Making Peace Possible

NO. 168 | September 2020

PEACEWORKS

Digital Inclusion in Mediated 

Peace Processes

HOW TECHNOLOGY CAN ENHANCE PARTICIPATION

By Andreas T. Hirblinger
NO. 168 | September 2020

Making Peace Possible

The views expressed in this report are those of the author alone. They do not necessarily reflect the views of

the United States Institute of Peace. An online edition of this and related reports can be found on our website 

(www.usip.org), together with additional information on the subject.

© 2020 by the United States Institute of Peace

United States Institute of Peace

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Peaceworks No. 168. First published 2020.

ISBN: 978-1-60127-829-6

MEDIATION, 

NEGOTIATION

& DIALOGUE

ABOUT THE REPORT

This report explores the concept of digital inclusion and its current and potential uses by 

mediators in peace processes. It lays out a conceptual framework and identifies key strategic 

purposes and contextual factors for effective digital inclusion. The discussion is based on 

surveys and interviews conducted over a year by the Centre on Conflict, Development and 

Peacebuilding (CCDP) at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies, 

Geneva. This work was supported through a grant from the United States Institute of Peace.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Andreas T. Hirblinger is a researcher at the CCDP in Geneva. He conducts research on 

inclusive peacemaking, the impact of digitization on peace processes, and the role of 

knowledge-making practices in peacebuilding. His research has been published in Security 

Dialogue, Journal of Intervention, and other leading journals.

Cover photo: Members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia look at photos 

on a mobile phone as they gathered on the eve of a historic armistice in San Vicente del 

Caguán on September 16, 2016. (Photo by Federico Rios Escobar/New York Times)
USIP.ORG 1

Contents

3 Introduction: The Digitization of Peace Processes

8 Understanding Digital Inclusion

11 The Emerging Practice of Digital Inclusion

15 A Conceptual Framework for Digital Inclusion

19 The Strategic Purposes of Digital Inclusion

34 Conclusion: Toward Effective Digital Inclusion
2 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Summary

Conflict parties and stakeholders increasingly use digital technology, especially 

social media, to further their agendas and interests. This trend toward greater digitization of peace processes among those directly involved in conflicts, however, has 

only recently begun to be mirrored by those whose job it is to mediate those conflicts. Digital technology can make it easier to include a wide range of stakeholders 

in peace processes, but mediators have tended to neglect this potential or have 

focused on the risks of social media and similar technologies. A clearer understanding of the concept of digital inclusion and its practical applications is needed.

Inclusion in peace processes is conventionally understood in “offline” terms, such 

as being physically present at the negotiation table. However, digital technology can 

support a mediator’s efforts to integrate a broad variety of perspectives, interests, 

and needs into a peace process. More particularly, digital inclusion can serve such 

strategic purposes as strengthening the legitimacy of peace processes and their 

outcomes, empowering women and marginalized groups, transforming community 

relationships, and reducing threats to vulnerable groups or risks to a peace process.

This report presents a conceptual framework for digital inclusion that helps elucidate 

an understanding of how digital technology can contribute to any of these strategic 

purposes of inclusion by delivering specific functions and outputs. The use made of 

digital technology by mediators until now has been relatively modest, although the 

COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted its value. The potential applications, however, 

are numerous and varied, as illustrated by a range of “use cases”—scenarios depicting specific situations in which a particular technology could be applied, tailored to 

the context and the peacemaking challenge the mediator is confronting. 

To make the most effective use of digital technology for inclusion, mediators 

need to consider a variety of contextual factors, not least the sociocultural and 

political environment, and should attempt to leverage existing technological 

capacity. Mediators must also carefully balance risks and opportunities. The risks 

are real, but they should not be exaggerated, lest mediators shy away from innovative applications that can integrate the voice of conflict parties and stakeholders into a peace process in the form of digital data.
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Conventional definitions of mediation entail at their core that the conflict parties seek 

a negotiated settlement with the assistance of a third party.1 These definitions are 

vague about the means used to settle the conflict, as long as they involve reaching some form of consensus and employing reason and logic, rather than coercion. 

However, inclusion in peace processes has predominantly been operationalized in 

“offline” terms, such as providing seats at the table to civil society representatives or 

conducting workshops or consultations through which stakeholders can make their 

views heard.2 Consequently, the question of how digital technology can contribute 

to mediated peace processes—and, more specifically, how it can enhance inclusive 

peacemaking—is yet to be answered. This report sets out to do just that.

The report begins, in this section, by explaining how mediators have gradually come to 

recognize the opportunities that digital technology offers. This section also outlines the 

growing literature on the subject and summarizes the methodology of the project on 

which this report is based. The second section gets to grips with the two key elements 

A young boy downloads a video from WhatsApp on his smartphone in Chennai, India on June 9, 2018. (Photo by Priyadarshini Ravichandran/

New York Times)

Many members 

of the mediation 

community have . . . 

remained reluctant to 

take their mediation 

efforts “online.” This 

changed in 2020 in 

the context of the 

global COVID-19 

pandemic.

Introduction: The Digitization 

of Peace Processes
4 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

of this report—digital technology and inclusion—by 

exploring how, broadly speaking, the former functions 

within the dynamics of a mediated peace process and 

how it can help overcome the challenges that characterize current approaches to inclusion. The third section 

gives an overview of the emerging practice of digital 

inclusion. It describes which technologies are used and 

how, and how they are linked with offline inclusion efforts and activities across different peacemaking tracks. 

The fourth section provides a conceptual framework 

that outlines four principal strategic purposes that digital 

inclusion can serve, as well as associated functions 

and outputs. Mediators can use this framework as a 

guide as they consider how to use digital inclusion and 

for what purpose. The practical application of digital 

inclusion comes into sharper focus in the fifth section. 

Looking in turn at each of the four strategic purposes, 

this section describes a broad array of potential applications as well as five recent uses in conflicts in Colombia, 

Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Myanmar. The concluding 

section emphasizes the need for mediators to adapt 

digital inclusion to the technological, sociocultural, and 

political realities of each peacemaking context and to 

balance the risks of using—and not using—digital technology with the opportunities it presents to respond 

purposefully and effectively to the increasing digitization of peace processes.

THE INEXORABLE RISE OF 

TECHNOLOGY IN PEACEMAKING

Currently, mediators tend to perceive digital technology predominantly as an obstacle and threat to a peaceful settlement of conflict—as weapons that conflict 

parties use to fight for their cause away from the negotiation table and that can all too easily disrupt, derail, or 

damage mediation efforts. Contemporary peacemaking 

takes place in a highly technologized political landscape, in which surveillance and spy technologies are 

pervasive. Conventionally, mediators make considerable efforts to guarantee that negotiation processes can 

take place in safe spaces in which confidentiality and 

the protection of participants can be guaranteed. The 

use of digital technology in peacemaking, therefore, 

seemingly stands in tension with an essential need of 

mediators, namely, to control the environment in which 

the negotiation process occurs.

This wariness of technology is understandable. But, 

when it amounts to a rejection of digital possibilities, it 

is also unwise and perhaps even futile, given the seemingly inexorable digitization of peace processes. The 

increasing role of technology—electronic equipment, 

applications, and platforms that communicate, process, 

and store data—has been the subject of academic and 

practice-oriented contributions on peacebuilding for 

some time. The United States Institute of Peace (USIP), for 

instance, published a report on the impact of new media 

on peacebuilding and conflict management all the way 

back in 2011. Although written before the repercussions 

of social media use during the Arab Spring could be fully 

grasped, the report shed light on the use of social media 

in “grassroots” protest movements and how it could be 

harnessed in “communications for peacebuilding.” As the 

authors argued, “The use of these technologies to resist 

political oppression or promote conflict has garnered 

much more attention than the use of these same technologies to promote peace and postconflict reconstruction.”3

Almost one decade later, the discourse around digital 

technology—and especially social media—is even more 

strongly centered around its conflict-aggravating potential, especially its utility in efforts to increase political polarization, spread misinformation, and erode trust in political 

institutions.4 Many members of the mediation community 

have therefore remained reluctant to take their mediation 

efforts “online.” This changed in 2020 in the context of 

the global COVID-19 pandemic, which saw many mediation teams resorting to digital means of communication 

in order to keep peace processes going in the face of 

global travel bans that made offline mediation impossible. 

Even once conventional forms of inclusion are possible 

again, peacemakers cannot afford to ignore the potential impact of digital technology on peace processes. 
USIP.ORG 5

This is because many conflict parties already make proactive use of the increasing availability of digital technology to further their interests and agendas. Consequently, 

conflicts are inevitably fought out in the digital sphere. 

What is more, conflict stakeholders, third parties, and the 

general population increasingly use digital technology to 

obtain information about the conflict, partake in political 

activities, or engage in conflict resolution efforts. In an 

online survey among mediation professionals conducted in 2019 as part of the research for this report, four 

out of five respondents said they had firsthand experience of conflict parties and stakeholders using digital 

technology to make their views heard and to promote 

or reinforce their positions.5 Social media applications 

in particular now play a crucial role in forming political 

opinion and facilitating political mobilization. 

Digital technology also opens up new opportunities for 

communication and engagement in mediation that did 

not previously exist. Traditional “shuttle diplomacy”—in 

which diplomats jet from one location to another as 

they conducted negotiations—is now partly replaced 

by a mediator’s instant communication with the conflict 

parties through messaging services such as WhatsApp. 

Such communication methods also make it easier to 

engage conflict parties that are territorially scattered 

or based in hard-to-reach areas. In 2017, in Syria, for 

example, mediators almost exclusively used instant 

messaging technology to broker local ceasefires; many 

of the signatories to agreements never met in person 

(see the snapshot box on page 33).

DIGITAL INCLUSION: AN EMERGING 

FIELD OF PRACTICE 

In the past two years, mediators and mediation support 

actors have been increasingly inclined to use digital technology in their work. In the 2019 online survey conducted 

among mediation professionals, three out of five survey 

respondents stated that they had used digital technologies to support their mediation efforts. This proportion 

has almost certainly increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. The growing use of digital technology is mirrored 

in a growing literature about how best to use it. 

The Geneva-based CyberMediation Initiative produced 

a number of policy publications on the role of digital 

technology in peace mediation.6 That initiative transformed in 2020 into the CyberMediation Network, 

aimed at informing mediation practitioners about the 

impact of digital technology on peacemaking. As of 

July 2020, the network is composed of ten members, 

including USIP.

7

 In 2019, the United Nations Department 

of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA) and 

the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue issued a report 

on the use of digital technologies in mediation and 

made available a continuously updated online Digital 

Mediation Toolkit for mediation practitioners.8 The 

toolkit identifies “inclusivity” as one of the main thematic areas in which digital technologies can be applied 

and suggests that digital technologies could be used 

“to solicit input from large numbers of people on the 

issues they view as priorities, their aspirations or their 

views of the process without necessarily broadening 

the actual negotiating table.”9 In addition, the UNDPPA 

has published an e-analytics guide on the use of data 

and technology for peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, and peacebuilding. The guide contends that 

inclusivity should be one of the main principles shaping 

how new technologies are employed.10

The broader peacebuilding field has seen the emergence 

of “peacetech,” or technologies employed strategically in 

peacebuilding efforts. Dedicated peacetech organizations 

and peacetech labs now exist in many countries. Some 

of the applications and tools that fall under this umbrella 

have potential utility for inclusive peacemaking. Peacetech 

Traditional “shuttle diplomacy”—in which diplomats jet from one location to another as they conducted 

negotiations—is now partly replaced by a mediator’s instant communication with the conflict parties 

through messaging services such as WhatsApp.
6 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

is nothing if not a dynamic field, but constant innovation 

fuels a perception that peacetech always remains “in the 

making” and unconsolidated.11 The fact that technologies 

are always in flux has led some peacebuilding scholars to 

argue that technology remains in a “liminal” state—that is, 

it is characterized by continuous ambiguity about its role.12

This creates unease among those who aim to use these 

technologies in a planned and predictable manner. It also 

means that it is challenging to produce guidance that is 

still relevant after the next round of software updates has 

been rolled out. This report responds to this challenge by 

offering insights that are focused less on specific technologies and more on the strategic purposes that they can 

serve. It proposes a strategic approach to digital inclusion 

through which mediators can gradually leverage the 

potential of digital technology to achieve specific purposes, while carefully taking into account important context 

factors that vary across different peacemaking scenarios, 

as well as the associated risks.

This report does not pretend that digital technology, 

especially social media, cannot have harmful effects on 

peace processes, but it aims to provide knowledge that 

can be used despite the associated challenges. This 

effort is based on the guiding consideration that if digital 

technology is increasingly employed in an informed and 

strategic manner, potential risks and challenges can be 

better controlled. The report seeks neither to spread 

“tech optimism” nor to indulge in “tech pessimism.” 

Rather, it carves out a reflexive and pragmatic path along 

which mediators can explore options for digital inclusion, 

while carefully controlling potential risks.

PROJECT METHODOLOGY

This report reflects the results of the yearlong 

Designing Digital Inclusion Project, conducted in 

2019 at the Centre on Conflict, Development and 

Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute, Geneva. The 

project, which aimed to support the mediation support community to effectively use digital technology 

to enhance inclusion in peace processes, had three 

“workstreams” (or sequenced areas of interrelated 

activity). In the first workstream, the project assessed 

how mediators and mediation support actors currently 

use digital technology to promote inclusion. The project 

looked at how digital technology is used to facilitate 

communication between conflict stakeholders within 

the digital sphere and explored linkages between digital and conventional mediation formats across different 

tracks of diplomacy, ranging from formal, high-level 

talks between political and military leaders (track 1), 

across unofficial dialogue and problem-solving activities 

involving experts and civil society (track 2), to people-to-people diplomacy at the grassroots level (track 

3) that encourages interaction, understanding, and trust 

building between hostile communities.13

To identify not only how mediation practitioners use 

digital technology but also factors that enable or constrain the effectiveness of digital technology, the project 

team conducted the online survey referenced earlier. 

Invitations to participate were distributed widely among 

the most relevant organizations, including the mediation 

support units of international and regional organizations 

such as the United Nations, the European Union, the 

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 

and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development; 

and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) such as 

the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Swisspeace, the 

Conflict Management Initiative, the Berghof Foundation, 

and the African Centre for the Constructive Resolution 

of Disputes. Mediators and their teams employed in 

internationally mandated mediation initiatives were also 

invited to participate. To ensure strong representation 

by women, invitations were also sent to members of 

women’s mediator networks. A total of seventy-three 

responses were received. In addition, twenty interviews 

were conducted with mediation professionals and 

experts, who provided information and perspective on 

individual cases. The assessment was global and included experiences from Afghanistan, Northern Ireland, 

Syria, Yemen, Libya, Ukraine, Myanmar, Colombia, Mali, 

the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of 

the Congo, Kenya, and South Sudan.14
USIP.ORG 7

In the next workstream, a review was conducted of the 

large body of literature on the use of digital technologies for development (or “ICT4dev”) and humanitarian 

relief and disaster response. Relevant learning examples were also distilled from the literature on e-participation in policymaking and the role of social media in 

social movements. Finally, the literature on countering 

online hate speech was mined for relevant insights.

These fields bear similarities to peacemaking in terms 

of the context in which these technologies are applied, 

which is often characterized by limited socioeconomic development and communication infrastructures. 

Moreover, as with peacemaking, these fields have 

objectives related to the overarching goal of increasing 

participation. The application of digital technology in 

these fields has also unveiled a range of intervening 

factors, challenges, and risks that should also be considered when applying digital technology in the field 

of peace mediation. Therefore, this report draws on 

the knowledge resources produced in these adjacent 

fields—including academic studies and policy- and 

practice-oriented literature—to inform the adaption of 

digital technology by the mediation community.

In the third and final workstream, the project sought to 

translate insights gained from the adjacent professional 

fields to peacemaking generally and mediation specifically. To better understand how to tailor digital technology to the needs of the mediation community, the 

project team invited mediators and mediation support 

actors to participate in an online course; here, the goal 

was to help the project develop practical learning and 

guidance resources. This activity was implemented 

jointly with Helena Puig Larrauri and Maude Morrison 

from the NGO Build Up.15 The course presented the 

preliminary findings of the other two workstreams (the 

survey and the literature review) and discussed how 

digital technology could be used to facilitate inclusive 

peacemaking in four distinct peacemaking scenarios: 

negotiations after a full-fledged civil war, negotiations 

to end a localized armed insurgency, negotiations in 

the context of electoral violence, and national dialogues after a popular uprising. These scenarios were 

chosen to discuss a wide variety of use cases in which 

a technology could be tailored to a specific situation. 

Fifteen of the use cases developed during the online 

course are presented later in this report. More detailed 

descriptions can be found on the project’s online 

resource, www.digitalpeacemaking.com. This website 

also presents additional information on the various 

peacemaking scenarios and phases in which the use 

cases may be applied.
8 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Understanding Digital Inclusion

Before examining the question of how best to make 

use of digital technology for inclusion, some clarity is 

required about what is meant by these terms. It is also 

necessary to understand how digital technology functions within the dynamics of a mediated peace process 

and how it can help overcome some of the challenges 

and dilemmas that characterize current approaches 

to inclusion, such as the competition for seats at the 

negotiation table.

DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND 

TOOLS AND GADGETS

In this report, digital technologies are understood as 

devices, platforms, or techniques that communicate, 

process, and store data—in other words, both hardware and software. They thus include computer and 

mobile phone–based applications, as well as social 

media. The peacebuilding and peacemaking communities increasingly utilize the term “digital technologies” 

in place of the more unwieldy term “information and 

communication technologies,” the latter also encompassing some nondigital technologies.

However they are defined, these technologies are 

more than just tools or gadgets. Technologies contain 

specific knowledge, through which they complete a 

task.16 It is thus essential to ask about not only the material aspects of technology (the tools or gadget), but 

also the knowledge and skills required to utilize them. 

Like any technology, digital technologies are always 

situated in a context and are “socially embedded.” 

They have been shaped by the environment in which 

they were developed, and they serve specific preferences.17 Knowledge is necessary not only to create a 

specific technology, but also to apply it purposefully 

and effectively. 

In recent years, discussions about the use of digital 

technology have been dominated by concerns about 

the detrimental role that it can play in political processes, and particularly in increasing political polarization, 

populism, xenophobia, and racism.18 In addition, feminist critiques of technology have flagged that current 

patterns of technology design, access, and usage 

mirror the broader social patterns and institutions that 

continue to marginalize women and other groups. 

Technologies are thus colored by the intentions, interests, and inclinations of those who build and use them. 

But if this is true, then technology can of course be 

used as a tool to advance emancipatory agendas, just 

as well as repressive and divisive ones.19

Once put in place, these technologies have an impact 

on the dynamics of peace processes—and their inclusivity. For instance, they may facilitate specific political 

agendas and not others, enhance the voice of specific 

stakeholders over others, or provide access to specific 

segments of the population while making participation 

more difficult for others.

INCLUSION: CHALLENGES AND DILEMMAS

In the past years, inclusion has emerged as a central 

concern for mediators and mediation support actors. It 

now forms an essential element in international efforts 

to support the peaceful settlement of armed conflict and 

to build long-term peace. Inclusion is also increasingly 

enshrined in international policy provisions and international law, particularly since the publication in 2012 of 

the UN secretary-general’s report “Peacebuilding in the 

Aftermath of Conflict.”20 There is, however, no precise 

definition of “inclusion” and the term risks being used 

as a buzzword to correspond with expected normative 

commitments, while its utility remains unclear.21
USIP.ORG 9

The United Nations’ “Guidance on Effective Mediation,” 

which was also issued in 2012, defines “inclusivity” as 

“the extent and manner in which the views and needs 

of conflict parties and other stakeholders are represented and integrated into the process and outcome 

of a mediation effort.”22 The term “inclusion” focuses 

on the efforts in the process through which inclusivity 

is achieved. These definitions, while somewhat fuzzy, 

mirror some of the early reasoning behind inclusion, 

namely, to widen participation beyond the principal 

conflict parties so that the views and needs of all stakeholders can be brought into the process. 

In practice, implementing inclusive peace processes 

has been challenging. Inclusion can lead to a change 

of power relations at the negotiation table and beyond. 

Domestic political elites (whether within the country or 

part of a diaspora) may therefore view inclusive arrangements as a threat to their power and oppose it. Foreign 

interests also matter. In Syria, more inclusive arrangements have been hindered by powerful foreign states 

that reject more inclusive peace negotiations. Moreover, 

widespread insecurity, ongoing military operations, or 

the destruction of infrastructure through armed conflict 

make the participation of large parts of civilian society in 

peace processes very difficult. Although digital technology cannot change the political context in which peace 

processes take place, it allows mediation professionals 

to respond to these challenges differently, by enabling 

more flexible forms of inclusion that are less dependent 

on infrastructure and physical location.

But who should mediators include? The age-old fight to 

have a seat at the negotiation table has recently been 

widened, but there are no clear answers to the question 

of who should have a say alongside the track 1

parties—at the table or beyond. There is a risk of a 

competition for seats between participants that claim to 

represent various population and stakeholder groups, 

matching specific identity traits (for example, gender, 

age, ethnicity). Inclusion has to a great extent become 

associated with women’s participation, but other identity 

markers, such as youth, are also drawing attention.23

What is more, peace processes often necessitate resolving animosities along ethnic or religious identity categories. Given the focus on specific identity traits, participants in peace processes become associated with the 

seemingly homogenous constituencies they represent, 

while actually possessing multiple identity traits simultaneously. In addition, a reliance on a single identity marker, such as gender or geographic origin, as the criterion 

for selection poses the risk that the representatives of 

their constituents may brush over, or misrepresent, what 

is in fact a heterogeneous group of stakeholders.24

This complexity is compounded by increasing fragmentation in contemporary peace processes. In contexts 

such as Syria, Yemen, and South Sudan, the proliferation of armed groups, political parties, and civil society 

groups has made broad-based inclusion difficult to 

achieve.25 Conventional inclusion formats usually must 

go through a delicate selection process to guarantee 

that participation is balanced. This also pertains to the 

participation of what are often portrayed as “neutral” 

civil society actors, which may worsen detrimental 

power dynamics at the negotiation table if, for instance, 

civil society groups or women representatives side with 

elements of the political elite or armed opposition.26

HOW CAN DIGITAL INCLUSION HELP?

Many problems about participation stem from a misguided understanding of what should be included in a 

peace process. Inclusivity is achieved primarily through 

the inclusion, not of persons, but of the views and needs 

of conflict parties and stakeholders. These are related to 

the various identity traits that matter in a given conflict.27

In this respect, digital technology may provide practical solutions, because it allows access to the negotiation table and helps broaden the process in ways that 

conventional inclusion modalities cannot—by focusing 

primarily on the integration of views and needs that are 

expressed by a diverse set of stakeholders, rather than 

on their physical presence at a conference or workshop, 

for instance. Digital technology promises to enable more 
10 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

fluid and adaptive forms of participation. Digital inclusion 

allows for more direct forms of participation and thus 

circumvents the challenge to distribute seats at the table 

in a way that reflects the overall composition of those 

affected by the conflict. It also enables participation on 

a larger scale, which means in effect that a more heterogeneous group can be involved in the processes. For 

instance, the United Nations Innovation Cell currently experiments with large mass online focus groups that could 

enable the participation of up to a thousand stakeholders—for instance, in Yemen or Ukraine.28 Stakeholders 

can also participate more flexibly, engaging with others 

depending on the specific issues and purposes.

By way of definition, it is suggested here that digital 

inclusion in a mediated peace process means that the 

voice of conflict stakeholders is integrated into that 

process in the form of digital data. “Voice” encompasses various kinds of information that are intentionally expressed by the conflict party or stakeholder, including 

factual information, preferences, experiences, opinions, 

and beliefs. Peace processes are typically characterized by new and often inchoate political demands and 

ideas, which aim at the renegotiation of the political 

status quo and need to be given expression—hence 

the importance of voice.29 Voice also helps to gather 

information about the needs and experiences of population groups that are affected by war and violence, 

which can inform the short-term activities of mediators 

and their teams.

Conventional forms of inclusion ultimately require the 

physical presence of representatives who can ensure 

that their constituents’ preferences are communicated 

in a direct manner to the mediator and other conflict 

parties and stakeholders, thereby informing the ongoing 

peace process. The representatives will also be able 

to verify if their message has been accurately received 

and taken into account. When using digital technology, 

messages are translated into digital data and transmitted 

by digital means. This means that the “data” is split from 

the “sender.” This is another reason why the emphasis 

on voice is important in the data collected through digital 

inclusion—it requires that the data integrated into the 

process corresponds with the message that the sender 

wanted to deliver in the first place. 

A real danger exists that senders lose control of the 

information and ideas they express, especially if they 

do not express them with the intention of influencing 

the peace process. Large amounts of data are available 

that can inform a peace process that have not originally 

been produced with this intent. For instance, posts and 

comments on social media may contain political messages that can help mediation professionals understand 

the preferences of conflict parties, conflict stakeholders, 

and their respective constituents. Indeed, sentiment 

analysis tools are specifically designed to reveal such 

preferences. But although these tools may gather relevant information, there is no way to guarantee that the 

senders of information actually wanted the information 

to inform the peace process in this particular way. 

This problem has been raised through warnings about 

the “extractive” potential of digital technology and its 

possibly disempowering effects that do not encourage 

engagement in peace processes.30 Research in other 

domains has shown that while social media users have 

to agree to the collection and use of personal data 

that is difficult to keep track of, they nonetheless have 

a sense of the range of uses of that information and 

the inferences that might be made from it.31 That said, 

using social media data to inform political processes 

without the explicit consent of social media users is 

likely to backfire for several reasons, not least because 

of the danger of taking comments out of context and 

thus misinterpreting them. An emphasis on the need 

to capture voice in order to be truly inclusive can avert 

such risks because it requires that the data collected is 

intended by its senders to inform the peace process.
USIP.ORG 11

The Emerging Practice 

of Digital Inclusion

Which digital technologies do mediators use to facilitate inclusion and how do they use them? Drawing on 

the results of the online survey and expert interviews 

conducted as part of this study, this chapter offers a 

rough sketch of current practice. Those results are not 

representative of all mediation practices, but they are 

likely to be indicative of broader trends. 

The aim here is not to describe the vast array of technologies that can be used in peace processes (to do so 

would require a small encyclopedia in need of constant 

updating), but first to offer a brief overview and then to 

describe the communication patterns that result from 

the use of digital technology, how digital technology 

is used in combination with offline conventional forms 

of inclusion, and how digital technology is used to link 

peacemaking efforts between different tracks.

Since the survey was conducted, the global COVID-19 

pandemic has changed these use patterns. Faced with 

a global lockdown and widespread travel restrictions, 

many mediation teams have increasingly used digital 

technology in their work. This is documented in a starkly 

increased interest in the topic of digital inclusion. In a survey of individuals with an interest in the CyberMediation 

Network conducted in June 2020, more than nine out of 

From left to right, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, Qatari Minister of Foreign 

Affairs Sheikh Mohamad Bin Abdel Rahman Al-Thani and Mutlaq bin Majid al-Qahtani, the special envoy of the Qatari Foreign Minister for Terrorism and Mediation in the Settlement of Disputes, listen to Abdullah Abdullah, chairman of Afghanistan’s High Council for National Reconciliation, on the screen, at the 

opening session of the peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in Doha, Qatar, on September 12, 2020. (Photo by Hussein Sayed/AP)
12 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

ten respondents stated that their teams had spent more 

time than usual considering or planning options for digital 

inclusion, and more than eight out of ten stated that their 

teams had increasingly applied digital technology to 

enhance inclusion during the pandemic.32

WHICH TECHNOLOGIES ARE 

CURRENTLY USED, AND WHY?

Many mediators make use of digital technologies, but not 

all the time and for all purposes. As noted earlier, three 

out of five participants in the 2019 survey stated they 

have used digital technologies to support their mediation 

efforts, and more than four out of five have firsthand experience of conflict parties or stakeholders using digital 

technologies to make their views heard. For instance, 

conflict parties use digital technologies to shape the 

“information battleground” and influence the participants’ 

perceptions, stances, and willingness to negotiate. At 

times, conflict parties may also use digital technologies 

to share grievances, put forward proposals, and promote 

or reinforce their positions. In many contexts, conflict 

party representatives that are involved in a negotiation 

may use their social media profiles to post updates about 

the process and share details and even documents. 

However, only two out of five respondents have known 

conflict parties to request that digital technologies be 

used as a tool for inclusion in a mediated peace process. 

This indicates a discrepancy between the use of technologies by the conflict parties and their interest in having 

technology used in mediation efforts. Of course, this 

should not be interpreted to mean that other stakeholders—and especially those with limited voice—would not 

appreciate stronger inclusion through digital means.

The survey also yielded insights into which technologies 

are used and why. The top technologies used were 

email, followed by websites, interactive data visualization and analysis tools, online discussion forums, short 

messaging services, and smartphone messaging applications. These results reflect the fact that the majority of 

the mediation support community employs off-the-shelf 

communication technologies that can be utilized for a 

variety of purposes. In contrast, specialized, dedicated, 

and more technically demanding technologies seem 

to be less widely used. The survey also indicates that 

mediation professionals choose their technologies 

mainly based on the criteria of “what works.” Important 

considerations are the appropriateness for a particular 

context, the availability and reliability of technology, and 

the stakeholders’ preferences for and acceptance of 

technology, visible in local use patterns. Other influential 

factors are ease of deployment, use, and maintenance; 

the overall performance and usefulness of technology 

for a given purpose; and cost. Security is also a crucial 

consideration, particularly concerns about data security, 

data manipulation, and surveillance risks, as well as protection concerns for those who use the technology.

COMMUNICATION PATTERNS: TWO-WAY 

VERSUS NETWORKED COMMUNICATION

The survey produced interesting insights into the communication patterns between mediation professionals, 

conflict parties, stakeholders, and the broader population. 

Three out of five respondents use digital technologies to 

communicate with the conflict parties; the same proportion use them to communicate with the general public; 

and an even larger proportion—four out of five—use digital technologies to facilitate their communication with conflict stakeholders. Some mediation teams, for example, 

set up several decentralized reporting centers to which 

the population could send news of ceasefire violations 

and other significant developments. Other teams used 

SMS-polling technologies to get a sense of the perceptions and preferences of the broader population. The 

lower levels of use in communication with conflict parties 

may be due to the mediators’ concerns about surveillance. For instance, mediators were conscious of the risk 

that the content of their conversations could be intercepted or the identity and geographical position of those using the technologies could be disclosed. Many mediators 

invest considerable resources to guarantee the safety of 

the conflict parties they interact with, and thus they aim to 

keep digital traces to a minimum. Where surveillance is 

less of a concern, and its consequences are less likely to 
USIP.ORG 13

imperil the parties’ safety, digital technologies are more 

likely to be used as a vehicle for inclusion.

Mediation professionals also use digital technologies to 

facilitate communication that does not primarily involve 

them. Almost three out of five respondents have used 

digital technologies to facilitate communication between 

the conflict parties and the general public. This again 

indicates that these technologies are already used in 

ways that foster inclusion. For example, such communication may be facilitated to foster a basic level of buy-in 

among the conflict parties’ constituents through information sharing and consultations. One in two respondents 

have used digital technologies to facilitate communication 

between different conflict stakeholders. This suggests 

that digital technologies can help strengthen interaction 

between parties that usually do not have direct access to 

the negotiation table. Almost two out of five respondents 

have used digital technologies to facilitate communication 

between conflict stakeholders and the general public, 

which also broadens engagement in peace processes. 

In contrast, digital technologies are used less to facilitate the communication between conflict parties and 

between conflict parties and conflict stakeholders. Here, 

again, data security concerns are likely to play an important role. It seems plausible that exchanges between 

conflict parties, and between conflict parties and other 

stakeholders, are perceived as highly sensitive and 

challenging to manage, which is why most mediation 

professionals continue to rely on face-to-face communication. There are some interesting outliers, however, 

such as the use of text-messaging services to establish 

contact between representatives of quarreling groups 

that have not been in direct contact for years or even 

decades. Digital technologies have also been used to 

increase empathy between communities associated 

with different conflict parties. In Ukraine, for instance, the 

Donbass Dialogue uses a virtual dialogue platform that 

connects communities that live in government-controlled 

areas with communities that live in areas not controlled 

by the government (see the snapshot box on page 30).

Many digital technologies enable forms of communication that are not strictly between two parties, but instead 

unfold in relational networks. For instance, messaging 

services, which have conventionally been used to connect 

two parties, now often involve groups of participants. A 

WhatsApp group may be moderated by an administrator, 

who regulates the membership of the group, but all members have an equal ability to contribute to the chat. Other 

communication platforms may allow a stronger level of 

moderation and control, for instance, through the curation of specific dialogue themes and through moderation 

functions such as calling on or muting participants or even 

censoring specific content and comments. In addition, 

some technologies—such as online surveys, polling, and 

crowdsourcing applications—are more suited to enable 

vertical communication between a central agent and a 

larger group, whereas other technologies—such as online 

fora and wikis—enable horizontal and decentralized communication. The design of such technologies shapes the 

dynamics of inclusion and ultimately influences what objectives can be achieved through them. As the use cases 

presented later in this report make clear, the design of the 

technology will affect how specific functions and outputs 

associated with a specific strategic purpose are delivered.

INTEGRATING OFFLINE AND 

ONLINE INCLUSION EFFORTS

The survey responses indicate that mediation professionals use digital technologies primarily in combination with conventional, offline forms of inclusion; digital 

technologies are also used, albeit to a smaller degree, 

to facilitate standalone, online forms of inclusion. In 

2019, almost nine out of ten respondents reported 

that they used digital technologies in combination 

with offline inclusion formats, such as consultations or 

workshops. Mediators often alternate between online 

formats and offline formats, or use them in parallel. 

For example, online platforms provide opportunities 

to organize and coordinate offline activities and to set 

agendas. In advance of offline activities, digital technologies are also used to conduct informal consultations 

and preliminary discussions with individual actors, 
14 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

which are then continued, extended, and finalized 

through offline activities. For instance, during the negotiations in Myanmar that led to a Nationwide Ceasefire 

Agreement in October 2015, mediators used, with the 

agreement of all major parties, an NGO’s Facebook 

page as an ad hoc consultation platform. During the 

COVID-19 pandemic, many mediators have used online-only inclusion formats. 

Digital technologies may be used to create and share 

content that then features in offline meetings. Digital 

technologies can also enable broader participation 

during offline activities—for instance, through video 

streaming or videoconferencing services. Many mediation professionals believe that digital technologies 

cannot easily replace face-to-face meetings and that 

these conventional forms of interaction continue to be 

understood as the “real” effort. In particular, offline forms 

continue to be perceived as more meaningful and more 

suited to building a basis for collaboration. They are 

also understood as a prerequisite for online activities. In 

short, digital inclusion is currently seen as being able to 

complement conventional forms of inclusion, but not to 

replace them. During the pandemic, although many mediation teams have relied on digital technology to maintain communication with important stakeholder groups 

and have taken already planned offline inclusion efforts 

online, most mediators still seem to regard building new 

relationships or realizing other strategic objectives solely 

through digital means as challenging. 

CREATING LINKAGES BETWEEN TRACKS

Digital inclusion can be a vehicle for connecting peacemaking efforts. Three out of four respondents have 

used digital technologies to create linkages between 

different peacemaking tracks. For example, digital 

technology can enable civil society actors in track 2 

dialogues to provide their perspectives to participants 

in track 1 through electronic messages, “digital feeds,” 

or videoconferencing links. Messaging services can 

provide a platform for informal discussions among influential civil society leaders that then inform the official 

negotiating positions of the conflict parties. Information 

gathered through online consultations can be fed back 

into formal national dialogue processes. Mediation professionals also use information gathered through social 

media sources to analyze and monitor conflict dynamics and trends and to inform mediation strategies. This 

information may also be presented to stakeholders and 

conflict parties taking part in various tracks. However, 

as explained in the preceding section, this does not 

contribute to digital inclusion unless the information is 

provided intentionally by the users. 

Digital technologies can also be used for multilevel 

peace advocacy and to capture the sentiments and 

interests expressed in one track and present them to 

stakeholders participating in another track. It is important to note, however, that in digital inclusion, differentiating between tracks becomes increasingly difficult. 

This is because digital inclusion stakeholders connect 

in spaces that are much more fluid and dynamic than a 

static model of separate peacemaking tracks assumes. 

When conflict parties and stakeholders interact on social media platforms, they are operating in a trackless 

space, one in which conventional roles and political 

boundaries are challenged. In some cases, conflict 

party representatives have shared information from 

the negotiating process with their followers or constituencies and have engaged in discussions with these 

audiences through social media channels. In other 

cases, civil society activists have brought political elites 

into a social media debate with the wider population 

by using Twitter hashtags and tagging these influential 

stakeholders in comments on Facebook. 

These examples point to an emerging practice of digital 

inclusion that is already changing how the broader public participates in peace processes. But if this desire for 

participation is to be harnessed by mediators and their 

teams, it is important to get clarity about the specific purposes that these various expressions of voice can serve. 

Mediators need an informed and strategic approach to 

digital inclusion, as the next section explains.
USIP.ORG 15

A Conceptual Framework 

for Digital Inclusion

Inclusion is not an end in itself but a means to an 

end: the peaceful settlement of conflict. But how can 

inclusion, and in particular digital inclusion, contribute 

to that broad goal? This section of the report introduces a conceptual framework that elucidates how digital 

inclusion can support specific strategic purposes in 

mediated peace processes by delivering specific 

functions and outputs.

As inclusion has grown more popular, approaches to 

it have considerably diversified. Many of these approaches implicitly or explicitly correspond with deeper 

reflections about the causes and dynamics of conflict, 

and how inclusion can help to address, mitigate, and 

overcome them. To matter for peace processes, inclusion should therefore be understood as purposeful.

The conceptual framework is built around four strategic 

purposes, drawing on an article published in January 

2020 by Andreas Hirblinger and Dana Landau, who 

spotlighted major strategies of inclusion in peacemaking practice and their underlying rationales:

• To build the legitimacy of processes and outcomes 

by involving a broad range of stakeholders beyond 

the principal conflict parties.

• To empower women and marginalized groups by 

providing opportunities for participation in peace 

processes and political institutions.

Men sell mobile phones and SIM cards at a market in Kabul, Afghanistan, on March 31, 2016. (Photo by Adam Ferguson/New York Times)
16 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Table 1. A Conceptual Framework for Digital Inclusion

Strategic purposes of digital technology Description

Build the legitimacy of

processes and outcomes 

Increase public support for peace processes and their outcomes by involving conflict stakeholders beyond the principal conflict parties

Empower women and marginalized groups Give marginalized or vulnerable groups the power to inform peace processes by providing 

opportunities and resources for participation 

Transform relationships Transform the social, political, and cultural relationships underlying conflict by focusing on the 

relations between conflict parties and stakeholders

Protect vulnerable groups and

reduce the risk of continued violence 

Enable early warning and early action by fostering horizontal networks of information exchange

Functions of digital technology Description

Gather data Collect data relevant for the peacemaking context, actors, or specific events

Analyze data Process, prepare, compare, or triangulate data relevant for the peacemaking context, actors, or 

specific events

Disseminate data Share or publish data relevant for the peacemaking context, actors, or specific events

Amplify messages Increase the visibility of information and make it more marked

Diversify messages Increase the diversity of information or the diversity of senders

Connect actors Enable exchange and communication between actors

Enable coordination Enable alignment between usually unconnected or disjointed actors

Enable collaboration Enable joint action between actors toward a common objective

Outputs of digital technology Description

Better information Providing data that is not otherwise available 

Faster information Reducing the time required for data transmission

Wider information Widening the reach of data among the population

Political expression Making the thoughts and feelings of stakeholders known

Assert influence Enabling stakeholders to affect the course of the peace process

Empathy Increasing the ability of stakeholders to understand and share the feelings of others

Mobilization Organizing and encouraging a particular group to take collective action

Representation Providing information that depicts someone’s interests, needs, or concerns

Deliberation Enabling discussion through which an issue is carefully considered
USIP.ORG 17

• To transform relationships underlying conflict and 

build community by focusing on the relational dynamics between conflict parties and stakeholders. 

• To protect vulnerable groups and reduce the risk of 

continued violence by enabling early warning and 

early action.33

Digital technologies can be used—either individually or 

collectively—to pursue any of these strategic purposes. 

Mediators can use digital technologies to achieve a 

single strategic purpose or a combination of them.

To chart out an actionable pathway to achieve each of 

these strategic purposes, it is helpful to think in greater 

detail about the individual functions that digital technology has to fulfill and the outputs it needs to generate. 

The NGO Build Up differentiates between three general 

functions of technology, namely, data management, 

strategic communication, and dialogue and networking. 

These general functions can in turn be broken down to 

yield a detailed understanding of what digital technology 

must deliver to facilitate inclusion in mediated peace processes. Data management can be broken out into data 

gathering, data analysis, and data dissemination. Strategic 

communication can be disaggregated into the amplification of messages and the diversification of messages. 

Finally, dialogue and networking can be broken down 

to differentiate between connecting users, coordinating 

their activities, and enabling collaboration between them.

The functions create various outputs that help to 

achieve each of the four objectives. The data management functions help to produce new or better information, increase the speed of information transmission, 

and increase the spread of information among the 

population. The strategic communication functions 

can enable or enhance political expression, assert 

influence in the peace process, and increase empathy. 

Finally, the dialogue and networking functions enable 

or enhance mobilization, representation, and deliberation. Importantly, the technologies will always have to 

enable a combination of functions in order to generate 

the outputs, and a combination of outputs is needed to 

achieve a single strategic purpose.

This conceptual framework—the strategic purposes, 

functions, and outputs of digital technology—is elaborated in table 1. It should be noted that it does not provide 

a one-size-fits-all solution; to the contrary, it is meant 

as an inspiration that can guide the designing of digital 

inclusion efforts in a context-sensitive manner. The functions and outputs of technology presented in the table 

were first derived from a review of academic and policy-oriented literature that documents the use of digital 

technologies in adjacent fields, such as peacebuilding, 

development aid, and humanitarian response. The idea 

was to distill lessons learned about how technologies 

can contribute to any of the four strategic purposes. 

The framework was then discussed and further refined 

during a participatory online course, held as part of the 

Designing Digital Inclusion project. The relevance of the 

individual functions and outputs for each of the strategic 

purposes was tested during the design of the digital 

inclusion use cases, which are presented in the next 

section. As such, the framework is meant to support the 

practical design of digital inclusion activities.

The four sections of figure 1 show which functions and 

outputs are involved with each of the four strategic 

purposes. As can be seen, not all functions are needed 

to achieve a specific output or strategic purpose.
18 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

 Gather data 

 Analyze data 

 Disseminate data 

 Amplify messages 

 Diversify messages 

 Connect actors 

 Enable coordination 

Enable collaboration 

 Better information 

 Faster information 

 Wider information 

 Political expression 

 Assert influence 

 Empathy 

 Mobilization 

 Representation 

 Deliberation 

 Legitimacy and 

 public support 

 Empowerment 

 Transforming 

 relations 

 Risk mitigation 

 and protection 

 Gather data 

 Analyze data 

 Disseminate data 

 Amplify messages 

 Diversify messages 

 Connect actors 

 Enable coordination 

Enable collaboration 

 Better information 

 Faster information 

 Wider information 

 Political expression 

 Assert influence 

 Empathy 

 Mobilization 

 Representation 

 Deliberation

 Legitimacy and 

 public support 

 Empowerment 

 Transforming 

 relations 

 Risk mitigation 

 and protection 

 Gather data 

 Analyze data 

 Disseminate data 

 Amplify messages 

 Diversify messages 

 Connect actors 

 Enable coordination 

Enable collaboration 

 Better information 

 Faster information 

 Wider information 

 Political expression 

 Assert influence 

 Empathy 

 Mobilization 

 Representation 

 Deliberation

 Legitimacy and 

 public support 

 Empowerment 

 Transforming 

 relations 

 Risk mitigation 

 and protection 

 Gather data 

 Analyze data 

 Disseminate data 

 Amplify messages 

 Diversify messages 

 Connect actors 

 Enable coordination 

Enable collaboration 

 Better information 

 Faster information 

 Wider information 

 Political expression 

 Assert influence 

 Empathy 

 Mobilization 

 Representation 

 Deliberation

 Legitimacy and 

 public support 

 Empowerment 

 Transforming 

 relations 

 Risk mitigation 

 and protection 

Figure 1. Strategic Purposes of Mediated Peace Processes: Functions and Outputs

Functions Outputs Strategic purpose

Functions Outputs Strategic purpose

Functions Outputs Strategic purpose

Functions Outputs Strategic purpose

LEGITIMACY AND PUBLIC SUPPORT

TRANSFORMING RELATIONS 

EMPOWERMENT

RISK MITIGATION AND PROTECTION
USIP.ORG 19

The Strategic Purposes 

of Digital Inclusion

The conceptual framework presented in the preceding 

section identifies the strategic purposes that digital inclusion can serve, as well as the functions and outputs 

that digital technologies have to deliver to contribute 

to these purposes. The framework is not prescriptive, 

but provides a heuristic resource through which mediation professionals can consider how to use digital 

technology and for what purpose. The framework thus 

encourages mediators to ask certain questions, but—as 

this section explains and illustrates—how they answer 

those questions must be shaped by the specific peacemaking context in which they are working.

Prominent among the contextual factors mediators and 

their support teams should consider is the kind of conflict 

and its underlying causes. Inclusion through digital technology can support a variety of peacemaking efforts in 

several different kinds of conflict, ranging from mediating 

in civil wars or armed insurgencies, to facilitating national 

dialogues in the context of political transitions, or preventing electoral violence. The needs of the process shape 

the mediator’s mandate, objectives, and approach and 

influence the purpose of the digital inclusion intervention.

The stage of the process also matters. Although generating public support is crucial throughout most of the 

process, the early stages may demand that mediators 

pay more attention to other strategic purposes, such 

as empowering civil society to increase the political 

pressure for a negotiated settlement or building trust 

between the conflict parties. The later stages of a mediation usually require that the outcomes of the negotiation are viewed as legitimate by all relevant stakeholders 

and call for activities that support the longer-term transformation of the relationships that underpinned conflict. 

This is not to suggest that peace processes unfold in a 

linear fashion. However, timing matters in the design and 

implementation of digital inclusion activities. 

This section discusses how the four strategic purposes 

can concretely be achieved. To this end, it summarizes 

core insights from the use of digital technologies in 

adjacent fields, such as development aid and humanitarian relief, and offers two types of examples for each 

of the strategic purposes. One type is a snapshot of 

how digital inclusion has been or currently is being 

used in peacemaking. The other type consists of use 

cases that sketch scenarios of how digital technology 

could be used for purposeful digital inclusion. As noted 

earlier, these use cases were developed in a participatory process during the Designing Digital Inclusion 

Online Course, which was held from August to October 

2019. To make it easier to see how the use cases correspond with the conceptual framework, the functions 

and outputs are set in bold type.

BUILDING THE LEGITIMACY OF 

PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES

Peace negotiations require public support at various 

stages in a process if they are to produce results that 

are legitimate. Inclusive arrangements, which make 

it more likely that the views and needs of all relevant 

stakeholders are taken into account, will also increase 

the likelihood that the underlying causes of conflict 

are addressed, thereby making it less likely that any 

conflict stakeholder will return to violence.
20 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Snapshot

COLOMBIA—DIGITAL AGENDA SETTING 

In 2012, in the course of the peace process between the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) 

and the government of Colombia, digital technology was used to consult with the public to shape the 

agenda of the peace negotiations and to inform the public about the peace process. The means used included a dedicated web page and a smartphone application, Mesa de Conversaciones, which was used 

to share documents and videos and to collect submissions from the general population. The platform 

was managed as a joint effort by the mediation parties in collaboration with the government. 

The information collected through the process, however, was too vast to be systematically analyzed. As 

a result, it remains unclear how it actually informed the negotiations. The initiative also struggled with 

a high percentage of SPAM and fabricated submissions, which had to be differentiated from authentic 

submissions. Reports on the consultative process were published in 2013. The final peace agreement 

text acknowledges the impact of the digital consultations, in conjunction with responses obtained in 

workshops with civil society across the country, and mentions that the public made more than seventeen 

thousand submissions. 

Following the 2014 elections, the use of digital technology became much more politicized. Social media 

in particular turned into a battleground for supporters and opponents of the peace process. This contest 

became especially pronounced after the government and FARC negotiators agreed on the terms of a 

peace agreement in August 2016. During preparations for a public referendum on the agreement, various political stakeholders used social media to campaign for or against it. After a thin majority rejected 

the peace agreement in the referendum, peace activists used social media to campaign for a renegotiation of the agreement. The amended agreement was ratified in the Colombian Congress and no attempt 

for a second referendum was made.
USIP.ORG 21

Inclusion has been widely used as a vehicle to 

strengthen the public support and acceptance of political processes and their outcomes, and digital technology plays an increasing role in such efforts. Even though 

increased use of digital technology, including social 

media, does not necessarily lead to increased political 

participation, this has not discouraged efforts to extend 

democratic processes into the digital realm through 

variants of “eParticipation.”34 These initiatives can take 

many forms, including data gathering, information sharing, electronic voting, online debates, consultations, 

and decision making.35 In addition, social media has 

been broadly used in support of political activism—both 

online and offline—which can strengthen the support 

for political and social movements. When decision makers hear such claims, political processes become more 

legitimate.36

In conflict-affected countries, many stakeholders have 

little opportunity to voice their needs and interests 

because of the high costs of participation. By providing 

simple and cost-effective means to engage, digital technology can also amplify the messages of a larger number of stakeholders and thus increase the public support 

for processes.37 For instance, providing input through a 

simple messaging platform is very inexpensive. During 

the COVID-19 pandemic, Build Up partnered with the 

UN Peacebuilding Fund to run a public consultation in 

Somalia to identify peacebuilding priorities for the next 

three years. The process was conducted exclusively on 

WhatsApp and almost four hundred people participated. 

The results of this public consultation were fed into a 

closed-door virtual consultation that brought together 

high-level UN and government officials to agree on a 

final list of peacebuilding priorities.

Digital inclusion in peace processes can strengthen 

public support and approval at several stages. In the 

early phases, mediators and their teams may make use 

of the political momentum created by peace activists 

and civil society. Although mediators usually do not 

work directly with such groups, the potential of peace 

movements can be leveraged to bring the conflict 

parties to the negotiation table. Digital technologies 

provide many opportunities to coordinate peace 

campaigns, help gather information about political 

demands, and increase public support for a peaceful 

settlement of the conflict. 

USE CASE 1: In the early phases of a process, participatory peace campaigns can be supplemented through a 

social media component. These campaigns could involve 

civil society groups that demonstrate the public’s willingness for a peaceful settlement and pressure conflict parties to join the formal negotiation process. For instance, 

mediation support actors could share multimedia content 

that documents progress in the peace process. Once a 

formal negotiation process is established, the campaign 

would disseminate data that informs the public about 

tangible achievements. The campaign would also ask 

members of the public to express their political demands 

and lobby their political representatives to commit to a 

peaceful settlement. The campaign would amplify the 

messages of peace activists, increase mobilization, and 

support them to assert influence on the conflict parties. 

The participants could also sign up for more confidence-building measures. These activities could be continuously documented and disseminated on social media.

Digital inclusion can contribute to the mapping of 

important peace processes actors, as well as their interests and positions and the power relations between 

them. Such mapping exercises are a prerequisite for 

crafting inclusion formulas that can help build public 

support. They are particularly relevant in contexts 

in which democratic representation is weak or long 

periods of violence have resulted in fragmented and 

dispersed forms of political organization, including 

in the online space. For instance, peace efforts that 

are intended to end long-running, large-scale armed 

conflicts—such as the conflicts ongoing in Syria, 

Yemen, and Libya—will have to deal with high levels of 
22 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

fractionalization. In addition, large parts of the population may be living in refugee communities outside 

the country and therefore may be limited to remote, 

online-only forms of engagement. Limited public infrastructures, especially in development settings, may 

also make it difficult to find information about those 

who hold influence and power in the society affected 

by conflict. Mapping methodologies that document 

conflict stakeholders and the relations between them 

can fill such information gaps. The peacetech start-up 

Dialeqtic has piloted such mapping tools in the context of armed conflicts—as, for instance, in the eastern 

Democratic Republic of the Congo.38

USE CASE 2: A tool that enables the collection, analysis, and visualization of data to conduct a dynamic 

mapping of power relations can enable mediators to 

acquire better information about the conflict context. 

The tool gathers and analyzes data from offline or 

online focus group discussions with the support of a 

network of insider or local-level facilitators. The data 

could be displayed on an online dashboard to illustrate and visualize key stakeholders, their interests, 

and attitudes, as well as the relationships between 

them. The information will help in the development 

of mediation strategies and processes that produce 

more legitimate outcomes. 

In preparations for peace negotiations, digital inclusion 

has proven helpful as a vehicle to enable joint agenda 

setting. Digital inclusion can increase the chances that the 

negotiation agenda reflects not only the interests of those 

with direct access to the negotiation table, but also the 

needs and concerns of the broader population. During 

the peace process between rebels and the government 

in Colombia, for instance, the conflict parties used digital 

tools to consult with the public on the agenda of the 

peace negotiations (see the snapshot box on page 20). 

USE CASE 3: A variety of rapid polling applications 

can be used to collect data before and during peace 

negotiations—for instance, to support agenda setting processes. The polls could capture attitudes and 

opinions on a wide range of subjects that should be 

covered in the negotiation, such as specific power- or 

wealth-sharing provisions, reintegration and resettlement, disarmament, and political reform processes. The 

information would be collected, classified, and analyzed, and conclusions shared with the mediation team. 

The polls would thus amplify the messages of stakeholders without direct access to the negotiation table. 

At a later state in the process, the results of the polls 

could be used to incentivize compromise among negotiating parties, shared back to polling participants, and 

distributed among a wider set of organizations involved 

in the peace process. Rapid polls would lead to better 

information and help stakeholders express their political 

demands and assert influence at the negotiation table. 

The data collection, analysis, and dissemination could 

be done through WhatsApp messages, dedicated polling apps, online forms, or SMS systems.

Once negotiations are under way, digital technology 

can be employed to foster and maintain transparency. 

Although much of the peace process will be conducted 

behind closed doors, a controlled dissemination of information can help to build public approval of the eventual 

negotiation outcomes and guard against them being 

deals that satisfy only elites. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for instance, Swisspeace and NOREF facilitated a 

series of virtual meetings between the UN Special Envoy 

for Syria and representatives of civil society.39

Many stakeholders have little opportunity to voice their needs and interests because of the high costs of 

participation. By providing simple and cost-effective means to engage, digital technology can also amplify 

the messages of a larger number of stakeholders and thus increase the public support for processes.
USIP.ORG 23

Civil society–led initiatives can play a strong role in enforcing transparency and a democratization of information.40 By promoting a culture of openness that enhances government accountability, digital technology can 

inject trust and reciprocity into state-society relations.41

Such qualities are usually absent in societies wracked 

by armed conflict. A first step in building trust can be the 

creation of online platforms that bring together representatives of the mediation team, conflict stakeholders, 

and civil society peacebuilding organizations to facilitate 

the exchange of information about the ongoing negotiation, its major activities and events, and options for participation. This could even involve collecting feedback 

on possible agreement texts or aspects of it. 

USE CASE 4: Toward the end of negotiations, digital 

inclusion could be used to strengthen the public’s 

acceptance of and support for an agreement. Key 

stakeholders could be invited to participate in a digital 

review of the draft agreement text or key provisions 

of a possible agreement. This could involve a selected 

number of qualified participants, who would be able to 

view an entire text and comment directly on the document. The review process would amplify and diversify 

the messages that inform a final agreement text. The 

mediation team would then analyze these comments 

and incorporate workable ideas that promise to be 

consensual into the next version of the agreement. 

USE CASE 5: Additionally, digital technology could 

be used to solicit public feedback on an agreement

through a large-scale campaign to gather inputs on 

a draft text and raise awareness of and support for 

it. The agreement would be disseminated through 

videos, infographics, and other forms that enable a lay 

public to understand the content of legalistic provisions. Feedback is then gathered from participants 

through a range of mechanisms, including surveys 

administered by trained enumerators on smartphones. 

In an increasing number of cases, digital tools have been 

used to inform ongoing dialogue efforts. (See the snapshot box on page 24 for an example of dialogue in Libya.) 

Digital technologies strengthen the legitimacy of policymaking processes particularly if they enable deliberation. In group discussions, for instance, participants can 

carefully weigh the arguments for and against a specific 

policy proposition presented by others.42 Importantly, 

deliberation does not always require a direct conversation between those participating in a process. It can be 

enabled through gathering, exchanging, and weighing 

views and positions through online collaboration or 

crowdsourcing—for instance, in the context of constitutional reform processes or national dialogues.43 Although 

achieving consensus may be difficult, such activities 

can help to ensure that a broader range of views and 

options inform an ongoing peace negotiation. 

USE CASE 6: During negotiations, public digital consultations could involve a broad cross section of the 

population interacting with the mediator on a dedicated online discussion forum. The consultations could 

focus on specific elements of the negotiations. The 

online forum would gather relevant data, as well as 

amplify and diversify the messages of stakeholders in 

the peace process. The results of these consultations 

would contain better information about the population’s 

needs and interests and could be used by the mediator 

to inform the negotiation process. The consultations 

would enable a broad range of stakeholders to express 

their political opinions and assert influence on the 

process. The collected data could also be analyzed and 

synthesized using analytical tools that leverage artificial 

intelligence. Furthermore, a social media campaign 

could be run to disseminate the results of the consultations and invite people to the online discussion forum 

that enables deliberation between them.
24 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Snapshot

OFFLINE AND ONLINE CONSULTATIONS IN

PREPARATION OF THE LIBYA NATIONAL DIALOGUE

In 2018, the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue conducted a series of local consultations in Libya to support 

the ongoing high-level political process. These consultations constituted the first phase of the National 

Conference Process (NCP), which was followed by the National Conference itself. The consultations were 

an integral part of the UN Action Plan for Libya and designed in close collaboration with the UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General and all major Libyan stakeholders. The objective of the initiative was to 

consult citizens from all sectors of Libyan society, especially those who had been left out of the elite political 

dialogue. The initiative aimed to identify elements of consensus in Libya’s fragmented political landscape in 

regard to key issues of the conflict and the future of the Libyan state.

The main element of the process was offline consultations. From April through July, seventy-seven townhall–style meetings were held in forty-three locations, including thirty-nine locations in Libya. This process 

was supported through online campaigning involving a dedicated website and social media channels, which 

provided an alternative means of participating in the process. The campaign sought to engage politically 

and geographically marginalized groups—such as women, youth, and minorities—who were unable to participate in public events. The website provided information on the nature of the process and the different 

options for engagement. It also gave details about upcoming events and published reports and visual content from earlier events. Libyans who were unable to attend events in the physical world could contribute to 

the consultative process by filling out an online questionnaire. In order to reduce barriers, the website was 

in Arabic and used simple language and a straightforward design. 

A Facebook page and a Twitter account were set up to promote the consultations, enable direct communication with participants, and encourage participation when options for offline consultation were limited. For 

instance, during the month of Ramadan, the “And you? Participate!” campaign was launched on Facebook 

and Twitter. The campaign featured anonymous quotations from participants on themes such as government 

priorities, national reconciliation, security and defense, and the distribution of resources to encourage other 

Libyans to share their perspectives via the NCP’s digital platforms. 

All digital data collected that provided substantive information was analyzed qualitatively and informed the 

final report, which was shared with the UN Security Council and the top echelons of the Libyan political 

sphere. The online contributions constituted more than 30 percent of the total contributions to the process.
USIP.ORG 25

EMPOWERING WOMEN AND 

MARGINALIZED GROUPS

Digital technology can enable users to make informed 

decisions, enlarge their opportunities, and strengthen 

their capacities.44 As such, it can be an invaluable tool 

in empowering women and marginalized groups. In the 

wake of UN Security Council Resolution 1325, which 

was adopted in 2000 and recognizes women’s key 

role in preventing and resolving armed conflict, many 

empowerment efforts have focused on women and 

girls. These have been able to draw on the experiences and expertise of feminist organizations that 

have used digital technologies to fight against structural disadvantages, unequal gender relations, sexual 

harassment, and gender-based violence.45 A need for 

empowerment exists for many parts of the population 

affected by conflict, including youth, the poor, and 

ethnic or religious minorities. These needs are often 

closely linked to both the causes of conflict and the 

dynamics of violence; for instance, a politically or economically marginalized group may have taken up arms 

in a bid to defend and assert itself.

When mediators enter a peace process, one of their 

first tasks is to map the relevant actors, including 

groups that have limited or no political influence on the 

negotiation, despite the fact that they hold a stake in 

the conflict. Conventional mapping techniques focus 

on, among other sources, literature and media reviews, 

as well as on information gathered through informal channels. However, the increased use of digital 

technology by conflict parties and stakeholders means 

that some voices—including those of marginalized 

groups with scant access to traditional media—may be 

found chiefly or even exclusively online. To begin with, 

empowerment efforts should therefore be based on 

an assessment of who has a voice in online as well as 

offline worlds. 

USE CASE 7: A social media analysis tool could be 

used for mapping voice on social media. The tool 

would identify voices on social media platforms that 

belong to constituencies that are outside of the 

political parties and armed factions that dominate the 

peace process’s offline activities. The analysis tool 

would help mediators identify weakly represented 

subgroups within those constituencies and develop a 

formula for their inclusion that recognizes the increasing role of social media in peace processes. The data 

collection and analysis would be conducted by political analysts manually identifying relevant seed social 

media pages, Twitter handles, hashtags, and keywords. The search would then be expanded to look at 

both individuals who are connected to the seed pages 

or handles and individuals who use similar keywords 

or hashtags. The results from the social media analysis 

could be cross-referenced with data collected from 

focus group discussions in order to identify differences between online and offline representation.

Large parts of the populations in conflict-affected societies often have limited access to—and limited ability to 

exchange—information. The civil wars in Syria or Yemen, 

for instance, destroyed much public infrastructure while 

displacing huge numbers of people, forcing them to 

rely on digital technology to get and share information. 

Populations in geographically remote parts of a country 

are likewise reliant on technology—if it exists.46 Where it 

does not, mediation support actors should partner with 

development and humanitarian agencies, as well as 

the private sector, to develop communication infrastructures, such as telecenters, which increase the populations’ access to information. With the infrastructure 

in place, mediation teams can use digital technology 

to enable civil society as a whole, and vulnerable and 

marginalized groups in particular, to participate actively 

in the peace process. Many mediation teams maintain 

informal contact with relevant stakeholders through 

text-messaging applications, for instance. 
26 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Digital platforms can enable marginalized groups to 

coordinate among themselves and collaborate on joint 

activities.47 Studies in the humanitarian field suggest 

that the spread of digital technologies changes the role 

of crisis-affected populations from passive “beneficiaries” of assistance to active participants in relief efforts, 

and that this ultimately leads to a change in power 

relations.48 Mediation efforts can similarly seek to enable victims of conflict to become active participants in 

peace processes. 

USE CASE 8: Mediation support actors could bolster 

online collaboration in support of the peace process 

around specific initiatives relating to the peace talks. 

For example, a dedicated website could connect participants from different stakeholder groups and enable 

them to identify common concerns and build coalitions 

around key issues. The website could further facilitate 

collaboration through the planning and coordination of 

joint actions that support the mediation. Results of the 

online collaborations could be fed into the negotiation 

as collective contributions to agenda setting or advocacy for specific outcomes, which would also allow 

the public to exercise influence on the negotiations by 

demonstrating their support for peace. 

A woman takes a photo with her mobile phone during the announcement of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, in Havana, Cuba, on August 24, 2016. (Photo by Desmond Boylan/AP)
USIP.ORG 27

Once peace negotiations are ongoing, digital technologies can strengthen representation of otherwise marginalized groups in decision-making processes. In settings with limited connections between political elites 

and the broader population, WhatsApp groups have 

been used to connect urban-based elected representatives and their rural constituencies. These messaging 

groups not only provide a medium through which data 

about ongoing political debates and policymaking 

processes can be shared, but also give constituents a 

channel through which to amplify their views and opinions, thus holding elected officers to account.49

USE CASE 9: The rapid polling methodology described 

in use case 3 could be used to reach out to specific 

population groups that do not have a strong voice in 

the public sphere. Groups could be targeted using 

identity markers such as gender, age, ethnic affiliation, 

or geographic location. For example, during the early 

stages of a negotiation, data could be collected from 

members of the target groups and analyzed to understand their interests, needs, and concerns. The results 

of the poll could be used for agenda setting and to 

inform the design of the negotiation process.

Women are disproportionally affected by conflict and 

violence. Their empowerment should be a key objective 

throughout the peace process. Despite the fact that in 

many parts of the world women continue to have less 

access to digital technology than men, digital technologies can contribute to challenging social norms and gender roles by creating new spaces where women (and 

men) can express themselves, amplifying a more diverse 

set of messages.50 The proactive use of digital technologies can contribute to women’s empowerment in various 

additional ways, from helping to coordinate women-led 

human rights campaigns (for example, through using 

common hashtags on Twitter) to facilitating efforts to 

lobby for respect for women’s rights.51

USE CASE 10: Digital technology could be used 

to conduct online focus groups that bring together 

subject experts and representatives from specific 

vulnerable or marginalized demographic groups. The 

virtual exchange platform could create a safe space in 

which policy options debated at the negotiation table 

and relevant to the group could be deliberated. The 

groups could comment on and advise on more complex questions, such as administrative reforms, decentralization, or resource governance and thus assert 

influence on the negotiation process. The group could 

also discuss data collected through other forms of 

digital inclusion, such as from rapid polling. The results 

of these discussions could be used by the mediator to 

inform track 1 negotiations.

TRANSFORMING RELATIONS

Digital technology can help transform the relationships 

that underpin armed conflict and violence within and between communities. Such efforts are often associated with 

peacebuilding rather than mediation. However, addressing how the conflict parties and their constituents view 

each other and how they relate—with the aim of building 

nonviolent relationships—can be beneficial throughout a 

peace process, from early trust-building and humanizing 

measures to long-term reconciliation programs. 

Digital technology has been used widely to strengthen 

cohesion and trust within communities. For instance, 

social media has been used to enhance a sense of 

belonging among members of religious and cultural 

groups and to increase the commitment of members to 

work together and solve problems.52 However, digital 

technology, particularly social media, has also been 

widely associated with increased polarization between 

different groups through the spreading of stereotypes, 

scapegoating, and the use of hate speech. These 

intra- and intergroup dynamics often lie at the heart of 

the conflict—and transforming them should thus be an 

integral part of any peace mediation effort.
28 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Before using digital technology to support conflict 

transformation, it is important to get a clear sense of 

the narratives and representations of “the other” that 

are produced and perpetuated on digital platforms, 

especially social media. Understanding such narratives 

is particularly relevant for the mediation team’s conflict 

analysis at the early stages of a peacemaking effort. An 

analysis that draws on data collected through social media promises a fine-grained picture of the narratives that 

underpin violence by allowing a disaggregation of data 

down to the level of the individual user. Moreover, such 

analysis can map changes in the relationships between 

conflict parties and their constituents throughout the 

peace process and can be used to understand how the 

narratives constructed online affect offline dynamics. 

USE CASE 11: An analysis tool could be designed for 

understanding narratives in digital qualitative media.

This tool would identify key narratives about the Other 

that shape the relationship between the conflict parties. 

To this end, the tool could collect and analyze data from 

a broad selection of digital media, including social media. A mediation support actor could curate sources that 

feed into the analysis tool and a network of volunteers 

could support the data collection and analysis. If large 

enough amounts of data need to be analyzed, artificial 

intelligence–driven tools could be utilized to automate 

this task. The tool would provide better information 

to mediators and their teams, not least about relevant 

stereotypes, and thereby help the mediators design a 

strategy for fostering more positive community relations 

at the negotiation table and beyond. Note that this use 

case will only contribute to digital inclusion if paired up 

with other activities through which stakeholders actively 

participate in the peace process, such as use case 12. 

In addition to analyzing narratives, digital technology 

can be used to proactively construct and disseminate 

counternarratives to fight extremist viewpoints and ideologies.53 In Kenya, for instance, digital technology is used 

to reduce stereotyping and scapegoating across ethnic 

groups, thereby helping to prevent violence. As part of 

larger conflict prevention efforts, the Uwiano Platform 

uses digital technology to disseminate “peace messages” to persons located in “hot spot” areas affected by 

armed conflict. This helps to influence popular discourse 

and prevent conflict boiling over into violence.54 Such 

countermessaging seems particularly effective if it 

involves informal actors, or “amateurs,” that can create 

more credible and authentic content and disseminate it 

in collaboration with formal campaigns and actors.55

On social media, information flows in multiple directions, which enables more parties to initiate and 

maintain communication.56 Humanitarian actors have 

leveraged this ability to alter communication patterns 

by enabling horizontal and decentralized communication between local volunteers. Mediation teams could 

similarly encourage an expansion in the numbers of 

people participating online in peace activism, allowing 

new ideas to be aired, discussed, and shared, with 

the aim of changing the mutual perceptions of conflict 

parties and their constituents and fostering empathy between different communities. Social media, in 

particular, can serve as a channel through which users 

can express their emotions about an event or process 

and share information not available in the conventional 

mass media that can help the population understand 

and cope emotionally and cognitively with the crisis.57

Furthermore, social media has been used in many 

ways to create sympathy with victims and encourage 

collaboration between social media users around support and relief activities.58

Digital technology has been used widely to strengthen cohesion and trust within communities. . . . However, 

digital technology, particularly social media, has also been widely associated with increased polarization 

between different groups through the spreading of stereotypes, scapegoating, and the use of hate speech.
USIP.ORG 29

USE CASE 12: In the early phases of a mediated 

process, a digital campaign to build empathy between 

conflict parties could encourage citizens to share 

positive experiences of interacting with other conflict stakeholders, thereby encouraging a change in 

community relations that can build momentum for the 

peace process. The campaign could start with short 

video clips that demonstrate empathy with people who 

have different and opposing views and experiences. 

These videos could be created during offline mediation 

activities and then disseminated on social media. The 

campaign could also launch an open call for submissions by citizens to create and disseminate their videos 

as part of a nationwide competition. Videos would then 

be shared regularly, demonstrating the value of human 

stories across the divide. Targeted workshops and outreach activities could accompany such a campaign.

Digital technology also has the potential to play a supporting role in fostering empathy and understanding 

across different communities and restoring relationships between them. For instance, social media can 

play a role in “post-disaster community deliberation” 

by connecting those who have caused suffering with 

those affected by it.59 Among the more notable cases, 

oil companies have used social media platforms to try 

to restore their public reputations by disseminating 

factual information about their response efforts and 

promising “corrective action” after causing environmental crises that prompted public outcry on social 

media, which amplified the voices of those affected by 

the disaster. In peace processes, digital technology can 

likewise help develop a shared understanding of the 

causes of conflict and possible options for its resolution.60 This may be particularly relevant in cases of 

armed conflict where the population is geographically 

divided and the opportunities for conventional communication between communities are sparse, as is the 

case in the Donetsk region of eastern Ukraine (see the 

snapshot box on page 30).

USE CASE 13: Digital technology can be used to facilitate virtual exchange between conflict parties. The virtual exchange could be conducted before or in parallel 

with the formal negotiation. Through the process, participants would begin to build empathy toward each other, 

thus contributing to an enabling environment for peace 

negotiations. A mediation support actor could invite 

groups of eight to twelve people drawn from constituencies to participate in a series of online exchanges where 

they share views and perceptions of the conflict, of the 

peace process, and of one another and perhaps engage 

in deliberation. The results of these exchanges would be 

shared with principal negotiation parties to help to diversify and amplify the voices around the negotiation table.

Reconciliation processes and efforts to deal with the 

past can be facilitated by digital technology’s ability to 

transcend physical distance. For instance, Facebook 

profiles now routinely turn into a place for mourning for 

victims of violence. By connecting affected populations 

in locations that are geographically distant from where 

the violence occurred, social media enables a dispersed group to come together and express their emotions. This experience can contribute significantly to 

societal healing, which is one reason why social media 

has featured in truth and reconciliation processes and 

in community reconciliation efforts that seek to develop 

a mutual understanding of conflict causes.61 In Cyprus, 

for instance, digital technology was used to devise new 

approaches to environmental peace education that 

helped to acknowledge narratives of conflict across 

communities and develop compassionate responses to 

the challenges of the other community.62

PROTECTING VULNERABLE 

GROUPS AND REDUCING THE RISK 

OF CONTINUED CONFLICT 

Although protecting the population from the consequences of armed conflict should be an abiding concern 

throughout a peace process, efforts to reduce risks to 
30 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

the process should intensify as it progresses, so as to 

safeguard mediation achievements, such as a cessation 

of hostilities or a ceasefire agreement. Digital inclusion 

efforts can help protect both the population and the 

process. This strategic purpose of inclusion is often unacknowledged among mediators, but it is one in which 

digital technology can play a significant role. 

Even before violence erupts, digital technology can 

play a valuable role by helping to collect and analyze 

timely data that makes it easier to predict crises and 

develop indicators of increased risks of violence. This 

data can also support the coordination of preventive 

measures. Conventional conflict early-warning systems 

often operate vertically, by feeding information into a 

central unit, such as a government entity or international 

organization. However, citizen-reporting systems can 

establish horizontal networks through which early warning and response can be driven and coordinated from 

the bottom up.63 For instance, crowdsourcing applications have been discussed as a method to gather and 

disseminate relevant data promptly and to coordinate 

responses.64 The information collected can encompass 

a broad range of indicators, such as commodity prices, 

citizen perceptions, and migration patterns.65 In addition, 

monitoring efforts that are particularly relevant for an ongoing peace mediation could involve the documentation 

of misinformation that may endanger the process. 

Snapshot

UKRAINE—DONBASS DIALOGUE

The Donbass Dialogue is a virtual dialogue platform created in April 2015 in the Donetsk region of eastern 

Ukraine. The initiative seeks to reconnect citizens from the government-controlled area with citizens from 

the non-government-controlled area. To this end, the project has adopted a combination of online dialogues 

and offline elements. Through a closed Facebook group with more than four hundred members, the team 

crowdsources dialogue topics by posting questions or statements of mutual concern. Then, the team gathers and analyzes responses to identify relevant topics. 

These topics are then addressed in detail during weeklong dialogues, which take place twice per year. The 

dialogue participants are recruited from both sides of the conflict and include community and civil society 

representatives and internally displaced persons, as well as members of the Facebook group. International 

experts are invited to present on specific topics. Participation is possible in a physical location, as well as 

through a dedicated videoconferencing platform that uses peer-to-peer technology, which allows anonymous connection. This creates a safe space for all dialogue participants, independent of their physical location. The Donbass Dialogue publishes results of the online and offline meetings on its website. 

Despite—or because of—the absence of strong links to high-level political processes, the Donbas Dialogue 

has enabled significant engagement across the conflict’s major fault lines and promoted more cooperative 

community relations.
USIP.ORG 31

USE CASE 14: Digital technology can be used to reduce the risks stemming from fabricated information by 

countering misinformation about the negotiations. With 

the help of trained volunteers, a reporting and analysis system could collect data regarding the spread of 

rumors and misinformation about security incidents, the 

negotiating process, and other sensitive subjects. This 

system could involve the machine-supported monitoring of specific keywords on popular social media 

platforms, as well as regular or ad hoc reports from key 

informants, such as civil society organizations and journalists. Once a rumor relevant to the negotiations has 

been reported, the volunteers would analyze its factual 

validity, source, spread, and impact on public opinion. 

This information could be used by mediation support 

actors to counter the rumor with targeted messaging.

Digital technology is increasingly used to warn populations about imminent dangers. For instance, to reduce 

the risks of violence in the run-up to elections, NGOs 

such as Impart Change use messaging platforms to 

coordinate a network of volunteers who exchange 

information about ongoing events and coordinate 

responses to increased tensions between different ethnic communities (see the snapshot box on page 32).

Drawing on experiences in humanitarian disaster prevention and relief, other potential applications of digital 

technology include disseminating information about 

rapidly evolving security situations and relaying warning 

messages to the population about impending dangers 

and how to behave to minimize the risks they present.66

Better information shared quickly through social media 

can help increase the preparedness of a population and 

reduce casualties and damage.67 Some peacekeeping 

Women take part in a demonstration against Muammar Gadhafi at the Green Square in Tripoli, Libya, on August 29, 2011.

(Photo by Alexandre Meneghini/AP)
32 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

missions establish alert systems that rely on mobile 

phones to provide information about imminent attacks.68

Social media–based applications can also create 

participatory environments in which potential security 

threats can be discussed and evaluated and community 

responses planned and implemented.69

Once violence begins, the reporting and documenting 

of security incidents or compliance with agreed-upon security arrangements, through dedicated online 

platforms or mobile applications, can help to build trust 

between the conflict parties and prevent a relapse into 

conflict. Conventional approaches to monitoring and 

safeguarding security arrangements or ceasefire often 

depend on securing the buy-in of all conflict parties, 

incur high costs, and more often than not require a UN 

Security Council mandate. Online approaches that rely 

on citizen monitors may offer viable alternatives, especially given the widespread availability of devices able 

to collect evidence, such as smartphones.

Similar applications have been tested for human rights 

monitoring. For instance, the eyeWitness project, 

an initiative by the London-based International Bar 

Snapshot

KENYA—VIOLENCE PREVENTION

THROUGH DIGITAL YOUTH NETWORKS

Impart Change, a local not-for-profit organization, uses digital technology to connect and coordinate youth 

leaders based in Nairobi’s informal settlements. The organization leverages social media (e.g., WhatsApp) to 

enable dialogue between youth to prevent violent conflict in the context of Kenya’s recurrent electoral crises. The core membership of these social media groups consists of leaders of local youth groups, selected 

in partnership with local authorities, who have undergone training as “community ambassadors” or “community peace champions.” These youth leaders then recruit additional youth into the social media groups. 

This method has proven effective in securing membership from specific locations that identify with different 

ethnic groups and political parties. The organization also invites women to join these groups to foster their 

empowerment and achieve a gender balance. Groups also form as a follow-up to offline dialogue activities 

and consultations. Impart Change then facilitates online exchanges among the group members. 

Through the groups, Impart Change monitors levels of youth mobilization, spreads messages to counter online 

hate speech and misinformation, and enables group members to vent their grievances. On occasion, the organization also facilitates an exchange between youth representatives and high-level political leaders who are 

involved in formal dialogue efforts. In addition, Impart Change engages in public social media groups, posting 

on the Facebook pages of political leaders and monitoring and commenting on specific Twitter hashtags. The 

organization is a member of various social media networks that share information about ongoing developments 

and coordinate joint initiatives with peacebuilding and human rights organizations. These various social media 

activities are driven by local dynamics and demands rather than being part of a carefully orchestrated strategy.
USIP.ORG 33

Association, developed a dedicated mobile application 

in 2015 through which citizens were able to collaborate 

in documenting and sharing footage about human rights 

violations.70 In efforts to prevent electoral violence, digital technology plays a growing role in the detection and 

reporting of rumors and incitements of violence.71 In the 

context of an ongoing peace process, documenting individual security incidents can reduce the likelihood of an 

escalation of conflict if mediators are ready to respond 

with de-escalation efforts and the conflict parties are 

willing and able to discipline individual violators. 

USE CASE 15: To reduce the risks to a mediated 

peace process and protect vulnerable groups, digital 

inclusion can enable both early-warning and early-response activities. Technology can, for example, be 

used to enable digital monitoring of security incidents 

by civilians. This can take place through a reporting 

system that allows trained civilian volunteers to collect 

data about security incidents on the ground, such as 

ceasefire violations. These monitors would provide input through SMS, a mobile application, or a dedicated 

website. All reports would be triangulated and verified 

by a team of validators before being published. The 

data would then be disseminated to mediators and 

peacebuilding organizations, which would combine 

it with other information to create a panorama of the 

security situation across the country and plan and 

implement timely and appropriate responses. 

Snapshot

SYRIA—MONITORING OF SECURITY INCIDENTS

After the Cessation of Hostilities agreement had been negotiated by the International Syria Support Group in 

2015, mediators and mediation support actors facilitated efforts to track potential violations of the agreement. In 

the absence of a formal observer mission mandated by the UN Security Council, mediators decided to employ 

digital technology to increase international ceasefire monitoring capacities. In addition to obtaining information 

on violations from social media, the mediation team collected reports through a decentralized platform. Informants were invited to message mediators individually or send data such as pictures to contact centers based in 

various countries allied to the conflict parties. The information obtained not only helped verify compliance with 

the agreement but also was used to analyze ongoing events and was shared with the Security Council.
34 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Conclusion: Toward 

Effective Digital Inclusion

The extent to which mediators currently use digital 

technology to broaden participation in peace processes beyond the main conflict parties is hard to gauge 

with any precision, but it seems clear that the enormous potential of digital inclusion is beginning to be 

exploited. If this trend is to continue, and if it is to yield 

good results, mediators and their support teams need 

to do two things: one is to always adapt digital inclusion to the peacemaking context; the other is to balance risks and opportunities. This final section of this 

report looks in turn at these imperatives, in the process 

offering recommendations for using digital technology 

wisely and effectively.

ADAPT TO CONTEXT

Digital technology can foster inclusion in mediated 

peace processes only if it is used in a way that acknowledges and responds to the challenges of the peacemaking context. Those challenges inevitably vary from 

case to case, but three types of factors should always 

be considered: technological, sociocultural, and political. 

These dimensions are often closely interrelated, reinforcing or counterbalancing one another in both subtle 

and not-so-subtle ways. Each set of factors has its risks 

and unintended consequences, but there are strategies 

that mediation teams can adopt to mitigate those risks. 

Technological Factors

Not surprisingly, the local infrastructure of information 

and communication technologies (ICT) is a basic determinant of what technologies can be used in that context, as well as when and how. At the most fundamental 

level, digital technology depends on the availability of 

electricity. In many conflict-affected societies, the electricity grid is patchy (especially in rural areas) and the 

supply is unreliable or subject to regular and lengthy 

power cuts. These problems can be mitigated by using 

local sources of electricity, including generators, solar 

panels, and power banks. These options, however, 

are often restricted to wealthier neighborhoods and to 

professional organizations. 

Similarly, the availability of ICTs differs not only from 

country to country, but also within countries. Most relevant is the penetration of internet services, including 

cable and mobile phone networks, as well as the widely varying cost of data and the speed of data transmission. Electricity and communication infrastructure are 

often damaged or destroyed during armed violence. 

In such situations, mediators dare not rely exclusively 

on digital technology and must always complement 

digital inclusion with offline participation. Mediators 

may also work with other actors, including peacekeeping operations and development or humanitarian 

organizations, to maintain or improve ICT infrastructure. 

Another locally variable factor is platform popularity and usage, which varies from one peacemaking 

context to another. While Facebook tends to be used 

by large parts of the population in Libya and Myanmar, 

other social media platforms may be more prevalent in other countries. For example, political elites in 

Burundi widely use Twitter. Platform usage also differs 

between urban and rural areas, correlating with the 

general availability of ICTs. There is also a variation in 

each platform’s demographic. For instance, Twitter is 
USIP.ORG 35

more heavily used by social and political elites than 

is Facebook. Other social media platforms, such as 

Snapchat, target younger user groups. When relying 

on off-the-shelf social media platforms, mediators 

thus always run the risk that inclusion is limited. 

Investing in better knowledge about context-specific 

usage patterns, and using multiple platforms, can 

reduce this risk.

Technology design should follow the intended purpose 

of the inclusion effort. Some off-the-shelf technologies 

fulfill certain functions better than others. For example, 

none of the conventional social media platforms are 

currently well suited to facilitate deliberation, as filtering and ranking effects influence the communicative 

interaction between users. Many platforms also only 

limitedly allow for a moderated discussion. Word limits, 

the embedding of multimedia content, and options to 

encrypt data and enable anonymous participation are 

a few among many additional factors that influence the 

functions that the technologies can enable. Creating 

or customizing technologies specifically for inclusion 

can overcome some of these problems if designers 

consider the needs of both the mediators and those 

who they aim to include.72

Sociocultural Factors

Digital inclusion is also conditioned by the social and 

cultural environment in which technologies are designed and utilized. One crucial factor is the level of 

digital literacy of those whom mediators hope to reach 

through technology. Digital literacy refers to having not 

only the skills needed to use the various features of 

digital technology but also the ability to do so safely 

Men from a group of People’s Peace marchers check their phones in Ghazni, Afghanistan, on June 11, 2018. WhatsApp has become second only to 

Facebook as a way for Afghans to communicate, including in the highest echelons of the country's government and military, as well as among the 

Taliban. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/New York Times)
36 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

and to critically evaluate the data obtained.73 For instance, specific approaches to digital inclusion may not 

match a population’s level of digital literacy, and more 

demanding forms of digital inclusion, such as online 

consultations or monitoring activities, are likely to lead 

to a selection bias. 

Digital literacy, and indeed basic access to digital technology, is also impeded by various sociocultural barriers 

to ICT use. The cost of hardware, software, and data usage may exclude not only poorer socioeconomic groups 

but large sections of an entire society. Prevailing gender 

roles limit women’s access to digital technologies in 

most contexts or shape how women can use them. For 

instance, women may engage less than men in visible 

political behavior online.74 This suggests that particular 

strategies are necessary if digital technologies are to be 

used effectively for women’s empowerment. Linguistic 

barriers continue to be a challenge in many multilingual 

settings, despite improvements in machine-enabled 

translation. In many contexts, older people tend to have 

less digital literacy and access to technology and more 

resistance to using it.75 If these barriers are not to lead 

to new forms of exclusion, mediators and their support teams need to put together packages of different 

technologies that cater to the abilities, habits, and 

preferences of various demographic groups and to 

ensure that offline inclusion efforts reach populations 

that cannot participate online. 

Digital inclusion may also be affected by hierarchies

that exist in social media networks, where specific 

types of users enjoy a higher profile and more authority 

than others. These hierarchies can mirror social and 

political hierarchies that exist offline; for instance, experts from think tanks may automatically be accorded 

high levels of respect.76 However, digital technology, 

and especially social media, can also erode trust in 

conventional authorities, including government actors. 

Conventional hierarchies may also be challenged and 

reshaped by the rise of new influencers.77 It should be 

remembered that hierarchies exist in most forms of 

social organizations and do not necessarily constitute a 

problem for digital inclusion—but they can make objectives such as empowerment more difficult to achieve. 

Recognizing such hierarchies and gaining more 

information about them is the first step to reducing 

risks and unintended consequences that may jeopardize the intended purpose of digital inclusion. 

Variants in the culture of digital technology use are likely to influence how and why digital inclusion is used. 

For instance, the size and composition of individual social media networks may differ from context to context 

and may influence the degree to which social media 

can be used for political mobilization and for democratic engagement, both online and offline.78 How a society 

uses digital technology in its political life is usually a 

good indicator of how and to what degree technology 

can be used to foster digital inclusion in peacemaking. 

In many contexts, however, such information is limited, and mediators will have to explore context-specific technology use patterns to better judge what 

digital technologies to use for what purpose. 

Political Factors

The third category of contextual factors—the properties 

of the political system and the behavior of governing 

institutions—is probably the one most discussed by 

mediation professionals. At the top of the list of factors 

that inform the behavior of technology users and produce specific risks is political surveillance. Domestic 

and foreign government agencies, as well as agents 

operating on behalf of nonstate conflict parties, may 

Prevailing gender roles limit women’s access to digital technologies in most contexts or shape

how women can use them. . . . Women may engage less than men in visible political behavior online.

This suggests that particular strategies are necessary if digital technologies are to be used effectively

for women’s empowerment.
USIP.ORG 37

try to intercept information about the negotiations; 

about negotiation parties’ interests, preferences, and 

strategies; and about specific participants. Surveillance 

poses multiple risks to a mediation: Mediators’ control 

over the negotiation process may weaken, because, 

for instance, information can no longer be shared 

selectively. The negotiation process may be driven less 

by conflict parties’ efforts to find a mutually acceptable 

common position than by efforts to manipulate each 

other’s interests and bargaining power. The negotiation parties, conflict stakeholders, and mediators 

may also become susceptible to blackmail or their 

physical security may be at risk if information about 

their location is disclosed. Even perceived threats of 

political surveillance can erode the mediators’, conflict 

parties’, and stakeholders’ willingness to use digital 

technologies. Many professional mediators operate 

under the assumption that all information shared online 

is potentially public information. This attitude, however, 

may hinder a mediator’s ability to facilitate meaningful 

dialogue through digital means.

Moreover, state control of ICT infrastructure can have 

a significant negative impact on digital inclusion. Some 

governments have a record of blacking out the internet 

in specific locations or even the whole country, and 

government agencies may be able to block specific 

applications and social media platforms, such as Skype 

or Twitter, as well as particular websites.79 “Backdoors” 

in distributed hardware can also allow governments to 

conduct mass surveillance or spy on individual users.80

In fragile states, a fragmented ICT infrastructure may 

allow various actors to control the infrastructure in parts 

of the country. Given the risk of national or foreign 

agencies blocking specific populations from participating in the peace process through digital media, mediators who want to employ digital technology require 

the consent of those actors who control the communication infrastructure. Conventional efforts to foster 

inclusion—for example, through workshops or consultations—can avoid this danger by flying participants to 

a foreign country. However, digital inclusion that aims 

to involve large parts of the population usually requires 

reaching the users where they live. 

Fortunately, technology users are not defenseless 

against political surveillance and control. In contrast to 

cybersecurity—the failproof protection of ICT infrastructure, which cannot be achieved in many conflict contexts—cyber resilience refers to the ability to maintain 

the functional use of digital technologies in the face 

of adverse political events or conditions.81 Achieving 

cyber resilience requires conflict stakeholders to develop the necessary skills and technical capacity to 

protect themselves from cyber threats so that they 

can continue their work—for instance, by identifying 

vulnerabilities and security breaches, and by creating 

and maintaining ICT infrastructure that enables autonomous communication networks. Efforts to foster 

digital inclusion should thus go together with efforts 

to strengthen the cyber resilience of those who are 

to be included. 

When users are not afraid about possible negative 

repercussions of their online behavior or are willing to 

take risks, they are likely to generate content that can 

be relevant for the mediation effort—for instance, by 

exchanging views on social media regarding specific topics that are discussed at the mediation table. 

However, it is important that this information is not 

extracted without the users’ knowledge. Where users 

provide information intentionally, they will actively 

contribute to the negotiation of a political settlement by 

sharing their objections to the current status quo. Civil 

society groups may also use digital platforms to coordinate campaigns in support of a peaceful settlement 

or to lobby for political change. This information flows 

in all sorts of directions and is not necessarily intended 

for the mediator. When facilitating digital inclusion, 

mediators should develop linkages or synergies with 

existing online movements or civil society initiatives 

to provide opportunities to integrate the voice of 

their constituencies into the peace process.
38 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

If mediators are to anticipate and address not only 

these political challenges but also the technological 

and sociocultural factors described above, they need 

to invest in the mediation team’s analytical capacities. Several databases can help with assessing country 

contexts, including databases on internet freedom and 

internet inclusivity, as well as databases of household 

use of digital technology provided by UN agencies and 

the World Bank.82 There also exist individual indicators 

that capture, for individual countries, the diversity of online media, social media censorship and monitoring, and 

internet shutdowns.83 However, for many of the factors 

mentioned above, comprehensive and comparable data 

is still lacking. Therefore, mediation teams should proactively invest in their in-house capacities and technology 

partnerships to collect and analyze data relevant to the 

context in which they operate.

BALANCE RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Although the notion of a technology-free, and thus controllable, peacemaking environment persists in some 

quarters, many mediation professionals could not effectively carry out their work without the use of technology. Contemporary mediation efforts are already highly 

dependent on various types of digital technologies, 

such as messaging applications, social media, and 

websites. This dependence has been underscored by 

the COVID-19 pandemic, which has reduced mediators’ 

ability to travel and conduct face-to-face meetings.

Even so, digital inclusion in peacemaking, as a concept 

and as practice, is still in its infancy. There is a need for 

a more nuanced discussion about the added value and 

the strategic purposes of digital inclusion—to which this 

report aimed to contribute. It is likely that a combination 

of online and offline activities will be the new normal, 

Female delegates during the opening ceremony of Afghanistan's Grand Assembly in Kabul, Afghanistan, on April 29, 2019. (Photo by Jim Huylebroek/

New York Times)
USIP.ORG 39

because digital technologies do provide benefits to 

inclusion efforts. This is most obvious in situations where 

their use is unavoidable, as during the 2020 global lockdown. However, digital inclusion can also enable, supplement, and strengthen conventional inclusion efforts—

for instance, by reaching stakeholders in geographically 

isolated areas, enabling forms of participation suited to 

tech-savvy and younger groups, reducing the pressure around the negotiation table, and providing more 

flexible forms of participation that can accommodate a 

greater diversity of interests and needs.

But while many mediators and mediation professionals contemplate the use of digital technology, initiatives that go beyond ad hoc uses by mediation team 

members have often proven difficult to implement. 

This is due not least to the perceived risks, which often 

lead to a selective and cautious approach to technology. Caution is understandable, and the mediation 

community needs better tools to assess the risks and 

possible unintended consequences of digital inclusion. 

However, such knowledge can emerge only through 

experience. We need to build a knowledge base that 

is grounded in practice and lessons learned, including through the aggregation of existing data and 

the development of new analytical tools that help to 

assess the most important context factors.

Many mediators fail to factor in the risks of not using 

technology. When weighing risks and benefits, it is 

important that the peace mediation field as a whole 

moves beyond individual short-term calculations and 

focuses on the longer-term picture. Conflict parties 

and stakeholders are less risk averse and will continue to increase their digital capabilities. If mediators 

do not follow suit, they will fall ever further behind in 

their understanding of the digital dimensions of conflict 

and in their ability to use digital technology to make 

peace. Technological innovation cannot be restricted 

to the laboratory; it requires an iterative process that is 

nurtured through practical experience. Over the long 

run, successful digital inclusion requires that any 

negative effects are kept at an acceptable level. In 

the short term, however, innovation may require 

taking significant risks so as to enable learning. This 

process of innovation will require close collaboration 

between mediators, technology experts, and researchers. This will also provide the basis for further research 

on this topic—including on how meaningful inclusion 

can best be achieved and under which conditions digital inclusion will most likely contribute to a mediator’s 

strategic objectives. 

An additional challenge is to enable effective learning 

in a professional community that continues to cherish secrecy. Most mediation initiatives adhere to high 

standards of confidentiality, which reduces the mediation community’s ability to exchange information, 

develop synergies, and advance common knowledge. 

In practice, this means that experiences in using digital 

technology are not widely shared or are shared only 

after considerable delay. At best, some cases of success are referenced more widely. However, innovation 

also requires learning from past failures. The mediation support community should thus consider how 

to build innovation processes that can immediately 

benefit individual mediation initiatives while contributing to a steadily accumulating global body of 

knowledge on digital inclusion.

Digital inclusion is not a panacea for peace processes. 

However, as conflict parties and conflict stakeholders 

increasingly rely on digital technologies, so should mediators. The increasing digitization of peace processes 

demands a response, and digital inclusion allows the 

mediation community to turn digitization to the advantage of themselves and the people they seek to assist. 

When designing digital inclusion, mediators must give 

up the illusion that they can control the environment in 

which peace negotiations take place—at least its digital 

dimensions. In return, they will increasingly understand 

that they can shape it.
40 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

Notes

Portions of this report were published in “Digital Inclusion in Peacemaking: A Strategic Perspective,” copyright 2020 by the Centre 

On Conflict, Development & Peacebuilding at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. Used here by permission.

1. Peter Wallensteen and Isak Svensson, “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research

51, no. 2 (2014): 315–27.

2. Sara Hellmüller, “Beyond Buzzwords: Civil Society Inclusion in Mediation,” in Conflict Intervention and Transformation: Theory 

and Practice, ed. Ho-Won Jeong (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), 47–63; and Alex de Waal, “Inclusion in Peacemaking: 

From Moral Claim to Political Fact,” in The Fabric of Peace in Africa: Looking beyond the State, ed. Chester A. Crocker and 

Pamela Aall (Waterloo, ON: Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2017).

3. United States Institute of Peace, “The Impact of New Media on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management: A Study Guide Series 

on Peace and Conflict for Independent Learners and Classroom Instructors,” September 1, 2011, www.usip.org/publications/2011

/09/impact-new-media-peacebuilding-and-conflict-management.

4. Joshua Tucker et al., “Social Media, Political Polarization, and Political Disinformation: A Review of the Scientific Literature,” SSRN 

Electronic Journal (2018).

5. For more details about the survey, see the section of this report entitled “The Emerging Practice of Digital Inclusion.”

6. David Lanz and Ahmed Eleiba, “The Good, the Bad and the Ugly: Social Media and Peace Mediation,” Swisspeace, December 

2018, www.swisspeace.ch/publications/policy-briefs/the-good-the-bad-and-the-ugly-social-media-and-peace-mediation-3.

7. At the time of publication, the following organization were part of the network: Build Up; the Centre for Humanitarian 

Dialogue (HD Centre); the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Jakarta; the Centre on Conflict, Development and 

Peacebuilding; DiploFoundation; the European External Action Service; ICT4Peace; the Mediation Support Unit of the UN 

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA); Swisspeace; and the United States Institute of Peace.

8. See UNDPPA, “Digital Technologies and Mediation: Toolkit 1.0,” https://peacemaker.un.org/digitaltoolkit; and UNDPPA and HD 

Centre, “Digital Technologies and Mediation in Armed Conflict,” March 2019, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker

.un.org/files/DigitalToolkitReport.pdf.

9. UNDPPA and HD Centre, “Digital Technologies and Mediation in Armed Conflict,” 24.

10. Martin Waehlisch and Daanish Masood, “Using Data and New Technology for Peacemaking, Preventive Diplomacy and 

Peacebuilding,” UNDPPA, 2019, www.reliefweb.int/report/world/e-analytics-guide-using-data-and-new-technology

-peacemaking-preventive-diplomacy-and.

11. Diana Dajer, “Cracking the Code of Tech for Peace: International Perspectives of Peacetech Research And Practice,” in Peace 

and Beyond: Reflections on Building Inclusive and Sustainable Peace (Manchester: British Council, 2018), 77.

12. Pamina Firchow et al., “PeaceTech: The Liminal Spaces of Digital Technology in Peacebuilding,” International Studies 

Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2017): 4–42.

13. Compare with Dan Snodderly, ed., Peace Terms. Glossary of Terms for Conflict Management and Peacebuilding, 2nd ed. 

(Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2018), 88.

14. This list is not complete to safeguard the anonymity of respondents. 

15. Build Up is a nonprofit organization that works to transform conflict in the digital age. More information can be found at

www.howtobuildup.com. 

16. Richard Heeks, Information and Communication Technology for Development (ICT4D), Routledge Perspectives on Development 

(London: Routledge, 2018), 9.

17. Chrisanthi Avgerou, “Information Systems in Developing Countries: A Critical Research Review,” Journal of Information 

Technology 23, no. 3 (2008): 135.
USIP.ORG 41

18. This is related to a further important question, namely if technologies are “neutral.” Some argue that technologies can be applied to serve various agendas and objectives and do not themselves define them. The opposing view is that technologies and 

societies are shaped mutually, and that technologies cannot be employed to perform a task but evolve jointly with specific political 

(and peacebuilding) initiatives. See, for instance, J. R. Welch, S. Halford, and M. Weal, “Conceptualising the Web for Post-Conflict 

Governance Building,” Peacebuilding 3, no. 1 (2015): 58–74.

19. Amy O’Donnell and Caroline Sweetman, “Introduction: Gender, Development, and ICTs,” Gender and Development 26, no. 2 

(2018): 217–29.

20. Catherine Turner, “Mapping a Norm of Inclusion in the Jus Post Bellum,” in Just Peace After Conflict: Jus Post Bellum and the 

Justice of Peace, ed. Carsten Stahn and Jens Iverson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

21. Hellmüller, “Beyond Buzzwords.”

22. United Nations, “Guidance for Effective Mediation,” July 2012, https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files

/GuidanceEffectiveMediation_UNDPA2012%28english%29_0.pdf.

23. Waal, “Inclusion in Peacemaking.”

24. Andreas T. Hirblinger and Dana M. Landau, “Daring to Differ? Strategies of Inclusion in Peacemaking,” Security Dialogue, 51, no. 

4 (2020).

25. Kathleen Gallagher Cunningham, “Understanding Fragmentation in Conflict and Its Impact on Prospects for Peace,” Oslo Forum 

Papers no. 6, HD Centre, December 2016, 20, www.hdcentre.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Understanding-fragmentation-in

-conflict.pdf.

26. Hirblinger and Landau, “Daring to Differ?”

27. This requires what can be called a “relational” approach to inclusion. See Hirblinger and Landau, “Daring to Differ?” See also 

Dario Castiglione and Mark E Warren, “Rethinking Democratic Representation: Eight Theoretical Issues” (paper presented at 

the Conference on Rethinking Democratic Representation, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, May 18–19, 2006), 13, 

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.565.9652&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

28. Helen Warrell, “UN Tries Mass Polling to Build Peace Deals.” Financial Times, February 20, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content

/9da969d8-518e-11ea-8841-482eed0038b1.

29. Mirca Madianou, Liezel Longboan, and Jonathan Corpus Ong, “Finding a Voice through Humanitarian Technologies? 

Communication Technologies and Participation in Disaster Recovery,” International Journal of Communication 9 (2015): 

3020–38. This definition draws on the works of Judith Butler and Albert Hirschmann. The emphasis on voice is important here 

because it limits the kinds of information and data relevant to inclusion to that which has been intentionally expressed by the 

conflict party or stakeholder, with the aim of giving an account of oneself in an attempt to change an objectionable state of affairs. The emphasis is especially relevant in peace processes because they are characterized by dynamics in which established 

political institutions may have been abolished or are under critique. See Aletta Norval, “Democracy, Pluralization, and Voice,” 

Ethics and Global Politics 2, no. 4 (2009): 297–320.

30. Helena Puig Larrauri and Yeonju Jung, “Reimagining Peacebuilding through Innovation Stockholm Forum on Peace and 

Development. Conference Report.,” Session Report no. 14, Stockholm Forum on Peace and Development, May 2017, www.sipri

.org/sites/default/files/2017-09/session_report_no_14.pdf.

31. Benedict Rumbold and James Wilson, “Privacy Rights and Public Information,” Journal of Political Philosophy 27, no. 1 (2019): 

3–25.

32. This survey was run by the author on behalf of the CyberMediation Network. It was distributed to the participants of the 

network’s webinar, “Digital Inclusion during and after Covid-19,” held on June 3, 2020, as well as through the author’s Twitter 

account. A total of twenty-four respondents answered the survey between June 18 and 24. 

33. Hirblinger and Landau, “Daring to Differ?”

34. Sebastián Valenzuela, Teresa Correa, and Homero Gil de Zúñiga, “Ties, Likes, and Tweets: Using Strong and Weak Ties to 

Explain Differences in Protest Participation across Facebook and Twitter Use,” Political Communication 35, no. 1 (2018): 117–34; 

Øystein Sæbø, Jeremy Rose, and Leif Skiftenes Flak, “The Shape of Eparticipation: Characterizing an Emerging Research Area,” 

Government Information Quarterly 25, no. 3 (2008): 400–428; and Fabro Steibel and Elsa Estevez, “Designing Web 2.0 Tools 

for Online Public Consultation,” in Impact of Information Society Research in the Global South, ed. Arul Chib, Julian May, and 

Roxana Barrantes (Singapore: Springer, 2015), 243–63.

35. Sæbø, Rose, and Flak, “The Shape of Eparticipation.”

36. Francis L. F. Lee and Joseph Man Chan, “Digital Media Activities and Mode of Participation in a Protest Campaign: A Study of the Umbrella 

Movement,” Information, Communication, and Society 19, no. 1 (2016): 4–22.
42 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

37. Stephen Coleman and Peter M. Shane, eds., Connecting Democracy: Online Consultation and the Flow of Political 

Communication (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012).

38. For example, see Dialectiq, “Bringing analysis to life in DR Congo,” October 24, 2019, https://dialectiq.blog/2019/10/24/bringing

-analysis-to-life-in-dr-congo.

39. Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution, “UN Syria Envoy Continues to Engage Syrian Civil Society,” press release, June 9, 

2020, www.noref.no/About-NOREF/News/UN-Syria-Envoy-continues-to-engage-Syrian-civil-society.

40. Sæbø, Rose, and Flak, “The Shape of Eparticipation,” 47; Stefan Baack, “Datafication and Empowerment: How the Open Data 

Movement Re-Articulates Notions of Democracy, Participation, and Journalism,” Big Data and Society 2, no. 2 (2015): 11, https://doi.org

/10.1177/2053951715594634.

41. Mark Thompson and Geoff Walsham, “ICT Research in Africa: Need for a Strategic Developmental Focus,” Information 

Technology for Development 16, no. 2 (1 April 2010): 112–27, https://doi.org/10.1080/02681101003737390.

42. Daniel Halpern and Jennifer Gibbs, “Social Media As a Catalyst for Online Deliberation? Exploring the Affordances of Facebook and 

YouTube for Political Expression,” Computers in Human Behavior 29, no. 3 (May 2013): 1159–1168, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2012.10

.008. See also Dennis Friess and Christiane Eilders, “A Systematic Review of Online Deliberation Research,” Policy and Internet 7, no. 3 

(2015): 319–39, https://doi.org/10.1002/poi3.95.

43. Tanja Aitamurto, Crowdsourcing for Democracy: A New Era in Policy-Making, Publication of the Committee for the Future, 1/2012 

(Helsinki: Parliament of Finland, 2012).

44. Shana R. Ponelis and Marlene A. Holmner, “ICT in Africa: Building a Better Life for All,” Information Technology for Development

21, no. 2 (3 April 2015): 163–77.

45. O’Donnell and Sweetman, “Introduction,” 217.

46. Maung K. Sein et al., “A Holistic Perspective on the Theoretical Foundations for ICT4D Research,” Information Technology for 

Development, August 21, 2018, 1–19.

47. Thompson and Walsham, “ICT Research in Africa,” 118.

48. Róisín Read, Bertrand Taithe, and Roger Mac Ginty, “Data Hubris? Humanitarian Information Systems and the Mirage of 

Technology,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 8 (August 2, 2016): 1321, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2015.1136208.

49. Naima Hafiz Abubakar and Salihu Ibrahim Dasuki, “Empowerment in Their Hands: Use of WhatsApp by Women in Nigeria,” 

Gender, Technology and Development 22, no. 2 (4 May 2018): 164–83.

50. Shannon Philip, “Youth and ICTs in a ‘New’ India: Exploring Changing Gendered Online Relationships among Young Urban Men 

and Women,” Gender and Development 26, no. 2 (May 4, 2018): 313–24.

51. See Divya Titus, “Social Media as a Gateway for Young Feminists: Lessons from the #IWillGoOut Campaign in India,” Gender 

and Development 26, no. 2 (2018): 231–48; and Sara Baker, “’We Want That for Ourselves’: How Girls and Young Women Are 

Using ICTs to Counter Violence and Demand Their Rights,” Gender and Development 26, no. 2 (2018): 283–97.

52. Abubakar and Dasuki, “Empowerment in Their Hands,” 175.

53. Kurt Braddock and John Horgan, “Towards a Guide for Constructing and Disseminating Counternarratives to Reduce Support for 

Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 39, no. 5 (2016): 381–404; and Jan-Jaap van Eerten and Bertjan Doosje, Challenging 

Extremist Views on Social Media: Developing a Counter-Messaging Response (London: Routledge, 2019).

54. Ben Lumsdaine, Trixie Akpedonu, and Aminata Sow, “Keeping the Peace: Lessons Learned from Preventive Action towards 

Kenya’s 2013 Elections,” Geneva Peacebuilding Platform, 2013, www.gpplatform.ch/sites/default/files/PP%2010%20Kenya%20

-%20Keeping%20the%20peace.pdf.

55. Benjamin Lee, “Countering Violent Extremism Online: The Experiences of Informal Counter Messaging Actors,” Policy and 

Internet 12, no. 1 (2020): 66–87.

56. Bruce R. Lindsay, “Social Media and Disasters: Current Uses, Future Options, and Policy Considerations,” Congressional 

Research Service, September 6, 2011, 4, www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R41987.pdf.

57. See J. Brian Houston et al., “Social Media and Disasters: A Functional Framework for Social Media Use in Disaster Planning, 

Response, and Research,” Disasters 39, no. 1 (2015): 1–22; and T. Vihalemm, M. Kiisel, and H. Harro-Loit, “Citizens’ Response 

Patterns to Warning Messages,” Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 20, no. 1 (2012): 13–25.

58. David E. Alexander, “Social Media in Disaster Risk Reduction and Crisis Management,” Science and Engineering Ethics 20, no. 3 

(2014): 720.

59. Houston et al., “Social Media and Disasters,” 15.

60. Sidharth Muralidharan, Kristie Dillistone, and Jae-Hwa Shin, “The Gulf Coast Oil Spill: Extending the Theory of Image Restoration 

Discourse to the Realm of Social Media and beyond Petroleum,” Public Relations Review 37, no. 3 (2011): 226–32.
USIP.ORG 43

61. See Houston et al., “Social Media and Disasters,” 14; Jason Miklian and Kristian Hoelscher, “A New Research Approach for Peace 

Innovation,” Innovation and Development 8, no. 2 (2018): 189–207; and C. Vrasidas et al., “ICT as a Tool for Environmental Education, 

Peace, and Reconciliation,” Educational Media International 44, no. 2 (2007): 129–40.

62. Vrasidas et al., “ICT as a Tool for Environmental Education.”

63. Robert Muggah and Gustavo Diniz, “Using Information and Communication Technologies for Violence Prevention in Latin 

America,” in New Technology and the Prevention of Violence and Conflict, ed. Francesco Mancini (New York: International 

Peace Institute, 2013), 28–41.

64. Anne Kahl, Christy McConnell, and William Tsuma, “Crowdsourcing as a Tool in Conflict Prevention,” Conflict Trends 2012, no. 1 

(2012): 27–34.

65. Luke Kelly, “Uses of Digital Technologies in Managing and Preventing Conflict,” Helpdesk Report, K4D: Knowledge, Evidence 

and Learning for Development, May 2019, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5d0cecb640f0b62006e1f4ef/600

_ICTs_in_conflict.pdf.

66. Peter M. Landwehr et al., “Using Tweets to Support Disaster Planning, Warning and Response,” Safety Science 90 (December 1, 

2016): 33–47; Houston et al., ““Social Media and Disasters,” 9; Michael F. Goodchild, “Citizens as Sensors: The World of Volunteered 

Geography,” GeoJournal 69, no. 4 (August 1, 2007): 211–21; and Peter M. Landwehr and Kathleen M. Carley, “Social Media in Disaster 

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Studies in Big Data (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2014), 225–57.

67. On disaster preparedness, see Houston et al., “Social Media and Disasters,” 8; Tomer Simon, Avishay Goldberg, and Bruria 

Adini, “Socializing in Emergencies: A Review of the Use of Social Media in Emergency Situations,” International Journal of 

Information Management 35, no. 5 (2015): 609–19; Lindsay, “Social Media and Disasters,” 3; and G. Rive et al., “Social Media in 

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68. John Karlsrud, “Peacekeeping 4.0: Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, Social Media, and Cyber Technologies,” in Cyberspace 

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69. Abubakar and Dasuki, “Empowerment in Their Hands,” 178.

70. EyeWitness to Atrocities, “What We Do,” www.eyewitness.global/our-work.html.

71. Patrick Mutahi and Brian Kimari, “The Impact of Social Media and Digital Technology on Electoral Violence in Kenya,” IDS 

Working Paper no. 493, Institute of Development Studies, August 2017, www.ids.ac.uk/publications/the-impact-of-social

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72. One way of doing this is through plotting “user stories” in the process of technology development. The participants of the project’s 

online course created such user stories for some of the use cases presented above. See www.digitalinclusion.com for examples. 

73. David Buckingham, “Defining Digital Literacy,” in Medienbildung in Neuen Kulturräumen: Die Deutschprachige Und Britische Diskussion, 

ed. Ben Bachmair (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010), 59–71.

74. Leticia Bode, “Closing the Gap: Gender Parity in Political Engagement on Social Media,” Information, Communication and 

Society 20, no. 4 (April 3, 2017): 587–603.

75. Tobias Olsson, Ulli Samuelsson, and Dino Viscovi, “At Risk of Exclusion? Degrees of ICT Access and Literacy among Senior 

Citizens,” Information, Communication and Society 22, no. 1 (2019): 55–72; and Filomena Papa et al., “Engaging TechnologyResistant Elderly People: Empirical Evidence from an ICT-Enabled Social Environment,” Informatics for Health and Social Care

42, no. 1 (January 2, 2017): 43–60.

76. Nick Anstead and Andrew Chadwick, “A Primary Definer Online: The Construction and Propagation of a Think Tank’s Authority 

on Social Media,” Media, Culture, and Society 40, no. 2 (2018): 246–66.

77. Anstead and Chadwick, “A Primary Definer Online.”

78. Hsuan-Ting Chen, Michael Chan, and Francis L. F. Lee, “Social Media Use and Democratic Engagement: A Comparative Study of 

Hong Kong, Taiwan, and China,” Chinese Journal of Communication 9, no. 4 (2016): 348–66.

79. See, for instance, https://netblocks.org/reports for specific country examples. 

80. Mieke Eoyang, “Beyond Privacy & Security: The Role of the Telecommunications Industry in Electronic Surveillance,” Journal of 

National Security Law and Policy 9, no. 2 (2017): 259–82; and Steven I. Friedland, “Unchecked and Unbalanced: The Adverse 

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44 PEACEWORKS | NO. 168

81. Fredrik Björck et al., “Cyber Resilience: Fundamentals for a Definition,” in New Contributions in Information Systems and 

Technologies, ed. Alvaro Rocha et al. (Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2015), 311–16.

82. On internet freedom and inclusivity, see, respectively, Adrian Shahbaz and Allie Funk, “Freedom on the Net 2019: The Crisis of 

Social Media,” Freedom House, November 2019, www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-net/2019/crisis-social-media; and The 

Economist Intelligence Unit, “The Inclusive Internet Index 2020,” www.theinclusiveinternet.eiu.com.

83. See, for instance, the Varieties of Democracy Project’s Digital Society Variables at www.v-dem.net/en/analysis/MapGraph.
ABOUT THE INSTITUTE

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nonpartisan, independent institute, founded by Congress 

and dedicated to the proposition that a world without 

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costly interventions, USIP works with governments and civil 

societies to help their countries solve their own problems 

peacefully. The Institute provides expertise, training, 

analysis, and support to those who are working to build a 

more peaceful, inclusive world.

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Stephen J. Hadley (Chair), Principal, Rice, Hadley, Gates & Manuel LLC, Washington, DC •George E. Moose 

(Vice Chair), Adjunct Professor of Practice, The George Washington University, Washington, DC • Judy 

Ansley, Former Assistant to the President and Deputy National Security Advisor under George W. Bush, 

Washington, DC • Eric Edelman, Roger Hertog Practitioner in Residence, Johns Hopkins University School 

of Advanced International Studies, Washington, DC • Joseph Eldridge, Distinguished Practitioner, School of 

International Service, American University, Washington, DC • Kerry Kennedy, President, Robert F. Kennedy 

Human Rights, Washington, DC • Ikram U. Khan, President, Quality Care Consultants, LLC, Las Vegas, NV •

Stephen D. Krasner, Graham H. Stuart Professor of International Relations, Stanford University, Palo Alto, 

CA • John A. Lancaster, Former Executive Director, National Council on Independent Living, Potsdam, NY • 

Jeremy A. Rabkin, Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School, George Mason University, Arlington, VA • 

J. Robinson West, Former Chairman, PFC Energy, Washington, DC • Nancy Zirkin, Executive Vice President, 

Leadership Conference on Civil and Human Rights, Washington, DC

MEMBERS EX OFFICIO

Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State • Mark T. Esper, Secretary of Defense • Frederick J. Roegge, Vice Admiral, 

US Navy; President, National Defense University • Joe Lataille, Acting President; Chief Financial Officer, 

United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

THE UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE PRESS

Since its inception in 1991, the United States Institute of Peace Press has published hundreds of influential 

books, reports, and briefs on the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international 

conflicts. All our books and reports arise from research and fieldwork sponsored by the Institute’s many 

programs, and the Press is committed to expanding the reach of the Institute’s work by continuing to publish significant and sustainable publications for practitioners, scholars, diplomats, and students. Each work 

undergoes thorough peer review by external subject experts to ensure that the research and conclusions 

are balanced, relevant, and sound.
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Making Peace Possible

NO. 168 | September 2020

Conflict parties and stakeholders increasingly use digital technology, especially social 

media, to further their agendas and interests. This trend toward greater digitization of peace 

processes among those directly involved in conflicts, however, has only recently begun 

to be mirrored by those whose job it is to mediate those conflicts. Digital technology can 

make it easier to include a wide range of stakeholders in peace processes, but mediators 

have tended to neglect this potential or have focused on the risks. This report attempts to 

provide a clearer understanding of the concept of digital inclusion and its practical applications in mediation while illustrating how a greater diversity of voices can be integrated into a 

peace process in the form of digital data.

• After the Agreement: Why the Oversight of Peace Deals Succeeds or Fails by 

Aly Verjee (Peaceworks, September 2020)

• Nonviolent Action in Myanmar: Challenges and Lessons for Civil Society and 

Donors by La Ring, Khin Sandar Nyunt, Nist Pianchupat, and Shaazka Beyerle 

(Special Report, September 2020)

• Curbing Corruption after Conflict: Anticorruption Mobilization in Guatemala by 

Walter Flores and Miranda Rivers (Special Report, September 2020)

• North Korean Phone Money: Airtime Transfers as a Precursor to Mobile 

Payment System by Yonho Kim (Special Report, September 2020)

• Lessons Learned in the Search for COVID-19 Ceasefires by Tyler Jess 

Thompson (Special Report, September 2020)

OTHER USIP PUBLICATIONS