Making Peace Possible

NO. 161 | May 2020

PEACEWORKS

Illicit Drug Trafficking and Use in Libya

HIGHS AND LOWS

By Fiona Mangan
NO. 161 | May 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

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Peaceworks No. 161. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-803-6

JUSTICE, 

SECURITY & 

RULE OF LAW

ABOUT THE REPORT

Drug trafficking and drug use in Libya have increased significantly in the wake of the 

2011 uprising that ousted Muammar Gadhafi. This report explores how these illicit 

activities both feed off of and fuel the country’s conflict and instability. The research 

was supported by USIP’s Middle East and North Africa program with funding by the 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Bureau of the US Department of State.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Fiona Mangan is research director at Justice + Security in Transitions, where she 

focuses on organized crime, prison reform, justice, and security issues. A senior 

program officer at USIP from 2012 to 2016, she managed the Institute’s rule of law 

programming in Libya and Yemen. She continues to consult for USIP and is a fellow at 

University of South Carolina’s Rule of Law Collaborative.

Cover photo: Drugs are often transported across Libya alongside migrants packed 

into 4x4 vehicles such as this one heading north from Agadez, Niger, on June 4, 2018. 

(Photo by Jerome Delay/AP)
USIP.ORG 1

Contents

3 Drug Trafficking, Drug Use, and Libya’s Conflict Dynamics 

7 Drug Flows and Illicit Trafficking

16 Drug Use, Addiction, and Treatment

22 Drugs, Organized Crime, and Conflict

27 Paths Forward
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

Summary

Initially considered a triumph of the so-called Arab Spring, Libya is now defined 

by what seem to be contradictory tensions. On the one hand, illicit drug trafficking and smuggling have undercut the ability of the state to rebuild. On the other, 

its networks knit the fractured state together.

Looking at the country’s illicit economy before 2011 is crucial to understanding 

how drug markets have evolved and flourished. Since the late 1990s, Libya had 

been a transit zone and small market for drugs. The 2011 uprising upended the 

controlled disorder of that economy, and trafficking and smuggling became more 

decentralized, producing a significant increase in the flow of illicit drugs and a 

proliferation of local drug markets. The intricacies of the various flows shed light 

on who controls the markets, which areas are transit points and destinations, and 

how local actors intersect with external flows.

The hierarchy of profit and strategic importance of Libya’s illicit markets—not just 

in drugs but in weapons, migrants, and commodities such as fuel—has important 

implications for the country’s conflict dynamics. Drug trafficking overlaps and 

intertwines with almost all other flows in Libya’s complex illicit economy.

Ultimately, drug trafficking and use fuels and feeds off violence. Their profits sustain some communities, but creeping use and abuse trends harm others. Ignoring 

drug trafficking and use dynamics or blithely waiting to resolve them once the 

basics of peace and structural reforms have been achieved is no longer an option.

To address Libya’s drug trafficking and consumption dynamic, domestic policymakers and civil society, along with international donors and partners, will need to take 

into account several recommendations in determining the path forward, including 

understanding how Libya’s complex network of illicit markets are interconnected 

and feed off one another, providing viable economic and social alternatives to engaging in trafficking and drug use, and developing durable peace agreements that 

holistically address, rather than ignore, the corrosive impact of organized crime.
USIP.ORG 3

Illicit drug trafficking in Libya is not new. Nor is the recreational consumption of drugs. 

Both, though, have been reshaped in the wake of the country’s 2011 uprising, meriting 

analysis of how they relate to the ongoing conflict, both feeding from it and fueling it.

In the nine years since Libya’s 2011 uprising, hopes for a smooth transition that once 

soared have been dashed. Initially viewed as a central success of the so-called Arab 

Spring, the loose alliances that came together to oust Muammar Gadhafi—the country’s autocratic ruler for forty-two years—soon descended into fractious militias and a 

new political order that has failed to coalesce. The state has come to be defined by 

seemingly contradictory tensions: illicit drug trafficking simultaneously undercuts the 

ability of the state to rebuild even as its networks are among the few things that knit 

the fractured state together. Meanwhile, the focus of the international community has 

been on other illicit flows—principally human and fuel smuggling—even as drug trafficking has remained a hugely profitable, top-tier element of Libya’s criminal economy. 

The country also now houses a rapidly growing local market for drug consumption, 

These blocks of hashish were seized by authorities in Palermo, Italy, from a Libyan cargo ship in December 2015. (Photo by Gianni Cipriano/New York Times)

Libya has come to be 

defined by seemingly 

contradictory tensions: 

illicit drug trafficking 

simultaneously 

undercuts the ability 

of the state to rebuild 

even as its networks 

are among the few 

things that knit 

the fractured state 

together.

Drug Trafficking, Drug Use, and 

Libya’s Conflict Dynamics 
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

driving a new focus on Libya as a destination rather 

than just a transit hub. In the absence of a coherent 

government response to growing rates of drug use 

and addiction, militia groups have asserted a new role 

in addiction treatment and policing. Furthermore, a 

number of armed groups associated with the Ministry 

of Interior have taken note of the growing problem with 

youth drug addiction and intervened.

This report explores how illicit drug trafficking and 

use has shaped, and been shaped by, Libyan conflict 

dynamics. Researching illicit trafficking, smuggling, 

and particularly the flow and use of drugs presents 

obvious challenges. Figures involved in illegal activities in any country generally strive to conceal their 

motivations and methods, and even administration 

officials are often unwilling to speak about organized 

crime, embarrassed by their inability to police it. This is 

further compounded in an environment such as Libya, 

where social taboos and conflict intensify research 

risks. Nonetheless, it does not preclude the possibility 

of conducting research. Despite the sensitive nature of 

the topic, when approached with care and meticulously 

triangulated and corroborated, gathering information 

on organized crime and drug trafficking and use patterns is possible. Additionally, given growing concerns 

over illicit trafficking, sale, and use of drugs, many 

people are willing to talk when the correct conditions 

are provided.

This report builds on research on illicit trafficking carried out by the United States Institute of Peace in 2012 

and 2013.1

 More than two hundred individuals were 

interviewed for that study, across all key smuggling 

hubs in Libya and in Libya’s prisons and migrant detention centers. In the years that followed, hundreds of 

additional interviews were conducted in the course of 

broader rule of law work and research in Libya. Further 

dedicated research was conducted in 2018 and 2019 

on the topic of drugs specifically. A local research team 

provided key support, conducting qualitative research 

in Libya in the fall of 2018 and the spring of 2019.

Local researchers used a structured interview methodology based on prepared interview and focus group 

guides. Longer-form interviews used semi-structured and 

unstructured methodologies for in-person and telephone 

sessions, enabling interviewees to discuss in detail their 

areas of knowledge, guiding and tailoring discussion 

topics accordingly. In some cases, maps were used as a 

visual aid to assist in plotting smuggling routes and discussing geographic zones of importance and influence.

Interviewees included police, prosecutors, armed 

groups involved in policing and security functions, border guards, local armed groups, judicial police, airport 

and port officials, businesses involved in transport and 

shipping, drug treatment specialists (including psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers, and volunteers), 

addicts and recovering addicts, young people experimenting with drug use, detainees and migrants, community leaders, tribes, families and groups linked with 

smuggling activities, as well as international experts on 

Libya, North Africa, the Sahel, and organized crime.

ILLICIT ECONOMY IN TRANSITION

Looking back at Libya’s pre-2011 illicit economy is crucial to understanding how drug markets have evolved 

and flourished since the uprising. Gadhafi publicly 

espoused socialist notions of black markets serving as 

“people’s markets,” but in reality access to trafficking 

and smuggling networks was open to a chosen few 

only. As international sanctions, falling oil prices, and 

a deeply inefficient economy hampered the state’s 

ability to provide for its people, black markets and illicit 

smuggling became a way of quelling unrest. However, 

although all were encouraged to purchase smuggled 

goods, extracting wealth from criminal markets was 

restricted to a mixture of tribes, families, and communities close to Gadhafi. His administration controlled the 

country’s network of age-old smuggling routes through 

a number of political and economic bargains. He also 

used enforcement mechanisms that favored certain 

groups and commodities over others, which ebbed and 

flowed with diplomatic tides, and internal and external 
USIP.ORG 5

political shifts. Border control and law enforcement 

provided further opportunities for the state to extract 

wealth, rewarding some officials, tribes, families, and 

institutions with access to payoffs and bribes. This 

fostered a protection economy and institutionalized 

predation within the security sector.2

The 2011 uprising upended the controlled disorder 

of Libya’s illicit economy. In the immediate aftermath, 

Libya’s elite and protected class of tribes, families, 

and security officials found themselves relegated to 

the bottom rung. Having backed the losing side, many 

were suddenly disempowered. Absent the traditional 

administrative centers for controlling black markets, 

trafficking and smuggling became more decentralized.

A convergence of some key features of Gadhafi’s 

legacy and decisions made during the early transitional 

phase set the stage for a boom in smuggling. First, as 

mentioned, smuggling had become culturally embedded under the Gadhafi administration through his overt 

encouragement of a shadow economy and his administration’s tacit levers of control over trafficking and 

smuggling routes. A product of its geography, Libya sits 

at the center of long-established trans-Saharan trade 

routes, a nexus for trade crossing the Sahel to reach 

the Mediterranean and from the Maghreb into the 

Mashriq. It is home to desert, land, and sea routes in all 

directions that Gadhafi used and exploited, ultimately 

normalizing smuggling in Libyan society.

Second, after 2011, Libya’s fledgling government found 

itself with a collapsing security sector staffed with the 

remnants of Gadhafi’s old guard. The police force, 

military, and border guards were despised by many 

and mistrusted by most. Many abandoned their posts 

A revolutionary fighter walks through the captured town of Sirte on October 20, 2011, the day Muammar Gadhafi, who ruled the country for forty-two 

years, was deposed. (Photo by Manu Brabo/AP)
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

and went into hiding as thuwar (revolutionary armed 

groups) stepped in to take their place. Crucially, state 

weapons caches were emptied during the fighting 

and seized by armed groups and individuals. Thus, in 

a move driven both by political calculus and necessity, 

the transitional government sought to integrate the thuwar—then viewed as hxeroes—into the security sector 

rather than disarm and demobilize them. A briefly held 

belief was that injecting new revolutionary blood into 

Libya’s failing security sector could revitalize and legitimize the institutions in the eyes of the people.

Third, the thuwar that overthrew Gadhafi—many of 

whom now exert influence over the country’s smuggling routes—had no central command structure. The 

relative speed and fragmented nature of the uprising was such that revolutionary groups sprang from 

different localities and briefly and loosely coalesced 

to topple the regime. These groups were financed by 

and exerted influence in their localities and had links 

and alliances to other groups but no unifying leadership. The post-Gadhafi government began integrating 

disparate revolutionary armed groups into the security sector through transitional security entities such 

as the Supreme Security Committee and Combatting 

Crimes Committee, both associated with the Ministry of 

Interior, and Libya Shield, associated with the Ministry 

of Defense. Units were integrated wholesale under 

different ministries, receiving state salaries and legitimacy but never coming under any central command 

and control structure. The prospect of a salary proved 

to be an incentive for many who never participated 

in the uprising to put their name on lists submitted by 

armed group commanders. Thus, the process inflated 

rather than controlled armed group numbers.3

 In a 2017 

paper, Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw observe that

in this way, the growing militias—an irony in itself since 

the war was ostensibly over—were essentially given the 

financial platform to pursue their own agendas. . . . This 

reinforced the frenzied competition that required ever 

greater amounts of capital, “graduating” revolutionary 

brigades from political violence to resource predation.4

Finally, mixed into the ranks of these revolutionary 

brigades were members of drug dealing and trafficking 

gangs active in the local market and a broad mix of 

other criminal actors, some of whom counted among 

the estimated 17,500 prisoners who escaped from 

Libya’s prisons when they were opened during the 2011 

uprising.5 With access to weapons, and many gaining 

legitimacy by becoming quasi-state security actors, 

they were able to expand their criminal enterprises 

relatively unhindered.6

Thus, as central control over illicit trafficking routes and 

networks collapsed, localized conflicts erupted over 

control of smuggling activities and profits. Old players and 

new actors fought for control over illicit trade and, in some 

cases, fused. Absent top-level regime controls, which 

had influenced the nature and intensity of flows before 

2011, activities expanded in every sense. Most important, 

the injection of arms into the hands of smugglers and the 

general population altered the nature of smuggling in 

Libya, infusing new levels of violence into the trade.

The injection of arms into the hands of smugglers and the general population altered the nature of illicit 

trafficking in Libya, infusing new levels of violence into the trade.
USIP.ORG 7

Drug Flows and Illicit Trafficking

Stretching back to the late 1990s and early 2000s, 

Libya has been a transit zone and small market for 

drugs—most prominently for cannabis from Morocco. 

Before 2011, other drugs—including heroin and cocaine—had small, niche markets in Libya’s coastal cities 

but represented relatively small flows. After 2011, drug 

flows and local markets shifted significantly. Although 

Libyan authorities and smugglers tend to speak generally about “drugs,” a distinction must be made between 

illegal drugs and illicit flows of prescription medication. Discussion of drugs in this report refers broadly 

to substances controlled under the international drug 

control conventions. However, beyond those conventions, the illicit trafficking and nonmedical consumption 

of prescription drugs have experienced a huge uptick 

in Libya, mirroring broader global trends. Drug trafficking further intersects with other flows—both licit and 

illicit—creating a hierarchy of illegal markets that continue to evolve alongside conflict dynamics.

ILLEGAL DRUG FLOWS

Understanding the intricacies of various illicit drug flows—

cannabis, cocaine, ecstasy, amphetamines, and heroin—

provides insight into who controls the market, which geographic areas serve as transit points and destinations for 

certain drugs, and how local actors intersect with external 

flows. (The main trafficking routes for these substances 

into and out of Libya are shown in map 1 on page 12.)

Cannabis

Blocks of cannabis resin from Morocco, transiting Libya 

to Egypt and onward to Europe through the Balkans, 

are Libya’s most steady traffic. Shipments tend to flow 

through southern Algeria, sometimes dipping into 

A Libyan police officer inspects a haul of the prescription drug tramadol seized from a shipping container in Tripoli on March 3, 2011. (Photo by Chris 

Helgren/Reuters)
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

northern Niger, and enter the country through the 

so-called Salvador Pass, where the borders of Libya, 

Algeria, and Niger converge in an ungoverned stretch 

of desert (see figure 1). Most major shipments transit 

through or around the southern cities of Sebha, Ubari, 

Murzuq, and a constellation of smaller towns and farmlands in their surrounds. These are used as storage 

hubs and logistics centers for illicit flows of all kinds.

Weakened state control has allowed cannabis flows to 

surge in Libya today. As a Tuareg tribe member from Ghat 

who had family in the smuggling business observed:

Before the revolution there was plenty of hashish movement. But there was political control before. You needed a sort of permission from Senussi [Gadhafi’s former 

intelligence chief and brother-in-law] or someone like 

that. But now we are free to move. And the movement of 

hashish—like everything else—has gone up a lot. And the 

consumption is much higher too.

The largest consignments transit through southern Libya 

to Egypt directly along a number of established routes 

through the desert. These cross north of Kufra in southeastern Libya through transit hubs such as Tazirbu and 

Rebiana and onward into Egypt through a variety of crossing points. Transit is managed by smugglers from the Tebu 

or Tuareg tribes who guide and manage logistics for convoys of 4x4 vehicles through the desert terrain. Although 

flows occur all year, the largest consignments are usually 

between the end of winter and beginning of spring when 

conditions for movement through the desert are optimal.

Significant amounts of cannabis are also stored and 

trafficked to serve growing markets for hashish in Libya’s 

towns and cities. In southwestern Libya, a market for 

hashish exists in Sebha and southern cities. These 

locales are also a staging ground for flows northward 

through Ash Shwayrif, Brak al-Shati, and Bani Walid to 

western coastal cities and towns. To meet demands 

in eastern Libya, hashish transits either to Benghazi 

and surrounds from Bani Walid or north to Tobruk 

from southeastern Libya. Cannabis was the preserve 

of Libya’s wealthier coastal cities before 2011. Now, 

however, hashish consumption in Libya is a sizable and 

growing market, with robust markets in the major coastal 

cities and steady markets in most other towns.

Coastal cannabis flows through Libya’s seaports are 

also becoming more common. Some shipments transported from Morocco and Algeria enter the country by 

sea, primarily through the ports of Al-Khoms and Misrata 

in the west and Tobruk in the east. Habitual hashish 

smokers in Tripoli noted the addition of “Afghani” cannabis resin in their options for purchase over the past year 

and a growing availability of “Lebanese hashish” rumored to be laced with opium. “It comes from the sea and 

is a bit more expensive,” one user noted. Informants 

indicated that this new flow enters the country via shipments from Turkey to Al-Khoms and other western ports 

and through Tobruk. Finally, some cannabis is grown 

on family farms outside of main cities, then dried and 

smoked mostly for personal use.

Locations including Al-Khoms, Bani Walid, and Tobruk increasingly serve as storage and staging hubs for repackaging and onward transport of hashish being smuggled 

for sale in Libya’s coastal cities or directly to Europe. 

Regional organized crime specialist Mark Micallef posits 

that wealthy Libyan businessmen may be using these 

hubs to benefit from seasonal price fluctuations, purchasing cannabis at lower prices during the winter-spring transit season and storing it until prices are higher during low 

transit season. This aligns with observations from low-level smugglers with roots in Bani Walid, who observed that 

they often exploit the price differential in hashish when 

traveling back and forth to Tripoli, explaining that 

a one kilogram block of hashish from the storage centers in 

Bani Walid is around 1,500 Libyan dinar ($1,075). If you bring 

it to Tripoli, you can make 3,000 dinar ($2,150). And that’s 

just uncut. That’s just the simple monkey business—easy 

money. If you get it cut, you’ll make 9,000 to 11,000 dinar 

($6,450 to $7,885). But we usually don’t take that risk.7
USIP.ORG 9

Reference List of Drugs Commonly Consumed and Trafficked in Libya

Drug Street 

names Price range Description and Use in Libya

Cannabis Hashish, 

Gelub, Ajba

$1.50–$3 per 

3 cm stick

Plant used as a psychoactive drug. Both medical and recreational purposes. 

Either harvested and dried (weed) or its resin extracted before being pressed 

and shaped into blocks (hashish). Rising numbers of users. Primarily smoked. 

Most is hashish from Morocco, some Afghani and Lebanese. Small amounts 

grown on family farms.

Tramadol Trema, Trama $1.50–$3 per 

8-tablet strips

Potentially habit-forming opioid painkiller. Usual oral doses are 50 to 100 mg 

every 4 to 6 hours, maximum daily dose not to exceed 400 mg. A stimulant. 

Nonmedical use common globally. Euphoric effect at high doses, similar to 

nonmedical oxycodone. Associated with use during battle or checkpoint duty.

Clonazepam Roge Potentially habit-forming benzodiazepine. Used to relieve seizures, panic attacks, 

acute catatonic conditions, and restlessness by decreasing abnormal electrical 

brain activity. Marketed as Rivotril. Commonly used as an over-the-counter anti-anxiety treatment. Most common in pill form, but also available in liquid drops. 

Ecstasy + 

“other pills”

Ecsta, the 

king’s pill, “See 

you in a week”

$20–$30 

per pill

Hallucinogenic synthetic drug. Associated with young people.

Occasional-use party drug. Known for potency and long-lasting high and 

disassociated state.

Trihexyphenidyl Artane, Scaf Targets symptoms of Parkinson’s disease, such as tremors, but can have hallucinogenic or euphoric effects. Use reported by combatants, particularly in Iraq, 

to alleviate stress from combat. Brand names include Artane and Tremen.

Zolpidem Habit-forming sedative used to treat insomnia and anxiety. Various brand 

names, including Ambien, Ambien CR, Edluar, Intermezzo, and Zolpimist. 

Cocaine Coca, Samia $90–$100 

per gram

Addictive stimulant drug made from leaves of the coca plant. Consumption 

relatively low, mostly restricted to elites in larger cities.

Cough syrup 

+ alcohol

+ soda 

Purple drank, 

Purple haze

Combination of prescription strength cough medicine containing codeine and 

soda drinks. Produces a swooning euphoria and sedative effect. Generally 

mixed with alcohol.

Captagon Central nervous system stimulant similar to an amphetamine. Originally the 

trade name of a pharmaceutical preparation containing fenethylline, a synthetic stimulant. Listed as a Schedule 2 psychotropic substance by the UN in 

1986. Sales as a recreational drug continued into the 2000s. Market growing 

in Northern Africa.

Heroin Herwina, 

al-Hera

$45–$68 per 

gram (30% 

purity), $3–$5 

per gram (3% 

purity)

Opioid, usually injected. Can be chewed or smoked. Consumption low. Sold in 

larger cities. Purity and price varies significantly.

Inhalents 

and solvents

Huffing or inhaling solvents common among children and adolescents. Produces dizziness, relaxation, and hallucination, and loss of consciousness. 

Sources: UNODC, World Drug Report 2010; World Drug Report 2017, booklet 3, 15; World Drug Report 2018, booklet 1, 7; Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan. 

“Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses,” Peaceworks report no. 96, USIP, February 2014; Natalie Tecimer, “The Dangerous Opioid from 

India,” New Perspectives in Foreign Policy no. 15 (Spring 2018); Drug Enforcement Administration, “Fenethylline and the Middle East: A Brief Summary,” 

DEA-03046, September 2003; European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction, “Captagon: Understanding today’s Illict Market,” 2018; Christian Nellemann et al., ed., World Atlas of Illicit Flows (INTERPOL, RHIPTO, and Global Initiative, 2018); Council of the EU, “Regional Report for North Africa.”
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

This phase of work intersects with Libya’s now-infamous 

migrant flows. Once at its point of destination, cannabis 

is cut and distributed by operations that are owned by 

Libyans but whose day-to-day activities are often managed and run by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who 

act as workers and cashiers. Many of these migrants 

are willing to take on the risk of involvement in the illicit 

drug trade because it pays better than the wages they 

can earn in construction, domestic work, or other jobs. 

For example, the Gragsha section of Tripoli’s Gargaresh 

neighborhood—well-known for its warrens of small houses containing drug stores, cutting rooms, alcohol vendors, 

and prostitution—was raided in 2017, resulting in the 

arrest of numerous lower-level African migrant workers. 

Distribution then reverts back to Libyan hands, mostly carried out by low-level Libyan dealers and friend networks, 

“as most Libyans would not buy from an African,” one 

user and occasional low-level dealer explained.

Cocaine

Cocaine flows through Libya tend to be less frequent 

but move in large, heavily guarded convoys separate 

from other drug and illicit trafficking flows. In contrast 

to cannabis and pharmaceutical drug shipments, which 

often pass through numerous sets of hands as they 

are sold up the value chain, cocaine tends to move 

in consignments controlled from its point of origin. 

These flows originate in Latin America, and transit via 

sea or air to West Africa, where they move through the 

Sahel and into Libya (see figure 2). In Libya, transport 

is seasonal, toward the end of winter and beginning 

of spring. Interviews with communities involved in 

Map 1. Main Illegal Drug Trafficking Routes

Map by Vita Obscura Design
USIP.ORG 11

smuggling in southern Libya, and other researchers, revealed that communities, other smugglers, and militias 

are paid to remain off the routes on key dates when 

such convoys are due. This allows convoys rapid, unencumbered progress through the desert to the coast, 

where shipments are then believed to be transported 

to mainland Europe. However, as conflict dynamics in 

southern Libya and banditry in northern Niger have 

made security arrangements less predictable, overland 

cocaine flows through Libya have dropped. Alternative 

routing involves use of coastal shipments from Latin 

America either to West Africa and onward via sea 

to North Africa and to Europe, or directly from Latin 

America to North Africa and onward.8

Before 2016, North Africa made up only 11 percent of 

cocaine seizures in Africa.9 Since then, however, based 

on seizures in 2016, cocaine quantities increased 

sixfold, and about 69 percent of the continent’s seized 

cocaine is now found in North Africa.10 Many believe 

this indicates a growing maritime delivery network 

connecting flows from Latin America to West Africa and 

onward to Europe, through coastal shipments linking 

Morocco, Algeria, and Libya in North Africa.

Libya is solely a transit country for high-quality cocaine. 

There is little evidence to indicate that any significant 

amounts are peeled off to serve local markets. A

very small flow, however, serves a nascent market of 

less-pure cocaine trafficked by West African migrants, 

who often smuggle small quantities to pay for transit 

through the Sahel and Libya to Europe.11 A separate 

small-scale flow of high-quality cocaine purchased in 

Europe occasionally arrives with business and political 

travelers and their security teams. Consumption, rare 

as it is, is generally for personal use or use by close 

acquaintances.12

Ecstasy and Amphetamines

Libya is both a transit country and a small market for 

ecstasy and amphetamine-type stimulants. The primary 

transit route is through Libya’s ports, and occasionally 

airports, from East and Southeast Asia moving east and 

west to Tunisia and Egypt, and southward toward larger 

markets for such products in West Africa. Small amounts 

serve a market for ecstasy in Libya’s larger towns and 

coastal cities. Ecstasy shipments tend to be in smaller 

parcels or contained within shipments of other commodities and electrical goods, and travel alongside 

other licit and illicit trade on overland routes. Reports 

indicate that the ports of Tripoli, Al-Khoms, Misrata, 

Benghazi, and Tobruk are most relevant for this trade.13

Heroin

Libya had a confined but serious heroin problem 

in the late 1990s and early 2000s, as will be discussed later. Before 2006, the United Nations Office 

of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) assessed that heroin 

use in Libya was between 0.1 and 0.3 percent of the 

population.14 Currently, however, the market is quite 

limited. Interviews indicate that flows into and through 

the country are low. Heroin production is centered in 

Afghanistan. From there it travels through to India, and 

from India to East Africa and West Africa, from which 

it is transported up to North Africa.15 Heroin is also 

transported to the Middle East and then on to Egypt.16

In Libya, it is largely trafficked through Sebha or enters 

the country in small amounts from Egypt.17 Occasional 

shipments also enter the country from Europe via seaports, including Al-Khoms.18

 In 2010, heroin production in Afghanistan declined 

slightly, reducing trafficking worldwide.19 By 2017, however, Afghanistan’s production rebounded and reached 

record levels.20 This has resulted in a global oversupply 

and increasing attempts by traffickers to target African 

Once at its point of destination, cannabis is cut and distributed by operations that are owned by Libyans 

but whose day-to-day activities are often managed and run by migrants from sub-Saharan Africa who act 

as workers and cashiers.
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

countries as a potential growth market rather than 

just as transit states. This is clearly in evidence along 

the East African seaboard and merits broader caution 

continent-wide, particularly given surging opioid and 

prescription drug abuse and attendant risks for transition to heroin use.21

PHARMACEUTICAL SMUGGLING

Perhaps the most significant expansion in Libya’s drug 

market and transit flows is a booming business in pharmaceutical smuggling. Customs officials at Libya’s ports 

and airports report that they only occasionally open 

shipping containers, either for random inspection (when 

they receive a tip-off) or when paperwork raises concerns. Despite the infrequency of inspections, shipments 

of millions of pills have been seized regularly since 2012.

Two routes for pharmaceuticals exist in Libya, one coastal 

and one overland (see map 2). The vast majority comes 

into the country via its ports and, to a lesser extent, 

airports. These serve booming markets in all of Libya’s 

coastal cities and towns. Eastern flows also extend into 

Egypt, which has a massive market, and both out of and 

into Tunisia. Some consignments also move south to 

markets in southern cities. There the market mixes with 

pharmaceuticals smuggled from West Africa northward 

and through the Sebha area.22 According to one smuggler, a carton of tramadol strips can be acquired for €300 

($340) in Nigeria and sold in Sebha for €4,500 ($5,100).23

Prescription medication is imported into Libya by a 

broad array of groups—from criminal gangs to business leaders to armed groups—all seeking profit from 

Map 2. Main Pharmaceutical Trafficking Routes

Map by Vita Obscura Design
USIP.ORG 13

a booming market. The role of pharmacies is important 

to highlight. The Ministry of Health provides oversight 

of Libya’s pharmacies, which are supposed to request a 

written prescription from customers and record all prescription medication sales. In Libya, however, purchasing 

prescription medication without a prescription from a 

doctor occurs frequently and with ease, according to 

many interviewees. Low-level smugglers reported that 

many pharmacists supplement their income by importing black-market pharmaceuticals from Asia and selling 

them under the counter at their pharmacies. Some pharmacists are also involved in importing medication that 

they then sell to other black-market distributors.

Flows include enormous quantities of painkillers—most 

prominently tramadol, produced in India, Pakistan, and 

China—and psychiatric medication, sleeping pills, and 

others. Boxes of pills are often smuggled alongside 

and mixed with broader contraband flows. Larger quantities can travel in dedicated truckloads. Before 2011, 

the primary entry point for tramadol into North Africa 

was Egypt, where it served a large domestic market 

and was trafficked south through Africa and east into 

Gaza. Egyptian authorities clamped down on such trafficking in 2011 and 2012, a period that coincided with 

the collapse of Libya’s security sector. This resulted in 

Egypt’s large-scale illicit flows rapidly diverting course 

to Libya, a dynamic that remains in place.24

A HIERARCHY OF ILLICIT MARKETS

The hierarchy of profit and strategic importance of illicit 

markets—weapons, drugs, and smuggling of subsidized goods—has evolved and shifted over time and 

has had important implications for conflict dynamics.

At the base of the hierarchy, smuggling in livestock, 

consumer goods, and subsidized goods is an economic mainstay of many communities along Libya’s borders. Such goods include camels and other livestock, 

sugar, flour, rice, oil, manufactured goods, cigarettes, 

and cars. As the country has sunk into economic crisis 

in the years since the 2011 uprising, funding for goods 

subsidized by the state has been lowered. This has 

affected ordinary Libyans and the smuggling economy 

alike, disrupting and reducing livelihoods.25 Routes and 

modes of transport for this type of smuggling often 

overlap with drug smuggling, particularly pharmaceutical flows, smaller consignments of hashish, and the 

movement of migrants northward through Libya.

Fuel smuggling, which is also a category of subsidized 

goods in Libya, should be considered separately given 

its status as a hugely profitable enterprise for both lower-level land-border smugglers and larger-scale diesel 

smugglers. Specialized fuel smuggling is a top-level 

criminal activity garnering millions of dollars per year 

for the militia leaders involved. One long-established 

route runs between the western towns of Zawiya and 

Zuwarah and Malta, Spain, Italy, Greece, and Turkey, 

exiting Libya carrying fuel and returning with alcohol 

and an array of other goods, and involving Libyan 

groups, Sicilian mafia, and others, including groups 

under the internationally recognized Government 

of National Accord.26 In eastern Libya, Field Marshal 

Khalifa Hafter’s Libyan Arab Armed Forces and associated armed groups are involved.27 Targeted Italian law 

enforcement operations since 2017 have had some 

effect in reducing large-scale fuel smuggling, particularly from western Libya.28

Several overlaps between drug and human smuggling 

flows are clear. Pharmaceutical drugs and small consignments of cannabis often travel alongside migrants 

in packed 4x4 cars and trucks. Further, migrants occasionally carry small amounts of cocaine or other drugs 

to pay for their journey. USIP’s 2012–13 study placed 

migrant smuggling on the next rung of the hierarchy of 

trafficked commodities; the migrant crisis in intervening 

years and responses to it have shifted the situation 

significantly. Although the country had long been both 

a destination for migrants and a launch point for travel 

to Europe, migrant smuggling and trafficking surged 

as Gadhafi-era controls dissipated and militia dynamics entered the picture.29 Wealthier migrants fleeing 
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

violence in Syria and Iraq also injected new levels of 

profit alongside steady flows from sub-Saharan Africa. 

Libya became the focus of attention as the so-called 

central Mediterranean route to Europe.30

Efforts to stem migrant flows—particularly by the 

European Union and Italy—initially further commodified 

migrants by engaging with Libyan security and migrant 

detention agencies, many with significant militia involvement, known records of abuse, and a track record of extorting migrants.31 In response to pressure by the EU to 

stem the northward movement, Libya’s southern neighbor Niger introduced a law in 2015 criminalizing human 

smuggling across borders and restricting the transport 

of non-Nigerien migrants in border areas. Research 

indicates that this has driven migrant smugglers into 

closer association with more illicit trafficking networks.32

These elements have also driven up the profit, risks, and 

strategic importance of human smuggling within Libya’s 

hierarchy, placing it on par with or above many types 

of drug smuggling. However, the tide began to turn in 

2017 and 2018 when UN sanctions on six top human 

smugglers, combined with international and domestic 

efforts to curb flows, saw many militia groups reduce or 

abandon activities in this sphere.33

Interestingly, around the same time that human and fuel 

smuggling activities decreased, Italian law enforcement 

began to detect an increase in coastal drug movements 

centered on Libya, indicating a transition to an expansion 

of activities in a different illicit market as the environment 

for human and fuel smuggling hardened. As Mark Micallef 

WEAPONS

DRUGS

SMUGGLING 

GOODS FROM

AND INTO LIBYA

MIGRANTS

Heroin

Pharmaceuticals

Cocaine

Cannabis

Ecstasy

Figure 6. Shifting Intersections and Hierarchy of Trafficked Commodities
USIP.ORG 15

observes, “This is not to say that the decline of sea bound 

fuel smuggling and human smuggling created a coastal 

drug trafficking industry. . . . But the sudden collapse of 

these enterprises . . . was a catalyst for the intensification 

of narcotics shipping along [Libya’s] west coast.”34

Drug trafficking itself spans the middle of the hierarchy, 

splitting into flows of varying value and levels of protection—from highly insulated, occasional, high-value 

consignments of cocaine to boxes of pharmaceutical 

drugs loaded on trucks alongside other goods. Drug 

trafficking overlaps and intertwines with almost all other 

flows in Libya’s complex illicit economy.

Finally, weapons trafficking sits atop and influences all 

other flows in and through the country. Although flows 

have slowed from their peak, Libya remains a vibrant 

market for arms and a transit country. Between 2011 and 

2013, vast stockpiles of heavy weapons closely held during the Gadhafi era spread through the country, outward 

to Syria and down through the Sahel and across Africa. 

Downturns in trafficking of Gadhafi-era small arms and 

heavy weapons began in 2014, aligning with increased 

domestic volatility that reduced the willingness of armed 

groups to part with their arsenals. Export of heavy 

weapons has now almost entirely ceased. Indeed, from 

mid-2014 on, different groups around the country have 

sought to acquire more arms and especially ammunition.35 The import market is vibrant for small arms—assault rifles, pump-action shotguns, and pistols, including 

blank firing pistols imported from Turkey and converted 

to fire live rounds.36 Since conflict intensified with the 

launch of Haftar’s campaign against western Libya and 

Tripoli in April 2019, conflict parties have received fresh 

injections of arms—including heavy weapons and even 

mercenary forces—from international backers who have 

increased their military support for Libya’s warring factions, especially since the beginning of 2020.

Most important in this discussion, the injection of 

arms has transformed smuggling and illicit trafficking 

in Libya. Before 2011, protection for smugglers emanated from payoffs and connections with the central 

state administration. Smugglers were rarely armed. 

Conversations with smugglers in 2013 revealed major 

changes: trafficking was evolving based on increasingly violent competition between localized armed 

groups and tribes vying for control along trafficking 

routes and in smuggling hubs across the country. This 

trend continues. The spread of arms has transformed 

smuggling and as a result Libya now houses a lively 

market for protection. Additionally, flows of Libyan 

arms southward across the Sahel have injected similar 

dynamics in Niger, Mali, and farther afield.37 Absent 

the controls of a central state, a number of protection 

economies have developed. How protection overlaps 

with different types of drug trafficking is illustrative:

• Direct protection. Hashish smuggled through 

Libya’s southern desert to Egypt moves under the 

protection of tribal smuggling guides who, given 

their control and knowledge of desert routes, directly run smuggling activities. They are paid for their 

protection and for guiding convoys.

• Taxation for safe passage. Lorries and 4x4s loaded 

with smuggled pharmaceuticals may bribe or pay 

a fee to armed groups dominant in a given town or 

along a smuggling route for safe passage through a 

particular area.

• Extortion. Smugglers and businesses in Libya may 

enter into an agreement with authorities and militias “providing security” at a key port or airport to 

arrange for the secure inbound or outbound flow of 

consignments of drugs and the assurance that their 

containers will not be searched.38
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

Drug Use, Addiction, 

and Treatment

Getting an accurate picture of drug use, addiction, and 

treatment in Libya both before and after 2011 is important to understanding trends in drug consumption. 

Nevertheless, gathering such information is challenging. The government under Gadhafi paid little attention 

to monitoring, treating, or combating drug addiction. 

Whatever data was gathered was rarely accessible, 

and research on the topic was generally not welcomed. 

Additionally, Libya’s relatively closed, conservative 

society has meant that addiction is often hidden behind 

closed doors and dealt with from within the family 

or tribe. As the UNODC observed in 2013, “Under 

Gadhafi, Libya’s drug problem was largely ignored. 

Now we’re starting from scratch trying to pull together 

hospital records and data from prisons but so far it’s 

been impossible to get a handle on the situation.”39 A

number of addiction specialists noted that hospitals 

and clinics often went out of their way to avoid recording medical data about addiction, given concerns over 

associated stigma and also a sense that data stored 

was vulnerable to use by the administration. For example, a patient admitted with severe addiction-related 

health concerns might be recorded as suffering from 

kidney failure without mention of the cause. 

BEFORE 2011

Although information is limited, research interviews and 

data suggest that drug use was prevalent under the 

Gadhafi regime and has increased since the uprising. 

The few related public estimates are linked to research 

on HIV rates, a body of work that gained prominence following the largest purported hospital outbreak of HIV in 

1998 in Libya. The case garnered significant international 

attention because it resulted in the arrest and nine-year 

detention of six international health workers implicated in the scandal.40 Interviews with current and former 

drug treatment specialists, psychiatrists, psychologists, 

health workers, and former addicts revealed concerning patterns of drug use. One treatment professional 

observed that “the drug problem in Libya was not clear 

until the addiction treatment department was opened at 

the psychiatric hospital in Tripoli in 1992. They had anticipated alcohol or cannabis abuse cases, but everyone 

was surprised that 90 percent of cases sought voluntary 

treatment for heroin addiction.” A number of studies in 

the late 1990s and early 2000s focused on soaring HIV 

infection rates of 87 percent among people who were 

injecting drugs in Tripoli—the highest rate recorded 

globally.41 Medical research conducted in 2010 revealed 

that high rates of HIV infection may have resulted from 

logistical and cultural taboos that made getting clean 

needles particularly challenging. The study noted that

[85%] of PWID [people who inject drugs] reported having 

shared needles in the past, 29% in the past month, and 

18% at last injection. More than a third of all PWID reported having shared drugs in a high equipment sharing 

situation (ie, shooting galleries, prison, or as injection by 

a dealer) in the past month.42

In the mid-1990s, the Irada Clinic at Benghazi Psychiatric 

Hospital opened and witnessed a similar influx of injecting drug users with high rates of HIV/AIDS and Hepatitis 

B and C infection, many of them residents of Tripoli 

and western regions. In 2000, the General Directorate 

for Drug Control opened the Center for the Care, 

Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts in Tripoli’s 
USIP.ORG 17

Tajoura neighborhood, offering more comprehensive 

psychological support, access to social workers, and 

job-training programs. The government also launched 

education campaigns centered around intravenous 

drug use and the HIV/AIDS outbreak to some effect. 

Observations by treatment specialists and medical 

researchers both reinforce the view that heroin use has 

fallen in Libya and continues to be relatively low.43

More broadly, recreational drug use was not uncommon, particularly smoking hashish, but remained a 

relatively hidden activity mostly engaged in by young 

men. Nonmedical prescription drug use was also present, mostly under-the-counter painkillers, antidepressants and anti-anxiety medication such as Clonazepam, 

known as roge. A small market for cocaine, ecstasy, 

and other “party drugs” existed, mostly for occasional 

use by more wealthy and liberal groups in larger cities.

AFTER 2011

Almost all interviewees agreed that Libya has seen a 

marked increase in drug use in the nine years since the 

2011 uprising. The reasons and nature of use are manifold. First, as discussed, once administration controls 

over smuggling collapsed, activity along established 

trafficking routes surged. Second, with security in flux, 

the purchase, sale, and use of drugs became less risky. 

As one young person explained,

Smoking hashish has gone way up. It’s more accessible. 

Before you needed to be linked to that kind of circle. But 

now you can sometimes even smell it in the streets. . . . 

You’d be surprised by how many and who take drugs now. 

Women, old and young. Culturally things are shifting a bit.

The results of two focus groups on drug use conducted 

with male and female youth groups in Tripoli—though 

People wait for prescriptions to be filled at a pharmacy in Tripoli’s Al-Khadra Hospital on January 8, 2020. Many pharmacists supplement their income by 

importing black-market pharmaceuticals and selling them under the counter. (Photo by Mahmud Turkia/AFP/Getty) 
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

by no means scientific—illustrate broader trends gathered from other interviews with drug users

Drug use among young people has increased but 

much of it remains within the frame of experimentation. 

Middle-class Libyan youth described parties on family 

farms or in friends’ houses, weighed the benefits of 

smuggled Absolut vodka versus homemade alcohol, 

and discussed smoking joints, popping occasional 

ecstasy pills (if someone gets their hands on them), and 

even imbibing “purple drank,” a mixture of prescription 

cough medicine, codeine, alcohol, and Sprite soda. “It’s 

all sort of trendy: using drugs, drinking alcohol, even 

being gay. But heroin, cocaine, and pills . . . with my 

friends that’s a big no-no.”

However, a darker side of drug use—creeping dependence and addiction—is increasingly notable as 

well. Addiction specialists report shifting dynamics in 

patient profiles. Although the dominant category of addicts is still young men ages eighteen to forty, increases are significant among women and much younger 

patients, notably children of middle-school and 

high-school age. Children as young as ten or twelve 

are accessing tramadol, easily purchased alongside 

sweets and cellphone credit from small shops in most 

cities for two to three dinar ($1.50 to $2) or less per 

strip of pills. For women, addiction often begins with 

self-medication. One younger woman explained that 

“taboos around mental health persist, so there’s a lot 

of self-diagnosis and a lot of people start taking things 

through that route.” Anti-anxiety medication, sleeping 

pills, and painkillers are pervasive among female users, mostly purchased under the counter from pharmacies or quietly shared among friends.

Militia groups and conflict actors are another significant group of habitual drug users. The prescription 

painkiller tramadol, and to a lesser extent the stimulant Captagon, are popular. Cheap and easily attainable, they ease pain, act as a stimulant, and, in large 

doses, produce a euphoric effect that many fighters 

believe increases energy and bravery. Militias report 

using tramadol to stay alert and stave off anxiety while 

manning checkpoints and on the frontlines of Libya’s 

frequent outbursts of violent conflict. Although some 

interviewees reported that “all fighters take it [tramadol] and some militias even import it so that commanders give it out to control them,” in reality, distribution 

and consumption is more likely rooted in the rank and 

file. As one militia-associated youth put it,

Each militia is really just a group of friends. And in all 

groups, you have the bad friend . . . the one who knows 

how to get things. Most of it [drug use] is not supported 

from above, because the heads are Islamic. But there’s no 

doubt that the dealers are always active on the frontlines.

A wide array of drugs other than tramadol are popular 

within militia circles. Hashish and alcohol consumption 

are common, as well as many prescription drugs, including an anti-tremor medication used to treat Parkinson’s 

disease known in Libya by its brand name Artane (trihexyphenidyl), Clonazepam, and sleeping pills.

TRAUMA AND DRUG USE

The conflict dynamics that have marked the country 

since the 2011 uprising have reshaped drug consumption. Running through the different strands of drug use 

in Libya are clear markers of trauma: children raised in 

conflict, women suffering from depression and anxiety, 

and youth self-medicating to cope with pain, to feel 

brave, to relax, to sleep, to escape. For one psychosocial support worker, the effects of progressive waves of 

conflict on the population over nine years is clear: 

People don’t smile anymore. People are living with tension. 

They are quick to anger and drug use is just one coping 

mechanism. Violence has increased in schools. Domestic 

violence is up. We don’t sleep so many nights and we ask 

our kids to stay ready in case we need to leave because 

of fighting. . . . And the things these young men have seen 

and done. We’ve treated former fighters, raped women, 

raped men, tortured people. . . . And that was just the start 

after the conflict.
USIP.ORG 19

TRAMADOL IN AFRICA

A Lesser-Known Opioid Epidemic?

“Tramadol is something we had barely heard about before the revolution. Back then it was just hashish. 

Now it’s everywhere.”

Tramadol is a potentially habit-forming opioid painkiller used to treat moderate to severe pain.a

 It is a stimulant, allowing people to feel high-functioning, and when taken in large doses can produce a euphoric effect. 

Unlike Captagon—another pharmaceutical drug synonymous with use in conflict zones such as Iraq and 

Syria but banned in the 1980s—tramadol is appealing because it lacks regulation, so production is cheap.b

Theories about how tramadol use was introduced in Libya are numerous. Some assert that youth who fought 

in the 2011 uprising were given opioid painkillers as a course of treatment for their injuries and became addicted. Others note that Egyptian migrant laborers have long used tramadol to self-medicate for pain, introducing the trend to Libya before 2011. Many espouse conspiracy theories of how Gadhafi and his loyalists 

intentionally flooded the country with pills to sabotage revolutionary dreams. In reality, the reasons people 

initially take tramadol are likely varied—much like opioid addiction in the United States or anywhere else: 

for some, it might be after an injury or medical procedure, for others, recreational drug use with friends, or 

recommended by a colleague for aches and pains. Addiction to tramadol and other opioid painkillers, like 

other nonmedical prescription drug use, can be insidious because many view prescription medicines as 

safer or less nefarious than scheduled substances, but addiction can be rapid. As one study notes, “Particularly in countries whose legislative systems are based on Islamic notions of justice with an injunction against 

psychoactive substances and where public codes of morality tend to condemn ‘intoxication’ as ‘haram’ or 

unacceptable, an opportunity opens up for moderately powerful substances that come with a medical alibi.”c

Libya’s sharp rise in tramadol trafficking and use is part of a larger regional trend. The UN Office of Drugs 

and Crime has repeatedly drawn attention to “epidemic proportions” of nonmedical use of prescription 

drugs in recent editions of its annual World Drug Report. The 2018 edition observes that although “the opioid 

crisis in North America is rightly getting attention. . . . However, we need to raise the alarm about addiction 

to tramadol, rates of which are soaring in parts of Africa.”d Yet many question what policy solutions should 

be undertaken to address this complex problem, noting that tighter regulation may reduce access to one of 

the few cheap, accessible analgesics on a continent where a significant proportion of the population remain 

underserved by medical care and pain management.e

Notes

a. Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses,” Peaceworks report no. 96, USIP, February 2014, 13. 

b. Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu, “There’s an opiod abuse problem unfolding in African cities and it’s not getting the attention it needs,” Quartz Africa, March 16, 2018. 

c. Axel Klein, “Drug Problem or Medicrime? Distribution and Use of Falsified Tramadol Medication in Egypt and West Africa,” Journal of Illicit Economies and Development 1, no. 1 (January 14, 2019): 52–62.

d. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, booklet 1.

e. Ernest Yorke et al., “Tramadol: A Valuable Treatment for Pain in Ghana and Nigeria,” Current Medical Research and Opinion 35, no. 5 (May 4, 2019): 777–84.
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

“Emptiness is a killer,” a security officer in Ubari observed, capturing a pervasive sense of hopelessness 

that echoed through all interviews and feeds drug use 

and addiction cycles in Libya, from middle-class kids 

experimenting on a weekend evening, to fearful parents worrying about safety and their children’s futures, 

to adrenaline-filled fighters who find it hard to relax or 

sleep. The highs of Libya’s so-called revolution have 

been replaced by the lows of protracted conflict. War 

has reduced already limited job prospects and positive 

recreational outlets are few in Libya. A young female 

NGO worker in Tripoli noted that, in her view, 

No one cares about education now. If you graduate it’s not 

like there are any jobs, so everyone is dropping out and 

joining in smuggling or joining a militia to at least get a salary. 

. . . [or] a sense of belonging. And then many of them get into 

drugs there. The youth here, we’re a ticking time bomb. In 

the past eight years no one has cared about this generation 

and what they’ve seen. It’s a time bomb and it will explode.

TREATMENT OPTIONS

As described, a limited set of drug treatment facilities 

provided care prior to the uprising. These included 

the Ziad unit at Tripoli’s Al Razi Psychiatric Hospital, 

Irada Clinic at Benghazi Psychiatric Hospital, and the 

General Directorate for Drug Control Center for the 

Care, Treatment and Rehabilitation of Drug Addicts 

in Tripoli’s Tajoura neighborhood, which had a criminal justice component. After the uprising, the limited 

support systems for drug addiction crumbled: any drug 

outreach and education programs that operated under 

the regime expired, and few were reopened.

Numerous private clinics have either opened or expanded drug treatment services in the main population 

centers, reporting and responding to an increase in 

community members seeking treatment for addiction. 

Psychiatrists and psychologists interviewed also note a 

long-standing trend among wealthier families—sending 

relatives abroad to private clinics, most commonly in 

Egypt and Tunisia. However, these options are generally the preserve of middle-income and wealthier 

classes, and those that catch addiction early, before 

the system catches them. For those who cannot afford 

to go abroad, private clinics offer an alternative to the 

collapsed public system and thus some discretion for 

patients. Treatment is paid for privately by patients or 

family members.

Criminal Justice

For drug users who come in conflict with the law, treatment options within the official criminal justice system 

are scant. According to interviewed prison leaders, 

because the Tajoura center is no longer operating, 

the trend in drug-dependent detainees within general 

prison settings is moving upward. As Libya’s medical 

sector struggles to care for its population, prison clinics 

are in short supply of medication, equipment, and 

personnel.44 Some clinics are of course significantly 

better equipped than others, but none are staffed with 

addiction specialists. During a 2017 visit to Tobruk prison, a particularly resource-limited facility, the director 

revealed that he was using cramped isolation cells to 

house inmates in withdrawal and treating them with 

antibiotics and milk. The facility has no clinic and no 

medical staff. The director acknowledged the treatment 

was inappropriate but noted that he was doing his best 

and had no other recourse or support options.

Militia Involvement

In the absence of a coherent government response to 

growing rates of drug use and addiction, militia groups 

have asserted a new role for themselves—drug treatment and policing. A number of armed groups associated with the Ministry of Interior observed a growing 

problem with youth drug addiction and intervened.

The Special Deterrence Force (SDF), or Rada, runs a 

correctional center alongside its detention facility on 

Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli. Individuals are arrested and 

detained if caught with quantities of drugs or alcohol, 

informed upon, or caught using or dealing. Other “moral infractions” dealt with by the facility include homosexuality, political activism, or social activism.
USIP.ORG 21

Another subset of detainees or patients are committed 

to the center by family either voluntarily or following 

pressure from community members or armed groups. 

Interviewees observed that detainees have their heads 

shaved, receive religious instruction, get individual and 

group therapy, and can participate in exercise activities 

and vocational skills training courses. A staff member 

reported in an interview that they have different punishments for different concerns, giving the example that a 

youth might receive six months for drug consumption 

but be held for longer if selling drugs. He contended 

that community members felt that it was necessary and 

were grateful to the group’s leader, Abdul Raouf Kara, for 

providing an option for them in the face of increased drug 

consumption and insecurity, which has driven families and 

parents to desperate measures in seeking to control their 

children. However, former Mitiga detainees, their family, 

and their friends report that the SDF uses fear, intimidation, and physical violence. Others note that the period of 

detention is often determined by a person’s connections, 

wealth, and so on. The SDF is also prominently involved 

in drug, alcohol, and organized crime raids in Tripoli.

In Misrata, the Anti-Crime Unit, an armed entity associated with the Libyan National Police Criminal 

Investigation Department, runs a drug treatment facility 

set up in 2015 that professes to hold more than six 

hundred patients from across Libya. It is 90 percent 

privately funded “because the Ministry of Health is 

incapable of providing treatment or protecting their 

hospitals.” Another Misratan detention center, Al Huda 

prison, is known to voluntarily accept addicts as well as 

detainees being processed by the criminal justice system. Although associated with the Ministry of Justice, 

Al Huda is significantly influenced by an armed group 

associated with the Judicial Police. The facility provides 

medical and psychiatric treatment to addicts in its care.

The groups operating these facilities are guided by 

Islamic Madkhali-Salafi teaching and principles—a 

growing trend in Libya’s security sector.45 Interviews 

indicate that many believe that a good-faith effort to 

respond to soaring drug use, particularly among Libya’s 

youth, lies at the core of these interventions. However, 

such facilities are run by security staff associated with 

the Ministries of Interior and Justice and have only a 

limited number of medical doctors, addiction specialists, and psychologists. None of the facilities has any 

association or supervision from the Ministry of Health 

or any other appropriate government agency.
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

Drugs, Organized 

Crime, and Conflict

Drug trafficking and increasingly embedded organized crime both fuel and sustain conflict, whether 

directly or indirectly. 

USE ON THE FRONTLINES

Video images captured from the frontlines of Libya’s 

latest large-scale conflict, which began in the spring 

of 2019, show intoxicated young men indiscriminately 

shelling and operating vehicles mounted with machine 

guns or anti-aircraft weapons known as technicals.

46 The 

images vividly illustrated the drug use described during 

interviews with militia-associated users and psychosocial 

support specialists who underlined the very direct role 

of drugs in fueling violent confrontations and violence. 

One psychologist observed that militia members they 

interact with discuss their need for a sense of removal: 

“I believe that deep in their minds they don’t want to 

kill. Many confrontations are just a show of power. They 

shoot in the sky. But in real conflict situations, it [drug 

use] takes them out of themselves.” Militia-associated 

youth, meanwhile, describe drug use as commonplace: 

“Yes, in war, on the frontlines, we use pills to get high—to 

fight more. It gets us out of our heads. And there’s a mix 

that comes . . . the adrenaline and the highness.”

IMPACT ON JUSTICE AND SECURITY SECTOR

The impact of trafficking, smuggling, and use of drugs 

has been particularly corrosive to the justice and 

security sector. The vast wealth extracted from trafficking and smuggling has empowered militia groups and 

denigrated efforts for reform or strategies to tackle 

associated criminal dynamics.

A number of decisions and dynamics make this situation particularly acute in Libya. Gadhafi’s use of border 

agencies and law enforcement to control trafficking 

and smuggling institutionalized predation and patronage in the security sector. Key officials, tribes, families, 

and institutions were carefully placed in positions 

around the country, preferring some over others and 

granting them access to local control and bribes. Thus, 

when the 2011 uprising upset local power balances, the 

strategic value of institutional positioning was not lost 

on Libya’s revolutionaries and political power brokers.

When the decision was made to integrate revolutionary armed groups into the state security architecture, 

brigades across the country’s towns and cities jockeyed for control over key security functions. Some 

brigades joined the Ministry of Justice, running the 

prisons and detention centers and court security and 

assuming responsibility for the enforcement of court 

rulings. Others joined the Ministry of Defense, securing borders and working on national security issues. 

Perhaps the largest group joined the Ministry of Interior, 

taking on policing-style functions, border security, and 

immigration controls. Although salaried and deputized 

by each ministry to carry out these functions, few were 

successfully integrated into central state command 

structures, instead tasked by brigade commanders 

according to localized interests. These groups have 

access to weapons, 4x4 vehicles, uniforms, salaries, 

and authority. Alongside these entities, the old structures of the police, border guards, and others remain 

present but are outgunned and outnumbered by their 

new colleagues.
USIP.ORG 23

The state has essentially provided Libya’s armed groups 

with the seed money, equipment, and legitimacy to 

operate according to their interests—which for many has 

included participating in the illicit economy and drug trafficking, whether directly or indirectly. Having empowered 

these entities, it becomes very difficult to tip the balance 

of power back in favor of central state security forces.

Simultaneously, police, militia security providers, prosecutors, and judges report increased drug-related crime 

and insecurity. An ongoing security vacuum and widespread weapons ownership has led to a surge in criminality in Libya. Although reliable data on crime rates 

amid the current crisis in Libya is difficult to obtain, legal 

professionals, prison guards, and community members 

all echo concerns that criminality, and particularly youth 

and juvenile criminality, has significantly increased. This 

includes juvenile-on-juvenile crime, including murder, 

manslaughter, drug dealing and possession, theft, car 

accidents, and carjacking. USIP’s research on juvenile 

detention in Libya revealed that with easy access to 

weapons, youthful playacting or rivalries now have 

the scope to quickly escalate beyond control with 

unintended consequences. According to prosecutors, 

involuntary manslaughter (“accidental murder,” as it is 

known in Libya) is occurring at far higher rates than in 

the past, especially among youth and juveniles. A specialized juvenile prosecutor and lawyers interviewed 

regarding this dynamic referenced drug and alcohol 

consumption as a frequent contributing factor.

Organized crime is surging but judges, prosecutors, 

and lawyers note that tackling it is nearly impossible 

in the current climate. First, arresting smugglers and 

traffickers is extremely challenging because criminal 

gangs and militias linked with illicit activities are better 

armed than state security forces. Second, in rare 

instances that suspects are intercepted, it is often by 

armed groups associated with the Ministry of Interior 

who operate in policing roles. Prosecutors note the 

challenge of formally charging or trying such cases, given that militia security providers often fail to adhere to 

correct police arrest procedures, pre-charge detention 

periods, criminal procedure codes, or laws of evidence. 

When cases proceed to trial, threats and kidnapping 

of judges, prosecutors, and their family members have 

bred an atmosphere of fear. Judicial Police—who are 

responsible for ensuring court security and transport 

of detainees to and from hearings—note that convoys 

transporting sensitive, high-profile, or tribe- or militia-associated detainees are vulnerable to threats or attacks. 

Courthouses have been attacked or surrounded by 

militias. Judges and judicial staff benefit from protection 

only when at their place of work, even when handling 

sensitive cases. They are thus vulnerable to violence, 

threats, and pressure. Additionally, judges also complain that Libya’s criminal code, adopted in 1953, 

requires modernization to equip them to handle the 

evolving nature of organized crime. Finally, crime labs 

for processing evidence—including testing narcotics—

are currently in a state of reduced function, and witness 

protection is all but impossible to guarantee.

The result is an environment of effective impunity in 

which only low-level actors risk rare intervention by law 

enforcement. For example, the SDF made a name for 

itself in Tripoli for being tough on crime and alcohol. 

In 2016 and 2017, the group conducted a number of 

high-profile raids on the Gragsha section of Tripoli’s 

Gargaresh neighborhood that were successful in disrupting and reducing drug trafficking and distribution 

hubs in the area.47 The raids targeted a number of senior figures and also resulted in the arrest of a significant 

number of lower-level African migrant workers. Many 

Tripoli residents hailed the raids as impressive. Those 

involved in the smuggling business remain skeptical, 

noting that it only temporarily affected flows. Activities 

that centered around Gragsha soon relocated to areas 

of Tajoura, Warshafana, and other Tripoli suburbs.

The growth in criminality and embedding of drug trade, 

combined with the state’s inability to address it, is having a considerable impact on overall social stability and 

prospects for recovery.
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

TRIBES, TOWNS, AND TRAFFICKING

Much like in other parts of the globe, illicit trafficking in 

Libya relies on tightly knit organized criminal groups and 

smuggling networks, which have traditionally centered 

around families, tribes, and geographic zones of influence. Levels of violence between and within communities depend on numerous factors, including homogeneity or diversity of the local community, value of the 

smuggled commodities, and levels of political influence.

Examples abound. In Tobruk, near the Egyptian border, 

close ancestral relationships between the families of 

the Ubaidat and Awlad Ali combine with the dominance 

and homogeneity of the Ubaidat in political and security life of the town (and indeed across eastern Libya). 

These relationships are key to smooth illicit flows of 

drugs and other goods through many diverse crossing 

points along the border and the seaport.48 On Libya’s 

western coast, the town of Zuwarah is an important 

smuggling hub because of its proximity to the Tunisian 

border and, by sea, to Malta and Italy. As in Tobruk, 

the town’s population is relatively homogeneous, 

composed of families from Libya’s minority Amazigh 

community, allowing smuggling to proceed relatively 

smoothly with significant community-level control over 

what is smuggled and when.49 By contrast, however, 

Zuwarah has experienced repeated low-level clashes 

with neighboring Arab communities—Rigdalin, Al-Jmail, 

and Zelten—which were empowered over Amazigh during the Gadhafi era, both as smugglers and in local law 

enforcement. As smuggling interests have rebalanced 

since 2011, smugglers and rival youth from these border 

towns have often clashed in the town’s periphery.50

Perhaps nowhere have localized tribal and familial 

conflicts over smuggling and control of economic 

resources been more frequent and intense than in 

Libya’s southern Fezzan region. Its vast desert terrain 

is traversed by smuggling routes that are the main 

arteries for much of Libya’s most lucrative licit and 

illicit trade flows. Dotted with a number of towns, these 

routes are centers of commerce, storage hubs, and 

logistical bases for operations. Here, long-standing cultural reliance on smuggling is even more pronounced, 

and employment opportunities in the legitimate economy are more scarce than in Libya’s coastal cities. Profit 

margins are high and the stakes for exclusion therefore even higher. Numerous tribes mix in larger cities, 

such as Sebha and Kufra. In smaller cities and towns, 

composition is also mixed but tends to reflect a historic dominance and perceived ownership by different 

tribes and families. In Sebha, the capital of the south, 

and the towns of Murzuq, Ubari, and Kufra, complex 

conflicts over the smuggling trade and political control 

have played out between a multitude of groups, most 

prominently the Gadadfa, Awlad Suleiman, Tuareg, 

Tebu, and Zwai.

The role of the Tuareg and Tebu tribes in drug smuggling is particularly pertinent. “In any movement of 

trade [in the south], you must use Tuareg or Tebu. They 

are the owners of the area,” a community member 

from Ghat explained. Both communities are traditionally nomadic, living in Libya and straddling borders for 

centuries, playing a key role in guiding and transporting goods through the desert. The Tuareg presence 

centers on the Algerian border, and is most concentrated in Sebha, Ubari, Ghat, Awal, and Dirj. Tebu communities, on the other hand, line the border with Chad 

and Niger, concentrated in Kufra, Rebyanah, Murzuq, 

Um Al Aranib, Qatrun, and Sebha. Both are minority 

communities that had complex relationships with the 

former administration, were marginalized, and were 

used as instruments to benefit Gadhafi. Before the 

uprising, an understanding between the communities 

had maintained peace for more than a century, given 

that families from both tribes profited from licit and illicit 

trade.51 After it, that truce collapsed, and the delicate 

balance between tribes was altered by changes in 

political providence, access to weaponry, and the 

upending of Gadhafi-era controls over smuggling. “In 

the Libyan south, desert communities saw their fortunes rise or fall after the 2011 uprising,” writes Rebecca 

Murray, a journalist and expert on Libya’s south.52
USIP.ORG 25

During the uprising, the Tebu and Tuareg largely sided 

with Gadhafi, but the Tebu sensed the tide turning and 

switched sides. Finding themselves on the winning 

side, the Tebu strategically deployed their brigades to 

acquire control over key economic assets such as oil 

fields and the southern border.

The Tuareg and Tebu both smuggled drugs (mainly 

cannabis) during the latter part of the Gadhafi era. 

The Tuareg had the upper hand given their strategic 

positioning and familial bonds straddling the Algerian 

border, where the dominant hashish flows enter 

Libya from Morocco. After 2011, the Tebu significantly 

increased their involvement in drug trafficking, emboldened by dominance on key routes and increased 

access to weapons and 4x4 vehicles.53 This displaced 

some more-established Tuareg smugglers and much 

reduced their operations. Some engaged in banditry, 

pressed by income loss and as a form of retaliation. 

The balance of Libya’s age-old desert truce upset, 

skirmishes between the Tuareg and Tebu spilled 

from desert routes into cities and towns in the south. 

In Ubari, hundreds were killed and many displaced 

by waves of violent conflict. In Sebha, the Tebu have 

repeatedly clashed with Tuareg and other tribes, most 

prominently with the Awlad Suleiman. In Kufra, in the 

southeast, conflict between Tebu, Zwai, and other Arab 

tribes has erupted regularly since 2011. Camille Schyns 

of the European Institute of Peace has observed that 

research interviews indicate that violence in Kufra is 

often heightened when seasonal drug flows are at 

their peak. Conflict and competition within tribes has 

also increased. Once tight social controls over youth 

have frayed, and conflict between different families and 

growing factionalized militias has further contributed to 

complicated inter- and intra-community violence.54

Although the many layers of conflict and tribal discord 

in Libya’s south cannot be explained by competition 

over smuggling alone, it is a key driver of insecurity, 

and the increased prominence of illicit drug trafficking 

is an important factor.55 The injection of high-value 

flows of cocaine and regular large-scale flows of pharmaceuticals, along with increased quantities of cannabis, have upped the risks, rewards, and competition for 

engagement in the drug trade.

Drug trafficking and smuggling dynamics contribute 

to inter- and intra-community violence at a local level 

across Libya, with violent confrontations between 

rival towns, tribes, and families a regular occurrence. 

Although they are often overlaid with political overtures of the moment, in many cases economic motivations lie at their core. These outbursts of localized 

violence are destabilizing to community relations and 

disruptive to daily life.

UNDERCUTTING PEACE PROCESSES 

AND STATE CONSOLIDATION

The role of organized crime in conflict and postconflict 

settings is increasingly acknowledged in the peacebuilding and statebuilding literature. Drug trafficking 

and organized crime, once understood as the domain 

of specialized criminal organizations, is more and more 

recognized as a funder and driver of conflict. Further, 

recognition is growing that organized crime has itself 

become a dynamic actor in postconflict settings.56

The scale of profits generated from drug trafficking 

render it particularly insidious in corrupting local- and 

national-level politics and security institutions. (Such institutions are even more susceptible to infiltration when 

in a nascent stage.) As networks further embed and a 

local market for consumption continues to grow, so do 

the long-term challenges of restoring political processes and a functioning justice and security sector. In Libya, 

state funding has empowered localized armed actors 

to vie for and consolidate control over illicit trafficking 

Drug trafficking and smuggling dynamics contribute to inter- and intra-community violence at a local level 

across Libya, with violent confrontations between rival towns, tribes, and families a regular occurrence.
26 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

networks. Salaries and status were not conditioned on 

integration into state security architecture. Decisions 

by successive governments have simply strengthened 

some groups over others without demonstrating effective central state power or institutional control. Ongoing 

peacebuilding and statebuilding initiatives have sought 

to map, engage, and understand Libya’s many armed 

militia groups. The reality, however, is that the financial 

rewards from ongoing instability undercut sincere commitment to peace and state consolidation.

LINKS BETWEEN DRUG TRAFFICKING

AND EXTREMIST GROUPS

Given the role of organized criminal activities in financing Islamic extremist groups in the Sahel, Syria, and 

Iraq, assessing links between drug trafficking and such groups in Libya is warranted. The prevalence of the 

amphetamine Captagon in the conflicts in both Syria and Iraq is infamous. Used by the Islamic State and 

rebel groups alike, it was hailed for producing “pharmacological morale,” making fighters “more alert, more 

focused, and resistant to fatigue.” Further afield, some reports suggest that the perpetrators of the Bardo 

attack in Tunis in 2015 took Captagon beforehand.a

 It was also reportedly found in the hideout of the Bataclan terrorists and the base used by the Tunisian violent extremist who shot tourists on a beach at Sousse.b

Some Captagon is available on the market in Libya, but tramadol is currently the most available and appealing pharmaceutical drug to fighters. It is also viewed as improving endurance, alertness, and steadying 

nerves. As outlined, huge quantities of the drug, along with other pharmaceuticals, are entering the country 

and mixing with markets and flows in other illegal drugs.

Nonetheless, research revealed scant evidence that the Islamic State or other entities are using drug trafficking or sales to finance their operations in Libya. Interviewees in the southern towns of Ghat and Ubari did 

note with concern the presence of new actors purchasing homes and farms in the area, however. “We need 

to be careful with new people coming into our community,” one resident remarked. “They tend to overpay 

[for property]. That’s the Daesh way.” Nonetheless, the overwhelming sense from smugglers in the area is 

that it is not advantageous to interact with these new arrivals, fearing that their presence will draw attention 

from the international community and thus damage their own smuggling operations. The issue remains a 

challenging area to research and merits ongoing scrutiny.

Notes

a. Le Monde, “Captagon: un rapport démonte le mythe de la ‘drogue des djihadistes,’” July 27, 2017.

b. Sophie des Déserts, “Le Captagon, la pilule qui rend fou,” Vanity Fair, May 12, 2016.
USIP.ORG 27

Paths Forward

In the early post-Gadhafi years, when hopes for a 

smooth transition were high, community and political 

leaders in Libya conceded that trafficking and smuggling were dynamics the new state would need to tackle. Most, though, viewed them as abstract concerns. 

Illicit drug flows, they posited, would be controlled 

once the basic architecture of the new free Libya had 

been established. Drug use was seen as a social ill that 

could be corrected in time. In the years since, the same 

political and community leaders have seen Libya torn 

apart by competition over resources and witnessed 

creeping increases in drug use at levels that can no 

longer be ignored. Many of those who stood against 

these trends found themselves exiled or silenced.

The scale of Libya’s drug flows and consumption has 

grown significantly since 2011 and shows no signs of 

abating. Drug trafficking, drug use, and, increasingly, embedded organized criminal networks fuel and 

sustain conflict, whether directly or indirectly. Evidence 

ranges from direct examples of conflict actors using 

drugs during fighting on the frontlines of conflict to 

the ways that it has damaged the justice and security 

sector, stoked localized inter- and intra-community 

violence, and detracted from central peacebuilding and 

state consolidation efforts. 

Viable solutions to Libya’s drug trafficking and drug 

use problems are likely to remain elusive, especially 

given the ongoing conflict, the fragility of the state, and 

the lack of capacity of state institutions. The following 

observations and recommendations, however, merit 

serious consideration by Libya’s domestic policymakers, civil society, and international donors and partners 

in determining the path forward:

Recognizing the problem is the first step. Little government attention was paid to monitoring, treating, or combating drug addiction under Gadhafi. Limited data was 

gathered, and research on the topic was generally unwelcome. Although discussion of drug use and abuse in 

Libya remains taboo, space for discussion and analysis 

is opening. Users, treatment professionals, and health 

officials almost universally admit that Libya is facing significant trafficking and use problems. Although the topic 

remains challenging to research, when approached with 

sensitivity, interviewees are surprisingly willing to discuss 

use patterns and smuggling dynamics. This marks a 

significant shift, even since the early post-uprising years. 

Much like in drug treatment itself, recognizing that you 

have a problem is a key first step. Civil society and 

policymakers in Libya need to recognize concerning 

trends taking hold in Libya and be willing to engage in 

the challenging work required to address them. In Libya, 

where evidence of trauma-associated drug use is rife, 

this will also entail confronting mental health concerns, 

seeking to destigmatize discussions around trauma, and 

connecting citizens with the support they need to stem 

the tide of self-medication.

Understanding Libya’s complex network of interconnected illicit markets. Libya’s evolving illicit economy 

is made up of four interconnected markets: weapons, 

migrants, drugs, and smuggling of subsidized goods. In 

the years since the uprising, the hierarchy of profit and 

strategic importance of these illicit markets has continued to evolve and shift, and the implications for conflict 

dynamics are significant. For example, policies that 

the European Union and Italy adopted to counter the 

so-called migrant crisis drove up the profit, risks, and 

strategic importance of human smuggling within Libya’s 

hierarchy, placing it on par with or above many types 
28 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

of drug smuggling. Similarly, an increase in the use and 

trafficking of pharmaceutical drugs has altered the nature, modalities, and profile of users and drug traffickers. Given the financial benefits accrued by different 

militias and political forces through smuggling activities, 

on the one hand, and countercrime and countermigration activities on the other, shifts in Libya’s illicit markets 

and smuggling networks are key to understanding 

the fluid power dynamics. Thus, in seeking to address 

the economic forces at play in Libya that detract 

from efforts to build sustainable peace, domestic and 

international policymakers and peacebuilders need 

to understand how these illicit markets connect, how 

they manifest in different localities, and the key levers 

of power involved, using this analysis to guide engagement at every level. This will require ongoing research 

and analysis as the political economy of Libya’s conflict 

and transition continue to evolve.

Providing viable alternatives. Any policy decisions 

aimed at curbing drug trafficking and consumption 

must consider viable economic and social alternatives. 

Although a few individuals at the apex of drug trafficking 

extract vast wealth from their activities, the majority see 

an opportunity to make quick money in a country with 

few economic opportunities. As conflict wages on and 

economic investment in the state remains low, more and 

more citizens are turning to Libya’s surging illicit economy. In the south, economic and cultural reliance on 

smuggling is even more deeply embedded. Nonetheless, 

interviews with individuals from southern tribes historically 

involved in smuggling note that this is not what anybody 

dreams their son will do when he grows up. From a social 

perspective, few positive outlets exist for young people 

in Libya. There are few spaces or opportunities—such 

as sports clubs and cinemas—for youth-oriented social activities. Given limited professional and economic 

A Libyan soldier checks weapons handed in by rebel fighters and civilians at a military compound in Tripoli on September 3, 2012. (Photo by Moham-mad Hannon/AP/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 29

opportunities, many young people are losing interest in 

their studies. As drugs have become easier to obtain, 

small gatherings at homes and farms have become associated with experimentation. Providing tangible economic 

and social opportunities to engage in licit rather than illicit 

activities will be important in any plan for Libya’s recovery.

Adopting a phased and multilevel approach. 

Addressing organized crime in conflict-affected environments tends to be relegated to later-stage intervention, 

targeted through technical, security-focused programming. These interventions are generally introduced 

after the fundamentals of peace processes have been 

hammered out and basic security sector reforms are 

in place. The reality is that such programs often offer 

too little, too late, allowing illicit trafficking dynamics to 

expand and embed during transition processes. Libya is 

a classic example of a state where trafficking dynamics 

were enabled rather than addressed in the immediate 

aftermath of a government change. Given the increasing 

awareness that the economic incentives of some actors 

run counter to peace and statebuilding efforts, interventions must use analysis of illicit trafficking and markets 

at every phase and level of peacebuilding. This should 

include informing high-level diplomatic engagement, 

developing durable peace agreements that include 

measures to address economic drivers of conflict and 

potential spoilers, and supporting multiyear strategic-level programming. Considerations regarding organized 

crime should come both from above, at a senior leadership level, and below, at the practitioner level. Too often 

a disconnect between policy objectives and practice 

realities hinders the impact of interventions aimed at 

combating organized crime.

Understanding the approach and impact of border 

security and law enforcement initiatives. The international community has long engaged with Libyan authorities on border security and law enforcement—perhaps 

most prominently the European Union, Italy, and the 

United States. On its own, drug trafficking has received 

much less international attention, despite its clear intersection with migrant smuggling and other illicit markets 

and its impact on Libyan youth and society. Meanwhile, 

extensive media coverage and border security funding 

focused on the migrant crisis has resulted in growing 

negative perceptions of work targeting trafficking in 

persons and smuggling of migrants in Libya, viewed as 

focused on external needs rather than those most central to Libyans. Adopting a broader approach in border 

security and law enforcement that seeks to tackle 

serious and organized crime as a whole, including 

drug trafficking, may have the dual effect of improving 

receptivity from Libyan stakeholders and broadening 

the impact of programming.

In the Gordian knot of Libya’s complex conflict dynamics, drug trafficking and use are an important strand, 

tangled with other illicit trafficking concerns, enmeshed 

with a mess of predatory armed actors, and influenced 

by internal politics and external meddling. Ultimately, 

drug trafficking and use fuels and feeds off violence. 

Their profits sustain some communities, but creeping 

use and abuse trends harm others. Ignoring drug trafficking and use dynamics or blithely waiting to resolve 

them once the basics of peace and structural reforms 

have been achieved is no longer an option. Action is 

required. The challenge is where to begin.
30 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

Notes

The author wishes to thank Nate Wilson for his input in shaping this project 

and Abby Natividad for her research support and content editing.

1. Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking and Libya’s Transition: Profits and Losses,” Peaceworks report no. 96, United States 

Institute of Peace, February 2014, www.usip.org/publications/2014/02/illicit-trafficking-and-libyas-transition-profits-and-losses.

2. For a concise account of Libya’s political and economic ecosystem over time, see Tuesday Reitano and Mark Shaw, “The Politics of Power, 

Protection, Identity and Illicit Trade,” Crime Conflict Nexus Series no. 3, United Nations University Centre for Policy Research, May 2017.

3. Fiona Mangan and Christina Murtaugh, “Security and Justice in Post-Revolution Libya,” Peaceworks report no. 100, United States 

Institute of Peace, September 2014, www.usip.org/publications/2014/09/security-and-justice-post-revolution-libya.

4. Reitano and Shaw, “Politics of Power,” 6.

5. Fiona Mangan and Rebecca Murray, “Prisons and Detention in Libya,” Peaceworks report no. 119, United States Institute of 

Peace, August 2016, www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW119-Prisons-and-Detention-in-Libya.pdf.

6. Mark Micallef, “Shifting Sands: Libya’s Changing Drug Trafficking Dynamics on Coastal and Desert Borders,” Global Initiative 

Against Transnational Organized Crime, November 20, 2018, www.globalinitiative.net/shifting-sands-libyas-changing-drug

-trafficking-dynamics-on-the-coastal-and-desert-borders. 

7. Calculations are based on the official exchange rate of $1 to 1.40 Libyan dinar at the time of writing. In reality, most currency 

exchanges in Libya occur on the black market, where the rate at the time of writing was $1 to 4.55 dinar.

8. United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2013, www.unodc.org/wdr2013; World Drug Report 2017, 

www.unodc.org/wdr2017; World Drug Report 2018, www.unodc.org/wdr2018; and Matt Herbert, “The Butcher’s Bill: Cocaine 

Trafficking in North Africa,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, September 21, 2018, www.globalinitiative.net

/the-butchers-bill-cocaine-trafficking-in-north-africa. 

9. UNODC, World Drug Report 2016, 39, www.unodc.org/doc/wdr2016.

10. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, booklet 2, 31.

11. Shaw and Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking,” 14; Vice News, “Here’s What the European Union Did to Stop Migrants from Coming,” 

March 18, 2019, www.vice.com/en_us/article/pan8kk/heres-what-the-european-union-did-to-stop-migrants-from-coming. 

12. This occasional cocaine use was mentioned in interviews with individuals associated with the political class in Libya in 2017 and 2019. 

13. UNODC, World Drug Report 2013, 57.

14. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, 15, www.unodc.org/documents/wdr/WDR_2010/World_Drug_Report_2010_lo-res.pdf.

15. Simone Haysom, Peter Gastrow, and Mark Shaw, “The Heroin Coast: A Political Economy along the Eastern African Seaboard,” Enact

research report no. 4, June 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/the-heroin-coast-a-political-economy-along-the-eastern-african-seaboard. 

16. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, booklet 3, 18.

17. Shaw and Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking,” 13.

18. In 2013, heroin was discovered hidden in used cars imported from Rotterdam, Netherlands. 

19. UNODC, World Drug Report 2010, 15.

20. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, booklet 3, 18. 

21. Haysom, Gastrow, and Shaw, “Heroin Coast.”

22. UNODC, World Drug Report 2018, booklet 1, 7.

23. Peter Tinti, “New trends in tramadol trafficking in Niger,” Global Initiative, June 25, 2018, https://globalinitiative.net/tramadol

-trafficking-in-niger. 

24. Kwasi Gyamfi Asiedu, “There’s an opioid abuse problem unfolding in African cities and it’s not getting the attention it needs,” Quartz 

Africa, March 16, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1223167/opioid-crisis-china-india-tramadol-flood-african-cities-in-ghana-nigeria-egypt-gabon.

25. REACH, “Market Systems in Libya: Assessment of Wheat Flour, Insulin, Tomato and Soap Supply Chains,” United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees and REACH Initiative, October 2017, https://reliefweb.int/report/libya/market-systems-libya

-assessment-wheat-flour-insulin-tomato-and-soap-supply-chains.
USIP.ORG 31

26. For an in-depth look at fuel smuggling, see Tim Eaton, “Libya’s War Economy: Predation, Profiteering and State Weakness,” Chatham 

House, April 12, 2018, www.chathamhouse.org/publication/libyas-war-economy-predation-profiteering-and-state-weakness; and 

Micallef, “Shifting Sands.”

27. Naji Abou Khalil, “Predatory Economies in Eastern Libya,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, June 2019, 

www.globalinitiative.net/eastern-libya-lna.

28. Micallef, “Shifting Sands.”

29. The distinction between human smuggling and trafficking is significant. The UN defines human smuggling as “a crime involving the 

procurement for financial or other material benefit of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national or resident” 

and human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force 

or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or 

receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.”

30. Peter Tinti and Tuesday Reitano, Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Saviour (London: Hurst Publishers, 2018); Global Initiative Against 

Transnational Organized Crime, “Human Trafficking-Smuggling Nexus in Libya,” Policy Note, July 2018, www.globalinitiative.net

/human-trafficking-smuggling-nexus-in-libya.

31. Matt Herbert, “Less than the Sum of Its Parts: Europe’s Fixation with Libyan Border Security,” Institute for Security Studies, 2019, 

www.issafrica.org/research/policy-brief/less-than-the-sum-of-its-parts-europes-fixation-with-libyan-border-security; Mark Micallef 

and Alexandre Bish, “The Human Conveyor Belt Broken,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, April 1, 2019, 

www.globalinitiative.net/the-human-conveyor-belt-broken.

32. Fiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak, “The West Africa-Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking,” Small Arms 

Survey Briefing Paper, December 2019, https://reliefweb.int/report/mali/briefing-paper-west-africa-sahel-connection-mapping

-cross-border-arms-trafficking. 

33. Rodrigo Campos, “UN sanctions six people on Libya human trafficking,” Reuters, June 7, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-libya

-migrants-un/un-sanctions-six-people-on-libya-human-trafficking-idUSKCN1J32V1; Micallef, “Shifting Sands.”

34. Micallef, “Shifting Sands.”

35. UN Security Council, Libya Sanctions Committee, Panel of Experts reports, www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1970

/panel-experts/reports. 

36. Nicolas Florquin and Benjamin King, From Legal to Lethal: Converted Firearms in Europe, Small Arms Survey, April 2018, www.small

armssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/U-Reports/SAS-Report-Europe-Conversion.pdf; and Mangan and Nowak, West Africa-Sahel Connection.

37. Mangan and Nowak, West Africa-Sahel Connection.

38. For further analysis of Libya’s evolving protection economies, see Mark Shaw and Fiona Mangan, “Enforcing ‘Our Law’ When 

the State Breaks Down: The Case of Protection Economies in Libya and Their Political Consequences,” Hague Journal on the 

Rule of Law 7, no. 1 (September 1, 2015): 99–110; Shaw and Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking”; Reitano and Shaw, “Politics of Power.” 

39. New Humanitarian, “Libya’s ‘Growing’ Drugs/HIV Problem,” June 17, 2013, www.thenewhumanitarian.org/feature/2013/06/17/libya

-s-growing-drugshiv-problem. 

40. Associated Press, “Libya Frees HIV Case Medics,” The Guardian, July 24, 2007, www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/24/libya.

41. New Humanitarian, “Libya’s ‘Growing’ Drugs/HIV Problem.” 

42. Lusine Mirzoyan et al., “New Evidence on the HIV Epidemic in Libya: Why Countries Must Implement Prevention Programs 

Among People Who Inject Drugs,” JAIDS Journal of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndromes 62, no. 5 (April 15, 2013): 577.

43. Mirzoyan et al., “New Evidence on the HIV Epidemic in Libya.”

44. Mangan and Murray, “Prisons and Detention in Libya.” 

45. International Crisis Group, “Addressing the Rise of Libya’s Madkhali-Salafis,” Middle East and North Africa Report no. 200, April 

25, 2019, www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/north-africa/libya/addressing-rise-libyas-madkhali-salafis. 

46. Video footage was shared by multiple Libya analysts, including Emadeddin Badi, a nonresident scholar at the Middle East 

Institute in Washington, DC. See Emad Badi @emad_badi, “Video showing #LNA’s 106th brigade (that is unofficially under the 

command of Khaled #Haftar) fighters engaged in #Tripoli. . . .” Twitter, May 21, 2019, 1:00 p.m., www.twitter.com/emad_badi/

status/1130805471265382401. 

47. Sami Zaptia, “Rada Continues Raids on Tripoli’s Criminal Dens,” Libya Herald, January 15, 2017, www.libyaherald.com/2017/01/15

/rada-continues-raids-on-tripolis-criminal-dens.
32 PEACEWORKS | NO. 161

48. Thomas Hüsken, “The Practice and Culture of Smuggling in the Borderland of Egypt and Libya,” International Affairs 93, no. 4 

(July 2017): 897–915, https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iix121; Peter Cole and Fiona Mangan, “Tribe, Security, Justice, and Peace in Libya 

Today,” Peaceworks report no. 118, United States Institute of Peace, September 2016, www.usip.org/publications/2016/09/tribe

-security-justice-and-peace-libya-today.

49. An interesting example of the level of control exerted over smuggling in Zuwarah is the decision to withdraw from an established role in lucrative migrant smuggling in late 2015. Following pressure from community groups and growing concern about 

negative press that Amazigh communities might face, Zuwarah called a halt to its role in the trade and drove out any groups 

who sought to continue. See Mark Micallef, “The Human Conveyor Belt: Trends in Human Trafficking and Smuggling in PostRevolution Libya,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 2017, www.globalinitiative.net/report-the

-human-conveyor-belt-trends-in-human-trafficking-and-smuggling-in-post-revolution-libya; Reitano and Shaw, “Politics of Power.”

50. Shaw and Mangan, “Illicit Trafficking,” 26. 

51. Rebecca Murray, “Southern Libya Destablized: The Case of Ubari,” Small Arms Survey, April 2017, www.smallarmssurvey.org

/fileadmin/docs/T-Briefing-Papers/SAS-SANA-BP-Ubari.pdf.

52. Murray, “Southern Libya Destablized.” 

53. Jérôme Tubiana and Claudio Gramizzi, Lost in Trans-Nation: Tubu and Other Armed Groups and Smugglers along Libya’s 

Southern Border (Geneva: Small Arms Survey-Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 2018), 77–78, 

www.smallarmssurvey.org/about-us/highlights/2018/highlight-tubu2.html. 

54. For an interesting discussion of different Tebu militia groups and dynamics, see Tubiana and Gramizzi, Lost in Trans-Nation. 

55. Numerous reports provide deeper analysis of the many complexities of instability in Libya’s south. For example, see Frederic 

Wehrey, Insecurity and Governance Challenges in Southern Libya (Washington, DC: Carnegie, 2017); Murray, “Southern Libya 

Destablized”; Tubiana and Gramizzi, Lost in Trans-Nation. 

56. James Cockayne and Adam Lupel, Peace Operations and Organized Crime: Enemies or Allies? (London: Routledge, 2013); James 

Cockayne, “Transnational Organized Crime,” IPI Blue Paper No. 2, International Peace Institute, January 2009, www.ipinst.org/2009/01

/transnational-organized-crime-ipi-blue-paper-no-2; Mark Shaw and Walter Kemp, “Margins to the Mainstream,” International Peace 

Institute, September 2014, www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/1409_margins_to_mainstream_toc.pdf. 
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Making Peace Possible

NO. 161 | May 2020

Illicit drug trafficking and drug use in Libya have increased significantly in the wake of the 

2011 uprising that ousted Muammar Gadhafi. Initially viewed as a success of the so-called 

Arab Spring, Libya is now marred by conflict and defined by seemingly contradictory 

tensions: illicit trafficking and smuggling networks that simultaneously undercut the ability 

of the state to rebuild are also among the few things that knit the fractured state together. 

Based on hundreds of interviews conducted since 2012 and dedicated research on drugs 

conducted in 2018 and 2019, this report explores the links between illicit drug trafficking 

and use and the ongoing conflict and instability that have plagued Libya since the uprising, 

assessing how both feed off it and fuel it. 

• China’s Periphery Diplomacy: Implications for Peace and Security in Asia by 

Jacob Stokes (Special Report, May 2020)

• China’s Response to Sudan’s Political Transition by Laura Barber (Special 

Report, May 2020)

• Service Delivery in Taliban-Influenced Areas of Afghanistan by Scott S. Smith 

(Special Report, April 2020)

• Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future by Andrew Watkins 

(Peaceworks, March 2020)

• Understanding Resistance to Inclusive Peace Processes by Esra Cuhadar 

(Peaceworks, March 2020)

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