NO. 165 | August 2020

PEACEWORKS

Violence Prevention through 

Election Observation

By Larry Garber
NO. 165 | August 2020

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

2301 Constitution Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

Phone: 202.457.1700

Fax: 202.429.6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 165. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-819-7

ELECTORAL 

VIOLENCE

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the impact of violence prevention mandates in the election observer 

missions organized by intergovernmental, international, or domestic organizations. Commissioned by USIP’s Governance, Justice & Security program, the report draws on desk 

research and builds on findings presented in Electing Peace (USIP Press, 2017).

ABOUT THE AUTHOR 

Larry Garber has more than thirty-five years of election-related experience. In 1984, he 

authored the Guidelines for International Election Observing and subsequently organized observer delegations in more than twenty-five countries. Most recently, he served 

as field director for missions in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe, and as team leader of a 

review of US government election assistance in Tunisia. He has advised senior leaders 

in several countries and inter-governmental organizations on election matters.

Cover photo: Observers from the European Union monitor the election process 

inside a polling station outside Tunis during the first round of the presidential 

election on September 15, 2019. (Photo by Mosa’ab Elshamy/AP)
USIP.ORG 1

Contents

3 Responding to Election Violence

8 Evolution of Election Observation

13 Contemporary Election Observation Challenges

24 Conclusions and Recommendations 
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

Summary

Election-related violence affects more than 20 percent of elections worldwide, with 

the ferocity varying from a few incidents of intimidation and destruction of property 

to large-scale deaths and mass population displacements. Responding to severe occurrences of election-related violence in the mid-2000s, the international community 

has emphasized the development of tools aimed at preventing and mitigating such 

outbreaks and support for research to understand the impact of these tools. 

Election observation, which has evolved dramatically during the past thirty-five 

years, is one of the international community’s principal tools to prevent election 

violence, although it is by no means a silver bullet. In some instances, a heavy 

observer presence on election day may shift violence to other phases of the 

process, and critical post-election observer statements may exacerbate tensions 

and stimulate violence. Consequently, considerable deliberation is required in 

planning a mission, framing the content, and determining the timing of public 

statements. 

Election observers’ ability to help prevent election violence is enhanced when 

the mission commits to a long-term and geographically targeted deployment in 

coordination with other credible international and domestic observer groups. 

However, quantifying the precise impact of the observers’ presence is difficult, 

complicating decisions to determine the appropriate investment in observation 

as opposed to other forms of electoral support. Consistent with their mandates, 

observer missions should play a proactive mediation role when violence appears 

imminent at the national and subnational levels, and should proactively encourage all competing parties to take affirmative steps to reduce tensions. 

Even though election observers can play an important role in preventing violence, their deployment is not warranted where security conditions compromise 

their freedom of movement or place the observers at physical risk. This consideration is particularly relevant where an armed actor seeks to prevent the occurrence of elections through repeated acts of violence directed at those participating in the process. 
USIP.ORG 3

For many years, election-related violence has posed a serious threat to the integrity of 

electoral processes worldwide. To prevent or minimize such violence, the international 

community often has relied upon election observation, which incorporates by design 

an extended on-the-ground presence and proactive mediation by international and 

domestic actors. However, whether the mere presence of election observers prevents 

violence is debatable, even as expectations have continued to rise. 

The experience of Zimbabwe’s July 2018 harmonized elections, for example, illustrates the challenges associated with assessing the impact of election observation 

on violence prevention. The 2018 elections were to take place against the backdrop 

of the country’s eighteen-year-long crisis, in a severely limited political space and 

where widespread violence had marred a series of fundamentally flawed elections. 

Consequently, the international community mobilized the full panoply of tools to 

enhance the prospects that the 2018 elections would be different. The Zimbabwe 

Election Commission (ZEC) received technical assistance, including for the development of a voter education campaign and dispute resolution mechanisms, and 

robust election observer missions were deployed by both international and domestic 

organizations.

Zimbabwe Electoral Commission chairperson Justice Priscilla Chigumba (center) announces the results of presidential elections in Harare, Zimbabwe, on 

August 3, 2018. (Photo by Jerome Delay/AP)

To prevent or 

minimize such 

violence, the 

international 

community often has 

relied upon election 

observation, which 

incorporates by 

design an extended 

on-the-ground 

presence and 

proactive mediation 

by international and 

domestic actors.

Responding to Election Violence
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

The consensus among the observers was that the 

2018 elections were among the most peaceful in 

Zimbabwe’s history.1 However, several international 

observer organizations and the lead domestic organization criticized the overall process for failing to 

demonstrate a decisive break from flawed elections in 

the past.2 Among other concerns, they cited a bombing 

at a pre-election ruling party rally that killed three people and injured several others, and the deaths of seven 

protesters on the streets of the capital two days after 

the elections. These observer groups also noted a pattern of intimidation and threats directed at opposition 

candidates and supporters throughout the process.

As was evident in Zimbabwe, election observation is 

not the only tool available for responding to concerns 

of election violence. Indeed, many approaches have 

been articulated and implemented with this objective 

in mind, including improving election management, 

conducting preventive diplomacy, supporting peace 

messaging and civic education activities, expanding 

youth programming, focusing particular attention on 

threats directed at women, training and engaging 

security sector actors, and supporting the development 

of credible dispute resolution mechanisms. Yet election 

observation remains the default tool of the international 

community and the tool most familiar to the general 

public while requiring the most resources.3

Observer missions are organized by intergovernmental, international nongovernmental, and domestic 

nonpartisan organizations. During the past forty years, 

election observation has been recognized as an international norm and institutionalized through lessons 

drawn from decades of practice. The scope of election 

observation missions has grown in terms of numerical 

size, length of time associated with on-the-ground 

deployments, methodological sophistication, use of 

advanced technology, media and social media monitoring, extent of interactions between international and 

domestic operations, and influence on domestic political actors. As defined by their sponsors, the purposes 

of such missions today include enhancing public 

confidence, assessing the fairness of the process, and 

deterring election violence. It was not always this way. 

In the 1980s and 1990s, election observers focused on 

deterring or detecting fraud and encouraging participation in the electoral process. Violence prevention 

was not specified as an objective, although the relation 

between a credible process and a minimum level of 

violence and intimidation was assumed as self-evident. 

The frequency and severity of violence associated with 

elections in a number of countries during the first decade of the twenty-first century elevated the prevention of 

election violence to a leading objective of many observer 

missions. The vicious clashes between supporters of the 

major parties following the announcement of results in the 

2007 Kenyan presidential election proved a watershed 

moment for those seeking to understand the nature of 

election-related violence and to prevent its occurrence.4

Before calm was reestablished, upward of 1,300 people 

were killed and more than half a million were displaced. 

And because the Kenya tragedy was followed in quick 

succession by serious electoral violence in Zimbabwe, 

Bangladesh, Côte d’Ivoire, Afghanistan, and elsewhere, 

policymakers, assistance providers, and academics have 

been drawn to assessing the efficacy of various mechanisms that have been deployed to mitigate the problem. 

Several current data sets provide more precise information on the incidence and intensity of election-related 

violence.5 They show that the prevalence of election 

violence varies from region to region. For example, in subSaharan Africa between 1990 and 2014, violence—ranging 

from low-level intimidation to intense, protracted conflict—

took place in approximately 55 percent of elections.6 A 

more recent study estimates that “election violence affects 

about a quarter of national elections worldwide, with even 

higher rates in the developing world.”7

As election observation missions have acquired more 

responsibilities, their role in addressing election violence 

has expanded as well. This development has raised a 
USIP.ORG 5

number of conceptual and operational challenges that 

deserve to be examined in greater detail. This report 

defines the problem of election violence, describes how 

election observation has evolved over the past four decades, assesses the direct and indirect impact of election 

observation on election violence, and suggests how 

preventive efforts can be enhanced through improved, 

multi-mandate observation practices. 

DEFINING THE PROBLEM 

Elections generally are conceived as a mechanism for 

peacefully resolving competition for political power and 

allowing for the popular choice of leaders. Yet throughout history, elections have triggered violence, particularly where the contest is seen as a winner-take-all or 

zero-sum venture. The passions stimulated by electoral 

competition and the grievances that often exist just 

below the surface—particularly in countries with no or 

minimal democratic experience, or with severe political 

divides along religious or ethnic lines—create a cauldron that can boil over with disastrous consequences. 

At the same time, election-related violence, while a 

justifiably troubling phenomenon, must be considered 

from an objective, real-world perspective: violence in 

a conflict-affected country is a year-long phenomenon, 

which may not necessarily increase during an election period.8

 Moreover, violence is caused by myriad 

factors, and the risks associated with using force (or 

allowing it to be used) make it less common than other 

contemporary rigging tactics deployed by those seeking to manipulate elections.9

As described in a handbook published by the National 

Democratic Institute (NDI), the impacts of election violence are varied:

Head of the OAS Electoral Observation Mission and former president of Costa Rica Laura Chinchilla, accompanied by an observer, visits a polling 

station in Brasilia, Brazil, on October 28, 2018. (Photo by Eraldo Peres/AP)
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

Electoral violence subverts basic standards for democratic 

elections. Violence against candidates, activists, journalists, 

voters, election officials and observers can reduce voters’ 

choices and suppress the vote. Violence can be used to 

intimidate individuals and communities to vote against 

their will for a candidate. Assassinations of candidates can 

even change electoral outcomes. Armed groups seeking 

to overthrow a government often resort to violence during 

elections. In other cases, violence can break out when large 

numbers of people [protest] official election results.10

Not surprisingly, the term “election-related violence” 

has any number of definitions. A 2014 study prepared 

for the European Parliament emphasizes the relationship between election-related violence and power:

Election-related violence is, most fundamentally, a form 

of political violence that aims to influence the conduct of 

an election, usually to influence its outcome. It is about 

power—holding it, winning it or protesting how it has been 

won and involves any use of force with the intent to cause 

harm or the threat to use force to harm persons or property involved in the electoral process.11

A 2017 paper by Sarah Birch and David Mulchinski reviews a half-dozen definitions before offering their own: 

“coercive force, directed towards electoral actors and/

or objects, that occurs in the context of electoral competition.”12 An even more recent study on the subject 

considers the following features as relevant to defining 

election-related violence: temporally close to elections, 

targeted against those involved in the electoral process, 

motivated by desire to influence electoral outcome, and 

a strategic tool used to influence political processes.13

This report adopts a definition of election violence formulated by Jonas Claes and Inken von Borzyskowski 

as including “any form of intimidation or physical 

violence directed against electoral stakeholders, the 

disruption of events or damage to materials, intended 

to affect an electoral process or influence the outcome.” Their definition of election violence prevention 

spans the measures “taken with the explicit aim of 

protecting electoral stakeholders, events, and materials; promoting an environment conducive to a peaceful 

election process; and addressing the risk of violence in 

a proactive and sustained manner.”14

Determining what constitutes “close to elections” is the 

subject of debate. Most data sets count only those acts 

that are related to the pre-election day preparations, such 

as voter registration, or that occur no more than three 

months after election day. The implications of such a cutoff are significant. For example, in June 1993, Burundians 

overwhelmingly elected as president Melchior Ndadaye, 

the head of the leading opposition party and member of 

the majority Hutu ethnic group. In October—outside the 

ninety-day window—Ndadaye was assassinated by Tutsi 

extremists, and more than fifty thousand people were 

killed in the ensuing violence.15 Most analysts viewed the 

unwillingness of the Tutsi-dominated military to accept the 

election outcome as the proximate cause of the violence.

A second demarcation point relates to whether the 

number of election-related violence incidents should 

be limited to deaths and physical injuries. Judith Kelley, 

for example, distinguishes between “violence,” which 

includes grenades and other weapons, murders, 

physical assaults, and protests that turned violent, and 

“intimidation,” which is categorized as election irregularities.16 A too-narrow definition contributes in particular to the gross undercounting of violence directed 

against women in the election context, as they often 

suffer from nonphysical forms of violence such as intimidation, virtual threats through social media, and other 

forms of psychological pressures. A narrow definition 

may also prevent researchers from monitoring and analyzing how nonlethal risk factors are evolving over time, 

Most data sets count only those acts that are related to the pre-election day preparations,

such as voter registration, or that occur no more than three months after election day.

The implications of such a cutoff are significant.
USIP.ORG 7

which may reduce the ability to detect and prevent a 

sudden shift toward violence.

The joint International Republican Institute (IRI)/NDI report on the 2018 Zimbabwe election is illustrative. The 

report describes the nonlethal violence that took place 

during the pre-election period and the impact of such 

“soft intimidation”:

Though the freedom to organize and speak freely during 

the campaign period was a welcome new development 

during this election cycle, unfortunately the overall environment was compromised by widespread intimidation. . . . 

Methods of intimidation included reminding citizens of the 

violence that took place during the 2008 elections and the 

lingering threat of similar violence in the event of a runoff 

or if the ruling party were to lose. Other threats involved 

destroying homes or the loss of land for those living in 

resettlement areas without title deeds. Reports of military 

personnel in civilian clothing using politically motivated 

threats to influence voters were also prevalent. . . . These 

subtle or so-called “soft intimidation” methods affected 

voter confidence in the secrecy of the ballot and subverted the electoral process more broadly.17

Common structural sources of election violence 

include weak or inadequate state structures, deep 

societal divisions, poverty and economic inequality, the 

high-stakes nature of elections, ongoing human rights 

abuses, and a history of political violence. The proximate cause of the violence, meanwhile, may involve 

the seemingly arbitrary exclusion of a party, candidate, 

or voter; hate speech directed at a particular group or 

candidate competing in the election; gross mismanagement of the election administration; and delayed 

announcement of the results or concerns about 

their manipulation. Specific forms of election-related 

violence include interparty or intraparty violence, street 

protests, excessive use of force by security forces, 

targeted assassinations directed against political leaders, gender-based violence directed primarily against 

women, and the destruction or vandalism of property, 

including increasingly through the use of cyberattacks. 

Competitors in the political process, security force 

operations, insurgent groups, and criminal or neighborhood gangs seeking to prevent the occurrence of 

elections or affect the outcome may all be responsible 

for election-related violence. 

Election-related violence often is examined in the context of the specific phase of the election cycle when 

it occurs. The usual distinctions are the pre-election 

day period, including voter registration and political 

campaigning; the election day, both at and away from 

polling sites; the immediate post-election period before 

and immediately following the announcement of results; and the period following the final adjudication of 

complaints by the constitutionally authorized body. 

This report focuses on election observation as a violence 

prevention tool, but a broad array of complementary tools 

may provide support for these efforts. A 2013 US Agency 

for International Development (USAID) election security 

handbook draws the following conclusions from lessons 

learned about preventing electoral violence: “comprehensive program responses should be multi-sectoral and can 

involve elections and political transitions, conflict management and mitigation, rule of law, civil society, media, 

women’s empowerment, and security sector programs.”18

In other words, it suggests employing the full panoply of 

democracy assistance tools, with the focus on preventing 

election violence in any and all potential forms. 
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

Evolution of Election Observation

Before 1980, the practice of dispatching international observers was a sign of democratic solidarity. The 

Organization of American States (OAS) in particular used 

election observers for this purpose. The observers were 

two or three political notables who spent a few days in 

the country during the election period and then issued 

a short congratulatory statement following the conclusion of the balloting process. These efforts came under 

deserved criticism as being inconsequential and a waste 

of resources, and potentially undermining democracy by 

legitimizing severely flawed elections. 

In 1984, the International Human Rights Law Group 

(IHRLG), with USAID funding, developed standards 

for election observation.19 The standards articulated 

several rationales for dispatching election observers, 

but with a primary emphasis on providing an objective assessment of the electoral process. They did 

not explicitly mention violence prevention, though 

they did refer to the presence of international election 

observers as contributing to an improved human rights 

situation in the country.

In the years that followed, observers witnessed many 

elections in countries that were emerging from armed 

conflict, where security forces were perceived as 

violators of human rights, or where political tensions 

among the competing parties led to violence among 

their supporters. In these countries, observers understood that election-related violence was a real possibility. Among the many factors considered in their overall 

assessment, they had to assess whether any physical 

or psychological violence directed against election 

officials, political candidates, or ordinary citizens had 

affected the quality of the election. However, the tools 

for examining the magnitude of such violence and 

identifying those responsible for violent acts were 

rudimentary. Observers therefore had to evaluate the 

impact of violence on the electoral process in terms of 

whether, under the prevailing circumstances, contestants could communicate their message, voters could 

make a free choice, and election officials could carry 

out their prescribed activities. 

The 1986 Philippines snap presidential election and 

the 1990 Nicaragua elections were important inflection 

points in the evolution of election observation. The 

Philippines experience, which took place in the midst 

of severe political turmoil triggered by allegations of 

corruption and human rights abuses against President 

Ferdinand Marcos and his administration, highlighted the 

role that the combination of international and domestic 

observers could play in delegitimizing a flawed electoral 

process. However, despite the Philippines’ historical experience with violent elections, the principal international 

observers did not explicitly include preventing violence 

as one of the objectives in their terms of reference.20

The 1986 election introduced the international community to the National Citizens’ Movement for Free 

Elections (NAMFREL), a domestic Filipino election 

watch organization that observed the polling and challenged President Marcos’s claim to electoral victory. 

NAMFREL relied on two tools that have since played 

critical roles in contemporary election observation: the 

recruitment, training, and deployment of a large number of citizen volunteers operating under a nonpartisan 

umbrella to monitor all phases of the election, and the 

undertaking by these domestic monitors of a parallel 

vote tabulation (PVT) to validate or contest the results 

published by the official election management body 

(EMB).21 NAMFREL volunteers often placed themselves 
USIP.ORG 9

in harm’s way, and three were killed and scores injured 

while serving as observers.22 In the ensuing three decades, millions of citizens in more than ninety countries 

have joined nonpartisan election observation efforts, 

significantly contributing to “safeguarding genuine 

elections, mitigating potentials for conflict, and promoting accountability and democratic development.”23

The 1990 Nicaragua elections, which ended in a surprise defeat for ruling President Daniel Ortega, provided the next milestone. For the first time, the United 

Nations agreed to observe an election in a sovereign 

state. The OAS adopted a more holistic approach, 

which included deploying long-term observers several 

months before election day, thereby contributing to a 

peaceful pre-election environment. Both organizations 

conducted their own PVTs, which convinced Ortega’s 

Sandinista National Liberation Front to acknowledge 

defeat on election night. The leaders of the UN and 

OAS delegations, encouraged and accompanied by former US President Jimmy Carter, also played a proactive 

role in negotiating the rules of the electoral process, 

mediating specific disputes, and obtaining commitments 

from the principal contestants that they would respect 

the results. All of these contributions helped lead to a 

peaceful result in a country that had been riven by political violence for more than three decades.24

Building on the Nicaraguan experience, the principle of 

intergovernmental organizations using observation and 

technical assistance to engage in elections in sovereign 

states was extended, more generally, to post-conflict 

elections in Angola, Cambodia, Mozambique, and El 

Salvador.25 In these cases, the international community 

assumed a more active role than mere observation, 

often directly supporting the electoral authorities with 

NAMFREL volunteers link arms to protect a dump truck full of ballots being taken to City Hall in Manila for counting the day after the February 7, 1986 

presidential election. (Photo by AP)
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

supplies and expert staff, and providing military and police forces to maintain the peace. The election observers also confronted the realities of post-conflict elections, which often required compromises to ensure that 

elections could occur in the time frame authorized by a 

particular peace agreement in order to facilitate reconstruction and the withdrawal of peacekeeping troops. 

Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 

and the rapid collapse of communist governments in 

the former Warsaw Pact countries of East and Central 

Europe, election watch organizations faced new 

challenges in securing free and fair elections in a post–

Cold War world. The 1990 Copenhagen Declaration 

formally enshrined the role of international and domestic observers among all the member states of 

(what was then called) the Conference of Security and 

Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): 

The participating States consider that the presence of 

observers, both foreign and domestic, can enhance the 

electoral process for States in which elections are taking 

place. They therefore invite observers from any other 

CSCE participating States and any appropriate private 

institutions and organizations who may wish to do so to 

observe the course of their national election proceedings, 

to the extent permitted by law. They will also endeavor 

to facilitate similar access for election proceedings held 

below the national level. Such observers will undertake 

not to interfere in the electoral proceedings.26

Other regional organizations soon adopted resolutions 

expressing similar sentiments and began sponsoring election observer missions as a regular course of business. 

By the early 2000s, international observation had 

become ubiquitous around the globe. In a 2005 

ceremony at UN headquarters, more than fifty international organizations, both intergovernmental and 

nongovernmental, formally adopted the Declaration of 

Principles for International Election Observation and accompanying Code of Conduct for International Election 

Observers. The declaration’s preamble states: 

International election observation has the potential to 

enhance the integrity of election processes, by deterring 

and exposing irregularities and fraud and by providing 

recommendations for improving electoral processes. It 

can promote public confidence, as warranted, promote 

electoral participation and mitigate the potential for election-related conflict.27

Interestingly, beyond the preamble, there is little 

mention of violence prevention. The drafters sought to 

distinguish observation from mediation, and steered 

away from language that might confuse or conflate 

the two. Six years later, a network of domestic groups 

from all regions of the globe approved a declaration 

of principles governing their observation activities. By 

then, election violence was a major concern, and their 

declaration was much more explicit in addressing it:

Non-partisan election observation and monitoring by citizen organizations can contribute significantly to deterring 

and mitigating potentials for election related violence, 

and that activities by non-partisan election observation 

and monitoring organizations can contribute significantly 

to improving the democratic quality of legal frameworks 

for elections, [and] the conduct of election processes and 

broader democratic development.28

In recent years, both international and domestic 

groups have directed more attention to the pernicious 

problem of gender-based violence in the context of 

electoral processes, which includes “the escalation of 

harassment, intimidation, sexual and physical violence 

against women in public life, gender-biased scrutiny 

by the public and the media, and the forced resignations and assassinations of women politicians in the 

most extreme cases.”29 In response, the United Nations 

Development Programme (UNDP) and other bodies 

are advocating for efforts to ensure that the issue of 

violence against women in elections is integrated into 

electoral violence early warning and general monitoring tools, and that it is addressed through prevention 

and mediation tools in the same manner as other forms 

of electoral violence.30
USIP.ORG 11

ELECTION OBSERVATION TODAY

Since the 1980s, election observation has evolved from 

an ad hoc exercise to a structured process undertaken 

by a range of organizations and often incorporating 

multiple mandates, including violence prevention. 

The early emphasis was on objectively assessing the 

election process, but even during this period observers 

frequently assumed that the presence of “outsiders,” 

whether from abroad or as part of a domestic monitoring effort, would deter or mitigate the most egregious 

incidents of electoral violence. At the same time, however, observers did not receive guidance or training in 

violence prevention, and were not expected to intervene, other than to make their presence known to the 

relevant authorities.

In many cases, simply reporting on events proved an 

inadequate response to a combustible situation on the 

ground. Following the example set by former President 

Carter, observer group leaders began attempting to exercise a “good offices” function during the pre-election 

period, seeking commitments from the leading actors 

to refrain from specific activities that could exacerbate 

tensions. Many of these ad hoc attempts, however well 

intended, did not have explicit authorization from any 

of the parties involved.31 Nevertheless, the shift to a 

more holistic approach to election observation reflected growing sophistication among the organizations 

sponsoring missions, as well as several real-world experiences where significant electoral violence caused 

large numbers of deaths and affected the democratic 

well-being of specific countries. As a consequence, 

and depending on the availability of resources, observers began to be deployed for extensive periods outside a national capital during the pre-election period 

with the explicit objective of preventing violence. 

Former US President Jimmy Carter (center) visits a polling station in Katmandu, Nepal, on November 19, 2013, where the Carter Center, an international poll observation organization headed by the former president, mobilized election observers for the election. (Photo by Niranjan Shrestha/AP)
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

The 2018 Zimbabwe elections illustrate the contemporary mindset. Well before the election, the government 

of Zimbabwe indicated that international observer missions would be welcome and that, unlike in previous 

elections, it would extend that welcome to missions 

from beyond the Africa region. A joint IRI/NDI team 

began deploying in April, a month before the election 

date was formally set. A June pre-election mission 

recommended thirteen steps that the government and 

EMB could take to enhance confidence in the process, 

including several that reflected concerns about the 

prospects for violence. Specifically, the team urged 

that the contesting parties be held accountable to the 

political party code of conduct and that they proactively address the issue of violence against women in 

politics. Most notably, the team called for the political 

parties to express 

their commitment to conduct a violence-free campaign 

and to accepting the results of credible elections through 

a well-publicized pledge witnessed by leading domestic 

and international personalities. Further, senior officers of the 

Zimbabwe Defense Forces (ZDF) should make public and 

unambiguous statements that all branches of the military will 

loyally serve whoever wins this and future elections.32

Six weeks before the election, both IRI/NDI and the 

European Union deployed long-term observers to provincial capitals around the country. For the election day 

period, these teams were supplemented by short-term 

observers from IRI/NDI, the EU, and several additional 

organizations, including the African Union (AU), the 

Southern Africa Development Community (SADC), and 

the Commonwealth. Each of these latter organizations 

was led by a former African head of government or other prominent official. The short-term observers arrived 

in the country several days before the election and remained for up to four days afterward. The delegations 

came together for extensive coordination before and 

after the elections, and contributed to the calming of 

tensions following the violence that occurred in Harare 

two days after the polls closed.

In addition to the international presence, Zimbabwe 

has a plethora of domestic organizations that have 

considerable experience monitoring elections in 

the country. Most notable is the Zimbabwe Election 

Support Network (ZESN), which formed in the early 

2000s. ZESN assessed each phase of the process 

beginning with voter registration and mobilized 7,200 

volunteers to monitor the election day events. ZESN 

also conducted a well-designed PVT, which provided 

critical data regarding the validity of the results reported by the EMB. 

The Zimbabwe case is not unique. Indeed, the model applied in Zimbabwe has been used worldwide, 

although the precise details of a specific mission vary 

depending on circumstances within the country and 

the broader interests of the international community. 

The next section examines questions regarding efficacy, costs, and the potential unintended consequences 

that may emerge from these efforts. 

Short-term observers arrived in the country several days before the election and

remained for up to four days afterward. The delegations came together for extensive

coordination before and after the elections, and contributed to the calming of tensions

following the violence that occurred in Harare two days after the polls closed.
USIP.ORG 13

Contemporary Election 

Observation Challenges

Several rigorous studies have raised important policy 

questions for those funding and organizing election 

observation missions. However, they have not undermined the continued utilization of election observation 

as a violence prevention mechanism. Specific challenges confronting election observation today are disaggregated for consideration below (and summarized in 

table 1), although they form part of an integrated “system” and, ultimately, must be addressed in a holistic 

fashion to maximize the benefits of this oft-used tool.

COMPETING MANDATES 

Many who support the election observation process 

suggest that such efforts can benefit from the inclusion 

of a violence prevention mandate. First, they argue, the 

mere presence of neutral observers serves as a deterrent to those inclined to use violence for political gain. 

Second, observers are capable of acting as effective 

mediators among potential violent actors. Third, observers can effectively map the locations where violence is 

most likely to occur and devise effective strategies for 

addressing the problem. Fourth, observers can encourage security forces to operate in a manner that reduces 

the likelihood of violence by interacting with them on a 

regular basis and by monitoring their activities. Finally, 

observers can use tools like parallel vote tabulations and 

the timely issuance of statements to influence the activities of those who might be inclined to initiate violence.33

Nonetheless, some practitioners remain adamant that, 

regardless of the current preferences for more dynamic on-the-ground action by domestic and international observers, the primary objective of an election 

observer mission should be to assess the integrity of 

the electoral process. The assessment should cover 

the full range of election-related issues from the legal 

framework through the adjudication of complaints. 

(This scope may be modified if the observer group has 

articulated an intent to focus on a specific or limited 

number of issues, such as voter registration, media 

monitoring, or youth participation.34) Election-related 

violence, of course, impacts the quality of the process 

and thus must be factored into an assessment, but 

diverting scarce resources to violence prevention, 

from this perspective, may compromise the observer 

mission’s ability to fulfill its primary responsibility.

A middle position seeks to avoid the either-or scenario. When establishing an observer mission in a violence-prone environment, an organization must have 

a plan that guides the observers’ response to acts of 

violence. Simply recording incidents of violence can be 

seen as having a deterrent impact, but domestic actors 

inevitably will encourage observers to play more active 

roles. Such efforts might involve accompanying victims 

of violence to police stations to report an incident or 

attending a “peace” dialogue designed to minimize 

the prospects of violence or terminate violence that is 

already taking place. Adopting an “I am only here to 

observe” mantra when a more active role might contribute to a more peaceful outcome places observers, 

and particularly those deployed for extended periods 

of time, in an awkward, unsatisfying position. Thus, 

regardless of the explicit guidance emanating from 

headquarters, long-term observers in particular often 

play an active mediation role in their assigned regions. 
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

Table 1. Challenges of Contemporary Election Observation 

Challenges Considerations Examples of Operational Responses

Competing mandates While success in mitigating or preventing violence is not 

the inevitable outcome of a multi-mandate observation 

mission, de facto the era of simply reporting on the 

process has passed.

Employing multi-mandate terms of reference to ensure 

that violence prevention is incorporated into the planning 

for an observation mission.

Public statements Where preliminary statements are issued, observer groups 

must be prepared to issue supplemental statements to 

reinforce confidence that an accurate assessment is being 

provided to the national and international communities.

Crafting nuanced public statements to minimize the possibility that statements serve to provoke violence.

Host country

conditions for

deployment 

Some of the more contentious aspects of the election 

process—including voter registration, constituency 

delimitation, and party selection of candidates—may 

take place before the on-the-ground deployment of an 

international observer mission is authorized.

Ensuring minimum criteria for credible elections are in 

place and security conditions on the ground will permit 

effective observation, and relying on reports of domestic 

monitors to cover pre-deployment aspects of the process.

Temporal and

geographic presence

In determining the timing and deployment for an observer mission, consider the historic and political context in 

which the election is occurring; who else is operating in 

the observation space; and the costs, risks, and benefits 

associated with the agreed-upon activities. 

Utilizing available technology to identify hot spots and to 

track incidents of violence.

Coordination among

observers

In the African context, the African Union and African 

sub-regional organizations coordinate efforts to prevent 

the outbreak of violence, even when they may be wary of 

criticizing too bluntly the integrity of the electoral process.

Sharing information, harmonizing deployments, previewing preliminary statements, and undertaking joint 

mediation efforts as necessary.

Security conundrums Observers should take the following practical steps to minimize physical risks: build relationships, maintain regular internal communications, recognize the security implications 

of social networking, take precautions when releasing or 

disseminating sensitive information, and develop security 

plans and implement training programs to socialize them.

Employing security coordinators and utilizing advanced 

communications technology.

Observation costs Prepare a coherent plan of action that is derived from an 

understanding of the situation on the ground and an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of previous interventions.

Recognizing that the inclusion of a violence prevention 

mandate inevitably requires a flexible, expansive budget.

Influencing long-term 

reforms 

By documenting specific cases and drawing on comparative perspectives, observers can focus on sensitive 

issues relating to the role played by security forces 

during the electoral process (whether positive or negative); the importance of prosecuting instances of electoral 

violence whoever is responsible; the need for initiatives 

like peace commissions and peace messaging before, 

during, and after the elections; and the actions that media outlets can take to avoid fanning the existing flames.

Encouraging a long-term perspective in promoting electoral reforms and in addressing the underlying causes of 

election violence.
USIP.ORG 15

More fundamentally, observer missions today are 

seen as enhancing the prospects for a post-election 

calm through direct intervention with the political 

contestants. As tensions emerge, the leaders of 

the principal international observer missions, many 

of whom are former elected leaders in their own 

countries, will meet with the leading contestants in 

the days immediately following the election. They 

use both moral suasion and political affinities to urge 

the competing candidates to avoid making provocative statements, to urge their supporters to exercise 

restraint, and to take full advantage of the remedies 

provided by domestic law. In exchange, the observers commit to monitor the entire process through the 

announcement of the results and the adjudication of 

complaints, and to issue objective (and, as necessary, critical) statements as circumstances warrant.

Domestic groups also have become more conscious 

of their role in preventing election-related violence. 

In some cases, they focus on these efforts. As part 

of the monitoring effort, they urge their members to 

remain present in potential hot spots, to remain vigilant for events that could trigger violence, to remain 

in contact with local security forces, and to convene 

peace commissions or other forums in response to 

provocations or acts of violence. In addition, they 

have expanded their pre-election activities to include 

civic education, peace messaging, and joint planning 

with local security forces, all of which are premised 

on a violence prevention objective. 

The commitment to violence prevention has created a context where election observers must act to 

maintain their credibility in the eyes of both the host 

country public and the international community. Thus, 

while success in mitigating or preventing violence is 

not the inevitable outcome of a multi-mandate observation mission, de facto the era of simply reporting 

on the process has passed. 

PUBLIC STATEMENTS

The observer community regularly considers the 

questions of when to offer an assessment of the 

process and how the assessment should be framed. 

The concerns relate to potential interference in an 

ongoing process and to provoking violence through 

the content of the statement. 

Most observer groups issue a minimum of two public 

statements: the first upon initial deployment of the 

mission to identify the sponsoring organization, to 

introduce the members of the team, and to present 

the terms of reference for the mission; and the second 

within twenty-four to seventy-two hours after the polls 

close to offer a preliminary assessment of the electoral 

process. In addition, some observer groups incorporate into their overall observation plan one or more 

pre-election missions, which assess various aspects of 

the pre-election environment and recommend steps 

that can be taken to improve the process. Similarly, 

groups may issue post-election statements to cover the 

tabulation of results and the adjudication of complaints. 

Several analysts have questioned whether an emphasis on violence prevention results in observer missions 

toning down their public statements. For example, 

Judith Kelley states that “when pre-election violence 

has been particularly high, monitors may dampen their 

criticisms of incumbent fraud in the hope that even if 

the incumbent did not run a clean election, the incumbent will at least be able to maintain calm and therefore 

lessen the chances of serious post-election conflict.” 

While acknowledging the need for more research, she 

concludes that “because higher levels of violence are 

associated with more irregularities, monitors may therefore experience a conflict between upholding electoral 

norms and endorsing an election as a means to quell 

potential violence after a violent election campaign.”35

A study by Ursula Daxecker examined the relationship 

between observers’ immediate post-election statements and election-related violence. She concludes 
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

that “when elections are not only suspected of being 

manipulated but such manipulation is documented by 

international organizations considered credible in their 

assessment, the risk of violence . . . may increase even 

more.” She explains that the “monitoring of fraudulent 

elections . . . draws attention to unfair electoral processes, reduces uncertainty over whether fraud was committed, and alleviates coordination problems among 

groups concerned about manipulation. Jointly, these 

factors could contribute to violent contestation after manipulated elections.”36 Daxecker’s arguments have been 

reinforced by a more comprehensive study conducted 

by Inken von Borzyskowski, who maintains that “it is 

often internationally certified fraud, not fraud alone, that 

exacerbates loser challenges and violence.”37

These studies raise the stakes for the observation 

process. Credible observers spend considerable 

effort debating the nuances of their statements; 

not surprisingly, the statements issued by various 

groups often reflect different institutional emphases.38

Observer groups are well aware that their pronouncements can have political impact, including exacerbating tensions among the leading contestants and their 

respective supporters. However, if they fail to criticize 

a flawed process because they are concerned about 

potential violence, they risk undermining the credibility and influence of the observation process, raising 

concerns similar to those expressed regarding the 

early election observer missions of the 1960s and 

1970s. Thus, without underestimating the political and 

psychological pressures on observers not to provoke 

violence, observers should always maintain the integrity of their mission, relying on other interventions, 

as described below, to minimize the potential for 

post-election violence.

Joseph Njoroge Kimani, 3, waits while his father, James Kimani Njoroge, casts his vote in Gatundu, Kenya, on October 26, 2017. Father and son both 

wear the colors of the Kenyan flag. (Photo by Ben Curtis/AP)
USIP.ORG 17

A related question concerns the timing of the immediate post-election statement, which often represents 

an observer group’s first substantive, public assessment of the process. Several factors influence the 

current convention of issuing a statement within one 

to three days after the polls close. First, the general 

public is interested in hearing independent groups’ 

assessment of a major national event with a countrywide mobilization. Second, a statement within this 

time frame allows the groups to project a holistic 

assessment of the process as opposed to a focus on 

isolated incidents made public by individual observers 

through their social media networks that might distort 

perceptions and exacerbate existing tensions.39 Third, 

observer groups seek to maximize coverage of their 

assessment in the media and among influential policymakers; to many organizations, delaying the issuance 

of a statement minimizes its impact. 

Observers recognize that their immediate post-election 

statements are commenting on a process that is not yet 

complete. Such statements invariably emphasize the 

importance of allowing the election to play out in the 

prescribed manner and that a final assessment must 

await the completion of the entire process—that is, after the official results are announced and post-election 

complaints have been adjudicated. Even with such 

caveats, the immediate post-election statement often is 

viewed as an organization’s most authoritative assessment, one that either endorses or criticizes the overall 

electoral process. 

Following the 2017 Kenyan election, several delegations issued preliminary statements that were taken as 

endorsement of the process, only to have the Kenyan 

Supreme Court conclude that the electoral process 

was flawed and that a rerun was required. A review of 

the statements indicates that they included the appropriate caveats. Moreover, following the Supreme Court 

decision, the observer groups celebrated this example of meaningful judicial review, regardless of their 

view about the wisdom of requiring a second round of 

voting.40 Nonetheless, many Kenyans felt that observer 

groups prematurely and mistakenly endorsed what the 

higher courts determined was a flawed process.

When observer groups issue preliminary statements, 

they must be prepared to issue supplemental statements to reinforce confidence that national and international communities will receive a full and accurate 

report. The IRI/NDI experience in Zimbabwe offers a 

contemporary example: in the six weeks following the 

issuance of the immediate post-election statement, the 

observer mission organized by the institutes issued 

five additional statements, including a joint statement 

with the other observer groups, in response to specific 

developments related to the electoral process.41

HOST COUNTRY CONDITIONS 

FOR DEPLOYMENT

Organizations sponsoring election observer missions 

require an invitation from the host government before 

they deploy teams on the ground. The host government may issue a generic invitation to all interested 

organizations or limit the invitation to specific organizations. In exchange for formal accreditation, which provides access to polling and counting sites and to other 

relevant data, the host government prescribes the legal 

regime under which the observers operate. However, 

as specified in the respective declarations of principles for international and domestic observers, the host 

government should guarantee the observers freedom 

of movement and freedom to speak publicly. 

Before deciding to accept an invitation, the sponsoring organization should consider two matters. First, 

they should determine whether minimum criteria for 

credible elections are in place—otherwise, it makes 

little sense to expend the resources on the effort. 

Second, they should assess whether security conditions on the ground permit effective observation—

otherwise, the observers may not have the capability 

to offer a credible assessment. A 2014 study for the 

European Parliament, for example, recommended 
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

that “alternatives to EU election observation missions 

(EOMs) should be developed for conflict situations 

where minimum conditions for observation may be 

lacking and the presence of an EU EOM could potentially exacerbate conflict.”42

The accreditation process impacts the observers’ ability to prevent or mitigate violence in several ways. For 

example, formal accreditation may not occur until after 

an election date is formally set. Hence, some of the 

more contentious aspects of the election process—

including voter registration, constituency delimitation, 

and party selection of candidates—may take place 

before an international observer mission receives authorization for an on-the-ground deployment. In these 

circumstances, domestic groups, assuming they are 

well organized and adequately funded, bear the burden of projecting a deterrent presence and reporting 

on the incidents of violence during these early phases 

of the process. 

Host governments also may place limits on the specific activities of observer groups, most notably by 

regulating the timing of the announcement of results 

generated by a PVT. From the government’s perspective, only the designated EMB has the authority 

to release official results. The government may fear, 

sincerely or as a pretext to obscure electoral manipulation, that releasing unofficial results will confuse 

the public and arouse tensions. The counterargument 

is that, in a highly contentious political environment, 

where the EMB does not have the confidence of 

the population or where delays in releasing official 

results are likely, a credible PVT calms tensions and 

encourages reliance on peaceful means for resolving 

disputes regarding election outcomes. As PVTs serve 

both to enhance the quality of the observers’ assessment process and to prevent tensions from escalating, observers should emphasize the importance 

of allowing a credible PVT and the release of PVT

results in a timely manner.

In Zimbabwe, ZESN did not disclose publicly the results 

of its PVT until the official results were announced, 

although they were shared privately with senior diplomats from several countries. The PVT indicated that 

the official results were within the range of credible 

results and that the principal opposition presidential 

candidate’s claim that he had received a majority of 

the votes was not credible. The diplomats and the 

leaders of the observer delegations used the PVT

results to reinforce the notion that seeking to reverse 

the announced results through street demonstrations 

that could turn violent, as opposed to pursuing remedies through the legal process, would not obtain the 

support of the international community. 

TEMPORAL AND GEOGRAPHIC PRESENCE

The operating assumption for incorporating a violence 

prevention component into the observer mission mandate is that the presence of independent observers deters violence from erupting, or at the very least limits the 

scope of any violence that does emerge. This suggests 

that an extended and geographically widespread presence is the necessary approach. However, despite decades of experience, no cookie-cutter formula exists for 

determining the scope and size of an observer mission. 

Such decisions require consideration of the historic and 

political context in which the election is occurring, an 

appreciation of who else is operating in the observation 

space, and a calculation of the costs, risks, and benefits 

associated with the agreed-upon activities. 

In planning an observer mission, the sponsoring organization must consider several factors. First, should 

observers be deployed at the start of the election cycle, 

which often commences with the voter registration 

process, or only once the election is formally scheduled, which usually is when the responsible EMB issues 

the official invitations to observe the election? Second, 

should observers be deployed in a random fashion 

across the country, which will permit a broad assessment 

of the situation on the ground, or in targeted hot spots 

where their deterrent role can be fully appreciated?
USIP.ORG 19

These questions reflect uncertainty about the impact 

that observers actually have on the process. For example, one recent study concluded that to “avoid negative 

publicity and punishment, domestic elites strategically 

shift violent intimidation to the pre-election period in internationally monitored elections, resulting in increased 

violent manipulation before elections but relatively lower levels of violence on election day.”43 This assumes 

a high degree of premeditation and coordination by 

domestic actors in directing and controlling the timing 

and nature of the violence.

There is also the question of possible geographic displacement, in which election violence shifts from regions 

where observers are deployed to those where they 

are absent. Several country studies that were part of a 

research project conducted by Jonas Claes revealed a 

strong correlation between a combination of mapping 

programs and robust monitoring on the one hand and 

low levels of violence on the other.44 A follow-up USIP 

comparative study on elections in Kenya and Liberia 

found that greater exposure to election monitoring was 

associated with increased trust in the electoral process, 

and a general public belief that observers could mitigate 

fraud and prevent election violence.45

Today, many observer groups use technology to identify hot spots and to track incidents of violence. The 

Election Violence Education and Resolution methodology developed by the International Foundation for 

Electoral Systems provides a framework for systematic 

information gathering, standards for verification, and 

analysis of tensions and community indicators.46 Another 

well-known violence tracking tool is Ushahidi, an opensource platform developed to map reports of violence 

in Kenya after the post-election violence in 2008, which 

People wait to cast their votes during the October 10, 2017 presidential election in Monrovia, Liberia. (Photo by Abbas Dulleh/AP)
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

has since been used as a crowdsourcing tool across 

Africa and beyond.47 However, even the most robust 

platform for mapping incidents will yield only limited 

benefits if a complementary “response” mechanism is 

lacking. As the following comment about the 2013 Kenya 

elections illustrates, “In the end, the [Ushahidi] platform 

served only as a data warehouse for incidences, rather 

than a coordinating mechanism for response as promised. Peace monitors and implementing partners sent 

text messages detailing incidents, but never received 

responses as to how the issue was addressed.”48

COORDINATION AMONG OBSERVERS

A major advance in the practice of election observation 

during the past decade has been the conscious effort 

to ensure effective coordination among the leading 

organizations that sponsor international observer missions. The coordination occurs at multiple levels and 

involves sharing information, harmonizing deployments, 

previewing preliminary statements, and undertaking 

joint mediation efforts as necessary. In the African context, for example, the AU and African subregional organizations coordinate efforts to prevent the outbreak 

of violence, even where they may be wary of criticizing 

too bluntly the integrity of the electoral process. 

Zimbabwe again provides an illustrative example. The 

leadership of the principal international observer groups 

met two days before the 2018 elections and on the day 

following the elections to compare assessments of the 

pre-election process, to coordinate the timing of the release of post-election statements, and to share perspectives regarding election day observations. As noted earlier, the EU, IRI/NDI, and the Commonwealth were critical 

in their preliminary assessment of the overall process, 

while the AU and the SADC assessments were more favorable. However, all the observer groups incorporated 

into their respective statements recommendations that 

the competing parties remain calm while waiting for the 

release of the official results and that parties should use 

available legal mechanisms to seek redress for election-related complaints. 

When seven people were killed in Harare by security 

forces two days after the election, the leaders of the observer groups quickly met, agreed to issue a joint statement condemning the violence and calling for the rapid 

release of the election results, and arranged a series of 

joint meetings with the two leading presidential candidates and the head of the election commission to share 

their concerns about the violence getting out of hand.49

The results were released later that evening and the 

streets remained calm, as the losing candidate sought to 

overturn the results through the prescribed constitutional mechanism for electoral challenges. Although there 

were no further clashes such as had occurred in Harare, 

there were credible reports of multiple incidents of 

retribution against opposition supporters taking place in 

various regions. Thus, the precise impact of the international observers in mitigating the post-election violence 

in Zimbabwe remains an open question. 

Coordination between international and domestic observers is less formalized and more dependent on the orientation of the sponsoring international organization. Almost 

all international observers will provide rhetorical support 

for the efforts undertaken by domestic counterparts, 

but only a few will actively coordinate with the domestic 

groups. The implication is that the domestic groups, even 

though they identify as nonpartisan, are unlikely to maintain such a posture in practice, and hence their credibility 

as observers is one of the factors that the international 

observers must assess as part of their mission. 

This dialectic is heightened when the domestic group 

is conducting a PVT. Some international groups will 

distance themselves from referencing the announced 

PVT results, relying exclusively on the official results. 

Other groups, most prominently NDI, IRI, and the Carter 

Center, consider a credible PVT essential to their ability 

to assess the credibility of the tabulation process. As 

was the case in Zimbabwe, the NDI often directly supports a domestic group in designing and implementing 

a PVT, while simultaneously sponsoring an international 

observer mission. 
USIP.ORG 21

SECURITY CONUNDRUMS

The most serious concern confronting the sponsors of an observation effort is ensuring that their 

observers are not placed at risk of physical harm. 

Veteran observers often describe the most dangerous aspects of their deployments as involving road 

accidents and food ailments, yet observers occasionally have been directly affected by election violence. 

Most poignantly, during the 2014 Afghan elections, 

the Taliban targeted a hotel frequented by the international community in Kabul, killing several people, 

including an international observer who was part of 

the NDI observer delegation.50

Observers, particularly those deployed to isolated 

communities, are subject to competing demands. 

They are briefed on the importance of their presence 

as a deterrent, suggesting that they should be mobile 

and visible, and on their responsibility to investigate 

acts of violence as part of their monitoring and mediating mandates. At the same time, they are informed 

that their role is one of “observer,” not adjudicator; 

they are warned against intervening in domestic 

processes; and they are told above all else that their 

personal security is the highest priority of the sponsoring organization.

NDI’s 1995 handbook for domestic monitoring organizations frames the issues as follows:

For the monitoring group, security issues may raise difficult 

policy dilemmas. For example, publicizing the presence 

of monitors and challenging irregularities are activities 

that help promote confidence in the election process. 

However, accomplishing the goals may require exposing 

volunteers to danger. . . . In order to prevent monitors 

from publicizing their findings, individuals or groups may 

attempt to intimidate or incapacitate the monitors.51

A 2014 NDI guidance document advises individual 

observers to take the following practical steps: build 

relationships, maintain regular internal communications, 

recognize the security implications of social networking, 

take particular precautions when releasing or disseminating sensitive information, and develop security plans 

and implement training programs to socialize them.52

Presently, observer groups are responding to security 

challenges by retaining experienced security advisers 

and relying on advances in technology. The security 

advisers, often former military or police officials, are 

among the first deployed when the observer mission 

is established. They conduct security assessments 

to identify risk factors and to recommend steps for 

mitigating the risks. These advisers often remain on the 

ground throughout the mission and are the authoritative voice when mission leadership needs to balance 

identified mission objectives with perceived security 

risks. The consequence is that observers often are 

precluded from being present in precisely those areas 

where violence is most likely to occur.

As a counterpoint, advanced telecommunications contribute to an increased willingness to allow observers 

to travel outside the capital and other major cities. Cell 

phone coverage, even in the least developed countries, is rapidly expanding, and most observer groups 

deployed outside capitals will be equipped with satellite telephones, which theoretically allow for communication from anywhere. 

A final point about security relates to the observers’ interactions with local security forces (police and military). 

In many instances, the security forces are apolitical 

and seek to fulfill their constitutional mandate to the 

best of their abilities, which admittedly may be more 

limited than the observers expect. However, in some 

Security advisers, often former military or police officials, are among the first deployed

when the observer mission is established. They conduct security assessments to

identify risk factors and to recommend steps for mitigating the risks.
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

instances, the security forces, operating either overtly 

or covertly, may be viewed as instigators of violence 

or as unwilling to act in the face of violence. In such 

circumstances, the observers’ tasks include critically 

monitoring the actions of the security forces while at 

the same time seeking security force protection for 

themselves and for other actors in the political process. 

Engaging with security forces; asking about their training, practices, and disciplinary measures; and inquiring 

about their plans for providing election security before, 

during, and after election day may all encourage security forces to play their appropriate roles. At the same 

time, the observers must avoid spending too much 

time with the security forces or accepting at face value 

the data provided by them, as this may create the impression among the general public that the observers 

have been co-opted.

OBSERVATION COSTS

The inclusion of a violence prevention objective into 

the observer mission mandate requires a concomitant increase in resources allocated to the effort. As 

described above, an observer mission’s temporal 

scope now reaches back to the earliest parts of the 

process, such as voter registration, which may begin 

a year before election day. And as violence is a major 

concern following the announcement of results and 

adjudication of complaints, the continued presence 

of observers may be critical during these periods. 

Similarly, from a geographic perspective, observers 

are not just seeking to identify whether the processes 

are credible, but also to deter violence in vulnerable 

regions. Coordination among observer groups can 

help reduce costs, as different groups focus on particular aspects of the process 

An Afghan police officer stands guard while voters line up to enter a polling station and cast their ballots in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 5, 2014.

(Photo by Muhammed Muheisen/AP)
USIP.ORG 23

In addition to the temporal and geographic increases 

in observer mission scope, securitization adds other 

costs. Security advisers cost money, as does the expensive technology required to keep mission members 

physically safe and to allow them to communicate with 

headquarters on a regular basis. Given observer missions’ limited resources, trade-offs may include: 

• Deploying more long-term observers versus adding 

a larger number of short-term observers;

• Procuring advanced communications technology 

versus recruiting skilled and knowledgeable drivers;

• Supporting international observer missions with their 

embedded travel and per diem costs versus funding 

an expansive domestic observer mission; and

• Funding a full-scale observation mission versus other forms of assistance, such as technical assistance 

to the EMB, civic and voter education programs, 

election-related security training, and support for 

election dispute resolution mechanisms.

All such decisions require a coherent plan of action 

that is derived from an understanding of the situation 

on the ground and an assessment of the cost-effectiveness of previous interventions.

INFLUENCING LONG-TERM REFORMS

Most observer missions prepare a lengthy final report, 

which includes a fulsome set of recommendations to 

the various host-country electoral actors. The reports 

generally are published several months after the 

conclusion of the last phase of a given election cycle 

and provide a constructive frame for follow-on debates 

within the legislature or the EMB. The final report does 

not receive as much public attention as the statement 

issued immediately after election day, but nonetheless forms part of the election cycle construct favored 

by election administrators and outside experts. The 

cycle begins soon after the completion of the previous 

election with an after-action review, proceeds to a discussion among election officials and others regarding 

the need for legislative and administrative reforms, and 

continues with the development of an operation plan 

and the procurement of necessary election paraphernalia, all of which may occur two or three years before 

the next election. However, maintaining momentum for 

electoral reform is a challenge around the globe. 

The substance of the recommendations offered by 

election observer missions is particularly important 

in the context of elections marred by violence. By 

documenting specific cases and drawing on comparative perspectives, observers can focus attention on 

sensitive issues relating to the role played by security 

forces during the electoral process (whether positive 

or negative); to the importance of prosecuting those 

responsible for instigating electoral violence; to the 

need for initiatives like peace commissions and peace 

messaging before, during, and after the elections; and 

to actions that media outlets can take to avoid fanning 

any flames. Observer groups should reinforce their 

recommendations through continued on-the-ground 

engagement with the relevant players and through 

assistance programs that address the flaws identified in 

the observer mission’s final report.
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

Conclusions and 

Recommendations 

This report has traced the evolution of modern-day 

election observation from a focus on providing a credible and objective assessment of a contested electoral process to a multi-mandate effort with a violence 

prevention component. Election observers’ expanded 

mandates must be complemented with a multifaceted, 

integrated set of initiatives that address the problem 

of electoral violence. These initiatives may include 

electoral reforms, codes of conduct, civic education, 

violence mapping and response mechanisms, efforts 

to counter disinformation campaigns, and initiatives to 

address other root causes of violence. However, election observation missions must not be viewed as the 

silver bullet for preventing election-related violence. In 

particular, organizations should weigh the serious risks 

of deploying observers to countries where internal 

security conditions may compromise the observers’ 

freedom of movement or place them at physical risk. 

With the aforementioned caveats in mind, the following 

recommendations will enhance the ability of an election observer mission to prevent election violence.

BEFORE THE ELECTION

Election observers should ensure that their pre-election 

assessments incorporate a violence prevention orientation. To do so, they will have to review previous electoral 

experiences and the configuration of the wider conflict, 

analyze security force capabilities, and examine existing plans for addressing outbreaks of violence and the 

impact of an election observation mission in terms of potential conflict mitigation or exacerbation. As part of this 

work, they will need to encourage adequate support for 

a holistic approach to violence prevention, recognizing 

that election observation is merely one component of 

the overall effort. 

As the election day approaches, observers should 

establish robust mechanisms for engaging with key 

domestic players in the electoral process, including 

the EMB, political parties, and security forces, while 

respecting that their priority is to fulfill their assigned 

operational tasks. They will need to design an operational plan that includes deployment of both short- and 

long-term observers to targeted hot spots and emphasizes flexibility in responding to developments on the 

ground. To carry out this plan, they will need to train 

observers, particularly those deployed for long-term 

assignments, in violence prevention techniques and in 

how best to engage effectively with security forces.

DURING THE ELECTION PERIOD

Electoral violence can occur well before the polls open, 

so observers will benefit from using existing technology platforms to map and report incidents of violence. 

On-the-ground mediation or public statements issued 

by observer groups may help facilitate effective and 

timely responses. Global coordination mechanisms, 

similar to those applied in African countries, among 

international and domestic observer groups can be 

established at both national and local levels to provide 

real-time mediation when violence appears imminent.

Throughout the election period, international observers 

must recognize and support the important role that 

domestic observers play in addressing, deterring, and 

responding to election-related violence. Support for 
USIP.ORG 25

domestic observers may include efforts to promote the 

use of credible PVTs to provide data that can validate 

or call into question the official results released by the 

EMB, and can thus enhance mediation efforts by diplomats and observer groups. Election observers should 

also issue periodic statements assessing different 

phases of the electoral process, crafting their narrative 

to focus on levels of violence, sources of violence, and 

responses to violence. 

AFTER THE ELECTION

An election observer’s work does not stop after the 

election is over. When preparing assessments of their 

experiences, observers should incorporate specific 

recommendations into final reports that stress ways to 

minimize violence in future elections and encourage ongoing dialogue among local actors. These recommendations should emphasize, where necessary, the need for 

key reforms well in advance of the next scheduled elections. Beyond action taken at specific elections, election 

observation organizations can support further research 

on the relationship between election observation and 

violence prevention, including more empirical data on 

the specific circumstances where election observation is likely to mitigate or enhance electoral violence. 

Practitioners and academic experts have much to learn 

from each other, but unless they have opportunities to 

share information and engage in dialogue, the problem 

of election violence will continue to interfere with individuals’ rights to express their opinions at the ballot box.

Congolese political party observers check independent electoral commission officials’ tally of presidential ballots from over 900 polling stations at a 

local results-compilation center in Kinshasa, Congo, on January 4, 2019. (Photo by Jerome Delay/AP)
26 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

Notes

1. Norimitsu Onishi and Jeffrey Moyo, “Zimbabwe Elections, Mostly Peaceful, Bring Voters Out in Droves,” New York Times, July 31, 

2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/world/africa/zimbabwe-election.html.

2. See the following final election observer mission reports: The Commonwealth, “Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 30 July 2018,” 

November 2018; European Union Election Observer Mission, “Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018 Final Report,” October 2018; 

International Republican Institute (IRI)/National Democratic Institute (NDI), “Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission 

Final Report,” October 2018; Zimbabwe Election Support Network, “Report on the July 30 Harmonized Elections,” October 2018.

3. The expenses associated with an observation mission depend on context factors such as in-country cost of living and length 

of deployments. For international observers, the costs include travel, lodging, and per diems for a coordinating team, long-term 

observers, and short-term observers, and the associated expenses for making the mission operational (e.g., car rentals, communications, meeting rooms). The per-person costs for domestic observers include per diems for participating in training sessions 

and for working on election day, and the numbers recruited are exponentially larger than the international missions. The expenses associated with the other available tools are more modest, with the exception of the deployment of peacekeepers. 

4. Holly Ruthrauff and Andrew Bruce, “Developing Operational Tools Within the EU for a Comprehensive Approach to Prevent 

Electoral Violence,” European Parliament, 2015), 1, www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/534986/EXPO_STU

(2015)534986_EN.pdf. 

5. See Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA), www.nelda.co; Sarah Birch 

and David Muchlinski, “The Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence,” Terrorism and Political Violence 32, no. 2 (2020), 

217–36; Ursula Daxecker, Elio Amicarelli, and Alexander Jung, “Electoral Contention and Violence (ECAV): A New Dataset,” 

Journal of Peace Research 56, no. 5 (2019): 714–23. The newest contribution is the Global Election Violence Dataset, which is 

described in Inken von Borzyskowski, The Credibility Challenge: How Democracy Aid Influences Election Violence (Ithaca, NY: 

Cornell University Press, 2019), appendix 1C, 170–79.

6. Dorina A. Bekoe and Stephanie M. Burchard, “The Contradictions of Pre-election Violence: The Effects of Violence on Voter 

Turnout in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Africa Studies Review 60, no. 2 (2017), 74–75. 

7. Von Borzyskowski, The Credibility Challenge, 3. 

8. According to one recent study, election years are, on average, no more violent than non-election years. Dorina Bekoe, ed., 

Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2012), 4. 

9. Nic Cheesman and Brian Klaas, How to Rig an Election (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018), 96–97. 

10. Julia Brothers and Michael McNulty, “Monitoring and Mitigating Election Violence Through Nonpartisan Citizen Election 

Observation,” National Democratic Institute, 6, www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/Monitoring-and-Mitigating-Electoral-Conflict.pdf.

11. Ruthrauf and Bruce, “Developing Operational Tools Within the EU,” 2. 

12. Birch and Mulchinski, “The Dataset of Countries at Risk of Electoral Violence.” 

13. Von Borzyskowski, The Credibility Challenge, 33–35. 

14. Jonas Claes and Inken von Borzyskowski, “What Works in Preventing Election Violence: Evidence From Liberia and Kenya,”

Peaceworks no. 143, United States Institute of Peace, October 2018, 5, www.usip.org/publications/2018/10/what-works

-preventing-election-violence.

15. “Burundi: Post-election Killings and Civil War,” Mass Atrocity Endings (blog), World Peace Foundation, Fletcher School, Tufts 

University, April 7, 2015, https://sites.tufts.edu/atrocityendings/2015/08/07/burundi-post-election-killings-and-civil-war.

16. Judith Kelley, “D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observation,” International Organization 63, 

no. 4 (2009), 775.

17. IRI/NDI, “Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission,” 30–31.

18. US Agency for International Development (USAID), “Best Practices in Election Security: A Guide for Democracy, Human Rights and 

Governance Programming,” 2013, 3, www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1860/Electoral_Security_Best_Practices_USAID-1.pdf. 

19. Larry Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing (Washington: International Human Rights Law Group, 1984). 
USIP.ORG 27

20. NDI, “Reforming the Philippines Electoral Process,” 1991, 12–15, www.ndi.org/sites/default/files/233_ph_reforming_0.pdf. The 

stated objectives of the international observer delegation organized by the NDI and IRI were “1) to evidence support for those 

committed to the democratic process in the Philippines; 2) to deter fraud on election day and during the counting phase by 

being present in key provinces; 3) to detect and report incidents of fraud and other violations of the election code; and 4) to 

disseminate broadly an independent evaluation of the electoral process.” 

21. For a discussion of the evolution of the term and practices associated with PVTs, see Larry Garber and Glenn Cowan, “The 

Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations,” Journal of Democracy 4, no. 2 (1993): 95–107.

22. NDI, “Reforming the Philippines Electoral Process,” 48. 

23. See “Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations,” initiated 

by the Global Network of Domestic Election Monitors (GNDEM), April 3, 2012, www.gndem.org/assets/pdfs/DoGP_en.pdf. 

24. Jennifer McCoy, Larry Garber, and Robert A. Pastor, “Pollwatching and Peacemaking,” Journal of Democracy 2, no. 4 (1991): 102–14.

25. See generally Krishna Kumar, ed., Post-conflict Elections, Democratization and International Assistance (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 

1998). Additionally, in the cases of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Timor-Leste, the international community did much more 

than directly support the state with supplies and expert staff. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, under Annex 3 of the Dayton 

Peace Agreement, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe was vested with the explicit responsibility to directly 

supervise the preparation and conduct of all elections. This responsibility included the authority to establish and lead a Provisional 

Election Commission responsible, inter alia, for adopting all electoral rules and regulations. See “The General Framework 

Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” November 21, 1995, www.osce.org/files/f/documents/e/0/126173.pdf.

26. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, “Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human 

Dimension of the CSCE,” article 8, June 20, 1990, www.csce.gov/international-impact/publications/document-copenhagen

-meeting-conference-human-dimension-csce. 

27. “Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct for International Election Observers,” 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, October 27, 2005, www.osce.org/odihr/16935.

28. “Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations,” para. 15.

29. UN Women and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Preventing Violence against Women in Elections: A 

Programming Guide (New York: UN Women and UNDP, 2017), 8.

30. UN Women and UNDP, Preventing Violence against Women, 46, 68. See also Gabrielle S. Bardall, “Violence, Politics and 

Gender,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (February 2018).

31. Eric Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy (Washington: Woodrow Wilson Center 

Press, 2004), 78–81.

32. IRI/NDI, “Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission Final Report,” 68–69. 

33. These points are elaborated in an unpublished paper provided to the author by Pat Merloe, NDI’s long-time senior associate for 

electoral programs.

34. See “Declaration of Global Principles,” para. 5.

35. Kelley, “D-Minus Elections,” 783.

36. Ursula Daxecker, “The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-election Violence in Africa,” 

Journal of Peace Research 49, no. 4 (2012), 504.

37. Von Borzyskowski, The Credibility Challenge, 153. 

38. See, for instance, The Carter Center, “March 7, 2018 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections in Sierra Leone,” March 23, 2018, 58–

59, www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/news/peace_publications/election_reports/sierra-leone-report-032318.pdf. This report 

contrasts the differences in the preliminary statements issued by the African Union, ECOWAS, the Commonwealth, the European 

Union, and the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa following the first round of the Sierra Leone elections.

39. Observer groups have struggled with the pervasive reality of social media in contemporary society. Several have sought commitments from members of an observer mission not to post anything until after the formal statement is issued by the mission 

leadership, while other groups have adopted less restrictive approaches. 

40. See Larry Garber, “The Kenya Elections and the Future of Election Observation,” Lobe Log, December 1, 2017, www.lobelog.com

/the-kenya-elections-and-the-future-of-election-observation.

41. IRI/NDI, “Zimbabwe International Election Observation Mission Final Report,” appendices C–G at 79–88.

42. Ruthrauff and Bruce, “Developing Operational Tools Within the EU,” 1.

43. Ursula Daxecker, “All Quiet on Election Day? International Election Observation and Incentives for Pre-Election Violence in 
28 PEACEWORKS | NO. 165

African Elections,” Electoral Studies 34 (2014): 232–43.

44. Jonas Claes, Electing Peace: Violence Prevention and Impact at the Polls (Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2016), 3.

45. Claes and von Borzyskowski, “What Works in Preventing Election Violence,” 23.

46. International Foundation for Electoral Systems, “Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER),” August 2014, www.ifes.org

/sites/default/files/ever_one_pager_august_2014.pdf.

47. Nat Manning, “10 Years of Innovation. 10 Years of Global Impact,” Ushahidi, October 31, 2018, www.ushahidi.com

/blog/2018/10/31/10-years-of-innovation-10-years-of-global-impact. 

48. Larry Garber, Elizabeth Dallas, and Johanna Wilkie, “USAID Support for Kenya’s 2013 Elections: Rapid Assessment Review,” 

USAID, 2014, 22, www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1866/Kenya%2527s%25202013%2520Elections.pdf.

49. European Union Election Observer Mission, “Zimbabwe Harmonised Elections 2018 Final Report,” 38. 

50. NDI, “NDI Mourns Luis Maria Duarte,” March 21, 2014, www.ndi.org/NDI-mourns-Luis-Duarte. 

51. NDI, How Domestic Organizations Monitor Elections: An A to Z Guide (Washington, DC: NDI, 1995), 46.

52. Brothers and McNulty, "Monitoring and Mitigating Election Violence,” 61–64.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

The United States Institute of Peace is a national, 

nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress 

and dedicated to the proposition that a world without 

violent conflict is possible, practical, and essential for US

and global security. In conflict zones abroad, the Institute 

works with local partners to prevent, mitigate, and resolve 

violent conflict. To reduce future crises and the need for 

costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil 

societies to help their countries solve their own problems 

peacefully. The Institute provides expertise, training, 

analysis, and support to those who are working to build a 

more peaceful, inclusive world.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC, Washington, DC • George E. 

Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • 

Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. 

Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Roger Hertog Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University 

School of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, Distinguished Practitioner, 

School of International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert 

F. Kennedy Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las 

Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University, 

Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, National Council on Independent Living, 

Potsdam, NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, 

Arlington, VA • J. Robinson West, Former Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive 

Vice President, Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC 

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State • Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense • Frederick J. Roegge, Vice

Admiral, US Navy; President, National Defense University • Joe Lataille, Acting President; Chief Financial 

Officer, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS

Since its inception in 1991, the United States Institute of Peace Press has published hundreds of influential 

books, reports, and briefs on the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. All our books and reports arise from research and fieldwork sponsored by the Institute’s many 

programs, and the Press is committed to expanding the reach of the Institute’s work by continuing to publish significant and sustainable publications for practitioners, scholars, diplomats, and students. Each work 

undergoes thorough peer review by external subject experts to ensure that the research and conclusions 

are balanced, relevant, and sound.
2301 Constitution Avenue NW

Washington, DC 20037

202.457.1700

www.USIP.org

Making Peace Possible

NO. 165 | August 2020

Responding to severe occurrences of election-related violence, the international community 

has increasingly focused on developing a set of tools to prevent and mitigate such 

outbreaks. One of those tools is a violence-prevention mandate in the election observation 

missions carried out by intergovernmental, international nongovernmental, and domestic 

nonpartisan organizations. This report defines the problem of election violence, describes 

how election observation missions have evolved over the past four decades to include 

violence prevention and mitigation components, assesses the direct and indirect impact 

of election observation on election violence, and provides recommendations for actions 

observer missions should undertake before, during, and after voting.

• Water Conflict Pathways and Peacebuilding Strategies by David Michel 

(Peaceworks, August 2020)

• Preparing the Global Counterterrorism Forum for the Next Decade by Eric 

Rosand (Special Report, August 2020)

• Disengagement and Reconciliation in Conflict-Affected Settings by Leanne 

Erdberg Steadman (Special Report, August 2020)

• Toward a Kashmir Endgame? How India and Pakistan Could Negotiate a 

Lasting Solution by Happymon Jacob (Special Report, August 2020)

• India’s Kashmir Conundrum: Before and After the Abrogation of Article 370 by 

Sameer P. Lalwani and Gillian Gayner (Special Report, August 2020)

OTHER USIP PUBLICATIONS