SUMMARY

April 21, 2022

2022COA44

No. 19CA2398, People v. Bagwell — Crimes — Murder in the 

First Degree; Criminal Law — Affirmative Defenses — Consent; 

Public Health and Environment — End-of-life Options —

Colorado End-of-life Options Act

A division of the court of appeals considers whether a 

defendant who intentionally kills a consenting, terminally ill victim 

may assert a defense of consent under section 18-1-505, C.R.S. 

2021. This statute creates an affirmative defense under certain 

circumstances in which the victim consents to the defendant’s 

conduct or to the injury the defendant causes. Section 18-1-505(2), 

however, states: “When conduct is charged to constitute an offense 

because it causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that

conduct or to the infliction of that injury is a defense only if the 

bodily injury consented to or threatened by the conduct consented 

to is not serious . . . .”

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
The division concludes that death is necessarily a bodily injury 

that is serious. The division therefore holds that the defense of 

consent is not available to a defendant who intentionally kills a 

terminally ill victim who consents to her own death.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2022COA44

Court of Appeals No. 19CA2398

Jefferson County District Court No. 19CR490

Honorable Lily W. Oeffler, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Bruce E. Bagwell,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division II

Opinion by JUDGE KUHN

Pawar and Rothenberg*, JJ., concur

Announced April 21, 2022

Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Elizabeth Rohrbough, Senior Assistant 

Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Katherine Brien, Deputy State 

Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. 

VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2021.
1

¶ 1 Defendant, Bruce E. Bagwell, appeals his conviction of 

intentional first degree murder. We affirm.

I. Background

¶ 2 Bagwell was convicted for killing his terminally ill wife of 

thirty-six years. Shortly after Bagwell’s wife was diagnosed with 

metastatic lung cancer, her health and quality of life began to 

deteriorate. Weeks before Bagwell fatally shot her, his wife 

experienced declining cognitive function, lapses in consciousness, 

and difficulty walking because the cancer had spread to her brain. 

She lost approximately forty pounds and needed a walker or 

wheelchair to move around their apartment. Her doctor estimated 

she had mere months or weeks to live.

¶ 3 Hospice care was ordered; a hospice nurse began weekly visits 

to the Bagwells’ apartment to attend to Bagwell’s wife and bring her 

medication for pain management. Bagwell’s wife, though, elected 

not to take these medications or undergo the painful cancer 

treatments that might have prolonged her life.

¶ 4 After she allegedly asked Bagwell to end her life each day for 

five days straight, he shot her in the apartment they shared — twice 

in her head and once in her chest.
2

¶ 5 Shortly before Bagwell fatally shot his wife, he told her sister 

he believed his wife would be dead in approximately two weeks. In 

the hour after the shooting, Bagwell admitted to his wife’s father, 

his wife’s sister, and the arresting officers that he shot his wife 

because she asked him to do so to end her suffering. He told law 

enforcement that his wife had begged him to shoot her each of the 

preceding five days, and he explained that it was a “mercy killing.” 

In a videotaped interrogation, Bagwell again admitted to two 

detectives that he had killed his wife.

¶ 6 Bagwell was charged with first degree murder, a class 1 felony 

under section 18-3-102(1)(a), (3), C.R.S. 2021. Before trial, he 

moved to suppress his statements to the detectives and endorsed 

an affirmative defense of consent under section 18-1-505, C.R.S. 

2021. The trial court denied Bagwell’s motion to suppress and 

precluded him from asserting his wife’s alleged consent to be killed 

as a defense. The trial court reasoned that when the General 

Assembly intended to create an affirmative defense to homicide, it 

did so explicitly.

¶ 7 Bagwell was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. He 

challenges both the consent and suppression rulings on appeal.
3

II. Affirmative Defense of Consent

¶ 8 Section 18-1-505 creates an affirmative defense for criminal 

defendants under certain circumstances in which the victim 

consents to the defendant inflicting the victim’s injury. Bagwell 

contends the trial court erred by denying him this defense to the

first degree murder charge. We conclude that section 18-1-505 

does not permit this defense when the victim consents to the 

defendant causing the victim’s death.

A. The Affirmative Defense of Consent, First Degree Murder,

and Standard of Review

¶ 9 Section 18-1-505 provides that consent of the victim is an

affirmative defense when, as relevant here, two criteria are met. 

§ 18-1-505(1), (2), (4). Subsection (1) makes the defense available if 

“the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the 

infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law 

defining the offense.” § 18-1-505(1); see Hotsenpiller v. Morris, 2017 

COA 95, ¶ 24. But even if subsection (1) is satisfied, subsection 

(2) may still preclude the defense. It provides that 

[w]hen conduct is charged to constitute an 

offense because it causes or threatens bodily 

injury, consent to that conduct or to the 

infliction of that injury is a defense only if the 
4

bodily injury consented to or threatened by the 

conduct consented to is not serious . . . . 

§ 18-1-505(2).

¶ 10 We analyze whether consent can constitute a defense to a 

crime in the context of the particular offense and the defendant’s 

particular conduct. See Hotsenpiller, ¶ 22 (citing Model Penal Code 

§ 2.11 note 1 on General Principles (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft and 

Revised Comments 1985)). Bagwell committed first degree murder 

if, “[a]fter deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a 

person other than himself, he cause[d] the death of that person.” 

§ 18-3-102(1)(a).

¶ 11 Whether section 18-1-505 permits a defense of consent to first 

degree murder is a question of statutory interpretation that we 

review de novo. See People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 54. If the 

defense is available, we also review de novo whether Bagwell 

presented sufficient evidence to be entitled to the jury’s 

consideration of it. People v. DeGreat, 2018 CO 83, ¶ 16.

¶ 12 “It is the General Assembly’s prerogative to define crimes and 

prescribe punishments . . . .” People v. Trujillo, 631 P.2d 146, 148 

(Colo. 1981). Our primary goal in statutory interpretation is to 
5

discern the legislature’s intent and to “effectuate the purpose of the 

legislative scheme[,] . . . read[ing] that scheme as a whole [and] 

giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its 

parts.” McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶¶ 37-38.

¶ 13 We first look to the language of the statute, reading it as a 

whole and giving its words and phrases their common meanings. 

Jones, ¶ 54. If the plain meaning of the statute is clear, we apply it 

as written. Id. “If, however, the language is ambiguous, meaning it 

is silent or susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, 

we may use extrinsic aids of construction, ‘such as the 

consequences of a given construction, the end to be achieved by the 

statute, and the statute’s legislative history.’” Id. at ¶ 55 (quoting 

McCoy, ¶ 38).

B. Bagwell Was Not Entitled to 

An Affirmative Defense of Consent

¶ 14 Bagwell contends that section 18-1-505 permits the defense of 

consent to first degree murder when a terminally ill victim urges a 

loved one to put an end to her painful, inevitable decline. We 

disagree.
6

¶ 15 Bagwell urges that, in this situation, section 18-1-505(1) 

makes the defense available because the terminally ill victim’s 

consent to dying — and the loved one’s desire to fulfill that wish —

“precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented 

by” the prohibition of murder. This prohibition, according to 

Bagwell, seeks to prevent malicious killings, not mercy killings such 

as the one that allegedly occurred here. In other words, Bagwell 

argues that the prohibition of murder seeks to prevent unwanted as 

opposed to wanted deaths.

¶ 16 Even if we assume, however, that subsection (1) makes the 

defense available to Bagwell,1 we conclude that subsection

(2) precludes it. Under any reasonable interpretation of subsection 

1 Historically, a victim’s consent to homicide has not precluded the 

harm inflicted or evil sought to be prevented by its criminal 

prohibition, as this prohibition also serves wider societal interests 

beyond those asserted by the victim. Model Penal Code § 2.11 note 

1 on General Principles (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft and Revised 

Comments 1985); see also State v. Brown, 364 A.2d 27, 28 (N.J. 

Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976) (discussing how some criminal 

prohibitions are designed to protect the interests of society as a 

whole and why the victim’s consent is not considered in that 

context because there is more at stake than the victim’s rights), 

aff’d, 381 A.2d 1231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
7

(2), the injuries causing his wife’s death are “bodily injur[ies] . . . 

[that are] . . . serious.”

1. The Plain Meaning of Section 18-1-505(2)

¶ 17 “When conduct is charged to constitute an offense because it 

causes or threatens bodily injury, consent to that conduct or to the 

infliction of that injury is a defense only if the bodily injury 

consented to or threatened by the conduct consented to is not 

serious . . . .” § 18-1-505(2). Whether the injuries to which

Bagwell’s wife consented fall under this provision turns on the 

General Assembly’s intent in using the phrase “bodily injury . . . 

[that] is not serious.”

¶ 18 The criminal code defines “bodily injury” as “physical pain, 

illness, or any impairment of physical or mental condition.” 

§ 18-1-901(1), (3)(c), C.R.S. 2021. It does not, however, define 

“serious” by itself or the phrase “bodily injury . . . [that] is not 

serious.”2 

2 The General Assembly has also defined the phrase “serious bodily 

injury” to mean “bodily injury which, . . . involves a substantial risk 

of death, a substantial risk of serious permanent disfigurement, a 

substantial risk of protracted loss or impairment of the function of 
8

¶ 19 Colorado’s consent defense is largely based on the Model Penal 

Code (MPC), Hotsenpiller, ¶ 22 n.5, and subsection (2) enacted 

section 2.11 of the MPC verbatim. Because no Colorado appellate 

cases have interpreted subsection (2), we refer to the MPC and its 

commentary for guidance on the meaning of this portion of the 

consent statute. See Hotsenpiller, ¶ 22 n.5.

¶ 20 The MPC explains that, for offenses that cause or threaten 

bodily injury, consent will have defensive significance only if, as 

relevant here, “the injury is not serious.” Model Penal Code § 2.11 

Explanatory Note (Am. L. Inst., Official Draft and Revised 

Comments 1985) (emphasis added). Indeed, the commentary 

observes that consent is generally accepted as a defense only when

“no injury is caused or the injury is slight.” Id. at note 2 on Bodily 

Injury. Notably, the drafters of the MPC explained that homicide 

has universally been thought to be an offense “as to which consent 

any part or organ of the body, or breaks, fractures, or burns of the 

second or third degree.” § 18-1-901(1), (3)(p), C.R.S. 2021. The 

parties do not argue on appeal that the phrase “bodily injury that is 

serious” means the same thing as the statutorily defined term 

“serious bodily injury.”
9

does not operate to prevent consummation of the crime.” Id. at note 

1 on General Principles. 

¶ 21 Neither the consent statute nor the MPC defines when an 

injury is “serious,” so we may refer to dictionary definitions to 

determine the plain and ordinary meaning of this term. See People 

v. Serra, 2015 COA 130, ¶ 52. The dictionary defines “serious” to 

include “having important or dangerous consequences.” 

Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/SXQ4-ASMV. 

¶ 22 We conclude the plain meaning of section 18-1-505 reveals the 

General Assembly’s intent to adopt the consent defense as it was 

described by the MPC commentary. In other words, the defense is 

available under subsection (2) only when the victim consents to a

minor injury. An injury that causes a victim’s death is necessarily 

“serious” — and thus not minor — because it involves a permanent 

and dangerous impairment of the victim’s physical condition. The 

consent defense is not available, then, when a defendant 

intentionally kills a victim who consents to her own death. 

¶ 23 Bagwell nevertheless asserts that a victim’s injury is not 

“serious” when the victim is suffering from an agonizing, life-ending 

illness and urges the defendant to cause the victim’s death as an 
10

act of mercy. But the plain meaning of the phrase “bodily injury 

that is not serious” focuses on the degree of injury inflicted, not on 

the intent of the defendant, and section 18-1-505 does not suggest 

that a victim’s injury is any less “serious” merely because the 

victim’s pre-existing condition is dire. 

¶ 24 Here, it is undisputed that Bagwell inflicted fatal gunshot 

wounds on his wife. Under section 18-1-505(2), such wounds are 

“bodily injur[ies] . . . [that are] . . . serious.” Thus, even if she 

consented to those injuries, as Bagwell claims, the plain meaning of 

the statute precludes him from asserting the affirmative defense of 

consent to his first degree murder charge.

2. The General Assembly’s Intent is Clear

¶ 25 Alternatively, Bagwell argues that section 18-1-505 is 

ambiguous and that we should apply the rule of lenity to interpret it 

in his favor. We are not persuaded.

¶ 26 The rule of lenity provides that, “when we cannot discern the 

legislature’s intent, ‘ambiguity in the meaning of a criminal statute 

must be interpreted in favor of the defendant.’” Jones, ¶ 70 

(quoting People v. Summers, 208 P.3d 251, 258 (Colo. 2009)). 

However, we only apply this rule as a last resort — only “if after 
11

utilizing the various aids of statutory construction, the General 

Assembly’s intent remains obscured.” Summers, 208 P.3d at 258

(quoting People v. Thoro Prods. Co., 70 P.3d 1188, 1198 (Colo. 

2003)); Jones, ¶¶ 56-71 (invoking lenity after applying multiple 

other tools of statutory construction). We also use the general rules 

of statutory construction where, as here, the statutes we interpret 

include citizen-initiated measures. Huber v. Colo. Mining Ass’n, 264 

P.3d 884, 889 (Colo. 2011).

¶ 27 Even if we were to assume that the meaning of the consent 

statute is ambiguous, though, we would still conclude that the 

overall statutory scheme demonstrates that consent is not a defense 

to first degree murder.

¶ 28 Colorado law provides a means for terminally ill individuals 

like Bagwell’s wife to seek the end of their own lives — the Colorado 

End-of-Life Options Act.3 This Act provides a path for certain 

terminally ill patients to receive aid-in-dying medication from their 

physicians. §§ 25-48-101 to -123, C.R.S. 2021. It carefully 

3 Bagwell told law enforcement that he and his wife were familiar 

with her options under the Act but she didn’t want to go to a 

hospital or wait to use them.
12

delineates which terminally ill patients are eligible for this 

medication, §§ 25-48-102(16), -103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2021, and the 

procedures necessary to receive it.4

¶ 29 Critically, the Act expressly states that it does not authorize 

any person — physician or not — to directly end an individual’s life 

by “lethal injection, mercy killing, or euthanasia.” § 25-48-121, 

C.R.S. 2021. To the contrary, the Act specifically notes that it does 

not preclude criminal penalties for conduct inconsistent with the 

Act. §§ 25-48-119(4), -121, C.R.S. 2021. These provisions 

demonstrate the Act’s intent to create a narrow exception to the 

4 The Act requires terminally ill patients not merely to consent to 

receiving assistance in ending their lives, but rather to affirmatively 

request such assistance. § 25-48-103(1)(c), C.R.S. 2021. Even 

further, the patients must make the request to their attending 

physician specifically, § 25-48-104(1), C.R.S. 2021, and their 

request must be implemented via a host of statutorily prescribed 

procedures, see id. (patient must make two oral requests, separated 

by at least fifteen days, as well as a written request); § 25-48-103(1)

(attending physician must have diagnosed patient with terminal 

illness and determine patient has mental capacity to request 

assisted suicide); § 25-48-110, C.R.S. 2021 (attending physician 

must verify that patient is making an informed decision); 

§ 25-48-107, C.R.S. 2021 (consulting physician must confirm 

attending physician’s findings); § 25-48-111, C.R.S. 2021 (attending 

physician must document the patient’s requests and the physician’s 

findings in patient’s medical record).
13

prohibition of homicide by allowing individuals a path to receive 

assistance in ending their own lives under specific circumstances. 

The Act explicitly forecloses Bagwell’s interpretation that the 

consent statute creates, in effect, its own “mercy killing” exception. 

Bagwell’s actions directly ending another’s life were not authorized 

by the Act or the consent statute, even under circumstances that 

might constitute a mercy killing.

¶ 30 The Act also left in place the offense of intentionally aiding 

another in committing suicide as a form of manslaughter. 

§ 18-3-104(1)(b), C.R.S. 2021. In People v. Gordon, 32 P.3d 575 

(Colo. App. 2001), a defendant charged with first degree murder 

testified that he shot and killed his suicidal girlfriend to put her out 

of her misery, as she had allegedly already shot herself once in the 

head and survived. Id. at 577. A division of this court concluded 

he was not entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser offense of 

manslaughter (aiding suicide). The division reasoned that the 

defendant did not “aid” the victim’s suicide because he did not 

“merely furnish[] the victim the means to kill herself . . . [but rather] 

actively engaged those means to kill her himself.” Id. at 578-79 

(“This particular phraseology [of ‘aids another to commit suicide’] 
14

evidences a clear and unambiguous intent to penalize only persons 

who provide indirect types of aid or assistance to others who then 

go forward and kill themselves.”).

¶ 31 Likewise here, Bagwell actively engaged the means leading to 

his wife’s death rather than indirectly aiding her passing.5 We 

conclude that if Bagwell would not even be entitled to a jury

instruction on manslaughter, a lesser offense than murder, then 

the statutory scheme would also not entitle him to an affirmative 

defense completely exonerating his conduct. See People v. Nelson, 

2014 COA 165, ¶ 48 (“An affirmative defense admits ‘the 

defendant’s commission of the elements of the charged act, but 

seek[s] to justify, excuse, or mitigate the commission of the act.’” 

(quoting People v. Pickering, 276 P.3d 553, 555 (Colo. 2011))).

¶ 32 Finally, like in Gordon, our interpretation of the consent 

defense serves similar, important ends. It guards against murders 

being disguised as mercy killings and gives effect to the Act’s 

5 During his interrogation, Bagwell admitted that he and his wife 

had discussed helping her to commit suicide by overdose on her 

prescribed medications, but he alleged that they decided not to do 

so.
15

statutory safeguards surrounding a terminally ill individual’s 

decision to seek assistance in dying. See Gordon, 32 P.3d at 579; 

§ 25-48-110, C.R.S. 2021; see also, e.g., § 25-48-103(1)(c) (requiring 

terminally ill patient to voluntarily express the wish to receive aidin-dying medication); § 25-48-104(2)(a), C.R.S. 2021 (patient’s 

signed, written request must be witnessed by at least two 

individuals); § 25-48-108, C.R.S. 2021 (requiring a physician to 

verify the patient is mentally capable and making an informed 

decision before prescribing aid-in-dying medication); § 18-1-505(3) 

(consent is not available as a defense if the consent is induced by 

force, duress, or deception, and the consenting individual must be 

legally competent and not unable to consent due to a behavioral or 

mental health disorder). 

¶ 33 These considerations are particularly apt where, as here, the 

only evidence of Bagwell’s wife’s consent was from Bagwell, his wife 

was suffering cognitive decline, and her ability to freely and capably 

consent was not evaluated before her death.

¶ 34 Given this statutory context, we conclude that the General 

Assembly did not intend for section 18-1-505(2) to allow the defense 
16

of consent to murder, and therefore, there is no basis for applying 

the rule of lenity.

¶ 35 In summary, we hold that a defendant is precluded from 

raising a consent defense under section 18-1-505 where, as here, 

he intentionally kills a victim who consents to her own death. The 

trial court did not err by denying Bagwell’s request to assert it. 

III. Suppression of Bagwell’s Statements

¶ 36 Bagwell also contends that the trial court violated his 

constitutional rights by denying his motion to suppress his 

statements to the detectives because (1) the detectives failed to 

obtain a valid waiver of his constitutional rights under Miranda v. 

Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (2) his statements were given 

involuntarily. We see no error in the trial court’s suppression 

ruling.

A. Additional Facts

¶ 37 One of the detectives who interrogated Bagwell testified at the 

suppression hearing. A transcript and video recording capturing 

the entirety of the interrogation were also admitted. The 

interrogation took place at the police station in a ten-by-ten-foot 

room and lasted approximately an hour and forty minutes. Before 
17

the detectives entered, Bagwell spoke spontaneously to a 

supervising officer for twenty minutes and admitted that he shot his 

wife.

¶ 38 Upon entering, the detectives read Bagwell his Miranda rights

and asked Bagwell if he understood those rights. Bagwell 

responded, “Absolutely.” He asked for no clarification, said no 

lawyer needed to be present, and then signed a written Miranda

advisement. At no point during the rest of the interrogation did 

Bagwell request an attorney, ask to stop answering questions, or 

seek any clarification of his rights. The detectives made no 

promises or threats to Bagwell to get him to speak with them, and it 

appeared to the testifying detective that Bagwell spoke freely and 

voluntarily. Bagwell did most of the talking, speaking 

spontaneously at times and giving lengthy answers to the 

detectives’ open-ended questions.

¶ 39 Bagwell repeatedly told the detectives that he killed his wife to 

end her suffering. He expressed that he was upset because he had 

just shot his best friend, that he hadn’t wanted to kill her, and that 

his decision tormented him.
18

¶ 40 The tone of the interview was conversational. Bagwell 

cooperated with the detectives’ questioning and appeared to be 

tracking what they were saying and responding appropriately. 

Bagwell appeared to speak rapidly at times but said on multiple 

occasions that he understood he was going to be arrested for 

homicide, and, on one occasion, he said that he was thinking

rationally.

¶ 41 The testifying detective noted that Bagwell had an odor of 

alcohol on his breath, but that he didn’t slur his words, sway, or 

nod off during the interrogation.

¶ 42 Near the end of the interrogation, the detectives ordered a 

blood draw to test Bagwell’s blood alcohol content (BAC), but 

neither party sought admission of the results at the hearing. 

Bagwell said that he believed his BAC was not high at that moment, 

but that he was “not completely sober” when he shot his wife. At 

the end of the interrogation, Bagwell lay on the floor of the 

interrogation room and said he believed he was on the verge of 

having a partially alcohol-induced seizure.

¶ 43 In denying Bagwell’s motion, the trial court found that 

(1) Bagwell was oriented as to time and place and that any self-
19

induced intoxication did not prevent him from understanding his 

waiver or the circumstances of the interrogation; (2) Bagwell’s 

answers — though lengthy and spoken rapidly — were coherent 

and responsive to questioning, and evidenced Bagwell’s 

understanding of his circumstances; and (3) though Bagwell 

appeared upset and agitated, this did not negate his ability to waive 

his Miranda rights.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 44 We review suppression rulings as mixed questions of fact and 

law. People v. Ferguson, 227 P.3d 510, 512 (Colo. 2010) (Miranda 

waiver); Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868, 878 (Colo. 2010) 

(voluntariness of statements). We defer to the trial court’s factual 

findings unless they are clearly erroneous but review the court’s 

application of the relevant constitutional law to the facts of the case 

de novo. Ferguson, 227 P.3d at 512-13. 

¶ 45 In reviewing a trial court’s suppression order, we look solely to

the record created at the suppression hearing. People v. Thompson, 

2021 CO 15, ¶ 16. Because we also have a video recording of 

Bagwell’s interrogation and Miranda waiver, we can undertake this 

review independently and not just from the cold record. See 
20

Ferguson, 227 P.3d at 514 n.3; see also People v. Taylor, 2018 CO 

35, ¶ 7 (“Where, as here, a portion of the challenged incident is 

recorded, and there are no disputed facts outside of that recording 

pertinent to the issue of suppression, we . . . may undertake an 

independent review of the recording to determine whether the 

evidence was properly suppressed in light of the controlling law.”).

¶ 46 The prosecution bears the burden of proving both the validity 

of a defendant’s Miranda waiver and the voluntariness of his

statements by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Thames, 

2015 CO 18, ¶ 12; Effland, 240 P.3d at 878. We consider the

totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation. 

Thames, ¶ 13; Effland, 240 P.3d at 877.

¶ 47 If we conclude that the trial court erred in failing to suppress 

Bagwell’s statements in violation of his constitutional rights, we 

must reverse the judgment of conviction unless the error was 

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hagos v. People, 2012 CO 

63, ¶ 11.

C. Bagwell’s Miranda Waiver Was Valid

¶ 48 Bagwell contends that the detectives failed to obtain a valid 

waiver of his Miranda rights. We disagree.
21

¶ 49 The United States and Colorado Constitutions guarantee 

individuals the right against self-incrimination. U.S. Const. 

amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. To protect this right, 

Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, holds that the prosecution may not 

introduce in its case-in-chief any of a suspect’s custodial 

statements resulting from interrogation unless the police preceded 

their interrogation with certain advisements of the suspect’s 

constitutional rights. People v. Davis, 2019 CO 84, ¶ 16; Thames, 

¶ 11 (“A Miranda advisement is adequate as long as it conveys to 

the suspect a clear and understandable warning that he has a right 

to remain silent, anything he says can be used against him in 

court, he has a right to the presence of an attorney, and, if he 

cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any 

questioning if he so desires.”).

¶ 50 Suspects can choose to waive their rights, but this waiver is 

only valid if given voluntarily,6 knowingly, and intelligently. 

6 Bagwell’s only challenge to the voluntariness of his waiver is his 

contention that he was intoxicated during the interrogation. But 

intoxication only renders a suspect’s waiver involuntary when 

governmental conduct causes the intoxication, People v. Platt, 81 
22

Thames, ¶¶ 12, 14 (listing factors for evaluating the validity of a 

waiver). A suspect’s waiver is knowing and intelligent “when made 

with awareness of the nature of the right being abandoned and the 

consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Id. at ¶ 12. This 

awareness can be diminished by a suspect’s intoxication, but 

intoxication does not automatically invalidate a waiver. People v. 

Knedler, 2014 CO 28, ¶ 15; People v. Platt, 81 P.3d 1060, 1066 

(Colo. 2004). We use a set of factors to determine whether a 

suspect’s intoxication prevented him from understanding the 

nature of those rights and the ramifications of waiving them:

(1) whether the defendant was oriented to his 

or her surroundings and situation; (2) whether 

the defendant’s answers were the responsive 

product of a rational thought process; 

(3) whether the defendant was able to 

appreciate the seriousness of his or her 

situation and the possibility of incarceration; 

(4) whether the defendant had the foresight to 

attempt to deceive the police to avoid 

prosecution; (5) whether the defendant 

expressed remorse for his or her actions; and 

(6) whether the defendant expressly stated that 

he or she understood his or her rights.

P.3d 1060, 1066 (Colo. 2004), and the record here contains no 

evidence that Bagwell’s intoxication was anything but self-induced. 
23

Knedler, ¶ 14 (citing Platt, 81 P.3d at 1066).

¶ 51 Bagwell argues that his waiver was not knowing and 

intelligent because he was intoxicated, sick, and visibly upset 

during the interrogation, and because he had no criminal history. 

However, the record reveals that Bagwell waived his Miranda rights 

out of a desire to justify shooting his wife — to explain she was 

suffering and repeatedly asked him to do it. He was read a Miranda 

advisement, right by right, immediately before the interrogation;

responded clearly that he had no questions; signed the written 

advisement; and said on multiple occasions that he knew he would

be charged with homicide. These circumstances establish Bagwell’s

awareness of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.

¶ 52 Bagwell’s self-induced intoxication did not sufficiently 

undermine this awareness to render his waiver invalid. Bagwell’s 

responses during questioning, though lengthy and at times 

rambling, evidence the rational thought process of an individual 

oriented to the circumstances of the situation. He repeatedly said 

he understood the consequences of his actions, expressed remorse 

over them, and chose to speak with the detectives anyway. Indeed, 

Bagwell waived his Miranda rights approximately two hours after 
24

his last drink, and he told the detectives that he did not believe he 

was intoxicated during the interrogation. 

¶ 53 Although Bagwell did exhibit some signs of disorientation,

these signs do not demonstrate that his waiver was unknowing and 

unintelligent. At most, they demonstrate Bagwell’s understandable 

shock and torment over just having shot his terminally ill wife.

¶ 54 We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in ruling that 

Bagwell validly waived his Miranda rights.

D. Bagwell’s Statements Were Made Voluntarily

¶ 55 Bagwell further contends that, even if he waived his Miranda

rights, the trial court erred in ruling that he gave his statements 

voluntarily. We again disagree.

¶ 56 The Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado 

Constitutions protect defendants from the admission of statements 

they made involuntarily. Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. A statement is 

given voluntarily if it is “the product of an essentially free and 

unconstrained choice by its maker.” Id. (quoting People v. Raffaelli, 

647 P.2d 230, 234 (Colo. 1982)). But a statement is given 

involuntarily if “coercive governmental conduct played a significant 

role in inducing the statement.” Id. The focus of the voluntariness 
25

analysis is thus “whether the behavior of the [government] official 

was such as to overbear the defendant’s will to resist and bring 

about an admission or inculpatory statement not freely selfdetermined.” People v. Ramadon, 2013 CO 68, ¶ 20.

¶ 57 This coercive governmental conduct can “include[] not only 

physical abuse or threats directed against a person, but also subtle 

forms of psychological coercion” like the deliberate exploitation of 

the suspect’s weaknesses. Effland, 240 P.3d at 877. In assessing 

the coerciveness of the governmental conduct, we look at both the 

defendant’s ability to resist coercive pressures and the nature of the 

police conduct, using a nonexclusive list of factors:

(1) whether the defendant was in custody; 

(2) whether the defendant was free to leave; 

(3) whether the defendant was aware of the

situation; 

(4) whether the police read Miranda rights to 

the defendant; 

(5) whether the defendant understood and 

waived Miranda rights; 

(6) whether the defendant had an opportunity 

to confer with counsel or anyone else prior to 

or during the interrogation; 
26

(7) whether the statement was made during 

the interrogation or volunteered later; 

(8) whether the police threatened [the] 

defendant or promised anything directly or 

impliedly; 

(9) the method or style of the interrogation; 

(10) the defendant’s mental and physical 

condition just prior to the interrogation; 

(11) the length of the interrogation; 

(12) the location of the interrogation; and 

(13) the physical conditions of the location 

where the interrogation occurred.

Ramadon, ¶ 20.

¶ 58 Bagwell points to no behavior by the detectives that amounted 

to coercive police conduct. Indeed, he admitted his crime even 

before the detectives asked any questions, and throughout the 

interrogation he gave lengthy and revealing answers to the 

detectives’ open-ended questions. The detectives made no threats 

or promises to induce Bagwell’s statements. We do not see how 

Bagwell’s will was overborne by the detectives’ conduct.

¶ 59 We therefore conclude the trial court did not err in finding 

Bagwell’s interrogation statements voluntary or in denying his 

motion to suppress. 
27

IV. Conclusion

¶ 60 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE PAWAR and JUDGE ROTHENBERG concur.