Henri J. Barkey

Turkey and Iraq 

The Perils (and Prospects) of Proximity

Summary

• Throughout the 1990s, Turkey was the anchor in the containment of Saddam Hussein’s

Iraq by the United States. The unpredictable set of events unleashed by Operation 

Iraqi Freedom has unnerved both Turkish decision makers and the public alike.

• The U.S.-led coalition’s operation in Iraq has also upended Turkey’s fundamental 

interests in Iraq, which are fourfold: (1) Prevent the division of Iraq along sectarian 

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SPECIAL REPORT 141 JULY 2005

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SPECIAL REPORT

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect 

those of the United States Institute of Peace, which does 

not advocate specific policy positions.

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

Turkish Interests in Iraq 3

Turkish Domestic Politics and Iraq 8

Turkish Influence in Iraq 13

Turkey and U.S. Policy 16

ABOUT THE REPORT

Iraq’s neighbors are playing a major role—both positive 

and negative—in the stabilization and reconstruction 

of “the new Iraq.” As part of the Institute’s “Iraq and 

Its Neighbors” project, a group of leading specialists 

on the geopolitics of the region and on the domestic 

politics of the individual countries is assessing the 

interests and influence of the countries surrounding 

Iraq. In addition, these specialists are examining how 

the situation in Iraq is impacting U.S. bilateral relations 

with these countries. Henri Barkey’s report on Turkey 

is the first in a series of USIP special reports on “Iraq 

and Its Neighbors” to be published over the next few 

months. Next in the series will be a study on Iran 

by Geoffrey Kemp of the Nixon Center. The “Iraq and 

Its Neighbors” project is directed by Scott Lasensky 

of the Institute’s Research and Studies Program. For 

an overview of the topic, see Phebe Marr and Scott 

Lasensky, “An Opening at Sharm el-Sheikh,”

Beirut Daily Star, November 20, 2004.

Henri J. Barkey is the Bernard L. and Bertha F. Cohen 

Professor of international relations at Lehigh University. 

He served as a member of the U.S. State Department 

Policy Planning Staff (1998–2000), working primarily 

on issues related to the Middle East, the eastern 

Mediterranean, and intelligence matters. He has 

authored, co-authored, or edited many articles and 

books on Turkey’s domestic politics and foreign policy, 

most recently (with Graham Fuller) Turkey’s 

Kurdish Question. Kerem Levitas, program assistant in 

the Institute’s Research and Studies Program, provided 

additional research and writing for this special report. 

I R A Q A N D I T S N E I G H B O R S
2

or ethnic lines that would give rise to an independent or confederal Kurdish state 

(with the oil-rich city of Kirkuk as its capital), thus supporting aspirations for a 

similar entity from Turkey’s own extensive Kurdish population. (2) Protect the Turkish-speaking Turkmen minority, which resides primarily in northern Iraq. (3) Eliminate 

the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, the Turkish Kurdish insurgent movement, which has 

sought refuge in the northeast of Iraq following its defeat in 1999. (4) Prevent the 

emergence of a potentially hostile nondemocratic fundamentalist Iraqi state.

• Turkish concerns reflect the deep anxiety it harbors regarding the demonstration 

effect Kurdish independence or robust autonomy in Iraq would have on its own 

domestic Kurdish population. Having turned down a U.S. request to open up a second 

front against Iraq, Turkey has found itself with limited influence in Iraq and is at a 

loss as to how to shape the future course of events. Turks perceive that Iraqi Kurds 

have achieved a position of privilege as a result of their unconditional support for the 

overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq and the occupation of the country 

by coalition forces.

• Turkish attitudes and foreign policy toward Iraq are complicated by the uneasy relationship between Ankara’s ruling Justice and Development Party government and 

the traditional secularist elites, military and civilian. The latter’s suspicions of the 

ruling party are driven mainly by the “concessions” made to obtain an invitation this 

past December from the European Union to open accession negotiations. One of the 

“concessions” was to adopt a tempered policy toward Iraq; hence, success in Iraq has 

become a litmus test of sorts for the government.

• With uncertainty in Iraq and Turkish anxieties mounting, U.S.-Turkish relations have 

suffered, despite their mutual desire for a unified, prosperous, and democratic Iraqi 

state that can become a counterweight to Iran in the future. What divides the 

United States and Turkey most of all is the lack of accord over future contingencies 

in Iraq, especially in the event of a U.S. failure in that country. Thus, it is crucial 

for the United States and Turkey to engage in extensive—preferably back-channel—

negotiations and, later, to include the Iraqi government and representatives from 

Iraqi Kurdish factions in the negotiations in order to rebuild confidence in the U.S.-

Turkish relationship.

Introduction

Turkey, like every other country surrounding Iraq, has seen its interests upended by the 

conflict in that country. For the past three decades, turmoil in Iraq has been a source 

of both instability and opportunities for Ankara. Ever since the end of the Gulf War in 

1991, Turkey has found itself more deeply involved in Iraqi affairs. The establishment of 

the no-fly zone over northern Iraq, enabling British and U.S. aircraft operating out of the 

Turkish air base at Incirlik to routinely patrol the territory in defense of Iraqi Kurds, made 

Ankara a permanent pillar of the U.S. policy of containing Saddam Hussein. However, the 

unpredictable set of events unleashed by the current war in Iraq unnerves Turkish decision makers and publics alike. The current situation represents a conundrum for Ankara: 

because of its proximity, it is propelled to act in Iraq both in defense of its interests and, 

simultaneously, with a great deal of caution and restraint for fear of further entangling 

itself in what appears to be a quagmire. 

Turkey and the United States share basic goals in Iraq. They both would very much 

prefer to see Iraq remain united and not break up into numerous enclaves or states along 

ethnic or sectarian lines. They both would like a strong central government that is not 

only capable of bringing back political and economic stability, but that will also be robust 

enough to become a future counterweight to Iran in the region. Neither would like to see 

the emergence of any form of a fundamentalist state in Iraq. 

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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independent, nonpartisan federal institution created by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

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by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. 

Bumpers, Founder and former President, Peace Links, 

Washington, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy 

Director, Physicians for Human Rights, Washington, 

D.C. • Chester A. Crocker, James R. Schlesinger 

Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service, 

Georgetown University • Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, 

Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles 

Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, 

D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public 

Policy, George Mason University • Mora L. McLean,

President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y.• 

Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former 

Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration • Michael M. Dunn,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National 

Defense University • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

Where Turkey and the United States differ is the extent to which the Iraqi Kurds should 

be allowed to maintain their hard-won gains of autonomy and quasi-independence during the past decade. More broadly, however, the Turkish-American relationship has been 

marred by misunderstandings and mistrust stemming primarily from the lack of accord 

over future contingencies in Iraq.

What further complicates Turkish attitudes and foreign-policy making is the uneasy 

relationship between the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) government in 

Ankara and the traditional secularist elites, military and civilian, who eye the relationship 

with a great deal of suspicion. At stake in Iraq are not just immediate Turkish interests—

such as the stability of a neighboring state with vast oil riches and the presence of a 

Turkish-speaking minority (the Turkmen) in northern Iraq—but also the very nature of 

Kemal Ataturk’s conception of the modern Turkish state. Primarily because the Kurdish 

minority in Iraq may end up with at least a robust autonomous state or even perhaps an 

independent state of its own, Ankara is particularly affected by the uncertainty in Iraq, 

for it fears the contagion effect on its own Kurdish minority of a potential independent 

or federal Kurdish state in Iraq’s north. 

Still more sensitive is how the government and its powerful detractors within the 

state establishment each will approach the issue. Although adamantly opposed to Kurdish independence in Iraq, Turkish elites feel powerless at the moment to influence events 

on the ground. The Kemalist elite—the secular and nationalist hard-liners in the military 

and civilian bureaucracy and their supporters—has tied itself in knots by marrying itself 

to the Iraqi Turkmen community and using it as a wedge with which it can justify a Turkish intervention in northern Iraq.1 Also, by making strong their opposition to the Iraqi 

Kurds’ aspirations, the Kemalists have also limited their own room to maneuver. Hence, 

any attempt by the government to seek a compromise in northern Iraq—most likely to 

stave off a worse eventuality—is likely to engender a domestic political crisis. Such a 

crisis could have dire consequences for Turkey’s prospective membership in the European 

Union (EU), which advanced significantly on December 17, 2004, with the decision of the 

EU’s European Council summit in Brussels to open negotiations with Turkey this fall based 

on its progress on accession criteria agreed to at the 1993 European Council summit in 

Copenhagen (the so-called Copenhagen Criteria).

The aftereffects of the Iraq War in combination with the uncertainty over northern Iraq 

have the potential to seriously damage the U.S.-Turkish relationship; Turks, by and large, 

do not have much confidence in Washington’s motives and intentions. The U.S. administration’s inability or unwillingness to do away with the remnants of the Turkish Kurdish 

insurgent group, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), holed up in northeastern Iraq, has 

further strengthened these suspicions. Hence, the possible emergence as a worst-case 

scenario of an independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq or the creation of an autonomous 

Iraqi Kurdish federal republic that also incorporates the oil-rich city of Kirkuk is likely to 

deepen the alienation of mainstream Turks from the United States. Nevertheless, given 

the multiplicity of bilateral channels and a history marked by a strong alliance relationship—particularly within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—the United 

States and Turkey can work together to ensure a stable outcome in northern Iraq if the 

rest of the country descends into chaos; a U.S.-Turkish deal in northern Iraq could entail 

guarantees for both the Kurds and the Turkmen. Such a positive scenario, however, will 

require an active diplomatic initiative on the part of Washington, Ankara, and Baghdad 

in collaboration with the Iraqi Kurdish leadership.

Turkish Interests in Iraq 

Turkish interests in Iraq have remained fairly stable over the years and are primarily 

motivated by the fear of a possible politicization of Turkey’s own Kurds. These interests

can be reduced to two specific and primary factors: The first is to deny any Turkish Kurdish insurgent group, such as the PKK, a safe haven in northern Iraq. Second, and more 

Where Turkey and the United 

States differ is the extent to 

which the Iraqi Kurds should 

be allowed to maintain their 

hard-won gains of autonomy 

and quasi-independence during 

the past decade. More broadly, 

however, the Turkish-American 

relationship has been marred by 

misunderstandings and mistrust 

stemming primarily from the 

lack of accord over future 

contingencies in Iraq.

The aftereffects of the Iraq War 

in combination with the uncertainty over northern Iraq have 

the potential to seriously damage the U.S.-Turkish relationship; 

Turks, by and large, do not have 

much confidence in Washington’s 

motives and intentions.
4

important, is to minimize the contagion effect on Turkey’s Kurds that may emanate from 

the political activities of Iraqi Kurds; this factor requires the containment of Iraqi Kurds’ 

political ambitions, be they the creation of an autonomous entity in northern Iraq, with 

the oil-rich city of Kirkuk at its heart, or straightforward independence. 

With an estimated 12 million citizens of Kurdish origin living in its borders, Turkey 

accounts for the largest single group of Kurds residing in the region. Turkey has been 

wary of the rebellious Iraqi Kurds’ influence because of its experience with its own Kurdish population, which has rebelled on a number of occasions since the inception of the 

Turkish Republic in 1923. Periods of quiet were marked by extensive political activity 

and grassroots mobilization designed to challenge the state.2 The last such insurgency 

collapsed in 1999 when PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured and imprisoned. 

Instability in Iraq, first during the Iraq-Iran war and later following the Gulf War and the 

UN-imposed sanctions period, enabled the PKK to use northern Iraqi territory as both a 

staging ground for raids into Turkey and a sanctuary where it could enjoy a respite from 

Turkish counterattacks. As a result, Ankara, especially during the height of the Kurdish 

insurgency in the late 1980s and 1990s, was keen on collaborating with Baghdad to 

mount crossborder raids designed to eliminate the PKK’s rear bases. 

Although it retreated to northern Iraq following its 1999 defeat and announcement of 

a unilateral ceasefire, the PKK nevertheless remains a fighting force capable of creating 

problems for Turkish security forces. In fact, it abandoned its ceasefire in summer 2004 

and resumed fighting, leading to numerous clashes since. Still, the organization, which 

has suffered many defections and internal dissension, no longer represents the kind of 

existential threat to the Turkish Republic that it did in its earlier days. This diminished 

threat stems primarily from reforms engendered by the EU accession process that have

provided Turkish Kurds with alternative means of achieving some minimum of cultural 

expression. Also, the fifteen-year insurrection took a tremendous toll on the region’s 

Kurdish civilian population, which does not want to see it resume. The diminished Kurdish threat does not mean that political activity among the Kurds has ebbed; indeed, it 

remains a constant source of worry for the Turkish political elite—Kemalist and nonKemalist alike. For instance, the 2005 traditional Newrouz celebrations by Kurds in Turkey 

were marked by many instances of defiance and veneration for the imprisoned Ocalan.3

Despite these developments, the fear of the Iraqi contagion effect is still one that 

dominates Ankara’s thinking. The most explicit and recent public articulation of this 

anxiety came from former Turkish prime minister Bulent Ecevit, who argued for a Turkish 

military intervention into northern Iraq not just to support the Turkmen there but also to 

prevent what Turkey sees as more serious and dangerous developments from occurring. 

Pointing out the fact that Kurds in Iraq are organizing themselves politically, he argued 

that they

want to create a powerful political party that will incorporate them all. They will succeed in 

this. They are also thinking of creating a parallel Kurdish party in Turkey. They may succeed 

in this. After succeeding in this, they will query why should we live in two distinct territories. 

After a political evolution they will be asking Turkey to give up territory.4

Iraqi Kurds have a history of rebelling against the central government in Baghdad. 

There are strong tribal, familial, and historical bonds that unite the two Kurdish communities across the Turkish-Iraqi international border. Following the 1991 Gulf War, when 

half a million Kurdish refugees fleeing Saddam Hussein’s retribution ended up on Turkey’s 

border (another one million ended up on Iran’s border), Ankara agreed to a limited U.S.-

UK military mission (which would eventually be called Operation Provide Comfort) to 

enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq. Although the mission allowed the Iraqi Kurds to 

return home, it also provided the space for an embryonic Kurdish state in northern Iraq. 

However, intra-Kurdish rivalries between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and the Patriotic 

Union of Kurdistan not only hampered this development but also allowed Ankara to play 

one faction against the other. Turkey has maintained a contingent of well-armed forces 

estimated between 1,200–1,500 soldiers within northern Iraq to keep an eye on both 

Turkey has maintained a contingent of well-armed forces 

estimated between 1,200-1,500 

soldiers within northern Iraq to 

keep an eye on both the PKK 

and the Iraq Kurdish parties and 

their militias. Even after the 

U.S. occupation of Iraq, Turkish 

troops have remained there with 

Washington’s acquiescence.

Turkey has been wary of the 

rebellious Iraqi Kurds’ influence 

because of its experience with 

its own Kurdish population, 

which has rebelled on a number 

of occasions since the inception 

of the Turkish Republic in 1923.
5

the PKK and the Iraq Kurdish parties and their militias. Even after the U.S. occupation of 

Iraq, Turkish troops have remained there with Washington’s acquiescence. 

Ankara’s preferences in Iraq

Turkey’s professed first preference in Iraq is to see a return of central government authority and control over the entire Iraqi territory. As in the past, it wants the new government 

in Baghdad to be able to overcome the ethnic, regional, and sectarian divisions that have 

plagued the country to varying degrees over the course of its history. It also wants Iraq 

to become a stable and prosperous nation with which it can resume its lucrative trade 

relationship; this includes the security of the two pipelines that carry oil from northern 

Iraqi fields to Turkish terminals at the Mediterranean port city of Ceyhan. At different 

times, Ankara has articulated what it deems its “red lines” in Iraq, which have had a great 

deal more to do with the disposition of northern Iraq than anything else. At first, these 

“red lines” were declared in opposition to any Kurdish federal arrangement in Iraq. Subsequently, they were refined to include three unacceptable outcomes: the creation of an 

independent Kurdish state in Iraq; the incorporation of the city of Kirkuk—deemed to be 

a Turkmen city by Ankara—into a Kurdish federal (or independent) state; and increased 

vulnerability of the Turkmen living in Kirkuk (whom the deputy chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Ilker Basbug, and many other Turkish elites have consistently referred 

to as being of the same “race or ethnic origin” as Turks5). The latter two outcomes were 

expressed by General Basbug in a press briefing on the eve of the January 30 Iraqi elections as “vital.”6

For Ankara, an additional and important consideration is whether a new government in 

Baghdad can successfully control its northern borders and put an end to the infiltration 

by the PKK and other Kurdish insurgent groups. In the past, Ankara tried to cooperate 

with Saddam Hussein on the Kurds, especially on Turkish counterinsurgency raids. After 

the 1991 Gulf War and the containment of the Baathist regime, Turkish governments 

continued to deal with Hussein, although they professed to be indifferent as to whether 

he would make a comeback. He did represent in Turkey’s view someone capable of holding the country together; understandably, Ankara is not confident that a Kurdish federal 

entity would be as capable or as willing as a strong central government in securing Iraq’s 

border with Turkey.

Still, Ankara is realistic enough to understand that the emergence of a federal entity 

along some combination of ethnic and sectarian lines is a distinct possibility under a 

new Iraqi government. The idea of a federated Iraqi state is not new: In October 1998, 

then–U.S. secretary of state Madeleine Albright threw American support behind the idea 

of federalism when she negotiated a truce between the leaders of the two Kurdish factions, Massoud Barzani and Jalal Talabani—the latter of whom was recently elected as 

Iraq’s president. More significant, though, is the fact that the interim Iraqi constitution 

(the Transitional Administrative Law, signed in March 2004) explicitly provides Iraqi 

Kurdistan with a special status. In the event that Iraqis decide to create such a federal 

arrangement, Ankara would very much prefer that the central government be capable of 

minimizing the autonomy of the federal regions, even beyond the obvious centralization 

of powers regarding foreign, defense, and monetary policy. Ankara would like the putative 

Kurdish federal region to possess the most limited ability to interact on its own with the 

world outside and certainly with Turkey. 

Ankara also wants to see Iraq’s oil resources brought under the firm control of the 

central government in Baghdad; oil, it fears, can provide the resources for a future drive 

to Kurdish independence. And although it understands that it will not be able to influence Baghdad to minimize cultural autonomy, Ankara would still like to see restrictions 

on domestic education policy. The acceptance of Kurdish as a language on par with 

Arabic could, in Ankara’s view, fuel demands for the same in Turkey. Ironically, Turkey’s 

own negotiation process for accession to the European Union (scheduled to commence in 

October 2005) is likely to increase Turkish Kurds’ demands for cultural rights.7

At different times, Ankara has 

articulated what it deems its 

“red lines” in Iraq, which have 

had a great deal more to do with 

the disposition of northern Iraq 

than anything else.

Ankara also wants to see Iraq’s 

oil resources brought under the 

firm control of the central government in Baghdad; oil, it fears, 

can provide the resources for a 

future drive to Kurdish 

independence.
6

As part of its campaign to contain the contagion effects of the Iraqi Kurds, Ankara 

increasingly came to rely on Iraq’s Turkmen minority. The Turkmen issue is relatively new 

to Turkey; it was not until the 1990s that Ankara began to articulate demands for Turkmen 

minority rights in Iraq. Arguing that the Turkmen represent the third largest ethnic group 

in Iraq, Ankara has taken up the banner for their defense, especially their claims to control the city of Kirkuk.8 As part of this effort, Turkey has been instrumental in the creation 

of the Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF), an organization it wants the Turkmen to rally around. Yet 

the Turkmen are divided: Not only are there those who oppose Ankara’s interference and 

the ITF ’s heavy hand, but there are also sectarian Sunni-Shiite differences that divide the 

community.9 Perhaps as many as half of the Iraqi Turkmen are Shiite.

The Turkmen question not only has enabled Ankara to slow down Kurdish ambitions 

and table alternative claims to the city of Kirkuk but, most important, also provides 

Ankara with a “legitimate” reason to remain engaged in northern Iraq. If the U.S. were 

to remove the last vestiges of the PKK from Iraq as it has promised, the Turkmen would 

effectively become the only card Ankara can brandish in northern Iraq. Ankara wants the 

Turkmen minority to have as much say as possible in determining the future of Iraq and 

control the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. Both the Kurds and the Turkmen claim Kirkuk as their 

heritage, and the conflicting claims have been characterized by an International Crisis 

Group report as “dueling narratives.”10 Both groups suffered from Saddam Hussein’s policy 

of ethnic cleansing and “Arabization” of the northern provinces; thus they are wary of 

each other’s attempt at resettling refugees in order to create a demographic landscape 

more favorable to it.

The unabated violence that has followed the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has also 

heightened Turkish concerns over the ultimate stability of Iraq. Beyond the immediate 

concern over the Kurds, there are also lingering fears about the potential breakup of Iraq 

and the emergence of unstable, radical, and possibly fundamentalist Shi’a or Sunni entities, as well as the likelihood of a two- or three-way civil war. Such an eventuality can 

affect Turkey in two distinct ways. 

The first is the danger that the violence and instability will be exported to Turkey 

and other neighbors. The emergence of an authority in Baghdad bent on revenge and 

punishing the Kurds for being the primary allies of the United States in the war against 

Iraq will ultimately lead to interethnic violence close to Turkey’s own borders. In turn, if 

the incipient Kurdish state is threatened, the U.S. may want to help its Kurdish allies in 

northern Iraq and thus make demands on Ankara that will be difficult to accept, much 

like the initial demand for opening a second front against Saddam Hussein on the eve 

of the war. Complicating matters further would be the Turkmen role and fate in any such 

conflict between Arabs and Kurds.11 There is a delicate understanding between the two 

primary Kurdish groups, which fought bitterly with each other in the 1990s, that can be 

endangered by the potential chaos and uncertainty of Iraq. In the event of civil war in 

Iraq, Ankara will be hard pressed to resist domestic calls for direct intervention. At this 

stage, one cannot assume that the Kurds will remain united in the long run either. All 

these factors have drastic implications for the domestic peace that has been achieved in 

Turkey itself following the defeat of the PKK in 1999.

The second way a fragmented Iraq could affect Turkey is that instability and violence 

in its immediate neighborhood—especially the kind of violence that is likely to pull 

Turkey into Iraq, either to protect the Turkmen or to support other interests—may make 

the European Union suspend or even reconsider the accession process. Moreover, should 

events in Iraq lead to greater unrest within Turkey’s own Kurdish population, either as a 

result of Turkish Kurds’ need to come to the support of their brethren across the border 

or because of increased repressive measures employed by Ankara to quell Kurdish turmoil, 

the Europeans are quite likely to freeze the accession process. Hence Iraqi instability 

can potentially derail what ultimately has been regarded as the greatest achievement of 

Turkish diplomacy to date—the beginning of European Union accession talks.

Should Iraq fall into the hands of a fundamentalist Iranian type Shi’a regime, it is quite 

possible that both the United States and the European Union will want to see Ankara 

Should Iraq fall into the hands 

of a fundamentalist Iranian type 

Shi’a regime, it is quite possible 

that both the United States and 

the European Union will want to 

see Ankara become the bulwark 

against both Iran and Iraq.

As part of its campaign to contain the contagion effects of the 

Iraqi Kurds, Ankara increasingly 

came to rely on Iraq’s Turkmen 

minority. 

Arguing that the Turkmen represent the third largest ethnic 

group in Iraq, Ankara has taken 

up the banner for their defense, 

especially their claims to control 

the city of Kirkuk.
7

Who Are the Turkmen?

The past and present of the Iraqi Turkmen (or Turkoman) is a subject still largely open 

to debate. Estimates of their numbers, as well as historical narratives of their origin, vary 

widely. 

The earliest Iraqi Turkmen are thought to have settled in northern Iraq in the seventh or 

eighth centuries, arriving from Central Asia. These non-Muslim Turkic peoples posed a threat 

to the expanding Islamic empire and many converted. Their numbers were bolstered with the 

arrival of the Seljuk Turks in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; these migrations are likely 

the source of the current Iraqi Turkmen populations.

The Turkmen in the region flourished under the Ottoman Empire as Istanbul sought to 

place Turkic peoples in important bureaucratic positions in the regions, as well as to ensure a 

favorable Turkic demographic along its trade and transport routes south to Baghdad. Thus the 

Turkmen have held a disproportionate number of prominent professional, official, and trading 

positions throughout the north of Iraq—particularly in Kirkuk—from Ottoman times until the 

British mandate.

In the twentieth century, Kurdish urbanization fueled by the region’s oil boom led to tense 

relations with the Turkmen throughout the cities of northern Iraq. Relations were further 

strained by latent class resentment: For centuries, Turkmen were the ruling elite, while Kurds 

were mostly lower class. In 1926, British authorities tipped power in the other direction 

by changing the language of education from Turkish to Kurdish—to “the language of the 

servants,” in the words of Ihsan Dogramaci, a Turkmen native of Irbil and founder of Bilkent 

University in Ankara.*

Under Saddam Hussein’s policy of Arabization in Kirkuk and the nearby areas, the Turkmen, 

along with the Kurds, suffered forced deportations as a result of the effort to consolidate Arab 

Baathist control of the oil-rich region.

Today, as Kurds return to Kirkuk, the remaining Turkmen feel increasingly threatened. 

They allege that the voter rolls in Kirkuk for the January 30 elections for Iraq’s new National 

Assembly were stacked with Kurds from other regions who have no claim to land or heritage in 

Kirkuk. Kurdish leaders argue that these are the same Kurds who were expelled alongside the 

Turkmen from Kirkuk by Saddam Hussein. Estimates of Turkmen populations vary accordingly. 

The Iraqi Turkmen Front (ITF)—a political party backed by Ankara—estimates their numbers 

at some 2 to 3 million, or 8–11 percent of the Iraqi population; independent scholars put the 

population share at no more than 2–3 percent.

Regardless of the numbers, the Turkmen faired poorly in the recent Iraqi elections. The 

ITF list won only three seats in the National Assembly. There are also several other Turkmen 

scattered on some of the larger party lists. 

Sources: International Crisis Group, Allaying Turkey’s Fears over Kurdish Ambitions; ICG Middle 

East Report, no. 35 (Ankara/Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 26, 2005); 

online; available: http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3241&l=1 (accessed 

June 1, 2005). The World Factbook 2005; online; available: http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook (accessed June 1, 2005). “Iraqi Kurdish Leader Holds ‘Positive’ Talks in 

Turkey,” Agence France-Presse, October 11, 2004. Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 2d 

ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2005). Middle East Institute, Rethinking Iraq: Sectarian Identities—The Turkmen (policy brief on a presentation by the ITF ’s Orhan Ketene, April 15, 2004); 

online; available: http://www.mideasti.org/articles/doc194.html (accessed June 6, 2004). 

Nir Rosen, “Are They Iraqis, Ultimately, or Are They Kurds?” The New York Times Magazine,

February 20, 2005.

*Quoted in International Crisis Group, Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears over Kurdish Ambitions. ICG Middle East 

Report, no. 35 (Ankara/Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 26, 2005), 8. 
8

become the bulwark against both Iran and Iraq. Although such a role would transform 

Turkey into a frontline state, it would necessarily pit Ankara against its neighbors, a position it has not relished in the past and is unlikely to do so in the future. The current AKPled government has aggressively sought to improve ties with Turkey’s Muslim neighbors 

and the Muslim world in general, and it even aspires to have Turkey assume a leadership 

role among Muslim countries. In the event of a Sh’ia takeover of Iraq’s government, U.S. 

and EU resistance to the division of the country may diminish as they consider the benefits of a Kurdish buffer state. It remains to be seen whether the Turkish establishment, 

including the government, would countenance an independent Kurdish buffer state by 

overcoming its deeper fears stemming from such an entity.

The dilemma for Turkey is one of ascertaining a risk-minimizing policy vis-à-vis Iraq at 

a time when the future of the country is indeterminate. Turkish leaders not only have to 

balance their own domestic preferences but also must prepare for the worst as they currently define it. Ankara’s conundrum extends beyond the probable emergence of a Kurdish 

entity in northern Iraq and includes the disposition of the other parts of the country, 

including the future of the Turkmen minority. Clearly, as it defines its immediate interests, 

Ankara would perceive an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, with Kirkuk as its 

capital and the Turkmen under its tutelage neighboring a rump “fundamentalist” Iraqi 

state or two, to be its worst scenario. Unlike any other difference it may have had with its 

principal strategic ally, the United States, over a variety of issues, the direct involvement 

of the United States in Iraq complicates matters for Turkey. Turkey will be careful not to 

alienate Washington, irrespective of its relations with the EU, especially considering the 

importance the U.S. attaches to an eventual resolution of the Iraq crisis in a manner that 

does not compromise its image, credibility, and influence in the region.

Turkish Domestic Politics and Iraq 

Vulnerabilities at home 

The ruling Justice and Development Party of Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan emerged from 

the 2002 elections with one of the largest parliamentary majorities ever seen in Turkish 

politics: With 34.7 percent of the popular vote, the AKP commands almost two-thirds of 

the parliamentary seats. The electoral rule requiring political parties to garner at least 

10 percent of the national vote for parliamentary representation has meant that the 

government, unlike its recent predecessors, has only one opposition party to contend 

with in the Turkish parliament. Moreover, the AKP government appears to have increased 

its popularity since its election, primarily because of its single-minded determination to 

improve its chances of getting a date for accession negotiations from the EU by reforming 

the institutions of the state.

Yet despite its increased popularity and enviable parliamentary majority, the government remains vulnerable on its Iraq policy; ironically, that vulnerability results perhaps 

in part from its success on the European front. Given the AKP’s origins in Turkey’s Islamic 

movement, the party’s 2002 electoral victory was received with a great deal of trepidation and unease by the country’s traditional secular elites and institutions. The reforms 

and policy changes required to get the EU accession negotiations on track have not 

only chipped away at the prerogatives enjoyed by these groups and institutions but 

have also opened the way for greater democratization in Turkey. Specifically, the reforms 

have constrained the military’s role as a bulwark against Islamic reaction and Kurdish 

nationalism in Turkey. For those wedded to the hard-line interpretation of the Kemalist 

principles that underscore the foundation of the modern Turkish state, these concessions 

are nothing short of a betrayal. The reforms required by the European Union would make 

it easier for Kurds in Turkey to express their ethnic heritage and roots openly; hence, the 
9

AKP government is accused of having sacrificed and conceded far too much in its pursuit 

of EU accession. To further emphasize this point, the hard-liners point to the AKP’s successful policy of marginalizing Turkish Cypriot leader and fellow hard-liner Rauf Denktash 

in order to get the Turkish Cypriots to vote in favor of a political solution to reunify the 

divided island, and the broad support among Turks for the European path has made it 

very difficult for opponents of the AKP to offer serious resistance to all these moves. The 

efforts of the AKP government eventually bore fruit in the December 2004 EU summit, 

which concluded that Ankara had sufficiently fulfilled enough of the Copenhagen Criteria 

to begin accession negotiations in October 2005. 

The AKP’s Iraq policy, however, is a different matter altogether. Because of its potential 

impact on the domestic Kurdish question, it remains the one area where the traditional 

elites, with their suspicions of the AKP’s nationalist credentials, can try to weaken, if not 

undermine, the party’s hold on power. With the Turkish government’s declaration of victory after the EU summit, it is not surprising that former prime minister Ecevit’s call for a 

military intervention in northern Iraq was accompanied by criticisms of the EU decision’s 

shortcomings.12 The future of Turkish interests in Iraq will loom larger in the domestic 

political discourse; after the EU decision, Iraq remains a primary point of vulnerability 

for the strengthened AKP government. The AKP has tried to avoid being dragged into the 

Iraqi quicksand, especially after having dodged a bullet at the onset of the war when the 

Turkish parliament on March 1, 2003 turned down a U.S. request to permit the transit of 

U.S. troops in advance of the Iraq invasion. That the question of Iraq remains a contentious one is evident from the public criticisms that the commander of the ground forces, 

General Yasar Buyukanit, leveled at the government when he accused it of not having an 

Iraq policy.13

In this context, one cannot underestimate the importance of the Turkmen factor. Previous governments in Ankara were the primary instigators behind the creation of the Iraqi 

Turkmen Front, but it is unclear how much influence the government now has over the 

ITF. Two developments have contributed to the current uncertainty.

First, the ITF and its leaders have succeeded in capturing the imagination of many 

Turks; they are increasingly perceived in Turkey as an Iraqi Turkish minority deserving of 

official help, and by making claims similar to those of the Turkish Cypriots, ITF leaders 

are insinuating themselves into the Turkish mainstream. For the ITF leaders, the current 

chaos in Iraq is the best possible opportunity to stake their claims and try to improve 

their status as a separate and important ethnic minority; the ITF is no different than any 

other ethnopolitical entrepreneur. Hence, when the U.S. assault on the mostly Turkmen 

city of Tel Afer occurred in September 2004, the ITF launched an information campaign 

in Turkey that accused the U.S. of committing “massacres and ethnic cleansing” against 

the Turkmen in the city. Accounts of massive civilian casualties were widely reported in 

Turkish media outlets and forced the Turkish government to adopt a hard stance against 

Washington.14 Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Gul even cautioned 

that, should the U.S. military operation continue, Turkey’s relations with Washington 

would have to be reviewed.15

Turks increasingly perceive the conflict in northern Iraq as a zero-sum relationship 

between Kurds and Turkmen. Although the Turkmen question is a relatively new issue, 

it has assumed an important dimension in Ankara’s foreign policy rhetoric and even 

domestic politics. It mirrors many of Turkey’s domestic sensibilities and allows the Turks 

to project a sense of illegitimacy onto Iraqi Kurds and their demands. Hence, were the 

Turkmen to be humiliated by being forced out of the ancestral lands or from Kirkuk in 

particular, the Turkish government would come under severe pressure from hard-line 

elements to act—and act decisively.16 The government has so far tried to walk a tightrope: On the one hand, it has regularly met with Iraqi Kurdish leaders Barzani and Talabani in an attempt to keep the lines of communication open, while on the other hand 

it refers to the high-level Kurds not by name but as “clan leaders” to satisfy domestic 

Turks increasingly perceive the 

conflict in northern Iraq as a 

zero-sum relationship between 

Kurds and Turkmen. Although 

the Turkmen question is a relatively new issue, it has assumed 

an important dimension in 

Ankara’s foreign policy rhetoric 

and even domestic politics.
10

constituencies.17 Both Erdogan and Gul were critical of Iraq’s January 30 elections; they 

complained about Kurds who were sent at the last minute to vote in Kirkuk, as well as 

the abstention and inability of Sunnis to vote. 

Whereas the government was on solid ground with the country’s political mainstream 

when it pursued the EU accession negotiations, the war in Iraq and the Turkmen question 

have revealed the deep nationalistic bent of the party. The Erdogan government has been 

forced to cater to hard-line elements by increasing the level of the rhetoric over Kirkuk, 

the Turkmen’ demands, and Iraq’s January 30 elections.18 The ITF fared poorly in the 

elections, however, thereby diminishing both its influence and Turkey’s room to maneuver 

in Iraq. The ITF garnered 0.87 percent of the 8.5 million votes cast, managing to get 

only three of its members elected into the 275-person National Assembly. The ITF’s poor 

showing sparked severe criticism in Turkey, and both Erdogan and Gul criticized the ITF 

leadership for failing to bring its voters to the polls.19

The second reason for the uncertainty surrounding the Turkish government’s influence 

over Iraq’s Turkmen is the relationship between the Turkish military and the ITF, which is 

ambiguous. As a result, the extent to which the Turkish government can exercise operational control over the ITF is unclear. The ITF operates in tandem with Turkish Special 

Forces in Iraq, which are there with U.S. cognizance.20 The Turkish Special Forces have 

been operating under a 1996 National Security Council Special Political Document that 

gives the chief of the Turkish General Staff (TGS) the authority to coordinate all of Turkey’s 

activities relating to Iraq and northern Iraq, including the Special Forces. Accordingly, the 

Turkish Foreign Minsitry also has its representatives assigned to the TGS headquarters in 

Silopi, southeastern Turkey. 

In a series of events that have yet to be completely explained, on July 4, 2003, U.S. 

soldiers detained a number of Turkish Special Forces troops and ITF personnel at an ITF 

site in Suleymaniyah, Iraq on suspicion of planning to engage in violent activities. The 

Turks were transported to Baghdad and subjected to the same kind of treatment reserved 

for al Qaeda members. Although the Turks were released a few days later, the incident 

created a furor in Turkey as it capped a long list of what Turks viewed as U.S. misdeeds 

against their country. Still, after some delay, the Turkish military high command cashiered 

one of the generals in charge of the Special Forces in Iraq and retired another; the 

commander with overall operational control of the Special Forces in the Turkish General 

Staff also retired. Turkish General Staff efforts at establishing control over its own forces 

notwithstanding, the incident suggests the strong possibility of an ITF-led or influenced 

rogue operation in northern Iraq leading to a confrontation with Kurds or coalition troops. 

U.S. overreaction to the incident was partially determined by bureaucratic factors: as the 

head of U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM), General John Abizaid, would admit later, 

unlike their U.S. European Command counterparts, who routinely work with the Turks, U.S. 

forces in Iraq under USCENTCOM had little if any experience with Turkey.21

Despite American promises to remove it, the continued presence of a sizable PKK force 

in northern Iraq exacerbates the Turkish government’s vulnerability as the PKK presence 

opens it to charges of continued subservience to U.S. interests. The deployment of the 

PKK in the mountain regions and the general chaos in Iraq have prevented U.S. military 

authorities from initiating an operation against the PKK. 

The re-emergence of the PKK is a serious political problem for both the government 

and the Turkish military. Though still minimal, casualties nonetheless conjure up images 

of the previous PKK insurrection. Unlike the late 1980s and early 1990s, the current state 

of violence does not constitute a strategic challenge to Turkey, although it opens the 

government to charges that it is inattentive to Kurdish terrorism. Perhaps more important, though, it undermines the Turkish populace’s confidence in U.S.-Turkish relations, 

something that both the Turkish government and military do not want to see damaged 

even if they are leading the criticism of Washington. Every event in Iraq’s Kurdish region 

is scrutinized. For instance, the brother of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, Osman, who

broke with his brother and quit the PKK, ended up in U.S.-controlled Iraqi territory.

In a series of events that have 

yet to be completely explained, 

on July 4, 2003, U.S. soldiers 

detained a number of Turkish 

Special Forces troops and ITF 

personnel at an ITF site in 

Suleymaniyah, Iraq on suspicion 

of planning to engage in 

violent activities.
11

Understandably, Turks were angered when an enterprising journalist easily discovered 

and interviewed someone they consider a terrorist in Mosul.22 Accounts of U.S. unwillingness and inability to deal effectively with the PKK in Iraq are used by opponents of 

the government’s policy as proof of the relative weakness of the Turkish political position 

in Iraq today.

How do events in Iraq play in Turkey’s domestic politics?

Although the AKP has an unassailable majority in the Turkish National Assembly, the 

party and the government are susceptible to charges of abandoning Turkey’s “red lines” 

in Iraq from not only the opposition but also from hard-liners in practically every 

institution in Turkish society, particularly the bureaucracy and the media. Complicating matters further for the Turkish government is the poor image of the United States 

among Turkey’s media elites and, correspondingly, with the general public following the 

Iraq war. Also there is the fact that the AKP’s supporters have been among the least 

pro-American groups in Turkey. While opposition to the war was extremely strong, U.S. 

actions in Iraq—particularly the Abu Ghraib prison scandal—have reduced the AKP’s 

room to maneuver in Iraq for fear of being accused of condoning questionable actions 

by U.S. military forces. One such example was the accusation by the AKP chairman of 

the Turkish parliament, Mehmet Elkatmis, that the U.S. was committing genocide during 

its November 2004 pacification campaign in Falluja. Faced with Washington’s anger, the 

Turkish government dissociated itself and engaged in damage control.23 Similarly, when 

five Turkish security guards traveling to Baghdad were ambushed and killed near Mosul 

in December 2004, many in Turkey pointed an accusatory finger at the United States. 

Adding his voice to the fray, the commander of Turkey’s 1st Army, General Hursit Tolon, 

also indirectly implicated the U.S. and Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani in the killings.24

A parliamentary delegation investigating the incident reminded the Turkish public of the 

humiliating July 4, 2003 episode, when members of the Turkish Special Forces in Iraq 

were arrested by the U.S. military, and questioned the official version of the facts.25

The Turkish political system in recent years has been unduly influenced by the political weight of the country’s military brass and by the weakness of the Turkish media as 

an institution. During the debate in early 2003 on whether to allow the transit of U.S. 

troops over Turkish soil for the opening of a second front in the Iraq war, the interplay 

between Turkish politicians and military officers was particularly rancorous. Rumors of 

dissent within military ranks—and of possible coup plots—have made headlines, adding 

to the political uncertainty.26 Civilian politicians have been accustomed to letting the 

military take the lead in matters of national security; in this case particularly, the AKP 

wished the military would have made the decision, given the unpopularity of the issue at 

home. Likewise, the officers (although not completely of one mind) were anxious to have 

civilian officials shoulder the blame—as they are supposed to in a country with “normal” 

civil-military relations. The interaction between the government and the military was 

one of the factors that led to the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote denying the United 

States a Turkish staging area to open a second front in its impending military phase of 

Operation Iraqi Freedom. Turkey’s civil-military relations have since improved somewhat 

as the current chief of the Turkish General Staff, Hilmi Ozkok, has consolidated his hold 

on the military’s high command. Despite its progress toward EU accession, Turkey is still 

a country where the role of the military in politics is a divisive issue.27

Still other contentious issues between the strictly secular military and the Islaminfluenced AKP—ranging from secular education to headscarves—can potentially affect 

the making of Iraq policy. For those (especially hard-line Kemalists) who think that the 

consolidation of the AKP with a two-thirds majority in parliament is anathema, the 

government’s behavior in Iraq is seen as a litmus test of its intentions to protect the Turkish Republic. The inability of the government, for instance, to quell Kurdish Democratic 

During the debate in early 2003 

on whether to allow the transit 

of U.S. troops over Turkish soil 

for the opening of a second 

front in the Iraq war, the interplay between Turkish politicians 

and military officers was particularly rancorous. Rumors of dissent within military ranks—and 

of possible coup plots—have 

made headlines, adding to the 

political uncertainty.

Accounts of U.S. unwillingness 

and inability to deal effectively 

with the PKK in Iraq are used by 

opponents of the government’s 

policy as proof of the relative 

weakness of the Turkish political 

position in Iraq today.
12

Party leader Massoud Barzani’s public pronouncements about Kurdish intentions regarding 

Kirkuk and to get the Iraqi government open a second border crossing between the two 

countries (at Ovakoy, about 10–15 miles southwest of the border crossing at Habur) over 

Barzani’s objections is often interpreted as proof that the AKP cannot influence events 

in Iraq.

The uncertainty regarding Iraq’s future has become the greatest challenge for the 

Turkish government as it has united many elements of both the center-left and extreme 

nationalist right along an anti-American and nationalist axis. This “nationalist moment” 

of sorts has come to dominate media outlets and Turkish civil society in general and has 

worked to constrain Ankara’s freedom to shape a coherent policy toward Iraq. The combination of a diverse set of pressures emanating from the AKP’s Islamist base, the anti-AKP 

establishment, and hardcore nationalists, amplified by a media that has conducted its 

share of inaccurate and inflammatory reporting, has continuously pulled the government 

into a variety of mini-crises with U.S. and Iraqi leaders. Abdullah Gul’s response to reports 

of “massacres” in Tel Afer is a case in point. Underlying the government’s difficulties in 

Iraq is the general public antipathy and distrust for U.S. policy in that country. 

Until late 2004, the impending EU vote on accession negotiations and the incessant 

speculation regarding the conditions the EU was expected to attach to an initiation of 

talks diverted the attention away from Iraq. That diversion has proven to be the government’s saving grace: until December 17, neither Iraq as a whole nor the Turkmen question 

has been the primary preoccupation of the public or media. Should Turkey’s interests in 

Iraq suffer if conditions there radically change in the postelection period or if the insurrection were to include cities such as Kirkuk and Mosul, pressure on Turkey’s government 

likely would increase.

How do events in Iraq constrain Turkey’s foreign policy objectives?

The new Turkish government’s first and foremost objective since assuming power has been 

to devise and implement reforms that would prove sufficient for the European Union to 

issue an invitation to start accession negotiations. Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies 

have thus been subjected to an EU test of sorts. If anything, it is the EU process that constrains Turkish foreign policy options in Iraq. Ankara knows that the EU would take a dim 

view of any Turkish military intervention in Iraq to stop the Kurds from achieving either 

independence or even robust autonomy. It is unclear how the Europeans would react to 

a Turkish military intervention on the sides of the Turkmen following violent interethnic 

clashes or a Turkish attack on PKK camps without U.S. authorization. Given the opposition 

in many EU countries to Turkey’s accession, a military move undoubtedly would give more 

ammunition to Ankara’s detractors.

On the other hand, instability in Iraq—especially the prospect of a fundamentalist 

Sunni or Sh’ia regime in Baghdad—is a cause of concern not only for the secular Turkish 

establishment but also for the Europeans. If anything, a fundamentalist and unstable 

Iraq on the Turkish border could further add reservations to an already long list of doubts 

about eventual Turkish membership in the European Union because this, in effect, would 

extend the EU’s borders to Iraq.

Events in Iraq have also significantly reduced the amount of control Turkey could 

exert on the Kurdish factions in northern Iraq. Prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Kurds in 

the north were very dependent—though not solely—on Turkish goodwill. With the presence of U.S. troops and new conditions, Turkey has seen its influence diminish as far as 

containing Kurdish ambitions. Ankara makes its presence felt because everyone involved 

is conscious of Turkish preferences. In general, the transitional Iraqi governments and 

bodies, such as the Interim Governing Council (IGC), in existence until June 30, 2004, 

and the subsequent Alawi interim government, had made it clear that they prefer that 

the neighboring countries, including Turkey, minimize their role and presence in Iraq. In 

the summer of 2003, the Kurds, together with the IGC, successfully prevented the deployment of Turkish peacekeeping troops in Iraq following an agreement between Ankara and 

Washington.

Should Turkey’s interests in Iraq 

suffer if conditions there radically change in the postelection 

period or if the insurrection were 

to include cities such as Kirkuk 

and Mosul, pressure on Turkey’s 

government likely would increase. 

Turkey’s domestic and foreign 

policies have thus been subjected 

to an EU test of sorts. If anything, it is the EU process that 

constrains Turkish foreign policy 

options in Iraq.
13

Despite its focus on the EU accession process, the AKP government was quite intent 

on involving itself in a Middle East–wide initiative. Prime Minister Erdogan and Foreign 

Minister Gul’s vision for Turkey has been an expansive one. During the 1996–1997 coalition government of the Islamist Necmettin Erbakan’s Welfare Party and the center-right 

True Path Party led by Tansu Çiller, Erbakan launched a number of foreign policy initiatives—including the Developing Eight (Bangladesh, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Malaysia, 

Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey), which he envisioned as a way to promote much closer 

cooperation among the predominantly Muslim countries. Gul was then one of Erbakan’s 

most trusted confidants and eager supporter of the new and more assertive foreign policy, 

and that vision continues with the current AKP government as both Erdogan and Gul 

perceive Turkey as a country with a much greater potential to influence events on the 

world stage and particularly in the neighboring region. In their pursuit for more visibility and renown, Erdogan and Gul have already shown their abilities by outmaneuvering 

Bangladesh for the general-secretary position at the Organization of the Islamic Conference.28 In January 2005, Gul re-embarked on a Middle East mission designed to highlight 

Turkey’s potential role as an interlocutor between Israelis and Syrians and between Israelis 

and Palestinians. Before the launching of the Iraq war, Gul initiated a regional effort at 

preventing it. Ironically, much of the Erdogan-Gul team’s ambitions for a more influential 

Turkish foreign policy is helped by Turkey’s EU accession path; mishaps in Iraq that alienate the Europeans will, by contrast, undermine Turkey’s stature.

Turkish Influence in Iraq

Compared to Iran, which has had a long relationship with Iraq’s largest community, 

the Sh’ia, Turkey cannot claim any influence over any of the groups in Iraq except for 

a segment of the Turkmen, specifically the ITF. Its current relations with the Kurdish 

groups are characterized by limited cooperation under a veil of mutual suspicion. During 

the Saddam Hussein years, Syria was one of the preferred locations for Iraqi exiles and 

thus could establish strong linkages to a variety of Iraqi opposition groups. Turkey, by 

contrast, had emphasized bilateral relations with the Baathist government. The Iraqi 

insurgents clearly do not discriminate between Turks and other foreigners as they have 

attacked Turkish truck drivers with equal frequency; more than seventy of them have 

fallen victim to date.

Despite the lack of strong linkages with Iraqi society—some of the Turkmen, although 

an obvious exception, do not measure up to other sectarian and ethnic groups in importance—Turkey is still a critical player in the future of Iraq. To be sure, given the volatility 

of the Iraqi scene, no neighboring country can completely determine the course of future 

developments in Iraq. Turkey, not unlike Iran, has the capability to both impede and 

facilitate progress for the U.S. and its allies in Iraq. 

First and foremost, Turkey represents Iraq’s most direct gateway to European markets; 

a great deal of truck traffic crosses through the border post at Habur. In addition, two oil 

pipelines traverse Turkish territory en route to Mediterranean oil terminals at Ceyhan.29

Currently, Turkey serves as an important base for support operations for the U.S. military. 

The air base at Incirlik has historically played a critical role not just for maintaining the 

sanctions policy against the Saddam Hussein regime but also for facilitating U.S. troop 

rotations and other combat support activities. Such links to the United States obviously 

differentiate Turkey from both Iran and Syria. While Ankara has had some limited influence on U.S. policy options in Iraq, the general distrust harbored by the current Iraqi 

leadership toward all neighboring countries has limited overall Turkish influence.

Ankara has the capability—although not necessarily the will and certainly not the 

intention—to disrupt U.S. supply lines, prevent the U.S. military from making use of 

Turkey, not unlike Iran, has the 

capability to both impede and 

facilitate progress for the U.S. 

and its allies in Iraq.
14

the Incirlik air base, and use the ITF to further exacerbate interethnic relations. Some 

Sh’ia Turkmen (although not associated with the ITF) in Tel Afer and even Kirkuk have 

sided with the insurgency against the United States and the Alawi government. The ITF, 

independent of Turkey, has some ability to influence and even disrupt the conditions on 

ground in Kirkuk and beyond, although its poor performance in the January elections 

has cast some serious doubts on its long-term viability. In fact, reports indicate that the 

ITF has suffered severe defections and split into several factions.30 These developments 

perhaps explain the dubious claims articulated by the ITF leadership in Mosul of American 

soldiers attacking them and then using their uniforms to fire indiscriminately on Mosul’s 

residents.31

Following its criticisms of the ITF performance in the January 30 elections, the Turkish 

government has been looking for alternative approaches to the Turkmen question. In this 

vein, Ankara’s point person in Iraq, Ambassador Osman Koruturk, enunciated a new set of 

policy guidelines that he claimed were drawn from Ankara’s experience with the Bulgarian 

Turks in the 1980s. Accordingly, the Turkmen would be encouraged to rely on themselves, 

increase their political involvement, and broaden their coalition to include all Turkmen, 

just as the Bulgarian Turks had done earlier.32 Koruturk emphasized that the new policy 

did not represent just the Turkish foreign ministry’s preferences but, rather, those of all 

relevant Turkish institutions (read the military).33

Despite the recent difficulties in Turkish-American relations, Ankara understands that 

it cannot afford to alienate Washington and, therefore, is unlikely to risk such a course of 

action unless its fundamental interests are threatened in any meaningful manner. Clearly, 

the Turkish government’s attempt to adjust its policies in Iraq in the wake of the elections 

augurs well for Turkish-American relations. The EU decision to open accession talks does 

not make it easier for Ankara to move away from the U.S. on the matter of Iraq precisely 

because, as far as Turkey’s involvement in Iraq is concerned, the EU’s views do not differ 

significantly from those of the United States. Still, given the rising tensions in relations, 

the U.S.-Turkish relationship is hostage to any potential unfortunate accident or event 

such as the incident with Turkish Special Forces troops on July 4, 2003.

Turkey’s influence in Iraq will materialize in the medium term and only after efforts 

at writing a new constitution commence. Convinced that a federation based on ethnic 

lines is a recipe for future division—à la Yugoslavia—Turkish elites have no doubt that 

Turkey’s diplomacy will then focus on limiting the nature of the emerging federal structure 

in Iraq, particularly in northern Iraq. To the extent that a new Baghdad government will 

be looking for help not only to consolidate its position but also to improve economic 

conditions quickly, Ankara’s cooperation will be necessary. Any sort of impediment at the 

Habur border post can threaten the recovery effort and also put the Kurdish enclave in 

the north under pressure.

The Kurds have the most pressing need for access to the West in general and also to 

Turkey for trade and political support. For them, such support is a balancer of sorts vis-à-vis

Iraq’s other constituent groups. Should a federated Iraq emerge in the near future that 

is not to its liking, Ankara will intensify its past efforts at containing the Iraqi Kurds in 

collaboration with Iran and Syria. In the past, such collaboration has not produced many 

concrete results, in part because of the mutual suspicions each country has about the 

other’s intentions. Yet the AKP government has gone out of its way to improve relations 

with Syria and, to a lesser extent, with Iran. Kurdish nationalist feelings are running 

high in northern Iraq, and in the event that Baghdad implodes in sectarian violence or 

emerges as the center of a fundamentalist state, the likelihood that the Kurds would 

seek independence is almost certain.34 This prospect could propel Ankara to join in any 

anti-Kurdish movement that would emerge within the Arab world, especially because the 

latter will perceive Kurdish independence as an attempt by the United States to create 

another non-Arab state in the Middle East. Even some commentators close to the Turkish 

military who were at the forefront in criticizing Syria and Iran for their support of the PKK 

Convinced that a federation 

based on ethnic lines is a recipe 

for future division—à la 

Yugoslavia—Turkish elites have 

no doubt that Turkey’s diplomacy will then focus on limiting 

the nature of the emerging federal structure in Iraq, particularly in northern Iraq.
15

are currently arguing that these two countries no longer pose as grave a threat, if any, to 

Turkey, compared to the developments in Iraq.35

Finally, Turkey’s ability to influence events in Iraq is hampered by the presence of the 

United States in that country. Were the U.S. to leave before Iraq is stabilized, Ankara will 

find its options in Iraq increased, especially its ability to block developments. In this 

eventuality, the EU and the collateral damage on the accession process would remain the 

only impediments to its policies.

Of course, these are outcomes Turkey would like to avoid. As a result, Ankara has a 

stake in the new political process in Iraq that began with the January elections if a modicum of plurality and stability is to be attained in the medium term. The relative success 

of the January 30 elections, in which Kurds and Shiites defied the threat of violence and 

participated in great numbers, is a positive outcome for Ankara, because it gives pause 

to the Kurdish push for independence. Furthermore, Talabani’s selection as Iraq’s president 

can also be seen as an attempt by the Kurds to become more integrated with Baghdad 

and, hence, with Iraq as a whole. By their own admission, the Turks have tried to play a 

constructive role and encourage the Sunnis to participate in the January 30 elections.36

They have also been instrumental in regional efforts aimed at supporting the Iraqi transition. Yet Turkey’s influence is severely limited; the political class now in power in Baghdad 

does not trust Ankara. 

Ironically, Turkish influence in Iraq would be greatly augmented if it aligned itself with 

the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq. Despite its misgivings regarding Iraqi Kurds, Ankara’s 

support for genuine and robust Kurdish autonomy in Iraq may go a long way to tip the 

balance in favor of those among the Kurds who are willing to give a federal arrangement 

a try and remain within a unified Iraq. Currently, two factors are propelling the move for 

Kurdish independence. The first is a growing sentiment for independence that is forcing 

leaders such as Talabani and Barzani to play the nationalist card, especially with regard 

to the final disposition of Kirkuk. After almost fourteen years of quasi-independence, it is 

hard for the younger generations to accept a return to Iraqi rule. The second is that the 

push for independence stems from the alarm over an uncertain future and the fear that a 

fundamentalist or even revengeful regime will come to occupy Baghdad. Adding to Kurdish woes is the increasing debate in Washington about the future course of Iraqi policy 

and calls for early disengagement. 

Turkey cannot do much to prevent the first, but, given the Iraqi Kurds’ preference 

for access to Europe and Turkey’s privileged relationship with the EU, Turkish assurances 

would go a long way to assuage Kurdish anxieties. In fact, in the event of an early American pullout, Turkey may end up with much greater say in Iraq—as both a counterbalance 

against Iran and, if it chooses to be, as a protector of the Kurds against future instability 

and, especially, any attempt by a future central government in Baghdad to reduce Kurdish 

prerogatives.

Turkey can reap other benefits from positive inducements. First and foremost, a change 

in discourse and an offer of political assistance to the Kurds would also help diffuse some 

of the interethnic tensions between Kurds and Turkmen, making a dialogue over Kirkuk 

possible. Kurds are more likely to heed Turkish concerns and engage with both the Turks 

and Turkmen if they perceive that Ankara is not adamantly opposed to Kurdish aspirations. 

Similarly, the Kurds are far more likely to cooperate fruitfully with the Turks in anti-PKK 

operations.37 More important, though, it is in the interest of the Turkmen in Iraq to make 

a deal with the Kurds and perhaps join a Kurdish-administered territory rather than remain 

under the tutelage of a Sh’ia-dominated and more “pious” Baghdad.

Second, Turkey would benefit from having a secular Kurdish autonomous entity—or 

even an independent state—should matters deteriorate further; such an entity could 

serve as a buffer zone in the event fundamentalist forces—Sunni or Sh’ia—were to 

emerge dominant in Baghdad. The existing Kurdish political infrastructure has had some 

success in keeping Iraqi insurgents at bay and away from northern Iraq. 

Third, a change in the Turkish discourse vis-à-vis the Kurds would also help alleviate 

domestic tensions in Turkey. Already, changes in cultural rights for Kurds influenced by the 

Ironically, Turkish influence in 

Iraq would be greatly augmented 

if it aligned itself with the 

Kurdish groups in northern Iraq.

Talabani’s selection as Iraq’s 

president can also be seen as 

an attempt by the Kurds to 

become more integrated with 

Baghdad and, hence, with Iraq 

as a whole.
16

EU process have led to improvements on the ground. Politically, however, Turkish Kurds 

remain quite attached to their Iraqi brethren. Any attempts by Ankara in support of Iraqi 

Kurds would be received with great enthusiasm in Turkey’s southeastern provinces. Such 

a course of action was attempted once by former Turkish president Turgut Ozal in the 

early 1990s, when he actively courted Iraq’s Kurdish leaders as a means of appealing to 

Turkish Kurds and weaning them away from the PKK. The policy had a successful start but 

collapsed with Ozal’s death in office.

A rapprochement with Iraq’s Kurds would benefit Turkey economically, especially its 

southeastern provinces, which have suffered much from the PKK-led insurgency throughout the 1990s. The Iraqi Kurdish leadership has already tried to make inroads with the 

Turkish business community by awarding it a passel of contracts—ranging from oil exploration to the construction of school dormitories, including a $40 million airport construction project in Suleymaniyah.38

Turkish engagement with Iraqi Kurds would also help ease future U.S. disengagement. 

The Bush administration is likely to come under pressure at home not to abandon the 

Kurds, especially because of their support for the U.S. effort in Iraq and Washington’s past 

record of failing to stand by them after encouraging them to lead insurrections against 

the Saddam Hussein regime.

Turkey and U.S. Policy

Ankara’s misgivings regarding U.S. policy in Iraq precede the current conflict and date 

back to the aftermath of the first Gulf War, when the zone of protection over northern 

Iraq, including the no-fly zone, gave rise to the creation of a Kurdish autonomous entity. 

For most of the 1990s, Turkey’s acquiescence to the basing of American and British aircraft 

at the Incirlik air base to enforce the northern no-fly zone over Iraq proved to be one 

(if not the most important) of the U.S. policy anchors designed to contain Saddam Hussein. It would be safe to say that without Ankara, the U.S. position in Iraq would have 

suffered severe reverses. On the eve of the war in 2003, the United States, with Turkish 

permission, transferred undercover teams into Iraq from Turkish territory to lay out the 

groundwork for the invasion.39

Yet the war in Iraq has deepened anti-American sentiment in Turkey, which had begun 

to change with the post–September 11, 2001 U.S. efforts at declaring a global War on 

Terror. A recent BBC survey found that, with 82 percent responding negatively, the Turks 

topped the list of people worldwide who believed that President George Bush’s re-election 

would have negative consequences for the world.40 Turkish-American relations have had 

their ups and downs during the 1990s, and the divergence often can be attributable to 

the role Iraq has played in the relationship.41

Compatibility with U.S. interests 

At first glance, long-term Turkish and American interests in the Middle East do not differ 

very much. They both would prefer a democratic, stable, and unified Iraq; both perceive 

Iraq as a critical country in the region and are committed to its territorial integrity, 

regarding it as a valuable ally in containing Iran’s ambitions. Washington and Ankara, 

including the Islam-friendly AKP government (not to mention the secular military), 

would consider the emergence of a full-blown fundamentalist regime in Iraq a failure of 

the Iraq war. Continued instability in Iraq not only undermines U.S. objectives but, from 

Ankara’s standpoint, also has the potential of spilling over into Turkish territory through 

infiltration by PKK-like groups, the influence of fundamentalist activists, and consequent 

refugee flows. Both countries have shared the same viewpoint on the PKK presence for 

more than a decade: It must be removed.

Despite the compatibility of long-term interests, there is a great deal of variance on 

the means to accomplish these goals, and the divergence revolves around the future of 

Continued instability in Iraq not 

only undermines U.S. objectives 

but, from Ankara’s standpoint, 

also has the potential of spilling over into Turkish territory 

through infiltration by PKK-like 

groups, the influence of 

fundamentalist activists, and 

consequent refugee flows.

A rapprochement with Iraq’s 

Kurds would benefit Turkey 

economically, especially its 

southeastern provinces, which 

have suffered so much from the 

PKK-led insurgency throughout 

the 1990s.
17

Iraq; contingencies there divide the two countries the most. Ankara wants to see Kurdish 

ambitions circumscribed and also to see the Turkmen play a greater role in a reconstituted Iraq and assume control of the city of Kirkuk as a bulwark against Kurdish separatist 

ambitions. The U.S. is more ambivalent about Kurdish aspirations: having promised them 

support for a federal arrangement in 1998, when Secretary of State Madeleine Albright 

negotiated a truce between the two Kurdish factions in northern Iraq, Washington is 

unlikely to back away from that promise. Realistically, the U.S. also understands that 

after more than a decade of quasi-independence, a federal structure is the absolute minimum condition that could convince the Kurds to remain within a unified Iraq. Turkey, 

too, reluctantly understands the necessity of a federal arrangement; but whereas the U.S. 

would leave the details of this arrangement to be determined by the Iraqis, Ankara wants 

not only to have a say but also to minimize the geographic and institutional reach of 

this kind of federation. What is more worrisome to the Turks is whether the U.S. would 

support the creation of an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq should conditions 

in Iraq deteriorate beyond a certain point.

 Underlying the Turkish viewpoint is a deep mistrust of U.S. actions and intentions in 

Iraq. The mistrust was accentuated by the failure of the prewar diplomacy. On the eve 

of the war, and despite intense domestic opposition, the Turkish government promised 

the U.S. that it would allow the creation of a second front, yet it failed to deliver on 

its promise when its inept handling of the parliamentary vote on the issue resulted in 

a negative vote. The agreement, which had been meticulously negotiated, would have 

allowed for a sizable Turkish military contingent to enter northern Iraq on the heels of 

U.S. troops. With the deal off the table, the U.S. has been adamant in limiting the Turkish military presence in Iraq to a minimum and has heeded Iraqi (both Kurdish and nonKurdish) demands not to let Turks bring in troops. Still, despite the opposition to the 

war, Ankara did quietly lend a hand to U.S. forces by opening limited use of the border 

with Iraq and airspace, and later by becoming a conduit for supplies.42

The parliamentary rejection precipitated a crisis in Turkish-American relations, and, 

after the vote, the U.S. was careful not to criticize the government, which had at least 

tried to pass the resolution through parliament. However, Deputy Defense Secretary 

Paul Wolfowitz’s interview with CNN-Turk criticizing the military establishment in Ankara 

for failing to provide leadership on the issue and trying to indirectly stall the measure 

shocked many.43 Many Turks are convinced that the United States seeks to punish Ankara 

for having rejected the deployment of U.S. forces in Turkey in the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote. In their view, the rejection privileged the Iraqi Kurdish factions by providing them an opportunity to demonstrate their support for the Bush administration’s Iraq 

policy. Therefore, the increased reliance on the Kurds by the United States came at the 

expense of Turkey, which prohibited the entry of U.S. troops into northern Iraq from Turkish soil. In effect, the reliance of the U.S. forces in Iraq on Kurdish units to help them 

maintain order and even engage insurgents further inflames Turkish perceptions that the 

Kurds are now more important than them. Furthermore, U.S. inaction on the PKK front is 

also interpreted in the media as another way in which Washington is punishing Ankara 

for its rejection. All these perceptions culminate in the fear of a hidden U.S. agenda to 

create a state for its loyal Kurdish allies.

To some extent, the U.S. has also been exasperated with Turkish opposition to any 

future Iraqi agreement that offers the Kurds more than symbolic autonomy. As one 

commentator has recently argued, since the March 1, 2003 parliamentary vote, the real 

change in U.S.-Turkish relations has been one of diminished importance for the United 

States.44 Both the July 4, 2003 incident involving Turkish Special Forces and the decision of Coalition Provisional Authority head L. Paul Bremer III to side with the Iraqis 

that same summer against the deployment of Turkish troops in Iraq reflected the growing 

unease within the U.S. Department of Defense about Turkey’s intentions. Yet TGS chief 

Turkey, too, reluctantly understands the necessity of a federal 

arrangement; but whereas the 

U.S. would leave the detail of 

this arrangement to be determined by the Iraqis, Ankara 

wants not only to have a say 

but also to minimize the 

geographic and institutional 

reach of this kind of federation.
18

Ozkok and his deputy Basbug have tried hard, despite rank-and-file uneasiness, to reinvigorate the Turkish-American relationship and put a stop to the spiraling anti-American 

rhetoric emanating from Ankara.45

Another cause of disagreement is that neither Turkey nor the United States has succeeded in formulating a coherent Iraq policy. Because of all the unanticipated difficulties it has faced almost since the end of major combat operations, the U.S. has had to 

continually improvise its policies on the ground. The Turks, because of the fundamental 

nature of the threat they perceive to their own vision of national identity from Kurdish 

independence in Iraq and the domestic fallout such an event may cause, have opted out 

for a policy that cannot accommodate the changing conditions and realities in Iraq. But 

here, too, there are signs that some change is in the offing.

Can the differences be reconciled?

In the medium run, the differences between the United States and Turkey will increasingly 

be reconcilable as Turkey makes progress along the European accession path, which will 

boost Turkey’s confidence and reduce its worries regarding Kurdish irredentism. Of course, 

this will require that the Turkish government continue to institute and implement reforms 

and policies that the EU deems necessary. Currently, the perception in Turkey is that the 

government has stalled on this front, at least temporarily. More important, the Europeans 

will also be able to weigh in on this matter, because it is in their interest to see the Iraqi 

situation resolved as soon as possible with a minimum amount of disruption. 

The more important problem is in the near term, in which another incident such as 

the July 4, 2003, mishap with the Turkish Special Forces troops can throw the U.S.-

Turkish relationship into a tailspin. Of late, Turkey and the United States have increased 

their dialogue on certain critical issues, such as the PKK. In early January 2005, Deputy 

Secretary of State Richard Armitage was dispatched to Ankara, and a tripartite meeting 

on January 11, 2005, that brought together U.S., Turkish, and Iraqi officials to discuss 

measures against the PKK followed Armitage’s visit. Media reports suggest that there was 

agreement on a number of issues, including repatriating PKK fighters by Iraq, dismantling 

a refugee camp said to be under PKK control, and preventing the participation of a PKKaffiliated political party in the January 30 Iraqi elections. On the heels of this meeting, 

USCENTCOM’s General John Abizaid met with Turkish military officials to discuss a wide 

variety of issues, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Condoleezza Rice, in her first trip abroad 

as U.S. secretary of state, put Ankara on her itinerary as a clear signal that Turkey is an 

important ally. Clearly as a policy of damage control, Washington has decided to step up 

the frequency of contacts with ankara.

Nevertheless, it is also vital that the United States and Turkey engage in a backstage 

diplomatic dialogue that helps clarify the potential scenarios and plans for different 

contingencies. Critical to bridging the differences is how to approach the Kurdish and 

Turkmen problems. Were Iraq to splinter, the Turkmen, at least the more secular ones and 

those close to Turkey, are likely to face a dilemma: They can either try to form a common front with an anti-Kurdish government in Baghdad that may end up implementing a 

fundamentalist agenda, or they can elect to side with the Kurds, who have made it clear 

they are opposed to fundamentalist rule and have so far shown to be far more liberal in 

their approach to governance. 

It is also important for Turks and Americans to learn to compartmentalize issues, especially Iraq. Washington must understand that Turkey has to live with its neighbors—as 

unsavory as they may be, as is the case with Iran and Syria. And Turkey must understand 

that the U.S. role as a global power requires that these agreements on Iraq not be allowed 

to mar cooperation in other areas—particularly in NATO. The political future of Iraq, its 

economic development, and the role of both Turkey and the United States in the country’s 

future are of paramount concern at this stage. The dialogue must be not only extensive 

but also multilayered and encompass different groups and political entities, including 

officials, politicians, academics, and journalists. Engaging in a such dialogue as soon as 

Condoleezza Rice, in her first trip 

abroad as U.S. secretary of state, 

put Ankara on her itinerary 

as a clear signal that Turkey is 

an important ally. Clearly as a 

policy of damage control, 

Washington has decided to step 

up the frequency of contacts 

with Ankara.
19

possible will not only help the two sides narrow their differences but also help moderate 

Turkish demands.

The greatest impediment to such a dialogue is that both sides have to confront some 

unpleasant facts. In the case of the United States, the occupation has suffered some 

rather severe setbacks and, despite the elections, Iraq is far from where many in the 

U.S. expected it to be in the post–Saddam Hussein period. Defense Secretary Donald 

Rumsfeld’s ruminations regarding Turkey’s lack of cooperation on the second front as 

the cause for the current situation in Iraq are not only unfair but also unhelpful.46 For 

Turkey, the fact is that it must confront the Kurdish issue—at home and in Iraq—head 

on and explore ways in which the United States can help; this is something that Ankara 

has avoided, despite the EU reform process. Ultimately, the dialogue has to include both 

Iraqi officials as well as Iraqi Kurds. 

What the U.S. should be looking for from the Turks is help in the event conditions in 

Iraq deteriorate further. It is possible that Iraqis may end up fighting a civil war, which 

should not be viewed as naturally resulting in a partition. If such an event were to 

materialize, where the U.S. will need Turkey the most is in maintaining open borders and 

also helping to limit Iranian and Syrian assistance for their proxies. Despite the mutual 

suspicions, Turkey’s improved relations with both Syria and Iran and enhanced standing 

because of the European process will come in handy. 

If the postelection outlook in Iraq improves, Turkey should conduct active yet careful 

engagement in Iraq, ranging from reconstruction activities to trade and political dialogue 

with Iraqi Kurds and the Iraqi government on issues such as Kirkuk. Bolstering the confidence of the Kurds in Iraq is vital to their chances of remaining part of the Iraqi state. 

Hence, containing the ITF’s radical inclinations and even restructuring it from a quasiparamilitary group into a genuine political movement will be necessary.

What can the United States offer in return? Its ability to influence what the Turks 

view as vital interests is directly correlated with an improving security situation in Iraq. 

Should conditions improve significantly, the U.S. will be able to make a more concrete 

gesture toward the Turks first and foremost, perhaps by issuing an ultimatum to the PKK 

forces in Iraq to give themselves up to the new Iraqi authorities. Turkish, Iraqi, and U.S. 

authorities must also come up with a realistic plan on how to handle demobilized PKK 

fighters; the U.S. was disappointed by the limited and restrictive nature of an amnesty 

offered by Ankara in 2003. As a result, and despite the organization’s internal divisions, 

very few PKK fighters opted for returning to Turkey. Because it is unlikely that all PKK 

members will want to return to Turkey, a plan is certainly required for demobilization and 

relocation. Although such a plan would be only an interim step, it will go a long way toward assuaging Turkish fears about the future of the organization. 

More important, perhaps, given Turkish domestic sensitivities, is working out an 

equitable solution to the status of Kirkuk, where competing Kurdish, Turkmen, and Arab 

claims to property and governance rights have yet to be negotiated. If conditions in Iraq 

improve, the U.S. will have to play the role of honest broker among the three. Considering that many of the Arab settlers in Kirkuk are Sh’ia relocated there by Saddam Hussein 

and that there is always the likelihood of a Sh’ia-influenced government in Baghdad, it 

is imperative that some kind of internationally supported adjudication system is put in 

place as soon as possible.

Turkish-American differences over the future of Iraq are not insurmountable. However, 

events in northern Iraq have the potential of creating a backlash—for reasons that are 

peculiar to Turkish domestic politics—that will undermine not just the Turkish-American 

relationship but also endanger the EU reform and accession processes. The current AKP 

government, despite all the post–EU summit political support it enjoys, remains vulnerable to developments in Iraq. Ironically, because Turkey has succeeded in convincing the 

EU of its commitment to required reforms, the actual path of negotiations is likely to 

The current AKP government, 

despite all the post–EU 

summit political support it 

enjoys, remains vulnerable to 

developments in Iraq.

It is possible that Iraqis may 

end up fighting a civil war, 

which should not be viewed as 

naturally resulting in a partition. If such an event were to 

materialize, where the U.S. 

will need Turkey the most is in 

maintaining open borders and 

also helping to limit Iranian and 

Syrian assistance for 

their proxies.
20

chip away at this same political support as different constituencies discover that the EU’s 

requirements overwhelm their particular interests.

Because the Kurdish question goes to the heart of Turkish identity and deep concerns 

over its own territorial integrity, an independent Kurdish entity in Iraq before most of the 

EU political reforms are introduced and institutionalized can deal a severe blow to Turkey’s 

government. It is in the interest of both the U.S. and Turkish governments to work on 

modalities in anticipation of any unforeseen developments.
21

NOTES

1. Although there is not one Kemalist worldview, it has come to represent a combination of rigid secularism, centralized government, an inward-looking foreign policy, and the reliance on the military as the institution of last resort. For the Kemalist vision of foreign policy, see Philip Robins, Suits and Uniforms: Turkish 

Foreign Policy since the Cold War (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003), 136–39.

2. For more detailed histories of the Kurdish question in Turkey, see Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, 

Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), and Kemal Kirisçi and Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question in Turkey: An Example of a Trans-State Conflict (London: Frank Cass, 1997).

3. Radikal (Istanbul), March 21, 2005, and Hurriyet (Istanbul), March 21, 2005. All Turkish news sources 

cited here are their internet editions unless otherwise specified.

4. Hurriyet (Istanbul), December 22, 2004. 

5. The word used was “soydas,” which brought a sharp response from a liberal columnist who argued 

that, given the large numbers of Kurdish-origin citizens in Turkey, the use of the word “soydas” was at best 

discriminatory and divisive; see Gulay Gokturk, “Kirmizi Çizgilerimiz II,” Dunden Bugune Tercuman (Istanbul), 

February 4, 2005.

6. http://www.tsk.mil.tr/bashalk/toplanti/basbiltoplanti/ocak2005_sorucevap.htm, January 26, 2005.

7. The issue of nonreligious minorities in Turkey, such as the Kurds, has figured prominently in the run up 

to the December 17, 2004, EU summit vote on opening accession negotiations; see Murat Yetkin, “Ankara’nin 

Kurt Sikintisi,” Radikal (Istanbul), November 7, 2004. Most Kurds view the reforms instituted—but yet to be 

fully implemented—by the Turkish government to be too timid and insufficient. Although the reforms satisfied 

the European Union enough to initiate accession negotiations with Ankara, Kurds are likely to take advantage 

of the EU process to push for more comprehensive reforms.

8. After decades of “Arabization” policies, natural population movements, and conflict, it is hard to come 

up with accurate figures on Kirkuk’s population; see International Crisis Group, Iraq: Allaying Turkey’s Fears over 

Kurdish Ambitions. ICG Middle East Report, no. 35 (Ankara/Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, January 

26, 2005). Phebe Marr estimates that the total Turkmen population is no more than 2–3 percent of the total 

Iraqi population; see The Modern History of Iraq, 2d ed. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2004), 16. Marr argues that 

the Turkmen were until recently well integrated into Iraqi society.

9. Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 9–11. 

10. International Crisis Group, Iraq’s Kurds: Toward a Historic Compromise? ICG Middle East Report, no. 26 

(Amman/Brussels: International Crisis Group, April 8, 2004), 9.

11. The primarily Shiite Turkmen city of Tel Afer became a battleground in early fall 2004 when U.S. troops 

intervened to cleanse the city of insurgents.

12. Ecevit is not the only one to call for intervention; see, for example, Umit Ozdag’s interview with Nese 

Duzel, “Gerekirse Amerika’yla Çatisiriz,” Radikal (Istanbul), February 7, 2005.

13. In an unusual fashion, Foreign Minister Gul quickly responded to the general’s criticisms; Radikal 

(Istanbul), March 17, 2005. A number of columnists also took the general to task; see Hasan Cemal, “Komutan 

Iki!” Milliyet (Istanbul), March 19, 2005.

14. “Kerkuk Provasi,” Hurriyet (Istanbul), September 28, 2004. An ITF representative argued that the Tel 

Afer operation was a joint U.S.-Kurdish initiative designed to rid the city of its Turkmen population and replace 

it with Kurds; Hurriyet (Istanbul), September 12, 2004. 

15. Cengiz Çandar, “Gul’un Turkiyesi Irak’ta Kime Karsi?” Dunden Bugune Tercuman (Istanbul), September 

15, 2004, and Fikret Bila, “Gul Kayitsiz Kalamayiz,” Milliyet (Istanbul), September 15, 2004.

16. In a November 1, 2004 front-page story, the daily Milliyet claimed that some forty thousand Turkish 

soldiers were poised to intervene if the U.S. turned over Kirkuk and its oil fields to the Kurds. Deputy Chief of 

the General Staff Ilker Basbug denied the story at a news conference the following day; see http://www.tsk.

mil.tr/bashalk/toplanti/bsbiltoplanti/kasim2004/kasim2004_sorucevap.htm. Still, Basbug did stress that the 

Turkish military prepares plans for all sorts of contingencies. The paper was also widely criticized—even by its 

own ombudsman—for not sufficiently sourcing the story; see Milliyet (Istanbul), November 8, 2004. Nevertheless, the story was interpreted as part of a disinformation campaign designed to weaken the government; see 

Ismet Berkan, “Savasa mi Giriyoruz?” Radikal (Istanbul), November 3, 2004. 

17. See Foreign Minister Gul’s speech in the Turkish parliament, Sabah (Istanbul), September 14, 2004.

18. Semih Idiz argues that Erdogan was “trying to court a hard-core Sunni nationalist element that is 

prevalent in Turkey, and which also has a not so negligible presence within the AKP”; “Kirkuk a Potential 
22

Debacle for the Government,” Turkish Daily News (Ankara), February 3, 2005. In a sharp attack on the United 

States, Erdogan commented to his party members: “Forces that came to the region in the name of democracy 

have elected to remain passive in the face of nondemocratic aims. Everyone should know that Turkey, which has 

historical and kinship ties to the region, will not allow it to be engulfed by years-long turmoil”; Murat Yetkin, 

“Ankara ve Washington’da soru ayni: Bu nasil bir iliski?” Radikal (Istanbul), February 5, 2005.

19. Sedat Ergin, “Irak’li Turkmenler buharlastilar mi?” Hurriyet (Istanbul), February 18, 2005. In fact, Ergin 

points out that there were twelve Turkmen elected for the assembly; the Sh’ia coalition had five and the Kurds 

another four.

20. Fiket Bila, “Ozel Siyaset Belgesi ve Rumsfeld,” Milliyet (Istanbul), July 20, 2003. These forces being in 

place prior to the U.S. invasion of Iraq, they remained with the acknowledgement of the U.S. authorities.

21. See Abizaid’s interview with Murat Yetkin, “Abizaid: Irak’in Gelecegi Için Turkiye’nin Destegi Kilit 

Onemde,” Radikal (Istanbul), January 13, 2005.

22. See the interview with Osman Ocalan, Milliyet (Istanbul), September 16, 2004.

23. Yasemin Çongar, “Irak Cephesinden Yansiyanlar,” Milliyet (Istanbul), December 27, 2004.

24. Cengiz Çandar, “Musul Bilmecesi mi?” Dunden Bugune Tercuman (Istanbul), December 22, 2004.

25. Hurriyet (Istanbul), December 23, 2004.

26. “Turkish people disturbed due to military coup rumors,” Turkish Daily News (Ankara), June 11, 2003.

27. In a recent poll, 45 percent of university professors said they trusted the military most compared with 

17 percent who stated the parliament, 15 percent the judiciary, and 6 percent the European Union; Taha Akyol, 

“Iste Universite,” Milliyet (Istanbul), January 3, 2005.

28. Prime Minister Erdogan claimed that after two years of AKP rule, Turkey was on “its way to become a 

global power,” Yeni Safak (Istanbul), December 29, 2004.

29. The pipelines were built in the 1980s and have a combined capacity of 1.5–1.6 million barrels a day. 

They were closed during the sanctions period and were reopened for limited use after the UN’s Oil-for-Food 

regime was instituted. Since the fall of the Saddam Hussein regime, oil exports through the north have suffered 

from insurgent attacks and have not, as a result, reached full capacity. 

30. Cengiz Çandar, “Turkmenlerin Geldigi Nokta,” Dunden Bugune Tercuman (Istanbul), April 26, 2005.

31. Milliyet (Istanbul), February 27, 2005.

32. For details, see Fikret Bila, “Yeni Turkmen Politikasi Olustu,” Milliyet (Istanbul), March 21, 2005. The 

Bulgarian reference is to the late 1980s, when the Sofia government tried to forcibly change the names of Bulgarian citizens of ethnic Turkish origin. Many Bulgarian Turks migrated to Turkey but the policy was abandoned 

soon thereafter, allowing for the return of many.

33. Ibid.

34. A group of leading Kurdish representatives delivered to the United Nations a petition for the independence of the Iraqi Kurdish areas signed by 1.7 million people; Reuters, December 23, 2004.

35. Mehmet Ali Kislali, “Turkiye-Suriye-Iran,” Radikal (Istanbul), March 25, 2005.

36. See the interview with Foreign Minister Gul, “Gul: Turkiye’yi Kürtlerle Korkutmak Yanlis,” Milliyet 

(Istanbul), November 5, 2004.

37. Throughout the 1990s, the two Kurdish parties in northern Iraq collaborated and fought with Turkish 

troops against the PKK.

38. William Safire, “The Resolution’s Weakness,” New York Times, June 9, 2004. 

39. See Sedat Ergin, “We Can Open a Northern Front but a UN Resolution Is Needed,” Hurriyet (Istanbul),

September 21, 2003.

40. BBC World Service, January 19, 2005.

41. For a detailed analysis of the period, see Henri J. Barkey, “The Endless Pursuit: Improving U.S.-Turkish 

Relations,” in Friends in Need: Turkey and the United States after September 11, ed. Morton Abramowitz (New 

York: The Century Foundation, 2003).

42. See Sedat Ergin, “Kararin Sonuclari,” Hurriyet (Istanbul), March 2, 2003, and Erdal Guven,“?” Radikal 

(Istanbul), March 2, 2003.

43. For a transcript, see http://dod.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20030506-depsecdef0156.html.

44. Omer Taspinar, “Gerginlik Abartiliyor,” Radikal (Istanbul), March 21, 2005.

45. See, for example, http://www.tsk.mil.tr/bashalk/konusma_mesaj/2005/yillikdegerlendirme_200405.

htm.
23

46. Tom Shanker, “Rumsfeld Faults Turkey for Barring Use of Its Land in ‘03 to Open Northern Front in Iraq,” 

New York Times, March 21, 2005. Technically, Rumsfeld may be correct: Had the 4th Infantry Division been 

allowed to transit through Turkey, there would have been many more troops on the ground and the insurgency 

might not have gained the momentum it did following Baghdad’s fall. Moreover, with more troops, the looting 

would have been reduced and the occupation could have started on a better footing. That said, however, it is 

also clear that the U.S. failed to anticipate the insurgency and did not prepare for it. In fact, the Americans 

were planning to reduce their troops soon after Baghdad’s fall.
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace examine issues 

related to Iraq and regional security in the broader Middle East.

Recent Institute reports include:

• Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq, by Amatzia Baram (Special Report, 

April 2005)

• Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision for the Country’s Future (Special Report, 

February 2005) **Arabic version available

• Promoting Middle East Democracy: European Initiatives, by Mona Yacoubian (Special 

Report, October 2004) **Arabic version available

• Global Terrorism after the Iraq War (Special Report, October 2003)

• Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, by Graham E. Fuller (Special Report, 

August 2003)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of 

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; 

fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Books from USIP Press include:

• Reluctant Neighbor: Turkey’s Role in the Middle East, edited by Henri J. Barkey 

(1996)

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