About the Repor

This report highlights key strategic functions and outcomes 

of education and training in nonviolent civil resistance 

movements around the world. Funded by the United States 

Institute of Peace (USIP), it draws on findings from research, 

trainer and participant interviews, and the author’s 

experience with nonviolent civil movements.

About the Autho

Nadine Bloch is training director for Beautiful Trouble, 

an organization that advances creative activism. Her work 

focuses on nonviolence education and civil resistance. The 

author thanks Maria Stephan and Amun Nadeem at 

USIP for support of this project.

2301 Constitution Ave., NW • Washington, DC 20037 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

Special Report 394  October

© 2016 by the United States Institute of Peace. 

All rights reserved.

Conten

Why Emphasize Training and Why Now? 2

Capacity Building and Civil Resistance 3

Limitations of Education and Training 11

Education, Training, and Social Change 12

Conclusion 14

Appendix: Case Study Matrix 15

Nadine Bloch

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE www.usip.org

SPECIAL REPORT

Education and Training in 

Nonviolent Resistance

Summary

• The three nonviolent methodologies identified in seminal works are protest and persuasion, 

noncooperation, and intervention. Somewhat overlooked is a focus on organization or 

capacity building, which includes education and training.

• Education and training fulfill a critical strategic function in capacity building by helping build 

certain key components of successful movements: planning, unity, and discipline.

• Historical examples from Germany, the Philippines, Serbia, and the United States demonstrate this instrumental role. 

• The education and training methodology and philosophy developed during the U.S. civil 

rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s became a model for the campaigns and movements 

that followed.

• The Yellow Revolution in the Philippines to restore democracy in the mid-1980s was built 

on education that enabled the powerless to strategically address the regime’s power and on 

training to effectively challenge authority.

• The nuclear power industry in the United States and Germany was stymied by a determined 

transnational grassroots movement in the 1970s and 1980s. Critical to its success were strategic planning, nonviolent action, consensus decision making, and legal processes.

• The Serbian civil protest group Otpor! grew from a handful of students into an eighty thousand–person movement that proved instrumental in overthrowing a dictatorship and helping 

establish a democracy. Training was key.

• Although policy-relevant research on civil resistance is expanding as the number of popular 

movements increases, the strategic value of education and training in such movements 

remains relatively understudied.

• Four historical examples of successful nonviolent movements suggest five general and 

actionable strategic functions of education and training.
2 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

Why Emphasize Training and Why Now?

Over the past several decades, civil society’s potential to bring about change without resorting to violence has been demonstrated in diverse social and economic environments worldwide. From the successful uprisings against dictatorships in Serbia, the Philippines, and Chile 

to the civil rights movement in the United States and the more recent popular movements in 

the Middle East, North Africa, Burma, Brazil, and Venezuela, the efficacy of nonviolent direct 

action has been improved by strategic and skillful use of education and training.

Even against seemingly insurmountable odds, under brutal regimes and during violent 

conflict, grassroots movements have effectively harnessed nonviolent strategies. Indeed, over 

the past century and more, nonviolent resistance movements have been twice as successful 

in achieving their aims as resistance movements that embraced violence.1 These triumphs in 

large part owe to a long-standing tradition of preparing communities to take safe and strategic 

nonviolent action (NVA) through education and training (for definitions, see box 1).

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily 

reflect the views of the United States Institute of Peace, 

which does not advocate specific policy positions.

To request permission to photocopy or reprint materials, 

email: permissions@usip.org.

About the Institu

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, 

nonpartisan institution established and funded by Congress. 

Its goals are to help prevent and resolve violent conflicts, 

promote postconflict peacebuilding, and increase conflict 

management tools, capacity, and intellectual capital 

worldwide. The Institute does this by empowering others 

with knowledge, skills, and resources, as well as by its direct 

involvement in conflict zones around the globe.

Board of Di

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, RiceHadleyGates, LLC, 

Washington, DC • George E. Moose (Vice Chair), Adjunct 

Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and 

Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Hertog Distinguished Practitioner 

in Residence, Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International 

Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, University Chaplain 

and Senior Adjunct Professorial Lecturer, School of International 

Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, 

President, Robert F. Kennedy Center for Justice and Human 

Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care 

Consultants, LLC., Las Vegas, NV • Stephen D. Krasner, Graham 

H. Stuart Professor of International Relations at Stanford 

University, Palo Alto, CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive 

Director, International Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, 

NY • Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, George Mason 

University, Fairfax, VA • J. Robinson West, Chairman, PFC 

Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice 

President, Leadership Conference on Civil and 

Human Rights, Washington, DC 

Members Ex Offi

John Kerry, Secretary of State • Ashton Carter, Secretary of 

Defense • Gregg F. Martin, Major General, U.S. Army; President, 

National Defense University • Nancy Lindborg, President, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting) Government agencies, intergovernmental agencies—including the United Nations (UN)— 

and many international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have also recognized the 

potential for reducing violent conflict by supporting civil society movements and actors. 

Eleanor Openshaw of the International Service for Human Rights underscored the connection 

between peace and a strong civil society when she observed, with respect to the adoption 

of UN Security Council Resolution 2171 (Maintenance of international peace and security—

Conflict prevention), that “Through this resolution the Security Council has recognised that 

efforts to prevent and resolve conflict are strengthened by a vibrant civil society.”2

In July 2014, the U.S. Institute of Peace hosted a workshop to identify the key challenges and opportunities in using technologies to support nonviolent civic movements in 

the twenty-first century. The civic activists, policymakers, technologists, NGO leaders, and 

education professionals participating in the workshop noted the power of training to support movement-building, the development of appropriate skills and knowledge, planning and 

innovation, and access to materials.3 Peer-to-peer capacity-building training, participatory 

workshops, locally based clinics, and mentoring were identified as robust elements of an 

approach emphasizing civil society engagement.4

We examine education and training undertaken specifically to address the functional needs of a 

campaign, often within the framework of a civil resistance movement. Education is defined as the 

process of receiving or giving systematic instruction. It can be formal, as in at a school or university, 

or informal, as in a grassroots education experience. It may or may not have a specific associated 

outcome. Training is defined as the action of teaching a person a particular skill or type of behavior. 

It can be thought of as education with a specific defined outcome. The scope of nonviolent action 

education and training can range from an hour or less of preparation for a specific event to the 

equivalent of semesters of a college-level course, depending on campaign goals, organizational 

needs, and available resources. Education and training topics include political and NVA theory and 

philosophy, NVA skills, creating and using media, street medic/first aid care, action logistics, outreach, 

legal support, deescalation tools, peacekeeping, PTSD, mass mobilization platforms, team building, 

leadership, decision-making process and tools, strategic planning, creative and cultural tactics, antioppression, cultural competency, facilitation, third-party nonviolent intervention, and more.

Box 1. Key Definitions
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 3

The impact of training can be seen in the success of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution and 

the Georgian Rose Revolution.5 Specifically, the Georgian youth group Kmara (Enough) significantly improved its planning and execution after its activists were trained in NVA methods 

and strategy by veterans of Serbia’s Otpor! (Revolution!) movement in 2003. Similarly, in the 

civil uprising against Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos, civil resistance education and 

training helped turn “nuns and priests into skilled organizers who readily commanded the 

crowd’s attention.”6 Training also helped Papuan nonviolent civic activists and leaders in their 

struggle for self-determination from Indonesia “reflect on how they wage the struggle, conduct 

a cost-benefit analysis of different methods, and at the same time build strategic capacity by 

bringing diverse groups of activists together and supporting collective reflection of what has 

worked, what has failed and why.”7

Capacity Building and Civil Resistance

In his seminal 1973 work, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, scholar Gene Sharp identifies three 

broad NVA methodologies: protest and persuasion, noncooperation (social, economic, political), and intervention.8 Somewhat overlooked, however, is a focus on the critical and foundational role of organization or capacity building in successful social movements. Without 

consistent, transparent, realistic ways of planning, recruiting, training, preparing, and unity 

building, the sustainable process and structure of movements would be severely limited. 

Achieving political, economic, and social change depends as much on successful education 

and training as on the higher-profile tactics and strategies of nonviolent civic action.

NVA education and training to achieve capacity building in civil resistance campaigns 

spans a fairly wide spectrum of activities and formats, as well as duration and intensity of 

training, depending on campaign goals, organizational needs, and available resources. The 

activities involved range from those appropriate to supporting big-picture movements—

such as strategic planning, analysis, and theory development—to those suitable for specific skill and capacity building. These more specific activities include leadership and team 

development, logistics exploration, cultural and arts work, anti-oppression education, media 

response skill development, medical response skill development, and mass mobilization 

training. Integral to campaign and movement-building trajectories, education and training 

help support strategic planning, shared theories of change, unity of purpose and vision, and 

effective tactics, as well as strengthen commitment and adherence to NVA. In this report, 

the functions of education and training and the ways in which they contribute to nonviolent societal change are explored in four typological examples and five case studies. These 

cases highlight the value of training in strengthening the likelihood of meaningful change 

as well as the lessons and practices that have enabled nonviolent movements to become 

more disciplined and resilient.

Background research and interviews with experts in the field of NVA and social movements, and with trainers involved in specific campaigns, were used to identify common 

patterns across four disparate but successful movements, three of which were focused 

on political and social change. All of the cases reflect community-based movements. The 

fourth—anti–nuclear power movements—reinforces the success of education and training 

at the community level. Although each movement intentionally used education and training 

to address its particular needs, the tactics and strategies served different functions. Education and training were used as a key to creating discipline and common ground as well as a 

spiritual and intellectual foundation for the U.S. civil rights movement; as key middle-class 

mobilization tools in the Philippines; as preparation for sustained tactical occupation of 

sites of proposed nuclear power stations during the anti–nuclear power movement in the 

Achieving political, economic, 

and social change depends as 

much on successful education 

and training as on the higherprofile tactics and strategies of 

nonviolent civic action.
4 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

United States and Germany; and as part of a multipartite recruitment drive for the Serbian 

pro-democracy organization Otpor!. These examples highlight the functions and a few of the 

outcomes of intentional training and education.9

U.S. Civil Rights Movement

The strategic and philosophical cornerstones of the civil rights movement in the United 

States were NVA theory and practice. The two main expressions of the commitment might 

be loosely described as NVA education and training and as political education or citizenship 

schools. The former were supported by the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) and the War 

Resisters’ League (WRL), the latter by the Highlander Folk School and the Southern Christian 

Leadership Conference (SCLC).10

The education and training component was deeply rooted in a culture of analysis, political education, and training that grew out of the work of the Christian-based FOR, which 

formed after World War I to focus on NVA. The WRL formed shortly after that and worked 

alongside FOR, supporting education and training from a secular orientation. Staff of both 

organizations brought depth and experience to civil rights strategizing, organizing, and 

training. FOR’s James Lawson and WRL’s Bayard Rustin in particular helped steer Martin 

Luther King Jr. toward embracing Gandhian active nonviolence principles and NVA strategies 

within a spiritual Christian framework.11

In 1942, an offshoot of FOR formed the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), which was dedicated to using principles of nonviolent resistance in support of desegregation. Bayard Rustin 

was one of the educators and trainers who led classes and workshops to prepare participants 

to confront potential violence and incarceration. The educational and training materials 

incorporated lessons learned from earlier segregation challenges, including actions protesting 

the segregation of a Cleveland swimming pool in 1941. In 1947, the Journey of Reconciliation, 

an early integrated freedom ride, was followed by month-long NVA workshops and training 

sessions in Washington, DC, which CORE continued to run for ten years. The training methods 

drew on theories of change grounded in philosophical nonviolence strategies and skills, such 

as the power of turning the other cheek and maintaining a moral high ground, as well as 

organizing methods.12

The Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) grew out of the Nashville resistance scene. In 1959, James Lawson began weekly participatory training sessions for youth 

using role-playing, stories, and discussion, focusing in particular on whites-only lunch 

counters in department stores. As Joanne Sheehan of WRL reports,

Lawson facilitated a process of empowerment for the young black students living 

in a segregated society, where they developed a sense of their own value. They 

learned how to focus on the issue of racist segregation and choose a target. Not 

believing in hierarchical leadership, Lawson organised a central committee which 

was open to those taking the trainings. As the students developed a strategy to 

desegregate stores, they learned to organise, conduct a demonstration, negotiate, 

and deal with the media. They role played the physical and verbal abuse they would 

receive when they sat at a segregated lunch counter, learning how to nonviolently 

resist the impulse to run or fight back. Their three month campaign—which was 

preceded by six months of trainings—was a success, and the restaurants and stores 

of Nashville were desegregated. Nashville became a model for campaigns and 

trainings. Eight of the young black students went on to be key organisers of major 

campaigns in the civil rights movement and beyond.13

A major component of the training was helping participants manage fear. Sessions with 

lawyers to learn how to navigate the legal system and understand the anticipated arrest 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 5

process were paired with singing to uplift and build courage.14 Specific instructions, such as 

how to roll into a fetal position to protect oneself in case of a physical attack, instilled in 

activists a feeling of preparedness. Many of the possible situations of abuse that activists 

might encounter during actions were role-played to reveal both possibilities and personal 

limits. As Mary E. King, now a professor of peace and conflict studies, relates, “We SNCC 

workers always carried a toothbrush in our pocket, as it connoted readiness for being locked 

up and the acceptance of penalties—which is at the core of noncooperation and civil disobedience—and since all of us did this it also signified that we were bonded together.”15

In 1964, the SNCC was instrumental in creating the Mississippi Freedom Schools, which 

ultimately comprised a network of forty-one schools, open for three months, dedicated to 

linking learning to liberation from segregation and offering a vision of how to transform 

the American South. The process of preparing the mostly white volunteer teachers from 

the North included sessions in everything from black history to NVA and significant soulsearching.16 The classroom pedagogy was rooted in the belief that responses to oppression 

had to grow out of the experiences of those who were oppressed. Popular education (critical 

pedagogy) methods were used to empower students to take control of their learning and 

thereby create social change. An elicitive and participant-centered format was encouraged 

for the classes; it was reported that teachers often had students sit in a circle rather than 

in traditional rows as a physical manifestation of inclusiveness.

Another major figure from the civil rights era, Septima Poinsette Clark, promoted political education through a citizenship program in the 1950s at the Highlander Folk School, 

which was designed to teach literacy and civic rights while expanding voter participation 

among disenfranchised blacks in the South.17 The Highlander Research and Education 

Center, as it is known today, was and remains a critical gathering place for activists and 

trainers committed to NVA and a locus of political and popular education in fighting racism 

and other types of oppression.

By 1958, thirty-seven adults were able to pass the voter registration test (used as a legal 

barrier to suppress black voters) as a result of the first session of community schools. When 

Highlander shut down in 1961, the SCLC took over the program and expanded its reach. 

Eventually the citizenship school project trained one hundred thousand teachers who then 

led citizenship schools throughout the South, a huge and impressive popular education 

program that addressed topical issues of racist power imbalances in the U.S. voting system 

and aimed to effect positive social change. This in turn supported the voter registration 

of about seven hundred thousand African Americans by 1969, in large part because of the 

establishment of the citizenship schools and Septima Clark’s vision.18

By addressing adult literacy, the classes also helped build individual agency and capacity. 

Lessons were connected to the current events of the day and focused on civil rights, voting 

rights, community leadership and organizing, and the nonviolent campaigns then taking 

place. This was a clear effort to involve rural communities in the civil rights movement and 

to lay the foundation for developing leadership and collective process skills. Miles Horton, 

who had founded the Highlander Folk School in 1932, wrote from his experience with citizenship schools that “educational work during social movement periods provides the best 

opportunity for multiplying democratic leadership.”19

The SCLC also maintained a full schedule of training and education programs. An explanatory flyer from the 1960s lists seven: voter registration, political education, citizenship 

education, operation breadbasket, direct action, operation dialogue, and nonviolence and 

leadership training.20 Because the SCLC was affiliated with churches across the South, these 

sessions were designed to situate the civil rights struggle in a moral context so as to speak 

directly to the congregants.
6 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

The myriad training sessions and classes offered under the penumbra of the civil rights 

movement continued a long-standing tradition of preparing and empowering communities 

to engage in strategic, safe, and effective NVA. Trainers also experimented, innovated, and 

refined the training methods to deliver a sustained mass mobilization characterized by 

adherence to nonviolent discipline, unity of diverse participants, and effective action. The 

training methodology and philosophy became a model for the campaigns and movements 

that followed, including the Vietnam War protests and the global anti–nuclear weapons 

movement.21 Many have asserted that the South Africa liberation struggle drew considerable 

inspiration from the U.S. civil rights movement: “After his release from prison in 1990 and 

rise to the presidency, Mandela would often pay homage to Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. 

and the Southern civil rights movement, which he said were an inspiration to him and other 

anti-apartheid activists in South Africa.”22

Filipino Yellow Revolution

The 1983–86 Yellow Revolution in the Philippines was fueled by a commitment to NVA from 

a cross section of the lower and middle economic classes of Filipino society. Their work to 

remove the dictator President Ferdinand Marcos from power and restore democracy was 

built on education that enabled the “powerless” to analyze how to strategically address the 

regime’s power and on training in how to effectively challenge authority.

Historically, nonviolent resistance had been practiced in the Philippines as far back as 

Spanish colonial times. In its traditional context, NVA was a tool used mostly by poor rural 

communities, and therefore was decentralized and addressed local issues. It was based 

on small, flexible groups of activists that operated with autonomy, often in concert with 

other affinity groups working on similar issues. Resources included the seminal 1974 manual 

Organizing People for Power.23 This work was used as a political education manual to support 

the powerless in analyzing power and in strategic thinking on how to challenge authority, 

usually at a local level.

The training for these situations focused on maintaining discipline and executing effective actions; it was usually provided by local radical clergy or affiliated laity. This background 

was the foundation for people’s strikes (welgang bayan), boycotts, and other large protests 

in 1984 and 1985. The opposition leadership formed a left-wing alliance of five hundred 

grassroots groups that turned out more than a million people trained in nonviolent discipline 

who maintained that discipline during a series of general strikes.24

It was not until after the democratic opposition leader Benigno Aquino was assassinated 

in 1983 that the middle class was ready to join the uprising against the Marcos dictatorship. 

A Catholic community of nuns invited trainers from the International Fellowship of Reconciliation to lead workshops in NVA that included political education and power analysis, and 

this outside influence had a dramatic effect on mobilizing the middle class, the opposition 

elites, and the Church. A newly created Philippine chapter of the Fellowship of Reconciliation 

organized forty NVA training sessions in thirty provinces. About 1,500 people participated 

in the three-day workshops, which included history, philosophy, and strategies of NVA and 

focused on the biblical traditions of NVA and on the sociopolitical situation.25

The training team included the French Austrian husband-and-wife team of Jean and 

Hildegard Goss-Meyer, the Americans Richard Deats and Stefan Merken, and a group of six 

students from Union Seminary who were part of a larger activist group called Friends of 

Jesus. For fear of arrest by the Marcos regime, the workshops were by invitation only, held 

in various community venues, and not publicized. Participant Richard Deats reported, 

The myriad training sessions 

and classes offered under the 

penumbra of the civil rights 

movement continued a longstanding tradition of preparing 

and empowering communities 

to engage in strategic, safe, 

and effective NVA. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 7

We did role-plays, where participants would take assigned parts, such as a tenant 

farmer dealing with an oppressive landlord, or a worker stopped by an armed soldier 

for questioning. We talked about “the pillars of oppression,” e.g., the army, the 

government, the upper class. Participants shared their opinions and experiences 

and began to feel strength that came from verbalizing and acting out internal 

struggles that often had been held in silence. Learning of what had happened in 

India, in the US and other places was a powerful incentive for action.26

The training paid off, as thousands embraced the potential of people power and prepared to 

take to the streets. The protesters had learned from studying historical resistance movements. 

They set up affinity groups and adopted simple and powerful tactics: link arms, drop down in 

case of attack, don’t run, move in a deliberate manner. When tear gas was thrown, the front 

row of demonstrators would disperse and be replaced by those in the back.27 The protesters 

were prepared to work under pressure and make prudent, safe decisions in the streets. The 

safety of protesters was enhanced because the local police and military on the ground saw 

their adherence to NVA and recognized the value of the unarmed protesters’ protection of 

renegade troops refusing to follow Marcos’ orders.28

Growing awareness of the power of NVA enabled many Filipinos who wanted social 

change but were wary of armed struggle to become involved activists. The appeal of NVA 

as a strategy united the leftists and the conservatives in their opposition to the Marcos 

regime. The relative openness of Filipino society to adopting NVA may have been tied to the 

country’s widespread acceptance of Christianity and the historical use of NVA by the local 

clergy. Mobilizing the middle class was particularly important as the scope of the movement significantly expanded; in addition, the training was effective because it targeted the 

middle classes and used the teachings of the Catholic Church to promote acceptance of NVA. 

The trainings enabled people, particularly the middle class, to build solidarity and common 

cause as well as coalesce as a unit.

Four days after Marcos attempted to steal the election in February 1986, he was forced 

to flee. The world had witnessed a remarkable four-day bloodless revolution. Behind this 

achievement, however, lay years of training and preparation based on situational analysis 

of political power dynamics, along with ethical and pragmatic commitments to NVA and 

mass participation.

Anti–Nuclear Power Movement

The nuclear power industry in the United States and Germany was stymied by a determined 

grassroots movement dedicated to nonviolent resistance in the 1970s and 1980s. Since 

1977, no new ground has been broken for nuclear plants in the United States. In Germany, 

the construction or planning of many proposed plants and storage facilities was stopped, 

and the country has since committed to a complete phase-out of nuclear power by 2020 

following the Fukushima nuclear disaster. Critical to the success of the popular resistance 

were comprehensive preparatory workshops in strategic planning, NVA, consensus decision 

making, and legal processes.29

New Hampshire. From its first action, the Clamshell Alliance—the New England organizing body of the U.S. anti–nuclear power movement, which was fighting the proposed twounit nuclear power plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire—required all participants who risked 

arrest to undergo training.30 Workshops included role-playing of court trials and incarceration, as well as sessions spent learning how to share leadership and overcome oppressive 

societal behaviors. The training linked participants to the history of civil resistance. The 

education and training programs of the anti–nuclear power movement in the 1970s and 

1980s were heirs to the seminal NVA training of the civil rights era, and many of the trainers 

The trainings enabled people, 

particularly the middle class, 

to build solidarity and common 

cause as well as coalesce 

as a unit.
8 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

and participants were veterans of successful actions that had been mounted by FOR, WRL, 

the SNCC, and the SCLC.31

The Clamshell Alliance required attendance at intensive, six- to eight-hour training sessions for its action participants. This requirement enabled the activists to maintain discipline in collective decision making as well as NVA, in comparison with movements that did 

not engage in mandatory training. The Clamshell Alliance actively engaged its opposition 

using training as an asset: activists were able to parlay training into a tool for deescalation 

on-site and in advance through the public promulgation of action guidelines and a commitment to NVA discipline. As Paul Gunter, an anti–nuclear power activist since the 1970s and 

now with the organization Beyond Nuclear, explains, “Our folks were disciplined, we were not 

going to destroy property, we had clear guidelines, and we could then establish this trust 

about why we were really there, and to keep the action on point, on issues about nuclear 

power, not on property destruction [or] rebellion but on nukes.”32

According to Kristie Conrad, organizer and founding member of the Clamshell Alliance, “A 

large part of the training was role-playing...so that you could...prepare yourself for various 

scenarios....We would role-play, with half of us being police officers and half of us being 

demonstrators...so that people could have the opportunity to at least experience it and give 

some forethought to it so that should we get in that situation we would know what to do.”33

Understanding the police perspective was a critical strategy—not only because it helped 

participants to better understand the context, but because the training became a precondition to the state of New Hampshire allowing the protests. Gunter acknowledges that in June 

1978 the organizers negotiated with the New Hampshire attorney general regarding terms for 

the protesters to stay on site overnight for the three-day encampment. People who had not 

gone through extensive training were turned away and not allowed to remain. In effect, the 

training was recognized by the state of New Hampshire, and the Clamshell Alliance honored 

and enforced the agreement.

Through the training sessions, many participants got both their first exposure to a feminist perspective and an opportunity to explore alternative transformational interactions, as 

Paul Gunter explains:

It was the early [1970s] and most people had not had direct experience [with 

feminist critique], so in trainings we would have folks observe in various dialogues 

how many times men said what women had just said (as if it was their own 

original idea), talking not only about active listening but also how sexist it was 

and how it affected our communication—and having the large training group 

broken down into the smaller affinity groups really helped make this a growth 

experience for everyone, and taught empathy skills that we could use, not only 

internally, but also with those we would confront, public affairs officers, pro-nuke 

townspeople, police.34

Directly confronting oppression and prejudice operating within organizing structures 

not only transformed interpersonal interactions but also increased the movement’s overall 

effectiveness by encouraging participation of a diverse community, thereby helping build a 

broader-based people power movement.

Gunter relates the importance of a spectrum of training, from recommending specific 

ways to stay safe to how to make quick decisions:

[Learning] how to incorporate what you brought on-site with you to defend vs. 

police dogs—put packs on your back and sit in a tight circle to keep dogs from 

getting a grab on you—and sitting in close circles could help if police used 

horses—it’s not likely they would step on you if in a big clump...gave people 

some confidence to enter into the action, some sense of being prepared. Each AG 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 9

[affinity group, or small action team] had rotating responsibilities that included, 

and were used in quick decision-making exercises in training, [how] to isolate 

hecklers, not get involved with troublemakers, to deal internally with provocateurs, 

to have media talking points, [to] have a person with a medical kit.35

The consensus process had been so integrated into the campaign that it was effectively 

used when 1,414 protestors were arrested after occupying the proposed Seabrook power 

plant site on May 1, 1977. They were held in seven armories and jails for two weeks, lawyers 

carrying information between the groups. “There was even a New Hampshire Guard testimony where they said they were completely taken over by the civilness of the opposition they 

faced....Particularly in New Hampshire, the guards had never come across nonviolent protesters....The trainings knit people together, gave us the cohesiveness to carry on through 

the incarceration....By design, training helps to get through the consequences of action.”36

The commitment to collective decision making and open process was not only practice for a 

future in which everyone’s voice would be valued, it also influenced subsequent nonviolent 

movements, most notably the Central American solidarity and economic justice movements 

of the 1980s and 1990s.

Germany. In West Germany, the construction of a proposed nuclear power plant was halted by a series of actions carried out between 1971 and 1977. After a massive demonstration 

of twenty thousand to thirty thousand people in February 1975, the site was continuously 

occupied for ten months and supported by the founding of an on-site “people’s university.” 

More than sixty courses were offered in such topics as environmental protection, nuclear 

energy (pro and con), civil democracy, strategic thinking, and the legal right to protest. 

Although large-scale occupation of the site ended in late 1975, when a panel of judges was 

established to rule on the proposed nuclear power generator there, the ruling against the 

plant did not occur until 1977.37

A large-scale NVA training of three hundred activists in 1974 supported a preceding sister 

campaign across the Rhine in Marckolsheim, France, against a lead factory. Eric Bachman, 

one of the NVA trainers on the ground at the time, notes that although NVA groups were 

in many parts of Germany by 1973–74, NVA training was not common. In addition, he says, 

“although the NVA training did not directly reach the masses of twenty to thirty thousand 

who took part in the occupation, it did reach the movers and shakers, and certainly had an 

effect that way. Organizers would ask people, ‘Even if you don’t believe in nonviolence, for 

this action we want you to be nonviolent.’” This approach, he explains, was generally successful because the local residents were committed to avoiding violence in their home areas 

and therefore supported the nonviolent tactics.38

When the Marckolsheim lead factory permit was withdrawn in 1975, the protesters were 

free to cross the river and join the occupation at Wyhl. Later courses in the people’s university were a resource for other activist groups in Germany, France, and beyond, including 

those in the growing anti–nuclear weapons movement.39

The NVA training sessions were effective in helping prepare those risking arrest and in 

building working affinity groups that could handle the site occupation, in both the United 

States and Germany. The safety of protesters was enhanced because the authorities trusted 

their adherence to NVA discipline. The concerns of New Hampshire authorities were allayed 

at Seabrook because of the NVA training, enabling close to eight thousand protesters (all 

trained) to remain overnight for three days. Although one of the two proposed nuclear reactors did go online at Seabrook, the Clamshell Alliance is widely credited with bringing the 

issue of nuclear power “into the public square,” defending local democracy, and halting new 

nuclear power plant construction in the United States after 1977.40

The commitment to collective 

decision making and open 

process was not only practice 

for a future in which everyone’s 

voice would be valued, it also 

influenced subsequent nonviolent 

movements. 
10 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

Otpor! Anti-Dictatorship Movement

In two short years, the Serbian civil protest group Otpor! (Resistance!) grew from a handful 

of students into an eighty-thousand-person movement that was instrumental in overthrowing Slobodan Milošević’s government and helping the country’s transition to a democracy.41

Training was one of the keys to the explosive growth of Otpor! and the effectiveness of 

its strategies. Organizers recognized that they could harness training as a way to develop 

leaders, build membership, and brainstorm tactics.42 Training sessions were facilitated by the 

main organizers from within Otpor! rather than by outsiders, which lent credibility to the 

organization. As Ivan Marović, a founding Otpor! student leader, explains, 

In the beginning, the leadership of Otpor! was doing the training of the new 

recruits, building a second tier, to establish the visibility and influence that you 

need as a leader. And instead of telling people what to do, we gave them skills 

for what they needed...and then they would get to be [the] leadership when they 

trained the next batch of recruits. In this way training was incorporated into the 

movement strategy to grow—and the trainings included a product-orientated 

approach.43

The product was an action at the end of the training using tactics that the recruits themselves had developed. Having the training sessions facilitated by insiders ensured that the 

training would reflect the Otpor! culture, which encouraged creativity, satirical actions, and 

sharing information on a need-to-know basis. Because Otpor! culture strongly discouraged 

bragging or gratuitous chatter about action plans, anyone who engaged in this behavior 

was easily identified as an outsider, which had the effect of increasing trust, and therefore 

security, among those who honored the insider culture.

All new recruits were required to go through an intensive five-day training process. This 

process was associated with a rapid growth rate and high retention of recruits, who were 

quickly deployed and made useful in the movement. The slogan Act, Recruit, Train (ART) 

reflects this efficient model and helped the activists avoid “newcomer-itis.” Early Otpor! 

research into how to retain interested people showed that attending meetings as a novice 

discouraged recruitment. Starting with a training element that built a cohort, which would 

then be involved in an action within the first week, meant that participants went to their 

first meeting with a street action already under their belt.44

Otpor! also relied on a do-gooder multilevel marketing approach, whereby each new 

recruit found others to join and be trained. Multilevel marketing depends on a personal 

relationship to sell, or in this case to recruit the individual, rather than on the product or 

campaign selling itself. Marović credits this adaptation of multilevel marketing with allowing 

Otpor!to penetrate sectors of society that had not been reached before. This was particularly 

important for expanding the coalition beyond the youth sector.

Marović was part of a team that trained a few hundred people in the initial expansion phase; 

many of them became trainers themselves and advanced the ART model within the progressive 

multilevel marketing structure. As the cohort of trainers grew, Otpor! developed a manual to 

support trainers because they couldn’t manage the level of mentoring and support demanded 

by the numbers involved. Growth also meant that it was difficult (eventually impossible) to vet 

new members; after Milošević was ousted, the training program was ended.

The five-day training sessions took place in the evenings, Monday through Friday, and 

included an action on the weekend at the end of the session. Generally, recruits in groups 

of fifteen to twenty were clustered geographically by town, neighborhood, or university for 

the series. At the end of this process, participants had a complete set of organizing, media, 

design, and planning skills as well as action experience. An unintentional outcome of this 

Organizers recognized that they 

could harness training as a 

way to develop leaders, 

build membership, and 

brainstorm tactics.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 11

effective training program was that when Otpor!folded, these well-trained organizers were 

in high demand and recruited by other groups. However, according to Marović, 

all these trainings created a group of very self-confident people, and when 

Miloševic was gone, they felt because they were doing things on their own, they 

could do what they wanted—it was difficult to keep them in line—it’s one reason 

Otpor! fell apart after that.... Of course, [it was] not the main reason, that was 

simply because we, Otpor!, didn’t prepare for after—but having all these selfconfident, competent, tough folks with completely divergent ideas, who were not 

used to waiting for leadership to tell them what to do, didn’t help.45

Otpor! had expanded rapidly. According to Marović, training the first year reached around 

a thousand people; after six months, twenty thousand; and within two years, eighty thousand. With such exponential growth, in the last couple months before Milošević stepped 

down, about forty thousand new recruits did not get trained. This could have harmed Otpor! 

had this phase of the struggle continued much longer. However, because so many recruits 

had been trained, the more seasoned activists were critical during the period of exponential 

growth in passing on movement knowledge. Before systems could break down, Milošević was 

gone, and Otpor!was on to the next phase of the campaign.

Limitations of Education and Training

Clearly, education and training can profoundly support a social movement and help ensure 

its success. When used as intentional components of a strategic plan, they can contribute 

to significant results. They have certain limitations, however, and by themselves do not 

guarantee a successful campaign.

Education and training can also become a diversion if they are not linked to strategic 

goals. Identifying specific goals and objectives will help ensure that the right people are 

in the room and the most useful skills are being developed. Otpor! identified specific topics and tasked specific individuals for its weeklong training sessions, which increased the 

movement’s effectiveness.

Investing in trainers and facilitators through specialized training and mentorship is also 

important. Untrained, inexperienced facilitators can teach in inappropriate ways or use tools 

incorrectly and, in so doing, set a group back. The choice of outside professional trainers or 

internal trainers is critical. Developing trainers within an organization can move it ahead 

quickly but may also foster cliques or a professional class within the movement that might 

perpetuate nontransformational dynamics and prove counterproductive to the movement. 

During the Yellow Revolution in the Philippines, outside facilitators invited into the movement’s training sessions worked within the context of the Church’s authority and the movement’s respect for that institution.

In designing training, it is important to be aware of the potential for dishonesty toward 

or manipulation of those undergoing the training. The leadership position of trainers 

ethically requires transparency regarding the purpose and goals of the training, theories of 

change, and the assumptions that underlie the workshops. Novice participants may not be 

prepared to assess situations and missions that are not transparent. The first step in the 

Otpor! training protocol was to clearly and directly communicate the organization’s theory 

of change and the movement’s vision. For some, that may be manipulative or dogmatic. 

Therefore, if the goals, the vision, did not mesh with potential participants’ interests, they 

were asked to find a different group to work with.

Education and training can also 

become a diversion if they are 

not linked to strategic goals. 
12 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

In addition, differences of opinion and cleavages can emerge around consensus-based 

decision making. Trainings and workshops helped foster environments where consensus 

could be used, but if people felt that a consensus process was bypassed, rifts and dissent 

within the group usually followed. Sometimes this happened because of time constraints 

or geography, sometimes because of power issues. Other issues and behaviors that surfaced 

in meetings and trainings required professional skills to address (mental health issues, 

significant behavior problems, former injuries, or PTSD) and the community did not usually 

have access to that assistance—which, when not addressed, undermined the effectiveness 

of training and preparation.

Disagreement around the role and acceptability of property destruction is also common, 

and a reason groups splinter into camps: those who accept property destruction within 

a nonviolent campaign and those who do not. For many, particularly outside the United 

States, property can represent the accumulated violence of the system or be a strong symbol 

of the system. Outside of capitalist and strongly individualistic societies, property is far less 

revered and assaults on property are viewed as distinct from any violence against persons.

Finally, education and training will deliver only on the content defined by the specific 

event. It is unreasonable to expect that training in such matters as outreach and public relations will produce people with core skills in another area, such as leadership. On the other 

hand, education and training protocols may be deliberately designed to reach beyond the 

immediate event. In the U.S. civil rights struggle, for example, delivering voter registration 

and literacy programs within a political context inspired political activism that reached well 

beyond simply voting in elections.

Education, Training, and Social Change

The historical examples of NVA undertaken to achieve social change suggest five general and 

actionable strategic functions of education and training.

1. Facilitate personal preparation and behavior change.

Initial encounters with movements are often via teach-ins or educational forums that 

provide enough information for an individual to decide to join a group. The overall 

strategic value of such introductory educational sessions lies in increasing the number 

of participants and creating a support mechanism for individuals to take NVA.

Personal preparation includes consciousness-raising and empowerment. Thus the 

knowledge and tools imparted by the trainers must be matched by the recruit’s realization 

of having the power to effect change on the specific issue at hand, agreement with the 

guiding theory of change, and an understanding of how to proceed. Training as part of 

the U.S. civil rights movement not only supported adherence to nonviolent discipline, but 

also helped participants maintain the moral high ground and led to protester behavior 

that reduced overall the retaliation violence of authorities and onlookers.

Specific training sessions can be tailored to managing fear and to understanding 

risks and consequences while continuing to adhere to the principles of NVA. The shared 

experience of training strengthens preparedness as the individual becomes aware of 

a strong network of support. Training sessions also provide both a space for activists 

to meet fellow collaborators and opportunities to become aware of and practice the 

transformative behavior needed to break through oppressive cultural norms that 

limit organization growth. In the Philippines, expanded citizen involvement came 

about because the use of the teachings of the Church provided greater acceptance 

for NVA.

The knowledge and tools 

imparted by the trainers must 

be matched by the recruit’s 

realization of having the power 

to effect change on the specific 

issue at hand, agreement with 

the guiding theory of change, 

and an understanding of 

how to proceed. 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 13

2. Build organization and group cohesion, leadership, and capacity.

Training helps build unity of purpose within groups, increases transparency in 

regard to the group’s means and goals, and supports resiliency and flexibility, which 

are indicators of sustainability of the community over time. Some workshops build 

specific leadership, facilitation, organization, and media skills. Other workshops 

may be used to develop cultural competency, skills in decision processes, and 

anti-oppression techniques. Such capacity building encourages a level playing field 

and competent working or affinity groups that help distribute power internally. 

The original Otpor! team specifically used trainings not only to pass on vital 

information and build capacity for media, action planning, and outreach through a 

week-long training course of short workshops, but also to enable teams to respond 

flexibly and build leadership capacity internally.

External benefits are found when training sessions are intentionally used 

to build a base, create a coalition, or forge alliances with experts, trainers, and 

others outside the usual community. In almost all cases, the trainings awakened 

and motivated new sectors of the population to join the movement. The trainings 

developed trainers and participants who went on to populate, lead, and train other 

activists across diverse issue campaigns.

3. Aid strategic planning and improve strategies and tactics.

Collective analysis of issues and the political environment is key to developing a 

shared vision and theory of change, innovative activities, and effective sequencing. 

Training and education sessions that include active planning help participants 

define and understand the political situation, analyze power differentials, and 

strengthen strategic decisions about when and how to turn to the spectrum of 

tactical methods of protest, noncooperation, intervention, and prefigurative and 

constructive work. Planning supports effective campaigns and movements by 

reserving time for reflection, debriefing, and evaluation, as well as improving these 

tools and procedures and the likelihood that they will affect future work.

For the Filipino Yellow Revolution, a focus on specific skills around election 

monitoring was particularly important for that context. The intentional contact with 

and sympathy for the police and military forces ultimately encouraged defections, 

and when some soldiers then defected, well-organized nonviolent activists were able 

to protect them. Across the case studies, one can also see that the safety of the 

protesters was enhanced because the authorities ultimately trusted their adherence 

to nonviolent discipline.

4. Increase capacity for, knowledge of, and adherence to NVA principles, skills, 

and tactics.

The ability of the group or movement to adhere to nonviolent principles and 

tactics often depends on the accessibility of NVA education and training. Steadfast 

adherence to NVA is associated with a decrease in retaliatory violence. Adherence to 

NVA principles and tactics also significantly lowers the bar to participation, thereby 

opening up pathways for people to join the movement—which builds numbers, a 

key indicator of growing movement power. Conversely, the adoption of violent tactics 

raises the bar to participation and decreases the pool of potential members.

The anti-nuclear movements in the United States and Germany leveraged 

their commitments to NVA to push their campaigns’ effectiveness. In Germany, 

locals—both activists and those not part of the movement—generally supported 

The ability of the group 

or movement to adhere to 

nonviolent principles and tactics 

often depends on the accessibility 

of NVA education and training. 
14 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

NVA, recognizing the lower cost to their communities relative to violent tactics; in 

New Hampshire, activists even managed to parlay mandatory NVA training into a statesanctioned occupation of the nuclear power plant construction site.

Training workshops may be specifically designed to increase activists’ capacity to use 

a variety of NVA skills. Targeted skills may include social media use, communication tools, 

formation of affinity groups, consensus building, scouting, strategic planning, research, 

recruitment, or providing legal support. Planning sessions also help activists determine 

appropriate tactics and identify the stage in a campaign when and where a tactic could 

be most effectively deployed.

5. Rehearse, evaluate, and improve the execution of strategic plans.

Role-playing of various kinds is a constant of NVA workshops. Role-playing allows 

rapid development and troubleshooting of logistics. The sessions may be designed to 

practice escalation and de-escalation tactics in a confrontation scenario, to try out 

peacekeeping tactics (in response to both internal and external provocations), or to 

retain focus during a confrontational situation. Familiarity with the use of such tactics 

helps develop leaders’ comfort under stress, and practicing them in a nonbinding 

setting gives the experience of decision making under stress. Practicing for possible 

eventualities helps participants develop courage and preparedness and move toward 

collaborative and team-building work. Training for American civil rights activists helped 

them strategize and prepare for specific actions, such as lunch counter sit-ins, marches, 

and even incarceration. The training was critical not only to develop the best tactics but 

also to support individuals in overcoming their fears and retaining strong self-discipline 

in resisting the temptation to respond to provocations or to fight back.

Conclusion

A commitment to education and training is integral to the success of nonviolent civil 

resistance movements dedicated to social change. Approaches that enhance a movement’s 

success include adherence to NVA discipline; unity of purpose of individuals and organizations; and active, strategic planning.46 Less well recognized is the function of civil resistance 

education and training to help ensure that protesters are not engaged in activities for which 

they do not have skill sets and are not put in harm’s way.

The lack of such recognition is attributable to various factors: the ad hoc and improvisatory nature of training, its context-specific nature, lack of documentation by movement 

insiders or historians, lack of appropriate instruments of evaluation, and occasionally the 

hiding of much behind-the-scenes preparation in movements presented as having sprung de 

novo from the streets and neighborhoods of resistors. Some of these factors can be readily 

addressed: modern technology has made documentation much easier, and internal awareness of the need for self-reflection and self-evaluation even in the midst of campaigns is 

stronger. Contemporary documentation also serves the critical function of helping prepare 

facilitators and trainers to step into their roles as well as the importance of good planning 

and transparency.

Despite the strategic effectiveness of NVA education and training, it cannot and will not 

eliminate the false accusation that NVA incites violence rather than promotes peace. What 

disciplined use of nonviolent tactics in fact does is dissemble the facade of peace and expose 

the violence inherent in a system or society.47

NVA encompasses a broad range of activities that are further distinguished by their differing goals, cultures, languages, and participants. Attention must be paid to the appropriate 
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 15

adaptation of generic agendas or those developed in different contexts to the specific circumstances of use, a possible source of training inefficacy. The possible longer reach of NVA 

training, beyond the immediate campaign, creates social uplift and contributes to greater civic 

participation in matters affecting the population.

One of the subtexts of the effectiveness of trainings is the experiential nature of much 

of the process, the incorporation of rehearsal or practice time as an essential and legitimate 

component for successful outcomes. In this way, participatory and experiential training 

functions as both theory and practice of transformative campaigns. Because education and 

training are highly adaptable in both structure and content, effective and well-designed 

classes and training can enhance all of the key factors of movement success.

Appendix: Case Study Matrix

Type

• Yellow Revolution: anti-authoritarian

• Anti–nuclear power: environmental rights

• Civil rights: human rights

• Otpor!: anti-authoritarian

Training 

• Yellow Revolution

∙ Dispersed rural community empowerment workshops 

∙ NVA for urban middle class

• Anti–nuclear power

∙ Clamshell Alliance: mandatory six- to eight-hour Nonviolent Direct Action trainings

∙ Affinity group formation and training 

∙ Educational classes as part of the peoples’ university

• Civil rights

∙ Citizenship school, literacy, and ethics

∙ Civil disobedience

∙ History and philosophy of nonviolence and NVA

∙ Support workshops: overcoming fear, arrest, court, jail, and legal system 

∙ Consciousness raising

• Otpor!

∙ Small group initiation trainings (fewer than twenty-five participants), leading to action 

with the cohort immediately following the five-day, 1.5+ hours-per-day workshops

Methodology

• Yellow Revolution: dialogue, role-plays, prayer, lectures, strategy sessions, analytical 

sessions, study circles, lectures

• Anti–nuclear power: dialogue, role-plays, team building work, experiential and practice 

sessions, lectures

• Civil rights: dialogue, role-plays, group work, prayer and meditation, communal singing, 

study circles, sermons or lectures

• Otpor!: dialogue, role-plays, slide presentations, videos, group work, real-time action 

planning/event
16 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

Stated purpose

• Yellow Revolution

∙ Ensure discipline and effective tactics 

∙ Provide space or time for personal reflection

∙ Teach the history and capacity of nonviolent resistance strategies and techniques

∙ Use teachings of the Church to move acceptance of NVA

∙ Specific skills in election monitoring (1986)

∙ Ensure easy access for mass participation in training and education

• Anti–nuclear power

∙ Educate on history, philosophy, and principles of NVA and build commitment for using 

nonviolent action

∙ Prepare and rehearse for specific scenarios (marches, occupations, incarceration, nonviolent 

responses in confrontation)

∙ Build community of support and trust to form affinity groups 

∙ Address oppressive behaviors that cost the community and need to be transformed

∙ Train and practice consensus decision making

∙ Create safe space to address personal fears and feelings and reflect on personal motivation, 

confronting the power structure

∙ Learn and practice quick decisions and group process

∙ Practice for the media, marshal, and peacekeeper roles

∙ Limit influence of outsiders and provocateurs 

∙ Develop strategies to focus attention on the problem of nuclear power and position the 

movement as operating with moral authority (rather than let the media focus on the 

violence or property destruction of protests)

• Civil rights

∙ Build commitment to NVA as philosophy and strategy

∙ Educate on NVA history and philosophy, civil disobedience techniques 

∙ Develop leadership

∙ Build community and group decision-making capacity

∙ Support individuals in overcoming fear 

∙ Strategize and prepare for specific actions: lunch counter sit-ins, marches, incarceration 

∙ Prepare to handle media 

∙ Build allies across black and white divisions

• Otpor!

∙ Establish a leadership pipeline through training trainers

∙ Eliminate “newcomer-itis” and create a direct pipeline to actions, not meetings

∙ Develop geographically dispersed leaders and teams

∙ Specific skill building: using the media, creative tools, organizing, dealing with repression 

and police, and others

∙ Teach and use multilevel marketing techniques

∙ Vet second-tier trainers and leaders

∙ Brainstorm creative actions and execute one immediately following the training

∙ Institutionalize opposition-Otpor! culture

Planned outcomes

• Yellow Revolution

∙ Training mobilized the middle class

∙ Diversity of trainings contributed to the emergence of a widespread nonviolent movement

∙ Trained organizers and activists, maintained nonviolent discipline
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 17

• Anti–nuclear power

∙ Created a solid and committed base of affinity groups who maintained nonviolent 

discipline

∙ Led to victories on local fights that had a national impact on nuclear power policy and 

plant siting for years to come

∙ Used adhering to NVA guidelines as a negotiating strength when dealing with the state 

authorities; preemptively kept violent retaliation low in several instances, including a 

negotiated occupation of the Seabrook site by eight thousand people in 1978

• Civil rights

∙ Built unity, mobilized masses of people, connected the campaigns across the nation 

∙ Supported adherence to nonviolent discipline, maintained moral high ground, and reduced 

overall retaliation violence

∙ Weakened grip of fear and solidified resolve to act

∙ Awakened and motivated new sectors of the population to join the movement

∙ Led to major legislative victories and change of the status quo—Civil Rights Act of 1964 

and Voting Rights Act of 1965

• Otpor!

∙ Produced training manual to support trainers 

∙ Exponential growth of participants in movement 

∙ Leadership development 

∙ Proliferation of autonomous cells and creative actions dispersed across country

∙ Adherence to nonviolent discipline in mass actions

∙ Mass defections in state forces

Unintentional outcomes

• Yellow Revolution

∙ Contact with and sympathy for police and military forces encouraged defections

∙ Training guidelines allowed creativity and spontaneous actions to be effective within clear 

boundaries of NVA

∙ Well-organized nonviolent activists were able to protect defecting soldiers

• Anti–nuclear power

∙ Developed trainers and trained participants who went on to populate, lead, and train other 

activists across diverse issue campaigns

∙ Success of the community occupation in Wyhl empowered Clamshell and others to adopt 

occupation as a strategy; Clamshell’s use of affinity group structure and prioritizing 

training led German activists and others to adopt that model to fight nuclear weapons 

bases in Europe

• Civil rights

∙ Developed trainers and trained participants who went on to populate, lead, and train other 

activists across diverse issue campaigns

∙ Direct lineage of nonviolent action trainers from the civil rights movement to trainers for 

Vietnam War protests, anti-nuclear movement, and beyond

• Otpor!

∙ Training manual developed into global training program in new organization, CANVAS

∙ Contributed to activist base in future struggles; became the model for several similar youth 

movements around the world

∙ Dispersed empowered leadership became uncontrollable 

∙ Model scaled up only to certain point, then growth became exponential and unmanageable; 

training system abandoned toward the end of the mobilization phase
18 USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394

Perceived value

• Yellow Revolution: high

• Anti–nuclear power: high

• Civil rights: high

• Otpor!: high

Acknowledgments

The following individuals graciously provided information or agreed to personal interviews: 

Eric Bachman, A. J. Muste Memorial Institute; Michael Beer, Nonviolence International; 

James Brady, Greenpeace; Daryn Cambridge, U.S. Institute of Peace; Janet Cherry, Nelson 

Mandela Metropolitan University; Philippe Duhamel, consultant, Quebec; Lisa Fithian, Alliance 

of Community Trainers; Ryan Gerety, Open Technology Institute; Paul Gunter, Beyond Nuclear/

Clamshell Alliance; Mary King, University of Peace; George Lakey, Movement for a New Society/

Training for Change, Swarthmore College; Ivan Marović, consultant, Otpor!; Hardy Merriman, 

International Center on Nonviolent Conflict; Joanne Sheehan, War Resisters’ League; Stellan 

Vinthagen, University of Massachusetts, Amherst; Barbara Wein, American University; and 

Stephen Zunes, University of San Francisco. Thanks also to Michael Beer and Ryan Gerety for 

guidance, to American University intern Rachel Koller for research assistance, and to Debby 

Anker for editing support.

Notes

1. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011).

2. Openshaw quoted in “UN Security Council: Strengthen Relationship with Civil Society and Focus on Human Rights 

to Prevent Conflict,” International Service for Human Rights, August 8, 2014, www.ishr.ch/news/un-securitycouncil-strengthen-relationship-civil-society-and-focus-human-rights-prevent. 

3. Kelly McKone, Maria J. Stephan, and Noel Dickover, “Using Technology in Nonviolent Activism against Repression,” 

Special Report no. 357 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, January 8, 2015), www.usip.org/publications/

using-technology-in-nonviolent-activism-against-repression.

4. Maria J. Stephan, Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala, “Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset,” Special Report 

no. 361 (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, February 23, 2015), www.usip.org/publications/2015/02/23/

aid-civil-society-movement-mindset.

5. Peter Ackerman and Jack DuVall, “People Power Primed: Civilian Resistance and Democratization,” Harvard International Review, Summer 2005, www.nonviolent-conflict.org/images/stories/pdfs/hirppp.pdf.

6. Sharon Nepstad, Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the Late 20th Century (New York: Oxford University 

Press, 2011), 119.

7. Jason MacLeod, “From the Mountains and Jungles to the Villages and Streets: Transitions from Violent to 

Nonviolent Resistance in West Papua,” in Civil Resistance and Conflict Transformation: Transitions from Armed to 

Nonviolent Struggle, ed. Veronique Dudouet (New York: Routledge, 2015), chap. 3, www.academia.edu/8546479/

From_the_Mountains_and_Jungles_to_the_Villages_and_Streets_Transitions_from_Violent_to_Nonviolent_

Resistance_in_West_Papua.

8. Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston, MA: Porter Sargent, 1973); see also www.aeinstein.org/

wp-content/uploads/2014/12/198-Methods.pdf. 

9. Other factors in the selection of these four cases included the accessibility of primary materials or living 

participants who could be interviewed, and varied geographic regions and issue areas. Content and process 

varied significantly among the examples, with methods ranging from traditional lectures to participatory and 

group-led learning situations. Background research and interviews were conducted with experts in NVA and social 

movements and with trainers and educators from the specific movements to identify the purposes, the planned 

and unintended outcomes, and the overall value of training and education to the movement. A supporting matrix 

was developed for quick reference (see the appendix; see also https://docs.google.com/document/d/1MrEh4NyP

B5V5lwNl5hXjtSgJp92KTu0sk_bUXOivHV8/edit).

10. Mary King, Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr.: The Power of Nonviolent Action, 2nd ed. (New Delhi: Mehta 

Publishers, 2002).

11. Ibid.

12. Martin Oppenheimer, “Workshops in Nonviolence—Why?” (mimeograph, Philadelphia CORE training handout, 

rept. March 1964), www.crmvet.org/docs/nv_core_workshop.pdf.

13. Joanne Sheehan, “Nonviolence Training During the U.S. Civil Rights Movement,” War Resisters’ International, July 

31, 2014, www.wri-irg.org/node/23268.
USIP.ORG • SPECIAL REPORT 394 19

14. Mary E. King, telephone interview, November 3, 2014; Mary E. King, “Anticipating Fear,” WagingNonviolence.org, 

February 19, 2012, http://wagingnonviolence.org/feature/anticipating-fear/.

15. King, interview, November 3, 2014.

16. Daniel Perlstein, “Teaching Freedom: SNCC and the Creation of the Mississippi Freedom Schools,” History of 

Education Quarterly 30, no. 3 (1990), https://centerx.gseis.ucla.edu/principal-leadership/documents/Perlstei

Teaching%20Freedom.pdf.

17. The Martin Luther King, Jr., Research and Education Institute, Stanford University, King Encyclopedia, s.v. 

“Highlander Folk School,” http://kingencyclopedia.stanford.edu/encyclopedia/encyclopedia/enc_highlander_

folk_school/index.html.

18. These numbers are from Tomiko Brown-Nagin, “The Transformation of a Social Movement into Law? The SCLC 

and NAACP’s Campaigns for Civil Rights Reconsidered in Light of the Educational Activism of Septima Clark,” 

Women’s History Review 80, no. 1 (1999): 81–137, www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09612029900200193#.

.VQ8rbcbS3Xo.

19. Miles Horton, The Long Haul (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1998), 127, cited in “Highlander 

Folk School,” http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/kingweb/about_king/encyclopedia/highlanderfolkschool.html.

20. “SCLC Program Areas,” TheKingCenter.org, n.d., www.thekingcenter.org/archive/document/sclc-program-areas; 

Bruce Hartford, “Nonviolent Training,” Veterans of the Civil Rights Movement, 2004, www.crmvet.org/info/nv3.

htm.

21. King, interview, November 3, 2014: Joanne Sheehan, telephone interview, October 1, 2014; Arnie Alpert, “A Week 

at World Fellowship,” InzaneTimes [blog], August 4, 2014, https://inzanetimes.wordpress.com/2014/08/04/aweek-at-world-fellowship/.

22. Chris Kromm, “From Selma to Soweto: Nelson Mandela and the Southern Freedom Struggle,” Facing South, 

December 6, 2013, www.southernstudies.org/2013/12/from-selma-to-soweto-nelson-mandela-and-the-southe.

html.

23. Felipe E. Maglaya, Organizing People for Power: A Manual for Organizers (Kowloon, Hong Kong: Asian Committee 

for People’s Organization, 1974). 

24. Stephen Zunes, “The Origins of People Power in the Philippines,” in Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical 

Perspective (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999), 129–57.

25. Zunes, “Origins of People Power.”

26. Richard Deats, “The People Power Revolution in the Philippines: The Power of Active Nonviolence and Truth 

Movements,” [2013], Superconsciousness.com, www.superconsciousness.com/topics/society/people-powerrevolution-philippines#sthash.7afpDcoq.dpuf.

27. Zunes, “Origins of People Power,” 148.

28. Stephen Zunes, telephone interview, November 9, 2014.

29. Quoted in Al Giordano, “Clam Magic: The Birth of a National Anti–Nuclear Movement,” Narco News Bulletin, May 

8, 2014, http://narconews.com/Issue67/article4739.html.

30. Sheehan, interview, October 1, 2014. 

31. Joanne Sheehan and Eric Bachman, “Seabrook—Wyhl—Marckolsheim: Transnational Links in a Chain of 

Campaigns,” in Handbook on Nonviolent Campaigns, 2nd ed. (London: War Resisters’ International, 2014), www.

wri-irg.org/node/5182.

32. Paul Gunter, interview, October 7, 2014.

33. Quoted in Giordano, “Clam Magic.”

34. Gunter, interview, October 7, 2014.

35. Ibid. 

36. Ibid. 

37. Nathalie Schils, “Mass Occupation of Proposed Wyhl Nuclear Power Plant Site in Germany, 1974–1977,” Global 

Nonviolent Action Database, July 7, 2011, http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/mass-occupationproposed-wyhl-nuclear-power-plant-site-germany-1974-1977.

38. Eric Bachman, telephone interviews, February 19 and March 3, 2015.

39. Stellan Vintagen, telephone interview, October 27, 2014.

40. http://clamshell-tvs.org/clamshell_history “About Clamshell: Picnic Table Democracy,” www.clamshellalliance.

net/about.

41. Steve York, Bringing Down a Dictator, 2012, DVD, www.aforcemorepowerful.org/films/bdd/index.php.

42. Ivan Marović, Skype interview, November 4, 2014.

43. Ibid.

44. Srdja Popović, Slobodan Djinović, Amdrej Milivojević, Hardy Merriman, and Ivan Marović, “CANVAS Core Curriculum: 

Guide to Effective Nonviolent Struggle” (Belgrade: Center for Applied Nonviolent Action and Strategies, 2007), 

www.canvasopedia.org/project/canvas-core-curriculum/?.

45. Marović, interview, November 4, 2014.

46. Ackerman and DuVall, “People Power Primed.”

47. As the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. said so neatly in 1963, “We who in engage in nonviolent direct action are 

not the creators of tension. We merely bring to the surface the hidden tension that is already alive” (“Letter from 

a Birmingham Jail,” April 16, 1963, www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2015/01/19/letter_from_a_birmingham_

jail_125300.html).
Of Related Interest

• Reconciliation in Practice by Kelly McKone (Peaceworks, August 2015)

• Aid to Civil Society: A Movement Mindset by Maria J. Stephan, Sadaf Lakhani, and Nadia Naviwala (Special Report, February 2015)

• Using Technology in Nonviolent Activism against Repression by Kelly McKone, Maria J. Stephan, 

and Noel Dickover (Special Report, January 2015)

ISBN: 978-1-60127-624-7

An online edition of this and related 

reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional 

information on the subject.

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