RENDERED: JANUARY 21, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2020-CA-1577-MR

JOHN K. CARTER APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM OLDHAM CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE KAREN A. CONRAD, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CI-00495

OLDHAM COUNTY EXTENSION 

DISTRICT; JUDGE EXECUTIVE 

DAVID VOEGELE; OLDHAM 

COUNTY EXTENSION BOARD; 

AND OLDHAM COUNTY, 

KENTUCKY APPELLEES 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CETRULO, LAMBERT, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: John K. Carter appeals from two orders of the Oldham 

Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of appellees Oldham County 

Extension District and Oldham County Extension Board (collectively “the 
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Extension District”); David Voegele, Oldham County Judge Executive (“Judge 

Voegele”); and Oldham County. We affirm.

The underlying facts of this matter were previously summarized, in 

part, by this Court as follows:

In July of 2017, Julie Barr, the Oldham County 

Clerk, received a tax rate sheet from [the Extension 

District] which sought to levy a tax on real property, 

tangible personal property, watercraft, and motor 

vehicles. Prior to this date, [the Extension District] had 

never levied a tax. [The Extension District] had 

previously been funded through the general county taxes 

levied by the fiscal court.

Following the receipt of the tax rate sheet, Barr 

contacted [Carter] and [Judge Voegele]. Barr asked for 

instructions on how to proceed as it was her duty to 

prepare the county tax bills. [Carter] believed that the 

Extension District was not a taxing district and could not 

levy its own taxes. [Judge Voegele] informed Barr that 

he believed the tax was legal and should be included on 

the tax bills. On August 9, 2017, and in response to this 

conflicting information, Barr filed a petition for 

declaration of rights seeking guidance from the circuit 

court. [Carter], in his official capacity, and all Appellees

were named in the action.

On August 11, 2017, [the Extension District] filed 

[its] answer and sought a declaratory judgment in its 

favor. [The Extension District] also sought a writ of 

mandamus compelling Barr to include the new tax on the 

tax bills. On August 29, 2017, [Carter], in his official 

capacity answered the petition. [Carter] also moved to be 

allowed to proceed individually.

On September 15, 2017, the [circuit] court entered 

an order which directed Barr to include the tax on the tax 
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bills. The court found that her job was to only list the 

taxes presented to her on the tax bills. The court further 

found that she had no duty to contest the legality of the 

tax, and that this could only be done by an individual 

taxpayer once the tax has been levied. The court also 

dismissed [Carter], in his official capacity, from the 

action because it held that he was not representing the 

county as an entity. The court believed [Carter] was 

representing dissenting individual taxpayers, which is not 

within the mandate of a county attorney. Finally, the 

court reserved [Carter’s] request to be joined to the action 

in his individual capacity until after the tax bills have 

been issued. The court stated:

Upon issuance of the tax bill by the Sheriff’s 

Department, the Court shall entertain the 

issue of taxpayer challenges to the Extension 

District tax. The Court will then grant Mr. 

Carter’s motion, as an individual taxpayer, 

to intervene, and shall schedule a hearing 

regarding the legality of the tax. The 

declaratory judgment action shall remain on 

the docket.

Once the tax bills were issued, [Carter] filed a 

motion to intervene in his individual capacity as a 

resident and taxpayer of Oldham County. [Carter] again 

sought to challenge the validity of the tax. The Extension 

District objected to the motion. The Extension District

argued that [Carter] had a conflict of interest in the case 

because his interests were adverse to those of his client, 

Oldham County.

On April 2, 2018, the trial court entered an order 

which denied [Carter’s] motion to intervene. The court 

held that [Carter’s] individual interests conflicted with 

those of Oldham County and the Oldham County Fiscal 

Court, and that it would be improper to allow [Carter] to 

proceed due to this conflict of interest.
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Carter v. Oldham County Extension Dist., No. 2018-CA-000655-MR, 2019 WL 

3246490, at *1-2 (Ky. App. Jul. 19, 2019) (footnotes omitted).

This Court affirmed the judgment of the circuit court as to Carter’s 

ability to pursue this action in his official capacity. However, this Court reversed 

and remanded as to Carter’s ability to pursue this action in his individual capacity 

and held that Carter, individually, should be permitted to intervene. On remand, all 

parties filed motions for summary judgment. After extensive briefing and oral 

arguments, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Extension 

District, Judge Voegele, and Oldham County. Carter’s motion for summary 

judgment was denied. This appeal followed.

At the outset, in this appeal, the Extension District requests we strike 

Carter’s brief, or alternatively, review for manifest injustice only. Carter argues 

his appellant brief fully complied with CR1 76.12 both in letter and spirit. As the

proper interpretation of statutes is an issue of law, the Court of Appeals’ review is

generally de novo. Clark County Att’y v. Thompson, 617 S.W.3d 427 (Ky. App. 

2021). However, the Kentucky Supreme Court recently clarified what options are 

available when appellate counsel fails to follow the mandates of CR 76.12, 

pointing out that the review of unpreserved claims of error on direct appeal shall be 

 

1 Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure.
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only for palpable error. Ford v. Commonwealth, 628 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Ky. 2021). 

To prevail, one must show that the error resulted in “manifest injustice.” Id.

We have elected to review this matter de novo, although our result 

would be the same if we considered it only for manifest injustice. We find that the 

briefs and the record provide sufficient basis for this Court to address the merits of 

the claim asserted herein, which is essentially a dispute over the proper application 

of a statute that is no longer the law. 

We begin our review by noting Carter does not dispute that the 

Extension District is a special purpose government entity (“SPGE”), defined in 

KRS2 65A.010(9) as

(a) “Special purpose governmental entity” or “entity” 

means any agency, authority, or entity created or 

authorized by statute which:

1. Exercises less than statewide jurisdiction;

2. Exists for the purpose of providing one 

(1) or a limited number of services or 

functions;

3. Is governed by a board, council, 

commission, committee, authority, or 

corporation with policy-making authority 

that is separate from the state and the 

governing body of the city, county, or cities 

and counties in which it operates; and

 

2 Kentucky Revised Statute.
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4. a. Has the independent authority to 

generate public funds; or

b. May receive and expend public 

funds, grants, awards, or appropriations 

from the state, from any agency, or 

authority of the state, from a city or 

county, or from any other special 

purpose governmental entity.

The statute goes on to list agricultural extension services as an 

example of a SPGE. KRS 65A.010(9)(c)15. 

In granting summary judgment in favor of the Extension District, the 

circuit court looked to KRS 65A.100. Although repealed effective January 1, 

2021, the statute was in effect at the time the Extension District levied the tax in 

2017, and provided, in relevant part,

(1) Beginning January 1, 2014, the provisions of this 

section shall apply to any fee or ad valorem tax levied by 

a [SPGE] that is otherwise not required by statute or 

ordinance to be adopted or approved through an official 

act of an establishing entity.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (4) of this section, 

any [SPGE] that:

(a) 1. Adopts a new fee or ad valorem tax;

 2. Increases the rate at which an existing 

fee or tax, other than an ad valorem tax, is 

imposed; or

 3. Adopts an ad valorem tax rate; shall 

report the fee or tax to the governing body 

of the establishing entity in which the largest 
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number of citizens served by the [SPGE] 

reside. If the [SPGE] serves only the 

residents of a city, the notice shall be 

provided to the governing body of that city.

(b) The report required by paragraph (a) of 

this subsection shall be for informational 

purposes only, and the governing body shall 

not have the authority to adjust, amend, or 

veto the fee or tax, provided that any other 

provision of the [KRS] that provides greater 

authority for the governing body of a city or 

county over taxes, fees, or rates imposed by 

a [SPGE] shall continue to apply to those 

taxes, fees, or rates.

The circuit court concluded that neither KRS 65A.100 nor any other 

statute required the Extension District to obtain approval from the Oldham County 

Fiscal Court prior to levying the ad valorem tax. The circuit court also concluded 

the Extension District fully complied with the mandates of KRS 65A.100 and the 

tax was legally authorized by the statute. As noted by the circuit court, KRS 

65A.100 was repealed and replaced by KRS 65A.110 on January 1, 2021. The 

new statute instructs the establishing body of a SPGE (here, the Oldham County 

Fiscal Court) to approve or disapprove the proposed tax, which, moving forward,

conforms to Carter’s position in the instant action.

The circuit court rejected Carter’s argument that KRS 67.083(3)(q)

“provides greater authority for the governing body of a city or county over taxes, 
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fees, or rates imposed by a [SPGE]” pursuant to KRS 65A.100(2)(b).

3

 We agree. 

Nothing in KRS 67.083 requires the tax levied by the Extension District to be 

adopted or approved through the Oldham County Fiscal Court. It provides only 

that the fiscal court may levy taxes in performance of certain public functions. 

KRS 67.083(3).

Secondly, the circuit court also rejected Carter’s reliance on an 

opinion from the Trigg Circuit Court entered August 25, 1989, which found that an 

extension district was not authorized to levy a tax. An opinion from a circuit court

generally has little to no precedential value. Bell v. Commonwealth, Cabinet for

Health and Family Services, Dep’t for Cmty. Based Services, 423 S.W.3d 742, 751 

(Ky. 2014). Moreover, the Trigg Circuit Court’s decision was entered 

 

3 The applicable portion of KRS 67.083 argued by Carter reads:

(3) The fiscal court shall have the power to carry out governmental 

functions necessary for the operation of the county. Except as 

otherwise provided by statute or the Kentucky Constitution, the 

fiscal court of any county may enact ordinances, issue regulations, 

levy taxes, issue bonds, appropriate funds, and employ personnel 

in performance of the following public functions:

. . . 

(q) Cooperation with other units of government and 

private agencies for the provision of public services, 

including, but not limited to, training, educational 

services, and cooperative extension service 

programs[.]

(Emphasis added.)
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approximately twenty-four years before the Kentucky legislature created KRS 

Chapter 65A. The Oldham Circuit Court’s rejection of an opinion from another 

circuit court was not in error. 

In contrast, the circuit court did rely on an opinion of the Kentucky 

Attorney General, Cecil Watkins, OAG 18-005, 2018 WL 1028898 (Ky. OAG Feb. 

15, 2018). Although the Attorney General’s opinion did not examine KRS 

65A.100, it nevertheless reasoned that KRS Chapter 164 also authorized a 

cooperative extension service district to levy a tax without approval from a fiscal 

court. “This Court may give great weight to the reasoning and opinion expressed 

in Attorney General’s opinions.” Woodward, Hobson & Fulton, L.L.P. v. Revenue

Cabinet, 69 S.W.3d 476, 480 (Ky. App. 2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in looking to the 

opinion of the Attorney General for guidance.

For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the Oldham Circuit Court.

ALL CONCUR.
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BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Lee E. Sitlinger

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES OLDHAM 

COUNTY EXTENSION DISTRICT 

AND OLDHAM COUNTY 

EXTENSION BOARD:

Jon Salomon

Kristin E. McCall

Louisville, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES OLDHAM 

COUNTY FISCAL COURT AND 

JUDGE EXECUTIVE DAVID 

VOEGELE:

Carol S. Petitt

Adam E. Fuller

Pewee Valley, Kentucky