aggravated a preexisting back condition, but that the injury was not a 

substantial contributing cause of appellant's current condition. The 

appeals officer determined that Dr. Vater's report was credible and that 

respondent had met her burden under NRS 616C.150 to establish that her 

injury was industrial. The appeals officer then reversed the hearing 

officer's decision and ordered appellant to provide appropriate treatment 

for an accepted claim of lumbar sprain/strain, but noted that "[w]hether 

the diagnosed aggravation of the Claimant's pre-existing back condition is 

a temporary condition is something to be determined after conservative 

medical treatment/investigation proceeds under her claim for, an accepted 

lumbar sprain/strain." In making this determination, the appeals officer 

did not address Dr. Vater's conclusion that the injury was not a 

substantial contributing cause of appellant's current condition. 

Appellant subsequently filed a petition for judicial review in 

the district court." The district court granted the petition and remanded 

the matter to the appeals officer to make specific findings as to whether 

respondent's injury was a substantial contributing cause of her current 

condition and to address the implications of NRS 616C.175, which sets 

forth an exception to the insurer's liability in cases involving the 

aggravation of a preexisting nonindustrial condition, in precluding 

compensation. 

On remand, the appeals officer issued a supplemental decision 

and order, which clarified that he could not at that time determine 

whether respondent's industrial injury had "more than temporarily 

'Appellant did not provide the briefing associated with either of its 

petitions for judicial review in its appendix on appeal. 

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aggravated her preexisting condition and whether it is a substantial 

contributing cause of the entirety of her resulting condition," and he 

ordered the claim accepted for a lumbar sprain/strain, but deferred a 

determination on the NRS 616C.175 issue until "further medical 

investigation and conservative care is provided. . . ." 

Appellant filed another petition for judicial review of the 

supplemental decision and order, asserting that the appeals officer's 

decision was an abuse of discretion. The district court denied the petition, 

concluding that, under NRS 616C.330, the appeals officer had the 

authority to require appellant to pay for continuing treatment of 

respondent's injury to resolve the question regarding her preexisting back 

condition. This appeal followed. On appeal, appellant argues, among 

other things, that the appeals officer erred by not addressing the NRS 

616C.175 issue when he ordered the acceptance of respondent's claim for 

lumbar sprain/strain. We agree, and we therefore reverse the district 

court's decision. 

DISCUSSION 

This court reviews an appeals officer's decision in a workers' 

compensation matter for clear error or abuse of discretion. NRS 

233B.135(3); Vredenburg v. Sedgwick CMS, 124 Nev. 553, 557, 188 P.3d 

1084, 1087 (2008). Judicial review is confined to the record before the 

appeals officer, and on issues of fact and fact-based conclusions of law, the 

appeals officer's decision will not be disturbed if it is supported by 

substantial evidence. Vredenburg, 124 Nev. at 557, 188 P.3d at 1087-88; 

Grover C. Dils Med. Ctr. v. Menditto, 121 Nev. 278, 283, 112 P.3d 1093, 

1097 (2005). An appeals officer's determinations on pure issues of law, 

however, are reviewed de novo. Roberts v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 114 Nev. 

364, 367, 956 P.2d 790, 792 (1998). 

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When an employee suffers an industrial injury that 

aggravates a preexisting nonindustrial condition, the compensability of 

that employee's workers' compensation claim requires a two-part 

evaluation. See NRS 616C.150(1) (setting forth the injured employee's 

initial burden to establish that workers' compensation benefits are 

warranted); NRS 616C.175(1) (explaining when a preexisting condition 

may preclude an injured employee from receiving workers' compensation 

benefits for his or her current injury). First, an injured employee is 

required to establish that his or her injury occurred within the course of 

employment in order to obtain workers' compensation benefits. NRS 

616C.150(1). Second, if the injured employee meets his or her burden 

under NRS 616C.150, the burden shifts to the insurer to prove that the 

injury, which aggravated, precipitated, or accelerated a preexisting 

nonindustrial condition, is not a substantial contributing cause of the 

employee's current condition and that the insurer is therefore not liable 

for workers' compensation benefits. NRS 616C.175(1); see also Ross v. 

Reno Hilton, 113 Nev. 228, 229, 931 P.2d 1366, 1367 (1997). 

Here, the appeals officer determined that respondent had met 

her burden under NRS 616C.150 of showing that her injury was industrial 

and that the injury had aggravated a preexisting back condition. This 

determination is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 

Vredenburg, 124 Nev. at 557 11.4, 188 P.3d at 1087 n.4 ("Substantial 

evidence is evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequately 

supporting a conclusion."). The appeals officer erred, however, in ordering 

the acceptance of respondent's claim while deferring a determination 

regarding respondent's preexisting condition. If appellant can show that 

respondent's current lumbar sprain/strain injury is not a substantial 

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contributing cause of her present back pain condition, then respondent's 

claim will not be accepted and no benefits for her injury will be paid. 

Thus, the appeals officer's order that appellant accept respondent's lumbar 

sprain/strain claim and provide conservative medical treatment before any 

determination regarding appellant's NRS 616C.175 argument was 

premature and is a legal error. See NRS 616C.175(1) (recognizing that if 

the insurer meets its burden under NRS 616C.175(1), the injured 

employee's claim is not compensable); see also NRS 616C.155 (stating that 

lain insurer shall not provide compensation to or for an employee . . . 

before the compensation is required to be paid pursuant to the provisions 

of [NRS Chapters 616A to 616D1"). 

The appeals officer stated that he did not have sufficient 

evidence to make a determination regarding NRS 616C.175, but NRS 

616C.330(3) specifically allows the appeals officer to order additional 

evidence when it is necessary to resolve a medical question concerning an 

injured employee's condition. 2Accordingly, we reverse the district court's 

order denying judicial review and direct the district court to grant the 

petition and remand this matter to the appeals officer to resolve the 

2In denying the petition for judicial review, the district court pointed 

to NRS 616C.330(3) as authorizing the appeals officer to order the 

acceptance of the claim and direct that conservative medical treatment be 

provided before making any determination regarding appellant's NRS 

616C.175 arguments. The parties did not address that statute on appeal. 

Under these circumstances, and given our conclusion that 616C.175(1) and 

NRS 616C.155 preclude the appeals officer from making such a 

determination without first resolving the NRS 616C.175 issue, we need 

not address the district court's conclusion in this regard. 

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Fl& , J. 

Douglas 

J. 

question of whether appellant has met its burden under NRS 616C.175, so 

as to preclude its liability for respondent's industrial injury. 

It is so ORDERED. 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Linda Marie Bell, District Judge 

William F. Buchanan, Settlement Judge 

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, LLP/Las Vegas 

Nevada Attorney for Injured Workers/Las Vegas 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

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