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116TM CONGRESS

Session

SENATE REPORT

116-XX

REPORT

OF THE

SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

UNITED STATES SENATE

ON

RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND

INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION

VOLUME 4: REVIEW OF THE INTELLIGENCE

COMMUNITY ASSESSMENT

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(U) Review of the Intelligence Community Assessment

L (U) INTRODUCTION 6

II. (U) FINDINGS 6

III. (U) BACKGROUND 8

V. 10

A. 10

B. 13

C. 17

18

19

3.

20

4.

20

5. 20

21

7.

22

8.

23

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D.

V. (U) ICA REVIEW: TASKING TO PUBLICATION 26

A. (U) Tasking and Drafting 26

B. (U) Confidence Level Debate Over One Judgment 32

C. (U) Discussion of the "Steele Reporting" in the ICA 38

D. (U) Finalizing the ICA 42

VI. (U) ICA REVIEW: KEY JUDGEMENTS 46

A.(U) On the Key Judgments of the December 2016 ICA 46

1.(U) Russian Efforts to Influence the 2016 Election 46

2.(U) Russian Leadership Intentions 47

3.(U) Multifaceted Russian Influence Operations 48

4.(U) The Threat from Future Russian Influence Operations 50

B.(U) Counteriutelligence Investigations 50

C.(U) The Unfinished Work of Intelligence 50

D.(U) Intelligence Cited in the ICA 51

VII. (U) ICA Review: Sectiou-by-Section 52

A.(^^^^^^m|||||||||||||[|||| Analytic Linc|: Putin Ordered Campaign to

Influence U.S. Election 53

1. (U) Discussion 54

2. (U) On Putin Directing the Active Measures 67

B.(S//NF) Analytic LineJI: Russian Campaign Was Multifaceted 82

l^^m Introduction 82

2.(||^^^|^H[[|||||^m|||m||| First Sub-topic: Cyber Espionage Against

U.S. Political Organizations 91

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4.(U) Third Sub-topic: Russian Cyber Intnisions Into State Electoral

Infrastructure 100

5.(U) Fourth Sub-topic: Russian Propaganda Efforts 106

Analytic LineJ: Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US Ill

114

115

116

eH^^I Anal)rtic Line|||: Election Operation Signals "New Normal" In

Russian Influence Efforts 118

1.(U) CIA Reporting 119

2.(U) NSA Reporting 123

3.(U) DIA Reporting 124

4.(U) Open Source Reporting 125

5.(U) Department of State Reporting 126

6.(U) DHS Reporting 126

IX. (U) The ICA Annexes 127

A

127

|..128

C.(l!/iim) Annex|: Open Source Center Analysis: Russia—Kremlin's TV

Seeks lo influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US, Published December 12,

2012 132

133

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133

133

H.(U) Annex|: Estimative Language 134

135

A.(U) Sensitivity of the Reporting 135

B||||||^|||^^^^^^^||||||||||||||||||||||||m 136

(U) APPENDIX B: CIA ANALYSIS ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES—

1981-1991,2016 144

A.(U) Historical Analysis—1981-1991 144

B.(U) National Intelligence Council Report—2016 150

(U) Appendix C: THE COMMITTEE REVIEW PROCESS 153

(U) Additional Views of Senator Wyden 157

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I. (U) INTRODUCTION

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence acknowledges the impressive

accomplishment in drafting aiid coordinating of the Intelligence Community Assessing! (ICA),

wiiicii was compk'ied as a '^IpjiioirUidiuniuMlit^kesidonf^i^em

and a dfclassiticd versiDii datpd laniiar}' 6, 2017,

and liudL- available lu die publie uii die Ullice of the Director of National Intelligence

(ODNl) website. Tlie Committee's review focused on the highly compaitmented "Memorandum

to the President."

II. (U) FINDINGS

1. (U) The Committee found the ICA presents a coherent and well-constmcted intelligence

basis for the case of unprecedented Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. pre^ential

election. On the analytic lines of the ICA, the Committee concludes that all^| analytic

lines are supported with all-source intelligence, although with varying substantiation.

The Committee did not discover any significant analytic tradecraft issues in the

preparation or final presentation of the ICA.

(U) Tlie ICA reflects proper analytic tradecraft despite being tasked and completed

widiin a compressed timefraiiie. The compact timeframe was a contributing factor for

not conducting formal analysis of competing hypotheses.

(U) The differing confidence levels on one analytic judgment are justified and properly

represented. Those in disagreement all stated that they had the opportunity to express

differing points of view. Tlie decision regarding the presentation of differing confidence

levels was the responsibility of the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Jolm Brennan and the Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) Admiral Michael

Rogers, both of whom independently expressed to the Committee that they reached the

final wording openly and with sufficient exciiaiiges of views.

(U) Multiple intelligence disciplines are used and identified througliout the ICA. Where

tlie Committee noted concerns about die use of specific sources, in no case did the

Committee conclude any analytic line was compromised as a result.

(U) In all the interviews of those who drafted and prepared the ICA, the Committee

heard consistently that analysts were under no politically motivated pressure to reach

specific conclusions. All analysts expressed that they were free to debate, object to

content, and assess confidence levels, as is noniial and proper for the analytic process.

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2.

3,

4.

5.

(U) The Committee found that the agencies responsible for the ICA—CIA, NSA, and

FBI. under the aegis of ODNI—met the primary tasking as directed by President Obama,

which was to assemble a product that reflected the intelligence available to the

Intelligence Community (IC) regarding Russian interference in the 2016 election.

(U) The Committee found that the ICA provides a proper representation of the

intelligence collected by CIA, NSA, and FBI on Russian interference in 2016, and this

body of evidence supports the substance and judgments of the ICA.

Regarding FBI, the ICA states, in its "Scope and Sourcing" inrmdiirrion, that

"[wje also do not include information from ongoing investigations." The

Committee found that the information provided by Christopher Steele to FBI was not

used in the body of the ICA or to support any of its analytic judgments. However, a

siunmary of tliis material was included in Annex A as a compromise to FBI's insistence

that the information was responsive to the presidential tasking.

(U) The Committee found the ICA makes a clear argument that the manner and

aggressiveness of the Russian interference was historically unprecedented. However, the

ICA and its sources do not provide a substantial representation of Russian interference in

the 2008 and 2012 presidential elections, as the Committee understands was part of the

President's original tasking.

The Committee found that the ICA did not provide a set of policy

recomrnendations on how to respond to fimire Russian active measures, which was part

of the tasking the President conveyed to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)

James Clapper. Tlie ICA did include, in the compartmented version, an unclassified

section independently produced by DHS, FBI, and the Department of Commerce's

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), "DHS/FBI/NIST

Recommendations: Options to Protect and Defend US Election Infrastructure and US

Political Parlies."

(U) Tlie absence of policy recommendations was deliberate, due to the well-established

norm that the IC provides insigiit and warning to policy makers, but does not itself make

policy.

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6. (U) The Committee found the ICA would benefit from a more comprehensive

presentation of how Russian propaganda—as generated by Russia's multiple state-owned

platfomis—was used to complement the full Russian influence campaign.

(U) Open source collection is a long-standing discipline for CIA and otlier elements of

the IC, and open source reporting is used througliout the ICA to support specific analytic

assertions. However, open source reporting on RT and Sputnik's coverage of VSTikiLeaks

releases of Democratic National Committee (DNC) infonnation would have strengthened

die ICA's examination of Russia's use of propaganda. On this point, the Committee finds

that AmiexJ of the ICA—"Open Source Center Analysis: Russia: Kremlin's TV Seeks to

Influence Politics, Fuel Discontent in US," published December 12, 2012^—should have

been updated to provide a summary of Kremlin propaganda in 2016, diereby making a

more relevant contribution to the ICA. An update to this assessment was not produced by

the Open Source Enterprise until after die publication of the ICA.

7.

The

role of social media lias been a significant tix us by the Coinniiltee and is discussed in a

separate volume of this report.

111. (U) BACKGROUND

(U) The Obama Administration released two versions of the ICA, a classified version on

January 5 and a declassified version on January 6, 2017, both tilled Assessing Russian

Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections.^

M' }

the House and Senate intelligence committees.

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Tlie Cumiuitiee lield iwo lieariiigs on idiiuary 10. 2017—one open hearing In

the moniiiig and one closed hearing in tlie aftemoon—to take testimony on the ICA from

Director Clapper. FBI Director James Comey, Director Brennan. and Admiral Rogers.^

(U) On January 23. Committee Chaimian Burr and Vice Chaimian Wanier of the

Committee convened a business meeting to discuss plans for the Committee's oversiglit on the

issue of Russian activities during the 2016 presidential election cycle.^

(U) At the business meeting, the Committee unanimously agreed to initiate a formal

inquiry into the subject of Russian involvement in the 2016 elections. The Committee agreed to

Terms of Reference delineating the lines of inquiry.

(U) The Committee conducted its examination of the ICA through document reviews of

source documents and related materials and through interviews with IC officials involved in the

direction, preparation, writing, editing, and review of the ICA.

4 (U) SSCI Open and Closed Hearings on Russian Active Measures Against the U.S. Political System. January 10,

2017.

5 (U) Throughout 2017 the Committee held numerous hearings and briefings on the subject of Russian active

measures, and Comminee staff organized briefings on this topic as pan of regular oversight activities.

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In the case of FBI dociimeiitation for

provide the correct underlying report until January 29. 2018.

, FBI did not

A.

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(U) On July 22, 2016, WikiLeaks began to disseminate material exfiltrated from the

DNC7

AlsojUHm^^^mil Director Brennan spoke with Director Comey and

learned that FBI had an open investigation into potential lies between Moscow and U.S. persons

associated with the Trump Campaign.'®

8(U) Ibid.

9 (IT) Ibid.

10\

TFie Coiuuiinee notes

Ihdt FBI opened its fomtat iiivesugaliou luto potetaiai U.S. person c oordination wuh Russia on plertion intei-ferenre.

rodenameH CROSSFIRE HURRICANE, on Julv 30. 2016.

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12

lA

1-

lb

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18

iy

23

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26 (U) Ibid., p. 3S.

27 (U) Ibid., pp. 17-19.

28 (U) Ibid., pp. 20-21.

29 (U) Ibid., pp. 16-17.

30 (U) Ibid., pp. 21-23.

31 (U) Ibid., p. IB.

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32 (U) Ibid., pp. 36-38, 43.

33 (U) Ibid., pp. 26-27.

34 (U) Ibid., p. 26,

35 (U) Ibid., p. 52.

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36

37 y^,

38 (U) Ibid., p. 35.

39 (U) Ibid., pp. 64-65.

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C.

40 (U) Ibid., pp. 71-72.

41 fin Ihid . nn. n^.qR.

42

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2.

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3.

44

20

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6.

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7.

45

4G

22

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R.

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9.

10.

48 (II) The public staienient refers to the ioint public statement bv ODNl and DHS on October 7. 2016.

49l

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D.

V. (U) ICA REVIEW: TASKING TO PUBLICATION

A. (U) Tasking and Drafting

In a meeting of the NSC on December 6, 2016, President Obama instnicted

Director Clapper to have the Intelligence Community prepare a comprehensive report on Russian

interference in the 2016 presidential election.^ Director Clapper told the Committee: "I don't

tliink we would have mounted the effort we did. probably, to be honest, in the absence of

presidential direction, because that kind of cleared the way on sharing all the accesses."^

The President directed that the report include everything the IC knew about

Russian iiuui terence in the 2016 elections. In addition, the tasking included providing the IC's

understanding of the historical context of Russian interference in U.S. political processes,

focusing on the 2008 and 2012 elections. The presidential tasking also requested

recommendations on how to prevent interference in the future and how to strengthen electoral

systems.^ Finally, the instruction was to have a version available to brief Congress, and also a

declassified version releasable to the public. Tlie President requested this product be completed

53 (U) Uuuuuiui;> aud daico lui Uil' dialling; al tlia -iiav. Uaiu iuau> uucn - L'jiidu'-ifjd h) di-j

54 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with James Clapper, Former Director of National Intelligence. July 17,

2017. p. 53.

55 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9,

2017, p. 8.

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by tlie end of his Adinlniso atioii, Jdiuidiy 20, 2017. Tliere was no docunieiu ineniorializing this

presidential direction.

The same day. Director Clapper passed the President's verbal direction to the

National Intelligence Council (NIC), specifically the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for

Russia and Eurasia, Julia Gurganus, and the NIO for Cyber Issues, Vinh Nguyen.

The NIO for Russia and Eurasia and the NIO for Cyber Issues held a community

meeting^^^HHU^^^^^^^^^H to di'^cuss rho triskinu. n^'ianmrnt rr-pnn-ihilirins^

outline, scope, and approacli tor the prujeci.

56 (U) SSCI Transcript of the interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9.

2017. p. 10.

57 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO for Cyber Issues], May 9,

2017, pp. 22-23, 32.

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FBI assigned two coimterintelligeiice aiialysis to the lCAteaiii.|

58 (U) Interview with Bill Priestap, Assistant Director, Counterintelligence DivisitHi. FBI, Apdl 13,2017; Interview

with [Section Chief, Counterintelligence Analysis Section, CD-I, FBI] April 21,2017. The Section Chief of

Analysis was lonarhan Moffa

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60 (IT) rh!,f

61

(II) SSCl Xianscript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and {NIO for Cyber Issues), May 9.

201". pp 38-19. 48-49,

63|

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65 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO

for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, p. 86.

66 (U) Ibid., pp. 38-39.

67 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18.2017, p. 50.

68(1!) /biU. pp. 66-73.

69 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid.. May 9, 2017, pp. 72-73.

70 (II) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid.. May 9. 2017, p. 65.

71 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., pp. 74.

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CIA reported to the Committee that on the same day, December 20, FBI first

infomied the CIA's team that FBI wanted to include material doriscd fiDiii what hci -uitp known

as the "Steele dossier." This infonnation was from a fonner

officer now operating a private commercial intelligence finii, who had an

72 fin Ti .il l '.' I lilt I if i!if Tsih'i |.\ idi N.ai'iii.tl m ir. P.iii"!, M>i\' IH. Jft". (ir.

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established relatiunsliip with FBI. Tiiis material eventually became Annex A of the ICA, but its

placement in die ICA was not resolved until December 29.

B. (U) Confidence Level Debate Over One Judgment

'7 (U) SSCl TtdiiM-iipi of []ie iiueiviev. wiili Admiral Michael S. Rogers. USN, Direacw, National Security Agency,

and Conimand«-, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19,2018, p. 58.

78 (U) Ibid., pp. 62-65.

79 (U) Ibid., p. 61.

80 (U) Ibid., p. 60.

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I

81 (U) Ibid., p. 53. ("One guy speaks for NSA.")

82 (U) Ibid., p. 82.

83 (U) SSCI Transcripi of the Interview with James Clapper, Fonner Direaor of National Intelligence, July 17.

2017, p. 54. In November 2016, the transition team invited Admiral Rogers to New York to intn^^iew for the DNl

pKKition. Admiral Rogers told the Committee that he met with the President-elect ("did a job interview, went back to

my job ... [wjhich had zero impact on anything I have ever done)." Admiral Rogers also told the Conunittee that

he consulted with his lawyer and spoke with the Chainnan of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before going to the interview.

See SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers. USN, Director, National Security Agency,

and Commander. U.S. Cyber Command. March 19. 2018. p. 104.

841

85

87 (U^SC^aasaTp^Ttlie Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Direaor, National Security Agency,

and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19,2018, p. 54.

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88 (U) Ibid., p. 61.

89 (If) SSCI Transcript of the Tnterviw with National Seciiritv Agency Panel. May 18. 2017, pp. 52-53.

90|

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3. »'J(J. p 8B

11 1

5)8

90

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iul

102

Ibid., p. 72.

Ibid., p. 70.

103 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. Rogers, USN, Director, National Security

Agency, and Commander, U.S. Cyber Command, March 19, 2018, p. 66.

104 (U) Ibid., p. 67.

105 (U) Ibid., p. 68.

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106

n

108 (U) , pp. .) - iB. 1- 2

109

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C. (U) Discussion of the "Steele Reporting" in the ICA

The CIA teani working on the ICA first learned on December 20, 2016, of

infomiaiion tiie FBI held and wanted to include in the ICA. Despite the fact that the ICA

explicitly excluded ongoing investigations. FBI sought to introduce a summary of the material

from officer Christopher Steele."^

The Committee reviewed the debate over whether and where to include the

Steele tiiaierials with all participants to the drafting of the ICA. In the first meeting of the

Committee with Assistant Director for the Counlerintelligence Division (AD/CD) of the FBI, he

articulated the FBI's concerns. First was the directive from die President to include all the

infoniiation the IC had on Russian involvement in the 2016 presidential election, and this

included material that FBI held. Even thoiigli the Assistant Director suggested that "the FBI

didn't want to stand behind it," it qualified for this directive. Second, the question immediately

became how to handle this information in the drafting of the ICA. This was ultimately resolved

by including the infomiation as Annex A, a two-page summary attached only to the most

classified version of the ICA (i.e., the "Memorandum to the President" version)."^ FBI officials

told the Committee that they "would have had a major problem if Annex A had not been

included," and that FBI believed they "had to put everything in."'"

111^^ The Assistant Director for^mj recounted a conversation witli FBI Assistant

Director for CD on December 22, and recanetHheFBTs interest in "weaving their dossier in the

actual text of the report." Assistant Director for|||m stated there was no "visibility, at the time

of the writing of tlie report, into the sub-sourcing dynamic for that dossier ... because of the siibsourcing, 1 felt [it] was not appropriate for inclusion in the report and would detract from the

report." The Assistant Director for^H||| told the Committee that when she asked the FBI

Assistant Director for CD for more iiifonnation on the sources for the dossier, the Assistant

Director for CD told her that the FBI's primary source "had not provided information regarding

n

Tt') Analyst 2, SSCI Transcript of tlie Interview with Analysts Panel. July 18. 2017, p. 151.

112 (U) TrnT^ew with Bill Priestap, Assistant Director. Counterintelligence Division. FBI. April 13. 2017.

113 (U) Interview with [Section Chief, Counterintelligence Analysis Section. CD-I, FBI] April 21. 2017.

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tlie sub-sources, but that [FBI was] able to independently corroborate some of the sub-sourcing.

Biit he did not provide the names or reliability for the sub-sources." Assistant Director for

mH said the FBI Assistant Director told her, "We fee! ver\' strongly that it should be included

and woven into the text," to which Assistant Director for^m stated tliey would have to

"agree to disagree" and that her recommendation would be tliat the information "not be included

in the report. At a minimum, 1 was thinking it should be pulled out and put in an annex.""^

When asked to comment on Annex A as it appears in the ICA, Assistant Director

forH^^si^'d that she concuired with most of the language on the first page of what became

Annex A of the ICA."^ However, from where the text in Annex A begins with "the most

politically sensitive claims by the FBI source alleging a close relationship between the President

elect and the Kremlin," the Assistant Director forB|^ stated "from there on down, I can tell

you that there is no infonnation coming from^^Bsources that would corroborate any of

that.""®

The Assistant Director for^m also noted the FBI insisted on including the

Steele reporting because "they didn't want to look like they were hiding anything," and that "[t]o

me, that sounded fair.""^ The Assistant Director foi'|^^| and her deputy reviewed the material

and sent a copy to Director Brennan and Deputy Director Cohen."® The Assistant Director for

told the Committee that her understanding was that "the analysts were very much against"

putting the FBI material in the ICA."® "[I]t was very iinvetted information." according to the

Assistant Director forHH and "some of it made sense."^^ "[Ilf you look at the theme, are the

Russians trying to mes^witn our elections, that theme is certainly accurate. But the details were

really—we wouldn't be able to come up with a good analytic confidence in them before the ICA

was due."^^' Ultimately, "[e]verybody agreed that it would just be an annex, and then it was

agreed there would be a big caveat put on top of the annex, that this is totally unvetted,

unverified."^^^

1^^^^ The CIA analysts interviewed by the Committee recalled "at one point the FBI

wanted [tlie Steele reporting] in the text [of the ICA]. The FBI wanted it m one form. We had it

in a big text box on page 4.... We had a bitter argument with the FBI to put it in an annex."'^^

One analyst acknowledged that the material was already circulating, and that "[i]f we hadn't

114 (If) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with May 25, 2017, pp. 48-51, 53-54, 61.

115 "Memorandum to the President" version of the ICA only, p. 27.

May 25. 2017, pp. 53-54.

. May 15, 2017, pp. 77-78.

116 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [AI

117 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [AI

118 (U) /hi£f..pp. 76. 78.

119 (U) Ibid., p. 77.

120 (U) Ibid.

121 (U) Ibid.

122 (U) Ibid., p. 78.

123 (U) mi Analyst 1. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Analysts Panel. July 18. 2017, p. 155.

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addressed it, it would have eitlier created tlie impression among people who didn't go through

the sourcing that we had relied on it, which we didn't, or that we were unaware of it."'^*

Deputy Director for Analysis stated, ''We would have never included that report

in a ClA-only assessment because the source was so indirect. And we made sure we indicated

we didn't use it in our analysis, and if it had been a CIA-only product we wouldn't have included

it at all."^^^

Director Clapper later reiterated to the SSCI in a closed hearing in May 2018:

/ don 1 think you 'II find in any of the footnotes in the ICA any reference to the

dossier. We thought it important to include a summary description of it, but it was

not included as an organic part of the ICA Maybe a difference without a

distinction, but to us that was a very important point. For our part, particularly

the CIA and ODNI, since we could not validate the second and third-order assets,

that's why we did not use it os part of the assessment. We felt—and the whole

reason particularly for Jim Comey's part—that we had a duty to warn the

President-elect that it was out there, and that was the whole point. But it was not

included as an organic part of the assessment.^^

S Director Brennan reiterated the CIA's reservations about the FBI's Steele

j, that the DDA|||^| "was very concerned about polluting the ICA with this

material," and that "there was stiff opposition, especially from CIA, to include that material

either in essence or in substance in that report," which "was not used in any way as far as the

judgments in tlie ICA were concerned.""^ Director Brennan stated:

Jim Comey and the FBI felt strongly that, here is a very sensitive document that is

being produced by CIA, NSA, and FBI about Russian attempts to interfere in the

election and Russian attempts to denigrate one candidate and promote prospects

of the other. The FBI has acquired this information that come; from a former

foreign intelligence officer from a pretty respectable service, that includes

information of potential kompromat related to Donald Trump. So Jim Comey,

with some elegance said: How can we have this report and deliver it to the

outgoing President and the incoming President and for he, Jim Comey, to be

completely silent on this dossier that a lot of people have seen and that the FBI

124 (U) ^^Analyst, ibid., p. 152.

125 (U) Depl eputy Director for Analysis, ibid.

126 (U) Closed SSCI Hearing with Former Intelligence Directors, May 16, 2018, pp. 33-34.

127 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan. fomter Director, Central Intelligence Agency. June 23.

2017, pp. 60-65.

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was following up on and doesnt know whether or not Mr. Trump is aware or

not?'^

When Brennan appeared before the SSCI in a dosed hearing in 2018, he stated:

Initially FBI wanted it incorporated into the assessment itself. We all pushed

back on that. They wanted it to be included as the last portion of the assessment

if it wasn't even going to be used as a finding. We pushed back against that. But

Jim Comey made a very strong case, which we didn't object to, that it needed to

accompany the assessment because it was related to the issue, and we didn t know

where the FBI's investigation was as far as some of those things.'^

a call from

Director Brennan volunteered to tiie Committee that around tlie time he received

who said that:

[H]e wanted to make sure that I understood and that others in the senior

officialdom of the V.S. government understood that that officer, Steele, had been a

forrne/ im officer, but had no current relationship w/r/^m, and that dossier

was not put together in any woy withJUmf^ support. So he wanted to make sure

there was a separation there.^^

Director Comey addressed the question of the dossier and its placement when

asked by SSCI Chainnan Burr whether he "insisted that the dossier be part of the ICA in any

way, shape, or fonn?" Director Comey replied:

I insisted that we bring it to the party, and I was agnostic as to whether it was

footnoted in the document itself, put as an annex. I have some recollection of

talking to John Brennan maybe at some point saying: I don t really care, but I

think it is relevant and so ought to be part of the consideration.^^

mm NSA played no role in the debate over the Steele reporting and the ICA. NSA

analysts told the Committee they had "no role in drafting, nor role in its inclusion, no role in

reviewing the source material, became aware of it as it was apf)ended."^ NSA analysts first

129

130

128 ftq Ibid., pp. 60-61.

Closed SSCI Hearing with Former Intelligence Directors, May 16. 2018, pp. 34-35.

SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, former Director. Central Inrenigenro Agency

Juni J '>■ JDl"". p 65 When Brennan appeared before the SSCI in 2018. he added ihai^

see

131 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed SSCI Hearing with James Comey, Former Director of the Federal Bureau of

Investigation. June 8, 2017, p. 49.

132 (U) SSCI Transcript of tlie Interview with National Security Agency Panel, May 18, 2017, p. 86.

41

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lieard of tlie iufoniidiion on December 29 and liad no insiglics into Steele's source network, and

the Steele material had no effect on NSA's views of the Key Judgments of the ICA.'^

Admiral Rogers recalled that he heard of this from his team of analysts on

December 29 while reviewing a draft of the ICA to which this material had been appended.

Admiral Rogers*s initial reaction was tliat the Steele infonnation ouglit not be in the body of the

ICA, but "let's put it in the appendix."^^

1^^^ Director Clapper said he "first heard" of the Steele material in a conversation

with Director Brennan "around the 15'*' of December."^^^ The NIOs were witting of some of the

conversations regarding the Steele material, but "had almost no say in this," and recalled a

"unanimous sense that this was not germane to the judgments and findings in tiie paper" and "did

not add value."*^ The NIO for Russia and Eurasia said that they were "comfonable placing it in

the annex" because "that remained true to the task."^^^

On December 27, a SVTC was held between the four deputies of CIA, NSA,

FBI, and ODNl, in order to reach an agreement on where to place the Steele materials in the

ICA, with the FBI insisting it remain in the body of the ICA. No agreement was reached and,

according to the CIA senior officer assigned to the ICA, Director Brennan left it to the analysts to

make the call on where to put it. On December 28, Director Comey was still insisting the

doaunent be in the body. On December 29, Deputy Director Cohen and Deputy Director

McCabe agreed to place the material in an annex.

Director Brennan recalled to the Committee: "So as long as it was separated

from the ICA's substance and judgments and as long as it was not going to be part of the fonnal

briefing we gave on the ICA, we felt, ok, Jim [Comey], you want to do it, okay. We're not going

to object.'"^

D. (U) Finalizing the ICA

With the placement of the Steele material resolved, the ICA was formalized as a

iTm to the President, dated December 30, 2016, and handed to ilie NIOs at the NIC.

133 (U) Ibid.

134 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with Admiral Michael S. RogCTS. USN, Direaor, National Security

Agency, and Commander. U.S. Cybw Command, March 19, 2018, pp. 69. 71.

135 (U) SSCI Transcript of the Closed Hearing: Former Intel Directors Panel on Russian Interference. May 16,

2018, p. 107.

136 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIG for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO

for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp. 90. 92.

137 (U) p. 93.

liitfiview April

1 4. JUl

14U (U) transcript of the Interview with John Brennan. former Director, Central Intelligence Agency. June 23.

2017, p. 62.

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From December 30, 2016. through lannarv 5. 2017, the NIOs hosted several

meetings and SVTCs to produce the^^^^^^^m||||m^ of tlte Memorandum to the

President.

(U) While noting details of disagreement in content and confidence levels as reviewed

above, tlie Committee heard no significant criticisms or objections to the ICA process, or the

resulting paper, from all the analysts, managers, and agency heads interviewed. Every witness

interviewed believed the collaboration was transparent and professionally candid, including

disagreements over confidence levels. Every witness interviewed by the Committee stated that

he or she saw no attempts or pressure to politicize the findings.

(U) The Committee asked about the lack of recommendations, how the process

compared with other ICA productions, how additional time would have benefited diis iCA

142 i ijii rht' IitTMiview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia} and [NIO

for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp. 121-122.

143 (U) Ibid., p. 124.

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exercise, and how aiid whether the counterinteliigence question was handled during the ICA

process.

Tlie President's original tasking included a request for recominendations about

protectin^l^oral infrastnicture and responding to foreign interference in the future. Ail

witnesses interviewed by the Committee stated the position that the IC does not make policy

recommendations. The NIG for Russia and Eurasia stated, "that's an area we don't touch," while

noting that the final "Memorandum to the President" included, as a separate document (but not

an annex), an unclassified, eleven-page paper produced by DHS, FBI, and the Department of

Commerce's National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST), titled "Recommendations:

Options to Protect and Defend US Election Infrastnicture and US Political Parties." NIG for

Russia and Eurasia slated there was no input to thi^ document from anyone writing the ICA.'^

The NIG for Russia and Eurasia was mindful of the President's full direction

and stated that she reached out to both the National Security Council (NSC) and the Department

of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) in the period after the first complete draft

was presented on December 19 and presented a deadline to submit policy recommendations by

December 27. The NIG received no responses."^

The other key difference in this process, according to tlie NIO for Russia and

Eurasia, was dealing with discussion of U.S. persons. The NIG noted, "[d]ay to day, we do not

deal with U.S persons in any way." The participants in the process even debated whether to

144 (U) Ibid, p. 112.

145 (U) /6/d..p. 113.

146 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid. pp. 61-64.

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nanie the two leading candidates. Regarding the option of leaving the candidates unidentified,

NIO for Russia and Eurasia concluded this made "no sense ... but that fell uncomfortable, I

tliink, for a lot of us.""'

Noting the imperative of the tight deadline, the Committee asked how

additional time would have affected the quality of the ICA. The NIO for Russia and Eurasia

responded that it would have allowed the opportunity to |

148

NIO for Cyber Issues stated:

[More time would have helped] to collate FBI information in terms of the

changes because their reporting and the reporting

from privatf iiidu^uy ^^lui siiiics uikcs a long time.... You can see in the paper

the

because w \ iiii/ 1| n i we

something more completed'^''

NIO for Russia and Eurasia also believed more time would have allowed for:

147 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., p. 102.

148 (U) /bid., pp. 103-104.

149 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., p. 103.

150 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid.

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The Committee asked the NIOs who worked on the ICA how they handled the

question of whether activities were being coordinated between the Russian government and the

Trump Campaign. The NIO for Russia and Eurasia responded that "it did not come up.... We

didn't have any evidence for that. There was not information that pointed us in that direction."

The NIO for Cyber Issues slated "[w)e rely on our FBI colleagues to bring it up. But it was not

discussed."'^ As noted elsewhere, neither the Fusion Cell members nor the ICA authors were

read into the FBI's investigation.

VI. (U) ICA REVIEW: KEY JUDGEMENTS

(U) The Committee finds that the IC met President Obama's primary tasking and that the

ICA is a sound intelligence product. While the Committee had to rely on the agencies that the

sensitive information and accesses had been accurately reported, as part of its review the

Committee examined analytic procedures and interviewed analysts, managers, and senior

intelligence officers who wrote and oversaw the production and who were well-versed with the

information. These findings are based on these interviews as well as a detailed review of the

entire body of finished intelligence reporting used to substantiate the ICA.

(U) In all the interviews of those wlio drafted and prepared die ICA, the Committee

heard consistently that analysts were under no politically motivated pressure to reach specific

conclusions. All analysts expressed that they were free to debate, object to content, and assess

confidence levels, as is normal and proper for the analytic process.

A. (U) On the Key Judgments of the December 2016 ICA

1. (U) Russian Efforts to Influence the 2016 Election

(U) The ICA states:

Russian efforts to influence the 2016 presidential election represent the most

recent expression of Moscow'^ longstanding desire to undermine the U.S.-led

liberal democratic order, but these activities demonstrated a significant

1*51

152 (U) NIO tor Russia and Emasia. ibidT, p. 61.

153 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., p. 116-117.

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escalation in directness, level of activity, and scope of effort computed to previous

operations.

(U) Tlie ICA revealed the elements of a comprehensive and multifaceted Russian

campaign against the United States as it was understood by the U.S. Intelligence Community at

die end of 2016. Tlie intelligence presented supports the judgment that the Russian campaign

"demonstrated a significant escalation in direcmess, level of activity, and scope of effort

compared to previous operations."

(U) However, the Committee found the ICA's treatment of the historical context of

Russian interference in U.S. domestic politics limited.

2. (U) Russian Leadership Intentions

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(U) The Comminee found that the ICA provided a range of all-source reporting to

support these assessments.

(U) The Committee found that specific intelligence as well as open source assessments

support the assessment that President Putin approved and directed aspects of this influence

campaign.

(U) Further, a body of reporting, to include different intelligence disciplines, open source

reporting on Russian leadership policy preferences, and Russian media content, showed that

Moscow sought to denigrate then-candidate Clinton.

(U) Tlie Committee found that the ICA presents information from public Russian

leadership commentary, Russian state media reports, and specific intelligence reporting to

support the assessment that Putin and the Russian Government demonstrated a preference for

candidate Trump.

(U) Russia leadership intentions is the only assessment in the ICA that had different

confidence levels between the participating agencies—the CIA and FBI assessed with "high

confidence" and the NSA assessed with "moderate confidence"—so the Committee gave this

section additional attention. The Committee finds that the analytic disagreement was reasonable,

transparent, and openly debated among the agencies and analysts, with analysts, managers, and

agency heads on l^th sides of the confidence level reasonably justifying their positions.

3. (U) Multifaceted Russian Influence Operations

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(U) The Committee found that the IC A presents a detailed assessment of the elements

fhnf rnmprT^-pd rhf^ inflTirnrr rnmpni;

(U) While the ICA cites examples of Russian media in 2016, its analysis of RT (formerly

Russia Today) and Spumik is dated, and the ICA does not provide an updated assessment of this

Russian capability in 2016, which the Committee found to be a shortcoming in the ICA, as this is

infonnation that was available in open sources.

4. (U) The Threat from Future Russian Influence Operations

(U) Since January 2017, the Committee has discovered additional examples of Russia's

attempt to sow discord, undermine democratic institutions, and interfere in U.S. elections. The

Committee also has reviewed intelligence demonstrating Russia's efforts to interfere in the

elections of our allies as well as countries Russia perceives to be in its sphere of influence.

B. (U) Counterinteliigence Investigations

(U) The ICA did not attempt to address ongoing investigations, to include whether

Russian intelligence services attempted to recruit sources with access to any campaign. All

individuals the Committee interviewed stated tliat the Steele material did not in any way infonn

the analysis in the ICA—including the key judgments—because it was unverified information

and had not been disseminated as serialized intelligence reporting. The material was instead

included in Annex A of the comparimented ICA.

C. (U) The Unfinished Work of Intelligence

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(U) Tiie Committee notes that, as is the case with all intelligence questions, information

continues to be gathered and analyzed. Tlie Committee finds the conclusions of the ICA are

sound, and is reassured by the fact that collection and analysis subsequent to the ICA's

publication continue to reinforce its assessments.

D. (U) Intelligence Cited in the ICA

(U) Tlie ICA has^H footnotes. Source doaiments for the foomotes include:^

From FBI—intellignirp rnpnrf; ritnd fifU'-nnr inrlndinp FBI Infplligence

Intonnation Reports (IIRs

"Letterhead Memorandum" (LHM)/wliich is an FBI manner for fonnaliy assemOlmg

intelligence reporting on various topics; and records of victim notifications.

SSCl Transcript of the Hparing on Ru«L«;ian Active Mpasurps Against thp U S. PoliUcal

Sysit'ui, January 10. 2017, pp. 16-19.

157 (U) Ibid., pp. 10-13.

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VIL (U) ICA Review: Section-by-Section

Liri {io/i

Analytic LineH: Putin Ordered Campaign To Influence

Analytic Line Russian Campaign Was

Multifaceted This section had five sub-headings:

O Cvber Espionage Against U.S. Political Organization^,

O Public Disclosures of Russian-Collected Data

O Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State Electoral Infrastructure

0 Russian Propaganda Efforts

0

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Analytic LiiieH: Influence Effort Wbs Boldest Yet in the U.S. I

Analytic I inrjr Fhrrirtn O^vrrrrfon ^fr?na/s "New Normal" In Russian

Influence Effort-^

Analytic LtneH: Putin Ordered Campaign to Influence

.S. l- lcdioii

(U) Tlie Committee found tliat reporting from multiple intelligence disciplines was used

as evidence to support this analytic line, and that the analytic tradecraft was transparent.

139

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1. (U) Discussion

a. (U) Open Source Reporting

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161 m

ifii d') I)N April 0 6

55

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b.

165

Ifif.

168

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c. (U) NSA Reporting

16(

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d. (U) FBI Reporting

171

172

172 (U^NI^To^yber Issues, SSCl Transcript of die iuteiview i'li TNK ) tm Ru. ut hilI Eurasia] and (NIO for

Cyber May 9. 2017, p. 40.

174(t|^^H) FBI, nR4 212 0834 17. November 2. FBI. im4 212 0168 17. October

U.20ib

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d. (U) CIA Reporting

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177

178

179

180

M

183

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185

8(

18:

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188

189

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u.

190

191

192

193

194

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lu.

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19(

iJ

191)

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201 (I') Ihii

202

JO ;

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2. (U) On Putin Directing the Active Measures

204

206

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208

20SI

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211

212

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213|

214 (U) NIO for Cybei Issues. SSCI Trauscripi ^

Cyber Issues], May 9. 2017, pp. 77-78.

215 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., p. 79,

he luierview wUh [NIC for Rus^and Eurasia] and [NIO for

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216 (U) NIO for Cyber Issues, ibid., p. 81.

217 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia, ibid., pp. 82-83.

218 (I') SSC! Transrripf of rhe Inrerview wifh Narional Seoirifv Agenrv Panel. Mav 18. 2017. 20-30

21

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jjf

222

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223

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224

225

7S

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229

230

231

232

233

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2^4

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236

237

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238

239

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d.

240

241

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2

244

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B. Analytic LineH: Russian Campaign Was Muitifaceted

1. Introduction

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(U) Tlie Committee found that this section is supported and substantiated by multiple

intelligence disciplines. The cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use

is consistent with proper analytic standards.

The Committee found that die analysis does not exceed the evidence presented

251

25

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a. On Putin's Role

25?.

254

25

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25f

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I

COMMITI EE SENSITIVE - RUSSLAINVES XIGAHON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

bJ

86

COMMin EL SENSITIVE - RUSSLV EN \ Lb 1 iGAnON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESI UiATlON ONLY

The temi "neighbors" is noinenclatiire the Russian

intelligence services have used to refer to each other going back to the 1930s.^

iGj (U) See, e.g.. VVeuisieia and VasbUiev. The Haunted Wood (1999) (describing Soviet intelligence activities in

the U.S. during the Stalin era and drawing on Soviet intelligence services archives accessible in the 1990s).

264 (U) SSCl Transcript of the Closed Hearing on Russian Active Measures Against the U.S. Political System,

January 10. 2017, pp. 14-15.

265 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia. SSCI Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO

for Cyber Issues], May 9, 2017, pp.79-80.

87

COMMITIEl SI Nsl IIVI - RUSSI A !N\ I S I K,ATION ONLY
COMMIITEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

b. (U) On Russia's Influence Capabilities

"Moscow's caniDai£ii aimed at the U.S. election vc.iis >>1 ni iu LapabiiiUL's,

which Moscow has honed in the former Soviet states."^

26r(tn . i)"':

2at (U) Ibi'i. p. 85

270

88

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA IN\ I s I!(. \TION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSI I IVE - RUSSIA INVESI KiATION ONLY

27

27d

89

COMMITITI Sf NSI11\ I - KUSSI \ INVI S I K,\nON ONLY
COMMITI Eti SENSi 1 iVE - RUSSIA INVES i IGATION ONLY

c. (U) On the Challenge of Attributing Moscow's Actions

275

27€

27

278

90

I

COMMITI EE SENSn iVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMITTEt SENSl riVfc - RUSSIA IN VES i lOATION ONLY

2. Sub-topic: Cyber Espionage Against

U.S. roliticol Uiganizaliuns

(U) The Committee found tliat this sub-topic is supported and substantiated by multiple

intelligence disciplines. The cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use

is consistent witli proper analytic standards.

279

91

COMMITIFI SI Nsmvr - RUSSIA INV! STIf.ATION ONLY
COMMTTTFh SK.NSI IIVK - RUSSIA INVhSriGAnON ONLY

a.

b. (U) GRU Operations

'8C

281

2ii

284

92

COMMin i F SF Nsn !VT - RUSSI A INVF STFGATION ONLY
COMMITTEt StNSiiiVfc-KUSSiAINVtSilGAnON ONLY

28f

28

28f

28S)

290

93

I

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMlTlEfc SENSli IVt - RUSSIA iNVtSl IGAllON ONLY

29i

29

29

29

29^^

94

I

COMMinFF SI NSniVF - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMiriLL SLNSlilVt: - RUSSIA INVLSI IGATION ONLY

29/

95

I

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSMIVE - RUSSIA INVES i iGAriON ONLY

A>w

3.

(U) The Committee found that this sub-topic is supported and substantiated by multiple

intelligence disciplines. The cited sources support logically defensible conclusions, and their use

is consistent with proper analytic standards.

a. (U) NSA Reporting

298

299

)0 (II) Depanniein of Justice. Office of Inspector General. A Review of Vferious Arfions by die Federal Bureau of

Investigation and Department of Justice in Advance of the 2016 Election, classified Appendix One, July 2018.

301

96

COMMrn 11 M NSI 11\ I - RLISSI A INVl S I K,A I ION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

302

303

304

305

30(

97

COMMITIEL SENSITIVE - RUSSLAINVESliGAnON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

b. (U) Open Source Reporting

307

: '.t);

98

COMMinEE SENSITIVE - RUSSLYINVESllUVnON ONLY
(OMMITTFF. SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVtS UGATION ONLY

c. (U) CIA Reporting

14

99

CQMMITIEE SLNSlllN 1 - RUSSIA |N\ I S I I(.ATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESI IGATION ONLY

is tlic

discussed a ve under the first analytic line ot

tne

Sub-topic: Russian Cyber Intrusions Into State Electoral

liilidsUucture

(U) The Comminee found that tliis sub-topic cites multiple intelligence disciplines. With

tlie limited exception of certain FBI materials, the sources cited support logically defensible

conclusions that are consistent with proper analytic standards.

mm Tlie Comminee found that wliile FBI material is used for most citations, some

FBI reports referenced vaiy in relevance and transparency, and one FBI repon is missing.

315

31£

31

100

CGMMITIEL SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INN i s I K. ATION ONLY
COMMi ri EE SENSn IVE - KUSMIA INVtb I IGATION ONLY

a. (U) CIA Reporting

31H

31'J

101

COMMirrLL bi NSI livi - RUSSI A INVI SI K.ATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSIUVE - RUSSIA INVES I K.AriON ONLY

b. (U) NSA Reporting

c. (U) FBI Reporting

Nine FBI reports are used to support language about specific Russian

intelligence activities targeting the U.S. electoral system as wHl ryhnr inrnT*^inn^ in thr U.S.

The most extensive report supports the ICA assessment that^

320

321

322

323

102

COMMini l SI NSI1IVF - RUSSIA INVI S IK,ATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

i report is an LHM cldted October 21 troiii lite tBl iomm

This six-pdue I.IIM lias (wemv-nne footnotes < itinn I HI < as^

This

investigations.

lis LHM states:

R Other FBI reports submitted for tliis section include four reports cited for the

ich states:

103

COMMITIEL SENSITIVE - RUSSLYINVESTIGATIQN ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSH IVE - RUSSIA INVESIIGAI IDN ONLY

One FBI IIR cited identifies

he FBI

R'puiiiuj^ LiiL'd iiieiLidL'i dii Luii_id^:;UiL'd ''iii.iii wiui dii uiipiiiiU'd /ip III*-' jfkk liiMcnt, and therefore

cannot be judged to support the ICA language.^ The other fooOiote to this statement cites a

doaiinent missing in both copies of supporting materials provided to the Committee.TM

Therefore, the Committee cannot verify if the infonnation cited supports the ICA language.

rBI, 1IR4 213 3763 16. March 21. ^016.■■!■■■■■■

(1 FBI, Electronic Communication, Log File^niviaecny^R^acted}, October 26, 2010

IP IS to

The I, It'-'-- H !!' 'r jii . ;■ |fd Ml'- ;nId" i li i:

104

COMMITI I I SI Nsn ivr - RUSSIA INVI snC.ATION ONLY
COMMlTTEt SENSl 1IVE - RUSSIA IN VfcS i IGAHON ONLY

332 (U) Ibid.

333

i05

I

COMMnTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSI I IVE - RUSSIA INVES I KwATION ONl.Y

Sub-topic: Russian Propaganda Efforts

(U) Tlie Committee found that analysts draw inferences from open source reporting in

this sub-topic.

(U) The Committee found that CIA, FBI, and NSA reporting is properly used to support

this section, and this sub-topic expounds on the propaganda element in the Russian influence

campaign in 2016. The use of sources, except where noted, supports logically defensible

conclusions that are consistent with proper analytic standards.

a. (U) Open Source Reporting

13

23t

33

106

COMMITTEE SI Nsi 11\ I - RUSSI \ INVF S I K.ATION ONLY
COMMITTEt StNSl 1 iVt - RUSSIA IN VfcSi iGAnON ONLY

(U) Tlirougliout this section, open source reporting supports the text in the ICA, with the

following notable exceptions.

b. (U) CIA Reporting

33R

107

I

COMMrn HE Sl NSmVF - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSHTVE - RUSSIA INVES i l(;ATION ONl.Y

340

341

108

COMMIITEE SLNSlllN I - RUSSI A IN\ ! SI!(,ATION ONLY
C OMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTK-AnON ONLY

c. (U) NSA Reporting

d.

M2

i4

34

109

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSE\ 1N\ Ls 1IGATION ONLY
COMMiriEE SENSniVfc - RUSSIA INVtSl IGATION ONI Y

346

347

34fl

110

COMMITTl I SI NSn IVF - UL SSI \ INVI S I K.ATION ONLY
COMMlTFEt SENSi 1 iVt - RUSSIA INVfcS IIGATION ONLY

Analytic Linef: Influence Effort Was Boldest Yet in the US

(U) Tlie Committee found tliat this section logically follows Analytic Linef, and is

supported and substantiated by multiple intelligence disciplines. As above, the cited sources

support logically defensible conclusions, and their use is consistent with proper analytic

standards.

(U) Tlie Committee acknowledges that the purpose of the ICA was not to present a

comprehensive historical perspective, and that the authors were working under significant time

constraint, yet the direction received from the President asked for context for the 2016 election

by looking at foreign interference in the 2008 and 2012 elections.

(U) The Committee notes there is no historical precedent for the use of cyber intnisions

followed by release of stolen infonnation (i.e., hacks and leaks) used in combination with other

elements of slate activity for tlie purposes of an active measures campaign against the United

Slates. However, the ICA's treatment of tlie historical context of Russian interference in U.S.

351

351

35J ilR

8709 !(>. DM 23 201( FB R 2120405 pubiis

353 (I FBI IIR4 212 0405 I".

is FBI 11R4 212

^20. 2018.

i (>ctober 20. 2018.

Ill

I

COMMl riFl SI Nsn IVF - RUSSIA INVT STIGATION ONLY
rOMMITTtt SENSII IVt - RUSSIA INVtSllGATlON ONLY

domestic politics Is limited, atid the over-redacted FBI references in the ICA source book make

die assessments in diis section difficult to substantiate.

354

112

COMMITl l I Si NSmVF - RUSSIA INV! S I K,ATION ONLY
COMMITTtt StNSi llVh - RUSSIA INVfcSl lGAnON ONLY

Of the other four separate FBI reports, three are heavily redacted. In each case,

the teports put in the source book include several blank pages with no dates or headings, and

isolated paragraphs that refer obliquely to the examples of possible historic active measures cited

in this section of the ICA, ranging from 1984 to 1999.^^^

D.

355 (U) [hid

356(iH|H FBt. IIR 4212366812, February 27. 2niL:|

Internal report. November 16, Internal report, October 8.

1991. FBI. Internal report. March 12. 1984. The docuni-jiu pi j -jdt.d lu thv < oinmittee for the November 16. 1999

reference and the October 8. 1991 reference are each seven pages, five of which are blank and two of which include

an excerpted paragraph of text. The March 12.1984 reference includes nine blank pages and two pages wliich liave

an excerpted paragraph.

358 ianuaiy 13. Scott Shane and Charlie Savage.

"In Ornma^Uv'es. U.S. Sees the Work of Russian Agents.'^WMo^^mT^iine 28. 2010|

113

I

COMMHTEF. SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSl UVE - RUSSIA INVES ilGATlON ONLY

1. (U) NSA Reporting

359

114

COMMITll I SI NSn iVF - RUSSI A INVI S I R,ATION ONLY
COMMi rrFF SFNSITIVF - RUSSIA INVESTIGATION ONLY

2. (U) FBI Reporting

The sentence summarizes a kev point in this analytic line, which is that

This citation, to FBI reporting, resulted in significant confusion in the

^oinEiiiuee's review of the ICA. The original set of ICA source documents made available to the

Committee in March 2017 included a December 27, 2016, FBI Letterhead Memorandum

supporting footnote 222. This LHM did not match the document cited in the fooQiotes of the

ICA, which referred to an LHM of the same date with a different heading.^

FR , October 18. 201(i

HM ^uhiiiuted to the ICA source book reviewed by the Committee|

all of which are also re<iac fed

'.r>j FBI. L.tiM Review for POTUS Tasking on Russian Influence in

the 20I(^^r^iTTrui^al^ng. December 222).

npt

August 22. 2017, pp. 12-1

115

COMMirrELSl_Nsiil\L-ia'bSL\LN\ 1M K.M'ION ONLY
COMMITTEt SENSl IIVE - RUSSIA INVESllGATION ONl,Y

Tlie LHM originallv submitted to the Committee was an FBI

summary ol materials FBI had received from Christopher Steele.^ Tlie LHM specifically cites

the various "company reports" that are included in the Steele material, which are a compilation

of reports all titled (and numbered as) "company reports." Submission of this memo for foooioie

222 appears to have been an FBI error, as the LHM did not support the ICA language cited.

When the Committee noted this anomaly to the FBI in repeated conversations, as well as noting

repeated statements by FBI and CIA that no Steele material was used in the ICA, the FBI

wididrew this document.

It was not until Januar\' 28. 201^. that the FBI submitted to the

Committee the LHM cited in the ICA foomotes, "FBI Review for POTUS

Tasking on Russian Influence in the 2016 Presidential Election."

3. (U) CIA Reporting

363 mifm previously discussed, die Steele material was summarized in Annex A of the ICA, "Additional

Repuiuug Fioiii an FBI Source on Russian Influence Efforts." The reports in the Steele material are labeled

"company reports." which the FBI rite as such in their LHM under tlie designation "CROWN."

364^H||||| FBI. LHM Review for POTVS Tasking on Russian Influence in the 2016

Pre^Urniui! Tasking. Deceniln i J'l j., (H A footnote 222).

116

COMMIT! I ! SI NSmVF - RUSSI A INVI S l !(,ATION ONLY
coMMirrEE sENsrnvE - Russia inves i igation only

3rj5

3oo

^A>ii

369

37n

117

CGMMiri El SI NSl I IVf - !U SSI A IN\ I S I K. ATION ONLY
COMMITI Et SENSn 1 Vfc - RUSSIA IN VES1IGATION ONLY

E. Analytic LinejU: Election Operation Signals "New Normal" In Russian

Influence Efforts

(U) The Committee found that multiple intelligence disciplines are used to support tliis

analytic line, the analytic tradecraft is transparent, and the sources support the language of the

ICA, except where noted.

(U) While the Committee notes that "new normal" is an imprecise tenn, the Committee

found that this section convincingly argues that Russia's use of active measures to target

118

COMMITIEI SI NSITIVF - RUSSIA INVI s rK.ATION ONLY
COMMITTEh SENSll IVt - KUSMA INVhSl IG/VI'ION ONLY

elections has been widely applied outside the United States over tlie past decade.

(U) The analytic line on "new normal" serves as both prediction and warning, and the

Committee notes that IC and open source reporting has revealed much evidence to reinforce the

IC's 2016 assessments.

Til final analytic line of tlie ICA states:

We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the U.S.

presidential election to future influence efforts in the U.S. and worldwide. We

assess the Russian intelligence services would have seen their election influence

as a qualified success because of

their perceived ability to impact public discussion in the U.S. I

1. (U) CIA Reporting

119

coMMi nn SI Nsn ivi - uussi \ invi s ri(. \TiON only
COMMIT! Et SENSinVt - RUSi.lA INVfcS l iGAl ION ONLY

373

376

377

378

120

I

COMMITIFi SI NSIIIVI - RUSSI A INVI S I K. VI ION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVES i lGAnON ONLY

379

380

381

IIHJ

121

COMMITIEL SLNM 1 1\ 1 - RUssi \ |N\ I S 1 1(. VFION ONLY
COMMi n F,F, SFNSn iVh - RUSSIA INVtS 1IGATION ONLY

383(11) Ibid

38^1

122

COMMITIFi; SI Nsl 1 IVI - RUSSIA INVI s| K. vnON ONLY
COMMIT! Eh ShNSI i lVE - KUSSIA INVESI IGAI'ION ON! ,Y

2. (U) NSA Reporting

38:

388

123

COMMm i-I SI NSl I IVl - RUSSI A IN\ 1 SI K.ATIGN ONLY
COMMITIEt: StNSi 1IVE - RUSSIA INVES l iGATION ON1.Y

3. (U) DIA Reporting

380

390

391

39

39

124

I

COMMITI F F SI Nsn ivr - RUSSIA INVFS I IC.ATION ONLY
COMMllTEt SfcNM i IVt - RUSSIA INV tS i IGAl ION ONI Y

4. (U) Open Source Reporting

(U) Fntir npm source articles are cited in this section, beginning with a reprise of the

art

304

125

I

COMMITIFI SI NSInVI - RUSSIA INVI STIC.ATION ONLY
COMMin EK SENSl 1IVE - RUSSIA INVES1IGATION ONLY

5. (U) Department of State Reporting

6. (U) DHS Reporting

VIII.

398

41)1)

126

COMMini l SI NSI1 IVI - RLSSI A INVI S I K.ATION ONLY
c:oMMrrrEE sensitive - russia invesnciAriON only

IX. (U) The IC A Annexes

(U) Tlie ICA includes an unclassified, twelve-page addendum that provides

recommendations jointly prepared by DHS, FBI, and the NIST to protect U.S. election

infrastructure and political entities.

(U) Tlie addendum represents a partial response to tlie original presidential tasking for

the ICA, which included a request for recommendations. According to Director Clapper, "[w]hat

we ended up doing was focusing on the cyber things that could be done. Tliat's what generated

separately on an unclassified basis the best practices paper tliat DHS and FBI did."**^

(U) The Committee addresses election security issues in Volume 1 of this report,

including some of the recommendations made in this annex.

A. Annex A: Additional Reporting from an FBI Source on Russian

Influence Efforts

Annex A represents a summary of information provided to the FBI bv

rhn=^tn])lit'i SicpIo. Thp nnnnx

references cite

two LHMs, one of which is a summary reports. The second LHM,

'Additional CROWN Reporting for USIC TasRugl^va^rronwu provided to the Committee

402 (U) SSCI Transcript of the interview with James Clapper, Former Direaor of National Intelligence. July 17,

2017, p. 42.

127

COMMITIEL SLNSmVE - ilCbSLVlNX i s ri<. \riON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSI MVE - RUSSIA INVES l IGAnON ONLY

as the supporting material for foomote 222. The final citation is an open source reference to an

October 31, 2016, piece in Mother Jones.

B Annex A includes qualifiers for the Steele material, but does not mention the

rt^ho paid for Steele*s work. Tlte Committee found no evidence that analysts

working on the ICA were aware of the political provenance of the Steele material.

1^^^ CIA shared drafting responsibility for the first portion of Annex A, which states,

"Some of ilie FBI source's reporting is consistent with the judgments in tliis assessment." and the

first three footnotes of the ICA are reprised.

annex language notes, however, that one aspect of the Steele material

assertion tliat the Kremlin "regretted its decision to

The

The

r\ intiKit dSkec

We repomiig lat

the Committee's report.)

wiietiiet rhev liad anv "intelligence that

responded,

(For more information on this material, see elsewhere in

4031

Tiansrnpt of the liHPfV'iew witli Analysis Paiii-l, Juis 18. p. 34. For

P""" Now Reqtets U.S. Presidential

Flection influence Operations

128

COMMITIEL SI NSI I |\ I - RUSSIA INN I S i K-ATION ONLY
COMMITIEt SENS! i IVE - RUSSIA INVESiiGAnON ONLY

405

UK

129

■

COMMin Ei: SI NSITIVI - RUSSIA INVE S IIGATION ONLY
COMMlTTEt StNSl 11Vt - KUSSiA INVfcS 1 iGATION ONLY

40fl

i u

410

411

412

413

130

COMMnTEF SF NSITIVI - I^USSIA INVF STIGATION ONLY
rOMMin tt SKNSl 1 IVt - RUSSIA INVhSi iGATlON ONLY

414

415

41

Ifi

4iy

420

42

131

coMMrn 11 SI Nsn [\ r - kussi \ invi s i UrVnoN only
COMMITIEt StNSl 1 iVL - RUSSIA INVfcS IIGATION ONLY

C. Annex I: Open Source Center Analysis: Russia—Kremlin's TV Seeks

To Inllunice Politics, Fuel Discontent in US, Published December 12, 2012

(U) Annex B is referred to in the section in the ICA on "Russian Propaganda Efforts."

It is a nine-page unclassified report produced by the Open Source Center (OSC,

now Open Source Enterprise, OSE) in 2012. The NIG for Russia and Eurasia characterized this

report to the Connnittee as an "off-the-shelf OSE product from 2012."'*^'* It was not updated until

after iJie publication of the ICA.'^^

(U) Annex I introduces the role of Russian social media only near the end, and provides

a graphic of "comparative social media footprint" contrasting RT and RT America with Al

Jazeera English. BBC World, CNN, and CNN International social media broadcasting. However,

it does so without proper contextualization for the platfomis highlighted (YouTube, Twitter,

Facebook). Further, the product includes statements such as, "[ajccording to market research

company Nielsen, RT had the most rapid growth (40%) among all international news channels in

the United States over the past year." Tliis statement could be interpreted to imply

media prominence greater than it acmaliy was, as this was only a measure of YouTube views,

which are a distinct subcategory of "all infonnational news channels." This product makes no

mention of the Internet Research Agency or Russia's use of social media trolls, the latter of

which the Russian Government had already developed by 2012.

42

4J B lecironic (.onimuni< rttnui.

Df'-L'iuber2, 201(i

Mnf'.i f^i! i u .l 1 'ii I M, ^SCI Transcript of die Iiirt ix I.-ss auIi [MO for Russia and Eurasia] and [NIO

for Cvber Issues]. Mav 9. 2017. p. 99.

4251

132

I

COMMITI FF SI NSH I\ 1 - RUSSI A IN\ I S I KiA! ION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSH IVE - RUSSIA INVtS IIGATIGN ONLY

(U) The Committee believes this annex, while providing a historical snapshot of one

aspect of Russian propaganda in 2012, does not contribute to understanding Russian interference

in llie 2016 election. Recognizing that the ICA's authors were working under a compressed time

table, the presentation of the multifaceted aspects of the Russian interference campaign—

specifically, the use of RT, Sputnik, other Russian media platfonns, social media, and trolls, as

part of the propaganda element of the influence campaign—would have been much stronger with

an updated OSE annex.

E.

F.

G.

426 (U) NIO for Russia and Eurasia. SSCl Transcript of the Interview with [NIO for Russia and Eurasia] and (NIO

forCvher Issups], Mav<^, 2017. p. tfi.

4271

133

COMMlTiEl SI Ns! I l\ I - RUSSIA l\\ I SIK.vriON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSl l IVE - RUSSIA INVES l iGATION ONLY

H. (U) Annex Estimative Language

| (U) Annex is standard language that is attached to NIC products.

134

COMMITI11 St NS| i IVF - RUSSIA INV I SI K.AI ION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSl l lVE - RUSSIA INVtS UGAnON ONLY

135

COMMITIEI SI NSI I IVl - RUSSI A INVI S I K, ATION ONLY
COMMITTEt SENSmVt - RUSSIA INVfcS I K.AnON ONLY

4281

429(1') r,-r

430 (U) SSCI Transcript of the CJosed Hearing: Fonner Intel Directors Panel on Russian Interference, May 16.

2018, pp. 18-19

136

I

COMMITTFF SI NSIT IVF - RUSSIA INVFSTIC.ATIGN ONLY
COMMiriEE SENSl 11VE - RUSSIA INVES I IGAi'ION ONLY

431

432 Ibid., pp. 81-8J

433 Wid.. n 82.

434

435 nd , j.i. Il l- I . I'l

137

COMMinil SI Nsn IVI - RUSSI A INVI s riCrAIION ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSI i lVE - RUSSIA INVES riGATION ONLY

436

437

438

439 (U n 4.->

440

441

442

138

COMMini I SI Nsl IIVI - RUSSIA INVl S l !(. VHON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESIIGATION ONl.Y

443

444 (U) pp. 29-30.

445 (U) Ibid., p. 59.

446 (U) Ibid., p. 60.

139

COMMITlEli bl_NMllVL - ULbbLV 1N\ I s I K. vnON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESi lGAnON ONI Y

447 (U) Ibid.

448 (U) Ibid., pp. 61-62.

449 (IT) Ibid-, pp SQ-fi3

450

451

140

I

COMMITTFI SI NSn iVI - RUSSI A INVT S 11(. \TTON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESilGATION ONLY

454 (U) IbiJ.i M-i l

141

I

COMMITIEL SLNsinvi - RUSSI A IN\ I S I K.ATION ONLY
COMMITTEK SENS! 1 iVt - RUSSIA INVfcSi IGATION ONLY

455

i : DD. 10-15

142

COMMm KI SI NSIIIVI - RUSSIA INVI S I K.ATION ONLY
COMMinEt SENSniVt - RUSSIA INVtS liGATION ONLY

458

143

coMMim I SI Nsinvi - uussi \ invi s rK» vi ion only
COMMITTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVES I IGAnON ONLY

(U) APPENDIX B: CIA ANALYSIS ON RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES~1981-1991,

2016

A. (U) Historical Analysis—1981-1991

im As noted in the Coinmittee's report, the Committee believes that the ICA and its

supponing sources do not provide a satisfactory representation of Russian interference in the two

previous presidential elections, as requested in the original POTUS tasking. Noting the lack of

information provided to support the ICA on this issue, the Committee could not determine

whether this was due to a lack of collection, or the failure of the three agencies, particularly the

FBI. which holds primary responsibility for counterintelligence threats to U.S. domestic tai^ets,

to access historical reporting or produce finished analysis. As noted in the Committee's report,

FBI support for the historical record presented in the ICA is so redacted as to be largely

meaningless to anyone reviewing these reports for the ICA.

annex.

(U) Thr nnfhon nf rhr TC ^ u'rrd pnpTihr .ind nr-rdrmT'" source reporting for this

1 460

(U) During this review, the Committee requested that CIA's Center for the Study of

Intellisence (CSI) search CIA's holdings for analytic products on Russian active measures. I

i hese lepoits demunstiale a

ly ot intonnatlon known to the IC about Russian active measures, including definitions,

organization, goals, types of activities, and leadership direction. None are referenced in the ICA.

(U) The following products were provided to the Committee by CSI, and are attached to

the Committee's report;

(U) The Soviet Foreign Propaganda Apparatus, Research Paper, Directorate of

Intelligence, Office of Soviet Analysis, April 1986.

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COMMITIEI SI Nsl 1 IVl - RUSSl \ IN\ I S I j(. \I'lON ONLY
COMMITIEt: StNSli IVt - RUSSIA INVKS IKVAllON ONLY

(U) For the purpose of higlilighting what the CIA knew about the history of Russian

active measures, this section organized select excerpts from these products under four themes:

• (U) Definitions and Activities of Russian Active Measures;

• (U) Leadership Direction and Cost Assessment for Russian Active Measures;

• (U) Goals of Russian Active Measures; and,

• (U) Understanding Russian Active Measures.

(U) Nbi All text under each heading is quoted directly from the product.

Definitions and Activities

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COMMITIll SI NSI i [\ r - RUSSI A 1N\ I s 11(, VHON ONLY
COMMITTEL SENSl l IVh - RUSSIA INVtS IIGATION ONLY

146

COMMm FJ S! NSI IIVF - RUSSIA INVI S I IC. VIION ONLY
COMMIlTEt SENS! 1 iVh - RUSSIA IN VES1IGATION ONLY

Leadership Direction and Cost Assessment

147

I

COMMI n EE S! Nsn IVE - RUSSIA INVES I KiAriON ONLY
COMMHTEE SENSITIVE - RUSSIA INVESI K.ATION ONLY

Goal ofActive Measures

148

COMMITlEi: bL-NbUlVE-RUssiA [N\ | I s |( , vnON ONLY
COMMITI Et SENSl 11VE - UUbSiA iNVES1 KtATION ONLY

Understanding Active Measures

149

I

COMMini E SI NSITIVF - RUSSIA INVI STIGATION ONLY
COMMITIEt SfclNSl ilVh - RUSSIA INVtS i lGATION ONLY

B. (U) National Intelligence Council Report—2016

Nearly 15 years later, the National Intelligence Council prepared the following

paper on Russian active measures:

N.ttioiial lii(cllii;('ii( »' Council Report,

January 19, 20lb.

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COMMITl l l SI NSI I IVl - RUSSI A INVI S I K, VHON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSI liVE - KUSSIA INVESI ICiATION ONI Y

All pmHiirts prpvinnsiy ritwl in this appendix are historical intelligence

products un Russian active measures from the period 1981-1991, covering the period from when

die U.S. made its last concerted effort to confront Russia's use of active measures througli the

end of the Cold War. Tliis NIC product was produced at the begiimiiig of 2016, with no specific

anticipation of the Russian interference to come that year.

AU ICAt U:iuvv k> JliccU> liuin die dUiU .\IL piuduel.

(2016, p. i)

(2016, p. i)

(201b, p. ii)

(2Ulb, p. ii)

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COMMITIEL SLNMllVI - RUSSI A |N\ I s I K. vnON ONLY
COMMITTEE SENSI1IVE - RUSSIA IN VES1IGA710N ONLY

(2U10, p. i>

(2016. p. 2)

1201b i)

Utb 3)

(2Ui6, p.

152

I

coMMim i: SI Nsn ivi -russi x [nvi stk.aiion only
COMMin EE SENSI FIVE - RUSSIA INVES I IGATION ONLY

(U) Appendix C: THE COMMnTEE REVIEW PROCESS

(U) Committee Access

46

46

153

COMMIT!FI SI NS| 11\ 1 - RUSSIA INVI SI K,AIION ONLY
COMMITTKK StNSl llVt - RUSSIA INVhS 1 iGAl ION ONLY

The Committee's access to FBI intelligence reports characterized as ^

as well as I.HMs. was also beyond the nonn of regular

C-oinmiuee oveisight. While FBI did during spvernl Committee

inletviinv's icKili'd to (he ICAJ

to the FBI went beyond the level typically shared by

in tiie course ot normal oversight.

463

464(11) Ihtd

4fiS

154

I

COMMlTIFi: SI Nsn iVl - RUSSI A INVI S I K,ATION ONLY
COMMIT! Et SENSn iVE - RUSSIA INVES i lGATlON ONLY

The Committee's review of the ICA Involved studying the underlying source

documents, interviewing all tlie relevant tlirectors, managers, and analysts involved in the

production of the and conducting a stnicmred review of the

analytic lines of the ICA.

(U) The Committee conducted twenty-five interviews and hearings with over forty

intelligence officers from the across the IC involved in tlie ICA process, including the directors

of ODNI, CIA, NSA, and FBI. The Committee undertook these interviews for the purpose of

evaluating the ICA and the ICA process. Interviews were conducted in SSCl secure spaces and

at CIA Headquarters and always included bipartisan representation by the Coimnittee. Almost

all interviews were transcribed. The Committee also conducted follow-up discussions and emails

on many points for better understanding and clarification, and held other interviews with CIA,

officers, for

understanding about collection and operating enviiotunents on tlie Russia target.

(U) Committee Methodology

(U) The Committee evaluated the ICA along two lines. First, the Committee detennined

whether the ICA met the tasking from the President on December 6, 2016. Second, the

Committee reviewed the analytic lines within the ICA, asking the following questions:

466

467

469

155

I

COMMIITFI SI NSI ri\ I - RUSSI A INVI S I K,AI ION ONLY
COMMIT!tt StNS! 11Vt - RUSSIA IN VtS i iOATlGN ONLY

• (U) Was thp analysis supported by the intelligence presented?

• (U) Was the analytic tradecraft sound?

• (U) Does the Committee accept the analytic line?

(U) This report volume represents the detailed examination and conclusions the

Committee reached on these questions.

156

I

COMMITTEE SI NSmVE - RUSSI A INVES I KiAI ION ONLY
ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR W VDEN

(LI) Over the course of nearly 20 years at the Senate Select Committee on

Intelligence, I have refused to assume the accuracy of intelligence assessments and

have endeavored to always ask the hard questions. That is what this report does,

painstakingly scrutinizing every piece of intelligence thai went into the Intelligence

Community Assessment and allowing the Committee to independently verify the

findings of that assessment. The findings are not a '*hoax." They are not in doubt

because, as Donald Trump stated, Vladimir Putin "very strongly" denies them.

Russian interference in the 2016 election is a fact and Donald Trump's deference

to Putin only serves to further Russian disinformation and undermine efforts to

defend the United States against ongoing attacks.

(U) This report also provides additional evidence against Donald Trump's

false assertions regarding Ukraine. For example, the Committee conducted an

extensive examination of the intelligence demonstrating Russia's intrusions into

DNC networks. That review, which confirmed the ICA's findings, is

fundamentally incompatible with Trump's conspiracy theories about Ukrainian

involvement, for which there is no supporting evidence of any kind.

One aspect of the ICA calls for more commentary. The ICA

cites DHS's assessment that "the types of systems we observed Russian actors

targeting or compromising are not involved in vote tallying." In my Minority

Views to Volume I of the Committee's investigation, I discussed confidence levels

in and gaps related to DHS's assessment, as acknowledged at the Committee's

June 21, 2017, hearing. This report adds additional context, quoting a DHS email

that requested that the Department's assessment be "couched with references to

intelligence gaps and ongoing forensic investigations," caveats that were not

included in the public version of the ICA.

(U) The limitations associated with this aspect of the ICA provide important

lessons regarding intelligence collection and analysis and the topic of election

security. All-source intelligence must be integrated with information collected by

DUS to produce coordinated IC-wide assessments. Analytic tradecraft related to

confidence levels and dissents must be applied. And limits on DHS's ability to

track attacks must be addressed. 1 have previously discussed the need tor nation

wide mandated paper ballots, risk-limiting audits and minimum cyber security

standards for all election systems. The ongoing failure to require these basic

security measures across the country is not just a threat to our demociacy, it

damages the ability of DUS and the IC to assess whether, or to what extent U.S.

157
election systems have been compromised. It is the job of the iC to seek to address

intelligence gaps, particularly when those gaps hinder assessments related to our

most urgent and serious national security priorities. The actions of our adversaries

challenge our intelligence capabilities. In this case, in which audits are inadequate,

state and local election officials lack the expertise and resources to identify

sophisticated cyber-attacks, and DHS lacks comprehensive, nation-wide

information, the harm is partly self-inflicted.

158