i

Table of Contents

Executive Summary ....................................................................................iii

Introduction ................................................................................................ 1

Enhancements to Nuclear Security ............................................................. 3

Threat Assessment ..................................................................................... 7

Force-on-Force Exercises.......................................................................... 11

Power Reactor Security Baseline Inspection Program ................................ 15

Vulnerability Assessments and Mitigation Strategies .................................. 17

Spent Fuel Storage ................................................................................... 21

Spent Fuel Transportation ......................................................................... 23

Research and Test Reactors ..................................................................... 25

Enhancements to Materials Security.......................................................... 27

International Safeguards and Security ....................................................... 31

Enhancements to the Protection of Sensitive Information ........................... 37

Communications....................................................................................... 39

Emergency Preparedness and Response to Terrorist Attacks ..................... 41

Interagency Exercises ............................................................................... 45

Organizational Enhancements ................................................................... 47

Legislation ................................................................................................ 49

Conclusion ............................................................................................... 51
ii
iii

Executive Summary

Nuclear security under the oversight of the NRC is a product of the private sector working in close partnership

with Federal, State, and local authorities. Well before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC

had provided for the protection of these key parts of our national infrastructure and public safety. This report

outlines additional NRC actions to protect our Nation’s nuclear facilities against terrorist attacks. These actions

include significant reinforcement of the defense capabilities for nuclear facilities, better control of sensitive

information, and enhancements in emergency preparedness to further strengthen NRC’s nuclear facility

security programs.

Security is a priority for the NRC

For decades, nuclear power plants were well protected by physical barriers, armed guards, intrusion detection

systems, area surveillance systems, access controls, and access authorization requirements for employees

working inside the plants. In response to the September 11 attacks, NRC moved aggressively to further

enhance safety and security, and has comprehensively re-evaluated and strengthened security at nuclear

power plants and other facilities, and for radioactive material it regulates. Nuclear power plants continue to

likely be the best protected private sector facilities in the Nation.

NRC has strengthened requirements and enhanced coordination

NRC major actions since September 11, 2001 include:

I. Ordered plant owners to increase physical security to defend against a more challenging adversarial

threat;

II. Required strict site access controls for personnel;

III. Required utilities to conduct vehicle checks at greater stand-off distances;

IV. Improved liaison with Federal, State, and local agencies responsible for protection of the national critical

infrastructure through integrated response planning;
iv

V. Enhanced communication and liaison with the Intelligence Community;

VI. Improved communication between military surveillance authorities, NRC, and its licensees to prepare

power plants and to effect safe shutdown should it be necessary;

VII. Ordered plant owners to improve their capability to respond to events involving explosions or fires;

VIII. Enhanced readiness of security organizations by strengthening training and qualification programs for

plant security forces;

IX. Enhanced force-on-force exercises to provide a more realistic test of plant capabilities to defend against

an adversary force; and

X. Worked with national experts to predict the realistic consequences of terrorist attacks on nuclear facilities, including one from a large commercial aircraft. For the facilities analyzed, the results confirm that

the likelihood of both damaging the reactor core and releasing radioactivity that could affect public

health and safety is low. Even in the unlikely event of a radiological release, due to a terrorist use of a

large aircraft against a nuclear power plant, the studies indicate that there would be time to implement

the required on-site mitigating actions. These results have also validated the off-site emergency planning basis.

The NRC has enhanced emergency preparedness and response capabilities to address

the threat of terrorist attack

The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, reemphasized that emergency preparedness is a crucial

element in protecting our Nation’s critical infrastructure. Accordingly, NRC licensees have made substantial

improvements in their emergency plans and their preparedness of responders to deal with the challenges of a

terrorist attack. Nuclear power plants are required to have emergency plans that are tested on a routine basis

through exercises and drills. First responders from Federal, State, and local government agencies and plant

staff participate in these exercises.

The NRC has increased the security of radioactive materials

The NRC has long-standing regulatory programs to ensure the security of NRC-licensed radioactive material,

particularly material that could be used in an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device.

Since September 11, 2001, the NRC has required security improvements for high-risk sources and is enhancing the tracking of these sources. Moreover, the NRC is increasing controls on export and import of high-risk

sources.

The NRC has reorganized to better manage nuclear security and response

The NRC has made a number of changes in its organizational structure, facilities, personnel, and procedures

to improve oversight of security and emergency preparedness of nuclear facilities. The NRC has accomplished these changes and the enhancements to security and emergency response using existing authority.

The agency continues to propose several legislative initiatives designed to increase response capabilities of

licensees’ security organizations.
1

Introduction

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is committed to protecting the

health and safety of the public and the environment. The terrorist attacks on

September 11, 2001, reaffirmed the need for collective vigilance, the need for

enhanced security, and improved emergency preparedness and incident response

capabilities across the Nation’s critical infrastructure. As a result, the NRC has

since conducted a comprehensive review of the agency’s security programs and

made further enhancements to security at a wide range of NRC-regulated facilities.

Nuclear security, achieved through effective regulation of the industry, and strong

partnership with a variety of Federal, State, and local authorities, had been in place

for decades before the terrorist attacks occurred. Then and now, nuclear power

plants likely represent the best protected private sector facilities in the U.S.

This report describes a carefully planned, progressive approach to strengthening

the NRC’s security program to protect our Nation’s nuclear facilities and materials against terrorist attack. This progressive approach begins with voluntary

measures, then proceeds through mandatory Orders, and finally reaches fruition

through a directed ability to respond to an even greater threat. In implementing

this approach, the NRC has already undertaken a comprehensive sequence of

enhancements to bolster the security of our Nation’s nuclear facilities and radioactive materials. This report captures the highlights of these actions, but is not

intended to be an all-inclusive account of the NRC’s efforts in this area.

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
2
3

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Background

Since Congress established the NRC in 1975, the agency has recognized the

importance of security at the Nation’s sensitive nuclear facilities, including nuclear

power plants and other key nuclear facilities. Following September 11, 2001,

the NRC immediately placed nuclear power plants and other facilities at the

highest level of alert using procedures developed years before the attacks. From

NRC’s Operations Center in Rockville, Maryland, the NRC Chairman and senior

staff on an Executive Team coordinated NRC’s actions with Federal and State

authorities and NRC licensees.

The Nation’s nuclear power plants had implemented strong physical protection

programs decades before September 11, 2001. The plants were already surrounded by fences with continuously monitored perimeter detection and surveillance systems, and they were guarded by well-trained and well-armed security

forces. The plants also have redundant and diverse safety equipment so that if

any active component becomes unavailable, another component or system will

satisfy its function. In addition, plant operators had been trained to respond to

unusual events and emergencies, and each plant has carefully designed emergency plans in place.
4

Current Program and a Look Forward

A result of NRC’s past and present security program is the

successful protection of nuclear facilities. Although this program has been effective in deterring a terrorist event to date,

actions taken since September 11, 2001 both diminish the

probability of such an attack occurring at nuclear facilities and

enhance our response capabilities if one were to occur.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the

NRC conducted a thorough review of security to continue to

ensure that nuclear power plants and other licensed facilities

had robust security measures in place. In so doing, the NRC

recognized that some time would be necessary to conduct a

thorough review including threat and vulnerability assessments,

so the agency advised and required licensees to make prompt,

interim enhancements to security. These interim enhancements increased security at nuclear power plants and other

facilities with respect to physical barriers, access controls,

armed response capabilities, and emergency preparedness.

Since that time, the NRC has begun replacing those interim

enhancements with more stable and predictable requirements, which are

updated based on a periodic assessment of the current threat environment,

technology, and studies.

Orders to Enhance Security

Power Reactors - February 2002

The NRC required power reactor licensees to enhance security and improve their

capabilities to respond to a terrorist attack. These enhancements to security

included increased security patrols, augmented security forces, additional security posts, increased vehicle standoff distances, and improved coordination with

law enforcement and intelligence communities, as well as strengthened safetyrelated mitigation procedures and strategies. The NRC subsequently inspected

each facility to verify the licensee’s implementation, evaluated the inspection

findings, and when necessary, required action to address any noted deficiencies.

Access Authorization - January 2003

The NRC required licensees to enhance background investigations of persons

applying for and holding unescorted access to power reactor facilities. The NRC

also required additional oversight of employees holding or requesting unescorted

access at these facilities or who have access to sensitive security information

called “Safeguards Information.” In addition, the NRC coordinated with other

Federal agencies to enhance the background investigation process.

Access Control Terminal
5

Supplemental Requirements Related to the Design Basis Threat - April 2003

After soliciting and receiving comments from appropriate Federal, State, and

industry stakeholders, the NRC issued new requirements supplementing the

Design Basis Threats (DBTs) that provided additional details regarding specific

adversary characteristics against which power reactors and Category I fuel cycle

facilities (facilities that process nuclear weapons-grade uranium), need to protect.

While the specifics of these changes are sensitive, in general these supplements

to the existing threat result in enhancements such as increased patrols,

augmented security forces and capabilities, additional security posts, additional

physical barriers, vehicle checks at greater standoff distances, enhanced coordination with law enforcement and military authorities, augmented security and

emergency response training, equipment, and communication, and more

restrictive site access controls for personnel, including expanded, expedited, and

more thorough employee background checks.

The NRC’s DBTs address more than terrorist attacks. They include radiological

sabotage and theft or diversion of NRC-licensed material. Specifically, the DBTs

represent the largest threat against which private sector facilities must be able to

defend with high assurance. This capability is tested in Force-on-Force (FOF)

exercises described later in this report. Nuclear utilities were required to

reassess their security and contingency plans in view of these supplemental

requirements associated with the DBT. The NRC is currently reviewing the nearly

200 revised security plans submitted by licensees to address the new requirements, and expects that all plans will be reviewed and approved, and nearly all

plans implemented by October 29, 2004.

Fitness-For-Duty/Fatigue - April 2003

The increased emphasis on security in the current threat environment initially

translated into longer working hours for security force personnel. As a result,

concerns arose as to whether these longer working hours adversely affected the

performance of security personnel. In response to those concerns, the NRC

required nuclear power plant licensees to impose enforceable work-hour limits

on security force personnel and procedures to evaluate security force fatigue.

These enhancements have been in place since October 2003.

Training and Qualifications for Security Force Personnel - April 2003

The NRC issued Orders requiring nuclear power plant licensees to enhance training and qualification programs to ensure that armed security personnel are fit,

properly trained, and qualified. The Orders require enhancements that include

fitness requirements, as well as drills and exercises that will encompass defensive strategies and capabilities for the DBT and the supplemental requirements.

These enhancements are planned for implementation by October 29, 2004.
6

Radiation Source Security Programs - 2001 - 2004

Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC had modest requirements for materials licensees related to security of radioactive sources. Those

requirements were established as part of radiation safety programs. Soon after

the terrorist attacks, however, the NRC identified the need to enhance security

measures to protect against theft or sabotage of the higher-risk sources used by

industrial, medical, and research licensees. In particular, in 2002-2003, the NRC

and the U.S. Department of Energy worked together to identify the highest risk

radioactive sources that could be used to make radiological exposure devices

(REDs) and radiological dispersal devices (RDDs) or “dirty bombs.” Based on

this work, the NRC and the States are working together in identifying and ensuring the implementation of necessary additional security measures. The NRC

imposes additional temporary measures, if needed, to ensure elevated security

during periods of heightened threat levels or events of national significance. When

addressing such events, the NRC coordinates with other Federal agencies.

The NRC also imposed security enhancements on panoramic irradiator licensees

in June 2003, and imposed security enhancements on manufacturers and

distributors of high-risk sources in January 2004. Panoramic irradiators are primarily used for sterilizing and disinfesting medical, food, and industrial products.

Manufacturers and distributors make the sealed sources from bulk radioactive

material and transfer them to licensees for medical and industrial applications.

The NRC will continue to review our programs to ensure that the security requirements imposed on the Nation’s nuclear power plants and other agency-licensed

nuclear facilities, as well as those related to radioactive sources, protect the public health and safety, common defense and security, and the environment.

Other Facilities - 2002-2004

The NRC also imposed enhanced security requirements on other nuclear and

radioactive material facilities. These included Category I fuel cycle facilities,

gaseous diffusion plants (GDPs), a uranium

conversion facility, facilities that process low

enriched uranium (commonly known as

Category III fuel cycle facilities), decommissioning reactors, independent spent fuel

storage installations (ISFSIs), high-risk

radioactive sources, spent fuel transportation, and research and test reactors.

Typical Fuel Fabrication Process

Incoming

UF6 Cylinders

UF6 Vaporization UO2 Powder

Production

Powder Processing/

Pellet Manufacturing

Fuel Rod/

Bundle Assembly/

Quality Check

Transport to

Nuclear Reactors

Uranium Recovery Waste Treatment
7

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Threat Assessment

Background

The NRC has systematically assessed threats to licensed nuclear facilities and

activities since the 1970s to provide indications and warnings of potential attacks

or other malevolent activities. To communicate threat information rapidly to licensees and response agencies, the NRC developed the Threat Advisory System,

which has been in use since the mid-1980s. Advisories are non-public, rapid

communications from the NRC to our licensees that provide information obtained

from the Intelligence Community or law enforcement agencies on changes to the

threat environment. Advisories also include guidance for licensees to promptly

take specific actions to strengthen their capabilities to defend against the threat.

Although advisories are not legally binding, they are effective in quickly conveying important information to large numbers of licensees. They are tailored to

categories of licensees including power reactors, non-power reactors, fuel facilities, decommissioning reactors, independent spent fuel storage installations,

gaseous diffusion plants, and materials licensees.

The NRC expanded the Threat Advisory System after the September 11 terrorist

attacks to include a broader range of licensees. In addition, the NRC has incorporated the threat condition levels used in the Homeland Security Advisory

System (HSAS), administered by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) into the NRC’s Threat Advisory System. The NRC threat assessment staff
8

reviews, analyzes, coordinates, and disseminates threat and intelligence information, at both strategic and tactical levels, with respect to the U.S. civilian nuclear

sector. Threat assessment staff also serves as the NRC’s liaison and coordination

staff with other organizations and agencies, such as those within the intelligence

and law enforcement communities.

Current Program and a Look Forward

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a

comprehensive review of the domestic and international threat environment and

worked with intelligence and law enforcement agencies to provide the analytical

basis for supplemental requirements associated with the DBT, which the agency

issued in April 2003. The NRC staff continues to assess the threat environment

and coordinate with the intelligence and law enforcement agencies, including

DHS. The staff formally reports to the Commission semi-annually concerning the

threat environment and reviews and recommends, for Commission consideration,

potential changes to the DBTs.

The NRC staff also performed a systematic review of existing safeguards and

security programs, including the DBTs. The Commission’s initial consideration of

the enhanced threat characteristics was reflected in specific enhancements to

security required in the interim compensatory measures for power reactors in

February 2002 and Category I fuel facilities in August 2002. Subsequently, the

staff provided the Commission with two comprehensive assessments of the threat

environment and possible adversary attributes for consideration based on review

of relevant intelligence and law enforcement information, as well as interagency

discussion. During this time, the staff also participated in the working group that

developed the U.S. Departments of Energy and Defense (DOE and DoD, respectively) Postulated Threat. Although not intended to apply to the commercial nuclear

sector, the Postulated Threat provided analytical insights to be considered for

application to NRC licensed facilities. The staff also coordinated with the DOE to

ensure clear understanding of each agency’s DBTs and security measures for

comparable activities.

The NRC held several meetings regarding supplementary requirements related

to the DBT with authorized stakeholders including Federal and State authorities

and industry representatives. In April 2003, the NRC issued Orders providing the

supplemental requirements related to the DBTs to the power reactors and the

Category I Fuel facilities. The NRC then reinstated the semi-annual reviews of the

DBTs to ensure their continuing validity.

In addition, threat assessment is a key function of NRC’s Information Assessment

Team (IAT), which is staffed by threat and security specialists at the agency’s

headquarters and regional offices. The IAT serves as the agency focal point for

initial threat and security incident assessment within the NRC. Through the IAT,

the NRC ensures that licensees and Federal, State, and local authorities promptly
9

receive and respond to threat and security information. For example, as a result

of security incidents and changes in the threat levels established through the

HSAS, the NRC has issued numerous Advisories to licensees informing them of

changes in the threat environment since September 11, 2001.

In addition to the enhanced information exchange with law enforcement and

intelligence agencies, the NRC has increased its ability to communicate that information to those who need to know through a program of granting clearances to a

limited number of industry personnel, as well as an increase in secure communications equipment for the NRC. This program, along with increased coordination with

other agencies, has given the NRC the ability to communicate classified threat information in real time to agency licensees if the need should arise.

The threat assessment staff exchanges terrorism and threat information with law

enforcement and intelligence communities including the DHS, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and others. The NRC will continue to review

intelligence and threat reporting to recommend any appropriate modifications to

the DBTs. In addition, the NRC works closely with other Federal agencies and

the Intelligence Community to ensure that the current threat environment and

adversary characteristics are reflected in required security measures to protect

the public.
10
11

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Force-on-Force

Exercises

Background

The NRC initiated the Force-on-Force (FOF) exercise program in the early 1980s

as a means to confirm the adequacy of licensee security programs in response to

NRC regulatory requirements. The purpose is to evaluate the effectiveness of

the licensees’ security plans against a series of attack scenarios by a simulated

commando-style mock adversary force seeking to exploit potential deficiencies

in the plant’s defensive strategy. The adversary force attempts to reach and

destroy enough safety equipment to set in motion an accident that would

damage the reactor’s core or spent fuel pool and potentially cause a release

of radiation to the environment. The nuclear power plant’s security force, in

turn, seeks to interdict the adversary force and prevent them from reaching the

safety equipment.

Prior to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a FOF

exercise at each reactor site approximately once every eight years. In the wake of

the terrorist attacks, however, the Commission temporarily suspended the FOF

evaluations at nuclear power plants and Category I fuel cycle facilities.
12

The Commission’s primary concern was that conducting

such exercises would have significantly distracted the licensees’ security forces and the NRC staff during a time

when licensees needed to focus on implementing the NRC’s

highest level of alert, as well as numerous security upgrades.

The Commission subsequently resumed the FOF exercise

program in February 2003.

Current Program and a Look Forward

Since September 11, 2001, the NRC has issued supplemental requirements related to the DBT, which required

licensees to enhance security. As a result, the agency has

expanded its FOF program to reflect these changes and

make the exercises more realistic, while ensuring the safety

of both plant employees and the public. These changes

have significantly increased the level of complexity for each

exercise in terms of planning, preparation, and logistical

support. In February 2003, the NRC initiated pilot FOF exercises that included

additional participants and weaponry, more complex tactical approaches and

defensive strategies, increased attention on the adversaries approach to the plant

perimeter, and state-of-the-art exercise equipment. These enhancements have

increased the realism associated with FOF exercises.

In 2003, the NRC conducted expanded FOF pilot exercises at 15 commercial

nuclear power reactors with a variety of designs, locations, and size characteristics. This increased frequency of FOF exercises reflects the Commission’s decision to conduct such exercises in the future at least once every three years at

each site. The staff has also revised the exercise program to incorporate lessons

learned and is now in transition to fully implement the expanded program in

November 2004. The staff is conducting the transitional FOF exercise program

at a pace of approximately two exercises per month, which will enable the staff to

complete an additional 16 exercises by October 29, 2004. Ultimately, the revised

program will test the licensee’s response and evaluate the conduct and control of

the exercises, equipment, and the adversary force.

As one of the ongoing enhancements to improve the realism of FOF exercises,

the NRC is incorporating Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES)

equipment into the exercises. When used properly and with sufficient training,

MILES equipment (mock weaponry) provides a much greater degree of realism

and reduces many artificialities of simulated combat. NRC also revised its

guidance by requiring that licensee-provided MILES equipment meet appropriate

use standards. The use of MILES during the expanded FOF pilot successfully

contributed to pilot program results.
13

A credible, well-trained, and consistent mock adversary force is vital to the

overall success of the NRC’s FOF exercise program. To date, licensees have

assembled adversary teams from a variety of sources including security officers

from their own sites, other licensees, and State police tactical team members.

However, these diverse sources gave rise to inconsistencies in the adversary

team capabilities, training, and knowledge. In response, NRC interacted with

the industry to develop a composite adversary force, which would be trained to

standards issued by the Commission. The adversary force for all FOF exercises

conducted after October 2004 will be drawn from this composite force.
14
15

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Power Reactor

Security Baseline

Inspection Program

Background

Prior to the attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC conducted a Baseline

Inspection Program for power reactors as part of the agency’s Reactor Oversight

Program. Through a sampling of licensees’ security activities, the NRC

assessed whether each licensee’s security program complied with requirements

and provided adequate protection against the DBT for radiological sabotage. The

security oversight program focused on four key areas, which are: (1) access

authorization, (2) access control, (3) response to contingency events, and

(4) security plan changes. The NRC also conducted similar oversight programs

for other significant nuclear facilities that had security programs, including

Category I fuel cycle facilities and reactors undergoing decommissioning.

Current Program and a Look Forward

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC enhanced both

security requirements and the level of security oversight. The NRC also revised
16

the Baseline Inspection Program for nuclear power reactors and is making comparable changes to oversight programs for other nuclear facilities. The NRC has

confirmed effective implementation of the interim security enhancements at nuclear

power plants and has begun the revised Baseline Security Inspection Program.

Security inspection oversight has increased significantly since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. In 2000, approximately 40 staff weeks of direct

inspection effort were spent on security inspections (excluding FOF exercises) for

nuclear power reactors. By 2003, this inspection effort had increased to 205

staff weeks - more than five times the effort expended annually before the terrorist attacks. The NRC also implemented a Management Review Panel to ensure

that inspection findings and potential violations are treated in a consistent and

appropriate manner, which is especially important during this transition period.

As a result, NRC’s inspection program remains an essential element for ensuring

that the licensees have made the necessary enhancements to their security

programs and are responsive to changes in threat levels.

Drawing on insights gained during the inspections conducted from 2001 to 2003,

the NRC revised and implemented the baseline inspection program in February

2004. The new program includes: Access Authorization; Access Controls; Security Plan Changes; Contingency Response - FOF Testing (conducted by licensees

as part of the enhanced training program ordered by NRC); Equipment Performance, Testing and Maintenance; Protective Strategy and Evaluation, Security

Training, the Fitness for Duty Program; Owner Controlled Area Controls; Information

Technology Security; Material Control and Accountability; and Physical Protection of

Shipments of spent nuclear fuel. The inspection oversight program will continue to

evolve as a result of ongoing studies and experience with the program.
17

Vulnerability

Assessments

and Mitigation

Strategies

Background

A Vulnerability Assessment (VA) is a systematic evaluation in which qualitative

and quantitative techniques are applied to determine potential vulnerabilities to

radiological sabotage, theft or diversion of radioactive material. As such, VAs can

be used to identify effective countermeasures or mitigating measures to protect

specific targets. The NRC is also using the VA’s results to confirm the effectiveness of the mitigative strategies that the Commission ordered in February 2002

for nuclear power plants. In addition, the assessments are used to develop additional mitigating measures for licensees to implement and to assist national

efforts to enhance infrastructure protection. NRC’s efforts related to radioactive

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
18

materials, transportation, and storage in spent fuel casks are

described in the other sections of this report.

From a structural point of view, nuclear power plants are designed

to protect against such external events as tornados, hurricanes,

fires, and floods. By the same token, these same structural features, supported by the deployment of effective and visible physical protection measures, are powerful deterrents to any terrorist

activities. Additionally, the emergency procedures and severe

accident management strategies developed for reactor accidents

also provide means for mitigating the potential consequences of

terrorist attacks should they occur.

The NRC conducted vulnerability assessments for some operating

nuclear power plants and spent fuel pools in the 1970s and 1980s

to establish the technical basis for security requirements. The staff

also routinely evaluated the potential impacts of terrorist attacks on

power reactors as part of the FOF exercise program on a plant-by-plant basis. In

addition, as a result of increasing concerns about the threat and vulnerability of

nuclear facilities to the threat of computer attacks, the NRC initiated some cybersecurity assessments in the late 1990s. At that time there was no consideration

given to conducting VAs of an intentional aircraft attack at a nuclear power plant,

although some evaluations of accidental crashes were completed during the

licensing of nuclear power plants located relatively close to airports. The risk of

accidental aircraft crashes into spent fuel pool structures has been similarly evaluated.

Current Program and a Look Forward

After the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly assessed

the potential for and consequences of terrorists targeting a nuclear power plant

for aircraft attack, the physical effects of such a strike, and compounding factors

such as meteorology that would affect the impact of potential radioactive releases.

As a result of these preliminary assessments, the NRC required that nuclear power

plant licensees implement interim enhancements to mitigate potential consequences in the unlikely event of a successful attack on a nuclear power plant.

As part of a comprehensive review of security for NRC-licensed facilities, the NRC

conducted detailed site-specific engineering studies of a limited number of nuclear

power plants to assess potential vulnerabilities of deliberate attacks involving large

commercial aircraft. In conducting these studies, the NRC drew on national

experts from several DOE laboratories using state-of-the-art structural and fire

analyses. The agency also enhanced its ability to predict accident progression

and radiological consequences realistically. For the facilities analyzed, the vulnerability studies confirm that the likelihood of both damaging the reactor core

and releasing radioactivity that could affect public health and safety is low. Even

in the unlikely event of a radiological release due to terrorist use of a large aircraft,
19

there would be time to implement mitigating actions and offsite emergency

plans such that the NRC’s emergency planning basis remains valid. Additional

site-specific studies of operating nuclear power plants are underway or being

planned to determine the need, if any, for additional mitigating capability on a

site-specific basis.

The NRC has also collaborated closely with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) with

respect to the Maritime Transportation Security Act and associated waterborne

VAs. The NRC’s continuing interaction with the USCG includes developing Area

Maritime Security Plans, participation in the USCG Underwater Assault Working

Group, and developing an agreement with the USCG in this area. Further, the

NRC will continue interacting with DHS with respect to additional barriers against

waterborne threats for nuclear power plants and analyses of critical infrastructure protection. The NRC is also extensively involved in industry and government

interagency working groups to identify technologies that may prove beneficial for

securing the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

Further NRC VA efforts will be directed to confirm and extrapolate results as

needed. Additional studies will focus on power reactor facilities and spent fuel

pools to further develop mitigation measures at specific sites. Land-based

assault VA methodologies are also planned for use by the NRC and licensee

security staff to design more sophisticated physical protection systems than are

in place today.
20
21

Spent Fuel Storage

Background

Prior to 1976, national policy called for reprocessing spent nuclear fuel after

a short cooling period. Therefore, the Nation’s nuclear power plants were only

designed to hold a limited amount of spent nuclear fuel within each spent fuel

pool (wet storage). As a result of changes in the national non-proliferation policy

in the 1970s, the industry suspended reprocessing in favor of storing spent fuel

at the power reactor sites and ultimately disposing of the fuel in a geological

repository. However, delays in the development of the repository led to greater

amounts of spent fuel requiring onsite storage.

Consequently, the industry made modifications to increase the capacity of the

spent fuel pools (“reracking”). In addition, beginning in the early 1980s, the

nuclear power industry requested NRC approval to store spent fuel onsite in dry

storage. One solution was to use dry storage casks in an independent spent fuel

storage installation (ISFSI). The casks themselves are very robust massive concrete and/or steel structures. The NRC has required the ISFSIs to have security

systems to protect against unauthorized access to the spent fuel. In addition, the

NRC conducted several classified studies evaluating the robustness of spent fuel

storage casks to bulk explosives and shaped charges to evaluate their potential

vulnerability to ground assaults.

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
22

Current Program and a Look Forward

Consistent with the approach taken at other categories of nuclear facilities, the

NRC responded to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, by promptly

developing and requiring security enhancements for both spent fuel storage in

spent fuel pools and dry casks. The NRC also worked with the industry to develop

guidance to ensure that the security enhancements provided adequate protection in the current threat environment until NRC completed more systematic assessments of potential vulnerabilities and mitigating measures.

In parallel with these efforts, the NRC initiated vulnerability assessments for spent

fuel storage in casks at ISFSIs. The assessments specifically evaluate two different threat scenarios: a large aircraft impact similar in magnitude to the attacks on

September 11, 2001, and ground assaults using expanded adversary characteristics consistent with the DBT for radiological sabotage. Because several cask

designs are currently in use, the assessment has been conducted for several

casks.

The staff chose four storage cask designs currently licensed by the NRC to evaluate their strength when struck by a large aircraft. These evaluations include

structural analyses of the aircraft impact into a single cask and the resulting caskto-cask interactions. Thermal evaluations were performed to estimate the effect of

the jet fuel fire on the casks. Those evaluations indicate that it is highly unlikely

that a significant release of radioactivity would occur from an aircraft impact on a dry

spent fuel storage cask.
23

Spent Fuel

Transportation

Background

Of the more than 290 million shipments of hazardous material in the U.S. each

year, approximately 3 million shipments involve radioactive material. Of these

3 million shipments, fewer than 50 involve shipments of spent nuclear fuel. These

shipments typically move by road, rail, or water, because of the heavier weight of

these packages. Packages used to ship commercial spent nuclear fuel are robust

structures that typically weigh 125 tons or more. For decades, the NRC has

required that such packages must withstand different types of accidents, including dropping, puncturing, flooding, and fire, to ensure protection of the public

health and safety. The associated security measures for spent nuclear fuel

transportation complement the safety controls. The NRC requires that licensees

and carriers involved in these shipments follow only approved routes, provide

armed escorts, immobilization devices, redundant communications, and

advance notifications of shipments to the NRC and States through which the

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
24

shipments pass. The NRC established these measures using a graded approach

which reflected the differing risks posed by the various material being shipped,

and were based on an earlier study evaluating the potential vulnerability of radioactive

material transportation packages to various terrorist weapons and explosives.

Current Program and a Look Forward

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC issued

multiple safeguards advisories to enhance the security of spent fuel transportation and shipments of large quantities of radioactive material. These advisories

recommended that licensees implement additional security measures during shipments, including enhanced preplanning and

coordination with the affected States, additional advance notification of shipments, enhanced control and monitoring of shipments

enroute, trustworthiness checks for individuals who have access

to the shipment or to information about the shipment, and

enhanced information security measures for shipment routes and

schedules. Licensees fully adhered to these advisories. In addition, the NRC required enhanced security measures for spent fuel

shipments from power reactors as well as research and test reactors beginning in 2002.

The NRC has also adjusted the security measures for shipments to

reflect changes in the HSAS threat level. For example, during

a period of heightened security in March 2003, the NRC issued

advisories suspending spent nuclear fuel shipments and requesting that licensees defer large shipments of radioactive material,

unless the shipments supported medical treatments for life-threatening conditions or were necessary for national security. The NRC also worked with other

Federal agencies, State authorities and industry to clarify what shipments met

these categories and identify those that could be resumed.

The NRC has also supported efforts by the DHS Bureau of Customs and Border

Protection (CBP) and the USCG to begin advance electronic notifications of

dangerous goods crossing U.S. borders and to implement regulations concerning

port and facility security. Additionally, the NRC now collects and shares information on shipments of large quantities of radioactive material with the CBP National

Targeting Center.

In parallel with these enhancements, the NRC has assessed the potential vulnerabilities and mitigating strategies for a spent fuel rail transportation package

design, a spent fuel truck package design, and six radioactive material package

designs. The NRC evaluated the response of the various packages to ground

assault tactics consistent with the radiological sabotage DBT, including a range of

explosive threats.
25

Research and

Test Reactors

Background

Compared to power reactors, research and test reactors pose significantly less

risk of radiological exposure to the public. Consequently, NRC has historically

tailored the security requirements and oversight consistent with those lower risks.

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC promptly

advised research and test reactor licensees to implement the highest level of

security to protect against radiological sabotage and theft of certain nuclear fuel.

NRC also advised research and test reactor operators to consider taking certain

additional security measures. The NRC then verified that appropriate security

measures were in place to protect research and test reactor facilities from theft

or sabotage.

Current Program and a Look Forward

The NRC is continuing to work with the research and test reactor community to

further improve security and evaluate whether such facilities have vulnerabilities

that warrant additional preventive or mitigating measures. Two main factors are

considered in establishing the additional security measures for research and test

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
26

reactors. First, the generally small radioactive inventory and low potential radiological consequences associated with research and test reactors make it unlikely

that a terrorist attack could compromise public health and safety by causing

radiation exposure. Second, each licensee is implementing site-specific security

plans because each research and test reactor facility is unique in design, operation, use, location, and other important characteristics. The NRC’s requirements

for security measures at research and test reactors are graded to account for the

size of each reactor. In August 2002, the NRC provided guidance on protective

measures that are appropriate for the different threat conditions (action levels)

corresponding to the HSAS.

The NRC is also working with licensees and DOE to evaluate steps to reduce the

inventories of reactor fuel, including fuel containing high enriched uranium, at

research and test reactors. The NRC continues to work with DOE, licensees, and

State and local authorities to ensure that any transportation of spent nuclear fuel

to and from research and test reactors is performed safely and securely.
27

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Enhancements to

Materials Security

Background

The NRC has longstanding regulatory programs to ensure the security of NRClicensed radioactive materials. These programs provide the greatest protection

to special nuclear material which, if stolen, could be used in an improvised nuclear

explosive device. As a result, the NRC requires licensees to apply a graded level

of physical protection and material control and accounting, depending on the

relative potential consequences posed by the given radioactive material.

Another important responsibility involves ensuring the security of radioactive

materials that the NRC licenses for medical, academic, and industrial uses. There

are millions of radioactive sources in the U.S., with approximately 21,000

specific licensees, and many thousands of general licensees who possess and

use radioactive sources of various types and quantities. Nonetheless, only a

small fraction (fewer than 10 percent) of the licensed materials poses a significant terrorist target for malevolent use in a Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD)

or Radiological Exposure Device (RED), a device that could covertly expose

individuals to a large and potentially lethal dose of radiation. The NRC also works

with Agreement States, which administer regulatory programs to ensure the safety

of radioactive materials that are used for medical, industrial, and academic

purposes within their respective States.
28

Current Program and a Look Forward

Shortly after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC recognized

the elevated threat to radioactive sources and issued numerous advisories to

licensees in possession of large sources of radioactive material that might be

attractive to terrorists for use in RDDs or REDs. Those advisories identified practical measures to enhance security against terrorist threats and were intended to

augment existing security programs that had been geared more to radiation protection. In 2002, the Commission and the Secretary of Energy convened an

NRC-DOE working group to evaluate and identify measures to enhance the security

of radioactive sources. That effort culminated with the publication of a joint

report that identified the most attractive radioactive sources (“high-risk” sources)

and measures that should be taken to increase their security, including prompt

dispositioning of unwanted sources and enhanced tracking of high-risk sources.

This report was published in 2003 and is entitled, Radiological Dispersal

Devices: An Initial Study to Identify Radioactive Material of Greatest Concern and

Approaches to Their Tracking, Tagging, and Disposition.

The joint NRC-DOE report also provided the foundation for systematically evaluating upgrades to the security of high-risk sources. As a result, the NRC’s overall

approach focuses on radioactive materials that pose the greatest concern if used

in an RDD or RED. To accomplish that, the NRC is working to ensure that such

attacks are prevented by identifying, adequately securing, and appropriately monitoring radioactive materials of greatest concern. The NRC is assisting response

organizations in their preparation for a potential RDD attack to limit consequences

of events. In addition, the NRC is working with international and domestic organizations to address RDD issues in an integrated, consistent manner through

communication and coordination. More detailed information on that project is

presented in the “International Safeguards and Security” section in this report.

Working with State radiation control programs, the NRC has required materials

licensees to enhance security for panoramic irradiators (June 2003) and manufacturers and distributors of high-risk radioactive sources (January 2004). The

NRC is also currently developing security enhancements for other lower-risk

radioactive sources. The NRC expects to complete these enhancements by the

end of 2004. In addition, the NRC and the States are using the results of ongoing

VAs to identify and assess the need for mitigating measures and controls for other

categories of licensees who possess high-risk sources. The NRC issues advisories to licensees during periods of heightened threat, and licensees implement

security enhancements, shipping schedule changes, or other measures as needed

to ensure the continued safety of the public.

The NRC, DOE, and the States are also developing a national source tracking

system. The NRC, with DOE, other Federal agencies, and States, have also accelerated the collection of unwanted radioactive sources. The National Nuclear
29

Security Administration’s Offsite Source Recovery Program is playing a vital role

in identifying, collecting, and disposing of stolen, lost, and orphaned radiological

sources that are no longer wanted or have exceeded their useful life. More than

5000 radioactive sources have been recovered in the past 20 months. The DOE

also has a program to recover orphan sources overseas.

The NRC and its licensees also have taken steps to increase the security of

export/import controls for high-risk sources, and the NRC is currently evaluating

alternative forms of radioactive materials that may reduce their attractiveness for

use in an RDD. The NRC has also coordinated

with international and domestic partners to discuss

possible methods to make high-risk sources less

vulnerable to malevolent use. In addition, NRC

staff representatives have also actively participated

in international arenas to enhance source security

worldwide. Additional information on international

source security is presented in the “International

Safeguards and Security” section in this report.

The NRC is reviewing the existing Material Control

and Accounting (MC&A) program to provide a fresh

and objective assessment of current NRC regulations and practices in this area, including inspection programs for nuclear material licensees. The

review includes technical assessments of the

adequacy of existing controls, along with interviews

with current and former NRC staff who are

knowledgeable in the MC&A area, and visits to

representative nuclear facilities to examine current

controls and practices. The NRC staff recommendations resulting from the review will be submitted

to the Commission in 2005.

The NRC is also working with DOE to upgrade the Nuclear Material Management

and Safeguards System (NMMSS), which was developed and implemented

decades ago to track transfers and inventories of special nuclear material, source

material from abroad, and other material. Approximately 180 NRC-licensed facilities are authorized to possess plutonium and enriched uranium in quantities

ranging from a kilogram to multiple tons. These licensees verify and document

their inventories in the NMMSS database. There are several hundred additional

sites licensed by the NRC or State governments that possess plutonium and

enriched uranium in smaller quantities typically ranging from a gram to tens

of grams. The NRC is currently working with these licensees to confirm the

accuracy of inventories to provide increased confidence in the location and quantity

of plutonium and enriched uranium held by NRC and Agreement State licensees.

Commercial Gamma Irradiator

Conveyor

System

Radiation Shield

Unloading

Processed

Product

Control

Console

Irradiation

Room

Loading

Radiation Source

Storage

Pool
30

In addition, consistent with the systematic review of agency security programs,

the NRC has undertaken a series of assessments of potential vulnerabilities and

mitigating strategies for materials licensees. Through these facility- or materialspecific VAs, the staff is examining potential consequences beyond those that are

already evaluated in the licensing process or that could result from the loss of control

of radioactive material. Vulnerabilities of structures, process and protective systems,

security operations and physical protection systems, information systems, MC&A

systems, and access control systems vulnerabilities are being assessed, as applicable. Ultimately, the staff will integrate the results of individual VAs into one

risk-informed VA for materials licensees to support decisions about protective

strategies for each type of facility. In addition, the staff is also developing

recommendations for regulatory enhancements based on this integrated riskinformed approach for materials licensees.
31

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

International

Safeguards and

Security

Code of Conduct on the Safety and

Security of Radiological Sources

Background

Before the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the use and international

commerce of radiological sources (other than radiological sources with special

nuclear material or source material) was of concern primarily from a health and

safety perspective. The NRC authorized exports and imports of sealed sources

and bulk material under a general license. Beginning in 2000, the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Member States began the development of a Code of

Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources (the Code of Conduct).
32

Current Program and a Look Forward

Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (as amended) and the Energy Reorganization Act, the NRC is the U.S. competent authority for regulating radioactive

material associated with sealed sources. Except for naturally occurring radioactive material and material under the control of DOE, the NRC has the authority

within the U.S. to regulate all aspects related to radioactive sealed sources,

including issuing general or specific licenses to receive title to, own, acquire,

deliver, receive, possess, use, export, import or transfer such material.

Together with DOE and the U.S. Department of State (DOS), the NRC has worked

with the international community to define the radionuclides of concern and action levels for those radionuclides that represent the highest risk for potential

malevolent use by a terrorist. Toward that end, the NRC worked to define highrisk radioactive sources to ensure consistency between domestic and international programs as described by the IAEA in its draft TECDOC-1344, which provides the supporting technical basis for IAEA’s Code of Conduct on the Safety and

Security of Radioactive Sources. The revised text of the non-legally binding Code

of Conduct was approved by the IAEA Board of Governors and endorsed by the

General Conference in September 2003 (GC(47)/RES/7.B), and published as IAEA/

CODEOC/2004 in January 2004.

In April 2004, representatives on the Nuclear Safety and Security Working Group

of the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized nations met to discuss the guidance

document associated with implementing the export/import provisions of the Code

of Conduct. The U.S. Government, as president of the G-8 in 2004, was able to

obtain G-8 consensus on both a revised text and a commitment of support to

implement the Code and its guidance after December 2005. The NRC continued

in its national Federal leadership role on security of radioactive sources in the

U.S. in its endorsement of the Code of Conduct, which marks the culmination of

developments and efforts spanning the past several years of increased international consensus regarding the strengthening of controls on radioactive sources.

The guidance developed at the G-8 Summit will be considered for approval by the

IAEA Board of Governors in September 2004.

In late 2003, the NRC staff coordinated with international and domestic partners

to discuss with manufacturers of radioactive sources and devices possible methods that would make high-risk radioactive sources more secure and less vulnerable to dispersion or dismantling by persons with malicious intent. In addition,

NRC representatives met with manufacturers to discuss improved methods of

validating legitimate purchases of radioactive sources and ensuring that such

sources are only distributed to authorized users who are operating within an

appropriate regulatory regime. Discussions also raised concern regarding

arrangements for ensuring appropriate return or disposal of spent sources and

developing a Code of Practice for manufacturers and suppliers, to define their

roles and responsibilities during the life cycle of high-risk sources.
33

The NRC staff also continues to take the lead in the technical and legal arena

to further develop internationally harmonized guidance for implementing the

recommendations of the Code of Conduct in relation to the import and export of

the highest-risk radioactive sources listed in Categories 1 and 2 of the Annex to

the Code. This guidance is designed to not impede international cooperation or

commerce, as long as such cooperation and commerce does not contribute to

the use of such sources for purposes that threaten safety and security.

The NRC is currently pursuing regulatory improvements in alignment with the

Code of Conduct. These improvements include developing a national source

registry and revising the requirements for the import and export of byproduct

material. The NRC has already developed an interim database of current source

inventories, which is substantially complete.

In addition, the Commission has approved a proposed rule regarding enhanced

controls over the import and export of high-risk sources. Unlike the Code of

Conduct, the NRC’s proposed rule includes bulk material as well as sealed sources.

The Commission intends to have a final rule issued by the end of 2004, and

licensees will then have six months to come into compliance. Whereas such

byproduct material was previously imported and exported under general licenses,

under the new rule licensees will be required to apply for specific licenses, and

will have to document that the end user is authorized to possess the material.

Licensees will also have to provide prior notice of shipments. For the export of

high-risk sources, the NRC, drawing on information from DOS and the IAEA, will

have to assess and make a determination whether the importing country’s

regulatory infrastructure is adequate to maintain continuous control over the

material. (In cases of import of high risk sources, the NRC will provide the needed

consent.) In countries without adequate regulatory controls, the Code of

Conduct provides for “exceptional circumstances” under which high-risk sources

can be exported with additional conditions imposed on the licensee.

International Safeguards

Background

The NRC conducts international safeguards activities to demonstrate the U.S.

commitment to nonproliferation of nuclear materials, and to strengthen the IAEA’s

capability to verify a State’s commitments on the peaceful use of nuclear materials and to prevent the spread of nuclear explosives capability. The NRC supports

the strengthening of the IAEA safeguards program through participation in interagency groups as well as in activities directly supporting the IAEA.

Current Program and Look Forward

NRC’s involvement in the IAEA’s international safeguards and nonproliferation

activities are implemented through cooperative technical work with other Federal

IAEA Headquarters located in

Vienna, Austria
34

agencies, other countries, and the IAEA. The following NRC activities support the

IAEA safeguards program:

• Implementation of US-IAEA Safeguards Agreement through monthly IAEA

safeguards inspections, which are conducted at a high-enriched uranium

downblending facility. Similar inspections are also planned in the near future

for centrifuge enrichment facilities. The U.S. demonstration of commitment

to IAEA safeguards for these proliferation-sensitive facilities will support

the IAEA’s efforts to implement safeguards in similar facilities in countries of

concern.

• Implementation of the Additional Protocol to U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement, for which the U.S. Senate provided its consent for ratification in March

2004. Approximately 90 countries have signed Additional Protocols and

approximately 60 have brought them into force. Bringing the U.S. Additional

Protocols into force is important to demonstrate our commitment to strengthened IAEA safeguards and to strengthen the IAEA’s and U.S.’s ability to

encourage other countries to bring Additional Protocols into force.

• Participation in interagency technical efforts to strengthen IAEA safeguards

and integrate the new measures into the IAEA safeguards system. The U.S.

Subcommittee on International Safeguards and Monitoring develops and facilitates U.S. policy on IAEA safeguards and related nonproliferation issues

and meets with the IAEA and other governments to coordinate U.S. Government policy and implementation activities. Bilateral meetings are held with

U.S. allies to coordinate policy positions and approaches for strengthening

IAEA safeguards. The meetings provide a forum for the U.S. to espouse new

policy initiatives, such as the President’s Initiative for Combating Proliferation

of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as well as coordinating on policy issues

before the IAEA Board of Governors, sharing experiences with implementing

IAEA safeguards, coordinating technical support tasks, and providing results

of U.S. technical evaluations on issues.

International Physical Protection

Background

Since 1998, the U.S. has led an effort to revise the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) to strengthen obligations for the physical

protection of nuclear material in domestic use, storage, and transport, and for the

protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities from sabotage. Physical protection bilateral visits are conducted by NRC staff as part of a U.S. interagency

team with those countries possessing nuclear materials carrying U.S. obligations.

The NRC also hosts meetings and tours to demonstrate U.S. physical protection

practices. In addition, NRC participates on International Physical Protection Ad-
35

visory Service (IPPAS) missions to assist countries in strengthening the effectiveness of their national physical protection system. Furthermore, the NRC consults with the nuclear regulators in the former Soviet Union countries to improve

capabilities to assure the effective control and protection of nuclear materials.

Current Program and Look Forward

In March 2003, international legal and technical experts met at IAEA and drafted

possible amendments to the CPPNM, but further consultations are needed

to identify a proposal that could serve as a basis for convening a successful

diplomatic conference. NRC plans to continue its participation in this activity.

NRC participates in four to five physical protection visits to other countries per

year to review the protection of U.S.-obligated nuclear materials. Also, NRC

routinely supports one IPPAS mission per year. Assistance to the former Soviet

Union republics is conducted in coordination with DOE.

Export License Reviews and

Cooperation Agreements

Background

The Atomic Energy Act requires NRC to review export license applications for

compliance with the international safeguards and physical protection license

conditions. Also, to maintain compliance with Agreements for Nuclear Cooperation with other countries, NRC is required to verify that the U.S. facility importing

nuclear material is prepared to effectively protect the material, verify the tamperindicating devices on containers, and maintain material accountancy

information on the nuclear material.

Current Program and Look Forward

NRC reviews facilities receiving imports and exports of nuclear materials to ensure that the materials will be effectively protected against a subnational theft or

diversion event and to ensure that the IAEA could detect diversion of the U.S.-

obligated nuclear material from peaceful uses. The loss of control of nuclear

materials in international commerce could have potential impacts to the health

and safety of the public and security in the U.S.
36
37

Enhancements

to the Protection

of Sensitive

Information

Background

The NRC protects classified and sensitive unclassified information both internally and externally through administrative procedures and requirements in

accordance with Federal law and national programs.

Current Program and a Look Forward

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC identified the

need to rapidly communicate classified and sensitive unclassified information

among NRC headquarters, regional offices, and licensee personnel. NRC

actions in this area have been closely coordinated with DHS, DOE, and other

Federal agencies in the area of secure communications, homeland security and

incident response. As a result, the NRC enhanced communication capabilities

and developed a program that enables the NRC to routinely share classified and

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
38

sensitive unclassified information with authorized licensee representatives up to

the SECRET- National Security Information level. As part of the program, the

staff coordinated with DOE to provide Foreign Ownership, Control, or Influence

analyses for the NRC so that the NRC may grant facility security clearances to

licensees having access to classified information. To date, the NRC has issued

facility security and personnel clearances to nuclear power plant sites. The NRC

has also significantly enhanced secure communication capabilities in headquarters and the regional offices.

The NRC has obtained additional secure communications connectivity with the

National Command Authority, Federal Agencies, and the Department of Defense

(DoD), to include high-speed secure faxing, secure video teleconferencing,

improved secure voice equipment, and connectivity to two secure data networks.

The NRC also protects certain types of sensitive unclassified information that

could be useful to a potential terrorist. To that end, the NRC has been enhancing

the program for handling, transmitting, and protecting this information, including

development of a Safeguards Information designation guide to enhance the

consistency of designation decisions and improve training for NRC staff and

contractors, who are responsible for protecting sensitive information. Additionally, the NRC approved equipment for several licensees to use in electronically

transmitting Safeguards Information among their facilities and to the NRC. The

NRC has also broadened the range and number of licensees that possess and

use Safeguards Information (e.g., source and byproduct licensees). As a result,

the NRC issued new security orders to materials licensees to establish requirements for handling and protection of “Safeguards Information-Modified Handling

(SGI-M),” a designation that pertains to certain categories of information. The

NRC and DOE developed the Yucca Mountain Classification Guide in June 2004

to comprehensively delineate what comprises sensitive unclassified, safeguards,

and classified information with respect to Yucca Mountain. In addition, the NRC

is developing additional comprehensive subject-specific classification guides

for other areas to continue to ensure protection of classified and sensitive

unclassified information.
39

Communications

Background

Effective external communications play a vital role in protecting our Nation’s nuclear

facilities from acts of terrorism. Nuclear power plant licensees have standing

agreements with State and local government agencies and have incorporated

these agreements into their contingency plans and response procedures. In

addition, the NRC has maintained close coordination with appropriate Federal

and State officials in Agreement and other States through working groups with

representatives from the Organization of Agreement States and the Conference

of Radiation Control Program Directors. NRC also routinely interacts with the

U.S. Congress by providing monthly reports on NRC activities, briefings, and

written responses to inquiries about specific topics and NRC programs, including nuclear security.

Current Program and a Look Forward

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC has enhanced its

communications and coordination both within the agency and with external entities, including Federal, State, and local agencies, and the private sector. Close

coordination among the NRC, DHS, FBI, DOE, DoD, other Federal agencies,

States, local authorities, and licensees that operate nuclear power plants and

other significant nuclear facilities and activities is essential. NRC has enhanced

communications and coordination in a wide variety of ways with its principal

partners. For example, to allow faster and easier exchange of classified information with licensees and authorized Federal, State, and local officials, the NRC

established a protected computer server system in February 2003 for the faster

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
40

and easier exchange of such information. The NRC is working closely

with stakeholders in the Federal, State, and private sector communities

to ensure that its security programs reflect their needs in the current

threat environment.

In addition to regular and frequent communication with DHS, the NRC

regularly communicates with other Federal agencies such as the TSA,

Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), FBI, DOE, and DoD on both policy

and program matters, as well as operational responses to specific threats.

This coordination has been instrumental in accomplishing rapid responses

and short-term protections for nuclear facilities, and lays the foundation

for ongoing national efforts to deter, detect, prevent, disrupt, and respond

to terrorist attacks.

In June 2003, the NRC and DHS cosponsored a two-day Homeland

Security Workshop on civilian nuclear security and incident response, which was

attended by approximately 300 Federal and State government officials. The workshop further strengthened NRC and DHS linkages with these key officials by

increasing and strengthening awareness of DHS and NRC initiatives related to

homeland security and incident response. In the fall of 2004, the NRC plans to

conduct a series of workshops in each NRC region to increase our partners’ awareness of security and National Response Plan initiatives.

Contacts and liaison with the Intelligence Community have been and will

continue to be essential to maintain a real-time knowledge of potential threats to

NRC-licensed facilities and to make decisions regarding changes to the design

basis threats. The NRC recognizes that response actions for the many levels of

State and Federal agencies and private sector entities may overlap to some

extent. Consequently, the NRC is working closely with those that are key in

responding to threats at nuclear facilities, in order to ensure efficient and effective

response, including integration of response plans at the Federal and State levels.

The NRC is also dedicated to sharing information among organizations and

licensees with a need to know to enhance prevention and response to terrorist

and other security incidents. The NRC has a long history of promoting openness

in its regulatory and decisionmaking processes. However, in protecting our

Nation, the NRC remains diligent in preventing terrorists from gaining access to

sensitive information. Consequently, the NRC must balance its commitment to

openness with the need to prevent releases of sensitive information. NRC will

continue to explore areas in which sharing information with Federal and State

agencies, licensees, and the public will result in a better-informed, betterprepared Nation.
41

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Emergency

Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Background

Since the accident at Three Mile Island in 1979, NRC has heightened its regulatory oversight and made sweeping changes in emergency response planning

and nuclear power plant operations. Over the years since that accident, the NRC

has responded to domestic radiological events and security matters, overseen

licensees’ emergency preparedness, and supported and coordinated with other

Federal, State and local response organizations. The NRC has also maintained

staff on-call and around-the-clock at the NRC Headquarters Operations Center.

These actions have been performed in coordination with other Federal agencies

under the NRC’s Incident Response Plan and Federal Radiological Emergency

Response Plan (FRERP). For more than 20 years, the NRC, in conjunction with

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, has conducted a comprehensive
42

emergency exercise program with NRC licensees. This program includes participation by State and local response organizations and other agencies of the

Federal government.

Current Program and a Look Forward

As a result of the attacks on September 11, 2001, the NRC has increased

its focus on potential terrorist scenarios as initiating events in emergency

preparedness. It should be noted that NRC’s response to a radiological

release—whether caused by a terrorist attack, equipment malfunction, or natural

disaster—could be similar, even though each type of event may have unique

concerns. As part of the Orders issued in February 2002, nuclear power plant

operators were required to make enhancements in several areas of emergency

preparedness, including emergency response facilities, emergency response

organizations, classification of and response to credible threats, and evaluation of

a broader range of hazards. Nuclear industry groups and Federal, State, and

local government agencies assisted in the prompt implementation of these

measures and participated in drills and exercises to test new planning elements.

Since that time, the NRC has reviewed licensee commitments to address these

requirements and verified the implementation by direct inspection.

As part of the NRC’s transitional FOF exercises at nuclear power plants, the NRC

is evaluating the licensees’ emergency preparedness response concurrent with

their security response. Licensees have improved their emergency preparedness

response capabilities through the identification of areas for improvement during

these exercises. Licensees have also shared lessons learned with other licensees, States, and local response organizations.

In addition, the NRC conducted a formal evaluation of the emergency preparedness planning basis in view of the threat environment that has existed since the

terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This evaluation addressed all aspects

of nuclear power plant emergency preparedness requirements. In doing so, the

evaluation determined that emergency preparedness at nuclear power plants

remains strong, but identified several areas for improvement. These areas included

communications processes, resource management issues, drill program enhancements, and changes to NRC guidance documents used by licensees. The NRC

is currently reviewing and inspecting these improvements. Additionally, the NRC

recognizes the importance of bolstering communication of its emergency preparedness activities with internal and external stakeholders including the public,

the industry, the international nuclear community, as well as Federal, State and

local government agencies. The NRC continues to emphasize the importance of

emergency preparedness to mitigate the effects of potential security threats and

other events.

As part of the overall improvement of emergency response capabilities, the NRC

has improved the Headquarters Operations Center, where the NRC directs
43

emergency response activities. The NRC Operations Center is continually staffed

with knowledgeable personnel, who have the expertise and ability to evaluate

events and alert NRC management, other Federal partners, and licensees, as

necessary, about unfolding events. The NRC has added secure video teleconferencing in the Operations Center, as well as increased the capacity for secure

communications and classified information storage. In the four NRC Regional

offices, the Regional Incident Response Centers also have similarly undergone

substantial improvements, including additional space and improved communications capability. The NRC also continues to improve

coordination with other Federal agencies to refine

Federal plans for response to an emergency or terrorist event involving nuclear materials or facilities. NRC

actively takes part in Federal interagency exercises

such as the Top Officials (TOPOFF) series to test and

improve these plans.

The NRC is also playing an active role in enhancing

Federal, State, and private sector incident response

capabilities for nuclear and radiological emergencies

and incidents. With the passage of the Homeland

Security Act of 2002, the DHS has been vested with

the overall responsibility for coordinating the Federal

response to domestic incidents. The NRC has been

actively working with DHS to develop and administer

a National Incident Management System (NIMS) and National Response Plan

(NRP) consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 (Management

of Domestic Incidents). The NRC, along with other Federal agencies, and NRC

licensees regularly participate in exercises involving NRC licensed facilities. The

NRC is also committed to greater use of security scenarios in exercises, such as

the scenario used in the June 2004 exercise at Indian Point nuclear power plant.

This commitment is not new to the NRC. The agency began to use security

scenarios long before the September 11 terrorist attacks as illustrated by a drill

involving considerable FBI field participation which was conducted at Palo Verde

nuclear power plant in 2000. Additional information on the NRC’s emergency

response exercises is presented later in this document.

With respect to planning for Continuity Of Operations (COOP), the NRC has

accelerated infrastructure enhancements at our alternative COOP site, tested

backup capabilities, conducted an agency-wide COOP exercise, and participated

in a National COOP exercise in May 2004. The NRC’s COOP and Continuity of

Government (COG) plans have been in place well before the terrorist attacks in

2001. In the future, the NRC expects to fully exercise the agency and nationallevel COOP capabilities to ensure readiness against potential terrorist attacks or

other incidents that could disrupt operations. Additionally, the NRC plans to

continue to participate in future COG exercises that enhance preparedness for

the agency and the Nation.
44

When the NRC supplemented the DBTs in April 2003, the agency began

discussing with DHS, the White House Homeland Security Council, FBI,

DoD, and other agencies the potential need for an “integrated response” by government assets to help defend against threats that could exceed the DBTs. The

concept of “integrated response” applies to both prevention of and response to a

potential terrorist event. The NRC has a strong history related to the integration of

responders, in both exercises and actual events and the agency is actively

engaged in both prevention or deterrence and response elements of integrated

response planning.

The NRC also continues to have an active role in a number of DHS initiatives to

further prepare our Nation against potential terrorist attacks. In particular, NRC

involvement includes participation in a number of Homeland Security Council

policy coordinating committees, the Deputies Committee, the Federal Radiological Preparedness Coordinating Committee, the Federal Response Plan’s Emergency Support Function Leaders Group, numerous Federal interagency working

groups (including development of the National Infrastructure Protection Plan),

and NRC-initiated outreach activities with industry groups and State agencies.

The NRC will continue to strengthen our partnerships with other Federal agencies

to implement a national framework for domestic incident response.
45

Interagency

Exercises

Background

The NRC has a long history of evaluating and participating in emergency exercises at nuclear power plants. In fact, NRC regulations require that nuclear power

plant licensees participate biennially in large consequence management exercises (“plume phase”) and every six years in extended (“post-plume phase”)

exercises for evaluation. The NRC has participated in many interagency exercises along with licensees, and State and local responders. A number of these

exercises have also included large-scale Federal participation. However, before

the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, only a limited number of these

exercises contained simulated terrorist attacks.

Current Program and a Look Forward

In the threat environment that has existed since the terrorist attacks in 2001, the

NRC has built upon the established exercise program with licensees to include

participation in national-level, interagency, terrorism-related exercises. In addition, the NRC has responded to a number of events that required extensive

interagency responses, including the electric power blackout in August 2003.

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
46

The NRC has also begun upgrading our exercise

program to more regularly incorporate security and

counter-terrorism considerations into exercises. This

initiative has improved both the NRC and licensee

response capabilities.

In May 2003, the NRC’s Headquarters and Regional

Offices participated in Top Officials 2 (TOPOFF2), the

second Congressionally-mandated, national-level exercise

involving simulated weapons of mass destruction.

Simulated exercise events focused on terrorist threats to

licensee facilities, a radiological dispersal device detonation in Seattle, a lost highway shipment of radioactive

material in the Pacific Northwest, and a bioterrorism

attack in Chicago. TOPOFF2 provided the NRC with

unique and valuable learning experiences that helped to

enhance the NRC’s response capabilities and preparedness for radiological and nuclear incidents. The NRC

plans to participate in additional TOPOFF exercises.

In February 2004, the NRC participated in Unified Defense 04 (UD04),

a major exercise conducted by the U.S. Northern Command

(NORTHCOM) involving both DoD and non-DoD Federal departments

and agencies, as well as a variety of State, and local agencies. This

exercise focused on a hurricane of national significance, a general

emergency at a NRC-regulated nuclear power plant resulting in radiological release to the environment and protective actions, including

public evacuation, and detonation of a nuclear device by terrorists in

southern Texas. Similarly, the NRC supported Determined Promise

04, a U.S. NORTHCOM exercise in August 2004.

Although not an exercise, the most significant real-world incident

involving the NRC, other agencies, and licensees since the terrorist

attacks on September 11, 2001, was the electrical power blackout in

August 2003. As the blackout raced across a multi-State area, grid

instabilities caused the near-simultaneous automatic shutdown of nine nuclear

power plants. During that incident, the NRC and licensees promptly responded

to ensure public safety as part of a coordinated national response. The blackout,

the first large-scale incident with simultaneous challenges to safety systems at

multiple nuclear power plants, provided the NRC with valuable experience and

insight for enhancing response capabilities.

The NRC will continue to participate in interagency exercises. The NRC also has

an active role in developing a number of interagency exercises relevant to the

agency’s responsibilities and remains a valued Federal partner in the incident

response community.
47

Organizational

Enhancements

Background

For more than 25 years, the NRC has conducted effective nuclear security, emergency preparedness, and incident response programs. The NRC’s Headquarters

Operations Center serves as the focal point for communications, analysis, and

response in support of State and local agencies during an emergency involving a

U.S. nuclear power plant, research or test reactor, fuel cycle facility, or nuclear

materials licensee. However, before the terrorist attacks in 2001, program responsibilities for nuclear security, incident response, and emergency preparedness were distributed among several headquarters offices.

Current Program and a Look Forward

The events on September 11, 2001, highlighted the need to examine the way the

NRC is organized to carry out our safeguards, security, emergency preparedness, and incident response functions. After a thorough review of NRC’s organizational structure, staffing, and training in the security and safeguards areas, the

Commission determined that the agency would achieve greater efficiency and

effectiveness by consolidating certain NRC safeguards, security, and incident

response functions into an Office of Nuclear Security and Incident Response

(NSIR). Therefore, the Commission established NSIR in April 2002. NSIR has

aggressively increased staffing and agency expertise by hiring outside experts in

security with civilian and military experience. NSIR staff expertise has been

shared with other Federal organizations through detailing of staff to the Terrorist

Threat Integration Center, the Office of Homeland Security, DHS, and others.

In addition, the Commission named a Deputy Executive Director for Homeland

Protection and Preparedness in June 2003, to review and resolve homeland

protection and preparedness issues.

Since that time, the NRC and its many stakeholders have become increasingly

aware of the importance of emergency preparedness to mitigate the effects of

potential security threats. Along with this increased awareness, the NRC has

acknowledged the need for increased communication of emergency preparedness activities with internal and external stakeholders including the public,

industry, the international nuclear community, and Federal, State and local

agencies. As a result, the Commission established the Emergency Preparedness

Project Office in January 2004, and moved that office to NSIR in June 2004,

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
48

to integrate emergency preparedness with emergency

response and security. The establishment and placement of

this organization reflects another step in the NRC’s ongoing

efforts to increase attention on activities that affect emergency preparedness. The Project Office is responsible for

developing emergency preparedness policies, regulations,

programs, and guidelines for both currently licensed nuclear

reactors and potential new nuclear reactors.

Since September 11, 2001, the NRC has also enhanced the

infrastructure of the Headquarters Operations Center to

include additional staffing, improved emergency response

procedures, and equipment upgrades. For example, the NRC

increased personnel who continuously staff the Operations

Center to receive, assess, and promptly respond to both safety

and security incidents. The NRC has also revised our emergency response team procedures to incorporate specific NRC actions related to

changes in the HSAS threat level. Significant enhancements have been made to

the Operations Center telecommunications capabilities, such as secure telephone

and fax units, upgraded satellite phones, and an improved teleconferencing system. An alternate incident response center has been established at one of NRC’s

regional offices, with all the capabilities to assume the role of the Headquarters

Operations Center in the event of loss of that facility. In addition, the NRC is

continuing to expand the capabilities of the Headquarters Operations Center

through the use of modern information technology systems, such as new display

monitors, computer servers, specialized software applications, and secure video

teleconferencing capability. Related enhancements have also been completed

for response facilities in the four NRC’s regional offices.
49

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion

Legislation

Background

The NRC has accomplished the numerous enhancements to security and preparedness described in this report under existing Federal law. Over time, the

NRC has proposed legislation to the U.S. Congress to allow the Commission to

enhance nuclear security by granting arrest authority to security personnel at

licensee facilities and the use of deadly force to strict Federal law, rather than

State law. The proposed legislation would also make it a Federal crime to introduce dangerous weapons into nuclear facilities and to sabotage nuclear facilities

during construction. Although both Houses supported these provisions in various legislative bills, they have not yet been enacted.

Current Program and a Look Forward

Following the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, NRC worked with its Oversight Committees on proposals to substantially enhance nuclear security through

the enactment of more comprehensive legislation. The most important of the

nuclear security proposals that have been introduced in the 108th Congress are

as follows:

• Authorization of security personnel at NRC-regulated facilities and activities

to receive, possess, and, in appropriate circumstances, use more powerful

weapons important to defend against terrorist attacks [H.R. 6; S. 2095,

H.R. 4503].
50

• Expansion of the classes of NRC-regulated entities and activities whose employees are subject to fingerprinting and criminal history background checks

[H.R. 6; S. 2095, H.R. 4503].

• Federal criminalization of unauthorized introduction of dangerous weapons

into nuclear facilities [H.R. 6; S. 2095, H.R. 4503].

• Federal criminalization of sabotage of additional classes of nuclear facilities,

fuel, and material [H.R. 6; S. 2095, H.R. 4503].

• Authorization for NRC to carry out a training and fellowship program to

address shortages of individuals with critical nuclear safety regulatory skills

[H.R. 6; S. 2095, H.R. 4503].

• Extension of NRC’s authority to regulate discrete sources of accelerator-produced radioactive material and radium-226, materials not now covered by

the Atomic Energy Act [S. 1043, S. 2763].

All but the last of these provisions are contained in H.R. 6,

the “Energy Policy Act of 2003,” as approved by Congressional conferees.

The authority provided by additional legislation is important to enhance civilian nuclear security in this country.

Prompt legislative enactment of the six provisions listed

above would substantially enhance the protection of civilian nuclear facilities and materials.
51

Conclusion

As described briefly in this report, the NRC has made and will continue to make

significant progress in enhancing homeland security and preparedness through

working closely with DHS, other Federal agencies, State and local governments,

and our licensees. Guided by our mission to protect the public health and safety,

promote the common defense and security, and protect the environment,

our objective is to implement an integrated, coordinated system for protecting

our Nation.

Introduction

Enhancements to

Nuclear Security

Threat Assessment

Force-on-Force Exercises

Power Reactor Security

Baseline Inspection

Program

Vulnerability Assessments

and Mitigation Strategies

Spent Fuel Storage

Spent Fuel Transportation

Research and

Test Reactors

Enhancements to

Materials Security

International Safeguards

and Security

Enhancements to

the Protection of

Sensitive Information

Communications

Emergency Preparedness

and Response to

Terrorist Attacks

Interagency Exercises

Organizational

Enhancements

Legislation

Conclusion
52

September 2004

NUREG/BR-0314