American Ci v i l i a n Po l i c e

in UNPeace Operation s

Lessons Learned and Ideas for the Future

B r i e f l y. . .

• With the advent of the United Na t io ns missio ns in Kosovo and East Timo r, civilia n

p o l ice (CIVPOL) ma ndates ex p a nded in scope and scale to assume the full spectrum

of executive law enfo rc e me nt autho r i t y, along with the cruc ial peacebuilding tasks of

c re a t i ng ind ige nous law enfo rc e me nt and criminal justice systems based on de mo cra t ic values and ins t i t u t io ns.

• T he Clinton adm i n i s t ra t ion’s Pre s ide nt ial Decision Directive (PDD) 71 sought to addre s s

t he “public security gap,” created by the lack of a compre he nsive justice system packa ge for peace opera t io ns, by enhanc i ng U.S. capabilities to recruit, train, and de p l o y

A me r ican police of f icers and by pro v id i ng the necessary criminal justice re s o u rc e s.

• T he United States has been assig n i ng an inc re a s i ng number of ex p e r ie nced Ame r ic a n

p o l ice of f icers to CIVPOL missio ns in peace opera t io ns such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and

East Timo r, with the number re a c h i ng mo re than eig ht hu ndred annua l l y.

• C u r re nt l y, the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram is not a perma ne nt or long-term initia t i v e, but is

f u nded on an annual basis; the pro g ram does not have a statutory basis. The U.S.

D e p a r t me nt of State’s Bureau for Int e r na t io nal Na rc o t ics and Law Enfo rc e me nt is curre ntly re s p o nsible for the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram; it has a budget of $10 million for Fiscal Year 2001 for de v e l o p i ng a two-tho u s a nd-person CIVPOL cadre drawn prima r i l y

f rom mu n icipal and state law enfo rc e me nt age nc ie s.

• Ma ny partic i p a nts were in agre e me nt that CIVPOL by itself can do little to build sust a i nable peace in a postconflict enviro n me nt. In the initial stages of a peace operat ion, the overrid i ng priority is establishing baseline law and orde r. Both Kosovo and

East Timor illustrate that even such an initial objective is a challenge for CIVPOL to

a c h ie v e, given the time re q u i red to deploy of f icers with suffic ie nt and appro p r ia t e

e q u i p me nt for the task.

w w w. u s i p . o rg

S P E C I A L R E P O RT

1200 17th Street NW • Washington, DC 20036 • 202.457.1700 • fax 202.429.6063

July 6, 2001

AB O U T T H E RE P O R T

This report pre s e nts the major issues, conc e r ns,

a nd re c o m me nda t io ns that eme rged from the

United States Institute of Peace symposium

“A me r ican Civilian Po l ice in Int e r na t io nal Pe a c e

O p e ra t io ns: What Have We Learned? Is The re Mo re

We Can Do?” held on Ma rch 14–15, 2001. The

symposium was organized by the Institute’s Tra i ni ng Pro g ram in collabora t ion with the Pro g ram on

Pe a c e ke e p i ng Po l icy at George Mason Un i v e r s i t y,

in Fairfax, Virg i n ia. The two-day symposium,

s t r uc t u red aro u nd four panel sessio ns and two

w o r k i ng gro u p s, bro u g ht toge t her Ame r ican civilian police of f ic e r s, go v e r n me nt and int e rgo v e r nme ntal of f ic ia l s, pra c t i t io ne r s, and acade m ics to

discuss lessons learned from re c e nt United States

i n v o l v e me nt in United Na t io ns civilian polic e

(CIVPOL) missio ns, most notably in Kosovo and

East Timo r, and what can be do ne to enhance the

f u t u re status of the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram. This

s p e c ial report, pre p a red by William Ha y den, synt hesizes the panel pre s e nt a t io ns and discussio ns

of the four major the mes of the symposium

re g a rd i ng Ame r ican ex p e r ie nces in CIVPOL fro m

t he perspective of police of f ic e r s, pra c t i t io ne r s,

a nd polic y ma ke r s. The report conc l udes with a

b r ief discussion of the working group’s re c o m me nda t io ns for future actio n .

The views ex p ressed in this report do not necessarily reflect those of the United States Institute of

Pe a c e, which does not advocate specific policies.

UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEAC E

CO N T E N T S

I nt ro duc t io n 2

S e t t i ng the Stage 3

D e f i n i ng CIVPOL’s Missio n 4

C ro s s - C u l t u ral Is s u e s 6

I m p l e me nt a t ion and Coord i na t io n 7

Tra i n i ng and Prof e s s io na l i z a t io n 9

C o nc l u s io n1 0

Pa r t ic i p a nt s1 1
• F o r mer CIVPOL partic i p a nts from the United States stressed that establishing org a n iz a t io nal comma nd and cont rol struc t u res early on or even befo re de p l o y me nt, along

with a personnel ra n k i ng system, would greatly facilitate the speedier and mo re effective de p l o y me nt of CIVPOL in the fie l d.

• All the Ame r ican of f icers and ma ny partic i p a nts agreed that the de s i red end state of

a CIVPOL mission is a self-sustaining ind ige nous criminal justice system based on

de mo c ra t ic polic i ng principles and the pro t e c t ion of hu man rig ht s.

• C ro s s - c u l t u ral issues in mu l t i na t io nal peace opera t io ns are very sens i t i v e, not only

within and amo ng the mission’s civilian and military compone nt s, but also between

t hose compone nts and the local population. The mu l t i na t io nal composition of a UN

CIVPOL mission can create ma ny obstacles to effective law enfo rc e me nt actio n .

• T he symposium’s Ame r ican CIVPOL partic i p a nts agreed that opera t io nal challenge s

w e re the most sig n i f ic a nt barrier to setting up an interim law enfo rc e me nt pre s e nce in

a peace opera t ion. The U.S. of f icers emphasized that, absent an int e r na t io nal pro g ra m

that facilitates org a n i z a t ion, as well as tra i n i ng and coord i na t ion for differe nt na t io nal cont i nge nts prior to de p l o y me nt, they the mselves had to invest cons ide rable time,

e f fort, and re s o u rces in the field to fo rge a standa rdized and unified team composed

of civilian police from the United States and a variety of other count r ie s. 

• A number of partic i p a nts voiced support for such ideas as Cong ress’s taking action to

give the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram a statutory basis, cre a t i ng a reserve fo rce in which of f icers would be deputized fede ral age nt s, or establishing a stand i ng “ge nda r me r ie ” -

type paramilitary capacity (such as that fo u nd in Fra nc e, It a l y, or Spain) to be used

exclusively for CIVPOL opera t io ns.

• In Bosnia, East Timo r, and Kosovo, Ame r ican of f icers ge ne rally have earned a prof e ss io nal re p u t a t ion and are looked to for leadership and solid polic i ng ex p e r t i s e.

• E n h a nc i ng public perc e p t ion and unde r s t a nd i ng of CIVPOL and the role of Ame r ic a n

of f icers must take place to propel CIVPOL to a greater level of importance as a peaceke e p i ng and peacebuilding tool.

I n t ro d u c t i o n

On Ma rch 14–15, the United States Institute of Pe a c e, in conjunc t ion with George Ma s o n

University’s Pro g ram on Pe a c e ke e p i ng Po l ic y, hosted a symposium on the roles of Ame rican CIVPOL of f icers in UN peace opera t io ns. Approx i mately fifty partic i p a nts gathe re d

in panel sessio ns and working groups to grapple with lessons learned from past and curre nt U.S. involveme nt in CIVPOL missio ns, specifically Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timo r,

a nd to pre s e nt conc rete re c o m me nda t io ns for impro v i ng U.S. capabilities in these types

of missio ns. The partic i p a nts inc l uded polic y ma ke r s, pra c t i t io ne r s, acade m ic s, ana l y s t s,

a nd, for the first time, a number of Ame r ican police of f icers who were vetera ns of CIVPOL

c o nt i nge nts in peace opera t io ns. The symposium pro v ided the Ame r ican CIVPOL of f ic e r s

t he unique opportunity to inject their valuable mission ex p e r ie nce into the policy disc u s s ion on what should be the next stage of de v e l o p me nt in the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ra m .

P r ior to 1989, only two UN peace opera t io ns cont a i ned CIVPOL compone nts: Congo

(1960–1964) and Cyprus (1964–pre s e nt). Since 1989, CIVPOL has become an int e g ra l

e l e me nt of UN peace opera t io ns, beginning with the mo n i t o r i ng mission in Na m i b ia

( U N TAG) and the limited executive authority ma ndate in Cambodia (UNTAC). A sig n i f ic a nt ex p a ns ion of CIVPOL opera t io ns occurred with the UN Int e r na t io nal Po l ice Ta s k

F o rce (UNIPTF) in Bosnia - He r z e go v i na, a mo n i t o r i ng, me nt o r i ng, and tra i n i ng missio n

with an authorized stre ngth of mo re than two tho u s a nd. With the advent of the Ko s o v o

(UNMIK) and East Timor (UNTAET) missio ns, CIVPOL ma ndates ex p a nded in scope and

scale to assume the full spectrum of executive law enfo rc e me nt authority—that is, the

2

AB O U T T H E IN S T I T U T E

T he United States Institute of Peace is an indep e nde nt, nonpartisan fede ral ins t i t u t ion cre a t e d

by Cong ress to pro mote re s e a rch, educ a t ion, and

t ra i n i ng on the pre v e nt ion, ma na ge me nt, and re so l u t ion of int e r na t io nal conflic t s. Established in

1984, the Institute meets its cong re s s io nal ma ndate through an array of pro g ra ms, inc l ud i ng

re s e a rch gra nt s, fellowships, prof e s s io nal tra i n i ng

p ro g ra ms, confere nces and worksho p s, library serv ic e s, public a t io ns, and other educ a t io nal activit ie s. The Institute’s Board of Directors is

a p p o i nted by the Pre s ide nt of the United States

a nd confirmed by the Sena t e.

BOA R D O F DI R E C TO R S

Chester A. Cro c ker ( C h a i r man), Ja mes R. Schlesinge r

P rofessor of Stra t e g ic Stud ie s, School of Fore ign Servic e,

G e o rgetown University • S eymour Martin Lipset ( V ic e

C h a i r man), Hazel Professor of Public Po l ic y, George

Mason University • Betty F. Bumpers, P re s ide nt, Pe a c e

L i n k s, Wa s h i ngton, D.C. • Holly J. Burkhalter, Ad v o -

cacy Dire c t o r, Phy s ic ia ns for Hu man Rig ht s, Wa s h i ng t o n ,

D.C. • M a rc E. Leland, Esq., Pre s ide nt, Ma rc E. Leland &

As s o c ia t e s, Arlington, Va. • M o ra L. McLean, E s q . ,

P re s ide nt, Afric a - A me r ica Ins t i t u t e, New York, N.Y. •

María Otero , P re s ide nt, AC C ION Int e r na t io na l ,

S o me r v i l l e, Ma s s. • B a r b a ra W. Snelling, State Sena t o r

a nd fo r mer Lie u t e na nt Governo r, She l b u r ne, Vt.

• S h i b l ey Te l h a m i , A nwar Sadat Chair for Peace and

D e v e l o p me nt, University of Ma r y l a nd 

• Harriet Zimmerman, V ice Pre s ide nt, Ame r ican Is ra e l

P u b l ic Affairs Committee, Wa s h i ngton, D.C.

ME M B E R SE X O F F I C I O

Paul G. Gaffney II, V ice Adm i ral, U.S. Navy; Pre s ide nt ,

Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r s i t y • Colin L. Powell, S e c re t a r y

of State • Donald H. Rumsfeld, S e c retary of Defense 

• R i c h a rd H. Solomon, P re s ide nt, United States 

I nstitute of Peace (no n v o t i ng)
a u t hority to carry side a r ms and to arre s t — a l o ng with the cruc ial peacebuilding tasks of

c re a t i ng ind ige nous law enfo rc e me nt and criminal justice systems based on de mo c ra t ic

values and ins t i t u t io ns. 

In Kosovo and East Timo r, the UN assumed the re s p o nsibility of re b u i l d i ng public

i ns t i t u t io ns, social infra s t r uc t u re, and econo m ic life. Sig n i f ic a nt burde ns were placed

on CIVPOL, along with ex p e c t a t io ns that CIVPOL would ra p idly re s t o re law and orde r

a nd enable the military cont i nge nt of the peace opera t io ns to withdraw from tho s e

a c t i v i t ie s. The UN’s Brahimi Report, released in August 2000, ind icated that the

“ de ma nd for civilian police opera t io ns de a l i ng with int rastate conflict is likely to

re main high on any list of re q u i re me nts for he l p i ng a war-torn society re s t o re cond it io ns for social, econo m ic, and political stability.” The United States has been assig ni ng an inc re a s i ng number of ex p e r ie nced Ame r ican police of f icers to CIVPOL missio ns

in peace opera t io ns such as Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timo r, with the number re a c hi ng mo re than eig ht hu ndred annua l l y.

In peace opera t io ns whe re CIVPOL cont i nge nts have executive law enfo rc e me nt

a u t hority and whe re rule of law systems have failed or are no nex i s t e nt, CIVPOL’s success in establishing law and order is cruc ially linked with the compleme ntary compone nts of a criminal justice system—courts, judge s, pro s e c u t o r s, corre c t io ns of f ic ia l s,

a nd public de f e nde r s. The Clinton adm i n i s t ra t ion’s Pre s ide nt ial Decision Directive (PDD)

71 sought to address the “public security gap,” created by the lack of a compre he nsive justice system packa ge for peace opera t io ns, by enhanc i ng U.S. capabilities to

recruit, train, and deploy Ame r ican police of f ic e r s, and also by pro v id i ng the ne c e s s a r y

c r i m i nal justice re s o u rc e s. As one symposium partic i p a nt no t e d, “We all know the pro bl e ms, and PDD-71 says it all.” Ho w e v e r, the principal factors that impede the enhanc eme nt of CIVPOL as a key tool in U.S. involveme nt in peace opera t io ns are political will

a nd fund i ng. Symposium partic i p a nts agreed that it is in the na t io nal int e rest that the

United States cont i nue to enhance U.S. CIVPOL capabilities and involveme nt in int e rna t io nal peace opera t io ns. 

Setting the Stage

T he symposium’s ke y note speake r, Major Gene ral William Nash (U.S. Army, ret.), fo r me r

Task Force Eagle Comma nder in Bosnia and the UNMIK Regio nal Adm i n i s t rator for the

M i t ro v ica re g ion of Kosovo du r i ng much of 2000, posed a three-part thesis to the part ic i p a nts: First, until the civilian compone nts of peace opera t io ns attain the same re l ative competency and appro p r iate re s o u rces as the military compone nt, the

p e a c e b u i l d i ng effort and its political objectives will never be achie v e d. Second, too

much effort has been spent talking about the military compone nt of peace opera t io ns

a nd not enough directed at unde r s t a nd i ng the complex and int e r t w i ned political, econo m ic, social, and security dime ns io ns of the socie t ies whe re int e r v e nt ion is taking

p l a c e. Third, establishing law and order and combating the organized crime that flouri s hes in the security vacuum of peace opera t io ns cannot be do ne with disorg a n i z e d

i nt e r na t io nal polic e.

Nash stressed that the int e r na t io nal community steps onto a slippery slope when it

e q uates security with military capacity in peace opera t io ns, because security is a muc h

b ro a der and mo re complex concept. In fact, issues such as re s t o r i ng the rule of law, fre edom of mo v e me nt, and civil orde r, as well as no r ma l i z i ng the political, econo m ic, and

s o c ial orders in a postconflict enviro n me nt, are far beyond the scope of the military

c o m p o ne nt in a peace opera t ion. The military is re q u i red to pro v ide security for both

p a c i f ic a t ion and stabilization; it is not the appro p r iate actor for ins t i t u t ion- or stateb u i l d i ng .

A compre he nsive ma ndate such as UN Security Council Resolution 1244—the fo u nda t ion for the int e r na t io nal community’s initiative in Ko s o v o — re q u i res mo re ex t e ns i v e

3

The UN’s Brahimi Report

indicated that the “demand 

for civilian police opera t i o n s

dealing with intra s tate conflict

is likely to remain high on any

list of re q u i rements for helping

a wa r - torn society re s to re conditions for social, economic,

and political sta b i l i t y.” 

Nash stressed that the international community steps onto a

slippery slope when it equates

security with military capacity

in peace opera t i o n s, because

security is a much broader and

m o re complex concept.
u nde r s t a nd i ng of the full spectrum of re q u i re me nts and assig n i ng appro p r iate org a n i z at io ns to achieve those objectives. The impro v e me nt of int e r na t io nal civilian polic e

capacity re q u i re s, at a minimum, the int e g ra t ion of jud ic ial and penal compone nts int o

a compre he nsive rule of law capacity, which in turn must be int e g rated with other civilian capacitie s.

S uch a task can be achieved only by investing the necessary re s o u rces—both hu ma n

a nd fina nc ial—in the civilian compone nts of peace opera t io ns. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and

East Timo r, the military had a lopsided prof e s s io nal and logistical advant a ge over the

c i v i l ian eleme nt s. Nash re ma r ked that, as Task Force Eagle comma nder in Bosnia, he had

led soldiers fully tra i ned and equipped who worked with other prof e s s io nal soldiers fro m

o t her count r ies who were equally well tra i ned; all the military objectives were fully

p l a n ned and executed through coord i na t ion. As the UNMIK Regio nal Adm i n i s t rator in

Kosovo, Nash noted that the Serbs and Albania ns were the least of his pro b l e ms, as he

s p e nt the majority of his time ma na g i ng and coord i na t i ng the various civilian compone nts of the peace opera t ion. While he fo u nd de d icated and prof e s s io nal civilia ns, the re

was chaos in planning and exe c u t ion, not the least of which was on the police and ruleof-law side.

Nash conc l uded by re c o m me nd i ng that we must re member the primacy of civilia n

goals and objectives in all cases of int e r v e nt ion through peace opera t io ns. Military

objectives only support the successful achie v e me nt of the civilian objectives. Establishi ng law and order and re c o ns t r uc t i ng a criminal justice system as part of the overall security and peacebuilding goals can be realized only through a civilian capacity that has

a de q uate re s o u rc e s.

Defining CIVPOL’s Mission

This overa rc h i ng topic for the panel “The Prof e s s io nal Challenge: What Should CIVPOL Be

D o i ng to Build Sustainable Peace?” focused partic i p a nts’ attent ion on the question of

C I V P O L’s funda me ntal role in peace opera t io ns. The panelists in this session posed

nu me rous issues that touc hed on not only U.S. CIVPOL capabilitie s, but on the conc e pt ion and pra c t ice of UN civilian polic i ng as well. What will the ma ndate be and how will

it be achieved? If sustainable peace is the end state, what can CIVPOL do to realize that

goal? What is the pro duct that CIVPOL is de l i v e r i ng? What services are to be pro v ide d ?

A nd who are the customers? Ma ny partic i p a nts were in agre e me nt that CIVPOL by itself

can do little to build sustainable peace in a postconflict enviro n me nt. In the initia l

s t a ges of a peace opera t ion, the overrid i ng priority is establishing baseline law and orde r.

Both Kosovo and East Timor illustrate that even such an initial objective is a challenge

for CIVPOL to achie v e, given the time re q u i red to deploy of f icers with suffic ie nt and

a p p ro p r iate equipme nt for the task. The curre nt cont roversy over whe t her the U.S. military should play a role in securing baseline law and order du r i ng peace opera t io ns is a

result of that state of affa i r s.

C o m p l ex peace opera t io ns such as those in Kosovo and East Timor are, in effect, large -

s c a l e, int e r na t io nal efforts at state building. When CIVPOL arrive, they inevitably begin

to change the status quo and the balance of power amo ng competing groups in the miss ion area. This is an inescapable fact of peace opera t io ns—as is the fact that ma nda t e s

for Kosovo and East Timor charge the civilian compone nts with cre a t i ng the ins t i t u t io ns

necessary for legitima t e, de mo c ra t ic go v e r na nc e. Un fo r t u na t e l y, the term “state buildi ng”—as was the case with the term “na t ion building”—has developed a negative conno t a t ion with respect to U.S. military involveme nt in polic i ng and re b u i l d i ng war-torn

s o c ie t ies du r i ng peace opera t io ns. Ho w e v e r, ne i t her the military nor the civilian compone nt of a peace opera t ion is capable of building sustainable peace by itself; ra t he r, the y

must work in a coord i nated and int e g rated fa s h ion to target specific capacities and 

support each other as ne c e s s a r y. With CIVPOL, the initial securing of baseline law and

4

C o m p l ex peace operations 

such as those in Ko s ovo and

East Timor are, in effect, 

l a rg e - s c a l e, international 

e f forts at state building.
o rder cannot occur without military support and coord i na t ion. Pa r t ic i p a nts noted that

t he U.S. go v e r n me nt will have to play a key role in de t e r m i n i ng the fra mework for effective CIVPOL-military coord i na t ion. 

C u r re nt l y, UN CIVPOL capacity is based on member-state cont r i b u t io ns of hu man and

ma t e r ial re s o u rc e s, as the UN does not have a stand i ng capacity to deploy the array of

law enfo rc e me nt capabilities that an executive authority ma ndate re q u i re s. The impedi me nts to effective law enfo rc e me nt action are nu me rous: civilian police assig ned to a

peace opera t ion may have never worked toge t he r, do not know one ano t he r, and come

f rom all over the world with very differe nt law enfo rc e me nt ex p e r ie nc e s, tra i n i ng, and

a b i l i t ie s. Forg i ng an effective and effic ie nt int e r na t io nal police fo rce from fifty-thre e

na t io nal cont i nge nt s, as in Kosovo, is a difficult task in an uns t a b l e, unfa m i l iar enviro n me nt. Law enfo rc e me nt in a postconflict tra ns i t io nal setting is not achieved by simply placing police of f icers in the field with a sidearm, handc u f f s, and the power to arre s t ,

for this is me rely the street-level phase of establishing rule of law. The ins t i t u t io na l

capacity to sanc t ion lawbre a kers must exist along s ide CIVPOL or else it will be impossible to establish the rule of law’s full ex t e nt. 

T he Ame r ican CIVPOL partic i p a nts also stressed that establishing org a n i z a t io nal comma nd and cont rol struc t u res early on or even befo re de p l o y me nt, along with a personnel ra n k i ng system, would greatly facilitate the speedier and effective de p l o y me nt of

CIVPOL in the fie l d. Like w i s e, ma ny Ame r ican of f icers with years of specialized ex p e r ie nce in organized crime, drug enfo rc e me nt, investig a t io ns, fo re ns ic s, and senior ma na ge me nt fo u nd the mselves placed in positio ns that did not match their specific

p rof e s s io nal ex p e r ie nce; he nc e, CIVPOL in ge ne ral bypassed opportunities in which the s e

skills could have sig n i f ic a ntly improved its initial law enfo rc e me nt action in peace opera t io ns. One fo r mer CIVPOL of f icer who had served as a major me t ropolitan chief of polic e

fo u nd himself placed as an airport gua rd. Instead of the effective placeme nt of of f ic e r s

with specialized skills re q u i red to combat organized crime, political terrorism, or hu ma n

t ra f f ic k i ng, the curre nt pra c t ice has been to create specialized units from scratch that

re q u i re their own logistical and adm i n i s t rative support. Ma ny Ame r ican of f icers feel that

t he U.S. go v e r n me nt does not ade q uately address issues of comma nd and cont rol, ra n k ,

a nd appro p r iate placeme nt, thus affecting of f icers’ mo rale and effectivene s s. The U.S.

go v e r n me nt should have a closer affinity with of f icers on the gro u nd, not only as a

s o u rce of na t io nal pride for U.S. cont i nge nt me m b e r s, but also because Ame r ican of f icers are looked to for leadership in a disorganized mission enviro n me nt .

CIVPOL missio ns also cont i nuously evolve, and it is necessary that CIVPOL de p l o yme nts be organized to effectively utilize of f icers with the appro p r iate skills and ex p e r ie nce for each stage of the mission. Initial de p l o y me nt for securing baseline law and

o rder re q u i res differe nt skills than those du r i ng the middle and late stages of a missio n ’ s

life cycle, in which ins t i t u t ion building, tra i n i ng new police fo rc e s, and employing spec ialized law enfo rc e me nt func t io ns are ne c e s s a r y. This places CIVPOL of f icers in new and

c h a l l e ng i ng situa t io ns with which they may have had no ex p e r ie nce in their ho me polic e

a ge nc ie s. CIVPOL of f icers also find the mselves serving as political actors, which gre a t l y

c o m p l icates the impartial, public service roles with which Ame r ican of f icers are fa m i l ia r.

Kosovo’s highly politicized cont ext (which inc l udes some cont r i b u t i ng na t io ns being

fa v o red over others by either Albania ns or Serbs) places Ame r ican of f icers in prof e s s io na l

s i t ua t io ns that he ig hten the potent ial for ma n i p u l a t ion, compro m i s e, and loss of impart ia l i t y. This politic i z a t ion not only affects polic i ng, but also greatly complicates ins t i t ut ion building and other goals that have been set as mission objectives.

I l l - de f i ned peace opera t ion ma nda t e s, in which political de c i s io ns re g a rd i ng end

states are not taken or de f e r re d, also complicate CIVPOL’s mission. All the Ame r ican of f icers and ma ny other partic i p a nts agreed that the de s i red end state is a self-sustaining

i nd ige nous criminal justice system based on de mo c ra t ic polic i ng principles and the 

p ro t e c t ion of hu man rig ht s. In Kosovo and East Timo r, criminal justice systems have

been created from the gro u nd up; in Bosnia, UNIPTF of f icers deployed to mo n i t o r, 

5

M a ny American officers feel

that the U.S. government does

not adequately address issues of

command and control, ra n k ,

and appropriate placement,

thus affecting officers’ mora l e

and effective n e s s.

All the American officers and

m a ny other participants agre e d

that the desired end state is 

a self-sustaining indigenous

criminal justice system based

on democratic policing

principles and the protection 

of human rights.
me nt o r, and train fo u nd the mselves fa c i ng three differe nt polic i ng struc t u res and little

l e v e ra ge or ability to get behind the scenes and alter the re l a t io nship between na t io nalist power bro ke r s, organized crime, and local law enfo rc e me nt. In the fo r mer cases,

CIVPOL is able to work with senior mission of f ic ials and local leaders and commu n i t ie s

in ide nt i f y i ng how a future police fo rce should func t ion. Such collabora t ion is cruc ial in

e na b l i ng the local population to have an important stake in building impartial, accountable ins t i t u t io ns that break with past pra c t ic e s, and CIVPOL can deliver basic and fie l d

t ra i n i ng in law enfo rc e me nt funda me nt a l s, inc l ud i ng community polic i ng. Wo r k i ng closely with local commu n i t ies in establishing an ind ige nous police fo rce that inc l udes me mbers of all ethnic groups in the society is tre me ndously important to building sustaina b l e

peace in a postconflict enviro n me nt. 

C I V P O L’s best cont r i b u t ion to that goal comes not through serving as a long-term law

e n fo rc e me nt surro g a t e, but in supporting the de v e l o p me nt of a new criminal justice system that has the trust and confide nce of the ent i re population. Long-term eng a ge me nt

s hould come in the form of tra i n i ng and support, along with qua ntitative and qua l i t ative evalua t ion of new police servic e s. Such assessme nt would be backed by the kind of

executive authority necessary to address ins t i t u t io nal and personnel pro b l e ms and conc retely ma na ge the de v e l o p me nt of de mo c ra t ic police and criminal justice ins t i t u t io ns.

C ro s s - C u l t u ral Issues 

T he panel session “The Challenge of Differe nces: Cro s s - C u l t u ral Issues for CIVPOL in Mu l t ina t io nal Peace Opera t io ns” addressed the complex subject of cultural differe nc e s, whic h

t he panelists stressed as being one of the most challeng i ng issues UN CIVPOL missio ns

fa c e. Cro s s - c u l t u ral issues in mu l t i na t io nal peace opera t io ns are very sens i t i v e, not only

within and amo ng the mission’s civilian and military compone nt s, but also between

t hose compone nts and the local population. The mu l t i na t io nal composition of a UN

CIVPOL mission can create ma ny obstacles to effective law enfo rc e me nt action. Within

a CIVPOL mission, the social, cultural, no r ma t i v e, and re l ig ious backg ro u nd s, prof e s s io nal skills and competenc e, and law enfo rc e me nt subcultures of the na t io nal cont i nge nt s

differ cons ide rably amo ng police from established de mo c ra c ie s, eme rg i ng de mo c ra c ie s,

a nd autocra t ic re g i me s. 

Ma ny Ame r ican of f icers fo u nd the mselves having to ma na ge several polic i ng culture s

within ind i v idual CIVPOL statio ns, whe re of f icers had quite differe nt attitudes toward

h a ndc u f f i ng suspects or using fo rce against de t a i ne e s. They also fo u nd the mselves tra i ni ng of f icers from other count r ies who had been placed in supervisory positio ns, but

w hose prof e s s io nal skills were weak. These differe nc e s, along with mo ra l e, effic ie nc y, and

s e r v ice effectiveness pro b l e ms, created ma ny obstacles to fo rg i ng a cohe s i v e, unified UN

c i v i l ian police fo rc e. In Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timo r, the ex p e c t a t io ns of the local

p o p u l a t ion toward the int e r na t io nal community were very high. When CIVPOL could no t

meet those ex p e c t a t io ns and the local population could see the int e r nal disarray of

CIVPOL, respect from the local community was diminishe d. 

T hese cro s s - c u l t u ral factors also eme rge in working with ex t a nt ind ige nous polic e

fo rc e s, as in Bosnia - He r z e go v i na, or in cre a t i ng new police fo rc e s, as in Kosovo and East

T i mo r. Although CIVPOL cont i nge nts arrive with the basic ma t e r ial for tra i n i ng tho s e

i nd ige nous police in int e r na t io nal polic i ng no r ms, such as de mo c ra t ic polic i ng, community polic i ng, and hu man rig ht s, the fact is that the re is no robust and cohe re nt int e rna t io nal CIVPOL culture that would enable of f icers from Western de mo c ra c ie s, eme rg i ng

de mo c ra c ie s, and Is l a m ic socie t ie s, for exa m p l e, to impart the same packa ge of no r ms

a nd prof e s s io nal conduct to ex t a nt police fo rces in postconflict socie t ie s. In partic u l a r,

ge nder and re l ig ious issues can complicate not only how CIVPOL tackles pro b l e ms of

hu man tra f f ic k i ng and fo rced pro s t i t u t ion, but also how CIVPOL goes about cultivating

6

Working closely with local 

communities in establishing an

indigenous police fo rce that

includes members of all ethnic

g roups in the society is 

t remendously important to

building sustainable peace in a

p o s tconflict environment. 

M a ny American officers fo u n d

t h e m s e l ves having to manage

s eve ral policing cultures within

individual CIVPOL sta t i o n s,

w h e re officers had quite 

d i f f e rent attitudes towa rd

handcuffing suspects or using

fo rce against deta i n e e s. 
an appro p r iate law enfo rc e me nt attitude amo ng ind ige nous polic e. In ma ny peace opera t ion setting s, bad pra c t ices and une t h ical behavior are condo ned or overlooked in the

na me of cultural tolera nc e. 

This situa t ion is ma de even mo re complex by the problem of de t e r m i n i ng what law

CIVPOL should apply in exe rc i s i ng executive autho r i t y. When CIVPOL na t io nal cont i nge nt s

first arrived in Kosovo and East Timo r, the issue of what legal code would apply was unres o l v e d. The re was no code of criminal pro c e du re to regulate how suspects were to be

a r re s t e d, pro c e s s e d, de t a i ne d, and bro u g ht befo re a court. This situa t ion was complic a ted by the fact that differe nt na t io nal cont i nge nts were fa m i l iar with differe nt legal syst e ms: common law, civil law, Shari’a, Confuc ian, customa r y, or a blend of differe nt types.

T he Ame r ican of f icers stressed the importance of the UN’s de v e l o p i ng a special peace

o p e ra t ion criminal code and pro c e du re that could be used du r i ng the early stages unt i l

s e n ior of f ic ials and local leaders de t e r m i ne what laws will be applicable or draft ne w

l a w s. Existing within a postconflict security and legal vacuum, ma ny local commu n i t ie s

fo u nd the mselves re s o l v i ng disputes or addre s s i ng illicit acts by re l y i ng on alternative or

t ra d i t io nal me t hods that were unfa m i l iar to CIVPOL of f ic e r s. Ho w e v e r, ma ny of f ic e r s

l e a r ned that some alternative or tra d i t io nal me t hods—if respectful of hu man rig ht s —

could actually be he l pful du r i ng the re - e s t a b l i s h me nt of law and order and a criminal just ice system, especially when community polic i ng stra t e g ies are used to fill the public

security gap—a critical task in building the trust and confide nce of the local populatio n

in CIVPOL missio ns. 

C ro s s - c u l t u ral issues are also int e r nal to the U.S. na t io nal cont i nge nt. Ame r ican polic e

of f icers come from very differe nt cultures within the United States; the re are also unique

p rof e s s io nal subcultures of law enfo rc e me nt age nc ies across the count r y. Because the

U.S. go v e r n me nt recruits primarily from mu n icipal and state law enfo rc e me nt age nc ie s,

t he same sort of prof e s s io nal and personal issues fo u nd in a mu l t i na t io nal UN CIVPOL

m i s s ion can be fo u nd amo ng Ame r ican of f ic e r s. While U.S. go v e r n me nt re c r u i t me nt has

i m p ro v e d, the re are still cons ide rable challenges in attra c t i ng qua l i f ied of f icers fo r

CIVPOL missio ns. These of f icers are alre a dy in high de ma nd by local U.S. police de p a r tme nt s, and the re is little inc e ntive to let them go on CIVPOL missio ns. Mo re o v e r, cro s s -

c u l t u ral tra i n i ng for Ame r ican of f icers de p l o y i ng to peace opera t io ns is limited, and some

of f icers come to the mission not fully pre p a red to handle the ge ne ral and specific cro s s -

c u l t u ral challenges they will inevitably fa c e.

Implementation and Coord i n a t i o n

T he third panel session of the symposium focused on the opera t io nal challenges UN

CIVPOL missio ns enc o u nt e r. The panelists shared ex t e nsive field and polic y ma k i ng ex p er ie nce on the subject of impleme nt i ng and coord i na t i ng action, and they illustrated ho w

CIVPOL has ma de substant ial pro g ress in re c e nt years in solving opera t io nal diffic u l t ie s.

Kosovo and East Timor in particular show how lessons learned from earlier peace operat io ns, in both military and civilian capacitie s, have contributed to the dra ma t ic evolut ion in polic i ng in peace opera t io ns in fragile postconflict socie t ie s. The field has

w i t nessed tre me ndous change over a short perio d, as the ability and willing ness of the

i nt e r na t io nal community to int e r v e ne in failed socie t ie s, re duce tens ion, and re s t o re no rmality have improved cons ide ra b l y. CIVPOL is mostly a de v e l o p me nt of the de c a de fo ll o w i ng the end of the Cold Wa r, so much re ma i ns to be do ne. 

Just as in the military side of peace opera t io ns, the int e r na t io nal community has

developed new ide a s, techniques, and capacities in field missio ns; much of this has been

do ne through the UN and the Org a n i z a t ion for Security and Coopera t ion in Euro p e.

I m p ro v e me nts have eme rged only through a difficult process of trial and error in the

f ie l d. Ta k i ng over executive law enfo rc e me nt authority is a tre me ndous re s p o ns i b i l i t y,

7

CIVPOL is mostly a deve l o p m e n t

of the decade fo l l owing the end

of the Cold Wa r, so much

remains to be done. 

When CIVPOL national

contingents first arrived in

Ko s ovo and East Timor, the

issue of what legal code wo u l d

apply was unre s o l ved. There

was no code of criminal

p ro c e d u re to regulate how 

suspects we re to be arre s t e d ,

p rocessed, detained, and

b rought befo re a court.
a nd CIVPOL opera t io ns must be cons t a ntly analyzed and reassessed by the U.S. go v e r nme nt, the UN, and re g io nal org a n i z a t io ns. Po l ic y ma kers should listen carefully to lessons

l e a r ned by CIVPOL of f icers in the field to improve impleme nt a t ion and coord i na t ion of

executive authority with other eleme nts of the criminal justice compone nt .

T he Ame r ican CIVPOL partic i p a nts agreed that opera t io nal challenges were the mo s t

s ig n i f ic a nt barrier to setting up an interim law enfo rc e me nt pre s e nce in a peace operat ion. As discussed du r i ng the first panel session, of f icers ackno w l e dged that they the mselves ex p e nded cons ide rable time, effort, and re s o u rces in fo rg i ng a standa rdized and

u n i f ied CIVPOL team composed of U.S. of f icers and those from other na t io ns. Hu ma n

re s o u rces were not always used effectively, and the list of opera t io nal diffic u l t ies affecti ng impleme nt a t ion and coord i na t ion of U.S. and int e r na t io nal CIVPOL of f icers was subs t a nt ial: unfa m i l iar polic i ng techniques, cultural differe nces and bia s e s, lack of

f u nda me ntal skills, lack of common unde r s t a nd i ng of hu man rig hts and de mo c ra t ic polici ng pra c t ic e s, lack of standa rd equipme nt and unifo r ms, no nex i s t e nt polic ies and guidel i ne s, confusion about applicable laws and pro c e du re s, and confusion over rank. As

G e ne ral Nash noted in his ke y note re ma r k s, the civilian compone nts were prof e s s io na l l y

a nd technically disadvant a ged compared to the military cont i nge nt s. Securing baseline

law and orde r — a l o ng with jump-starting ins t i t u t ion building for ind ige nous police serv ices and the criminal justice system—are difficult under the abno r mal cond i t io ns of a

peace opera t ion in a postconflict setting .

Kosovo has been an especially difficult unde r t a k i ng, as the essent ial eleme nts of the

c o n f l ict re main unresolved and UNMIK’s efforts to secure coopera t ion and complia nc e

f rom and amo ng the various ethnic and other groups involved has been difficult at best.

In some areas of Kosovo, baseline law and order and security have not been re a l i z e d,

re q u i r i ng daily coord i na t ion between NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR) and CIVPOL to ma i ntain some semblance of cont rol. Po l i t ical terrorism and organized crime have proved diff icult to deal with, and, in certain re s p e c t s, peace in Kosovo has become the

c o nt i nua t ion of war by other me a ns. The pro v i nce is populated by ma ny “spoilers,” who

a re pre p a red to sacrifice peace for short-term political gain. 

C o o rd i na t ion at the tactical level—not only between CIVPOL and KFOR, but also

a mo ng CIVPOL cont i nge nts—has been personality driven: Ind i v idual leadership has

often been the key to suc c e s s. In the gray area of the public security gap, it is not always

clear whe re military re s p o nsibility for security and law and order ends and CIVPOL

re s p o nsibility begins. Po l i t ical inde c i s ion and unc e r t a i nt y, and the exc r uc ia t i ngly slow

i m p l e me nt a t ion of the criminal justice compone nts and the rule of law compound the s e

f u nc t io nal pro b l e ms. In Kosovo and East Timo r, a me a ger handful of int e r na t io nal judge s

a nd prosecutors has been ins u f f ic ie nt for supporting and guid i ng the new ind ige no u s

c r i m i nal justice system or pro c e s s i ng the backlog of minor and major cases sitting on

CIVPOL comma nders’ de s k s. As the Ame r ican of f icers no t e d, given these circ u ms t a nc e s

a nd other re s o u rce cons t ra i nt s, impleme nt i ng CIVPOL’s executive authority and coord ina t i ng law enfo rc e me nt action were some t i mes ins u r mo u ntable tasks.

In Kosovo, CIVPOL opera t io ns have been hampered by the lack of effective crimina l

i nt e l l ige nce work. KFOR and UNMIK have sought to overc o me that int e l l ige nce gap by

s h a r i ng info r ma t ion and working jointly to improve CIVPOL’s grasp of the political lands c a p e. This form of coord i na t ion should enable ide nt i f ic a t ion of who is behind politic a l

v io l e nc e, who the targets are, what is the struc t u re of organized crime ent i t ie s, and what

CIVPOL, UNMIK, and KFOR can do. Jo i nt planning and targeted opera t io ns conducted by

CIVPOL and KFOR have led to mo re successful eng a ge me nt against illegal weapons,

hu man tra f f ic k i ng, organized crime, and political vio l e nc e. Some go v e r n me nts ma k i ng

p e r s o n nel and re s o u rce cont r i b u t io ns have stepped up their efforts by ma k i ng sure that

s p e c ialized of f icers are better used and that the tools they need are ma de available.

T he Ame r ican of f icers and other panelists and partic i p a nts no t e d, ho w e v e r, that

p ro g ress has also been ma de and that the re are re me d ies to the pro b l e ms. While the lack

of political will and fund i ng by cont r i b u t i ng states is still a major obstacle, the missio n

8

In some areas of Ko s ovo ,

baseline law and order and

security have not been re a l i z e d ,

requiring daily coord i n a t i o n

b e t ween NATO’s Ko s ovo Fo rc e

(KFOR) and CIVPOL to mainta i n

some semblance of control. 
has moved fo r w a rd in building the rule of law and de mo ns t ra t i ng to the local populat ion—as the customers re c e i v i ng int e r na t io nal public servic e s — mo dels of legitima t e

go v e r na nc e. Impro v i ng and ex p a nd i ng coord i na t ion and collabora t ion amo ng the civilian and military leaders of a peace opera t ion can enhance CIVPOL’s capabilitie s. Cons t a nt

c o m mu n ic a t ion, ro u t i ne me e t i ng s, and common opera t io ns will contribute to gre a t e r

u nde r s t a nd i ng and effective action. 

Training and Prof e s s i o n a l i z a t i o n

T he final panel session of the symposium focused on the state of tra i n i ng and prof e ss io na l i z i ng Ame r ican police of f icers for UN CIVPOL missio ns. The panelists hig h l ig ht e d

c u r re nt diffic u l t ies and successes of the U.S. go v e r n me nt’s CIVPOL pro g ram. Curre nt l y,

t he U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram is not a perma ne nt or long-term initia t i v e, and it is funded on

an annual basis; the pro g ram does not have a statutory basis. The U.S. Departme nt of

State’s Bureau for Int e r na t io nal Na rc o t ics and Law Enfo rc e me nt is curre ntly re s p o ns i b l e

for the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram and has a budget of $10 million for Fiscal Year 2001 fo r

de v e l o p i ng a two-tho u s a nd-person CIVPOL cadre drawn primarily from mu n icipal and

state law enfo rc e me nt age nc ie s. The da y - t o - day adm i n i s t ra t ion of the pro g ram is subc o nt racted to a private company, DynCorp, which is re s p o nsible for re c r u i t i ng, pre p a r i ng ,

a nd supporting the mission’s Ame r ican of f icers selected for de p l o y me nt. As one pane l i s t

re ma r ke d, the CIVPOL pro g ram is ex p e nsive in terms of putting an of f icer on the gro u nd

in Kosovo or East Timor—an estimated $10,000 per of f icer; $1 million per week is spent

on the U.S. CIVPOL cont i nge nt in Kosovo. Because fund i ng comes slowly and no political de c i s ion has been ma de on how to establish the pro g ram on a perma ne nt basis,

re s p o nses to pro b l e ms in the opera t io nal setting are some t i mes also slow to come.

T he CIVPOL pro g ram has been overshadowed by the issue of the United States’ fina nc ial arrears to the UN and the debate over the role of the U.S. military in peace operat io ns. Ho w e v e r, the new Bush adm i n i s t ra t ion has ind icated that it cons iders the U.S.

CIVPOL pro g ram valuable and that it is study i ng the possibility of an ex p a nded role fo r

CIVPOL. This int e rest is based on the position that the military is best suited for a limited mission of establishing security through pacific a t ion and stabilization and does no t

have the capacity to establish law and order by addre s s i ng organized crime and using

c o m munity polic i ng techniques; these are police func t io ns. 

A number of partic i p a nts voiced support for such ideas as ge t t i ng Cong ress to ma ke

t he U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram perma ne nt, cre a t i ng a reserve CIVPOL fo rce in which of f ic e r s

would be deputized fede ral age nt s, or establishing a stand i ng “ge nda r me r ie”-type of

p a ramilitary capacity (such as that fo u nd in Fra nc e, It a l y, or Spain) to be used exc l usively for CIVPOL opera t io ns. Ho w e v e r, in charting the way fo r w a rd, the U.S. go v e r n me nt

must de c ide whe t her U.S. cont r i b u t io ns to CIVPOL will cont i nue at least at curre nt levels and whe t her a mo re perma ne nt legal and bure a uc ra t ic basis for CIVPOL will be fo u nd.

As of no w, the U.S. go v e r n me nt has not ma de a de c i s ion to adopt U.S. CIVPOL as a perma ne nt pro g ram, and the future of U.S. CIVPOL’s of f ic ial status is still a matter of publ ic de b a t e. 

S e v e ral partic i p a nts ma i nt a i ned that curre nt re c r u i t i ng is ins u f f ic ie nt, as the U.S. go ve r n me nt basically goes state-to-state searc h i ng for qua l i f ied of f ic e r s. Because vacanc y

rates in mu n icipal de p a r t me nts aro u nd the country are high, police chiefs and city go ve r n me nt executives are re l uc t a nt to let qua l i f ied of f icers take leaves of absence or give

t hem any prof e s s io nal cont i nuity for time served with UN CIVPOL. Ma ny active-du t y

p o l ice of f icers have had to re s ign in order to pursue their int e rest in int e r na t io nal serv ic e, and they find it difficult to return to a do me s t ic position after serving abro a d. A

l a rge perc e nt a ge of police recruited are re t i red of f icers who view working abroad in a

peace opera t ion as a way to see the world and have some advent u re. One panelist urge d

that du r i ng the selection pro c e s s, mo re fa c e - t o - face contact take place to better 

9

C u r re n t l y, the U.S. CIVPOL

p ro g ram is not a permanent or

long-term initiative . . . [but]

the new Bush administra t i o n

has indicated that it considers

the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ra m

valuable and that it is studying

the possibility of an ex p a n d e d

role for CIVPOL. 

Because va c a n cy rates in

municipal departments aro u n d

the country are high, police

chiefs and city gove r n m e n t

exe c u t i ves are re l u c tant to let

qualified officers take leaves of

absence or give them any

p rofessional continuity for time

s e r ved with UN CIVPOL.
de t e r m i ne applic a nts’ mo t i v a t ion and suitability. This kind of “targeted” assessme nt

would be especially necessary in cre a t i ng a reserve roster based on the inc re a s i ng comp l exity and func t io nal specia l i z a t ion thro u g hout a mission’s life cycle: the initial startup, whe re living cond i t io ns are hazardous and re s o u rces scarce; the

ma nda t e - i m p l e me nt a t ion phase, in which the CIVPOL mission establishes its full operat io nal pre s e nce; and the ins t i t u t io n - b u i l d i ng phase, with of f icers capable of assisting in

re b u i l d i ng a criminal justice system and turning it over to the local citizens at the end

of a mission. 

A cent ral concern of the partic i p a nts was on the issue of how to improve tra i n i ng and

p rof e s s io na l i z a t ion of U.S. CIVPOL of f ic e r s. Under the curre nt fra mework, Ame r ican of f icers recruited by DynCorp unde rgo a two-week testing and orie nt a t ion process that

i nc l udes phy s ical tra i n i ng, psycho l o g ical testing, fire a r ms and de f e nsive tactics tra i n i ng ,

as well as a variety of short mo dules covering the UN, peace opera t io ns, and re g io na l

p o l i t ics and history; recruits also get ex p o s u re to ne go t ia t ion, me d ia t ion, and conflic t

ma na ge me nt pro v ided by the U.S. Institute of Pe a c e. Ma ny partic i p a nts and fo r me r

CIVPOL of f icers view the tra i n i ng mo dules as very useful but suggested that add i t io na l

t ra i n i ng time is ne e ded to cover the key topics in mo re depth to help CIVPOL cope with

de ma nd i ng tasks and unique enviro n me nt s. The limited tra i n i ng time available is cons t ra i ned by available fund i ng and the opera t io nally driven, some t i mes uneven, fo re c a s t

for new of f icer re q u i re me nts coming from the UN.

S o me partic i p a nts urged that the next step should be to impleme nt an ex t e nded mu lt id i s c i p l i nary tra i n i ng pro g ram with follow-up advance tra i n i ng that could inc l ude dist a nce learning courses via the Int e r net. Curre nt l y, the re is an effort to establish a basic

p re p a ratory pro g ram of four to eig ht weeks, du r i ng which cand idates would be given

ex t e nsive tra i n i ng to create prof e s s io nal confide nc e, technical competenc e, and de d ic at ion to the principles of CIVPOL. The U.S. go v e r n me nt has exa m i ned other na t io nal prog ra ms, such as the Cana d ian and Scand i na v ian mo de l s, to derive ideas for building a U.S.

mo del based on a core curriculum of the UN’s basic police of f icer course, compara t i v e

p o l ic i ng and legal systems, int e r na t io nal hu man rig ht s, cro s s - c u l t u ral pro g ra ms, and the

t e c h n ical roles of police in peace opera t io ns. 

Symposium partic i p a nts suggested that mo re advanced tra i n i ng should inc l ude, fo r

exa m p l e, ethic s, civil-military re l a t io ns, working with no ngo v e r n me ntal org a n i z a t io ns,

ma na ge me nt and leadership courses, team building, and cro s s - c u l t u ral issues and commu n ic a t io ns. Equally important will be building conflict ma na ge me nt and re s o l u t io n

skills along s ide cultural and ge nder aware ness tra i n i ng that will enable of f icers to ex p a nd

t he re p e r t o i re of skills they bring to the fie l d. Some partic i p a nts advocated that of f ic e r s

s hould also receive certain tra i n i ng toge t her with other prof e s s io nal compone nts of the

c r i m i nal justice system. Such add i t io nal tra i n i ng would potent ially improve the ability of

t he int e r na t io nal community to pre p a re and deploy a compre he nsive criminal justic e

p a c ka ge in a postconflict socie t y, re duc i ng the time and re s o u rces curre ntly spent in a

m i s s ion to get all the eleme nts working toge t he r.

C o n c l u s i o n

T he symposium’s partic i p a nts were una n i mous in their convic t ion that U.S. civilian polic e

a re essent ial and critical to the success of UN CIVPOL missio ns. In Bosnia, East Timo r, and

Kosovo, Ame r ican of f icers ge ne rally have earned a prof e s s io nal re p u t a t ion and are looke d

to for leadership and solid polic i ng ex p e r t i s e. The re was broad cons e nsus that changes ne e d

to be ma de in the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram and, given the unc e r t a i nty of the U.S. go v e r n me nt ’ s

p o s i t ion, the symposium featured a variety of sugge s t io ns on whe re to go and what to do. 

Pa r t ic i p a nts also emphasized that CIVPOL is just as important as the military compone nt in peace opera t io ns. Each eleme nt has differe nt objectives and capacities that 

c a n not be assumed by the othe r. CIVPOL should not be re g a rded as a pana c e a — t he 

1 0

The limited training time 

a vailable is constrained by

a vailable funding and the 

o p e rationally driven, sometimes uneven, fo recast for 

n ew officer re q u i rements 

coming from the UN.

Some participants advo c a t e d

that officers should also re c e i ve

c e r tain training together with

other professional components

of the criminal justice sy s t e m .
s i ngle best alterna t i v e — for U.S. military involveme nt in peace opera t io ns, just as the

military should not be burde ned with executive law-and - o rder re s p o ns i b i l i t ie s. During the

c r uc ial early phases of a peace opera t ion, both are re q u i red and need the involveme nt

a nd support of the othe r.

Two working groups de l i b e rated on re c o m me nda t io ns the symposium could offer to

t he U.S. go v e r n me nt on the key issues raised in each panel session. In the area of tra i ni ng and prof e s s io na l i z a t ion, several key re c o m me nda t io ns eme rge d :

• R e c r u i t i ng and job tasking must be linked to mission ma ndate specific s.

• O p e ra t io nal pro c e du res should be standa rd i z e d, not only for the U.S. CIVPOL cont i nge nt, but for all na t io nal cont i nge nt s.

• C r i m i nal legal and pro c e du ral codes should be created for peace opera t io ns to eliminate confusion over what laws are applied by CIVPOL for an interim perio d.

• D e p l o y me nt of specific technical expertise should be targe t e d.

• Adm i n i s t rative and civilian support should have ade q uate re s o u rc e s.

• A UN rank struc t u re and comma nd system should be establishe d, with all CIVPOL cont i nge nts wearing the same unifo r ms and using the same equipme nt .

• Pe r io d ic evalua t io ns and prof e s s io nal benc h marks must be impleme nt e d, along with

p rof e s s io nal enhanc e me nt that is tra ns f e rable to do me s t ic positio ns.

• A CIVPOL re t u r nees panel should be fo r med to capture ins t i t u t io nal kno w l e dge fro m

t he field and to develop a “lessons learned” capacity.

T he second working group pre s e nted a re c o m me nda t ion that should be acted on if

a ny sig n i f ic a nt evolution in the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram is to occur: Enhanc i ng public perc e p t io ns and unde r s t a nd i ng of CIVPOL and the role of Ame r ican of f icers must take place

in order to propel CIVPOL to a greater level of importance as a peaceke e p i ng and peaceb u i l d i ng tool. This effort should also inc l ude educ a t i ng Cong ress as a step toward de v e lo p i ng a legislative cons t i t u e ncy critical to CIVPOL. Like w i s e, a na t io nally coord i na t e d

e f fort could be used to educate the Ame r ican public on the mission of CIVPOL and why

it is important for Ame r ican police of f icers to be active in peace opera t io ns. One tool

that mig ht be utilized could emulate the Pe nt a gon’s “Ho metown News Pro g ram,” prov id i ng the U.S. CIVPOL pro g ram with a system of public outreach in the ho me commun i t ies of of f icers serving abro a d. This form of public outreach would pro v ide Ame r ic a ns

with re a s o ns about the need for a U.S. CIVPOL cont r i b u t ion and how it would impro v e

t he U.S. go v e r n me nt’s ability to participate in peace opera t io ns.

Pa r t i c i p a n t s

The Professional Challenge: What Should CIVPOL Be Doing To Build Sustainable Pe a c e ?

Mo de rator: William Ha y den, pro g ram of f ic e r, Tra i n i ng Pro g ram, U.S. Institute of Pe a c e

M i ke Stie r s, UNIPTF deputy commissio ne r, UN M i s s ion in Bosnia - He r z e go v i na

John Collins, UNMIK police deputy commissio ne r

E r ic Sche y e, policy and planning of f ic e r, CIVPOL Division, UN Departme nt of Pe a c e ke e pi ng Opera t io ns

Major Kim Field (U.S. Army), political adviser, U.S. Mission to the UN

The Challenge of Differences: Cro s s - C u l t u ral Issues for CIVPOL in 

Multinational Peace Opera t i o n s

Mo de rator: Ted Feifer, pro g ram of f ic e r, Tra i n i ng Pro g ram, U.S. Institute of Peace 

Ma u reen Ke l l y, UNIPTF captain, UN M i s s ion in Bosnia - He r z e go v i na

CIVPOL should not be re g a rd e d

as a panacea—the single best

a l t e r n a t i ve — for U.S. milita r y

i n vo l vement in peace

o p e ra t i o n s, just as the milita r y

should not be burdened with

exe c u t i ve law-and-order 

re s p o n s i b i l i t i e s.

1 1
G raham Day, senior fellow, U.S. Institute of Pe a c e, and fo r mer UNTAET district adm i n i s t ra t o r

Harvey Lang holtz, College of William & Ma r y, Willia ms b u rg, Va .

Ad d ressing the Challenge: Implementing and Coordinating Action in Peace Opera t i o n s

Mo de rator: Colonel Curtis Morris (USA F, ret.), pro g ram of f ic e r, Tra i n i ng Pro g ram, U.S. 

I ns t itute of Pe a c e

R a ndy Ostra nde r, UNMIK police station comma nde r

Gary Va nde r s l ic e, UNTAET protective services team leade r

C o l o nel Mike Dzie d z ic (USAF), Na t io nal Defense Un i v e r s i t y, peace opera t io ns analyst, 

U.S. Defense Strategy Te a m

Ma t t hew Va c c a ro, dire c t o r, Pe a c e ke e p i ng Offic e, U.S. Departme nt of Defens e

P reparing for the Challenge: Training and Professionalizing CIVPOL

Mo de rator: David Davis, Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, George Mason 

Un i v e r s i t y, Fairfax, Va .

Lynn Ho l l a nd, Int e r na t io nal Po l ice Pro g ram ma na ge r, DynCorp, Reston, Va .

Je re my Pritchard, UNMIK Po l ice Planning and Developme nt Division/U.S. Cont i nge nt

c o m ma nde r

Robert Perito, Int e r na t io nal Criminal Investigative Tra i n i ng As s i s t a nce Pro g ram, U.S.

D e p a r t me nt of Justic e

Robert Giffo rd, Bureau for Int e r na t io nal Na rc o t ics and Law Enfo rc e me nt, U.S. Departme nt

of State

For mo re info r ma t ion, see our web site

( w w w. u s i p . o rg), which has an online

e d i t ion of this report cont a i n i ng links

to related web sites, as well as

a dd i t io nal info r ma t ion on the topic.

SP E C I A L RE P O R T 7 1

United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

1200 17th Street NW

Wa s h i ngton, DC 20036