FOR PUBLICATION

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

THOMAS C. ALLEN GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Fort Wayne, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

AARON J. SPOLARICH

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

PHILLIP T. BILLINGSLEY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A05-1204-CR-216

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

APPEAL FROM THE ALLEN SUPERIOR COURT

The Honorable Wendy W. Davis, Judge

Cause No. 02D04-1111-FD-1527

December 7, 2012

OPINION - FOR PUBLICATION

NAJAM, Judge
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Phillip T. Billingsley appeals his conviction for possession of marijuana, as a 

Class D felony, following a bench trial. Billingsley raises three issues for our review, 

which we consolidate and restate as the following two issues: 

1. Whether the officer responding to a 9-1-1 call initiated an 

investigatory stop of Billingsley or, instead, placed Billingsley under 

arrest when the officer withdrew his firearm upon his arrival at the 

scene; and

2. Whether the responding officer had a reasonable and articulable 

suspicion to initiate an investigatory stop of Billingsley.

We hold, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances available to the responding 

officer at the time he detained Billingsley, that the responding officer initiated an 

investigatory stop of Billingsley based on a reasonable and articulable suspicion that he

was engaged in criminal activity. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it admitted into evidence marijuana seized following the officer’s detention of 

Billingsley, and we affirm his conviction.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Around 2:34 a.m. on November 5, 2011, the 9-1-1 dispatch center of the Fort 

Wayne Police Department (“FWPD”) received a call from a woman. The woman said 

there was a “young man” at the Veterans of Foreign Wars (“VFW”) building who had 

“held [her] hostage” a week or two before and that she “want[ed] the police to come up 

here and lock him up.” Def.’s Ex. B. She then stated that he was “going to leave right 

now” and that she did not “want him to leave because that’s the same dude who did the 

shooting at Mookie’s nightclub.” Id. The caller stated that the man was currently armed,
3

though she could not specify the type of firearm; that his name was Phillip Billingsley;

and that he was sitting as a passenger in a “newer,” “tan-brown” or “tan-gray” Dodge 

Durango with tinted windows. Id. She further stated that the man sitting in the driver’s

seat of the vehicle was also armed.

During her five-minute phone call with 9-1-1, the caller turned her attention away 

from the dispatch operator to tell a third party that she was not “talking to the police I’m 

talking to my brother.” Id. At the dispatch operator’s request, the caller then identified 

herself as Renita Brown and said she was calling from a friend’s cell phone. The FWPD 

dispatched Officer Nicholas Lichtsinn to the scene.

Officer Lichtsinn knew the VFW was “not the most friendly environment” and 

also knew Billingsley from having personally arrested him on prior allegations of

possession of cocaine, resisting arrest, fleeing, and criminal trespass. Motion to Suppress 

Hearing Transcript at 14, 19. Officer Lichtsinn further knew that Billingsley had also 

been arrested for possession of a handgun by a felon and that Billingsley used to “hang 

around with” two people who have since been convicted of murder. Id. at 29.

Upon arriving at the VFW, Officer Lichtsinn did not see a Dodge Durango but did 

observe an SUV—a Chevrolet Trailblazer—that, “in the darker light . . . appear[ed] to be 

brown[, but] when the sun’s out, it appear[ed] to be silver.” Id. at 40. Officer Lichtsinn

knew from his experiences as an officer that, “often when people call [9-1-1], colors [of 

vehicles] are goofy and makes and models of vehicles are goofy.” Id. at 30. Officer 

Lichtsinn then observed Billingsley in the passenger seat of the Trailblazer and parked 

his patrol vehicle in front of the Trailblazer. Officer Lichtsinn called for backup and 
4

exited his vehicle with his sidearm drawn. He ordered Billingsley to place his hands on 

the roof of the SUV while they waited for backup to arrive, which Billingsley did.

Backup officers arrived shortly thereafter. Officer Lichtsinn then holstered his 

weapon and ordered Billingsley to exit the vehicle. Officer Lichtsinn handcuffed 

Billingsley and patted him down for weapons. While doing so, Officer Lichtsinn smelled 

an “overpowering odor of [raw] marijuana,” which he recognized based on “[n]umerous” 

prior arrests he had made involving marijuana. Id. at 18. Officer Lichtsinn then observed 

“on the front passenger seat where [Billingsley] was sitting . . . a clear plastic baggie

containing . . . a green leafy plant substance that [Officer Lichtsinn] immediately 

recognized . . . to be marijuana.” State’s Exh. 1. The substance field tested positive for 

marijuana and was later measured at 229.7 grams. No firearm was found on or near 

Billingsley.

The State charged Billingsley with possession of marijuana, as a Class D felony. 

Billingsley moved to suppress the seized marijuana and, after a hearing, the trial court 

denied Billingsley’s motion. Billingsley renewed his objections during the ensuing bench 

trial, and the court overruled them. The court then found Billingsley guilty as charged 

and sentenced him accordingly. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Billingsley contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the 

seized marijuana into evidence because the State’s seizure of the marijuana from the front 

passenger seat of the SUV violated his rights under the federal and Indiana constitutions. 

A trial court is afforded broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and 
5

we will reverse such a ruling only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Washington 

v. State, 784 N.E.2d 584, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). An abuse of discretion involves a 

decision that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before 

the court. Id. We will not reweigh the evidence, and we consider conflicting evidence in 

the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Cole v. State, 878 N.E.2d 882, 885 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007).

Issue One: Investigatory Stop or Arrest

The parties first dispute whether Officer Lichtsinn exiting his vehicle with his 

firearm drawn upon his arrival at the VFW subjected Billingsley to an investigatory stop 

or an arrest. An investigatory stop allows a police officer to “temporarily freeze the 

situation in order to make an investigative inquiry.” Johnson v. State, 766 N.E.2d 426, 

429 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968), the 

United States Supreme Court held that an officer may, consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, conduct a brief investigatory stop when, based on a totality of the 

circumstances, the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is 

afoot. Hardister v. State, 849 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. 2006). A Terry stop is a lesser 

intrusion on the person than an arrest and may include a request to see identification and 

inquiry necessary to confirm or dispel the officer’s suspicions. Id. (citing Hiibel v. Sixth 

Judicial Dist. Court of Nev., 542 U.S. 177, 185-89 (2004)). Reasonable suspicion entails 

some minimal level of objective justification for making a stop, something more than an 

unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for 
6

probable cause. Wilson v. State, 670 N.E.2d 27, 29 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (citing United 

States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)).

An arrest, on the other hand, occurs “when a police officer interrupts the freedom 

of the accused and restricts his liberty of movement.” Sears v. State, 668 N.E.2d 662, 

667 (Ind. 1996). An arrest requires probable cause. See, e.g., Reinhart v. State, 930 

N.E.2d 42, 45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). There is no question that “[h]olding a person at 

gunpoint certainly restrains his liberty of movement” and may be an example of an arrest. 

Taylor v. State, 464 N.E.2d 1333, 1335 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984). But “there is no ‘bright 

line’ for evaluating whether an investigative detention is unreasonable” such that it has 

been transformed into a full arrest. See Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 782 (Ind. 

2001) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 685 (1985)). 

This court recently considered the fine line between an investigatory stop and an 

arrest when the attending officer has drawn his firearm. In Willis v. State, 907 N.E.2d 

541, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009), we held that, based on the facts of that case, an 

investigatory stop had occurred. In particular, we noted that “the police arrived at the 

scene moments after a caller reported a man holding a handgun to another man’s head.” 

Id. Upon arriving at the scene, the police immediately observed two individuals 

matching the description provided by the caller. We held that under the totality of those 

circumstances the police did not convert an investigatory stop into an arrest when they 

immediately withdrew their firearms to investigate whether the suspect had a firearm. 

Id.; accord United States v. Askew, 403 F.3d 496, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

officers conducted a Terry stop and not an arrest even though the officers blockaded 
7

Askew’s car and approached with guns drawn, based on the officers’ “reasonable 

suspicion” that Askew was in the car and “the inherent danger in stopping those 

suspected of drug trafficking, for which guns are known tools of the trade”).

About a year after this court’s decision in Willis, we held on a different set of facts 

that an officer’s withdrawal of his firearm from its holster placed the suspect citizen 

under arrest. Specifically, in Reinhart, we held as follows:

Unlike in Willis, the facts presented here indicate that what may have 

begun as a Terry investigatory stop was quickly converted to an arrest 

requiring probable cause. “[A] seizure that is lawful at its inception can 

violate the Fourth Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably 

infringes interests protected by the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 

U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Deputy Coney’s purported purpose in stopping 

Reinhart’s vehicle was to investigate a possible drunk driver. While 

Deputy Coney testified that, at the time of the stop, he was concerned with 

his safety based upon Reinhart’s earlier behavior of pulling into the third 

driveway and yelling out the window, there is no evidence suggesting that 

Reinhart engaged in any behavior which could have led to a specific 

reasonable inference that he was armed with a weapon. Therefore, under 

the circumstances, Deputy Coney’s action of ordering Reinhart to exit the 

vehicle at gunpoint was excessive.

930 N.E.2d at 47 (alteration original).

Thus, whether an officer’s use of a firearm to detain a suspect is pursuant to an 

investigatory stop or an arrest is dependent on whether the totality of the facts and 

circumstances before the officer at that time demonstrated a specific and reasonable 

belief that the suspect may be armed with a weapon. Here, Officer Lichtsinn was 

responding to a call that Billingsley was armed at the VFW. Officer Lichtsinn knew the 

VFW to be a dangerous area, knew Billingsley, knew Billingsley to be a convicted felon, 

and knew Billingsley had a history of dangerous acquaintances. Upon his arrival at the 

VFW, Officer Lichtsinn immediately observed Billingsley sitting in the passenger seat of
8

a brown-gray SUV, which corroborated the caller’s description of the scene. And Officer 

Lichtsinn’s use of his firearm was limited. Namely, he had his firearm drawn only until 

backup arrived at the scene, at which time Officer Lichtsinn holstered his firearm and 

then further engaged Billingsley.

On these facts, Officer Lichtsinn withdrew his firearm only because he had a 

specific and reasonable belief that Billingsley may have been armed. As in Willis, it 

would have been unreasonable to expect Officer Lichtsinn to approach Billingsley 

without his gun drawn because the risk to the officer’s safety was simply too great. 907 

N.E.2d at 546. And Officer Lichtsinn’s limited use of his firearm temporarily froze the 

situation until backup could arrive and he could complete his investigative inquiry in a 

safer environment without his firearm. We conclude that the totality of these 

circumstances describes an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio and not an arrest.

Issue Two: Reasonable Suspicion

Billingsley next asserts that, even under the standards for Terry stops, Officer 

Lichtsinn did not have a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Billingsley because 

the caller, Renita Brown, did not give police any personally identifying information and 

later was not located by either the State or Billingsley’s defense counsel.

1

 According to 

Billingsley, because Brown could not later be found, her call to the police is equivalent to

an anonymous tip. We cannot agree.

As the Supreme Court of the United States has explained:

Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not 

only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with 

 

1

 The parties do not describe the measures taken in the attempts to locate Brown.
9

information that is different in quantity or content than that required to 

establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can 

arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show 

probable cause. Adams v. Williams . . . demonstrates as much. We there 

assumed that the unverified tip from the known informant might not have 

been reliable enough to establish probable cause, but nevertheless found it 

sufficiently reliable to justify a Terry stop. 407 U.S.[ 143, 147 (1972).] 

Reasonable suspicion, like probable cause, is dependent upon both the 

content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. 

Both factors—quantity and quality—are considered in the “totality of the 

circumstances—the whole picture,” United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 

417[] (1981), that must be taken into account when evaluating whether 

there is reasonable suspicion.

Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990).

The reasonable suspicion requirement is satisfied where the facts known to the 

officer at the moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from 

such facts, would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has 

occurred or is about to occur. Lyons v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1179, 1183-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2000), trans. denied. Thus, reasonable suspicion entails something more than an inchoate 

and unparticularized suspicion or hunch but considerably less than proof of wrongdoing 

by a preponderance of the evidence. Luster v. State, 578 N.E.2d 740, 743 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1991). We review a trial court’s determination regarding reasonable suspicion de novo. 

Burkett v. State, 736 N.E.2d 304, 306 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

Brown’s possible status as an anonymous caller presents an important question. 

As our supreme court has explained:

Reliability of the professional informant or anonymous tipster generally 

must be established by reference to underlying facts and circumstances 

which indicate that the information is trustworthy. Our requirement for

corroboration is necessitated because this type of information may be 

unreliable or self-serving, especially if given in return for favors such as 

money or leniency in possible criminal prosecution. On the other hand, we 
10

recognize a concerned citizen tip is different. This tip is made up of people 

who may have been victims of crime or have witnessed a crime. These 

individuals generally come forward with information out of a spirit of good 

citizenship and a desire to help law enforcement. Some jurisdictions have 

therefore held informants of this type are considered more reliable. In 

Kellems [v. State, 842 N.E.2d 352, 356 (Ind. 2006), rev’d on other grounds, 

849 N.E.2d 1110 (Ind. 2006)], we again reaffirmed our belief that there 

“may well be great indicia of reliability in the report of the ‘concerned 

citizen’ as distinguished from the ‘professional informant’—though again 

the totality of the circumstances controls.” These concerned citizens are 

usually one-time informants, and no basis exists from prior contacts to 

determine their reliability . . . .

State v. Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d 1143, 1147 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted); see also Florida 

v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (distinguishing known informants from anonymous 

informants); Sellmer v. State, 842 N.E.2d 358, 361 (Ind. 2006) (describing the degree of 

corroboration necessary before law enforcement may rely on an anonymous tip).

Here, Billingsley’s argument for why Brown should have the status of an 

anonymous caller is as follows:

The only identifying information the caller gave to the police when she 

called was her name. She did not provide a birth date, a telephone number, 

an address, or any other information which would allow the State to hold 

her “responsible” if her allegations turned out to be fabricated. In fact, the 

only information she gave which would have identified her turned out to be 

false as both the State of Indiana and the defense attorney attempted to no 

avail to locate her for purposes of having her testify at trial. . . . There was 

[also] no evidence put forth that the [FWPD] had th[e] technological tools 

available [to know the telephone number from which the call was placed].

Appellant’s Br. at 15-16 (citations omitted). Billingsley also suggests that, since the 

caller identified him by name, the caller must have had a questionable motive for the 9-1-

1 call.

Billingsley’s argument misapplies our legal standards. Indeed, the crux of 

Billingsley’s legal position is that a caller who identifies herself by name can nonetheless 
11

become anonymous after the fact when legal counsel fails to locate her. But “[t]hat ex

post inquiry . . . is not our focus.” United States v. Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d 1170, 1174 

(9th Cir. 2004). What matters is whether the facts known to Officer Lichtsinn at the 

moment of the stop, together with the reasonable inferences arising from those facts, 

would cause an ordinarily prudent person to believe that criminal activity has occurred or 

is about to occur. See Lyons, 735 N.E.2d at 1183-84. This is not to say that a caller who 

identifies herself by name can per se create reasonable suspicion. Again, whether 

reasonable suspicion exists requires us to consider the totality of the circumstances 

known to Officer Lichtsinn at the time of the stop. See id.

Moreover, Brown was not an anonymous caller but a concerned citizen. In her 9-

1-1 call, she claimed both to have been a recent victim of Billingsley’s criminal activity 

and to be witnessing his ongoing criminal activity. As an apparent concerned citizen, she

was entitled to a degree of reliability despite the fact that “no basis exist[ed] from prior 

contacts to determine [her] reliability.” Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1147; see also Kellems, 

842 N.E.2d at 356-57 (holding that a caller who had reported an intoxicated driver was 

not an anonymous caller but a concerned citizen because she had provided her name, 

even though her identity could not later be verified).

On these facts, we conclude that Officer Lichtsinn had reasonable suspicion to 

briefly detain Billingsley. At the time he stopped Billingsley, Officer Lichtsinn had been 

informed by a 9-1-1 caller identified by name that a known felon had a firearm, contrary 

to Indiana Code Section 35-47-2-23(c)(2)(B), in a dangerous area at about 2:30 in the 

morning. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Lichtsinn immediately observed Billingsley 
12

in the passenger seat of a brown-gray SUV, which he reasonably believed to be 

consistent with Brown’s description of the scene.

Billingsley notes that Brown’s description of the scene was based on information 

generally available to the public and was therefore not quality information on which to 

support a finding of reasonable suspicion. But Brown’s specific identification of 

Billingsley lends her description of the scene greater credibility than that of the general 

public.

Further, because Officer Lichtsinn reasonably believed that the caller was a 

concerned citizen, one reasonable inference is that he believed Brown could later be 

located and held accountable for false reporting. See J.L., 529 U.S. at 270. Stated 

another way, it is reasonable for the police to believe that a 9-1-1 caller has provided her 

real name. See Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 1147; Kellems, 842 N.E.2d 356-57. As the Ninth 

Circuit Court of Appeals has stated:

We acknowledge that any given caller reporting an emergency to [9-1-1] 

could provide a false name. . . . We decline to impose a duty on the police 

to confirm the identity of every [9-1-1] caller who provides his or her name 

or to know the universe of names in the United States and their endless 

variants.

Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d at 1175. Accordingly, Brown’s 9-1-1 call “was not anonymous 

and therefore was entitled to greater reliability.” Id. at 1174; see Renzulli, 958 N.E.2d at 

1147.

Finally, the fact that Brown called 9-1-1 rather than a police station entitles the 

call to a degree of reliability. Calls to 9-1-1 are “entitled to greater reliability than a tip 

concerning general criminality because the police must take [9-1-1] emergency calls 
13

seriously and respond with dispatch.” Terry-Crespo, 356 F.3d at 1176 (discussing United 

States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1339 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1161 

(2003)). Calls to 9-1-1

involve exigent situations that may limit the police’s ability to gather

identifying information. Police delay while attempting to verify an identity 

or seek corroboration of a reported emergency may prove costly to public 

safety and undermine the [9-1-1] system’s usefulness. We do not believe 

that the Constitution requires that result. The touchstone of our search and 

seizure jurisprudence remains the Fourth Amendment’s textual requirement 

that any search be “reasonable,” a determination we make by weighing the 

competing interests of individual security and privacy with the need to 

promote legitimate governmental interests. Having weighed those interests, 

we conclude that it is reasonable to accommodate the public’s need for a 

prompt police response. The Fourth Amendment does not require the 

police to conduct further pre-response verification of a [9-1-1] caller’s 

identity where the caller reports an emergency. Accordingly, an emergency 

[9-1-1] call is entitled to greater reliability than an anonymous tip 

concerning general criminality.

Id. (citations omitted); see also Kellems, 842 N.E.2d at 356-57 (holding that the exigent 

circumstances described by a concerned citizen were “particularly relevant” to justifying 

the need for a Terry stop).

In sum, based on the totality of the facts and circumstances known to Officer 

Lichtsinn at the time he detained Billingsley, we conclude that Officer Lichtsinn had a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that Billingsley may have been involved in criminal 

activity. Officer Lichtsinn had been informed, by a concerned citizen who had called 9-

1-1, of a known felon with a firearm at a location known to be dangerous. Accordingly, 

Officer Lichtsinn’s Terry stop of Billingsley did not violate Billinglsey’s Fourth 

Amendment rights. For the same reasons, Billingsley’s claim under Article I, Section 11 
14

of the Indiana Constitution must fail.2 E.g., Sowers v. State, 724 N.E.2d 588, 591-92 

(Ind. 2000). 

Conclusion

Officer Lichtsinn lawfully detained Billingsley during an investigatory stop. 

Accordingly, the State lawfully seized the discovered marijuana and the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence against Billingsley. Thus, we affirm 

Billingsley’s conviction.

Affirmed.

MAY, J., concurs.

KIRSCH, J., dissents with separate opinion.

 

2

 In reviewing claims under Article I, Section 11, we balance three factors to determine the 

reasonableness of a search or seizure: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation 

has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method of the seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary 

activities; and (3) the extent of law enforcement needs. Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. 

2005). The State asserts, and we agree, that Billingsley’s argument fails to address the second and third 

prongs under Article I, Section 11.
15

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

PHILLIP T. BILLINGSLEY, )

)

Appellant-Defendant, )

)

vs. ) No. 02A05-1204-CR-216

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Plaintiff. )

KIRSCH, Judge, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent.

To conduct an investigatory stop, a police officer must have a reasonably 

articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). To 

determine whether a citizen’s constitutional rights are violated by such a stop, the 

Supreme Courts of the United States and of Indiana have directed reviewing courts to 

look at the “‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining 

officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” U.S. 

v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002), State v. Bulington, 802 N.E.2d 435, 438 (Ind. 2004). 

Both courts have also held as a general matter that “an anonymous tip alone is not 

likely to constitute the reasonable suspicion necessary for a valid Terry stop.” Lampkins 
16

v. State, 682 N.E.2d 1268, 1271 (Ind. 1997) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329-

30 (1990)). The concern about uncorroborated anonymous tips arises because “[i]f any 

anonymous caller’s allegation, uncorroborated by anything beyond public knowledge, 

could justify a search, every citizen’s home [and car for that matter] would be fair game 

for a variety of innocent and not so innocent intrusions.” Jaggers v. State, 687 N.E.2d 

180, 183 (Ind. 1997).

For an officer to have a “‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal 

wrongdoing, significant aspects of the tip must be corroborated by the police.” 

Lampkins, 682 N.E.2d at 1271. The corroboration requirement will be satisfied if the 

anonymous tip gives the police something more than details readily obtainable by the 

general public. See Johnson v. State, 659 N.E.2d 116, 119 (Ind. 1995) (holding that 

anonymous tip that provided only information easily obtainable by members of general 

public was insufficiently reliable to constitute reasonable suspicion to conduct 

investigatory stop). In addition, to constitute reasonable suspicion for an investigatory 

stop, an anonymous tip must also demonstrate an intimate familiarity with the suspect’s 

affairs and be able to predict future behavior. See id. at 118.

Here, the police received a tip from a 9-1-1 caller who, in response to police 

questioning, gave her name as “Renita Brown.” She was neither asked for, nor provided, 

any other information about her identity such as her age, address, or Social Security 

Number. The caller could not be located by either the State or the defense, and it is not 

known whether the caller was, in fact, “Renita Brown” or whether the caller provided a 
17

false name. Nothing known to the police officer, nor provided to this court, allow us to

determine the accuracy or inaccuracy of the identification information.

In regard to the other information provided in the 9-1-1 call, the only information 

that was accurate was that Phillip Billingsley was in the passenger seat of an SUV in the 

parking lot of the Fort Wayne VFW and that the SUV could appear to be brown when 

viewed “in a darker light.” Other than Billingsley’s name, there was no information that 

provided details that would not be known to the general public, there was no information 

that demonstrated “an intimate familiarity” with Billingsley’s affairs, and there was no 

information that demonstrated an ability to predict future behavior. None of the other 

information provided during the call was verified by the officer before conducting the 

investigatory stop. Indeed, none of such information was ever shown to be accurate.

Because there was no supporting information or any other indicia of reliability for 

the name provided, I do not believe that the mere providing of a name by a 9-1-1 caller 

removes this case from the category of an anonymous caller. I also do not believe that 

the information known to the investigating officer was sufficient to satisfy the standards 

established by our Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of the United States for 

investigatory stops. Accordingly, I would reverse Billingsley’s conviction.