $1,400 per PRD, yet the reference 

for EPA‟s costs cites a cost of $5,000 to $10,000. There does not appear to be any justification in

the docket to support the value of $1,400 per PRD.

Further, in the documentation10 for the Uniform Standards rulemaking package signed by the 

EPA Administrator on February 24, 2012, EPA cites the same sources of information to estimate 

costs but comes up with entirely different PRD counts and costs. In this same document, EPA 

goes on to state that “[i]t was assumed that no additional emissions reductions would occur from 

this (PRD monitoring) requirement, but it would result in additional capital costs.” Id. at page 

11. ACC questions why EPA is requiring the installation of such costly monitors if no emissions 

reductions are expected. 

 

7

“Technical Analysis Spreadsheet – PVC – Equipment Leaks”. Docket Item EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0037-0199.

8

Final Staff Report, South Coast Air Quality Management District. Proposed Amended Rule 1173 – Control of 

Volatile Organic Compound Leaks and Releases from Components at Petroleum Facilities and Chemical Plants. 

May 15, 2007.

9 Guideline Series. Control of Volatile Organic Compound Leaks from Synthetic Organic and Polymer 

Manufacturing Equipment. EPA-450/3-83-006. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Air Quality 

Planning and Standards. March 1984.

10 Memorandum. Cindy Hancy, RTI International, to Jodi Howard, EPA/OAQPS, “Analysis of Emissions Reduction 

Techniques for Equipment Leaks.” December 21, 2011. Docket Item EPA-HQ-OAR-2002-0037-0180.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

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20

ACC would also like to point out that even if EPA had conducted a valid cost analysis using the 

SCAQMD data, these costs are for wireless monitors only. There are many situations in a 

chemical plant where wireless monitors are not technically the best alternative. A simple 

situation is where the process unit is remote beyond the potential reach of the wireless 

transmitters; multiple signal repeaters might be necessary to relay the signal. As a result, it may 

be judged that a hard-wired system will be more reliable and less prone to failure or interference. 

As the SCAQMD study noted, it is more expensive to install wired monitors. The true cost of 

installing monitoring systems is much higher than the costs EPA cites. 

In conclusion, the cost analysis used to justify the proposed requirement for a monitoring device 

on every PRD is incorrect. EPA cannot require monitoring devices on every PRD without first 

performing a rigorous and realistic cost assessment and presenting that assessment (and 

supporting documentation) for public comment. 

Cost of release indicator is not justified. As discussed above, EPA estimated the capital costs of 

the PRD monitoring devices to be over $14.5 million for all seven source categories, and annual 

costs just over $2 million/year. These costs, which EPA presumably determined to be reasonable, 

are based on a cost of $1,400 per PRD.

ACC collected information from member companies related to the anticipated costs of installing 

a “release indicator” on “each” PRD. As with the PRD release information above, the time frame 

of the comment period did not allow a large number of member companies adequate time to 

obtain complete cost information. Further, there was insufficient time to fully quality assure the 

data and ascertain the reasons for differences in the estimates. Following the close of the 

comment period, ACC would welcome the opportunity to provide additional information to 

EPA.

However, detailed information was obtained from three member companies. Since there is no 

one-size fits all solution to meet the proposed requirements, the assumptions of the specific 

equipment needed varied. In addition, the unclear nature of some aspects of the proposed 

requirements led to different assumptions regarding what was required to be monitored, which 

led to differences in the estimates. The following table summarizes the information from 

Companies A and B. More detailed descriptions of the information, along with additional 

comments on the technical issues associated with the proposed monitoring requirements, are 

provided below.

Company Estimated Cost 

Per PRD Note/Description

Company A $55,000 Includes flow monitoring equipment, which company A 

interprets is required by the proposed requirements

Company A $15,000 Very preliminary vendor cost (does not include flow 

monitoring equipment)

Company B $35,000 Assumed additional junction box is required

Company B $19,000 Assumes additional junction box is not required

EPA $1,400 Wireless release indicator
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In addition, Company C provided actual costs from the recent installation of wireless 

temperature monitoring devices. The cost was just under $15,000 per monitor. While PRD 

monitors are expected to be more expensive, this is another point for comparison with EPA‟s 

estimate. 

Using these estimates, the capital cost for EPA‟s “average” facility (which contains 134 PRDs), 

would range from around $2 million to over $7 million, as compared to EPA‟s estimate of 

$188,913 per facility. Using EPA‟s “average” facility estimates, the total capital cost for all three 

of these subparts would then range from around $150 million to well over $500 million. This 

compares to EPA‟s estimate of $14.5 million. ACC does not believe that the original costs 

estimated by EPA can be considered reasonable. Given the evidence that EPA‟s estimated costs 

are an order of magnitude too low, EPA must provide significant justification that these large 

costs are warranted. 

Following are summaries of the feedback that was received.

Company A: 

At one site owned by this company, there are two separate process units subject to the Pesticides 

Active Ingredient NESHAP (subpart MMM). Because the company has no experience with 

wireless PRD monitoring devices, and because these devices have not been demonstrated in the 

chemical sector, Company A determined that it would not accept the risk of investing in this 

unproven wireless technology. Therefore, the costs below include wiring and piping. Also, the 

environmental professionals and engineers at this company interpret the proposed rule to require 

continuous flow monitoring, so the comments also address the difficulty/impossibility of this 

flow monitoring.

Unit 1 has 43 PRDs (36 relief valves and 7 rupture disks) along with 8 storage tank conservation 

vents that meet the definition of PRD. Company engineers estimated that the cost of a 

monitoring device would average around $55,000 per PRD. This is broken down as follows:

Cost Element Cost per PRD

Meter + Wiring $10,000

Piping $30,000

Engineering $5,000

Contingency $10,000

Total $55,000

For the 43 PRDs, the total cost would be around $2.4 million.

However, there were questions raised by the engineers regarding the technical feasibility of 

installing the necessary equipment. Meter installations require a specific straight pipe run both 

upstream and downstream of the meter, creating a smoothing effect to the flowing stream, in 

order to function with any degree of accuracy. These piping meter run lengths vary with meter 

type, but are generally 20 pipe diameters upstream and 10 diameters downstream of the meter 

(30 pipe diameters total). This extra piping causes frictional pressure drop which makes it 
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

22

necessary to recalculate the conditions under which the PRD functions. Standard design practices 

are to minimize these pipe lengths to take uncertainties out of the function of PRDs as these are 

the last lines of defense in the protection of human lives.

To summarize specific reasons on why it is not possible to monitor continuously:

1. Existing PRD device installations at Unit 1 have not been installed with any 

consideration of monitoring the flow under relieving conditions;

2. Extra piping = extra pressure drop = approximately 50-75% of the existing PRDs will 

now be undersized and need replacing;

3. Physical space to install such piping would not be available to most PRDs;

4. Structural steel to support this extra piping in most cases is not installed; and

5. Monitoring conservation vents is largely impractical.

Assuming that the new piping requirements generate more pressure drop for the PRDs, it was 

assumed that perhaps 50% of the PRD will be undersized and will need to be replaced at a cost 

of $5,000 each. This results in an additional $107,500. This raises the total cost to install PRD 

monitoring equipment for this unit to $2.5 million, which represents an overall average cost of 

around $58,000 per PRD for these 43 PRDs.

This company also received a very preliminary cost estimate from a third party vendor for the 

release indicator device only (does not include equipment to measure flow). This estimate, which 

was $15,000 per device, included consideration of field labor and material to run the signal to the 

control center, allowances for scaffolding or manlift, allowances for interface cards, and 

engineering and programming.

With regard to the conservation vents that meet the definition of PRD, it would be hugely 

expensive to have meters installed on these vents, which are generally located on top of thin 

walled storage tanks on flanges of a minimum of 18" in size. In order to conform to standard 

engineering design principles for a meter installation (see discussion below), the upstream plus 

downstream meter run piping would create either a large "stack" or horizontal header on the top 

of the tank. 

18" Storage Tank Flange x 30 Pipe Diameters = 540" meter run piping = 45 feet 

of piping.

Standard carbon steel piping weighs 70.6 lbs/ft; therefore the weight added to the tank would be:

45 feet of piping x 70.6 lbs/ft = 3,177 lbs (this is on the order of a weight of a car 

on the conservation vent nozzle/tank structure). This does not included the weight 

of the meter and support steel needed.

The existing tank walls, roofs, and nozzles were never designed for these kinds of loads. Each 

conservation vent meter installation would have to be evaluated on a case by case basis in a 

detailed fashion to come up with even a rough cost estimate. Therefore, a cost was not provided 

for these 8 vents.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

23

Unit 2 has 38 relief valves in HAP service, not including conservation vents or emergency vents 

on some tanks. When the engineers at this unit were asked for a cost estimate for monitoring 

systems to comply with the proposed requirements, they provided the following response:

Adding flow meters would not be feasible in the space provided below most PRVs. 

There is not enough straight length of pipe to measure flow. Adding significant 

piping for a flow meter plus the meter itself would greatly increase the pressure 

drop to the PRV and would require recalculation of all PRV sizing and replacement 

of a significant number of PRVs. Even if a feasible flow measurement device were 

found, the cost would be at least $30,000 per installation for meter, piping, PRV, 

and engineering. Alternatively, one could put electronic pressure switches in place 

of the "tattle tail" pressure gauges that currently exist between PRDs and PRVs. 

These would not be particularly feasible either. First, they would simply indicate if 

one had a ruptured disc and would not indicate how much, if any, process fluid is 

flowing out. Secondly, the vessels are run at such a low pressure that we may be 

prone to false alarms due to pressuring up of the space between the PRD and PRV 

from the increase in ambient temperature.

Company B:

Engineers at this company estimated the costs for generic installation of PSV switches on PRDs 

at their chemical plants. They estimated the costs for two separate scenarios:

 Situations where the installation requires an additional junction box, and

 Situations where an additional junction box is not required. The company indicated that 

this would represent “most of the cases.”

Following are detailed breakdowns of each of these scenarios.

Cost Element

Cost per PRD monitor

Additional Junction 

Box

No Additional 

Junction Box

Material

Instruments $4,142 $540

Contracts

Instrumentation $2,315 $1,350

Electrical $8,559 $4,973

Scaffolding $900 $900

Equipment Rental $2,048 $1,146

Indirects

Project Management $872 $872

Design Engineering $4,920 $2,521

Procurement $109 $109

Construction Management $1,736 $1,033

Miscellaneous $1,326 $871
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

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Special Items

Taxes and Fees $698 $252

Freight $57 $17

Subtotal $27,683 $14,585

Contingency $6,860 $4,174

Total Requested Capital $35,000 $19,000

Company C:

This company recently installed 30 temperature monitoring units on vent condensers at one of its 

sites. Each unit was equipped with a wireless transmitter to reduce the cost of hard-wiring the 

temperature transmitter back to the control rooms. Following is a summary of the costs for these 

transmitters.

Cost Element Total Actual Project 

Cost

Material/Equipment $188,046

Engineering $181,817

Construction $64,594

Total Cost $438,404

Number of Wireless Temperature Monitors 30

Cost per Monitor $14,613

This company also provided the following observations.

1) These temperature monitoring units typically included a thermowell and probe.

2) The structures were steel framed buildings with mostly steel grating for flooring and with 

a general height of three to five stories. Where concrete walls or flooring existed, they 

proved to block wireless signals and required repeating units in a very limited number of 

cases. For other Company C facilities, where the building height is taller and where floors 

and walls are concrete and brick, it is anticipated that additional equipment will be 

needed.

3) There were no limitations on data capture; one sample every fifteen minutes was 

adequate. 

4) The company reported that they have experienced occasional signal interference yielding 

false positive data. Some of these events appeared to be tied to the proximity to local 

roads and the use of CB radio on the roads.

5) The company expects that the per unit cost will be higher if PRD monitoring is required. 

It points out that the EPA / California assumptions for monitoring equipment are 

unproven in chemical service (and certainly unknown within this company). Company C 

anticipates that upgrades will be necessary to improve reliability to EPA data capture 

expectations, and also anticipates that the data provided will only provide one more piece 

of information and it is unclear whether the data will be truly reliable for all services.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

25

4. EPA must clarify that other parameters can be estimated 

Each of the three rules requires that sources submit a PRD deviation report: § 63.1335(e)(9) for 

Group IV Polymers and Resins; § 63.1363(h)(4) for Pesticides Active Ingredients; and §

63.1439(e)(9) for Polyether Polyols. These reports must contain the following information:

 The source, nature and cause of the discharge,

 The date, time and duration of the discharge,

 An estimate of the quantity of total organic HAP emitted during the discharge and the 

method used for determining this quantity,

 The actions taken to prevent this discharge, and 

 The measures adopted to prevent future such discharges.

The proposed § 63.1331(a)(9)(i) for Group IV Polymers and Resins, §6 3.1363(b)(4)(i) for 

Pesticides Active Ingredients, and § 63.1434(c)(1) for Polyether Polyols require that the release 

indicator indicate “when an emission release has occurred.” There is no indication that EPA 

intended these monitoring devices to measure other parameters (e.g., duration of discharge, 

quantity of HAP emitted, etc.) that are required to be reported in the deviation report. Therefore, 

EPA must clarify that the information required to be submitted in the PRD Deviation Report can 

be estimated using available information.

5. Recommended rule language

As discussed in sections V.D.1 through V.D.4, ACC provided rationale for several changes that 

will need to be made if EPA moves forward with requirements for PRDs. 

Accordingly, ACC suggests the following edits (in bold to § 63.1331(a)(9) of subpart JJJ (Group 

IV Polymers and Resins). These same changes are appropriate for § 63.1363(b)(4) for subpart 

MMM (Pesticides Active Ingredients) and § 63.1434(c) for subpart PPP (Polyether Polyols).

(9) Requirements for pressure relief devices. For pressure relief devices in 

organic HAP gas/vapor service, the owner or operator must meet the 

requirements of this paragraph. Any pressure release to the atmosphere from a 

pressure relief device in organic HAP gas/vapor service constitutes a violation of 

this rule. Pressure releases that are routed to a closed vent system and control 

device and pressure releases routed to a process are not considered releases 

to the atmosphere. The owner or operator must utilize one of the methods

install, maintain and operate release indicators as specified in paragraphs (a)(9)(i) 

and (ii) of this section to identify each pressure release, unless the pressure 

relief device routes to a closed vent system and control device designed and 

operated in accordance with the requirements of this subpart or the pressure 

relief device routes to a process. For any pressure relief devices in organic HAP 

gas/vapor service, the owner or operator must comply with the recordkeeping 

and reporting provisions in this paragraph (a) and § 63.1335(e)(9). For any 

pressure release, the owner or operator must submit the report specified in § 

63.1335(e)(9), as described in paragraph (a)(9)(iii) of this section.
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

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26

(i) A release indicator must be properly installed on each pressure relief 

device in such a way that it will For each pressure relief device in 

organic HAP gas/vapor service, the owner or operator must use one of 

the methods identified in paragraphs (a)(9)(i)(A) through (C) to 

indicate when an emission release has occurred.

(A) A device that indicates a pressure release to the atmosphere,

(B) A monitor on an associated process system sufficient to 

indicate a pressure release to the atmosphere, or

(C) Daily inspections using audio, visual, or olfactory methods to 

indicate that a pressure release to the atmosphere has occurred.

(ii) Each indicator must be equipped with an alert system that will notify an The 

indicator, continuous monitor, or inspector must notify an operator within 24 hours 

of the time when the pressure release has occurred. relief device is open. The alert must 

be located such that the signal is detected and recognized easily by an operator.

ACC recommends the following changes for § 63.1335(e)(9) of subpart JJJ. The same changes 

are recommended for § 63.1363(h)(4) of subpart MMM and § 63.1439(e)(9) of subpart PPP

(9) Pressure relief device deviation report. If any pressure relief device in organic HAP 

service or any piece of equipment or closed vent system has discharged to the 

atmosphere, as specified in § 63.1331(a)(9), the owner or operator must submit the 

information identified in paragraphs (a)(9)(i) through (v) of this section to the 

Administrator in the next Periodic Report: This information can be determined using 

the best available information including, but not limited to, engineering judgment 

and company records.

6. EPA must include a compliance date for existing sources to implement 

any new monitoring requirements. 

In the preamble, EPA stated that “the compliance date for PRD monitoring is 3 years from the 

effective date of the promulgated standards. This time period will allow facilities to purchase, 

install and test the equipment.” (77 Fed. Reg. 1302) However, the proposed regulatory 

amendments do not include this proposed compliance timeframe. ACC requests that EPA 

include a 3 year compliance date in the final rule in accordance with the stated intent in the 

proposal preamble.

V. OTHER ISSUES WITH THE PROPOSED RULES

A. The Reference to FIFRA Form 3540-16 Must Be Corrected in Subpart 

MMM

The definition of pesticide active ingredient or PAI is found at §63.1361, which states:

Pesticide active ingredient or PAI means any material that is an active ingredient within 

the meaning of FIFRA section 2(a); that is used to produce an insecticide, herbicide, or 

fungicide end use pesticide product; that consists of one or more organic compounds; and 
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

27

that must be labeled in accordance with 40 CFR part 156 for transfer, sale, or distribution. 

These materials are typically described by North American Industrial Classification 

System (NAICS) Codes 325199 and 32532 (i.e., previously known as Standard Industrial 

Classification System Codes 2869 and 2879). These materials are identified by product 

classification codes 01, 21, 02, 04, 44, 07, 08, and 16 in block 19 on EPA form 3540-16, 

the Pesticides Report for Pesticide-Producing Establishments.

The definition needs to be changed to reflect the changes in EPA form 3540-16 since the 

finalization of Subpart MMM in 1999. The box reference and coding reference in the above 

definition originally specified 1999 for material coding in box 19. Box (now item number) 19 is 

part of the company site address entry section and the intended information in the rule is now 

found in block (item) number 31 "Product Classifications" (reference Attachment 2) in the 2007 

form version. As a result, a 1999 rule code '09' originally classified with a "Disinfectant, 

Germicide, Sanitizer" classification code would now indicate the product to be an "Attractant" 

when the newest version of form 3540-16 is used for reference.

To clarify the meaning and use of form 3540-16 codes, ACC requests a change, 

acknowledgement or clarification that the definition of PAI used specifically is with reference to 

the 1999 version of form 3540-16. This would eliminate questions/confusion and the need to 

modify the rule each time the FIFRA form is modified in future years.

B. Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT)

The proposal to require the use of the Electronic Reporting Tool (ERT) is not appropriate as the 

costs and burdens imposed cannot yet be determined. ACC recommends that EPA remove the 

ERT requirement from this rulemaking. Until the methods that apply to the regulated community 

are built into the ERT, it is inappropriate to require its use.

If EPA insists on the inclusion of ERT requirements, then it should be limited to the methods 

which are incorporated into the ERT at the time of rule proposal. Further, EPA should 

incorporate a variety of changes to reduce the burdens associated with the rule and which 

provide a smooth transition for the regulated community, local agencies, state agencies and EPA. 

1. Anticipated Benefits

The preamble language in these three rules states that the primary benefit anticipated by the 

proposed rule is to increase the ease and efficiency of data submittal and improve data 

accessibility. (77 Fed. Reg. 1285.) EPA believes that the advantages of submitting performance 

test data through the ERT include standardized methods to compile and store documentation, 

clearly states what testing information would be required, and a substantial reduction of effort 

involved for future data collection activities. States, local and tribal agencies would also benefit 

by allowing for electronic review process rather than manual data assessment. And finally, EPA 

would be able to use submitted data to improve the overall quality of existing and new emissions 

factors. (Id. at 1286.)
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

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28

While ACC agrees in principle and generally support the goals as stated, we are concerned that 

the reality for the regulated sources within the affected MACT standards may be different as 

applied in this case.

2. Methods supported by the Electronic Reporting Tool

As identified by the EPA‟s ERT web site,” [t]he test methods supported by ERT include the 

following:

Methods 1 through 4

Method 3A

Method 5

Methods 5B and 5F

Method 6C

Method 7E

Method 8 

Method 10

Method 12 

Methods 13A and 13B

Method 17

Method 23

Method 25A

Method 26

Method 26A

Method 29

Method 101

Method 101A

Method 102 

Method 103

Method 104

Method 108

Method 201A

Method 202

Method 0011

Method 0061 

Method 315 

Method 316 

CT Method 39

Performance Standard 2

Performance Standard 3

Performance Standard 4

Custom test methods -

instructions are below.

The pollutants quantified by these test methods include: 

- Filterable Particulate Matter

- Condensable Particulate Matter

- Filterable PM10

- Filterable PM2.5 

- Acetaldehyde 

- Formaldehyde 

- Carbon Monoxide

- Chlorine, Chloride, Hydrogen Chloride, Total Chloride

- Nitrogen Oxides (NOx)

- Sulfur Dioxide

- Sulfuric Acid

- Sulfur Trioxide 

- Metals including Antimony, Arsenic, Barium, Beryllium, Cadmium, Chromium, Cobalt, 

Copper, Hexavelant Chromium, Lead, Manganese, Mercury, Nickel, Phosphorus (yellow or 

white), Selenium, Silver, Thallium and Zinc

- Total Fluoride 

- Hydrogen Fluoride 

- Hydrogen Bromide 

- Total organic compounds (TOC) (as Carbon, Ethane, Methane, Propane)

- Dioxin/Furan Cogeners 

- Coplaner PCB's

- PAH Compounds

- Total Dioxins, Total Mono-CBs, Total Di-CBs, Total Tri-CBs, Total Tetra-CBs, Total Penta-
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

29

CBs, Total Hexa-CBs, Total Hepta-CBs, Total Octa-CBs, Total Nona-CBs, and 

2,3,3',4,4',5/2,3,3',4,4',5’ –HxCB

- Custom pollutants - instructions for adding compounds not found in ERT are below. “

While these methods include those for criteria pollutants from combustion sources such might be 

anticipated from thermal oxidizers or fume incinerators, the limitations imposed by the proposed 

MACT standards are expressed in terms of hazardous organic pollutants. In other words, the 

primary performance test method (Method 18) required for determining compliance is not 

currently included in the list of methods supported by the ERT.

3. The timing and methods for including Method 18 have not been 

determined or shared with the regulated community

The regulated community‟s experience with Method 18 is that it is a very broad methodology 

and can be exceptionally complex to execute and to report. We are aware of reports which run 

hundreds to thousands of pages. In the case of one member company regulated under the 

Polymer & Resins Group IV NESHAP, executing the methodology requires the use of methods 

validated under Method 301; this adds to the complexity. It is our understanding from 

discussions with EPA that it is aware that Method 18 reporting is complex; that it may be 

difficult to incorporate into the ERT; and that no time schedule has been defined for 

development or implementation for this method.

4. Without formal notice of changes to the ERT, the regulated community is 

at risk of non-compliance

The only way for the regulated community to know that changes have occurred within the ERT 

is to directly monitor the web site. Changes made to the ERT are not formally announced by 

EPA via the routes normally used for rulemaking (e.g. the Federal Register). It will be quite 

possible for a regulated entity to be unaware of changes made such as the incorporation of 

Method 18. ACC is concerned that the proposal language is in essence an open ended 

commitment subject to change without notice.

5. Use of the ERT does not reduce the burden on the regulated community 

and makes timely report submittal more difficult

ACC is concerned that implementation of the ERT will not achieve the desired goals of reducing 

the burden and improving efficiency. Rather, ACC believes it may duplicate burdens already 

borne by the regulated community. 

State and local regulatory agencies have established regulatory requirements for planning, 

executing and reporting performance tests. The proposed rule does not supersede or replace any 

state reporting requirements. In states where reporting requirements are established by state 

specific rules (e.g., South Carolina), the regulated industry will be subject to dual reporting 

requirements. While it is possible that some states may begin to accept data submitted using the 

ERT in lieu of their already established methods, it is probable that hard copy reports will still be 

required as separate reports filed to the local or state authorities. Changes to state regulations will 

be required to reduce this burden and given the current constraints on state and local agency 
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30

resources, this will be a new burden. The timing of changes at the state and local level will at 

best be slow and in many cases, will never occur. At the best, there will be a transition period 

where duplicate reporting will be required.

ACC is concerned that duplicative reporting requirements will strain the regulated industry to 

comply with deadlines established by rule for report submittals. The proposed requirement for 

ERT submittal is 60 days. Duplicative reporting makes it more difficult for the regulated 

community to comply with the submittal deadline and is an unreasonable burden. As a result, 

requiring the ERT use is additive and increases the costs borne by the regulated source.

6. There is no mechanism for obtaining extensions for special circumstances

Under proposed §63.1439(e)(10), all reports are due in 60 days. By not referencing reporting 

requirements to the general provisions in §63.10(d)(2), there is no allowance for obtaining 

additional time due to unforeseen circumstances or for the difficulties involved with completing 

particularly complex reports.

7. As the requirements for Method 18 reports are unknown, so are the costs

It is impossible for the regulated community to fully comment on the cost of duplicating test 

reports using the ERT for Method 18 and other methods which are not currently supported by the 

ERT. Method 18 reports can consist of hundreds to thousands of pages of field collected data, 

calculations, and chromatograms. Until the ERT requirements are known, the costs cannot be 

estimated.

C. The Burden Imposed by the Affirmative Defense Standards Has Been 

Greatly Under Estimated by EPA. 

EPA has estimated that the costs imposed by “the notification, recordkeeping, and reporting 

requirements associated with the assertion of the affirmative defense.... for.... any individual 

incident, including root cause analysis, totals $1,459 annually...” EPA further “estimate[s] no 

more than 1 or 2 such occurrences for all sources subject to subparts JJJ, MMM and PPP over 

the 3 year period covered by this ICR. (77 Fed. Reg. 1304)

ACC member companies experienced with conducting root cause failure analyses estimate that 

the cost of a full root cause failure analysis is at least an order of magnitude greater than EPA 

estimates. One ACC member company compiled cost data for conducting root cause failure 

analyses, and found that such analyses average $15,000 (see attached spreadsheet). It is true that 

executing a failure evaluation can cost much less if the situation warrants. To take the example 

of the single failure of a thermocouple, the cost would only require a few hours of a 

professional‟s time to review, evaluate and determine the appropriate course of action. However, 

if the event must incorporate a full legal review and formal report to the Agency, those costs 

would remain. Executing a failure analysis can also be much greater in cost if the situation were 

complex such as one involving a catastrophic system failure resulting in property damage, injury, 

or offsite impacts. In those cases, the numbers of people involved and the number of hours 

devoted to determining cause and response rise significantly. 
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

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31

ACC believes EPA underestimates the number of events which must be evaluated to determine 

cause and appropriate responses. For example: 

 Even as the data collected by ACC demonstrated that PRD releases are rare, their 

occurrence frequency is not zero. For example, a single PET production unit may have 

150 PRDs. At an actuation rate of 0.5%, this equates to roughly 2 events to evaluate 

every three years. This is equivalent to the total EPA estimated for the entire industry. 

Given that the PET production industry in the U.S. is composed of multiple facilities, the 

frequency of evaluations for PRD events is at least an order of magnitude greater than 2 

and for the number of facilities covered by the three MACT standards, the value must be 

greater again. 

 As PRDs are components of piping and equipment subject to fugitive emission leaks, 

PRDs can be statistically expected to experience fugitive emission rates above the 500 

ppmv leak threshold at a frequency which can be measured. Using the thresholds EPA 

has established for determining monitoring frequencies, one might predict the occurrence 

rate to be between 0.0 and 2.0% annually. Even using half of the threshold for the best 

performance category (0.5%) yields at least one leaking PRD per year. Given the manner 

in which EPA has banned emissions from PRDs, this yields multiple affirmative defense 

efforts across the industry annually. 

ACC urges EPA to reevaluate its assumptions regarding the costs to a facility of asserting an 

affirmative defense.

D. Excused Excursion Comments for Subparts JJJ and PPP

1. Subpart JJJ - EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semiannual reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to 

the environment.

EPA in the proposed rule removed the provisions in §63.1334(g) allowing for excused 

excursions and revised the provisions in §63.1335(e)(6)(xii)(A)(1) that states affected sources 

having one or more excursions shall submit quarterly reports for a period of 1 year. EPA should 

instead reinstate an excused excursion per reporting period so loss of monitoring data does not 

itself result in a violation of the emission standard. Loss of monitoring data may occur during 

data transfer or be lost in data storage. Though redundancies are built to avoid data loss, 

sometimes it is unpreventable. In this case, when the monitoring data before and after the “lost 

data” shows no evidence of improper operation of the control device or an exceedance of the 

emission limit, then the affected source should not incur an excursion and the incident should 

instead be an excused excursion. 

ACC suggests the following regulatory text: 

63.1334(g) – For the sixth and all subsequent semiannual periods – one excused 

excursion is allowed for cases where loss of parameter monitoring data occurs and the 

owner/operator does not have an exceedance of an applicable emission limit. 
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2. Subpart PPP - EPA should allow an excused excursion during each semiannual reporting period for loss of monitoring data that has no impact to 

the environment.

EPA in the proposed rule removed the provisions in §63.1438(g) allowing for excused 

excursions and revised the provisions in §63.1439(e)(6)(viii)(A)(1) that states affected sources 

having one or more excursions shall submit quarterly reports for a period of 1 year. EPA should 

instead reinstate an excused excursion per reporting period so loss of monitoring data does not in 

and of itself result in a violation of the emission standard. 

Loss of monitoring data may occur during data transfer or be lost in data storage. Though 

redundancies are built into systems to avoid data loss, sometimes it is unpreventable. In the case 

when the monitoring data before and after the “lost data” show no evidence of improper 

operation of the control device or an exceedance of the emission limit, then the affected source 

should not incur an excursion, and the incident should instead be an excused excursion. 

ACC suggests the following regulatory language: 

63.1438(g) – For the sixth and all subsequent semiannual periods – one excused 

excursion is allowed for cases where loss of parameter monitoring data occurs and the 

owner/operator does not have an exceedance of an applicable emission limit. 

E. Subpart MMM Should Be Revised to Make It Consistent with Subpart JJJ. 

When considering the total amount of operating hours and the 75% monitoring data requirement 

for a day, the owner/operator should be allowed to subtract the time during periods of monitoring 

system breakdowns, repairs, calibration checks, and zero (low-level) and high-level adjustments. 

These provisions should be added to §63.1366(b)(7) regarding Excursions. Such an addition 

would make Subpart MMM consistent with Subpart JJJ. 
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

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ATTACHMENT A – AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE COST ESTIMATE
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

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Costs Associated with Raising Affirmative Defense

Initial Investigation

Description

On-Site Travel 

Required

Unit Cost On-Site Travel 

Required

Assignment of Principal 

Investigator / Mobilization

Initiation 1 1 $125 $125 $125 

Travel Arrangements 0 1 $125 $ - $125 

Travel Time 0 16 $125 $ - $2,000 

Airfare 0 1 $600 $ - $600 

Lodging 0 4 $100 $ - $400 

Meals 0 15 $20 $ - $300 

Rental Car / Gas / Parking 0 5 $100 $ - $500 

Subtotal - Mobilization $125 $4,050 

Principal Investigator Average 

Labor Hours

Unit Cost

Review of Operating Data, 

Interviews, Other On-Site 

Activities

24 $130 $3,120 

Facilitation / Leading Review 

(Analysis of Data, Construction 

of Why-Trees, etc)

24 $130 $3,120 

Collection of Additional 

Confirmatory Data

8 $130 $1,040 

Preparation of Draft Report 16 $130 $2,080 

Review of Draft Report 8 $130 $1,040 

Revision of Report and 

Issuance

8 $130 $1,040 

Subtotal - Principal Investigator $11,440 

Site Personnel 

Review of Operating Data, 

Interviews, Other On-Site 

Activities

-- Operators / Technicans / 

Maintenance Forces

6 $35 $210 

-- Line Management / 

Engineering Staff / HSES Staff

6 $85 $510 
Docket EPA-HQ-OAR-2011-0435

Comments by the American Chemistry Council

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Participation in Review (Analysis of Data, Construction of 

Why-Trees, etc)

-- Operators / Technicans / 

Maintenance Forces

12 $35 $420 

-- Line Management / 

Engineering Staff / HSES Staff

12 $85 $1,020 

Subtotal - Site Personnel $2,160 

Report Draft for Submittal to 

US EPA 

(Includes Cover Letter/Legal Context to Relevant Standards/Application of CBI Claims/Certification of 

Accuracy)

HSES Staff 1 $85 $85 

Legal Review by Attorney 2 $210 $420 

Verbal Response to Questions 

by Agency

2 $210 $420 

Written Responses to Questions 

by Agency

2 $210 $420 

Subtotal Report $1,345 

Simple Cost for Executing an 

Affirmative Defense

$18,995 

Labor rates judged typical for fully allocated 

costs for a US facility.