Making Peace Possible

NO. 155 | J anuary 2020

PEACEWORKS

Displacement and the Vulnerability 

to Mobilize for Violence

EVIDENCE FROM AFGHANISTAN

By Sadaf Lakhani and Rahmatullah Amiri
NO. 155 | January 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

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Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 155. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-789-3

VIOLENT 

EXTREMISM

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines whether displaced persons in Afghanistan are more vulnerable 

to radicalization and mobilization to violence than groups that have not experienced 

displacement. Fieldwork—which included surveys and interviews conducted in eight 

Afghan provinces throughout 2018—was carried out by The Liaison Office (TLO), a 

research and peacebuilding organization based in Kabul.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Sadaf Lakhani is CEO of Cognitiks, a company that assists organizations in fragile states 

integrate data science into their decision-making processes. Before this, she spent 

eighteen years working on development in fragile and conflict-affected contexts for the 

World Bank, USIP, and other organizations. Rahmatullah Amiri is a senior researcher and 

analyst with TLO, where he works on sociopolitical issues, peacebuilding and reconciliation, countering violent extremism, and humanitarian access.

Cover photo: Internally displaced Afghan men line up to receive winter relief assistance 

at a refugee camp in Kabul in January 2017. (Photo by Omar Sobhani/Reuters)
USIP.ORG 1

3 Introduction and Methodology

9 Findings

23 Analysis

28 Recommendations

Contents
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

Summary

A perception shared broadly both within and outside Afghanistan is that displaced persons are vulnerable to radicalization and mobilization to violence. To 

assess the validity of this perception, this study—based on extensive surveys and 

interviews involving more than 1,400 respondents across eight Afghan provinces—compared groups of displaced and nondisplaced persons on an array of 

socioeconomic factors that the literature suggests lead to greater vulnerability to 

radicalization.

The results did not support this general perception. Attitudes toward the Taliban 

and toward the use of violence against civilians did not vary greatly between displaced and nondisplaced groups in any given province. Yet the attitudes of any 

one group might vary significantly from province to province (for example, between displaced populations in Balkh and those in Nangarhar), underscoring the 

need for well-targeted, locale-specific interventions. The study also found that 

displaced persons were more likely than returnees or host community Afghans 

to have been approached directly for recruitment by the Taliban, but it did not 

find that displaced persons were more sympathetic toward the Taliban or toward 

the use of violence against civilians. The perception of vulnerability of displaced 

persons to joining armed nonstate groups was not matched by actual sympathy 

for the Taliban.

One exception to these findings is notable: returnees who had left and subsequently returned to Afghanistan more than five years before the time of 

this study were most likely to express sympathy for the Taliban. A deeper and 

focused understanding of this specific wave of returnees may reveal characteristics that make returnees vulnerable to Taliban messaging.

Regardless of displacement status, many respondents who expressed sympathy 

for the Taliban did so out of a belief that the Taliban could provide security and 

dispute resolution. Rather than agreeing with the Taliban’s ideology, respondents 

expressed a willingness to put up with the negative aspects of Taliban authority, 

including violence toward civilians, simply to benefit from the security and protection afforded by the Taliban. The recommendations emphasize significantly 

improved government provision of security and rule of law to dissuade alignment 

of displaced persons with the Taliban or other armed groups.
USIP.ORG 3

Forced displacement currently affects a record 70.8 million people worldwide and 

is among the most pressing humanitarian and development challenges today. The 

impacts of forced displacement are disproportionately felt in developing and conflict-affected countries such as Afghanistan, where seven to eight million people, or 

one-fifth of the population, are displaced.1 Though natural disasters are one cause of 

displacement, the greatest part of forced displacement in Afghanistan today is the 

result of violent conflict.2

A large body of literature exists on both displacement and violent extremism, but 

there are few in-depth studies on the intersection of the two. This gap, combined with 

several high-profile attacks in Western Europe in which migrants—often displaced 

persons—were implicated, has led to assumptions that displacement and migration 

constitute a particular security and stabilization threat and that displaced persons are 

at greater risk of radicalization or recruitment to violence than the general population.3

Because of the scale of displacement in Afghanistan, ascertaining in the first place 

whether a relationship exists between displacement and vulnerability to recruitment 

to violence, and, if so, the details of the dynamics of the relationship, is crucial to the 

success of efforts to counter violent extremism in the country.

Displaced Afghan men gather in the Tangi Wazir area of eastern Nangarhar Province, where ISIS militants had set houses on fire, in December 2017. 

(Photo by Mauricio Lima/New York Times)

Ascertaining whether 

a relationship exists 

between displacement 

and vulnerability 

to recruitment to 

violence—and, if 

so, the details of 

the dynamics of 

the relationship—is 

crucial to the success 

of efforts to counter 

violent extremism in 

Afghanistan.

Introduction and Methodology
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

At the same time, countering violent extremism evaluations and lessons learned have enabled practitioners 

to better understand vulnerabilities (and resiliencies) 

among defined subgroups or communities, with the 

goal of better tailoring programming and targeting 

support. Understanding the specific vulnerabilities of 

different displaced groups compared with those who 

have not experienced displacement helps inform policies and programs to assist displaced persons.

The goal of this study was to explore the nexus of displacement in a conflict-affected situation and vulnerability 

to radicalization, and to derive recommendations for 

government and nongovernmental organizations. The 

study examined factors related to radicalization that had 

been identified in other studies; and compared displaced 

and nondisplaced individuals. It also looked at differences among different displaced populations—internally 

displaced persons (IDPs) and returnees. 

Afghanistan's conflict dynamics are complex. They 

include protracted displacement, urban displacement, 

returnees arriving in different waves for different reasons, differences between groups of IDPs coming from 

different ethnic groups and different areas of origin, 

and displacement because of individuals’ association 

with or support for (or lack thereof) the government or 

one or another violent extremist group. The displaced 

may also have experienced multiple displacements, 

and often have been both a refugee and a returnee, 

as well as internally displaced.4

 Drawing generalizations about vulnerability to radicalization based solely 

on individuals’ categorization as “displaced” is insufficiently sensitive to the specific and divergent factors 

found within the experiences and current conditions 

of displaced people. The causes of radicalization are 

manifold and cross multiple domains: they do not always equate with agreement with a radical ideology or 

with an experience of displacement.

DEFINITIONS OF DISPLACED OR 

NONDISPLACED GROUPS

Forced displacement is a significant phenomenon 

in Afghanistan as a result of the country’s protracted 

history of conflict and regime change. In this report the 

following terms are used:

Refugees and returnees. Refugees are those who have 

left homes because of persecution or violence and have 

crossed an international border in search of safety.5

Currently about 6 million Afghans have fled the country, 

including 2.4 million registered refugees and an estimated 2.7 to 3.4 million undocumented Afghans in Iran 

and Pakistan. These figures make Afghanistan the second-largest source of refugees in the world, after Syria.6

Returnees are persons who have either returned to 

Afghanistan from outside the country or returned to their 

original area in Afghanistan after internal displacement to 

a different region. More than 820,000 Afghans returned 

to the country in 2018 from Iran and Pakistan alone, the 

vast majority of whom were undocumented; fewer than 

20,000 were documented refugees returning.7 UN agencies do their best to ensure that returns are voluntary. 

“Spontaneous returns” indicate that people have been 

coerced into returning to Afghanistan, usually because 

of actions on the part of the host country’s government.8

The conditions surrounding forced returns can add to the 

vulnerabilities to radicalization that returnees face.

On returning to Afghanistan, it is common for returnees to become internally displaced as they search for 

secure places to live and work. For the purposes of this 

analysis, cross-border returnees who were also IDPs 

(returnees unable to resettle in their former sites) were 

treated as returnees because a review of the literature consistently identified the experience of being a 

cross-border returnee as more defining than the experience of being secondarily displaced.

The number of conflict-related internal displacements in Afghanistan grew from 297,000 in 2009 to 

more than 2.5 million by the end of 2018—an eightfold increase.
USIP.ORG 5

Internally displaced persons. IDPs are people who 

have fled their homes but remain within the borders 

of Afghanistan. The number of conflict-related internal 

displacements in Afghanistan grew from 297,000 in 

2009 to more than 2.5 million by the end of 2018—an 

eightfold increase. The United Nations Office for the 

Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reported 675,000 

new cases of conflict related displacement in 2016, 

512,000 in 2017, 385,000 in 2018, and approximately 

400,000 in 2019.9

Nondisplaced or host communities. Nondisplaced 

persons (hosts) were included for comparison purposes, 

to test for differences between returnees or IDPs and 

those who had never had to leave their place of origin 

because of conflict. 

A robust body of research documents forced displacement as an outcome of conflict and insecurity (e.g., civil 

war, state repression) or fragility (e.g., state failure).10

Much of the current research and news reporting on 

displacement driving violent extremism, however, is 

fueled by fears of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 

infiltration among Syrian refugees and by concerns over 

broader demographic and cultural shifts resulting from 

refugee flows into Europe. As such, both research and 

news commentary tend to aggregate forcibly displaced 

persons with economic migrants and second-generation 

diaspora adolescents. Often this commentary focuses on 

integration into recipient European countries and implicitly equates piety or religious expression with extremism.11

National and international agendas around the asylum 

process and the protection of displaced populations 

may be driving much of the commentary in popular discourse, without evidentiary support. This discourse leads 

to self-fulfilling assessments. For example, a 2015 Rand 

Corporation study found that “host governments, fearing 

refugee violence almost from the beginning, tended to 

find the terrorist connection they were looking for.”12

A handful of recent studies have attempted to move 

beyond both the culture-clash narrative and fears of ISIS 

operatives posing as refugees to examine the ways in 

which the causes of flight, prior political affiliation, and 

the recipient nation’s desire and capacity to address 

refugees’ needs all shape radicalization.13 The evidence 

shows that displaced persons with inadequate support often face hardship and marginalization.14 A World Bank-UN 

report notes that forcibly displaced persons often suffer 

from “a loss of assets, lack of legal rights, absence of 

opportunities, and a short planning horizon.” They need 

dedicated support to overcome these vulnerabilities and 

regain confidence in their future.

SOCIOECONOMIC AND SITUATIONAL 

FACTORS INCREASING THE 

RISK OF RADICALIZATION

The literature on the radicalization of returning refugee 

or IDP populations (rather than foreign terrorist fighters, 

who can also be considered a particular type of returnee) is scant.15 Forced and “spontaneous” returnees 

in particular, such as those returning to Afghanistan in 

2015 and 2016, are less prepared for return and more 

likely to experience poverty and secondary displacement, according to agencies that monitor returns.16

Radicalization and recruitment occurring within refugee 

camps, especially that targeting children, have been 

the subject of some limited research and are supported by anecdotal evidence.17 One hypothesis holds 

that the risk of radicalization is greater the longer the 

displacement and the more the displaced population 

finds itself marginalized and disenfranchised.18 Both 

the Taliban and the anticommunist mujahideen forces 

before them recruited in long-term Pashtun refugee 

camps in Pakistan.19 However, the literature on the risk 

of radicalization of refugees in camps often does not 

discretize whether it is the situation of displacement or 

other conditions specific to refugees—such as their experience of fleeing their country or their political beliefs 

related to the decision to seek refuge—that are salient. 

The dearth of research comparing rates of refugee 
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

radicalization with those of settled populations makes 

it impossible to say whether the forcibly displaced 

are any more or less vulnerable to radicalization and 

recruitment than the general population.

The social exclusion displaced persons face on their 

return is associated with another set of factors that 

could increase vulnerability to radicalization. The sense 

of “not belonging,” especially among returnees who 

left Afghanistan decades ago, has been reported by 

the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 

and anecdotally by local organizations implementing 

support programs for returnees and is considered by 

some to be an underestimated factor in recruitment 

into the Taliban.20

This study examined the feelings of exclusion captured 

in the surveys and the interviews to determine whether 

there is a greater feeling of exclusion among displaced 

groups than among host respondents. Linked to the 

issue of social exclusion is the experience of injustice; some researchers have proposed that perceptions of injustice and marginalization are at the very 

heart of radicalization. A study of groups in Colombia, 

Afghanistan, and Somalia found that early experiences 

of abuse and humiliation, whether originating within a 

family or initiated externally, were an important driver 

of joining extremist groups, more so than economic 

factors.21

Beyond the specific risks for radicalization faced by 

refugees, returnees, and IDPs in conflict-affected areas, 

several other factors are recognized as potentially increasing the risk of radicalization and violent extremism.

Youth demographic and education. Afghanistan’s 

large youth population has been considered a risk 

factor in the growth of violent extremist groups.22 The 

association between youth and radicalization includes 

young people’s potential exposure to radical elements 

in the educational system. There is already research 

that links some types of schools—madrassas—and 

some universities in Afghanistan with radicalization 

through the intentional spread of radical ideas and 

support for the use of violence. It would be important 

to know whether schools and universities are sites of 

radicalization in Afghanistan and whether there is a 

correlation between vulnerability to radicalization and 

level of education achieved. Studies that have looked 

at the role of education in radicalization in other contexts have noted that a large majority of terrorists are 

well educated.23 Recruits into ISIS, for example, have 

achieved a higher level of education than the average 

male in their country of origin.24 Others have found 

that the educational environment interacts with other 

factors to increase the risk of radicalization: research 

on Middle Eastern and North African youth found that 

young people with a secondary education who were 

either unemployed or underemployed were at greatest 

risk of radicalization.25

Unemployment, underemployment, and poverty. The 

availability of free time to Afghan youth (which may also 

be associated with level of education) and the lack of 

meaningful or full-time employment have been singled 

out as factors increasing the risk of radicalization.26

While the evidence is ambiguous, and some important 

statistical work does not consider poverty by itself to 

be a risk factor, including in Afghanistan, a correlation 

between unemployment and radicalization has been 

observed in a number of contexts.27 A 2018 World Bank 

statistical analysis of nearly four thousand foreign recruits into ISIS found that “individual-level socioeconomic conditions drive participation in violent extremism.”28

Social capital. A strong social network has been highlighted as playing an important role in the resilience or 

vulnerability to radicalization in certain contexts.29 Where 

avenues for social connections with the nonviolent 

extremist community are limited, affiliation with violent 

extremist groups may fill the gap. Research on youth 

recruitment into the Taliban notes that much of it takes 

place in rural areas and among relatively poor young 
USIP.ORG 7

people with lower levels of education.30 This may indicate 

a relationship between recruitment and lack of access to 

an alternative social network, or it may reflect the fact that 

the Taliban remain a predominantly rural phenomenon.

Ideological attraction. Research that has examined the 

general population’s motivations to work with violent extremist groups in Afghanistan finds that sympathy for the 

ideological causes prominent in the narratives of these 

groups is generally weak.31 A desire for security and some 

means of dispute resolution in the context of a weak national government is often the leading motivation.

STUDY METHODS

To ascertain whether displaced persons in conflictaffected areas are more vulnerable to recruitment to 

violent extremism than nondisplaced persons, the study 

asked respondents directly whether they had sympathy 

for the Taliban or felt that the use of violence toward 

civilians is justified. This approach, however, is subject to 

the usual fallibilities of self-reporting, particularly given 

the sensitivity of the subject. Another way is to examine 

the socioeconomic factors that have been suggested in 

the literature to lead to vulnerability to radicalization.

The study therefore included a survey and structured 

interviews based on factors identified in the literature 

as potentially correlated with radicalization. A total of 

1,405 respondents from eight provinces completed 

the survey, which provided the quantitative data. Of 

this number, 104 respondents were selected to be 

interviewed by personnel trained in interview methods 

and cognizant of and sensitive to local conditions and 

cultures.32 The qualitative data from the interviews 

complemented the survey data by exploring the specific experiences and perceptions of individual respondents. Interviews were carried out over a nine-month 

period (March to November) in 2018.

Eight provinces with relatively high numbers of displaced 

people, differing ethnic group composition, and located 

in different parts of the country were selected for inclusion in the study—Balkh, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabul, 

Kandahar, Kunduz, and Nangarhar.33 Three individual 

sites within each province were selected to capture 

both urban and rural living environments. Roughly equal 

numbers of IDP, returnee, and nondisplaced respondents were chosen at each site. Roughly sixty respondents were selected from each of these three groups, 

with small variations resulting from difficulty accessing 

returnees. Interviewees were identified by the researchers based on locations and using a “snowball” method 

whereby those approached could refer others.34 The 

total sample for each province averaged about 180 

respondents, for a total survey sample of 1,405.

Respondents were asked to self-identify as returnee, IDP, 

or nondisplaced. A small number of respondents in two 

provinces saw themselves as both returnees and IDPs 

in that they had returned to Afghanistan but remained 

displaced from their communities of origin. This sentiment was particularly strong in Herat, where the majority 

of returnees identified as both returnees and internally 

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

PAKISTAN

Nangarhar

Helmand

Kandahar

Kunduz

Kabul

Ghazni

Herat Kabul

Balkh

Survey and Interview Locations in Afghanistan

Adapted from artwork by Rainer Lesniewskiparunto/

Shutterstock
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

displaced. For the purposes of analysis, returnees who 

were also IDPs were counted as returnees. Additional 

details on the statistical methods are provided in the 

appendix and on the data platform created for this study.

REASONS FOR USING A MIXED 

METHODS APPROACH

In-depth qualitative work, such as interviewing, is 

needed to uncover motivations and to try to detect the 

presence of attitudes and experiences indicating a vulnerability to radicalization to violence. Quantitative information, such as that obtained by surveys, is needed 

to test whether there is statistical significance in between-group differences and to map or isolate certain 

factors attributable to different groups. Quantitative 

data can also be used to test multiple hypotheses at 

the same time—hypotheses that the qualitative data 

suggest may be of relevance—such as a possible 

correlation between lack of economic opportunities, 

grievances, or perceptions of injustice and contact with 

groups that promulgate the use of violence. If statistical analyses alone are used, such correlations may be 

missed. Further, the study used both quantitative and 

qualitative data to explore the perception of poverty or 

inequality as expressed by the respondents about their 

lives, which were found to differ from some of the more 

commonly used metrics of poverty and inequality, such 

as income levels or the value of household assets.

Mixed methods approaches, such as those used in 

this study, may be most appropriate but have not been 

commonly used in looking at radicalization because they 

are resource-intensive to carry out. In addition, the often 

limited sample and the highly subjective nature of the data 

collected may pose difficulties for the statistical analysis.

Another reason not to rely on either qualitative or quantitative data alone for this research is that participants (both 

interview and survey) tend to answer in ways that do not 

reveal attitudes or behaviors outside the norm, particularly when the interview touches on sensitive or taboo 

subjects. The mixed methods approach allowed for the 

triangulation of answers in the surveys and the interviews.

One weakness that plagues much research on radicalization, including this study, is that sympathy toward 

violent extremist groups expressed by interviewees is 

often used as a proxy for willingness to join such groups 

or to commit acts of violence on their behalf. This arises 

from the belief that interviewees are less likely to answer 

truthfully if they are asked whether they would join or 

have joined violent extremist groups and their use of 

violence than when asked about their “sympathy” for 

violent extremist groups. This issue was addressed in 

this study by asking more pointed questions about the 

circumstances in which respondents would approve the 

use of violence against civilians, rather than just questions about whether they “sympathized” with violent extremist groups. However, the relation between “radicalization” expressed as sympathizing with a group’s aims 

or methods and actually committing violent acts is not 

linear or clear, and that applies to this research study.35
USIP.ORG 9

Findings

Research for this study looked at those factors that have 

been identified in the literature or commentary as being 

related to radicalization and mobilization to violence. 

The study compared the degree to which these factors 

were present in displaced versus nondisplaced groups 

to determine if any significant differences existed that 

would render displaced persons more vulnerable to radicalization. The study also compared displaced groups 

and nondisplaced groups for self-expressed sympathy 

for the use of violence against citizens and sympathy 

for the Taliban. Finally, models were created to identify 

which factors were highly correlated with sympathy, and 

whether these differed between displaced and nondisplaced groups. Looking specifically at resiliency, factors 

were identified that were strongly correlated with a 

lack of sympathy for violence against civilians or toward 

the Taliban, even in the presence of factors that have 

been commonly identified in news commentary or the 

literature as vulnerabilities. Identifying clearly both the 

vulnerabilities and resiliency factors of displaced groups 

can assist in the development of more efficacious policy 

and programmatic support. 

DEMOGRAPHIC AND 

SOCIOECONOMIC DIFFERENCES

The first set of factors examined included demographic and socioeconomic indicators such as educational 

attainment, level of income, and employment.

Education

Returnees, IDPs, and nondisplaced individuals exhibited 

stark differences in educational levels achieved. Overall, 

displaced persons had lower levels of education, with 

returnees in particular faring poorly.36 In Nangarhar, 66 

An internally displaced Afghan man walks through a refugee camp in Herat Province in October 2018. (Photo by Mohammad Ismail/Reuters)
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

percent of returnees reported that they had never gone 

to school (the highest proportion in the survey), compared 

with 59 percent of IDPs and only 35 percent of host 

respondents. Provinces in which this pattern was different 

included Ghazni, where IDPs were more likely to have 

had at least some education compared to host communities, and Herat, the only province where returnees were 

more likely to have had at least some education compared with host and IDP populations, a factor attributable 

to the access to education these particular refugees had 

while they were refugees in neighboring Iran.

The findings across all provinces reveal that the majority of respondents (across all groups) had never gone 

to school or were not attending school at the time of 

the survey. The figure was highest in Nangarhar, with 

52 percent of all respondents reporting having never 

gone to school, followed by Balkh and Kunduz. Despite 

a relatively high number of respondents in Ghazni reporting having completed some form of schooling, this 

province had the lowest average incomes, indicating 

that educational attainment did not necessarily lead to 

higher income-earning opportunities.

The reasons respondents gave for terminating their education also varied across provinces. Balkh, Helmand, 

and Ghazni were the provinces where the greatest 

proportion of respondents stated they had terminated 

their education because of conflict and disruption. In 

other provinces, the need to work or the lack of money 

to pay for an education were more important reasons.

Educational outcomes also have a generational aspect 

to them; the data show that lower educational attainment 

was linked to older respondents. Among those aged 

nineteen and younger (in the survey, this group included 

respondents aged sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, or nineteen years) and those aged twenty to twenty-nine years 

there were significantly fewer respondents who had not 

had any education compared with older age groups. 

Reasons for terminating education, while not differing 

greatly between different displaced groups, did show 

significant differences between generations. Among 

the oldest age cohort surveyed, those aged fifty to 

fifty-nine years, conflict and disruption were the most 

significant reasons, as also held true for respondents 

in the next oldest age cohort, those aged forty to 

forty-nine years. This generational distinction suggests 

that as time went on, conflict and disruption became 

less of a barrier to completing an education.

Income and Livelihood

IDPs had slightly lower incomes than returnee and host 

respondents. There were also other between-group differences that rendered IDPs worse off in terms of income.

For example, IDPs had the same median monthly income 

as returnees in the survey (6,000 Afs, or $76), while host 

median income was reported at 7,000 Afs ($88). While 

mean monthly incomes were similar for returnees and 

IDPs (7,300 Afs, or $92, for IDPs compared with 7,400 Afs, 

or $93, for returnees), both were significantly lower than 

the mean monthly income of host respondents (8,500 

Afs, or $107). Nondisplaced individuals also had higher 

wages at the lower limits than did IDPs or returnees. A

few returnees reported significantly higher incomes than 

other respondents, possibly reflecting income-earning 

opportunities while they were outside the country. 

When asked their income levels, IDPs and nondisplaced persons were more likely to report that they 

had zero income coming into the household. Returnees 

were least likely to report having no income.

Returnees also tended to be more self-reliant: they were 

least likely to rely on other family members and most likely to rely only on their own jobs or livelihoods as a source 

of income. This finding may indicate a breakdown in 

social connections or a decline in social capital among returnees. Twice as many returnee respondents (17 percent) 

as host respondents (8 percent) and IDPs (10 percent) 

said they found it very difficult to make ends meet. Some 
USIP.ORG 11

IDPs had become accustomed to identifying new ways of 

earning an income because of the multiple displacements 

they had faced. For example, in Kandahar, IDPs from 

Panjwayi and Zhari districts have been displaced more 

than ten times over the course of the past eighteen years. 

They have adapted to an unsettled way of life and to 

constantly looking for ways to generate income. 

Income by province. Incomes varied considerably across 

provinces. Respondents in Balkh had the lowest average 

monthly income (6,197.74 Afs, or $82.21) and by far the 

narrowest range between the lowest and the highest 

income reported. The difference in mean incomes across 

all groups in Balkh compared with the province with 

the highest mean income, Kandahar, was large: mean 

incomes in Kandahar were nearly double those in Balkh.

Livelihoods. Among those employed in some kind 

of work, IDPs and returnees reported more insecurity 

in their livelihoods and sources of income than host 

community respondents. IDPs were most likely to be day 

laborers than to work in any other occupation and more 

likely than other groups to do so. Host respondents 

were more than three times as likely as returnees and 

a little more than twice as likely as IDPs to hold salaried 

government official employment (such as a health care 

worker or teacher). All three groups were as likely to be 

shopkeepers or small traders; returnees were the group 

most likely to be street vendors—that is, to lack a permanent physical structure from which to sell their goods. 

Host community respondents were twice as likely as 

IDPs to farm or tend livestock, but not significantly more 

likely than returnees. All three groups were equally likely 

to be employed by a nongovernmental organization.

Host respondents were slightly more likely than IDPs to 

be long-term unemployed. Returnee long-term unemployment was significantly lower than that of either 

hosts or IDPs. Short-term unemployment rates were 

highest among IDPs and lowest among returnees. 

These findings are interesting as they give us insights 

into the access to opportunities, attitudes, resiliency, 

and possession of assets by the three groups, and 

show some important differences between them.

Children per household. The average number of 

children in the household of each respondent was 4.1, 

with Ghazni, Kabul, and Kunduz having above-average 

numbers and Helmand and Herat having below-average numbers. Returnees across all provinces except 

Herat and Kunduz had a higher number of children per 

respondent than did IDPs and host community respondents. Across all eight provinces surveyed, returnees 

had more children per respondent than did IDPs, who 

had more children than host community members. 

This difference is important, as higher fertility rates 

may indicate greater vulnerability to poverty, violence, 

insecurity, and lack of access to health services. 

Higher fertility rates may also make returnee and IDP 

households vulnerable to resource scarcity within the 

household, as household income must spread to cover 

more people. Ghazni had the greatest range in number of children per respondent and Kandahar had the 

narrowest range but some outliers: a few respondents 

had more children than the average range.

Length of time in current location. The data were sorted 

to look at how long respondents had been displaced: 

for returnees, how long since they had returned to 

Afghanistan, and for IDPs, how long they had been in 

their current place of displacement. The objective was 

to see whether the length of time spent in displacement 

(for IDPs) or the timing of displacement (for both IDPs and 

returnees) would have an impact on other variables. The 

data revealed some subtle differences in the length of 

time IDPs or returnees had been in their current locations. 

While longer-term resettlement (since their return from 

host countries) was more likely the case with returnee 

respondents (68 percent of the returnees surveyed 

reported they had been in their current locations in 

Afghanistan for five years or more, compared with 54 percent of IDPs), and medium-term resettlement rates (24.5 

percent of returnees and 26 percent of IDPs had arrived 
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

at their current location in the previous year) were similar 

for the two groups, the pattern was different for more recent movements. Close to three times as many IDPs had 

relocated in the previous six months as had returnees. 

Across all the provinces surveyed, internal displacement 

is a newer and ongoing phenomenon compared with the 

return of refugees who had left the country.

The length of time spent in the current location of 

displacement, however, varied considerably across 

provinces. More than 80 percent of returnees in Ghazni, 

Helmand, and Kandahar had been settled in the province for more than five years. The majority of IDPs in 

Kandahar and Helmand had also been settled in the 

province for five years or more. Kunduz showed recent 

movements of both IDPs and returnees, while Balkh, 

Herat, Kabul, and Kunduz showed recent movements 

of IDPs. Interestingly, Kunduz also had the lowest levels 

of basic education completion of any of the provinces 

surveyed, with 67 percent of IDPs and 48 percent of 

returnees having never gone to school. Kunduz also had 

the second-highest number of children in the household.

A significant correlation was the percentage of returnees 

who had returned to the country more than five years 

prior to this study (a much smaller percentage of protracted IDPs had done so) and the majority percentage of 

respondents in Helmand who replied that they did not find 

the Taliban to be “significantly difficult” or “very difficult” 

in their lives (almost twice the number of IDPs and almost 

three times the number of displaced respondents who 

responded that way). This reinforces interview data and 

anecdotal observations about the radicalization of older 

returnee groups that had spent time in Pakistan. What is 

not clear is whether sympathy for the Taliban developed 

before people left the country, during their displacement 

as refugees, or upon their return to Afghanistan and 

whether it is correlated with another variable that has not 

been included, or identified, in this study. Another finding 

that may provide some clues is that in provinces where 

there was a greater percentage of more recent returnees 

(e.g., Balkh and Kabul) returnees responded very similarly 

to IDPs and host respondents when asked whether the 

Taliban posed a significant difficulty in their lives. This 

raises the question of whether protracted displacement 

and/or the multiple displacements that returnees often 

experience play a key role in radicalization.

EXPERIENCE OF HARDSHIP

Survey respondents were asked about the “hardships” 

they experienced in their lives and the degree to which 

they experienced them. Perceptions of hardship are subjective interpretations of respondents’ own lives. While 

studies often use quantitative socioeconomic metrics 

such as income to gauge the degree of hardship faced, 

respondents’ own perceptions of their lives, regardless 

of the quantitative metrics, tell us more about how they 

had experienced their socioeconomic situations; such 

data can also provide insights into their attitudes and 

beliefs and their resiliency in challenging situations.

Factor analysis of the multiple-choice questions regarding sources of hardship faced by respondents was 

used to determine which variables, if any, are related to 

each other. These responses were clustered into two 

groups: hardship caused by exposure to violence and 

hardship arising from material conditions (see table 1).

There was little difference among IDP, returnee, and host 

populations with regard to exposure to violence, but 

definite differences were reported in material conditions 

as sources of hardship, with IDPs and returnees reporting greater difficulties than hosts. Of the three groups, 

returnees reported the greatest experience of hardship 

related to material conditions, followed closely by IDPs.

There were some standout findings when individual 

factors were scrutinized. Returnees reported significantly 

more difficulty in accessing services such as health care 

and education than did host or IDP respondents. One 

quarter of returnees reported that accessing services 

was very difficult, and close to 50 percent reported that 

accessing services was very or significantly difficult. By 

contrast, 28 percent of host community respondents 
USIP.ORG 13

and 39 percent of IDPs reported that accessing services 

was very or significantly difficult. Across the five hardship 

issues, access to services presented the greatest difficulty for all three groups; interestingly, despite being the 

greatest challenge for each of the groups, the challenges in accessing services showed the greatest variance 

across the three groups, with returnees reporting the 

greatest levels of hardship compared with IDPs and 

nondisplaced persons. Returnees may find it difficult to 

navigate access to services, and when they do succeed, 

they may find that the services are not of the same quality as they received in their host countries.

Respondents reported that harassment and the political situation created fewer challenges. Surveyors 

asked respondents to rate to what extent harassment 

or bribe solicitation by police, local leaders, or officials 

caused them difficulty. There was a small difference 

among the three groups: IDPs and returnees reported 

they had experienced more difficulty than host community members reported.

The degree of hardship experienced due to the prevailing political situation was reported to be very similar 

across the three groups. The only difference was that 

fewer IDPs reported that the political situation was “not 

difficult at all,” but the responses “not difficult at all” and 

“a little difficult” when aggregated were the same across 

all groups. The probable reason for this finding is that 

all the groups have been treated the same way by the 

political elites, regardless of whether they are displaced 

or not. Qualitative interviews revealed that regardless of 

ethnicity, or whether respondents had been displaced or 

not, or whether they showed more sympathy or antipathy 

toward the government, respondents felt there was little 

good about the current political situation.

Feelings of Exclusion

Returnees in each province except Kandahar reported 

greater feelings of exclusion than did IDPs. These findings align with anecdotal observations of feelings of exclusion experienced by displaced groups, particularly 

Box 1. 

PERCEIVED 

SOURCES OF 

HARDSHIP

Factor Group 1:

EXPOSURE TO VIOLENCE 

Exposure to terrorism

Exposure to crime

Political situation

Challenges caused by Taliban

Factor Group 2: 

MATERIAL CONDITIONS

Poor housing conditions

Poor or no income or work

Harassment or requests for bribes from 

police, local leaders, or officials

Difficulty accessing government services, 

such as education and health care

Worries about the future
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

returnees, who may not have the same social support 

networks as IDPs do, depending on their place of displacement. The difference between returnees and host 

and IDP groups was most pronounced in Kunduz and 

Ghazni, where returnees reported that their experience 

of feeling excluded was “very difficult” or “significantly 

difficult.” In Kunduz, by contrast, all six returnees interviewed said that IDPs were the most “marginalized” 

and “excluded.” A twenty-seven-year-old Pashtun IDP, 

an unemployed resident of Kunduz with a madrassa 

education, captured the overt differencing he felt:

The host community has never considered us one of their 

own. . . . They don’t allow their children to play with our 

children because they consider IDPs strangers. . . . They 

[the nondisplaced] always argue with us over small conflicts. Clearly, they don’t want us to live beside them.

Across all provinces, displaced groups felt greater social 

exclusion than host respondents. In Kandahar, which 

has a central role in the history of the ruling elite, host 

respondents reported no feelings of social exclusion.

The interviews also captured the link between displacement, social exclusion, and access to social capital and 

the impacts those factors had on individuals’ sense of 

grievance toward the state (or toward the Taliban, in 

some cases). A thirty-five-year-old Pashtun IDP residing 

in Loya Wiala, Kandahar, recounted this story

A member of my extended family was a victim of a robbery—criminals attacked him, beating him, and robbed 

money from his small business. Without local connections 

(he is an IDP), he was not able to get help from the police 

to complain. He also thought he was a victim because he 

was perceived as defenseless.

Feelings of Political Violence

Across all provinces, IDP, returnee, and nondisplaced 

respondents gave similar responses when asked whether 

exposure to political violence constituted a significant difficulty for them. Political violence was defined in the survey 

as violence committed by the Taliban, ISIS, the Afghan 

Local Police, or government forces that was not strictly 

criminal in nature; it did not, for example, include tribal 

land dispute violence. Political violence associated with 

the elections also was not captured in the data set, as the 

survey and interviews took place in early to mid-2018.

Kunduz was the province where respondents in all three 

groups reported the greatest levels of difficulty, with 

around 50 percent of all respondents reporting that 

political violence posed very difficult (the most extreme 

category of difficulty) or significantly difficult conditions 

for them in their everyday lives. The lowest levels were 

reported in Ghazni. Across all provinces, however, both 

returnees and IDPs reported more difficulty from political 

violence than did nondisplaced persons.

ATTITUDES TOWARD VIOLENT 

EXTREMIST GROUPS

A central question the study looked at was whether 

the different groups held different attitudes toward the 

Taliban and other armed nonstate groups, and toward 

the use of violence more generally. The question explored earlier—whether respondents felt that the Taliban 

constituted a difficulty in their lives—gives insights not 

only into objective hardships experienced but also subjective perceptions of the legitimacy of the Taliban and 

whether they conferred benefits on respondents’ lives. 

The survey presented a multiple-choice question—What 

kind of people are the Taliban?—to gauge the level of 

positive perceptions of the Taliban.

In addition, to determine attitudes toward the Taliban, 

the survey asked what respondents thought of other armed nonstate groups (such as, for example, the 

Islamic State’s Khorasan branch) and what a respondent would do if he or she knew that someone close to 

them was going to join such a group. This last question 

is a little more complex as an indicator of individual vulnerability to radicalization, but it does elicit a potential 

resiliency factor related to the willingness and capacity 

of social networks to intervene in the recruitment and 

radicalization process.
USIP.ORG 15

Further, to explore general attitudes toward the use of 

violence and to frame the question about the legitimacy of violence in a way that was not specifically 

connected to the Taliban, the survey asked respondents whether violence against civilians was justified 

in defense of one’s religion, whether violence against 

civilians was justified in defense of one’s ethnic group, 

and whether violence against civilians was justified to 

retaliate for actions against one’s group.

Perceptions of the Taliban

To explore whether displaced populations are more 

likely to sympathize with the Taliban and other armed 

groups than host populations, the survey asked 

respondents, “What Kind of People Are the Taliban?” 

Multiple choice responses ranged from “very bad” to 

“very good” people (see figure 1). The responses were 

subsequently sorted and analyzed on a yes/no binary.

Across all groups the findings were highly differentiated 

by province, with interprovincial differences more striking 

than differences among the three groups. The lowest level 

of sympathy for the Taliban was recorded in Balkh, where 

only 10 percent of all respondents stated that they thought 

the Taliban were good people, followed by Nangarhar. (It 

is worth noting that Balkh has a large population of ethnic 

Uzbeks and Tajik, while Nangarhar has historically had a 

smaller Taliban presence than Kandahar or Helmand.) The 

highest level of support was found in Kandahar, where 

over two-thirds of respondents stating that they thought 

the Taliban were good people. In Helmand, sympathy was 

reported by around 50 percent of respondents, with the 

remaining provinces all recording less than 50 percent.37

Responses by Village or Site

The data showed significant within-province variation in positive perceptions of the Taliban or levels of 

sympathy for them. For example, respondents from 

Greshk and Mukhtar Camp in Helmand showed far 

greater sympathy toward the Taliban than did those 

from Safiyan, also in Helmand. One of the sites in 

Herat, Jebrael, had the sixth-fewest responses that 

the Taliban are good people, while respondents from 

another site in Herat, Tourghondi, had the sixth-most 

responses that the Taliban are good people.

On the other hand, sympathy for the Taliban was occasionally consistent across locations in some provinces. 

For example, the three locations assessed in Ghazni 

all exhibited similar attitudes toward the Taliban. The 

Figure 1. Responses to the Survey Question, “What Kind of People Are the Taliban?”

Of the 1,405 survey respondents, nearly 35 percent said that the Taliban were “very good” or “somewhat good.”

 Very good Somewhat good Somewhat bad Very bad Other

HOST

IDP

RETURNEE
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

6.2% Other reason

0.5% They provide education

2.0% You believe in Jihad and this the right time

6.7% They are keeping our country true to Islam

6.9% They are true Muslim

8.1% You like their ideology

8.9% They provide protection

18.0% Economic opportunity

local area with the greatest positive perception of the 

Taliban among both displaced and host respondents 

was the Loy Wiala and Mirwais Mena neighborhoods in 

Kandahar city.

Responses by Displaced versus 

Nondisplaced Persons

Overall, some differences were noted between displaced 

and nondisplaced respondents in their degree of sympathy for (or positive perception of) the Taliban, but the 

degree of difference was highly dependent on the province (or site). In Helmand, 75 percent of returnees said the 

Taliban were good people, compared to only 27 percent 

of host community respondents. By contrast, in Kandahar, 

the province with the greatest sympathy for the Taliban 

across all groups, host community respondents were only 

slightly more likely than either returnees or IDPs to say 

that the Taliban were good people.

Reasons for Expressing Sympathy for the Taliban

Respondents cited both ideological and material or 

grievance-based reasons in the qualitative interviews for 

supporting the Taliban. Ideological reasons were most 

commonly associated with returnees. One forty-fiveyear-old journalist in Ghazni recounted this episode:

Returnees from Pakistan usually hold extreme views. 

They mostly have studied in Pakistani madrassas. These 

returnees beat those who oppose their ideas. For example, 

about three months ago, the imam was preaching after the 

prayer. During his speech, the mullah said that Islam permits 

women to work. Then Niaz Mohammad, a returnee from 

Pakistan, stood up and accused the mullah of infidelity and 

Figure 2. Respondentsʼ Reasons for Considering the Taliban “Good”

Of the survey respondents who said the Taliban were “very good” or “somewhat good,” the reason cited most often 

was that the Taliban provide justice and resolve conflicts.

42.7%

of respondents

said the Taliban provide

justice/conflict resolution
USIP.ORG 17

being a foreign spy. Niaz Mohammad and a couple of other 

returnees were about to beat the mullah. They forced the 

mullah to apologize in the next prayer and announce that 

Islam does not permit women to work outside the home.

Economic reasons were also compelling. One unemployed IDP in Torghundi, a twenty-five-year-old university graduate, said that “unemployment is the main 

reason why many join extremist groups” and that he 

personally had “heard many stories about a youth who 

has joined the Taliban in Torghundi because of unemployment and financial problems.”

Between-Group Differences in Reasons 

for Sympathy for the Taliban

The view that returnees, who are commonly believed 

to be more extreme in their views, have stronger 

ideological reasons for sympathizing with the Taliban 

was not corroborated by the quantitative data, which 

revealed that only a slightly greater percentage of 

returnees held ideological reasons for sympathy for the 

Taliban than did nondisplaced respondents and IDPs. 

When the answers “You like their ideology,” “You believe in jihad and now is the right time,” “They are true 

Muslims,” and “They keep our country true to Islam” are 

aggregated, the following percentages of respondents 

expressed ideological reasons for holding a positive 

view of the Taliban: 20.6 percent of IDPs, 24.6 percent 

of nondisplaced persons, and 26 percent of returnees.

The most common reason for thinking that the Taliban 

were good people was that they provide justice and 

conflict resolution: more than twice as many respondents chose this answer as chose the next most popular 

reason—for economic opportunity (see figure 2). This 

finding was consistent across all three groups. IDPs and 

returnees may be in particular need of assistance with 

dispute resolution because of the disruption to community and social networks and the need for trusted sources 

to assist in managing conflicts and disputes. A twentyfive-year-old IDP, a university student in Ghazni, pointed 

to the preference of many for a sharia-based system to 

settle disputes:

When there are disputes among people, like land disputes 

or someone did something to a family member . . . [the] 

Taliban step in and try to resolve it as soon as possible. 

This is how people sometimes prefer their court and 

justice system; mostly because they think it is based on 

Islamic jurisprudence and they believe [the] Taliban make 

just decisions. After [the case is resolved] they become 

loyal to them and absolutely sympathize with them whenever Afghan national forces attack them.

As well, practical concerns such as protection and security were almost twice as important to both IDPs and 

returnees than to host community respondents, which 

likely lent strength to their sympathy for the Taliban. 

One host community respondent, a forty-five-year-old 

journalist in Pashtunabad, pointed out other practical 

benefits of supporting the Taliban:

A good number of IDPs want to return to their permanent 

residences, and they have kept connections and support 

the Taliban so they can get access to their farm land once 

they return to their homes. On top of that, even people on 

the district council pay taxes to the Taliban because they 

are scared of target killings; therefore, sympathy for the 

armed groups [exists] among government officials as well.

Attitudes toward Recruitment by the Taliban

When respondents were asked what they would do if 

someone close to them tried to join the Taliban, across 

all provinces it was host community respondents who 

were most likely to report that they would support the decision, followed by returnees, and last IDPs. However, the 

between-group differences amounted to just a couple of 

percentage points. When the responses “I would support 

their decision” and “I would do nothing” are aggregated, 

more returnees than either host community respondents 

or IDPs chose those responses, but the difference was 

only a few percentage points. Returnees were also most 

likely to seek help in their community but least likely to 

try themselves to talk the person out of joining.
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

The data revealed marked differences among the provinces between displaced and nondisplaced groups. In 

Ghazni, a similar percentage of returnee (16 percent) 

and host respondents (19 percent) answered that they 

would support the decision, while not a single IDP did 

so. In Herat, three times as many returnees responded 

that they would support the decision than IDP respondents, but only a few more than host community respondents. In Kandahar, host community respondents 

had the highest level of support for, or indifference to 

stopping, potential recruits, followed by returnees, with 

IDPs indicating far less support. 

Perceptions of Other Armed Nonstate Groups

In addition to the Taliban, the survey explored respondents’ perceptions of other armed nonstate groups, in 

particular the Islamic State’s Khorasan branch (IS-K) and 

the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). The findings 

were very different from those regarding perceptions 

of the Taliban and provide insights into provincial and 

group differences. Overwhelmingly, for all groups across 

all provinces (with one exception), respondents said 

that other armed nonstate groups were “very bad.” 

Returnees were the group with the greatest (but still very 

limited) sympathy: in all provinces where some respondents reported they felt that armed groups were “somewhat good” or “very good,” it was returnees who had the 

greatest percentage of sympathizers. In Kandahar, host 

community respondents exhibited the greatest ambivalence, with nearly three quarters stating that the armed 

groups were “somewhat bad” rather than “very bad,” 

versus almost 50 percent of returnee respondents and 

fewer than 25 percent of IDP respondents.

Conflict resolution was most frequently mentioned as 

the reason why respondents sympathized with other

armed nonstate groups. Other reasons related to 

defense of religion, such as “They are keeping our 

country true to Islam” or “Their ideology is the right one” 

or “[They are] true Muslims.” A small number of respondents (in Nangarhar) noted that the IS-K and IMU provided guidance and purpose in life. Economic opportunity 

was rarely cited as a reason for sympathizing with other 

armed nonstate groups, whereas it was quite frequently 

cited as a reason for sympathizing with the Taliban.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE USE OF 

VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS

The survey explored attitudes toward the use of violence 

against civilians to achieve particular ends. Three questions were asked: (1) whether violence against civilians 

was justified to defend one’s religion, (2) whether violence 

against civilians was justified to defend one’s ethnic group, 

and (3) whether violence against civilians was justified as 

retaliation for violence that had been committed against 

the respondent or the respondent’s group. (See figure 3.)

Use of Violence to Defend One’s Religion

In Balkh, all groups—IDPs, hosts, and returnees—

answered overwhelmingly that violence was “never” 

or “rarely” justified in defense of one’s religion. Yet in 

Kandahar, Kunduz, and Herat, all groups responded overwhelmingly that violence was “sometimes” or “always” 

justified in defense of one’s religion. Differences between 

displaced and nondisplaced groups were marked in some 

provinces but not in others. In Balkh, returnees were more 

likely than both IDPs and host community members to 

say that violence was rarely justified. In Ghazni, however, 

they were more likely than both IDPs and host community 

members to say that violence was “always” justified.

Use of Violence to Defend One’s Ethnic Group

There were far more “never” answers by all groups to the 

question of whether the use of violence to defend one’s 

ethnic group was ever justified. Nangarhar, Ghazni, and 

Balkh had the highest percentages of “never” responses 

across all groups. “Always” was a significant response 

(more than 5 percent of all responses) only in Balkh, Herat, 

and Kunduz Provinces. Kunduz yielded the greatest percentage of “always” and “sometimes” answers, and this 

finding was consistent among hosts, IDPs, and returnees. 

A comparison of displaced with nondisplaced groups 

showed little within-province variance in responses other 

than in Helmand, where 3 percent of IDPs responded 
Figure 3. Attitudes toward the Use of Violence against Civilians

Helmand

Herat

Kunduz

Herat

Kunduz

Helmand

Herat

Kandahar

Kunduz

Balkh

Ghazni

Kabul

Nangarhar

IS VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS JUSTIFIED TO

DEFEND ONE’S ETHNIC GROUP?

IS VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS JUSTIFIED TO

RETALIATE FOR VIOLENCE COMMITTED AGAINST YOU OR YOUR GROUP?

IS VIOLENCE AGAINST CIVILIANS JUSTIFIED TO

DEFEND ONE’S RELIGION?

 Never Rarely Not sure Sometimes Always

Balkh

Ghazni

Helmand

Kabul

Kandahar

Nangarhar

Balkh

Ghazni

Kabul

Kandahar

Nangarhar

Each bar represents 100% of the responses for each province. The larger rectangles represent the distribution of responses for all respondents in the eight provinces.
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

“never,” while more than 50 percent of host community respondents chose that response. In Balkh, returnees were 

half as likely as both host community respondents and 

IDPs to respond to this question with “always” or “never.”

Use of Violence to Retaliate against 

Another Group for a Wrongdoing

There was far less support for the use of violence in 

retaliation for another group’s perceived wrongdoing 

than there was for the use of violence to defend one’s 

religion or ethnic group, illustrating that there is a calibrated sense of the legitimate use of violence, and, as 

a means of retaliation, it is questionable. Despite strong 

cultural norms of badal or “revenge,” being prevalent in 

some provinces there were significant between-province differences, even in provinces where Pashtuns are 

the majority ethnic group. Across all groups, respondents in Kunduz were most likely to say that violence 

against civilians was “always” justified. In Kandahar, the 

majority of respondents across all groups replied “not 

sure.” IDPs in Ghazni, returnees in Balkh and Kabul, 

and host respondents in Helmand most often reported 

“never.” No clear pattern emerged of any one group 

more likely to justify the use of violence against another 

group in retaliation for perceived wrongdoing.

VULNERABILITY TO RECRUITMENT 

TO THE TALIBAN

To gauge how vulnerable different groups were to 

recruitment, respondents were asked whether they 

had ever personally been approached by the Taliban 

for recruitment. The question is a sensitive one, so the 

responses likely underreported the actual number of 

respondents who had been approached.

IDPs were more likely overall than returnees and hosts to 

have been approached for recruitment into the Taliban 

across all provinces, except in Ghazni, where not a single 

IDP respondent (and only one returnee respondent, or 

2 percent) reported having been approached for recruitment, compared with 13 percent (eight individuals) of host 

community respondents. The greatest variance between 

displaced and nondisplaced respondents was registered 

in Kandahar, where close to 25 percent of all IDPs (twelve 

respondents) responded that they had been approached, 

but only 3 percent (one) of host community members and 

no returnees reported the same. Nangarhar had the highest number of respondents who reported that they had 

been approached: close to one-third of all IDPs (twenty 

respondents), but the figure fell to almost half for hosts, at 

17 percent (seven), and 26 percent (nineteen) for returnees. Balkh was the province with the lowest rates across 

all three groups, with approximately 5 percent of all IDPs, 

returnees, and nondisplaced respondents reporting they 

had been approached.

Qualitative data from the interviews support the notion 

that IDPs may be more likely to sympathize with or support 

the Taliban. The interviews revealed that many IDPs maintain strong links to family in their villages of origin. If these 

villages are in Taliban-controlled areas, it is very likely 

that the respondents will have a family member who is 

involved with the Taliban and that they too will be encouraged or coerced into supporting the Taliban. Economic 

incentives may also be at work. One interviewee, a twenty-three-year-old unemployed graduate living in Compani, 

Kabul, provided details on a typical arrangement:

Those who have returned from other places and displaced 

to our area have relationships with the Taliban and other 

armed groups, and they still keep their ties with the armed 

groups because they have family members and relatives 

among them. Suicide attackers and their people keep IEDs 

[improvised explosive devices] and other explosive devices in their houses or transport them so that they could 

later distribute them to the Taliban, or [they] keep their 

weapons or provide them safe havens.

PERCEPTIONS OF VULNERABILITY 

TO RADICALIZATION

Given the supposition, supported by some anecdotal 

information, that displaced groups are more likely to 

sympathize with and join the Taliban, the survey asked 

respondents, “In your opinion, who is most likely to join 

the Taliban or other armed nonstate groups?”
USIP.ORG 21

Unemployed individuals and madrassa students were 

consistently cited across all provinces and among all three 

survey groups as the top two kinds of people respondents 

felt were most likely to join the Taliban. IDPs and returnees 

were named as the third- and fourth-most likely groups to 

join. There were a few exceptions to this general pattern. 

In Kandahar, both returnees and hosts reported that IDPs 

were most likely (more so than madrassa students) to 

sympathize with or join the Taliban, while IDPs in Kandahar 

felt that madrassa students were twice as likely as IDPs to 

join militant groups. Balkh and Helmand Provinces registered a significant percentage of “other” responses, with 

“illiterate people” and returnees from Pakistan being the 

most common “other” groups cited in Balkh. In six of eight 

provinces, approximately the same number of returnee 

respondents as host respondents and IDPs reported 

that returnees as a group were likely to join the Taliban. 

However, in Kunduz, twice as many IDP respondents said 

returnees as a group were likely to join the Taliban, and 

in Helmand, 12 percent of host respondents said that 

returnees were likely to join the Taliban, whereas IDPs 

and returnees selected that response at less than half that 

frequency. IDPs were far less likely to report that IDPs as 

a group were likely to join the Taliban, with more hosts 

and returnees in six provinces registering that opinion at a 

higher response rate than IDPs themselves did.

Returnees and IDPs are often perceived as more vulnerable to radicalization. One of the common themes that 

came up in interviews with all three groups was the role 

of “foreign countries” and “foreign interference” in leading to radicalization, both in terms of foreign interference 

and foreign presence as a motivation factor for those 

who become radicalized in Afghanistan and in terms 

of the influence of madrassas and other elements in 

Pakistan funded by foreign entities that intentionally radicalize. A twenty-three-year-old returnee, an unemployed 

graduate living in Compani, Kabul, provided this insight:

Russia and Pakistan are involved in the area and they support the Taliban by providing them new weapons and even 

training, and financially they also help them so they can fight 

ISIS in Afghanistan. That is the main reason this war is not 

coming to an end. . . . And speaking of ISIS, it was created 

by the United States so they could excavate our intact 

mines secretly. Americans spent a lot of capital during this 

time and they want to [offset] it by extracting our minerals.

A countervailing view of Pakistan as the site of radicalization came from a thirty-year-old IDP and grade 

twelve graduate, now working as a laborer, who had 

lived in Pakistan. His narrative highlights that the reasons for leaving a host country can play a large role in 

how the returnee views the country and the government on return. The interviewee’s exasperation with his 

continued hardships are also apparent:

I believe living in Pakistan has no effect on being radicalized. 

Most refugees who were living in Pakistan were day laborers; they just worked to make some money for themselves 

and their families. I am so tired of this life! When I was in Iran, 

I worked a lot. I have tried to make some money, but I could 

not make any difference in my life! We lived for over thirty 

years in Pakistan. We heard a lot of bad things from them, 

and they humiliated us a lot. They would bully us and call 

us names like, “Hey, refugee, come here!” Now I am back, I 

cannot find jobs here with the government, and we need a 

lot of money to provide for the needs of our family. I work as 

a day laborer, but work is not available most of the time.

Another factor often cited as motivation for radicalization was a family member who had already joined the 

Taliban. That connection was expected to be exploited 

by the Taliban to gain more support, or the recruit himor herself would pressure family members into joining. 

Loss of control over children was one of the more 

unusual responses given in Helmand and points to the 

breakdown of familial relationships and social cohesion:

When a family becomes IDPs, their control over their 

children decreases. . . . This loss of control reaches a 

point where the teenager or young adult no longer listens 

to their parents or older family members. The moment a 

member of the family no longer feels afraid or thinks that 

the family can control him, he starts doing whatever he 

likes, from joining the Taliban [or other] criminal groups to 

[committing] robberies or joining the police.
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

EXPOSURE TO VIOLENT 

EXTREMIST MESSAGING

Across all the provinces surveyed, there was no significant difference in responses among IDPs, returnees, and host community members in the frequency 

of exposure to violent extremist messaging, whether 

from the Taliban or from ISIS. Taliban messaging is 

encountered far more frequently than ISIS messaging: 50 percent of respondents across all groups said 

that they received Taliban messaging hourly, daily, or 

weekly. Fewer than 10 percent reported that they were 

“never” exposed to Taliban messaging. With regard to 

ISIS messages, approximately 70 percent of all groups 

reported that they “never” or only “one time per year” 

had been exposed to messaging from ISIS.

At the provincial level, significant differences in exposure to violent extremist messaging appeared. 

Respondents in Balkh and Nangarhar reported 

the least exposure to Taliban messaging, while for 

ISIS messaging the lowest exposure was in Balkh, 

Helmand, and Herat provinces. Ghazni and Kunduz 

stood out as the provinces where respondents were 

most likely to encounter violent extremist messaging 

frequently, with more than 50 percent of respondents 

reporting hourly or daily exposure to violent extremist 

messaging from the Taliban. ISIS messaging was far 

less frequently received, with the greatest frequency of 

exposure in Ghazni, followed by Kabul, but well below 

the frequency of Taliban messaging.

The frequency of exposure to Taliban messaging did 

not follow a clear pattern across displaced groups 

or host respondents. Instead, provincial differences played a larger role in determining exposure. 

Returnees living in Kunduz were significantly more 

frequently exposed to Taliban messaging, followed by 

those living in Ghazni and Kabul. IDPs were significantly more likely to receive frequent Taliban messaging 

in Helmand than were host and returnee respondents, but only slightly more likely than returnees or 

nondisplaced respondents to receive such messaging 

in Balkh and Nangarhar.

Host respondents in Kabul were far more frequently 

exposed to ISIS messaging, and in Kunduz IDPs were 

somewhat more frequently exposed to messaging 

from ISIS than either returnees or host respondents. 

In Helmand, hosts reported that they never or only 

once per year received ISIS messaging, while among 

both displaced respondent groups (IDPs and returnees), close to 25 percent said they were exposed to 

ISIS messages either weekly or monthly. In Kandahar, 

returnees seem to be far less exposed to messaging 

than either IDPs or host respondents, who reported 

exposure to messaging with very similar frequency.

When messaging by the Taliban and messaging by ISIS 

are aggregated, respondents in Balkh had the least 

exposure to violent extremist messaging and respondents in Ghazni had the most, with close to 70 percent 

of all respondents reporting that they encountered 

messaging on a daily or weekly basis.

Social media are a common and growing channel for 

messaging by violent extremist groups. Many interviewees, particularly younger urban respondents, noted that 

it was hard to avoid such messaging because they used 

social media as their main source of information. Content 

disseminated by social media was also described as 

having a particularly virulent impact on viewers, though 

some questioned whether the posts and accompanying 

photographs were genuine. Facebook was mentioned 

specifically by many interviewees, with Viber, WhatsApp, 

and IMO mentioned less frequently. A couple of interviewees noted that social media had been used, along 

with mosque sermons, to entice local youth to join the 

war in Syria, which some did. Sermons, word of mouth, 

and social gatherings were more frequently cited by older respondents as ways in which the Taliban disseminated content, and respondents noted that these channels, 

especially religious gatherings, were used frequently.
USIP.ORG 23

Analysis

To answer the overarching question of whether displaced Afghans are more vulnerable to radicalization 

than nondisplaced Afghans, this study tested several 

socioeconomic and experiential factors identified in the 

literature as potentially leading to radicalization. The 

study then looked for factor associations, distilled from 

participants’ responses, suggestive of vulnerability or 

resilience to radicalization to violent extremism. To address vulnerability, the modeling sought to identify which 

variables may be associated with a favorable opinion 

of the Taliban (as a proxy indicator of radicalization) or 

with support for the use of violence against civilians (as a 

proxy indicator for mobilization to violence). The associations do not imply causality. Rather, they indicate strong 

odds that a specific variable or set of variables is present 

when a respondent expresses a favorable opinion about 

armed nonstate groups or the use of violence. 

Other than the finding on returnees who had reentered 

Afghanistan more than five years earlier, the analysis 

found no other associations between displaced groups 

specifically and sympathy for the Taliban. Instead, 

intergroup comparisons showed that all groups may be 

vulnerable to sympathy for the Taliban or support for 

the use of violence against citizens if their life experience includes certain conditions or hardships. Because 

displaced persons in some locales are more likely to 

have experienced these conditions or hardships than 

displaced persons in other locales or nondisplaced 

persons, they may be incorrectly thought to be at 

greater risk of mobilization to violence solely because 

of displacement. The findings show that, contrary to 

this common misperception, all three groups—returnees, IDPs, and hosts—across all provinces studied 

exhibited similar vulnerability to radicalization. 

An Afghan man sells vegetables in Kunduz, in May 2017, where residents had been displaced twice by Taliban assaults in just a little over a year, each 

time returning to damaged homes. (Photo by Najim Rahim/New York Times)
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

The following breakdown of factor associations considers first factors associated with vulnerability to mobilization to violent extremism, followed by factors associated with resilience to mobilization.

SYMPATHY FOR THE TALIBAN 

The factors most strongly correlated with sympathy for 

or a favorable opinion of the Taliban included being a 

resident of Kandahar, having little or no schooling, and 

frequent—hourly or daily—exposure to violent extremist 

messaging. Also, returnees who reentered Afghanistan 

more than five years before the time of the study were 

much more likely than recent returnees to express 

sympathy toward the Taliban. There was no association 

between the length of time IDPs had spent in displacement and sympathy for the Taliban. 

Perceptions that local powerbrokers or nonstate 

militias were helpful in everyday life were associated 

with a more sympathetic attitude toward the Taliban. 

Respondents who noted that the availability of government-provided services such as schooling or health 

care was important to them in deciding whether or not 

to join armed nonstate groups were less likely to join 

than those who answered that the availability of government services did not influence their decision. 

ACCEPTABILITY OF USING VIOLENCE 

(PROXY FOR MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE)

To determine what factors might correlate with a response 

indicating a vulnerability to mobilization to violence, the 

survey and interview questions asked specifically whether it was permissible to use violence, including violence 

against civilians, to defend one’s religion, to defend one’s 

ethnic group, or in retaliation for perceived wrongdoings. 

Factor associations included level of education, locale, 

exposure to violent extremist messaging, and grievances 

against Afghanistan’s official government. Use of violence 

toward civilians in the defense of religion was most strongly supported, with notably high support in some provinces.

To defend one’s religion. The factors most strongly 

correlated with support for the use of violence to defend 

one’s religion included residence in Helmand, Kandahar, 

or Kunduz provinces and having only a primary school 

education. Frequent exposure (hourly or daily) to violent 

extremist messaging also showed a very strong correlation, especially in Kandahar and Kunduz. 

The answer “not at all” to the question of whether the 

availability of government-provided services would play 

a role in the decision to join armed nonstate groups was 

also associated with justifying the use of violence against 

civilians in defense of religion. This may indicate that 

religious concerns are conditioning responses, separate 

from concerns about material conditions or hardships.

Having a grievance against the government was associated with agreeing that the use of violence against civilians 

to defend one’s religion is justified. This association indicates that grievances may be subjective interpretations of 

a material situation that are guided by other, intersecting 

factors. For example, the most commonly cited grievance 

against the government was corruption. The lack of services was perceived to be an artifact of corruption rather 

than an isolated complaint, and the corruption is what 

seems to provoke a stronger reaction from respondents 

than the lack of services in and of itself.

In retaliation for perceived wrongdoings. The use of 

violence to retaliate for perceived wrongdoings was 

not well supported. The few variables that were found 

to have an association were having a grievance against 

the government, frequent (hourly or daily) exposure 

to violent extremist messaging, and answering “not at 

all” when asked whether the availability of government 

Finding central government actors such as the Afghan National Police,

Afghan National Army, and other government agencies helpful in everyday

life was associated with having an unfavorable opinion of the Taliban.
USIP.ORG 25

services would play a role in the respondent’s decision 

to join an armed group or not.

LACK OF SYMPATHY FOR THE TALIBAN 

(AND OTHER ARMED NONSTATE GROUPS)

Using regression analysis, the analysis identified a range 

of variables that were inversely related to support for 

the Taliban. The regressions used only one question 

as the proxy for sympathy—What is your opinion of the 

Taliban?—and applied a binary (“good” or “bad”) valuation to the responses. The most notable finding, in 

agreement with some existing studies, was that a higher 

level of educational achievement was associated with 

lack of sympathy for the Taliban. Those who did not 

have a grievance against the government were also less 

likely to have a favorable opinion of the Taliban.

Factors correlating with lack of sympathy for the Taliban 

included having started or completed university, 

unemployment or only seasonal employment, inability 

to spend on nonessential items, and infrequent exposure to violent extremist messaging (“yearly or less” or 

“never”). Two of these associations—unemployment 

or seasonal employment and the lack of spending on 

discretionary items—run counter to some theories of 

radicalization, which generally view straitened economic circumstances as a driver of mobilization. The 

results suggest that individuals’ own interpretation of 

their economic circumstances are more important than 

objective measures of their economic situations, and 

this correlation may indicate that respondents view the 

Taliban as responsible for their economic hardships. 

Finding central government actors such as the Afghan 

National Police, Afghan National Army, and other government agencies helpful in everyday life was associated 

with having an unfavorable opinion of the Taliban, as 

was the respondents’ stated view that political violence 

posed a “significant” difficulty in life. Those who responded that lack of access to government services would only 

“to some extent” be a motivating factor in their decision 

to join armed nonstate groups were more likely to have 

an unfavorable opinion of the Taliban, as were those who 

did not have a grievance against the government.

An important correlation was found concerning sources

of information on Islam. Respondents who primarily 

listened to preaching by mullahs at a mosque were two 

times less likely to have a favorable opinion of the Taliban 

than those who listened to naat (religious poetry), read the 

Quran alone, or talked to a friend about religious obligations. This factor association suggests a useful insight for 

countering violent extremism (CVE) interventions through 

narratives on religion provided by credible voices.

SOURCES OF RESILIENCY TO 

MOBILIZATION TO VIOLENCE

In addition to looking at displaced groups’ experience 

of hardships and difficulties and how these experiences may condition a propensity toward mobilization to 

violence, the study also explored the strength of social 

support networks and mode of religious learning as 

resiliency factors that may protect against radicalization 

or mobilization to violence by armed nonstate groups. 

The findings also provided a strong indication of which 

formal and informal institutions the respondents trusted.

Social support networks. Respondents were asked 

whom they relied on for support in decision making 

or to help solve problems in their daily lives. Multiplechoice responses were offered on a scale ranging from 

“unhelpful” to “very helpful.” A factor analysis was then 

conducted that grouped the actors based on respondents’ answers. The three main groupings produced by 

this method were (1) armed actors, including powerbrokers or strongmen, the Taliban or other armed nonstate 

groups, militias, and members of the Afghan Local Police 

(ALP); (2) family and community, including the household, 

“immediate family not living in your household,” siblings, 

extended family members, neighbors, the “local community in which you live,” and community leaders, tribal 

elders, and imams; and (3) government representatives, 

including representatives of the Afghan National Police, 

Afghan National Army, or other government officials.
26 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

The second (family and community) and third (government representatives) groups were the most helpful, 

and were seen as equally helpful by IDPs and nondisplaced respondents (according to the mean responses). 

Interviews also highlighted that advice respondents 

obtained from family members and from imams and 

community elders was more important than advice from 

any other actors. Returnees found the third group (government representatives) less helpful than did IDPs and 

nondisplaced persons, but the mean response indicated that they were still seen as somewhat helpful. This 

finding may be a manifestation of indifference, a sense 

of grievance, or lack of expectations on the part of returnees with respect to the government and government 

representatives. Significantly, least useful as a source 

of support in their daily lives were the actors in the first 

group (armed actors); this applied to all three groups of 

respondents, with little variation in the mean responses 

from IDPs, returnees, and nondisplaced persons. 

Notable is the distrust of the ALP, which is grouped 

with other “least trusted” actors, and the perceptions 

of illegitimacy expressed in some interviews. As one 

nondisplaced Tajik, a forty-two-year-old shopkeeper, 

holder of a grade fourteen diploma, and resident of 

Bagh Sherkat, Kunduz, said:

People are not happy with the ALP. They are made up of 

nondisplaced [persons] but they create insecurities in the 

region. They use force and commit theft in the region. . . .The 

ALP are worse than the Taliban because they don’t abide by 

the law, and, just like the Taliban, the ALP use force and take 

farmers’ harvest by force. They misuse their authority.

Sayed Mohammed, whose family has been displaced from their farm and home by fighting, holds his daughter Halima at their shelter in Tirin Kot, 

Afghanistan, on February 11, 2019. (Photo by Mujib Mashal/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 27

All groups of respondents in all provinces found local 

armed actors to be of only limited help to them in their 

everyday lives.

The findings disclose far more variability between provinces than between displaced and nondisplaced groups. 

Family and community were similarly helpful to both displaced and nondisplaced groups, though their relative 

importance was much greater in Helmand, Kandahar, 

Herat, and Nangarhar Provinces, possibly indicating either the strength of family and community ties or the lack 

of trust in other providers. There is also notable variation 

across provinces in whether respondents found the government to be helpful; this observation may align with 

political affiliations or with the level of service provision, 

and with perceptions of corruption and a corresponding 

confidence in government institutions.

A cross-provincial analysis of how respondents evaluated the overall strength of support networks again revealed strong interprovincial differences. Values were 

highest for all support groups in Ghazni and Nangarhar, 

showing a strong degree of support and trust across a 

range of actors. The lowest values, and therefore the 

lowest levels of social support and trust, were assigned 

to Helmand and Kandahar. Notably, in only three 

provinces did the median values reported by respondents indicate robust support from that group (i.e., the 

respondent found the actors in the support group to 

be “very helpful”). Median values for the first group, 

the armed actors group (which includes the Taliban 

and other armed groups, such as the ALP), were low 

(the highest value given by respondents being “a little 

helpful”) across all provinces and were assigned by 

both displaced and nondisplaced groups. Surprisingly, 

median values for central government representatives 

were fairly high for most provinces, indicating that 

these institutions are considered “fairly helpful” to respondents in their everyday lives. However, the range 

of responses is broad and encompasses low to higher 

values, indicating respondents were less in agreement 

on the degree of helpfulness of the government. This 

finding suggests that locale-specific differences are 

important and need to be considered in designing CVE 

interventions that are well targeted.

Religious instruction. Because the narrative of jihad 

has been used by armed groups to justify the use of 

violence in defending one’s religion, it was important to 

look at respondents’ sources for learning about religion. 

There was great similarity in the favored channels for 

listening to messages about Islam. Nondisplaced and 

displaced persons alike reported that their preferred 

means of instruction was hearing from mullahs preaching at a mosque, followed very closely by reading the 

Quran by themselves. Displaced persons—IDPs in 

particular—were more likely than returnees or hosts to 

report reading the Quran, and both IDPs and returnees 

were slightly less likely than host community members to 

listen to the preaching of mullahs at mosques, perhaps 

as a result of recent arrival in the community and greater 

isolation.38 A far less favored method for displaced and 

nondisplaced persons alike was talking with a friend 

about religious obligations, and the least favored method was listening to naat, though returnees favored this 

method more than the other groups did.

Employment. Another source of resiliency that was 

noted in the interviews was employment. Some existing 

commentary and some of the interviewees for this study 

have suggested that being busy during the day means 

individuals find their lives purposeful and have less time 

to talk with others or browse social media and thereby 

come in contact with violent extremist messaging.
28 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

Recommendations

The major findings of this study, that displaced persons—IDPs and returnees—are not per se at greater risk for recruitment to violent extremism or more 

vulnerable to radicalization than nondisplaced persons, 

and several associated findings guide these recommendations. These recommendations are intended 

for Afghanistan’s government, international donors 

supporting stability operations, and agencies that work 

with displaced people in policy and program formulation. Targeted support for displaced populations should 

not be thought of as a stability intervention. 

Where displaced persons are vulnerable, it is in the 

specific areas arising from the conditions of their 

displacement. Assistance should be targeted toward 

those Afghan IDPs and returnees who are in particular 

need of social safety nets and services, regardless of 

their possible sympathy for armed nonstate groups: 

their living conditions are often worse than those faced 

by nondisplaced groups. To put it clearly, there is no 

reason to target CVE programs based on displacement 

status alone. There is a need to address mitigable 

factors that leave displaced Afghans preferring the security, dispute resolution, and opportunities afforded by 

a nonstate group to the services they receive—or fail to 

receive—from the government.

The findings of this study did elicit clear distinctions 

between displaced and nondisplaced persons along 

certain lines. The most important distinction, as noted, 

is in the living conditions and experiences of IDPs and 

some returnees. This reality warrants focusing mitigation efforts on areas where material needs are greatest, but with a differentiated approach that recognizes 

and responds to the needs of different displaced 

groups. A couple of points can be made here.

First, more recently displaced persons (recent returnees, and in particular recent IDPs) have different 

experiences and different immediate needs from those 

who have been in their place of displacement for a 

long time. Support should prioritize the stabilization of 

living conditions and the provision of access to critical 

services such as health care and schooling for children.

Second, if further research does find that some long-time 

returnees may be particularly vulnerable to radicalization 

or have already been radicalized, special initiatives to 

engage with these groups are needed to address the 

grievances that might have led to an increased likelihood 

of supporting the Taliban. Long-term returnees are overall less likely to benefit from existing programming by 

the government or other aid providers, and this research 

shows they rely less on the support systems and coping 

mechanisms used by nondisplaced persons.

Locale- and issue-specific programs. Because the research found greater variation between or even within 

provinces than among the three groups of returnees, 

IDPs, and nondisplaced persons, assistance programs 

should also include nearby nondisplaced communities. 

This is particularly important where the host or nondisplaced community is bearing an increased burden from 

the presence of displaced populations. This approach 

should complement locale-specific interventions, especially improvements in governance and sociopolitical 

situations, and can benefit all groups if designed and 

delivered with different needs in mind. 

Strengthening critical governance functions. Among 

IDPs and returnees, one of the most frequently cited 

reasons for sympathizing with the Taliban was the 

structure of law and dispute resolution services that the 
USIP.ORG 29

Taliban provide (this reason was less frequently cited 

by nondisplaced groups). Therefore, strengthening 

government institutions that ensure equitable law enforcement and support access to dispute resolution for 

displaced populations through targeted locale-specific 

assistance may be critical interventions that would undermine sympathy for the Taliban and mitigate feelings 

of grievance against the state. Insofar as grievances 

against the government were often driven by perceptions of corruption, addressing local-level corruption 

in areas with displaced groups and in agencies and 

bodies that interface with displaced persons most 

often—such as provincial, district, and subdistrict police 

departments; offices that issue tazkira (national identity 

cards); governors’ offices; land agencies; local health 

clinics; and schools—could go a long way toward addressing corruption affecting these groups and building 

confidence in the government. In addition, timely government services (or government-sponsored services) 

as a first response for addressing recent returnees’ and 

IDPs’ needs can assist in preventing the Taliban from 

filling this critical need for displaced persons.

Ensuring inclusion in development programs.

Displaced populations are often invisible to development programs that assist with poverty alleviation, the 

provision of services, and livelihood support within the 

country. Targeted interventions to increase the access 

of displaced groups—whether recent arrivals or those 

living in protracted displacement—to such programs 

and services should help reduce perceptions of injustice or unfair treatments, as well as address critical 

needs. Ensuring the inclusion of displaced persons 

in local decision-making processes involving service 

delivery and other development interventions is also 

important both to foster a sense of inclusion and to 

ensure services and projects are tailored appropriately 

to their needs.

Addressing exposure to messaging by violent 

extremist groups. Violent extremist groups have 

successfully used both social media and other channels to 

spread their messages and attract recruits. Respondents 

in all groups were frequently exposed to messaging by 

the Taliban; in turn, frequent exposure to Taliban messaging was found to be correlated with sympathy for the 

Taliban and offered as justification for the use of violence 

to defend one’s religion. Reducing exposure to narratives 

of violence would help curb the exposure of potentially vulnerable populations (regardless of displacement 

status). It is important to work with the religious establishment on focused messaging regarding CVE to counteract 

and decrease the risk of exposure to religious suasion on 

the part of the Taliban and other groups using violence. 

It should be noted, however, that the qualitative research 

indicated that the consumption of such messages appears 

to be related more to the availability of time than to a genuine interest and seeking out of the content.

Assisting durable returns. Most of the 2.3 to 3 million 

Afghan refugees currently living outside the country 

are undocumented. Because recent returns have been 

either forced (by the host country) or spontaneous, 

many returnees find themselves experiencing significant difficulties on return. There is a need to provide 

support for undocumented Afghan refugees and those 

at risk of spontaneous return to better prepare them 

for a durable return. Such forms of assistance would be 

similar to those received by documented and assisted 

returnees and include the provision of information on 

safe areas and housing, assistance in planning and 

successfully executing a physical return, assistance 

with the documentation needed to access services in 

Afghanistan once they return, support for retaining or 

recovering assets they have accumulated in their host 

countries, financial assistance, and continued support 

to meet critical needs in the initial phase after return.

There is no reason to target CVE programs based on displacement status alone. There is a need to 

address mitigable factors that leave displaced Afghans preferring the security, dispute resolution, and 

opportunities afforded by nonstate groups.
30 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

Notes

1. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018,” January 2019,

www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018; Government of Afghanistan, Central Statistics Organization (CSO), Afghanistan Living 

Conditions Survey 2016–17 (Kabul: CSO, 2018). See also International Organization for Migration (IOM), “Return of 

Undocumented Afghans,” Weekly Situation Report, December 23–29, 2018, https://afghanistan.iom.int/sites/default/files/Reports

/iom_afghanistan-return_of_undocumented_afghans-_situation_report_23_-_29_dec_2018_003.pdf; and Internal 

Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), “Afghanistan,” www.internal-displacement.org/countries/afghanistan.

2. See IDMC, “Afghanistan”; and World Bank, “Internally Displaced Persons, New Displacement Associated with Conflict and Violence 

(Number of Cases)—Afghanistan” (database), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/VC.IDP.NWCV?locations=AF&view=chart.

3. Two of the perpetrators of the Paris attacks in November 2015 reached Europe by falsely claiming to be Syrian asylum seekers; 

another nine individuals were involved in terror attacks between July 2016 and October 2017 across five countries (David McKeever 

and Naureen Chowdhury Fink, “Complex Migration, Terrorism, and Violent Extremism Needs Comprehensive Response,” IPI Global 

Observatory, November 27, 2017, www.theglobalobservatory.org/2017/11/migration-terrorism-violent-extremism-needs-comprehensive

-response). Speculation that displaced or migrant persons may pose a greater security and stabilization threat than the general host 

population is typically based on isolated cases. However, refugee-related terrorist attacks represent only a small fraction of overall terrorist attacks worldwide. An example of this type of reporting is Robin Simcox, “The Asylum-Terror Nexus: How Europe Should Respond,” 

Heritage Foundation, June 18, 2018, www.heritage.org/terrorism/report/the-asylum-terror-nexus-how-europe-should-respond.

4. Khalid Koser, “Internal Displacement in Afghanistan,” Brookings Institution, November 8, 2017, www.brookings.edu/on-the-record

/internal-displacement-in-afghanistan.

5. The definition of refugee is found in Article 1 of the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (modified by Article 1 of the 

Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees) as any person who, “owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 

race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside of the country of his nationality and is 

unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.” The definition of refugee has since been 

expanded to include persons fleeing generalized violence (international war, internal armed conflict, foreign aggression or occupation, severe disruption of public order, or massive violations of human rights) in the whole or part of the country of nationality.

6. IOM and UNHCR, "Returns to Afghanistan in 2018," May 2019, www.reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/

returns-afghanistan-2018-joint-iom-unhcr-summary-report-endaripashto.

7. IOM and UNHCR, "Returns to Afghanistan in 2018," May 2019, www.reliefweb.int/report/afghanistan/

returns-afghanistan-2018-joint-iom-unhcr-summary-report-endaripashto.

8. Belquis Ahmadi and Sadaf Lakhani, “The Forced Return of Afghan Refugees,” Peace Brief no. 199, United States Institute of Peace 

(USIP), January 2016, www.usip.org/publications/2016/01/forced-return-afghan-refugees-and-implications-stability; Ahmadi and 

Lakhani, “Returnees: The Afghan Refugee Crisis in 2016,” Peace Brief no. 220, USIP, February 2017, www.usip.org/publications

/2017/02/afghan-refugee-crisis-2016.

9. See United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, "Internal Displacement due to Conflict," www.humanitarian

response.info/en/operations/afghanistan/idps.

10. Alex P. Schmid, “Links between Terrorism and Migration: An Exploration,” International Centre for Counter-Terrorism, May 2016, 

www.icct.nl/publication/links-between-terrorism-and-migration-an-exploration.

11. For example, see Soeren Kern, “The Islamization of Belgium and the Netherlands in 2013,” Gatestone Institute, January 13, 2014, 

www.gatestoneinstitute.org/4129/islamization-belgium-netherlands.

12. Barbara Sude, David Stebbins, and Sarah Weilant, “Lessening the Risk of Refugee Radicalization: Lessons for the Middle East 

from Past Crises,” Perspective no. 166, Rand Corporation, 2015, https://doi.org/10.7249/PE166.

13. For example, see Marina Eleftheriadou, “Refugee Radicalization/Militarization in the Age of the European Refugee Crisis: A

Composite Model,” Terrorism and Political Violence, September 13, 2018. For one of the few empirical studies on refugee flows 

and violent extremism, see Daniel Milton, Megan Spencer, and Michael Findley, “Radicalism of the Hopeless: Refugee Flows and 

Transnational Terrorism,” International Interactions 39, no. 5 (2013): 621–45. 
USIP.ORG 31

14. World Bank, Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their 

Hosts (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017).

15. Returning refugees, in limited contexts, are also seen as a threat, but the evidence is highly anecdotal. Some examples are 

Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, those from Kenya returning to Somalia, and more recently Syrian refugees. For example, Milo 

Comerford, “Between Refuge and Radicalisation,” Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, September 7, 2017, www.nstitute.global

/insight/co-existence/between-refuge-and-radicalisation; Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant, “Lessening the Risk.”

16. "Spontaneous return” is the official term used by refugee agencies to describe returns that are voluntary but not assisted by national or international agencies. Spontaneous returnees to Afghanistan are typically ill-prepared because the decision to move 

was made quickly in response to conditions in the host country. See IOM and UNHCR, “Return to Afghanistan in 2017.”

17. Muhsin Hasan, “Understanding Drivers of Violent Extremism: The Case of al-Shabab and Somali Youth,” CTC Sentinel 5, no. 8 

(August 2012); UNHCR, “Recruitment and Use of Children: The Need for Response in Jordan,” n.d., https://data2.unhcr.org/en

/documents/download/42527.

18. For example, see Khalid Koser, “IDPs, Refugees, Violent Extremism: From Victims to Vectors of Change,” Brookings Institution, 

February 20, 2015, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2015/02/20/idps-refugees-and-violent-extremism-from-victims-to

-vectors-of-change; Milton, Spencer, and Findley, “Radicalism of the Hopeless”; Sude, Stebbins, and Weilant, “Lessening the Risk.”

19. For example, see Shahid Afsar, Chris Samples, and Thomas Wood, “The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis,” Military Review, 

May/June 2008, www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20080630_art011.pdf.

20. TLO interview with a young leader, Kandahar, July 11, 2018. On the UNHCR findings, see Rod Norland, “Afghanistan Is Now Taking in 

the Most Afghan Migrants,” New York Times, November 4, 2016, www.nytimes.com/2016/11/05/world/asia/afghanistan-migrants.html.

21. Mercy Corps, “Youth and Consequences: Unemployment, Injustice and Violence,” February 2015, www.mercycorps.org/research

-resources/youth-consequences-unemployment-injustice-and-violence.

22. For example, see William J. Parker III and Tara Kangarlou, “Addressing the Refugee Crisis and Terrorism Simultaneously and 

Immediately,” EastWest Institute, June 23, 2017, www.eastwest.ngo/idea/addressing-refugee-crisis-and-terrorism-simultaneously

-and-immediately; Marco Funk and Roderick Parkes, “Refugees versus Terrorists,” Issue Alert no. 6, European Union Institute for 

Security Studies, January 29, 2016, www.iss.europa.eu/content/refugees-versus-terrorists.

23. Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection?,” Journal of Economic 

Perspectives 17 (2003): 119–44; Anneli Botha, “Assessing the Vulnerability of Kenyan Youths to Radicalisation and Extremism,” ISS 

Paper no. 245, Institute for Security Studies Africa, April 2013, www.files.ethz.ch/isn/164232/Paper245.pdf.

24. Krueger and Maleckova, “Education, Poverty and Terrorism.”

25. Kartika Bhatia and Hafez Ghanem, “How Do Education and Unemployment Affect Support for Violent Extremism? Evidence from 

Eight Arab Countries,” Global Economy & Development Working Paper no. 102, Brookings Institution, March 2017, www.brookings

.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/global_20170322_violent-extremism.pdf.

26. Belquis Ahmadi, “Afghan Youth and Extremists: Why Are Extremists’ Narratives So Appealing?,” Peace Brief no. 188, USIP, August 

2015, www.usip.org/publications/2015/08/afghan-youth-and-extremists.

27. On poverty as a risk factor, Eli Berman, Michael Callen, Joseph H. Felter, and Jacob N. Shapiro found a negative relationship 

between unemployment and localized violence in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines (“Do Working Men Rebel? Insurgency 

and Unemployment in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Philippines,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55, no. 4 [2011]). On the correlation 

between employment and radicalization, see, for example, Stig Jarle Hansen, ed., Al Shabaab in Somalia: The History and 

Ideology of a Militant Islamist Group (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013).

28 Mohamed Abdel Jelil et al., “Unemployment and Violent Extremism: Evidence from Daesh Foreign Recruits,” Policy Research 

Working Paper no. 8381, World Bank, March 2018, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29561.

29. Kamaldeep Bhui, Brian Everitt, and Edgar Jones, “Might Depression, Psychosocial Adversity, and Limited Social Assets Explain 

Vulnerability to and Resistance against Violent Radicalisation?,” PLoS One, September 24, 2014.

30. Ahmadi, “Afghan Youth and Extremists.”

31. Reza Fazli, Casey Johnson, and Peyton Cooke, “Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan,” Special Report 

no. 379, USIP, September 2015, www.usip.org/publications/2015/09/understanding-and-countering-violent-extremism-afghanistan.

32. Survey respondents were asked directly at the end of the survey if they would like to be interviewed, and the interview process 

was explained to them. It should be noted that this self-selection may result in some biases in the answers, as those most likely 

to agree are those who have the time to answer questions and may have stronger opinions that they want to share. The field 

team, however, took care to encourage those who did not seem immediately willing to be interviewed, reassured concerns 

about anonymity, and made the timing of interviews as convenient as possible for the interviewees.
32 PEACEWORKS | NO. 155

33. Criteria for selecting provinces and districts to be included in the study were determined through research and United Nations 

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs reports indicating a sizable population of IDPs and returnees in locales. Other 

variables that were used to select the provinces included whether the majority of the displaced persons in the province were 

originally from the province or not; whether the province was predominantly periurban, urban, or rural; the existence of significant 

extremist activities or groups; the availability of social services for (1) displaced persons and (2) host population; demographic factors, such as median age and types of ethnic group (diversity); economic factors, such as poverty level, land availability, and kinds 

of livelihood pursued; and anecdotal information or existing research on the radicalization of IDPs or returnees in the province.

34. The snowball sampling method was one of the main methods used to select survey respondents. (Snowball sampling is a nonprobabilistic method that may introduce bias.) Because there were three distinct categories of interviewees—returnees, IDPs, 

and hosts—the snowball method was applied to each group individually. All respondents had to be at least eighteen years old, 

and consent was required. Consent was obtained sometimes through written agreement and sometimes through oral agreement. To ensure that surveys and interviews were conducted with bona fide IDPs and returnees, respondents were required to 

present documentation proving that they were in fact IDPs or returnees. Though most respondents were able to present some 

sort of documentation, others were not. For those lacking documentation, the field team would ask local teachers, doctors, or 

tribal elders whether the person identified for an interview or survey was an IDP or returnee, to confirm that person’s status informally. Surveyors sometimes worked with local tribal elders, teachers, doctors, and other respected people from the community to help identify survey respondents and interviewees. This was the case mostly in Balkh and Herat provinces. Demographic 

parameters were set to assist with selection of participants to ensure that qualitative data and insights were collected from 

respondents who were a representative sample of the demographic and socioconomic diversity of the survey respondents.

35. Fazli, Johnson, and Cooke, “Understanding and Countering Violent Extremism in Afghanistan.”

36. The study did differentiate between religious and secular education.

37. The findings indicated higher levels of sympathy for the Taliban than were reported in Asia Foundation, A Survey of the Afghan 

People: Afghanistan in 2018 (San Francisco, CA: Asia Foundation, 2018), www.asiafoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12

/2018_Afghan-Survey_fullReport-12.4.18.pdf.

38. It is important to compare the channels cited for learning about Islam with the most common channels cited for acquiring everyday information about politics, events, and so on. Many respondents noted that they most frequently used television and radio, 

while younger residents noted that they used social media for their “everyday” information.
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Making Peace Possible

NO. 155 | January 2020

A perception shared broadly both within and outside Afghanistan is that displaced persons 

are vulnerable to radicalization and mobilization to violence. To assess the validity of this 

perception, this study—based on extensive surveys and interviews across eight Afghan 

provinces—compared groups of displaced and nondisplaced persons on an array of socioeconomic factors assumed to lead to greater vulnerability to radicalization. Counter to the 

general perception, the study found that the attitudes of displaced and nondisplaced groups 

toward the Taliban and the use of violence against civilians did not vary greatly, while the 

attitudes of any one group varied significantly from province to province, underscoring the 

need for well-targeted, locale-specific interventions to counter recruitment efforts.

• Strategic Implications of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor by James 

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• Engaging the Post-ISIS Iraqi Religious Landscape for Peace and Reconciliation

by Ann Wainscott (Peaceworks, November 2019)

• Insurgent Bureaucracy: How the Taliban Makes Policy by Ashley Jackson and 

Rahmatullah Amiri (Peaceworks, November 2019)

• Managing the Secure Release of Sensitive Detainees in Libya by Fiona Mangan 

and Lillian Dang with Nathaniel L. Wilson (Special Report, October 2019)

• Local Cross-line Coordination in Syria by Natasha Hall, Benjamin Smith, and 

Thomas McGee (Peaceworks, October 2019)

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