NRC NEWS

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Office of Public Affairs Telephone: 301/415-8200

Washington, DC 20555-001 E-mail: opa@nrc.gov

 

 

 No. 96-49 FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

 (Friday, March 8, 1996)

 

 

 NOTE TO EDITORS: 

 

 

 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission staff has issued two

 letters to Northeast Utilities (NU) requesting certain

 information, under oath or affirmation, regarding operation

 of the Millstone 2 & 3 and Haddam Neck nuclear power plants

 in Connecticut. 

 

 Millstone 2 is required to submit to the NRC, seven days

 before restarting from its current refueling outage, actions

 it has taken to asssure future operation will be conducted in

 compliance with its operating license, NRC regulations and

 final safety analysis report for the plant.

 

 Millstone 3 and Haddam Neck, both of which are currently

 in operation, are required to provide the NRC similar

 information and assurance within 30 days of the date of

 receipt of the letters.

 

 The NRC is taking this action after reviewing an

 internal NU document that found inaccuracies in Millstone 1's

 final safety analysis report. Millstone 1 is currently shut

 down.

 

 #

 

 Attachments:

 As stated

 . March 7, 1996

 

 

 Mr. Robert E. Busch

 President - Energy Resources Group

 Northeast Utilities Service Company

 P.O. Box 128

 Waterford, CT 06385

 

 Dear Mr. Busch:

 

 On December 13, 1995, the NRC issued to Northeast Utilities

 (NU) a letter requesting NU pursuant to Section 182a of the

 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f) to

 "describe actions taken to ensure that future operation of

 Millstone Unit 1 will be conducted in accordance with the

 terms and conditions of the Millstone Unit 1 operating

 license, the Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR

 50.59, and the Millstone Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis

 Report (UFSAR)." Since that time NRC has continued to

 conduct inspections and investigations at the Millstone
 Station to determine the state of compliance of NU nuclear

 facilities with NRC requirements. As part of these efforts,

 NRC has obtained a copy of an internal NU document, "ACR 7007

 - Event Response Team Report" (7007 Report), dated February

 22, 1996.

 

 The Executive Summary of the 7007 Report states that an Event

 Response Team was chartered to determine the causes for the

 inaccuracies in the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR. The fundamental

 causes for these inaccuracies were found by this Team to

 include:

 

 - The original 1986/1987 UFSAR contained errors and

 omissions;

 

 - Administrative control programs such as Design Control,

 Corrective Action, and Commitment Tracking did not fully

 address regulatory requirements;

 

 - NU did not fully implement the administrative programs. 

 NU did not see the UFSAR as a document that was required

 to be accurate;

 

 - Internal correspondence and events involving the design

 basis from 1985 through 1996 show a pattern of

 information communicated to NU management. This

 information consistently identified weaknesses and risks

 associated with the UFSAR and design bases. NU

 management made commitments, on the docket, to correct

 these deficiencies. The commitments to correct these

 deficiencies were ineffective, partially implemented, or

 not done;

 - NU oversight did not identify this event pattern to

 management, its significance, or the effectiveness of

 corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

 

 The 7007 Report further states that, due to the nature of the

 causes that the Team has identified, the potential exists for

 the presence of similar configuration management conditions

 at Millstone Unit 2. It notes that without a sample similar

 to the initiatives currently in progress for Millstone Unit 1

 as a result of the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter of December 13,

 1995, the full implications for Millstone Unit 2 cannot be

 ascertained. The 7007 Report recognizes that those efforts

 may be underway. This Report also addresses Millstone Unit 3

 and Haddam Neck which we are addressing by separate letter. 

 

 Current licensee reviews and NRC inspections of Millstone

 Unit 2 have identified a number of operability and design

 concerns. Millstone Unit 2 shutdown on February 20, 1996,

 when a potential design deficiency was identified that could

 block or reduce safety injection flow during the

 recirculation phase of an accident. During this shutdown,

 other design discrepancies were identified in which NU had

 not maintained the current design or licensing basis for

 Millstone Unit 2. For example, NU's inspection of the

 containment sump screen mesh revealed that debris larger than

 the design value could pass through with potential adverse

 consequences to the emergency core cooling systems. NU

 identified that the flood protection enclosure could not be

 installed on one of the service water pumps that has been

 relied on for ultimate heat sink operability. Further, the

 NRC identified that the post-accident containment hydrogen

 monitor design was flawed in that insufficient sample flow
 would be available at low containment pressures when the

 monitor must be operable.

 

 Consequently, there is a question as to whether Millstone

 Unit 2 conforms to the UFSAR, license conditions, and

 Commission regulations. Therefore, the NRC requires

 additional information to be submitted pursuant to Section

 182a of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR

 50.54(f) in writing, under oath or affirmation, to determine

 whether or not the license for Millstone Unit 2 should be

 suspended, modified, or revoked. The information is to be

 submitted no later than 7 days prior to Millstone Unit 2

 restart (prior to criticality) from its current outage and is

 to describe actions taken to ensure that future operation of

 Millstone Unit 2 will be conducted in accordance with the

 terms and conditions of the Millstone Unit 2 operating

 license, the Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR

 50.59, and the Millstone Unit 2 UFSAR.

 The submittal should describe actions taken to assure that

 deficiencies identified at Millstone Unit 2 based on your

 ongoing review have been evaluated for operability, existence

 of unreviewed safety questions, and reportabilty. In

 particular, seriously degraded conditions must be reported

 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

 

 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of

 Practice," a copy of this letter and your responses will be

 placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) the Gelman

 Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and in the

 local public document room located at the Learning Resources

 Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New

 London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360. The NRC also intends to

 place in the PDR a copy of the 7007 Report on March 15, 1996,

 unless you provide a sufficient basis to withhold this Report 

 by March 12, 1996. Any request for withholding must be

 accompanied by a bracketed copy of the Report that identifies

 the information that you seek 

 

 to have protected and a redacted copy that deletes such

 information. You must provide for each portion of the

 document you seek to be withheld the bases for your claim of

 withholding. 

 

 Sincerely,

 

 /s/

 

 William T. Russell, Director

 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

 

 Docket No. 50-336

 

 cc: See next page

 

 

 March 7, 1996

 

 

 Mr. Robert E. Busch

 President - Energy Resources Group

 Northeast Utilities Service Company

 P.O. Box 128
 Waterford, CT 06385

 

 Dear Mr. Busch:

 

 On December 13, 1995, the NRC issued to Northeast Utilities

 (NU) a letter requesting NU pursuant to Section 182a of the

 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f) to

 "describe actions taken to ensure that future operation of

 Millstone Unit 1 will be conducted in accordance with the

 terms and conditions of the Millstone Unit 1 operating

 license, the Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR

 50.59, and the Millstone Unit 1 Updated Final Safety Analysis

 Report (UFSAR)." Since that time NRC has continued to

 conduct inspections and investigations at the Millstone

 Station to determine the state of compliance of NU nuclear

 facilities with NRC requirements. As part of these efforts,

 NRC has obtained a copy of an internal NU document, "ACR 7007

 - Event Response Team Report" (7007 Report), dated February

 22, 1996.

 

 The Executive Summary of the 7007 Report states that an Event

 Response Team was chartered to determine the causes for the

 inaccuracies in the Millstone Unit 1 UFSAR. The fundamental

 causes for these inaccuracies were found by this Team to

 include:

 

 - The original 1986/1987 UFSAR contained errors and

 omissions;

 

 - Administrative control programs such as Design Control,

 Corrective Action, and Commitment Tracking did not fully

 address regulatory requirements;

 

 - NU did not fully implement the administrative programs. 

 NU did not see the UFSAR as a document that was required

 to be accurate;

 

 - Internal correspondence and events involving the design

 basis from 1985 through 1996 show a pattern of

 information communicated to NU management. This

 information consistently identified weaknesses and risks

 associated with the UFSAR and design bases. NU

 management made commitments, on the docket, to correct

 these deficiencies. The commitments to correct these

 deficiencies were ineffective, partially implemented, or

 not done;

 

 - NU oversight did not identify this event pattern to

 management, its significance, or the effectiveness of

 corrective actions to prevent recurrence.

 

 The 7007 Report further states that due to the nature of the

 causes that the Team has identified, the potential exists for

 the presence of similar configuration management conditions

 at the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Unit 3. It notes that

 without a sample similar to the initiatives (as a result of

 the 10 CFR 50.54(f) letter of December 13, 1995) currently in

 progress for Unit 1, the full implications for the Haddam

 Neck Plant and Millstone Unit 3 cannot be ascertained. The

 7007 Report recognizes that those efforts may be underway. 

 This Report also addresses Millstone Unit 2 which we are

 addressing by separate letter. 

 

 NRC does not have an inspection history at Millstone Unit 3
 and Haddam Neck that reveals design deficiencies similar in

 number and nature to that of Millstone Units 1 and 2. 

 Nevertheless in view of the 7007 Report, the NRC requires

 additional information to be submitted in writing, under oath

 or affirmation, pursuant to Section 182a of the Atomic Energy

 Act of 1954, as amended, and 10 CFR 50.54(f) to determine

 whether or not the licenses of the Millstone Unit 3 and

 Haddam Neck Plant should be suspended, modified, or revoked. 

 The information required is as follows:

 

 Millstone Unit 3

 

 Within 30 days from the date of this letter, provide

 your actions taken to date and future plans to address

 the conclusions of the 7007 Report as it pertains to

 Millstone Unit 3. This should include your plans and

 schedule to ensure that future operation of Millstone

 Unit 3 will be conducted in accordance with the terms

 and conditions of the Millstone Unit 3 operating

 license, the Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR

 50.59, and the Millstone Unit 3 UFSAR.

 

 Haddam Neck Plant

 

 Within 30 days from the date of this letter, provide

 your actions taken to date and future plans to address

 the conclusions of the 7007 Report as it pertains to

 Haddam Neck. This should include your plans and

 schedule to ensure that future operation of Haddam Neck

 will be conducted in accordance with the terms and

 conditions of the Haddam Neck operating license, the

 Commission's regulations, including 10 CFR 50.59, and

 the Haddam Neck UFSAR.

 

 Each submittal should describe actions taken to assure that

 deficiencies identified at the respective facilities based on

 your ongoing reviews have been evaluated for operability,

 existence of unreviewed safety questions, and reportabilty

 pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i) and 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

 

 In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of

 Practice," a copy of this letter and your responses will be

 placed in the NRC Public Document Room (PDR) the Gelman

 Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC, and in the

 local public document room located at the Learning Resources

 Center, Three Rivers Community-Technical College, 574 New

 London Turnpike, Norwich, CT 06360. The NRC also intends to

 place in the PDR a copy of the 7007 Report by March 15, 1996,

 unless you provide a sufficient basis to withhold this Report

 by March 12, 1996. Any request for withholding must be

 accompanied by a bracketed copy of the Report that identifies

 the information that you seek to have protected and a

 redacted copy that deletes such information. You must

 provide for each portion of the document you seek to be

 withheld the bases for your claim of withholding.

 

 Sincerely,

 

 /s/

 

 William T. Russell, Director

 Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

 Docket Nos. 50-213 and 50-423

 

 cc: See next page