Department of Homeland Security

Office of Inspector General 

Information Sharing at the 


National Operations Center 


(Redacted) 


OIG-10-15 November 2009 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

 November 10, 2009 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was 

established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment 

to the Inspector General Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and 

special reports prepared as part of our oversight responsibilities to promote economy, 

efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning’s National Operations Center. It is based on interviews with 

employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a 

review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We 

trust this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We 

express our appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................1
 

Background..........................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................8
 

The National Operations Center Has Improved Its Information 


Sharing Capabilities Since Hurricane Katrina ...............................................................8 


Organizational Obstacles Continue to Challenge the National Operations Center .....16 


Recommendations........................................................................................................20 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................20 


Information Sharing Is Hindered by Administrative Challenges ................................23 


Relationships Between the Operations and Intelligence Sides Are Strained.........23 


Recommendations..................................................................................................26 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................26 


Formal Agreements With Participating Components and Agencies Are Needed .28 


Recommendations..................................................................................................29 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................29 


Desk Officer Training Needs Improvement ..........................................................29 


Recommendations..................................................................................................31 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................31 


National Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures Are Needed ............32 


Recommendations..................................................................................................32 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................33 


Daily Exercises Need to Be More Realistic...........................................................33 


Recommendations..................................................................................................34 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................34 


Infrastructure and Information Technology Issues Affect Collaboration....................34 


Recommendations........................................................................................................37 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................37 


Staffing Inefficiencies Need to Be Addressed.............................................................38 


National Operations Center Reliance on Contract Support Has Increased............39 


Recommendations..................................................................................................41 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................41 


The National Operations Center’s Reorganization Planning and Execution 


 Was Deficient .....................................................................................................41 


Recommendations..................................................................................................44 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................45 


The Intelligence Side Would Benefit From Component Detailees .......................45 


Recommendations..................................................................................................46 


Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..........................................................46 


Conclusion .........................................................................................................................46
 

Appendixes 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.......................................................48 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report.......................................50 


Appendix C: National Operations Center Watch Participants ..................................57 


Appendix D: National Operations Center Operations and 

 Intelligence Participants.......................................................................58 


Appendix E: National Operations Center Operational Phases 

and Director’s Criteria .........................................................................59 


Appendix F: Key Actions, Deliverables, and Target Audience................................60 


Appendix G: DHS Operations Center Working Group Participants.........................61 


Appendix H: Congressional Denial to Move the National Operations Center..........62 


Appendix I: Deputy Secretary Request for National Operations 

 Center Detailees...................................................................................64 


Appendix J: Major Contributors to This Report ......................................................67 


Appendix K: Report Distribution ..............................................................................68 


Abbreviations 

ASWO Assistant Senior Watch Officer 


CBP U.S. Customs and Border Protection 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 


FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation 


HSIN Homeland Security Information Network 


I&A Office of Intelligence and Analysis 


IT information technology 


MOA Memorandum of Agreement 


NOC National Operations Center 


NICC National Infrastructure Coordinating Center 


NRCC National Response Coordination Center 


NTC National Targeting Center 


OIG Office of Inspector General 


OPS Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 


SWO Senior Watch Officer 


TS Top Secret 


TSOC Transportation Security Operations Center 


TS/SCI Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information 

OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

At the request of U.S. Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman of 

the House Committee on Homeland Security, we reviewed information 

sharing processes at the Department of Homeland Security’s National 

Operations Center. We focused on the functional and organizational 

changes the department has made to the National Operations Center, since 

Hurricane Katrina, to manage the flow of information better. Specifically, 

we assessed whether: (1) procedures instituted ensure that incoming 

reports are appropriately directed within the center; (2) information is 

reviewed and disseminated timely to key department officials; and (3) 

information is coordinated efficiently and effectively with other federal, 

state, and local governmental partners that have a role in response 

operations. 

Within the department, the Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning oversees the National Operations Center and has made numerous 

improvements to the center’s information sharing capabilities since 

Hurricane Katrina. These improvements include the development and 

implementation of the operational phase and notification systems, and 

increased involvement in working groups and coordination meetings. 

Despite these improvements, a number of barriers hinder the flow of 

information. Organizational, administrative, infrastructure, information 

technology, and staffing obstacles continue to affect information sharing at 

the National Operations Center adversely. 

Our report addresses information sharing and collaboration changes at the 

National Operations Center from Hurricane Katrina’s August 2005 

landfall to completion of our fieldwork in April 2009. We are making 17 

recommendations to assist the Office of Operations Coordination and 

Planning in improving the information sharing capabilities of the National 

Operations Center. In response to our report, the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning has proposed plans and taken action that, once 

fully implemented, will enhance the follow of information. The 

department concurred with all 17 recommendations. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 1 
Background 

The federal government received widespread criticism for a slow and 

ineffective response to Hurricane Katrina. In February 2006, after an 

extensive evaluation of the federal government’s response, the White 

House released its report, The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina: 

Lessons Learned. The report, the product of a review by the President’s 

Homeland Security Advisor, outlined numerous failings in emergency 

preparedness and response and made 125 recommendations to the 

President. 

The report concluded that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

needed both the requisite headquarters management institutions and 

sufficient field capabilities to organize a successful federal response effort. 

According to the report, it was essential to strengthen DHS’ headquarters 

elements to direct the federal response, while also providing appropriate 

resources to DHS field elements for more effective ground response efforts. 

Recommendations of the White House Report 

To achieve these goals, one recommendation in the report called 

for DHS to create a new organizational structure, or National 

Operations Center (NOC), to coordinate and integrate the national 

response and provide a Common Operating Picture for the entire 

federal government.1

 Another recommendation was that the NOC 

should combine, co-locate, and replace the situational awareness 

mission of DHS’ Homeland Security Operations Center, the 

operational mission of its National Response Coordination Center 

(NRCC), and the role of the Interagency Incident Management 

Group. Also, the NOC should be staffed with full-time detailed 

employees assigned to a planning cell from relevant federal, state, 

and local departments and agencies. 

Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS’ Homeland Security Operations 

Center served as the Nation’s nerve center for information sharing 

and domestic incident management, increasing coordination 

between federal, state, territorial, tribal and local governments, and 

the private sector. The NRCC handled overall federal response 

coordination for incidents of national significance and 

implemented emergency management programs. The Interagency 

Incident Management Group was responsible for strategic 

1

 Common Operating Picture is a shared display of relevant and operational information (e.g., the position 

of resources and status of important infrastructure such as bridges, roads, etc.) that facilitates collaborative 

planning and assists all in achieving situational awareness of an event. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 2 
interagency-level coordination and worked to resolve resource 

conflicts unresolved by the NRCC. 

The White House report included three additional 

recommendations intended to improve information sharing and 

enhance the information reporting system. 

•	 Recommendation 16 called for a national information and 

knowledge management system for all departments and 

agencies working with the NOC to provide a Common 

Operating Picture that allows for the processing and timely 

provisioning of interagency information sources. 

•	 Recommendation 17 required the creation of a single or 

national reporting system by departments and agencies 

working with the NOC in order to establish uniform 

information flow to senior decision makers. 

•	 Recommendation 18 described the establishment of 

national information requirements and a national reporting 

chain to ensure both that accurate information is reported in 

a timely manner and that there is standard information flow 

through all levels of the incident command structure. 

We used a number of recommendations in the White House report 

as a baseline to determine DHS’ progress in making functional and 

organizational changes to the NOC since Hurricane Katrina. 

Office of Operations Coordination and Planning and the 

Creation of the National Operations Center 

DHS’ Office of Operations Coordination and Planning (OPS) is 

responsible for monitoring the daily security of the United States. 

It does so by coordinating activities within DHS, with state 

governors, Homeland Security Advisors, law enforcement 

partners, and with critical infrastructure operators in all 50 states. 

Among its duties, OPS is responsible for overseeing the NOC, 

conducting joint operations across all organizational elements, 

coordinating activities related to incident management, and 

employing all DHS resources to translate intelligence and policy 

into action. 

The NOC was officially established on May 25, 2006. Its mission 

is to facilitate information sharing and operational coordination 

with other federal, state, local, tribal, non-governmental, and 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 3 
private sector agencies, as well as to provide situation awareness to 

senior DHS and White House leadership. The NOC accomplishes 

its mission through a network of coordination elements that 

provide domestic situational awareness, a Common Operating 

Picture, information fusion, information sharing, communications, 

and coordination pertaining to domestic incident management and 

the prevention of terrorism.2 

The National Operation Center and Its Elements 

The NOC operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year, 

and it collects and fuses information from more than 35 federal, 

state, local, tribal, non-governmental, and private sector agencies. 

The NOC is composed of five elements—Watch, Intelligence 

Watch and Warning, NRCC, the National Infrastructure 

Coordinating Center (NICC), and the Planning Element, as shown 

in Figure 1. 

2

 Information fusion is the process of managing the flow of information and intelligence across all levels 

and sectors of government and private industry, and through analysis, creating meaningful intelligence 

products. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Figure 1: Elements of the NOC 

Although the NRCC, NICC, and Intelligence Watch and Warning 

are elements of the NOC, they remain independent entities under 

the tactical, operational, and program management control of their 

DHS components, the Federal Emergency Management Agency, 

the National Protection and Programs Directorate, and the Office 

of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), respectively. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 5 
National Operations Center Watch Officers’ Duties and 

Responsibilities 

The NOC Watch is the center of operations, and information is 

communicated through it to the other elements. The NOC Watch is 

staffed on weekdays and 

on weekends. Relieving personnel report to duty before 

their shift to establish situational awareness 

The NOC Watch is manned by watch officers including the Senior 

Watch Officer (SWO), Assistant Senior Watch Officer (ASWO), 

Communications Watch Officer, Knowledge Management Officer, 

Incident Management Officer, Tracker, and other agency desk 

officers. Appendix C lists NOC Watch participants. 

The SWOs supervise the activities of the NOC. 

The 

SWOs brief the NOC Director, DHS’ Secretary, Deputy Secretary, 

and Chiefs of Staff on potential or actual incidents, both domestic 

and international, that may affect national security. 

The ASWOs serve as the SWOs’ executive watch officers. They 

keep a log of events, assist the SWOs in their duties, and act 

on the SWOs’ behalf when the SWOs are absent from the NOC. 

The Communications Watch Officer applies technical expertise 

and facilitates communications 

 The Knowledge Management Officer prepares 

visual display schemes and posts relevant information 

The Incident 

Management Officer finds vetted sources and distills information 

 The Tracker 

monitors intelligence threats or incidents 

A number of desk officers are detailed to the NOC from DHS 

components and other federal agencies. Desk officers provide 

subject matter expertise and liaise with agency officials and other 

watch centers to collect valuable information. 

In fall 2008, the NOC underwent reorganization. Several SWO 

and ASWO positions are now staffed by DHS component detailees 

serving 2-year assignments, and the NOC reimburses their salaries. 

Before the reorganization, the SWO and ASWO positions were 

staffed entirely by full-time government employees hired on a 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 6 
permanent basis; individuals formerly serving in these positions 

have found new positions within DHS or have left the department. 

Operations and Intelligence Sides of the National Operations 

Center 

The NOC is divided into two sections, the Operations Side and the 

Intelligence Side. These sections function in tandem, 

and share 

information. Both sections are on the same floor; however, a wall 

separates the sections; 

The Operations Side tracks emergency management and law 

enforcement activities across the country that may affect national 

security.

 The SWO is located 

on the Operations Side, along with the DHS component desks and 

state and local law enforcement officers. 

The Intelligence Side focuses on classified intelligence and uses 

that information in support of emergency management and law 

enforcement activities. 

The Intelligence Side consists of the 

Senior Intelligence Analysts, Intelligence Analysts, the Intelligence 

Watch and Warning branch of the NOC, and the U.S. Secret 

Service desk officers. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Information Sharing Platforms at the National Operations 

Center 

The NOC maintains situational awareness through shared 

programs such as the Homeland Security Information Network 

(HSIN). HSIN is a comprehensive web-based platform that 

facilitates real-time Sensitive But Unclassified information sharing 

and collaboration with federal, state, local, tribal, private sector, 

and international partners. HSIN also hosts the Common 

Operating Picture and provides situational awareness and analysis 

of emerging events to state and local officials, and across the 

federal government. 

As part of the Common Operating Picture, NOC officials can post 

valuable information, such as situation reports and technical data 

regarding unfolding events or recovery efforts. NOC products 

such as NOC Notes and Situation Reports provide detailed realtime information to NOC partners. By using these products, 

interested parties can access reports and other detailed information 

such as statistics and interactive maps. 

Results of Review 

OPS has made numerous improvements to information sharing capabilities at the 

NOC since Hurricane Katrina. However, a number of barriers hinder the effective 

and efficient flow of information. Organizational, administrative, infrastructure, 

information technology (IT), and staffing obstacles continue to affect information 

sharing and collaboration at the NOC adversely. Although NOC officials and 

managers acknowledge most of these barriers, they have made limited progress in 

correcting the challenges. However, NOC officials are committed to mitigating 

or eliminating obstacles that limit the NOC’s effectiveness, or ability to fulfill its 

mission. 

The National Operations Center Has Improved Its Information 

Sharing Capabilities Since Hurricane Katrina 

The NOC has made numerous improvements to its information sharing 

capabilities since Hurricane Katrina. Improvements include the 

operational phase and notification systems, and an increased involvement 

of NOC management in working groups and coordination meetings. As a 

result of these improvements, NOC managers are able to process 

information and distribute it to key decision makers better. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 8 
The National Operations Center Now Operates Under an 

Operational Phase System 

During Hurricane Katrina, the NOC’s operational phase system did 

not exist. As of February 2007, the NOC 

respond to time-sensitive 

incidents in a decisive manner depending on severity. Before the 

operational phase system was implemented, a NOC official said 

that when events occurred, there was no level of severity 

associated with an incident. Now there are “key actions” that must 

be performed once a certain threshold of severity is reached. This 

official added that NOC management developed the 

system, 

Figure 2: NOC Operational Phases 

These phases correspond to the NOC Director’s Criteria, which 

represent a list of increasingly severe events that are thresholds for 

the NOC to transition to increased operational postures. The 

Director’s Criteria range from routine national and international 

events that may be of interest to DHS officials, to events so severe 

or catastrophic that the federal government must assume the 

highest operational level. During each operational phase, the NOC 

performs a set of key actions and develops deliverables 

collectively aimed at target audiences. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Figure 3: NOC Operational Phase System 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 


Page 10
 
The National Operations Center’s Notification System Has 

Been Enhanced 

To ensure DHS leadership’s awareness of emerging events and 

domestic threats, the NOC has updated its notification system 

The SWO, along with NOC leadership, uses the information 

obtained to determine the appropriate 

NOC phase. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Figure 4: NOC Notification Sequence of Key Actions 

To determine whether NOC officials disseminated relevant, useful, 

and timely information to key department officials, we reviewed 

six past events reported to the NOC. The events, which occurred 

from August 2006 to February 2008, represent the type and variety 

of incidents faced by an all-hazards operations center such as the 

NOC. These events involved information sharing and operational 

coordination with multiple DHS components and external 

agencies, and had implications for a broad spectrum of national 

security concerns. The events also involved emergency 

management efforts and an incident involving the biological 

warfare agent ricin.5 

Event One: Threat to Commercial Aircraft 

In August 2006, a terrorist plot was uncovered in which several 

individuals planned to detonate liquid explosives carried onboard 

several commercial aircraft traveling from the United Kingdom to 

the United States and Canada. Efforts to disrupt this plot involved 

valuable intelligence gathering, surveillance, and the eventual 

arrests of multiple conspirators by British law enforcement. 

3

 T = Time when incident was reported to the NOC. T+ indicates the number of minutes from the initial 

report to the time a key action should be completed. 4

 The Crisis Action Team is activated to take on the responsibilities of the NOC Watch during a phase 2 or 

phase 3 event or threat. The Crisis Action Team prepares executive summaries, situation reports, and other 

briefing products, responds to requests for information, and frames the courses of action and policy 

decisions to facilitate the DHS Secretary’s informed interaction with DHS principals and interagency peers. 5

 Ricin is a toxin created from the waste of processed castor beans that can be weaponized as a powder, 

spray, or pellet. It is highly poisonous; a dose the size of a pinhead (approximately 0.5 milligrams) can kill 

an adult. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Event Two: Drug-Resistant Strain of Tuberculosis 

In May 2007, a U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) 

Inspector allowed an individual infected with a drug-resistant 

strain of tuberculosis to cross the border into the United States 

from Canada. 

Event Three: Threat to Petroleum Pipelines at John F. Kennedy 

International Airport 

In June 2007, a joint investigation by the New York City Police 

Department, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the 

New York City Port Authority resulted in the arrests of four 

individuals plotting to attack John F. Kennedy International 

Airport by planting explosives on the airport’s jet fuel supply tanks 

and pipelines. 

Event Four: Wildfires in Southern California 

In October 2007, state and federal emergency responders battled a 

series of wildfires in Southern California that affected seven 

counties and resulted in extensive damage and mass evacuations. 

Drought, hot weather, and strong Santa Ana winds fueled these 

fires.6 

Event Five: Power Outage in Miami, Florida 

In February 2008, a failed switch and fire at an electrical substation 

resulted in widespread blackouts throughout much of South 

Florida, including all of Miami, and reached as far as Tampa and 

Orlando. 

Event Six: Ricin Incident in Las Vegas, Nevada 

In February 2008, law enforcement and emergency responders 

were called to a Las Vegas hotel, where a guest had contacted 

authorities to report he was suffering from respiratory distress. 

Upon entering the hotel room, emergency personnel discovered a 

substance that was later determined to be ricin. 

6

 Santa Ana winds are dry and warm, often hot winds in the Southern California area that blow in from the 

desert. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Figure 5 lists the selected events, corresponding date, highest NOC 

phase determination, and the number of minutes required to post 

the initial phase notification to HSIN. 

Figure 5: NOC Selected Events for Review 

The threat to commercial aircraft from London to the United States 

and the aircraft passenger with tuberculosis occurred before the 

NOC’s use of the phased notification system. Figure 6 shows that, 

with the exception of the John F. Kennedy pipeline incident, NOC 

personnel did not meet their established notification requirements, 

but our analysis revealed that information did get to key decision 

makers in a timely manner for all six events. For example, during 

the Southern California wildfires, DHS’ Secretary requested that 

information regarding the event be included in the Secretary’s 

Morning Brief before making the phase notice determination.7 

7

 The DHS Secretary’s Morning Brief is a daily compilation of material, including articles, operational 

reports, and intelligence briefings from component agencies and collaborative agencies such as the FBI and 

the Central Intelligence Agency. These materials and the related briefing are intended to allow the 

Secretary to maintain full situational awareness of events affecting national security. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Working Groups and Coordination Meetings Have Enhanced 

Information Sharing 

NOC management has increased involvement in working groups 

and coordination meetings. One NOC staff member said daily 

communication between NOC leadership and entities such as the 

NRCC, the NICC, and other component command centers such as 

the Transportation Security Administration’s Transportation 

Security Operations Center (TSOC), and CBP’s National Targeting 

Center (NTC) has increased professional relationships and fostered 

information sharing. Although not part of the NOC, the TSOC and 

the NTC work closely with NOC officials. The TSOC is the 

primary coordination point for multiple agencies that deal with 

transportation security. The NTC is the primary coordination point 

for tactical targeting and analytical research in support of CBP’s 

anti-terrorism efforts. 

In addition, NOC leadership initiated the Department of Homeland 

Security Operations Centers Working Group to provide a 

departmental information sharing forum. The group was chartered 

in February 2008, and its membership includes directors and 

operations officers from 14 DHS operations centers. Appendix G 

lists the participating DHS operations centers. 

The goals of the Operations Centers Working Group are to: 

•	 Enhance relationships by creating a forum with established 

agency and department representation; 

•	 Improve information flow, mission coordination, and 

national reporting between federal operations centers in the 

areas of incident management, planning, training, and 

exercises; 

•	 Facilitate information sharing, situational awareness, and 

decision making; and 

•	 Aid issue resolution and leverage capabilities. 

The working group meets every other month, and the NOC 

Director is its Chairperson. The Operations Centers Working 

Group can establish standing committees to achieve its objectives 

and governance. Standing committees are required to report to the 

NOC Director. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 15 
Organizational Obstacles Continue to Challenge the National 

Operations Center 

Although NOC management has made improvements following Hurricane 

Katrina, a number of issues still hinder the effective and efficient flow of 

information. Most significantly, the NOC is negatively affected by 

organizational issues such as not having requisite authority, ambiguities in 

its mission, and an unclear chain of command. The overall focus of the 

NOC shifts between emergency management, terrorism prevention, and 

law enforcement. However, following Hurricane Katrina, the NOC began 

to dedicate most of its resources to emergency management rather than 

terrorism prevention. Many NOC staff contends that this shift in focus is 

detrimental to NOC intelligence and law enforcement functions. 

The National Operations Center Does Not Possess Requisite 

Authority and Needs More Executive-Level Support to 

Accomplish Its Mission 

Federal laws such as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and the 

Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, require 

the NOC to ensure that critical information is disseminated to key 

DHS and other government decision makers. However, no 

statutory authorities require components to forward information to 

the NOC. For example, DHS components routinely provide 

information to DHS’ Secretary without first informing the NOC. 

These actions prevent the NOC from fully satisfying its 

information sharing obligations and could affect its ability to 

maintain situational awareness or a Common Operating Picture 

during a natural or manmade disaster or act of terrorism. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 16 
Responsibilities Are Defined in Law 

In the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Congress emphasized that 

federal, state, and local entities should share information to the 

maximum extent practicable.8 The act further stated that federal, 

state, and local governments and intelligence, law enforcement, 

and other emergency preparation and response agencies must act in 

partnership to maximize the benefits of information gathering and 

analysis to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks. To comply 

with the information sharing provisions of this act, in 2003 DHS 

created the Homeland Security Operations Center. Following 

Hurricane Katrina and the Post Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act of 2006, the Homeland Security Operations Center 

gained additional situational awareness responsibilities and was 

renamed the NOC.9 

According to the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform 

Act of 2006, the NOC is the principal DHS operations center and 

provides situational awareness for the federal government and for 

state, local, and tribal governments as appropriate, during a natural 

or manmade disaster or act of terrorism. The Post Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 also requires the 

NOC to ensure that critical terrorism and disaster-related 

information reaches government decision makers. In accordance 

with the National Response Framework, the NOC serves as the 

national fusion center, collecting and synthesizing all-source 

information, including information from state fusion centers, 

across all threats and all hazards.10 

The National Operations Center Has No Stated Authority to Direct 

DHS Component Participation 

Although the NOC combines the subject matter expertise of the 

law enforcement, emergency management, and intelligence 

communities, it was not designed to possess operational 

capabilities. One NOC official said the center is operational only 

in name, and does not have the capabilities or authority to direct 

DHS component resources or personnel. He added that the NOC is 

8 6 U.S.C. § 481. 

9 6 U.S.C. § 321d.

10 Approved in January 2008, the National Response Framework is a guide that presents the key response 

principles, participants, roles, and structures that guide the Nation’s response operations. It describes 

specific authorities and best practices for managing incidents that range from the serious but purely local, to 

large-scale terrorist attacks or catastrophic natural disasters requiring federal assistance. It was written for 

the use of government executives, private sector and nongovernmental organization leaders, and emergency 

management practitioners. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 17 
responsible for coordination and must politely request information 

from DHS components. Another NOC official stated that other 

DHS operation centers such as the NRCC, the TSOC, and the NTC 

are “charting their own course” and rely very little on the NOC 

because they possess operational capabilities. Another NOC 

official said that government officials rely more heavily on entities 

external to DHS, such as the Office of the Director of National 

Intelligence’s National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI’s 

National Joint Terrorism Task Force, for information and 

intelligence, because they are operational in nature. The National 

Counterterrorism Center is the primary organization for integrating 

and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism possessed or 

acquired by the U.S. government. The National Joint Terrorism 

Task Force is a command center representing nearly 30 agencies 

that collects terrorism information and intelligence from local or 

regional task forces and coordinates interagency efforts at 

combating terrorism. 

Resources Were Focused on Emergency Management 

Following Hurricane Katrina 

Following Hurricane Katrina, the NOC’s main mission focus 

shifted to emergency management, although personnel are tasked 

with maintaining all-hazards response readiness. NOC managers 

assert that the center is doing an excellent job focusing on “all 

threats.” However, the focus on emergency management and 

disaster assistance has resulted in a greater separation between the 

Intelligence and Operations sides of the NOC. One NOC desk 

officer told us that after Hurricane Katrina, everything turned to 

disaster assistance and recovery, and described this change as a 

“pendulum swing effect.” 

Some NOC desk officers said the focus on emergency management 

has negatively affected the NOC’s ability to respond to multiple 

concurrent events. Originally, the NOC’s predecessor, the 

Homeland Security Operations Center, was designed to respond to 

three simultaneous events. After Hurricane Katrina, some NOC 

personnel said the center has “become an arm of the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency,” and they contend that the change 

has diminished the ability of all NOC personnel to respond to 

terrorist threats. Multiple NOC desk officers expressed concern 

regarding the NOC’s ability to respond to a scenario involving both 

a natural disaster and a terrorist incident. Although these desk 

officers told us the NOC would likely be able to respond to both 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 18 
events, they are concerned that NOC resources would be strained 

and that information sharing abilities would be affected. 

Additional Review Levels May Slow Information Flow 

The restructuring of OPS and the NOC, which began in 2008, 

created additional levels of review and reporting that may slow the 

flow of information to senior leadership. According to internal 

documents, NOC personnel must vet information through multiple 

levels of management before sharing it with the DHS Secretary or 

other key officials. Desk officers reported that new vetting 

requirements are more cumbersome than the old process in which 

SWOs spoke directly with the Secretary regarding emerging 

events. An internal document titled Standing Order #4, dated May 

20, 2008, describes the current reporting requirements. SWO and 

ASWO detailees receive this document as part of their orientation. 

Standing Order #4 provides a comprehensive list of tasks that 

should be considered when a threat, hazard, incident, or event is 

reported to the NOC. After making a phase determination, the 

SWO must notify as many as four levels of management before 

notifying the Secretary. 

Before the restructuring, the SWO had greater authority to report 

information directly to the DHS Secretary, and some view the 

current notification and reporting practices as more cumbersome. 

One SWO said he spoke directly to the Secretary on a regular basis 

before the restructuring. Additional levels of review and reporting 

tend to act as a “stick and rudder” steering operations at the NOC. 

Another SWO remarked, “The delay in getting timely information 

to the Secretary would likely be double what it was during Katrina.” 

Situational Awareness Efforts Are Influenced by Media 

Coverage 

An overwhelming concern expressed by most of the NOC 

personnel we spoke with is the effect of the media on day-to-day 

operations. They call this the “CNN Effect.” NOC management 

expects its personnel to provide vetted, accurate information 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 19 
concerning emerging threats, hazards, incidents, or events. 

However, information requests from some senior department 

officials are frequently driven by major media news sources. 

These information requests are problematic because initial reports 

by media sources are often not as accurate as needed for the 

NOC’s vetting and reporting requirements. Unlike the media, 

NOC desk officers cannot amend their reports easily, and getting 

accurate firsthand accounts from first responders is often difficult 

given the emergent and high-pressure nature of emergency 

response duties and activities. The CNN Effect causes a great deal 

of frustration for NOC desk officers and senior managers. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the DHS Deputy Secretary: 

Recommendation #1: Engage senior Department of Homeland 

Security headquarters and component officials to explore options 

for improving the timeliness of component and operation center 

reporting to the National Operations Center. 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #2: Ensure that the National Operations 

Center’s mission focus, as the National Fusion Center, emphasizes 

all-hazard response readiness, and that its mandate to provide 

situational awareness for the federal government and for state, 

local, and tribal governments as appropriate, during a natural or 

manmade disaster or act of terrorism, is clearly articulated. 

Recommendation #3: Convene a multiple-component working 

group, with Senior Watch Officer participation, to evaluate 

whether the current review and reporting flow of information is the 

most efficient and effective way of delivering potential threats to 

senior department leadership. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated OPS’ written comments and have made changes to 

the report where we deemed appropriate. A summary of OPS’ 

written response to the report’s recommendations and our analysis 

of the response follows each recommendation. A copy of OPS’ 

response, in its entirety, is included as Appendix B. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 1. In its 

response, OPS management said the NOC serves as the National 

Fusion Center, and federal departments and agencies "should 

report information regarding actual or potential incidents requiring 

a coordinated Federal response to the NOC." For events falling 

outside of the National Response Framework, DHS Directive 252­

06 and DHS Instruction 252-06-001 establish DHS’ operational 

reporting requirements. OPS management stated that the directive 

and instruction do not apply to all components; however, the 

instruction includes time and frequency of reporting requirements. 

OPS management recently conducted an initial assessment of 

component reporting, and will soon brief the Component 

Operations Deputies on the results of the assessment. OPS 

management plans to revise the reporting instruction and will work 

to address component and operation center directives that conflict 

with DHS reporting instructions. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the 

revised reporting instruction. 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with recommendation 2. In its 

response OPS management said federal law has already established 

the NOC's mission as described in the recommendation. As stated 

in the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the "NOC is the principal 

operations center for DHS, and it shall provide situational 

awareness and a common operating picture for the entire Federal 

government, and for State, local, and tribal governments as 

appropriate, in the event of a natural disaster, act of terrorism, or 

other man-made disaster." The National Response Framework 

identifies the NOC as the National Fusion Center, and in this 

capacity the NOC fulfills its mission by fusing information from 

state fusion centers and law enforcement, intelligence, emergency 

response, open source, and private sectors. The NOC disseminates 

this information to its homeland security partners. 

With respect to meeting the needs of these homeland security 

partners, the NOC also fulfills its mission in the following ways: 

providing broad, 24/7 all-threats, all-hazards situational awareness; 

remaining vigilant in its monitoring and tracking of activities that 

may threaten the homeland; and focusing on emerging and 

ongoing events to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from "a 

natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other manmade disaster." For 

example, during hurricane and wildfire seasons the NOC maintains 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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a heightened awareness posture regarding these potential disasters, 

while still monitoring events across the country and abroad. OPS 

agrees that the NOC’s current mission focus should emphasize allthreats and all-hazards response readiness, and OPS will continue 

to staff the NOC with federal, state, and local partners who 

concentrate on prevention, protection, response, and recovery. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions unresponsive 

to the recommendation, which is unresolved and open. OPS did 

not address the change in mission focus as outlined in our report. 

Mission focus is a distinct concept from the formal legislated 

mission as established through the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 

Although federal law establishes the NOC’s mission, there has 

been a noticeable shift in mission focus 

. Multiple desk officers said this shift 

has affected the NOC’s ability to respond 

. Although maintaining heightened awareness 

 is significant, it does not 

demonstrate the NOC’s ability . 

Rather, this demonstrates a heightened awareness 

. To be responsive and to resolve this recommendation, 

OPS needs to provide internal policy and planning documents 

demonstrating that the NOC is prepared for concurrent events 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 3. In its 

response, OPS management said multiple-component operations 

center working groups currently exist, and one function of these 

groups is to review information reporting flows. The Director of 

the Operations Coordination Division chartered and hosts a bimonthly National Capital Region Interagency Operations Center 

Working Group meeting and a DHS Component Operations Center 

Working Group meeting. Started in 2008 and 2007 respectively, 

these working groups discuss and vet operational issues, to include 

information reporting processes. Directors of the various 

operations centers attend these meetings on behalf of their 

respective centers, and OPS will encourage NOC Senior Watch 

Officers (SWOs) to attend. For any known events, such as 

National Special Security Events, terrorist threat exercises, 

hurricanes, wildfires, etc..., the working groups spend a great deal 

of time evaluating and tailoring the flow of information prior to the 

events. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation related to working group meetings in which 

information sharing is the focus. These meetings should also 

include Senior Watch Officer participation. 

Information Sharing Is Hindered by Administrative Challenges 

Although some progress and improvements have been made, NOC 

information sharing is hindered by a number of administrative concerns. 

For example, difficulty obtaining higher-level security clearances 

complicates interaction between the NOC’s Operations Side and 

Intelligence Side personnel. This complication is more evident for law 

enforcement detailees assigned to the NOC. The NOC does not require 

formal agreements with DHS component detailees. Executing these 

agreements, improving desk officer training, and creating formalized 

standard operating procedures would help define detailee roles and 

responsibilities better, while also improving information sharing. The 

realism of daily training exercises for NOC personnel should be enhanced 

to provide more meaningful opportunities for the exchange of information 

and to practice roles and responsibilities. 

Relationships Between the Operations and Intelligence Sides 

Are Strained 

Despite the need for Operations Side and Intelligence Side 

personnel to work in tandem to achieve all-hazards NOC readiness, 

a disconnect exists because of an unclear chain of command and 

the inability of the Operations Side to obtain higher-level security 

clearances. At times, we observed tense relationships between the 

two sides, which negatively affect information sharing. NOC 

managers need to enhance efforts to assimilate both sides into one 

cohesive and effective unit, with a common goal to provide 

situational awareness in the event of a disaster or act of terrorism. 

There is also a need for more clarity regarding the chain of 

command when sharing information at the NOC. The Intelligence 

Side and the Operations Side have separate chains of command. 

Intelligence Side personnel report to the Under Secretary for I&A, 

while Operations Side personnel report to the Director of OPS. 

An I&A employee on the Intelligence 

Side said that he is not 100% sure of the SWO and ASWO roles 

and responsibilities. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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 Another desk officer 

remarked, “The SWOs can get better information from CNN 

As stated earlier, the SWOs manage and supervise the activities of 

the NOC and are responsible for maintaining awareness of all 

intelligence and operations being managed by DHS and NOC 

components. The SWOs are also responsible for briefing DHS 

senior leadership regarding potential or actual incidents, both 

domestic and international that may affect national security. 

We determined that some SWOs were not receiving the necessary 

information to brief DHS senior leadership on emerging issues. 

One desk officer stated that I&A has taken over control of the 

Intelligence Side of the NOC. Not everything the SWOs need to 

receive is being passed through the correct channels. A desk 

officer added that the working relationship with the Operations 

Side has further diminished in recent months. Another desk officer 

said the Intelligence and Operations sides play in different worlds, 

and 90% of what I&A knows, the SWOs do not know. 

Inability to Obtain Higher-Level Security Clearances Also Divides 

the National Operations Center 

Another factor that affects information sharing is the difference in 

security clearance levels between the NOC’s Intelligence Side and 

Operations Side personnel. NOC management acknowledges past 

inefficiencies and has taken positive actions to address some 

problems related to clearance levels. Despite these improvements, 

issues regarding security clearance level still exist. Getting all 

NOC personnel cleared to a higher level would enable greater 

interaction with I&A personnel. 

Personnel on the Intelligence Side have 

 while many personnel on the Operations Side have 

only the This creates 

classification and physical barriers. For example, the Intelligence 

Side operates independently and is separate from the rest of the 

facility, and most Operations Side personnel are not permitted to 

enter the Intelligence Side. Although progress has been made in 

obtaining the highest practical security clearance level for NOC 

personnel, NOC leadership should further emphasize sharing 

sanitized intelligence information in an unclassified format to 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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benefit law enforcement and emergency management and response 

efforts. 

Divisions Also Exist Between Intelligence and Law Enforcement 

The relationship between law enforcement and intelligence desk 

officers is also somewhat divided. Intelligence Side personnel 

voiced concern that law enforcement officers are not familiar with 

the proper procedures for handling classified information. Law 

enforcement officers need training to understand what is required 

of them and what information they can release. Law enforcement 

and intelligence desk officers indicated that they would benefit 

from training in the other’s area of expertise. Both stated that, at a 

minimum, an overview of each side’s missions, duties, and 

responsibilities would enable them to leverage their strengths 

better. 

If Intelligence Side personnel and law enforcement desk officers 

interacted more frequently, intelligence analysts would understand 

what information is beneficial to local law enforcement on the 

Operations Side. Although tear line reporting is useful, better 

professional and personal relationships and collaboration between 

the two sides could elevate the quality and usefulness of the 

information they share.11 Cross training would enable personnel to 

see the differences in duties and responsibilities, gain a better 

working knowledge of the others’ capabilities, and help foster 

professional and personal relationships, which are integral to 

information sharing. 

Some NOC personnel describe state and local law enforcement 

participation as “a coalition of the willing.” Officers are detailed 

to the NOC and can return to their original organization with little 

notice, as resources within individual law enforcement agencies 

determine NOC staffing levels. NOC officials said that they are 

hesitant to expend funds to obtain higher-level security clearances 

for desk officers who are detailed for an indeterminate period. The 

NOC needs longer commitments from individual departments and 

their detailees before investing the resources to obtain higher-level 

security clearances. With a commitment from law enforcement 

desk officers for extended service periods, NOC officials would be 

more likely 

11 A “tear line” is a demarcation on an intelligence report below which the unclassified version of a more 

highly classified and controlled report begins. This permits dissemination of essential information to wider 

audiences as it no longer contains sensitive sources and methods. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 25 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #4: Clearly define the chain of command for 

all personnel at the National Operations Center and clarify that 

personnel working in the National Operations Center report 

through the Senior Watch Officer on all issues affecting 

Department of Homeland Security operations and the Secretary’s 

situational awareness. 

Recommendation #5: Establish procedures and develop guidance 

to share classified information with the Operations Side in an 

unclassified format, including revised documents and tear lines 

when necessary. 

Recommendation #6: Clear personnel 

 to facilitate information sharing between 

Intelligence and Operations Side personnel. 

Recommendation #7: Cross train law enforcement officers and 

intelligence desk officers assigned to the National Operations 

Center on one another’s duties and responsibilities to gain a better 

understanding of each area of expertise. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 4. In its 

response, OPS management said the current NOC policy is that 

desk officers provide operationally relevant information to the 

SWO. Desk officers may also provide this information to their 

parent organization(s). The current NOC chain is articulated in the 

NOC Desk Officer Guide. OPS management said they will review 

the chain of command with all NOC officers and provide the us 

with a copy of the NOC Desk Officer Guide. 

In addition to the information provided in the guide, each NOC 

watch shift performs an internal drill in which desk officers 

practice the steps they take when responding to real-world 

incidents. Successful completion of these drills requires execution 

of the chain of command. OPS management said that in 2008, the 

NOC conducted drills for scenarios and has conducted 

drills for scenarios in 2009. OPS management added that they will 

provide copies of the scenarios to us. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the NOC 

Desk Officer Guide, which articulates the current NOC chain of 

command and documentation of the watch shift drills in which 

desk officers practice the steps taken when responding to realworld incidents. 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 5. In its 

response, OPS management said the NOC's Intelligence, Watch, 

and Warning element has standing procedures for sanitizing and 

sharing information at all classification levels. Requests for tear 

lines are processed routinely through Intelligence Community 

partners, unclassified information is disseminated via email, 

appropriately cleared information is posted to DHS portals, and 

classified briefings are open to all appropriately-cleared NOC 

personnel. Intelligence, Watch, and Warning personnel also work 

closely with DHS representatives at state and local fusion centers 

and with NOC desk officers to facilitate the sharing of intelligence 

information with federal, state, local, and tribal governments and 

private sector partners. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

Intelligence, Watch, and Warning procedures for sanitizing and 

sharing information at all classification levels and tear line 

documentation. The tear line documentation should include copies 

and the number of tear lines shared with the Operations Side of the 

NOC for FY 2009. 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 6. In its 

response, OPS management said all U.S. government full-time 

employees assigned to the NOC are required to possess a 

 The NOC prefers that all detailees possess 

Many of the 

detailees are assigned to the NOC on rotations of six months or 

less. 

OPS management said that the recently-created OPS Detailee 

Affairs Program is drafting MOUs with component and 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 27 
interagency partners to establish standard operating procedures. 

The MOUs will stipulate longer time commitments from 

interagency partners. With respect to personnel detailed from the 

federal interagency community, home agencies must sponsor 

 OPS will require that federal agencies sponsor 

their employees for , per DHS policy. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of MOUs 

with the component and interagency partners. These MOUs 

should require longer commitments from interagency partners and 

that federal agencies sponsor their employees for 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 7. In its 

response, OPS management said the NOC provides training to 

operations desk officers so they better understand how to request 

and use intelligence products. The NOC also provides training to 

intelligence analysts so they better understand the level of support 

needed by various operations desk officers. NOC management 

stated they have co-located full-time NOC personnel with law 

enforcement backgrounds with intelligence personnel to expedite 

the learning process. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open until our receipt of materials 

used to train operations desk officers on how to request and use 

intelligence products, and intelligence analysts training materials 

on the level of support various operations desk officers need. 

Formal Agreements With Participating Components and 

Agencies Are Needed 

Formal agreements are needed with all agencies that detail 

personnel to the NOC. Formal commitments ensure that detailed 

personnel clearly understand their roles and responsibilities, and 

they are less likely to return to their original organization with little 

prior notice. Currently, only one Memorandum of Agreement 

(MOA) exists, with the Department of Defense for the National 

Geospatial-Intelligence Agency desk officer. The NOC needs to 

institute formal MOAs with all participating DHS components and 

external agencies. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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The MOAs should define, at a minimum, the duration and 

commitment of the detail, the duties and responsibilities, and the 

professional or subject matter expertise of the detailees. DHS 

headquarters should initiate these formal agreements and have each 

agency participating in NOC operations or detailing personnel to 

the NOC sign an agency-specific agreement. Executing MOAs 

will ensure that expectations are fully met and adequately 

communicated to component organizations. The agreements will 

also provide NOC officials with the necessary level of 

commitment to expend resources to obtain higher-level security 

clearances. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #8: Establish formal Memoranda of 

Agreement with Department of Homeland Security components 

and organizations providing desk officers to the National 

Operations Center. The agreements should define, at a minimum, 

the duration of the detail, required clearance level, duties and 

responsibilities, and the required area and level of expertise. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 8. In its 

response, OPS management said they recently created a Detailee 

Affairs Program that will establish and coordinate MOAs with 

components and organizations. These MOAs will define the 

duration of the details, the required clearance levels, generic duties, 

and management responsibilities. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’s proposed actions responsive 

to the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the 

Detailee Affairs Program position descriptions, evidence that the 

positions have been filled, and copies of MOAs. 

Desk Officer Training Needs Improvement 

NOC managers said they had implemented an effective training 

program for the NOC SWO and ASWO reorganization. SWO and 

ASWO detailees received training that included classroom 

instruction, shadowing existing SWOs and ASWOs, and written 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 29 
and oral examinations. They also received comprehensive study 

materials and an informative training handbook. However, these 

materials were not available to desk officers previously detailed to 

the NOC. Many desk officers interviewed said that an effective 

training program would help them understand their responsibilities 

and optimize their ability to achieve desired goals. 

NOC managers contend that training opportunities provided to new 

employees are adequate, although they acknowledge that there is 

room for improvement. In direct contrast to statements of NOC 

management, several desk officers reported that they received no 

formal training when they began their NOC detail. These officers 

told us there was no guidance describing day-to-day 

responsibilities, and all training occurred on the job. One detailed 

desk officer said there was a general orientation to DHS 

headquarters and the Nebraska Avenue Complex. However, this 

did little to prepare him for duty at the NOC. The training focused 

on proximity to eating establishments, parking, and facility layout. 

This desk officer described his indoctrination to the NOC as a 

“trial by fire.” 

NOC desk officers said that new desk officers relied heavily on 

other NOC personnel to train them. Some desk officers obtained 

individually created handbooks left by their predecessors that 

explained duties and responsibilities. Standard instructions would 

help ensure that new desk officers are aware of all aspects of their 

jobs. 

The reliance on other NOC personnel and predecessors is 

problematic because detailees may be unwilling to ask questions 

when they need assistance or information. Desk officers need to 

be trained not only on their own duties and responsibilities, but 

also on the duties and responsibilities of all other NOC personnel. 

One desk officer said the NOC would benefit greatly by instituting 

an intensive training course on duties and responsibilities. He said 

that the NOC should also train detailees in the duties and 

responsibilities of other desks. Cross training would allow 

individual desk officers to understand the duties and 

responsibilities of their counterparts from other components better. 

In addition to developing and implementing training for desk 

officers, NOC officials need to create an employee handbook that 

provides useful information to incoming detailees. An employee 

handbook would provide a quick reference tool to help 

inexperienced desk officers gain information on multiple subjects. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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This handbook should familiarize desk officers with general 

operations, desk officer duties and responsibilities, computer 

systems, accessibility of programs, and proper classification 

procedures. 

Some Desk Officers Are Not Prepared to Handle National 

Operations Center Duties 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #9: Develop an orientation and training 

program for new desk officers on the duties and responsibilities of 

all National Operations Center desks. This program should include 

the development and distribution of a handbook that familiarizes 

personnel with general operations, desk officer duties and 

responsibilities, computer systems, accessibility of programs, and 

proper classification procedures. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 9. In its 

response, OPS management said the NOC staff has published a 

NOC Desk Officer Guide that includes information on general 

NOC operations, computer systems, available programs, and 

classification procedures. The NOC Desk Officer Guide continues 

to be updated. The staff is currently documenting the duties and 

responsibilities of each desk officer and will add the results to the 

NOC Desk Officer Guide. Additionally, the NOC has hired a 

training officer to focus on individual and collective training needs 

and issues. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending evidence that the 

training officer position has been filled, our receipt of detailed 

training plans for new desk officers, and a copy of the updated 

NOC Desk Officer Guide. 

National Operations Center Standard Operating Procedures 

Are Needed 

Although some NOC desk officers have developed standard 

operating procedures on an ad hoc basis, OPS has not established 

comprehensive operating procedures or guidance to define NOC 

roles and responsibilities. NOC management has noted the need 

for operating instructions and standing orders to help maintain 

consistency and accountability. However, NOC management was 

unable to produce formalized standard operating procedures when 

requested. Instead, during our fieldwork we collected operating 

procedures from individual desk officers, many of which were 

outdated or drafted by individual detailees. 

NOC managers said they have not been able to establish formal 

standard operating procedures for each desk because the mission 

constantly changes. Not having standard procedures is most 

problematic for law enforcement desks because the frequent 

turnover of assigned personnel creates a need for continuity. 

Although law enforcement officers have created informal 

procedures, all desk officers told us that headquarters-driven 

standard operating procedures would benefit overall NOC 

operations. Standard procedures would provide continuity for 

incoming detailees. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #10: Create comprehensive standard operating 

procedures that define the duties and responsibilities of each desk 

at the National Operations Center and guide personnel on proper 

actions and procedures. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 10. In its 

response, OPS management said the NOC has a series of standard 

operating procedures and operating instructions in place, and the 

duties and responsibilities of the various desk officers are currently 

being added to the NOC Desk Officer Guide. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. This 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the 

updated NOC Desk Officer Guide, which includes the duties and 

responsibilities specific to each desk assigned to the NOC. 

Daily Exercises Need to Be More Realistic 

NOC personnel participate in daily exercises with scenarios that 

address a variety of events involving multiple DHS components. 

While these exercises can be helpful in maintaining readiness and 

can facilitate information sharing, most NOC personnel told us the 

training scenarios are fairly basic and repetitive. Some stated that 

the exercises were at times factually inaccurate or unrealistic, 

which can be partially attributed to little input by components and 

scenario development by non-subject matter experts. A desk 

officer said, “Exercises repeat themselves and frequency is 

trumping quality and active, full participation.” Other desk 

officers said the training scenarios, although helpful to new 

personnel, do little to challenge more experienced detailees. 

To add value, the frequency and effect of exercises should be 

balanced, involve more participants, and include realistic and 

factually based scenarios to simulate real-world threats, hazards, 

incidents, and events. Additionally, collaboration with 

components would provide opportunities for the exchange of 

information. NOC training personnel should use component 

detailees to create more involved and factually accurate scenarios 

to equip desk officers better to handle real-world scenarios. 

Additionally, the NOC should enhance communication and 

leverage the expertise of other component watch centers to create 

more focused, events-driven training while practicing respective 

roles and responsibilities. For instance, the NOC could leverage 

training scenarios created by the TSOC, CBP’s Commissioner’s 

Situation Room, and the NRCC to further train NOC personnel. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 33 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #11: Enhance communication with 

components and leverage subject matter expertise to create 

exercise scenarios that include realistic and factually based 

scenarios 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 11. In its 

response, OPS management said the NOC has improved 

coordination with components and interagency partners prior to 

and during training events, and the NOC continues to create more 

integrated training scenarios. NOC management reiterated that 

each NOC watch shift conducts drills. SWOs and ASWOs draft 

these drills, 

 They also added that they will further improve 

exercise scenarios and drills by involving component subject 

matter experts in the creation of more

 NOC management said they recently 

hired a NOC training officer to focus on training needs and issues. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation that demonstrates component subject matter 

experts’ involvement in exercise scenario and drill development. 

Infrastructure and Information Technology Issues Affect 

Collaboration 

improvements are necessary to enable the NOC to realize its full potential 

as DHS’ principal operations center for providing situational awareness 

for federal, state, local, and tribal governments in the event of a natural or 

manmade disaster or act of terrorism. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 34 
Personnel Would Benefit From an Upgraded Facility or 

Build-out 

Most NOC personnel we spoke with said the current facility is 

inadequate to support the NOC’s unique demands. The building 

housing the NOC cannot accommodate the number of personnel 

required to operate a watch operation of its size. NOC personnel 

said the need to update the facility is self-evident, and we agree. 

NOC management is aware that the facility is inadequate and has 

made efforts to relocate. On June 29, 2007, DHS’ Undersecretary 

for Management submitted a letter to Congress requesting a 

reallocation of approximately $25 million to fund construction of a 

new NOC facility at the department’s TSOC in Herndon, Virginia. 

Although congressional officials recognized the “significant 

limitations of the existing facility,” Congress did not approve the 

reallocation of funds. The response to the request is in Appendix H. 

All NOC personnel we spoke with expressed the need for a 

significant build-out of current facilities or a complete relocation to 

a new or better equipped facility. Additionally, many personnel 

suggested that the NOC would benefit from being co-located with 

the TSOC or the NICC to enhance professional relationships. 

They said the existing building and infrastructure could not be 

improved sufficiently to support operations, and thought that 

having a structure near another watch center would improve 

synergy and situational awareness. 

Deficiencies Exist in Equipment and Information Technology 

Support 

We observed equipment and IT deficiencies at the NOC; 

management did not provide us with statistics on equipment 

outages and IT support requests. 

Despite assurances by managers that the situation has improved, 

most NOC personnel we spoke with indicate that issues 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 35 
NOC Intelligence Side desk officers use multiple systems and 

monitors at each workstation to access classified and unclassified 

information. When one of the monitors or hard drives fails to 

operate, personnel use unclassified systems at one workstation to 

access unclassified systems and augment their usage with classified 

systems at another workstation. This “leapfrogging” between 

workstations has lasted for as long as three days. On a few 

occasions, analysts have gutted some computers to use parts for 

others, rather than wait for IT support. 

Many equipment issues stem from the wear and tear 

Dust and fluctuations in 

temperature affect hard drives and other equipment such as servers 

and copiers. Deficiencies are not limited to hardware, but also 

extend to software.

 I&A personnel said that system malfunctions 

sometimes complicate the sharing of necessary information with 

senior leadership during briefings. 

Although equipment issues and response times are major factors 

affecting NOC operations, a detailed analysis of related data could 

not be conducted because appropriate tracking mechanisms are not 

in place. OPS were unable to provide relevant data related to the 

frequency of equipment failures and IT support requests. Tracking 

and cataloging such data would enable NOC personnel to analyze 

problem areas, identify trends, and determine possible solutions to 

equipment issues better. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

Page 36 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #12: Provide onsite 24/7 technical support for 

Information 

and communications systems in the National Operations Center, 

and ensure the capability 

 exists, so that management can address problem 

areas related to equipment failures and deficiencies in information 

technology support. 

Recommendation # 13: Invest in computer technology to 

address deficiencies and 


issues at the National Operations Center. 


Recommendation #14: Communicate to all personnel their ability 

to access the Homeland Security Information Network on their 

individual workstations, and formally train all personnel on its 

situational awareness and information sharing capabilities. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 12. In its 

response, OPS management said a process and application to 

in use by the NOC. OPS 

management added that they do not have the resources required for 

onsite 24/7 technical support.

 A report summarizing identified problems and 

associated corrective actions is provided to the Office of the Chief 

Information Officer and OPS’ Chief Information Officer. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of OPS’ 

requests for onsite 24/7 technical support to the NOC, and copies 

of the weekly reports used to summarize identified problems and 

associated corrective actions for FY 2009. 

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OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 13. In its 

response, OPS management said it contributes to a Working 

Capital Fund for the specific purpose of providing funding to the 

DHS Office of the Chief Information Officer, which is responsible 

for refreshing/replacing OPS IT equipment. Currently, the only 

NOC computers being replaced are those that stop functioning. 

The OPS Chief Information Officer is working with the DHS 

Office of the Chief Information Officer to finalize a plan for 

regular upgrades to and replacement of computer equipment in the 

NOC. In addition to 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The response to 

the recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the 

final plan that specifies the timeline for equipment replacement. 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 14. In its 

response, OPS management said all operations, intelligence, 

emergency management, and law enforcement personnel in the 

NOC are trained on and have access to HSIN. Individuals are 

provided the requisite password, granted access to various 

communities of interest, and receive training on how to log on to 

and navigate HSIN. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open until OPS provides us with 

documentation of a formal training plan that includes training 

requirements for HSIN. 

Staffing Inefficiencies Need to Be Addressed 

Although NOC officials have made some progress concerning staffing, 

inefficiencies that could affect information sharing remain. For example, 

some key NOC operations are dependent on contract support personnel. 

Should current contractor support be removed, the continuity of NOC 

operations and information sharing could be disrupted, as contractors have 

taken on increased duties and responsibilities. 

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Some contractors may be performing inherently governmental functions. 

For example, one contractor has program manager responsibilities and 

oversees seven NOC functions: the fusion desk, the Tracker, the 

Knowledge Management Officer, the 

representative, the Secretary’s Briefing Staff, the 

chemical/biological/radiological/nuclear desk, the explosive incidents 

desk, and the state and local law enforcement desks. The contractor is 

also performing all fusion desk duties. While a review to determine 

whether NOC contractors are performing inherently governmental 

functions is outside the scope of this review, we believe the issue warrants 

further attention by our office. 

National Operations Center Reliance on Contract Support Has 

Increased 

The NOC relies heavily on contractor staff to perform its mission 

functions. Since FY 2006, the NOC’s use of contractors has 

increased 195%. Sixty-two percent of the NOC’s FY 2009 budget 

is designated for contract support. NOC management plans to 

spend $11.2 million for contract support in FY 2009. By 

comparison, NOC management spent $3.8 million on contractors 

in FY 2003 (see Figures 6 and 7). 

Figure 6: NOC Contract Funding for FY 2006 to 2009 

3.8 

5.2 

7.8 

11.2 

0 

2 

4 

6 

8 

10 

12 

2006 2007 2008 2009 

Fiscal Years 

Amount ($ in millions) 

Source: OIG Analysis of NOC contracting funding data 

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Figure 7: NOC FY 2009 Funding Allocation 

Government 

Employees 

30% 

Other 

8% 

Contractors 

62% 

Source: OIG Analysis of NOC contracting funding data 

A SWO said contractors were needed in the first three years, but 

that they should have been subsequently replaced with full-time 

federal employees. The SWO also said that contractors’ technical 

expertise is not as important as stated by management, and some 

contractors’ jobs could be performed by a federal government 

General Schedule grade 9 or 11. Another desk officer said that 

only a few NOC employees are federal employees and that most 

are contractors, which may indicate that some contractors are 

performing inherently governmental functions. 

The NOC contracts for the Communications Watch Officer, 

Knowledge Management Officer, Fusion Desk Officer, Tracker, 

HSIN Desk Officer, Incident Management Desk Officer, and 

media monitoring desk officer positions, and for a NOC senior 

advisor. The Communications Watch Officer initiates the NOC 

conference calls, takes roll call of call participants, takes notes 

during such calls, monitors the calls for clarity, and conducts tests 

of each call list. The Incident Management Officer takes notes 

during NOC conference calls and prepares the related NOC Call 

Summary Report. 

NOC management said the reliance on contractors is due to the 

need for more experienced staff and the inability to hire staff for 

shift work. According to NOC management, there is an effort to 

replace some of the contract support with full-time government 

employees. However, no developmental plan is in place for 

federal employees. A NOC manager told us the center will 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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gradually stop using contract support once the NOC can fill the 

full-time government positions, resulting in significant overall cost 

reductions. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #15: Continue efforts to replace contractors 

with full-time federal employees. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 15. In its 

response, OPS management said that in line with the Secretary's 

desire to reduce reliance on contractors, OPS developed a 4-year 

plan, subject to funding, to hire full-time federal employees to 

perform inherently governmental functions. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the 4­

year plan to hire full-time federal employees to perform inherently 

governmental functions. 

The National Operations Center’s Reorganization Planning 

and Execution Was Deficient 

NOC management described the 2008 reorganization of the SWO 

and ASWO positions as an attempt to provide more variety in 

leadership and to help personnel deal with the high pressures and 

rigorous schedule associated with watch operation positions. The 

reorganization was also an effort to bring in the additional 

expertise of component watch officers. However, the 

reorganization has had an adverse effect on information sharing. 

Intelligence Side personnel are more reluctant to share information 

with the NOC Watch because they do not have professional 

relationships with personnel detailed to the NOC. In addition, one 

SWO could not gain access to the Intelligence Side because he did 

not have Instead, information had to be directed 

to his attending ASWO, resulting in additional delays in decision 

making. The reorganization’s transition did not have formal plans, 

and managers did not explain the changes clearly to NOC 

personnel. NOC managers should have placed more emphasis on 

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developing formal plans for the transition and on communicating 

those plans to NOC personnel. 

Reorganization Had No Formal Plans 

No formal plans or training programs were in place to facilitate the 

NOC reorganization. Although managers assured us that such 

documents and training programs were in place, our interviews, 

data requests, and analysis do not indicate that such documents or 

training programs existed. The only document supplied regarding 

the NOC reorganization was a three-page memorandum titled 

“Converting the National Operations Center Senior Watch Officers 

and Assistant Senior Watch Officer Positions to Reimbursable 

Detailee Positions.” A copy of this document is in Appendix I. 

The memorandum, which was signed by DHS’ Deputy Secretary, 

described how the reorganization “will allow component expertise 

to be represented at the senior level and will bring the experience 

Component personnel gained at the NOC back to their parent 

organizations.” The memorandum provides a general outline of 

proposed changes, but is not a detailed, formal plan. 

Although NOC desk officers acknowledge the need to make 

assignments more sustainable, personnel stress that SWO and 

ASWO detailees need a vetted, established training program before 

taking over operations. The memorandum does not discuss 

training, and does not address who will pay the salaries of former 

SWOs and ASWOs, although it does mention that component 

detailees will be reimbursable. Other than the statement “a 

selection panel will make final selections for the position,” the 

memorandum includes few details relating to the application 

process. 

There are broader implications to not having a formal plan for the 

reorganization. Detailees were assigned to the NOC without 

formal MOAs between DHS headquarters and component 

organizations. This is problematic in that detailed SWOs and 

ASWOs could be pulled back to component organizations with 

little prior notice. In addition, the memorandum dictates that the 

following components are required to nominate at least two people 

for the SWO and ASWO positions, respectively, by 

September 7, 2008: 

• CBP 

• Federal Emergency Management Agency 

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• U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement 

• Transportation Security Administration 

• U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services 

• U.S. Coast Guard 

• U.S. Secret Service 

These components provided fewer applicants than expected, and 

the deadline was extended. However, the reorganization had 

already been announced to NOC personnel, and a number of 

SWOs and ASWOs left for new positions. This situation could 

have created a significant leadership vacuum at the SWO and 

ASWO level. Formal planning documents for the reorganization 

would have provided viable contingency plans to assist NOC 

management in addressing such unforeseen staffing issues. 

Managers Were Not Transparent Regarding Proposed Changes and 

Were Unreceptive to Suggestions 

Despite efforts to communicate the reorganization to components, 

NOC managers’ communications with NOC personnel were not 

transparent regarding the proposed changes to the SWO and 

ASWO positions. Although the reorganization was announced to 

NOC employees in May 2008, affected personnel were not 

provided formal guidance regarding staffing changes. A NOC 

employee told us “it was as if the hammer had dropped, and the 

floor was numb.” Another SWO reported that the SWOs and 

ASWOs were told they needed to find other employment by 

October 1, 2008. Since their positions were not being eliminated 

and staff did not fall under reduction in force provisions, 

employees were not considered displaced within the department 

and were not eligible for unemployment assistance. 

The uncertainty regarding changes to the NOC resulted in anxiety 

and morale issues for all NOC employees. Although the 

department’s Office of the Chief Human Capital Officer offered 

assistance to affected personnel, this assistance was slow to 

materialize. Many SWOs and ASWOs applied for jobs outside 

DHS to ensure continued employment. 

Reorganization plans should have provided a vehicle for input and 

suggestions from displaced SWOs and ASWOs. However, NOC 

management largely dismissed employee suggestions regarding 

changes. Such suggestions were often valid and would have 

resulted in a more effective reorganization. A number of NOC 

employees felt the new SWOs should be staffed from current NOC 

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desk officers. Such staffing would shorten the learning curve of 

detailed personnel and ensure that individuals possessed 

operational knowledge. SWOs and ASWOs also suggested 

keeping on some seasoned personnel to develop standard operating 

procedures and operating instructions. Finally, NOC personnel 

cautioned management about the amount of time it takes to clear 

personnel to the As a result of 

delays in the process, one of the component SWOs has 

been excluded from the NOC’s Intelligence Side. Similar delays 

in the process could result in negative effects on future 

information sharing between the Intelligence and Operations sides. 

Reorganization Timing Was Problematic 

The reorganization’s timing was problematic. The replacement of 

SWOs and ASWOs was scheduled during a series of important 

national events. NOC personnel felt the impending elections, 

ongoing hurricane season, planning for the presidential 

inauguration, and the resulting change of administration created a 

high-stress period and was not the appropriate time to reconstitute 

NOC leadership. These operational concerns likely resulted in the 

decision by NOC management to delay the transition past the 

original date of October 1, 2008. Nevertheless, some component 

detailees assumed responsibility for NOC operations in January 

2009, one week before the inauguration. 

Had a significant event occurred, NOC desk officers expressed 

uncertainty as to whether component detailees possessed the 

knowledge, expertise, and experience to initiate an appropriate 

response. A desk officer expressed concern because the elections 

and resulting change in administrations presented a prime 

opportunity for terrorists to strike. Another NOC employee said 

that even without the elections, the new SWOs and ASWOs would 

face a steep learning curve. Regardless of the possible effects of 

the reorganization, NOC personnel will experience another period 

of transition in two years, when all recently detailed staff complete 

their rotation and return to their parent organizations. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #16: Develop formal planning documents and 

internal guidance for all future staffing changes or organizational 

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realignments, to enhance effective, timely, and accurate 

information sharing and continuity of operations. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 16. In its 

response, OPS management said that during the last two years, 

staffing changes and organizational realignments have reflected the 

implementation of the Mission Blueprint study conducted for OPS 

by Booz Allen Hamilton and delivered to OPS in March 2007. 

Further changes based on new requirements and additional mission 

taskings continually need to be reconciled with the organizational 

structure and capabilities that were previously outlined in the 

Mission Blueprint. OPS management added that they will develop 

a formal plan, which will establish procedures to ensure continued 

operations regardless of staffing changes. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of the 

formal plan that ensures continued operation when faced with 

staffing changes. 

Intelligence Side Would Benefit From Component Detailees 

The NOC’s Intelligence Side would benefit from increased 

involvement of component intelligence officers in day-to-day 

operations. NOC management said the center’s reorganization was 

intended to increase component involvement and leverage the 

expertise of subject matter experts to improve information sharing. 

However, DHS component detailees are largely limited to the 

Operations Side. Although the Intelligence Side is staffed with 

multiple desk officers, there is only one component detailee from 

the U.S. Secret Service. Additional Intelligence Side detailees 

could enhance component relationships, while also providing for a 

more effective exchange of information. 

Detailed intelligence officers would enable the NOC to leverage 

specific areas of expertise to fulfill its mission better. In addition, 

individual DHS components would benefit from increased 

information sharing as detailees gain valuable insight into watch 

and warning functions. At the conclusion of their detail, NOC 

desk officers will have developed key skills and abilities that 

contribute to the overall mission of their component. As a result, 

detailed intelligence officers would gain institutional knowledge 

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and professional contacts necessary to link departmental 

information gathering efforts in the field with efforts at DHS 

headquarters. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Director of the Office of Operations 

Coordination and Planning: 

Recommendation #17: Augment the Intelligence Side of the 

National Operations Center with intelligence officer detailees from 

DHS components to enhance relationships and facilitate 

information sharing. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

OPS Response: OPS concurred with Recommendation 17. In its 

response, OPS management said that while this recommendation is 

fully supported by OPS, it is problematic for components due to 

the limited number of component intelligence analysts. To further 

diversify the NOC’s human capital resources, the OPS Director 

will formally request intelligence analysts and officers from the 

components via the DHS Under Secretary for Intelligence and 

Analysis. 

OIG Analysis: We consider OPS’ proposed actions responsive to 

the recommendation, which is resolved and open. The 

recommendation will remain open pending our receipt of 

documentation that OPS has solicited the DHS Under Secretary for 

Intelligence and Analysis regarding detailing intelligence analysts 

to the NOC and the disposition of those requests. 

Conclusion 

Although OPS has made significant progress at the NOC, a number of 

areas require improvement. Organizational, administrative, infrastructure, 

IT, and staffing obstacles continue to hinder NOC information sharing and 

collaboration. Federal laws such as the Homeland Security Act of 2002 

and the Post Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 require 

the NOC to serve as the principal DHS operations center and provide 

situational awareness for the federal government and for state, local, and 

tribal governments as appropriate. However, because the NOC does not 

possess the operational capacity or authority to require DHS components 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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and other watch centers to channel information through the NOC Watch to 

key decision makers, it is unable to meet these requirements. 

NOC information sharing is further hindered by administrative concerns, 

including disparities in security clearance levels among personnel, a need 

for formal MOAs, and an absence of official standard operating 

procedures. NOC management acknowledges inadequacies related to 

infrastructure, but has been unable to gain funding and approval for a 

sufficient build-out of the current facility or construction of a new facility. 

Furthermore, NOC officials need to address significant staffing 

inefficiencies to improve overall operations and effectiveness. OPS is 

overly reliant on contract support personnel to fill NOC positions, and 

recent staffing changes have been deficient in both planning and 

execution. 

To complete its mission successfully, the NOC needs support from key 

executive department officials and stakeholders. To this end, DHS 

leadership needs to emphasize the NOC’s importance in enhancing 

information sharing efforts throughout DHS, the federal government, and 

with state and local entities and regional fusion centers. Specifically, 

components and component watch centers should be required to direct all 

relevant information to the NOC to ensure that critical terrorism, law 

enforcement, and disaster-related information reaches government 

decision makers timely and accurately. 

As DHS leadership emphasizes the NOC’s importance and key 

department officials provide the requisite support to its operations, the 

NOC will be positioned better to realize its full potential as intended by 

Congress—as DHS’ principal operations center, providing situational 

awareness for the federal government and for state, local, and tribal 

governments, as appropriate, in the event of a natural or manmade disaster 

or act of terrorism. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We assessed information sharing at the NOC in response to a 

request from U.S. Representative Bennie G. Thompson, Chairman 

of the House Committee on Homeland Security. Our review 

focused on the functional and organizational changes DHS made to 

the NOC after Hurricane Katrina to manage the flow of 

information better. Our objectives were to determine whether: 

•	 New procedures instituted ensure that incoming reports are 

appropriately directed within the center; 

•	 Information is reviewed and disseminated timely to key 

department officials; and 

•	 Information is coordinated efficiently and effectively with 

other federal, state, and local government partners that have 

a role in response operations. 

To accomplish our objectives, we reviewed the NOC’s current and 

former processes for managing the flow of information to ensure 

that incoming reports are appropriately directed within the center. 

This included reviewing all relevant NOC and OPS regulations, 

policies, and procedures, as well as interviewing NOC employees. 

We analyzed six past events during which information had been 

reviewed and disseminated to key department officials to 

determine whether the information reported was relevant, useful, 

and timely. 

To assess whether information was coordinated efficiently and 

effectively with other federal, state, and local partners, we 

examined current NOC staff composition, situational awareness 

tools used by personnel, relevant working groups, relationships 

between the NOC and mission partners, participation in training 

and joint exercises, and processes used to communicate real-time 

information to DHS leadership. 

Although our review focused on DHS headquarters personnel, we 

interviewed more than 100 NOC staff, as well as others from DHS 

components and mission partners. For comparative purposes, we 

also visited coordination and operations centers in the Washington, 

DC, metropolitan area. We visited the department’s NRCC, 

Mount Weather Facility, NICC, TSOC, U.S. Coast Guard 

Command Center, CBP’s Commissioner’s Situation Room, NTCPassenger, and NTC-Cargo. In addition, we visited other federal 

department operation centers, such as the Office of the Director of 

National Intelligence’s National Counter Terrorism Center and the 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Department of Defense’s National Joint Operations Intelligence 

Center. 

Our fieldwork began in June 2008 and concluded in April 2009. 

We initiated this review under the authority of the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended, and according to the “Quality 

Standards for Inspections,” issued by the President’s Council of 

Integrity and Efficiency. 

Information Sharing at the National Operations Center 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

National Operation Center Watch Participants 

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Appendix D 

National Operation Center Operations and Intelligence Participants 

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Appendix E 

National Operations Center Operational Phases and Director’s Criteria 

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Appendix F 

Key Actions, Deliverables, and Target Audience 

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Appendix G 

DHS Operations Center Working Group Participants 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services Command Center 

U.S. Coast Guard Command Center 

U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team Operations Center 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner’s Situation Room 

Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Joint Analysis Center 

Federal Air Marshal Service Mission Operations Center 

Federal Emergency Management Agency Operations Center 

U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Operations Center 

Incident Management Cell, Contingency Planning & Incident 

Management Division – Office of Infrastructure Protection, National 

Protection and Programs Directorate 

National Coordination Center – National Communications System, 

National Protection and Programs Directorate 

National Operations Center 

Office of Health Affairs – National Bio-surveillance Integration Center 

Transportation Security Operations Center 

U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Division Duty Desk 

Source: DHS Operations Centers Working Group Charter 

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Appendix H 

Congressional Denial to Move the National Operations Center 

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Appendix H 

Congressional Denial to Move the National Operations Center 

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Appendix I 

Deputy Secretary Request for National Operations Center Detailees 

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Appendix I 

Deputy Secretary Request for National Operations Center Detailees 

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Appendix I 

Deputy Secretary Request for National Operations Center Detailees 

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Appendix J 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Marcia Moxey Hodges, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

Angela Garvin, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland 

Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

McKay Smith, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections 

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Appendix K 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

Deputy Chiefs of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretariat 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

Under Secretary for Office of Intelligence and Analysis 

Director for Office of Operations Coordination and Planning 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Operations Coordination Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as 

appropriate 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4100, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG HOTLINE 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal or noncriminal 

misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, 

Attention: Office of Investigations - Hotline, 

245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528. 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.