PEACEW RKS

STATE STRENGTHENING 

IN AFGHANISTAN

Edited by

Scott Smith and Colin Cookman

[ [

LESSONS LEARNED, 2001–14
Cover photo: An Afghan village elder talks to 

International Security Assistance Forces from atop his 

home. Nate Derrick/Shutterstock.com.

The views expressed in this report are those of the 

author(s) alone. They do not necessarily reflect the 

views of the United States Institute of Peace.

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Ave., NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 116. First published 2016.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-602-5

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace

About the Repor

In March 2015, the United States Institute of Peace 

(USIP), Chatham House, and Stanford University held 

a two-day conference on “State-Strengthening in 

Afghanistan 2001–2014: Learning from the Past to Inform 

the Future.” This report comprises a selection of papers 

presented at the conference. The papers look back 

critically at thirteen years of international intervention 

in Afghanistan, focusing on the impact of statestrengthening exercises on security, democratization, 

governance, the economy, rule of law, infrastructure, civil 

society participation, youth development, and women’s 

empowerment. They describe, from the perspective of 

Afghan and international policy makers and experts, the 

immense and often unforseen challenges in rebuilding 

the Afghan state. 
PEACEWORKS • MAY 2016 • NO. 116

CONTENTS

Foreword ...3

Summary ...5

Introduction ...7

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and Counterterrorism:

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies

Thomas Barfield ...9

Military and Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan: An Incoherent Approach

Barbara J. Stapleton ...19

Elections and Democratization in Afghanista

Scott Seward Smith ...35

Subnational Governance in Afghanistan: Back to the Future

Jennifer Murtazashvili ...53

Rule of Law and Statebuilding in Afghanistan: Testing Theory with Practice

Erica Gaston and Erik Jensen ...69

Macroeconomic and Public Financial Management in Afghanista

William A. Byrd ...81

Support to Afghan Private Sector Development

Paul Fishstein and Murtaza Edries Amiryar ...99

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan: 

State Strengthening Through Infrastructure Building

Jodi Smith, John Drake, M. Annette Evans, and Scott C. Farquhar ...111

Role of the Media in Nation Forming

James Deane and Shirazuddin Siddiqi ...125

Afghan Youth and the Effects of Hybrid Politics

Mujib Mashal ...133

Women’s Empowerment: Challenging the Notion of Victimization

Orzala Ashraf Nemat ...139

Recommendations ...149

About the Authors ...151

USIP.ORG 3

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Foreword

In March 2015, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Chatham House, and Stanford 

University held a two-day “Conference on State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001–2014: 

Learning from the Past to Inform the Future.” Hosted at the Institute’s headquarters in 

Washington, DC, participants included Afghan and international policymakers, academics, 

journalists, and representatives of the military, civil society, and nongovernmental organizations. 

This Peaceworks comprises a selection of papers presented at the conference during various 

panel discussions. The authors have revised the papers in light of these discussions, as well as 

subsequent developments in Afghanistan. Preceding the papers is a summary that outlines the 

main conclusions of the conference.

At least two presumptions underlaid the decision to organize a lessons-learned exercise. The 

first is that lessons could indeed be learned. While the conference participants were asked to think 

about both positive and negative lessons, it was perhaps inevitable that most of the discussion 

focused on what could have been done better. The timing of the conference was surely a factor, 

being held in the first months of the new “National Unity Government” of President Ashraf 

Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah. This was a moment of some hope for 

improved governance, but the memories of the 2014 presidential election crisis were still fresh. 

Even if the creation of the National Unity Government had successfully prevented the country 

from descending into a full-blown political crisis, the election was still a reminder of the fragility of 

Afghanistan’s transition and the unmet expectations that were set a decade before.

The second presumption was that these lessons might indeed be applied. Participants were 

asked to think about the implications of the lessons for Afghanistan’s future, as well as possible 

“state-strengthening” projects. State collapse appears to be a defining phenomenon of our time, 

and each day our headlines are filled with the increasingly frightening consequences. It is therefore 

urgent that we learn as much as possible from recent attempts to strengthen state institutions. 

Afghanistan has become an unwitting laboratory for ongoing efforts to create political institutions 

that can foster stability, development, and respect for basic human rights; we now need to collate 

and internalize the lessons learned, effectively apply them, and monitor the outcomes.

Preparations for the conference reminded us of the immense complexity of the Afghanistan 

situation. Our long discussions over how to break down the topics mirrored the policy debates 

of the previous decade. Fault will inevitably be found with this breakdown. We had to ignore 

some important topics, such as counternarcotics. We could have focused more on women, youth, 

and civil society. Different priorities revealed different analytical biases and “theories of change.” 

These differing perspectives were further amplified during the conference deliberations but did 

not prevent consensus on a number of key issues, as the summary denotes.

We are especially grateful to the authors of the enclosed papers for developing and revising 

such informative, evidence-based studies on their respective topics. All the authors are experts in 

their field and gave their time freely, demonstrating a sincere desire to learn and share knowledge 

for the sake of a better future for Afghanistan and other fragile states. Particular gratitude goes to 

Scott Smith, who oversaw the project; and Colin Cookman, who kept the editorial production 

effort on track and edited each paper.

Karl Eikenberry Michael Keating Andrew Wilder

Stanford University Chatham House United States Institute of Peace

USIP.ORG 5

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Summary

■ State-strengthening interventions in Afghanistan have contributed to remarkable changes

in the country’s physical, political, economic, and social landscapes; however, success has

been limited by myriad approaches taken by multiple actors with multiple objectives—

some of which have been conflicting or too short-term in nature.

■ International counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies aimed at dismantling

the Taliban and increasing security have proven at times to be at odds with statebuilding objectives.

■ Lack of unity of effort and priority setting among military and civilian actors have severly

hampered the nationbuilding process, allowing power brokers to maintain their

strongholds; creating more opportunity for corruption; and preventing the establishment

of sustainable, national instutitions.

■ The contentious second round of the 2014 presidential election that resulted in Ashraf

Ghani’s inauguration was a clear indicator of the complexity of a political environment set

within a civil conflict. The need for a negotiated solution to the electoral crisis undermined

Afghanistan’s democratic institutions. National and local power dynamics hindered efforts

to make the power-sharing government work. 

■ The Afghan state remains highly centralized in theory and highly fragmented in practice. 

Instead of strengthening formal structures, parallel structures have been created, often

leaving the Afghan people to rely on informal or illegitimate structures of power. The lack

of formal decentralization has left subnational goverance hostage to informal actors. 

■ Rule of law strategies were developed in tandem to rather than as part of political and

security strategies and were underfunded given the expectations surrounding establishing

a justice system and reducing corruption. Moreover, while international assistance provided

Afghans access to courts, they tended not to use them given rampant corruption and lack

of perceived legitimacy and fairness. However, the subsequent hybrid approach that

employed informal, community-based mechanisms as well as formal mechanisms had the

unintended consequence of increasing corruption.

■ Macroeconomic and public finance management performance has improved substantially, 

but income and wealth inequality persist, and the current fiscal crisis and decline in

international funding is already having a negative impact on economic growth. Further, the

lack of early attention to incentives and preventive measures to avoid corruption has led to

fraud and theft in the banking system and customs facilities.

■ Significant investments in private sector development projects and economic activity more

generally have had mixed results due to the duplication of efforts, misaligned incentives

and corruption, short duration of projects, and lack of support for successful implementation 

(logisitics, human capital, political frameworks). Many argue that Afghanistan’s institutions

were not ready for the abrupt transition to a market-driven economy.

■ Billions of dollars spent on rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure (buildings, roads, and

energy) have provided security forces and Afghans with crucial transportation routes,

facilities, and communication systems. However, the short-term nature of some of the

projects has led to the lack of planning and funding for maintaining newly built infrastructure, 

including the national road system that is vital for political and economic connectivity. 
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PEACEWORKS 116

■ While Afghanistan now has a diverse array of TV channels, radio stations, and

newspapers—making it one of the most open societies in the region from this point of

view—they are at increasing risk from dwindling donor funds and advertising income 

and threats from powerholders and extremist groups. Also, the country’s open licensing

regime has permitted the establishment of media channels that are free to promote

divisive politics.

■ Despite the Afghan government’s recognition that youth will increasingly constitute the

backbone of governmental and private instutitions, their advancement has been capped at

the bureaucratic level and no long-term vision exists for embracing the potential of this

increasingly well-educated segment of the population. The staying power of strongmen 

has also presented a challenge through their control of the political economy and 

employment. Declining economic growth is a major challenge for this new generation of 

increasingly disillusioned Afghans. 

■ International interventions have included a major focus on women’s empowerment and

ensuring their full participation in all aspects of public life. However, the underlying

motivations and approaches have varied; and many, short-term, women-focused projects

have been unable to challenge the deep structural aspects of women’s subordination and

the influence of a patronage-based system of rule. This limits and threatens the

sustainability of women’s advancements, especially given that the current political and

donor environments do not support all women’s engagement as agents of change. 
USIP.ORG 7

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Introduction

Since 2001, Afghanistan has transformed physically, politically, and socially. Even if the outcome 

of the 2014 presidential election was contentious, the core notion of democracy has grown, 

with citizens increasingly expressing their demands for participation and accountability. The 

pool of human capital has expanded and deepened, especially among youth, many of whom are 

aspiring and motivated citizens eager to make a positive difference. The status of women, while 

still unequal, has improved profoundly since the fall of the Taliban regime. There is a pluralistic 

media and a level of political sophistication that would not have been imaginable thirteen years 

ago. These advancements have been drowned out by an overarching narrative of failure. 

Considerable international aid and assistance has contributed to Afghanistan’s 

transformation. From 2001–14, state-strengthening interventions focused on not only 

improving security but also on supporting democratization, rule of law, and governance; 

rebuilding Afghanistan’s infrastructure; strengthening macroeconomic management and private 

sector participation; and increasing civil society involvement, especially by youth, women, and 

the media. However, these interventions employed varying approaches and had both positive 

and negative effects. This report analyzes those effects and offers specific lessons learned and 

broad recommendations for future interventions. During the March 2015 conference on state 

strengthening, the below overall opportunities and challenges were highlighted.

Opportunities

International interventions should capitalize on following the factors that represent 

opportunities for further advancement:

• A new government with a reformist outlook that recognizes the importance of 

building less corrupt and more sustainable institutions, generating revenue streams 

from new economic activity, engaging the West on security and other matters, and 

having the president visibly play the role of commander-in-chief of the military. 

• Domestic pressure for reform articulated through the media, civil society groups, and 

private sector professional associations. 

• Recognition among Afghanistan’s political leaders that some devolution of government 

functions and decision making to bodies outside of Kabul is needed. 

• Reduction in excessive international funding, which can allow support to be 

calibrated at a sensible but predictable level, putting the brakes on excessive ambition 

as well as reducing problematic parallel structures. 

• Indications of a possible new, more helpful approach by Pakistan toward allowing a 

stable Afghanistan, encouraged by President Ashraf Ghani’s reaching out and 

reinforced by China’s interests in regional stability and in helping to establish a 

peace process.

Challenges

In addition, international interventions should account for the following factors that serve as 

challenges to achieving state-strengthening objectives.

• Throughout history, Afghan governments have fallen when external support has 

been withdrawn. Largely due to the international community’s sharp reduction in aid 

over the last two years, Afghanistan’s resources are low, even to the point where it 
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may struggle to pay salaries. Similar to the 1990s post-Soviet period, collapse of the 

Afghan state would have severe regional and international consequences. 

• The National Unity Government will need to function at a pace more in line with 

citizen expectations and the unfolding regional political situation. Economic 

progress, including in the trade sector in the short term and the promising extractives 

sector in the long term, requires that steps be taken to improve governance. Progress 

to date in forming a cabinet and articulating programs is widely viewed as inadequate 

and must be accelerated. 

• Reforming state institutions and reducing endemic corruption will be a long-term 

and challenging process that is more likely to be successful if the international 

community adopts longer-term horizons and funding commitments rather than a 

series of one-year projects that often result in merely symbolic actions. 

• The Afghan state’s failure to deliver on governance and become a more responsive 

state may fuel insurgency as well as “soft extremist groups” working through 

educational and other institutions. 

• U.S. politics and inter-institutional rivalries can degrade clear thinking about what 

makes strategic sense for the United States, including reconciliation with the Taliban 

and levels and types of support to Afghanistan. From the start of international 

intervention, shortcomings, including the late start on building the Afghan National 

Security Forces in earnest, have resulted from the lack of agreement on objectives, 

poor coordination among U.S. institutions and with allies, and the lack of an 

overarching strategy.
USIP.ORG 9

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

After more than a decade of international intervention in Afghanistan, 2015 was a year of 

introspection, focusing on (1) what the foreign forces, now mostly withdrawn, accomplished 

and whether the Afghan state can now stand on its own; (2) whether the change of national 

leadership from President Hamid Karzai to the National Unity Government led by President 

Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah is a sign of political stability 

or the prelude to more political turmoil; and (3) what a Taliban-led insurgency really wants 

to achieve—an Afghan-made political deal or a nihilistic jihad, similar to that of the Islamic 

State of Iraq and al-Sham. This introspection revealed ongoing errors in policy and judgment, 

beginning with the failure to make reconciliation a priority immediately after the fall of the 

Taliban, continuing with a counterterrorism strategy that was fundamentally at odds with 

building an Afghan state, and ending with a counterinsurgency plan that relied too heavily 

on the template of counterterrorism and lacked a strong Afghan government to partner with. 

Now that most foreign troops have withdrawn, it may paradoxically be the Afghans who have 

the better chance to bring about stability.

Winning a War...but Losing an Opportunity for Peace

When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the administration of president George 

W. Bush had no interest in statebuilding. The invasion was deemed purely a counterterrorism 

mission, designed only to destroy al-Qaeda following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Though 

largely forgotten now, the Bush administration did not initially demand the removal of the 

Taliban government—only that its leaders hand over Osama bin Laden and his al-Qaeda 

compatriots. When Mullah Omar refused, the Taliban too became a target and, in less than 

ten weeks, was driven from power. This appeared to decisively end a civil war that had plagued 

Afghanistan since 1992. The civil war had begun when the mujahideen overthrew President 

Mohammad Najibullah’s Peoples Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) but then could 

not consolidate power and lost most of Afghanistan to the Taliban. The war’s end opened the 

door to reconstruction and reconciliation among the various Afghan factions. The prospects for 

this reconciliation appeared good. Most of the Taliban fighters had laid down their arms and 
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returned home. The unreconciled Taliban fighters had fled to Pakistan, along with most of the 

surviving members of al-Qaeda and other foreign jihadists. The efficacy of precision-guided 

weapons that routed out the Taliban had so profoundly impressed the victorious regional militia 

commanders that they were keen to accommodate rather than oppose any new government in 

Kabul. The Northern Alliance commanders who had taken Kabul when the Taliban fled did 

not attempt to form a government unilaterally even though they could have easily done so. 

And far from rejecting Western intervention, Afghanistan’s war-weary population welcomed 

any assistance that promised to end its suffering and gave hope for the future. 

Creating a minimally effective Afghan state was necessary to achieve the goal of stability, 

but the United States did not prioritze this task. The Bush administration, already turning 

its attention to Iraq, wished to take as little responsibility for Afghanistan as possible. It 

turned to the United Nations (UN) under the leadership of Special Representative Lakhdar 

Brahimi to reach an agreement among Afghan factions in Bonn, Germany, and form 

a new government. The final agreement to name an interim government on December 5, 

2001—with Karzai at its head—was deemed a great success at the time but, in retrospect, 

laid the groundwork for a larger failure by neglecting to include any representatives of the 

defeated Taliban. 

The time to win the peace is at the end of a war, and the absence of Taliban representatives 

resulted in two missed opportunities: (1) an official surrender from the Taliban (or at least a 

faction of them) that would have formally recognized the termination of their claim to be the 

government of Afghanistan and (2) the outlining of a reconciliation and reintegration plan 

for those who had fought for the Taliban. Promising former Taliban fighters security and 

participation in a new Afghanistan would have gone far to relieve their well-founded fear of 

being vulnerable to future attacks by their former enemies. It would have also made the Bonn 

Agreement appear less of a zero-sum victor’s peace. Instead, international focus was diverted 

to pressuring the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance power brokers to pick a Pashtun as interim 

leader—as if Pashtun ethnicity could serve as a proxy for reconciliation with the Taliban. While 

the Taliban were overwhelmingly of Pashtun ethnicity, only a minority of the Pashtuns had 

been keen Taliban supporters. Nor had the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan, 

historically displayed much unity except in their desire to remain the country’s politically 

dominant group. Indeed, Pashtuns were so divided that no single individual—perhaps with 

the exception of the old king Zahir Shah—could be said to represent them. Unfortunately, 

the international players took his name off the table in spite of considerable Afghan support, 

losing the opportunity to employ the aura of an old dynastic tradition as a bridge to a more 

inclusive government. Karzai by contrast, although a Pashtun, was an unknown figure without 

an existing local or national power base. For better or worse, his administration in popular eyes 

would always be tied directly to the foreign intervention that created it. 

What the Bonn Agreement did not address was internal security; Annex 1, covering the 

International Security Force, was only four sentences and merely requested international help. 

Yet, in practically every other international peacekeeping effort, a political agreement had 

always been tied directly to a specific security arrangement designed to keep the peace even 

in the absence of fighting. For example, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

deployed 54,000 troops to Bosnia in 1996 as internationally recognized peacekeepers. One 

would assume that similar or greater numbers would be required for Afghanistan, a country 

the size of France with thirty million people. This was not the case. The initial UN-mandated 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) comprised only 5,000 troops, which were 

Promising former Taliban 

fighters security and 

participation in a new 

Afghanistan would have 

gone far to relieve their 

well-founded fear of 

being vulnerable to future 

attacks by their former 

enemies. It would have 

also made the Bonn 

Agreement appear less of 

a zero-sum victor’s peace.
USIP.ORG 11

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

restricted to Kabul. Other Afghan cities and all rural areas were on their own. The United 

States, determined to maintain only a “light footprint,” committed only 7,000 troops to 

Afghanistan in 2002/03, and they were not serving under the international peacekeeping 

mandate. Instead, the bulk of these troops were tasked with tracking down the remnants of 

al-Qaeda and the Taliban in the south and east of Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF). Nor could the Afghan army act as an effective national security force for the 

new government. At the end of 2003, two years after the Bonn Agreement, the Afghan army’s 

total force numbered only 6,000 men. Most major NATO donor countries had city police 

forces with more active duty officers than all the security forces in Afghanistan combined. For 

a country that had been at war for twenty-five years and still swarmed with old militia groups, 

not to mention old Taliban fighters, this was peacekeeping by wishful thinking. 

Counterterrorism Versus Afghan Statebuilding

State rebuilding in any country where domestic institutions have collapsed or become 

ineffective is never an easy task. In Afghanistan, the process was exacerbated by many other 

problems, including low levels of literacy, a paucity of people to run the needed governmental 

organizations, a domestic revenue stream much too small to finance the state, and the Kabul 

government’s lack of authority in most regions. Yet, unlike Iraq, Afghanistan had never lost 

its sovereignty and so, in theory, had the right to set the agenda for its own reconstruction, 

including supervision over how any military operations were to be conducted. But acting as a 

truly sovereign state proved a far more difficult matter. The government appeared powerless 

(and was perhaps even disinclined) to set the security agenda within the country—a crucial 

aspect of governance. Thus, while the deployment of foreign forces into Afghanistan had 

the approval of the new government, neither the UN-mandated ISAF nor the OEF troops 

were under its control. Decisions about where they were to be deployed, whom (or if) these 

forces would fight, and the tactics they employed were made by their own separate chains of 

command in distant foreign capitals, not Kabul. It could be argued that such a situation was 

only a temporary necessity and that ISAF in particular was there to assist in an internationally 

supported statebuilding process. This was not true, however, for the OEF troops who were 

tasked with a counterterrorism mission against al-Qaeda and its supporters. 

Policies of counterterrorism present significant problems for weak states like Afghanistan, 

because they come with a high domestic political cost when conducted by outsiders in a wartorn context. In strong, well-established democratic states, even the worst terrorist acts fall 

under the jurisdiction of the domestic legal system. It takes an extremely high-level threat 

to trigger the suspension of the ordinary rule of law that would allow terrorists to be treated 

as war combatants rather than criminals. In authoritarian states or weak democracies, such 

suspensions of civil liberties or declarations of martial law to deal with politically inspired 

violence (terrorist or otherwise) are more common but remain within the purview of the 

sovereign states that declare them. Thus, the government of Pakistan could mount large-scale 

military operations in Swat or South Waziristan against the Pakistani Taliban and treat these 

areas as war zones but still firmly insist that only it had the right to do so. 

In weak or failed states like Afghanistan, Somalia, or Yemen, a counterterrorism military 

force is supplied predominately by external state actors who intervene to attack terrorist groups 

directly. Their military actions may be unilateral (technically an act of war), although they more 

often occur under the banner of some international body or with the permission of the state 

involved. Whether voluntary or not, the intervention of an outside power or international 
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consortium undermines one of the core definitions of a modern state, which Max Weber defined 

as a country’s successful imposition of a monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force 

within its territory. Foreign forces that act independently of the national government become 

parallel coercive authorities that undermine the legitimacy of the state. Because the Karzai 

administration had no control over U.S. counterterrorism operations that killed or captured 

Afghans deemed to be terrorists, opponents called the government’s practical sovereignty into 

question. Sensitive to this criticism, Karzai regularly condemned the operations in the hopes 

of displaying his independence. But because he could neither ban them nor limit their tactics, 

he only highlighted his lack of authority and the weakness of the Afghan state. 

What gets sacrificed in a counterterrorism campaign conducted by external forces? Quite 

often, it is the country’s stability. As later defined by President Barack Obama in 2009, the 

ultimate goal of the U.S.-led counterterrorism campaign was “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat 

al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the 

future.”1 Whether a strong Afghan government was deemed a necessity for achieving the goal 

was not clearly delineated, but the campaign’s practical application in Afghanistan suggests that 

it was not. Paradoxically perhaps, a weak and ineffective Afghan government could be viewed 

as an asset for those international forces engaged in hunting down suspected terrorists (and 

later insurgents). It gave them far more latitude in determining the tactics used and the targets 

chosen. Nor did they have to justify their actions to the Afghan government or people—only 

to their own chain of command. 

By contrast, a stronger Afghan state might possibly have insisted on its prior approval for 

any actions taken by foreign troops and limited their scope for domestic political reasons—

moves that would have surely been viewed as complicating any counterterrorism mission. 

After all, the majority of al-Qaeda members and allied terrorist groups who had fled to 

neighboring Pakistan after 2001 resided there largely untouched because the Pakistani state 

so strongly objected to international or Afghan troops pursuing them over the border or even 

firing across it. Such assertions of sovereignty were not always effective (the United States did 

target bin Laden deep inside Pakistan), but in most cases, the will of the Pakistani government 

prevailed—much to the chagrin of the Afghan government and foreign troops stationed in 

Afghanistan that were being attacked by fighters based in Pakistan. Even cross-border drone 

attacks, though publicly condemned by Pakistan, were tacitly limited to the troubled border 

tribal areas where the writ of the Pakistani state itself rarely governed. This is not to argue that 

the United States had a conscious policy of antistatebuilding in Afghanistan—only that the 

Bush administration’s predominant focus on counterterrorism objectives created a hierarchical 

(and often contradictory) set of policy objectives that ranked statebuilding near the bottom. 

These priorities became remarkably entrenched and were rarely examined. In particular, 

too little effort was made to regularly evaluate whether such polices were truly effective at 

countering terrorism and whether the damage they did to the legitimacy of the government in 

Kabul was worth the price. 

Counterterrorism as a Destabilizing Process 

The United States had a remarkable victory in Afghanistan in 2001 that rid the country of alQaeda and its Taliban protectors. Its major failing was an inability to recognize that they were 

really gone. Instead of pivoting to a policy of peace and reconciliation, U.S. Special Operations 

Forces (SOF) scoured the countryside in search of “bad guys.” Lacking enough troops of their 

own, they were keen to recruit local allies that could both assist them in finding bad guys 

Foreign forces that act 

independently of the 

national government 

become parallel coercive 

authorities that undermine 

the legitimacy of the state.
USIP.ORG 13

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

and provide armed backup. These local militia commanders were quick to provide lists of alQaeda or Taliban targets to hunt down or hit with airstrikes. But with the war over and the 

worst elements out of the country, such lists too often simply targeted local rivals with whom 

informants had a property dispute or blood feud—a fact that often became painfully clear 

only after the damage was done. When cash bounties were being offered, the supply of needed 

terrorists quickly rose—leading some ordinary Afghan farmers to be shipped off to prisons 

in Guantanamo or Bagram, while true terrorists were left untouched in Pakistan.2 Former 

Taliban fighters were also easy targets in such sweeps, and many took up arms less out of fealty 

to Mullah Omar than to protect themselves. Bush had said “either you are with us, or you 

are with the terrorists,” but given the bewildering range of factions and shifting alliances that 

existed in Afghanistan, this simple Manichean division made for poor policy there. Illiterate 

rural Afghans were rather more likely to agree with England’s Viscount Lord Palmerston 

when he declared in 1848 that “we have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. 

Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”3

A robust counterterrorism campaign that might have been perceived as necessary in the 

wake of the Taliban collapse in 2001–02 soon paid diminishing returns in Afghanistan. Fewer 

and fewer high-value targets were even in-country, and those targets who constituted a direct 

threat to the United States was probably zero. The most appropriate targets, as the Afghans 

constantly pointed out, were in Pakistan, a view shared by international military commanders 

in Afghanistan. But the United States gave its nominal ally in Pakistan a pass, so the terrorists 

and Taliban there were off limits. The counterterrorism campaign therefore focused on the 

mountainous areas in eastern Afghanistan to which al-Qaeda fighters had first retreated and on 

the desert areas in southern Afghanistan that had previously been Taliban strongholds. These 

were some of the least densely populated and most economically insignificant parts of the 

country. Historically, the people there had rarely been under any government’s direct control, 

and their lands were pejoratively labelled yagistan (land of rebels). When central governments 

did choose to assert their authority in these areas, it was through indirect means that included 

a combination of carrots (political favors, subsidies, and local autonomy) and sticks (punitive 

military campaigns, trade embargoes, and playing one tribe against another). On the other side 

of the Durand Line, even the powerful British Raj had carved out its own tribal areas that it 

governed in a similar fashion—a policy still employed by Pakistan to this day. These areas had 

a long history of resisting outsiders of all sorts, a tradition first documented when Alexander 

the Great took his troops into the area in the fourth century before the common era. Defense 

of Islam and antiforeign rhetoric might be a rallying cry today, but the ancestors of these 

people had fought just as fiercely against Muslim rulers in the past centuries as well as against 

each other.4 That some of the fiercest fighting in Afghanistan soon commenced here was no 

surprise; that it took so long to question in what ways these deployments were designed “to 

disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan...” was a surprise. 

Fighting in remote areas had little political impact on the Kabul government, but other 

military actions did, particularly night raids by SOF and the reliance on unpopular warlords as 

allies. Throughout Afghanistan, SOF engaged in night raids and aggressive house searches to 

capture or kill targeted individuals or small groups. Villages were sometimes bombed as well. 

These raids were not only carried out without the consultation of the Kabul government, they 

were carried out independently of both the regular U.S. military and ISAF—each of which had 

its own chain of command. The first instinct of armed Afghan villagers attacked at night was 

to fire back in self-defense, an act that turned them from civilians to combatants in the eyes of 
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foreign forces. Even if no violence was involved, the tactics employed in such raids violated the 

fundamental code of honor practiced by rural Afghans. Breaking down doors, searching homes 

without permission, violating the seclusion of women from outsiders, and seizing people by 

force were all deemed personal affronts to honor that demanded revenge. This was even more 

true if such raids resulted in deaths. In a land of blood feuds, the death or humiliation of even 

one community member could quickly turn that entire community hostile. The number of 

incidents did not need to be large to poison the political atmosphere, particularly when direct 

complaints to Karzai brought no significant policy changes. When SOF counterterrorism 

tactics began generating more enemies than they deterred and undermined the legitimacy of 

the Kabul government, the cost-benefit analysis for using them should have raised red flags. 

Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the counterterrorism war plan was its drift in focus 

from targeting identifiable terrorists to targeting anyone taking up arms against the Kabul 

government and its appointees or international forces. Such armed conflicts in Afghanistan 

were usually driven by local grievances and not by any overarching ideology or desire to 

overthrow the Kabul government. In a country awash in arms, it did not take much to turn 

these local disputes violent. In the past, similar disputes were resolved through compromise, 

because neither the government nor any of the local factions believed it had the capacity 

to win outright. The presence of outside forces changed this calculus. Factions supporting 

the government would often attempt to use international forces to trump their rivals—

interventions that then ignited more fighting. 

These disputes were also exacerbated by a history of international forces recruiting local 

warlords as their allies. Many warlords were among the the most hated people in Afghanistan 

because of the violence they had wrought during the civil war. The initial happiness that 

Afghans had of seeing these commanders (and the Taliban) swept off the political stage was 

soon replaced by anger when they returned, apparently backed by international forces and 

the new Kabul government. Unfamiliar with their backgrounds and the local culture and 

languages, foreign troop commanders were often at the mercy of their interlocutors, who used 

them and their resources as tools to wield personal power. While most also eventually received 

appointments from the Karzai administration as governors or police commanders, this did not 

make them any more legitimate in Afghan eyes. International forces that thought of themselves 

as protecting Afghanistan’s people generally knew little about how unsavory a reputation many 

of their allies had or how they coerced the cooperation of local villagers with threats of ground 

attacks by foreign troops or air strikes.5 That these threats had no basis in reality was of little 

comfort to populations not keen to test whether they were legitimate. All in all, this strategy 

was a recipe for political disaster in Afghanistan, because one response to disputes with the 

Kabul government or international forces was to ally with a renewed Taliban or at least turn a 

blind eye to its presence. Beginning with an unexpectedly high level of combat that occurred 

when NATO troops took charge of Kandahar and southern Afghanistan in 2006, talk soon 

turned from the rhetoric of counterterrorism to that of counterinsurgency. 

Counterinsurgency and the Afghan State 

Statebuilding takes on much more significance for a counterinsurgency campaign than it does 

for a counterterrorism mission. As the U.S. Army field manual on counterinsurgency stresses, 

success is “primarily dependent on the host nation and the people who reside in that nation. 

Ultimately, every society has to provide solutions to its own problems. As such, one of the 

Army and Marine Corps’ primary roles in counterinsurgency is to enable the host nation.”6 

Perhaps the most 

damaging aspect of 

the counterterrorism 

war plan was its drift 

in focus from targeting 

identifiable terrorists 

to targeting anyone 

taking up arms against 

the Kabul government 

and its appointees or 

international forces.
USIP.ORG 15

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

But even in 2006 when the return of the Taliban began to redefine the struggle in Afghanistan 

as one of counterinsurgency, few players on the ground saw the Kabul government as capable 

of fulfilling that role. The government was weak and corrupt—its appointed officials were 

judged on their loyalty to the palace rather than their competence. Afghan security forces 

comprised only 36,000 army troops and 50,000 police—both poorly trained and equipped. 

NATO’s assumption of control over ISAF in 2003 in theory put it in a better position to 

take military action, and ISAF forces grew to 30,000 by 2008. However, contributing states 

consistently failed to deliver additional promised manpower or equipment and insisted on 

imposing restrictive caveats about what their troops could do. The Bush administration, with 

its focus still entirely on the insurgency in Iraq, did not step into this breach. While it helped 

sponsor a steady increase in the size of Afghan security forces, U.S. troop levels remained 

consistently at 30,000 or less until Bush left office. 

In late 2009, the new Obama administration deemed the situation in Afghanistan dire 

enough to require a counterinsurgency (COIN) campaign to be led by an additional 70,000 

U.S. troops. Conditions on the ground were not conducive for a well-run COIN operation. 

A just-concluded Afghan presidential election (widely viewed as massively fraudulent) had 

returned Karzai to office, and he was determined to be even less cooperative than in the past. 

Plans to double the size of the Afghan army to 200,000 and the police to 150,000 would 

take a minimum of two or three years, requiring (contrary to COIN doctrine) that foreign 

rather than Afghan forces take the lead in fighting. Building a robust police and government 

administration in the provinces would have to take place simultaneously with fighting an 

insurgency. Most problematic was that the additional American troops at the center of the 

COIN strategy would be withdrawn before the end of 2012, a timetable tied to the U.S. 

presidential campaign cycle rather than conditions in Afghanistan. 

Not surprisingly, the impact of the U.S./NATO “surge” on Afghan statebuilding was 

uneven. The security side grew in numbers and professionalism, but there was no counterpart 

effort on the civilian side. The international troops based in the south and east did relieve 

the pressure on the Kabul government and pushed the Taliban out of longtime strongholds. 

However, the counterterrorism legacy of war fighting proved hard to shake. In terms of tactics 

and troop deployments, fighting and killing bad guys in remote places still took precedence 

over more prosaic security and stability operations in highly populous areas, even though this 

contradicted the logic of long-term counterinsurgency strategies. For example, in the east, 

the U.S. military remained fixated on the mountainous hinterlands where they had long 

sought to find terrorists rather than the region’s population centers straddling the Kabul River 

Valley. Similarly, the first major deployments of troops to the south (U.S. marines and British 

paratroopers) were not to Kandahar, the region’s densely populated center of gravity, but to the 

marginal Helmand Valley. And even in those marginal regions, international forces chose to 

take the fight to the most marginal parts of them (Nuristan and Kunar in the east and Marja 

and Sangin in the Helmand Valley). 

Because foreign troops had to take the lead in fighting rather than acting as training 

mentors or backstopping Afghan efforts, it was a proxy COIN war in which they were fighting 

on behalf of a Kabul government with the expectation that they could transfer responsibility 

to the Afghans when they left. Of course, it was also a proxy insurgency on the Taliban side—

Pakistan’s only barely covert military aid to them and permission for Afghan insurgents to 

use their territory as a sanctuary was a policy that put Pakistan’s own interests far above its 

Afghan clients. This was not new to the Afghans. Since 1978, their blood had been spilled 

The security side 

grew in numbers and 

professionalism, but there 

was no counterpart effort 

on the civilian side.
16 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

in the furtherance of a string of conflicts whose combatants had been funded by outside 

powers using them as proxies in non-Afghan struggles: the Cold War, Saudi support of Sunni 

jihadists, India-Pakistan conflicts over Kashmir, and al-Qaeda’s plotting of its terrorist attacks 

on Afghan soil. 

The weakness in implementing a successful COIN strategy in Afghanistan, however, was 

political rather than military in nature. COIN leaders lacked a credible national government 

to partner with. Dissatisfaction with the Kabul government in too many rural localities made 

the goal of asserting its authority more difficult, even among people who had no sympathy 

for the Taliban. While counterinsurgency is often viewed as a two-person game (governments 

competing with insurgents for the loyalty of a passive population), in Afghanistan, the local 

population was a political player in its own right. One consequence of Afghanistan’s historically 

weak governments was that its rural areas had well-developed, nonstate systems of local 

governance.7 While these systems could not handle all problems, they were remarkably effective 

at maintaining social order in the absence of a state or during times of conflict. Thus, populations 

that might oppose the Taliban were not necessarily keen to support Kabul government officials 

either. Both would have to vie for their loyalty that could be withdrawn at any point. The highly 

centralized structure of the Kabul government was at odds with this tradition of local autonomy. 

To the extent that international actors saw their role as extending Kabul’s writ by force, they 

were building an Afghan state in opposition to its own people. In practice, this problem was 

quickly recognized by international military leaders who tended to side with the locals in the 

preservation of their autonomy against demands from Kabul that it be suppressed; this was 

most apparent in the creation of the Afghan Local Police and Village Stability Operations that 

organized local defense forces to resist the Taliban. The logic for this was simple: If international 

troops were to depart, a self-interested, local population that could resist the Taliban was a 

greater barrier to its spread than more distant Kabul-based national institutions. If that meant 

weakening the authority of the national state, so be it. 

As International Forces Depart...

Afghanistan has now experienced four foreign invasions and withdrawals over the past 175 years: 

the First and Second Anglo-Afghan Wars (1839–42, 1878–80), the Soviet invasion (1979–89), 

and U.S./NATO intervention (2001–present). This has provided Afghan governments with an 

historic template for successfully maintaining state power in times of crisis. The basic lesson 

any Kabul government knows from this history is that while insurgencies have been effective 

at getting foreign troops to leave Afghanistan, none have succeeded in toppling a national 

government that has a strong international backer. This is because foreign boots on the ground 

in Afghanistan have always proved less decisive (and even counterproductive) than large and 

continuing flows of aid that governments in Kabul could use to reinforce their power against 

much more poorly resourced insurgents. 

Indeed, the success of insurgents in getting foreign militaries to leave Afghanistan 

undermined their ability to seize national power because (1) local factions that joined the 

fight in expelling foreigners lost their cohesion in the absence of a common enemy and (2) 

these insurgents lacked the capacity to build a conventional military necessary to topple a 

government with an intact army. In addition, Afghan insurgent leaders could never make the 

transition from leaders of parochial factions to recognized contenders for national leadership. 

By contrast, governments in Kabul became more effective. Weak leaders initially installed by 

foreign governments were replaced by more forceful leaders when they left. Lacking a foreign 
USIP.ORG 17

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

army to protect them, such leaders reverted to old styles of patronage, alliance building, and 

cooptation that undermined their opponents; in a battle of patronage, an internationally 

financed government could always offer far more than insurgent groups could. Both postwar Amir Dost Mohammad (1843–63) and Amir Abdur Rahman (1880–1901) used British 

arms and subsidies to rebuild the Afghan state and unite the country. And although the 

Soviets expected the Mohammad Najibullah regime to collapse within six months of their 

departure in 1989, his regime survived until the collapse of the Soviet Union itself and the end 

of outside aid in 1992. Indeed, the only time insurgents were able to take power was when the 

Kabul government had no strong foreign patron (e.g., during the civil wars that toppled King 

Amanullah Khan in 1929 and put the Taliban in power in 1996). Whether the new GhaniAbdullah government can match the skill of their predecessors remains to be seen, but one 

should not underestimate the powers of self-interest and self-preservation as motivators.

Notes

1. See his remarks at www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-a-new-strategy-afghanistanand-pakistan.

2. For more details, see Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014); 

and Deedee Derksen, “The Politics of Disarmament and Rearmament in Afghanistan,” Peaceworks 110 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015).

3. Of course, a decade earlier, Palmerston had been one of the loudest advocates for the disastrous First AngloAfghan War, so his advice should come with a caveat that being clear-sighted in theory is not proof against 

folly in practice. 

4. Descriptions of this long series of wars and resistance to outside powers of all types can be found in Olaf 

Caroe, The Pathans 550 B.C.–A.D. 1957 (London: Oxford University Press, 1983); and Steven Tanner, 

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the War against the Taliban (Philadelphia, PA: Da 

Capo Press, 2009). 

5. See David Manfield, A State Built on Sand: How Opium Undermined Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 2016) for 

the role such threats had in attempts to eradicate poppy production; and Noah Coburn, Losing Afghanistan: 

An Obituary for the Intervention (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2016) for the broader analysis of how 

poorly international partners understood the dynamics of the country they were in.

6. FM 3-24 MCWP 3-33.5 Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies (Washington, DC: Department of the 

Army, 2014), 1–6, https://armypubs.us.army.mil/doctrine/index.html. 

7. Thomas Barfield, Neamatollah Nojumi, and Alexander Their, “The Clash of Two Goods: State and Nonstate Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan,” in Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-torn Societies, ed. 

Deborah Isser (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011), 159–92; and Jennifer Murtazashvili, 

“Informal Federalism: Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan,” Publius: The Journal of 

Federalism 2, (2014): 324–43.

USIP.ORG 19

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

The U.S.-led coalition’s intervention in Afghanistan in response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks 

had limited aims: to eliminate al-Qaeda from the region and remove the Taliban from power. 

Given the focus on enacting a swift response to the attacks, the administration of president 

George W. Bush was not directly considering the post-Taliban future of Afghanistan; it was 

envisaged that other countries and the United Nations (UN) would run the nationbuilding 

show. 1 The possibility of managing the transitional period under a UN administration—as in 

the run-up to the 1993 elections in Cambodia—was briefly discussed and dismissed early on. 

This left the international community without an authoritative, international body in charge of 

directing security and financial resources toward common objectives under what the military 

would term unity of effort.

A rapid and decisive U.S. military campaign to dismantle the Taliban regime and target 

al-Qaeda was based on the use of U.S. airpower and on the militias of the Northern Alliance 

(NA).2 This coalition of predominantly Tajik and Uzbek factions that had opposed Taliban rule 

acted as proxy ground forces to expedite U.S. objectives. This necessitated covert operations 

conducted by U.S. Special Forces and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) that included 

large cash payments to the NA commanders. It appears that no thought was given to how 

the political vacuum, caused by the overthrow of the Taliban, would allow the newly resourced 

former mujahideen commanders of the NA to restore their power in their former fiefdoms; 

nor how this predictable outcome would further harden factional and ethnic divisions, making 

implementation of security sector reform processes—fundamental to building a stable state—

even more challenging.3 According to Barnett Rubin, the United States only supported state 

strengthening “in so far as it helped achieve the primary goal to disrupt, dismantle and defeat 

al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and prevent their return.”4 What happened beyond these 

objectives was of little interest to key members of the Bush administration,5 which viewed the 

intervention in Afghanistan as the opening salvo in a global war on terror—the focus of which 

rapidly moved on to Iraq. Official U.S. statements on the Afghanistan mission under successive 

administrations have never referenced nationbuilding,6 and Rubin argues that a counterterrorism 

strategy, rather than nationbuilding, always represented the core of the U.S. engagement, 

trumping, when perceived necessary, longer-term, state-strengthening considerations.7

Military and Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan

An Incoherent Approach

BARBARA J. STAPLETON
20 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

The post-9/11 intervention opened a window of opportunity for change that most Afghans 

supported; their hopes for peace and stability were reflected in the return of 1.8 million 

refugees from Pakistan and Iran by the end of 2002.8 The Taliban had failed to address leading 

Afghan concerns over jobs, health, and education. Even in the former Taliban heartlands of 

the southwest, the U.S.-led military intervention did not immediately produce a xenophobic 

reaction, with opposition only becoming apparent from 2003 to 2004. There was also 

widespread Afghan support for a strong central government given Afghans’ experience with 

the tanzimats (resistance parties).9 However, the intensifying political factionalism following 

the overthrow of the Taliban contaminated everything (e.g., school teacher appointments, the 

media, and especially the Afghan security forces)—preventing the development of national 

institutions that would act in the interests of all Afghans—and added to tensions by creating 

winners and losers at local levels. 

Soaring corruption contributed to the restoration of the rule of impunity, fueled in particular 

by narcotics trafficking controlled by local powerholders who were often closely linked to 

government institutions, especially the Ministry of Interior.10 These powerholders were also 

often supported by the U.S. and other international forces in pursuance of counterterrorism 

goals. In addition to dealing with a predatory police force dominated by commander/militia 

structures, Afghans had to bribe officials for even basic services. For Afghans, learning that 

corruption went to the top echelons of the government (as the Kabul Bank scandal publicly and 

unequivocally demonstrated) was no surprise. These realities and others undermined Afghan 

confidence in a better and more stable future and eroded trust in the role of the international 

community and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF) in particular, a highly visible international face in the country. 

President Hamid Karzai’s official appointments of closely allied strongmen—such as Sher 

Mohammed Akhundzada in Helmand Province, Jan Mohammed in Uruzgan, and his stepbrother Ahmed Wali Karzai in Kandahar—resulted in public warnings from Human Rights 

Watch and strong opposition at times from some diplomatic quarters.11 The controversial 

appointments of these and other strongmen—many of whom had Afghan blood on their 

hands from the civil war (1992–96) and had opposed the Taliban—increased the danger of 

revenge and generated growing armed opposition to Kabul initially in the southwest. U.S. 

and other international forces tended to work with these powerful allies of Karzai because 

they wielded great influence and, if opposed, could make the security situation (at a time 

when limited international forces had been committed) untenable. One U.S. Special Forces 

soldier active in Uruzgan when Jan Mohammed came to power summed up a situation being 

replicated in other parts of the country: “We built a strong relationship with him. We trained 

his troops and rearmed them so they would be ready to fight the Taliban. The United States 

empowered them.”12 Good governance was effectively jettisoned in key areas of the country as 

Karzai’s political strongmen “became Americans’ eyes and ears in the hunt for the Taliban.”13

The situation was not helped by Taliban propaganda labelling international forces as “invaders” 

and an Afghan president who increasingly fanned the winds of conspiracy.14

The Bush administration’s wish to avoid nationbuilding altogether,15 and the negative 

consequences of its invasion of Iraq,16 brought a broader constituency of NATO member 

states to the fore of policymaking in Afghanistan. Some NATO and U.S. representatives 

and Afghans argued that “the interveners now had an obligation to deliver more than a 

government of warlords.”17 In framing their growing involvement in Afghanistan, NATO 

member states frequently referenced a “comprehensive approach” that integrates political, 
USIP.ORG 21

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

military, economic, and humanitarian elements (an approach borne from lessons learned in 

nationbuilding interventions under the administration of president William Clinton in the 

1990s).18 But an overarching, strategic vision that delineated agreed-on contours of a future 

Afghanistan remained absent. 

Germany and other NATO member states that were strongly adverse to direct engagement 

in the Afghan conflict actively promoted a comprehensive approach that focused more on 

economic and reconstruction efforts than on boosting force levels. And though NATO’s 2008 

summit statement expressed support for the comprehensive approach, this did not mean that 

all senior U.S. government officials actually supported its longer-term, state-strengthening 

processes, beyond building up Afghan security forces.19

In addition to counterterrorism—a constant throughout the U.S. engagement (2001–

14) and beyond—U.S. and international objectives have also included, to varying extents, 

strengthening the state and its security; countering the insurgency; and finally, transferring 

full responsibility for security, governance, and development to the Afghan government by 

the end of 2014. However, many of these objectives were implemented simultaneously,20 with 

priorities determined as much by the electoral, budgetary, and news cycles of leading NATO 

member states as by conditions in Afghanistan.21 The absence of agreed-on priorities and 

objectives was further exacerbated by (1) the absence of an authoritative lead institution that 

could align multiple assistance efforts, (2) the limited capacity of the Afghan government 

(especially evident at the provincial and district levels), and (3) the bilateral management of 

the majority of military and civilian assistance—mostly off-budget and unaligned with Afghan 

national development strategies.22 Donor nations and organizations, both military and civilian, 

followed their own interests, and an incoherent approach was the inevitable result. 

In the early years of the intervention, U.S. policy toward state strengthening amounted 

to one of “benign neglect.”23 Many observers in academic, political, and military circles see 

the early shift in U.S. focus to Iraq as a primary contributing factor to the limited outcomes 

in Afghanistan. The challenges to stabilizing the country, following the fall of the Taliban, 

were profound. But opportunities to address these challenges were either missed or ignored 

by international actors plunging into a highly complex environment that they underestimated 

and did not understand. 

In the crucial early years, “international efforts in Afghanistan really amounted to nothing 

more than stopgap measures—just enough to keep immediate problems at bay with the hope 

that the situation would improve on its own in the future.”24 Perspectives of the small number 

of nonprofit, international nongovernmental organizations that had worked in Afghanistan or 

across the border since the Soviet invasion were marginalized. At the same time, criticism of 

the new Afghan government or international policy in Afghanistan was discouraged by the 

main donors—on the grounds that this would be unhelpful and would undermine chances of 

democratic progress. A Manichean tendency to view the Taliban regime as the main obstacle to 

respect for human rights was evident.25 This obscured the complex factors that contributed to 

the country’s deteriorating human security, linked to both the actions of official and nonofficial 

powerholders and to the armed opposition.

By the end of the ten-day Bonn Conference (convened November 25, 2001), the NA had 

control of the three “power” ministries (defense, interior, and national directorate for security), 

having been persuaded by representatives of the alliance’s regional backers (Iran, India, and 

Russia) to drop an earlier push to control all ministries. According to Francesc Vendrell, then 

personal representative of the UN secretary-general, “The UN, the U.S. and its main allies 

Donor nations and 

organizations, both 

military and civilian, 

followed their own 

interests, and an 

incoherent approach was 

the inevitable result.
22 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

agreed with the participating Afghan delegations, representing the NA and the various factions 

within it, the supporters of the ex-King, and two smaller delegations, that they had met not to 

reach a peace settlement, as the Taliban were considered a defeated force, but to agree [on] a 

road map for a statebuilding process.”26 This road map was “based on the assumption that an 

international security force would be deployed (to bridge the security gap in the absence of a 

professional Afghan army and police force) and that the Northern Alliance would be a player 

but not a decisive player as it turned out to be.”27 

NATO’s Involvement

A key factor in dismissing the option of a UN-led intervention was the need to quickly assemble 

high-quality international forces. It was felt that “the first world would be unwilling to commit 

forces under a ‘blue helmet’ UN command and that generating forces under the blue helmets 

anyway would have taken too long.”28 Consequently, the UN Security Council mandated 

that multinational peacekeeping forces be assembled by NATO member states. The regional 

expansion of these peacekeeping forces (envisaged in Annex 1 of the Bonn Agreement) was 

vetoed by the United States in 2002, when “NATO member states and others would have been 

more willing to supply forces.”29 As the door closed on the regional expansion of ISAF, the 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) plan was announced in November 2002 by U.S. and 

British coalition representatives at the U.S. embassy in Kabul.30

Unity of command was missing on both the military and civilian sides of the assistance 

effort, giving rise to turf wars and command and control problems. Two distinct chains of 

command began operating in Afghanistan in 2003, when NATO took over command of 

ISAF: (1) Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), comprising most conventional U.S. forces 

deployed in Afghanistan, covert Special Forces operations, and the training and equipping of 

the Afghan security forces; and (2) ISAF, comprising NATO nations (including the United 

States) and other troop-contributing nations. 

NATO’s expansion throughout Afghanistan from 2003 to 2006, complicated by the 

controversial move into the kinetic areas of the southwest, resulted in a formal transfer of 

command from the U.S.-led coalition to ISAF, but the majority of conventional U.S. forces 

and Special Forces remained separate, under OEF.31 NATO’s expansion was premised on the 

provision of armed peacekeeping to assist the legitimate new Afghan government in building 

a “postconflict” state and not on military engagement in a renewed Afghan civil war—most 

NATO states stipulated national caveats to avert the possibility of being drawn into one. 

NATO’s widening involvement was partly driven by the need to support the United States, 

which was bogged down in the aftermath of the Iraq invasion, and partly by the need to 

find new roles in what was then seen as a post-Cold War world. NATO’s central assumption 

was that the Kabul government would extend and legitimate its authority countrywide on 

the basis of reconstruction and development, achieving and sustaining stability through 

economic development with the support of its international partners. This model, drawn from 

the experience of other postconflict fragile states, was the “end state” referred to by military 

planners that would allow an international exit. However, the grounds for such a conditionsbased exit kept receding as time went on, and Afghanistan’s problems were increasingly seen 

as intractable by donors.

The burden-sharing arrangement in Afghanistan with NATO member states was 

considered more a necessity to enable a full U.S. military campaign in Iraq than a demonstration 

of U.S. confidence in NATO’s capabilities.32 Nevertheless, the United States began increasing 

Unity of command was 

missing on both the military 

and civilian sides of the 

assistance effort, giving rise 

to turf wars and command 

and control problems.
USIP.ORG 23

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

funding and support for several state-strengthening processes in Afghanistan at the end 

of 2003, when an “accelerating success strategy” was adopted in the face of deteriorating 

security.33 Of particular concern was the limited progress in security sector reform. This was 

partly due to multiple nations taking the lead in interrelated elements of the reform—justice 

(Italy); disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (Japan); counternarcotics (the UK); 

police reform (Germany); and the building of a new Afghan army (the U.S.)34—and partly 

due to the circumvention of reform objectives, particularly by the Afghan Ministry of Interior 

and its associated networks. Although these security sector reform processes were intended to 

be mutually reinforcing, the development of the army and the police topped the international 

agenda. Reforms to the Ministry of Interior, viewed by the diplomatic community in Kabul 

as the frontline in the war on corruption and narcotics,35 made little headway, allowing the 

ministry to continue to protect powerful vested interests.

By 2006, the police sector, led by Germany, was supported by twenty-five countries and 

several international organizations, but there was no common vision on the kind of police force 

Afghanistan needed. The growing insurgency led the United States, the largest contributor 

both in terms of financial and human resources to the police sector since 2004, to advocate an 

increase in police numbers by late 2006 (from 62,000, previously agreed to in the Afghanistan 

Compact negotiated at the start of 2006, to 82,000). Not all international police reform actors 

fully supported what was viewed as a move from the establishment of a civilian police force 

toward the development of a paramilitary or counterinsurgency force. The fiscal sustainability 

of increasing Afghan National Police numbers was also questioned.36

Parallel Commands

ISAF’s first deployment as a peacekeeping force aimed to support implementation of the 2001 

Bonn Agreement. The focus was on security sector reform, particularly building a new army 

and training the police and peacekeeping operations in the north. The peacekeeping force did 

not engage in any fighting; “the Americans did that.”37 The second ISAF configuration under 

the British commander, General David Richards, brought the coalition joint task force that had 

been commanded by U.S. General Karl Eikenberry into ISAF as Regional Command East. 

Though in theory there was now a single unified ISAF command, in reality there were 

two ISAFs, the first Bonn-focused ISAF mission whose contributors had not signed up 

for anything else, and then the Americans plus forces committed by NATO members 

that would fight, including the British, Australians, and Canadians. This second ISAF 

iteration grew out of the rebirth of the Taliban and the strengthening insurgency and 

though focused on the insurgency also had a state-building component, mainly to buy 

acceptance of the military presence.38

Adding to the confusion, although it had different objectives from the first ISAF iteration, 

the second ISAF iteration was also framed as a peacekeeping mission in a postconflict fragile 

state. In addition, there was a third force, “ABCA” (America, Britain, Canada, Australia), also 

referred to as the “Four Eyes” intelligence-sharing agency. These countries operated “black” 

Special Forces (comprising U.S. Delta and Rangers forces and UK and Australian Special Air 

Service forces), who were focused on counterterrorism missions such as night raids and kill/

capture operations that were highly controversial within Afghanistan. These forces reported to 

and came under the direct command of U.S. Central Command in Tampa, Florida. 

The possibility of establishing unity of command by having a single U.S. command 

foundered on European insistence on falling under NATO command to avoid making NATO 

member states complicit in black Special Forces-led operations, “which their publics would not 

By 2006, the police 

sector, led by Germany, 

was supported by 

twenty-five countries 

and several international 

organizations, but there 

was no common vision on 

the kind of police force 

Afghanistan needed.
24 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

stand for.”39 During U.S. General David McKiernan’s tenure as commander of ISAF, he was 

also appointed commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, bringing the U.S.-led security sector 

reform processes as well as U.S. logistics under a double-hatted control. But counterterrorism 

operations still remained outside McKiernan’s command. In addition, McKiernan had to answer 

to two masters: the U.S. supreme allied commander for Europe on the NATO operational side, 

and U.S. Central Command, based in the U.S. military base in Qatar, for control of resources 

(manpower, money, equipment). This eroded the coherence of McKiernan’s command further 

“in that you had two warring robber barons—both of whom thought they were in charge and 

were often giving contradictory instructions.”40 It was also difficult “because the real focus for 

U.S. CENTCOM until 2009 was not Afghanistan but Iraq.”41

Night raids or kill/capture operations sometimes caused civilian casualties and led to 

frequent allegations of unwarranted detentions. Night raids were also viewed as an affront 

to Afghan cultural norms. For these reasons, the Afghan president frequently criticized the 

international military. However, the U.S. Department of Defense viewed the operations as 

vital to reducing civilian casualties while targeting the Taliban. Counterterrorism operations 

are a component of any counterinsurgency effort and were sharply increased under the 

counterinsurgency (COIN) military campaign that intensified between 2009 and 2011. 

Tactical changes, including additional constraints on the use of air power, introduced by U.S. 

General Stanley McChrystal to reduce civilian casualties as a means of winning Afghan “hearts 

and minds,” did produce results.42 But botched airstrikes still occurred, such as in Kunduz in 

September 2009, when a misguided strike on two fuel tankers stolen by insurgents resulted in 

more than ninety civilian deaths;43 and operations conducted by international forces and the 

Afghan Special Forces they had trained continued to cause civilian casualties. In one egregious 

incident in February 2010, three women and two men were killed (all of whom proved to be 

noncombatants); and an open disagreement ensued between NATO and the United Nations, 

which challenged NATO’s initial account that diverted blame for the women’s deaths.44

Disjuncture in the chain of command contributed to the damaging fallout from this 

incident and others. Afghans made multiple allegations of mistaken killings and detentions 

of noncombatants during counterterrorism operations over time. Unlike ISAF, which usually 

deployed for six months to a year in one area and was able to develop a level of situational 

awareness, international Special Forces were rotated for ninety-day periods with no interaction 

with the local community, thereby generating their own targets. “No-one has visibility on how 

and why they select certain targets, it can be on the back of an opponent saying that X is a bad 

guy. All our polling and Afghan friends told the U.S. military that this is not advancing our 

campaign goals but retarding them by turning Afghans against you and most of the time you 

don’t get the bad guys.”45 Former U.S. secretary of defense Robert Gates finally succeeded in 

establishing unity of command by summer 2010,46 but whether Special Operations Forces 

(SOF) then came under effective central command is questionable.47 According to a senior 

U.S. military analyst who had deployed to both Iraq and Afghanistan theatres, “It got to the 

point where Special Forces were supposed to inform the regional ISAF command before an 

operation, but with only a few hours warning there was insufficient time to evaluate whether the 

mission made sense or not or to do any coordination between SOF and conventional units.”48

Blurred Lines

Following fulfillment of the political objectives of the 2001 Bonn Agreement (presidential 

elections in October 2004 and parliamentary elections in September 2005), the security 
USIP.ORG 25

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

objectives of the U.S. military and NATO increasingly dominated the state-strengthening 

agenda. Longer-term, state-strengthening considerations came second to building up 

Afghan police and army numbers—objectives that were addressed with increasing urgency 

to both counter the growing Afghan insurgency, “defined primarily as a law enforcement 

issue,”49 and ultimately enable an exit strategy. In effect, the U.S. military and NATO saw 

strengthening the Afghan security forces as the same thing as strengthening the state. The 

arguments made by mainstream development professionals—that a lasting stabilization would 

depend on developing the economy, governance, and functioning ministries—failed to make 

a determining impact. “We said this at meetings” said a former U.S. government development 

professional interviewed, “but I wonder how much we were listened to?” 

COIN doctrine—based on the concept of winning hearts and minds using a comprehensive 

approach by which all available civilian and military resources are incorporated to maximize 

chances of success—provided an entry point for the U.S. military to engage representatives of 

the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to 

establish the rule of law and improve the economy, infrastructure, and governance. Given that 

the U.S. military led such core state-strengthening processes was indicative of the absence of 

an overarching political strategy. 

Development professionals within USAID and other donor agencies were often between 

“a rock and a hard place:” The presence and weight of a single and powerful ISAF commander 

overshadowed a fragmented and leaderless civilian effort.50 In addition, throughout the 

engagement, political demands from NATO member states were made on civilians leading 

development efforts,51 as well as on the military, for fast and positive results.52 The demand for 

good news from capitals meant inconvenient truths tended not to feature in most reporting if 

they made it into reports at all.53 Nor, with rare exceptions, was reporting sufficiently nuanced 

to capture the complexity of a security environment in which the Taliban was then considered 

by many Afghans to be just one of the problems they faced. Questions were not being asked 

between 2002 and 2005, when “everything was seen as wonderful and Hamid Karzai was seen 

as the miracle man.”54 And as things got worse in Iraq, it became more essential to show that 

all was going well in Afghanistan. 

The military’s engagement in assistance-type activities took the securitization of aid to 

higher, controversial levels. Decisions were taken without fully evaluating the costs and benefits 

of each project. Heavy emphasis was given to “the burn rate”—the process in which money 

allocated under specially created funding lines for the international military (e.g., the U.S. 

Commanders Emergency Response Program, or CERP, established in 2003), were spent 

rapidly, as a condition of their swift replenishment.55 According to one U.S. military analyst 

interviewed, twenty brigade commanders had $50 million a year to spend. “If you can’t solve 

the problem with money, spend more money” seems to have been the underlying rationale, 

and not just for U.S. forces; “No conditionality was applied to the development assistance 

given under ISAF PRTs which was all off-budget and not effectively tied to the development 

strategies led by the Afghan government.”56 The Afghan government’s limited absorptive 

capacity at all levels was overwhelmed,57 while the resulting environment for corruption was, 

in practice, ignored. 

Nationbuilding Lessons Unlearned 

The disparate priorities, interests, and perceptions of international civilian and military 

actors in Afghanistan were reflected in interagency planning within leading NATO national 

In effect, the U.S. 

military and NATO saw 

strengthening the Afghan 

security forces as the same 

thing as strengthening 

the state.
26 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

governments. In theory, civilian perspectives were meant to carry equal weight in the setting 

of realistic timelines and objectives for state strengthening.58 Tensions were rooted in the 

bureaucratic politics of Washington and other NATO capitals. The U.S. Department of 

State, Department of Defense, Federal Bureau of Investigation, and CIA all tended to prize 

departmental autonomy over achieving a common approach. 

This was nothing new. U.S. interventions in the 1990s had shown that, in practice, an 

integrated approach requires establishing mechanisms to ensure unity of effort during both 

the planning and execution phases of an operation. For example, Presidential Decision 

Directive (PDD) 56 on “Managing Complex Contingency Operations” under the Clinton 

administration directed the establishment of an interagency executive committee to coordinate 

U.S. government activities in a given operation.59 As Michèle A. Flournoy has pointed out, 

“with the notable exception of the U.S. military, which has an elaborate system for collecting 

and disseminating ‘after action reviews’ of its operations, the U.S. government as a whole does 

not have organizations devoted to identifying, analyzing, and promulgating lessons learned 

from nationbuilding or any other type of complex operation.”60 When the Bush administration 

took office, PDD 56 was shelved and replaced by a national security presidential directive. This 

directive also recognized that developing integrated strategies to deal with complexs operations 

was of central importance, but it was never signed and was “largely ignored when the Bush 

administration developed its post-9/11 strategy for Afghanistan.”61 Successful collaboration 

when it did occur was based on an absence of jargon and clear planning early-on that took the 

realities of execution, in a very demanding environment, into account.62

A former NATO deputy senior civilian representative summarized the military’s attitude: 

“When the military do a plan, the civilian element is a sub-element of that plan. The military 

tend to plan in isolation and get frustrated when the civilians do not fit into that plan. To do 

a plan, you have to have control of resources so they plan for the use of resources under the 

military’s control and set out aspirations for civilians.”63

After the ISAF’s expansion throughout Afghanistan in 2006, different approaches in the 

bilateral delivery of security and reconstruction assistance by donors, mainly conducted through 

PRTs, became more pronounced at provincial and district levels. The Afghan government 

repeatedly labelled PRTs as a parallel administration undermining its national development 

strategy, but again, government protests were effectively ignored. U.S.-led PRTs mainly located 

in the southeast remained under the military within a single U.S. command structure. This was 

not the case with PRTs supported by other NATO member states and troop-contributing 

nations. While PRTs were established under the protection of ISAF, they were controlled by 

their respective national authorities. Many were instruments of national development programs 

and aid budgets and were usually directed by their respective state capitals. Civilian political 

and development advisers on PRTs often did not even include their respective embassies in 

reports back to their capitals. 

The PRT Executive Steering Committee tried to improve civil-military coherence64 but 

could not overcome the reality of each PRT nation having its own plan, separately conceived and 

implemented, as well as the difficulties inherent in managing the center/periphery relationship 

in Afghanistan. The implementation of policy notes by PRT commanders (involving countless 

preparatory meetings) went effectively unmonitored and often ignored by PRTs and forward 

operating bases remote from Kabul.

The securitization of assistance at provincial and district levels led to a Balkanized assistance 

effort, with the wealthier south and east of Afghanistan (where the heartlands of the insurgency 
USIP.ORG 27

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

are located) getting much more aid and development support than the poorer center and north. 

U.S.-led PRTs in the east and those run by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Netherlands in 

the southwest received what seemed like unlimited funds for reconstruction and development. 

In comparison, parts of the center and north missed out on what was seen by many Afghan 

provincial governors, provincial council members, and Afghan contractors (who were often 

inter-related and stood to profit) as a windfall. This caused considerable resentment in poor 

provinces like Ghor, where the Lithuanians with limited resources ran the PRT. As a senior 

British diplomat interviewed put it, “It was a postcode lottery.”65

The U.S. Military-Led Surge

Following his first visit to Afghanistan in January 2007, Gates summarized U.S. efforts as 

“being significantly hampered not only by muddled and overly ambitious objectives but 

also by confusion in the military command structure, confusion in economic and civilian 

assistance efforts, and confusion over how the war was actually going.”66 The 2009 Strategic 

Review conducted by ISAF and McChrystal warned the new Obama administration that 

continuation of the status quo in Afghanistan threatened ISAF with “strategic defeat” and 

recommended an extensive, “population-centric” COIN campaign.67 Following months of 

deliberation, Obama authorized a temporary surge of 30,000 additional U.S. forces for this 

effort and reportedly also ordered an (unpublicized) increase in the tempo of counterterrorism 

operations.68 Planned numbers of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) were significantly 

increased. The option of a fully resourced and open-ended counterinsurgency that included 

the longer-term, nationbuilding aspects lobbied for by U.S. General David Petraeus and the 

Pentagon was rejected.69

U.S. military and civilian assistance represented approximately half of all assistance during 

the early years of the intervention, rising markedly from 2007. The United States’ dominance 

over international approaches to state-strengthening objectives stemmed from congressionally 

approved funding levels that dwarfed the commitments of all other donors for Afghanistan. 

U.S. appropriations for all war-related operations initiated by the United States since the 9/11 

attacks cumulatively amounted to $1.6 trillion as of U.S. fiscal year 2014. Of this total, 43 percent 

(or $686 billion) was appropriated for the U.S. military’s OEF campaign in Afghanistan. A 

further breakdown of the funding received by agencies illustrates the extent to which the U.S. 

military received the lion’s share of funding in all theaters: $1.5 trillion was appropriated to the 

U.S. Department of Defense, compared to $92.7 billion combined to the U.S. Department of 

State and USAID. 

It has been estimated that between 2007 and 2009, a half to two-thirds of all U.S. 

assistance to Afghanistan was focused on the security sector, covering the salaries, equipment, 

and facilities of the ANSF.70 The sheer scale and direction of congressional funds placed the 

U.S. Department of Defense and senior U.S. military representatives in the field in powerful 

positions. According to many people interviewed for this paper, other donors and the Afghan 

government were basically expected to do as they were told in response to the military’s 

directives. The U.S. largesse left the rest of the international community as “mere bystanders 

agreeing to follow wherever the U.S. pointed.”71 Though some actors—including Germany, the 

United Kingdom, and the European Union—were more important than others, they were still 

“outside the magic circle comprised of the U.S. ambassador and the U.S. military commander 

in Kabul where the actual decision-making took place.”72
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PEACEWORKS 116

An Irreversible Transition? 

The COIN mantra of “clear/hold/build” rapidly changed to “clear/hold/transfer” in 2010, as 

NATO and the Afghan government formalized plans for a drawdown of international troops 

and phased handover of responsibility to the Afghan government for security, governance, and 

development. The brevity of the timeline for the security transition—starting in March 2011 

and officially ending in December 2014—meant that the commanders of the military COIN 

campaign were under pressure to utilize resources while they still had them. It also meant that 

establishing minimal levels of security, governance, and development in districts selected for 

the transition process were not preconditions for transfer.73

The brief timeline for the phased withdrawal of the bulk of international combat forces 

required even faster results in setting conditions for the drawdown. Both civilian and 

military sectors were rewarded for doing so.74 The effects of short-term objectives further 

distorted Afghan politics and economics in what was already a rentier state of unprecedented 

proportions.75 The presence of 140,000 international troops by 2011 with access to funding 

sources such as the CERP—“that had accountability and control that differed from any civilian 

equivalent”76—compounded a highly artificial situation. 

By 2012, with the international community viewing the handover to the Afghan government 

as being of paramount importance, many were frantic, wondering how the transfer would 

be sustainable when the Afghan government lacked domestic revenue for its civil servants’ 

salaries, let alone its inflated police and army. According to a senior British diplomat on the 

ground at the time, “It was not just the fault of the military who were not in a position to judge 

the viability of nonmilitary projects, a lot of civilian activity was also not sustainable.77 There 

was so much money, so much pressure, everyone was in on it.”78 In the Canadian government’s 

Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Development Program in Afghanistan (2015), some shortterm quantitative results are acknowledged, but the sustainability of these results was questioned 

by the independent evaluation team from Ecorys that conducted the report.79 A former head 

of the Canadian International Development Agency’s80 program in Kabul disagrees with the 

report’s claim that Canada was guided by a strategic vision throughout the period of evaluation, 

pointing out that the objectives of Canada’s development program in Afghanistan changed 

four times in nine years.81 In common with many other donors, “Canada’s largest venture in 

a fragile state was not well-defined; nor was it supported by adequate analysis based on an 

understanding of the history, society and culture, ethnic politics, the root causes of conflict, and 

the realities of fragility conditions in the country.”82

Whether the ANSF can maintain control over areas that were restored to the writ of 

central government by the 2009–2011 surge remains to be seen, even in light of Obama’s 

announcement to retain U.S. forces in Afghanistan through the end of his term in 2017.83

Attrition rates within the ANSF described in 2014 by the former U.S. commander general 

Joseph Anderson as “unsustainable” have continued to rise,84 though growing unemployment 

has led to an increase in recruitment into the ANSF. The more limited use of air support has 

reportedly also damaged ANSF morale.85 Hanging over everything is the question of how 

the ANSF will be fiscally maintained even with cuts to numbers. The pledge announced by 

Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter during President Ashraf Ghani’s March 2015 visit to the 

United States stipulated only that the U.S. Department of Defense “intends to seek funding 

for Afghan forces to sustain an end strength of 352,000 through 2017.”86

The effects of shortterm objectives further 

distorted Afghan politics 

and economics in what was 

already a rentier state of 

unprecedented proportions.
USIP.ORG 29

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Conclusion

A former deputy commander of the ISAF summed up the reasons underlying the military’s 

incoherent approach in Afghanistan: There was (1) no single command of the money, (2) 

no attention to addressing Afghan community needs as opposed to those of donors, (3) no 

means of prioritizing, and (4) no means of rewarding good behavior and punishing bad.87 In 

the absence of consistent, shared objectives in Afghanistan, the strategies of counterterrorism, 

counterinsurgency, and long-term state strengthening often worked at cross purposes.88 A 

former head of the World Bank mission in Kabul summed up the corrosive damage caused to 

statebuilding efforts: “The net effect of this was lots of talk about good governance and the rule 

of law when the main donors themselves were paying huge sums to warlords and other corrupt 

officials.”89 A clear example was the dependence of the U.S. and other international forces on 

powerholders’ militias (i.e., illegal armed groups) for the provision of periphery security for 

bases90 and their logistical resupply.

The widely held assumption that reconstruction and development produces a stability 

dividend went largely unquestioned.91 A related assumption was that Afghans—particularly 

in rural areas where the majority of the population is located—were able to choose between 

supporting the armed opposition or the Afghan government.92 Limited international 

understanding of the root causes of conflict in Afghanistan in the early and comparatively 

poorly resourced years of the engagement, combined with insufficient local awareness and an 

overall failure to understand how international actions at provincial and district levels were 

viewed by locals, did not help. 

The intensifying political demand from donor capitals for demonstrable progress in 

rebuilding Afghanistan contributed to a seemingly unstoppable aid juggernaut. This, combined 

with a war economy that spurred massive U.S. Department of Defense (and other) contracts,93

caused a feeding frenzy among international and well-connected Afghan contractors.94 

Corruption became “pervasive, entrenched, systemic and by all accounts...unprecedented in 

scale and reach” according to a 2009 report for USAID.95 By 2008, more nuanced approaches 

acknowledged the gulf between (1) the government that the international community was 

ostensibly trying to build and (2) how this government was actually experienced by Afghans.96 

But these time-consuming approaches came late in the day. By 2010, the international 

community’s focus was on preparing the ground for international military exit97 rather than on 

processes to identify political opportunities for stabilization at subnational levels.

Insecurity and limited Afghan government capacity increased the difficulty in monitoring 

projects, further facilitating corruption and suboptimal outputs. The implementation of projects 

via extended chains of international and Afghan subcontractors clearly played a major role in 

this problem. Repeated Afghan government protests over the qualitative costs and unnecessary 

squandering of off-budget reconstruction funds were largely ignored. 

The few project successes mainly came out of on-budget funding delivered directly to the 

government via the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund administered by the World Bank. 

Helping to achieve the outcomes were the fund’s specific incentives and conditions, namely 

a competent Ministry of Finance (MOF) that was committed to building effective financial 

systems and that understood any increase in on-budget funding would depend on that 

effectiveness. Without such a capable partner, a former World Bank senior official interviewed 

stated, “World Bank efforts would have been a waste of time.” Few other Afghan ministries 

had the MOF’s technical ability and commitment to implement reforms. 
30 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

The test of the security transition is now underway. The success or failure of the National 

Unity Government and the ability of President Ashraf Ghani to reduce corruption and 

violence, manage the intensifying conflict, and develop a legitimate economy will determine 

how the international intervention between 2001 and 2014 is judged and the nature of future 

donor engagement. A contraction in the economy and security forces is a real danger, making 

reaching a peace settlement and building regional economic connectivity the top priorities 

for the government. Internal political challenges have hardened, epitomized by the failure to 

appoint a Minister of Defense. At the same time, the relationship between Afghanistan and 

Pakistan has deteriorated significantly,98 while divisions within the Taliban are deepening.99 

More fronts have opened up beyond that of the ANSF versus the Taliban,100 increasing the 

number of actors in the conflict. The lack of jobs, as well as loss of hope in political solutions to 

the crisis, are underlying drivers of the Afghan exodus.101 The removal of remaining U.S. forces 

by the end of 2017 and the impact of the loss of air support they provide on ANSF morale is 

a key issue for the next U.S. administration to consider, along with the decision to continue 

to lead (or not) international funding efforts over the payment of salaries for the Afghan 

security forces. 

A marked imbalance between military and civilian sectors characterized the 2001–14 U.S.-

led intervention in Afghanistan. In looking forward, the U.S. military both believes in and 

needs unity of command and will continue to make progress toward that objective via detailed 

operational reviews and other measures. Much work has been undertaken by the United 

Nations, World Bank, and others to identify the elements that should be central to coherent 

and realistic international engagement in conflict and postconflict countries. The New Deal 

for Engagement in Fragile States—an agreement between conflict-affected states, civil society 

actors, and international development partners to improve current development policies and 

practice in fragile states—underscores the importance of commitment to a set of common 

goals and the centrality to success of trust among and between national and international 

actors. Yet, the civilian sector remains comparatively fragmented—be it because of the various 

UN agencies involved, donors’ differing national objectives, or the various agendas and, at times, 

competing interests of government ministries. The sector lacks the military’s unifying drive. 

The institutionalization of integrated approaches to the planning and conduct of statebuilding 

operations, facilitated by interagency structures, would offset this problem and would enable 

civilian perspectives to carry more weight in setting realistic timelines, priorities, and allocation 

of resources for durable state-strengthening processes. 

International appetite for intervening in fragile states is at a low point, but nationbuilding 

interventions will still be seen as being in the strategic interests of the United States for the 

foreseeable future, again drawing in U.S. allies. Identifying what worked and what undermined 

stabilization in Afghanistan is highly relevant to U.S. aims to increase burden sharing in 

an increasingly unstable world in which short-term counterterrorism approaches currently 

dominate strategic thinking.

A contraction in the economy 

and security forces is a real 

danger, making reaching 

a peace settlement and 

building regional economic 

connectivity the top priorities 

for the government.
USIP.ORG 31

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Notes

1. A. Surkhe, When More Is Less—The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2011), 24–25; T. Barfield, Afghanistan—A Cultural and Political History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 2010), 283.

2. Beneficiaries included prominent commanders like Mohammed Fahim. NA militias brought large areas of 

the country, including Kabul, under their control prior to the establishment of the Transitional Authority, 

ignoring U.S. calls not to enter the capital. 

3. The NA was able to take and maintain control of the key security ministries (defense, interior, and 

intelligence), as well as appoint governors and chiefs of police in most of Afghanistan’s provinces.

4. Dr. Barnett Rubin, former adviser to Richard Holbrooke, the U.S. government’s Af/Pak representative, in 

a keynote presentation: “Understanding the Political Economy of State-building Interventions,” at the 

Chatham House, Stanford University, and USIP-hosted “Conference on State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 

2001–2014: Learning from the Past to Inform the Future,” Washington, DC, March 16–17, 2015. 

5. Splits occurred between the U.S. Department of Defense under Donald Rumsfeld and the U.S. Department 

of State under Colin Powell; the latter had wanted to consider long-term political consequences and adjust the 

campaign accordingly. See J. Alexander Thier, “Afghanistan” in Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. 

William J. Durch (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace and The Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 477. 

6. Rubin, keynote presentation: “Understanding the Political Economy of State-building Interventions.” 

7. Ibid.

8. See www.unhcr.org/49ba2e9116.pdf.

9. The tanzimats included the main Afghan political parties based in Pakistan, backed by Pakistan, Saudi 

Arabia, and the West during the Soviet-backed communist period of the Afghan government. Tanzimatlinked militias waged a destructive civil war following the collapse of the Najibullah government that 

destroyed swathes of Kabul and killed uncounted numbers of civilians. Amnesty International in 1995 cited 

a figure of 25,000 dead. Many more were injured.

10. See Jonathan Goodhand, Bandits, Borderlands and Opium Wars: Afghan State Building Viewed From the 

Margins (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2009); and Doris Buddenberg and 

William A. Byrd (eds), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning, Dynamics and Implications for 

Counter-Narcotics Policy (Kabul: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime/World Bank, 2006).

11. The UK government, for example, leveraged its commitment of British forces to Helmand on President 

Karzai’s agreement to replace Sher Mohammed Akhundzada as provincial governor there. 

12. Bette Dam, A Man And A Motor Cycle—How Hamid Karzai Came To Power (Urecht, Netherlands: Ipso Facto 

Publishers, 2014), 192.

13. Ibid.

14. Karzai mistakenly believed that geo-strategic considerations would lock the United States into Afghanistan 

for the next hundred years, giving him and future Afghan governments leverage in return for the retention 

of U.S. bases in the country.

15. Michele A. Flournoy, “Lessons Learned and Unlearned,” in Nation-Building Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, 

ed. Francis Fukuyama (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 86.

16. By mid-2002, key air support and other assets were being removed from Afghanistan in preparation for the 

invasion of Iraq.

17. Capturing the Lessons from the Helmand Provincial Reconstruction Team, Wilton Park Report, December 3–5, 

2014, 11.

18. Flournoy, “Lessons Learned and Unlearned,” 88. Against the background of a widening security gap, the 

2006 NATO summit at Riga outlined the principles and intent of NATO’s “Comprehensive Approach,” 

which fed into NATO’s 2008 “Comprehensive Strategic, Political, Military Plan for Afghanistan.”

19. Robert M. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 215–16.

20. The Summative Evaluation of Canada’s Development Program in Afghanistan (2004–2013), released on a 

Canadian government website in March 2015, states that the objectives of the Canadian development 

program were reformulated several times during this period. Canada was not unique in this. 

21. The withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Afghanistan beyond a U.S. embassy detail coincides with the ending 

of President Barack Obama’s U.S. presidency in 2016. Obama promised in his 2013 State of the Union 

address that the Afghan mission would change from combat to support and that by 2014 the transition 

process will be complete. The pace of the withdrawal of remaining forces of around 10,000 was adjusted in 

2015, but the date for a completed withdrawal by the end of 2016 has not, at time of writing, been altered. 

22. Alastair McKechnie estimated that around two-thirds of all development assistance was outside the purview 

and policy frameworks of the Afghan administration; see Alastair J. McKechnie, Post-War Programme 

Implementation and Procurement: Some Lessons from the Experience of Afghanistan (London: Overseas 

Development Institute, 2011), 6.
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PEACEWORKS 116

23. Interview with Francesc Vendrell, former Personal Representative of the UN Secretary General on 

Afghanistan (January 2000–January 2002) and European Union (EU) Special Representative for 

Afghanistan (July 2002–September 2008), March 5, 2015, London.

24. Barfield, Afghanistan—A Cultural and Political History, 313.

25. Author’s observation, drawn from direct experiences as policy coordinator (2002–05) of the main 

nongovernmental umbrella organization, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief and Development. 

26. At the time, including the Taliban at the Bonn Conference was not considered politically possible either by 

the United States or participating Afghans. The realization that the Taliban’s defeat presented a unique 

opportunity for a negotiated reconciliation dawned much later.

27. Interview with FrancescVendrell, March 5, 2015, London. 

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid. The expansion of a NATO/ISAF presence throughout the country did not start until the ISAF 

mandate was adjusted by the United Nations in August 2003, an outcome led by Germany. In addition to 

the removal of assets in the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Pentagon did not want separately mandated 

peacekeeping forces in the same battle space as special forces operations under OEF. 

30. For background to the announcement of the PRT plan, see Barbara J. Stapleton, “A Means to What End? 

Why Provincial Reconstruction Teams are Peripheral to the Bigger Security Challenges in Afghanistan,” in 

Civil-Military Coordination: Challenges and Opportunities in Afghanistan and Beyond, ed. John Ferris (Calgary: 

Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, 2008), volume 3.

31. OEF is the U.S. government’s official name for its contribution to the war in Afghanistan and global 

counterterrorism efforts.

32. Wilton Park Report, Capturing the Lessons, 11. 

33. Office of the Secretary of Defense, “’Accelerating Success in Afghanistan’ in 2004: An Assessment,” 

Declassified White House Memorandum, January 18, 2005, http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/sp/440/

From%20the%20White%20House%20re%20Accelerating%20Success%20in%20Afghanistan%20in%20

2004%20an%20Assessment%2001-18-2005.pdf. 

34. These country leads were agreed on at the first international donors’ pledging conference in Tokyo in 

January 2002.

35. The Shura i Nazar, NA member, controlled the Ministry of Interior by selling police chief appointments 

that resulted in monthly kickbacks of thousands of dollars for lucrative positions situated on drug trafficking 

routes. See Joel Hafvenstein, “Afghanistan’s Opium Strategy Alternatives—A Moment for Masterful 

Inactivity?” in The Rule of Law in Afghanistan: Missing in Inaction, ed. Whit Mason (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2011), 124–25.

36. Andrew Wilder, “Cops or Robbers? The Struggle to Reform the Afghan National Police,” in State, Security 

and Economy in Afghanistan Current Challenges, Possible Solutions (Liechtenstein Institute on SelfDetermination, 2008), Liechtenstein Colloquium Report, volume 3, 23.

37. Interview with General Jonathon Riley, Oxford, October 2015; his direct experience of the international 

military command structure informs this section of the paper.

38. Ibid. 

39. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 206.

40. Interview with General Riley.

41. Ibid.

42. The joint annual report on civilian casualties (March 2011) from the United Nations Assistance Mission in 

Afghanistan and the Afghan Independent Human Rights Committee reported a reduction of 26 percent in 

civilian casualties attributed to Afghan and international military forces in 2010, from 2009.

43. See www.spiegel.de/international/germany/aftermath-of-an-afghanistan-tragedy-germany-to-pay-500-

000-for-civilian-bombing-victims-a-710439.html.

44. Special Forces had mistakenly targeted an Afghan party celebrating the birth of a baby boy. See Rod 

Nordland, “Afghanistan: Different Accounts Offered About Civilian Deaths,” New York Times, February 

12, 2010; and Richard A. Oppel, “U.S. Admits Role in February Killing of Afghan Women,” New York 

Times, April 4, 2010. 

45. Interview with senior U.S. military analyst, March 18, 2015, Washington, DC.

46. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 206.

47. Interview with senior U.S. military analyst, March 18, 2015, Washington, DC.

48. Ibid.

49. Interview with Nick Williams, former deputy NATO senior civilian representative, October, Oxford.

50. Ibid.
USIP.ORG 33

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

51. During 2004 to 2005 when the situation in Iraq verged on the catastrophic, development efforts in 

Afghanistan led by the U.S. embassy were being virtually micromanaged by senior members of the Bush 

administration in Washington according to multiple contacts the author had in the U.S. embassy at the time. 

52. A perspective corroborated by all interviewees.

53. This was the case in civilian as well as military institutions. In 2003—following the murder of a United 

Nations High Commissioner for Refugees staff member in Ghazni and a car-bomb explosion outside the 

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) office in Kandahar—Jean Arnault, then 

deputy head of UNAMA, queried why he had not seen the more acute and presumably unedited security 

report that he was given by UN agency security personnel based in Kandahar directly when he visited the 

city in the immediate aftermath of the attack. 

54. Interview with Francesc Vendrell, March 5, 2015, London. 

55. The United Kingdom rapidly followed suit in Helmand in 2006, initially reversing the security approaches 

taken in its northern-based PRT that had specifically avoided making large amounts of funding available to 

military commanders.

56. Interview with General Riley.

57. For example, Afghan ministries were often only able to disburse less than half of their annual budgets. 

58. Conference call with former U.S. government development professionals, Chatham House, March 6, 

2015, London.

59. The UK government’s Stabilisation Unit, comprising the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department 

for International Development, and Ministry of Defence, is a later example of the attempt to improve crossministerial unity of effort in complex interventions.

60. Flournoy, “Lessons Learned and Unlearned,” 86–89.

61. Ibid.

62. Conference call with former U.S. government development professionals, Chatham House, March 6, 

2015, London.

63. Interview with Nick Williams.

64. The PRT Executive Steering Committee (ESC) was viewed as a key means of improving civil-military 

coordination by ISAF IX (2006). However, in practice, there was no evidence of increased coordination. For 

example, although ESC policy notes were given a “Fragmentary Order,” meaning forces in the field were 

commanded to implement them, there is no evidence they had any impact; the EU Office was involved in 

drafting and monitoring the note of the Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG), and the office 

found no evidence of the note impacting DIAG processes.

65. Interview with former NATO senior civilian representative (SCR) to Afghanistan, Foreign and 

Commonwealth Office, March 11, 2015, London.

66. Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War, 205.

67. The U.S. Department of Defense released an unclassified version of the Strategic Review, September 20, 2009.

68. Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 314–15.

69. Ibid.

70. Surkhe, When More Is Less, 126.

71. Interview with Nick Williams.

72. Interview with former NATO SCR.

73. NATO and the Afghan government had pre-agreed minimal levels of security, governance, and development 

that were supposed to apply in selecting areas for a transfer in responsibility.

74. According to Michael Keating, deputy SRSG for UNAMA 2011–13 who monitored PRT preparedness in 

the lead up to exiting Afghanistan, to enable an exit, metrics were lowered continually for PRTs.

75. See Surkhe, When More Is Less, 126–30. According to World Bank and International Monetary Fund 

reports, foreign aid financing is estimated around 90 percent of all official expenditure in post-Taliban 

Afghanistan for most of the period under discussion.

76. Interview with former NATO senior civilian representative to Afghanistan, Foreign and Commonwealth 

Office, March 11, 2015, London.

77. This has been highlighted in successive reports by Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction 

(SIGAR) John Sopko.

78. Interview with former NATO senior civilian representative to Afghanistan, Foreign and Commonwealth 

Office, March 11, 2015, London.

79. To date, this is the only third-party evaluation released by a NATO member state on civilian and 

military assistance to Afghanistan funded by its taxpayers. Norway and Denmark are currently 

conducting similar evaluations.

80. The Canadian International Development Agency has since been amalgamated into the government’s 

Foreign Affairs and Trade Department.
34 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

81. Nipa Banerjee, head of Canada’s aid program in Afghanistan (2003–06), Ottawa Center for Policy Studies 

Seminar, “What Have We Learned from the Summative Evaluation of Canda’s Development Programme 

in Afghanistan,” April 14, 2015. 

82. Nipa Banerjee, “Afghanistan Not a Model to Follow,” Embassy, March 25, 2015. 

83. Matthew Rosenberg and Michael Shear, “In a Reversal, Obama Says U.S. Soldiers Will Stay in Afghanistan 

to 2017,” New York Times, October 15, 2015.

84. The report by SIGAR John Sopko (March 3, 2015) states that the number of Afghan National Army 

(ANA) members has declined by more than 15,500 or 8.5 percent since February 2014 to 169,203—the 

lowest force strength since August 2011.

85. Gabriel Dominguez, Deutsche Welle, March 5, 2015. Though the United States no longer routinely 

provides air support to ANSF operations, it still conducts airstrikes under the security agreement between 

the United States and Afghanistan. See Trofimov, August 27, 2015.

86. Mir Aqa, “Two Important U.S. Pledges to Afghanistan at Camp David,” TOLOnews, March 24, 2015.

87. Interview with General Riley.

88. Examples range from military presence/operations preventing access to communities by civilian aid and 

development actors, to Afghans joining the insurgency out of revenge for the death or detention of relatives, 

to absence of justice and impunity to the creation and expansion of the Afghan Local Police.

89. Email from former World Bank director for Kabul to the author, March 2015. 

90. Barnett Rubin, “What I Saw in Afghanistan,” New Yorker, July 1, 2015; Rep. John F. Tierney, Warlord, 

Inc.—Extortion and Corruption Along the U.S. Supply Chain in Afghanistan, Report of the Majority Staff, 

Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, June 22, 2010.

91. Academic literature on the role of development assistance in providing a stability dividend is limited. A 

paper coauthored by Alistair McKechnie of the Overseas Development Institute references research using a 

cross-sectional sample of one hundred districts in Iraq that indicated that the military handing out grants to 

local leaders was most effective in reducing the number of violent incidents, whereas investment in 

infrastructure was the least effective (Berman, 2009). The research in northern Afghanistan found that 

development assistance could exacerbate conflict by providing new resources to fight over; see Paul Fishstein 

and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and Security in 

Afghanistan (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Centre, Tufts University, 2012). 

92. As ISAF expanded, Afghan communities were caught between (1) armed opposition groups monitoring 

their actions and taking punitive measures if they collaborated and (2) ISAF, which acted as a magnet for 

attacks by the armed opposition.

93. The World Bank’s 2009 report, Fighting Corruption, states the U.S. Department of Defense authorized work 

contracts in Afghanistan for US$11.5 billion between 2007 and 2009. See Surkhe, When More Is Less, 133.

94. Surkhe, When More Is Less. 

95. USAID/Afghanistan, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan (Kabul: USAID, 2009), 4. Also see Surkhe, 

When More Is Less, 132. Transparency International’s annual assessment of corruption in states regularly 

placed Afghanistan near or at the bottom of its list.

96. See Capturing the Lessons, Wilton Park Report. The stabilization advisers deployed by the UK’s crossministerial Stabilisation Unit to Helmand were prominent in pioneering approaches that produced some 

stability, political, and governance outcomes at local levels. See Barbara J. Stapleton, “The Civil-Military 

Approaches Developed by the United Kingdom under its PRTs in Mazar-e-Sharif and Lashkar Gah,” in 

Reconstructing Afghanistan: Civil-Military Experiences in Comparative Perspective, eds. William Maley and 

Susanne Schmeidl (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 36.

97. See Barbara J. Stapleton, Beating a Retreat: Prospects for the Transition Process in Afghanistan (Kabul: 

Afghanistan Analysts Network, 2012).

98. See Marvin G. Weinbaum, “Dangerous Trajectory—Afghan and Pakistani Relations Are in a Downward 

Spiral, Moving Towards Levels not Witnessed for More Than 25 Years,” Foreign Policy, September 11, 2015.

99. The Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) views the scale of open factionalism in the wake of Mullah 

Omar’s announced death as “unprecedented in Taleban history but not representing rifts large enough to 

amount to a serious threat to the overall operational capabilities and organisational structure of the Taleban 

movement;” see Thomas Ruttig, “The New Taleban Deputy Leaders: Is There an Obvious Successor to 

Akhtar Mansur?” (Kabul: AAN, 2016).

100. For example, (1) Afghan Taliban versus local Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) groups, which 

include disgruntled former Afghan Taliban fighters based in Pakistan; (2) ISIL groups comprising 

indigenous Afghans plus Chechen and Uzbek fighters (based mostly in Nangahar and the south); and (3) 

the Afghan government arming of Afghan militias in the north against the Taliban and ISIL.

101. “Afghan President Vows Economic Boost to Stop Migrant Exodus,” Agence France-Presse, September 20, 

2015; Eltaf Najafizada, “Afghanistan Can’t Print Passports Fast Enough as Exodus Worsens,” Bloomberg, 

September 22, 2015.
USIP.ORG 35

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Evolution of Democratic Peacebuilding

The outbreak of several civil wars at the end of the Cold War, and the international community’s 

attempt to resolve them, raised the long-dormant question of what constitutes political order. 

How are states formed? How should power be allocated among formerly warring factions and 

elites? What political institutions are necessary? In what order should they be created—and 

how? Can they indeed be created? How can they endure? These questions were theorized at 

the same time as their premises were being tested in postconflict countries like Angola, El 

Salvador, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and a bit later in the Balkans. Whatever the differences 

among these efforts, they all had in common the holding of elections and the intended 

transition toward democracy.

If democracy was the answer to the fundamental question of political order, it was partly 

because liberal democracy had, by the early 1990s, become a global norm, vindicated by 

the victory of the West in the Cold War. The case for democracy was also underpinned by 

several theoretical arguments. First, democracies were believed to promote internal stability 

by offering a fair and transparent mechanism for contesting and distributing political power. 

Second, democracies were believed to govern more efficiently and with greater accountability 

than other systems, and this “performance legitimacy”1 would contribute to stability. In other 

words, elections provide democratic legitimacy, and efficient governance provides performance 

legitimacy. These two factors make it much harder for the state to be contested. On this basis, 

“democratic peacebuilding” was born, and the holding of elections has been part of every 

postconflict settlement brokered by the international community.2

The practical limits to this theory have now become apparent. The mechanisms of 

democracy, while robust enough to provide short-term legitimacy, are often unable to prevail 

over the unstructured and raw political environments that underlay civil conflicts. These 

environments are almost always characterized by weak institutions, disaggregated centers of 

unofficial power, low barriers to the use of violence, and lack of trust among political elites. 

They can be categorized as “limited access orders:” regimes comprising elite pacts in which 

insiders obtain and share rents from power while collaborating to exclude pretenders to power. 

But, as William Byrd has noted, “There is an inherent disconnect between democratic elections 

and the political structure and processes of a fragile limited access order.”3 Elections produce 

Elections and Democratization in Afghanistan

SCOTT SEWARD SMITH

The mechanisms of 

democracy, while robust 

enough to provide shortterm legitimacy, are often 

unable to prevail over 

the unstructured and raw 

political environments that 

underlay civil conflicts.
36 USIP.ORG

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winners and losers through a contest played, theoretically at least, according to transparent 

rules, which undermine elite pact making. Elections also, when properly conducted, allow new 

entrants into the game of power. 

As democratic peacebuilding has evolved, it has tried to address this disconnect in two 

ways. First, in the short term, the international community has tried positive and negative 

inducements to influence the behavior of political elites who might feel threatened by elections 

as a means of allocating and legitimizing power. These inducements include promises of aid, 

threats of being targeted by international justice mechanisms and sanctions, and even the threat 

and use of force.4 Second, practitioners of democratic peacebuilding have theorized that over 

time the repeated holding of elections will ultimately prompt the development of institutions 

that allow the consolidation of democracy, such as impartial electoral management bodies, an 

independent and effective judiciary, a free press, political parties, civil society organizations, and 

eventually a middle class that produces educated citizens.5 Dankwart Rustow described this as 

the “habituation phase” of a democratic transition, where the democratic design is “transmitted 

to the professional politicians and to the citizenry at large.”6

While this design has worked in its early phases, over the medium term, few postconflict 

elections have led to an organic establishment of the institutions necessary to achieve a more 

recognizable liberal democracy. More typically—from Mozambique to Cambodia, Angola 

to Rwanda—the victors of early elections have used their electorally legitimized authority 

to sideline old rivals and prevent new ones from gaining power.7 In other words, the first 

postconflict election becomes an instrument of the dynamics of the limited access order, rather 

than serving as a mechanism to break out of the exclusionary politics of that order. One marker 

of democratic consolidation is when power is transferred from one government to another as 

the result of an election.8 This is a surprisingly rare occurrence in postconflict democracies. 

Afghanistan’s Transition to Democracy

However, in 2014, Afghanistan seemed poised to be an exception. President Hamid Karzai, 

reaching the end of his constitutional two terms, stated repeatedly that he would cede power 

once a new government was elected. A first-round election was held on April 4, with high 

voter turnout and an engaged electorate. It was conducted in a way that earned praise from 

candidates and international observers alike for Afghanistan’s electoral institutions. But, as 

none of the eight candidates reached the 50 percent threshold, a second round between the 

top two candidates, Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah, was held on June 15. This time, 

there could only be one winner. When Ghani—who had come in second in the first round—

appeared to have won the second round, Abdullah’s camp claimed widespread fraud and 

threatened to withdraw from the process. The international community, which had invested 

greatly in Afghanistan’s democratization, felt compelled to step in and prevent the collapse of 

the electoral process and a potential civil war. On July 10, the U.S. special representative for 

Afghanistan and Pakistan, Ambassador James Dobbins, provided his analysis of the crisis—an 

analysis that would have far-reaching consequences: “[Afghan] democracy is not sufficiently 

developed to the point where a winner take all system, in which the losers retire and organize for 

the next election but don’t share any power following their loss, is really a workable solution.”9

The U.S. diplomatic strategy to resolve the electoral crisis was thus revealed. Two days later, U.S. 

Secretary of State John Kerry made an emergency visit to Kabul and brokered an agreement 

between the two candidates. A full audit of the votes would be held to determine the winner, 

but the winner would guarantee up front to share power with the loser. The audit took place 
USIP.ORG 37

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

in an intense environment as both camps negotiated the details of the power-sharing deal. 

Although the audit’s final results were never revealed, Ghani was declared president. The two 

candidates eventually formed a National Unity Government, with Abdullah being appointed 

by decree as chief executive officer—a post that does not exist in the Afghan constitution. 

This curious outcome—an election without a final vote count; a jerry-rigged, power-sharing 

government; and discredited electoral institutions—was described by the White House as “the 

first democratic and peaceful transfer of leadership in Afghanistan’s history.”10 Democracy 

International, a U.S. organization that observed both rounds of the election and the audit, 

more accurately concluded, “A peaceful transfer of power did occur, but the process that 

led to it was not democratic.”11 Thus, the question arises: What is the real legacy of the 

international community’s attempt to help Afghans restore their political order on the basis of 

democratic rules?

Visions and Revisions

Contemporary understanding of Afghanistan’s political order has been distorted by the 

country’s peripheral relationship to the western world for most of the twentieth century.12

Afghanistan has seized international attention only in times of crisis, when the political order 

has broken down. One must see past the historical grime of the last fifteen years to understand 

the salient features of Afghanistan’s political history, especially those most relevant to its 

attempted refounding in 2001 on the basis of democracy and the rule of law.13

First, take the question of constitutionalism as a basis for political order. The 1789 U.S. 

constitution was the first modern political charter. In the early nineteenth century, constitutions 

were adopted by newly independent Latin American countries and a few northern European 

countries (Norway in 1814 and Belgium in 1831). In the Islamic world, constitutionalism 

began with the Iranian constitutional revolution between 1906 and 191114 and the Ottoman 

constitution of 1908.15 These events inspired a similar movement in Afghanistan, where “Young 

Afghans,” modeled on the constitutionalist “Young Turks,” sought “a constitutional monarchy 

and a freely elected national assembly.”16 Among the Young Afghans was the son of King 

Habibullah Khan, Amanullah, who ascended the throne in 1919. Amanullah promulgated the 

first Afghan constitution in 1923. This is now considered an authoritarian constitution, “aimed 

at the organization of the state rather than the limitation of government,”17—although it did 

include several advisory and consultative bodies that, though not elected, were designed to be 

representative.18 This history places Afghanistan in the vanguard of Islamic constitutionalism. 

The case is similar for democracy. King Zahir Shah’s “new democracy” period in the 

1960s made Afghanistan one of the first Islamic states to adopt representative democracy 

as a political system—though it was within the framework of a constitutional monarchy.19

Afghanistan thereby joined a global trend among monarchies, while avoiding the trend 

toward authoritarianism of most Islamic countries. As Samuel Huntington pointed out in 

1968, “Traditional monarchies are, in today’s world, rarely, if ever, traditionalizing monarchies. 

The monarchical oligarchies are [...] modernizing oligarchies and the ruling monarchs are 

modernizing monarchs.”20 That these attempts at constitutionalism and democracy were 

ultimately unsuccessful is less important than the fact that they were tried. Afghan elites 

considered them to be legitimate, indigenous solutions to the problem of political order.21 It 

was therefore natural and uncontroversial for the post-Bonn order to be premised on broad 

democratic legitimization based on elections. If democracy has failed or stalled in Afghanistan, 

it is not, arguably, because it was seen by most Afghans as an alien imposition.22
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The Bonn process was a generally well-designed sequence of events that gradually expanded 

the legitimacy of the new government by offering greater and greater levels of participation.23

Up until the first election, the timelines set for these processes were properly measured and 

realistic. International diplomats shepherding the process considered it essential that the 

deadlines of the road map be met to provide assurance to a war-traumatized population that 

this process would not fail as previous ones had a decade earlier. The inauguration of the new 

government, the holding of the Emergency Loya Jirga, the formation of the Constitutional 

Drafting Commission, and the holding of the Constitutional Loya Jirga all happened 

on schedule. 

The timelines, however, were only part of the credibility of the process. The international 

community paid less attention to the substance of the law. If a political order is to be constructed 

on the basis of the rule of law, the laws should be designed for feasible implementation. As 

Yash Ghai (one of the international advisers to the Afghan constitutional commission) noted 

in another context, “Contemporary democratizing constitutions [...] embody normative values 

but have less of a ‘fit’ with power structures: They depend for their efficacy substantially on 

respect for the document.”24 Similarly, the great jurist Hans Kelsen observed that “a legal order 

is valid only if it, as a whole, is by and large effective.”25 The Afghan constitution was drafted 

in a way that undermined the elections before they were held. It is even more unfortunate that 

many of its unhelpful provisions were uncontroversial and technical, rather than necessary 

political compromises. A law that cannot be fulfilled quickly becomes a farce, and a farce 

cannot serve as the basis for a democratic order, which should be underpinned by transparency.

On the more general question of constitutionalism and the rule of law in Afghanistan, Noah 

Coburn and Anna Larson argue that Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution “simply does not have 

the same sacred quality that such documents have in other countries.”26 This can be interpreted 

in several ways. It may be that Afghans as a polity will never really embrace a formal, textbased, rule-of-law system because they are unable to escape from their local, traditional forms 

of rule; this is the “Afghanistan is a tribal confederation” argument that during the height of 

the 2010–12 “surge” was considered the key to unlocking Afghanistan’s political mysteries by 

Afghan specialists.27 But it may also be that, by 2010, Afghans saw no reason to impute any 

“sacred qualities” to the document when neither their own government nor the international 

community felt particularly bound by it. Afghans are neither inescapably tribal nor are they 

political dupes. As a member of the Constitutional Drafting Commission stated, “Afghan 

people may be illiterate but they’re also politicians. Now, after all these years of conflict, Afghan 

people can analyze anything.”28

The international community deserves a preponderant share of the blame for the many 

missed opportunities to instill a greater respect for the rule of law among Afghan political 

leaders. This attitude of laissez-faire rule of law raises an underexamined question: What 

responsibilities does the international community have in supporting rule-of-law-based 

democratization in other countries? When should it intervene and when should it not? At 

what point does intervention delegitimize local processes by making them seem inauthentic or 

imposed? At what point is intervention necessary to safeguard essentially democratic processes 

from adulteration by political elites frightened of losing power? From early in the process, a 

balanced approach proved difficult to achieve. Astri Suhrke describes the intervention of U.S. 

Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad during the Emergency Loya Jirga to prevent King Shah from 

becoming the head of the Interim Authority in June 2002: 

Having a non-jirga member and official of a foreign government make a critical decision 

on behalf of the jirga made a mockery of the process. The story rapidly trickled down to 
USIP.ORG 39

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

the countryside as evidence of the limited significance of elections. ‘What is the point,’ 

villagers later asked when discussing the scheduled next presidential election, when ‘they’ 

had even stopped the King being selected by the loya jirga.29

Richard Holbrooke played a similarly inappropriate role in the run-up to the 2009 

elections,30 when he was actively encouraging other candidates to run against Karzai—a policy 

that then U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates subsequently described as a “clumsy and 

failed putsch.”31

If, on the one hand, there was an excessive willingness to get involved when it was 

inappropriate, on the other hand, there was a general aversion to trying to discipline elites 

when they clearly broke the rules. The democratic rules were nominally embraced by elites 

at Bonn, and, as demonstrated by the high turnout in the first election, were widely accepted 

by the population.32 But in practice, there was a default tendency by elites to fall back on 

more familiar rules of the Afghan power game. Here, the responsibility of the international 

community should have been to encourage deference to the rule of law—not because it had 

been brought from the outside, but because it had been requested by Afghans. However, as time 

went on, the international community seemed to assume that tribalism, solidarity networks, 

patronage politics, and latent violence were the only means through which Afghans could 

conduct politics. Once international weakness on this question was internalized by Afghan 

political elites, it was fully exploited, and the relapse to tribalism and patronage became a selffulfilling prophecy. 

An early first missed opportunity was not decoupling the first election from the constitutional 

process. The Bonn timelines called for a constitution to be ratified in December 2003 and 

elections to be held in June 2004. That left only six months after the constitution was ratified 

to draft electoral legislation and plan and organize the election. To get around this impossibly 

tight timeline, the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division in 2003 proposed a “one-off ” electoral 

law that would only cover the first presidential and parliamentary elections and that could 

be decreed long before the constitution was adopted.33 The elected parliament would then 

have the responsibility for drafting a law that conformed with the constitution’s provisions. 

This would have added a year to the electoral planning process, allowing sufficient time for 

some operational processes to take place, such as the training of electoral commissioners and 

operational staff, the early launch of a civic education campaign, and timely procurement 

decisions that may well have saved money.34 Above all, however, it would have allowed time for 

a negotiation process among the dominant political actors over how to construct the rules of 

the electoral game, ensuring their buy-in. 

Instead, all these processes had to be compacted within six short months. Not surprisingly, 

this proved logistically impossible. The presidential election had to be postponed to October 

and the parliamentary election to a full year later. The unfortunate splitting of the two elections 

(both the president and the lower house of parliament had five-year terms) added another 

avoidable complexity and expense to future electoral cycles. The broken timelines, combined 

with operational shortcuts that undermined the quality of the election, contributed to the 

beginning of a breakdown in confidence in the democratic transition. Political elites were less 

invested in the “rules of the game,” because they had been less involved in their creation. The 

rules came to be seen as opaque and, justifiably, largely designed by foreigners.35 It is easy to 

reject the argument that democracy was imposed on Afghanistan; it is harder to reject the 

argument that the specific mechanisms and systems of democracy were imposed.

Once the decision to base the first election on the new constitution was taken, it was 

incumbent on the constitutional drafters (and their international advisors) to ensure that its 

An early first missed 

opportunity was not 

decoupling the first 

election from the 

constitutional process.
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PEACEWORKS 116

provisions were realistic and implementable. On this issue, the document disappoints.36 Lakhdar 

Brahimi, the special representative of the secretary-general who oversaw the constitutional 

drafting process, said “We took the very decent constitution of 1964 and just took out the 

king.”37 But head transplants are normally not so simple. The king was replaced by an elected 

president, and therefore, the constitution required an entirely new process for selecting the 

supreme executive. These provisions were the key innovations of the 2004 constitution and 

where the international community most needed to prove its competence. In some important 

ways, it came up short.

Numerous election-related provisions have, for no reason other than carelessness, 

complicated and actually undermined implementation of the elections.38 For example, both 

presidential and parliamentary elections were set in spring, requiring elections to be held under 

logistical conditions far more difficult than they would have been a few months later.39 In 

another oddity, the ending of the terms were separated by one month, and elections were 

prescribed to be held within thirty to sixty days before the end of each term. This means there 

is only one day on which the elections could be held simultaneously.40 Given that each election 

costs hundreds of millions of dollars, this is not a negligible consideration. Furthermore, district 

council, provincial council, and presidential and parliamentary terms are staggered at three, four, 

and five years, respectively. This creates a perpetual and never-ending electoral cycle. If district 

elections had been held (and the impossibility of holding them so far is another significant 

constitutional breach), this would have required seventeen elections in the first twenty-one 

years of the Bonn process. Mandating that the second round of presidential elections, in the 

event that no candidate receives a majority in the first round, be held two weeks after first 

round results have been announced may be realistic in France, but it is absurd in Afghanistan.

Each of these issues could have been identified and corrected had technical experts vetted 

the draft provisions. In the constitutional drafting process, however, the UN’s electoral experts 

were kept at an arms’ length from the constitutional drafters. The result is an illogical document 

that confounds practical implementation. The failure of implementation further debases the 

political authority of the document.

There has been a great deal of criticism regarding the registration of voters in Afghanistan 

and the absence of a unified voter registry or voter lists.41 Ghani has long been a critic of 

the technical advice received from the United Nations, which recommended a low-tech 

solution in 2003 when he had pushed for biometric registration.42 There were two main 

drivers of this advice: the tight timeframe of the election and the potential problems related 

to implementing a more sophisticated system, which could complicate the already-difficult 

electoral preparations.43 There is, however, a great deal to criticize about what has been the 

result of millions of dollars spent on multiple voter registration processes. Cumulatively, 

more than twenty million voter registration cards have been distributed to a total estimated 

population of twenty-seven million.44 Each voter registration exercise has created a separate 

database, and the various databases do not talk to each other. Experts have concluded that it 

is technically impossible to merge these databases, eliminate duplicates, and create a unified 

list. There is essentially, therefore, no registry. Similarly, it has been impossible to link voters to 

polling stations. 

After the 2004/05 electoral cycle, technical experts proposed to re-register every Afghan voter 

and link him or her to a polling station. Unfortunately, the significant overspending that occurred 

during the 2005 parliamentary elections contributed to increasing the already significant donor 

fatigue on elections. Funding dried up for the next several years, until early 2008, when planning 
USIP.ORG 41

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

had to begin for the 2009 elections, starting another rushed partial voter registration exercise to 

register those who had come of voting age since the 2005 parliamentary election. 

It is remarkable how frequently the international community overestimated what could be 

done in extremely short periods of time in Afghanistan. The community has paid for its shortsightedness or over-ambitiousness by having to spend far more money in a short timeframe 

than would have been needed in a longer, adequate timeframe.45

The voter registration problems are real; but, at the same time, the parlous state of the 

registry is not the significant driver of fraud that many believe it to be. The lack of polling 

station lists requires election organizers to print more ballots for every polling station than will 

be used, and some of these ballots have been misappropriated and used fraudulently. Improved 

tracking systems, however, have begun to address this problem. Similarly, even though many 

Afghans have several voter cards, multiple voting is not the major source of fraud. 

Fraud and Political Power

As the voter registration discussion demonstrates, the international community has 

overestimated the degree to which fraud can be addressed through technical measures. 

Fraud has become a feature of Afghan elections; it is expected by political actors (who are 

also responsible for it) and therefore has been factored into their electoral strategies.46 Fraud 

has also become iterative. If the worst is to be believed about the reports of fraud in the 

2014 election, it can only be concluded that those committing it had learned from 2009 and 

developed far more sophisticated techniques to evade the improved antifraud controls—which 

were themselves based on the gross and easily detectible fraud that took place in 2009.47 Fraud 

is therefore not a problem that is diminishing with each electoral cycle, as one might hope 

given advances in Afghan electoral capacity. Instead, it is becoming more sophisticated in each 

cycle and insinuating itself into regular electoral practice. 

The most common explanation for the prevalence of fraud is the pervasive insecurity in 

Afghanistan. However, while insecurity has prevented the extension of state authority, the 

manner in which the state has exercised authority has also driven insecurity.48 The link between 

insecurity and electoral fraud is complex and sometimes counterintuitive. The uneven or lack 

of security across Afghanistan has impacted elections in two ways. First, insecurity—defined 

here as a state’s inability to exclusively control violence—means that the state cannot guarantee 

that the established rules for the electoral contest will be applied consistently and as designed. 

The state cannot prevent the suborning of polling stations by local strongmen, the intimidation 

of voters or polling station officials, the illegal confiscation of voting materials, and so forth. 

The second effect of insecurity is the general sense of fear the insurgency instills in 

particular, making people afraid to vote. Calculated acts such as the deliberate singling out 

and killing of people possessing voter cards make later threats to attack polling centers more 

believable, depressing turnout in areas where insurgents are known to be active. Given that 

insurgent-related violence has, for most of the past decade, been more prevalent in the south 

of the country, the issue of disenfranchisement roughly along community and ethnic lines 

has arisen. This has forced electoral planners to attempt to navigate a delicate line between 

enfranchisement and fraud prevention. The difficulty of finding the balance was demonstrated 

in the elections of 2009 and 2010. In the former, polling stations were opened even in districts 

where security was known to be highly questionable, and where there had barely been a state 

presence, to avoid disenfranchising potential voters. As a result, though, the election was 

almost invalidated due to the massive fraud, including ballot stuffing in insecure areas.49 In the 
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parliamentary elections the following year, far stricter controls were placed on where polling 

stations were opened. The result was a prolonged national political crisis when, in the Ghazni 

Province, all eleven seats went to Hazara candidates in the north and none to Pashtuns in 

the south, who claimed they had been disenfranchised.50 While on the whole the electoral 

accomplishments in Afghanistan in the face of such chronic insecurity have been immense, 

it is increasingly apparent that chronic insecurity poses an insurmountable problem for the 

consolidation of democracy.

Ultimately, political violence in Afghanistan is one effect of the lack of agreement over 

“whose rules rule.”51 Even for those politicians who pledge to play by the electoral rules, 

the pervasiveness of fraud demonstrates the superficiality of that pretense. Karzai was once 

described as accepting the values of democracy but distrusting its rules and institutions.52 This 

probably is true of the attitudes of most Afghan political elites. Given institutional weaknesses, 

they have good reasons to distrust rules and institutions, but they have also contributed to 

and exploited that institutional weakness. Furthermore, without the rules and institutions of 

elections, the values of democracy eventually become meaningless. One cannot, for long, enjoy 

the idea of democracy and dismiss what makes it work.

The relationship between fraud and institutional weakness has been misunderstood by 

international policymakers, leading to questionable decisions. This became apparent in 2009, 

when the significant amount of fraud committed in that election was believed to have been 

one-sided and generally orchestrated by the presidential palace through the Independent 

Election Commission (IEC). As the audit of the votes showed, the fraud did largely favor 

Karzai (about 75 percent of the fraudulent votes went to Karzai), but it is less clear that it was 

orchestrated by the palace. Much of the fraud was likely a result of the overzealousness of local 

actors who were appointed by Karzai (as almost all local officials were) and who reasonably 

calculated that the best way of keeping their jobs was to ensure that Karzai was reelected.53

Similarly, international observers probably overstated the IEC’s ability to carry out a 

singularly conceived design across the national territory. It is more likely that local branches 

of the commission were co-opted by local power brokers. A less compelling argument, but 

one worth noting anyway, is that if the fraud in 2009 was the result of a single plan, it was a 

spectacularly bad one. The fraud was so blatant and excessive that it delegitimized the reelection 

of Karzai, haunted his second term, and contributed to the problems in 2014 that nearly split 

the country apart.

In 2014, international policymakers made similar claims that fraud was conducted from 

the center. Evidence from the exhaustive audit found that both candidates had committed 

fraud. That neither candidate was thought to be supported by Karzai (and therefore fraud was 

not necessarily at the behest of the palace) suggests that fraud is as much a feature of local 

politics as it is of the misuse of central state power.54 Indeed, the main forms of fraud identified 

in past elections, though they vary from region to region, are almost all committed locally at 

the behest of power brokers.55 One misfortune of the 2014 elections is that the politicians 

managed to portray themselves as victims, while the electoral institutions (though clearly not 

blameless)56 carried all the blame for the flawed election. 

Transformation and Representation

In postconflict societies, the political space is never favorable for the holding of authentically 

democratic elections. For example, the rule of law is weak; administrative systems are barely 

present; real power is dispersed among informal actors; the state has no control over violence; 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

voters are uninformed; and political parties, if they exist, are largely repurposed fighting 

factions. In Afghanistan, as Giustozzi and Orsini put it, “As long as the system continued to be 

patrimonially based on the personal relationship between rulers and local power brokers, the 

electoral process would inevitably represent a window of instability.”57

Postconflict elections are supposed to have both representative and transformative effects. 

The representative effect is to secure the legitimacy of the new political leadership, and the 

transformative effect is to gradually entrench the democratic order by demonstrating that it 

works. In this area more than any other, and perhaps surprisingly given the many problems 

that have already been discussed, the theory worked rather well in practice in Afghanistan. 

The large voter turnout, at least in the first round of the 2014 election, demonstrated that 

Afghans want this system to work. A surprisingly free and vibrant media environment has 

shaped itself around each election, and with each election, the process becomes more diverse, 

sophisticated, and informed (and more partisan as well, though that is perhaps inevitable). The 

inclusion of women in politics through the electoral quota for parliament has changed the face 

of Afghan politics, and it is only a matter of time until these changes penetrate politics in more 

meaningful ways.

What democratization has been unable to do, however, is to alter the structure of power 

by institutionalizing it. This fact distinguishes elections in established democracies from those 

in postconflict countries. In the former, elections confer power. In the latter, in many cases, 

elections have the practical result of deducting power. While warlords may have traded in their 

combat fatigues for fancy suits and learned to speak in the democratic vernacular, they have, in 

the end, shaped Afghanistan’s democracy more than democracy has shaped them. They have 

accepted that elections are a means of measuring power more than legitimizing or refreshing it 

and have used the full array of their formal and informal powers to try to maximize the measure 

of their power determined through the election. This is the root of not only the phenomenon 

of fraud but also the postelection negotiations of 2009 and 2014. 

Electoral processes alone are unlikely to change power structures, especially when, as in 

the case of Afghanistan, they are designed hastily to meet optimistic international timelines 

and defended weakly when confronted with the extra legal demands of powerholders. If the 

repeated holding of elections does not eventually change the way power is exercised, then the 

elections become increasingly futile. 

William Byrd proposes that, rather than elections, the building of political parties might 

be a better way of moving toward an electoral democracy: “Political party coherence requires 

mechanisms that provide incentives for both party leaders and members to avoid free-riding 

by the latter and pursuit of personal agendas inconsistent with the party platform by the 

former.”58 Discussion about political parties during a democratic transition focuses more on 

voter preferences than on incentives for political leaders, which are equally important. Samuel 

Huntington observed that “the capacity to create political institutions is the capacity to create 

public interests.”59

Another lesson to draw is that there are real limits to technical fixes to these deep-rooted 

patterns of power. The approach taken so far—diplomats working within and strengthening 

these patterns of power, while technical experts are left with fashioning incentives to break 

these patterns—is simply counterproductive. The “technical” in these cases will always be 

engulfed by the “political.”

What democratization 

has been unable to do, 

however, is to alter the 

structure of power by 

institutionalizing it.
44 USIP.ORG

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Sovereignty and Credibility

Elections only work if they have the widespread participation of eligible citizens and 

powerholders respect the results. They must be locally intelligible and sovereignly owned. The 

need for trust requires some degree of local ownership in their administration—an election 

run entirely by outsiders might not be respected.60 As Laurence Whitehead observed, “There 

is a point where the claims of popular sovereignty tend to clash with democratization viewed 

as an international project.”61

The nexus between sovereignty and credibility creates a general paradox that is present in 

almost all postconflict democratization efforts. The same nexus created a particular paradox for 

Afghanistan. The general paradox is that in most postconflict countries, local, administrative 

systems and skills simply do not exist to support elections. This means that international 

organizations and experts have to play a large role in organizing them. In 2004, a Joint 

Electoral Management Body (JEMB), comprising six Afghans and five international experts, 

organized the Afghan presidential elections. Initially, the JEMB Secretariat—the operational 

body in charge of implementing the election—was almost entirely made up of international 

experts. In early 2004, a new framework was devised so that Afghan civil servants who had 

just completed working on the Constitutional Loya Jirga were deployed to the JEMB, where 

they were paired with international counterparts, who now had the job of both training their 

Afghan colleagues and organizing the election under tight deadlines. The efficiency and 

coherence of this structure was questionable; at the time, there was sufficient good will and 

trust toward the international community to allow for a more streamlined election, without the 

complication of adding Afghans. Nevertheless, in 2014, the Afghan electoral commission was 

able to at least complete the logistical tasks of the election with greatly reduced international 

technical support. 

A particular problem was that the international community placed such a huge strategic 

importance on Afghanistan that the stake in the elections was just as high for the community 

as it was for Afghans—but for different reasons. Whitehead has pointed out a shift over 

the past decades to a “new emphasis on democracy as security rather than democracy as 

liberation.”62 This shift has implications for the perceptions of the international community’s 

role in a sovereign electoral process. It demotes the importance of allowing an Afghan view of 

democracy to evolve, which could include more functional norms even if uncomfortable to those 

international observers who expected to see “Swedish-style” elections. It did not help, either, that 

the international views were often contradictory. As Martine van Biljert noted, “International 

observers often seem to oscillate between an optimistic hope that improved antifraud measures 

will result in a much cleaner election, and a cynical acceptance that an Afghan elections will by 

nature be messy, with little hope of or effort towards greater transparency or accountability.”63

This schizophrenia has led in each Afghan election to widely divergent postures before and 

after the elections. The pre-electoral posture is characterized by an emphasis on rules, reforms, 

and high expectations. When the process is inevitably confronted with fraud, disorder, and 

messiness, international decision makers, citing the importance of Afghan stability, make 

extravagant excuses for the conduct of the election and then find expedient ways to maintain 

order. This outcome demonstrates how the political in moments of crisis engulfs the technical, 

but it is the nature of these elections to consistently generate crises.64

At a theoretical level, the international community promotes postconflict elections 

because it believes that popular inclusion in these processes promotes legitimacy and 

therefore government stability. At a practical level, the international community tends to 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

balk at the instability that elections generate—what Przeworski calls their “institutionalized 

uncertainty”65—and seeks the most convenient compromises with powerful actors, inevitably 

at the expense of the electoral process per se. 

Graveyard of Democratic Peacebuilding?

Has the storied “graveyard of empires” also become the “graveyard of democratic peacebuilding”? 

Never have so many resources—political, military, and financial—been deployed in the service 

of a democratic transformation. Yet, each successive election in Afghanistan has yielded a result 

that has been less and less democratic in the sense that the count of the votes have had less and 

less to do with the determination of the result.

The conclusion of the 2014 election, the power-sharing agreement, and the 100 percent 

audit are a stark demonstration of the de-democratization of Afghan elections. The political deal 

that finally brought an end to the electoral crisis is a demonstration of the desovereignization 

of the elections. And the logic behind that intervention—that Afghans are not developed 

enough for a winner-take-all process—pulls a dark shade over the future of democracy in 

Afghanistan. Dobbins, in the quote cited earlier, did not say that the election had been so 

marred by fraud that it could not reliably be seen as the expression of the people’s will and 

therefore both candidates should share power; he said that even if there is a winner, the loser 

could not trust that the winner would not allow future elections to be held. As William Maley 

said, commenting on the 2009 election, “It is more than likely that those who are unready for 

democracy are not ordinary people but entrenched elites, for whom the idea of ejection from 

office at the hands of the electorate may indeed be unpalatable.”66

Yet, in 2014, Afghanistan was poised to achieve the great hurdle of democratic consolidation: 

the handover of power from one party to a rival party through an election. Strikingly, the 

incumbent, Karzai, defied expectations and did not use his significant constitutional 

presidential powers to remain in power. He did not formally back any candidate, nor enact a 

“Putin-Medvedev” scenario, as many had hypothesized.67 The candidate he was rumored to be 

backing, Zalmay Rassoul, came in third place, confounding those who were sure that Karzai 

would use the mechanisms of executive power to ensure his favored candidate would win. One 

of the most interesting things about the fraud that took place in 2014 was that it was enacted 

by two candidates who were not part of the regime.68

Furthermore, a number of institutions conducive to democracy had begun to emerge 

since the beginning of the state’s reconstruction in 2001. Huge crowds at campaign rallies for 

the major candidates showed a mobilized citizenry. Civil society was active and increasingly 

organized. Afghanistan has a remarkably free press by most standards, let alone the standards 

of its region. The media devoted huge coverage to the election, with different outlets taking 

different sides. The judiciary under Karzai was noticeably subservient to the executive, but 

it does not play a significant role in elections. The main electoral bodies—the IEC and the 

Independent Electoral Complaints Commission—were, on the other hand, both relevant to 

the conduct of the election and of questionable integrity. But the problem of these institutions 

was less that they were organized and partial, and more that they were fragmented, weak, and 

easily captured at local levels by local power brokers. In other words, they resembled pretty 

much every other institution in Afghanistan. 

Whatever the flaws of the IEC, the agreement by both candidates to conduct an audit of 

every ballot box supervised by the United Nations—observed by international and local groups 

and implemented with the direct participation of both camps—was intended to control for the 
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weaknesses of the institution. This was a classic illustration of peacebuilding theory in practice. 

In other words, all of the instruments were in place in Afghanistan in 2014 for the democratic 

peacebuilding theory to demonstrate its validity. Despite this generally favorable backdrop, the 

democratic component of the election began to unravel quickly in a series of decisive steps, 

mostly driven by elites supported by international actors eager to mollify them.69

First, threats by backers of Abdullah to use force if Abdullah was not declared the winner 

frightened the international community. Any historical judgment on the wisdom of what 

happened next—in particular the immediate call by the international community for a powersharing government—will hinge on the credibility of these threats.70 Those who justify the 

political compromise that pre-empted the electoral result argue that, whatever the damage 

to the democratic instrument, it was necessary to avoid a relapse into civil war. Second, while 

agreeing to support an audit, the United States in particular preempted the result of the audit 

by proposing a power-sharing deal, whatever the audit revealed. This meant that the present 

presumption of fraud had the same political effect as any to-be-discovered evidence of fraud. 

Despite the significant resources spent on the audit; the participation of international observers 

from Europe, Asia, and the United States; and the technical expertise of the United Nations, 

the audit’s results were essentially ignored.71 The United States acceded to requests by the 

Abdullah camp to not release the results. The European Union, sending its own observer team, 

described the UN-supervised audit as “unsatisfactory”72 despite the intense scrutiny provided 

every ballot box by UN officials, candidate agents, and hundreds of national and international 

observers. The divergence between the European Union, the United States, and the United 

Nations on the credibility of the audit is perhaps the most significant breakdown of consensus 

and comity among the three main international actors promoting democracy since the end of 

the Cold War.

As for learning lessons from these three cycles of elections in Afghanistan, one fears it 

might be too late. Part of the power-sharing agreement was to hold a loya jirga in 2016 that 

would change the constitution to create a system that better suits the reality of Afghanistan’s 

dispersed power and its need for elite settlements rather than ballot box victories. The problem 

is, again, the timeframe. It is difficult to see how the electoral reforms necessary for holding a 

constitutionally prescribed loya jirga can occur in time. As in 2004, the timelines are incredibly 

short. And while the international community sees these next round of elections, and hopefully 

a patched-up constitutional solution, as a prelude to an exit, the past election has left donors 

and the international apparatus that supports democracy building divided and exhausted and 

quite happy to drop the electoral agenda.73 The electoral reform commission, according to the 

September agreement, is supposed to guide the reforms, but at the time of this writing, it is not 

functioning and is mired in disputes about its membership. 

With so many other pressing crises to resolve—not least the institutionalized crisis of 

power sharing—it is hard to see how Afghan elites will find the energy to do what is necessary 

to implement its heavy electoral agenda, nor whether the international community has the 

energy or sincere belief in democracy to encourage them to do so. Despite the expenditure of 

great efforts and resources, and despite some remarkably encouraging signs that Afghans have 

embraced democracy, the democratic system seems increasingly a burden on political actors 

rather than the foundation of a political system. 
USIP.ORG 47

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Notes

1. Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman, OK: 

University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 50.

2. In his book by the same title, Richard Ponzio proposes democratic peacebuilding as a term to describe a 

“dynamic, long-term process of institutionalizing and expanding democratic legal authority within a weak 

state or territory to reduce the propensity towards violent conflict.” The term is used more generically in this 

paper to describe the established practice of the international community since the 1990s of incorporating 

elections and democratization into its postconflict peacebuilding strategies. Ponzio’s democratic 

peacebuilding is presented as a new approach. It could be argued, however, that his definition aptly describes 

the practice of the international community over the past several decades, though Ponzio is correct to point 

out—as this paper does as well—that the international community’s commitment to “expanding democratic 

legal authority” in postconflict states has been highly inconsistent. See Richard Ponzio, Democratic 

Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan and other Fragile States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 13.

3. William A. Byrd, “Understanding Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential Election: The Limits to Democracy in a 

Limited Access Order,” Special Report 370, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015), 8.

4. There are recent examples of all of these inducements being used. During the 2010 Côte d’Ivoire election, 

France used force against incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo, who refused to accept the second-round 

electoral result and now sits in the Hague following a French-led military operation. (In this election, as in 

the just-completed Afghan election, the candidate who had won the first round, Gbagbo, lost in the second 

round.) In Iraq, Nouri al-Maliki relinquished the prime ministry under international pressure despite being 

the leader of the party that won the most votes. The European Union uses the threat to discontinue trade 

and aid cooperation with developing countries under the Cotonou Accords if they do not hold democratic 

elections as certified by EU observer missions.

5. Seymour Martin Lipset originally asserted that “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that 

it will sustain democracy”; see “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political 

Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 69–105. Some thirty-five years later, Adam 

Przeworski, Michael M. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Papaterra Limongi Neto took this 

hypothesis and tested it empirically. They found that “no democratic system has ever fallen in a country 

where per capita income exceeds $6,055”; see “What Makes Democracies Endure,” Journal of Democracy 7, 

no. 1 (1996): 39–55. Even later, Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse argue that “low economic growth 

per se is not a clear sign that democracy is threatened, while high economic growth provides no guarantee 

against economic reversal”; see “Why Democracies Fail,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008): 57–68. 

6. Dankwart Rustow, “Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,” Comparative Politics 2, no. 3 

(1970): 337–63. Rustow’s model is derived from a historical case set that explicitly excluded countries whose 

democratic transitions were driven by external actors, but there is no reason why his description of how 

democracy becomes habituated would not also apply to democratic-peacebuilding contexts.

7. The point is obvious but concisely stated by Carles Boix: “Hence a stable or successful democracy—that is, 

the uninterrupted use of a free and fair voting mechanism to make political decisions and select public 

officials—is possible only if both the winner and the loser (or, more generally, the majority and the minority) 

comply with the outcomes of the periodic elections that they have set up to govern themselves”; see “The 

Roots of Democracy,” Policy Review no. 135 (2006).

8. Samuel P. Huntington proposed the “two turnover” test in The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late 

Twentieth Century. By their nature, indicators of democratic consolidation are debatable.

9. See http://asiasociety.org/blog/asia/us-envoy-candidates-support-national-unity-key-next-afghangovernment, accessed February 21, 2016.

10. David Jackson, “Obama Team Applauds Afghanistan Power Sharing Deal,” USA Today, September 21, 2014.

11. Democracy International, Afghanistan Election Observation Mission 2014—Final Report (Bethesda, MD: 

Democracy International, 2015), 47.

12. Before 2001, the term Afghanistanism was used to describe the practice of concentrating on problems far from 

home while ignoring critical issues closer to home. “A term based on the remoteness of that country from 

the U.S.; the practice of concentrating investigations on far-off places for problems to which some ‘answers’ 

can be put forward, rather than looking at problems nearer to home, for which no such black-and-white 

solutions will do”; see Jonathan Green, Dictionary of Jargon (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987), 13.

13. While the following discussion deals with Afghanistan’s constitutional and democratic antecedents, Vartan 

Gregorian reminds us that the modernizing impulse among its rulers has been a consistent feature since 

1880, when Abdul Rahman Khan began his twenty-one-year reign. While allegedly warning his sons to 

“make haste slowly,” he said this in his political testament: “I hope and pray that if I do not succeed in my 

lifetime in the great desire for making railways, introducing telegraphs and steamers, working the mines, 

opening banks, issuing banknotes, inviting travelers and capitalists from all parts of the world, opening 

universities and other institutions in Afghanistan, my sons and successors will carry out these desires of my 

heart and make Afghanistan what I desire it to become”; see The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan (Palo Alto, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 2013), 161. (There is a delightful symmetry between this line of thought and 
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that of another founder, John Adams, who wrote to his wife: “I must study politics and war, that our sons 

may have liberty to study mathematics and philosophy. Our sons ought to study mathematics and 

philosophy, geography, natural history and naval architecture, navigation, commerce and agriculture in 

order to give their children a right to study painting, poetry, music, architecture, statuary, tapestry, and 

porcelain,” http://www.quotationspage.com/quote/33545.html.) 

14. Said Amir Arjomand, “Islamic Constitutionalism,” Annual Review of Law and Social Science 3, (2007): 

115–40.

15. The first Ottoman constitution actually dates from 1876—the first modern constitution outside of Europe 

and the Americas—but it lasted only two years.

16. M. Hassan Kakar, “Constitutional History of Afghanistan,” in Encyclopedia Iranica vol. vi, fasc. 2, 158–62.

17. Said Amir Arjomand, “Constitutional Developments in Afghanistan: A Comparative and Historical 

Perspective,” Drake Law Review 53 (2004–05), 943.

18. For details on Amanullah’s constitution, see, for example, Vartan Gregorian, The Emergence of Modern 

Afghanistan (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1969), 251. For an excellent discussion of 

Afghanistan’s early constitutional movement, see also Amin Tarzi, “Islam and Constitutionalism in 

Afghanistan,” Journal of Persianate Studies 5, (2012): 205–43.

19. See, for example, Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan: Elections in an 

Unstable Political Landscape (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014), 33–36.

20. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1968, 1996), 

153. Of the monarchies that Huntington discusses, only Morocco and Afghanistan were Islamic.

21. For a succinct summary of Afghanistan’s pre-2001 democratic history, see Anna Larson, Toward an Afghan 

Democracy? Exploring Perceptions of Democratisation in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and 

Evaluation Unit, 2009), 5–8. 

22. The Asia Foundation has monitored Afghan attitudes on a variety of issues since 2006. Afghans’ 

“satisfaction with democracy” has varied between 68 and 77 percent; see Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the 

Afghan People (Kabul: The Asia Foundation, 2014), 90.

23. Richard J. Ponzio noted, “Although an imperfect document, an important characteristic of the Bonn 

Agreement is that it set into motion an inclusive political process that would be driven locally, with 

mechanisms established to accommodate diverse interest groups and power brokers across the country”; see 

Democratic Peacebuilding: Aiding Afghanistan and other Fragile States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 

121. Clare Lockhart and Ashraf Ghani also noted, “The Bonn Agreement in Afghanistan set the following 

two distinctive phases of transition. The first involved the transfer of power to an interim administration for 

six months. The second called for the election of an emergency grand council to choose a head of state and 

key positions in the transitional government; it further required the appointment of a constitutional 

commission to draft a constitution, the election of a constitutional convention to debate and adopt a 

constitution, direct presidential elections to elect a president, and parliamentary elections. At each state the 

agreement provided citizens with means by which to assess, participate in, and monitor progress”; see Fixing 

Failed States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 182. 

24. Yash Ghai, “Constitution-building Processes and Democratization: Lessons Learned,” in Democracy, 

Conflict and Human Security: Further Readings, International IDEA, 235.

25. Hans Kelsen, Principles of International Law (New York: Rinehart, 1952), 414.

26. Coburn and Larson, Derailing Democracy in Afghanistan, 225.

27. As Benjamin D. Hopkins wrote, “The vision of a rural ‘tribal society’ bound by ancient customs and 

traditions such as the ‘Pashtunwali,’ the so-called Pashtun tribal code, remains deeply embedded in policy 

prescriptions”; see “America’s Shocking Ignorance of Afghanistan: Afghanistan Is Much More Complex 

than Western Stereotypes of its ‘Tribal’ Culture Would Have Us Believe,” www.nationalinterest.org, June 5, 

2015.

28. Chris Johnson and Jolyon Leslie, Afghanistan: The Mirage of Peace (London: Zed Books, 2004), 221.

29. Astri Suhrke, When More is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (London: Hurst and Company, 

2011), 164.

30. Scott S. Smith, “The Bull in Afghanistan’s China Shop,” Foreign Policy, March 27, 2013.

31. Robert Gates, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2014), 359. Gates earlier 

writes, “For Holbrooke and others at the table, it provided the time necessary to identify a viable alternative 

to Karzai, who they thought had to go. If the Afghan constitution was an impediment to achieving this goal, 

the hell with it” (341). It was apparently not only Afghans who did not impute a “sacred quality” to 

their constitution.

32. As the International Crisis Group put it, “The key lesson from the presidential election [of 2004] is that 

Afghans strongly want a say in their governance”; see “Afghanistan: From Presidential to Parliamentary 

Elections,” Asia Report no. 88, November 23, 2004. The question of what “democracy” means to Afghans 

is more complex than can be given due consideration here. Anna Larson, for example, notes that some 

Afghans who associated democracy with western licentiousness rejected it, but the concept of “Islamic 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

democracy” (i.e., government elected by popular vote) was more widely embraced; see Toward an Afghan 

Democracy? Exploring Perceptions of Democratisation in Afghanistan. Similarly, field research also provides 

evidence of an embrace of democracy. “One of the points taken from respondents in the study areas is that 

Afghan voters support the idea of a representative government selected through an electoral process”; see 

Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Losing Legitimacy? Some Afghan Views on the Government, the 

International Community, and the 2009 Election” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, 2009), 8.

33. This proposal is discussed in greater detail in Scott Seward Smith, Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition: Politics, 

Peacekeeping, and the 2004 Presidential Election (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner, 2011), 149.

34. There are several other indirect but important potential benefits. First, an earlier planning process might 

have yielded information. Second, the one-off electoral law, by not being legislated, might have offered a 

more rational arrangement that, in turn, might have positively influenced the legislature when it came time 

for Afghanistan to draft its own law.

35. According to Andrew Reynolds, one reason that a proportional representation system—favored by most 

international experts—was rejected by the Afghan cabinet was because the Afghan official responsible could 

not explain the system to the cabinet; see “The Curious Case of Afghanistan,” Journal of Democracy 17, no. 

2 (2006): 104–17.

36. For a more comprehensive analysis of the problematic constitutional provisions, see Scott Seward Smith, 

Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition, 269–72.

37. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, 

Afghanistan, and Central Asia (New York: Viking, 2008), 212.

38. An interview with one of the three principal constitutional advisors perhaps explains this sort of carelessness 

(author translation): “Yes, I arrive with a sort of deliberate arrogance. I announce, for example in the case of 

Afghanistan that it is not me who will adapt myself to Afghanistan. They want to adapt themselves to 

democracy? It’s for them to learn. In fact, I don’t hesitate to add something along the lines of: ‘I don’t know 

anything about your problems and they do not interest me.’ The best specialists of Afghanistan are Afghans 

themselves. If they brought me there it was because they wanted me to teach them about Afghanistan. I’ve 

hung around a lot of countries in the world, and everywhere I go the first thing people tell me is, ‘here, things 

are very unique.’ I answer immediately, there is nothing unique. Until I see otherwise, I am face to face with 

men and women made of skin and blood who want to live in peace in a legitimate system”; see “Militant de 

la démocatie: entretien avec Guy Carcassonne,” Critique Internationale no. 24 (2004). At least on the 

question of timing the elections, Carcassonne may have been better off listening to one of his compatriots, 

albeit from a former, wiser era: “[The spirit of a people’s law] must have relation to the physical characteristics 

of a country, to the climate—frigid, torrid, or temperate—to the nature of the land, its situation, its extent, 

to the people’s mode of life [...] they must have relations one to another, to their origin, to the order of things 

under which they were established. They must be considered from all these points of view.” Anne M.Cohler, 

Basia C. Miller, and Harold S. Stone (eds.), Montesquieu: The Spirit of the Laws (Cambridge: Cambridge 

University Press, 1989). 

39. The organizers of the 2014 presidential elections proved for the first time that elections can be organized in 

April. Until then, it had seemed too risky. The 2004 and 2009 presidential elections and 2005 and 2010 

parliamentary elections were all held outside of the constitutional timelines.

40. That day would be thirty days before the end of the presidential term and sixty days before the end of the 

parliamentary term. In other words, if to save money, it is decided to hold both elections on the same day, 

then it virtually guarantees there will not be enough time to count and certify the results before the 

expiration of the president’s term. This design flaw was negated in practice because it was impossible to hold 

parliamentary elections along with the presidential elections in 2004 (in part due to the short period between 

adopting the constitution and holding the first elections). But this has only added to the staggering of 

election dates, ensuring that three elections are held in every five-year period.

41. A single voter registry refers to one, up-to-date list of all eligible voters in the country. Voter lists refer to lists 

of voters eligible to vote at each polling station. Afghanistan has neither a single registry nor a voter list. 

42. See Lockhart and Ghani, Fixing Failed States, 77–78. They describe being rebuffed when they proposed a 

biometric system based on iris scanning for the registration of voters prior to 2004. Whatever the feasibility 

of an iris-based biometric system, Ghani and Lockhart correctly identify the dilemma presented by the tight 

timeline. “Faced with the urgency of either proceeding with a tight deadline for elections or being blamed 

for causing the postponement of the political process, Afghanistan had to accept an inadequate solution with 

the promise that at least the manual system, although costly, would be failsafe.”

43. Several years earlier, in East Timor, an attempt had been made to use biometrics at the insistence of a donor, 

which was supplying the system. The new system failed, and the elections were almost postponed. See, also, 

this more recent account of uses of biometric cards in Africa and their mixed record, with the conclusion that 

“African governments and donors should stop looking at technology as the best bet for improving electoral 

integrity”; see www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/10/what-other-african-electionstell-us-about-nigerias-bet-on-biometrics/.
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44. European Union Election Assessment Team, European Union Election Assessment Team: Final Report

(Brussels: European Union External Action Service, 2015), 15. The initial voter registration took place in 

2003 and 2004. Since then there have been additional partial registrations in 2005, 2008, 2009/10, and 

2013/14. See also Inge Fryklund, “Stop Registering Afghan Voters,” www.fpif.org, February 5, 2013.

45. Funding registration for the first round was also difficult. With donors focused on the constitution process 

in the second half of 2003, it was difficult to raise funds for the registration of voters. The fragmented nature 

of the funding meant that major donors waited for others to act first, so as to not be on the hook, demanding 

to see progress first. But because of a lack of funding, there was a lack of progress. A desperate push had to 

be made as late as March 31, 2004, at the Berlin conference, to secure funding for the elections that were 

then still officially scheduled for June.

46. Martine van Bijlert noted ahead of the 2010 parliamentary elections that fraud was likely because “the 2009 

elections will have persuaded many candidates that they need to ensure an excess of votes, in case a 

proportion is disqualified”; see Who Controls the Vote: Afghanistan’s Evolving Elections (Kabul: Afghan 

Analysts Network, 2010), 2.

47. A number of antifraud measures were taken in 2014, in part because of learning from the fraud in 2009. 

These included plastic tape to cover the tally sheets to avoid tampering with them, unique serial numers on 

voter logs, results forms and ballots, GPS identification of all polling stations, and tracking of ballot 

materials. In addition, 95 percent of polling stations were said to have been covered by candidate agents.

48. See, for example, Ben W. Heineman Jr., “Corruption—The Afghan Wild Card,” The Atlantic, October 2, 

2009.

49. See for example, Scott Worden, “Afghanistan: An Election Gone Awry,” Journal of Democracy 21, no. 3 

(2010): 11–25; and Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Voting Together: Why Afghanistan’s 2009 Elections 

Were (and Were Not) a Disaster” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU), 2009).

50. See, for example, Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, “Undermining Representative Governance: Afghanistan’s 

2010 Parliamentary Election and its Alienating Impact” (Kabul: AREU, 2011); International Crisis Group, 

“Afghanistan Election Stalemate,” Asia Briefing no. 117 (2011); and Aruni Jayakody, “The State of Electoral 

Dispute Mechanisms in Afghanistan” (Kabul: AREU, 2014).

51. For an extended discussion of this theme, see Tamim Ansary, Games Without Rules: The Often Interrupted 

History of Afghanistan (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012).

52. Former Afghan Minister of Interior Ali Jilali once described Karzai as saying that he cherishes the values of 

democracy but “has no faith in its institutions”; see Elizabeth Rubin, “Karzai in His Labyrinth,” NYT 

Magazine, August 9, 2009. This attitude is probably true of most Afghan elites.

53. “While fraud can be a problem in almost any system, there are good reasons in principle to think that strong 

presidential systems can offer a peculiarly enabling environment. Presidents are typically surrounded by 

networks of unelected officials whose careers depend upon the continuation of the patronage of the 

incumbent to whom they have become attached. The fall of the incumbent president will most likely entail 

the fall of his clients as well, and they stand to fall much further than their patron”; see “Afghan Elections: 

From the Sublime to the Ridiculous,” presented at Indiana University’s conference on State-building in the 

Contemporary Islamic World: U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, November 13–14, 2009. Ethan 

B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse make a similar point: “When a leader, whether a president or a prime 

minister, faces only weak constraints, the temptation grows to gather economic and political power into 

executive hands. As power becomes more concentrated, members of other branches of government, 

investors, and agents of civil society begin to doubt whether public policies will promote the general welfare”; 

see “Why Democracies Fail,” Journal of Democracy 19, no. 4 (2008): 57–68. 

54. For a discussion of perceptions of local- and national-level fraud, see also Noah Coburn and Anna Larson, 

“Justifying the Means: Afghan Perceptions of Electoral Processes,” Special Report 326 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Institute of Peace, 2013), 5–6. 

55. Martine van Bijlert’s analysis of the 2009 presidential and provincial council elections reveals the following 

as major forms of fraud: (1) off-site stuffing (“ghost” polling stations); (2) top-up stuffing; (3) result sheet 

tampering; (4) proxy voting; (5) multiple voting; and (6) tally center manipulation; see “Who Controls the 

Vote?: Afghanistan’s Evolving Elections” (Kabul: Afghan Analysts Network, 2010).

56. The Chief Electoral Officer of the IEC was allegedly caught on tape planning ballot stuffing and 

subsequently resigned. The controversial tape was released by the Abdullah campaign. A good account of 

the affair can be found at www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghanistan-elections-2014-33-amarkhel-gate-sheeptape-resignation/.

57. Antonio Giustozzi and Dominique Orsini, “Center-Periphery Relations in Afghanistan: Badakhshan 

between Patrimonialism and Institution-building,” Central Asian Survey 28, no. 1 (2009), 14.

58. William Byrd, “Understanding Afghanistan’s 2014 Election: The Limits to Democracy in a Limited Access 

Order,” Special Report 370 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015).

59. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 24.

60. Although, it is worth noting that in Cambodia in 1993 and in Timor in 2000, the United Nations assumed 

effective sovereignty over those two countries and the elections were largely organized by international experts.
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61. Edward Newman and Roland Rich, eds., The UN Role in Promoting Democracy: Between Ideals and Reality

(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2004), 147.

62. Laurence Whitehead, “Democratization with the Benefit of Hindsight: The Changing International 

Components,” in The UN Role in Promoting Democracy, eds. Edward Newman and Roland Rich (Tokyo: 

United Nations University Press, 2004), 136.

63. Van Biljert, “Who Controls the Vote?”

64. While the 2014 and 2009 electoral compromises are prime exhibits of this instinct for political expediency 

at the expense of a respect for the most basic norms, it has its precedent in a little known incident in 2004. 

In that election, most of the candidates called for a boycott of the election as a result of the problems with 

the indelible ink that were witnessed early on election day. As a result of the boycott, they themselves did 

not vote, while millions of their fellow citizens, satisfied that the ink issue had been resolved, braved their 

fears and went to the polls. Several days later, the candidates approached the then special representative of 

the secretary-general (SRSG) and asked for a ceremonial occasion to vote on national television. The UN 

electoral advisors advised that this request not be accepted. They argued that the UN had been telling 

Afghans for months that election day was their unique chance to participate in choosing their government, 

and they should overcome security risks to do so. Providing another special voting day to the boycotting 

politicians would imply that there were rules for ordinary people and other rules for powerful politicians. 

The political team advised the SRSG that they should be allowed to “save face” and “reconcile” with the 

process by voting on television. This was an early indication of the international community’s predilection 

to bend democratic norms to satisfy the interests of powerful politicians and to disrespect Afghan voters.

65. Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 14.

66. William Maley, “Afghan Elections: From the Sublime to the Ridiculous.” Paper presented at State-Building 

in the Contemporary Islamic Workd: U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, November 13–14, 2009, 

Indiana University.

67. According to this scenario, Karzai would have ensured the election of a pliant seat-holder and then seek 

reelection subsequently. Nonetheless, the Afghan constitution is fairly explicit that after serving two terms, 

a president may not serve again.

68. According to press reports, the undisclosed results of the audit showed 800,000 fraudulent votes (570,000 

were for Ghani and 220,000 were for Abdullah). See Zubair Babakarkhail and Dean Nelson, “Afghan Poll 

Results Delayed to ‘Hide Scale of Ballot Rigging,’” The Telegraph, September 22, 2014.

69. One cannot dismiss the ongoing problems of security in Afghanistan, but by the 2014 election, it was 

increasingly easy to argue that the lack of institutionalization—largely due to a lack of discipline among 

political elites—was more a driver of insecurity than insecurity was a driver of the lack of institutionalization.

70. Matthew Rosenberg and Azam Ahmed, “Tentative Results in Afghan Presidential Runoff Spark Protests,” 

New York Times, July 7, 2014. This article carried reports of Mohammad Atta’s threats to create a “parallel 

government” as a “next step.” See also Margharita Stancati, Nathan Hodge, and Dion Nissenbaum, “Afghan 

Crisis Risks Splitting Country,” Wall Street Journal, July 8, 2014.

71. The audit required bringing in all 22,828 ballot boxes from all over the country, involving more than 100 

air and ground movements by the ISAF, U.S. Special Forces, and United Nations transport assets. Setting 

the rules for the audit required seven meetings with president Karzai, 25 meetings with the candidates, and 

16 with the IEC. It was observed by 216 international observers and 337 domestic observers. Technical 

support was provided by 123 UN-recruited international experts, seconded from ongoing electoral projects 

in 22 other countries. These were supported by 23 resident international electoral staff from the United 

Nations Development Programme and 25 resident international staff from the United Nations Assistance 

Mission in Aghanistan redeployed to the audit. 

72. See www.eueom.eu/files/pressreleases/english/eueat-afghanistan-press-release-21092014_en.pdf, accessed 

February 21, 2016.

73. A decision in May 2015 by major donors (United States, European Union, and United Kingdom) to 

drastically reduce funding for Afghan electoral institutions is further evidence of this claim.

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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

The introduction of democracy in Afghanistan fundamentally transformed citizens’ expectations 

of their government, but the corruption associated with the country’s elections undermined 

the state’s legitimacy. Similarly, promises to reform subnational governance led Afghans to 

hope that deep historical tensions between the central government and Afghan society could 

be alleviated by establishing local levels of government that are capable of providing public 

goods and are directly accountable to and representative of citizen interests. Despite millions 

spent supporting subnational governance, success in this area has been limited because citizens 

continue to experience the same government structures that have existed for decades. The 

Afghan state remains centralized; technical fixes are crowding out the need for meaningful 

political reform; and there is even more reliance on parallel structures at the local level—both 

those structures created by donors and those whose continuing legitimacy rests on traditional 

authority. As a result, responsive subnational governance is more of an aspiration than a reality 

despite massive expenditures. 

Lessons can be learned from efforts to build subnational governance in Afghanistan. 

Foremost is that political decentralization, along with establishing effective constraints on the 

central government, may be more pressing than expanding the capacity of the Afghan state, 

especially in the face of declining donor support. Technical fixes without meaningful political 

(especially institutional) reform will continue to dissipate resources. 

Center-Local Relations

Afghan and international policymakers expended vast resources since 2001 to facilitate the 

emergence of peaceful and predictable relations between the central government and its 

subnational levels because these relations have historically been antagonistic. For centuries, 

the central government sought to increase its autonomy and capacity to operate free from 

constraints imposed by lower levels of government and its constituents. The Kabul government 

works to maintain central authority through attempts to dismantle self-governing mechanisms 

at the community level and through bureaucratic centralization. 

Subnational Governance in Afghanistan

Back to the Future

JENNIFER MURTAZASHVILI
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The relationship between the centralized government and customary authority has been 

particularly antagonistic. Most Afghan leaders took a page from Max Weber’s concept of 

legitimacy, viewing a zero-sum relationship between the state and traditional or self-governing 

authority.1 Thus, since the inception of the Afghan state in 1747, most rulers have aspired 

to centralize political authority vis-à-vis customary authorities. This process was accelerated 

during the reign of Abdur Rahman (1880–1901), who viewed the persistence of autonomous 

local actors at the village level as the primary challenge to central government authority. He 

sought to increase his control over local governors by appointing bureaucrats accountable only 

to Kabul to subnational positions rather than rely on kin, who frequently worked in tandem 

and negotiated with local communities often at the expense of the central government. This 

was part of a broader strategy to systematically undermine the customary governance that 

defined Afghan society—a strategy that was accomplished mainly through a series of vicious 

military campaigns. 

The drive to neutralize community autonomy is not confined to the distant past. Successive 

communist governments, who ruled from 1978 to 1992, viewed decentralized authority 

structures as a threat to modernization and sought to eliminate these elements in rural society 

by replacing customary and tribal brokers with their own village representatives directly 

accountable to the political center. The Taliban regime, which ruled from 1996 to 2001, was 

similarly centralizing, seeking to rule villages through its own appointed religious leaders. 

Rulers throughout the twentieth century developed centralized bureaucratic models 

to implement their vision of government intent on building quick capacity. As the Soviet 

influence in Afghanistan began to grow in the 1950s, so too did the adoption of centralized 

governance systems. This was most pronounced in the centralized nature of the policymaking 

and planning process, as well as the reliance on Soviet models of public administration. Soviet 

bureaucratic models relied on appointed officials at subnational levels, with the Ministry of 

Interior overseeing most aspects of local governance. The system of budgeting and public 

finance was also copied from the Soviets, encompassing central budget planning based on 

inputs from line ministries, where all local revenues were remitted to the central government and 

later redistributed. Government policies were executed not by subnational government officials 

but instead by line ministry officials at the subnational level appointed by and beholden to 

principals in Kabul. Furthermore, district and provincial government officials had no oversight 

over line ministry officials but instead were deliberately weak with limited decision-making 

authority and political autonomy. This model sought to assure subnational compliance. 

Although this centralized model was planted during the reign of Zahir Shah (1933–73) 

as a result of technical assistance, many Afghans attribute the relative tranquility and stability 

during his reign to the fact that he did not undertake the policies of his predecessors: he did 

not seek to directly alter underlying social norms, nor did he strive to strengthen the state for 

its own sake. Although Shah imported many aspects of the Soviet bureaucratic model, he 

implemented them with a light hand. The state did grow in scope and strength under his reign, 

providing an increased variety of public goods and services, but the growth was largely gradual 

and based on the consensus of subjects. The perceived lack of state capacity was one of the 

main motivations of Mohammad Daoud Khan’s 1973 coup that toppled his paternal cousin 

and brought an end to the monarchy. Daoud and the Communists used the centralized system 

that was already in place to drive Afghanistan toward their view of modernized development.

Although both the mujahideen and Taliban regimes attempted to change certain 

organizational features of the government, they were hampered by a general inability to 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

implement reform in a context of profound conflict. Thus, after 2001, the formal government 

structures in place were the shells of the Soviet-inspired bureaucracy left standing in 1992. 

This brief review of center-local relations provides two historical lessons for post2001 subnational governance reform: (1) Afghan rulers, regardless of their ideological 

predisposition—modernizing, leftist, autocratic, or theocratic—have had little tolerance for 

local autonomy, stressing the assertion of state capacity rather than constraints on rulers; and 

(2) the organization of the government has been highly centralized in terms of its bureaucratic 

capacity, and the structures existing at the dawn of the statebuilding effort basically reflected 

the old Soviet model of governance. In light of this context, one might expect that a reform 

effort seeking to break from the past would emphasize a more cooperative relationship between 

the local and the central government and to perhaps attempt to neutralize the old, hierarchical 

modes of bureaucratic organization. Yet, reform has thus far reinforced centralization and the 

previous bureaucratic system. 

The New Afghan State: Drive for Capacity

The 2004 constitution represented a continuation of historical governing norms, as subnational 

officials continued to implement the desires of Kabul. Although there were debates among 

policymakers over whether the country should have a parliamentary or presidential system, 

there was little debate about the role of the state in society. The constitution was driven by a 

capacity-building philosophy, where the state served to provide public goods as a means to 

generate allegiance. To illustrate, according to the constitution, the state was obligated to create 

a “prosperous society based in social justice” (Article 6); to “design and implement effective 

programs for developing industries [and] expanding production” (Article 13); and to “develop 

religious teachings, regulate and improve the conditions of mosques, religious schools, as well 

as religious centers” (Article 17). It also guaranteed the right to free education (Article 43); 

equality of educational opportunities for girls and women, improved education for nomads, 

and the elimination of illiteracy (Article 42); development of religious curricula for schools 

(Article 45); the right to work (Article 48); and the right to free preventative healthcare and 

treatment of diseases (Article 52). 

The vision of the state was further fleshed out in collaborations between international 

donors and the Afghan government, such as the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 

(ANDS). The ANDS took the constitution as a point of departure and created benchmarks 

for ministries and obligations for donors to fulfill this vision.2 The ANDS, supported by the 

constitution, was a grand development plan that laid out a long list of government priorities 

deduced from constitutional principles. Containing no substantive political reforms, it 

embodied the “technical” approach to reform characteristic of most post-2001 international 

assistance to the country.

These documents reflect a state intent on winning the allegiance of Afghan citizens through 

delivering services and reducing poverty. This intention, while laudable in effort, created a tall 

order for the government and its subnational units to fulfill. It also left donors scrambling 

to build the government’s capacity to follow through with its promises. The aspirational 

scope of the state was out of step with the strength of the state to execute this vision. In fact, 

many developed countries would struggle to carry out the mandate called for in the Afghan 

constitution. Rather than rethink the government’s mandate, Hamid Karzai’s administration 

and the international donor community opened the door to unlimited capacity-building 

Reform has thus far 

reinforced centralization 

and the previous 

bureaucratic system.
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exercises at every ministry and government office, creating a carte blanche for donor and 

government efforts. 

The vision did not present a new state or allow individuals in communities outside Kabul to 

experience a new social contract. Empowered with vast resources from and the blessing of the 

international community, the Afghan government embarked on strengthening state capacity. 

During the “surge” years, the desire to increase capacity only intensified, resulting in relatively 

strong ministries in Kabul but weak local implementation. 

Subnational Governance After 2001: 

Centralized Rule Versus Parallel Structures

The new constitution includes a commitment to democratic principles, consideration 

of gender equality, and rights for religious and ethnic minorities. It also mandates not just 

national elections but also provincial, district, and village council elections and mayor and 

municipal council elections. Broad contours of the state, however, remain unchanged. Enduring 

constitutional centralism meant that subnational units struggled to execute policies, resulting in 

citizens relying not on the state but on donor organizations, strongmen, and customary sources 

for governance at the local level. This is particularly true in rural areas where most Afghans still 

reside. Although the new constitution has brought formal democracy to Afghanistan, it has 

not altered the way individuals experience the state.

The Afghan state remains highly centralized. Similar to its predecessors, the 2004 

constitution did not create local government units but instead continued the policy whereby 

district and provincial offices served as administrative subunits of the national government. 

Municipalities were the only local units given some potential autonomy.

Centralism produced provincial and district governors appointed by and beholden to 

officials in Kabul. Their role was to implement national policies by overseeing the work of 

ministry officials at the subnational level. They were not elected by or directly accountable to 

constituents. Furthermore, the constitution did not give subnational elected bodies veto or 

sanctioning power over subnational governors. Although principles of centralism were hotly 

contested among international community members and some Afghan policymakers during 

the Constitutional Loya Jirga in 2003–04, defenders of centralism justified its maintenance for 

several reasons. First, the system represented continuities with the past and familiar patterns of 

authority for citizens. Second, it gave the executive branch the ability to execute power quickly 

and almost unhindered, allowing the state to demonstrate its capacity to citizens who may 

have been wavering in support. Karzai and some international community members argued 

that such centralization was needed to ensure that warlords did not see a benefit to hijacking 

subnational government.3

Provincial or district governments had no incentive to horizontally integrate local 

ministerial activity. Absence of such integration was also a function of the Soviet bureaucratic 

legacy, which intentionally weakened governors, giving them little oversight over the more 

than fifty ministries and executive agencies potentially operating in each province or district. 

District governors frequently complained of having little say over staff hiring in their districts 

or discretion to make policy decisions.4

The creation of the Independent Directorate for Local Governance (IDLG) in 2007 

represented an important move, in theory, to facilitate horizontal integration among 

subnational line ministries, as the Ministry of Interior was previously responsible for appointing 

and overseeing district and provincial governors. The IDLG was created to alleviate tensions 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

between the Ministry of Interior and other line ministries who saw governors as representing 

a single ministry rather than an individual who could serve to coordinate functions among 

ministries. It also served to give Karzai direct control over subnational appointments, further 

centralizing government control. There is little evidence that the IDLG remedied these 

tensions. Instead, its creation fueled bureaucratic competition for donor attention. 

Provincial Government

Provincial governors, appointed by the president through IDLG, serve as representatives of 

the executive branch for the thirty-four provinces. While some provincial governors were 

previously associated with mujahideen factions and emerged as strong leaders, most governors 

did not have such a high profile and were chosen by the Karzai administration because of their 

weak power bases, allowing the central government to maintain political control. 

The case of the provincial councils illustrates the challenges with the institutional design 

of a democracy based on strong principles of centralism. Each successive round of provincial 

council elections (2005, 2009, and 2014) has been met with increased allegations of vote rigging, 

undermining citizen confidence in the councils. In annual, nationally representative public 

opinion polls of the Afghan people, the Asia Foundation has found that citizen confidence 

in provincial councils has decreased since their inception.5 Similarly, another nationally 

representative survey funded by Democracy International showed that individuals believe their 

provincial members to be the most inaccessible of all public figures (including nonelected 

district and provincial governors). In some provinces, provincial councils have become another 

vehicle to extract rents from citizens and aid projects.6

The lack of citizen confidence and perceived lack of access to provincial council members 

can be attributed to various factors. First, the councils were elected on an at-large basis, thus 

individual members have no formal constituency (aside from serving an entire province).7

The lack of local constituencies diffused accountability. Second, council members had weak 

authority. According to a 2006 law specifying their roles, provincial councils exist to monitor 

the role of the provincial governor and administration, but these bodies have no veto or agendasetting power. Although they are elected councils, they are not legislative bodies because 

they have no lawmaking authority. The only substantial activity given to these bodies was 

oversight of international development projects supported by donors as well as some provincial 

development planning, which provincial governors have no obligation to heed. The international 

community helped carve out the role for provincial councils in overseeing donor projects, 

believing that influence over the allocation of donor funds would yield political influence. 

According to interviews and focus group discussions conducted by Democracy International, 

when informants expressed satisfaction with these bodies, it was frequently a result of their 

ability to distribute aid.8 On the other hand, the ability to leverage aid for personal gain was 

more frequently cited as a source of outrage. And although some effective representatives did 

emerge from the process, the electoral institutions created weak and dependent councils that 

did not allow them to live up to their democratic promise and provided a limited check on the 

authority of or representation to provincial administration. 

District Government

District governors are also both appointed and dismissed by the president. However, unlike at 

the provincial level, the constitutionally mandated district council elections never happened 
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because the government lacked the logistical resources and security required to physically 

delimit districts and implement district elections. Even if district councils were to be held, they 

would face the same legitimacy constraints facing provincial councils, as it is unclear what role 

district councils would have vis-à-vis appointed district governors. 

Although district governors have weak formal authority, they are the most consequential 

subnational officials in most of Afghanistan, serving as the face of the state to citizens. With 

little citizen input, they are vetted by IDLG and appointed by the president. Some district 

governors are professional bureaucrats, and, in some cases, they have served as governors 

of other districts during their career. In the best case, district governors and their staff are 

members of the professional civil service and have gone through civil service exams and 

training. In some districts, professional district government staff have served for almost a 

decade.9 Although public opinion data are consistent in showing that, on average, district 

governors are more trusted than provincial governors, qualitative research illustrates that 

individuals tend to have greater faith in district governors who come from their district. This 

is because citizens feel that deep ties with the district allow space for citizens to hold these 

individuals accountable.10 Conversely, although citizens have relatively more faith in district 

governors than most public officials, their track record remains quite mixed. When district 

governors rotate frequently from one district to the next or expect to be in power for a short 

period as a result of the insurgency, they behave like “roving bandits” and prey on citizens. 

This pattern of behavior has done extraordinary damage to government legitimacy. In many 

instances, the lack of formal accountability of district governors to citizens and their short 

time horizons provide incentives for malfeasance, especially when the district governor has 

no ties to the district. 

In the absence of elected district councils, various ministries, with support from the 

international community, sought to establish district councils to build legitimacy of the state. 

With support from the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), district 

development assemblies (DDAs) were set up to coordinate donor and development activity 

in each district. IDLG, through the Afghanistan Social Outreach Program, set up its own 

district community councils (DCCs). The DDAs and DCCs, set up by rival government 

agencies in competition for donor funds, sought to draw on distinct constituents, but both 

sought to serve as de facto district councils called for in the constitution. The DDAs sought to 

scale up the MRRD’s community development councils (CDCs), while the DCCs sought to 

draw on “traditional” leaders in the community to improve political communication between 

citizens and the government, with the goal of enhancing political stability. After much 

wrangling, by 2013, the MRRD and IDLG had agreed to a common framework that would 

establish DCCs, relying primarily on CDCs, in all thirty-four provinces by the end of 2016. 

The start-up of these councils has been slow.

The development of the DCCs may be premature, because after the creation of the 

National Unity Government, there has been a rush to hold district council elections; according 

to the power-sharing agreement, members of the Constitutional Loya Jirga (CLJ) that will 

decide on long-term constitutional reforms in 2016 must be selected from elected district 

councils. District council elections were slated for 2015 but postponed due to resource and 

security constraints. Given that CLJ delegates should come from district councils, enormous 

contestation over the election procedures is likely to occur. 

Although district 

governors have weak 

formal authority, they are 

the most consequential 

subnational officials in 

most of Afghanistan, 

serving as the face of the 

state to citizens.
USIP.ORG 59

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Village Governance

Although the constitution calls for formal village governments, it is unclear how many villages 

exist in Afghanistan; scholars and practitioners continue to debate what constitutes a village, 

and thus, the current estimate is somewhere between 20,000 and 40,000. As donors became 

interested in providing village-based aid, the number of villages estimated by the government 

increased. The constitution calls for village council elections, but none have been held. Like 

in the districts, donors and Afghan ministries provided their own solutions to fill a perceived 

vacuum of governance. Unlike district or provincial governments, the constitution did not 

mandate a village leader—only village councils (who had no mandate). 

After 2001, many Afghan and international policymakers assumed that the social fabric 

in villages had completely broken down, as observers had long detailed the breakdown and 

transformation of traditional governance resulting from economic transformation and war.11

This rationale led to the MRRD to create the National Solidarity Program (NSP), which created 

more than 30,000 CDCs throughout Afghanistan covering almost 80 percent of rural areas 

with more than US$1 billion in funding, mostly from the World Bank. Although created by 

MRRD, the NSP was implemented by more than two-dozen, mostly foreign nongovernmental 

organizations (NGOs). The NSP was based on community-driven development models 

imported from Indonesia and East Timor but was more ambitious as it sought to go beyond 

aid delivery and create “government at its most basic form... The introduction of democratically 

elected community decision-making bodies as a viable alternative to the traditional local 

governance structure has provided a vehicle to re-build the social fabric and relationships at 

grassroots level.”12 On the one hand, the NSP was to rebuild the social fabric, but at the same 

time, MRRD presented the CDCs as a new alternative to customary governing organizations, 

which NSP officials believed to be an impediment to local development.13

Efforts to establish governance at this level are somewhat paradoxical, as villages tend 

to have fairly robust systems of customary governance.14 When observers described the 

breakdown of traditional authority in Afghanistan, they described a reduced ability of largerscale traditional mechanisms to maintain authority at the intracommunal level (usually at 

the provincial or district level). This meant that the collapse of traditional regional political 

mechanisms did not necessarily result in the breakdown of customary governance at the village 

level. Indeed, customary sources of authority are effective in providing certain public goods; 

are widely perceived as legitimate; and in many situations, work collaboratively with district 

governments.15 The MRRD and donor community nonetheless proceeded to roll out CDCs 

in thousands of villages to address a perceived governance vacuum. Systematic evaluations of 

the NSP suggest that the councils actually undermined quality of governance, largely because 

they competed with—not substituted for—existing governing mechanisms.16 Despite this, 

CDCs became the interim village councils called for in the constitution. 

By the time of the surge, this diagnosis became increasingly apparent to some observers. 

Perceiving the failure of the formal justice sector to produce legitimacy, some called on the 

Afghan government and donors to provide assistance to the traditional justice system.17

Similarly, many U.S. soldiers serving in rural Afghanistan described the importance of tribes 

and traditional forms of governance as a bulwark against the Taliban insurgency. This led to 

countless military and civilian programs designed to strengthen traditional governance and 

link traditional governance with district governments, providing incentives for communities to 

create cadres of “fake” elders.18
60 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

Emergence and Endurance of Parallel Structures

It is no surprise that in the absence of meaningful reform, the international community created 

parallel structures of governance—a sort of rentier government alongside the formal state. 

Three kinds of parallel structures resulted from the formal structure of subnational government 

and international engagement: donor structures supported by the International Security 

Assistance Force (ISAF), development structures, and government by strongmen. 

Donor Structures

The most pervasive parallel structures were created by donor governments to address 

the inability of the Afghan national government to quickly fulfill its capacity mandate. 

Frequently out of frustration, donors established parallel governing organizations to help 

them execute their goals, which were often out of step with government agendas. Donors 

operated within these parallel structures, and once in place, there was less pressure in the 

short run to reform the state, because strengthening parallel systems became an end in 

itself.19 The most visible parallel structures in post-2001 Afghanistan were the provincial 

reconstruction teams (PRTs), which at the height of surge activities in 2010, covered all of 

Afghanistan’s thirty-four provinces. Initially established in 2002 to provide both military 

and development assistance, with the goal of extending state authority, improving security, 

and promoting reconstruction, the PRTs were inherently political bodies.20 They brought 

international military and civilian actors “together to work for the common good of the local 

population whose goodwill would determine whether state authorities would succeed or 

not.”21 By attempting to coordinate military and development assistance, the PRTs engaged 

in state-like functions, seeking to “win the hearts and minds” of Afghans by providing 

services and security to generate stability. 

By default, establishment of the PRTs as parallel governing bodies represented the 

Afghan state’s inability to provide similar functions and public services through its line 

ministries. The United States and other ISAF partners created PRTs to work around the 

cumbersome Afghan bureaucracy. As the surge reached its height, it crowded out Afghan 

government priorities and reduced the incentives of Afghan subnational officials to engage 

with citizens through rentier dynamics. Ultimately, the PRTs appeared to undermine rather 

than strengthen government by crowding out local agendas, overwhelming the capacity of 

subnational units to absorb resources, and creating projects that were neither desired nor 

sustainable for subnational governments or their constituents.22

In 2009, the United States established district stability teams (DSTs) in the more 

insecure districts of Afghanistan to implement ISAF’s counterinsurgency mandate. DST 

activities mirrored PRT activities at the district level, seeking to expand the writ of the 

state through the provision of security and development assistance. Similarly, the Village 

Stability Operations (VSO) program extended DST activity into “hostile” areas. Unlike the 

DSTs and PRTs, VSO worked almost exclusively with nonstate actors, including customary 

leaders and anti-Taliban local militias (who later became the Afghan Local Police, based on 

an idealized arbakai model).23 Once again, external military forces sought to engage with 

local actors in a decentralized manner, because the centralized bureaucracy proved largely 

unable to provide the goods and services demanded by the service delivery model used in 

the counterinsurgency strategy. 

Ultimately, the provincial 

reconstruction teams 

appeared to undermine 

rather than strengthen 

government by crowding 

out local agendas, 

overwhelming the 

capacity of subnational 

units to absorb resources, 

and creating projects 

that were neither desired 

nor sustainable for 

subnational governments 

or their constituents.
USIP.ORG 61

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Development Structures

Many development projects have served as parallel governments competing with or 

substituting for subnational governments. Efforts to strengthen municipal governance and the 

NSP illustrate this point. The models used by donor programs to support both of these efforts 

were emblematic of approaches taken by donors after 2001. 

The Regional Afghan Municipalities Program for Urban Populations (2009–14), 

funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development, sought to provide training to 

municipal officials and small grants to citizen groups. Rather than establishing its offices 

in local municipal government buildings, it set up its own offices that worked in parallel to 

the government, hiring local staff as trainers and paying them significantly more than what 

officials earned at the subnational level. These donor-supported offices were better resourced 

than their counterpart subnational government offices. Project staff could allocate grant money 

for activities with far greater ease than local municipalities, who were constrained by Ministry 

of Finance regulations. As a result, citizens were encouraged to turn to donors if they had issues 

to address, undermining the state-society relationship. 

International NGOs were largely responsible for establishing the CDCs in almost every 

district throughout rural Afghanistan. The NSP was not implemented by government officials 

but instead by these NGOs who set up offices in district centers. The high visibility of NSP 

offices compared to government offices in many parts of the countryside was striking. NSP 

offices, responsible for dispersing government funds for local projects, had better trained 

staff (usually from outside the district), computers, generators, satellite communications, and 

multiple four-wheel drive vehicles. The capabilities of district government offices seemed weak 

in comparison. The implementing NGOs, as subcontractors to the government (with donor 

funding), were able to provide services to communities much faster than the government 

offices; they were not subject to the same procurement regulations as district government 

officials, therefore giving them a higher level of discretion and allowing them to operate quickly 

and more effectively. The high level of funding and profile of NSP offices created antagonism 

between district governors and NSP officials, especially before the surge. 

Government by Strongmen

Although provincial and district governors had weak formal authority, many emerged as being 

capable. Frequently, these individuals were former warlords or strongmen.24 Although they 

had formal positions in the state, the authority they exercised was not formally enshrined in 

any written document but rather existed in parallel to the formal rule of law. These governors 

bent the rules or operated entirely outside them to accomplish their goals, noble and otherwise. 

They exercised enormous authority despite the law. 

Individuals also established power bases outside of the formal authority granted to them 

by the state. At the provincial level, individuals such as Atta Mohammad Noor in Balkh 

Province and Gul Agha Sherzai in Nangarhar Province were capable of both providing local 

public goods, especially with the creation of impressive infrastructure projects, and challenging 

executive authority in Kabul. To skirt the rules was a double-edged sword, allowing them to 

expropriate donor resources to provide some public goods. Although predation of government 

officials at all levels has been well-chronicled, many district government officials used informal 

authority to resolve disputes in their communities. Governors frequently mediate disputes that 

communities are unable to resolve themselves, usually at the request of citizens. Legally, district 
62 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

governors have no legal right to resolve such disputes, but do so because they provide faster 

justice than the state courts.

Technical Fixes

Donor programs and the Afghan government’s national priority programs almost universally 

ranked technical assistance over meaningful political reform. Instead of encouraging dialogue 

over political change, donor support created institutional stagnation by promoting technical 

solutions to inherently political problems. This was particularly acute in the areas of land 

reform and the rule of law at the local level. 

A pressing issue facing districts and villages is land tenure security. Since 2001, Afghan 

and international approaches have treated land reform as a technical rather than political issue. 

Policymakers believed that the issuance of government-backed legal titles would yield land 

tenure security. Since coming to power, Ghani has also supported this position.25 The theory is 

clear: Legal titles improve productivity by decreasing uncertainty and can improve prospects 

for development.26 Technical assistance should therefore focus on registration of ownership. 

Yet, creating an effective system of property rights requires more than mapping plots and 

providing legal titles; it is entirely dependent on political reform, such as creating an effective 

judiciary to adjudicate decisions and a police force that can enforce decisions with equanimity. 

Such reform also requires the ability of the state to tie its own hands and not become involved 

in land grabbing and to respect the courts’ decisions. There is little reason to believe that legal 

titles will improve tenure security; the state is weak, judges who interpret property rights are 

frequently corrupt, and there are few effective constraints on state authority.27 In other words, 

while the state can plot out and issue legal titles, it is not necessarily required to adjudicate 

disputes or resolve them. 

Efforts to establish rule of law are another example. Substantial investments were made 

in training judges and lawyers and building courthouses at the subnational level.28 Clearly, 

technical capacity does not build legitimacy in the absence of effective political reform. Citizens 

view the highly centralized legal system, which operates largely in isolation from customary 

systems of adjudication, as corrupt.29 Although rule of law is typically treated separately from 

subnational governance, citizens evaluate the legitimacy of subnational governance through its 

ability to fairly adjudicate disputes. 

The Ways Forward

In considering the challenges of centralized governance and lack of reform at the subnational 

level, several ways forward come to light.

Encourage debates about the role of state in society: If a centralized system has failed 

Afghanistan, what is the appropriate form of government for the country? The only appropriate 

form is the one that is agreed on by the people of Afghanistan. During the 2014 presidential 

election, each major candidate expressed his support of the decentralization of authority to 

the local level but differed on to what degree. As the CLJ approaches, Afghans are debating 

state-society relations. 

A fundamental political question for any society is “what role should the state play in 

society?” In answering this question, one must consider the size of government in the economy 

and society and the impact of decentralization: Should government be big or small? Should 

the government expand its role to build capacity or focus on establishing constraints on its 

Donor support created 

institutional stagnation 

by promoting technical 

solutions to inherently 

political problems.
USIP.ORG 63

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

authority? Should government officials continue to be appointed by Kabul or should they be 

selected locally? 

Decentralization is not uniformly seen as a panacea, as some have cautioned about 

decentralizing political and fiscal authority.30 However, decentralization may be important in 

a state widely perceived as corrupt. Furthermore, no amount of capacity building or training 

could make the central planning model the Afghans inherited from previous regimes function 

well. In the presence of corruption, it may make more sense to invest in local control rather 

than a centralized state. The reason is that a corrupt, centralized state in Afghanistan may be 

worse than a corrupt, decentralized state. Bureaucratic rigidity is one reason for corruption, 

because it is often the only way to get things done. Decentralization and autonomy could 

reduce the need for corruption as a way to grease the wheels of bureaucracy. 

Decentralization may also improve the provision of public goods, better matching the local 

needs of citizens and possibly enhancing quality and delivery of the goods.31 In the context of a 

fragile state, decentralization to local levels can reduce opportunities for the state to renege on 

its promise of institutional reforms.32 More generally, decentralized governance can improve 

the quality of government.33

Decentralization of government would not be out of step with the reality of governance 

in Afghanistan. The term federalism is a colored political term, but in many ways, the Afghan 

political system behaves like an informal federal system.34 There is routine power sharing 

between district officials and village representatives.35 Customary governance may provide a 

source of local governance and a defense against government predation.36 Decentralization of 

political authority may capitalize on the governance capability of those who actually hold local 

power. As the central government has for decades proven incapable to execute its own policies, 

government officials and communities continue to rely on work-arounds to solve problems. It 

may be time for these de facto arrangements to be recognized. 

It may also make sense to refocus statebuilding efforts on establishing constraints at the 

central level. The international community promoted state capacity as a key to gaining the 

trust of citizens. The service delivery model introduced in 2001 was taken to extraordinary 

heights during the surge to win hearts and minds through the provision of public goods. Yet, 

in most postconflict environments, egregious predation on the part of the state generates 

most conflicts and cycles of state failure.37 Given mistrust of the state over several generations, 

a focus on tying the state’s hands might make more sense.38 After all, a fundamental lesson 

of Afghan history is that the state has had enough capacity to make life hard for its citizens 

but has never had meaningful constraints on its authority. Rather than building state capacity, 

donors may wish to turn their attention to helping governments credibly commit to tying 

their own hands. 

Breaking the path of dependence: It is a great irony that reconstruction efforts to build 

subnational governance appear to have strengthened a dysfunctional system of subnational 

administration. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, international donors used leverage to 

encourage countries with central planning legacies to reform their institutions—to decentralize 

decision making, to build checks and balances within the government, and to make government 

more accountable to citizens. Ironically, donor funds in Afghanistan were used to strengthen 

the same kinds of institutions that in other contexts donors fought to reform. 

Reliance on the 1964 model meant that the basic framework of law governing subnational 

administration remained largely unchanged. In fact, the Bonn process in 2001 stated that the 

1964 legal framework would serve as the basis of law. Institutional lock-in resulted in the 
64 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

preservation of the Soviet bureaucratic model and even the return of many bureaucrats from 

the 1960s and 1970s who had previously served in the government. 

The reconstruction project emboldened political institutions that were not designed to 

accommodate democratic interests, providing few constraints on government officials and no 

meaningful local oversight of government activity. The planning model was designed to suit 

authoritarian interests, not a democracy. The state was riddled with an incoherent planning 

process that was to transmit budgets and execution from the central government to myriad 

line ministries. Path-dependent processes also ensured a top-heavy bureaucracy, comprising 

line ministries and executive agencies with, in many cases, overlapping areas of responsibility. 

Once donor funds began to pour into the country, government officials had almost no 

incentive to rationalize and reduce the number of ministries, as each ministry office provided 

a need for unfulfilled capacity building and donor assistance. The resulting dysfunction is 

illustrated in the government’s abysmal budget execution rate. 

Aid largesse did not leverage governance reform but served to crowd out political debates 

as a result of rentier dynamics. By 2007, a consensus within Afghan society began to emerge: 

the Taliban was growing in strength and the centralized administration was not creating 

incentives for subnational officials to deliver goods and services. Government offices were 

used as patronage and rewards. Former warlords, or strongmen, were entering government 

office.39 Across the country, reports of growing corruption among district and provincial 

officials led some to conclude that state ineffectiveness and corruption at the subnational level 

was a primary driver of the continued Taliban insurgency.40

The role of provincial councils as advisory bodies to the unelected provincial administration 

was not new but had been part of the constitutional structure in 1923. The authority of 

provincial councils had not changed substantially over time. Thus, subnational governance in 

post-2001 Afghanistan represented institutional continuity with that of the past. Rather than 

revisit the accountability structure of the state or the design of institutions that facilitated 

government abuse, the military and civilian surge that followed sought to strengthen an 

administrative state that was unable to deliver basic goods and services. The influx of aid and 

external assistance during that period further crowded out domestic debates about the role of 

government in society. This created an institutional lock-in rather than reform. 

Better evidence, better policy: A first step to improving the prospects for subnational 

governance is to replace presumptions and panaceas with concrete evidence. For example, 

many donors and governments put enormous stock into the CDCs as a magic bullet without 

sufficient data to back up such claims. As Afghanistan looks to debate the creation of village 

governance, this evidence should help direct policymakers and Afghan citizens. 

A survey experiment was recently conducted to understand the consequences of 

introducing village council elections in rural Afghanistan.41 A nationally representative sample 

of respondents in rural areas were told they would be voting in future village council elections. 

They were then randomly assigned to one of three village election scenarios: formal elections 

using secret ballots, formalization of their CDC as the village council, and formalization of 

customary governing councils. During qualitative interviews and focus group discussions, 

many informants indicated being wary of formal elections in their village, as they associated 

the ballot box with state corruption (given the high level of corruption surrounding the 

national and provincial elections). 

Despite these misgivings, when considering the different ways to establish village councils, 

the survey revealed that formal ballot box elections could help change the perceptions of 
USIP.ORG 65

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

democracy in Afghanistan. The research found that recognizing customary governance 

could lead to more support for reconciliation with the Taliban and improve perceptions 

that subnational structures will represent citizens at higher levels of government.42 This 

suggests that holding local elections may be premature and that resources for building village 

governance may be better used to address more pressing gaps at other levels of government. 

It also illustrates the fundamental trade-off in any policy: Introducing formal state elections 

may improve citizen satisfaction with democracy, but use of customary structures may increase 

support of reconciliation with the Taliban. 

Conclusion

Lack of reform at the subnational level continues to reinforce a system where local units 

have no autonomy and no meaningful representation of citizens’ interests. At the same time, 

the central state aspires to extend its authority without providing a substantial role for local 

governance. Thus, it is not surprising that Afghanistan faces the same challenges of decades 

past. To improve statebuilding prospects, Afghans may wish to renegotiate the social contract 

upon which the post-2001 constitution was constructed.

Policymakers seeking to reform subnational governance need to recognize that there are 

no panaceas—simply imperfect alternatives from which to choose. The appropriateness of 

institutions depends on context; institutional blueprints imposed without consideration of 

local conditions do not generally work.43

Given the state’s poor track record of subnational governance, many Afghans fear, rather 

than desire, an extension of the state to the countryside.44 As a result, the post-2001 model that 

prioritized the strengthening of government institutions and building state capacity without 

sufficient consideration of how they would be restrained seemed to foment citizens dissent 

rather win hearts and minds.

Notes

1. Max Weber, The Vocation Lectures: Science as a Vocation, Politics as a Vocation (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004).

2. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy 1387–1391 (2008–2013): A 

Strategy for Security, Governance, Economic Growth & Poverty Reduction (Kabul: Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan, 2007).

3. For background on this debate, see J. Alexander Thier, “The Making of a Constitution in Afghanistan” 

(London: London School of Economics, 2003).

4. Interviews with district government officials, Nangarhar and Balkh provinces, July 2012. 

5. Asia Foundation, Afghanistan in 2014: A Survey of the Afghan People (Kabul: Asia Foundation, 2014).

6. According to an interview with a long-serving U.S. Department of State official for eastern Afghanistan, 

provincial council members represented a center of “organized crime” in Nangarhar Province. 

7. Provincial council members are elected through the same Single Non-Transferable Vote system used to select 

members of the Wolesi Jirga. 

8. Jennifer Murtazashvili, Survey on Political Institutions, Elections, and Democracy in Afghanistan (Washington, 

DC: Democracy International and U.S. Agency for International Development, 2012).

9. Personal correspondence with the international advisor to Afghan subnational governance, January 2015. 

10. Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Informal Federalism: Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan,” 

Publius: The Journal of Federalism 44, no. 2 (2014): 324–43. 

11. Jon W. Anderson, “There Are No Khāns Anymore: Economic Development and Social Change in Tribal 

Afghanistan,” Middle East Journal 32, no. 2 (1978): 167–83; Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State

Formation and Collapse in the International System, Second Edition (New Haven, CT: Yale University 

Press, 2002).

12. Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development, “The Most Important Achievement of the NSP to 

Date,” accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.nspafghanistan.org/Default.aspx?Sel=103.

Recognizing customary 

governance could lead 

to more support for 

reconciliation with the 

Taliban and improve 

perceptions that 

subnational structures will 

represent citizens at higher 

levels of government.
66 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

13. Interview with an MRRD official, July 2012. 

14. Multiple nationally representative surveys bear this out, including those by Democracy International and the 

Asia Foundation cited earlier. 

15. Jennifer Murtazashvili, Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 2016).

16. Andrew Beath, Fotini Christia, and Ruben Enikolopov, Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s 

National Solidarity Program: Final Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013); and Jennifer Brick, Final 

Report: Investigating the Sustainability of Community Development Councils in Afghanistan (Kabul: Afghanistan 

Research and Evaluation Unit, 2008).

17. Ali Wardak, “Building a Post-War Justice System in Afghanistan,” Crime, Law and Social Change 41, no. 4 

(2004): 319–41.

18. David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2013), 119.

19. Astri Suhrke, When More Is Less: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2011).

20. Robert M. Perito, “U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons 

Identified,” Special Report 152, (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2009).

21. William Maley and Susanne Schmeidl, Reconstructing Afghanistan: Civil-Military Experiences in Comparative 

Perspective (Florence, KY: Routledge, 2014), 3.

22. For an excellent case study on how PRT activities worked to undermine governance in one of Afghanistan’s 

most advanced provincial governments, see Office of the Special Inspector General on Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR), Weaknesses in Reporting and Coordination of Development Assistance and Lack of 

Provincial Capacity Pose Risks to U.S. Strategy in Nangarhar Province (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, October 2010).

23. Carlos Terrones, “Special Operations Forces’ Turn: Recommendations for Leading the Way in Governance 

and Development in the Afghan Districts Post-DSTs,” Stability: International Journal of Security & 

Development 3, no. 1 (2014): 16.

24. Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2014).

25. Nathan Hodge, “Afghan Land Tangle Stymies Development,” Wall Street Journal, December 1, 2014.

26. Hernando De Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else

(New York: Basic Books, 2000).

27. Ilia Murtazashvili and Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Anarchy, Self-Governance, and Legal Titling,” Public 

Choice, December 31, 2014, 1–19.

28. Noah Coburn, “Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan,” Peaceworks 84 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2013).

29. Astri Suhrke and Kaja Borchgrevink, “Negotiating Justice Sector Reform in Afghanistan,” Crime, Law and 

Social Change 51, no. 2 (2008): 211–30.

30. Jonathan A. Rodden, Hamilton’s Paradox: The Promise and Peril of Fiscal Federalism (New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2005).

31. Timothy Besley and Stephen Coate, “Centralized versus Decentralized Provision of Local Public Goods: A 

Political Economy Approach,” Journal of Public Economics 87, no. 12 (2003): 2611–37.

32. Roger Myerson, “Constitutional Structures for a Strong Democracy: Considerations on the Government of 

Pakistan,” World Development 53 (2014): 46–54.

33. Elinor Ostrom, Understanding Institutional Diversity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

34. Murtazashvili, “Informal Federalism: Self-Governance and Power Sharing in Afghanistan.”

35. Murtazashvili, Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan.

36. Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongman Governors and State Building in Afghanistan.

37. Robert H. Bates, When Things Fell Apart (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

38. Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Bad Medicine: Diagnosing the Failure of State Building Efforts in Afghanistan,” 

Central Asian Affairs 2, no. 1 (2015): 10–34.

39. Antonio Giustozzi, “War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan’s Strongmen,” International Peacekeeping 14, 

no. 1 (2007): 75–89.

40. Sarah Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security (New York: W. W. Norton & 

Company, 2015).

41. Jochem, Torsten, Ilia Murtazashvili, and Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Establishing Local Government in 

Fragile States: Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan,” World Development 77 (2016): 293–310. 

42. Indeed, the major assessment of NSP also finds that the program does not have tremendous long-run 

positive impacts. See Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov, Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s 

National Solidarity Program: Final Report. 
USIP.ORG 67

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

43. Elinor Ostrom, Marco A. Janssen, and John M. Anderies, “Going Beyond Panaceas,” Proceedings of the 

National Academy of Sciences 104, no. 39 (2007): 15176–78.

44. M. Nazif Shahrani, Afghanistan’s Alternatives for Peace, Governance and Development: Transforming Subjects to 

Citizens & Rulers to Civil Servants, The Afghanistan Papers (Waterloo, Ontario: The Center for International 

Governance Innovation, August 2009).

USIP.ORG 69

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

Underfunded, underprioritized, and underperforming, rule of law development has been a 

much-maligned part of the Afghan statebuilding exercise. Critics argue that rule of law efforts 

were not only poorly managed and implemented but also poorly conceived and designed, driven 

by international donor preferences and capabilities rather than by Afghan justice needs. While 

partially true, this view misses the great deal of effort and interest in identifying strategies to 

respond to the environment and to address rule of law weaknesses in Afghanistan, often despite 

limited funds and significant political constraints. Further, donors and practitioners (Afghan 

and international) developed rule of law strategies in Afghanistan based on the best practices 

and thinking at the time and were willing to course correct and rethink their assumptions 

where those efforts did not appear to be succeeding. 

Rule of law assistance in Afghanistan can be divided into two phases. During the early 

years, from 2002 to 2007, relatively small amounts of donor funds and interest in rule of 

law were focused on top-down, state-centric approaches. From 2007 on, renewed interest in 

Afghanistan and the counterinsurgency approach increased the funding and scale of rule of law 

efforts and encouraged bottom-up, community-focused approaches and embraced alternatives 

to the formal justice system.1 These two phases were informed by similar shifts in rule of law 

development theory at the time—often referred to as the first and second generation of rule 

of law approaches.2 

In thinking about the next phase of rule of law efforts in Afghanistan, donors and 

practitioners must assess whether the second-generation approaches succeeded in addressing 

the failings of the first. Such an inquiry must go beyond critiquing implementation failures—of 

which there were no doubt many—and assess whether the underlying theories and assumptions 

addressed the problems that emerged in the early years. A preliminary examination of the 

second-generation programming on community-based dispute resolution, often referred to 

as “informal justice,” suggests that the failings had more to do with a lack of political will to 

tackle underlying political problems and to be realistic about timelines, than due to the rule of 

law programming per se. 

Examining these rule of law theories has broader implications than for rule of law in 

Afghanistan alone. In many ways, Afghanistan became a testing ground for global rule of law 

Rule of Law and Statebuilding in Afghanistan

Testing Theory with Practice

ERICA GASTON AND ERIK JENSEN
70 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

theories and best practice. Given the scope of engagement in Afghanistan (time, money, and 

sheer number of international projects and initiatives tried), it offers one of the best test cases for 

whether prevailing theories on rule of law development were apt and which types of program 

interventions work better than others. Analyzing rule of law efforts in Afghanistan offers an 

important opportunity to develop more effective practices and strategies for postconflict rule 

of law development writ large. 

The Early Years

In 2002, Afghanistan had inarguably one of the weakest rule of law systems in the world. 

Insecurity was rampant. Most of the country was beyond state control or even the control of 

local power brokers. State institutions were weak, wanting, or nonexistent. 

Formal justice institutions were particularly frail. Even during the formal justice system’s 

zenith, from 1964 to 1979, there were few functioning courts beyond urban areas, and those 

that did exist were highly limited by weak legal education and knowledge among the judiciary, 

poor availability of statutory texts, lack of judicial independence (vis-a-vis the executive or local 

power brokers), and weak enforcement.3 Islamic law and customary norms and traditions had 

far more credibility and use among the population than the Western-modeled state system. 

These long-standing weaknesses were exacerbated by the thirty years of war and domestic 

upheaval that began with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The scale of physical 

destruction, the erosion of government and judicial institutions, and the fracturing of state 

power for long periods of time destroyed any semblance of a functioning, national legal system. 

Given the virtual nonexistence of the formal justice system, and the projected cost and 

time involved in resurrecting (or creating) one, one might have expected early interventions 

in Afghanistan to rely more on Afghanistan’s long tradition of legal pluralism, including 

nonstate Islamic and customary mechanisms, than a purely state-driven approach to rule of 

law. However, the early years of engagement in Afghanistan were heavily influenced by the 

“liberal peace” model of statebuilding that had emerged in the previous decade. Along with free 

market reforms, elections, and developing strong state institutions, rule of law reforms were 

part of the standard package of international intervention in the 1990s and early 2000s. From 

post-Soviet Eastern Europe, to Kosovo and East Timor, to Kabul, rule of law practitioners 

went to work implementing this first generation of rule of law reforms—through training 

judges, prosecutors, and other legal professionals; urging international treaty accession and 

legal reform; building or renovating courthouses; and updating judicial management systems 

to mirror Western justice systems. In Afghanistan, such an approach was encouraged by many 

Afghan partners and elites, some motivated by a desire to break with the past and modernize 

Afghanistan and some motivated by the opportunity for new construction contracts or legal 

trainings abroad.

However, this approach was difficult to implement in Afghanistan given the state of the 

Afghan judicial system and the limited funding. Although nominally a priority, the justice 

sector received only a fraction of international assistance. Under the “lead nation” approach 

developed in 2002, Italy was given lead responsibility for the justice sector and, in the first few 

years, bore most of the costs for judicial assistance, providing US$20 million of the US$27 

million requested by the Afghan government for justice sector reform for the 2003–04 fiscal 

year.4 Over time, other major donors gradually increased funds for rule of law, but the funds 

still only constituted a small percentage of their overall international assistance. From 2002 to 

The early years 

of engagement in 

Afghanistan were 

heavily influenced by the 

“liberal peace” model of 

statebuilding that had 

emerged in the 

previous decade.
USIP.ORG 71

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

2007, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) allocated only 1 percent of its 

total budget for Afghanistan to rule of law support.5

Questioning the First-Generation Approach

By 2005, international practitioners were beginning to question whether the liberal peace 

model of statebuilding was working. The model had been developed based on the theory that 

in failed or failing states, weak central governments were the problem because they could 

not satisfy popular grievances, equally distribute resources or political power, or otherwise 

address persistent sources of conflict. However, the proposed remedy—strong, democratic 

state institutions—proved difficult to establish. In case after case, the top-down, state-centric 

focus did not result in strong, democratic institutions but rather created ineffective or hollow 

institutions, dominated by corrupt elites who had a greater interest in safeguarding power and 

absorbing donor resources than creating institutions that served the public good.6 This had the 

opposite effect of what the liberal peace model intended and often fostered further conflict.

Afghanistan appeared to be a case in point. Despite billions of dollars, and years of effort 

to build the Afghan state, weak state institutions lacked the capacity or will to meet the 

demands of the population. Corruption and nepotism were rampant. Rather than supporting 

the development of a strong, inclusive state, the massive influx of aid resulted in a rentier state 

dominated by warlords and corrupt elites. 

The justice sector offered a particularly stark example of the failings of this top-down 

institutional approach. Thanks to Western donors, Afghans had more courts, judges, and model 

laws, but they were inaccessible or simply undesired by the Afghan population, which vested 

more legitimacy in Islamic and customary law traditions and mechanisms.7 With limited reach 

beyond Kabul and a few urban areas, the justice system was at best irrelevant and at worst 

pernicious. Rather than acting as a check on burgeoning corruption, the justice sector was 

one of the most corrupt sectors. Uninformed or ill-prepared justices and prosecutors were 

as likely to apply the law in ways that violated rights as they were to enforce the new liberal 

Constitution and laws that had been so carefully crafted since 2002.8

The state-centric liberal peace model was not wholly to blame for these failings, of course. 

Billions of dollars had been wasted or misspent through a lack of coordination, high overheads 

inherent in many donor-driven projects, lack of sufficient consultation and engagement 

with the local population, and pure mismanagement of funds.9 The disappointing progress 

could also be attributed to unrealistic donor expectations of what it would take to build state 

institutions in Afghanistan. 

Second-Generation Rule of Law in Afghanistan 

Responding to the failures unfolding in Afghanistan and other countries, the international 

community increasingly turned its attention to alternatives to the state-centric model.10 For 

example, they looked to governance that existed beyond the state or to community approaches 

to security provision. 

Within the rule of law sector, practitioners increasingly dismissed first-generation activities 

like providing courthouses, training judges, or drafting a constitution (although some of these 

activities still continued in Afghanistan, to be sure, particularly once the international military 

became more engaged in rule of law from 2011). Rather than the first-generation, top-down 

approach, second-generation practitioners tended to argue that a legitimate rule of law system 

The top-down, statecentric focus did not result 

in strong, democratic 

institutions but rather 

created ineffective or 

hollow institutions, 

dominated by corrupt 

elites who had a greater 

interest in safeguarding 

power and absorbing 

donor resources than 

creating institutions that 

served the public good.
72 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

must be driven by a bottom-up, organic process—more attuned to the impact of corruption, a 

needs-based approach to justice, and community-tailored project interventions.11

Perhaps more than anywhere, these new trends in statebuilding practice would be put to the 

test in Afghanistan. Finding alternatives to the state not only fit with the second-generation 

rationales but also offered a potential relief to frustrated donors tired of dealing with a difficult 

and corrupt Afghan state. They also meshed well with the emerging counterinsurgency strategy 

on the military side, which embraced a bottom-up strategy of addressing the popular and local 

grievances that were helping the Taliban gain supporters.

Among other strategic pivots, this shift led to a particular reexamination of the rule of law 

approach in Afghanistan.12 Donors hoped that reforming their justice strategies and providing 

more support could not only help fix what was wrong in the justice sector,13 but that the justice 

sector might then be able to help curb corruption and rule of law weaknesses that were feeding 

insecurity and crippling the overall statebuilding effort. 

Rule of law assistance was already moving in this direction with the 2006 Afghanistan 

Compact14 and the 2007 Afghanistan National Development Strategy,15 which advocated both 

justice sector reform and greater funding. Attention toward rule of law then multiplied with the 

adoption of a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in 2009; commander of the International 

Security Assistance Force (ISAF), U.S. General Stanley McChrystal, argued that to fight the 

Taliban insurgency, they would have to “promote good local governance, root out corruption, 

reform the justice sector, pursue narcotics traffickers, [and] increase reconstruction activities.”16

Although there was little empirical evidence that justice institutions would be a safeguard 

against Taliban encroachment, it became an imperative strategy to improve existing justice 

institutions and extend their reach (along with governance and development institutions) to 

contested areas. 

Along with the COIN strategy came more resources for rule of law programming. From 

2006 to 2010, the budget for the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International Narcotics 

and Law Enforcement in Afghanistan, whose core mandate includes rule of law components, 

went from $26.5 million to $328 million.17 From 2009 to 2010 alone, the USAID rule of law 

budget doubled to $75 million.18 Additional funding for rule of law-related activities through 

military sources, such as provincial reconstruction team funds, are difficult to track and assess 

but would have increased the total amount significantly. Although the largest donor, the United 

States was not alone; the European Union, United Kingdom, United Nations, World Bank, 

and other donors also increased engagement in the justice sector.19

The shift was not just in the amount of resources but also how those resources would 

be spent. In keeping with the new second-generation thinking on rule of law, interest 

in community norms and legal structures and nonstate approaches to building rule of law 

increased significantly. Post-2009 justice programming began to reflect an imperative to go 

beyond the urban elite and government partners in Kabul.

Informal Justice and Community Stabilization

Although there are many aspects of second-generation rule of law programming, the way 

these new approaches attempted to address failings of the first-generation approach are best 

illustrated by the projects surrounding justice provision through community-based dispute 

resolution, often referred to as “informal justice.” 

As interest in nonstate approaches and legal pluralism increased, research and theories 

surrounding community-based justice provision gained greater salience with second-
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

generation rule of law theorists. Research in countries like Sudan and Liberia demonstrated 

how nonstate or community-based dispute resolution, which applied religious or community 

codes of behavior, stood in for rule of law where the state was absent or not respected.20 Secondgeneration practitioners began to suggest hybrid or pluralistic justice systems—those that 

incorporated both traditional or customary mechanisms and formal state judiciary processes. 

Afghanistan represented a strong case for such a hybrid approach. Rule of law practitioners 

visiting Afghanistan since 2002 had noted the insignificance of the state justice system vis-àvis the much stronger and more widespread system of community-based dispute resolution.21

Tribal or community-based mechanisms known as shuras and jirgas had dominated dispute 

resolution across Afghanistan historically. They were perceived as quick, credible, and more 

trustworthy than formal justice mechanisms.22 Moreover, because the informal justice system 

already existed, it promised the quick results demanded by the COIN strategy and timeline.23

Informal justice projects proliferated across Afghanistan from 2009 on, typically funded 

by international donors or coalition military forces and implemented by local or international 

nongovernmental organizations or development contractors.24 Projects included research and 

documentation to understand existing practices, efforts to recognize or develop elements of 

legal pluralism in Afghan legislation, outreach with elders and dispute resolution leaders to 

improve awareness about the Afghan state and Afghan law, and the expansion or creation of 

community-based dispute resolution in many areas to counter or displace “Taliban justice” 

in contested areas.25 Other projects included linking community-based dispute resolution 

bodies with state justice or governance actors, for example, by encouraging referral of cases 

from the informal to the formal system and enabling local elders or shuras to seek recognition 

or approval from local formal justice or executive actors once a decision had been reached.26

Many informal justice projects overlapped with similar bottom-up, nonstate initiatives 

funded by international donors working in other sectors. These initiatives, for example, included 

creating district community development councils (CDCs) in the development sector and 

district community councils (DCCs) in the governance sector27 and organizing or supporting 

local militias in the security sector.28 In practice, at a local level, these various shura initiatives 

all involved the same local actors, making the achievements or consequences of any individual 

initiative difficult to disentangle. 

The focus on informal justice hoped to remedy the failings of the state-centered firstgeneration efforts by (1) improving legitimacy—greater consideration of community-based 

justice forums and customary or Islamic law perspectives might address the formal system’s 

lack of popular legitimacy, while linking the discredited and dysfunctional state with serviceproviding community mechanisms led by respected local actors might improve the state’s 

credibility in hard-to-reach, local areas; (2) addressing corruption—related to the state’s 

credibility issues, community justice mechanisms might play a role in tackling corruption, 

either by supporting alternatives to the corrupt state mechanisms or by empowering local 

actors, who might then provide a check on corrupt state actors; (3) addressing access issues 

and service gaps—supporting justice provision through mechanisms that already existed (i.e., 

community-based mechanisms) was thought to be faster than building a formal justice system, 

preventing the Taliban from stepping in to fill the gaps in the meantime. 

Each of these three objectives proved difficult to achieve in practice. For instance, informal 

justice projects that sought to address the Afghan government’s lack of credibility by linking 

them (locally) with respected community actors tended to function only when the local 

government official in question already had some measure of local power or credibility.29 In these 

Second-generation 

practitioners began 

to suggest hybrid 

or pluralistic justice 

systems—those that 

incorporated both 

traditional or customary 

mechanisms and formal 

state judiciary processes.
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cases, the community-based dispute resolution mechanisms would have likely have sought the 

government official’s input or ratification regardless of an international donor encouraging it. 

Most of these mechanisms did not take hold in communities and have not outlasted the end of 

their funding. Meanwhile, efforts to take greater consideration of community or Islamic norms 

proved controversial from a human rights perspective.30 While these normative frameworks 

may have had greater legitimacy with the majority of the population, rights activists argued 

they did so at the cost of women’s and minorities’ rights and presented staunch opposition to 

any state recognition of alternate dispute resolution.31 Facing these critiques, embracing legal 

pluralism in Afghanistan was a nonstarter from its inception. 

Second, the most significant sources of the Afghan government’s credibility problem 

were widespread corruption and state capture by predatory actors, which second-generation 

interventions not only failed to address but may have helped spread to previously untainted local 

levels. Rather than reducing corruption, informal justice projects exposed local, communitybased dispute resolution to corrupt practices. For example, encouraging a local shura-mediated 

land dispute to be referred to the local district governor for a stamp of approval or to the 

local judge for validation frequently resulted in the demand of a bribe or sometimes direct 

misappropriation of the land in question. 

Meanwhile, the build-up of new local community structures and injection of funds into 

them crowded out traditional community mechanisms and created new opportunities for local 

capture by predatory actors. Because of the access to and control over the local distribution of 

foreign funds, CDCs and DCCs became dominant structures locally, crowding out traditional 

community elders and structures in all areas, including dispute resolution.32 The governmentbacked Afghan Local Police or other local militia initiatives also become more engaged in 

dispute resolution in many areas, overpowering community-based rule of law forums with 

rule by the gun. The international funds and military support available through such new local 

structures attracted the interest of local power brokers, many with direct or indirect links back 

to corrupt state officials.33 This created incentives for capture and spread corruption to the local 

community rule of law space, making it less fair than before.

Finally, the second-generation programs did no better at surpassing the fundamental 

impediment to first-generation programs’ successes—that building a justice system or 

addressing rule of law gaps takes time. In practice, second-generation projects, such as 

attempting to empower community structures or shift norms, can take as long as firstgeneration approaches of developing formal institutions. In 2009 and 2010, donors looked to 

informal justice alternatives to fill gaps in areas where, due to insecurity, the formal sector was 

weak or nonexistent. However, in reality, community mechanisms tended to also be weaker in 

areas where the state was weak and for the same reasons.34 Repeated cycles of conflict—and 

the resulting death, mass displacement, and property damage—disrupted local, social dynamics 

and structures, eroding the source of authority for traditional tribal structures or of individual 

elders.35 Even where the government reassumed control, tribal structures in many cases did not 

reassert themselves. The original legitimate, relatively locally accountable community actors 

and structures had taken generations to form. Resurrecting these community structures would 

itself be a long-term project and was challenging to begin in an environment in which rule by 

the gun, corruption, and short-term survival was the prevailing logic. 

Even where community structures existed, efforts to change or shape them—for example, 

by discouraging practices seen to violate human rights or Afghan law or encouraging 

cooperation with Afghan state actors—tended to take longer than the six-month to two-year 

Rather than reducing 

corruption, informal 

justice projects exposed 

local, community-based 

dispute resolution to 

corrupt practices.
USIP.ORG 75

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

timeline given to most informal justice projects. Establishing relationships or improving rights 

awareness and protection within informal justice can take as long as building state institutions. 

This is in part because of the personality-driven nature of informal justice but also because 

altering or developing informal justice depends to an extent on changing underlying norms 

and accepted behaviors—the same essential challenge to developing a formal justice system. 

Conclusions

The limited impact of informal justice programming offers only one example of a wider trend—

that many second-generation programs not only failed to address the first-generation issues but 

also, in some cases, exacerbated existing problems. This was not necessarily because the secondgeneration instincts were misplaced. For example, greater attention to community perspectives 

and demands for justice and efforts to strengthen rule of law beyond formal state institutions 

were important corrections to an overly state-centric focus of the first generation. However, 

these innovations did not get at the fundamental issues feeding rule of law weaknesses, which 

often resided in political decisions beyond the justice sector. In the case of informal justice, 

the assumption that switching from formal to informal justice actors could bypass or check 

corruption, or that it could avoid the generational pace of rule of law development, appear 

particularly misplaced, providing two key lessons for future efforts. 

Rule of law interventions alone cannot lead the fight against corruption in the early 

stages of a justice system’s development. The widespread assumption in international rule of 

law practice is that judiciaries can and should lead the public fight against corruption. This 

assumption endures despite evidence in many countries that judiciaries in the early stages of 

development perform poorly in constraining corruption. Although, ideally, the justice system is 

an independent and neutral forum for resolving issues, in reality, the system is highly influenced 

by underlying power dynamics, especially if still in development. If leading government actors 

reject the premise of being bound by the rule of law, and if the structures are occupied by 

predatory or corrupt actors, then it is highly improbable that any amount of external assistance 

can minimize those elements via the justice system. Where the main political actors are 

allowed to prioritize their interests above others with impunity, essentially rejecting a rule 

of law approach, neither formal nor informal justice actors will be able to constrain them. 

Tolerating corruption and impunity in higher levels of the Afghan government, or in the 

security sector, had a much bigger negative effect than any justice programming could ever 

make up for.

A critical and dispassionate conversation about the realistic time horizons needed for 

results to take shape is required. The take-away from the equally slow progress in communitybased justice development should not be that informal justice approaches should be abandoned 

simply because they did not deliver a quicker alternative (nor that they should be embraced 

in other countries on the misguided theory that they will). Building a legal culture requires 

adequate time, the strategic use of foreign assistance resources, and highly capable and selfcritical program personnel knowledgeable about the political economy of the country and 

of international donor assistance. Currently, the vast majority of rule of law resources are 

committed to short-term assistance (one to three years), even if that assistance is ineffective 

in addressing long-term problems and needs. A realistic conversation about objectives and 

timelines would, in general, help donors make more strategic funding decisions for both formal 

and informal justice programming. 
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Whether building formal institutions or gradually changing community norms and 

practices around women’s rights, establishing a functioning rule of law system could take 

decades and maybe even longer in countries dealing with the legacy of long-term conflicts, 

atrocities, and injustice. There is no shortcut to justice. In the short term, this can put 

Western statebuilding practitioners in the uncomfortable position of supporting institutions 

or individuals that are still neglecting minority rights, increasing inequality, or committing 

or condoning rights abuses—critiques that could be lodged against both community-based 

mechanisms and formal institutions. This is evident by the dilemma faced in continuing to 

work with an Afghan government that punishes women from running away from abusive 

situations, sentences alleged blasphemers to death, or routinely tortures security detainees 

to coerce confessions. Yet, as disturbing as these official and unofficial acts are, norms and 

habits do not change overnight; therefore, realistically, the best option is to develop plausible, 

incremental strategies to address them.

As practitioners approach a “third generation” of rule of law programming and statebuilding 

in Afghanistan and other countries, how should they incorporate these lessons? Perhaps the 

solution is not to embrace one type of approach (e.g., second generation) to the exclusion 

of another (e.g., first generation)—but rather examine which interventions under these two 

umbrellas have yielded results. Where programming has not appeared to work, the solution 

may not be to abandon that approach or type of project altogether but rather investigate why 

the underlying theories and assumptions (not just the implementation of them) failed. Such an 

inquiry should go beyond factors in the rule of law arena and explore how surrounding political 

structures and statebuilding choices in other sectors affected rule of law programming. 

This kind of deeper reflection on past rule of law programming in Afghanistan may not 

only result in better choices in rule of law development in the future but may also help guide 

rule of law development in other contexts. Already among the rule of law development field, 

programming that took place in Afghanistan is often looked to as a model or at least as the 

only example where many first- and second-generation theories have been put into practice at 

such a level. Learning from the successes and failures in the past decade of Afghanistan rule of 

law development may yet lead to a more balanced, incremental, and ultimately more successful 

approach in future rule of law development.

Notes

1. There are at least five distinct waves of thinking about rule of law post-WWII. See Erik G. Jensen, “The 

Rule of Law and Judicial Reform: The Political Economy of Diverse Institutional Patterns and Reformers’ 

Responses,” in Beyond Common Knowledge: Empirical Approaches to the Rule of Law, eds. Erik G. Jensen and 

Thomas C. Heller (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 336–66. But for purposes of this 

paper and the focus on statebuilding, the rule of law initiatives in Afghanistan are divided into 

two generations.

2. In Afghanistan, as in other rule of law development contexts, the two generations are not mutually exclusive. 

Some second-generation activity occurred in the first and significant first-generation activity has continued 

in the second.

3. Martin Lau, Afghanistan’s Legal System and its Compatibility with International Human Rights Standards 

(Berlin: International Commissions of Jurists, 2003).

4. The United States spent approximately $13 million on nonpolice-related rule of law assistance in 2003, the 

report noted. See International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken Judiciary,” Asia Report, 

no. 195 (2010), www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/asia/south-asia/afghanistan/195%20Reforming%20

Afghanistans%20Broken%20Judiciary.ashx. 

5. From 2002 to 2007, USAID allocated $64 million for rule of law support (1 percent of total aid), according 

to the International Crisis Group. See International Crisis Group, “Reforming Afghanistan’s Broken 

Judiciary,” Asia Report, no. 195 (2010), 10 (citing USAID, “Afghanistan: Budget and Obligations,” www.

usaid.gov/afghanistan/budget-and-obligations).

Perhaps the solution is 

not to embrace one type 

of approach...to the 

exclusion of another...

but rather examine which 

interventions under 

these two umbrellas have 

yielded results.
USIP.ORG 77

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

6. For a broader discussion on peacebuilding trends at this time, see Astri Sukhri, “The Long Decade of State 

Buliding,” in Managing Conflict in a World Adrift, eds. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela 

Aall (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015).

7. Surveys suggested that no more than 20 percent of Afghans relied on the formal justice to resolve disputes. 

See, for example, Leigh Toomey and J. Alexander Thier, “Bridging Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law 

and Search for Justice in Afghanistan” (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2007), www.usip.org/

publications/bridging-modernity-and-tradition-rule-of-law-and-search-justice-in-afghanistan.

8. For example, women who fled abusive situations would frequently be prosecuted and imprisoned for 

“running away,” although this crime does not exist under Afghan law and violates basic international human 

rights principles. See Tim Luccaro and Erica Gaston, “Women’s Access to Justice in Afghanistan,” 

Peaceworks 98 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2014), 19–20. See also Toomey and Their, 

“Bridging Modernity and Tradition,” which notes the widespread lack of education and judicial training 

among the judiciary, that 36 percent had no access to statutes, and that 82 percent had no access to Supreme 

Court decisions. 

9. For at least the last forty years, donors have had unrealistic expectations along wholly unrealistic timelines 

for creating or improving formal legal institutions in countries at earlier stages of development. See David 

Kennedy, “Laws and Developments,” in Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century, ed. 

Amanda Perry (New York: Cavendish Square Publishing, 2003), 17–26. 

10. Astrid Suhrke, When Less Is More: The International Project in Afghanistan (New York: Columbia University 

Press, 2012).

11. Of course, academic work of previous decades such as Clifford and Hildred Geertz, Meaning and Order in 

Moroccan Society (1979) and Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach (1978) and even 

work that stretches back to Sir Henry Maine’s writing in the mid-nineteenth century is relevant to the 

second-generation programs that focus on nonstate processes and the evolution and manifestation of norms. 

Bridging theory and practice in rule of law promotion has always been challenging. Even bridging the 

accumulation of knowledge between one generation of rule of law practitioners and the next is severely 

incomplete. And, in any event, a dynamic balance between induction and deduction in the development of 

programs on the ground is difficult to achieve. 

12. See, for example, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Evaluation Office, Assessment of 

Development Results: Evaluation of UNDP Contribution (New York: UNDP, 2009), 35, www.oecd.org/

countries/afghanistan/46817736.pdf. The UNDP notes that lack of progress resulting from lack of 

coordination or a coherent strategy are “particularly acute” in the justice sector compared to other sectors. 

A European Union justice strategy document in 2008 found that of all the sectors, the judicial sector 

“remains perhaps the one in most urgent need of change.” See Gareth Harding, Afghanistan: Reform of the 

Justice Sector Programme (Brussels: European Union External Action, 2008), 25, http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/

publications/articles/rep1/reportage%20vol1_chapter2_afghanistan%20-%20reform%20of%20the%20

justice%20sector.pdf. 

13. Although the overall tone was critical, by many measures, substantial progress was made in the justice sector 

in the early years. Courthouses had been renovated or built in urban areas, and even some peri-urban areas, 

across the country. Hundreds of judges, prosecutors, and legal personnel had been trained. Key justice 

institutions including the Supreme Court, the Attorney General’s office, and the Ministry of Justice had 

been significantly stood up and strengthened from a fledgling existence in 2002. Hundreds of laws and 

statutes had been recovered, and ongoing projects to rationalize them with the new 2004 Constitution and 

subsequent legislation were underway. Critiques may have had as much to do with unrealistic donor 

expectations as with the legitimate concerns about continuing poor performance and corruption. 

14. “Governance Rule of Law and Human Rights,” in The Afghanistan Compact (London Conference on 

Afghanistan, January 31–February 1, 2006), Annex I. 

15. Ali Wardak, Daud Saba, and Halima Kazem, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007—Bridging 

Modernity and Tradition: Rule of Law and the Search for Justice (Islamabad: Army Press, 2007). 

16. Rajiv Chandrasekaran and Karen DeYoung, “Changes in Afghanistan, Washington May Require Shift in 

U.S. War Strategy,” Washington Post, September 21, 2009.

17. Besides the rule of law assistance, this increase in the international narcotics and law budget also supported 

counternarcotic justice and anticorruption efforts, assistance for the protection of women and girls, and 

correctional facility development. For more information, see Liana Sun Wyler and Kenneth Katzman, 

“Afghanistan: U.S. Rule of Law and Justice Sector Assistance” (Washington, DC: Congressional Research 

Service, 2010), 27.

18. See Suhrke, When Less Is More, 216. 

19. For a more detailed account of the trends in rule of law funding, see Noah Coburn, “Informal Justice and 

the International Community in Afghanistan,” Peaceworks 84 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 

2013), 35–37. 

20. See, for example, Deborah H. Isser, Customary Justice and the Rule of Law in War-Torn Societies (Washington, 

DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2011); and Cherry Leonardi, Leben Nelson Moro, Martina Santschi, and 
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Deborah H. Isser, “Local Justice in Southern Sudan,” Peaceworks 66 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of 

Peace, 2010).

21. For an overview, see Coburn, “Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan,” 45–46. 

The Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (AREU) conducted community-based dispute resolution 

case studies in the Nangarhar, Bamiyan, Kabul, and Balkh provinces. For more information, see www.areu.

org.af.

22. See Wardak et al., Afghanistan Human Development Report 2007—Bridging Modernity and Tradition: The 

Rule of Law and the Search for Justice, 9. 

23. “[A]s part of the overall counterinsurgency strategy, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the 

U.S. government, and others have suggested that tangible progress in improving governance and rule of law 

must be made in the short term (often defined as a twelve to eighteen month timeframe). ...Given the 

shortcomings of the state institutions and the length of time it will take to develop the state justice sector, 

Western military and civilians leaders have begun to work with informal mechanisms to provide needed 

short-term services to the population.” See Noah Coburn and John Dempsey, “Informal Dispute Resolution 

in Afghanistan,” Special Report 247 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010), 5.

24. For an expansive discussion of different types of international community engagement in informal justice, 

see Coburn, “Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan.” 

25. Ibid. 

26. See, for example, Erica Gaston, Akbar Sarwari, and Arne Strand, “Lessons Learned on Traditional Dispute 

Resolution in Afghanistan,” Building Peace 3 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2013). The piece 

describes a series of USIP projects that included developing such linkages; see also Coburn, “Informal Justice 

and the International Community in Afghanistan,” 41–42. Coburn describes a large-scale, multiyear project 

funded by USAID and implemented by Checchi Consulting that significantly involved developing formal 

justice linkages. 

27. Locally elected CDCs funded through the World Bank’s Afghan Solidarity Program were rolled out in most 

areas of Afghanistan. Because they could decide how foreign development funds were spent in local districts, 

CDCs dramatically reshaped local development and governance dynamics. See Hamish Nixon, The 

Changing Face of Local Governance (Kabul: AREU, 2008), www.areu.org.af/Uploads/EditionPdfs/802EChanging%20Face%20of%20local%20Governance-WP-print.pdf.pdf. For a general overview of local 

subnational structures, see Michael Shurkin, Subnational Government in Afghanistan (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2011), 10–12, www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2011/RAND_OP318.

pdf. For more on the creation and impact of these programs, generally, see Frances Z. Brown, “The U.S. 

Surge and Afghan Local Governance,” Special Report 316 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 

2012). For a more critical review of these programs, see Coburn, “Informal Justice and the International 

Community in Afghanistan,” 39–42; and Shahmahmood Miakhel and Noah Coburn, “Many Shuras Do 

Not a Government Make: International Community Engagement with Local Councils in Afghanistan,” 

Peace Brief (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2010), www.usip.org/sites/default/files/pb50.pdf. 

28. On the security side, efforts to coopt local tribes and armed groups into state-backed community defense 

structures cycled through a number of different acronyms and projects, each with significant investment and 

implementation across wide areas of Afghanistan. Most of these were monitored under some auspice of the 

Afghan security forces structure. For an overview of different community defense or militia development 

activities, see Rachel Reid, “Just Don’t Call it a Militia”: Impunity, Militias, and the “Afghan Local Police” (New 

York: Human Rights Watch, 2011), 15–23, www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/

afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf.

29. See, for example, Seth Peavey, Opportunities and Challenges for Linking Formal and Informal Justice Institutions 

in Kunduz and Takhar: An Evaluation of the USIP Justice Linkages Project in Kunduz and Takhar Provinces

(Kabul: Cooperation for Peace and Unity, 2012); and The Liaison Office, Linkages between State and NonState Justice Systems in Eastern Afghanistan: Evidence from Jalalabad, Nangarhar, and Ahmad Aba, Paktia

(Kabul: The Liaison Office, 2009).

30. Opponents of incorporating or supporting informal justice mechanisms argue that, on principle, Western 

donors should not be involved in supporting community mechanisms that have a reputation for rights 

violations, particularly against women. This ranges from disenfranchisement of minorities in communities 

to trading women or boys as barter for resolving disputes, to (in extreme examples) enforcing stoning for 

adultery or other perceived crimes. Many argue that even if state mechanisms are also supported, supporting 

a parallel, nonstate structure detracts from the long-term project of achieving a positive, rights-based rule of 

law framework. 

31. An example of this was the role of women’s rights and human rights groups in defeating proposals to develop 

a formal policy on the relationship between formal and informal justice actors. See Coburn, “Informal 

Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan,” 21–23.

32. For more on how these quasi-government structures affected other local dispute resolution, see Gaston et 

al., “Lessons Learned on Traditional Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan.”
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

33. CDCs originally had only a development focus, but because they controlled development funds, many took 

on conflict resolution in practice (enabled by the prominent role that their control over development funds 

gave them in communities), while the DCCs had dispute resolution and rule of law engagement as a core 

part of their mandate from conception. For more on the differing mandates, see Shurkin, Subnational 

Government in Afghanistan, 11. 

34. See Coburn and Dempsey, “Informal Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan,” 3; and Gaston et al., “Lessons 

Learned on Traditional Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan.” 

35. In some areas, tribal elders have been deliberately assassinated or threatened by the Taliban or other 

insurgent groups to prevent competition for authority or their ability to shift support to the state. See The 

Liaison Office, Building Dispute Resolution Institutions in Southern Afghanistan (Kabul: The Liaison Office, 

2011), 15–28.

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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

In addition to challenging political and security transitions, Afghanistan faces daunting 

economic problems, including slow growth, high unemployment, weak private investment, 

and low government revenues. The 2014 presidential election—Afghanistan’s first without 

an incumbent on the ballot—led to a prolonged and difficult political transition to a new 

administration.1 This political change was juxtaposed with the transfer of combat responsibilities 

to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) as the United States and other international 

partners drew down their military forces in 2014. The security situation remains volatile, 

especially with the Taliban’s resurgence in 2015, as exemplified by their brief takeover of the 

provincial capital of Kunduz. Although the ANSF has not been defeated, it is incurring heavy, 

probably unsustainable casualties, and serious deficits in air support and other key “enablers” 

are evident. 

The National Unity Government (NUG), in addition to serious political challenges, came 

into office facing a weak economy and a fiscal crisis.2 Although the NUG agreement,3 as 

well as the government’s paper for the London Conference on Afghanistan4 in December 

2014, embodied strong policy statements and a general determination to move ahead, the 

complex formal political arrangements of the NUG constitute an obstacle to reforms and dayto-day political management. Moreover, the NUG agreement’s political agenda is ambitious 

and its implementation is proving contentious, further absorbing political attention. In this 

challenging political and security context, the economy will continue to demand attention and, 

if things get worse, could have political ramifications. 

In this light, it makes sense to analyze economic management experiences in Afghanistan 

since 2001 and gauge their relevance in the current environment. While significant progress 

has been made in economic management—particularly in macroeconomic and public financial 

management (PFM)—the progress has been variable, with some backsliding in recent years 

and signs that certain areas of success may be unsustainable. Important lessons can be learned 

from both the successes and failures to date, especially where there are common contributing 

factors. Understanding the implications of these lessons will be important for overcoming the 

limitations and obstacles to further improvements in macroeconomic management and PFM.

Macroeconomic and Public Financial 

Management in Afghanistan

WILLIAM A. BYRD
82 USIP.ORG

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Overview of Macroeconomic and PFM Performance

The overall picture for macroeconomic and PFM performance is positive (see Table 1). 

Economic growth has been rapid (an average of 9 percent per year) amidst large year-to-year 

fluctuations, and average per-capita income has risen sharply. Inflation has been contained, 

though it is suffering from volatility as a result of fluctuations in international food and energy 

prices. The exchange rate has been relatively stable following the successful currency reform 

of 2002/03.5 Afghanistan’s international reserves grew to more than $7 billion, equivalent to 

nearly eight months of imports—a good cushion against external shocks that many other 

countries lack. 

However, growth has not been inclusive following the early agricultural and postconflict 

recovery. Between 2007/08 and 2011/12, consumption inequality increased slightly, and the 

proportion of Afghanistan’s population below the poverty line barely changed.6

Moreover, some achievements are unsustainable. A sharp slowdown in economic growth 

began in 2013/14 and continued in 2015. The slowdown can be attributed to several factors, 

including the reduction in international military expenditures as a result of the drawdown of 

foreign troops, uncertainty over the transition and loss of confidence over the delay in signing 

the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the United States, the election process and its 

convoluted outcome, and the volatile security situation and outlook. Low economic growth, 

despite the relatively good agricultural performance over the past three years, highlights the 

vulnerability of the macroeconomy to further shocks. A poor agricultural harvest, substantial 

worsening of the security situation, or a political breakdown could easily send economic growth 

into negative territory.

For some economic and fiscal variables, the pattern has been one of substantial progress 

followed by stagnation or backsliding. The most notable example is Afghanistan’s budgetary 

revenue. During most of the period from 2001 to 2011/12, revenue grew rapidly, peaking at 

11.6 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) (higher than Pakistan’s corresponding ratio 

and Iran’s non-oil revenue to GDP ratio), but subsequently, it has stagnated in nominal terms, 

dropping sharply as a share of GDP to 8.7 percent by 2014 (see Table 1).

Public Financial Management: An Unambiguous Success Story 

PFM—which refers to the budgeting, allocation, spending, accounting, and auditing of 

public funds—is a foundation of government functionality, policymaking, and accountability. 

This has been an area of outstanding, sustained progress. Based on the World Bank’s Public 

Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) assessment of the country’s PFM status as 

of the end of 2012, Afghanistan compares favorably with countries that in other respects are 

much better off and far exceeds other fragile or conflict-affected, low-income countries. PFM 

improvements—and associated confidence that budget funds are properly accounted for and 

are spent for stipulated purposes with credible financial controls—have enabled large increases 

in aid to be channeled through the Afghan budget. Starting from low levels in the early post2001 period, total on-budget aid exceeded 14 percent of GDP in 2013 and approached 16 

percent of GDP in 2014, with further increases expected as more security costs are shifted 

onto the budget.

Moreover, nonprojectized on-budget aid, comprising funds not earmarked for specific 

development projects or programs, and over which the Afghan government has control within 

the parameters of its budget, approached $2 billion (over 9 percent of GDP) in 2013 and 
USIP.ORG 83

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Table 1: Summary of Macroeconomic and Public Financial Management 

and Performance

Broad Area Indicator Performance Comments

Economic Growth Average annual real 

GDP growth

9.1% per annum 

during 2003/04–

2010/11; low 

recently: 3.7% in 

2013, 1.3% in 2014, 

projected at 1.3% in 

2015

Economic growth 

rapid but volatile, 

unsustainable; early 

agricultural and 

postconflict recovery, 

then huge aid

Average per capita 

income

Rose from $186 in 

2002 to $689 in 2012

Incomes have risen 

rapidly with GDP 

growth

Inequality of 

average per capita 

consumption

Gini coefficient rose 

modestly from 29.7 

in 2007/08 to 31.6 in 

2011/12

Consumption-based 

indicator understates 

income inequality

Poverty ratio 33% in 2005 (survey 

covered summer 

only); 36.3% in 

2007/08; 36.5% in 

2011/12

No change from 

2008 to 2012 despite 

rapid GDP growth

Inflation Average annual 

consumer price index 

increase

Inflation fell sharply 

after 2002/03 

currency reform; 

currently, it is 

negligible due to the 

weak economy

Inflation mostly 

single-digit; volatility 

due to international 

food, energy prices

Foreign Exchange 

Management

U.S. dollar exchange 

rate

47.8 in 2011/12; 57.4 

in 2014; 60.8 in July 

2015 (average during 

each year) 

Remarkably stable, 

with only modest 

depreciation recently

Gross reserves 

(foreign currency plus 

gold)

$7.4 billion in 2013, 

2014, and 2015 

(equivalent to about 

8 months’ imports)

Rapid growth during 

2002–12, based 

on high aid; good 

cushion 

International Trade Exports of goods $0.7 billion in 2013, 

$0.8 billion in 2014; 

projected at $0.8 

billion in 2015

Exports anemic 

(but significant 

unrecorded exports)

Imports of goods $9.2 billion in 2013, 

$8.9 billion in 2014; 

projected at $8.8 

billion in 2014

High imports funded 

largely by aid inflows

Trade deficit > 40% of GDP 

currently

Large, financed by 

aid

Revenue 

Mobilization

(2002–11)

Ratio of revenue to 

GDP

3% of GDP in 

2002/03; rose to 

11.6% of GDP in 

2011/12

Rapid revenue 

growth, ratio above 

Pakistan, Iran 

(non-oil)

Revenue as % 

of recurrent 

expenditures 

Reached 66.5% in 

2011/12—covered 

nearly two-thirds of 

recurrent spending

“Fiscal sustainability 

ratio” rose 

progressively over 

time
84 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

Broad Area Indicator Performance Comments

Revenue 

Mobilization

(2011–14)

Ratio of revenue to 

GDP

Dropped to 9.7% of 

GDP in 2013, 8.7% 

in 2014

Three percentage 

point drop, 

stagnation in nominal 

terms

Revenue as percent 

of recurrent 

expenditures 

Dropped to 55.2% in 

2013, 43.8% in 2014

Considerable 

backsliding from 

earlier progress 

Other Fiscal 

Aggregates

Total core budgetary 

expenditure

Reached 24.6% of 

GDP in 2013 and 

26.2% of GDP in 

2014

This is comparable to 

budgets in other lowincome countries

Core fiscal gap 14.9% of GDP in 

2013 and 17.5% in 

2014

Extremely large, 

financed almost 

entirely by aid

Aid through core 

budget (including 

projectized)

14.4% of GDP in 

2013 and 15.7% of 

GDP in 2014

High compared to 

most other countries

Nonproject onbudget aid9.3% of GDP in 

2013—around US$2 

billion of fungible 

budget funds; 10.3% 

in 2014

ARTF recurrent 

window, LOTFA, 

direct budget 

support; 

extraordinarily high

PM Improvements Total core budgetary 

expenditure

Reached 24.6% of 

GDP in 2013 and 

26.2% of GDP in 

2014

This is comparable to 

budgets in other lowincome countries

Sources: World Bank Afghanistan Economic Update, October 2014 and April 2015; World Bank Afghanistan 

Development Update, October 2015; World Bank Transition Economics Update, November 27, 2014; World 

Bank, Afghanistan: Emerging from Transition (presentation for Senior Officials Meeting, September 4–5, 

2015); Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Fiscal Bulletin Month 12 1393 (2014); World Bank, Poverty Status in 

Afghanistan, July 2010; Central Statistics Organization, National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 2011–2012; 

author’s calculations.

increased to more than 10 percent of GDP in 2014—an extraordinary achievement only made 

possible by the major improvements in PFM institutions, processes, and capacity.7 While onbudget aid has comprised a relatively small proportion of total civilian and security sector aid 

to Afghanistan (total aid peaked at around 100 percent of GDP in 2011/12 before dropping 

to below half that level in recent years), Afghanistan nevertheless has achieved extraordinarily 

high levels of on-budget aid in absolute terms compared with other postconflict and conflictaffected countries.

Within this overall picture of sustained progress, some issues are apparent. The pace of 

improvement was rapid in the early post-2001 years but has slowed down in recent years, 

with signs of modest backsliding in some areas since 2012.8 And the credibility of the budget 

remains weak compared to other PFM indicators. While raising concerns, these issues do not 

detract from the impressive progress made since 2002. 

Successes in the PFM area can largely be attributed to the reasonably well-aligned 

incentives of key actors, catalytic initial investments and actions, and dynamics set in motion 

that favored increases in on-budget aid and PFM improvements over time. 

Table 1 (continued)
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

2002–03 Currency Reform: 

Not Listening to the IMF, in the National Interest

By 2001, following hyperinflation during the 1990s, Afghanistan’s currency was almost 

valueless—the largest note worth less than $0.25. The Afghan government, led by the Minister 

of Finance with the Governor of the Central Bank (Da Afghanistan Bank—DAB), decided 

that a new currency was essential for national sovereignty and macroeconomic stability and 

went ahead with a currency reform despite initial advice from the International Monetary 

Fund (IMF) to go instead with dollarization. Subsequently, international advice was to 

engage an expensive consulting firm to implement the currency reform, but the government 

decided to rely on the hawala (informal financial transfer) system to collect the old currency 

and exchange it for new notes.

This was inevitably a chaotic and messy process—not least because considerably more of 

the old currency appeared than had been thought to exist. The difficult decision was made 

to exchange this extra currency (some of which consisted of large amounts of brand new 

bills in shipping containers), even while recognizing that doing so would provide a further 

windfall to the powerholders who had control over it. Inventory control and disposal of the 

enormous number of old notes posed logistical difficulties. Nevertheless, the currency reform 

was completed during October 2002 to January 2003. The new Afghan currency quickly 

built up credibility and provided a sound foundation for macroeconomic management. This 

is an example where success was achieved by the Afghan government charting its own path, 

making use of existing local capacity, and taking a practical approach in implementation 

rather than striving for illusory perfection. 

The No-Overdraft Fiscal Rule: Right for its Time 

The Afghan Ministry of Finance (MOF), in this case with full IMF support, instituted 

from the beginning a strict policy of not resorting to domestic deficit financing (i.e., not 

borrowing from or running a negative deposit balance or overdraft vis-a-vis the DAB). This 

sent a welcome signal of fiscal self-restraint and buttressed the credibility of the Afghani. The 

no-overdraft policy was feasible during the post-2001 decade, when both domestic revenues 

and aid channeled through the Afghan budget were rising rapidly. Once deposits with the 

DAB were built up, managing cash flow within each year by drawing down or increasing 

DAB deposits was possible. Moreover, the usual trade-off that fiscal tightness, by reducing 

aggregate demand, might lead to lower economic growth was not in play, since the economy 

was growing rapidly, fuelled first by the initial agricultural and postconflict recovery and then 

by massive international military expenditures and large amounts of aid. 

However, in recent years—with the economy in recession, revenue stagnating, expenditure 

pressures worsening, international military spending sharply falling, and aid beginning to 

decline—the disadvantages of the no-overdraft policy came to the fore, particularly in terms 

of dampening aggregate demand in an already weakening economy. In 2014, the government 

ran a small domestically financed budget deficit of 1.7 percent of GDP by running down 

deposits at the DAB.9 With those deposits now reduced to very low levels, maintaining small 

deficits would require some form of borrowing or overdraft from DAB. But whatever deficit 

policy may make sense now,10 the no-overdraft policy certainly played a useful role in the early 

post-2001 years.
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PEACEWORKS 116

Strong Monetary and Foreign Exchange Management, but Weak 

Bank Supervision

The DAB presents a mixed picture: On the one hand, macroeconomic management, using 

rudimentary instruments (notably regular auctions of foreign currency in the Kabul market), 

has been effective in controlling the money supply and stabilizing the foreign exchange rate, 

limiting inflation, and building up sizable foreign currency reserves. On the other hand, weak 

supervision of private banks was a contributing factor to the massive fraud and theft amounting 

to close to $1 billion in the politically connected Kabul Bank. Perhaps most fundamentally, the 

Kabul Bank fiasco illustrates how a confluence of greed, readily available resources for looting, 

and high-level political connections protecting those involved gave rise to a “perfect storm” 

and worst-case outcome. While other Afghan private banks, though much smaller than Kabul 

Bank, also carry vulnerabilities and risks of failure, those risks relate more to concentrated 

and potentially bad investments rather than the kind of outright fraud and theft seen in 

Kabul Bank. 

The establishment of around a half dozen Afghan private banks, initially seen as one of 

the post-2001 success stories, was based on a new banking law designed with international 

technical assistance. However, as information emerged in 2010 about the massive fraud and 

theft at Kabul Bank, it became clear that the bank was a serious threat to macroeconomic 

and fiscal stability, severely damaging the credibility of the Afghan government. Despite great 

international pressure, efforts to hold the principals of Kabul Bank criminally or financially 

accountable faltered. 

The reasons for and ramifications of the Kabul Bank crisis have been recounted in detail 

elsewhere, most notably in two publicly available reports by the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation 

Committee.11 Some contributing factors include, first and foremost, the combination of 

high-level political connections and an aggressively expanding private bank with large and 

growing deposits (partly facilitated by Kabul Bank’s role in handling the payment of salaries 

into government employees’ bank accounts). This led to politicized decision making, as well as 

serious risks of fraud and theft with political protection. A fundamental problem was that close 

associates and relatives of top political leaders were serving as principals and shareholders of a 

private bank.

Second, technical assistance and capacity building provided to the DAB, though significant, 

did not offset these powerful political forces. Nor was having a good banking law on the books 

a meaningful deterrent.

Third, the early warnings of problems at the Kabul Bank were not heeded. By the time 

the huge extent of the losses became apparent, it was already too late to engage in prevention. 

Recovering stolen funds has subsequently been an uphill battle, although the current Afghan 

administration has tried to reenergize this effort, including by reopening legal cases against the 

principals of Kabul Bank. 

Fourth, the narrow institutional objectives and incentives of donors and international 

financial institutions (IFIs) were not closely aligned with the financial probity of Afghan private 

banks. Their own money was not directly at risk (although when the Afghan government had 

to step in and fill the “fiscal hole” created by the Kabul Bank failure, donor funds were indirectly 

affected given the fungibility of the budget). And for the IFIs, hands-on oversight of private 

banks was not part of their mandate or normal business, unlike public financial management. 

Thus, there were no strong institutional incentives at play on the international side to prevent 

the Kabul Bank disaster.

The Kabul Bank fiasco 

illustrates how a confluence 

of greed, readily available 

resources for looting, 

and high-level political 

connections protecting 

those involved gave rise 

to a “perfect storm” and 

worst-case outcome.
USIP.ORG 87

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

And finally, in retrospect, the early focus on restructuring and privatizing Afghanistan’s 

handful of public sector banks seems misplaced. These fairly small banks (most of them 

virtually defunct) did face management problems and posed potential fiscal risks, but 

nothing like Kabul Bank as its deposits grew to a peak of $1.3 billion. Moreover, despite 

considerable efforts and associated conditionality, progress reforming the public sector banks 

was slow, while in the meantime, Kabul Bank was incurring major systemic risks, resulting in a 

worst-case outcome. 

Customs Revenue Captured by the Government, but Worsening 

Systemic Corruption 

In late 2001, customs facilities at Afghanistan’s border crossings were controlled by regional 

powerholders, who prevented customs revenues from accruing to the national budget and 

instead appropriated them for their own use. The MOF made recapturing these revenues an 

early priority and was successful over several years through a combination of pressure, moral 

suasion, and, in some cases, transfer of the powerholders concerned to other positions. As a 

result, once received and booked, customs revenues entered the government’s single treasury 

account and become resources for the national budget, with associated PFM protections. This 

major accomplishment contributed to the rapid growth of total budget revenues to a peak 

of 11.6 percent of GDP in 2011/12, representing an impressive average rise of around one 

percentage point of GDP per year from 2002 to 2011/12.

Unfortunately, especially since 2011/12, apparently worsening corruption in the MOF 

Customs Department has resulted in major losses of potential revenues. Although the 

decline in customs revenues can partly be explained by the slowdown in economic growth 

and lower dutiable imports, corruption also has been a considerable factor. Widespread 

reports and accounts (including interviews with current and former customs officials) indicate 

that corruption in the department has become organized and pervasive. Moreover, other 

government officials and regional and local powerholders in the border crossing areas appear 

to be systematically involved as well. The sheer volume of resources collected at a small number 

of border processing points and international airports make these revenues an attractive target 

for corruption. 

Different Approaches and Results Across Other MOF Departments 

The MOF is by all accounts a relatively effective and institutionally developed government 

agency in the Afghan context, led by well-qualified, effective management teams throughout 

the past dozen years, with demonstrated strong performance notably in terms of PFM. 

Nevertheless, performance has varied across the main departments within the ministry.

The Treasury Department arguably has been the most successful among MOF departments. 

It was the locus of initial efforts in 2002 to jump-start payments, computerization, and accounts, 

with international capacity brought in to assist. Within a few years, the unreformed MOF 

Accounting Department was absorbed into the Treasury Department, which consolidated 

early achievements and helped pave the way for further PFM improvements. Reforms built 

on the existing accounting framework (dating from the 1960s), rather than trying immediately 

to revamp and modernize it. As a result, civil servants in the department were more readily 

able to learn and implement computerized approaches based on concepts they were already 

familiar with. In contrast to some other departments, capacity was developed to a large 
88 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

extent by building the skills of civil servants rather than only bringing in high-paid Afghan 

professionals in noncivil service positions (the so-called “second civil service”). The low political 

exposure and visibility of the work of the Treasury Department gave it an overtly “technocratic” 

ethos, which facilitated improvements in PFM performance.12 And finally, early PFM efforts 

at the department helped minimize vulnerabilities to corruption; and by all indications, actual 

corruption has been limited. 

The Budget Department presents a somewhat different picture, although considerable 

progress has been made in improving technical aspects of the budget process. Annual 

budgets are properly formulated and generally have been promulgated on a timely basis at 

the beginning of each fiscal year (a basic PFM standard in the PEFA indicators), and budget 

preparation has become increasingly systematic over time. However, the budget is inherently 

a political instrument (from 2006 onward, subject to approval by the elected legislature), 

and understandably, the more political parts of the budget process have proven challenging 

to effectively operationalize. Moreover, the Budget Department and staff appear to have 

been overloaded with reforms introducing somewhat advanced processes, such as program 

budgeting, which have fallen short of achieving their objectives and may have detracted from 

the department effectively fulfilling more basic budget functions. And finally, capacity in the 

department has been developed largely by bringing in outside Afghan professional expertise 

in high-paid, noncivil service positions that will be more challenging to integrate into core 

civil service capacity.

In 2005, the MOF’s Internal Audit Department was given the responsibility to oversee 

internal audits in all ministries, as stipulated in the Public Finance and Expenditure 

Management Law (PFEML). However, this mandate was challenged by the comptroller and 

auditor general (head of Afghanistan’s supreme external audit body), who considered internal 

audits to be under the purview of his office. Reflecting this view, an amendment to the PFEML 

in 2012 prevented the MOF Internal Audit Department from auditing other ministries. Thus, 

although solid capacity existed in this department, with a sizable cohort of trained auditors, 

this capacity could not be utilized to its full potential.

Ingredients of Success in Public Financial Management

What were the ingredients of sustained progress in PFM? First, the incentives for key actors 

involved—the Afghan government (primarily the MOF), the World Bank (administrator of 

the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund—ARTF),13 and bilateral donors—were reasonably 

well-aligned. The narrow institutional objectives of these actors and the constraints they 

faced, though distinct, pushed them in the same direction, especially via the ARTF financing 

mechanism. The government wanted more funds to go through the Afghan budget, under its 

control; this was seen as critically important, not least for paying government employees’ salaries 

at the beginning, which had been paid only intermittently during the Taliban period (1994–

2001). The World Bank’s objective of delivering substantial aid to Afghanistan (both directly 

and through the ARTF) required that such aid go through the budget and be executed by the 

Afghan government, as per the bank’s institutional rules. Bilateral donors were interested in 

supporting development and stabilization priorities but were largely reluctant to channel their 

aid through the Afghan budget, reflecting fiduciary as well as legislative constraints in their 

capitals. Progress toward the institutional objectives of all three main actors was made, and the 

constraints the actors faced were eased, by establishing sound PFM systems and improving 

them over time. Initially, PFM improvements occurred through bringing in donor-funded, 

The low political exposure 

and visibility of the work of 

the Treasury Department 

gave it an overtly 

“technocratic” ethos, which 

facilitated improvements 

in public financial 

management performance.
USIP.ORG 89

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

foreign capacity to work for the Afghan government, but over time, Afghan institutional and 

human capacity increased.14

Second, financial investments and enabling factors were instrumental in achieving initial success 

and subsequent progress. As early as April 2002, the World Bank initiated a series of projects to 

fund the development of PFM systems and capacities in the MOF. The World Bank also covered 

the initial administrative costs of the ARTF. An up-front grant of 35 million Euros from the 

Netherlands, along with contributions from the United Kingdom, enabled the fund’s start-up. 

Other donors, with a generally supportive albeit more cautious attitude, slowly started contributing 

to the ARTF in significant amounts, and eventually, “flocking to success” became evident as 

contributions snowballed to high levels. Rapidly growing aid flows through the fund generated 

rising management fees (even though relatively low as a percentage of ARTF disbursements—

ranging from 3 percent initially to a low of 1.5 percent at different times), which supported highquality management and administration of the ARTF as well as project preparation. 

Third, policy actions and sustained management attention were important factors. PFM 

reforms initially relied on Afghanistan’s existing accounting system (which facilitated rapid 

uptake by government officials already familiar with that system) and on the existing legal 

framework dating mostly from around the 1960s. Later, when new laws were introduced, 

such as the PFEML, they were tailored to Afghanistan’s circumstances and needs and could 

be understood locally. Senior officials in both the MOF and World Bank prioritized the 

ARTF, and early on, the World Bank stationed senior financial management staff in Kabul to 

provide hands-on support. Finally, donors proactively supported the fund, participating in the 

ARTF Steering Committee, conducting reviews, and demanding adequate financial controls, 

reporting, and accountability. 

Fourth, aligned incentives along with key actors’ initial investments and projects set in 

motion strong dynamics fostering progressive increases in on-budget aid and further PFM 

improvements over time. Aid money channelled through the national budget via the ARTF 

entailed requirements for documentation and accounting of funds spent, which in turn, meant 

that effective PFM systems, processes, and checks and balances had to be put in place. Learning 

by doing characterized the early post-2001 years, leading to better PFM implementation, 

declining fiduciary risks, improving PFM indicators, acceptable audit reports, and so on. 

Increasing confidence that on-budget funds were being spent well and that fiduciary risks were 

contained encouraged donors to provide more funding through the ARTF, building a virtuous 

cycle that delivered sustained increases in on-budget aid—progressively improving PFM 

processes and outcomes (as demonstrated by respectable and improving PEFA indicators for 

2005, 2008, and 2012)—and positive development outcomes for national programs supported 

by the fund and other on-budget aid. 

Finally, the ARTF has demonstrated considerable flexibility as a coordinated financing 

instrument, further increasing both its attractiveness to donors and its impact. The ARTF 

Incentive Program,15 instituted at the end of 2008, consisted of (1) a gradually declining baseline 

of fund reimbursements for the recurrent budget—signalling that as Afghanistan’s domestic 

revenue increased, underlying dependence on the ARTF would fall over time; (2) linking 

higher ARTF recurrent budget reimbursements to a combination of revenue performance 

and stipulated progress on agreed policy reforms; and, more recently, (3) an Operations and 

Maintenance (O&M) facility to incentivize increases in O&M spending and improvements 

in fiscal flows to provinces. The program has worked well and represents a good-practice 

innovation, building on the ARTF’s earlier success.
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LOTFA’s Lack of Success Compared with the ARTF 

The Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan (LOTFA), administered by the United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and mainly used to pay police salaries, has not 

performed as well as the ARTF. While security expenditures raise particular challenges, the 

problems of LOTFA appear to go beyond such issues. Although the fund has grown over time, 

with the size of the Afghan National Police increasing and their wages rising, LOTFA has 

long been plagued by weak management and lack of oversight.16 There have been longstanding 

concerns about the lack of control over payroll and verification, as well as outright corruption; in 

2012, long-term procurement fraud involving LOTFA and UNDP staff came to light, which 

damaged the fund’s credibility.17 Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s request that management of 

police salaries be transferred from LOTFA to the Afghan government (not yet implemented 

at the time of writing) reflects a broader perception that the fund has not performed well. 

The incentives for key actors involved in LOTFA do not appear to have been aligned in 

favor of strong fiduciary standards and financial controls. The Ministry of Interior (MOI), 

responsible for the police, has remained largely unreformed. Moreover, the de facto segregation 

of police funding through LOTFA from the civilian budget (which was partly funded through 

the ARTF) reduced pressures on the MOI to improve and may have weakened the linkage 

between PFM performance and payments from LOTFA. PFM was not a core area of expertise 

for the UNDP, and outside PFM expertise was not employed in the early years to remedy this 

deficiency for LOTFA. Even though police salaries accounted for the overwhelming bulk of 

fund expenditures (and associated management fees paid to UNDP), getting the nuts and 

bolts right—ensuring that funding for police salaries was appropriately utilized and properly 

documented with a reasonable degree of oversight—did not appear to be a top priority early 

on. And, at least initially, LOTFA donors did not seem to prioritize holding the UNDP and 

MOI accountable for PFM performance—perhaps because they were more concerned with 

the quantitative expansion of the security forces and only secondarily about PFM performance 

in the security sector. In recent years, bilateral donors (and their audit bodies, such as the U.S. 

Department of Defense Inspector-General and the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction) have been much more vocal about the need for effective financial controls 

to prevent corruption in the security sector. A salient lesson is that such concerns need to be 

prioritized from the beginning.

Contributing Factors to Progress or Lack Thereof 

Broader contributing factors to progress, or lack of progress, in the field of macroeconomic 

management and PFM have included the following:

Afghan leadership and management. A consistent theme since 2002 is that development 

progress has been greater when the responsible Afghan government institutions have had 

strong leadership and management teams, and more limited when they have not—irrespective 

of the level and quality of international support.18 The starting point was usually a qualified 

minister with a technically qualified, effective Afghan management team, who developed a 

vision for the sector and operationalized and implemented well-designed programs for the 

Afghanistan context. Foreign advisors were often involved in program design but operated 

under the leadership of Afghan management teams in the ministries concerned. Donors did 

not drive the process, but as program implementation got going and achieved initial results, 

they increased their funding. The macroeconomic management and PFM spheres have been 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

no exception to this general pattern; both the MOF and, perhaps to a slightly lesser extent, 

DAB have had relatively strong senior management teams. 

Resources and vulnerabilities to corruption. Progress was greater when an institution 

or department did not handle large amounts of resources (e.g., in the case of monetary and 

exchange rate management), especially if protections were in place to make corruption more 

difficult. In some cases (e.g., PFM), early actions were able to offset vulnerabilities to corruption 

when the amounts of money involved were still relatively small. At the opposite extreme, Kabul 

Bank, with large deposits and inadequate oversight, represented an enormous opportunity 

for theft and fraud. Customs revenues have offered another major target for corruption. The 

huge amounts of international military spending and off-budget aid during the “surge” period 

represented an extremely lucrative target for corruption and probably contributed indirectly, 

at least to some extent, to the shielding of on-budget expenditures from the most serious 

vulnerability to corruption. But in recent years, as international military spending and offbudget aid have declined, the relative attractiveness of budgetary revenues and expenditures for 

corruption might have increased. 

Political exposure. Progress tended to be easier when activities were overtly “technical” and 

did not attract much political attention (e.g., macroeconomic management and nuts-and-bolts 

PFM). Sometimes political imperatives aligned reasonably well with technical achievements—

for example, in the case of reforming the currency and maintaining a stable exchange rate for the 

Afghani, where considerations of national sovereignty came into play. On the other hand, where 

the political profile was higher, especially when intertwined with high-level political interests 

reaping financial benefits, not only was progress slower, but there was a risk of disastrous 

outcomes (e.g., the Kabul Bank crisis).

Windows of opportunity. A window of opportunity for reforms existed in the first several 

years following the downfall of the Taliban regime in late 2001. This is not surprising; similar 

phenomena are observed in other countries—even in a much more normal situation, there is 

often a “political honeymoon” for a new government coming into office. So much more so in 

Afghanistan where the 2001 intervention was widely seen as a major turning point, providing 

a great opportunity for change—a “golden moment” for a country thought at the time to be 

entering a postconflict phase. The situation was fluid; the Taliban regime was defeated and 

thoroughly discredited, and the elite powerholders who came back after being pushed out by 

the Taliban in the 1990s were not yet fully entrenched and probably were uncertain about their 

prospects. Moreover, their political preoccupations were mainly over the key security agencies—

the defense and interior ministries and the National Directorate of Security (intelligence)—

whereas the MOF and DAB were not yet on the political radar (though the MOF assumed 

increasing importance over time). 

Reforms and good practices put in place soon after the 2001 regime change had much greater 

prospects of being successful and sustained (if the enabling conditions were in place) than those 

attempted later in the face of more entrenched political headwinds.19 This is evident in the case 

of national development programs: Those that were developed and implemented early on had 

greater prospects for success (e.g., the Basic Package of Health Services and the National Solidarity 

Programme). In addition to effective Afghan leadership of the Ministry of Communications, 

early reform efforts in telecommunications contributed to the success achieved in this sector. On 

the other hand, progress was much slower for civil aviation, where early reform efforts stalled and 

leadership was weaker—even though it is a sector, like telecommunications, where international 

experience demonstrates that rapid, private sector-based development is possible. 

Progress was greater 

when an institution or 

department did not 

handle large amounts of 

resources...especially if 

protections were in 

place to make corruption 

more difficult.
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Incentives and dynamics. Sustained progress was achieved when the objectives and 

incentives of the main institutional actors were fairly consistent and well-aligned and when 

positive dynamics were set in motion to achieve sustained progress over time. Examples include 

on-budget international aid, primarily through the ARTF, and improvements in PFM. Taking 

informed risks that started a virtuous cycle was extremely important (e.g., when a proactive 

donor made an up-front, sizable contribution to the ARTF, without waiting for everything to 

be in place or for demonstrated results). The relatively simple design of the ARTF, its flexibility 

to expand and evolve over time, and the priority it received from the World Bank as ARTF 

administrator were all conducive to sustained progress, resulting in the ARTF mobilizing a 

cumulative total of nearly $9 billion of on-budget aid during 2002–15.20

In other areas, however, incentives and dynamics were not conducive to sustained success or 

were even inimical to progress. Prominent examples include the MOF Customs Department 

(sizable resources to plunder and high vulnerability to corruption), the DAB’s private bank 

supervision (high-level political connections of Kabul Bank, which led to massive theft and 

fraud), and the poor performance of LOTFA (unreformed Ministry of Interior, weak incentives 

in the main entities involved to pursue PFM improvements).

Limitations and Obstacles

Afghanistan’s experience has also shown the limitations and obstacles to sustained progress in 

macroeconomic management and PFM. 

The limits to technocratic reforms. Technocratic reforms and development programs can 

significantly contribute to progress, but only if there is political space for this to happen. In 

areas that inherently have a strong political dimension (e.g., certain parts of the budget process) 

progress has been slower. Moreover, the political space for more technocratic reforms arguably 

has narrowed in recent years.21 While the macroeconomic management and PFM spheres 

tend to be less vulnerable to the narrowing of political space, they are not entirely exempt. 

Increasingly entrenched and pervasive corruption. One major obstacle has been corruption. 

While corruption has been avoided or curtailed in some institutions and processes—effectively 

creating relative “islands of integrity”—overall, it appears to have become more pervasive over 

time, reflecting the following:

• Huge inflows of resources vulnerable to corruption, in the form of in-country international 

military expenditures and off-budget aid, which peaked during the “surge” period at 

tens of billions of dollars per year—well exceeding Afghanistan’s GDP.

• Rising government revenues, which as they increased over time became lucrative targets 

for corruption—particularly customs duties but also other tax and nontax revenues.

• Enhanced government functionality and regulatory and service delivery roles, which has 

provided scope for bribes and favors; government procurement and mining contracts, 

for example, are highly vulnerable to corruption.

• Entrenchment of patronage networks and lack of high-level political checks against corruption.

As corruption becomes more entrenched in general, it might be increasingly difficult to 

maintain islands of integrity, such as for core PFM functions. Thus, the government must 

urgently work to reverse corruption trends and make inroads against its most damaging forms. 

From too much money to perhaps too little, resulting in primarily negative PFM 

incentives. Increasing availability of aid in the first half of the post-2001 period, albeit much 

more modest than later during the surge, generated important positive incentives for the 
USIP.ORG 93

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Afghan government and other actors. While there were negative sanctions tied to financial 

requirements for ARTF reimbursements and ARTF contributions, these functioned within 

an overall environment of increasing on-budget resources, where good performance of 

development programs and improvements in PFM led to more aid funding. In the current 

fiscal squeeze, with declining aid and the need to protect security sector expenditures and 

other basic spending (e.g., on civil servants’ salaries), it is questionable whether the associated 

predominantly negative incentives in place can further stimulate PFM improvements.22 A 

related question is whether negative incentives in the current environment can be credible, 

when they might result in, at the extreme, nonpayment of government salaries.

Challenges of macroeconomic management under severe resource constraints and with 

slow economic growth. Good macroeconomic management in Afghanistan since 2001 

was facilitated by large inflows of resources: aid, fiscal support, and foreign exchange. Rapid 

economic growth fuelled by these inflows meant that difficult trade-offs in macroeconomic 

and fiscal management could be avoided. This does not detract from the achievements of 

macroeconomic management during this period; avoiding major mistakes on the macro 

front is important in any country and never should be taken for granted. However, with the 

current low-growth environment, fiscal crisis, and exchange rate depreciation, macroeconomic 

management by the MOF and DAB will be more difficult. They will need to better prioritize 

fiscal expenditures, mobilize more revenues without major recessionary consequences for the 

private sector, and determine how to jump-start economic growth.

Main challenges to further progress in Afghanistan’s public financial management. Some 

broader challenges could not only inhibit but also reverse PFM progress. These include 

• Stagnation of revenue—this has worsened the outlook for fiscal sustainability and may 

at some point undermine donor support for on-budget aid—not least if it is perceived 

that such aid reduces the government’s incentives to mobilize more revenue.

• Enormous availability of off-budget funds during the surge period, which may have 

diluted some of the positive incentives supporting PFM improvements.

• Significant ineligible expenditures submitted to the ARTF for reimbursement—as much 

as 20 percent of payroll and close to 60 percent of nonwage O&M in recent 

years—have been found by the ARTF’s external monitoring agent to be ineligible 

for reimbursement by the ARTF. This does not mean loss of donor money, but it 

is a sign of weakness in PFM processes.23

• Entrenched and pervasive corruption in general—though good PFM practices have so 

far reduced the vulnerability of budget spending to corruption. 

• Difficulties in making the Afghan budget a more strategic policy instrument, exacerbated 

by the fiscal squeeze during the past couple years—with most budget resources tied 

to security, salaries, and specific donor-funded development projects, only a small 

discretionary portion is left. 

Narrowing political space for development. During his nearly thirteen years in office, former 

president Hamid Karzai was not a reformist nor a strong advocate for institutionalization but 

was instead almost entirely preoccupied with day-to-day political management. Under these 

circumstances, progress depended on whether there was a strong leader and/or empowered 

management team in the ministry or agency concerned, whether they had the political space to 

take forward reforms and development policies, and whether corruption was not out of hand.24 

However, the political space, even for more technocratic reforms, appears to have narrowed 

during the latter part of the Karzai administration, largely as a result of the entrenchment 
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of elite networks and pervasive patterns of patronage.25 Moreover, Karzai’s style of political 

management meant that it became increasingly difficult to keep reform areas insulated from 

politicization. While macroeconomic management and PFM have tended to be less vulnerable 

to this narrowing of political space, they have not been entirely exempt.

The 2014 political transition—loss of the usual window of opportunity? Prior to the 2014 

presidential election, concerns were widely voiced that it might go badly wrong or in a worstcase scenario break down into violent conflict. There was also a widespread feeling, however, 

that if the election went well, the change to a new administration would provide a window of 

opportunity to renew reforms, take forward a meaningful anticorruption agenda, and make a 

good start in the post-transition decade.26 The election fortunately did not break down, but the 

long drawn-out process of finalizing the outcome and the negotiations over the NUG and its 

slow start have detracted from the expected window of opportunity. The first one hundred days 

of the new administration saw some significant changes and important signals (e.g., signature 

of the BSA, more generally repairing the relationship with the United States, reopening Kabul 

Bank criminal cases, outreach to Pakistan and the Taliban). However, there was a long delay 

in forming the cabinet, and selecting and appointing deputy ministers, provincial governors, 

and other senior officials also has been a slow process. Thus, the window of opportunity that 

normally ensues after a change of government may have at least to a considerable extent closed, 

without having been sufficiently exploited. 

Lessons Learned

Important lessons can be learned from Afghanistan’s experience with macroeconomic 

management and PFM since 2001—for Afghan government institutions and the political 

leadership and for international partners. Some lessons may be applicable to other spheres of 

activity, as well as to other conflict-affected and postconflict countries.

Take advantage of windows of opportunity. The first few years after 2001 saw a 

disproportionate share of successful initiatives that achieved major progress. Virtually all of 

the achievements in macroeconomic management and PFM were set in motion in these early 

years, reflecting the fluidity of the situation and less entrenched political interests, which left 

space to put in place sensible macroeconomic policies and PFM reforms. Once a window 

of opportunity has closed, it becomes much more difficult to build and sustain momentum 

for progress.

Build on what already exists. The currency reform is a good example where progress was 

facilitated by relying on existing capacity and/or practices. Another example is the use of the 

existing Afghan budget accounting system as a basis for initial PFM improvements, rather 

than starting with a completely new accounting system. 

Use simple, flexible instruments and interventions. Macro instruments were rudimentary, 

including most prominently the regular auctions of U.S. dollars by DAB to stabilize the 

exchange rate, influence the money supply, and limit inflation. The ARTF started out with a 

simple design but had the flexibility to evolve and build on success over time. 

Synergize incentives and foster positive dynamics. Rather than pursuing one-off 

interventions or repeatedly trying to make inroads against a static target, the key for both 

government and international partners is to rely on incentive alignment and to set in motion 

positive dynamics that cumulatively build progress over time and become sustainable. 

PFM is the most prominent example where conducive incentives and dynamics led to 

sustained success. 
USIP.ORG 95

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Learn by doing. PFM improvements came about through successive years of 

implementation, starting from a small and rudimentary base. Implementing computerized 

payments and accounts, enhancing the quality of the Afghan national budget, and developing 

a more programmatic approach in key sectors are all examples of learning by doing. In the early 

post-2001 period, each annual budget represented a significant improvement over the previous 

year’s budget.

Make sound macroeconomic management a priority. Poor macroeconomic management 

could have greatly exacerbated Afghanistan’s problems, resulting in adverse outcomes such as 

high inflation, exchange rate instability, and/or dissipation of foreign exchange reserves. Macro 

instruments were rudimentary and limited, but macroeconomic outcomes were positive for 

the most part. 

Push forward reforms in more technocratic, less overtly political, activities. Key dimensions 

of PFM benefited from being below the political radar and from being seen as “technical” 

activities; the same applied to macroeconomic policies and instruments.

Facilitate political space for technocratic reforms as much as possible. Even in the more 

technical areas, the existence of political space for progress (which could be generated in 

different ways) has been a crucial factor for success (such as in parts of the budget process). 

Creating political space calls for greater political awareness on the part of international partners 

and a political strategy by the government. 

Prioritize mechanisms to prevent and combat corruption early on. Widespread corruption 

has become a dominant concern (especially regarding customs and revenue collection), even 

if PFM on the expenditure side has remained more insulated from large-scale corruption. If 

financial accountability and integrity are not prioritized up-front, corruption could become 

entrenched, making it harder to address. 

Prospects for the Future

While considerable success has been achieved since 2001 in macroeconomic management 

and PFM, there have been some examples of slow progress or even major failure. Looking 

forward, macroeconomic management and PFM perhaps face even greater challenges. Some 

key questions must be addressed: 

How can the government respond effectively and pro-actively to the country’s challenges, 

rather than drifting from one political “crisis” to another? The Ghani administration has 

already used up about one-third of its term in office. Although the cabinet is now in place, 

much time has been lost, and the rest of the government remains far from fully staffed. The 

country faces worsening security threats, ongoing political challenges (including implementing 

the ambitious political agenda put forward in the NUG agreement), and an even weaker 

economy than expected earlier. 

How can political space be generated for effective development and reforms? The political 

configuration of the new administration (and correspondingly how the necessary political 

space could be generated) is different from the previous administration. Ghani is a reformist 

president, but the more complex political arrangements now in place can be obstacles to reform 

and day-to-day political management. Moreover, the highly contentious political agenda 

set forth in the NUG agreement is further distracting political attention from reforms and 

development policies and programs. 

How can modest job-creating growth be achieved given the challenging security and 

political situation and a deteriorating economy? The economy and issues around macroeconomic 
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management are increasingly coming to the fore. One challenge will be managing the exchange 

rate while maintaining adequate foreign currency reserves, which inevitably will entail further 

depreciation of the Afghani over time—although the government will need to be mindful of 

the inflationary impact. Sustaining the impressive growth in Afghanistan’s domestic budgetary 

revenue seen in 2015 will be a priority,27 while minimizing recessionary consequences for the 

private sector. With limited discretionary resources, prioritizing expenditures for maximum 

effectiveness will be a major challenge. 

How can PFM improvements be maintained and built upon when resources are severely 

squeezed and past incentives and dynamics may have weakened? As noted earlier, progress 

in PFM has slowed down over time, and, in recent years, there have been signs of possible 

backsliding. A recent review found that PFM systems are relatively strong but the credibility of 

the budget remains weak.28 Moreover, the fiscal cash crunch in 2014 necessitated extraordinary 

measures that have further undermined budget credibility and may have exacerbated 

vulnerabilities to corruption in the budget execution process. 

Acknowledgments

Inputs and comments from Paul Sisk, and comments from Nicholas Krafft, Paul Fishstein, 

Martine van Bijlert, Kate Clark, and Colin Cookman are gratefully acknowledged. A shorter 

version of this chapter—“Economic Management in Afghanistan: What Worked, What Didn’t, 

And Why?”—was published by the Afghanistan Analysts Network on August 26, 2015, www.

afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/20150806-Economic-Managementfinal-Sud2.pdf.

Notes

1. For an analysis of the election and the postvoting difficulties encountered from a broader political economy 

perspective, see William A. Byrd, “Understanding Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential Election: The Limits to 

Democracy in a Limited Access Order,” Special Report 370 (Washington, DC: U.S. Insitute of Peace, 

2015), www.usip.org/publications/2015/04/24/understanding-afghanistans-2014-presidential-election.

2. For more information on the economy, see World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, April 2015, https://

openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/21894; for more on the fiscal crisis, see William A. Byrd, 

“Afghanistan’s Continuing Fiscal Crisis: No End in Sight,” Peace Brief 185 (Washington, DC: U.S. 

Institute of Peace, 2015), www.usip.org/publications/2015/05/15/afghanistans-continuing-fiscal-crisis-noend-in-sight. 

3. Afghanistan Analysts Network, “The ‘Government of National Unity’ Deal,” www.afghanistan-analysts.

org/miscellaneous/aan-resources/the-government-of-national-unity-deal-full-text/.

4. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Realizing Self-Reliance: Commitments to Reforms and Renewed Partnership, 

London Conference on Afghanstan, December 2014, www.embassyofafghanistan.org/document/

realizing-self-reliance. 

5. For the broad economic picture and trends since 2001, see, among others, Richard Hogg, Claudia Nassif, 

Camilo Gomez Orsorio, William Byrd, and Andrew Beath, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014

(Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), 41, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986

/13107/758480PUB0EPI0001300PUBDATE02028013.pdf?sequence=1. For more recent developments—

including with regard to inflation, exchange rate, foreign currency reserves—see World Bank, Afghanistan 

Development Update, October 2015, www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/

WDSP/IB/2015/10/27/090224b083174638/1_0/Rendered/PDF/Afghanistan0de0pdate00October

020150.pdf. Also see World Bank, “Afghanistan: Emerging from Transition.” Presentation for Senior 

Officials Meeting, September 4–5, 2015, www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/SAR/

afghanistan/Af-SOM-Sept-2015.pdf.

6. Based on an earlier, not fully comparable household survey conducted in 2005, it appears that there was not 

much change in the poverty ratio between 2005 and 2011/12, despite rapid economic growth during this 

entire period. See Dean Jolliffe, Poverty Status in Afghanistan (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2010), http://

documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2010/07/14551011/poverty-status-afghanistan-profile-basednational-risk-vulnerability-assessment-nrva-2007-08; also see Afghanistan Central Statistics Organization 

Sustaining the impressive 

growth in Afghanistan’s 

domestic budgetary 

revenue seen in 2015 

will be a priority, while 

minimizing recessionary 

consequences for the 

private sector.
USIP.ORG 97

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

(CSO), National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment, 2011–2012: Afghanistan Living Conditions Survey (Kabul: 

CSO, 2014), www.af.undp.org/content/dam/afghanistan/docs/MDGs/NRVA REPORT-rev-5 2013.pdf. 

7. The figures on aid-to-GDP ratios can be found in World Bank, Afghanistan Economic Update, April 2015, 

Annex 2, 26.

8. This finding is emphasized in a consultant study commissioned by the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, 

Afghanistan: A Preliminary Fiduciary, Development Risk and Cost-Effectiveness Assessment, 1, 6, and elsewhere. 

(Reviewed by author; not available to the public.) 

9. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, October 2015, Appendix Table 3, 24 (figure for discretionary 

balance). A drawdown of positive deposits represents deficit financing in the year in which it occurs, and 

there is no difference from a macro-monetary perspective between running down positive deposits by a 

certain amount and incurring an overdraft (i.e., negative deposit balance) vis-à-vis the Central Bank of the 

same amount.

10. For a discussion on the need for Afghanistan to run modest, domestically financed fiscal deficits in the 

current economic situation, see William A. Byrd, “What Can Be Done to Revive Afghanistan’s Economy” 

Special Report 387 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2016), 8–9, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/

SR387-What-Can-Be-Done-to-Revive-Afghanistans-Economy.pdf. 

11. See Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC), Report of the Public 

Inquiry into the Kabul Bank Crisis (Kabul: MEC, 2012); also see MEC, Unfinished Business: The Kabul Bank 

Follow-up Report (Kabul: MEC, 2014).

12. However, the recent cash crunch has given the Treasury Department a more political role in deciding which 

government bills and other budgeted expenditure items actually get paid and which are left unpaid (building 

up significant arrears in the government accounts).

13. The ARTF, established in 2002, is a multidonor, coordinated financing mechanism that pools contributions 

of several dozen donors and channels them through the Afghan budget. The ARTF recurrent window pays 

for civilian government salaries and nonwage operating expenditures, while the ARTF development 

window funds development projects and programs. For more details on the fund, see www.artf.af/. 

14. However, many professional and managerial Afghan staff—in the MOF and elsewhere in the government—

have been on temporary contracts at much higher than civil service pay rates, raising important questions 

about sustainability.

15. See www.artf.af/policy-reform-program. 

16. The problems of LOTFA and UNDP’s management are documented in UNDP evaluations and audit 

reports, SIGAR reports, press accounts, and other public documents. See, for example, UNDP Office of 

Audit and Investigations, Desk Review of UNDP Afghanistan: Oversight of the Monitoring Agent of the Law 

and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan, http://audit-public-disclosure.undp.org/view_audit_rpt_2.cfm?audit_

id=1310. See also William A. Byrd and Scott Smith, “Ghani, UNDP, and The New York Times: Who 

Really Overreached on Paying Afghan Police,” Foreign Policy South Asia Channel, February 2, 2015, 

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/02/02/ghani-undp-and-the-new-york-times-who-really-overreached-onpaying-the-afghan-police/. 

17. Nathan Hodge, “U.N. Fund Scrutinized for Afghan Corruption,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2012, www.

wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304543904577396421507307902; and Meena Haseeb, “UN Trust 

Fund Agency Allowed Procurement Fraud in Afghanistan,” Khaama Press, February 28, 2013, www.

khaama.com/un-trust-fund-agency-allowed-procurement-fraud-in-afghanistan-2232?keepThis=true

&TB_iframe=true&height=600&width=900&caption=UN+trust+fund+agency+allowed+procurement+fra

ud+in+Afghanistan. 

18. William Byrd, “Responding to Afghanistan’s Development Challenge: An Assessment of Experience 

During 2002–2007 and Issues and Priorities for the Future,” South Asia Region PREM Working Paper 

Series SASPR-11 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2007), 22, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/

en/2007/10/8903270/responding-afghanistans-development-challenge-assessment-experience-during-2002-

2007-issues-priorities-future.

19. See Byrd, “Responding to Afghanistan’s Development Challenge,” 31–33, for a more detailed discussion.

20. See World Bank, “ARTF Administrator’s Report on Financial Status as of December 21, 2015 (end of 12th 

month of FY1394),” Table 5, www-wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2

016/02/11/090224b08416f9b6/1_0/Rendered/PDF/ARTF000adminis0fth0month0of0FY13940.pdf. 

21. William A. Byrd, “Afghanistan: Nurturing Political Space for Development,” Opportunity in Crisis Series 

3 (London: Chatham House, 2015), www.chathamhouse.org/publications/papers/view/199287.

22. The withholding of donors’ ARTF contributions for a time during 2010 to 2011—to pressure the Afghan 

government to address the Kabul Bank crisis—illustrates the limits of trying to impose strong negative 

conditionality. While there was success in documenting the extent of the problem and where money went 

and in orderly capitalization of the fiscal hole, the recovery of lost and stolen assets was slow, Kabul Bank 

could not be sold off, and progress in holding those responsible criminally accountable was limited. The 

Kabul Bank experience also exemplifies the adverse side effects (disruption to the Afghan national budget 
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and damage to development programs and ARTF’s credibility) that can arise from such an exercise of strong 

negative conditionality.

23. In earlier years, ineligible ratios of 10 percent or less for payroll and below 40 percent for nonwage O&M 

were typical. Since the ARTF does not reimburse ineligible expenditures, no ARTF funds (or associated 

donor contributions to ARTF) are lost as a result, but nevertheless, high ineligibles can be an indicator of 

weakness in expenditure reporting and controls.

24. Byrd, “Afghanistan: Nurturing Political Space for Development.”

25. Ibid.

26. As suggested in Byrd, “Afghanistan: Nurturing Political Space for Development,” 3: “...there may be a 

window of opportunity in the months immediately after the new government takes office to institute 

improvements and restore and expand the space for development-oriented policies and investments.” 

27. For a discussion of the performance of budgetary revenue in 2015, see William A. Byrd and M. Khalid 

Payenda, “Afghanistan’s Revenue Turnaround in 2015,” Peace Brief 201 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute 

of Peace, 2016).

28. Consultant study commissioned by the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance, Afghanistan: A Preliminary 

Fiduciary, Development Risk and Cost-Effectiveness Assessment. (Reviewed by author; not available to the 

public.)
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

Between 2001 and 2014, the United States and its allies made significant investments in 

private sector development, mainly because of the perceived importance of creating livelihoods 

and human security for the Afghan people but also because of the widely and deeply held 

belief that economic growth and employment would lead to stability and support for the 

new Afghan government. The investments aimed to encourage the shift from a mixed, but 

largely state-led, economy to a market-driven economy and to support the state in creating the 

necessary enabling environment. 

Afghanistan’s economic progress has been mixed; while significant achievements have been 

made, many of them have proven to be unsustainable. Weaknesses have become more visible 

since the 2014 transition—evident by the contraction of donor-fueled sectors of the economy 

such as construction and services; the decline from the double-digit overall growth of the 

previous decade to 1.3 percent in 2014;1 and the shrinking of revenues that has pushed the 

government into a fiscal crisis and put payment for salaries and services at risk. 

With unemployment continuing to rise, economic issues are increasingly coming to the 

fore. Lessons can be learned from examining the effectiveness of past support to the economy.

Economic Performance, Unemployment, and Poverty

Since 2001, the international community in Afghanistan has invested heavily in private sector 

development and economic growth, in part due to the belief that poverty and unemployment 

are major sources of instability. The international community’s support has been oriented to 

developing a free market economy and an outward-looking trade regime, while discouraging 

an activist role for the state, such as operating state-owned enterprises and providing 

subsidies. Various programs have targeted economic governance, small and medium enterprise 

development, and employment creation. 

However, despite average, annual, aggregate growth rates of more than 9 percent, a fivefold 

increase in per capita income, and dynamic sectors such as telecommunications, transport, 

construction, media, private education, and services, neither the economy nor the enabling 

environment has developed to the satisfaction of Afghans or their international supporters. 

Support to Afghan Private Sector Development

PAUL FISHSTEIN AND MURTAZA EDRIES AMIRYAR
100 USIP.ORG

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Gross domestic product (GDP) growth fell to 3.7 percent in 2013 and further to 1.3 percent in 

2014, and net foreign direct investment in 2013 was less than one-third of the 2004 level.2 This 

can be attributed to several factors, including the reduction in both international spending and 

the population’s confidence (the latter due to a drawn-out election process and a sharp uptick 

in violence). Afghanistan’s agriculture sector, traditionally its strongest, has performed poorly, 

and opium poppy cultivation set a new high during the 2013/14 agricultural year.3

The 2011–12 National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment4 and other sources give no 

indication of a national-level improvement in either poverty or unemployment over the last 

seven years. In fact, there are indications of an increase in income inequality,5 and job creation 

is far below the level required even to keep pace with new labor market entrants, let alone 

meet the heightened expectations of the post-2001 generation. While the government has 

been given high marks for some aspects of public financial management and macroeconomic 

management, the indicators for the enabling environment all show either no change or a 

decline, especially in areas related to policy enforcement. Predictions of even modest growth in 

the future make optimistic assumptions about stability, reforms, investment in infrastructure, 

and the extractives sector. Certainly, optimism has fallen since the heady days of the early 

2000s when there was talk of a Kabul stock exchange. 

Economic Policy 

The most significant policy change post-2001 was the adoption of a market economy after 

decades of a mixed, guided economy. While large parts of Afghanistan’s trading and small 

industries sectors had always been private and outside direct government control, after the fall 

of the Taliban, there was a general expectation that, armed with capital and technical support 

from the international community, the state would again take the lead in the economic sphere. 

After thirteen years, Afghan society is still divided on the practical and ethical implications of 

this policy change. Fairly or not, the market economy is held responsible for numerous evils: 

corruption, mafias, warlords, inequality, and the trade imbalance. It is also seen by many as 

part of a Western-imposed package of liberal “democratic” values, which has led to license and 

impunity and upholds individual rights at the expense of society. To some extent, the divisions 

in attitudes fall along generational lines. The older generations retain an imperfect nostalgia for 

a better and more secure time when the country was at peace, there was less corruption, and the 

government ran factories that employed thousands of Afghans and provided goods through 

a “coupon” system. The younger generation, much of which has been educated outside of the 

country during refugee stays in Pakistan or Iran or else at home post-2001, is generally more 

open to the values of the market economy, believing more in competition, achievements based 

on merit, and the right to enjoy the fruits of one’s own labor. However, even those who support 

the market economy say that the rollout was too fast—that institutions were not ready—and 

that, as a consequence, Afghanistan has not experienced the true market economy, only crony 

or warlord capitalism.6

Lessons Learned

There is fairly wide agreement that Afghanistan’s economy has not achieved the type of growth 

desired—and that the country’s economic problems and challenges primarily relate to security 

and uncertainty but also competitiveness, infrastructure, the enabling environment, and 

governance. There is less agreement, however, on how the international community’s support 
USIP.ORG 101

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

has contributed to economic growth (or not), and how it could have been more effective, 

considering the performance of the Afghan government and the dire condition the country 

was in at the end of 2001. It is hard to gauge just where the economy should be after thirteen 

years, especially given the insurgency. 

Some of the following lessons learned are specific to private sector development and the 

economy, while others are more generic and applicable to other areas of intervention as well. 

They reflect the immediate objective of creating economic activity and jobs but also the more 

abstract goal of building a state that Afghans respect and pay allegiance to. Many of these 

lessons are in line with first principles of development and therefore should have been learned 

decades ago, which begs the question of whether the primary issue is knowledge or agency 

and motivation. 

Development in the midst of war is challenging. Above all else, expecting sustained economic 

growth in the midst of insurgency or war is unrealistic—not least because conflict-related 

uncertainty creates an inhospitable climate for long-term, slow-yielding investments, especially 

if neither donors nor the government is able to provide guarantees. Throughout Afghanistan’s 

history, the preference for trade (relatively low-risk and with a short time horizon) has been 

ascribed to uncertainty,7 and the present is no exception. Insecurity and uncertainty motivate 

national and international private sector firms to seek long-term investments elsewhere in the 

region; this includes the roughly four thousand Afghan businessmen who are said to be based 

in China. In 2011, an estimated $4.6 billion in cash, or roughly one-quarter of GDP, was 

legally exported through Kabul Airport alone, not including funds exporting via other channels 

or by illegal transfers.8 At a minimum, the cost of security imposes an additional burden on any 

economic activity. Uncertainty also creates an inhospitable environment for building the sorts 

of institutions required to effectively manage and guide private sector development. 

A war economy establishes a set of dynamics and incentives that skew resources toward 

short-term gains, are inimical to longer-term growth, and generally have a negative impact 

on competition. The war economy in Afghanistan has created opportunities for powerful 

private sector players to opt for monopoly and misuse of public resources, such as in the 

extractives sector, where instability and lack of government control has allowed commanders 

and local powerholders to capture resources for personal benefit. In addition, the focus on 

counterinsurgency and stabilization channeled international funding to exactly those insecure 

geographic areas where investments were least likely to produce returns. Relatedly, some 

private sector development activities were used as short-term stabilization tools to win “hearts 

and minds” rather than achieve sustainable economic outcomes. While quick impact projects 

and other stabilization activities focused on putting people (especially young men) to work, 

such short-term activities do not usually create sustainable employment. 

Money was a two-edged weapons system. While Afghanistan’s dilapidated condition 

seemed to require almost unlimited financial resources to build its institutions and jump-start its 

economy, there is significant evidence that the attempt by international donors to spend too much 

money too fast had negative unintended consequences.9 Success was measured by the amount 

of money disbursed (the “burn rate”) rather than development outcomes. This was especially the 

case from 2007 onward, and even more so during the 2009 military and civilian “surge.” 

The most obvious consequence of excessive spending has been the corruption that has 

reduced the population’s faith in the state (and the international community) and compromised 

the performance of institutions that should support the private sector. With pressure from 

Washington, DC, (and other capitals) to spend, fewer questions were asked. Free or highly 

A war economy establishes 

a set of dynamics and 

incentives that skew 

resources toward shortterm gains, are inimical to 

longer-term growth, and 

generally have a negative 

impact on competition.
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subsidized inputs (justified on the basis of poverty), funds for conferences and exhibitions 

that could have been paid for by entrepreneurs themselves, and other uses for “easy money” 

also furthered a culture of dependence from the village to the ministry. Even when ministries 

had money in their budgets, there was often a preference for donor funds, because accessing 

them was easier. This reinforced the sense of playing with “someone else’s money.” At times, 

donor funds also competed with private sector investments. For instance, the U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID) created the Agricultural Development Fund (ADF) in 

part because the private sector was not willing to lend to the agriculture sector. This, however, 

competed with private sector financial services companies, such as Afghan Growth Finance, 

as ADF provided cheaper loans. The market was distorted, and local successful firms had to 

compete with free or subsidized money from the international community.

High salaries paid by the donors (three to eight times civil service levels) fueled salary inflation 

and resulted not only in a brain drain from ministries and other government institutions but 

also increased the cost of living and costs of production. Ironically, Afghanistan now has among 

the highest labor costs in South Asia—one factor that makes production uncompetitive and 

the country unattractive to foreign investment. Salary inflation was recognized as a potential 

issue from the beginning but was mostly ignored by agencies who feared losing out in the 

bidding war for what was then seen as a limited pool of human resources. Finally, as noted 

above, the war economy drew capital to quick and better-paying contracts (which often had 

minimal oversight), rather than to other less remunerative but longer-term activities. 

A purely technical approach was too narrow. Aid agencies mostly adopted a relatively 

narrow technical view in formulating policies and programs, rather than one that adequately 

considered how various types of power are used to capture markets and institutions. Pursuing 

an idealized version of how competitive markets should work, rather than acknowledging 

realities (such as the often rampant abuse of market power to discourage competition), led to 

unanticipated outcomes. 

Afghans’ most pervasive complaint about the post-2001 economy is the capture of benefits 

by a small group of well-connected individuals and groups who have acted as mafias to suppress 

competition, especially in profitable industries such as oil, gas, and transport. The capture of 

benefits has been observed in other postconflict settings, as well as in settings where rapid 

social change of any sort has taken place. According to one analysis, “Liberalization of the 

economy according to simplistic Western models (and not taking into account the political 

economy and conflict dimensions) has effectively been taken advantage of by a select group of 

individuals, families and networks that originally gained power and earned money from the war 

in Afghanistan.”10 The international community’s desire for stability often meant acquiescing 

in noncompetitive behavior by powerholders so as to keep them “inside the tent.” Regional 

warlords thus became entrenched as big economic players who suppressed competition and 

marginalized rivals. This has had a negative effect on both equity and growth.

The narrow technical approach also ignored that the state’s functions were being captured 

by elites and the well-connected. Tasked with being a regulator of the economy, the state 

instead became a source of preferential access to contracts, economic rents, and other benefits. 

Toward the end of former president Hamid Karzai’s era, a popular meme referred cynically 

to the government as a shirkat-e sahami or “stakeholder company.” The opaque manner in 

which some of the country’s state-owned enterprises were sold off on favorable terms to those 

with wasita (personal connections) under privatization initiatives backed by the international 

community was seen as “looting” and as part of a deeply flawed process characterized as “insider 

Afghanistan now has among 

the highest labor costs in 

South Asia—one factor 

that makes production 

uncompetitive and the 

country unattractive to 

foreign investment.
USIP.ORG 103

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

trading.” The sale of the Ghori cement factory to a group affiliated with senior government 

officials is considered one of the more egregious examples that both crowded out economic 

activity and undermined support for the state.11 Many believe that the state-owned enterprises 

(SOEs) should not have been killed off until a way was found to employ the displaced workers.

The extractives sector also offers examples of where privileged access has led to capture 

by powerful individuals and groups. The Ministry of Mines and Petroleum identified two 

thousand illegal mining sites;12 yet, there has apparently been little appetite for doing anything 

about them, despite the widespread recognition that such mining leads to suboptimal resource 

management and poor economic and social outcomes. During the long and acrimonious 

debate on the minerals law, members of parliament took a firm stand against the privatization 

of mines and mineral resources partly due to ideology and partly to self-interest, as it was 

alleged that they stood to gain from the current arrangements. Such impasses have hurt 

economic development; according to one government official, “The wolesi jirga’s [lower house 

of Parliament] failure to act on the minerals law has cost the country US$100 m so far.”13

Afghanistan was not a blank slate. The common assertion in the early years after 2001 

that “nothing existed” or that “everything had been destroyed,” despite evidence of vestigial 

elements of an administration,14 had at least two major unintended consequences. First, 

ignoring or bypassing the existing bureaucracy often left international advisors unaware of 

how policies were being implemented (or not). Office heads and mamurin (rank and file office 

workers) often delayed or subverted policies that were supposed to encourage the private 

sector. Sometimes attributed to “lack of capacity,” it was usually due more to a mix of personal 

and ideological reasons. Planned private enterprises, such as a slaughterhouse in Herat or a 

skilled labor institute, which would compete with government enterprises were abandoned by 

entrepreneurs when it became clear that they were likely to encounter bureaucratic obstacles 

from within the ministries.

The second consequence of the blank slate assumption was the creation of parallel structures. 

To speed implementation, many projects were designed to sideline current government 

officials, creating donor-led project implementation units and project management units 

staffed largely by consultants. Often referred to as the “second civil service,” these units were 

sometimes effective at achieving immediate project goals but much less so at developing and 

implementing policy. This weakness has come to the fore, especially with reduced funding in 

recent years; in some cases, programs ground to a halt when funding for the units ceased. In 

other cases, projects failed because they were designed by consultants but implemented by 

ministry staff who did not fully understand the project or have the necessary skills. In addition, 

the salary and resource differentials created resentment between the old and new generations 

of office workers, which further reduced the motivation for integration. 

In some cases, new institutions exacerbated the problems they were intended to solve. Their 

ostensible mission was to assist the line ministries in providing quick and effective services to the 

private sector in order to respond to the unprecedented demand for goods and services needed 

for the delivery of aid. However, internal government politics, personality-driven approaches, 

and the lack of a vision for the institutions’ future often resulted in a shift from their initial 

mission and created a competitive environment among institutions vying to provide services 

that had money and opportunities for power. For example, originally created to perform a 

registration function, the Afghanistan Investment Support Agency was considered a success at 

first, but after a leadership change, it succumbed to corruption and ineffectiveness; its investment 

promotion and support function was overshadowed by potentially more lucrative licensing. 
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Strong and transparent institutions are needed for an enabling environment. As a 

consequence of corruption and officials’ lack of real commitment to proclaimed policy goals, 

the strong and transparent institutions required for creating the enabling environment in 

which the private sector could thrive did not exist. As a member of the Kabul Bank review 

committee put it, “you can’t create a market economy without creating a strong government.”15

Despite achievements in areas such as public financial management, overall, the government 

has made “limited” progress.16 Indicators show either no improvement or a decline, especially 

in critical areas such as policy enforcement and property rights, or even the basic protection 

of business owners against physical threats and intimidation by their competitors.17 Moreover, 

the international community often had to operate in a policy vacuum, as the government did 

not have a consistent, unified vision or policy for economic development.18 As a result, donors 

often had competing strategies and projects. 

The regulatory capacity of the state did not grow in proportion to the post-2001 economic 

boom launched by the billions of dollars injected into Afghanistan by the international 

community. As a consequence, abuses followed. Laws were selectively executed, subverted, or 

simply ignored. In many cases, officials set their own “policy.”19 Changes in tax and fee policy, 

sometimes apparently at the whim of senior officials, maintain an uncertain environment that 

can be exploited by corrupt officials. Overlapping mandates, ambiguity over responsibilities, 

and lack of clarity about “scope of authority” have led to inter- or intra-institutional competition 

over who controls processes, which can be used to extract rents. Significant delays have 

occurred when institutions (e.g., the Ministry of Commerce and Industry and the Afghanistan 

Chamber of Commerce and Industry) contest the control of procedures, with neither willing 

to give up potentially remunerative gate-keeping functions. 

According to estimates by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 

the Afghan people pay bribes equivalent to 20 percent of GDP (including for business-related 

procedures such as land or shop registration and paying taxes and public utility fees), which 

“has a major impact on the country’s economy.”20 Without reasonable assurances of protection, 

entrepreneurs are often unwilling to raise their visibility or take risks that might expose them 

to financial losses or even physical harm. Partly for this reason, an estimated 80–90 percent 

of Afghanistan’s GDP remains in the informal economy, and Afghan entrepreneurs are 

investing in neighboring countries. Businessmen complain that some policies pave the way for 

corruption by establishing requirements that are either too frequent or too difficult to fulfill. 

For instance, requiring firms to renew business licenses annually rather than every three or 

five years provides corrupt officials with more opportunity to collect bribes. Similarly, in an 

environment where record keeping can be extremely “casual,” requiring firms to submit five 

years of business accounts creates such an onerous task that paying a bribe is often the most 

expeditious way to resolve the requirement. Some attribute the greater external investment in 

telecommunications to the relatively strong institutions put in place in that sector, which might 

demonstrate their importance in supporting private sector growth. 

Despite the extremely unconducive environment for conducting business transparently, 

some private sector firms continue to struggle to conduct business ethically and avoid corruption 

by any possible means. However, doing business transparently is costly, and competing becomes 

difficult; corrupt contracting processes on government tenders sideline firms that promote 

clean business. Without the establishment of transparent government institutions that can 

reduce corruption and create a level playing field for the private sector to grow, private sector 

businesses reluctantly see the unethical way of doing business as the only means of surviving. 

The Afghan people pay 

bribes equivalent to 20 

percent of the gross 

domestic product...which 

“has a major impact on the 

country’s economy.”
USIP.ORG 105

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Sustainability must be considered early on. It is mainly in the last several years—since the 

2010 announcement of the 2014 transition plan—that increased attention has been paid to 

the sustainability of many of the investments made in Afghanistan since 2001, as well as, on 

an even higher level, the sustainability of the overall economy and its sources of growth. While 

recent criticism has mostly surrounded the major shortfall in operations and maintenance 

funds for capital projects,21 less obvious but equally important is the lack of technical and 

organizational sustainability of many of the institutions and processes created to foster private 

sector development. Even with progress in streamlining processes, there has often been 

backsliding. For instance, one study found that the steps required to license a business had been 

reduced from more than fifty to eight between 2004 and 2006 but that, by 2011, had inched 

back up to more than twenty—most of which required handing over “illicit fees.”22 This is less 

an indictment of technical assistance than an illustration of the difficulty of changing deeply 

engrained behavior. The computerization of customs forms has been affected by problems with 

connectivity, entry of incorrect data, and other issues that suggest that new technology was 

not a sufficient solution. But, it is also widely believed that officials are reluctant to use new 

technology that targets inefficiency, because this would reveal performance inadequacies and 

reduce opportunities for corruption. 

Regarding employment, while donor-funded programs—such as the National Solidarity 

Program and public works, microfinance, and military-supported stabilization programs—

have created short-term work, the World Bank has observed that “permanent job creation 

can only be achieved through growth in the real economy.”23 Despite the expressed desire 

for “market-driven” employment and training programs, studies have found a lack of linkages 

between donor-funded training/capacity-building programs and the labor market.24 Many 

donor-funded vocational training centers have provided training that was “rudimentary” 

and focused on traditional skills (especially in the case of women) that were already widely 

available.25 Although the human capital pool has greatly expanded, it is ironic that during a 

time when Afghanistan experienced an extreme building boom, complaints were still heard 

about the lack of qualified Afghan tradesmen. Critics assert that more proactive training 

and vocational education in the building trades would have allowed Afghan workers to take 

advantage of job opportunities during the post-2001 construction and services boom, which 

attracted skilled and semi-skilled workers from all over South Asia (sometimes imported by 

construction bosses under questionable working conditions).26

Donor-funded industrial parks were meant to address the key constraints of land and 

power, but the “build it and they will come model” has had mixed results. Electricity, water, and 

sewage have often been lacking, and especially where generator power has been necessary, the 

fully priced services that the industrial parks offer (based on a cost-recovery model) have been 

too high for Afghan companies. Plots have often been distributed on a speculative basis rather 

than for productive activities. Business activity and employment generated by industrial parks 

has been far less successful than was anticipated or was projected in proposals.27 Construction 

of cold storage facilities for agricultural outputs has similarly been largely ineffective without 

complementary investments. Donors have invested in business development services (BDS) as 

a way to support budding enterprises that wish to expand and lack the knowledge to do so, but 

demand from Afghan companies has been limited, and most of the BDS agencies are chasing 

the same donor-funded opportunities; many BDS have become defunct.

On a positive note, some development practitioners point to the effective use of private 

sector development grants by programs such as the Afghanistan Business Innovation Fund 
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as a meaningful incentive for already-running private firms to use innovative approaches to 

produce goods that were demanded domestically and, in certain cases, internationally. With 

a focus on sustainability and a market-driven approach from the outset, such programs have 

resulted in more sustainable private firms. For example, 786 Pharmacy, which provides highquality medicine through its medicine-dispensing chain of stores, has grown rapidly with the 

funding and technical support of donor funds. 786 Pharmacy has also managed to receive 

venture capital funding from the London-based InFrontier for a planned expansion of the 

chain from eight stores today to fifty in five years’ time.28

Citizens want to perceive the state as strong and capable. Even if a sensible policy choice, 

designation of the private sector as driver of the economy has undermined support for the state 

by the population, which frequently accuses it of having done “nothing.” The idea of a laissez 

faire system in which the state “gets out of the way” of the private sector has been subject to 

double criticism: first, because it has not gotten out of the way (e.g., due to corruption), and, 

second, because it pays the political price of “doing nothing.” 

Despite extensive and pervasive corruption and the complaint that the state’s actions have 

not delivered meaningful impact, many Afghans still believe in the state and want it to play a 

larger role in areas assigned to the private sector, including health service delivery, agricultural 

extension, and manufacturing. State legitimacy is affected by the growth of the economy and 

the extent to which it is seen as delivering employment. Some analysis has concluded that 

the state should have had a stronger focus on economic development and job creation.29 Also, 

branding and communication strategies that aimed to create goodwill and associate services 

with specific donors and agencies may have done so at the expense of the Afghan government. 

The decline in what were considered symbols of modernization (e.g., the former Bagrami 

textile mill, which is currently being used as a car wash) is a sore point with many Afghans, 

young and old. Perhaps it is an idealized version of the state, but the international community 

seems to have underestimated the extent to which its reduced role was a break with the past.

Free trade needs to account for regional competition and predatory behavior. Afghanistan 

has been unable to take full advantage of the free-trade regime, which was largely imposed 

on the country after 2001. There are, of course, many reasons for the country’s massive trade 

imbalance,30 including all those that come with an economy decimated by decades of conflict 

(e.g., high costs, poor infrastructure, unreliable power, lack of quality control, poor rule of 

law), but the population mostly blames it on a combination of the market economy and the 

weakness of the state in not responding to predatory behavior by neighbors. According to one 

official, “We should have protected industries; we needed at least five years to be competitive, 

but instead we forced them to compete with Iran and Pakistan.”31 At least some of this can be 

attributed to the international community’s pressing for an open trade regime and its reluctance 

to support subsidies and protective measures. There have been significant credible reports of 

“dumping” (which has now entered the local language vocabulary), obstruction of trade, and 

changes in tariffs and taxes by neighbors that have killed some Afghan industries. According 

to one official, “We had factories in the past, but now Torkham [the main border crossing into 

Pakistan] has an open door in one direction.”32 Afghan producers complain that the actions 

taken to link them with international markets have been sporadic and inconsistent. Smuggling 

of goods and other “off-the-books” trade with the neighboring countries makes recognition of 

dumping and other unfair practices difficult. 

Many Afghans believe that Afghanistan moved toward accession to the World Trade 

Organization to show the country’s progressiveness, capability, and engagement with the 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

world, but that under current conditions, it would be “suicide” to go beyond observer status. 

Recognizing that the notion of open trade (as well as the market economy more generally) 

was controversial, the USAID-funded Trade and Accession Facilitation project was partially 

devoted to changing public attitudes.33

Implementation issues and competing institutional imperatives need to be addressed. 

Finally, myriad implementation issues have limited success in Afghanistan and are the source 

of many of the ills mentioned above. Aside from the use of the “burn rate” as a metric for 

success, numerous other issues—short duration projects, unrealistic timeframes, excessive 

focus on countable deliverables, rapid turnover and lack of continuity of personnel, complex 

bureaucratic procedures, institutional rivalries, inconsistency of policies between agencies 

and over time, cumbersome processes for vetting and approval of staff, the need to produce 

“success stories,” application of inappropriate international standards, and the introduction 

of nonsustainable technology and systems—have contributed to ineffective or even 

counterproductive projects. Many of those issues have been documented in the development 

literature and institutional archives. While collaboration and minimization of overlap were 

objectives written into most project documents, institutional imperatives and the challenges 

of coordination (e.g., mobility, short-term postings) often made achieving them impossible. 

Activities such as energy transmission and capacity building were especially notorious in this 

regard. In the latter case, duplication of activities overloaded government institutions. Perhaps 

the most serious implementation issue was lack of knowledge of the social and institutional 

context in which policies and projects were designed and implemented. 

Institutions as well as policies have had multiple, sometimes conflicting, imperatives. Despite 

the objective of employing idle citizens, especially young men, capital intensive construction 

techniques were frequently used, generating returns to capital (at first mostly to external firms) 

rather than income to labor. For example, the US$129 million ADB-financed construction of 

the 73 km railway between the Hairatan border crossing and Camp Marmal/Mazar airport 

was done by the Uzbekistan State Railways, which apparently provided all materials and labor, 

losing an opportunity to create local employment and build a cadre of trained staff.34

Conclusion 

Although the above lessons would have been more pertinent several years ago when the level 

of international investment in Afghanistan was greater, most remain relevant and could inform 

current and future interventions in the country, as well as those in other countries. The key 

take-away points include the following: 

• Expectations were excessively high for broad-based economic activity and institutional 

development, given that Afghanistan was increasingly under conflict and therefore 

subject to pervasive uncertainty. 

• Multiple, myriad objectives, such as mixing private sector development work with 

military-led stabilization activities, resulted in misaligned incentives and the 

channeling of funds into short-term projects with limited long-term impact. 

• Spending too much money too fast made institutions vulnerable to corruption, 

created dependence, raised the costs of living and production, and made short-term, 

quick-payoff economic activity more attractive. 

• There was inadequate understanding of the population’s lack of knowledge of and 

enthusiasm for a market economy, as well as the extent of people’s expectations of the 

Perhaps the most serious 

implementation issue was 

lack of knowledge of the 

social and institutional 

context in which policies 

and projects were designed 

and implemented.
108 USIP.ORG

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state with respect to the economy. This does not necessarily point to a need to 

increase government involvement or retain the SOEs in their previous form—only to 

be aware of the social consequences of economic policy and practice. 

• Insufficient attention was paid to the political economy of markets and institutions 

and how they were captured by well-connected powerholders who used their 

positions to suppress competition and marginalize rivals. 

• Afghanistan was mistakenly viewed as an institutional “blank slate,” and trial and 

error was deemed an effective method to discover what works best—thus resulting in 

the development of parallel structures rather than the integration of new structures 

or ideas into existing institutions or ways of thinking. 

• The strong and transparent institutions necessary for establishing an enabling 

environment for economic activity largely did not exist, which discredited the state 

and its economic policies and inhibited private sector development. 

• Interest in the financial, institutional, and technical sustainability of projects and 

programs—including those related to job creation and human capital development—

came too late and was inadequate. 

• An open trade regime in a country with noncompetitive production and predatory 

neighbors led to a massive trade imbalance, job losses, lack of popular support for 

economic policy, and alienation from the state. This is not to argue for protection but 

rather to (1) recognize the regional competitive and political disadvantages that make 

the notion of a “level playing field” implausible, as well as the domestic political cost 

of current policies and (2) question whether at times ideology blocked opportunities. 

• Many in the international community underestimated the practical challenges of an 

environment where logistics, institutions, human capital, and politics were not 

sufficient to support smooth project execution. Implementation was also exacerbated 

by numerous other issues (e.g., short rotations for personnel, unrealistic timeframes, 

complex bureaucratic procedures, and introduction of non-sustainable technology 

and systems) that further impeded progress. 

In fact, many of these “lessons” were well known in advance by development professionals. 

Many of what have been called “unanticipated consequences” were not unanticipated at all, 

but were foreseen. These include wage inflation, a culture of dependence, and corruption. This 

raises a question about whether it is a lack of knowledge or the often perverse incentives within 

our own institutions that are responsible for working in violation of known best practices 

and first principles. Through drawing on the substantial and growing body of experience 

in Afghanistan, the international community should be able to use increasingly limited aid 

resources more wisely and make better informed decisions in future operations elsewhere. 

Despite the serious challenges and problems facing the Afghan private sector, many firms have 

managed to survive and even thrive; with the right kind of support, such firms can seek further 

growth, especially in the most promising sectors such as telecommunications, agriculture, 

education, and healthcare.

Notes

1. World Bank, Afghanistan Development Update, October 2015 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), https://

openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/22931.

2. Ibid. 

An open trade regime 

in a country with 

noncompetitive production 

and predatory neighbors 

led to a massive trade 

imbalance, job losses, 

lack of popular support 

for economic policy, and 

alienation from the state.
USIP.ORG 109

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

3. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and Islamic Republic of Afghanistan/Ministry 

of Counter Narcotics, “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2014: Cultivation and Production” (Vienna: 

UNODC, 2014).

4. Central Statistics Organization (CSO), National Risk and Vulnerability Assessment 2011–12: Afghanistan 

Living Condition Survey (Kabul: CSO, 2014).

5. While adequate understanding of unemployment and poverty in Afghanistan is hampered by the lack of 

consistent, comprehensive, and reliable data, as well as definitional questions, the National Risk and 

Vulnerability Assessment and other informal sources suggest a lack of improvement. See CSO, National Risk 

and Vulnerability Assessment 2011–12.

6. For additional discussion, see Paul Fishstein, “Afghan Economic Policy, Institutions, and Society Since 

2001,” Special Report 383 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 2015).

7. Maxwell J. Fry, The Afghan Economy: Money, Finance, and the Critical Constraints to Economic Development

(Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1974), Chapter 3. 

8. Matthew Green, “Afghanistan Acts to Curb Flight of Capital,” Financial Times, March 18, 2012, www.

ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/a888d1fc-6f12-11e1-afb8-00144feab49a.html#axzz43gmChVx0. 

9. Paul Fishstein and Andrew Wilder, Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship Between Aid and 

Security in Afghanistan (Medford, MA: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, 2012); also Scott 

Dempsey, “Is Spending the Strategy?” Small Wars Journal, May 4, 2011, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/

art/is-spending-the-strategy.

10. Javed Noorani, “Elite Connections, Government Contracts and the Mining Oligarchy: Political Economy 

and Conflict Analysis of Selected Mines in Afghanistan” (Kabul: Integrity Watch Afghanistan, forthcoming).

11. Mir Sediq Zaliq, “A Loss-Making Cash Cow,” Afghanistan Today, June 7, 2011, www.afghanistan-today.

org/article/?id=129. 

12. Zarmina Mohammdi, “Analysts: Over 2,000 Illegal Mining Sites in Afghanistan,” TOLOnews, June 24, 

2015, www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/20176-analysts-over-2000-illegal-mining-sites-in-afghanistan. 

13. Interview with official, Ministry of Finance, Kabul, February 2015. 

14. Anne Evans, Nick Manning, and Anne Tully, Subnational Administration in Afghanistan: Assessment and 

Recommendations for Action (Washington, DC and Kabul: World Bank and Afghanistan Research and 

Evaluation Unit, 2004). 

15. Interview with member of the Kabul Bank review committee, Kabul, January 2015. 

16. Independent Evaluation Group, Afghanistan Country Program Evaluation, 2002–11: Evaluation of the World 

Bank Group Program (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013).

17. World Bank, Doing Business 2015: Going Beyond Efficiency (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2014); and 

World Bank and Department for International Development, The Afghanistan Investment Climate in 2008: 

Growth Despite Poor Governance, Weak Factor Markets, and Lack of Innovation (Washington, DC: World 

Bank, 2009). 

18. Unfortunately, much of the criticism from Afghan analysts emerged only after the end of the Karzai 

administration. See Zabulullah Jahanmal, “Analysts Criticize Previous Government’s Economic Legacy,” 

TOLOnews, November 27, 2014, www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/17270-analysts-criticize-previousgovernments-economic-legacy. 

19. For example, in theory, raisins were officially exempted from export taxes but were still subjected to various 

taxes and fees by some officials. Sarah Lister and Adam Pain, “Trading in Power: The Politics of ‘Free’ 

Markets in Afghanistan,” Briefing Paper (Kabul: Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 2004).

20. UNODC, Corruption in Afghanistan: Recent Patterns and Integrity Challenges (Vienna: UNODC, 2013), 5. 

21. It is notoriously easier to mobilize donor funds to construct physical infrastructure (e.g., roads, hospitals, and 

schools) than to maintain and run them. According to the World Bank, “the Afghan budget ... will also face 

even greater liabilities from a growing wage bill and the O&M costs of the assets built over the last decade”; 

see Richard Hogg, Claudia Nassif, Camilo Gomez Osorio, William Byrd, and Andrew Beath, Afghanistan 

in Transition: Looking Beyond 2014 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), 52. 

22. Saeed Parto and Jos Winters, “Business Licensing in Afghanistan: Procedural Reform or Institutional 

Regression?” Working Paper (Kabul: Afghanistan Public Policy Research Organization, 2014).

23. Inder Sud and John O. Rankin, “Afghanistan: A Synthesis Paper of Lessons from Ten Years of Aid,” 

Workshop Draft (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2013), 11. 

24. While private English language and computer training academies have mushroomed since 2001, 

employment in foreign offices and Afghan companies is neither extensive enough nor sustainable enough to 

provide employment for all those who have flocked to these courses. Some question whether they provide 

access to the long-term job market. Some lay the blame in part on the government’s lack of policy and 

implementation. While the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs has developed occupational standards and 

the Ministry of Education plans to build schools in key sectors using standard curriculum, there is a long 

way to go. At certain times, the vocational training agenda has been stalled due to competition between 

these and other ministries over responsibility.
110 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

25. Samuel Hall Consulting, Afghanistan: Time to Move to Sustainable Jobs: Study on the State of Employment in 

Afghanistan (Kabul: International Labour Organisation, 2012).

26. Afghan employers often prefer regional workers because they are seen as cheaper and more skilled. It is ironic 

that Afghan workers in Iran are often preferred for the same reasons.

27. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), “Gorimar Industrial Park: Lack of 

Electricity and Water Have Left This $7.7 Million U.S.-funded Industrial Park Underutilized by Afghan 

Businesses,” SIGAR 15-30 Inspection Report (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2015).

28. Andrew Ward, “InFrontier Takes Stake in Afghan Pharmacy Chain,” Financial Times, June 29, 2015, www.

ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f8b4e5d2-1c1e-11e5-8201-cbdb03d71480.html#axzz43NxiIsgC. 

29. Francoise Jacob, Monitoring the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations, 

Country Report 1: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and 

Development, 2010).

30. For most of the post-2001 period, imports have been four times exports. See World Bank, “Afghanistan in 

Transition: Looking Beyond 2014: Volume 2: Main Report” (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012). 

31. Interview with the chief executive officer and managing partner of the business group, January 2015. Actual 

and perceived predatory behavior has led to lobbying for protection. “Afghan Industry Union Calls for More 

Government Supports,” Ariana News, January 29, 2012.

32. Interview with an Afghan government official, February 2015. Torkham is the main border crossing 

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. 

33. “Traders and the Afghan public see insecurity, corruption, and decreasing product quality as negative 

consequences of increased trade”; see Chemonics International, Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan 

(TAFA): Annual Report November 2009–November 2010 (Washington, DC: Chemonics International, 

2010), 46; Trade and Accession Facilitation for Afghanistan, “Knowledge, Attitude and Practice (KAP) 

Survey of Afghanistan Towards Trade: Summary of Findings for TAFA” (Kabul: TAFA Project 

Office, 2010). 

34. The nontendered construction contract, as well as a subsequent three-year management contract, has been 

attributed by some to the dual desires for speed in construction and to curry favor with Uzbekistan in the 

context of North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s increased reliance on the Northern Distribution Network. 

An Asian Development Bank (ADB) evaluation noted that “by employing the design–build concept, ADB 

also missed an opportunity to develop the capacity of the government to plan, design, and contract 

management for civil works.” According to the evaluation, the project “would be neither financially nor 

economically viable if sound methodological and analytical standards were used.” ADB Independent 

Evaluation, Country Assistance Program Evaluation: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Asia Development Bank

(Washington, DC: 2012), 34. The project was given a Development Impact Honors award by the U.S. 

government but was heavily criticized by the ADB independent evaluation for “weak analysis and due 

diligence”; see Country Assistance Program Evaluation, 28.
USIP.ORG 111

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

In 2001, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) began a major endeavor to assist in 

rebuilding Afghanistan’s national infrastructure. USACE has provided construction and 

program management in overseas locations for many years; however, Operations Enduring 

Freedom (OEF) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF) notably increased the USACE scope in active 

war zones where the United States and its coalition partners designated reconstruction as a 

strategic priority. During the ensuing years, USACE executed a contract construction program 

in Afghanistan including 943 completed projects at a cost of nearly $10 billion.1

Operating in Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency (COIN) environment presented many 

novel challenges for USACE, including working with coalition partners, incorporating new 

skill sets, and defining appropriate metrics for success. Afghanistan’s primitive infrastructure 

and lack of electrical power complicated the coalition strategy and efforts.

Many factors will ultimately determine whether the United States’ involvement in 

Afghanistan and its reconstruction efforts was successful or worthwhile. In determining 

victory in an insurgency, the “perception of a strategic audience”2 is a distinct factor; this 

perception is more difficult to measure than in a traditional military victory. In Afghanistan, 

the strategic audience may have several critical components, including the host nation 

population’s perception. Because the COIN “end state requires sustainability, which is an 

enduring perception by the strategic audience,”3 these perceptions must not only exist at a 

specific time but continue through time. 

One measure of success is the Afghan population’s own reported reasons for optimism. 

While accurate measures are difficult to obtain, polling by the Asia Foundation showed that 

Afghans who feel optimistic about the direction of their country cite “reconstruction and 

rebuilding”4 more often than any other reason for that optimism. These data suggest that 

USACE’s construction efforts positively influence this strategic audience.

Working as part of a holistic team, from strategy development through to completion, 

USACE gained some unique perspectives on state strengthening in Afghanistan. Through 

examining USACE’s road and energy programs and capacity development efforts since 2001, 

important lessons can be learned and appropriate metrics for success can be gleaned. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Afghanistan

State Strengthening Through Infrastructure Building

JODI JONES SMITH, JOHN DRAKE, M. ANNETTE EVANS, AND SCOTT C. FARQUHAR
112 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

In most cases, USACE did not design the programs/projects but rather managed, 

engineered, and constructed them for others, including the Combined Security Transition 

Command-Afghanistan, military units, the U.S. Department of State, and the U.S. Agency 

for International Development (USAID). A USACE project delivery team worked with host 

government representatives, stakeholders, USACE engineering and technical experts, and 

construction contractors to meet the agencies’ requirements. 

USACE in Nonpermissive Contingency Environments

USACE’s approximately 35,000 civilian and military members deliver engineering services 

in more than 130 countries. USACE is distinct from the U.S. Army’s tactical engineer units, 

reporting directly to the Secretary of the Army and executing U.S. Army and Department 

of Defense military construction, acquiring real estate, and developing national infrastructure 

through a civil works program. 

USACE provides capabilities complementing the operational Army force in situations 

requiring a military response (called a contingency) and in nonpermissive environments in which 

the host nation military and law enforcement lack control and/or intent to assist with U.S. 

military operations. These capabilities include technical engineering and contract construction, 

which leverage USACE’s considerable scope and resources that are otherwise unavailable to 

the operational commander5 and typically involve extensive construction within a host nation. 

USACE in Afghanistan: 2001 to Present

USACE efforts in Afghanistan fit within the U.S. military’s overall efforts to establish peace 

and stability. Achieving this goal in a conflict-affected nation requires that military objectives 

link with an overarching cooperative effort by U.S. government departments and agencies, 

“intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations, multinational partners, the private 

sector and the host nation.”6 These stability efforts endeavor to

• create conditions fostering the local population’s belief that the situation occurring in 

their nation is legitimate, acceptable, and predictable;

• lessen violence;

• enable governmental, economic, and societal institutional functioning; and 

• encourage general adherence to local laws, rules, and behavioral norms.7

In 2001, a USACE Forward Engineering Support Team (FEST) deployed with the U.S. 

Army XVIII Airborne Corps during Afghanistan combat operations, providing engineering, 

planning, contracting, and real estate management during and immediately after the initial 

conflict. 8 As part of USACE’s Field Force Engineering program, the FEST provided responsive 

technical engineering and contract construction management to combatant commands and 

their Army components. 

As the newly formed U.S. headquarters at the embassy compound in Kabul began 

strengthening and reinforcing the nascent transitional Afghan government, the Combined 

Forces Command-Afghanistan (CFC-A) focused on political-military affairs, building 

relationships with the Afghan government, its allies, the U.S. Embassy, and the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s military mission (International Security Assistance Force or ISAF). 

Focusing on stability and reconstruction, the first CFC-A commander began harmonizing 

coalition military actions with political plans, harnessing the instruments of national power 
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(diplomatic, information, military, and economic) within the campaign and supporting the 

national strategy. 

The military effort refocused its strategy on the Afghan people and local legitimacy as its 

center of gravity or the element necessary to achieve victory. The coalition planned to achieve 

success not only by fighting the enemy but through fostering and strengthening Afghans’ 

support for their new national government. The plan relied on the belief that the population 

would reject the insurgency or terrorist groups and instead rally to the efforts of the coalition 

and Afghan security forces. 

The campaign plan focused on assigning coalition combat units to unsecure areas—using 

the “clear, hold, build” tenets established in the Army’s field manual on counterinsurgencies9—

and was advocated by former secretary of state Condoleezza Rice.10 After better understanding 

the area, these units would conduct precise, simultaneous offensive, stability, and information 

operations to clear the enemy; increased local stability and outing of violent insurgents would 

foster support for the national government. Eventually, improved Afghan security forces would 

partner with and supplant the coalition combat units. These indigenous units would hold the 

territory to secure the population from the enemy while creating the security that would allow 

building economic and governmental reform.11

Following combat operations in 2002, the Office of Military Cooperation-Afghanistan 

asked USACE to oversee facility renovation and construction for the new Afghan National 

Army (ANA). Afghanistan’s new government needed the ANA to ensure internal peace 

and stability, and it required facilities to support its new force. The pace of renovating and 

constructing the ANA’s support facilities determined how quickly the ANA could expand. 

USACE was a key component of the U.S. reconstruction plan for Afghanistan. Given 

the increasing scope and complexity of Afghan infrastructure development, Major General 

Karl Eikenberry requested that USACE deploy more personnel from its Transatlantic 

Program Center, which provided engineering support to soldiers in the Middle East, Africa, 

and Russia.12 In September 2002, USACE’s Transatlantic Programs Center established the 

Afghanistan Area Office in Kabul to manage the ANA construction program.13

As the reconstruction effort grew, USACE established the Afghanistan Engineer District 

(AED) in Kabul in March 2004. By February 2005, AED was staffed by more than one 

hundred USACE personnel.14 The AED managed projects for the coalition militaries, the 

advisory effort to build Afghan security forces, and USAID. This growth also benefitted the 

Afghan economy. In early 2003, large international contractors performed 70 percent of AED’s 

construction work, but by 2007, Afghan contractors were completing almost 70 percent.15 In 

fiscal year 2004, USACE awarded $600 million in contracts for work in Afghanistan, with a 

significant portion allocated to companies who trained and employed local workers.16

USACE’s 943 completed construction projects in Afghanistan focused on infrastructure 

supporting the Afghan National Police and ANA, medical facilities, transportation, electrical 

power generation, education facilities, housing, and fuel storage. While most USACE 

construction centered on Afghan National Security Force infrastructure, USACE also 

improved Afghanistan’s civil works, supporting the Afghan government’s efforts to provide 

sustainable governance, economic development, security, and stability. 

USACE’s civil works program in Afghanistan is similar to its U.S.-based civil works 

program. Projects require authorization and approval and must be followed by a separate 

funding appropriation, but these processes occur much more quickly in the contingency 

environment. Like the U.S. civil works program, projects are often initiated at the local level, 
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but in Afghanistan, this may occur through military units working with Afghan leaders or 

through USAID’s partnership with a specific ministry. 

Civil works projects aim to improve Afghan quality of life and set the conditions for 

commerce and employment opportunities. Staffed with deployed volunteer engineering, 

construction, and business professionals, the USACE civil works team provides comprehensive 

engineering, management, and technical support. Civil works project examples include 

potable water supply for Kandahar, irrigation and dam improvements in the Helmand and 

Arghandab valleys, watershed studies in western Afghanistan, transportation infrastructure to 

and from the Pakistan and Iranian borders, and local and regional hydroelectric and electrical 

power improvements. 

USACE Involvement in the Transportation and Electrical Sectors 

Civil works projects addressed immediate access to reliable municipal services like water and 

electricity, job creation in the revitalized agricultural value chains, and commerce through 

route corridors. Two sectors, roads and electrical power, illustrate infrastructure development 

dynamics in Afghanistan. 

Creating a Transportation Infrastructure 

Afghanistan’s primitive transportation infrastructure complicated the coalition strategy. Lack 

of paved roads hindered U.S. forces’ ability to support one another17 and maintain its logistical 

network. Some of Afghanistan’s greatest internal challenges also resulted from the lack of an 

adequate and reliable transportation network; Afghanistan had few options for importing and 

exporting goods, impeding its economic development. 

In 2001, Afghanistan had 18,000 km of roadways and only 60 km of paved roads. About 90 

percent of this network was disconnected and poorly maintained.18 By early 2015, these values 

increased to 42,150 km and 12,350 km, respectively.19 These figures represent almost a complete 

new creation of the national paved road network and more than a 234 percent increase in all 

roadways. USAID, in partnership with USACE, continues building and repairing roads to 

help overcome obstacles created by the lack of transportation.

By 2011, development partners had invested more than $4 billion improving transportation 

infrastructure and institutions in Afghanistan. USAID alone has invested more than $2 billion 

to construct and rehabilitate more than 2,000 km of roads.20

Afghan government road categories include regional and national highways and provincial 

and rural roads. A funding source accompanies each approved road project. Various sources can 

provide these funds, depending on the project’s purpose. For example, military construction 

(MILCON) funds provide resources for roads built for the military’s operational requirements. 

The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) provides funding for commanders 

to construct “urgent, small-scale, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction projects and services 

that immediately assist the indigenous population and that the local population or government 

can sustain.”21 USACE’s road construction was funded by MILCON, the Afghanistan 

Infrastructure Fund (AIF) in partnership with USAID, and CERP.

The Ring Road

The Ring Road is the “backbone of the national transport system and principal conduit for 

national and international passenger and freight traffic.”22 More than 80 percent of Afghans 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

live within 50 km of the road,23 which connects Afghanistan’s five major cities (Herat, Kabul, 

Kandahar City, Jalalabad, and Mazar-e-Sharif). Efforts to build and rebuild the road appear to 

be positively affecting the Afghan economy, with imports and exports increasing almost 250 

percent since 2003, representing annual average growth of about 30 percent.24

However, these efforts and other transportation network investments have been fraught 

with many complex challenges. The major enduring problem is how to meet ongoing 

operations and maintenance requirements, which have, to date, been accomplished mostly 

through international and coalition efforts. To ensure long-term maintenance of their roads, 

the Afghan government must have the institutions and resources to sustain their infrastructure. 

USAID currently has a project providing “Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Public 

Works,” valued at $25.5 million. Scheduled to conclude in 2017, project goals include helping 

the Ministry of Public Works (MOPW) establish an independent government road authority25

to improve accountability and efficiency by initiating road-user fees to fund operations 

and maintenance.26

The Salang Tunnel

The USACE Salang Tunnel project exemplifies many of the strong points and complications 

involved with Afghanistan rebuilding efforts. The 1.6 mile tunnel is part of the Salang corridor 

through Parwan Province; it serves as the primary route between northern and southern 

Afghanistan crossing the Hindu Kush mountain range and is typically the only pass in the 

area remaining open the entire year. An estimated 5,000 to 7,000 vehicles travel the route 

daily, carrying nearly all commerce for Kabul and all other eastern Afghanistan cities. At 

about 11,200 feet (3,400 meters) above sea level, the Salang is one of the world’s highest 

road tunnels.27 

The Soviet Union and Afghanistan developed the Salang Road together beginning in 

1955. While providing a critical connection for Afghans, the tunnel has had many safety 

issues. Military actions and accidents compound the pass’s inherent dangers, which include 

avalanches and extreme weather. A tunnel fire in 1982 killed more than one hundred seventy 

Soviets and Afghans. Combat between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban through 1997 

and 1998 destroyed the tunnel ventilation system and entrances, resulting in the tunnel’s 

closure to all but foot traffic.28

A joint effort by Afghanistan, Russia, the United States, and other countries cleared mines 

and debris from the pass and reopened the tunnel in January 2002. About a decade later, 

rehabilitation of the Salang Tunnel began under a two-phase, $20 million, CERP-funded 

project. The first phase included purchasing materials and equipment to conduct emergency 

repairs to the tunnel roadway. The Theater Engineer Brigade performed some of the work and 

also oversaw and mentored MOPW personnel at the tunnel. These repairs were designed to 

allow USACE time to award the Phase 2 contract providing more permanent repairs.29

USACE awarded the $13.4 million contract to the Omran Holding Group. Phase 2 work 

began on November 5, 2012, and concluded on time and under budget about thirteen months 

later on November 30, 2013. Work included replacing the road pavement, improving the subdrainage system, upgrading electrical and ventilation systems, repairing and expanding power 

plants, replacing jet fan conductors, replacing and installing lights, and installing closed circuit 

television cameras.30

The major enduring 

problem is how to meet 

ongoing operations and 

maintenance requirements, 

which have, to date, been 

accomplished mostly 

through international and 

coalition efforts.
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PEACEWORKS 116

Successful project completion required cooperation among USACE, ISAF mentors, 

the MOPW, and Omran Holding Group (formed in 2004 as a product of the Afghan 

First Initiative).31

The Salang Tunnel project was successful in numerous ways, but problems linger related 

to upkeep and overuse. In terms of positive aspects, the tunnel was an excellent use of CERP 

funding because its successful completion addressed important transportation and safety 

requirements for the local population. The tunnel’s previous state not only generated vehicle 

collisions, but many people died in the tunnel because of poor ventilation. The project was 

a model for collaboration between the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and the Afghan 

government. An Afghan firm also successfully constructed the project with quality assurance 

oversight from the USACE Local National Quality Assurance program. 

Unfortunately, systemic problems with tunnel upkeep, combined with overuse, have 

degraded the project’s enduring legacy. The MOPW has not been able to fully take up 

operations and maintenance efforts, resulting in overall tunnel deterioration. 

Sustaining the Roads

Sustaining gains made during the past decade is the primary issue now facing Afghanistan. 

Without a viable, internal Afghan maintenance plan, the roadway system is quickly 

deteriorating. Both Afghan and coalition leaders recognize that the road network’s success 

depends on a sound plan.

In 2007, the Afghan government created the Afghan National Development Strategy 

(ANDS), with the overarching objective to “substantially reduce poverty, improve the lives of 

the Afghan people, and create the foundation for a secure and stable country.”32 Recognizing 

the road network’s importance in creating conditions for economic growth and prosperity, 

ANDS articulated the country’s vision for roads, including specific objectives for the Ring 

Road and airports. Focusing on inexpensive and reliable connectivity, ANDS aimed to establish 

a fiscally sustainable road maintenance system. 

In spite of ANDS’ goals and strategy, an Asian Development Bank Transport Sector 

Assessment identified continued funding challenges and a lack of sector governance in 

2011.33 In 2014, the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction expressed 

concern that “the U.S. government may be supporting road projects in Afghanistan that will 

be unsustainable due to not being properly maintained.”34

USAID recognizes that an ongoing plan for road operations and maintenance (O&M) is 

a necessity. Although the MOPW is now able to take some ownership of O&M, they have an 

approximate “$100 million maintenance gap and inadequate technical staff ” and, therefore, can 

only focus on “serious emergency repairs.”35 Not only does Afghanistan require a viable plan, 

they also require the personnel, expertise, funds collection, and national security to execute this 

plan. A critical question remaining is how Afghanistan will collect, manage, and disburse fees 

from road users, in the form of taxes or tolls, to fund O&M. 

The method in which the road projects were initiated also affects the road’s ultimate 

sustainability. For example, MILCON-funded roads were intended specifically for U.S. and 

coalition transport, traversing some of Afghanistan’s most difficult terrain. The roads were 

designed without a long-term sustainability plan because they were built for the military’s 

short- and medium-term operational requirements. 

Lack of a sufficient maintenance program is sometimes evident before road projects are 

even completed. One current USACE road project in eastern Afghanistan shows considerable 

Although the Minsitry of 

Public Works is now able 

to take some ownership 

of operations and 

maintenance, they have 

an approximate “$100 

million maintenance gap 

and inadequate technical 

staff” and, therefore, can 

only focus on “serious 

emergency repairs.”
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

wear and tear in its early completed sections. Damage from terrorist attacks, decay, and pitting 

and grooving from overloaded vehicles underscore the critical need for Afghanistan to create 

an internal mechanism to maintain roads as international partnership declines. 

Ultimately, successful nationbuilding requires a host nation to maintain and repair 

transportation infrastructure. In addition to fiscal considerations, sustainability requires 

engineering and construction expertise and the ability to forecast maintenance requirements. 

Unfortunately, it is extremely difficult to address these issues at a project’s inception because 

the strengthening of government institutions parallels infrastructure development in the 

contingency environment. A coordinated effort across interagency organizations and the host 

government involved in road projects is essential. Unity of effort in developing a strategy and 

the resulting projects would help avoid duplication of effort and over-committing the host 

nation to unaffordable, follow-on O&M costs.

A comprehensive roads strategy and associated maintenance and cost recovery plans are still 

being developed. While USACE can carry out the projects, ultimate stability in Afghanistan 

requires governmental agencies that provide structure and financial support to sustain these 

projects. While the lack of strategy and O&M does not affect USACE’s ability to manage road 

construction, the overall wisdom of this program is questionable without a plan for sustaining 

gains. State-strengthening efforts are clearly improved when the host nation addresses fiscal 

and programmatic concerns early in the reconstruction process. 

Creating a Power and Energy Infrastructure

One of USAID’s priorities has been enabling Afghan communication with the wider global 

community by providing electricity. USACE partnered in this effort to increase Afghanistan’s 

per capita electricity production, which remains one of the world’s lowest. After multibillion 

dollar investments, about 28 percent of Afghans could regularly access power by 2012—up 

from about 6 percent in 2002.36 Specifically, in 2003, Afghanistan had a 200 megawatt power 

generation capacity; this increased more than four times to 900 megawatts (MW) in 2014.37

Until about 2010, USACE focused on power generation supporting construction for 

coalition forces. After that, USACE broadened its scope to include the AIF, which concentrated 

on providing power generation to Afghanistan as a whole using a national power grid. The 

Afghan government, the international community, the U.S. Department of State, USAID, and 

the U.S. Department of Defense effectively planned for the Afghan national electrical system 

and invested AIF funds in appropriate (and sometimes insecure) locations. 

Hydroelectric Power through the Kajaki Dam

The international coalition has long placed strategic importance on upgrading the Kajaki 

Dam in Helmand Province; this project provides another example of difficulties faced during 

the reconstruction effort. Built by the American engineering firm Morrison Knudson and 

commissioned in 1953, the dam is about 100 miles northwest of Kandahar City. Kajaki 

Dam originally held 1.7 billion m3 of water and produces 33 MW of electricity using only 

two of its three originally planned turbines. Installing and operating the third turbine would 

boost electrical output to 50 MW; routing that electricity to Kandahar would ease the city’s 

requirement for diesel generators, reducing operating costs and air pollution and providing a 

sustainable, renewable energy source.38
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Installing the third turbine became a reconstruction priority as part of “a major U.S.-funded 

project in cooperation with the Government of Afghanistan.”39 After lengthy delays, caused 

largely by security concerns and political conflict, the $75 million project began in May 2013 

and is scheduled to end in 2016. 

For the past ten years, the U.S. government has funded diesel fuel for Kandahar’s generators 

at a cost of roughly $1 million every month. These generators were put in place to help power 

Kandahar until the Kajaki Dam turbines and power lines are functional. As coalition forces 

withdraw, the Kandahar fuel subsidies will also disappear, potentially leaving one million 

Kandahar citizens without power and providing insurgents with an opportunity to recruit the 

unemployed and disenfranchised.40

The third turbine sits just outside the dam’s powerhouse, waiting for installation after being 

delivered in 2008 by mostly British troops. The turbine pieces traversed a 100-mile route in 

which “more than 3,000 British troops were needed to fight off the insurgents” and about 200 

Taliban fighters were killed.41

As USAID and USACE upgrade Kajaki Dam, other USACE contractors will install 

high voltage cables from Kajaki to Durai Junction, Laskar Gah, and Kandahar. Substations 

along the power lines will deliver electricity to local cities and towns, introducing government 

services to rural areas, hopefully encouraging local farmers to grow commercial crops.42

Sustainability of the Power Generation Network

Many stakeholders are more optimistic about the sustainability of Afghanistan’s power and 

energy than its road network, because 

• the Afghan government has a more viable plan for long-term power grid management;

• although still difficult, capturing user fees is much easier for power than roads; and

• a national power grid requires a national cooperative effort, whereas roads may be 

constructed individually.

The electrical power sector’s relative success results significantly from involvement of 

the Afghan electric utility company, Da Afghan Breshna Sherkat (DABS). DABS is an 

independent, autonomous limited liability company established under the Corporations and 

Limited Liabilities law; the Afghan government owns all DABS’ equity shares.43

DABS assumed ownership of the electrical sector in the Afghanistan Energy Strategy, 

and USACE’s electricity construction projects have a much higher success rate because of 

DABS’ consistent and timely communication. Long-term success is possible because DABS 

represents the governance structure and associated municipal services’ commitment to 

sustainability. Both the public and private sectors actively supported the energy strategy and 

resulting fiscal responsibilities. Establishing appropriate “energy sector governance is the single 

most important issue for the long run health of the sector.”44

A national grid, unlike individual spot generation, requires national government oversight. 

The power grid also connects Afghanistan to its neighboring countries, including Pakistan, 

creating a mutual, vested interest in success. Neighbors depending on the same electrical grid 

are probably less likely to attack or take other actions damaging to the grid. 

Electricity on a national grid also lends itself to a market model. The ability to collect 

user fees creates conditions for a successful long-term financial support plan that is currently 

lacking in the roads framework. Independence for the Afghan government depends on 

its economy generating funds to sustain these investments. With USAID’s assistance to 

As coalition forces 

withdraw, the Kandahar 

fuel subsidies will also 

disappear, potentially 

leaving one million 

Kandahar citizens without 

power and providing 

insurgents with an 

opportunity to 

recruit the unemployed 

and disenfranchised.
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

commercialize DABS-Kabul, “cash collections increased by nearly 60 percent.”45 The Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction recognizes DABS-Kabul as “one of the 

best performing electricity directorates in all of Afghanistan” but further acknowledges they 

continue to operate at a financial loss.46

Building Capacity in Construction and Engineering 

Although the long-term success of infrastructure in Afghanistan depends on internal 

ownership, Afghanistan lacked this capability early in the operation. Many developing nations 

lack construction and management expertise, as well as supporting institutions such as banking 

and law enforcement. To help remedy this and ensure successful project completion, USACE 

developed several programs to increase local capacity, including a successful program to train 

local nationals on construction quality assurance. 

In this program, Afghan local national engineers act as quality assurance representatives 

(QARs), executing USACE’s quality assurance program “at remote locations not easily accessible 

to U.S. personnel.”47 USACE project managers and engineers help train these individuals in 

USACE processes. This program helps ensure project sustainability into the future. 

USACE currently has a little more than two hundred trained QARs who visit project sites 

daily. USACE has executed more than fifty Afghan QAR-only projects since early 2014. Most 

of these individuals hold at least a bachelor’s degree in engineering and are fluent in English as 

well as local languages. The QAR program 

• allows the execution and oversight of projects that strengthen Afghan security and 

stability;

• allows a smaller USACE presence in-country, protecting U.S. personnel and 

conserving monetary resources;

• increases Afghan economic growth and trains future leaders;

• provides USACE access to sites otherwise inaccessible to American engineers;

• allows project continuity and language and customs assistance; and

• builds national pride.48

USACE plans to expand the local QAR program as its in-country presence decreases. 

Other successful programs for developing and supporting Afghan construction companies 

have taken place since early in OEF. One Afghan firm stated:

The recent history of the Afghan construction industry is one of complete transformation. 

It is a fact that we do not have reliable statistics on the construction industry in the years 

before September 11, 2001, but it is fair to say that before 9/11 there was no structured 

construction industry in the country. By 2013, however, the Afghan Investment Support 

Agency (AISA) counted as many as 6,540 registered construction companies in 

Afghanistan, and there probably were a lot more.49

Capturing and Documenting Lessons Learned

USACE, along with many other agencies, has begun capturing, processing, and documenting 

information from the coalition engagement in Afghanistan. For many reasons, including the 

novelty of counterinsurgency operations and protracted engagement length, OEF provided a 

large volume of information. Critical self-evaluation may be even more warranted given the 

large funding expenditure and criticism that Afghanistan stability efforts have not been viewed 

as fully successful.50
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USACE’s Transatlantic Division began formally documenting lessons learned in its 

overseas contingency operations in spring 2011, as the last contingency district in Iraq closed. 

During the analysis, information coalesced into seven guiding principles for how USACE 

operates in nonpermissive contingency environments (see Table 1).51 The principles emerged 

through analyzing hundreds of pages of internal after-action reviews, interviewing operational 

leaders, funding and reviewing a third-party study evaluating USACE’s participation in OIF 

and OEF operations, and conducting two conferences to discuss and capture senior leaders’ 

experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Table 1. USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Principles

Adapt Provide only the level of service needed to accomplish the mission.

Adapt methodologies in stride to meet changing requirements.

Design Sustainability

Consider program/project handover and end state early in the 

process; assume the host nation will eventually use, operate, and 

control all projects.

Project success depends on the local population’s needs and 

abilities. Build facilities that the host nation can operate and 

maintain.

Develop Capacity Maximize indigenous resources and build host nation capacity

where appropriate.

Integrate Command 

and Effort

Recognize that military and civilian agencies share equities in 

each other’s initiatives/programs/projects. Whenever possible, 

coordinate, de-conflict, network, etc.

Communicate critical observations to those who need to hear 

them (command, host nation officials, customers), even if not part 

of the standard process.

Fully integrate USACE elements into the theater military 

command/task force.

Maximize Reachback Maximize the use of reachback and reduce deployed assets.

Standardize Processes

Maximize the use of USACE standard business processes and 

corporate information technology solutions.

Use standard engineering designs where possible.

Train Train for contingencies during peacetime; establish relationships

with supporting maneuver units and sister agencies.

Each guiding principle applies to the contingency environment. As the analysis continued, 

the matrix was refined based on summarized wisdom from previous leaders. The principles 

provide an essential, experience-based starting point for USACE planning and operating in 

the contingency environment. USACE is institutionalizing these lessons into salient doctrine 

and training programs so future contingency operations personnel may benefit from its 

experiences in OIF and OEF.

Interestingly, other organizations involved in stability operations discovered similar 

principles and lessons independently. USAID’s “Nine Principles of Reconstruction and 

Development” evolved from its realization that it required a “more uniform and consistent 

set of guiding principles.”52 Four of USAID’s major principles mirror USACE’s, including 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

capacity building, sustainability, partnership, and flexibility. Similarly, the final report of 

the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction to Congress echoed these lessons.53

Its report provides seven final lessons—three of which (host-country engagement, uniform 

systems, and integrated efforts) are similar to USACE principles. 

Conclusion: Measuring Effects and Success

Working in support of stability tasks presents complex challenges, including determining 

when the operation reaches successful conclusion. USACE confronted these challenges 

by collaborating intensively with the requirement-generating agencies, multidisciplinary 

approaches to project management, continuous feedback, and, most effectively, partnerships 

with the host nation when possible. “By almost all metrics, societal progress in Afghanistan 

has been significant in the last 13+ years. U.S. and Coalition forces, along with an increasingly 

capable ANSF, have provided the necessary security to enable these improvements.”54

USACE’s internal success measurements vary, depending on the program being measured. 

For Afghan National Security Fund projects, the metric is the number of completed facilities 

to base, train, and operate the ANA and Afghan National Police; currently, one thousand 

facilities have been completed at a cost of $8.6 billion. The AIF contributions are intended 

to improve Afghanistan’s economic development. AIF success metrics would include items 

such as the number of persons receiving electricity, acres of improved irrigation, and miles of 

roads produced. 

After the conclusion of OEF, the U.S. Forces-Afghanistan commander testified to the 

U.S. Senate on gains made during the campaign, including an overall life expectancy that has 

increased from forty-three years to sixty-four years. In addition to improvements in roadways, 

access to reliable electricity increased from 6 percent to 28 percent, internet users increased 

from zero to more than six million, and the number of Afghan television stations increased 

from none to fifty.55

Perhaps the best measure of success is the optimism of the Afghan people. While indicators 

are mixed, surveyed Afghans who state they believe their country is “moving in the right 

direction” cite reconstruction and rebuilding as their primary reason for optimism.56 These data 

indicate that the reconstruction effort positively influenced the Afghan people and suggest 

that the country now has a more tangible foundation on which to build.57

Notes

1. Forward Program Office, Transatlantic Division, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Afghanistan Monthly 

USACE Construction Program Update.” PowerPoint presentation, January 5, 2015 (Unclassified/For 

Official Use Only), slide 3. 

2. Michael C. Griffin, Rethinking Victory in Counterinsurgency (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S, Army War College 

Press, 2014), 2. 

3. Ibid, 4. 

4. Zachary Warren and Nancy Hopkins (eds.), Afghanistan in 2015: A Survey of the Afghan People (San 

Francisco, CA: Asia Foundation), 18, accessed April 25, 2015, http://asiafoundation.org/publications/

pdf/1558. 

5. U.S. Department of the Army, “Engineer Operations—Echelons Above Brigade Combat Team,” Army 

Techniques Publication 3–34.23 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2015), 1–7. 

6. U.S. Department of the Army, “Stability,” Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-07 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Department of the Army, 2012), v. 

7. Ibid, 1.

8. USACE, Afghanistan Engineer District, Moving Forward: The First Five Years of the Afghanistan Engineer 

District (Washington, DC: USACE, 2009), 5.

In addition to 

improvements in roadways, 

access to reliable electricity 

increased from 6 percent 

to 28 percent, internet 

users increased from zero 

to more than six million, 

and the number of Afghan 

television stations increased 

from none to fifty.
122 USIP.ORG

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9. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-34, Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Department of the Army, 2014). 

10. Condoleezza Rice, “Iraq and U.S. Policy,” Hearing at the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

Washington, DC, October 19, 2005, accessed April 25, 2016, www.foreign.senate.gov/hearings/

iraq-in-us-foreign-policy. 

11. George Packer, “The Lesson of Tal Afar,” The New Yorker, April 10, 2006.

12. Donald P. Wright, James R. Bird, Steven E. Clay, Peter W. Connors, Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler 

Garcia, and Dennis F. Van Wey, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM, October 2001-September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 267.

13. USACE, Moving Forward, 5. 

14. Ibid, 11.

15. Ibid, 16.

16. Wright et al., A Different Kind of War, 293.

17. Eric T. Olson, “Rethink the Afghanistan Surge,” Christian Science Monitor, March 17, 2009, accessed 

April 25, 2016, www.csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2009/0317/p09s01-coop.html. 

18. Asian Development Bank (ADB), Transport Network Development Investment Program, “Transport 

Sector Assessment” (Manila: ADB, 2011), 2, accessed April 25, 2016, www.adb.org/sites/default/files/

linked-documents/44482-012-afg-ssa.pdf.

19. John F. Campbell, Statement of General John F. Campbell, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, 

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan, February 12, 2015, 21, 

accessed April 25, 2016, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Campbell_03-26-14.pdf.

20. Ken Yamashita, Christine Altendorf, and Stephen Curda, “USG Support for the Afghan Road Network,” 

PowerPoint presentation to principals, December 31, 2011, slide 1. 

21. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), Commander’s Guide to 

Money as a Weapons System Handbook (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: CALL, 2009), Chapter 4. 

22. ADB, “Project Data Sheet, Road Network Development Investment Program, Tranche 2” (Manila: ADB, 

2015), 2. 

23. USAID, “Afghanistan Infrastructure,” www.usaid.gov/afghanistan/infrastructure, accessed February 20, 2014. 

24. ADB, “Transport Sector Assessment,” 2.

25. USAID, “Technical Assistance to the Ministry of Public Works (TA-MOPW) Overview” (Washington, 

DC: USAID, 2015), accessed April 25, 2016 www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/

technical-assistance-ministry-public-works-ta-mopw. 

26. USAID, “Afghanistan Infrastructure.”

27. Bryton Johnson and John Drake, Salang Tunnel CERP Project Information Paper, December 2013. 

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Afghanistan National Development Strategy, 1387–1391 (2008-2013): A 

Strategy for Security, Governance, Rule or Law, Human Rights, Social-Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction

(Kabul: Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, 2007), Chapter 1, 5. 

33. ADB, “Transport Sector Assessment,” 2.

34. John F. Sopko, Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Letter to Mr. 

William Hammink, USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan, June 6, 2014. 

35. William Hammink, USAID Mission Director for Afghanistan, Memorandum to John. F. Sopko, Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, June 26, 2014. 

36. USAID, “Afghanistan Infrastructure Fact Sheet,” www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1871/

Infrastructure Sector Fact Sheet Aug 2014.pdf, accessed February 22, 2015. 

37. Donald E. Jackson, Jr., Commanding General, Transatlantic Division, presentation to the USACE 

Communicator’s Webinar, “The Engineer Mission in Operation Enduring Freedom,” August 28, 2015, 

slide 5. 

38. Robert Moore, “To Generate and Sustain,” The Military Engineer 694, March–April 2015, 53. 

39. USAID, “Installation of Turbine Generator Unit 2 at Kajaki Dam Hydropower Plant (Kajaki Unit 2),” 

www.usaid.gov/news-information/fact-sheets/installation-turbine-generator-unit-2-kajaki-damhydropower-plant, accessed February 22, 2015. 

40. Moore, “To Generate and Sustain,” 53. 
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

41. Thomas Harding, “British Soldiers Kill 200 Taliban in Afghan Dam Operation,” The Telegraph, September 

2, 2008, www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/onthefrontline/2668595/British-soldiers-kill-200-Talibanin-Afghan-dam-operation.html, accessed February 22, 2015. 

42. Moore, “To Generate and Sustain,” 54.

43. Da Afghan Breshna Sherkat (DABS), “About Us,” www.dabs.af/pages/aboutdabs.php, accessed February 

22, 2015. 

44. USAID/Kabul, Office of Economic Growth and Infrastructure, New Energy Strategy (draft) (Washington, 

DC: USAID, 2007), 7. 

45. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), Afghanistan’s National Power Utility: 

Commercialization Efforts Challenged by Expiring Subsidy and Poor USFOR-A and USAID Project Management, 

SIGAR Audit, 13-7 (Arlington, VA: SIGAR, 2013), 1. 

46. Ibid.

47. Transatlantic Afghanistan District, “Local National QAR Program: Building Afghan Capacity,” 

presentation, January 28, 2015, slide 3. 

48. Ibid.

49. Sayed Aziz Azimi, “News Release: The State of the Construction Industry in Afghanistan,” edited 

summary of remarks at the 2014 U.S.-Afghanistan Business Matchmaking Conference made on December 

11, 2014. 

50. Matt Waldman, “System Failure: The Underlying Causes of U.S. Policy-Making Errors in Afghanistan,” 

International Affairs 89, no. 4 (2014): 825. 

51. USACE, USACE Overseas Contingency Operations Playbook (draft), (For Official Use Only), 2–5. 

52. Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” Parameters 35, no. 3 

(2005): 4. 

53. Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), Learning from Iraq: A Final Report from the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (Arlington, VA: SIGIR, 2013), 129–32.

54. John F. Campbell, Statement of General John F. Campbell, USA, Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, 

Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Situation in Afghanistan, February 12, 2015, 21, 

accessed April 25, 2016, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Campbell_03-26-14.pdf.

55. Ibid, 22.

56. Warren and Hopkins, Afghanistan in 2015, 18. 

57. Eikenberry, “There Is Hope Yet for Afghanistan.”

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Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

When I look back on the processes of history, when I survey the genesis of America, 

I see this written over every page: that the nations are renewed from the bottom, not from 

the top; that the genius which springs up from the ranks of unknown men is the genius 

which renews the youth and energy of the people. Everything I know about history, every 

bit of experience and observation that has contributed to my thought, has confirmed me 

in the conviction that the real wisdom of human life is compounded out of the 

experiences of ordinary men. 

—Woodrow Wilson, The New Freedom: A Call for the Emancipation of the Generous 

Energies of a People, 1913

In its more than 250-year history, the diverse communities that constitute modern Afghanistan 

have never had the opportunity to shape the destiny and identity of their nation. The role 

of the media in the Afghanistan transition has been a relatively peripheral priority in posttransition planning, particularly in relation to its potential for providing a national platform 

for public debate and dialogue. Here we distinguish between concepts of statebuilding and 

nationbuilding, focusing on the role of media in nation formation and bringing Afghanistan’s 

diverse communities closer together in shared political dialogue. Though the Afghan media has 

developed significantly over the last decade, it faces major threats and there is high potential 

for backsliding. Currently, the media is poorly situated to play the increasingly important role 

of enabling the people of Afghanistan to negotiate their differences and establish a stronger 

sense of shared identity and nationhood. However, concrete steps could be taken to address 

this increasingly urgent challenge, with a particular focus on reforming the state broadcaster, 

Radio Television Afghanistan.

Introduction

Despite some moments of democratic flowering—such as between 1963 and 1973, when 

political parties were able to publish freely—prior to 2001, the media was largely under 

the influence of the state and deeply mistrusted by the public. This was the case under the 

monarchy that ruled the country for most of the twentieth century and the 1973 republic 

that followed it. It was certainly the case when in the 1980s, the Soviet Union poured money 

into the propaganda machine that was the monopoly state broadcaster of the time. And it 

was most tragically the case under the mujahideen and the Taliban when, from 1996, Radio 

Role of the Media in Nation Forming

JAMES DEANE AND SHIRAZUDDIN SIDDIQI
126 USIP.ORG

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Kabul and Radio Television Afghanistan were renamed Radio Shariat and all forms of cultural 

expression, including music and tape cassettes, were banned. 

Given the media’s history, it is no wonder that Afghans and the international community 

take pride in the media as it exists today. It is now one of the most liberalized in the world, 

comprising a broadcast spectrum saturated with jostling radio and television channels and 

notable for its dynamism and relative independence. That pride resides mainly in the pluralistic 

character of the media—that multiple media institutions exist; that journalism has a certain 

capacity and freedom to inform the public and hold government to account; and that it is 

vibrant, innovative, and of reasonable quality. 

Regrettably, while the progress is indeed remarkable, the media’s future is of increasing 

concern. That concern is rooted in many factors, including the lack of an advertising market 

sufficient to sustain the media sector that has evolved, the growing cooption of media by 

factional forces (including warlords), and the withdrawal of international support.1 Of 

particular concern is the media’s capacity to play the role which, arguably, its people need 

most: to provide the democratic platform through which Afghan citizens can come together 

to rebuild their nation. 

Statebuilding, Nationbuilding, and Nation Forming: 

A Brief Discussion of Concepts

Any discussion about the role of the media in state strengthening is inevitably contentious. 

“Statebuilding is the creation of new government institutions and the strengthening of existing 

ones,” argued Francis Fukuyama in 2004.2 In Afghanistan’s history, as in much of the world, 

the principal characteristic of any strategy designed to use the media to strengthen the state has 

been that of authoritarian governments controlling and deploying a centralized, state media 

system to project a national vision and control power. 

This chapter does not focus on the role of the Afghanistan media in statebuilding but on 

its role in building a sense of nation. There is not space to do proper service to the conceptual 

confusion that besets the term nationbuilding, but the confusion was usefully summarized 

more than a decade ago by Jochen Hippler: 

The term nationbuilding is used today in a markedly vague and inconsistent manner. 

Nationbuilding is on the one hand the process of socio-political development which—

usually over a longer historical timespan—allows initially loosely linked communities to 

become a common society with a nation-state corresponding to it........on the other hand 

[it is] a political objective as well as a strategy for reaching specific political objectives.3

This chapter focuses on the first of Hippler’s concepts—a process that allows the loosely 

linked communities of Afghanistan to become a common society through a process shaped by 

society, not just the state. 

Hippler identifies three prerequisites for nationbuilding to succeed. The first is an 

integrative ideology, the second is the development of a functional state apparatus, and the 

third—the main focus of this chapter—is the integration of society from the loosely associated 

groups that existed previously. “To achieve this, the patterns of communication between the 

social groups need to be intensified to the extent that communication does not principally 

take place within the groups,” argues Hippler.4 “Even though the internal communication of 

the ethnic religious and other groups may remain stronger than that between them, a certain 

degree of close communication among them is [a] requirement for successful and enduring 

nationbuilding,” he concludes.

It [the Afghan media] 

is now one of the most 

liberalized in the world, 

comprising a broadcast 

spectrum saturated 

with jostling radio and 

television channels and 

notable for its dynamism 

and relative independence.
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A similar definition, with a similar focus on the role of media, is made by Hopp and KlokeLesch, who argue that the objective of nationbuilding rests on three constituents. The first 

is a functional statism central to which are “the functions of securing a monopoly of force, 

guaranteeing security for the population and neighboring countries, the provision of public 

assets, as well as the rule of law and legal certainty.”5 Second, “the building of a nation requires 

a physical, social, and media infrastructure that is shared by the entire civil society, [and] these 

assets must be accessible to all groups of the population.”6 Third, nationbuilding “presupposes 

a sociocultural structuring and integration process leading to shared characteristics of identity, 

values, and goals.”7

The neglected focus on identity formation is emphasized by Professor Paul Collier: “The 

fundamental mistake of our approach to statebuilding has been to forget that well-functioning 

states are built not just on shared interests but on shared identity.”8 This is a valid concern: Too 

much international attention has been invested in supporting the architecture and capacities of 

the Afghan state and not enough on how Afghans—as a people, as a society—can engage in the 

kind of dialogue that can help overcome their differences and define their future. While elite 

political leadership is essential to building national identity and nationhood in Afghanistan, 

success cannot be assured without incorporating, reflecting, and melding the diverse voices 

from across Afghan society. The media system of Afghanistan is currently poorly equipped to 

play that role.

Why Independent, Trusted Platforms Matter for National Debate 

The process of nation rebuilding will require Afghans to have access to information they can 

trust, it will require people to be exposed to the perspectives of those with whom they disagree, 

and it will require the existence of trusted platforms upon which people can debate their 

differences peacefully.

These differences are a reflection of the diverse histories of the peoples who happened 

to live close to each other when this part of the region was declared a unified country in the 

eighteenth century. Since then, these diverse communities have had few opportunities to fully 

understand each other. The country still lacks an essential precondition for forming a national 

identity, and as a result, a whole range of issues can still be exploited to divide rather than unite. 

These issues relate to geographical affiliation (known as samt), which is still highly relevant 

even with increased urbanization; linguistic diversity; ethnic diversity; tribal affiliation (that 

is, the divisions within each ethnic group); and religious differences (besides having a Sunni 

majority, Afghanistan is also home to Shia and Ismaili Muslims, Hindus, as well as small silent 

minorities belonging to other religions). To negotiate these differences and accommodate 

these diversities within a shared national identity and culture, all these groups require shared 

platforms and goals they can trust and engage with. While the media of Afghanistan has much 

to be proud of, it is also increasingly fragmented with the great number of broadcast stations 

serving particular, often urban, audiences and is relatively poorly equipped to engage all people 

in society in the same national conversation. Worse, if the media fractures along sectarian 

lines—and there are signs that this is happening—the fear is that it might further deepen these 

divisions rather than resolve them. In the twenty-first century, with increasingly ubiquitous 

access to information and communication, the role of media in nationbuilding cannot be to 

simply preserve the state. Afghanistan needs a media system that can reflect and meet the 

concerns and interests of all sectors of society. It needs, in other words, some kind of a national 
128 USIP.ORG

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public service media. Afghanistan is a long way off having that system, but unprecedented 

opportunities now exist to help create it.

The Successes and Limits of Investment in Afghan Media

Investment in the Afghan media, as part of building democracy, has focused on distributing 

the state’s control of information to as many different actors in society as possible. International 

support to the Afghan media has been arguably the most intensive, costly, and successful 

example of media development in history.

In 2001, aside from the Taliban’s Radio Shariat, only a small number of courageous Afghan 

journalists existed and they worked for international media. Since then, the government has 

prioritized rapid liberalization of the Afghan media, and with private investment from the 

Afghan diaspora and international support, the media environment has been transformed. 

Television and radio has expanded by around 20 percent per year since 2006.9 Kabul alone 

has an estimated thirty TV stations, larger cities like Herat and Jalalabad typically have about 

four or five TV stations, and there are close to two hundred radio stations across the country. 

An estimated ten thousand people are employed by the television, radio, and print industries. 

Mobile telephony has exploded. This growth has been driven by large-scale commercial as well 

as donor investment. The National Endowment for Democracy estimates that “hundreds of 

millions of dollars over a ten year period” were invested in the Afghan media by the United 

States alone.

The objectives underpinning support for the media have overwhelmingly focused on 

supporting decentralized democratic institutions capable of holding government to account 

and reflecting the diversity of Afghanistan’s society. On many levels, this approach has 

been successful: A truly diverse and dynamic media landscape now exists, and even while 

still relatively nascent, the Afghan media has come far in informing its public and holding 

government to account. However, there are two areas still needing further attention.

First, the environment needs to allow for an even greater impact on the state’s performance. 

For all its vibrancy, innovation, and pluralism, there is little evidence that the Afghan media 

has made the state more responsive to citizen’s needs or more capable in meeting them. In 

particular, Afghanistan has continued to feature among the most corrupt of countries, ranking 

166 out of 168 countries in the world.10 It still takes immense courage to carry out proper 

investigative journalism in the country, and the level of impunity of those who attack, kill, or 

harass journalists remains a source of national and international concern. “Despite the expansion 

of stations and titles, the number of independent journalistic outlets remains relatively small. 

In much of the media, proprietors call the tune and journalists must follow. There is a great 

deal of censorship and bias,” according a BBC Media Action analysis published in 2012.11

“You can’t write against powerful faces in parliament,” said one leading journalist quoted in the 

BBC report. Nor is this inability to hold powerholders to account limited to government. “It 

is not possible to write about corruption and the warlords,” argued the same the journalist.12

More recently, a reporter who recounted the fighting between Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban 

was instructed by a Taliban commander to “stop all your reporting or we’ll kill your family.”13 

While the biggest threat to journalist safety is still the Taliban, those who expose corruption 

continue to be in danger. According to one Afghan journalist quoted in a Reporters without 

Borders report, “Fear is a constant companion in our work, especially when we reveal cases of 

corruption involving senior officials. The fear is such that it drives some journalists to leave 

their region. We are increasingly seeing a lack of professional journalists, especially those 
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doing reporting and investigative journalism.”14 The country is still classified as “Not Free” by 

Freedom House.15 

Attacks on the media have been especially intense around elections, restricting it from 

informing the national public debate at its most critical juncture. “Relative freedom of speech 

was undermined prior to both rounds of the election, when numerous attacks on journalists 

occurred with impunity,” according to the European Commission electoral monitoring 

commission for the 2014 election.16

Much still needs to be done to support Afghanistan’s independent media to overcome 

these challenges, but despite them, the role of a still nascent media in Afghanistan in informing 

its public, and in holding government to account, has been impressive and is wildly more 

effective than anything that has preceded it in the country’s history. There remains much to 

be proud of. It is in the second area that success has been arguably more limited—in enabling 

communication across the deep fracture lines in Afghan society to allow the kind of nation 

forming that is the focus of the remainder of this chapter.

Media, Society, and the Afghan Nation

Afghanistan is a nation that has a famously strong society and a historically weak state.17 “The 

Afghan state has been in a condition of crisis for most its life, since the country’s emergence 

as an identifiable political unit from 1747. It has gone through so many internal political and 

social upheavals, foreign interventions, and invasions that it has largely existed as a seriously 

fractured or disrupted political entity,” according Amin Saikal writing in 2005. “The authority 

of successive central governments has remained weak in comparison with the strength of 

micro-societies which have functioned more or less as autonomous enclaves shaped by ethnic, 

tribal, sectarian and linguistic allegiances and the role of dominant personalities.”18

The international community’s focus on building the institutions and capacities of the 

Afghan state, and particularly its capacity to provide security and services for its people, 

clearly makes sense given this history. So too, however, would an approach that complements 

statebuilding with a focus on enabling Afghan society to play its part in rebuilding the nation. 

Given the strength of Afghan society, the engagement of people in defining the country’s 

future will need to go beyond representational politics (however successful and inclusive recent 

elections have been). The Afghan media is crucial to that process but is ill equipped to play a 

role in democratic nation formation.

A process of nationbuilding requires at least a national media infrastructure that provides 

all Afghans with a means of accessing independent news and a trusted platform for public 

dialogue and debate through which they can negotiate their differences. An infrastructure 

capable of mediating difference will be especially important. 

Challenges to Media and Nationbuilding in Afghanistan

Three indicators suggest that the media, as it currently exists in Afghanistan, is ill-equipped to 

enable the kind of democratic, national public debate and dialogue that is needed. 

The media is mainly local, not national. The broadcast spectrum in Kabul is saturated, 

but drive 10 miles outside of the city and getting a broadcast signal becomes difficult. The 

same is true for other major cities. Afghanistan is one of the most mountainous nations in the 

world, where broadcast signals travel especially short distances. Rural areas are poorly served 

by the media, and it is here that the Taliban communication networks are often strongest. The 

A process of 

nationbuilding requires 

at least a national media 

infrastructure that 

provides all Afghans with 

a means of accessing 

independent news and a 

trusted platform for public 

dialogue and debate 

through which they can 

negotiate their differences.
130 USIP.ORG

PEACEWORKS 116

only broadcaster that has a genuinely national reach is Radio Television Afghanistan, which 

still exists to serve the Afghan state, not necessarily the Afghan public. Even international 

stations, including the BBC, that have historically been available across the country have cut 

back on expensive shortwave and medium wave transmissions and now focus on localized 

FM broadcast stations in more populated areas (even if they had not cut back, it is not clear 

how many Afghans would continue to have shortwave radios or listen to them). The most 

marginalized groups in Afghan society are arguably those with the least opportunity to engage 

in, or be engaged in, a national public conversation.

The media is mainly partial, not independent. The media system, while far more plural now, 

risks becoming increasingly captured by political, factional, ethnic, or extreme religious actors. 

Donor agencies have invested heavily in the media but are generally decreasing their budgets as 

the transition progresses. Any independent, commercial media sector depends on advertising 

to sustain themselves and invest in journalism and serves the audience their advertisers want to 

reach. The advertising market in Afghanistan is estimated to be between $20 and $30 million, 

which is far too small to sustain the media that exists.19 There are only a handful of major 

advertisers, principally mobile phone companies and large banks based in Kabul. 

The lack of advertisers and generally weak economy will have two consequences. Without 

adequate advertising income, mainstream media is likely to (1) shrink and consolidate as donor 

funds dry up and (2) become more dependent on those who can afford to pay for it, which 

increasingly include factional actors, such as warlords, and those who fund them. Findings 

from BBC Media Action’s research in 2012 suggested that the second largest supporter to 

media after the United States was Iran.20 

The country’s open licensing regime has already enabled politicians and religious leaders 

to establish their own media. Some of the media are being referred to as “warlord” channels 

that have a highly restricted agenda and foster divisive conflict and an ethnicization of 

Afghan politics. While the reach of these channels remains relatively low, their impact can be 

serious. The government has closed down some channels for “inciting sectarian tension and 

threatening national unity.” One human rights specialist interviewed by BBC Media Action 

said, “I am very worried about warlord media because they are taking their political agendas 

onto the screen. Even if you radicalize a thousand people in Kabul, it can prove dangerous in 

the long term.”21

The media landscape in Afghanistan looks likely to become increasingly fractured and 

coopted by specific interests in society. The interests owning and controlling much of this 

media are focused on advancing their own agendas, not allowing the citizenry of the country 

to chart their own way forward and find sufficient shared identity to rebuild their nation. These 

processes are intensifying, but the most factional media of all are simply persisting. The Taliban 

do not have their own television channels, but they do have a social media presence that makes 

prominent use of video footage and is highly sophisticated and effective at fostering loyalty to 

their cause. 

The national broadcaster is insufficiently independent or credible to provide a platform for 

democratic nationbuilding. When BBC Media Action interviewed journalists and politicians 

as part of its research on the media in Afghanistan, a common theme emerged about the 

importance of national media. “Stations have not been created on the basis of the needs 

of the people. They have been set up to serve the interests of foreign countries or powerful 

warlords,” said one former independent member of parliament.22 “We still don’t have a country 

wide media...in Afghanistan today, we seem to lack confidence to build institutions,” said 

The media landscape in 

Afghanistan looks likely 

to become increasingly 

fractured and coopted by 

specific interests in society.
USIP.ORG 131

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

one experienced journalist.23 “The biggest need in the media sector is unity, consensus, and 

national understanding....otherwise, we will never pull ourselves out of this difficulty,” said 

another journalist.24

Such sentiments have led many to focus again on whether the state broadcaster, Radio 

Television Afghanistan (RTA), can be reformed to become sufficiently independent and trusted 

across political and factional spectrums to become a credible platform for national debate and 

dialogue. The broadcaster is much weakened because of its lack of editorial independence. Like 

its commercial rivals it is heavily dependent on advertising. However, while it is losing audience 

share, popularity, and credibility, a significant residual respect for the station remains, and its 

national reach makes it an important consideration in the context of this chapter.

Efforts have already been made to make RTA more independent and effective. The Media 

Law of 2009, passed by a two-thirds majority, was an attempt to equip RTA to play a more 

independent national role. Many donors—including Japan, the United States, the United 

Kingdom, France, and India—have provided substantial support, especially to improve its 

equipment. China has also supported the broadcaster. A major partnership with BBC Media 

Action includes the coproduction of an independent public debate program, Open Jirga, 

which has attracted a substantial audience (more than three million), major credibility, and 

the participation of the most senior political actors in the country, including former president 

Hamid Karzai and President Ashraf Ghani.

However, the 2009 media law has never been implemented, and the reformed governance 

structure it envisaged has never appointed. The broadcaster continues to serve the state’s 

interest. Despite this, Ghani has signaled that he believes RTA should become independent. “I 

want our national TV (RTA) to be like the BBC. It must be a truly national TV, which should 

reflect the voice of Afghans,” he tweeted on August 12, 2014.

Conclusion

The media faces many challenges in Afghanistan, especially in enabling the people of 

Afghanistan to rebuild their nation. However, there are also opportunities for the international 

community to pursue, especially related to supporting a reform process for the state broadcaster. 

It is difficult to see how Afghanistan can rebuild itself without a forum for national public 

dialogue and debate, and this forum is unlikely to be created without the media providing 

a foundation.

International development and diplomatic support for the media has focused on bolstering 

diverse, often localized, democratic institutions. Given the success of this approach and its major 

contributions to the rebuilding of political, social, and cultural life in Afghanistan, existing 

media support strategies should remain a priority. However, they should be complemented by 

equally urgent strategies to build a genuinely independent, national media that will enable the 

people of Afghanistan to negotiate their differences and help rebuild their nation. 

No one pretends that this process will be easy or successful. The history of transforming 

state broadcasters into independent and financially sustainable public service broadcasters is, at 

best, mixed. Even when support strategies are highly effective, the political obstacles to states 

surrendering control of “their” broadcaster can be immense. 

The consequences of failure, however, seem serious. It is extremely difficult to envisage 

how Afghanistan can rebuild itself unless its people have the means to develop a sense of 

shared identity, common purpose, and peaceful reconciliation—and one crucial vehicle is a 

national media infrastructure that provides an environment for that to happen. The people 
132 USIP.ORG

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of Afghanistan face immense challenges in rebuilding their nation. Supporting national 

democratic media platforms that can help them to do so should be a far higher priority than 

it has been in the past. 

Notes

1. David Page and Shirazuddin Siddiqi, “The Media of Afghanistan: The Challenges of Transition,” Policy 

Briefing #5 (London: BBC Media Action, 2012).

2. Francis Fukuyama, State Building: Governance and World Order in the Twenty First Century (Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2004), ix.

3. Jochen Hippler (ed.), Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? (London: Pluto 

Press, 2005). For quote, also see www.jochenhippler.de/html/violent_conflicts-_conflict_prevention_and_

nation-building.html.

4. Jochen Hippler, “Violent Conflicts, Conflict Prevention and Nation-Building—Terminology and Political 

Concepts,” www.jochenhippler.de/html/violent_conflicts-_conflict_prevention_and_nation-building.html.

5. Ulrike Hopp and Adolf Kloke-Lesch, “External Nation-Building vs Endogenous Nation Forming: A 

Development Policy Perspective,” in Nation-Building: A Key Concept for Peaceful Conflict Transformation? ed. 

Jochen Hippler (London: Pluto Press, 20005), 137–50.

6. Ibid.

7. Ibid.

8. Paul Collier, Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (London: Bodley Head, 2009), 9. 

9. All data in this paragraph come from Page and Siddiqi, “The Media of Afghanistan: The Challenges 

of Transition.” 

10. Transparency International, “Table of Results: Corruption Perceptions Index 2015,” www.transparency.org/

cpi2015#results-table.

11. Page and Siddiqi, “The Media of Afghanistan: The Challenges of Transition,” 14.

12. Ibid. 

13. Human Rights Watch, “Stop Reporting or We’ll Kill Your Family: Threats to Media Freedom in 

Afghanistan,” January 21, 2015, www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/21/stop-reporting-or-well-kill-your-family/

threats-media-freedom-afghanistan.

14. Reporters Without Borders, Presidential Election in Afghanistan: Local Media on the Front Line (Paris: 

Reporters Without Borders, 2014), 14.

15. Freedom House, “Freedom in the World 2014: Afghanistan,” https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2014/afghanistan. 

16. European Union Election Assessment Team, Islamic Republic of Afghanistan Final Report: Presidential 

Election, April 5 and June 14, 2014 (Brussels: European Union, 2014), 19, www.eueom.eu/files/dmfile/

FINAL-REPORT-EUEAT-AFGHANISTAN-2014-c_en.pdf.

17. Amin Saikal, “Afghanistan’s Weak State and Strong Society,” in Making States Work: State Failure and the 

Crisis of Governance, eds. Simon Chesterman, Michael Ignatieff, and Ramesh Thakur (New York: United 

Nations University Press, 2005).

18. Saikal, “Afghanistan’s Weak State and Strong Society,” 193. 

19. Page and Siddiqi, “The Media of Afghanistan: The Challenges of Transition.”

20. Ibid.

21. Ibid, 9.

22. Ibid, 20.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid, 21.
USIP.ORG 133

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Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

After the fall of the Taliban fourteen years ago, space opened up for youth participation in 

every sector of life, including governance. Having the skills to operate in a rapidly changing 

outside world, youth make up much of the workforce in the government and private sector. 

Increases in connectedness, availability of educational opportunities, and urbanization have 

created decent human capacity—something Afghanistan has been in dire need of after three 

decades of conflict left many institutions shattered. 

However, this youth development has happened without a clear direction or long-term 

vision. Hybrid politics that give the powerful an unfair advantage have paved the way for 

political dynasties and blocked natural merit-based growth and capacity building. On the 

surface, a generational shift seems to be happening in Afghan politics, but deeper down, the 

system has given a boost to the controversial old guard that has proven versatile. The Afghan 

government’s lack of vision is evident by its lack of investment and planning in higher 

education, its suppression of any kind of politics in educational institutions, and its failure to 

control fundamentalist trends in these institutions. The shallow development of civil society, 

driven largely by donor “quick-fix” projects that align with political calendars at home, has 

further weakened a sense of direction for the development of youth and their place in the 

democratic cycle. 

What the Elections Showed

The country’s presidential and provincial council elections in 2014 provided a glimpse into 

where Afghan youth stand today. While on the surface, voter turnout was large and the 

process went smoothly, the deeper reality, as is usually the case in Afghanistan, was much 

more complex and showed some deficiencies. No presidential party broke completely with the 

past. The candidates publicly proclaimed the importance of the youth vote, but much of their 

actual work was focused on ringing in the old guard, perpetuating the idea of “vote-banks” 

controlled by former warlords (something many hoped would be eliminated by this election). 

The candidates also ignored the trends of rapid urbanization, connectedness, and political 

awareness of the new youth, continuing to see them through the old lens—that the youth had 

no agency and would follow the path their political and ethnic elders chose for them. 

Afghan Youth and the Effects of Hybrid Politics

MUJIB MASHAL
134 USIP.ORG

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Prominent youth political movements found themselves torn apart—their unity tested by 

whom they decided to support. With campaigns focused on personalities rather than agendas, 

achieving consensus over whom to support as a group became difficult. Many youth groups 

splintered or remained silent to give their movements more time to mature into stronger 

players in the political cycle. Allegations of serious election fraud sent a bitter message: It 

was not grassroots politics that decided the future of the country but rather networks of 

patronage and the bullying force of warlords, who still had many weapons despite costly 

disarmament campaigns. 

While all attention was focused on the messy presidential election, the generational shift in 

Afghan politics was most apparent in the provincial council elections and better demonstrates 

the complexity of politics outside Kabul. The Afghanistan Independent Election Commission 

(IEC) reported that 70 percent of the provincial council candidates were youth,1 defined in 

Afghanistan as between the ages of eighteen and thirty. But beneath that number was a mixed 

reality. The Election Complaints Commission received many complaints of vast engineered 

fraud. Furthermore, although a quick study of ten provinces shows that about 60 percent of 

the winning council candidates are in their thirties or younger,2 many of them are either family 

members of influential commanders or have acted as their political proxies due to depending 

on them for campaign funding. The election was predominantly about resources—those who 

had the resources, either from their own businesses or as a proxy for someone else, could more 

easily rally people or simply buy votes to stuff the boxes. 

The elections point to the uneven playing field. The politics of thirteen years has perpetuated 

the influence of a powerful class. The provincial council vote also points to the durability of the 

old guard and its adaptability to the demands of the nascent democratic system. In many cases, 

the old guard’s politics have become more about employing influence and resources, either in 

favor of an offspring or a proxy. 

The new power-sharing government of President Ashraf Ghani has largely kept to its 

promise of increasing youth in leadership positions. A majority of president Ghani’s palace 

staff are young, but youth appointees at the highest levels (deputy ministers and directors) are 

typically either children of strongmen or campaign loyalists who are often criticized for taking 

key posts in areas they have no expertise in. 

The Cost of Political Hybridism

Following the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan had the opportunity to lay a strong foundation 

for democracy. But a government in a vacuum, buttressed not by its own roots but rather 

foreign armies and foreign aid, needed to move forward cautiously. Out of necessity, former 

president Hamid Karzai chose what is described as a “hybrid system,” where interest groups 

with diverging ideologies, liberal and conservative, could coexist. The principal idea was that 

the government will “be stable if its authority pattern is congruent with the authority patterns 

of the society of which it is a part.”3 In reality, a shattered social fabric was taking hold, with 

new local dynamics replacing traditional leaders. The guns and drugs of three decades had 

deeply affected the traditional weight of the Maliks and Khans. 

The hybridism gave time and space to old strongmen, who allied themselves with the 

government and the U.S. military to extend their roots and tap into the vast resources that 

came with the invasion. The system perpetuated patronage that has its roots in the first influx 

of military money for anti-Soviet fighters during the 1980s. These strongmen’s ideologies did 

Youth appointees at the 

highest levels (deputy 

ministers and directors) 

are typically either children 

of strongmen or campaign 

loyalists who are often 

criticized for taking key 

posts in areas they have 

no expertise in.
USIP.ORG 135

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

not match the new democratic reality, yet on the surface they polished their images to meet the 

demands of a new era, under the gaze of a watchful media. 

Over the last decade, the Afghan economy has largely depended on development aid and 

military spending. And through their connections, strongmen gained a monopoly over much 

of the logistics, transportation, and supply contracts. They also started their own construction 

companies to control the market even further. Or they used their political influence to get a 

cut from projects obtained by others. Their money ensured the continuation of their patronage. 

Bureaucratic Representation, but Not Political Weight

When Karzai came to Kabul in 2001 to form a government, the country was drained of 

any capacity to deal with the billions of dollars in international aid that poured in. For an 

entire decade of the civil war, Afghanistan had run on chits and signed letters, not a formal 

bureaucracy. The remnants of the 1980s system were not adaptable to the new realities of a 

world that called for computer and English language skills at the least. Thus, the government 

had to rely on a new cadre of youth, mostly refugees returning from Pakistan and Iran who had 

gotten a better education during the years that the country burned in war. Even the bureaucracy 

became a hybrid one: A generation in its 40s and 50s, slow on learning the new demands of 

partnering with the outside world and happy to sign timesheets and not create much trouble, 

and a class of ambitious youth in its 20s and 30s, moving at a pace more attuned to the strides 

the country needed to take.

Over the past thirteen years, this class of youth has become the backbone of the government 

system. They are delivering most of the work done by a government marred by inefficiency 

and corruption, failing to provide the most basic services. However, political hybridism has 

prevented the evolution of a clear, long-term vision for youth development. Due to the lack of 

investment and planning in higher education, the capacity of government universities remains 

low; they are unable to absorb more than 50 percent of the country’s high school graduates. 

And while the privatization of higher education has helped—there are 134,000 students in 98 

private universities and 120,000 in 31 public universities4—the quality of education remains 

a serious concern. There is significant program duplication, and the programs offered do not 

match many of the country’s human resource needs. Agriculture and mining remain the two 

economic hopes of the country, but none of the private universities offer degrees in either. 

Despite their role in running the government, Afghan youth have not been able to rise 

above the bureaucratic level. To move into elite political posts, they need the support of 

strongmen. For example, in southern Helmand Province, the position of the deputy governor 

opened up following a scandal in 2011. Taking initiative they thought the government would 

appreciate, local activists sent a list of competent youth leaders to the governor and to Kabul for 

consideration. Over thirteen years, Helmand had had many young leaders with master degrees 

from abroad and with experience running businesses and nongovernmental organizations in 

the difficult reality of the volatile province. This was an opportunity for the gradual rise of 

youth. But, Sher Mohamed Akhudnzada, a former warlord and governor of Helmand whom 

Karzai had essentially given veto power over local appointments, was furious; he shut down the 

process as soon as he found out about it.5

“The political architecture of the Afghan system—based around patronage and clientelist 

networks that do not permit inclusive politics—is not conducive to encouraging youth 

development and participation,” writes Srinjoy Bose, who has extensively researched Afghan 

youth over the past decade.6 “The present hybrid system of governance (the mix of formal and 

Political hybridism has 

prevented the evolution 

of a clear, long-term vision 

for youth development.
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informal institutions) dismisses the modern and increasingly educated youth as a caricatured 

entity not yet capable of contributing meaningfully to state and society.”7

Some level of disconnect is also associated with the development of civil society, which is 

also largely driven by youth. Because donor agendas have dictated most civil society efforts 

over the past ten years, these efforts have become synonymous with those of nongovernmental 

organizations that use funds to implement “quick impact projects.” Not only has this 

marginalized the traditional platforms of civil society in Afghanistan—the shuras and jirgas—

but, in many places, the voluntary nature of such shuras was eliminated by paying shuras either 

a one-time payment or monthly salaries for the project’s duration. Because such efforts were 

always vulnerable to corruption, “the perceived legitimacy of efforts to rebuild Afghan civil 

society” was deeply affected.8 Civil society development became characterized by reactionary 

conferences and seminars described as “box ticking exercises.” 

Risk of a New Kind of Islamist Activism

While the government has been focused on fighting the Taliban insurgency and trying to 

bring them to the table, a softer religious fundamentalism is taking root. Unlike the Taliban, 

which recruited its foot soldiers from the rural youth migrating to Pakistani madrasas, new 

extremist groups are targeting educated youth inside Afghanistan, especially those in urban 

centers who are disenfranchised by the government’s corruption and the presence of the 

international community. Well-networked and technologically savvy, these groups—such 

as the pan-Islamist movement Hizb u-Tahrir and the less extreme group Jamiat-e Eslah—

preach against voting and elections, citing them as un-Islamic and Western.9 The groups hold 

public gatherings and use social media extensively to reach Afghans. The government’s lack of 

attention to addressing such trends leaves youth especially vulnerable to indoctrination. 

The most alarming factor about these new groups, especially Hizb u-Tahrir and Jamat-e 

Eslah, is that they have gained a foothold among youth who have “enjoyed modern and higher 

education...come from the middle class and modern professions.”10 That is exactly the class 

that the U.S. government’s development efforts have touted as their biggest achievement—

in providing them education and development opportunities. Both these extremist groups, 

according to extensive research by the Afghan Analyst Network across nine provinces, have 

educational institutions at their core. “Hizb ut-Tahrir has been a predominantly campus-born 

group effective at spreading its message among students (and teachers and lecturers). Eslah 

organizes large, dedicated programs, such as free seasonal courses for school children and 

religious competitions with attractive awards for the winners. Eslah also runs its own high 

schools, universities and teacher-training institutes.”11

These new groups have what the Taliban have lacked: a chicer, urban packaging that draws 

on modern politics from states such as Turkey and Egypt, with role models such as Recep 

Tayyip Erdogan and Mohamed Morsi. Helping them package and disseminate messages 

are mainstream media tools—from Youtube and Facebook, to FM radio channels, to local 

television channels, and recorded sermons sold in music shops. 

Conclusion

Despite the hybrid politics that gave unfair advantage to old strongmen, Karzai’s government—

with significant international support—succeeded in developing a capable cadre of young 

Afghans who constitute the backbone of almost all government and private institutions. 
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But Karzai’s lack of long-term vision, and his penchant for playing politics at the cost of 

everything else, have made it difficult for the new power-sharing government to work within 

a polarized environment and curb the influences of burgeoning extremist groups that threaten 

to reverse or derail youth progress. While Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah have been locked in 

discussions over cabinet appointments, the stagnation has frustrated the population, especially 

the youth.

Ghani ran for office on the promise of becoming a transitional leader—one who will do 

the groundwork to hand over the country to a younger, better-equipped cadre. While he has 

brought some younger talent into the government, he has struggled on almost every other front, 

including security, development, and the economy. The “brain drain” that depleted Afghanistan 

of all its capable human resources during the civil war is once again becoming a possibility in 

Kabul and across the country.12 Unless the government can restore the public’s trust, the current 

charged environment of fear and uncertainty will cause a backsliding on the achievements of 

the past fourteen years. 

Notes

1. Aazem Arash, “Youth Constitute 70 Percent of Provincial Council Candidates,” TOLOnews, March 12, 2014, 

www.tolonews.com/en/afghanistan/14165-youth-constitute-70-percent-of-provincial-council-candidates. 

2. The provinces include Badakhshan, Badghis, Laghman, Kandahar, Khost, Nangrahar, Takhar, Panjshir, 

Parwan, and Kapisa. 

3. Srinjoy Bose and Nishank Motwani, “The Limits of ‘Hybrid Governance’ in Afghanistan,” Strategic Analysis

38, no. 4 (2014): 416–26.

4. Provided by Massoud Trishtwal, former director of Private Universities at the Ministry of Higher Education. 

5. As recounted to the author by activists in Helmand.

6. Srinjoy Bose, “Afghan Youth: Separating Fact from Fiction,” The Diplomat, accessed October 31, 2015, 

http://thediplomat.com/2013/11/afghan-youth-separating-fact-from-fiction/.

7. Ibid. 

8. Vanessa van den Boogaard, “Building Afghan Civil Society ‘From the Outside,’” International Affairs 

Review 10, no. 2 (2011): 29–42, 33.

9. Borhan Osman, “Afghan Youth for Democracy? Not all of Them,” Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN), 

www.afghanistan-analysts.org/afghan-youth-for-democracy-not-all-of-them/, accessed July 2, 2015.

10. AAN, “Afghanistan’s New Generation of Islamic Activities,” AAN, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/aanpaper-afghanistans-new-generation-of-islamic-activists/, accessed July 2, 2015. 

11. Borhan Osman, “Beyond Jihad and Traditionalism: Afghanistan’s New Generation of Islamic Activists,” 

AAN, www.afghanistan-analysts.org/publication/aan-papers/between-jihad-and-traditionalismafghanistans-new-generation-of-islamic-activists/, accessed July 2, 2015.

12. Frud Bezhan, “Afghanistan Tries to Stem Tide of Migration ‘Brain Drain,’” Radio Free Europe Radio 

Liberty, www.rferl.org/content/afghanistan-fighting-migration-brain-drain/27262971.html, accessed 

October 31, 2015.

USIP.ORG 139

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Statebuilding, Counterinsurgency, and 

Counterterrorism

Complementary or Contradictory Strategies?

THOMAS BARFIELD

Introduction

To fully understand how the lives of Afghan women have changed over the past fourteen 

years, it is important to learn from the real-time experiences of women and how international 

assistance for women’s advancement has really been received and translated on the ground. 

Some valuable insights can be learned from the following story of one woman’s journey.

On a hot summer day, I found Huma filing the classroom score list into the school logbook 

in her small office at the village high school. Huma used to be a young teacher in the early 

2000s, running home-based secret classes for girls in her village. Later, she got involved in the 

governance of her village and helped form a community development council (CDC).1 Her 

initial experiences of organizing home-based classes helped her reconnect with her villagers 

and explain to them the CDC election process and how to vote anonymously for their preferred 

local representatives. In the process, Huma herself won a seat and became a CDC member. 

However, due to several events, Huma had to resign from the CDC and begin her career 

as a school administrator: she started to have children, adding to her responsibilities at home; 

the CDC leadership was not actively engaging her in the distribution of resources in her 

village (e.g., she was not kept informed about solar panel distribution in her village and was not 

informed about CDC meetings); and more broadly, national parliamentary and presidential 

elections changed people’s understanding of and attitudes about elections and democracy. 

I approached Huma during my field research because I heard she was one of two female 

council members but no longer active. She first refused to talk to me because she said she was 

no longer engaged in the CDC, and if I wanted to see her about that, there was nothing she 

could share. My second attempt to see her at the village school office was successful. Although 

she was still not interested in sharing information about her CDC experience, when I invited 

her to reflect on her view of the village’s council work as part of the larger National Solidarity 

Program, she responded, “Democracy was working very well in our village, but elections ruined 

it.” She then went on to explain:

You see, when we started with CDC elections, it was fairly easy to mobilize villagers. I 

would go knock [on] doors and ask people to gather for a cup of tea in a house. They 

would not expect anything in return. They will gather and we would discuss our village 

issues, problems, etc. But now, particularly after the way the national elections were 

organized in our village, things have changed. Because in these elections, every 

Women’s Empowerment

Challenging the Notion of Victimization

ORZALA ASHRAF NEMAT
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candidate run all different forms of bribery in order to succeed, such as offering food, 

clothes like lungi and chapan [turban and long traditional coats], and even cash. So after 

this, people think democracy is all about bribing, buying, and not really about true 

representation and anonymous voting.

Huma’s story illustrates the following important points: It first challenges the notion that 

Afghanistan’s traditional society is resistant to democratic models of governance and that 

rural women are more vulnerable than urban women. Huma’s story also highlights the various 

structural norms and traditional values that remain a barrier to women taking on a public role. 

For instance, after she became a mother, with more family responsibilities, she was not kept 

informed about village meetings. Finally, it demonstrates the outcomes of development and 

governance interventions in a given place and time. Broadly, her story reveals the complexity of 

democratization in a society mainly led by patronage relations. That these relations dominated 

presidential and parliamentary elections reveals how internationally sponsored democracy 

can actually reinforce patronage relations rather than replace them with democratic values, 

processes, and institutions. 

Many lessons can be learned from post-2001 statebuilding and governance interventions 

and their support of women’s rights and advancement in Afghanistan. However, whether these 

interventions primarily focused on women’s empowerment or just addressed it as part of a larger 

initiative, the resulting changes cannot be framed as being solely successful or unsuccessful. 

Further, a more in-depth study of these interventions is needed to identify the empirical rather 

than theoretical realities of how women’s situations have changed on the ground. Related 

to this point, it is important to not only consider the evolution of women’s rights and their 

political and socioeconomic status but to also go deeper and examine how broad reforms have 

translated to real changes and improvements in women’s daily lives.

One way to determine real change is to look at women’s advancement in the context of 

changes in the political economy since 2001. Production structures and different patterns 

of economic activity cannot be understood without looking at political interests and the 

organization and balance of power and social relations. Through examining how power 

relations govern the distribution of resources, benefits, privileges, authority, and relationships 

with donors, the material status of women’s empowerment can be discerned.2

Finally, in gleaning the gains made in women’s advancement, it is important to then 

understand the significance for women’s rights and how these gains can be sustained and built 

on through the next phase of U.S. and international engagement. 

Note that what follows below is not a systematic review of women’s empowerment 

programs and projects in Afghanistan, nor is it a comprehensive critique of what empowerment 

or advancement means.3

Historical Overview of Women’s Advancement 

The political advancement of women’s rights in Afghanistan since 2001 can be best understood 

by (1) analyzing how women’s social, political, economic, and legal status have been negotiated 

by different political regimes over the past century; and (2) situating women’s empowerment 

and their advancement into a broader context of internationally sponsored statebuilding 

and governance assistance. Therefore, it is first necessary to examine women’s advancement 

historically and in the broader context of statebuilding interventions. 

Since the nineteenth century, various political regimes in Afghanistan have made women’s 

rights an integral part of discourse, seeking to create a stronger public role for women in 

sociopolitical and economic spheres. Support for reforms first emerged under the rule of Amir 
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Abdur Rahman Khan. He ordered the abolition of some traditional customs (such as forcing 

widows to marry their deceased husband’s brother), raised the age of marriage, allowed women 

to inherit property, and secured women the right to divorce under defined conditions.4 Abdur 

Rahman Khan’s predecessors (Habibulah Khan, later followed by King Amanullah Khan) 

attempted to build on these reforms by sending girls abroad for education, building schools for 

girls beyond the capital, and denouncing polygamy. Despite resistance from some conservative 

parts of the population and women from Amanullah’s family, particularly Queen Soraya, his 

wife played an instrumental role in promoting women’s public role in the society.5 After a 

brief period of turmoil in the decades to follow,6 in the early 1930s, the country embarked 

on expanding public spaces for women. Many women were educated as teachers, nurses, 

lawyers, doctors, engineers, and other professions; and were able to assume formal, public roles 

in government offices in the cities. However, women in rural areas often remained isolated, 

with less or limited access to education and other services. Afghanistan’s 1964 constitution 

emphasized the equal rights and obligations of all Afghans without any discrimination or 

preference (Article 25); and this, for the first time, opened the space for women to vote and 

be elected. Since then, a limited number of women have become members of parliament and 

taken leadership positions in a few government offices. 

Rapid reform continued in the 1970s under the Soviet-sponsored People’s Democratic 

Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) regime. Women’s literacy efforts and broader land reform 

campaigns were used to extend reforms to rural and remote areas. The PDPA made education 

compulsory for girls and boys, as well as adults, and raised the marriage age to sixteen. PDPA’s 

radical socialist agenda—most notably its promotion of state atheism, confiscation of land, 

and abolishment of bride prices—triggered strong reactions by the local population, especially 

power brokers.7 In Kabul, women were relatively active as party central committee members and 

cabinet members, as well as participants in antigovernment activities such as demonstrations 

and the distribution of antigovernment propaganda.8 However, at the subnational level, outside 

of the major provincial capitals, there was more opposition to supporting women’s literacy and 

their involvement in politics. 

During the civil war period (1990s) and the Taliban’s rule (1996–2001), there was a 

major backsliding in many of the reforms, once again restricting women to household roles. 

Systematic discrimination against women began under the Mujahideen era in early 1990s 

and intensified under the Taliban.9 In the mid-1990s, public infrastructure was significantly 

damaged, and funding for education and other public services decreased significantly, leaving 

nongovernmental organizations to fill the gaps through confined projects with limited outreach. 

Additionally, the formal ruling regimes promoted a far more restrictive and fundamentalist 

approach with regards to women’s mobility and access to services. They eventually took away 

their right to education and participation in the political sphere. However, it is important to 

recognize the silent forms of resistance and resilience that Afghan people, particularly women, 

performed during this period—for example, by running home-based literacy and health 

education classes for women and girls and continuing to work in the health sector.10

A key lesson to be learned from Afghanistan’s contemporary context is that women’s rights 

and their status has been a bargaining chip used by various national governments and regimes 

to either promote modernity or counter it on the basis of more restrictive interpretation of 

religion and customary norms. Recent history (1978–2001) also reveals how the PDPA and the 

Taliban—two ideologically radical extremes (one focused on “liberating’ and “freeing” women 

and the other focused on restricting women to household and reproductive roles)—were

Women’s rights and 

their status has been a 

bargaining chip used 

by various national 

governments and regimes 

to either promote 

modernity or counter it on 

the basis of more restrictive 

interpretation of religion 

and customary norms.
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both rejected by the population as a whole.11 In addition, it highlights the dependency of 

Afghan elites on external sponsorships for carrying out their ideological campaigns. But, what 

is equally notable is that women’s resilience and resistance to the restrictive rules on mobility and 

public life serves to portray them as active agents rather than passive victims of these conflicting 

interventions or reforms. 

Significance of Women’s Advancement in Post-2001 

Over the last fourteen years of U.S. intervention, Afghan government leaders and international 

partners have repeatedly highlighted the gains made for women’s rights, and thus, they have 

been well-documented.12 So, this section will focus instead on the significance of those gains.

A significant difference between historical and post-2001 attempts at reform and 

modernization is the current centrality of women’s liberation and women’s rights—to the point 

that the war on terror was justified as a war to “liberate” women.13 The Taliban’s ill-treatment 

of women has contributed further to such a justification. The broadcasting and publishing 

of public execution footage14 and other photos of beatings and amputations of women have 

become part of war-on-terror propaganda posters and billboard ads, inviting people to make a 

choice to be “either with us, or against us”—the dominant rhetoric used by president George 

W. Bush in the early days of intervention.15

Securing women’s rights and ensuring their full participation in all aspects of life were goals 

of the historical Bonn Agreement, which has become the foundation for the post-2001 political 

settlement.16 Cooperation with the United States and its allies in Afghanistan meant every 

Afghan leader, including warlord commanders and veterans of the anti-Soviet Mujahadeen 

era, are obliged to express their support for women’s rights at least in speeches. Starting with 

president Hamid Karzai (first as chairman of the transitional administration), all higher- and 

lower-ranking officials expressed their support through somewhat artificial statements to the 

media (e.g., celebrating women’s day with speeches about women’s rights), with a purpose of 

showing allegiance to U.S. and ally efforts. In practice, few of the political elites were seen to 

accept or endorse outstanding women leaders who spoke up in parliament or other political 

settings. This exceptional opportunity to empower Afghan women, however, was recognized 

by others, including moderate Afghan government leaders and civil society organizations, who 

used the international and national political commitment to encourage donors to fund more 

women-focused programs and projects. By using Islamic references, women organizations 

and moderate Afghan politicians succeeded in presenting a far more lasting and moderate 

model of democracy and women’s rights that could also be accepted by conservative parts of 

Afghan society.17

Since 2001, international donors, government leadership, and allies have expressed greater 

political commitment to women’s empowerment; and women-focused programs and projects 

have significantly increased their outreach (covering relatively larger parts of both urban and 

rural areas). However, the unprecedented flow of resources and expanded political support have 

not necessarily resulted in the complete transformation of gender relations and women’s place 

in the society, as will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter.

Other recent and significant contributions to women’s advancement include constitutional 

guarantees and electoral rights for women, including that 25 percent of parliamentary seats be 

filled by women; institutional and legal reforms that aim to ensure women’s access to the public 

sector and to justice; national and subnational policies that include gender as a crosscutting 

theme; and the ratification of various international treaties and conventions that mandate 
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the Afghan government to report on women’s rights. Regardless of the effectiveness and 

sustainability of these advancements, they have undoubtedly opened more space for women’s 

meaningful participation in the public sphere. 

Mixed Motivations and Instrumentalization of Women’s 

Empowerment 

Considering the above advancements, a valid question arises: If political will is present and 

international interventions have been endorsed by national leaders who signed onto an 

agreement to ensure women’s full inclusion in all political, social, and economic spheres, then 

why do women continue to experience gender-related violence and why are their security and 

political participation and legal status at even greater risk than in the past decade and a half? 

Scholars and policymakers have different responses based on their world view and where 

they stand.18 Arguably, there are several important factors to consider when trying to answer 

the question. 

Justifying the war on terror on the basis of “liberating” Afghan women to “save” them from 

the “barbarian” Taliban brought increased attention to, followed by substantial resources for, 

women’s rights efforts.19 But, for many intervening governments, institutions, and organizations, 

Afghanistan and its people were considered passive receipts of aid and assistance. This meant 

international operations were seen as being applied to a tabula rasa or a blank slate.20 It was 

assumed that once the Taliban was eliminated as a ruling regime, there would be no resistance 

to women’s active public role.21 This assumption led the international community to largely 

overlook existing power structures and dominance of the patronage-based system of rule, 

which obviously has patriarchy at its core.22 Most project documents, policy papers, and media 

outputs highlighted the Taliban’s antiwomen mentality, associating every aspect of women’s 

subordination and discrimination with the Taliban and their followers.23 In reality, a far more 

complex sets of power relations exists, with competing forces operating for their own party, 

group, community, or larger constituency’s interests and, thereby, defending women’s rights or 

respecting them only if those rights do not threaten their own power and authority.24

In addition, the reality is that the United States and its allies25 also have mixed motivations 

and intentions, such as safeguarding their own national security; eliminating safe havens 

for terrorist operations at a global level; maintaining a stronger presence in the region; and 

introducing a liberal democratic system through constitutional democracy, development 

aid, and investment and privatization. Further investigation of all these motivations and the 

implications is beyond the scope of this chapter and requires further research. The development 

environment in Afghanistan is complex, with various modes of assistance being implemented 

by multiple intervening countries. These modes range from Wilsonian approaches based on 

external interventionism as a response to existing needs, to Dunantist approaches based on 

humanitarian principles, to religious and faith-based approaches that sometimes counter these 

other approaches—all operating in one context and for the same population.26

Short-Term(ism) and Sustainability 

Major shifts in the scale and flow of resources, political commitments, and intergovernmental 

relations all affect how women-focused programs and projects are implemented and sustained. 

For instance, during 2002 to 2008, “quick impact projects” became an important tool for U.S.-

funded programs (particularly through the U.S. Department of Defense).27 The drawback of 
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these projects—particularly those focused on women—was the implementation timeframe 

(generally less than six months); few results or outcomes could be viewed as making a longterm impact or contributing to sustainability. 

Furthermore, while donor funding increased dramatically with the military surge in 2009, 

it has been declining since the drawdown of military forces began in 2012. This has led to 

a backsliding of progress related to jobs and infrastructure (e.g., roads, clinics, and schools). 

The elimination of large-scale, off-budget funding has resulted in large-scale unemployment, 

limited access to jobs, and an increasing number of dysfunctional buildings, conference rooms, 

offices, and even clinics and schools that the government cannot afford to maintain and sustain 

without international funding.28

Innovative approaches are needed to address the issues of donor dependency and lack of 

sustainability. In terms of the economy, women lack direct access to markets, sufficient skills 

to run their business beyond the project life cycle, and lasting mechanisms to support micro-, 

meso-, and macro-level enterprises that benefit women. 

Regarding women’s rights projects, they have done little to challenge the structural aspects 

of women’s subordination that results in their lower status in the domestic and public spheres. 

In other words, there is limited indication that a theory of change has been applied or tested 

when programs and projects have claimed to empower women or build their capacities. For 

example, in protesting the efficacy of women’s rights workshops and trainings, a woman trainee 

complained that although she has acquired many certificates, her place in society has not yet 

improved. Undoubtedly, behavioral and attitude changes take time, but there is little evidence 

that short-term, one-time workshops—which often focus on women only—can lead to such 

changes. In addition, some women and men participate in these workshops because of the 

financial incentives, which makes applying what they have learned less likely. 

Regarding political participation, although quotas were introduced successfully, they do 

not appear to have been useful in practice. Essentially, the political economy of governance 

in Afghanistan was overlooked. In other words, most of the seats reserved for women in 

parliament have been dictated by political elites—including strongmen, influential politicomilitary figures, private business owners and contractors, and drug-mafia—who introduced 

and sponsored female candidates in exchange for their full loyalty.29 This is one reason that, 

to date, parliament has not witnessed any collective action by more than 26 percent of female 

parliamentarians on matters that concern women’s rights.30

In terms of advocacy, although women leaders have proved to be highly dedicated and 

vocal in their demands, more attention must be paid to the content and implementation of 

advocacy efforts. Some of the training and coaching workshops to build women’s advocacy 

capacity have been helpful, but these have largely focused on individuals and not enough on 

institutions. For instance, international partners often invite individual advocates with good 

language and communication skills to visit the United States or Europe and claim that they 

represent the voices of Afghan women. The problem with such simplification is that there is 

no single “Afghan women’s stance” or voice—as in every society, women constitute a diverse, 

heterogeneous group. Women residing outside Kabul or the provincial capitals do not feel 

represented by women’s voices from Kabul. Hence, building institutional capacity in advocacy 

must also be a priority to bring together and represent all voices. Furthermore, more south-south 

cooperation is needed to create ties and solidarity among women from war-affected societies 

and other developing countries; this will enable them to share experiences and strategies and 

to build stronger, more effective regional and global networks of women advocates. Currently, 

Women lack direct access 

to markets, sufficient 

skills to run their business 

beyond the project 

life cycle, and lasting 

mechanisms to support 

micro-, meso-, and macrolevel enterprises that 

benefit women.
USIP.ORG 145

STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

women activists and leaders from Afghanistan travel more often to the United States and 

European countries than to Middle Eastern or Asian countries; perhaps this approach should 

be reconsidered for future programs. 

Finally, in looking at rural versus urban interventions, there is no doubt that, post-2001—

with the aim of expanding the government’s influence into the communities and districts—

unprecedented nationwide coverage was achieved. However, for numerous reasons, outreach 

to rural areas remains too limited, particularly in regards to women’s active and meaningful 

engagement in public life. For example, certain assumptions have led to inappropriate or less 

effective interventions in Afghanistan’s rural settings: the idea that illiteracy is equivalent to 

lack of knowledge, that rural women are passive objects with no power and authority, that 

rural women have little or no mobility or access to productive roles in the economy, and that 

rural women do not resist patriarchy. More in-depth research is required to challenge these 

misconceptions; contemporary and historical literature and ethnography on Afghan women 

already challenges them by highlighting women’s agency, their active role in the economy, and 

their productive roles and power and influence within the existing patriarchal system of rule.31

The earlier account of Huma’s experience demonstrates that women can be proactive 

and occupy a public space within their communities. The school Huma works in is named 

after Queen Suraya, a progressive woman and the wife of King Amanullah, who secured 

Afghanistan’s independence in 1919. When I visited Huma’s village, I asked the school 

headmaster (a man) if I could take a picture of the large portrait of the queen and king, along 

with the queen’s brief biography. After I took the photo, Huma invited me to her tiny office, 

where she had a much larger portrait of Queen Suraya, who was without a scarf and wearing a 

light blue, slightly adjusted sleeveless dress; Huma said,

Here, you should also take [a] picture of this portrait. This is the initial portrait we, the 

women of the village, brought to the school. We liked it, because we can see the queen 

and her beauty more clearly. But the school principal—who also is the Mullah of the 

grand mosque in the village—and some of the male colleagues objected that this photo 

was not appropriate because she doesn’t wear a dress with sleeves. So, we agreed to send 

the portrait back to the photo studio and asked to do something with the sleeves. By the 

time we came back, the men in the school had already hung this other photo where the 

Queen appears with the King. We were surprised how they did that without telling us. 

But we knew what the message was. So, I decided to keep this large portray of the Queen 

in my own tiny office. We said, this portrait is not going to leave this school! 

This story may not seem significant without having an in-depth understanding of the 

broader village context and its power dynamics. What is clearly remarkable is the resilience 

of women in perhaps the most challenging environment, where they have to continuously 

defend their rights and values and challenge norms and practices. Huma’s attempt may seem 

simplistic, but her story, particularly the way it was communicated to me as a researcher or 

“outsider” in her village, conveyed the message that “we, too, are active and willing to change 

our lives and challenge the existing system.”

Conclusion

The importance of drawing lessons in the context of liberal, statebuilding interventions 

and experiences cannot be understated—where not only the intentions, motivations, and 

assumptions of the intervening actors and institutions are considered but also their impact 

on the broader political economy and, in this case, women’s empowerment and political 

participation. While the focus on women’s issues is not unique to the post-2001 period, the 

scale and scope of interventions and response of the population are particularly noteworthy. 
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Many different actors, with their own strategic, geopolitical, military, and factional or personal 

objectives, have instrumentalized women’s rights. In this context, serious challenges remain 

related to mixed motivations, misconceptions, and long-term impact and sustainability. The 

on-the-ground reality of women’s experiences must be recognized, and the resilience, resistance, 

and proactivity of Afghan women must be harnessed. Afghan women need to be seen as 

partners rather than vulnerable individuals if the United States and its allies are to achieve real, 

sustainable change for women and girls. 

Notes

1. In 2003, the government of Afghanistan established a nationwide National Solidarity Program (NSP), 

funded under the World Bank’s Community Driven Development Scheme. For varying perspectives on the 

gender aspects of this program, see Sippi Azarbaijani-Moghaddam, If Anyone Listens, I have a Lot of Plans: 

A Study of Gender Equity through the National Solidarity Program’s Community Development Councils (Kabul: 

Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees, 2010); and A. Beath, F. Christia, and R. Enikolopov, 

Randomized Impact Evaluation of Afghanistan’s National Solidarity Programme (Washington DC: World 

Bank, 2013). 

2. Jacqui True, The Political Economy of Violence against Women (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2012). 

3. See, for example, Naila Kabeer, “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment: A Critical Analysis of the 

Third Millennium Development Goal,” Gender and Development 13, no. 1 (2005): 13–24.

4. Ghosh, Huma A., “A History of Women in Afghanistan: Lessons Learnt for the Future or Yesterdays and 

Tomorrow: Women in Afghanistan,” Journal of International Women’s Studies 4, no. 3 (2003): 1–14.

5. Ibid, 4.

6. Amanullah Khan’s government was toppled by Habibullah Kalakani, whose rule was somewhat similar to 

the Taliban’s. For instance, he closed all schools for women and all western education centers. See Ghosh, 

“A History of Women in Afghanistan,” 7.

7. Lester W. Grau, and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “The Soviet-Afghan War: Breaking the Hammer & Sickle,” Veterans 

of Foreign Wars Magazine, March 1, 2002; and Ghosh, “A History of Women in Afghanistan.” 

8. Cheryl Benard, Veiled Courage: Inside the Afghan Women’s Resistance (New York: Broadway Books, 2002).

9. For more information on Taliban decrees related to women and other cultural issues, see A. Rashid, Taliban: 

Militant Islam, Oil, and the New Great Game in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2000), 

217–19; and Amnesty International, Women in Afghanistan: Pawns in Men’s Power Struggles (London: 

Amnesty International, 1999).

10. For further elaboration, see Orzala Ashraf Nemat, Afghan Women at the Crossroads: Agents of Peace—or Its 

Victims? (New York: The Century Foundation, 2011); and Elaheh Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women: Identity 

and Invasion (London and New York: Zed Books, 2007).

11. Nemat, Afghan Women at the Crossroads.

12. “Afghan women have come out of a total seclusion during Taliban rule to take their rightful place in the 

society making 20 per cent of our civil service, 27 per cent of our parliament and 39 per cent of our students 

in our classrooms;” from Karzai’s statement at The International Afghanistan Conference in Bonn, 

December 5, 2011, http://president.gov.af/en/news/5281, access July 21, 2015.

13. Lila Abu‐Lughod, “Do Muslim Women Really Need Saving? Anthropological Reflections on Cultural 

Relativism and Its Others,” American Anthropologist 104, no. 3 (2002): 783–90; Ratna Kapur, “Unveiling 

Women’s Rights in the ‘War on Terrorism,’” Duke Journal of Gender Law and Policy 9 (2002): 211.

14. Zarmina was publicly executed in the Ghazi Sports Stadium on November 17, 1999. The incident was 

filmed by the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan. The incident received significant 

coverage on the day of its occurrence by Taliban police across Kabul; later, the footage was publicized 

globally, symbolizing an image of Taliban’s treatment of women. See http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/

story?id=125721&page=1, accessed July 22, 2015. 

15. “All nations, if they want to fight terror, must do something... You’re either with us or you’re against us;” from 

George W. Bush’s statement after September 11, 2001, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1642130.

stm, accessed July 21, 2015.

16. Nemat, Afghan Women at the Crossroads.

17. Huma Ahmed-Ghosh, “Voices of Afghan Women: Human Rights and Economic Development,” 

International Feminist Journal of Politics 8, no. 1 (2006): 110–28.

18. See, for example, Deniz Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan (Geneva: United 

Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2005); Sedef Arat-Koc, “Imperial Wars or Benevolent 

Afghan women need to 

be seen as partners rather 

than vulnerable individuals.
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STATE STRENGTHENING IN AFGHANISTAN

Interventions? Reflections on ‘Global Feminism’ Post September 11th,” Atlantis 26, no. 2 (2002): 53–65; and 

Rostami-Povey, Afghan Women: Identity and Invasion.

19. See, for example, Kapur, “Unveiling Women’s Rights in the ‘War on Terrorism,’” 211; Krista Hunt and Kim 

Rygiel (eds), (En)Gendering the War on Terror: War Stories and Camouflaged Politics (Hampshire, United 

Kingdom: Ashgate Publishing, 2006); and Anne Sisson Runyan and V. Spike Peterson, Global Gender Issues 

in the New Millennium (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2013).

20. Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 2003); Michael Latham, “Modernization as Ideology,” cited in Ian Roxborough, “Building 

Other Peoples’ States: The Sociology of State-Building,” Comparative Sociology 11, no. 2 (2012): 181; Hunt and 

Rygiel, (En) Gendering the War on Terror; and Runyan and Peterson, Global Gender Issues in the New Millennium.

21. Kapur, “Unveiling Women’s Rights in the ‘War on Terrorism.’”

22. Mounira M. Charrad, “Central and Local Patrimonialism State-building in Kin-Based Societies,” The 

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 636, no. 1 (2011): 49–68.

23. Orzala Ashraf Nemat, “Local Governance in the Age of Liberal Interventionism: Governance Relations in 

the Post-2001 Afghanistan,” PhD thesis (SOAS, London, 2014). 

24. Ibid.

25. Homogeneity also did not exist among the United States and its allies on the ground; each country had its 

own approach.

26. This issue is not limited to Afghanistan. See Dalya Mitri, “Challenges of Aid Coordination in a Complex 

Crisis: An Overview of Funding Policies and Conditions Regarding Aid Provision to Syrian Refugees in 

Lebanon,” Civil Society Knowledge Center and Lebanon Support, May 23, 2014, http://cskc.daleelmadani.org/paper/challenges-aid-coordination-complex-crisis, accessed July 18, 2015.

27. U.S. Agency for International Development, “PRT Quick Impact Projects,” www.usaid.gov/node/51861, 

accessed October 21, 2015.

28. For examples of these projects, see quarterly reports from the Special Inspector General for Afghanstian 

Reconscruction (SIGAR) published since 2008 (www.sigar.mil/allreports/, accessed in June 2015). 

29. Orzala Ashraf Nemat, “Women and the Elections: Facilitating and Hindering Factors in the Upcoming 

Parliamentary Elections” (Kabul: Afghanistan Research Evaluation Unit, 2015). 

30. For example, parliament has repeatedly refused to pass the Elimination of Violence Against Women bill, 

and strong and experienced candidates for ministry-level positions, including at the Ministry of Women 

Affairs, have been discounted.

31. See, for example, Kandiyoti, The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan; and T.W. Chaudhary, 

Orzala A. Nemat, and Astri Suhrke, “Promoting Women’s Rights in Afghanistan: The Ambiguous 

Footprint of the West,” in Susanna Campbell, David Chandler, and Meera Sabaratnam (eds.), A Liberal 

Peace? The Problems and Practices of Peace Building (London and New York: Zed Books, 2011), 106–20.

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Recommendations

The following broad recommendations apply not only to Afghanistan but also to other 

countries where the international community is involved in state strengthening.

• Commit to long-term, predictable support at reasonable levels. Financial, military, 

and development support can create a level of confidence in the future, encourage 

domestic and foreign private investment, and reinforce and sustain the gains made. 

This starts but does not end with the Afghan National Security Forces. The United 

States should build on its investments in social and economic transformation but also 

insist on improved monitoring, evaluation, and accountability and recognize that 

some of the emerging long-term needs stem from the systems international actors 

have instituted. 

• Support Afghan civil society and invest more in higher education. Support for 

Afghan civil society, as well as critical government institutions, should continue. 

Over the next decade, control of Afghan politics will likely pass from the hands of 

traditional power brokers to those with a different and far more constructive world 

view. This trend should be recognized by increasing investment in Afghanistan’s 

younger generation. A longer-term commitment will also help to sustain the gains 

made by women. 

• Support the Afghan government in negotiations with the Taliban. If the new 

government continues to pursue negotiations that are backed by significant segments 

of the population, stay within articulated red lines, and are consistent with U.S. 

national interests, the United States should not undermine these politically or 

militarily, as done in the past. The reality is that the negotiation process will be long 

and extremely fragile. 

• Be clear, pragmatic, and skillful in managing relations with Afghanistan’s regional 

neighbors. Since 2001, the United States has at times been able to work discretely 

with Iran and Pakistan but has also been vulnerable to being misled by them and has 

occasionally not considered the regional impacts of bilateral diplomacy.

• Build on U.S. domestic support for Afghanistan. Public support for major military 

operations in Afghanistan has waned over the past five years (in part due to the 

dominant narrative of failure), but this does not imply opposition to more modest, 

long-term programs of security and development assistance and diplomatic 

engagement. If provided with the strategic rationale for a stable and politically 

moderate Afghanistan, the American public will endorse policies supportive of that 

objective, provided that the costs are not deemed excessive. Support would be 

especially forthcoming for keeping Afghanistan from again becoming a safe haven 

for international terrorism, sustaining the gains of Afghan women, and not 

destabilizing nuclear-armed Pakistan.

• Improve U.S. analytical and decision-making processes. The political context and 

operating incentives in Afghanistan should be more carefully considered to ensure 

that military and development resources are not wasted or have unintended 

negative consequences.

• Promote accountability systems that encourage institutional learning and 

improvement rather than attempt to catch out and punish. Currently, policymakers 
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are encouraged to highlight and exaggerate success and hide or minimize failure, 

which reduces opportunities for improvement. 

• Capitalize on and enhance the effectiveness of U.S. accumulated human and 

political capital. Unlike in 2001, the United States now has a pool of people with 

extensive experience in Afghanistan and a good understanding of its politics, 

economy, security forces, and society. They can help formulate and implement an 

effective Afghanistan policy but will need professional incentives to serve in that 

country as America’s security priorities shift elsewhere. Tours of duty for senior- and 

mid-level management should be extended from one to two or three years (building 

in appropriate career incentives for those who accept), and personnel assigned to 

Afghanistan must be given the wherewithal to engage with the population beyond 

fortified embassy and military compound walls.

• Establish a bipartisan congressional caucus for Afghanistan. A group of people who 

believe in providing sustained, long-term U.S. and international support to 

Afghanistan, contingent upon improvements in government performance and 

accountability, can play a positive role in mobilizing resources and ensuring that 

policies are effective.
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About the Authors

Murtaza Edries Amiryar, an economist with a degree from Lawrence University as a 

Fulbright Scholar, specializes in private sector development, economic growth, and program 

management. He has led various national research projects in economic development, has 

spoken on entrepreneurship at TEDx Kabul, and is currently a Chevening Scholar in the 

United Kingdom.

Thomas Barfield, an anthropologist, conducted ethnographic fieldwork with nomads in 

northern Afghanistan in the mid-1970s. His published work includes The Central Asian Arabs 

of Afghanistan, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, and Afghanistan: An Atlas of 

Indigenous Domestic Architecture. A professor of anthropology at Boston University, Barfield 

is also president of the American Institute for Afghanistan Studies. In 2007, he received a 

Guggenheim Fellowship that supported the research for his most recent book, Afghanistan: A 

Cultural and Political History. Barfield has a PhD from Harvard University.

William A. Byrd is a development economist whose academic background includes a doctorate 

in economics and a master’s degree in East Asian Regional Studies from Harvard University. 

Following many years at the World Bank, he joined the U.S. Institute of Peace in April 2012 

as a senior expert, working on Afghanistan. He has worked on and lived in China, India, 

Pakistan, and Afghanistan. During 2002 to 2006, he was stationed in Kabul, where he served 

as the World Bank’s country manager for Afghanistan and then as economic adviser. He has 

published extensively on Afghanistan, China, and related topics. 

James Deane is the director of policy and learning at BBC Media Action, where he oversees 

the organization’s research, technical assistance, and policy activities. Deane has spent more 

than thirty years working in the field of media development. He was a founding member 

and later executive director of the Panos Institute, London, and immediately before joining 

BBC Media Action in 2007, managing director of the Communication for Social Change 

Consortium, a New York-based organization set up by the Rockefeller Foundation. He has 

provided formal strategic advice and consultancies to numerous bilateral, multilateral, and 

other development agencies, mostly related to communication and media in development. 

Deane is the commissioning editor of several recent BBC Media Action policy briefings 

on media in fragile states and author of its recent briefing, Fragile States: The Role of Media 

and Communication.

John Drake is the civil works program manager for Arizona and Nevada for the U.S. Army 

Corps of Engineers Los Angeles District. He has been working civil works projects with the 

district since 1984. While deployed in Afghanistan, Drake was the chief of the infrastructure 

division at the Joint Programs Integration Office, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan. He was also 

deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom for three years from 2005–09. Drake holds a bachelor of 

science in business administration from the University of Phoenix, Arizona. 

M. Annette Evans is the project integration officer at the U.S. Army Engineer Research 

and Development Center (ERDC), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Previous assignments 

include deputy, Joint Programs, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan; ERDC’s deputy to the commander; 

program manager, Water and Infrastructure, Afghanistan Engineer District South; and 

deputy garrison manager, U.S. Army Research Laboratory. While at Army War College, she 

received the Commandant’s Award for Distinction in Research for her research project, “U.S. 

Military Stability Operations and Social Capital,” published as a book chapter in 2013. Evans 
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is currently completing her doctoral degree in international development at the University of 

Southern Mississippi. 

Scott C. Farquhar is an analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), serving 

in Germany, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Yugoslavia. He holds a bachelor of arts from Providence 

College and master in arts from Kansas State University. His publications include Back to 

Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD (editor); chapters in “A 

Different Kind of War:” The U.S. Army in Operation Enduring Freedom; a monograph Legacy 

of Langres: The U.S. Army’s Plan to Educate Reserve and National Guard Officers in the InterWar Period; and papers for CALL, the United States Institute for Peace, and Society for 

Military History.

Paul Fishstein, an independent consultant, began working in Afghanistan in 1977. He has 

implemented projects and conducted research on the economy, rural livelihoods, and aid 

and stabilization. From 2005 to 2008, he served as director of the Afghanistan Research and 

Evaluation Unit. 

Erica Gaston is a project manager at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin, Germany. 

She is a human rights lawyer with seven years of experience in programming and research in 

Afghanistan related to human rights and justice promotion. Her publications include books on 

the legal, ethical, and practical dilemmas emerging in modern conflict and crisis zones; studies 

mapping justice systems and outcomes in Afghanistan and Yemen; and thematic research and 

opinion pieces on rule of law issues in transitioning countries. She is currently a German 

Chancellor Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute in Berlin. She holds degrees from 

Stanford University and Harvard Law School.

Erik Jensen is a professor of the practice of law and director of the Rule of Law Program at 

Stanford Law School. He is also an affiliated faculty member at Stanford’s Center on Democracy, 

Development, and the Rule of Law and a senior advisor for governance and law at The Asia 

Foundation. Jensen has taught and practiced in the field of law and development for thirty years 

and has carried out fieldwork in thirty-five developing countries. He has led or advised research 

teams on governance and the rule of law at the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, and 

the African Development Bank. Since 2007, he has been the faculty advisor for a Stanford Law 

School project that has developed a full law degree granting program at American University 

of Afghanistan (AUAF). He also sits on the Board of Trustees of AUAF.

Mujib Mashal is an Afghan journalist, currently writing for the New York Times. He previously 

wrote for magazines such as The Atlantic, Harper’s, Time, Businessweek, and others. He has a 

bachelor’s degree in history from Columbia University.

Jennifer Murtazashvili is assistant professor of international development and public 

management at the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of 

Pittsburgh. She is the author of Informal Order and the State in Afghanistan. During the past 

decade, she has conducted extensive ethnographic research as well as designed public opinion 

surveys and experimental research on subnational governance in Afghanistan. In addition 

to her academic experience, she has served as a governance advisor to the U.S. Agency for 

International Development, United Nations agencies, and nongovernmental organizations in 

Afghanistan and across Central Asia.
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Orzala Ashraf Nemat is a senior teaching fellow at SOAS, University of London, and a 

governance and civil society expert at the Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit. Nemat 

has more than fifteen years of experience in development practice. Once a war refugee and 

grassroots organization’s founding leader, Nemat continued to be a dedicated advocate for 

women’s rights, human rights, and justice. She later joined various international development 

organizations in Afghanistan, serving as a researcher, consultant, and country program officer. 

Nemat has published several articles on development in Afghanistan and is a frequent 

commentator on BBC and Al Jazeera English. 

Shirazuddin Siddiqi is the BBC Media Action country director for Afghanistan. He has a 

distinguished track record as a director of educational and development programming for 

Afghan audiences and has worked with a wide range of donors. After two years of a devastating 

civil war, Siddiqi fled to Pakistan in 1994, where he joined BBC Afghan Education Projects 

(BBC AEP) and was responsible for many projects, including the long-running radio soap 

opera in Dari and Pashto, New Home, New Life. Since repatriating in 2002, he has worked 

with key Afghan and international stakeholders in developing the legal framework for media 

development in Afghanistan, including the present media law. In 2012, he co-wrote BBC 

Media Action’s policy briefing, The Media of Afghanistan: The Challenges of Transition. After 

completing the successful localization of BBC AEP, which now operates as a fully independent 

Afghan organization, in 2012, Siddiqi launched the Afghan multimedia debate program, 

Open Jirga.

Lieutenant Colonel Jodi Jones Smith is a strategic planning officer at the Transatlantic 

Division (TAD), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in Winchester, Virginia. She has worked at 

TAD since April 2010, where she has also served as district chief of operations and intelligence, 

program manager, and division executive officer. She has served in Operations Iraqi Freedom, 

New Dawn, and Enduring Freedom; and led a lessons learned Collection and Analysis Team 

to Afghanistan in 2014. She holds a bachelor of science in marine science and in geology 

from the University of Miami, and a master of science in marine, estuarine and environmental 

sciences from the University of Maryland. 

Scott Smith served as the director of the Afghanistan and Central Asia program at the U.S. 

Institute of Peace (USIP) from 2012 to 2016. Previously, Smith spent thirteen years at the 

United Nations (UN), focusing primarily on Afghanistan and democratization issues. He 

held various positions, including the senior special assistant to the special representative of 

the secretary-general in Kabul and the senior political affairs officer and team leader for 

Afghanistan in the department of peacekeeping operations. As the desk officer for the 2004 

Afghan presidential elections in the UN’s Electoral Assistance Division, Smith oversaw the 

planning, establishment, and financing of the UN electoral team in Afghanistan. Prior to 2004, 

Smith held several political affairs officer positions, including as the Afghanistan desk officer 

from 2002 to 2003 and as the political adviser to the UN Political Office in Bougainville, 

Papua New Guinea.

Barbara J. Stapleton resided in Afghanistan from 2002 to 2010, serving as the advocacy and 

policy coordinator of the Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (2002–05) and as the 

senior political adviser and deputy to the European Union Special Representative (2006–10). 

She followed both civil-military developments and operations of the International Security 

Assistance Force, led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Stapleton has 

published widely on the political and security context underlying civil-military approaches 
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and continues to conduct field research in Afghanistan. Most recently, she wrote a critique of 

NATO’s strategy for withdrawal and an examination of civil-military approaches developed 

by the United Kingdom’s Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Mazar-e-Sharif and Lashkar 

Gah. Stapleton now works as an independent consultant. Additional contributions to Military 

and Civilian Assistance in Afghanistan: An Incoherent Approach came from Michael Keating, 

associate director of research partnership at Chatham House.


 5

About the Institut

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan 

institution established and funded by Congress. Its goals are to 

help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, promote postconflict 

peacebuilding, and increase conflict-management tools, capacity, and 

intellectual capital worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering 

others with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Chairman of the Board: Steven J. Hadley

Vice Chairman: George E. Moose

President: Nancy Lindborg

Chief Financial Officer: Michael Graham

Board of Di

Stephen J. Hadley, (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, Washington, 

D.C.• George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The 

George Washington University, Washington, D.C. • Judy Ansley, Former 

Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under 

George W. Bush, Washington, D.C. • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished 

Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 

International Studies, Washington, D.C. • Joseph Eldridge, University 

Chaplain and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. 

Kennedy Center for Justice and Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Ikram 

U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, Nev. • 

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International 

Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Calif. • John A. Lancaster, 

Former Executive Director, International Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, N.Y. • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, Va. • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, Leadership 

Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Members Ex Offi

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense 

• Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, National 

Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
2 Looking for Justice

Afghanistan was transformed physically, politically, and 

socially after the international intervention in 2001. But 

to prevent the backsliding of progress, predictable and 

well-designed long-term assistance is needed to support 

Afghan efforts to establish effective governance and 

sustainable institutions. A coordinated strategy among 

international actors and the government will be essential 

to navigate the country’s complex political, economic, 

and societal relationships. This strategy must include 

delineating common objectives and capitalizing on the 

strengths of civil society (especially youth and women), 

the private sector, the media, and human capital both 

within and outside of Afghanistan. This report provides 

lessons learned in state strengthening in Afghanistan 

from 2001–14, as well as specific recommendations for 

current and future interventions. 

Other USIP Publications

■ Getting It Right in Afghanistan by Moeed Yusuf, Scott Smith, and Colin 

Cookman (eds.) (Book, December 2013)

■ What Can Be Done to Revive Afghanistan’s Economy? by William A. Byrd 

(Special Report, February 2016)

■ Understanding Afghanistan’s 2014 Presidential Election: The Limits to 

Democracy in a Limited Access Order by William A. Byrd (Special Report, 

April 2015)

■ Provincial Governors in Afghan Politics by Dipali Mukhopadhay (Special 

Report, January 2016)

■ Informal Justice and the International Community in Afghanistan by Noah 

Coburn (Peaceworks, April 2013)

■ Women’s Access to Justice in Afghanistan by Erica Gaston and Tim Luccaro 

(Peaceworks, July 2014)

PEACEWORKS • MAY 2016 • NO. 116

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