alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT 32.1**Section1350 Certification of Chief Executive Officer     Inconnection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A of Syntax-Brillian Corporation (the“Company”) for the quarter ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and ExchangeCommission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Vincent F. Sollitto Jr., Chief Executive Officerof the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 ofthe Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that: (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78o(d)); and  (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.        February 16, 2007            /s/ Vincent F. Sollitto Jr.   Vincent F. Sollitto Jr.   Chief Executive Officer
COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton

HEYWARD JOSEPH TUMLIN MEMORANDUM OPINION * v. Record No. 1603-97-3 PER CURIAM NOVEMBER 18, 1997 THE GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY AND TRAVELERS INDEMNITY COMPANY OF ILLINOIS

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION (Heyward J. Tumlin, pro se , on brief). (Gregory T. Casker; Daniel, Vaughan, Medley & Smitherman, on brief), for appellees.

Heyward J. Tumlin (claimant) contends that the Workers' Compensation Commission erred in finding that the applicable statute of limitations contained in Code § 65.2-708 barred the commission from considering claimant's April 15, 1997 application alleging a change-in-condition. Upon reviewing the record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the commission's decision. Rule 5A:27. On May 18, 1990, claimant sustained a compensable injury by accident. Claimant received temporary total disability benefits, pursuant to an award, from May 19, 1990 through August 12, 1990. In a July 25, 1995 opinion, the commission upheld the deputy commissioner's award of permanent partial disability benefits for a period of 56.25 weeks beginning June 11, 1991 and ending July

* Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.2 8, 1992. On April 15, 1997, claimant filed an application requesting reinstatement of compensation benefits. The commission denied his application, finding it was not timely filed pursuant to Code § 65.2-708. Code § 65.2-708 clearly and unequivocally provides that an award shall not be reviewed "after twenty-four months from the last day for which compensation was paid, pursuant to an award under this title . . . ." This section required that claimant's application alleging a change in condition be filed within twenty-four months from July 8, 1992, the last day for which compensation was paid. Claimant filed his application on April 15, 1997, more than twenty-four months after July 8, 1992. Accordingly, the commission did not err in finding that claimant's April 15, 1997 application was not timely filed, and, therefore, could not be considered by the commission. For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. Affirmed.
#### Lucille DeStrange, Respondent, v Allan H. Lind et al., Appellants.

[716 NYS2d 105]

—In an action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Colabella, J.), entered September 27, 1999, as granted the plaintiffs cross motion for a protective order limiting the disclosure of her medical records to five years before the accrual of her cause of action herein. ,

Ordered that the order is affirmed insofar as appealed from, with costs.

By commencing this action to recover damages for medical malpractice, the plaintiff waived the physician-patient privilege with respect to her relevant past medical history *(see,*CPLR 3121; *Coddington v Lisk,*249 AD2d 817). That waiver must be read in conjunction with the mandate of CPLR 3101 (a), which provides for disclosure of all matter “material and *345necessary” to the defense of the action *(see, Andon v 302-304 Mott St.*Assocs., 94 NY2d 740). The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in limiting the defendants’ access to the plaintiffs past medical records to the five-year period before the alleged acts of malpractice in controversy, as the defendants failed to demonstrate that access to earlier medical records would result in the discovery of admissible or relevant evidence (see, *King v Salvation Army,*240 AD2d 473; *Manley v New York City Hous. Auth.,*190 AD2d 600).

The defendants’ remaining contentions are without merit. O’Brien, J. P., Thompson, S. Miller and Feuerstein, JJ., concur.
Editorial Note on Part 249
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 249 appear at 57 FR 36501, Aug. 13, 1992, and 57 FR 47409, Oct. 16, 1992.

§ 249.308a Form 10-Q, for quarterly and transition reports under sections 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. ( a ) Form 10-Q shall be used for quarterly reports under section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)), required to be filed pursuant to § 240.13a-13 or § 240.15d-13 of this chapter. A quarterly report on this form pursuant to § 240.13a-13 or § 240.15d-13 of this chapter shall be filed within the following period after the end of the first three fiscal quarters of each fiscal year, but no quarterly report need be filed for the fourth quarter of any fiscal year: ( 1 ) 40 days after the end of the fiscal quarter for large accelerated filers and accelerated filers (as defined in § 240.12b-2 of this chapter); and
( 2 ) 45 days after the end of the fiscal quarter for all other registrants.
( b ) Form 10-Q also shall be used for transition and quarterly reports filed pursuant to § 240.13a-10 or § 240.15d-10 of this chapter. Such transition or quarterly reports shall be filed in accordance with the requirements set forth in § 240.13a-10 or § 240.15d-10 of this chapter applicable when the registrant changes its fiscal year end.
[67 FR 58506, Sept. 16, 2002, as amended at 69 FR 68236, Nov. 23, 2004; 70 FR 76642, Dec. 27, 2005] Editorial Note
Editorial Note: For Federal Register citations affecting Form 10-Q, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at *www.govinfo.gov .*
508.802 Policy. 		    The Director of the Reproduction and Visual Arts Division in the Office of Communications (X) is both GSA’s: 			       				         					          (a)  Central printing authority. 				         				         					          (b)  Liaison with the Joint Committee on Printing and the Public Printer on all matters related to printing. 	  **Parent topic:** Subpart 508.8 - Acquisition of Printing and Related Supplies
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 07-6078

BASIL W. AKBAR,

Petitioner - Appellant,

versus

ANTHONY J. PADULA, Warden; HENRY MCMASTER;

Attorney General of the State of South

Carolina,

Respondents - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Beaufort. David C. Norton, District Judge.

(9:06-cv-0097-DCN)

Submitted: September 26, 2007 Decided: October 10, 2007

Before WILKINSON, MICHAEL, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Basil Akbar, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Derrick K.

McFarland, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
 *

We agree with Appellees that Akbar’s second post-conviction

motion filed on June 28, 1996 tolled the one-year limitations

period until March 14, 2001. The district court’s contrary

conclusion was error. Nonetheless, Akbar’s § 2254 petition is

still untimely.

- 2 -

PER CURIAM:

Basil Akbar appeals the district court’s orders accepting

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and denying relief on

his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition and denying reconsideration of

that order. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible

error. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated

by the district court.*

 Akbar v. Padula, No. 9:06-cv-00907-DCN

(D.S.C. Dec. 18, 2006; Jan. 16, 2007). We dispense with oral

argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

presented in the materials before the court and argument would not

aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 410 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide for compensation 

to States incarcerating undocumented aliens charged with a felony or 

two or more misdemeanors. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 24, 2011 

Ms. LINDA T. SA ́NCHEZ of California (for herself, Mr. BERMAN, Mrs. CAPPS, 

Mrs. DAVIS of California, Mr. FARR, Mr. FILNER, Mr. GRIJALVA, and 

Mr. SHERMAN) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on the Judiciary 

A BILL 

To amend the Immigration and Nationality Act to provide 

for compensation to States incarcerating undocumented 

aliens charged with a felony or two or more misdemeanors. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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2 

•HR 410 IH

1 SECTION 1. ASSISTANCE FOR STATES INCARCERATING UN2 DOCUMENTED ALIENS CHARGED WITH CER3 TAIN CRIMES. 

4 Section 241(i)(3)(A) of the Immigration and Nation5 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1231(i)(3)(A)) is amended by inserting 

6 ‘‘charged with or’’ before ‘‘convicted’’. 

Æ 


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**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, Polly E. Boe, Chief Financial Officer, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 3, 2005 of RedEnvelope, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe registrant and have:a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b. [paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release 33-8238]; andc. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presentedin this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd. in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting thatoccurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting;and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrols over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s internal controls over financial reporting.Date:August 17, 2005*By: /s/ POLLY E. BOE*
I 

112TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4015 

To repeal the conservation stewardship program of the Department of 

Agriculture. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 13, 2012 

Mr. SCOTT of South Carolina introduced the following bill; which was referred 

to the Committee on Agriculture 

A BILL 

To repeal the conservation stewardship program of the 

Department of Agriculture. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Responsible Farming 

5 Act of 2012’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds that repealing the conservation stew8 ardship program of the Department of Agriculture while 

9 honoring all stewardship contracts in effect on the date 


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•HR 4015 IH

1 of the enactment of this Act would reduce the deficit by 

2 $10,500,000,000 over a ten-year period. 

3 SEC. 3. REPEAL OF CONSERVATION STEWARDSHIP PRO4 GRAM. 

5 (a) REPEAL.—Subchapter B of chapter 2 of subtitle 

6 D of title XII of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 

7 3838d et seq.) is repealed. 

8 (b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.—Section 1241(a)(3) 

9 of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 U.S.C. 3841(a)(3)) 

10 is amended— 

11 (1) by striking ‘‘(A)’’; and 

12 (2) by striking subparagraph (B). 

13 (c) EFFECT ON EXISTING CONTRACTS.—Nothing in 

14 this section shall be construed to affect the validity or the 

15 terms and conditions of any stewardship contract under 

16 section 1238F of the Food Security Act of 1985 (16 

17 U.S.C. 3838f) as in effect on the date before the date of 

18 the enactment of this Act that was entered into on or be19 fore such date. 

Æ 


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#### Eugene A. Hegy, Respondent, *v.*William A. White & Sons et al., Appellants.

Shientag, J.

(concurring). I concur in the result here reached in view of the special circumstances presented in this ease. I wish to point out, however, that the question as to whether the plaintiff or the defendant shall first be examined before trial is one which primarily rests within the sound discretion of the Special Term. The case of *Dorros, Inc.,*v. *Dorros Bros.*(274. App. Div. 11) which gave to a defendant in commercial litigation a general right of examination before trial as broad in essence as that possessed by a plaintiff (and not limited to matters concerning which the defendant had the burden of proof or of proceeding) in no way indicates who is entitled to priority of examination. Ordinarily, and in the absence of special circumstances, the plaintiff who has the burden of proof on the entire case is entitled to examine the defendant before the latter proceeds with his examination before trial of the plaintiff. Ordinarily also, the priority of examinations before trial, as between plaintiff and defendant, will not be determined on the basis of who made the first application, particularly when both applications come on to be heard at the same time. A lawsuit is not a game or a race between litigants for pretrial relief.

Glennon, J. P., Dore, Cohn and Callahan, JJ.,. concur in decision; Shientag, J., concurs in the result, in opinion.

In the light of the facts in this case we think defendants should have the right to examine the plaintiff before plaintiff examines defendants. Orders unanimously modified accordingly and, as so modified, affirmed, with one bill of $20 costs and disbursements to defendants-appellants. Settle order on notice.
#### In the Matter of Robert Saltzman et al., Copartners Doing Business as Grant Square Liquor Store, et al., Appellants, against John F. O’Connell et al., Constituting the State Liquor Authority, et al., Respondents.

Motion referred to the court that rendered the decision. Present — Nolan, P. J., Adel, Wenzel, MaeCrate and Beldock, JJ. Motion for reargument denied, without costs. Motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied. The time for respondents to serve and file answers to the petition is extended for ten days from the entry of the order hereon. Present- — Nolan, P. J., Adel, Wenzel and

Beldock, JJ.; Carswell, J., not voting. [See «míe, p. 732.]
#### § 274.201 Form N-MFP, portfolio holdings of money market funds.

This form shall be used by registered open-end management investment companies that are regulated as money market funds under § 270.2a-7 of this chapter to file reports pursuant to § 270.30b1-7 of this chapter no later than the fifth business day of each month.

[75 FR 10118, Mar. 4, 2010]

###### Editorial Note

#### Editorial Note:

For Federal Register citations affecting Form N-MFP, see the List of CFR Sections Affected, which appears in the Finding Aids section of the printed volume and at *www.govinfo.gov.*
#### In the Matter of the Claim of John Arpa, Petitioner, v Joe David, as Superintendent of Greene Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

[821 NYS2d 495]

*1141Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Albany County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner was present at an unauthorized meeting of a group of inmates during which he questioned the inmates about a theft in the dormitory. A fist fight subsequently ensued. As a result, two misbehavior reports were filed against petitioner, one charging him with engaging in an unauthorized assembly and making an unauthorized address, and the second charging him with fighting and engaging in violent conduct. A tier III disciplinary hearing was subsequently conducted concerning both reports. At the conclusion of the hearing, petitioner was found guilty of all charges. The determination was upheld on administrative appeal and this CPLR article 78 proceeding ensued.

Initially, respondents concede, and we agree, that the charges of fighting and engaging in violent conduct are not supported by substantial evidence and that the determination must be annulled with respect to these charges *(see Matter of Green v Goord,*26 AD3d 562, 563 [2006]). On the other hand, that part of the determination finding petitioner guilty of engaging in an unauthorized assembly and making an unauthorized address is supported by substantial evidence consisting of the first misbehavior report, the hearing testimony and the confidential documentation prepared in connection with the investigation of the incident *(see Matter of Fletcher v Goord,*16 AD3d 731, 732 [2005]). However, inasmuch as a loss of good time was imposed as part of the original penalty, the matter must be remitted to the Commissioner of Correctional Services for a redetermination of the penalty with respect to the remaining violations *(see Matter of Green v Goord, supra*at 563; *Matter of Williams v Goord,*301 AD2d 983, 984 [2003]). Petitioner’s other contentions have not been preserved for our review.

Crew III, J.P, Peters, Spain, Rose and Kane, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is modified, without costs, by annulling so much thereof as found petitioner guilty of fighting and engaging in violent conduct and imposed a penalty; petition granted to that extent, the Commissioner of Correctional Services is directed to expunge all references thereto from petitioner’s institutional record, and matter remitted to the Commissioner of Correctional Services for an administrative re-determination of the penalty imposed on the remaining violations; and, as so modified, confirmed.
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT
                            WILL NOT REVIEW COASTAL'S
                              ROYALTY INTEREST CASE


         APALACHICOLA,  FL, Jan. 30, 1998 - Coastal  Petroleum  Company said the
Florida  Supreme Court has declined to review an appellate  court ruling against
the Company in its royalty-interest claim against the State.

         The suit, initiated in 1990, had sought compensation from the State for
its  expropriation of Coastal's  royalty  interests in any petroleum or minerals
that might be found on 2.5 million tidal acres along the Gulf Coast.

         Florida's  First District  Court of Appeal  ruled against  Coastal last
August,  the Company  said.

         According to a  Coastal spokesman,  the  Company's  ongoing  effort  to
obtain an offshore drilling permit involves working-interest acreage that is not
affected by the high court's ruling.

       The spokesman  further  noted  that  Coastal  is  reviewing  its options,
including a possible appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court.

         Coastal  Petroleum  Company is a  majority-held  subsidiary  of Coastal
Caribbean Oils & Minerals, Ltd. (Boston:  CCO-B; CCO-BN).


                   Contact: Phillip W. Ware, at (904) 653-2732
**EXHIBIT 31.2****CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 302 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**I, Polly E. Boe, certify that:1. I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q for the period ended July 2, 2006 of RedEnvelope, Inc.;2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact oromit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstancesunder which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by thisreport;3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operationsand cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintainingdisclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) forthe registrant and have:a. designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls andprocedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating tothe registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within thoseentities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;b. [paragraph omitted pursuant to SEC Release 33-8238];c. evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presentedin this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures,as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; andd. disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that has materiallyaffected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the auditcommittee of the registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):a. all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internalcontrols over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’sability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; andb. any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have asignificant role in the registrant’s