In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3985

LISA WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

MARK C. CURRAN, JR.,

Sheriff of Lake County, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 09 C 562—John W. Darrah, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 10, 2012—DECIDED APRIL 4, 2013

Before POSNER, ROVNER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Lisa Williamson was arrested

along with her husband Lance on a charge that they

had stolen someone else’s horse. After being acquitted

on the charge, Williamson filed suit against two Lake

County, Illinois sheriff’s deputies pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, alleging that they arrested her without probable

cause in violation of the Fourth Amendment and de-
2 No. 09-3985

prived her of her Fourteenth Amendment right to

equal protection by arresting her based on nothing

more (she contends) than her status as Lance’s wife. The

district court dismissed both claims for failure to state

a claim on which relief could be granted. Williamson

v. Curran, 2009 WL 3817613 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12, 2009);

see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). We affirm.

I.

As this case was dismissed at the pleading stage, we

accept the factual allegations of Williamson’s first

amended complaint as true, granting Williamson the

benefit of every reasonable inference that may be

drawn from those allegations. E.g., Bogie v. Rosenberg,

705 F.3d 603, 608 (7th Cir. 2013).

Williamson has referred to and attached a variety

of documents to her complaint, including, for example,

the investigator reports that culminated in the issuance

of the warrant for her arrest. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) provides that “written instruments” attached

to a pleading become part of that pleading for all purposes. Thus, when a plaintiff attaches to the complaint

a document that qualifies as a written instrument, and

her complaint references and relies upon that document in asserting her claim, the contents of that

document become part of the complaint and may be

considered as such when the court decides a motion

attacking the sufficiency of the complaint. See, e.g., Centers

v. Centennial Mortg., Inc., 398 F.3d 930, 933 (7th Cir.

2005); N. Indiana Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of
No. 09-3985 3

South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452-53 (7th Cir. 1998). The traditional understanding of an instrument is a document

that defines a party’s rights, obligations, entitlements,

or liabilities—a contract, for example. BLACK’S LAW

DICTIONARY 869 (9th ed. 2009). Most of the documents

that Williamson has appended to her complaint do not

fit within that narrow understanding description of

a written instrument. But we have taken a broader view

of documents that may be considered on a motion to

dismiss, noting that a court may consider, in addition

to the allegations set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the complaint, documents

that are central to the complaint and are referred to in

it, and information that is properly subject to judicial

notice. Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1

(7th Cir. 2012); see also Reger Dev., LLC v. Nat’l City Bank,

592 F.3d 759, 764 (7th Cir. 2010); Hecker v. Deere & Co.,

556 F.3d 575, 582-83 (7th Cir. 2009); Tierney v. Vahle, 304

F.3d 734, 738-39 (7th Cir. 2002); see, e.g., Bogie, 705 F.3d

at 608-09 (considering video cited in and attached to

complaint); Brownmark Films, LLC v. Comedy Partners,

682 F.3d 687, 690-91 (7th Cir. 2012) (considering videos

cited in complaint in support of copyright infringement claim and submitted by defendant in support

of motion to dismiss). What makes it appropriate for us

to consider the documents that Williamson has attached

to her complaint is that she has not only cited them in

the body of her complaint, but she has, to some degree,

relied on their contents as support for her claims. See,

e.g., R. 35 at 8 ¶¶ 34, 37 (citing and attaching two

different police reports and alleging that nothing in
4 No. 09-3985

these reports “made any reference to any act, error

or omission of Lisa Williamson”).

Thus, in the factual summary that follows, we have

on occasion included statements that are drawn from

the documents that Williamson has attached to and

referenced in her complaint. Where we have done so,

we have made it clear that this is what we are doing.

As we discuss later in this opinion, Williamson has

argued that it was inappropriate for the district court

to consider these documents (along with additional

documents submitted by the defendants) without converting the defendants’ motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d).

We reject that argument for the reasons we detail below. For now it is sufficient to note that where we

have incorporated the exhibits to the complaint into

our summary of the facts, we have done so based on

Williamson’s own reliance on these documents and in

the absence of any indication from her—be it in the complaint or the briefing—that the documents are not

genuine or that they have been falsified in some way.

See Hecker, 556 F.3d at 582 (noting that plaintiff did

not contest authenticity of documents defendant sought

to use in moving to dismiss complaint). We add that

where we have cited documents attributing particular

statements to Williamson, whether or not she made

these statements obviously is within her personal knowledge, so we may legitimately assume that if the statements have not been accurately recounted in the

exhibits, she would have disavowed them. With that
No. 09-3985 5

said, we proceed with our summary of the facts as

alleged in the complaint.

Marta Schroeder owned a horse named Chevallo,

which she had purchased in January 2006 from the

Lance Williamson Stables, LLC (“Williamson Stables”) in

Gurnee, Illinois, for $20,000. Lance Williamson (“Lance”)

was the owner and managing member of Williamson

Stables. Schroeder kept the horse not at Williamson

Stables but at Field & Fences Equestrian Center (“Field

& Fences”), which was also in Gurnee. Christine

Capuson was Chevallo’s trainer at Field & Fences;

she had also negotiated the purchase of the horse from

Williamson Stables on Schroeder’s behalf. In or about

March 2007, Schroeder decided to sell the horse, and

she commissioned Capuson to locate a buyer. Schroeder

advised Capuson that she did not want either Williamson Stables or Lance to be involved with the sale.

Later that month, against Schroeder’s expressed

wish, Capuson contacted Lance, identified herself as

Chevallo’s trainer and Schroeder’s agent, and told him

she was looking for a buyer for the horse. Capuson

asked Lance if he would show Chevallo to prospective

buyers on consignment, given that he was already

familiar with the animal. Lance advised Capuson that

he did not have space in his barn for the horse at that

time. But when Capuson followed up with him in

late April and reported that she was still looking for

a buyer, Lance agreed to board the horse and show him

to prospective buyers. Lance advised Capuson that he

would charge Schroeder a standard monthly fee for
6 No. 09-3985

the boarding, feeding, and care of the horse; Capuson

in turn consented to this arrangement and directed

Lance to send the invoices for these services to her as

Schroeder’s agent and not to Schroeder. On April 27,

2007, Jennifer Crow, the barn manager for Williamson

Stables, picked up Chevallo from Field & Fences and

transported him to Williamson Stables, where Chevallo

thereafter remained. Lisa Williamson had nothing to

do with this arrangement.

On or about June 30, 2007, Schroeder asked Capuson

about the status of Capuson’s efforts to locate a buyer

for Chevallo. Capuson in turn called Lance. When Lance

informed her that he had not found a buyer, Capuson

demanded the return of the horse to her. Lance

informed her that he would return the horse when he

was paid for having boarded and cared for the horse.

Capuson then informed Schroeder for the first time

that Chevallo was in the custody of Williamson Stables.

It was at this point, Williamson alleges, that Capuson

and Schroeder concocted a false story that Lance had

stolen Chevallo, with the aim of regaining possession of

the horse without having to pay Williamson Stables for

its services. Capuson and Schroeder proceeded to the

Lake County Sheriff’s Department in order to file a

report charging Williamson Stables and the Williamsons

with theft. Although the complaint portrays Schroeder

and Capuson as being equally culpable in reporting to

the Sheriff’s Department that Chevallo had been stolen

and in allowing a criminal charge to be pursued

against Williamson, R. 35 at 7-8 ¶¶ 31, 33, Williamson
No. 09-3985 7

Williamson, by the way, denies that she had any involvement

1

with the horse. The complaint alleges that she never rode

Chevallo and, due to an injury, she would not have been able

to ride a horse at that time. 

alleges that Capuson kept Schroeder in the dark about

the fact that she (Capuson) had asked Lance to try to

find a buyer for the horse, R. 35 at 8 ¶ 35; see also R. 35 at

10 ¶ 44. So Williamson’s theory apparently is that

Schroeder understood from the start that the horse had

not been stolen and that Williamson had nothing to

do with Williamson Stables’ possession of the horse,

but that she did not know how in fact the horse had

come to be in Lance’s possession.

According to a written report by Sheriff’s Deputy

Anthony Fanella dated July 6, 2007, which Williamson

has referenced in and attached to her complaint,

Capuson represented that Lance had asked to take possession of Chevallo for a couple of days so that his

wife could try him out and see if she liked the horse.1

She had therefore allowed Lance’s employee to pick up

Chevallo and take him to Williamson Stables on the

explicit understanding that he would be returned after

Williamson took the horse for a test ride. After a week

went by without the horse being returned to the Field

& Fences stable, Capuson contacted Lance; he assured

her that he would have someone bring the horse back.

That did not occur, however, and Capuson said that

her numerous follow-up telephone calls were not returned. Capuson did not disclose to Fanella that
8 No. 09-3985

The complaint alleges that Fanella himself did not per- 2

sonally inspect the premises and that the horse in fact

was present.

she, in fact, had asked Lance to board the horse at Williamson Stables and show him to prospective customers

or that she had agreed to pay Williamson Stables for

Chevallo’s care and boarding.

Fanella, accompanied by Capuson, visited Williamson

Stables on the evening of July 1, 2007, to investigate

Schroeder’s complaint. There, they met Crow, the barn

manager, who reported that the Williamsons were in

California. Capuson checked the barn but did not see

Chevallo there, and Crow she said did not know where

he was. Fanella advised Crow that the horse should 2

be returned to Schroeder immediately or criminal

charges would be filed. Capuson would later tell

Sheriff’s Deputy Ted Sittig that as she and Fanella were

preparing to leave the premises, Crow approached

Fanella and told him she had just spoken with

Williamson by telephone, and that Williamson had

told her she wanted Fanella and Capuson off the

property and that she had placed a lien on the horse

“for back board and other items.” R. 50-1 Ex. 6 at 4.

That same evening, according to Fanella’s report, Williamson spoke directly with Fanella by telephone. She

informed him that money was owed to “them” for the

care and boarding of Chevallo. R. 50-1 Ex. 5 at 2. Fanella

inquired whether there was a signed agreement to

board the horse, and Williamson told him there was
No. 09-3985 9

Schroeder signed the report on July 10, 2007, but the report 3

appears to have been prepared on July 3. We will refer to

the report as Schroeder’s July 3 report.

not. Fanella advised her that the horse must be returned

to Schroeder or charges would be filed. Williamson

responded that “they” had a lien on the horse for the

unpaid boarding charges. Fanella in turn admonished

her that the horse could not be held “hostage” over

the unpaid charges. R. 50-1 Ex. 5 at 2.

On July 2, Williamson Stables recorded a “Memorandum of Stable Keeper’s Lien” against Chevallo for the

unpaid boarding charges. The lien was asserted pursuant

to the Illinois Innkeeper’s Lien Act, 770 ILCS 40/49 (2007),

which in relevant part provided that “[s]table keepers

and any persons shall have a lien upon the horses, carriages and harness kept by them for the proper charges

due for the keeping thereof and expenses bestowed

thereon at the request of the owner, or the person

having the possession thereof.” § 40/49(b). The lien was

prepared by Lance and makes no mention of Williamson.

On or about July 3, Schroeder prepared a written

report that she filed with the Sheriff’s office. That report 3

is referenced in and attached to the complaint. Among

other representations, Schroeder’s report asserted that

Chevallo had been removed from Field & Fences and

taken to Williamson Stables “without her notification

and without approval.” R. 50-1 Ex. 3 at 3. The report

also averred that Schroeder, after learning that

Williamson Stables had possession of the horse,
10 No. 09-3985

left multiple unreturned messages for Lance and Lisa

Williamson, whom Schroeder’s report described as coowners of the stable. Lance eventually had left her a

voicemail on July 5 to say that he had been out of town

and that he wished to speak with her to clear up “this

horse fiasco,” but that he was on his way out of town

again. R. 50-1 Ex. 3 at 2.

On July 6, Deputy Sittig paid a visit to Williamson

Stables to further investigate Schroeder’s complaint.

His report summarizing the visit is attached to and referenced in Williamson’s complaint. According to Sittig’s

report, he spoke with Crow, who confirmed that Williamson Stables had possession of Chevallo but said that

the horse was subject to a lien for unpaid boarding

charges. Sittig asked to speak with either Lance or Lisa

Williamson but was told they were not on the premises.

Crow placed a telephone call to Williamson from the

stable so that Sittig could speak with her. Williamson

told Sittig that he had no business being at the stable,

that “the horse had been at their property for quite . . .

some time,” that “the owner owed them money,” and

“that they had a lien on the horse.” R. 50-1 Ex. 6 at 2.

Sittig apprised her that, based on what he had been

told, the horse was not legally on their property and

should be returned to its owner at once. According to

Sittig, Williamson demurred, informing him that

Schroeder “actually brought the horse to her property

for her to sell” and that “she would not” be returning

the horse. R. 50-1 Ex. 6 at 2. Sittig, according to the complaint, admonished Williamson to return the horse “or

this matter will come back to bite you in the ass.” R. 35
No. 09-3985 11

at 15 ¶ 75. Before Sittig left the premises, Crow gave him

a copy of the lien showing that $1,985 was owed to the

stable. Sittig told her that the lien was “irrelevant.” R. 35

at 8 ¶ 36.

Sittig’s report also recounts an in-person conversation with Capuson on July 7. Capuson reiterated to

Sittig that she lent Chevallo to Lance to try out for three

to four days. When she followed up with him at the

conclusion of that period, Lance advised her that he

was not interested in buying the horse because he was

“too quiet.” R. 50-1 Ex. 6 at 3. Capuson asked him to

send the horse back to Field & Fences, but months went

by without the horse’s return. Capuson told Sittig that

she had visited Williamson Stables with Deputy Fanella

on July 1 but had not seen Chevallo there when she

looked through the barn stalls. Capuson denied that

she had sent the horse to Williamson Stables for Lance

to sell; she had only given Lance permission to keep

the horse for a few days for a test ride. Sittig’s report

acknowledged that Williamson Stables had recorded a

lien against the horse, but according to the complaint,

he never asked Capuson about the lien.

Although they were aware of the lien, Sittig and

Fanella did not view it as a defense to the accusation

that the Williamsons had wrongful possession of

Chevallo. They concluded that the lien had been

issued under false pretenses, given the lack of a

written contract for boarding the horse.

On July 10, a Lake County judge issued arrest warrants

for both Williamson and her husband after criminal

informations were filed by the Lake County State’s At-
12 No. 09-3985

The complaint alleges that Schroeder and Capuson allowed 4

the criminal case to be pursued against Williamson, despite

knowing that she had nothing whatsoever to do with the

horse, in order to help Schroeder gain a strategic advantage

in her civil dispute with Lance and Williamson Stables. There

are also additional allegations concerning Schroeder’s attorney in the civil action and her ties to the Sheriff’s Department, which Williamson cites as a reason why the deputies

initiated the criminal charge against the Williamsons. In view

of our conclusion below that the deputies had probable cause

to arrest Williamson for theft, we see no need to discuss

those additional allegations in this opinion.

torney on the same date charging both of the

Williamsons with theft pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/16-

1(a)(1)(A). Lance and Lisa Williamson were arrested

on July 14, 2007. They pleaded not guilty to the theft

charge, and a bench trial took place in June 2008.

They were both acquitted: the court found that they had

no intention to permanently deprive Schroeder of possession of the horse.

In the meantime, Schroeder had filed a civil suit

against Lance and Williamson Stables in August 2007.4

That suit ultimately was settled, and Schroeder finally

regained possession of the horse in November 2008,

after she paid Williamson Stables a portion of what it

asserted it was owed for boarding Chevallo.

Williamson subsequently filed this suit against

Deputies Sittig and Fanella, among other defendants.

Two counts of her first amended complaint, both

naming the deputies as defendants, are relevant to
No. 09-3985 13

this appeal: a claim that she was arrested without

probable cause to believe that she had committed

a crime, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and a

class-of-one Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

claim premised on the theory that Sittig and Fanella

arrested her based solely on her status as Lance’s wife

without any evidence that she had anything to do

with Williamson Stables’ possession of the horse, in

contrast to other cases in which wives were not

arrested based on the purported criminal acts of

their husbands.

The district court dismissed both claims pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6). Williamson v. Curran, supra, 2009 WL

3817613. With respect to the false arrest claim, the

court reasoned that because Williamson had been

arrested pursuant to a facially valid warrant, she would

have to show that the deputies knew the warrant had

been issued without probable cause. Yet, Williamson’s

contention that there was no evidence to implicate her

in the alleged theft of the horse was “belied by her own

Complaint.” Id., at *3. Williamson’s own statements, as

recounted in the exhibits to the complaint, gave the

deputies reason to believe that Williamson herself shared possession of the horse and had an intent

to permanently deprive Schroeder of the use of the

horse. “Plaintiff admitted that she had the horse,

insisted on her legal right to possess the horse and

refused to return the horse.” Id., at *4. The lien, which

was issued after Capuson and Schroeder complained

that the horse had been stolen and an investigation

had commenced, did not alter the legal calculus. “Plain-
14 No. 09-3985

tiff has cited no authority supporting the claim that law

enforcement may not pursue an investigation once a

lien has been filed. If this were the law, one unlawfully

in possession of property could obviate criminal prosecution by simply filing a lien.” Id. That the deputies had

reason to believe that Williamson was implicated in the

wrongful possession of the horse defeated her class-ofone equal protection claim as well. That claim would, at

a minimum, demand proof that Williamson had been

treated differently from others similarly situated,

without a rational basis for the differential treatment.

Yet, “the facts alleged, as augmented through the documents attached to the Complaint, . . . provide a

rational basis for [Williamson’s] arrest.” Id., at *5.

II.

A. False arrest claim

Williamson’s claim of false arrest hinges on the contention that Deputies Sittig and Fanella lacked probable

cause to believe that she had committed a crime. See,

e.g., Thayer v. Chiczewski, 705 F.3d 237, 246 (7th Cir.

2012); Mucha v. Vill. of Oak Brook, 650 F.3d 1053,

1056 (7th Cir. 2011). “Probable cause exists if ‘at the

time of the arrest, the facts and circumstances within the

officers’ knowledge are sufficient to warrant a prudent

person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the

circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed,

is committing, or is about to commit an offense.’ ” Id.

(quoting Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526, 537 (7th

Cir. 2009)). The existence of probable cause does not
No. 09-3985 15

depend on the truth of a complaint of wrongdoing.

Mustafa v. City of Chicago, 442 F.3d 544, 548 (7th Cir.

2006) (citing Woods v. City of Chicago, 234 F.3d 979, 987 (7th

Cir. 2000)). So long as an officer reasonably believes the

putative victim of or eyewitness to a crime is telling the

truth, he may rely on the information provided to him

by such persons in deciding to make an arrest, without

having to conduct an independent investigation into

their accounts. See, e.g., Holmes v. Vill. of Hoffman Estates,

511 F.3d 673, 680 (7th Cir. 2007); Askew v. City of Chicago,

440 F.3d 894, 895-96 (7th Cir. 2006); Gramenos v. Jewel Cos.,

797 F.2d 432, 439 (7th Cir. 1986). This is so even when

the suspect denies an accusation of wrongdoing. See, e.g.,

Reynolds v. Jamison, 488 F.3d 756, 762 (7th Cir. 2007). When

presented with a credible report of criminal behavior,

an officer “ ‘[is] under no constitutional obligation to

exclude all suggestions that the witness or victim is

not telling the truth.’ ” Id. (quoting Beauchamp v. City

of Noblesville, Ind., 320 F.3d 733, 743 (7th Cir. 2003)).

Thus, assuming, as Williamson has alleged, that

Schroeder and Capuson were dissembling when they

told the Sheriff’s deputies that the Williamsons had

taken wrongful possession of Chevallo, the falsity of

their report by itself does not mean that Sittig and

Fanella lacked probable cause to believe that Williamson

had committed or was committing a crime. Williamson

herself does not argue that the deputies could not reasonably credit what Schroeder and Capuson had told

them. Rather, Williamson makes two central points in

support of her contention that she was arrested without

probable cause: (1) that she was arrested solely on the
16 No. 09-3985

basis of her marital relationship with Lance, who was

the managing member of Williamson Stables, and in

the absence of any information suggesting that she

herself had some involvement in obtaining or maintaining possession of the horse; and (2) because

Williamson Stables had a lien on the horse, the lien

negated any probable cause to believe that either she

or her husband was improperly exerting control over

the horse.

Before we reach these arguments, we must first deal

with what Williamson contends was a procedural error

in the district court’s decision to dismiss the false

arrest claim. In the district court (as they have in this

court), Sittig and Fanella invoked the general rule that

a person arrested pursuant to a facially valid arrest

warrant cannot prevail on a section 1983 claim of false

arrest. See, e.g., Brooks v. City of Aurora, Ill., 653 F.3d 478,

483 n.5 (7th Cir. 2011); Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345,

350 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing, inter alia, Baker v. McCollan,

443 U.S. 137, 143, 99 S. Ct. 2689, 2694 (1979)); R. 38 at 4.

Williamson in turn invoked an exception to that rule,

namely that a facially valid warrant will pose no bar to

a claim of false arrest when the officers responsible for

effectuating the arrest knew that the warrant was issued

without probable cause. See Juriss, 957 F.2d at 350-51;

R. 54 at 7-8, 10. Obviously, the application of the rule

and the exception begin with consideration of whether

there was in fact a facially valid arrest warrant. Sittig

and Fanella submitted certified copies of both the warrant for Williamson’s arrest and the charging document (the information), as well as an abstract of the court
No. 09-3985 17

The warrant identified Williamson by name, date of birth, 5

physical description, and address, among other data; it

(continued...)

proceedings that ensued from the arrest and charge.

R. 37-1. Williamson contends that the court relied on

these and other documents outside of the complaint in

order to determine both that the deputies took her into

custody pursuant to a facially valid arrest warrant and

that, based on the facts and circumstances known to

them, they had no reason to doubt that the warrant

was supported by probable cause. Williamson Br. 22-23.

In looking to these documents, Williamson argues, the

district court ran afoul of its obligation, pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(d), to convert the

motion into one for summary judgment and to afford

her the opportunity for discovery before ruling on

the motion.

The argument is frivolous as to the issuance of an

arrest warrant. True enough, the court’s analysis did

proceed from the premise that Williamson was arrested

pursuant to a facially valid warrant. 2009 WL 3817613,

at *2 (noting that an arrest warrant was issued) and *4

(noting that the arrest warrant was facially valid). Yet, as

the defendants point out, the complaint itself alleged

that arrest warrants were issued for Williamson and

her husband. R. 35 at 9 ¶ 39 & 16 ¶ 83. The complaint

did not acknowledge that the warrant for Williamson’s

arrest was facially valid; but there has never been any

real dispute that it was. To the extent that the court 5
18 No. 09-3985

(...continued)

indicated that an information had been filed charging her

with theft of Schroeder’s horse between May and July 2007, in

violation of 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A); it reflected that an

ex parte hearing had been held and that probable cause

had been found; it commanded that Williamson be arrested

and brought before a judge without unnecessary delay; and

the warrant was signed by a judge. See U.S. CONST. amend.

IV; Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b)(1); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, SEARCH AND

SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, § 5.1(h) (5th

ed. 2012). 

took notice of and relied upon the copies of the warrant and criminal information that the defendants submitted, Williamson has not shown that it deprived her

of the opportunity to conduct discovery and to present

contrary evidence on a point of genuinely disputed fact.

At first blush, it might seem that there is more

substance to Williamson’s contention that the court

erred by looking to the facts known to Sittig and Fanella

at the time of Williamson’s arrest in order to assess the

viability of Williamson’s allegation that the deputies

knew the warrant for her arrest was issued without

probable cause. Often, an assessment of the facts within

an officer’s knowledge will be a matter for summary

judgment, if not trial, rather than a motion to dismiss. However, as we have noted, what the district

court looked to as evidence of what Sittig and Fanella

knew were not the documents that the defendants submitted and of which they asked the court to take judicial notice, but rather the documents that Williamson
No. 09-3985 19

herself had attached to her own complaint. As we remarked at the outset of our factual summary, Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 10(c) provides that a written

instrument attached to a pleading becomes part of

that pleading, so when the plaintiff has attached an

instrument to her complaint, a court may consider the

contents of that instrument in ruling on a motion to

dismiss. And as we noted, this circuit has taken a relatively expansive view of the documents that a district

court properly may consider in disposing of a motion

to dismiss. See Geinosky v. City of Chicago, supra, 675 F.3d

at 745 n.1; Hecker v. Deere & Co., supra, 556 F.3d at 582-

83; Tierney v. Vahle, supra, 304 F.3d at 739.

Neither Williamson nor the appellees have attempted

to parse out which of the documents she appended to

her complaint, if any, might qualify as an instrument

that the court could consider in assessing the viability

of her complaint. Instead, Williamson has made a

blanket argument that none of these documents was

appropriately considered in assessing whether the defendants had probable cause to arrest her, whereas the

defendants have contended that all of the documents

were fair game.

The key documents whose contents the district court

considered in assessing the facts known to the deputies

were their own investigative reports, along with the

written statements that Schroeder and Capuson submitted to the Sheriff’s Department; and we believe that

the district court properly took these documents into

account. Williamson not only attached these documents
20 No. 09-3985

to her complaint but affirmatively relied on them

in support of her claim. She cited the reports that

Schroeder and Capuson filed as proof of the allegedly

false story that they concocted in an effort to secure

the return of Chevallo without paying the outstanding

bill for his boarding. And in both her complaint and her

memorandum in opposition to the deputies’ motion to

dismiss, she cited the reports prepared by Sittig and

Fanella as proof that none of the facts known to the

two deputies implicated herself in the possession of the

horse. R. 35 at 8 ¶¶ 34, 37; R. 54 at 6. She has done the

same in her appellate briefs. By citing and relying on

such documents as affirmative proof of her lack of involvement in the possession of the horse—and thus

the lack of probable cause to arrest her—Williamson

invited the district court—and has likewise invited

this court—to consider these documents in ruling on

the motion to dismiss.

We shall have a last word to say about the district

court’s reliance on the investigative reports and other

documents attached to Williamson’s complaint in our

discussion of probable cause a bit later in this opinion.

For the moment it is enough to note that the district

court did not commit any procedural error in considering such documents in ruling on the motion

to dismiss.

The fact that Williamson was arrested pursuant to a

facially valid arrest warrant narrows the circumstances

under which she could prevail on her false arrest claim.

As we stated in Juriss v. McGowan:
No. 09-3985 21

Generally, a person arrested pursuant to a facially

valid warrant cannot prevail in a § 1983 suit for

false arrest; this is so even if the arrest warrant

is later determined to have an inadequate factual

foundation. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143, 99

S. Ct. 2689, 2694 (1979); Mark [v. Furay], 769 F.2d [1266]

at 1268 [(7th Cir. 1985)]. There was (and still is), however, a recognized exception for situations where

officers responsible for bringing about an unlawful

arrest knew that the arrest warrant had issued

without probable cause; this is particularly true of

officers who knew that those who obtained the

warrant had deceived the authorizing body. Malley

v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345, 106 S. Ct. 1092, 1098 (1986);

Olson v. Tyler, 771 F.2d 277, 281 (7th Cir. 1985).

Under these circumstances, even a facially valid

arrest warrant does not shield otherwise unreasonable conduct.

957 F.2d at 350-51; see also Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854,

864 (7th Cir. 2012); Beauchamp v. City of Noblesville, Ind.,

supra, 320 F.3d at 742-43; Neiman v. Keane, 232 F.3d 577, 579-

80 (7th Cir. 2000). Thus, in order to prevail on her

false arrest claim, Williamson ultimately would have to

show not only that there was no probable cause to

believe she had committed a crime, but also that Sittig

and Fanella knew that the arrest warrant was issued

without probable cause. Juriss, 957 F.2d at 350-51.

We mentioned earlier that Williamson was charged

with theft pursuant to 720 ILCS 5/16-1(a)(1)(A). At the

time of the events at issue in this case, that statute pro-
22 No. 09-3985

vided that “[a] person commits theft when he

knowingly: (1) [o]btains or exerts unauthorized control

over property of the owner; . . . and (A) [i]ntends to

deprive the owner permanently of the use or benefit of

the property[.]” (2006). The facts alleged in the complaint would not support an inference that Williamson

Stables wrongfully came into possession of Schroeder’s

horse in the first instance. Recall that Capuson, as

Schroeder’s agent, is alleged to have asked Lance

to take Chevallo so that he might show the horse

to prospective buyers. According to the complaint, she

later lied to the Sheriff’s deputies (and apparently to

Schroeder as well), telling them that Lance had asked

to take the horse for a few days so that Williamson

could try the horse out. Under either scenario, the

Williamsons first came into possession of the horse

with Capuson’s consent as Schroeder’s agent, and thus

they did not wrongfully obtain control over the horse.

But the statute recognizes that a person may nonetheless commit theft when he “exerts unauthorized control

over” another person’s property, as by refusing to return

the property to its rightful owner. See People v. Alexander,

442 N.E.2d 887, 889-90 (Ill. 1982) (defendant may be

guilty of theft based solely on his knowing exertion

of unauthorized control over another’s property at time

of his arrest, because crime of theft is not limited to

original taking of property); accord People v. Price, 850

N.E.2d 199, 204-05 (Ill. 2006) (same); see also, e.g., People

v. Fuller, 533 N.E.2d 1111, 1113 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)

(where defendant was originally given money by victim

to post bond for victim’s jailed daughter, defendant
No. 09-3985 23

“was not authorized to retain, spend or abandon the

$400 or use it for any purpose other than” posting

bond; thus, despite evidence of defendant’s good intentions at outset, jury could find that once victim

demanded her money back and defendant failed to

return it, defendant instead intended to permanently

deprive victim of her property, thereby committing

crime of theft). The Williamsons thus could have been

reasonably suspected of theft if they wrongfully exerted

control over Chevallo by refusing Capuson’s and

Schroeder’s demands that they return the horse. It is in

this respect that the lie Capuson allegedly told the

deputies was important, for it suggested that Lance

had asked to take Chevallo just for a few days for

the purpose of trying out the horse, but then

held onto the horse and refused to return Capuson’s

and Schroeder’s multiple telephone calls. Under that

scenario, we may assume that Capuson had not agreed

to pay Williamson Stables for the care and boarding of

the horse, that neither Williamson Stables nor the

Williamsons had a legitimate claim to compensation

for such fees and no basis to assert a lien against the

horse, and that the Williamsons thus had no grounds

on which to retain possession of the horse, particularly

once the Sheriff’s deputies admonished them to return

Chevallo to Schroeder.

The next question is whether, on the facts alleged in

the complaint, the defendants had any reason to believe

that Williamson herself was involved with the stable’s

refusal to surrender Chevallo to Schroeder and Capuson.
24 No. 09-3985

The complaint alleges that Lance was the owner

and managing director of Williamson Stables and that

Williamson occupied no ownership or managerial role

in relation to the stables. Williamson thus alleges that

she had no responsibility for the stable’s possession of

the horse and the authorities had no reason to suppose

that she might be culpable for the stable’s unauthorized

exertion of control over the horse. She contends, as

we have noted, that the deputies simply assumed she

was culpable based on her status as Lance’s wife.

Yet, although Williamson has alleged that she had no

involvement with the stable’s possession of the horse,

the investigative reports attached to her complaint—

which, as we have discussed, she invited the court

to examine and thus became part of her complaint—indicate that Deputies Sittig and Fanella had at

least some grounds to believe otherwise. First, it was

Williamson rather than her husband who responded to

the deputies’ inquiries about Chevallo. Second, in her

multiple interactions with the deputies (directly and

through Crow), Williamson referred both to herself

individually and to her husband and herself jointly

in discussing possession of the horse. For example,

Capuson’s written statement of July 7 notes that

when she and Fanella visited the Williamson Stables

on July 1, barn manager Crow, after speaking with Williamson by telephone, reported to them that “Lisa had

decided to put a lien on the horse.” R. 50-1 Ex. 4 at 5.

Fanella’s own report of July 6 noted that when he

spoke directly with Williamson on the evening of July 1

(after his visit to the stable), Williamson told him that
No. 09-3985 25

the horse’s owner owed “them” money for the care and

boarding of the horse and that “they” had a lien on the

horse for the unpaid charges. R. 50-1 Ex. 5 at 2. It is a

reasonable inference from Crow’s statement that

“Lisa” would be filing a lien against the horse, and

from Williamson’s subsequent remarks to Fanella that

“they” were owed money and had a lien on the horse,

that Williamson was not a mere bystander to the

dispute over the horse but rather shared responsibility

with her husband in refusing to turn over the horse

to Schroeder and Capuson. Sittig’s report of his own

visit to the stable on July 6, and his telephone conversation with Williamson during this visit, supports the

same inference. Williamson, according to Sittig, told

him that “the horse had been at their property for

quite some time,” that the horse’s owner owed “them”

money, and that “they had a lien on the horse.” R. 50-1

Ex. 6 at 2. She also told Sittig that Schroeder “brought

the horse to her property to sell” and that “she

would not” be returning the horse. R. 50-1 Ex. 6 at 2.

These remarks reinforce the inference that Williamson

as well as her husband was exerting control over the

horse. Third, Williamson never disclaimed involvement

or responsibility with the horse or with the stable generally, nor did she say that she was speaking solely as

her husband’s representative. Fourth, Schroeder in her

July 3 statement represented that Williamson was a coowner of the stable. Sittig and Fanella thus had

reasonable grounds to believe that Williamson was at

least partially responsible for the stable’s refusal to turn

over the horse; and their reports belie the contention
26 No. 09-3985

At oral argument, Williamson’s counsel for the first time 6

suggested that the reports were not entirely accurate in recounting her statements. But nowhere in the complaint,

her memoranda opposing the motion to dismiss, or in the

briefing on appeal has Williamson made this assertion.

What Williamson said to Crow and to the deputies has

always been a matter within her personal knowledge. If the

reports did not accurately characterize her statements, she

was obliged to note that fact earlier. 

that the decision to arrest Williamson was based solely

on her status as Lance’s wife.

The deputies’ reports of course constituted their

version of events—more to the point, their recounting

of what Williamson said. As we have discussed at

some length, Williamson has attached these reports to

her complaint and relied on them for her own

purposes without disowning their accuracy as summaries of what information had been communicated to

the deputies concerning Williamson Stables’ possession

of the horse. If Williamson had denied the remarks attributed to her in these reports, which she was free to

do, then we would in the usual case be obliged to credit

her denial on a motion to dismiss. See generally, e.g.,

Peters v. West, 692 F.3d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 2012). Yet, although Williamson denies any responsibility for the

horse, she never, in the briefing below or in this court,

denied uttering the words Sittig and Fanella attribute

to her in their reports. The same is obviously true 6

with respect to the written statements that Capuson

and Schroeder filed with the Sheriff’s Department: Wil-
No. 09-3985 27

liamson, for example, denies the truth of Schroeder’s

representation that Williamson was a co-owner of Williamson Stables, but she does not deny that Schroeder

made that representation to the Sheriff’s Department.

And, more generally, although Williamson alleges that

Schroeder and Capuson were misrepresenting the facts

to the Sheriff’s Department, she does not dispute what

they actually told the Sheriff’s deputies. Collectively,

these reports, as we have said, indicate that the

deputies were relying on more than her marital status

in deciding to arrest her—that they had reason to

believe she was directly involved in and shared responsibility for the refusal to return the horse to Schroeder

and Capuson. This, in turn, precludes a finding that

they knew the warrant for Williamson’s arrest was

issued without probable cause.

According to the complaint, Sittig did admit at Williamson’s criminal trial that “he had no evidence that Lisa

Williamson had any involvement with the Lance Williamson Stables in connection with its possession of the

Horse and its efforts to sell the Horse.” R. 35 at 20 ¶ 107

& 21 ¶ 117. Fanella allegedly made a similar admission.

R. 35 at 19 ¶¶ 103, 104. See also R. 35 at 19-21 ¶¶ 102, 105-

106, 108-11, 116. Williamson has argued that these allegations are sufficient to support her claim that

the deputies knew there was no probable cause to

believe that she had stolen (or helped to steal) the

horse. That may be so when the allegations are read in

isolation, but not in the context of the complaint as a

whole. These allegations do not purport to disavow

the information set forth in the deputies’ reports, for
28 No. 09-3985

example, including in particular the statements attributed to Williamson in those reports. The deputies’

admissions at trial thus do not require us to ignore

the information known to the deputies, which for the

reasons we have discussed did point to Williamson’s

involvement with the stable’s possession of Chevallo.

Moreover, the deputies’ admissions constituted their

subjective assessment of the evidence they had (or did

not have) at the time of Williamson’s arrest. But, of

course, their understanding is immaterial for purposes

of the probable cause determination. The standard governing that determination is an objective one which

asks what a reasonable person would be warranted in

believing based on the facts known to the arresting

officer, not what the arresting officer actually thought

or what his motivation was. Silven v. Ind. Dep’t of Child

Servs., 635 F.3d 921, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2011) (officer’s belief

as to basis for detention irrelevant to probable cause

analysis) (quoting Potts v. City of Lafayette, Ind., 121

F.3d 1106, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997)); see also United States v.

Hines, 449 F.3d 808, 815 n.7 (7th Cir. 2006); Richardson v.

Bonds, 860 F.3d 1427, 1430-31 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1988); see

generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116

S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996); Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.

690, 696, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1661-62 (1996); Abbott v. Sangamon

Cnty., Ill., 705 F.3d 706, 714 (7th Cir. 2013). The facts

known to Sittig and Fanella, including Williamson’s

own statements indicating that she along with her

husband was exerting control over the horse, were sufficient to warrant a reasonable belief that she too was

involved in the purported theft.
No. 09-3985 29

Perhaps the deputies can be faulted for not looking

into Williamson’s status with respect to the stable. So far

as the complaint reveals, the only evidence they had in

that regard was Schroeder’s description of Williamson

as a co-owner of the stable in the July 3 report she

filed with the Sheriff’s Department. That may have

been Schroeder’s assumption or impression; but

Schroeder was not situated, as the stable’s attorney or its

employee would have been, to know who owned and

managed the stables and controlled the horses boarded

there. And so far as the deputies’ own reports reveal,

they made no effort to ascertain whether Williamson

was in fact a co-owner of the stable or played any management role in the stable’s operations. These were facts

that could have been verified independently, and had

the deputies done so Williamson might not have

been arrested.

However, the deputies’ apparent failure to look more

closely into Williamson’s role at the stable—even though

it might have led the deputies not to seek an arrest

warrant for Williamson—does not suggest that they

knew probable cause to arrest Williamson was lacking.

As we have said, Williamson’s own remarks to the deputies suggested that she was more than a mere bystander to the dispute over Chevallo.

The slightly more difficult question is whether the

stable’s lien on Chevallo, of which the deputies were

aware, undermined if not precluded an inference that

Williamson, along with her husband, were wrongfully

exerting control over the horse. The lien amounted
30 No. 09-3985

to formal confirmation that Williamson Stables was

asserting a legal right to retain possession of the horse,

based on unpaid bills for the horse’s boarding. (The Innkeeper’s Lien Act was not amended to expressly

authorize a stable keeper to retain possession of a

boarded animal in these circumstances until 2012, well

after the events at issue here occurred. See 770 ILCS

40/49(c), added by Pub. Act. No. 97-569 (enacted Aug. 25,

2011 and effective Jan. 1, 2012). We may nonetheless

assume, without deciding, that Illinois cases granted

this right to a stable keeper in 2007. See Tumalty v.

Parker, 1902 WL 1781, at *3-*4 (Ill. App. Ct. 1902)

(owner’s surreptitious removal of horse from keeper‘s

barn, knowing that keeper had lien on horse for

unpaid boarding charges, amounted to larceny).) In

practical terms, the lien was also a warning sign that

the deputies were placing themselves in the middle of

a civil dispute between Schroeder and Williamson

Stables—one that could be resolved in civil court, as

it ultimately was—without criminal charges. But

insofar as Williamson’s false arrest claim goes, the

lien matters insofar as it suggested that Williamson

Stables (and the Williamsons) might have a legitimate,

legal ground on which to exert control over the horse.

However, a stable keeper’s lien is premised upon an

agreement to pay the stable for boarding. See Bender v.

Consol. Mink Ranch, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1315, 1320 (Ill. App. Ct.

1982) (citing Reynolds ex rel. Jones v. Weakly, 12 N.E.2d 689,

691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938)); see also 3B C.J.S. Animals § 111

(Westlaw through March 2013). Such an agreement

need not be written, as Sittig and Fanella appeared to
No. 09-3985 31

believe, see, e.g., Reynolds, 12 N.E.2d at 692 (noting that

requisite agreement can be express or implied); but nonetheless there had to be some type of agreement, id. Needless to say, if a stable has converted an animal, it cannot

properly assert a lien for boarding the animal. Bender,

441 N.E.2d at 1420. So the lien begs the question: was

there an agreement to board Chevallo at Williamson

Stables?

The facts known to the officers, as revealed in both

the complaint and the investigatory reports attached

thereto, were inconsistent with any agreement to pay

Williamson Stables for boarding Chevallo. Williamson

herself admitted to Fanella that there was no signed

(i.e., written) agreement to board Chevallo. As we have

said, the lack of a written agreement does not rule

out the existence of an express oral agreement to pay

Williamson Stables for boarding the horse—which the

complaint in fact attributes to Capuson—or an implied

agreement. But more to the point, Schroeder and

Capuson told the deputies that there was no agreement

to board the horse. They represented that Lance had

asked to borrow Chevallo for a few days to try the horse

out and then inexplicably refused to return the horse.

Their account is contrary to the complaint’s allegations

as to what was really going on—that Capuson in fact

had engaged Lance to show the horse and had expressly

agreed to pay for boarding the horse at Williamson

Stables. Again, however, the complaint does not allege

that the deputies knew that this was the arrangement

between Capuson and the stable. To the contrary, the

complaint itself asserts that Schroeder and Capuson
32 No. 09-3985

deceived the two deputies. In short, no inference arises,

either from the face of the complaint or attached exhibits,

including the investigator reports, that the deputies

had any inkling they were being lied to by complainants.

So far as they knew, there was no agreement to

board Chevallo at Williamson Stables; rather, Lance

asked to take possession of Chevallo for a few days for

his own purposes and thereafter refused—wrongfully—

to return the horse. On that understanding of events,

the deputies could legitimately disregard the lien.

In sum, Williamson has pleaded herself out of court.

The facts set forth in both the body of her complaint

and the incorporated exhibits reveal that the deputies

had reason to believe that the horse Chevallo was not

in the rightful possession of Williamson Stables and

that Williamson was responsible along with her husband for the refusal to return the horse to its owner.

B. Class-of-One Equal Protection Claim

Williamson also contends that the decision to arrest

her deprived her of her Fourteenth Amendment right

to equal protection. See Geinosky v. City of Chicago, supra,

675 F.3d at 747 (recognizing that such a claim can be

asserted based on the irrational or malicious application

of law enforcement powers). Although the standard for

a class-of-one equal protection claim like Williamson’s

currently is unsettled in this circuit, see Del Marcelle

v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th Cir.) (en banc) (5-

5 division resulting in no controlling opinion), cert.
No. 09-3985 33

denied, 133 S. Ct. 654 (2012), the claim at a minimum

would require proof that the defendants intentionally

treated Williamson differently from others situated similarly to her for no rational reason. Thayer v. Chiczewski,

supra, 705 F.3d at 254. Like the false arrest claim, then,

the class-of-one equal protection claim hinges on the

notion that the authorities lacked probable cause to

arrest Williamson, as the existence of probable cause

necessarily means that there was a legitimate reason to

arrest her. See Kim v. Ritter, 493 F. App’x 787, 2012 WL

4373342, at *2 (7th Cir. Sep. 26, 2012) (non-precedential

decision) (citing Wagner v. Washington Cnty., 493 F.3d 833,

836 (7th Cir. 2007) (per curiam), and Askew v. City of Chicago, supra, 440 F.3d at 895), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 984

(2013).

This claim consequently fails for the same reason that

the false arrest claim does. The allegations of the complaint, coupled with the exhibits attached thereto,

indicate that Sheriff’s deputies were deceived into

thinking that Lance had taken possession of Chevallo

ostensibly to try him out for a few days, and absent

any agreement by the horse’s owner, Schroeder, or her

agent, Capuson, to board the horse at Williamson

Stables and to compensate the stable for its boarding

and care of the horse. So far as the deputies knew, Lance

was in the wrong in maintaining possession of the

horse, and the lien filed by Williamson Stables was a

ruse to give cover to his conversion of the horse and,

quite possibly, to extort money from the horse’s owner.

And, as we have discussed, the deputies had reason

to believe, based in large part on Williamson’s own in-
34 No. 09-3985

teraction with them, that she shared responsibility

along with her husband and Williamson’s Stables for

the possession of and refusal to surrender the horse.

In short, the deputies had reasonable grounds on which

to believe that Williamson, like her husband, was guilty

of theft, even if, as the complaint alleges, they had

been duped by Capuson and Schroeder.

III.

The district court properly dismissed Williamson’s

false arrest and class-of-one equal protection claims.

The facts set forth in the complaint and the exhibits

referenced and incorporated into the complaint indicate

that the authorities had probable cause to arrest her

for theft in violation of Illinois law.

AFFIRMED.

4-4-13