United States 

Institute of Pe a c e

The Role of I n t e r n a t i o n a l

Financial Institutions

in International

Humanitarian Law

Report from the International

Humanitarian Law Working Gro u p

Laurie R. Blank
Peaceworks No. 42. First published January 2002.

The views expressed in this report are those of the author or participants alone.

They do not necessarily reflect views of the United States Institute of Peace.

UN I T E D ST A T E S IN S T I T U T EO F PE A C E

1200 17th Street NW, Suite 200

Washington, DC 20036-3011

Phone: 202-457-1700

Fax: 202-429-6063

E-mail: usip_requests@usip.org

Web: www.usip.org
C o n t e n t s

Key Po i n t s 5

Fo rewo rd by Richard H. Solomon 7

P re fa c e 9

1. Introduction 10

2. A Role for International Financial Institutions? 14

3. How IFIs Can Contribute to International

Humanitarian Law 22

4. Conclusions and Recommendations 31

N o t e s 35

List of Pa r t i c i p a n t s 39

About the Au t h o r 41

About the Institute 42
Key Po i n t s

◗ In tern a ti onal financial insti tuti ons (IFIs) are incre a s i n gly invo lved in con f l i ct situ ati ons and co u n tries in wh i ch vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law are wi des pre ad and deva s t a ting to the civilian pop u l a ti on and the co u n tri e s’ econ om i c

pro s pect s . Can IFIs be appropri a te agents for prom o ting ad h eren ce to and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law? Are they equ i pped to do so? Ma ny argue

that stru ctu ral and po l i tical con cerns pose ob s t acles to the devel opm ent of a role for

I F Is with re s pect to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. In con tra s t ,o t h ers su ggest that

the role and functi on of the IFIs in the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty en a ble them to

m a ke some con tri buti on to the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law, and that factoring hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons into thei r

dec i s i on-making processes can actu a lly be essen tial to the ef fective implem en t a ti on

of t h eir own mandate s .

◗Any policy an IFI en acts in co u n tries marked by con f l i ct and atroc i ties wi ll send a

m e s s a ge abo ut the insti tuti on’s level of to l era n ce for or abhorren ce of hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw vio l a ti on s .P l acing the financial wei ght of the IFIs behind intern a ti onal hu m a n it a rian law can help to dissu ade states and other actors from com m i t ting atroc i ti e s

for fear of losing mu ch - n eeded financial assistance . Al t h o u gh some argue that disen ga gem ent in re s ponse to atroc i ties would undermine an IFI’s po s i ti on as an

i m p a rtial advi s er, proceeding with loans and proj ects wi t h o ut con s i dering past or

on going atroc i ties com m i t ted with impunity is not a neutral stance . An IFI’s influen ce makes the very act of en ga gem en t , even if on the basis of econ omic con s i derati ons alon e , just as sym bolic as that of d i s en ga gem en t .

◗ IFI invo lvem ent in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law can also su pport ef forts by the

Un i ted Na ti ons and the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty to prevent and limit vi o l a ti ons of

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and en force the law against those su s pected of comm i t ting atroc i ti e s . Al t h o u gh the World Bank and the In tern a ti onal Mon et a ry Fu n d

(IMF) are spec i a l i zed agencies of the Un i ted Na ti ons and functi on as indepen den t

i n tern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti ons not bound by most UN dec i s i on s ,t h ey are bound by

UN Sec u ri ty Council re s o luti ons taken under Ch a pter VII of the UN Ch a rter. I F Is

t h erefore need to tailor their opera ti ons in co u n tries that are the su bj ect of Ch a pter

VII re s o luti ons to en su re that they do not con travene the binding dec i s i ons and

acti ons of the Un i ted Na ti on s . In ad d i ti on , as or ga n i z a ti ons com prising states that

a re also mem bers of the Un i ted Na ti on s ,I F Is need to con f ront what they can do as

i n s ti tuti ons in light of t h eir mem ber state s’ l egal obl i ga ti ons under the UN Ch a rter

and con s i der how their propo s ed opera ti ons might affect their mem ber state s’ a bi l ity to fulfill their obl i ga ti ons as mem bers of the Un i ted Na ti on s .

5
◗Any ef fort to prom o te a role for IFIs in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law mu s t

n on et h eless ad d ress the acco u n t a bi l i ty and po l i tical qu e s ti ons ra i s ed by the IFIs’

govern a n ce stru ctu res and the legal qu e s ti ons ra i s ed by the limited mandates of t h e

I F Is as spec i a l i zed econ omic or ga n i z a ti on s . One con cern is that taking intern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law into con s i dera ti on wi ll po l i ti c i ze IFIs and open them to ch a r ges of

bias and su bj ectivi ty, u n dermining their role as out s i de ex pert or ga n i z a ti ons that

give impartial and disintere s ted advi ce and re s o u rce s . In ad d i ti on , most of the IFIs’

m a n d a tes pro h i bit their interfering in or being influ en ced by any mem ber state’s

po l i tical ch a racter of dom e s tic po l i ti c s , a pro h i bi ti on that leads many to argue that

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issues fall out s i de the purvi ew of I F Is’ m a n d a te s .

◗ However, i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons can have significant and direct

econ omic ef fects that IFIs should take into con s i dera ti on in their dec i s i on - m a k i n g

proce s s e s . Atroc i ties com m i t ted against civilian pop u l a ti ons du ring con f l i ct of ten

d i s ru pt the regular functi oning of the econ omy du ring con f l i ct and then com p l i c a te

and hinder the recon s tru cti on and devel opm ent of the econ omy after the con f l i ct ,

as do the non a ppreh en s i on of war criminals and the spre ad of or ga n i zed crime and

corru pti on — t h re a tening the very mandates that IFIs seek to fulfill . Hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw vi o l a ti ons are therefore of l egi ti m a te econ omic con cern to IFIs and should not

be exclu ded from con s i dera ti on as purely po l i tical issu e s .

◗ In ad d i ti on ,m a ny argue that IFIs actu a lly need to con s i der intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issues in certain circ u m s t a n ces in order to fulfill their mandate s . Wi de s pre ad

vi o l a ti ons of ri ghts under hu m a n i t a rian law can of fer insight into how a governm ent wi ll treat other intern a ti onal obl i ga ti on s , su ch as loan agreem ents with the

World Bank or the IMF. S tudies and past ex peri en ce have also shown that hu m a n

ri ghts vi o l a ti ons and, by ex ten s i on , the com m i s s i on of m a s s ive atroc i ties du ri n g

con f l i ct can affect a co u n try ’s econ omic growt h , the financial su ccess of devel opm ent progra m s , and the state’s abi l i ty to servi ce its debt s , as well as an IFI’s abi l i ty to

su pervise and manage its proj ect s . If vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

a re indicators of a state’s futu re econ omic pro s pects or undermine ef forts to prom o te devel opm ent and econ omic coopera ti on ,h aving inform a ti on abo ut su ch vi ol a ti ons wi ll help IFIs en su re that they can fulfill their mandate s .

◗A role for IFIs in the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law does not mean that they must alw ays wi t h d raw or redu ce funding; ra t h er, i t

requ i res that IFIs con s i der the impact of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti on s

as a factor in making policy and dec i s i on s . Ex i s ting practi ce dem on s tra tes that IFIs

a l re ady do incorpora te these con cerns into their analys e s , at least on an occ a s i on a l

b a s i s , and su ggests several po ten tial opportu n i ties for IFIs to make a con tri buti on in

this are a . These opportu n i ties inclu de examining the links bet ween vi o l a ti ons of

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and pro s pects for econ omic growth and stabi l i ty,

s h a ring inform a ti on with other intern a ti onal and mu l ti l a teral or ga n i z a ti on s , su pporting UN Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i ons and opera ti ons taken under Ch a pter V I I ,

adopting formal con d i ti on a l i ty po l i c i e s , and app lying informal con d i ti on a l i ty in the

co u rse of d a i ly opera ti on s .

6 Key Points
Fo rewo rd

I

n a recent Fo rei gn Af f a i rs e s s ay, form er World Bank managing director Jessica Ei n h orn

casts a worri ed look at her previous em p l oyer.* The bank has become unwi el dy, s h e

w a rn s ,h aving ad ded a myri ad of f u n cti ons to its ori ginal mission of recon s tru cting the

econ omies of co u n tries recovering from the de s tru cti on of World War II. In ad d i ti on ,s h e

n o te s , the bank has gone far afield in adding to the ranks of its mem bers h i p, en com p a s sing most of the Th i rd Worl d ’s fled gling econ omies fo ll owing the peri od of deco l on i z ati on . Devel opm en t , in all of its def i n i ti ons and recon ceptu a l i z a ti on s , is now the bank’s

most evi dent—and most con trovers i a l — com m i tm en t .And it is with this focus on developm ent that the bank has en ga ged in its most com p l ex and nu m erous initi a tive s , ra n gi n g

f rom the provi s i on of capital for ru ral managem ent and en trepren eu rship to an em ph a s i s

on good govern a n ce and ef fective insti tuti ons to en su re the ef f i c i ent and on going operati on of su ch proj ects aimed at el i m i n a ting poverty in the devel oping worl d .

To be su re , cl i ent states out s i de the devel oping world have provi ded their share of ch a ll en ges to the bank, whose ef forts have been com p l i c a ted of l a te with the ad d i ti on of n ew

m em bers from the form er Sovi et bl oc and ex - Yu go s l avi a .Aga i n , the tasks among these

p a rticular mem bers go well beyond mere lending and financial assistance .In recent ye a rs ,

Ei n h orn wri te s , the World Bank “has been call ed on for em er gency lending in the wake of

the Asian financial cri s i s , for econ omic managem ent as part of Mi d dle East pe ace keep i n g

ef fort s , for postwar Balkan recon s tru cti on , and for loans to combat the AIDS tra gedy in

Af ri c a .”As if to em ph a s i ze the need yet aga i n , she stresses that in the crush of demands for

the bank’s atten ti on ,“ [ p ] o s tcon f l i ct recon s tru cti on (in the Balkans and the West Ba n k , for

example) and con f l i ct preven ti on are also issues of the mom en t .”As Ei n h orn note s ,a ll of

these tasks have ad ded up to a ra t h er ex p a n s ive—and unmanage a bl e — a gen d a .

That mu ch of this cl i en tele has fall en prey to intern ecine con f l i cts and mass vi o l en ce

raises a profound qu e s ti on abo ut the basic mission of the World Bank and other intern ati onal financial insti tuti ons (IFIs)—the In tern a ti onal Mon et a ry Fund and regi onal developm ent banks among them :G iven their ex ten s ive pre s en ce and invo lvem ent in these

con f l i ct - prone regi ons of the worl d ,should IFIs take mass vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hum a n i t a rian law in cl i ent states into con s i dera ti on wh en opera ting in these co u n tries? Af ter

a ll , these or ga n i z a ti ons have a great deal of i n f lu en ce with govern m ents that seek assist a n ce in rebuilding war- torn soc i eti e s . Or should they interpret their basic mission as requ i ring that they con cen tra te on purely econ omic data in their assessments of t h e

co u n tri e s’ l ending and aid requ i rem ents? 

From this procedu ral anti n omy, t wo other qu e s ti ons ari s e : If s tri ct ly econ omic cri teri a

t a ke pri m acy in IFI dec i s i on making, cannot severe damage to a co u n try ’s stock of hu m a n

c a p i t a l — su ch as that re su l ting from gen oc i de — be con s i dered an econ omic factor? If i t

c a n ,what ex act ly should an IFI official or field of f i cer do with su ch inform a ti on , at the

risk of d a m a ging the or ga n i z a ti on’s rel a ti onship with the co u n try in qu e s ti on (a lesson

7

* “The World Bank’s Mission Creep,” Foreign Affairs, September/October 2001.
n on govern m ental or ga n i z a ti ons have learn ed qu i te well in re s ponding to “com p l ex

em er gen c i e s”)? 

L a u rie Bl a n k , program of f i cer in the In s ti tute’s Rule of L aw Progra m , argues in the

fo ll owing pages that IFIs’ n ew task of a t tending to the ef fects of con f l i ct on cl i ent state s’

econ omies should not be seen as just another functi on to be ad ded to their portfolios but

as the su rest way to carry out their principal mandate of s et ting their mem bers’

econ omies on the ri ght track . Su m m a rizing the del i bera ti ons of a recent meeting of t h e

In s ti tute’s In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a rian Law Working Gro u p, Blank makes the fundamental point that if it is econ omic ef f i c i ency and improvem ent of l iving standards IFIs are after, it makes no sense to tu rn a blind eye to the fact that hu n d red s ,i f not thousands, of t h e

co u n try ’s citi zens are killing or prep a ring to kill one another and de s troying one another ’s

com mu n i ties—not ex act ly the kind of envi ron m ent that fo s ters econ omic stabi l i ty and

the growth or recon s ti tuti on of en trepren eu rialism and a middle cl a s s .Al t h o u gh IFI fiel d

workers and head qu a rters of f i cers may be relu ctant to devo te their or ga n i z a ti on s’ef fort s

to a seem i n gly “n on econ om i c” t a s k — su ch as the con s i dera ti on of p a s t , pre s en t , or thre a ten ed intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti on s — t h ey might con s i der that su ch an exp a n ded repertoi re of f u n cti ons could in fact fac i l i t a te more ef f i c i ency in the bank’s

principal mission : financial assistance in the servi ce of a cl i ent state’s econ omic recons tru cti on and devel opm en t .

This meeting of the In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a rian Law Working Group was the third in

a series en ti t l ed “ New Players in the Im p l em en t a ti on and Enforcem ent of In tern a ti on a l

L aw.”This proj ect focuses on the innova tive role that new groups and establ i s h ed intern ati onal or ga n i z a ti ons can play in stemming the ti de of a troc i ties and prom o ting ad h eren ce

to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law in regi ons whose inhabitants cannot count on the matu re insti tuti ons of c ivil soc i ety to handle their gri eva n ce s . In the ef fort to rebuild po s t -

Taliban Afgh a n i s t a n , for ex a m p l e ,I F Is wi ll have a prom i n ent role to play in the

i n tern a ti onal re s ponse long after troops leave the co u n try. That crucial peri od of reh a bi l it a ti on wi ll undo u btedly bring with it ethnic con f l i cts and disloc a ti on s , and Laurie Bl a n k’s

report provi des a useful fra m ework for IFIs to recon ceptu a l i ze their roles in this and other

postwar recon s tru cti on and recon c i l i a ti on initi a tive s .

If the of f i cers and field workers of these intern a ti onal financial insti tuti ons begin to see

t h eir close va n t a ge point to su ch con f l i cts not as a venue for yet more tasks or net t l e s om e

probl ems but as a way to repri ori ti ze cri teria for a bet ter assessment of a co u n try ’s abi l i ty

to use devel opm ent proj ects and financing properly, t h ey wi ll go a long way tow a rd averting Ei n h orn’s warn i n gs abo ut or ga n i z a ti onal overl oad . Su ch a recon ceptu a l i z a ti on co u l d

in fact move IFIs from , to borrow her parl a n ce ,t h eir ex p a n s ive and vi s i on a ry stage to a

“m a n a geri a l ” on e .

RI C H A R D H . SO LO M O N

PR E S I D E N T

UN I T E D STAT E S IN S T I T U T EO F PE AC E

8 Foreword
P re fa c e

This report focuses on the role of i n tern a ti onal financial insti tuti ons in the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, and is based on

the discussion and a paper pre s en ted by Profe s s or Daniel Bradl ow at a meeting of

the In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a rian Law (IHL) Working Group held on Febru a ry 7, 2 0 0 1 .

The IHL Working Gro u p, ch a i red by Mi ch ael Ma t h e s on , is a policy forum conven ed by

the Rule of L aw Program at the Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace to fac i l i t a te discussion

a m ong intern a ti onal law yers ,n on govern m ental or ga n i z a ti on s , and govern m ent agen c i e s

working on intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. The Febru a ry meeting was the third in the

IHL Working Gro u p’s Proj ect on New Players in the Im p l em en t a ti on and Enforcem ent of

In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a rian Law. For the purposes of the proj ect and this report ,i n tern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law inclu des the basic norms and principles pro h i bi ting gen oc i de ,

c rimes against hu m a n i ty, war cri m e s , and other vi o l a ti ons of the laws of war as set forth in

the 1949 Gen eva Conven ti on s , the Gen oc i de Conven ti on , and other rel evant tre a ti e s , conven ti on s , and intern a ti onal and nati onal judicial dec i s i on s .

The Proj ect on New Players in the Im p l em en t a ti on and Enforcem ent of In tern a ti on a l

Hu m a n i t a rian Law focuses on the ch a n ging roles played by va rious actors in the arena of

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, ra n ging from cl a ri f i c a ti on of evo lving norms to edu c ati on and training to implem en t a ti on and en forcem en t . De s p i te great adva n ces in intern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law in recent ye a rs ,e s pec i a lly as seen in the ju ri s pru den ce of t h e

i n tern a ti onal tri bunals for the form er Yu go s l avia and for Rwanda, these actors and gro u p s

a re incre a s i n gly proving essen tial to the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law. The proj ect’s goal is to furt h er our understanding of what is needed to

tra n s l a te intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law from ac ademic rules of w a rf a re into more robu s t

and re s pected norms governing both con du ct on the ground in con f l i ct zones and intern a ti onal policy re s ponses thereto.

Th ro u gh a series of s em i n a rs , the mem bers of the IHL Working Group and ad d i ti on a l

ex perts are examining each iden ti f i ed sector of the broad com mu n i ty of i n d ivi duals and

i n s ti tuti ons invo lved in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, with an eye tow a rd unders t a n ding how that sector con tri butes or should be con tri buting to the devel opm ent and implem en t a ti on of the law, cl a ri f ying the rel evant norms of the law that app ly to that sector,

a n a lyzing ob s t acles to more ef fective parti c i p a ti on in an overa ll sys tem for the implem ent a ti on and en forcem ent of the law, and iden ti f ying appropri a te re s pon s e s . Am ong the sectors the IHL Working Group is con s i dering are the med i a , forei gn servi ce of f i cers ,

hu m a n i t a rian aid and rel i ef or ga n i z a ti on s ,i n tern a ti onal financial insti tuti on s ,n on s t a te

a rm ed gro u p s , corpora te actors , the military, the intell i gen ce com mu n i ty, dom e s tic co u rt s

and ju d ge s , edu c a ti onal programs and insti tuti on s , and the U. S . Con gre s s .

9
O n e

I n t ro d u c t i o n

I

n recent ye a rs ,m a ny intern a ti onal financial insti tuti ons (IFIs) have moved beyond narrow econ omic ben ch m a rks to begin con s i dering a broader array of s ocial factors in

t h eir programs and dec i s i on s . The World Ba n k , for ex a m p l e ,i n clu des envi ron m en t a l

con cern s , human ri ghts issu e s , gen der issu e s , govern a n ce ,l egal and judicial reform , a n d

p u blic parti c i p a ti on in its con s i dera ti on of po ten tial and ex i s ting proj ects and assistance

progra m s . Ot h er insti tuti on s ,i n cluding the In tern a ti onal Mon et a ry Fund (IMF), t h e

Eu ropean Bank for Recon s tru cti on and Devel opm ent (EBRD), and the In ter- Am eri c a n

Devel opm ent Bank (IDB), also factor human ri gh t s , envi ron m en t a l , and other con cern s

i n to their analys e s .

As the overlap bet ween co u n tries mired in inters t a te or internal con f l i ct and the co u ntries com prising the cl i ent base of these intern a ti onal financial insti tuti ons con ti nues to

grow, the insti tuti ons wi ll en co u n ter the ch a ll en ges of ad d ressing massive vi o l a ti ons of i ntern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law by govern m ents and other actors in cl i ent states more frequ en t ly.1 For the purposes of this report ,i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law inclu des the

basic norms and principles pro h i bi ting gen oc i de ,c rimes against hu m a n i ty,war cri m e s ,

and other vi o l a ti ons of the laws of war as set forth in the 1949 Gen eva Conven ti on s ,t h e

G en oc i de Conven ti on , and other rel evant tre a ti e s , conven ti on s , and intern a ti onal and nati onal judicial dec i s i on s .

For ex a m p l e , wh en con s i dering a pro s pective or on going program in a co u n try wh ere

the govern m en t ,o t h er actors , or both are com m i t ting war cri m e s ,c rimes against hu m a ni ty, or gen oc i de ,h ow should an intern a ti onal financial insti tuti on re act? In tern a ti onal econ omic policy is a powerful too l , and many argue that, given the power and influ en ce of

i n tern a ti onal financial insti tuti on s ,it can be an appropri a te tool for prom o ting ad h eren ce

to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. Wh et h er thro u gh acti on or inacti on ,i n tern a ti onal financial insti tuti ons arguably wi ll play some role in the implem en t a ti on of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law — just as policies de s i gn ed to ad d ress intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

vi o l a ti ons send a message to govern m ents com m i t ting or su pporting those en ga ged in

a troc i ti e s ,so the implem en t a ti on of proj ects and loans wi t h o ut any con s i dera ti on of ongoing vi o l a ti ons com mu n i c a tes a message of accept a n ce . The qu e s ti on ,t h erefore , is wh a t

form that role can and should take .

The Structure and Function of IFIs

Ma ny of the arguments both in favor of and against IFIs incorpora ting intern a ti onal hum a n i t a rian law con cerns into their dec i s i on-making process stem from the role that these

i n s ti tuti ons play and are de s i gn ed to play in the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty. A bri ef l ook at

the basic stru ctu re and mandate of the rel evant financial insti tuti ons wi ll of fer guidance

1 0 for the discussion of this issu e .
The World Bank

The World Bank Group inclu des four financial insti tuti ons and one cen ter for dispute re so luti on : the In tern a ti onal Bank for Recon s tru cti on and Devel opm ent (IBRD), the In tern a ti onal Devel opm ent As s oc i a ti on (IDA ) , the In tern a ti onal Finance Corpora ti on (IFC),

the Mu l ti l a teral Inve s tm ent Gu a ra n tee Agency (MIGA), and the In tern a ti onal Cen ter for

the Set t l em ent of Inve s tm ent Di s p utes (ICSID).2 The Ba n k’s activi ties in its mem ber

s t a tes inclu de financial opera ti on s , su ch as lending mon ey; d i a l ogues abo ut policies that

m ay affect econ omic devel opm ent and proj ects the Bank is financing; technical assistance ,

i n cluding tra i n i n g ; and the provi s i on of t h eoretical and practical inform a ti on abo ut devel opm ent activi ti e s . The Ba n k’s Arti cles of Agreem ent set forth its basic purpo s e s , wh i ch

a re to assist in the econ omic recon s tru cti on and devel opm ent of m em ber state s , prom o te

b a l a n ced growth in intern a ti onal trade and the mainten a n ce of equ i l i brium in balance of

p aym en t s ,i n c rease produ ctivi ty, and raise the standards of l iving in less-devel oped are a s

of the worl d .

Regional Development Banks

L i ke the World Ba n k , the Af ri c a n ,As i a n , and In ter- Am erican Devel opm ent Banks provi de

financing to qu a l i f ying mem ber states and prom o te econ omic devel opm en t . The EBRD,

wh i ch was cre a ted in the aftermath of the Cold War to ad d ress the recon s tru cti on of t h e

form er com munist states of cen tral and eastern Eu rope , and now the indepen dent state s

of the form er Sovi et Un i on as well , has both a devel opm ent and a recon s tru cti on mand a te . Arti cle 1 of the agreem ent establishing the EBRD states that its pri m a ry purpose is

“to fo s ter the tra n s i ti on tow a rd open market - ori en ted econ omies and to prom o te priva te

and en trepren eu rial initi a tive in the cen tral and eastern Eu ropean co u n tries com m i t ted to

and app lying the principles of mu l ti p a rty dem oc rac y, p lu ra l i s m , and market econ om i c s .”3

The International Monetary Fund

The IMF is a mon et a ry insti tuti on , ra t h er than a devel opm ent insti tuti on like the banks

de s c ri bed above , and its pri m a ry purposes are to prom o te mon et a ry coopera ti on , assist in

the establ i s h m ent of a mu l ti l a teral sys tem of p aym ents for tra n s acti on s , prom o te orderly

and stable exch a n ge ra te s , and help correct balance - of - p aym ents probl em s . To do so, t h e

IMF en ga ges in three pri m a ry activi ti e s : su rvei ll a n ce , wh i ch inclu des regular con su l t a ti on s

with mem ber states to mon i tor exch a n ge ra te and balance - of - p aym ents policies and provi de mac roecon omic and mon et a ry advi ce ; the provi s i on of financing to mem ber state s

to co u n teract balance - of - p aym ents probl em s ; and technical training and su pport assist a n ce . In recent ye a rs , the IMF has begun to servi ce on ly devel oping nati ons ra t h er than 

a ll of its mem ber state s , becoming less a mon et a ry insti tuti on and more a devel opm en t

financing insti tuti on .As a re su l t , its foc u s , on ce solely mac roecon om i c ,n ow inclu des govern a n ce ;l a bor market issu e s ;l aw reform ; bu d get a ry all oc a ti on s ,i n cluding military ex pend i tu re s ; and mon i toring com p l i a n ce with standards and codes for banking, acco u n ti n g,

a u d i ti n g, corpora te govern a n ce , and rel a ted issu e s .

Introduction 1 1
C u r rent Practice of IFIs in Conflict Situat i o n s

The World Bank is the most active of the IFIs in con f l i ct situ a ti on s , pri m a ri ly bec a u s e

m a ny of the co u n tries in wh i ch it opera tes have ex peri en ced vi o l ent con f l i ct ei t h er wi t h i n

or just beyond their borders in the past few dec ade s .In re s ponse to this devel opm en t ,t h e

Bank cre a ted a Po s t - Con f l i ct Unit in 1994 (recen t ly ren a m ed the Con f l i ct Preven ti on and

Recon s tru cti on Team) to coord i n a te its opera ti ons in co u n tries recovering from con f l i ct

and to help the Bank learn more abo ut the probl ems of dealing with co u n tries in con f l i ct .

Opera ti ons in con f l i ct or po s tcon f l i ct regi ons pre s ent the Bank with new ch a ll en ge s , su ch

as the com p l ex military and econ omic issues of dem obi l i z a ti on , dem i n i n g, and establ i s hing govern a n ce stru ctu re s . Un der the terms of its new Opera ti onal Policy (OP) 2.30, t h e

Bank approaches con f l i ct in three stage s : in co u n tries vu l n era ble to con f l i ct , the Ba n k

s eeks to prom o te econ omic growth and poverty redu cti on thro u gh its usual instru m en t s

of devel opm ent assistance ; in co u n tries in con f l i ct , the Bank also “a n a ly ze[s] the impact of

con f l i ct on econ omic and social devel opm en t” and prep a res for the provi s i on of a s s i s t a n ce

wh en appropri a te ; and in co u n tries in tra n s i ti on from con f l i ct , the Bank su pports econ omic recovery and su s t a i n a ble devel opm ent with “p a rticular atten ti on to the needs of

w a r- a f fected gro u p s .”4

Wh en con f l i ct ren ders con ti nu ed assistance impo s s i bl e , the Bank may initi a te a “ w a tching bri ef” in order to ga t h er inform a ti on abo ut and devel op an understanding of the 

con f l i ct , the major players , po s s i ble partn ers for po s tcon f l i ct recon s tru cti on , adverse econ omic and envi ron m ental con s equ en ce s , and rel i ef opti on s . For co u n tries in tra n s i ti on

f rom con f l i ct ,the Bank may rei n s t a te the Co u n try As s i s t a n ce Stra tegy or prep a re a Tra n s iti onal Su pport Stra tegy, wh i ch is an interm ed i a te - term plan for Bank invo lvem ent on ce

the con f l i ct has diminished en o u gh to proceed with devel opm ent activi ti e s .

5 Th ro u gh o ut

this proce s s , the Bank must opera te within its mandate , funding econ omic recon s tru cti on

and rel a ted activi ties but ref raining from direct parti c i p a ti on in pe ace keeping or pe acemaking ef fort s .

The IMF’s invo lvem ent in con f l i ct situ a ti ons is pri m a ri ly limited to assisting co u n tri e s

in rebuilding ad m i n i s tra tive and insti tuti onal capac i ties nece s s a ry for the establ i s h m ent of

an econ omic fra m ework . To fac i l i t a te its invo lvem ent in po s tcon f l i ct regi on s , the IMF crea ted a Po s t - Con f l i ct Emer gency As s i s t a n ce Program in October 1995 that is de s i gn ed to

re s tore mac roecon omic stabi l i ty to a nati on and cataly ze balance - of - p aym ents su pport

f rom the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty. Co u n tries are el i gi ble for the program on ce they meet

four cri teri a :(1) an urgent balance - of - p aym ents crisis ex i s t s ; (2) there is a high ly disru pted “ i n s ti tuti onal and ad m i n i s tra tive capac i ty ” ; (3) the co u n try ’s aut h ori ties make a

com m i tm ent of coopera ti on ; and (4) a con certed intern a ti onal recon s tru cti on ef fort is alre ady under way. In the past six ye a rs , the IMF has introdu ced the Po s t - Con f l i ct Emergency As s i s t a n ce Program in Bosnia and Her zegovi n a ,R w a n d a , Al b a n i a , Ta j i k i s t a n ,t h e

Rep u blic of the Con go, and Si erra Leon e .

6

In gen era l , the regi onal banks have become invo lved in con f l i ct and po s tcon f l i ct situ ati ons in re s ponse to con f l i cts in or bet ween co u n tries in their regi on s .O f the fo u r, t h e

EBRD has become immers ed in po s tcon f l i ct recon s tru cti on most frequ en t ly and most inten s ively, p a rti c u l a rly in the Ba l k a n s , wh ere it establ i s h ed a Balkan Regi onal Acti on Plan

1 2 Introduction
Introduction 1 3

( n ow the So uth Eastern Eu ropean Acti on Plan). Un l i ke the other IFIs , the EBRD was crea ted to prom o te the va lues of mu l ti p a rty dem oc rac y, p lu ra l i s m ,m a rket econ om i c s , human ri gh t s , and the rule of l aw,7 and a specific po l i tical mandate in Arti cle 1 of i t s

Agreem ent directs the EBRD to invest on ly in co u n tries making progress tow a rd implem en ting principles of mu l ti p a rty dem oc rac y, p lu ra l i s m , and market econ om i c s .

8 In genera l , the EBRD interprets the po l i tical aspects of its mandate narrowly, of ten maintaining

opera ti ons in co u n tries in wh i ch the natu re of the po l i tical sys tem or the qu a l i ty of the dem oc ra tic govern m ent does not nece s s a ri ly meet the standards set forth in Arti cle 1. However, it does work cl o s ely with other spec i a l i zed intern a ti onal and regi onal or ga n i z a ti on s

and wi ll alter its lending and financing opera ti ons in re s ponse to gross vi o l a ti ons of i t s

f u n d a m ental pri n c i p l e s .

The EBRD has two pri m a ry means of re s ponding to states that fail to meet its stand a rd s .F i rs t , it can prevent a co u n try from becoming a mem ber and having access to funding if that co u n try is not ad h ering to, or making significant progress in ad h ering to, t h e

principles of Arti cle 1. For ex a m p l e , the newly indepen dent co u n tries of the form er

Socialist Federal Rep u blic of Yu go s l avia were requ i red to en dorse the va lues in Arti cle 1

s pec i f i c a lly as a con d i ti on of m em bers h i p. Si m i l a rly, the EBRD preven ted the Federa l

Rep u blic of Yu go s l avia from app lying for mem bership until Ja nu a ry 19, 2 0 0 1 , because the

n a tu re of the con f l i cts in wh i ch the co u n try was invo lved preven ted ad h eren ce to and

com p l i a n ce with those pri n c i p l e s . Secon d , the EBRD can su s pend a mem ber state’s acce s s

to funding if it stops proceeding tow a rd the fulfill m ent of the EBRD’s stated va lu e s . In

Tu rk m en i s t a n , for ex a m p l e , the EBRD has su s pen ded public sector funding in re s ponse to

the Sovi et su cce s s or state’s retu rn to a command econ omy; yet it con ti nues to provi de financing to the co u n try ’s priva te sector to pro tect against this tren d .
Two

A Role for International Financial Institutions?

The daily and po s tcon f l i ct opera ti ons of the World Ba n k , the IMF, and the regi on a l

devel opm ent banks su ggest that there can be a role for IFIs in the implem en t ati on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. These or ga n i z a ti ons frequ en t ly make econ omic and financial aid con d i ti onal on econ omic reform s , fiscal po l i c y,

or mon et a ry po l i c y, dem on s tra ting their abi l i ty to exert significant influ en ce on thei r

cl i ent states and prom o te specific de s i gn a ted goals of econ omic stabi l i ty and financial

i n depen den ce . Th ey also eva lu a te econ omic con d i ti ons in the rel evant co u n tri e s , as well

as the factors that could influ en ce those con d i ti ons and the su ccess of proj ects and

f i n a n c i n g. Both of these activi ties po s i ti on IFIs not on ly to make a po s i tive con tri buti on

to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law but also to incorpora te su ch principles into their po l ic ymaking processes and thus ben efit their opera ti ons and ef fectiven e s s .

As the natu re of con f l i ct has become pri m a ri ly intra s t a te and sign i f i c a n t ly more dama ging to civilians in the past dec ade , it has become app a rent that the intern a ti onal res ponse to co u n tries in con f l i ct is incom p l ete . Ma ny participants at the IHL Work i n g

Group meeting su gge s ted that IFIs can help to fill this gap by re s ponding in ways that su pport the ef forts of the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty to prevent and end con f l i ct or ad d ress its

a f teref fect s . With their abundant financial power, I F Is exert su b s t a n tial influ en ce on the

po l i c ymaking process in states receiving financing and proj ect funding. The World Ba n k ,

for ex a m p l e , is the single largest cred i tor to the more than one hu n d red devel oping co u ntri e s .In Fiscal Year 2001 alon e , theWorld Bank ex ten ded capital com m i tm ents to t a l i n g

$17.3 bi ll i on , pri m a ri ly to devel oping state s , in many cases to states that have been the

venues for atroc i ties and abuses com m i t ted by ei t h er the govern m ent or other gro u p s .

9

Al t h o u gh IFIs have trad i ti on a lly sought to be en ga ged with govern m ents in po l i c ym a k i n g

on devel opm ent issu e s ,t h ey have become mu ch more po l i c y - ori en ted in recent ye a rs — to

the point that they are now usu a lly key players in the po l i c ymaking process in co u n tri e s

depen dent on them for loans and proj ect financing. I F Is exert their influ en ce thro u gh

l oa n s ,m ac roecon omic assistance , proj ect financing, policy dialog u e s , technical assistance ,

and re s e a rch progra m s .

Con cern abo ut ex p a n s i on of m a n d a tes and diluti on of re s pon s i bi l i ties leads many IFI

exec utives and staff to resist calls for a role in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.Yet the large

nu m ber of cl i ent states that are mired in con f l i ct leaves IFIs vi rtu a lly no ch oi ce but to be

i nvo lved in some way in con f l i ct situ a ti on s ,i f on ly to carry out their lending and assist a n ce programs more ef fectively. The World Ba n k , for ex a m p l e , is now com m i t ted to analyzing the causes and ef fects of con f l i ct , as set forth in OP 2.30. Ma ny of tod ay ’s con f l i ct s

a re marked by massive vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and human ri gh t s

l aw, and their corre s pon d i n gly deva s t a ting ef fect on civilians and pro s pects for econ om i c

1 4 growth demands gre a ter intern a ti onal atten ti on . The Febru a ry meeting of the IHL Work-
ing Group ad d re s s ed wh et h er IFIs can be appropri a te agents for prom o ting ad h eren ce to

and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and wh et h er they are equ i pped to do

s o. Ma ny argue that stru ctu ral and po l i tical con cerns pose ob s t acles to the devel opm ent of

a role for IFIs in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.

In con tra s t ,o t h ers su ggest that the ef fective implem en t a ti on of t h eir own mandate s

actu a lly obl i ges IFIs to factor hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons into their dec i s i on - m a k i n g

processes and, in su ch a way, en a bles them to make some con tri buti on to the implem ent a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.

Any policy an IFI en acts in co u n tries marked by con f l i ct and atroc i ties wi ll send a mess a ge abo ut the insti tuti on’s level of to l era n ce for or abhorren ce of hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l ati on s . Several participants su gge s ted that disen ga gem ent in re s ponse to atroc i ties wo u l d

u n dermine an IFI’s po s i ti on as an impartial advi s er. Being seen as an intere s ted parti c ipant in a cl i ent state’s affairs could po l i ti c i ze an IFI, d a m a ging its rel a ti onship with the

cl i ent state . Su ch states might then be less wi lling to work with the IFI in other econ om i c

a re a s ,t hus harming the IFI’s abi l i ty to fulfill its mandate . Fu rt h erm ore , in some situ a ti on s ,

financial assistance and proj ect devel opm ent can have a po s i tive impact even in the face of

a troc i ties and human ri ghts abuses by all evi a ting su f fering thro u gh an improved standard

of l ivi n g, f ac i l i t a ting an end to the econ omic causes of con f l i ct , or en a bling the devel opm ent of m echanisms to ad d ress past abuses by freeing up assets otherwise used for other

n eed s .

Ot h ers ,h owever, argue that proceeding with loans and proj ects wi t h o ut con s i deri n g

past or on going atroc i ties com m i t ted with impunity is not a neutral stance , because the

I F Is’ i n f lu en ce makes the very act of en ga gem en t , even if on the basis of econ omic con s i dera ti ons alon e , just as sym bolic as that of d i s en ga gem en t .A govern m ent en ga ged in or

f ac i l i t a ting atroc i ties wi ll have less incen tive to ad h ere to intern a ti onal legal norms if i t

con ti nues to receive funds from the World Ba n k , the IMF, or a regi onal bank wi t h o ut any

con s i dera ti on of the atroc i ties or the impunity of those re s pon s i bl e . Hort a tory and diplom a tic pre s su re wi ll lose its mu s cle wh en match ed with “revers e” econ omic incen tive s . Th e

i s sue is not wh et h er IFIs should take sides in con f l i cts or help one side to defeat the other,

n or is it wh et h er IFIs should autom a ti c a lly cease all activi ties in a co u n try at the first sign

of hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti on s . The power of the purse of ten gives IFIs one of the loude s t

voi ce s , one that can be used to com p l em ent ef forts by the Un i ted Na ti on s ,i n tere s ted

s t a te s , and non govern m ental or ga n i z a ti ons (NGOs) to pro tect civilians and prevent vi o l ati ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. Factoring con s i dera ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hum a n i t a rian law into the dec i s i on-making process may thus of fer IFIs an opportu n i ty to

h elp prevent or ad d ress the type and scale of a troc i ties that the world has seen far too often in recent ye a rs . The key qu e s ti on , according to the con s en sus of p a rticipants at the

IHL Working Group meeti n g, is how IFIs can incorpora te su ch con s i dera ti ons in ways

that do not undermine their core mandate s .

A Role for International Financial Institutions? 1 5
I m p roved Implementation and Enfo rcement of

I n t e r n ational Humanitarian Law and Support for the

United Nations and the International Community

If I F Is were to factor intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law into their dec i s i on-making proce s s e s ,

the incen tives for com p l i a n ce and pen a l ties for non com p l i a n ce with intern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law would likely incre a s e .S t a tes that depend on financial assistance from

one or more IFIs wi llrecogn i ze that their hu m a n i t a rian law record affects their abi l i ty to

obtain su ch assistance and may re s pond by tailoring their beh avi or to meet the nece s s a ry

obl i ga ti ons under intern a ti onal law. In con tra s t , gra n ting financial su pport to co u n tri e s

that commit atroc i ti e s ,a ll ow atroc i ties to be com m i t ted by para m i l i t a ry forces and rebel

gro u p s , or disrega rd the legal orders of i n tern a ti onal criminal tri bunals wi ll give su ch

co u n tries little incen tive to uphold their intern a ti onal legal obl i ga ti ons—and actu a lly may

em bo l den them to con ti nue su ch practi ce s .

IFI invo lvem ent in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law can also su pport ef forts by the

Un i ted Na ti ons and the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty to prevent and limit vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and en force the law against those su s pected of com m i t ti n g

a troc i ti e s . For ex a m p l e , pre s su re from the intern a ti onal don or com mu n i ty on Serbia was

a cri tical factor in the ex trad i ti on of form er Yu go s l av pre s i dent Sl obodan Mi l o s evic to the

In tern a ti onal Criminal Tri bunal for Yu go s l avia (ICTY) in The Ha g u e . In tern a ti on a l

don ors ,i n cluding intern a ti onal financial insti tution s ,u s ed their financial influ en ce to indu ce Yu go s l avia to com p ly with obl i ga ti ons alre ady establ i s h ed under intern a ti onal law.1 0

Al t h o u gh the World Bank and the IMF are spec i a l i zed agencies of the Un i ted Na ti ons and

f u n cti on as indepen dent intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti ons not bound by most UN dec i s i on s ,

t h ey are bound by UN Sec u ri ty Council re s o luti ons taken under Ch a pter VII of the UN

Ch a rter.1 1 Thu s , wh en the Sec u ri ty Council imposes sancti on s ,e s t a blishes a tri bu n a l , or

t a kes other acti on under Ch a pter V I I , theWorld Ba n k , the IMF, and other insti tuti ons are

obl i ga ted to “h ave due rega rd ” for those dec i s i on s .

1 2 For this re a s on , form er World Ba n k

gen eral co u n s el Ibrahim Shihata ex p l a i n ed that the Bank would not “l end to a mem ber

co u n try wh i ch is su bj ect to em b a r go measu res impo s ed by the Sec u ri ty Co u n c i l ” rega rdless of econ omic or financial con s i dera ti on s .

1 3

Si m i l a rly, I F Is need to tailor their opera ti ons in co u n tries that are the su bj ect of Ch a pter VII re s o luti ons to en su re that they do not con travene the binding dec i s i ons and acti ons of the Un i ted Na ti on s . The dec i s i on to withhold aid from Yu go s l avia until a measu re

of coopera ti on with the ICTY was establ i s h ed is one ex a m p l e . In some cases, the obl i gati on to abi de by Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i ons could requ i re that an IFI su s pend lending or

c u rtail opera ti ons in a co u n try that is harboring su s pected war criminals indicted by a tribunal establ i s h ed under Ch a pter V I I .I F Is that lend to the priva te sector could face the

n eed to determine wh et h er su ch a tri bunal had indicted any of the managers or shareh o l ders in priva te en terprises receiving assistance . A more difficult qu e s ti on may ari s e

wh en the Sec u ri ty Co u n c i l , acting under Ch a pter V I I , has decl a red that vi o l a ti ons of i ntern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law in a particular co u n try are a threat to intern a ti onal pe ace

and sec u ri ty but has not yet taken any furt h er acti on .

Some argue that by vi rtue of being spec i a l i zed agencies of the Un i ted Na ti on s , the IMF

and the World Bank “should recogn i ze and make every ef fort to uphold UN standard s

1 6 A Role for International Financial Institutions?
and goa l s .”1 4 In deed ,e ach IFI com prises states that are also mem bers of the Un i ted Nati ons and, u n der Arti cle 103 of the UN Ch a rter, h ave obl i ga ti ons under the Ch a rterthat

prevail over all other tre a ty obl i ga ti on s ,i n cluding those stemming from their mem bers h i p

in intern a ti onal financial insti tuti on s . Arti cle 48(2) of the Ch a rter also requ i res mem ber

s t a tes to carry out Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i ons “d i rect ly and thro u gh their acti on in the appropri a te intern a ti onal agencies of wh i ch they are mem bers ,”an obl i ga ti on ex p l i c i t ly recogn i zed in the 1947 agreem ent bet ween the Un i ted Na ti ons and the World Ba n k .

1 5 I F Is

t h erefore need to con f ront what they can do as insti tuti ons in light of t h eir mem ber state s’

l egal obl i ga ti ons under the UN Ch a rter. In devel oping proposals for lending and proj ect s ,

IFI staff should con s i der how the propo s ed opera ti ons might affect their mem ber state s’

a bi l i ty to fulfill their obl i ga ti ons as mem bers of the Un i ted Na ti on s .

In making dec i s i ons and vo ting on su ch propo s ed opera ti on s ,IFI directors similarly

must con s i der the obl i ga ti ons of the states they repre s ent to en su re that all mem ber state s

a re able to carry out their obl i ga ti ons not on ly as mem bers of the IFI but also under Articles 48(2) and 103 of the UN Ch a rter. I F Is thus cannot fac i l i t a te a state’s abi l i ty to take acti on indirect ly that it could not take direct ly—a state bound to implem ent and en force

UN sancti ons against another state , for ex a m p l e , cannot vo te to approve IFI lending to the

t a r get state . As a resu l t ,m a ny urge that IFIs should act so as to avoid undermining ef fort s

by the Un i ted Na ti on s ,m em ber state s , and mu l ti l a teral and non govern m ental or ga n i z ati ons to implem ent and en force intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law — ef forts ra n ging from

d i p l om acy to advoc acy campaigns to assistance with the establ i s h m ent of trials and trut h

com m i s s i on s .Providing financing to a govern m ent that is su s pected of i nvo lvem ent or

com p l i c i ty in atroc i ties can com promise intern a ti onal ef forts to halt the atroc i ties and

bring the perpetra tors to ju s ti ce by reducing the pre s su re the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty

can exert on that govern m en t .

Al t h o u gh recognizing the ben efits of I F Is su pporting Un i ted Na ti ons ef forts to preven t ,

l i m i t , and red ress atroc i ti e s ,s ome participants at the IHL Working Gro u p’s Febru a ry sess i on argued that it is inappropri a te for an insti tuti on with no direct acco u n t a bi l i ty to the

people affected by its programs to adva n ce obj ectives beyond the stri ct ly econ omic goa l s

of its proj ect s .E ach IFI has a boa rd of d i rectors that must approve all financing opera ti on s

and is re s pon s i ble for most opera ti onal policies and the daily functi oning of the insti tuti on s . The IMF and World Bank boa rds have sign i f i c a n t ly fewer directors than the nu mber of m em ber state s ,with each Group of Seven (G-7) co u n try and China having its own

d i rector and each of the remaining directors repre s en ting a group of m em ber state s . Th i s

s tru ctu re leads many to argue that the G-7 co u n tries can exert su b s t a n tial con trol over the

I F Is’ opera ti ons and dec i s i ons wh i l e , at the same ti m e , not using the financial or advi s ory

s ervi ces of the insti tuti ons they con tro l . Some sch o l a rs con tend that this exercise of power

wi t h o ut acco u n t a bi l i ty or re s pon s i bi l i ty cre a tes govern a n ce probl em s , ex acerb a ted by the

i n f lu en tial voi ce IFIs have in the po l i c ymaking process in cl i ent states most direct ly affected by the IFIs’ po l i c i e s . In ad d i ti on , because the IFIs’ financial power gives them gre a ter

i n f lu en ce than other spec i a l i zed agen c i e s ,p l aying a role in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

could en a ble IFIs to exercise disproporti on a te con trol over the issu e . A furt h er con cern often ra i s ed is that taking intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law into con s i dera ti on wi ll po l i ti c i ze

the IFIs and open them to ch a r ges of bias and su bj ectivi ty, u n dermining their role as outA Role for International Financial Institutions? 1 7
s i de ex perts who give impartial and disintere s ted advi ce and re s o u rce s . Di a l ogues wi t h

borrowing govern m ents may lose their ef fectiveness if those govern m ents begin to do u bt

the IFIs’obj ectivi ty and vi ew the impo s i ti on of con d i ti ons or requ i rem ents as a mere ref l ecti on of p a rticular po l i tical intere s t s .

Ot h er ob s ervers su ggest that IFI invo lvem ent in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law wi ll

h ave an incon s i s tent impact on mem ber state s . IFI ef forts to con tri bute to the implem ent a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law wi ll affect on ly those state s

s eeking financing and other assistance from the IFIs . Poorer co u n tri e s , wh i ch have bl e a k

econ omic pro s pects wi t h o ut assistance from the World Ba n k , the IMF, and other insti tuti on s , wi ll face new requ i rem ents and obl i ga ti ons in order to receive the type and level of

a s s i s t a n ce nece s s a ry to prom o te devel opm ent and recon s tru cti on , as well as to maintain

econ omic stabi l i ty. Co u n tries that have econ omies strong en o u gh to manage wi t h o ut IFI

a s s i s t a n ce , and are therefore not su bj ect to their influ en ce , wi ll be able to ign ore these

same requ i rem ents and obl i ga ti on s . This situ a ti on could cause some re s en tm ent amon g

poorer cl i ent states of I F Is , whose govern m ents could argue that these financial insti tuti on s’h ei gh ten ed atten ti on to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons in their co u n tri e s

amounts to a do u ble standard if the same atten ti on is not directed to ri ch er states as well .

However, a ll s t a tes are obl i ga ted to re s pect the basic principles of i n tern a ti onal hu m a ni t a rian law, rega rdless of wh et h er other states do so. IFI dec i s i ons wi ll nece s s a ri ly be limi ted to those states seeking assistance . If t h eir con s i dera ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw has an incon s i s tent impact on mem ber state s , this is no different from the com m on

practi ce of i m posing envi ron m ental reg u l a ti ons and other con d i ti ons on su ch of fers of f inancial assistance—the ad h eren ce to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law by we a l t h i er state s

wi ll need to be fac i l i t a ted thro u gh or ga n i z a ti ons other than IFIs . If , by con s i dering intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law con cerns in the dec i s i on-making proce s s ,I F Is can help prom o te ad h eren ce to, or prevent vi o l a ti ons of,i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law in even on e

s t a te ,m a ny argue that IFIs wi ll be fulfilling an appropri a te and vital ro l e .

F u l fillment of Mandat e s

E ach IFI has a specific econ omic and devel opm ent mandate , as det a i l ed above .With the

excepti on of the EBRD Agreem en t , the IFIs’ va rious arti cles of a greem ent also limit the

f actors that each insti tuti on can take into account in re aching dec i s i ons abo ut loans and

proj ect s ,s ti p u l a ting that po l i tics and po l i tical factors should not influ en ce any dec i s i on s .

(This discussion of the limitati ons in the IFIs’ m a n d a tes wi ll therefore not pertain to the

E B R D.) For ex a m p l e , Arti cle IV, Secti on 10 of the World Ba n k’s Arti cles of Agreem en t

s t a tes that “the Bank and its of f i cers shall not interfere in the po l i tical affairs of a ny

m em ber; n or shall they be influ en ced in their dec i s i ons by the po l i tical ch a racter of t h e

m em ber or mem bers con cern ed .O n ly econ omic con s i dera ti ons shall be rel evant to thei r

dec i s i on s , and these con s i dera ti ons shall be wei gh ed imparti a lly in order to ach i eve” t h e

basic purposes of the Ba n k .

1 6 The IMF’s arti cles mandate that the fund must “re s pect the

dom e s tic social and po l i tical policies of m em bers , and in app lying these principles . . . p ay

due rega rd to the circ u m s t a n ces of m em bers .”1 7Al t h o u gh this provi s i on does not place

a ny explicit pro h i bi ti on on con s i dera ti on of “po l i ti c a l ”i s su e s , the IMF has interpreted it

that way. Ma ny argue that these provi s i ons requ i re these IFIs to disrega rd any factors that

1 8 A Role for International Financial Institutions?
a re not direct ly rel evant to the econ omic terms and re sults of a particular loan or proj ect ,

e s pec i a lly since the IFIs of ten do not have the staff ex pertise or the re s o u rces to incorpora te so-call ed non econ omic con s i dera ti ons into the dec i s i on-making proce s s .

Al t h o u gh the IFIs cannot interfere in or be influ en ced by the po l i tical ch a racter of dom e s tic po l i tics of a ny mem ber state ,t h ere is gen eral agreem ent that certain po l i tical factors and events can have “s i gnificant direct econ omic ef fects wh i ch , due to their econ om i c

n a tu re ,m ay properly be taken into con s i dera ti on in the Ba n k’s dec i s i on s .”1 8 Po l i ti c a l

events can also produ ce obl i ga ti ons for the Bank and its mem ber states that must be res pected , su ch as binding obl i ga ti ons under UN Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i on s .

1 9 Atroc i ti e s

com m i t ted against civilian pop u l a ti ons du ring con f l i ct of ten disru pt the regular functi oning of the econ omy and divert re s o u rces aw ay from bu s i n e s s , com m erce , and govern m en t

i n f ra s tru ctu re to pay for military opera ti on s .

O n ce the con f l i ct has en ded and the recon s tru cti on ef forts have beg u n , vi o l a ti ons of

hu m a n i t a rian law may con ti nue to com p l i c a te and hinder the recon s tru cti on and developm ent of the econ omy because of pop u l a ti on displacem en t s ; ref u gee flows ;i n c re a s ed

et h n i c , rel i gi o u s , or other ten s i on s ; and the loss of s k i ll ed and edu c a ted people who were

ei t h er kill ed or fled the atroc i ti e s . The frequ ent close link bet ween the non a ppreh en s i on of

war criminals and the po s tcon f l i ct spre ad of econ omic corru pti on and en tren ch m ent of

or ga n i zed crime ren ders the failu re to appreh end war criminals an ill - i gn ored factor in

econ omic recon s tru cti on .Atroc i ties that hinder and of ten reverse the ef fects of devel opm en t — t hus posing ob s t acles to recon s tru cti on — t h re a ten the very mandate the Ba n k

s eeks to fulfill .

2 0 Form er World Bank gen eral co u n s el Ibrahim Shihata recogn i zed that “ i f

the po l i tical situ a ti on in a co u n try is so rep u gnant to intern a ti on a lly accept a ble beh avi or

or if the vi o l a ti on of po l i tical ri ghts in su ch co u n try is so perva s ive ,t h ere wi ll inevi t a bly be

econ omic reperc u s s i ons to these po l i tical events wh i ch the Bank may have no ch oi ce but

to take into account as rel evant econ omic con s i dera ti on s .”2 1As nearly every co u n try in

the world and likely every mem ber of the IFIs is a party to the 1949 Gen eva Conven ti on s ,

vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law can be con s i dered rep u gnant to intern a ti ona lly accept a ble beh avi or and are therefore of l egi ti m a te econ omic con cern to IFIs .

Some IFI staff and com m en t a tors argue that the “po l i tical pro h i bi ti on”in the Ba n k’s

m a n d a te requ i res it to refuse to con s i der atroc i ti e s ,o t h er vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hum a n i t a rian law, and indicati ons of po s s i ble futu re atroc i ties that occur within a cl i ent state

because su ch con s i dera ti ons are matters of n a ti onal sec u ri ty that fall within the meaning

of po l i tical affairs . Al t h o u gh dec i s i ons abo ut wh et h er to devel op certain new we a pon s

m ay be qu e s ti ons of n a ti onal sec u ri ty, wi llful vi o l a ti ons and passive accept a n ce of vi o l ati ons of f u n d a m ental intern a ti onal legal norms and obl i ga ti ons do not fall within the

realm of dom e s tic nati onal sec u ri ty or po l i tical issu e s .The ch oi ce of h ow to re s pond to vio l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law — wh et h er thro u gh a tri bu n a l , truth com m i ss i on , or other mech a n i s m — m ay be left appropri a tely to the dom e s tic govern m en t a l

process in some cases, but the obl i ga ti on to preven t ,l i m i t , and re s pond to su ch atroc i ti e s

in some way is sti p u l a ted under intern a ti onal law and does not fall within the realm of

dom e s tic po l i tical affairs . It is now well establ i s h ed that certain fundamental human ri gh t s

and intern a ti onal norms lie beyond a state’s dom e s tic ju ri s d i cti on and repre s ent obl i gati ons that a state owes to the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty.2 2

A Role for International Financial Institutions? 1 9
Thus many sch o l a rs and intern a ti onal law yers ,i n cluding form er World Bank gen era l

co u n s el Shihata, con tend that the pro h i bi ti on against con s i dering po l i tical factors in the

Ba n k’s mandate does not inclu de “the intern a ti onal con du ct of a state affecting its

f u n d a m ental obl i ga ti ons under the UN Ch a rter ” but , ra t h er, con cerns on ly “ i n terferen ce

in the i n tern a l po l i tical affairs of the Bank mem bers and discri m i n a ti on against a mem ber

because of the po l i tical ch a racter of its govern m en t .”2 3 It is set t l ed as a matter of i n tern ati onal law that, while many va ri a ti ons in nati onal policy and dom e s tic affairs are legi tim a te , vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and human ri gh t s , even wh en

perpetra ted intern a lly, a re not legi ti m a te ch oi ces for a govern m ent and repre s ent vi o l ati ons of that govern m en t’s obl i ga ti ons under the UN Ch a rter and va rious other intern ati onal agreem en t s .

Ap a rt from qu e s ti ons of wh et h er IFIs can con s i der intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issu e s ,s ome participants at the IHL Working Group meeting su gge s ted that in certain circ u m s t a n ce s ,I F Is wi ll need to con s i der su ch issues in order to fulfill their mandate s

properly. Wi de s pre ad vi o l a ti ons of ri ghts under hu m a n i t a rian law can of fer insight into

h ow a govern m ent wi ll treat other intern a ti onal obl i ga ti on s , su ch as loan agreem ents wi t h

the World Bank or the IMF. For its own purposes in assessing a state’s cred i t wort h i n e s s

and risk level and deciding wh et h er to initi a te or con ti nue opera ti on s , an IFI should at

least vi ew the ex i s ten ce of a troc i ties or the failu re to combat impunity as important cons i dera ti ons in devel oping and pursuing loans and proj ect s .The World Bank has recogn i zed that “ [ k ] n owl ed ge of the po l i tical situ a ti on may . . . be nece s s a ry in the assessment of

the co u n try ’s cred i t worthiness and of the abi l i ty of a certain govern m ent to carry out its

obl i ga ti ons under a specific loan or of the Ba n k’s abi l i ty to su pervise the proj ect” it is fin a n c i n g.2 4Arti cle III, Secti on 4(v) of the Ba n k’s Arti cles of Agreem ent instru cts the Ba n k

“to pay due rega rd to pro s pects that the borrower . . . wi ll be in a po s i ti on to meet its

obl i ga ti ons under the loa n .”Any factor that affects a state’s abi l i ty to satisfy its obl i ga ti on s

to the Bank thus can be rel evant for the Bank to con s i der, i n cluding the impact of i n tern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons on a state’s actual abi l i ty to meet its obl i ga ti ons and the

l i kel i h ood that a state in vi o l a ti on of one set of i n tern a ti onal legal obl i ga ti ons may ign ore

a n o t h er obl i ga ti on .

A va ri ety of s tudies and past ex peri en ces dem on s tra te that human ri ghts vi o l a ti on s

a n d , by ex ten s i on , the com m i s s i on of m a s s ive atroc i ties du ring con f l i ct can affect a co u ntry ’s econ omic growt h ,the financial su ccess of devel opm ent progra m s , and the state’s

a bi l i ty to servi ce its debt s .

2 5Atroc i ties can also hinder IFIs’ a bi l i ty to su pervise and mana ge their proj ects and inve s tm en t s , wh i ch is an important factor for su ch insti tuti ons to

i n corpora te in their analys e s . The Ba n k’s OP 2.30 high l i ghts the impacts that con f l i ct can

h ave on the Ba n k’s opera ti ons and abi l i ty to fulfill its mandate , explaining that con f l i ct

“re sults in loss of l i fe and de s tru cti on of a s s et s , con tri butes to social and econ omic disintegra ti on , and reverses the gains of devel opm en t ,t h ereby advers ely affecting the Ba n k’s core

m i s s i on of poverty redu cti on .”2 6 It adds that “con f l i ct not on ly affects the co u n try or

co u n tries of the com b a t a n t s , but also may spill over to other co u n tries and have regi on a l

i m p l i c a ti on s .”2 7 If vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law are indicators of a state’s

f utu re econ omic pro s pects or undermine ef forts to prom o te devel opm ent and econ om i c

2 0 A Role for International Financial Institutions?
A Role for International Financial Institutions? 2 1

coopera ti on ,i n form a ti on abo ut su ch vi o l a ti ons wi ll help IFIs en su re that they can fulfill

t h eir mandate s .

Factoring su ch inform a ti on into the dec i s i on-making process can be difficult, p a rti c ul a rly in cases wh ere the con n ecti on bet ween the atroc i ties and econ omic perform a n ce

m ay appear tenu o u s . While massive vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law that occur in a small co u n try or thro u gh o ut a co u n try wi ll likely affect the co u n try ’s econ omy

advers ely, the con n ecti on bet ween atroc i ties and econ omic devel opm ent may be harder to

d i s cern in a larger co u n try with con f l i ct ra ging in on ly one small regi on . For ex a m p l e ,a lt h o u gh Russia faces econ omic difficulties and receives assistance from va rious IFIs , it is

not clear how the on going con f l i ct and vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law in

Ch ech nya affect Ru s s i a’s econ omy as a wh o l e . Assessing wh et h er atroc i ties have su ch an

i m p act as to thre a ten su s t a i n a ble devel opm ent proves sign i f i c a n t ly more ch a ll en ging in

this scen a rio than in others .I F Is may not alw ays be able to re ach con clu s i ons abo ut how

to re s pond to inform a ti on abo ut atroc i ti e s , but the inform a ti on remains rel evant to the

f u l f i ll m ent of t h eir mandate s .L i ke any econ omic or financial insti tuti on , an IFI needs to

h ave full and acc u ra te inform a ti on abo ut the likel i h ood of su ccess and rep aym ent in order to fulfill its mandate appropri a tely and be acco u n t a ble to its other mem ber state s .

A role for IFIs in the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw does not mean that they must alw ays wi t h d raw or redu ce funding; ra t h er, it su gge s t s

that IFIs con s i der the impact of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons as a factor in

making policy and dec i s i on s . In form a ti on abo ut atroc i ties and the intern a ti onal com mun i ty ’s ef forts to prevent and limit them can become integral factors in the dec i s i on -

making process of e ach financial insti tuti on opera ting in co u n tries that could po ten ti a lly

become em broi l ed in con f l i ct ,a re actively en ga ged in con f l i ct , or are rebuilding after the

end of con f l i ct .Thus some participants at the IHL Working Group meeting urged that

I F Is con s i der what they can do by way of devel opm ent and econ omic assistance that underpins the ef forts of the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty. Doing so requ i res IFIs to unders t a n d

and take into account the intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issues and con cerns in rel eva n t

co u n tries so as to play a role that fulfills their insti tuti onal mandates and goals while ass i s ting the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty, wh en po s s i ble and appropri a te ,to en su re re s pect for

i n tern a ti onal law.
Th re e

H ow IFIs Can Contribute to Internat i o n a l

Humanitarian Law

Within the stri ctu res cre a ted by the IFIs’ l egal mandate s , s pec i a l i zed staff a n d

re s o u rce s , and po l i tical con s i dera ti on s ,t h ere can be an important role for IFIs

in bo l s tering the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty ’s ef forts to en su re gre a ter re s pect

for the basic principles of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and bring perpetra tors of

a troc i ties to ju s ti ce .I F Is are not de s i gn ed for con f l i ct preven ti on , pe ace keep i n g, or conf l i ct re s o luti on . Yet many of the IHL Working Gro u p’s participants su gge s ted that IFIs ,a s

s pec i a l i zed econ omic insti tuti ons that are su bj ects of i n tern a ti onal law and import a n t

p l ayers in the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty and in con f l i ct are a s , should examine their capaci ties to see how they can su pport the ef forts of the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty to preven t ,

l i m i t , and ad d ress atroc i ties and pro tect the ri ghts of combatants and non com b a t a n t s

a l i ke . Policies should be devi s ed and dec i s i ons taken with an eye to the intern a ti on a l

com mu n i ty ’s ef forts and to how they can su pport and, a bove all , avoid underm i n i n g

those ef fort s . Ex i s ting practi ce su ggests several po ten tial opportu n i ties for IFIs to make a

con tri buti on in this aren a ,i n cluding co ll ecting and sharing inform a ti on with other intern a ti onal and mu l ti l a teral or ga n i z a ti on s , su pporting UN Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i ons and

opera ti ons taken under Ch a pter V I I , adopting formal con d i ti on a l i ty po l i c i e s , and app lying informal con d i ti on a l i ty in the co u rse of d a i ly opera ti on s . In deed , the fo ll owing disc u s s i on of po s s i ble ways for IFIs to play a role in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

dem on s tra tes that these insti tuti ons alre ady do incorpora te these con cerns into thei r

a n a lys e s , at least on an occ a s i onal basis, and can therefore do so within their ex i s ting analytical fra m ework s .

I n fo r m ation Gathering and Sharing

As noted previ o u s ly, I F Is are pre s ent in some capac i ty in most states that are at risk of

con f l i ct , en ga ged in con f l i ct , or recovering from con f l i ct . Th eir prox i m i ty to and inti m a te

i nvo lvem ent in events makes inform a ti on abo ut the situ a ti on in a con f l i ct regi on cri ti c a l

to their opera ti on s .By liaising with repre s en t a tives from other intern a ti onal or ga n i z ati on s ,n o t a bly those specializing in intern a ti onal law, human ri gh t s , hu m a n i t a rian rel i ef ,

and pe ace opera ti on s ,I F Is can acqu i re inform a ti on abo ut intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

i s sues that wi ll inform their dec i s i on-making proce s s .

For ex a m p l e , wh en hu m a n i t a rian rel i ef workers have been targeted in a certain area or

by a certain gro u p, I F Is wi ll most likely want to take measu res to pro tect their own pers on n el . Coord i n a ti on and exch a n ge of bri ef i n gs with or ga n i z a ti ons su ch as, for ex a m p l e ,

the In tern a ti onal Com m i t tee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Un i ted Na ti ons Hi gh

Com m i s s i on er for Ref u gees (UNHCR) rega rding devel opm ents in con f l i ct regi on s , vi o l a2 2 ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian and human ri ghts law, and pop u l a ti on and ref u gee
f l ows could prove useful for IFIs in determining futu re step s . These con su l t a ti ons and informal means of coopera ti on are parti c u l a rly rel evant du ring the World Ba n k’s “ w a tch i n g

bri ef”and wh en an IFI is trying to determine if it can rei n s t a te opera ti ons in the aftermath of con f l i ct . The Ba n k’s recen t ly issu ed OP 2.30 decl a res that the purpose of t h e

w a tching bri ef is “to devel op an understanding of the con tex t , dy n a m i c s ,n eed s , and instituti ons of the area to po s i ti on the Bank to su pport an appropri a te inve s tm ent portfo l i o

wh en con d i ti ons perm i t .”2 8 In order to en ga ge in a co u n try em er ging from con f l i ct ,t h e

Bank must first be able to determine that active con f l i ct has su b s i ded to the point wh ere

pers on n el can travel to and thro u gh o ut the regi on and can “prep a re and carry out any

su ch activi ties ef fectively and ach i eve their obj ective s .”2 9 Ot h er IFIs face the same con s i dera ti ons wh en con tem p l a ting a retu rn to opera ti ons in a co u n try em er ging from con f l i ct .

Beyond safety con cern s ,i n form a ti on abo ut vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw and the re su l ting ef fects on the co u n try ’s po l i tical and econ omic infra s tru ctu re may

be rel evant to the devel opm ent of proj ect s . In the absen ce of an aut h ori t a tive legal determ i n a ti on from the UN Sec u ri ty Council that would be binding on both IFIs and thei r

m em ber state s , ga t h ering and wei ghing inform a ti on from the Un i ted Na ti on s ,o t h er spec i a l i zed intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti on s ,N G O s , and mem ber states can help IFIs determ i n e

a ppropri a te co u rses of acti on . As spec i a l i zed econ omic or ga n i z a ti on s ,I F Is do not gen era lly have the capabi l i ty to make determ i n a ti ons abo ut vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n it a rian law. Ot h er or ga n i z a ti on s , su ch as rel evant UN bod i e s , the ICRC , and va ri o u s

N G O s , do have ex pertise in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and can provi de su ch determ i n a ti on s , wh i ch can then serve as the basis for IFI con s i dera ti ons and dec i s i on making.

For ex a m p l e ,h ow should a regi onal devel opm ent bank or other IFI re s pond wh en cred ible or ga n i z a ti ons report that a cl i ent state is en ga ged in carrying out massive hu m a n

ri ghts abuses rising to the level of c rimes against hu m a n i ty? The UN Sec u ri ty Co u n c i l

m ay not yet be “s ei zed of the matter”—that is, actively en ga ged — but because vi o l a ti on s

of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law could indicate an incre a s ed prob a bi l i ty of econ omic ins t a bi l i ty in the offing in some co u n tri e s ,

3 0 get ting su ch inform a ti on direct ly from others

on the ground and at an early stage wi ll help dec i s i on makers at IFIs to re s pond in a

ti m ely and ef fective manner.

With all rel evant inform a ti on at hand, I F Is have an opportu n i ty to assess wh et h er and

h ow they can fulfill their obj ectives in a way that su pports what the intern a ti onal com mun i ty is trying to accom p l i s h . The Ba n k’s approach to devel opm ent and con f l i ct out l i n ed in

OP 2.30 su ggests that including this type of i n form a ti on in both doc u m ents and discuss i ons abo ut policy dec i s i ons is an integral part of opera ting in a con f l i ct regi on . In co u ntries vu l n era ble to con f l i ct , the Bank is to “prom o te econ omic growth and poverty

redu cti on thro u gh devel opm ent assistance that minimizes po ten tial causes of con f l i ct .”3 1

In co u n tries in con f l i ct , one of the Ba n k’s obj ectives is to “a n a ly ze the impact of con f l i ct

on econ omic and social devel opm ent [and] prep a re for Bank assistance as opportu n i ti e s

a ri s e .”3 2 F i n a lly, in co u n tries making the tra n s i ti on from con f l i ct , the Bank is tasked wi t h

su pporting econ omic recovery and devel opm ent “ with particular atten ti on to the needs of

w a r- a f fected groups who are espec i a lly vu l n era ble by re a s ons of gen der, a ge , or disabi li ty.”3 3 Det a i l ed inform a ti on on atroc i ties and other intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law –

rel a ted issues can help the Bank fulfill these obj ectives properly. An IFI’s lower profile or

How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law 2 3
l ack of i nvo lvem ent altoget h er du ring times of con f l i ct can pose significant ob s t acles to

ga t h ering and sharing inform a ti on . Ro uti n ely co ll ecting inform a ti on ,i n cluding hu m a n it a rian law con cern s ,f rom rel evant out s i de agencies and or ga n i z a ti ons can help fill the

gaps in an IFI’s knowl ed ge base.

I F Is can also play a role in provi d i n g u s eful inform a ti on to other spec i a l i zed intern ati onal or ga n i z a ti ons abo ut devel opm ents in co u n tries vu l n era ble to con f l i ct , in con f l i ct , or

em er ging from con f l i ct . Al t h o u gh ga t h ering inform a ti on and reporting on intern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons is not a pri m a ry functi on of a ny IFI, i n - co u n try staff of ten

glean inform a ti on abo ut abuses that would prove useful to the work of or ga n i z a ti on s

whose mandates cover those are a s . Some IFIs may be relu ctant to share su ch inform a ti on

with other or ga n i z a ti ons because of s ec u ri ty or con f i den ti a l i ty con cern s . In circ u m s t a n ce s

in wh i ch the exch a n ge of i n form a ti on abo ut intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issues is fe as i bl e , an IFI could devel op procedu res to guide its pers on n el in passing on any inform ati on they learn in the co u rse of t h eir regular duties that can help the intern a ti on a l

com mu n i ty to preven t ,m a n a ge , or re s o lve con f l i ct s . Su ch procedu res would likely need to

ad d ress ad d i ti onal qu e s ti on s ,i n cluding wh et h er in-co u n try staff should exch a n ge inform a ti on direct ly with their co u n terp a rts at other spec i a l i zed or ga n i z a ti ons or pass the inform a ti on up the chain of command for exch a n ge at high er level s ; wh et h er in-co u n try

s t a f f would need some basic training in spo t ting intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l ati on s ; and wh et h er inform a ti on abo ut atroc i ties should be passed on to UN agencies on ly,

or to NGOs and all other rel evant actors as well .This form of con tri buti on to the implem en t a ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law does not requ i re IFIs to add inve s ti ga ti on of

war crimes to their mandate , but simply to recogn i ze that by dint of t h eir po s i ti on in 

con f l i ct - a f fected co u n tri e s , IFI staff of ten acqu i re inform a ti on that other mem bers of t h e

i n tern a ti onal com mu n i ty can use.

Support of UN Chapter VII A c t i o n s

UN Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i ons under Ch a pter VII can lead to a series of s cen a rios in

wh i ch IFIs face dec i s i ons abo ut how to en ga ge in con f l i ct are a s . For ex a m p l e , wh en an intern a ti onal tri bunal establ i s h ed under Ch a pter VII aut h ori ty, su ch as the ICTY or the tribunal for Rwanda, i n d i cts a head of s t a te for sys tem a tic vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law, an IFI’s policy in that state can prove qu i te import a n t . The IMF talks

with Serbia in Ja nu a ry 2001 provi de a useful example of h ow IFI policies can help to prom o te the goals of the Un i ted Na ti ons and the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty. In the wake of t h e

I C T Y ’s indictm ent of Sl obodan Mi l o s evi c ,i n tern a ti onal don ors warn ed Serbian leaders

that the IMF, the World Ba n k , and We s tern don ors would withhold econ omic aid if t h ey

did not coopera te with the tri bu n a l ’s demands by the end of Ma rch .

3 4 The World Ba n k

and the IMF also wi t h h eld approval of l oans to Croa tia in mid-1997 because of t h a t

co u n try ’s failu re to bring war criminals to ju s ti ce , to coopera te with the ICTY, and to fulfill

its com m i tm ents under the Dayton Accord s .

3 5

In the Un i ted State s , one important force behind the IMF and World Ba n k’s inform a l

con d i ti oning of aid on coopera ti on with the tri bunal was a provi s i on inclu ded in the 2001

Forei gn Opera ti ons Appropri a ti ons Act .

3 6 Secti on 564 provi des that U. S . exec utive directors of I F Is wi ll not vo te to ex tend any financial aid to co u n tries that have failed to “t a ke

2 4 How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law
n ece s s a ry and significant steps to appreh end and tra n s fer to the tri bunal all pers ons wh o

h ave been publ i cly indicted by the tri bu n a l .”The law also preclu des su pport for financing

for programs in wh i ch a publ i cly indicted war criminal is known to have any material intere s t , or for co u n tries in wh i ch a pers on publ i cly indicted by the tri bunal is residing and

in wh i ch the com petent aut h ori ties have failed to notify the tri bu n a l ,f a i l ed to take appropri a te steps to appreh end the indictee , or ob s tru cted the tri bu n a l ’s work . U. S . vo ti n g

power at the World Ba n k ,the IMF, and other IFIs of ten en a bles it to prevent an IFI from

providing financial assistance to a co u n try that is hindering the ICTY’s work . In the case

of Croa ti a , the Un i ted Ki n gdom also vo ted to bl ock the approval of l oans until the Croa tians su rren dered indicted war criminals to the ICTY.

However, Serbia is on ly one example of a state in wh i ch perpetra tors of vi o l a ti ons of

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law re s i de .As powerful and influ en tial or ga n i z a ti ons in the

i n tern a ti onal com mu n i ty, I F Is should at least con s i der the impact of t h eir policies in

co u n tries wh ere atroc i ties are com m i t ted and inve s ti ga te the opti ons for using their power

and influ en ce to su pport the ef forts of the Un i ted Na ti ons and other intern a ti onal actors

to pro tect civilians from atroc i ties and en force the obl i ga ti ons of s t a tes and indivi du a l s

u n der intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. Ot h er scen a rios in wh i ch IFIs face co u n tries that

a re the obj ect of Ch a pter VII dec i s i ons could inclu de states that are harboring war cri m inals or sustaining them militari ly or econ om i c a lly, i n d i ctm ents by a nati onal tri bunal that

is su pported by a Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i on ,s t a tes that are the target of UN sancti ons or

o t h er en forcem ent acti on because of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti on s , or state s

that are the obj ect of Ch a pter VII re s o luti ons con demning vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hum a n i t a rian law.As noted earl i er, in these instances IFIs and their indivi dual directors are

l ega lly obl i ga ted to “h ave due rega rd ” for su ch Sec u ri ty Council dec i s i on s . In s ti tuti ons that

l end to the priva te sector, su ch as the In tern a ti onal Finance Corpora ti on , the EBRD, or export credit agen c i e s , can also face qu e s ti ons abo ut how to re s pond to indictm ents of i n d ivi duals for war crimes who manage en ti ties receiving priva te sector financing.

Formal Conditionality

I F Is reg u l a rly make financial assistance su bj ect to the sati s f acti on of va rious cri teri a . Alt h o u gh su ch con d i ti on a l i ty gen era lly targets econ omic policies bel i eved to be cri tical to

the mainten a n ce or devel opm ent of econ omic stabi l i ty and growt h ,I F Is (notably the

World Bank) have recen t ly app l i ed con d i ti on a l i ty to social and legal reforms as well . Th e

ex i s ting use of con d i ti on a l i ty provi des a fo u n d a ti on to examine wh et h er and how IFIs can

use some form of con d i ti on a l i ty to help prom o te gre a ter ad h eren ce to and en forcem ent of

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.

One su ch example inclu des measu res som etimes de s i gn a ted “pe ace con d i ti on a l i ty.”

Pe ace con d i ti on a l i ty has become a popular su bj ect in recent ye a rs , with the UN sec ret a ry -

gen era l ,s ch o l a rs , and va rious or ga n i z a ti ons calling for IFIs to make financial assistance

con ti n gent on implem en t a ti on of pe ace accord s , com p l i a n ce with intern a ti onal directive s ,

and mainten a n ce of the pe ace in the aftermath of a con f l i ct .

3 7 While the cen tral goals of

trad i ti onal con d i ti on a l i ty are mac roecon omic stabi l i ty and econ omic reform , pe ace cond i ti on a l i ty places the pri m a ry em phasis on the implem en t a ti on of pe ace accords and the

con s o l i d a ti on of pe ace . For ex a m p l e , in 1997, IMF managing director Mi ch el Ca m de s su s

How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law 2 5
a n n o u n ced that financial assistance to Gu a temala depen ded pri m a ri ly on ti m ely implem en t a ti on of the pe ace accords sign ed several months earl i er.3 8 The World Bank and

We s tern don ors have used pe ace con d i ti on a l i ty frequ en t ly in prom o ting the ti m ely and effective implem en t a ti on of the Dayton Accords in Bosnia and Her zegovi n a .In April 1996,

the World Bank and the Eu ropean Un i on announced that “ i n tern a ti onal ef forts to assist

recon s tru cti on in Bosnia and Her zegovina are cl o s ely linked to com p l i a n ce with the cond i ti ons sti p u l a ted in the pe ace agreem en t . Devel opm ents on the ground should be cons t a n t ly revi ewed to en su re that aid is con d i ti onal on the thoro u gh implem en t a ti on of t h e

obl i ga ti ons undert a ken by all parti e s , in parti c u l a r, coopera ti on with the intern a ti on a l

tri bunal for the pro s ec uti on of war cri m i n a l s .”3 9 These statem ents dem on s tra te the

com m i tm ent of the IFIs to use their influ en ce to bo l s ter the ef forts of the intern a ti on a l

com mu n i ty in prom o ting pe ace ,recon s tru cti on , and ad h eren ce to intern a ti onal obl i gati ons in the aftermath of con f l i ct .

One example of con d i ti on a l i ty used by the intern a ti onal don or com mu n i ty but not by

I F Is is the Un i ted Na ti ons Hi gh Com m i s s i on er for Ref u gee s’“Open Ci ti e s”In i ti a tive ,

adopted in 1997, wh i ch provi des recon s tru cti on aid for mu n i c i p a l i ties in Bosnia that publ i cly decl a re their wi ll i n gness to all ow minori ties to retu rn .O n ce actual minori ty retu rn s

dem on s tra te the sinceri ty of the com m i tm en t , UNHCR then provi des assistance to the

m a j ori ty com mu n i ty as well as to the retu rn ee s .

4 0 The con d i ti ons for the provi s i on of a ss i s t a n ce are tailored to each city and the particular needs of the minori ty com mu n i ty,

su ch as processing paperwork to retu rn homes to their form er occupants or sch ool en ro llm ent for minori ty ch i l d ren .

These uses of pe ace con d i ti on a l i ty serve as an important referen ce point for the use of

con d i ti on a l i ty to prom o te ad h eren ce to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. If a pe ace proce s s

co ll a p s e s , the ch a n ces for econ omic recovery wi ll likely be severely com prom i s ed , and if

econ omic policies fail to improve living standards and redu ce ten s i on s , the pe ace proce s s

wi ll likely fail. In the same way, i f re s pect for intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law disintegra te s ,

the re su l ting atroc i ties wi ll likely undermine hopes for econ omic devel opm ent and stabi li ty. Just as IFIs have used pe ace con d i ti on a l i ty to urge states to sign and implem ent pe ace

accord s ,t h ey could also con tem p l a te using a similar form of con d i ti on a l i ty to give state s

i n cen tives to implem ent their intern a ti onal legal obl i ga ti on s . Some participants at the IHL

Working Group meeting ra i s ed con cerns that IFI con d i ti on a l i ty in the intern a ti onal hum a n i t a rian law arena would re sult in IFIs interfering in or even dict a ting the ch oi ces of

m echanisms for ad d ressing intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti on s . Dec i s i ons abo ut

wh et h er and how to establish a truth com m i s s i on ,n a ti onal tri bu n a l ,a m n e s ty progra m , or

a ny other su ch mechanism invo lve a wi de ra n ge of con s i dera ti ons and factors specific to

e ach co u n try. The use of con d i ti on a l i ty to dict a te to a co u n try wh i ch approach it must use

could have an adverse ef fect on the su ccess of su ch a mech a n i s m — both by dem a n d i n g

one that is not appropri a te in light of the co u n try ’s specific circ u m s t a n ces and by undermining public su pport thro u gh the appe a ra n ce of a mechanism impo s ed from the outs i de .

However, wh en pe ace accords provi de for truth com m i s s i on s ,s pecial co u rt s , or other

s pecific mechanisms to ad d ress the intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons com m i t ted

by one or more sides in a con f l i ct , as in El Sa lvador, Si erra Leon e , and Gu a tem a l a , pe ace

2 6 How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law
con d i ti on a l i ty can of fer an IFI a direct way to influ en ce the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law wi t h o ut dict a ting one particular soluti on to the

govern m en t . Ra t h er, an IFI can simply provi de the govern m ent with a strong incen tive to

u phold the obl i ga ti ons it accepted in signing the pe ace accord . Fu rt h erm ore , the wi ll i n gness of a govern m ent to abi de by the terms of a pe ace accord has important fiscal ra m i f ic a ti ons with wh i ch IFIs can influ en ce the shifting of re s o u rces to the tasks obl i ga ted in the

accord .E s t a blishing a civilian po l i ce force and dismantling a military internal sec u ri ty

force as out l i n ed in a pe ace accord wi ll requ i re a govern m ent to alter its spending pri oriti e s , an important con s i dera ti on for IFIs , but wi ll also con tri bute to an atm o s ph ere in

wh i ch vi o l a ti ons of human ri ghts and hu m a n i t a rian law wi ll be less likely to occ u r. Pe ace

con d i ti on a l i ty thus serves as one example of h ow IFIs can play a po s i tive role in intern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law by pursuing ex i s ting approaches to carrying out their fundamental econ omic mandate s .

Two ad d i ti onal po s s i ble uses of con d i ti on a l i ty were su gge s ted at the meeti n g. Du ri n g

pe aceti m e ,I F Is could use con d i ti on a l i ty to prom o te ad h eren ce to intern a ti onal lega l

obl i ga ti on s . Ne a rly all states are parties to the Gen eva Conven ti on s , wh i ch requ i re that

p a rties take appropri a te measu res to implem ent tre a ty obl i ga ti on s ,i n cluding dissem i n ati on of and training in the laws of a rm ed con f l i ct . However,few states fulfill these obl i gati ons by training their arm ed forces in the basic principles of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw. I F Is could con d i ti on the provi s i on of financing and loans on the rec i p i ent co u n try ’s

a greeing to train and edu c a te its military and could inclu de discussion of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law issues in their policy dialogues with co u n tries that are vu l n era ble to

con f l i ct . Con su l t a ti on with or ga n i z a ti ons that focus on this issu e , su ch as the ICRC , wo u l d

en a ble an IFI to assess su ch agreem ents and discussions adequ a tely.

A more aggre s s ive use of con d i ti on a l i ty could invo lve premising approval for loans and

financing on the provi s i on of i n form a ti on abo ut measu res taken to com p ly with intern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law and human ri ghts obl i ga ti on s . Doing so would all ow IFIs to ensu re that they provi de assistance on ly to states that are fulfilling their obl i ga ti ons under

tre a ty and custom a ry law, wh et h er du ring pe aceti m e , con f l i ct , or po s tcon f l i ct recon s tru cti on . However, this approach to con d i ti on a l i ty would also place a heavi er bu rden on the

s t a f f of the IFIs to ga t h er, veri f y, and assess inform a ti on abo ut com p l i a n ce with intern ati onal obl i ga ti on s — i n form a ti on that affect s , but is not nece s s a ri ly direct ly part of,t h ei r

m a n d a te . Al t h o u gh rel i a n ce on reports and analyses from other spec i a l i zed or ga n i z a ti on s

can rel i eve this bu rden ,m a ny ob s ervers remain con cern ed that con d i ti on a l i ty attach ed to

l egal obl i ga ti ons wi ll non et h eless requ i re a level of com peten ce in intern a ti onal hu m a n it a rian law that may not now, and po s s i bly should not, exist in spec i a l i zed econ omic or gan i z a ti on s .

The use of formal con d i ti ons can also en a ble IFIs to make a po s i tive con tri buti on to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law du ring con f l i ct . Al t h o u gh IFIs usu a lly su s pend opera ti on s

du ring con f l i ct ,p a rti c u l a rly wh en con f l i ct ra ges thro u gh o ut a co u n try and prevents the

s a fe and sec u re con ti nu a ti on of proj ect s ,I F Is do maintain opera ti ons in certain circ u ms t a n ce s . Examples occur wh en a con f l i ct eru pts in one regi on of a large co u n try, su ch as

the con f l i ct in Ch ech nya ,a l ong the border regi ons bet ween two co u n tri e s , su ch as the

con f l i ct in Ka s h m i r, or wh en one or more co u n tries are invo lved in a nei gh boring con f l i ct ,

How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law 2 7
su ch as in the Dem oc ra tic Rep u blic of the Con go. In these cases, an IFI wi ll likely be providing financial assistance to a co u n try en ga ged in con f l i ct and is thus in a po s i ti on to use

its influ en ce , wh en appropri a te , to en co u ra ge ad h eren ce to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw.

One su gge s ti on is for IFIs to con d i ti on immed i a te and futu re assistance on a co u n try ’s

ad h eren ce to certain basic and easily def i n ed obl i ga ti ons du ring con f l i ct , su ch as cooperati on with ef forts to pro tect civilians and other non com b a t a n t s . For ex a m p l e , co u n tries in

con f l i ct are gen era lly obl i ga ted to provi de access to UN ra pporteu rs ,s pecial repre s en t ative s ,s pecial envoys , and repre s en t a tives of the ICRC and other hu m a n i t a rian rel i ef a genc i e s . Du ring con f l i ct ,the ICRC and other hu m a n i t a rian agencies provi de essen tial servi ce s

to the civilian pop u l a ti on ,s ec u ring food , clean water, s h el ter, and medical care for

ref u gee s ,i n tern a lly displaced pers on s , and other civilians affected by the con f l i ct . Th e

G en eva Conven ti ons and Ad d i ti onal Pro tocol I grant special access to the ICRC in intern a ti onal arm ed con f l i cts to bring rel i ef to wo u n ded ,s i ck , or shipwrecked military pers onn el ; visit pri s on ers of w a r; t a ke acti on on beh a l f of the civilian pop u l a ti on ; and en su re that

pro tected pers ons are tre a ted according to the law.4 1 Du ring internal arm ed con f l i ct s ,Arti cle 3 com m on to the four conven ti ons and Ad d i ti onal Pro tocol II guara n tee the ICRC ’s

ri ght to of fer its servi ces to parties in con f l i ct with a vi ew to undertaking rel i ef opera ti on s

and vi s i ting pers ons det a i n ed in con n ecti on with the con f l i ct .

4 2 UN ra pporteu rs ,s pec i a l

repre s en t a tive s , and special envoys ga t h er inform a ti on used by the Un i ted Na ti ons in determining how to re s pond to con f l i ct and how to help the co u n tries and parties invo lved

re ach a pe aceful soluti on . Wh en the Sec u ri ty Council acts under Ch a pter VII and call s

u pon the sec ret a ry - gen eral to send a repre s en t a tive to a con f l i ct regi on , that binding re s oluti on obl i ga tes the party or parties in con trol of that regi on to all ow su ch indivi duals acce s s . Ad d ressing the con f l i ct in Bosnia and Her zegovina in Re s o luti on 1019 (1995), for

ex a m p l e , the Sec u ri ty Council dem a n ded “that the Bosnian Serb party give immed i a te

and unimpeded access to repre s en t a tives of the Un i ted Na ti ons Hi gh Com m i s s i on er for

Ref u gee s , the ICRC , and other intern a ti onal agen c i e s .”4 3

Al t h o u gh access for both hu m a n i t a rian agencies and UN repre s en t a tives is crucial to

t h eir abi l i ty to fulfill their tasks of a s s i s ting the civilian pop u l a ti on and seeking a re s o luti on of the con f l i ct ,s t a tes and other parties to a con f l i ct may re s tri ct su ch access in part or

a l toget h er, of ten to prevent discovery of acts being com m i t ted by both state and non s t a te

actors in vi o l a ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. Some indicators of com p l i a n ce wi t h

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law are difficult for a spec i a l i zed econ omic or ga n i z a ti on to

eva lu a te , even with rel i a n ce on other spec i a l i zed or ga n i z a ti on s , but obj ective determ i n ati ons can be made abo ut a state’s fulfill m ent of these obl i ga ti ons to all ow su ch acce s s . Reports from the Un i ted Na ti on s , the ICRC , and other or ga n i z a ti ons rega rding wh et h er

p a rticular co u n tries have den i ed su ch access of fer con clu s ive evi den ce abo ut those co u ntri e s’ com p l i a n ce with their obl i ga ti on s .I F Is could therefore rely on su ch reports wi t h o ut

the need to du p l i c a te the ex pertise intern a lly. Several participants su gge s ted that by foc u sing on specific demands and obl i ga ti ons in this manner, I F Is have the opportu n i ty to inf lu en ce states to uphold these obl i ga ti ons and thus pro tect the fundamental ri ghts of t h o s e

most vu l n era ble du ring con f l i ct .

2 8 How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law
I n formal Mechanisms

Ap a rt from the app l i c a ti on of form a l , explicit con d i ti on a l i ty to lending dec i s i on s , an informal approach can of ten of fer the most ef fective way for IFIs to su pport the intern ati onal com mu n i ty ’s ef forts to implem ent and en force intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.

One informal mechanism arises in the regular Arti cle IV con su l t a ti ons that the IMF holds

with cl i ent state s , wh i ch are de s i gn ed to give the fund an opportu n i ty to mon i tor its member state s’ exch a n ge - ra te and balance - of - p aym ents po l i c i e s .G iven the impact that hu m a ni t a rian law vi o l a ti ons and con f l i ct can have on econ omic devel opm ent and stabi l i ty,

p a rti c u l a rly wh en military ex pen d i tu res draw re s o u rces aw ay from vital mac roecon om i c

a pp l i c a ti on s ,the Arti cle IV con su l t a ti on s — wh i ch are usu a lly qu i te broad and can inclu de

a ny issue that can affect a state’s balance of p aym ents and exch a n ge ra te — could be an appropri a te forum in wh i ch the IMF can raise con cerns with mem ber state s . Some parti c ipants at the IHL Working Gro u p’s Febru a ry session argued that referen ce to and

d i s c u s s i ons abo ut vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law or a state’s failu re to coopera tewith intern a ti onal ef forts to bring perpetra tors to ju s ti ce , wi t h o ut any pron o u n cem ents of con d i ti on a l i ty, s a n cti on s , or wi t h d rawals of a i d , can have an impact on a state’s

beh avi or.An IFI that en ga ges in discussions abo ut these issues wi ll thus dem on s tra te to its

m em ber states that it is both aw a re of and con cern ed abo ut atroc i ties and acco u n t a bi l i ty,

s et ting the stage for futu re opportu n i ties to take intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issu e s

i n to con s i dera ti on wh en providing assistance and funding proj ect s .

I F Is can also exercise con d i ti on a l i ty inform a lly at the local level by working with other

or ga n i z a ti ons in a po s tcon f l i ct situ a ti on to determine how to all oc a te aid sel ectively.

Ra t h er than set forth formal and specific con d i ti ons for the recei pt of a s s i s t a n ce ,I F Is

could simply implem ent their proj ects and assistance with an eye to rew a rding those wh o

u phold their com m i tm en t s ,penalizing those who vi o l a te or have vi o l a ted legal obl i ga ti on s

and pri n c i p l e s , and en co u ra ging com p l i a n ce from those who remain ambiva l en t . Th i s

type of a pproach accomplishes two goa l s : dem on s tra ting the import a n ce of i n tern a ti on a l

l egal obl i ga ti ons and the IFIs’ de s i re to prom o te ad h eren ce to su ch obl i ga ti on s , and enco u ra ging implem en t a ti on of pe ace accords and recon s tru cti on ef fort s . The World Ba n k

has used this met h od in Bosnia in re s ponse to the va rying levels of ad h eren ce differen t

mu n i c i p a l i ties have dem on s tra ted with rega rd to the principles set forth in the Dayton

Accord s . Working with the Office of the Hi gh Repre s en t a tive , the World Bank incorpora ted an informal screening process for the provi s i on of a s s i s t a n ce to mu n i c i p a l i ti e s . In

e s s en ce , wh en de s tru cti on of housing in a particular com mu n i ty preven ted the retu rn of

ref u gee s , for ex a m p l e , the “ Hi gh Repre s en t a tive [could] alert don ors to the fact that bu i l ding a house in that com mu n i ty is unlikely to have a lot of su cce s s .”4 4 Coopera ti on wi t h

o t h er spec i a l i zed or ga n i z a ti ons on the ground helps the Bank and other IFIs to en su re

that their financial assistance is being used for the de s i gn a ted purpo s e . For ex a m p l e ,

gra n ting home recon s tru cti on funds to a com mu n i ty in wh i ch no ef fort is being made to

prevent homes from being de s troyed in the first place is not an ef f i c i ent use of re s o u rce s .

The cutof f of financial assistance could influ en ce these com mu n i ties to rethink their comm i tm ents to pe ace accords and legal obl i ga ti on s .

How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law 2 9
3 0 How IFIs Can Contribute to International Humanitarian Law

At ti m e s , this informal screening process became more publ i c : In 1998, the Bank ann o u n ced a $17 mill i on loan for recon s tru cti on in Bo s n i a’s Serb Rep u bl i c , of wh i ch 15 percent was de s i gn a ted for areas under the con trol of h a rd-line nati on a l i s t s .Af ter an outc ry

f rom human ri ghts groups and mem bers of the U. S . Con gre s s ,the Bank exclu ded the

town of Foc a , the site of n o torious atroc i ties wh ere several indicted war criminals con ti nu ed to live in impunity.4 5Al t h o u gh the dec i s i on to target the provi s i on of a s s i s t a n ce was

d riven by pre s su re from out s i de , the Ba n k’s acti on non et h eless dem on s tra ted how financial aid can be tailored to incorpora te con s i dera ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

and su pport the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty ’s ef forts to bring to ju s ti ce perpetra tors of t h e

l aw ’s vi o l a ti on s . These examples dem on s tra te that incorpora ting intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law con cerns into the po l i c ymaking process is not just a po s s i ble futu re con s i dera ti on

for IFIs but is alre ady done in certain circ u m s t a n ce s .
Fo u r

Conclusions and Recommendat i o n s

Econ omic devel opm ent and stabi l i ty can no lon ger be sep a ra ted from con f l i ct , po s tcon f l i ct recon s tru cti on , or the com m i s s i on of a troc i ti e s . In many con tem pora ry

con f l i ct s ,a rmies and rebel forces battle for con trol of key re s o u rce s , de s troying econ omic and social infra s tru ctu re and com m i t ting massive vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law in the proce s s . In s ti tuti ons and or ga n i z a ti ons ded i c a ted to hel p i n g

co u n tries ach i eve econ omic stabi l i ty thro u gh devel opm ent and recon s tru cti on cannot

a f ford to ign ore the ef fects of con f l i ct ,p a rti c u l a rly the impact of vi o l a ti ons of i n tern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law, on their abi l i ty to fulfill their mandate s .

In deed ,i n corpora ting inform a ti on abo ut intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law con cern s

m ay help IFIs to pursue their obj ectives by en su ring that they have all nece s s a ry inform ati on at their disposal in the de s i gn of financing and loan proj ect s .I F Is can also use thei r

i n f lu en ce in some cases to bo l s ter the ef forts of the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty to prom o te

gre a ter ad h eren ce to and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.A thoro u gh exa m i n a ti on of the ways incorpora ting intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law con cerns can improve fulfill m ent of I F Is’ core mandates and adva n ce the policy goals of the broader

i n tern a ti onal com mu n i ty in en co u ra ging ad h eren ce to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law

t hus appe a rs to be appropri a te .

To this en d , the fo ll owing recom m en d a ti ons of fer several ways in wh i ch IFIs can bu i l d

on current policies to su pport the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty ’s ef forts and make a po s i tive

con tri buti on to the implem en t a ti on and en forcem ent of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law.

Analyzing Links between International Humanitarian Law

and Deve l o p m e n t

Ma ny of the participants agreed that an inve s ti ga ti on of the interp l ay bet ween intern ati onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons and econ omic devel opm ent and stabi l i ty would be

u s eful for IFIs in assessing their role in con f l i ct regi ons and the impact of vi o l a ti ons on

t h eir mandates and proj ect s . Su ch a stu dy could be perform ed by the World Ba n k ,o t h er

I F Is , or specialists in the ac ademic or NGO com mu n i ti e s . The World Ba n k’s OP 2.30

s t a tes a clear need for this type of eva lu a ti on , decl a ring that one of the Ba n k’s obj ectives in

co u n tries in con f l i ct is to “a n a ly ze the impact of con f l i ct on econ omic and social devel opm en t .”4 6 In parti c u l a r, vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law de s t a bi l i ze soc i ety and

ex acerb a te the de s tru ctive ef fects of con f l i ct by adding fe a r, m a s s ive civilian de a t h s ,a n d

d i s p l acem ent to the mix. No t withstanding the sep a ra ti on of econ omic and po l i tical cons i dera ti ons in the mandates of most IFIs , wi de s pre ad vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n it a rian law raise many po l i tical con s i dera ti ons that are high ly rel evant to the econ om i c

con cerns on wh i ch the IFIs foc u s .

3 1
For ex a m p l e ,the Rwandan gen oc i de left the co u n try not on ly with a legacy of de a t h

and the need to hold perpetra tors acco u n t a ble but also with a wh o lly deva s t a ted econ omic and social stru ctu re . According to a recent report of the Bri tish House of Comm on s ,h owever, n ei t h er the IMF nor the World Bank “recogn i zed the direct link bet ween

growing social ten s i on , human ri ghts abu s e s , and the su b s equ ent de s tru cti on of the en ti re

econ omic infra s tru ctu re”in Rwanda.4 7 For these re a s on s , most participants at the IHL

Working Group meeting wel com ed the idea of a stu dy that could analy ze wh et h er intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons can serve as re a s on a bly rel i a ble pred i ctors of advers e

econ omic con s equ en ces and, i f s o, i den tify what con d i ti ons and factors produ ce su ch

l i n k s . To the ex tent that atroc i ties may be nega tive econ omic indicators ,i n form a ti on

a bo ut intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law vi o l a ti ons could prove hel pful to IFIs in tailori n g

t h eir proj ects and policies to provi de the best assistance and servi ces to their mem ber

s t a te s .

Inclusion of Info r m ation about International Humanitarian

L aw Developments in Watching Briefs and Other IFI

D o c u m e n t s

I F Is can obtain inform a ti on abo ut past, pre s en t , and imminent atroc i ties in several po s s ible ways :f rom their own pers on n el on the gro u n d ,o t h er spec i a l i zed intern a ti onal or ga n iz a ti ons and agen c i e s , hu m a n i t a rian and human ri ghts NGOs, m em ber govern m ents wi t h

a pre s en ce in the con f l i ct regi on , and the media and other public source s . Di s c u s s i ons at

the Febru a ry meeting produ ced the fo ll owing su gge s ted mechanisms for obtaining and

i n corpora ting inform a ti on from other or ga n i z a ti ons with the appropri a te ex perti s e .

Reports by Specialized Organizations

I F Is can make use of the reports that other intern a ti onal or ga n i z a ti on s ,m em ber state s ,

and NGOs ro uti n ely produ ce on hu m a n i t a rian law and human ri ghts vi o l a ti ons in co u ntries around the worl d . Su ch reports of fer doc u m en t a ti on of a troc i ti e s , ex p l a n a ti ons of t h e

va rious actors and the sources of the con f l i ct or abu s e s , and inform a ti on abo ut patterns of

vi o l a ti on s ;t h ey also frequ en t ly make legal determ i n a ti ons abo ut the natu re of the vi o l ati on s . Su ch inform a ti on is vital for IFIs not on ly in assessing how to proceed with thei r

opera ti ons in va rious co u n tries but also in determining wh en to evac u a te pers on n el on

the ground because of s a fety con cern s .

Briefings by the ICRC, UNHCR, and Other Organizations

Ro utine bri ef i n gs at the head qu a rters level on hu m a n i t a rian law con cerns in IFI cl i en t

s t a tes can be provi ded by or ga n i z a ti ons with spec i a l i zed ex perti s e , su ch as the ICRC ,

U N H C R , the Office of the UN Hi gh Com m i s s i on er for Human Ri gh t s , and rel eva n t

N G O s , and can serve as a key source of i n form a ti on . In - co u n try IFI staff as well may find

that bri ef i n gs on the specific situ a ti on and devel opm ents in their co u n try or local regi on

a re parti c u l a rly hel pful in keeping abreast of events and making appropri a te dec i s i on s

a bo ut next step s . An IFI can arra n ge to have the ICRC ,U N H C R , or other spec i a l i zed orga n i z a ti ons provi de su ch bri ef i n gs to local staff as events warra n t . In deed , a repre s en t a tive

of the ICRC serves on the staff of the World Ba n k’s Po s t - Con f l i ct Un i t , providing an im3 2 Conclusions and Recommendations
portant link for su ch bri ef i n gs . These arra n gem ents can have the ad ded ben efit of l ayi n g

the fra m ework for a working rel a ti onship bet ween the IFI and the spec i a l i zed or ga n i z ati on s .

Development of Guidelines for IFI Pe rs o n n e l

Some participants su gge s ted that IFIs should devel op staff g u i delines set ting forth gen era l

principles for the con s i dera ti on and incorpora ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issu e s . These guidelines could inclu de procedu res for exch a n ging inform a ti on with pers onn el from the Un i ted Na ti ons and other spec i a l i zed or ga n i z a ti ons on the gro u n d ,s o u rce s

of i n form a ti on abo ut intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, and a basic fra m ework for wh en

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issues are appropri a tely con s i dered within the mandate of

the IFIs . Su ch guidelines could also inclu de the basic principles of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n it a rian law and the major conven ti ons and sources of the law.

Training for IFI Pe rsonnel in the Basics of International

Humanitarian Law 

Al t h o u gh IFIs remain spec i a l i zed econ omic or ga n i z a ti on s ,s everal participants at the IHL

Working Group meeting su gge s ted that as intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law becomes inc re a s i n gly rel evant to their opera ti on s ,I F Is should pursue basic training for sel ected emp l oyees in the fundamental principles of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. The goal of su ch

training is not to devel op an in-house ex pertise in the law, but to prep a re em p l oyees in the

rel evant dep a rtm ents to be able to exch a n ge inform a ti on abo ut the law and use appropria te reports and sources of i n form a ti on that can help IFIs fulfill their mandates and su pport the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty ’s ef fort s . Training could be perform ed by a va ri ety of

or ga n i z a ti on s ,i n cluding the ICRC ,the Un i ted Na ti ons In s ti tute for Training and Res e a rch , or sel ected NGOs.

P reconflict Implementation Effo r t s

Pe acetime or precon f l i ct peri ods of fer IFIs a va ri ety of opportu n i ties to make a po s i tive

con tri buti on to the implem en t a ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. One su gge s ti on

was that du ring policy dialogues and other informal discussion s , su ch as the IMF’s Arti cl e

IV con su l t a ti on s ,IFI officials can discuss intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law issues wi t h

m em ber states that are at risk of ex peri encing arm ed con f l i ct . Doing so could dem ons tra te that the insti tuti on is aw a re of the po s s i bi l i ty of con f l i ct and atroc i ties and wi ll be

focusing atten ti on on su ch issues should con f l i ct devel op, rei n forcing that the intern ati onal com mu n i ty wi ll not ign ore the com m i s s i on of war cri m e s , gen oc i de ,c rimes aga i n s t

hu m a n i ty, and other atroc i ties du ring any con f l i ct , wh et h er internal or intern a ti on a l . Informal discussions also en a ble mem ber states to raise their own con cerns and seek assist a n ce from the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty in preven ting vi o l a ti ons of i n tern a ti on a l

hu m a n i t a rian law. In su ch cases, I F Is could then pass su ch inform a ti on on to the appropri a te spec i a l i zed or ga n i z a ti on s .

Some participants at the Febru a ry meeting and other sch o l a rs have urged that IFIs take

m ore formal acti on to prom o te pe acetime implem en t a ti on of basic intern a ti onal lega l

obl i ga ti on s . One opti on is for IFIs to inve s ti ga te the fe a s i bi l i ty of requ i ring co u n tries reConclusions and Recommendations 3 3
ceiving precon f l i ct assistance to edu c a te their arm ed forces and civilian pop u l a ti ons abo ut

i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law and the norms governing the beh avi or and pro tecting the

ri ghts of m i l i t a ry force s ,s ec u ri ty pers on n el , and civilians du ring con f l i ct situ a ti on s . Su ch

edu c a ti on and training is a basic obl i ga ti on of a ll states that are parties to the 1949 Gen eva

Conven ti on s .

4 8 The ICRC and other or ga n i z a ti ons ro uti n ely assess the con tent and qu a li ty of m i l i t a ry and civilian training in intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, and reports from

su ch or ga n i z a ti ons can serve as an appropri a te fra m ework for eva lu a ting wh et h er a co u ntry has met the requ i rem ents to receive financial assistance .In this way, I F Is would not

n eed to devel op in-house ex pertise and capac i ty in eva lu a ting intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a ri a n

l aw training but could rely on out s i de or ga n i z a ti ons with su ch ex perti s e .

Ma ny IFI officials have legi ti m a te con cerns abo ut any invo lvem ent with military force s

in co u n tries receiving loans and financial assistance ,p a rti c u l a rly wh en those loans are de si gn a ted for edu c a ti on , judicial reform , or other civilian reform s . These su gge s ti ons for

prom o ting pe acetime implem en t a ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law do not seek to

u n dere s ti m a te su ch con cerns or alter the natu re of an IFI’s rel a ti onship with a co u n try ’s

govern m ent and military; ra t h er, t h ey simply point to another way in wh i ch IFIs co u l d

con tri bute to the implem en t a ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law. In ad d i ti on to the

po ten tial po s i tive con tri buti on these pe acetime and precon f l i ct ef forts can make to intern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, t h ey may also prove useful for IFIs wh en faced with the eru pti on of con f l i ct , because a fra m ework for the discussion of hu m a n i t a rian law issues and

a troc i ties wi ll have alre ady been cre a ted du ring times of less ten s i on and con f u s i on .

IFIs as Potential Allies for the International Community

during Conflict

I F Is can make a su b s t a n tive con tri buti on to the implem en t a ti on of i n tern a ti onal hu m a n it a rian law by bo l s tering the ef forts of the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty to prevent the escalati on and spre ad of mass vi o l en ce . As discussed previ o u s ly, the ICRC , UN ra pporteu rs ,a n d

o t h er rel evant actors need access to con f l i ct regi ons in order to help those in need ,s ee k

re s o luti on to the con f l i ct and an end to atroc i ti e s ,a n d , perh a p s ,h elp bring those acco u n ta ble to ju s ti ce—and co u n tries are obl i ga ted to provi de su ch acce s s . Less com p l ex than

qu e s ti ons of wh et h er particular acts are vi o l a ti ons of the Gen eva Conven ti ons or the Add i ti onal Pro toco l s ,i s sues of access are an appropri a te are a , it has been su gge s ted , in wh i ch

I F Is can su pport the intern a ti onal com mu n i ty thro u gh two pri m a ry approach e s .F i rs t ,f inancial assistance and other proj ects can be con d i ti on ed on an agreem ent to grant acce s s

to UN repre s en t a tive s , the ICRC , and other rel i ef or ga n i z a ti on s . Secon d , in re s ponse to reports from the Un i ted Na ti ons and the ICRC that access has been den i ed in particular are a s ,I F Is managing proj ects in those areas can wi t h d raw or su s pend assistance to indu ce

n a ti onal and local govern m ents to com p ly with their obl i ga ti ons and agreem ents to all ow

acce s s .

3 4 Conclusions and Recommendations
N o t e s

1. Although this report focuses on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the

regional development banks, the issues and recommendations presented apply to export credit

agencies, such as the Export-Import Bank of the United States and the Overseas Private Investment

Corporation, and other international financial institutions in the United States and abroad.

2. For the purposes of this report, the IBRD and the IDA are the most important members of

the World Bank Group and will be referred to collectively as “the World Bank” or “the Bank.”

3. Agreement Establishing the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Article 1,

available at h t t p : / / w w w . e b r d . c o m / e n g l i s h / p u b l i c / i n d e x . h t m (hereinafter “EBRD Agreement”).

4. World Bank Operational Policy 2.30 (hereinafter OP 2.30), “Development Cooperation

and Conflict” (January 2001), paras. 1 and 2.

5. Ibid., paras. 7–9.

6. See John D. Ciorciari, “A Prospective Enlargement of the Roles of the Bretton Woods

Financial Institutions in International Peace Operations,” 22 Fordham Int’l L.J. 292, 337–339

( 1 9 9 8 ) .

7. EBRD Agreement, preamble.

8. Ibid., Article 1.

9. “Lending to Poorest Countries Rises in FY01,” World Bank, Press Release 2002/051/S,

August 2, 2001. See also Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, The World Bank: Governance

and Human Rights, 2d ed. (New York: Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1995), 61.

10. “Yugoslavs Act on Hague Trial for Milosevic,” New York Times, June 24, 2001; and United

Nations Security Council Resolution 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), May 25, 1993, para 4.

11. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays, vol. 1 (Boston:

M. Nijhoff, 1991), 76. 

12. Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development, Articles I and VI, approved by the General Assembly on November 15, 1947,

Document A/349, September 2, 1947. 

13. Shihata, The World Bank, 7 6 .

14. Canada, House of Commons, Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and

International Trade on the Issues of International Financial Institutions Reforms for the Agenda

of the June 1995 G-7 Halifax Summit, From Bretton Woods to Halifax and Beyond: Towards a

Twenty-First Summit for the Twenty-First Century Challenge; available at h t t p : / / w w w . l i b r a r y .

u t o r o n t o . c a / g 7 / g o v e r n m e n t a l / h c 2 5. The Standing Committee recommended that “the Halifax

action programme call for the IFIs to take into account in their lending policies and programs the

obligation to respect universal human rights, including those of democratic expression, and also

the need to implement principles of sound public administration and to support demilitarization,

including the reduction of military budgets.”

15. See Agreement between the United Nations and the International Bank for

Reconstruction and Development, Articles I and VI. 3 5
16. Article IV, Section 10, Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction

and Development (hereinafter “IBRD Articles”), opened for signature December 27, 1945, 60

Stat. 1440, 2 U.N.T.S. 134, as amended February 19, 1989; available at h t t p : / / w w w . w o r l d b a n k . o r g /

h t m l / e x t d r / b a c k g r d / i b r d / a r t t o c . h t m.

17. Article IV, Section 3(b), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund (hereinafter “IMF Articles”), December 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2. U.N.T.S. 39,

amended July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2775, amended April 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203.

18. Shihata, The World Bank, 7 5 .

19. Ibid.

20. Indeed, the Bank now includes considerations such as female genital mutilation, environmental concerns, and fundamental civil and political rights within its definition of “economic

considerations.” Massive violations of international humanitarian law, or the commission of

atrocities that suggest future widespread violations will probably occur, are at least as likely to

affect development and economic stability as these factors already considered by the Bank.

21. Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World: Selected Essays, vol. 2

(Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1995), 577–78; original emphasis.

22. See, for example, Prosecutor v Tadic, Case no. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense

Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, October 2, 1995, para. 58-9, in which the

Appeals Chamber of the ICTY held that “[i]t would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to be raised successfully

against human rights. Borders should not be considered as a shield against the reach of the law

and as a protection for those who trample underfoot the most elementary rights of humanity. . . .

[Violations of international humanitarian law] are really crimes which are universal in nature . . .

and transcend the interest of any one State.” See also Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co., Ltd.

(Belgium v Spain) 1970 I.C.J. 3, 33 (February 5): obligations erga omnes, or obligations a state

holds toward the international community, “derive, for example, in contemporary international

law, from the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles and

rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and

racial discrimination”; and Philip Alston, “Environment, Economic Development, and Human

Rights: A Triangular Relationship?” 82 Am. Soc'y Int'l L. Proc. 40, 54 (1988), arguing that “human

rights are not political, they are matters of international law.”

23. Shihata, The World Bank, vol. 1, 78, citing UN General Assembly, Twenty-First Session,

Fourth Committee, Provisional Summary Record of the 1653d meeting, New York, December 3,

1966, UN Doc. A/C.4/SR1653 (December 8, 1966); Samuel A. Bleicher, “UN v. IBRD: A

Dilemma of Functionalism,” International Organization 24 (1970): 31; and Victoria E.

Marmorstein, “World Bank Power to Consider Human Rights Factors in Loan Decisions,” 13 J .

Int’l L. & Ec. 113 (1978).

24. Shihata, The World Bank, vol. 1, 81.

25. John D. Ciorciari, “The Lawful Scope of Human Rights Criteria in World Bank Credit

Decisions: An Interpretive Analysis of the IBRD and IDA Articles of Agreement,” 33 Cornell Int’l

L . J . 331, 346–48 (2000). Sources supporting this claim include studies by international economists, the policies and practices of bilateral and private lenders in their dealings with emerging

markets, and the World Bank’s own field experience. See Arup Banjeri and Hafez Ghanem, “Does

the Type of Political Regime Matter for Trade and Labor Market Practices?” 11 World Bank Ec.

3 6 Notes
R e v . 171 (1997); Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, “Environment, Economic Development and Human

Rights: A Triangular Relationship?” 82 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 40, 45 (1988).

26. OP 2.30.

27. Ibid.

28. Ibid., para 7.

29. Ibid., para 9(a).

30. Studies investigating the links between widespread violations of international humanitarian law and economic development will be critical for IFIs to make decisions appropriate to any

given situation. If research and evidence demonstrates that war crimes, genocide, and other atrocities are negative economic indicators, then all lending and financing institutions, whether international or local, will need to factor information about such atrocities into all decisions regarding

projects in conflict areas. An IFI’s failure to do so would effectively mean that it was not fulfilling

its mandate to address economic considerations.

31. OP 2.30, para 2(a).

32. Ibid., para 2(b).

33. Ibid., para 2(c).

34. “Belgrade Nervous over IMF Talks,” IWPR Balkan Crisis Report, no. 215 (February 6,

2 0 0 1 ) .

35. Associated Press, “U.S. Delays $30 Million World Bank Loan to Croatia,” June 25, 1997;

“Cook Reins in Tudjman with IMF Loan Veto,” The Times of London, July 31, 1997; Dow Jones

International News Service, “IMF Postpones Approval of $40 Million Loan to Croatia,” July 10,

1997; Dow Jones International News Service, “U.S. Says World Bank to Indefinitely Delay Loan to

Croatia,” July 1, 1997.

36. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2001,

H.R. 5526 (106th Cong., 2d sess.), Section 564, “Restrictions on Assistance to Countries Providing

Sanctuary to Indicted War Criminals.”

37. James K. Boyce and Manuel Pastor, Jr., “Aid for Peace: Can International Financial

Institutions Help Prevent Conflict?” World Policy Journal 15 (1998): 42; Robert Skidelsky and

Edward Mortimer, “Economic Sanctions as a Means to International ‘Health’” (p. 154) and Kevin

M. Cahill, “Introduction” (p. 3) in Preventive Diplomacy: Stopping Wars Before They Start, e d .

Kevin M. Cahill (New York: Basic Books, 1996); “Conflict Prevention Forum, A Guide: Costs and

Causes of Conflict in the Greater Horn of Africa: Conditionality/Incentives for Conflict

Prevention,” available at http://www.caii-dc.com/ghai/toolbox10.htm; African News Service,

“Report by Annan Explores Causes, Cures of Africa Conflict,” April 16, 1998.

38. Gilles Carbonnier, Conflict, Postwar Rebuilding and the Economy: A Critical Review of the

L i t e r a t u r e . WSP Occasional Paper no. 2 (Geneva: War-Torn Societies Project, March 1998), chapter 6.

39. World Bank, Press Release no. 96/S56 (April 13, 1996), “Donors Pledge $1.23 Billion to

Help Rebuild Bosnia: Total Available for 1996 Reconstruction Now Exceeds $1.8 Billion.” See also

European Commission/World Bank, Press Release (April 13, 1996), “Chairman’s Conclusions of

the Second Donors’ Conference on the Reconstruction of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”

Notes 3 7
40. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Open Cities Initiative(Sarajevo: UNHCR Office of

the Special Envoy and Office of the Chief of Mission, August 31, 1997). 

41. Article 9, Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and

Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (hereinafter “First Geneva Convention”), opened for signature

August 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Article 9, Geneva Convention for the

Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at

Sea (hereinafter “Second Geneva Convention”), opened for signature August 12, 1949, 75

U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Article 10, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners

of War (hereinafter “Third Geneva Convention”), opened for signature August 12, 1949, 75

U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3316; Article 10, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian

Persons in Time of War (hereinafter “Fourth Geneva Convention”), opened for signature August

12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Article 5, Protocol I Additional to the Geneva

Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed

Conflicts (hereinafter “Additional Protocol I”), opened for signature at Berne, December 12,

1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex I, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 1391 (1977). Protocol II Additional to

the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of the Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (hereinafter “Additional Protocol II”), opened for signature at

Berne, December 12, 1977, U.N. Doc. A/32/144 Annex II, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 561 (1987) also

requires that impartial and humanitarian relief actions for the civilian population be permitted,

subject to the consent of the parties. In the event that a state consents to such relief actions and

then later denies access, IFIs can use their influence to urge the country to reinstate such access.

42. Geneva Conventions, common article 3, Additional Protocol II, Article 18.

43. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1019, S/RES/1019 (1995), November 9, 1995,

para. 2.

44. Interview with Rory O’Sullivan, director of the World Bank’s resident mission in Bosnia

and Herzegovina, in War Report, no. 51 (May 1997), 32.

45. R. Jeffrey Smith, “At U.S.’s Behest, World Bank Won’t Finance Water Project,”

Washington Post, January 3, 1998, A16.

46. OP 2.30, para 2(b)(iii). The Operational Policy further states that “[r]ecognizing the

incomplete links between development assistance and conflict, the Bank’s analytical work in the

area of conflict attempts to increase an understanding of the root causes, catalysts, indicators, and

policy implications of conflict and post-conflict recovery.” International humanitarian law violations fall squarely within this framework. In particular, “conflict analysis incorporates a judgment

about the degree to which poverty reduction activities . . . (b) are negatively affected by warrelated destruction and destabilization of normal socioeconomic activity as well as by the diversion of public resources from development purposes to military and other expenditures incurred

in waging war”; OP 2.30, para. 5 and note 11.

47. House of Commons, International Development Committee, Conflict Prevention and PostConflict Reconstruction, Volume I: Report and Proceedings (London: The Stationery Office, 1999),

para. 59.

48. First Geneva Convention, Chapter VIII; Second Geneva Convention, Chapter VII; Third

Geneva Convention, Part VI, Section 1; Fourth Geneva Convention, Part IV, Section 1.

3 8 Notes
3 9

Pa r t i c i p a n t s

I n t e r n ational Humanitarian Law

Wo rking Gro u p

“ New Players in the Im p l em en t a ti on and Enforcem ent of In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a ri a n

L aw: The Role of In tern a ti onal Econ omic In s ti tuti on s ,” Febru a ry 7, 2 0 0 1

Mi ke Ma t h e s on

IHL Working Group Ch a i rpers on and

Sen i or Fell ow, Jen n i n gs Ra n do l ph

Program for In tern a ti onal Pe ace

Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace

Sh eppie Abra m owi t z

S pecial Advi s or

In tern a ti onal Rescue Com m i t tee

Edu a rdo Arbo l ed a

Dep uty Regi onal Repre s en t a tive

Un i ted Na ti ons Hi gh Com m i s s i on er

for Ref u gee s

Nina Bang-Jen s en

Exec utive Di rector

Coa l i ti on for In tern a ti onal Ju s ti ce

Mark Barto l i n i

Vi ce Pre s i den t ,G overn m ent Rel a ti on s

In tern a ti onal Rescue Com m i t tee

La u rie Bl a n k

Program Officer, Rule of L aw Progra m

Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace

Urs Boegl i

He ad of Regi onal Del ega ti on

In tern a ti onal Com m i t tee of the Red Cro s s

Lucy Brown

Sen i or Advi s or

In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a rian Law

Am erican Red Cro s s

Ho lly Bu rk h a l ter

Advoc acy Di rector

P hysicians for Human Ri gh t s

Joel Ch a rny

Vi ce Pre s i dent for Po l i c y

Ref u gees In tern a ti on a l

Fel i ce Gaer

Di rector

Jacob Bl a u s tein In s ti tute for

Adva n cem ent of Human Ri gh t s

Roy Gutm a n

Di p l om a tic Corre s pon den t ,Newsd ay

and Pre s i den t , Crimes of War Proj ect

Neil Kri t z

Di rector, Rule of L aw Progra m

Un i ted States In s ti tute of Pe ace

Ti m o t hy La n e

Divi s i on Ch i ef

Policy Devel opm en t

and Revi ew Dep a rtm en t

In tern a ti onal Mon et a ry Fu n d

Meg Lu n d s a ger

Al tern a te Exec utive Di rector

In tern a ti onal Mon et a ry Fu n d

T h eodor Meron

Co u n s el or on In tern a ti onal Law

O f f i ce of the Legal Advi s or

Dep a rtm ent of S t a te
4 0
4 1 Participants

John Ni ehu s s

G en eral Co u n s el

Ex port - Im port Bank of the Un i ted State s

Saad Noor

Form er Sen i or Edu c a ti on An a lys t

Af rican Devel opm ent Ba n k

Doug Norl en

Policy Di rector

Pacific Envi ron m ent and Re s o u rces Cen ter

Diane Oren t l i ch er

Wa s h i n g ton Co ll ege of L aw

Am erican Un ivers i ty

John Ri d dl e

Dep uty Coord i n a tor for

E a s tern Eu ropean As s i s t a n ce

Dep a rtm ent of S t a te

Colin Sco t t

Ad m i n i s tra tor, Po s t - Con f l i ct Fu n d

The World Ba n k

Ch a rles Toy

G en eral Co u n s el

Overseas Priva te Inve s tm ent Corpora ti on

Ru dy Van Puym broeck

Form er Ch i ef Co u n s el

L a tin Am erica and the Ca ri bbe a n

The World Ba n k

Ca rol Wel ch

In tern a ti onal Policy An a lys t

Fri ends of the Eart h
About the Au t h o r

Laurie R. Blank is a program of f i cer in the In s ti tute’s Rule of L aw Progra m , foc u s i n g

on issues rel a ting to tra n s i ti onal ju s ti ce ,i n tern a ti onal hu m a n i t a rian law, and war cri m e s .

She also directs the In tern a ti onal Hu m a n i t a rian Law Working Gro u p.Before joining the

In s ti tute , she was an assoc i a te attorn ey in the liti ga ti on dep a rtm ent of the New York law

f i rm of S h e a rman & Sterl i n g. She is the aut h or of “ Un i ted Na ti ons Sa n cti on s : Cre a ting a

More Effective Tool for the Enforcem ent of In tern a ti onal Law ” in the Au s trian Jou rnal of

Pu blic and In tern a tional Law and “The Laws of War in Shake s pe a re : In tern a ti onal vs . Internal Arm ed Con f l i ct”in the NYU Jou rnal of In tern a tional Law and Pol i ti cs . Blank holds

an M.A. in intern a ti onal rel a ti ons from the Sch ool of Adva n ced In tern a ti onal Studies at

Johns Hopkins Un ivers i ty and a J. D. f rom New York Un ivers i ty Sch ool of L aw, wh ere she

was the Hen ry L. Boudin fell ow for human ri ghts in 1996–98.

4 2
About the Institute

The United States Institute of Peace is an independent, nonpartisan federal institution created byCongress to promote the prevention, management, and peaceful resolution of international conflicts.

Established in 1984, the Institute meets its congressional mandate through an array of programs, including

research grants, fellowships, professional training, education programs from high school through graduate

school, conferences and workshops, library services, and publications. The Institute's Board of Directors is appointed by the President of the United States and confirmed by the Senate.

Chairman of the Board: Chester A. Crocker

Vice Chairman: Seymour Martin Lipset

P r e s i d e n t :Richard H. Solomon

Executive Vice President: Harriet Hentges

Vice President: Charles E. Nelson

Board of Directors

Chester A. Crocker ( C h a i r m a n ) , James R. Schlesinger Professor of Strategic Studies, School of Foreign 

Service, Georgetown University

Seymour Martin Lipset (Vice Chairman), Hazel Professor of Public Policy, George Mason University

Betty F. Bumpers, President, Peace Links, Washington, D.C.

Holly J. Burkhalter, Advocacy Director, Physicians for Human Rights, Washington, D.C.

Marc E. Leland, E s q ., President, Marc E. Leland & Associates, Arlington, Va.

Mora L. McLean, E s q ., President, Africa-America Institute, New York, N.Y.

María Otero, President, ACCION International, Somerville, Mass.

Barbara W. Snelling, State Senator and former Lieutenant Governor, Shelburne, Vt.

Shibley Telhami, Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development, University of Maryland

Harriet Zimmerman, Vice President, American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Washington, D.C.

Members ex-officio

Lorne W. Craner, Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor

Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Paul G. Gaffney II, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy; President, National Defense University

Richard H. Solomon, President, United States Institute of Peace (nonvoting)

4 3
OTHER TITLES IN THE PEACEWORKS SERIES

Controlling Weapons of Mass Destruction: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Projects, edited by Deepa M.

Ollapally (No. 41, September 2001)

Passing the Baton: Challenges of Statecraft for the New Administration, with remarks by Samuel R. Berger

and Condoleezza Rice (No. 40, May 2001)

From Revolutionary Internationalism to Conservative Nationalism: The Chinese Military’s Discourse on

National Security and Identity in the Post-Mao Era, by Nan Li (No. 39, May 2001)

El Salvador: Implementation of the Peace Accords, edited by Margarita S. Studemeister

(No. 38, January 2001)

The News Media and Peace Processes: The Middle East and Northern Ireland, by Gadi Wolfsfeld

(No. 37, January 2001)

Conflict Management Training: Advancing Best Practices, by Robert M. Schoenhaus

(No. 36, January 2001)

Coercive Prevention: Normative, Political, and Policy Dilemmas, by Bruce W. Jentleson

(No. 35, October 2000)

Women in War and Peace: Grassroots Peacebuilding, by Donna Ramsey Marshall (No. 34, August 2000)

Grappling with Peace Education in Serbia, by Ruzica Rozandic (No. 33, April 2000)

Three Dimensions of Peacebuilding in Bosnia: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research and Field Projects,

edited by Steven M. Riskin (No. 32, December 1999)

Building Security in Post–Cold War Eurasia: The OSCE and U.S. Foreign Policy, by P. Terrence

Hopmann (No. 31, September 1999)

New Approaches to International Negotiation and Mediation: Findings from USIP-Sponsored Research,

edited by Timothy D. Sisk (No. 30, August 1999)

Training to Promote Conflict Management: USIP-Assisted Training Projects, edited by David Smock

(No. 29, July 1999)

The Challenge of Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: Preventing Conflict in the Ferghana Valley, b y

Anara Tabyshalieva (No. 28, June 1999)

Territorial Conflicts and Their Resolution: The Case of Ecuador and Peru, by Beth A. Simmons

(No. 27, April 1999)

The Quest for Democratic Security: The Role of the Council of Europe and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Heinrich

Klebes (No. 26, January 1999)

Nagorno-Karabakh: Searching for a Solution, by Patricia Carley (No. 25, December 1998)