About the Report

This report analyzes Afghan president Ashraf Ghani’s decision 

to set aside his country’s long-standing distrust of its largest 

neighbor, Pakistan, and to embark instead on a policy 

of sustained conciliation in an attempt to secure greater 

cooperation from Pakistan in fighting Taliban militants on 

Afghan soil. The report examines the logic of Ghani’s outreach 

and considers why, ten months after initiating the policy, he 

continues to pursue it despite ongoing Taliban violence in 

Afghanistan and few signs of concrete actions from Pakistan. 

About the Authors

Moeed Yusuf is director of South Asia programs at the U.S. 

Institute of Peace (USIP). His current research focuses on 

youth and democratic institutions in Pakistan, policy options 

to mitigate militancy in Pakistan and the South Asian region 

in general, and the U.S. role in South Asian crisis management. 

Scott Smith is director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia 

program at USIP. Prior to joining the Institute he spent 

thirteen years at the United Nations, focusing primarily on 

Afghanistan and democratization and peacekeeping issues.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 376 July 2015

© 2015 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Contents

Introduction 2

What the Unity Government Inherited 2

Accommodating Pakistan’s Interests 3

Ghani’s Delicate Balance 7

RealPolitik versus Reality 8

Spoilers and Obstacles to Conciliation 9

The Way Forward 10

Conclusion 13

Moeed Yusuf and Scott Smith

Ashraf Ghani’s Pakistan 

Outreach

Fighting against the Odds

Summary

• Immediately after coming to office, the national unity government in Afghanistan undertook 

the bold but controversial move of adopting a conciliatory approach toward Pakistan to secure 

its cooperation in bringing the Afghan Taliban to the negotiating table and, over the long 

term, helping the Afghan economy by acting as a sort of “traffic circle” between an integrated 

South and Central Asian economy. 

• This decision has led to a domestic backlash in Afghanistan, colored by a historical mistrust 

of Pakistan, that undermines President Ashraf Ghani’s already weak political position.

• Though former president Hamid Karzai had also sought to enlist Pakistan’s support in facilitating negotiations with the Taliban, he vacillated between urging an Afghanistan-Pakistan 

rapprochement and blaming Pakistan for Afghanistan’s problems, while attempting to play 

off Pakistan against its chief rival, India. Ghani’s outreach is substantively different in that it 

seeks to allay Pakistan’s concerns, real or perceived, with regard to its interests in Afghanistan. 

• With its key strategic interests addressed, and with China’s growing interest in Afghan stability 

and Pakistan and China’s nervousness about the U.S. troop withdrawal potentially increasing 

the chaos in Afghanistan, Pakistan may now find that it is in its interest to move away from 

its Karzai-era policy of turning a blind eye to the situation in Afghanistan. 

• President Ghani is fighting against the odds. Not only is Pakistan’s willingness to provide support unknown, so too is Pakistan’s ability to draw the Taliban into a meaningful reconciliation 

process. The weakness of the Afghan national unity government and the growing perception 

that it may not last are additional complicating factors.

• Pakistan’s tepid response to date has left Ghani increasingly vulnerable politically. But Ghani’s 

approach, though high risk and having a low probability of success, in the absence of any 

viable alternative offers the only real hope for comprehensive peace in Afghanistan and stability in the region, and should be supported by all concerned parties. 

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

Introduction

When Afghanistan’s national unity government took charge in Kabul in late September 

2014, it inherited a country in crisis. The Afghan economy, shaped by twelve years of war 

and fueled by external development spending, had a weak base on which to sustain itself, 

and the Taliban-led insurgency was keeping the state on a war footing. The unity government, despite its name, was deeply divided and found basic decisions, such as appointing a 

cabinet, extremely difficult to make. 

The government did, however, undertake one bold and decisive step soon after the inauguration. President Ashraf Ghani offered Pakistan sustained cooperation in exchange for 

its help in achieving a comprehensive peace with the Taliban insurgency. This was a drastic 

departure from his predecessor Hamid Karzai’s strategy. Karzai deeply distrusted Pakistan, as 

do most Afghans, and for good reason. Pakistan has contributed significantly to violence in 

Afghanistan by allowing the Taliban and its affiliated Haqqani network to operate freely from 

sanctuaries on Pakistani territory. Ghani therefore went out on a limb in courting a reviled 

neighbor and betting on its willingness to depart from its traditional policy of seeing Afghanistan as little more than its backyard. Ghani’s critics argue that Karzai tried hard but failed to 

convince Pakistan to change its outlook, and that Ghani’s approach comes at a “huge cost to 

Afghanistan with little chance of reward.”1 However, it is the only strategy left to try.

This report analyzes this key moment in the Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship. An obvious question is why President Ghani would pursue such a high-risk strategy and persist with 

it, even after the Taliban launched a massive spring offensive in April.2 The answer lies 

chiefly in the lack of viable alternatives to bring stability to Afghanistan. President Ghani is 

correct to argue that the first priority is not necessarily peace with the Taliban but a more 

general peace with Pakistan.3 Further, a constructive long-term relationship with Pakistan 

is an essential part of Ghani’s broader vision for landlocked Afghanistan to act as the hub of 

an integrated South and Central Asian economy.4

Ultimately, the fate of Ghani’s efforts depends on Pakistan’s willingness and ability to 

deliver the Taliban to the negotiating table. Six months into the strategy, Pakistan’s intentions remain unknown. But Pakistan may now see a self-interest in helping Afghanistan attain 

stability that it did not see in the past. In the absence of alternatives, Ghani’s effort deserves 

support from those who desire stability in the region, including rivals, such as India; frustrated 

and tired allies, such as the United States; and neighbors and near-neighbors. 

What the Unity Government Inherited 

The Taliban-led insurgency has been the main source of instability in Afghanistan since its 

revival in earnest in 2005–06. With insecurity worsening year after year, hopes for an outright military defeat of the insurgency are no longer realistic. The imperative of a political 

negotiation with the Taliban to end the conflict is recognized by the Kabul government and 

its international partners, including the United States. Little has been achieved to date, 

however, despite the numerous initiatives undertaken by former president Hamid Karzai and 

by members of the international community. 

President Karzai pursued reconciliation with the Taliban, but inconsistently. At the beginning of his second term he created the High Peace Council, an assembly of respected figures, to 

guide the peace process.5 He appealed through the media to his “Taliban brothers” to return to 

the Afghan political fold.6 Karzai was aware of efforts by the United States and other countries 

to develop channels of communication with the Taliban leadership for the purpose of finding 

a negotiated solution, but did not trust them; on occasion he appeared to sabotage them.7 At 

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

e-mail: permissions@usip.org

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Directors

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Officio

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 3

the same time, the Taliban saw Karzai as an American puppet and pointed to his support for 

the international troop presence as justification for not talking to him.8

Karzai’s biggest problem, however, was his inability to solicit Pakistan’s cooperation. He 

tried both carrots and sticks, simultaneously seeking greater cooperation while singling out 

Pakistan—and in particular its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy agency—as the chief 

abettor of the insurgency and the main reason for his inability to negotiate freely with the 

Taliban. At the same time, he visited Pakistan nineteen times during his twelve years in 

power, called Pakistan a “twin brother” while visiting India in 2011,9 and repeatedly promised not to allow his country to be used against Pakistan’s interests. Apart from occasional 

concessions, such as the release of about two dozen Taliban prisoners from Pakistani custody 

in late 2013, these attempts achieved no change in Pakistan’s attitude.10 Consequently, Karzai’s relationship with Pakistan’s security establishment remained a fundamentally hostile 

one, with Karzai blaming his problems on Pakistan and Pakistan seeing Karzai helping “India 

stab Pakistan in the back.”11

Fraught Relations

Karzai’s distrust of Pakistan was well founded. Pakistan’s constant denials notwithstanding, 

there is a virtual consensus among the international community that the ISI has knowingly 

harbored and nurtured the Taliban and its affiliated Haqqani network as a matter of policy—

though more so the Haqqanis than the so-called Quetta Shura Taliban, Mullah Omar’s group 

and the core of the movement.12 There is evidence that Pakistan undermined efforts at 

talks with the Taliban in the past as well, in particular by arresting senior Taliban members 

who were known to favor negotiations and allegedly in secret communication with Kabul 

without Pakistan’s knowledge.13 Perhaps the most candid assertion of Pakistan’s support for 

the Taliban, specifically the Haqqani network, came from then chairman of the U.S. Joint 

Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Mike Mullen, when he described the Haqqani network as a “veritable 

arm” of the ISI and asserted that Pakistan was using “violent extremism as an instrument 

of policy.”14 President Karzai left office with the bilateral relationship broken and Afghans 

blaming Pakistan for being a key, perhaps the sole, reason for the absence of any serious 

reconciliation process with the Taliban. 

Karzai seemed to believe that he could force or cajole Pakistan into giving up support for 

the Taliban without addressing Pakistan’s self-identified strategic concerns in Afghanistan. 

Pakistan ignored Karzai’s antics while also skillfully deflecting U.S. pressure to “do more,” 

even as Islamabad and Rawalpindi continued to absorb substantial Western assistance 

inflows, which had been offered in part to induce behavioral change among Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership. President Karzai earned much respect at home for standing up 

to Pakistan (and the United States), but his extreme nationalist stance achieved little in 

terms of bringing peace to his country.

Accommodating Pakistan’s Interests

President Ghani’s calculus derives from the same logic that drove Karzai’s policy—namely, 

that Pakistan is the problem and, absent a change in Pakistan’s attitude, Afghanistan will 

not stabilize.15 But, unlike Karzai, Ghani has repeatedly emphasized that the fundamental 

problem is not the Taliban insurgency itself but an “undeclared state of hostilities” between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan.16 He sees the Taliban as a symptom of this problem, not its 

essence. While Karzai tried to shame and coerce Pakistan into cooperation, Ghani has sought 

to make it a part of the solution by trying to convincingly address its concerns in relation 

to Afghanistan in a way that preserves both countries’ interests. 

While Karzai tried to shame and 

coerce Pakistan into cooperation, 

Ghani has sought to make it a 

part of the solution by trying to 

convincingly address its concerns 

in relation to Afghanistan in 

a way that preserves both 

countries’ interests.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

Pakistan’s strategy in Afghanistan during the Karzai years was the offshoot of three basic 

threat perceptions. First, Afghanistan has always been the staging ground for Pakistan’s 

larger regional competition with its traditional foe, India. Under no circumstances would 

Pakistan’s leaders allow India to gain a strategic foothold in Afghanistan. Pakistan may have 

shed its infamous policy of “strategic depth,” whereby it saw Afghan territory as a physical 

rear base in case of war with India, but figuratively it has continued to view Afghanistan 

as its backyard, where even the slightest amount of Indian ingress is regarded as “encirclement” by the enemy.17 By extension, Pakistan did not want a government in Kabul that was 

sympathetic to India and antagonistic to Islamabad. 

Second, Pakistan recognized that it could not openly defy the world’s only superpower—

and that it was also benefiting greatly from U.S. funding—and so it had to achieve its first 

goal of not allowing India a foothold in Afghanistan while remaining a member in good 

standing of the U.S.-led coalition against terrorism, whatever the contradictions between 

this second objective and the first. Pakistan executed this balancing act with great skill, 

utterly frustrating U.S. policymakers, who could not see the point of the double game. Pakistan’s third concern was to prevent terrorist blowback on its own territory, where Pakistan’s 

domestic insurgency was increasingly active.18

Their questionable objectivity aside, viewed through the prism of these long-standing 

concerns, the post-2001 developments in Afghanistan were alarming for Pakistan. The growing warmth of the Indo-U.S. relationship and the so-called dehyphenation of U.S. policy 

toward India and Pakistan was seen by Pakistani leaders as fundamentally upsetting the 

regional balance, and not in their favor.19 The United States knew its improved ties with 

India irked Pakistan, but it also believed it had used the closer relationship to restrain Delhi 

from expanding its role in Afghanistan in a way that would provoke Pakistan. Pakistan, 

however, perceived India’s fairly significant engagement with the Karzai government to be 

part of this U.S. realignment, offering India the opportunity to reinforce an anti-Pakistan 

sentiment among Afghans and, more important, within the Panjshiri Tajik–dominated (as 

Pakistan sees it) Afghan Army officer corps. President Karzai’s personal ties to India (he was 

educated there) and his overtures toward it—aimed partly at eliciting Indian investment 

and partly at raising Pakistan’s diplomatic and strategic costs by signaling his ability to rely 

more heavily on India at Pakistan’s expense—concerned Pakistan further. These perceptions 

were reinforced when, in the wake of a fast-deteriorating Afghanistan-Pakistan relationship, 

Karzai signed a strategic partnership agreement with the Indian government in 2011 that 

included a provision for India to train and provide equipment to the Afghan National Army.20

While neutral observers argued that Karzai’s hand was forced by Pakistan’s lack of cooperation, Pakistan perceived the provision as evidence of Karzai’s inherent preference for India 

over Pakistan, contributing to Pakistan’s mistrust of Karzai. 

Another disturbing development was a major terrorist backlash in Pakistan over the 

past decade that Pakistan considers to be a spillover of U.S. policies in Afghanistan as well 

as a reaction to its own backing of the United States’ actions in Afghanistan, which many 

Pakistani policymakers regard as having been coerced. The United States and Pakistan have 

had many public spats on this issue without either truly understanding the other’s position. 

Washington believed that the terrorist backlash within Pakistan was a result of its selective 

approach in dealing with militants—distinguishing “good” Afghan Taliban from “bad” Pakistani Taliban—and thus counseled Pakistan to “do more” against all insurgent and terrorist 

groups, including the Afghan Taliban. The Pakistani military attributed the internal chaos to 

Pakistan’s having done “too much” at the United States’ behest immediately after 9/11.21 To 

Islamabad, Washington never understood that the armed and restive populations in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas would never accept the overthrow of an Islamic 

The growing warmth of the 

Indo-U.S. relationship and the 

so-called dehyphenation of 

U.S. policy toward India and 

Pakistan was seen by Pakistani 

leaders as fundamentally 

upsetting the regional balance.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 5

regime of fellow Pashtuns (the Taliban-led emirate) especially when that overthrow was at 

the behest of the distrusted United States.22 As the backlash grew, Pakistan’s decision makers became convinced that their only way out of the predicament was to become even more 

selective in their targeting, to leave groups like the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani network 

alone while focusing exclusively on militants who were active against the Pakistani state. 

The upshot was that while Pakistan continued to offer tactical counterterrorism support to 

the U.S.-led global war on terror, the underlying logic of Pakistani policy during the Karzai 

years remained accepting, or even abetting, of controlled chaos in Afghanistan as a means 

of keeping itself relevant, while trying to limit terrorism within its own territory.23

Ghani’s Hope for Regional Cooperation

President Ghani therefore decided to accommodate Pakistan’s concerns to an unprecedented 

degree, in the expectation of reciprocal cooperation. He has worked to settle Pakistani 

nerves with respect to India by suspending Karzai’s arms deal.24 More generally, he has 

indicated that he will not try to play the two countries off against each other. Indeed, his 

stance on the India-Pakistan equation has been unambiguous enough to gain Ghani criticism in India for ignoring Indian interests.25 Even during his maiden presidential visit to 

India in April 2015, Ghani seemed to pay particular attention to how his statements would 

be received in Islamabad and deflected the barrage of questions on what his Pakistan policy 

meant for India.26 That said, he was equally deliberate in reiterating that India would remain 

relevant to Afghanistan’s future development needs and also demanded—in public during 

his trip to India and in private with Pakistani officials shortly prior to it—that Pakistan 

allow Afghanistan an overland route to trade with India. 27 Ghani understands that for 

Afghanistan to truly benefit from his “traffic circle” vision of regional economic integration, 

both Pakistan and India have to be cooperative partners.

With President Obama remaining firm in his promise to withdraw all U.S. troops by 

January 2017, Ghani is now truly in the lead in terms of engagement with Pakistan and 

the Taliban and is offering Pakistan a central role in helping Kabul and the Taliban achieve 

a comprehensive peace. Pakistan’s help is required not only to fulfill Ghani’s most immediate demand of bringing the Taliban to the negotiating table but also in demobilizing and 

demilitarizing the Taliban if and when a successful negotiation process with the Taliban is 

concluded.28 Integrating Pakistan this way eliminates Pakistan’s worry, evident during the 

Karzai administration, that Kabul (or Washington) would exclude it from the table where 

Afghanistan’s future might be negotiated.29 The U.S. troop withdrawal also lowers the 

stakes of Pakistan’s relationship with the superpower, making it easier for Pakistan to pursue 

its regional interests without conflicting with Washington’s interests in the same space.

Equally consequential is that Kabul’s principal request of Pakistan at the outset of Ghani’s 

outreach effort was no longer that it take military action against the Afghan Taliban. Rather, it 

was to get the Taliban to begin direct, meaningful negotiations with the Afghan government 

through means of Pakistan’s choosing. Talks with the Taliban are something Pakistan has long 

preferred to any effort to seek total military victory, even though it previously resisted, and 

even sabotaged, negotiation tracks it was not involved in. Ghani’s demand for dialogue could 

conceivably be satisfied without forcing Pakistan to fully turn against the Taliban, a move that 

Pakistan has resisted for fear of backlash and diminished leverage over the group.

Ghani has also forthrightly addressed Pakistan’s concerns about the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or Pakistani Taliban, who maintain sanctuaries in Kunar and Nuristan provinces on 

the Afghan side of the Durand Line (the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, established 

by treaty in 1893). These sanctuaries, which are a primary Pakistani security concern, began 

functioning during President Karzai’s second term as part of an active covert battle between 

Pakistan’s help is required not 

only to fulfill Ghani’s most 

immediate demand of bringing 

the Taliban to the negotiating 

table but also in demobilizing 

and demilitarizing the Taliban 

if and when a successful 

negotiation process with the 

Taliban is concluded.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

the two countries’ intelligence agencies. Though the Afghan National Directorate of Security 

(NDS) is no match for ISI, given the latter’s extensive and long-standing networks among 

Afghanistan’s strongmen, militias, and politicians, the NDS did begin to score some points by 

tolerating a TTP presence in these areas toward the end of Karzai’s tenure.30 Ghani has sought 

to end this approach. Pakistani officials praised Ghani’s efforts to deliver the Afghanistan-based 

perpetrators of the heinous terrorist attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 

2014, which left over 130 children dead and shook the Pakistani nation.31 Ghani also ordered 

ANSF operations against sanctuaries in Kunar, at significant human cost to his forces.32 Ghani’s 

ability to do so was also important evidence for Pakistan that he is able to exercise control over 

his security and intelligence agencies, something Pakistan has doubted, given its conspiratorial 

perception that the NDS works hand in glove with Indian intelligence. 

The long-term vision underpinning Ghani’s approach also addresses another shared 

objective with Pakistan: downsizing the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Securing 

Pakistan’s partnership ultimately hinges on Ghani’s ability to convince Pakistan that a stable 

Afghanistan will not be a threat. Pakistani policymakers have surely determined that a 

stable Afghanistan, with a 350,000-man security force trained by NATO, would be an unacceptable menace, especially given ongoing unsettled issues between the two neighbors, 

such as the validity of the international border and Afghan claims on Pakistan territory.33

For his part, Ghani is aware that in the long run, the country cannot economically sustain 

such a large force, which continues to be paid for largely by the U.S. military. But the ANSF 

can be reduced only if there is an end to the insurgency and an economy sufficiently robust 

to absorb the demobilized troops. Both could be achieved through a seriously conducted 

reconciliation process coupled with improved regional economic ties. 

China’s Engagement

Finally, Ghani’s approach benefits from another crucial aspect that was missing in previous 

efforts: He is able to exploit China’s increasing interest in facilitating a reconciliation process 

with the Taliban. For many years, China appeared indifferent to the international effort in 

Afghanistan, acting as a casual free rider on the security provided by international forces. 

Now that the United States has expressed its intent to keep to its troop withdrawal schedule, 

China (and Pakistan) have become more concerned about the possible effects of instability 

in Afghanistan after the U.S. withdrawal.34

China is increasingly worried that instability in Afghanistan and in Pakistan’s tribal areas 

will allow the training of Eastern Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) insurgents, who are 

already present in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region and are more and more active 

in China’s restive Muslim-majority Xinjiang province, an autonomous territory in northwest 

China that is home to several ethnic minority groups.35 Beijing appears to be belatedly waking up to the reality that the ETIM is increasingly integrated into global jihadist networks, 

and its cause is now finding its way into statements of groups like ISIS and al-Qaeda.35

China also recognizes that an unstable Afghanistan provides the best opportunity for these 

Uyghur separatists to forge relationships with other Islamist groups. 

With core interests at stake, China has signaled its intent to move beyond its traditional 

engagement with Afghanistan, which, for all practical purposes, until recently was channeled 

through Pakistan. China’s stance on reconciliation continues to echo Pakistan’s preference for 

talks between Kabul and the Taliban. But in the last year or so, Beijing has taken a direct interest in facilitating a dialogue with the Taliban.37 China not only has the advantage of being seen 

as a relatively neutral actor, it is also the only country with real influence over the Pakistani 

security establishment, particularly demonstrated in the past by Pakistan’s extreme responsiveness to Chinese demands for action against Uyghur militants in Pakistan.38
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 7

At the same time, Pakistan will feel far more comfortable with a Chinese presence and 

Chinese guarantees regarding the protection of its interests in Afghanistan than it ever 

did with the U.S. presence and guarantees. In fact, Pakistani, Chinese, and U.S. interests 

appear to have converged on the need to cooperate more effectively to bring about a stable 

Afghanistan. These factors also help explain Ghani’s proactive diplomacy with Islamabad and 

Beijing. Part of Ghani’s calculation is that China will exert pressure on Pakistan to play a more 

active role in bringing stability not only to Afghanistan but the region as a whole. 

Ghani’s Delicate Balance

Ghani’s outreach strategy is really about forging a strategic relationship with Pakistan to replace 

the traditional state of mutual distrust and tactical tit for tat. But this break from the past has 

generated severe criticism at home. Ghani’s critics have called him naïve for trusting Pakistan.39

Their case is bolstered by the fact that so far, Ghani has received little in return for his conciliatory 

efforts. Afghan Taliban-led violence has drastically increased following the April 2015 launch of 

the most vicious and geographically dispersed Taliban spring offensive since 9/11, with spectacular attacks against Afghan police, army, government officials, and civilians. Afghans see this 

violence as evidence of a continuing ISI policy to destabilize Afghanistan. Ghani has persisted 

with his approach despite widespread domestic opposition and the Taliban violence, though his 

tone has gradually but noticeably hardened toward Pakistan—requesting plainly, for example, 

that Taliban sanctuaries not be allowed to remain operational.40 

This persistence owes not to naivety but to the lack of realistic alternatives. The imperative to get the Taliban to reject violence and join the political order is even stronger today 

than it was when Karzai was in power, and Ghani, unlike Karzai, does not have the luxury of 

banking on more than one hundred thousand international troops to fight the insurgents for 

him. Moreover, attrition rates have reached dangerous levels among the ANSF, despite greatly 

improved cohesiveness and tactical capacity.41 Given these realities, the Ghani administration 

has begun rearming militias to help fight the Taliban—a sign not only that the official security 

forces are reaching their limits but also of the growing weakness of the state.42

Ghani also recognizes that Afghanistan is no longer the most urgent priority for the 

West, for the rising threat of ISIS has forced the United States and its allies to turn their 

attention and resources to the Middle East. Ghani can therefore neither hope to continue 

fighting the Taliban endlessly nor depend on the West to bankroll the Afghan government 

forever. Nor can Kabul expect the United States to increase the pressure on Pakistan to help 

Kabul’s cause, as the United States has clearly signaled its intent to mend fences with the 

Pakistan military.43 These factors have forced Ghani into his policy of accommodation, if 

only by depriving him of alternatives.

The counterargument to Ghani’s approach, and one espoused by many in Kabul, is that 

improved governance itself will lead to stability, and therefore Ghani should focus on 

governance rather than on appeasing Pakistan. But the contention that better governance 

alone takes the momentum away from insurgents is not upheld by the experience of other 

South Asian countries. Much stronger countries, such as India, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka, have 

tried and failed to improve governance amid turmoil, despite having far greater resources 

than Afghanistan.44 Better governance helps stability, but a minimum level of stability is 

needed to allow space for good policies to have the desired impact. In Afghanistan, even the 

resources necessary to attempt a major governance and economic turnaround are dependent 

on the government’s ability to attract foreign investment or aid, gain rents from regional 

economic activity, and reduce expenditures on the ANSF. Each of these initiatives requires a 

serious reduction in, if not an end to, the perennial state of conflict in the country. 

Ghani’s outreach strategy 

is about forging a strategic 

relationship with Pakistan to 

replace the traditional state 

of mutual distrust and tactical 

tit for tat. But this break from 

the past has generated severe 

criticism at home.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

Realpolitik versus Reality

The soundness of Ghani’s realpolitik may be unquestionable, but it is one thing to conceive 

of a grand strategic design and another to get other players to cooperate. Ghani has made 

the best pitch yet to achieve normalized Afghanistan-Pakistan ties, but precisely because his 

success hinges so heavily on Pakistan’s reaction, his is truly a leap of faith. Moreover, failure 

may still occur despite Pakistan’s best intentions and efforts. 

Pakistan’s willingness to deliver is the greatest unknown factor. Pakistani policymakers 

have acknowledged through conciliatory statements that they now see supporting Ghani to 

be in their best interests. At one level, Pakistan seems to have responded. Afghanistan saw a 

temporary lull in violence between mid-December 2014 and the end of April 2015, a development attributed to Pakistan at least momentarily staying the hand of the Haqqani network. 

Afghan and Pakistani officials, with Chinese assistance, remain in regular contact about 

finding ways to initiate talks with the Taliban. Since late 2014, senior Taliban representatives have visited China for meetings, with and without accompanying Pakistani intelligence 

officials.45 Reports also suggest that Sun Yuxi, China’s special envoy to Afghanistan, met 

Afghan Taliban leaders in Peshawar after President Ghani came to power.46 Most recently, 

former Afghan Taliban officials reportedly met Masoom Stanekzai, head of the secretariat of 

the Afghan High Peace Council, and Afghan representatives close to CEO Abdullah Abdullah 

at a meeting in Urumqi facilitated by Pakistan’s ISI and with Chinese support.47 Progress 

seemed real enough for a while that Afghan and Pakistani officials expressed their belief that 

they were getting close to initiating formal talks with the Taliban.48

There has also been a shift in Pakistan’s declared policy toward the Taliban, with the 

Pakistani prime minister categorically stating as recently as mid-May 2015 that Afghan Taliban 

attacks would be viewed as terrorist acts and promising that the Taliban would be “outlawed 

and hunted down.”49 Responding to requests from Ghani for more tangible results, the Pakistani state also conveyed to the Taliban to halt their offensive in Afghanistan or face serious 

consequences—though what those consequences might be remains unknown.50 The Standing 

Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Pakistani parliament recently also made the unprecedented 

move of publicly calling on the government to hand over the Afghan Taliban to Kabul.51 If these 

statements are translated into action, this would be a major policy shift for Pakistan. For now, 

however, all this activity amounts to little more than confidence building. 

That is all the good news there is. On the whole, Ghani has been in an extremely precarious 

domestic situation for some time. The increase in violence across the country since the onset 

of the Taliban spring offensive presents an existential threat to his effort. Ghani’s vulnerability 

was exposed when a controversial ISI-NDS memorandum of understanding (MoU) seeking 

intelligence cooperation and direct coordination between these mutually distrusting institutions was leaked in Afghanistan, prompting what a former spokesperson for President Karzai 

described as a “deep and unfortunate rupture” between the current president and his predecessor.52 Up until then, Karzai, still an influential figure in Afghanistan, had voiced his support 

for the national unity government, even though he had always criticized its Pakistan policy.

Ghani responded with a tough letter to the Pakistani leadership.53 His specific demands 

included taking real measures to deny the Taliban sanctuary, putting Taliban leaders under 

house arrest, exchanging Afghan and Pakistani Taliban prisoners, investigating and arresting all 

those being treated in medical facilities in Pakistan, controlling the sale of materials used for 

manufacturing improvised explosive devices, and agreeing to simultaneous operations on both 

sides of the Durand Line to squeeze both Afghan and Pakistani Taliban. Ghani also signaled his 

fallback option of becoming a “war president,”54 perhaps a hint at his ability to use the TTP 

sanctuaries in Afghanistan more strategically in case Pakistan failed to deliver. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 9

Ghani’s lack of constructive options is evident from the fact that he had communicated 

essentially the same demands to Pakistan in April after Pakistan had failed to convince 

the Taliban not to launch their spring offensive.56 Pakistan had shared its actions and 

the progress it was making at the time with Kabul and pleaded for the Afghan president’s 

patience.56 Ghani’s letter, revealed in early June, gave Pakistan two weeks to respond, but 

the supposed deadline passed without any indication from Ghani that a change in his strategy was imminent, leaving many wondering whether Pakistan is either unable or unwilling 

to exert influence on the Taliban. 

Spoilers and Obstacles to Conciliation

Ghani’s persistence may also be a function of a more nuanced and realistic understanding of 

the significant complexities involved in Pakistan getting the Taliban to talk meaningfully. 

Ghani may well have grasped this reality and be willing to live with a longer timeline, perhaps 

beyond the current fighting season, for Pakistan to take specific actions.57 There is also the 

question of Pakistan’s ability to draw the Taliban into negotiations even if it truly wants to. 

Exactly how much sway Pakistan has over the Taliban has long been debated by Afghanistan 

and Pakistan analysts. The conventional wisdom is that the ISI has far more influence over the 

Haqqani network than over the Quetta Shura but that it is the Shura that needs to be wooed 

to talk since it is the core of the movement. While Islamabad could push the Shura to the 

negotiating table, under the existing paradigm that defines their relationship it cannot force 

the Shura to make concessions that the Taliban perceive to be against their core interests.

Pakistan’s influence over the Taliban has likely diminished further in recent years as evidence 

has emerged of growing splits within the movement.58 For some time there have been indications of the existence of a pro-fighting wing and a pro-negotiation wing within the Quetta 

Shura. As long as it is not clear what the negotiation process can deliver, the militant voices, 

who may see themselves within reach of defeating a second superpower in three decades, will 

probably win most of the internal arguments. The fear of internal fracturing is one reason why 

the Taliban continue to deny that any of the meetings involving them have been about starting 

formal talks.59 In private conversations, Pakistani officials have revealed that the Taliban are 

unhappy about the leaks regarding talks already held, such as the recent round in Urumqi, as 

this leaves the pro-talk factions more open to internal criticism.60

The reported presence of a large number of Central Asian militants who have fled 

Pakistan’s North Waziristan operation against the TTP complicates matters further, as these 

groups have no stake in the Taliban movement itself and thus no interest in accepting any 

political directives not to fight.61 Their presence also makes the pro-fighting camp within 

the Taliban less dependent on the pro-talking faction to contribute to their battlefield 

strength. Finally, those who oppose talks can point to the fragility of the Kabul national 

unity government. The best chance of getting the Taliban to talk meaningfully may be a 

strong demonstration from the unity government and ANSF of their ability to stand up to 

the Taliban’s offensive. For this reason, any real talks would be more likely to occur after the 

end of the fighting season this year rather than during it. 

In recent months, a further split has begun to emerge within the Taliban as a number 

of fighting-level factions have reportedly declared their allegiance to ISIS. The presence of 

such violent spoilers will make it harder for the Taliban to implement the terms of any agreement (for example, a cease-fire) if one were to be reached. 

Pakistan must also wonder about President Ghani’s ability to control his security establishment. Although he demonstrated his ability to get the NDS to apprehend the Peshawar 

attack suspects, the fallout from the leaked ISI-NDS MoU could not have gone unnoticed.62

The best chance of getting the 

Taliban to talk meaningfully 

may be a strong demonstration 

from the unity government and 

ANSF of their ability to stand up 

to the Taliban’s offensive.
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

The Ghani government’s ability to function as a unitary actor is crucial for Pakistan to maintain a real interest in supporting him. Pakistan’s response to Ghani’s own demands hinges 

largely on this factor. For instance, simultaneous operations on both sides of the border 

require real-time intelligence sharing, which presupposes that intelligence agencies trust 

that their opposite number will act in the spirit of this arrangement. If the chain of command on the Afghan side is fungible, Pakistan may be reluctant to cooperate, especially in 

light of the deep-seated mistrust between the ISI and NDS. Pakistanis also privately admit 

the merit in Ghani’s prisoner exchange proposal but remain reluctant to execute it, under 

the pretext that when Pakistan has handed over arrested Taliban to Afghanistan in the past, 

their “confessions” about working with the ISI have been used to inflame anti-Pakistani 

feelings in Afghanistan.63 Many of these dynamics are of Pakistan’s own making, the result 

of its long-standing double game, but they are complications nonetheless that underscore 

the importance of ensuring there is no disconnect between Ghani’s strategic vision and his 

security establishment’s tactical actions.

Be that as it may, Ghani’s threshold for domestic criticism is not unlimited, and he has 

conveyed as much to Pakistan directly and through emissaries. Pakistan must recognize that 

he needs more than verbal reassurances, ministerial visits, and controversial MoUs. Thus 

far, no tangible Pakistani action demonstrates with certainty that Pakistan has given up its 

old tactics with respect to Afghanistan and is sincerely trying to help Ghani achieve peace. 

Pakistan’s failure to deliver tangible outcomes will be self-defeating and devastating for the 

two countries’ long-term relationship, perhaps closing off forever the possibility of a longterm, mutually beneficial, strategic relationship.

The Way Forward

Ghani’s outreach initiative is beset with uncertainty. Yet in the absence of viable alternatives, his approach remains the best hope for peace in Afghanistan and deserves support 

from all quarters. 

Tasks for Pakistan

Most important, Pakistani civilian and military leaders must recognize that President 

Ghani has offered their country the best possible opportunity to protect its interests in 

Afghanistan. Their failure to deliver on his most basic demand, to bring the Taliban to the 

negotiating table, will sooner or later force him to give up his policy of conciliation and try 

to salvage whatever political capital he can at home. This retrenchment would inevitably 

involve criticizing Pakistan, which in turn would reinforce the already strong Afghan and 

international perception that Pakistan does not want peace in Afghanistan.

To date, Pakistan has done little more than nudge and verbally threaten the Taliban to 

enter into a dialogue with Kabul, only to find out that it had overestimated its own clout 

with the Taliban opposed to talks, as they have reportedly refused to oblige.64 Pakistan 

must immediately accept its responsibility to change paradigms or else risk a perpetuation of 

instability, perhaps descending into all-out chaos in Afghanistan, which would open up even 

greater space for the TTP and its affiliates to operate and strike from across the Durand Line. 

The list of demands laid out in Ghani’s letter to Pakistan are all realistic next steps that 

would buy both sides time and perhaps also begin to influence the Taliban’s strategy. The 

most prudent approach would entail Pakistan targeting its strategy disproportionately to the 

pro-fighting groups among the Taliban, raising their costs and weakening them while giving 

those in favor of dialogue an opportunity to move quickly toward formal negotiations—and 

Thus far, no tangible 

Pakistani action demonstrates 

with certainty that Pakistan 

has given up its old tactics with 

respect to Afghanistan and is 

sincerely trying to help Ghani 

achieve peace. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 11

conveying that failure to do so would have real consequences. Specifically, Pakistan should 

undertake the following actions:

• immediately shut down financial flows to Taliban fighters participating in the spring 

offensive; 

• start making life uncomfortable for Taliban fighters’ families if the fighting faction remains 

unresponsive to Pakistani demands to reconsider the use of violence; 

• begin to arrest Taliban fighters and agree to Ghani’s offer of Afghan and Pakistan Taliban 

prisoner exchanges; 

• exert greater control over the border through real-time intelligence sharing, with or 

without a formal MoU. 

If these efforts do not begin to show positive results within a reasonably short time 

frame—within weeks, and by the end of the summer at the latest—Pakistan must then 

make the difficult decision of initiating direct action against those operating from the sanctuaries and opposed to talks with the Kabul government. Because the Taliban are believed to 

be present in and around the heavily populated cities of Quetta, Peshawar, and Karachi, this 

would entail a series of targeted law enforcement (police and paramilitary)-with-intelligence 

operations. A law enforcement approach is also recommended over a larger military offensive because even if the latter were tactically viable, it would inevitably push the Taliban 

into Afghanistan and add to the ANSF’s burden. 

All along, Pakistan must continually hold before the Taliban the possibility of forced 

expulsion from Pakistan or the arrest of their leadership. Conducting such direct actions 

without first exhausting other measures would terminate any prospects of talks, and such 

moves should be considered only as a last resort. But Pakistan must be willing to countenance and execute such direct actions should the situation warrant them. A graduated 

approach primarily targeting the pro-fighting faction of the Taliban would also avoid forcing 

the entire Taliban movement to turn violent against the Pakistani state—a long-standing 

Pakistani concern. To counter the growing suspicions among Afghans that Pakistan lacks 

serious commitment to the cause of peace, the Pakistani leadership should provide tangible 

evidence to the Kabul government as it undertakes each of these moves. 

Laying the Groundwork for Negotiating with the Taliban

The substance of the actual conversations with the Taliban is important to work out. All interlocutors need to prioritize requests and focus on the most important ones first. This means 

that engagements between the Taliban and Afghan representatives need to move quickly 

beyond exploring confidence-building measures. The best use of future meetings would be to 

scaffold all conversations with the Taliban on the fundamental issue of achieving a cease-fire 

on the ground in Afghanistan. The Taliban understandably do not want to give up their trump 

card of violence completely without having a guaranteed quid pro quo in place. Discussions 

must therefore be aimed at identifying the minimum prerequisites on all sides that would allow 

a cease-fire to take effect, and a formal negotiation process to begin thereafter. 

The Ghani government also needs to have a better grasp of the multiple channels now in 

existence for talking to the Taliban and provide guidance. Even as the Chinese track is being 

pursued, Taliban representatives sit in Doha awaiting the formal opening of the Taliban 

office. It is unclear how the Qatar option intersects with what is being pursued by other 

channels within the region.65 Other track 1.5 processes are ongoing in parallel, without 

anyone having a clear sense of the impact they might have on formal negotiations and in 

the absence of any real guidance from the Ghani government on what type of discussions 

in these meetings would be most useful to the more direct conversations being pursued. 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

Ghani’s Tasks

Meanwhile, Ghani has two important tasks if he wants his initiative to succeed. First, to buy 

himself time, he needs to manage the politics around his Pakistan outreach more astutely than 

he has to date. While he may have taken key actors in the unity government into his confidence 

with regard to his Pakistan policy, he has done little to explain his reasoning to the public or to 

build a broader political consensus on the issue. With these lapses, he has ceded crucial media 

space to his critics and fueled ill will. In retrospect, a quieter courting of Pakistan might have 

not only prevented the constant criticism—perhaps even given Ghani space to take bolder steps 

behind the scenes—but also could have left him with plausible deniability had the effort failed, 

and the option of taking credit for it if tangible progress was made. The best he can do now is 

to avoid unnecessary crises such as the one provoked by the leak of the ISI-NDS MoU, while more 

generally but carefully explaining the logic of his policy to his people. The current atmosphere 

also requires that he adopt a less conciliatory tone toward Pakistan in public and in a way that 

projects firmness, at least until Islamabad is able to deliver something tangible.66

The second and more important task is for Ghani to demonstrate that his government is 

able to function. The power-sharing construct that resulted from Afghanistan’s contentious 

2014 presidential election has frustrated decision making. Nine months after the government’s 

inauguration, the cabinet is still not complete, and two-thirds of the country’s governors have 

not been appointed. A government that is perceived as weak will encourage Taliban hard-liners 

to believe that it can be toppled through fighting and will discourage pro-negotiation Taliban 

(and Pakistan) who might fear that the Ghani government will not be able to implement its 

commitments. The unity government’s success in holding out in the face of the Taliban offensive this year may well be key to opening up space for a meaningful dialogue. 

Ghani’s political opponents must also recognize that the status quo can only destabilize 

the Afghan state apparatus, which is increasingly incapable of defending or sustaining itself, 

let alone improving the lives of its citizens. Great damage is being done through premature 

leaks about developments linked to Ghani’s Pakistan policy. It is not only setting back progress but also giving Pakistan room to transfer the blame for its failure to deliver the Taliban 

to the table and strengthening the hand of the Taliban still seeking total victory. Rather than 

charged critiques that seek to put Ghani down or pose determined opposition to Pakistan’s 

role, Ghani’s critics could contribute constructively by offering suggestions on how to elicit 

greater support from Pakistan, China, and other interested actors. 

China’s Role in Afghanistan-Pakistan Conciliation and Taliban Mitigation

Though China’s diplomatic style is typically noninterventionist, China should lean more 

heavily on Pakistan and apply greater pressure directly on the Taliban leadership to enter 

negotiations in earnest, for mere prodding has not succeeded in moving affairs along fast 

enough to ensure Ghani’s political survival. For their part, Ghani and the United States need 

to remain proactive in trying to mobilize Chinese influence. The United States, China, and 

Afghanistan are now engaged in a trilateral dialogue on Afghanistan, but this channel is 

more bureaucratic than action-oriented. Kabul and Washington need to more aggressively 

convince China to develop a sense of urgency in its dealings with Pakistan and the Taliban. 

The Role of the International Community

Finally, the United States and the rest of the international community must not see Ghani’s 

Pakistan outreach and China’s growing involvement in Afghanistan-Pakistan conciliation as 

a substitute for the need to stay the course in Afghanistan. Perhaps the biggest blow to 

Ghani’s efforts at this point would be a further reinforcement of the perception that the 

The unity government’s success 

in holding out in the face of the 

Taliban offensive this year may 

well be key to opening up space for 

a meaningful dialogue. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 13

West has given up and that the unity government and ANSF will collapse. The United States 

must convincingly demonstrate its continued support of Afghanistan to counter the perception that it is disinterested in the country’s long-term future. It would also be advisable to 

formally reopen the debate in Washington about the U.S. military’s drawdown schedule and 

support role. Leaving a window open for the next U.S. president to choose his or her own 

course would not only allow a possible recalibration based on the situation at the time but 

would also help assuage any concerns that Afghanistan is about to be abandoned again. 

Strong signals of support from the international community are crucial to disincentivize 

hedging strategies by Afghan political actors—which could make the collapse of the unity 

government a self-fulfilling prophecy—and to avoid giving the pro-fighting Taliban groups 

even greater opportunity to convince the movement that total victory is in sight. 

Conclusion

Time is of the essence. The longer Pakistan waits to make a more concerted effort against the 

Taliban, the less likely it is that the Afghan government will be able to continue operating 

with a single voice. It would be a mistake on Pakistan’s part to believe that the solution is 

to leave Ghani to manage his domestic political opponents rather than to deliver, and soon.

President Ghani has undoubtedly taken a gamble, but it is a calculated one that has the 

potential to bring serious dividends in terms of Afghanistan’s, and the region’s, stability 

and economic progress. The international community can help by more effectively aligning 

their diplomacy behind him. Most of all, though, success for Ghani depends heavily on what 

Pakistan is willing and able to deliver within the next few months. Pakistan’s failure to 

seize the offer of strategic cooperation offered by Ghani would precipitate a nightmare for 

Afghanistan—but no less for Pakistan itself. There is hope, but it is fading rapidly. 

Notes

1. Mohammed Umer Daudzai, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The False Promise of Rapprochement,” New York 

Times, March 22, 2015, www.nytimes.com/2015/03/23/opinion/afghanistan-and-pakistan-the-false-promise-ofrapprochement.html.

2. Lynne O’Donnell, “Taliban Announce Spring Offensive in Afghanistan,” Associated Press, April 22, 2015, www.

usatoday.com/story/news/world/2015/04/22/taliban-spring-offensive/26168955.

3. Karim Amini, “Peace First with Pakistan Before the Taliban: Ghani,” Tolo News, June 9, 2015, www.tolonews.com/

en/afghanistan/19932-peace-first-with-pakistan-before-the-taliban-ghani. 

4. Ghani has stated, “The key to prosperity is not in foreign aid, it’s in regional economic integration.” Interview at 

Chatham House, December 4, 2014. For additional insights into Ghani’s economic priorities, see the transcript of 

his remarks at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, March 26, 2015: “The Road Ahead for Afghanistan,” 

Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/afghanistan/road-ahead-afghanistan/p36304.

5. Created on September 5, 2010, the High Peace Council includes former members of the Taliban as well as 

influential Afghan political figures, such as Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani and Abdul Rab Rasul Sayaf. For more 

information on the Council, visit the website at www.hpc.org.af/english/. 

6. See Ben Farmer, “Hamid Karzai Reaches Out to ‘Taliban Brothers’ in Afghanistan,” The Telegraph, November 3, 2009. 

Karzai repeatedly used this formulation during his second term. See Alex Sundby, “Karzai on Taliban: ‘I’m Still Calling 

Them Brothers,’” CBS News, April 3, 2013,www.cbsnews.com/news/karzai-on-taliban-im-still-calling-them-brothers/.

7. See Kai Eide, Power Struggle Over Afghanistan (New York: Skyhorse Publishing, 2010), 290.

8. “Taliban Reject Karzai Claim of Secret Meetings,” CNN, February 16, 2012, www.cnn.com/2012/02/16/world/

asia/afghanistan-taliban-us/.

9. “Karzai Calls Pakistan ‘Twin Brother’ in India,” News Tribe, October 5, 2011, www.thenewstribe.com/2011/10/05/

karzai-calls-pakistan-twin-brother-in-india/.

10. D. D. Gray and A. Shah, “Afghan Negotiator Hopes Release of 8 Taliban Prisoners by Pakistan Will Further Peace 

Process,” Associated Press, January 1, 2013. These releases soon became controversial as it was suspected that 

some of these individuals went back to join the fighting in Afghanistan.

11. ”ISI Cultivated Taliban to Counter Indian Action Against Pakistan: Musharraf,” Dawn, February 13, 2015, www.

dawn.com/news/1163376.

12. On the Quetta Shura Taliban, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 

2nd ed. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 187, and Neamatullah Nojumi, “The Rise and Fall of the 

Taliban,” in The Taliban and the Crisis of Afghanistan, ed. Robert Crews and Amin Tarzi (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 

University Press, 2008), 90–117. For a detailed account of the Haqqani network, see Vahid Brown and Don Rassler, 

Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973–2012 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376

13. Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, the Taliban’s second-highest-ranking member and the movement’s operational 

commander, was picked up from the Pakistani city of Karachi in 2010. Baradar was allegedly arrested because 

he was trying to engage in secret talks with the Karzai government without Pakistan’s knowledge. Pakistan has 

continued to dispute this account, arguing that Baradar was arrested in a joint operation alongside the CIA with 

U.S. understanding. Dexter Filkins, “Pakistanis Tell of Motive in Taliban Leader’s Arrest,” New York Times, August 

22, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/08/23/world/asia/23taliban.html?pagewanted=all. 

14. See Karen DeYoung, “Pakistan Backed Attacks on American Targets, U.S. Says,” Washington Post, September 

23, 2011, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/pakistan-backed-attacks-on-american-targets-ussays/2011/09/22/gIQAf0q6oK_story.html.

15. This reality is most succinctly depicted in former UN special répétiteur to the secretary-general Lakhdar Brahimi’s 

words: “Afghanistan cannot be stable unless Pakistan wants it to be stable.” Edward Wong, “Q. and A.: Barnett 

Rubin on China’s Role in Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 20, 2015, http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.

com/2015/02/20/q-and-a-barnett-rubin-on-chinas-role-in-afghanistan/?_r=0.

16. James Rupert, “Afghan President: Pakistan Is Why Peace with Taliban Is Possible,” U.S. Institute of Peace, March 

25, 2015, www.usip.org/publications/2015/03/25/afghan-president-pakistan-why-peace-taliban-possible.

17. Pakistani military strategists have long worried about “encirclement” by India, or a “two-front” situation, as 

they call it, whereby the problem of a hostile neighbor in the east is coupled with a pro-India and anti-Pakistan 

Afghanistan in the west. See A. S. Agha, “Pakistan’s Security Perceptions,” in Security and Nuclear Stabilization in 

South Asia , ed. Imtiaz Alam (Lahore: Free Media Association, 2006), 201–16.

18. We originally elucidated these Pakistani concerns; see Scott Smith and Moeed Yusuf, “Too Late to Tango? Ashraf 

Ghani’s Risky Outreach to Pakistan,” Foreign Policy, May 7, 2015, http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/05/07/too-lateto-tango-ashraf-ghanis-risky-outreach-to-pakistan/.

19. Moeed Yusuf, “Rational Institutional Design, Perverse Incentives, and the US-Pakistan Relationship in Post-9/11,” 

Defense Against Terrorism Review 2, no. 1 (2009): 22, 25–26.

20. The text of the strategic partnership agreement is available at India Ministry of External Affairs, “Text of Agreement 

on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of India and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan,” http://

mfa.gov.af/en/news/3867, http://mfa.gov.af/content/files/agreement%20on%20strategic%20partnership%20

between%20afghanistan%20and%20india%20-%20english.pdf.

21. See Shaukat Qadir, “The State’s Response to the Pakistani Taliban Onslaught,” in Insurgency and Counterinsurgency 

in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens, ed. Moeed Yusuf (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 

2014), 133–34.

22. Ibid.

23. For a detailed analysis of Pakistani concerns that drove its Afghanistan policy and some of its key policy choices to 

protect its self-defined interests, see Moeed Yusuf, Decoding Pakistan’s ‘Strategic Shift’ in Afghanistan (Stockholm: 

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2013), http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/SIPRI13wcaMY.pdf.

24. Karim Amini, “President Ghani Suspends Karzai’s Request for Indian Arms,” Tolo News, February 10, 2015, www.

tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/18152-president-ghani-suspends-karzais-request-for-indian-arms; Tahir Khan, 

“Ghani May Decline Indian Arms to Build Bridges with Pakistan,” Express Tribune, February 14, 2015, http://

tribune.com.pk/story/837964/ghani-may-decline-indian-arms-to-build-bridges-with-pakistan/.

25. “’Don’t Make Us a Proxy War Battleground’: Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to NDTV,” NDTV, April 27, 2015, www.

ndtv.com/video/player/ndtv-special-ndtv-24x7/don-t-make-us-a-proxy-war-battleground-afghan-president-ashrafghani-to-ndtv/365361; Manasi Pritam and Maihan Saeedi, “India Risks Marginalization in Afghanistan,” Nikkei 

Asian Review, February 23, 2015, http://asia.nikkei.com/Viewpoints/Geopolitico/India-risks-marginalization-inAfghanistan; Sanjeev Miglani, “India to Host Afghan Leader, Seeks to Regain Ground Lost to China, Pakistan,” 

Reuters, April 24, 2015, http://in.reuters.com/article/2015/04/23/india-afghanistan-idINL4N0XJ5M220150423.

26. “Don’t Make Us a Proxy War Battleground.”

27. The only time Ghani deviated from his evidently soft tone on Pakistan during his visit to India was on the 

question of transit trade between India and Afghanistan, when he threatened not to “provide equal transit 

access to Central Asia” if Pakistan did not do the same for Afghan imports coming from India. Suhasini Haidar, 

“Pakistan Must Open Wagah for Trade: Ghani,” The Hindu, April 30, 2015, www.thehindu.com/news/national/

pakistan-must-open-wagah-for-trade-ghani/article7155457.ece. Ghani also delayed the finalization of the 

Pakistan-Afghanistan-Tajikistan transit trade agreement in a tit-for-tat move. Author’s (M.Y.) conversation with 

senior Pakistani official, June 2015. 

28. Wong, “Q. and A.”

29. Yusuf, Decoding Pakistan.

30. Umar Farooq, “Afghanistan-Pakistan: The Covert War,” The Diplomat, January 1, 2014, http://thediplomat.

com/2014/01/afghanistan-pakistan-the-covert-war/.

31. “Pakistan Taliban: Peshawar School Attack Leaves 141 Dead,” BBC, December 14, 2014. www.bbc.com/news/

world-asia-30491435. Pakistani intelligence agencies were able to track down cell phone conversations the 

terrorists involved in the Peshawar massacre were having with their handlers in Afghanistan as they were carrying 

out the attack. The Pakistani Army and ISI chiefs met President Ghani and his team the next day and demanded 

action against the handlers. The Afghan security apparatus arrested the alleged handlers within weeks. Margherita 

Stancati and Nathan Hodge, “Kabul Arrests Militants Suspected of Role in Pakistan School Attack,” Wall Street 

Journal, January 15, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/kabul-arrests-militants-suspected-of-role-in-pakistan-schoolattack-1421353059.

32. Ejaz Haider, “Trust Deficit,” Newsweek Pakistan, June 25, 2015, http://newsweekpakistan.com/trust-deficit/.

33. On Pashtun nationalism, Pakistan’s fear of Afghanistan supporting a movement for a “greater Pashtunistan” 

straddling both sides of the Durand Line, and related interstate tensions. See S. M. M. Qureshi, “Pakhtunistan: 

The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan,” Pacific Affairs 39, no. 1 (1966): 101; Amin Saikal, 

“Afghanistan and Pakistan: The Question of Pashtun Nationalism?,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 30, no. 1 

(2010): 5–17; and Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (New York: Sage, 

2005), 83–109.

34. On Chinese calculations, see Andrew Small, “China’s Afghan Moment,” Foreign Policy, October 3, 2012, http://

foreignpolicy.com/2012/10/03/chinas-afghan-moment/. In a report published by the U.S. Institute of Peace 

and the Jinnah Institute in 2011 that captured the perceptions of the Pakistani strategic elite on Afghanistan, 

the possibility of a permanent U.S. presence was reported as one of their biggest concerns. Moeed Yusuf, Huma 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 376 15

Yusuf, and Salman Zaidi, “Pakistan, the United States, and the End Game in Afghanistan: Perceptions of Pakistan’s 

Foreign Policy Elite,” Peace Brief no. 100 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011), www.usip.org/sites/

default/files/PB100.pdf. The last two years have, however, seen a turnaround in Pakistan’s position, and Pakistani 

officials have cautioned the United States about leaving a security vacuum behind in Afghanistan: “Pakistan 

Urges US to Tread Carefully in Afghan Withdrawal,” Voice of America, January 27, 2014, www.voanews.com/

content/reu-pakistan-urges-us-to-tread-carefully-in-afghan-withdrawal/1838879.html; “Jilani Suggests Slower 

US Troops’ Drawdown,” Pajhwok, March 4, 2015, www.pajhwok.com/en/2015/03/10/jilani-suggests-slower-ustroops%E2%80%99-drawdown.

35. Zia Ur Rehman, “ETIM’s Presence in Pakistan and China’s Growing Pressure,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource 

Centre, Oslo, August 2014, www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/381280b226170

116bb6f07dc969cb17d.pdf.

36. Gary Sands, “China and the ISIS Threat,” The Diplomat, September 26, 2014, http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/

china-and-the-isis-threat/; Dirk van der Kley, “China’s Foreign Policy in Afghanistan,” Lowy Institute for 

International Policy, Sydney, Australia, October 24, 2014, 5.

37. Edward Wong, “Exploring a New Role: Peacemaker in Afghanistan,” New York Times, January 14, 2015, www.

nytimes.com/2015/01/14/world/asia/exploring-a-new-role-peacemaker-in-afghanistan.html; Nathan Hodge, 

Habib Totakhil, and Josh Chin, “China Creates New Avenue for Afghan Peace Talks,” Wall Street Journal, January 

6, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/china-creates-new-avenue-for-afghan-peace-talks-1420564492; Jeremy Page, 

Margherita Stancati, and Nathan Hodge, “As U.S. Exits, China Takes on Afghanistan Role,” Wall Street Journal, 

February 9, 2015, www.wsj.com/articles/as-u-s-exits-china-takes-on-afghanistan-role-1423539002.

38. Rehman, “ETIM’s Presence.”

39. Daudzai, “Afghanistan and Pakistan: The False Promise”; Aimal Faizi, “Afghan Government Is Sleeping with the 

Enemy,” Al Jazeera, May 21, 2015, www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/05/afghan-government-sleepingenemy-150521044826456.html.

40. See Zahid Hussain, “Ghani’s Frustration,” Dawn, June 10, 2015, www.dawn.com/news/1187178/ghanis-frustration.

41. See, for example, Antonio Giustozzi and Peter Quentin, “The Afghan National Army: Sustainability Challenges 

Beyond Financial Aspects” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2014). The Special Inspector 

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported in January 2015 that over the previous year, the size of 

the Afghan National Army had declined by 8.5 percent, or by 15,636 soldiers. See SIGAR, “Supplement to SIGAR’s 

January 2015 Quarterly Report to the United States Congress” (Washington, DC: SIGAR, 2015).

42. See, for example, Mujib Mashal, Joseph Goldstein, and Jawad Sukhanyar, “Afghans Form Militias and Call 

on Warlords to Battle Taliban,” New York Times, May 24, 2015.; “Report: Afghanistan Relying On ‘Cheap but 

Dangerous’ Militia with Abuse Record,” Radio Free Europe, June 4, 2015, www.rferl.org/content/afghanistanmilitias-abuse-record/27052651.html; International Crisis Group, “The Future of the Afghan Local Police,” Asia 

Report no 268, June 4, 2015, www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/268-the-future-ofthe-afghan-local-police.aspx.

43. See, for example, Chidanand Rajghatta, “US, Pak & ISI—Generals and the Red Carpet,” Times of India, 

December 23, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/US-PAK-ISI-Generals-and-the-red-carpet/

articleshow/45611674.cms.

44. For a detailed analysis of the key drivers of select insurgencies in South Asia and counterinsurgency strategies 

used by states, see Moeed Yusuf, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2014).

45. At least two such meetings took place shortly after President Ghani visited China in October 2014. Page, Stancati, 

and Hodge, “As U.S. Exits”; Wong, “Exploring a New Role.” More meetings have taken place since then. 

46. Mian Abrar, “The Man Behind the Chinese Dream,” Pakistan Today, January 10, 2015, www.pakistantoday.com.

pk/2015/01/10/comment/the-man-behind-the-chinese-dream/.

47. Margherita Stancati, “Afghan Peace Envoy Met Taliban in Secret China Talks,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 2015, 

www.wsj.com/articles/afghan-peace-envoy-met-taliban-in-secret-china-talks-1432486585.

48. A number of public statements from officials on both sides, including Afghan officials, such as CEO Abdullah, who 

has traditionally been extremely suspicious of Pakistan, suggested a fair amount of confidence that efforts to 

initiate talks with the Taliban would bear fruit imminently. See, for example, “Abdullah Says Taliban Talks Could 

Start Soon, Militants Deny,” Dawn, February 23, 2015, www.dawn.com/news/1165423.

49. Mateen Haider and Ifran Haider, “Nawaz Sharif Pledges Support in Afghan Fight against Taliban,” Dawn, May 12, 

2015, www.dawn.com/news/1181502.

50. Kamran Yousaf, “Spring Offensive in Afghanistan: Pakistan Warns Taliban to Shun Violence—or Else,” Express 

Tribune, May 25, 2015, http://tribune.com.pk/story/891809/spring-offensive-in-afghanistan-pakistan-warnstaliban-to-shun-violence-or-else/.

51. Mateen Haider, “NA Panel Suggests Handing over Afghan Taliban to Kabul,” Dawn, June 1, 2015, www.dawn.

com/news/1185528.

52. Tariq Majidi, “NDS and ISI Sign MoU,” Tolo News, May 17, 2015, www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19576-ndsand-isi-sign-mou. This MoU created an instant political backlash, which forced the Ghani government to call for its 

review and reconsideration: Saleha Soadat, “Muslimyar Denounces NDS-ISI Agreement,” Tolo News, May 19, 2015, 

www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19604-muslimyar-denounces-nds-isi-agreement”; Govt to Review Controversial 

NDS-ISI MoU,” Tolo News, May 24, 2015, www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19671-govt-to-review-controversialnds-isi-mou; Jan Alekozai and Zarif Nazar, “Amid Rising Political Tempers, Afghans Question Karzai,” Ghandara, June 

15, 2015, http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-karzai-criticism/27060589.html.

53. Abubakar Siddique, “Amid Deteriorating Ties with Pakistan, Afghan Leader Makes Tough Demands,” Gandhara, May 

30, 2015, http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-ghani-tough-letter-to-pakistan-/27044658.html; Kathy 

Whitehead, “Ghani Reportedly Sent List of Security Demands to Sharif,” Tolo News, May 31, 2015, www.tolonews.

com/en/afghanistan/19767-ghani-reportedly-sent-list-of-security-demands-to-sharif.

54. Ibid. 

55. Praveen Swami, “‘Pakistan Promised to Rein In Taliban Offensive,’” Indian Express, June 5, 2015, http://

indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/pakistan-promised-to-rein-in-taliban-offensive-2/.

56. This was the second time Pakistan has demanded more time, as President Ghani had initially set a February 

deadline to seek a clear sense and evidence of Pakistan’s ability and effort to deliver on the Taliban. 
57. Author’s (S.S.) conversations with Afghan officials, June 2015. In one rather interesting statement to an Indian 

TV channel just before his trip to India in April, President Ghani hinted at testing Pakistan’s resolve “this year” 

instead of the much shorter time frame most believe Pakistan has to deliver in. NDTV, “’Don’t Make Us a Proxy War 

Battleground.’” Pakistani interlocutors also perceive their understanding with Ghani to be on a longer time frame 

as long as they are able to show incremental progress and success. Author’s (M.Y.) conversations with former and 

current Pakistani officials, March–June 2015.

58. Antonio Giustozzi and Silab Mangal, “Violence, the Taliban, and Afghanistan’s 2014 Elections,” Peaceworks 

no. 103 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015), www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW103-Violencethe-Taliban-and-Afghanistan-s-2014-Elections.pdf. For a slightly contrary view, see Michael Semple, “Rhetoric, 

Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement,” Peaceworks no. 102 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015), www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW102-Rhetoric-Ideology-and-OrganizationalStructure-of-the-Taliban-Movement.pdf.

59. See, for example, Alessandria Masi, “Afghan Government, Taliban Clash on Peace Talks ‘Rumors,’” International Business 

Times, February 24, 2015, www.ibtimes.com/afghan-government-taliban-clash-peace-talks-rumors-1826574.

60. Author’s (M.Y.) conversation with senior Pakistani officials, June 2015. 

61. Sudarsan Raghavan, “Foreign Fighters Pushed Out of Pakistan Now Helping Afghan Taliban,” Washington Post, 

April 15, 2015, www.stripes.com/news/middle-east/foreign-fighters-pushed-out-of-pakistan-now-helping-afghantaliban-1.340403; Abubakar Siddique, “The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan Overshadows Afghan Battlefield,” 

Gandhara, May 12, 2015, http://gandhara.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-imu-role-in-fighting/27011645.html.

62. Saleha Soadat and Shakila Ibrahimkhail, “Abdullah Demands MoU Amendment,” Tolo News, May 20, 2015, www.

tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/19616-abdullah-demands-mou-amendment.

63. Author’s (M.Y.) conversation with senior Pakistani officials, June 2015.

64. Hekmatullah Azamy, “The Future of the Taliban,” Foreign Policy, June 23, 2015, https://foreignpolicy.

com/2015/06/23/the-future-of-the-taliban/. 

65. Ghani was scheduled to travel to Qatar in late-May to discuss precisely this issue with the Qatari authorities but 

had to cancel his trip owing to the political furor caused by the ISI-NDS MoU negotiated just days earlier. Sharif 

Amiry, “Ghani’s Trip to Qatar Cancelled amid Debate Over NDS-ISI MoU,” Tolo News, May 28, 2015, www.tolonews.

com/en/afghanistan/19742-ghanis-trip-to-qatar-cancelled-amid-debate-over-nds-isi-mou.

66. Some of this is already happening, as Ghani has taken a visibly sterner line on Pakistan in public amid the furor 

over the ISI-NDS MoU. For instance, in a recent statement during a visit to Kandahar in the second week of June, 

President Ghani accused Pakistan of having waged war against Afghanistan for thirty-six years. He was equally clear, 

though, that the solution lay in ensuring a peaceful relationship with Pakistan. Amini, “Peace First.”

Of Related Interest

• Managing Conflict in a World Adrift edited by Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall (USIP Press, 2015) 

• Getting It Right in Afghanistan edited by Moeed Yusuf, Scott Smith, and Colin Cookman (USIP 

Press, 2013) 

• Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in South Asia: Through a Peacebuilding Lens edited by Moeed 

Yusuf (USIP Press, 2014)

• Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy by Raza Rumi (Special Report, May 2015)

• Understanding Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential Election by William A. Byrd (Special Report, April 

2015)

• Forging Afghanistan’s National Unity Government by Ali Jalali (Peace Brief, January 2015)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-304-8

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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