# Supreme Court of Louisiana

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE NEWS RELEASE #027

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 26th day of June, 2019 , are as follows:

PER CURIAM :
2018 -K K -1 518 STATE OF LOUISIANA v. KELLY FOLSE (Parish of Jefferson) On this record, we cannot say whether defendant merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority, see Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548

– 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), or validly consented to provide her passcode in exchange for the phone. We are also unable from this record to determine whether the officer acted reasonably in good faith, as urged by the State, or the police conduct was coercive and indicative of bad faith, as the court of appeal found. Therefore, rather than rule on the merits of such significant questions on a deficient record, we reverse the court of appeal, and we remand to the district court to conduct further evidentiary proceedings, after which the district court is directed to reconsider whether the e vidence ought to be suppressed.

REVERSED AND REMANDED. WEIMER, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
reasons assigned by Just ice GENOVESE, J., dissents for the Weimer.06/26/19

S UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

No . 201 8-KK- 1518
S TATE OF LOUISIANA
VE RSUS

KELLY FOLSE

O N WRIT OF CERTIO R ARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

PE R CURIAM

D efendant, a veterinarian, was charged with aggravated cruelty to animals, La.R.S. 14:102.1, and illegal use of a weapon, La.R.S. 14:94, arising from the allegation she shot her neighbor’s dog in River Ridge. 1 Defendant was arrested and her home was searched pursuant to arrest and search wa rrants. Her iPhone was seized at the time of her arrest. Access to the phone was locked by a passcode

. On December 19, 2017, p olice obtained a search warrant to extract and
examine the contents of the phone. On January 3, 2018, d efendant came to the

Detec tive Bureau, accompanied by her lawyer, to retrieve her phone. It is not clear how that event was arranged, and t he extent of counsel’s participation in the
arrangement is not known . It is clear, however, that she consulted with the attorney
who accompanie d her as well as with additional counsel by phone. At some point, s he was informed that police had a search warrant for the phone but they would return it to her after she provided the passcode and they

1 A search of defendant’s residence also resulted in charges of possession of a legend drug without a prescription (methocarbamol), La.R.S. 40:1060.13, and possession of a controlled dangerous substance (diazepam), La.R.S. 40:969.2 extracted a copy of its contents. However, t he 10

- da y period provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 163(C) (“a search warrant cannot be lawfully executed after the expiration of the tenth day after its issuance”) had passed at that time. It is not clear who ( if anyone) was aware of that fact. Under circumstances that were not well developed at the evidentiary hearing, d efendant ultimately provided her passcode , her data was extracted, and her phone returned to her. Defendant moved to suppress the contents of the phone because the warrant had expired at the time the pho ne was searched. The district court found that the
warrant could not be executed because the 10

- day period provided in La.C.Cr.P.
art. 163 (C) had passed. However, because defendant, with the assistance of counsel, consented to the search by providing her p asscode in exchange for the return of her phone, the district court denied defendant’s motion to suppress. The court of appeal held that defendant’s consent to search her phone was not free and voluntary because it was given only after an officer asserted that she had a warrant to search the phone, citing Bumper v. North Carolina , 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968) for the proposition : “ [A] law enforcement officer cannot rely upon the authority of a warrant to obtain a person’s consent to a search of his or her property. Such conduct is coercive and, in our view, indicative
of bad faith.” State v. Folse , 18

- 0458, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 8/16/18) (unpub’d). Therefore, the court of appeal reversed the district court’s denial of defendant’s
motio n to suppress and remanded for further proceedings.
The State contends the c ourt of appeal erred because La.C.Cr.P. art. 163(D)(2), which pertains to the examination or testing of seized property, authorized the police to extract the data from defendant’s phone notwithstanding
the 10

- day period limiting the execution of the search warrant established in La.C.Cr.P. art. 163(C). Alternatively, if La.C.Cr.P. art. 163(D)(2) does not apply,3 the State argues that the officer acted reasonably in good faith believ ing it applied, 2
defendant consented to the search, 3 or the inevitable discovery exception to the warrant requirement applie s
. 4 After examining La.C.Cr.P. art. 163(D)(2) in its context, one thing is certain : The legislature has failed to keep pace with de veloping information technology as
it involve s the enduring rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. Cf. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(e)(2)(B). We are not prepared to adopt the State’s expansive and novel reading of Art. 163, as applied to the poorly developed facts here, particularly given the record before us, which includes an evidentiary hearing that contains just under a dozen pages of testimony, and which inspires more questions
than it answers. Therefore, we decline to consider the State’s firs t argument regarding the applicability of La.C.Cr.P. art. 163(D)(2) , particularly in light of what might amount to a concession in the court below that this provision does not squarely apply

. 5

As to the State’ s remaining claims, the sparse record on thos e issues also
stands as an insurmountable obstacle to their resolution

. T he circumstances under which the phone was arranged to be returned, and under which defendant ultimately agreed to furnish the pas scode in exchange , were only skeletally developed at t he suppression hearing. The role of counsel, also unknown, may
further complicate matters . On this record, we cannot say whether defendant merely acquiesced to a claim of lawful authority, see Bumper v. North Carolina , 391 U.S. 543, 548

– 550, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1792, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), or validly consented to provide her pas scode in exchange for the phone. We are also unable

2 See generally United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1990).

3 See generally Schneckloth v. Bustamente , 412 U. S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).

4 See generally Nix v. Williams , 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984).4 from this record to determine whether the officer acted reasonably in good faith, as urged by the State , or the police conduct was coer cive and indicative of bad faith, as the court of appeal found. Therefore, rather than rule on the merits of such significant questions on a deficient record , we reverse the court of appeal, and we
remand to the district court to conduct f urther evidentiar y proceedings, after which the district court is directed to reconsider whether the evidence ought to be suppressed.
REVERSED AND REMANDED

5 See State’s Exhibit B, pp. 5

– 6.

### 0 6/2 6 /1 9

SUPREM E CO URT O F LO UISIANA

NO. 2 0 1 8 -KK-1 51 8

STATE OF LOUI SI A NA

VERSUS

KELLY FOLSE

O N W RIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

W EI MER, J
. , d i ss en t i n g

. Th e m ajo ri ty

es s en t i al ly

h o l d s t h at t h e l aw reg ard i n g cel l p h o n e s earch es h as

n o t k ep t pace w i t h t ech n o l o g y an d p ro v i d e s t h e s t at e an o t h er o p p ort u n i t y to ju s t i fy

a s earch o f t h e d efen d an t ’ s cel l p h o n e wh en t he s t at e’ s fi rs t effo rt s fai led t o s h o w t h e

s earch co m

p l i ed wi t h s t at ut o ry

an d co n s t i t u t io n al m an d at es . I res pect fu l ly d i s s en t

. Nearl y fi v e y e a r s a g o , th e Un i t ed St at es Su p rem e Co u rt d es cri b ed i n g reat
d et ai l t h e c o nstitutional l y -p ro t ect ed p ri v acy i nt eres t s t h at are p res en t ed w h en , as h ere,

t h e go v ern m en t wi s h es t o s earch a cel l ph o n e t h at i s b een s e i zed in ci d en t al t o an

arres t

. Ri l ey v . Ca l i fo rni a , 5 7 3 U.S. 3 7 3 (2 0 1 4 ). Th e Co u rt o b s erv ed t h at “ [m ] o d ern
cel l p h o nes , as a cat eg o ry , im p l i cat e p ri vacy co ncern s far b ey o n d t h o s e im p l i cat ed by

t h e search of a ci g aret t e p ack , a wal l et , o r a p urs e.” I d
. at 39 3

. “ Befo re cel l p h o n es ,

a search of a p ers on was li m i ted b y p h y s i cal real i t i es an d t en ded as a g en eral m at t er

t o co n st i t u te o n l y

a n arro w i n t ru s i o n o n pri v acy

. ” I d
. No w, h o wev er, a cel l p h o n e

m ay co n t a i n “ [ t ]h e s u m o f an i n d iv i d u al ’ s p ri v at e l i fe,” w i t h d et ai l s s uch as b an k

s t at em en t s , ad d res s es , m es s ag es , n ot es , p res cri p t i o n s , p h o t o g rap h s , an d v i d eo s

. I d
.
at 3 94

. To t h i s l i t an y , I ad d m ed i cal reco rd s, wh i ch ar e am o n g t h e m o s t p ri v at e o f

m at t ers t h at s h o u ld b e s afe fro m g o v ern m en t v i ew.Th e s earch warran t t h e s t at e o b t a i n ed h ere was co n s is ten t wi t h t h e Ri l ey

Co u rt ’ s ru l i n g “ no t t h at t h e in fo rm at i o n on a cel l p h o n e i s i m m u n e fro m s earch ; [t h e
Co u rt ’ s ru l i n g ] i s i n s t ead t h at a warra n t i s g en eral l y req u ired b efo re s u ch a s earch ,

ev en wh en a cel l p ho n e i s s ei zed i n c i d e n t t o arres t .” Id
. at 4 0 1

. Th e fu n d am en t al

p ro b lem i n t h i s cas e is t h at t h e t i m e fo r co n du ct i n g a s earch s p eci fi ed i n t he warran t
h ad ex p i red

. Lo n g befo re t h e ad v en t o f cel l p h o n es , i n t h e cri m i n al l ex ico n , t h e t erm

“ s t al e warran t ” was co i n ed fo r t h i s s i t u at i o n

. No t ech no l o g ical i s s u e s t y m i ed t h e s t at e an d c au sed i t s s earch w arran t t o g o

s t al e. Th i s cas e s h o ul d, t h erefo re, b e an al y zed u nd er w el l -es t ab l i sh ed p ri n ci p l es to

as cert ai n wh et h er an ex cep t i on t o t h e warran t req u i rem en t ap p li es

. Th e s tat e arg u es t h at t he o ffi cer act ed reas on ab l y i n g o o d fai t h b el i ev i n g t h e

s earch warran t ap p l i ed , 1 d efen d an t c o n s e n t ed to th e search , 2 or t h e i n ev i t ab l e
d i s co v ery ex cep t io n t o t h e war r an t req u irem en t ap p li es

. 3 W h et her rel y i ng o n t h e

g o o d fai t h ex cep t i o n, t he i n ev i tab l e d i s co v ery ex cep t io n , o r d efen d an t ’ s co n s en t , in
each i n s t an ce t h e St at e u l t i m at el y carri es t h e b u rd en o f p ro o f. See U ni ted Sta tes v.
Ga nt , 7 5 9 F.2 d 4 8 4 , 4 8 7 -8 9 (5 t h Ci r. 1 9 8 5 ); Sta t e v . V i g ne , 0 1-2 9 4 0 , p

. 9 (La.

6 / 2 1 / 0 2 ), 8 2 0 So .2 d 5 3 3 , 5 3 9 (ci t i n g N i x v . W i l l i a m s , 4 67 U.S. 4 3 1 , 44 4 , 1 0 4 S.Ct

. 2 5 0 1 , 2 5 0 9 , 8 1 L.Ed .2 d 3 7 7 (1 9 8 4 )); Sta te v . Edw a rds , 4 3 4 So .2 d 39 5 , 3 9 7 (La.

1 9 8 3 ).

Th e co u rt o f ap p eal h el d t h at d efen d an t ’ s co n s en t t o search h er p ho n e was n ot
free an d v o l u n tary b ecau s e i t was g i v en o n l y aft er an o ffi cer as s ert ed t h at s h e h ad a

warran t t o s earch t h e p h o n e, ci t i n g Bum per v . No rth Ca ro l i na , 3 9 1 U.S. 5 4 3 , 8 8

1 See g e nerally United States v. Leon , 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L .Ed.2d 677 (1990).

2 See g enerally Schneckloth v. Bustam ente , 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2 0 41, 36 L

. Ed.2d 8 54 (1973).

3 See g e nerally Nix v. William s , 467 U.S. 431, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L .Ed.2d 377 (1984).
2S.Ct . 1 7 8 8 , 2 0 L.Ed .2 d 7 9 7 (1 96 8 ). Th at rat i o nal e i s s el f-ex p lan at ory an d i s am p l y

s u p p ort ed by t he ev i d en t i ary reco rd

. Ho wev er, th e ap p el l at e co u rt al s o n o t ed

– b u t d id

n o t an al y ze– t h e co erci ve p o wer o f t h e o ffi cer p ro m i s i n g t o ret u rn t h e ph o ne o n l y aft er
d efen d an t co m

p l i ed wi t h t h e s earch . Co erci o n , t h i s co u rt h as ex pl ai ned , can d efeat

a p e r s o n ’s c o n sen t t o search

. See Sta te v. Ho w a rd , 1 5-1 4 0 4 , p p

. 8 -9 (La. 5 / 3 / 1 7 ),

2 2 6 So .3 d 4 1 9 , 4 2 5 -2 6 (“ To b e v al i d , co n s en t m u s t b e

... free a n d vo l u n t ary , in
ci rcu m s t an ces t h at i n d i cat e t h e co n s en t was n o t t he p ro d u ct o f c o e r c i o n , t h reat ,
p ro m i s e, p res s u re o r d u res s t hat wo u l d n eg at e t h e v o l u n t ari nes s

... .”).

To t h e Ri l ey Co u rt ’ s o b s erv at i o n s ab o ut t h e p ri vat e m at eri al s cel l p ho n es m ay

co n tai n , I ad d t h e fo ll o w i ng ad d it i o n al o b s erv at i o n s ab o u t w h y t h e s tat e h el d a

co erci v e ad v an t ag e wh en t h e offi cer t o ld t h e d efen d an t s h e n eed ed t o un l o ck h er cel l

p h o n e an d co n sen t t o i t s s earch as a co n di t i o n fo r p o l ice t o ret urn i t

. Cel l p h o n es are freq uen t l y a p ers on ’ s s o l e m ean s o f t rack i ng s ch ed u l e s a n d ap p o in t m en t cal en d ars ,

as wel l an ex cl u s i ve m ean s o f tel eco m m u n i cat i o n , si n ce rel i an ce o n cel l p h o n es h as
l ed t o few p eo pl e m ai n t ai ni n g l an dl i n es

. Cel l ph o nes are al s o q u i t e ex p en s i v e, an d

p u rch as in g a rep l acem en t p ho n e an d s erv i ce co n t ract co ul d b e d i ffi cu l t fo r a s u d d en l y

u n em p l o y ed d efen d an t faci n g ex t en s i v e leg al bi l l s

. W i t h ou t h er p h on e, d efen d an t
l i kel y h ad n o eas y way t o co m m u n i cat e wi t h h er fam i l y , o r ev en co n t act em erg en cy

s erv i ces i f n eed b e. Co m m u n i cat i n g wi t h h er l awy er wo u l d al so p red ict ab l y b e a

p ro b lem

. As p art o f t h e ju s t i fi cat i o n fo r rem an d i n g t hi s m at t er, t h e m ajo ri t y n o t es t h at t h e
d efen d an t was act u al ly acco m p an i ed b y h er l awy er w h en s h e wen t t o ret ri ev e h er cel l

p h o n e fro m th e p o l i ce. Th e m ajo ri t y ap p ears t o v i e w a s a n o p en q u es t i o n wh y t h e
l awy er d id n ot b eco m e m o re in v o l v ed i n t h e t ran s act i o n wi th p o li ce. Un d er t h e l aw,

t h i s i s n o t an o pen q u es t i o n. U n d er t h e l aw, i t i s n ei t h er po l i ce, n o r d efen s e co u n s el ,

3wh o deci d e wh et h er a warran t i s v al i d ; th e l aw res erv es t h at d eci s i o n fo r ju d g es

. See,

e.g . La. C.C.P. art

. 7 03 (A).

As n o t ed earl i er, t h e s t at e u rg es t h at p o li ce reas o n ab l y rel i ed o n an ap p aren t l y

v a li d search warran t t h at w as o n l y lat er d is co v ered t o b e st al e. Ho wev er, t h e s t a t e
d o es n o t p ro v i de an y ev i d en ce t o su p p o rt t h is arg u m en t. Rel at ed l y , t h e s t at e arg u es

t h at i t in ev i t ab l y wo u l d h av e v al i d l y search ed t h e cel l p h o n e a f t e r s eek i n g an d

o b t ai n i n g a “ fres h ” warran t

. Th e reco rd on t h at l at t er p o i nt , h owev er, i s d ev el o p ed
b u t d o es n o t s u p p o rt t h e st at e’ s p o s it i o n

. At t h e s u p p res s io n h eari n g , a cas e d et ect i v e
ack n owl ed ged o n cro s s-ex am i n at i o n t hat “ t h ere’ s no t h i n g s p eci f ic a bout this c as e t h at

cau s ed [h er] t o b el i ev e t h at t h ere was g o i n g t o b e ev id en ce o n [d efen d an t ’ s ] p h o n e,”
b ey o n d h er g en eral “ ex p eri en ce as a p o l i ce o ffi cer t h at o ft en ti m es p eo p l e wi l l h av e
i n cri m i nat i n g i n fo rm at i on o n t h e i r ph o n e.” Th i s t es ti m o n y rev eal s t h e o pp o s i t e o f

p ro b ab l e cau s e t o b el i ev e t he cel l p h o n e co nt ai n ed ev i d en ce g erm an e t o t h i s cas e.
See La. C.Cr.P. art

. 1 6 2 (“ A s earch warran t m ay i s s u e o n ly u p on p ro b ab l e cau s e

es t ab l i s h ed to t h e s at i s fact io n o f t h e ju d g e, by t h e affi d av it o f a cr e d i b l e p ers o n,
reci ti n g fact s es t ab li s h in g t h e cau s e fo r i s su an ce o f t h e warran t .”); s ee al s o Sta te v
. Ca s e , 3 6 3 So .2 d 4 8 6 , 48 8 (La.1 9 7 8 ) (“ a warran t m ay n ot i ss u e o n m ere s us p i ci o n ”).

In s u m , I w o u l d affi rm th e co u rt o f ap p eal ’ s ru l in g , wh ich rev ers ed th e d i s t ri ct

co u rt , co n cl u di ng t h at t h e ev i d en ce s ei zed fro m d efen d an t ’s p h o n e m u s t b e

s u p p res s ed

.

406/26/19

S UPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

N o. 2018

- KK

- 1518 STATE OF LOUISIANA VERSUS KELLY FOLSE

O N WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIFTH CIRCUIT, PARISH OF JEFFERSON

G enovese, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Weimer.