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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

November 17, 2015 

v No. 321806 

Saginaw Circuit Court 

ERIC LAMONTEE BECK, LC No. 13-039031-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: BOONSTRA, P.J., and SAAD and HOEKSTRA, JJ. 

PER CURIAM. 

 Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of felon in possession of a firearm, MCL 

750.224f, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony firearm), MCL 

750.227b. He was acquitted of murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, and 

two felony firearm charges. The trial court departed from the recommended sentencing range 

under the now-advisory legislative guidelines and sentenced defendant as an habitual offender, 

fourth offense, MCL 769.12, to 240 to 400 months’ imprisonment for the felon in possession 

conviction and to a consecutive sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment for the felony firearm 

conviction. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm defendant’s convictions. However, in 

light of People v Steanhouse, __ Mich App, __; __ NW2d __ (2015), we remand for a Crosby1

hearing. 

 On June 11, 2013, Hoshea Pruitt was shot to death. Mary Loyd-Deal, a witness who died 

before trial, saw the shooting and identified defendant as the shooter in her preliminary 

examination testimony, which was presented to the jury. Loyd-Deal explained that defendant 

shot Pruitt after a verbal altercation about a woman named Rajeana Drain. The shooting was 

also witnessed by Jamira Calais. Although Calais could not identify defendant, she testified that 

she saw a man in a black shirt run across the street after a man in a white shirt was shot three or 

four times. She saw the man with the black shirt with a gun. The prosecution also presented 

testimony from Aaron Fuse, who testified that defendant called him a couple of days after 

Pruitt’s death and told Fuse that he had done “something stupid” and shot someone while 

arguing about a woman. 

 

1 United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2 2005). 
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 Defendant was charged with murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, 

felon in possession of a firearm, and three counts of felony-firearm. As noted, the jury convicted 

defendant of felon in possession of a firearm and one count of felony-firearm, but returned a 

verdict of not guilty with respect to murder, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, 

and the remaining two counts of felony-firearm. Defendant’s recommended minimum 

sentencing range under the legislative guidelines as a fourth-habitual offender, MCL 769.12, was 

22 to 76 months for felon in possession of a firearm. The trial court departed upward from this 

range and sentenced defendant to 240 to 400 months’ imprisonment for felon in possession of a 

firearm, which was to be served consecutively to a 5 year sentence for felony-firearm. 

Defendant now appeals as of right. 

I. SENTENCING 

 On appeal, defendant raises several challenges regarding the sentence imposed. First, 

defendant contends that the trial court impermissibly engaged in judicial fact-finding that 

increased the floor of his minimum sentencing range in violation of Alleyne v United States, __ 

US __; 133 S Ct 2151; 186 L Ed 2d 314 (2013). Specifically, defendant asserts that the trial 

court’s scoring of offense variables required the trial court to find facts beyond those established 

by the jury. Based on this required judicial fact-finding, defendant claims that he is entitled to 

resentencing. 

 Defendant failed to raise this judicial fact-finding argument regarding of the scoring of 

offense variables in the trial court, meaning that his Alleyne claim is unpreserved and reviewed 

for plain error affecting his substantial rights. See People v Lockridge, __ Mich __, __; __ 

NW2d __ (2015), slip op at 30. Recently, in Lockridge, the Michigan Supreme Court 

determined that Michigan’s sentencing guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment right to a jury 

trial insofar as they require a sentencing judge to find facts at sentencing that mandatorily 

increase the floor of the recommended minimum sentencing range under the legislative 

guidelines. Id., slip op at 1-2. To remedy this constitutional defect, the Lockridge Court held 

that the sentencing guidelines are now “advisory.” Id. at 36. However, while declaring the 

guidelines advisory, the Lockridge Court specified that an unpreserved claim of Alleyne error 

was subject to plain error analysis and that, under this standard of review, a defendant who 

received a minimum sentence that is an upward departure cannot show plain error “because the 

sentencing court has already clearly exercised its discretion to impose a harsher sentence than 

allowed by the guidelines and expressed its reasons for doing so on the record.” Id., slip op at 30 

& n 31. “It defies logic that the court in those circumstances would impose a lesser sentence had 

it been aware that the guidelines were merely advisory.” Id. Consequently, in this case, because 

defendant’s sentence was an upward departure, he cannot show plain error and he is not entitled 

to resentencing on the basis of judicial fact-finding regarding offense variables. See id.

 Next, with respect to sentencing, defendant also argues that the trial court could not 

consider Pruitt’s death when imposing a sentence because the jury found defendant not guilty of 

homicide. Contrary to these assertions, it is well-settled that a trial court may consider all the 

evidence admitted at trial when determining the appropriate sentence. See People v Shavers, 448 

Mich 389, 393; 531 NW2d 165 (1995). Indeed, a trial court may consider even acquitted 

conduct during sentencing, provided that the facts are proven to the judge by a preponderance of 

the evidence. See People v Ewing, 435 Mich 443, 451-452; 458 NW2d 880 (1990) (opinion by 
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BRICKLEY, J.); id. at 473 (opinion by BOYLE, J.); People v Compagnari, 233 Mich App 233, 236; 

590 NW2d 302 (1998). Consequently, in this case, we see nothing improper in the trial court’s 

consideration of defendant’s role in Pruitt’s death when crafting an appropriate sentence. The 

evidence introduced at trial included Loyd-Beal’s identification of defendant in her preliminary 

examination testimony along with other evidence establishing defendant’s identity as the shooter 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the trial court was free to consider defendant’s 

responsibility for Pruitt’s death as a circumstance surrounding defendant’s conduct when 

imposing the sentence for defendant’s felon in possession conviction. 

 Regarding the sentence imposed, defendant also contends that the trial court failed to 

justify the departure with substantial and compelling reasons. After defendant filed his appellate 

brief in the present case, our Supreme Court reached a decision in Lockridge, which, as described 

above, rendered the previously mandatory sentencing guidelines “only advisory.” Lockridge, slip 

op at 36. Relevant to defendant’s current arguments on appeal, in holding that the guidelines 

were now “advisory,” the Court specifically struck down the requirement that a trial court 

articulate substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the guidelines range as previously 

required under MCL 769.34(3). Lockridge, slip op at 29. Consequently, following Lockridge, 

we no longer consider whether a trial court articulated substantial and compelling reason to 

justify a departure; rather, a departure sentence will be reviewed on appeal for “reasonableness.” 

Id. Sentencing courts must still articulate justification for the departure sentence in order to 

facilitate appellate review; but resentencing will only be required when a sentence is determined 

to be “unreasonable.” Id. 

 The Lockridge Court did not elaborate on the meaning of “reasonableness.” The phrase 

was, however, recently considered by a panel of this Court. Specifically, in People v 

Steanhouse, this Court considered two possible approaches to understanding “reasonableness,” 

and concluded that Lockridge’s adoption of a reasonableness standard heralded a return to the 

proportionality principles in place before the enactment of the legislative guidelines as set forth 

in People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630; 461 NW2d 1 (1990) and its progeny. See People v 

Steanhouse, __ Mich App __, __; __ NW2d __ (2015), slip op at 23-24. Under this standard, we 

apply a “‘principle of proportionality’ test in order to determine whether a trial court abuses its 

discretion in imposing a sentence.” Id. at 23, citing Milbourn, 435 Mich at 634-636. 

 The principle of proportionality requires a trial court to impose a sentence that takes “into 

account the nature of the offense and the background of the offender.” Id., quoting Milbourn, 

435 Mich at 651. In this context, the sentencing guidelines serve as an advisory “barometer,” 

that assists the trial court in placing a given case on the “continuum from the least to the most 

threatening circumstances.” Id., quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 656-657. The trial court has 

discretion to depart from the sentencing guidelines when the trial court concludes that the 

guidelines are disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime. Id., citing Milbourn, 435 Mich at 

656-657. The court may consider a variety of factors when sentencing, including among others, 

(1) the seriousness of the offense; (2) factors not considered by the guidelines, such as the 

relationship between the victim and the aggressor, the defendant's misconduct while in custody, 

the defendant's expressions of remorse, and the defendant's potential for rehabilitation, and (3) 

factors that were inadequately considered by the guidelines in a particular case. Id. at 24 

(citation omitted). 
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 On appeal, we review the trial court’s sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion, and 

a trial court will be said to have abused its discretion “if that sentence violate[d] the principle of 

proportionality, which require[d] sentences imposed by the trial court to be proportionate to the 

seriousness of the circumstances surrounding the offense and the offender.” Id. at 23, quoting 

Milbourn, 435 Mich at 636. 

Where there is a departure from the sentencing guidelines, an appellate court's 

first inquiry should be whether the case involves circumstances that are not 

adequately embodied within the variables used to score the guidelines. A 

departure from the recommended range in the absence of factors not adequately 

reflected in the guidelines should alert the appellate court to the possibility that 

the trial court has violated the principle of proportionality and thus abused its 

sentencing discretion. Even where some departure appears to be appropriate, the 

extent of the departure (rather than the fact of the departure itself) may embody a 

violation of the principle of proportionality. [Id., quoting Milbourn, 435 Mich at 

659–660.] 

 In this case, the trial court sentenced defendant before the decisions in Lockridge and 

Steanhouse were issued. Consequently, the trial court articulated substantial and compelling 

reasons for departing, rather than focusing on the “reasonableness” of the sentence imposed. In 

these circumstances, the Steanhouse Court determined that a remand for a Crosby hearing is the 

appropriate remedy. Steanhouse, slip op at 25. Resentencing is not necessarily required incident 

to a Crosby hearing; rather, at a Crosby hearing the sentencing court, now fully informed of the 

new sentencing regime, determines whether or not to resentence. Lockridge, slip op at 33-36, 

citing Crosby, 397 F2d 117-118. In other words, “the purpose of a Crosby remand is to 

determine what effect Lockridge would have on the defendant's sentence, so that it may be 

determined whether any prejudice resulted from the error.” People v Stokes, __ Mich App __, 

__; __ NW2d __ (2015), slip op at 11. Under the new sentencing regime now in place, a 

defendant may face a more severe sentence at resentencing and, for this reason, a defendant is 

provided with an opportunity to avoid resentencing by promptly notifying the trial judge that 

resentencing will not be sought. Id. at 11-12. Consequently, in keeping with Steanhouse, we 

remand this case for a Crosby hearing following the procedures set forth in Lockridge. 

Steanhouse, slip op at 25. Defendant may elect to forego resentencing and must promptly notify 

the trial court of this decision. Id. “If notification is not received in a timely manner, the trial 

court shall continue with the Crosby remand procedure as explained in Lockridge.” Id. (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). 

II. DEFENDANT’S STANDARD 4 BRIEF 

 In a Standard 4 brief, defendant raises three additional arguments. First, relying on MCL 

769.11b, defendant argues that he was denied credit for 268 days served before his convictions. 

Contrary to defendant’s argument, the judgment of sentence clearly indicates that he was 

credited with 268 days in relation to his felony-firearm conviction. Defendant appears to believe 

that he was also entitled to this credit in relation to his felon in possession sentence or that, 

alternatively, the credit should have instead been applied to his felon in possession sentence 

rather than his felony-firearm sentence. But, as noted, defendant’s sentences are consecutive, not 

concurrent, and in these circumstances the jail credit was properly applied only to the felony-
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firearm sentence which, according to the judgment of sentence, is to precede his felon in 

possession sentence. See People v Cantu, 117 Mich App 399, 402-404; 323 NW2d 719 (1982). 

 Second, defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions 

beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, defendant contends that the prosecution presented no 

evidence to establish that defendant was present at the scene or that he possessed a gun. Further, 

defendant claims that, because the jury found him not guilty of murder, they could not convict 

him of felon in possession or felony firearm. Defendant also argues that trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to move for a directed verdict or a new trial. 

 We review de novo a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. People v Ericksen, 

288 Mich App 192, 195; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). When determining whether the prosecutor 

presented sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction, we consider the evidence in a light most 

favorable to the prosecutor to ascertain whether a rational trier of fact could find the defendant 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Tennyson, 487 Mich 730, 735; 790 NW2d 354 

(2010). Direct evidence as well as circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences arising 

therefrom can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. People v Nowack, 462 

Mich 392, 400; 614 NW2d 78 (2000). It is for the jury to determine witness credibility and to 

resolve any inconsistencies in the testimony; and, this Court will not interfere with the jury’s role 

as fact-finder. People v Harverson, 291 Mich App 171, 175, 179; 804 NW2d 757 (2010). 

Rather, “a reviewing court is required to draw all reasonable inferences and make credibility 

choices in support of the jury verdict.” Nowack, 462 Mich at 400. 

 In this case, defendant does not dispute that he was a felon ineligible to possess a firearm, 

and he does not dispute that someone at the scene possessed a firearm. Instead, defendant 

essentially argues that there was no evidence that he was identified as present during the crime or 

as being the person in possession of the gun. Defendant is correct in his assertion that identity is 

an element of every offense. People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 356; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). 

However, contrary to defendant’s arguments, there was sufficient evidence to establish his 

identity as the individual in possession of a gun at the scene. Calais, who was behind a turquoise 

car, saw an unidentified man shooting a gun before running away. Loyd-Deal stated that she saw 

defendant get out of a car that was the same color as the one in front of Calais. Loyd-Deal 

identified defendant as the man having a heated argument with Pruitt regarding Drain. And, 

most notably, Loyd-Deal testified that, after she heard a shot fired, she went to her window and 

she saw defendant shoot Pruitt three times. Indeed, Loyd-Deal testified that she saw defendant 

with a gun more than once during the incident. Fuse testified that defendant called him a couple 

days after Pruitt died and that, consistent with Loyd-Deal’s description of events, defendant told 

Fuse that he did something stupid and shot “someone” while arguing with a man over a girl. 

Thus, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude from the evidence presented that defendant was 

at the scene and in possession of a gun. Although on appeal defendant highlights inconsistencies 

in the evidence and in Loyd-Deal’s testimony in particular, these issues were for the jury to 

resolve.2

 See Harverson, 291 Mich App at 175, 179. Viewed in a light most favorable to the 

 

2

 There is also no merit to defendant’s assertion that his convictions were not supported by 

sufficient evidence simply because the jury returned a not guilty verdict with respect to open 
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prosecution, the direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as all reasonable inferences that may 

be drawn, was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions beyond a reasonable doubt. See 

Nowack, 462 Mich at 400. 

 Insofar as defendant asserts that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to 

move for a directed verdict or a new trial, his claims are without merit. To establish a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel a defendant must show “(1) that counsel's representation fell 

below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” 

People v Douglas, 496 Mich 557, 592; 852 NW2d 587 (2014) (quotation marks and citations 

omitted). The effective assistance of counsel is presumed, and the defendant bears the heavy 

burden of proving otherwise. People v Rodgers, 248 Mich App 702, 714; 645 NW2d 294 

(2001). Counsel is not considered ineffective for failing to make meritless arguments or for 

failing to pursue a futile motion. People v Riley, 468 Mich 135, 142; 659 NW2d 611 (2003); 

People v Ericksen, 288 Mich App 192, 201; 793 NW2d 120 (2010). 

 In this case, defendant argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance 

because he did not move for a directed verdict. However, such a motion would have been futile 

because the evidence discussed above, along with the physical evidence that Pruitt died of a 

homicide after he was shot at close range, provided a basis for a reasonable juror to convict 

defendant of the crimes for which he was charged, including murder. Counsel was not 

ineffective for failing to make a futile motion. Riley, 468 Mich at 142. 

 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting LoydDeal’s preliminary examination testimony and her 911 call at trial.3

 Specifically, defendant 

murder. Although it is not entirely clear from defendant’s argument, it appears to be his 

contention that there is some inconsistency in the verdicts that renders his convictions infirm. 

But, even supposing that there was some inconsistency in the verdicts, this would not entitle 

defendant to relief because “inconsistent verdicts within a single jury trial are permissible.” 

People v Wilson, 496 Mich 91, 100; 852 NW2d 134 (2014). Moreover, in this case, the jury’s 

verdicts are not necessarily inconsistent. The jury could have found credible Loyd-Deal’s 

testimony that defendant was present with a gun while at the same time they might have had 

reasonable doubts about Loyd-Deal’s statement that she saw defendant shoot Pruitt given that 

she also testified that she was in the kitchen on the phone when she initially heard shots fired. 

3

 Insofar as defendant challenges the admission of Loyd-Deal’s 911 call, defendant waived any 

error in this regard because it was defense counsel who introduced Loyd-Deal’s 911 call into 

evidence at trial. “Defendant may not assign error on appeal to something that his own counsel 

deemed proper at trial.” People v Barclay, 208 Mich App 670, 673; 528 NW2d 842 (1995). 

Further, decisions regarding what evidence to present are matters of trial strategy, People v 

Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 39; 755 NW2d 212 (2008), and it is clear that counsel was not 

ineffective for introducing this evidence because counsel used the 911 call to discredit LoydDeal’s testimony by asserting that she did not identify defendant during the 911 call as the 

shooter when events were “still fresh in her mind” and that she instead “developed the story 

about [defendant] after the fact.” We need not consider the 911 call further. 
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categorizes the evidence as inadmissible hearsay, he contends that Loyd-Deal was lacking the 

requisite mental capacity when she testified at the preliminary examination due to her poor 

health and, relying on MRE 403, defendant contends that this evidence was irrelevant and 

unfairly prejudicial. Defendant also argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

object to the admission of this evidence or to file a motion in limine for the exclusion of this 

evidence. 

 We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion. People v 

Duncan, 494 Mich 713, 722; 835 NW2d 399 (2013). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its 

decision falls outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Id. at 722-723. 

Preliminary questions of law, including whether a rule of evidence precludes admissibility of 

evidence, are reviewed de novo. People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 488; 596 NW2d 607 (1999). A 

court necessarily abuses its discretion when it admits evidence that is inadmissible as a matter of 

law. Id. 

 In this case, contrary to defendant’s arguments, Loyd-Deal’s testimony was plainly 

relevant. She was present at the scene, she observed defendant with a gun, and she testified that 

she saw defendant shoot Pruitt three times. Her testimony thus constituted evidence making it 

more probable that defendant was in possession of a gun and that he killed Pruitt. Because 

Loyd-Deal’s testimony was relevant to facts of consequence, it was generally admissible. See 

MRE 401; MRE 402. Further, although Loyd-Deal’s preliminary examination testimony 

constituted hearsay, see MRE 801, it was nonetheless admissible because Loyd-Deal was 

unavailable at trial and she testified at the preliminary examination, during which defendant had 

an opportunity and similar motive to develop her testimony on cross examination. See MRE 

804(a)(4); MRE 804(b)(1). 

 Nonetheless, defendant claims Loyd-Deal’s testimony was inadmissible because she was 

mentally incompetent. In support of this argument, defendant notes that Loyd-Deal testified 

during the preliminary examination from a hospital bed in the courtroom. Although it would 

appear that Loyd-Deal was in poor physical health at the time of the examination, and in fact 

died shortly thereafter, it is nonetheless true that “a witness is presumed to be competent to 

testify.” People v Flowers, 222 Mich App 732, 737-738; 565 NW2d 12 (1997). Under MRE 

601, “[u]nless the court finds after questioning a person that the person does not have sufficient 

physical or mental capacity or sense of obligation to testify truthfully and understandably, every 

person is competent to be a witness except as otherwise provided in these rules.” See also 

People v Breck, 230 Mich App 450, 457; 584 NW2d 602 (1998). There is no indication that 

Loyd-Deal lacked this capacity and the mere fact of her poor health does not, on its own, render 

her incompetent within the meaning of MRE 601.4

 

 

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 Insofar as defendant claims counsel should have objected to Loyd-Deal’s testimony on this 

basis, we note that it is defendant’s burden to establish the factual predicate for his claim. 

People v Carbin, 463 Mich 590, 600; 623 NW2d 884 (2001). Without evidence to support the 

assertion that Loyd-Deal was incompetent within the meaning of MRE 601, there is no factual 

support for defendant’s claim that counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to 
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 In addition, defendant argues that her testimony should have been excluded because it 

was unduly prejudicial and confusing. Even if relevant, evidence may be excluded if its 

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 

issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative 

evidence. MRE 403. See also People v Musser, 494 Mich 337, 356; 835 NW2d 319 (2013). 

Unfair prejudice exists when there is a tendency that the marginally probative evidence will be 

given undue or preemptive weight by the jury. People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 627; 790 

NW2d 607 (2010). We have no such concerns in the present case. Here, the testimony had 

significant probative value as substantive evidence of the crimes for which defendant was 

charged. It was certainly prejudicial to the extent that the jury could have relied on it to identify 

defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes; but, in this regard, “[a]ll relevant evidence is 

prejudicial,” and we see nothing unfairly prejudicial in this evidence which would require its 

exclusion. See People v McGhee, 268 Mich App 600, 613-614; 709 NW2d 595 (2005). Nor can 

we discern any basis for concluding that the evidence was so confusing as to substantially 

outweigh the significant probative value of the evidence. Consequently, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by admitting Loyd-Deal’s testimony. 

 Having concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting LoydDeal’s testimony, we also reject defendant’s assertion that his trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to the admission of this testimony based on the various reasons asserted by 

defendant on appeal. First, the decision to object is typically considered a matter of trial 

strategy, People v Matuszak, 263 Mich App 42, 58; 687 NW2d 342 (2004), and in this case the 

record shows that counsel did raise objections to portions of Loyd-Deal’s testimony and that 

counsel succeeded in having some of her testimony redacted before it was presented to the jury. 

Second, overall, the testimony that was ultimately admitted was admissible for the reasons 

discussed supra and counsel cannot be considered ineffective for failing to make meritless 

objections or for failing to pursue a futile motion in limine. See Riley, 468 Mich at 142; 

Ericksen, 288 Mich App at 201. 

 We affirm defendant’s convictions, but remand for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

/s/ Mark T. Boonstra 

/s/ Henry William Saad 

/s/ Joel P. Hoekstra 

object to her testimony on this basis. Thus, defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim 

must fail. See Carbin, 463 Mich at 600-601.