Taking Stock and 

Looking Fo r wa rd

I n t e r vention in the Balkans and Beyo n d

B r i e f l y . . .

• The Balka ns are in better shape than at any other time in the last 10 years, and the

re g ion is no longer at the top of Ame r ica’s int e r na t io nal age nda .

• But the job the re is not yet do ne.

• No t h i ng less than viable states will satisfy U.S. objectives of dra w i ng down NATO and

e ns u r i ng that the re g ion does not become a haven for terro r i s t s.

• Eu rope should inc re a s i ngly take the lead as its capacities develop; the United States

needs to re main eng a ged and learn how to play a stro ng supporting ro l e.

• The goal is to ma ke the Balka ns part of Euro p e, whe re they belong .

• This will re q u i re ra i s i ng standa rds of political, econo m ic, and jud ic ial behavio r

t h ro u g hout the re g ion, a process that will take ma ny mo re years.

• The int e r na t io nal community will need to focus in a mo re disciplined way on establ i s h i ng the rule of law, inc l ud i ng cont ro l l i ng ex t remists and organized crime and

b r i ng i ng war criminals to justic e.

• The Balka ns int e r v e nt io ns suggest that the int e r na t io nal community needs far better

p re p a ra t ion for its civilian re s p o ns i b i l i t ie s, better coord i na t ion between political and

military objectives, and a deeper appre c ia t ion of the challenges on the gro u nd.

• The United States has comparative advant a ges in military capacity and in building

demo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns and civil society that it should use in future int e r v e nt io ns.

• Me c h a n i s ms for coord i na t ion with Europe will be inc re a s i ngly important in ens u r i ng

effective perfo r ma nce in int e r na t io nal int e r v e nt io ns.

Time for Euro p e

While a great deal re ma i ns to be do ne in the Balka ns to ma ke peace self-sustaining, the

i nt e r na t io nal community has had sig n i f ic a nt successes the re over the last few years. All

t he rep u b l ics of fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia are now go v e r ned by leaders elected de mo c ra t ic a l l y

a nd committed to re s o l v i ng peacefully their re ma i n i ng disputes. Serbia is inc re a s i ngly a

p a r t ner and a source of stability ra t her than a source of war. All Balka ns count r ies are

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

February 22, 2002

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

Ten years of int e r v e nt ion in the Balka ns —

b e g i n n i ng with European monitors in 1991, 

ext e nd i ng through the ill-fated hu ma n i t a r ian effo r t s

of the UN Pro t e c t ion Force in Bosnia (1992–95), to

t he curre nt multi-purpose int e r v e nt io ns in Bosnia

(1995), Kosovo (1999), and Ma c e do n ia (2001)—

have pro v ided the most ex t e nsive post–Cold Wa r

ex p e r ie nce in int e r na t io nal community efforts to

stabilize a conflict zone. Whe re do the Balka ns

s t a nd now? What mo re needs to be do ne the re ?

What has been learned? What lessons should be

a p p l ied in other conflict areas like Afg h a n i s t a n ?

T he United States Institute of Pe a c e, beginning in

1996, has focused re s o u rces from its pro g ra ms

( t ra i n i ng, gra nt s, fellowships, rule of law,

e duc a t ion, virtual diplomacy) first on Bosnia and

later on other re p u b l ics of the fo r mer Yu go s l a v ia

a nd on the re g ion as a who l e. Thro u g hout this 

p e r io d, the Institute has convened a Balka ns 

Wo r k i ng Group (BWG) to discuss specific issues and

p o l icy optio ns. The BWG consists of Balka ns ex p e r t s

f rom no ngo v e r n me ntal and int e r na t io nal org a n i z at io ns, the adm i n i s t ra t ion, Cong re s s, think tanks,

a c a de m ia, and the me d ia. The group met Ja nua r y

22, 2002 to discuss lessons learned and how the y

m ig ht be applied both in the Balka ns and to future

i nt e r na t io nal int e r v e nt io ns. This report was

p re p a red on the basis of that discussion by Balka ns

I n i t iative director Daniel Serwer. 

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pea c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

T i me for Euro p e 1

L e s s o ns Av a i l a b l e 4

C o nc l u s io ns 5
committed to mo v i ng into Europe and towards NATO. Mo re o v e r, Europe is committed to

i nc l ud i ng them and is inc re a s i ngly capable of leading the diploma t ic, re form, and security efforts ne e ded to keep the peace. Membership in the European Un ion (EU) for Balka ns

states is still far off, but the European Stabilization and As s o c ia t ion Pro c e s s, which is

des ig ned to pave the way for int e g ra t ion into EU struc t u res through political and econom ic refo r ms as well as re g io nal coopera t ion, pro v ides a clear sense of dire c t ion and a

me a ns of pushing Balka ns states to meet high standa rds and complete their de mo c ra t ic

t ra ns i t io ns. The time has come to stop talking of Dayton impleme nt a t ion and to fo c u s

i nstead on European int e g ra t ion. Like w i s e, NATO and the Pa r t nership for Pe a c e, which prov ides the pra c t ical basis for coopera t ion between NATO and no n - member states, play a

c r uc ial role in ra i s i ng ex p e c t a t io ns, and standa rd s, for Balka ns armies and de f e nse establ i s h me nt s. 

While Europe should be at the center of ins t i t u t io na l i z i ng de mo c racy in the Balka ns, the United States plays an ind i s p e nsable ro l e. Because the United States led the

N ATO int e r v e nt io ns in Bosnia and Kosovo, Ame r ica has unique stand i ng and influence in

both places. U.S. rumblings about leaving the Balka ns are ne i t her credible nor in the U.S.

i nt e rest. They are even count e r p ro duc t i v e, since they put Bosnia ns, Serbs, Albania ns, and

West Euro p e a ns on high alert, cre a t i ng re s i s t a nce to even mo dest proposals for re c o n f igu r i ng the U.S. pre s e nc e. Talk of U.S. withdrawal also boosts the influence of hard l i ne r s

opposed to rule of law and peace processes in all ethnic commu n i t ie s. Whatever the U.S.

t roop levels, occasio nal high-level U.S. attent ion is cruc ial, both to the peace process in

t he Balka ns and to pro t e c t i ng vital U.S. int e re s t s. Is l a m ic ex t remism in Bosnia and

Kosovo would be much worse but for the U.S. effo r t s, which have all but eliminated the

v e s t iges of Ira n ian and other efforts to gain a fo o t hold in Europe in the 1990s. The

rec e nt tra nsfer from the Fede ra t ion of Bosnia and He r z e go v i na to Gua nt a na mo Bay of

A l ge r ian members of al Qaeda with the coopera t ion of the fede ra t ion polic e, de s p i t e

local pro t e s t s, de mo ns t rates how important it is to U.S. na t io nal int e rests to ma i nt a i n

i n f l u e nce in the Balka ns and to build effective state struc t u re s. 

E u rope and the United States will need to re b a l a nce their respective roles in the

next few years. European capabilities have improved dra ma t ically since the fa i l u res of

t he 1990s, but the re is still doubt about whe t her they can handle the situa t ion. Ja v ie r

S o l a na, the EU high re p re s e ntative for the common fo re ign and security polic y, and Chris

Patten, the EU ex t e r nal re l a t io ns commissio ne r, have ma de great strides in exe rc i s i ng

E u rope's political clout and impro v i ng its speed and perfo r ma nce in de l i v e r i ng assistanc e

a nd pro v id i ng access to European ma r kets and ins t i t u t io ns. But Europe still lacks cre d ib i l i t y, unity, and re s o l v e. It may also be overloading its newly established capabilitie s.

T he United States needs to help create the cond i t io ns in which Europe will succeed in

t he Balka ns. This inc l udes ens u r i ng that European views on critical issues—like final status for Kosovo and Mo nt e ne g ro’s inde p e nde nce push—can be supported by the Un i t e d

S t a t e s. It also inc l udes re s o l v i ng differe nces between Europe and the United States on

issues like whe t her to arm int e r na t io nal police units in Bosnia and how to handle tho s e

w ho seek to establish de facto ethnically pure are a s. It is particularly important for the

United States to unde r s t a nd better how it can influence the European Stabilization and

Ass o c ia t ion Pro c e s s, which pro v ides cruc ial levera ge thro u g hout the Balka ns by of f e r i ng

ma r ket access in exc h a nge for re fo r m .

T he main threat to peace in the Balka ns now comes from those who impede the

mov e me nt of the Balka ns towards Euro p e. The re are serious risks of backslid i ng in Bosnia

a nd Her z e go v i na, in Kosovo, and in Ma c e do n ia, caused by small groups of ex t re me na t io nalists opposed to European standa rds of de mo c racy and rule of law, often involved in crimi nal ent e r p r i s e s, and bent on blocking pro g re s s. The int e r na t io nal community is no t

w e l l - o rganized for an assault on these gro u p s. Its fa i l u re to capture and tra nsfer Rado v a n

Kara d z ic and Ratko Mladic to the int e r na t io nal tribunal in The Hague is symptoma t ic of a

more gene ral fa i l u re to deal effectively with “spoilers.” The capture of ind icted war crimi nals is an absolutely necessary step within the overall effort of weake n i ng ex t re m i s t

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an 

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion 

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote the pre v e nt io n ,

mana ge me nt, and peaceful re s o l u t ion of int e r nat io nal conflic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an 

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng, educ a t ion 

p ro g ra ms from high school through gra dua t e

s c hool, confere nces and worksho p s, libra r y

s e r v ic e s, and public a t io ns. The Institute’s Board of

D i rectors is appointed by the Pre s ide nt of the

United States and confirmed by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, F o u nder and 

fo r mer Pre s ide nt, Peace Links, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns fo r

Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. 

• M o ra L. McLean, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t it u t e, New York, N.Y. • María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C IO N

I nt e r na t io nal, Some r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling,

State Senator and fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne,

Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs C o m m i t t e e, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Lorne W. Cra n e r, As s i s t a nt Secretary of State for Demo cra c y, Hu man Rig ht s, and Labor • Douglas J. Fe i t h , Unde r

S e c retary of Defense for Po l icy • Paul G. Gaffney II, V ic e

Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt, Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r -

s i t y • R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
3

forc e s. Ka ra d z ic and Mladic should be in The Hague well befo re the October electio ns in

B o s n ia. It is also necessary to focus on the sources of fina nc i ng for ex t remist groups and

to deprive them of their re s o u rc e s. An effort of this sort contributed to the fall in October

2000 of Slobodan Milosevic. A similar effort should now be unde r t a ken to weaken othe r s

w ho pose ex t remist or criminal threats to int e g ra t i ng the Balka ns into Euro p e. 

Ne u t ra l i z i ng the ex t remist threat in the Balka ns will re q u i re re form of the int e rna t io nal ins t i t u t io ns in Bosnia and Kosovo. 

In Bosnia, whe re the Dayton agre e me nts created a very loose civilian impleme nt a t ion struc t u re, int e r na t io nal civilian authority should be cent ralized under the hig h

rep re s e nt a t i v e. Extremists cannot be count e red with an unc o o rd i nated effort that lacks

f i re p o w e r. The high re p re s e ntative should be given direct cont rol over substant ial arme d

p o l ice fo rces and investigatory capability. He should also be ma de mo re accountable to

t he Bosnian public. Once the ex t remist threats to Bosnia's cont i nu i ng ex i s t e nce have

been count e re d, the goal of the high re p re s e ntative should be to tra ns form his org a n iz a t ion into some t h i ng mo re like a no r mal European assistance mission. 

At the same time, the NATO fo rce in Bosnia needs to re main the re but it can be

reduced and given a mo re focused mission. The convent io nal military threat in Bosnia

t o day is minimal. While cont i nu i ng de t e r re nce is re q u i re d, the main NATO task toda y

s hould be focused on int e g ra t i ng the three Bosnian armies and pre p a r i ng the de f e ns e

e s t a b l i s h me nt for event ual membership. NATO should also be cons ide r i ng its own long -

term int e rests in re ma i n i ng in Bosnia and utilizing military fa c i l i t ies the re. The re is no

reason why the NATO fo o t p r i nt should not cont i nue to inc l ude tra i n i ng, exe rc i s e s, and

possibly bases in Bosnia. 

In Kosovo, the peace is less firmly established but the int e r na t io nal struc t u re, led

by the United Na t io ns Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) on the civilian side, is better coord inated with the military side as well as better organized and equipped. UNMIK is corre c t l y

fo c u s i ng on building pro v i s io nal ins t i t u t io ns and cre a t i ng an ind ige nous fo u nda t ion fo r

t he rule of law. The difficulty in electing a pre s ide nt and prime minister and fo r m i ng the

first go v e r n me nt in Kosovo raises questio ns about capabilities for self-go v e r na nce that

will have to ans w e red by mo re cons i s t e nt and capable perfo r ma nce on the part of the

A l b a n ian political parties in the future. UNMIK will also have to enhance coopera t ion with

B e l g ra de and int e g rate Kosovo Serbs into the pro v i s io nal ins t i t u t io ns, while pro v id i ng

much improved pro t e c t ion for the Serb and other minority populatio ns as well as establ i s h i ng UN authority in Serb-majority are a s. The question of Kosovo’s final status canno t

be put off fo re v e r. UNMIK will have to begin pro c e s s e s, inc l ud i ng dialogue between Belg ra de and Pristina, that can lead event ually to re p l a c i ng the int e r na t io nal pro t e c t o ra t e

a nd the pro v i s io nal ins t i t u t io ns now being created with a mo re perma ne nt solution. 

T he most imme d iate threat to the peace in the Balka ns may come this spring in

Ma c e do n ia, whe re vio l e nce could re s u me after a winter break. Reestablishme nt of go ve r n me nt authority over Ma c e do n ia’s territory and borders is pro g re s s i ng, but ex t re m i s t

A l b a n ia ns and Ma c e do n ia ns still need to be isolated. The best way of do i ng this is full

i m p l e me nt a t ion of the Ohrid fra mework peace agre e me nt, with the European Un ion in

t he lead. 

S e r b ia’s European vocation is an essent ial eleme nt in the overall Balka ns pic t u re.

S e r b ia should be a partner and source of stability, an opportunity ra t her than a pro blem. Un fo r t u na t e l y, divisio ns between Yu goslav pre s ide nt Vojislav Ko s t u n ica and Serbia n

p r i me minister Zo ran Djind j ic are slowing re form in Belgra de and ma k i ng it likely that

t he re fo r mers will be blamed for the pain but get little credit for the gain. With hard l i ne

M i l o s e v ic supporters still in place in the army, the polic e, and the courts, the re is a serious risk of major setbacks. While the Yu go s l a v / S e r b ian econo m ic team is virtually without equal in its pre p a ra t io ns for the re form challenge, the political situa t ion thre a t e ns

to nullify their effo r t s. The United States and Europe need to press Yu go s l a v ia and Serb ia to move ahead; those who stand in the way of re form should not be counted as

f r ie nds and partne r s. Reform of the military, inc l ud i ng the re moval of the Milosevic - e ra

W h a t ever the U.S. tro o p

l eve l s, occasional high-level 

U.S. attention is crucial, both

to the peace process in the

Balkans and to protecting 

v i tal U.S. intere s t s.

The question of Ko s ovo’s final

s tatus cannot be put off fo reve r.
4

A r my chief of staff, is critical befo re Serbia can enter the Pa r t nership for Pe a c e. Tra nsfer of add i t io nal ind ictees to The Hague is also essent ial to fre e i ng Serbia from Milosev ic’s legacy and establishing the rule of law. 

All the count r ies of the Balka ns will move faster towards Europe if they mo v e

t o ge t he r. While the Stability Pact, the 1999 agre e me nt in which 40 partner count r ie s

u ndertook to stre ng t hen the count r ies of Southeastern Euro p e, has served useful purp o s e s, add i t io nal re g io nal arra nge me nts may be ne e de d. Resolving Kosovo’s status will

a l most surely re q u i re mo re ex t e nsive re g io nal arra nge me nts than exist toda y. So too will

c o u nt e r i ng organized crime, which has alre a dy established its own re g io nal ne t w o r k s

that are unhinde red by ethnic differe nc e s. The United States and European Un ion ne e d

to begin cons u l t a t io ns on confede ral and other proposals in pre p a ra t ion for discussio ns

with count r ies in the re g ion. 

T he re is a serious risk that some polic y ma kers will conc l ude that the re l a t i v e

a b s e nce of vio l e nce in the Balka ns me a ns that the task is do ne. This is definitively no t

t he case. The balance between the United States and the European Un ion may need to

be adjusted so that the EU takes mo re of the lead, but both need to re main stro ng l y

e ng a ged if the re g ion is to cont i nue in the rig ht dire c t ion. The United States has part icularly stro ng capabilities in building de mo c ra t ic ins t i t u t io ns (especially political part ies and jud ic ial systems) and civil socie t y. It should use them, coord i na t i ng closely with

t he European Un ion. New me c h a n i s ms for this coord i na t ion may be re q u i re d.

Lessons Available: Will We Learn Them?

T he “int e r na t io nal community” was ill-pre p a red for int e r v e nt ion in the Balka ns; its perfor ma nce has improved over the past de c a de, but the re is still lots of room for furthe r

i m p ro v e me nt. 

Nei t her int e r na t io nal org a n i z a t io ns nor the U.S. go v e r n me nt came to the Balka ns

e nterprise without de f e c t s. The United Na t io ns lacked effective comma nd struc t u res and

p o l i t ical cons e nsus when it went into Bosnia. NATO suffered from an eno r mous capability gap in wartime between the United States and the Euro p e a ns, and it is ill-equipped

to deal with “spoilers” or to take on long-term custodial care. The European Un ion was

sluggish and absorbed with its own int e r nal pro b l e ms. The Org a n i z a t ion for Security and

C o o p e ra t ion in Europe (OSCE) lacked ins t i t u t io nal clout. The U.S. go v e r n me nt also had

i nt e r nal coord i na t ion pro b l e ms and hesitated to use its full power for lack of perc e i v e d

dome s t ic political support. 

T he int e r na t io nal community also suffered from misunde r s t a nd i ng of the pro b l e ms

with which it was de a l i ng. It failed to appre c iate the de g ree to which ethnic conflict in

t he Balka ns orig i nated not only in gra s s roots ant i p a t h ies but also in leadership effo r t s

to establish do m i na nc e, fueled in part by fo re ign support and int ra - g roup rivalrie s. Mo de rates who mig ht have avoided war were shoved aside and re nde red powerless. Hu ma ni t a r ian law proved not to be self-exe c u t i ng and pro v ided little count e r w e ig ht to

na t io nalist political ambitio ns. 

T he pro b l e ms proved particularly difficult on the civilian side, whe re the scope of

t he challenge the int e r na t io nal community faced in the Balka ns was vastly unde re s t ima t e d. State-building is cruc ial if peace is to be ma de self-sustaining and U.S. count e rt e r rorism and ant i - c r i me objectives are to be achie v e d. Military int e r v e nt ion fo rces plan

a nd pre p a re well befo re the sig n i ng of peace agre e me nt s, but their role is necessarily limi t e d. Military needs may even be ant i t he t ical in the short-term to the overall goal. In

B o s n ia, for exa m p l e, the military goal of establishing the Zo ne of Separa t ion between the

w a r r i ng parties contra d icted the overall goal of establishing a single Bosnian state. The re

was no pre p a ra t ion on the civilian side for the int e r v e nt ion in either Bosnia or Ko s o v o .

T he civilian impleme nters were the re fo re unable to take advant a ge of the early window of

opportunity pro v ided by initial military do m i na nc e. 

The balance between the

United States and the Euro p e a n

Union may need to be adjusted

so that the EU takes more of

the lead, but both need to

remain strongly engaged if the

region is to continue in the

right dire c t i o n .
5

T he civilia ns are particularly unpre p a red in the public security area. The re are no

s t a nd i ng police fo rces re a dy to deploy imme d iately in post-conflict situa t io ns. Even if the re

w e re, the lack of courts and prisons would nullify much of their effectivene s s. No ne of the

s e v e ral mo dels so far used for int e r na t io nal police fo rces has proved ent i rely satisfa c t o r y.

Una r med monitors in Bosnia, lig htly armed but small fo rces in Kosovo, and special polic e

units under military comma nd in both Bosnia and Kosovo have all had serious sho r tc o m i ng s. Mo re o v e r, the do c t r i ne under which these int e r na t io nal police fo rces opera t e

needs clarific a t ion. They have too often fo u nd the mselves trying to choose between “go o d

guys” (often the int e r na t io nal community surrogates in the war that pre c e ded the int e rna t io nal de p l o y me nt) and the “bad guys” (fo r mer ene m ies) ra t her than establishing the

rule of law. 

O nce on the gro u nd, int e r na t io nal int e r v e nt ion is necessarily a political as well as

a military pro c e s s. Peace in the Balka ns has proved to be war by other me a ns. The int e rnat io nal community needs to coord i nate its military and political effo r t s, even if the y

a re under separate comma nd s. This was do ne better and earlier in Kosovo than in Bosnia .

While the int e r na t io nal community re q u i res clarity about overall goals—to create a single state (as in Bosnia) or simply to create a state (as in Ko s o v o ) — t he parties on the

g ro u nd may not be re a dy to ackno w l e dge those go a l s. They need re a l i s t ic, int e r me d ia t e

goa l s. Just avoid i ng chaos may be a mo re appro p r iate imme d iate task, one to which the

p a r t ies can mo re readily agre e. Too much was spelled out in the Dayton agre e me nts on

B o s n ia, which limited the flexibility of the int e r na t io nal impleme nt e r s. The Ko s o v o

a g re e me nt spelled out in UN Security Council re s o l u t ion 1244 appro p r iately left mo re

a m b iguity and no time limit, as well as cre a t i ng a stro nger political ma na ger for the

peace pro c e s s. 

That process needs to stre ng t hen mo de rates and delegitimize ex t re m i s t s. The re is

no avoid i ng the tough task of re mo v i ng those for whom vio l e nce has been a legitima t e

p o l i t ical ins t r u me nt. Ig no r i ng this task both in Bosnia and Kosovo unde r m i ned the

respective int e r na t io nal missio ns. The jury is still out on the situa t ion in Ma c e do n ia, but

ex t remists the re may still have the upper hand; mo de rates in Ma c e do n ia are not firmly

in power. The int e r na t io nal community needs to have the me a ns — m i l i t a r y, polic e, invest igatory capability, laws, and pro c e du res—to defeat ex t remist fo rces as early as possible

after de p l o y me nt, when military do m i na nce is at its peak. 

This is particularly important for econo m ic de v e l o p me nt. In the imme d iate postc o n f l ict perio d, those with weapons cont rol the econo my as well as politic s. If they are

allowed to ma i ntain that cont rol, the prospects for legitimate econo m ic prosperity will

dim. Econo m ic growth needs to take place within an ins t i t u t io nal and legal fra me w o r k .

While some “gray ma r ket” activity may be legalized, it is a mistake to think that warl o rdism will lead in a ma r ket econo my dire c t ion. It is much mo re likely to turn in the

d i re c t ion of organized crime. Fore ign investme nt will follow if good cond i t io ns fo r

dome s t ic investme nt, inc l ud i ng a func t io n i ng banking system, are establishe d.

C o n c l u s i o n s

T he United States and its partners in Europe did not seek to int e r v e ne in the Balka ns but

fou nd the mselves repeatedly compelled to do so. This was not only a hu ma n i t a r ian quest ion but also a stra t e g ic one, in particular for Euro p e. Europe’s int e rest in Balka ns stability is clear and compelling. Ne i t her Europe nor the United States can affo rd to have

t he Balka ns become a haven for terrorists or a center for organized crime.

That said, European capabilities have improved since the 1990s, while the Un i t e d

States finds its int e rests at risk in ma ny other places and its security challenged by 

global terrorism. Without abando n i ng the Balka ns, the United States needs to look to

E u rope for mo re leadership, as it has alre a dy do ne with good results—at least for the

mo me nt—in Ma c e do n ia. 

[The peace] process needs 

to strengthen moderates and 

delegitimize ex t re m i s t s. There is

no avoiding the tough task of

rem oving those for whom

violence has been a legitimate

political instrument.
T he challenge will be to keep the United States and Europe re a d i ng from the same

mus ic, even if they are playing differe nt parts. This will not be easy. The re are import a nt diverge nces in thinking between Europe and the United States, and within Euro p e

as well, on issues like Kosovo final status, how to push re form in Belgra de, how far to

go in re i nt e g ra t i ng Bosnia, and how important it is to capture Hague ind ic t e e s. The s e

d i v e rge nces can be na r rowed and their cons e q u e nces ma na ge d, but it will take a cons c ious and cont i nu i ng effo r t .

T he lessons available from the Balka ns are compelling: effective int e r na t io nal int e rv e nt ion needs better planning, especially on the civilian side, and better coord i na t io n

between military and civilian effo r t s. The challenges on the gro u nd in post-conflict 

s o c ie t ies are eno r mous: separa t i ng combatant s, pro v id i ng hu ma n i t a r ian re l ief, re t u r n i ng

people ho me, re s u s c i t a t i ng the econo my, capturing war crimina l s, count e r i ng org a n i z e d

c r i me, establishing the rule of law. The ma na ge me nt of int e r na t io nal int e r v e nt ion re q u i re s

a political process under a clear, coord i nated struc t u re. The United States and Euro p e a n

Union need to share common objectives and to agree on a division of labor. Even if the

o v e rall goals are fa r - re a c h i ng, the effort needs re a l i s t ic, short-term benc h ma r k s. Pe r f e c t

de mo c racy is unlikely to eme rge quic k l y. State-building on fo re ign soil is not what mo s t

go v e r n me nts want to be do i ng. They would ra t her int e r v e ne and get out as quickly as poss i b l e, fundi ng assistance but leaving the tough issues to the people most directly 

a f f e c t e d. It would be nice if it worke d, but it did not in the Balka ns and is not likely to

work elsewhe re. A longer term commitme nt is re q u i red in those places whe re U.S. and

E u ropean int e rests are most at stake. 

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our website (www. u s i p . o rg), which has an

o n l i ne edition of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related websites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 8 3

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036

The lessons available from the

Balkans are compelling: effective

international intervention needs

better planning, especially on

the civilian side, and better

c o o rdination between milita r y

and civilian effo r t s.