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U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections 

Inspection Report 

Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory Protective Force Authority 

DOE/IG-0820 September 2009 
Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

September 4, 2009 

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY 

 FROM: Gregory H. Friedman 

 Inspector General 

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Inspection Report on “Lawrence Livermore 

National Laboratory Protective Force Authority” 

BACKGROUND

The Department of Energy’s (Department) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

(Livermore) is a premier research and development institution supporting the Department’s 

scientific, engineering, environmental, and national security activities. Livermore is 

managed and operated under contract by Lawrence Livermore National Security (LLNS) 

LLC, for the Department’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). In 

accordance with the Department’s safeguards and security policy, Livermore maintains a 

cadre of armed protective force officers to prevent and defend against malevolent acts. 

Federal regulations establish protective force arrest authority to enforce specific laws 

regarding property of the United States in the custody of the Department or its contractors. 

Federal regulations and Department policy limit protective force officials’ arrest authority to 

the performance of official duties related to Department property. 

In November 2008, the Office of Inspector General received an allegation that 

Livermore’s protective force was acting outside its established authority. Specifically, it 

was alleged that the protective force violated the law and Livermore policy by responding 

to a local Livermore Police Department radio call for assistance, which they overheard on 

their police band radio. Protective force officers already away from the Livermore site 

responded to a private residence and interacted with the public. It was also alleged that 

while onsite at Livermore, the protective force violated employees’ privacy rights by 

accessing the Department of Motor Vehicles database when conducting vehicle traffic 

stops for administrative traffic violations. We noted that the protective force was using 

the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (CLETS) to access the 

Department of Motor Vehicles database. Information available from CLETS can include 

vehicle registration information and criminal records, such as outstanding “wants and 

warrants.” We initiated this inspection to review the facts and circumstances regarding 

the allegation. 

RESULTS OF INSPECTION

We concluded that Livermore’s protective force exceeded its authority when assisting a 

local law enforcement agency at an offsite location. We also concluded that the 

protective force may have exceeded its authority by accessing the CLETS database for 

administrative traffic violations where they may detain individuals. Specifically, we 

found that: 
 The actions of Livermore’s protective force in providing armed assistance to local 

law enforcement outside Livermore’s perimeter was not consistent with Department 

policy. In general, Federal regulations and Department policy limit protective force 

officials’ arrest authority to the performance of official duties related to Department 

property. In reviewing Livermore’s policies and procedures regarding protective 

force officer duties, Livermore’s protective force did not have clear guidance on 

providing assistance to local law enforcement outside of Livermore’s perimeter. 

 Livermore did not establish clear policies regarding protective force responsibilities 

and authority while conducting administrative vehicle stops for traffic violations as 

required by Department policy. While conducting administrative vehicle stops for 

traffic violations, the Livermore protective force queried CLETS records where there 

is the potential for detaining individuals for crimes outside of their arrest authority. 

Resultantly, this practice may present a liability to the Department. 

We noted that by the end of our fieldwork, NNSA’s Livermore Site Office issued a 

memorandum to LLNS stating that the protective force’s actions offsite are restricted to 

the Department’s mission, and that the use of CLETS is not authorized for traffic 

enforcement. We also noted that the Office of Health, Safety and Security issued a 

memorandum to Department and NNSA security officials that reiterated existing policy 

where offsite assistance to local law enforcement authorities by Department contractor 

personnel is not permitted and that accessing law enforcement databases during 

administrative traffic stops exceeds the scope of authorized duties. 

We made two recommendations to the Manager, Livermore Site Office to address our 

findings. 

MANAGEMENT REACTION

In responding to a draft of this report, NNSA agreed with the recommendations and 

provided information on corrective actions taken and planned. 

We consider management’s agreement with the report recommendations to be responsive 

to our report findings. 

Attachment 

cc: Deputy Secretary 

 Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

 Chief of Staff 

 Manager, Livermore Site Office 

 Director, Office of Internal Review (CF-1.2) 
LAWRENCE LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY 

PROTECTIVE FORCE AUTHORITY 

 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objective 1 

Observations and Conclusions 2 

DETAILS OF FINDINGS 

Offsite Responses to Local Law Enforcement 3

Traffic Violations 4 

RECOMMENDATIONS 5 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 5 

INSPECTOR COMMENTS 5 

APPENDICES

A. Scope and Methodology 6 

B. Management Comments 7 
Overview 

Page 1 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 

 Protective Force Authority 

INTRODUCTION The Department of Energy’s (Department) Lawrence Livermore

AND OBJECTIVE National Laboratory (Livermore) is a premier research and

 development institution supporting the Department’s scientific, 

engineering, environmental, and national security activities. 

Livermore is managed and operated under contract by Lawrence 

Livermore National Security (LLNS) LLC, for the Department’s 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). 

In accordance with the Department’s safeguards and security 

policy, Livermore maintains a cadre of armed protective force 

officers to prevent and defend against malevolent acts. Federal 

regulations establish protective force arrest authority to enforce 

specific laws regarding property of the United States in the custody 

of the Department or its contractors. Federal regulations and 

Department policy limit protective force officials’ arrest authority 

to the performance of official duties related to Department 

property1

. 

In November 2008, the Office of Inspector General received an 

allegation that Livermore’s protective force was acting outside its 

established authority. Specifically, it was alleged that the 

protective force violated the law and Livermore policy by 

responding to a local Livermore Police Department radio call for 

assistance, which they overheard on their police band radio. 

Protective force officers already away from the Livermore site 

responded to a private residence and interacted with the public. It 

was also alleged that while onsite at Livermore, the protective 

force violated employees’ privacy rights by accessing the 

Department of Motor Vehicles database when conducting vehicle 

traffic stops for administrative traffic violations. We noted that the 

protective force was using the California Law Enforcement 

Telecommunication System (CLETS) to access the Department of 

Motor Vehicles database. Information available from CLETS can 

include vehicle registration information and criminal records, such 

as outstanding “wants and warrants.” We initiated this inspection 

to review the facts and circumstances regarding the allegation. 

 

1

 In instances of fresh pursuit, protective force officials may be authorized for offsite pursuit and apprehension of 

someone suspected of having committed an onsite offense. 
Page 2 Observations and Conclusions 

OBSERVATIONS AND We concluded that Livermore’s protective force exceeded its 

CONCLUSIONS authority when assisting a local law enforcement agency at an 

offsite location. We also concluded that the protective force may 

have exceeded its authority by accessing the CLETS database for 

administrative traffic violations where they may detain individuals. 

Specifically, we found that: 

 The actions of Livermore’s protective force in providing 

armed assistance to local law enforcement outside 

Livermore’s perimeter was not consistent with Department 

policy. In general, Federal regulations and Department 

policy limit protective force officials’ arrest authority to the 

performance of official duties related to Department 

property. In reviewing Livermore’s policies and 

procedures regarding protective force officer duties, 

Livermore’s protective force did not have clear guidance on 

providing assistance to local law enforcement outside of 

Livermore’s perimeter. 

 Livermore did not establish clear policies regarding 

protective force responsibilities and authority while 

conducting administrative vehicle stops for traffic 

violations as required by Department policy. While 

conducting administrative vehicle stops for traffic 

violations, the Livermore protective force queried CLETS 

records where there is the potential for detaining 

individuals for crimes outside of their arrest authority. 

Resultantly, this practice may present a liability to the 

Department. 

 We noted that by the end of our fieldwork, NNSA’s Livermore 

Site Office issued a memorandum to LLNS stating that the 

protective force’s actions offsite are restricted to the Department’s 

mission, and that the use of CLETS is not authorized for traffic 

enforcement. We also noted that the Office of Health, Safety and 

Security issued a memorandum to Department and NNSA security 

officials that reiterated existing policy where offsite assistance to 

local law enforcement authorities by Department contractor 

personnel is not permitted and that accessing law enforcement 

databases during administrative traffic stops exceeds the scope of 

authorized duties.
Details of Findings 

Page 3 Details of Findings 

OFFSITE RESPONSES We concluded that Livermore’s protective force exceeded its 

TO LOCAL LAW authority when assisting a local law enforcement agency at an 

ENFORCEMENT offsite location. Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1047 

(10 CFR §1047), limits protective force arrest authority to the 

performance of official duties related to Department property. 

In October 2008, two Livermore uniformed protective force 

officers driving in a marked patrol car were returning from an 

evening security check of a Livermore facility located in the city of 

Livermore when they overheard on their radio a Livermore Police 

Department officer’s call for emergency assistance related to a 

domestic disturbance. Driving outside their normal patrol route to 

a private residence, the protective force officers, while armed and 

in uniform, assisted the local police officers. At the location, the 

protective force officers provided incident scene perimeter security 

and were in contact with the general public. 

During the course of our review, we became aware of an additional 

incident in 2008 where a protective force officer, using a 

Livermore patrol car to take another officer to a medical 

appointment in the city of Livermore, responded to a request from 

a Livermore Police Department officer. The protective force 

officer assisted the police officer in investigating the source of a 

burglar alarm at a non-Department-related facility. 

 

The Department’s Contractor Protective Force Manual (DOE M 

470.4-3A) requires the establishment of clear and concise post 

orders regarding officer responsibilities, assignments, and 

operational requirements at a designated duty post. Our review of 

post orders for Livermore’s protective force revealed that officer 

offsite authority was unclear when collaborating with local law 

enforcement. For example, a post order for offsite activities states 

that if a protective force officer takes actions outside the scope of 

10 CFR §1047, such actions shall be taken in a personal capacity 

as a private citizen without the assurance of Livermore’s or LLNS’ 

defense and indemnifications. However, this same post order 

states that in the event of an emergency request for assistance from 

a peace officer to the protective force, a protective force officer 

may respond. Livermore protective force officials told us that they 

are authorized to assist local law enforcement offsite for 

non-Department-related matters as private citizens under common 

law. They indicated the principle of “posse comitatus” allows 

local law enforcement to request private citizens for assistance. 
Page 4 Details of Findings 

 We interviewed an official with the Department’s Office of 

Security Policy, who said that assisting local law enforcement as 

previously mentioned would be outside the protective force scope 

of employment. A Livermore Site Office official also opined that 

protective force officers cannot act offsite as private citizens under 

“posse comitatus” while on duty and in uniform, and that these 

actions with local law enforcement were outside the protective 

force responsibilities and authority. After we concluded our 

fieldwork in February 2009, the Livermore Site Office issued a 

letter to LLNS stating that, due to concerns with legal liability and 

officer safety, protective force activities offsite were restricted to 

Department interests. 

 

TRAFFIC We found that the protective force may have exceeded its authority 

VIOLATIONS by accessing the CLETS database for administrative traffic 

violations. Specifically, conducting criminal inquiries utilizing 

CLETS during administrative traffic stops may result in the 

detention of individuals for crimes outside of the protective force’s 

arrest authority. We determined that the protective force has the 

authority to conduct traffic stops on the Livermore premises. We 

further determined that the protective force also has the authority 

to query CLETS records, but the authority is silent on accessing 

CLETS during administrative vehicle stops. 

Protective force officers informed us that the protective force had 

established a practice of obtaining law enforcement information 

through the CLETS database during administrative vehicle stops. 

Further, a protective force official said that the protective force 

may detain an individual stopped for an administrative violation if, 

as a result of a CLETS inquiry, a “want or warrant” criminal 

response is received, regardless of whether the crime is within the 

scope of their protective force authority per the CFR. 

Protective force officers we interviewed further opined that in 

some instances Livermore’s protective force may detain someone 

for any want or warrant for the purpose of officer safety. 

Protective force officials said there is a “gray” area on what they 

should do if during an administrative traffic stop a CLETS report is 

received indicating that a want or warrant is outstanding. Senior 

Livermore Site Office officials also said this is a “gray” area, and 

that it may be problematic to detain someone for a want or warrant 

outside the authority provided by the CFR. Both Livermore and 

Livermore Site Office officials agreed that clarification on 

handling these types of situations is required.
Page 5 Recommendations 

 Management and Inspector Comments 

We concluded that the above conditions were caused because 

Livermore had not implemented clear policies regarding protective 

force officers’ responsibilities and authority while conducting 

administrative vehicle stops for traffic violations. Our review of 

Livermore’s post orders revealed that they did not clearly detail the 

duties and authority for officers to access CLETS when conducting 

vehicle stops for traffic violations. Of particular concern is that 

there was no guidance stating when officers were allowed to obtain 

a CLETS report for an administrative traffic violation, or what 

officers were authorized to do should the CLETS report state that a 

person has a want or warrant for criminal behavior. 

We noted that after we concluded our fieldwork, the Livermore 

Site Office issued a letter to LLNS, which stated, in part, that the 

protective force is not authorized to utilize CLETS for 

administrative traffic stops. Additionally, the Office of Health, 

Safety and Security issued similar guidance to the Department in 

response to a pre-decisional version of this report. 

RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Manager, Livermore Site Office: 

1. Ensure Livermore develops policies and procedures on 

protective force authority offsite that corresponds to Federal 

and Department regulations. 

2. Ensure Livermore develops policies and procedures for 

conducting traffic enforcement that addresses accessing the 

CLETS telecommunication system. 

MANAGEMENT In comments on a draft of this report, management concurred 

COMMENTS with the report and its recommendations. We have included 

management’s comments in Appendix B. 

INSPECTOR We consider management’s comments to be responsive to our 

COMMENTS report.
Appendix A 

Page 6 Scope and Methodology 

SCOPE AND The fieldwork for this inspection was conducted between 

METHODOLOGY January 2009 and February 2009. As part of this inspection we 

conducted interviews, document reviews and analysis that 

included: 

 10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1047 “Limited Arrest 

Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers”; 

 DOE Manual 470.4-3, “Protective Force”; 

 DOE Manual 470.4-3A, “Contractor Protective Force”; 

 California penal and government codes; 

 Livermore protective force site policy orders; and, 

 Memorandums of Understanding with local law enforcement 

agencies. 

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the “Quality 

Standards for Inspections” issued by the President’s Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 
Appendix B 

Page 7 Management Comments 
IG Report No. DOE/IG-0820 

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