Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Nos. 04-22-00199-CR, 04-22-00200-CR, 04-22-00201-CR, and 04-22-00202-CR

Roman Dexter SOTO,

Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 451st Judicial District Court, Kendall County, Texas

Trial Court Nos. 7817, 7818, 7819, 7820

Honorable Kirsten Cohoon, Judge Presiding

Opinion by: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Beth Watkins, Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Ret.)1

Delivered and Filed: August 16, 2023

AFFIRMED

Appellant Roman Dexter Soto appeals the trial court’s denial of his motions to suppress

evidence seized after a traffic stop. On appeal, Soto contends the officer lacked reasonable 

suspicion to stop him because he did not commit a traffic violation, and video evidence 

indisputably supports his contention. Because we conclude the officer had reasonable suspicion 

to believe Soto committed a traffic violation, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

1 The Honorable Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice (Retired) of the Fourth Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment 

of the Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 74.003, 75.002, 75.003.
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BACKGROUND

Boerne Police Department Officer Pedro Moncada was on routine patrol one evening and 

driving his patrol car on South Main Street. As he moved into the center turn lane of the street to 

stop and observe traffic, he saw a silver Nissan Pathfinder driving down South Main Street. 

According to Officer Moncada, the Pathfinder was traveling in the far-right lane, and he saw the 

Pathfinder move into the left lane as its driver signaled. Officer Moncada believed the driver had 

committed a traffic violation and initiated a traffic stop. 

During the stop, Officer Moncada learned Soto was the Pathfinder’s driver and smelled 

marijuana coming from the vehicle. He searched the vehicle and seized a gun, two medium sized 

plastic bags containing marijuana, several small baggies containing cocaine and different colored 

capsules, a brown vial containing a liquid substance, and several digital scales. Soto was 

subsequently charged with possession of 4,000 abuse units or more of a controlled substance, 

namely lysergic acid diethylamide, with intent to deliver (Trial Court Cause No. 7817), possession 

of four grams or more but less than 200 grams of a controlled substance, namely cocaine, with 

intent to deliver (Trial Court Cause No. 7818), possession of four grams or more but less than 400 

grams of a controlled substance, namely 3,4-methylenedioxy-methamphetamine, with intent to 

deliver (Trial Court Cause No. 7819), and possession of four grams or more but less than 200 

grams of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, with intent to deliver (Trial Court 

Cause No. 7820). 

In each cause number, Soto moved to suppress all the evidence obtained in connection with 

the traffic stop, and the trial court set the motions for a suppression hearing. At the hearing, the 

trial court heard testimony from Officer Moncada, who testified he stopped Soto because Soto 

committed a traffic violation by failing to signal 100 feet prior to changing lanes. Officer Moncada 

explained as soon as Soto flashed his signal, he started changing lanes, and Soto’s action was a 
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traffic violation. The trial court also watched dashcam video from Officer Moncada’s patrol car

showing the incident. At the end of the hearing, Soto argued Officer Moncada did not have 

reasonable suspicion to stop him for a traffic violation. The trial court denied his motions to 

suppress and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law, specifically concluding Officer 

Moncada had probable cause to stop Soto because he “failed to signal continuously for 100 feet 

before changing lanes in violation of the section 545.104 of the Texas Transportation Code.” 

Soto filed motions for reconsideration, arguing Texas law does not require a motorist to 

maintain his signal continuously for 100 feet before changing lanes. At the reconsideration 

hearing, Soto argued “the 100-foot rule” applies only when a driver is turning, not when a driver 

is changing lanes, and the dashcam video clearly showed he had not committed a traffic violation. 

The State, however, asserted Texas law requires a driver to signal before changing lanes, and based 

on Officer Moncada’s testimony, Soto did not activate his blinker before changing lanes. The trial 

court took the matter under advisement. It ultimately overruled Soto’s motions for reconsideration 

and issued amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. It found Officer Moncada testified 

Soto signaled and changed lanes “at the same time,” and it concluded “Texas law does not include 

a requirement that a driver signal a lane change for one hundred feet . . . it is clear that a driver 

must signal an intention to make a lane change” under section 545.104(a) of the Texas 

Transportation Code. The trial court further concluded Officer Moncada had probable cause to 

stop Soto because he changed lanes while simultaneously using his blinker, and the failure to signal 

an intention to change lanes is a traffic violation under section 545.104(a). 

Soto pled guilty in all four cause numbers, and the trial court sentenced him to thirty years’

confinement in each cause number, with the sentences to run concurrently, in accordance with a 

plea bargain agreement. Soto now appeals the trial court’s rulings in each cause number, which 

we consolidated on appeal. He argues the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress 
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because Officer Moncada did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop, and the 

subsequent seizure of evidence violated his constitutional and statutory rights under the Fourth 

Amendment of the United States Constitution and section 38.23 of the Texas Code of Criminal 

Procedure. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, section 9 of the 

Texas Constitution protect individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures by government 

officials. See, e.g., Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Holder v. State, 

595 S.W.3d 691, 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020). Evidence seized by a police officer in violation of 

the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary rule codified in article 38.23(a) of the Texas 

Code of Criminal Procedure. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 38.23(a); Miles v. State, 241 S.W.3d 

28, 32 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (“[T]he Texas exclusionary rule mirrors the federal one.”). When, 

as in this case, a police officer performs a search without a warrant, the State bears the burden of 

establishing the search and seizure were reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. 

Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 672–73 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). 

We review a trial court’s motion to suppress evidence ruling under a bifurcated standard 

of review. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); Valtierra v. State, 

310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). We “give almost total deference to a trial court’s 

determination of the historical facts that are supported by the record, particularly if the findings of 

fact are based on credibility and demeanor.” Miller v. State, 393 S.W.3d 255, 262 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2012). This is because the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witness’s 

credibility and weight given to their testimony at a suppression hearing. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d 

at 190; Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. The trial court is entitled to believe or to disbelieve all or 

any part of the witness’s testimony. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. We also “give the same level 
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of deference in reviewing a trial court’s application of law to the facts or to mixed questions of 

law and fact, especially when the findings are based on credibility and are supported by the record.” 

Miller, 393 S.W.3d at 262–63. “If the trial judge makes express findings of fact, we view the 

evidence in the light most favorable to his ruling and determine whether the evidence supports 

these factual findings.” Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. But, if evidence is conclusive, we may 

disregard any trial court finding inconsistent with that conclusive evidence as unsupported by the 

record. Miller, 393 S.W.3d at 263. Finally, we review de novo the application of law to the facts, 

and we will affirm a ruling that is “reasonably supported by the record and is correct on any theory 

of law applicable to the case.” Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447–48. 

APPLICABLE LAW

A police officer may make a warrantless traffic stop if the “reasonable suspicion” standard 

is satisfied. Jaganathan v. State, 479 S.W.3d 244, 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). Reasonable 

suspicion exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, “the officer has specific 

articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him to 

reasonably suspect that a particular person has engaged or is (or soon will be) engaging in criminal 

activity.” Id. (quoting Abney v. State, 394 S.W.3d 542, 548 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). This standard is an objective standard, which disregards any subjective 

intent of the officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop 

exists. Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). It is well-settled a police 

officer may conduct a traffic stop if he has reasonable suspicion a person committed a traffic 

violation. See Lerma, 543 S.W.3d at 190 (“In the context of a traffic stop, police officers are 

justified in stopping a vehicle when the officers have reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic 

violation has occurred.”); Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (“Thus, 
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the appropriate limitation of an officer’s discretion, under the Fourth Amendment, is the existence 

of a law and the actual commission of the offense[.]”). 

At issue in this appeal are two sections of the Texas Transportation Code—sections 

545.104(a) and 545.104(b). Section 545.104(a) requires a driver to signal an intention to make a 

lane change. TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(a). Texas courts have recognized the purpose of 

signaling an intention to make a lane change is to alert other drivers of the intended movement, 

and thus, “a lighted turn signal which does not blink prior to the lane change” does not satisfy the 

statutory mandate to signal an intention to turn. Coleman v. State, 188 S.W.3d 708, 716–17 (Tex. 

App.—Tyler 2005, pet. ref’d). Section 545.104(b) further requires a driver intending to turn left 

or right to “signal continuously for not less than the last 100 feet of movement” before the turn. 

TEX. TRANSP. CODE § 545.104(b). 

APPLICATION

We begin by addressing Soto’s contention Officer Moncada lacked reasonable suspicion

to stop him. According to Soto, Officer Moncada improperly stopped him for failing to signal 

continuously for 100 feet prior to changing lanes, and the trial court erred by concluding Officer 

Moncada made a reasonable mistake of law when stopping Soto. 

At the suppression hearing, Officer Moncada testified he stopped Soto because Soto 

committed a traffic violation by failing to signal 100 feet prior to changing lanes. When asked to 

clarify, Officer Moncada explained when Soto “signaled, he started moving over into the inside 

lane at the same time as he’s – as he’s signaling, he’s moving over.” He further explained the 

action constituted a traffic violation because a driver is required to inform the other motorists of 

his intention by signaling 100 feet prior to changing lanes or turning. On cross-examination, 

defense counsel asked the officer whether Soto used his signal before changing lanes, and Officer 

Moncada maintained Soto’s actions were done “immediately” and “simultaneously.” He testified, 
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“[A]s soon as [Soto] hit the signal, he started changing lanes.” In the trial court’s amended findings

of fact and conclusions of law, the trial court found Officer Moncada testified Soto changed lanes 

“at the same time” he was flashing his blinker. It concluded Texas law did not require a driver to 

signal a lane change 100 feet before changing lanes, but it did require a driver to signal an intention 

to make a lane change under section 545.104(a). It further concluded “[t]he stop was not unlawful 

merely because Officer Moncada incorrectly stated the law that justified the stop[,]” and cited

Coleman v. State for support. 

In Coleman, a police officer testified he saw the appellant change lanes before activating 

his blinker, and he stopped the appellant “for failing to signal a lane change for one hundred feet.” 

188 S.W.3d at 716. On appeal, the appellant argued Texas law did not require a driver to signal a 

lane change for one hundred feet. Id. The court agreed, but it held the officer had probable cause 

to initiate a traffic stop because the appellant had committed a traffic violation. Id. at 716–17. It 

reasoned because Texas law required a driver to signal an intention to change lanes and the officer 

had testified the appellant did not activate his blinker prior to changing lanes, the appellant had 

committed a traffic violation supporting the stop. Id. It concluded, “The stop was not unlawful 

merely because [the officer] incorrectly stated the law that justified the stop.” Id. at 716 

Here, the same analysis applies. Although Officer Moncada testified he stopped Soto for 

failing to signal 100 feet before changing lanes, he also testified he observed Soto change lanes 

without timely activating his signal. Throughout his testimony, he described Soto’s actions as 

“simultaneous,” “immediate,” and “at the same time.” He further detailed Soto “was in the middle 

of changing lanes when he signaled.” When viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to 

the trial court’s ruling and giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of 

historical facts, we conclude Officer Moncada had reasonable suspicion to believe Soto committed 

a traffic violation justifying the traffic stop. See Miller, 393 S.W.3d. at 262; Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d 
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at 447. Here, Officer Moncada conveyed specific articulable facts that, when combined with 

rational inferences from those facts, could lead him to reasonably suspect Soto committed a traffic 

violation. See Jaganathan, 479 S.W.3d at 247. And as reasoned in Coleman, the stop was not 

unlawful simply because Officer Moncada referenced the incorrect law. See 188 S.W.3d at 716. 

Instead, contrary to Soto’s contention the trial court improperly relied on a mistake of law 

principle, an objective basis existed to justify Officer Moncada’s traffic stop. See id.; see also 

Ford, 158 S.W.3d at 492 (requiring us to disregard subjective intent of officer and look solely to 

whether objective basis for traffic stop existed); Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Fisher, 56 S.W.3d 

159, 163 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.) (explaining the State “is not required to show a traffic 

offense was actually committed, but only that the officer reasonably believed a violation was in 

progress”). 

Soto next asserts video evidence undisputedly shows he did not commit a traffic offense. 

Specifically, Soto contends Officer Moncada’s dashcam video unequivocally shows Soto flashed 

his blinker four times before changing lanes, and we can disregard the trial court’s finding Soto’s 

actions were simultaneous because it is contradicted by this conclusive evidence. 

During the suppression hearing, the State introduced Officer Moncada’s dashcam video. 

When asked about the video’s quality, Officer Moncada testified the video was “two dimensional,” 

and because his vision was three dimensional, he could see “everything,” which may not be shown 

in the video. Defense counsel then played the dashcam video from Officer Moncada’s patrol car, 

and the video shows the Pathfinder traveling in the far-right lane between two other vehicles. The 

vehicles become smaller and smaller as they drive away from the patrol car, and the lane markings 

become unclear when the driver of the Pathfinder begins flashing his left blinker and changes 

lanes. 
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Defense counsel replayed the video and asked Officer Moncada to explain details 

surrounding when Soto activated his blinker. Officer Moncada testified Soto did so when his 

vehicle was “still in the outside lane.” Defense counsel replayed the video, began counting the 

flashes, and asked the officer whether he agreed Soto changed lanes after he flashed his blinker 

“four or five” times. Officer Moncada then testified, “No sir. He’s doing it immediately.” When 

pressed, the officer described Soto’s actions as occurring “[s]imultaneously, as soon as he hit the 

signal, he started changing lanes.” On redirect examination, Officer Moncada further testified 

Soto was “crossing over, signaling and moving over and crossing over into the next lane at the 

same time,” and it happened “[s]imultaneously. At the same time.” 

Here, after viewing the dashcam video, we cannot say it indisputably contradicts Officer 

Moncada’s testimony, requiring us to overturn the trial court’s finding Soto’s actions were 

simultaneous. See Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179, 187 n.1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (Alcala, J., 

concurring) (“Rarely will videotape evidence actually be ‘indisputable.’”). The video does not 

clearly show whether the Pathfinder’s tires cross into the next lane as Soto is signaling because the 

lane change occurs when Soto’s vehicle is traveling away from Officer Moncada’s patrol car. As 

a result, because the video is not clear, we cannot disregard the trial court’s finding. See Miller, 

393 S.W.3d at 263 (stating we can disregard trial court’s finding only if it is inconsistent with 

conclusive evidence). 

Instead, we must defer to the trial court’s finding of fact stating Officer Moncada observed 

Soto making a traffic violation by changing lanes while simultaneously activating his blinker, so 

long as it is supported by the evidence. See id.; Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. Here, Officer 

Moncada specifically testified he saw the Pathfinder’s tires “moving over onto the other lane 

crossing over” at the same time Soto began flashing his blinker. When viewing this evidence in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, we conclude the evidence supports this finding 
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of fact made by the trial court. See Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447–48. We therefore overrule Soto’s 

final argument and hold the trial court did not err in denying Soto’s motions to suppress. 

CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgments. 

Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice

Do Not Publish