HEARINGS 

BEFORE THE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

OF THE 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATIO

UNITED STATES SENATE 

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

ON 

SPACE SHUTTLE ACCIDENT AND THE ROGERS COMMISSION 

FEBRUARY 18, JUNE 10 AND 17, 1986 

Printed for the use of the 

Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

US. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

52-885 0 WASHINGTON : 1986 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office 

U.S. Government Printing Office. Washington. DC 20402 
COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE. SCIENCE. AND TRANSPOR

JOIG C. DANFORTH, Missouri, Chairman 

BOB PACKWOOD, Oregon 

BARRY GOLDWATER, Arizona 

NANCY LANDON KASSEBAUM, Kansas 

LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota 

SLADE GORTON, Washington 

TED STEVENS, Alaska 

BOB KASTEN. Wisconsin 

PALL S. TRIBLE, JR., Virginia 

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, S

RUSSELL B. LONG, Loui

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Haw

WENDELL H. FORD. Ken

DONALD W. RIEGLE, JR

J. JAMES EXON, Nebrask

ALBERT GORE. JR., Tenn

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 

W. ALLEN MOORE Ckte~CounrelandS&ffDircclor 

R4LPH B. EVERETT, Mtmnty Chief Coumel MdSloflDirector 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY. AND SPACE 

SLADE GORTON. Washington, Charrman 

BARRY GOLDWATER. Arizona 

NANCY LAhDON KASSEBAL’M. Kansas 

PALL S. TRIBLE. JR.. Virginia 

DONALD W. RIEGLE JR

ALBERT GORE, JR.. Tenn

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER 

(11) 
CONTENTS 

Opening statement by . . . . . . . . . 

Opening statement by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

by 

Opening statement by .........

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES 

FEBRUARY 18.1986 

Graham, Dr. William R.. Acting Administrator. NASA: accompanie

Moore, Associate Administrator for S ace Flight: and David W

Rogers, Hon. William P., Chairman, Presidential Commission 

Shuttle Chofflenger Accident: accompanied by Neil .4rmstrong, Vice 

Acting Director, Propulsion Division. Okce of Space Flight, .... 

JUNE 10.1986 

Opening statement by Senator Gorton .._...._............ 

Opening statement by Senator Ford ...... Opening Statement by Senator Trible ..._ Opening statement by Senator Hollings 

. . . . . . . . . . . . 

Opening statement by Senator Rockefeller ,..,......... by the Chairman ...... ..........................................................

. . . . . . . . . 

. . . . . . . . . 

. . 

Opening statement by Senator Gore ...... Opening statement by Senator Pressler . 

Rogers. Hon. William P., Chairman, 

Shuttle Challlen er Accident: accompanied by Neil Armstrong, Vice 

Questions of the Chairman and the answers ..........................................

and Dr. A1 Keef Executive Director ............................ 

Prepared statement ..................... .................................... 

Questions of Senator Gorton and the answers ........ Questions of Senator Pressler and the answers ....... 

JUNE 17,1986 

Opening statement by Senator Gorton. ....... .............. ... ..... . ...... . ...........

Opening Statement by Senator Riegle ... ........ ............... ...... ................

Opening Statement by Senator Gore ........................... ....................................

Opening statement by Senator Hollings .................................. ............................

Fletcher, Hon. James C., Administrator. XASA: accompanied by 

Richard H. Truly, Associate Adminisuator for Space Flight: 

Alrdich. Program Manager, Natlonal Space Transportatlon System

Office: James R. Thompson, vice Chairman. Space transportation S

Data and Design Analysis Task Force: Thomas J. Lee, Leader, D

and Production Team, Data and Design Analysis Task Force: 

Thomas. De uty, Accident Analqsis Team. Data and Design An

Force: and ?a t Robert Crippen. .L\suonauts' Office ....._....... ...........

Questions OPSenator Gonon and the answers ............ ..., .....................

Questions of Senator Riegle and the answers .., ............ 

ADDITIOSAL ARTICLES. LETTERS. AND ST..ITEME

Nunn, Hon. Sam. C.S. Senator from Georgia. letter ......,.. .................. ...

Stephens. Jay B.. Deputy Counsel to the President. letter ._ ........... ... ..

(111) 
SPACE SHUTTLE “CHALLENGER’ AC

t 

TTJESDAY, FEBRUARY 18, 1986 

U.S. SENAT

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPOR

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGYAN

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 

SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Slade 

man of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Staff members assigned to these hearings: Pete P

sional staff member and Marty Kress, minority pr

member. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GOR

Was

Senator GORTON. This hearing of the Subcommit

Technology, and Space will come to order. 

We are here, as all of you know, to begin the inqu

gress, and most specifically, of the Senate into the t

January 28, 1986, and to help give us the necessa

what actions the Congress should take as a respons

dy, and what changes, if any, are necessary in our 

grams in the future. 

We are delighted, of course, to begin today with t

guished Americans who have accepted the Presiden

head up the Commission investigating the causes a

ommendations to prevent the recurrence of the Jan

dy. They are most welcome here. 

It is not the.purpose of this subcommittee either 

to second guess the work of that Commission, but t

can help it in answering questions which are asked 

the United States. NASA has been one of the most 

c one of the favored agencies of the Government 

States, leading our exploration of space, tangibly illu

ican technological leadership at the cutting edge of k

just as everyone in the United States has had a w

NASA, everyone is concerned about any errors or a

which it is involved. 

It is my intention as chairman of this subcomm

lieve the intention of all of the members of the s

inquire into four distinct subjects. The first, of c

events which led up to the launch and to the traged

of course, the particular mission of the President

But as it goes through its work, as it completes its w

its findings and recommendations, we wish the 

(1) 

6 
went wrong and lead inevitably to this tragedy, and wh

any, there were in the decisionmaking process which 

launch overlooking those physical problems. 

Second, the chairman at least wants more detailed a

have been provided so far into whether in connection w

sion or any future mission it is possible after launch to 

shuttle vehicle from solid rocket boosters which are s

ation for any kind of emergency landing or ditching, 

So far we have been given negative answers to that q

we wish to inquire into them both in connection with 

mission and any mission in the future. 

Third, of course we have a great concern which I kno

with the Commission as to the future of the shuttle pro

when will we be satisfied that we have discovered and 

the mistakes, technological or otherwise, which led to t

When, therefore, is it appropriate to restart shuttle mi

nected with that, of course, is the question of who sh

those shuttle missions? 

Mr. Chairman, I feel strongly that we should requi

degree of safety and assurance of reliability for our 

NASA crews as we should both for civilians who are th

of various contractors and civilians like Christa Mc

were going for other or for educational purposes. Th

when the shuttle is safe enough for our crews, it sh

enough for anyone else to ride in it. 

And fourth, of course, is the question which is the pe

ince of this subcommittee and its parent committee of t

to answer, and that is, “What is the direction of the f

U.S. Space Program.” Should we build a new fourth o

questiorl has grave implications as to the feasibility 

station. It has very important implications in the wh

of our future in space. 

Have we been relying too much on manned space v

have we ignored the‘ possibility or the desirability of h

of these missions conducted in unmanned space vehicle

The question of a fourth orbiter is one which the sub

probably going to have to answer relatively soon as 

ward to budget decisions which are going to be made i

immediate future, and the imminent loss of a reasonab

to manufacture such a shuttle. That question, of cours

which the Commission headed by Secretary Rogers w

answer. Their deliberations, of course, are focused on 

these questions, primarily, but with implications as t

rest. 

This is an important hearing. The Commission’s w

very important. We on the subcommittee want to faci

cooperate with it and to learn from it a sufficient am

we can intelligently make the decisions about the f

space program which are our province to make. 

Senator Riegle. 
y

First, let me say I very much share your sentiment

the initial statement which you have made here sets f

I think clearly and very completely, and it is one th

work on with you to see that we meet it and meet 

will not attempt to repeat all the things that you h

though I .would like to add a couple of thoughts of my 

Certainly this is a very sad inquiry that we begin to

of the shuttle and the astronauts was a tremendou

country. In many ways I think as we have come to kn

nauts themselves even better since the accident in te

that we have read and profdes that have been done, i

are members of each of our respective families. I thin

across the country feel this way. 

So we have a bond to them having been lost in thi

know why, what can be done to prevent any acciden

from happening in the future, to the extent that we 

pacity, and to see to it that we proceed in a measured 

safe way so that future astronauts are accorded every 

ure that we can reasonably provide, both technically, 

respect to the process by which decisions are made, 

launch decisions or sequencing decisions, in terms of 

try to move from one step to another. 

But I think all of these issues are probably ones 

have to look at together as a nation and make so

about. 

Over the years, the men and women of NASA have 

an outstanding job of managing America’s space eff

credible goals have been achieved. While it seems lik

ago now, we carried out successfully six manned m

moon. People left our planet and made that journe

safely on the moon and carried out the work respons

and came safely back. And of course, all of the pre

missions in the latest chapter of our space program, 

underscore what his been an astonishing record o

safety, with the exception of the previous accident ma

the fire on the pad, and of course, the accident that w

And so, while as the chairman has said we are goi

every aspect of how this accident happened and how 

it and what the policy decisions are that have to be 

future, I think that accident has to be weighed again

markable record of NASA accomplishment that stretc

nearly three decades. 

So clearly we must find the causes of this acciden

them, and we will. The space program must go forwar

Significant policy adjustments and decisions will hav

and working together, we will make them. It is cle

our manned exploration of the heavens will continue

do it with measured steps within the bounds of our te

our available resources. 

c focus on today. 

c 
things, and we will have to deal with that down th

course. I think it is essential that NASA, particularly 

the stories that are being written and a lot of the spe

is loose, I think it is essential that NASA emerge from 

stronger and wiser. That is much easier said than don

that has to be where we end up, however tortured t

are required to get there. I think we owe that to the 

nauts who were lost and to their families, and I think 

to the American people. And I think in due course 

that responsibility. 

Senator GORTON. The distinguished chairman of the 

tee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMA

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Chairman, I think you and S

have done an excellent job in setting forth the purpos

jective of this hearing, and I congratulate you on you

I share your views completely. 

Obviously this is a most important subject. I think 

portant as we go into it to reiterate just exactly the 

that Senator Riegle just finished saying, that the s

has been one of the prides of this country. It has b

mously successful program. 

The purpose of an analysis of the disaster is to m

this kind of accident is not likely to happen again. B

we go into it, it is very important to reiterate the s

that Congress has and that this committee has for N

the space program. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings. 

Senator HOLLJNGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

At the time of the shuttle tragedy I reacted by sayi

20 years ago we could really know what caused the f

sule at that particular time. We had the evidence wit

will never know really how this thing happened be

lost. I just did not think with that type explosion 

would be left, and now we learn differently. We also l

the weather, the O-rings, the tensile strength of th

booster, the admonition that was going on for the p

the manufacturer. At this particular juncture the sh

seems like an avoidable accident rather than an una

The only way that we can support the space progr

ever going to maintain any credibility and suppor

make absolutely sure that no accident like this w

again and that the circumstances that could cause i

be allowed to develop. 

So we will be looking very critically, and I will dis

Dr. Graham at the appropriate time. I want to make 

committee gets every bit of evidence so that once and 

we.do hear, as we are going through this task, that 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR HOLLI
any more outstanding American than Secretary Rog

up-but I have served on Presidential Commissions

impossible to get all of the situation together. I am g

down to the site. I hope they will follow through w

investigations and everything else, because typically 

you are not smart enough to ask all the questions, 

sary type proceeding of investigators is necessary to r

a conclusive result. 

And that is what I have in mind in this particular 

that we not be shielding any information in this c

cause we are the ones who really are supporting the 

we are the ones who will have to try to reestablish 

of it. 

I up is what the particular agency will bring to you, a

Senator GORTON. Senator Trible. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR TRIB

Senator TRIBLE. Chairman, I too am pleased that 

the opportunity to discuss with the Commission their 

and that work is vital to America’s space program. W

lenger’s fate reminds us that great achievement is so 

must sustain the effort that will ensure America’s p

space. We must continue to unlock the mysterie

system. The space shuttle and the space station are 

will provide us with the basic knowledge that we r

future and will give us a stronger economy, mo

future, and a better world. 

And so I would hope, Mr. Chairman, that today 

forward as well as backward as we begin this process

Senator GORTON. Senator Gore. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GO

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The American Space Program is truly a national 

efforts of NASA during the past 25 years have been t

of the best in our national achievement, from the W

on down to what, until recently, was a successful Sh

None of us can forget the first manned space fligh

pard, the successful orbit made by our colleague Jo

that most stirring moment when Neil Armstrong

always will be a source of national pride, inspiration

For these reasons, the National Aeronautics and S

tration has always had the overwhelming support of 

The benefits of the Space Program have been obviou

here, and I can assure you it will always have my su

But this support cannot be unconditional. As with 

ernment agency, the Congress has a constitutional r

ensure that NASA is fulfilling its potential. 

- today, first stepped on the Moon. The Space Program 
ports that a gantry arm banged into the external tan

before the ill-fated launch. Then on one of the abort

launch flight 51-L, when it was decided to evacuate 

bolt on the hatch to the orbiter was stripped. When a 

trieved to open the hatch, it turns out the battery was 

ed, these were minor incidents, but they hardly ref

rate operation we have come to expect. What is clearly not a minor incident is the fact that 

ture of the suspect right hand solid rocket booster was 

7-9 degrees, yet apparently the danger sign was ignor

fact turns out to be a major link in the cause of this d

lieve that NASA should take another look at its chain 

for shuttle launches. I applaud the Presidential 

action to remove anyone directly involved in the 

launch, for an investigation can scarcely be objective 

are allowed to pass judgment on their own actions. 

I am also concerned Mr. Chairman, that NASA m

nored some of the risks of space flight, and that the 

have become prematurely confident about the succes

gram. The agency seemed to have deemed the shuttle 

to operate like an airline, when in fact it was still ver

search project, however successful. This lead to what n

be mistakes, such as allowing non astronauts to fly. 

Shuttle Program will continue, but we avoid a ten

ahead of ourselves, and what seemed to be proclivit

risks. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask for a bri

silence for the seven brave souls who gave their lives 

the last frontier. 

Senator GORTON. SenatorKassebaum. 

Senator KASSEBAUM. I have no statement, Mr. Chair

Senator GORTON. Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFEWR. Mr. Chairman, I would like 

one comment. 

I do think that we have to find out everything we c

investigation. I think that the investigation of NASA 

dent’s Commission will do that in large measure, perh

But I think as you indicated, our longer term objectiv

committee and full committee needs to be to fully 

policy implications and the budgetary implications f

program and its future. 

I think it is fair to say that in the aftermath of thi

of us are fully for the NASA program and its contin

also have to understand that with a number of misha

lems and evidences of insufficiencies, we are still de

shuttle program that is in the R&D stage. That has t

have a responsibility to be supportive, but we also hav

bility to be responsible. If we are going to go forw

space program, we have to fund it in a way which wil

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROCKEFE
promise for the cure of cancer, anemia, diabetes, and o

dinary things for human welfare which are going 

going on in space. 

And so the space program should be balanced. We m

and get to the bottom of what happened. I think the 

the President’s Commission, will do that. Then I thin

committee, have to take the longer term view of ou

oversight committee and the future of the space prog

responsible for the future of the NASA program and to 

what it has been, and to restore the full confidence o

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR FORD 

Senator GORTON. Senator Ford. 

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, I am not a member of your subcom

want to thank you for allowing me to sit in with you t

There is an overriding need in my mind as it rel

happens from this hearing and from the President’s 

There was a great deal of excitement and anticipatio

students of this great country because of the teacher 

shuttle. It almost had become a routine operation; not 

were worried about it, particularly the major networ

all of the students that were watching in anticipation 

to be offered, I hope that we can find some answer 

given to them, that this will not turn them off as it re

desire, their hopes, their anticipation of the future. 

Mr. Chairman, I think the hearings are in good ha

and Senator Riegle, and I look forward to participat

And thank you again for allowing me to sit in with yo

Senator GORTON. Thank you very much. 

We will now be honored to hear from Secretary Rog

Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. Secretary, Mr. Armstrong, the subcommit

wishes to welcome you here and to thank each of you 

for your willingness to take on what is a very diffi

what is in many respects a very unpleasant task but 

vital for an understanding on the part of the America

what happened, and vital to ensuring that out of i

stronger and safer space program. 

Your roles are very, very important and are to be 

Secretary Rogers, you may start. 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, CHAIR

DENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE 

ER” ACCIDENT, ACCOMPANIED BY NEIL ARMST

CHAIRMAN 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members o

tee. Mr. Armstrong and I appreciate this opportun

before your subcommittee to talk briefly about the 

Presidential Commission. It was helpful to me to hea
The mandate given to the Presidential Commission 

Reagan was to investigate thoroughly and to report 

President on the tragic loss of the space shuttle ChaZZ

crew of seven on January 28, 1986. The President h

Commission to take a hard and objective look at the ac

a calm, deliberate and independent assessment of th

out if possible how this accident happened, the cause

or causes, and to recommend ways to avoid a repe

tragedy; and finally, to submit a full report within 12

Commission’s formation on February 3. 

I know the subcommittee and other Members of 

want to review the Commission’s report after it is sub

President. At this stage I simply want to outline for 

the principles and objectives that will guide the Com

work, which is already well underway. 

I might say in response to some of the comments t

of the committee made, I am sure you realize that 

been in operation for 12 days, so there are a lot of q

were raised that we are not in a position to answe

however, that we have gotten off to a good start. 

First, I think it was important that we made it c

review will be independent. We must and will rely i

ure on data collected by NASA because there is no o

ble way to obtain it. However, the Commission evalua

sions and recommendations will be its own. The inve

cover the NASA decisionmaking process. Our intens

date has indicated that the decisionmaking process m

flawed, and I say the process may have been flawed. 

said the decision was flawed; we said the process m

flawed, and we base that on testimony we have taken 

session. 

This is not to say-and I want to emphasize-that 

any question in my mind or the committee’s mind a

ability and trustworthiness of NASA officials. They h

Commission 100-percent effort and support, and we 

and of course, they will be available at all times to 

mation and help as needed. 

Second, Commission members bring to their task 

variety of skills and expertise that enable them to 

questions and to understand, analyze, and make soun

dations about the facts. 

The Commission acted quickly, I believe, to retain 

spected and qualified executive director, Dr. Alton 

who in turn is rapidly assembling a capable staff t

Commission in its work. In consequence, that work 

quickly underway. 

I might say that since we were sworn in, we have 

public sessions. We had four long executive sessions, 

hour session in Cape Kennedy, and another &hour s

Thursday and one on Friday. We have taken a grea

mony. We have done that without a staff so far and 

space yet, but we hope to get space in the next couple 

._ 
1 

L 

made of all of the testimony that we have taken, but 

that soon. The Commission members are working, 

diligently and are able to work long hours and to b

any time. 

Now, our goal is a thorough and comprehensive 

nating in a well-documented and researched Com

that will put all relevant facts on the table. Our rev

comprehensive in scope as is possible within the tim

under which we operate. While it would be impossib

to list every avenue of investigation the Commissi

mine merits exploration, I can summarize some of th

already examining and intend to review. 

To answer the question “what happened?” we ar

films, photographs, telemetry and other data relate

lenger’s launch and flight, the conditions of the laun

and after launch. Incidentally, this was the first time 

ticular launch pad was used. They had always used 

before. This time they used launch pad B. Whethe

particular significance or not, we are not sure. 

Part of the study, of course, includes a comparison 

the sort just described, or similar data from pr

launches, and that is a long, tedious process. NAS

now reviewing the movies of this flight and compar

the movies of all others, and they are doing the sa

telemetry, to see if there are any anomalies in this f

They are also looking, as you all know, at the d

explosion, and I will say, incidentally, that if they 

cover the right-hand booster, the chances are we 

better chance to get a quick solution and answer 

questions. 

Now, once we have answered the first questio

pened?”-and fortunately, we have a great deal of 

this, as Senator Hollings pointed out. At the time th

curred, one wondered whether it would ever be po

determine what happened, and I think we are goin

determine what happened. 

The pictures are really quite impressive and tell 

Now, I am sure the committee noticed that NASA, a

hearings, released a lot of data about the timing, sp

the launch, broken down into small fractions of sec

cated next to that how those were determined, wh

ing at that precise time. 

Now, specific analysis in great detail is going to 

determine the significance of each second, and I am 

fractions of seconds. And that is very complicated wo

Once we solve, if we can, what happened-and 

about the visual results, the results of the telemetr

and maybe isolate what happened-and as you k

focus of attention is on the right booster. Whethe

cause or effect we are not sure, and we may not be 

’ with previous flights. 
It was only a few days ago that NASA found out fro

the photographs that before the first second had elaps

a puff of black smoke. You have probably seen this in 

puff of black smoke which appeared before the first 

completed, which was about 25 feet long. And it laste

seconds and then disappeared. And then later on-and 

me to the time exactly, but later on before the first 

elapsed, there appeared to be another burst of smoke 

that was visible, and then the plume, and shortly th

explosion. 

And that all appeared particularly in the early part, 

on the right booster. And a good deal of speculation 

that that resulted from the O-rings and the seams w

ments are put together. On the other hand, it would be a mistake to focus 

tention on that because it is possible the external 

volved. We know that the strut that connects the boo

external tank was broken. Whether that was broken 

or later on has not been determined yet, but we ex

may be able to determine that, and NASA is working 

ly on that. 

Well, “what happened?” is but the first question. 

and equally important question is why? The areas a

Commission will explore in trying to find out why in

lowing: what were the testing and certification proce

shuttle, the rocket boosters and other components; w

problems in the past and how were they analyzed; w

had been expressed in the past, and how were they h

waivers granted dealing with safety; were there waive

why were they granted? 

Second, what are the NASA and contractor quality c

ards and procedures for the manufacture, handling a

of key components? Was there laxity or negligence o

the contractors in the performance or maintenanc

duties? What were the effects of weather and other e

factors, the temperature, the wind and the humid

course, it is important in this case to consider very ca

factors because it was a low temperature. There was a 

weighed and reviewed in hindsight in light of what hap

What are the launch commit criteria, and how we

lyzed before the decision to launch was made? How 

schedule and the desire to meet it affect the launch d

generally, who were the people and what were the fac

and the procedures followed to make certain that all 

carefully and promptly considered before the decisi

was made? These are among the areas we intend to ex

you can see, that is a big job. 

The answers to “what happened” and “why” we h

vide the keys to the final question, “what should we d

the chances of any recurrence of such a tragedy?” N

have been reached as yet, of course. If the right boo

amount of wind, and all of those things now have to 

-. 
pg

g 

aspect that is most likely to be exonerated and proba

onerated first, but that decision has not been made, 

the orbiter itself. 

As far as the evidence that we now have is concer

that the orbiter performed properly. 

When the Commission reaches conclusions wh

final-and we do not have to wait until the final c

can make preliminary conclusions to the Presid

along-whatever they are, the temporary conclusion

clusions, we will report to the President, as our man

and we are very mindful of the importance of the un

the interests that this subcommittee and all of ou

that the work be done carefully, thoroughly and well

I appreciate very much your strong support, an

this opportunity to be here, and I particularly appr

that the vice chairman of the Commission is Mr. N

Senator GORTON. Mr. Armstrong, do you have a sta

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I have no opening statement. 

Senator GORTON. Secretary Rogers, are you conv

can complete your assigned tasks in the 120 days w

dent has set out as the term of the Commission? 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, we certainly hope so

possible we cap,. As I say, if we determine the c

quickly-maybe a better way to put it, if we determ

pened quickly, and we are speaking about visually, 

it to an area and be sure that is the case, then I thin

tainly I hope we can. That is what we are going to tr

Senator GORTON. Are you convinced that you can 

the facts which are necessary to make your findin

your conclusions, and can the Commission come u

mendations with either a small or no staff through 

and through the factual material that you can g

itself? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we intend, Mr. Chairman, to ha

staff. I have not decided yet exactly what it will b

available to us any kind of assistance we need fro

within the Government. The President has indicated 

to be sure that we do a thorough job and that we 

personnel to staff it, and that we have a full disclo

facts. So we certainly are going to try to do that. I

tough, but I think we can. 

Senator GORTON. Now, am I correct in hearing you

indicating that you will come up with a series of fin

what in fact took place physically, and what kind 

ing process was involved, that you will have finding

will attempt to come to conclusions as to the cause o

and on the basis of those findings and conclusions

tions as to the future of the shuttle program? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, let me be precise. We certainly 

that. The first part of your question, the answer 

going to try to do that. Now, we never can promise 
a recurrence of an accident like this or anything in t

we will try to make recommendations in the whole fie

We will not be required, nor should we make recom

about the whole future of the space program. That 

matter for Congress and the President, and not for t

sion. 

Senator GORTON. You have quite carefully separa

ments of your inquiry, Secretary Rogers; emphasizing o

ings about what physically happened, looking at the pi

ing the telemetry, everything physically which took pl

ginning with the launch and whatever physical findi

find prelaunch, and you separated that in your ow

from findings as to the decisionmaking process which l

decision to launch. 

I want to concentrate for a moment on the first of tho

ically what took place. 

Can you tell me at this obviously preliminary stage, 

Armstrong comment on how close you feel you are, h

you have now focused on what the actual physical ano

from launch until the explosion? 

Mr. ROGERS. I think that is an appropriate question f

strong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman, as was pointed out 

Rogers’ testimony, we have not eliminated any pos

though, as he said, the orbiter at this point looks clea

the TDRS, and the inertial upper stage appear to h

factor. I suspect that as we build more and more evid

be able to eliminate more and more of the hypotheses, 

certainly hope that within a reasonably short period 

will be able to converge to a point where there are on

ous contenders. 

Senator GORTON. Have you concluded as yet that 

failure or failures in a seal or seals in the right solid 

er? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir. We have not concluded th

failure was the cause. It is clear to all of us that certa

occurred, but as to the progression of events, we have n

mined. 

Senator GORTON. I think you sort of anticipated m

tion. 

I take it you have concluded that there was a fai

point or another in one of those seals but not whether 

first failure or the cause of, the proximate cause of th

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We have not concluded there was 

the seals. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, you cannot conclude. 

dence in the area of the seal, in that general area, but 

strong says, you cannot really conclude for sure an

that except the area where it occurred. 

Senator GORTON. And I gather that you are serious

ing the impact, the effect of the extremely cold temper
Mr. ROGERS Yes, Senator. Mr. Chairman, I do not 

you followed our public hearings or not, but we had 

testimony at that time about the weather. We ha

deal more testimony since that time in executive 

have one of our Cornmission members who was in 

yesterday and today, I believe, trying to get precis

the weather, to be sure exactly what happened. Yo

that it would be easy to find out what the weather 

or were, but it is not as easy as you think. 

A word like “ambient temperature” means a 

things. I just thought it was what you looked at w

thermometer, but it can be-is it in the shade or in 

near a building, and all of these other things. And t

course, the temperature of the booster, the outside, 

perature, how do you determine those things? So we are giving a lot of weight and a lot of c

weather factors and related factors. 

Senator GORTON. And I take it in connection wi

making process itself, you are examining in as muc

possibly can whether or not there was concern expr

NASA personnel themselves, by contractors, or by t

ers of the solid rocket booster, and for that matte

turers of other components, as to the impact of tha

Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely. We have taken a lot o

that, on the decisionmaking process, and it is our pr

although no final decision has been made, that we 

sessions dealing with that whole subject matter in t

One of the difficulties we have is, of course, the su

plex and because there are so many factors involv

harm could occur if we do not present it thoraughl

order, that we want to be sure that we are prepare

sions so that we will have precisely the correct i

that we will be able to present it in a way that is 

and that those people affected, some of whom may 

fected, are treated fairly. 

Senator GORTON. That leads me to another questi

Obviously you are going to come up with a set of 

suspect that those findings are going to be detailed. 

Do you intend to make fully public all of the inf

has led to those findings and not just the informa

come out during the course of the public hearings? 

tee and the general public going to have access to 

dence upon which the findings are based? 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, all of the facts wil

public. We will make them public as we go along to 

we think it would not be harmful to the investiga

final analysis, we will make everything public. 

Senator GORTON. Are you going to be utilizing 

parently calls a devil’s advocate team to test you

your findings against? 

Mr. ROGERS. We have 13. 
p 

Do you have any insight into whether or not there 

additional members appointed to the Commission? 

Mr. ROGERS. Not really, except that I think if I am a

may be asked, that the present size of the Commission i

right. We have been able to move quickly. We are h

and cohesive so far, and I hope that we will continue th

everybody has participated to the full extent. And I t

Commission was much larger, it would not work as effe

So my own impression is that probably we will stay 

Size. 

Senator GORTON. Does that mean that you are ope

committee of the whole and you have not delegated sp

to specific members? 

Mr. ROGERS. Up to this point, that is true, Mr. Ch

that is going to change. In fact, one of the things we are 

tomorrow-and we have some of the Commission memb

on it now-is to figure out how we could break down i

groups or subcommittees, or however you want to call it

can do a variety of things at the same time. And those 

tees or working groups will report back to the comm

whole later on. It will expedite the work. We do not 

body listening to everything all the time. 

Senator GORTON. One last question before my time 

Secretary, and that is your assurance that you are goi

through on the human as well as the mechanical an

this decision and to this disaster, and that subject to 

given individuals, you will follow that inquiry where

and whoever may or may not be embarrassed in conn

that. 

Mr. ROGERS. There is no question about that. 

I was interested in Senator Hollings’ comments, and 

him that we were going to do that. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Riegle. 

And incidentally, for members of the committee, in 

everyone may ask questions, we will limit them to 10 m

and then have a second round if anyone wishes. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you. 

Secretary Rogers, I take it that you were involved 

other professional duties you had at the time you go

Call to serve in this capacity, and I take it that you 

stepped away from whatever it was that was occupyin

professionally, and you are now devoting full time to th

Mr. ROGERS. Iam so far. I do not know whether I wi

do anything else or not, but so far I have devoted ful

Senator RIEGLE. And I take it that you are available 

to do that for the foreseeable future? 

Mr. ROGERS. The foreseeable 120day future. 

Senator RIEGLE. So if it were to run longer than that-

Mr. ROGERS. I would like to end it at 120 days. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Armstrong, is that true for you 

you able at the present time to devote, in effect, full t

. 
p

Commission, and I expect that I will be spending 

time through the remainder of the 12Oday tenure. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I appreciate that because 

impressed with the quickness and the seriousnes

the Commission, and I appreciate, Secretary Roge

at the outset in your statement the independence 

you feel about that. Knowing you as many of us 

years, we know that when you say that, that is 

mean. I think it is essential that that be clearly 

there be no doubt about it, and the public have 

that the investigative work that is done asks all 

tions, uncovers everything that needs to be foun

and that we do not miss a thing. And I take it that that is the purpose, as you tw

are determined to do that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes; that is right, Senator. Senator RIEGLE. We have to begin to make som

selves here with our colleagues about budgeting de

kinds of long leadtime decisions that may or may 

with the continuing investigative work of the 

NASA’s other investigative efforts and so forth. 

helpful to us to be able to stay abreast of what 

and finding so that we do not have to plow all of 

ourselves, to try to have a sound basis for the ju

are going to be called upon to make. And we ha

the opportunity to have access to the transcript

them so that what information is being collec

chance to assimilate and learn from as well. 

And thus far, the response that we have gotte

mission staff level has been that that is not possib

transcripts are not available to us. 

I would like to ask you to comment on that, a

that we would not get stuck on that point, if that 

culty. I would like to suggest that possibly the sen

of this subcommittee and committee who have t

ances have an opportunity to sit in on some of th

as participants but as listeners, so that we do no

lot of time and ability or to have a duplicative eff

would not have to be the case. 

Can you be helpful to us in that respect? Mr. ROGERS. Well, Senator, it is a difficult 

know, I would like to cooperate as fully as I can. 

can do that because we have had so many reques

sit in on our Commission work, and after all, it 

Commission, and because of the separation of po

should continue to have the option of proceeding 

sion when we think it is appropriate. 

I would be glad-and, of course, we will make 

transcripts and other evidence available to you 

made public, and we will try to give it to you in a 

for you to digest. And I do not believe that the w
p y p

try to make it public as we go along because I think it i

tant for the Nation to feel that we are developing in

sort of confidential information-that nobody can have 

I would like to think about that and maybe work wit

man. Certainly I would have no problem with briefin

man about our work, and if there was something that 

really vital to the work of the committee, I would li

about that. 

Senator RIEGLE. I want to pursue this just a little bit 

cause there are a number of very complicated decisio

going to begin to jam up against one another. We 

behind on our launch schedule because of different de

had experienced along the line, and in NASA now. One 

cles is, of course, gone, and so we have had a 25-perce

in the capability to take these flights. There will be 

here now, an unknown length, until we get these a

make corrective steps. 

But we are going to have to begin to make some dec

how aggressively we can pursue the commercializa

which has been something that has been important. W

star wars considerations that bear on this. And so it is 

committee but other related matters to this. 

And what I would hope is that-it seems to me that w

allel responsibilities here. I am sure you must have som

need to go into executive session, but I do not quite 

why whatever you are learning is not, ought not to be 

the rest of us who have work duties that are paralle

that require us to understand the same things. In othe

not know that we would want to rely just in the end o

opinion, and probably we would end up finding that we 

to sort of go over the same roads. 

It seems to me we ought to be able to go down th

together more or less at the same time. And so I guess 

what at a loss to know why there is any reluctance ther

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I think you know, Senator. I do no

hard to figure out because of the separation of powers

executive branch does not normally sit in Senate hear

sessions, and would not want to and would not ask to. 

This is a Presidential Advisory Commission, and w

think we have the right and continue to have the righ

ecutive sessions as we see fit. 

Now, as I have said, if at any time there is somet

that you or the chairman or any member of the comm

that would be vital to you in the assessment of your 

ities, we would want to consider that. I do not think 

to happen in real life. I think that the things that we 

develop in executive session are going to be very soon 

public session, but I think we have to maintain the s

powers, and I think we have to work as a Commissio

wise I have had a lot of requests from Members of the 

want to sit in. There are a lot of people that have a v

- 
think that is desirable. 

But I will try to work with you. If you really hav

mind that you want to know that we are in a posit

we will try to tell you. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I appreciate that. The probl

not sure from the vantage point that the Commiss

the moment that the incredible timing and budget 

are upon us here at the present time-- 

Mr. ROGERS. Could you illustrate what you mean, 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, yes. There is a very seriou

whether or not we are going to need to build anoth

is a long lead time and it is very expensive. It is esti

cost us $2.2 billion. Some people now say we should 

in the beginning. We built four. Now we have lost o

three. And so if we are going to have to build anot

we should build two. 

There is the question of how long we want to try t

tle technology to carry out our space program does i

years 2000 to 2005? We are now at a point where 

make some very major budget decisions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Could I say on that, though, if we g

where we reach a conclusion, we would make that a

Senator RIEGLE. Well, but-- 

Mr. ROGERS. You do not want to be involved in th

of reaching the conclusion, do you? 

Senator RIEGLE. I think the question of how quick

able to start flying again and under what circumst

we are going to juggle the competing payload requir

we are not going to be able to handle everythin

planned to handle, we are just not going to be able 

time is important here. 

I guess the thing I am having a little bit of difficu

when you develop a transcript, you are asking que

are getting information. I guess I am somewhat at a 

that information you would have any reluctance i

base of information with the committees of jurisdicti

Mr. ROGERS. I really do not know that this deser

tention. Let me say that we are not in a position 

available at the time we take it because we think 

important that this evidence be presented in an 

and in a way that will not be harmful to individu

going to try to do it that way. We are not going to 

information very long, 

Now, I cannot believe that is going to make all th

you, whether you know it on Tuesday or next Th

are going to try to do it quickly. And if you find tha

have some information that would be helpful to you

what it is and I will try to get it to you. I will t

myself. 

Senator RIEGLE. In that vein, let me mention o

that is, we have had a lot of information develop 

mentioned some today with respect to the question
about as a problem for a long period of time. For whatev

sons, certain steps were taken and maybe others were n

will get to the bottom of that. 

If there are other problems other safety issues and que

have been around for a period of time that either hav

correct or have been downgraded in importance or put i

be fixed &er something else is fured, or perhaps has 

moved on aggressively because we have been short of 

short of staff or short of this or short of that, I think i

tant that anything that comes close to being in that c

identified and red-flagged immediately so that we kno

and we do not find out about it later on down the line b

have got classified transcripts here. 

Mr, ROGERS. Ithink that is correct. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Danforth. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, let me express my tha

and to the other members of your Commission, Mr. Arm

others, for the considerable sacrifice of your time and y

that you are putting in to render a very important natio

You have now been at this, I think, you said 12 days. 

Mr. ROGERS. It seems longer. 

The CHAIRMAN. How are things going at NASA? I wou

that that has been very traumatic for the organization. 

Are people down in the dumps, or is there a sense o

for the future? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it is a combination. I think you hav

finger on both things. First, the event was overwhe

there was obviously a lot of time spent on just ge

thoughts collected, and of course, there is a lot of publi

focused on NASA and a lot of stories to the effect that th

has deteriorated and so forth. And I am sure that there 

that. 

As far as the Commission is concerned, as I said in 

ment, we have been very impressed with the way they 

in great detail for this information. They have provided 

information. They have released a lot of information at 

tion. They have prepared witnesses and gotten informati

hour notice and so on and so forth. So I detect still a g

de corps there, and I think it will continue. But it is go

tough period for them. 

I mean, there is no way around it, it is going to be d

cause when you lay out all the facts and you hear all 

and all the speculation, you know they are going to be 

gun, and they are going to feel bad about it, and I do no

other way to do it. I think if all the facts are laid out an

tigation is completed, however unpleasant it may be, a

get back to square one, and people start working, and 

program continues, and certainly all of us on the Co

think are enthusiastically for the space program, as suc

it is very important and in the national interest. But i

ess, it is going to be difficult for them. 
A 

p 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, your role and our role is v

this regard because it certainly was a very, very t

for everybody at NASA, and we want to find out 

and make sure that it does not happen again, and 

encouragement and support. 

Your statement includes a statement which say

review to date has indicated that the decisionmaki

have been flawed. 

Could you elaborate on that sentence and tell us 

ing is and whether this is some sort of preliminary 

just a matter-- 

Mr. ROGERS. I had better wait to say it is. We dra

to try to say exactly what we meant. We said it bec

to be sure that no person who is involved in the N

tions be placed in a position of investigations hims

not want to single out anybody at this early stage

not have any conclusions about anybody. But we th

itself may have been flawed, and I couched as it “

flawed.” 

I think that as we go along and in talking abou

sion vis-a-vis public session, as we go along, I think 

sions will disclose how we think the process may ha

That presentation we want to make very carefully 

all the facts are accurate and all the people who 

be affected are given fair opportunity to be heard 

no misjudgment or misinformation, or that anybod

they were treated unfairly. There certainly is not-th

in the picture which refers to the trustworthiness 

of the people involved. 

The CHAIRMAN. And certainly no hint, even by 

your statement, that there has been sort of a slip

approach to the operations at NASA. 

Mr. ROGERS. Did I say that? 

The CHAIRMAN. No. I am saying that that certain

read into your statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

The CHAIRMAN. Some of the stories in the press 

concern on how something like this could happen 

been some speculation that NASA’s shuttle opera

sort of a rush-rush operation. I have to say that 

looking at NASA, NASA seems to be very cautious. 

I mean, a couple of days before this particular lau

layed the launch because of perceived bad weathe

turn out to be bad weather. 

In other words, any speculation that they were 

the gun or rushing to get the flight off is not som

have indicated by this particular statement? 

Mr. ROGERS. The only conclusion that we have re

that you read, and I really do not want to go bey

moment. We just have not reached any other concl
that mean? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Mr. Armstrong can explain that bett

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Every step in the NASA process is do

at various levels of approval, and the requirements and 

ing of requirements is documented. When a particular ite

ponent or procedure or process does not precisely meet its 

tions, that is reviewed to see whether it is still adequ

though it does not meet the specifications. And if it is dee

adequate, a waiver is granted that that specification be 

And that has happened in a variety of circumstances 

years, but we in the Commission feel it is very importan

review all of these waivers, particularly on things that ar

ical nature, and see if the process whereby those wai

granted was complete and adequate. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Mr. Armstrong, knowing what you k

as an experienced astronaut would you think it would 

get in that shuttle under the same circumstances and c

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, I am reminded, Senator Holl

meeting with John Young, a former colleague and curr

naut, immediately after the accident. And he said: We ar

on this; none of us want to go again until we really u

what happened and get it fixed. And that is the same wa

feel at this point. 

Senator HOLLINGS. In other words, it could have bee

perhaps? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am not in a position to judge that ye

Senator HOLLINGS. Secretary Rogers, with respect to t

am anxious that you have an adequate staff. And with r

just to the people correlating all of the statements and 

but rather investigators on the ground. How many inv

does the Commission have? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, depending upon what you call them

got a couple of lawyers. I am not sure you would call the

gators. 

But we will get, as I say, it is 10 or 12 or 14, somethin

altogether. A lot of this is going to require a great deal 

It is not investigators in the police sense. It is reading 

and understanding what they mean, organizing hearings, 

witnesses, and that sort of thing. 

And so we may have a staff of 15, but we will have an 

staff, I assure you. And we are going to have good people

our choice of the very best people available. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, that is the point. In my exp

investigating cases, I would want 15 to 16. I would 

steeped in the science and space technology, four or 

there going around at Canaveral talking to everybody, ea

with them. You would be amazed what you will find out. 

Similarly at Huntsville and similarly at the Thioko

Utah, and similarly at NASA headquarters. So if you w

read what is given you, I have found out in these kind 
Mr. ROGERS. I have been involved in a lot of inves

lifetime, and I am not going to hang around and w

to just sit and read. In fact, I got my start as a Sena

for a Senate investigating committee, the old Warre

committee. 

And I know how to handle a staff. We are n

around. What we have done lately is we have gotten 

in the room and asked them all at the same tim

having a gumshoe walking around asking some p

time. 

At our meeting at Cape Kennedy, we had probab

the room from Thiokol and NASA, and we got a lot 

Senator HOLLINGS. I understand. And yet, I be

cerned about your product, in that you need 

around. That is the whole thing, the trouble with p

missions. 

I have been on them. I have investigated intellige

this government under the Hoover Commission, an

what you are fed by the FBI and the CIA and the s

and otherwise. So if you can get some investigator

mean running around like in a criminal case, a g

you get some experts down on the ground and th

people that did the launching and talk to them ab

and December when they had trouble and the cran

nal tank and talk to some other of the crews and 

They will not gather around in a room. Those fel

want to get involved in Presidential commissions

their jobs and will not do much talking. But you w

if you eat in a restaurant around there for two or 

Canaveral what you will find out. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I appreciate your comment, S

say first, I think we will do a good job. I hope we wi

And I do not want to promise that you will be s

erything, but I think you will be satisfied. Let m

have-one of our Commission members is down th

a Nobel laureate and he is investigating the way 

him to investigate, and we have other Commissio

are going to do that, too. 

And they are better positioned to find out and 

these things than the average detective would be. I 

are going to need so many so-called detectives. W

need people who will do a lot of work. 

And as I say, we have got some very capable peo

mission. We have an Air Force general who has be

of these investigations just recently, involving a s

in California. He has gone through it all and m

report and knows exactly how it was done, and it 

And so he is going to be able to give us a lot of h

have him supervise one aspect of it. And he will ha

ing for him. 

And so I think you will find-at least, do not ho

you all of the answers for the first 12 days. 

1 
answer, so that it will be conclusive. You know, we are sti

gating the Warren Commission report around this place. 

Mr. ROGERS. I know, I am familiar with that. 

Senator HOLLINGS. That is what I am talking about, bec

did not use the CIA. The CIA furnished it to them and th

went in behind it, and then you had to get investigative 

and people writing books and everything else. 

And so I am not questioning the competence of the No

ate. I have been reading with great interest what he has 

there is no question about the competence of the Commis

But investigating cases you need some investigators aro

you have been in 10 days or so and you do not have any 

You all have been working hard and you really have b

ready to the public attention a lot of very interesting fac

you all have not been negligent in any fashion. 

But to really get a thorough investigation-and if I 

that Commission, I would say, Secretary or Mr. Chairma

to get me about 15, 16 investigators, and send them out 

me and just put them over there in Huntsville, Thiokol, a

thing around, and just listen and talk to all the people 

And then they might want to be taking some statemen

erything else like that, because there is a lot of valuable 

tion out there. 

And that is the way you make a thorough investigatio

that you have got 40 people in a room or a Nobel pri

asking the questions. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Senator, I respect your views and I 

happy to talk to you about it. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, we might have to do it at thi

tee level, then, if it is not done at the Commission level. T

trouble. That is what we are trying to do. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am not quite sure why we are h

difficulty. I will be glad. to see that we have that type 

available to do work, and I realize that there are occas

that is important. I was a DA for a long time and I kno

conduct criminal investigations, I think. 

And I know that the Warren Commission’s responsibi

different from this. I mean, we are not going to have

there they had a lot of problems with ordinary detective 

do you find who shot the gun and all those other horrib

We are not going to have things like that to investigate. If we do, I certainly will get detectives. And as we g

you think we do not have enough, please talk to me abo

derstand your point of view. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Kassebaum. 

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am really here just to learn. I would like to add my c

tions to you for the time and effort that you are givin

thoughtfulness and the thoroughness with which I think 

mission is setting out on this task. 
y g , 

and the impact of this accident, and the concern 

seeing some real veterans at NASA wondering if i

on. 

Exactly would you describe at this point-and it 

brief time-NASA's role in the investigation and y

to it, to NASA? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, may I address the first part 

first. Of course, the morale of the people in NASA 

tant. The morale of the astronauts is vitally impor

We are very fortunate to have Dr. Sally Ride on 

and she is in close communication with the peop

particularly with the astronauts. And they are wo

they are worried about the safety aspects of this. 

But they are-the ones I have talked to, and I 

couple, they are also very enthusiastic about the 

all of us here, they want to get to the bottom of it 

out what caused it and see if we can correct it. 

But they are not discouraged in terms of the p

think. That gives emphasis to the point that I wa

and that is how important it is to get to the roo

aspects made public, so that when we are finishe

will have confidence that what we do from now 

safe. 

And I think that that is possible. I have to cau

tee, though, that in the process of full disclosure 

that there will be further demoralization. You can

cannot have full disclosure, which may disclose 

pects, without embarrassing the people who are in

Senator KASSEBAUM. That is why I was a bit s

you say that you were going to be making public y

each step of the way. Do you think there is any p

as far as being able to keep it in the full contex

ture if you are going to make these observations 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I did not mean-if I said tha

it the way you interpreted it. I said that we are n

any conclusions until-unless we, for example-if 

exactly caused it to happen. If that did occur, we m

fact to the President earlier on. 

I doubt that that will happen. I think the cha

take the full 120 days and make a report. That 

Now, as to the other-and maybe where I th

track was I said that from time to time, in order 

closure, not wait until the end of everything, we w

hearing. In order to have the public hearing, we 

well prepared, so that it is orderly, so that the fa

in an orderly fashion to the public and to everyone 

In that process, you can cause people to feel so

dumps, because it may adversely affect the proce

for that matter. Now, we hope it does not, but th

the facts themselves should turn out to be emba
Sometimes you embarrass people a little bit. I do not 

we can avoid it. That is the dilemma we have. I mean, t

tendency would be to say do not disclose the facts, let us 

quiet, let us not tell the public because that might 

NASA. 

I do not think even NASA wants that. The NASA p

said to us they want everything disclosed, pleasant and u

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I would like to add a footnote, Sena

talked to quite a few NASA people in the last couple of 

it seems like Americans are at their best when they 

pressure. That is the situation I see, and I do not get th

the dumps reaction. 

In general, I get a challenged reaction, where most 

that I talk to asks: How could I help; what can I do; I am 

and ready and able and willing. 

Mr. ROGERS. Without exception. 

Senator KASSEBAUM. Well, it would seem to me, with t

atmosphere, you really can overcome any demoraliza

speak, because I think everyone would respect an ob

thoroughly competent investigation. 

And I would assume that because you have adopted 

dure you will get the fullest cooperation from NASA, an

seem to me keeping it on that level, where it remains 

and objective, you can only get as a matter of fact full su

Thank you very much. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Gore. 

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and Mr. Armstrong, is the Commission 

ing at the possibility that a flow of super-cold gas from 

tank may nave participated in the lowering of temperat

O-rings? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we are looking at all aspects of that

Senator GORE. Are you looking at that scenario specifi

Mr. ROGERS. Well, as I say, I do not want to single o

aspect, because that gives it undue importance. We are 

all aspects of the weather and how weather might ha

the launch. 

Senator GORE. Is a possible leak in the main tank one 

narios that you are looking at? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That is, Senator, one of a number o

that is being investigated still actively as possible. 

Senator GORE. Let me ask a question which begins, 

likely, which is a difficult question to ask. But in tryin

stand this quickly-you know, we have our budget he

week and, as several members of the subcommittee hav

we have got some difficult choices to make in a very sho

time. 

We are confronted with evidence that-of temperatu

of 7 and 8 degrees Fahrenheit on the right solid rocket 

your opinion-and maybe the question is unfair, but I 

anyway. In your opinion, is it more likely that this was 

. 
g

tions 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That particular measurement c

red scanning, and the calibration of such instrum

and suspect. And these particular readings that c

completely add up, and so that is one of the reason

is at the Cape now looking at the calibrations and t

that were made in determining those temperatur

whether that is real evidence or whether that is 

dence. 

Senator GORE. A statistical artifact of some kind? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes. 

Senator GORE. But if I am not mistaken, the ra

calibration is probably less than what would accou

degree reading. And just as a layman, that is so

have been led to believe, 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am not a specialist on infrared 

my understanding that your assumption or your r

rect, given the proper assumptions in the first pla

the thing Dr. Feynman is looking at. 

Senator GORE. So that is one of the things Dr. Fe

at the Cape looking at now? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. One of the several things he is lo

Senator GORE. Do you agree, Mr. Armstrong, tha

to 8 degrees Fahrenheit on the solid rocket boost

side prior to launch should have been the kind of f

up the chain of command as a factor to be taken in

the launch decision was made? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I am sorry, Senator, I cannot an

tion, because I do not have enough background to sa

Senator GORE. Secretary Rogers, do you want to t

Mr. ROGERS. No; I do not want to pick out any fa

think all factors should have been considered, and I 

were. And when the record is complete, I hope we w

Senator GORE. Well, but you have said publicly 

by which the launch decision was made may have 

this one of the factors you had in mind when you m

statement? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

Senator GORE. It is not? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

Senator GORE. What did you have in mind? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, as I have said to the chairman

to get into that today. I am not going behind wh

have said very carefully what I think should be s

right time we will say more. 

Senator GORE. Who had final responsibility for 

sion? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, that is another matter we w

and we will develop that in a public session before t

Senator GORE. Did Mr. Beggs participate in the 

Mr. ROGERS. I do not know. 
Senator GORE. Iwould not normally expect him to be

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Itnormally would not-the Adm

NASA normally would not be in the chain, I do not thin

Senator GORE. All right. 

Now, in the moments prior to the catastrophe-and a

one of those questions which I will certainly understan

hypothetical. But as a representative of just the peo

trying to better understand this, there seem to be two 

for what was the immediate cause of the explosion. 

One of them is that the flame came out of the bottom 

solid rocket booster and burned a hole in the main tank

is that it caused the booster to fly in a skewed way a

top of it crushed into the main tank. 

Do you have an opinion at this stage as to which o

events is more likely to turn out to have been the one 

ally occurred? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; I do not have an opinion a

Senator GORE. Well, I can certainly understand that. 

statement you made about the possibly flawed process

tary, there have been reports of heated arguments the 

the launch, during which the manufacturer of the 

booster recommended against going ahead with the t

as cold as they were predicted to be during that night. Is that a factor which led to your conclusion that 

flaw in the process? 

Mr. ROGERS. Itold the chairman when I came up he

not want to get involved in those kind of speculative 

we are going to do our work properly, we cannot b

answer questions all along the line about what we ar

what we think. 

Now, I have said several times we will make all o

public in due course and in a proper way, and at the m

not going to answer any of those questions. 

Senator GORE. Well, I understand your response an

press you too hard on it. But with all due respect, I do 

that is a speculative question. You made a public stat

the possible flaw in the decisionmaking process, and 

been public press reports about heated arguments the 

and I was just asking whether or not that was what 

mind or whether it was something else. 

Now, when you made the statement of a flaw, you re

that the people involved in the decisionmaking proce

volved in the investigation inside NASA. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. 

Senator GORE. Now, some of those people are engine

most intimately familiar with the facts involved. Is t

wrong? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Certainly that is true, those most d

haps that know the most about it. But as a matter of 

dent investigation procedures as conducted by NASA, 

Department, the FAA, NTSB, whoever, it is a matter 

. 
position of having to pass judgment on their own p

And I think that is a policy which over the ye

good stead, and it seemed appropriate to place tha

striction on this investigation as well. 

Senator GORE. I do not necessarily disagree wi

sion’s judgment on that score. I am concerned that 

those individuals be available and be used within N

Mr. ROGERS. It will. We have talked it over and it 

not going to ask everybody to take a leave of abs

going to be there and they will be available to prov

We just do not want them in the investigative proce

Senator GORE. Now, there have been a number o

to me as a lay person are frankly very disturbing. 

to do with the memoranda inside NASA warning 

and graphic terms what could happen if these O-r

spelling out the history of problems with these O-r

mending in very strong terms that something be do

quickly. 

And yet it seems that nothing was done about it

tion that raises for me is, has the Commission unc

regard for flight safety in the procedures followed b

Mr. ROGERS. What is the question? 

Senator GORE. Has the Commission uncovered a 

for flight safety on the part of NASA? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, Senator, we are not going to m

sions of that kind now. We have just been in opera

and I think it is unfair to keep asking us to draw t

clusion. 

Senator GORE. All right, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Mr. Secretary, let me try 

work this out both ways. I totally understand your f

Mr. ROGERS. It is not really frustration, and I do n

ed at all. We will make all of the facts available. W

the President asked us to do and try to cooperate. 

to do it right now. I am not frustrated at all. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Well, I am glad of that. I u

frustration in having us pepper you with questions 

you are not in a position at this point to answer. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. Senator ROCKEFELLER. You have indicated that y

investigation, but I would take from that that you a

make available what led you to those conclusions? 

Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely. Senator ROCKEFELLER. Which would imply all o

sensitive, semisensitive, personal, professional in

lead up to your conclusions now, and I understan

here you are without staff, on duty 12 days, und

public attention, which you indeed are accustomed 

would be. 

. make available not only what you conclude, the con
, 

ed the Federal Advisory Committee Act in the same par

You have referred to the separation of powers, and 

done so and you have done so quite properly. But I hav

that the Federal Advisory Committee Act was put in 

specifically. In other words, he could have just said 

vested in me as President of the United States,” period. 

But he did not. He included this other part, in whic

references made to open meetings, and that informat

closed to the public, and a variety of other things, wh

may not have bearing upon what you want. 

But it does talk about in that particular act, the Fede

ry Committee Act, responsibilities of congressional comm

it does refer back to the Administrative Procedures Act

does talk about in one place agencies that might be likel

cantly frustrate implementation of a proposed agency’s a

Now, I am not a lawyer and I am not trying to mak

case here. I am trying to give a frustration from our po

I would judge that it is going to take a long time 

your investigation. I mean, if you are going to get the p

dence from the bottom of the ocean, if you decide t

worthwhile and if the submarines are photographing 

cate it is worthwhile, it is going to take a long time and 

to be very expensive to get them up. 

And then what do you have when you get them up? N

longer investigating. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is not true. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Well, they are no longer inve

the same way as they were before it is reposed with you

Mr. ROGERS. No, no. They are investigating actively

people are doing what they have been doing, and they 

doing it very adequately. The only difference is that the 

were involved in the decisionmaking process are not res

the investigation. 

The idea that somehow this has slowed down the pro

curate. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But that is not my point. I a

lead to a point. I am not saying they are not investigati

are under a general jurisdiction, ably commanded by y

Mr. Armstrong-with which, incidentally, I fully appro

that was a wise and proper decision. 

My concern is this. If it takes a long time to find 

dence, for you to arrive at your conclusions, there is g

physical evidence problem, there is going to be-after 

evidence is produced, if it does lead to a positive concl

can actually and finally say what it is that did happen

is going to be a very long leadtime of 18 to 24 mon

before anything else can happen in the way, for exam

next launch. 

One concern that we have here is trying to keep the 

gram a civilian program, and I am sure it is one of you

possible-and this is not a question, but just a musing 
ppyg

one. 

It is quite possible that DOD, the Air Force, will s

over, because the President has stated we have to h

fense system in space by a certain time, talking abo

ties and now perhaps later than that. 

I think it is fair to say that the NASA program b

dy was losing popularity, it was losing money. It di

the preemptive attention that the Apollo missio

There is now much more question about the mix. 

more competition. There is much more commerciali

So from our point of view, it is not that we ask 

merely that it be given to all of the committee me

that in order to save NASA as a civilian program

leadtime for the conclusion of the investigation an

that takes place after that, why would it be so im

the Federal Advisory Committee Act was specific

the President, to allow let us say a senior majority 

a senior minority staff member, and maybe only 

read-not to hold, but to read, not to sit in on the 

read, testimony of what it is that you are getting, to 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, let us talk about that. We we

with Senator Riegle. I do not want to be unreasonab

On the other hand, we really do not want to ope

tive committee sessions because, for the reason th

We will try to work with your committee. We hav

delaying anything. We will try to work it out som

have a procedure that is good for everybody. 

God knows we do not want to disrupt anything. W

help. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. As are we, Mr. Secretary. A

Chairman, that would be my final comment. I think 

this investigation is to, first, conclude what happen

sure that it does not happen again. But quite frank

from ow point of view, it is to save the NASA p

future and to make sure that it does not get swallo

of priorities with a diminishing budget under Gram

And I think that is what Senator Riegle was try

that we want to cooperate. If I were in your posi

doing exactly the same thing. But we do have b

ations and we do have Gramm-Rudman. We hav

which has been diminishing in popularity. We need 

And therefore, whatever possible cooperation th

think, vitally important for the future of NASA. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I appreciate that, Senator. W

consider that and we will try to help. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I might add that we are tryin

these causes and make our recommendations, and 

on the whole feels strongly that doing that job i

possible time is in the interest of all Americans, 

tainly going to do everything that we can to avoid 

ever in getting on with our job. 

62-885 0 - 86 - 2 
you. I think the more faces and feet you have in a m

more chances you have of something getting out that 

strued, and it might be more damaging to NASA for 

have this ongoing information. I hope you can find the 

You were very careful, and that was brought up 

Gore, in your opening statement that the process to 

was flawed, not the decision. That is a little bit like 

country church: You love the sinner, but hate the 

wonder about that. 

Those who made the decision apparently had to set 

sionmaking process, and so, if those who made the deci

veloped the process, would they not need to be looked 

they arrived at the process be one of your areas of conc

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, sir. 

Senator FORD. Now, Senator Rockefeller makes a 

point that the space program is becoming routine, not 

terest in it as there has been in the past, and by hav

fly on the shuttle, it brought more public attention to i

And you say that one of your priorities is to det

NASA’s schedule and the desire to meet it affect the 

sion. So I hope that you will look at maybe the nee

awareness and public support that might have been a

factor in getting the launch off. 

And Mr. Armstrong, my final question. How much a

how aware were the seven people on the shuttle of 

happen? How were they briefed and what did they 

Were they-did they understand the possibilities of wh

before they agreed to go? Did they know all of the poss

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Senator, I will be exploring that 

stantial detail during the course of the Commission’s w

Senator FORD. Were you aware of all of this, then? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I was going to add that, from my 

ence, the crewmen knew full well the risks associate

job. As a matter of fact, in my case, it always surpris

things worked properly. 

We expected a large number of equipment failure

course of each flight. We spent all of our training focu

to handle emergencies of whatever nature, and we jus

we would never have to face the kind of emergency tha

have a procedure to handle. 

I cannot answer specifically the question about ho

ticular crewmen viewed that situation, but from my 

ence and all of the people I know well and over the y

that position, we very much knew of the risks. 

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you. 

We are delighted to have Senator Goldwater wit

Senator GOLDWATER. I would like to go on the next f

Senator GORTON. Thank you, Senator. 

wonder if he has any questions or any comments. 
j

phisticated enough to have determined in the fi

after launch, at the time of the first puff of smok

now discovered, that there were serious anomali

very likely lead to this explosion. 

Was there any possibility or is there any p

present configurations of separating the shuttle fro

ing before the solid rocket boosters are fully burned 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Not to my knowledge, Mr. Cha

tainly possible that, were you to task our industry 

system, that they may be able to come up with it, w

tion that could do that. But I do not know whether 

be technically practical to do so. 

Senator GORTON. Well, I guess my first question 

possible on this flight or under present configuratio

Mr. ARMSTRONG. No, sir; it was not possible, 

deemed to be survivable, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think the NASA officials said th

practical likelihood that anyone could survive in th

Senator GORTON. Is this a matter of enough in

make recommendations of changes if it were techn

ble in the future? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It would certainly be considered 

sion in the course of their deliberations. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you very much. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, if 1 may, just a f

point. 

It seems to me there is a difference between whe

could be detached and then its ability to survive 

tached. Had there been a way to know that the se

was happening, versus the belief of the technical 

had detached it probably could not survive for rea

was and its ability to navigate by itself. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think the answer to that we we

Commission hearing is it was probably not possible

Senator RIEGLE. I am asking, I guess. I just wa

that I am hearing carefully enough what you a

asking the first part of the question and not th

asking, was it possible for the shuttle to be detache

tion had gone through the loop fast enough? 

Could the shuttle have been split off from the bo

arate and apart from its ability then to maintain 

flight path on its own? Could it have been separat

were in place to get the information to somebody 

made that separation decision? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I cannot answer the question, I 

find out the answer to the question, however, be

second and third order effects here that have to be 

which I am not familiar in sufficient technical deta

Senator RIEGLE. Fair enough. So that remains 

at this point. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings. 

* tank and the solid rocket boosters for any kind of e
y y g

that is that Dr. Graham told the subcommittee last we

pared statement about his internal investigations, and 

our investigation to date, we have focused on so-and-so. 

And then in the next paragraph, the investigation i

the physical evidence, and he talked about two intern

tory groups, the data and design task force and the dev

group. And now today in his prepared statement, which 

dent 'he will deliver here in just a few minutes, he tal

our review to date, and our review has focused. 

And I get the inference that he is not investigating a

he is reviewing. And I just wondered whether he has 

direction or guidance from the Presidential Commissio

we are making this investigation and anything you ge

us, and let us not have any two investigations going on 

time. 

Mr. ROGERS. No. On the contrary, he has been very 

and we just had a meeting with him this morning. I 

anything has slowed down. The only thing we have is 

that I made that, insofar as there were people in the 

ing process prior to the launch, that he ought to 

having them on investigative teams. 

Now, that is not going to slow down anything. Th

going to be a large number of people involved, and tho

the most part-I talked to some of them. They preferr

in a position where it appeared that they were investi

selves. And so I do not think it is going to cause any c

except when we get information from NASA, whoever 

of that group will provide it, so that there is not any su

we were not getting all of the facts. 

Senator HOLLINGS. And you have no objection to hi

with his internal investigation? 

Mr. ROGERS. Not at all. It is very helpful to us. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I think, Senator, to footnote that, th

tigation and our investigation are really the same, exc

purposes of the people that you say that are really doi

Senator HOLLINGS. And once again, I hope you get 

gators on board, because Aviation Weekly will run ci

you if you do not. They seem to have a lot of gumsho

and I do not know the reliability of it, but they are 

able group and they seem to have a lot of sources of 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. We are fortunate to ha

editor for 20-some years of Aviation Weekly on our 

and we think he has got a lot of access to some of tho

that might be able to help us if we should desire it. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Very good. Senator GORTON. Gentlemen, thank you very, very m

preciate your help and we know we will be hearing fro

Dr. Graham and Mr. Moore and Mr. Winterhalter. 

Dr. Graham, we are ready to hear from you and, 

either of those accompanying you to make an openin

we will be happy to hear from them as well. 
ACCOMPANIED BY JESSE MOORE, ASSOCIATE AD

RECTOR, PROPULSION DIVISION, OFFICE OF SPA

Dr. GRAHAM. Thank you, Senator Gorton. Mr. C

guished members of the subcommittee: 

The tragedy of January 28, when the Challenger 

shortly after liftoff, reminds us in the cruelest po

the exploration and the exploitation of space is not 

risk not only to people and machines, but to the sp

in the face of adversity. 

The greatest tragedy, however, would be if the l

lenger and its crew would undermine our national 

problems that have been presented, to confront 

and to continue to open the frontiers of science and 

Our first priority has always been and will con

and successful shuttle flights. Prior to the mission 

the US. manned space flight programs-Mercury , 

Skylab, Apollo-Soyuz test project, and space shuttle

ed 55 successful launches, carried 196 crew member

cumulated over 11,500 hours of flight time, and tr

million miles in space, without the loss of any hu

flight. 

Understandably, our major energies today are cu

in supporting the investigation of the 51-L acciden

appointed the Presidential Commission on the Spa

lenger Accident on February 3, 1986, to review th

surrounding the accident, to establish the probable 

of the accident, to develop recommendations for cor

action based upon the Commission’s findings and 

and to submit its final report to the President an

Administrator within 120 days. 

The NASA participation is currently designate

Data and Design Analysis Task Force. The task fo

scription of structure and membership are being pr

be provided in the near future. 

In our review to date, we have focused on acquir

dating all of the data related to the STS 51-L acc

that all of the data was preserved, we impounded a

diately following the accident. The data was the

that originals could be cataloged and preserved mor

The task was then to identify, catalog, and dist

dreds of thousands of pages of information, frames 

and so on to the proper location for more detailed a

The review has focused on the physical evidence 

erations, on launch-related data analysis, including 

on photographic evidence, integrated loads analys

sion events time line, on the manufacturing and a

ing of hardware, on the launch pad, on the cargo, a

on the design of hardware and operation, and ma

factors. 

FOR SPACE FLIGHT; AND DAVID WINTERHALTE

* 

. 
ing between cause and effect. Both the solid rocket boos

external tank are involved in these scenarios. At this po

information concerning the orbiter, shuttle main en

other elements are also being analyzed. At this point in the data analysis, which is a very p

point, I underline, the orbiter itself appears to have 

properly and to have responded to external factors. 

The recovery of the floating debris from the acciden

nearly completed, but recovery of physical evidence from 

floor will be a time-consuming, laborious, and difficult 

the evidence must be located and mapped using detec

ment, some of it very sophisticated. Special vessels are r

cause of sea conditions, 3 to 4 knot currents at 1,100 to 1

the Gulf Stream, where we are now searching and th

water in the vicinity of the debris. 

Once a significant item is located, large submersibles w

to photograph the item and the surrounding area witho

ing the evidence. And I emphasize that this is not a sa

ation in the classical sense. This is an evidence recovery 

and therefore it must be handled in a much more precis

ful way. 

These photos must then be studied to determine if an

item is to be recovered. The weight of some of these item

very substantial. The weight of the SRB, solid rocket boo

ample, each is over 100,000 pounds. 

The area where the debris is located now covers h

square miles, and that is on the ocean floor. It is estim

will take a considerable period of time to locate and rec

of the evidence that is there. 

Mr. Chairman, this ends my prepared testimony. I 

this opportunity to appear before you today, and after 

ments by Mr. Jesse Moore, seated to my right, who is 

Associate Administrator for Space Flight, and an introd

he will give of the gentleman to his right, we would be 

answer any questions that you may have. 

Senator GORTON. I wish Mr. Winterhalter would move 

so that I can see him. 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee

This is Mr. David Winterhalter. He is the Acting Dire

Propulsion Division in the Office of Space Flight. 

Before answering your questions, sir, I would like to m

short statement concerning this national tragedy. With 

tion of the families of the Challenger astronauts, the s

men and women who gave their lives for the cause of r

the next frontier, space, no one feels any greater los

tragedy than the members of the space shuttle team. 

I speak on behalf of the entire team, and I would like 

we grieve every day. At the same time we are working 

ish pace to analyze data and vigorously support the P

Commission that is investigating the 51-L mission tr

must leave no stone unturned. We must maintain the 

dedication to find and repair our problems and once 
I am happy to answer any of your questions, Mr. C

Senator GORTON. Does Mr. Winterhalter have any 

Mr. MOORE. Mr. Winterhalter has no opening stat

Senator GORTON. I want to start my questions, D

with the accident, which I will get back to, but wi

preliminary thoughts about the future of the space 

We have seen reports in the press that NASA 

McDonnell Douglas for information about the purch

expendable launch vehicles. Is NASA reconsideri

which it made a number of years ago to phase ou

pendable launch vehicles? And if it were to go back 

ness, for what kind of missions? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, at this point in time 

administration as a whole, through the interagency 

sidering the broadest possible range of options, in

use of expendable launch vehicles, which in a gove

course, are not being phased out but are being con

agencies of the Government. 

We are looking across a broad range of options a

has historically been the focal point for work on 

Douglas system that you referenced, the Delta, th

options that we will consider. But I do not want to 

as either-or options to the committee. 

There will be, certainly, a shortfall in the nationa

capability in the near term. Both as an agency an

Administration, certainly it behooves us to look acr

bility that we can identify to try to make up that 

try to make sure that we have a broad-based nati

gram. Senator GORTON. When do you expect the sen

group on space to be in a position to make recomm

President? 

Dr. GRAHAM. As you know, Mr. Chairman, that i

process, and its pace is determined by the magnitu

involved, the degree of focus that the various agen

establish in the time of the interagency group’s acti

Because of that, it would be presumptive of me 

how long that process is going to take. However

finish I know that the interagency group is making 

accelerate that process to the greatest degree possib

Senator GORTON. But would it be safe to say that 

tee and its parent committee, and for that matter, 

the United States, are going to have to make dec

thorization bill for NASA for fiscal year 1987 witho

mendations? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, that is really a que

termination of the interagency group and the Offic

Affairs in the Cabinet, to which it reports, and the 

ty Council, and I am not prepared to speak for the

may, as they proceed, wish to consider possibilitie

deal with the issues in factored sets, subsets of the 

but groups of issues that seem to go together, and 

* 

c 
Senator GORTON. As you know, Dr. Graham, at the pr

the priority order for shuttle payloads ranks Departm

fense payloads No. 1, foreign and commercial paylo

NASA and other Government payloads No. 3. As a resu

cident and the uncertainty of future shuttle schedules, a

er capacity for at least an extended period of time, is N

process of reassessing that order of priorities? 

Dr. GRAHAM. If I may, Mr. Chairman, I would state t

a slightly different fashion. I would say that the first ord

ity is national security payloads, payloads that are cri

country’s national security; second, critical NASA paylo

some rare cases other payloads which have specific laun

constraints such as the Galileo and the Ulysses payl

have an approximately 20day window every 13 mon

which the payloads can be launched on their missions to 

ter. After that we have foreign and commercial payload

in my mind are grouped together with the NASA sci

loads and are traded off on at least an equal basis with 

I think as we have lost one quarter of our shuttle or

ity and are temporarily in a state of hiatus of shuttle fl

hooves us to go back and review the entire launch man

the payloads, and to see what means we can identify to 

launch capabilities that we had hoped to achieve with 

biter fleet in as timely a way as possible. We will do th

sider all options in the process. 

Senator GORTON. What about the pricing policy? We 

up with a $74 million pricing policy for fiscal year 19

was based upon a launch rate of 24 missions a year. 

Do you think it likely that the pricing policy will be a

Dr. GRAHAM. Again, Mr. Chairman, that was a pricin

tablished through the interagency group and a Cabi

and it is not a NASA item to determine alone. 

I am sure that will be considered along with the bro

other activities as we go into the process. However, I 

foundation for that was substantial when the decision 

and if we consider it further, that should be our point o

in those considerations. 

Senator GORTON. Let me ask a question that I have 

slightly different form. In the the next 2 weeks or so

must consider in the full Commerce, Science, and Tra

Committee an authorization bill for fiscal year 1987, ar

to have any recommendations to us as to revisions in 

budget? 

Dr. GRAHAM. I do not have a definitive answer on 

point, Mr. Chairman. That depends upon the pace of tn

cy group process, possibly on the pace of the President

sion on the accident, and possibly other factors. 

Senator GORTON. Finally, with respect to the future

you going to be able to advise us on your position on a 

for Challezger, whether or not we should attempt to bu

orbiter? 
tied together, and while I cannot give you a specific 

assured that we are working on those issues as rapid

as we can, and in fact, within the NASA structure

lished a separate task force which is not involved 

study of the accident and is not involved in the dat

design review but is focused entirely upon implicati

dent to our national space program. They are work

with equal speed and vigor to the analysis work tha

in support of the Presidential Commission’s investiga

Senator GORTON. Dr. Graham and/or Mr. Moore, 

ask you the question that I ended my questioning of 

bers of the Commission, with the outstanding ref

Senator Riegle placed on that, and that is, if you ha

tell within a few seconds after launch that you ha

launch which was going to end in that explosion, 

separated the shuttle itself, the orbiter itself, from 

tank and the rockets; and second, if you could have 

it have escaped destruction in any event? 

Dr. GRAHAM. That is a very complex question, 

Let me start it, and perhaps Mr. Moore would like 

formation to it. 

There exists a capability in the orbiter and at th

either the pilot or the mission commander, through 

steps, to remove the attachment of the orbiter to the 

That has to be done later, in any case, so chat the o

itself from of the external tank. So, in that sense, i

cally be detached at that point. 

There are additional attachments at the point wh

fuel lines, one providing liquid hydrogen to the ma

one providing liquid oxygen to the main engines, ca

genic fuels to the engines., The mechanics of those a

very complicated and involved, when detaching. Th

volves the dynamics of the orbiter and the tank an

that point. They were not designed, nor was the sys

be detached during the 2 minutes and 8 seconds o

solid rocket boosters were operating at thrust and s

the external tank. 

So while, in a detailed sense, the orbiter can be 

is a question as to whether in fact it would come cl

the tank, and even if it did, whether with the thr

rocket boosters being applied to the tank, whethe

would be such that the orbiter could depart the tan

other damage or excessive stress occurring to it. 

After that, of course, there is a question of even if 

free itself by some process, could it return to som

successfully. The bottom line on this, I believe, is th

of the shuttle system, neither the capability to ass

cessful detachment could occur or the training for 

ment was included, because it was taken as a desi

that the solid rocket boosters be so reliable that th

not have to detach itself from the external tank 

rocket boosters were still attached. Therefore, a
tachment points, would be very speculative. We are goin

looking at that, but at very best, I think we will find th

be a very difficult process. That is a preliminary indicat

sistent with the overall design philosophy of the shuttle 

Mr. Moore, do you have anything to add? 

Mr. MOORE. I think you have covered it very well, D

in terms of what past studies have shown and some of 

considerations in the program, in looking at ways to phy

arate the orbiter from the external tank and solids, 

other mechanism. The program placed its emphasis on 

ity of the solid rocket boosters during this basic 2 

period, while the SRB’s were at full thrust. And so I 

have answered that quite appropriately. Senator GORTON. That is by far the most precise ans

question that I have heard or seen. But I take it that 

plied in the answer to that question is further inve

those possibilities and a further consideration as to w

should be an alternative or an attempted alternative on 

sions. Am I correct? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator GORTON. On another subject, to what exte

Commission’s decision to exclude from the NASA inves

tain personnel who were involved in the launch decision 

agency’s ability to fulfill its own responsibilities in th

tion? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, the principle here, as I 

from direct discussions with the Chairman of the Comm

retary Rogers, is that the Commission has requested 

personnel involved in various processes associated with 

system, specifically the launch decisions, not be placed i

where they would have to investigate themselves. I con

very sound position. It is something that NASA would h

out even had we not been asked, and it in no way inte

the NASA work either to understand what occurred o

the Commission. 

We will continue our investigating efforts and are wo

ly with the Commission, and that is just a principle o

agement of any study such as this. 

Senator GORTON. There have been public reports in 

days that on the evening before the Challenger laun

Thiokol officials were emphatic in their advice not to 

cause of the effect cold weather might have on the 

booster seals. 

Is this report consistent with your own findings, an

been able to determine whether that in fact is the cas

was it considered in the process of reaching a decision 

Dr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, that again is a very co

What I would like to say about it is that I think it fal

category generally of the question of NASA investigatin

whether it should, in fact, be trying to make a specific 

tion on that. I think it far better that NASA make ava

Commission all information and all sources and all 
and the rest of the process that established and crea

system, and that I would like to defer to the Commis

conclusion and judgment on that matter. 

Senator GORTON. And I take it in anticipation th

your answer to any other question of the sort that 

asked of the Commission members? 

Dr. GRAHAM. If the question regards specific inter

matters of fact or technical characteristics or desi

tics, I will be only too pleased to answer you or to 

leagues answer you. If it involves questions of pro

tions, or judgments taken by the NASA staff at va

think it would be far more productive to defer to t

on that because I believe that is one of the major rea

the Commission was established, and at the same ti

I put NASA in the position of basically attempting 

Senator GORTON. Well, Dr. Graham, at least the f

previous question was simply a question of a matt

the qustion was, and I will shorten it, did Morton-T

on the evening before the launch advise that the la

postponed because of the effect of cold weather on th

Dr. GRAHAM. That unfortunately is not a question 

you a simple yes or no answer to. There were quit

officials involved and so on, and I do not wish to prej

tion. So I would really prefer, if I could, not to answ

because there is no simple answer. 

Senator GORTON. Are we assured we are going to h

to that question within the foreseeable future, whet

is simple or not? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Mr. Chairman, I would look to the C

as I understood Chairman Rogers’ response to you 

sponse was that all relevant information concerning 

accident would be provided to you at the appropriate 

Senator GORTON. I think it is very important for N

stand, as I believe the Commission should understa

the nature of NASA’s mission, which was designed 

stance to operate in a goldfish bowl, and under full 

in distinction to operations of the Department of De

very important that factual questions like that be an

answered in a way which is quite clear not just to M

US. Senate and the Commission, but to the general 

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes; sir. I understand that point ver

strongly, and I believe Chairman Rogers and the C

derstand that very strongly. And I cannot today gi

definitive and comprehensive answer to that ques

sure that one will be determined and established 

through the course of the investigation. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Riegle? Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to try to go through some things quickly. 

We have had a chance to speak before about som

ters in our other discussions. It seems to me that 

about the system not being designed to separate off 

a 

. 
down the safety features during that first two minute

the booster rockets. It sort of leads us back to this mo

cern about whether those rockets were designed properl

these O-rings were as good as they should have been, w

cold temperatures might have aggravated a problem in 

ad the fact that this had been redflagged. In other wor

enough data now in the record that indicates that the O

lem, if you will, was one that was talked about, looked 

fied as a problem and needing some work. It seems 

what you have just said is that because of the importa

during that first 2 minutes or so of launch, that that be

more critical. 

I understand that at the launch site when people 

around with gauges and reading the temperatures on 

rockets, that apparently before the launch there was a f

down at the lower part of the rockets the temperature

low. They were down, say, at 10 degrees or less, is that r

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Riegle, there were measuremen

approximately 7:30 in the morning with an infrared py

optical infrared instrument to read the temperature of a 

points both on and off the flight hardware, includin

rocket booster. There were temperatures that were in

the instrument which were in the 740-9 OF. range. How

caution you very carefully that infrared pyrometers m

reading are not easy instruments to operate, and we a

very hard to establish the error bounds on those mea

And I caution you that the error bounds could be quite 

and until we determine what those are, I cannot tell yo

the temperature might have been or how low the t

might have been at various points. We are working on 

lem. 

Mr. MOORE. Senator Riegle, may I add a little bit? As 

routine preparation for launch, we always send ice team

is part of the ritual that we go through in validatin

system is safe from an ice standpoint. Their primary ob

look at ice formation on the external tank, or ice on 

support structure which may impact things like the th

tection system on the orbiter, and damage there cou

some heat damage during our ascent flight. 

On this particular occasion the ice team was sent ou

ferent times, at 1:30 in the morning and at 7 a.m. Dr. G

reported to you on the data that they observed during 

of time, and also at 11 o’clock the ice team was sent ou

mary purpose was to go out and physically look at the 

tank, physically look at any ice on the support structur

mine if we had a major problem or a major risk, I shou

ciated with ice debris which may impact the therma

system. That is what they basically reported back to 

team. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, as I understand it, though, whe

this infrared device-and I assume that is the best devi

I mean, I assume if it was not, they would be using 
g, pp 

and for some reason, at least the readings they 

down to the bottom of the tank; there was this 

much lower temperature; is that correct? 

Dr. GRAHAM. The readings at the lower part of 

a lower temperature, Senator Riegle. I caution you 

add the uncertainty bounds of that instrument r

geometry before you reach a definitive conclusion 

temperatures might have actually been. 

Senator RIEGLE. I understand that point. 

Now, in terms of how that information gets tra

line or across to the decision launch team, as I u

parently that information did not make its way th

some sort to the small group at the top that actua

ble for the launch decision, is that right? Mr. MOORE. That is, I think, a correct assessm

stand it right now, but again, the ice team repor

really no problems on the orbiter thermal prote

from the launch support structure with respect to 

ture, impact or the tile on the orbiter. There was 

held, that our level I1 program manager held with 

from the various elements of the program to ass

that point in time their assessment from an ice 

that we were safe. 

Now, what specifically happened relative to tem

up and how far they got up the system is somethi

we are looking at right now. 

Senator RIEGLE. Let me ask you this, Mr. Mo

member of that launch decision team? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. If you had gotten that informati

that the lower part of the booster rockets were s

tures below 10 degrees, would that have caused yo

rial concern? 

Mr. MOORE. Well, it is hard to say. You know, h

Senator RIEGLE. I understand. We are trying to 

all 20/20 now. 

Mr. MOORE. I understand that, and I would say 

project people or my level I1 managers and so 

issues, that those are in the philosophy of a shuttl

and discussed very, very vigorously and very ope

surface up and people are compktely satisfied t

safe to launch. 

Senator RIEGLE. Had you known that though, I 

ing it and looking backward, is a temperature rea

the tank something that would have caused you 

alarm or you would have said, look, I need to know 

before we take any more steps? 

Mr. MOORE. I believe I would have asked som

about what the readings indicated and what were 

between the left booster reading and the right bo

so forth were the kind of things that I would hav

in the system to get some answers to. 
of the lowest level of temperature, and below thatMr. MOORE. Sir, we have in the space shuttle program

its early days, as I recall the history, and I have been 

gram since I think February 1983, but in the early days 

gram we had a launch commit criteria, which is basicall

in the program, that said if the ambient temperature is 

than 26 degrees, we do not launch, and that was in the 

of the program, some years ago. And my memory esc

terms of the precise time. That was updated to say if 

have an ambient temperature which is 31 degrees or gr

not launch, and at the time of this particular launch, th

sidered the ambient launch temperature, or the ambie

ture at launch was 38 degrees at the time of launch. 

So that is the major constraint we have relative to 

commit criteria. 

Senator RIEGLE. Ihave just got one other question 

because there are a hundred questions that one could 

spect to the business of the O-rings and the temperatu

procedures and so forth. 

Who are the members that serve on that launch dec

How big a group is that? Yourself and how many others

Mr. MOORE. Let me give you a minute or two, if I mig

of how NASA prepares to get ready for launch and w

the players involved in that launch preparation. 

We start out by having each contractor who contribu

piece of hardware or software to the program to condu

internal review to their own management. That review 

ported to the responsible NASA center flight team. For 

the case of the SRB, if we want to take that, Thiokol 

review. They would then come to the Marshall Space F

at the Marshall project level and review that review 

Then the Marshall SRB project people would then 

center director and review that with them. Then it wou

Johnson Space Flight Center where our program man

sides at what we call our level 11. They would then cond

grated review across the program. That review wou

brought to my level where me, my managers like M

halter, my deputies and others, would sit and listen t

associated with a particular launch, and in the case of 

decisions are then made at the various levels. I mea

made at the contractor level, the engineering level. 

Senator RXEGLE. Let me just ask you this. Say wit

hour before the launch the small group of principals, t

executives, yourself and the others, how small would 

group be after they had gotten all of this input that r

sort of make that collective judgment that say go or no 

Mr. MOORE. We have in our launch control cente

basic areas that have about six or seven Kennedy S

people in it, and the Kennedy Space Center has the re

for the launch processing and the preparations for laun

about 31 seconds, and then after the 31 second count, w
gy pp

the overall launch team. We also have as part of 

about seven or eight other critical people sitting in 

trol center, including myself, including the center 

Marshall Space Flight Center, including the projec

solid rocket booster, including my level I1 manage

Mr. Aldrich, including his deputy, Mr. Kohrs. And 

a tiering again of people there that tag up on a 

There is a voice loop going on at the launch cont

to make sure everything is coming together, and a

occur during the countdown are in fact heard by e

cussed by everyone. 

And in addition to the real people, the people 

sitting at the launch control center, there is an e

of people at the Johnson Space Center that are lis

acting on these conversations to ensure that any i

affect the flight are in fact raised and discussed. 

And one final thing, we bring up operation cen

shall Space Flight Center in Huntsville as well. T

people both from the Marshall Space Flight Cen

tractors that support the Marshall Center and 

system products are actively also listening in on 

activities, so that there is a large network of peo

together to ensure that if any issue comes up d

down of a flight or our preparations for a flight, 

handled in real time. 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator, just to add one point

launch by a vote of 10 to 2 or something like that

with all the people on the loop before a launch, 

down in the system can go through a designated 

process is operating properly to put their view forw

Senator RIEGLE. I just wanted to have for the re

that final launch loop yourself on this flight? 

Dr. GRAHAM. No, Senator, I was not. I have bee

ous launches. I was there in the anticipation o

Sunday, but that, as you know, was canceled Sa

cause of the anticipated poor weather. I returned 

and Mr. Philip Culbertson, the General Manage

down to the Kennedy Space Center and was there 

lowing days and through the launch. 

However, while he or I represent a senior mana

there, in general, and while we monitor the proces

describes, in general practice, as a matter of most 

not inject ourselves in that process. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, I am about to y

ests of time because it is late and we have othe

want to question, but I am wondering if I might 

we know yet when we might reconvene to try t

this general line of inquiry. 

Senator GORTON. I do not have a precise date 

will reconvene. We are going to have another he

8 
think from the questioning that has gone on so far that 

ginning the discussion, but there is an awful lot that w

to have to talk through, and to get finally, and hopef

rather than later, to some of these operational decisi

going to have to make together, and they are enormou

know that the public yet understands the nature of the 

choices and decisions that are now imposed on us by th

and all of the demands that are pressing in from diff

tions, quite separate and apart from the investigative ef

the problem and solve the problems, which we are going 

But we have got a lot of work ahead of us, but I thin

made a good start today, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you. Senator Hollings. Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Graham, can you think of any information which 

give the Presidential Commission that you would not 

committee? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator, I understand that is a very c

tion, and I would like to give you a very careful answer 

I think there may be some legal areas that would fall 

type of condition, and I am an engineer, not a lawyer b

and if you will permit me, I would like to respond to 

question carefully in writing in a prompt way. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, I do not see the complicatio

not see the need to be a lawyer to answer that particul

This is the oversight committee for the National Aero

Space Administration, and bluntly, there is an old 

whose bread I eat, his song I sing. Mr. Moore and I ar

South Carolina, and I have studied my humility und

Rivers. 

And I do not intend to sit here on this committee and 

sarily upstage the Commission. We are not trying to do 

the same time, I do not like the Commission to be used 

the questions of this committee, because it is our respon

mately. The President has appointed his Commissio

people have appointed us, and we will be around long

days. Right to the point, we have not only got your auth

am on the appropriations end and the budget end. I ge

ways. 

And so I want answers to my questions. 

Now, No. 1, is there any information that you can th

you would give to the Commission and not give to this 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Hollings, at this point in tim

nothing that I can think of that would fall under that 

However, I must tell you that I do not consider that t

prehensive answer, and I will get you a comprehensiv

that as soon as possible. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, I am a little surprised at 

tion, and particularly your answer with respect to the M

kol opposition to launch. 
report you mean. 

Senator HOLLINGS. The report that Morton-Th

before unanimously opposed the launch and so a

there any evidence to support that report? 

Dr. GRAHAM. No, Senator, the evidence is in th

Senator HOLLINGS. There is 30 evidence whatso

as far as you know? 

Dr. GRAHAM. That is right, Senator. However

again that that was a very complex process whic

substmtial period of time, and I am very concern

give you a yes or a no answer that describes th

will become apparent, I am sure, as time goes o

fully apparent to me or to NASA, nor do I believ

sion, and which will have many aspects to it t

simple yes or no. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, the time involved is 

before, and I do not understand the complexity, an

you have got any support for that. I mean, as fa

cerned, that is a rumor and there is no basis in 

ticular report? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Well, Senator, at the end of 

Morton-Thiokol Co. provided a statement signed 

their senior management who normally signs 

mending that from their perspective the shuttle 

and that is at that point the end of a complex pr

not able to fully characterize to you today, but th

piece of evidence which I have seen. 

Now, I do aot want to imply that that in any 

the entire process or what occurred, but that does 

Senator HOLLINGS. I see. 

With respect to the significance of the change 

tion, where your prepared statement said cn Fri

terminology “inve~tigation,~~ andnow you are 

review, is there any significance to that, Dr. Grah

I have the two statements here, and I noticed t

ing except you are talking about review instead o

Am I reading something into that, or did scmeo

tigating, there is ody one investigation, and tha

tial Commission, and as far as the agency is con

ministration, there is not any investigation going 

What is the case? What is the situation? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Holiings, I think the co

the notion of an investigation which is a generic 

and analysis or review and so on, and a search fo

one hand, and the investigation on the other h

comprehensive investigation of the Challenger ac

vide one report which will be submitted to me and 

and of course, I am sure, tc the Congress, and it 

tive investigation of the Challenger accident, and 

ducted at Presidential direction by Chairman Rog

idential Commission, that is the investigation. NA
control, transport, assembly, checkout and so on activitie

to the launch of the Challenger. We will continue to pu

We are pursuing that as an agency at this very moment

utmost vigor. Nothing has been done in any way to im

process nor, I am assured by Chairman Rogers, will an

done to impede that process. 

But I do not want to give you the impression that NAS

conducting the complete, comprehensive, unbiased study 

gation of the subject. That must necessarily in this case b

the Presidential Commission, and as I understand it, th

task. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Iunderstand. 

Mr. Moore, with respect to the responsibility of the 

that had no responsibility, as I understand, with respect 

nards of the solid rocket booster? In other words, they we

for external ice that might flake off and hurt the particu

or of the shuttle itself? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Like you and I know, you can have 

tion of only 7 degrees, you can have a wind chill factor, 

it has gone up to, let’s say, 38 you say at the time of laun

could have caused a crack, perhaps, of that putty-like su

there. 

Mr. MOORE. Possibly. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Are you looking into that? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir. As Chairman Rogers said earlie

Hollings, we are looking at all aspects of the weather. W

ing not only at the temperature effects and how the te

varies as a function of time during that area, but we are 

ing at the relative humidity, and it was a particularly, 

from my memory, a fairly dry evening in Florida, and 

fairly low relative humidity. We are also looking at the 

rain the shuttle system was exposed to during its tim

launch pad. During the middle of January in Florida, 

enormous amount of rain down there. There was somet

or 5 inches in a very short period of time, and we are no

rain had any effects on the launch or on the system, 

another aspect that is being looked at as far as weather. 

And the other aspect from a weather standpoint is w

ing at the winds. We are looking at the upper atmosph

because if you have seen the time line that came out, 

have tried to quantify the various events that took pl

this flight, at somewhere around 59 to 60 seconds, it loo

get a fairly significant side force, and that could be a w

Prior to launch, we used weather balloons that we sen

very frequent basis to get a measure of the upper a

winds to determine the loads on the vehicle as it is 

through its ascent trajectory, and prior to launch we h

bill of health from the load standpoint. But postlaunch 

some weather activity reported in the area, and we are 

to trace that to see if that had any effect upon Challeng
are looking at these readings that we had betwee

and the left hand and the external tank, the rig

hand booster and the tank, and trying to unde

perspective associated with the weather on that ev

Senator HOLLINGS. And if, as you say now, wi

launch that had been delayed, that had been out o

for how many days? Mr. MOORE. That particular vehicle, I think, 

was on the launch pad since I believe the 22d or 23

that period of time. We had planned to launch 

January as we got closer into the January timefr

planned to launch on the 26th. That evening we 

the launch attempt on the 26th because of rain 

day. We got a forecast that said there is alm

having any opportunity to launch the next morn

out we did have some opportunity to launch on t

but we scrubbed on the basis of the forecast the ev

Then the next day we scrubbed our launch at

because of cross winds at the runway in the ev

into an abort mode of the shuttle. We do have 

which are kind of launch commit criteria, as I 

and they were very, very high at that time. So w

with the launch then. 

And following that scrub, we then went into 

afternoon to talk about should we prepare for lau

And at that time we got a weather forecast, and 

cated that yes, it is going to be fairly cold in Fl

~O’S, but we had a 3-hour launch window, and n

managers in that meeting expressed any real co

paring for launch the next day. So we left the session with all system manager

the solids and the orbiter all going back and pre

the next day, and if there were any problems with 

were to report back in to our management str

know so we would hold the launch. 

Senator HOLLINGS. If the freeze had actually c

like substance around the O-rings, there was no 

month’s period to actually check one way or anot

Mr. MOORE. No, sir; to my knowledge there w

the putty. The putty, part of the joints, is made a

nozzle joints are made at the factory. And from 

point, we had seen most of the occurrences in the 

an O-ring erosion standpoint, we had had very l

the case joint, and the case joint is the system th

vertically at the Kennedy Space Center. Putty 

joint, two O-rings are put around the particular s

lifted together, tang into a clevis. And then we pu

the circumference of each individual segment a

that segment and tighten the band up and put a 

around that particular band, and then it is paint

coating on it, and that is how we made that p

We build all those segments up until we get a 
g

Mr. MOORE. We had seen on the field joints I think ab

stances out of the entire flight experience on the field joi

are these joints here. There is a joint there, there is one 

here, and I believe one up there, there are three joints

mately here up to here, and we call them field joints. 

made at the Kennedy Space Center. In other words, the 

are shipped to the Kennedy Space Center from Utah. 

then mated and stacked at the Kennedy Space Center, a

seen I believe six instances on the primary seal where w

some minor erosion of the primary seal on those case j

never any erosion of the secondary seal. And in the pu

used to put these joints together could have had some in

due to temperature exposure and so forth that we may 

some cracking of the putty, but we do not know that 

Senator. 

The other thing I would like to comment on is that 

been a lot of speculation that the O-ring is the problem. W

sure the O-ring is the problem. As I am sure you know, 

see as we reported and as the media has reported, a clou

smoke emanating from the right SRB, in this vicinity her

Senator HOLLINGS. So it had to come from the O-ring? Mr. MOORE. We are not sure it had to come out of t

Senator HOLLINGS. What other potential is there? 

Mr. MOORE. You could potentially have something er

anomalous, I could say, with the strap here possibly. The

leak test port that we test these O-rings as we put these 

together. There are two O-rings. There is a leak test po

check the pressure and seat the O-ring with about 200-p

square-inch pressure. If that port had some anomaly 

with it or problem, we could possibly get a leak through 

also could postulate the possibility of maybe some hole in 

nal tank showing some liquid hydrogen impinging on 

possibly igniting some of the grease that is around these 

here. 

And so there are a number of scenarios that we are 

there. The O-ring certainly is one of our primary optio

point in time, but we just do not want to rule out, the 

that there are some other ai-eas we are looking at. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, you see what the committee 

at. In other words, with all of the delays and getting beh

many launches to be accomplished there in 1986, and so 

not we were a little too hasty and did not show the prop

that is what we are really looking at also, in addition 

chanicai failures that could have occurred. 

Thank you, sir. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Sore. 

Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to pursue the orbiter matter, but before doin

wanted to pin down this Thiokol business because you

earlier to Senator Hollings, Dr. Graham, is just diame
Now, Mr. Moore, did you have any conversatio

the night before the launch? 

Mr. MOORE. No, sir, I did not. The last convers

with Thiokol was at the launch minus 1 readine

was held on Saturday morning at 11 o’clock. 

Senator GORE. The picture I get, and you tell m

the picture I get is that the Thiokol people expres

during subsequent conversations between NASA a

tually Thiokol signed off and said, well, OK. 

Is that an accurate description of what happened

Dr. GRAHAM. I think, Senator Gore, it is nece

plete description of what happened, and to that 

rate. 

Senator GORE. As far as you know, is it accurate

it with details that you think are essential to imp

tee’s understanding. 

Dr. GRAHAM. Unfortunately, I really do not fee

you a description of that entire process which w

and make accurate the committee’s understandin

at this point because, as I stated earlier, I do no

person fully understands the process that occurred

Senator GORE. Well, just do the best you can, 

from what you know. Just give us the best info

personally have about it. 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator, it would put me in a p

certainly leaving out vital and important element

fore necessarily misleading you and the members 

Senator GORE. Is your understanding of it consi

scription I just gave? 

Dr. GRAHAM. No, sir. As I stated earlier, my un

is the process was more complex and involved th

not have a complete understanding of it. 

Senator GORE. In what ways does your understa

from the way that I gave you? 

Dr. GRAHAM. My understanding of it, Senator G

process involved more complexity, more activit

sions. 

Senator GORE. Did they initially express reserva

cision to go ahead at those temperatures? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Who, Senator? 

Senator GORE. Thiokol. 

Dr. GRAHAM. There was obviously concern by Th

Senator GORE. All right. 

Subsequently there were discussions between NA

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator GORE. After that time, Thiokol eventu

Dr. GRAHAM. Yes, sir. 

Senator GORE. Mr. Moore, is that your under

Mr. MOORE. Yes. sir. 

the decision to go ahead, is that your understandin

happened? 
Mr. MOORE. Senator Gore, as I think Dr. Graham has in

this was a complex matter. I was not personally involved 

particular discussion, but I think the steps that you outlin

are in fact the set of circumstances that did occur. There w

discussion at Thiokol. There was discussion between Thi

the NASA people at the Marshall Space Flight Center, an

final analysis, the Thiokol management signed off on a re

dation to launch. 

Senator GORE. Thiokol communicated through a written 

that correct? 

Mr. MOORE. My understanding is, sir, there was a teleph

con, as we call it, set up between the people at the Kenne

Center representing the Marshall Space Flight Center. 

Senator GORE. Is it a voice link? 

Mr. MOORE. It is a voice link, and some people are mee

so forth, and so there was a mixture of personal, person-

meetings as well as telephone meetings, but the final prod

understand it, was a datafax piece of paper that had the s

on it that Thiokol supported the launch. 

Senator GORE. I see. 

Can you provide that to the subcommittee? 

Mr. MOORE. Yes, sir. 

me following information was subsequently received 

record:] 
9 

. 

P 

8 CALCULATIONS SHOW THAT SRN-25 O-RINGS WILL BE 20' COLDE

i TWERATURE DATA NOT CONCLUSIVE ON PREDICTING PRIMARY 0

@ ~GINEERING ASSESSPENT IS THAT: 

8 COLDER O-RINGS WILL HAVE INCREASED EFFECTIVE DURW

8 m~~~O O-RINGS WILL TAKE LONGER TO "SEAT. 

0 MRE GAS MY PASS PRIMARY O-RING BEFORE THE 

(IIEUTIVE TO SM-15) 

0 DWHSTRATED SEALING THRESHOLD IS 3 TIM

EROSION,€XPERIENCED ON SR'I-15 

0 IF TtlE PRIMRY SEAL DOES NOT SEAT, THE SECONDARY 

0 PRESSURE WILL GET 10 SECONDARY SEAL BEFORE T

0 O-RING PRESSURE LEAK CHECK PLACES SECON

POSlTlON nHICH t4lHl~lZES SEALING 116 

0 MI RECOMEWDS STS-S1L LAUNCH PROCEED ON 28 JANUARY 19

0 sW-25 WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY DIFFERENT FROB s

Senator GORE. All right, fine. 

Let me preface this question by saying, Dr. Grah

has had the image of being just foolproof; I mean 

just so dedicated to quality control and perfection 

and everybody is concerned that a tragedy of thi

lessly destroy an image of that kind that has been 

like all members of the subcommittee, want to be 

regard. 

I must say that it is difficult in reading the pu

ports over the last week or so to sustain that k

really is, because just to take the example of th

leading example of what seems to have been-I 

word mishandled, because from my point of view

some of the memos in NASA files should have ra

red flags and warning bells, set off warning bells, 

not. 

As early as December 17, 1982, the O-rings wer

potential problem and put on the critical items list

a whole series of studies and investigations of wha

wrong with these things, and then in April-well, t

al incidents where the first of the two O-rings fai

blew through, and then in April 1985, the second 

area also suffered a partial failure. At that point, 

neers was quoted as saying, "that is when I started 

, Do you remember that memo? 
budget, the document from the budget analyst who-and 

quoted in the paper. You know the one I am talking abou

Mr. MOORE. I know the one you are talking about-- 

Senator GORE. Maybe it is nct fair to go back and dig 

like that out of the files and say, gosh, anybody reading th

have done more to prevent this from happening, a p

major problem affecting both flight safety and program 

you have the finding of the report of the SRM hand

mishap investigation board which, in finding No. 3, says, 

lacked discipline. Then you have the incident with the g

ting the external tank, and finally they had a problem w

and they brought the instrument up and the battery faile

thing. 

But then, all of these things seem to add up to the 

something has gone wrong with the absolute commitmen

ity control and discipline that we have always come to 

with NASA. 

Now, is that unfair to reach that conclusion? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Well, Senator Gore, there is no question 

tragic accident took place with the Challenger, and th

question whatsoever that that accident should not h

place. If history is any guide, as we understand what c

accident, and history of far less complex systems than 

shuttle system, we will in fact eventually find that the

large number of events which occurred in sequence, Vir

one af which, had it been done differently, would have 

the accident. 

The structure of those events is something that the P

Commission is certainly working, beginning it work to 

and NASA is providing its full support to discover. In t

of operating a system as complex as this, with human be

are bound to be points where actions are taken, where 

are conducted which are not perfection. In fact, one of 

criteria is that the system can be operated by humans. 

There is obviously something that has not gone correc

process, and we intend to find it, we intend to correct 

intend to not let it happen again. 

Senator GORE. Who is in charge at NASA, Dr. Graham

Dr. GRAHAM. I am, Senator Gore. 

Senator GORE. Is Dr. Beggs still in? Is he still-does he 

Dr. GBAHAM. Senator Gore, I have not seen Mr. Beggs 

Senator GORE. Do you know in fact that he has been 

Dr. GRAHAM. Idon’t know, in fact, but I have not 

Senator GORE. You have not seen him with your eyes. 

Have you seen other evidence that he has been at wor

Dr. GRAHAM. No, sir. 

Senator GORE. Has he left you notes? 

in to work every day? 

work every day. 

work or not? 

coming to work for several weeks. 

ular basis? 
Senator GORE. Was he there the day-and let me 

saying that I do not want a cheap inference on 

really do not, but let me just say what I was told

occasions, including the day of the accident, he com

written tasks for people, including you, and then yo

you do not see him personally but you get the task. 

Is that right or wrong? Dr. GRAHAM. That is inaccurate, Senator Gore. M

knowledge, has never left a written task for me. 

Senator GORE. For others? 

Dr. GRAHAM. I do not know, Senator. Not to my k

Senator GORE. You have not heard that? 

Dr. GRAHAM. No, sir. 

Senator GORE. Mr. Moore, do you want to respon

Mr. MOORE. I would like to comment, Senator G

tors. One is the safety aspects, the question yo

about NASA being lax on safety. I think NASA h

lent safety record. I think we have got a very, very 

which staris out with a set of directed documen

down through each of our NASA field centers and 

tors requiring them to maintain quality safety sta

the products they produce for us. These are produc

ufactured or inspected not only by the contractor 

ernment inspectors, and they are bought off at eac

way. We have safety offices that are very, very ac

to each contractor, at each NASA center that i

hardware for the shuttle. We also have a major off

liability, and quality assurance at the Johnson Spa

especially set up and established, just to look at ov

ability and quality assurances for the shuttle fligh

shuttle flights are concerned, and we also have 

Engineer’s office here in Washington that has a sp

tions assigned to it in the areas of safety, reliabi

assurance. 

So I would like to respond back to your comm

think NASA does an extremely thorough proce

safety. There can be human processes somewher

that are not according to the book, and that is wh

back and really try to find. In the case of the KS

you cited, Senator, I would like to say that I thin

tored that transition. You know, Lockheed took 

processing contractor some 2 to 3 years ago, and in 

lowing that transition, I think the overall incident 

all safety record has been very, very good down 

Space Center, and I think that marriage has work

tween KSC and the Lockheed Corp. 

Senator GORE. Let me just say in conclusion 

number of questions on quality control for our fut

budget hearing. If I had time today, I would go in

to me to be a reduction in the number of quality 

understand there is a difference in the job defin

thzt, but I will deal with this matter at a future he

. 
there but on leave and so forth. I think that in almost a

zation there is a tone that affects what everybody does. 

some kind of confusion at the top, uncertainty, then I t

can have an effect on an organization. I see it in depart

offices all the time. 

I believe that NASA needs a full-time Administrato

Acting Administrator, but an Administrator who can 

helm and set that kind of tone that is going to be so 

needed in the aftermath of this very difficult tragedy 

and for the country. Did you want to respond to that? My time may be up. 

Mr. MOORE. Iwould like to make one more comment. Y

impression earlier, Senator, about the program not resp

the O-ring situation. I would like to make two comments

the joint in question, on this particular flight, which is t

case joint, the worst case O-ring erosion was only the pr

sion, and it was on flight No. 2 in the Shuttle Program b

vember 1981. 

Point No. 2 I would like to make is that we were c

cerned about erosion. My engineers, the Marshall eng

Thiokol engineers, felt we had an adequate margin of 

flight, and yet we initiated activities early last year to s

a test program and a potential redesign program to co

the erosion we were seeing. But in our experiences to da

maintained on the secondary O-ring, the only time we s

on the secondary O-ring, we maintained a factor of four 

that O-ring. Tests were done in the laboratories which d

ed we could stand a factor of three to four more erosion 

ondary O-ring and still be in a safe condition. 

NASA took very active, very aggressive actions, in my 

was looked at by a lot of engineering people, not only in 

but a lot of engineering people at the Marshall Sp

Center, some outside engineering people as well as the 

engineering people, and we felt we were on a prudent 

action as far as correcting what erosion we were seeing 

gram. 

We were not happy with that. Let me conclude with th

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add just 

that I think ought to be part of this session, too. I am to

the category of things which could cause a catastrophic 

mission into which the O-ring problem fell, there are 

700 other items. 

Now, I think-excuse me-over 700 other criticality I 

the reason I raise that is that you go back after one of th

and pick one out which is suspect, and I did want to p

perspective. Still, having said that, I think that the reco

particular issue is one that really calls into question t

which the alarm bells are heard and rung. Thank you. 

Mr. MOORE. Senator Gore, let me respond on that. In 

are more than 900 criticality I items. If you take each 

item one at a time and counted through the systems, th
c 

. 

gppg

their maintenance and so on, and they go through 

broad range of equipment. That is a large number, b

to take a commercial air transport, you would als

large number of items which were category 1, whe

essential to the operation of the system. The important thing, in our view, is to identify tho

derstand their importance, and make sure in the en

manufacture and quality control test and checkout 

they are in fact capable of performing the role nece

gory 1 items. 

If I may respond to your earlier question about N

ment, let me assure you that from the moment tha

Acting Administrator, when Mr. Beggs stepped as

never any question whatsoever in my mind, nor do I 

mind of the NASA staff, who was in charge of the a

was the designated President’s appointee to be in ch

and that is still the case today, Senator. 

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Rockefeller? 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. You indicated that NASA i

investigation. Secretary Rogers indicated that was 

There is some evidence to the contrary as to how th

scribed. At a meeting this morning with some staff 

indicated that it really was the Presidential Com

doing the investigation, but that probably is not the 

I am concerned about the future of NASA as ar

Acting Administrator. You have in 1985 a $7% bi

went up a little bit in fiscal 1986, and then G

chopped $300 million off. So it is now actually less 

fiscal year 1985. You have budgetary pressures, you 

objectives in space pressures, you have Ariane pre

spect to what the Europeans are doing. You have th

I indicated earlier of a somewhat diminished pub

prior to this tragedy with NASA, and hence the w

crisis under the Gramm-Rudman discipline that we l

My question to you is that in answers to specific q

whereas you were much more forthcoming than Se

you still needed to deflect a lot because if your inve

underneath his, then there is still a question of wh

We are in the process of trying to make a budge

mittee has to recommend to the full committee. W

final response on a budget recommendation by Apr

or 6 weeks off. 

Are you wearing two hats here? Are you going to 

cate as you would ordinarily to us, and argue with 

priorities and what we need to be looking at, or ar

until this investigation is concluded? 

And let me just redefine that. What comes out o

tion could be expensive. It could cause us to do 

might not otherwise do in our budget. If the O-rings 

ty, there are at least 40 possible options for correcti

us. 
the load, and therefore cut down on what can go into t

All of these cost. 

We have budget decisions to make. Are you in a pos

able to advocate for your agency what you want to see u

that budget in the next 6 weeks so that we can come to 

sion, or are you locked in until this whole investigation i

and cannot be forthcoming with us? 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Rockefeller, to address your 

first, I would like to distinguish betweep the investigatio

the Presidential Commission’s mission, its charter and it

those activities supporting that investigation which NAS

sarily conducting and will bear much of the load on. Th

in support of the Presidential Commission in my estim

volve many tens of thousands of work-hours of activity 

stand what happened, why it happened, and how to cor

how to make sure that it does not happen again, and w

tainly very actively pursuing that in NASA. 

But NASA will not provide the conclusive report ei

Congress or to the President. The Presidential Comm

provide that, and I think there is a clear separation in 

ities there. And I believe I have tried to make that clear 

ing, and I will be glad to elaborate further if you wish. 

As far as budget priorities go, the fiscal year 1987 b

NASA prepared and you have received was prepared 

Challenger accident. It was done with no anticipation o

lenger accident, and, therefore, it is not entirely applic

post-Chal lenger accident situation. There are activities t

planned for fiscal year 1987 and in fact for 1986 which c

be undertaken. There are activities which had not be

plated at the time of that budget which might appropria

dertaken. We have all of that under review, and we wi

thing that is possible to bring forward to you a budget 

of action that is appropriate to the era we are now in, w

post-Challenger accident era. That much I can assure yo

Senator ROCKEFELLER. This much I can assure you, 

particular Senator wants to see the continued success 

This particular Senator does not want to see the Departm

fense take advantage without castigating them in mo

this tragedy in order to absorb the NASA Program. I se

distinct possibility, given the long leadtimes, the bu

Gramm-Rudman, the length of the investigation and w

come up after that. I hope that I see you in a position 

will be able to advocate, we will be able to respond, we 

to keep this program going so that it keeps its balan

cancer can be cured, so that the anemia can be cured, 

betes can be cured. It is not all military; it is not all 

mean, the welfare of mankind is a very large subject. 

We want to be supportive of you, and we hope and a

you will be forthcoming with us as we deliver the bud

for your agency. 

Dr. GRAHAM. Senator Rockefeller, we will certainly b

ing with you. We will tell you all of our assumption
gy 

Rudman cut for this year. They are under tigh

straints. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But not nearly like you a

Dr. GRAHAM. They in fact reimbcrse NASA fo

that NASA provides, so that within their budget 

are tranferred to NASA for NASA resources tha

them, and, of course, that will continue. We will 

in great detail for you and everything will be on 

Rockefeller. 

Senator GORTON. Senator, your statement was 

eloquent. 

I want to thank the three of you for coming 

course, not an easy task for you by any means. Y

however, that we are only at a preliminary stag

just as you are, and that all of the questions 

asked here by one member or another are going 

swered eventually, and I hope as quickly as possi

move forward with a strengthening of the entire 

mereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the subcommittee re

the call of the Chair.] 

ROGERS COMMISSION REPO

TUESDAY, JUNE 10, 1986 

U.S. SENA

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPO

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOG

A

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 

SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Slad

man of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GO

Wa

Senator GORTON. Welcome to this hearing of the 

mittee on Science, Technology, and Space. As w

report of the Rogers Commission on the ChaZZen er 

thanks not just of the subcommittee but of the e

Chairman Rogers and to Vice Chairman Armstr

members and the staff of the Rogers Commission. 

As I have already stated, I believe that the work 

sion will stand as an example for future such Presi

sions for many years to come. The combination of 

and experience and background of the members of 

who not only knew what to look for but how to fi

personal commitment to spend their own time on t

rather than simply to respond, as so many blue ribb

do, to the work of professional staff, have combin

report which meets fully and completely the char

dent of the United States to the members of the Co

In fact, here today I am not entirely certain wh

of the Commission and its distinguished executi

Keel, can add. It seems to me that it is up to us, 

the Senate who have received this report, to hear 

tional wisdom the two members here can provi

engage in the much longer and more difficult pursu

The first of those pursuits is of course the ove

itself, and it will be up to us and our compatriots 

Representatives, as well as in the administration, t

to it that NASA promptly and completely and e

out the recommendations which the Commission ha

very good reason, in particular cases, for not doing 

Second, of course, it is up to us in the very near 

making decisions as to the mission and future o

build a replacement orbiter? What about a space 

we begin to plan toward the President’s recomm

(59) 

to begin by formally expressing my thanks, and f a
y p

Many of these questions were beyond the charge to 

mission, Secretary Rogers. But they are the charge of t

tee. 

Today we thank you for a job well done and we ask 

extent you are able to do so, to continue to provide u

wisdom in the future. 

To the end that we should hear as much as we possib

the members, I would like to announce in advance 

members will restrict their opening statements to 5 m

We will have 10 minute rounds of questioning, but w

members off on one round. But given the fact that the r

Commission is in written form, I would-I have every h

can complete that questioning today and go on very 

what is going to be the more important set of question

NASA about its response to this Commission report. 

Senator Rockefeller. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR ROCKEFEL

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Along with the rest of the committee, I want to thank 

tary Rogers, Mr. Armstrong, Dr. Keel, and other mem

Rogers Commission for a truly extraordinary service 

try. I think your personal involvement and the inten

ment to finding the facts out and bringing them hon

openly before the American public is exemplary and in 

traditions of our Nation. 

If I might say so, I think that the Rogers Commissio

response to the Challenger disaster is quintessentially 

That is, that you have faced openly and forthrightly th

and the difficult facts, and you have made no attem

anything under the rug, easy or tempting though p

might have been to some. 

As Justice Brandeis once said, sunlight is the best 

And when I compare what it is that we as a nation a

Commission have done in response to the Challenger s

on the one hand in comparison with the way the Sovie

dled the Chernobyl disaster on the other hand, I think 

which should not be lost on this world, because I think 

flects the fundamental difference between our two soci

integrity and the way in which we go openly and hon

tional dilemmas. 

So I am deeply grateful to you. I have comments t

like to make, but I will make those a matter of the p

Secretary Rogers, because I will be interested in what 

say, sir. 

And please, please understand how grateful we are

first came before this committee, there was not any cle

me why it was that you had to do this. You have done 

so many ways for our country. 
strength of your character and the quality of the 

have worked with people know that they have b

truth. And when Americans know they have been de

fully, they will respond aggressively and positively. 

We have got to get back to the business of putting 

space program back on its feet, and we have got to d

ly, we have got to do it wisely. We cannot retreat fro

al commitment and we cannot be afraid of what it is 

reported in your report. So I congratulate you, sir. 

Senator GORTON. Chairman Danforth. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRM

The CHAIRMAN. Secretary Rogers, I want to ad

thanks to you and the members of the Commission 

job. I have not had an opportunity to explore in dep

sion’s report. I have just looked through it very 

assure you that the Commerce Committee will give i

tention. 

Your Commission has indeed served as a model fo

dential Commission should be. The time that you a

bers put into this personally is greater than anyone 

pected-and, as you have stated, this is not a staff 

rubber stamped by Commission members. Each of y

personally in very great depth, at great sacrifice of 

energies. 

And I simply want to add my words of thanks to y

has now ended. I hope you get a little rest. 

Our work really has begun. I think all along th

question on the part of the members of our committ

the precise role of the Commerce Committee, wha

role of the Commission. I have never felt that our jo

duplicate what the Commission was doing. 

I do feel, however, that our role is going to be ver

the future, obviously, with respect to making deci

future of NASA, the expenditure of money for the 

the oversight of the space program. We are going to 

careful look at your recommendations. 

We are going to have to decide if there are any 

are left open that we will have to explore. And with 

recommendations that you have made, we will ana

we will proceed to attempt to implement through 

otherwise, those recommendations which you have m

It really is a first-rate job. I just want to emph

point, and that is the same final point which you 

your Commission report. This has been a tragic tim

who have been involved and their families. It has 

spondent time for NASA. But I, and I think every 

committee, completely share the confidence that yo

members of your Commission have stated in NASA

the future of our space program. 

62-885 0 - 86 - 3 
ppg

confident in the future of NASA. Your role has served 

even sounder and better, and now the ball is in our cou

same. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Ford. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR FORD 

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think all of us feel the same, and we probably put 

ent verbiage. But I too, Mr. Chairman and vice chairm

that you have set the criteria for commissions in the 

have pinpointed the problem. You have made your r

tions, and then I think probably the strongest point th

in the whole report was your concluding thought, tha

brought greatness and from this we need to gather o

And I just say to this committee and those that are 

that we the Congress can equal the same level of com

wind up with the same level of confidence that your 

has given this country. I compliment you and thank yo

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR TRIBL

Senator GORTON. Senator Trible. 

Senator TRIBLE. Mr. Chairman, thank you. 

I too want to join my colleagues in not only we

Rogers and his colleagues today, but in thanking eac

your leadership and for your thorough and thoughtf

the problems that have plagued NASA to date, and 

recommendations. 

I would like to think, Mr. Chairman, that we can n

turn the corner. We have this body of information and 

dations before us. We have new leadership at NASA. I 

begin to put these problems behind us and press ahead 

and renewed vigor. 

And I thank you, gentlemen and ladies on your Com

your contribution. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR HOLLIN

Senator HOLLINGS. Mr. Secretary, I also want to 

thank you and the Commission members. I do not kno

outstanding group of Americans assembled on a Com

have worked hard and we appreciate very, very much 

ing within the timeframe and coming up very early w

ticular report. 

I have a slightly different approach with respect t

the improvement of our performance out there at NA

far-I am studying the report and getting into the b

ments-that there was almost a zeal to make certain i

sponsibility was not fixed. I do not find any individu

sponsible. 
there was any venality. But I do think when you f

bility, thereupon you promote safety. 

If every time one of these kind of things occurs a

sponsible, you can put in 12 more safety comm

review boards, and 9 more other safety groups, an

responsibility to it, it won’t be safe. I just feel som

accountable and there has been an indication to me 

been. However, I hope you will respond to this appr

rate in your testimony. 

But that is just a difference that I have in ap

thing. I want to make absolutely certain that we 

other disaster. Also I am glad to see that your rep

two remarks I made in February. No. 1, you finally 

was an avoidable accident; and No. 2, the space pro

the R&D stage and is not an operational, comm

gram. 

As your report indicates, there were some saf

That’s another area where you and I differ a littl

the process was flawed. I find the process and sa

violated. And that is where my questions will b

today. I do not intend to be hostile to you or any

Commission, but to really get at the heart of the is

are putting in another process and if the new proce

be violated in the future, then we have made no rea

But I think if we make them know down at NAS

going to be held responsible, then we will have a fin

that we all want to continue for the future in spa

Senator GORTON. Senator Gore. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GO

Senator GORE. Mr. Chairman, I know it is redun

like saying it anyway. To you, Secretary Rogers a

man Armstrong, Executive Director Dr. Keel, and 

all of the other members of the Commission: It is 

members of this statement to adequately convey t

of appreciation felt by the American people for the 

done. 

The countless hours of personal time, the tremen

you put in personally, rather than, as is often the c

it over to an appointed staff, really was one of the 

jobs in my memory in looking at commissions of t

the memory of those who have been watching them 

have as well. 

So the only thing I would say by way of opening i

a demonstration of patriotism of the highest or

down and really getting to work on an important ta

trusted to you and doing it in an excellent fashion. 

So thank you. 

Senator GORTON. I have an opening statemen

Pressler for the record. 

[The statement follows:] 

. 
y gy 

gy g

Challenger. During those intervening weeks, the President’s Comm

ing the causes of the Challenger accident has conducted an exh

under the able leadership of its chairman, William Rogers. Before we begin our discussion of the Commission’s specific find

mendations, I think it appropriate to express our extreme gratitu

Rogers, Vice-chairman Armstrong, Executive Director Keel, and all 

bers of the Commission. These individuals have demonstrated the f

public servants by responding to the President’s request for assistan

countless hours to the Commission’s work at the expense of their n

The Commission has carried out an extensive examination of th

up to the Challenger tragedy. Many of their findings have been, qu

concerting. It is obvious that the communication and management 

NASA developed and implemented for the Shuttle Program were in

The decentralized shuttle management system was inadequate to 

cial information concerning the reliability of particular shuttle com

tems was brought to the attention of those ultimately responsible fo

lives of the flight crew. At the same time, the safety criteria design

flight-worthiness of the shuttle were routinely waived, with ultim

sults. Yet, the existence of these failings within NASA are not 

abandon the Space Shuttle Program, or any of our unmanned progr

I mentioned earlier that we have reached the end of a long journe

is far from complete. The next step is to correct NASA’s problems 

renew our manned exploration of the worlds around us. The Comm

should not be used as a reason to end, or in any way diminish, th

commitment to manned space flight. Continued shuttle flights are 

United States warlts to maintain its preeminence in space science 

Manned flights are needed for launching and servicing satellites, co

ments that are impossible on earth, and developing medicines an

can be used here on earth. 

This is not to suggest that we should rely exclusively on the shu

space. The series of rocket failures that followed the shuttle accid

demonstrated that we must always have several operational sys

launching the communications, weather, and military satellites th

to our commerce, safety, and national security. For that reason, it is 

we begin the process of correcting those parts of NASA’s structure 

Congress, in conjunction with NASA, must examine and implemen

dations of the President’s Commission, and do so in a manner tha

space program as safe and reliable as possible. 

Senator GORTON. Secretary Rogers, if you would like 

response or any opening statement. And if Mr. Arm

Keel would, too, we would be delighted to hear from y

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, CHAIR

DENTIAL COMMISSION ON THE SPACE SHUTTLE 

ER’ ACCIDENT, ACCOMPANIED BY NEIL A. ARMS

CHAIRMAN; AND DR. AL KEEL, EXECUTIVE DIRECT

Mr. ROGERS. I sort of hate to have you stop. Well, first let me say that we and the Commissi

very much the attitude of this committee. You have v

waited until we completed our work. You have made 

comments in support of our work, and we appreci

much. 

We appreciate the cooperation we have had from y

we will continue to provide on our side the same kin

tion. We have thousands and thousands of docum

available. 

We are going to print further documents and appe

will come along in a couple of weeks. We could not 
record of the nation, and it will be in the Archives 

automated so that it will be easy to retrieve any d

the committee would like to obtain. 

I think everything is, as you said, Mr. Chairman, i

remarks, everything that we have to say we hav

report. We have tried to say it completely and thoro

undue emphasis on any portion of it. 

I think when one reads the whole report the i

quite great. It is sad in a lot of ways, but it is the

Rockefeller pointed out, I think it is in the best of A

tion. When we make a mistake, we admit it and 

facts, so the public understands what happened, an

mendations about how it can be improved in the f

get on about our business. 

That is what we have tried to do here in this rep

that it will stand the test of time. I do not believ

doubt at all about what happened. Unlike the Warr

where there continued to be doubt, I think this repo

to anyone who thoroughly reads it that this joint fa

what caused the accident. 

Fortunately, they even found the very part or t

failed, which corresponds to the puff of smoke initi

responds to the flame. And without doubt that is w

that is what caused the accident. 

Then we point out in the report other factors tha

the accident. We point out that there is a long hist

have signaled to the people involved that there w

this joint and it is a major, major problem. 

Everybody recognized early on there was a majo

segmented joints were a problem when they tho

There was ‘debate at the time whether this was th

system, whether other systems were preferable, an

no lack of warning, it seems to the Commission. We 

. ter an accident rooted in history, because we think 

clearly shows that this accident was bound to happ

thing was done about it. 

We point out that the safety system that was i

not work and, as Senator Hollings pointed out, the

to be an adequate person in charge of safety, and t

of the reasons we recommended, Senator, that th

assistant to the administrator who will be in charge 

It will be his responsibility, and if things go wron

him if there are failures, failures in notification a

tion. 

Now, as some people have said--I heard someo

last night point out that: Well, there was a relucta

person in charge of safety, because everybody had 

of safety. Well, that’s true, in a sense everybody ha

of safety. But if you leave it to everybody, what ha

up really nobody being in charge. I think in a sense that is what happened here, so 

recommendations, to address Senator Hollings’ poi

’ 

i 
anything of that kind should go to his-immediately 

his attention, so that he will know all aspects of it. 

Yesterday, to digress just for a moment, we met wit

er and Dick Truly, Admiral Truly, and he pointed 

thought was extremely significant and I had not h

before-I guess I did not associate him with that flig

derscores the importance of what we say in this repor

He was on the second flight, STS-2, and on that fl

problems with this joint. He told me yesterday that h

had never heard of the problem they had on his flig

the accident, after we started talking to him about it. 

Now, that obviously underscores what we have 

report. That cannot happen again. We may have ac

future or with the program, but they cannot be bas

information. If we decide to take a chance and say th

that we can do about this, but we have to go ahead 

gram even though it is risky, at least that is a jud

upon known facts. 

But we cannot permit a system to operate where th

make the decisions state they did not know anything 

will see in our report that we have a chart here of ke

say they did not know anything about this. 

So we hope very much that this report will make e

to really the importance of safety. We cannot consi

ational, we cannot consider it routine. Every flight ha

at with safety in mind. 

We also recommend a safety panel which will be-an

strong can explain it better than I, but it will be on 

will involve astronauts and others, and they will be a

at any time, based upon any concerns they have, and 

or make it impossible for the launch to occur. 

This is one of the things the astronauts themselv

wanted. We think that will be a very useful recom

does not require any outside help and it does no

money. 

It is just, there was something similar in the Ap

which seemed to work pretty well, and we hope it wi

emphasized the safety feature of this to a great exten

So there are two aspects that I wanted to emphas

these few remarks, and one is, there is no doubt abou

pened, no doubt that this joint failed, and that was th

accident. There is no doubt there were managemen

human failures in addition to the mechanical failure

that the recommendations we made will reduce the 

future flights. 

One other point I would make is that we realize no

ished our work, the difficult problems that this comm

to be faced with. As you said, Mr. Chairman, there 

difficult problems. We have not undertaken to try to 

ommendations because we were not asked to; and sec

sure we were capable enough to do it. 
the position that there are other safety matters, 

should be considered and dealt with right away. A

shuttle is not flying is a good time to fix some of these 

As you know, we listened very carefully to the a

the astronaut community, and we think the astronau

a more active role in the space program. There are v

nauts in management now and we recommend that t

ered a source of, or a reservoir of, extraordinary talen

move into management. 

We also recommend that they be given a more a

good office, but they have not been given quite the im

in the organizational structure of NASA that they sh

think Jim Fletcher will do that. 

I think that as a nation we all have to get behind 

have to get behind Jim Fletcher and Admiral Truly a

I might say, Admiral Truly has been a very strong 

picture. He has cooperated fully with us. He is highl

the community, not only among astronauts but eve

the system, and he is going to be in charge of this p

future and I think he will be a great asset. 

We are very fortunate to have him in that position

Certainly we believe the headquarters here has t

ened. Apropos of Senator H~llings’ point, at the pr

the time of the accident there was one man who was 

zational chart responsible for safety, and his name w

veira. He is the chief engineer, and his responsibil

but he had all kinds of other responsibilities. 

He said, when we questioned him, “If I had known

any time period when we first came to the conclusion 

was not redundant”, and that means that it was cri

failed it was the loss of mission and crew, “I would 

that we get busy right now on a design change and 

any temporary fix we could do to improve the op

seal.” 

He knew nothing about this. He was the man in ch

and he did not know all of this history that went on 

So we do believe that it is very important to have 

is in charge of safety who is going to be responsible 

system. Now, it is not easy to get that kind of a man 

to do that. It does not have that glamour. You ar

charged with a tremendous responsibility and a lot o

engineers and so forth, would rather do other things. 

Anyway, I guess in conclusion I would like to say t

ciate the support of this committee. We hope that NA

and does a good job. We have every reason to think 

Now that we have finished our work, we will do all 

port NASA. 

Anything like this is very difficult for the whole 

You can say maybe they deserve it, but most people 

done a wonderful job. We know that. This was a 

system and maybe a failure of certain individuals

. 

. these launch matters. They have had an office and 

j 

i 
I agree with Senator Hollings. I do not believe there 

nality. I do not believe there would be any advant

thinking about a criminal case against anybody. I thin

destructive. In any event, we did not go into that, bu

personal opinion. I hope that we can just get on with 

and make it successful in the years ahead. 

Thank you. [The statement follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM P. ROGERS, CHAIRMAN, PRESIDENTIA

THE SPACE SHUrrZE iiCHALLENGER” ACCIDENT 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin by expressing my gratitude a

to you and your Committee for your support and cooperation thoru

mission investigation. You allowed the Commission the opportunity 

its very important, and often difficult task, without interference o

deserve acknowledgment and recognition fm doing so. The Comm

that it’s now the right and responsibility of Congress in its oversigh

hearings as it deems appropriate. We fully support and welcome suc

I would like to begin, Mr. Chairman, by providing the Committe

scope of our investigation and a description of the Commission app

vestigation as events unfolded. 

I will then give you a brief description of the accident and ex

cause as determined by the Commissions. I will relate our finding

launch decision process, and the history of concerns about the desi

perience with the Solid Rocket Booster joints and O-ring seals. Fina

Commission findings regarding the NASA safety organization, laun

the system, and other future safety concerns-including those brou

mission’s attention by the Astronaut office. 

I will conclude with a summary of our recommendations to avoi

rence of a tragedy such as the Challenger accident, and to return o

space flight. 

SCOPE OF INVESTIGATON 

We believe the investigation - and report is one of the most com

complete of its kind. 

transcriDt. Seventy witnesses testified before the full Commission, providin

More’than 160 individuals were interveweed and 46 Commissio

Over 6,300 reports and documents were renewed, totaling mo

33 NASA Task Force Reports were prepared-in part by Commis

bers-and submitted to the Commission for review and analysis. All materials relating to the investigation, including private corre

documented, reviewed, and evaluated and made a part of the co

base. Commission materials will now become part of the permane

The Commission Report is a complete and careful presentation 

vealed by the investigation and of the Commission findings and r

based on those facts. Four additional volumes of supplemental repo

six NASA Team Reports; and two volumes of Commission Hearing T

were conducted, yielding 12,000 pages of transcript. 

pages. 

COMMISSION ACTIVITIES 

President Reagan, seeking to ensure a thorough and unbaised inv

Challenger accident,, announced the formation of the Commission 

1986. The mandate gwen by the President, contained in Executives 

quired Commission members to: 

(1) Review the circumsfances surrounding the accident to estab

cause or causes of the accident; and 

(2) Develop recommendations for corrective or other action base

misison’s findings and determinations. 
pgg

Shortly thereafter, on February 10, Dr. Alton G. Keel, Jr., Ass

the Office of Management and Budget, was appointed Executive D

began gathering a staff of 15 experienced investigators as well a

personnel from various government agencies and the military servi

Eventually, 42 permanent staff personnel, including administra

support were assembled. Over 100 additional contract personnel w

staff the Commission document control center-to enter documents 

er data base, and to assist Commissioners and staff in conducting c

of Commission documents. 

y During a closed session on February 10, 1986, the Commission 

the troubled history of the Solid Rocket Motor joints and seals. M

against launch on January 27, 1986, the night before the launch o

concerns regarding low temperature effects on the joint and seal. T

disturbing development, additional closed sessions were scheduled 

and 14 at Kennedy. The February 13, 1986, session was an extensiv

film, video, and telemetry data relating to the Challenger acciden

Commission the first evidence that the Solid Rocket Motor joint a

malfunctioned, initiating the accident. 

The session on February 14, included NASA and Contractor par

in the discussion on January 27, 1986, not to launch 51-L. After 

ceived, an executive session of the Commission was convened. Th

ment was subsequently issued on February 15, 1986, reflecting th

view of the Commisison. 

“In recent days, the Commission has been investigating all aspe

making process leading up to the launch of the Challenger and h

process may have been flawed. The President has been so advised. 

“Dr. William Graham, Acting Administrator of NASA, has bee

clude on the internal investigating teams at NASA, persons invo

ess. 

“The Commission will, of course, continue its investigation and 

report to the President within 120 days.” 

The role of the Commissioners thus changed from that of ov

active investigators and analysts of data presented by NASA and i

By February 17, the Commission had divided itself into four inv

Working groups were sent to Marshall, Kennedy, and Thiokol to a

ing to the accident and to redirect efforts. NASA’s investigation 

nized to reflect the structure of the Commission’s panels. 

The Accident Analysis Panel, chaired by Major General Dona

several trips to both Kennedy and Marshall and traveled to Th

Utah to review photographic and telemetric evidence as well as 

salvage operation and to oversee the tests being conducted by N

engineers. Early in March, at my request, this group assembled and dire

sion’s mdependent team of six technical observers with extens

Solid Rocket Motor technology and accident investigation to valid

the tests and analyses performed on the Thiokol motor by NASA a

The Development and Production Panel, chaired by Joseph Sutt

vestigation on the produciton and testing activities of the Shuttle 

tors. 

The Prelaunch Activities Panel, chaired by David Acheson, co

tivities at Kennedy where the Shuttle elements are assembled a

. ered the fmt indication that the contractor, Morton Thiokol, initia

launch preparations are completed. 

The Mission Planning and Operations Panel, chaired by Dr. Sall

efforts on mission planning and crew preoaration for STS 51-L 

NASA’s safety, reliibility, and quality assurance programs. While the work of the individual panels and their investigativ

ing, the Commission’s general investigative staff began a series o

views to document fully the factual background of various area

sion’s interest, including the telecon between NASA and Thiokol 

before the launch; the history of joint design and O-ring proble

reliability and quality assurance functions; and the assembly o

Rocket Booster for STS 51-L. Subsequent investigative efforts b

directed in the area of the effectiveness of NASA’s organizational 
sonnel expended a vast effort in the investigation. More than 1,30

all NASA facilities were involved and were supported by more 

from other government agencies and over 3,100 from NASA’s co

tions. Particularly significant were the activities of the military, 

and the National Transportation Safety Board in the Salvage an

Shuttle wreckage. 

DESCFSPTlON OF THE ACCIDENT 

Based on fh, video and telemetry data, the Commission determ

quence of events leading to the accident was as follows: 

Liftoff began with the ignition of the Solid Rocket Boosters, (6.6 

tion of the Space Shuttle Main Engines). At .678 seconds after liftoff, the first puff of smoke was observe

the right Solid Rocket Booster in the vicinity of the aft field joint b

er and the External Tank, near the External Tank attach strut. 

By 2.5 seconds after liftoff the generation of the smoke stopped

of smoke had been generated. During the ascent-beginning at about 37 seconds and lasting u

onds-heavy wind shears were encountered that, although not pr

loads, did provide a “bumpy ride” that could have had an effect o

aged system; namely, the seal in the aft field joint. Everything looked normal until about 59 seconds after liftoff. A

started coming out of the right booster in the area where smo

before. 

The flame and hot gas plume grew in size during the next 14 to 

impinging on the aft (hydro en tank portion) of the External Ta

the tank is connected to the hid Rocket Booster. 

At about 64 to 65 seconds the structural integrity of the Ex

breached and hydrogen began leaking from the aft region near a w

Beginning at about 72 seconds, a rapid sequence of events beg

flame weakened connection (strut) to the lower part of the Extern

about 73 seconds, the bottom portion of the External Tank (hydr

Failure of the bottom of the External Tank caused the pressur

gen to be released rapidly, which in turn propelled the hydrogen 

2.8 million pounds of force, into the intertank area (between hyd

tanks), and probably into the bottom of the oxygen tank (upper p

Tank). 

At about the same time, the forward part of the booster (frustu

the forward part of the External Tank, which contained the oxyg

the aft booster attachment strut had allowed the bottom part of th

away from the External Tank, rotating about its forward attachm

This nearly instantaneous mixing of hydrogen and oxygen, in 

sparks produced when the hydrogen tank was propelled into th

caused a fire, or nearly explosive burning of these propellants. T

severe aerodynamic loads, broke into pieces within fractions of a s

The Shuttle was going at nearly twice the speed of sound (M

pFslng through 46,000 feet of altitude. There were no alarms so

pit. The crew apparently had no indication of a problem before t

of the Space Shuttle system. The first evidence of an accident cam

coverage. Radar then began to track multiple objects. The flight d

Houston confirmed to the flight director that “RSO (range safety 

hicle exploded?” and 30 seconds later he added that the range safe

the destruct signal to the Solid Rocket Boosters. During the per

the Solid Rocket Boosters are thrusting, there are no surviva

There was nothing that either the crew or the ground controllers 

avert the catastrophe. 

CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT 

The consensus of the Commission and participating investigativ

the loss of the Space Shuttle Challenger was caused by a failu

tween the two lower segments of the right Solid Rocket Motor. T

was the destruction of the seals that are intended to prevent hot 

through the joint during the propellant bum of the rocket motor
da+, reports, and records; directed and supervised numerous tests, 

penments by NASA, civilian contractors and various governme

then developed specific failure scenarios and the range of most pr

factors. 

Throughout the investigation three critical questions were centr

namely: 

What were the circumstances surrounding mission 51-L that c

catastrophic termination of that flight in contrast to 24 successful 

it? 

What evidence pointed to the right Solid Rocket Booster as the s

dent as opposed to other elements of the Space Shuttle? 

Finally, what was the mechanism of failure? 

Using mission data, subsequently completed tests and analyse

wreckage, the Commission identified all possible faults that could 

respective flight elements of the Space Shuttle which might have 

lead to loss of the Challenger. Potential contributors to the accid

the Commission were the launch pad, the External Tank, the Sp

Engines, the Orbiter and related equipment, payload/Orbiter int

load, the Solid Rocket Boosters and Solid Rocket Motors. 

In a parallel effort, the question of sabotage was examined in de

by the Commission in executive session. There is no evidence of s

the launch pad or during other processes prior to or during launch

As the investigation progressed, elements assessed as being imp

tors to the accident were eliminated from further consideration

elimination brought focus to the right Solid Rocket Motor. As a 

related to the functioning of that motor received detailed analysis: 

Failure of the Case Wall (Case Membrane); Propellant Anomalies; 

sure Seal at the Case Joint. 

Through analysis, supporting data based on the investigation an

mission concluded that structural loads at launch or during flight, 

cause membrane, or propellant anomalies were not the cause of the 

In contrast, joint seal failure was suspect. Enhanced photograph

er-graphic positioning determined that the flame from the right S

er near the aft field joint emanated at about the 305degree circum

The smoke at Lift off appeared in the same general location. Thu

vestigation, the right Solid Rocket Booster aft field joint seal becam

ure suspect. This supposition was confirmed when the Salvage Te

tions of both sides of the aft joint containing large holes extending 

to 318 degrees. Based on extensive tests and analyses, the investigation has sho

sealing performance is sensitive to the following factors: 

(a) Damage to the joints/seals or generation of contaminants as 

bled. 

(b) Tanglclevis gap opening due to motor pressure and other load

(c) Static O-ring compression. 

(d) Joint temperature as it affects O-ring response and hardness 

ice in the joint. 

(e) Use of putty as a thermal bamer as it related to O-ring p

timing and O-ring erosion. 

The Commission concluded that the joint/seal design faulty, 

tive to the above factors, and that as a consequence the jomt malf

ing the Challenger accident. In summary, the specific findings o

mth aspect to the cause of the accident are as follows: 

(1) A combustion gas leak through the right Solid Rocket Motor 

tiated at or shortly after ignition eventually weakened and/or pen

nal Tank initiating vehicle structural breakup and loss of the Sp

lenger during STS Mission 51-L. 

(2) The evidence shows that no other STS 51/L Shuttle eleme

contributed to the causes of the right Solid Rocket Motor aft field 

gas leak. Sabotage was not a factor. 

(3) Launch site records show that the right Solid Rocket Motor 

sembled using approved procedures. However, significant out-of-ro

isEd between the two segments joined at the right Solid Rock

jomt. 
(5) Experimental evidence indicates that due to several effects as

Solid Rocket Booster’s ignition and combustion pressures and assoc

tions, the gap between the tang and the clevis will open as much 

inches at the secondary and primary O-rings, respectively. 

(6) A co.mpresseed O-ring at 75 degrees Fahrenheit it is five times 

in returning to its uncompressed shape than a cold O-ring at 30 de

As a result, it is probable that the O-rings in the right solid boos

were not following the opening of the gap between the tang and 

ignition. 

(7) Experiments indicate that the primary mechanism that actua

is the application of gas pressure to the upstream (high pressure) 

as it sits in its groove or channel. A tang-toclevis gap of .004 in

existed in the failed joint, would have initially compressed the O-r

that no clearance existed between the O-ring and the walls and b

the channel. At the cold launch temperature experienced, the O-ri

slow in returning to its normal rounded shape and it would re

pressed position in the O-ring channel unable to follow the gap op

probable the O/ring would not be pressure actuated to seal the ga

clude joint failure, resulting from blow-by and O-ring erosion from 

gases. (8) Experimental evidence indicates that temperature, humidity

bles in the putty compound used to seal the joint can delay pressu

the joint by 500 milliseconds or more. (9) Of 20 launches with calculated joint temperatures of 66 degr

greater, only three showed signs of O-ring thermal distress; i.e., e

and soot. Each of the four launches with joint temperature at 63 

resulted in one or more O-rings showing signs of thermal distress. 

(10) At time of launch, it was cold enough that water present i

freeze. Tests show that ice in the joint can inhibit proper second

ance. 

(11) A small leak could have persisted throughout the flight and 

the joint in flame at a time on the order of 58 to 60 seconds afte

tively, the O-ring gap could have been resealed by deposition of a 

alummum oxide and other combustion debris. This resealed se

could have been disturbed by thrust vectoring, Space Shuttle m

loads induced by changing winds aloft. 

In conclusion, in view of the findings, the Commission concluded 

the Challenger accident was the failure of the pressure seal in th

the right Solid Rocket Motor. The failure was due to a faulty de

sensitive to a number of factors. These factors were the effects of t

ical dimensions, the character of materials, the effects of reusabilit

the reaction of the joint to dynamic loading. 

CONTRIBUTING CAUSE: FLAWED DECISION PROCESS 

In addition to analyzing all available evidence concerning the m

the accident on January 28, the Commission examined the chain 

culminated in approval of the launch. It concluded that tne decis

Challenger was flawed. Those who made that decision were unaw

history of problems concerning the O-rings and the joint and wer

initial written recommendation of the contractor advising again

temperature below 53 degrees Fahrenheit and the continuing oppo

neers at Thiokol after the management reversed its position. Th

clear understanding of Rockwell’s concern that it was not safe to 

ice on the pad. If the decision makers had known all of the facts, i

ly that they would have decided to launch 51-L on January 28, 19

Commission testimony reveals failures in communication that 

sion to launch 51-1 based on incomplete and sometimes misleadi

conflict between engineering data and management judgments, a

agement structure that permitted internal flight safety problem

Shuttle managers. 

Specifically, the launch decision makers for flight 51-L were n

the lengthy discussion during teleconferences of the concerns of 

relative to the effects of the cold temperatures predicted for launc
agement reassessed and recommended to launch. 

The Commission consequently concluded that the launch decisio

riously flawed. Had the concerns of most Thiokol engineers, and s

gineers, been conveyed to launch decision makers, it seems likely t

51-L might not have occurred when it did. 

The Commission is troubled by what appears to be a propensity 

Marshall to contain potentially serious problems and to attempt t

ternally rather than communicate them forward. This tendency 

odds with the need for Marshall to function as part of a system wo

cessful flight missions, interfacing and communicating with the o

system that work to the same end. 

The Commission also concluded that the Thiokol Management 

tion are recommended the launch of X-L, at the urging of Marsha

the views of its engineers in order to accommodate a major custom

Also, the investigation revealed that although the freeze prote

launch pad was “implemented,” the water system was not drain

imminent launch of 51-L. In order to prevent pipes from freezin

made to allow water to run slowly from the system. This had 

before, and the combination of freezing temperatures and stiff w

amounts of ice to form below the 240-foot level of the fixed service 

ing the access to the crew emergency egress slide wire baskets. 

These conditions were first identified by the Ice Team at approx

on January 28 and were assessed by management and engineerin

night, culminating with a Mission Management Team meeting at 

meeting, representatives for the Orbiter prime contractor, Rockw

expressed their concern about what effects the ice might have on t

launch. 

The decision was made to launch pending a final ice team rev

complex in order to assess any changes in the situation. This in

pleted following the Mission Management Team meeting and th

indicated no significant change. - 

The analysis of all the testimonv and interviews establishes th

ommendatibn to launch at the 9:Ob A.M. meeting was ambiguous

finds it difficult, as did NASA, to conclude that there was a ndau

tion. 

The Commission is concerned, however, about the NASA respon

position. While it is understood that decisions have to be made in 

tle, the Commission is not convinced Levels I and I1 appropriately 

well’s concern about the ice. However ambiguous Rockwell’s posit

that they did tell NASA that the ice was an unknown condition. G

the ice on the pad, the Commission finds the decision to launch q

those circumstances. In this situation, NASA appeared to be requ

to prove that it was not safe to launch, rather than proving it was 

AN ACCIDENT ROOTED IN HISTORY: A FAULTY DESIGN AND IGNOR

The Space Shuttle’s Solid Rocket Booster problem began with th

its joint and increased as both NASA and contractor management 

ognize it as a problem, then failed to fE it, and finally treated i

flight risk. 

Morton Thiokol, Inc., the contractor, did not accept the implica

in the program that the design had a serious and unanticipated fl

accept the judgment of its engineers that the design was unacce

joint problems grew in number and severity NASA minimized the

briefings and reports. Thiokol’s stated position was that “the cond

ble but is acceptable.” 

Neither Thiokol nor NASA expected the rubber O-rings sealin

touched by hot gases of motor ignition, much less to be partially 

as tests and then flights confirmed damage to the sealing rings, th

NASA and Thiokol was to increase the amount of damage consid

At no time did management either recommend a redesign of the j

Shuttle’s grounding until the problem was solved. 

The Commission’s review of the Marshall and Thiokol documen

at the various Flight Readiness Reviews prior to Shuttle flights re
was an early acceptance of the phenomenon. Third, because of a be

O-ring erosion was “within the data base” of prior experience, la

ness Reviews gave a cursory review and often dismissed the recu

within “acceptable” or “allowable” limits. Fourth, both Thiokol a

tinued to rely on the redundancy of the secondary O-ring long afte

cially declared that the seal was a non-redundant single point fa

1985 when temperature became a major concern after STS 51-C 

launch constraint was applied after 51-B, NASA Levels I and I1 w

of these developments in the Flight Readiness Review process. 

The Commission concluded that the genesis of the Challenger a

ure of the joint of the right Solid Rocket Motor-began with decis

design of the joint and in the failure by both Thiokol and NAS

Booster project office to understand and respond to facts obke

The Commission also concluded that neither Thiokol nor NASA 

quately to internal warnings about the faulty seal design. Furtherm

NASA did not make a timely attempt to develop and ye* a n

initial design was shown to be deficient. Neither organlzation dev

to the unexpected Occurrences of O-ring erosion and blow-by even 

lem was experienced frequently during the Shuttle flight history

and NASA management came to accept erosion and blow-by as un

acceptable flight risk. Specif+ly, the Comeion has found that 

The joint test and cerfiication program was madequate. Prior to the accident, neither NASA nor Thiokol fully understoo

by which the joint sealing action took place. 

NASA. and Thiokol accepted escala$$g risk as they began t

“anomalies” as part of thelr “data base. 

The O-ring erosion history presented to Level I at NASA headq

1985 was sufficiently detailed to require corrective action prior t

A careful analysis of the flight history of O-ring performance wo

the correlation of O-ring damage and low temperature. 

THE SILENT SAFEn PROGRAM 

The Commission was surprised to realize after many hours o

NASA’s safety staff or safety organization was never mentioned. N

the approval or disapproval of the reliability engineers, and none 

isfaction or dissatisfaction of the quality assurance staff. No one th

safety representative or a reliability and quality assurance engine

27, 1986, teleconference between Marshall and Thiokol. Similarly, 

resentative of safety on the Mission Management Team that m

during the countdown on January 28,1986. 

might have been adequately handled by NASA if it had insisted up

thorough procedures that were its hallmark during the Apollo pr

sive .and redundant safety program comprising interdependent safe

quality assurance functions existed during and after the lunar pr

any potential safety programs. Between that period and 1986, how

became ineffective. This loss of effectiveness seriously degraded th

ances essential for maintaining flight safety. 

On April 3, 1986, Arnold Aldrich, the Space Shuttle program m

before the Commission at a public hearing in Washington, D.C. 

different communication or organization failures that affected th

on January 28, 1986. Four of those failures related directly to 

safety program. These faults include a lack of program reporting 

adequate trend analysis, misrepresentation of criticality and lack 

critical discussions. A properly staffed, supported, and robust sa

might well have avoided these faults and thus eliminated those co

ures. 

NASA has a safety program intended to ensure that the comm

to which Mr. Aldrich referred do not Occur. In the case of missio

gram fell short. 

Relative to the safety function, the Commission found that 

safety, reliability and quality assurance work force at Mashall 

quarters have seriously limited capability in those vital functions. 

The unrelenting pressure to meet the demands of an accelerati
PRESSURES ON THE SYSTEM 

With the 1982 completion of the orbital flight test series, NASA 

acceleration of the Space Shuttle launch schedule. One early plan 

eventual rate of a mission a week, but realism forced several downw

1985, NASA published a projection calling for an annual rate of 2

Long before the Challenger accident, however, it was becoming o

the modified goal of two flights a month was overambitious. 

In establishing the schedule, NASA had not provided adequate 

attainment. As a result, the capabilities of the system were strain

ninemission rate of 1985, and the evidence suggests that NASA 

been able to accomplish the 15 flights scheduled for 1986. 

One effect of NASA‘s accelerated flight rate and the agency’s 

meet it was the dilution of the human and material resources that 

to any particular flight. The part of the system responsible for tur

requirements and objectives into flight software, flight trajectory 

crew training materials was struggling to keep up with the flight 

and forecasts showed it would be unable to meet its milestones f

spect to the flight rate pressures the Commission found 

The capabilities of the system were stretched to the limit to s

rate in the winter of 1985/1986. 

The Shuttle progam made a conscious decision to postpone spa

ments in favor of budget items of preceived higher priority. Lac

would likely have limited flight operations in 1986. 

Stated cargo and crew manifest policies are not enforced. Numer

changes have been made to both major payloads and minor payl

load specialists, throughout the Shuttle program. 

OUTSIDE PRESSURE TO LAUNCH 

After the accident, rumors appeared in the press to the effect 

made the decision to lauch mission 51-L might have been subjec

sure to launch. Such rumors concerning unnamed persons, emana

mous sources about events that may never have happened, are di

and dispel. Nonetheless, during the Commission’s hearings all pe

key roles in the decision were questioned. Each one attested, unde

had been no outside intervention or pressure of any kind leading 

One rumor was that plans had been made to have a live comm

with the 51-L crew during the State of the Union Message. Com

tors interviewed all of the persons who would have been involved i

had been planned, and all stated unequivocally that there was not 

The Commission thus concluded that the decision to launch th

made solely by the appropriate NASA officials without any outsid

pressure. 

OTHER SAm CONSIDERATIONS 

In the course of its investigation, the Commission became awar

matters that played no part in the mission 51-L accident but n

potential for safety problems in the future. 

Some of these matters, those involving operational concerns, we

ly to the Commission’s attention by the NASA astronaut office. T

ject of a special hearing. 

Other areas of concern came to light as the Commission pursue

investigation in its attempt to isolate the cause of the accident. T

amined such aspects as the development and operation of each o

the Space Shuttle-the Orbiter, its main engines and the Externa

dures employed in the processing and assembly of 5l-L, and launch 

The Cornmission examined potential risks in two general are

braced critical aspects of a Shuttle flight; for example, considera

possible premature mission termination during the ascent phase an

connected with the demanding approach and landing phase. The 

testing, processing and assembling the various elements of the Shu
cern to the Commission were the current abort capabilities, opti

those capabilities, options for cyew escape and the performance of t

system. 

It was not the Commission’s intent to second-guess the Space Shut

to depict escape provisions that might have saved the 51-L crew. In 

that led to destruction of the Challenger progressed very rapidly and 

ing. Under those circumstances, the Commission believes it is highl

any of the systems discussed, or any combination of those system

saved the Challenger crew. The Space Shuttle System was not designed to survive a failu

Rocket Boosters. There are no corrective actions that can be taken if 

not operate properly after ignition; i.e., there is no ability to sepa

safely from thrusting boosters and no ability for the crew to esc

during first-stage ascent. Neither the Mission Control Team nor the 

any warning of impending disaster. Even if there had been warning

actions available to the crew or the Mission Control Team to ave

Nevertheless, the Commission did conclude that other escape system

tions should receive intensive review and made specific recommen

regard. 

Landing: Another critical phase.-The consequences of faulty perf

dynamic and demanding flight environment can be catastrophic. T

was concerned that an insufficient safety margin may have existed 

than Shuttle ascent. Entry and landing of the Shuttle are dynamic 

with all the risks and complications inherent in flying a heavyweig

very steep glide path. Since the Shuttle crew cannot divert to any a

ing site after entry, the landing decision must be both timely and ac

tion, the landing gear, which includes wheels, tires and brakes, mus

erly. 

These considerations were examined by the Commission for bo

abort landings. It found that although there are valid programmatic 

routinely at Kennedy, there are concerns that suggest that this is 

the present circumstances. For example, the realities of weather ca

With. the capabilities of the system. today, the Shuttle cannot afford 

side its experience in the areas of tires, brakes, and weather. Pendin

standing of all landing and deceleration systems, and a resolution 

encountered to date in Shuttle landings, the most concervative cou

lowed in order to minimize risk during this dynamic phase of flight. 

The Commission, therefore, made specific recommendations to 

landings and improve Shuttle landing systems. 

Shuttle elements.-The Space Shuttle Main Engine teams at Mars

dyne have developed engines that have achieved their performance 

performed extremely well. Nevertheless, the main engines contin

complex and critical components of the Shuttle that involve an elem

cipally because important components degrade more rapidly with fli

ticipated. Both NASA and Rocketdyne have taken steps to contain t

portant aspect of the main engine program has been the extensive “

test program. Unfortunately, the vitality of the test program has b

cause of budegetary constraints. The number of engine test firings 

decreased over the past two years. Yet this test program has not y

the limits of engine operation paramenters or included tests over th

envelope to show full engine capability. In addition, tests have not y

ately conducted to the point of failure to determine actual engine 

ms. The Orbiter has also performed well. There is, however, one serio

ure mode related to the disconnect valves between the Orbiter a

Tank. The present design includes two 17-inch diameter valves, one 

oxygen flow, and the other the hydrogen flow from the tank to the 

engines. An inadvertent closure during normal engine operation w

tastrophe due to rupture of the supply line and/or tank. New de

study, incorporating modifications to prevent inadvertent valve clos

valves could be qualified, certified and available for use on the Shut

Processing and assembly.-During the processing and assembly of 

flight 51-L, various problems were seen in the Commission’s revi

bear on the safety of future flights. 
Furthermore, throughout the Commission’s review of the 

number of errors were noted in the paperwork for the Space Shu

Main Propulsion System and for the Orbiter. The review showed

the vast majority of cases the problem lay in the documentation it

work that was actually accomplished. The review led the Comm

that the Operations and Maintenance Instructions are in need of 

and update, and the implementation of Operations and Mainten

needs to be improved. 

At the time of launch, all items called for by the Operationa

quirements and Specifications Document were to have been met, 

ed. The 51-L audit review revealed areas where such requireme

and were not formally waived or excepted. 

Another aspect of the processing activities that warrants part

the Shuttle Processing Contractor’s policy of using “designated ve

ment the NASA quality assurance force. Due to reduced manpow

assurance personnel now inspect only areas that are considered m

the system of independent checks that NASA maintained through 

is declining in effectiveness. The effect of this change requires car

NASA. 

Finally, technicians interviewed by Commission investigators s

damage is not consistently reported, when it occurs, because of la

management’s forgiveness policy and the technicians’ consequent 

jobs. This situation has obviously severe implications if left uncorr

Development nature of program.-The Space Shuttle program, li

Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Skylab and Apollo-Soyuz, is clearly a d

gram and must be treatey as such by NASA. Indeed, the chief d

the Shuttle and previous de:velopmental programs are that the Sh

a transportation system and employs reusable hardware. Reusab

set of functions such as logistics, support, maintenance, refurbis

lifetime evaluation and structural inspections that must be accom

gram. In order to enhance post-fight “turnaround” schedule and ef

striving to implement processing procedures accepted by the tra

try. While this effort is useful, there is not an exact industry ana

vehicles’ flight operations, because each successive Shuttle missi

and performance requirements. Consequently, the Shuttle config

as design changes and improvements are incorporated. These dev

make significant demands, which can be met only by the followin

Maintain a significant engineering design and development cap

Shuttle contractors and an ongoing engineering capability within 

Maintain an active analytical capability so that the evolving 

Shuttle can be matched to the demands of the Shuttle. 

In short, the Shuttle’s developmental status demands that both 

contractors maintain a high level of in-house experience and tech

RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Commission conducted an extensive investigation of the C

to determine the probable cause and necessary corrective actions. 

ings and determinations of its investigation, the Commission un

recommendations to help assure the return to safe flight. 

RECOMMENDATION ONE 

Design-The faulty Solid Rocket Motor joint and seal must 

could be a new design eliminating the joint or a redesign of the 

seal. The Commission established specific criteria for evaluation

testing of the new design. 

Independent oversight.-The Administrator of NASA should re

Research Council to form an independent Solid Rocket Motor de

mittee to implement the Commission’s design recommendation

design effort. 
ggpy 

definition should give the Program Manager the requisite authority 

STS operations. Program funding and all Shuttle Program work 

should be placed clearly under the Program Manager's authority. Astronauts in management.-The Commission observed that there a

departure from the philosophy of the 1960s and 1970s relating to th

nauts in management positions. These individuals brough to their p

experience and a keen appreciation of operations and flight safety. 

encourage the transition of qualified astronauts into agency managem

The function of the Flight Crew Operations Director should be e

NASA organization structure. 

Shuttle safety panel.-NASA should establish an STS Safety Adv

porting to the STS Program Manager. The charter of this panel 

Shuttle operational issues, launch commit criteria, flight rules, flight 

risk management. The panel should include representation from the 

zation, mission operations, and the astronaut office. 

RECOMMENDATION THREE 

Criticality review and hazard analysis.-NASA and the primary S

tors should review all Critically 1, lR, 2, and 2R items and hazard 

review should identify those items that must be improved prior to f

mission success and flight safety. An Audit Panel, appointed by th

search Chncil, should verify the adequacy of the effort and report 

Administrator of NASA. 

RECOMMENDATION FOUR 

Safety organization.-NASA should establish an Office of Safety, 

Quality Assurance to be headed by an Associate Administrator, repor

the NASA Administrator. The office should be assigned to work force 

quate oversight of its functions and should be independent of other N

ai and prsgram responsibilities. 

RECOMMENDATION F'IVE 

Improved communications.-The Commission found that Marshal

Center project managers, because of a tendency at Marshall to man

tion, failed to provide full and timely information bearing on the safe

L to other vital elements of Shuttle program management. NASA sh

getic steps to eliminate this tendency whether by changes of perso

tion, indoctrination or all three. 

In addition, a policy should be developed which governs the imposit

al of Shuttle launch constraints. Flight Readiness Reviews and M

ment Team meetings should be recorded. The flight crew commander

ed representative, should attend the Flight Readiness Review, partic

ance of the vehicle for flight, and certify that the crew is properl

flight. 

RECOMMENDATION SIX 

Landing safety.-NASA must take actions to improve landing s

brake and nosewheel steering systems must be improved. The spe

under which planned landings at Kennedy would be acceptable sh

mined. During unpredicable weather periods at Kennedy, program 

plan on Edwards landings. 

RECOMMENDATION SEVEN 

Launch abort and crew escape.-The Commission recommends that 

Make all efforts to provide a crew escape system for use during co

flight. 

Make every effort to increase the range of flight conditions under 

gency runway landing can be successfully conducted in the event th

main engines fail early in ascent. 
pability created a relentless pressure on NASA to increase the fli

ance on a single launch capability should be avoided in the future

NASA must establish a flight rate that is consistent with its 

payload assignment policy should be established to include rig

cargo manifest changes. 

RECOMMENDATION NINE 

Maintenance safeguards.-Installation, test, and maintenance p

especially rigorous for Spece Shuttle items designated Criticalit

establish a system of analyzing and reporting performance tren

NASA should restore and support the Orbiter maintenance an

grams and stop the practice of removing parts from one Orbiter 

CONCLUDING THOUGHT 

The Commission closed its report with the following concludin

believe is a fitting way, Mr. Chairman, to conclude the testimony

urges that NASA continue to receive the support of the Admi

nation. The agency constitutes a national resource that plays a cr

exploration and development. It also provides a symbol of nation

nological leadership. The Commission applauds NASA’s spectacu

the past and anticipates impressive achievements to come. The f

mendations presented in this report are intended to contribute to 

successes that the nation both expects and requires as the 21st ce

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I will be glad, along wi

Vice Chairman, Neil Armstrong, to answer any questions you ma

Senator GORTON. Mr. Armstrong. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I want to thank you all very 

kind words about our work. I recall that immediatel

ment, we sat in this chamber with this committee, a

some very good advice. You said something to the e

ing the mandate of our Commission that the Pres

You said something further, and I cannot recall whi

bers made a comment. They said, “and go where th

leads you.” 

That is what we have done. We did find the cau

dent. We identified that clearly and, I think, witho

the process of that pursui’c, we did find some other 

of interest, and the Commission has included thos

the pursuit, where the investigation, led us. We 

those things in our report. 

At the same time, we would not want this comm

else to think that we carried out a comprehensive ev

technical, managerial, budgetary, or other aspects 

program. We certainly went where the investigati

time did not permit us to go further. 

We do believe, however, that if the recommend

have listed are carried out, it will certainly improve 

the success of the program to come. 

Thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Could I just add to that? I certainly a

Neil has said. When we started out, we did not know 

caused the accident, although we suspected it was th

in order to investigate the whole system and to be 

was no contributing failure, we did look at all asp

the aspects of the shuttle system. 
particularly true of tires and brakes, landing areas, and 

things. So Neil is right; we did not consider everything, 

expand our mandate a little bit to make other referenc

think will be helpful both to NASA and to this committ

will see those in the report. 

Senator GORTON. Secretary Rogers, your very last com

to my first question, which in one sense is out of order

day of the accident itself, I have been very interested in 

not there is any usable escape mechanism available for 

in the case of this kind of failure or any other kind of fa

You have addressed that question in the report and i

ommendations, but the principal thrust of your recom

in this connection is that NASA should make every po

to devise a crew escape system for use during contro

flight which seems quite clear to rule on escape from 

accident which you investigated. Is it the implication of your findings and your recom

that there is no practical way to provide an escape for 

in an accident of this nature, even if the telemetry ha

to show just exactly from the time of launch that this w

be the result? 

Mr. ROGERS. I will have Mr. Armstrong address that i

To answer your question, the answer is, yes, we foun

found that there was no system presently available 

have prevented this accident. 

Furthermore, we took considerable testimony from 

and others about whether it was possible to devise an a

that would be workable during the time of the first 

while the boosters were on. I think that the general con

no. 

There are some people who think it would be possible 

but most of the astronaut community feel that attem

structure the orbiter to provide for an abort capability i

anything else they might do would be dangerous, th

create accidents; therefore, we did not make that as a re

tion. 

I know NASA is giving thought to all aspects of it. Dr

was in charge of that panel, conducted some investiga

it. Our recommendation is based largely on the work of 

think there is additional testimony that she took whic

available to the committee on how others feel about tha

We took some testimony from the astronauts in pu

about it, and I think the general feeling was that it pr

not feasible. There was a feeling that more attention 

given to the abort possibilities in a gliding mode. I th

the astronauts feel there would probably be no surviv

water impact. I guess with an abort mode there is som

of separating the glider in a way that would make it 

some other landing, but that is all being studied by N

think it should be. Neil can expand, I am sure, on this. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman, a number of studie

done by NASA since the inception of the shuttle desig
Our limited review of those considerations led us 

conclusions were probably correct. However, we w

vinced that two things could be done: One would be 

escape possibility which you quoted to allow surviv

of a ditching; and second, to improve the situatio

return to launch site abort would be possible with a 

than one engine. 

Senator GORTON. I presume when you speak to th

that failure which would be after the first 2 minute

rocket boosters have exhausted? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Yes, sir. 

Senator GORTON. Go ahead. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. We had supported those to th

cluded them in the recommendations. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, would you yie

before moving off that point? 

Senator GORTON. Go ahead. 

Senator RIEGLE. I will be very brief. You raised t

very importantly. The conclusion I draw from what 

that because there is not a way to design in an esc

during that first 2 minutes of launch, that that oug

the conclusion that we ought to take every conc

that we know of that occurs during the first 2 minu

it is fixed; in other words, that is the time wh

backup safety measure, in a sense. 

So the conclusion I draw is that we have to, withi

the human mind, make sure that every conceivab

can arise in that 2 minutes which we can anticipa

we do so that it does lead to a conclusion about a 

that has to be built in during the first 2 minutes of 

I thank you for yielding. 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Chairman, if I could say, at page 

panel and what they considered. You will see th

sions, April 14 and 15, there were hearings on the 

ties. If your staff is interested, we can very quickl

information when you want it. 

Senator GORTON. That would be a great help. I di

to the related point of the return to launch site. Ob

the capability of dealing with that kind of emergen

hanced. What does that imply about the extent to 

gency landing is possible, given current shuttle con

I think, Mr. Armstrong, that might be for you. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. The limitation for this case c

ware development limitation. It is our understandi

ditional program improvements, the shuttle wo

expand the envelope from which it could conduct 

launch site abort. That seems a reasonable goal to 

point in time. 

Senator GORTON. I will have time for only one 

and then we will go back to the solid rocket booste

ance. 
seal design-with possible contributing conditions from 

perature, putty performance, ice in the joint, assembly 

to name a few. 

Were you able to isolate any further than that the ca

accident, as Admiral Truly told you, something that h

this connection as long ago as STS-2? Are you able to sa

confidence, even with over a 50-50 chance of being corr

ample, that had it not been for the abnormally low te

there would have been no accident? For example, had 

gone off at less than 50 "F, is there a probability that, 

the rest of these design failures, that we would not ha

catastrophe? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, it is a little difficult, as you have i

be sure about that. My own view is that probably the w

a major contributor to this accident. It also is possible 

design was a faulty design to begin with and because th

trouble with it before. It is quite possible you could h

accident at temperatures of 55, and there is no way 

that. All you can say is that the worst experience they 

colder weather, and this day was colder than the worst 

Second, this right booster rocket was colder than th

the spot on the right booster that failed appeared from o

the testimony we received to be the coldest spot on th

So, in putting together those facts you can draw a 

that the probability is that environmental consideration

made a difference. Can I or anyone say conclusively th

not have happened if the weather had been warmer? I d

you can say conclusively, but in answer to your questi

view is the probability is that if the weather had been w

accident might not have happened. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you. By my own rules I have 

time, and I will turn it over to Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, at the beginning of the space program 

an extraordinary degree of national urgency and con

really, there was a degree of excitement in putting a 

Moon, that particular man. It would really galvanize 

and created a sense of urgency. From that, it create

NASA, focused and concentrated with every instinct f

accuracy, laser intensity, high morale, correctness of d

ing. 

Then, as so often happens, and I have seen, with so 

agencies things begin to-Neil was put on the Moon. Ti

The launches go up. People relax just a bit. Funding 

secure. Then it potentially turns into bureaucracy as y

sentially said that in your report. Then there are co

ships; the question of pressures, pressures to militariz

of budget, pressures of new competition with the Eur

Ariane, with the Chinese, and the Japanese, the pres

creasing budgets from the Congress, the pressures to pu

and teachers and others into space; all kinds of pressure
we have lost focus of the real goals of the space 

think based on your observation, that we can rebui

And can we do it under the existing budget con

control these pressures so that NASA, not yet cle

sion-right now they are in retreat, and right n

grouping, and right now there is argument whet

launch in 1987 or launch in 1988-can get back on t

What worries me is all of a sudden we are talkin

bles again. Maybe there is the need to talk abou

what we truly need to accomplish, prioritize as No

Now, is it your sense, having worked with these 

can do that? That the Congress working with N

Fletcher and implementing a variety or all of the 

you have put into place, do you think that NASA 

equipped to withstand the pressures so that they 

on real missions and stay away from really backtra

schedules and the minutia of schedule, which I th

some of our problems? 

Mr. ROGERS. I will let Neil answer that in a mom

My own view is that yes, we can do that. I think 

has the ability to do almost anything that we set 

have the will and we have the support of the Am

Now, it is not going to be easy. There is no doubt 

not going to be easy, but I think in getting to know 

people that they have great talent there. I think 

challenge. You have the Space Station coming alon

a lot of competition from other nations. 

I think the American drive is such that we can d

we, as a people, have not only the technical expert

the human initiative and drive that is necessary. If 

it, it is not going to be easy. That is one of the prob

going to have to face, and one of the problems the 

face, and one of the problems the American peop

To answer your question, I was in the Eisenho

tion, and I never thought we would get a man on th

thought it would be possible to have a man on the 

would be sitting next to him. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I did not think so, either. 

Mr. ROGERS. So I guess the answer is yes. I think 

is not going to be easy. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary

One other question for the moment. You have 

solesource contracting. Now, you speak forcefully 

my judgment, of accountability. We have decided n

vidual responsibility, but we know that there we

with respect to NASA and Morton Thiokol and oth

down heavily on accountability. 

Part of accountability is quality control, competi

rest of it. Now, if you are going to build a Triden

have got to go to ElectriceBoat, because they are th

build it. I do not criticize that, but now we are tdk
Two hundred and fifty House Members want to reop

tion for the solid rocket boosters. Now, I am not going t

ment on that, but it is a question of sole-source bidding

thing that we do not control in this country in the priv

who goes into what kind of business, who decides to 

kind of product. 

Does the problem of sole-source bidding weigh on you

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, I think it is a very real problem, a

that the Administrator of NASA is going to have to dea

one that Congress has to deal with. I was personall

about the comment that the head of Morton Thiokol 

ported in the Wall Street Journal, to the effect that, 

was not too concerned because they were the sole suppli

I think that was after I made some comments abo

Boisjoly and Mr. McDonald had been treated, and I t

was a very unfortunate comment. It is a matter, I th

cern. I hope Morton Thiokol, if it continues to be the su

not have that attitude. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Danforth. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask 

question, and that is what lessons have we learned, 

learned any, about a relationship between NASA and 

contractors. 

The impression I have is that this was a case of 

being very dependent on NASA, and NASA being ver

on the contractor as its sole source for a major portion 

ation; engineers of the contractor recognizing the da

launch; management in the process of negotiating a n

I think that is correct. Is that right? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. Itappears that management at Mo

was in the process of negotiating a new contract with 

overruled the engineers and that subsequent to the a

engineers who had opposed the launch were transferre

Finally, they were recalled after this came to light. It 

me to be a major question that has not been addressed

us, in the last few months, as to, one, what was the 

Morton Thiokol both before and after the accident; and 

I think, more significant, from our purposes, what less

learned about the relationship between NASA and 

contractors? 

Mr. ROGERS. Let me get started in my thought pro

think we learned that the contractor is going to have 

and be counted, whatever his recommendation is. It is 

record. 

In the case of Rockwell, they appeared to or they t

recommended against the launch because of the we

tions. The NASA people said they did not understand 

did not understand that there was a no vote. 
have to say yes or not, and it has to be clearly underst

The same thing is true in the case of Morton Th

there is an impression that only the engineers vote

launch. That is incorrect. The whole company vote

launch, engineers and managers. There was a writte

dation that there should be no launch unless the tem

53 degrees or above. 

What happened subsequent is that at the urging

that is too strong a word-at the suggestion of NASA 

that they were appalled by that recommendation an

recommendation stood they would not be able to get 

off until April, at that point the Morton Thiokol pe

the line and had a private conversation and changed 

This is all a matter of record. 

Now, they did not change the minds of the en

changed the mind of the chief engineer, but they tol

off his engineer's hat and put on his manager's hat. 

the other way. He voted to launch. So the three man

Lund changed their mind and voted to go ahead wi

The engineers did not change their mind. In fact, th

Kennedy strongly opposed it and would not sign the 

NASA insisted on receiving before they would go a

launch. 

So we say in our recommendation that Thiokol cha

They did it to accommodate the customer, a major c

is our judgment, and I think that is a fact. That sug

relationship was such that NASA was able to influen

ment on such a critical matter. That is something I t

is going to have to consider, how those things will wo

In any event, there should be a clearer record of h

stands. If the engineers who built this joint and w

qualified to deal with it still said do not launch, 

should be known to everybody who made that decisio

the people who made the decision to launch said we 

about that. 

If you look at our report, you will see how many p

volved in that discussion and how long the discussi

They had never had a discussion of this kind on the 

that lasted so long with so many people knowing ab

happened that the key people knew nothing of it is h

stand, but I believe them when they said they did not

So, yes, I think the relationship between the c

NASA becomes very important. We have no recom

make. I do not think that was in our charge, but it 

matter that Congress will have to consider. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have any thoughts for us

about the advisability of sole sourcing with a single 

concerns about the degree of dependence of an agenc

contractor? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, if we are going to-and here aga

ing now personally because we, the Commission, di

this-I would think if it is possible from budgetary m
very active program with a lot of launches, reliance 

source, it seems to me, is very questionable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings? 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, now, Mr. Secretary, on th

do find, as I understand, on page 104, that they overr

ommendation against launch in order to accommodate 

er. I think we ought to look just at that one point fo

time that I have, and then we can get to some of th

cerns I would like to raise. 

Is it not a fact that Mr. Lund, who was a vice presid

of engineering, was the man who went in August 

NASA on the O-ring problem. So he knew all about 

and he was saying that it was a Criticality 1, that its 

result in the loss of crew and mission. And thereupon

cated-I think it is on page 90-he had a written reco

against the January 28th launch of the shuttle Challe

a little handwritten memo that he had telefaxed to NA

Now, on page 139, Mr. Boisjoly, among other valua

tion he has provided, brings in a very important fact 

early on. Earlier in discussions I had with Allan Mc

talked to me on the telephone, I discovered he had 

Marshall Space Center on the Wednesday and Thursd

launch to discuss renewal of the solid rocket boos

Morton Thiokol was very concerned about that contra

Mr. Boisjoly said on page 139, they were sensitive t

particular contract to a competitor if a timely solut

found. 

And it is quite obvious from my review, and I suspe

using the threat of a second source to pressure Thi

lower price. The Congress in last year’s authorization 

at second sourcing. So there was economic pressur

Thiokol. And is it not the truth that when he said, l

that engineering hat and put on that management h

what he was saying is, let us take off that safety ha

our pocketbook hat? 

They were not accommodating the customer; they 

modating Morton Thiokol’s pocketbook. That is wh

looking at. That is the kind of contractor I saw. That 

concerned, like you, when they demoted Boisjoly and 

talking too much. It was, as they said, Chairman R

about him; we are the sole contractor. We do not h

about him. 

That kind of thing puts me to giving the Good 

Award to the engineers of Morton Thiokol but a kic

know-what to the management out there. I do not th

competent managers to take on the arrogance of that 

titude. I do not find, as you do, on page 104, that it w

modate the customer. I think it was to accommodat

Thiokol pocketbook. 
book. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, that is what they were loo

were really concerned about that second-sourcing, 

Allan McDonald down there 2 days before trying t

and everything else, and when they got into this discu

all have-the Commissioners provided us the record 

he says, take off your hat and put on the managemen

I have been in business and management, too, as w

You know what that means. 

Let us get to the pocketbook. Let us not talk abo

more. We have got a contractor and we are threa

second source here, and let us forget about safety an

our pocketbook. 

Mr. ROGERS. I agree. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, let me emphasize one thi

differing with respect to the safety, recommending 

charge of safety. I do not differ with that, but that is 

ly my view. I thought they had certain safety pro

had, for example-and I do not know whether I will g

here-the criticality 1 that Mr. Mulloy treated as cri

overruled that criticality 1. He changed the criteria. 

And I do not see that he did conform with the pa

dure in order to change that criteria. What we had 

ity 1 item being treated as IR. Is that not correct, M

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, that is right. 

Senator HOLLINGS. And the manual said that th

change that without notifying level I and level 11, 

changing that criticality 1 and changing that with

those. And then, when he is reminded that he is doi

McDonald, he is giving this, what do you mean? Ne

we going to have to wait until that time in order to la

I find that gross negligence. I do not think he was 

astronauts. Let us be blunt about it. But I think his 

the type and nature, willful, gross misconduct, when 

Criticality I item of that kind and the safety proce

inherent. 

Our friend, Jesse Moore, said they never launched 

' tion of a contractor. Here they were launching over 

That could not be taken lightly. The entire procedur

Allan McDonald, was for the NASA agency to press

examine the contractor of launch. And here cs Bo

said, it was totally reversed. 

And one of the main culprits is the gentleman, Lu

I watched him testify with you, and then he went b

news conference and he said we would do the sam

again. There was no remorse. There was no misgivi

no understanding of individual responsibility, and i

fault so far-and I am going to be fair with you, I 

through the entire report and I am trying to get thro

particular parts-but that tendency not to fur indiv

bility is what bothers me. 
you fur those folks up at Morton Thiokol who said 

safety, let us get into the pocketbook, the program wo

off. 

Would you comment on that, please? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I agree with generally what you 

think our report does reflect that, and we have as

system be changed so that the responsibility is fure

know exactly who is responsible for certain things. 

For example, on the constraint that was placed on 

there were five previous flights prior to 51-L had a 

them, which means that there was something wrong w

and that it should be fixed. 

Senator HOLLINGS. And it had been waived. They 

them on five previous flights? 

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. And I think that is wha

mind about the constraint. It was a criticality chan

think Mr. Mulloy changed the criticality matter, altho

cality was changed. Originally it was criticality lR, 

that there was a redundancy in the seal, there was a 

which would protect in the event that one seal failed, 

changed in 1982, as I remember. 

And I do not think Mr. Mulloy had anything to do w

he did have something to do with the constraint, a

constraints on five previous €lights. And then he rem

straints by himself. And we recommend that tha

changed, that if there is a constraint on the flight t

not be removed unless the problem was solved or th

adequate discussion and consideration about remov

straints. 

What happened here was Mr. Mulloy put on the co

then removed them. It was meaningless. You had wh

straint that had no meaning. Nothing was done to fur 

Senator HOLLINGS. But he did not notify levels I and 

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct. 

Senator HOLLTNGS. He did not tell Johnson and h

Washington headquarters, and that is really where 

process was violated. He should have, should he not? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, he said he should not, but we th

have; yes. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, does not NASA think th

have? 

Mr. ROGERS. I think so. But it was not any one thin

several failures of the system, and I do not mind you

words you chose are fine with me. 

Let me say the reason we used the word “flaw,” “

in the system,” is because I wanted to explain pub

asked some of these people involved in the decisionm

qualify themselves from being involved in the investi

had to use some word at that point. We were not exac

happened, but we said we thought the process might b

we were able, as a result of that, to disqualify the peo

involved in that decision from being a part of the inve
did not work, however you state it. The facts are al

think any full reading of the report will cause anybo

feeling of sadness that it happened. You say I cannot 

it happened, but there it is. Those are facts that were 

can be looked at. I think they are accurate facts, and 

explain them all. 

I do not think there is any one explanation. I thi

story of a failure and we have tried to set it out as 

we can. 

Senator HOLLINGS. But why not the individual resp

Secretary? You know what bothered me about Mu

first appeared before you when he started reading th

answer that some lawyer had written out for him? I h

courtroom as have you. And I knew he knew all a

gram. Then, all of a sudden he was reading his answe

bothered me. 

I said that fellow-unfortunately, what McDonald 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I guess on assessing blame I am 

ing my own view. I can understand how people feel 

have reservation from a standpoint of a prosecutor 

would ever have a successful prosecution of anybody. 

able to proceed, but I doubt it. I doubt that there is e

ness there. 

Second, I doubt that it would serve the national int

see what is to be gained by it. I mean, everybody is 

people involved have suffered a lot and I think that 

of a system. It is a failed system and I am not sure p

scapegoat and prosecuting him would serve the natio

hope it does not happen. I just hope we can get on 

into space. 

Senator HOLLINGS. I am just trying to fur responsib

trying to prosecute. But I just do not want to sit it 

you can retire so long as you keep your mouth sh

some questions later on about pressure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I understand. I think the NA

think Jim Fletcher and others are moving to ma

think the changes they have made have been prett

and I think we have to leave it up to them. I certain

position-none of us are on the Commission are in 

recommend to him how he staffs his operation. I thin

good job. Senator GORTON. Senator Riegle? Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to follow along the lines of Senator Hollings 

before I do I want to say what I have said in other 

that is to congratulate the Commission, you, Chairma

Mr. Armstrong, and your counsel for, I think, an 

piece of work and a great public service under diffic

We are very much in your debt. 

I have some concerns, too, about the rest of this sto

tracking down anything that requires fixing in a spec

Mr. Mulloy, for example, is still working for NASA, i
pp

has. I do not know. I guess it is. Dr. Keel says he thi

assistant to Mr. Kingsbury, but I am not sure. 

Senator RIEGLE. The thing that you mentioned, the 

ness of this tragedy, and it is that. I mean, words fall 

pressing how sad it is. The only thing that would be s

view, is if we had another accident in the future with 

same problems cropping up-either individuals or proc

I feel very strongly that if we fix the mechanical prob

do not fix the people problems we have not done our w

I understand the delicacy in the job the Commission 

do here of essentially shining the light where it needs 

without necessarily pinpointing individuals. But I thi

feel, as Senator Hollings does, that I just want to ma

the individuals who behaved improperly, did not follow 

were involved in a fatal decision to seven other individ

allowed to participate in these decisions in the future

strongly about it. 

And, as we sit here today, we have no assurance 

other than it gets very vague that presumably chan

made and so forth. I think we need something a li

than that here in terms of an assurance that the pe

haved improperly and who did not do what they shou

will not be allowed to participate in any material way 

in NASA again. And I guess we do not have that assu

moment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I certainly do not take issue with 

Senator RIEGLE. Pardon? 

Mr. ROGERS. I do not take issue with that at all. I th

find that the Administrator probably will support wha

can not speak for him, but I think he is well aware o

am sure you will ask him questions about it. I do no

our Commission felt that we should do that, make t

ourselves. 

But, as you can see, we have not made any recom

about changes of personnel, and already a lot of them 

made, and I think others will be made. I think that 

new Administrator has to do. I do not think we shou

not want you to think that we are reluctant that it b

just saying that I do not think that it is our job to do it

Senator RIEGLE. Let me ask you a related question. 

of the report you note, under item 5, you say the O

history presented to level I at NASA Headquarters 

1985 was sufficiently detailed to require corrective ac

the next flight. Now level I would be the top level in N

it not? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. 

Senator RIEGLE. And one of the things that has co

from the beginning is how people at the lower levels 

in a flawed pattern of activity and decisions for a lo

time. We had a serious problem. It was not fixed. B
If that is the case, then there is something wrong i

nication system, and you in a sense say that in anoth

report. Who would have been present at that sessio

meeting at NASA headquarters in August of 1985 wh

problem, as you say, was sufficiently detailed to requ

action? 

Mr. ROGERS. I will ask Dr. Keel to answer that. 

Dr. KEEL. The highest level, Senator, that was ther

was Michael Weeks, who is a deputy associate adm

space flight. Senator RIEGLE. So he was the sole person represe

Dr. KEEL. No. He was the highest level person. 

Senator RIEGLE. Are there any other people fro

whose names you recall who were at that meeting? Dr. KEEL. Well, some of Weeks’ assistants working 

office were there. 

Senator RIEGLE. Were there also people from level 

sion, or did they jump a level? It was I11 talking to I h

Dr. KEEL. It was I11 talking to I. 

Mr. ROGERS. As a matter of fact, on that point lev

sort of cut out of this loop, and that is one of the t

drich complained about. You will see some of his testi

not understand why he was cut out and he was sort 

the budgetary process, too, on some of these things. Senator RIEGLE. Did the level I officials who were 

ing, did they do what they were supposed to do an

weren’t these problems flagged and fixed? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, here again we cannot answer th

ously did not, and their testimony was they did not re

ousness of it. 

Senator RIEGLE. But I guess you drew a different c

cause you feel here that what was presented was s

tailed-and these are the words of the Commission

detailed to require corrective action prior to the n

guess that is the unanimous conclusion of your group? Mr. ROGERS. That is right. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, was the level I official presen

edly as to why he then did not take what was a comp

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. And that is all available to the co

Senator RIEGLE. Well, were there satisfactory resp

there failure to perform on that individual’s part? 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, presumably my same concer

be stated again, and that is that anybody in a signif

ment position that really did not do what they sh

have done, I think ought to be taken out of the future 

decisions. And I would apply that just as readily t

would to the people that we have talked about in gre

level 111. 

- 

L 

8 tation and do with it what should properly have been 

b Mr. ROGERS. There were not satisfactory performanc

Do you have any response to that? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I do not disagree with you. That 
cated to Dr. Fletcher, that we have got a clear identifi

points at which there was a specific breakdown, a spe

ment failure by an individual, and that is simply to ma

in the future, when we have got the mechanical proble

have also got the management problems fixed in each 

ment. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, that is right, and we will be happ

Senator. 

Senator RIEGLE. Now, with respect to the Morton Th

and I think Senator Hollings makes a very importan

the fact that they were negotiating a renewal of thei

tract at virtually the same moment that the Challenge

being prepared, and in fact, if I understand it right

meetings the week before the Challenger launch on th

the contract renewal. And then there was a meeting sc

understand it, the very day of the launch later in th

where Morton Thiokol individuals were going to si

NASA and perhaps even finalize or come very close 

the rocket contract. 

Are you aware of that? Is that generally within the 

the Commission? 

Mr. ROGERS. I am just not sure of the time sequenc

right. Of course, at that time the renegotiation of i

that significant in the sense that there was no oth

supply. But there was testimony, I think, from Mr. Bo

ment, as a matter of fact, in which he talked about 

about developing a second source of supply. That real

cern and that would lead one to think that maybe tha

wanted to satisfy NASA in this decision. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, it certainly appears that wa

that, as you say, they did not want a second source o

so they were clearly in a frame of mind to want to be 

dating to their customer, NASA, as they could be, p

the time when they were going to sit down and rene

tracts. That timing, I think, is very, very troubling a

in terms of the pattern that we see on either side of 

which the launch took place. 

Are you satisfied in your mind that no one above 

level I11 was aware of the serious objections to laun

Morton Thiokol or by Rockwell prior to the time th

made? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you have to divide the question 

In Rockwell’s case, of course, they made their opposi

level 11, and I think it probably was known to level I

out, that aspect of it did not contribute to the accid

words, their concern was the condition of the launch 

on the launch pad. 

Senator RIEGLE. But might it not have-I mean, th

did not in a sense relate to this accident, the fact tha

safety concern that might have threatened the launc

ion of the subcontractor to the point that they wer

there were great dangers in the fact that we fired it o
Mr. ROGERS. No, no, not at all, and we say so in th

point that out. As a matter of completeness and as a m

it is pretty clear that that ice on the launch pad did n

to this accident. I agree with you fully that, and we 

when a contractor expresses that concern that shou

paid more attention to. 

Senator RIEGLE. And what NASA managers at the l

I1 position were aware of that concern prior to the lau

Mr. ROGERS. Well, that is in the report. I think the 

I1 knew about it, Mr. Aldrich, and that is in the re

that was generally known, that there was. I do not re

else knew about it, but that part of it was not closely 

there was a lot of concern about the ice on the lau

Rockwell, being the contractor, was there at the ti

people expressed concern about it. So that part of i

Senator RIEGLE. Was the single individual respon

final go-ahead for the launch informed of that inform

knowledge? 

Mr. ROGERS. Ithink so. That is my recollection. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. That would have been Mr. Aldrich

Senator RIEGLE. So Mr. Aldrich was the person re

the final decision. Insofar as you know, he was aware 

well reservations but not the Morton Thiokol reservati

Mr. ROGERS. Oh, sure. We have got a lot of testim

Senator RIEGLE. That is my assumption, but I ju

have in clear in the sequence of these questions that 

rect. 

Mr. ROGERS. Ido not remember for sure whether 

knew about it or not. 

Dr. KEEL. Mr. Aldrich chaired the mission mana

meeting where the discussion took place at 5 a.m. in 

and then he went in and informed Mr. Moore, wh

then, of that concern. 

Senator RIEGLE. Of the Rockwell concern? 

Mr. ROGERS. The answer to your question is bcth lev

I1 knew about that concern. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I might just add, Senator Riegle

know this concern was for icicles falling off the launc

being deflected one way or another into the therm

system of the orbiter, which Rockwell is very sens

damage to that thermal protection system. 

In the investigation by the Commission, although 

that we discussed this in some length, the Commissi

termine that that information was not passed along, n

well concerns were not adequately expressed. As a m

fairly careful examination and analysis was done of t

the icicles might take on their way to possible impac

mal protection system, and as a matter of fact in gen

ysis, as far as we know, was reasonably correct. 

Nevertheless, the Commission was concerned tha

concern when forwarded by a contractor perhaps sho

evaluated in a different or more thorough way. 

52-885 0 - 86 - 4 
Senator GORE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman

To begin with, I would like to follow up on one loo

on Senator Riegle’s questions. Dr. Keel, you referred to 

of people or the specific people who were in that de

loop, signing off on the O-ring problem and other 

issues. 

Is it not a fact that beginning 2 years ago the chief 

removed from the group assessing those particular issu

Dr. KEEL. That is correct. In fact, the chairman ref

comment in our report here, that he did not know 

roughly of the O-ring problems. 

Senator GORE. Well, that is one of several indica

report that there was a general deemphasis within NA

ity control and reliability assurance, Would you agre

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, we certainly do. There were a lot 

employed in it, and so forth, that is correct. 

Senator GORE. In fact, you state explicitly that 

safety, reliability, and quality assurance work force 

and NASA headquarters have seriously limited c

those vital functions. And I would say that that same 

implicit in your recommendation for a new safety orga

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct. 

Senator GORE. Now, in addition to the new safety 

you are also recommending a safety shuttle panel. I a

in how you would envision this panel interacting w

safety office. 

Mr. ROGERS. I will let Neil answer that, because 

close to that recommendation. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Senator Gore, these two functio

quite different. First let me talk about the overall sa

tion, which naturally NASA has had historically goo

nizations, and currently, particularly on the aeronau

think they seem to be operating very effectively, and 

many of the people in the space side safety organiz

good. 

But it is a matter of management emphasis, and we 

a thunderous silence in the fact that we had gone thr

of hearing and nobody had ever mentioned what the 

had to say about anything. That seemed like a glarin

So we thought this function should act like an outs

a business, an independent function that has access to 

and sort of like at the board of directors and can say

being done adequately or not. 

The safety panel, on the other hand, although we w

it as having representatives from a professional saf

tion, would be more a working level organization at 

level. We were concerned by the fact that many witne

tified in front of the Commission expressed frustr

safety issues that they did not think had been pro

quately or fully handled over the course of years. 

us. 
issues will be handled. And we suggested the safety 

would have representation not only from safety people 

erations people, from crew people, from flight directo

program offices, and R&D people, whoever, who w

where the action was and knew where the problems 

that they would have sort of a court of appeals to go to

Senator GORE. All right. That certainly explains it th

Let me ask a related question, and this question m

outside the boundaries of the mandate of the Comm

you will be willing to answer it, because you have ga

peripheral knowledge in your work. 

Many outside experts on the space program have

longer view of what has happened at NASA, made t

in the aftermath of the Apollo program the Agency s

its focus a little bit. And they have posed the hypothes

absence of an inspiring and all-consuming goal of th

energized the space program during the Apollo years, 

of that focus caused the Agency to sort of drift. 

Now, with regard to this last question I was just a

Apollo years the position of chief safety officer attra

the best people in the country. And you know, they a

dents and heads of some of the major aerospace firms 

And then afterward, there was a period of 2 years 

sition was totally vacant. They could not find anyo

They finally got someone on the condition that the 

remain in California, or at least that was part of th

And then of course, it has been filled since then. Bu

ficulty in attracting the very best people and so for

also be related to the absence of the kind of inspiring 

isted during the Apollo program? Basically, to boil 

down to its essence, do you think there is something 

that the problem stemmed in part from the loss of 

failure of either the executive branch in a series of ad

or the Congress to set a new goal worthy of succeedin

the Apollo program? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I think I will have Neil answer 

me say that I think you put your finger on a major 

we face: How to attract the very best people to this 

it is going to be increasingly difficult. 

We have had some talks with Jim Fletcher about 

attract the best young engineers and how to challeng

forth, and I think it is a very major problem and I th

lot to what you said. As I say, Neil knows a lot more 

he was involved in the Apollo program and he may h

swers for you. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, I would look at it a bit, Sen

previous analogy I used, which was an audit departm

ness. The businesses are often concerned that peopl

the auditing function might lose career track and not 

into the line organization, and they sit out there on 

are deadended. 
y y

from a management point of view is that quality peo

apportunity to go into the safety organization, provid

tion for some years, and it not be a barricade to furt

and have the ability to take what they have learned f

diting function ad go over into another line organi

other outside organization. I think it need not be a barrier. I think it is just a 

management to properly organize it. 

Senator GORE. Well, let me phrase the question a s

ent way, because what you are saying might not con

hypothesis that I threw out at all. It might well b

though the career path in the safety organization has 

on as a dead end in the past, that while we were tryin

Moon and while we had that inspiring goal, people w

serve in that part of the Agency in spite of the fact tha

a dead end career path, in order to be part of this in

to reach the goal. 

When the level of inspiration fell, the 110 perfo

began to decline and any underlying weaknesses in th

the Agency, such as this dead end career path, just t

many examples, those underlying weaknesses began to 

Now, that is just a hypothesis, but I wonder if it f

you have seen during your work. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It does fit, and we have devoted 

our report to this subject because we felt so sincerely 

portance. And I really do believe that no one could no

shuttle program and not realize the inherent impo

safety function and what a valuable service it can prov

Senator GORE. My time is running out. Just a co

ones if I have time. 

Have you given thought to which of your recomme

require legislation and which are purely administrati

Mr. ROGERS. I think most of them are administrati

Of course, there are going to be budgetary demands 

gress, particularly in repairing the joint and in provid

spare parts and other aspects of it. There may be co

with fixing and improving the brakes and improving 

so forth. 

But I do not think there will be many other require

gislatiion. 

Senator GORE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. In the course of your report, you m

ment that project managers in various elements of th

gram felt more accountable to the management of the

than they did to that of the entire shuttle program 

And the obvious conclusion you drew from that is it 

the shuttle management structure. 

Could. you elaborate a little bit on that and on h

great geographic dispersion of NASA, we can assure a 
tion, arid not only from the tastimony but from a lot 

ments and observations that were made by others wh

about it, it was pretty clear thzt there hac! developed 

ing of closeness among the people at the centers, and 

ticularly true about Marshall. 

And some people felt that that was in part respon

shall’s what appeared to be holding this information 

among themselves and not passing it on. And I thi

quite a lot to that, that changes have to be made. 

And that is why we recommended that the headqua

new administrator consider more centralization. Now

that is to be done, we did not attempt to spell that o

tainly is true, for example, in the safety feature of 

officer who was here, the chief engineer, really did 

hands on the problems. 

And that was also true in other respects. Mr. We

example, that Dr. Keel referred to. So there has t

melding of the responsibilities, and headquarters h

more of the centralized responsibilities. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Mr. Chairman, as you know, N

many years used a matrix management structure, in 

the employees but most employees are responsible 

their center and perhaps horizontally to their program

And I do not find fault with that as a system. I am 

find deans of business schools from around the coun

various views as to what the most effective way to p

management is. 

The Commission was struck, however, that in a p

magnitude of the shuttle endeavor certain additional 

to be included. And we should not have the situation

fied to us, w-hereas the program manager, who redly 

be responsible for the overall success of the endeav

not only does not have control over certain budget

but does not even have knowledge of them. 

And we considered what specific recommendatio

make and concluded that we would not be specific, o

this as a problem and encourage the program manag

appropriate lines of responsibility to conduct his work

Senator GORTON. I would like to go to another su

two of you, the subject of both internal and external 

retary Rogers, yesterday in the course of your ne

when you were asked-I think perhaps it was in the 

dividual responsibility--you said that there was eno

bility to go around and that it went well outside of th

nization itself, to a previous administration decision 

all cur eggs in the shuttle basket, tc an administra

gress which made relatively high demands 2nd had 

tions of NASA, but was not willing to fund it adequ

to an insufficient degree cf oversight here, and to t

we had some examples of the way in which NASA 

cized when it did not meet its own rather unofficial s
nization that had been successful that it could co

great demands on itself. And I suspect it is inevitabl

or 20 years from now what we are talking about her

forgotten. But maybe some of the same human char

still going to be around then. 

Would you and Mr. Armstrong, if you will, com

little bit about those pressures, how they came ab

you think we might learn from this terrible tragedy 

expectations, wherever they come from? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, you know, we tend as Americ

very pleased with success. And we tend to cheer 

much about success, and our cheers lead us on to ev

phoria. 

And the result is that you impose pressures on yo

speaking about NASA and I’m speaking about eve

the country. You impose these pressures on yourself

to meet your own advertising. And you advertise su

say it is great and you say we are going to hav

launches and so forth. 

And then you find that you cannot quite do it. A

trying to say was, it is easy enough to place blame 

part of the Government or this person or that pe

sense we were all responsible for it. I mean, to th

when there was the delay the day before this laun

made some vicious attacks on-at least some of the m

cious attacks on NASA, as if the fact that they h

launch because of the hatch on a door was a major 

they were subject to scathing criticism. 

And everybody had gotten to the point of believ

launches could occur-what were they talking abo

When you look back on it, that is pretty unrealistic 

everybody. There are very few people that said: T

you cannot have 24 launches a year, it is not going 

of what you have to do. 

You have to put these segments together, and the

rocket and you land in the ocean, and you pick the

them back on the train, take them out to Utah, clea

propellant back in, stack them on the train again, s

to Kennedy, stack them, and be sure that they are s

ly, and fire them again, and they are out in the ocea

And that would require you do that 24 times a ye

rible pressure. You have got four orbiters, and you 

well, if one orbiter is getting ready to fly and a pa

you have to cannibalize. You have to take the pa

shuttle and put it in. That’s a dangerous operation. 

So all those are pressures that we put on oursel

was not anybody. It was not Congress and it was no

not the administration. It was everybody. We al

thought process that this was going to work and we 

worry about it, and it was going to work fine and we 

have a shuttle like the shuttle back and forth fro
Well, that is a psychology that prevailed, and I thin

not prevail anymore. And I think that has been bene

all there. We can see what happened. All the facts are 

And I think the real problem is, how are we going t

in the future? And fortunately, we are going to leave

leave this in your hands. That is the benefit of a Co

only operates 120 days. Senator GORTON. Mr. Armstrong, do you want to 

ment on that? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I would only add, Mr. Chairman

your assessment that predominantly the pressure w

generated, and it was generated perhaps because o

tion or acceptance of unreasonable commitments, lev

ments for the resources that they had available. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings. Senator HOLLINGS. Well, let us talk about that pre

a minute. And let me ask, Mr. Secretary, before I get 

sure, with respect to the explosion, the tragedy. Imme

after, if you remember, National Public Radio had b

some of the engineers and their wives who said, 

cannot go to sleep, we want to make a statement. W

to necessarily go public at this time, but if we can 

happened to somebody of a responsible nature or 

journalist. 

And so they went out and the statement was made

a transcript of, where they said at 8:45-and I am 

right in on part of the story-Thiokol General M

takes NASA officials off hold. That is the evening b

tells them: “OK, we will approve the launch after a

quotes. And then: “They signed a document rig

NASA’s Mulloy tells them, send it to us by telefax.” 

Although one top Thiokol manager, Allan McDo

been taking part in the conference calls from the C

sign the paper, the meeting breaks up. The engineers 

in downtrodden, defeated, and terribly worried. 

‘I kept having fantasies that night, ’ says one eng

the moment of ignition the shuttle would blow up 

we thought that if the seals failed the shuttle would 

the pad. There would just be a big fireball and eve

vanish. I was so scared I did not even want to watch 

At the next morning, the engineer joins 50 other c

at company headquarters in the same conference roo

had argued the night before. They were all watchi

down together on the large projection TV. 

When the shuttle lifted off the pad, he says: “I tho

going all right, it is a piece of cake. And when we w

into the launch, a friend turned to me and he said

made it, we made it.’ Then a few seconds later the 

The shuttle blew up, and we all knew exactly wha

Did the Commission find out who made that statem

interview is with? Dr. Keel, do you know? 

Dr. KEEL. Yes; we did, Senator. 

. 
Senator HOLLINGS. The two engineers are Mr. Ebe

Dr. KEEL. Very good. 

Senator HOLUNGS. Very good. 

Now, with respect to the-- 

Dr. KEEL. I cannot certify that is exactly accurate 

account, but-- 

Senator HOLLINGS. That is just a transcript of t

made. I understand. 

Now, with respect to the pressure that Senator 

about, you must understand the interest of this Sen

the others, and some of the public, because the 

report refers to the outside pressure and what involv

or interest did the White House have. 

Now, we start of course with the President’s progra

in August 1984, of the first private citizen to fly in 

was quite a big ceremony, and we were recognizing t

ondary schools. And on November 8, after the elec

then NASA itself released the announcement of th

for the Teacher in Space Program. Some 10,000 applied, 10,000 teachers all over th

May, the Council of State School Officers announced 

chosen as nominees for the Teacher in Space Progra

on July 1985, the 10 finalists for the NASA Teacher 

gram were announced and they all went down to 

Space Center for their medicals and initial space fligh

And then on July 19, in the White House, they ha

with Vice President George Bush announcing the 

Christa McAuliffe, and millions of schoolchildren w

to this particular launch. And this particular Se

schools hook up with the satellite and everything el

the kids were prepared when Christa McAuliffe wa

conduct her classroom from space. 

There was no question that NASA was not only c

but zbsolutely interested and enthused about it. And 

and Dr. Culbertson submitted the final, draft input fo

the Union Message that reads as follows: 

Tonight while I am speaking to you, a young elementary school t

cord, New Hampshire, is taking us all on the ultimate field trip, 

earth as the first citizen-passenger on the space shuttle. 

This text was submitted by NASA. Dr. Graham and 

son that I know of checked off on this particular su

asked that the President include it in his State of th

sage. 

Thompson. 

Quoting further: 

Christa McAuliffe’s journey is a prelude to the journeys of othe

our friends around the worid who will be living and working tog

nently manned space station in the mid-l990’s, bringing a rich re

technical, and economic benefits to mankind. 

Mrs. McAuliffe’s week in space is just one of the achievements i

have planned for the coming year. The United States Voyager sp

this week visited the planet Uranus and sent back striking imag

world, after a two billion mile trip in space. Later we will participa
g yppp

Our commitment to continuation of a strong civil space program 

projects as the space station, the space transportation, and space s

technology required for the program of the 1990’s is an investment i

America’s greatness in space and the young men and women of this 

be the leaders of tomorrow. 

That, Mr. Secretary, was submitted and received by t

tial senior staff, Cabinet officer Alfred H. Kingon, who 

net secretary and assistant to the President, Alfred H. 

n-g-o-n. He is immediately under Patrick Buchanan. 

Now, what leaves us to wonder and still pursue this 

of course of the White House itself. The White House 

any reference or any thought or any tinge that th

would refer to the teacher in space. As we Congressme

tors know, the President always has a pleasant gimmic

of his talks. He usually refers to an individual such as 

from West Point that came from Vietnam and was N

graduate, or the hero that was saving people down h

Florida crash in the Potomac, Lenny Skutnik. 

As we all know, any time the President makes a 

Union Message, we can count on some pleasant w

proach that brings everybody in America together an

proud of ourselves and what have you. And yet they ha

that there was no idea whatsoever or any submission 

concerning the Teacher in Space Program. The fact o

is, it was denied that any submission was made to 

House. 

And we looked around here for a month until an AB

er finally got it. Then when they finally got it, they 

time admitted that there was such a proposal. You 

11:28. The President and all of the press was gathered 

House for a pre-State of the Union briefing, and there 

that there was any thought of the Challenger whatsoe

reference to be made there. And no, there was not ev

the talk. 

And then when we got a copy of the talk, it left off t

And then we noted that, and then it came in and we f

yes, the last page did include a reference to the shutt

we find is something that is very difficult for this S

lieve. And you are not the appropriate witness, in a s

firm or deny, and I am not asking that you do. But we 

President at the time of the Challenger explosion was 

that evening “We see the dream coming true and the 

covery of 21-year-old Richard Cavolie. All his life he 

the path of science and medicine. Today the science 

begun in high school was launched on the space shut

er.” 

Now, obviously there is no question in this Senator

the President was going to talk about the Challenger. 

obvious to this Senator that if he ever was going to 

Challenger he was going to refer to Christa McAuliffe. 
from the White House asked about that? 

Mr. ROGERS. Senator, let me say that we have been 

a Commission about the thought that anyone called 

intervention to encourage this launch. We took it ve

Obviously, there was a submission by Mr. Graham, 

tioned, as there is by every department and agency wh

the Union Message is to be delivered, that you submi

that you would like to have included in the State 

Message. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Excuse me at that point, Mr. Ch

retary Baldrige and others said they were not asked 

submit any text. I heard what you are just saying. T

Secretary Baldrige, I have his letter here. He says 

asked to submit any text. 

But go right ahead, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I guess I was relaying my own 

certainly always did, hoping that there would be som

State of the Union Message. 

But in any event, because we did realize the serio

rumor, we questioned everybody involved in the deci

that would have had any effect on the decision to lau

cle. And we questioned them under oath, either by de

an affidavit. And that means everybody. 

And the answers without exception were that noth

happened. So that if there ever was any interventio

not talking about whether somebody might have bee

the knowledge that everybody was anxious to have th

cessful, and I am not talking about that, but I am 

any intervention on the part of anybody. Everyone 

thing happened. 

I took very seriously your comments originally, and 

FBI people assigned to us. 

Senator HOLLINGS. You went to gumshoes? 

Mr. ROGERS. We got high class gumshoes. 

And we asked everybody to keep their ears and ey

if anything like that had ever happened. And I do n

many people we questioned. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Did you ask anybody at the W

keep their eyes and ears open? 

Mr. ROGERS. No; we did not say that to the White H

did inquire from the White House, and we saw the ex

ters that you had with the White House and so forth. 

But let me just finish by way of saying, the way, 

from your experience, that you find out if somethin

to ask the people who would have been involved, and 

erybody who was involved in that decisionmaking pro

all said, no, it did not happen. 

Then we questioned, as I say, hundreds of people, 

if anybody ever heard of the rumor or not. And exc

that heard the rumor in the press, everybody said tha

that happened. 
like that happened. And I said: I know you have test

have testified in public; did that happen at all? And t

Rogers, I promise you it never happened. Jesse Moore said: I was so busy, I did not even know 

the Union Message was on. He said: That is a Wa

nomenon; I did not even know it. He said: We were in

for 3 days, and I assure you nothing like that ever hap

Then we got the telephone records of all the people 

and checked them out, and we could not find any call 

ed this at all. And more importantly I guess, and thi

that convinces me that it did not happen at all, becau

just as upset as you would be if anything like that ha

the people involved in this decision have been under 

sure. They have been criticized all over. 

Now, if they had been asked by anybody, anybody

kind of a decision, the most natural thing in the worl

say: Somebody told me to do it, somebody suggested 

wrote to me. Nothing like that happened. They have all said it didn’t, and the most natural 

world, that when you are under intense heat yourself 

you like to put the blame on somebody else. Nobody d

We asked Mr. Mulloy; absolutely not. All of the

would have been the most natural thing to say, sur

and-so. It did not happen, and so I am convinced it d

hope that the rumor dies. I hope it dies. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, Mr. SecretaryMr. ROGERS. It is a little bit like I am trying to fig

starts a rumor, and I heard a story the other day I l

em Ireland they are having a parade and somebod

mayor: Mr. Mayor, I hear there is a rumor out to kill 

you have to say about that rumor? And he said: I n

such a rumor. And the guy says: You have now. 

rumors start, just somebody mentions it. 

And of course, in this case, because it was the ju

the President’s State of the Union and the launch, w

prearranged, it is natural for the rumor to start. But 

ly convinced that it is a rumor, and I just hope that it 

tinue to live on. 

We will make everything available to you, Senator

at all the files and look at all the testimony. And I ju

not continue. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, Mr. Secretary, most resp

did you not ask somebody at the White House? 

Mr. ROGERS. We did. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, I do not see any White Ho

listed. 

Mr. ROGERS. We did not get involved in that and 

we should, because the White House assured us and 

said so in public in his television program, nothing 

pened. And I certainly did not feel and I do not fee

should go around summoning people from the Wh

cause there just was not anything like that that happ
never happened. There is no baby in this case. 

You have got to have somebody who says, I think th

some evidence. There is no evidence in this case, and if 

talking about it some people out there in the public 

say, maybe there is something to it. There is not. The

scintilla of evidence. 

Senator HOLLINGS. The baby in this case, Mr. Secr

most respectfully, is the explosion itself. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is not the baby. That is not the bab

Senator HOLLINGS. The baby in this case is the exp

and you found pressure. In addition to the O-ring defe

tific or technical fault, there was also the human fa

pressed it by way of communications. You express it by 

cedures of safety and everything else. 

This Senator happens to believe there was individu

we will fix it in our hearings, hopefully, because I th

promotes safety. 

But let me get one answer before I go to your oth

one answer that I wanted in who did you interview a

House? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, we did not as a Commission inter

We talked to the White House about the President’s 

Union Message. We found out the same thing you foun

Senator HOLLINGS. But there is no statement. 

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. We are not going to-we 

finished our work, and of course if this committee wan

it has every right to do it. I would hope that in th

public knowledge about this, that the rumor that ev

has seemed to drop-I mean, nobody in the press ha

about this for 2 months. 

And with all the people in the press who were so 

there was a bit of evidence of that kind they would be 

us all the time. And I just do not think there is any 

that kind. 

But I do not want to keep talking about it. If you 

have enough evidence to proceed, please feel free to d

a Senator. You have every right to do it. Go ahead. 

Senator HOLLINGS. But you did not ask anybody a

House? 

Mr. ROGERS. Not specifically. 

Senator HOLL~NGS. I think Dr. Keel might have a 

some names. I Ern looking at page 209, where you l

views of outside pressure to launch, and I do not see an

Mr. RGGERS. Here is a written response from the W

We asked them. 1 believe their response is correct. We 

record. They say nothing like that happened. 

Senator HOLLINGS. I appreciate it. Now, who is that 

Mr. ROGERS. Mr. Jay Steveris, Deputy Counsel to th

And he responded to the Commission’s request, and he

[The letter follows:] 
f 

Mr. R. RAY MOLESWORTH, 

Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident, 

DEAR MR. MOLESWORTH: In response to the requests made in 

phone conversation with Richard Hauser, I am enclosing copies of 

(1) March 20, 1986, 1986 letter to Fred F. Fielding from Senat

lings; 

(2) March 27, 1986 letter to Senator Ernest F. Hollings from Fred 

attachment, a copy of the January 28, 1986 draft of the State of th

as given to ABC Nightly News; and 

(3) A copy of the final version of the State of the Union Addre

February 4, 1986. 

You also requested a copy of any part of any draft of the State 

dress that included a reference to NASA. I have been advised tha

address referenced NASA. One draft, however, did mention the s

tion with Richard Cavoli, one of the several American heroes r

President in the Address. The draft read in relevant part: 

The dream lives. And as long as it is real, work of noble note wi

see the dream coming home in the spirit of discovery of 21-yeara

All of his life, he has followed the path of science and medicine. 

experiment he began in high school was launched on the space s

Richard, your work could reduce harmful radiation effects of X-r

could enable astronomers to view the golden gateways of the farth

As you will note, the language ultimately delivered by the Presid

We see the dream coming true in the spirit of discovery of Richa

life he’s been enthralled by the mysteries of medicine. And Richa

the experiment that you began in high school was launched and 

your dream lives. 

You also inquired whether there had been a proposal to have th

via telephone hook-up to the Challenger astronauts during the S

Address. I have been advised that consideration was never given 

hook-up for the State of the Union Address. 

Finally, we have discussed with Messrs. Rick Davis, Gerald Ma

and with Ms. Ann Foreman, their recollections of the telephone 

meetings they had with Dr. Graham in the days immediately pr

disaster. Mr. Davis advised that his January 17 Conversation with 

a courtesy call he received from Graham. Graham sought to int

Davis, who was to become Graham’s contact person in the Whit

Cabinet Affairs. Ms. Foreman recalls that her conversation of Ja

Graham concerned an invitation Dr. Graham extended to her to 

liftoff, then scheduled to take place over the weekend of the 25th 

ary. 

Alfred Kingon advised that although he received a call from Dr. 

ary 24, he had Rick Davis of his staff return the call. Davis adv

concerned the announcement of a NASA personnel action (Jess M

Space Flight Operations). 

Col. Gerald Mav advised that his Januarv 21 amointment with 

at the request of Admiral Johr Poindexter; AssisGnt to the Pres

Security Affairs. It provided May an opportunity to meet Graham 

him matters he, Graham, wanted to discuss in a future meeting 

None of those matters concerned the Challenger, nor was it otherw

I trust you will find the above responsive to your inquiry. How

tate to contact me if you have any further questions. Sincerely, JAY B

Deputy Counsel 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, we appreciate that. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, again a little bit further. M

did not think to ask him what he did with that s

went to him. Would it not be logical, looking at all of 

you say your Commission went into 300 different 

you interviewed hundreds of witnesses. 
py

body tried to influence this launch, and if we keep talk

a lot of people will believe it happened. It did not happe

If you can prove it, I will apologize to you. I will com

and apologize if you can prove anything like that happe

Senator HOLLINGS. Oh, yes, yes, I imagine you. wou

know of any evidence. I never have said there was ev

thought it was logical and our responsibility is there to 

logical thing. 

I cannot see the President of the United States in 

the Union message with a submission by the head of 

gesting a direct reference to Christa McAuliffe on the 

disregarding that and including a reference to a stud

experiment on the Challenger. That puzzles me. Th

asked the question. That is the one bit of evidence that 

I want to clear up. There is nothing wrong with clearing it up, or gett

or annoyed or saying if you later find any evidence y

to apologize, none of that at all. 

Let us go to Dr. Graham and bring in his own pressu

am the head of NASA and I have made this particula

to the White House, what about Dr. Graham and Phil 

I am Phil Culbertson, the No. 1 man at the Kennedy 

on the day of launch. I know I have signed off on a r

tion that starts off saying, “Tonight while I am speak

And so I am Phil Culbertson and I have got already 

am the head man of NASA down at Kennedy Space C

the head man, I have already submitted ‘Tonight, 

speaking to you, a young elementary school teacher, C

liffe from Concord, New Hampshire, is taking us all 

mate field trip,” and on and on. 

Now, I know, trying to get that off-I’ve already su

do not know whether the White House is going to do i

not have any idea. I have not received any calls, as you 

anything else like that, and no individual to call. 

But is it not natural for me to assume that, havin

submission to the White House, I would like to be ab

out? And so, like the press jumps on NASA and blam

an unlatched door, necessarily the White House woul

on me and say: Look, you had us all ready to go and y

again. 

So I brought really pressure on myself, is that not co

Mr. ROGERS. I guess so. Here again, I do not want 

that I object to your asking the questions. And I kn

asked a lot. We have tried to answer. I just hope that p

persist in perpetuating this rumor that I think is basel

But I certainly do not object to your right to do it. I 

an hing else to say about it, Senator. 

gnator HOIUNGS. What did you ask Phil Culberts

ask Phil Culbertson or Dr. Graham if they had that i

ments? 

Mr. ROGERS. Sure. 
Mr. ROGERS. No; we asked everybody we could find 

er anything like this happened, and everyone says no. 

Senator HOLLINGS. And you do have a statement fr

bertson, and you do have a statement from Dr. Graham

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, we do. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Now, with respect to your log

trigues me, that somebody would come out and indica

not also logical that if no one is fired, no one is di

there is no one to blame? It is a sort of a sweethear

body goes their way and everybody is responsible and 

I believe if I had dismissed two or three down the 

there had been pressure, logically they would have 

and said Wait a minute, do not set me aside; 1 was as

No one says that and you say, I do not have any evi

But is that part of the lack of finding any individual 

in this Commission’s report? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Let me ask on another subject. 

Mr. Secretary-and I have some other things, but I di

I will get the time this afternoon. But it seems imp

that you recommend with respect to landing, but not 

to launch. 

On page 200 you say: “Committing to a specific la

quires the landing area weather be forecast more tha

advance.” That is the landing area weather be forecas

But if you turn, if you please, to page 37, where it i

esting part of the report, showing exactly what conce

tor here, you find what we learned at the very early 

there was a puff of smoke and then for 26 seconds th

lutely none. It sort of resealed itself. 

At page 37 at the top here, at 0.67 or six-tenths of a 

firmed smoke above field joint on RH SRM.” Now, 

time and down at 58.7 seconds, Mr. Secretary, we ge

dence of flame. In between there, at 36.99 seconds, yo

the yaw, the attitude response to wind. 

And we are told that winds of hurricane force hit 

and it seemed perhaps that they did have O-ring pr

did seal back itself, but when it hit that hurricane 

wind shear, however you would characterize it, that 

apart. The flame emerged and hit the booster and th

sion and the tragedy itself. 

So do you not think it is just as important for the 

the landing that we have within the hour preceding 

shear information, and other data? 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes, I certainly do, Senator. And we h

of testimony on that subject. They are attempting to 

capability to predict weather at the site. 

They have a pretty good system now, but it is no

and they are trying to improve it. They launch ballo

have planes going up, and so forth. But I think NAS

proposition that you just proposed, and that is tha

. sponsible. 
Mr. ARMSTRONG. I might add, Mr. Chairman, and w

mission, Senator, that you characterize them as hur

winds, which is quite correct. Yet you and I and o

room fly in hurricane force jetstream daily. These wer

al winds at all for the winter. They were very standar

well within the design envelope of the vehicle. 

Senator HOLLINGS. You say they were not hurricane

the report. 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. It does not say hurricane force w

that is quite correct. If you say winds in excess of 90 a

an hour, they certainly were. And it is expected. 

This vehicle is designed to handle those winds. As 

fact, the loads through the wind shears as we have re

our analysis were well within the design envelope of 

and as a matter of fact they were considerably lower th

during the initial phases of the boost. 

So this was not surprising, those parts of the loads 

by the wind shears were not surprising. Now, there wa

ference from previous flights. The size of the loads w

ent, but the duration of the loads was somewhat lon

previously been experienced, giving evidence to the fac

existed, although not greater in magnitude, to somewh

titudes than were measured on previous flights. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Riegle. 

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

There are three areas that I want to get into. Firs

one is a new subject that we have not discussed befor

this hearing. And that is that I am very concerned a

sure that these recommendations that you have work

develop are carried out fully and properly. 

And that is a difficult job by itself because, as yo

budget implications and these are complex questions. 

engineering change issues have to be resolved. We 

know yet how those are to be resolved, and so forth. 

I want to raise with you a concern that I have a

structure of decisionmaking, because I think, while thi

right in the center of your assigned mission in a sens

you have done is not fully implemented then the jo

ished. 

I am concerned that it is essentially now the middle 

a very busy congressional session. We have got the ta

floor, which is highly technical and involved, as yo

have got other major legislative items, with the bu

Gramm-Rudman pressures and all the appropriation

pass. We have got the trade legislation coming. 

And I would say that we probably have at the most 

days left to work with, recognizing that the desire of 

will be to end about October 1, because there is an ele

November. 
legislative priorities that are already center stage, so 

And I am concerned as well that there is a very d

tion over NASA issues. You have got a lot of player

different committees in :he Congress, the authoriz

and the appropriating committees in the House an

have got NASA itself, which is going through a 

change and reorganization and new leadership comi

You have got a policy group at the executive br

SIG group, that is struggling with some of the futu

questions, and so far we have had no recommendati

And we are very late in the legslative budgetary 

year. And all of these things I think complicate an

implementation of these decisions. Even if the Pr

strong language says, I want everything that is in 

ried out, no ifs, ands, or buts-and I hope he will sa

But if that signal goes out, getting it all done in th

other kinds of pressures and responsibilities is very 

It has occurred to me that in the same fashion tha

an ad hoc group come together to accomplish a ver

of work in a very compressed timeframe, that mayb

here is some kind of an equivalent task force effo

period of time, maybe only through the end of this y

only through the legislative session, that would 

people on the authorizing and the appropriating co

Congress and on the policy level in the administra

top level in NASA to maybe be able to work togeth

group to see to it that all of the collateral issues he

issues, the policy issues, the fur issues, all of which 

part in together-but that we can somehow find a 

operatively and put the branch of Government c

sense somewhat to the side and have absolutely no 

it whatsoever, and in a sense try to rationalize a 

that allows us to not stay behind the curve, if you 

catch ourselves up here, put these decisions toge

sure we have got a workable plan where all of the p

the budgetary piece, is worked into place. 

And then it seems to me we would have a much 

of making sure that all of this work that you have p

in fact carried out properiy and on a timely bzsis. 

Absent that, I am concerned that NASA and the

difficult enough, they are diffused across a broad 

tional area, that they are going to be buffeted by a 

pressures. You are about to disband as a Commis

are not going to be there, in a sense, as a presenc

herd things ahead. 

And I would like to pnt that ictea on che table t

think about. I talked to Dick Truly yesterday. He 

that idea as a way to try to enable us to just work t

I mean, there is nothing wrong with the Governm

gether on?e in a while. And it seems to me this is 

time for it, and we are in kind of an emergency s

. 
y

carried on down the field here and not just in a sens

field while time passes. So I just wanted to say that 

then I wanted to go back to a couple of other areas. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think you certainly are thinking alon

line. I want to think about how just to do it, and I am 

should make a recommendation other than to say tha

to take a special emphasis and impetus, I think, to ge

program go$g again. 

And I thmk that Jim Fletcher and Dick Truly and 

going to need some support. And so it is going to be a

cult for them to proceed. I mean, there is going to b

tendency to keep harping at them and say, Ghy d

happen, why did you not do that? And of course, tha

structive if it goes on too long. What we tried to do in this report is to get it all behi

all out on the table and to say that the Nation has done 

now let us get on with it. And I think Congress has a 

problem to deal with. 

And certainly what you have suggested is a way that 

pursued. Senator RIEGLE. Well, let me just make one other co

then move on, and that is that I know that Senator G

man of this committee, and I and others who are worki

have tried to establish that manner of approach to the

that we could in fact work them through. 

And as you say, in a sense the investigative effort is 

us and the finding of cause and the recommendations 

front of us. And carrying them out, of course, is the ne

journey here. 

And I am just very concerned. And you have been 

town a lot longer than I have, but I have seen an awfu

intentions sort of get stymied because there is the lac

mass focused behind them. And I am concerned about 

a group disband, because we then break into a fragm

ture, and I am afraid that is just the wrong way to do i

At this point, I think we need a consolidated struct

for a period of time, to try to work through the decisi

right in front of us, so that we can really in a sens

moving again. 

Mr. ROGERS. I certainly support that concept. And I 

say again how much we appreciate the Senators an

man’s and your cooperation, Senator Gorton, and you

aspect of this. 

I know that you came down and watched our proceed

through two or three days of hearings, and we appre

And we certainly appreciate the chairman’s cooperat

the members of the committee have been very coope

think it has been in the national interest. 

And I think if we all work together in the future-I 

out of the public position, but I certainly would do all I 

ally and privately to help the space program, because 
tainly important for the future. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, thank you. 

Let me go back now to two other areas. As I under

late in the conduct of the investigation, I think it m

about early May, just about a month ago, that in you

work you found a memo of some sort at Thiokol that 

this O-ring problem was very severe. 

And I gather there was an exchange of letters a

straints established, and it was when you discovere

the Thiokol files that you then tracked it back to NA

was such a high level of concern about whatever w

ticular document that you then on May 2 held a sp

ecutive session centering on that memo and its impli

Am I correct in that? 

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct. 

Senator RIEGLE. Now, the question in my mind 

really shocked that it was not until that late in th

effort, when all of the work was being done, the 

asked people to come forward, and so forth, that tha

piece of information had not been forthcoming. I 

found it, and I gather somewhat by chance. 

You were trying to determine information, but th

up at Thiokol, is that correct? 

Mr. ROGERS. That is correct. 

Senator RIEGLE. And then you were able to tak

point. 

I, for the life of me, cannot understand why that 

would not have been volunteered to you by NAS

game. And I would like to know why it was not, or 

concluded about that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I do not think that the peop

charge of the investigation-and I am talking ab

particularly-knew about it. 

Senator RIEGLE. I am sure that is right. 

Mr. ROGERS. So that insofar as they were concern

ated 100 percent with us on everything. In fact, th

all kinds of information we did not ask for. And s

complaint at all. Quite the contrary, we think they 

job in cooperating with the Commission. 

As to the second part of the question-- 

Senator RIEGLE. Just on that point, somebody kne

somebody did not bring it forward. Who would that 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, the people at Marshall. 

Senator RIEGLE. But who is that? I mean, people a

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I am not sure. I mean, Mr. M

one. Certainly we asked him about it, and there is s

about why he did not do that. 

Senator RIEGLE. So he would have had the op

prior to when you found this letter at Thiokol, to 

that this letter was given to the Commission? 

Mr. ROGERS. Sure, absolutely. 

Senator RIEGLE. But it was not given to the Comm

f 
was withheld? 

Mr. ROGERS. No. As I say, he tried to explain it, not v

torily. But there are others at Marshall that must h

about it, too. 

Senator RIEGLE. Who would they be? 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, I do not know. I am not sure. M

bury. 

Dr. KEEL. Well, certainly everyone in the shuttle pr

level I11 at Marshall, should have been aware of the doc

Senator RIEGLE. Who would that include? 

Dr. KEEL. Well, Mr. Reinartz of course was project m

Mulloy, Mr. Wear; all of their cohorts who worked for 

people in the science and engineering directorate at M

ticularly in propulsion, the propulsion division and the 

motor branch of the science and engineering directorate

Senator RIEGLE. So there were a number of peop

gather that may numbsr a dozen or two dozen people 

have been aware of that letter and that circumstance? 

Dr. KEEL. Presumably even more than that. People in 

reliability, and quality assurance area who actually p

straint on should have been aware of it. 

Senator RIEGLE. But that was not made-that knowle

come to the attention of the Commission until on or a

or thereabouts? 

Dr. KEEL. No, it was a little before that, Senator. It w

it was early April. We were, as you know, conducting 

interviews and gathering documents, reviewing those 

evaluating them. So around early April we found the m

at Morton Thiokol that referenced this problem of O

problem assessment report. 

And then in following up on that memo we went to M

actually found more, and in those were dccuments rel

launch constraint itself. 

Senator RIEGLE. I am really distressed about that, as 

Commission was. 

Mr. ROGERS. We expressed our distress, as you remem

made the testimony public. Senator RIEGLE. And I am wondering now, is there a

derstanding as to why that information was not volun

timely basis? It gives the appearance of having been 

that in effect was withheld, or at least it was not of

Commission and you only found it by relentless digging

Mr. ROGERS. Not beyond what I have said. 

Senator RIEGLE. So there is no explanation as to ho

about, 1 mean as to why you were not given this inform

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. As I say, the testimony by 

and others maybe, is available and they try to explain 

sound to me like a good explanation. Senator RIEGLE. But I am clear on that. I guess what 

to get at, though, is this long length of time when the 

was charged by the President to do its work, you wer

your work, people know they were to present relevant 
y 

pp

brought to the attention of the Commission for sever

I mean, I gather-how long would it have been, Dr

2 months? 

Dr. KEEL. At least 2 months. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think the explanation they gave

have to go back and refresh my recollection-is tha

we knew about it. I think that was their explanation

Senator RIEGLE. Well, that does not wash, though, 

Mr. ROGERS. No, it does not. You and I agree. I 

with you exactly. I agree with you. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, the reason I press the poin

it speaks to a very serious prcblem at Huntsville. I 

to an issue of lack of full disclosure, a lack of tel

truth on a timely basis, and I am deeply troubled ab

gather you are as well. 

Mr. ROGERS. Absolutely. Senator RIEGLE. Well, it seems to me-and I find i

ine that 20 or 30 people would have had knowledge 

important information and would have withheld 

were asked to. I mean, it almost suggests to me tha

out that people were to keep this to themselves. 

Mr. ROGERS. I would not want to draw that concl

one of the things you might conclude. I think you 

you question them that they will all say that they t

it. But that is not a very good explanation. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, it certainly is not a sufficie

for the people at the top, who would have an affirma

to make sure you had it. Would that not be a fair sta

Mr. ROGERS. That is right. Senator RIEGLE. So I cannot conceive of an exc

there could be any justification for that not having b

your attention. And I am glad the Commission 

enough that you unearthed it through an unorthodox 

tivity. 

But you should not have had to get it that way, 

ered about that, and the people who withheld that 

think ought not to be in responsible positions in the 

how do we guard against that kind of thing happ

people who conducted themselves in that fashion ar

I mean, I would think that there is always the con

might conduct themselves that way again. 

Mr. ROGERS. I agree with you. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I guess it is important to 

cause then it helps us, I think, in sort of moving fo

the Commission now goes out of business. 

Mr. ROGERS. I think you are pointing up one of th

this kind of an investigation and this kind of a repor

Senator RIEGLE. Let me ask a slightly different 

that is were there any other witnesses in the course 

gation that gave the Commission either misleadin

what you learned after the fact to be incomplete or 

than an honest answer? 
were bits of testimony, bits and pieces of testimony fr

time which I would characterize as less than forthright

was totally incorrect, but some of it looked as if there w

to smooth over a bad situation or say it in a way th

appear less important than it really was. 

And I think that as we went along we were able to 

significant facts which did not appear at first blush. 

cannot point to specific testimony today, but we are go

all of the testimony made available to the public publ

think when students go back and look at the testimony 

chance to analyze it, they will probably come to the con

some of it was not totally forthright. I think it is all there now. 

Here again, I want to say in terms of assessing blame 

out who did these things, that it seems to me has to be 

Administrator at NASA. We have laid it all out. We we

ing judgment on people. We were not asked to. 

That is for the Administrator to do. Whether he wan

these spots and what decisions he makes about them is 

were not asked to do that and I do not think we shoul

it, and I think the facts are all there. 

NASA itself has to deal with them. I have confiden

deal with them properly. And it is tough for him. It 

Jim Fletcher, it is tough for some of the others. Thes

able men who have been involved in the program for 

They have had a fine record of success. 

And it is easy enough to condemn them and dam

complain about them and so forth. We have exposed 

think it is perfectly proper for this committee to ask 

the new Administrator. I do not think we should hav

them. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I do not think we are approa

condemnatory fashion here. I think we are just trying 

exactly what was learned, and so forth. 

Mr. ROGERS. No, I understand. I was not complaining

Senator RIEGLE. And I want to say as well that I gre

ate your own leadership in persisting in the face of inc

swers and answers that I think were designed to deflec

mislead in certain instances. 

I know the times that I attended the public sessio

that is what I was hearing by the witnesses, and I felt 

times when you interjected personally to compel witn

dress specific questions and to not slide off that tho

times where we got some of the most important infor

we got. 

And I think anybody watching and listening to tho

would have sensed your own frustration at certain 

without pressing, you would not have gotten the truth 

of the witnesses in the form that you needed to have it

Mr. ROGERS. It was not particularly pleasant duty, I m

Senator RIEGLE. Well, it was not, and it should not h

quired in that fashion, I would say, of people who w
solutely truthful and forthcoming. 

And I think there were instances where that wa

and that is troubling to me and it is troubling to m

that I just do not want to put anybody in the futu

not want another astronaut going into space if ther

a managerial position of responsibility who thinks th

works that way, or that there is even any kind of an 

lem along those lines in any given space center or 

I think that needs to be cleaned up and it needs t

tion is that I felt that he was strong enough and se

and tough enough and enough of a person who is c

the reputation and future success of NASA that he 

to go in and make the changes that were needed at 

and personnel levels. 

Time will tell whether that is right. That is my 

his actions will have to indicate whether that con

founded. I think it is. 

I want to raise one final issue with you now, a

respect to the full scope of your recommendations

from your report that a number of members of the C

that certain mechanical problems with the Space P

to be identified and put on a short list. And I gathe

50 different recommendations suggested by the Co

bers as a whole. 

You sorted through those as a Commission and 

coming down to a list, I think, of nine or so that yo

as a group to put forward to us. Is that correct? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I cannot quote that number, sir, 

is true, yes. 

Senator RIEGLE. So in other words, I think it wou

us to have the remainder of the list, and I am sure y

not want to necessarily go into it this minute, but 

portant that these recommendations be submitted to 

so we can see what members of the Commission f

tant enough to flag. I would like to see that compl

just the winnoweddown version. 

Can we have that full list? 

Mr. ROGERS. Sure. 

Senator RIEGLE. I will just end with this. Am I c

ing that the Commission is saying that any critical

are outstanding have to be fixed before the shuttl

not? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. May I answer that, Senator? As 

is a long list of things, and some inherently will alw

ity 1. If the wing breaks off, that is the end of the 

has to stay on. There are a lot of things that have 

in order to have a successful flight. 

We have suggested that the entire list be revie

one, that its criticality status be evaluated to see 

judgments were correct or are still correct at thi

6 completely. One of the reasons I supported Jim Fle
Senator RIEGLE. Is there a list of items that the Comm

decided have to be fixed? Do you have a minimum lis

that you say, based upon your study, have got to be fixed 

shuttle flies again? 

Mr. ARMSTRONG. I think the only thing we really say 

solid rocket booster has to be bed. The other items ha

on them associated with the recommendations that say, 

and such happens, this has to be done. 

And it does not necessarily mean before flight, al

think that some of these are of such a nature that in t

period they should logically be completed. 

Senator RIEGLE. I think it is very important that 

much light on that as you can for us. I mean, we are 

process of reviewing the Commission’s report, because a

we just got it yesterday, and you were kind to give us co

day. 

Mr. ROGERS. May I comment? 

Senator RIEGLE. Please. 

Mr. ROGERS. I just want to make a comment on this 

and 1-R and 2 and 2-R. What was totally unsatisfactor

listening to the descriptions of these was the meaning o

the effect of the designation. 

For example, this joint was considered for a while to 

ity 1-R, which meant that they thought that if one of 

fsiled there was another backup seal. There were two 

for a long time they operated on the theory that there 

dancy. 

And then because they had trouble with it and they 

they decided that criticality designation was not corr

they changed it. So they changed it to criticality 1, whi

and it said so-this is a criticality 1 item and if it fails, 

O-ring fails, it means loss of mission and crew. 

Now, that should have alerted everybody in dealin

joint in all the discussions about it that it meant exact

you will see when you read the report and the testimo

that Marshall seemed to, and some of the people at Thio

to, operate on the basis that there was still redundancy. 

And they, in justifying why they agreed to the launc

Well, even though it was criticality 1, we in effect tho

was redundancy. And so they weren’t operating on thei

ria. 

And so what we have asked them to do is review all o

only Criticality 1 but all of them, to see if they make sen

there are things that should be corrected and improved, 

things, such as Neil suggests, that when you say critica

wing it does not have any meaning. Obviously, if the w

you know what is going to happen. So that designation 

does not mean very much. 

Designation for the joint means a lot. It means you 

joint. So what we have asked here in this recommenda

them to review it very carefully and have an audit of 
and report directly to the Administrator. And so we 

recommendation, if carried out, will clear that up, 

body in the system knows that if it is criticality 1 an

slight failure, or suggestion of failure everybody ta

count and works on that basis. 

And I hope they will do that. I think this is a v

recommendation. 

Senator RIEGLE. I was just going to ask if Preside

that very point-and then I would yield to Senato

cause he has a question on that-has President Reag

directly as the Commission Chairman and other me

has pledged himself to carry out these recommenda

in the process of studying the report and will decide 

Mr. ROGERS. It is the latter, but he certainly was v

the meeting he had with us. I mesn, he could not h

supportive and positive. He did say that he wante

carefully and he had not had the opportunity to, and 

make a statement on it very soon. 

So we expect that is forthcoming. Senator RIEGLE. That will be a very important 

will look for that. 

Senator Hollings wanted me to yield. 

Senator HOLLINGB. Just one other point. The hour 

Chairman has been testifying since aarly this mor

stand. 

But on that criticality 1, Mr. Secretary, you say th

ed on the basis of criticality 1-R, that it had a redun

contrary, on page 85 you refer to that L-1 missio

team meeting that took place on the 25th and they m

readiness review. And Mr. Mulloy testified as follow

flight readiness review record about O-ring concerns

Chairman ROGERS. Why was that not a cause for concern on th

NASA organization? 

Mr. MULLOY. Itwas cause for concern. 

You see, he was not treating it as 1-R. 

It was cause for concern. Chairman ROGERS. Who did you tell about this? 

Mr. MULLOY. Everyone. 

Chairman ROGERS. And they all knew it at the time of 51-L? 

Mr. MULLOY. Yes, sir. You will find in the Flight Readiness R

Then the language: 

It is disturbing to the Commission that, contrary to the admis

seriousness of concern was not conveyed in Flight Readiness Revi

L Readiness Review. 

So he wasn’t treating it as redundancy. 

That fellow either misled or lied about this thing. 

rode the devil out of Allan McDonald. And there i

point. If we are really going to get safety, because 

ment of human nature, if Senator Gorton is in c

around here then nobody has to worry about it; we 

charge. 

went all the way to the L minus 1 review. 
then you have got to look out for your man. Every com

not have a safety officer. As you and I both know, ever

of responsible for it. 

And that does not mean that nobody is. Everybody 

fundamental that has given us all wonderful confiden

I never heard of an O-ring on this subcommittee, b

feel badly. Like you said, Dick Truly, he has gone up an

a defect in the one he flew. He did not hear about i

nauts did not hear. We did not hear about this or any

that kind. 

That is one of the real important parts of your rep

got to come out. But when it comes down about the 

the effect that Mulloy, for example, thought it was a 

He said: Oh, no, I knew about the concern and I repor

He moves about with those statements in his hands, 

him and I hope we can get him later on. 

Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you very much, Senator. 

Senator GORTON. You have been through not only 

time, but a very tiring and exhausting time. Not jus

noon, of course, but all along. Once again, I would like to thank you, Mr. Secret

Armstrong, and through you to the other 11 members 

mission. 

I think it would be appropriate to compliment Dr. K

We have emphasized how much of the work the Comm

bers did themselves, but I know they were well served 

Members of the committee and subcommittee will h

al questions which we will submit in writing. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Will the other members be avai

too, the other members of the Commission? I saw M

morning and was very impressed with what he had 

more out of Sally Ride’s facial expressions than anythi

could tell the witness was not telling a true stateme

looked at her. 

Mr. ROGERS. She was really a wonderful contributor. 

Senator HOLLINGS. But will they be available for the 

Mr. ROGERS. They are going to hate me if I say yes

they will. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Iam not trying to belabor them

they can be very helpful. 

Senator GORTON. I simply wanted to ask how long D

be on the job and if there will be a staff to answer 

questions that we will submit. 

Mr. ROGERS. Before you answer, let me tell you th

really terrific job, and this whole documentation system

and he put it into effect. And he does not want to be 

long, but I will let him answer. 

Dr. KEEL. How about until this afternoon? 

I suspect it will be a matter of weeks, Senator. W

more volumes to report, as well as transitioning all of 

der of our documents into the archives. 
even when you are simply a pure citizen again, you 

when we need that help. Mr. ROGERS. We will. 

Senator GORTON. In any event, we once again thank 

marvelous public service. 

The committee is adjourned. [Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adj

[The following information was subsequently rec

record:] 

QUFSTIONS OF THE CHAIRMAN AND THE ANSWEI

Question 1. The Commission concluded that Morton Thiokol rev

position and recommended a launch at the urging of Marshall Sp

A. Are you aware of any other instances when such “pressure

any of its centers, might have forced a contractor to reverse its or

ommendation? 

B. Do you believe that by the very nature of the contractor/custo

such pressures, however, subtle, will always exist in the process? 

Answer 1. A. The Commissim is not aware of any other instanc

tractor reversed a “no launch” recommendation at the urging of N

B. The very nature of the relationship will always make the sys

such pressures unless steps are taken to assure proper commun

launch related recommendations-whether reversed or not-to all 

ment. 

Question 2. In April 1984, Marshall and Morton Thiokol esta

task force to investigate O-ring charring. 

A. What conclusions did the Cammission reach regarding this i

and its progress? 

Answer 2. The Commission concluded that the task force was no

should have been in exp-ditiously achieving a solution to the pro

sion is based on complaints about the task force’s progress in inte

Thiokol documents, as well as progress reports from the task force

Question 3. It is clear that at the beginning, Rockwell had serio

the lkely effect of ice formation on the Shuttle and its launch 

where is it clear to me that NASA and its Ice Inspection Team 

cerns. A. Was this Ice Inspection Team qualified to make the necessa

garding ice formation and its likely effects? 

Answer 3. A plan for ice inspection of the launch facility and S

been developed and was followed by the Ice Team. The Team repo

their supervisor who then assessed risk. This included the ability 

tial ice impacts with the Shuttle thermal protection system tile

method, however, did not adequately account for the influenc

caused by the main engines or solid rockets-the effects of aspir

ing ice debris. 

Question 4. Your report concludes that NASA’s Freeze Protecti

equate. A. HOW was it inadequate, and how could it be improved? 

Answer 4. NASA’s Freeze Protection Plan was inadequate in th

be completely shut down and drained from the launch pad while 

preparations. The procedures called for a draining system to av

was not done since it would have delayed launch. Instead, to pre

and possible pipe ruptures, water was allowed to run. This resul

buildup when the drains themselves froze and plugged. 

Question 5. The Commission established an independent technic

assist the Commission in its investigation. 

A. What was the extent of this panel’s involvement throughou

and how did it function? 

Answer 5. The Commission established an Independent Test Te

servers in early March 1986. The team was principally charged w

NASA and Thiokol tests and analyses designed to test various h

ing the cause of the accident and to establishing the sensitivity 
ence throughout the Commission investigation. A report to the Com

Independent Test Team is being published as Appendix E to th

Report. 

Question 6. Once again, we have been reminded of the risks of 

flight, yet I doubt that we will ever be able to eliminate all risks. N

should strive to assess those risks as accurately as possible. 

A. What is th? Commission’s assessment of NASA’s Risk Asses

and what risk assessments had been made on the SRB’s or its joints? 

Answer 6. NASA does not use a probablistic determination of ri

system is assessed from the standpoint of the acceptability of the f

ticular component. In most cases, redundancy protects the Orbiter a

this is not the case, a formal waiver is required to allow operation a

is no formal Risk Assessmint protocol. 

Question 7. A. After having examined NASA’s Flight Readiness 

what, in your opinions, are the fundamental problems in this proces

they be corrected? 

B. How can it be assured that problems at a Level 111 or IV F

Review will receive proper attention at the same ‘Level I Flight Rea

Answer 7. A. Incomplete presentations and a tendency to downp

the program was declared “operational” were problems. A lack of 

edge on all systems by key managers will perhaps always be a prob

mission believes that the structure of the Level I FRR, usually invol

ences wich a large number of participants, may need to be examine

whether a different format could increase the amount of information 

frank and complete discussions of any flight problem. 

B. All problems presented at Level I11 or IV cannot be brought 

FRR. However, certainly all problems associated with Criticality 1 h

be required to be discussed in detail. 

Question 8. There are approximately ?OO to 800 components on th

Critical Items List. 

A. What is your assessment of the efficiency and accuracy of this 

toring critical-items? 

B. What improvements, if any, should be considered for this system

Answer 8 (A and B). The Commission has called for a NASA 

review of all Criticality 1, lR, 2, an6 2R items on the Critical Items 

audit of this review by an independent National Research Ccmncil pa

would serve to recertify all of the most critical items on the list an

what changes should be made prior to the next launch. In addit

ideally will facilitate a reassessment of procedures concerning the re

porting of problems involving items on the Critical Items List. In ad

mission did specifically call for more rigorous maintenance procedu

the Critical Items List. 

Question 9. The CAmmission has recommended that NASA should 

and considerable attention to its Safety, Reliability, and Quality 

gram. 

A. During the investigation, did you ever learn why this program

creased in importance? 

B. Could you compare the present program of Safety, Reliability, 

surance to that which existed in the Apollo program? 

Answer 9. A. There was a lack of concerii and attention by key 

the Chief Engineer to the Center Directors, to Project managers. I

ployment environment with mandated ceilings, managers put emph

tion” workers (engineers, managers, and operators), rather than SR&

The perception of an “operational” program also wrongly led to fu

in importance. 

B. Today, the SaQA program has less people, less voice, and l

during Apollo. Ah, the personnel appear to have less status in 

managers. In April 1974, a Space Shuttle Crew Safety Panel was est

tify possible hazards to Shuttle crews and to provide guidance and a

management. This panel ceased to exist as an independent forum w

chairman retired in 1981. 

Question 10. It appears that NASA’s Safety, Reliability, and Qu

program was deemphasized, beginning in 1983, when Level 111 w
as concern by NASA personnel? 

Answer 10. Quite to the contrary, both Level I1 and Level 111 per

fied mth the revision. the current Level I1 personnel were not aw

of the change. It should be noted that there is still a formal re

Problem Reporting and Corrective Action document to report 

straints to Level 11. 

Question 11. You cited that NASA’s flight rate goal was placing 

NASA’s resources and manpower. 

A. In your opinion, was there any recognition by any of NASA’s 

headquarters or at the Centers-that safety could have been com

pressures of the flight schedule and its effect on the work force? 

Answer 11. There clearly was concern that pressure might comp

testimony indicates that all levels of management had convinced 

flight safety was not being compromised. The Astronaut Office 

number of flight safety concerns in internal memoranda. 

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR GoRTON AND THE ANSWER

Question 1. The Commission has concluded that the SXB joint 

tion program was inadequate. 

A. What is the Commission’s assessment as to why such an ina

was established and tolerated? 

B. Who was responsible for these tests-NASA, Norton Thiokol, 

Answer 1. A. The Commission believes that adequate testing w

due in part to an erroneous assumption that the similarity betwe

seals and the Titan joint seals allowed reliance on the prior flig

Titan to establish confidence in the SRB joints. The costs of more 

was also a likely consideration. Reliance on similarity to the Titan 

be faulty reasoning since there were differences between the design

was no way of knowing what thermal distress the O-rings in the 

have experienced because the Titan hardware was not recoverable

ing was not called for after seal problems arose apparent!y bec

schedule concerns and an unwarranted reliance on analysis. 

B. Both NASA and Morton Thiokol were responsible for cond

and interpreting the SRB joint testing and certification program. 

Question 2. How did this SRB joint, with its obvious flaws and 

raised about it in its initial design and development, evolve in

system-were there not check-points along the way that should hav

development of a safe and reliable joint? 

Answer 2. There is a basis of arguing that a redesign effort sho

tiated when static tests as early as September 1977 showed evide

design did not work as intended. The early flight incidence of 

STS-2 in November 1981 during the “developmental” phase shoul

cient to cause corrective action to be taken. The request in Dec

waiver of the requirement for the secondary O-ring to provide r

primary O-ring should have precipitated a more extensive reasse

when flight experience indicated that the primary O-ring could su

increased frequency of flight problems should have been sufficient 

the August 1985 briefmg to Headquarters of the history of O-ring 

ficient to have required corrective action. More attentive managem

more vigorous Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance role cou

the ovesight needed to assure the development of a safe and reliab

Question 3. Your report discusses the effect that cold temperatur

ring resiliency and on the stability of the O-ring to seal the gap 

motor segments. 

A. What tests had NASA run in the past to establish the mini

at which the O-rings would reliably perform? 

Answer 3. NASA and Thiokol has reports on cold-gas subscale O

ed at temperatures as low as 30° F., and had experience with a De

tested at 40° F. with no apparent detrimental effect. Morton Thiok

fied that these tests were not representative in that they did no

processing procedures or the in-flight configuration. 
not as resilient at cold temperatures (Report, p. 136-37, 140). 

Question 4. When O-ring leak check pressures were increased ov

the Shuttle flight program, there was an attendant increase in ero

joint and nozzle O-rings. 

A. Were you able to establish why these pressures were increased 

and why no one noticed and acted on the cause-andeffect relatio

creased pressure and increased O-ring erosion? 

Answer 4. The leak check pressure were increased because NASA 

lieved that during the leak check procedure the putty could “mask” 

from a defective O-ring or an improperly seated O-ring. The pressur

sufficiently to “blow through” the putty to ensure that the putty did 

unintended pressure seal during the leak testing. However, this inc

caused more “blow holes” in the putty, allowing a direct hot gas pat

thereby increasing the frequency of erosion of the O-rings. No trend analysis relating to leak check pressure was perform

Safety, Reliability and Quality Assurance. Engineers and program 

various times, express concern about the potential of “blow holes” 

erosion. However, no direct correlation of increased frequency of e

increased leak check stabilization pressure was apparently made. 

Question 5. You have concluded that humidity, temperature, and 

in the putty compound could have been a factor in the initial joint fa

A. What test did NASA conduct to ascertain how and to what ex

bles would affect joint performance. 

B. What conclusions did you reach about the need for putty in t

Answer 5. A. From March through June of 1983, Thiokol perform

to the types of putty used, of the effects of leak check pressure on t

effect of SRB assembly on the putty, and of the effects of putty la

tion. Marshall specifically asked for more putty tests on Decembe

over, as a result of the NASA Action Item sent to Thiokol after the 

Readiness Review (April 5, 19841, Thiokol planned some subsequent 

check pressure, assembly loads, putty lay-up, and other variables

tests were performed during developmental motor firings in 1984-1

March 6, 1985, Marshall document reflected dissatisfaction with th

Thiokol was completing the planned tests (Commission document 

009911). 

A fairly comprehensive review of the entire O-ring erosion proble

putty type, putty lay-up, leak check procedures, and so forth, was r

ed by Brian Russell at Morton Thiokol (Commission document 

038276). 

B. The Commission agrees with the May 2, 1986, testimony of 

James Kingsbury that the unpredictability of the putty’s behavior 

ble that the new joint design should not contain putty. Question 6. The Challenger had been on the pad for 38 days and h

to seven inches of rain before its launch. This situation obviously c

the formation of ice in the joints. 

A. At the time of the Challenger launch, was there a NASA prot

cally assessing rain accumulation in the SRB joints, and if there w

there not such a protocol? B. If there was such a protocol, was it acted on? 

Answer 6. No protocol existed. On STS-9 a requirement arose to 

biter from the launch pad. When the SRB was de-stacked, water 

least one joint. However, no problem report was written on this cond

alert managers of the potential for water in the joints contributed 

protocol. After the 51-L accident, a check of the SRB’s for STS 61-

Pad A indicated that spaces the thickness of a credit card were evi

and thus water accumulation was certainly possible. 

Qftestion 7. A. Could you explain the rationale for the waiver of 

stramt that was imposed on flight 51-F in July 1985, and on all sub

B. How did it occur that Morton Thiokol and Levels I and I1 at 

aware of these particular launch constraints and waivers? 

Answer 7. A. The rationale given by NASA witnesses was that t

cause of the serious erosion of the primary O-ring and the subseque

secondary O-ring on the nozzle joint of STS 51-B (which led to the l

prior to 51-F) was an improperly seated primary O-ring in the noz
adequately justify the waiver of the launch constraint. 

B. &en though a written requirement existed for Level I11 to r

straints to Level 11, it was not done (Report pp. 138-39, 159). The L

testified that they did not believe there was a requirement to repor

a launch constraint or its waiver. 

Question 8. According to your report, a Marshall definition of 

states that “all open problems coded Criticality 1, lR, 2, and 2R w

launch constraints until resolved or sufficient rationale is given 

will not occur. . .” 

A. Given that approximately 700 to 800 Criticality 1 items are 

review by NASA, over 100 of which are related to the SRB, how m

treated as launch constraints, and how many of these launch cons

waived? 

Answer 8. Launch constraints were defined as all open problems 

1, lR, and 2R. In other words, only flight anomalies or problems i

ity 1, lR, 2, and 2R were constraints. If no problem occurred, 

straint was established. The Commission did not attempt to deter

of launch constraints that were waived during the program. In th

of launch constraints attached to the SRB could be determined f

Problem Assessment System. However, the Commission found tha

plication of the Marshall Problem Assessment System, including la

was unclear and not adequately defined. 

4)uestion 9. A. What conclusions did you reach about NASA’s La

teria system, particularly with regard to the SRB field joints? 

B. Were these Launch Commit Criteria strict enough, and 

enough to routinely ensure the safety of the Shuttle system? 

Answer 9. A. There were no Launch Commit Criteria relating 

joints or to operational temperatures for the SRB other than the 

Bulk Temperature. B. The Commission was troubled by the absence of more specifi

Criteria relating to operating temperatures for the Shuttle syste

nents. 

Question 10. In December 1985, Morton Thiokol requested of Ma

ring erosion problem be removed, or closed, from Marshall’s Pro

System. According to your report, there was some confusion about 

this request. 

A. What were the ramifications of this confusion-did it affect 

of O-ring erosion as a problem at Flight Readiness Reviews? 

Answer 10. The closure action had been requested by Marsh

Thiokol, and accepted by Rockwell. The closure had been entered 

Problem Assessment System. However, Marshall SRB project m

that they were unaware that the system was showing the probl

that the Program Office had not approved closure. SRM Project M

Wear testified that the erroneous closure entry meant that no “he

(in the problem reporting system) prior to the 51-L Flight Readine

Qllestion 11. It is my understanding that the Challenger enco

severe wind shear conditions of any Shuttle mission. 

A. Was this wind shear detectable before launch, and if so, was 

to be too severe? 

B. If NASA does not have a wind shear detection protocol, sho

one? 

Answer 11 (A and B). The wind shears encountered by STS 51

the worst winds encountered by a Shuttle mission. Prior to each la

weather ballons to measure winds, and this is routinely followed b

of acceptability. Previous launches have been delayed due to hi

being outside the allowable operational envelope. However, for 51

and post-flight determinations indicate that the winds were ac

limits were not exceeded. 

Question 12. I understand that there were some discrepancies 

temperatures recorded for the Shuttle and its launch facilities tha

ed from imprecise temperature recording procedures. A. Were these discrepancies significant enough to cause seriou

any launch decisions? 

0 

. 
g (p, pg

p

Shuttle system and launch facility were taken with an optical infr

Of particular interest, the left had SRB was measured to be about 

enheit in the aft region, whereas the right hand SRB was measur

degrees. These temperature measurements were not reported sin

Launch Commit Criteria on surface temperature. After the Challen

pyrometer instrument was calibrated in accordance with the manu

dures. A correction of approximately +loo Fahrenheit to the pre

ture measurements was calculated, implying that the aft region of 

about 35’ F., while the right SRB was about 18” F. at the time of th

prior to launch. 

Question 13. A. The Commission has recommended the establish

Safety Advisory Panel which would consist of NASA personnel and 

the STS Program Manager. During the investigation when thi

broached at one of the Commission hearings,.was it not envisioned

independent panel, rather than one made up of NASA personnel? 

B. What considerations led the Commission to recommend a pa

NASA personnel? 

Answer 13. When considering the need for a Shuttle safety panel, 

considered a number of options, including a completely independen

mission ultimately concluded that the safety oversight and review 

could best be fulfilled by those most familiar with the operation

safety requirements of the Shuttle. It further concluded that the 

day-in, day-out requirement. It determined, however, that this pan

dependent” of program pressures: schedule, budget, managemen

Commission, therefore, recommended an STS Safety Advisory P

members of the new Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance offi

office, the Mission Operations directorate, as well as the program 

will serve as an independent forum to raise safety concerns direc

program manager. 

Question 14. The Commission has identified tire, brake, and no

systems as systems that must be improved. As you undoubtedly le

investigation, these problems have existed for some time. 

A. What is the Commission’s assessment of NASA’s response to 

these problems, prior to the Challenger accident? 

Answer 14. Brakes and tires had received considerable attention 

point to a number of tests and minor modifications. The Commissio

however, with the experience of continuing damage to critical hard

operational margin, and repeated and frequent warnings by the 

that the deficiencies be corrected as soon as possible. An improv

brake had been approved prior to the accident, but funding was sti

that time. These issues are obviously being addressed with more vig

dent. 

Question 15. In your opinion, what other potentially hazardous 

the Shuttle program, of a hardward, management, or organizationa

Answer 15. The Shuttle Main Engines, the 17-inch disconnect va

Orbiter and the External Tank, and the indicators for the vent val

drogen and liquid oxygen were other hardware concerns raised by 

(see Chapter IX, Other Safety Considerations). 

As mentioned in the Report, the Payload Safety program doe

NASA to conduct a detailed audit of compliance with safety direc

is certified by the payload owner/builder. Areas of non-complian

found very late and are often determined to be “acceptable” even 

tion of stated requirements. All of this to “keep the program movi

often no time to make the payload as safe as the requirements sa

Other concerns are raised in Chapter VII, the Silent Safety Pro

ter VIII, Pressures on the System. 

Question 16. Are there still any questions that are lingering in 

Commission? 

Answer 16. There are no lingering questions as to the cause o

mission 51-L accident. The determination of the cause of the acci

mary charge of the Commission. 

Question 17. It has been widely reported that Dr. Feynman ha

differing opinion that will be included as an appendix to the report
by Dr. Feynman of the Shuttle’s reliability would be included in th

in the main body of the Report. This was agreed to by all, includin

since the analysis was not a Commission product and did not relate 

er 51-L accident. 

Question 18. The Commission has concluded that the Shuttle’s in

parts inventory has caused NASA to resort to cannibalization of pa

biter to another, a pra$ce that is “costly, disruptive, and introduc

for component damage. 

A. As you probably know, NASA is in the middle of a $450 mil

enhance its spare parts inventory. While this effort may not have be

ance to the current problems, what was the Commission’s assessmen

cy of this program? 

Answer 18. The Commission did not construe its charter to requir

of any ongoing or planned program for Shuttle support, or of the bu

ments for such programs. Hence, no assessment of the spare par

made. 

QUESTIONS OF SENATOR F‘RE~~LER AND THE ANSWEFS 

Question 1. The Commission recommends that NASA establish a 

Peel to ensure that safety issues are brought to the attention of th

of Shuttle management. 

Specifically, how will this Panel ensure that staff level concerns a

ty of any Shuttle component or system will be communicated to 

responsible for crew safety? 

Answer 1. The Commission recommended establishing an STS 

Panel with its membership including representatives from the new 

Reliability and Quality Assurance, the Astronaut Office, and the Mi

Directorate. It is intended that this Panel serve as an independent 

safety concerns from all staff levels can be raised directly with th

Manager. 

Question 2. What do you feel is the appropriate role of Congress in 

tion of NASA, the redesign of the solid rocket booster, and the im

the Commission’s other safety and organizational recommendations? 

Answer 2. The Commission has indicated that it fully supports an

right and responsibility of Congress to exercise its oversight role 

mines how to implement the Commission recommendations and ho

US. space launch capability. The Commission, however, did not be

appropriate for it to recommend to Congress how to carry out thi

tion. 

Question 3. One of your recommendations stated, “reliance on a 

pability should be avoided in the future.” I think most of the coun

with that assessment, especially in light of the series of launch 

curred after the Challenger accident. 

Do you have any specific recommendations on the number or ty

systems the United States should develop? Do you feel that a fourt

be built? 

Answer 3. The Commission did recommend that reliance on a sin

bility such as the Shuttle should be avoided in the future. However

did not believe it was within its mandate to make recommendatio

mix recommendation regarding building a fourth orbiter. 

Question 4. According to your Report, NASA’s top managemen

the history of the O-ring failures at a meeting on August 19, 1985. 

How do you account for the fact that following that briefing no at

to halt Shuttle flights until this serious problem was corrected? 

Answer 4. The Commission has no explanation for lack of suffi

taken by top NASA management after the August 19, 1985, brief

NASA Headquarters (Level I). The Commission concluded that the 

ficiently detailed to have required corrective actions to have been t

next launch. The briefing, however, did conclude with the recomm

is safe to continue flying” based on analysis of existing data (Report

62-885 0 - 86 - 5 
Answer 5. NASA has recently indicated in its report to the Pres

menting the Commission recommendations that the SRB design 

longer than anticipated, with the final Design Certification Review 

for December 1987. The first Shuttle flight will consequently be afte

of calendar year 1988. 
ROGERS COMMISSION REPORT 

TUESDAY, JUNE 17, 1986 

U.S. SENATE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORT

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 

SR-253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Slade G

man of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GORT

Washi

Senator GORTON. Welcome to this hearing of the S

on Science, Technology, and Space with the Adm

NASA and many of the members of his senior staff. 

Dr. Fletcher, we are delighted to have you here. A

just over a week has elaped since the time of the is

Rogers Commission report. It has received both wide 

wide praise and acceptance. 

From your perspective, by far from the least imp

elements of that acceptance is that of the President, 

with you late last week and his set of instructions to 

spect to that report. I may say that I too found the 

Rogers Commission to be exceptional in its thoroughn

in the wisdom of its recommendations. 

And we will want to hear from you today on how 

pose to go about implementing the Rogers Cornmissi

dations and where, if anywhere, you may disagree wit

those recommendations. 

You obviously have taken on a very tough challeng

miral Truly. It is my opinion that both of you have a

plary fashion to this point in dealing with what clea

vest challenge to NASA, to its mission, and to its 

ance. 

We are all well aware of the fact that NASA has 

favored agency in the press to one which much of th

joying kicking around at this point. Many people 

second guessing what you have done and where it 

going to go. 

Our goal, however, as yours is, is simply to see to i

rect the physical and human deficiencies which hav

ered in the light of the Challenger disaster, and to ge

to its primary mission as promptly, effectively, and a

possibly can. 

(127) 
that there should be more congressional and adminis

sight connected with the way in which NASA carries 

sion. 

We have a particular and a peculiar need for your 

sistance, of course, and that need arises out of the 

must write an authorization bill for NASA as promptly 

We should have written it already, and more expli

than we have received so far on the impact, the cost 

the directional impact of the disaster and its afterm

thing which the subcommittee urgently needs, and w

you will begin to provide guidance for us in that co

morning. 

Senator RIEGLE. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR RIEGL

Senator RIEGLE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me welcome all of our panelists today, and we’v

work ahead of us, as we all well know. I am hopeful th

will be able to shed some light on what the policy 

within the executive branch of government. 

We have been getting very mixed signals, as you k

insofar as I know still don’t have any specific reco

unless of course one has been hammered out last nigh

bringing it with you this morning. If you are, that w

news indeed. I gather that that still is not where we 

policy process has not been completed. So we are not going to get a firm recommendation, 

today with respect to the shuttle replacement or, for 

other very important related issues. I must say I am v

about the fact that time is running on us here and we 

in the legislative year. It is the middle of June. 

We have got a number of other complex issues befor

including wrapping up the tax bill and appropriation 

of the areas and the trade bill and so forth. So that ti

away from us. And I see NASA in a sense in jeopa

caught in the backwash of those other events and 

being able to see definitive action taken here that wi

taken before the year is out. 

I am distressed about that. I have made some sug

way, some organizational arrangements that I think m

on an ad hoc basis between now and the end of the yea

And I have mentioned that to you, Dr. Fletcher, an

miral Truly. And I may touch on that a little bit lat

concerned that we are falling further behind. 

There is a story in the last couple of days about the 

face with the Soviets well ahead of us in terms of th

tion and the number of hours now that they have bee

with cosmonauts in space. And so it seems to me ever

lose here is a very costly day to our country and to ou

And so I would hope that somehow we can find a 

this impasse and this kind of policy paralysis that se
The second thing I want to mention at the outset 

before we get very far down the track I think we’ve go

down. The Rogers Commission was in the other day 

viewed with them the findings of the commission, an

President has charged you, Dr. Fletcher, with apparen

recommendations over the next 30 days to carry out 

sion’s recommendations. 

But one area where I think the Commission, havi

done I think an exceptional job in a short period of t

area where I think they have fallen short is that we d

clear sense of where in the organization and what spe

tions the basic mistakes were made. 

And I am concerned about that because I don’t wa

takes made again, and I think the scale of the mista

that when people make them they forfeit their right 

chance to make them again in this agency, and I feel 

about it. 

And so one of the things that I am going to want to 

you today is the thing that the Commission more or 

around, and that is the question of who, in the dec

failed to do what they should have done. 

Now, the Commission, when we asked them about th

that in effect that was going to be left to you folks, a

not want to hear now from you is a response to the e

that is really the Commission’s job. I do not want this 

back and forth. 

They have passed it to you apparently, and so in or

ourselves and to assure the country that those mis

going to be made again, at least by those individual

have to have some clear sense as to what is going to b

it. 

And we have been very patient, I think, in waiting 

ess to move forward, the Commission to finish its 

forth. But I think we are now at the point where th

system that did not work, namely, the managerial sy

individuals that did not function properly, did not rep

were, I think, clearly involved in misjudgment of a sc

acceptable. I think we have to have some clear sense 

to what the corrective steps are that are going to be ta

And I think, finally, we owe that to several people. 

owe it to the astronauts that were lost and those th

the program. I think we owe it to the families involve

owe it to all the other people in NASA who follow 

who do report as properly they should. 

And I do not think there should be any kind of a 

around that when people do not function properly t

that is an acceptable situation and by inference that 

how the standard operation within NASA. Clearly 

cannot be, should not be. And I do not want people w

their jobs in a sense properly having their reputation

those who do not. 
have the right people in the right slots, we have t

forthcoming on that count. It has been a long time 

dent happened and so I would mention that to you 

because when my opportunity comes, if you have no

in your own comments, then I will ask you to do so. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator GORE. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR GOR

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The importance of today’s hearings and the issue o

problems associated with the Challenger tragedy cann

phasized. The Associated Press this morning is ca

about the new edition of Jane’s Space Flight, which 

Soviet Union has taken an almost frightening, to us

10-year lead over the United States and our space pro

The reasons cited by the editor of Jane’s are that N

contingency plans for the space program in case o

with the shuttle, and the Soviets are so far ahead of 

as a result that, in quoting Jane’s, they are almost ou

We have to establish long-term goals and objectiv

program that will help us with an organizing focus t

lems like those that occurred with the Challenger a

put us in second place in space, if in fact that is the c

I, too, look forward to exploring the questions wh

need of exploration as a result of the excellent re

Rogers Commission. I look forward to exploring you

plementing their recommendations, as the Presiden

dered. 

And I look forward to exploring your views, Dr

some of the difficult decisions that this subcommitte

on the fourth orbiter, where the funding is going 

what we do about the space station, and some other 

are still unresolved. And I look forward to having tha

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I have no opening stateme

Senator GORTON. Senator HOLLINGS. 

man. 

OPENING STATEMENT BY SENATOR HOLL

Senator HOLLINGS. Dr. Fletcher, you probably can 

tration. Obviously, it is not with you. It is with my o

up here, because I did not expect you. I expected the 

are appearing over on the House side. 

I thought we had an understanding, and we will h

and clear up that understanding. But we were rea

ago, around 2 or 3 months, to get going on an auth

did not have the information. But quite bluntly, Sena

I were using the holdup on the authorization to tr
. 

Now, we are not doing that and we are moving f

get somewhat the feeling that we’re going to get a sym

ization bill that does not necessarily have the support 

the Congress or the committee, that we just got an 

bill; we do not know why or how or where we are head

That brings us to you and to your group here this 

cifically, I take it now that we, having conversed 

others, are going to put the emphasis on research 

ment, instead of commercial launches and the comm

of the program. That means that we will launch only 

of safety and not on the basis of profit and loss or 

commercial, competitive level of program with Arian

else. There are reports we are 10 years behind the S

emphasis should be trying to catch up in R&D, not t

pete commercially with the French. 

I am trying to catch up research and develop

spacewise and scientificwise with the Soviets. That w

a real thorough shuttle-type program in the sense 

other words, we will reverse the policy. 

We have not heard from you, but obviously we are 

to go to the expendable launch vehicles, go where 

NASA was over here and said everything is up in the 

Defense was over on the other side of the spectru

put it up on the ELV’s. And I think not that one has 

that particular argument, but we will have to tend 

the expendable launch vehicles rather than the shut

while. 

I differ with some of the findings and I think s

frankly, have been covered up in the Rogers Comm

would like to get into that in depth. But that is not be

were not there and responsible at the time. 

But one recommendation, of course, for example, th

Commission makes is to try to change around the in

charge upon each and every element of NASA and 

gram and the operation itself. Everybody was in ch

and I do not agree that since everybody is in charg

one is. On the contrary, everyone is, and they che

make sure. 

What really happened in this sense I think is a 

communications, and I would direct my questions to t

opportunity here at questioning time to find out wh

down in communications, or did we just drift towar

authority to Marshall. 

I have got a bank operation in my own home State

my town, but then as the operation grew and bec

necessarily the headquarters moved from the coast w

to the center of the State, in the State’s capital. 

But the State capital bank operatives and chief m

told, just leave that Charleston crowd alone, they run 

what they are doing; just sort of an unwritten rule t

running things down in Charleston. 
gy

q

ington, and you just leave us alone; we have got th

have got the booster, we know what we are doing; 

you call on us, the order is go. 

In fact, there is testimony to the effect-and it w

brought out sooner or later, or perhaps by the Ho

that was the Lucas policy, that you never refused a 

time you were asked, the answer was yes. 

And so I think there are some mistakes down the

go to you in getting us a program to make certain th

you as the principal officer in charge were on top of i

on the spurt of everything going again, that we do no

that cancer down there at the Marshall Space Center

It is a cancer in my opinion. It has been a bad on

to fix the responsibility I would fix it on Lucas. I 

Mulloy is a fall guy. 

Chairman Rogers thinks I am off on a bent to p

White House ordered the launch. I am trying to p

White House did not order the launch. He cannot 

his head. He does not question a single witness fr

House concerning calls to the Kennedy Space Cent

26 and a couple of days ahead of that. But he does n

one of those to remove any kind of suspicion or doub

But if I had to fm it, I do not have to prove a case

Rogers says, that they did do it, so he can apologize. 

apologize now for not asking and going over there 

single witness and just get their statements. That is 

do. 

But it seems to me that is another problem that t

ought to get into. We are 10 years behind the Sovi

question about that. I want to hear from you on 

Regan’s approach to it, since we are caught up he

lapse or 1Yz years or whatever it is, do we use that t

advantage and jump forward technologically in so

better than that shuttle? 

These are the kinds of things now that the comm

really reflect on, and we want to hear from you abou

Thank you. 

Senator GORTON. Dr. Fletcher, we would be happy 

you now. I understand you have a statement and A

Dr. FLETCHER. That is correct, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Excuse me. 

Senator Ford, I am sorry, I did not see you come i

Senator FORD. I am just here to listen. 

Senator GORTON. Dr. Fletcher. 

an opening statement? 
PANIED BY REAR ADM. RICHARD H. TRULY, AS

MINISTRATOR FOR SPACE FLIGHT; ARNOLD D. A

GRAM MANAGER, NATIONAL SPACE TRANSPOR

TEMS PROGRAM OFFICE; JAMES R. THOMPSON, 

MAN, SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM 51-L 

DESIGN ANALYSIS TASK FORCE; THOMAS J. LEE, 

VELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION TEAM, DATA 

ANALYSIS TASK FORCE; JOHN W. THOMAS, DEPUT

ANALYSIS TEAM, DATA AND DESIGN ANALYSIS 

AND CAPT. ROBERT CRIPPEN, ASTRONAUTS’ OFFI

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, members of the subc

a week ago, as you mentioned, the Rogers Commis

thoughtful and thorough report to the President and 

can people. We at NASA have spent a good deal of ti

studying the report and its recommendations. Last 

mentioned, the President himself noted the procedur

zational changes suggested in the report will be essen

effective and efficient space transportation system o

will be crucial in restoring the U.S. space launch ac

operational status. 

I want to assure you, as I did the President, that 

our present responsibility. We will move with determ

out hesitation, to guarantee that the space program 

highest levels of excellence and accomplishments a

achievements. We will do what the President gave 

to do, “make our programs safe, reliable, and a sou

our Nation and of benefit to all mankind.” 

With me today are Adm. Richard Truly, Arney Ald

Lee, who is Deputy Director at the Marshall Space 

and who participated in the recovery operations, 

Thompson, who was also involved in the recovery 

loan from Princeton University. These officials hav

sponsibility for the cleanup or recovery of the accid

will give you a firsthand report on our progress in 

the Rogers Commission report recommendations. 

But I wish to begin today by responding to the on

tion which is not among Admiral Truly’s direct r

The Rogers Commission recommended that NASA sh

an Office of Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assuran

it should be independent of other NASA functiona

responsibilities. It also recommended that this ne

direct authority over safety, reliability, and quality 

that it should report directly to me. 

All of those suggestions will soon be realities. I am 

of creating such an office, and will announce in the n

person who will administer that new and crucia

every step of improvement is important, I believe th

the lynchpin that ensures that all the rest are wo

As you know, the Commission also recommended 

the shuttle management structure. Admiral Truly 

week that Capt. Robert Crippen of the Astronauts

. 

. 
Crippen is here also this morning. I have also had a panel under the direction of Gen. 

who as you remember was the Apollo program manag

work on a broader study of management systems an

including the relations between our various space 

each other and with NASA headquarters. I am confi

activity underway under Admiral Truly, Captain 

General Phillips among others will permit, indeed, w

that we will meet the deadline set by the President la

He said: 

Specifically I would like NASA to report back to me in 30 days o

the Commission’s recommendations will be implemented. This repo

milestones by which progress in the implementation process can be 

I have been asked to come back into NASA at this 

to meet the President’s demands and to satisfy cong

cerns that we are once again working in a fashion th

rect both success and safety and will make America p

will settle for nothing less. 

Last week I promised that where NASA managem

to be weak we would strengthen it; where engineerin

process needed improvement or change, we would 

needed; and that where our internal communications

cludes decisionmaking, were poor, they would be m

repeat. I will settle for nothing less. 

Let me now review some of NASA’s own activities 

since the Challenger accident shook our confidence. W

to look at everything we had done from design to the 

own decisionmaking. Part of this was the responsib

force under Admiral Truly’s general direction and w

direction by his associate, Mr. J.R. Thompson on m

volved the development and production team, a prela

team, a mission planning and operations team, an a

sis team, a salvage support team, and a photo and TV 

Much of its activities were aimed at helping the Ro

sion. The NASA task force reports were made to th

in mid-April, but data is still being gathered, analy

sued by appropriate NASA leaders. While the Roger

has completed its activities, we have not. We search f

we continue our work. The period from the Challeng

our next launch will be a time of reevaluation for NA

will not stop. It will only be more intense than ever. 

Mr. Chairman, during the past several weeks, an

during the past few days, the questions of when w

next space shuttle has been raised. I have said that o

is July 1987, but I want that goal placed in its prope

that context is safety. We will fly in 1987 if it is saf

will not fly if it is not. In the complicated interrelate

which we must function, a target date is necessary, p

potential users. But the date is not a fixed and inflexi

We are realistic about our problems, some of whi

Commission noted, and we know there may be del
the date of summer of 1987 as a goal, which may ch

not changeable is our commitment to fly again only 

to do so. We will fly when we know clearly that we h

the problems which led to the Challenger disaster. 

Finally, while Admiral Truly will deal with the 

mendations of the Rogers Commission report and w

ready doing or have done, I want to make severa

about the report itself. The report of a presidentially 

dependent body carries with it special status and t

obligation to study its conclusions with an openness 

ness to change. That is particularly so with this repo

thoroughly and with care, and with both toughne

standing, and I repeat, it was done with our cooperat

In its preface it was noted that NASA established 

of people not involved in the Challenger launch pro

the Commission and its panels. I think it is importa

committee and the Congress and the American pu

stand that NASA and the Rogers Commission have 

together even as each maintained its independen

many weeks of the Commission’s work. 

The preface of the report said, “These NASA team

ated with the Commission in every aspect of its wo

has been a comprehensive and complete investigatio

tigation will have profound effects on NASA and 

grams in the future of the United States. Change

been made or will come, yet, Mr. Rogers said, “You 

punish, you just want to make sure it does not happe

I am reminded also of a statement by President J

dy, who said at another difficult time in our history, 

bility is not to fix the blame for the past, but to fix 

the future.” This is the goal I think we all share. It 

best, possibly the only way to reassert American 

space. The President said last week, “The men 

NASA and the task they so ably perform are e

Nation if we are to retain our leadership in the pur

logical and scientific progress.” That is certainly 

beyond question. As I have said, speaking for the e

agency that has given lasting knowledge to the wor

tion to this great Nation that we have reached w

Commission report, a day of resolve, a time of begin

redirection. 

I hope my testimony and what Admiral Truly w

greater detail demonstrates the validity of that asse

is done, we would be pleased to respond to any que

have. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you, Dr. Fletcher. 

Admiral Truly. 

Admiral TRULY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and 

members. With your permission, I would like to su

ment for the record and summarize it. 
Admiral TRULY. Mr. Chairman, in the months since 

duty following the loss of the Challenger, I alon wi

organization have spent many hours in support o B the 

mission. I have done my best to assist them in the co

investigation. I have read their report carefully, and 

people that are pulling it together, not only just the 

tions and the findings, but the text, with a fine tooth 

those suggestions that we can, should, and will implem

The report is extremely thorough and comprehensi

in agreement with the findings and recommendatio

tremely pleased to say that in my own case there w

surprises in their findings and recommendations, an

this to the closeness with which we worked with the 

As a matter of fact, I am pleased to tell you that w

our way in each of them, I believe, to being able to 

President within 30 days as to our progress, and to 

format where as the months go on we can report effi

Congress and to the President and to the people as 

safe flight. 

With your permission I would like to very briefly g

recommendations one by one and summarize what h

and where we are. The first recommendation had to 

redesign of the joint of the solid rocket motor. Back o

directed that a redesign team be formed located at 

Space Flight Center to include participation not on

shall but also from other centers, Johnson, Kennedy, 

industry, and the leader of that team is with us he

John Thomas. I am sure that if there are details tha

answer, he would be pleased to step forward to the t

At that time an expert advisory panel was formed 

to the team. It includes about a dozen people from 

tions, including about half from industry, and recent

of an early suggestion in conversations with the Co

oversight group from the National Research Council 

nounced. We are having our first meeting with this o

mittee starting on Thursday and Friday of this wee

come them and look forward to working with them as 

as we make the decisions that are required to fix the 

get back to flight. 

Safety will be the primary concern, and the criteria 

redesign and the testing of that design will be the pro

ding. I think we are quite far along, but we have a v

to go, and we will be pleased to tell you about that tod

The second major recommendation had to do wit

management structure, and back on March 24, o

things that I set in motion through the system, I too

for myseif and purposely did not take action on it u

Commission had made its report. As Dr. Fletcher sai

announced that Capt. Bob Crippen, who has been a p

vestigation from the beginning, is going to be workin

lead a small group of people that will reexamine o

us. 
options that we will be looking at in the immediate fu

His review will be done in coordination with Gen. 

review for Dr. Fletcher of the entire NASA organiz

way that we manage our programs. The third major recommendation was a complete 

critical items list and the hazard analysis, and again 

I directed Mr. Arnie Aldrich, to my right here, who is 

manager of the space transportation system, to inst

malize a very large review of every item on the criti

Not just the solid rocket motor, but the orbiter, the e

and the main engines. That is in work, and we will 

answer your questions as to its status today. Dr. Fle

ready addressed the next recommendation, which ha

safety organization within NASA and the appointme

in NASA that would have safety, reliability, and qua

as its only and sole function. 

The next recommendation had to do with improve

tions within our system, and I personally think thi

most important part of the Commission’s work. It d

only to the Marshall Space Flight Center or to headqu

all of our people and all of our organizations. Captain 

also be taking a critical look at this recommendation 

program management structure, since they are so 

linked. One of the issues that came up, not as a direct 

accident, but was looked at thoroughly by the Commi

subject of landing safety. That is the use of the K

Center for landings, the status of our landing gear 

nose wheel steering, and our brakes. 

We have known about these problems for some 

have already begun to take programmatic actions t

work and to continue testing that is in work, and w

about that today. Another issue that quite naturall

been on the minds of the Commission and the public h

launch abort and crew escape. We have initiated a t

egress and escape review of the systems aboard the 

review has been in work at the Johnson Space Ce

time. It will be some time before it is completed. We 

the next couple of weeks to have an interim report, bu

you a status today, and as we go forward on that we w

to communicate that with you. 

One of the primary things that was recognized f

and addressed directly in the report are the pres

system, some of which are caused by striving for a fl

may be overambitious. We are actively looking at th

have already done that and reported to this subcom

our preliminary look at it, but I can assure you that w

studies are done, that we will be projecting and flying 

sustainable flight rate, and it is one that our system

our spares, our logistics, and our program managem

will support. 

The final and last recommendation had to do with 

safeguards, and we have already instituted or starte
you today. 

Mr. Chairman, I came to this job in the weeks fo

tragic accident with the resolve and the duty to assist th

tial Commission in finding the cause. The Commissio

their work. I embrace their report, and believe that I h

motion the initial steps to return the space shuttle to 

fective flight. Their report is a road map for me, and 

use it as my mandate for action. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before your 

tee today, for NASA needs your support and guida

Nation returns to safe space flight. Senator GORTON. Dr. Fletcher, Admiral Truly, than

that finish your formal presentation? 

Mr. FLETCHER. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

SENATOR Gorton. For the members of the subcommi

other guests, we will have one round limited to 10 min

everybody will be able to get in, and then a second roun

member can ask as many questions as he wishes on 

round. So 10 minutes for now. 

Admiral Truly, one of the recommendations of the R

mission was a firm payload assignment policy that w

rigorous controls on cargo manifest changes to limit th

such changes exert on schedule and crew changes. N

tion has been to use a certain amount of flexibility in 

its cargo in order to accommodate customers or to ma

tle capacity. 

Is this a recommendation with which you have rese

do you feel that the Rogers Commission changes are 

Admiral TRULY. No; it is not a recommendation tha

ervations about. This is one that I can directly and 

affect since the manifesting responsibility is in my off

headquarters. As we went through the investigation an

with the Commission I think the primary problem is 

primarly at the level 11 which is Mr. Aldrich’s organi

have the responsibility to do the advance planning fo

and there are too many late changes, changes to the m

instances, where even though we have rigorous guideli

that when you get within x number of months prior to 

should not change a certain item. I intend to thorou

that. I agree with it. I do not think that is going to ta

flexibility. In the space business we have always had c

I do not anticipate that this will change, we will have 

date late changes. For example, we had a case this past year where we 

lite actually on the pad that had a problem. We were 

back and change the manifest. We will have to have th

within the system to do that, but I intend to take a 

manifesting process and make sure that the changes th

are required, whether they be satellites or people or p

whatever. 

Senator GORTON. Dr. Fletcher, I am sure Admiral Tr

ment if he wishes. Are there any of the recommend
. 

p, 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, Admiral Truly an

cussed this at some length during the days since th

report was given to us, and one by one we have look

ommendations, and we have no difficulty with any of 

Senator GORTON. Admiral Truly, there has been 

emphasis and, of course, an appropriate emphasi

rocket boosters as the cause of this accident over oth

items. In your testimony, you told us about your im

ning with that problem. Can you outline at this poin

changes you are either going to make or are most lik

the redesign of the solid rocket boosters and their s

a future accident like the accident which destroyed t

Admiral TRULY. We have not chosen a design so 

describe to you what the redesign will be. We are lo

options. We very much would like to have a redesig

suming we will have a redesign that can use the 

the raw case hardware that is being delivered to 

ready under contract at the time. We are not lim

however, to that possibility, and as a matter of fact, 

we had a meeting to look at other design possibiliti

that the testing of our approved redesign when we 

along the way. This will save us months in the futur

Dr. FLETCHER. MrChairman, could I add to that 

though that is in the area of Admiral Truly’s exper

sociates, I have had an opportunity to go over the d

though he may be modest about saying so, all of th

were shown to me are greatly superior to the one th

in the accident. No matter which one is chosen, I 

look very good. But of course you will not know that 

gone through the test program, and that is what 

was emphasizing. 

Senator GORTON. Do you intend to test several di

before you decide on one? 

Admiral TRULY. We are doing a lot of early sub

order to determine a final design. What Dr. Fletch

very important. As you know, the Commission found 

of this accident was a failure of the solid rocket mo

ever, there are four or five areas within that that co

causes, so we are requiring that this redesign assum

those was the primary cause, and we will design 

future. 

For example, the doubt on the use or the perfo

putty, the possibility of water getting into the joi

into ice, the possibility of damage during assembling 

so forth. Each of those possible failures will be desi

new design, whatever it turns out to be. 

Senator GORTON. Isthis most likely to be the prob

erns when we fly again whether or not it can be J

any time in 1987? It seems to me that your answ

first, you have got to pick a design, and then, seco

implement that design, test it, all of these, before w
gg

Dr. FLETCHER. Well, Mr. Chairman I probably ough

first, but Admiral Truly, I am sure, will correct me 

track. Of course, there are many, many things invol

launch which is now planned for summer of 1987. If I w

a judgment, I would say not just the choosing of a des

test program that is associated with whatever design or 

go forward with probably will be the determining factor 

we launch again. 

Having said that, however, until you actually get in

sign of these various critical items, which are also un

you need to review things like management, which I am 

sure we can handle by then, and other possible con

launch. I should not mention this, but it is also conc

there might be funding constraints. If there are any, I w

but right now there do not appear to be any. But these 

sible constraints on that launch date. 

If I were guessing, though, I would say it is still th

those seal designs that would probably be the long pole 

Admiral Truly, do you want to correct what I just sai

Admiral TRULY. No; I agree with that. Of the items t

seen so far, and the difficulty involved with full-scale te

redesigned solid rocket motor, taking that system thr

liminary design review and the critical design review, a

ting concurrence of the oversight committee, I see that 

pole in the tent. 

Senator GORTON. What about the unused solid rocket 

ments manufactured by Morton Thiokol that you have 

Are they, under most of your redesign efforts, going to 

are they going to be waste? 

Admiral TRULY. There is some hardware we are not 

able to use; however, we did have already in as a po

filament wound case development a design that involv

tang which will help us, but not completely, solve the p

you are aware of in joint rotation; in other words, the m

the joint caused by the pressure transient at ignition. 

It is that hardware, and I should also say that after 

tang had been designed into the filament wound cas

began to get the manufacturer of the raw case hardwa

to us hardware with enough metal so that it could b

with that capture tang of various dimensions. It is th

that we intend to use. 

Senator GORTON. One more question. What has the 

your investigation and your work done with respect to 

on second sourcing? Admiral TRULY. As you know, we have instituted an 

out and start a solid rocket motor second-source ini

was in the works, and after the accident, that effort 

hold. I have the action within the Office of Space Flig

all the complex factors that we have now facing us and 

ommendation to Dr. Fletcher as to what I think is the 

to go. 
actually joined us in a working sense yet, that action 

in basket, and I have not reported to Dr. Fletcher w

believe we should take. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr.Chairman, I want to make sure 

that second source will not affect the start date whe

that that will be downstream if and when it is implem

Senator GORTON. Senator Riegle. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Chairman, before the clock 

terms of my time with the witnesses, I am wondering 

haps pose a question to you just in terms of subcomm

which I think we ought to try to pin down at the out

Senator GORTON. Sure. Go ahead. 

Senator RIEGLE. Senator Hollings has some concer

dicated, and I share the concern that we make sure 

ommendation in hand from the administration on th

policy decision on the replacement of the shuttle, i

recommended, how it is to be paid for, all the co

issues that go with that, prior to the time that we 

markup, on the theory that if we do not really know 

going, we cannot chart a proper course. 

I am acutely conscious of the pressure of time, as I 

and so I have no desire for us to delay a single h

think we are already very late. On the other hand, 

how we can properly go through a process of puttin

dation to the Senate if we have not had a clear re

from the administration. That is my first point. 

My second, and perhaps you could address both of 

am concerned that this subcommittee has not yet a

view, to pursue some of the questions that remain 

dent. This is the appropriate subcommittee in the Se

The House, as I understand it, this week is ca

which include Dr. Lucas and apparently Mr. Mul

who were involved in the breakdown in the mana

that led to the state of launch. It is appropriate tha

am pleased that they are doing their work. 

I do not, however, view that as a substitute for o

am wondering if we will here shortly also be able t

with key management people within NASA question

of us have that I think are as yet unanswered. 

So we have not yet had a chance to discuss this 

are sort of rolling ahead on their own, but I think 

very important questions, and I pose them in the sp

we have worked together all the way along here, wi

sion and with one another. I want to continue to ha

constructive approach to it, because that is what I t

lem requires. 

I am just wondering if you could give me a 

thoughts on those two things. 

Senator GORTON. I am happy to deal with those 

counting against your initial 10 minutes. I will ta

verse order. 
more important than going into the details of the past

less, if you and Senator Hollings and other members of t

mittee have specific concerns which we can productiv

here, I think that we should meet together and find out 

concerns are and see whether or not we can deal with 

tively. 

Now,.as I say, my primary goal is to be engaged in the 

which we are engaged here today and relating our w

future. With respect to your first question, you know 

shared an intense frustration at the unwillingness or 

the administration to get its act together and to make 

dations to us as to the future of NASA. 

Senator Hollings, both you and I serve on the Sen

Committee Conference which in fact is meeting righ

have, in that connection, not waited for the administra

its act together. We have made a very specific offer o

resolution which involves NASA in hopes that making 

mendation, taking a Senate position, a bipartisan posi

force the administration into an answer. 

As a consequence, it is my disposition not to wait m

for administration recommendations in order to determ

mittee and a subcommittee position. I believe that we sh

what we think is right and write an authorization b

basis, with the hope that it might trigger action on the 

administration. 

Now, I do not want to do that in a way which is goin

sive in the committee or on the floor of the Senate, bu

ticularly in the subcommittee and the committee. If e

percentage of the members do not want to do anythin

authorization until the administration comes forward 

ommendation, I suppose I will have to defer to that posi

My own view is, and I can express it here publicly 

privately, that we have responsibilities in this regard 

administration does. The fact that the administration d

up to what you and I consider to be those responsibil

opinion, is going to make our job harder, but I do no

should abandon doing the job. 

Senator RIEGLE. I thank the chairman for his respons

Let me take it just one step further. I know about a 

over a month ago, we asked Admiral Poindexter of th

Security Council if we might be able to have a discussi

policy issues so that we could at least get a sense as to 

might be heading and use that usefully here in maki

judgments. We have had no response from that request. 

I know they have been busy, but presumably there i

some point for some discussion. I suppose Senator Hol

also like to reflect his thought on it as the ranking me

full committee, but the point I want to make here is t

we are at an absolutely crucial point in the space p

other words, we are now confronted with a host of enor

questions that we could not foresee a while ago prior 

dent, but the accident, together now with other things, 
The decision as to whether or not to have an

whether that is to come out of the hide of NASA 

current programming or whether we face up to th

may need money in order to decide if we are able t

placement shuttle; the whole question of whether 

commercial launch business; of whether we are go

major way to expendable launch vehicles; wheth

target with our space station timing and program, 

lutely vital questions, I think, to the country and 

security. 

I am not suggesting that the chairman disagrees

pressing my own view. I do not think we can k

through those questions without everyone sitting do

with one another and coming out with a kind of a 

tional consensus. 

So I am reluctant to, in a sense, steamroller the 

or to have them steamroll us because we are all 

same direction. I would hope that we would resolv

before we start spending money on making recom

the Senate. 

I think when we go to the Senate floor as an auth

tee and subcommittee, we have to be able to say to 

in the Senate this is what we see as the future pro

for our country, and we have talked it through. T

tion, ourselves, and hopefully the House as well, an

gether with a common plan which we have really w

We know where we are going, and we can now go t

people and ask them to join in that commitment an

money to see that it is done. 

I am not sure that at a point as momentous as th

do it any other way properly, and so I am very un

notion of saying that because the administration is l

are, we will just roll ahead anyway. I think someho

cussions which have to take place with Don Regan 

self and Chairman Danforth or what have you, I thi

to proceed in what I would consider to be a more 

given the magnitude of the decisions which we have 

Also, of course, we have this closing legislative w

probably no more than 55 or 60 legislative days left 

am concerned that we are going to get caught in t

events and that we will just roll on into next yea

thing being clearly decided. 

Senator GORTON. That is correct. If we do nothin

find something in a continuing resolution or an app

in which the policy will be settled. 

Senator HOLLINGS. I think there is no question, 

that you and I and Senator Riegle and the committe

move forward. I think we all believe in the shuttle 

Program. There is no question that we are 100 pe

We are going even in the Budget Committee to get 

lion or whatever it is. There will be enough money 
That 1s where I go down a different road in the co

trying to solve the administration’s intramural probl

that, quite bluntly, Dr. Fletcher, quoting John F. Kenn

one in this room could be closer to him than I, our resp

not to fix the blame for the past but fix the past for 

Jack Kennedy would have said that without any shut

without any capsule fire. Our responsibility is to fix th

the past in order to fix the course for the future. 

I am not trying to put anybody in jail. After all I a

said there was no real malice in mind and we were n

kill astronauts and everything else, the silly Washin

trying to talk about criminal stuff. They are still bent o

Hollings into some kind of untenable, nonsensical posit

I am very genuine and sincere about this thing. Un

find out why they broke down in the communicatio

they did not follow through the normal channels-you 

NASA, generally speaking until all of this came out, h

procedures. 

Now, they have gone over all of these criticalities an

else, but if I am looking as a lawyer at proximate caus

cause is not, in this context as we in the law would 

flawed process but a violated one. I will ask Captain 

join you all at the table, and just ask him. He can be 

over. I would like to know from him what happened

heard comments that he made at the particular time. 

am trying to find out. 

You folks are trying to give the Rogers Commission t

ernment award. The heck with that. I am trying to 

Program that we all can proudly get behind, and we a

to fashion one of those unless we get through with the 

mission. They make, I think, a fundamental flaw in re

a safety officer. Once you have the safety officer, nob

about safety because that is the safety officer’s problem

We know that that is the way it has worked when

that thing up, and I do not want to go down that parti

want to reinstitute that procedure, for example, Capt

when you come up, whereby you said the process was 

NASA cross-examines the contractor as to why fly. In 

was why fly rather than why fly. I like that procedu

gosh, the contractor is saying why not to fly, and y

saying let us go, forget about safety. Forget about safe

As I understand what Captain Crippen said, to sort o

memory he said that the process was reversed for the 

his memory. Now, he can stand up and clear that up la

I get my time. 

Mr. Chairman, you know we are going to get a bud

going to put some money in, but we are not going to h

Program really going unless we get in and find out 

some positive recommendations rather than the litan

the Rogers report. We are looking at this; we are loo

we are looking into the next thing and everything e

doing all of these things. That is fine business, but we 
Now, that is what I want, and that is what you 

they will have to come back after they have done s

flection. They have not lined it out, and maybe it ha

the administration. Obviously, it has to begin with t

tion but then they will have to put it in, rather 

Rogers report, with the administration submission. T

have got to look at it and make sure that this wh

back in harness where the House and Senate, Re

Democrats and everybody are fully behind the progr

I am confident the money is going to be there. 

you and I are going to put it in the budget, even if t

anything up from the White House. Do you not agree

Senator GORTON. Yes. I think we had better get ba

tions of this panel now. 

Senator Riegle, now your time is starting. 

Senator RIEGLE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am convinced that we are going to solve the m

lems that led to this disaster. In fact, there were v

people within NASA who felt they knew what had c

dent after the explosion and before the shuttle and t

even hit the water because of the history of the 

forth. That has all been laid out in the Rogers Com

I think that is the easiest set of problems to solve. 

are very difficult problems, we will solve those probl

the ones we know how to solve, and we will get them 

I must say I do not have at the moment yet the 

confidence with respect to how we are going to sol

management issues which are related to it. In thi

confidence in you, Dr. Fletcher. As you know, I. was 

your nomination because I felt that you were a pe

tackle that, and I have the same feeling about Admi

I think that job is a lot tougher, and I think som

fully hard to get the full truth. I think there has be

sion in terms of even assembling the truth. In the c

that the Rogers Commission has done in terms of 

and who did what and so forth, a lot of the inform

gathered by the Rogers Commission grudgingly cam

That is very troubling to me, and it tells me th

problem that led to the breakdown in the manag

process I suspect continues to this day, and I want i

and dealt with so that we can have confidence that 

to happen again, at least by those individuals. 

SO let me start with you, Mr. Aldrich, and I wo

you just some very direct questions. Did you know 

ment the night before the launch, anytime prior to t

Mr. ALDRICH. No, sir, Senator Riegle, I did not k

cussion or of the criticality of it. 

Senator Riegle: Should you have known? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir, I should have known. 

Senator Riegle: Who would normally have been 

giving you that information? 
from Larry Mulloy, the solid rocket booster project man

Senator Riegle: Under the existing system that was 

that time, did they have an affirmative obligation to g

formation to you? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir, I believe they did. In fact, in 

earlier in the day where we discussed all aspects of th

ture and the weather effects on the launch we specifi

We reviewed all of the technical and procedural issues 

be impacted by the weather, and we specifically ask

other questions or concerns that might come up during 

of the remaining day or into the countdown to be broug

In fact, I believe that was a specific request for tha

report. Senator Riegle: So you asked for it, or it was asked fo

not provided, is that correct? 

Mr. ALDRICH. It was not brought forward. 

Senator Riegle: It should have been, I take it? 

Mr. ALDRICH. My opinion is definitely that it should 

Senator Riegle: Is that a matter of NASA procedure 

that is well established, that in a matter of that m

would be expected and proper practice for that inform

related to you? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Senator Riegle: So there was a breakdown at that poi

Mr. ALDRICH. I believe there was. I had strong confi

system as it should work, and I had no uncertainty th

would be brought forward. I think our system has docu

cedures and provision for that to happen. 

Senator Riegle: Now, with respect to the O-ring prob

history and the fact that last year, I believe in August, 

meeting at the level I level of NASA where Michael W

pated where the O-ring problem was discussed in some 

you familiar with that meeting and the concerns that 

at that time about that problem? 

Mr. AIDRICH. No, sir, I was not. I was only infor

meeting after the accident and in particular the level 

who were involved and the detailed technical content o

ing. I did not know that such a deliberation was activ

gram. I might add that I took this job I am in in August. 

other position, and I was not sensitized particularly to 

out such an activity with regard to the prior history. It is my belief, though, that the proper way for in

that criticality to flow is through the level I1 office, wh

and it did not flow in that manner. 

Senator Riegle: I do not know what the dates are of 

in August in terms of when that meeting occurred an

came aboard, but it seems to me that presumably som

affirmative managerial obligation to see that you had t

tion. Am I correct in thinking that? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I think most certainly that is correc

criticality of the subject and the amount of concern w
Senator Riegle: Who would have had the obligatio

information to your attention? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I am not sure how the meeting was 

it was requested by NASA Headquarters Level I org

fact if it was brought forward by the Level I11 proje

at Marshall. I do not know who first said we shou

meeting, but either of those levels should in fact 

process of communication through the Level I1 offi

gram management in Houston, as the mechanism 

all parties and all communications were involved i

tions that followed. 

Senator Riegle: In terms of the connecting points d

agement structure, who would be the person that r

ately to you from those lower levels? Who in a sens

person that normally would deliver that message ha

erly delivered to you? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Well, normally the report coming up 

I11 project would come from Mr. Reinartz and 

myself, indicating that a technical issue should be d

questing to bring it forward. 

If the request was in fact the result of delibera

Headquarters about concerns that related to the im

flight which had a nozzle erosion question, then a

correct way and the programmatically correct wa

that information would be for the NASA Headqu

tion to send me directions to set up such a meeting 

all parties. 

Senator RIEGLE. It sounds to me like it was the s

again that would have had a managerial obliga

normal course of events to bring this information to 

and did not do so. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman. 

Senator RIEGLE. If I may, Dr. Fletcher, let me just 

answer, then I would be happy to hear from you. 

Mr. ALDRICH. The program communication man

nels are essentially the same from project to pro

Headquarters in the day-today business. 

Senator RIEGLE. So these would be the same indi

what it boils down to? 

Mr. A.IDRICH. Yes, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. You wanted to say something, Dr

Dr. FLETCHER. I wanted to make sure that inform

Riegle, has to flow both ways, and so I think it was 

sibility of the headquarters people to inform Arnie 

seriousness of the problem. I want to make sure 

have a one-way communication system. 

Senator RIEGLE. I think that is a very importa

Who would have been the management people at t

that would have had an awareness of this problem 

have properly reported it to you? 

Mr. ALDRICH. My reporting channel in the progra

ral Truly’s predecessor, Mr. Jesse Moore. Mr. Week
Senator RIEGLE. So should Mr. Weeks likewise have r

to you? 

Mr. ALDRICH. There are a number of offices there, 

which might have been the specific person or office, bu

zation as a whole should have not reported it so much 

that we be directly involved and specifically arrange it. 

Senator RIEGLE. Going up the ladder, would Mr. W

Moore be the critical point? 

Mr. ALDRICH. It could be Mr. Moore or Mr. Wee

Moore did not have a deputy. His deputy position w

that time. It could be his deputy. 

Also, there is a Propulsion Office at NASA Headqu

Mr. Winterhalter who frequently would pursue arrange

sure they were conducted in a complete fashion. 

Senator RIEGLE. Is it your understanding that the O-

knowledge was known at that higher level? It certainly 

Weeks, because he had participated in that briefing i

he had the information. 

Do you know one way or another as to whether Mr. M

as well? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I believe the question of O-ring erosion 

throughout the program for a number of flights, p

summer. It is really the severity of it and the implic

interrelationship with the design that was not apprecia

Senator RIEGLE. So you did not receive a message f

down either, as you might properly have received it? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I did not. 

Senator RIEGLE. My time is nearly up. And I am goin

pursue this because these are critical matters in my vie

don’t want these mistakes repeated, and the only wa

make sure they are not going to be repeated is not on

the management system, but to find out who violated 

and to see to it that they don’t have a chance to do it a

Senator GORTON. Senator Gore. 

Senator GORE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I would like to, first of all, just pick up where Senato

off and ask some questions about the communications 

The Commission recommended improvements to the 

tions system. 

Let me just ask you, shouldn’t upper level managem

of the criticality I items that most threaten the succes

sion, and shouldn’t upper management know when 

waiver of constraints as a result of those criticality 

Fletcher? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Gore, of course, the answer i

management should be aware of those things. Why th

aware of the particular instance when it was changed 

ity I-R to criticality I in the case of the seals is a puzz

am sure that is one of the things that Captain Crippe

look very carefully at in his examination. 
do you know, Mr. Aldrich? 

Mr. ALDRICH. I believe Jack Lee has that figure. 

Mr. LEE. On 51-L there were two criticality I lau

waived on the SRB; none on the external tank, fiv

Senator GORE. What were they? 

Mr. LEE. Can I give you that for the record? I 

number at this time. I have the area that they wer

not the specifics associated with them. 

Senator GORE. What was the other one on the SR

Mr. LEE. One was a transducer that required som

I am not certain of that torque value. 

[The following information was subsequently r

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Who was informed of these waivers? 

Dr. FLETCHER. There are two questions, Senator Go

the past, we can answer that one, either Arnie or Jac

future, we are going to correct whatever deviations w

the past. 

Go ahead, Jack. 

Mr. LEE. In the case of the launch constraints tha

lished by the Solid Rocket Booster Project Office-there 

nal system that allowed the establishment of a constr

own use in identiffing problems. The category of the launch constraint or the te

launch constraint was dropped within the Project Offi

considered that problem to be closed. 

Now, the problem itself associated with that cons

other levels of review throughout the system, but we

fied as launch constraints after that. So the problem 

selves got discussed a number of times at different fli

reviews. 

Senator GORE. Well, correct me if I am wrong, but 

of launch constraint is that there is a problem that sh

before the next launch; correct? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. 

Senator GORE. OK. Leaving aside this question whi

plore for the record, but in the future who should b

launch constraints? All the way up to the top, Dr. Flet

Dr. FLETCHER. Of course, that is an issue that Cap

will be looking at, but in my opinion yes, all the way 

Senator GORE. OK, fine. 

Now, I am interested in how many other problems w

tle might reach the level of criticality that the O-ring

"here were a number of other launch constraints. 

number of other problems. Do you have a sense that yet as to whether any 

might be as serious as the O-ring problem? 

Admiral TRULY. I think I will pass this to Mr. A

think that could probably best be answered by him 

scription of what he is going through in the critica

This review includes the flight history of these ind

and there are some items that we are considering, and 

will make changes to. 

Senator GORE. Well, if it is going to be lengthy 

supply that for the record if you would. 

Let me ask you about one in particular and that h

the space shuttle main engine. In the NASA data and 

sis review, the finding was that the main engine is re

high-technology, high-power density state-of-the-art r

The mutual understanding of the complexity of th

the attention of detail given has no doubt been an im

in the success of the program to date. 

Now, you mentioned that while there were two 

straints on the SRB for flight 51-L, there were fiv

straints that were waived on the main engine. 
space shuttle main engine since the Challenger accident exceeded NA

gines and would have grounded the fleet if the accident had not. 

Do you agree with that, Mr. Aldrich? 

Mr. LEE. I can answer that. I do not agree with th

know the basis of it. I would be happy to determine t

Senator GORE. Does anybody else want to comment o

Dr. FLETCHER. I think, Senator Gore, just a gener

The space shuttle main engine did receive a lot more a

concern than the solid rocket booster. It has always b

very high technology engine and there were things li

the blades, and so forth, that were always being carefu

as the program went along. 

Senator GORE. And there were shortcuts in the te

main engine, too, weren't there? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I do not know about the shortcuts, b

there were concerns and that is why you find so many 

waivers in the case of the space shuttle main engine

more attention because of the very high technology 

volved. 

Now, the particular detail that you referred to, I am 

of. 

[The following information was subsequently rece

record:] 

Further checking verifies that there were six launch constraints in

previously indicated in Mr. Lee's testimony. The six, together with a

each, and the ongoing corrective action are provided as follows: 

Constraint Assessment Cor

One ball of HPOT No. 4 

bearing found spalled 

during pump disassembly. 

4,000 Hz high vibration 

levels on engine 2025. 

Cracks found in LOX inlet 

splitter vanes on ground 

test engine 2116. 

4,000, Hz vibration observed 

on engine 2026. 

lntermitten firing of spark 

igniters was indicated 

during engine preiaunch 

checkout. 

Similar spalling has been observed periodically through- Improvements ha

out the program without incident. cantly reduce 

spalled ball. 

While certain ground test engines have experienced Tests are in pro

this problem, no engine has been used for flight flow resonan

that exhibited this characteristic. Engines with high splitter vane

vibrations can be identified in engine ground testing. tions. Also, 

engines that 

tion is in dev

Cracks were determined to be results of MCC LOX Tests are in pro

flow resonant condition causing 4,000 Hz high flow resonan

vibration condition. The effect is vane cracking flow splitter v

caused by high cycle fatigue. No engine has been tions. Also, 

used for flight that exhibits this characteristic. engines that 

tion is in dev

The vibration amplitude was less than 15 G's and Tests are in pr

duration was less than fie seconds. Because of the flow resonan

low amplitude and by analyses, this was not flow splitter 

considered a problem on this engine. tion. Also, a 

gines that e

is in develop

Igniters were returned to Rocketdyne for failure analy- None. 

sis. The igniters were extensively tested without 

incurring any failures. Also, six igniters were hot 

fire tested in an engine and were found to be 

satisfactory. All engine combustors have redundant 

spark igniters. No ignition problems have occurred 

in program. 
g pqy pg

metal pad came loose and additional insp

was found lodged against the metal 

nozzle. welded. 

Senator GORE. Well, I would like you to elaborate on 

record, if you would, each of the five launch constr

main engine and your assessment of how serious the p

and what the fix might be. 

Dr. Feynman also from the Commission also pointed 

for the record. 

Now, in the area of quality assurance, I welcomed 

ment in your opening remarks, Dr. Fletcher, indicati

intend to move immediately to establish that separa

Quality Assurance and I think that is the kind of imm

that is really needed here. 

What about the number of quality assurance person

intend to increase the number of quality assurance 

addition to establishing this new office? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Well, Senator Gore, my feeling about 

number of personnel isn’t the critical issue. The critica

quality of personnel, the feedback that those personn

the quality assurance program from both the contract

the various quality control and safety people in the ce

make sure that plays well. That is the important thing

If an increase in the number of personnel is requir

certainly be done. 

Senator GORE. Well, the Commission felt that the 

critical. One of the Commission’s findings, and I quote

tions in the number of safety, realibility and quali

work force at Marshall and NASA Headquarters ha

limited capability in those vital functions.” 

You don’t disagree with that, do you? Dr. FLETCHER. No,I don’t disagree with that. 

Senator GORE. Well, isn’t one of the fixes then to 

number of people in the quality assurance work force? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I think that is certainly one of the th

entire organization. 

Senator GORE. But if you don’t have enough of them

can operate perfectly and they still won’t do the job. 

Dr. FLETCHER. I have no question but that there sho

crease of quality assurance personnel in certain aspec

gram. Senator GORE. All right. Well, I welcome that respon

Are you going to propose increasing the number 

budget? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I think that is going to have to awai

all of the management procedures. It is not a large ex

tor Gore, and so it can easily be accommodated in th

budget. 

c 

- titular problem and I will look forward to you elabora

L but as I indicated before, is how these people oper

62-885 0 - 86 - 6 
gp

deal with this finding as well and to increase the num

assurance personnel. I am recommending, I will say to, the chairman, t

separate line item for quality assurance in the budg

from NASA to the Congress, so that we can track this 

What do you think about that idea? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I don’t think that is a bad idea at 

Gore. I think you ought to track all the aspects of wh

that is certainly one of them. 

Senator GORE. Well, I appreciate that. 

Now, if you were given a choice today between ha

orbiter with all of the funding coming from other NA

or, on the other hand, not having a fourth orbiter, 

would you make? 

Dr. FLETCHER. That is a question that we are deali

now, Senator Gore, and as was indicated, this is a pol

am really reluctant to, shall we say, take the cost of 

biter out of our hide. We do not have much hide lef

my opinion. This is only my feeling and it does not r

of the administration necessarily. 

We are in a critical situation at NASA right now. W

bad accident. We are trying to fix what went wrong

the technical fix, as you all indicated, but the commu

management fix. We really need a fourth orbiter. W

placement orbiter for the Challenger, not just becaus

needs, but because the country wants it. 

We would be letting those that lost their lives down 

ahead with the fourth orbiter. As I say, it is a crisi

seems to me that in normal times a crisis situation de

plement to a budget of an agency like NASA. 

Now, having said that, we are in an awkward situa

Gramm-Rudman-Hollings bill, in that people hav

themselves to following that bill. The administration

following it without a tax increase, Senator Holling

the problem-how we fund that fourth orbiter-and 

yet been resolved. 

Senator GORE. But given that choice, you would say 

biter? 

Dr. FLETCHER. It depends upon the details of tha

without knowing the details, I would not want to e

cost of that fourth orbiter; no. 

Senator GORE. So the answer would be that you w

it. OK. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Rockefeller. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Fletcher, you talk about the Office of Safety, R

Quality Assurance. And it has been suggested in 

today that if you fix responsibility to an office or to 

administrator, that that somehow diffuses the instin

elsewhere in the organization. 
relationship betweenthe reporting relationship betw

ciate administrator and the administrator. 

It is very difficult to make any comparison betwee

the Peace Corps in its earlier days, and I will not t

that. But one of the innovations of the early day 

which was in a sense new, skeptically regarded as nai

of Americans all across the world, doing what people 

sure what. So the question was, how do you make s

agency, skeptically regarded by Congress, but more 

within the agency, that mandates are carried out? 

safety in this case or quality assurance, but quality of 

So the Peace Corps started what was new in Govern

point. They started an Office of Evaluation and the 

not that it was an Mice of Evaluation, but that its 

his staff reported only to the Administrator. It was an 

situation. Only the Director of the Peace Corps or Sa

received that recommendation. 

It did not pass through other areas of the Peace Co

only go to the Director. Therefore, it could speak the 

There could be no pressures on it. The Director, whe

it knew, in that he trusted the associate administr

case, a fellow named Charley Peters-that he was tell

Charley Peters had no reason not to tell the t

nobody could get at him except the Administrator. 

seem to be a trivial thing, but it worked out to be 

and powerful tool. 

I wonder whether it is that kind of relationship th

from your office in the reporting procedure. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Rockefeller, I do not think 

that you made with the Peace Corps is a bad one. T

fairly accurately my impression of the kind of office 

going to try to set up. 

It is an independent audit function, if you like, 

safety and quality assurance, reliability and quality 

being carried out everywhere in the agency, not just i

but at the contractors, and so forth. 

It is an independent chain, if you like, to the Admin

sure that things are being done correctly. Having s

does not make automatically safety and reliability 

people that have to make that happen are the line p

signers, the people that communicate, the managers, 

This is an indpendent route on how well we are doing

supposed to do, and the kind of person that leads th

got to be somebody that is respected by the entire orga

I would like to think of it as somebody not with larg

troops supplying large amounts of data, but somebod

intimate knowledge of how the system works, is abl

himself personally, and we call it kicking the tires, 

visiting the troops, seeing how the program is coming

tions, how are you doing here, and are you followin

dure, et cetera, et cetera. An independent chain of co

like, much the same as you described the Peace Corps
p

you, that is, “eyes only,” that report not being availa

senior officials at NASA, except at your discretion? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I was just going to add, except at my 

think there are times when you would want the resu

vealed to the rest of the organization, but in cases w

sensitive, to me only. I should add, and to my deputy as well. 

Senator ROCKEFEDR. When you said “cases,” wh

phrasing? Dr. FLETCHER. Well, for example, there may be ve

cases, in which case he would want to report to me dire

an body else being aware of it. That is the nature-- 

Lnator ROCKEFELLER. That is the point I am trying t

Dr. FLETCHER. Butthere may be other cases where h

porting to me and it should be made known to othe

that they are in error, and that should be reported b

Senator ROCKEFELLER. But that would be at your d

other words, the initial thrust would come only to you 

discretion you would go to those affected? 

Dr. FLETCHER. That description, Senator Rockefe

goals; yes. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I think that will be very usefu

important matter of quality assurance. I think that 

great deal. 

The last time you were before us, Dr. Fletcher, y

your own concern that NASA not be taken over by the 

of Defense, and you and I have talked about that pr

that time. 

There appeared to be even more pressures-budgetary 

SDI pressures, a truck shuttle, large capacity launch s

wings. It has been suggested by SDI people that there 

to literally be 50,000 launches at the current rate to g

ing. 

Well, we were at 24 launches, and now we are repo

to 12, so that would seem to put the military dimensio

the forefront which it has on the priority basis any

even greater sense of priority. You worried about that last time. You mused about 

cerned that it not happen, and now you have made ref

new budget restraints. SDI continues to be a priority 

dent. He is going to be in office for another 2Y2 years. Does your concern about military predominance with

it as strong as it was before, or perhaps stronger? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Rockefeller, you raise a good 

if you don’t mind, I would like to divide it into two 

what the SDI needs will be, if and when it becomes o

think that is what was referred to when they said larg

flights will be required of the shuttle. 

I think that is a brandnew ballgame when that take

would hope a different transportation system than 

would be indicated. However, during this technology 
pp

I intend to keep a good balance between that pre

pressure from the scientific community and others 

that we have a balanced program on the shuttle. Re

only 1992 on our current schedule that we begin to 

space station. And the shuttle, if it is a four-orbiter 

hard pressed to even just take care of the space stat

SDI and other needs. 

So with three shuttles, it looks very difficult. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Are you in a position to con

works out? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Rockefeller, at this point I 

worthy assistant, Associate Administrator Admiral 

should leave the Admiral out, because he is a NASA 

now and he is doing very well at working the delica

tween all of the different users, the NASA users, th

users like the TDRS, the scientific users, and the mili

Senator ROCKEFELLER. One final question. We have 

the military use, we have talked about the requirem

itself and launches, et cetera. 

There is also medical use. The last time you discu

use-Voyagers, the telescopes. 

Dr. FLETCHER. I include medicine as a science. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. I want to differentiate that j

because it seems to me that the cure for cancer, 

anemia, various experiments that are planned for sp

which have been started that are noncommercial

nonspace-oriented in the sense of telescopes or V

simply medical-cures of major diseases, zero gr

which come up there which cannot be duplicated at le

tific laboratories on Earth-that they have an eno

tance. 

I truly worry about their future. I think science a

percent of the NASA budget now. What part of th

periments would be, I don’t know, but it must be an 

Are you committed to seeing that medical science e

space, for example, the cure for cancer, for example

anemia about which there is hope on both fronts 

those will be continued? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Rockefeller, I give you my w

will be continued. They are a very firm part of our 

ess that Admiral Truly, even in the early phases whe

is including very seriously in the planning process. 

a 

. Senator ROCKEFELLER. Butthey are last on the prio

Dr. FLETCHER. I would not say that; no. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Officially they are last. Desi

priorities, they come last. 

Admiral TRULY. When we started into the job of m

did set general priorities, the first being national 

second being large scientific payloads that have s

windows, and then finally-then, if I remember pre

our commitments to commercial and foreign satellite 
demands from each of these areasnational security, 

so forth. 

And your specific question, in medical science w

spacelab, life sciences spacelab, that is very high on th

ence priority list in their demands. We need it very b

as we look forward to the space station we think th

important primary mission. 

The difficulty is with the down time and the lower f

does have to compete with major national security pay

forth. But I can assure you that, even though, as an ex

of our DOD payloads have a high priority, they are no

fly before the next category. 

As a matter of fact, I have said before, and as comp

is, I think that in the first year or 18 months we are g

all of these, what I would call policy categories of cus

must also say very forthrightly that we are not going t

of them in those first few months, because of the limi

payload bays of the orbiter. 

Senator ROCKEFELLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Senator Hollings. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Let me ask, Captain Crippen, wo

around and sit next to Mr. Aldrich there. And Cap

want to know is what happened. I along with everyon

what scientifically and technically happened with resp

ring and the weather problem, all joining together to c

aster. 

I am also of the mind there was no venality or ma

tional injury done to our astronaut friends. And yet, 

time there is gross negligence. This lack of communica

erything else comes in to where in my opinion, unles

termine it and clean that up-the expression used by 

is “clean up and recovery”-that all of these folks who 

in the clean up and recovery-I’m not talking about 

and recovery of the damaged parts of the shuttle tha

ered and cleaned up and what have you. 

I am talking about the system. And you have been i

and I took note of your comment at the particula

rather than the contractor justifying why to fly and b

mined in the press and by NASA, as the system 

sponded and required, that rather the contractor was 

tify why not to fly. 

So with that little prelude, just tell us, what do you 

tor ought to know, what happened, so we can make 

does not happen again. And I am not talking about 

part. I am talking about the human part. 

I do not believe in this so-called safety office or w

and letting them put some one around to watch ev

more than that, somehow, as Arnie Aldrich has alr

now, and what I have always suspected, that the sy

flawed or the process flawed; it was violated. 
Fletcher. What happened and what should we do about 

Captain CRIPPEN. Senator Hollings, your objective is 

mine and the same as the rest of these gentlemen at 

think it was the same as the Commission. But we perh

that in a different way. If I may, I would like to at least put straight on th

comment that you were referring to that I made. It o

closed hearing of the Commission. The occasion wa

review of the meeting that occurred the night prior to 

between Morton Thiokol and NASA. And that was 

most people first learned of that particular conversatio

My statement was made in regard that I have been 

since 1969 and every launch that I have participated in 

the launch review process, the entire thing is for th

and the project management to come forth and pro

ready to fly. I believed that was the case on 51-L. 

However, in listening to the remarks that were 

about the conversation that occurred the night pr

Morton Thiokol and NASA, I observed to Chairman R

appeared that, in this particular instance, the contract

placed in the position of having to prove that he was 

fly; and if that had occurred, I thought NASA had m

error. 

It is difficult to establish the contractor position, be

big company. There were certain individuals that we

come forth and say that. And as Admiral Truly indi

the most important findings that came out of the 

report was communication. 

And that is just a word, but obviously communica

flowing properly from the bottom up or from top dow

that was happening, I do not know. I wish I did. I h

the system several times over and it is not obvious to m

Now, trying to fm blame, I find it difficult to do th

having to blame the system. We were not doing som

And it is my objective in the assignment that Admir

given me to try and correct that. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, you find then that comm

and I guess Admiral Truly agrees with you, because I 

tified over on the House side-that up there, that if th

cated to him a defect on one of the flights he took or 

a criticality one condition there, that he would have c

and not taken the flight. 

Admiral Truly, you were not communicated to pr

you? 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir; that is essentially right. 

had to do with the erosion on the second shuttle fl

flew aboard, and it turned out that that erosion of th

ring was the most serious erosion. And my answer w

on that day I been in charge and had we known-and 

important-had we known on that day what we kno

the accident, after our thousands of tests that have b

some of the members that are here today, how th
Senator HOLLINGS. And that again, as Captain Cr

tested, is a lack of communication. You did not know. 

Admiral TRULY. To be truthful, at that time I th

that I did not know about it until I came back to this 

the accident. However, I think on the first event, a

done all of that testing at that time, that would hav

cult conclusion to come to at that first event. 

But there is no question that, as the Commission a

Task Force has unfolded the events leading up to t

have to agree with Captain Crippen. The problem-a

this is difficult to accept, but it is still what I believe. 

The problem was in the system, and the problem 

discipline in using the launch review process and 

management process that has served us so well. 

Within hours after the President gave his letter 

Dr. Fletcher, I sent out a message to the various p

and to the centers on initial steps as to how to set i

covery procedure. And I said in there that the dire

out and the information that comes back is going to g

level 2 office, which is what I had always assumed ha

Senator HOLLINGS. Captain Crippen, really, you sa

cations problem. But is it not the case that the ind

the engineers, in one statement I think they said th

single prolaunch statement in that room, or at least 

ald was saying not to launch and he was communicat

Why was he being overridden so vigorously and vi

Marshall folks? 

Captain CRIPPEN. I am not sure I know the answer 

Mr. McDonald quoted in this weekend’s paper wher

aware of a problem with the erosion of the O-rings. 

it had been occurring on all of these flights, and he a

that it was OK to go fly. 

That had been the position, that the O-ring problem 

curring down the line, we have lots of evidence of i

the individuals that were looking at it thought ther

margin of safety still there. That was still, in my opi

conveyed throughout the rest of the system. 

But Mr. McDonald apparently was at least awar

degree, and it was only when combined with the cold 

preceding the launch that apparently those factors b

were the ones that caused him to be concerned. 

Obviously, some engineers and managers-and inc

of the managers were engineers, both on the Morto

NASA side-obviously did not reach the same conc

every one of them that were sitting in that room wis

chance to change their mind now, but obviously t

case. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Well, you know, in fairness to 

I think the record is replete that he was the one obj

was not approving. In fact, that is where the testim

here in this particular hearing room by Dr. Graha

the person charged with the responsibility of signing 
. 

Oh, no; I am the fellow who is responsible and I absolutely refus

launch, and Dr. Graham of NASA knows that because I testified to 

ous Friday in the closed hearing. 

So that is pretty clear to me. 

Mr. Aldrich, was there any kind of-what was the 

this particular occasion where you have just that, eve

ing exactly why. Everybody knew about the O-ring 

other words, it is not-well, I will just complete that th

When they say on page 82 of the Rogers Commission 

The decision to launch the Challenger was flawed. Those who ma

were unaware of the recent history of problems concerning the 

joint. 

They were not aware? We know differently. That f

Commission is inaccurate, and we will have a chance 

out if we want to. But these are the kinds of things, g

down the list with respect to the report of the Comm

again on page 145 that they say, Mr. Beggs: 

I had no specific concerns with the joints, the O-rings, or the putty

This is contradicted by the document in the Commi

sion that the O-ring charring is a major agenda item 

1985 between Mr. Beggs and Mr. Moore. And so I cou

through here and make those corrections. 

But I am trying to find out, Mr. Aldrich, do you hav

now on reflection to know why you weren’t communi

these particular things? For example, they had som

conversations, calls back and forth, the evening be

Morton Thiokol, Marshall, and the center, and yet no

to you. 

What is your explanation of that? 

Mr. &RICH. Mr. Hollings, I have thought abou

times since the accident and I have thought about ou

it is a system that has been in existence at NASA fo

and I had great confidence in it. It is a system that I 

has perceptibly changed at any point in time prior to 

When you couple that with my knowledge of the 

Marshall Center that were responsible in these area

and Mr. Mulloy and Mr. Reinartz-I have worked in p

at NASA, the Skylab Program and the Apollo Progra

individuals, and had the highest respect for their tec

tence. 

So why we came to this point in a system that I b

the people who were responsible in the program for 

cant technical matters, and yet we were not able to 

in a way that we all understood the issues on the ta

answer. 

The fact is, those items were not brought forwa

before the launch, even though Mr. Mulloy called m

about two other items, the ice on the launch pad, o

complex, and the sea state at sea. We had a discussio

that evening following this long deliberation on the SR
But it did not. 

Senator HOLLINGS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you. 

Now, at this point, members, each may ask whatev

he wishes. We are not going to time the second round. 

Both Admiral Truly and Dr. Fletcher have talked a

dorsed the concept of a shuttle safety panel. Senator 

concerns about that on the ground that by assigning s

cally to a particular group there will be a loss of conc

on the part of other people within NASA. 

I would like either or both of you to comment on 

would differ from the current aerospace safety adviso

what kind of responsibilities and day to day functions 

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Chairman, there is always the d

are not careful that you set up a crutch to solve a 

that people then relax, thinking that the crutch will so

lem. 

The only way you can solve that problem is to ma

everybody in the direct chain of management feels a 

for doing his job correctly. This is a motivation and I 

dedication problem. All of the people in the chain of c

we talked about earlier today have got to feel a direc

ity for his part of the job. 

That means communicating both up and down, ma

propriate judgment, if he has some concerns, lett

known, and so forth. That is the only way you can ma

work and work reliably. And that is the main thing I 

emphasize. 

This other is an audit function to make sure. It is a 

if you like, to make sure that everybody has done his j

down the line, and if there are some concerns along 

it has a separate channel to be fed to top managem

me. 

Senator GORTON. Ok. If I could interrupt, it is not go

veto power in and of itself? It will have a separate c

to Admiral Truly and to you, to relay these conce

launch decision .is made, am I correct? 

Dr. FLETCHER. It will not have a veto power in the n

We may, although this will have to be dealt with in 

we are not going to just appoint a person and then 

leave it. We are going to get the best experts in the co

that person do his job. 

It may turn out that he will be a part of the launch 

he has some concerns, he will refer those concerns to, 

the launch, the flight director and the mission contro

director later. But we have not made that decision yet

Mostly, he will be reporting to me, and of course 

have the power to stop the flight also. But generally 

done at the level one, which is the program AA, whi

Truly. 

Senator GORTON. Do you have anything to add to th
And I have to agree with Senator Hollings that a safe

not make in itself safety. 

On the other hand, I think that I welcome the reco

in the Commission report that says in the Office of Sp

should have, and I forgot the words, but a safety pa

that guarantees an open door directly to me. 

I see it more, though, than a panel that would sit th

I see it as internal to the Office of Space Flight, an 

but not additional people, people in the working organ

could flow or could feel free to flow safety-related inf

and down. 

As a matter of fact, if I may go back, one of the mos

situations for safety and yet one of the safest operation

a Navy carrier at sea. You have there a situation wh

much need safety, and it cannot stop with the safe

must go through the pilots and the flight deck perso

handling personnel, and it must be ingrained into the 

And that is the kind of system I think in the Shu

that we need. Frankly, I think also on the subject of s

have taken some unfair licks. I know that in the 14 

was in the astronaut office I would say, if there was an

ject that permeated more the technical discussions, be 

design or operational procedures, safety was that point

And it was not just between people in the office, b

the engineering end of the program. But this one got a

and we are going to make sure that it never does again

And so I welcome this little safety panel. It is not 

big one, but it is going to have my ear. 

Senator GORTON. I would like to ask you particula

Truly, about launch abort and crew escape, There ar

mendations from the Rogers Commission in that conne

But I first simply want to ask you whether or not yo

the Rogers Commission that there is simply no sur

escape options during the first 2 minutes after launc

solid rocket boosters are still active, before they h

leased? Do you agree with that at least implicit conc

Rogers Commission? 

Admiral TRULY. I do. 

Senator GORTON. But immediately thereafter, while 

gines are still in operation, the situation has changed 

degree? 

Admiral TRULY. I think there is a possibility for cre

egress improvement during gliding flight. We do 

might ask Mr. Aldrich to give you a brief status on 

have a fairly extensive reexamination of those options 

Houston. That study is going to be underway for some 

I think at one point it was publicized that they w

have a report on the 15th of this month, which wa

days ago, and that was inaccurate. We are going t

status to the level two, to Mr. Aldrich, the status o

here, and I think that is scheduled in the next couple 
Senator GORTON. I would be happy to have you do th

And I would like to have Mr. Aldrich’s comments o

recommendations of the Rogers Commission, the glid

the main engine failure, if you could briefly summari

are on those at the present time. 

Mr. ALDRICH. Several times in the past program 

sessed the question you asked earlier about the firs

during the first 2 minutes. I agree with Admiral Tr

think we are going to come up with something that 

reasonable that can be added to the shuttle system for 

The team, however, is looking at all phases of escap

2 minutes for augmentation and in particular the kin

have called up to now contingency aborts, where yo

separate from the remaining propulsive elements and 

biter down to a flat and level glide above the ocean b

to arrive at a runway. 

There are several techniques for coming out of t

before it hits the water which appear to be more sa

survivability than staying with the vehicle and ditch

volve both active and nonactive means of coming ou

haps a new hatch in the vehicle to allow the crew t

chute and come down to the water. We are looking 

strongly. 

They have been looked at also in the program in 

there are some new ideas and some new technology 

fact give us the ability to deal with that kind of an 

crew as large as the size which we have been flying 

There is also one other mode that we may be able 

in the flight software. It is called a split S maneu

being looked at for a very early return to the return 

landing at the cape during a regime where you had m

main engine out. We had previously thought that you 

able to return for that, and so that is another area w

perhaps to augment our current capability. 

The effort of this team and its subteams is to look 

of crew survival and escape for the entire assent and 

of flight. 

Senator GORTON. Admiral. Truly, while you are 

this entire shuttle reevaluation, what priority and wh

you have about the necessity for changes in the sh

gines? Are they fundamental and major changes whi

a lot of cost and time or relatively minor such change

Admiral TRULY. The main engine is a high preci

formance instrument, but I have no personal intentio

another. I am going to let the system do its job throu

items review. I am a great believer in testing. 

Incidentally, I should tell you that we are back into 

testing in Mississippi and conducted the first sing

since the accident a few days ago. We specifically 

testing to look at a particular problem that has show

test engines, and that is a 4,000-cycle-per-second vibr
So we are going to pay particular attention to the en

cannot predict to you today precisely how that will 

play out with regard to dollars. 

Senator GORTON. Thank you. Gentlemen, I have literally dozens of additional que

I am going to submit to you in writing, as I have a n

ment and I am going to turn this hearing over to Se

now to complete all such oral questioning as he wis

then adjourn the meeting. Senator Riegle. Senator RIEGLF, Ipresiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Dr. Fletcher, earlier YOU heard Mr. Aldrich indicate 

- 

* 

the proper procedures &thin NASA he should have be

by Mr. Reinartz or Mr. Mulloy about the disagreeme

lem with the O-rings and so forth prior to the launch. 

They had an affirmative obligation to report and di

that information to him. Is that your understanding as 

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes; Senator Riegle, it is my unders

though I have not been close to it, I have talked to th

involved, and I have read the Rogers Commission rep

surprised as Mr. Aldrich. 

Senator RIEGLE. Now, knowing that now as you d

taken any disciplinary action against those individual

plan to? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I hate to use the civil 

ogy, but we do evaluate people regularly in our proced

a personnel evaluation system, and so any errors on th

various individuals involved-and there were a lot o

involved up and down, as you have heard-especially 

this severity, will be taken into account in their evalu

and it will be accounted for in their record and futur

and so forth. 

Having said that, however, reference has been made 

the decisionmaking loop. In the future, we plan to pu

in that loop who are not only going to follow procedu

municate well up and down so that we have a team o

not a series of individuals. 

Senator RIEGLE. Does that mean that all of the ind

you identify who have behaved improperly will be tak

decision loop in the future? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I cannot say for certain that all of th

have been identified, because I do not believe that all 

future, that has been done. I see no reason to change th

I want to reserve, however, the option of making ch

future as the situation demands, not making a comm

lasts forever here in this meeting. 

Senator RIEGLE. Ithink this situation is unique in 

gravity of the consequences, the loss of seven astron

struction of at least 3 billion dollars’ worth of very v

placeable national security assets, at least not replac

any kind of a short timeframe. 

- 

been identified, but certainly for the foreseeable futu
about the delicacy with which we deal with individ

chain of command who had a direct responsibility in t

I will just aim this at you, and I am making a general 

about that fact. 

I must say I am hard pressed to reconcile those th

hear Mr. Aldrich say that under the management s

was an affirmative obligation for Mr. Mulloy and Mr

inform him of the special dangers that have been brou

knowledge about the cold temperatures and the O-rin

not do so, and the launch went ahead and seven people 

That, to me, is a very, very serious failure on their 

it requires direct disciplinary action. I am somewhat 

understand why that is not the view within NASA. Per

it is, I would like to hear it, but if it is not I would 

what the thinking is with respect to those individuals. 

Particularly, I want to get to the rest up and down 

let us take those two because they are directly in the c

and are part of the nexis of that decision chain that 

Dr. FLGIcHER. Senator Riegle, they have been remov

chain of command, and they will be disciplined in acc

the procedures that we always follow. I do not know w

implying. Are you implying punishment in the sense o

indictment? 

Senator RIEGLE. No; I have been very careful not to 

I have not said that at any time. What I am concerne

is whether or not, having identified the individuals w

improperly with the result in the end that we had a f

to others, what disciplinary steps are being taken in 

those individuals? 

I think the public needs to know the answer to that, 

ly we need to know the answer to that. Now you hav

that apparently disciplinary actions have been taken a

two individuals. Am I correct in understanding that? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I would not call it disciplinary .acti

have been removed from the chain of command. They 

their record an indication of the mistakes and gravit

takes that they made. I think that is about as far as t

ice system allows us to go, Senator Riegle, but may

some further thoughts on that. 

Senator RIEGLE. Is there any conceivable justificati

facts being known now as they are, for those indiv

have conveyed that information to Mr. Aldrich and 

others prior to that launch? 

Dr. FLETCHER. I think I had better turn that one ove

Truly and his associate, Senator. 

I am surprised that that was not done. I have come 

side, but I have not really probed deeply, and I have 

the individuals involved personally. I am surprised th

not better communication up and down the line. It is 

two individuals that you mentioned. It is a whole seri

uals. 
g , 

move on up and down that list with you. Is there any proper explanation? 

Admiral TRULY. No. I would have to agree both wit

and particularly with what Mr. Aldrich said earlier w

ty of the situation. All of us associated with the inve

surprised and terribly sorry that that particular in

long chain of events that led to the accident did no

decision at least to the level 11 and then presumably 

that it could be dealt with, the launch warning as a 

circumstances with the weather the night before. 

Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Aldrich, as you understand it, 

have this information also the night before the launch

Mr. &RICH. My understanding is that Mr. Luc

edge early in the evening that such a meeting was 

place on that subject, and then very early the followi

the countdown a summary of the discussion was pre

so he knew that the results were concluded. As w

they were concluded. 

Senator RIEGLE. To the extent that he was aware 

agreements and problems and this controversy, as th

work, as they are designed to work, would he have h

tive obligation to report that to others? 

Mr. ALDRICH. That is hard for me to answer be

there in the firing room with us, and he had this info

ever, he is not in the normal reporting chain of th

problems. So it is hard for me to say that he would 

quired to report; however, our process is normally 

things that have come up during the countdown, 

hours, and to be sure that we understand how we 

them. The fact that that discussion was not entered 

disappointing. 

Senator RIEGLE. So he had this information and d

on to you, but it is vague in your mind as to wheth

specific management requirement to do so, is that cor

Mr. &RICH. In the reporting chain, he is not dir

ble to do so.. It would be the project personnel we hav

cussed and his organization who are also there wh

been required to do that. 

Senator RIEGLE. At the same time, you expressed 

he did not inform you on a matter of this consequenc

Mr. ALDRICH. Surprised that either he or one of his 

not raise that discussion in the firing room on launch 

Senator RIEGLE. Dr. Fletcher. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, just to clarify thi

speaking there is a well-defined chain of comman

program, which in this case would be Admiral Truly 

level I1 which would be Mr. Aldrich, and then le

would be some place in Marshall, probably Mr. Mull

normal well-defined chain of command, and that i

project organization works. 
of command, I guess I would have expected him to spe

had serious concerns about the launch. That would 

myself, and I am not in the chain of command, either. I

cerns, I would feel free to express them to Admiral Tr

body else in the chain; probably Admiral Truly, since 

reports to me. 

So even though there is a direct chain of command

NASA organization is a team, and we ought to hav

frank discussions with each other on problems of this 

I hope this clarifies things. 

Senator RIEGLE. It is becoming clearer as we move 

Mr. Lee, let me ask you. You were informed prior to 

of the discussions the night before and apparently the 

agreements on the part of some that temperatures w

and it was too dangerous. Is that correct? 

Mr. LEE. No, sir, I was not in that discussion. 

Senator RIEGLE. Are we talking about another Lee? I

ed in the Commission report that approximately 8 

morning Lovingood informs Lee of previous night discus

Is that inaccurate? 

Mr. LEE. No; that is accurate. That is true. 

Senator RIEGLE. What did you learn? 

Mr. LEE. I am unsure of that. I did not read that testi

Senator RIEGLE. What do you recall Mr. Lovingood sa

that morning? 

Mr. LEE. I believe it was to the effect that they had h

sion with Thiokol, and it had been resolved with a recom

on the part of Thiokol management to proceed. I believ

had a copy of that telex, and that was the extent of 

ment in it. 

Senator RIEGLE. Were you given any sense that there 

heated argument the night before? Was any of the flav

tensity of that disagreement conveyed to you? 

Mr. LEE. No, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. Were you informed of the fact that t

unusual procedure used to acquire that signoff, n

McDonald, the man onsite who would normally do it, w

and this fax came in from Utah? 

Mr. LEE. No, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. Would you have expected to hav

those things? Should you have been told those things? 

Mr. LEE. Ordinarily, the way we work these, I stay in 

When we have early morning launches, I come in just f

part of the launch because most of the other people, the 

cape, specifically Dr. Lucas and that management team

ally been up longer. So I only attend the launch portion so that then I c

with the Center business the rest of that day in the 

there are launch delays. This is the kind of a routine t

worked out. 
Oring problem? Mr. LEE. No, sir, other than the fact he mentione

a discussion and they had the written recommenda

kol which was to launch, which is normal in our pro

Senator RIEGLE. Under the circumstances, kno

ground here, is it your view that you should have be

Mr. Lovingood? 

Mr. LEE. I would say no, based upon the fact that 

launch processing chain, and the launch team wo

me in that respect. Senator RIEGLE. Earlier you indicated that there 

viduals up and down the line who did not perform 

management chain here. Who did you have in m

made that comment, Dr. Fletcher? 

Dr. FLETCHER. It is hard to identify individuals, b

formation about the seriousness of the seal problem 

headquarters, and I do not know all the people tha

the problem. 

It is just a little surprising to me that that infor

communicated down through Mr. Aldrich somehow

was, you might say, new on board. This is a terrible 

ture, but they may have assumed he knew it, not r

was a recent arrival. 

Whatever the case, that communication should 

from headquarters, and there were a number of 

quarters who were aware of the seriousness of the p

Senator RIEGLE. Is Mr. Weeks one of those people

Dr. FLETCHER. Mr. Weeks is certainly one of the 

sure be is the only person involved. 

Senator RIEGLE. Is an effort underway to ide

should have known and should have communicated

Dr. FLETCHER. Wehave had discussions on thi

have to turn that over to Admiral Truly. We know 

dividuals who were aware of it, but I am not sure 

plete picture of all the people. Admiral TRULY. Senator Riegle, I base my kn

entire meeting and episode on the testimony that t

mission took. 

I think the clear breakdown in my view in t

system is that level I was dealing technically with 

rather than through level I1 up and down. That is n

I thought the system worked. It is certainly not goi

the system worked. It is certainly not going to 

system works from now on. 

Even though there are many funding things, b

that may be very appropriately worked directly be

and the level I11 project office, it certainly would 

level I1 being involved. So, to me, that is the breakd

In answer to your specific question, other than 

who were in responsible positions at that time, 

Moore, who was the Associate Administrator, and 

is the deputy for technical matters, and Mr. Wint

. 
y g

and I do not have any other investigation, internal or e

derway. Senator RIEGLE. That gets directly to the heart of the 

cause I think there is a significant gap here. That is th

mission decided that they would stop short of doing th

management audit to identify precisely who behaved 

either the night before the launch and the morning of 

or over a longer period of time with respect to the grav

problems. They apparently did so in terms of my co

with Secretary Rogers on the theory that you folks wo

that would be your job. 

What I am hearing as I listen carefully to everyth

being said is that NASA is in effect saying, well, we ar

sure that is our job, that the Commission really did 

going ahead and examining these things. Now our job 

mechanical problems and the other system problems, m

system problems, and go on from there. 

It seems to me that that leaves out a critically impor

the puzzle, and that is individuals in critical positions 

do what they were supposed to do, who behaved impr

did not follow the established procedures with respect t

cation at a minimum and it seems to me with judgme

tion to that, in terms of just the qualitative judgmen

circumstances. 

I guess what I am waiting to hear from you is the Co

seems to me, has left that problem with you to solve b

not mean it is to sort of fade away. It seems to me it is 

very precise requirement on your part to act affirmativ

tify the people who were in the decision process and in 

them out of the decision process unmistakeably for the 

Now, that is this Senator’s judgment. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I think your observa

lutely correct. It is our responsibility to deal with the 

involved and also with the errors in the system that ma

People had put together a system and apparently pro

communications which apparently had defects in it. T

that designed that procedure also have to be dealt with

with, however, not in our normal way. This is a serio

but it will be done very carefully. 

What we are telling you is two things. One is that i

individuals that have a sense of responsibility for ma

decisions and following procedures and communicati

will be put in those line positions. That is the first poin

The other point that I tried to make clear is that wi

the people that were making faulty judgments, that w

into account in terms of their future positions within 

are doing that. 

Senator RIEGLE. Who is responsible for that part of 

see that that analysis is being done, as painful as it is

awful chore, but it is a vital chore and I am wonder

that assignment. 
and also the Center directors who were involved. Eve

in the line of command, the people in a reporting sen

to the various Center directors will also be involved i

the Center directors being Marshall Space Flight Cen

son Space Center, and the Kennedy Space Center. 

Senator RIEGLE. Beneath you is any individual, an

lot of things to do, and it is a terribly complica

moment, is there anybody beneath you that has bee

cific assignment in this area to tie up the loose ends 

part of the job done with care and completeness? Dr. FLETCHER. I do not think there is an individual 

We do, Senator Riegle-it is primarily in discus

myself and Admiral Truly and also Dr. Graham, wh

the time. Those three individuals primarily are deali

also with our personnel procedures. We have to 

follow the rules, as you know, with the civil service s

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I understand that, and one 

we have had this accident is, we did not follow the 

people that did not follow the rules, it seems to m

identified, and there has to be a response here. And 

cause I think that is not typical within NASA. Tha

mean, we have had a splendid record of success ove

because people have performed to a higher standard 

I do not want that standard compromised, and I do 

situation to happen of this magnitude where people 

standard far below that, and then somehow or ano

sort of washed out here. And that there is any notio

part that that is acceptable or that that is the wa

whole operates, it cannot. It should not. 

I am confident with you and Admiral Truly that i

of the ways you make that clear is that you, just 

would and with a surgeon’s care, I think that problem 

addressed from A to Z, and every single person that 

and function properly has got to be identified, and t

some kind of disciplinary action taken here. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Well, certainly what you say will b

in the process of being done. 

Senator RIEGLE. Do you have a role in that, Adm

such? 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir; I do. In the civil service s

ous performance reports for all the senior people 

come through me, and then on procedurally through 

review board. And I can personally assure you tha

and I have discussed this, and potential future rea

jobs for many people, and some have happened, and 

under discussion. 

Senator RIEGLE. At any time in the future will we 

a summary report from you as to what has happen

so that we are clear that that work has been done? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I think we will be h

at some time in the future. I do not know what time

time, but speaking for myself, because I am taking 
y 

, g, yp

Senator RIEGLE. Well, to finish this discussion in this a

gather that it is both your feelings that the Commissio

that job for you to do, and that you fully-and that you 

a job to do, and that it has been left to you, and tha

intend to do it. Is that a fair summa 

Dr. FLETCHER. That is my opinion, T enator Riegle. Senator RIEGLE. Is that your view also, Admiral Truly? 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir. If that is Dr. Fletcher’s opi

assure you that I will support him. 

No, seriously, yes, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I think it is very important, a

that an awful lot of people that care about that issue a

sponse, including family members of the astronauts, a

others, and so I think it is a key area. I want to ask 

thing to you, Mr. Lee, and anyone else who might wa

ment on it, and that is, as I understand it there is some 

to whether or not the solid rocket boosters were eve

qualified against the specifications that were laid out in 

ning when we signed the contracts and decided to go ah

is the situation there? Were they qualified to the speci

not? 

Mr. LEE. The answer is in the form of qualification te

if I could give a little explanation, and I will try to be b

are a number of ways that you can qualify or that a con

in fact qualify the specifications that could be done by d

test, qualification test, or by analyses, and usually th

program, the contractor will use all of these in the proc

fying the specifications imposed upon them. 

The specification which requires the full range of env

conditions for the solid rocket motor to be qualified to, 

or certified to, has to do with the induced temperature, 

vironment for temperature on the motor, which ranges 

grees Fahrenheit to about 120 degrees Fahrenheit. Tho

ments were in fact imposed on the contract and Thiok

certe the joint through those extremes by analyses. 

In our review with the Commission, and that is und

duction and development team headed by Mr. Joe Sutte

when questioned on this, the Thiokol response was tha

misinterpreted that requirement not to be a vertical flig

ment but a storage requirement. Therefore, they did n

on their part that they had in fact certified to those 

though the agreement between the Thiokol and NASA 

certify that particular area. The environment would be 

analyses. 

The acceptance on the part of NASA was based on th

tion of the O-ring material itself, which was identified 

through the range of minus 30 degrees Fahrenheit to 

Fahrenheit. Now, this was the basis for which the NAS

that certification. However, in reality Thiokol did not co

they interpreted that requirement to be of that range

they did not stand behind, if you will, the fact that the
Senator RIEGLE. Well, as I listen to that, the bot

it was not properly certified. Is that correct? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, sir; I believe it was not properly cer

Senator RIEGLE. Now, to what extent is that NA

there was this mixup in communication or whatev

that the certification was not done as it should have 

Mr. LEE. Under consideration, in hindsight, obv

know today about the joint, I would say that the fir

certify that critical joint by analyses was improper 

and the fact that because I would say today we sho

fied that it be tested through those environments, 

part of-- 

Senator RIEGLE. When you say we, you mean NA

done that? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, we in agreement with the contr

second part, that is also inadequate on the basis 

fact agreed to is that the review or the acceptanc

which for only the O-ring for that range of temp

opinion was inadequate even for analsyis, but that w

NASA used. 

Senator RIEGLE. Now, when that kind of discussio

ing work and talk goes back and forth, is it princip

was it principally between the Huntsville Center 

this case? Is that principally where this happens? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. So to the extent that NASA 

through with the kind of full blown certification t

have, would that have been principally the respo

Marshall Center? 

Mr. LEE. Yes, sir. 

Senator RIEGLE. How high up the line are these t

at the higher levels of management within NAS

people at level 1, for example, have been aware of 

it were brought to their attention? 

Mr. LEE. That responsibility, I believe is through

For the establishment of requirements, the end ite

if you will, on a project resides within the project 

that is Marshall or JSC, for the orbiter or what ha

fact, the responsibility in this case, and it was, of t

ager ultimately to approve or accept that certificati

Senator RIEGLE. And who would that have been a

Mr. LEE. At the time I believe that was Mr. Geor

Senator RIEGLE. And he would have had the auth

to basically accept something short of a full-blown c

Mr. LEE. Not entirely by himself. He has the ben

nical review individuals within our center and our 

zation. 

Senator RIEGLE. But those other signoff individ

been at the same level? 

Mr. LEE. In essence, yes. 

Senator RIEGLE. It would not have been pushed 

level l? 
Mr. LEE. I believe under the place where it was inade

the initial establishment of the requirement. Had we req

it be qualified in tests through that range, we would h

fied a lot of the shortcomings of the design and our kn

the design and the function of that joint would have 

known to us and established a data base which could 

used throughout the operation. Senator RIEGLE. I want to come back to one other 

then we will finish here, because the hour is late. 

I want to come back to this issue of responsibility up th

not just down the line. Mr. Weeks took part in this re

the seriousness of the O-ring problem, this presentation 

place in August of last year. I want to understand aga

Once he was aware of the gravity of that problem, wh

sponsibility would have required him to report that in

where would he have been expected to convey that info

once he had it? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I cannot speak for M

who is not here, but normally if Mike had thought this 

ous problem enough so that we should call a halt to th

until we fixed it, he would have relayed that on to level 

Mr. Aldrich, but also up to the administrator, becaus

pretty serious thing; of course, also to Jess Moore, who h

directly to. It really is a judgment question. Did he a

leagues feel that this was a serious enough problem to 

to the program? Apparently Mr. Weeks in discussions w

and others felt that this was a serious problem but 

enough to relay up and down the line as he in retrosp

have. 

Senator RIEGLE. Within the last year or two would 

been other meetings of that kind on other problems 

have bubbled up to the top with that level of gravity 

have brought about a special meeting of that kind in W

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I am not sure you hav

people to answer that. This is my fifth week, and I thin

miral Truly’s fifth month. 

Senator RIEGLE. Maybe Mr. Aldrich would know, and 

address the question to others. Might you know? 

Mr. ALDRICH. Well, I believe there was a regular pa

porting up the channels normally through level 2 to lev

the administrator on critical problems. An example are 

brakes and the landing system which have been trouble

number of flights and a number of years. We have atte

strongly in the program to find corrective ac ions and 

people involved and all outside help we coul i! get to 

problems, but they continued to plague us. On a numb

sions, we reported the technical status and planning in 

all the way up through level 1 and to the prior administ

Senator RIEGLE. Within roughly, say, the year prior 

dent, were there any meetings that would have been the 

of this where criticality 1 items were brought to the W

level for a special meeting because of their gravity? 
acetatee woud be oteeetgs aso, po

main engines, but I cannot give you a specific examp

searching it. 

[The following information was subsequently rec

record:] 

ISSUES PRESENTED TO NASA HFADQUARTERS PERSO

1. SOLID ROCKET BOOSTERS 

A. Problem: New Bum Through of the Nozzle Ablative Material 

Presented To: 1. Mr. Beggs, Dr. Mark, Gen. Abrahams on, Mr. W

2. Gen. Abrahamson. W. Dankhoff at Morton Thiokol. Inc. (MT

1983. 

1983-overall SRM status report, emphasis on nozzle issues. . 

3. SRM Program Review, July 26, 1984. 

4. Special SRM Nozzle Review at MTI April 2, 1984 TWR # 1432

5. STS-9 FRR/Flinht Worthiness Review at Headauarters Novem

Purpose of Preseritation: To review ablative matirial erosion o

solid rocket motor nozzle. The remaining material would support 

ditional bum time. Results of comparison with previous flights an

cure cycles and methods of illeviating erosion problems etc., were 

worthiness of STS-9 was approved. 

2. SPACE SHUTTLE MAIN ENGINES 

A. Problem: Engine 2109 Main Injector Failure. 

Presented to: Mr. Beggs at NASA Headquarters-August 10, 198

Purpose of Presentation: To summarize the failure investigation 

test of Engine 2108 main injector failure, background of prior sim

rective redesign and substantiation that current design with redu

fly prior to incorporation of redesign into flight engines. 

B. Problem: Engine 2005 High Pressure Fuel Pump Impeller Fai

Presented To: Mr. Beggs and Dr. Mark at NASA Headquarter

and Dr. Mark at NASA Headquarters October 18, 1982. 

Purpose of Presentation: August 27, 1982 Presentation-to 

Engine 2005 high pressure fuel pump impeller failure analysis and 

options for STS-5 Mission, and recommendation for continued use 

STS-5. Mr. Beggs approved recommendation. October 18, 1982 

present results of worst case impeller failure analyses requested 

identify effect on fuel pump performance, effect of mechanical 

pump parts, and effect on any other element of engine fuel system

C. Problem: Two Flight Engines Delivered to Field for Flight U

cies not Detected During Engine Acceptance Process. 

Presented To: Mr. Beggs at NASA Headquarters-February 22,.

Purpose of Presentation: To explain why Engine 2011 combusti

neck cracked and why Engine 2016 LOX heat exchanger tube leak

dlscrepancies escaped detection during engine acceptance testing a

to shipment to field and what confidence does MSFC have tha

problems do not exist on other flight engines, and what measures 

Presented To: Mr. ' 

Purpose of Presentat'lon: During STS-6 FRR, data w-as pres

second stage turbine blade crack experiencehst 'history with- rec

tionale that STS-6 HPFTP's were acceptable to fly. During the F

assigned MSFC to provide a more detailed briefing prior to STS

cracking that had been observed in several HPFTP's. Based on t

presented, it was concluded that there was a high probability tha

have no cracked blades and a small probability that cracks cou

STS-6 engine flight operation and based on engine test history, th

fidence that a crack would not propagate to faiiure. 

E. Problem: STS-6 Engine Flight Discrepancies Applicable to ST

Presented To: Mr. Beggs at NASA Headquarters-May 19,1983
g

Presented To: Dr. Mark by telecon June 6, 1983. 

Purpose of Presentation: To delineate the history of HPFTP turbin

cracking, inspection methods to find cracks, crack acceptance criteria

procedures, and long range design and fabrication procedures to correc

G. Problem: During Columbia Engine overhaul, re-X-Ray of ma

chamber inlet line indicated thinner walls adjacent to welds and gre

sets that used in stress analysis. 

Presented To: Dr. Mark at NASA Headquarters-July 29,1983. 

Purpose of Presentation: To present results of inspections make on 

ground test engines to determine condition of welds on MCC inlet li

stress analysis on line life using inspection data and special lab tests 

strain vs. load on line welded parts, and rationale for recommending 

to fly (STS-8). 

H. Problem: HPFI'P Coolant Liner Overpressure Results in CRIT 1 

Presented To: Dr. Mark by telecon on March 29, 1984. 

Purpose of Presentation: To summarize the failure investigation res

tests of Engine 0108 that demonstrated HPFTP coolant overpressure 

contained engine failure, that the exact cause of Engine 0108's failure 

determined, and that a coolant liner pressure redline was developed, 

ed, and that implementation was mandatory for STS 414. 

I. Problem: HPFTP Temperature Redline Sensor Failures. 

Presented To: Mr. Yardley at NASA Headquarters-August 8, 1985

Purpose of Presentation: To report the results of the failure invest

to HPFTP turbine temperature redline sensor failures that cause p

engine shutdown during STS 51-F, changes to temperature sensors de

ufacture, and redline implementation prior to subsequent flights. 

3. ORBITER BRAKES 

A. Problem: History of Brake Damage on Landing. 

Presented To: Mr. Beggs on May 15, 1985. 

Purpose of Presentation: Review of brake damage history and rec

from first meeting of Industry Ad Hoc Brake Committee. Showed rec

were in work. Approval was obtained to continue with the brake up

including implementation of the stiff axle to reduce brake damage, au

the brake flight instrumentation, improving the nosewheel steering 

load the brakes and the reinitiation of brake studies based on the us

carbon in lieu of beryllium. 

B. Problem: Review of Ad Hoc Brake Committee Recommendations

Presented To: Mr. Jesse Moore on December 6, 1985. 

Purpose of Presentation: The recommendations from the second 

Ad Hoc Brake Committee were reviewed. These recommendations, w

implemented, included activation of nosewheel steering as the prima

rectional control, pe.rforming near term testing on the pitch plane sim

stalling brake housing orifices. The results of the structural carbon 

were presented with a recommendation by JSC that carbon brakes b

the Orbiter. The Associate Administrator for Space Flight approved t

dation and authority to proceed was issued December 16, 1985. 

Senator RIEGLE. Iwould appreciate it, Dr. Fletcher, 

person who can dig that out would do so so that we w

sense for whether there were other meetings that wo

equivalent to the gravity of the meeting that was held i

the O-rings related to other items that were criticality 

the red flags were really up that said we have got a seri

here and one serious enough that it requires a ver

Washington based meeting. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, we will do our best, reco

some of the people that were involved in those decisio

but I think there are enough people around and we can 

good job on that problem for you. 
your assignments, and so that you could speak knowle

what you have done and seen since you have been th

much before that. I continue to be distressed and dis

difficult it has been to get information out of the Hun

since the accident. There was a long delay in even fin

the big argument that took place the night before the 

has been an anonymous letter sent by one of the se

down there. 

He is a senior manager, unidentified, but sent a 

letter, I gather, to the Rogers Commission, and I just 

this letter yesterday signed with the pen name A

talking at great length here about major problem

Huntsville Center and information being withheld del

there was a conscious effort made after the accident 

little factual background information to the Commiss

a very serious charge, and I do not know whether mo

this letter or not in terms of this individual perhaps co

I would hope they would come forward, and I wo

would come forward in a personal way, and not just b

anonymous letter, but then just the other day there wa

as I understand it, and I have not seen it, of the part 

or the presentation on the O-rings that was just sudde

and this, of course, after the Commission had finishe

published its report, and you sort of scratch your head 

yourself, is that not strange that something as funda

would be there as a factual record right on the prob

rings, and yet remarkably nobody seemed to find it or n

to volunteer and bring it forward and so forth. 

I guess what I am saying is this. It seems to m

pattern-it may still be continuing-of less than a fu

tive bringing forth of information out of the Hunts

have just cited some of the examples, but there are o

are familiar with, some of which we have discussed pr

am wondering. I want to register my strong feeling ab

want to ask you to comment on it, and what steps are 

deal with that problem, which seems to me to be 

problem of just an individual. It seems to me som

broader than that, and I think it has to be cleaned u

all, and I would like to hear your comments on it. 

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, there are two point

ought to be made. One, the specific instance that y

about the tape that was found later, and I would like 

to address that in a minute, with regard to the gene

you like, and that is the seeming reluctance for the M

Flight Center, and it was singled out in the Commi

communicate to other centers and to headquarters. Senator RIEGLE. And to the Commission. 

Dr. FLETCHER. And to the Commission. That is the 

General Phillips task force; to flesh all of that out a

that communications are tightened up between ce

tween centers and headquarters so that we really m

grams much better than we have in the past or than 

I hope by the end of this year we will have some go

to how we fix that. 
are taking this time now that we are down, to fur th

those other technical fixes. Admiral Truly is going to 

his management and his shop. While we are doing tha

we might as well take a look at the whole NASA Progr

centers operate, which ones are a little faulty, if that 

which ones need improvement, how do we change m

and so on and so forth. How do we manage our progr

are doing very intensively during the next several mon

Senator RIEGLE. You were going to comment, Ad

about this tape presentation that just recently came to 

Admiral TRULY. Yes, sir. I am very glad you brou

point, because it is one that over the past months I h

many conversations with other people, including som

conversations with the Commission during the course 

tigation. Without defending any specific instance, I m

that during the investigation, and working primarily w

who is the Deputy Director of Marshall Space Flig

never, I personally as head of the task force, never 

single instance where I personally felt that I was not g

mation through me to the Commission as requested an

as possible. 

I am delighted you brought up this situation with th

because it is specifically one that Mr. Lee and I person

if I may, I would like for him to describe for you the b

that video tape at Marshall. I can assure you that whe

call came up to me concerning that video tape, within 

the Commission knew that it was in existence, an

hours, which was what it took to get the people at wor

had transmitted the video tape via satellite through 

here, and it was in their hands. 

With your permission, I would like for Mr. Lee to 

situation at the Marshall Center, because I think it 

one. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, I am going to do that, and I w

hear his response before I do. In terms of just putting 

in time, you got that tape what, 2 weeks ago, or 10 

thereabouts? 

Admiral TRULY. It was the week it came to my a

week before the Commission-it was in the middle 

before the Commission was to release its report. 

Senator RIEGLE. Certainly several months after th

mean, for reasons that we are going to hear from Mr. L

not surprised that you would get that tape to the 

within 10 minutes, because that is the kind of per

What I am concerned about is that it did not get to 

better part of 4 or 5 months. 

Admiral TRULY. That is what I would like Mr. Lee t

a matter of fact, I am very sorry that it would not hav

would have been very much to the benefit of the Ma

Flight Center and the Commission and the task force 

it. It did add a face and words describing the problem 

were only vu-graphs. 
Senator RIEGLE. Mr. Lee. 

Mr. LEE. It was on May 29 or 30, in that time p

headquarters, some representatives from the Marsha

Center and JSC were reviewing with the House staff 

port of their investigation of the accident, it was me

of the staff members that they had either heard or 

had heard a tape of the flight readiness review. 

That triggered the individual representative from 

aware that they were in fact recorded. But the fact t

up and the fact that we are in fact sensitive to in

cause of the Commission’s statements-as you have 

viding information, they inquired of our flight rea

process about, at Marshall, if such tapes-if such f

reviews had in fact been taped. 

Now, you have to go back in time. When Genera

was the a, he started the process of video teleconf

readiness reviews. And when asked about the record

munications office at Marshall, which coordinates th

ferences, acknowledged that they had in fact recorde

of these flight readiness reviews, primarily for the pu

ing out quality problems in the transmission. 

We would transmit the video over one line and 

another line, plus the production itseIf really was 

itself to everybody’s satisfaction. 

There was no requirement on the part of level I, le

I11 at Marshall Space Flight Center to record these. 

knew until this time that they had in fact been r

were only recorded to work out the quality of th

itself. 

That was on the 29th. On the 3rd of June, I was 

communications manager that he had been requeste

tion for these tapes for the benefit of-of flight rea

for the benefit of the Commission, and wanted to 

should do with them. 

I said, well, first you retain them. Let us review th

there is pertinent information on these tapes. And 

one of these tapes Mr. Mulloy did in fact give quit

dissertation on O-ring erosion and the history thereo

I immediately called Admiral Truly’s office to no

situation. We in fact played the tape through th

loop, the communications loop, to headquarters. On 

fied Mr. Thompson’s office, which is my route for g

tion to the Commission. 

And on the 5th of June, I had hand delivered that 

Mr. Thompson at KSC. So there was no way that 

these were even in the system. They were not a p

gram. I did exactly what I was expected to do when 

uncovered information which might be pertinent to 

sion. 

0 

ask the question about that, such a recording, becau

. mined that, specifically about the O-ring now, it was 
te owedge ote aguet beoe te aucto 

attention of the Commission, but it sure took a long t

not think there is any excuse for it. 

And I just want to make my point this way, becau

lots of other instances of this kind that could be cited, 

one reason or another given for why it was, that we 

we had this, or this came to our attention late, or we 

anybody wanted this, or we thought somebody else 

give you that, or well, nobody asked us and so we did 

it, and so forth. 

And if there were not a pattern over a long period 

lot of information coming very slowly, very grudgingl

in a piecemeal fashion, then I think you could take 

stance in a different context. But when there is that c

long period of time, it is a problem, and I think it is s

people as a problem and I think it is seen by the Pres

mission as a problem, and I think they have made tha

ferent points themselves. 

I guess what I am interested in now is, I want to k

you, Dr. Fletcher, or you, Admiral Truly, have said 

guage to the people at Marshall, I mean to everybody 

we want every last scrap of information that relates 

whether it is damaging to somebody else, to a superio

body that is a work associate; we want the full tru

every single shred of information; and that anybody th

ward with the information is not going to be punishe

anybody else makes an effort to punish somebody th

ward, that they will be out of NASA within 10 minu

ear, civil service requirements or not; that if anybod

carry out any kind of intimidation or reprisal, they 

door, as they properly should be. 

But has that been said in plain, blunt English, in 

that that message has gone absolutely through th

Center, so that everybody feels free to come forward w

tional information that they might have? 

Admiral TRULY. Shortly after I arrived on the scene 

man of the task force, I did personally talk to Dr. 

talked to Mr. Lee. And as I said, from my view-and 

difficult investigation. 

In my view, we responded to the Commission thr

time period, and so did Marshall, as best as we were c

the situation at hand, with the requests coming in fr

mission, the Congress, the Freedom of Information 

forth. 

I agree with you 100 percent, though. The investiga

the total knowledge, both in paper and in videotapes

that case it was an unfortunate case, because had we 

lier I would have dearly loved to have had that video

knowledge of it 3 months ago. It would have been o

It was not hidden, but you cannot bring forward wh

know exists. 
same thing as you personally transmitting the message

large meeting or over a television screen to assembl

Huntsville, to make it crystal clear that you want ev

information and that there is not going to be any kind 

tion or whatever used. 

Now, you are as familiar as I am with a lot of the 

and! comments that have been made about Mr. Lucas 

tough, heavyhanded sort of an administrator, who 

people disagreeing with him very much. And it seem

the requirement to make people feel comfortable abou

ward with the facts that they had is something tha

transmitted broadly. I mean, you have to get that message out, in a sens

people. And I gather that has not been done, or has i

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I think I want to turn 

who was deputy at Marshall at the time. But the nor

dc this is in two directions. 

One is we inform the Director of the Center and w

to relay that on to the troops. We did that recently, fo

terms of our responses to the Rogers Commission rep

them. Hey, this is a good report; let us be responsiv

down through the Center Director and I understand w

ately communicated to the rest of the people at the Ce

Admiral Truly did that with the Center directors an

expect, done, although I will have to ask Mr. Lee to 

The other way is the way you suggest. Occasional

dress the troops by way of, we call it, closedcircuit TV

via satellite to all of the media as well. But neverthel

that mechanism for informing the troops. 

In this particular case, I do not know that that sec

lowed out, and I am not sure it was required. I woul

you ought to ask Mr. Lee about the communication

from his office. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, before I do that, I am muc

cerned about the communications downward from yo

from Admiral Truly’s office, because you are the fellow

run the show and that is who I think people are going 

guidance from. 

Now, Mr. Lee and Mr. Lucas were key players in Hu

obviously people there are going to take their signal

But we have had instances now where information ha

coming, in a sense, around that management structu

ville, and I think there is probably more informatio

people might want to contribute. Maybe it is material

not. 

But I do not think that is easy to do unless there is 

signal from up top, namely from the two of you, tha

we want to know everything there is to know, and we 

to allow any reprisals to take place against anybody

just the nature of the situation. 
memorandums. I do not think they should have to do 

one thing, I would hope that you would use that telev

that you specifically would say to this individual and 

like this person. We expect you to come forward, we 

come forward, it is not going to be held against you if y

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, I think I agree with 

came in kind of late in the program, and I was tempt

that. I prefer to do it in person and I plan to do that a

the earliest opportunity. 

As soon as I can get some decisions out of the Con

White House, I plan to go to Marshall-Marshall is 

list-to discuss just that. I imagine the same is true 

Truly, as soon as he gets some time to do it. 

Senator RIEGLE. So it is your intention to say that 

personally to the people in Huntsville? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes, indeed. 

Senator RIEGLE. And some time quite soon? 

Dr. FLETCHER. Yes. Rather than over the net, to talk 

sonally, yes. 

Senator RIEGLE. And I take it you agree with th

Truly? 

Admiral TRULY. Yes; I certainly do. And as a mat

wish we had had this discussion a little earlier, becaus

television to all, not just to Marshall Space Flight Cen

of the NASA centers, shortly after I came, when I 

strategy for returning to safe flight. 

On that occasion, I was looking forward, and talkin

Marshall, but to Johnson, Kennedy, and so forth, an

have been a beautiful opportunity for me to do just w

And I made, looking back and after listening to your 

made the mistake of missing such an opportunity

which is a very bad thing to do in this sort of busines

not necessary since I felt like what I said and the 

would make it obvious. 

But now that I look back, I wish I had said it the w

because it is absolutely true. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, you still can. And I think it w

I gather you intend to. 

Admiral TRULY. I certainly do. And I hope it will-I 

over the point where either the Commission or the 

NASA or any of us can communicate through anony

because I cannot respond that way, as you know. 

Senator RIEGLE. Exactly, and people should not have 

is why I hope the individual who wrote this letter w

the climate that YOU are putting forward here today 

feel that they can come forward because that is prope

should do, and I thmk they owe it to themselves and 

and to the astronauts that were lost and everything el

My last point is this. We have talked before, an

other day at the White House when the Commission

forthcoming, about the desirability of perhaps setting 

group, perhaps just through the end. of the year

through the end of this legislative session, that wou
and whoever the two or three or whatever number o

executive branch; and that this small group of peop

try to work through these decisions here in a legi

that is in the process of winding itself up, that we 

chance to sit down around a table and maybe exped

discussion and some of the effort to reach a con

needed, so that we can decide what we are going to 

are going to do it and in fact get it done, get it done t

I am concerned that we are caught. We are still be

in the sense of other events, the normal legislative 

and the other items on the schedule, the fact that w

hard time apparently with these policy judgments in 

branch, and we have got divided jurisdictions here in 

And you have got enough players at work that it i

the time to slip on by here, and all of a sudden w

year and we will not have done things this year 

have. 

I have spoken with Chairman Gorton about attem

we cannot get that kind of an ad hoc mechanism in p

time basis. It is not to try and proliferate bureaucra

and overcome bureaucracy. 

It is to try and allow us a way, if we could meet o

week, at least enough times to try to decide wher

where we are going, that we can get our work done b

gress adjourns this year, and that all of the player

gether as a team. 

And after all, we ought to be a team. We are all tr

plish the same goals. And I am just wondering if, f

tage point, if you feel that that kind of an arrangeme

get it put together, would be helpful to you in per

some of these items or moving them along a little fas

Dr. FLETCHER. Senator Riegle, as you know, I e

embraced it. I had not realized you had talked to A

but we had discussions afterwards. We think it is an 

and it should be implemented as soon as you can. W

go ahead with that procedure. 

Senator RIEGLE. Well, we are going to try to. Sena

I discussed it today, and I do not know how the adm

feel about it. It is only a desire to try to be helpful 

so that we can make decisions sooner rather than la

some kind of a consensus as quickly as we can. 

So in any event, we will try to pursue that, becau

be helpful to you. And I hope you know that from t

ings and sessions and work that we have all done 

that it is essential that we get the space program 

And I appreciate the work that both of you are do

the extraordinary duties and responsibilities you h

new to both of you and which I feel you are working 

you can. And I hope that you will understand that 

think expressed by everybody on the subcommittee 

concerns that are aimed exactly in the same directio
we have to meet as a nation, and hopefully we will. 

And I appreciate your testimony today, all of you. 

The committee is in recess. 

mereupon, at 12:45 p.m., the subcommittee was re

flne following information was subsequently rec

record:] 
Solid Rocket Motor Redesign 

r 

Question 1: One of the Commission's recommendat

of the Solid Rocket Motor redesign is to consider st

the exact flight configuration in a vertical attitude

is a vertical test better than a horizontal test 

problems uniquely associated with a vertical test? 

Answer 1: An assessment of the SRM static fir

that is most suitable for accomplishing the objectiv

the SRM operational capability at load conditions 

launch and flight is in progress. The assessment i

completion by mid July 1986. Major factors under stu

1. Ability to simulate launch and flight limit loa

2. Ability to simulate launch and flight joint dyn

3. Nozzle up or nozzle down attitude. 

4. Availability of facilities (schedule). 

5. cost. 

More specifically, the advantages of a nozzle

attitude static test are that it places the propella

and other elastomeric materials in the proper flig

under normal conditions. Assembly (mating) would b

using the prelaunch procedural method. Problems uniq

with vertical test deal with facility protect

structural configuration, slag accumulation, 

replication, and environmental impact of exhaust p

flame deflection must be water cooled. 

Question 2: I understand that one problem a

testing in a vertical attitude is 'determining wh

should be conducted with the nozzle up or down. 

considerations for testing in both vertical positions

Answer 2: The considerations for vertical stati

a. Nozzle up - It is questionable if the forward 

can withstand the weight of motor and the moto

Slag accumulation in the forward dome 

necessitate additional insulation thickness 

concern wich the insulation stress relief f

integrity in this reversed configuration. 

b. Nozzle down - It is extremely difficult 

understand motor performance due to the 

analytically derive net performance as a funct

thrust and propellant consumed. The facility 

involve flame deflector cooling particularly w

produces acid rain and the ability to absor

approximately 200 ft. UP the test stand structu

62-885 0 - 86 - 7 
g

Question 3: What facilities, either at NASA or 

exist for a full-scale vertical test of the Solid Rocket 

What would it cost and how long would it take to dev

facility and to qualify a new SRM joint design? 

Answer 3.: No facilities exist at NASA or elsewhere 

a full-scale vertical test of the SRM. A number of 

vertical test facilities can be modified to accommodat

Shuttle SRM. These include facilities at the Air Fo

Propulsion Lab, National Space Technology Laboratorie

Space Center, and the Marshall Space Flight Center. 

Answer 3: Based upon early assessments, it is estim

vertical test facility could be available in 15 to 18 m

cost of $15 - $20 million. 

Question 4: I understand that transportation of 

Rocket Motor segments over long distances has the po

adversely affecting the performance of the motor. What 

to prevent any distortion or deformation of fuel segme

must be transported over long highway distances? 

Answer 4: Distortion or deformation of fuel segm

long distance transportation does not adversely 

propulsion performance of the SRMS. Any distortion 

segments that may affect assembly and/or flight operat

corrected or alleviated to acceptable conditions by use 

tooling. The objective for the redesigned joint is 

insensitive to transportation and handling induced con

assembly procedures. 

Question 5: In addition to transportation and ha

Rogers Commission has identified other factors, 

environmental effects and flight and water impact loads t

SRM joints should be insensitive. Of the factors menti

Commission, which will be the most troublesome to 

insensitivity to? 

Answer 5: Analysis of design concepts currently 

indicates that making the joint integrity insensitive 

case operating pressure will be most difficult. The 

deflections produced by the internal motor pressur

controlled to produce minimal sealing configuration cha

is necessary to ensure that a reproducible, completely 

seal is verified and maintained throughout the SRM operat

Shuttle Program Management 

Question 6: One of the recommendations of 

Commission was essentially to centralize more of the Shut

activities within your office of the National Space Tra

Sy s t em. 
, 

"decentralization" of this office, and what ideas do 

to improve the function of this office? 

What institutional resistance do you expect i

zentralize the function of this office? 

Answer 6: As the Commission report stated, the 

management structure has made the various progr

project managers feel more accountable to their Ce

than to the Shuttle program organization. Th

inadequate communication throughout the Shuttle org

the seriousness of the SRM O-ring problem. Capt. C

assigned to load a fact-finding group to address t

propose a solution to correct it. 

Answer 6: None. The Agency, including the 

Shuttle program, are committed to correcting the prob

Question 7: I understand that astronaut Bob C

been asked to study the overall Shuttle prog

structure. 

Could you elaborate on this effort -- What is t

task, and when will this study be complete? 

What areas in the Shuttle program management st

already identified as warranting priority considerat

Answer 7: Capt. Crippen has been assign

fact-finding group to address the Commission's rec

and V dealing with Shuttle management structure

management, a Shuttle safety panel, and improved 

The group will execute this by careful review 

interviews with all levels of management (pr

institutional), and interviews with knowledgeable pe

the Agency. A report is due in early August. 

Answer 7: All of the specific concerns 

Commission will be addressed. The short time period 

group to complete the review is intended to expe

process. 

Question 8: How, and in what capacities do y

astronauts can most effectively serve in age

positions? 

Answer 8: The group will seek means to identif

may best be served by individuals with the unique q

an astronaut. It will also identify ways to facili

such position changes. 

Question 9: A finding of the Data and Desig

Force's Development and Production Team is that 

sufficiently involved in orbiter processing and lau

Could you elaborate on this and please tell us i

responsibility, in part, to increase Rockwell's invo

activities? 
vehicle processing and launch operations activity under 

contractor in lieu of having involvement by each of t

contractors as was done in previous programs and in the e

of the Shuttle program. The consolidated effort is ent

Shuttle Processing Contractor (SPC) and is performed by 

The SPC was effected in February 1984. Rockwell Int

continues to provide field engineering, logistics, and con

management support. The field engineeting effort ser

.: Interface between the SPC and the design organization. T

provides support for problem resolution, interprets dra

specifications, supports major tests, coordinates design 

and transmits the company's requirements regardin

acceptance, material review board actions, and anomalies 

and NASA. 

The team expressed concern over the separation 

designerhanu-facturing and the operator, in that the SP

possess the necessary technical background gained during 

and development phase to adequately determine system d

resulting from multiple missions. 

The roles and responsibilities of both the SPC a

contractors were established by the Agency; there

responsibility for any changes thereto resides with NASA. 

Question 10: The review of the Development and Produ

also found that Rockwell was not giving adequate safety 

review to the Centaur upper stage and other critical payl

has Rockwell been deficient in this regard? 

Answer 10: The Orbiter is required to incorpora

interface and functional modifications (e.g., attach poi

and power connectors, etc.) to accommodate payloa

requirements. Some payloads, such as Centaur, are extreme

and critical. STS/Centaur payload integration activ

conducted in a vigorous and indepth manner, but Rockwel

per se, was found not to be fully involved in the pay

integration effort. Rockwell Integration, as the 

integration contractor, does participate in this act

perfoms such tasks as conducting analysis to assure 

compatibility and conducting interface safety assessments 

analyses. It was the team's conclusion that for critic

payloads the Orbiter contractor should be a major particip

payload integration effort to further assure all aspects 

are addressed both at the element and systems levels. 

Communications 

Question 11: The Rogers Commission has recommende

order to improve communications, a policy should be devel

governs the imposition and removal of launch constraints. 

Would you explain how launch constraints and waivers 

on the SRB joint seals for the last six Shuttle flights w

people aware that they were being used -- what flaws in t

permitted this to occur? 
waivers be improved? 

Answer 11: The MSFC Problem Assessment Syste

open problems which are coded Criticality 1, lR, 

considered launch constraints and are to be so c

submitted by the design contractor. Each report 

representatives of the project office, Quality Assur

engineer and the chairman of the Problem Review Boa

criticality and constraint assignment. The ultimat

establishing a launch constraint resides with 

Manager. 

All launch constraints must be resolved (rec

established) or sufficient rationale must exist to co

problem will not occur on the flight vehicle du

launch, or flight. 

The launch constraints in question were li

rationale for flight readiness developed during th

Prior to the actual lifting of the constraint, t

assessed the data and concluded that the hardware was 

flight and carried its assessment to at least one 

management in the FRR chain, i.e., the Shuttle Pro

Center Board. Once this level concurred with 

rationale for flight, the constraint was lifted 

Assessment System (PAS), but the problems remained 

system. The FRR procedures did not require that PAS 

had at one time been classified as launch constrai

through all levels of the FRR structure for decision. 

this may be considered a deficiency, and in the fu

appropriate that all items applicable to the lau

question, which had been classified as launch constra

and closed, be presented to all levels of the FRR str

Answer 11: The Problem Reporting and Corrective 

system was established as the means to report all pr

system. This system has not worked as intended and

of the requirements were relaxed in 1981. At that 

longer required that the Level 111 projects report 

the total system (i.e., Level I1 and I). The requir

system are being redefined and rigid reporting st

established, especially in relation to Criticality 

In addition, acceptance of problem closeouts involvin

and 1R items will be elevated to Level I1 approval

mandatory that all criticality 1 problems which have 

the last FRR be discussed at the next FRR. 

Question 12: How do you think that pre-launch 

for both the Flight Readiness Review and the L-1 

improved? 

In the future, what will be done to ensure 

problems and concerns receive proper emphasis and at

I reviews? 
recommend a mechanism to streamline the flow of critical 

between Level I, 11, and I11 from the Flight Readiness R

final launch countdown. 

Critical Items Review 

Question 13: What progress to date has been made i

of Criticality-1 and -lR components -- when will you d

items require changes or requalification, and what is 

cost of this whole Critical Items Review activity? 

The Rogers Commission has recommended that an Aud

the National Research Council verify the adequacy of t

items review. Do you agree with this recommendation? 

Answer 13: On March 13, 1986, the Manager, NSTS re

all program failure modes and effects analyses and t

items lists be re-reviewed for completeness and accura

and instructions were provided for implementation. 

letter NB/86-L133, enclosure 1). 

A technical re-review team with representation fro

contractors, NASA, and an independent contractor 

reevaluation activities in early April. The team review 

progressing satisfactorily with KSC reporting 

completion. 

Level 111 project management configuration co

meetings will start in early July for assessment and app

technical team findings and recommendations. The tec

review and management approval process will be sch

continuing basis through January 1987 (see enclo

schedule). When items requiring redesign and requali

identified, they will receive expeditious processing 

and implementation. Cost estimates for this reevaluat

are not available at this time. 

Answer 13: Yes. Actions are underway to imp

recommendation. 

Landing Safety 

Question 14: According to the testimony of Adm

surface runway testing at Kennedy has already been under

time . 

What is the nature of this runway testing, and 

expect to complete it? 

How will this testing enhance Kennedy as a landing 

Answer 14: Kennedy Space Center (KSC) runway test

actually be conducted at KSC. Orbiter tires will be 

tests at two facilities to determine tire forces and 

affected by Orbiter weight, crosswinds, and landing 

Langley Research Center, Virginia, a water jet sled on 
landing at various landing speeds, crosswinds, and la

Once spinup effects are determined, dynamomete

conducted at Wright Patterson AFB to examine ti

demonstrate tread wear margin. 

The test program is expected to be completed by 

Answer 14: Potential enhancements at KSC may 

or smoothing of the runway at the landing area, and

tread modifications as determined by a better unders

margins. If the testing supports, relaxation of wei

speed placards could allow more frequent KSC landing 

Of primary importance, however, is the determ

wear and load margins with respect to both routine a

of the KSC landing facility. 

Question 15: According to the Task Force's M

and Operations Team, current landing and decelerati

not shown adequate margins to support routine Kenne

or trans-Atlantic landings. 

In what ways have these systems not shown ad

In your opinion, what does the future hold 

Kennedy Space Center -- do you think it will ever 

landing site? 

Answer 15: The current Orbiter landing an

systems have not shown adequate margins in the f

1. Possible Tire Failures 

Tire wear is excessive for landings on the "a

runway surface. The wear occurs in wheel spinup an

to crosswinds and is increased when differential bra

directional control. 

The Orbiter is subject to severe directional 

if it lands with one main gear tire deflated. A

that the second tire (of 2) on the same side will 

or shortly thereafter because of the increased l

forced to carry. Simulator results indicate loss 

subsequent loss of vehicle and crew) will occur if 

failure occurs at or prior to nosewheel touchdown. 

2. Brake Damage 

Brake energy is rated as amount of energy ava

one of four brakes. The rated energy is defined b

of the first stator failure (of three) on a give

dynamometer tests indicated that 55 million foot-p

should be available from each brake. Data from t

shorn that stator failures occurred at or be

foot-pounds of energy using a moderate braking 
technique and brake material design. Recent testing using 

techniques and system pressure has confirmed the flight da

Other less severe brake damage may occur if the brak

is momentarily relaxed during the braking profile. In ad

have a chance to obtain maximum braking the init

application is initiated at 140 knots (landing 

approximately 215+ knots) and brake pressure relaxed below 

3. Criticality of Nosewheel Steering 

The nosewheel steering system was recently upgraded 

catastrophic failure modes. The current system lacks r

The nosewheel steering system offers the only possible 

directional control for the two tire failure case (s

above), allows all available braking capability to be 

stopping rather than for directional control in the p

crosswinds or for single tire or brake failure. 

4. Weather Considerations 

Due to the limitations in the landing and decelerati

and requirement to protect against single credible failur

rules and runway rollout margin (runway length remaining a

stop) computations have been developed which placard the 

wind conditions to values well below those envisioned i

Shuttle design. Conservative application of these placar

in a relatively high percentage of wave offs for landings 

KSC. 

Answer 15: As a minimum, the KSC landing facility co

be required to support Return-to-Launch-Site aborts 

available as a weather alternate site for end-of-mission 

As system improvements/modifications are developed in t

tires, nosewheel steering, and possibly, KSC runway surfac

then return as the primary landing site. The Pr

Commission has recommended that NASA define the condit

which this can happen. 

It should be noted that weather concerns will co

persist. Exposure of Orbiter tiles to rain damage can 

severe turnaround impact, far more severe than the impact 

at Edwards Air Force Base in California or Northrup st

Mexico. Estimates based upon climatological data and co

application of flight rule placards suggest that weather 

from KSC can be expected from 30 to 40 percent of the time

Question 16: The tire, brakes, and nosewheel steeri

have been nagging problems for some time. What do you in

to ensure that they perform as they should -- what fixe

incorporate into these systems? 

Answer 16: Upgrades to the nosewheel steering syste

elimination of single failure points in control and 

systems. Tire modifications include the addition of tir

instrumentation and the possibility of tread redesi

results of tire testing. 
reflight will include a new design using thicker 

current materials and would dissipate at least the s

the existing design. A design incorporating 

(carbon/carbon) will be available in early 1988 which 

increased energy dissipation capacity. Improvement

January, 1987, include stiffer wheel axles and hyd

orificing, which should eliminate dynamically 

failures; these plus thick stators and brake press

electronics should increase the energy available f

maximum braking stops. 

Question 17: According to the Missions Planning 

Team, the question of whether a range safety system 

for the Shuttle will be addressed by a joint NASA/DOD 

What concerns are there about a Shuttle range 

that would warrant this review? 

Answer 17: The current Range Safety System incl

elements on the two solid rocket boosters (SRB's) and 

tank. These systems are electrically cross-wired t

radio frequency spherical coverage required in this 

result of this cross-wiring the range safety com

capable of selecting a single system for destruction

destroy the SRB's you also destroy the external tank. 

destruction of the external tank is generally agreed 

timeframe when the vehicle is in the vicinity of the l

the stack is intact, it may be able to be shown th

destroying the SRB's will always destroy the exter

analysis may show that if the stack comes apart, the 

cannot survive. If analysis shows this to be true, 

charge on the external tank may not be required. 

Removing the system from the external tank 

advantages aside from the obvious cost and weight 

fewer explosives you handle in the vehicle preparat

the safer the operation. Without ah external tank 

Safety action initiated after SRB separation would n

Orbiter or crew and any risk inherent in the externa

regardless of how remote, would be eliminated. 

The current investigation is in line with t

currently being given to all other aspects of the 

launch process and hardware. The investigation does n

concern with the adequacy of the present system

represents a possible improvement which warrants fur

and operational evaluation. 

Question 18: The Rogers Commission indicate

number of landings at Edwards Air Force Base is incre

need a second Shuttle carrier aircraft to ferry orb

Kennedy. 

What would be the cost of another such car

necessary modifications, how could it be procured, 

would it take to incorporate the necessary modificatio
approximately 70 to 80 million dollars if a current Boe

were purchased and modified. The 747-200 would offer 

range capability compared to the -100 which is a s

advantage for recovery following a transatlantic landi

aircraft would be a used aircraft purchased from m

civilian sources and modified by Boeing. To complete t

an Orbiter ferry kit and a tail cone would also be 

increasing the total cost to 80 or 90 million dol

procurement plus engineering, modification, install

testing would require 14 to 18 months. 

Launch Abort and Crew Escape 

Question 19: The Rogers Commission requested NASA 

the range of flight conditions under which an emergency 

be successfully conducted in the event that two or 

engines fail early in ascent. 

Generally, what are the limiting factors for abort 

these conditions, and what are some ways to over

limitations? 

Answer 19: To do an emergency landing, the Orbite

sufficient energy to glide to a designated landing s

completion of powered flight and must be able to su

separate from the external tank and fly a return profi

within the structural design limits of the vehicle. A

current Orbiter hardware remains basically unchanged, 

continuing powered flight at least through SRB sep

shutting down the remaining main engine (if any) suc

Orbiter's range from the runway and residual energy pro

intact landing. 

During ascent the Orbiter flies through a narrow co

controls structural stresses and aerodynamic heating wi

limits. The process of increasing the range of flight 

under which the Orbiter can complete an intact emergency 

one of analyzing this corridor and identifying where wi

Orbiter meets the necessary range and energy requirem

this is done, engineering analysis must be completed to d

a profile can be designed to fly the Orbiter successf

runway. If analysis and testing indicates the 

acceptable, the flight software used onboard the Orbite

be changed to provide the capability. 

The limiting factors then are range from runway

energy at the end of powered flight, identification 

profile which the Orbiter can successfully fly, and the 

of onboard software to fly the profile. These limitat

addressed through the systematic process addressed above

the process is already underway with one candidate prof

Split-S return to launch site already being analyzed. 

provides for an intact landing for failures of two or 

engines during the first 20-30 seconds of flight. 
either to go back to KSC or to go on to a transatlanti

Contingency abort procedures currently in place res

ditches. Survivability for these cases is being addr

Crew Esqe brldng Qoup chartered by the NSTS Program Office. 

Shuttle/Centaur 

Question 20: When Admiral Truly appeared 

Subcommittee on May 8, he said that NASA was reevaluat

Shuttle/Centaur program in light of costs, 

flight-worthiness. 

What have you learned in the past five weeks? 

Answer 20: NASA has completed a reevalua

Shuttle/Centaur program and concluded that even foll

modifications identified by on-going reviews, the res

would not meet safety criteria being applied to ot

elements of the Space Shuttle system. On June 19, 1986

of the Centaur upper stage for use aboard the Space 

terminated. 
Recommendation I: 

(a) Design: The faulty solid rocket motor joint and s

changed. This could be a new design elim

joint or a redesign of the current joint an

design options should be prematurely preclu

of schedule, cost, or reliance on existing h

Question la: Does NASA favor the total redesign o

rocket booster? What are the leading candidates tha

considered? Are the Marshall and Morton Thiokol redesign 

currently under way considering all possible redesig

including parallel studies of monolithic solid rocket bo

(b) How long does it take to develop, test and qualify 

rocket booster or a redesigned solid rocket booster? W

cost? 

(c) Is there any truth to the rumor that Morton Thiokol 

a redesign candidate for the solid rocket boosters? 

option incorporate a capture joint? Does it still have 

Answer la: The SRM failure on STS 51-L was isolate

field joint and seal design. A comparable design was 

SRM case to nozzle joint and seal. However, the second

that joint was insensitive to joint rotation and the

resistant to failure. Design actions are underway to c

and seal designs for both of these joints. In addition

assessment of the entire SRM design has been performed 

actions are being taken to enhance the reliability o

Specifically, the number of potential leak paths is bein

the igniter and the margins of safety are being impr

nozzle. These improvements are being defined by indep

and Morton Thiokol teams to produce a reliable SRM desig

the facilities and major tooling capability already in p

Both design teams are charged with the responsibility fo

alternate designs to ensure adequate program margin. 

activity is being reviewed with the National Resea

Overview Committee. A separate SRM design study will b

involving all solid rocket motor manufacturers to eva

design solutions. These studies will not be limited to 

concepts and will include evaluation of monolithic SRM's. 

Answer lb: Based on historical experience on dev

large solid rocket motors (SRM) we, would estimate a m

years required to design, develop, and qualify a new 

The current Shuttle SRM required approximately 6 

initiation of the contract to completion of qualifica

time could be reduced some on the basis of the exper

during Shuttle SRM development program if you were devel

with identical performance. Using the Shuttle SRM deve

as a basis for projecting the cost of developing a new 
This estimate simply takes the Shuttle SRM cost and 

cost to the time frame for development of a new Sh

minimum 4 years estimated development and qualifica

Shuttle SRM is exclusive of procurement time to comp

a supplier. This would add 12 to 15 months to the ov

A redesign of the booster including qualification te

accomplished in less than two years. The cost 

redesigned booster is included in the FY 1986 suppl

approved by Congress. 

Answer lc: It is true that Morton Thiokol 

redesign candidates. The redesign candidates addres

or contributory failure causes identified in the 51-L 

There are two leading concepts for the metal case f

of the redesign and both of these concepts include c

and O-rings. 

Question 2: The Commission recommends static 

final flight configuration. Does a suitable test fac

vertical tests of this nature? How many tests shou

to verify the redesigned joint and under what condit

your best estimates of the cost of (a) refurbishing 

facility and (b) of each vertical test? 

Answer 2a & b: There are no existing facili

testing the Shuttle SRM vertically (nozzle up or no

verification plan being implemented includes test

fixtures, full segments, and flight configuratio

motors. The subscale tests will be conducted on fix

2 ft. in diameter simulating field joints primari

sealing performance using various seal types and m

wide temperatures and dimensional extremes. Other 

will be conducted on small motors hot fired to 

insulation, thermal behavior, etc., with varying to

size joints will be tested to evaluate and 

environmental protection (temperature and rain) d

verify computer models of joint dynamic behavior. 

full size segments will be assembled vertically int

motors containing inert propellant. Small ign

installed in these shortened motors and fired t

identical pressure profiles as experienced duri

ignition. These shortened vertical motor tests w

evaluate the joint movement under dynamic cond

pressuring hot gas dynamic effect on the insulation 

sealing capability. Appropriate full size seg

assembled into a structural test article that will 

flight loading conditions. Finally, four full sca

hot firings are planned to be tested either h

vertically. All these tests are to be conducted ove

of environmental conditions. This testing will b

detailed extensive analysis to verify the joint desig

Cost estimates are being developed at this time. V

rough order magnitude (ROM) estimates indicate a tot

down vertical test facility would cost between $50 a

a refurbished nozzle down test facility would cost 

$50 million, and a refurbished nozzle up test faci
Test cost could vary significantly based on test site loc

only basis available at this time for estimating cost p

horizontal testing at Morton Thiokol which cost approx

million per test. This includes the test motor cost, 

cost, instrumentation cost and engineering support cost. 

Question 3: Under the original research, design and 

activities for the solid rocket boosters, what factors 

abridged test program? Why hadn't Morton Thiokol cond

that conformed with the temperature requirements of 

Commit Criteria? 

Answer 3: Verification of the SRM to the natural 

environmental requirements was planned early in the pro

conducted by analysis and test. Morton Thiokol eventuall

the joint for induced temperature through analysis 

retrospect the resulting certification was inadequate. Ad

when questioned by the NASA Data and Design Analysis 

during the investigation of the accident, Morton Thiokol 

they had misinterpreted the vertical flight en

requirement for a storage requirement. 

The requirements for matched performance between the two 

a major concern during the development phase. These r

were more stringent than previous SRM programs to ens

control and maximum performance. As a consequence, the 

motor test program was oriented toward testing 

temperatures to minimize ballistic performance variab

concern for ballistic performance verification coupled 

inadequate plan for analytical environmental verificatio

in insufficient verification of the thermal effects. 

(b) Independent Oversight: The Administrator of NASA sho

the National Research Council to form an 

Solid Rocket Motor design oversight co

implement the Commission's design recommen

oversee the design effort. 

Question 1: Does NASA interpret this recommendatio

that the NRC will participate in the formulation of th

candidates? Has Dr. Stever already initiated NRC activ

will be members of the NRC group? Who makes the fin

decision? What will be the critical factors -- cos

reliability, availability? 

Answer 1: The NRC Panel of experts will particip

formulation of the redesign candidates to the extent tha

conduct technical evaluation of key steps in the redesi

The Panel will review and comment on the technical 

scheduled NASA reviews of the redesign and provide writt

reports to the NASA Administrator. 

The NRC has formed a Panel with Dr. Stever as Chairman

news release listing the Panel members is attached). 

meeting of the Panel was held on June 19 and 20 at t

Academy of Sciences. NASA and Morton Thiokol personn
The final SRB fix decision will be made by the NASA 

following formal reviews through the NASA configu

process and reviews by a NASAIindustry design overview 

NRC Panel. The critical factors in the SRB fix de

safety and reliability. 

Question 2: What impact does the ongoing NASA 

Review have on these activities and the possible candi

Answer 2: The new design will be assessed a

overall criticality 1 review process. When the design 

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) will be con

design and any criticality 1 and 1R components will b

ensure adequacy for flight safety. 

Question 3: Should alternatives such as monolith

boosters be candidates? 

Answer 3: The SRM design team has not restricted 

particular design options. If a "seal system" 

provides the safety requirements and complies with 

established by the Presidential Commission, t

configuration would be advantageous to the pro

monolithic design presents other problems such as 

transportation, re-verification, etc. However, a mo

has not been deleted as a design option. 

Question 4: Doesn't a comprehensive reassess

rocket motor designs and the development, 

requalification of the ultimate selection infer an 

time for the Shuttle? 

I 

Answer 4: The primary factor in the selection o

SRM seal is safety, In the event the final design n

extended down time, the flight program will be delaye

seal design is verified. 

Recommendation 11: 

(a) Shuttle Management: The shuttle program struc

reviewed.. . A redefinition of the Pro

responsibility is essential. 

Question 1: Does the current management review b

by Sam Phillips meet the full scope of this recomm

does Captain Crippen's review of space shuttle manage

with Gen. Phillips? Should an outside organizatio

National Academy of Public Administration's or some 

support be enlisted in conducting this management stud

* Answer 1 : General Sam Phillips has been charge

Fletcher to review the overall NASA management struc

Crippen's effort is a subset which will specifical

Commission recommendations by reviewing Space Shut

The results of the Crippen study will be reviewed 

Phillips. This study will also be reviewed b
Question 2: How will NASA be able to attract and m

level management personnel in light of the current hiring 

the restrictive revolving door policy? 

* Answer 2: NASA has continued to develop outstandin

and women who are ready and willing 'to move upward in t

management. Also, in this time of need, many excel

outside of NASA have volunteered their services to put 

back on track. 

(b) Astronauts in Management: NASA should encourage the 

of qualified astronauts into agency 

pos it ions . Question 1: At what level and in what positions w

astronauts enhance the appreciation of operations and fli

* Answer 1: The backgrounds and experience lev

individuals in the astronaut office are widely varied. 

the individual involved, they can serve in any managem

for which they are qualified. 

Question 2: Does NASA offer enough benefits and ch

retain top rated NASA astronauts? 

* Answer 2: The Crippen study will address the inc

retaining astronauts in management. Many individuals in 

as well as the rest of the NASA family, are rewar

knowledge they are participating in a challenging endea

important. 

(c) Safety Shuttle Panel: NASA should establish an 

Advisory Panel. 

Question 1: How would this Panel interact with the 

proposed creation of an Office of Safety, Reliability 

Control within NASA? 

* Answer 1: The STS Safety Advisory Panel would be 

entity from the SR&QA office. Its function would deal 

that involve flight safety as opposed to safety in ge

intent is to have this panel work closely with the SRhQ

well as the operations and engineering organizations of 

Question 2: IS quality control a function of an or

chart, or is it the result of a line item emphasis? 

* Answer 2: Quality is obtained by emphasis on its i

all individuals involved with a product and an organ

adequate checks to ensure the integrity of the product. 

Question 3: HOW will NASA be able to attrac

technicians and engineers to safety/quality control-re

when in the past it was a dead end career slot? 

* Answer 3: In responding to the Commission's re
> 

planned a renewed emphasis on this vital function. T

be a natural career progression plan for this field. 

Question 4: Would the Shuttle Safety Panel have 

to terminate or delay a launch? 

* Answer 4: The exact role of the Shuttle Safet

launch decision process is under study. 

Recommendation 111: 

Criticality Review and Hazard Analysis: NASA an

shuttle contractors should review all Criti

and 2R items and hazard analysis. An 

appointed by the National Research Council

the adequacy of the effort and report d

Administrator of NASA. 

Question 1: Does this effort infer only a rev

Criticality Items Review methodology? Or doe

independent outside group will reassess all criticali

Answer 1: The failure modes and effects an

critical items list (CIL), and hazard analysis (HA

effort entails complete reviews of design and ex

CIL's, and HA's to ensure completeness, and/or 

additions or deletions. The re-evaluations are bein

each NASA project element and element contractor and 

contractors (FMEA's and CIL's only). The independ

assigned to do the FMEA and CIL re-evaluations are as 

a. Orbiter and Government-furnished equipment (

Douglas Astronautics Company 

b. Space shuttle main engine (SSME), Martin Mar

C. External tank (ET), Rocketdyne 

d. Solid rocket booster (SRB), Martin Marietta A

The data derived from these reviews will be integrat

by the projects in a series of internal reviews. The 

be submitted to a series of official NASA projec

Headquarters boards for review. In conjunction w

effort, the instructions for preparing FMGA's and 

performing the analyses are also being re-evaluated 

groundrules and assumptions used in performing th

valid and will yield accurate and consistent results

to assure that the methodology is consistent acros

Level I1 is preparing documentation requirement

formalize the methodology for FMEA's and CIL's. 

In addition, Presidential Commission Recommendatio

that an audit panel be appointed by the National Rese

verify the adequacy of the re-evaluation effort 

directly to the Administrator of NASA. 
contractors ? 

(b) When will NASA complete its Critical Items list revie

Answer 2a: As part of the FMEA and CIL re-evaluatio

each project element is using the services of an in

contractor along with those of an element prime contract

to STS 51-L, however, there was no independent 

duplicating the effort of the element prime contractor. A

reviewed by each NASA project element. The project eleme

included assessments by the responsible design organizati

JSC Reliability Division. The CIL was then submitted to 

I1 and I boards as required. Information copies of th

also submitted to other organizations, including the J

Operations Directorate, JSC Safety Division, and the J

Assurance Division. 

MSFC management is overviewing the FMEA and CIL re-evalua

being performed by the MSFC engineers, the prime contract

independent contractor for the SSME, ET, SRB, and Spacela

JSC management is performing the same overview for the O

GFE. In addition, JSC and MSFC managements and a JSC Le

(comprised of Reliability Division, Astronaut Office, 

Crew Operations Directorate personnel) are surveying e

element contractors to assure their methodology is correc

During the period when the FMEA's and CIL's are being re

Level I1 SRhQA personnel will be resident at the NA

element and element contractor facilities. 

As the F'ME.4 and CIL re-evaluations are completed, the re

be submitted for review to a series of official boards 

the project facilities, then the Level I1 (program offi

and finally to the Level I (Headquarters) board. 

At the completion of this process, the Office of the Ad

will initiate action to have an audit panel appoint

National Research Council to provide an end audit of this 

Answer 2b: Although completion of the Level I cri

list review has not been scheduled, it is anticipated tha

I review will be completed by the end of June 1987 an

Level I1 review will be completed in May 1987. This 

however, does not necessarily provide for identifyin

Critical items which may become a part of present or 

designs. 

Question 3: NASA recently released a list of 44 Cr

items that would require changes before the shuttle f

This was part of the System Design Review. 

(a) Does this mean these items presented unnecessary r

hadn't they been reworked before the accident? And t

changes" does this infer analytical work or redesign/

work? 
flight? What are they? 

Answer 3a: The 44 Criticality Items list referr

the elimination of SRB nozzle erosion. This proble

STS-8 and subsequent to this flight the material whic

to erosion was replaced on all subsequent flights. 

be evaluated utilizing the planned static test firing

Answer 3b: There were 4 Criticality I Items besi

that the Shuttle Projects Office identified as a lau

in the MSFC Problem Assessment System (PAS) on fl

They are as follows: 

1. APU problem which caused an abort prior to li

61-C. The problem was found to be comparitors in 

controller that caused an SRB right tilt APU overspee

new comparitor obtained from a different vendor and 

first time on flight 61-C. These comparitors were re

system for all subsequent flights. This problem 

pending resolution of eliminating two unused terminal

2. Improper torque on an SRM Transducer Bolt A

problem was found during post flight inspection. 

found to be torquing interference using the torqui

bolts have been retorqued and leak checked on a

flights. Revised torquing requirements have been im

new torquing tool developed to eliminate this problem

3. Missing section of SRM outer boat ring. M

from the outer boat ring occurred on DM-4, 51B, 

STS-3. Analyses of the structure indicates the failu

seconds in the burn. The worse case analyses i

separation could not occur prior to 85 seconds afte

thermal analysis indicates a failure would not occur 

case condition. Corrective actions are in process. 

4. SRM igniter gasket erosion damage. Erosion 

primary seal of the inner gasket and hot gas flo

primary and secondary seals was found during post tes

the DM-6 static firing. Investigation revealed the a

caused by either an overfill of the rubber seal, to

of the bolts, tolerance stacking between mat

deformation of the cover during ignition. Correct

underway. 

Recommendation IV: 

Safety Organization: See Recommendation II(c). 

Question 1: Does this recommendation indicate 

downgraded its safety, reliability, and quality assur

despite their prior arguments to the contrary? 

Answer 1: We believe that this recommen

Commission conclusions that (1) there should be an O

Reliability and Quality Assurance headed by 
have a work force sufficient to insure that its f

adequately performed, and (4) this office should be i

other NASA functional and program responsibilities. 

Question 2: Wouldn't the consolidation of safet

quality assurance activities at the Associate Admin

further reduce its priority at the program and pro

create a situation where safety/reliability/quality a

be seen as the other guy's problem? 

Answer 2: The establishment of an Office of Safet

and Quality Assurance at the Associate Administrator l

in any way relieve the program Associate Administ

responsibility for safety, reliability and quality ass

execution of their programs. 

Recommendation V: 

Improved Communication: The Commission found that M

Flight Center project managers, because of 

Marshall to management isolation, failed t

and timely information bearing on the saf

51-L to other vital elements of sh

management. 

Question 1: In light of this finding, what con

this Committee have in other programs and projects m

Marshall Space Flight Center including the external 

space shuttle main engine? 

Answer 1: The management structure for the e

program is essentially the same as that for the solid 

program. Both are production programs and basic d

considered complete. The external tank program has 

history of problem reporting to all levels of NASA man

The SSME is an on-going large flight and development 

known problems that are being worked on. The solid 

program was not structured for continued development. 

development phase, it was considered essentially 

program. The SSME can limit the life of a component 

comes up. This has been done on the turbine blades, e

rocket motor had to be designed/developed differentl

failure modes were not a function of lifetime. 

Question 2: How many Criticality 1 launch co

waived each flight for the SRBs? ET? SSMES? and Orb

Answer 2: NO answer yet. 

Question 3: Despite the fact Morton Thiokol's 

concerns were not addressed to the Mission Direc

shouldn't upper level management be aware of t

Criticality I items that most threaten the success o

Wouldn't a waived launch constraint COmtitute such an 

waived launch constraints addressed as Part of the Fl
* Answer 3: Upper level management should be and 

numerous critical items associated with the vehicle. 

should be aware of any imposition and removal 

associated with these items. The waiver of any 

should also be addressed at the FRR. This was not t

SRM seals. A mandate of the Crippen study is a p

ensure this information flow in the future. 

8 

Recommendation VI: 

Landing Safety: NASA must take actions to improve la

Question 1: Does the Commission have 

recommendations concerning improvements in the tire, 

wheel steering systems on the shuttle? 

Answer 1: The Commission recommends that the 

particularly at abort sites, be improved on the 

nosewheel steering systems. They also recommend 

criteria be established for these systems and that 

required to meet these criteria in high fidelity 

verified at Edwards prior to landing at KSC. 

NASA is taking action to improve the safety margin a

the Commission. The abort site capability of the 

increased approximately 50 percent through the us

carbon brakes in lieu of the baseline beryllium 

studies are being conducted on a fail operat

nosewheel steering system in lieu of the present f

and on methods to reduce tire wear and the chance of 

As potential backups in case of a blown tire, stu

conducted on landing gear emergency skids and a ro

capability. Based on the results of the studi

improvements will be made as required to insure land

improvements will be certified to specific criter

fidelity ground and flight testing. 

Question 2: Despite significant efforts to 

systems, they still do not have sufficient safety 

Are inadequate resources being devoted to these acti

Answer 2: It is not felt that inadequate reso

devoted to improving the landing systems. The orig

solving the brake damage problem was to fix the ba

brakes. Considerable effort was expended in 

however, ground and flight test results have demon

baseline brakes do not have sufficient capability 

landing under all conditions. It is now planned t

set of brakes (structural carbon) with sufficien

provide for safe landings under both normal and 

conditions. 

The nosewheel steering system was originally designe

contingency purposes and not as a primary steerin

brakes were utilized as a primary steering 

differential braking. T~ offload the brakes, the no

. 
Consideration is being given to further upgrading the 

steering system to a fail operational/fail safe system to 

availability for primary steering. 

Question 3: Do landings at the Kennedy Space Center 

an excessive safety risk? 

Answer 3: Shuttle landings can be made at the Ken

Center without excessive risk when "good weather" conditio

However, weather prediction can be a problem when th

conditions are marginal. Improvements in weather 

capability, as well as improvements to the orbiter brak

and nose wheel steering, would reduce that risk even 

Therefore, NASA plans to resume Shuttle flights with la

Edwards Air Force Base and incorporate these improveme

resuming landings at KSC. The brake improvements and 

equipment for more accurate weather forecasting are in p

scheduled for implementation with demonstration tests d

first year after resuming flying. Nose wheel steering 

-safe features is available for the next flight and de

whether to incorporate fail-operational features are sch

December 1986. After these modifications and with co

margins in weather forecasting, there will be even les

landing at KSC. 

Question 4: Besides improving landing weather for

launch weather forecasts also require substantial enhanc

improvements? Does the existing forecasting system provid

wind shear forecasting capabilities? If so, why was Mi

exposed to hurricane-level gusts? 

Answer 4: The Office of Space Flight has been rev

Shuttle weather forecasting capabilities since the format

Space Shuttle Weather Advisory Panel in the fall of 1985. 

consists of distinguished scientists and managers on a

operations and research. They have made a complete review 

current operational weather forecasting sys tem and wil

recommendations to OSF for system improvements in their fi

expected this month. 

A NASA team will review and formulate a system-wide Spa

Weather Improvements Plan upon review of this report. 

will be responsible for assessing both the short and 

research/forecast weather improvement requirements for 

Shuttle . Wind shear detection is not a separate characteristic 

launch Policy, since some level of wind shear typical

This phenomena is not specifically addressed as a separa

impacting launch decisions. However, it is included as p

wind profile and integrated to determine whether the ov

profile/initialization load is within acceptable limits fo

There were indeed strong wind shears aloft over KSC when 

was launched; however, these shears did not appear to 

operational design limits. Wind shear detection will be i
Recommendation VII : 

Launch abort and crew escape: 

Question 1: Would you please inform the Comm

various launch abort and crew escape systems that e

various stages of a launch? Are any launch abort 

systems feasible during the two minutes ignition p

rocket boosters? 

Answer 1: The early part of the ascent phase in 

engines and SRB's provide the thrust is known as 

"Second stage" begins after SRB separation and conti

engine cutoff (MECO). Any system failure during th

will result in an abort situation being declared. 

design of the Space Shuttle requires a delay in e

abort sequence until after SRB separation. 

There are two basic types of ascent abort modes 

Shuttle missions : intact aborts and contingency a

aborts are designed to provide a safe return of th

planned landing site. Contingency aborts are desig

crew survival following a failure when an intac

possible. 

The type of failure and time of the failure determin

abort is selected. There are four types of inta

ATO, AOA, TAL, and RTLS. The abort-to-orbit (ATO) m

to allow the vehicle to achieve a temporary orbit tha

the nominal orbit. The abort-once-around (AOA) mode 

allow the Orbiter to fly once around the Earth and m

and landing. The transatlantic-abort-landing (TAL) m

to permit an intact landing on the other side of the 

The return-to-launch-site (RTLS) mode involves flyin

dissipate propellant and then turning around to retu

near the launch site. The Contingency abort m

relatively intact landing on a prepared runway or a s

ditching if a runway cannot be reached. The chances 

ditching are low. The crew will probably not 

structural failure at water impact. For all abort 

escape procedures require the crew to stay inside th

ment until the Orbiter lands or ditches. At that 

egresses from the Orbiter. 

Two concepts may provide some remote possibility 

during first stage flight. The first concept invol

of the crew from the Orbiter. Possible escape sy

remove the crew from the Orbiter include e

encapsulated seats, or a specially designed crew c

would separate from the Orbiter. The other fir

concept involves the separation of the Orbiter from 

stack. Possible escape systems that could enhance se

Orbiter include SRB thrust termination and a f

capability. However, complex systems such as these 

inherent risks and penalties (such as cost, weight, 

actuation or hardware failure). If major changes s
the Shuttles payload capacity significantly, that would 

prudent thing to do. Feasibility, then, must be put in 

perspective by weighing it against the overall impact of 

changes. 

Question 2: Prior to 51-L, had NASA discussed the f

of incorporating enhanced launch abort or crew escape sy

the orbiter? 

Answer 2: Yes. The feasibility of enhanced launc

crew escape systems was studied in detail. Criteria for s

system for enhancing crew survivability included 

complexity; limited utility of the system due to lac

reaction time; cost, schedule, performance and mission 

impacts; and probability of need based upon predict

reliability. 

Appendix C of the Data and Design Analysis Mission Pl

Operations Team Report includes a summary of that histor

the STS 51-L accident. A more current review (the Louvie

of the entire subject is in progress and should be co

October 1, 1986. 

Question 3: Allen Louviere's report on Crew Escape 

is due for completion on June 15th. 

(a) When will the Subcommittee receive a copy of this r

are you familiar with its findings and recommendations? 

(b) Will shuttle crew size be reduced when the shutt

flights? 

(c) Is NASA reassessing the Space Flight Participant p

certain categories of the Payload Specialist Program? 

space flight be left to the professionals for the near ter

Answer 3a: The National Space Transportation Sys

Program Manager received an interim oral presentation on C

Provisions on 30 June 1986. The study is continuing and 

completed by October 1, 1986. Copies will be provid

Subcommittee as soon as the mitten report is available. 

* Answer 3b: The Louviere study, which is due for com

October 1, 1986, will address crew size in its proposa

objective is a design that will not limit crew size. Crew 

certainly be addressed as a major concern prior to the ne

* Answer 3c: NASA will address the Space Flight P

program for future operations to ensure a coherent polic

program. While such participants will not be a part of 

flights, it is anticipated that NASA will continue to su

program in the future. 

Recommendation VIII: 

Flight Rate: NASA must establish a flight rate that is 

with its resources. Reliance upon a sin
Question 1: Does the Commission's recommendation 

NASA should have both an ELV and a shuttle capability? 

Answer 1: NASA supports the mixed fleet concept. 

been authorized to proceed with the procurement 

national security purposes. Any NASA requirements for 

met by procurement through DOD or the private sector. 

Question 2: Does NASA feel the use of manned la

should be reserved for select missions that utilize 

unique capabilities ? 

Answer 2: There are many missions that can be acco

with a manned launch vehicle, but the Shuttle's capa

its use for almost any type of payload. The Shuttle's 

be utilized for mixed cargo flights according to p

decisions. 

Question 3: Does NASA intend to restrict foreign a

launches on the shuttle? What were the feel

Commissioners on this issue? 

Along a similar line, what were the feelings of the 

toward the launch of citizens in space? 

Answer 3: NASA intends to meet its commitments t

and commercial customers. However, NASA will not 

private ELV entrepreneurs for new customers. The r

Commissioners did not express any feelings on these 

The policy on the launch of foreign and commercial 

currently under interagency review and a policy is exp

Recommendation IX: 

Maintenance Standards : Installation, test and 

procedures must be especially rigorous for 

items designated Criticality I. 

Question 1: Can a vigorous maintenance program be 

conjunction with an ambitious launch schedule? 

Answer 1: A vigorous maintenance program will be 

whatever level is required to ensure safe operation

The launch schedule will reflect whatever that mainte

requires in terms of time and effort. 

Question 2: Is there a fear that an overemphasis 

1 and 1R items could result in an associated decline 

awareness of Criticality 2 and 2R items? 

Answer 2: NO, but there is an awareness tha

reliability and quality assurance program must be b

criticality of all STS components is currently being 

appropriate guidelines are being established for deal

level of criticality. 
are under way within NASA to put the spares program 

footing? 

Answer 3: We do not believe NASA has emphasized 

spares and new Orbiters at the expense of the spares 

structural spares are a separate budget, line item as 

Congress and the initial funding for a replacement 

proposed in a budget amendment. 

As Program Manager, Arnold Aldrich reported to the Comm

"There had been fund contentions in the program for 

years, at least starting in the mid-seventies 

through into the early to mid-eighties.. .intention

were made to defer the heavy build-up of 

procurement in the program so that the funds coul

to other more pressing activities" 

One major step being taken to put the spares pro

operational basis is the assumption of Logistics Manag

user organization, KSC. Locating this responsibility a

center will provide greater visibility and emphasis to 

During the current internal budget cycle, special empha

placed on the Logistics program. KSC as the responsibl

performed an in-depth requirements review and have pre

findings and recommendations to Headquarters. These 

recommendations are being incorporated into the agenc

and budget process. 
r 

L 

Hon. SLADE GORTON, 

Chairmnn, Subcommittee on Science, Technology, and Swe, Com

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a letter and material' provided 

uent regarding the malfunction of the space shuttle Challenger whic

explosion on January 28. I would appreciate your including it in th

oversight hearing held on the explosion of the space shuttle. 

meme, Science, and Transportation, Washington, Dc. 

I certainly appreciate your cooperation in this matter. 

Sincerely, SA

Enclosures. 

MAFZZTTA, GA, Jan

Senator JAKE GARN, 

Senator SAM NUNN, 

Senator MACK MAITINGLY, 

US. enate Building, Washington, DC 

GENTLEMEN: May I pass onto you three gentlemen several ideas 

you might entertain in your deliberations? 

First, may I tell Senator Garn my admiration in the way he co

feelingly expressed himself in regard to the Challenger tragedy 

Lehrer TV Newshours this sad week in our Nation's history. Likew

John Glenn. 

It is in regard to the above catastrophe that this letter is expressed

While Director of the Engineering Sciences Division of the US. 

Office at Duke University during the 1960s and 1970s, I carried out 

cal and experimental research program. This work was done in co

two outstanding engineering scientists, namely Dr. Sudhir Kumar, t

rector of the Division and Dr. Charles M. Haman, Professor of M

neering at Duke. 

The subject of our research, named Project Mountainwell which 

sored in both our spare time and funds along with the Duke Univ

was missile propulsion using atmospheric thrust through a seale

tube. This work was active from 1961 through 1975 and resulted 

technical (reviewed) journal papers, six Ph.ds and numerous MSs. 

Smce the research was in the field of rocket propulsion, we infor

group in Houston of our findings. In fact, it was favorably referre

that was lssued by the NASA Lewis Laboratories. 

This scheme enabled a missile, such as the Apollo series, to d

reduce its first propulsion stage in that the atmospheric thrust sup

thrust. This thrust phase would be available using a two thousand f

foot wide vertical, air-evacuated tube. The tube would be struct

alongside, or within, a vertically sheer precipice such as are plentif

the Glenwood Springs area of Colorado. A plastic, convex, muzzle 

exiting top of the tube) would be explosively timed to disintegrate a

tered the exit position. Not only is a considerable portion of the fue

to attain an upward velocity of 900+ fps at exit, but the missile ov

camed throw-off weight can be much reduced. Greater exiting velo

able, should the atmospheric thrust within the tube be implemen

state reduced propulsion first stage. The choice of an enclosed first stage operation in a protected tub

al advantages, namely: the vehicle or missile exits into the lower a

aerodynamically stable configuration, the possible atmospheric turb

er does not interfere with a chosen time foi launch of a mission, and 

erable savings and enhanced safety in reducing the need to carry 

propellants for the initial phase of early flight. The aspect of precis

dependent of weather, lends dependability for construction of a 

b 

The material was not reproducible. 
gp

The experimental work was carried out at Duke University, init

inch short tubes and finally after several years, a one foot diameter 

was 1870 feet long. Speeds of over 500 fps were attained at midpoi

later tube for vehicles weighing more than 80 lbs. I believe that thq

facility, although needing some policing in the forest location, could 

tests. 

Both Dr. Kumar, now Prof. of Ae/ME at the Illinois Institute of T

cago; and Dr. Harman of Duke, are actively continuing research an

with this now inactive project. I know that they would both be mo

relating to you their participation in that project and any aspect 

question. I called both last Tuesday evening after seeing the News

above. Incidentally, Dr. Kumar and I were awarded one of the A

Awards for our earlier work on this study. I will be pleased to address this subject further, should you request

Encl.: Project Mountainwell early site photo. Copy of fmt Moun

Sincerely yours, JAM

ARS Jounral, Oct. 1961.