The Diplomacy of

C o u n t e r t e r ro r i s m

Lessons Learned, Ignored, and Disputed

B r i e f l y . . .

R e c e nt lessons learned in the diplomacy of count e r t e r rorism inc l ude d :

• t he importance of cons i s t e nt, long-term inc re me ntal steps taken against a pheno me non that will not disappear

• t he necessity for a mu l t i faceted policy that inc l udes political, legal, social, diploma t ic, econo m ic, and military eleme nt s

• t he need to develop re a l i s t ic ex p e c t a t io ns and avoid a crisis me ntality that is ultimately satisfying to terro r i s t s, playing down military ana l o g ies that mig ht lead to

p u b l ic ex p e c t a t io ns of early “vic t o r y ”

• t he dy na m ic int e ra c t ion between terrorism and count e r t e r rorism, re s u l t i ng in polic ies that over time help shape the location, form, and me t hods used by terro r i s t s

• the promise of law enfo rc e me nt techniques as an effective long-term approach to

f ig ht i ng both na t io nal and int e r na t io nal terrorism, not as a substitute for military

a c t ion but as a compleme nt 

• the inc re a s i ng dissocia t ion of states from terrorism, and an inc re a s i ng willing ne s s

of states to combine their efforts to defeat or discoura ge terrorist org a n i z a t io ns

• t he gro w i ng promise of int e r na t io nal coopera t ion against the thre a t

Points of dispute that spawned lively debate inc l ude d :

• t he effectiveness of a law enfo rc e me nt approach in situa t io ns whe re the re is also a

na s c e nt peace pro c e s s, such as No r t hern Ire l a nd and Is ra e l

• t he appro p r iate use of military fo rc e, which tends to be effective for short-term purposes such as disrupting opera t io ns, but pro b l e ma t ical at stopping terrorism over time 

• t he actual threat of attack using che m ical, bio l o g ical, nuc l e a r, or ra d io l o g ic a l

w e a p o ns, and the level and type of re s o u rces that should be devoted to re s p o ndi ng to the (actual or perceived) thre a t

F i na l l y, count e r t e r rorism tre nds that are worrisome and need more attention i nc l ude d :

• t he inc re a s i ng globalization of the terrorist threat, re s u l t i ng in shifts to new ge og ra p h ic areas of concern like Cent ral and East As ia, the Balka ns, and the Tra ns c a ucasus re g ion, and the great fre e dom of mo v e me nt by perpetra t o r s

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O RT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

January 14, 2002

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report is based upon a me e t i ng of the Int e rna t io nal Research Group on Po l i t ical Vio l e nc e

(IRGPV) held at the United States Institute of

Peace to discuss na t io nal and int e r na t io nal me t hods of count e r i ng terrorism. Although the orig i na l

report was drafted befo re the September 11

a t t a c k s, it has been revised to reflect tho s e

attacks and mo re re c e nt event s. To p ics discussed

i nc l uded specific lessons learned from past ex p e r ie nc e, the challenges of building int e r na t io na l

c o a l i t io ns, the effectiveness of criminal law

a p p ro a c hes in cont rast to military re s p o ns e s, the

role of rhe t o r ic and public diploma c y, the effect i v e ness of curre nt polic ie s, and the “new terro rism” and weapons of mass de s t r uc t ion. 

T he IRGPV is co-spons o red by the U.S. Institute of

Peace and the Airey Neave Trust of Great Britain.

This report was written by Audrey Kurth Cronin, 

v i s i t i ng associate professor in the Security Stud ie s

P ro g ram at Georgetown University and a 

p a r t ic i p a nt in the me e t i ng .

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pe a c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 2

T he Threat befo re

September 11 2

C o u nt e r t e r rorism Lessons Learne d 5

C o nc l u s io n 7

R e c o m me nda t io ns 8
• t he re s u rge nce of ho s t a ge - t a k i ng as a terrorist technique, and the inc re a s i ng freq u e ncy with which both go v e r n me nts and private companies are paying ra ns o ms

a nd ma k i ng conc e s s io ns

• t he gro w i ng tende ncy of terrorists to use info r ma t ion techno l o g y, especially the

I nt e r net, to pursue their go a l s, and the diffic u l t ies of count e r i ng or tra c k i ng that use

• e v ide nce that terrorism as a tactic may mo re often be re s u l t i ng in stra t e g ic succ e s s e s

I n t ro d u c t i o n

T he September 11 attacks on the Pe nt a gon and the World Tra de Center drew into sharp

focus the need to unde r s t a nd and counter the threat of int e r na t io nal terrorism agains t

i n no c e nt vic t i ms on Ame r ican soil and elsewhe re. As this report is being written, the

c a m p a ign against the al Qaeda network is gra dually unfo l d i ng; Ame r ican and allie d

p o l ic y ma kers are working aro u nd the clock to develop a long-term, inno v a t i v e, bro a d -

based strategy for count e r t e r rorism that encompasses both tra d i t io nal and unt ra d it io nal me a ns. Unde r s t a nd i ng the past lessons of the diplomacy of count e r t e r rorism has

never been mo re important, as the coalition re s p o nse is being cra f t e d, re f i ne d, and

exe c u t e d, and as we brace for possible further bio t e r rorism and other count e ra t t a c k s

in the da y s, mo nt hs, and perhaps years ahe a d.

T he orig i nal version of this report was completed on August 30, 2001, a few da y s

b e fo re the initial attacks occurre d. It was based upon a me e t i ng of the Int e r na t io na l

R e s e a rch Group on Po l i t ical Vio l e nce held at the United States Institute of Peace to

discuss na t io nal and int e r na t io nal me t hods of count e r i ng terrorism. The disting u i s he d

members of the group re p re s e nted de c a des of ex p e r ie nce in study i ng terrorism, unde rs t a nd i ng its evolution as a tactic, and count e r i ng the phe no me non in the Un i t e d

States and elsewhe re. Their discussio ns ra nged from Ame r ican na t io nal policy de b a t e s

to philosophical arg u me nts about optimal me a ns of re s p o nse to a fungible and almo s t

u nde f i nable phe no me non. To p ics discussed inc l uded specific lessons learned from past

ex p e r ie nc e, the challenges of building int e r na t io nal coalitio ns, the effectiveness of

c r i m i nal law appro a c hes in cont rast to military re s p o ns e s, the role of rhe t o r ic and publ ic diploma c y, the effectiveness of curre nt polic ie s, and the “new terrorism” and

w e a p o ns of mass de s t r uc t ion. The re was agre e me nt on only a few of the points discussed; but in nearly every case, the quality of the debate was rich and new conc l us io ns eme rged from the clash of differing vie w p o i nt s.

Ma ny of the conc l u s io ns of the group re main valid in the aftermath of the attacks

a nd pro v ide the opportunity to place the events into a bro a der historical perspective,

but some of them have been altered to reflect re c e nt event s. Thu s, the report that fo llows is not a direct re f l e c t ion of the pro c e e d i ngs of the me e t i ng itself, but mo re a

s e l e c t ion of the count e r t e r rorism lessons discussed the re, recast in the cont ext of the

u n fo l d i ng post–September 11 int e r na t io nal campaign. 

The Threat befo re September 11

Even befo re September 11, most Ame r ic a ns perceived terrorism as one of the mo s t

i m p o r t a nt threats fa c i ng the United States into the 21st century (one poll said 84 perc e nt cons ide red int e r na t io nal terrorism a “c r i t ical threat” to the United States).

Attacks on U.S. soil had alre a dy dra ma t ically he ig ht e ned an unfa m i l iar sense of vulne rability at ho me. Tw ice as ma ny people died in int e r na t io nal terrorist attacks in the

s e c o nd half of the nine t ies than died in the first half, even though the total nu m b e r

of inc ide nts had de c l i ned overall. And hig h - p rofile inc ide nts in the middle of the

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an indep e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion cre a t e d

by Cong ress to pro mote the pre v e nt ion, ma na geme nt, and peaceful re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Institute me e t s

its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of

p ro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s, fellowships,

p rof e s s io nal tra i n i ng, educ a t ion pro g ra ms fro m

h igh school through gra duate school, confere nc e s

a nd worksho p s, library servic e s, and public a t io ns.

T he Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by

t he Pre s ide nt of the United States and confirme d

by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, F o u nder and 

fo r mer Pre s ide nt, Peace Links, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns fo r

Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. 

• M o ra L. McLean, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t it u t e, New York, N.Y. • María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C IO N

I nt e r na t io nal, Some r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling,

State Senator and fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne,

Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs C o m m i t t e e, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R S E X O F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Demo cra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Douglas J. Fe i t h , Unde r

S e c retary of Defense for Po l icy • Paul G. Gaffney II, V ic e

Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r -

s i t y • R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
3

de c a de, particularly the Oklaho ma City bombing, the first World Tra de Center inc ide nt ,

a nd the Tokyo sarin gas attacks, had he ig ht e ned public aware ness of the threat as well

as wide s p read worries about new tactics and targets for future assaults. 

In the United States, count e r t e r rorism efforts were alre a dy ma r s h a l i ng a gro w i ng

part of the U.S. budget, climbing from $6 billion (fiscal year 1998) to $9.7 billion (fiscal year 2001)—an inc rease of almost 40 perc e nt in those three years alone (U.S.

O f f ice of Ma na ge me nt and Budget, Annual Report to Congress on Combating Te r r o r i s m,

August 2001, p. 100). In the weeks befo re the attacks, this tre nd was cont i nu i ng, with

t he Bush adm i n i s t ra t ion putting forth a budget request of $10.3 billion in Au g u s t

2001 for the upcoming year (fiscal year 2002). Int e r na t io nal coopera t ion against terrorism had also inc re a s e d, ra ng i ng from the United Na t io ns’ gro w i ng willing ness in

re c e nt years to condemn terrorist actio ns, to enhanced bilateral int e l l ige nce cooperat ion, to the gro u nd b re a k i ng Int e r na t io nal Convent ion on the Suppre s s ion of the

F i na nc i ng of Te r rorism, opened for sig na t u re in Ja nuary 2000. The highly public i z e d

t r ial of Saudi ex p a t r iate Osama bin Laden’s associates involved in the 1998 bombing s

of U.S. embassies in Ta n z a n ia and Ke nya, which killed 224 people (12 U.S.) and

i n j u red 4574 (15 U.S.), had dra ma t ically de mo ns t rated the global reach of the al

Q a e da org a n i z a t ion and the vulne rability of Ame r ican targets overseas. And the sens e

of gro w i ng une a s i ness was not just an Ame r ican pre o c c u p a t ion, as de mo ns t rated by

t he highly publicized warnings by Russian pre m ier Vladimir Putin’s personal pro t e c t io n

fo rce of a threat by al Qaeda to assassinate Pre s ide nt Bush befo re the G-8 summit in

July 2001. Befo re September 11, no single ind i v idual had do ne mo re than bin Lade n

to stimulate a gro w i ng Ame r ican do me s t ic effort against terrorism and a wide n i ng

i nt e r na t io nal mo v e me nt to meet the threat. 

T he re was ge ne ral aware ness even befo re the attacks that the ge o g ra p hy of terro rism was chang i ng in the 21st cent u r y. While the Middle East cont i nued to be the locus

of most terrorist activity, Cent ral and South As ia, the Balka ns, and the Tra ns c a uc a s u s

w e re alre a dy gro w i ng in sig n i f ic a nc e. And the use of techno l o g ies such as the Int e rnet had inc reased the global reach of ma ny org a n i z a t io ns, for re c r u i t me nt purposes as

well as coord i na t ion of opera t io ns. The tra d i t io nal mo del of the hie ra rc h ical org a n i z at ion do m i nated by a cent ral he a d q uarters was alre a dy cons ide red outda t e d, having

been replaced by tra ns ie nt cells often connected through cyberspace. The bre a kdo w n

of barriers between count r ie s, from NAFTA to the European Un ion, had further re mo v e d

t he tra d i t io nal me a ns to track the mo v e me nts of known crimina l s. Globalization was

ma k i ng ge o g ra p hy mo re of a challenge than ever for count e r t e r rorism effo r t s, but it

was also pro v id i ng mo re opportunity for improved cro s s - b o rder and tra ns c o nt i ne nt a l

c o o p e ra t io n .

B e fo re 1972, you ra rely fo u nd the word “terrorism” in the political lex icon—it was

h i j a c k i ng s, kid na p p i ng s, and mu rde r s. In the int e r v e n i ng years, de s c r i b i ng the pheno me non as one “field” helped lead to an inc re a s i ng body of re s e a rch, the de v e l o pme nt of effective count e r me a s u res to some terrorist tactic s, and better commu n ic a t io n

a mo ng go v e r n me ntal and no ngo v e r n me ntal experts in count e r t e r rorism. Ho w e v e r, the

do w ns ide to the gro w i ng community of count e r t e r rorism experts has been the tende ncy to gloss over the varied political cont exts that give rise to terrorist acts, exa ce r b a t i ng the temptation to oversimplify the me a ns we must adopt to counter the m .

D i f f e re nt re s p o nses to terrorism can have differe nt re s u l t s, de p e nd i ng on the chara ct e r i s t ics of the group or ind i v idual, the local culture, the social and econo m ic cond it io ns, and the mo t i v a t io ns of the terro r i s t s. Inde e d, one partic i p a nt observed that it

is wro ng to address terrorism as an inde p e nde nt varia b l e, outside of culture and society: terrorism is always a dependent variable.

T he re were other worrisome de v e l o p me nt s. First, the re was a re s u rge nce of ho s t a ge -

t a k i ng—with, for exa m p l e, hig h - p rofile cases of ra nsom being paid in the Philippine s,

c o nc e s s ion after conc e s s ion re c e ntly ma de by the Ind ian go v e r n me nt, and an almo s t

c o ns t a nt stream of ra ns o ms being paid in Colombia — l e a d i ng to a need for new me a ns

Twice as many people died in

international terrorist atta c k s

in the second half of the

nineties than died in the first

half, even though the to ta l

number of incidents had

declined ove ra l l .

The downside to the grow i n g

community of counterterro r i s m

experts has been the tendency

to gloss over the varied political contexts that give rise to

t e r rorist acts, exacerbating 

the temptation to ove r s i m p l i f y

the means we must adopt to

counter them. 
4

of de t e r re nce and re s p o nse by both go v e r n me nt autho r i t ies conc e r ned about their citi z e ns and private companies int e rested in pro t e c t i ng their employees. Second was the

f r ig ht e n i ng specter of che m ical, bio l o g ical, nuc l e a r, and ra d io l o g ical (CBNR) terro r i s m

attack, particularly in the United States. With arg uably inc reased access to weapons

of mass de s t r uc t ion, such as “loose nu kes” from the fo r mer Soviet Un ion and potent ially lethal (and poorly cont rolled) bio l o g ical patho ge ns, the da nger of use of the s e

me a ns was cause for great concern. In a world of gro w i ng re l ig ious and ide o l o g ic a l l y

motivated terrorism, whe re terrorist inc ide nts have in re c e nt years aimed toward mo re

c a s ua l t ies per inc ide nt with less accountability to tra d i t io nal cons t i t u e nc ie s, the

t e m p t a t ion to use CBRN weaponry was especially worrisome.

Pa r t ic i p a nts grappled with the gro w i ng perc e p t ion of threat of attack by CBNR

w e a p o ns, and the appro p r iate re s p o nse to the threat (and its perc e p t ion). The chall e nge of assessing the like l i hood of the use of these weapons was discussed, with

s o me people arg u i ng that the shift from tra d i t io nal politically motivated terrorists to

t hose motivated by open-ended re l ig ious or apocryphal aims was an important re ason why these weapons mig ht be tempting to use. Mo re than one person me nt io ne d

that assessing the objective level of threat was not as important as the horrible cons e q u e nces that would ensue if they were used. Depend i ng upon the type of weapon,

t he death toll could be a matter of tens of tho u s a nd s, they warne d, re s u l t i ng not only

in nearly unima g i nable carna ge, but also a funda me ntal challenge to de mo c ra t ic go ve r n me nt and civil socie t y. We must, at almost any cost, minimize that possibility. Still

o t hers felt that the threat was grossly overstated: the technical challenges of CBNR

w e a p o ns, combined with the ease with which mo re tra d i t io nal convent io nal weapons

can cause mass casua l t ie s, ma de the like l i hood of their use very small. The fear that

is created by public speculation, and the waste of scarce re s o u rces ne e ded elsewhe re,

w e re much mo re da nge rous than the threat itself, they arg u e d.

O t hers count e red that the question was not whe t her CBNR attacks would occur, but

c o u l d t hey occur. Te r rorists have unpre c e de nted capability and access to the me a ns of

attack, particularly by bio l o g ical weapons: it was not the “de ma nd side,” but the “supply side” that should be focused upon. In any case, polic ies that are good for hu ma ni t y, such as global epide m io l o g ical mo n i t o r i ng, should be vigo rously pursued, sinc e

t heir benefits would pertain even without an attack. Ano t her partic i p a nt added that

he failed to see how such commo ns e ns e, ne e ded inno v a t io ns as tra i n i ng hospital pers o n nel and pre p a r i ng local re s p o nders would in any case be a waste. 

T he re was no cons e nsus re a c hed on the question of count e r t e r rorist efforts dire c ted against the use of CBNR weapons, with the fault lines ultimately drawn over the

q u e s t ion of whe t her we were overre a c t i ng to long s t a nd i ng evolutio nary changes or

e nt e r i ng a ne w, mo re “terrifying” era of terrorism. 

F i na l l y, partic i p a nts debated whe t her terrorism could in fact claim stra t e g ic succ e s s e s. After years of study, ma ny experts have argued that in the post-colonial world,

while the re have been tactical suc c e s s e s, terrorism has no w he re been a stra t e g ic succ e s s. Some partic i p a nts argued that this no longer seemed to be true. For exa m p l e,

t he case of No r t hern Ire l a nd mig ht be cons ide red a stra t e g ic suc c e s s, since the Good

F r iday accords would not have been ent e red into if not for the fact that the IRA’s terrorism had caused a great deal of pain and bro u g ht the political situa t ion to a ne w

p o i nt. Like w i s e, Is rael’s re t reat from Lebanon was arg uably a dra ma t ic example of the

s uccess of terrorism, also leading ind i rectly to the Middle East peace pro c e s s.

Still, the re was cons ide rable optimism amo ng experts about the limited ex t e nt to

w h ich terrorism could be employed as a me a ns to an end over the long run. Int e r nat io na l l y, an inc re a s i ng dissocia t ion of states from terrorism was alre a dy appare nt, as

well as an inc re a s i ng willing ness of states to combine their efforts to defeat or disc o u ra ge terrorist org a n i z a t io ns. Osama bin Laden was alre a dy cre a t i ng an allia nce of

states against him and against terrorism mo re ge ne ra l l y. In the United States, the

O k l a ho ma City bombing splint e red ra d ical ant i - f e de ral go v e r n me nt org a n i z a t io ns by

In a world of growing re l i g i o u s

and ideologically motiva t e d

t e r rorism, where terrorist 

incidents have in recent ye a r s

aimed towa rd more casualties

per incident with less 

a c c o u n tability to tra d i t i o n a l

c o n s t i t u e n c i e s, the tempta t i o n

to use CBRN weaponry wa s

especially wo r r i s o m e.

I n t e r n a t i o n a l l y, an incre a s i n g

dissociation of states from 

t e r rorism was alre a d y

a p p a rent, as well as an

i n c reasing willingness of sta t e s

to combine their efforts to

defeat or discourage terro r i s t

o rg a n i z a t i o n s.
5

fo rc i ng cons ide ra t ion of the hideous ex t re mes to which some ant i - go v e r n me nt sent ime nts could lead. If some terrorist org a n i z a t io ns were inc re a s i ngly achie v i ng fo r ms of

s t ra t e g ic suc c e s s, others were severely unde r m i n i ng their long-term cause by spawni ng inc reased count e r t e r rorist activity and wide s p read re v u l s ion at their me t ho d s

a mo ng cons t i t u e nt groups that they purport to attract or to serve. In this stra nge

world of action and re a c t ion, major terrorist suc c e s s e s, ra t her than leading to a gro wi ng political mo me ntum supportive of a cause, could sow the seeds of fra g me nt a t io n

a nd organized count e r - re a c t ion. 

Above all, ge ne ra l i z a t io ns about changes in the threat are fra u g ht with pitfa l l s.

C o u nt e r t e r rorist techniques are amo ng the most complex and subtle of tools, sinc e

p e rc e p t io ns of the threat to which they re s p o nd can be as important as the thre a t

i t s e l f .

C o u n t e r t e r rorism Lessons Learned

D e c a des of ex p e r ie nce ind icate that the most effective count e r t e r rorist efforts are ultimately stealthy, inc re me ntal, pra g ma t ic, and de f e ns i v e, and they may only ma rg i na l l y

affect the terrorists’ perceived pay-off. It is ex t re mely difficult to raise the costs of terrorism sig n i f ic a nt l y, since terrorists only need a few successes on the ma rg i ns to ma ke

a political point. The costs of disruption and de f e nse are much greater than the costs

of opportunistic attacks. Ultima t e l y, terrorists are spoilers—Ame r ic a ns and their allie s

c a n not be safe everywhe re, all the time. And the United States, while the most powerful na t ion on earth, has not been very effective in re c e nt years at conduc t i ng opera t io ns against no n - go v e r n me nt actors or even, in some cases, ind i v idual terro r i s t s. In

re c e nt years, the threat has evolved much mo re quickly than have U.S. political and

b udgetary re s p o ns e s, and we are fo rced now to learn very quickly and to ma ke up fo r

lost time.

C o u nt e r t e r rorism is typically an area of frustra t ion because it tends to be re a c t i v e.

O ne partic i p a nt pointed to the shifting landscape of terrorist threats and the cyclic a l

waves of count e r t e r rorist re s p o ns e s, from skyjackings in the 1960s, to the ho s t a ge

i nc ide nts of the late 1960s and 1970s, to the U.S. focus on state sponsors in the

1 9 7 0 s, to the conc e nt ra t ion on phy s ical security in the 1980s (after the 1983 bombi ng of the Ma r i ne barracks in Beirut), to the fear of attack with CBNR weapons toda y.

This is a cause for re f l e c t ion on the dy na m ic int e ra c t ion between terrorism and count e r t e r rorism, cause and effect, subsequently leading to cause and effect again. To what

ex t e nt are the count e r t e r rorist polic ies that we employ shifting the threat from one

form to ano t he r, so that even “success” against one type of threat leads to mu t a t io n

i nto ano t her form of threat? Even when we are successful, are we me rely shifting the

t h reat “down the road” to other venu e s, pushing perpetrators to develop mo re inno vative me t ho d s, and enc o u ra g i ng the tende ncy to maximize the carna ge in each attack?

In this re g a rd, one partic i p a nt me nt io ned that avia t ion terrorism had ge ne rally been

c o ns ide red an area of success in count e r t e r rorism, with the number of skyjackings and

b o m b i ngs dro p p i ng precipitously in the 1990s; the events of September 11 put this

o b s e r v a t ion into painful re l ief and were a re m i nder of how da nge rous it can be to

ex t rapolate from historical ex p e r ie nce and nu me r ical tre nd s. 

T he re were two other major areas of focus in discussing re s p o nses to terrorism: the

use of law enfo rc e me nt techniques, and the effectiveness of military re s p o ns e s. The s e

will be discussed in turn.

First, several partic i p a nts argued fo rcefully for primary re l ia nce upon law enfo rc eme nt as the most effective longer term re s p o nse to terro r i s t s, asserting that it is the

most int e l l e c t ually cons i s t e nt me a ns of de a l i ng with terrorists’ complex political mo t iv a t io ns or fa na t icism. Law enfo rc e me nt, with its focus on the illegal act itself, re mo v e s

t he temptation to try to judge between just and unjust mo t i v a t io ns, legitimate and

Decades of experience indicate

that the most effective

c o u n t e r t e r rorist efforts are

ultimately stealthy, incre m e ntal, pra g m a t i c, and defensive,

and they may only marg i n a l l y

affect the terrorists’ perc e i ve d

p a y - of f .

E ven when we are successful,

a re we merely shifting the

t h reat “down the road” to

other ve n u e s, pushing perpetrators to develop more innova t i ve

m e t h o d s, and encouraging the

t e n d e n cy to maximize the 

carnage in each attack? 
6

i l l e g i t i mate conc e s s io ns, worthy and unw o r t hy political causes: the re can be no

p ro g ress toward social justice by a n y de f i n i t ion in an atmo s p he re of vio l e nce and ins ec u r i t y. Mo re o v e r, if autho r i t ies establish the perc e p t ion that these acts may be carrie d

out with impunity, everyone suffers. This is particularly important in situa t io ns suc h

as that in No r t hern Ire l a nd, ano t her partic i p a nt arg u e d, whe re of f ic ials have been

tempted to downplay the criminal justice and security aspects to focus on the polit ics of mo v i ng the process fo r w a rd. It is cruc ial that of f ic ials not unde r m i ne public

c o n f ide nce in the rule of law, for then they are actually unde r m i n i ng the peace pro c e s s

t hey are trying to pro mo t e, because they are not able to ens u re the security of the

majority of the population. Others argued that the ado p t ion of a peace pro c e s s, political and socio - e c o no m ic re fo r ms, and other pro p hy l a c t ic me a s u res are de s i rable alternatives to the criminal law approach, because they address the root causes of terro r i s t

activity over time. Legal inflexibility pre v e nts the kinds of conc e s s io ns that are ne cessary in the short run to ne go t iate a longer term solution. In re s p o ns e, pro p o ne nt s

of the criminal law approach vigo rously disagreed: if go v e r n me nts send sig nals that

t hey are only int e rested in conc i l iatory activitie s, then they are taking actio ns that

a re inc o ns i s t e nt with the principles of de mo c racy and very da nge ro u s. Ultima t e l y,

na t io nal polic ies and laws are the building blocks to combat terro r i s m .

A second lively debate ignited over the use of military fo rc e. The use of military

fo rc e, on the one hand, was seen as the only way to fo rcibly and dra ma t ically pre e m p t

a nd disrupt plots and to de mo ns t rate that you can attack terrorists’ assets with speed

a nd flex i b i l i t y. Some partic i p a nts argued that these me a s u res are vitally important no t

only in the short run, whe re elaborate opera t io ns are phy s ically de s t ro y e d, but also in

t he long run, since terrorists gain a he a l t hy respect for the ability of the United States

(in particular) not only to re t a l iate but also to preempt. Arg uably this respect tra nslates to de t e r re nce of future activities and it also re a s s u res the Ame r ican public that

t he United States is not helpless in the face of asymme t r ical thre a t s. Other partic ip a nts arg u e d, ho w e v e r, that the re c o rd shows that the use of military fo rce is ra re l y

s uccessful at stopping terrorism over time, since it tends to drive ex i s t i ng groups even

f u r t her unde rg ro u nd, can lock a go v e r n me nt into an unpro ductive tit-for-tat escalat ion with terro r i s t s, and can inc rease int e r na t io nal alie na t ion against the Un i t e d

S t a t e s. Dra ma t ic cruise missile attacks, for exa m p l e, can inflame public opinion in

s o me third world count r ies (and even amo ng some of our allies), affirming the belie f

that the United States is arro g a nt, takes too much unilateral action, and has too muc h

sway in the world. The iro n ic result can be an overall inc rease in political sympathy

for the terrorists or their cause. 

In mo re pra c t ical terms, mo re o v e r, the use of military fo rce has become mo re diff icult because of evolutio ns in the threat. Te r rorist groups are inc re a s i ngly amo r p ho u s,

mo re likely to use evolving info r ma t ion techno l o g ies and to rely less upon tra d i t io nal org a n i z a t io nal struc t u re s, thus ma k i ng it much harder to find targets to attack mili t a r i l y. Some t i mes perpetrators come toge t her temporarily only for the purpose of

a t t a c k i ng a target, as was the case in the first World Tra de Center bombing. Furthe rmo re, after attacks, terrorist org a n i z a t io ns are claiming credit less often than was

o nce the case: it is inc re a s i ngly difficult to ide ntify the perpetrators and thus to kno w

a g a i nst whom to re t a l ia t e.

Pa r t ic i p a nts emphasized that terrorism is a tactic, a me a ns, not a single perpetrator or an end in itself. This may at first seem a pede s t r ian observation; ho w e v e r, suc h

t h i n k i ng cautio ns against the wide s p read tende ncy either: (1) to over-personalize the

t h reat, as, for exa m p l e, an ind i v idual (Osama bin Laden) or ide o l o g y / g roup (re l ig io u s

f u nda me ntalists); or (2) to rely overmuch on military ana l o g ies (the “war” against terrorism) that imply the possibility of a vic t o r y. Both are attractive tools to public i z e

t he threat and gain support in a de mo c ra c y, but both must be used with great care

because they can ultimately serve the goals of terrorists and unde r m i ne efforts to disc o u ra ge their tactic s. Ta rge t i ng our efforts against an ind i v idual leads to the perc e pLaw enfo rcement, with 

its focus on the illegal act

itself, re m oves the tempta t i o n

to try to judge between just

and unjust motiva t i o n s,

legitimate and illegitimate

c o n c e s s i o n s, wo r t hy and 

u nwo r t hy political causes:

t h e re can be no pro g re s s

towa rd social justice by a ny

definition in an atmosphere of

violence and insecurity.

The use of military fo rce is

ra rely successful at sto p p i n g

t e r rorism over time, since 

it tends to drive ex i s t i n g

g roups even further

u n d e rg round, can lock a

g overnment into an unpro d u ct i ve tit-fo r - tat escalation with

t e r ro r i s t s, and can incre a s e

international alienation

against the United Sta t e s.
7

t ion that if that person is killed or captured the threat is over; and using military

a na l o g ies leads to a belief that the battle or war can be effectively fo u g ht with tra d it io nal military me a ns alone and a clear-cut victory achie v e d. These are da nge rous illus io ns that work against effective count e r t e r rorism. 

T he use of military fo rce is only effective as part of a mu l t i faceted campaign along

with social, econo m ic, legal, and political eleme nt s. Un fo r t u na t e l y, ho w e v e r, military

fo rce is often used because it is the most imme d ia t e, de mo ns t rable way to re s p o nd to

an outra geous event. When a major int e r na t io nal inc ide nt occurs, a dra ma t ic military

re s p o nse may be fully justifie d, but short-term fixes must not be permitted to overt a ke or unde r m i ne longer-term stra t e g ic int e re s t s. The of t e n - drawn cont rast to criminal law appro a c he s, mo re o v e r, is a false dic ho t o my. It is hard to ma i ntain a sustaine d

military campaign, and law enfo rc e me nt is the best way to build a fo u nda t ion fo r

i nt e r na t io nal coopera t ion over time. The point is that both me t hods must be

e m p l o y e d, and the belief that effective count e r t e r rorism must reflect primarily one or

t he other is na r ro w, count e r p ro duc t i v e, and reflective of bure a uc ra t ic inflex i b i l i t y. 

O rg a n i z a t io nal and bure a uc ra t ic factors are cruc ial stumbling blocks in this new enviro n me nt: so much of the Ame r ican count e r t e r rorism struc t u re is fra g me nted into pie c e s

of the who l e, de s ig ned to re s p o nd to a particular eleme nt of the “threat” (for exa m p l e,

“ do me s t ic” versus “int e r na t io nal,” “law enfo rc e me nt” versus “military,” “immig ra t io n ”

versus “int e l l ige nce”) and unequipped to deal with setting bro a der stra t e g ic prio r i t ie s.

T he early 20th century philosophies that were the bedrock of our bure a uc ra c y, org a n i z e d

a l o ng func t io nal lines and protective of ind i v idual turf and missio ns, must be re p l a c e d.

An effective re s p o nse must combine bure a uc ra t ic func t io ns in a mo re flexible way, in the

s a me sense that the terrorist networks that have carried out these attacks are fluid, ad

ho c, and dy na m ic.

Past hig h - p rofile U.S. re s p o nses have tended to be cathartic, sho r t - l i v e d, and aime d

as much at re a s s u r i ng do me s t ic aud ie nces as at unde r m i n i ng the terrorist threat long -

term. Longer term efforts have focused on disruption of terrorist activity, whic h

re ma i ns mostly an invisible campaign. This problem is exacerbated in open de mo c rat ic socie t ies like the United States, whe re the need to build political support of t e n

t a kes pre c e de nce over less visible stra t e g ie s. Gene ra l l y, public attent ion rises as event s

occur; then the re are periods of quiet. One expert spoke about the serious pro b l e ms

A me r ica’s penc h a nt for publicity pre s e nts for other int e r na t io nal partners: public proc l a i m i ng of int e r na t io nal coopera t ion often hurts it, and opportunistic leaks enda nge r

s o u rc e s. Int e r na t io nal partners become wary of sharing info r ma t ion with the Un i t e d

S t a t e s, which ultimately hampers joint efforts to defeat common thre a t s. And the

h ig h - p rofile target pre s e nted by the United States and its assets also deters potent ia l

p a r t ners from opening the mselves by associa t ion to new terrorist thre a t s.

C o n c l u s i o n

U l t i ma t e l y, the most important the me to eme rge from the workshop was the need fo r

b a l a nc e, bre a dth, and long-term cons i s t e ncy in our approach to count e r t e r rorism. The

most effective me a s u res are those that are developed in the cont ext of a mu l t i fa c e t e d

p o l ic y, with political, legal, social, diploma t ic, econo m ic, and military eleme nt s. Exper ie nce shows that overemphasis on any one eleme nt, such as military re s p o ns e s, can

lead to an unde r m i n i ng of other eleme nt s, such as politic a l / d i p l o ma t ic tie s, social prog ra ms, and legal sanc t io ns. Like w i s e, short-term “fixes” such as cruise missile attacks

or hig h - p rofile spend i ng initiatives must be balanced with long-term, inc re me nt a l

b u i l d i ng of count e r t e r rorism pro g ra ms that establish depth of kno w l e dge, political and

s o c ial conne c t io ns, lang ua ge capabilitie s, cultural fa m i l ia r i t y, and int e r - go v e r n me nt a l

c o o p e ra t ion. Regardless of the level of do me s t ic political int e rest over time, the re is

no short-cut to effective count e r t e r rorism me a s u re s — a l t hough the political will in the

Short-term “fixes” such as

cruise missile attacks or highp rofile spending initiative s

must be balanced with longterm, incre m e n tal building of

c o u n t e r t e r rorism pro g rams that

e s tablish depth of know l e d g e,

political and social connect i o n s, language capabilities,

c u l t u ral fa m i l i a r i t y, and interg ove r n m e n tal coopera t i o n .
United States for a sustaine d, effective, and broad-based re s p o nse is unlikely to flag

in the fo reseeable future. In the aftermath of this na t io nal tra u ma, the re is gre a t e r

hope at least that the lessons of count e r t e r rorism will be stud ie d, ex p a nde d, and

me t ho d ically applie d.

R e c o m m e n d a t i o n s

• We need to cont i nually sho re up our int e r na t io nal coalition in order to ant ic i p a t e,

p re v e nt, and deter terrorist attacks, not just react to them. Even if it does not yie l d

i m me d iate dra ma t ic re s u l t s, coopera t ion can help to perpetuate an int e r na t io na l

c l i mate of conde m na t ion of all terrorist actio ns.

• T he United States needs to ma ke clear that it opposes terrorism no matter whe re

it arises. Int e r na t io nal count e r t e r rorist coopera t ion should be ex p a nde d, not just

a mo ng tra d i t io nal developed states, but also with less developed count r ies and

even to some de g ree with so-called “states of conc e r n . ”

• T he fig ht against terrorism should be seen as a long-term struggle, not susceptible

to a “quick fix”: the goal should be to ma na ge ex p e c t a t io ns, ke e p i ng them re a l i st ic and avoid i ng a crisis me ntality that is ultimately satisfying to terro r i s t s.

• T he United States should work to enhance int e r na t io nal and bilateral coopera t io n

with other states, particularly in areas such as int e l l ige nc e, public diploma c y, ant i -

t e r rorism me a s u re s, cont rol of borders and territory, law enfo rc e me nt techniques,

a nd count e r t e r rorist tra i n i ng. To the ex t e nt that the United States is perceived as

re s p o nd i ng unilaterally to the threat, it will also inc re a s i ngly be perceived as a singular target. The United States has impressive military capabilitie s, but cathartic

s hort-term attacks can boome ra ng into complex long-term political lia b i l i t ie s,

unless they are carefully balanced by the full ra nge of available count e r t e r ro r i s t

t o o l s.

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our website (www. u s i p . o rg), which has an

o n l i ne edition of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related websites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 8 0