UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA J. CRAWFORD, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration,  Defendant-Appellee. No. 12-5125 (D.C. No. 4:11-CV-00233-TLW) (N.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT 

Before BRISCOE , Chief Judge, McKAY and O’BRIEN , Circuit Judges.

Melissa J. Crawford a ppeals from a district c ourt order affirming the Commissioner’s denial of disability insu rance benefits (DIB) and supplemental

 In accordance with Rule 43( c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for Michae l J. Astrue as the defendant-appellee in this action.

 After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### March 25, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court- 2 - security income payments ( SSIP). We have jurisdicti on under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
B ACKGROUND Crawford suffers from bipolar disorder. She has a high-school education and past-work experience as a cust omer-service representative. In January 2009, she began seeing Dr. Pe ter Rao for treatment. He prescribed various anti-depressant medications and recommended follow-up visits. In February 2009, at age 40, she app lied for DIB and SSIP. She was examined by Dr. Minor Gordon, who found her bipolar disorder “to be in marginal to fair remission,” and he gave he r a Global Assessment of F unctioning (GAF) score of 65. 1 Aplt. App. at 177. In April 2009, a state-agency medical consultant, Dr. Deborah Hartley, reviewed Crawford’s record s and opined that she was moderately limited in her daily-living activities, he r social functioning, and her abilities to maintain concentration, persistence, or pace. Additionally, Dr. Hartley found marked

1 “The GAF is a 100–point scale divi ded into ten numerical ranges, which permits clinicians to assign a single ranged score to a pers on's psychological, social, and occupational functioning.” Keyes–Zachary v. Astrue , 695 F.3d 1156, 1162 n.1 (10th Cir. 2012). A GAF score of 65 i ndicates “[s]ome mild symptoms (e.g., depressed mood and mild insomn ia), OR some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning (e.g., occasional truancy, or theft within the household), but generally functioning pretty well, has some meaningful interpersonal relationships.” Id. (quotation omitted).- 3 - limitations in her abil ities to understand and remember detailed instructions, to carry out detailed instructions, and to interact appropriately with the general public. 2 In July 2009, Dr. Rao completed a Mental Status form for Crawford, describing her prognosis as fa ir and concluding that she could “not now” respond to work pressure, supervis ion, and co-workers. Id. at 203. Dr. Rao c ontinued to see her on a monthly basis, monitoring her symptoms and prescribing medi cation. During an April 2010 visit, he noted she had been cutting or burning her arm. The following month, he completed a mental Medical Source Statement (MSS) form, checking boxes for moderate or marked limitations in thirteen of the form’s twenty categories. 3 Crawford appeared before an admini strative law judge (A LJ) in May 2010 and testified that “one of the bigger problem s” she faces is “d ealing with people,” id. at 34, and consequently, she doe s not “leave [her] house unless [she] usually [has] to,” id. at 34-35. She also testified to havi ng been cutting and burni ng herself for “about a year,” and Dr. Rao “will work with [her] on it.” Id. at 38.

2 A second medical consulta nt, Dr. Paul Cherry, concurred in Dr. Hartley’s assessments.
3 Dr. Rao identified seven marked lim itations: understanding and remembering detailed instructions; workin g in coordination with or pr oximity to others without being distracted; completing a normal work day and performing at a consistent pace; interacting appropriately with the gene ral public; accepting instructions and responding appropriately to criticism; ge tting along with coworkers; and setting realistic goals or making plans independently of others. In regard to moderate limitations, Dr. Rao checked six boxes: carrying out detailed instructions; maintaining attention and concentration for extended periods; performing activities within a schedule; sustaining an unsupervi sed routine; responding appropriately to work-setting changes; and traveling in unfam iliar places or usi ng public transit.- 4 - According to a vocational expert (VE), an individual with Crawford’s age, education, and work experi ence who was limited to simp le, repetitive tasks and only “incidental contact with the public” could not perform Crawford’s past work as a customer-service re presentative. Id. at 40. But, the VE said, such an individual could work as a dishwasher or a bench assembler. The ALJ determined that Crawford wa s not disabled given the existence of other jobs in the economy she could perform . In doing so, the ALJ found Crawford’s bipolar disorder was capable of causing th e symptoms she alleged, but not to the degree she claimed. Additiona lly, the ALJ declined to give controlling weight to Dr. Rao’s opinion of moderate to marked limitations in most areas of mental functioning because Dr. Rao’ s opinion conflicted with hi s own treatment records and was inconsistent with th e other record evidence. Crawford challenged the denial of benefi ts in district cour t. A magistrate judge affirmed, prompting this appeal.
D ISCUSSION I. Standards of Review In reviewing the ALJ’s decision, “we neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs. , 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Ci r. 1991). Instead, we re view the ALJ’s decision only “to determine whether th e factual findings are suppor ted by substantial evidence in the record and whethe r the correct legal sta ndards were applied.” Doyal v.- 5 - Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003). Substantial evidence is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Lax v. Astrue , 489 F.3d 1080, 1084 (10th Cir. 2007). It is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. (quotation omitted). A decision is not based on substantial evidence “if it is overwhelmed by other ev idence in the record.” Wall v. Astrue , 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Ci r. 2009) (quotation omitted). II. Treating-Physician Rule Crawford argues that the ALJ erred by not giving Dr. Rao’s opinions on the MSS form controlling weight. A treati ng physician’s opinion must be given controlling weight if it “is supported by medically acceptab le clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques a nd is not inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record.” Hamlin v. Barnhart , 365 F.3d 1208, 1215 (10th Cir. 2004). “[I]f the [ALJ’s] opinion is deficient in either of these respects, then it is not entitled to controlling weight.” Watkins v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003). Here, the ALJ found Dr. Rao’s opinions not to be entitled to controlling weight because they conflicted with his treatment records and were inconsistent with other record evidence. As to Dr. Rao’s treatm ent records, we agr ee: they are largely devoid of observations or c onclusions tending to support the thirteen moderate and marked limitations he identified on the MSS form. But the ALJ co mpletely failed to address the significance of Crawford’s sel f-injury. Indeed, the ALJ erroneously- 6 - found “[t]here is no menti on of [Crawford] cutting hers elf or burning herself in Dr. Rao’s treatment record s.” Aplt. App. at 15. Further, to the extent the ALJ found Dr. Rao’s opinions inconsistent with the other record evidence, the ALJ failed to identify those inconsistencies with any clarity. Rather, the ALJ simply referred to an earlier discussi on in his decision, which mostly recounted the content of Dr. Rao’s treatment records. We cannot determine whether substantia l evidence supports the ALJ’s decision not to give Dr. Rao’s MSS opinions controlling weight. Next, Crawford argues the ALJ erred by not specifying the weight he actually gave Dr. Rao’s MSS opinions. When a treating physician’s opi nion is not given controlling weight the ALJ must explain what weight, if any, was assigned to the opinion “using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F. R. §§ 404.1527 and 416.927.” 4
Watkins , 350 F.3d at 1300. Specifically, “t he ALJ must give good reasons in the notice of determination or decision for the weight he ultimately assigns the opinion,”

4 The six factors are: (1) the length of the treatment re lationship and the frequency of examination; (2) the nature and exte nt of the treatment relationship, including the treatment provided and th e kind of examination or testing performed; (3) the degree to which th e physician’s opinion is supported by relevant evidence; (4) consis tency between the opinion and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6) other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to s upport or contradict the opinion. Watkins , 350 F.3d at 1301 (quotation omitted).- 7 - and if he “rejects the opini on completely, he must then give specific, legitimate reasons for doing so.” Id. at 1301 (brackets a nd quotation omitted). The Commissioner concedes the ALJ did “not explic itly state the specific weight [he] [gave] to Dr. Ra o’s opinion.” Aple. Br. at 24. But, in summary fashion, she assures us that we can nevertheless conduct a meani ngful review of the ALJ’s decision to ascertain that we ight and determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence. But the ALJ’s decision contains no explicit discussion of the six factors, and the Commissioner does not attempt to identify any implicit discussion of those factors. And if we were to somehow c onclude that the ALJ gave absolutely no weight to Dr. Rao’s opinions, the ALJ has provided no “specific, legitimate reason” that could explain a complete rejection of those opinions. We conclude that a remand is neces sary because we cannot meaningfully review the ALJ’s decision re garding Dr. Rao’s opinions. III. Credibility Crawford argues the ALJ erred in findi ng her not entirely credible. To the extent the ALJ made this determinati on by rejecting her h earing testimony about self-injury on the mistaken view she did not report that behavior to Dr. Rao, the ALJ erred. See Raymond v. Astrue , 621 F.3d 1269, 1273 (10th Ci r. 2009) (observing that “findings as to credibility should be clos ely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence” (quotation omitted)). On remand, the Commissione r must revisit the issue- 8 - of credibility because Crawford’s test imony about cutting and burning herself is reflected in Dr. Rao’s treatment notes. C ONCLUSION We reverse the judgment of the district court, and we remand this case to the district court with instructions to remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment. Entered for the Court

Terrence L. O’Brien Circuit Judge