U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

i 

30–561 2019

[H.A.S.C. No. 115–91] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2019 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS HEARING 

ON

NAVY READINESS POSTURE 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 20, 2018 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina, Chairman 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona, Vice Chair 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

TRENT KELLY, Mississippi 

MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

A. DONALD MCEACHIN, Virginia 

SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California 

ANTHONY G. BROWN, Maryland 

STEPHANIE N. MURPHY, Florida 

RO KHANNA, California 

MARGARET DEAN, Professional Staff Member 

BRIAN GARRETT, Professional Staff Member 

MEGAN HANDAL, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 2 

Wilson, Hon. Joe, a Representative from South Carolina, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ............................................................................................. 1 

WITNESSES 

Lescher, VADM William K., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources, Headquarters, U.S. Navy ......................... 3 

Lewis, VADM Andrew L., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy, Headquarters, U.S. Navy ...................................... 5 

McCollum, VADM Luke M., USN, Chief of Navy Reserve, Commander, Navy 

Reserve Force, Headquarters, U.S. Navy ........................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

McCollum, VADM Luke M., joint with VADM William K. Lescher and 

VADM Andrew L. Lewis ............................................................................... 22 

Wilson, Hon. Joe ............................................................................................... 21 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Brown ......................................................................................................... 40 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 39 

(1) 

NAVY READINESS POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 20, 2018. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:41 p.m., in Room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Joe Wilson (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOE WILSON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM SOUTH CAROLINA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. WILSON. Good afternoon. The Readiness Subcommittee of the 

House Armed Services Committee will come to order. I welcome 

each of you to this hearing on the posture of the U.S. Navy. 

Today, the subcommittee will hear from the Chief of the Navy 

Reserve, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Integration of 

Capabilities and Resources, and the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy on how well the Navy is 

postured to meet the needs of this Nation, both today and in the 

future. 

Over the past 6 months, this subcommittee has held a series of 

hearings to examine shortfalls, gaps, and critical challenges facing 

the Navy’s readiness recovery. In November, Vice Admiral Shoemaker described the ongoing challenges to naval aviation. In December, Vice Admiral Lewis described the shortfalls in amphibious 

warfare. And through a series of hearings and briefings, the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations, and Vice Chief of 

Naval Operations helped this subcommittee understand the underlying factors that led to the tragedies aboard the USS Fitzgerald 

and the USS John S. McCain. 

Today, the Readiness Subcommittee meets to hear how this 

year’s President’s budget [PB] intends to address remaining readiness gaps. This subcommittee will have a separate future opportunity to discuss the progress of the recommendation from the 

Navy’s Strategic Readiness Review and Comprehensive Review recommendations. 

Across the surface, expeditionary, and aviation forces, the Navy 

continues to struggle to maintain the material readiness necessary 

to train and fight. Limited spare parts, backlog in depots, and insufficient manning both afloat and ashore impede the Navy’s ability to train to meet the demands of a major conflict. We welcome 

the witnesses’ perspective on these issues and any recommendations you may have. 
2 

Before I introduce the witnesses, I am grateful to turn to the distinguished ranking member of the Readiness Subcommittee, the 

gentlelady from the territory of Guam, Congresswoman Madeleine 

Bordallo, for her opening statements. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wilson can be found in the Appendix on page 21.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to our witnesses for being here today. 

Last year was a very challenging year for the Navy. And I am 

hopeful that 2018 will be much better in terms of improving your 

readiness posture. While we will have an opportunity at a future 

hearing to discuss the status of implementing the recommendations 

from the Navy’s Strategic Readiness Review and Comprehensive 

Review, today the Readiness Subcommittee is meeting to hear details of the Navy’s fiscal year 2019 budget request. 

So I look forward to hearing from you on the current readiness 

of the Navy’s Active and Reserve Components, the threat and operational challenges that you face, your plans for addressing these 

challenges, and what this subcommittee can do to support your efforts. 

At the conclusion of this hearing, I hope to better understand 

how the fiscal year 2019 budget request will improve the Navy’s 

readiness, how you are prioritizing the modernization and the 

maintenance needs of the fleet. And as we begin to review the budget request, I am concerned about whether this budget appropriately balances near-term readiness recovery through investments in 

the operation and maintenance accounts with long-term readiness 

through procurement and modernization. 

In terms of operation and maintenance spending, I note that the 

fiscal year 2019 request reflects only a 1.5 percent increase over 

the fiscal year 2018 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] 

levels, while seeking a significantly larger increase in procurement 

accounts. Specifically, I note that the budget materials reflect the 

fact that the request would only resource 92 percent of the ship 

and aircraft depot maintenance requirements at funding levels 

below what was authorized in the fiscal year 2018 NDAA. 

Gentlemen, we have heard about the readiness challenges the 

Navy is facing through various committee hearings and briefings. 

We have heard about the negative impact of continuing resolutions, 

as well as the shortfalls that exist in spare parts, reduced training 

hours, and critical personnel shortages. In light of the budget deal 

that was reached earlier this year, I am concerned that the fiscal 

year 2019 budget request fails to properly resource the accounts 

that help address these shortfalls and enable near-term readiness 

recovery. 

This committee wants to support your efforts to rebuild readiness 

and recovery from the budget uncertainty caused by sequestration 

and continuing resolutions. And we hope that today’s hearing helps 

provide more details on the Navy’s near-term and long-term readi-
3 

ness recovery plans as we begin our work on the fiscal year 2019 

NDAA. 

So, again, welcome, gentlemen, and I look forward to your testimony. Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman Bordallo. I am pleased 

to recognize our witnesses today. I want to thank them for taking 

the time to be with us. We have Vice Admiral Luke M. McCollum, 

Chief of Navy Reserve, Commander, Navy Reserve Force. And we 

are really grateful that your wife could join us today. And indeed, 

we all appreciate military families and the joint opportunities and 

sacrifices that military families have. So thank you for being with 

us today. 

We have Vice Admiral William ‘‘Bill’’ K. Lescher, the Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations, Integration of Capabilities and Resources, and Vice Admiral Andrew L. ‘‘Woody’’ Lewis, the Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations for Operations, Plans and Strategy. 

Before we begin, I would like to remind our witnesses that your 

full written statements will be submitted for the record. We will 

ask that you summarize your comments to 5 minutes or less. And 

Vice Admiral Lescher, we will begin with you and look forward to 

your opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM K. LESCHER, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, INTEGRATION OF CAPABILITIES AND RESOURCES, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral LESCHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and 

Ranking Member Bordallo, distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to join you today 

to talk about this critical issue of Navy readiness. 

As we start today, I do want to add our deepest condolences to 

the families and loved ones of the two outstanding naval aviators 

that we lost last week from the Blacklions of VFA–213 [Strike 

Fighter Squadron 213]. Their loss is a reminder of the tremendous 

sacrifices our men and women in uniform make in service to the 

Nation. They and their families are in our thoughts and prayers as 

we do business today. 

Today we look forward to discussing with you the critically important topic of Navy readiness. And I want to start by thanking 

the subcommittee for your leadership in enacting the 2017 request 

for additional appropriations, which addressed key readiness needs 

last year. We are also appreciative of the legislation approving 

2018 and 2019 defense funding levels that when enacted will do so 

much to accelerate readiness recovery and strengthen our path to 

increase naval power. 

This 2019 budget request strongly aligns with the new National 

Defense Strategy, which highlights a return to great power competition and directs increased naval power and response. This 

budget also strongly aligns with the Secretary of Defense’s threephase budget campaign plan, which we have talked about in prior 

years’ testimony, as well. That plan, as you recall, prioritized improving warfighting and readiness in 2017, addressing pressing 

shortfalls in the 2018 budget request, while continuing to rebuild 

readiness, and growing capacity and improving lethality in 2019. 
4 

As this subcommittee knows very well, our current readiness 

debt has accrued over a decade and a half of wartime operational 

tempo, Budget Control Act fiscal constraints, and 9 consecutive 

years of continuing resolutions, and we all understand it is going 

to take time, resources, and budget stability to recover that readiness. 

Today, our routinely deployed and next to deploy forces remain 

operationally ready to respond to any challenge, and we are working very hard to restore our ability to fully surge forces in a crisis. 

This work requires enactment of a fiscal year 2018 budget now, 6 

months into the fiscal year. Each additional delay in enacting this 

2018 budget postpones our readiness recovery. 

The 2019 budget will build on that enacted 2018 funding to improve the operational availability of today’s ships and aircraft and 

to modernize them with the advanced capabilities that are key to 

countering the threat. The 2019 budget funds our four major readiness accounts to 100 percent of the requirement or their maximum 

executable levels, which I would be very happy to discuss in further 

testimony as we talk further today. That is the ship operations account, the flying hours account, and the aviation and ship depot 

maintenance accounts. 

This budget also increases funding for the readiness and enabling account, such as aviation logistics, depot support, and spares. 

A key surge capacity enabler in this budget is the funding to increase maintenance throughput in our shipyards and our depots, 

by continuing to hire and train new workers, recapitalize equipment, modernize information technology infrastructure, and better 

balance work between public and private shipyards. And while 

funding for our facility sustainment, restoration, and modernization [FSRM] account is still below that required to reduce the backlog, we were able to increase investment in FSRM this year and 

doubled the military construction budget from 2018 to fund key 

projects and increased lethality and restore warfighting readiness. 

Collectively, these investments are focused on driving readiness 

outputs, moving the readiness needle. The Navy is laser-focused on 

executing this funding responsibly, closely scrutinizing the spending while driving performance to plan. We are fully embracing the 

department-wide audit, so we can say with confidence to the American taxpayer that their hard-earned money is being spent as carefully as if it were their own. So I very much appreciate this subcommittee’s role, the leadership role in sustaining focus on this 

readiness recovery imperative, and we look forward to working together with the committee to build an increasingly ready and lethal 

Navy for our enemies, supportive Navy for our allies, and a safe 

Navy for our sailors. Thank you, sir. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Lescher, Admiral 

Lewis, and Admiral McCollum can be found in the Appendix on 

page 22.] 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Vice Admiral Lescher. We 

now proceed to Vice Admiral Lewis. 
5 

STATEMENT OF VADM ANDREW L. LEWIS, USN, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS FOR OPERATIONS, PLANS AND 

STRATEGY, HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral LEWIS. Chairman Wilson, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify today on the operational aspects 

of Navy readiness. 

To start, I join with my colleague in thanking you for your efforts 

to pass a fiscal year 2018 appropriation and the support you provided in the fiscal year 2017 request for additional appropriations. 

These resources directly support the operational readiness of the 

fleet that you and the Nation expect. 

The Navy generates readiness in order to deploy forces across the 

globe in support of the National Security Strategy and the National 

Defense Strategy. For the large majority of our forces, this means 

executing specified maintenance and training regimens in the 

United States prior to earning a certification to deploy at the Secretary of Defense’s direction in support of the National Defense 

Strategy. When not deployed, Navy forces maintain a surge readiness to respond to contingencies. 

Taking place within a 36-month cycle, this force generation 

model provides predictability and stability for sailors and their 

families, the maintenance community and industry, and also allows 

ships and squadrons to focus on building readiness without undue 

operational requirements. It also provides transparency to the 

Joint Staff and the combatant commanders on the number of forces 

the Navy can provide to the joint force on a sustainable basis. It 

has been very successful in meeting those objectives. 

A small segment of our forces, specifically the forward deployed 

naval forces, homeported in Japan, Spain, and Bahrain, have used 

a different force generation model. Intended to maximize the operational availability and crisis response capability of these forward 

deployed forces, this model used a continuous certification concept 

which relied upon the periodic completion of unit-level training 

events to maintain proficiency and readiness across all mission 

areas. 

In the aftermath of the tragic USS Fitzgerald and USS John 

McCain collisions, however, it became clear that due to operational 

pressures the Navy in the Western Pacific was sacrificing training 

opportunities for forward deployed naval force ships in favor of 

meeting operational tasking. The excessive use of waivers and mitigation plans to maintain certifications, combined with the obvious 

operational inadequacies demonstrated by the collisions and other 

incidents clearly showed that Japan-based ships were not meeting 

our readiness expectations. 

The Navy is taking decisive action to fix this. And as previously 

mentioned, both the Secretary of the Navy’s directed Strategic 

Readiness Review [SRR] and the Chief of Naval Operations directed Comprehensive Review [CR] of Surface Force Readiness 

made various recommendations to improve command and control 

and force generation practices for the forward deployed naval force. 

We have begun to implement these recommendations. Specifically, we have eliminated all waivers and mitigation plans, conducted fleetwide readiness assessments, established a command in 
6 

Japan solely focused on readiness, and we are applying our standard force generation model to forward deployed naval force ships. 

As you would expect, these actions have reduced the operational 

availability of our Japan-based ships in the short run as they undergo a rigorous recertification process. 

I expect to be past this initial—I expect that we will be past this 

initial bow wave by late spring this year. Full implementation of 

the new processes will take some time, but the end result will be 

a more ready, more capable, and more lethal Navy. 

Finally, please allow me to emphasize what you just heard from 

Admiral Lescher. Fully funding our readiness accounts is the foundation of operational readiness. Without properly manned, trained, 

equipped, and maintained forces, we will always be incurring a 

readiness debt that will be more expensive to pay off in the long 

run. In this current era of renewed great power competition, we 

cannot afford any degradations in readiness. 

On behalf of all of our sailors, civilians, and our families, I would 

like to thank you, the Congress and this committee, for your support. I also look forward to working with you to ensure the operational readiness of the Navy we have now and in the future the 

Navy the Nation needs. I look forward to your questions. Thank 

you. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Vice Admiral Lewis. We now 

proceed to Vice Admiral McCollum. 

STATEMENT OF VADM LUKE M. McCOLLUM, USN, CHIEF OF 

NAVY RESERVE, COMMANDER, NAVY RESERVE FORCE, 

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Bordallo, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 

I would like to echo my thanks in your leadership in supporting 

readiness being restored to the Navy. It is my privilege to testify 

today in the readiness of the Navy Reserve. 

As part of the total force, the Navy Reserve has the responsibility 

to provide strategic depth and operational capability to our Active 

Component. Combatant commanders depend on the cost-effective 

and unique capabilities of the Navy Reserve and what it brings to 

the fight. Therefore, the Navy Reserve must be combat-ready in 

order to deliver operational excellence in support of a more lethal 

and capable total force. Your Navy Reserve has been fully integrated and engaged over the past 16 years. 

Around the globe, in serving as a total force multiplier, since 

9/11 alone, Navy reservists have mobilized over 81,000 times in 

support of the Navy and joint force. The ability to provide properly 

manned, trained, and equipped forces capable to sustain operations 

where and when needed requires predictability and funding. As we 

have mentioned in previous occasions, continuing resolutions and 

threats of shutdowns affect Reserve Component service members a 

little bit more uniquely than the Active side. In particular, that 

they train on weekends, and as an example, Navy Reserve medical 

readiness in itself dropped 8 percent as a direct result of the canceled drill weekend in January when the government went into 

shutdown. 
7 

Government shutdowns consume resources, they affect morale, 

and prevent us from focus on the warfighting lethality. Tomorrow 

will be the beginning of a big travel day for a drill weekend this 

weekend, and there is already obviously some anxiety in the force. 

Consistent stable funding is the most important step in our readiness recovery. And PB 2019 focuses on sustaining that recovery. 

Navy Reserve force structure provides integration options across 

the globe, ranging from the mobilization of an entire unit to go to 

combat, to an individual sailor in support of a single exercise. Our 

ability to surge and respond on short notice where and when needed is a critical piece that enhances the Navy’s capability and lethality. 

To maintain this lethality, investment in aging Reserve Component equipment is critical to minimizing the interoperability gap 

between Active and Reserve Components. Should this gap widen 

further, it will be challenging to provide the required support to the 

Active Component. 

Even though the challenges do exist in today’s environment, I am 

proud of our sailors’ dedication, their resilience, their morale, and 

their professionalism. The sacrifices made by sailors, employers, 

and families is immense in supporting the Navy our Nation needs. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I sincerely appreciate the support you have given to date, and I look 

forward to taking your questions. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much, Admiral McCollum. We 

now begin with the question by each of the subcommittee members, 

and we are fortunate that Margaret Dean, who is a very dedicated 

Navy reservist herself, will be keeping the time. And so she is very 

punctual, we already know. 

So we will begin. Admiral McCollum, sadly we understand that 

most of the Navy Reserve’s C–130 fleet remain grounded after the 

crash of the KC–130T in Leflore County, Mississippi. Amongst the 

Navy’s unfunded priorities list is a request for NP–2000 propeller 

kit. How would funding this propeller restore readiness of Navy Reserve aviation? What is the impact if this remains unfunded? 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. Mr. Chairman, thank you for that question. 

First of all, if we think about what the Navy Reserve brings to the 

logistics side of the Navy, Navy Reserve provides 100 percent of the 

inter-theater lift for the Navy. Said another way, boxes, people, 

crews, parts, have to be sourced and delivered around the globe. 

The capability that resides in a Navy Reserve that delivers this 

is in the C–40 Alpha and the C–130 Tango. Those two aircraft provide that capability. Right now, we have 42 percent degradation in 

that capability. And that is related to the grounding of the C–130 

Tangos. 

The recovery aspect of this allows us in the form of this ask of 

the NP–2000 propeller system allows us to replace these propellers 

and restore readiness to these aircraft that would further allow us 

to continue our mission in supporting the fleet. So it is highly important that we upgrade our capability. 

Mr. WILSON. And additionally, what has been the impact on your 

maintenance crews and then pilot hours? It just seems like it 

would be really catastrophic. 
8 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. The demand signal for Navy Reserve in this 

capacity is very high. When what we have been able to do is—while 

we are focused with these down aircraft, we have taken advantage 

of the flat hours and the accrue—because the mission continues. 

Our C–40s are operating at 100 percent capacity and we have 

vectored a lot of those mission sets to that location. 

With the proposal to—and the ask to replace with this propeller 

system that it gives us the ability to get on pace and the timeline 

to restore on a steady, methodical way, and communicating that 

progress with our aircrew gives positive support. 

Mr. WILSON. And the maintenance personnel, are they being utilized or are they—— 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. Absolutely. There is no shortage of need for 

aviation maintainers. And the one thing about the Navy Reserve 

is the—we are integrated with the Active Component. It does depend on which piece of the maintenance that resides, but we are 

an integrated force, and often you can walk into a squadron and 

see both Active and Reserve working together, and sometimes the 

demand signal is higher in one or the other. And we interchange, 

provided that the skill set and certifications match. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I am grateful to hear that, because the expertise of these individuals will be very difficult to replace, so best 

wishes. 

Admiral Lescher, this year’s President’s budget increases procurement by 10 percent over last year’s National Defense Authorization Act levels, while sustainment showed just over a 1 percent 

increase. It is known that the sustainment of new systems is up 

to 70 percent of the lifetime costs. How is the budget request ensuring that readiness recovery remains on track, while modernizing 

the force? 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, sir. Thank you for that question. The answer to that question is really embodied in this context of this 3- 

year campaign that the SECDEF [Secretary of Defense] put out in 

January 2017. And I alluded to that in the opening comments. 

So very much the highest priority, the initial priority of the Secretary of Defense was to restore readiness. And you saw that in the 

fiscal year 2017 request for additional appropriations. In the 2018 

bill, which the Congress has right now and we hope to see enacted 

by the 23rd of this week, there is growth above that level that really is in consonance with this concept of 2018 further rebuilding 

their readiness. 

So in 2017, for example, we executed just in their four major 

readiness accounts that you highlighted and we talked about $1 

billion above the 2016 level. In the 2018 request, there is $3 billion 

in those four readiness accounts above that 2017 level. And then 

to your point, the 2019 level carries that forward. 

If you look even more broadly at wholeness of readiness to include personnel, equipment, supply, training, ordnance, networks 

and installation, that growth from 2017 to 2018 is about $7.5 billion, and then from 2018 to 2019, it is about another just under $4 

billion. 

So what has gone on is the department has very much emphasized readiness recovery in the 2017 and the 2018 bills, and now 

in the 2019 we are holding that level and driving that level, while 
9 

now starting to grow capacity and lethality. Part of what is also 

driving that choice of how to balance our portfolio is what this subcommittee understands, I know better than most, that it is not just 

resources, it is time. It takes time, particularly in our industrial operations and our shipyards and our fleet readiness centers, the 

aviation depots, to grow the naval force now to execute that higher 

level of capacity. 

And so you have really seen an analysis of the phasing, but to 

be very clear, as we talked about in the opening comment, the fact 

that we are 6 months into the fiscal year 2018 year and still don’t 

have that additional funding is part of what is constraining our 

ability to recover readiness and go forward. We are executing the 

first half of this year at fiscal year 2017 funding levels. So all that 

goodness, all that accelerated readiness recovery that is in this fiscal year 2018 bill hasn’t started yet. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you for addressing that. And we now 

proceed to Congresswoman Bordallo of the territory of Guam. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Vice Admiral Lescher, 

2017 was challenging for the Navy, particularly with regard to the 

maintenance of the fleet. Several GAO [Government Accountability 

Office] reports discussed the extensive maintenance backlog for 

surface ships and submarines. The Navy’s own Strategic Readiness 

Review highlighted that the constrained ship repair industrial base 

capacity is inadequate to meet the current demand. 

Yet when asked during a HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing if the current depot-level ship repair capability was 

sufficient in the Pacific, the response contradicted the SRR findings. So I continue to be confused by the Navy’s mixed message. 

With 60 percent of our naval fleet operating in the Pacific, is the 

ship repair capability sufficient or insufficient to meet the current 

demand? 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, ma’am, thank you. So your comments are 

exactly on point in terms of the ship depot maintenance backlog 

and the need to assertively get after growing public shipyard nuclear maintenance capacity. As part of our response to that, Vice 

Admiral Tom Moore, the commander of Naval Sea Systems Command [NAVSEA], authored a report that was conveyed to the committees about shipyard optimization. 

It talks about a 20-year effort to grow the public shipyard capacity to get after this backlog we are seeing in nuclear maintenance. 

More broadly, in terms of the Western Pacific, I know Secretary 

Geurts testified earlier about the Navy is committed to giving a 

fresh look at this analysis and is complying with the NDAA reports, first of all, to do reports on the Western Pacific ship depot 

maintenance writ large, the requirements for capacity and capability, and then to also perform a business case analysis on courses 

of action to address and grow that. 

So it is work that is ongoing and that we will fully, obviously, 

share—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. So—— 

Mr. WILSON. And, Admiral, could you adjust, everyone, their 

microphone a bit better for the court reporter? Thank you very 

much. Excuse me, mademoiselle. 

Ms. BORDALLO. That took 1 minute of my time, Mr. Chairman. 
10 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. WILSON. That was 5 seconds. I already measured it. Thank 

you. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, Admiral, then would you say you are on the 

way to improving capabilities? Is that what you are—— 

Admiral LESCHER. We are. So, for example, in the public shipyards, in the labor accounts, we are growing to 36,100. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good, okay. 

Admiral LESCHER. And capital investment, et cetera, yes. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I have a second question for any of you here. 

After years of concerns regarding readiness shortfalls and the impacts of sequestration, I am concerned that the fiscal year 2019 

budget request may not appropriately balance long-term readiness 

recovery through modernization with near-term efforts through 

sustainment and maintenance. With regard to the fiscal year 2019 

budget, how will the request support near-term readiness recovery? 

And are there specific areas in the O&M [operations and maintenance] accounts, such as ship or aviation depot maintenance, fleet 

air training, FSRM, or others, where you think additional resources 

could help with the readiness recovery efforts? Whichever one—— 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, ma’am, I will take a stab at that. Thank 

you. I think the department remains very focused on near-term 

readiness recovery. At the same time, you also see, to the point you 

made in terms of procurement in fiscal year 2019 now starting to 

grow to a larger, more lethal Navy, as well, but the investments 

in near-term readiness recovery that I highlighted earlier in our 

big four readiness accounts, that is essentially at maximum executable levels that we—are based on absolute physical capacity constraints to execute. 

Even in the enabling accounts, aviation logistics, aviation spares, 

depot support, they are at historic highs all in the high 90s or 100 

percent. So a very strong focus on accelerating readiness recovery, 

but it is going to take time. It is going to take time to—in these 

major industrial operations, the public shipyards, the aviation depots, as we are hiring engineers, we are hiring artisans, now we 

have to train these new hires to get productive work out of them. 

And there is a big focus on that training program. We are making 

capital investment improvements, as well. 

So I would say a strong focus from a portfolio balance perspective, heavy allocation of resources on near-term readiness, it is 

going to take time to move that needle, to move that output readiness metric. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. And I yield back 

my remaining time, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Congresswoman. We appreciate your 

service very much. And we now proceed to Congressman Austin 

Scott of Georgia. 

Mr. SCOTT. [Inaudible.] I apologize, 11 special capability ships. 

Admiral Lewis, that is pretty much for you, I believe. Although 

TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] has operational control of the ships, the Navy owns the ships. These ships are required 

to meet the heavy and sustained logistical demands in any major 

conflict, and in peacetime, these ships—especially those like the 

Mercy and the Comfort—are essential to meeting humanitarian as-
11 

sistance and disaster relief efforts of both our Nation and our allies, and even at times people that are our adversaries. 

If these ships are not funded, how will the Navy’s warships be 

refueled? How will they be rearmed? How will they be resupplied 

with food? And how will we be able to support the casualties during a major conflict? 

Admiral LEWIS. I am actually going to yield this to Admiral 

Lescher. I think he is better suited to answer that question. 

Mr. SCOTT. All right. 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, sir. Let me take a stab at that, in terms 

of articulating how the department is addressing that urgent need 

that you highlighted. So 75 of these ships total, of the sealift ships, 

10 of them special capabilities you highlight, and the department 

has articulated a three-phase approach to address that, starting 

with service life extensions. 

So in this budget, this fiscal year 2019 budget, there is funding 

across the 5-year program to do service life extensions on 21 of 

those ships. The second element of addressing that need is to—with 

the authorities we received from the Congress, which we are very 

much appreciative of, to buy used ships, so starting in fiscal year 

2020 and fiscal year 2021 we will buy one each year of a used ship. 

And then we are—looking at recapitalizing those ships, as well. 

So in fiscal year 2019 and 2020, there is R&D [research and development] funding for a common hull replacement for those ships 

that will do the design work that will lead us to do a recapitalization of that fleet, as well. So across service life extension, procuring 

used ships as a bridge, and then building new ships with the R&D 

we are doing on a common hull replacement, that is how the department’s attacking that requirement. 

Mr. SCOTT. So one of the things that I am concerned about is, 

you know, just as we talked about this week, we had a budget deal. 

Now we are having difficulty getting to the final language in an appropriations measure. 

We had, I think, hoped to be done by last week. We are still 

going this year. And so you have got a budget number for 2018 and 

2019. The dispute right now in the appropriation measures is not 

over the funding of the military. But as you look out to 2020, 2021, 

2022, what do you see as far as the budget for the Navy? What are 

you making plans for? 

Admiral LESCHER. So, sir, the Secretary of Defense has been— 

provided some strong guidance on this. Secretary of the Navy, as 

well, has testified to the fact that clearly as we grow to the larger, 

more lethal Navy, additional resources will be required, and we are 

going to look to develop those through reform. We are bringing a 

strong effort and across the board on not only executing new funds, 

but executing them in a more productive, a more effective, a more 

efficient way, with strong accountability. 

In this PB 2019 budget, for example, in fiscal year 2019, the 

Navy has $1 billion of reform from prior years that were generated 

and was actually allocated to buy readiness, to buy platforms. 

Across the 5-year program, Navy has about $4 billion of reform. So 

we are looking strongly at that. You know, the SECNAV [Secretary 

of the Navy], DEPSECDEF [Deputy Secretary of Defense] both 
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bring a very strong view on performance to plan that is helping us 

get after that. So there is work to be done. 

Clearly, I would also highlight in the context of what you say, 

Columbia recapitalization outside the FYDP [Future Years Defense 

Program] is something that is going to require substantially higher 

levels of Ship Construction, Navy funding. So it is work for us to 

get after to talk about with the department, but through a combination of reform and other relief to get after that. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am glad to hear that. And I think it would be wise 

for—and I have heard General Mattis say the same thing—give us 

the 715 for 2019 and we will—the additions for 2020 and 2021, into 

the future, we will find the reforms to help pay for that. And I 

think that that is wise advice to those of you in those positions. I 

think it is probably unlikely that you see additional increases in 

2019, 2020 and 2021. 

And with that, I yield the remainder of my time. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much, Congressman Scott. We now 

proceed to Congressman Joe Courtney of Connecticut. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 

witnesses for your testimony here today. 

I would like to follow up Ms. Bordallo’s questions regarding the 

ship maintenance challenge, which is a big one for readiness, obviously. First of all, you know, Admiral Lescher, I think there is 

unanimous support on the committee to, you know, go back and 

really update and modernize our public shipyards. You know, clearly, I think it is like the 1900s or it is since then—a lot of the work 

has been done there. But that is going to take some time. I mean, 

by I think your own testimony was about 20 years’ process that Admiral Moore is proposing. 

You know, in the meantime, you know, we have got a situation 

right now where between carriers and SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines], I mean, they kind of are just using up all the bandwidth 

at the public yards. And the attack subs have really been the poor 

cousins who—Boise and the Albany are, you know, the sort of poster childs for delays. But there is more than that, in terms of—the 

Connecticut took twice as long through its repair availability as 

was original seen. At the same time, we have combatant commanders who are testifying before our committee that they can’t 

meet even half the requirements that they have out there. 

So we just had a hearing with Assistant Secretary Geurts and 

Admiral Jabaley, again, talking about some of the workforce issues 

as we sort of ramp up on Columbia and Virginia in the private 

yards, where there certainly are some industrial capacity for helping with the repair availabilities. Admiral McCoy, when he was the 

head of NAVSEA a number of years ago, you know, always talked 

about sort of the one shipyard mentality, which is that, you know, 

he really didn’t make a distinction necessarily between public and 

private yards. 

If the work was there, you know, we want to keep metal tradesmen and welders and electricians, you know, from sort of drifting 

off into other opportunities. So I guess, you know, in terms of looking at the short-term challenge, particularly for the SSN [attack 

submarine] fleet, I mean, what is your sort of take on the one ship-
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yard mentality as a solution, which, again, is going to actually help 

us, you know, hit those production targets that we need to hit? 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, exactly. And I think you see that essentially we have embraced that, as you highlighted with the SSNs 

that are in private shipyards right now. So, as you know, we have 

three of them already in work, between HII [Huntington Ingalls Industries] and Electric Boat, and a fourth, the Boise scheduled to 

start in fiscal year 2019. 

So—and that is absolute good behavior and good practice for all 

the reasons you cited. You know, I would say before we understood 

that well, you would see a behavior of us loading our public shipyards beyond their capacity. And so that is what led to across the 

board slowing down all the availabilities, loss of critical chain discipline, and so we recognize—and, really, Boise, I would say, was 

a classic example of—in the execution year the leadership said, 

hey, let’s recognize we simply don’t have the capacity to execute 

that. And then let’s—essentially with the concept you described— 

look to push that workload, that availability—that specific availability to a private shipyard. 

So I think that is proper practice, but I also think that we want 

to fully load our public shipyards, after making all those investments. I know Naval Reactors in particular is looking at the issue, 

as we lead turn going into Columbia procurement, to make sure 

the contractors are able to have the workforce trained and ready 

to execute that. So I think thoughtful analysis is being done on 

that, and then the broader question, I think the proof is really in 

our execution, where we are subscribing to that concept. 

Mr. COURTNEY. No, and I think you are right. I mean, once that 

production really hits in around 2020, 2021, I mean, there is going 

to be a wall of production work that is going to make repair availabilities probably pretty hard to sort of squeeze in there. On the 

other hand, the public yards are going to have this new service life 

extension program, you know, for the subs with the—you know, upgrading the reactors. 

So I think basically you are in a position, along with Admiral 

Moore, of trying to be the air traffic controller to try to make sure, 

you know, this work sort of all sort of fits in, and the combatant 

commanders get with—— 

Admiral LESCHER. So that will be capacity—you know, analysis 

of capacity at all those locations and just best practices, driving discipline into our process, but really an honesty, as well, in terms of 

where the capacity is and then allocating the workload to that capacity. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. And one last question for Admiral McCollum. Again, Mr. Wilson asked about the Navy C–130s. And again, 

the new propellers—you mentioned, again, that was not in the 

2019 budget. Assuming, you know, we were able through our subcommittee and the appropriators [to] find the resources, I mean, 

would that accelerate the process of getting these plans back up in 

the air? 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. Well, certainly, because it would instill confidence in our strategy, in our planning assumptions, absolutely. 

Right now, we are estimating 12 to 18 months, and the fleet needs 

it sooner. 
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Mr. COURTNEY. Great. And so the propellers, though—I mean, as 

a process, would be able to be installed quicker than the sanding 

down and the—you know, the refurbishment of the old ones? Is 

that the—— 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. We would make progress on that timeline. 

It does—it is a precision exercise to do that, as you just articulated. 

But it would definitely help. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you. Just wanted to get that on the 

record. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for a few extra seconds. 

Mr. WILSON. Here, here. And thank you, Congressman Courtney. 

We now proceed to Congressman Ro Khanna of California. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for your 

service to our country. 

I just have one question. You mentioned that you would like to 

bring up the Navy’s structural force from 308 ships to 355 ships 

from 2014 to 2016. And I was curious what the reasons for the additional ships are, what they will be used for, and how they serve 

our national interest. 

Admiral LESCHER. Yes, sir, thank you. I will take a stab at that. 

The foundational analysis for the 355 ships was a force structure 

assessment that the department did in 2016, so the force structure 

assessment looked at the combatant commander command to execute the strategy and then, based on that, integrated what that 

would require. 

I don’t recall what the initial number was. It was substantially 

north of 355. And then the department accepted risk to that execution, said we are going to allocate risk in certain theaters that lessen the requirement and come to a fiscally informed moderate risk 

force of 355. Beyond that force structure assessment, the Congress 

directed the department to execute future fleet architecture studies. So MITRE Corporation, Center for Strategy—CSBA, Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary [Assessments], and an internal Navy 

team, each did an independent look, also in the context, looking 

forward of the security environment going forward. 

And each of those approaches also showed the need for a substantially larger Navy, each with a different number, but substantially larger than 308. So that is the context, strategically informed, execute the strategy, execute the combatant commanders’ 

requirements to set their theater and execute their OPLANs [operation plans] is what drove that number. 

Mr. KHANNA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. We now—our concluding 

person participating, somebody we know and love, Congresswoman 

Elise Stefanik of New York. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you, Chairman Wilson. A traditional 

strength of the Reserve force has been the ability to leverage civilian skills which strengthen subject matter expertise across the 

naval enterprise. And in May 2016 during a joint hearing with the 

Committee on Seapower and Projection Forces and this Subcommittee on Readiness, the commanding officer of Naval Construction Group Two testified that only 30 percent of today’s Reserve force enters with equivalent civilian experience compared to 

historically over 70 percent. 
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How are you addressing these gaps in training and subject matter expertise in our Reserve sailors? 

Admiral MCCOLLUM. Congresswoman, thank you for that question. I will tell you, not a day goes by that I don’t get a request 

of a unique civilian skill set to serve our Navy, the full spectrum, 

the skill sets you just outlined, as well as things like additive manufacturing, data science, artificial intelligence. This is why I am so 

proud to lead the Reserve force with their unique civilian skills 

that they do. 

I am in a close partnership with the Chief of Navy Personnel, 

and we continually talk about permeability, meaning said another 

way, the ability for somebody in the Reserve force to surge and be 

part of the Active force, somebody on the Active force to be on the 

Reserve force. And we continue to work with the authorities that 

Congress has given us to support this. 

Additional authorities and discussions related to this, with 

DOPMA [Defense Officer Personnel Management Act] and ROPMA 

[Reserve Officer Personnel Management Act] reform and so forth, 

allow us to toggle, so to speak, before—between the two environments of the—what is mandated legislatively for Active and Reserve end strength. 

With regard to the focus, the laser focus on civilian skill set, we 

are launching this spring a requirement of our Navy Reserve sailors to be more detailed in their—in how they enter in a data reserve skill set database. We have given them the means and the 

communications we are just rolling out. 

This will at least allow us to have a repository of the reservists 

in their current skill sets. When we look at accessions, we have 

now been looking at the two ways we access. One is direct accessions with no prior service and accessions with prior service. 

In the Seabee area, the Construction Battalion force, we recognize that there are construction mechanics, there are individuals 

on the street doing this type of work that we need in our Navy Reserve. And we are in active discussions on how we lever those 

strengths and cross-rate those civilian qualifications, how they 

might merit the qualification that the Navy has. So we are very 

open, and we have just got to get our certifications right, and how 

we recognize that, but we are all in on civilian skills. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you for that. My last question relates to 

testimony a year ago in March of 2017 where it was stated, quote, 

To characterize where we are today, we would say it is the tale of 

two navies. The Navy’s deployed units are operationally ready to 

respond to any challenge. Unfortunately, the status of units in installations back home in the United States paint a different picture. The strain is significant and growing. Do you still feel today, 

a year later, that it is the tale of two navies? And have you seen 

any positive change when it comes to the strain placed on the units 

and installations back at home? 

Admiral LESCHER. Ma’am, I would say it still is a tale of two navies, absolutely. And the reason is because we haven’t received the 

additional funding that was requested in the fiscal year 2018 bill. 

So as I alluded to earlier, we are still executing at that fiscal year 

2017 level of funding. 
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Now, there has been absolutely goodness that has occurred and 

progress is being made. And again, the fiscal year 2017 request for 

additional appropriations was key to enabling ships to sail, pilots 

to fly, and critical shore infrastructure maintenance to take place. 

But to get traction, to accelerate readiness, to really start driving 

these output needles, we need the fiscal year 2018 bill enacted, and 

then this fiscal year 2019 bill will build on that, build on that 

progress we make. 

This concept earlier about it is a combination of resources and 

time that will really enable us, particularly in our industrial operations, the public shipyards, the fleet readiness centers, to drive 

that improvement, to hire the additional labor, to make the capital 

investment to drive the throughput increase that will really get us 

traction, as well as the increased funding for facility sustainment, 

restoration, and modernization in this 2018 bill. So a lot of goodness in the bill when enacted. We are absolutely positioned right 

now to move forward when that bill is enacted. 

Ms. STEFANIK. Thank you for that. I yield back. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you, Congresswoman Stefanik. As we 

conclude, I want to thank Commander Margaret Dean for her service, Tom Hawley. We have got professional staff that are doing 

such a great service. And we also will be providing questions for 

the record on readiness accounts. If there is no further business, 

we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 20, 2018 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 20, 2018 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 20, 2018 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. In the Navy’s opening statement, readiness accounts are said to be 

funded to ‘‘maximum executable levels.’’ Is this the maximum executable within the 

public and private industrial base? Regarding available industry capacity, this committee has long expressed support for optimizing efficiencies and throughput of aircraft, including through competitive industry contracts for maintaining legacy F/A– 

18s. I understand that the Navy is taking 3 to 6 times longer than projected to provide engineering approvals and required sustainment funding under existing contracts. Can you explain why the Navy is dragging its feet on approving required repairs—and getting our tactical aircraft back on operations? Can you help the committee understand how the Navy defines maximum executable levels if clearly capacity remains within industry that will expedite readiness recovery? 

Admiral LESCHER, Admiral LEWIS, and Admiral MCCOLLUM. Program requirements for a fiscal year are assessed and updated at five distinct points in the Department’s Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES). 

Total Fleet and System Command (SYSCOM) requirements are collected and determined by modeled and non-modeled processes during Planning and Programming. 

The total requirement is evaluated by the Navy in conjunction with stakeholders to 

determine if the entire requirement can be executed in the budget year, almost two 

years in the future. Factors considered include current public and private sector performance, updated pricing, the material condition and operating status (i.e. Mission 

Capable aircraft) of the force, utilization of the force, and the anticipated improvements in the readiness of the force based on funded and executed efforts. 

Executability is evaluated again by the Navy during the Budgeting phase of 

PPBES prior to submission to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), with 

the hindsight of an additional six to eight months of program execution and additional inputs from the Fleets and SYSCOMs with updated requirements. OSD provides a third review of the Navy’s programs and prior to budget lock, the Department queries stakeholders for emergent requirements that were not previously evaluated. Items not funded in the President’s Budget are considered for the CNO Unfunded Priority List. 

The result of this process and thorough evaluation determines the level to which 

readiness accounts will be funded relative to the requirement. Some accounts are 

funded to 100% of the requirement while others are funded to maximum executable 

levels. Maximum executable represents the maximum amount of funding that can 

be executed in a given fiscal year. The Navy would not be able to execute funding 

provided above that level. When it is submitted, the President’s Budget represents 

the Navy’s most current and best estimate of the aviation and ship readiness requirements. 

Prior to the start of the fiscal year, Fleets and System Commands (SYSCOMs) update their requirements and identify anticipated shortfalls and assets pending enactment of the annual appropriations bill. Execution of programs is tracked across 

the fiscal year and a Mid-Year Execution Review is conducted in April and May to 

support the OMNIBUS reprogramming action submitted to Congress in June. When 

conditions change, the Navy seeks additional funds to improve the readiness of the 

force. 

Specific to naval aviation recovery, the Navy is not dragging its feet. The backlog 

that previously existed and which necessitated the use of commercial depot contracts has been eliminated, with all aircraft inducted into workflow. Recent reductions in the overall requirement, enabled by combining depot events, and the steady 

increase in capacity at organic Fleet Readiness Centers, have reduced the requirement for follow-on commercial contracts for F/A–18A/B/C/D depot-level maintenance, 

since the forecasted requirement can be covered within existing organic depot capacities. The Air Systems Support budget (OMN 1A4N), which funds Program Related 

Logistics for engineering dispositions, is funded to $876M in FY19, significantly 

more than the FY18 enacted amount of $701M and the FY17 executed amount of 

$655M. Work-In-Progress (WIP) for engineering instructions has been on an improving trend since March of 2017. Aircraft parts funded in Aircraft Procurement, Navy 

(APN) for the overall aviation spares account are funded to historically high levels 
40 

with $1.8 billion in FY19 and $2.2 billion enacted in FY18. This funding coupled 

with the parts procured by the Working Capital Fund in 2017 that start to deliver 

in 2019, will provide the needed parts for our Sailors and Fleet Readiness Centers 

to return aircraft to a Mission Capable (MC) status. The Navy is using industry capacity to recover naval aviation readiness. The Navy has numerous Public-Private 

Partnerships (PPP) that support sustainment of aviation products. The Navy is also 

partnering with Boeing on the Service Life Modification (SLM) Program for F/A– 

18E/F, the first major extensive sustainment program to deliver a Mission Capable 

(MC) aircraft with extended life. We will continue to assess the best use of resources 

to maximize the return of MC aircraft to the Fleet. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROWN 

Mr. BROWN. As you already know, Navy Readiness is at an all-time low. A portion 

of readiness is the ability to upgrade existing weapon systems. The Navy has several organic prototyping capabilities that seemed to be under utilized due in part 

to the lack of knowledge the capabilities exist. Can you tell me the percentage of 

naval weapon system upgrades utilize internal Navy resources vice going straight 

to the OEM? Is there a detailed analysis of organic prototyping capabilities and any 

existing gaps that might prevent you from using them in the future? 

Admiral LESCHER, Admiral LEWIS, and Admiral MCCOLLUM. The Department of 

the Navy (DON) has been engaging the Naval Research and Development Establishment (NR&DE), comprised of the Naval Warfare and Systems Centers and Laboratory, organic capabilities through several pathways. As an innovation engine of 

ideas, Section 219 of the FY 2009 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has 

provided means to increase research funding within the NR&DE to develop technology solutions. The DON has been engaging the NR&DE through a series of technology explorations and Advanced Naval Technology Exercises (ANTX) to evaluate 

the NR&DE technology advancement and apply them to the Navy’s and Marine 

Corps’ pressing problems. These technology exploration/ANTX events included 

Smart Mining, Counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems, Urban 5th Generation Marine, 

Ship-to-Shore Maneuver, Unmanned Systems, and Advanced Combat System Technology. These efforts have provided the platform for the DON to more efficiently utilize the organic prototyping capabilities and focus the efforts on the DON’s most 

pressing needs. 

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