71342 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 236 / Thursday, December 9, 2004 / Rules and Regulations 

Compliance: Required as indicated, unless 

accomplished previously. 

To prevent failure of the main deck floor 

stanchions and consequent collapse of the 

main floor during an emergency landing, 

which could result in passenger injury and 

impede passenger evacuation from the 

airplane, accomplish the following: 

Replacement and Related Investigative and 

Corrective Actions and Retrofit Action 

(a) Within 18 months after the effective 

date of this AD: Replace the four tie rods for 

the waste tank cradle with new tie rods and 

do all applicable related investigative 

actions, corrective actions, and special 

retrofit actions by accomplishing all the 

actions in the Accomplishment Instructions 

of Boeing Alert Service Bulletins 767–

38A0062 (for Model 767–300 series 

airplanes) and 767–38A0063 (for Model 767–

400ER series airplanes), both dated August 

15, 2002; as applicable. Do the actions in 

accordance with the applicable service 

bulletin except as provided by paragraph (b) 

of this AD. Accomplish any related 

investigative, corrective, or special retrofit 

action before further flight. 

(b) If any deformation, crack, or other 

damage is found during any related 

investigative action required by paragraph (a) 

of this AD, and the bulletin specifies 

contacting Boeing for appropriate action: 

Before further flight, perform the special 

retrofit action per a method approved by the 

Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), FAA. For a retrofit method to be 

approved by the Manager, Seattle ACO, as 

required by this paragraph, the Manager’s 

approval letter must specifically refer to this 

AD. 

Parts Installation 

(c) As of the effective date of this AD, no 

person may install any tie rod for the waste 

tank cradle having part number 251T0100–

1401, 251T0100–1402, 251T0100–1403, or 

251T0100–1404, on any airplane to which 

this AD applies. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(d) In accordance with 14 CFR 39.19, the 

Manager, Seattle ACO, FAA, is authorized to 

approve alternative methods of compliance 

(AMOCs) for this AD. 

Incorporation by Reference 

(e) Unless otherwise specified in this AD, 

the actions shall be done in accordance with 

Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 767–38A0062, 

dated August 15, 2002; and Boeing Alert 

Service Bulletin 767–38A0063, dated August 

15, 2002; as applicable. This incorporation by 

reference was approved by the Director of the 

Federal Register in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. Copies may be 

obtained from Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 

PO Box 3707, Seattle, Washington 98124–

2207. Copies may be inspected at the FAA, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington; or at the 

National Archives and Records 

Administration (NARA). For information on 

the availability of this material at NARA, call 

(202) 741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html.

Effective Date 

(f) This amendment becomes effective on 

January 13, 2005.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

November 30, 2004. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–26917 Filed 12–8–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2004–19023; Directorate 

Identifier 2004–NM–123–AD; Amendment 

39–13899; AD 2004–25–11] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus Model 

A318, A319, A320, and A321 Series 

Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA is adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Airbus Model A318, A319, A320, and 

A321 series airplanes. This AD requires 

removing two maintenance lights in the 

hydraulics bay, disconnecting the 

wiring for the lights, and modifying the 

switches. This AD is prompted by 

underlying safety issues involved in fuel 

tank explosions on several large 

transport airplanes. We are issuing this 

AD to prevent an ignition source for fuel 

vapor in the hydraulics bay, which 

could result in fire or explosion in the 

adjacent center wing fuel tank.

DATES: This AD becomes effective 

January 13, 2005. 

The incorporation by reference of 

certain publications listed in the AD is 

approved by the Director of the Federal 

Register as of January 13, 2005.

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Airbus, 1 

Rond Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 

Blagnac Cedex, France. You can 

examine this information at the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). For information on the 

availability of this material at NARA, 

call (202) 741–6030, or go to: http://

www.archives.gov/federal_register/

code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html.

You can examine the contents of this 

AD docket on the Internet at http://

dms.dot.gov, or at the Docket 

Management Facility, U.S. Department 

of Transportation, 400 Seventh Street 

SW., room PL–401, on the plaza level of 

the Nassif Building, Washington, DC.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Technical information: Dan Rodina, 

Aerospace Engineer, International 

Branch, ANM–116, FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 

Avenue, SW., Renton, Washington 

98055–4056; telephone (425) 227–2125; 

fax (425) 227–1149. 

Plain language information: Marcia 

Walters, marcia.walters@faa.gov.

Examining the Docket 

The AD docket contains the proposed 

AD, comments, and any final 

disposition. You can examine the AD 

docket on the Internet at http://

dms.dot.gov, or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility office between 9 

a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The 

Docket Management Facility office 

(telephone (800) 647–5227) is located on 

the plaza level of the Nassif Building at 

the DOT street address stated in the 

ADDRESSES section.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The FAA 

proposed to amend 14 CFR Part 39 with 

an AD for certain Airbus Model A318, 

A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes. 

The proposed AD was published in the 

Federal Register on September 7, 2004 

(69 FR 54055), to require removing two 

maintenance lights in the hydraulics 

bay, disconnecting the wiring for the 

lights, and modifying the switches. 

Comments 

We provided the public the 

opportunity to participate in the 

development of this AD. We have 

considered the comments that have 

been submitted on the proposed AD. 

Request To Include a Terminating 

Action 

One commenter states that it has no 

objection to the proposed AD but 

requests that we revise the proposed AD 

to include a terminating action that 

includes installation of an explosionproof lighting system. 

We acknowledge the commenter’s 

request but do not concur. The 

commenter’s request did not include 

any technical information about an 

explosion-proof lighting system, nor did 

it describe the procedures associated 

with installing such a system. Further, 

we do not know of any service 

information at this time that provides 

procedures for installing this type of 

system. Once such service information 

is available and approved, we may 

consider approving a request for an 

alternative method of compliance 

Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 236 / Thursday, December 9, 2004 / Rules and Regulations 71343

(AMOC) for the requirements of this AD. 

No change has been made to the final 

rule. 

Request To Provide Option of 

Deactivating Power 

One commenter requests that we 

revise the proposed AD to include an 

option that would allow an operator to 

deactivate the power to the subject 

maintenance lights by modifying certain 

switch wiring. The commenter notes 

that this modification would reduce the 

cost of deactivating the existing lights 

and allow easier installation when 

replacement lights are available. The 

commenter states that this modification 

‘‘would equally address the unsafe 

condition.’’

We do not concur with the 

commenter’s request. The commenter 

did not provide any information on how 

it plans to modify the wiring to 

deactivate power to the subject 

maintenance lights. We may approve a 

request for an AMOC for the 

requirements of this AD if the 

commenter submits this request with 

technical data supporting its request. No 

change has been made to the final rule.

Conclusion 

We have carefully reviewed the 

available data, including the comments 

that have been submitted, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

as proposed. 

Costs of Compliance 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs for U.S. operators to 

comply with this AD.

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Parts Cost perairplane 

Number of 

U.S.-registered 

airplanes 

Fleet cost 

Remove lights, disconnect wires, and 

modify switches .................................... 3 $65 $70 $265 648 $171,720 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

The FAA’s authority to issue rules 

regarding aviation safety is found in 

Title 49 of the United States Code. 

Subtitle I, Section 106, describes the 

authority of the FAA Administrator. 

Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs 

describes in more detail the scope of the 

agency’s authority. 

This rulemaking is promulgated 

under the authority described in 

Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 

44701, ‘‘General requirements.’’ Under 

that section, the FAA is charged with 

promoting safety flight of civil aircraft 

in air commerce by prescribing 

regulations for practices, methods, and 

procedures the Administrator finds 

necessary for safety in air commerce. 

This regulation is within the scope of 

that authority because it addresses an 

unsafe condition that is likely to exist or 

develop on products identified in this 

AD. 

Regulatory Findings 

We have determined that this AD will 

not have federalism implications under 

Executive Order 13132. This AD will 

not have a substantial direct effect on 

the States, on the relationship between 

the national government and the States, 

or on the distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866; 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979); and 

(3) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

We prepared a regulatory evaluation 

of the estimated costs to comply with 

this AD. See the ADDRESSES section for 

a location to examine the regulatory 

evaluation.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

■ Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows:

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive:

2004–25–11 Airbus: Amendment 39–13899. 

Docket No. FAA–2004–19023; 

Directorate Identifier 2004–NM–123–AD. 

Effective Date 

(a) This airworthiness directive (AD) 

becomes effective January 13, 2005. 

Affected ADs 

(b) None. 

Applicability 

(c) This AD applies to Airbus Model A318, 

A319, A320, and A321 series airplanes; 

certificated in any category; except those 

airplanes on which Airbus Modification 

33518 has been accomplished in production. 

Unsafe Condition 

(d) This AD was prompted by underlying 

safety issues involved in fuel tank explosions 

on several large transport airplanes. We are 

issuing this AD to prevent an ignition source 

for fuel vapor in the hydraulics bay, which 

could result in fire or explosion in the center 

wing fuel tank. 

Compliance 

(e) You are responsible for having the 

actions required by this AD performed within 

the compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

Modification 

(f) Within 19 months after the effective 

date of this AD, remove maintenance lights 

9LL and 10LL from the hydraulics bay, 

disconnect the wiring for the lights, and 

modify the 12LL switches. Do the actions in 

accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin 

A320–92–1032, dated March 8, 2004. 

Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(g) The Manager, International Branch, 

ANM–116, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs 

for this AD, if requested in accordance with 

the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. 

Related Information 

(h) French airworthiness directive F–2004–

073, dated May 26, 2004, also addresses the 

subject of this AD. 

Material Incorporated by Reference 

(i) You must use Airbus Service Bulletin 

A320–92–1032, dated March 8, 2004, to 

perform the actions that are required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The 

71344 Federal Register / Vol. 69, No. 236 / Thursday, December 9, 2004 / Rules and Regulations 

Director of the Federal Register approves the 

incorporation by reference of this document 

in accordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR 

part 51. For copies of the service information, 

contact Airbus, 1 Rond Point Maurice 

Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac Cedex, France. For 

information on the availability of this 

material at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA), call (202) 

741–6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/

ibr_locations.html. You may view the AD 

docket at the Docket Management Facility, 

U.S. Department of Transportation, 400 

Seventh Street SW., room PL–401, Nassif 

Building, Washington, DC.

Issued in Renton, Washington, on 

November 30, 2004. 

Ali Bahrami, 

Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service.

[FR Doc. 04–26916 Filed 12–8–04; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. 98–CE–64–AD; Amendment 39–

13891; AD 2004–25–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Mooney 

Aircraft Corporation Models M20B, 

M20C, M20D, M20E, M20F, M20G, and 

M20J Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The FAA adopts a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Mooney Aircraft Corporation (Mooney) 

Models M20B, M20C, M20D, M20E, 

M20F, M20G, and M20J airplanes 

equipped with an O & N Bladder Fuel 

Cell installed per Supplemental Type 

Certificate (STC) SA2277CE or STC 

SA2350CE. The STCs apply to all the 

affected airplane models except for 

Model M20B airplanes. Model M20B 

airplanes could have one of the STCs 

incorporated by field approval. This AD 

requires you to inspect the drain valve 

to assure that it is inserted fully into the 

drain nipple and modify any drain valve 

found not to be inserted fully into the 

drain nipple. This AD also requires 

certain modifications and replacements 

on the affected fuel cells to reduce the 

chances of water/ice contamination. 

This AD is the result of reports of 

rainwater entering the fuel bladders and 

the information from the subsequent 

evaluation of the fuel systems. The 

actions specified by this AD are 

intended to assist in preventing water 

from entering the fuel bladders, which 

could result in rough engine operation 

or complete loss of engine power.

DATES: This AD becomes effective on 

January 21, 2005. 

As of January 21, 2005, the Director of 

the Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference of certain 

publications listed in the regulation.

ADDRESSES: You may get the service 

information identified in this AD from 

O & N Aircraft Modifications Inc., 210 

Windsock Lane, Seamans Airport, 

Factoryville, PA 18419; telephone: (717) 

945–3769; facsimile: (717) 945–7282. 

You may view the AD docket at FAA, 

Central Region, Office of the Regional 

Counsel, Attention: Rules Docket No. 

98–CE–64–AD, 901 Locust, Room 506, 

Kansas City, Missouri 64106. Office 

hours are 8 a.m. to 4 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Paul 

O. Pendleton, Aerospace Engineer, FAA, 

Wichita Aircraft Certification Office, 

1801 Airport Road, Room 100, MidContinent Airport, Wichita, Kansas 

67209; telephone: (316) 946–4143; 

facsimile: (316) 946–4107.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

What events have caused this AD?

The FAA has received a report of water 

being trapped in the fuel bladders on 

Mooney Models M20C, M20D, M20E, 

M20F, M20G, and M20J airplanes that 

are equipped with an O & N Bladder 

Fuel Cell installed per Supplemental 

Type Certificate (STC) SA2277CE or 

STC SA2350CE. The STCs apply to all 

of the above-referenced airplane models 

except for the Mooney Model M20B 

airplanes; the Model M20B airplanes 

could have one of the STCs 

incorporated by field approval. 

Evaluation of this problem shows that 

improper installation of the fuel bladder 

drains and fuel caps could allow 

rainwater to enter the fuel bladders if 

the fuel cap was defective. 

The evaluation also revealed 

additional installation problems and 

design deficiencies, including:

—Inadequate installation of the foam 

filler that supports the fuel bladders; 

—Inadequate engine crankcase breather 

vent and primary fuel vent ice 

protection; and 

—Fuel caps that have the sealing surface 

below the fuel tank opening.

What is the potential impact if FAA 

took no action? If not prevented, water 

entering the fuel bladders could result 

in rough engine operation or complete 

loss of engine power. 

Has FAA taken any action to this 

point? We issued a proposal to amend 

part 39 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR part 39) to include 

an AD that would apply to all Mooney 

Aircraft Corporation (Mooney) Models 

M20B, M20C, M20D, M20E, M20F, 

M20G, and M20J airplanes equipped 

with an O & N Bladder Fuel Cell 

installed per Supplemental Type 

Certificate (STC) SA2277CE or STC 

SA2350CE. This proposal was 

published in the Federal Register as a 

notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) 

on October 9, 1998 (63 FR 54401). The 

NPRM proposed to require you to 

inspect the drain valve to assure that it 

was inserted fully into the drain nipple 

and modify any drain valve found not 

fully inserted into the drain nipple. The 

NPRM also proposed to require you to 

incorporate the design changes specified 

in O & N Aircraft Modifications Inc. 

Mandatory Service Bulletin No. ON–

100, dated February 1, 1998.

Comments 

Was the public invited to comment?

We provided the public the opportunity 

to participate in developing this AD. 

The following presents the comments 

received on the proposal and FAA’s 

response to each comment: 

Comment Issue No. 1: Remove the 

Requirement To Replace the Flush 

Style Fuel Cap With a Raised Style Fuel 

Cap 

What is the commenter’s concern?

The FAA received 18 comments with 

each commenter stating that requiring 

replacement of the flush style fuel caps 

with raised style fuel caps is 

unnecessary. 

Most commenters, which are owners 

and operators of the affected model 

airplanes, state that they have never 

experienced getting a single drop of 

water in the fuel tanks with the O&N 

flush style fuel caps. Many of these 

airplanes are washed frequently with 

high-pressure hoses and are parked 

outside in the rain, sleet, and snow. 

The commenters express no problems 

with the flush style fuel caps because of 

proper maintenance and proper 

operating procedures. 

Several commenters state that all high 

performance airplanes have flush style 

fuel caps. They further comment that, if 

the FAA wants these fuel caps replaced 

on the affected Mooney airplanes 

because they pose an unsafe condition, 

then the FAA should mandate this on 

all airplanes with flush style fuel caps. 

The commenters also communicate 

that this replacement would cause a 

financial burden with no gain in safety. 

The commenters want the fuel cap 

replacement requirement removed from 

the AD.