NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

SHANE T. BETTS,

Defendant/Appellant,

v.

SAMUEL E. CARR, D.C., P.C., et al. 

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 21-0008 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2019-000419

The Honorable Joseph P. Mikitish, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Shane T. Betts, Phoenix

Defendant/Appellant

Jeffrey L. Bradford, PLLC, Phoenix

By Jeffrey L. Bradford

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Samuel E. Carr, D.C., P.C.

Law Office of Lawrence K. Lynde, Phoenix

By Lawrence K. Lynde

Counsel for Defendant/Appellee Joseph A. Silence

FILED 11-30-2021
BETTS v. CARR, et al. 

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Peter B. Swann and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1 Shane Betts appeals the superior court’s judgment in favor of

Dr. Samuel Carr and Joseph Silence on their claims of breach of contract 

and unjust enrichment. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2 This appeal arises from two contracts for professional 

services—legal services and chiropractic services—entered by Betts after he 

was injured in a car accident in December 2015. Betts retained Silence to 

pursue his personal injury claim against the other driver. Betts and Silence 

entered a contingent fee agreement, which promised that Silence would 

receive either 30% or 33% “of any settlement offers or gross recovery,”

depending on whether a lawsuit was filed. For seven months, Silence 

performed legal services for Betts, culminating in a settlement demand 

letter to the other driver’s insurance carrier for $42,500. The insurer 

counteroffered $30,000. Just three days later, Betts fired Silence and he 

represented himself moving forward. Silence later asserted a charging lien 

for $9,000 in attorney fees, representing 30% of the insurer’s counteroffer. 

¶3 Betts also entered a contract with Dr. Carr to receive 

chiropractic treatment, which acknowledged that Betts was personally 

responsible for payment and Dr. Carr would defer payment until 

settlement of the negligence claim. After making 54 visits to Dr. Carr over 

four months, and accruing $8,574 in medical bills, Betts asked Dr. Carr to 

bill his insurance carrier. Dr. Carr declined, explaining that any insurance 

claims needed to be submitted within 90 days of treatment. Betts refused 

to pay. Dr. Carr asserted a medical lien. 

1 We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the 

superior court’s judgment after a bench trial. Vanessa H. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 215 Ariz. 252, 256, ¶ 20 (App. 2007).
BETTS v. CARR, et al. 

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¶4 Around two years after he fired Silence, Betts settled his 

negligence claim with the insurance company for $34,244.10. The 

settlement agreement addressed the charging and medical liens. Betts 

promised to satisfy all liens “by payment from the settlement funds,” and 

he agreed the liens “are [his] sole responsibility.” The agreement also 

required the settlement proceeds to remain in trust until the liens were 

resolved.

¶5 Betts later demanded all settlement proceeds from the 

insurer. The insurer paid $16,670.10 to Betts, representing the undisputed 

portion of the settlement, but filed an interpleader action in the superior 

court to allocate the remainder. The insurer deposited the funds with the 

court and was dismissed from the action. Silence and Dr. Carr asserted 

crossclaims against Betts for breach of contract. Silence also requested the 

reasonable value of his services under quantum meruit. Betts moved to 

dismiss the crossclaims, which the superior court denied.

¶6 The lawsuit went to mandatory arbitration. An arbitrator 

ruled against Betts, who appealed to the superior court, and the case went 

to trial. The bench trial lasted two days and the court received over 50 

exhibits. Five witnesses testified, including Betts, Silence and Dr. Carr.

Betts was given one-half of the trial time, while Silence and Dr. Carr shared 

the remainder. The court also extended the trial to a second day to allow 

for closing arguments. After the trial, the court entered judgment for 

Silence and Dr. Carr. Betts moved for a new trial and for relief from 

judgment, which the court denied. The court awarded Silence and Carr 

attorney fees and entered final judgment. We have jurisdiction over Betts’s 

timely appeal. See A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1), (A)(2), and (A)(5)(a).

DISCUSSION

¶7 We uphold findings of fact unless “clearly erroneous or 

unsupported by any credible evidence,” Federoff v. Pioneer Title & Tr. Co. of 

Ariz., 166 Ariz. 383, 388 (1990), but review de novo all questions of law, 

Enter. Leasing Co. of Phoenix v. Ehmke, 197 Ariz. 144, 148, ¶ 11 (App. 1999).

We review the denial of a motion for new trial or motion for relief from 

judgment for abuse of discretion. Spring v. Bradford, 243 Ariz. 167, 170, ¶ 11 

(2017); Norwest Bank (Minnesota), N.A. v. Symington, 197 Ariz. 181, 184, ¶ 11 

(App. 2000).

I. Professional Liens

¶8 Betts first contends the professional liens were invalid and 

offered no basis for the judgment. But the court’s judgment was not based 
BETTS v. CARR, et al. 

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on the liens. Rather, the court awarded damages to Carr for breach of 

contract, and awarded Silence the reasonable value of his legal services. We 

affirm because the record has ample supporting evidence that (1) Betts 

entered and breached a contract with Carr, and (2) Betts was unjustly 

enriched by failing to pay Silence for the reasonable value of his legal 

services.

II. Health Insurance

¶9 Betts next argues the judgment was error because Betts had 

health insurance through UnitedHealthcare, Dr. Carr had a contract with 

UnitedHealthcare, and that contract prohibited Dr. Carr from billing Betts 

directly. This argument is meritless. Betts promised to pay Carr for 

treatment under the contract “REGARDLESS OF MY INSURANCE 

STATUS.” Betts did not even provide his health insurance information to 

Carr when entering the contract, and Betts only raised the health insurance 

issue after Carr completed the chiropractic services. Nor did Carr ever bill

or receive payment from UnitedHealthcare for these services.

2

III. Quantum Meruit Award

¶10 Betts next contends the judgment was error because Silence’s 

contingency fee agreement was unethical and invalid. He argues Silence 

was only entitled to damages under quantum meruit. But the superior 

court awarded Silence the reasonable value of his legal services under 

quantum meruit, not for breach of contract. A quantum meruit award is 

permissible under Arizona law unless the parties agreed that services 

would be provided for free, or it would not be unfair to receive the benefit 

of services without payment. Dey v. Quinin, 21 Ariz. 265, 266 (1920) (“It is 

well settled that when one is employed in the services of another for any 

period of time the law implies a promise to pay what such services are 

reasonably worth, unless it is understood that the services were to be 

rendered gratuitously, or unless they were rendered under circumstances 

which repel the presumption.”); see also Blue Ridge Sewer Imp. Dist. v. Lowry 

& Assocs., Inc., 149 Ariz. 373, 376 (App. 1986). Betts does not make these 

arguments, and we find no evidence in the record that Silence agreed to 

perform his services for free or that it would be unfair for Betts to pay 

Silence. 

2 Betts also argues that Dr. Carr’s contract claim was preempted under 

the Employee Retirement Income Services Act (“ERISA”), but he never 

develops the argument or provides supporting authority.
BETTS v. CARR, et al. 

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IV. Interpleader and Assignment

¶11 Betts argues the judgment was error because Arizona 

prohibits an assignment of personal injury claims, and this court should 

“extrapolate[] that to fictional charging lien claims.” We are unpersuaded. 

Betts never assigned his personal injury claim.3 The insurance company 

settled his claim, paid him the uncontested amount and filed an 

interpleader action for Betts, Silence and Carr to litigate their rights to the 

remaining settlement proceeds. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 22. Silence and Carr 

answered and filed crossclaims against Betts for breach of contract. These 

claims were appropriate. Ariz. R. Civ. P. 13(f).

V. Fundamental Error

¶12 Betts contends the superior court committed fundamental 

errors so “numerous I cannot list [them] all.” His argument fails. 

Fundamental error is “error going to the foundation of the case . . . of such 

magnitude that the defendant could not possibly have received a fair trial.” 

State v. Hunter, 142 Ariz. 88, 90 (1984); see also Maxwell v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 

143 Ariz. 205, 212 (App. 1984). Betts received a full and fair trial. He was 

given one-half of the trial time; Silence and Carr shared the rest. The court 

often reminded Betts of his time limitations, encouraged him to focus his 

questions, gave him more time and extended the trial to a second day for 

closing arguments. 

VI. Attorney Fees

¶13 Last, Betts challenges the superior court’s award of attorney 

fees to Silence and Carr. The superior court awarded fees under A.R.S. § 

12-341.01 because Silence’s and Carr’s claims arose out of contracts for 

3 An assignment is a “transfer of rights or property” from one party to 

another. Assignment, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). An 

assignment occurs in personal injury cases when an injured party gives 

away his right to sue and recover to a third party. See Karp v. Speizer, 132 

Ariz. 599, 600-01 (App. 1982) (assignment of personal injury claim and 

proceeds from recovery both unenforceable). These assignments are 

prohibited because of “the dangers of maintenance and champerty,” where 

“unscrupulous people would purchase causes of action and thereby traffic 

in lawsuits for pain and suffering.” Id. (citation omitted). A lien, by 

contrast, is a “legal right or interest that a creditor has in another’s property, 

lasting [] until a debt or duty that it secures is satisfied.” Lien, Black’s Law 

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
BETTS v. CARR, et al. 

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services and Betts refused to provide payment. We review the superior 

court’s decision to award attorney fees under A.R.S. § 12–341.01 for abuse 

of discretion. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Warner, 143 Ariz. 567, 570–71 (1985).

Betts entered two contracts for professional services, refused payment and 

litigated the claims from arbitration to the superior court to the court of 

appeals. Because the court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm the 

attorney fee award.

CONCLUSION

¶14 We affirm the judgment in favor of Dr. Carr and Silence. We 

award Dr. Carr and Silence their attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal 

under A.R.S. § 12-341.01, contingent on compliance with ARCAP 21.