S tojan Cerov i c

Serbia and Montenegro

R e i n t e g ration, Divo rc e, or Something Else?

B r i e f l y. . .

• As the Fede ral Republic of Yu go s l a v ia’s (FRY) new pre s ide nt, Vojislav Ko s t u n ica, and

t he Demo c ra t ic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) attempt to guide the FRY through the tra ns i t ion to de mo c ra t ic rule in the post-Milosevic era, the big gest challenge has come

f rom Mont e ne g ro, Serbia’s junior partner in the FRY. 

• Mo nt e ne g ro’s go v e r n me nt does not recognize Ko s t u n ica and cont i nues to discuss the

c o u ntry’s own inde p e nde nc e. Yet ma ny Mo nt e ne g r i ns hold out the possibility that

t heir country can re main in some sort of "associa t ion" with Serbia that gives both

members substant ial autono my.

• Po s t - M i l o s e v ic Serbia appears open to ne go t ia t io ns with Mo nt e ne g ro conc e r n i ng a ne w

c o ns t i t u t io nal arra nge me nt, but it should not be taken for gra nted that Belgra de will

be unc o nd i t io nally int e rested in any form of community or cont ract with Mo nt e ne g ro .

• Over time, Slobodan Milosevic inc reased pre s s u re on Mo nt e ne g ro, fo rc i ng Mo nt e negrin pre s ide nt Milo Djuka no v ic to embrace a pro - i nde p e nde nce stanc e. Thu s, for the

past two years, Mo nt e negrin of f ic ials repeated spora d ically that they could not wait

forever for the de mo c ra t i z a t ion of Serbia and that Mo nt e ne g ro would ultimately call

for a re f e re ndum on inde p e nde nc e.

• Ho w e v e r, the ethnic boundary between Serbs and Mo nt e ne g r i ns has always been ra t he r

f l u id. Ma ny Mo nt e ne g r i ns believe that they are also Serbs, as if that is the bro a der 

fam i l y, but ma ny others will say that the re is a clear distinc t ion between the two.

• Ever since Djuka no v ic’s election, Mo nt e ne g ro has struggled to pull itself out of int e rnat io nal isolation. Despite the lack of sovere ig nt y, it has ma na ged to establish alternate fo r ms of diploma t ic and tra de re p re s e nt a t ion. It has also ma na ged to obtain

s u b s t a nt ial fina nc ial support from the United States and the European Un ion (EU),

w h ich has helped to preserve its social and political stability.

• One could expect that Mo nt e ne g ro’s support for secession would drop with the

c h a nges in Serbia, because opposition to Milosevic’s re g i me was the major basis fo r

this polic y. The new go v e r n me nt in Belgra de must be patie nt and respectful; it sho u l d

s how int e rest in Mo nt e ne g ro, as well as a willing ness to ne go t iate a new fede ral or

c o n f e de ral arra nge me nt .

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

April 2, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report focuses on the future of the Fede ra l

R e p u b l ic of Yu go s l a v ia (FRY) and the

re l a t io nship between its two me m b e r s, Serbia

a nd Mont e ne g ro, fol l o w i ng the parlia me nt a r y

a nd pre s ide nt ial electio ns in Serbia late last

y e a r. The latter electio ns witnessed the ouster

of long - t i me Serbian ruler Slobodan Milosevic

a nd ushe red in a period of re a s s e s s i ng the

fo r mal union of both count r ie s. On April 22,

Mo nt e ne g ro will hold parlia me ntary electio ns,

w h ich Pre s ide nt Djuka no v ic may use to gauge

t he sent i me nt of the country fo r

i nde p e nde nc e. Based on the electio ns ’

o u t c o me, Djuka no v ic may also hold a

na t io nw ide re f e re ndum on inde p e nde nc e,

possibly as early as June.

Stojan Cerov i c is a columnist for the weekly

i nde p e nde nt ne w s ma g a z i ne V r e m e, based in

B e l g ra de. In his editorials and ana l y s i s,

C e ro v ic was a leading voice in the oppositio n

to Slobodan Milosevic, as well as an ex p e r t

c o m me ntator on na t io nalism, postcommu n i s t

s o c ie t ie s, and ethnic conflict in the Balka ns.

C e ro v ic was a senior fellow at the Institute in

1 9 9 9 – 2 0 0 0 .

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not advo c a t e

specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 2

M i l o s e v ic’s Legacy 3

History and the Ethnic Dime ns io n 5

Is Inde p e nde nce an Optio n ? 6

T he New Arra nge me nt 7

C o nc l u s io n 8
• The Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt re c e ntly anno u nced its int e nt ion to call for a re f e re ndum, possibly in June. It plans to offer its cons t i t u e nts a cho ice between inde p e ndence and some alternative political arra nge me nt with Serbia expected to be agre e d

upon by that time. 

• But differe nces over the issue have become sharper and much mo re re s o na nt sinc e

t he split in Mo nt e ne g ro’s ruling coalition: the Social Demo c ra t ic Party is pushing fo r

i nde p e nde nce; the People’s Pa r t y, which now sits in opposition to Djuka no v ic’s mino rity go v e r n me nt, is urg i ng the re - e s t a b l i s h me nt of closer links with Serbia. Above all,

t hough, Belgra de should not exploit Djuka no v ic’s political diffic u l t ie s.

• Mo nt e ne g ro mig ht be left alone to de c ide about its future and about its viability as

an inde p e nde nt state, but if the int e r na t io nal community were to condo ne such a

d i v o rc e, would it serve as a negative example for the re i nt e g ra t ion of Bosnia? The

u n resolved status of Kosovo would also become far mo re complicated because one of

t he optio ns for Kosovo is to become the third re p u b l ic in a new Yu goslav fede ra t io n .

I n t ro d u c t i o n

In October 2000, the Fede ral Republic of Yu go s l a v ia (FRY)—composed of Serbia and

Mo nt e ne g ro — ma na ged in a ra t her spectacular way to depose its no t o r ious long - t i me

r u l e r, Slobodan Milosevic. The world praised the election results and the de t e r m i na t io n

of the Serbian people in de f e nd i ng their vic t o r y. But the re have been serious challenge s

posed to the winning coalition, the Demo c ra t ic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), and the ne w

p re s ide nt of the FRY, Vojislav Ko s t u n ica, in their attempts to guide state and socie t y

t h rough the tra ns i t ion to de mo c ra t ic rule. 

T he big gest challenge has come from Mo nt e ne g ro, the junior partner in the fede rat ion, which does not recognize Ko s t u n ica and cont i nues to discuss its own inde p e ndenc e. Some bitter word s, mostly in the me d ia, have been exc h a nged between the two

c a p i t a l s, Belgra de and Po dgo r ica. Conversely, the re have also been some ex p re s s io ns of

mut ual unde r s t a nd i ng and respect, as well as a stated willing ness to enter into a dialogue and carefully look for a way out of the crisis in their re l a t io ns. Inde e d, ma ny Mo nt e ne g r i ns hold out the possibility that their country can re main in some sort of

“as s o c ia t ion” with Serbia that gives both members substant ial autono my.

How e v e r, for those who cons ider Mo nt e ne g ro as ex i s t i ng inde p e nde ntly of the FRY in

all matters but na me, it seems pointless to discuss the future of any fede ral arra nge me nt

i n v o l v i ng the two. Othe r s, though, expected that the re formist pro - Western go v e r n me nt

would quickly reverse its course toward inde p e nde nce fo l l o w i ng the “de mo c ra t ic re v o l ut ion” in Serbia. The pro - i nde p e nde nce policy finds its basis in, and has always been well

j u s t i f ied by, the aggre s s i v e ness and autho r i t a r ianism of Milosevic’s re g i me and Mo nt e ne g ro’s cons e q u e nt isolation from both the FRY and int e r na t io nal affa i r s. Prior to Octob e r, and while slowly mo v i ng in opposition to Belgra de, Po dgo r ica repeated it could no t

wait for Serbia to become de mo c ra t ic. No w, with Serbia’s re c e nt achie v e me nt, the Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt voices mo re, or at least a differe nt kind, of a dilemma with re g a rd

to its re l a t io ns with Serbia .

There are also problems on the Serbian side. Post-Milosevic Serbia appears open

to negotiations with Montenegro concerning a new constitutional arrangement. But

it should not be taken for granted that Belgrade will be unconditionally interested

in any form of community or contract with Montenegro. With a new government

that is embraced by the international community, Serbia has regained its self-confidence and may not be too patient with numerous or varied Montenegrin demands

a nd pre c o nd i t io ns. The will to discuss and impleme nt a new fede ral, or confede ra l ,

a r ra nge me nt has yet to be tested on both side s.

Even though all the pro b l e ms between Serbia and Mo nt e ne g ro did not disappear with

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute’s Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), James R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E.

L e l a nd & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean,

Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y.

• María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd 

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Paul G. Gaffney II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt ,

Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r s i t y • Colin L. Powell, S e c re t a r y

of State • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
t he fall of Milosevic’s re g i me, one big and positive change is evide nt. The re is no longe r

a ny risk of FRY military int e r v e nt ion in Mo nt e ne g ro. The new go v e r n me nt in Belgra de is

all too eager to cooperate with the world and to re i nt e g rate the country in int e r na t io na l

i ns t i t u t io ns. The last thing one can now expect from Belgra de is for the go v e r n me nt to

be aggressive and to exploit possible int e r nal tens io ns in Mo nt e ne g ro. The re fo re, fro m

now on, all disputes are likely to be resolved peacefully. 

T he purpose of this paper is to exa m i ne the ra p idly evolving na t u re of the FRY—princ i p a l l y, the pre s e nt and possible future re l a t io nship between the fede ra t ion’s two me mbers and, beyond this, the implic a t io ns of changes in the re l a t io nship for the rest of the

B a l ka ns. Can the process of the FRY’s disint e g ra t ion be reversed? If yes, should it be?

A nd what would be the pros and cons for each position from each side’s point of view? 

M i l o s ev i c ’s Legacy

Most of the actual pro b l e ms, fears, and tens io ns between the two re p u b l ics can be tra c e d

to the last few years of Milosevic’s rule. The pattern began in 1997, du r i ng an electora l

crisis in Serbia, when hu ndreds of tho u s a nds of people protested in Belgra de, and mo s t

o t her major cities in Serbia, against Milosevic’s appare nt commission of voter fra ud. Rall ies were carried out on a daily basis for three mo nt hs in the wint e r. Milosevic’s stand i ng

as a leader was de l e g i t i m i z e d. He appeared weak, attempting to retain power at any cost.

T he Mont e negrin go v e r n me nt used this opportunity to distance itself from him.

Milo Djuka no v ic, at that time prime minister of Mo nt e ne g ro, was the first go v e r nment of f ic ial who da red to criticize Milosevic in public. In his int e r v iew for the Belgra de

weekly V r e m e ( F e b r uary 22, 1997), he stated that “it would be completely wro ng politically for Slobodan Milosevic to re main in any place in the political life of Yu go s l a v ia . ”

D j u ka no v ic called Milosevic “a man of obsolete political ide a s, lacking the ability to fo r m

a strat e g ic vision of the pro b l e ms this country is fa c i ng.” Djuka no v ic faced stro ng oppos i t ion within his own party, the Demo c ra t ic Party of Socialists (DPS), but after severa l

weeks of int e r nal fig ht i ng he ma na ged to gain the support of some of the most pro m inent and influent ial Mo nt e negrin party leade r s. His major oppone nt, Momir Bulatovic

(at that time, pre s ide nt of Mo nt e ne g ro and, later, prime minister of the FRY), ex p re s s e d

his loyalty to Milosevic, the DPS event ually split apart, and Bulatovic’s fa c t ion re na me d

itself the Socialist People’s Party (SNP).

At the time, the issue at stake was not Mo nt e ne g ro’s position in the Yu goslav fede ra t ion, or separatism, or any kind of na t io nalism. (For ins t a nc e, Svetozar Ma ro v ic, the

p re s ide nt of the Mo nt e negrin parlia me nt, who has a re p u t a t ion for being “pro - Yu go s l a v, ”

or even “pro - S e r b,” also sided with Djuka no v ic.) The real issue was conc e p t ual in na t u re.

This was a stra t e g ic shift away from Milosevic’s polic y, with the new Mo nt e negrin platform stres s i ng a pro - Western orie nt a t ion, free ma r ket re form, pro t e c t ion of mino r i t y

r ig ht s, ins t i t u t io na l i z a t ion of de mo c ra c y, and adhe re nce to the rule of law. On this platform, Djuka no v ic was able to defeat Bulatovic in the 1997 Mo nt e negrin pre s ide nt ia l

e l e c t io ns—but only in a run-off, and by a slim ma rgin, capturing 50.8 perc e nt of the

vote (5,488 mo re than Bulatovic ) .

D j u ka no v ic’s change in outlook was imme d iately labeled by his political oppone nt s

in Mo nt e ne g ro and by the Belgra de pro p a g a nda ma c h i ne as “a nt i - Yu go s l a v.” He re f u s e d

this chara c t e r i z a t ion, though, ins i s t i ng that he wanted only to contribute to the de mo crat i z a t ion of Yu go s l a v ia. Djuka no v ic established good re l a t io ns with the Serbian 

o p p o s i t ion and for some time he appeared to be a serious political threat to Milosevic.

As he enjoyed certain popularity in Serbia pro p e r, ma ny people believed Djuka no v ic held 

a m b i t io ns to play a mo re important role at the fede ral level. The true Mo nt e negrin sepa ra t i s t s, rep re s e nted mostly by the Liberal Pa r t y, stro ngly criticized Djuka no v ic and

refused to ackno w l e dge any differe nces between him and Milosevic (see the Februa r y

28, 1997 edition of M o n i t o r) .

3

With a new government 

that is embraced by the 

international community, Serbia

has regained its self-confidence

and may not be too patient with

n u m e rous or varied Montenegrin

demands and pre c o n d i t i o n s. The

will to discuss and implement a

n ew federal, or confedera l ,

a r rangement has yet to be 

tested on both sides.
As time went on, Milosevic inc reased pre s s u re on Mo nt e ne g ro from his base of power

in Belgra de. This slowly fo rced Djuka no v ic to embrace a pro - i nde p e nde nce stanc e. Thu s,

for the past two years, Mo nt e negrin of f ic ials have repeated spora d ically that they cannot wait fo rever for the de mo c ra t i z a t ion of Serbia and that Mo nt e ne g ro would ultima t ely call for a re f e re ndum on inde p e nde nc e. This posturing must have satisfied Milosevic :

I nstead of being challenged by Mo nt e negrin de mo c ra t ic re fo r ms, he could accuse

D j u ka no v ic of separatism. 

Ho w e v e r, it is not Djuka no v ic who should be cons ide red re s p o nsible for the dissolut ion of the Yu goslav fede ra t ion. It was Milosevic who began to pro g ressively de s t roy the

f e de ral ins t i t u t io ns when he realized that he could no longer cont rol them in his autho ri t a r ian ma n ne r. In April 1998, he appointed his puppet and Djuka no v ic’s political rival,

Momir Bulatovic, as Yu goslav prime minister. Mo nt e ne g ro subsequently refused to re cognize the fede ral go v e r n me nt. When Belgra de rejected those de p u t ies no m i nated fo r

t he federal parlia me nt by Djuka no v ic’s ruling coalition, Po dgo r ica was fo rced to boycott

that body. Several Mo nt e negrin cadres loyal to Djuka no v ic were also purged from the

FRY’s Cons t i t u t io nal Court and Fore ign Servic e.

To protect its int e re s t s, Mo nt e ne g ro ig no red any legislation and de c i s io ns issued by

t he federal go v e r n me nt and took steps to separate its econo my from Serbia. In 1998,

b udgetary tra nsfers between Po dgo r ica and Belgra de ceased. By the summer of 1999,

Mont e ne g ro took over customs collection at its borde r s. Serbia subsequently placed cust o ms posts at its border cro s s i ngs with Mo nt e ne g ro. By the end of 1999, Mo nt e ne g ro had

i nt ro duced the German mark as a parallel curre nc y, and Serbia banned the tra de of agric u l t u ral pro ducts with Mo nt e ne g ro .

For the past two years, Mo nt e ne g ro has struggled to pull itself out of int e r na t io nal isol a t ion. Despite the lack of sovere ig nt y, it has ma na ged to establish alternate fo r ms of diploma t ic and tra de re p re s e nt a t ion in Wa s h i ngton, London, Rome, Brussels, Berlin, Sara j e v o ,

a nd Ljubljana. Po dgo r ica has also ma na ged to obtain substant ial fina nc ial support from the

United States and the European Un ion (EU), which has helped to preserve its social and

p o l i t ical stability. Because of these me a s u re s, Mo nt e ne g ro has not only ma na ged to endu re

B e l g ra de - s p o ns o red pre s s u re but has also appeared as a “success story” when compare d

with Serbia. But this int e r na t io nal re c o g n i t ion and support of Djuka no v ic’s dissent agains t

M i l o s e v ic add i t io nally fueled Mo nt e negrin ambitio ns for inde p e nde nc e. 

D u r i ng the most critical period of the war in Kosovo and the North At l a nt ic Treaty Org an i z a t ion’s (NATO) bombing campaign in 1999, Mo nt e ne g ro de c l a red its ne u t rality and

refused to observe ma r t ial law. At that time, and ever sinc e, the re l a t io ns between the

Mont e negrin go v e r n me nt and the Yu goslav Na t io nal Army have been very tens e. Ma ny

p o t e nt ially da nge rous inc ide nts took place, and ma ny stro ng accusatio ns have been

exc h a nge d. The army was loyal to Milosevic, but it probably would have been very re l uct a nt to launch an unpro v o ked attack on Mo nt e ne g ro. (That same army refused to pro t e c t

M i l o s e v ic on October 5, 2000, when opposition supporters stormed the fede ral parlia me nt

a nd forced him to admit his election de f e a t . )

D j u ka no v ic fo u nd himself in an ex t re mely difficult position du r i ng NATO’s Opera t ion Allie d

F o rce because he opposed Milosevic’s aggressive policy and basically sided with the We s t .

Mont e ne g ro also received some air strike s, though, and it was very difficult to explain this

“ f r ie ndly” bombing to the Mo nt e negrin people. The army further accused Djuka no v ic of

b e i ng a tra i t o r, but he ma ne u v e red skillfully and ma na ged to survive. Ho w e v e r, it is fair to

say that Djuka no v ic’s opposition, the pro - B e l g ra de SNP, acted in a re ma r kably re s p o ns i b l e

man ner in that decisive mo me nt. It voted for a re s o l u t ion on the ma i nt e na nce of civil orde r

in Mo nt e ne g ro, and did not try to exploit Djuka no v ic’s diffic u l t ie s.

Still, the army was perceived as a threat to Mo nt e ne g ro, even after the NATO int e rv e nt ion. The Seventh Battalion, a special fo rces unit, was added to the regular units stat io ned in the re p u b l ic. The Mo nt e negrin me d ia was full of alarming stories and he a d l i ne s

w a r n i ng that war could break out at any mo me nt. The situa t ion, though, also attra c t e d

i nt e r na t io nal attent ion and ma ny stro ng me s s a ge s, particularly by NATO of f ic ia l s, 

w a r n i ng Belgra de not to take action. Most Western experts and observers were convinc e d

4

As time went on, Milosev i c

i n c reased pre s s u re on Montenegro

f rom his base of power in

B e l g ra d e. This slowly fo rc e d

D j u k a n ovic to embrace a pro -

independence sta n c e. 

During the most critical

period of the war in Ko s ovo and

the NATO bombing campaign in

1999, Montenegro declared its

n e u t rality and refused to

o b s e r ve martial law. At that

t i m e, and ever since, the

relations between the 

Montenegrin government and

the Yugoslav National Army

h a ve been very tense.
that Milosevic would attack Mo nt e ne g ro and were urg i ng for cons e nsus on a mo re de c isive actio n — a nd stro nger commitme nt—to de f e nd Mo nt e ne g ro .

We may never know whe t her it was because of this “pre v e ntive diploma c y,” but the

a r my never tried to overthrow the Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt. Ho w e v e r, Mo nt e ne g ro did

live in fear of aggre s s ion from Serbia, and that feeling was regularly fed by Milosevic ’ s

p ro p a g a nda ma c h i ne. The Mo nt e negrin me d ia re s p o nded by de no u nc i ng the Belgra de

re g i me. This pro p a g a nda war inevitably ge ne rated some ge ne ral ant i - S e r b ian feelings in

Mo nt e ne g ro, and vice versa. 

M i l o s e v ic aggravated Serbia – Mo nt e ne g ro re l a t io ns even mo re by chang i ng the

Yu goslav cons t i t u t ion in July 2000. The Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt was not consulted no r

even info r med about the ame ndme nts that substant ially violated its position in the fede ra t ion. Ac c o rd i ng to the change s, the pre s ide nt of the FRY is now directly elected, ma ki ng it pra c t ically impossible for a Mo nt e negrin to occupy that position. Both houses of

t he federal parlia me nt are now also directly elected, pre v e nt i ng the Mo nt e ne g r i ns fro m

h a v i ng an impact with respect to fede ral legislatio n .

It is not surprising that the ruling coalition in Mo nt e ne g ro boycotted the September

24 fede ral electio ns, having no hope that Milosevic would lose hold of his cont rol of the

gov e r n me nt. This re a c t ion was probably what Milosevic had ex p e c t e d, and even ho p e d

for, because only his supporters in Mo nt e ne g ro participated in the pro c e s s. Djuka no v ic

was alre a dy firmly on a course toward inde p e nde nce and did not go out of his way to

help the Serbian opposition in its campaign. His de c i s ion looked unde r s t a ndable at the

t i me, but in hind s ig ht, one wonders if he wished he had been mo re active. Not only did

Mo nt e ne g ro contribute very little to the victory of the Serbian opposition, it also ma y

have contributed to Milosevic’s re c e i v i ng approx i mately 100,000 Mo nt e negrin votes.

L uc k i l y, the number was not de c i s i v e.

As an added dilemma for the new Serbian go v e r n me nt, because of Djuka no v ic’s boycott, all of the Mo nt e negrin de p u t ies in the fede ral parlia me nt were members of the pro -

M i l o s e v ic SNP. Thus a political nig ht ma re was created as the new de mo c ra t ic fo rces in

S e r b ia had no cho ice but to cooperate with their ene m ies and to confro nt their fo r me r

a l l ies in Mo nt e ne g ro. The new Yu goslav pre s ide nt, Vojislav Ko s t u n ica, visited Po dgo r ic a

i m me d iately after the electio ns but was greeted with a ra t her chilly re c e p t ion. Ho w e v e r,

it is important to note that he of f e red to find a solution for future re l a t io ns between the

two go v e r n me nts that suited Mo nt e ne g ro .

D j u ka no v ic has now suddenly fo u nd himself in an even mo re difficult position than

b e fo re the electio ns. The possible road to re i nt e g ra t ion with Serbia is complic a t e d. His

o p p o ne nts were pro moted on the fede ral level, at least tempora r i l y. And the road to indep e nde nce is also very uncertain because he can no longer count on int e r na t io nal support. Mo nt e ne g ro was, and still is, deeply divided over the issue of inde p e nde nc e. But

his supporters are pushing stro ngly in that dire c t ion any w a y. Djuka no v ic will need acrob a t ic skills to find a way out. And, of course, what is at stake is not just his politic a l

f u t u re, but also the future of the FRY. 

Me a nw h i l e, a grin has re t u r ned to Milosevic’s fa c e.

History and the Ethnic Dimension

For a deeper unde r s t a nd i ng of Serbia n - Mo nt e negrin re l a t io ns, one cannot escape some

l e s s o ns in history and the ethnic differe nces between the two peoples. This appears 

p a r t icularly important no w, when the me mory of the disint e g ra t ion of the fo r me r

Yu go s l a v ia—a painful and bloody process that obviously had some t h i ng to do with history and ethnic divisio ns—is still fresh in people’s mind s. One mig ht conc l ude that the

p rocess is not yet finished and that the rump Yu go s l a v ia, composed of two out of the

six orig i nal Yu goslav re p u b l ic s, should be peacefully disma nt l e d.

The actual problems and disputes might look like proof that once again the

5

The new Yugoslav pre s i d e n t ,

Vojislav Kostunica, visited 

Podgorica immediately after the

elections but was greeted with a

rather chilly reception. Howeve r,

it is important to note that he

off e red to find a solution fo r

f u t u re relations between the

t wo governments that suited

M o n t e n e g ro .

D j u k a n ovic will need acro b a t i c

skills to find a way out. And, of

c o u r s e, what is at stake is not

just his political future, but also

the future of the FRY.
principle of self-determination should be respected and that Montenegro needs and

deserves its freedom from Serbian domination. But, at least from the international

point of view, there is also the principle of multiethnic tolerance, which contradicts

the first principle and does not encourage any secession or change of borders without mutual agreement. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the international community has been struggling with the two principles, hoping that multiethnicity will

eventually prevail. But how differe nt are Serbs and Mo nt e ne g r i ns ?

C l e a r l y, they are less differe nt than other peoples in the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia. They are

both Ortho dox Christia ns and they speak the same lang ua ge. Mo nt e ne g r i ns the ms e l v e s

call their lang ua ge s r p s k i ( S e r b ian), although the re is a small but imme d iately re c o g n i zable differe nce in dialect. During the last census conducted in the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia in

1991, 62 perc e nt of the population in Mo nt e ne g ro cons ide red the mselves Mo nt e ne g r i ns,

14.6 perc e nt Mu s l i ms (who now call the mselves Bosniaks), 6.6 perc e nt Albania ns, and

only 9.3 perc e nt Serbs (see Statisticki godisnjak Crne Gore, 1 9 9 9 ) .

Ho w e v e r, the ethnic boundary between Serbs and Mo nt e ne g r i ns has always been

rat her fluid. Ma ny Mo nt e ne g r i ns believe that they are also Serbs, as if that is the bro a der fa m i l y, but ma ny others will say that the re is a clear distinc t ion between the two. One

can find such differe nces even amo ng close re l a t i v e s. Some of the most vigo rous Serbia n

nat io nalists are of Mo nt e negrin origin, inc l ud i ng Slobodan Milosevic. But his own bro t he r, Borislav, ide nt i f ies himself as Mo nt e negrin. 

T he inde p e nde nt Mo nt e negrin state ceased to exist after World War I, when the Serb ian Army liberated (or occupie d, de p e nd i ng on the point of view) Mo nt e ne g ro. In 1918,

an assembly of pro - S e r b ian re p re s e ntatives in Po dgo r ica ruled una n i mously for unific at ion of the two states. Serbia then do m i nated over Mo nt e ne g ro until World War II. In

c o m munist Yu go s l a v ia, Mo nt e ne g ro re - e me rged as the smallest, and the poorest, re p u bl ic, but it had equal rig hts with the othe r s. During this perio d, it had no serious pro bl e ms with Serbia .

O ne could conc l ude that, altoge t he r, historical me mo r ies do not appear too diffic u l t

to overc o me in this pre s e nt situa t ion, at least when compared to some other me mo r ie s

in the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia. It is fair to state that Serbian na t io nalism negated Mo nt e negrin ide nt i t y, with the claim that both peoples were Serbs. (Serbian na t io nalists also

used to de ny the ex i s t e nce of Bosnian Mu s l i ms, as well as Ma c e do n ia ns, who were cons ide red “Southern Serbs.”) The re is ho p e, though, that some lessons have been learne d

by Serbia’s past de f e a t s, and that the ne w, de mo c ra t ic Serbia will re f rain from any arrog a nce of that kind in the future.

Is Independence an Option?

B e fo re the last electio ns, while Milosevic was still in power, Mo nt e ne g ro enjoyed We s tern support, primarily because of its opposition to the ant i - Western re g i me in Belgra de.

Ho w e v e r, the West never urged Mo nt e ne g ro to seek inde p e nde nce for principles and pra gmat ic re a s o ns. Conc e r n i ng the first, it would have been difficult to explain the appare nt

i nc o ns i s t e ncy in policy in opposing any secession in Bosnia and Kosovo, and then allow

for it in Mo nt e ne g ro. On the second point, the re was re a s o nable concern that secessio n

could not be carried out without vio l e nc e — a nd possibly a full-scale war. 

With the de mo c ra t ic changes in Belgra de, ho w e v e r, Serbia has come into the focus of

Western attent ion. The int e r na t io nal community is now less likely to support any unil a t e ral Mo nt e negrin move toward inde p e nde nc e. Inde e d, the FRY has applied for and

received membership in the United Na t io ns, as well as in the Org a n i z a t ion for Security

a nd Coopera t ion in Euro p e. The Mo nt e negrin de ma nd to have a separate chair in the

United Na t io ns has been ig no re d. This is the reality that Po dgo r ica must fa c e. Bearing

in mind that Mo nt e ne g ro has been highly de p e nde nt on Western fina nc ial support fo r

6

H ow different are Serbs 

and Montenegrins?

The international community is

n ow less likely to support any

u n i l a t e ral Montenegrin move

toward independence. Indeed,

the FRY has applied for and

rec e i ved membership in the

United Nations, as well as in

the Organization for Security

and Cooperation in Euro p e. The

Montenegrin demand to have a

s e p a rate chair in the United

Nations has been ignored. 
t he past several y e a r s, it seems inc o nceivable that Po dgo r ica would risk a confro nt a t io n

with the West: a country populated by just 650,000 people, with a very weak econo my and

few res o u rc e s, is simply not equipped for such an ende a v o r.

F u r t he r mo re, a convinc i ng majority of the population has never supported the idea of

an inde p e nde nt Mo nt e ne g ro. Ac c o rd i ng to an April 2000 Center for Demo c racy and

Hu man Rig hts opinion poll, 35 perc e nt fa v o red outrig ht inde p e nde nc e, 25 perc e nt supported the curre nt fede ral arra nge me nt, and ano t her 20 perc e nt fa v o red a re de f i n i t ion of

t he Yugoslav fede ra t ion along the lines of a confede ral platform proposed by the Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt two summers befo re. Mu n icipal electio ns conducted in June 2000

in Po dgo r ica and in the second - l a rgest major city, He rceg Novi, de mo ns t rated that people were voting for the status quo. Djuka no v ic’s coalition won in Po dgo r ica, while the

p ro - B e l g ra de SNP won in He rceg Novi, both by a na r row ma rgin. 

O ne could expect that support for secession would drop with the changes in Serbia ,

because opposition to Milosevic’s re g i me was the major basis for this polic y. The ne w

gov e r n me nt in Belgra de must be patie nt and respectful; it should show int e rest in Mo nt e ne g ro, as well as a willing ness to ne go t iate a new fede ral or confede ral arra nge me nt .

Above all, it should not exploit Djuka no v ic’s political diffic u l t ie s. So fa r, Ko s t u n ica seems

to be adhe r i ng to such a polic y. He has visited Po dgo r ica twice after the electio ns,

igno r i ng the fact that Mo nt e ne g ro does not of f ic ially recognize him and fails to accord

him pre s ide nt ial protocol. 

The New Arra n g e m e n t

While an inde p e nde nt Mo nt e ne g ro does not look via b l e, an inde p e nde nt Serbia certainly do e s. It is not inc o nceivable that Serbia mig ht seriously cons ider that optio n — na mel y, despite common int e rests and ma ny links with Mo nt e ne g ro, the re is a gro w i ng feeling

a mo ng people that Serbia should abandon any further ambitio ns beyond its borders and

s hould not tie its hands with an arra nge me nt that would re q u i re the conferral of specia l

r ig hts to a junior partne r. During a visit to Belgra de at the end of October, the autho r

s p o ke to ma ny people from, or close to, the new go v e r n me nt; they gave the impre s s io n

that they mig ht be willing to unde r t a ke a profo u nd re c o ns ide ra t ion of na t io nal stra t e g y

a nd learn lessons from the defeats of Milosevic’s ex p a ns ionism. This may or may no t

p rove to be true, but the Serbian position in future ne go t ia t io ns with Mo nt e ne g ro is no w

clearly much stro nge r. Mo nt e ne g ro needs to recognize this change and perhaps re de f i ne

its strategy accord i ng l y.

T he Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt re c e ntly anno u nced its int e nt ion to call for a re f e re ndu m ,

possibly in June. It plans to offer its cons t i t u e nts a cho ice between inde p e nde nce and some

a l t e r native political arra nge me nt with Serbia expected to be agreed upon by that time. In

August 1999, Po dgo r ica of f e red a platform for a new basis for re l a t io ns with Serbia. Gene ra l l y, Serbia and Mo nt e ne g ro would be sovere ign states and agree to cooperate on a limited number of ma t t e r s, inc l ud i ng de f e ns e, fo re ign polic y, an econo m ic system, tra f f ic and

t ra nsport, and scie nt i f ic and technical de v e l o p me nt. The union would have a pre s ide nt, parl ia me nt, council of ministers, and a high court, but its powers would be limited.

This platform had been proposed while Milosevic was still in power. The Mo nt e ne g r i n

gov e r n me nt was obviously guided by a priority to protect itself from the Serbian re g i me ’ s

des i re to do m i nate its junior fede ral partne r, but also to involve Mo nt e ne g ro in conflic t

a nd war, like the one in Kosovo. Belgra de never of f ic ially re s p o nded to Po dgo r ica’s platform. Mo nt e ne g ro cont i nued to distance itself from Serbia and to build the ins t i t u t io ns

necessary for it to become fully sovere ig n .

F o l l o w i ng the September electio ns and subsequent change in Serbian leadership, the

s ig nals from Mo nt e ne g ro have been mixe d. Po dgo r ica anno u nced a new proposal along

t he lines of the August 1999 platform, but with even fewer links between the two

7

The Montenegrin gove r n m e n t

recently announced its

intention to call for a re fe rendum, possibly in June. It

plans to offer its constituents a

choice between independence

and some alternative political

a r rangement with Serbia

expected to be agreed upon 

by that time.
The unre s o l ved status of Ko s ovo

would also become far more

complicated because one of the

options for Ko s ovo is to become

the third republic in a new

Yugoslav federa t i o n .

re p u b l ic s. It cont i nues to insist that it be fully recognized as a sovere ign state by the

i nt e r na t io nal community and receive a seat in the United Na t io ns. But differe nces over

t he issue have become sharper and much mo re re s o na nt since the split in Mo nt e ne g ro ’ s

r u l i ng coalition: the Social Demo c ra t ic Party is pushing for inde p e nde nce; the Pe o p l e ’ s

Par t y, which now sits in opposition to Djuka no v ic’s minority go v e r n me nt, is urg i ng the

re- e s t a b l i s h me nt of closer links with Serbia. 

O f f ic ia l l y, Mont e ne g ro is open to ne go t ia t ion with Serbia, but it must first overc o me

its own int e r nal polarization. Some people cons ider any linka ge with Serbia to be “past”

h i s t o r y. They belie v e — u n re a l i s t ically—that a Mo nt e ne g ro without Serbia is far ahead in

t he line toward adm i t t a nce into European ins t i t u t io ns — for ins t a nc e, almost half way to

t he EU. But what is for them a reason to be hopeful is reason for some other Mo nt e neg r i ns to be fearful. Djuka no v ic himself re c e ntly said that the world should be aware of

t he fact that the FRY does not exist any mo re. But at the same time, he seems to have

given a sig nal to the Mo nt e negrin me d ia re f l e c t i ng the opposite position, as re p o r t e r s

began re f e r r i ng to Ko s t u n ica as the pre s ide nt of the FRY. 

On the Serbian side, Ko s t u n ica has adopted a policy of careful and patie nt ne go t iat ion, and he ex p ressed his ex p e c t a t ion that some uno r t ho dox solution mig ht need to be

fou nd. Yet ma ny people in Serbia are afra id of such solutio ns and tend to believe only

in a tra d i t io nal, sovere ign state. 

T he outcome of future ne go t ia t io ns with Mo nt e ne g ro may also be affected by the

expected political struggle in Serbia — p r i marily within the DOS and between its stro nge s t

l e a de r s, Kos t u n ica and Zo ran Djind j ic. With the int e nt ion of stre ng t he n i ng the fede ral go ve r n me nt, as well as Djuka no v ic’s SNP opposition, Ko s t u n ica insists that ne go t ia t io ns be

held within the fra mework of ex i s t i ng fede ral ins t i t u t io ns. Djind j ic, who became the prime

minister of Serbia after the December 23 parlia me ntary electio ns, appears mo re willing to

reach agree me nt with Djuka no v ic; such a ra p p ro c he me nt would likely unde r m i ne the fede ral go v e r n me nt and, he nc e, Ko s t u n ica’s autho r i t y. The future arra nge me nt with Mo nt e ne g ro will play an important role in the struggle for power in Belgra de.

C o n c l u s i o n

U l t i ma t e l y, the future of the FRY or some sort of Serbia n - Mo nt e negrin union de p e nds on

Mont e ne g ro, or primarily upon the Mo nt e negrin go v e r n me nt. But what is at stake is no t

only the FRY, or the viability of Mo nt e ne g ro. A possible divorce between the two would

have bro a de r, re g io nal cons e q u e nc e s, ma k i ng the burden of re s p o nsibility too heavy fo r

Mont e ne g ro to carry all alone. This me a ns that int e r na t io nal concern, if not me d ia t io n ,

is ne e de d.

Mont e ne g ro mig ht be left alone to de c ide about its future and about its viability as

an inde p e nde nt state, but if the int e r na t io nal community were to condo ne such a

d i v o rc e, would it serve as a negative example for the re i nt e g ra t ion of Bosnia? The unresolved status of Kosovo would also become far mo re complicated because one of the

o p t io ns for Kosovo is to become the third re p u b l ic in a new Yu goslav fede ra t io n .

F rom the bro a der perspective, the de s t i ny of this last re ma i n i ng link from the fo r me r

Yugoslav period may have symbolic value. It is of the utmost importance for the who l e

reg ion to attain a sense of hope and a new beginning. The end of Milosevic’s re g i me is

t he best possible event to mark this starting point. The fra g me nt a t ion trig ge red mo s t l y

by the aggressive policy of that re g i me should be stopped, and the new states in the

re g ion should be enc o u ra ged to coopera t e, look fo r w a rd, and work toge t her to overc o me

t he terrible legacy of the past de c a de. If Serbia and Mo nt e ne g ro prove unable to re b u i l d

mut ual trust and reach a compro m i s e, this mo me ntum will be lost. 

It will look as if—with or without Milosevic — f ra g me nt a t ion cont i nues in the Balka ns.

O f f i c i a l l y, Montenegro is

open to negotiation with

Serbia, but it must first

ove rcome its own internal

p o l a r i z a t i o n .

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our web

site (www. u s i p . o rg), which has an

o n l i ne edition of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related web sites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 6 8

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036