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Special Report 155 November 2005

United States Institute of Peace

Special Report

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

Contents 

Introduction 3

Background: Iraqi Constitutionalism 4

Process: Sunni Arab Exclusion 6

Timeline: A Better Process? 9

Reasons for Extension 11

Exclusion of Civil Society and Women 16

Committee Secretariat: Public Engagement 18

Conclusions 20

About the Report

Starting in August 2004, the U.S. Institute of Peace 

Rule of Law Program has been providing in-country 

support on constitution making to Iraqi political, 

governmental, and civil society actors. The goal of 

this program is to maximize the transparency and 

inclusiveness of Iraq’s constitutional process, enabling 

Iraqi citizens to engage directly with the drafters, and 

ensuring domestic ownership of the constitution. USIP 

Rule of Law Program Officer Jonathan Morrow has 

been travelling frequently to Iraq over the last year. 

Through July and August 2005, he worked in Baghdad 

with Iraqi participants and with other international 

experts in the constitutional negotiations. In this 

report, he describes and analyzes the process of 

negotiating and drafting Iraq’s constitution, and 

points to lessons for Iraq and for future 

constitutional processes.

Jonathan Morrow

Iraq’s Constitutional 

Process II

An Opportunity Lost 

Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection
2

About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created 

by Congress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute meets 

its congressional mandate through an array of 

programs, including research grants, fellowships, 

professional training, education programs from 

high school through graduate school, conferences 

and workshops, library services, and publications. 

The Institute’s Board of Directors is appointed by 

the President of the United States and confirmed 

by the Senate.

Board of Directors

J. Robinson West (Chair), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chair), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, 

Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, 

D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. 

Crocker, James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic 

Studies, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University 

• Laurie S. Fulton, Partner, Williams and Connolly, 

Washington, D.C. • Charles Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson 

Institute, Washington, D.C. • Seymour Martin Lipset, 

Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University 

• Mora L. McLean, President, Africa-America Institute, 

New York, N.Y. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State 

Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Members ex officio

Michael M. Dunn, Lieutenant General, U.S. 

Air Force; President, National Defense University • Barry 

F. Lowenkron, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, 

Human Rights, and Labor • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

Summary

•	 Even with the approval of a permanent constitution in the October national referendum, Iraq’s future is uncertain. Widespread Sunni Arab opposition to the new 

constitution has confirmed the existence of a fault line that profoundly divides Iraqi 

society. 

• The Transitional Authoritative Law (TAL) envisaged a six-and-a-half-month, transparent, participatory, and orderly constitutional process. The TAL also provided the 

option, in Article 61(F), of a further six-month extension.

• Notwithstanding the preference of the Chairman of the Constitution Drafting Committee that the Article 61(F) extension be used—a view senior Kurdish and Shia negotiators, as well as other minority group and civil society leaders publicly and privately 

supported—the U.S. Government pressed for the drafting to be completed by August 

15. The decision not to use Article 61(F) had the effect of minimizing Sunni Arab 

participation in the drafting process, and led the National Assembly to make a series 

of ad hoc moves after it missed the August 15 deadline, which exposed the body to 

charges of illegality.

• The Constitution Drafting Committee began its work late and was terminated early. 

Substantive discussions to include Sunni Arab representatives did not begin until late 

June. On August 8, the negotiations were removed from the Committee to a series of 

private and irregular meetings between Kurdish and Shia party leaders, from which 

Sunni Arab negotiators were often excluded. 

• The National Assembly formed a Constitutional Outreach Unit to disseminate constitutional information and analyze public responses. The Unit, however, had no more 

Timeline

JAN • January 30: Elections

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY May 10: 55-member Constitution Drafting Committee formed 

(without Sunni Arab representation)

May 23: Committee Chair appointed

•

•

JUN Jun 16: Decision to expand Committee membership to include 

Sunni Arab representation

•

JUL Jul 8: Constitution Drafting Committee work begins: Sunni 

Arabs attend first Committee meeting

Jul 19: Sunni Arab Committee member assassinated; other members 

suspend participation

Jul 25: Sunni Arabs rejoin Committee

•

•

•

AUG Aug 1: Deadline to request Art.61(F) extension

Aug 8: Constitution Drafting Committee work ends: negotiations 

moved to Leadership Council

Aug 15: Deadline for draft constitution; National Assembly amends 

Transitional Authoritative Law for ad hoc one-week extension

Aug 22: Ad hoc three-day extension

Aug 25: Ad hoc unlimited extension

Aug 28: Draft submitted to National Assembly

•

•

•

•

•

•

SEP • Sep 18: Draft submitted to United Nations for printing

OCT • Oct 15: Referendum
3

than eight weeks to engage Iraqi citizens on constitutional issues, and lacked the 

capacity to report to the Committee before the August 15 deadline. 

• The rushed constitutional process hindered Sunni Arabs’ emerging confidence in an 

Iraqi federal model; amplified imbalances in respective camps’ technical negotiating 

competencies; removed opportunities for international mediation, in particular UN 

assistance; increased U.S. visibility as an agent and participant in the Iraqi negotiations; and excluded meaningful Iraqi citizen participation. 

• Many Iraqi groups and parties criticized the draft constitution. While the reasons for 

opposition varied, they often included procedural complaints of exclusion from the 

negotiations and major substantive objections. By the end of August, opposition 

remained despite efforts to appease the Sunni Arab groups. Some women’s groups, 

the parties of Ayad Allawi and Moqtada Al-Sadr, and ethnic minority groups continued to oppose the draft. 

• This constitutional process was a unique opportunity lost to build new institutional 

legitimacy, and interethnic and intersectarian alliances. Additional opportunities to 

include Sunni Arabs and other groups within a federal Iraq still exist and should not 

be ignored. 

• The Iraqi government, National Assembly, and international community should 

mobilize all efforts to encourage a popular commitment to democratic federalism. 

This should include educating the Iraqi people and bringing political elites closer to 

their constituents; helping Sunni Arab communities to strategize within a federal 

framework; and developing constitutional enforcement mechanisms to ensure that 

Iraqi citizens can protect their constitutional rights in the long term. 

Introduction

On Sunday September 18, 2005, Iraq’s Transitional National Assembly approved a draft 

constitution and submitted it to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, which 

was to be published throughout Iraq prior to the October 15 national referendum. The 

Independent Electoral Commission has now confirmed that the Iraqi people approved the 

constitution in conformity with Article 61(C) of Iraq’s interim constitution, the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL). Large sections of Iraq’s Sunni Arab community and other 

groups in Iraq, however, opposed the constitutional text. Notwithstanding the strong 

support for the text in Iraq as a whole, 96.96 percent and 81.75 percent of voters from 

Sunni Arab–dominated Anbar and Salahaddin governorates voted no. Though there is 

evidence of some Sunni Arab support for the constitution in Ninevah and Diyala governorates, where the “no” vote was as low as 55.01 percent and 48.73 percent, respectively, it 

is clear that Sunni Arabs in Iraq generally voted against the constitution.

Even with the approval of Iraq’s constitution in the October national referendum, the 

future of Iraq is uncertain. For Sunni Arab Iraqis, the constitutional text poses difficult 

questions. What are the consequences of the success of the draft in the referendum if it 

does not command the support of one large section of the Iraqi people? 

This Special Report traces the events that led to the creation of the draft constitution, and identifies both the strengths and shortcomings of Iraq’s constitution-making 

efforts. It argues that the refusal of the Iraq National Assembly to extend the constitution-drafting process by using the mechanism provided in Article 61(F) of the TAL was a 

mistake. Under U.S. Government pressure, the National Assembly insisted that the August 

15 deadline be met, allowing the Constitution Drafting Committee, which included Sunni 

Arab members, to operate for only one month—a plainly inadequate period of time. The 

truncation of the constitution-drafting process

• precluded the real possibility that the confidence of Sunni Arab Iraqis might have 

been built around the model of a federal Iraq;

Under U.S. Government pressure, 

the National Assembly insisted 

that the August 15 deadline 

be met, allowing the Constitution Drafting Committee, which 

included Sunni Arab members, to operate for only one 

month—a plainly inadequate 

period of time.
4

• amplified imbalances in the technical competency of the respective negotiating 

camps; 

• removed opportunities for international mediation, in particular by the United 

Nations; 

• increased U.S. visibility as an agent and participant in the Iraqi negotiations; and

• excluded meaningful Iraqi citizen participation in the constitution-making process. 

This Special Report identifies Iraq’s constitutional process as a unique opportunity lost 

to build new institutional legitimacy, as well as interethnic and intersectarian alliances. 

Further opportunities to include Sunni Arabs and other groups within a federal Iraq still 

exist and should not be ignored.

Background: Iraqi Constitutionalism 

Participatory Constitutionalism 

Since the March 2003 occupation, those in Iraqi political circles, the Iraqi media, the U.S. 

administration, and the United Nations have shared the assumption that a constitutional 

democracy would be the hallmark of success in post-Saddam Iraq. Well before Iraq’s first 

national election on January 30, 2005, there was a real expectation that the completion 

of a permanent constitution would represent an important, perhaps critical, turning point 

in Iraq’s fortunes. 

Moreover, the TAL unequivocally signaled that a constitution on its own would not be 

sufficient. Also necessary would be a participatory, transparent, and well-ordered drafting 

process: a process that would display the virtues of democracy that the constitutional 

text itself was expected to embody. As one influential Iraqi civil society organization, the 

Iraq Prospect Organisation, put it in December 2003: “This process in itself will help root 

democratic values and set Iraq on a course to freedom.” The TAL stipulated in some detail 

the means by which a permanent constitution would be prepared. TAL Article 60 states 

that the National Assembly should write the text, “in part by encouraging debate on the 

constitution through regular general public meetings in all parts of Iraq and through the 

media, and receiving proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution.” 

Security Council Resolution 1546 mandated the United Nations to “promote national promote national

dialogue and consensus-building on the drafting of a national constitution by the people 

of Iraq,” as requested by the Iraqi government. Iraqi government. To achieve this broad national dialogue, To achieve this broad national dialogue, To achieve this broad national dialogue,

the TAL provided an ambitious timetable from the January 2005 election until August 15, 

2005, with the option of a further six-month extension as stated in TAL Article 61(F). 

Sources of Constitutionalism 

Where, precisely, did these expectations of constitutionalism come from? Internal and 

external factors contributed to the desire and goal for a permanent constitution. In part, 

the desire was distinctly nationalist, including a popular Iraqi yearning for a level of stability and justice unknown in the Saddam period, a period characterized by conspicuously 

“interim” constitutions. A senior independent Shia intellectual and one of the deputy 

speakers of the National Assembly, Dr. Hussain Shahristani, recounts one of Saddam 

Hussein’s favorite bons mots: “A constitution is written by men so that another man can 

tear it up.” Since 2003, this desire for a truly permanent constitution was compounded by 

a growing frustration with the operational shortcomings of the U.S.-led Coalition occupation and appointed interim government, for which an elected constitutional government 

seemed the obvious remedy. 

A demand for constitutionalism within Iraq was consolidated by a survey of the 

international scene. In particular, there was an appreciation of the post–Cold War“ new 

The TAL unequivocally signaled 

that a constitution on its own 

would not be sufficient. Also necessary would be a participatory, 

transparent, and well-ordered 

drafting process.
5

constitutionalism” and the symbolic significance of popular constitution-making in the 

democratization of countries as diverse as Poland, Hungary, and South Africa. It also arose 

in part from more recent postconflict experiences in Afghanistan and East Timor, where 

international programs supporting peacekeeping and governance culminated, almost 

triumphantly, in the entry into force of newly drafted constitutions. These comparative 

constitutional experiences are now well documented, and contain lessons for Iraq that 

USIP, among others, has identified. (See “Iraq’s Constitutional Process: Shaping a Vision 

for the Country’s Future,” USIP Special Report 132, February 2005.)

Moreover, the overwhelming U.S. political and cultural influence in post-2003 Iraq 

brought to bear the specific U.S. vision of a constitution as the centerpiece of stability 

and democratic independence of post-Saddam Iraq. Constitutionalism is at the heart of 

the U.S. vision of its own democratic identity; thus, it may not be surprising that this 

vision was rhetorically projected onto the massive democratization project in Iraq. In 

a dynamic familiar to observers of transitional governments, over time the idea of a 

permanent constitution for Iraq became more and more closely linked, in the U.S. imagination, with nation-building success and a plausible exit strategy. 

Finally, and more pragmatically, many Iraqis—particularly, but not exclusively, Iraqi 

Kurds—perceived that in a multisectarian, regionalized country, a permanent constitution 

would be desirable, if not necessary, as a kind of an intercommunal peace treaty. This 

constitution-as-treaty would not be a principled discussion leading to the consolidation 

of Iraqi political identity, it would, more modestly, represent a modus vivendi to settle 

competing interests surrounding religious law, local self-governance, and resource management. As far as this last source of “constitutionalism” was concerned, the relevant 

analogies were less to the United States or even Afghanistan and East Timor, and more 

to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Sri Lanka, and Sudan. 

Expectations of Citizen Involvement

Each of these intellectual origins for Iraqi constitutionalism—nationalist, “new constitutionalist,” and pragmatist—were to some extent popular. That is, each derived from a 

demand from nonelite Iraqis for a new social contract. Each presupposed that the Iraqi 

citizenry would have some opportunity to directly influence the constitution-making process. As one young Baghdadi man put it in late 2004, “When we hear talk of a permanent 

constitution, our eyes light up.” Early ambitions of the Coalition Provisional Authority 

for a constitution to be drafted by U.S. appointees quickly gave way to pressure from 

Shia religious leader Grand Ayatollah Sistani for a constitution to be drafted by elected 

representatives. Even the minimalist, pragmatist approach was premised, for instance, on 

the importance of Kurdish popular opinion and a Kurdish popular desire for a large degree 

of autonomy, if not independence, from Baghdad. 

This demand for citizen involvement in constitutionmaking was increased by the widespread criticism of the process by which the TAL had been drafted in early 2003 during the 

period in which the Coalition Provisional Authority exercised the rights of an occupying 

power. The TAL process, though it involved some senior Iraqi political figures, was notoriously, if unintentionally, hasty and secretive, and was heavily influenced by U.S. political 

interests. The buildup of popular constitutionalism in Iraq during the occupation added 

considerable significance to the task of the future elected National Assembly in writing 

the constitution by an initial deadline of August 15, 2005, or, if the National Assembly 

considered that an extension using Article 61(F) was needed, by February 15, 2006. The 

National Democratic Institute (NDI) found that by April 2005 “almost every participant” 

in national focus group research “is of the opinion that the Iraqi citizens should be 

involved in the preparation of the constitution.” 

If transitional Iraq was always in need of a credible constitutional process, by late 

2004 this need was made acute by Iraqi electoral politics and the dynamics of a predominantly Sunni Arab insurgency. In December 2004, it became clear that the January

If transitional Iraq was always in 

need of a credible constitutional 

process, by late 2004 this need 

was made acute by Iraqi electoral 

politics and the dynamics of a predominantly Sunni Arab insurgency.
6

2005 election outcome would be dictated by ethnic and sectarian politics, and that large 

sections of Iraq’s Sunni Arab community would not participate. 

The Process: Sunni Arab Exclusion 

The Threat to Constitutionalism: January Election Boycott

Sunni Arabs, a minority that enjoyed favor in pre-2003 Iraqi governments and that had 

traditionally managed the state apparatus of unelected Iraqi governments, had the least 

to gain from an election. Sunni Arabs supply the most promising recruiting ground for 

insurgents and terrorists, but they are also the most vulnerable to violence, which escalated during the campaign period leading up to the January 2005 elections. In November 

2004, Sunni Arab leaders, including the umbrella Iraqi National Foundation Congress, 

rejected the election on the grounds that it was taking place under Coalition “occupation,” and was therefore illegitimate and likely, in the words of the Muslim Scholars 

Association leader Harith al-Dhari, to be “faked.” The more moderate Iraqi Islamic Party, 

led by Mohsen Abdul Hamid, also boycotted the election. 

The Sunni Arabs’ January 2005 election boycott and the simultaneous campaign of 

intimidation of Sunni Arab voters by the insurgency resulted in only seventeen Sunni 

Arabs elected to the 275-member Assembly—a very low number compared to the proportion of Sunni Arabs in Iraq, conventionally estimated at 15 to 20 percent. By contrast, 

the Kurdistan Coalition List won seventy-five seats and the predominantly Shia United 

Iraqi Alliance won 140—an absolute majority that in theory, if not in fact, gave the Alliance the ability to write a constitution without the involvement of any other political 

grouping. 

In practice, however, the strength of Iraqi Shia majoritarianism was doubtful in the 

context of a future Iraq constitution. Neither the Shia nor Kurdistan parties could afford 

to ignore the interests of Sunni Arabs completely. The Sunni Arabs pointed to the TAL 

provision—Article 61(C)—that gave any three of Iraq’s eighteen governorates the ability to veto any constitutional draft by a two-thirds majority. Sunni Arabs are believed to 

constitute a majority of residents in at least three Iraqi governorates: Anbar, Salahaddin, 

and Ninevah. It was always seen as at least possible that Sunni Arabs might have sufficient numbers and cohesion to invoke the Article 61(C) veto successfully. It is well known 

that Article 61(C) had been included in the TAL text as a last-minute modification of a 

demand from the Kurdish parties. Many commentators have remarked on the irony that it 

was now the Kurds, likely to do well in the constitutional negotiations, for whom Article 

61(C) posed the greatest threat. 

In these circumstances, the low Sunni Arab turnout at the January election raised 

the discomfiting spectre of a draft constitution that would explicitly exclude Sunni Arab 

views and that, in an already deteriorating security environment, would cement Sunni 

Arab opposition. This exclusion presented immediate problems: first, the possibility that 

the constitution would be blocked at the referendum; and second, in the event of the 

constitution’s success at the referendum, a still more profound failure—the failure of 

Iraqi nationalist, “new constitutionalist,” and pragmatist ambitions for a constitutional 

compact including all three of Iraq’s major groups. The constitution might fail to deliver 

on the promise of true Iraqi consensus.

A Possible Solution: Constitutional Engagement

No doubt anticipating the problem, a number of Sunni Arab leaders publicly indicated 

in November 2004 that though they would likely boycott the election, they would be 

willing to engage in the postelection constitutional discussions. Statements of boycott 

often contained an implication that future constitutional discussions for a democratic 

In November 2004, Sunni Arab 

leaders rejected the election on the 

grounds that it was taking place 

under Coalition “occupation.”

A number of Sunni Arab leaders 

publicly indicated in November 

2004 that though they would likely 

boycott the election, they would be 

willing to engage in the postelection constitutional discussions.
7

Iraq could be relatively free from coalition influence and, as a sovereign Iraqi process, 

could therefore be supported. 

In the weeks before the election, Shia and Kurdish party leaders were reciprocating 

these Sunni Arab advances. Dr. Hussain Shahristani, charged with assembling the Shia 

Alliance, stated on January 23: “ If the people of [any area of Iraq] are not represented in 

the elected National Assembly—and we hope and pray the issue will not be so—we will 

call for a national dialogue with the real representatives of all these areas. We will not 

write a constitution that does not satisfy all sectors of the Iraqi society.” This rapprochement came with the clear encouragement of the centrist, nonsectarian parties, including 

the Iraqi List, the party of then Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. He stated on January 24: “We 

know that the [TAL] does not mean that only the ones who voted will write the constitution. It is possible for anyone to participate in writing the constitution.” On January 

27, Wamidh Nadhmi, a secular spokesman of the Iraq National Foundation Conference, 

echoed the views of the Muslim Scholars Association that notwithstanding the electoral 

boycott, “[i]f we were invited by respectable committees [in the National Assembly] I 

don’t see why we wouldn’t say what we think of the constitution.”

Party leaders reaffirmed their rapprochement after the election results were announced 

in February. At that time, Iraqi lawyers and political advisers discussed the question of 

Sunni Arab inclusion in detail in a cross-factional working session, convened by USIP 

and the American Bar Association in Jordan. These discussions set the stage for a constitutional process that might rescue Iraq’s transitional governments from the perception 

of illegitimacy among Sunni Arabs and other nationalists. The International Republican 

Institute’s (IRI) polling conducted in April showed a large public desire across Iraq to 

include Sunni Arabs in the constitutional process.

Sunni Arab Opposition to Constitutional Draft

As events transpired since the January elections, however, the spectre of an exclusionary 

constitution has become real. The substantive criticisms of the draft by Sunni Arabs also 

included serious procedural complaints.

Elements of the Draft Constitution

The terms of the constitution itself, though quite different from the TAL language, are 

fairly familiar to Western eyes: a parliamentary, republican, asymmetrical federal democracy that posits a central government with certain enumerated exclusive powers, including foreign affairs, defense, and fiscal policy. Executive, legislative, and judicial powers 

are balanced, if not with great precision. The exclusive powers of the federal government are very limited and do not include, for instance, an explicit power of taxation, 

though, it seems clear that the central government has the power to legislate outside 

the list of enumerated powers. As for Iraq’s all-important hydrocarbons, the constitution 

explicitly gives management control over existing petroleum production to the federal 

government, “with” the producing regional government, and implicitly gives control over 

future petroleum production to the regional government, with revenues to be shared 

throughout Iraq. Regional governments enjoy wide residual powers, with regional law 

overriding nonexclusive federal law to the extent of any inconsistency between the two. 

The constitution gives recognition to Iraqi Kurdistan as a region, and allows for one or 

more governorates to come together as new federal regions in the future. 

The constitution provides for a fairly modern bill of rights, but also provides for many 

of the rights to be elaborated through legislation, under which these constitutional 

rights could be reduced. Though the constitution purports to preserve the essence of 

these rights, conservative Islamic law can clearly qualify them. The constitution describes 

Islam as “a fundamental source of legislation,” prohibits legislation that contradicts 

“the established provisions of Islam,” and inscribes a role for “experts in Islamic jurisA cross-factional working session, 

convened by USIP and the American Bar Association set the stage 

for a constitutional process that 

might rescue Iraq’s transitional 

governments from the perception 

of illegitimacy among Sunni Arabs. 
8

prudence”—generally understood as Islamic clerics—on the constitutional court. Perhaps 

less obvious is the large scope the constitution gives regional legislatures to prevail over 

federal law in those areas in which Islamic jurisprudence conventionally holds sway, 

including family law and criminal law. A referendum by the end of 2007 will resolve the 

outstanding status of multiethnic Kirkuk.

Substantive Opposition to the Draft Constitution 

The draft constitution attracted criticism from a range of Iraqi groups and parties, and in 

particular Sunni Arab groups. After the National Assembly adopted the draft constitution 

on August 28, influential secular and religious Sunni Arab political groups, including the 

Iraq Islamic Party, the National Dialogue Council, and the Muslim Scholars Association, 

publicly indicated that they would oppose the draft at the national referendum. 

The stated reasons for opposition were not uniform. For instance, secular and religious 

Sunni Arab groups were divided on the statement in the draft that Islam“ is a fundamental 

source of legislation.” Secularists thought this was too much religion; clerics thought it 

was not enough. There were common themes, however. Typically, the Sunni Arabs objected 

to the regional federalist model for Iraq and, in particular, the prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region. In many cases, there was a specific rejection of regional 

control of petroleum production, a demand for a stronger statement of an Arab identity 

for Iraq, and an objection to provisions in the draft condemning Ba’athism. Later efforts 

to bring the August 28 text closer to the Sunni Arab position eventually led, to a statement of support by the more moderate Iraq Islamic Party for the constitutional text. The 

majority of Sunni Arab representative groups, however, maintained these objections up to 

the date of the referendum. 

Significantly, opposition to the text was not confined to Sunni Arab groups. Former 

Prime Minister Ayad Allawi had also publicly opposed the model of regional federalism 

in the constitutional draft. The influential Shia clerics Moqtada al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ayatollah

Mohammed al-Yaqoubi indicated their opposition to the draft at the referendum, for rea indicated their opposition to the draft at the referendum, for reasons that likely stem from hostility toward the Iranian ties of the Supreme Council for the 

Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). SCIRI is the powerful Shia party and major proponent 

of constitutional provisions that facilitate a southern federal region, which they wish to 

be composed of as many as nine existing governorates. Some women’s groups and certain 

ethnic minorities also opposed the draft on grounds that the text insufficiently promoted 

and protected their interests. 

The Problem: Time Pressures

These substantive Sunni Arab criticisms of the draft were also accompanied by procedural 

complaints. Sunni Arab representatives said that they were not sufficiently included in the 

constitutional negotiations. 

The creation of the Committee was promising in some respects. In particular, Sunni 

Arab negotiators nominated fifteen new representatives to join the National Assembly’s 

fifty-five-member Constitution Drafting Committee (the Committee) in late June 2005, 

and the following weeks saw the participation by those representatives in the Committee’s 

activities. (The enlarged body was notionally renamed a “Commission” (hay’a ‘ameh) but 

was continually referred to as the “Committee” (lajneh), and this report follows the common practice.) 

The Assembly had elected a SCIRI member, Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, to chair the Committee. He was not appointed until May 23, after negotiations over the formation of an 

Iraqi Cabinet extended to April 28, and the negotiations over Committee membership continued until May 11. Once appointed, Sheikh Hamoudi heard evidence from international 

experts from constitutional commissions in South Africa, Albania, Kenya, Afghanistan, 

East Timor, and elsewhere. He agreed to bring Sunni Arab members into the Committee 

structure and to take decisions by consensus. This principle of consensus was adopted to 

The Sunni Arabs objected to 

the regional federalist model 

for Iraq and, in particular, the 

prospect of a southern, predominantly Shia, federal region.
9

provide some assurance that Sunni Arab Committee members would not be sidelined in a 

Committee on which, because they were not elected to the Assembly, they had no vote. 

In finalizing the Committee composition in this way, the Assembly implicitly rejected 

earlier proposals in February suggesting that the constitution be drafted by a commission that would be independent of the government and the Assembly. The Assembly also 

rejected the possibility that the drafting body contain, as members, Iraqi civil society 

representatives or constitutional experts. As a result, additional, unelected Committee 

members were limited to the Sunni Arab political leadership.

The extent to which the Committee was able to operate as a forum for the expression 

of Sunni Arab constitutional positions, however, was marginal at best. First, the period 

during which Sunni Arabs were able to take part in the Committee activities was very 

short. It was late June before the fifteen Sunni Arab members of the Committee had 

been invited onto the Committee, and it was later still, July 8, before they attended their 

first meeting. Matters were tragically complicated on July 19 when a Sunni Arab Committee member, Sheikh Mijbil Issa, was assassinated in the Baghdad suburb of Karrada 

—presumably by Sunni Arab insurgents. As a result, some Sunni Arabs on the Committee 

suspended their membership until the government could assure them a higher level of 

security protection.

The Committee leadership, having made repeated public commitments that they would 

meet the default TAL constitutional deadline of August 15, remained under intense time 

pressure to produce a draft. Public and private statements of senior U.S. officials, including the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President himself, dramatically increased this pressure. These officials made it clear that any move to extend the 

constitutional deadline beyond August 15 would earn the displeasure of the U.S. and U.K. 

governments. The standard U.S. pronouncement was: “The [United States] supports the 

Iraqi people in their desire to complete a constitution by August 15,” in circumstances in 

which an expression of that desire was far from universal within Iraq, and did not precede 

the statement by the United States of its position. 

Defunct Constitution Drafting Committee

As it turned out, however, the Committee was effectively scrapped, or rendered defunct, 

by the meeting of political party leaders that began in the Baghdad International Zone 

on August 8. Scrapping the Committee on August 8 meant that in effect the Sunni Arab 

Committee members, after no more than one month of trying to develop and assert a 

coherent constitutional position, were retired en masse.

After August 8, constitutional negotiations took place in a series of private, ad hoc 

meetings between Kurdish and Shia party leaders—the “Leadership Council,” as it was 

termed by the international press, or more informally by Committee members, “the kitchen” (matbagh). In its basic form, the Leadership Council consisted of SCIRI leader Abdul 

Aziz al-Hakim, Shia Dawa party leader Prime Minister Jaafari, Kurdish PUK party leader 

President Jalal Talabani, and Kurdish KDP party leader Masoud Barzani. These meetings 

took place at irregular intervals at a number of private residences and compounds in the 

International Zone. These were meetings at which the Sunni Committee members had no 

right of attendance, to which they frequently requested attendance, but were not often 

invited. The expectation was quite clear: the Shia and Kurdish parties would agree to a 

constitutional text, which would then be presented as a fait accompli to the Sunni Arabs, 

who would be asked to take it or leave it.

Timeline: A Better Process?

The question arises, then, as to whether before the Leadership Council began meeting 

on August 8, a more extended time period for constitutional deliberations within the 

Scrapping the Committee on 

August 8 meant that in effect the 

Sunni Arab Committee members, 

after no more than one month 

of trying to develop and assert a 

coherent constitutional position, 

were retired en masse.

The question arises, then, as to 

whether before the Leadership 

Council began meeting on August 

8, a more extended time period for 

constitutional deliberations within 

the Committee would have produced 

a better result, and specifically 

would have created the conditions 

for Sunni Arab acceptance of a constitutional draft.
Committee would have produced a better result, and specifically would have created the 

conditions for Sunni Arab acceptance of a constitutional draft. The answer to this question 

has implications for any post-constitutional Iraq strategy. 

Iraqi Support for 61(F) Extension

At the outset, it should be noted that many—probably most—of those Iraqis closest to 

the negotiations clearly favored a more extended timeline, including the Chairman of the 

Constitution Drafting Committee himself. Under the terms of the TAL, if the provisions to 

extend the constitutional process were to be invoked, such action had to be taken by the 

Assembly before August 1, presumably on the advice of the Committee. 

On July 31, Sheikh Hamoudi indicated to the Committee his wish to extend the process 

to September 15. In early June, he had sought independent advice from USIP consultants 

on timeline extension options; the work needed to reach true consensus weighed heavily 

on his mind. This preference for an extension was shared by Mahmoud Othman and other 

senior Kurdish negotiators, international advisers to the Kurds, and senior Shia List officials on the Committee, including Abbas Bayati. This preference also had private support 

among senior independent Shia leaders in the Assembly, from Committee member and 

Chairman of the Council of Iraqi Minorities Dr. Hunain Al-Qaddo, and from Dr. Younadam 

Kanna, Committee member and leader of an independent Chaldo-Assyrian Christian party. 

The leaders of most, if not all, important civil society organizations expressed their desire 

for an extension. NDI focus group research in April 2005 revealed strong reservations 

across Iraq regarding the value of a hasty constitutional process. On August 1, Speaker of 

the Assembly Hajim Al-Hassani was expecting to receive a request from Sheikh Hamoudi 

for an extension. Some observers in the international community, including the International Crisis Group, had publicly doubted the possibility, and desirability, of meeting the 

August 15 deadline, and these views had been influential in the Iraqi political class. 

The United States, however, maintained its policy. In the days prior to August 1, U.S. 

Ambassador Khalilzad convened meetings with political party leaders to impress upon 

them the importance of meeting the August 15 deadline. He issued similar messages to 

members of the international community. The U.S. government‘s strong demarches stand 

out as the principal reason for the Assembly ultimately declining the TAL extension provision on August 1.

Committee Shortcomings

Given the shortcomings of the Committee, the proposition that an extension would have 

helped is, at first glance, doubtful. First, through June and July, the Committee lacked the 

ability to identify constitutional differences and reach common ground across factions. As 

one Iraqi observer put it: “These days, if someone wishes you good morning, you are suspicious.” Committee drafting work was slow, and discussions at Committee meetings were 

frequently abstract and academic. The discussions were not characterized by the practical 

bargaining and trading clearly necessary to produce the consensus that the Committee 

had rightly established as its goal. Political party leaders did not provide their Committee representatives with clear mandates, inhibiting true consensus. Committee meeting 

minutes were not taken.

Second, the Committee did not implement a set of rules and work plan to clearly define, 

for all participants, the stages in the constitutional process. There was no protocol to 

address the fact that crucial off line bilateral negotiations among the three major political 

blocs of Shia Arabs, Kurds, and Sunni Arabs would be needed at each step of the way. In 

Iraq’s difficult security environment, these constitutional discussions were always fated 

to take on the nature of peace treaty talks, as if among three sovereign governments. 

(Indeed, as late as June one senior Kurdish negotiator, Dr. Saedi Barzinji, was arguing 

Kurdish autonomy be protected in the constitution by a set of international guarantees.) 

10

Many—probably most—of those 

Iraqis closest to the negotiations 

clearly favored a more extended 

timeline, including the Chairman 

of the Consittution Drafting 

Committee himself.

The U.S. Government‘s strong 

demarches stand out as the 

principal reason for the Assembly ultimately declining the TAL 

extension provision on August 1.
The life of the Committee was characterized by frequent resignations and walkouts by 

Sunni Arab, Kurdish, and other representatives. Also, no protocol provided for Committee 

interaction with the Iraqi public. Occasional press conferences were held in the heavily 

guarded Convention Center to update the media on the Committee’s drafting work, but 

these did not involve serious dialogue on constitutional issues. 

Sunni Arab Committee membership was continually criticized for being drawn largely 

from the Baghdad political elite and insufficiently representing its constituency. Some 

also felt that Sunni Arab civil society leaders, including tribal leaders, had been largely 

overlooked to the peril of the final constitution. For example, in early June, Shia and 

Kurdish Committee members rejected a proposal to identify Sunni Arab constitutional 

drafters through a multiweek, regional caucus process. The Iraq Institute of Peace, a 

nongovernmental interfaith dialogue organization with strong Sunni Arab tribal connections, had tested the idea, but the Shia and Kurdish members thought the process would 

be too time-consuming. 

Insurmountable Differences?

Even with all the time in the world, the gap between the Sunni Arab and Shia constitutional positions on federalism may not have been reconcilable. There was arguably little 

chance for the Sunni Arabs to reach an accommodation with SCIRI, which over the course 

of July started pressing for a constitutional right to create a new southern federal unit 

to mirror that of the Kurdistan Region. The model of federalism the Kurdish and Shia 

“kitchen” finally offered to Sunni Arab negotiators would not only consolidate a large 

degree of autonomy to the Kurdistan Region, but would also allow for other future federal 

regions, including a southern, predominantly Shia, federal unit. 

In rejecting this model, the Sunni Arabs took a stance that bluntly and fundamentally 

contradicted the bilateral Kurd-Shia agreement on the terms of federalism, in circumstances where that agreement was apparently not open to modification. The terms of 

that Kurd-Shia agreement give to one or more of Iraq’s eighteen governorates the right 

to “organize into a region” following a referendum in the respective governorate(s). The 

central Sunni Arab objections as stated lay with the prospect that a southern federal unit 

would radically challenge a Sunni Arab conception of the integrity of the Iraqi nation, and 

that would (or so it is imagined) isolate Sunni Arab nationalists between two sectarian 

and strong and oil-rich provincial powers of Iraqi Kurdistan and a new Iraqi “Shiastan.” 

As constitutional rhetoric amplified toward the end of August, adherents of the Kurdistan and Shia parties made private allegations that the Sunni Arab negotiators had no 

intention of finding common ground. They stated a belief that the Sunni Arab negotiators 

had as primary objective a failure by the Assembly to meet the August 15 deadline. Under 

the relevant TAL provisions, a failure to meet—or extend—the August 15 deadline would 

automatically precipitate the dissolution of the Assembly and mandate new constituent 

elections for a new Assembly, to which more Sunni Arabs would be presumably be elected. 

In their darker moments, Kurdish and Shia negotiators ascribed this “nuclear option” to 

the ambition of the Sunni Arabs.

Reasons for Extension

Several indicators suggest, however, that Sunni Arab positions had not hardened against 

federalism, and were not as intractable as some have suggested. For several reasons, an 

extended constitutional process would have produced better results.

A Moderating Sunni Arab Position on Federalism

First, it is a fact that influential sections of the Sunni Arab community in June and July, 

in evolving discussions on the terms of Iraqi federalism, were beginning to produce more 

11

Even with all the time in the 

world, the gap between the 

Sunni Arab and Shia constitutional positions on federalism 

may not have been reconcilable.

Several indicators suggest, however, that Sunni Arab positions 

had not hardened against federalism, and were not as intractable as some have suggested.
12

moderate constitutional positions. There were signs that some influential Sunni Arabs 

were coming to accept the possibility that federalism might work to their benefit. They 

were already accepting, for instance, a governorate-based federalism that would imply 

self-government in Sunni Arab areas of Iraq. As one Sunni Arab lawyer put it: “When you 

ask a Sunni if they want Anbar to rule Najaf they say no; if you ask if they want Najaf 

to rule Anbar, they say no. They want federalism without realizing it.” Moreover, at no 

point was there a strong statement by Sunni Arab negotiators against the existence of a 

relatively autonomous Kurdistan Region. 

USIP was in close contact with some of these Sunni Arab opinion makers, who were 

working with their constituents to bring about credible and acceptable Sunni Arab positions. A large part of the problem among Sunni Arab elites was the fact that the Kurdish 

and Shia parties overlooked Sunni Arab technical constitutional expertise. Sunni Arab 

leaders pointed to a professional class of lawyers who had been kept away from the 

constitutional negotiations. The leaders often stated their ambition as no greater than to 

have these lawyers conduct a technical review the text negotiated between the Kurdish 

and Shia parties. In this way, much Sunni Arab hostility to the terms of federalism as they 

were developed in the August negotiations was due to this sense of professional pride and 

a belief in constitution-making as a technical, not only political, exercise. 

In the final days of August, some leading Sunni Arab negotiators were privately 

sympathetic to some models of Iraqi regional federalism, but were unable to move 

because of their constituent institutions and populations. In Sunni Arab populations, 

evidence collected by NDI and others shows that hostility to the concept of federalism 

stems not from principle or an informed self-interest, but rather from a perception that 

“federalism” (ittihadiyyah) is code for Kurdish separation and, more generally, the partition of Iraq. There was little recognition in the Sunni Arab heartland that federalism is 

an internationally recognized way of structuring a state that can be neutral, or at least 

mutually beneficial, as to the respective interests of different regional and ethnic groups. 

Interviews conducted by the United Nations Office for Project Services in late July showed 

that of the Sunni Arabs in the interview group, 51.7 percent believed federalism would 

lead to a divided Iraq, and 46.8 percent believed it would lead to civil war. By way of 

contrast, a year earlier Shia popular opinion reflected a similarly limited understanding 

of federalism, including a belief that federalism simply meant Kurdish separation. Over 

several months of Shia strategizing on constitutional matters, the position of popular 

Shia sentiment moved significantly—if not uniformly—toward an acceptance federal 

constitution models. Similarly, if Sunni Arab constitutional negotiators were to accept the 

terms of a federal Iraq, their constituents would need to empower them to do so. 

By July that dialogue had clearly begun, but the deadline of August 15, did not allow 

it to produce results. To this extent, the Sunni Arab position as articulated in July and 

August was premature, hastily crafted, and without the benefit of an informed debate 

among the broader Sunni Arab population. While it is arguable that convening a party 

leaders summit—in the form of the Leadership Council—in early August was necessary, 

it was neither necessary nor desirable for the Committee to be disbanded at the same 

time.

Imbalanced Negotiating Capacity 

The highly compressed timeline for constitutional discussions also amplified the imbalance between the respective competencies of the established Kurdistan and Shia parties 

on the one hand, and the Sunni Arab representatives on the other. The effective August 8 

dissolution of the Committee apparatus and the beginning of a last-minute, unstructured 

three-way negotiation shifted great weight, very suddenly, onto the respective negotiating teams. The Sunni Arab team was by far the least organized. 

By August 2005, the Kurdistan Region parties were well prepared for ad hoc negotiations. They had developed constitutional positions and even draft Iraqi constitutional 

texts that, over time, became increasingly ambitious and firm. Most recently, the Kurds 

By July a dialogue between Sunni 

Arab negotiators and their constituents had clearly begun, but the 

deadline of August 15, did not allow 

it to produce results.
13

had internally agreed on their nonnegotiable “red line” positions, which Committee 

members from the Kurdistan Coalition were not at liberty to modify. During the January 

election, the Kurdistan parties were able to orchestrate a region-wide poll that predictably 

showed a popular preference for independence over integration into Iraq. This result sent 

the message to non-Kurdish parties that the Kurdish leaders had little room to retreat 

from maximalist constitutional positions. Similarly, in late July, the Kurdistan National 

Parliament gave the Kurdistan parties a clear mandate on these red line positions, which 

were made public. Street demonstrations across the Kurdistan Region on August 15 also 

showed support for the Kurdish parties. Last, the Kurdish parties were able to invite into 

the ad hoc meetings experienced non-Iraqi international negotiators and constitutional 

lawyers, including former U.S. diplomat Peter Galbraith and University of Maryland Professor Karol Soltan, to advance the Kurdish case. 

The Shia parties, for their part, did not have clear mandates from their constituencies, 

and did not choose to deploy international negotiators. The Shia Alliance position during 

the final days of the Shia-Kurd negotiations was subject to radical changes and reversals, 

frequently wavering on the basic terms of federalism, petroleum management, and the 

constitutional status of Shia clergy. Somewhat surprisingly, no Shia party tabled a readymade draft constitution for Iraq. (An earlier, very Islamist draft circulated in early 2005 

by the Islamic Dawa Party of Iraq did not arrive at the negotiating table). Strong factions 

within the Shia Alliance, however, clearly had resources to use as soon as their strategic 

interests became clear. In particular, on August 11, in the final days of negotiations, 

SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz al-Hakim was able to mobilize the well-organized SCIRI base to 

stage large public demonstrations in Najaf and other southern Iraqi cities in favor of the 

formation of a southern federal unit, a move even the Kurds declared to be surprising. 

Anecdotal evidence suggests also that the government of Iran was channeling financial 

and in-kind support to SCIRI’s position. 

The Sunni Arab negotiators, though not without institutional affiliation and support, 

lacked the ability to rally constituents and resources around a coherent constitutional 

strategy. Iraq’s Arab neighbours have little practical experience with constitutional matters and were of little practical help. Indeed, at least until August, there was no clear 

Sunni Arab constitutional position of any sort. Again, Sunni Arab competence, negotiating mandates, and ability to organize their constituents could have coalesced with 

adequate time, but time was the resource least available to them. 

This capacity imbalance further isolated and radicalized Sunni Arab positions. A definitive Sunni Arab denunciation of regional federalism came after, not before, the Committee dissolution. As the July and August discussions progressed, it became increasingly 

commonplace for Iraqi leaders to identify themselves and act according to ethnic and 

sectarian politics. The Sunni Arab participants, who typically saw themselves as nationalists, were not well versed in these practices and did not succeed in pressing a coherent 

constitutional position. As with any negotiation, all parties were likely hurt by the relative 

lack of competency of one of the parties. Under these circumstances, it was always much 

more likely that Sunni Arab negotiators would quickly move away from the negotiating 

table and revert to a strategy hinging on threats of nonparticipation and opposition to 

the referendum.

Lack of International Mediation

The compressed time frame also forestalled the United Nations and independent international constitutional experts from mediating between the parties to the negotiations as 

well as providing options and alternatives for bridging factional divides. 

Nicholas Haysom, who led the constitutional support team of the United Nations 

Assistance Mission in Iraq (UNAMI), arrived in Baghdad in May to begin the task of 

supporting the Constitutional Committee. UN headquarters had been slow in starting to 

discharge its mandate under Security Council Resolution 1546, waiting to formalize its 

role with the Transitional Iraq Government, and taking time to assemble its constitutional 

As with any negotiation, all parties 

were likely disadvantaged by the 

relative lack of competency of one 

of the parties.

The compressed time frame also forestalled the United Nations and independent international constitutional 

experts from mediating between the 

parties to the negotiations
14

team. As in East Timor and Afghanistan, the United Nations in Iraq suffered from the lack 

of a ready roster of experts for rapid deployment to the field in support of postconflict 

constitution-making. 

The Iraqi Government did not issue a formal invitation to the United Nations until 

early June. Further, Sheikh Hamoudi was clearly skeptical of the value and propriety of 

any international involvement, however enlightened and unobtrusive, in the Iraq constitution. Even before this invitation had been issued, Haysom, a veteran of the South 

African constitutional negotiations, was working behind the scenes to help the Committee incorporate Sunni Arabs as members. He developed a consensus model of decisionmaking that would avoid the question of whether Sunni Arab appointees would have 

full voting rights. He later worked with the Committee in designing the arrangement of 

thematic and technical subcommittees. He also helped develop federal models that might be 

sufficiently flexible to allow for future federal units, and to balance regional and national 

interests in natural resources. A paper he circulated on August 10 titled “A Framework 

for Decentralised Government in Iraq” was particularly influential in setting out a scheme 

of exclusive federal powers, a mechanism for the creation of new federal units and joint 

federal/regional oil management. 

International experts brought to Iraq by the United Nations and USIP, including constitutionalist Professor Yash Ghai, worked directly with Sheikh Hamoudi beginning in early 

June. They gave particular attention to the Sunni Arab Committee members, spending 

much time illustrating the value of federalism in multiethnic states. Specifically, Professor 

Ghai referred extensively to comparative constitutional models, explaining that federalism, far from precipitating the breakup of the state, in fact might hold Iraq together. “Iraq 

does not face a choice between a unitary or federal/autonomous system,” he advised, 

“but between federalism/autonomy and bitter civil war (and ultimately no Iraq).” During 

this time, Committee members paid a great deal of attention to the Spanish constitution. 

More than any other model, the Spanish constitution provided the conceptual basis for 

the gradual federalism negotiated in the final Iraq text. 

These important colloquies with Sunni Arabs were broken, however, when the Committee dissolved in August. Even though Haysom had quite properly formalized a role 

for UNAMI with the Committee, as of August 8 that role became unclear and informal. 

Haysom and other UN officials were sometimes called on to speak to the party leaders 

and perform secretarial functions. The UN officials worked especially hard with Saleh 

Mutlaq of the National Dialogue Council, who had emerged as the leading Sunni Arab 

negotiator, to reconcile his views with those of the Kurdish and Shia leadership. By this 

stage, however, there was no longer a negotiating table to which the United Nations had 

a standing invitation. The United Nations’ position was considerably weakened, especially 

by U.S. intervention in the negotiations. The UN position in the Leadership Council was 

never clarified or assured.

Increased U.S. Visibility

The compressed timetable allowed, and probably required, much heavier and more visible 

involvement of U.S. officials at the negotiations than would otherwise have been the case. 

The visible involvement of a foreign power in something so uniquely sovereign as the writing of a constitution is probably always regrettable. Especially with Iraq, even moderate 

Sunni Arab nationalists would frequently express the fear that the Iraq constitution would 

be written in Washington, D.C., and, as one Baghdad University political science professor 

put it, only half-joking, “dropped from a helicopter onto Baghdad.” Prior to August 8, the 

U.S. Embassy had kept some distance from the Committee, referring to the need for the 

Iraqi constitution to be settled with Iraqi, not American, solutions. It was apparently not 

possible, however, to maintain this distance and at the same time to insist, as a matter of 

U.S. policy, that the August 15 deadline be met. From the time the Leadership Council was 

formed, U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad attended meetings regularly, and U.S. Embassy 

officials were engaged in less-than-subtle efforts to accelerate a final constitution. Several 

The compressed timetable 

allowed, and probably required, 

a much heavier and more visible 

involvement of U.S. officials at 

the negotiations than would 

otherwise have been the case.

International experts gave particular attention to the Sunni 

Arab Committee members, 

spending much time illustrating 

the value of federalism in multiethnic states. These colloquies 

with Sunni Arabs were broken, 

however, when the Committee 

dissolved in August.
15

of the early meetings of the Leadership Council took place at the U.S. Embassy. By August 

10, the United States was strongly expressing its views on substantive constitutional 

issues to reach fast compromises that resembled the terms of the TAL. For example, the 

United States clearly favored an entirely centralized petroleum sector even though UNAMI 

had, in its August 10 paper, identified shared regional and central control as the only way 

of reaching a compromise. 

On August 12, in efforts to accelerate the drafting process, the U.S. Embassy circulated 

its own draft constitution in English. This took the form of a “track changes” version 

proposing amendments to the Committee’s draft text, offering extensive U.S. views on 

the terms of federalism, the judiciary, human rights protections, de-Ba’athification, and 

other matters. It is somewhat ironic that the U.S. government, having encouraged an 

early Shia-Kurd deal to the exclusion of Sunni Arabs, expended a great deal of effort in the 

final days of negotiations urging a speedy settlement of outstanding issues by pressing 

the Shia parties to accommodate Sunni Arab concerns. This effort included a telephone 

call from President Bush to SCIRI leader Abdul Aziz Al-Hakim on August 25. The American 

press and the Baghdad-based Al Sabah newspaper reported this telephone call, raising the 

U.S. profile in Iraq to a point that might confirm Sunni Arab suspicions that the constitution would be a U.S. product—without any observable softening of the SCIRI position. 

Ambassador Khalilzad took the unusual step of attending the meeting of the National 

Assembly on August 15 where the Assembly leadership moved for a seven-day extension, 

and again on August 22 when a further extension was sought. Domestic Iraqi television 

channels broadcasted his attendance in the Assembly, predictably attracting criticism 

from Iraqi nationalists and sections of the Arab media.

Charges of National Assembly Illegality

Finally, and perhaps most obviously, the unrealistic decision on August 1 not to extend 

the timetable beyond August 15 using Article 61(F) led to a series of ad hoc decisions by 

the Assembly after the deadline was missed on August 15. This exposed the Assembly to 

charges that it was operating illegally. Sections 61(E) and (G) of the TAL treat the eventuality of a missed August 15 deadline in the same way as a failed referendum. In both 

cases the TAL prescribes that “the National Assembly shall be dissolved. Elections for a 

new National Assembly shall be held no later than 15 December 2005.” Had the Assembly 

behaved lawfully, so the argument goes, it should have automatically dissolved and the 

government would plan for new elections. 

The precise nature of the Assembly’s proceedings on the evening of August 15 are 

unclear, though it seems arguable that the Assembly, by a show of hands that exceeded 

the necessary 75 percent majority, amended the TAL to change the deadline to August 

22. In doing so, it seems that the Assembly acted lawfully, albeit in a way that the TAL 

drafters may have thought eccentric. It is less clear, however, if the Speaker’s August 22 

announcement stating three additional days were needed, or the August 25 press conference announcing that still more time was needed, conformed either to the letter or the 

spirit of the TAL. It seems that after August 15, the Assembly did not make any formal 

amendment of the TAL deadline; after August 1, formal amendment of the TAL deadline 

was the only legal mechanism by which to avoid the mandatory provisions of clauses 

61(E) and (G). The Leadership Council was clearly unwilling to submit a series of rolling 

amendments of the TAL deadline to the Assembly, in circumstances where the negotiating 

text of the constitution was being withheld even from Assembly members. 

Indeed, the Iraqi constitutional process was remarkable in the way in which members 

of the Assembly, though legally charged with responsibility for writing the draft, were 

not involved. Rank and file National Assembly members had no access to constitutional 

drafts from August 8 to August 22. The Assembly leadership denied requests by Assembly 

members to address constitutional issues on the floor. For their part, the U.S. and U.K. 

Embassies had always been somewhat vague as to the legal consequences of a failure to 

meet the August 15 deadline, being unwilling to strategize around the probable scenario 

The unrealistic decision on 

August 1 not to extend the 

timetable beyond August 15 

using Article 61(F) led to a 

series of ad hoc decisions by 

the Assembly after the deadline 

was missed. This exposed the 

Assembly to charges that it was 

operating illegally.

The Iraqi constitutional process 

was remarkable in the way in 

which members of the Assembly, 

though legally charged with 

responsibility for writing the 

draft, were not involved.
16

that the deadline would not be met. In any event, criticisms from the Sunni Arab community and elsewhere stating that the Assembly acted contrary to the interim constitution 

continued, and added some force to claims that the current Assembly, and the document it 

later produced, lack legitimacy. It is likely, of course, that had the United States allowed 

the Assembly to adopt a more realistic deadline—a deadline which the Assembly could 

reasonably meet—the Assembly would not be exposed to these claims. 

Exclusion of Civil Society: Women, Minorities, and the Center

The breakdown of the process also worked against the interests of women, Iraqi ethnic 

and religious minorities other than Sunni Kurds, and liberal and centrist political interests. 

From the time of the occupation, the continued rise of sectarian and ethnic political parties fragmented and marginalized these groups. It is doubtful whether any constitutional 

process would have delivered them the constitutional recognition they sought, including 

strong statements of equality and human rights protections that were contested by the 

Shia Muslim religious conservatives, now clearly in the ascendancy. Smaller segments in 

Iraqi society had not had the chance to group together under strong civil society institutions.

Forgone Civil Society Influence

For that reason, some of the most promising initiatives in the post-election period 

came from civil society leaders who wanted to form umbrella organizations to represent 

civil society in constitutional discussions. From a centrist, more secular perspective, Dr. 

Ghassan Al-Atiyyah of the Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy developed a 

proposal for an Independent Constitution Commission (ICC). The stated purpose of the ICC 

would be to work alongside the “official” Constitution Drafting Committee, and to “bombard” it with civil society constitutional views—under the oversight of a board composed 

of senior political party members. The ICC membership would consist of a large number of 

Iraqi nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that were active in canvassing popular views 

on the constitution through 2005.

Similarly, the Thaqalayn Research Institute, an independent Shia religious NGO, started 

up a “Civil Constitutional Forum” of NGOs working on the constitution under the leadership of Dr. Sallama al-Khafaji and Sheikh Fateh al-Ghitta. The Forum was designed to educate religious Shia communities on the value of constitutionalism, the separation between 

church and state, and to bring consolidated civil society views to the Committee. Both the 

Iraq Foundation for Development and Democracy and the Thaqalayn Research Institute 

were, in the end, able to play a role in bringing civil society views to the Committee. 

Neither organization, however, was able to realize its goal of creating the institutions 

necessary to strengthen civil society’s influence on the draft. Both Ghassan Al-Atiyyah and 

Sheikh Fateh al-Ghitta pointed to the lack of time as the primary reason for failure. 

Women’s Groups Ignored

The truncated time frame problem also affected women’s groups. At meetings of women’s 

groups in late July, many participants identified an unmet need for a greater level of 

coordination if they were to successfully represent women’s views to the Committee, for 

instance proposing the creation of an Iraqi women’s “Coordination Committee” to manage 

this relationship. Again, it was clear that lack of time was the major constraint. Hanaa 

Edwar, leader of one very active women’s group, the Iraqi Women’s Network, recounts 

her meeting with the Committee in late July: “We’ve expressed our worry about the very 

short time behind the drafting committee to accomplish its work in a close doors. We’re 

still demanding for prolonging the deadline of writing the constitution in order to get 

the chance for Iraqi people to be involved actively in this very serious process. This will 

The breakdown of the process 

also worked against the interests of women, Iraqi ethnic and 

religious minorities other than 

Sunni Kurds, as well as liberal 

and centrist political interests.
17

enhance peaceful dialogue and bridge trust on national reconciliation among all Iraqi 

society constituencies.” Women’s groups were particularly concerned about provisions in 

the draft that would apparently erode the secular basis for Iraqi family law.

Committee Participation 

The Committee itself represented a way of partially correcting the lack of minority and 

women’s participation. Some care had been taken by the Kurdish and Shia blocs to ensure 

that women were represented on the Committee—with a total of nine—as well as representatives of the Assyrian, Shabak, and Yazidi communities. One of the Committee members, Hunain Al-Qaddo, was also serving as Chairman of the Council of Iraqi Minorities, a 

body formally established on July 2, 2005, by eight ethnic minority groups to advocate 

for their concerns in the constitutional discussions. One of the deputy chairmen of the 

Committee, Adnan Al-Janabi, was a representative of the centrist party of Ayad Allawi. 

The demise of the Committee on August 8 dramatically reduced the ability of these 

groups to participate in negotiations. The ad hoc Leadership Council meetings included 

no women and no non-Kurdish minorities. Centrist party representatives, when they 

attended, played a minor role, having moved closer to Sunni Arab skepticism. As a result, 

the constitutional provisions that these groups were seeking in the text were frequently 

removed from the Committee text, diluted, or modified in ways that bore little relationship to the views of the groups concerned. For example, the Council of Iraqi Minorities 

had been seeking a provision that would recognize several of Iraq’s many ethnic and 

religious minorities by name. Such a provision was included in Article 3 of the Committee 

draft: “The Iraqi people is comprised of two major nationalities, Arabs and Kurds, and from 

basic nationalities: the Turkmen, the Chaldeans, the Assyrians, the Syriacs, the Armenians, 

the Shabak, the Yazidis, and the Mandean Sabeans, all of whom are equal in rights and 

citizenship obligations.” This provision was removed from the draft after August 8 without consultation with the Council of Minorities or individual minority groups, and was 

replaced by different minorities language that does not, for instance, explicitly recognize 

the Shabak or Armenians. 

Civil Society Need for International Support 

The removal of the drafting responsibility from the Committee resulted in smaller groups, 

including Iraq’s ethnic and religious minorities, turning immediately to international 

institutions for lobbying support and patronage, where previously they had been able to 

access Iraqi members of the Constitution Drafting Committee directly. Hoping to influence the draft after August 8, these groups had an incentive to seek the backing of 

the U.S. Embassy, and to a lesser extent the United Nations, since there were no longer 

accessible or sympathetic Iraqis close to the drafting action. The United States and the 

United Nations clearly welcomed this role. For instance, the UN Special Representative, 

Ambassador Ashraf Ghazi, defined his own role as that of the protector of human rights 

and minority rights in the constitution. The press releases he issued in August reveal a 

series of meetings with Iraqi supplicants looking for UN help when apparently none was 

available elsewhere. 

It is far from clear that the adopted roles of the United States and UNAMI as human 

rights lobbyists were successful. There is no doubt that some of these Iraqi actors found 

the meetings with the U.S. Embassy and United Nations to be useful, if only so that they 

could determine the status of the latest drafts of the constitution. By August, it became 

very difficult even for participants in the negotiations to follow the drafting work, with at 

times two or even three different drafts being circulated by different negotiators as the 

“latest draft.” Competing “authoritative” texts were variously held by Dr. Hajim Al-Hassani, 

the Speaker of the Assembly, Sheikh Humam Hamoudi, the U.S. Embassy, and the United 

Nations. Although on two occasions these drafts were leaked to the Iraqi press, none of 

The demise of the Committee on 

August 8 dramatically reduced 

the ability of these groups to 

participate in negotiations.

Iraq’s ethnic and religious 

minorities, turning immediately 

to international institutions for 

lobbying support and patronage, 

where previously they had been 

able to access Iraqi members of 

the Constitution Drafting Committee directly.
18

these successive drafts were officially released to the Iraqi public for comment. Very few, 

if any, were released to members of the Committee or to the National Assembly. 

United States and Civil Society Patronage 

This absence of drafting and consultation protocols made it extremely difficult for nonexpert Iraqis to follow the process. This background of confusion and the desire for patronage by smaller Iraqi interests led, in turn, to the U.S. Embassy gaining still greater public 

involvement in Iraqi constitutional politics. The Embassy also became the most obvious 

agent for a range of international lobbying and advocacy institutions based outside Iraq, 

including the U.S. Commission for International Religious Freedom, Freedom House, and a 

range of U.S.-based Iraqi expatriate and women’s groups. Regardless of the value of these 

efforts to improve the constitution, the time pressure increased the likelihood that Iraqis 

would see foreigners as dominating their constitutional process, minimizing the popular 

legitimacy of the text.

The Committee Secretariat: Engaging the Iraqi Public

If relatively well-organized and well-connected women’s and minority groups found it 

difficult to interact with the constitutional drafters, these difficulties were greater for 

ordinary Iraqi citizens. Every meeting of the Committee, the National Assembly, and the 

Leadership Council took place behind the blast walls, barbed wire, and gun turrets of 

Baghdad’s International Zone. Iraqi citizens could gain entry to the International Zone 

only after time-consuming and dangerous queuing and multiple body searches. phone lines 

and internet connections were uniformly bad. The opportunity for Iraqis to communicate, 

either formally or informally, with their constituent representatives was practically nil. In 

one sense, the national dialogue and debate on constitutional matters were widespread, 

covered extensively in the Iraqi media. However, notwithstanding the enormous efforts 

of the Constitution Drafting Committee staff, very little of this dialogue was formally 

presented to the Committee in time for it to influence the constitutional text.

Creation of the Outreach Unit

In early June, Chairman Sheikh Hamoudi established, under the management of Dr. Adnan 

Ali, a skeleton Secretariat for the Committee. The Secretariat was to include an Outreach 

Unit, responsible for disseminating constitutional information to the public and for receiving and analyzing the public response. The Outreach Unit structure and mandate were 

prepared with the assistance of UN and USIP experts, including Scott Carlson, who advised 

the successful Albanian Constitutional Commission. 

There was great difficulty in starting the Outreach Unit, however. Prior to June, neither 

the United States nor the United Nations had taken steps to prepare office space for the 

Committee Secretariat. As a result, it was working in an ad hoc fashion out of a cramped 

space in the Convention Center through late July. Several weeks were lost while recruiting 

the Iraqi staff. 

At the end of July, the Outreach Unit issued a constitutional questionnaire with seven 

questions in total, which were designed to be disseminated throughout the country and 

returned to the Outreach Unit for entry into a computer database. The UN, NDI, and USIP 

each provided practical support to the Outreach Unit, including funding and staffing. By 

late July, USIP visited the newly established Outreach Unit offices in downtown Baghdad. 

A staff of fifty was working around the clock in precarious security conditions to enter 

piles of public submissions into a computerized database and to prepare a report to the 

Committee.

Notwithstanding the enormous 

efforts of the Constitution Drafting 

Committee staff, very little of this 

dialogue was formally presented 

to the Committee in time for it to 

influence the constitutional text.
19

Constraints: Time, Resources, and Security

Despite the professionalism and bravery of the Outreach Unit staff, the shortcomings of 

the process were striking. From its inception in early June, the Outreach Unit had no more 

than eight weeks to complete its work. 

The attempt to conduct a serious national constitutional dialogue in such a short 

space of time was probably unprecedented. By way of comparison, the East Timorese 

and Afghan constitutional processes, widely regarded as overly hasty, took around six 

and fifteen months, respectively. The effort in Iraq was all the more remarkable, given 

the poor and deteriorating security situation and the nationwide difficulties in delivering 

basic government services, including power and water. Therefore, it is not surprising that 

public participation did not work well. 

In particular, there was no period of public education on constitutional issues, so that 

nonelite Iraqis had little chance to understand even the simple questionnaire. The Outreach Unit had no clear ability to receive substantial input from Sunni Arab and Kurdish 

regions of Iraq, arguably the most important in building true constitutional legitimacy. 

By July 28, the Outreach Unit had received only 20,300 submissions. By August 10, the 

Outreach Unit had received 126,000 submissions, with none from Kurdistan or the Sunni 

Arab regions. As of August 15, it had received around 150,000 submissions, of which only 

around 20,000 had been received from the Kurdistan Region and only around 10,000 from 

Sunni Arab regions—indeed, all 10,000 were from Fallujah. This was an imbalance which 

the Outreach Unit was ultimately unable to correct. 

Largely because of the SCIRI chairmanship of the Committee, the staff of the Outreach 

Unit were drawn mainly from religious Shia social networks, and the networks put in place 

to receive submissions were biased toward Shia areas of Baghdad and other cities. It is 

unclear whether there were any Sunni Arabs on the Outreach Unit staff, though in early 

August the Unit did recruit some Iraqis from smaller ethnic and religious minorities. Submission boxes were distributed by the Outreach Unit in government buildings in Baghdad 

to allow citizens to submit completed questionnaires and written submissions for later 

collection by the Outreach Unit; however, the distribution of these boxes was uneven 

at best. There was no ability to enter non-questionnaire submissions into the database, 

obviously limiting the range of views that the public could express on constitutional 

issues. The results of the extensive constitutional awareness programs run throughout 

Iraq by international organizations, including NDI and IRI, either were not presented to 

the Outreach Unit, or were presented too late for those results to have an impact on the 

draft, or to strengthen the Outreach Unit’s own analysis.

Little Review of Public Input

Most important, perhaps, the Outreach Unit did not have the ability to circulate a report 

to the Committee members before August 13. Interviews conducted with various Committee members in early August confirmed that they had not received reports from the 

Outreach Unit. This was hardly surprising given the time constraints. This meant that 

there was little or no chance for the views of the public, as expressed to the Committee, 

to be taken into account in the preparation of the constitution. By August 13, a mature 

negotiating draft had existed for some time with no political will within the political blocs 

to reopen settled agreements within that draft. In very precise terms, then, the National 

Assembly failed to meet the obligation imposed by Article 60 of the TAL of “receiving 

proposals from the citizens of Iraq as it writes the constitution.” 

Inadequate Public Outreach

In summary, the activities of the Outreach Unit further suggest that the finalization of 

Iraq’s constitution was premature, and that another opportunity was lost. It was not 

until late July that the Outreach Unit was fully operational, with a multiethnic staff and 

From its inception in early June, 

the Outreach Unit had no more 

than eight weeks to complete its 

work.
20

adequate equipment, security, and reporting protocols. Had the process allowed them 

even a few more weeks, the Committee might have been in a position to take the views 

of the public, and in particular the views of Sunni Arabs, into account, and might have 

been seen to take them into account. Indeed, there is a danger that a widely advertised, 

but ultimately unsuccessful, constitutional participation campaign may have marginally 

worsened conditions in Iraq. Iraqis expected that their views would be taken into account, 

but clearly saw that they were not. 

It is unlikely that a properly conducted public participation campaign in Iraq would, on 

its own, have bridged the large constitutional divides that now confront Iraq following the 

referendum. Public participation typically does, however, have the effect of moderating 

constitutional views, both in the general public and among the drafting elites. From NDI 

focus groups conducted in April 2005, it was clear that Iraqi citizens had not withdrawn 

their demands for transparency and participation in constitutional matters. The fact that 

these demands were not met almost certainly affected, in particular, Sunni Arab perceptions of the final constitution. Had the Iraqi Government and the international community 

worked harder and longer with Sunni Arab groups on issues surrounding federalism, and 

had Sunni Arabs been given a chance to express to the Committee their unmediated, 

individual views on constitutional issues, the results would almost certainly have been 

encouraging, perhaps surprisingly so.

Conclusions: The Referendum and Iraq’s Constitutional Future

The merits and demerits of the constitutional text that resulted from this Iraqi process 

have been the subject of extensive Western press, academic, and policy commentary, particularly in respect to the provisions of the text that favor, or are seen to favor, the new 

conservative Shia establishment. The fact that the constitution also contemplates a fairly 

weak central government has also attracted much commentary and criticism. The arrival of 

this draft will no doubt encourage continued international policy discussions that revolve 

around competing conceptions of consociation and integration. Some commentators, 

including the International Crisis Group, catalogue the ambiguity of certain constitutional 

provisions, seeing in the ambiguity the “seeds of future discord.” Others, including Professor Yash Ghai, have serious reservations as to “whether the constitution as it stands can 

be fully and effectively implemented without grave danger to state and society.”

These criticisms have force; however, this constitutional text will be difficult to change. 

Given the mutually intersecting interests that now characterize Iraqi politics, it seems the 

major Shia and Kurdish political blocs will willingly revise very little in this constitutional 

text. Despite the very serious problems of constitutional process that have accompanied 

this text, the constitution as written may represent a reasonable approximation of a 

workable constitution for Iraq. It is certainly not the comprehensive constitutional document that some may have wanted, and given the Sunni Arab rejection of the text at the 

referendum, it probably does not satisfy even the modest goal of an Iraqi constitution-astreaty. By way of comparison, however, the TAL was hardly more detailed. It is difficult to 

imagine a very different constitutional text for an Iraq that is already highly regionalized 

and in which, for better or worse, the majority of the citizens see a role for Islam in public 

decision-making. As with any treaty text, most of the ambiguities in the draft constitution 

are neither casual oversights nor the result of deliberate evasiveness. The text is silent 

because the parties could not agree. Significantly, it is difficult to see any substantive 

change to the text that would guarantee Sunni Arab support, nor indeed the support of 

all women, secularists, and ethnic and religious minorities. 

In the case of Iraq, it may be that it is the process, more than the substance, that 

has created the current predicament. The recent Iraqi constitutional experience illustrates 

all too clearly the practical importance of the distinction, usually made by comparative 

constitutional specialists and academics, between constitutional substance and constituHad the process allowed them 

even just a few more weeks, the 

Committee might have been in 

a position to take the views of 

the public, and in particular 

the views of Sunni Arabs, into 

account; and might have been 

seen to take them into account.

Given the mutually intersecting 

interests that now characterize 

Iraqi politics, it seems the major 

Shia and Kurdish political blocs 

will willingly revise very little in 

this constitutional text.
21

tional process. It would be difficult to describe the process by which that text ultimately 

emerged from the National Assembly as meeting either the expectations of Iraqis, international standards, or the TAL itself. Specifically, it has been the dynamics of Sunni Arab 

opposition, more than mutually conflicting constitutional arguments, that has created 

Iraq’s constitutional crisis. Even allowing for some intransigence on the part of Sunni 

Arab negotiators, the fact remains that Iraq’s constitutional process was seen, with some 

justification, as an insult to Sunni Arab Iraqis.

Those familiar with recent postconflict constitution-making processes, including in 

East Timor and Afghanistan, are all too aware of the price—paid in stability, legitimacy, 

and the rule of law—when constitutional discussions are rushed. Unfortunately for Iraq, 

the consequences of a rushed constitutional process will not simply manifest themselves, as in so many other countries, by misunderstandings or legitimacy deficits in the 

medium-to-long term. Because of the peculiarly violent scene in contemporary Iraq and 

the polarization around the October constitutional referendum, it is reasonable to speculate that the deficiencies in constitutional process are having an immediate and violent 

effect on the lives of Iraqis. 

It was a mistake on the part of some in the Iraqi leadership and the U.S. government 

to insist on an adherence to the August 15 deadline. The constitutional discussions began 

much later than the framers of the TAL envisaged. The terms of the TAL itself clearly foresaw the possible need for a six-month extension. The pressure-cooker approach that the 

United States adopted might conceivably have been effective if the central problem was 

that Iraqi parliamentarians were simply being slow in moving to consolidate their Iraqi 

identity and shared vision of government in constitutional terms. 

The problem, however, was more profound. Iraqi constitution-making always required 

a complex three-way negotiation in circumstances where nothing—not even a residual 

shared Iraqi identity—could be taken for granted. Conventional wisdom presented Iraq 

as a centralized state undergoing a form of decentralization, when the reality was almost 

diametrically opposite. Regional powers were, in effect, negotiating the terms of a possible delegation of powers to the center. The three major negotiating blocs—Shia Arab, 

Kurd, and Sunni Arab—derived their authority from de facto regional interests, and the 

power of central government during the negotiating phase was marginal at best. For each 

of the three major blocs, the attractions of a constitution were not necessarily greater 

than living with no constitution at all, a fact that made the process even more delicate. 

The complexity of the negotiations and the backdrop of increasingly sectarian violence in 

Iraq meant that the meetings increasingly resembled peace talks, where peace was clearly 

elusive. The insurgency timed its mortar and car bomb attacks in Baghdad to coincide with 

National Assembly sessions. It was probably no coincidence either that the final stages of 

the negotiations were interrupted by violent intra-Shia clashes between loyalists to the 

Iranian-backed SCIRI and the nationalist followers of Moqtada al-Sadr.

Sadly, there is no obvious policy solution to Iraq’s constitutional predicament. The 

challenge is no longer the building of governmental and institutional legitimacy so much 

as it is a challenge of conflict management. The finalization of the constitution coincided 

with a statement plausibly attributed to insurgent leader Musab al-Zarqawi that he had 

“declared war against all Shiites in Iraq,” and with a significant rise in Sunni-Shia violence. We should confront the reality that Sunni Arab opposition to the constitution that 

emerged during the negotiations will continue, and that a national “yes” vote may have 

consolidated Sunni Arab isolation and moved Sunni Arabs still further toward an unrealistic insistence on a centralized state. This leaves only a medium- to long-term hope that 

Sunni Arab moderates might learn to embrace their federal constitution, and that in the 

meantime Shia and Kurdish political leaders might implement the constitution in a way 

that does not work to Sunni Arabs’ disadvantage. 

Efforts to bridge the Sunni-Shia divide by tinkering with the constitutional text are 

unlikely to be fruitful, and a pre-referendum agreement to consider amending the text 

after the December 2005 election may well prove to be hollow. It is not clear that a 

constitutional consensus could be attained that is different from the terms of the current

The deficiencies in constitutional 

process are having an immediate 

and violent effect on the lives of 

Iraqis.

Conventional wisdom presented 

Iraq as a centralized state undergoing a form of decentralization, 

when the reality was almost 

diametrically opposite. Regional 

powers were, in effect, negotiating the terms of a possible delegation of powers to the center.
22

constitutional draft. In particular, there is no evidence from the Kurdish or Shia camps 

that new electoral politics would soften their core demands that apparently cause so 

much offense in Sunni Arab Iraq. Even with active Sunni Arab participation in a new 

election, Shia and Kurdish factions will likely still command a large enough majority in a 

new National Assembly to force through their positions. Additional time for constitutional 

negotiations would have been useful before the current draft hardened Sunni Arab positions; but now, the prospect of continued unfocused “reaching out” to Sunni Arabs and 

continued constitutional negotiations is a fairly arid one. The fact is that Sunni Arabs’ 

alienation has been amplified by procedural problems in July and August. The damage has 

already been done; continued constitutional negotiations will simply confirm the existing 

divisions. This has been shown already in the continued eleventh hour negotiations in 

September, which made some minor adjustments to the “final” text, stating that Iraq is 

“a founding and active member of the Arab League,” moderating the language treating 

the Ba’ath party, confirming the “unity” of Iraq, and adjusting provisions relating to 

international covenants and water resources. It is apparent from the referendum results 

that these efforts, however well intentioned, did not significantly mollify Sunni Arab 

opposition to the text.

Back to the Grassroots

In the absence of an obvious immediate solution to Iraq’s constitutional crisis, what 

should Iraqis do? How can the international community help? How can Iraqi expectations 

of constitutionalism possibly be met? 

The answer may be simply to redouble efforts on the less glamorous, grassroots work 

that so many Iraqis—and so many international organizations—have begun. This work 

includes bringing the political elites in closer contact with their constituents, enlarging 

the circle of constitutional debate, and finding new ways of cultivating cross-ethnic and 

cross-sectarian coalitions on constitutional issues and new forms of Iraqi identity. 

Certainly there is much technical work to be done in order to resolve the many 

ambiguities and silences in the constitutional text. Implementing legislation is needed, 

in particular, to ensure human rights protections, and protocols are needed for intergovernmental relations within the federal system. The central problem remains, however, 

with Sunni Arab alienation. Working in concrete ways with Sunni Arab elites and local 

communities to strategize within the terms of an inevitably federal Iraq—including the 

securing of oil revenues for the Sunni Arab governorates and the possible establishment 

of a new federal region in the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq—may yet pay dividends. It is this 

work that has some chance of producing results in years to come. Out of this work, a 

nationwide popular commitment to democratic federalism may emerge, not as a reaction 

to a rushed Kurdish-Shia negotiation, but as a genuine and pragmatic expression of the 

peoples of Iraq.

Recommendations

•	 Public education: the Iraqi Government, National Assembly, and the international 

community should make every effort to educate the Iraqi people, particularly those 

in the Sunni Arab areas, on the contents of the constitution and the next stages of 

the transition.

•	 International mediation: the United States, the United Nations, and the international community should support initiatives for reconciliation and understanding 

among Iraqi communities on constitutional issues.

•	 Sunni Arab strategies: the United States, the United Nations, and the international 

community should help Sunni Arab communities strategize within a federal framework, and in particular, help moderate and progressive Sunni Arabs to identify ways 

of securing oil revenue, self-government, and political alliances.

Working in concrete ways with Sunni 

Arab elites and local communities 

to strategize within the terms of an 

inevitably federal Iraq—including the 

securing of oil revenues for the Sunni 

Arab governorates and the pssible 

establishment of a new federal region 

in the Sunni Arab areas of Iraq—may 

yet pay dividends. 
23

•	 UN office of constitutional expertise: the United Nations should establish a permanent office of constitutional advice and support within the Secretariat, analogous 

to the Electoral Assistance Division.

•	 Constitutional implementation: the Iraqi government, National Assembly, and 

international community should develop a strategy for constitutional implementation 

that focuses on intergovernmental relations and the enforceability by Iraqi citizens of 

their constitutional rights.

•	 Nonpartisanship: the international community, in assisting the Iraqi government 

on constitutional implementation, should not engage in the selection of political 

favorites, recognizing that any initiative must have broad political support.

•	 Equal representation: the institutional vehicles for constitutional implementation, 

including courts and Commissions, should visibly include Sunni Arabs, women, and 

members of ethnic and religious minorities.

•	 Public views report: the Outreach Unit of the Constitution Drafting Committee needs 

support in preparing a final report on Iraqi views on the constitution to form part of 

the public record.

•	 Permanent Center for Constitutional Dialogue and Research: the Iraqi government, with the support of the international community, should transform the Outreach Unit of the Constitution Drafting Committee into an independent Center for 

Constitutional Dialogue and Research established by national legislation.

•	 Benchmarks: the Iraqi leadership and the United States should adopt a strategy for 

Iraq’s transition that prioritizes Sunni Arab engagement with the constitution, rule 

of law, and democracy-building benchmarks instead of adherence to the TAL or other 

timetables.
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.

Of Related Interest

In the fall of 2003, Congress requested the United States Institute of Peace to provide 

assistance for peacebuilding initiatives under way in Iraq. The Institute’s work in this 

area complements many of its long-term programs and initiatives, including support for 

the rule of law in postconflict environments and transitional states, as reflected in recent 

publications that address these issues.

Recent Institute reports include:

• Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq (Special Report, April 2005)

• Iraq’s Constitutional process: Shaping a Vision for the Country’s Future (Special Report 

132, February 2005)

• Promoting Middle East Democracy: European Initiatives, Promoting Middle East Democracy: European Initiatives (Special Report, June 2004)

• Donor Activities and Civil Society Potential in Iraq (Special Report 124, July 2004)

• Building the Iraqi Special Tribunal: Lessons from Experiences in International Criminal 

Justice Justice (Special Report 122, June 2004)

• Postconflict Iraq: A Race for Stability, Reconstruction, and Legitimacy, by Faleh A. Jabar 

(Special Report 120, May 2004)

• Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam Hussein, Islamist Politics in Iraq after Saddam 

Hussein, by Graham E. Fuller (Special Report 108, August 2003)

• Democratic Constitution Making, Democratic Constitution Making, by Vivien Hart (Special Report 107, July 2003)

• Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq (Special Report 104, April 2003)

• The Road Ahead: Lessons in Nation Building from Japan, Germany, and Afghanistan for 

Postwar Iraq, Postwar Iraq, by Ray Salvatore Jennings (Peaceworks 49, April 2003)

Recent books from USIP Press include:

• Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes, 3 vols., 

edited by Neil J. Kritz (1995)

For book sales and order information, call 800.868.8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 

703.661.1590, or fax 703.661.1501.