____________

POLICY ISSUE

(Information) 

September 30, 2015 SECY-15-0123

FOR: The Commissioners 

FROM: Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director for Operations 

SUBJECT: THE STAFF’S STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF THE UNCONTESTED 

HEARING FOR ISSUANCE OF COMBINED LICENSES FOR THE 

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT, UNITS 3 AND 4 

PURPOSE: 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has completed its review of the 

application for two combined licenses (COLs) to authorize construction and operation of the 

South Texas Project (STP) Units 3 and 4, located in Matagorda County near Bay City, Texas. 

This reference COL (R-COL) application references the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor 

(ABWR) design certification. 

The staff presents this information paper in accordance with the revised Internal Commission 

Procedures dated June 12, 2012. Issuance of this paper follows the issuance of the final safety 

evaluation report (FSER) on September 29, 2015 (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15232A128). The agency issued the final 

environmental impact statement (FEIS) on February 24, 2011 (NUREG-1937, Volumes 1 and 2 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML11049A000 and ML11049A001, respectively)). The draft COLs for 

STP Units 3 and 4, and a draft record of decision are referenced in this Commission paper 

(ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15176A533, ML15237A141, and ML15070A372, respectively). 

CONTACTS: Tom Tai, NRO/DNRL 

 301-415-8484 

 

 Patricia Vokoun, NRO/DNRL 

 301-415-3470 
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This paper serves as the staff’s primary pre-filed testimony for the uncontested (mandatory) 

hearing for issuance of the COLs for STP Units 3 and 4. This paper, with its references, also 

provides the information requested to support the Commission’s determination that the staff’s 

review has been adequate to support the findings set forth in Title 10, “Energy,” of the Code of 

Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 52.97, “Issuance of combined licenses,” and 10 CFR 51.107, 

“Public hearings in proceedings for issuance of combined licenses; limited work authorizations.” 

In accordance with the Internal Commission Procedures, this paper focuses on non-routine 

matters. Non-routine matters with regard to areas of particular importance in supporting the 

findings related to 10 CFR Part 51, “Environmental Protection Regulations for Domestic 

Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions,” and Part 52, “Licenses, Certifications, and 

Approvals for Nuclear Power Plants,” are matters that relate to any unique features of the facility 

or novel issues that arose as part of the review process. 

SUMMARY: 

This paper addresses each of the findings in 10 CFR 52.97(a) and 10 CFR 51.107(a) and 

provides an adequate basis for the Commission to conclude that each of these findings can be 

made for the STP Units 3 and 4 COL application (COLA). This paper also focuses on nonroutine matters, such as unique features of the facility or novel issues that arose as part of the 

review process. This paper does not address routine aspects of the safety and environmental 

review process. 

BACKGROUND: 

I. Application History 

Application, Ownership, and Location 

On September 20, 2007, STP Nuclear Operating Company (STPNOC) tendered a COLA to 

construct and operate two additional nuclear reactors (STP Units 3 and 4) at the STP Electric 

Generating Station site located in Matagorda County near Bay City, Texas. On 

January 19, 2011, STPNOC notified the NRC that, effective January 24, 2011, Nuclear 

Innovation North America LLC (NINA) became the lead applicant for STP Units 3 and 4, with 

STPNOC remaining as the operator (ADAMS Accession No. ML110250369). 

NINA most recently updated the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA on April 21, 2015 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15120A324). The publicly available portions of the application are available in ADAMS 

and on the NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/south-texasproject/documents.html. There are portions of the application that contain non-public 

information, including the security plan, which contains Safeguards Information (SGI). The SGI 

version of the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA is located on the NRC’s secure local area network. 

The location of the proposed STP Units 3 and 4 is within the site boundaries of the existing 

STP Units 1 and 2, approximately 1,500 feet (ft.) (457 meters (m)) north and 2,150 ft. (655 m) 
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west of the center of STP Units 1 and 2. The STP site and existing facilities are owned by NRG 

Energy, Inc. (NRG); the City Public Service Board of San Antonio, Texas (CPS Energy); and 

the City of Austin, Texas. 

It is planned that STP Unit 3 would be owned by NINA Texas 3 LLC and CPS Energy; and STP 

Unit 4 would be owned by NINA Texas 4 LLC and CPS Energy (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15124A059). NINA Texas 3 LLC and NINA Texas 4 LLC are wholly-owned subsidiaries of 

NINA, which is the entity responsible for the design, construction, and licensing of STP Units 3 

and 4. STPNOC would be the licensed operator for the proposed units, as it currently is for the 

existing Units 1 and 2. 

Additional information about the applicants and ownership arrangements appears in Part 1 

(General and Financial Information) of the COLA. Additional information about the site location 

and characteristics appears in Part 2 (Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR)), Chapters 1 and 2, 

of the COLA. 

Referenced Design Certification and Design Certification Amendments 

The STP Units 3 and 4 COLA references the ABWR design control document (DCD), Revision 

4 (NRC Web site at http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/design-cert/abwr.html#dcd), which 

is incorporated by reference in Appendix A, “Design Certification Rule for the U.S. Advanced 

Boiling Water Reactor,” to 10 CFR Part 52. General Electric (GE) Nuclear Energy was the 

applicant for the ABWR design certification (DC). The FSER was published as NUREG-1503, 

“Final Safety Evaluation Report Related to the Certification of the Advanced Boiling Water 

Reactor Design,” in July 1994 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080670592) and was supplemented 

in May 1997 (ADAMS Accession No. ML080710134). On May 12, 1997, the NRC published the 

ABWR DC final rule in the Federal Register (FR) (62 FR 25800). 

In addition, the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA references an amendment to the ABWR DC to 

address the Aircraft Impact Assessment (AIA) rule. STPNOC was the applicant for the AIA 

Amendment to the ABWR DC rule, and the AIA Amendment DCD, Revision 3 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML102870017), is incorporated by reference in 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A. 

The NRC published the FSER related to the AIA as NUREG-1948, “Final Safety Evaluation 

Report Related to the Aircraft Impact Amendment to the U.S. Advanced Boiling Water Reactor 

(ABWR) Design Certification,” in June 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11182A163). On 

December 16, 2011, the NRC published the AIA Amendment to 10 CFR Part 52, Appendix A in 

the Federal Register (76 FR 78096). 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards 

To support the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) in providing an independent 

review and report to the Commission on the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA, the staff presented the 

results of its safety review to the ABWR subcommittee at 21 meetings held on: December 5, 

2007; March 2, 2010; March 18, 2010; May 20, 2010; June 8, 2010; June 23-24, 2010; 

October 20, 2010; November 30, 2010; February 8, 2011; March 8-9, 2011; April 6, 2011; 
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April 21, 2011; June 21, 2011; October 4, 2011; October 2, 2012; April 24, 2013; July 9, 2013; 

November 22, 2013; April 9, 2014; November 5, 2014; and December 3, 2014. The NRC staff 

presented the results of its STP Units 3 and 4 COL review to the ACRS Full Committee on 

February 5, 2015. The ACRS issued its final recommendation on February 19, 2015 (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15039A006), fulfilling the requirement of 10 CFR 52.87, “Referral to the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards (ACRS),” that the ACRS report on those portions of 

the application that concern safety. The ACRS conclusions and recommendations and the NRC 

staff response are discussed in Section IV of this paper. 

II. Outreach 

Public Meetings 

Before the NRC docketed the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA, the NRC staff held a public outreach 

meeting in Bay City, Texas, on June 27, 2007, to discuss the safety and environmental review 

of the anticipated COLA, to describe opportunities for public participation in the review process, 

and to take questions from the public (ADAMS Accession No. ML071570128). On 

February 5, 2008, the NRC staff held two scoping meetings in Bay City, Texas, to discuss the 

environmental scoping process and to give members of the public an opportunity to provide 

comments on environmental issues the NRC should consider during its review of the application 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML080950478). Approximately 250 people attended, including 

representatives of the NRC staff, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, STPNOC, State and 

local governments, the nuclear industry, members of the public and the local news media. The 

NRC staff hosted an informal “open house” for one hour before the meetings and used displays 

and provided brochures to answer questions about the proposed COLA. 

On July 23, 2008, the NRC staff held a public meeting in Rockville, Maryland, to discuss 

STPNOC’s plans to revise its COLA, and to use Toshiba American Nuclear Energy Corporation 

(TANE) as an alternate vendor (ADAMS Accession No. ML082170465). 

After issuing the draft environmental impact statement (DEIS) on March 19, 2010 (ADAMS 

Accession Nos. ML100700327 and ML100700333), the NRC staff held two public meetings in 

Bay City, Texas, on May 6, 2010, to provide an overview of the DEIS and to accept public 

comments on the document. 

In total, the NRC staff conducted approximately 160 public meetings and public teleconferences 

during the review of the application. 

Federal Register Notices

The NRC published the following Federal Register notices, as required for key milestones in the 

licensing process: 

• After the NRC received the application on September 20, 2007, the agency 

published notice of such receipt on October 24, 2007 (72 FR 60394).
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• The NRC docketed the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA on November 29, 2007, and 

published a notice of docketing on December 5, 2007 (72 FR 68597). 

• On December 21, 2007, the NRC published a notice of intent to prepare an 

environmental impact statement (EIS) and to conduct a scoping process 

(72 FR 72774). 

• On December 27, 2007, the NRC published a notice of hearing and opportunity 

to petition for leave to intervene (72 FR 73381). 

• On February 20, 2008, the NRC published a notice of withdrawing the hearing 

notice on the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA (73 FR 9362). 

• On February 20, 2009, the NRC published a notice of order, hearing, and 

opportunity to petition for leave to intervene (74 FR 7934). 

• On March 25, 2010, the NRC published a notice of availability of the DEIS for 

public comment and notice of public meetings to present an overview of the DEIS 

and to accept public comments on the document (75 FR 14474). 

• On March 2, 2011, the NRC published a notice of availability of the FEIS 

(76 FR 11522). 

• On April 23, 2015; April 28, 2015; May 6, 2015; and May 12, 2015, the NRC 

published notices of the COLA in accordance with Section 182c. of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954, as amended (AEA), and 10 CFR 50.43(a)(3) (80 FR 22746, 

80 FR 23597, 80 FR 26104, and 80 FR 27190).

Consultations 

In accordance with Section 657 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the NRC consulted with the 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. As part of its environmental review, in accordance with 

the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and other applicable statutes, including the 

Endangered Species Act and the National Historic Preservation Act, the staff consulted with and 

obtained input from appropriate Federal, State, local, and Tribal organizations. 

Adjudicatory Actions 

 

On December 27, 2007, the NRC published in the Federal Register (72 FR 73381) a notice of 

hearing and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene in the STP Units 3 and 4 COL 

proceeding. On February 20, 2008, the NRC published in the Federal Register (73 FR 9362) a 

notice withdrawing the hearing notice and stating that the notice would be republished when the 

staff was informed that the applicant was prepared to support a review of the complete COLA.
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On February 20, 2009, the NRC published in the Federal Register (74 FR 7934) a notice of 

order, hearing, and opportunity to petition for leave to intervene. On April 21, 2009, a group of 

organizations and individuals filed an intervention petition that included 28 contentions. In two 

decisions dated August 27, 2009 and September 29, 2009 (LBP-09-21 and LBP-09-25, 

respectively, ADAMS Accession No. ML12331A255), the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 

(ASLB) granted the petition and admitted five contentions of omission regarding portions of the 

applicant’s Environmental Report (ER). The five contentions concerned: (1) the environmental 

effects of severe radiological accident scenarios at STP Units 1 or 2 on STP Units 3 or 4, and 

vice versa; (2) impacts associated with the increase in radionuclide concentration in the main 

cooling reservoir (MCR) from operation of STP Units 3 and 4; (3) impacts of increasing 

groundwater tritium concentrations; (4) impacts of unregulated seepage from the MCR into the 

adjacent shallow groundwater; and (5) the impact of the possible withdrawal of additional 

groundwater in excess of that authorized by the current permits. The applicant subsequently 

amended the ER to address these topics and filed motions to dismiss these contentions as 

moot. The ASLB granted these motions on July 2, 2010 (LBP-10-14, ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13252A375). 

On August 14, 2009, the intervenors filed seven additional contentions concerning the adequacy 

of the application with respect to strategies for mitigating the loss of large areas of the nuclear 

plant from fires or explosions. On January 29, 2010, the ASLB denied the additional seven 

contentions (LBP-10-2, ADAMS Accession No. ML13056A621). The intervenors appealed the 

ASLB’s ruling on three of the seven contentions. On June 17, 2010, the Commission denied the 

appeal because it did not satisfy the standards for interlocutory review (CLI-10-16, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML13056A621). 

In December 2009, the intervenors filed nine new contentions and two amended contentions 

concerning the impacts of severe radiological accidents at one unit on the other units at the site, 

and environmental impacts to the MCR. On July 2, 2010, the ASLB denied the intervenors’ 

contentions with the exception of a reformulated Contention CL-2, which concerned the 

applicant’s evaluation of replacement power costs in its analysis of severe accident mitigation 

design alternatives. As admitted by the ASLB, Contention CL-2 alleged that the applicant 

understated the replacement power costs associated with the shutdown of multiple units at the 

STP site (LBP-10-14, ADAMS Accession No. ML13252A375). An evidentiary hearing on 

Contention CL-2 was held in Austin, Texas, on August 18 and 19, 2011. On December 29, 

2011, the ASLB issued a Partial Initial Decision ruling for the applicant and the NRC staff (LBP11-38, ADAMS Accession No. ML14028A565). In so ruling, the ASLB found that the applicant 

and staff carried their respective burdens of proof to demonstrate the adequacy of the 

environmental review in accordance with NEPA and 10 CFR Part 51. 

 

On May 19, 2010, the intervenors filed six contentions based on the DEIS. On 

February 28, 2011, the ASLB admitted one contention, DEIS-1-G, as narrowed by the ASLB, 

and denied the other five contentions (LBP-11-7, ADAMS Accession No. ML13311B485). 

Contention DEIS-1-G concerned the effect of energy efficient building codes on the need for 

power analysis. An evidentiary hearing on this contention was held in Rockville, Maryland, on 
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October 31, 2011. On February 29, 2012, the ASLB issued a Second Partial Initial Decision 

ruling for the NRC staff and the applicant (LBP-12-5, ADAMS Accession No. ML14192B367). In 

its ruling, the ASLB found that the FEIS adequately accounts for reduced demand caused by 

the adoption of energy efficient building codes in Texas and demonstrates a need for power 

from the proposed STP Units 3 and 4. 

Following the Fukushima nuclear power plant accident in Japan in March 2011, a petition to 

suspend all reactor licensing decisions and certain aspects of ongoing licensing proceedings 

was filed in several proceedings beginning on April 14, 2011. Although the petition was not filed 

in this proceeding, the petition filed in other proceedings included references to STP Units 3 

and 4. On September 9, 2011, the Commission denied the suspension petition, but granted the 

intervenors' request for a safety analysis to the extent that the NRC would conduct a short-term 

and long-term lessons-learned analysis of the Fukushima accident (CLI-11-5, ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14028A554). On August 11, 2011, the intervenors filed a contention alleging 

that the FEIS was inadequate in light of information in the NRC’s “Near-Term Task Force 

Review of Insights from the Fukushima Dai-ichi Accident.” The ASLB found this contention to 

be inadmissible on December 29, 2011 (LBP-11-39, ADAMS Accession No. ML14028A565). 

On May 16, 2011, the intervenors submitted Contention FC-1 concerning foreign ownership, 

control, or domination (FOCD) of STP Units 3 and 4 by Toshiba Corporation (Toshiba), a 

Japanese corporation. On September 30, 2011, the ASLB admitted this contention (LBP-11-25, 

ADAMS Accession No. ML14028A554). An evidentiary hearing on the contention was held in 

Houston, Texas, on January 6 through 8, 2014. On April 10, 2014, the ASLB issued a Third 

Partial Initial Decision ruling for the applicant (LBP-14-03, ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14111A456). In this ruling, the ASLB found that the applicant had demonstrated that its 

STP Units 3 and 4 joint venture with Toshiba, is not owned, controlled, or dominated by an 

alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government. The intervenors filed a petition seeking 

Commission review of the ASLB’s ruling on FOCD. On April 14, 2015, the Commission denied 

the petition for review (CLI-15-07, ADAMS Accession No. ML15104A449). 

On February 27, 2014, a petition was filed in this and other proceedings to suspend licensing 

decisions pending the resolution of a rulemaking petition regarding the environmental impacts of 

high-density spent fuel pool storage. The Commission denied this petition on July 17, 2014 

(CLI-14-07, ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A106). 

A contention related to continued storage of spent nuclear fuel was filed in this proceeding on 

July 9, 2012. Pursuant to the Commission’s direction in CLI-12-16, the ASLB issued an order 

holding the contention in abeyance on March 1, 2013 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13060A218). 

On August 26, 2014, the Commission issued an order directing the ASLB to dismiss this 

contention (CLI-14-08, ADAMS Accession No. ML14238A222). The ASLB issued an order 

dismissing the contention and terminating the proceeding on September 19, 2014 (LBP-14-14, 

ADAMS Accession No. ML14262A217). 

A contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition concerning safety issues related to 

disposal of spent nuclear fuel were filed in this proceeding and others on September 29, 2014. 
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The Commission denied the contention, motion to reopen, and suspension petition on 

February 26, 2015 (CLI-15-4, ADAMS Accession No. ML15057A277). On January 28, 2015, a 

petition was filed to supplement the FEIS in this and other proceedings to reference the 

“Continued Storage” generic environmental impact statement (GEIS). The Commission denied 

this petition on April 23, 2015 (CLI-15-10, ADAMS Accession No. ML15113A295). The 

intervenors subsequently filed a hearing request, intervention petition, and motion to reopen 

seeking admission of a “place-holder” contention regarding the NRC’s reliance on the Continued 

Storage Rule and GEIS. The Commission denied these requests on June 9, 2015 (CLI-15-15, 

ADAMS Accession No. ML15160A179). 

Currently, all contested issues in this proceeding have been resolved. 

III. Review Process/Methodology 

A description of the processes and methodologies used to ensure quality, consistency, and 

completeness in preparation of the FSER and FEIS are described in the following documents: 

NUREG-0800, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for 

Nuclear Power Plants (LWR [Light Water Reactor] Edition)” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML070660036). The principal purpose of the standard review plan (SRP) is to ensure the 

quality and uniformity of staff safety reviews. The staff uses the SRP as a routine tool for 

evaluating the safety of nuclear power plant designs. The SRP, comprehensively updated in 

2007, is the most definitive basis available for evaluating whether an application meets the set 

of regulations established by the Commission. Each section of the SRP outlines the specific 

regulations that will be met when the review is complete, including the general design criteria 

from Appendix A, “General Design Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants,” to 10 CFR Part 50, 

“Domestic Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities.” 

NUREG-1555, “Standard Review Plans for Environmental Reviews for Nuclear Power 

Plants: Environmental Standard Review Plan.” This guidance, including a 2007 update that 

addresses environmental reviews for COLAs, includes environmental SRPs that the NRC staff 

uses when conducting environmental reviews of applications related to nuclear power plants, in 

accordance with NEPA and the NRC’s NEPA implementing regulations in 10 CFR Part 51. 

(http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/nuregs/staff/sr1555/) 

NUREG-2157, “Generic Environmental Impact Statement for Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel,” (ADAMS Accession No. ML14198A440). The NRC prepared a final generic 

EIS that provides a regulatory basis for the final rule entitled “Continued Storage of Spent 

Nuclear Fuel.” As directed by 10 CFR 51.23(b), the impacts assessed in NUREG-2157 are 

deemed to be incorporated in an EIS for a COLA. 

SRM-SECY-12-0025, “Proposed Orders and Requests for Information in Response to 

Lessons Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Tsunami,” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML120690347). This Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM) 
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provides direction to the staff on implementing the Commission-approved recommended actions 

to be taken in response to Fukushima lessons learned. 

“Addressing Construction and Preconstruction Activities, Greenhouse Gas Issues, 

General Conformity Determinations, Environmental Justice, Need for Power, Cumulative 

Impact Analysis, and Cultural/Historical Resources Analysis Issues in Environmental 

Impact Statements,” internal NRC Office of New Reactors memorandum, 

December 10, 2010. (ADAMS Accession No. ML100760503). This guidance assisted the 

staff in addressing certain aspects of the environmental reviews for early site permit (ESP) and 

COL applications that: (1) had evolved since the last update to NUREG-1555 (in 2007) or 

(2) had been identified in conducting the first several reviews of ESP and COL applications. 

Regulatory Guides. Regulatory guides (RGs) provide guidance to licensees and applicants on 

implementing specific parts of the NRC’s regulations, techniques used by the NRC staff in 

evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents, and data needed by the staff in its review 

of applications for permits or licenses. Chapter 1, Table 1.9S-1, “Site-Specific Conformance 

with Regulatory Guides,” of the applicant’s FSAR identifies the RGs associated with the STP 

Units 3 and 4 COLA and whether the applicant conformed to or departed from each RG. This 

listing does not include departures from regulatory guidance associated with the ABWR DCD, 

which has been incorporated by reference. 

Interim Staff Guidance. For areas in which the existing SRP does not contain review 

guidance, the staff prepared and used interim staff guidance (ISG) documents. ISGs are found 

at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/isg/. The ISGs clarify technical review 

approaches and address questions related to processes and licensing. The staff used the 

following ISGs in the STP Units 3 and 4 COL review, and the FSER section(s) to which each 

ISG primarily relates are indicated below: 

• DC/COL-ISG-3, “PRA Information to Support Design Certification and Combined 

License Applications,” dated June 11, 2008; see FSER Sections 19.1 and 19.3. 

• DC/COL-ISG-7, “Assessment of Normal and Extreme Winter Precipitation Loads 

on the Roofs of Seismic Category I Structures,” dated June 23, 2009; see FSER 

Sections 2.3S.1 and 3.8.4. 

• DC/COL-ISG-8, “Necessary Content of Plant-Specific Technical Specifications,” 

dated December 9, 2008; see FSER Section 16.4. 

• DC/COL-ISG-15, “Post-Combined License Commitments,” dated January 21, 

2010; see FSER Section 3.2.2. 

• DC/COL-ISG-16, “Compliance with 10 CFR 50.54(hh)(2) and 10 CFR 52.80(d),” 

(nonpublic), dated June 9, 2010; see FSER Section 19.14 and FSER Chapter 19, 

Attachment A (non-public). 
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• DC/COL-ISG-17, “Ensuring Hazard-Consistent Seismic Input for Site Response 

and Soil Structure Interaction Analyses,” issued March 24, 2010; see FSER 

Sections 3.7.1, 3.7.2 and 22.1. 

• DC/COL-ISG-20, “Seismic Margin Analysis for New Reactors Based on 

Probabilistic Risk Assessment,” dated March 15, 2010; see FSER Sections 19.9, 

19.H, and 19.I. 

• DC/COL-ISG-22, “Interim Staff Guidance on Impact of Construction (under a 

Combined License) of New Nuclear Power Plants on Operating Units at MultiUnit Sites,” dated May 11, 2012; see FSER Section 1.10S. 

• DI&C-ISG-02, “Interim Staff Guidance on Digital Instrumentation and Control, 

Diversity and Defense-in-Depth Issues,” dated June 5, 2009; see FSER 

Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 

• DI&C-ISG-03, “Interim Staff Guidance on Review of New Reactor Digital 

Instrumentation and Control Probabilistic Risk Assessments,” dated 

August 11, 2008; see FSER Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 

• DI&C-ISG-04,“Interim Staff Guidance on Highly-Integrated Control Rooms - 

Communications Issues (HICRc),” dated March 6, 2009; see FSER 

Sections 7.1.1, 7.1.2, 7.2, 7.3, 7.4, 7.6, 7.9S, and 7.C. 

• DI&C-ISG-05, “Interim Staff Guidance on Highly-Integrated Control Rooms – 

Human Factors Issues (HICR-HF),” dated November 3, 2008; see FSER 

Sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2. 

• JLD-ISG-2012-01, “Compliance with Order EA-12-049, Order Modifying Licenses 

with Regard to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis 

External Events,” dated August 29, 2012; see FSER Section 22.2. 

• JLD-ISG-2012-03, “Compliance with Order EA-12-051, Reliable Spent Fuel Pool 

Instrumentation,” dated August 29, 2012; see FSER Section 22.3. 

• NSIR/DPR-ISG-01, “Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants,” dated 

November 2011; see FSER Sections 13.3, 13.3C.2, 13.3C.3, and 13.3C.8. 

Office Instructions. In its review, the staff followed administrative guidance contained in a 

number of office instructions. These internal documents address a range of procedural matters, 

including the staff’s process for issuing requests for additional information (RAIs); handling 

audits; ensuring the qualification and training of technical staff and managers; ensuring 

consistency between staff offices; and overseeing interactions with applicants, intervenors, and 

public stakeholders. 
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New and Significant Review Process: The staff has developed a generic process to address 

circumstances in which there is an extended delay between the issuance of the FEIS for a 

particular license application review and the start of that proceeding’s mandatory hearing phase 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML13199A170). This process provides guidance to the environmental 

staff on identifying potentially new and significant information after the DEIS or FEIS is issued in 

order to determine its significance, and to consider whether this information requires 

supplementation of the DEIS or FEIS in accordance with 10 CFR 51.72(a) or 10 CFR 51.92(a). 

IV. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Report

The ACRS review of the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA culminated with a letter to the Commission 

dated February 19, 2015, concluding that: (1) there is reasonable assurance that STP Units 3 

and 4 can be built and operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the public and 

that the COLA for STP Units 3 and 4 should be approved following its final revision; and 

(2) there is reasonable assurance that the ABWR design and the STP Units 3 and 4 site satisfy 

the requirements resulting from the Fukushima Near-Term Task Force recommendations 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15039A006). 

The ACRS letter identified two issues that it said the staff should address with the issuance of 

the STP Units 3 and 4 COLs. The ACRS recommended that: (1) the final plant-specific turbine 

missile analysis should explicitly evaluate each turbine control and protection system; and 

(2) the staff should incorporate a risk-informed analysis to determine the appropriate turbine 

stop valve test frequency instead of requiring weekly testing in accordance with the existing 

guidance. In addition, the ACRS letter also identified two generic issues that are not tied to the 

issuance of the STP Units 3 and 4 COLs. The ACRS recommended that: (3) the staff should 

consider updating the SRP’s acceptance criteria on Charpy V-notch test energy and fracture 

appearance transition temperature to address the difference between turbine rotors fabricated 

with shrunk-on discs versus monoblock rotors; and (4) the staff should consider fire-induced 

spurious actuations on digital instrumentation and control (I&C) signal cabinets as a generic 

issue. 

The staff responded to the ACRS by letter dated April 2, 2015 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15072A109), providing the staff’s position on these recommendations for the STP 

Units 3 and 4 COLA, operating plants, and future combined license applicants. For each 

recommendation identified by the ACRS, the staff documented how the STP Units 3 and 4 

COLA meets the NRC’s requirements, as summarized below. 

In response to recommendations (1) (i.e., the evaluation of each turbine control and protection 

system and all component failure modes) and (2) (i.e., the determination of a plant-specific 

valve test frequency), the NRC staff agreed that these will be addressed upon the applicant 

submittal, and NRC staff approval, of a plant-specific turbine missile analysis for STP Units 3 

and 4. Since a plant-specific turbine missile analysis has not been reviewed and approved by 

the NRC staff, a license condition specifies that as part of the turbine maintenance program, the 

steam valves shall be tested weekly to ensure that the requirements of General Design Criterion 

(GDC) 4 of Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 50 are met. This license condition supports the NRC’s 
The Commissioners - 12 - 

 

safety finding for COL issuance in the absence of a plant-specific turbine missile analysis. 

Weekly testing of the steam valves is consistent with NUREG-0800, Section 3.5.1.3, when the 

licensee does not have an NRC-approved turbine missile analysis, and this testing regimen has 

been implemented at current operating reactors and for some new reactor designs. The 

applicant also has provided a commitment to submit, within three years following the receipt of a 

COL, a turbine system maintenance program that includes a turbine missile generation 

probability analysis. The turbine missile probability analysis will form the basis for refining the 

inspection and testing frequencies that will be specified in the turbine maintenance program and 

the subsequent deletion of the license condition noted above. Therefore, the ACRS 

recommendation for explicitly evaluating each turbine control and protection system in a plantspecific turbine missile analysis and determining a plant-specific test frequency, will be achieved 

upon the applicant submittal, and NRC staff acceptance, of a plant-specific turbine missile 

analysis and turbine maintenance program for STP Units 3 and 4. 

In response to recommendation (3) (i.e., the update to SRP criteria regarding Charpy V-notch), 

the staff noted that even in the absence of specific guidance, the applicant successfully 

provided an acceptable alternative methodology. Nonetheless, the NRC staff will consider 

developing specific guidance to address this issue during the next revision to the pertinent 

NUREG-0800 subsection. With regards to recommendation (4) (i.e., fire-induced spurious 

actuations on digital I&C signal cabinets), the NRC staff agreed that this issue should be 

evaluated generically, and also explained why no further action is needed for the STP COL 

review. The NRC staff plans to inform the ACRS of the staff’s progress on the generic issues 

identified in recommendations (3) and (4) in the future. 

DISCUSSION: 

I. Excluded Matters 

This section discusses matters that were previously addressed and resolved in the context of 

other reviews undertaken as part of the 10 CFR Part 52 process. Such excluded matters 

include issues addressed under the ABWR DC review. 

A full discussion of matters resolved by the ABWR DCR, and thus excluded from the 

uncontested hearing, can be found in the final rules (62 FR 25800 and 76 FR 78096). As 

explained in these rules, those resolved matters include, for example, all nuclear safety issues 

associated with the information in the FSERs and Supplement; Tier 1 and Tier 2 information; 

and the rulemaking record for certification of the ABWR design and the AIA Amendment, with 

the exceptions specified below. 

There are certain matters for which the ABWR DCR does not provide finality, and which, 

therefore, remain for COL applicants to consider. These include, for example, generic technical 

specifications (TS) and other operational requirements such as human factors engineering 

procedure development and training program development. Furthermore, several tables in the 

DCD identify COL areas that interface with corresponding areas of the certified design. 

Table 1.9-1, “Summary of ABWR Standard Plant COL License Information,” of the DCD lists 
The Commissioners - 13 - 

 

COL information items, which address those areas for which COL applicants referencing the 

ABWR design must provide additional supporting information to meet a regulatory requirement. 

In addition, the ABWR DCD identified plant systems for which the COL applicant must provide 

design features or characteristics that comply with the interface requirements for the sitespecific portions of the facility design. The applicant has included this information in the 

applicable sections of the FSAR. The NRC staff’s review of the COLA for STP Units 3 and 4 

confirmed that the applicant satisfactorily addressed all interface items and COL information 

items. 

Finally, excluded from consideration in the uncontested hearing are substantive issues within 

the scope of contentions admitted during the COL contested proceeding. As described above, 

eight contentions had been admitted in this proceeding. Of these contentions, five were 

dismissed as moot and three were resolved at evidentiary hearings. 

II. Exemptions and Departures 

Exemptions from NRC Regulations 

The applicant submitted four requests for exemption from NRC regulations. On September 16, 

2009, the applicant withdrew the request to exempt the applicant from compliance with 

Appendix A to 10 CFR Part 52, Section IV.A.2.a (ADAMS Accession No. ML092930393). The 

staff evaluated and found acceptable the remaining three exemptions from NRC regulations 

associated with the review of the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA. With respect to the exemption from 

the financial qualifications requirement, as discussed further below, pursuant to 10 CFR 

50.12(a)(2)(vi) the staff is requesting Commission approval of the staff’s determination on 

special circumstances for this exemption. 

Description Regulation Location of 

Evaluation in FSER 

Financial qualification for 

construction and operation 

10 CFR 52.77, 50.33(f), 

and 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix C 

Sections 1.5S.2.1 

and 1.11S.5 

Special nuclear material control and 

accounting (MC&A) program 

10 CFR 70.22(b), 

70.32(c), 74.31, 

74.41, and 74.51 

Section 1.11S.3 

Installation of two crane foundation 

retaining walls (CFRWs) 10 CFR 50.10 N/A1

 

 

1

 The NRC staff approved this exemption on November 5, 2010. The evaluation of this exemption can be 

found in ADAMS Accession No. ML102770454. 
The Commissioners - 14 - 

 

a. Financial Qualification for Construction and Operation 

In accordance with 10 CFR 52.77, “Contents of applications; general information,” 10 CFR 

50.33(f), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix C, current applicants requesting a COL must submit 

information that demonstrates that they either possess or have reasonable assurance of 

obtaining the funds necessary to cover estimated construction and operating costs for the term 

of the license. The regulations further require applicants to identify the specific source or 

sources of funds on which they will rely. The NRC staff has been unable to conclude that NINA 

meets these requirements, primarily due to an absence of specifically identified sources of 

funds. 

On November 22, 2013, the NRC staff provided the Commission with SECY-13-0124, “Policy 

Options for Merchant (Non-Electric Utility) Plant Financial Qualifications,” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13057A006). In the SRM for SECY-13-0124, dated April 24, 2014, the Commission 

approved the option to engage in a rulemaking to amend 10 CFR Part 50 financial qualifications 

requirements, in a manner which would conform to the standards in 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic 

Licensing of Special Nuclear Material,” and that would allow a 10 CFR Part 50 or Part 52 license 

to be issued with license conditions addressing financial qualifications (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML14114A358). The SRM further stated that the NRC staff should consider utilizing 

exemptions from the current regulations to address existing cases, and that the exemptions 

should anticipate the outcome of the rulemaking. 

On June 17, 2015, the rulemaking working group issued the draft regulatory basis for the 

Financial Qualifications for Reactor Licensing Rulemaking (Draft Regulatory Basis) (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML14324A706). The Draft Regulatory Basis proposes that the NRC change the 

10 CFR Part 50 financial qualification standard from the current “reasonable assurance” to the 

10 CFR Part 70 standard of “appears to be financially qualified.” Specifically, the proposed 

rulemaking would remove the detailed requirements found in Appendix C of 10 CFR Part 50 and 

amend 10 CFR 50.33(f) to remove the requirement for a power reactor applicant to demonstrate 

that it possesses or can provide reasonable assurance of obtaining the funds necessary for 

construction and operation. Under the NRC staff proposal, the applicant would be required to 

submit a plan describing how it will finance the construction and operation of the facility. The 

plan would ensure that the applicant has the financial capacity to obtain the necessary financing 

for construction and operation. As used in the Draft Regulatory Basis, “financial capacity” 

means the applicant’s level of understanding of the size and scope of the project, including the 

level of capital necessary to undertake the project, and it reflects the organizational and human 

resources, experience, skills, and expertise required to ultimately finance the project, when 

appropriate. 

The proposed rulemaking would permit the NRC to issue licenses with conditions to applicants 

that may have insufficient (or no) funding at the outset of the license application review. As 

necessary, the license conditions could address funding for construction, funding for operation, 

or both. License conditions related to construction would have to be satisfied before 

construction begins, and license conditions related to operation would have to be satisfied prior 

to operation. The license conditions would be sufficient and specific to permit a simple, 
The Commissioners - 15 - 

 

ministerial kind of review to confirm that the applicant's plan is executed and that sufficient funds 

are available. 

On June 19, 2014, the applicant requested an exemption from the NRC’s financial qualification 

requirements (ADAMS Accession No. ML14175A142). This request was superseded in its 

entirety by an updated exemption request dated May 18, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15140A077). This updated exemption request was based on draft Section 7, "Proposed 

Financial Qualifications Requirement," of the Draft Regulatory Basis2

 (ADAMS Accession No. 

ML15111A270). With its May 18, 2015 exemption request, the applicant addressed the 

standards in 10 CFR 52.7 and 50.12 and submitted an Applicant Financial Capacity Plan with 

proposed license conditions. The applicant had previously provided construction and 

operational cost estimates as part of the COLA review. 

The license conditions would require NINA (1) to provide before the construction of STP Units 3 

and 4 an updated construction cost estimate and documentation demonstrating secured 

financing to meet the updated estimate; and (2) to provide before the operation of STP Units 3 

and 4 an updated operational cost estimate and documentation demonstrating secured sources 

of funds to meet the updated estimate. As discussed in Section 1.5S.2.1 of the FSER, the NRC 

staff concluded that NINA demonstrated its financial capacity, that NINA’s constructional and 

operational cost estimates are reasonable, and that NINA’s proposed license conditions (with 

minor revisions by the NRC staff) meet the intent of the Draft Regulatory Basis. Because 

NINA’s exemption request meets the standards in the Draft Regulatory Basis, granting the 

exemption anticipates the outcome of the rulemaking, in accordance with Commission direction 

in the SRM on SECY-13-0124.3

The NRC staff evaluated this exemption request and determined that such an exemption 

satisfies 10 CFR 50.12 because it is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the 

public health or safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security, and because 

special circumstances are present as described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi). To have special 

 

2

 A public meeting was held on April 29, 2015, to discuss draft Section 7, “Proposed Financial 

Qualification Requirements,” of the Draft Regulatory Basis (see ADAMS Accession No. ML15126A402). 

To facilitate interactions with the public, the NRC staff provided a description of the content of the draft 

regulatory basis, with an emphasis on Section 7, which describes the financial qualifications requirements 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15111A270). After the meeting, only editorial changes and corrections were 

made to Section 7 the Draft Regulatory Basis before publication. 3

 The comment period on the Draft Regulatory Basis ended on August 3, 2015. The NRC staff received 

three public submissions during the comment period. The comments supported the NRC undertaking a 

rulemaking to amend the financial qualification requirements for nuclear reactors. Some comments 

advocated extending the proposed new requirements to non-power reactors, and eliminating financial 

qualification requirements for renewal of non-power reactor licenses. Some commenters also took 

positions on the standards articulated in the Draft Regulatory Basis. These commenters either supported 

the standards or proposed that the requirements be further reduced or even entirely rescinded. The 

public comments do not undermine the basis for the COL applicant’s request for an exemption from the 

NRC’s financial qualification requirements because they do not suggest imposing a stricter standard than 

the one applied to the review of STP Units 3 and 4. 
The Commissioners - 16 - 

 

circumstances under 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi), there must be a material circumstance not 

considered when the regulation was adopted for which it would be in the public interest to grant 

an exemption. If such condition is relied on exclusively to satisfy 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2), the 

exemption may not be granted until the Executive Director for Operations has consulted with the 

Commission. The staff has concluded that the 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi) standard is satisfied 

because there is a material circumstance not considered when the regulation was adopted for 

which it would be in the public interest to grant an exemption. Specifically, the Commission in 

the SRM on SECY-13-0124 directed the staff to initiate a rulemaking to amend the financial 

qualification requirements of 10 CFR Part 50 and to apply financial qualification standards 

similar to those in 10 CFR Part 70, including an allowance for the use of license conditions. As 

explained in the Draft Regulatory Basis, the NRC has determined that the current detailed Part 

50 standards go well beyond the NRC’s mandate of ensuring safety and have become an 

unnecessary impediment to licensing. The objective of the proposed new standard is to 

remove this unnecessary impediment while still ensuring the protection of the public health and 

safety. The NRC staff’s evaluation of the exemption request appears in FSER section 1.11S.5. 

With this paper, the NRC staff is consulting with the Commission on the special circumstances 

determination, consistent with 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(vi) and the discussion of this consultation 

process in the December 12, 1985, final rule “Specific Exemptions; Clarification of Standards” 

(50 FR 50764, 50772). The exemption would be granted as part of COL issuance. 

b. Special Nuclear Material Control and Accounting Program 

In accordance with 10 CFR 70.22(b), current applicants requesting a license to possess special 

nuclear material (SNM) must submit a full description of their MC&A program and show 

compliance with 10 CFR 74.31, “Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear 

material of low strategic significance”; 10 CFR 74.33, “Nuclear material control and accounting 

for uranium enrichment facilities authorized to produce special nuclear material of low strategic 

significance”; 10 CFR 74.41, “Nuclear material control and accounting for special nuclear 

material of moderate strategic significance”; or 10 CFR 74.51, “Nuclear material control and 

accounting for strategic special nuclear material,” as applicable. Also, in accordance with 

10 CFR 70.32(c), applicants requesting a license to possess SNM in a quantity exceeding one 

effective kilogram are subject to a condition to maintain and follow an MC&A program for SNM 

in which decreases to the program’s effectiveness will be submitted as a license amendment 

request under 10 CFR 70.34, “Amendment of licenses.” However, the requirements in 10 CFR 

70.22(b) and 10 CFR 70.32(c) contain an exclusion for licensees governed by 10 CFR Part 50, 

including existing nuclear power plants. In addition, the regulations referenced by 10 CFR 

70.22(b) (10 CFR 74.31, 74.33, 74.41, and 74.51) either do not apply to reactors or explicitly 

exclude reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50. The STP Units 3 and 4 COLA was submitted, 

and accepted, as a licensing action for a nuclear power plant under 10 CFR Part 52, rather than 

10 CFR Part 50. The exclusions described above in 10 CFR Part 70, “Domestic Licensing of 

Special Nuclear Material,” and 10 CFR Part 74, “Material Control and Accounting of Special 

Nuclear Material,” do not include 10 CFR Part 52 applicants, even though for the purposes of 

the requirement, the applications are for the same facility type. For both Part 50 and Part 52 

applicants, Subpart B, “General Reporting and Recordkeeping Requirements,” of 10 CFR 

Part 74 (excluding Section 74.17, “Special nuclear material physical inventory summary report”) 
The Commissioners - 17 - 

 

contains the appropriate MC&A performance requirements. 

The applicant requested an exemption from the requirements in 10 CFR 70.22(b), 70.32(c), 

74.31, 74.41, and 74.51, that an SNM license application describe an MC&A program and that 

the applicant establish, implement, maintain, and follow an MC&A program. The applicant 

provided a full discussion of the exemption request and noted that the cited regulations include 

exceptions from these requirements for nuclear reactors licensed under 10 CFR Part 50. The 

purpose of the request was to achieve an exemption similar to the exception already granted by 

regulation to a reactor applicant licensed under 10 CFR Part 50. The same exemption has also 

been granted to the applicants for the previously-issued COLs. 

The staff evaluated this exemption request and determined that such an exemption is 

authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health or safety, and is consistent 

with the common defense and security, and that special circumstances are present as 

described in 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) because the Commission determined that these 

requirements are unnecessary for similar 10 CFR Part 50 applicants. The staff’s evaluation of 

the exemption request appears in FSER Section 1.11S.3. 

c. Installation of the Crane Foundation Retaining Walls for STP Units 3 and 4 

By letter dated January 8, 2010, the NRC staff notified STPNOC that installation of the CFRWs 

was considered construction under 10 CFR 50.10(a)(1), therefore requiring issuance of a limited 

work authorization (LWA) or COLs before their installation. In accordance with 10 CFR 

50.12(b), STPNOC requested an exemption that would permit the installation of the CFRWs 

without an LWA and prior to the issuance of COLs for STP Units 3 and 4. 

In its exemption request, the applicant stated that the proposed exemption was needed because 

the installation of the CFRWs must occur before excavation for permanent plant structures, and 

compliance with 10 CFR 50.10, “License required; limited work authorization,” i.e., obtaining a 

LWA, would result in undue hardship or other costs that are significantly in excess of those 

contemplated in the rulemaking amending 10 CFR 50.10. According to the exemption request, 

installation of the CFRWs was needed to allow the applicant to complete certain onsite activities 

in parallel with the licensing process, so that it could begin construction promptly upon issuance 

of COLs. On November 5, 2010, the NRC staff approved the exemption from the specific 

requirements of 10 CFR 50.10, for STP Units 3 and 4 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102770454), 

finding that the influence of the CFRWs would have a negligible nexus to safety. The exemption 

authorized the applicant to install two CFRWs prior to the issuance of the COLs. As of 

September 2015, the applicant has not yet installed the two CFRWs. 

Departures from the ABWR DCDs 

The STP Units 3 and 4 COL application identified the following departures from the certified 

design: 17 Tier 1 departures, one Tier 2* departure, 131 Tier 2 departures, and 126 departures 

from the Generic TS. Departures by a COL applicant from Tier 1, Tier 2*, Generic TS and other 

operational requirements in a DCD require NRC approval. This NRC approval must be in the 
The Commissioners - 18 - 

 

form of an exemption for departures from Tier 1, Generic TS, and other operational 

requirements in a DCD. Tier 2 departures are subject to a 50.59-like process in 10 CFR Part 

52, Appendix A, Section VIII.B.5, and do not ordinarily require NRC approval. Part 7 of the 

COLA describes, justifies, and evaluates the departures against the criteria in 10 CFR Part 52, 

Appendix A, Section VIII, and also identifies the affected FSAR sections. As documented 

throughout the FSER, the staff evaluated the applicant’s proposed departures from the certified 

design. Section 1.11S of the FSER contains the staff’s evaluation of the Tier 1 and Generic TS 

departures against the applicable exemption criteria for these departures. 

Given the large number of departures, this paper, for the sake of brevity, addresses two 

examples: a Tier 1 departure, STD DEP T1-3.4-1, “Safety Related Instrument and Controls 

(I&C) Architecture,” and a Tier 2 departure, STD DEP 6.2-2, “Containment Analysis.” 

The STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSAR incorporates by reference Chapter 7, “Instrumentation and 

Controls,” of the certified ABWR DCD Revision 4 with departures identified under each section.

The Tier 1 departure sought in STD DEP T1-3.4-1 had a significant impact on the content of this 

chapter and other related parts of the FSAR. It replaces data communication technology 

employed in the certified ABWR design, resulting in changes to the digital I&C architecture. The 

I&C system design proposed in the STP COLA commits to conformance with the latest 

applicable regulations and guidance. The NRC staff evaluated this departure for conformance 

to the current regulations using the NUREG-0800, Chapter 7, Revision 5 review guidance 

supplemented by the digital I&C (DI&C) ISG documents. 

This Tier 1 departure STD DEP T1 3.4-1 can be characterized into five primary changes: 

(1) Modification of data communication. 

The departure eliminates the obsolete essential multiplexer system (EMS) and the 

nonessential multiplexer system originally envisioned in the ABWR architecture and 

replaces them with separate and independent system level data communication 

capabilities. The original concept was based on a common EMS, which could be used 

by multiple safety-related, digitally-based protection systems. This departure defines 

separate dedicated data communication functions for each safety-related digital 

platform, including separate and independent data communication functions for each 

division within a system. 

The departure provides the following benefits: (1) it allows the overall safety system logic 

and control (SSLC) to be more resistant to common mode failure; (2) it provides a more 

robust communication design; (3) it makes the design less susceptible to a common 

cause failure disabling both the reactor trip and isolation system (RTIS) and the 

engineered safety features logic and control system (ELCS); and (4) it provides the 

flexibility to use communication technologies that have benefits in the areas of simplicity 

of function and improved independence. 
The Commissioners - 19 - 

 

The RTIS uses direct hardwired inputs to the system instead of the concept of using 

remote multiplexers as described in the certified ABWR DCD. This significantly reduces 

the complexity of data communication requirements for this system, while continuing to 

meet ABWR DCD functional requirements. 

The ELCS continues to use remote acquisition of signal information and remote output 

of command information to controlled components. The ELCS will use serial, 

unidirectional, fiber optically-isolated data links instead of the fiber distributed data 

interface protocol. The ELCS platform, including the use of unidirectional, serial data 

links, has been generically reviewed and approved by the NRC, as described in Topical 

Report WCAP-16097-P-A, Revision 0, “Common Qualified Platform Topical Report,” and 

has operating experience in U.S. nuclear power plant safety system applications. 

The digital data communication functions are primarily described in FSAR Tier 1 

Section 2.2, “Control and Instrument Systems”; Section 2.7, “Control Panels”; and 

Section 3.4, “Instrumentation and Control”; and in Tier 2 Section 7.1S, “Instrumentation 

and Control Systems and Platforms”; Section 7.2, “Reactor Protection (Trip) System 

(RPS)—Instrumentation and Controls”; Section 7.3 “Engineered Safety Feature 

Systems, Instrumentation and Control”; and Section 7.9S, “Data Communication 

Systems.” 

(2) Elimination of unnecessary inadvertent actuation prevention logic and equipment. 

This departure minimizes the potential for inadvertent actuation of engineered safety 

features (ESF) components. The ABWR DCD described the design of the ESF 

actuation outputs as being fully redundant within each division of the ESF digital controls 

systems. As a result of this departure, the redundant actuation logic is only implemented 

for components that may impact plant safety or operation if actuated during normal plant 

operation such as the emergency core-cooling systems functions of the ELCS as 

described in FSAR Tier 1 Section 3.4. These changes are primarily described in FSAR 

Tier 1, Sections 3.4 and 7.1, and Tier 2, Sections 7.3 and 16, “Technical Specifications.” 

TS Bases Figures B3.3.1.4-1 through 5 also show the elimination of the unnecessary 

inadvertent actuation logic. 

(3) Clarifications of digital controls nomenclature and systems. 

The ABWR DCD defined many functional design requirements in terms typically 

reserved for hardware. Examples include the terms “module,” “unit,” and “system.” The 

terminology was corrected to refer to the requirement as a “function” to eliminate the 

confusion associated with purely functional requirements and not physical requirements 

defined in the DCD. 

In addition, to better define the functional design and implementation of the digital 

controls platforms, specific I&C system names were assigned to the ESF digital controls 

systems and the reactor protection system (RPS). 
The Commissioners - 20 - 

 

(4) Final selection of platforms changed the implementation architecture. 

This departure revises the I&C architecture to use configurable logic devices for the 

NMS and RTIS in lieu of microprocessors. This platform change was necessary to 

accommodate available platforms that meet both the regulatory and technical 

requirements. These design updates are primarily described in FSAR Tier 2, Sections 

7.1S and 7.2. 

(5) Testing and surveillance changes for the SSLC. 

This departure revises the testing and surveillance descriptions for the SSLC (NMS, 

RTIS, and ELCS) and is consistent with the characteristics of the design platforms 

selected. These changes are primarily described in Tier 2, Section 7.1 and 7.1S. 

Additionally, Chapter 16, “Technical Specifications,” Section 3.0, “Limiting Condition for 

Operation (LCO) Applicability,” is modified to reflect the above changes to the safetyrelated I&C architecture. 

The NRC staff’s review of this departure from the certified ABWR design is based on the current 

regulatory requirements, and on the acceptance criteria and guidelines in NUREG-0800, 

Table 7-1, “Regulatory Requirements, Acceptance Criteria, and Guidelines for Instrumentation 

and Control Systems Important to Safety,” of the SRP, Revision 5 (March 2007). 

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.55a(h) for COLAs filed on or after May 13, 1999, departures from 

the referenced certified design material that require NRC approval must meet the requirements 

for safety systems in the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standard (Std) 603–

1991, “IEEE Standard Criteria for Safety Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations,” and 

in the correction sheet dated January 30, 1995. In addition, applicable guidelines in DI&C-ISG02 through 05 were also used to evaluate the departures from the certified ABWR design. 

The NRC staff’s evaluation of the proposed FSAR changes resulting from this departure 

included a number of public meetings with the applicant to understand the details of the 

departure from the I&C system design, RAIs, briefings to the ACRS Subcommittee on the 

ABWR design center, and significant revisions to the FSAR sections related to I&C design. The 

applicant addressed all of the staff’s safety concerns and adequately captured the I&C system 

design information in the FSAR, including demonstration of compliance to current regulatory 

requirements. The NRC staff compared the additional information provided in the COLA to the 

relevant NRC regulations and the guidance in NUREG–0800. The NRC staff’s review 

concluded that the applicant has adequately addressed Departure STD DEP T1 3.4-1 in 

accordance with the current regulatory requirements. The NRC staff’s evaluation of this 

departure appears in FSER Sections 7.1-7.3, 7.6-7.7, 7A and 7C. 

Another example of a departure involved an error in the ABWR containment analysis. This error 

was reported to the NRC by GE-Hitachi Nuclear Energy. As a result, the COL applicant took a 

Tier 2 departure, STD DEP 6.2-2, “Containment Analysis,” to reconstitute the containment 
The Commissioners - 21 - 

 

analysis using GOTHIC modeling code, rather than the method used in the certified ABWR 

design. The NRC staff found that the reconstituted analysis fully addressed the identified error. 

The NRC staff’s evaluation of this departure appears in FSER Section 6.2.1. 

III. Nonroutine Unique Facility Features or Novel Issues 

Safety Matters 

a. Qualifications of Toshiba as the Alternate Vendor for the Certified ABWR Design 

In February 2009, NINA awarded the engineering, procurement, and construction (EPC) 

contract to Toshiba4

 for providing a design for STP Units 3 and 4. As the holder of the EPC 

contract, Toshiba will assume the duties normally assigned to the plant vendor and the entity 

that originally obtained the DC. Because Toshiba is not the entity that originally obtained the 

DC, it is referred to as an “alternate vendor.” 

The regulations in 10 CFR 52.73(a), allow an alternate vendor to supply a certified design; 

however, the regulations require the alternate vendor to be demonstrated as qualified to supply 

that design. Before making a determination as to whether Toshiba is a qualified vendor, the 

staff proposed to answer these fundamental questions: 

• Since Toshiba is not the entity that obtained the DC, what information 

necessary to support the COL process may not be available to the 

applicant (e.g., proprietary topical reports or computer codes)? How does 

the applicant intend to fill the design basis gaps caused by the 

unavailability of this information? 

• Has the applicant done an adequate job of assessing Toshiba’s (and 

other contractors’) ability to provide the information that must be 

reconstituted? 

• Do we have reasonable assurance that the process employed by the 

applicant was adequate to identify all design basis information that must 

be reconstituted? 

• Do we have reasonable assurance that Toshiba and its contractors will be 

able to assume the duties normally assigned to the plant vendor and the 

entity that originally obtained the DC? Do they have the expertise and 

technical competence to manage and control design changes and 

support the licensing process? 

 

4

 The EPC contract was awarded to a consortium formed by Toshiba and The Shaw Group Inc. However, 

Toshiba has overall project management responsibility for the design and construction of the facility, 

including support of the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA. 
The Commissioners - 22 - 

 

• What are the differences between the ABWR designs that Toshiba has 

already developed and the U.S. certified ABWR design? Is there 

reasonable assurance that Toshiba can address these differences and 

provide a U.S. certified ABWR design? 

The U.S. ABWR DC FSER (NUREG–1503) describes the relationship between General Electric 

Nuclear Energy (a predecessor to GEH Nuclear Energy) and its associates (including Toshiba) 

in the development of the certified ABWR design. Recognizing Toshiba’s contributions to the 

certified ABWR design, the NRC staff proposed two activities for conducting the alternate 

vendor qualification review. Specifically, 

1. the NRC staff reviewed the STPNOC Due Diligence Report (DDR) for 

qualification of the alternate vendor, Toshiba; and 

2. the NRC staff conducted audits and an inspection, as necessary, to support the 

review of the STPNOC DDR. 

 

On August 19, 2008, STPNOC submitted the STPNOC DDR for the qualification of Toshiba to 

provide the ABWR design for STP Units 3 and 4 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML082350161 

[proprietary] and ML082350160 [non-proprietary]). On December 18, 2008, STPNOC submitted 

revisions to the DDR (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML083660245 [proprietary] and ML083660244 

[non-proprietary]) to update STPNOC’s decision on the disposition of various documents 

associated with the ABWR design. The due diligence effort was intended to assess areas 

where, in the applicant’s opinion, Toshiba may not have the direct experience necessary to 

support the certified ABWR design. The applicant evaluated, in detail, the areas of design 

documentation, ongoing technical development, licensing support, and the development and 

implementation of a supply chain. 

In order to confirm the applicant’s conclusions in the DDR, the staff both performed a review of 

the DDR and conducted a vendor inspection of Toshiba in Yokohama, Japan. These efforts 

constituted the staff’s independent assessment of Toshiba’s ability to provide the U.S. certified 

ABWR design for STP Units 3 and 4. 

The NRC staff looked at Toshiba’s qualification as an alternate vendor and checked whether 

Toshiba has access to ABWR engineering documents that are the design basis documents for 

the U.S. ABWR. In cases where a document may not be readily available to Toshiba, the staff 

looked at Toshiba’s ability to develop the needed document independently. The NRC staff also 

looked at Toshiba’s policies and implementing procedures for reporting defects and noncompliances to determine whether or not these are consistent with 10 CFR Part 21. The NRC 

staff inspected Toshiba’s quality assurance (QA) program for consistency with Appendix B, 

“Quality Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing Plants,” to 10 CFR 

Part 50, as well as Toshiba’s procedures for design control, procurement document control, 

general document control, control of purchased material, nonconforming materials, corrective 

actions, and training and qualification. The NRC staff also inspected Toshiba’s procedures for 
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developing and implementing the initial test program, evaluated its ability to perform licensing 

containment safety analysis, and reviewed its policies for developing and implementing the STP 

I&C systems. 

The NRC staff concluded that Toshiba’s programs are consistent with Appendix B to 10 CFR 

Part 50 and with 10 CFR Part 21, and that Toshiba has both the technical ability and access to 

technical documentation necessary to provide a design for the U.S. certified ABWR. Based on 

its review of the applicant’s DDR and the audits and inspection findings, the NRC staff 

concluded that there is reasonable assurance that Toshiba can provide a U.S certified ABWR 

design for STP Units 3 and 4; that Toshiba is able to support the STP Units 3 and 4 projects as 

the nuclear steam supply system vendor; and that STPNOC, Toshiba, and its subcontractors 

will be able to support staff audit, inspection, and licensing activities. 

b. Applicability of Near-Term Task Force (NTTF) Recommendations Regarding the 

Evaluation of the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power Plant Event to the STP 

Units 3 and 4 COL 

Both SECY-12-0025 (ADAMS Accession No. ML12039A103) and its associated SRM address 

the requirements and regulatory actions resulting from the Fukushima NTTF Tier 1 

recommendations. The NRC staff determined that four of the NTTF Tier 1 recommendations 

(and the resulting Commission Orders and requests for information) were applicable to the STP 

Units 3 and 4 COLA, and issued several RAIs. The RAIs asked the applicant to: (1) provide an 

evaluation of the STP Units 3 and 4 site for updated seismic hazards (Recommendation 2.1), 

(2) develop mitigating strategies for beyond-design-basis external events 

(Recommendation 4.2), (3) provide reliable spent fuel pool (SFP) instrumentation 

(Recommendation 7.1), and (4) evaluate emergency preparedness staffing and communications 

(Recommendation 9.3). 

The NRC staff evaluated the applicant’s responses to the RAIs in FSER Chapter 22, 

“Requirements Resulting from Fukushima Near-Term Task Force Recommendations.” 

A discussion of the remaining Tier 1 recommendations and why they did not apply to the STP 

Units 3 and 4 COL review appears in the introduction to Chapter 22. The applicant added 

FSAR Appendix 1E to address the NTTF recommendations, and also provided inspections, 

tests, analyses, and acceptance criteria (ITAAC) related to Recommendation 7.1. The draft 

license for STP Units 3 and 4 contains two license conditions related to Recommendations 4.2 

and 9.3. 

The NRC staff concluded that the COL applicant has adequately addressed the Fukushima 

NTTF Tier 1 recommendations, which are consistent with the intent of Commission-approved 

orders and requests for information. Therefore, this section is focused on one non-routine issue 

on Recommendation 4.2. Although no first-of-a-kind design was implemented, the mitigation 

strategies for the STP Units 3 and 4 design include unique design features or approaches to 

sustain core cooling and enhance the ability of the certified ABWR design to withstand a station 

blackout event. These include: (1) enhanced core cooling and SFP cooling capabilities; (2) 

strategic management of power systems that can provide direct current (DC) power supplies for 
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at least 36 hours; (3) use of the remote shutdown panel to maximize DC battery service time; 

(4) capability to access water in the ultimate heat sink (UHS) for long term core cooling and SFP 

cooling; and (5) use of containment overpressure protection (COPS) to ensure containment 

integrity. 

Recommendation 4.2, Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events 

The design features for STP Units 3 and 4 include installed equipment, such as reactor core 

isolation cooling (RCIC); COPS; and sufficient water, fuel, and battery capability to provide the 

required safety functions (i.e., core cooling, containment function, and SFP cooling) for 36 hours 

without reliance on alternating current (AC) power or external water sources. To maintain the 

required safety functions after the first 36 hours, the AC-independent water addition (ACIWA) 

pump takes suction from fire water storage tanks, and offsite portable 480V 1500 kW diesel 

generators recharge the batteries. Operators will need to transfer diesel fuel, as necessary, 

from emergency diesel generator (EDG) fuel oil storage tanks to the ACIWA fuel oil tank using a 

staged portable pump and a small portable diesel generator. After 72 hours, assuming loss of 

normal access to the UHS, the applicant added an alternative means of accessing the UHS 

such that the ACIWA pump can take suction from the water volume in the UHS basin to inject 

the water into the core, maintain the structural integrity of the containment, and make up the 

water in the SFP. 

The NRC staff reviewed the information provided by the applicant for mitigation strategies 

against the standards described in Order EA-12-049. For example, the staff confirmed the 

capabilities of the RCIC and ACIWA for cooling of both the core and SFP resulting from the 

decay heat, and confirmed the availability of water, fuel, and power supply to support the 

cooling function given a simultaneous loss of all AC power and a loss of normal access to the 

UHS. The NRC staff also reviewed the functional capabilities of the COPS to remove 

containment heat and maintain containment structure integrity. In addition, the NRC staff 

reviewed the equipment and connections being used for the mitigation strategies to ensure that 

they are adequately protected against seismic, flooding, and high wind conditions. 

In addition, the NRC staff developed an appropriate license condition that requires the licensee 

to prepare an overall integrated plan to maintain or restore core cooling, containment function, 

and SFP cooling capabilities in the event of a simultaneous loss of all AC power and loss of 

normal access to the UHS. The license condition also requires the licensee to complete the 

development of strategies and guidance to be used for mitigation and to specify implementation 

details, including (1) procedures, (2) training, (3) acquisition, staging, or installing of equipment 

and consumables relied on in the strategies, and (4) configuration controls and provisions for 

maintenance and testing. Based on this license condition and the COLA information, the NRC 

staff concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA meets the 

underlying purpose of Order EA-12-049. The NRC staff’s evaluation of Recommendation 4.2 

appears in FSER Section 22.2. 

 
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c. Design Basis Flood Above Plant Grade 

The STP site is located on the west bank of the Colorado River about 15 miles (mi.) 

(24.14 kilometers [km.]) inland from the Gulf of Mexico. The elevation of the site varies from 

approximately 15 feet (ft.) (4.58 meters [m.]) above mean sea level (MSL) at the south end of 

the site to 34 ft. (10.36 m.) MSL at the north end of the site. The elevation of the power block of 

the proposed units (plant grade) is 34 ft. (10.36 m.) MSL. 

A notable feature of the STP site is the large main cooling reservoir (MCR) located about 

1000 ft. (304.08 m.) to the south of the proposed location of STP Units 3 and 4. The MCR 

covers an area of approximately 7,000 acres and is surrounded by an earthen embankment that 

rises some 40 ft. (12.19 m.) above grade. The grade at the northern end of the MCR is about 

28 ft. (8.53 m.) MSL and the average water level in the MCR is 47 ft. (14.33 m.) MSL. The MCR 

provides circulating water during normal operations. 

The NRC staff conducted a hydrology safety review at the STP site using several potential 

flooding scenarios including local intense precipitation; probable maximum flood of streams and 

rivers; potential dam failures; probable maximum storm-generated surge and seiche (standing 

wave); probable maximum tsunami; flooding caused by ice effects; groundwater; accidental 

releases of effluents; accidental releases from cooling water canals and reservoirs; potential for 

flooding caused by channel diversions; and dam failures, including the failure of the MCR 

embankment. The NRC staff’s safety evaluation was developed using the present-day 

methodologies and guidance. A summary of what the staff found to be the events that would 

lead to the largest potential floods, along with their associated flood levels, is provided below: 

Tsunami 

The NRC staff confirmed that the probable maximum tsunami (PMT) would result from a 

submarine landslide in the Gulf of Mexico. The NRC staff conducted a review of the applicant’s 

PMT flood level calculations and performed independent calculations. The maximum PMT flood 

level was determined to be 11.5 ft. (3.51 m.) MSL or roughly 23 ft. (7.01 m.) below plant grade. 

Flooding from Streams and Rivers 

The applicant looked at various storm and probable maximum precipitation scenarios to 

determine the probable maximum flood from streams and rivers. The NRC staff found these 

scenarios to be reasonable. The staff reviewed the applicant’s modeling and calculations and 

found the models to be appropriate and the assumptions to be reasonable. The NRC staff 

found the applicant’s determination that the probable maximum flood from streams and rivers 

would be 26.1 ft. (7.96 m.) MSL or roughly 8 ft. (2.44 m.) below plant grade to be reasonable. 

Storm Surge 

The NRC staff looked at various scenarios and determined that the maximum storm surge 

would result from the probable maximum hurricane. The NRC staff reviewed the applicant’s 
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modeling and calculations and performed independent calculations. The staff confirmed that 

the probable maximum flood caused by storm surge would be 31.1 ft. (9.48 m.) MSL or roughly 

3 ft. (0.91 m.) below plant grade. 

 

Local Intense Precipitation 

The NRC staff reviewed the application in regard to items such as flood history, maximum 

stream runoff, and highest recorded water levels. The NRC staff also conducted independent 

research using other publicly available sources. The NRC staff confirmed that the probable 

maximum flood resulting from local intense precipitation is 36.6 ft. (11.16 m.) MSL or 2.6 ft. 

(0.79 m.) above plant grade. 

Main Cooling Reservoir Breach 

The applicant considered several scenarios for flooding caused by an MCR breach and 

eventually determined that the limiting case would result from an instantaneous breach of the 

north segment of the MCR embankment. The applicant concluded that such a breach would 

result in a probable maximum flood of 38.8 ft (11.8m) MSL. From this analysis, the applicant 

proposed a design basis flood (DBF) elevation of 40 ft (12.2m) MSL. The NRC staff reviewed 

the applicant’s analysis and conducted an independent confirmatory analysis. The 

confirmatory analysis performed by the staff postulated a breach at grade level with a maximum 

width of 574.3 ft. (175.05 m.). The maximum resulting flow from such a breach is calculated to 

be 127,929 cubic ft. (3,622 cubic m.) per second or roughly 895,500 gallons (3.39 x 106

 liters) 

per second. This would result in a probable maximum flood of approximately 39.9 ft. (12.19 m.) 

MSL or roughly 6 ft. (1.83 m.) above plant grade. This is the most limiting flood that the staff 

identified and, as such, the staff concluded that the DBF proposed by the applicant is 

acceptable. 

Implications of Flooding Above Plant Grade 

The NRC staff carefully analyzed the implications of the DBF at STP being approximately 6 ft. 

(1.83 m.) above the grade of the power block. The safety-related facilities must remain free 

from flooding. From a probabilistic risk assessment perspective, the assurance of closure of 

certain watertight doors during a breach of the MCR is an important risk insight. The applicant 

stated that all safety-related facilities below 40 ft. (12.2 m.) MSL in the power block area are 

watertight. Further, the applicant stated that all watertight doors and hatches open outward (so 

that the force of the water from the DBF helps maintain the watertight seals between the 

external metal doors and the structures) and are normally in closed position under 

administrative controls (e.g., control room doors, normal access doors, and reactor building 

access corridor watertight doors). Last, all ventilation openings are located above 40 ft. 

(12.2 m.) MSL, and the UHS and reactor service water system pump houses below 50 ft. 

(15 m.) MSL are designed to be watertight. The NRC staff concluded that this configuration is 

acceptable. 
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Design Basis Flood Determination Non-Concurrence 

An NRC staff member did not agree with the hydrological conclusions drawn by the NRC staff 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12348A249). The concerns were related to determining two site 

parameters (i.e., DBF level and maximum groundwater level) which are important site 

parameters for structural design and flood protection of safety-related facilities. The nonconcurring individual asserted that the DBF level of 40 ft. (12.2 m.) MSL was not determined 

accurately and conservatively for the proposed STP Units 3 and 4, in either the STP applicant’s 

FSAR or the NRC staff’s SER. As a result, the non-concurring individual asserted that the 

applicant did not meet 10 CFR 52.79(a)(1)(iii), GDC 2, “Design bases for protection against 

natural phenomena,” of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, or 10 CFR 100.20(c)(3). The nonconcurrence provided an alternate analysis of the DBF and accordingly made recommendations 

for modifications that, in the opinion of the non-concurring individual, would have met the 

germane requirements. The non-concurrence identified two flood mechanisms at the STP site 

that were postulated to be in error in the FSAR and FSER. 

Non-Concurrence Issues 

The non-concurrence assertions were categorized into three primary areas: 

1. The NRC staff’s MCR breach flood analysis is not conservative (see FSER 

Section 2.4.4). 

2. The NRC staff’s hurricane storm surge analysis is not conservative (see FSER 

Section 2.4.5). 

3. The SER inappropriately identified the maximum groundwater level; this should 

be the same as the DBF level (see FSER Section 2.4.12). 

Resolution of Non-Concurrence Issues 

The NRC staff, via the NRC’s Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, solicited independent 

expert reviewers for dam breach and probable maximum hurricane storm surge related issues 

from the University of Maryland, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Bureau of Reclamation, Virginia 

Polytechnic Institute and State University, Taylor Engineering Research Institute (University of 

North Florida), and the University of North Carolina. The independent review panel’s final 

determination of each issue is summarized below. 

In response to non-concurrence issue (1), the independent review panel concluded that all the 

technical issues were resolved correctly by the NRC staff. To address the non-concurring 

individual and the independent panel comments, the NRC staff made changes to FSER Section 

2.4.4, to clarify the NRC staff’s review of, and the applicant’s use of, empirical methods and 

tailwater sensitivity analysis. The NRC staff’s conclusions in FSER Section 2.4.4 did not 

change. 
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With regard to non-concurrence issue (2), the independent review panel concluded that all the 

technical issues were resolved correctly by the NRC staff. To address the non-concurring 

individual and the independent panel comments, the NRC staff made changes to FSER 

Section 2.4.5 to clarify that the probable maximum hurricane is appropriately conservative. In 

addition, the NRC staff added a sensitivity analysis that used storms that were less intense but 

had a larger radius of maximum wind than the probable maximum hurricane. The NRC staff’s 

conclusions in FSER Section 2.4.5 did not change. 

With respect to non-concurrence issue (3), no external review for groundwater level issues were 

solicited because the maximum groundwater level site parameter in the DCD is only for a nonDBF event, and not for the DBF level. Therefore, the NRC staff concluded that a departure from 

the maximum groundwater level site parameter in the DCD was unnecessary. 

The ACRS reviewed the non-concurrence as part of the ABWR Subcommittee on the STP 

COLA on April 24, 2013. The non-concurring individual presented his views before the ACRS 

Subcommittee. Before that meeting, an ACRS consultant from Purdue University had prepared 

a February 15, 2013, report based on his review of the non-concurrence. In that report, he 

concluded: 

Analyses of the NCP [non-concurrence process] postulated by the NRC staff and 

their contractor, PNNL, as well as by six subject-matter experts, three each for 

embankment breach and storm surge, suggest that the procedures and 

assumptions used in the STP FSAR and SER to determine the design basis 

flood level and the storm surge and its effect are generally appropriate and 

reasonable. These analyses and reviews do not support the postulates of the 

NCP. 

Following a complete review of the non-concurrence, the NRC staff remains confident that its 

conclusions relative to the site hydrology review are correct. The ACRS determined that the 

NRC staff’s review of site hydrology was acceptable. 

d. NRC Bulletin 2012-01 

On July 27, 2012, the NRC staff issued Bulletin (BL) 2012-01, “Design Vulnerability in Electric 

Power System,” which requested information about operating facilities’ electric power system 

designs in light of an operating experience event that involved a single-phase open circuit 

condition at Byron Station, Unit 2, to verify compliance with applicable regulations and to 

determine if further regulatory action is warranted. The NRC staff was concerned that an 

undervoltage condition due to a loss of phase event could damage engineered safety features 

equipment and actuate protective devices. 

The STP Units 3 and 4 electric power system (both offsite and onsite ac power systems) must 

address the design vulnerability identified in BL 2012-01 to permit functioning of SSCs important 

to safety, in accordance with GDC 17, “Electric power systems,” of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A. 
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The NRC staff determined that upon the onset of a loss of one or more phases in the three 

phase offsite power system, active reactor designs, such as STP Units 3 and 4, should provide: 

1. detection of an offsite power system open-phase circuit condition, both with and 

without a high impedance ground fault condition, on the high voltage side of the 

main power transformer under all loading and operating configurations, 

2. alarm in the main control room, and 

3. automatic mitigation and response to the event. 

Implementation would be adequately addressed by providing ITAAC to verify that the 

detection/alarm/mitigation scheme is working properly before fuel load. Also, TS should provide 

surveillance requirements for the detection/alarm/mitigation scheme. Furthermore, the 

procedures for, and the training on, the detection/alarm/mitigation scheme should provide 

assurance that the electrical power system will address the loss of one or more of the three 

phases of the offsite power circuit during the life of the plant. These steps would ensure that 

AC power, with adequate capacity and capability, is available to safety-related equipment to 

meet its intended safety function in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC 17 

requirements. 

The STP COL application is the first 10 CFR Part 52 active reactor design COL application to 

address the open-phase issue. The STP COL applicant successfully provided a complete 

design and a supporting analysis to detect, alarm, and automatically mitigate open-phase 

conditions. At the time of the review, the operating reactors were still evaluating several 

proposed designs to mitigate an open-phase condition. 

The staff reviewed the applicant’s technical solution, which provides features for monitoring, 

alarming, and automatically protecting safety-related equipment in the Class 1E 4.16-kV 

divisional buses against the effects of an unbalanced power supply. The NRC staff concludes 

that the STP Units 3 and 4 design complies with the requirements set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, 

Appendix A, GDC 17 for the offsite and onsite electrical power systems and adequately 

addresses the situation described in BL 2012-01. The offsite circuits are monitored and 

alarmed in the main control room to detect open-phase conditions. In addition, negative 

sequence voltage relays protect safety-related equipment in the Class 1E 4.16-kV divisional 

buses against the effects of an unbalanced power supply by opening the feeder circuit breaker 

to the Class 1E 4.16-kV bus creating an undervoltage condition. The undervoltage signal will 

start the EDGs before any of the Class 1E loads experience degraded conditions exceeding 

those for which the equipment is qualified. The applicant has provided an adequate monitoring, 

alarm, and automatic protection scheme for open-phase conditions that satisfies the concerns of 

the NRC staff. The NRC staff found that the proposed site-specific ITAAC will allow 

confirmation that the installed negative sequence relays meet the design functions specified in 

Section 8.2S of the FSAR. In addition, the TS surveillance requirements and training provisions 

will provide reasonable assurance that the electrical power system will address the loss of one 

or more of the three phases of the offsite power circuit during the life of the plant. 
The Commissioners - 30 - 

 

Environmental Matters 

The NRC staff issued the FEIS for the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA on February 24, 2011. The 

FEIS included the NRC staff’s analysis on: (1) the environmental effects of the proposed action; 

(2) the potential mitigation measures for reducing or avoiding adverse effects; (3) the 

environmental impacts of alternatives to the proposed action; and (4) the benefit-cost 

comparison for the proposed action. The FEIS also included the NRC staff’s recommendation 

on the proposed action. After the FEIS was issued, the staff assessed whether new information 

should lead to the supplementation of the FEIS using the “Staff Process for Determining if a 

Supplement to an Environmental Impact Statement is Required in Accordance with Title 10 of 

the Code of Federal Regulations, Part 51.92(a) or 51.72(a)” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13199A170). As part of this post-FEIS review, the NRC staff conducted an audit in 

February 2015 of the applicant’s process for identifying and assessing new information (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15040A372) and performed an analysis of whether information in the 

Continued Storage Rule and GEIS should lead to the supplementation of the FEIS (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15096A156). The NRC staff did not identify any new information that 

warranted a supplement to the FEIS. Based on the NRC staff’s review, documented in the 

FEIS, and on the above-mentioned post-FEIS process, the NRC staff found no novel issues for 

the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA. 

IV. Findings 

10 CFR 52.97(a)(1) 

(i) The applicable standards and requirements of the AEA and the Commission’s 

regulations have been met. 

The NRC staff reviewed the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA and evaluated it against the 

applicable regulations in 10 CFR Parts 20, 26, 30, 31, 32, 40, 50, 51, 52, 55, 70, 73, 74, 

100, and 140. The staff performed this evaluation using applicable portions of the SRP, 

ISG documents, RGs, bulletins, NUREGs and generic letters. Based on the NRC staff’s 

review, documented in the FSER and the FEIS, the NRC staff concludes that, for the 

purpose of issuing COLs for STP Units 3 and 4, the applicable standards and 

requirements of the AEA and the Commission’s regulations have been met. 

(ii) Any required notifications to other agencies or bodies have been duly made. 

As required by Section 182c. of the AEA and 10 CFR 50.43(a), the NRC took the 

following actions: On May 5, 2015, the NRC notified the Electric Reliability Council of 

Texas (ADAMS Accession No. ML15085A440), the Public Utility Commission of Texas 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15085A370), and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15085A430) about the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA. The NRC 

published notices of the application for STP EIS scoping meetings on January 27, 2008, 

and February 3, 2008, in the Bay City Tribune and Victoria Advocate. Notices of the 
The Commissioners - 31 - 

 

application for STP draft EIS public meetings were published on April 25, 2010, May 2, 

2010, and May 5, 2010, in the same papers. In addition, the NRC staff also published a 

notice of the application in the Federal Register on April 23, 2015; April 28, 2015; May 6, 

2015; and May 12, 2015 (at 80 FR 22746, 80 FR 23597, 80 FR 26104, and 

80 FR 27190, respectively). 

Based on the staff’s completion of notifications to regulatory agencies and the public 

notices described above, the staff concludes that, for the purposes of issuing COLs 

for STP Units 3 and 4, all required notifications to other agencies or bodies have 

been duly carried out. 

(iii) There is reasonable assurance that the facility will be constructed and will operate in 

conformity with the licenses, the provisions of the AEA, and the Commission’s 

regulations. 

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant to ensure that the plant will be 

constructed and will operate in conformity with the license, the applicable provisions of 

the AEA, and applicable regulations. This includes the FSAR and other portions of the 

application, including general and financial information, TS, the emergency plan, 

requests for departures and exemptions, the QA plan, and the security plan. 

In areas where the staff found that the information submitted initially was incomplete or 

insufficient to allow the staff to reach a reasonable assurance conclusion, the staff 

issued RAIs to the applicant to obtain sufficient information. The staff reviewed the 

applicant’s responses to ensure that the additional information provided was sufficient to 

support the staff’s conclusion. Where necessary, the applicant provided multiple 

supplemental responses. As necessary, the staff also conducted audits of the 

applicant’s records and calculations and performed its own confirmatory calculations to 

confirm applicant statements. 

In some cases, the staff’s “reasonable assurance” finding required the imposition of 

license conditions or ITAAC as part of the licenses. The draft COL lists the license 

conditions, including license conditions for the Fukushima NTTF Recommendations, and 

ITAAC. The basis for each license condition or ITAAC appears in the technical 

evaluations in the STP Units 3 and 4 COL FSER and the ABWR DCD FSERs 

referenced by the STP Units 3 and 4 COLA. 

On the basis of the staff’s review of the application discussed in this paper and 

documented in the FSER and FEIS, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing 

COLs for STP Units 3 and 4, there is reasonable assurance that the facility will be 

constructed and will operate in conformance with the license, the provisions of the AEA, 

and the Commission’s regulations. 
The Commissioners - 32 - 

 

(iv) The applicant is technically and financially qualified to engage in the activities 

authorized. 

The staff reviewed information provided by the applicant on technical and financial 

qualifications. 

a. Technical Qualification. The staff reviewed information provided by the 

applicants about their technical qualifications. The review included an evaluation 

of STPNOC’s operating experience, NINA’s organizational structure, and NINA’s 

QA program. The review included the fact that STPNOC currently operates STP 

Units 1 and 2, which are two 3,853-MW(t) pressurized-water reactor units on the 

STP site. STPNOC holds a 10 CFR Part 50 license for STP Units 1 and 2, and 

has demonstrated its ability to license and operate a nuclear power reactor. In 

assuming responsibility for the design and construction of STP Units 3 and 4, 

NINA organized itself by transitioning the previously existing STPNOC 

organization responsible for the development of STP Units 3 and 4 from 

STPNOC to NINA. This transition included the programs, processes and 

procedures developed by STPNOC for STP Units 3 and 4. NINA has 

demonstrated the ability to choose and manage the oversight of nuclear steam 

supply system vendors, architect-engineers, and constructors of nuclear-related 

work. Thus, the NRC staff concludes that NINA has the capability to subcontract, to procure, to schedule, and to manage the work associated with the 

detailed design (including licensing), procurement, and construction of STP Units 

3 and 4. The staff’s review of the applicants’ organizational structure concluded 

that their management, technical support, and operating organizations are 

acceptable. The staff reviewed the applicants’ QA program and found it 

acceptable. This QA program includes requirements that will be implemented by 

the applicants’ EPC contractors. 

The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Sections 1.5S, 13.5, 

and 17.5S of the FSER. Based on the staff’s evaluation of the applicants’ 

experience with licensing and operating a nuclear power plant, their operating 

organizations, and their QA program, the staff finds that the applicants are 

technically qualified to hold a 10 CFR Part 52 license in accordance with 

10 CFR 52.79(a)(1)(iv). 

b. Financial Qualifications. The staff reviewed information provided by the 

applicants about their financial qualifications. The staff evaluated information 

pertaining to the total estimated cost of STP Units 3 and 4, consisting of 

engineering, procurement, and construction costs; owners’ costs; and financing 

costs. In addition, the staff evaluated information pertaining to the cost of 

operations of STP Units 3 and 4, consisting of fixed and variable operating and 

maintenance costs, fuel costs, and other expenses. As described above, the 

staff also evaluated NINA’s request for an exemption from the current financial 

qualification requirements in 10 CFR Part 50. 
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The staff’s evaluation of this information appears in Chapter 1, “Introduction and 

General Description of Plant,” of the FSER. Based on the financial information 

provided by the applicant, the NRC staff concludes that the licensees have 

demonstrated that they appear to be financially qualified in accordance with the 

standard in the draft regulatory basis for the financial qualifications rulemaking, 

and that the requirements for an exemption have been satisfied. Therefore, the 

NRC staff concludes that the licensees are financially qualified to construct and 

operate STP Units 3 and 4 and to engage in the activities authorized by the 

licenses. 

(v) Issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to 

the health and safety of the public. 

The NRC staff reviewed the application to assure that issuance of the licenses will not 

be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety. 

Specifically, the staff evaluated the applicant’s analysis and conclusions about 

site-specific conditions, including the geography and demography of the site; nearby 

industrial, transportation, and military facilities; site meteorology; site hydrology; and site 

geology, seismology, and geotechnical engineering to ensure that issuance of the 

licenses will not be inimical to public health and safety. The review also evaluated the 

design of structures, components, equipment, and systems to ensure safe operation, 

performance, and shutdown when subjected to extreme weather, floods, seismic events, 

missiles (including aircraft impacts), chemical and radiological releases, and loss of 

offsite power to the extent not already resolved by the incorporation of the ABWR 

design. The review confirmed that radiological releases and human doses during both 

normal operation and accident scenarios will remain within regulatory limits, which 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public 

health and safety. 

The review determined that the security measures to be implemented at the site are 

adequate to protect the facility in accordance with NRC security regulations, which 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to the 

common defense and security. Also, the staff is not aware of any information presenting 

inimicality concerns. The applicants are all based in the United States. Toshiba, a 

Japanese corporation, does have ownership and financial ties to NINA. But the staff has 

determined that Toshiba’s corporate ownership and financial ties with NINA are not 

inimical to the public health and safety or the common defense and security. The U.S. 

Government has a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement and a 123 Agreement with 

the Government of Japan. These agreements involve the sharing of nuclear technology 

and special nuclear material as well as commitments for mutual defense. On June 1, 

2006, the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States approved the 

acquisition of Westinghouse by Toshiba, concluding that the acquisition would not place 

the national security of the U.S. at risk. Finally, Toshiba is a well-known, major 

participant in the domestic and international nuclear market, and the NRC staff is not 
The Commissioners - 34 - 

 

aware of information suggesting that Toshiba is a threat to the common defense and 

security. 

The review also determined that operational programs identified by the applicant are 

sufficiently described to assure the staff of compliance with regulations. Where the staff 

needed to confirm operational program implementation to reach a reasonable assurance 

finding, but the details of program implementation were not governed by specific 

regulatory requirements, the draft licenses contain license conditions to ensure that 

operational programs will be properly implemented and thus that issuance of the COLs 

will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health and safety. 

The NRC staff’s evaluation addressed the operational programs identified in the 

SRM, dated February 22, 2006, on SECY-05-0197, “Review of Operational Programs in 

a Combined License Application and Generic Emergency Planning Inspections, Tests, 

Analyses, and Acceptance Criteria,” as well as two additional operational programs, 

including a cybersecurity program, and a program for handling SNM, and an SNM 

transportation physical security program. The staff’s review of the applicant’s 

emergency planning information concluded that the emergency plan is acceptable and 

supports the staff’s conclusion that issuance of the licenses will not be inimical to public 

health and safety. 

On the basis of the NRC staff’s review of the application, as discussed in this paper and 

the referenced documents, the NRC staff concludes that issuance of the COLs for STP 

Units 3 and 4 will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to public health 

and safety. 

(vi) The findings required by Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 have been made. 

As discussed below, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing COLs for STP 

Units 3 and 4, the environmental review has been adequate to support the findings set 

forth in 10 CFR 51.107(a). 

10 CFR 52.97(a)(2): 

The staff concludes that there are no acceptance criteria from ITAAC in the referenced standard 

DC that the applicant has asserted are met. Therefore, no Commission finding under this 

section is required for the purpose of issuing COLs for STP Units 3 and 4. 

10 CFR 51.107(a):

(i) Determine whether the requirements of Sections 102(2) (A), (C), and (E) of NEPA and

the regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51 have been met. 

The staff reviewed the application and evaluated it against the applicable regulations in 10 CFR 

Parts 50, 51, 52, and 100. The staff performed this evaluation using applicable portions of 
The Commissioners - 35 - 

 

NUREG-1555, issued in 2000, and updated in 2007, and ISG documents, RGs, and generic 

letters. 

In accordance with NEPA Section 102(2)(A) (42 U.S.C. Section 4332(2)(A)), the staff prepared 

the FEIS (NUREG-1937) based on its independent assessment of the information provided by 

the applicant and information developed independently by the staff, including through 

consultation with other agencies. The staff’s technical analysis used a systematic, 

interdisciplinary approach to integrate information from many fields, including the natural and 

social sciences as well as the environmental design arts. 

In accordance with NEPA Sections 102(2)(C)(i–v) (42 USC Section 4332(2)(C)(i–v), the FEIS 

for the STP Units 3 and 4 COLs addresses: (1) the environmental impact of the proposed 

action, (2) any unavoidable adverse environmental effects, (3) alternatives to the proposed 

action, (4) the relationship between local short-term uses of the environment and the 

maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and (5) any irreversible and 

irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed action should it 

be implemented. 

As supported by correspondence presented in Appendix F, “Key Consultation Correspondence,” 

to the FEIS, the staff concludes that it fulfilled the requirement of NEPA Section 102(2)(C) by 

consulting with and obtaining comments from other Federal agencies with jurisdiction by law or 

special expertise (see 42 USC Section 4332(2)(C)). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 

(USACE) fully participated with the NRC in preparing this EIS as a cooperating agency and 

participated collaboratively on the review team under the Commission’s Memorandum of 

Agreement with the USACE. 

The staff concludes that the FEIS demonstrates that the staff adequately considered 

alternatives to the proposed action to the extent that it involves unresolved conflicts concerning 

alternative uses of available resources, consistent with the requirements of NEPA 

Section 102(2)(E) (42 USC Section 4332(2)(E)). The alternatives considered in the FEIS 

include the no-action alternative, energy alternatives, alternative sites, and system design 

alternatives. 

For the reasons given above, the staff also concludes that its review comports with the NRC’s 

requirements in 10 CFR Part 51, Subpart A. The staff concludes that the environmental findings 

in the FEIS constitute the “hard look” required by NEPA and have reasonable support in logic 

and fact. 

(ii) Independently consider the final balance among conflicting factors contained in the

record of the proceeding with a view to determining the appropriate action to be taken. 

Section 10.6, “Benefit-Cost Balance,” of the FEIS provides the staff’s summary of the benefitcost balance. The staff concluded that “building and operating the proposed Units 3 and 4, with 

mitigation measures identified by the review team, would have accrued benefits that most likely 

would outweigh the economic, environmental, and social costs. For the NRC-proposed action 
The Commissioners - 36 - 

 

(NRC-authorized construction and operation), the accrued benefits would also outweigh the 

costs of construction and operation of Units 3 and 4.” 

(iii) Determine, after weighing the environmental, economic, technical, and other benefits

against environmental and other costs, and considering reasonable alternatives, whether

the COLs should be issued, denied, or appropriately conditioned to protect 

environmental values. 

As noted above, in its FEIS, the staff considered the cost-benefit balancing as well as 

reasonable alternatives. Based on that analysis, the staff recommends that the COLs be 

issued. The staff based its recommendation on: (1) the ER submitted by STPNOC, 

(2) consultation with Federal, State, Tribal, and local agencies, (3) the review team’s own 

independent review, (4) the staff’s consideration of public comments, and (5) the assessments 

summarized in the FEIS, including the potential mitigation measures identified in the ER and in 

the FEIS. In addition, in making its recommendation, the staff determined that none of the 

alternative sites assessed is environmentally preferable or obviously superior to the STP site. 

The NRC staff also determined that none of the reasonable energy alternatives and none of the 

reasonable system design alternatives were environmentally preferable to those proposed. 

The NRC’s determination is independent of the USACE’s determination of a “least 

environmentally damaging practicable alternative” under the Clean Water Act (CWA) 

Section 404(b)(1) guidelines and its required public interest review (PIR). The USACE’s 

independent regulatory permit decision documentation will reference relevant analyses from the 

EIS and, as necessary, include a supplemental PIR; CWA Section 404(b)(1) evaluation; 

cumulative impact analysis; compensatory mitigation plan that is in accordance with 33 CFR 

Part 332, “Compensatory Mitigation for Losses of Aquatic Resources”; and other information and 

evaluations that may be outside the NRC’s scope of analysis and not included in the FEIS, but 

that are required by the USACE to support its permit decision. 

(iv) Determine, in an uncontested proceeding, whether the NEPA review conducted by the 

NRC staff has been adequate.

The staff conducted an independent evaluation of the application; developed independent, 

reliable information; and conducted a systematic, interdisciplinary review of the potential 

impacts of the proposed action on the human environment and reasonable alternatives to the 

applicant’s proposal. Before development of the DEIS, the staff issued a notice of intent and 

invited the public to provide any information relevant to the environmental review. The staff also 

provided opportunities for governmental and general public participation during the public 

meeting on the DEIS and used publicly available guidance in the development of its FEIS. 

The staff considered the purpose of and need for the proposed action, the environment that 

could be affected by the action, and the consequences of the proposed action, including 

mitigation that could reduce impacts. The FEIS considered the no-action alternative, energy 

alternatives, alternative sites, system design alternatives, and the potential impact of 

conservation measures in determining the demand for power and consequential need for 
The Commissioners - 37 - 

 

additional generating capacity. The FEIS compared the alternatives to the proposed action. 

The staff considered any adverse environmental effects that could not be avoided should the 

proposed action be implemented, the relationship between short-term uses of the human 

environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any 

irreversible or irretrievable commitments of resources that would be involved in the proposed 

project. 

The NRC filed the DEIS with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency for its review, consistent 

with its requirements in Section 309, “Policy Review,” of the Clean Air Act (see 42 U.S.C. 

Section 7609). The staff considered all comments received on the DEIS and, in Appendix E to 

the FEIS, described the manner in which each comment was dispositioned. 

 
The Commissioners - 38 - 

 

On these bases, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing the COL, it conducted a 

thorough and complete environmental review that was sufficient to meet the requirements of 

NEPA and adequate to inform the Commission’s action on the COL request. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/

 

Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

 
The Commissioners - 38 - 

 

On these bases, the staff concludes that, for the purpose of issuing the COL, it conducted a 

thorough and complete environmental review that was sufficient to meet the requirements of 

NEPA and adequate to inform the Commission’s action on the COL request. 

COORDINATION: 

The Office of the General Counsel has reviewed this paper and has no legal objection. 

 /RA/

Victor M. McCree 

 Executive Director 

 for Operations 

ADAMS Accession No.: ML15176A532 *via e-mail SECY-012 

OFFICE PM:NRO/DNRL/LB2 LA:NRO/DNRL/LB2 Tech Editor LPM:NRO/DNRL/LB2 PM:NRO/DNRL/EPB 

NAME LBetancourt CMurphy* JDougherty* TTai* PVokoun* 

DATE 6/25/2015 7/1/2015 7/13/2015 7/24/2015 7/24/2015

OFFICE BC:NRO/DNRL/EPB BC:NRO/DNRL/LB2 D:NRO/DSEA D:NRO/DARR D:NRO/DNRL 

NAME JDixon-Herrity* SLee* SFlanders* MMayfield* FAkstulewicz* 

DATE 7/28/2015 8/4/2015 9/4/2015 9/9/2015 9/10/2015

OFFICE D:NRO/DSRA D:NRO/DE D:NRO/DCIP D:NMSS/FCSS D:NRR/DIRS 

NAME JMonninger* JTappert* MCheok* MBailey* SMorris* 

DATE 9/10/2015 9/10/2015 9/10/2015 9/9/2015 9/10/2015

OFFICE D:NRR/DE D:NSIR/DSP D:NSIR/DPR D:NSIR/CSD OGC 

NAME JLubinski* CLui* RLewis 

(for JAnderson)* 

BWestreich 

(for RFells)* PMoulding* 

DATE 9/10/2015 9/10/2015 9/10/2015 09/8/15 9/21/2015 

OFFICE D:NRO EDO 

NAME GTracy VMcCree 

DATE 9/29/2015 9/ 30 /2015 

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY 
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- 3 - 

 

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- 4 - 

 

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