### The Honorable Jerry W. Cavaneau, United States Magistrat e 1 

### Judge for the Eastern District of Arkansas, to whom this case was referred for final disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). ___________ No. 96-2253

___________ Ruth A. Kisling, * * Appellant, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Eastern District of Arkansas. Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * of the Social Security * Administration, * * Appellee. *

___________ Submitted: December 9, 1996 Filed: February 5, 1997

___________ Before WOLLMAN, BRIGHT, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

Ru thA. Kisling appeals from the district court's order affirmin g 1 the de cision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration , denying her claim for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits. W e affirm.

I.
Kisling f iled for benefits on January 15, 1993, claiming disability due to ar thritis, bronchitis, and asthma. At her hearing before a n ad ministrative law judge (ALJ), Kisling testified to arthritis pain , bronchitis, asthma, and bad nerves. She also st ated that she often became depressed and angry.

### Dysthymia is a mood disorder characterized by a depresse d 2 

### feeling and loss of interest o r pleasure in one's usual activities that persists for more than two years but is not severe enough to meet t he criteria for major depression. Richard Sloane, Th e Sloane-Dorland Annotated Medical-Legal Dictionary 204 (1992 Supp.). -2- The ALJ found that Kisling suffered from bronchitis and dysthymia

. 2 Analyzing Kisling's claim under the framework outlined in 20 C.F.R. § § 416.920 and 416.920a, the ALJ found that while these impairments wer e severe, they did not meet the requirements for listed impairments. The AL J concluded that Kisling retained the residual functional capacity to perfor m her p ast relevant work as a shirt factory worker, and therefore denie d benefits.

The Appeals Council denied Kisling's request for review. Th e district court grante d summary judgment for the Commissioner. On appeal, Kislin g argues that the Commissioner's decision was not supported b y
su bstantial evidence, that the ALJ's credibility determinations wer e erroneous, and that t he ALJ failed to consider the combined effect of her impairments on her ability to perform her past relevant work.

II.

Our re view on appeal is limited to determining whether th e Commissioner's decision is supported by substant ial evidence on the record
as a whole. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Comstock v. Chater , 91 F.3d 1143, 114 5 (8th Cir. 1996); Johnson v. Chater , 87 F.3d 1015, 1017 (8th Cir. 1996)

. "Substantial evidence is that which a reasonable mind would find a s ade quate to support the Commissioner's decision." Comstock , 91 F.3d a t 1145; see Johnson , 87 F.3d at 1017.

The record clearly supports the Commissioner's determination tha t Kisling's physical impairments do not inhibit her ability to perform her past relevant work. The medical evidence does not show

### Kisling all eges that the ALJ breached his duty to adequately 3 

### develop the record. See Mitchell v. Shalala , 25 F.3d 712, 7 14 (8th Cir. 1994). The record itself, however, is sufficiently dev eloped; the do cuments and testimony simply fail to support Kisling' s claims. -3- that Kisling suffers from arthritis or from any other afflictions tha t might impair her ability to work. Medical recor ds do confirm that Kisling suffers from chronic, and occasionally acute bronchitis, but there is no evidence that her pul monary function is significantly compromised, and no physic ianhas ever restricted her activities because of her pulmonar y sta tus. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record showing tha t Kisling's pulmonary condition would inhibit her ability to work as a shirt factory worker. 3

Fu rthermore, the medical records show that Kisling's respirator y problems are related to her smoking habit. Although her physician s repeatedly recommended that she curb her smoking, Kisling did not heed thi s advice. Impairments that are controllable or am enable to treatment do not support a finding of disability, and "[f]ailure to follow a prescribe d course of remedial treatment without good reasonis grounds for denying an applicati on for benefits." Roth v. Shalala , 45 F.3d 279, 282 (8th Cir

. 1995); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.930(b).

The record also supports the Commissioner's determination tha t Kisling's mental condition does not impair her capacity to perform her pas t relevant work. Kisli ng's treating psychiatrist, Dr. Gary Tharp, noted on December 19, 1992, th at her dysthymia was in remission. In reports dated May 8, 1993 and July 10, 1993, Tharp did note that Kisling exhibite d schizoid avoidance features. In two subsequent reports dated August 28, 1993 and October 30, 1993, however, Tharp does not mention any suc h feat ures. Moreover, in the July 10th, August 28th, and October 30t h reports, Tharp described Kisling as alert and oriented, in a good mood , maintaining a normal speech pattern, exhibiting appropriate

### -4-

reactions, and presenting no evidence of psychosis or suicidal or homicida l thoughts.

We als o find that the ALJ properly assessed the credibility o f Kis ling and her sister and was justified in discounting their testimon y regardi ng Kisling's subjective complaints of pain. The ALJ based hi s credibilityassessment on specific inconsistencies between Kisling' s complaints and the record as a whole, as required by Polaski v. Heckler , 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). He noted the absence of medica l evidence supporting Kisling's subjective complai nts of pain, a factor that suppo rts the discounting of such complaints. See Comstock , 91 F.3d a t 1147. He also relied on the fact that Kisling was not on any pai n medication, which we have held "is `inconsistent with subjective complaint s of disabling pain.'" Johnson , 87 F.3d at 1017 ( quoting Haynes v. Shalala , 26 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 1994)). The ALJ additionally noted that Kislin g took c are of her own daily personal needs, and that no physician ha d instructe d her to limit herself in any capacity. Finally, he cited th e opinio n of Kisling's therapist that Kisling's motivation to work wa s suspect. These enumerated findings support the ALJ's decision to discount Kisling's subjective complaints of pain. See Polaski , 739 F.2d at 1322. Likewise, because Kis ling's sister merely stated that Kisling's testimony
was true and not exaggerated, the ALJ was justified in discrediting he r testimony as well. S ee Brown v. Chater , 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996) (ALJ may disbelieve witness's testimony due to suspect nature).
Finally, contrary to Kisling's assertion, we find that the AL J properly considered t he combined effect of Kisling's impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.923; Weikert v. Sullivan , 977 F.2d 1249, 1251 (8th Cir. 1992)

. Overall, the evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's conclusion that Kisling's impairments did not inhibit her a bility to perform her past relevant work.

### -5- The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.