Mona Yacoubian

Promoting Middle East Democracy

European Initiatives

Summary

• With the end of the Cold War, major geopolitical shifts prompted southern Europe to 

reorient its strategic landscape toward the southern Mediterranean. From a European 

vantage point, the Mediterranean’s strategic importance centers on migration, energy 

dependence, security/counterterrorism, and trade.

• Established in November 1995, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known 

as the Barcelona Process, was intended to be Europe’s answer to growing concerns 

about instability on its southern flank. The EMP has provided a framework for cooperation between EU members and their twelve Mediterranean partners. The partnership 

consists of a series of bilateral association agreements that cover trade, development, 

and reform issues. To date, all of the Mediterranean partners except Syria have signed 

association agreements.

• Aside from their primary goal of promoting economic reform and trade, the European 

Union’s association agreements seek to encourage political reform. However, the effort 

to spur political reform has yielded only limited results, not least because the European Union has adopted a long-term, cautious approach in the name of preserving 

short-term stability. 

• By and large, the European Union (like the United States) has not translated its calls 

for the promotion of democracy and human rights into concrete action. A variety of 

reasons explain this failure, including differing interests among EU members, the great 

reluctance of EU members to use conditionality, and the fact that the original intent 

of the Barcelona Process was not to promote political reform.

• Beginning in 2000, efforts have focused on reinvigorating the Barcelona Process 

by providing for a more vigorous and coherent democracy-promotion strategy. 

European strategists have sought to link European policy in the Mediterranean 

to the wider Middle East as well as to post-enlargement Wider Europe. 

• Still, a successful European democracy-promotion policy in the Middle East is far from 

assured. Several obstacles could impede effective implementation. First, neither the 

European Union nor its individual member states have demonstrated sustained commitment to using conditionality as an instrument for reform. Second, governments 

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SPECIAL REPORT 127 OCTOBER 2004

ABOUT THE REPORT

Since the end of the Cold War, European security 

concerns have focused increasingly on the potential 

for instability on Europe’s southern flank. In 

1995, the European Union developed a framework 

for cooperation with the southern Mediterranean 

nations. These efforts have included some relatively 

ineffective programs to promote democracy in 

the region. In the aftermath of 9/11, the goal 

of encouraging the development of Middle East 

democracy has acquired greater urgency, not least in 

the eyes of the United States, which has bolstered 

its own efforts to spur democratic reform.

As the United States moves forward in its quest 

to promote reform in the Middle East, it will be 

important to assess the effectiveness of other 

democracy-promotion activities, including those 

undertaken by European counterparts. This report 

seeks to inform discussion in U.S. policymaking 

circles by offering an assessment of multilateral 

European democracy-promotion efforts in the 

Middle East. A forthcoming companion paper will 

illuminate major reform initiatives originating 

from within the Arab world.

 This report was written by Mona 

Yacoubian, a special adviser to the United States 

Institute of Peace’s Special Initiative on the Muslim 

World, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, 

and an adjunct fellow at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

SPECIAL REPORT

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace, which 

does not advocate specific policy positions.

CONTENTS

Introduction 2

 The Evolution of the Barcelona Process 3

 Other European Democracy-Promotion Initiatives 5

 Assessing the Impact of the Barcelona Process 7

 Looking beyond Barcelona 8

The Transatlantic Dimension:

Complementarities and Frictions 12

 Whither Transatlantic Cooperation? 13
in the region have not signaled their willingness to pursue genuine reform. Third, 

European democracy-promotion efforts risk being drowned in a sea of bureaucracy. 

Success depends on the European Union and its regional partners overcoming all 

three of these obstacles.

• Sustained transatlantic cooperation could contribute significantly to efforts to promote democratic reform in the Middle East. While direct cooperation in the region 

remains a distant prospect, enhanced consultation, via a variety of venues, would 

make a significant contribution toward democracy promotion in the Middle East.

Introduction

In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, calls for 

reform in the Arab world have reverberated across the globe. Less than a year after the 

attacks, in July 2002, a group of Arab intellectuals, under the auspices of the United 

Nations, issued the first Arab Human Development Report. In sobering detail, the study 

chronicled the Arab world’s long-standing political, economic, and social ills. Specifically, it identified three critical deficits facing all Arab countries: freedom, women’s 

empowerment, and knowledge. The study made an impassioned plea for transforming 

the region through reform.

The United States and Europe responded with their own calls for promoting reform in the 

region. In December 2002 U.S. secretary of state Colin Powell announced the Middle East 

Partnership Initiative, which centers on the promotion of reform in the Middle East. More 

recently, the G-8 unveiled the “Partnership for Progress and a Common Future” with the 

broader Middle East and North Africa. The G-8 initiative underscores the need for multilateral 

cooperation as well as the importance of reform efforts emanating from the region.

The June 2004 G-8 summit demonstrated transatlantic consensus on the overarching 

goals of democracy promotion and reform in the broader Middle East and North Africa. 

Both sides of the Atlantic view the promotion of reform as crucial for their security 

as well as for the long-term stability of the region, where both have vital interests at 

stake. However, key differences exist between U.S. and European thinking on how best 

to achieve this goal. At the same time, important convergences of interest underscore 

the unexploited potential for greater transatlantic cooperation. To date, transatlantic 

cooperation has been minimal and largely ad hoc in nature; concrete progress remains 

limited. Given the long-term challenge ahead, the transatlantic community will need to 

resolve these differences in order to work together effectively toward the common goal 

of Middle East reform.

It is important, therefore, to understand the nature of European policies and programs 

geared toward democracy promotion in the Middle East to determine areas of complementarity as well as areas of friction. Surprisingly little is known of European efforts on 

this side of the Atlantic outside of a very small and specialized community. 

This report examines the European Union’s multilateral engagement with the Arab 

world in the area of democracy promotion. It reviews the European Union’s most significant reform-promotion efforts in both the Mediterranean and the wider Middle East. 

After assessing these efforts, the report concludes with an analysis of the prospects for 

transatlantic cooperation in this area. 

(A companion Special Report is being produced that asks many of the same questions of current Arab initiatives. Observers agree that change in the Arab world must 

come from within and that, therefore, homegrown initiatives should be encouraged and 

nurtured where feasible. Anything that smacks of being imposed from outside is likely to 

be met with resentment and even outright resistance. As U.S. and European-led efforts 

proceed, it is vital to gain a deep understanding of what Arab reformers propose and 

how best to work with indigenous movements in a sustained manner.)

ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is an 

independent, nonpartisan federal institution 

created by Congress to promote the prevention, 

management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts. Established in 1984, the Institute 

meets its congressional mandate through an array 

of programs, including research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs 

from high school through graduate school, 

conferences and workshops, library services, and 

publications. The Institute’s Board of Directors is 

appointed by the President of the United States 

and confirmed by the Senate.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

• J. Robinson West (Chairman), Chairman, PFC Energy, 

Washington, D.C. • María Otero (Vice Chairman), President, 

ACCION International, Boston, Mass. • Betty F. Bumpers, 

Founder and former President, Peace Links, Washington, 

D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians 

for Human Rights, Washington, D.C. • Chester A. Crocker,

James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School 

of Foreign Service, Georgetown University • Laurie S. 

Fulton, Williams and Connolly, Washington, D.C. • Charles 

Horner, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute, Washington, 

D.C. • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor 

of International Relations, Stanford University • Seymour 

Martin Lipset, Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George 

Mason University • Mora L. McLean, Esq., President, 

Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y. • Daniel Pipes, 

Director, Middle East Forum, Philadelphia, Pa. 

• Barbara W. Snelling, former State Senator and former 

Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt. 

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

• Arthur E. Dewey, Assistant Secretary of State for 

Population, Refugees, and Migration • Michael M. Dunn,

Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force; President, National 

Defense University • Peter W. Rodman, Assistant 

Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs 

• Richard H. Solomon, President, United States 

Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

2
The Evolution of the Barcelona Process

Europe’s proximity to the Middle East and North Africa, coupled with its large Muslim immigrant population, ensures that the Arab world occupies a top spot on Europe’s foreign policy 

agenda. Beginning with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, major geopolitical 

shifts prompted Europe, and southern Europe in particular, to reorient its strategic landscape 

toward the southern Mediterranean. To be sure, European policymakers also focused on the 

struggle to integrate Eastern Europe, but instability in Algeria and concerns about an influx 

of illegal immigrants caught the attention of policymakers more generally. 

In today’s Europe, the Mediterranean’s strategic importance centers on four key factors:

• Migration. Europe is home to a significant number of North African immigrants. For 

example, an estimated 15 percent of Morocco’s population lives in Europe. 

• Energy dependence. The European Union is dependent on imports (often originating 

from North Africa and the Persian Gulf) for half of its energy supplies.

• Trade/economy. The European Union is the largest trading partner for every country 

in the region, with the exception of Jordan. 

• Security/counterterrorism. The EU policy paper “European Security Strategy” (published in December 2003) identifies five key threats to European security—terrorism, 

weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflict, state failure, and organized 

crime—all of which can be found in the wider Middle East. The March 11, 2004, 

terrorist attacks in Madrid, which killed nearly two hundred people, have only heightened concerns about the terrorist threat.

In the early 1990s increased awareness of Europe’s neighbors, both to the east 

and to the south, instilled a sense of urgency about the need for concerted action 

on reform. Europe’s strategic thinkers emphasized the role of economic and political 

reform in ensuring the peace and stability of Europe’s wider neighborhood. Southern-tier 

countries—notably, France, Spain, and Italy—took the lead in initiating greater engagement with the Mediterranean. A number of individual countries adopted their own 

democracy-promotion policies, but the most significant response occurred at the multilateral level in the European Union.

In June 1991 the European Union asserted that the promotion of democracy and 

human rights was an essential element of its foreign policy and a “cornerstone” of 

European cooperation. At that time, a European Council declaration (http://europa

.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/hr_decl_91.htm) stressed the role 

of human rights and the rule of law as critical components of its development initiatives. The council adopted a resolution in November 1991 (http://europa.eu.int/comm/

external_relations/human_rights/doc/cr28_11_91en.htm) that established guidelines 

and procedures for a consistent approach toward countries attempting to democratize. 

Although the policy reflected Europe’s preoccupation at the time with the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, it laid the groundwork for putting democracy 

and human rights in a broader context—and this new approach was soon adopted 

toward the Arab states of the Mediterranean.

The following year, at the behest of its southern European members, the European 

Union reassessed its relations with the Mediterranean in light of the end of the Cold 

War, launching the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP). The RMP introduced several 

important innovations, most notably the notion of partnership with Mediterranean 

countries and structural adjustment support for those countries engaged in liberalization 

and economic reform. Significantly, the revised policy also stipulated that the European 

Parliament could freeze the budget of a financial protocol (providing assistance to Mediterranean countries) in the case of serious human rights violations. For a brief period 

in 1991, the European Parliament withheld aid to Syria and Morocco on human rights 

grounds. While the parliament subsequently relented, its action established a precedent 

linking assistance with the need to respect basic human rights. 

3

Europe’s proximity to the Middle 

East and North Africa, coupled 

with its large Muslim immigrant 

population, ensures that the Arab 

world occupies a top spot on 

Europe’s foreign policy agenda.

In June 1991 the European 

Union asserted that the promotion of democracy and human 

rights was an essential element 

of its foreign policy.
Throughout the early 1990s, the European Union continued to signal the importance 

of human rights and democracy in its foreign policy. The European Parliament launched 

the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIHDR) in 1994, bringing 

human rights–promotion line items together under a single budget heading. Currently, 

the EIHDR is funded at 132 million euros for activities worldwide; approximately 10 

percent of EIHDR funding goes to the Middle East. (In 2001 the European Commission 

established EuropeAid to implement the commission’s external aid instruments. EIHDR 

functions as a unit within EuropeAid.)

Most important, in May 1995 the European Union developed a democracy and human 

rights clause governing relations with third countries that stipulated the suspension 

of aid and trade in the event of serious human rights violations (COM 95(216)23 May 

1995). The clause was to become standard language in contracts between the European 

Union and third countries. The clause appears in all negotiated bilateral agreements, 

with the exception of sectoral agreements.

Established in November 1995 the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) (http://

europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/euromed/bd.htm), also known as the Barcelona 

Process, was intended to be Europe’s answer to growing concerns about instability on its 

southern flank. Southern-tier members argued that post–Cold War expansion to the east 

needed to be balanced by looking to the south as well and were particularly alarmed by the 

socioeconomic chasm dividing Europe and North Africa. The European Commission noted 

that European-Mediterranean income disparities stood at 1 to 12 and would increase to 1 

to 20 by 2010 if no measures were taken. The commission also estimated that the Mediterranean countries’ populations would grow from 220 million in 1995 to 300 million by 2010. 

North Africa’s population explosion and lack of economic opportunity heightened European 

fears of massive illegal immigration that would destabilize Europe. 

Europe’s desire for a role in the Middle East peace process inaugurated by the 1991 

Madrid Conference also played a role in the creation of the EMP. Europe did not occupy a 

prominent place at the negotiating table but instead managed the multilateral Regional 

Economic Development Working Group (REDWG). The Barcelona Process was launched 

using the momentum of the 1993 Oslo Accords, thereby tying the fate of the EMP—at 

least in part—to the Middle East peace process.

The EMP provides a framework for cooperation between EU members and their twelve 

Mediterranean partners (Libya is not as yet a partner, although discussions for bringing Libya into the EMP are under way). The partnership consists of a series of bilateral 

association agreements as well as the Barcelona Declaration, which provides for broad 

multilateral cooperation in sectors such as agriculture, energy, tourism, and youth. To 

date, all of the Mediterranean partners except Syria have signed association agreements. 

(Negotiations on the Syrian agreement have stalled over differences on a newly required 

clause regarding WMD.) 

The association agreements serve as the European Union’s principal instrument for 

promoting democratic change in the Arab world. When signing association agreements, 

Mediterranean partners have been obliged to endorse the human rights clause, which 

stipulates a commitment to democratic reform. In theory, the European Union could 

invoke the clause when governments commit serious human rights offenses and withhold aid or suspend trade. In addition, as signatories to the Barcelona Declaration, the 

Mediterranean partners have agreed to language endorsing the principles of respect for 

human rights, fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.

Conceptually, the Barcelona Declaration divides into three “baskets” of issues: political, 

economic, and cultural. The political basket aims to establish a Euro-Mediterranean area of 

peace and stability based on common respect for human rights and democracy. The creation 

of a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area by 2010 constitutes the principal goal of the economic basket, while intercultural dialogue and understanding are the hallmarks of the third 

basket.

The basic precept of the Barcelona Process is to exploit the deliberate linkage of politi4

North Africa’s population 

explosion and lack of economic 

opportunity heightened European fears of massive illegal 

immigration that would 

destabilize Europe.

The association agreements 

serve as the European Union’s 

principal instrument for 

promoting democratic change in 

the Arab world.
cal and economic policies and extract better performance on the former through the latter. 

The human rights and democracy clause included in every association agreement provides 

for regular meetings to raise issues of concern at the ministerial and official level. A political reform/human rights subcommittee has been established with Morocco—a first for any 

of Europe’s partners, Arab and non-Arab alike—providing an opportunity to engage on 

these issues at the working level with even greater regularity and seriousness. 

At the same time, EU relations with each Mediterranean partner are bolstered by a 

web of economic and social sector activities that helps to build a sense of partnership 

and a common basis from which to move forward. This comprehensive framework provides important incentives for establishing conditionality as well as a sense of ownership 

by Mediterranean partners. 

All projects of the EMP are funded by the MEDA program, which currently is allotted 

one billion euros annually. MEDA funding occurs in seven-year cycles, with the current 

cycle, MEDA II, covering the period 2000–2006. The European Investment Bank (EIB) 

provides an additional 2 billion euros in loans to the region.

The majority of MEDA funds have been spent on the EMP’s second basket, economic and 

trade assistance. For many years MEDA aid was oriented toward offsetting the social cost of 

economic reform. However, a portion of funding has been devoted to promoting good governance with the justification that greater transparency and accountability contribute to a 

better business climate. Some of these projects have contributed to promoting democratic 

reform, although their contributions are not formally recognized as such.

The economic basket has not only enjoyed the most financial support but also 

achieved the most progress to date. The association agreements include a free trade 

agreement between the European Union and its Mediterranean partners. The Agadir 

Agreement, concluded in March 2004 and signed by Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and 

Egypt, marks an important step toward building a Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Zone, 

creating an integrated market of more than 100 million people in the four signatory 

countries.

Human rights, women’s empowerment, and press freedom projects constitute the 

majority of political basket funding. Judicial reform stands as another prominent 

focus. Only a small number of projects have been aimed at institutional reform, 

and the European Union has resisted funding parliaments, political parties, or trade 

unions directly. Following tensions with Mediterranean governments over some MEDA 

programming, MEDA II political basket funding is geared more toward women’s and 

children’s rights. Indeed, only a small percentage of MEDA funding directly targets 

democracy promotion; the vast majority of its funding is more closely oriented toward 

a traditional development mandate.

A newly created Euro-Mediterranean Foundation, based in Alexandria, became 

operational on July 1, 2004. The foundation seeks to fulfill the third-basket imperatives of developing a dialogue of cultures and civilizations within the framework of the 

Mediterranean region. As such, this new institution is not likely to serve as a catalyst 

for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to develop in the region. Nor will it help to 

address the European Union’s need to develop a bottom-up approach to the promotion of democratic reform in the region. Instead, member states are likely to keep the 

foundation’s agenda apolitical, steering it away from potentially sensitive areas more 

directly related to democracy promotion.

Other European Democracy-Promotion Initiatives

While Europe’s multilateral democracy-promotion efforts focus mainly on the Mediterranean 

region, the European Union has initiated programs with other subregions of the Middle 

East—and EU officials have in the past year expressed a desire to devote more attention to 

those areas. Specific initiatives include the EU-GCC Dialogue, the Comprehensive Dialogue 

5

The basic precept of the Barcelona 

Process is to exploit the deliberate 

linkage of political and economic 

policies and extract better performance on the former through 

the latter.

Human rights, women’s empowerment, and press freedom projects constitute the majority of 

political basket funding. Judicial 

reform stands as another prominent focus. 
with Iran, and a cooperation agreement with Yemen. These programs, it should be noted, 

are not as rich and varied as the European Union’s interaction with the Mediterranean 

region, and the same instruments and levers are not available.

EU-GCC Dialogue

The European Union–Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Cooperation Agreement was signed 

in 1989. Its stated objective is to facilitate relations on trade issues as well as to contribute more generally to the stability of the region. EU-GCC ministerial meetings occur 

annually, and EU-GCC regional directors engage in political dialogue once a year. Substantively, the agenda does not address political reform, focusing instead on free trade 

issues and on cooperation in fighting terrorism and nonproliferation. A working group on 

energy issues also has been established. The GCC recently expressed an interest in securing European assistance in helping to develop a single currency. In addition, an EU-GCC 

free trade area agreement is under negotiation. To date, results of the political dialogue 

have been disappointing. The European Union has offered to launch contacts on human 

rights issues but has met with reluctance from its GCC partners. The commission is planning to open a delegation in the Gulf as part of an effort to reinvigorate the dialogue. 

While the European Union has allocated few resources to the political dialogue, it may 

fund technical assistance in the area of economic cooperation in the future.

Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran

The European Union’s Comprehensive Dialogue with Iran dates to 1998. The European 

Union made a strategic choice to engage rather than isolate Iran. However, the European 

Union does not have any contractual relations with Iran. The dialogue features semiannual meetings at the undersecretary level to discuss political and economic issues. 

In December 2002 the European Union linked negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation 

Agreement to progress on political issues in four key areas: human rights, WMD, terrorism, and the Middle East peace process. Movement on a free trade agreement has 

ceased due to significant tensions between Iran and the International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) over nuclear proliferation. A Human Rights Dialogue was launched in 

2002, consisting of a roundtable discussion with representatives of Iranian civil society 

followed by a session with government officials. Working groups on trade, energy, and 

illegal drugs have also been established. The Comprehensive Dialogue has yielded few 

significant results. The Iranians have not been willing to make concessions on any of the 

four key political issues; indeed, in certain areas, such as WMD proliferation, significant 

backsliding has occurred. At the same time, the European Union has refused to relax its 

conditions and move forward with the trade agreement, driving current discussions into 

a stalemate. Observers point to the European Union’s steadfast position as evidence of 

its willingness to implement conditionality. 

Cooperation Agreement with Yemen

The European Union signed a cooperation agreement with Yemen in 1997. The agreement’s 

objective is to facilitate cooperation in the areas of trade and development and in various sectors such as communications and the environment. Joint Cooperation Committee 

meetings are held annually. A new political dialogue component, covering issues related to 

political reform, was added in the summer of 2004. EU officials have listed the strengthening of pluralism and democracy as a priority for 2005–6. Specific project proposals 

include providing support to the Supreme Election Committee in anticipation of elections 

in 2006 and to local NGOs and media so as to enhance civil society’s role in the decisionmaking process. The European Union has allocated 61–70 million euros in aid for Yemen for 

2002–4. The commission is planning to open a delegation in Sanaa later this year.

6

The European Union made a 

strategic choice to engage rather 

than isolate Iran. 

To date, results of the political 

dialogue have been disappointing. 

The European Union has offered 

to launch contacts on human 

rights issues but has met with 

reluctance from its GCC partners.
Assessing the Impact of the Barcelona Process

The European Union’s democracy-promotion strategy has been characterized by a longterm, cautious approach adopted for the sake of preserving short-term stability. By and 

large, the European Union (like the United States) has not translated its calls for the 

promotion of democracy and human rights into concrete action. Rather than directly 

confronting regimes in the region, EU democracy-promotion programs have relied on 

more indirect methods, such as increasing support for “democratic values” and promoting 

cross-cultural dialogue.

The European Union has generally favored a top-down approach, conducting most of 

its democratic reform activities on a government-to-government basis. MEDA funding is 

used primarily for government programming, while the EIHDR line item (the relatively 

insignificant sum of 1.3 million euros for the Middle East) is used to fund NGOs. Contacts 

with Arab NGOs have not been accorded a high priority, and funding has been given only 

to those groups with a decidedly secular, pro-Western outlook and to apolitical organizations such as environmental groups.

Indeed, of the three baskets that constitute the EMP, the political reform portfolio has 

registered the least success. Arab states of the Mediterranean continue to be dominated 

by autocratic governments that restrict political freedoms. Even in the best cases, institutional and political reform has made only limited, often fleeting progress. 

This lack of achievement is hardly surprising, given the modest nature of the European 

Union’s efforts to promote political reform in the region. In the EMP’s early years, less 

than 1 percent of MEDA funding was devoted to political reform. A specific program, 

MEDA Democracy, was established in 1996 to fund democracy-promotion projects, but it 

was dismantled in 2001 and merged into the EIHDR. 

While the European Union does not bear significant responsibility for the Mediterranean region’s dearth of political reform (the chief responsibility lies with the region 

itself ), several factors have impinged on the EMP’s effectiveness as an instrument to 

promote reform. Five factors stand out. 

• The original intent of the Barcelona Process was not to promote political reform. In a 

sense, Europe launched the Barcelona Process in order to erect a cordon sanitaire, 

to protect itself from potential instability welling up from the southern shores of 

the Mediterranean. As such, the impetus for the creation of the EMP was less about 

spurring reform than about staving off the threat of massive illegal immigration. The 

Barcelona Process initially focused almost exclusively on trade and aid. Europe recognized that insisting on political reforms would only irritate incumbent regimes in 

the Middle East and complicate Europe’s near-term goals of promoting placid ties with 

those governments. Money flowed to buy stability rather than to lay the groundwork 

for change. Indeed, the Barcelona Process at first eschewed significant political reform 

measures because of the instability they would likely generate.

• EU members have differing interests in, and differing goals for, the Middle East. 

Southern-tier countries in the European Union have been less willing than their northern 

neighbors to rock the boat and push for reform. Their proximity to the southern Mediterranean heightens their concerns over illegal migration and instability and makes them 

uncomfortable with the notion of conditionality. In contrast, northern-tier countries such 

as Britain and Germany have pushed for a more stringent interpretation of the human 

rights clause embedded in the association agreements. As a result, the European Union 

has found it difficult to act in concert on the issue of reform. Instead, the European 

Union has often found itself captive to the lowest common denominator, and rather than 

launching bold initiatives to promote Middle East reform, it has acted with excessive 

caution. 

• EU members have been deeply reluctant to use conditionality. The factors outlined 

above have made the European Union largely unwilling to use the levers at its 

7

By and large, the European Union 

(like the United States) has not 

translated its calls for the promotion of democracy and human 

rights into concrete action. 

Even in the best cases, institutional and political reform has 

made only limited, often fleeting progress. 

[T]he European Union has often 

found itself captive to the lowest 

common denominator, and rather 

than launching bold initiatives 

to promote Middle East reform, it 

has acted with excessive caution. 
disposal to push harder for reform from its Mediterranean partners. The human 

rights clauses written into the association agreements are rarely invoked. Only one 

country, Tunisia, has had its MEDA aid reduced because of its human rights record. 

(In that case, the Tunisian government obstructed the European Union’s work with 

a Tunisian human rights group.) In general, the connection between progress on 

reform and funding has not been made explicit. For example, Egypt, despite its 

poor record on reform, has received a disproportionate amount of aid over the 

years because of its critical role in the Middle East peace process. While most EU 

members embrace the concept of conditionality in principle, they are wary of seeing it translated into practice. The European Union has yet to find a workable balance between engagement and isolation that would lead to some form of targeted 

conditionality.

• The Barcelona Process has been encumbered by an unwieldy bureaucracy. With its 

multiyear budget cycles and volumes of paperwork, the EMP is exceptionally cumbersome bureaucratically. When policies and programs need to be redefined, the process 

is extremely difficult to redirect. Currently, planning is under way for the 2007–13 

budget cycle; such a protracted cycle presents little opportunity for creative reform, 

which demands nimble instruments and flexible timing. Decision making is slow and 

can be held hostage by an individual member state looking to protect or advance 

its own narrow interests. Complicated procedures often hamper implementation of 

MEDA programming. In the first five years of the EMP, only 26 percent of the amount 

committed to aid was actually disbursed. Conflicting loyalties between the European 

Council, which represents the interests of individual member states, and the European Commission, whose mandate is tied to the interests of the European Union as a 

whole, can also add to bureaucratic tensions. The commission often looks to enhance 

the EU structure, while the council can be constrained by individual members who 

jealously guard their prerogatives. 

• The early fate of the Barcelona Process was intimately linked with the status of the 

Middle East peace process. The Barcelona Process was formulated in the heady days 

following the negotiation of the Oslo Accords. The subsequent breakdown of the 

Oslo process has hobbled the Barcelona Process, impeding its ability to implement 

regional initiatives. 

Looking beyond Barcelona

Nearly a decade old, the Barcelona Process has registered few successes in the quest to 

promote democratic reform in the Middle East and North Africa. While sustained reform 

must originate from within the region, European decision makers have eschewed policies 

that could exert real pressure to reform on incumbent regimes. Instead, like their U.S. 

counterparts, the Europeans have opted for short-term stability and a preservation of the 

status quo. The net result has been decidedly modest advances in the pursuit of respect 

for human rights and the rule of law. In some cases, such as that of Tunisia, states have 

displayed significant backsliding on political reforms.

Few observers contest that the Barcelona Process’s democracy-promotion record is 

modest at best. Some EU member states (from the northern tier) have privately called 

for scrapping the EMP and developing an entirely new framework for engagement encompassing the entire Middle East and North Africa. But EU member states that support the 

Barcelona Process constitute a powerful bloc that has fiercely resisted any attempt to 

retire the Barcelona Process; it remains a sacred cow. 

Instead, beginning in 2000, efforts have focused on “reinvigorating” the Barcelona 

Process by providing for a more vigorous and coherent democracy-promotion strategy. 

European strategists have sought to link European policy in the Mediterranean to the 

8

While most EU members embrace 

the concept of conditionality in 

principle, they are wary of seeing 

it translated into practice. 

Nearly a decade old, the Barcelona Process has registered few 

successes in the quest to promote democratic reform in the 

Middle East and North Africa.
wider Middle East as well as post-enlargement Wider Europe. A series of European Commission papers published over the past eighteen months articulate an overarching strategy as well as specific policies designed to facilitate and strengthen reform. Together, 

these policies form the backbone of Europe’s future Middle East democracy-promotion 

strategy.

European Neighborhood Policy

Launched in March 2003, the Wider Europe–Neighborhood policy (http://europa.eu.int/

comm/external_relations/we/doc/com03_04_en.pdf ) offers a new framework for relations with Europe’s new eastern and southern neighbors following the European Union’s 

May 1, 2004, enlargement (when ten new members were admitted). Europe’s borders 

now reach to Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus. At the advent of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the European Union’s southern-tier members successfully lobbied to 

include the Mediterranean states in the new policy. The resulting “new neighborhood” 

encompasses a vast swath of territory stretching from Morocco to Moldova. The European 

Union cannot offer these countries membership but hopes to ensure a stable, friendly 

neighborhood by providing powerful incentives to implement reform. 

Rather than building a “Fortress Europe” insulated from outlying political and economic instability, the policy aims to create a “ring of friends” around the European 

Union, nations that share the same values of democracy, respect for human rights, and 

the rule of law. In hopes of developing a “zone of prosperity,” the European Union would 

offer its new neighbors the prospect of entry into its internal market and, ultimately, the 

four freedoms (freedom of movement of goods, of persons, of services, and of capital) 

of EU membership in exchange for the implementation of significant political, economic, 

and institutional reforms. 

The ENP will be structured around a series of differentiated “action plans” that are 

jointly drafted with partners. Key areas covered by the plans will include political dialogue, economic and social development, trade, and justice and home affairs. The action 

plans, which envision a three- to five-year time frame, will be customized for individual 

countries and will contain mutually agreed-upon objectives and benchmarks that spell 

out actions the European Union expects in exchange for the benefits of greater integration. Benefits would accrue to partner countries progressively as they meet specific 

targets and benchmarks.

The European Union is currently drawing up action plans with those countries involved 

in the Barcelona Process that have operational association agreements. Barcelona countries selected for the first round of ENP action plans are Tunisia, Jordan, Morocco, and 

Israel/Palestinian Authority. The European Union is in consultation with these countries 

and is in the process of assisting with the development of their action plans.

Essentially, the ENP is intended to bolster (and perhaps replace) the Barcelona Process. It enhances and clarifies conditionality by offering a huge incentive—access to 

Europe’s internal market—to encourage countries to undertake serious reforms. It also 

aims to serve as a strategic overlay that articulates the principles of engagement with 

the Mediterranean and the Middle East. Together with the European Security Strategy 

(see below), the ENP seeks to establish important precepts for moving forward. In particular, the policy identifies three key factors—proximity, prosperity, and poverty—that 

define Europe’s relations with its neighbors. Europe’s new neighbors’ geographic proximity presents both opportunities and challenges. The region’s interdependence requires 

joint approaches to cross-border threats. At the same time, the European Union must 

work with its partners to tackle root causes of instability—a deficit of both democracy 

and economic opportunity—and promote prosperity.

EU members must still negotiate funding for the ENP. Southern-tier countries have 

expressed concern that the ENP will siphon funds away from the Barcelona Process or, even 

worse, that the Barcelona Process will be supplanted by the ENP. Several key questions arise: 

9

Rather than building a “Fortress 

Europe” insulated from outlying 

political and economic instability, the policy aims to create 

a “ring of friends” around the 

European Union, nations that 

share the same values of democracy, respect for human rights, 

and the rule of law. 

[The ENP] aims to serve as a 

strategic overlay that articulates 

the principles of engagement 

with the Mediterranean and 

the Middle East.
10

How will funds be allocated between new neighbors to the east and Mediterranean neighbors? How much MEDA funding will be diverted to the European Neighborhood action plans? 

Will additional funding be required, and if so, much? 

In addition, some incentives offered by the ENP are not monetary and instead hold 

out the prospect of access to Europe’s internal market. Europe’s powerful farm lobby will 

vigorously oppose allowing other countries such access and will seek to obstruct efforts 

to revise the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy (by removing tariffs) so as 

to allow wider access.

“Reinvigorating EU Actions”

In May 2003, the commission issued an important communication entitled “Reinvigorating EU Actions on Human Rights and Democratization with Mediterranean Partners” 

(http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/doc/com03_294.pdf). 

The document established strategic guidelines for strengthening the implementation of 

the human rights clause of the association agreements. It acknowledged the disappointing record of the European Union’s efforts to promote human rights with its Mediterranean partners and offered ten recommendations for improvement. 

Echoing the ENP, “Reinvigorating EU Actions” proposes establishing human rights 

action plans in partnership with Mediterranean counterparts. The proposal envisions 

regular dialogue between the European Union and individual partner countries on human 

rights issues, as well as regular consultation with, and increased funding for, human 

rights NGOs. As an enticement, a separate pot of money (from MEDA funds)—to be used 

in any sector—will be made available to countries that meet action plan benchmarks. 

The human rights action plans will be anchored to the ENP, serving as a component of 

the more comprehensive action plans developed as part of the ENP.

The Strategic Umbrella

Three key documents—“European Security Strategy,” “Strengthening the EU’s Relations 

with the Arab World,” and “Interim Report on the EU Strategic Partnership with the 

Mediterranean and the Middle East”—form a strategic umbrella for Europe’s new democracypromotion strategy. While the ENP lays out concrete policy options for energizing movement on reform, the European Security Strategy and accompanying papers situate these 

options in a broader, strategic context.

• As noted earlier in this report, the document “European Security Strategy” (http://

ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/EN/reports/76255.pdf ) identifies five 

key threats to European security: terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, 

failed states, and organized crime, including trafficking in illegal drugs and weapons 

and illegal migration. The paper notes that these threats differ significantly from the 

threat of invasion that defined the period up to and including the Cold War. While 

conventional threats could be tackled by military means, these newly defined threats 

demand a mixture of instruments, including political and economic tools.

With EU enlargement as its point of departure, the strategy builds a strong case 

for integrating Europe’s wider neighborhood into a web of well-governed, democratic 

states. The paper acknowledges traditional trade and development policies as powerful tools for promoting reform (the well-worn “trade-and-aid” formula) but also advocates the use of conditionality and targeted trade measures as a means of promoting 

democracy. The paper makes a strong case for “preventive engagement” to avert 

future crises. It demands a more active, capable, and coherent policy that harmonizes 

the many policies and instruments at the European Union’s disposal.

• In December 2003—the same month that saw the publication of “European Security 

Strategy”—the European Council published a paper entitled “Strengthening the EU’s 

While conventional threats could 

be tackled by military means, 

these newly defined threats 

demand a mixture of instruments, including political and 

economic tools.
11

Partnership with the Arab World” (http://ue.eu.int/ueDocs/cms_data/docs/PressData/

en/misc/78358.pdf) that lays out the principles that should govern the European 

Union’s relations with the Arab world. It asserts that an overriding objective should be 

to promote political, economic, and social reform. At the same time, successful reform 

efforts must emanate from within the region. Reform objectives will be pursued for 

Mediterranean countries via the Barcelona Process. The ENP will enhance and deepen 

relations with countries that are part of the Barcelona Process. The paper acknowledges 

that relations with countries east of Jordan are less developed than relations with Barcelona countries and in need of greater engagement. The paper underscores the need to 

deepen candid political dialogue and to focus on concrete reform issues. Significantly, it 

calls for the involvement of a wide spectrum of political forces and organizations in the 

region that favor a nonviolent approach and that agree to play by democratic rules.

• Issued in March 2004, “Interim Report on an EU Strategic Partnership with the 

Mediterranean and the Middle East” (http://www.eu2004.ie/templates/document_file

.asp?id=10466) provides an update on the development of the European Union’s Middle 

East strategy. It emphasizes the need for the European Union to consult with Middle 

Eastern countries and to inculcate a sense of shared ownership among its regional 

partners. The report enumerates the shared perspectives with partners in the region, 

including the value of consultation as well as the need to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The importance of differentiation, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach, is also 

underscored. The report elucidates a broad concept of security that addresses domestic 

concerns such as unemployment and underdevelopment. It reiterates the centrality of 

the Barcelona Process and, by extension, the ENP. The paper concludes by asserting 

eleven key objectives, including development, through partnership, of a common zone 

of peace, prosperity, and progress; resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict; long-term, 

sustained engagement with the region; and the need to strengthen political dialogue 

and promote respect for human rights and the rule of law.

✦ ✦ ✦

The European Union has made important progress by laying out a plan of action for promoting democratic reform in the Middle East. Concepts of partnership and conditionality 

have been further developed through the use of joint action plans. Greater weight has 

been added by endowing the plans with enticing incentives, namely, access to Europe’s 

internal market. 

Still, a successful European democracy-promotion policy in the Middle East is far from 

assured. Several obstacles remain that could impede effective implementation. First, 

neither the European Union nor its individual member states has demonstrated sustained 

commitment to using conditionality as an instrument for reform. Instead, European governments reflexively seek to preserve the status quo at all costs. Second, governments in 

the region have not signaled their willingness to pursue genuine reform—yet as currently 

structured, the European strategy relies heavily on these governments’ cooperation. 

Third, European democracy-promotion efforts risk being drowned in a sea of bureaucracy. 

Already, redundancies and overlaps are becoming apparent in and between the Barcelona 

Process and the ENP. Actors in the region could find themselves trapped in a thicket of 

reports, regulations, and procedures, with the notion of democratic-reform promotion 

getting lost along the way.

The Transatlantic Dimension: Complementarities and Frictions

Sustained transatlantic cooperation could contribute significantly to efforts to promote 

democratic reform in the Middle East. In the aftermath of 9/11 (and of the terrorist 

attack in Madrid on March 11, 2004), both the United States and Europe have identified 

The European Union has made 

important progress by laying out a 

plan of action for promoting democratic reform in the Middle East.

European democracy-promotion 

efforts risk being drowned in a 

sea of bureaucracy. 
12

the absence of political and economic freedoms in the Middle East as a primary source 

of instability and a threat to international security. Indeed, the region presents several 

strategic threats that have come to define the post–Cold War era: terrorism, failed states, 

and the proliferation of WMD. Therefore, the promotion of democratic reform in the 

Middle East is a key strategic priority for both the United States and Europe. 

U.S. and European views also converge on key elements defining the Middle East’s 

path toward democratic reform. General agreement exists on the need for reform to 

emanate from the region, rather than being imposed from outside. The notion of regional 

ownership is further bolstered by the concept of pursuing reform in partnership with the 

region—a critical focus of both the Barcelona Process and the U.S. Middle East Partnership Initiative. Also, both the United States and Europe have shifted from a regionwide 

to a country-specific approach, acknowledging that “one size does not fit all.”

Most significantly, both the United States and the European Union appear to be 

converging on the need for some type of conditionality—on the need to insist on a 

linkage between a country’s performance on reform-related objectives and the benefits 

it accrues, whether in the form of increased financial assistance or improved access to 

markets. Neither side has gone too far along this path, and each is limited by a variety 

of domestic constraints. However, were they to work together to fashion a united EUU.S. position on conditionality as well as joint incentives (e.g., membership in the World 

Trade Organization or coordinated increases in financial aid), they could give conditionality precisely the boost needed to produce results. At the least, they would minimize 

the ability of governments in the region to play the United States and the European 

Union off each other.

Important complementarities as well as frictions characterize the transatlantic dimension of the quest to promote Middle East reform. While transatlantic tensions over the 

Middle East have received greater attention in the media and among think tanks, the 

complementary roles of the United States and the European Union are also significant. 

The U.S. and European approaches boast different strengths; they are likely to achieve 

far more if coordinated than if undertaken separately. 

Geographically, the European Union maintains a comparative advantage over the United 

States in the Maghreb and the Levant. Thanks to its decade-long engagement via the 

Barcelona Process, as well as to its extensive historical ties and geographic proximity, the 

European Union has developed rich and complex relations with the Arab countries of the 

Mediterranean. For its part, the United States has engaged more actively with the Gulf 

countries, particularly Yemen and the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council.

From a programmatic standpoint, the European Union has focused its efforts largely 

on human rights, women’s empowerment, judicial reform, and press freedom. The European Union’s human rights emphasis, particularly its focus on developing ties with 

human rights NGOs, places it at a distinct advantage in this area. The European Union 

has also devoted resources to cross-cultural dialogue, which will receive even greater 

attention in the newly inaugurated Euro-Mediterranean Foundation. The foundation 

holds the potential to foster linkages to a variety of civil society groups in the region—a 

long-standing goal shared by both the European Union and the United States.

U.S. democracy-promotion aid has been directed more toward strengthening the 

democratic process and institution building, particularly parliamentary training and 

judicial reform. With its strong focus on electoral politics, the United States has been 

engaged in election assistance and observation as well as political party development. 

To date, the European Union has eschewed such activity, ceding the United States a 

comparative advantage in this area. Like its European counterparts, the United States 

has pinpointed women’s empowerment and media development as important focus areas. 

A variety of U.S.-funded programs seek to enhance NGOs at the grassroots, particularly 

women’s NGOs. The United States continues to develop bottom-up democracy-promotion 

programs, an area that the Europeans (aside from their aid to apolitical service NGOs) 

are only beginning to develop.

[B]oth the United States and 

Europe have identified the 

absence of political and economic freedoms in the Middle 

East as a primary source of 

instability and a threat to 

international security. 

[B]oth the United States and 

the European Union appear to 

be converging on the need for 

some type of conditionality.

While transatlantic tensions 

over the Middle East have 

received greater attention in the 

media and among think tanks, 

the complementary roles of the 

United States and the European 

Union are also significant. 
13

Unfortunately, transatlantic frictions, rooted in differences of approach and language, 

have obscured these potential synergies. While certain nuances and complexities characterize each side, the critical difference separating the United States from Europe reduces 

to one of idealism versus realism. The idealist/realist clash translates to important 

differences in approach for each side. For example, on the question of isolation versus 

engagement, the Europeans will often adopt a pragmatic stance. Europe’s Comprehensive 

Dialogue with Iran and its rapid rapprochement with Libya embody this approach. The 

United States, meanwhile, more typically opts for a policy of isolating “rogue regimes.” 

Eschewing Europe’s “soft power” model, the United States has staked its policies on 

a more muscular approach that relies on coercive policies such as the threat of sanctions and, in extreme cases, military action. The U.S. Congress recently enacted economic sanctions against the Syrian government, precluding any possibility of significant 

engagement, at least in the short term.

Transatlantic tensions over the issue of isolation versus engagement could seriously 

undermine joint reform-promotion efforts in the region. Differences over how to treat 

states such as Iran, Syria, and Libya (despite the resumption of diplomatic relations 

between the United States and Libya) could derail transatlantic cooperation. The United 

States and the European Union may find themselves clashing fairly often on whether or 

to what degree to engage these nations, creating opportunities for such states to play 

the United States and the European Union off one another.

A related key difference concerns the issue of enforced regime change. The United 

States argues that the only option for dealing with certain recalcitrant regimes (e.g., 

Saddam Hussein’s regime) is to remove them from power. Immediately after the invasion 

of Iraq, some U.S. officials warned of the potential for a similar fate for the government of Bashar Assad in Syria. In contrast, most Europeans favor a gradual, long-term 

approach to reform. They regard political reform in the Middle East as a generation-long 

challenge that will require patience and a need to work with entrenched regimes. Many 

Europeans have voiced fears that the United States has a far shorter attention span and 

is unwilling to commit to a decades-long endeavor. Strong differences over Iraq between 

the Americans and the Europeans starkly illustrate the damage to transatlantic relations 

that the issue of regime change can inflict 

U.S. policymakers tend to seek out individuals who can serve as “champions” of 

reform, looking for an Arab Gorbachev who might spearhead regional reform. The Europeans are leery of identifying individual reformers as recipients for EU support, concerned 

that such choices will inevitably politicize aid.

Whither Transatlantic Cooperation?

The magnitude of the challenge of promoting Middle East reform underscores the need 

for transatlantic cooperation. Indeed, translating the consensus on the need for Middle 

East reform into concrete action would significantly benefit both sides of the Atlantic. 

If the Americans and the Europeans are to cooperate effectively and move the region 

forward on the path of democratic reform, they must devise mechanisms that harness 

existing complementarities while easing tensions. If, however, transatlantic tensions 

persist unabated, they will significantly diminish the prospects for success. 

At their June summit, the G-8 partners reiterated their commitment to expand 

democracy-promotion initiatives in partnership with the region. The most important 

aspect of the G-8 package is its emphasis on consultation both with the region and 

among Western allies. The G-8 partners adopted a Plan of Support for Reform that 

includes initiatives on democracy building, literacy, and microfinance. A new Forum for 

the Future is slated to meet in Morocco in December 2004 and will be central to the success of the G-8 plan. The forum will bring together ministers from G-8 countries and the 

region to discuss reform; at the same time, parallel discussions will take place between 

[T]he critical difference separating the United States from 

Europe reduces to one of idealism 

Eschewing Europe’s “soft power” 

model, the United States has 

staked its policies on a more 

muscular approach that relies 

on coercive policies. 

[M]ost Europeans favor a

gradual, long-term approach 

to reform.

If the Americans and the Europeans are to cooperate effectively

. . . they must devise mechanisms 

that harness existing complementarities while easing tensions.
14

business and civil society leaders. In June, the G-8 also pledged to establish, with willing 

regional partners, a Democracy Assistance Dialogue, which will bring governments, civil 

society organizations, and others together to coordinate activities and share information 

on democracy-building activities.

Closer cooperation among the allies, however, is far from assured. With American 

standing in the Middle East at a nadir, the Europeans are reluctant to associate too 

closely with the United States in the region. European fears of being dragged down by 

America’s flagging credibility dramatically reduce the likelihood of joint U.S.-EU programming in the region. Further, the European Union is unlikely to give the United States a 

role in any of its Barcelona-related institutions and will instead continue to favor the 

formula of “complementary but distinct” programming. 

As such, greater dialogue and consultation hold the key to enhanced transatlantic 

cooperation, enabling complementarities to be identified and redundancies eliminated. 

More effective cooperation calls for ongoing consultations in a variety of venues.

• Regular consultation between U.S. and EU missions in the field would make an important contribution to enhanced cooperation. U.S. political officers covering reform 

could meet with their EU counterparts as part of their regular reporting duties. 

• Another useful step would be to hold an annual conference at which U.S. and EU diplomats posted in the Middle East could come together to compare notes on programs 

and projects, best practices, and lessons learned.

• In a similar vein, the United States could establish a committee among EU representatives in Brussels to serve as a focal point for consultations on reform with the 

European Union. 

• Regular videoconferences at the working level between Washington-based policymakers 

and their Brussels counterparts would also help to facilitate dialogue.

• A paper published by the German Marshall Fund in 2004 (“Democracy and Human 

Development in the Broader Middle East”) proposes that the United States and Europe 

“pool the best [democracy-promotion] proposals available . . . and coordinate their 

implementation.” This recommendation, the fruit of discussions between European 

and American scholars, merits further exploration.

The establishment of a G-8 joint democracy fund would be another valuable means 

of fostering cooperation. The June G-8 declaration stipulates the creation of a regional 

“Network of Funds,” consisting of regional development institutions and international 

financial institutions, to better coordinate existing programs, build institutional capacity, and improve the investment climate. A similar fund that pools multilateral resources 

to coordinate and develop democratic reform projects would be a useful tool to promote 

multilateral cooperation and move the reform agenda forward.

What is not likely to spur reform is to create, at the institutional level, new bureaucratic mechanisms. With the exception of the Forum for the Future, the development of 

new bureaucratic structures may well only encumber efforts. Instead, existing mechanisms, such as the annual G-8 summit, should be exploited. Specifically, the following 

options should be considered:

• add Middle East democracy promotion as a regular item on the agendas of the annual 

G-8 and U.S.-EU summits, requiring joint reporting and planning;

• establish an annual report on the status of reform efforts in the region to be presented and discussed at the G-8 summit; and

• give the United States observer status at the annual Barcelona Process ministerial 

meetings.

Ultimately, sustainable democratic reform in the Middle East must emanate from the 

region. However, the United States and the European Union, through greater dialogue 

and consultation, can make a difference. While transatlantic differences in outlook and 

With American standing in the 

Middle East at a nadir, the Europeans are reluctant to associate too closely with the United 

States in the region.

[G]reater dialogue and consultation hold the key to enhanced 

transatlantic cooperation.

What is not likely to spur 

reform is to create, at the 

institutional level, new 

bureaucratic mechanisms. 
15

approach threaten to undermine efforts at increased cooperation, significant common 

ground exists. Shared strategic interests coupled with complementary strengths in the 

region hold the potential for more fruitful transatlantic engagement on democracy promotion. While direct cooperation in the region remains a distant prospect, enhanced 

consultation, via a variety of venues, would make a significant contribution toward 

democracy promotion in the Middle East.

While transatlantic differences in outlook and approach 

threaten to undermine efforts at 

increased cooperation, significant common ground exists.
United States 

Institute of Peace

1200 17th Street NW

Washington, DC 20036

www.usip.org

An online edition of this report can be 

found at our website (www.usip.org), 

together with additional information 

on the subject.

Of Related Interest

A number of other publications from the United States Institute of Peace address the 

promotion of political and economic reform in the Middle East and closer cooperation 

between the United States and Europe.

Recent Institute reports include:

• Donor Activities and Civil Society Potential in Iraq (Special Report, April 2004)

• The Palestinian Reform Agenda, by Nathan Brown (Peaceworks, December 2002)

• Islam and Democracy (Special Report, September 2002)

• Advancing Human Rights and Peace in a Complex World (Special Report, April 2002)

To obtain an Institute report (available free of charge), write United States Institute of 

Peace, 1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20036-3011; call (202) 429-3832; 

fax (202) 429-6063; or e-mail: usip_requests@usip.org.

Recent books from USIP Press include:

• Implementing U.S. Human Rights Policy: Agendas, Policies, and Practices, edited by 

Debra Liang-Fenton (2004)

• A Strategy for Stable Peace: Toward a Euroatlantic Security Community, by James 

Goodby, Petrus Buwalda, and Dmitri Trenin (2002)

• A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza, by 

Rex Brynen (2000)

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