Making Peace Possible

NO. 157 | February 2020

PEACEW

A Peace Regime for th

Korean Peninsula

By Frank Aum, Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Atman M. Trivedi,

Rachel Vandenbrink, Jennifer Staats, and Joseph Y. Yun
NO. 157 | February 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

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Web: www.usip.org

Peaceworks No. 157. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-794-7

GLOBAL

POLICY

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report examines the issues and challenges related to establishing a peace 

regime—a framework of declarations, agreements, norms, rules, processes, and institutions aimed at building and sustaining peace—on the Korean Peninsula. Supported by 

the Asia Center at the United States Institute of Peace, the report also addresses how 

administrations can strategically and realistically approach these issues.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Frank Aum is senior expert on North Korea in the Asia Center at the US Institute of Peac

Jacob Stokes, Patricia M. Kim, Rachel Vandenbrink, and Jennifer Staats are members

of its East and Southeast Asia program teams. Ambassador Joseph Y. Yun is a se

adviser to the Asia Center. Atman M. Trivedi is a managing director at Hills & Compan

Cover photo: South Korean soldiers, front, and North Korean soldiers, rear, stand 

guard on either side of the Military Demarcation Line of the Demilitarized Zone 

dividing the two nations. (Photo by Korea Summit Press Pool via New York Times)
USIP.ORG 1

Contents

3 Background

6 Perspectives

18 Structure of a Peace Regime

22 Diplomatic Issues 

31 Security and Military Issues

44 Economic and Humanitarian Issues

50 Principles to Guide the Process
2 PEACEWO      NO.

Summary

Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, few serious efforts have been made to 

achieve a comprehensive peace on the Korean Peninsula. The unique aspects 

of the diplomatic engagement between Washington and Pyongyang in 2018 and 

2019, however, presented a situation that warranted both greater preparation for 

a potential peace process and greater vigilance about the potential obstacles 

and risks. Today, with the collapse of negotiations threatening to further strain 

US-North Korea relations and increase tensions on the Korean Peninsula, a more

earnest and sober discussion about how to build mutual confidence, enhance 

stability, and strengthen peace is all the more important.

Peace is a process, not an event.  peace regime thus represents a comprehensive framework of declarations, agreements, norms, rules, processes, and

institutions aimed at building and sustaining peace.

Six countries—North Korea, South Korea, the United States, China, Japan, and

Russia—have substantial interests in a peace regime for the Korean Peninsula.

Some of these interests are arguably compatible, including the desire for a stable and nuclear-free Peninsula. Others, such as North Korean human rights and 

the status of US forces, seem intractable but may present potential for progress.

Understanding these interests can shed light on how to approach areas of consensus and divergence during the peacebuilding process

Certain diplomatic, security, and economic components are necessary for a 

comprehensive peace on the Korean Peninsula. Denuclearization, sanctions relief, 

and the US military presence have drawn the most attention, but a peace regime

would also need to address other matters—from procedural aspects such as which 

countries participate and whether a treaty or an executive agreement should be 

used, to sensitive topics such as human rights, economic assistance, and humanitarian aid, to far-reaching considerations such as the Northern Limit Line, conventional force reductions, and the future of the United Nations Command. This report

addresses how US administrations can strategically and realistically approach the

challenges and opportunities these issues present, and then offers general principles for incorporating them into a peacebuilding process.
USIP.ORG 3

Since the signing of the 1953 Armistice Agreement established a military truce on th

Korean Peninsula, few serious endeavors have been undertaken to realize a “final 

peaceful settlement” to the Korean War.1  variety of factors, including geopolitical

tensions, deep mistrust, poor mutual understanding, political expediency, and myopic 

policymaking, have prevented diplomatic negotiations among the four major countries involved—the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea), th

Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea), the United States, and China—from advancing to the formal peacemaking sta

To be sure, many limited efforts have been made to reach a peace settlement. The 

first attempt, the 1954 Geneva Conference, reached potential agreement on the 

issues of foreign troop withdrawal and the scope of elections for the Peninsula.2

However, the conference ultimately foundered after two months over the question of 

who would supervise these issues—the communist side favoring Korea-only or neutral 

nations supervision and the US-led side supporting UN oversigh

Later, despite the grip of Cold War tensions on the Peninsula—China and the 

Soviet Union backing the North and the United States supporting the South—th

President Moon Jae-in of South Korea, right, and North Korea’s leader, Kim Jong Un, shake hands in the truce village of Panmunjom on April 27, 2018

At center is the border between the two Koreas. (Photo by Korea Summit Press Pool via New York Time

Achieving peace

on the Korean 

Peninsula is possible 

but it will be a

long and arduous 

process. The first

step is elevating

peace as a priority.

Backgroun
4 PEACEWO      NO.

two Koreas took sporadic, incremental steps toward 

peaceful coexistence and long-term reunification. 

They achieved significant breakthroughs in diplomatic 

relations and tension reduction, including the 1972 

joint North-South Statement on reunification, the 1991 

Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, a

Exchanges and Cooperation (Basic Agreement), a

the 1992 Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula.

These achievements, however, proved largely aspirational because they could not resolve three fundamental issues. First, North Korea desired direct negotiations 

and normalization with the United States, often sidelining South Korea in the process. Second, North Korea

continued to conduct violent acts against South Korea 

(such as the 1983 assassination attempt of President 

Chun Doo-hwan in Burma, the 1987 bombing of a

Korean Air flight, and the 2010 sinking of the ROK shi

Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island), partly because of its own insecurity about the South’s growing

political and economic legitimacy. Third, it was unclear 

how the two Koreas would accommodate mutually contradictory conceptions of reunification following peace.

Advances in North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile program in the 1990s finally drew Washington into

negotiations with Pyongyang but further complicated 

the prospects for peace discussions. Successive US

administrations prioritized denuclearization as the primary objective in negotiations and made it a precondition for discussing peace and diplomatic normalization. 

After the 1994 Agreed Framework deal froze Nort

Korea’s nuclear facility at Yongbyon, US President Bi

Clinton and South Korean President Kim Young-sam

proposed Four-Party Talks with North Korea and China 

in April 1996, the first major effort at peace negotiations

since the 1954 Geneva Conference. Unsure about U

intentions for the endgame, North Korea took more 

than a year to respond.3

 When it finally engaged, 

discussions about peace quickly collapsed because 

of its insistence that US troop presence on the Korean

Peninsula be on the agenda.4  North Korea review

process led by former US Secretary of Defense William

Perry (but conducted separately from the Four-Party 

Talks and ongoing US-DPRK missile talks) pushed th

two sides “tantalizingly close” to a deal that would have 

banned North Korea’s production and testing of longrange missiles in exchange for potential normalization 

steps.5 Because time was running out for his administration, however, President Clinton chose to prioritize

promising Israeli-Palestinian talks rather than making a 

trip to Pyongyang, believing that the next administration would consummate a deal with North Korea.6

In the mid-2000s, the Six-Party Talks chaired by China 

represented another attempt to address peace and 

denuclearization under a “commitment for commitment, 

action for action” approach.7 Despite some confidence-building measures, including North Korea’s shutting down the five-megawatt reactor at its Yongbyon

facility, the United States’ removing North Korea from

its state sponsors of terrorism list and Trading with the 

Enemy Act provisions, and the creation of workin

groups focused on normalization, the talks again fell 

apart in December 2008 when the two sides could not 

agree on a formal protocol for verifying North Korea’s 

nuclear activities. In the absence of a written protocol, 

Washington, along with new, right-of-center governments in Seoul and Tokyo, insisted on suspending 

energy assistance; Pyongyang responded by expelling 

international inspectors.8

The landmark June 2018 agreement reached in 

Singapore between President Donald J. Trump and 

Chairman Kim Jong Un—the first signed between the

Peace on the Korean Peninsula will require far more than a simple agreement, however.

A comprehensive regime consisting of declarations, agreements, norms, rules, processes,

and institutions will be necessary to build and sustain peace.
USIP.ORG 5

United States and North Korea at the leader level

was the latest effort at forging a peace regime on 

the Korean Peninsula. Under the agreement, the two

sides committed to “establish new US-DPRK relations

and “build a lasting and stable peace regime on the 

Korean Peninsula.” In addition, North Korea promised 

to “work toward the complete denuclearization of the 

Korean Peninsula.”9 The inability of the two countries 

to negotiate a more comprehensive agreement at a 

second summit in Hanoi in February 2019, or since 

then, underscores their entrenched positions and the 

long-standing chasm that lies between.

Nevertheless, the Singapore agreement’s call for a 

peace regime reinforced the need to examine this 

issue in a thorough and timely manner. Also, the

unique aspects of this period of diplomacy—including 

President Trump’s unconventional willingness to meet 

with Kim Jong Un directly and to discuss peace and

denuclearization simultaneously, the severity of the 

global pressure campaign against North Korea, the Kim 

regime’s purported desire to shift from nuclear to economic development, and the ostensibly cordial relationship between the two leaders—presented a potentially 

radical disjuncture from past negotiation scenarios.10

Although the considerable obstacles were clear, the

moment warranted greater preparation for a potential peace. As this latest effort at diplomacy appears

to have failed and US-North Korea relations seem on

the brink of another downward turn, it is just as—if not 

more—important to think through how to enhance stability, build mutual confidence, and strengthen peace 

on the Peninsula without a formal peace agreement.

The limited number of official, multilateral efforts to 

pursue a comprehensive peace regime has meant 

equally few examinations of what it entails, how the 

relevant countries view such an initiative, and what 

issues and risks it involves. The focus of most parties 

on the immediate challenges of North Korean denuclearization has further detracted from assessing the 

long-term challenge of structuring peace on the Korean 

Peninsula. The rapid development of North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs and 

the corresponding intensifying of the global sanctions 

regime against North Korea significantly complicate a 

potential peace process.

All parties interested in Korean Peninsula security

accept in principle the necessity of a peace regime to 

ensure a permanent end to conflict. Peace will require 

far more than a simple agreement, however.  comprehensive regime consisting of declarations, agreements,

norms, rules, processes, and institutions—spanning the 

diplomatic, security, economic, and social spheres—will 

be necessary to build and sustain peace. Furthermore, 

the process will raise challenging questions about the 

future of the US-ROK Alliance, the strategic orientati

of and relations between the two Koreas, the role of 

the United States and China on the Korean Peninsula,

and the overall security architecture in the Northeast 

Asian region

Achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula is possible,

but it will be a long and arduous process. The first step 

is elevating peace as a priority.
6 PEACEWO      NO.

Perspectives

Six countries—North Korea, South Korea, the United

States, China, Japan, and Russia—have substantial interests in how peace unfolds on the Korean Peninsula

and the implications for Northeast Asia. Many of these

interests are arguably compatible. For example, all 

six parties support the goal of denuclearization of the 

Peninsula, though following different definitions and 

timelines; even North Korea has committed to this goal, 

at least nominally, despite actions to the contrary. Some 

disputes, such as the presence of US forces on the

Korean Peninsula or the human rights situation in North 

Korea, seem nonnegotiable but may present areas 

for progress after greater dialogue and trust building. 

Other interests present challenges because they are 

at direct odds (such as the sequencing of denuclearization and reciprocal confidence-building measures) 

or particular to just one country (such as Japanese 

abductees). Understanding these interests can help

accentuate consensus areas while mitigating divergences during the peacebuilding process.

NORTH KOREA

Since at least the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union,

North Korea’s approach to peace has been rooted 

in its pursuit of regime security. To this end, the Kim 

regime has focused on ending what it perceives as a 

“hostile” US policy and transforming its overall relationship with the United States. The North has als

engaged with liberal South Korean governments to 

reduce tensions and gain benefits, but it has long 

perceived the United States as the paramount threat

to its security and the principal impediment to attaining 

comprehensive, sustainable peace.

During periods of negotiations with the United States,

the regime has pursued this approach by securing US

commitments to move toward full normalization of political and economic relations, provide formal assurances 

against the threat or use of conventional and nuclear 

weapons, ease economic and financial sanctions, and 

respect North Korea’s sovereignty. The most recent 

articulation of this goal was described in the June 2018 

US-DPRK Joint Statement in Singapore, which committed the two countries to “establish new US-D

relations” and “build a lasting and stable peace regime 

on the Korean Peninsula.”

North Korea believes that denuclearization should be 

the result, rather than the cause, of improved bilateral relations between Pyongyang and Washington. 

The regime insists, with China’s endorsement, that a 

transformed relationship can only occur by both sides 

taking “phased and synchronous measures” to build 

trust slowly rather than Pyongyang being required to 

denuclearize unilaterally and comprehensively up front 

under a “Libya model” as suggested by then National 

Security Advisor John Bolton.

For North Korea, measures for ending the “hostile” US

policy can be described under three categories: diplomatic, military, and economic.

For Pyongyang, an important demonstration of improved US-DPRK ties is the normalization of relations

North Korea believes that peace and security starts 

with a mutual recognition of each country’s sovereignty 

and parity, which can be accorded through normalization. Normalized relations would also facilitate regime 

legitimacy in other ways, including through enhanced 

economic and trade relations, greater academic, scientific, and technical exchanges, and improved standing 

in the international community.
USIP.ORG 7

SOUTH

KOREA

NORTH

KOREA

CHINA

RUSSIA

J A PA N

Yellow Sea

(West Sea)

Sea of Japan

(East Sea)

Korea Bay

Korea Strait

Seoul

Gwangju

Daejeon

Ulsan

Busan

Incheon

Daegu

Pyongyang

Wonsan

Yongbyon

Sinuiju

Hamhung

Chongjin

Tanchon

0 50 MILES

0 50 KILOMETERS

DEMILITARIZED ZONE (DMZ)

Map 1. The Korean Peninsula

Artwork by Lucidity Information Desig
8 PEACEWO      NO.

North Korea views the US military presence in South

Korea and its joint exercises as a direct threat to 

the regime’s security and a constant manifestation 

of Washington’s hostility. To mitigate this threat, the 

regime has sought military security guarantees from 

the United States, which include not only assurances

against an attack but also an end to joint US-South

Korea military exercises and a reduction in—if not complete withdrawal of—US forces on the Peninsula. The

regime has also made its own varying demands for the 

denuclearization of the entire Peninsula, including the 

removal of US nuclear and strategic assets from South

Korea and even in the region.

Despite its public emphasis on diplomatic normalization 

and security guarantees, North Korea has consistently 

demanded economic concessions in previous bilateral 

and multilateral negotiations. Since 2018, it has focused 

on gaining relief from the robust UN sanctions targeting the civilian economy that started with the adoption

of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 2270

March 2016. This effort also coincided with a shift in 

the country’s strategy to prioritize economic development rather than simultaneous development of nuclear 

weapons and the economy (byungjin).12 Experts disagree on whether the move was a natural progression in

national priorities after the successful completion of its 

nuclear force development, as North Korea claims, or a 

response to the crippling effects of economic pressure, 

as sanctions advocates argue.

North Korea has been equivocal and inconsistent about 

how it prioritizes potential US and international concessions. For example, at different points throughout the

1990s, North Korean officials both expressed a willingness to set aside the issue of US troops on the Peninsula

(such as during the 1994 Agreed Framework negotiations

and the 2000 inter-Korean summit) and demanded that 

the issue be on the negotiating agenda (for example, 

during the late-1990s four-party peace talks).13 Former US

official Robert Gallucci, who negotiated the 1994 Agree

Framework, noted that “from time to time there have 

been indications that the North would like more political 

freedom and less economic dependence on China and 

is not so enthusiastic about an American departure from

the region.”14 Similarly, North Korea has sometimes underscored its desire for sanctions relief, including making it 

its highest priority during the February 2019 Hanoi summit negotiations, but in other instances has dismissed 

its importance and instead emphasized the primacy of 

security guarantees.15 This equivocation may be an effort 

to downplay the effect of sanctions and save face while 

seeking economic relief. Ultimately, Pyongyang seeks

comprehensive security across the diplomatic, military, 

and economic dimensions, but has demonstrated flexibility in its demands, depending on the circumstances and 

potential corresponding concessions.

In the absence of diplomatic progress, North Korea has 

sought to coerce the United States into ending its “hostile” policy by increasing its leverage through nuclear

and long-range missile testing, heightened tensions 

on the Korean Peninsula, and improved relations with 

China, Russia, and other countries. After the collapse o

negotiations in December 2019, Chairman Kim stated 

that North Korea would revert back to “taking offensive 

measures to reliably ensure the sovereignty and security 

of our state.”16 Many experts argue that even an end to 

US enmity will not persuade North Korea to abandon

its nuclear weapons. Becoming a nuclear power has

been its highest security goal (if not national ambition) for 

several decades. North Korean officials have wondered 

in various settings why their country was not treated like 

India and Pakistan, which each possess nuclear weapons and have normal diplomatic relations with other 

countries but are not considered nuclear-weapon states 

North Korea has sought to coerce the United States into ending its “hostile” policy through nuclear and 

long-range missile testing, heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and improved relations with 

China, Russia, and other countries.
USIP.ORG 9

under the Non-Proliferation Treaty.17 Given North Korea’s 

claim that it has “finally realized the great historic cause 

of completing the state nuclear force” with the successful 

launch of its Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic missile 

in November 2017, many US experts believe that North

Korea will likely continue to maintain its nuclear deterrent 

because it is the best guarantee of regime security and 

national sovereignty.18 Accordingly, security guarantees

and promises of brighter economic futures will not be 

enough to get significant traction on denuclearization because North Koreans view the US domestic political landscape as unpredictable and changes in administrations

triggering swings in Washington’s North Korea policy.

SOUTH KOREA

Given the proximate security risk from North Korea and 

the fundamental yearning for reconciliation (and even 

reunification), both liberal and conservative South Korean 

administrations since the democratization period of the 

late 1980s have generally pursued a policy of engagement with the North. President Roh Tae-woo (1988–93),

inspired by West Germany’s Ostpolitik engagement 

with Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union’s adoption 

glasnost, implemented a Nordpolitik policy in 1988 that 

strengthened political and economic ties with communist 

countries to help draw the North out of isolation. The 

inter-Korean détente continued under President Kim 

Young-sam (1993–98) and intensified under the sunshine

policies of Presidents Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh

Moo-hyun (2003–8), leading to several breakthroughs, 

including the Mount Kumgang tourism project in 1998, the 

Kaesong joint industrial complex in 2004, and the first two 

North-South summits in 2000 and 2007. Critics have argued, however, that the sunshine policy achieved temporary rapprochement at the expense of enabling and even 

funding the North’s nuclear program and illicit behavior.

Subsequent conservative administrations adopted a 

tougher, more reciprocal approach in engaging with 

North Korea. President Lee Myung-bak (2008–13) conditioned dialogue and humanitarian assistance on North 

Korean steps toward denuclearization and openness; 

President Park Geun-hye (2013–17) sought a middle 

ground that emphasized mutual trust building as the foundation for peace and denuclearization. These engagement efforts, however, were undermined by North Korean 

provocations, which included four nuclear tests between 

2009 and 2017, the sinking of the Cheonan and shelling of Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, and a 2015 landmine

explosion in the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). Both administrations implemented a “proactive deterrence” policy that

aimed to thwart provocations by highlighting disproportionate retaliation, offensive capabilities, and preemption. 

Pyongyang rejected this less accommodating approach 

and viewed the conservative governments’ emphasis on 

reunification as a hostile regime-change strategy.

The current Moon Jae-in administration reinvigorated the 

sunshine policy of its liberal predecessors, highlighting 

three main principles for a peaceful Korean Peninsula. 

The first involves the renunciation of all military action 

and armed conflict, whether it is a North Korean provocation or a US preventive strike.A military clash would no

only undermine peace efforts but could also potentially 

lead to dangerous escalation. Second, President Moon 

has emphasized the importance of denuclearization of 

the Korean Peninsula. This point not only recognizes 

that North Korea’s denuclearization is a prerequisite for 

peace, but also rejects arguments by South Korea’s conservatives in support of indigenous nuclear weapons or 

the redeployment of US tactical nuclear weapons

The third principle stresses that the two Koreas must 

play the primary roles in leading the peace process. This 

principle stems from a strong desire for national selfdetermination born out of decades of colonial occupation, foreign intervention, great power influence, and 

North Korean refusals to engage with South Korea. In his 

first meeting with President Trump in June 2017, President 

Moon quickly secured US support for “the ROK’s leadin

role in fostering an environment for peaceful unification 

of the Korean Peninsula.”19  week later, in a speech

outlining his North Korea policy delivered in Berlin, he

declared that South Korea would be “in the driver’s seat” 
10 PEACEWO      NO.

of the Korean Peninsula. Nevertheless, South Korea 

recognizes that the United States will play a leading role

on the basis of its authority over nuclear issues and the 

North’s preoccupation with US enmity. Consistent with the

concept of self-determination, President Moon has also 

adopted from previous sunshine policies the principle of 

“no regime change” to allay Pyongyang’s fear that greater 

engagement could lead to forced integration, absorption 

by South Korea, or an end to the Kim regime.

With these three principles in mind, the Moon administration has pushed for a step-by-step, comprehensive 

approach to building and maintaining peace with North 

Korea. The South’s invitation of a senior North Korean 

delegation to the February 2018 Winter Olympics in 

Pyeongchang began an inter-Korean thaw that led to 

three North-South summits and a comprehensive military 

agreement on tension reduction. Seoul also envisioned a 

peace process beginning with an end-of-war declaration 

by the end of 2018 and then subsequent steps toward 

a peace treaty. Further, Seoul has pursued economic 

cooperation and nonpolitical exchanges with the North, 

promoting potential inter-Korean railway and energy 

projects for mutual prosperity and seeking the reunion 

of separate families to encourage reconciliation. At the

same time, the Moon administration has supported the 

US-led “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign, including sustaining the unilateral May 2010 sanctions adopted

by previous conservative governments, and maintained a 

policy of robust deterrence to urge the North to return to 

talks and stay on the path toward peace.

Despite these successes, South Korea has run out of road 

for advancing inter-Korean cooperation. Seoul will have a 

difficult time moving forward on joint inter-Korean economic ventures absent a US-DPRK agreement that allow

North Korea's Hwang Chung Gum and South Korea's Won Yun-jong carry the unification flag during the February 9 opening ceremony of the 2018

Winter Olympics in Pyeongchang, South Korea. (Photo by Jae C. Hong/AP
USIP.ORG 11

for at least partial relief from economic sanctions, including those against joint ventures with North Korea. The 

Moon government will also need to address North Korea’s 

concern about Seoul’s ongoing military buildup, including its acquisition of US F-35 stealth fighters. Moreover,

Pyongyang has grown weary of Seoul’s role as an “officious” mediator, arguing that it should instead support the 

interests of the Peninsula.20 For his part, President Moon 

recognizes the limitations of his five-year, single-term 

presidency and has begun efforts to institutionalize the 

Panmunjom Declaration reached during the April 2018 inter-Korean summit by ratifying it in the National Assembl

so that it is binding on future administrations.21

UNITED STATES

The US perspective on a Korean peace regime is driven

by its broader national security interests, primarily the 

elimination of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction and the need to maintain US strategic presence and

influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Washington maintains

a laser focus on ending North Korea’s nuclear program 

and considers denuclearization the linchpin of any 

improvements to the security situation on the Peninsula. 

Indeed, for many US analysts, a peace regime would

flow naturally from ending Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons 

program—and remain out of reach without it. 

A minority of US analysts have broached the potentia

for a peace regime under an arms control model that 

reframes denuclearization as an ambiguous or longterm goal and focuses on managing the growth of North 

Korea’s nuclear program in the short term.22 Believing

that North Korea will not denuclearize anytime soon, they 

advocate taking more realistic steps focused on capping 

Pyongyang’s nuclear arsenal, locking in a nuclear and missile testing freeze, cultivating crisis stability and controlling 

military escalation, and advancing a political framework 

for peace based on deterrence and arms control. That 

view, however, currently stands outside the mainstream 

of official thinking because it could require a tacit acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear power if an arms control 

agreement were construed as the endpoint rather than 

starting point for a process aimed at full denuclearization. 

Relatedly, many Washington analysts worry about permitting conditions that could induce South Korea and Japan

to acquire their own nuclear weapons. Some believe that 

North Korea could conceivably threaten to use its nuclear 

weapons to deter the United States from intervening to

stop North Korean aggression against the South.

A potential peace regime raises difficult security questions for Washington about the US-ROK Allian

American military presence in South Korea, and US strategic posture in Northeast Asia. Any moves within a pe

process that undermine the pillars of the existing US-led

regional security architecture would encounter significant 

opposition. The United States would in theory welcome

a peace regime whose principal effects were the consolidation of North Korean steps to end its nuclear program 

and curtail its human rights abuses, and a reduction of the 

potential for war between North and South. Washington 

would also be amenable to a peace regime nested within 

a wider, US-backed regional political and security order.

Therefore, a central question for the United States in

evaluating a potential peace regime is whether it would 

require Washington to accept a reduction to its desired 

force posture and level of influence in the region. North 

Korea, China, and Russia would welcome an outcome

that diminishes US influence, but the United States want

to avoid weakening its strategic position in Asia—especially if the promises of a peace regime prove illusory

Given these considerations, Washington has historically favored incremental over sweeping changes on the 

Korean Peninsula, thereby upholding the status quo. US

policymakers tend to dismiss North Korean, Chinese, and 

Russian arguments about US regional military postur

being excessively threatening toward Pyongyang. From 

Washington’s perspective, the only credible threat to 

peace and security on the Peninsula is the Kim regime. 

Therefore, although the United States wants North Korea

to move as rapidly as possible to dismantle its nuclear and 

missile arsenals, it prefers to move slowly and methodically on the other components of a peace regime.
12 PEACEWO      NO.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN

PEACE, DIVISION, AND REUNIFICATION

The relationships between Korean 

peace, division, and reunification 

have been in tension since 1945. 

Both Koreas were unhappy with the 

division and actively sought to reunify 

the Peninsula by force. Kim Il Sung attacked South Korea in 1950 with the 

aim of reunification. Three years later, 

South Korean President Syngman 

Rhee refused to sign the armistice 

because he wanted the war to continue until reunification was achieved. 

The notion of peaceful coexistence 

was unthinkable to both leaders.a

By the early 1970s, as Washington 

signaled a desire to reduce tensions 

with China and the Soviet Union and 

to decrease its defense burden in 

the region, the two Koreas took steps 

toward rapprochement. North Korea 

viewed North-South dialogue as a 

way to decouple Seoul from Washington and Tokyo and hasten the 

withdrawal of US troops; South Korea 

saw engagement with the North as a 

hedge against US abandonment.b

 In 

1972, the two countries signed a joint 

statement to promote the unification 

of the Peninsula through nonviolent 

means and independent Korean 

efforts. Later, the 1991 Basic Agreement signaled an implicit understanding that peaceful coexistence was a 

precursor to reunification. 

Since 2000, the two Koreas have 

recognized that their respective 

approaches to reunification have elements in common.c

 The North Korean 

proposal for a Democratic Confederal 

Republic of Koryo envisions reunification under a one-state, two-system 

approach in which the two governments maintain autonomy in managing diplomatic, military, and economic 

affairs. This system would be a transitional phase for the ultimate end state 

of a single-system country. Similarly, 

South Korea’s National Community 

Unification Formula uses a threestage approach that would begin with 

a period of reconciliation and cooperation, followed by the formation of an 

economic and social commonwealth 

(like the European Union), and then 

the final realization of a unified state.d

These positions are not static, however, and have evolved with changes 

in the security environment and each 

country’s security interests.

Fundamental differences in the two 

plans will make a unified state difficult to operationalize. South Korea’s 

constitution calls for a unified Korea 

based on a “free and basic democratic order.” North Korea’s approach 

seeks to preserve its socialist system 

and requires the removal of US forces, which it believes contributed to 

the division in the first place.

Analysts generally view the prospect 

of a democratic South Korea and 

an authoritarian North Korea living 

in peace as a waypoint to eventual 

unification. Nevertheless, whether a 

peace regime would extend or shorten the timeline for unification is not 

agreed. The Moon administration and 

other engagement advocates believe 

that a peace process, by encouraging cooperation and the exchange of 

ideas, goods, and people, can build 

mutual trust and facilitate the path 

to not only denuclearization but also 

Notes

a. “The idea that Korea could be separated into Northern and Southern parts and that the parts should coexist is very dangerous,” Kim said in 

November 1954. “It is a view obstructing our efforts for unification” (Chong-Sik Lee, “Korean Partition and Unification,” Journal of International 

Affairs 18, no. 2 (1964): 230–31).

b. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas : A Contemporary History, rev. ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2013), 25–26. 

c. Dae-jung Kim, “North and South Korea Find Common Ground,” New York Times, November 28, 2000, www.nytimes.com/2000/11/28/opinion

/IHT-north-and-south-korea-find-common-ground.html.

d. South Korean Ministry of Unification, "National Community Unification Plan" [in Korean], www.unikorea.go.kr/unikorea/policy/plan.

e. During the Cold War, Finland maintained a realist strategy of neutrality between the West and the Soviet Union and “neighborly” relations with the 

latter to coexist as a free and democratic country. The original use of the term Finlandization, however, suggested pejoratively that the country relinquished some aspects of its national sovereignty as a part of this arrangement. See James Kirchick, “Finlandization Is Not a Solution for Ukraine,” 

The American Interest, July 27, 2014, www.the-american-interest.com/2014/07/27/finlandization-is-not-a-solution-for-ukraine.

Box 1.
USIP.ORG 13

Previous US policy toward North Korea may have

also been influenced by the belief that the Kim 

regime would not endure indefinitely. The potential 

for regime collapse or change was a consideration, 

albeit small, for the Clinton, George W. Bush, and

Obama administrations that may have contributed 

to an unwillingness to consider the regime as a truly 

permanent entity requiring long-term relations and 

peaceful coexistence.

The Trump administration has prioritized North Korea 

as a top security concern and adopted a more aggressive and urgent approach to peace and denuclearization than those of previous administrations. Under the

first prong of its “maximum pressure and engagement” 

policy, the administration threatened military action 

against North Korea through “fire and fury” and “bloody 

nose strikes,” and significantly increased the number 

of North Korean sanctions designations in an effort to 

increase leverage.23

By the June 2018 Singapore Summit, however,

President Trump shifted toward an accelerated engagement approach. He minimized preconditions 

for talks, met directly with Chairman Kim (three times 

in thirteen months) despite the lack of regular working-level meetings, exchanged letters with him, provided significant concessions up front with little deliberation (such as suspending the August 2018 joint military

exercise), and demonstrated a willingness to pursue 

peace and denuclearization simultaneously rather 

than sequentially. These steps have put North Korea’s 

sincerity about denuclearization to the test.

At the same time, other aspects of the administration’s

policy implementation, including uneven Alliance

coordination, internal disunity, and disjointed messaging, warrant significant concern and may be offsetting 

any potential gains. In particular, the insistence by 

high-ranking officials that North Korea disarm unilaterally before Washington provides any sanctions relief 

continues to hinder US-DPRK negotiation

a mutually agreeable, soft-landing 

unification. Other experts argue that 

a peace regime process would prematurely relieve pressure on the Kim 

regime to denuclearize and conduct 

reforms, thereby extending it. From 

this perspective, a peace regime 

creates a strategic dilemma with no 

clear resolution. 

Assuming reunification is possible, 

what a unified Korea might mean for 

regional stability is also a matter of 

concern. Washington supports the 

peaceful reunification of Korea based 

on the principles of free democracy 

and a market economy. Yet some 

Washington analysts believe that 

South Korea, in its pursuit of reunification, may be willing to abandon 

the US-ROK Alliance and assume 

neutrality or, even worse, accommodate China’s foreign policy preferences under a Finlandization model.e

Such concerns are even greater in 

Tokyo, which worries that a neutral 

unified Korea would be anti-Japan, 

tilt toward China, reduce US influence and presence in the region, 

and degrade Japan’s security vis-àvis China. For its part, Beijing could 

accept a peacefully reunified Korea 

but would oppose the continuation 

of the Alliance and any effort to draw 

Korea into a US containment strategy 

against China. Mitigating these concerns about the future orientation of 

a reunified Korea will be an important 

aspect of the peace process.
14 PEACEWO      NO.

CHINA

China’s approach toward a peace regime is grounded 

in its core priorities for the Korean Peninsula, which 

Chinese officials have described as no war, no instability, 

and no nuclear weapons. Beijing seeks first to avoid

military escalation on the Korean Peninsula as well as 

regime collapse in North Korea, both of which would 

destabilize its immediate neighborhood. To a lesser 

extent and as a longer-term goal, it also seeks North 

Korea’s denuclearization to reduce proliferation and 

contamination risks, curtail the rationale for US force

presence and military buildup in the region, and prevent 

South Korea and Japan from seeking their own nuclear 

weapons. It supports peace negotiations because they 

would advance each of these three priorities.

It is also driven by its desire to maintain and project 

influence on the Korean Peninsula. Beijing expects to

be involved as a major player in any peace process, not 

only because of China’s role in the Korean War but also 

because of the geostrategic implications for the future of 

the region. In particular, Beijing seeks to take part in both

an end-of-war declaration and a formal peace treaty, 

but especially the latter given that China was an original 

signatory to the Armistice Agreement and wants to b

involved in shaping any final, legally binding agreement 

that affects the future of the Korean Peninsula.

China has made this position clear not only in words but 

also in its actions. Despite years of frosty relations and 

no contact between President Xi Jinping and Chairman 

Kim, bilateral ties warmed up quickly as North Korea 

announced a strategic shift from nuclear to economic 

development and began engaging with the United

States and South Korea to coordinate summit-level 

meetings. The unprecedented number of strategically 

timed meetings between Kim and Xi since 2018 signals 

China’s determination not to be left out.

Beijing has encouraged bilateral negotiations first

between Pyongyang and Washington, with each side 

making reciprocal concessions. It supports the idea of a 

dual suspension (that is, a freeze in major US-ROK militar

exercises in exchange for a freeze in North Korean nuclear and missile tests) to reduce tensions and has called for 

parallel track negotiations to advance denuclearization 

and peace simultaneously. This position is consistent with 

Pyongyang’s preference for a “phased and synchronous” 

process with Washington. However, if US-DPRK negotiations progress to a broader discussion about a futur

security arrangement for the Korean Peninsula, including 

a peace agreement, China would seek to participate.

As China advocates for North Korea’s demands for security concessions from the United States and South Korea

it will try to shift the balance of regional power in ways 

that are favorable to its interests. It is likely to leverage 

the peace regime process to advance its strategic aim 

of eroding the US presence in the region. For example,

Beijing has endorsed Pyongyang’s broad call to “denuclearize the Korean Peninsula.”24 Although neither Nort

Korea nor China has clearly defined the specific US-RO

actions required to create a “nuclear-free zone” on the 

Peninsula, it may include demands that Washington 

retract its nuclear umbrella over South Korea, end the 

deployment of US nuclear and strategic assets to the

Korean Peninsula, roll back any missile defense cooperation with Seoul, and reduce or withdraw US troops from

the Peninsula. If North Korea (and voices in South Korea) 

push for the “neutralization” of the Korean Peninsula, 

and thus the abrogation of the US-ROK Alliance, China 

likely to support this position given its desire to reduce 

the US presence and alliance network in Asia.

Beijing will reject a peace regime that it perceives as

harming its own security interests or places the burden 

of providing security for the Korean Peninsula on China. 

It is also likely to reject any security arrangement that 

it perceives as tilting the region toward Washington. It 

will likely oppose any US positive security guarantees

to North Korea or any efforts to integrate North Korea 

or a unified Korean Peninsula into the US-led alliance

network. At the same time, Beijing is also unlikely t

extend its own positive security guarantees to the 
USIP.ORG 15

Korean Peninsula beyond the strictly defensive terms 

enumerated in China’s bilateral treaty with North Korea.26

Chinese leaders insist that China is a “new type of great 

power” uninterested in formal alliances. China has never 

extended its nuclear umbrella over another country thus 

far, and the provision of extended deterrence guarantees to North Korea or other partners would require a 

fundamental shift in China’s strategic thinking.

China, however, would likely support any economic 

dimensions of a peace regime. Beijing views economic engagement and partnerships as its primary

way to expand its relationships and influence with 

partners. Beijing has long desired that Pyongyang

follow in China’s footsteps by opening up economically 

while preserving its political system. Chinese leaders 

believe North Korea’s economic development and 

regional integration are key to stabilizing its immediate 

neighborhood. They have therefore vowed to support 

Kim’s strategic shift toward economic development, 

including by proposing with Russia a plan for lifting U

sanctions on North Korea related to exporting statues, seafood, textiles, and labor as well as exempting 

inter-Korean railway projects from UN sanctions.2

JAPAN

In the post–Cold War era, Japan’s relations with North 

Korea have reflected Tokyo’s interest in increasing its 

regional leverage relative to Beijing and Moscow while

enhancing its ability to act independently of Washington 

and Seoul.28 Japan has typically engaged in normalization talks with North Korea during periods of inter-Korean and US-DPRK rapprochement to avoid losing influence and to ensure that its interests are being served

Between 1991 and 1992, it conducted eight rounds of

normalization talks with Pyongyang to establish ties 

Commuters in the Seoul Railway Station watch a television showing North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, left, welcoming Chinese President Xi Jinpin

to Pyongyang on June 21, 2019. (Photo by Lee Jin-man/AP
16 PEACEWO      NO.

and resolve outstanding claims from colonial Japanese 

rule. These talks failed, however, over the issues of 

international inspections of North Korea’s nuclear sites, 

Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea during the 

1970s and 1980s, and compensation for post–World War 

II claims.29 After North Korea conducted a Taepodong

missile launch over Japanese territory in 1998 and 

appeared to be making diplomatic progress with 

Washington and Seoul in 2000, Tokyo held additional 

rounds of normalization discussions in 2000 and 2002. 

Although these talks did not yield significant results, the

two sides agreed on a joint declaration in 2002 in which 

North Korea admitted to abducting Japanese nationals 

and Japan expressed remorse for its colonial past.30

Since the 2002 declaration, successive Japanese administrations have prioritized two goals under its North Korea 

policy: the elimination of North Korea’s weapons of mass 

destruction, including its nuclear and ballistic missile 

programs, and the resolution of the abductee issue. The 

first goal overlaps with US objectives, though Tokyo is

concerned that Washington is overlooking Pyongyang’s 

shorter-range missile capabilities while focusing on the 

longer-range threat. In response to domestic public 

opinion, Japan is also continuing to seek a full accounting of the remaining twelve Japanese abductees. In 

recent years, the Shinzo Abe government has insisted on

a “comprehensive resolution” of these two issues as the 

conditions for normalization of bilateral relations.31

Japan’s rigid position on these issues, particularly abductees, may stem from a desire to influence the agenda despite its limited role in nuclear negotiations. Some experts 

have argued that stalled denuclearization negotiations 

prolong the North Korean threat, which provides Japan 

additional justification to enhance its military capabilities, 

particularly in the context of a stronger China.32 During 

the Six-Party Talks, Japan was criticized for obstructing 

progress by making stringent denuclearization demands 

and conditioning its provision of economic and energy 

assistance on a full resolution of the abductee issue.33

During Pyongyang’s recent spate of diplomatic outreach, 

Tokyo has been relegated to indirect involvement in the 

form of consultations with Washington. Japan remains 

the only country with significant interests on the Korean 

Peninsula that has not had a leader-level meeting with 

North Korea during this period. The Abe administration

has been willing to let President Trump lead the denuclearization negotiations given their aligned position on 

North Korea policy, but in May 2019 began proposing an 

unconditional bilateral summit with Kim to ensure that its 

interests are not neglected.

Japan wants to be included in multilateral negotiations 

that involve serious discussions about a future regional 

security architecture. It also wants a security framework 

that reduces the North Korean threat so that it can focus 

resources on China, which it views as its primary longterm strategic threat.34 This view supports the continuation of a robust US presence on the Korean Peninsula

and in the region. Some Japanese experts are concerned, however, that efforts to reduce this posture, including modifications to US-ROK military exercises, woul

not only undermine military readiness and deterrence but 

also elicit domestic complaints about why similar measures could not be taken to decrease US forces in Japan

Japan’s ability to provide economic assistance can be 

useful in peace and denuclearization discussions. Tokyo 

continues to adhere to the understanding in the 2002 

declaration that Japan will provide grant aid, low interest 

loans, and humanitarian assistance to North Korea as 

part of the normalization process, similar to the compensation given to the South as part of the 1965 Japan-ROK

normalization treaty. Estimates of the compensation

amount, adjusted for inflation and accrued interest, 

range from $10 to $20 billion.35 However, Tokyo wants to 

Tokyo wants to have a role in shaping security discussions rather than being asked to simply provide a 

blank check. Japan may have to shed its spoiler role if it is to have a greater role in a peace regime process.
USIP.ORG 17

have a role in shaping security discussions rather than 

being asked to simply provide a blank check.

Japan may have to shed its spoiler role if it is to have a 

greater role in a peace regime process. In addition, its 

current dispute with South Korea regarding historical, 

export control, and security issues, if not resolved, could 

complicate future multilateral negotiations as well as 

Japan-DPRK normalization efforts. If US-DPRK and inter-Korean negotiations advance in the future without acceptable resolutions to the abductee and ballistic missi

issues, Japan will need to decide whether it can maintain 

its long-standing position or risk losing leverage on the 

Peninsula and in bilateral Japan-DPRK negotiations.

RUSSIA

Like Beijing, Moscow favors North Korea’s denuclearization and the de-escalation of tensions through political

dialogue but is skeptical about the Kim regime’s willingness to give up its nuclear weapons.36 Russia also

worries that North Korea’s nuclear program heightens a 

multitude of risks, including military conflict, regime instability, the erosion of the global nonproliferation regime, 

contamination from nuclear accidents, and US military

expansion in the region. Based on these concerns, its

historical ties with North Korea, and its limited leverage in 

the region, Moscow has typically mirrored Pyongyang’s 

and Beijing’s prescriptions—such as the “dual freeze”

proposal—and their criticisms of US demands for North

Korea’s immediate and unilateral denuclearization. In 

October 2018, at a trilateral vice foreign ministers meeting in Moscow, Russia joined China and North Korea in

supporting a negotiations process that includes step-bystep, reciprocal measures, a peace mechanism based on 

bilateral and multilateral cooperation, and an easing of 

the sanctions regime against North Korea.

From a broader perspective, Russia’s Korea policy reflects its geopolitical strategy for relations with other major powers and sustaining its claim to great power status

in the region. Cooperation on North Korea policy is a key 

issue for the deepening Sino-Russian “comprehensive

strategic partnership of coordination.”37 Both powers

hope to use the peace and denuclearization process to 

weaken the US-ROK Alliance and undermine the US-

regional security architecture. At the same time, Moscow

recognizes that China’s stake in Korea is bigger than 

Russia’s, and therefore shows a certain deference to

Beijing in dealing with Korea

Russia also seeks, however, to maintain regional

influence and avoid acquiescing to China in Peninsula 

diplomacy. The April 2019 Putin-Kim summit demonstrated Moscow’s ability to engage North Korea directly as

a way of gaining strategic leverage vis-à-vis the United

States.38 President Putin has also called for Russia to

“turn to the East” and deepen its involvement in the

Asia-Pacific overall.39 Staying involved in Korea, even

if not decisively, supports Moscow’s regional goals. It 

also envisions itself playing a helpful role in a broader 

discussion about security mechanisms in Northeast Asia.

It expects a peace regime to include a series of bilateral 

and multilateral security guarantees covering the entire 

Peninsula, which would then form the foundation for a 

new regional security mechanism—presumably one with 

a diminished US role. In addition, experts note that, in

the context of the collapse of the Intermediate-Range

Nuclear Forces Treaty and the potential for a regional 

missile arms race, Russia could facilitate discussions

among regional actors on strategic missile systems.40

Economics and trade are also major drivers of Russia’

Korea policy. Moscow wants to develop the Russian Far

East, link South Korean railroads to the Trans-Siberian

Railway, and grow demand for its energy exports to

Asia by connecting pipelines and electricity systems

with the Peninsula. These interests align well with 

President Moon’s hopes of using regional economic 

cooperation to persuade North Korea to intensify its 

shift from nuclear to economic development. Easing

sanctions on North Korea—which Russia helped adopt

as a permanent member of the UN Security Council

but has only selectively enforced—would remove an 

economic constraint for both countries.
18 PEACEWO      NO.

Structure of a Peace Regim

Various terms have been used to describe a complete 

and enduring settlement of the Korean War, but official 

bilateral and multilateral statements since the September 

2005 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks have explicitly articulated a peace regime as a primary goal. 

Recognizing that peace is not a singular event that can

be achieved by one accord, the South Korean government offered the concept of a peace regime as an 

organizing structure. The concept has since developed 

to encompass a comprehensive framework of declarations, agreements, norms, rules, processes, and institutions—spanning the diplomatic, security, economic, and 

social spheres—aimed at building and sustaining peace 

on the Korean Peninsula (see table 1). Under this broad

definition, a peace regime would encompass previous 

inter-Korean, US-DPRK, and multilateral declarations a

well as any future measures, including an end-of-war 

declaration, any bilateral or multilateral peace processes 

designed to achieve a final agreement, the peace agreement itself, and any subsequent organizations, mechanisms, or frameworks designed to maintain the peace.

Two important components of a peace regime—an endof-war declaration and a peace treaty—are often conflated. The Moon Jae-in administration envisions an endof-war declaration as a symbolic, nonbinding, political 

statement that proclaims the Korean War to be over and 

that marks the beginning of a new era of peaceful relations.41 These new relations could also be demonstrated 

through security guarantees, partial sanctions relief, the 

exchange of liaison offices, reduced military tensions, 

and people-to-people exchanges. To reinforce the lack 

of any legal effect, the statement would underscore that 

existing arrangements that maintain the peace, such as 

the UN Command, the Armistice Agreement, and t

Military Demarcation Line, would remain in place until 

the parties negotiate a more comprehensive peace 

settlement.42 The broader settlement, achieved under 

a formal peace treaty, would require extensive negotiations to replace the Armistice Agreement, formally en

the Korean War, complete the process of denuclearization, and create a binding set of obligations for maintaining peace and security on the Peninsula. In this sense, 

an end-of-war declaration would essentially serve as a 

preamble to a peace agreement.

A comprehensive peace regime should address three

separate, but interrelated, sets of unresolved issues 

from the Korean War: the multilateral nature of that war 

and a long-term security architecture for the Korean 

Peninsula and the region; the civil war and reconciliation between the two Koreas; and the normalization of 

relations between the United States and North Korea

and between Japan and North Korea.

First, an umbrella peace agreement could be used to settle the wider multilateral issues related to formally ending 

the Korean War and establishing peace on the Korean 

Peninsula. These issues would include the cessation of 

hostilities, the status of foreign conventional and strategic 

forces on the Peninsula, North Korea’s weapons of mass 

destruction programs, the replacement of the Armistice

Agreement, human rights, the role of the United Nations

and the establishment of both transitional and permanent 

systems for managing the peace on the Peninsula and in 

the region. The multilateral dimension of a peace agreement should also lay the foundation for regional stability 

by securing buy-in and support for a permanent Korean 

peace from the United States and China

Second, a separate process—perhaps annexed under 

the umbrella agreement—would formally end the war 
USIP.ORG 19

between the two Koreas and resolve additional interKorean issues, including outstanding border and territorial matters, such as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) and 

the Northwest Islands; military tension reduction; economic cooperation; the movement of people, goods, and 

services across the border; and any guidelines for future 

confederation or reunification. The United States wil

likely play a role given its combined defense posture with 

South Korea and its role through the UN Command in establishing the NLL and controlling the Northwest Islands.

Previous inter-Korean agreements, such as the 1972 

North-South Joint Statement, the 1991 Basic Agreement

and the 2018 Comprehensive Military Agreement, have

already delineated principles and steps for reconciliation 

and tension reduction that can serve as a foundation for 

the new inter-Korean agreement.

Examples

Declarations,

Agreements,

and Statements

(past and future)

• July 1972 South-North Joint Communique

• December 1991 Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation 

between the South and North

• January 1992 Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

• June 2000 North-South Joint Declaration

• October 2000 US-DPRK Joint Communique

• October 2007 Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity

• June 2018 Singapore Statement

• Potential end-of-war declaration

• Potential peace agreement or treaty

Norms, Rules,

and Processes

• Secretary Tillerson “Four No’s” (no regime change, no regime collapse, no accelerated reunification of 

the Korean Peninsula, and no US forces north of the 38th parallel)

• Four pillars of Singapore Statement (new US-DPRK relations, lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean 

Peninsula, complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, commitment to recovering POW/MIA remains)

• President Moon Sunshine Policy (two Koreas must play leading role on Peninsula and unification 

issues, peaceful coexistence of two Koreas, no intent for collapse or absorption of North Korea, 

denuclearization of the Peninsula, permanent peace regime, inter-Korean economic cooperation, 

nonpolitical exchange and cooperation separate from political matters)

• Chairman Kim-President Xi policy (“phased and synchronous measures” that would “eventually achieve 

denuclearization and lasting peace on the peninsula”)

• China’s support for “dual freeze” on North Korean nuclear and missile tests and US-ROK joint military 

exercises and parallel track negotiations on peace and denuclearization

• Japan’s policy (resolution of North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles and Japanese 

abductee issue)

• Potential institutionalized peace process

Institutions • Potential peace management organization (to replace Military Armistice Commission)

• Inter-Korean joint military committee

• Potential US-DPRK senior-level military-to-military dialogue

• Potential bilateral, four-party, and six-party working groups

• Potential regional security mechanisms (for example, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism)

Table 1. Conceptual Framework of a Korean Peninsula Peace Regime
20 PEACEWO      NO.

Finally, separate tracks would be needed to 

normalize Pyongyang’s relations with both 

Washington and Tokyo. Establishing USDPRK diplomatic relations could be relative

quick and simple once major issues such as 

denuclearization, sanctions relief, and human 

rights were resolved in multilateral discussions. Also, although Japan was not a belligerent in the Korean War, its role as a base

for US and multinational forces during the

conflict and as a major power in the region 

makes Japan-DPRK normalization an important part of the peace regime process. Other

bilateral aspects of the Korean War, such as 

the prior state of conflict between the United

States and China, and between the ROK and

China, have already been resolved through 

the normalization of diplomatic relations in 

1979 and 1992, respectively.

A Korean Peninsula peace regime comprises a broad set of interrelated diplomatic,

security, and economic challenges (see 

table 2). Certain sensitive issues (such as 

denuclearization and sanctions relief) are 

linchpins to the entire endeavor; others 

would be important confidence-building 

measures (an end-of-war declaration, humanitarian assistance, and so on). Similarly, 

some measures are better suited to the 

front end of the process. Others would 

come only later, as the process ripens. 

Ultimately, as the perspectives of the involved countries make clear, most if not all

of these issues must be addressed at some 

point in the peace regime process.

POTENTIAL MEASURES

UNDER A PEACE REGIME

 SHORT TERM (temporary or reversible measures)

Establishment of working groups on peace and 

normalization (US-DPRK, JPN-DPRK), setting of 

diplomatic end states

End-of-war declaration

Liaison offices

End of travel ban to and from North Korea

People-to-people exchanges (POW/MIA remains recovery 

operations, reunion of divided families, cultural exchanges)

Intermittent head-of-state meetings for progress updates

Broad DPRK commitment to engage on human rights, 

initial human rights measures, meetings with UN special 

rapporteur and US special envoy

Partial sanctions relief, with snapback provisions and 

focus on inter-Korean projects or limited sectors (such as 

Kaesong Industrial Complex, Mount Geumgang tourism, 

coal and textile)

Support for technical assistance related to economic 

reform and international financial institution (IFI) 

requirements

Humanitarian assistance

Commitment to discuss economic and energy assistance

DPRK commitment to address counterfeiting and money 

laundering

Establishment of four-party working group on 

denuclearization and security (US-DPRK-ROK-PRC), 

definition of denuclearization of Korean Peninsula

Mutual negative security assurances

Moratorium on nuclear and ballistic missile tests

Freeze on all nuclear and ballistic missile activities

Declaration of nuclear activities related to Yongbyon

Yongbyon shutdown and return of monitors and inspectors

Engagement on cooperative threat reduction measures

Development of inter-Korean joint military committee

Development of additional arms control, military tension 

reduction measures

Suspension or modification of large US-ROK military 

exercises and Korean People's Army (KPA) exercises

Halt to deployment of US strategic and nuclear assets on 

or near Korean Peninsula

Establishment of US-DPRK military-to-military dialogue

DIPLOMATIC ECONOMIC SECURITY

Table 2.
USIP.ORG 21

 LONG TERM

Regular working-level meetings on peace and 

normalization, including human rights norms

Continued people-to-people exchanges

Intermittent head-of-state meetings for progress updates

Continued DPRK engagement on human rights measures 

and periodic reviews

Signing of four-party peace agreement, including DPRK 

human rights commitments

Normalization of relations

Establishment of embassies

Continued review of peace agreement implementation

Increased people-to-people exchanges

Intermittent head-of-state meetings for progress updates

Continued implementation of DPRK human rights 

commitments and periodic reviews, including termination 

of gross violations

Additional sanctions relief with snapback provisions, 

commensurate with DPRK actions

Removal from state sponsor of terrorism list

Continued humanitarian assistance

Discussion of energy assistance

Complete sanctions relief commensurate with 

denuclearization, with snapback provisions

Continued support for economic reform and international 

financial institutions membership

Continued economic and energy assistance

Continued humanitarian assistance

Regular four-party working-level meetings on 

denuclearization and security

Complete and verifiable dismantlement of Yongbyon facility, 

partial verification of halt to uranium enrichment activities

Declaration of all nuclear and missile activities

North Korea accedes to the Chemical Weapons Convention

Continued engagement on cooperative threat reduction 

measures

Proportional US-ROK and DPRK conventional force 

reduction measures

Suspension or modification of large US-ROK military 

exercises and KPA exercises

Continued halt to deployment of US strategic and 

nuclear assets on or near Korean Peninsula

US force presence commensurate with security environment

Begin six-party working group on regional security

(US-DPRK-ROK-PRC-JPN-RUS)

Continued verification of halt to all uranium enrichment

Verified dismantlement of all nuclear weapons

Verified dismantlement of intermediate-range and longrange ballistic missiles

Elimination of DPRK chemical weapons

Continued engagement on cooperative threat reduction

Disestablishment of United Nations Command

Establishment of new peace management organization

Resolution of NLL and Northwest Islands issues

Proportional US-ROK and DPRK conventional force 

reduction measures

Suspension or modification of large US-ROK military 

exercises and KPA exercises

Continued halt to deployment of US strategic and 

nuclear assets on or near Korean Peninsula

US force presence commensurate with security environment

Establishment of six-party regional security mechanism

 MEDIUM TERM DIPLOMATIC

DIPLOMATIC

ECONOMICECONOMIC

SECURITYSECURITY
22 PEACEWO      NO.

Diplomatic Issues 

Constructing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula 

would require a series of diplomatic actions from several parties. In particular, Washington and Pyongyang 

would need to transform their ties from near-total estrangement into normalized relations. This would need 

to begin with ending the state of conflict that has existed since the beginning of the Korean War in 1950 and 

was frozen in place by the 1953 Armistice Agreemen

One approach, which South Korea has suggested, 

would be for the parties to formally conclude fighting in 

two steps. First, the United States, South Korea, North

Korea, and potentially China could issue an end-of-war 

declaration, which would amount to a political rather 

than legal statement that all the parties consider hostilities terminated. The second step would create a process to replace the armistice with a peace agreement. 

Such a process would be much more difficult given the 

large set of issues involved and the potential legal consequences of terminating the armistice. It would likely 

entail various interim steps or agreements that achieve 

prerequisite confidence-building measures prior to a final settlement (for example, an interim deal that freezes 

North Korea’s nuclear and missile activities in exchange 

for security guarantees and economic assistance).

The normalization of diplomatic relations by itself could 

potentially come before a final peace agreement and be 

relatively easy to achieve if the countries involved agree 

to it. For example, Japan and Russia share diplomatic

and economic ties despite the lack of a formal peace 

treaty after World War II. However, that sequence would 

be politically difficult for the United States unless significant progress is made on North Korean denuclearization

President Moon Jae-in of South Korea and Kim Jong Un of North Korea, flanked by their spouses, during a luncheon in Pyongyang during their September 2018 summit. (Photo by Pyeongyang Press Corps Pool via New York Time
USIP.ORG 23

and human rights.  process that addresses denuclearization and peace in parallel would have the best chance

of maintaining political support from all sides.

Questions about which parties have the authority to 

act on behalf of the belligerents remain. The armistice 

was signed by the UN Command; the Korean People’s

Army (KPA), North Korea’s military; and the People’

Volunteer Army, a now-defunct military force Beijin

created solely to fight in Korea. It is therefore unclear 

whether the United States can sign on behalf of the

United Nations, whether South Korea can sign at all,

and whether the unofficial status of the former People’s 

Volunteer Army allows Beijing to sign a subsequen

agreement on its behalf.43 Legal analyses have argued 

that both Koreas, the United States, and China could

justifiably sign an agreement to replace the armistice.44

None of the parties would likely contest this legal interpretation given their de facto roles in the conflict.

Creating venues for diplomatic representation is another 

critical part of the normalization process. Currently, the 

United States and North Korea communicate primarily

through the unofficial “New York Channel” at the DPR

Permanent Mission to the United Nations for working-level interactions. The next level of diplomatic presence

would be for each side to set up mutual liaison offices 

or “interests sections”—essentially, bare-bones unofficial 

embassies—in each other’s capitals (an example is the 

US interests section in Cuba before the embassy was

established in 2015). The Swedish Embassy in Pyongyang

reserves space to host a US liaison office should one

need to be set up quickly. For their part, the two Koreas 

opened liaison offices in the North Korean border town of 

Kaesong in September 2018, although North Korea (to signal displeasure) has at times recalled staff from the office.

The United States has a history of setting up liaison

offices as a precursor to full-fledged embassies within the context of diplomatic normalization processes. 

Washington and Beijing established them in 1973

following President Nixon’s visit in 1972, for example. 

Embassies were eventually opened in 1979 after the

United States officially recognized the People’s Republi

of China. In Vietnam, the process moved much more 

quickly. Washington and Hanoi established liaison offices in January 1995 and official embassies that August.

Similar processes could unfold for the United States and

North Korea as well as for Japan and North Korea. 

PROCESS, PARTICIPANTS, FORMAT

The process of developing a peace regime on the Korean 

Peninsula will be long and complicated. Devising an 

effective framework that addresses the central concerns 

of each party and carrying that arrangement through to implementation will be difficult. Decades of negotiations on 

the Korean Peninsula have seen a range of formats, from 

bilateral talks between the United States and North Korea

in the early 1990s to the Four-Party Talks in the late 1990s 

that included South Korea and China to the Six-Party Talks 

in the mid-2000s that added Japan and Russia.

The latest negotiations, initiated in early 2018, were mostly bilateral meetings between North Korea and a rotating 

cast of South Korea, the United States, China, and Russia

Japanese leaders were also eager to be involved. At

some point, however, the parties might see value in 

transitioning the process into a multilateral format given 

the far-reaching interests and implications for regional 

powers related to the Korean Peninsula. Ensuring all

the relevant countries have a seat at the table can help 

mitigate incentives for any party to act as a spoiler, build 

in support for an agreement up front, and spread out 

responsibilities and costs. Those rationales propelled 

the Six-Party Talks. At the same time, adding parties can

make the process substantively, procedurally, and logistically more difficult, so a balance must be struck. 

The parties could opt for one of several negotiating formats. The guiding principle should be the inclusion of parties on all issues for which they have substantial interests, 

yet keeping the overall process as nimble, focused, and 

results-oriented as possible. The first option would be for 

negotiations to move forward on a four-party basis: North 
24 PEACEWO      NO.

Korea, South Korea, the United States, and China. Such a

format would involve the modern representatives of the 

Korean War belligerents. It would also allow each Korea’s 

major-power backer to be directly involved in talks, and 

for US negotiators to act as proxy for Japanese interests

and Chinese negotiators for Russian interests.

A second option would be for talks to continue as a

series of bilateral meetings, possibly complemented 

by a few trilateral or quadrilateral meetings to address 

strategic issues related to the Korean Peninsula. In 

addition, a consultative mechanism could be set up 

that includes all six parties to tackle issues that have 

broader regional implications. 

A third option would be to bring in parties from outside

the region to act as neutral intermediaries for the regional states and to provide nuclear expertise and economic 

assistance. One possible arrangement along these 

lines would be to reassemble the P5+1 grouping (the 

permanent five members of the UN Security Council

plus Germany) that negotiated the Iran deal. This time it 

would include both Koreas, the P5+1, and perhaps Japan 

as well. Another possibility would be to involve the U

Secretary-General’s office as an independent mediator 

as the peace process moves toward a final agreement.45

However, given the two Koreas’ desire to limit foreign 

influence in peninsular affairs and the ability of relevant 

major powers to act as proxies for multilateral interests, 

it is unlikely that outside actors beyond the six parties 

would play a major role except in narrowly defined, 

supplementary capacities (such as nuclear dismantlement verification and facilitation) or to serve a procedural 

function (such as Security Council sanctions waivers and 

UN resolutions supporting a peace agreement)

REPLACING THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT

A peace treaty is generally considered the appropriate

instrument for replacing the 1953 Armistice Agreemen

and codifying a permanent peace on the Korean 

Peninsula. This emphasis stems from the conventional 

approach under customary international law in which 

wars were first terminated by military cease-fires and 

then permanently settled by peace treaties.46 Reinforcing

this approach was the basic understanding of the most 

fundamental principle under international law, pacta sunt 

servanda (“treaties must be complied with”).

However, the word treaty has different meanings under 

international and US law. In the context of international

law, specifically Article 2(1) of the Vienna Convention,

any agreement between states, however designated, 

constitutes a treaty if it is intended to be binding on 

the parties. Although none of the major agreements

and statements regarding the Korean Peninsula have 

explicitly articulated a peace treaty, their references to 

a peace settlement, mechanism, arrangement, or regime should all be construed as a treaty (or a broader 

framework that includes a treaty) that is intended to be 

binding on the relevant parties.

From the US perspective, a treaty is a narrower subcategory of binding international agreements. An agreemen

could take two principal forms under US law. The first is

a treaty, an agreement negotiated and signed by a member of the executive branch that enters into force if approved by a two-thirds majority of the Senate. Although

the president maintains the constitutional power to make 

treaties, the Senate has the authority to condition its consent on reservations, declarations, understandings, and 

provisos concerning the treaty’s application.47

The second form, known as an executive agreement, 

does not require the Senate’s advice and consent but 

is equally binding on the United States. Since the end

of World War II, the challenge of securing a two-thirds 

majority in the Senate has led to the growth of executive 

agreements. That trend has continued at a rapid pace 

in more recent years due to the heavy workload of the 

Senate and the volume of business conducted between 

the United States and other countries.Between 197

and 1996, 93 percent of the more than four thousand US

international agreements, including the 1994 US-DPR

Agreed Framework, were executive agreements.4
USIP.ORG 25

The type of instrument used to codify the final peace 

settlement could have important implications for diplomatic negotiations, long-term sustainability, and congressional-executive relations. The State Department’s Office 

of the Legal Adviser is responsible for deciding how an

international agreement should be classified based on 

criteria outlined under the Circular 175 procedure.49 In 

practice, however, the decision is often a political matter, 

taking into account the likelihood of Senate approval.50

An executive agreement offers a more expedient path to a

peace settlement than a treaty but may not be as sustainable.  future president can terminate such an agreement

without congressional approval, which is what happened 

when President Trump withdrew from his predecessor’s 

2015 nuclear agreement with Iran.51 Also, Congress could

use its power of the purse to withhold funds for commitments that have not received the Senate’s advice and 

consent or broader congressional input. This is what 

occurred when the Republican Party took control of the

House of Representatives two weeks after the Clinton

administration signed the Agreed Framework in October

1994, turning the agreement into a “political orphan.”52

A treaty can help ensure congressional support in

ratifying and implementing the agreement, but also 

has disadvantages. If Senate consent depends on 

North Korea’s acceptance of an exacting list of requirements related to denuclearization, human rights, 

financial transparency, and other good behavior, then 

a potential deal might not be reached in the first place. 

Furthermore, a treaty does not guarantee durability, 

even with initial Senate support. Despite an ongoing 

legal debate about the constitutional requirements 

for the termination of Senate-approved treaties, the 

president’s ability to withdraw unilaterally from such 

US Army General William K. Harrison, left, and North Korean General Nam Il sign armistice documents ending the three-year-old Korean conflict o

July 27, 1953. (Photo by Alpha Stock/Alamy Stock Phot
26 PEACEWO      NO.

treaties is the accepted norm.53 Recent examples of U

treaty withdrawals, including from the Mutual Defense 

Treaty with Taiwan, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, an

the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, demonstrate that treaties, although enjoying broader legitimacy and support than executive agreements, are not

necessarily permanent or binding on future presidents.

Administration officials have, at times, conveyed that

the White House’s intent is to seek Senate approval of 

a North Korea deal.54 However, the White House Office 

of Legal Counsel has also reportedly advised senators 

that ratification may not be necessary.55 In any case, US

Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has signaled in testimony 

before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that a deal

with North Korea would be submitted to the Senate as a 

treaty.56 Current Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell 

has expressed hope that any agreement with North Korea 

would take the form of a treaty.57 Meanwhile, the current 

Republican chairman of the Senate Foreign Relation

Committee, James Risch, has stated that the Senate will

assert its right to approve such an accord.58 Ultimately, the

White House will need to strike a balance between what 

is acceptable to the parties to an agreement, especially 

North Korea, and what is acceptable to Congress.

TERRITORIAL AND BORDER ISSUES

Replacing the Armistice Agreement will require t

resolution of thorny territorial and border disputes 

that have been potential flashpoints for a broader 

conflict on the Korean Peninsula. Under the Armistic

Agreement, the US-led UN Command maintains military control of five islands in the Yellow Sea off No

Korea’s southwest coast (the Northwest Islands).59

Although North Korea has not actively contested the

UN Command’s ongoing control over this territory,

it does claim ultimate sovereignty—as does South 

Korea—over the entire Korean Peninsula, which 

includes these islands. The elimination of the UN

Command and the armistice would present Pyongyang 

with an opportunity to revisit this issue and make it an 

agenda item in inter-Korean peace discussions.

Discussions about the Northwest Islands will have 

important implications for the volatile Northern Limit 

Line dispute. Shortly after the end of the Korean War, 

the UN Command unilaterally established the NLL as a

military control measure, setting a northern limit for UN

Command and South Korean vessels to avoid the potential of military clashes (see map 2). This line extends west 

from the Han River estuary through twelve coordinates

equidistant between the Northwest Islands and the North 

Korean coast and at least three nautical miles from the 

coast. Around 1973, North Korea began to contest the

NLL, with fishing boats and KPA vessels crossing the line

twenty to thirty times a year by the late 1970s, serious 

inter-Korean naval clashes occurring near Yeonpyeong

Island in 1999, 2002, and 2009, and the ROK corvette

Cheonan being sunk off Baengnyeong Island in 2010.6

For its part, South Korea argues that the NLL is a de facto 

maritime boundary in which North Korea acquiesced 

through its conduct until 1973.61 Although the NLL is

neither a part of the Armistice Agreement nor intende

to be an international maritime boundary, it has become 

“an effective means of separating ROK and DPRK militar

forces and preventing military tensions.”62

The NLL carries significant value for several reasons. 

From a security viewpoint, it allows the South Korean 

military to access and defend the Northwest Islands 

and monitor North Korean military installations on the 

coast. Shifting the NLL further south, on the other hand, 

would allow North Korean vessels to patrol closer to 

the Han River estuary and Seoul and prevent South

Korean ships from conducting surveillance close to the 

North Korean shore. For both countries, the maritime 

area around the NLL provides valuable fishing grounds 

and shipping routes to the Yellow Sea

Although Seoul has little present interest in adjusting

the NLL, significant progress in peace discussions could 

create political and legal momentum for adjudicating 

the territorial and maritime disputes. Currently, the two 

Koreas have outlined initial steps under the September 

2018 inter-Korean military agreement to reduce tensions 
USIP.ORG 27

Yellow Sea

(West Sea)

Kyonggi

Bay

Haeju

Bay

Yeonpyeongdo

NORTH KOREA

SOUTH

KOREA

INCHEON

INTERNATIONAL

AIRPORT

HAN RIVER ESTUARY

NEUTRAL ZONE

NORTHERN LIMIT LINE

NORTH KOREA-DECLARED

MILITARY DEMARCATION LINE

NORTHWEST ISLANDS

Kaesong

Panmunjom

Seosan

Munsan

Ongjin

Songang-ni

Changyon

Sinchon

Chaeryong

Sohae-ri

Haeju

Sariwon

Songnim

Hwangju

Nampo

0 10 MILES

0 10 KILOMETERS

Socheong

Daecheong

Baengnyeong

Incheon

Bucheon

Gimpo

SOUTH

KOREA

NORTH

KOREA

JAPAN

CHINA

AREA

ENLARGED

Map 2. Northern Limit Line

Artwork by Lucidity Information Desig
28 PEACEWO      NO.

near the NLL, including establishing a peace zone that 

prohibits all live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises 

and creating a pilot joint fishing zone between one of 

the Northwest Islands and the North Korean coast.63

However, any change in control over the Northwest 

Islands would affect the NLL.  final resolution of the

NLL and Northwest Islands issues could be reached as 

part of inter-Korean negotiations or through international 

arbitration under the framework of the UN Convention

on the Law of the Sea, which North Korea signed in 1982 

but has not ratified. The US-ROK Alliance will need 

determine the extent of US participation in settling these

issues given the UN Command’s role in establishing the

NLL and managing the Northwest Islands.

PEOPLE-TO-PEOPLE EXCHANGES

People-to-people engagements and initiatives—such as 

academic, cultural, sports, health, and humanitarianrelated exchanges—can over time help strengthen 

mutual trust under a peace regime and establish the 

new US-DPRK relations envisioned in the Singapor

agreement. Sustained lower-level contact may also 

help enhance broader domestic support for peace 

in each country and reinforce the political conditions 

conducive to progress on the diplomatic track. Previous 

examples of US exchanges with adversaries include

science diplomacy with the Soviet Union before the fall

of the Berlin Wall, ping-pong diplomacy that paved the

way for President Nixon to open relations with China, 

and more recently limited exchanges with Myanmar, 

Cuba, and Iran. At the height of the Six-Party Talks in

2008, the New York Philharmonic performed at the Eas

Pyongyang Grand Theater, the largest contingent of US

citizens in the country’s capital since the Korean War.64

Starting with the Obama administration and expanded under the Trump administration, the United States

has tied humanitarian exchanges to political progress 

with North Korea. Since September 2017, US bans on

American travel to North Korea (except for journalists,

humanitarian aid workers, and visits that advance US

national security interests) and North Korean travel 

to the United States have significantly restricted people-to-people exchanges. The restrictions came at the

height of the recent tensions between the two countries 

and were intended to reinforce the maximum pressure 

campaign against North Korea. The Trump administration 

imposed the US travel ban amid concerns about North

Korea’s arbitrary detentions following American student

Otto Warmbier’s death after falling into a coma while in 

North Korean custody and the detention of two other 

US citizens in the spring of 2017. Prior to the restriction,

an estimated eight hundred to a thousand Americans

visited North Korea each year.65 About two hundred U

citizens lived there.66 The ban on North Korean travel to 

the United States was implemented as part of a wider effort to protect US citizens from terrorist attacks.

However, that only a handful of North Korean officials 

and academics visited the United States each year led

some to question the purpose and impact of the order.68

People-to-people initiatives could help build mutual 

confidence leading up to, and as part of, a peace process. 

The 2018 Singapore agreement already emphasized a bilateral commitment to resume joint US-DPRK operations i

North Korea to recover the remains of US prisoners of war

and missing in action (POW/MIA) from the Korean War.6

One month after the Singapore Summit, North Korea 

handed over fifty-five boxes of presumed US remains,

but the effort was suspended after negotiations stalled at 

the February 2019 Hanoi summit. Another initiative some

activist groups advocate is family reunions for Americans

of Korean descent separated from relatives in North Korea 

after the Korean War. Although twenty-two official inter-Korean family reunions have been held since 1985, America

citizens have lacked a state-sponsored pathway to reunite 

with their family members in North Korea.70 Advocates

say as many as a hundred thousand Korean Americans

have relatives in North Korea who could be part of such 

a program.71 Last, the easing or termination of the travel 

bans to and from North Korea would open up a broader 

range of potential people-to-people exchanges, such as 

the participation of North Korean professionals in the State 

Department’s International Visitor Leadership Program, 
USIP.ORG 29

and the resumption of US congressional delegation visits7

to North Korea and US citizens teaching at the Pyongyang

University of Science and Technology.7

HUMAN RIGHTS

The North Korean regime’s status as one of the world’s 

worst human rights abusers poses a significant challenge for diplomatic normalization under a peace 

regime. US administrations have tended to segregate

human rights concerns because raising them could 

complicate and protract security-related negotiations. 

However, after many years of defector accounts and the 

2014 UN Commission of Inquiry’s conclusion of “systematic, widespread and gross human rights violations”

by the North Korean regime, many analysts argue that 

human rights must be an inextricable component of 

peace and denuclearization talks.74 Without progress on 

human rights, it could be politically difficult for two-thirds 

of US Senators to provide consent on a peace treaty.

Even with an executive agreement, various US law

with human rights provisions, such as the North Korea 

Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA), m

it legally difficult for the United States to grant the permanent sanctions relief necessary for a full normalization

of relations unless North Korea takes substantive steps 

to address its human rights violations.75

Human rights issues can be incorporated into the 

peace negotiation process in various ways. Initial, 

incremental steps on issues of humanitarian concern, 

such as allowing more reunions between families separated by the Korean War, particularly first-time reunions 

with Korean American families, could lend credibility to

North Korea’s commitment to an improved relationship 

with its neighbors and the United States under a peace

regime. Such measures would not bring about significant change in North Korea’s human rights situation 

but would indicate a commitment to establishing a new 

and closer relationship with the United States.

Next, any peace settlement should incorporate broad 

commitments to human rights principles that lay the 

groundwork for future discussions and reforms as well 

as the monitoring of human rights issues. This approach 

could follow the model of the 1975 Helsinki Accords,

which established the foundation for later reforms in 

Soviet Bloc states in Eastern Europe (see box 2). Certa

issues that North Korea has already agreed to address 

as part of the UN’s Universal Periodic Review proces

such as improving the rights of women and children and 

increasing access to food and health services, could be 

the basis for immediate cooperation.76

The commitments should address the concerns outlined in the NKSPEA and Commission of Inquiry, including accounting for and repatriating foreign abductee

and service member remains, allowing humanitarian 

aid workers greater access in North Korea, and improving living conditions in the political prison camps that 

house those considered disloyal to the regime. Greater 

North Korean willingness to engage with the UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Specia

Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in North

Korea, and a US special envoy for North Korean human

rights would help build congressional support for normalizing ties with Pyongyang. In this regard, the White 

House should appoint a human rights envoy immediately—a position vacant since January 2017—to begin 

coordinating the integration of human rights measures 

into efforts toward a peace regime. 

Getting Pyongyang to engage on human rights, which 

it perceives as an indirect attempt to pursue regime 

collapse, will not be easy. Beijing would also have no

interest in backing an incremental human rights agenda. Washington needs to demonstrate how human 

rights progress can strengthen regime security and 

improve US-DPRK relations, including greater offer

of humanitarian assistance, partial sanctions relief, 

and a tangible pathway to diplomatic normalization. 

At the same time, experience indicates that North

Korea responds to public shaming. In response to the 

Commission of Inquiry, the regime issued its own report 

defending its human rights practices, acknowledged 
30 PEACEWO      NO.

some multilateral recommendations from the Universal

Periodic Review process more sincerely, and enhanced

its senior-level diplomatic engagements on human 

rights, including the first visit by a North Korean foreign 

minister to the UN General Assembly in fifteen years.

In the long run, the United States will seek broad

reforms to North Korea’s political system, including 

dismantlement of the prison camp system and the 

songbun social classification system, as well as greater 

access to outside information and decriminalization of 

“hostile” information. However, because these types 

of measures are the most sensitive for North Korea, 

Washington will need to calibrate how it broaches and 

seeks implementation of these reforms.

THE HELSINKI ACCORDS

The 1975 Helsinki Accords—an agreement, signed by thirty-five states representing the rival Eastern and Western blocs 

of the Cold War, that introduced the concept of universal human rights as a basis for relations between states—may 

prove a useful model for how the United States can address human rights issues in a Korean Peninsula peace regime. 

Through the accords, Europe and the United States secured the Soviet Union’s agreement to a number of human rights 

provisions as part of a broader deal that allowed Moscow to consolidate its control over Eastern Europe and receive 

economic trade benefits from the West. The first basket of the accords included ten principles to guide relations between 

participating states, including Article VII, which stated that “the participating States recognize the universal significance 

of human rights and fundamental freedoms” such as freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief. The third basket 

related to improving humanitarian concerns such as family reunification, marriages, travel, people-to-people exchanges, 

working conditions for journalists, information access, and cultural exchanges.

At the time of signing, the Soviet Union’s leadership recognized the risks posed by international human rights norms but believed that the Helsinki principles of sovereignty and non-intervention would let Warsaw Pact members, as “masters in our 

own house,” neglect compliance with Helsinki norms.a Over time, however, the provisions proved to be effective in securing 

improvements in human rights after activists in the Soviet Union and Europe set up monitoring groups to track and draw 

international attention to violations of the accords, and a process was introduced to review Helsinki implementation.b

Pyongyang will likely be averse to a Helsinki-type framework, viewing it as a Trojan horse. But much like the Soviet Union, 

the leadership may regard commitments as unenforceable and thus a small price to pay for receiving desired benefits and 

being seen as a more responsible international actor. As difficult as it is to envisage at the moment, over time, circumstances could develop that lead to greater adherence to universal human rights standards in North Korea.

Notes

a. Daniel C. Thomas, The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the Demise of Communism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, September 1, 2001), 93.

b. US Department of State, Office of the Historian, "Helsinki Final Act, 1975," https://history.state.gov/milestones/1969-1976/helsinki.

Box 2.
USIP.ORG 31

Security and Military Issues

To be robust and durable, diplomatic agreements 

enshrining peace need to be accompanied by tangible 

measures that reduce military tensions and enhance 

mutual security. One of the greatest challenges for a 

peace regime on the Korean Peninsula will be crafting 

measures that can address the seventy years of mistrust 

between North Korea and the US-ROK Alliance as we

as the security concerns of major regional stakeholders. 

The process will also raise difficult and larger questions 

about the future of the Alliance, the strategic orientation

of North and South Korea, the role of the United States

and China on the Korean Peninsula, and the overall 

security framework for the Northeast Asian region

SECURITY GUARANTEES

A permanent peace settlement will require mutual security

guarantees among the two Koreas, the United States, and

China. Security guarantees could come in the form of both 

negative security assurances (promising not to attack) and 

positive ones (promising to protect from attack by others). 

Over three decades of negotiations, the United States

has extended negative security guarantees to North 

Korea numerous times. In the 1994 Agreed Framework,

Washington expressed intent to provide “formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.” It took an additional step in the September 2005

Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks by “affirm[ing] that 

it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula and 

has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.” In this statement, the RO

also “reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy 

nuclear weapons . . . while affirming that there exist no 

nuclear weapons within its territory.”78 Most recently, the 

Singapore Statement underscored that “President Trump 

committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK.”7

Despite these instances, the United States will need

to reaffirm explicitly through a formal agreement 

its commitment not to attack North Korea using either conventional or nuclear weapons. Washington 

could also argue that once relations have improved, 

the presence of a sizable number of US civilians in

Pyongyang, including diplomats, aid workers, business 

people, academics, and tourists, would help reinforce 

the security guarantee. Likewise, North Korea would 

need to forswear all threats and aggression against 

South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Russia ha

also identified the possibility of developing a “system 

of international security guarantees for North Korea,” 

perhaps a continuation of the Six-Party Talks proposal 

for a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism.8

Analysts have pointed out, however, that multilateral

security guarantees do not have great track records.81

An end-of-war declaration could further strengthen the

credibility of mutual security guarantees. The Moon 

administration as well as some analysts have argued 

that declaring an end to the Korean War could send an 

encouraging signal to North Korea about US intentions,

help Kim Jong Un counter hard-liners at home, and

boost momentum for ongoing negotiations.82 Other experts, however, have warned against such a declaration, 

arguing that it would be premature without greater North 

Korean concessions and could unravel the rationale and 

support for a US military presence on the Peninsula.8

President Trump reportedly promised Chairman Kim 

that he would sign an end-of-war declaration soon after 

their meeting in Singapore, but this debate continued 

to play out within the US government.84 Washington

apparently decided to put a joint end-of-war declaration 

on the table at the February 2019 Hanoi summit, but 

it was sidelined when the two sides could not agree 
32 PEACEWO      NO.

on denuclearization and sanctions relief measures.85

Even if a declaration is made, Washington and Seoul

should stress that existing arrangements that ensure 

security, such as the Armistice Agreement, the Militar

Demarcation Line, and the UN Command, will remain in

place until a formal peace agreement is reached.

Analysts have also pointed out that beyond just promises of nonaggression, Kim Jong Un seeks his regime’

guaranteed security.86 Setting aside that Congress would 

never support the idea of protecting the Kim regime, it is 

unclear how the United States would extend such a guarantee, other than vowing not to intervene in the face of

internal unrest in North Korea or pledging to ensure Kim’s 

personal safety in the event of a coup. One measure of 

reassurance, which does not cross the line into regime 

support, could be for Washington to underscore the political and symbolic value of official US recognition of the

DPRK and normalization of relations. Washington could

argue that the political legitimacy and economic development that flows from diplomatic normalization would help 

prevent domestic instability in North Korea. 

Ultimately, security guarantees are necessary but not sufficient measures for the establishment of a peace regime

on the Korean Peninsula. Oral and written guarantees 

are only the first step in a longer process and need to be 

substantiated through further discussions and tangible actions that reduce military tensions and build confidence.

CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES

Concrete measures by both sides that reduce military 

tensions, the likelihood of conflict, and the potential for 

miscommunication can strengthen mutual confidence 

in security guarantees.

Military Exercises

Cancellation of major US-ROK military exercises, whic

North Korea views as rehearsals for invasion, has sometimes served as a confidence-building measure during 

periods of diplomacy. The suspension of the massive 

spring field training exercise Team Spirit in January 

1992, in conjunction with the US withdrawal of its tactical

nuclear weapons from South Korea and the granting of a 

high-level US-DPRK meeting, led directly to Pyongyan

ratifying an International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards agreement. North Korea had dragged its fe

on that agreement since signing the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty in 1985. Similar cancellations in 1994, 

1995, and 1996 maintained the diplomatic space that 

allowed the Agreed Framework to be signed in October

1994 and remain in effect throughout the 1990s. More recently, President Trump’s unilateral decision at the June 

2018 Singapore Summit to suspend the fall command 

post exercise—although problematic from an Alliance

coordination perspective—likely helped ensure a 

positive summit outcome as well as confirm that a “dual 

freeze” was in effect. Conversely, the Alliance decision

to modify rather than suspend the major 2019 spring 

and fall exercises provided a basis for North Korea to 

pull back from working-level negotiations and conduct 

several short-range ballistic missile tests in response.87

Experts at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies, however, have found Alliance military exercises

to have no effect on US-North Korea relations (the state

of relations prior to the exercises were the primary determinant of North Korean behavior after them).88

If negotiations advance, the US-ROK Alliance will ne

to consider the role of military exercises in the peacebuilding process as well as in a future security environment. Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang should have 

a clear understanding that all militaries, including their 

own, conduct exercises for training and readiness purposes. The question is the extent to which military exercises should and can be adjusted to build trust under 

a peace regime while preserving necessary defense 

and deterrence objectives. US military officials have asserted that though a reduction in exercises can cause

slight degradations to military readiness, the diplomatic 

leverage or traction that comes from such adjustments 

may make this trade-off a prudent risk.89 Other analysts 

warn, however, that long-term cancellations and modifications could have a more severe impact.90
USIP.ORG 33

Scaling back major exercises remains a potential, 

though limited, option for reducing tensions and 

building trust. Further efforts to alter the current Dong 

Maeng exercise series may be difficult given that 

they are already reduced versions of the former Key 

Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardi

exercises. In addition, the exercises need to be comprehensive enough to test the operational and mission 

capabilities of the South Korean military, a requirement 

for giving Seoul wartime operational control of its 

troops by the Moon administration’s goal of 2022. As

the peace process unfolds over time, however, exercises could be modified to train for less threatening 

objectives, such as humanitarian assistance and search 

and rescue, or reduced in scope and size and moved 

off the Peninsula to be less threatening to Pyongyang. 

The potential transition of wartime operational control, 

which includes establishing a future combined command structure with a South Korean four-star general 

as the commander, would also give Seoul greater 

authority and confidence to shape the exercises. And

though Pyongyang should not have a vote in Alliance

matters, having discussions with the Korean People’s 

Army through the North-South joint military committee

could help clarify tension reduction measures, including reciprocal modifications to the KPA’s winter and

summer training cycles.

US Military Presence 

The potential for improved US-DPRK relations an

an eventual peace agreement would raise important 

questions about the future of the US military presence

on the Korean Peninsula. Currently, the United States

stations approximately 28,500 troops in South Korea, 

concentrated in two major hubs: Camp Humphreys, 

which is the largest US military base overseas and

located fifty-five miles south of Seoul in Pyeongtaek, 

and a constellation of bases around the southeastern 

city of Daegu. This forward-deployed presence reflects 

not only the US treaty commitment to defend its ally but

also the broader goals of projecting power and serving 

a stabilizing function in the region. 

US-ROK COMBINED

MILITARY EXERCISES

US-ROK combined military exercises play a pivotal role in maintaining peace and stability on the 

Korean Peninsula. Since 1955, the two countries’ 

militaries have conducted them to maintain military 

readiness, test command and control capabilities, 

strengthen interoperability, and train for a range of 

contingency operations, including defending South 

Korea against North Korean aggression.a These 

exercises also serve a signaling function, demonstrating Alliance resolve and military superiority 

to help deter, or at least minimize, North Korean 

adventurism. The scope, size, and function of these 

exercises, which number in the dozens annually 

and range from computer-assisted, command post 

exercises to tactical-level, field training exercises, 

have evolved over the years depending on the security environment. Typically, two major combined 

exercises occur each year during the spring and fall.

Notes

a. Robert Collins, “A Brief History of the US-ROK Combined 

Military Exercises,” 38 North, February 26, 2014,

www.38north.org/2014/02/rcollins022714.

US and South Korean soldiers cross the Namhan River during 

May 2013 joint military exercise in Yeoncheon near the border

with North Korea. (Photo by Ahn Young-joon/

Box 3.
34 PEACEWO      NO.

If negotiations progress toward a peace agreement, the 

US and South Korean governments could face external

and internal pressure to review and justify continuing 

US troop presence. As discussed, North Korea an

China may call for the outright withdrawal of US troops

from South Korea or at least a significant reduction in 

size and a reorientation toward peacekeeping and 

stability.91 According to a 2018 survey, 74 percent of

Americans support maintaining long-term bases in

South Korea, but a significant number also support a 

partial (54 percent) or complete (18 percent) withdrawal 

of troops if denuclearization occurs.92 In South Korea, 

views will likely diverge along liberal and conservative 

fault lines. It is conceivable, however, that if inter-Korean 

relations advance rapidly, the rationale for allowing and 

providing funding for US troops and bases on Korean

territory could be questioned, and South Korea could 

ask the US troops to leave, revise its presence, or

remain only on a rotational basis. According to recent

survey results, a majority of the South Korean public 

supports US troop presence (67.7 percent) but between

2013 and 2017 this number has trended downward from 

an average of more than 75 percent.93 The support 

drops to 43.5 percent in a post-unification scenario, and 

could further dip during periods of anti-Americanism.9

The current situation has been complicated by 

President Trump’s own criticism of the US military presence in South Korea. Since before taking office, he has

talked about withdrawing large numbers of troops from 

the Korean Peninsula. Prior to the June 2018 summit, he 

reportedly ordered the Pentagon to review options for 

drawing down US troops in South Korea.95 Fearing the

potential for arbitrary reductions in US troop presence,

Congress restricted the president’s ability to cut troops 

below current levels unless the secretary of defense 

first certifies that the reduction is in the national security 

interests of the United States and its allies and that

Washington has appropriately consulted with allies.96

The US and ROK defense establishments should begi

discussions about how the size, posture, and role of 

the US military in South Korea might change depending

on future scenarios and threat environments. US troop

presence on the Peninsula has constantly adapted to the 

political, strategic, and military needs of the times, from 

more than seventy thousand troops immediately after the 

Korean War to thirty-eight thousand in the 1990s to the 

current 28,500.97 Some experts believe that the current 

force posture is warranted given the prevailing goals of 

deterrence and reassurance, but believe Alliance discussions about future modifications could be helpful.98 Others

go a step further to suggest signaling to China and North 

Korea that future force levels could be calibrated commensurate with the severity of the North Korean threat.99

If this threat is diminished, various levels of US troop

deployments and US-ROK security arrangements coul

be employed, including nonpermanent, base access 

agreements (similar to the ones used with the Philippines 

and Australia) or a reduced posture oriented toward expeditionary, disaster relief, and humanitarian operations.10

Some US analysts even argue for modifying the force

structure today, either because a significant US presence

is no longer necessary given the readiness of the South 

Korean military or because deterrence against a nuclear 

North Korea requires a different approach than against a 

larger or a nuclear-armed adversary.101

Opinions will be split within the United States, particularly within the broader debate between those who

seek a more restrained foreign policy and a smaller 

global military footprint and those who value US power

projection capabilities and general military engagement 

around the world. However, reexamining the rationale 

If negotiations progress toward a peace agreement, the US and South Korean governments could face 

pressure to review and justify continuing US troop presence: North Korea and China may call for the 

outright withdrawal of US troops or at least a significant reduction in size and a reorientation toward 

peacekeeping and stability.
USIP.ORG 35

for the current disposition of US troops in South Korea

and the appropriate force posture for addressing specific missions can help shift the conversation away from a 

simplistic, all-or-none, stay-or-withdraw framework to a 

more nuanced and effective prescription tailored toward 

the current and future security environment.

Conventional Force Reductions

Reducing the size and scope of conventional military

forces on both sides of the Military Demarcation Line 

could help lower the potential for sudden, large-scale 

conflict and build confidence toward a permanent 

peace. North Korea has the fourth-largest military in the 

world (1.2 million serving as active-duty personnel), with 

a significant portion of its ground, naval, and air forces 

forward-deployed near the DMZ.102 Although undergoing

defense reform that will reduce its military personnel to 

a half a million troops by 2025, South Korea maintains 

a combined defense posture with US forces and fields

more advanced military weapons, technology, and systems to achieve its defense and deterrence objectives.103

The two Koreas already outlined an approach to reducing military confrontation in the 1991 Basic Agreement

They agreed to resolve disputes peacefully through 

dialogue and negotiation, not use force against each 

other, and create an inter-Korean joint military commission to further identify and implement measures 

to decrease military tensions. These steps included 

discussions of major movements of military units and 

major military exercises, the peaceful use of the DMZ, 

exchanges of military personnel and information, 

phased reductions in armaments and attack capabilities, and verification measures.

Although the 1991 measures were not implemented,

they provided a foundation for subsequent progress on 

tension reduction achieved under the September 2018 

Comprehensive Military Agreement.104 Within months of

this accord, the two Koreas enacted a range of actions to 

minimize conflict along the DMZ and in the Yellow Sea.

These steps included ceasing all live-fire artillery and field 

training drills near the Military Demarcation Line, withdrawing guard posts within the DMZ, demilitarizing the Joint 

Security Area in Panmunjom (including land mine and firearms removal), establishing no-fly zones along the MDL,

halting live-fire and maritime maneuver exercises in West 

and East Sea buffer zones, and adopting revised operational procedures to avoid accidental military clashes

Both in the course of peace negotiations and once a

treaty is signed, the United States and the two Koreas

could engage in additional, phased confidence-building 

measures to increase transparency, restrict operations, 

and reduce conventional arms. Although Washington

has never officially discussed which conventional force 

reduction measures would be appropriate as part of a 

peace agreement, analysts have pointed to the approach 

taken by the Conference on Security and Co-operation 

in Europe (now the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) under Vienna Document 1990 an

the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE).

This path would include confidence- and security-building 

measures that provide greater transparency and information sharing on military activities, organization, and plans 

(such as notification of major military activities; exchange 

of information on defense policy, manpower, and major 

conventional weapons and equipment systems; reciprocal 

observer visits to bases and exercises; and so on) and 

restrict peacetime operations and exercises (withdrawing 

North and South Korean artillery back from their forward 

positions, for example).106 In addition, the two sides could 

adopt the CFE focus on eliminating or reducing major

weapons and equipment (such as attack helicopters, 

heavy artillery, combat aircraft, or tanks) to decrease the 

possibility of large-scale, surprise attacks.107

These security-related discussions should occur through 

direct military-to-military engagement with North Korea, 

primarily through the inter-Korean joint military committee. 

In addition, establishing a senior-level, policy-oriented 

dialogue between the Defense Department and the 

KPA—rather than just revitalizing the defunct colonel- and

flag officer–level discussions that occurred intermittently 
36 PEACEWO      NO.

through the Military Armistice Commission at the DMZ during the 1990s and 2000s—would also provide a regular

forum for addressing strategic tension reduction measures, enhancing communication and transparency, and 

preventing miscalculations and accidents that could escalate into larger conflict.108  dialogue with the North Korean

military could also help build a relationship with one of the 

most powerful constituencies within the regime, enhance 

its buy-in to the peace regime process, and strengthen US

understanding of its interests and motivations. 

US-ROK Alliance

The United States and South Korea will decide the

future of the Alliance on a bilateral basis, regardless

of North Korean, Russian, and Chinese interests. Still,

a potential peace regime raises difficult questions 

for policymakers in Washington and Seoul about the 

Alliance’s role and scope. Although the 1953 US-

Mutual Defense Treaty never mentions North Korea 

and only declares a “common determination to defend 

themselves against external armed attack,” the Alliance

has existed primarily to deter North Korean aggression 

and ensure South Korean and regional security.109 

peace process that ostensibly promises to resolve 

North Korean threats and aggression could undermine 

a significant part of the rationale for the Alliance and the

US troop presence. More immediately, as a part of the

negotiations, North Korea may demand concessions 

that detract from military readiness and deterrence. 

Those could include reductions in US troop presence,

an end to US extended deterrence, and limitations on

nuclear and strategic asset deployments to the area. 

Washington and Seoul have argued that since its founding, the Alliance has grown global in nature, beyond the

North Korean threat. The two countries have worked 

South Korean Defense Minister Jeong Kyeong-doo, left, greets US Defense Secretary Mike Esper as he arrives at the Security Consultative Meetin

in Seoul on November 15, 2019. (Photo by Lee Jin-man/AP
USIP.ORG 37

together under the Alliance framework to address the

common interests of human rights, democracy, a market 

economy, and trade liberalization while tackling shared 

threats such as terrorism, climate change, piracy, and 

epidemic disease.110 Alliance supporters in Washington

and Seoul would take a skeptical view of any moves 

within a peace process that weaken the legal or political underpinnings for the US-ROK Alliance, encoura

Alliance “decoupling” overall, or degrade readiness and

deterrence while a threat still exists. Another argument

for continuing the Alliance even after denuclearization

would be that Pyongyang’s conventional weapons, 

even if reduced considerably as part of an agreement, 

still pose a threat to Seoul’s security.

In addition, Washington and Seoul would need to consider how a peace regime would affect the US strategic

position in Northeast Asia, which is built on a framework

of strong regional alliances. US policymakers believe that

the American-led order in Asia provides the foundatio

for peace, stability, and economic growth in the region, 

including for South Korea.111  peace regime necessarily

means revising existing security arrangements and may 

therefore be greeted by some camps with skepticism. 

If the threat from North Korea eases through a peace 

regime, US regional strategy will require a reassessment,

including whether the US-ROK Alliance should reorie

toward balancing Chinese power in Northeast Asia and

the Indo-Pacific region overall. In this regard, the recent 

bilateral effort to examine a forward-looking joint vision 

for the Alliance in light of dynamic changes in the security environment are encouraging.11

Long-Term Regional Security Architecture

A comprehensive Korean peace agreement would likely

transform the status quo security environment in the 

region. The two Koreas and the other major regional 

stakeholders should therefore begin discussions on a 

regional security mechanism (or a series of mechanisms) 

that can serve as a venue for discussing, implementing, and monitoring various multilateral aspects of the 

peace regime as well as building mutual confidence and 

regional peace and stability. This mechanism could address Peninsula-specific issues, from tracking progress 

on denuclearization to coordinating actions to facilitate 

North Korea’s integration into the regional economy, as 

well as help mitigate some of the conflicting security interests in the region by functioning as a venue for frank 

dialogue and confidence-building exchanges. Further, 

such a mechanism could later potentially be broadened to address other regional issues, from managing 

outstanding territorial disputes in the East China Sea to

coordinating efforts on transregional issues.

Creating such a regional security mechanism will be no 

easy task given the existing rivalries, mistrust, and historical grievances in the region. The closest analogue, 

the Six-Party Talks, ended without success and not all 

parties are willing to revive it at this juncture.  Northeast

Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (one of the proposals from the Six-Party Talks) that focuses more on regional peace and stability could avoid some of the resistance. Significant bilateral and four-party progress toward

a peace deal on the Korean Peninsula could serve as 

an impetus for the major stakeholders to explore the 

creation of such a mechanism, and a mechanism with 

mutual backing would in turn serve as a valuable asset 

for ensuring continued progress on peace.

Denuclearization

A sustainable peace regime will depend heavily on a

common understanding about what is included under 

the definition of denuclearization. Debating the term 

goes beyond semantics. Instead, agonizing over the 

meaning of denuclearization is a proxy for negotiating 

the fundamental trade-offs inherent in a deal. The areas 

of disagreement relate to the substantive, geographic, 

and temporal scope of denuclearization, as well as 

whether the term includes nonnuclear weapons.

Regarding denuclearization’s scope inside North Korea

itself, each party has its own view on which capabilities 

would be restricted or eliminated. Assembled nuclear

devices would clearly fall under this rubric, as would 
38 PEACEWO      NO.

stockpiles of weapons-grade fissile material that could 

be used to make bombs. However, including a range of 

other capabilities is less clear. For example, negotiators 

would need to determine which categories of ballistic 

missiles would be regulated. They would also need 

to agree on whether Pyongyang could retain a civilian 

nuclear or space program that uses dual-use technologies. Cooperative threat reduction measures related 

to the disposition of nuclear expertise and records as 

well as the transition of nuclear scientists to civilian 

programs could fall under the denuclearization definition as well.113 Moreover, an intrusive monitoring and 

verification mechanism would be needed to ensure 

compliance with those commitments. 

Beyond North Korean territory, definitions of denuclearization proposed by North Korea, China, and Russi

and recognized in principle by South Korea—broaden 

the geographic scope to include the entire Korean 

Peninsula. Accepting a broader scope could mean restrictions on South Korean and US activities, includin

agreeing not to station, rotate, or deploy nuclear-capable platforms such as B-52 bombers in South Korea.

North Korea has even demanded the withdrawal of US

troops that hold the authority to use nuclear weapons 

from South Korea.114 In addition, Pyongyang would likely 

expect Seoul (and Tokyo) to reaffirm its commitment not 

to develop or acquire nuclear weapons in the future.115

North Korea may also take issue with the US extended

deterrence commitments to South Korea. Although

Pyongyang has long called on Washington to remove 

US strategic assets from the Korean Peninsula, it has

not explicitly stated that the United States must retract

its nuclear umbrella over the ROK, which suggests

some flexibility in North Korea’s position.

Three post-peace regime possibilities exist regarding the 

US nuclear umbrella: retract, extend, or remain. Some

experts have advocated the first scenario, envisioning a 

Korean Peninsula as a nuclear-free zone with guarantees 

from all P5 states never to use a nuclear weapon against 

the Peninsula.116 Others have cautioned that such developments, without verification of denuclearization, would 

only play into North Korea’s hands, enabling it to forcibly 

unify the Korean Peninsula or otherwise coerce South 

Korea.117 Furthermore, such a decision would have broader implications for other US alliances and could raise

questions about US extended deterrence commitments.

Theoretically, the two Koreas could seek the extension of the US nuclear umbrella over the entire Korean

Peninsula as well as North Korea’s tacit affiliation with 

the US-ROK Alliance, given the concerns about China

growing influence in the region. Such an alternative security arrangement is not implausible considering North 

Korea’s deep distrust of China, but it would face fierce 

opposition from Beijing.

An arrangement could also be made for the US nuclea

umbrella to remain over South Korea, and for China and 

Russia (or both) to extend nuclear umbrellas over North

Korea. China, despite growing signs of a more ambitious 

regional role, has never extended such guarantees to 

any other state and has generally eschewed playing 

the role of a traditional great power security provider. 

Furthermore, Washington, Seoul, and Pyongyang itself 

would oppose expanding Chinese or Russian security

roles on the Korean Peninsula. At the conventional level,

it is unclear where Pyongyang stands on US extended

deterrence guarantees that are backed by nonnuclear 

strike and missile defense capabilities.

At times, North Korea has expanded its conception of

denuclearization beyond the Peninsula to include military 

assets stationed throughout East Asia, such as those o

Japan and Guam.118 Accepting a region-wide geographic scope for denuclearization would create a dilemma

for the United States for a variety of reasons, foremost

because those forces serve essential missions beyond 

deterring North Korea. Even if the United States remove

nuclear-capable assets from all of East Asia, its change

posture would provide only symbolic security reassurances. All three legs of the US nuclear triad—intercontinenta
USIP.ORG 39

ballistic missiles, submarines, and bombers—can reach 

North Korea from the continental United States. Refrainin

from basing nuclear forces in East Asia places only minimal operational constraints on US nuclear forces. In oth

words, if the US nuclear “threat” to North Korea is based

on capabilities rather than intent, the only way to make 

Pyongyang invulnerable is total US disarmament. To be

sure, the symbolism of security guarantees can still be 

meaningful, but only as indicators of benign intent.

Washington and Pyongyang also disagree on the time 

span of denuclearization. Chairman Kim called for the two 

countries to take “phased and synchronous measures” to 

“eventually achieve denuclearization and lasting peace 

on the peninsula,” reflecting a desire for a protracted, 

incremental process.119 Washington initially envisioned an 

accelerated time frame for denuclearization but lowered 

its expectations after the failed Hanoi meeting.120

Developing a common understanding about which 

types of nonnuclear assets fit under the denuclearization 

definition may be another variable in negotiations. North 

Korea has called for an end to the deployment of US

conventional “strategic assets” on or near the Peninsula 

that could defeat its air defense systems and conduct 

regime “decapitation” operations intended to take out 

the leadership (such as F-35 and F-22 stealth fighters 

and B1-B bombers).121 The regime has also complaine

about South Korea’s taking possession of US-made

F-35 stealth fighters. For its part, the United States has

at times interpreted denuclearization to include North 

Korea giving up all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 

including chemical and biological weapons.122

A compromise working definition of denuclearization

could leave out nonnuclear capabilities. The United

States would need to address North Korean chemical 

and biological weapons later; North Korea would have 

to accept highly capable conventional weapons being 

stationed on and around South Korea. Choosing this approach would allow the denuclearization process to begin with a relatively narrow scope and be expanded over 

time. Some analysts have argued that, rather than getting 

mired in defining denuclearization up front, it is more 

important to focus immediately on achieving tangible 

security benefits and beginning the confidence-building 

process123 Yet if a near-term definition is necessary, one

of the existing definitions from the 1992 Joint North-South 

Declaration or the 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party 

Talks could be used as a starting point.

Dismantlement and Verification

US policymakers have set a high bar for the end-state

they want to achieve for North Korea’s nuclear program: complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement. 

This concept dates back to the early 2000s and is codified into UNSCR 1718.124 Trump administration official

use “final, fully verified denuclearization” as an alternative phrasing for the same goal. Achieving it will require

a phased, step-by-step process. The sheer scope of 

North Korea’s nuclear program and the regime’s unwillingness to make security concessions until greater trust 

is established demands as much.

Experts generally agree that the first step in the dismantlement process is freezing and capping North Korea’s

nuclear and ballistic missile activities.125 Although the

regime has demonstrated a significant level of nuclear weapons development and testing, it has yet to 

demonstrate a fully integrated and reliable capability. 

Implementing a freeze on further nuclear and missile 

activities—including nuclear tests, fissile material production, long-range missile and solid-fuel rocket tests, and 

weapons export and proliferation, would halt the most 

concerning aspects of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Once a freeze is implemented, the next phase would 

seek to roll back and then completely dismantle North 

US policymakers have set a high bar for the end-state they want to achieve for North Korea’s nuclear 

program: complete, verifiable, irreversible dismantlement.
40 PEACEWO      NO.

Korea’s nuclear weapons facilities and programs. This 

goal would address two major categories of activities. 

The first is dismantling and removing North Korea’s existing arsenal of nuclear devices, ready-made component parts that can be assembled into nuclear devices, 

and stockpiles of fissile material. North Korean nuclear 

technicians could potentially dismantle some or all of 

those weapons with the appropriate monitoring. P5 

countries could provide related technical support.

The second area is neutralizing North Korea’s nuclear 

infrastructure and ways of operating a nuclear weapons 

program. Major capabilities to be destroyed would include 

Pyongyang’s declared and undeclared facilities that produce weapons-grade fissile material, mine and mill such 

material, assemble nuclear weapons, and build certain 

ballistic missiles. Finding alternative employment for the 

scientists and engineers who build and operate these 

weapons would also have to be taken into consideration. 

Addressing North Korea’s remaining nuclear infrastructure would pose a more technically difficult challenge

because some would fall under dual-use provisions (such 

as supporting a civilian nuclear or space program). Other 

facilities may build types of weapons that may fall outside 

the restrictions of a denuclearization agreement (such as 

short- and medium-range conventional ballistic missiles). 

Because of their dual-use roles, many facilities would have

to be continuously monitored rather than destroyed. 

Monitoring and verification are perhaps the greatest 

challenges in the dismantlement process. During 

the Six-Party Talks, an inability to agree on a written 

verification procedure for North Korea’s declared 

nuclear activities and stockpiles led to the demise of 

the negotiations. The significant growth of the country’s nuclear program since then has exacerbated the 

verification problem. The main issue is that verification 

with a 100 percent level of certainty across the entirety 

of North Korea’s nuclear program would be extremely 

difficult, if not impossible, given the resources required 

to conduct monitoring and verification and the access 

constraints that the regime would likely impose. North 

Korea also maintains an extensive network of covert 

and underground facilities, tunnels, and sites that can 

be used to hide activities and materials. 

Nevertheless, an extensive and stringent verification 

and monitoring regime will be necessary to enforce any 

agreement, keep tabs on North Korea’s denuclearization 

progress, and prevent any backsliding or reconstitution.126 Verification activities could potentially start small 

and ramp up over time in coordination with political progress on both sides toward a peace regime.127 One option might be to accept as a first step dismantlement and 

removal of major components of North Korea’s nuclear 

arsenal (that is, steps that undeniably reduce its arsenal 

or reduce its production capabilities) in lieu of transparency on the entire nuclear and missile complex. Experts

have proposed a “probabilistic” approach to comprehensive verification to supplement traditional verification of major objects or activities. This approach would 

subject a wider, though not exhaustive, list of items and 

activities for monitoring, each of which by itself could 

have a low probability of detection but in the aggregate 

would provide a higher monitoring confidence.128

Eventually, North Korea would need to provide a full

declaration of its nuclear and missile complex to enable 

verification and monitoring of Pyongyang’s compliance 

with any agreements. Over time, the United States and

the international community would expect North Korea 

to adhere to robust safeguards, including by negotiating 

an Additional Protocol agreement with the International

Atomic Energy Agency.129 Pyongyang would also need 

join or return to compliance with several relevant treaties, 

including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 

Weapons, which it withdrew from in January 2003; the 

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and the Missile

Technology Control Regime. The technically complex

process of verification will take many years to complete, 

and each side will require both political commitments 

and concrete actions early in the process to sustain the 

political momentum and diplomatic credibility required 

for adhering to the process until completion. Creating the 
USIP.ORG 41

necessary trust this process requires can best be accomplished by steps in parallel toward a peace regime.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

As noted, the United States has at times interprete

denuclearization to include North Korea giving up all 

weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and 

biological weapons. During the February 2019 Hanoi 

summit, President Trump reportedly handed Chairman 

Kim a document that called for fully dismantling not just 

North Korea’s nuclear infrastructure but also its chemical and biological warfare program.130

North Korea is party to the Biological and Toxin Weapons

Convention and the Geneva Protocol, but not to the 

Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The government 

denies having biological or chemical weapons, but the 

United States and others worry that the Kim regime

could turn to these weapons as a cheaper alternative or 

complement to its burgeoning nuclear capability.

North Korea is believed to have an indigenous capability to develop chemical weapons, as well as the world’s 

third-largest stockpile, and an estimated 2,500 to 5,000 

metric tons of chemical weapons agents. Concerns about 

Pyongyang’s willingness to use them were heightened in 

February 2017 when Kim Jong Un’s half-brother Kim Jong

Nam died from exposure to the VX nerve agent in the 

Kuala Lumpur airport. Pyongyang denied responsibility for 

the murder, but Washington imposed additional sanctions 

on North Korea in response to the incident.

North Korea can indigenously cultivate many types of 

biological agents, including anthrax and smallpox, and 

produce biological weapons in various dual-use facilities.131 Little data exist to confirm the existence and size 

of potential stockpiles, but signs indicate that Kim may 

be reviving efforts to weaponize and deliver the agents. 

According to former Pentagon official Andrew Weber

“North Korea is far more likely to use biological weapons 

than nuclear ones.”132 Still, experts warn against exaggerating North Korea’s capabilities in the absence of 

reliable evidence. Most information comes from defectors, and the US government has been increasingly

cautious in its estimates of North Korea’s capabilities.133

To address these risks, a peace agreement might 

include a no-first-use pledge on biological and chemical 

weapons, as well as a requirement that North Korea join 

the CWC. The parties should also identify additional confidence-building measures, such as technical exchanges 

among scientists or medical personnel, and mechanisms 

for improved transparency and monitoring.

United Nations Command

The UN Command has played both a stabilizing and controversial role on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean

War. In July 1950, the Security Council authorized a US-led

unified command of multilateral forces to repel North 

Korean aggression. Throughout the next two decades, the 

UN Command maintained nominal responsibility for South

Korea’s defense. However, the majority of the fifteen 

sending states, which made up only 4 percent of the total 

UN Command forces at peak strength in 1953, withdrew

most of their troops by 1956, and the defense mission was 

fulfilled by ROK and US forces.134 The UN Command’s ro

diminished further with the establishment of a US-RO

Combined Forces Command in 1978. Today, in the absence of active hostilities and an adequate distinction between its role and Alliance functions, the UN Command’

existence engenders ongoing dispute.

For the United States and its allies, the UN Comman

continues to serve important functions related to peacekeeping, multilateral cooperation, and contingency 

readiness. It helps enforce the Armistice Agreemen

and maintain communications with the Korean People’s 

Army through its participation in the Military Armistic

Commission.135 The UN Command would also serve as a

force provider in the case of a contingency on the Korean 

Peninsula. Its subordinate command, UN Command-Rear

has nominal authority over seven rear bases in Japan, 

which provide administrative and logistics support, 

allow multilateral forces to conduct missions (such as 
42 PEACEWO      NO.

monitoring and preventing North Korea’s illicit ship-to-ship 

transfers), and would manage force flows in a contingency scenario.136 In recent years, the UN Command has

undergone a formal “revitalization” process to strengthen the role of sending states in a potential crisis.137 The 

Moon administration has expressed concern, however, 

that Washington could use the UN Command to maintain

control over the Combined Forces Command and ROK

forces during a military crisis, even after the transition of 

wartime operational control, by defining the situation as a 

violation rather than nullification of the armistice.138

For Pyongyang, Beijing, and Moscow, however, the

UN Command is a shell construct propped up by

Washington to maintain the pretense of international solidarity against North Korea. They have long questioned 

the UN Command’s legitimacy given that the Security

Council voted to establish the command when a key 

permanent member, the Soviet Union, was boycotting

council proceedings. North Korea in particular has called 

for the UN Command to be dissolved, arguing that

the United States is trying to transform it into an “Asia

version of NATO.”139 In addition, critics argue that U

Command-Rear, which maintains just four personnel, is

merely a fig leaf entity used to prevent the termination of 

the UN-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) a

ensure US control over the rear bases

For its part, the United Nations has distanced itself from

the UN Command.140 Former UN Secretary-Genera

Boutros Boutros-Ghali noted in 1994 that the “Securit

Council did not establish the unified command as a 

subsidiary organ under its control but merely recommended the creation of such a command, specifying 

that it be under the authority of the United States.”

Therefore, Washington alone has the authority to 

Military officers from the US-led United Nations Command, South Korea, and North Korea (clockwise from left) attend an October 16, 2018 meeting in th

Demilitarized Zone to discuss efforts to ban weapons in the border village of Panmunjom. (Photo by South Korea Defense Ministry via AP
USIP.ORG 43

“decide on the continued existence or the dissolution 

of the United Nations Command.”14

As US-DPRK and inter-Korean negotiations ma

headway in 2018, the UN Command demonstrated its

ability to play a facilitating role in tension reduction. It 

met trilaterally with military officials from both Koreas in 

October to advance the implementation of the inter-Korean comprehensive military agreement. Later, it 

verified the removal of dozens of landmines and twenty-two front-line guard posts in the DMZ as part of the 

agreement. Throughout 2018, it approved the movement of more than six thousand people through the 

DMZ between the two Koreas, versus zero in 2017.142

The UN Command’s role will continue to evolve as a

peace process moves forward. It could play a role in 

coordinating the various international entities that would 

be involved in implementing peace arrangements.143

Some experts argue that, even after a peace agreement is reached, the command could continue in the 

capacity of a peace guarantor, managing peacekeeping 

operations and various North-South confidence-building measures.144 However, its historical baggage as a 

belligerent in the Korean War would potentially undermine its argument for a new, neutral role. Also, the

two Koreas’ desire to minimize foreign encroachment 

on their sovereignty may reinvigorate calls for it to be 

dissolved or replaced rather than reformed.145

A formal end to the Korean War would render the U

Command’s original rationale under UNSCR 84 moot o

obsolete. If it were dissolved, the UN Command-Rea

would also need to be dissolved, and UN forces would

need to be removed from Japan pursuant to the UNJapan SOF

146 Currently, the UN Command-Rear offer

a streamlined way to provide visiting forces access to 

bases in Japan, exercise multilateral cooperation, and 

supply political cover for sensitive ROK-Japan security

cooperation. In its place, Japan would need to negotiate 

bilateral access and SOFA agreements with relevant

countries (the United States already has a SOFA wit

Japan), which it has already begun doing with the United

Kingdom and Australia, two of the UN-Japan S

signatories.147 Given the implications for regional security, 

the United States, South Korea, Japan, and other interested parties would need to begin discussions on how

to replace the force management functions of the UN

Command-Rear in the new environment

New Peace Management System

The peace agreement that replaces the Armistice

Agreement would need to help establish a new

framework for maintaining the peace. Currently, the 

Armistice Agreement mandates the Military Armisti

Commission, along with representatives from the KP

and the UN Command, to implement the truce as

well as a Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to 

monitor armistice implementation outside of the DMZ. 

However, both commissions have largely been defunct since the mid-1990s. In practice, a fragile peace 

has been maintained on the Peninsula through mutual 

deterrence by the military capabilities of the KPA and

US-ROK Combined Forces Comman

A central question is how to structure the new peace

system to institutionalize and improve on the de 

facto way peace is maintained today, as well as how 

to account for the preferences of the main parties 

involved. Most likely, the two Koreas would prefer a 

Korea-only framework that ensures Korean sovereignty 

over security matters and minimizes foreign influence. 

The inter-Korean joint military commission established 

under the 1991 Basic Agreement and reaffirmed unde

the 2018 inter-Korean military agreement would be one 

potential body for addressing and resolving security 

issues, though it would need to be further developed 

during the negotiation process. Another possibility would be to add the United States and China a

members or supervisors to the management system 

given their direct interests on the Peninsula and ability 

to underwrite the peace process.  third, though least

likely, option would be to establish a formal UN peacekeeping operation in the DMZ
44 PEACEWO      NO.

Economic and

Humanitarian Issues

North Korea has long prioritized the economic aspects 

of regime security alongside military security in diplomatic negotiations. Previous negotiations with Pyongyang 

have all featured demands to address the regime’s 

economic security, including sanctions relief, provision 

of heavy fuel oil, and the promise of light-water reactors 

(as part of the Agreed Framework and Six-Party Talks);

the additional relaxation of sanctions after North Korea’s 

1999 moratorium on missile tests; the release of $25 

million in North Korean funds from the sanctioned Banco

Delta Asia (to reinvigorate Six-Party Talks discussions);

the removal of North Korea from the state sponsor of terrorism list in 2008; and 240,000 metric tons of nutritional 

assistance (as part of the 2012 Leap Day Deal).

North Korea’s economy, already in disarray after the fall 

of the Soviet Union and years of mismanagement, has

deteriorated further since the imposition of robust UN

sanctions in 2016 and 2017. According to the Bank o

Korea, North Korea’s economy contracted by 4.1 percent 

in 2018, the worst drop in twenty-one years and the 

second consecutive year of decline (see figure 1). In addition, its international trade dropped by 48.4 percent in 

2018, the largest fall in exports in nearly thirty years.148 In 

this regard, measures that reassure Pyongyang about its 

economic security, including sanctions relief, economic 

assistance, and humanitarian aid, will play an important 

role in peace and denuclearization negotiations.

DISMANTLING SANCTIONS

Relieving and ultimately ending US and multilatera

economic and financial sanctions against North Korea is 

the most significant element in addressing Pyongyang’s 

concerns about its economic security. Kim made sanctions relief his top demand during the second summit with 

President Trump in Hanoi, which suggests that Pyongyang 

may be prioritizing sanctions relief in much the same way 

Washington emphasizes denuclearization. Economic development and hard currency generation are critical to the

regime’s survival, and sanctions impede these aims. 

Currently, a robust regime of multilateral and unilateral 

sanctions are imposed on North Korea on the basis of 

its illicit activities and violations of international law.149

Between 2006 and 2017, the Security Council passed

eleven resolutions imposing sanctions against North 

Korea.150 The sanctions started with bans on exports of 

military items and luxury goods to North Korea, authorization for inspections of North Korean cargo, and other 

measures specifically tailored to curtail Pyongyang’s nuclear program. During 2016 and 2017, when North Korea 

conducted three nuclear tests and multiple long-range 

missile launches, the Security Council introduced a 

series of escalating sanctions that cumulatively banned 

exports from vast sectors of the North Korean civilian 

industry, including coal, iron ore, minerals, seafood, textiles, and labor. These sectors accounted for 99 percent 

of North Korea’s export revenues.151 North Korea’s import 

of refined petroleum was also capped at half a million 

barrels per year. It was these civilian sectoral sanctions 

that Kim sought to end during the Hanoi negotiations.152

The United States also maintains a complex web of

unilateral sanctions that restricts most commercial and financial activities by US companies, entities, and individuals with North Korea.153 Trade is generally limited to food,
USIP.ORG 45

medicine, and other humanitarian exports. Financial 

transactions involving US persons are prohibited, as are

new US investments in North Korea and arms sales and

transfers. Even US travel to North Korea is not permitte

except for journalists, humanitarian aid workers, and 

others receiving special validation passports from the 

State Department for visits said to advance national 

interests.  new US law signed in December 2019, th

Otto Warmbier Nuclear Sanctions Act, tightened the

sanctions regime further by prohibiting non-US entities

that facilitate business with North Korean enterprises 

from having access to the US financial system.15

US sanctions reflect the independent but overlapping

roles of the legislative and executive branches of the 

federal government. Congress has delegated some of 

its authority to regulate commerce with foreign nations 

to the president under the National Emergencies Act

the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, a

the Patriot Act. Pursuant to that authority, US president

have issued various executive orders related to North 

Korea. Congress has also enacted a series of North 

Korea–related statutes, including the NKSPEA; Title III o

the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanction

Act of 2017; the Warmbier Act; the Iran, North Korea

and Syria Non-Proliferation Act of 2000; and the North

Korea Human Rights Act of 2004. The NKSPEA and 

Warmbier Act, in particular, mandated the exclusion of

North Korea and its third-party enablers from the US financial system and the freezing of their assets. The power of

this sanction derives from the fact that most international transactions are denominated in dollars, the world’s 

Source: Bank of Kore

Figure 1. Annual Percentage Change in North Korea's GDP and Exports

In disarray after the fall of the Soviet Union and years of mismanagement, North Korea's economy deteriorated further

following the imposition of robust UN sanctions in 2016 and 2017

0

+10%

-50%

+20%

-40%

+30%

-30%

+40%

-20%

+50%

1991

1995

2000

2005

2010

2015

2018

-10% GDP GROWTH RATE

(% change from previous year)

EXPORT GROWTH RATE

(% change from previous year)
46 PEACEWO      NO.

primary reserve currency, and even dollar transactions that 

are not between US persons or banks must be cleared

through correspondent banks within US jurisdiction.15

Multilateral sanctions can be lifted by specific Security 

Council resolutions. Although any one of the five permanent members could veto such a measure, China

and Russia have been calling for sanctions relief for

North Korea so a veto would not likely be an issue. The 

Security Council can also waive sanctions for a specific 

period and adopt so-called snapback provisions that 

condition an extension of relief on continued denuclearization progress, as was the case in the Iran Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action.156 More narrowly, U

administrations can engage the UN’s 1718 Sanctions

Committee to allow for exemptions related to specific 

activities. For example, the United States has supported exemptions for limited inter-Korean projects, such

as a joint railway inspection at the end of 2018.

Removing US sanctions will be more complicated. Som

will be easier to lift, such as presidential executive orders 

that can be canceled by subsequent ones. Certain laws 

include waivers (such as for national security interests) 

or other flexible authorities for the executive branch.157

Others, such as certain restrictive proliferation-related 

sanctions, do not.158 The NKSPEA—the first comprehensive North Korea–related sanctions law—require

Pyongyang to demonstrate progress on a range of 

areas, including denuclearization, human rights, financial 

transparency, and counterfeiting, for a temporary oneyear suspension of its sanctions. “Significant progress” in 

those areas is needed for sanctions to be permanently 

lifted.159 The Warmbier Act also requires that North Korea

take certain steps toward permanently and verifiably 

limiting its WMD and ballistic missile programs before 

the law’s provisions are suspended or terminated. In the 

absence of legislative flexibility, an administration may 

find that official actions to test the viability of a peace 

regime or undertake related confidence-building measures (such as certain people-to-people exchanges) may 

be prohibited. Overlapping sanctions requirements of 

different legislation could introduce another complication 

that makes the piecemeal provision of relief difficult. For 

example, certain North Korean commercial activities could 

be sanctioned for a number of divergent reasons enumerated in separate legal authorities. These challenges 

arose in the context of US sanctions relief in response to

Myanmar’s democratic opening a few years ago.

The critical challenge in US deliberations over sanctions

relief will be how to encourage North Korean progress 

toward denuclearization and peace while minimizing any 

premature loss of the leverage that sanctions provide. 

Since the Hanoi summit, North Korea has made it clear, 

without being explicit, that no deal is possible without at 

least some form of sanctions relief. On the other hand, 

Secretary Pompeo has reiterated that no sanctions relief 

is possible until Pyongyang gives up its nuclear weapons.

Given the lack of mutual trust and the likelihood of a 

phased process, if Washington decides to consider 

sanctions relief in conjunction with corresponding 

North Korea denuclearization measures, it could begin 

with easing UN multilateral sanctions on a temporary

and limited basis. This could be done through waivers for specific North Korean sectors or inter-Korean 

projects, and include snapback provisions rather than 

outright sanctions removal. In a step-by-step process 

that emphasizes parallel and simultaneous actions to 

establish trust, an administration might prefer to allow 

activities that generate a limited amount of revenue for the regime or require disturbing the minimal 

number of sanctions. It could also focus on activities 

that are narrower in scope and humanitarian in nature 

or, relatedly, issue general licenses authorizing categories of action that previously required a specific 

license.160 The president would potentially have more 

flexibility in these circumstances and is not as likely to 

encounter staunch congressional opposition. During 

past instances of denuclearization progress in 2000 

and 2008, US administrations have lifted sanctions on

North Korea under the Trading with the Enemy Act, th

Export Administration Act, the Defense Production A
USIP.ORG 47

and related executive orders.161 As North Korea makes

progress on denuclearization steps and US confidence

builds, the sanctions relief process could possibly accelerate, depending on the circumstances. Washington 

and its partners will also want to ensure sanctions relief 

does not inadvertently allow Pyongyang to further 

develop or reconstitute its nuclear and other WMD 

programs while continuing to minimize North Korean 

sanctions circumvention and access to hard currency 

that can finance illicit activities. 

ECONOMIC AND ENERGY ASSISTANCE

Even after sanctions relief, North Korea would still need

significant assistance from the international community 

to develop its economy and build peace in a sustainable 

way. North Korea has been ambivalent, however, about 

accepting foreign assistance, recognizing it both as a 

necessity and a threat. Internally, the regime continues to trumpet the pursuit of a self-sufficient economy 

“without any external assistance or any others’ help.”162 In 

practice, however, it has taken steps to attract foreign investment, including creating dozens of special economic 

zones, seeking membership in the Asian Development

Bank, and permitting equity and joint venture investments from foreign companies. North Korea has also

made gradual moves over the last three decades to 

enhance marketization, private entrepreneurship, and 

decentralized planning, but it still appears reluctant to 

take the full economic reform and transparency measures required for foreign assistance.

At the bilateral level, Seoul would take the lead in aiding

Pyongyang given their shared interests, culture, language, and future. The Moon administration has already 

proposed a new economic road map for the Korean 

Peninsula that envisions—once significant progress on 

denuclearization has been made—various infrastructure 

investments and joint ventures connecting not only the 

two Koreas but also the Peninsula to China, Russia, and

Europe. This vision draws inspiration from the Europea

Coal and Steel Community, which enhanced economic 

and social ties among six European nations after World

War II and established the foundation for the European

Union.163 Japan and China, as well as various Europea

and Pacific Rim countries, would also seek to be involved at the appropriate time

International financial institutions (IFIs), such as the 

International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, can

also help provide North Korea with the funds, technical 

assistance, and international legitimacy to better integrate into the global economy. All major UN membe

states—and every country that has transitioned from 

central planning to a market economy—have become 

members of the IMF, except for Cuba and North Korea.

If North Korea decides to pursue international assistance seriously, it must first join the IMF, which is a 

prerequisite for membership in the World Bank and its

affiliates. There are two main factors for IMF membership. First, the country would need to gain approval 

from major IMF shareholders, particularly the United

States and Japan. As long as North Korea maintains

its WMD programs, the path to membership will be 

blocked.164 The experiences of other socialist countries 

that acceded to the IMF, such as China, Russia, and

Vietnam, have also shown that significant economic reform, in addition to mended ties with the United States,

always accompanies IMF membership.165

Second, the country needs to satisfy certain technical 

requirements, such as removing restrictions on currency exchange flows and providing information regarding its fiscal health and economic performance. North 

Korea would be unlikely to jeopardize its monetary 

stability by relaxing its currency exchange policy or 

meet reporting requirements that reveal too much information about its economic vulnerabilities. However, 

an inability to meet these technical requirements has 

not prevented other underdeveloped countries from 

joining the IMF, so major shareholder approval is likely 

the decisive factor.

Even without membership, North Korea could still
48 PEACEWO      NO.

receive assistance from IFIs. The IMF could begin 

providing technical advice to North Korean officials on 

standardizing economic information and adapting to 

the international economic system in preparation for 

future membership.166 Likewise, the World Bank and the

United Nations Development Program could collaborate to conduct needs assessments as they did for a

donors meeting on Iraq in 2003.167 The World Bank has

also administered international trust funds to finance 

development projects for nonmembers, such as Gaza 

and the West Bank, East Timor, Bosnia, and Kosovo.

Private capital markets are another important source 

of long-term funding.  2019 Korea Society report by

Thomas Byrne and Jonathan Corrado argues that, because neither South Korean financing nor IFI assistance

can support North Korean development on a sustainable basis, the regime will eventually need to turn to 

private markets. To access these markets, North Korea 

must resolve its international debt arrears and demonstrate sovereign creditworthiness. Pyongyang currently 

owes approximately $14.5 billion to external creditors, 

including foreign governments and Western banks.169

Potential avenues for debt relief include negotiations 

with Paris Club lenders (for foreign government debt), 

London Club creditors (for private bank debt), and the 

World Bank’s Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative

Another component related to economic and development aid is the provision of energy assistance. North

Korea continues to struggle to meet its energy demands, 

relying on its considerable coal reserves as well as hydropower and Chinese petroleum imports to meet its needs. 

During both the Agreed Framework period and Six-Party

Talks, the United States and other partners offered the

construction of light-water nuclear reactors, which are 

less efficient in producing weapons-usable plutonium, 

to induce North Korea to give up its nuclear program. 

Washington also provided North Korea with heavy fuel 

oil ($400 million between 1995 and 2003; $146 million 

between 2007 and 2009) as interim measures until the 

reactors were built.170 It is possible that energy assistance 

could again provide a similar incentive to North Korea in 

future negotiations. However, due to growing US fear of

“buying the same horse twice,” Washington may insist 

that Seoul and Beijing pick up more of the tab unless

Pyongyang offers additional concessions.171

HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Humanitarian assistance to North Korea, including food, 

medical, and development aid, can potentially reinforce 

a peace regime process but presents difficult challenges. 

A March 2019 UN report assesses that about 10.9 millio

North Koreans, around 40 percent of the population, have 

unmet food, nutrition, health and water, sanitation, and 

hygiene needs.172 Donor fatigue stemming from an unwillingness to support the North Korean regime and its continued development of nuclear weapons, however, has 

depressed US and international support for food aid.17

Pyongyang’s restrictions on donor agencies’ distribution 

and monitoring of food shipments have compounded the 

problem. As a result, US assistance to North Korea, whic

peaked in the early 2000s following a devastating famine 

in the mid-1990s, has dwindled to virtually zero since 

2009.  2018 appeal by UN agencies and internationa

nongovernmental organizations for $111 million to meet 

North Korean humanitarian needs was only 24 percent 

funded, one of the lowest-funded appeals in the world.174

North Korea has been skillful in rotating through 

donors to secure assistance on the best terms.175 In 

response to the US-led maximum pressure campaign,

Pyongyang turned to Beijing, securing a promise of

one million tons of rice and corn assistance without 

any access requirements as part of President Xi’s first 

state visit to North Korea, in June 2019. This, in turn, 

allowed Pyongyang to dismiss an offer from Seoul of 

fifty thousand tons of rice, citing displeasure over the 

continuation of US-ROK joint military drills.1

A viable humanitarian assistance program will need to

overcome the challenges related to distribution, access, 

and monitoring. The North Korean government imposes well-documented hurdles for aid workers, including 
USIP.ORG 49

limiting movement, restricting contact with aid recipients 

or relevant officials, surveillance, and failing to provide 

requested data.177 The UN Commission of Inquiry found

in 2014 that after two decades of humanitarian operations in the country, aid workers “still face unacceptable 

constraints impeding their access to populations in dire 

need.”178 Aid organizations have sought compromises to

overcome these restrictions, but even with better access, 

their efforts would still be hampered by concerns about 

providing aid to a state that is reluctant to make economic 

and political reforms that could increase food production 

and ensure more equitable distribution of resources. 

US and multilateral sanctions and US licensing and trave

restrictions pose additional, unintended obstacles to the 

provision of aid. International banking controls intended 

to ban transfers to support North Korea’s nuclear program 

have constrained UN agencies’ access to funds within the

country; transportation bans have delayed aid shipments 

in customs inspections; and UN Sanctions Committee and

US Treasury licensing requirements to export medical

and other equipment have created a lengthy approval 

process for exemptions. UN Sanctions Committee guidelines were introduced in August 2018 to expedite th

approval of humanitarian goods, leading to a decrease 

in approval times from an average of ninety-nine days in 

2018 to fifteen days the following year.179 Still, “life-saving 

programmes continue to face serious challenges and 

delays” even though sanctions “clearly exempt humanitarian activities,” according to the UN resident coordinator.18

The US government’s unclear standards for the compelling humanitarian considerations that would warrant an

exemption from the travel ban have also impeded the 

ability of American aid workers to do their work.181 Bot

US-based nongovernment organizations and international humanitarian organizations will continue to need to

grapple with these restrictions even if humanitarian aid to 

North Korea is stepped up under a peace process.

Despite the US government's stated aspiration to

abide by the principles of neutrality, impartiality, and 

independence from political objectives, its provision 

of humanitarian assistance will likely continue to be 

politicized. In this context, humanitarian aid will continue to have value as a confidence-building measure in 

peace discussions with North Korea, as was the case 

in the scuttled 2012 Leap Day Deal, which would have 

provided 240,000 tons of US nutritional assistance in

exchange for a moratorium on North Korean nuclear 

and missile activities. Nevertheless, Pyongyang will 

prioritize sanctions relief and other economic concessions that enhance its security while minimizing 

intrusive foreign monitoring and access.
50 PEACEWO      NO.

Principles to Guide the Process

The component parts of a peace regime on the Korean 

Peninsula are connected and need to be considered 

holistically. The parties will need to determine the 

appropriate timing and manner for addressing them, 

as well as how they relate and are prioritized. Several 

general principles for a cohesive and effective peacebuilding process follow.

Prioritize peace with denuclearization. The ultimate 

goal for all sides is peace and stability on the Korean 

Peninsula. Denuclearization—although a significant component of peace widely regarded as the sine qua non—is 

only one part of a peace process. Although North Korea

views immediate, unilateral denuclearization as incompatible with peace, it has committed several times to working 

incrementally toward denuclearization in parallel with 

peace. The success of a peace regime, however, depends on the level of political will and resources devoted 

to it. The United States should maintain an approach that

treats steps toward peace and denuclearization as simultaneous and inseparable—an approach hinted at but never fully realized by the Singapore Statement and previous 

agreements. Even without a comprehensive agreement

on denuclearization and peace, the two sides should still 

take steps that enhance peace and minimize the potential for conflict, including a freeze on nuclear and missile 

activities, an end-of-war declaration, military-to-military 

dialogues, partial sanctions relief, humanitarian assistance, easing or ending the travel bans on US and DPR

citizens, and other confidence-building measures.

Ensure reciprocity and proportionality. Relatedly, all aspects of negotiations should proceed based on reciprocity and proportionality. No party should expect the other

or others to make concessions without receiving equal 

concessions in return. Historical experience shows that 

negotiations predicated on one side caving will ultimately 

prove unsustainable.  mutually acceptable deal with

proportional commitments toward denuclearization and 

guaranteeing regime security (such as sanctions relief) 

will decrease the chances of one or more sides viewing 

backing out of that deal as a better alternative to using 

diplomatic engagement to overcome disputes.  sincere

desire for peace in Washington and Seoul will not be 

enough if Pyongyang refuses to countenance real denuclearization. Likewise, a willingness by Pyongyang to take 

denuclearization steps will not be adequate if Washington 

and its allies refuse to offer proportional incentives. The 

key challenge will be determining how each side values 

its demands and offers and then negotiating and matching them in a mutually acceptable way.

Approach peace as a long-term process, not a single 

event. Denuclearization and peace cannot be achieved 

quickly. Overcoming seventy years of animosity will 

require many years of negotiations, multiple setbacks, 

confidence-building measures, and reconciliation. This 

history of enmity and mistrust, along with the two countries’ desire to maintain leverage as long as possible 

(that is, maintaining nuclear weapons and withholding 

sanctions relief and normalization), means the peace 

and denuclearization process will likely unfold in phases 

and across the tenure of multiple US administrations.

The process must persist through changes in administration and intermittent breakdowns. One of the failures 

of the Agreed Framework and Six-Party Talks, in addition to nonperformance or insincerity by one or both

parties, was an inability to overcome setbacks through 

the negotiating process itself. Disagreements about 

noncompliance should be resolved within a consistent 

negotiating framework rather than by scrapping the 

process altogether.
USIP.ORG 51

Create the conditions for a sustainable diplomatic 

path forward. Given that a peace regime will take 

years to create, it is imperative to create the environment and institutions necessary for extensive negotiations. Leader-level summits, though at times pivotal, 

cannot replace regular, institutionalized working-level 

meetings to address technical details in a thorough 

and sustained manner. Instead, bilateral and multilateral 

working-level groups should be created to address 

various aspects of the peace regime. These groups 

should be founded on the mutual understanding that 

they will serve as stable coordinating mechanisms that 

meet consistently despite setbacks in negotiations. 

Clear rules of engagement should be mutually defined 

and agreed upon by all parties so that they have an 

explicit understanding of what actions are considered 

off limits, what countermeasures to expect if and when 

either side violates these rules, and what procedures 

exist to restart negotiations when the process stalls 

or falls apart. Admittedly, experience indicates that

keeping Pyongyang and Washington committed to diplomacy will be difficult when both sides have at times 

viewed engagement itself as leverage or a liability. 

However, as much as possible, both sides must know 

what is required to keep diplomacy alive and how to 

jumpstart it if and when the process falters.

Build momentum and trust through pragmatic, acceptable measures. Given the severe lack of trust, each 

side will seek to maintain leverage and avoid making 

concessions that it cannot reverse if someone violates an 

agreement. Therefore, maximalist demands from either 

side, such as complete, unilateral denuclearization or 

complete relief from economic and financial sanctions, 

will be unproductive. Instead, negotiators should build 

trust and momentum early by targeting low-hanging-fruit 

measures that are reversible or less sensitive.  practical

first step would be to establish an interim agreement that 

commits North Korea to denuclearization and freezes its 

nuclear and missile activities (including nuclear and missile 

testing and fissile material production) in exchange for appropriate security guarantees, such as partial, time-limited 

sanctions relief; greater modification of major joint military 

exercises; a moratorium on the deployment of US strategic and nuclear assets to the Peninsula; and an end-of-war

declaration. As trust builds, thornier areas can be tackled

in a proportional fashion through comprehensive negotiations. It is encouraging that the United States and South

Korea have disavowed any policy of near-term unification 

by force or absorption, which raises existential questions 

for the Peninsula, and decided to focus on building mutual 

security. Efforts that can facilitate inter-Korean cooperation

and remain consistent with US national security interests,

such as military tension reduction and limited economic 

cooperation, should also be supported.

Incorporate appropriate multilateral negotiating 

tracks. Although some issues are better addressed

bilaterally, many will benefit from multilateral consultations. Formal multilateral negotiations housed in regional security mechanisms can provide an effective and 

reliable forum for talks across the range of issue areas 

covered in this report. Further, multilateral processes 

can help garner support, resources, and buy-in from 

all major powers with interests on the Peninsula and 

preclude forum shopping by Pyongyang. 

Keep the broader strategic context in mind while 

advancing the peace regime process. Many aspects of 

the peace regime process, including security guarantees, 

denuclearization, economic concessions, conventional 

force reductions, and adjustments in the US-ROK defens

posture, must be considered within the broader regional 

strategic context. US-ROK Alliance coordination mechanisms (such as the 2+2 Ministerial Meeting, Securi

Consultative Meeting, Korea Integrated Defense Dialogue, 

and the US-ROK working group on nuclear negotiations)

trilateral consultative groups (such as the US-ROK-Japa

Defense Trilateral Talks), and other bilateral and multilateral dialogues with relevant partners should be strengthened. In addition, the United States should quickly seek

to help resolve the ongoing historical and trade disputes 

between its two regional allies, which could complicate 

and even undermine a peace process if left to fester.
52 PEACEWO      NO.

Notes

The authors gratefully acknowledge the many individuals who have commented on various drafts of this report, including Scott Snyder, 

Ambassador Kathleen Stephens, David Maxwell, and Tom Sheehy, and those organizations and individuals that convened or participated in workshops in support of the report, including the Korea National Diplomatic Academy, the Japan Institute of International Affair

Keith Luse, Mark Tokola, Ambassador Robert Gallucci, Ambassador Joseph DeTrani, Tony Namkung, Tong Zhao, and Professors Ouya

Wei, Li Nan, Cheng Xiaohe. The authors also thank those individuals that helped edit, assemble, and publish the report, including 

Richard Walker, Helen Glenn Court, Colin Cookman, Jake Harris, and Chris Brown. The authors take full responsibility for any errors

Lastly, the authors are grateful to Paul Lee and Lucy Stevenson-Yang for their invaluable assistance in various aspects of the report

1. US Bureau of Arms Control, “Korean War Armistice Agreement,” July 27, 1953, https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/3100

2. Mark Tokola, “The 1954 Geneva Conference on Korea: From Armistice to Stalemate,” The Asia Forum, February 14, 201

www.theasanforum.org/9324-2.

3. Charles Kartman, “A Peace Treaty for the Korean Peninsula: Will the Past be Prologue?,” 38 North, June 11, 2018, www.38north.or

/2018/06/ckartman061118.

4. BBC News, “Third time lucky for Korea peace talks,” October 21, 1998, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/197787.s

5. Wendy R. Sherman, “Talking to the North Koreans,” New York Times, March 7, 2001, www.nytimes.com/2001/03/07/opinio

/talking-to-the-north-koreans.html.

6. Bill Clinton, My Life: The Presidential Years (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 615,

7. US Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” September 19, 2005, https://2009-2017.state.go

/eap/regional/c15455.htm. Despite the commitment-for-commitment approach, the United States still believed that significant denuclearization steps had to come before peace talks could begin. Christopher Hill, the lead State Department negotiator during the Six-Party Talks,

stated that “discussions of a Korean Peninsula peace regime could begin among the directly related parties once the Democratic People's 

Republic of Korea (DPRK) has disabled its existing nuclear facilities, has provided a complete and correct declaration of all of its nuclea

programs, and is on the road to complete denuclearization” (US Senate, “Status of the Six-Party Talks for the Denuclearization of the

Korean Peninsula,” February 6, 2008, 110th Congress, 2nd session, www.foreign.senate.gov/download/hearing-transcript-020608).

8. Leon V. Sigal, “For North Korea, Verifying Requires Reconciling: The Lesson from a Troubled Past—Part II,” 38 North, Decembe

28, 2018, www.38north.org/2018/12/lsigal122818.

9. White House, “Joint Statement of President Donald J. Trump of the United States of America and Chairman Kim Jong Un of t

Democratic People’s Republic of Korea at the Singapore Summit,” June 12, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/joint-stat

ment-president-donald-j-trump-united-states-america-chairman-kim-jong-un-democratic-peoples-republic-korea-singapore-summit.

10. Although President Trump himself has not articulated the “simultaneous and in parallel” approach explicitly, he appears to have

endorsed it through the commitments in the Singapore Agreement and his support of a comprehensive deal at Hanoi, which

would have included an end-of-war declaration and complete sanctions relief in return for North Korea’s dismantlement of its 

entire weapons of mass destruction program. However, other key officials in the Trump administration, notably Secretary of 

State Mike Pompeo and then National Security Advisor John Bolton, have promoted the traditional approach of requiring significant North Korean denuclearization steps first before taking measures toward reconciliation. See Stephen Biegun, “Remarks

DPRK at Stanford University,” US Department of State, January 31, 2019, www.state.gov/remarks-on-dprk-at-stanford-universi

11. Jane Perlez, “On U.S.-North Korea Talks, China May Hold the Cards,” New York Times, May 11, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/11/worl

/asia/north-korea-china-nuclear-trump-sanctions.html; Megan Specia and David E. Sanger, “How the ‘Libya Model” Became a Stickin

Point in North Korea Nuclear Talks,” New York Times, May 16, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/16/world/asia/north-korea-libya-model.html.

12. National Committee on North Korea (NCNK), “Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year’s Address,” January 1, 2019, www.ncnk.

/resources/publications/kimjongun_2019_newyearaddress.pdf.

13. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), 12–

14. Robert L. Gallucci, “Lessons to be Learned from Negotiating with North Korea,” 38 North, September 17, 2019, www.38north.o

/2019/09/rgallucci091719.
USIP.ORG 53

15. After the Hanoi summit, DPRK Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho clarified that “even though the security guarantee is more important for us as we take denuclearization measures, we understood that it could be more difficult for the United States to

measures in the [military field.] That is why we proposed the removal of partial sanctions as corresponding measures” (CGTN 

America, "DPRK Foreign Minister disputes U.S. reason for breakdown at Trump-Kim summit, YouTube video, February 28, 20

www.youtu.be/o-NWGHQt_rk.

16. KCNA Watch, “Report on 5th Plenary Meeting of 7th Central Committee, Workers’ Party of Korea,” January 1, 2020, www.kc

watch.org/newstream/1577829999-473709661/report-on-5th-plenary-meeting-of-7th-c-c-wpk.

17. Uri Friedman and Krishnadev Calamur, “The Nuclear Game Theory of the India-Pakistan Crisis,” The Atlantic, February 27, 2019

www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2019/02/pakistan-india-nuclear-north-korea-trump/583723.

18. Uri Friedman, “North Korea Says It Has ‘Completed’ Its Nuclear Program,” The Atlantic, November 29, 2017, www.theatlantic.c

/international/archive/2017/11/north-korea-nuclear/547019.

19. White House, “Joint Statement Between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” June 30, 2017, www.whitehouse.

/briefings-statements/joint-statement-united-states-republic-korea.

20. Sang-hun Choe, “South Korean President, Called ‘Officious’ by Kim Jong Un, Still Wants Another Summit,” New York Times, Apr

15, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/04/15/world/asia/kim-jong-moon-jae.html.

21. Min-hyung Lee, “Gov’t seeks revision on laws concerning N. Korea,” Korea Times, March 21, 2019, www.koreatimes.co.kr/www

/nation/2019/03/356_265781.html.

22. Van Jackson, “Risk Realism,” Center for a New American Security, September 24, 2019, www.cnas.org/publications/reports/risk-reali

23. In President Trump’s first sixteen months in office, the Treasury Department issued 182 sanctions designations; during the two 

terms of the Obama administration, it issued 154 (Mathew Ha, “Let’s face it, North Korea won’t yield without more pressure,” The 

Hill, March 21, 2019, www.thehill.com/opinion/international/435056-lets-face-it-north-korea-wont-yield-without-more-pressure).

24. John Irish, “China urges UN action to make North Korea ‘pay price,’” Reuters, February 12, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/

-china-wangyi-korea-usa-idUSKCN0VL15S

25. Patricia M. Kim, “China’s Quest for Influence in Northeast Asia,” in Strategic Asia 2019: China’s Expanding Strategic Ambitions,

ed. Asheley J. Tellis, Alison Szalwinski, and Michasel Willis (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2019), ww

.org/publication/chinas-quest-for-influence-in-northeast-asia-the-korean-peninsula-japan-and-the-east-china-sea.

26. Simon Denyer and Amanda Erickson, “Beijing warns Pyongyang: You’re on your own if you go after United States,” Washin

Post, August 11, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/world/china-warns-north-korea-youre-on-your-own-if-you-go-after-the-us/201

/08/11/a01a4396-7e68-11e7-9026-4a0a64977c92_story.html.

27. Michelle Nichols, “China, Russia propose lifting some UN sanctions on North Korea, U.S. says not the time,” Reuters, December 16, 20

www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-un/china-russia-propose-lifting-of-some-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-idUSKBN1YK2

28. David Fouse, “Japan’s Post-Cold War North Korea Policy: Hedging Toward Autonomy?” Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

February 2004, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a446653.pdf.

29. Wada Haruki and Gavan McCormack, “The Strange Record of 15 years of Japan-North Korea Negotiations,” Asia-Pacific Journal,

Japan Focus 3, no. 9 (September 28, 2005), www.apjjf.org/-Gavan-McCormack--Wada-Haruki/1894/article.pdf. 

30. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration,” September 17, 2002, www.mofa.go.jp/region/as

-paci/n_korea/pmv0209/pyongyang.html.

31. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “The Inter-Korean Summit, Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Kono,” April 27, 2018, w

.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_002016.html.

32. Maaike Okano-Heijmans, “Japan as Spoiler in the Six-Party Talks: Single Issue Politics and Economic Diplomacy Towards North Korea,”

Asia-Pacific Journal, Japan Focus 6, no. 10 (October 3, 2008), www.apjjf.org/-Maaike-Okano-Heijmans/2929/article.html.

33. Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (New York: Random House, 2012), 6

34. Tim Kelly, “Japan lists China as bigger threat than nuclear-armed North Korea,” Reuters, September 26, 2019, www.reuters.co

/article/us-japan-defence/japan-promotes-china-as-bigger-threat-than-nuclear-armed-north-korea-idUSKBN1WC05

35. Marcus Noland, “Between Collapse and Revival A Reinterpretation of the North Korean Economy,” Peterson Institute

International Economics, March 15, 2001, www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/between-collapse-and-reviva

-reinterpretation-north-korean-economy.

36. Russian Federation, “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,” November 30, 2016, www.rusemb.org.uk/rp_insig

37. Artyom Lukin, “Russia’s Game on the Korean Peninsula: Accepting China’s Rise to Regional Hegemony?” Special Report n

National Bureau of Asian Research, March 2019, 21–30, www.nbr.org/wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/sr78_china_rus

_entente_march2019.pdf.
54 PEACEWO      NO.

38. Van Jackson, “Putin and the Hermit Kingdom,” Foreign Affairs, February 22, 2015, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/east-asia

/2015-02-22/putin-and-hermit-kingdom.

39. Jeffrey Mankoff, “Russia’s Asia Pivot: Confrontation or Cooperation?” Asia Policy 19 (January 2015): 65–88, www.nbr.o

/publication/russias-asia-pivot-confrontation-or-cooperation.

40. Alexander Gabuev, “Bad Cop, Mediator or Spoiler: Russia’s Role on the Korean Peninsula,” Carnegie Moscow Center, Apri

2019, https://carnegie.ru/commentary/78976.

41. An end-of-war declaration was first contemplated by South Korea and the United States in 2006 and then explicitly articulat

by the two Koreas in the October 2007 Joint Declaration as well as the April 2018 Panmunjom Declaration (Duyeon Kim, “What’s

in a Name? Korean ‘Peace’ and Breaking the Deadlock,” War on the Rocks, September 14, 2018, www.warontherocks.co

/2018/09/whats-in-a-name-korean-peace-and-breaking-the-deadlock).

42. Uri Friedman, “Inside the Dispute Derailing Nuclear Talks with North Korea,” The Atlantic, August 29, 2018, www.theatlantic.

/international/archive/2018/08/north-korea-war-declaration/568603.

43. It is also unclear whether the United States needs to participate in a peace agreement given that President Truman never

received congressional authority to declare war when he committed US troops to Korea in June 1950. See Louis Fisher, “The

Korean War: On What Legal Basis Did Truman Act?,” American Journal of International Law 89, no. 2 (1995): 21–3

44. Patrick M. Norton, “Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainabilit

March 1997, www.nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/napsnet-policy-forum-online-2-norton-ending-the-korean-armistice.

45. UNFold Zero, “Can the UN Command and Security Council play roles for peace in Korea?,” November 18, 2018, www.unfoldz

.org/can-the-un-command-and-security-council-play-roles-for-peace-in-korea.

46. Patrick M. Norton, “Ending the Korean Armistice Agreement: The Legal Issues,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainabilit

March 1997, www.nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/napsnet-policy-forum-online-2-norton-ending-the-korean-armistice.

47. Stephen P. Mulligan, “International Law and Agreements: Their Effect upon U.S. Law,” Report no. RL32528, Congressional Res

Service, September 19, 2018, 4, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf

48. Andrew Rudalevige, “Executive agreements and Senate disagreements,” Washington Post, March 10, 2015, www.washington

.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/03/10/executive-agreements-and-senate-disagreements.

49. US Department of State, “Considerations for Selecting Among Constitutionally Authorized Procedures,” section 11 FAM 72

Foreign Affairs Manual and Handbook, https://fam.state.gov/FAM/11FAM/11FAM0720.ht

50. The 1973 Paris Peace Accords, which effectively ended US involvement in Vietnam, was not submitted to the Senate for ratification. Alexander Haig, who helped negotiate the agreement, later noted that he was “not quite sure that the American Congre

had they been asked to ratify the Paris Accords, could ever have arrived at a consensus” (Nixon Center, “The Paris Agreemen

on Vietnam: Twenty-Five Years Later,” conference transcript, April 1998, www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/paris.htm

51. Stephen P. Mulligan, “Withdrawing from International Agreements: Legal Framework, the Paris Agreement, and the Iran Nuclea

Agreement,” Report no. R44761, Congressional Research Service, May 4, 2018, 6, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R44761

52. Stephen Bosworth, the executive director of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization from 1995 to 1997, stated tha

after the Democrats lost control of both houses of Congress in 1994, “conservative Republicans, particularly in the House, who hated the Agreed Framework, believed that it was basically an example of the U.S. paying extortion, began to oppose it very fiercel

(interview, PBS Frontline, February 21, 2003, www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kim/interviews/bosworth.html).

53. Mulligan, “Withdrawing from International Agreements,” 11

54. Ken Dilanian, “Senator: Trump admin agrees that Congress must approve any North Korea nuke deal,” NBC News, June 5, 2018,

www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/senator-trump-admin-agrees-congress-must-approve-any-north-korea-n880196.

55. Mark Landler, “Peace Treaty, and Peace Prize, for North Korea Appear to Tempt Trump,” New York Times, February 21, 2019,

www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/us/politics/trump-kim-north-korea.html.

56. Mariam Khan, “Pompeo Says US wants a treaty with North Korea: What one might look like,” ABC News, June 3, 201

www.abcnews.go.com/Politics/pompeo-us-treaty-north-korea/story?id=55538240.

57. Jordain Carney, “McConnell: Any North Korea deal should be submitted to Congress,” The Hill, June 12, 2018, https://thehill.co

/homenews/senate/391902-mcconnell-submit-north-korea-deal-to-congress.

58. Bill Gertz, “Senate to Review Any Future North Korea Arms Treaty,” Washington Free Beacon, June 13, 2018, www.freeb

.com/national-security/senate-review-future-north-korea-arms-treaty.

59. Article II, 13(b) of Armistice Agreement, https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31006.

60. International Crisis Group, “North Korea: The Risks of War in the Yellow Sea,” Asia Report no. 198, December 23, 2010

www.crisisgroup.org/asia/north-east-asia/korean-peninsula/north-korea-risks-war-yellow-sea.
USIP.ORG 55

61. Terence Roehrig, “The Northern Limit Line, National Committee on North Korea,” NCNK, September 2011, www.ncnk.or

/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/northern-limit-line.

62. US Department of Defense, “Joint Communique of the 51st ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting,” press release, November 16, 20

www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/2018651/joint-communiqu-of-the-51st-rok-us-security-consultative-meeti

63. NCNK, “Agreement on the Implementation of the Historic Panmunjom Declaration in the Military Domain,” September 21, 2018,

www.ncnk.org/sites/default/files/Agreement%20on%20the%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Historic%20Panmunjo

%20Declaration%20in%20the%20Military%20Domain.pdf.

64. Daniel J. Wakin, “North Koreans Welcome Symphonic Diplomacy,” New York Times, February 27, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008

/02/27/world/asia/27symphony.html.

65. Matthew Lee and Josh Lederman, “US bans travel for Americans to NKorea after Warmbier death,” Associated Press, July 2

2017, www.apnews.com/11c39275b9eb42399ba7ce8a0d2d746e.

66. Elizabeth Dias, “The 200 Americans Living in North Korea Have Little Time Left to Leave,” Time, August 24, 2

www.time.com/4913703/americans-living-north-korea-have-little-time-left.

67. White House, “Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry into the Uni

States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats,” September 24, 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential

-proclamation-enhancing-vetting-capabilities-processes-detecting-attempted-entry-united-states-terrorists-public-safety-threats.

68. Emily Rauhala, “Almost no North Koreans travel to the U.S., so why ban them?” Washington Post, September 25, 

www.washingtonpost.com/world/almost-no-north-koreans-travel-to-the-us-so-why-ban-them/2017/09/25/822ac340-a19c-11e7

-8c37-e1d99ad6aa22_story.html.

69. From 1996 to 2005, the Department of Defense conducted thirty-three joint field activities with the Korean People’s Army

(KPA) to search for the remains of the approximately 5,300 soldiers lost in North Korea (Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agen

“Progress on Korean War Personnel Accounting,” June 25, 2019, www.dpaa.mil/Resources/Fact-Sheets/Article-View/Art

/569610/progress-on-korean-war-personnel-accounting).

70. Soojin Park, “‘Farewell Reunions’: Time is running out for Korea’s divided families,” Wilson Center, September 4, 2018

www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/farewell-reunions-time-running-out-for-koreas-divided-families.

71. Natalie Seo, “Korean-Americans Push for Reunions with North Korea Family Members,” VOA News, August 19, 2

www.voanews.com/usa/korean-americans-push-reunions-north-korea-family-members.

72 According to a former congressional staffer who last visited North Kore in November 2008, visits of US congressional delegations to North Korea occurred fairly regularly until 2008 (email correspondence, August 3 and 10, 20

73. The US travel ban affected approximately half of the seventy-five professors at the Pyongyang University of Science and Technolog

(Ju-min Park, “Crisis-plagued Pyongyang university seeks revival after Trump-Kim summit,” Reuters, June 19, 2018, www.reuters.co

/article/us-northkorea-usa-university/crisis-plagued-pyongyang-university-seeks-revival-after-trump-kim-summit-idUSKBN1JF0OG

74. The 2014 UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea concluded that North Korea

systematic, widespread, and gross violations of human rights, some of which constituted crimes against humanity, present “a State 

that does not have any parallel in the contemporary world” (UN General Assembly, “Report of the commission of inquiry on hum

rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/25/63, February 7, 2014, para. 80, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBod

/CoIDPRK/Pages/ReportoftheCommissionofInquiryDPRK.aspx). On the inclusion of human rights, see, for example, Roberta Coh

“A Serious Human Rights Negotiation with North Korea,” 38 North, February 1, 2017, www.38north.org/2017/02/rcohen02011

75. Section 401 of the North Korea Sanctions and Policy Enhancement Act (NKSPEA) allows the president to suspend sanctions un

that law if North Korea has made progress toward, among other things, accounting for foreign abductees, accepting internationally 

recognized standards for the distribution and monitoring of humanitarian aid, and improving living conditions in its political prison 

camps. Section 402 states that these sanctions will terminate when the president has certified that North Korea has met all the 

conditions in Section 401 and has made significant progress toward, among other things, releasing all political prisoners, ceasing 

its censorship of peaceful political activity, establishing an open, transparent, and representative society, and accounting for and 

repatriating the remains of all Americans from North Korea (Pub. L. No. 114-122 [2016] [codified at 22 U.S.C. Ch. 99], § 401, 402

76. Cohen, "A Serious Human Rights Negotiation

77. David Hawk, “North Korea Responds to the UN Commission of Inquiry,” 38 North, October 16, 2014, www.38north.org/2014/

/dhawk101614.

78. US Department of State, “Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks,” September 19, 2005, https://2009-2

.state.gov/p/eap/regional/c15455.htm.

79. White House, “Joint Statement.” June 12, 2018.
56 PEACEWO      NO.

80. President of Russia, “News conference following Russian-North Korean talks,” April 25, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/eve

/president/news/60370.

81. Patrick M. Cronin and Ryan Neuhard, “Guaranteeing Peace with North Korea,” Hudson Institute, August 21, 2019, www.hudson.o

/research/15263-guaranteeing-peace-with-north-korea.

82. Frank Aum and Nathan Park, “After 65 years of ‘armistice,' it’s about time to end the Korean War,” CNN, October 2, 201

www.cnn.com/2018/10/02/opinions/north-korea-declaration-end-war-aum-park/index.html.

83. Abraham Denmark, “The Implications of Declaring an End to the Korean War,” Wilson Center, February 26, 2019, www.wilsoncen

.org/blog-post/the-implications-declaring-end-to-the-korean-war.

84. Alex Ward, “Exclusive: President Trump promised Kim Jong Un he’d sign an agreement to end the Korean War,” Vox, August

2018, www.vox.com/2018/8/29/17795452/trump-north-korea-war-summit-singapore-promise; Josh Rogin, “Why Trump Canceled

Pompeo’s Trip to North Korea,” Washington Post, August 27, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/josh-rogin/wp/2018/08/2

/why-trump-cancelled-pompeos-trip-to-north-korea.

85. Oliver Hotham, “One year since the Singapore Summit: what’s changed and what could happen next?,” NK News, June 12, 2019, 

www.nknews.org/2019/06/one-year-since-the-singapore-summit-whats-changed-and-what-could-happen-next.

86. Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: HarperCollins, 2012), 304

87. Sang-Hun Choe, “North Korea Hints at More Nuclear Tests Unless U.S. Ends Troop Drills with South,” New York Times, July 1

2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/07/16/world/asia/north-korea-us-military.html.

88. Beyond Parallel, “How Provocative Are U.S.-ROK Exercises,” Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 27,

https://beyondparallel.csis.org/do-u-s-rok-exercises-provoke-dprk.

89. General Vincent Brooks, “What a 2nd Trump-Kim summit could mean for the push to denuclearize North Korea,” PBS NewsHour,

January 18, 2019, www.pbs.org/newshour/show/what-a-2nd-trump-kim-summit-could-mean-for-the-push-to-denuclearize-north-korea.

90. Carla Babb, “US, South Korea Again Call Off Major Drill,” VOA News, October 19, 2018, www.voanews.com/usa/us-south-k

-again-call-major-drill.

91. Mark Landler and Sang-Hun Choe, “North Korea Drops Troop Demand, but U.S. Reacts Warily,” New York Times, April 19, 201

www.nytimes.com/2018/04/19/world/asia/north-korea-american-troops-withdrawal-trump.html.

92. Karl Friedhoff, “The American Public Remains Committed to Defending South Korea,” Chicago Council on Global Affairs, Octob

2018, www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/brief_north_korea_ccs18_181001.pdf.

93. Scott Snyder et al., “South Korean Attitudes Toward U.S.-ROK Alliance and USFK,” Asan Institute for Policy Studies, Februar

2019, http://en.asaninst.org/contents/south-korean-attitudes-toward-the-u-s-rok-alliance-and-usfk.

94. For example, South Korean support for the US-ROK Alliance dropped temporarily from 80 to 90 percent to 40 percent in 2002 aft

the death of two schoolgirls that involved US forces in Korea (Scott A. Snyder, “South Korean Public Opinion and the U.S.-ROK Allian

Council on Foreign Relations, October 17, 2012, www.cfr.org/blog/south-korean-public-opinion-and-us-rok-alliance)

95. Mark Landler, “Trump Orders Pentagon to Consider Reducing U.S. Forces in South Korea,” New York Times, May 3, 201

www.nytimes.com/2018/05/03/world/asia/trump-troops-south-korea.html.

96. Section 1254, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.

97. Larry Niksch, “Potential Sources of Opposition to a U.S. Troop Withdrawal from South Korea,” NCNK, April 2019, 3, www.ncn

org/resources/briefing-papers/all-briefing-papers/special-report-us-troop-withdrawal.

98. Council on Foreign Relations, “A Sharper Choice on North Korea: Engaging China for a Stable Northeast Asia,” Independ

Task Force Report no. 74, September 2016, 46–7, www.cfr.org/report/sharper-choice-north-korea

99. Doug Bandow, “Offer to Withdraw America’s Troops from South Korea to Seal a Nuclear Deal with the North,” Cato Institute, Apr

14, 2018, www.cato.org/publications/commentary/offer-withdraw-americas-troops-south-korea-seal-nuclear-deal-north.

100. Richard Sokolsky and Daniel R. DePetris, “Imagining a New U.S.-South Korean Security Architecture,” 38 North, November

2018, www.38north.org/2018/11/rsokolskyddepetris111518.

101. Todd South, “Will we stay or will we go?  look at removing US troops from South Korea,” Army Times, May 3, 2018

www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2018/05/03/will-we-stay-or-will-we-go-a-look-at-removing-us-troops-from-south-korea; 

Van Jackson, On the Brink: Trump, Kim, and The Threat of Nuclear War (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 203–

102. James Hackett, “The Conventional Military Balance on the Korean Peninsula,” International Institute for Strategic Studies, June

2018, 12, www.iiss.org/blogs/research-paper/2018/06/military-balance-korean-peninsula.

103. South Korean Ministry of National Defense, 2018 Defense White Paper, 118, www.mnd.go.kr/user/mndEN/upload/pblict

/PBLICTNEBOOK_201908070153390840.p

104. NCNK, “Agreement on the Implementation.”
USIP.ORG 57

105. See Richard Sokolsky, “Convention Threat Reduction on the Korean Peninsula: Toward a More Ambitious Agenda,” 38 Nor

March 8, 2019, www.38north.org/reports/2019/03/rsokolsky030819.

106. Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), “Vienna Document 1990,  November 17, 1990, www.osce.org/fsc/4124

107. OSCE, “Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe,” November 19, 1990, www.osce.org/library/140

108. Section 1675, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, www.congress.gov/116/bills/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.

109. US Department of State, “Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” CITIA no. 4228.

October 1, 1953, https://photos.state.gov/libraries/korea/49271/p_int_docs/p_rok_60th_int_14.pdf.

110. White House, “Joint vision for the alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea,” June 16, 20

https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-and-republic-korea.

111. White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-conte

/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf.

112. US Department of Defense, “Public Summary of Future Defense Vision of the Republic of Korea (ROK)-U.S. Alliance,” Nov

2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Nov/19/2002213369/-1/-1/1/PUBLIC-SUMMARY-OF-VISION-FOR-THE-

-ALLIANCE-FINAL.

113. Lynn Rusten and Richard Johnson, “Building Security Through Cooperation,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2019, 33–

https://media.nti.org/documents/NTI_DPRK2019_RPT_FNL.pd

114. This request may reveal North Korea’s lack of understanding of the US national command authority, under which only the president can direct the use of nuclear weapons (Robert Carlin, “North Korea Said It Is Willing to Talk About Denuclearization . . . 

No One Noticed,” 38 North, July 12, 2016, www.38north.org/2016/07/rcarlin071216).

115. President Trump has suggested that the United States would not necessarily oppose Seoul and Tokyo pursuing nuclear weapons. See CNN, “Full Rush Transcript: Donald Trump, CNN Milwaukee Republican Presidential Town Hall,” March 23, 20

http://cnnpressroom.blogs.cnn.com/2016/03/29/full-rush-transcript-donald-trump-cnn-milwaukee-republican-presidential-town-hall.

116. Morton Halperin et al., “From Enemies to Security Partners: Pathways to Denuclearization in Korea,” Nautilus Institute for Security

and Sustainability, July 6, 2018, www.nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/from-enemies-to-security-partners-pathways-to

-denuclearization-in-korea.

117. Uri Friedman, “The Mystery at the Heart of North Korea Talks,” The Atlantic, June 26, 2018, www.theatlantic.com/internation

/archive/2018/06/denuclearization-korean-peninsula-moon/562601.

118. As a December 2018 KCNA statement said, “When we talk about the Korean Peninsula, it includes the territory of our republ

and also the entire region of (South Korea) where the United States has placed its invasive force, including nuclear weapons.

When we talk about the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, it means the removal of all sources of nuclear threat, not only 

from the South and North but also from areas neighboring the Korean Peninsula” (Tong-hyung Kim, “N. Korea insists US act first

before it gives up nukes,” Associated Press, December 20, 2018, www.apnews.com/9ad490e00ff5458daa98edb9745aa27e)

119. Xinhua, “Xi Jinping, Kim Jong Un hold talks in Dalian,” May 8, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-05/08/c_137164420.htm

120. Jeff Mason and Josh Smith, “Trump wants North Korea to denuclearize, but is in no hurry,” Reuters, February 19, 2019, www.reuter

.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-trump/trump-says-he-wants-north-korea-to-denuclearize-but-is-not-in-a-hurry-idUSKCN1Q82H9

121. Yong-in Yi, “North Korea reportedly makes specific denuclearization proposal during working-level talks with US,” Hankyor

April 13, 2018, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_northkorea/840509.html

122. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “A Conversation with Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun,” 2

Nuclear Policy Conference, March 11, 2019, https://s3.amazonaws.com/ceipfiles/pdf/NPC19-SpecialRepresentativeBiegun.pd

123. Richard Johnson, “Stop Trying to Define ‘Denuclearization’ and Just Start Doing It,” 38 North, December 17, 2019, www.38nor

.org/2019/12/rjohnson121719.

124. Under UN Security Council Resolution 1718, the Security Council decided that “the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons

existing nuclear programmes in a complete, verifiable and irreversible manner.” For more background on the term, see Cha, The 

Impossible State, 256.

125. Siegfried S. Hecker, Robert L. Carlin, and Elliot A. Serbin, “A technically-informed roadmap for North Korea’s denuclearizatio

Stanford University, Center for International Security and Cooperation, May 28, 2018, https://fsi-live.s3.us-west-1.amazonaw

.com/s3fs-public/hecker_carlin-serbin_denuc_rlc.pdf.

126. David E. Sanger and William J. Broad, “Verifying the End of a Nuclear North Korea ‘Could Make Iran Look Easy,’” New Y

Times, May 6, 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/us/politics/nuclear-north-korea-iran-inspections.html.

127. Hecker, Carlin, and Serbin, “A technically-informed roadmap.”
58 PEACEWO      NO.

128. Mareena Robinson Snowden, “Probabilistic Verification:A New Concept for Verifying the Denuclearization of North Korea,” Arm

Control Today, September 2019, www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-09/features/probabilistic-verification-new-concept-verifying

-denuclearization-north-korea.

129. International Atomic Energy Agency, “IAEA Safeguards Overview: Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and Add

Protocols,” www.iaea.org/publications/factsheets/iaea-safeguards-overview.

130. Lesley Wroughton and David Brunnstrom, “Exclusive: With a piece of paper, Trump called on Kim to hand over nuclear weapons,” Reuters, March 29, 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-usa-document-exclusive/exclusive-with-a-piece

-paper-trump-called-on-kim-to-hand-over-nuclear-weapons-idUSKCN1RA

131. Nuclear Threat Initiative, “North Korea: Biological (last updated: July 2018),” www.nti.org/learn/countries/north-korea/biological.

132. Emily Baumgaertner and William J. Broad, “North Korea’s Less-Known Military Threat: Biological Weapons,” New York Ti

January 15, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/science/north-korea-biological-weapons.html. 

133. John Parachini, “Why We Should be Skeptical About Recent Reports on North Korea’s Biological Weapons Programs,” 38 Nor

January 30, 2019, www.38north.org/2019/01/jparachini013019. 

134. Col. Shawn P. Creamer, “The United Nations Command and the Sending States,” International Council on Korean Studies, July

28, 2012, 12, http://icks.org/n/data/ijks/2017FW-4.pdf.

135. The KPA stopped attending formal Military Armistice Commission meetings in 1991 after the UN Command (UNC) appointed a So

Korean general as the UNC delegation’s senior member. Since then, the KPA has since continued to meet intermittently with the Unit

Nations Command Military Armistice Commission delegation at the colonel and general officer level during periods of diplomacy

136. United Nations Command-Rear, "Fact Sheet,” www.yokota.af.mil/Portals/44/Documents/Units/AFD-150924-004

137. The UNC has increased the number of sending states, created a separate staff, and designated non-US officers to serve as th

deputy commander and United Nations Command-Rear commander

138. Kang-moon Yoo, “Defense Ministry and UNC discuss UNC’s role after OPCON transfer,” Hankyoreh, September 18, 20

www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/909986.html.

139. UN Security Council, “Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea to the United Nat

addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/2013/20, January 14, 2013, www.undocs.org/pdf?symbol=en/S/2013/20.

140. Currently, the UNC has no relationship with UN Headquarters other than submitting an annual report on armistice maintenance (Ti

Shorrock, “Can the United Nations Command Become a Catalyst for Change on the Korean Peninsula,” National Interest, Novembe

1, 2018, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-united-nations-command-become-catalyst-change-korean-peninsula-34857).

141. Selig S. Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University

Press, 2002), 163.

142. Tim Shorrock, “Can the United Nations Command Become a Catalyst

143. In-bum Chun, “The Future of the UN Command,” 38 North, September 12, 2017, www.38north.org/2017/09/ibchun091217

144. Halperin et al., “From Enemies to Security Partners.

145. Some sectors of the South Korean public have criticized the UNC in the past because of perceptions that it has limited South

Korean sovereignty, including preventing it from sending a train to Sinuiju, North Korea, in August 2018 as part of a joint ROK-DP

railway project and hampering its ability to deliver an effective military response to the March 2010 sinking of the Cheonan.

146. Article 24 of the UN-Japan SOFA states that “All the United Nations forces shall be withdrawn from Japan within ninety days after the date by which all the United Nations forces shall have been withdrawn from Korea.” Article 25 states that the SOF

terminate on the date by which all the United Nations forces shall be withdrawn from Japan.” UN Forces Japan, “Agreeme

regarding the Status of the United Nations Forces in Japan,” February 19, 1954, www.perma.cc/UUL4-A

147. Michael Bosack, “Relevance Despite Obscurity: Japan and UN Command,” Tokyo Review, February 1, 2018, www.tokyoreview.

/2018/02/relevance-despite-obscurity-japan-un-command.

148. Choonsik Yoo, “North Korea’s economy tanks as sanctions, drought bite: South Korea,” Reuters, July 25, 2019, www.reuters.c

/article/us-northkorea-economy-gdp-idUSKCN1UL08

149. The litany of North Korea’s proscribed activities includes conventional and nuclear weapons proliferation, tests of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile technology, cyberattacks, hostile acts in the region, international terrorism, narcotics distribution, human 

rights violations, money laundering, counterfeiting of goods and currency, and bulk cash smuggling.

150. UN Security Council Resolutions 1695, 1718, 1874, 2087, 2094, 2270, 2321, 2356, 2371, 2375, and 23

151. US Embassy & Consulates in China, “U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley at the Adoption of UN Security 

Resolution 2397,” December 26, 2017, https://china.usembassy-china.org.cn/fact-sheet-un-security-council-resolution-2397-north-korea
USIP.ORG 59

152. Philip Rucker, Simon Demyer, and David Nakamura, “North Korea’s foreign minister says country seeks only partial sanctions

relief,” Washington Post, February 28, 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-and-kim-downplay-expectations-as-key

-summit-talks-begin/2019/02/28/d77d752c-3ac5-11e9-aaae-69364b2ed137_story.html.

153. For a comprehensive discussion, see Dianne E. Rennack, “North Korea: Legislative Basis for U.S. Economic Sanctions,” R

no. R41438, Congressional Research Service, June 11, 2018, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41438.p

154. Otto Warmbier North Korea Nuclear Sanctions and Enforcement Act of 2019, Sections 7111–7147, www.congress.gov/116/bil

/s1790/BILLS-116s1790enr.pdf

155. Joshua Stanton, Sung-yoon Lee, and Bruce Klingner, “Getting Tough on North Korea,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2017

www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-04-17/getting-tough-north-korea.

156. UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), para. 11, www.undocs.org/S/RES/2231(2015); European Parliament, “Joint Comprehe

Plan of Action,” July 14, 2015, para. 37, www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/122460/full-text-of-the-iran-nuclear-deal.pdf

157. NKSPEA, Section 208(c), which allows the president to waive sanctions under that law on a case-by-case basis for renewabl

periods of between thirty days and one year if the waiver is important for national security interests.

158. Leon V. Sigal, “Sanctions easing as a sign of non-hostility,” Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, February 23, 2015,

www.nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/sanctions-easing-as-a-sign-of-non-hostility.

159. Sections 401 and 402, NKSPE

160. Sigal, “Sanctions easing as a sign of non-hostility.”

161. Morton Halperin et al., “Ending the North Korean Nuclear Threat by a Comprehensive Security Settlement in Northeast Asia,

Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, June 26, 2017, www.nautilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-policy-forum/ending-the-north

-korean-nuclear-threat-by-a-comprehensive-security-settlement-in-northeast-asia.

162. NCNK, “Kim Jong Un’s 2019 New Year's Addres

163. Office of the President of the Republic of Korea, “Address by President Moon Jae-in on Korea’s 73rd Liberation Day,” August 1

2018, https://english1.president.go.kr/briefingspeeches/speeches/61.

164. Rennack notes that “by law, U.S. representatives in the international financial institutions (IFI) are required to vote against a

support for North Korea due to its nuclear weapons ambitions and international terrorism” (“North Korea: Legislative Basis,” 5)

165. Daniel P. Erikson, “Bridging the Gap: IMF and World Bank Membership for Socialist Countries,” Association for the Study of 

Cuban Economy, November 30, 2003, www.ascecuba.org/asce_proceedings/bridging-the-gap-imf-and-world-bank-membershi

-for-socialist-countries.

166. Thomas Byrne and Jonathan Corrado, “Making North Korea Creditworthy: What Will It Take for North Korea to Finance Its PostNuclear Development?” Korea Society, June 19, 2019, 34, www.koreasociety.org/images/pdf/Making.North.Korea.Creditworth

-Final.Report__Byrne-Corrado.pd

167. Bradley O. Babson, “Designing Public Sector Capital Mobilization Strategies for the DPRK,” in A New International Engagem

Framework for North Korea, ed. Ahn Choong-yong, Nicholas Eberstadt, Lee Young-sun (Washington, DC: Korea Econo

Institute of America, 2004), 234, http://keia.org/sites/default/files/publications/04Babson.pd

168. Yoon-shik Park, “Political Economy of Denuclearizing North Korea,” paper presented at the 2005 International Council 

Korean Studies Annual Conference, Crystal City, VA (August 5–6, 2005), https://home.gwu.edu/~yspark/Files/7.p

169. Byrne and Corrado, “Making North Korea Creditworthy,” 2

170. Mark E. Manyin and Mary Beth D. Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” CRS Report no. R40095, Congressional Re

Service, April 2, 2014, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40095.pd

171. Jake Sullivan and Victor Cha, “The right way to play the China card on North Korea,” Washington Post, July 5, 2017, www.washington

post.com/opinions/the-right-way-to-play-the-china-card-on-north-korea/2017/07/05/6d223aa0-6187-11e7-a4f7 -af34fc1d9d39_story.html.

172. UN Resident Coordinator for DPRK, “2019 DPRK Needs and Priorities,” March 6, 2019, www.reliefweb.int/r

/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/2019-dpr-korea-needs-and-priorities.

173. Manyin and Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” 15

174. UN Resident Coordinator, “2019 DPRK Needs and Priorities Rep

175. Manyin and Nikitin, “Foreign Assistance to North Korea,” 11

176. Han-na Park, “N. Korea rejects food aid over S. Korea-US military drills,” Korea Herald, July 24, 2019, www.koreaherald.co

/view.php?ud=20190724000638.

177. Roberta Cohen, “Sanctions Hurt but Are Not the Main Impediment to Humanitarian Operations in North Korea,” Asia Policy 1

no. 3 (July 2018): 35–41, https://muse.jhu.edu/article/700148/pdf.
60 PEACEWO      NO.

178. UN Human Rights Council, “Report of the Detailed Findings of the Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights in the Democr

People’s Republic of Korea,” A/HRC/25/CRP.1, February 7, 2014, 194, www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoID

/CommissionInquiryonHRinDPRK.aspx

179. United Nations, “Security Council 1718 Sanctions Committee Approves Implementation Assistance Notice on Humanitar

Exemption for Democratic People’s Republic of Korea,” press release, August 6, 2018, www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13445.d

htm; Jessup Jong and Kee Park, “Humanitarian exemptions for North Korean aid work: crunching the numbers,” NK News, July 

16, 2019, www.nknews.org/2019/07/humanitarian-exemptions-for-north-korean-aid-work-crunching-the-numbers.

180. United Nations, “Statement by Mr. Tapan Mishra, UN Resident Coordinator in DPRK, on the release of the 2019 Needs and Priorities Pl

March 6, 2019, www.reliefweb.int/report/democratic-peoples-republic-korea/statement-mr-tapan-mishra-un-resident-coordinator-dprk.

181. In December 2018, Special Representative Stephen Biegun announced the United States would review American citizen tra

to the DPRK for the purposes of facilitating the delivery of aid, saying the travel ban imposed in 2017 “may have impacted the

delivery of humanitarian assistance” (US Department of State, “Remarks on Humanitarian Assistance to the DPRK,” December 

2018, www.state.gov/remarks-on-humanitarian-assistance-to-the-dprk).
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Making Peace Possible

NO. 157 | February 2020

Few serious efforts have been made since the end of the Korean War in 1953 to achieve 

a comprehensive peace on the Korean Peninsula. The current deadlock in negotiations 

means that a broader discussion may remain out of reach. Nevertheless, the need to examine a peace regime, and its challenges and risks, remains. Peace is a process, however, not 

an event. For the Korean Peninsula, it involves not only the two Koreas but also four major 

powers—the United States, China, Japan, and Russia. This report outlines the perspective

and interests of each country before describing the diplomatic, security, and economic components necessary for a comprehensive peace, and how the United States can strategically

and realistically approach the challenge. 

• Afghan Women’s Views on Violent Extremism and Aspirations to a 

Peacemaking Role by Haseeb Humayoon and Mustafa Basij-Rasik

(Peaceworks, February 2020)

• The India-Pakistan Rivalry in Afghanistan by Zachary Constantino (Special 

Report, January 2020

• Understanding Pakistan’s Deradicalization Programming by Arsla Jawaid

(Special Report, January 2020

• The Challenges for Social Movements in Post-Mugabe Zimbabwe by Gladys 

Kudzaishe Hlatywayo and Charles Mangongera (Special Report, January 2020

• Displacement and the Vulnerability to Mobilize for Violence: Evidence from 

Afghanistan by Sadaf Lakhani and Rahmatullah Amiri (Peaceworks, January 202

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