[Cite as State v. Knowles, 2016-Ohio-2859.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : 

 No. 15AP-991 

v. : (C.P.C. No. 04CR-4891)

Alawwal A. Knowles, : (ACCELERATED CALENDAR) 

 Defendant-Appellant. : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on May 5, 2016 

 

On brief: Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Seth L. 

Gilbert, for appellee. 

On brief: Alawwal A. Knowles, pro se. 

 

APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

SADLER, J. 

{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Alawwal A. Knowles, appeals from a judgment of the 

Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, which overruled appellant's "Motion to Correct 

Void Sentence and Order A New Sentencing Hearing" based on res judicata. For the 

following reasons, we affirm. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 2} On July 23, 2004, a grand jury indicted appellant on 13 counts of attempted 

murder with specifications, 13 counts of felonious assault with specifications, and 2 

counts of failure to comply with an order or signal of a police officer. Appellant, 

represented by counsel, pled guilty on July 12, 2005 to 2 counts of felonious assault and 3 

counts of attempted murder with firearm specifications, and the court entered a nolle 
No. 15AP-991 2 

prosequi on the remaining counts. The prosecutor and defense did not jointly 

recommend a sentence, and a presentencing investigation report was ordered. 

{¶ 3} On September 15, 2005, the trial court sentenced appellant to 39 years of 

prison, reflecting 9 years on the 3 gun specifications in addition to an aggregate 30-year 

term on the 5 counts, each which involved a separate victim. Appellant filed a notice of 

appeal on December 9, 2005. This court denied leave for delayed appeal, and the 

Supreme Court of Ohio subsequently declined to review the matter. Appellant filed a 

second notice of appeal on July 20, 2006, which this court again denied. 

{¶ 4} Appellant filed a series of motions three years later. On March 7, 2008, 

appellant filed with the trial court a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the trial 

court denied on January 19, 2010. Appellant filed a notice of appeal of that decision on 

February 9, 2010, and he was appointed counsel. In State v. Knowles, 10th Dist. No. 

10AP-119, 2011-Ohio-4477, this court issued a decision affirming the trial court decision. 

In doing so, we addressed appellant's allegations regarding inadequate notification of 

post-release control. 

{¶ 5} Prior to resolution of that appeal, on June 29, 2010, appellant filed with the 

trial court a motion to vacate sentence, and, on September 30, 2011, filed a motion for 

correction of sentence, which the trial court denied on November 22, 2011. In doing so, 

the trial court construed the motion as an untimely petition for postconviction relief and 

held that resolution of the merits of the issue was barred by res judicata. 

{¶ 6} On December 4, 2012, appellant filed a second motion to vacate sentence 

with the trial court, which the trial court again denied. Appellant filed his third motion to 

vacate sentence with the trial court on August 19, 2013, citing the trial court's alleged 

failure to sentence, pursuant to statutory guidelines and incorrect imposition of 

maximum and consecutive sentences, among other issues. The trial court denied the 

motion on September 6, 2013. Appellant filed a notice of appeal of this decision on 

October 2, 2013, but this court dismissed the appeal for failure to file a brief. 

{¶ 7} On May 5, 2014, appellant filed an application to reopen his appeal, 

pursuant to App.R. 26(B), which this court denied on July 8, 2014. In our decision, we 

addressed appellant's assignment of error that "appellate counsel performed deficiently 

by failing to challenge the trial court's imposition of the 'maximum sentence' " and noted 
No. 15AP-991 3 

that "appellate counsel did challenge to the propriety of appellant's sentence in his prior 

appeal to this court." State v. Knowles, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-119 (July 8, 2014) 

(memorandum decision). Accordingly, we overruled appellant's assignment of error. The 

Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction over appellant's ensuing appeal. 

{¶ 8} Appellant filed the motion at the root of the present appeal, entitled 

"Motion to Correct Void Sentence and Order A New Sentencing Hearing," on 

September 22, 2015. The trial court overruled appellant's motion as a sentencing 

challenge "clearly barred by res judicata" in light of appellant's numerous previous 

motions regarding vacating his sentence, all which lacked merit, and this court's prior 

judgments. (Oct. 8, 2015 Decision, 2.) Appellant filed a timely appeal of the trial court's 

latest motion denial. 

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR 

{¶ 9} Appellant assigns the following assignment as error: 

The trial court erred when it imposed a sentence that violates 

Blakely principles, Imposing a sentence on severed statutes. 

III. DISCUSSION 

{¶ 10} Under his assignment of error, appellant contends that his sentence was 

imposed in violation of State v. Foster, 109 Ohio St.3d 1, 2006-Ohio-856,1 in regard to the 

trial court's imposition of non-minimum prison terms and consecutive sentences. As 

such, appellant believes his sentence is void and asks that his sentence be vacated and the 

case remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 

{¶ 11} As a preliminary issue, appellant argues that his case is "still pending on 

direct review" and seeks to have his motion construed as a "direct review" of his original 

sentence, rather than a postconviction petition, as appellee suggests. (Appellant's Reply 

Brief, 1, 4.) 

{¶ 12} "Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21(A)(1), an individual who has been convicted of a 

criminal offense may file a petition requesting that the court vacate or set aside the 

judgment or sentence based on a claim of denial or infringement of their rights that would 

render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio or United States Constitution." 

 

1 Superseded by statute as discussed in State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d 209, 2014-Ohio-3177, and State v. 

Sergent, __ Ohio St.3d __, 2016-Ohio-2696, ¶ 34-37. 
No. 15AP-991 4 

State v. Souza, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-87, 2015-Ohio-2541, ¶ 7. Motions to correct or vacate 

a sentence may properly be construed as petitions for postconviction relief. See, e.g., 

State v. Rodriguez, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-953, 2016-Ohio-1090, ¶ 1, 7-8, 10 (construing 

"Motion to Correct an Illegal Conviction and Sentence based on Void Judgment Contrary 

to law" as a petition for postconviction relief); State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160 

(1997) (construing motion to correct or vacate sentence as a petition for postconviction 

relief); State v. Mason, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-120, 2012-Ohio-4510 (citing multiple cases 

construing motions seeking to correct or vacate sentences as motions for postconviction 

relief); State v. Holland, 5th Dist. No. 09-CA-120, 2010-Ohio-226, ¶ 13 ("[W]e find 

Appellant's motion to amend sentence is a petition for post conviction relief as defined in 

R.C. 2953.21."). We agree with appellee and find appellant's motion to be a petition for 

postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21. Id. 

{¶ 13} Next, we must consider whether the petition is barred by res judicata, the 

basis of the trial court's decision. "Res judicata is applicable in all postconviction relief 

proceedings." State v. Szefcyk, 77 Ohio St.3d 93, 95 (1996). The doctrine "prevents 

repeated attacks on a final judgment and applies to issues that were or might have been 

previously litigated." State v. Sappington, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-988, 2010-Ohio-1783, 

¶ 10. "[I]n criminal cases res judicata generally bars a defendant from litigating claims in 

a proceeding subsequent to the direct appeal 'if he or she raised or could have raised the 

issue at the trial that resulted in that judgment of conviction or on an appeal from that 

judgment.' " (Emphasis omitted.) State v. Anderson, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-897, 2016-

Ohio-1089, ¶ 7, quoting State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-Ohio-3707, ¶ 92. The 

doctrine is also applicable to bar claims in successive postconviction motions. State v. 

Turner, 10th Dist. No. 06AP-876, 2007-Ohio-1468, ¶ 12; State v. Wooden, 10th Dist. No. 

02AP-473, 2002-Ohio-7363, ¶ 19-20; State v. Muhumed, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-1001, 2012-

Ohio-6155, ¶ 13. 

{¶ 14} Res judicata may not be used to prevent the correction of "void" sentences 

by way of postconviction motions. Anderson at ¶ 8. However, "res judicata still applies to 

other aspects of the merits of a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the 

lawful elements of the ensuing sentence." State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio6238, paragraph 3 of the syllabus. Thus, this court has applied res judicata where the 
No. 15AP-991 5 

petitioner challenged a sentence over issues of merger and allied offenses, consecutive 

sentencing, and the retroactivity and application of Foster. Souza at ¶ 16; State v. 

Thompkins, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-1080, 2013-Ohio-3599, discretionary appeal not

allowed, 137 Ohio St.3d 1443, 2013-Ohio-5678; Rodriguez at ¶ 1, 5; State v. Thompkins, 

10th Dist. No. 08AP-454, 2008-Ohio-5373, ¶ 4, 12-13, discretionary appeal not allowed, 

120 Ohio St.3d 1527, 2009-Ohio-614; State v. Steward, 10th Dist. No. 10AP-838, 2011-

Ohio-2272, ¶ 22-23, discretionary appeal not allowed, 129 Ohio St.3d 1478, 2011-Ohio4751. 

{¶ 15} Applying these general principles here, we conclude that res judicata bars 

appellant's claim. In his motion, appellant raises issues he either did litigate previously or 

could have litigated previously. 

{¶ 16} Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is overruled. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

{¶ 17} Having overruled appellant's sole assignment of error, we affirm the 

judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. 

Judgment affirmed.

BROWN and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur. 

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