Filed 11/13/14 In re I.P. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re I.P., a Pers on Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. MOHAMMAD S., Defendant and Appellant; PAULA P., Defendant and Respondent. D065735
(Super. Ct. No. J518574)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Sa n Diego County, Kenneth J. Medel, Judge. Affirmed. William Hook, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.2 Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Dana C. Shoffner, Deputy Count y Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Jamie A. Moran, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Respondent, Paula P. Mohammad S. appeals the juvenile dependen cy court's order that he bear the cost of his supervised visits with his minor daughter, I.P. Mohammad contends the court exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion. We affirm.
BACKGROUND In December 2012, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a dependency petition for three-year-old I.P. The petition alleged she was exposed to violence between her mother, Paula P., and Mohammad. I.P. wa s detained with a relative. In January 2013, the court entere d a true finding on the petition, ordered I.P. placed with a relative and issued a restra ining order protecting Paula from Mohammad. I.P. then began a 60-day trial vis it with Paula. In July, the tr ial visit became a placement. Mohammad's visits were supervised. He did not take advantage of all the visitation he was allowed. In March 2013 , he was arrested, jailed and charged with violating the restraining order and other offe nses. Mohammad was released from jail in November. In April 2014, the court awarded custod y of I.P. to Paula and allowed Mohammad supervised visits on Sundays, Wednesdays and Fridays from 2:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Paula and Mohammad agreed on a supervisor, a family friend. The court ordered that Mohammad would bear the entire cost of supe rvision at the Family Visitation Center3 should that be required, ordered Paula to investigate an alternative supervisor, and authorized supervision by any person agreed upon by Paul a and Mohammad. The court terminated dependency jurisdiction.
DISCUSSION Mohammad contends that by or dering him to bear the entire cost of supervision at the visitation center, the court abused its di scretion by unreasonably limiting his visits and acted in excess of its jurisdiction. When making a custody order and termina ting dependency jurisdiction, the court may make a visitation order (Welf. & Inst. Code, 1 § 362.4) and place reasonable conditions on visitation ( In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 202-204, 213 [father's visitation conditioned on his progre ss in therapy; father to be financially responsible for visits]). We review a visitation order for abuse of discretion. ( In re Stephanie M . (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319; In re Alexandria M . (2007) 156 Cal.App. 4th 1088, 1095.) In the juvenile court here, the only cont ested issue was "who is going to pay for visitation at a family visitation center." Mohammad did not contend the court lacked jurisdiction to order that he b ear the entire cost. Instead, he asserted that he and Paula should share the cost. Thus , Mohammad impliedly conceded the court had jurisdiction to decide who should pay. Mohammad has forfeite d his right to assert on appeal that the court lacked jurisdiction. ( In re Valerie A . (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1001; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 360, fn. 6.)

1 Statutory references are to the Welfar e and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.4 Mohammad complains that section 362.4 does not "specifically authorize[] a juvenile court to order a parent to pay for the cost of supervised visits . . . after a dependency is terminated." The lack of an e xpress mention of cost in section 362.4 does not deprive the court of the power to address th at issue where, as here, it is essential to setting up a complete, workable system of vi sitation. To conclu de otherwise would deprive the court of its statutory power to ma ke a visitation order. " 'In our view section 362.4[, by] authorizing the court to make . . . visitation orders[,] implicitly authorizes the court to make collateral orders . . . that are reasonably related to the . . . visitation orders.' " ( In re Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th 196 at p. 204 .) Mohammad's citation of section 900 et seq. is also unavailing; gene rally, those sections relate to government support of dependent child ren and parents' liability for that support. Furthermore, there was no abuse of di scretion. Mohammad argues that requiring him to pay the entire cost of the visitation ce nter constituted "a grat uitous tax" designed to punish him for his failure to reunify and was contrary to I.P .'s best interests. The court expressly determined that its order was "not a matter of punishment but . . . a matter of fairness" and the record supports that determin ation. Since Mohammad's visits had to be supervised, the court had to address how the supervision would be accomplished. It was reasonable for the court to conclude that give n the history of the case and the reasons for the supervision requirement, "the interest of e quity or fairness" dictat ed that Paula should not bear the cost of supervision. Paula ha d achieved reunification and bore the expense of caring for I.P. Mohammad's inability to c ontrol himself had led to violation of the restraining order, driving unde r the influence and jail. As a result, Mohammad had never5 achieved unsupervised visitation. It was fair th at he bear the expense of any visits at the visitation center. There is no indication the orde r was inimical to I.P.' s best interests. Mohammad argues the court's order amou nted to a delegation to Paula of the power to determine visits, whic h would be infrequent or nonexistent. He premises this argument on the family friend' s inability to supervise all visits, the probability Paula would not agree to an additio nal supervisor and the likelih ood that "Mohammad . . . lacked the ability to pay," M ohammad's premises are pure speculation. Moreover, his reliance on In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119 is mi splaced. In that case, "[t]he court . . . ordered that father have superv ised visitation 'to be determined by the parents' . . . ." ( Id . at p. 1122.) Such is not the case here. Finally, Mohammad contends that if he se eks a change of the visitation order in family court, he will be prejudiced. He a sserts he will not have appointed counsel; he will have the burden of proof; the family court will defer to the dependency court; and the matter is likely to be handled informally, wi thout a contested hearing. At best, this contention is speculative. We presume the family court knows th e law and properly applies it. ( In re Elizabeth M. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 15 51, 1556, citing Evid. Code, § 664.)6 DISPOSITION The order is affirmed.

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

HALLER, J.

O'ROURKE, J.