U.S.Negotiating Behavior

Briefly . . .

• U.S. negotiators have a distinctive style: forceful, explicit, legalistic, urgent, and

results-oriented. Although these traits inevitably vary according to personalities and

circumstances, a recognizably pragmatic American style is always evident, shaped by

powerful and enduring structural and cultural factors.

• Chief among the structural influences is the United States’ position as a preeminent

international power. The enormous breadth of U.S. global interests and the depth of

U.S. power, coupled with the increasing linkages between security, economic, environmental, and other concerns, mean that the United States plays a leading—

indeed, often overwhelming—role in numerous negotiating forums. 

• While American diplomats tend to see themselves as tough but fair bargainers, most

foreign practitioners regard the United States as a hegemonic power that is less concerned to negotiate than it is to persuade, sermonize, or browbeat negotiating counterparts into acceding to American positions.

• U.S. negotiators must work within certain constitutional constraints. Although the

president has the power to negotiate, he must do so with a watchful eye on Congress,

which is traditionally wary of foreign “entanglements.” He must also be mindful of the

electoral calendar, which by limiting the tenure of both elected officials and political

appointees often inhibits the development of a long-term approach to negotiations.

• Culture significantly influences how U.S. negotiators use language and time. They

tend to be blunt and legalistic while employing a conceptual vocabulary drawn from

such diverse fields as labor relations, Christian theology, and sport. They are uncomfortable with silence and ignore body language. They enter a negotiation with their

own timeframe and usually press for an early agreement, especially if the issue at

stake has political significance at home.

• The United States applies pressure by simultaneously exerting its substantial and multifaceted resources. At the negotiating table, U.S. diplomats are adept at creating

“linkage” between issues and at marshalling facts and arguments as they seek to convince their counterparts of the benefits of reaching an agreement on U.S. terms, and

the costs of failing to do so.

• Keen to achieve results, U.S. negotiators will use all available channels of communication—including back channels and unofficial, “track-two,” contacts—to foster

progress. Even so, the focus remains on preserving the prerogatives of the official,

“track-one,” channel.

www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

SPECIAL REPORT 94 OCTOBER 2002

ABOUT THE REPORT

To explore the character of U.S. negotiating 

behavior, the United States Institute of Peace

brought together 30 seasoned U.S. and foreign

diplomats, policymakers, and scholars. For two days,

the participants sought to identify and explain key

elements in the U.S. approach to, and conduct of,

diplomatic encounters. 

The two-day discussion was part of the Institute’s

ongoing Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project, which is

designed to help negotiators better understand the

behavior of their counterparts and thereby reach

mutually satisfactory political solutions to issues

that might otherwise escalate into violent

confrontation. Among other aims, the project seeks

to delineate the national negotiating styles of leading players on the international stage. To date, the

Institute has published studies on China, Russia,

and North Korea; studies on Germany and Japan

will appear in late 2002.

This report, which is a first step toward a fulllength study of American negotiating behavior, synthesizes the off-the-record discussions held at a site

outside of Washington, D.C. It reflects the consensus

expressed at the workshop but should not be considered representative of the opinions of individual

participants. The workshop was organized and

summarized by Patrick Cronin. This report was

written by Nigel Quinney, based on a paper

prepared by Emily Metzgar.

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily

reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace,

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

The Impact of Structural Factors 3

The Impact of Culture 5

Continuity in Negotiating Behavior 9
• The American media can play an important role in setting the agenda for negotiations

but they rarely exercise much impact on the negotiations themselves and are seldom

used by U.S. negotiators to help shape outcomes.

Introduction

Neither the shifting policy priorities of succeeding U.S. administrations nor the differences

in personalities among U.S. negotiators can obscure the existence of an enduring and distinctive U.S. negotiating style. That style is complex and multifaceted, with different

aspects highlighted on different occasions, but it is nonetheless identifiable and definable.

Shaped by powerful structural and cultural factors, U.S. negotiating behavior is fundamentally forceful and pragmatic. Individual negotiators may be genial, or moralistic, or pushy,

but ultimately all share a businesslike concern to achieve results in the shortest time.

This was the consensus of a thirty-strong group of senior diplomats, policymakers,

and scholars convened in July 2000 by the United States Institute of Peace to explore

the character of U.S. negotiating behavior. As part of its Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project,

the Institute has examined the negotiating styles of China, Russia, North Korea, Japan,

Germany, and France. The two-day workshop in mid-2000 was an opportunity to turn the

spotlight on the United States, illuminating both strengths and weaknesses in the U.S.

approach while prompting insightful analyses from the illustrious cast of participants. As

with all endeavors of the Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project, the overall aim of the workshop was to help U.S. and foreign negotiators make their encounters more fruitful. Given

the global breadth of U.S. interests and the depth of U.S. power—economic, military,

and diplomatic—a better understanding of U.S. negotiating behavior is of value to an

enormous number and variety of players within the international community as well as

within the United States itself.

Four factors help explain negotiating behavior on any given occasion:

• structural factors, such as a country’s geopolitical situation and its political system;

• the national culture of the negotiators, which shapes conceptions of conflict and

negotiation, patterns of communication, attitudes toward time, the use of language,

and the role of the media;

• the specific issues being negotiated; and

• the personalities of negotiators.

Given that the latter two factors inevitably vary from negotiation to negotiation, and

that the workshop was tasked with identifying recurring and enduring characteristics of

U.S. negotiating behavior, participants focused their attention on the structural and cultural contexts within which negotiators must operate.

As the participants teased out common patterns in the style of U.S. negotiators, they

were conscious of the dangers of making vague and sweeping generalizations and thus

illustrated their arguments with specific examples. They also pointed out occasions on

which U.S. negotiators have acted out of character, defying expectations and defeating

stereotypes. Here, because space does not permit detailed discussion of examples and

counterexamples, attention is focused on common elements and recurring patterns in

the conduct of U.S. diplomacy, not on variations and deviations. We rely on the reader

to recognize that there are always exceptions to the rules presented in this report.

Two other caveats should be made at the outset. First, this report presents a composite picture of two days of discussions among thirty diplomats from fifteen different

countries. As such, it does not reflect the full variety of views expressed, nor does it

detail specific differences of opinion. Fortunately, the participants found a considerable

area of common ground. They often disagreed on exactly how influential or prominent a

particular characteristic might be; they rarely disagreed on its basic nature. Foreign participants tended to emphasize what they saw as a U.S. readiness to flex its muscle 

2

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention,

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute

meets its congressional mandate through an 

array of programs, including research grants, 

fellowships, professional training, education 

programs from high school through graduate

school, conferences and workshops, library

services, and publications. The Institute’s Board of

Directors is appointed by the President of the

United States and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Chester A. Crocker (Chairman), James R. Schlesinger

Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign Service,

Georgetown University • Seymour Martin Lipset (Vice

Chairman), Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, Founder and 

former President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C. 

• Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians for

Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Marc E. Leland, Esq.,

President, Marc E. Leland & Associates, Arlington, Va. 

• Mora L. McLean, Esq., President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • María Otero, President, ACCION

International, Boston, Mass. • Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. • Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American

Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor • Douglas J. Feith, Under

Secretary of Defense for Policy • Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice

Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University • Richard H. Solomon, President, United States

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)
3

during negotiations, while many American participants focused on the deal-making and

results-oriented qualities of the U.S. approach—but all participants agreed that both

characteristics were present within the U.S. makeup. It should be noted that while this

report summarizes, organizes, and sometimes paraphrases the participants’ comments,

all the opinions expressed herein were voiced at the workshop and, with few exceptions,

were widely shared.

The second caveat is that the discussions were held four months before George W.

Bush became president and more than a year before the terrorist attacks on the World

Trade Center and the Pentagon. In other words, much has changed in the focus and tenor

of U.S. foreign policy since the meeting on which this report is based. Those changes,

however, have not fundamentally altered the nature of American negotiating behavior,

which is shaped above all by cultural and structural factors that change only gradually.

The Impact of Structural Factors

Numerous structural factors help to mold a nation’s negotiating style, including geography and geopolitics, governmental structures, economic indicators, demographic makeup, and legal and educational systems. In the case of the United States, the two most

powerful structural influences are its status as the world’s only superpower and its political system.

A “Global Hegemon”?

During the Cold War, U.S. foreign policy was driven by the desire to contain and counter

the power of the Soviet Union. In pursuit of this overarching goal, the United States was

prepared to heed and accommodate some of the interests of its allies, friends, and proxies rather than risk alienating them and thus strengthening the hand of the Eastern bloc.

In short, negotiating with the United States in that era meant there was often room for

compromise.

Since the disappearance of the Soviet Union, that situation has changed. The United

States now has no peers of comparable military strength and—at least before the declaration of the “war on terrorism”—no overriding objective requiring coalition building to

match Cold War containment. Whether through historical accident or deliberate design,

this combination of unrivaled power and freedom of action has given the United States

the opportunity to assume the position of a global hegemon.

Americans at the workshop were generally hesitant to accept the label of “hegemon,”

but almost all foreign participants had no such reservations, nor many doubts about the

impact of this newly acquired status on American negotiating behavior. U.S. negotiators

are—said participants—domineering, insistent, and uncompromising. They are less concerned to negotiate, in the sense of exchanging views and trading concessions, than to

dictate terms or to persuade their counterparts of the rightness or potency of the American position. Unilateralism has become both a policy and an attitude. Even cordial and

conspicuously polite U.S. representatives tend to adopt a take-it-or-leave-it position.

Furthermore, this hegemonic status has aggravated a long-standing U.S. trait: namely,

the inclination to moralize, to treat negotiation as an opportunity to reveal unimpeachable truth rather than to understand and respect the other side’s worldview.

By no means all U.S. negotiators behave in this high-handed fashion, said the foreign participants. Nor, they added, does this domineering approach plague all encounters with the United States. Especially when Americans undertake third-party mediation,

rather than bilateral negotiation, they frequently win the respect of the parties by

demonstrating remarkable evenhandedness, patience, and a readiness to listen. In many

bilateral encounters, however, U.S. negotiators display precious little grace and humility as they seek to impose their opinions and terms.

Shaped by powerful structural

and cultural factors, U.S. negotiating behavior is fundamentally

forceful and pragmatic. 

[Recent changes] in the focus 

and tenor of U.S. foreign policy

. . . have not fundamentally

altered the nature of American

negotiating behavior. 

U.S. negotiators . . . are less

concerned to negotiate . . . than

to persuade their counterparts

of the rightness or potency of

the American position.
4

The widespread sense of being overwhelmed by the United States is accentuated by

an increasing erosion of the distinction between “high” politics (for example, security

issues) and “low” politics (for example, environmental and trade issues). In the

post–Cold War world, the boundaries between high and low politics are sometimes indistinguishable and linkages among issues are legion. This blurring of issues feeds the perception that the United States, with its numerous interests in so many different parts

of the world, is involved in everything.

A corollary of this is that when the United States develops an interest in an issue,

that issue automatically becomes internationalized. The United States, argued participants, is often insensitive to the fact that while an issue may occupy a lowly place on

the U.S. agenda, it can be a major national or regional concern to those on the other

side of the table. Through inattention or indifference, the U.S. side tends to ignore the

ripples it can cause by pursuing issues with significant repercussions for others.

The Constraints of the U.S. Political System

From the president on down, U.S. negotiators must take into account certain provisions

of the U.S. Constitution. Although the president is constitutionally empowered to conduct negotiations with foreign powers, Congress must ratify any treaties he signs. Hence

the president and his administration must keep a watchful eye for possible congressional

opposition to U.S. negotiating positions. Congress has a long history of opposing foreign “entanglements,” especially those of a multilateral character. This anti-internationalist bent, which both reflects and encourages American insularity, helps explain

why the United States is sometimes unwilling to sign on to international agreements

(for example, on landmines, on global warming, and on the establishment of a permanent war crimes tribunal) and reluctant to subscribe to the sovereignty-limiting aspects

of multilateral institutions. Whereas representatives of many other nations are prepared

to trade concessions, to make sacrifices for the sake of building long-term goodwill, and

to settle for less-than-perfect agreements, U.S. negotiators are less accommodating and

more inclined to behave in multilateral settings as they do in bilateral contexts. Thus,

for instance, they are reluctant to take a back seat in discussions and are impatient with

or dismissive of bodies such as the UN General Assembly that follow time-consuming

parliamentary procedures and engage in political posturing and horse-trading. Similar

considerations help explain why the United States prefers to form ad hoc coalitions to

achieve specific goals rather than rely on established organizations.

Yet while Congress can impede a U.S. negotiator’s flexibility, it can also give a negotiator leverage. American negotiators often use the threat of congressional disapproval

of an agreement as a club with which to bludgeon their counterparts into accepting a

U.S. proposal that—so the negotiators claim—will pass muster on Capitol Hill.

Another aspect of the U.S. political system that both constrains and empowers U.S.

negotiators is the electoral calendar. The two- and four-year cycles for congressional and

presidential elections greatly inhibit the adoption of a long-term approach toward negotiating on a subject that is politically contentious at home. Acutely conscious that they

have only four, or at most eight, years in which to make their mark on the international scene, and that the outcome of congressional elections can swiftly undermine congressional support for an administration’s policy, presidents must move swiftly. As

presidents near the end of their terms, their concern to leave an enduring legacy in foreign policy can also inspire last-minute efforts to bring difficult negotiations to a successful close. This sense of urgency is felt throughout the ranks of political appointees

and extends to career officials within the State and Defense Departments and other agencies. But while U.S. diplomats are denied the luxury of time with which to outlast or wear

down their counterparts, they can apply great pressure to the other side by arguing—

with a good deal of truth—that unless an agreement is reached relatively quickly, it may

never be reached at all.

When the United States 

develops an interest in an 

issue, that issue automatically

becomes internationalized.

While Congress can impede 

a U.S. negotiator’s flexibility, 

it can also give a negotiator

leverage.
5

A U.S. negotiating team’s room for maneuver, already limited by the need for congressional approval and by the electoral timetable, is further restricted by the

labyrinthine nature of Washington’s foreign policy bureaucracy. Not only are there typically several agencies interested in a given negotiation, but also those agencies are often

fiercely competitive, with different policies and personalities contending for the ear of

the president. Indeed, on many issues the most difficult negotiations for the United

States are the interagency discussions that take place before the U.S. negotiating team

has even left Washington. Arriving at a negotiating position that satisfies at least some

of the interested agencies is a tricky process and can result in a relatively rigid stance,

one that leaves the negotiating team little room for movement or compromise. According to foreign participants at the workshop, this rigidity can be perceived by the other

side as U.S. indifference to its justifiable concerns or, worse, as yet another manifestation of American unilateralism.

The Impact of Culture

The cultural context from which U.S. negotiators emerge and within which they plan and

conduct negotiations has a significant influence on their behavior. This influence does

not operate independently of structural factors, and it varies considerably from individual to individual and negotiation to negotiation; thus, it is virtually impossible to trace

or measure precisely. But, agreed the workshop participants, it is nonetheless recognizable and often potent. Most importantly, culture helps to shape a negotiator’s sense of

the negotiating process, conceptual vocabulary, use of language, attitude toward time,

favored channels of communication, and use of the media.

Sense of Process

Americans tend to subscribe to a view of negotiation as a linear process, a sequence of

stages that typically begins with prenegotiation, advances to the opening moves of the

formal negotiation, continues through a probing middle phase, and culminates in an end

game and a binding agreement. In many ways, this view calls to mind a scientific or technical endeavor. Even the vocabulary employed to describe the course of a negotiation

echoes the argot of the engineer: a problem is identified, a process is implemented to

address it, and a solution is found. Such technical terms attempt to neutralize the powerful emotions associated with the issue at hand, emotions that threaten to disrupt clearheaded analysis of the problem and to impede the attainment of a reasonable solution. 

Another echo of this fundamentally pragmatic outlook, of this belief that every problem has a solution, can be found in the business world. From the American standpoint,

a negotiation is something entered into by competing parties in an effort to find a mutually beneficial compromise, a win-win outcome rather than a zero-sum result. The

process is guided by accepted rules and involves give and take. Facts and figures—rather

than emotions, traditions, and aspirations—carry weight, which makes it crucial to do

meticulous homework and to enter negotiations well briefed and armed with a sheaf of

data and arguments. Discourse tends to be straightforward, and lies, bluster, and threats

are frowned upon. Cordiality is welcome but not necessary. An agreement, if reached, is

precise, legalistic, and binding.

To be sure, this schema is not always faithfully reproduced in practice. For instance, foreign participants at the workshop argued that while Americans are sincere in regarding

negotiation as an exercise in compromise, this is often a comforting delusion for U.S. negotiators, who actually demand one-sided concessions. True or not, it remains the case that

the outlook of American negotiators is deeply colored by this technical and businesslike

sense of the negotiating process. The United States is profoundly results-oriented and does

not engage in process for the sake of process or in talk for the sake of talk. This approach

On many issues the most

difficult negotiations for 

the United States are the 

interagency discussions that

take place before the U.S. 

negotiating team has even 

left Washington.

Americans tend to subscribe 

to a view of negotiation as a

linear process, a sequence of

stages that typically . . . 

culminates in an end game 

and a binding agreement.
6

differs from that of many other nations, which engage in negotiating processes to build

relationships and breed familiarity, not to attain specific policy goals. U.S. diplomats are

typically well read on the history of their negotiating counterparts, but history per se does

not influence their outlook or behavior. For them, history is irrelevant to the task at hand

unless history itself is the subject of the negotiations.

Conceptual Vocabulary

As noted, Americans draw on the lexicons of both the business and the scientific worlds

to describe the negotiating process. Three other areas of human activity also supply U.S.

negotiators with ideas and terms that shape not only their descriptions but also their

conceptions of conflict and negotiation.

The first of these is sport. The use of sporting metaphors is prevalent throughout

American society, and policymakers and diplomats are no exception. U.S. negotiators

speak of “moving the goalposts,” “being on a level playing field,” “hitting a home run,”

“being on the one-yard line,” “putting the ball in the other guy’s court,” and employ a

host of other expressions culled from the sporting world. Certain assumptions are inherent in this vocabulary. Sport depends on the unbiased enforcement of the rules of the

game. It instills team spirit and self-discipline. It is a two-way endeavor. It channels

conflict into acceptable, controllable outlets.

The second field is Christian theology. Among the various concepts borrowed from

Christianity by U.S. practitioners of conflict resolution and negotiation, perhaps the

most influential, or at least distinctive, is reconciliation. Without parallel in some other

languages, “reconciliation” is regarded as the optimum outcome of a peace process, the

ultimate win-win solution. Striving for reconciliation can give an activity transcendent

urgency.

The third field is industrial relations. The evolution during the late-nineteenth and

twentieth centuries of techniques to manage clashes between labor and capital has had

a substantial influence on the study of international conflict management and the practice of U.S. diplomacy. The parlance of industrial relations is designed to professionalize and take the heat out of industrial disputes—indeed, the very word “dispute,” with

its connotations of limited and resolvable disagreements, is employed instead of the

word “conflict,” which suggests a more violent and less tractable quarrel. It is no coincidence that such distinguished American diplomats as Cyrus Vance and George Shultz

have learned their craft in labor disputes.

Nor is it a coincidence—as several workshop participants pointed out—that so many

U.S. negotiators are lawyers by training. Just as the American legal profession values

dispassionate analysis, precise wording, and watertight agreements, so does American

diplomacy. The Anglo-Saxon tradition of case law, with its emphasis on inductive reasoning and pragmatism rather than on deductive reasoning and abstract principles, likewise comports with the typical approach of U.S. practitioners.

Use of Language

The fact that English is the primary language in the international arena is of great benefit to the United States, whose representatives can trust in their mastery of their native

tongue to convey exactly what they mean to say. Although deliberate ambiguity is occasionally employed by American negotiators, they generally prefer to make their position

unambiguously clear to their interlocutors. As one would expect given the linguistic and

conceptual influences identified above, they are explicit, precise, legalistic, forceful,

even blunt. The United States’ counterparts are rarely in any doubt about what the 

United States is proposing.

However, while U.S. negotiators are adept at making sure that the other side hears

what they say, they are less accomplished at hearing what the other side is not saying.

Just as the American legal 

profession values dispassionate

analysis, precise wording, and

watertight agreements, so does

American diplomacy. 
In communal, relationship-oriented cultures such as China and Japan, communication 

is allusive rather than direct; the context in which a message is delivered is as important as the content of the message. By contrast, in individualistic cultures—which the

United States exemplifies—language is used directly and explicitly, and context is relatively unimportant. Members of individualistic cultures are ill prepared to pick up the

nonverbal cues that can play such an important role in communication within communal societies. Thus, for instance, U.S. negotiators will often fail to heed the body language of their Chinese and Japanese counterparts and may miss subtle but meaningful

signals such as the seating arrangements at ceremonial functions.

In a similar vein, whereas relationship-oriented cultures are able to tolerate silence

during diplomatic exchanges—especially if the alternative is to utter outright disagreement, which is seen as impolite—Americans are typically uncomfortable with silence. 

Use of Time

Interested not in building relationships but in achieving results, Americans enter negotiations eager to press ahead with the business at hand and to reach agreement in the

shortest time possible. They try to condition their counterparts—even representatives

from relationship-oriented nations that prefer to establish a relationship before conducting business—to accept the need for haste or to recognize that the time is unusually propitious for fruitful dialogue. In short, American negotiators define a window of

opportunity and then seek to push their counterparts through it.

The reasons for this sense of urgency are many and varied. As we have noted, everyone on the American side is mindful of electoral cycles, which tend to dictate short and

fixed negotiating timetables. Furthermore, the United States is a relatively young country, with relatively little sense of, or interest in, history. It is also a business-oriented,

industrial society accustomed, unlike traditional peasant economies, to obeying the

demands of the clock and to measuring productivity by reaching targets. The U.S. tendency toward unilateralism also breeds impatience, especially with multilateral bodies

that need time to achieve internal consensus.

But not all of this sense of urgency is attributable to structural or cultural factors. On

occasion, U.S. negotiators use their own self-defined deadlines as a means of pressuring

the other side to reach agreement. In the case of a small country, such a sense of haste

might be interpreted as panic, but a powerful country such as the United States is often

able to force weaker nations to abide by its own deadlines.

The tables can be turned, however, when American negotiators are eager to reach an

agreement for political reasons—because, for instance, the U.S. president wants to

demonstrate the success of his foreign policy to audiences both abroad and at home by

signing an agreement during a scheduled visit to a particular country. Such situations

allow a negotiating counterpart to exploit the American position by refusing to sign

unless the United States offers concessions. 

American negotiators are not always looking at the clock. To be sure, when the issue

under discussion is prominent on the American domestic agenda, the U.S. side will look

to press ahead with negotiations. But if the issue excites neither media nor political

interest at home, the U.S. side is content to let negotiations stretch out for years.

Pressure Tactics

Both structural and cultural factors influence the way in which Americans apply pressure

to their negotiating counterparts. Structurally, the United States’ status as the preeminent international power gives it an unparalleled ability to push counterparts toward

agreement. The United States is not only stronger overall than other countries but also

stronger in individual areas, possessing, among other assets, the world’s best-equipped

military and single largest economy. Foreign workshop participants commented that, on

American negotiators define 

a window of opportunity 

and then seek to push their

counterparts through it.

7

While U.S. negotiators are

adept at making sure that the

other side hears what they say,

they are less accomplished at

hearing what the other side is

not saying.
occasion, the United States seems able to exert these multifaceted strengths simultaneously, orchestrating its various instruments of power to create a sense of overwhelming pressure while also targeting specific weaknesses (for example, internal political

divisions) on the other side.

Cultural influences can be seen in the behavior of U.S. diplomats at the negotiating

table. Like American lawyers or business executives, they rarely use deception (though

they are not always perfectly accurate), nor do they try to physically intimidate their

interlocutors by shouting or gesticulating. Instead, they play to their professional

strengths. They enter negotiations well briefed in both the substance and details of the

issue at hand; even top-level negotiators are usually very well informed. They advance

their arguments cogently and forcefully, marshalling facts and arguments to build an

impressive case for the U.S. position. The aim is to convince the other side not of the

logical rigor or philosophical integrity of the U.S. position but of its practical, concrete

advantages for both sides. They underline both the benefits of reaching agreement on

American terms and the costs of failing to do so. They are particularly adept at creating

“linkage,” making agreement on one issue dependent on progress in other issue areas.

U.S. negotiators craft and insist upon airtight, legalistic language in agreements, thereby

hoping to ensure that the other side implements the agreement exactly as envisaged by

the U.S. team.

Such impeccable professionalism does not demand that U.S. negotiators behave in 

a cold or aloof manner. Americans are generally cordial, often genial, and may project

an air of easygoing friendship. Such amicability, however, should not be mistaken for

amenability. As noted above, many foreign observers see the United States as dictatorial

and heavy-handed in negotiations. The cardinal principle that governs the actions of

U.S. negotiators is frequently perceived to be the same as that which was often attributed to Soviet negotiators: “What’s mine is mine, what’s yours is negotiable.”

Channels of Communication

In the same way that the United States on occasion marshals several of its instruments

of power to apply negotiating pressure, so it sometimes uses various channels of communication to conduct negotiations. Thus, for instance, the U.S. president may dispatch

a special envoy to float a trial balloon. Or the State Department may encourage the creation of track-two initiatives that bring together individuals who have great expertise

in the subject at hand or close contacts with high-ranking officials but who are not

themselves officials. Track-two endeavors are valued especially for brainstorming new

approaches to apparently intractable issues.

However, while such alternative channels are often used, the U.S. focus remains firmly

fixed on preserving the prerogatives of the official, or track-one, channel. Even when

competing U.S. agencies or individuals are at odds over who is in charge of the official

channel and what should be the division of labor in a forthcoming or ongoing negotiation, those agencies do not attempt to undercut the track-one effort.

This primacy of the official channel has not always been uncontested. Most famously

during Kissinger’s tenure as national security advisor, the authority of the formal channel

was sometimes undercut by efforts launched independently of the State Department. 

Furthermore, various U.S. administrations over many decades have also made use of back

channels to circumvent or spur a sluggish negotiating forum by allowing top-level officials

from both sides to communicate directly and secretly. Back channels have the benefit of

allowing the two sides to float ideas without running the risk of public embarrassment if

those ideas are shot down. They are also valuable in allowing communication to be opened

up with governments with which the United States has no formal relations. Back channels

work best when they run parallel to, not in opposition to, the official, public negotiations.

Back channels have their shortcomings, however, chief of which is the difficulty of

maintaining sececy in an age of intrusive media and “leaky” administrations. As a 

8

The aim is to convince the 

other side not of the logical

rigor or philosophical integrity

of the U.S. position but of its

practical, concrete advantages

for both sides.

The U.S. focus remains firmly

fixed on preserving the 

prerogatives of the official, or 

track-one, channel.
consequence, the United States has shown a marked and increasing reluctance in recent

years to use such channels.

The Role of the News Media

The U.S. news media can play an influential part in setting the agenda for U.S. foreign

policy in general and for negotiations in particular. Much attention has been given in

recent years to the “CNN effect,” by which the media can build public political pressure

on a U.S. administration to respond to a foreign crisis or disaster by broadcasting graphic

images of the human suffering associated with that crisis. Those images in turn generate demands from the public for government action to alleviate the suffering directly, by

providing relief, or indirectly, by negotiating with the countries or parties involved. The

CNN effect can be powerful but it tends to be short-lived. A more sustained impact can

be achieved when a foreign policy issue becomes politicized—often through the efforts

of special interest groups, such as the representatives of ethnic diasporas—and the

media shapes the parameters of public debate through editorial decisions on what to

cover, how often to cover it, and whose opinions to solicit. 

At the same time as the media influences the U.S. negotiating agenda, individual U.S.

negotiators can and do use the media to build public support for a particular policy position, to advance their own department’s interests in an interagency dispute, and even to

promote themselves. Beyond that, however, U.S. negotiators generally do not use the

media to shape the outcomes of ongoing negotiations. In other words, they seldom orchestrate a campaign to pressure their negotiating counterparts by leaking, feeding, or planting stories in the U.S. or foreign media. This disinclination to mount a media campaign

derives not from a principled opposition to such tactics but from a belief that such efforts

are largely unnecessary, because the United States is already strong enough to force the

other side to accede to U.S. demands.

Continuity in Negotiating Behavior

Given that structural and cultural factors play such an influential role in shaping negotiating behavior, and given that those factors change only slowly, U.S. behavior displays

considerable continuity from one administration and one decade to the next. Even such

era-defining events as the Cuban missile crisis and the fall of the Berlin Wall did not

prompt a significant shift in American negotiating behavior. Likewise, the 9-11 attacks

on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon have not brought about substantive

changes. Those same criticisms voiced by foreign participants in the July 2000 workshop

have been repeatedly echoed by foreign officials and media in recent months: namely,

that the United States tends not to negotiate but to insist on its demands, that it is

insensitive to the domestic political considerations of its negotiating counterparts, and

that it is concerned only with achieving results and not with building relationships. Many

other qualities identified at the workshop have also been on display: for instance, U.S.

negotiators have been forthright (about American aims) and blunt (about the dangers

of not supporting the war on terrorism); they have evinced a sense of great urgency;

they have presented voluminous facts, figures, and other data to convince their interlocutors of the American case; and they have made little apparent effort to use the media

to shape negotiating outcomes.

The conduct of American diplomacy will continue to be examined by the United States

Institute of Peace as it explores the complexities of cross-cultural negotiation. This

report and the workshop on which it is based are the first steps toward a comprehensive

study of American negotiating behavior, a subject that is now finally receiving long-overdue

attention. In war, to be victorious the warrior must know both himself and his enemy.

So in the pursuit of peace, the successful negotiator must not only see the other side’s

9

U.S. negotiators generally do

not use the media to shape 

the outcomes of ongoing

negotiations.
strengths and weaknesses but also recognize his or her own strong points and shortcomings.

Workshop Participants

The following individuals attended the workshop on U.S. negotiating behavior organized by

the United States Institute of Peace in July 2000. Their affiliations are as of that date. The

opinions expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the opinions of all participants.

Anatoly Adamishin, vice president of international affairs for SISTEMA Joint-Stock 

Financial Corporation

Jon Alterman, program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the United States

Institute of Peace

Chan Heng Chee, appointed Singapore’s ambassador to the United States in 1996

John de Chastelain, head of the Independent International Commission on 

Decommissioning in Northern Ireland

Tae-Yul Cho, counselor for economic affairs at the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in

Washington, D.C.

Raymond Cohen, professor of international relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Patrick Cronin, director of the Research and Studies Program at the United States Institute

of Peace

Abdel Raouf El Reedy, Egyptian ambassador to the United States from 1984 to 1992

Gareth Evans, president and chief executive of the International Crisis Group

Charles Gillespie, principal in the Scowcroft Group

Dore Gold, member of the research team at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at 

Tel Aviv University

Jerrold Green, director of international development, director of the Center for Middle East

Public Policy, and professor of international studies at the RAND Graduate School

Karl Kaiser, Otto Wolff director of the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign

Affairs in Berlin

Masood Khan, political counselor at the Embassy of Pakistan in Washington, D.C.

Samuel Lewis, senior policy adviser to the Israeli Policy Forum and former U.S. diplomat

Edward Marks, founder-president of Greenleaf Point

Jagat Mehta, honorary president of the Vidya Bhawan Society in Udaipur, India, and 

former foreign secretary for the Government of India

Emily Metzgar, program officer in the Research and Studies Program of the United States

Institute of Peace

John McDonald, chair and co-founder of the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy

Donald McHenry, distinguished professor in the practice of diplomacy at the School of 

Foreign Service at Georgetown University

Langhorne Motley, president of L. A. Motley and Company

Charles Nelson, vice president of the United States Institute of Peace

Deepa Ollapally, program officer in the Grant Program of the United States Institute of Peace

Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, executive secretary of the Global Coalition for Africa

Steve Pieczenik, consultant to the United States Institute of Peace and the RAND 

Corporation

Andrew Pierre, professor of European politics at the School of Advanced International 

Studies of Johns Hopkins University

10
Nigel Quinney, president of The Editorial Group

J. Stapleton Roy, assistant secretary of state for intelligence and research

W. Richard Smyser, adjunct professor at Georgetown University

Richard H. Solomon, president of the United States Institute of Peace

Helmut Sonnenfeldt, guest scholar at the Brookings Institution

Marjorie Sonnenfeldt, senior consultant to Fleishman-Hillard

Serge Sur, professor of international law and international relations at the University 

Panthéon-Assas

Willem van Eekelen, member of the First Chamber of the Parliament in the Netherlands

Ezra Vogel, Henry Ford II professor of social sciences at Harvard University

Katrine Wong, interpreter at the Administrative Court of Grenoble

11
Publications from the Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project

The United States Institute of Peace has published a number of special reports and booklength studies based on its Cross-Cultural Negotiation Project. Recent books include the

following. 

Country-Specific Studies

• How Germans Negotiate: Logical Goals, Practical Solutions (December 2002), by W. R.

Smyser

• Case Studies in Japanese Negotiating Behavior (November 2002), by Michael Blaker,

Paul Giarra, and Ezra Vogel

• Chinese Negotiating Behavior: Pursuing Interests through “Old Friends” (1999), by

Richard H. Solomon

• Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior (1999), by Scott Snyder

• Russian Negotiating Behavior: Continuity and Transition (1998), by Jerrold L. Schecter

Functional Studies

• Culture and Conflict Resolution (1998), by Kevin Avruch

• Negotiating across Cultures: International Communication in an Interdependent World

(revised edition, 1997), by Raymond Cohen

• Arts of Power: Statecraft and Diplomacy (1997), by Chas. W. Freeman, Jr. 

For book sales and order information, call 800-868-8064 (U.S. toll-free only) or 703-661-

1590, or fax 703-661-1501.

For more information on this topic, 

see our website (www.usip.org), 

which has an online edition of this

report containing links to related 

websites, as well as additional information on the subject.

United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036