If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

-1-

S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

METRO HEALTHCARE SERVICES, INC., d/b/a 

METRO SOLUTIONS, 

Plaintiff/CounterdefendantAppellee,

UNPUBLISHED

October 10, 2019

No. 342802

Wayne Circuit Court

LC No. 16-007213-CB

v

INNOVATIVE PAYROLL PROCESSING, INC. 

and AHMAD CHEBBANI, 

Defendants-Appellants,

and

METRO SOLUTIONS MI CHOICE, LLC and 

METRO SOLUTIONS MI HEALTHLINK, LLC, 

Defendants/CounterplaintiffsAppellants. 

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and BECKERING and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendants, Innovative Payroll Processing, Inc. (IPP), Ahmad Chebbani, Metro Solutions 

MI Choice, LLC (Choice), and Metro Solutions MI Healthlink, LLC (Healthlink), appeal as of 

right the judgment of the trial court entered in favor of plaintiff Metro Healthcare Services, Inc., 

doing business as Metro Solutions (Metro Solutions), and against IPP, Chebbani, and Healthlink 

in the amount of $200,686.88. Defendants challenge the portion of the judgment awarding 

Metro Solutions attorney fees, and also challenge the earlier orders of the trial court denying 
-2-

Healthlink’s and Choice’s motion to amend their counterclaim, and denying defendants’ motion 

to file an amended motion for summary disposition. We affirm. 

I. FACTS

This case arises from a business arrangement that gave rise to claims of conversion, 

breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. Plaintiff Metro Solutions is a non-profit 

corporation that acts as a fiscal intermediary for other entities. As such, Metro Solutions 

administers funds that are directed to particular entities from a government agency or from a 

foundation; Metro Solutions contracts with these entities to receive the funds on behalf of the 

entities, then disburses the funds as directed by the entity. The President and CEO of Metro 

Solutions is Rose Khalifa. 

Defendant IPP is a corporation that processes payrolls for other businesses, and is solely 

owned by defendant Chebbani. In October 2014, Metro Solutions contracted with IPP for 

payroll services for Metro Solutions’ own employees. Khalifa testified that this agreement is the 

only written agreement between the parties. To facilitate IPP processing the payroll for Metro 

Solutions, Metro Solutions permitted IPP to access Metro Solutions’ bank account to fund the 

payroll. Khalifa testified that for each payroll, IPP notified Metro Solutions in advance 

regarding how much would be withdrawn from Metro Solutions’ bank account, and IPP provided 

Metro Solutions with an invoice regarding each payroll. 

In 2013, Metro Solutions entered into an agreement with the Detroit Area Agency on 

Aging (DAAA) to act as fiscal intermediary for a DAAA program called MI Choice; part of 

Metro Solutions’ duties was processing the payroll payments to in-home caregivers who were to 

receive payment through the MI Choice program. In 2015, DAAA approached Metro Solutions 

about expanding their agreement so that Metro Solutions would also serve as the fiscal 

intermediary for a new DAAA project, known as MI HealthLink Pilot Program (pilot program), 

for dual eligible participants of Medicare and Medicaid benefits. 

In June 2015, Metro Solutions entered into an agreement with the DAAA to act as fiscal 

intermediary for the pilot program. Under its agreement with the DAAA, each client referred to 

Metro Solutions as part of the pilot program was a person receiving in-home care by a care 

provider, and each client was to be treated as the employer of the care provider. Metro 

Solutions’ duties under its agreement with DAAA included establishing an Employer 

Identification Number for each client, purchasing workers compensation insurance policies for 

each client, conducting background checks, and processing payroll to each in-home care provider 

on behalf of each client. 

Sometime in 2015, Khalifa discussed with Chebbani the possibility of subcontracting to 

IPP the payroll processing and other human resources services for the clients referred to Metro 

Solutions under the DAAA pilot program. Although the parties dispute the specifics of the 

arrangement, sometime in 2015, Khalifa and Chebbani agreed that IPP would process the payroll 

for clients under the pilot program on behalf of Metro Solutions. According to Metro Solutions, 

this arrangement was on a trial basis and the amount IPP was to be paid had yet to be determined 

and was contingent upon the amount of work generated by the pilot program. Metro Solutions 
-3-

alleged that Chebbani insisted that his attorney would draft the parties’ agreement 

commemorating their arrangement, but no contract was ever presented or executed. 

On September 1, 2015, Chebbani created defendants Healthlink and Choice; the LLCs 

are solely owned by Chebbani. Chebbani testified that he created the two LLCs, after Khalifa 

urged him to do so, for purposes of undertaking the payroll and human resources aspects of the 

DAAA pilot program. He further testified that from his conversations with Khalifa, he 

understood that he and Metro Solutions would jointly own the LLCs. By contrast, Khalifa 

testified that Metro Solutions did not agree that Chebbani would create new LLCs and did not 

agree to co-ownership of such entities. Metro Solutions alleged that the parties agreed only that 

IPP would continue to process the payroll for Metro Solutions, and that IPP would expand those 

services under the pilot program. 

Metro Solutions received its first client referral under the pilot program in August 2015. 

Metro Solutions authorized IPP to access its bank account to process payroll checks for the 

employees of the pilot program clients. In September and October 2015, IPP processed the 

payroll for Metro Solutions under the DAAA pilot program, each time withdrawing funds from 

Metro Solutions’ bank account. Apparently unbeknownst to Metro Solutions, Chebbani 

established a separate bank account in the name of Healthlink from which to pay the pilot 

program caregivers; each lump sum IPP transferred from Metro Solutions’ account was 

transferred to the Healthlink account. IPP employees then used the Healthlink account to issue 

checks to the in-home caregivers. The checks issued on that account were issued in the name of 

Healthlink. IPP processed six pilot program payrolls for Metro Solutions in September and 

October 2015. 

According to Khalifa, IPP failed to provide Metro Solutions with an appropriate 

accounting regarding the sums it withdrew from Metro Solutions’ account. Sometime in 

September or October 2015, Kahlifa requested a detailed accounting of the funds withdrawn, but 

Chebbani failed to provide the information. On October 21, 2015, Khalifa and Chebbani met 

and agreed to end the relationship between Metro Solutions and IPP after the next payroll. 

Khalifa testified that Chebbani acknowledged that IPP had withdrawn more funds than was 

justified from Metro Solutions’ account, and promised to issue Metro Solutions a check from IPP 

for the overcharged amount, but never did so. 

Thereafter, in preparation to process the October 23, 2015 payroll, IPP notified Metro 

Solutions that it planned to withdraw $52,134.40 from Metro Solutions’ account. Believing this 

to be in excess of the amount required for that payroll, Khalifa refused approval for that amount, 

approving only $33,197.82. Khalifa testified that on October 24, 2017, she informed Metro 

Solutions’ bank that IPP no longer had authorization to withdraw from Metro Solutions’ account. 

On October 26, 2015, Khalifa sent Chebbani a letter terminating IPP’s services to Metro 

Solutions. Metro Solutions alleged that thereafter, it determined that IPP had withdrawn 

$119,000 more from Metro Solutions’ account than was necessary to process the payroll under 

the pilot program, and also had failed to do certain assigned tasks, such as obtaining workers 

compensation policies for the in-home caregivers and processing the caregivers’ 2015 year-end 

tax statements. Metro Solutions initiated this action against IPP and Chebbani alleging 

conversion, and also alleging, against IPP, breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty. 
-4-

Metro Solutions also sought declaratory relief, asking that the trial court declare that there was 

not a partnership established between IPP and Metro Solutions, that any such alleged partnership 

was dissolved, and that any contracts between the two parties were terminated. 

In their answer to the complaint, IPP and Chebbani denied that they had contracted with 

Metro Solutions to provide services as part of the pilot program, and stated that any agreement 

with Metro Solutions had been undertaken by Healthlink, which had in turn contracted with IPP 

to perform the payroll processing for Healthlink. On August 2, 2016, Healthlink filed a separate 

action against Metro Solutions, alleging that there was a partnership between Metro Solutions 

and Healthlink regarding the pilot program. 

Metro Solutions moved to amend its complaint to add Healthlink and Choice as 

defendants. The amended complaint alleged conversion as to all defendants, breach of contract 

and breach of fiduciary duty by IPP, and sought declaratory judgment as to all defendants. The 

trial court granted Metro Solutions’ motion to amend the complaint. IPP and Chebbani moved

for reconsideration of the trial court’s order permitting Metro Solutions to amend its complaint, 

which the trial court denied. 

IPP and Chebbani moved for summary disposition of Metro Solutions’ claims against 

those two defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Healthlink and Choice then filed a 

counterclaim against Metro Solutions, alleging breach of contract and conversion, and also 

seeking a declaratory ruling that a partnership existed between Metro Solutions and Healthcare 

and Choice. 

At the hearing held before the trial court on the pending motions, the trial court 

determined that summary disposition was not appropriate at that point for either party because 

there existed issues of fact, and discovery was ongoing. The trial court also directed defendants 

to dismiss their separate lawsuit and to file a counterclaim in this action. 

Healthlink and Choice filed a counterclaim, and Metro Solutions moved for summary 

disposition of the counterclaim. Thereafter, Metro Solutions moved for summary disposition 

under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and MCR 2.605, of Count IV of its amended complaint seeking 

declaratory judgment, and of Count III of the counterclaim, which also sought declaratory 

judgment. The declaratory judgment sought by Metro Solutions was a ruling by the trial court 

that no partnership existed between Metro Solutions and any of the defendants. Defendants then 

moved for summary disposition of Metro Solutions’ amended complaint under MCR 

2.116(C)(10). 

At the conclusion of the hearing on the motions, the trial court granted Metro Solutions’ 

motions for summary disposition and dismissed Healthlink’s and Choice’s counterclaim. The 

trial court stated on the record that with respect to the counterclaim for conversion, Metro 

Solutions had carried the burden of proof that the money in question was owned by Metro 

Solutions, not by Healthlink or Choice, and therefore Healthlink and Choice could not establish 

conversion of the money by Metro Solutions; there was therefore no question of fact to be 

submitted to the jury on the conversion count of the counterclaim. The trial court also dismissed 

the counterclaims for breach of contract and for declaratory judgment, finding that they were 

based on allegations of a partnership but there was no evidence to support a finding of a 
-5-

partnership. The trial court permitted Healthlink and Choice to file a motion for leave to amend

the counterclaim. The trial court further ordered that defendants refile their earlier motion for 

summary disposition by September 8, 2017. 

The trial court also granted Metro Solutions’ request for declaratory judgment, finding 

that no partnership existed between Metro Solutions and either Choice or Healthlink. The trial 

court explained on the record that the counterclaim had alleged a partnership, but that during the 

hearing defense counsel had conceded that there was no partnership. Instead, the defense now 

asserted that Khalifa and Chebbani had agreed to enter into a contract to form an LLC owned 

equally by Metro Solutions and Chebbani for the purpose of processing the payroll for the pilot 

program, and to share equally in the profits from that undertaking. 

Healthlink and Choice timely filed their motion to amend the counterclaim, together with 

their amended counterclaim, alleging breach of contract by Metro Solutions. However, 

defendants did not refile their motion for summary disposition until November 6, 2017, at which 

time they also moved for the trial court to accept the late filing of the amended motion. 

The trial court denied Healthlink’s and Choice’s motion to amend the counterclaim, and 

also denied defendants’ motion for leave to file late the amended motion for summary 

disposition. The trial court noted that it nonetheless had reviewed the proposed amended motion 

for summary disposition and found it to be without merit because defendants’ brief in support of 

the amended motion failed to cite supporting authority. 

Defendants thereafter sought interlocutory relief from this Court, which denied the 

application for leave to appeal, being unpersuaded of the need for immediate appellate review. 

Metro Healthcare Services, Inc v Innovative Payroll Processing, Inc, unpublished order of the 

Court of Appeals, entered December 20, 2017. 

The parties proceeded to a jury trial on Metro Solutions’ remaining claims of conversion, 

breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. At the conclusion of trial, the jury found in 

favor of Metro Solutions on all counts, and awarded Metro Solutions $84,650 in actual damages. 

The trial court entered judgment on the verdict in the amount of $200,686.88, being 

$84,650 in actual damages, attorney fees of $109,077.50, costs of $3,132.48, and prejudgment 

interest of $3,826.90. Defendants now appeal from the order of judgment, challenging the award 

of attorney fees, and also challenging the trial court’s previous orders denying the amendment of 

the counterclaim and denying the late filing of defendants’ amended motion for summary 

disposition. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. MOTION TO AMEND THE COUNTERCLAIM

Defendants first contend that the trial court abused its discretion by denying Healthlink’s 

and Choice’s motion to amend their counterclaim. We disagree. 

We review for an abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to grant or deny a motion 

to amend pleadings. Sanders v Perfecting Church, 303 Mich App 1, 8-9; 840 NW2d 401 (2013). 
-6-

An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court chooses an outcome outside of the range of 

reasonable and principled outcomes. Saffian v Simmons, 477 Mich 8, 12; 727 NW2d 132 (2007). 

“[A]n abuse of discretion standard acknowledges that there will be circumstances in which there 

will be no single correct outcome; rather there will be more than one reasonable and principled 

outcome.” Maldonado v Ford Motor Co, 476 Mich 372, 388; 719 NW2d 809 (2006) (quotation 

marks and citation omitted). In other words, an abuse of discretion is more than a matter of a 

difference of judicial opinion, and instead occurs only when the trial court’s decision strays 

outside that range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Augustine v Allstate Ins Co, 292 Mich 

App 408, 419; 807 NW2d 77 (2011). 

MCR 2.118(A)(2) provides that leave to amend a pleading “shall be freely given when 

justice so requires.” Further, MCR 2.116(I)(5) provides:

If the grounds asserted [in support of summary disposition] are based in subrule

(C)(8), (9), or (10), the court shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their 

pleadings as provided by MCR 2.118, unless the evidence then before the court 

shows that amendment would not be justified. 

Thus, under MCR 2.116(I)(5), when a trial court grants summary disposition under MCR 

2.116(C)(8), (9), or (10), the trial court must permit the parties to amend their pleadings unless 

amendment would be futile. Weymers v Khera, 454 Mich 639, 658; 563 NW2d 647 (1997). 

Leave to amend “should ordinarily be denied only for particularized reasons such as undue 

delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failures to cure by amendments previously allowed, 

or futility.” Decker v Rochowiak, 287 Mich App 666, 682; 791 NW2d 507 (2010). In addition, 

“[a] determination of futility must be based on the legal insufficiency of the claim on its face.” 

Liggett Restaurant Group, Inc v City of Pontiac, 260 Mich App 127, 139; 676 NW2d 633 

(2004). 

In this case, the trial court granted Metro Solutions summary disposition of Healthlink’s 

and Choice’s counterclaim, but permitted Healthlink and Choice to move to amend their 

counterclaim. Healthlink and Choice filed their motion to amend the counterclaim, together with 

their amended counterclaim, alleging breach of contract by Metro Solutions. The trial court then

denied Healthlink’s and Choice’s motion to amend the counterclaim, finding that doing so would 

be futile. In a detailed opinion on the record, the trial court explained that defendants’ proposed 

amended counterclaim failed to assert the elements of breach of contract; specifically, the 

amended counterclaim did not assert facts to establish mutual assent on all essential terms of the 

alleged contract. We agree. 

A valid contract requires “(1) parties competent to contract, (2) a proper subject matter, 

(3) legal consideration, (4) mutuality of agreement, and (5) mutuality of obligation.” Innovation 

Ventures v Liquid Mfg, 499 Mich 491, 508; 885 NW2d 861 (2016). In addition, for a contract to 

be formed, there must be an offer, acceptance, and mutual assent, being a meeting of the minds, 

to all essential terms. Kloian v Domino’s Pizza, LLC, 273 Mich App 449, 452-453; 733 NW2d 

766 (2007). A contract does not exist without mutual assent. Calhoun Co v Blue Cross Blue 

Shield of Michigan, 297 Mich App 1, 13; 824 NW2d 202 (2012). “A meeting of the minds is 

judged by an objective standard, looking to the express words of the parties and their visible acts, 

not their subjective states of mind.” Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). In addition, the 
-7-

acceptance must be unambiguous and in strict conformance with the offer for a contract to form. 

Kloian, 273 Mich App at 452-453. 

In this case, the allegations of the proposed amended counterclaim do not allege a valid 

contract. The proposed amended counterclaim does not demonstrate offer, acceptance, and 

mutual assent, or meeting of the minds, to all the essential terms necessary to establish a 

contract. At most, the proposed amended counterclaim alleges that the parties discussed entering 

into an agreement to contract and Chebbani formed a subjective opinion as to what the 

agreement would be. Because the proposed amended counterclaim does not set out allegations 

adequate to establish a contract or a breach thereof, the trial court correctly determined that the 

proposed amended pleading was futile. The trial court stated its particularized reason for 

denying the motion on the record, see Decker, 287 Mich App at 681, and that finding was 

accurately based on the legal insufficiency of the claim on its face. See Liggett Restaurant 

Group, Inc, 260 Mich App at 138. The trial court’s decision was therefore not outside the range 

of reasonable and principled outcomes, and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion 

by denying leave to amend the counterclaim. 

B. MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION

Defendants next contend that the trial court abused its discretion by declining to permit 

them to file their amended motion for summary disposition. We disagree. We review for an 

abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision to decline to entertain motions not filed in compliance 

with the trial court’s scheduling order. Kemerko Clawson, LLC v RXIV Inc, 269 Mich App 347, 

349; 711 NW2d 801 (2006). 

MCR 2.401(B)(2) provides that if the trial court concludes that a scheduling order would 

facilitate the progress of the case, “the court shall establish times for events . . . the court deems 

appropriate” including the filing of motions. The trial court has discretion to decline to entertain 

motions that are not filed in compliance with the deadlines established by the trial court. 

Kermerko, 269 Mich App at 349. In addition, trial courts possess the inherent right to sanction 

litigants and their counsel, even to the extent of dismissing an action. Maldonado, 476 Mich at 

388. 

Here, defendants do not dispute that their motion was not timely filed. The trial court 

ordered defendants to refile their motion for summary disposition by September 8, 2017, and 

defendants did not refile the motion until November 6, 2017. Defendants argue, however, that 

the trial court should not have required them to refile their motion for summary disposition, and 

therefore the trial court abused its discretion by failing to permit the late refiling of the motion. 

Defendants suggest that they were required to refile it for reasons stated by the trial court off the 

record. 

It is not possible for this Court to review what allegedly occurred off the record. What 

the record does reveal, however, is that the trial court permitted defendants to refile their motion 

for summary disposition, but defendants failed to do so timely. Although the record does not 

specify the reason the refiling of the motion was necessary, given that the trial court had ruled on 

certain aspects of the claims, it appears that the trial court was permitting defendants an 

opportunity to refile their motion to adjust for any insufficiencies then apparent in their existing 

motion. Because enforcing the deadlines established by the trial court in a scheduling order is 
-8-

within the discretion of the trial court, and because defendants have not demonstrated that the 

trial court abused its discretion by enforcing that deadline, we conclude that the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion. See Kermerko, 269 Mich App at 349. 

Moreover, the trial court reviewed the merits of defendants’ amended motion. The trial 

court noted that it nonetheless had reviewed the proposed amended motion for summary 

disposition and found it to be without merit because defendants’ brief in support of the amended 

motion failed to cite supporting authority.1 In light of these considerations, we conclude that the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to permit defendants to file their late and 

meritless motion for summary disposition. 

C. ATTORNEY FEES

Lastly, defendants contend that the trial court erred in awarding Metro Solutions attorney 

fees under the conversion statute for fees that were not related to the conversion claim, and 

further erred in awarding attorney fees at the rate of $350 per hour. Again, we disagree. 

We review a trial court’s award of attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Pirgu v 

United Services Auto Ass’n, 499 Mich 269, 274; 884 NW2d 257 (2016). Specifically, the 

decision to award attorney fees and the reasonableness of the attorney fees awarded is reviewed 

for an abuse of discretion. Windemere Commons I Ass’n v O’Brien, 269 Mich App 681, 682; 

713 NW2d 814 (2006). The factual findings underlying the award are reviewed for clear error, 

and underlying questions of law are reviewed de novo. Brown v Home Owners Ins Co, 298 

Mich App 678, 690; 828 NW2d 400 (2012). A trial court abuses its discretion when it makes an 

error of law. Pirgu, 499 Mich at 274. 

Michigan follows the “American rule” with regard to the award of attorney fees, which 

provides that a party may not recover attorney fees as an element of costs or damages unless 

expressly permitted by statute, court rule, common-law exception, or by contract. Reed v Reed, 

265 Mich App 131, 164; 693 NW2d 825 (2005). Application of this rule prevents trial courts 

from using attorney fees as an economic sanction to prohibit litigants from exercising their right 

to trial. McKelvie v Mt Clemens, 193 Mich App 81, 84; 483 NW2d 442 (1992). 

In this case, Metro Solutions sought attorney fees under the conversion statute, MCL 

600.2919a, as a case evaluation sanction under MCR 2.403(O), and because defendants’ claim 

was frivolous. The trial court found that defendants’ case was not frivolous, but found that 

Metro Solutions was entitled to attorney fees as a result of the case evaluation. However, the 

 1 A review of defendants’ earlier motion for summary disposition reveals that the earlier version 

also lacked citation of authority, which may shed light on the trial court’s decision to order that 

the motion be refiled. In addition, defendants’ earlier motion presented positions regarding the 

parties’ “partnership” that defendants thereafter eschewed, also necessitating a refiling of the 

motion with arguments compatible with defendants’ new theory of the case that no partnership 

existed. 
-9-

trial court also found that Metro Solutions was entitled to attorney fees under the conversion 

statute, MCL 600.2919a, and stated that it was awarding attorney fees under that statute. 

Under MCL 600.2919a, a person damaged as a result of another person’s stealing, 

embezzling, or converting property, is entitled to recover “3 times the amount of actual damages 

sustained, plus costs and reasonable attorney fees.” In this case, the parties do not dispute that 

the jury found that IPP and Healthlink had converted Metro Solutions’ funds, and that Chebbani 

aided in that conversion. Defendants therefore do not challenge Metro Solutions’ entitlement to 

attorney fees under the conversion statute. 

Defendants do challenge, however, the trial court’s determinations of an hourly rate of 

$350, and the total number of hours awarded of 311.65, arguing that both determinations are 

excessive. Defendants argue that the hourly rate of $350 is not justified because Metro 

Solutions’ attorney only charged $200 per hour. Before the trial court, Metro Solutions’ attorney 

explained that he regularly charges up to $400 per hour, but had reduced his hourly rate because 

Metro Solutions was a non-profit corporation, and presented evidence supporting his credentials 

and the reasonableness of $350 in the given community and type of work involved in the case. 

The trial court discussed this information on the record and explained its reasoning in finding the 

hourly rate of $350 reasonable. Our Supreme Court has made it clear that a “reasonable fee” 

need not be the same as the actual fee charged. Smith v Khouri, 481 Mich 519, 528; 751 NW2d 

472 (2008); see also Cleary v Turning Point, 203 Mich App 208, 212; 512 NW2d 9 (1994). In 

this case, the trial court’s decision that $350 was a reasonable hourly rate customarily charged in 

the locality for similar legal services by a similarly-experienced attorney was based upon Metro 

Solutions’ attorney’s qualifications and the State Bar’s Attorney Income and Billing Rate 

Summary Report. Thus, there is evidence that the trial court properly relied upon the “market 

rate” that “lawyers of similar ability and experience in the community normally charge their 

paying clients for the type of work in question.” Smith, 481 Mich at 531. 

Similarly, there is no indication that 311.65 hours is unreasonable given the length and 

complexity of the litigation. “The fee applicant bears the burden of supporting its claimed hours 

with evidentiary support.” Augustine, 292 Mich App at 432, quoting Smith, 481 Mich at 532. 

“The fee applicant must submit detailed billing records, which the court must examine and 

opposing parties may contest for reasonableness.” Id. Here, Metro Solutions’ attorney 

submitted extensive records regarding his billing and the trial court permitted defendants to 

contest the reasonableness of the hours expended. Defendants argue that not all of the time 

expended related to the conversion claim, given that there were also claims for breach of contract 

and breach of fiduciary duty, as well as claims raised in the counterclaim. The trial court found, 

however, that all of the counts of the lawsuit were inextricably intertwined, and the record 

supports the intertwining nature of the claims, parties, witnesses, and theories. 
-10-

Because there is evidentiary support for the trial court’s determination of $350 as a reasonable 

hourly rate in this case, and the determination that 311.65 was a reasonable amount of hours 

spent on the case, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making the

baseline calculation. 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh

/s/ Jane M. Beckering

/s/ Michael F. Gadola