The Future of Macedonia

A Balkan Survivor Now Needs Refo r m

B r i e f l y. . .

• Ma c e do n ia has ma na ged to ma i ntain int e r nal stability and inde p e nde nce through a

t u mu l t uous de c a de. It now has to face cruc ial issues thre a t e n i ng the country’s socia l

p e a c e, pro s p e r i t y, and further int e g ra t ion into the European econo my. These inc l ude

e s t a b l i s h i ng a mo re mo dern, civic de mo c racy; inc re a s i ng tra ns p a re ncy and effic ie nc y

in go v e r na nce; and addre s s i ng ende m ic corruption and public cynic i s m .

• Ind i v idual hu man rig hts form the basis of mo dern de mo c ra c y, and a citizen’s ability

to exe rcise these rig hts is a test of rule of law. Ma c e do n ia’s gra v i t a t ion toward ins t it u t io na l i z i ng group rig hts reflects the fa i l u re to pro mote and protect ind i v idual rig ht s.

Mac e do n ia’s ethnic minority commu n i t ies believe that the state favors the ethnic

Mac e do n ian ma j o r i t y. Until this situa t ion is re me d ie d, pro g ress on other fro nts is diff icult to envisio n .

• De c e nt ra l i z a t ion of go v e r na nc e, coupled with tra ns p a re ncy and public account a b i l i t y

of adm i n i s t ra t ion, could help ame l io rate ethnic tens io ns in Ma c e do n ia and inc re a s e

gov e r n me ntal effic ie nc y. At pre s e nt, local adm i n i s t rative units are too small to funct ion effic ie nt l y. Ne w, large r, adm i n i s t rative units should not be drawn on an ethnic,

but ra t her adm i n i s t ratively logical, basis.

• Weak ins t i t u t io ns in Ma c e do n ia have allowed systemic cro nyism and corruptio n ,

u nde r m i n i ng public confide nce and fo s t e r i ng ge ne ral cynicism and lack of respect fo r

t he law. This subverts efforts to cons t r uct a func t io n i ng econo my and deters investment. Building solid public ins t i t u t io ns, ro o t i ng out corruption, and fo s t e r i ng

a c c o u ntability re q u i re leadership from civil society and the me d ia that has hithe r t o

been lacking .

• Ma c e do n ia suffered greatly du r i ng the past de c a de due to re g io nal conflict and ind irect effects of sanc t io ns, which helped pro mote illegal comme rce and corruptio n .

Ass i s t a nce from the int e r na t io nal commu n i t y, inc l ud i ng the Security Pact for Southeast Euro p e, the European Un ion (EU), and the United States, has not fulfilled Ma c edon ian ex p e c t a t io ns, ins p i red by promises of assistance especially du r i ng the Ko s o v o

w a r. Mac e do n ia ns ne v e r t heless re g a rd future EU membership as ind i s p e ns a b l e. This

gives the European Un ion eno r mous influenc e, if it sends cons i s t e nt sig na l s. 

• From Mac e do n ia’s perspective, NATO is a positive factor in the re g ion and the solut ion to the problem of “hard security” for the count r y. Despite wide s p read oppositio n

a mo ng ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns to the 1999 NATO air campaign against Yu go s l a v ia, and

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O R T

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

M a rch 23, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report is based on the Wo r k s hop on Future

Issues for Ma c e do n ia, co-spons o red by the

Nat io nal Demo c ra t ic Institute for Int e r na t io na l

A f fairs (NDI) and the United States Ins t i t u t e

of Peace and held in Ma v rovo, Ma c e do n ia, on

October 20–22. 

T he report was drafted prior to the outbreak of

f ig ht i ng in Ma c e do n ia. No ne t he l e s s, the issues

discussed he rein re main funda me ntal to

Ma c e do n ia’s future.

T he workshop was co-chaired by Daniel Serwer,

d i rector of the Institute’s Balka ns Initia t i v e, and

D e b o rah Alexa nde r, director of NDI’s Cent ral and

East European Pro g ra ms. The workshop bro u g ht

t o ge t her mo re than twenty citizens of Ma c e do n ia

f rom across the ethnic and political spectrum,

i nc l ud i ng members of civil socie t y. The panel chairs

a nd speakers at the two-day me e t i ng were Ke i t h

B rown of Brown Un i v e r s i t y, Victor Frie dman of the

University of Chic a go, Bre nda Pearson of the

I nt e r na t io nal Crisis Group, and Serwer. This re p o r t

reflects the discussion at the confere nc e — t he

a reas of cons e nsus as well as the areas of disa g re e me nt. The report was written by Ku r t

B a s s u e ne r, pro g ram of f icer in the Balka ns Initia t i v e.

The views ex p ressed in this report do not

necessarily reflect those of the United States

Institute of Pe a c e, which does not advo c a t e

specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t ion 2

P ro t e c t ion of Ind i v idual Rig hts 2

I na de q uacy of State Ins t i t u t io ns

a nd Citizen Involveme nt 3

Weak Ins t i t u t io ns Enge nder 

C o r r u p t ion and Cynicism 4

D i s i l l u s ion with Europe 

but Hope for Int e g ra t ion 5

I m p ro v i ng the Ne ig h b o r hood 6

C o nc l u s io ns 7
e p i s o des of frict ion with NATO fo rc e s, the re is a re s i l ie nt de s i re across a broad spectrum of political and civil society to join the allia nc e. The re is also a gro w i ng cons e nsus across ethnic groups that, from a Ma c e do n ian security stand p o i nt, Kosovo’s fina l

status is of less importance than whe t her it is pro s p e ro u s, open, and de mo c ra t ic. 

• Re s p o nsibility for Ma c e do n ia’s int e r nal de mo c ra t ic and ins t i t u t io nal de v e l o p me nt

rests with those citizens who have the vision and willing ness to advocate the change s

ne c e s s a r y. Ho w e v e r, the West has an abid i ng int e rest in Ma c e do n ia’s pro g re s s, and

s hould invest in pro mo t i ng civic values and public account a b i l i t y.

I n t ro d u c t i o n

T he United States Institute of Peace and the Na t io nal Demo c ra t ic Institute for Int e r nat io nal Affairs (NDI) held a Wo r k s hop on Future Issues for Ma c e do n ia at the Hotel Bistra

in Ma v rovo, Ma c e do n ia, on October 20–22. Tw e nty people drawn from a broad spectrum

of Ma c e do n ia’s political and civil socie t y, inc l ud i ng me d ia, hu man rig ht s, labor, and othe r s, participated in the ro u ndtable discussio ns, in add i t ion to the confere nce org a n i z e r s

a nd session chairs. Invitees reflected the diversity of peoples and int e rests in Ma c e do nian society as a who l e. Each partic i p a nt was invited as an ind i v idual and spoke in her or

his personal capacity. As the discussion was not for attribution, no na mes will appear in

this report. 

T he discussio ns were info r mal, amia b l e, but some t i mes charge d. This report tries to

describe the cleavage s, which were not necessarily ethnic in chara c t e r, as well as articulate areas of bro a d, if not universal, agre e me nt .

P rotection of Individual Rights Is Crucial

Par t ic i p a nts agreed that ind i v idual rig hts form the basis of the de mo c ra t ic system, and

that the politics of the past de c a de, as well as ins t i t u t io nal and psycho l o g ical baggage

f rom the Tito era (with its re l ia nce on de f i ned “na t io na l i t ies” and “na t io nal mino r i t ie s ” )

have det r i me ntally de-emphasized ind i v idual rig hts in favor of group rig ht s. Calls fo r

g roup rig hts are a re a c t ion to discrimina t ion and de n ial of ind i v idual rig hts to the Albanian and other mino r i t ie s.

S o me ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns ex p ressed the view that pro t e c t ion of ind i v idual rig hts is

i m p ro v i ng and that no ra d ical overhaul is re q u i re d. Since inde p e nde nc e, Ma c e do n ia has

i nc l uded the Albanian and other mino r i t ies in go v e r na nce and public life. Members of

t he Ma c e do n ian int e l l ige nt s ia have worked to defeat ethnic exclusivist Ma c e do n ia n

nat io nalism, which has diminished as a viable political fo rc e. From their perspective,

A l b a n ia ns have not ma de similar efforts to counter Albanian na t io nalism. One ethnic

Mac e do n ian said int e r - e t h n ic tens io ns would dampen if Ma c e do n ia were mo re pro s p e ro u s, as “the Deutschmark is the common lang ua ge.” Most in attenda nce agreed pro sperity would at least help in this re g a rd. 

T he cons e nsus amo ng Albanian partic i p a nts was that members of their community are

d i s c r i m i nated against and have ina de q uate partic i p a t ion in state bodie s. The questio n

of citizenship poses an issue, with tens of tho u s a nds (100,000, accord i ng to one part ic i p a nt) of Albanian re s ide nts not ho l d i ng Ma c e do n ian citizenship, while ethnic 

Mac e do n ia ns in the dia s p o ra abro a d, ma ny of whom have never lived in Ma c e do n ia, ho l d

p a s s p o r t s. To Albania ns, this illustrated une q ual applic a t ion of the law, and unde r s c o re d

t he cont e nt ion that they and other mino r i t ies have been second-class citizens in Ma c edon ia since inde p e nde nc e, despite their acceptance of the Ma c e do n ian cons t i t u t io na l

c o nt ext and substant ial efforts to pro mote Ma c e do n ian stability, in particular du r i ng the

N ATO / Yu go s l a v ia war. Albania ns from this perspective have not been exclusivist but

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an

i nde p e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t io n

c reated by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rc h ,

e duc a t ion, and tra i n i ng on the pre v e nt io n ,

ma na ge me nt, and re s o l u t ion of int e r na t io na l

c o n f l ic t s. Established in 1984, the Ins t i t u t e

meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an

a r ray of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng re s e a rch gra nt s,

f e l l o w s h i p s, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng pro g ra ms,

c o n f e re nces and worksho p s, library servic e s,

p u b l ic a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activitie s.

T he Institute’s Board of Directors is appoint e d

by the Pre s ide nt of the United States and

c o n f i r med by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • Zalmay Khalilzad, RAND Corpora t ion, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E.

L e l a nd & As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean,

Esq., Pre s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y.

• María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Paul G. Gaffney II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt ,

Nat io nal Defense Un i v e r s i t y • Colin L. Powell, S e c re t a r y

of State • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
rat her are pre p a red to live cooperatively with other commu n i t ie s. The gap in econo m ic

a nd social de v e l o p me nt between Ma c e do n ia ns and ethnic Albanian commu n i t ies was

a c k no w l e dged as a fac t o r, though the differe nt ial is na r ro w i ng. 

Members of no n - A l b a n ian mino r i t ies ex p ressed frustra t ion that their ind i v idual and

collective rig hts were not respected by either the Ma c e do n ian or Albanian commu n i t ie s

a nd political partie s, and that Western ins t i t u t io ns, especially the European Un ion (EU),

pay scant attent ion to their situa t ion. Smaller groups such as the Vlachs, Roma, and

Turks also find it difficult to ma ke their conc e r ns he a rd within Ma c e do n ia and the re fo re

bear the brunt of political compromises between the do m i na nt Ma c e do n ian and Albanian commu n i t ies and political partie s. Ethnic politics permeate socie t y, inc l ud i ng the

w o r k p l a c e, with ethnic Albania ns asserting that jobs are given to those with the “c o rrect” ethnicity or party affilia t ion, that is, ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns.

I nd i v idual rig hts are not suffic ie ntly respected for a n y c i t i z e ns. All groups in Ma c edon ia deserve pro t e c t ion of their ling u i s t ic, educ a t io nal, and cultural rig ht s. Most part ic i p a nts felt that the new Law on Hig her Educ a t ion, which will allow the opening of a

new private, triling ual (Ma c e do n ian, Albanian, and English), and Euro p e a n - a c c re d i t e d

university in Tetovo, had contributed to the cons ide rable re duc t ion of ethnic tens ion in

Mac e do n ia. Beyond educ a t ion and culture, the de ma nd for group rig hts is a re a c t ion to

i na de q uate pro t e c t ion of ind i v idual rig ht s. 

I n a d e q u a cy of State Institutions and Citizen Invo l ve m e n t

T he fa i l u re to protect ind i v idual rig hts is part of a mo re ge ne ral fa i l u re of the state to

p ro v ide clear rules of the political, econo m ic, and social game and to enable parliamentary cont rol and oversig ht of state ins t i t u t io ns. Even after the fall of commu n i s m ,

t he state has sought to do m i nate public life ra t her than pro v ide public servic e s. Ma c edon ia ns, Albania ns, and others do not re g a rd the mselves as ind i v idual citizens with a

def i ned and equal re l a t io nship to each other and to the state, but ra t her as members of

c o l l e c t i v i t ies that have to be de f e nded from each other as well as from the state. 

Members of the political class and me d ia, amo ng othe r s, conc u r red that politic ia ns

a nd med ia cont i nue to fall far short in pro mo t i ng ind i v idual rig hts and public accounta b i l i t y. Citizens lack confide nce in the capacity of public ins t i t u t io ns to protect ind iv idual rig ht s, and mino r i t ies feel they suffer systemic discrimina t ion by the state. Little

has been do ne since inde p e nde nce to articulate a new social cont ract, in which citizens

a re made aware of their rig hts and oblig a t io ns as well as the rules go v e r n i ng the behavior of the state. Po l i t ical coopera t ion amo ng ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns and ethnic Albania ns

at the upper re a c hes of go v e r n me nt, which is common, is not reflected in social re l at io ns. Po l i t ical coopera t ion reflects a collective rig hts vie w p o i nt, with assig na t ion of

c o nt rol over certain sectors—not the sort of example of coopera t ion that will lead to

g reater civic - m i nde d ness of their cons t i t u e nt s. 

Mac e do n ia needs ins t i t u t io nal de v e l o p me nt, especially in the civil servic e, jud ic ia r y,

a nd polic e. Ho w e v e r, the impetus to create impartial public bodies is lacking. The publ ic has shown little will to pre s s u re political players to deal with these sho r t c o m i ng s.

S o me partic i p a nts held that citizens are re s ig ned to of f ic ial corruption, assuming that

all politic ia ns and of f ic ials are corrupt and that this is an inevitable part of politic s.

Acc o rd i ng to this vie w, citizens ra rely vote for or against politic ia ns on this basis. 

O t hers disagre e d, asserting that the poor sho w i ng of the VMRO-DPMNE (Int e r nal Ma c edon ian Revolutio nary Org a n i z a t io n – D e mo c ra t ic Party of Ma c e do n ian Na t io nal Unity) at

rec e nt local electio ns may well have been connected to the wide s p read view that the i r s

was a mo re corrupt go v e r n me nt than the last. While the da ma ge suffered by the ruling

c o a l i t ion in autumn 2000 local electio ns was connected to their perceived corruptio n ,

t he campaign against them did not showcase this issue. In any event, gro u nd-up pre ss u re to “clean up” Ma c e do n ia’s politics has not yet eme rge d.

3

Individual rights are not

sufficiently respected for 

a ny citizens.

E ven after the fall of

communism, the state has

sought to dominate public 

life rather than provide 

public services.

Political cooperation among

ethnic Macedonians and ethnic

Albanians at the upper re a c h e s

of government, which is

common, is not reflected in

social re l a t i o n s. 
S o me felt that real de c e nt ra l i z a t ion to re g io nal and local levels through a Law on SelfG o v e r na nce could help diffuse int e r - e t h n ic tens io ns by bring i ng go v e r n me nt closer to

c o ns t i t u e nt s. If the proposed law were adopted and elites “de c r i m i na l i z e d,” one partic ip a nt not e d, local go v e r na nce could have the fiscal whe rewithal to func t ion effectively,

u n l i ke no w. Existing local adm i n i s t ra t io ns were, partic i p a nts agre e d, too small to func t io n

e f f e c t i v e l y, serving as little mo re than toke ns of patro na ge for political partie s. While fears

of cant o n i z a t ion by the Ma c e do n ian majority attend discussion of de c e nt ra l i z a t ion, the

c u r re nt local units—the re are 123 in a country of just over two millio n — a re too small to

p ro v ide effective go v e r n me nt. No ne pre s e nt ex p ressed a de s i re for de c e nt ralized units of

t he Ma c e do n ian state to have any ethnic basis. A cons e nsus eme rged that some shift

t o w a rd more local re s p o nsibility would be useful, but only with ne w, stre ng t he ne d, and

t ra ns p a re nt adm i n i s t rative struc t u re s. Dema rc a t ion of larger adm i n i s t rative distric t s,

developed in a mo re open and vibra nt political and civic clima t e, able to ge ne rate re ve nue without ino rd i nate re l ia nce on the cent e r, would serve Ma c e do n ia well.

Weak Institutions Engender Corruption and Cynicism

Mac e do n ia has faced severe econo m ic dislocation as a result of the combined effects of

Yugo s l a v ia’s dissolution, re g io nal wars and sanc t io ns, and int e r nal fa c t o r s. Fifty-six perc e nt of Ma c e do n ia’s population is worse off in real terms than they were a de c a de ago .

Roughly a third of the work fo rce is une m p l o y e d, with youth that have never had a re gular inc o me composing a majority of Ma c e do n ia’s jobless. Corruption is pervasive at an

i ns t i t u t io nal and personal level, and is perceived by ma ny Ma c e do n ian citizens to have

gotten worse, or at least mo re brazen, since the VMRO-DPMNE, DA (Demo c ra t ic Alternative) and DPA (Demo c ra t ic Party of Albania ns) came to power in 1998. Tra ns p a re nc y

I nt e r na t io nal’s 1999 Corruption Pe rc e p t ion Index rates Ma c e do n ia in the same rank with

reg io nal neighbors Roma n ia and Bulgaria, along with Egypt and Ghana, for perc e i v e d

c o r r u p t ion. This corruption deters investme nt, both fo re ign and do me s t ic. Sanc t io ns

a g a i nst the Fede ral Republic of Yu go s l a v ia (FRY), and the smu g g l i ng that attended the m ,

a l o ng with the Greek blocka de, created an enviro n me nt conducive to corrupt pra c t ic e s

in Mac e do n ia. Po l i t ical patro na ge, award i ng jobs and business on the basis of private

c o n ne c t io ns, and use of public of f ice for personal gain are the curre nt no r ms. Ins t i t u t io n

b u i l d i ng has been a neglected prio r i t y, re s u l t i ng in fragile public ins t i t u t io ns with little

popular confide nc e. The busine s s - e na b l i ng enviro n me nt of courts, customs, and polic e

rema i ns weak. Privatization thus far has appare ntly benefited a few well-conne c t e d

i ns iders (on both sides of the tra ns a c t ion), who have ma de off with state assets at subma r ket valua t ion. Ac c u s a t io ns of “asset stripping” have been leveled at both SDSM

( S o c ial Democ ra t ic Party of Ma c e do n ia) and VMRO/DPMNE-led go v e r n me nt s.

T he free ma r ket system now appears to be ge ne rally accepted across the full bre a dt h

of the social and political spectrum, which was not the case at the time of inde p e nde nc e.

But the re re ma i ns a body of public opinion, pro moted most vocally through org a n i z e d

l a b o r, that the state has final re s p o nsibility for employme nt and the econo my in ge ne ral. Ho w e v e r, re l ia nce on the state as an employer greatly inc reases the opportunity fo r

p o l i t ical patro na ge and abuse of power. One partic i p a nt suggested that labor inflex i b i lity by itself was a greater barrier to fo re ign and do me s t ic investme nt than corruptio n .

O t hers noted that Ma c e do n ia still had to cont e nd with the legacy of a “de p e nde ncy 

c u l t u re” developed in the socialist perio d. This is manifest on the social level, with the

c o nd i t io n i ng of the population to expect work and benefits to ema nate from the state.

Mac e do n ia in the socialist Yu goslav cont ext was primarily a pro ducer of raw ma t e r ial and

s e m i - f i n i s hed go o d s, with goods being finished for sale (or export) in other re p u b l ic s.

In part to compensate for ge ne ral unde rde v e l o p me nt, Ma c e do n ia was a net re c e i v e r,

a l o ng with Kosovo and Mo nt e ne g ro, of “solidarity funds” from the state to aid de v e l o pment. Eleme nts of such a de p e nde ncy culture appear to be manifested in the curre nt

4

Fifty-six percent of Macedonia’s

population is worse off in 

real terms than they we re a

decade ago.

Political patro n a g e, awa rd i n g

jobs and business on the basis

of private connections, and use

of public office for personal

gain are the current norms.
re l ia nce on ex t e r nal fund i ng and lack of saleable ex p o r t s. The question of whe t her the

labor ma r ket should be liberalized polarized workshop partic i p a nts mostly along ethnic

l i ne s, with ethnic Albania ns ge ne rally mo re supportive of fa r - ra ng i ng libera l i z a t io n .

Most partic i p a nts agreed that fina nc ial disclosure laws should be enacted for political cand ida t e s, of f ice ho l de r s, and adm i n i s t ra t o r s. At pre s e nt, the re are no legal re q u i rements for such public fig u res to disclose their assets. The lack of tra ns p a re ncy in

p r i v a t i z a t ion re ma i ns a problem, pro mo t i ng speculation about subterfuge and corrupt ion. Ac c o rd i ng to those at the workshop, pro c u re me nt also re q u i res mo re public scrutiny. The curre nt political culture does not de ma nd public account a b i l i t y. Although socie t a l

c h a nge takes time, establishing objective standa rds of conduct in the of f ic ial sector

would accelerate the pro c e s s. Unless addressed dire c t l y, this problem will cont i nue to sap

Ma c e do n ia’s econo m ic pro g ress and exacerbate other social pro b l e ms.

As with ind i v idual rig hts and their pro t e c t ion, a clear majority tho u g ht that politic a l ,

me d ia, and other civic actors had been de l i n q u e nt in ma k i ng the public aware of the

scale of the corruption problem, and in pro p o s i ng me t hods to address it. As me nt io ne d

e a r l ie r, most partic i p a nts asserted that the voting public was ge ne rally re s ig ned to politic ia ns being corrupt, ra rely punishing infra c t io ns at the ballot box. The re are appare nt l y

no effective legal sanc t io ns applied to public of f ic ials who are corrupt and misuse the i r

a u t ho r i t y. Enfo rc e me nt of those laws that do exist falls short, bre e d i ng contempt for the

law and legal ins t i t u t io ns. Po l i t ical parties have not held their members accountable fo r

c o r r u p t ion, even when faced with serious public accusatio ns. In such a clima t e, investments from within and abroad are likely to be viewed as uns a f e, leaving the door open

for further corruption through “ins ider” privatization. A chorus of cons e nsus rose on this

p o i nt. Greek investors are viewed by most Ma c e do n ia ns and ma ny other observers as

a mo ng the main bene f ic ia r ies of the Ma c e do n ian privatization pro c e s s, along with ruling

party stalwarts (Greeks are by far the largest fo re ign direct investors). The me d ia was

c a s t igated for not do i ng serious investigative journalism on public corruption. 

Disillusion with Europe but Hope for Integra t i o n

Ma c e do n ian citizens across the political and ethnic spectrum are disappointed in “the

i nt e r na t io nal commu n i t y,” which ma ny (particularly ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns) view as having

c reated ma ny of the country’s econo m ic pro b l e ms by imposing sanc t io ns and waging war

a g a i nst Yu go s l a v ia. Despite Ma c e do n ia’s coopera t ion with the West, Ma c e do n ian citizens

( e s p e c ially ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns) believe that their country has not been compensated or

rew a rded appro p r iately for their sacrifices and coopera t ion over the past de c a de. In comparison to most of its fo r mer Yu goslav ne ig h b o r s, Ma c e do n ia’s relatively peaceful ma na ge me nt of its own pro b l e ms has led to the country being ig no red in favor of Bosnia ,

Kosovo, Mo nt e ne g ro, and now Serbia. Ma c e do n ia ns believe they need mo re ex t e r na l

a s s i s t a nc e, as well as mo re unde r s t a nd i ng of the country’s difficult situa t ion. 

T he Stability Pact for Southeastern Euro p e, unveiled in Sarajevo in July 1999 and havi ng political, econo m ic, and security compone nt s, was hailed at the time as a comprehensive system to assist count r ies in the re g ion achieve their goals of greater int e g ra t io n

with European and Euro - At l a nt ic struc t u re s. From a Ma c e do n ian perspective, the pact is

fai l i ng in its promise to assist Ma c e do n ia in its econo m ic tra ns i t ion. Ma ny partic i p a nt s

w e re of the opinion that the “quick start” projects anno u nced for Ma c e do n ia this year

w e re des ig ned to meet the int e r na t io nal community’s prio r i t ie s, such as infra s t r uc t u re fo r

t ra nsit of KFOR (the NATO-led “Kosovo Force”) into Kosovo, ra t her than tailored for local

nee d s. Less econo m ically developed eastern Ma c e do n ia has been bypassed by the Stability Pact projects in favor of western Ma c e do n ia and the capital, Sko p j e, whe re mo s t

e t h n ic Albania ns live. This, perversely, has stoked ethnic tens io ns, as ethnic Albania ns

a re viewed as int e r na t io nal favorites by ethnic Ma c e do n ia ns and smaller mino r i t ie s.

Ma c e do n ia ns are disenc h a nted with Brussels’ perceived tre a t me nt of their count r y.

5

The lack of tra n s p a re n cy in privatization remains a pro b l e m ,

p romoting speculation about

subterfuge and corruption.

Political parties have not held

their members accountable fo r

corruption, even when fa c e d

with serious public accusations.

In comparison to most of its

former Yugoslav neighbors,

Macedonia’s re l a t i vely peaceful

management of its ow n

p roblems has led to the country

being ignored in fa vor of

Bosnia, Ko s ovo, Montenegro ,

and now Serbia.
S o me even posited that the European Un ion keeps re l a t io ns with Skopje tentative to

force Ma c e do n ia into greater re g io nal political re - i nt e g ra t ion, ma k i ng the very term

“ re g io nal int e g ra t ion” suspect to some. Following NATO’s int e r v e nt ion in the Kosovo war,

in which the West re l ied on Ma c e do n ia, some partic i p a nts opined that Ma c e do n ia sho u l d

have driven a harder bargain with Brussels in ne go t ia t io ns leading to the associa t io n

a g re e me nt with the European Un ion, which allows freer tra de with EU me m b e r s. Despite

p roposals for greater re g io nal econo m ic int e g ra t ion, the EU’s bilateral ins i s t e nce on

t ig hter visa re g i mes and changes in tra de re g i mes erects barriers to re g io nal tra de. Ma c edon ia, whose na t u ral tra de routes have been either of f ic ially cut or stifled by Belgra de

up until re c e nt l y, de s p e rately needs freer re g io nal tra de. It is unclear how to stimu l a t e

reg io nal tra de while also mo v i ng toward greater pan-European int e g ra t ion unless all the

c o u nt r ies of the re g ion are on the same path and have harmonized their re l a t io ns with

each othe r. Recent stateme nts by European UN of f ic ials enc o u ra g i ng local econo m ic

a l ig n me nt have prompted worries that inde p e nde nt Ma c e do n ia would be pre s s u red to

i nt e g rate with its Balkan ne ighbors in a poor-man’s European Un ion, diverting Ma c e don ia and its ne ighbors from full EU membership. It re ma i ns unclear how to balance the

goal of EU membership in the long-term with the imme d iate need to stimulate re g io na l

c o m me rce and econo m ic int e rc h a nge. Despite these conc e r ns, the re was cons e nsus at

t he workshop across ethnic lines that EU membership is the ultimate goal and that Ma c edon ia is the boat that will get them the re.

While Greece is taking a much mo re frie ndly approach to Ma c e do n ia, some Ma c e don ia ns remain conc e r ned about their southern ne ig h b o r. Greece has not accepted the

name “Ma c e do n ia,” or the ex i s t e nce of a Ma c e do n ian minority in Gre e c e. Some belie v e

that Greece has been a pre datory investor, mo re int e rested in gaining influence than in

p ro ductive econo m ic activity. In add i t ion, Greek ins i s t e nce that the “c o r r idor 8” tra ns -

B a l kan East-West hig h w a y, slated to traverse Bulgaria and Ma c e do n ia, be re ro u t e d

t h rough no r t hern Greece bolsters the view that Greece cont i nues to approach Ma c e don ia in an adversarial fa s h ion. The shift of the road southward will hamper Ma c e do n ia ’ s

attempts to int e g rate itself with its ne ighbors and Euro p e.

Security Requires Improving the Neighborhood

T he prospects for “hard security” in the Balka ns appear to have improved with NATO ’ s

i nt e r v e nt ion in Kosovo and the overthrow of the Milosevic re g i me in Serbia. Int e r s t a t e

v io l e nce is no longer a major threat. If the challenge posed by ethnic Albanian ins u rgents in southern Serbia and no r t hern Ma c e do n ia can be re s o l v e d, mo v e me nt on serio u s

re g io nal de m i l i t a r i z a t ion should accelera t e, so that re s o u rces hitherto plowed into arme d

forces can be re d i re c t e d. In add i t ion, western aid in “soft security,” such as mo re Pa r tnership for Peace activities and re g io nal coopera t ion, would assist Ma c e do n ia and its

neighbors in their pro g ress toward Euro - At l a nt ic ins t i t u t io ns. Ma c e do n ia’s de s i re to join

N ATO, though stra i ned du r i ng the Kosovo war and NATO air campaign, re ma i ns stro ng. 

Mac e do n ia ns welcome the de mo c ra t ic change in Serbia, ant ic i p a t i ng that the fall of

t he Milosevic re g i me will help bring an end to econo m ic isolation. Ma c e do n ia’s econo my

has tra d i t io nally de p e nded on its position on the north-south axis of the Balka ns. The

c e me nt i ng of de mo c ra t ic rule in Serbia is eagerly awaited. Ma c e do n ia ns expect that the i r

l o ng s t a nd i ng border dispute with Serbia will be resolved quic k l y, and are enc o u ra ged by

s ig nals to this effect from Belgra de. A solution to the division of Yu goslav state assets

a nd debts should come soon as well. 

I nstability in and ema na t i ng from Kosovo is today Ma c e do n ia’s big gest ex t e r nal security problem, along with unrest in Serbia’s Presevo Va l l e y. Ethnic Ma c e do n ian worksho p

p a r t ic i p a nts tended to believe that an inde p e nde nt Kosovo would exacerbate int e r - e t h n ic

t e ns io ns within Ma c e do n ia, and possibly lead to partition. They pre f e r red that Ko s o v o ’ s

status re main unde f i ned inde f i n i t e l y. Some re s e nted what they viewed as Ame r ican 

6

If the challenge posed by ethnic

Albanian insurgents in southern

Serbia and northern Macedonia

can be re s o l ved, movement on

serious regional demilita r -

ization should accelera t e, so

that re s o u rces hitherto plowe d

i n to armed fo rces can be

re d i re c t e d .
i ns i s t e nce that the issue be resolved soon, seeing such action as pre ma t u re. Albania ns

t e nded to believe that inde p e nde nce would end instability in Kosovo and ens u re Ma c edon ia’s territorial int e g r i t y. Some believe that complete dissolution of the fo r me r

Yugo s l a v ia into its compone nt ent i t ies (an inde p e nde nt Kosovo, Mo nt e ne g ro, Serbia, and

Voj v o d i na) would be the best way to build he a l t hy re g io nal re l a t io ns on the road to

E u ro p e. 

While views differed on the pre f e r red ultimate outcome, the re was cons e nsus that

whatever Kosovo’s final status, it is in Ma c e do n ia’s int e rest that Kosovo be peaceful,

p ro s p e ro u s, and go v e r ned de mo c ra t ic a l l y. Instability in Kosovo can only hurt Ma c e do n ia .

C o n c l u s i o n s

Despite these pro no u nced differe nces in vie w p o i nt, the re was substant ial agre e me nt

c o nc e r n i ng Ma c e do n ia’s pre s e nt cond i t ion and what is de s i rable for its future, even if

p a r t ic i p a nts were not able to ide ntify a clear road map. To develop such a road ma p ,

w h ich is ne e ded in the near future as the ent i re re g ion reassesses itself, mo re dia l o g u e

is nee ded in Ma c e do n ia, inc l ud i ng amo ng civil socie t y, busine s s, and labor, as well as the

med ia and political elite. But while Ma c e do n ia must chart its own course, the int e r nat io nal community should assure Ma c e do n ia that it will not be fo rgotten because of its

relative stability. The re is no country in the re g ion mo re de s e r v i ng of a peace divide nd

after a de c a de of nervous unc e r t a i nt y. It is important that the West not dash Ma c e don ia’s hopes of inc l u s ion. 

Ma c e do n ia ns of all groups were able to come to cons e nsus on what is ne e ded to he l p

develop func t io n i ng go v e r n me nt and ame l io rate ethnic fric t ion in Ma c e do n ia :

• st ro nger econo m ic growth and de v e l o p me nt

• a more active civil society sector, aimed in part at inc re a s i ng contact amo ng ethnic

g roups at the gra s s roots and chang i ng int o l e ra nt or exclusivist mind s e t s

• better pro t e c t ion of ind i v idual rig hts within the cont ext of stro nger law enfo rc e me nt

gene rally and firmer commitme nt to the rule of law

• st ro nge r, more tra ns p a re nt and mo re accountable cent ral and mu n icipal ins t i t u t io ns

• re duc t ion of state int e r v e nt ion in the econo my and the society at large and limits

on political party cont rol of state re s o u rces and jobs

• st ro nger parlia me ntary and citizen oversig ht of go v e r n me nt

T hese me a s u res would help address the de b i l i t a t i ng pro b l e ms of corruption, lack of

p u b l ic account a b i l i t y, and cynicism, which thrive in the curre nt enviro n me nt of weak and

opaque public ins t i t u t io ns. The re is a dire need for public disclosure laws for politic ia ns,

c a nd ida t e s, and appointed public of f ic ia l s, as well as for conflict of int e rest legislatio n .

T he United States has world-class expertise in these and other go o d - go v e r na nce are a s,

a nd should re double its assistance efforts in these sectors.

Palpable de s i re to ma ke up for lost time and the fo re go ne advant a ges of the commo n

Yu goslav state is evide nt in Ma c e do n ia. Most citizens view inc l u s ion in the Euro p e a n

Union and NATO as necessary to secure the country’s future, as do their ne ig h b o r s. This

b a s ic agree me nt implies an unde r l y i ng willing ness to accept ge ne ral European standa rd s,

despite the diffic u l t ies this ada p t a t ion will entail. This sent i me nt will not in itself bring

about the major changes necessary to ma ke Ma c e do n ia a viable cand idate for either the

E u ropean Un ion or NATO. But the hope of event ual inc l u s ion is one of the stro nge s t

i nc e ntives for do me s t ic and re g io nal de mo c ra t ic de v e l o p me nt, pro v id i ng a fo u nda t io n

upon which re s p o nsible political and civil actors can build. In its effo r t s, Europe ne e d s

to both be re a s s u r i ng that the door is and will re main open, while not re p e a t i ng mist a kes of stoking unre a l i s t ic ex p e c t a t io ns of how long the necessary changes will take.

T he re is a ge ne ral acceptance that objective criteria need to apply.

7

M o re dialogue is needed in

Macedonia, including among

civil society, business, and

l a b o r, as well as the media 

and political elite.

T h e re is a dire need for public

d i s c l o s u re laws for politicians,

c a n d i d a t e s, and appointed 

public of f i c i a l s, as well as fo r

conflict of interest legislation. 
Without a more vigorous effo r t

on the part of Macedonia’s

civil-society actors to hold the

g overnment and its agents to

account and to promote the

s o c i e tal changes necessary to

make Macedonia a modern civic

d e m o c ra cy, the best the country

can hope for is continued

n e r vous sta g n a t i o n .

A re i n v igo rated econo m ic, political, and security effort from the European Un ion is

u rge ntly re q u i red to pro v e, ra t her than me rely proclaim, its commitme nt to draw the

w hole of southeastern Europe into a zone of security and shared European pro s p e r i t y.

Ma c e do n ia is not alone in do u b t i ng the stre ngth of such a commitme nt (Roma n ia ns and

B u l g a r ia ns make similar observatio ns), though its situa t ion is in some ways mo re critical than ma ny other potent ial bene f ic ia r ies of Europe’s help. 

T he fol l o w i ng initiatives would assist Ma c e do n ia, and the re g ion as a who l e :

• a redoubled commitme nt to assist Ma c e do n ia in re fo r m i ng its adm i n i s t rative struct u res and legal fra mework to reflect EU no r ms and western standa rds of tra ns p a re nc y

• greater sensitivity to Ma c e do n ia’s de p e nde nce on tra de, and in particular ma i nt a i ni ng the orig i nal route of the “c o r r idor 8” tra ns - B a l kan road project through Ma c e don ia and Bulgaria 

• fo c u s i ng future Stability Pa c t – c o o rd i nated aid on areas of relative unde rde v e l o p me nt ,

a nd setting prio r i t ies for Ma c e do n ia’s econo my in cons u l t a t ion with local inde p e nde nt

ex p e r t s

• ad he re nce of all EU members to ant i - c o r r u p t ion standa rds in de a l i ng with Ma c e do n ia

a nd the re g ion as a who l e, most importantly as conc e r ns privatization and fo re ig n

i n v e s t me nt

• greater assistance in combatting re g io nal organized crime

• fo c u s i ng on the cond i t io ns for smaller mino r i t ie s, as is the case within the Euro p e a n

Un io n

Effective cultural and educ a t io nal pro g ra ms for mino r i t ies need fina nc ial and technical support while Ma c e do n ia rebuilds its econo my. Ha v i ng them in place will da m p e n

much of the pre s s u re for collective p o l i t i c a l r ig ht s, which has posed a problem in the

B a l ka ns for the past de c a de.

T he United States also has a cont i nued int e rest in pro mo t i ng Ma c e do n ia’s stability.

U.S. leadership in NATO and its long s t a nd i ng commitme nt to Ma c e do n ian sovere ig nt y, as

demo ns t rated in its support for the UN mission UNPROFOR (later UNPREDEP), give it

unique capabilities to assist the country in its efforts to improve its security. The Un i ted States could lead NATO to address the fo l l o w i ng, which affect not only Ma c e do n ia n ,

but re g io nal security: 

• Regular contact between NATO of f ic ials and Ma c e do n ian security autho r i t ies on the

s i t ua t ion in the Presevo Valley of southern Serbia would show new commitme nt to

Mac e do n ia’s security conc e r ns.

• Di s c o u ra g i ng inc u r s io ns from Kosovo and assisting Ma c e do n ia in properly re s p o nd i ng

w hen pro v o c a t io ns occur would likewise re a s s u re Ma c e do n ia ns.

• Co nt i nu i ng efforts bilaterally and through NATO to assist the Ma c e do n ian military

s hould enc o u ra ge greater re p re s e nt a t ion of the country’s ethnic composition thro u g hout the comma nd struc t u re.

T he future of Ma c e do n ia is up to its own citizens. Without a mo re vigo rous effort on

t he part of Ma c e do n ia’s civil-society actors to hold the go v e r n me nt and its age nts to

a c c o u nt and to pro mote the societal changes necessary to ma ke Ma c e do n ia a mo de r n

c i v ic de mo c ra c y, the best the country can hope for is cont i nued nervous stagna t io n .

How e v e r, now that the era of massive bloodletting in the re g ion appears past, the We s t

has an abid i ng int e rest in ens u r i ng that the cleavages and struc t u ral flaws that allowed

t hem to burst onto the fro nt pages of the me d ia 10 years ago are re s o l v e d. 

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our web

site (www. u s i p . o rg), which has an

o n l i ne edition of this report cont a i n i ng

links to related web sites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 6 7

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Was h i ngton, DC 20036