Docket: NRC-2011-0012 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0080 

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429 

Submitter Information 

Name: Ellie Pinto 

General Comment 

I think it's great that the government has looked into how you can regulate radioactive waste. If radioactive 

waste isn't handle the right way it can cause so many health problems to many people. 

PUBLIC SUBMISSION 

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Received: April 16, 2015 

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PR-20, 61 

80FR160811
Docket: NRC-2011-0012 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0081 

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429 

Submitter Information 

Name: Trevor Lee Hall 

General Comment 

With LLRW being present regardless, this is a great way to improve on what is already established. The 

sensitivity of the materials require very long term care and disposal. The 1,000 year compliance policy would 

greatly benefit, especially the future generations. I specifically approve of the 10,000 year protective assurance 

policy. The very long term planning is so very important. Thank you.

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PR-20, 61 

80FR160812
Docket: NRC-2011-0012 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0082 

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429 

Submitter Information 

Name: Anonymous Anonymous 

General Comment 

See attached file(s) 

Attachments 

NRC Comment 

PUBLIC SUBMISSION 

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PR-20, 61 

80FR160813
Catherine Haney 

Director 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Subject: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (Docket ID: NRC-2011-0012)

April 23, 2015

Dear Administrator and Staff, 

 I am writing in response to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s(NRC) proposed 

rule to amend the regulations that govern low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) from their 

disposal to long term storage to better provide comprehensive protection of public health and 

safety. By revising part 61 of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), “Licensing 

Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste adopted on December 27, 1982 (47 FR 

57446), the FRC holds sites disposing of low level radioactive waste to higher safety 

performance standards. I commend the NRC for their commitment to safeguarding the public 

from harmful radioactive exposure through the provisions of the proposed rule and I would urge 

the commission to additionally take further steps and expand safety requirements into other 

identified classes of radioactive waste. 

Implications of Proposed Ruling 

 The NRC, along with states, regulates the management, storage and disposal of 

commercial radioactive wastes from non-military uses of nuclear material2. Studies have 

demonstrated the harmful effects of radiation exposure from inadequate identification, disposal 

and storage of low level radioactive waste. 

The benefits of this proposed rule are achieved by: 

 Ensuring that low level radioactive waste separate from those identified in current 

regulations can be disposed of safely and meet waste site performance objectives1

 Using site-specific and updated dosimetry methodology for technical analysis to improve 

public health and safety outcomes1

Although the estimated costs of the proposed ruling are predominately assumed by

industry, states and the NRC, the outlined benefits of the proposed regulatory initiative are 

significant in enhancing public health and safety by ensuring the safe disposal of LLRW not 

analyzed in the regulatory basis for the original part 61 of Title 10 already.
Health Concerns of Low Level Radioactive Waste 

 The proposed ruling revises existing technical analysis frameworks to allow for greater 

safety and to identify existing inept site design features. These reassessments indicate that the 

proper and safe disposal and storage of radioactive waste is an issue, even for low level 

radioactive waste materials3. Low level radioactive waste are items that have been contaminated 

directly or indirectly from radioactive exposure that have not been identified as high level or 

uranium and thorium milling wastes1. Ranging from clothing items such as protective body 

covers to laboratory equipment and nuclear equipment with broad ranges of radioactive 

contamination, low level radioactive waste account for over 90% of the total radioactive waste 

volume and if not properly disposed of safely, can result in harmful environmental and health 

effects4. Although some radiation occurs naturally, the NRC requires that its licensees limit 

maximum radiation exposure from sites to the public to less than 5 mSv per year and limit 

occupational radiation exposure to workers dealing with radioactive material to less than 50 

mSv; levels beyond this are suggested to be mitigated because of their prescribed effect on 

human health5. This proposed rule on low level radioactive waste would limit that annual dose 

limit to less than 5 mSv and increase the site compliance period through 10,000 years. As states 

begin to designate their own low level radioactive waste storage sites within this proposed 

framework it is imperative to consider the health effects of exposure to radiation and the public 

health benefits of reduced exposure.

Health effects of radiation exposure3

: 

 Severe skin burns 

 Hair loss 

 Central nervous system damage 

 Birth defects 

 Cancer 

 Depending on the half-life of the radioactive isotopes in various low level and higher 

grades of radioactive waste, the more important secure disposal reveals to be. However, further 

expansion of safety measures regarding radioactive disposal sites across all radioactive waste 

levels are needed as well to further protect against site failures caused by land subsidence, human 

error or natural disaster6. Currently there are disposal and storage concerns with storage sites that 

range from inadequate protection of the general public from radioactive releases, protection of 

individual from inadvertent intrusion, long term site stability and testing and site inspection, all 

of which if corrected, will result in significant strides toward effective site management and 

public safety.

Call for further action 

 Although regulatory bodies suggest a radiation exposure annual dose limit, research 

suggests that due to the carcinogenic potential of radioactive potential at any level, that limiting 

exposure to levels far below these limits are advised7. This proposed ruling aims to limit 
stochastic seepage from storage sites minimal detectable levels, almost a half of current advised 

levels. Further action should be taken to better dispose and secure radioactive waste in the future 

building on the concepts and standards of this proposed rule such as: 

 Standardizing and consolidating standards regarding the transportation, design and 

operation of radioactive storage facilities.

 Enhancing measurement apparatus to accurately conduct radiological assessments to 

better detect and reduce stochastic radioactive seepage from storage sites. 

 Enforcing effective site evaluation and management standards to construct a permanent 

high level nuclear waste disposal facility. 

 Reducing the total volume of radioactive waste by converting to more sustainable 

alternatives.

Conclusion 

 In conclusion, LLRW and other grades of radioactive waste, without proper safeguard 

measures, pose significant risks to the public and I urge FRC to continue with the proposed rule 

while also considering avenues reduce public exposure from other higher grade radiation storage 

sites. The proposed measures implement a stronger risk management framework regarding 

protecting public safety and dually integrating both an analysis and design and control approach 

that strengthen these protection initiatives. Minimizing the dose threshold for the public, further 

detailing the waste criteria for low level radioactive waste and raising site specific standards to 

meet outlined performance objectives are significant and translatable radioactive waste 

management elements. Therefore, I recommend these same risk management principles be 

increasingly implemented as it relates to higher grades of radioactive waste as well to better 

ensure public health and safety. 

Thank you for your consideration, 

Sincerely, 

O.M 

References 

1 U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Fact Sheet: Proposed Rule for Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Disposal. Available at 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NRC-2011-0012-0077 

2 U.S. Draft Regulatory Commission. Draft Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rule: Low Level 

Radioactive Waste Disposal(10 CFR Part 61). Office of Nuclear Material and Safeguards. 

February 2015 
3 U.S. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry. Summary of Health Effects of 

Ionizing Radiation. Public Health Service 1999. 

4 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Radioactive Waste: An Environmental Perspective . 

Available at 

http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/radwaste/

5 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. NRC Regulations: 10 CFR Waste Classification. 

Available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part061/part061-0055.html

6 Nuclear Energy Institute. Nuclear Waste Management: Low Level Radioactive Waste. 

Available at http://www.nei.org/Issues-Policy/Nuclear-Waste-Management/Low-LevelRadioactive-Waste

7 U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Radioactive Waste: Production, Storage Disposal 

Available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc collections/nuregs/brochures/br0216/r2/br0216r2.pdf 
Docket: NRC-2011-0012 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0084 

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429 

Submitter Information 

Name: Samson Lai 

Address: 

771 Ferst Dr 

Rm 252 

Atlanta, GA, 30332 

Email: samsonium@gmail.com 

General Comment 

Dear United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

I am a Ph. D. student at the Georgia Institute of Technology and I would like to offer my comments on Docket 

ID NRC-2011-0012. Although I am not an expert in low-level radioactive waste, I have been educated at a 

broad level of the history and operation of the nuclear industry in the United States and have a keen interest in 

the future of nuclear power. Thus, while I cannot advocate as an expert, I would like to bring to your attention 

what I consider important points and other potential options that may not have been considered. 

A necessary requirement to protect the future of the environment, given the stated concern over an unpredicted 

influx of depleted uranium from the renewed interest in uranium enrichment facilities. Even if current standards 

are considered sufficient, the action of more stringent regulations also serves a public relations purpose. Further, 

site-specific analyses are especially appropriate in light of the consideration of unique combination of 

challenges that faced Fukushima Daiichi. Such unique combinations of disasters require more careful 

precautions and considerations for safeguards. 

Another key consideration of extending the compliance period to 1,000-year period is that this extends well into 

a period where climate change is certain to have negative effects. What exacerbates the situation is that as 

climate change accelerates, major positive and negative feedback loops, like methane in the permafrost, changes 

in albedo, and ocean acidification, are still dormant and poorly understood. What is likely is that extreme 

weather patterns will become more common as atmospheric CO2 continues to increase. Besides temperature, it 

would be important to consider that humidity and rainfall could change significantly, which would affect the 

PUBLIC SUBMISSION 

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Tracking No. 1jz-8ilu-bdik 

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PR-20, 61

80FR16081 4
site-specific requirements. Corrosion and flooding are two major problems that could become more impactful as 

climate change progresses further. 

Nuclear power was, and to some extent, still is a clean source of energy but, in my opinion, increasing the cost 

of nuclear is a long-term benefit. It has become clear recently is that more cost-effective, technological choices 

have emerged, primarily through higher efficiencies, solar, and wind power. Public support has faded since the 

Fukushima incident and recent failures of projects to control costs, such as Plant Vogtle in Georgia and South 

Carolina Electric and Gas's V.C. Summer reactor, have demonstrated that nuclear power needs to go back to the 

drawing board to prepare for a different future that competes with economically viable renewable technologies 

and plentiful natural gas. Although the forecasted cost to industry $4 million is small in comparison to an entire 

construction project, which is typically on the order of billions, higher costs will cause consumers to re-examine 

similar low carbon sources of electricity, ultimately to the benefit for a more competitive, less capital intensive, 

and most importantly, less government-reliant power source. 

Nuclear power will remain a poor governmental choice until public support rebuilds and changes are made in 

the leadership and for national security so that refinement opportunities are viable in the U.S. once more. 

Without these major cultural shifts in policy and public perception, this will only be a stopgap measure. With 

nuclear power having such a volatile effect on public opinion, it may be necessary to prepare information for the 

public that explains the meaning of low-level radioactive waste and how low is low, but not distribute this 

information until the situation warrants, as the information may needlessly cause commotion. 

Although I lack the pedigreed credentials to deem myself a nuclear waste expert, I hope that I have provided 

some thoughtful comments and stimulated new considerations. Based on the technical detail demonstrated by 

the NRC staff, an educated and concerned citizen like me has reason to trust that the NRC will make the right 

choices to maximize benefit and protection of the public.

Page 2 of 2

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JUN 0 3 2015 

LES-15-00091-NRC 

Ms. Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Mail Stop 0-16G4 

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 

Louisiana Energy Services, LLC 

NRC Docket No. 70-3103 

Subject: Request to Participate as Panel Member for 10 CFR 61 Proposed Rule 

Dear Ms. Vietti-Cook: 

On March 26, 2015, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a proposed rule that 

will significantly amend 10 CFR 61 (80 Fed. Reg 16082). Coincident with the publication, the 

NRC staff initiated a number of public meetings (which are still ongoing) to further inform 

stakeholders and interested parties about the bases for, and implementation of, the proposed 

rule. During one of the early meetings, responding to a stakeholder suggestion, the NRC 

agreed to introduce a panel discussion into one or more future public meetings to facilitate 

greater interaction between the NRC staff and stakeholders. 

On June 25, 2015, in the Commissioners' Conference Room, there will be public meeting on 10 

CFR 61 and Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal. Specifically, a panel of industry and NRC 

representatives will discuss the proposed revisions to Part 61 . Louisiana Energy Services, LLC 

(dba URENCO USA(UUSA)) would like to be part of this panel discussion. Should this request 

be granted, Perry Robinson will represent UUSA. His bio is attached as Enclosure 1. 

As discussed with Larry Camper, Director, Division of Decommissioning Uranium Recovery and 

Waste Programs, via telephone recently, UUSA believes, for a number reasons, that it is a 

critical stakeholder and thus, should be included as a panel member. Among the reasons is 

that UUSA is currently and for the reasonably foreseeable future the only operating enrichment 

facility in the US. Furthermore, the proposed rule arose out of a UUSA hearing and clearly any 

increases in regulatory burden and/or cost that are ultimately imposed on disposal site licensees 

will assuredly be passed onto waste generators such as UUSA. The cost of decommissioning 

and DUF6 disposal could significantly increase as a result of the rule change. Given the 

substantial probability of impact on UUSA that the Part 61 rulemaking will have, we believe it 

extremely important and relevant for us to be afforded an opportunity to participate in any panel 

discussions planned during future public meetings. 

LES,PO Box 1789, Eunice, New Mexico 88231,USA +1 575 394 4646 +1 575 394 4545 W www.urenco.com/LES 

PR-20, 61

80FR16081

5
Therefore, UUSA formally requests to be a participating panel member in the Commission 

Briefing planned for June 25, 2015. Because of the critical nature of our interests related to the 

rulemaking and due to the limited opportunities to participate in an interactive manner, I request 

that you promptly confirm that UUSA will be among the panel members at this future public 

meeting. 

We appreciate your attention to this matter. If you have any questions, please contact me at 

(575) 394-5599 or jay.laughlin@urenco.com. 

Enclosure: Perry Robinson Bio 

cc: Commissioners 

NRC/EDO 

Deputy Executive Director, Materials, Waste, Research, State, Tribal and Compliance 

Programs 

Director, Office of NMSS 

Director, Division of Fuel Cycle Safety, Safeguards & Environmental Review 

Director, Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery & Waste Programs 

Chief, Low-Level Waste Branch 

Chief, Enrichment Branch 

Janelle B. Jessie, DUWP, NMSS, NRC 
ENCLOSURE 

Perry Robinson Bio 
Mr. Robinson currently acts as General Counsel for Louisiana Energy Services, LLC (dba 

UUSA). Prior to retiring from UUSA at the end of 2013, Mr. Robinson was the Vice President of 

Regulatory Affairs and General Counsel for the company. His organizational responsibilities include 

Legal, Licensing, Performance Improvement (which includes the corrective action program), State 

Permitting and Employee Concerns. His organization supports compliance with export control issues. 

Prior to joining UUSA, Mr. Robinson was a partner in the Business and Finance Department at 

Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll, LLP and previously a partner at Winston & Strawn in Washington, 

D.C. In his private law practice, Mr. Robinson routinely represented clients before the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC), Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), Department of 

Energy (DOE), and state utility commissions. Mr. Robinson's legal practice included representing a 

Regional Transmission Organization 

(RTO), investor-owned utilities, 

generation and transmission cooperatives, 

DOE contractors and vendors associated 

with the energy industry. His work with 

these clients covered a broad range of 

matters, such as utility restructuring, 

including sales and acquisition of nuclear 

generating plants before state agencies 

and the NRC; power purchase 

agreements; various NRC matters such as 

whistleblower issues, enforcement 

actions, licensing actions, and rulemaking 

activities; enforcement matters before 

other federal agencies such as the 

Department of Transportation, Federal 

Aviation Administration, Federal 

Highway Administration, and the DOE; 

and administrative litigation before NRC, 

FERC, public utility commissions and 

state agencies. Mr. Robinson also writes and speaks extensively on regulatory matters. 

Prior to practicing Jaw, Mr. Robinson served on the enforcement and licensing staff of the NRC 

from 1982 - 1987; worked on the technical staff of Battelle Memorial Institute-Pacific Northwest 

Laboratories from 1981 - 1982; and was part of the research staff at the Radiation Research Section, 

Department of the Army from 197 6 - 1981. 

A law graduate of the University of Baltimore (J.D., 1986), Mr. Robinson received his B.S. degree 

from Virginia Polytechnic Institute (1975) and his M.S. degree (Health Physics) from Rutgers 

University (1981 ). He is admitted to the bar in the District of Columbia and Maryland and is admitted to 

practice before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 
NRCExecSec Resource 

From: 

Sent: 

To: 

Cc: 

Subject: 

Attachments: 

Ms. Vietti-Cook, 

Romero, Veronica <Veronica.Romero@urenco.com> 

Wednesday, June 03, 2015 5:17 PM 

NRCExecSec Resource; Janelle.Jesse@NRC.gov; Smith, Brian; tom.grice@nrc.gov; Suber, 

Gregory; Camper, Larry; Bailey, Marissa; Haney, Catherine; Weber, Michael; Satorius, 

Mark; CMRBARAN Resource; CMROSTENDORFF Resource; CMRSVINICKI Resource; 

CHAIRMAN Resource 

Johnson, Amy; Cowne, Stephen; Robinson, Perry 

RE: Request to Participate as Panel Member for 10 CFR 61 Proposed Rule 

LES-15-00091-NRC Request to Participate as Panel Member for 10 CFR 61 Proposed 

Rule.zip; A TTOOOOl.txt 

Attached is URE NCO USA's request to participate in the panel for the 10 CFR 61 proposed rule. Thank you for your 

prompt attention in processing our request. 

Thanks, 

Veronica Romero 

Licensing & Performance Assessment 

Administrative Assistant 

URENCO USA 

P.O. Box 1789 

Eunice, NM 88231 

Office +1 575 394 6692 

Cell +1 505 975 5347 

Email: veronica.romero@urenco.com 

WEB: www.urenco.com 

URENCO US.A 

1 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Julie Stewart <julie.stewart.pacenza@gmail.com>

Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2015 2:17 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, since so 

much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced this to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to 

look so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simple order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to make finally classify 

this waste to accurately inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Julie Stewart 

443 Kensington Ave. 

Salt Lake City, UT 84115 

PR-20, 61 

80FR160816
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Laura Schmidt <laura@healutah.org>

Sent: Wednesday, June 10, 2015 2:28 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Laura Schmidt 

1426 S 1100 E Apt 17 

Apt 17 

Salt Lake City, UT 84105 

PR-20, 61 

80FR160817
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Christopher Morgan <not.all.there13@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2015 3:38 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Christopher Morgan 

1405 s 1500 e 

unit B 

Salt Lake City, UT 84105 

PR-20, 61 

80FR160818
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Stephen Mossbarger <pub-mail@stephen-mossbarger.us>

Sent: Thursday, June 11, 2015 5:07 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

I am very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially since so 

much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Stephen Mossbarger 

868 E 500 S 

Salt Lake City, UT 84102 

PR-20, 61 

80FR160819
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Amy Kopischke <amy@rocketgurl.com>

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 1:52 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Amy Kopischke 

412 E Truman Ave 

South Salt Lake, UT 84115 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608110
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Sandy Cornell <moonwolf42@hotmail.com>

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 1:55 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Sandy Cornell 

168 N 100 E 

Moab, UT 84532 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608111
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Barbara Wise <wise4755@msn.com>

Sent: Monday, June 15, 2015 4:05 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Barbara Wise 

4755 Pin Tail Ct 

Salt Lake City, UT 84117 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608112
DATE: June 10, 2015 

TO: Catherine Haney 

Director 

FORMAL COMMENT 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

FROM: American Nuclear Society University of Utah Student Chapter 

SUBJECT:· Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Docket ID NRC-2015-0003 and NRC-2011-0012 

Introduction 

One hundred years ago when Rutherford first discovered the nucleus. who knew that 

«oould send the world into the golden age of nuclear science? A golden age that, until Chernobyl 

ir 1986, had given humanity unrivaled gifts and power. Since then, we have struggled to 

ivercome many obstacles and have finally reached what my colleagues and I believe to be a 

Jecond golden age for nuclear. As a student chapter full of young nuclear engineers we know 

that it is our duty to involve ourselves in the future of our industry, a future that is dependent on 

the rulemaking and policy of today. After our generation is long gone, this waste will remain and 

it is up to us to make sure it is secure with the right regulations. Today, we have read the rule 

changes and are here to provide feedback. 

Feedback 

Analyses timeframes 

Depleted Uranium (DU) will be the primary source of radiation for this Low Level 

Radioactive Waste (LLRW) storage facility. DU has a lower activity than natural uranium. 

Natural uranium has been present on this planet since its existence and has never impeded the 

- prog.ress of civilization in its presence. The background radiation dosage of the average 

American amounts to 300 mrem/yr, well above the required dosage of the 1,000 year 

Compliance Period. This annual dosage for Americans is still much lower than many 

international regions which can exceed 700-900 mrem/yr. Even during the 1,000-10,000 

Protective Assurance Period, society would not experience adverse health effects from the 500 

mrem/yr dosage. 

Nuclear technology has only existed for 6-7 decades and the advancement of said 

technology has been extraordinary. Safety in that industry has grown in parallel with technology 

and has surpassed the safety standards of other industries, thanks to organizations such as the 

Department of Energy and the NRC. This trend in safety, including the storage in the Clive 

facility, will only increase the capabilities of protection and safety. 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608113
Performance assessment (PA) 

Using information from the surrounding area and facility, with accurate and benchmarked 

models the capabilities of the site can be determined with reasonable accuracy. Limitations of 

time are reasonable within the analysis timeframes. Using continuous assessment of the 

facilities, similar to this ongoing assessment, and ongoing increases in technological ability 

allow organizations and licensees to ensure the safety of the public and surrounding habitation. 

Intruder assessment (IA) 

Site intrusion scenarios are not solely based on material definition, but the site 

characteristics and expected activities. We support the enhancing of intruder assessment to be 

site specific and not based on the classification of stored materials. These assessments not only 

allow th_e protection of the general public, but allow planning for future catastrophes.and even 

minor intrusions. 

Protective assurance period analyses 

Following a dosage optimization plan, as opposed to a dosage limit. allows the ongoing 

elimination of health risk. Keeping the dosage at a continuing minimum also decreases .., . . ,. necessary effort in controlling this risk. Extending assessment and setting a target dosage limit 

. rat is well under producing any adverse health effects allows for this optimization to operate 

roductively. 

Performance period analyses 

The analyses to assess site features beyond 10,000 years ensure limiting long term 

impact. Class A waste, as the least radioactive form of LLRW, is a useful trigger for these 

measures and the fractional concentration technique is well established and reputable. 

Safety case I Defense-in-depth (DID) 

Safety case and defense in depth, as defined, will provide long term protection and 

security for the general public and site for the necessary timeframe. Requirement of these 

measures is necessary and will provide the licensee be responsible for the site after closure. 

Waste acceptance criteria (WAC) 

Following proper waste characterization and certification and using site specific analyses 

to determine acceptable waste for a land waste storage facility will provide necessary protection 

for the site. 

Conclusion 

Providing the necessary safety and protection to ongoing generations is of the utmost 

importance for this industry to thrive. As young members of this industry, we need it to thrive. 

After reviewing these changes and policies we believe they will be a part of protecting this 

industry's future and help usher it into the new golden age of nuclear. 
References: 

' 

1. Technical Analysis Supporting Definition of Period of Performance for Low-Level Waste 

Disposal. (2012, December 4 ). Retrieved June 3, 2015, from 

pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML 111O/ML111030586.pdf 

2. Cameron, C. (2015, May 11). PUBLIC MEETING ON THE PROPOSED LOW-LEVEL 

RADIOACTIVE WASTE DISPOSAL RULEMAKING. Retrieved June 3, 2015, from 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML 1512/ML 15128A476.pdf 

3. Borchardt, R. (2013, August 2). PROPOSED RULE: LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE 

WASTE DISPOSAL (10 CFR PART 61) (RIN 3150-Al92). Retrieved June 3, 2015, from 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML 1312/ML 13129A268.pdf 

4. Comparison between Current Rule Language and Rule Language in Proposed Rule . 

"Low- Level Radio;;i_ctive W9ste Disposal" (80FR16082). (2015, March 31). Retrieved 

June 3, 2015, from 

http://www. n re. gov /about-nrc/regulatory /ru lema ki ng/potential-rulemaki ng/uw-strea ms/1 0-

cfr-part-61. pdf 

5. Draft Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (10 

CFR Part 61). (2015, March 26). Retrieved June 3, 2015, from 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML 1428/ML 14289A 158.pdf 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Mary Olson <maryo@nirs.org>

Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2015 9:46 AM

To: Grossman, Christopher

Cc: Dembek, Stephen; McKenney, Christepher; Yadav, Priya; Comfort, Gary; Esh, David; Tim 

Judson; Diane D'Arrigo

Subject: RE: Correction Regarding a Question at June 2, 2015 10 CFR Part 61 Public Meeting in 

Columbia, SC

Attachments: WaPo paducah articles 1999-2000.docx

Second Reply:

Mr. Grossman,

Cc above list; adding Diane D’Arrigo and Tim Judson at NIRS,  

I would like this reply, and the attached document to be also posted with public access in ADAMs.

I asked NRC the question about whether it had considered DU (Depleted Uranium) originating from Paducah (and

possibly other process sites) because of the history of the US Department of Energy sending uranium from plutonium

separation (reprocessing) back through the enrichment phase as documented in the attached file by the “Paper of

Record” the Washington Post. The uranium that was sent back through post‐reprocessing was laced with fission

products and activation products, including plutonium and other transuranics.  

In its discussion of the proposed changes to Part 61, which anticipate the inclusion of DU in so‐called “low‐level”

radioactive waste trenches, NRC has assumed that the DU is pure 238 and while somewhat radioactive itself would only

contribute other radioactivity as decay products over time (a long time) to the inventory at the site.  

The DU from Paducah is not pure DU. The enrichment process results in a more pure U235, not a more pure U238.

The attached file contains a series of 9 articles that together are the report of an independent investigation of the

impact of the contaminated uranium on workers at Paducah. The impacts were not trivial. It is very important that NRC

as a regulator not fall into the trap of using broad assumptions that are purely theoretical with no “process history.”  

A broad policy change such as proposing to call material with a 4.5 billion‐year half‐life “low‐level,” should not overlook

the actual history of this material, nor the possible implications for the future since reprocessing is one of the reasons

NRC cites for making changes at this time. An inventory of cesium, strontium and plutonium as well as the rest of the

fission‐product soup riding as “hitch hikers” on uranium must be factored since the impact would be today, not in the

distant future of radioactive decay.

I am sure that the over‐all plan to allow the dump‐operator to make a “safety case” will compensate for any possible

material that it wants to bury...but, on behalf of the drivers, waste handlers, dump workers, and the groundwater,

please do not assume all DU is only U238.

Sincerely,

Mary Olson

Mary Olson  

maryo@nirs.org   

NIRS Southeast   www.nirs.org   

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608114
2

828‐252‐8409 / 828‐242‐5621 cell

From: Grossman, Christopher [mailto:Christopher.Grossman@nrc.gov]  

Sent: Tuesday, June 16, 2015 2:56 PM

To: Mary Olson

Cc: Dembek, Stephen; McKenney, Christepher; Yadav, Priya; Comfort, Gary; Esh, David

Subject: Correction Regarding a Question at June 2, 2015 10 CFR Part 61 Public Meeting in Columbia, SC

Ms. Olson - 

During the June 2, 2015 public meeting on the rulemaking for 10 CFR Part 61, you inquired about whether 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff considered contaminated depleted uranium from U.S. 

Department of Energy (DOE) facilities in its analysis to support the Commission Paper, SECY-08-0147. In 

response at the meeting, I replied that we had considered contaminated depleted uranium. I have had some 

time to review our analysis and would like to correct my response to your question. While we considered the 

quantities of depleted uranium associated with DOE’s facilities in the analysis, we, in fact, did not consider 

radionuclides associated that might result from contamination of depleted uranium with reprocessed materials 

at DOE facilities. Rather our analysis only considered radionuclides associated with clean depleted 

uranium. As indicated during the meeting, Enclosure 1 to SECY-08-0147 includes a description of our analysis 

including the specific radionuclides considered. 

I apologize for any confusion my response may have created. NRC staff plans to correct the public record in 

the future, but I wanted to let you know personally as the originator of the question. In the near future, staff will 

also be placing this email in the NRC’s Agencywide Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) 

and on the NRC’s Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal public website for the 10 CFR Part 61 

rulemaking. ADAMS is available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. NRC’s 10 CFR Part 61 

rulemaking public website is available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/potentialrulemaking/uw-streams.html. You will be able to find it under “2015 Public Workshop Information”, “Public 

Meeting 5 — June 2, 2015 (Columbia, SC)” once it is available. If you have any further questions about our 

analyses or the rulemaking, please feel free to contact me or any of the project managers for the rulemaking. 

Respectfully, 

Christopher J. Grossman

Risk Analyst

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, & Waste Programs

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

301‐415‐0140

christopher.grossman@nrc.gov
Page 1 

1 of 9 DOCUMENTS 

The Washington Post 

August 8, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. 

Plant

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01 

LENGTH: 4790 words 

DATELINE: PADUCAH, Ky. 

 

Thousands of uranium workers were unwittingly exposed to plutonium and other highly radioactive metals here 

at a federally owned plant where contamination spread through work areas, locker rooms and even cafeterias, 

a Washington Post investigation has found. 

Unsuspecting workers inhaled plutonium-laced dust brought into the plant for 23 years as part of a flawed 

government experiment to recycle used nuclear reactor fuel at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, according to a review of court documents, plant records, and interviews with current and former workers. The 

government and its contractors did not inform workers about the hazards for decades, even as employees in 

the 1980s began to notice a string of cancers. 

Radioactive contaminants from the plant spilled into ditches and eventually seeped into creeks, a state-owned 

wildlife area and private wells, documents show. Plant workers contend in sealed court documents that radioactive waste also was deliberately dumped into nearby fields, abandoned buildings and a landfill not licensed 

for hazardous waste. 

The sprawling Kentucky plant on the Ohio River represents an unpublished chapter in the still-unfolding story 

of radioactive contamination and concealment in the chain of factories across the country that produced 

America's Cold War nuclear arsenal. Opened in 1952 in an impoverished region, the 750-acre plant built a 

fiercely loyal work force of more than 1,800 men and women who labored in hot, stadium-sized buildings 

turning trainloads of dusty uranium powder into material for bombs. 

Today, the Department of Energy contends that worker exposure was minimal and that contamination is being 

cleaned up. A lawsuit filed under seal in June by three current plant employees alleges that radiation exposure 

was a problem at Paducah well into the 1990s. 

The Post's investigation shows that contractors buried the facts about the plutonium contamination, which 

occurred from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, in reports filed in archives. Plutonium, a core ingredient in 

nuclear bombs, is a highly radioactive metal that can cause cancer if ingested in quantities as small as a millionth of an ounce. The Paducah plant was designed to handle only uranium, a mildly radioactive metal. 

"The community to this day has no idea of the kinds of contaminants they were exposed to," said James W. 

Owens, a Paducah lawyer representing residents whose water has been polluted by the plant. 

Health consequences remain unclear. No comprehensive study of worker medical histories has been attempted at Paducah. In neighborhoods where older workers live, stories abound of cancer clusters and unusual illnesses. One 20-year veteran worker who died in 1980 compiled a list of 50 employees he worked with 

who had died of cancer. 
Page 2 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

"Everything was so safe, so riskless," the worker, Joe Harding, said in an interview just before his death. 

"Today we know the truth about those promises. I can feel it in my body." 

Even though the plant's procedures and purpose have changed -- Paducah's enriched uranium is now used in 

commercial nuclear power plants -- problems have continued. Workers weave between makeshift fences that 

cordon off hundreds of radioactive "hot spots" scattered across the complex. In one corner of the plant, mildly 

radioactive runoff trickles from a nearly half-mile-long mound of rusting barrels that still contain traces of uranium. 

"The situation is as close to a complete lack of health physics as I have observed outside of the former Soviet 

Union," Thomas Cochran, nuclear program director for the Natural Resources Defense Council, said in 

documents filed in the lawsuit. 

The Department of Energy, which owns the plant, said it could not comment on allegations made in the suit 

because of the court-ordered seal. The agency is investigating the charges and dispatched a team to Paducah

to determine if conditions posed an immediate threat to workers or the public. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said the agency's national security goals had "sent many of our workers into 

harm's way," but he said the agency must now live up to its responsibility to "right the wrongs of the past." Two 

weeks ago, Richardson pledged millions of dollars for medical monitoring of nuclear workers who were exposed to beryllium, a highly toxic metal. 

"The Department of Energy will continue to take any actions that are necessary to ensure the protection of 

public health, the workers and the environment," he said. 

Still, agency officials, in a written response to questions from The Post, strongly defended past safety practices 

at Paducah and said no workers are at risk today. 

"The plant's monitoring data did not indicate an accumulation of [plutonium and other highly radioactive 

wastes] in the workplace or the environment that would be a health concern to workers or to the public," the 

DOE said. 

That position is vigorously contested in more than 2,000 pages of documents filed in the lawsuit by two of the 

plant's health physicists, or radiation safety experts, and a veteran worker who had his esophagus removed 

after three decades of work inside contaminated buildings. Copies of the documents were obtained by The 

Post from government sources. 

"The management line for years has been there was an insignificant amount" of plutonium at Paducah, said 

Mark Griffon, a health physicist at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell who is participating in a federal 

study of radiation conditions at nuclear weapons plants, including Paducah. Griffon reviewed plant documents 

provided by The Post. 

"If the levels were this significant," he said, "it raises an important question: Why weren't workers ever monitored?" 

The two health physicists suing the plant say in court documents they tried to call attention to the radiation 

problems but were confronted by a culture of unconcern. 

"I was told by my superior . . . in so many words that 'this is Paducah -- it doesn't matter here,' " said one of the 

physicists, Ronald Fowler, 50, who came to the plant in 1991. 

The suit was brought under a law that allows employees to collect payment for exposing fraud against the 

government. It was filed under seal to give Justice Department officials an opportunity to decide whether to join 

the suit or begin a criminal investigation. 

The suit names Lockheed Martin and Martin Marietta, which managed the uranium enrichment plant during the 

1980s and 1990s. It does not name the original manager, Union Carbide, which ran the facility for a 32-year 

period during which the bulk of the contamination occurred. None of the companies had been served with the 

suit and none would comment on the allegations. 

The current plant operator, U.S. Enrichment Corp., a government-chartered private company that assumed 

management this year, concedes past problems but says safeguards are now in place. USEC, which sold 
Page 3 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

shares to the public last year, says it has fully disclosed the plant's environmental problems to regulators, 

workers and stockholders. 

"It was acknowledged by all sides that contaminated conditions existed, . . . but USEC wasn't responsible for 

them," said Jim Miller, USEC executive vice president. 

Paducah is the latest DOE facility to be rocked by lawsuits and revelations of contamination. Cleaning up the 

complex is expected to cost $ 240 billion and take at least 75 years. 

Measured by the gram, the contamination at Paducah isn't nearly as extreme as that in plutonium production 

plants such as Washington state's Hanford Nuclear Reservation, where vast swaths of land have been sealed 

off from humans. But unlike the workers at those plants, employees at Paducah did not know of the risks in the 

uranium dust they breathed every day. 

Worker exposure to such dust has cost the government in the past. The Energy Department paid a $ 15 million 

settlement five years ago to former workers who had breathed uranium dust at the Fernald Feed Materials 

Production Center near Cincinnati. 

The difference between the dust at Fernald and that at Paducah comes down to one word: plutonium. 

For 2 Decades, Freight Cars 

Brought Unknown Danger 

The Paducah complex was the second of three U.S. government plants designed after World War II to create 

enriched uranium. The plants were operated for the government by private contractors who over time were 

paid bonuses for running safe, efficient facilities. 

In the beginning, uranium ore was scarce. The Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner of today's Energy 

Department, tried to fill the gap by "recycling" leftover uranium -- from nuclear reactors that made plutonium for 

bombs -- through the enrichment process at Paducah. 

From 1953 to 1976, more than 103,000 metric tons of used uranium was shipped to Paducah, records show. It 

arrived in freight cars as a fine black powder. Unknown to workers, the powder contained dangerous substances left over from the plutonium-making process -- fission byproducts such as technetium-99 and heavy 

metals known as "transuranics": neptunium and plutonium. 

"Plutonium is roughly 100,000 times more radioactive per gram than uranium," said Arjun Makhijani, president 

of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. 

Over time, through spills and waste discharges, the contaminants accumulated in the miles of pipes used to 

gasify and enrich uranium, around loading docks and in ditches, documents show. 

Plant officials were aware of the plutonium and other contaminants as early as the mid-1950s -- it made their 

recycled uranium less efficient. But they believed the amounts were too small to pose a health threat. 

Today, the DOE is able to rely only on a contractor's estimate of the total amount of contaminants introduced in 

that period: 12 ounces of plutonium, 40 pounds of neptunium and 1,320 pounds of technetium-99. 

The government today takes the same position as it did in the 1950s: The amounts were most likely not enough 

to harm workers. "The general protection provided to workers from the hazardous effects of uranium would 

have provided adequate protection" from the contaminants, the DOE statement said. 

But documents obtained by The Post show that plant officials became increasingly concerned about the 

contaminants. A 1992 report by Martin Marietta concluded that they caused "significant" environmental problems and "also pose a radiation hazard to the workforce." A 1988 study done for the DOE by a private contractor said the plutonium could "represent a significant internal dose concern even at very low mass concentrations." 

Plant records draw an instructive comparison that underlines the hazards posed by plutonium: The 12 ounces 

of plutonium in the black powder delivered more than twice as much radiation into the environment as the 

61,000 pounds of uranium that flowed out of the plant in waste water into the Ohio River between 1952 and 

1987. 
Page 4 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Bosses Took Threat 

With a Grain of Salt 

In the noisy, cavernous buildings where uranium was processed, workers did not receive the warnings. The 

conditions there were "extremely dusty . . . sometimes to the point where it was very difficult to see or breathe," 

said Garland "Bud" Jenkins, 56, a 31-year-veteran uranium worker and one of the three employees involved in 

the lawsuit against Lockheed Martin. 

To protect their skin from the uranium dust, workers wore cotton coveralls and gloves. But respiratory protection was optional -- old Army gas masks, which fit poorly and were seldom used, former and current workers 

said. 

At lunchtime, workers brushed black powder or green uranium dust off their food. "They told us you could eat 

this stuff and it wouldn't hurt you," said Al Puckett, a retired union shop steward. To dramatize the point, he 

said, some supervisors "salted" their bread with green uranium dust. 

The workers took the dust home at shift's end. 

"We frequently discovered that our bed linens would be green or black in the morning, from dust that apparently absorbed into our skin," Jenkins said. 

Exposure to uranium dust decreased after the late 1970s, when the plant stopped receiving the black powder 

and began processing a more refined form of uranium. In 1989, the DOE adopted more stringent worker safety 

rules. 

By then the plutonium had permeated the land around the plant. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the powder 

spilled, workers would shovel it up and wash the remnants into the nearest ditch, Jenkins said. More than a 

dozen ditches flow directly from the plant onto state property and private lands. 

There are no nationwide limits for plutonium in soil; cleanup standards depend on modeling the degree of 

public access to the contaminated spot. But the DOE has set cleanup limits at nuclear blast sites in the South 

Pacific of 15 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. 

Contractors measured plutonium at levels up to 47 picocuries in ditches outside the plant and 500 picocuries 

on plant grounds. 

Those measurements were made after the first evidence of environmental problems outside the plant surfaced 

in 1988, when a county health inspector found technetium and chemical carcinogens from the plant in a 

farmer's well. The discovery of the poisoned wells prompted a multimillion-dollar ground-water cleanup under 

the Environmental Protection Agency's oversight. 

Although plant managers posted creeks and ditches with warning signs in the early 1990s, the signs do not 

refer to plutonium or any other radioactive contaminants. Some warn of possible contamination with cancer-causing chemicals; others merely caution against eating local fish. 

Lawsuit Alleges 

Deliberate Dumping 

In addition to the substances that flowed or spilled out of the plant through the drainage ditches, the employees 

contend in their lawsuit that a wide variety of contaminated substances were deliberately dumped into the 

environment. Spilled black powder and empty radioactive waste containers allegedly were placed in dumpsters 

and trucked to a sanitary landfill on DOE property licensed only for trash and garbage. Rubble from demolished 

buildings and contaminated railroad ties allegedly were dumped in nearby woods and fields. Slag from uranium 

smelters was put in abandoned concrete bunkers in a state wildlife area outside the plant, according to the 

lawsuit. 

"There was only one dumpster for all waste, whether radioactive, hazardous, toxic or ordinary," Jenkins said. 

Plant records describe at least two dozen unlicensed radioactive debris piles on state lands outside the plant. 

Last year, ground-water tests turned up technetium directly beneath the sanitary landfill. 
Page 5 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

A 1990 DOE audit of Paducah found inadequate controls over waste disposal and a faulty system for tracking 

contamination that forced managers to rely on "word of mouth." 

Charles Deuschle, 56, a health physics technician and the third employee in the lawsuit, said he was "shocked" 

when his surveys discovered radioactive contamination in such places as the plant's cafeteria. 

"I saw conditions that would never have been tolerated in any other nuclear location where I have worked," 

Deuschle, who came to Paducah in 1992, said in court documents. 

Internal plant surveys included in the suit found high levels of radiation on street surfaces, manhole covers and 

loading docks and in locker rooms as recently as 1996. 

The plant's current managers maintain that all significantly contaminated areas have been addressed. "Hot" 

surfaces have been coated with absorbent paint, and warning signs have been posted, they said. Rope fences 

keep passersby away from radioactive equipment rusting in the open. Drain pipes and fire hydrants are coated 

with warning paint. Two dilapidated buildings where the black powder was once processed are padlocked. In 

1997, regulatory oversight of the plant was transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which declined 

to comment on allegations in the sealed lawsuit. 

Even the employees involved in the suit concede that safeguards have improved recently. But they insist that 

problems remain. This spring, elevated radioactivity was found in a parking area near the administration 

building, plant documents show. 

Soil collected from a ditch outside the plant's fence by The Post in June and analyzed at a commercial lab 

contained 2.6 picocuries of plutonium, slightly higher than the NRC's suggested guideline for cleaning up 

nuclear sites. 

The Post, using two hand-held detectors, also found sharply elevated radiation levels in the debris piles on the 

state wildlife lands. One such area was an unmarked pile of rotting railroad timbers near fishing ponds and 

campgrounds. 

Public Reports Tell 

Only Part of the Story 

Environmentalists, plant workers and neighbors claim that plant officials play down the hazards. 

"They cloak it in jargon," said Mark Donham, a member of a citizens advisory board that meets monthly with 

plant cleanup officials. "You have to order the documents and then spend hours and hours looking at them to 

learn anything." 

DOE officials say the facts and figures about the plutonium contamination inside the plant have been duly 

recorded since 1991 in thick inspection reports. But these are kept in archives rarely visited by the public. 

In the annual environmental reports that circulate to the public, the contamination is described as "trace" 

amounts of "radionuclides," a catchall term that can include mildly radioactive uranium as well as highly radioactive plutonium. 

A 1991 "site investigation" report, done by the plant's contractor and stored in the archives, shows much higher 

levels of plutonium than the annual environmental reports. The DOE said the reports use different methods and 

measure different things. 

The result has been that the DOE can claim full disclosure about the contamination while plant workers and 

neighbors remain in the dark, said Owens, the attorney for the plant's neighbors. 

"The company has engaged in a cynical disinformation campaign that centered on downplaying risks and 

presenting confusing and misleading information," he said. 

Inside the plant, the first disclosure of plutonium to workers came around 1990 after managers summoned top 

union leaders to discuss the results of tests ordered after the state found the poisoned wells. 

"They took it seriously," a union official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said of Martin Marietta's 

presentation. But "the health effects weren't viewed as serious. We just vehemently stressed that the contamination should be cleaned up." 
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1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Plant managers insist that workers today are fully aware of the potential hazards. USEC cites worker training 

programs that it says include a briefing on plutonium and other radioactive hazards at the plant. 

But officials with the union's Washington office contend workers still don't know a fraction of what they were 

exposed to. "What we're seeing now," said Daniel Guttman, former staff director of the federal Advisory 

Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, "is the outcropping of the glacier." 

Deficient Monitoring 

Compounded the Risk 

The health effects for Paducah workers remain an open question. 

The DOE said 442 Paducah workers were tested in 1997 and only 8 percent displayed measurable amounts of 

radiation. It said screening tests since 1992 have found no evidence of plutonium exposure in workers. 

But the greatest exposure to workers would have occurred before the enhanced monitoring that began in the 

late 1980s. 

In 1990, the DOE audited safety practices at Paducah and found scores of deficiencies in radiation monitoring 

and worker protection. The audit team said Paducah failed to properly monitor radiation to workers' internal 

organs -- even though plant managers had been repeatedly warned to do so. 

Radiation-measuring equipment was either missing or not properly calibrated, the report said, and workers 

weren't being tested for the kinds of radiation known to exist at Paducah. Whether the plant's equipment and 

personnel were even capable of detecting exposure to plutonium and other transuranics was "questionable," 

the audit said. 

Bolstering claims by workers that they had been left in the dark about radioactive hazards, the report found no 

mention of transuranics in plant safety procedures. 

"Onsite environmental radiological contamination conditions are largely unknown," the report said. "A formal 

program with well-defined monitoring, sampling and analysis requirements does not exist." 

Independent experts are investigating Paducah as part of two national studies of environmental and safety 

issues in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Both studies are relying primarily on data supplied by the plant. 

Officials brought in two years ago to review past radiation hazards told The Post they were not informed that 

Paducah workers may have been exposed to significant amounts of plutonium. 

Neither was Harold Hargan, a plant worker for 37 years. Hargan was one of about six workers who he says 

were told in 1990 that a test had found plutonium in their urine. 

"It surprised me. Hell, it surprised the doctor," Hargan said. "Everybody knew there was no plutonium at 

Paducah." 

What Happened Inside the Plant 

Uranium is a naturally radioactive element that comes mainly in two forms, or isotopes: uranium-238 and a 

small amount of uranium-235. Only U-235 is fissile, or capable of being split in a nuclear chain reaction. To 

make bombs or nuclear fuel, uranium must be "enriched" by increasing the proportion of U-235. 

The Mission: Uranium Enrichment 

1. Uranium ore from mines is milled in a process to extract uranium oxide, known as yellowcake. The yellowcake is sent to Paducah. 

2. At the Paducah plant, yellowcake is burned with hydrogen to form uranium dioxide, a black powdery substance called "black oxide." 

3. The black oxide is mixed with hydrofluoric acid to make uraniun tetrafluoride, known as greensalt. 

4. The greensalt is burned with fluorine to make uranium hexafluoride 

Since the late 1970s, Paducah has purchased uranium hexafluoride from other companies. Today, the enrichment process begins here. 
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In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

5. Finally comes the gaseous diffusion process for which the plant is named: The liquid uranium hexafluoride is 

heated and passed through a series of barriers, which separate and concentrate the U-235 isotope. The 

low-enriched uranium is condensed to a solid and packed into drums for shipping. 

The enriched uranium is shipped to another plant for further enrichment to make commercial nuclear fuel. In 

the past, some was converted to highly enriched uranium for bombs. 

4%-5%U235 Nuclear fuel for power plants 

90%U235 Nuclear weapons 

Enormous amounts of uranium are left over after enrichment. 

The processes used at Paducah also can move backward, turning uranium hexafluoride back into greensalt, 

or into depleted uranium metal for use in armor-piercing munitions or armor plating. 

Uranium hexafluoride mixed with magnesium yields greensalt,uranium metal and slag. 

Contamination Spreads 

Beginning about 1953, uranium from spent nuclear fuel was sent to Paducah to be enriched. Each shipment 

contained small amounts of plutonium and other radioactive contaminants. 

Worker exposure 

Processing uranium generated large amounts of contaminated airborne dust inside the buildings. Also, radioactive material often was spilled, then swept up by hand, hosed into gutters or placed in regular trash receptacles, whistle-blowers say. 

Workers carried uranium home on their skin and clothes. 

Metals Recovery 

Old nuclear warheads were dismantled at Paducah, where the radioactive material was extracted and gold 

and other precious metals were recovered. 

The recovered gold was melted into bars. Whistle-blowers allege some was shipped away without being 

measured for radiation. 

Tens of thousands of drums used to ship uranium are stored outdoors at the plant. Many drums still contain 

radioactive material. 

This "depleted" uranium -- still radioactive -- is stored in tens of thousands of cylinders in open lots. 

The plant continues to store significant amounts of various recovered metals deemed too contaminated to ship. 

The concrete-like gray slag, a contaminated 

byproduct of the process, allegedly was trucked to sanitary landfills and dumped in public areas near the plant. 

Large amounts of contaminated slag remain on the site. 

Hazards Inside the Plant 

For decades, plutonium and other radioactive hazards quietly spread through this Kentucky uranium plant, 

exposing unsuspecting workers to an invisible and potentially lethal threat. Red areas on this diagram denote 

contamination that was detected around the main work areas in 1992. 

'Barrel Mountain': A nearly half-mile mound of large piles of rusted metal scrap and other waste materials, 

some of it contaminated. 

Classified burial ground: This landfill contains nuclear weapons components. Workers who dismantled 

weapons may have been exposed to beryllium, a highly toxic metal. 

Burial pits: Enormous amounts of radioactive material lie in shallow landfills on plant grounds, and some are 

believed to be leaching into ground water. One pit contains hundreds of barrels of a highly flammable form of 

uranium stored in PCB-tainted oils. 
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1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Waste-water discharges: Company documents acknowledge the release of tens of thousands of pounds of 

uranium into creeks. Toxic chemicals and metals also were discharged in waste water. 

Dirty runoff: Rain washes uranium and other hazards into ditches that flow past outdoor scrap yards. Some of 

the ditches are posted as radioactive inside the plant fence, while just outside the fence there are no such 

warnings. 

Fouled ditches: Uranium, plutonium and other radioactive materials were flushed into ditches, such as this one, 

that flow into tributaries of the Ohio River. A test commissioned last month by The Washington Post found 

plutonium here. Earlier tests of the ditch inside plant grounds found plutonium at a level 100 times above what 

the government certifies as safe. 

One of the most contaminated buildings still in use, C-400 contained chemical solvent tanks for cleaning radioactive equipment. Workers this year found an old canister that contained radioactive technetium at levels 

millions of times above the safety standard. 

Outdoor hazards: Plant officials recently discovered radioactive contamination in this gravel parking lot near 

the main administration building. Dozens of "hot spots" around the plant grounds mark the sites of old spills or 

dumps. 

Buildings 410 and 420: Hundreds of workers were exposed to radioactive dust in these buildings, which were 

used to process uranium before enrichment. 

Contaminated buildings: Elevated radiation levels have been found in hundreds of areas frequented by 

workers, including a cafeteria. 

Tainted wells: Two large plumes of contaminated ground water extend more than a mile north of the plant into 

residential neighborhoods. The water is contaminated with chemical and radiological wastes. 

Cylinder piles: More than 30,000 metal tanks containing a toxic mix of depleted uranium and fluorine are 

stacked in open lots. Until recently, some were stored in a nearby residential neighborhood. 

Process buildings: The heart of the plant, these stadium-sized buildings now enrich uranium for commercial 

nuclear fuel. The truck alleys along the sides of each building are contaminated from spills during deliveries. 

Chemical spills: Thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals -- including suspected carcinogens -- were released 

into the environment in a series of leaks and spills. Some ended up in nearby creeks. 

Airborne releases: Exhaust fans vented radioactive dust into the atmosphere. Workers say the biggest releases were always at night. 

Switchyards: The plant requires enormous amounts of electricity -- two generating plants are dedicated to its 

needs. As recently as 1996, the plant also was the nation's largest single emitter of freon, the coolant blamed 

for damaging the Earth's ozone layer. 

SOURCES: "Radiological Survey of Selected Outdoor Areas, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, 

Kentucky," prepared by Oak Ridge Associated Universities, April 1992; Washington Post research. Satellite 

photo from U.S. Geological Survey. 

Spreading Toxins 

Radioactively contaminated slag and rubble from demolished buildings was dumped outdoors in more than two 

dozen places around the plant. For decades, waste water containing uranium, plutonium and cancer-causing 

chemicals was discharged into ditches and creeks that flow into the Ohio River, three miles away. 

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The Washington Post 

August 9, 1999, Monday, Final Edition 

Richardson Orders Probe Of Uranium Plant in Ky.

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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Energy Secretary Bill Richardson ordered an immediate investigation yesterday into reports that thousands of 

unsuspecting employees at a Kentucky uranium plant were exposed on the job to cancer-causing plutonium. 

Richardson said he would meet with workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and would request a 

National Academy of Sciences study to probe the links between worker illnesses and exposure to radioactive 

materials that occurred over decades at the federally owned plant. 

He also called for expanding a newly created program to bring health screening and medical treatment to 

thousands of workers who may have been put in harm's way at Paducah and similar facilities that were part of 

the government's nuclear weapons complex. 

"I have long maintained that we must correct the sins of the past by compensating workers who have been 

medically damaged," Richardson said in an interview. "I don't want this to be known as the department of 

excuses for not dealing with workers who have been harmed." 

His remarks came after The Washington Post reported that workers at the Paducah plant had been unwittingly 

exposed to plutonium and other radioactive metals that entered the plant over decades in shipments of used 

uranium from military nuclear reactor fuel. The report was based in part on sealed court documents filed as part 

of a lawsuit by workers and an environmental group, the Natural Resources Defense Council. The suit alleges 

that government contractors concealed evidence of the exposure for decades while allowing plutonium and 

other hazards to spread into the environment. 

The workers also allege that former plant managers allowed contaminated waste to be dumped into a 

state-owned wildlife area and a landfill not licensed for hazardous waste. They further contend that radioactively contaminated gold and other valuable metals may have been shipped out of the plant without being 

properly tested. 

Thomas Cochran, a nuclear expert with the NRDC who reviewed conditions at the plant, said health and safety 

practices there were the worst "outside the former Soviet Union." Former plant operators had not been served 

with the suit and declined to comment. The whistleblowers and their Washington attorney, Joseph Egan, said 

they also could not comment because of the judge's seal on the case. 

Energy officials sent a team to Paducah for an initial probe after the documents were first filed in June, 

Richardson confirmed. "They did not uncover any imminent threats . . . but we are continuing to investigate 

these concerns," Richardson said. 

The expanded investigation he announced yesterday would seek to uncover "what actually occurred, who was 

responsible and what must be done to assure that it never happens again," he said. 

Among the specific measures: 
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Richardson Orders Probe Of Uranium Plant in Ky. The Washington Post August 9, 1999, Monday, Final Edition 

Top Energy Department officials will be dispatched to Paducah this week to check compliance with environmental and safety regulations. The agency's Office of General Counsel will assess whether former contractors, including Lockheed Martin Corp. or Union Carbide Corp., had fulfilled their responsibilities to protect 

workers and the environment. 

Besides the health study by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, the Energy Department 

will institute a medical surveillance and screening program for employees. A screening of former Paducah

workers is just beginning as part of the Former Worker Program, a congressionally ordered study of past 

exposures of employees in the U.S. nuclear complex. 

The department's fiscal 2000 budget request will be reassessed and revised as necessary to include money to 

probe and rectify environmental and health concerns at the government's uranium enrichment plants. 

Richardson will ask the White House to expand a newly created program to provide millions of dollars in 

medical screening and other benefits to Energy Department workers who were exposed to beryllium, a highly 

toxic metal used in nuclear weapons. "These actions are warranted given the concerns raised . . . and I will not 

rest until these issues are fully dealt with and any injured workers are fairly compensated," Richardson said. 

Paducah workers were exposed to plutonium through shipments of contaminated uranium that arrived at the 

plant from 1953 to 1976, a period when national security priorities often surmounted concerns over risks to 

workers and the environment. The plutonium shipments stopped, but contaminants remain spattered over 

hundreds of acres of buildings and grounds. Workers did not learn of the problems until at least 1990, and 

some contend they were never told. 

The U.S. Enrichment Corp., a government-chartered private corporation that took over management of the 

plant this year, contends that all significantly contaminated areas have been cleaned up or marked with 

warning signs. 

Although no comprehensive study of worker medical histories has been conducted, current and former workers 

at the plant have linked past exposures to a string of cancers and other diseases. 

Richardson said although many of the exposures at Paducah were historical, the government bears responsibilities for those who may have been injured. 

"Even though it was the 1950s and everyone was gung-ho," he said, "it doesn't mean that you can forget about 

workers who have been made sick." 

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The Washington Post 

August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

A Deathly Postscript Comes Back to Life; After Being Rejected, Warnings of Paducah Atomic Worker Now Hailed as Heroism

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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A Deathly Postscript Comes Back to Life; After Being Rejected, Warnings of Paducah Atomic Worker Now 

Hailed as Heroism The Washington Post August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

DATELINE: PADUCAH, Ky. 

 

Stricken with cancer, his body mottled with painful sores, uranium worker Joe Harding picked up a pen for a 

final postscript to his nine-year struggle against the U.S.-owned factory he blamed for his fatal illness. "It is 

absolutely futile," he wrote just before his 1980 death, "like fighting a tiger with a toothpick." 

Two decades later, Harding is being proclaimed a "Cold War hero" by the same government that brushed aside 

his claims of dangerous radiation inside the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in western Kentucky. 

Revelations this week of worker exposure to plutonium at the Paducah plant have rekindled interest in the 

Harding case, which was championed briefly by anti-nuclear groups in the early 1980s as an example of the 

human cost of building America's nuclear arsenal. Although experts at the time linked Harding's ailments to 

radiation, the Department of Energy in 1981 dismissed Harding's reports of dangerous working conditions and 

declared the plant to be safe. Harding's disability pension and medical insurance were dropped and he was left 

nearly penniless. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, who has launched a probe into worker exposures at Paducah, said yesterday the government owed Harding and other workers a thorough investigation into whether their service in 

the nation's nuclear weapons complex had placed them in harm's way. 

"Joe Harding was a hero of the Cold War," Richardson said in statement to The Post. "But in the past, I believe 

that the government basically said -- without any review -- that there is no established linkage between the 

exposure these workers had and their illness. The Clinton administration is saying that's not our policy. We're 

going to make sure these workers are taken care of." 

The renewed interest in Harding came amid a flurry of calls for an expanded probe into environmental and 

safety problems at the plant. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) Monday demanded a congressional hearing into 

reports that contaminated material was dumped outside the plant. Kentucky Gov. Paul E. Patton (D) has 

appointed a state task force to examine claims of environmental damage. And Rep. Ted Strickland (D-Ohio) 

has asked the Department of Energy to account for contaminated uranium from Paducah that was shipped to 

a sister plant in Portsmouth, Ohio. 

David Michaels, the department's assistant secretary of environment, safety and health, told workers at 

Paducah the agency had let them down in failing to inform them about contaminants in the workplace. "There's 

been a real communications problem here," he told a news conference Monday. 

The Washington Post reported on Sunday that plutonium and other highly radioactive metals slipped into the 

plant over 23 years in shipments of recycled uranium from U.S. plutonium production factories. 

Sealed documents filed as part of a lawsuit against the plant's former operators allege that workers were 

exposed to plutonium-laced dust through the 1970s in the hot, smoky buildings where uranium was turned into 

fuel for bombs and nuclear power plants. 

One of those workers was Joe Harding, whose case has emerged as a powerful symbol of environmental and 

bureaucratic ills that allegedly plagued the facility. Although no comprehensive medical studies have been 

done of the health effects on plant workers, union officials and others have been tracking cases of cancer at the 

plant. Harding himself kept a list of more than 50 cancers among 200 people who began working with him at 

the plant in the early 1950s. 

Richardson has ordered a comprehensive medical review of current workers and an investigation of links 

between radiation exposures and illnesses. 

Union officials said yesterday the government not only failed to protect Harding, but also fought vigorously to 

prevent the worker and his widow from receiving a pension or medical insurance. 

"The DOE took the Joe Harding case very seriously: No dollar was spared in seeking to deny his claims," said 

Richard Miller, a policy analyst for the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers International Union, 
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Hailed as Heroism The Washington Post August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

which represents workers at the plant. "No effort was spared in their scorched-earth campaign to deny what 

was overwhelmingly obvious." 

In the months before succumbing to cancer at age 58, Harding meticulously documented environmental 

problems at the plant in tape recordings and in letters and journal entries obtained by The Post. 

It was "important, patriotic, secret work," Harding wrote of the job he started in 1952, the year the plant opened. 

"Brainwashing started in training school: 'Don't talk to anyone. Never mention radiation. The public is stupid 

about radiation.' " 

Soon Harding was put to work as a "process operator," mixing powdered uranium with fluorine and other 

chemicals. Inside the buildings, he wrote, the air was "heavy" with uranium dust, which is mildly radioactive and 

toxic if ingested or inhaled. Unknown to workers at the time, it also contained small amounts of plutonium and 

other radioactive metals that are thousands of times more dangerous than uranium. 

"I spent all those years breathing uranium hexafluoride gas so thick and heavy that you could see the haze in 

the air," Harding said in a hand-written account in 1979. "You could taste it coated on your teeth and in your 

throat and lungs. . . . Powder on the floor was thick enough that you would leave tracks." 

If workers worried about radioactive exposure from the dust, their concerns were brushed aside, Harding said. 

He said the official line from supervisors was: "You will not get any more radiation in this work than you would 

get from wearing a luminous dial wristwatch." 

Harding had worked at the plant less than a year when the first medical symptoms appeared, according to 

records made available by his widow. Lesions appeared on his legs, and slowly spread through the rest of his 

body. His weight dropped from 175 to 125 pounds. Searing pain radiated from his stomach and he vomited so 

frequently his co-workers mockingly called him "Joe Erp." 

Later, fingernail-like calcium growths began emerging from his finger joints, elbows and knees. X-rays of his 

lungs turned up odd-looking pockmarks. He lost most of his stomach to cancer. 

Physicians were mystified by Harding's ailments, though privately, he recalled, some suggested a possible 

cause: Radiation exposure. Harding didn't believe it. 

"Radiation? Hell, no!" he remembered saying. Later, though, as the symptoms worsened, Harding began to 

doubt assurances by Union Carbide, the plant operator, about safety. He remembered feeling nervous about 

maintenance jobs that required him to crawl inside large pipes used to carry radioactive uranium gas between 

buildings. 

"Pitch dark, full of UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] smoke and powder," he said of the pipes. "Felt like saying 

'Goodbye, world,' on entering." 

Eventually Harding's increasingly vocal complaints about working conditions earned him a reputation as a 

troublemaker, and he bounced around from one section of the plant to another. Finally, in 1971, the plant 

offered him a full-disability pension, citing a leg injury that Harding had received on the job. 

Harding accepted the offer and went home to wait for his first check. It never came. He later learned that his 

disability claim had been rejected, and along with it his pension and medical insurance. 

"This left me 50 years old with no job, and a crippled leg to get worse," he wrote. "No stomach. Bad lungs. No 

way to get a job, no way to make a living." 

Months after his death from stomach cancer in 1980, Harding's medical records were reviewed by Karl Z. 

Morgan, an internationally known radiation expert who concluded Harding's health problems were "strongly 

suggestive" of radiation exposure from chronic inhalation of uranium dust. Later, Harding's body was exhumed 

for testing, and uranium was found in his bones. 

Meanwhile, Energy Department officials were conducting their own investigation, at Harding's request. After 18 

months and a two-day visit to Paducah, the department concluded that Harding's illnesses were more likely 

caused by smoking and by the fact he "frequently ate country ham," according to the 1981 report. Based on 

computer modeling, the report's writers said the radiation exposures at Paducah were not sufficient to cause 

illnesses. 
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Hailed as Heroism The Washington Post August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

"The presence of thick dust in the air which Mr. Harding stated occurred . . . is not consistent with the mode of 

operation," the report said. 

The department's findings are now contradicted in court documents and interviews with current and former 

workers who also describe high exposures to uranium dust in the plant. Workers say the dust clung to their hair 

and skin and even contaminated the food they ate. 

Whether the new evidence from whistleblowers will ultimately vindicate Harding is unclear. If it does, it will 

provide little consolation for his widow, Clara, who lost both a husband and the financial security that was 

supposed to see her into twilight years. 

Clara Harding sold her house and moved to a small duplex on the outskirts of town. She continued to fight for 

the pension in court for several years before finally settling the case for $ 12,000. 

For her, the battle was clearly over from the first hearing, when Harding and her lawyer arrived in court to find 

a phalanx of attorneys and experts from the plant and the Energy Department representing the other side. 

"There were 14 of them and only two of us," she remembered. "So that was pretty much that." 

NAME: JOE HARDING 

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4 of 9 DOCUMENTS 

The Washington Post 

August 22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's 

Bones

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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The exhumed bones of a long-dead uranium worker have given a powerful boost to current employees' claims 

of dangerous exposures inside a government-owned Kentucky plant that supplied radioactive fuel for the 

nation's nuclear bombs. 

The long-overlooked medical evidence from the case of Joseph Harding suggests that for some workers radiation doses at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant were far higher than previously believed, and may have 

been dozens of times above federal limits, according to one analysis of the data. 

The hazards for uranium workers are further underscored by unpublished research from a sister plant in 

Tennessee. A draft study of workers at the K-25 plant in Oak Ridge shows unusually high death rates for 

former uranium workers, as well as sharply higher rates of lung and bone cancers. 
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Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones The Washington Post August 

22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

The results of Harding's posthumous tests, conducted as part of a lawsuit in 1983 but never published, offer the 

strongest corroboration to date of hazardous conditions inside the Paducah plant, where workers labored for 

decades in a haze of radioactive dust that was sometimes laced with deadly plutonium. 

"Uranium content of the bone was far in excess of normal expectations," wrote Alice Stewart, an internationally 

known British researcher who reviewed the results of laboratory tests of Harding's remains for his estate. "The 

terminal finding overrules all earlier impressions [from U.S. government officials] of NO internal depositions of 

uranium." 

Lab technicians were unaware of the presence of plutonium at the plant and did not test for it. Plutonium is 

about 100,000 times more radioactive per gram than uranium and can cause cancer if inhaled in microscopic 

amounts. Workers only recently learned that plutonium and other highly radioactive metals entered the plant in 

contaminated uranium shipments from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. 

The Department of Energy has launched an extensive investigation into claims of worker exposures at the 

Paducah plant as well as the K-25 plant and a third facility in Ohio. While the department had not evaluated the 

results of Harding's bone tests as of last week, agency officials said it is now clear that uranium workers were 

not properly protected until at least 1990, when new safety guidelines were implemented. 

"This reaffirms our decision to get out of the business of fighting sick workers," David Michaels, assistant 

secretary for environment, safety and health, said in an interview Friday. "This case is an example of how the 

DOE placed mission and secrecy in a paramount position in the past. Right now, we should be bending over 

backward to help those workers who helped win the Cold War for us." 

Both the Paducah and K-25 plants were owned by the federal government and operated by the same group of 

corporate contractors: Union Carbide from the 1950s to the early 1980s, followed by Martin Marietta and 

Lockheed Martin Corp. 

The latter two are the targets of a lawsuit filed by a group of current employees who allege unsafe working 

conditions and environmental contamination. Former workers also have alleged that radiation monitoring 

equipment at the Paducah plant was defective; in some cases, they say, "film" badges used to monitor exposures contained no film. 

"The dose evidence corroborates our allegations that the health physics program at Paducah has been essentially nonexistent," said Thomas Cochran, nuclear program director at the Natural Resources Defense 

Council, which joined workers in the lawsuit. "The contractors have been operating in callous disregard for the 

health and safety of the work force." 

Harding, an 18-year veteran plant worker who died of cancer in 1980, was hailed last week by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson as a "hero of the Cold War." But for the nine years before his death his claims of radiation 

exposure were vigorously challenged by contractors and Energy Department officials, who said conditions in 

the plant were safe. 

The department disputed Harding's allegations -- verified years later by other workers -- of a dense fog of 

uranium dust and smoke that would cling to workers' skin and coat their throats and teeth. A department study 

in 1981 attributed Harding's death to a combination of smoking and eating country ham. 

Eventually Harding developed stomach cancer along with an array of unusual maladies that are sometimes 

linked to radiation exposure, including perforations in his lungs and strange fingernail-like growths on his 

palms, wrists and shoulders. But after being discharged from the plant in 1971, Harding was denied a disability 

pension and lost his medical insurance. His widow's efforts to reclaim the pension were opposed by lawyers for 

Union Carbide and the Energy Department, and she eventually settled her claim for $ 12,000. 

The exhumation of Harding's remains in 1983 was a final attempt by Harding's widow to verify his assertions of 

exposure to radioactive uranium dust in the plant. His bones were analyzed by a Canadian lab for uranium, but 

for reasons now unclear the results were never published. 

The lab report -- obtained last week by The Post -- not only supported Harding's claims of radiation exposure 

but also suggested hazards at the plant were far greater than previously believed: More than a dozen years 

after Harding left the plant, his body contained uranium at levels up to 133 times higher than is normally found 

in bones.
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Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones The Washington Post August 

22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Moreover, the type of uranium found was "not from natural sources," and apparently came from the plant's 

uranium enrichment process, the report said. 

Because uranium is slowly purged by the body over time, the levels in Harding's bones would have been 

"several-fold higher" during the time he was employed, the lab report stated. 

Exactly how much higher is unclear. But Carl Johnson, a Colorado physician and radiation consultant who 

analyzed the test results for Harding's widow in 1983, said Harding's uranium "bone burden" in the 1970s 

would have been between 1,700 and 34,000 times higher than normal. Based on those levels, the annual 

radiation dose to Harding's bone tissue would have been 30 to 600 rems a year. Under current standards, U.S. 

nuclear industry workers are allowed a maximum full-body dose of 5 rems a year. 

Radiation experts who reviewed the data for The Post said the results could have been skewed by a number of 

factors, including the possible presence of plutonium in Harding's bone tissue. But by any measure, the exposure was certainly high. 

Arjun Makhijani, president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, said conditions at Paducah

appear to have been similar to an Energy Department site at Fernald, Ohio, where concentrations of radioactive particles in the air are now known to have far exceeded then-allowable limits, in one instance by 97,000 

times. 

"The DOE and its contractor Union Carbide committed a gross injustice on Joe Harding," Makhijani said. "The 

DOE is perpetuating that injustice upon the half-million people who worked in the nuclear weapons complex 

since it has not yet provided the vast majority of the survivors among them with medical monitoring and medical 

help." 

Energy Department officials are now pledging increased medical tests and possibly compensation to thousands of men and women who were exposed to chemical and radiological hazards at Paducah and other 

facilities in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. The department's investigative team at Paducah in coming 

weeks will attempt to determine exactly what the hazards were, and who was exposed. 

The task is fraught with obstacles, including a dearth of monitoring data from the early years when radiation 

exposures were likely to be highest. Unlike the K-25 plant, no comprehensive study of worker histories has 

been attempted at Paducah. 

The draft study of uranium workers at the K-25 plant appears to offer further support for concerns about hazards inside such facilities. The mortality study of about 11,000 former workers at the plant was conducted by 

the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education. Although the research essentially was completed in 1994, 

funding for the study was dropped before it could be peer reviewed and published in a scientific journal. 

The draft report, obtained by The Post, shows higher rates of death for all causes among former workers, a 

finding that is significant in itself, given that government workers are typically healthier than the general population because of higher salaries and access to health care. 

The study also shows higher rates of cancers of the lung (19 percent) and bone (82 percent) among white male 

workers compared with the general population. Both cancers are sometimes linked to radiation exposure. 

Researchers point to several factors that could have skewed the results, including the inclusion in the survey of 

a sample of thousands of people who worked at the K-25 plant for a relatively brief period during World War II. 

Since many able-bodied men were in the military during that period, the remaining work force may have been 

less healthy than the general population, the authors said. 

A new study is underway to track death rates among K-25 workers who were exposed to the highest amounts 

of radiation. Similar mortality studies at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio have shown relatively 

low rates of cancer. 

Another possible problem in evaluating risks for Paducah workers is the reliability of the data. Previous Energy 

Department audits of the plant's safety records cited extensive problems with monitoring programs and 

equipment. And former and current workers at the plant say they believe radiation monitoring was shoddy in 

the past. 
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Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones The Washington Post August 

22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Al Puckett, a retired union shop steward who worked at the gaseous diffusion plant in the 1960s and 1970s, 

said workers would sometimes open their "film" badges only to find no film inside. Suspecting that no one ever 

examined workers' radiation monitors, Puckett and his colleagues sometimes exposed the badges to radiation 

by leaving them for hours on top of barrels of enriched uranium. 

"We turned the badges in and that was the last we heard of it," he said. "No one ever said anything to us." 

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The Washington Post 

September 16, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

U.S. Will Propose Payments to Sick Paducah Workers; $20 Million Fund 

Eyed For Radiation Cancers

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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The Clinton administration today will propose spending tens of millions of dollars to compensate ailing workers 

at the government's Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in what is described as a step toward acknowledging 

abuses committed against thousands of men and women who helped build America's nuclear arsenal. 

The proposed pilot program, which eventually could be expanded to encompass other Energy Department 

facilities, will be unveiled by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson during a visit to the plant, department officials 

confirmed to The Washington Post. 

If approved by Congress, the program would compensate current and former employees who have developed 

specific cancers related to radiation after working at the western Kentucky plant, which has made enriched 

uranium for nuclear weapons and power plants since 1952. In addition, Richardson will propose $ 21.8 million 

in new spending to pay for cleanup and for expanded medical monitoring of workers at Paducah and at sister 

plants in Ohio and Tennessee. 

"I'm going to Paducah to hear firsthand from the community and workers," Richardson said in an interview. 

The visit to Paducah comes two days after the release of preliminary findings from a month-long investigation 

of safety practices at the plant. A team of Energy Department inspectors cited numerous weaknesses in environmental programs and criticized federal managers and cleanup contractors for a "lack of discipline, formality and oversight" in the plant's management of radiation risks. 

The team found no evidence of imminent health threats to workers or the public but said radiation controls 

should be strengthened. In response, Richardson ordered immediate upgrades in safety practices, including 

enhanced training for workers. 

A separate investigation is examining alleged illegal dumping of radioactive waste, as well as claims of worker 

exposure to harmful levels of plutonium and other radioactive metals before 1990. 
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U.S. Will Propose Payments to Sick Paducah Workers; $20 Million Fund Eyed For Radiation Cancers The 

Washington Post September 16, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Energy Department inspectors were due to report additional findings at a House Commerce subcommittee 

hearing on the Paducah plant, scheduled for today but canceled because of Hurricane Floyd's approach 

toward Washington. The hearing was rescheduled for Wednesday. 

Details of the proposed compensation package for Paducah workers had not been completed, but Energy 

Department officials said the cost of the program could exceed $ 20 million, depending on how many workers 

qualified. 

But the program's initially narrow limits have drawn criticism from the plant's union. The critics noted that 

workers at other plants were exposed to similar hazards and also deserved to be compensated. 

"You've got a worker population at risk, but the administration wants to triage this thing," said Richard Miller, a 

policy analyst with the Paper, Allied Chemical and Energy Workers International Union who was briefed on 

details of the plan. "How do you justify compensating workers at one plant, while saying another plant across 

the river doesn't merit the same compensation?" 

Limits on compensation for exposed workers have been the subject of debate in the administration for weeks. 

Earlier in the summer, the Energy Department announced plans to separately compensate workers who had 

been exposed to beryllium, a highly toxic metal that was widely used in making nuclear weapons components. 

The White House also has launched an interagency review that will look at a wide range of workplace hazards 

at Energy Department plants, especially uranium plants in Piketon, Ohio, and Oak Ridge, Tenn. 

Richardson ordered the probe at the Paducah plant on Aug. 8 after a Washington Post investigation highlighted radioactive contamination at the plant, including worker exposure to plutonium. Documents filed in a 

worker lawsuit accuse the plant's former operators of failing to protect workers from -- or even to warn them of 

-- radioactive hazards. 

The Paducah plant is owned by the Energy Department but has been managed by a series of corporate 

contractors. In May, management of uranium processing passed to U.S. Enrichment Corp., a government-chartered private company that is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Energy Department's investigation at Paducah has focused mainly on policies and practices of department managers, as 

well as separate government contractors charged with cleaning up contamination. 

The $ 21.8 million that Richardson will announce includes $ 7 million for environmental health programs to 

analyze past safety risks and current health hazards. The information will be provided to the National Academy 

of Sciences' Institute of Medicine to help determine compensation for worker illnesses. 

Yesterday, an Ohio newspaper reported that workers at the Paducah facility's sister plant in Piketon also 

handled a greater amount of the type of plutonium-laced uranium oxide that caused widespread problems in 

Paducah than was previously acknowledged. 

Like the Paducah facility, the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio received shipments of contaminated recycled uranium directly from nuclear power plants, the Columbus Dispatch quoted Energy Department 

officials as saying. The uranium contained small amounts of plutonium and other radioactive material normally 

not present at gaseous diffusion plants. 

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The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 
Page 18 

Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public Outcry The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 

Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of 

Public Outcry

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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LENGTH: 1396 words 

 

Managers of the government's Paducah, Ky., uranium plant knew for decades of unusual radiation hazards 

inside the complex but failed to warn workers because of fears of a public outcry, according to documents to be 

released by a congressional panel this week. 

Faded memos unearthed by workers and federal investigators shed new light on what early plant officials knew 

about the presence of plutonium and other highly radioactive metals in the plant -- knowledge that was kept 

from the workers for nearly four decades. 

In one 1960 document, a government physician wrote that hundreds of workers should be screened for exposure to "transuranics" -- radioactive metals such as plutonium and neptunium -- but he said plant officials 

feared such a move would cause alarm and lead to higher labor costs. 

"They hesitate to proceed to intensive studies because of the union's use of this for hazard pay," says the 

memo, discovered by Energy Department officials investigating the plant. 

The documents from government archives have been turned over to a House Commerce Committee panel, 

which is holding hearings Wednesday into allegations of unsafe conditions at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 

Plant. The Washington Post obtained advance copies of the documents and prepared testimony of some 

current and former plant officials. 

Accounts of plutonium contamination and illegal waste dumping at the facility have triggered an Energy Department investigation and a class action suit by employees who believe the plant put them at risk. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson toured the plant on Friday and formally apologized to workers for the government's failure to fully inform them about the risks. He pledged millions of dollars in new spending to compensate ailing workers and to accelerate the cleanup of the plant. And he presented an award to the family of 

the late Joe Harding, an employee who had tried vainly for years to convince Energy officials that hazards in 

the plant had caused his fatal illness. 

"On behalf of the government I'm here to say I'm sorry," Richardson said. "The men and women who have 

worked in this facility helped the United States win the Cold War and now help us keep the peace. We recognize and won't forget our obligation to them." 

Plant officials, while acknowledging the presence of plutonium at Paducah, have said the amounts were small 

and were likely of little threat to workers. 

Government contractors who ran the plant over the last 47 years have declined to comment because of 

pending litigation. A Union Carbide Corp. spokesman, in a statement last month, said the alleged acts at 

Paducah occurred long ago, and none of the current managers had any detailed knowledge of what had 

happened. Union Carbide operated the plant from 1952 to 1983. 

The documents and testimony to be presented at the congressional hearing suggest that the federal government and private contractors running the plant ignored decades of warnings to protect workers from plutonium, a man-made metal that can cause cancer if inhaled in amounts as small as a millionth of an ounce. 

"What is clear is that the [government] contractors knew of the need to protect workers from plutonium and 

other transuranics . . . as early as 1952," Jim H. Key, the ranking environmental and safety official for the plant's 

unionized employees, states in prepared testimony to be delivered Wednesday. 
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Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public Outcry The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 

Key, who has not yet spoken publicly about the allegations of workers' exposure, alleges "widespread, systematic and documented failures" by the government and its contractors to control the spread of radioactive 

hazards. He describes smoky, radioactive fires inside the plant and thick clouds of radioactive uranium dust -- 

workplace hazards for which workers were neither trained nor equipped. 

Former workers also have come forward with evidence suggesting that past managers viewed the contamination as a practical and economic problem. John Tillson, a hydrologist who analyzed early operations at the 

plant while working for a cleanup contractor, said Paducah managers tried to recover the transuranics from the 

plant's waste stream in the 1950s and 1960s, when the metals were in high demand for nuclear materials 

research. 

By 1970 the prices had dropped, and the recovery programs were halted, he said. 

Plant officials even began processing sewage sludge from the plant after it was found to contain high levels of 

uranium. Harold Hargan, a 37-year employee who was detailed to the recovery program, said the uranium in 

sludge came exclusively from the plant's sanitary system, which included lavatories, wash rooms and laundry 

facilities. "All that uranium was either on workers' clothes or bodies -- or inside their bodies," he said. 

Although no formal epidemiological study has been completed for Paducah, some workers have long raised 

questions about what they believe are unusual rates and types of cancers in their communities. Those fears 

have risen sharply in the wake of reports that plutonium and other highly radioactive metals were also present 

in the workplace, Key, the union safety officer, says in his statement. 

"The majority of current and former workers are afraid that they may have been exposed to substances like 

plutonium without proper protection and that they will, as a result, be stricken with a fatal disease," Key wrote. 

"I myself have this fear from my 25 years at Paducah." 

Hired by the plant's original contractor, Union Carbide, in 1974, Key said he began witnessing safety problems 

almost immediately. During his first year on the job, he was engulfed in radioactive smoke after helping dump 

drumloads of highly flammable uranium metal into an open pit on the plant's grounds. 

"The uranium spontaneously ignited . . . and a pungent and irritating smoke enveloped us," said Key, an hourly 

worker and officer in the local chapter of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union. "To my knowledge this dumping ground has never been characterized." 

Workers inside the building where powdered uranium was processed were not required to wear respirators, 

even though the dust at times was so thick it was difficult to see, Key said. 

"I recall having to hold my breath to get through clouds of unknown fumes," he said. 

In the 1970s, Key would observe workers cleaning up spills of "black powder," which he later learned consisted 

of recycled uranium from the government's plutonium production facilities. Not until 1990 did plant officials tell 

the union that the powder contained small amounts of "transuranics" -- a class of highly radioactive metals that 

includes neptunium and plutonium. Plutonium is 100,000 times more radioactive per gram than uranium. 

Key cited a 1952 Union Carbide memo that suggests the need for special labeling of "plutonium contaminated 

locations." 

Years later, in a 1985 memo, Energy officials advised Paducah's managers to test workers who handled the 

recycled uranium for exposure to transuranics. Key notes, "We have no evidence that these recommendations 

were acted upon or communicated to the workforce." 

In 1991, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, which was now operating the plant, began a voluntary program to 

test workers for exposure. Thirty workers participated, but the test results were "invalidated" due to what the 

company termed "concerns and discrepancies" regarding the testing lab, Key said. 

He said the company refused to release the results to the union, explaining in a memo that "management is 

reluctant to release this information due to concerns about how it would be used." 

Concerns about public reaction were echoed in the 1960 memo from H .D. Bruner, a physician, to Union 

Carbide and Atomic Energy Commission medical officials. He expressed concerns about relatively large 
Page 20 

Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public Outcry The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 

amounts of neptunium in recycled uranium delivered to the Paducah plant. "But I am afraid the policy of the 

plant is to be wary of the unions and any unfavorable public relations," the memo states. 

Although workers in some buildings were furnished with gas masks, Bruner said the respirators were not used 

and did not appear to be effective against the tiny uranium particles in the air. 

"The human factor in handling [the recycled material] should be considered a source of potential exposure," he 

wrote. 

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The Washington Post 

October 21, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Energy Dept. Faults Paducah Contractors; Deficient Plant Hazard 

Warnings Cited

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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The Energy Department, ending the first phase of its investigation of the troubled Paducah, Ky., uranium plant, 

faulted contractors yesterday for failing to properly warn the public about radioactive hazards, including "relatively high" levels of plutonium in ditches outside the plant. 

Investigators zeroing in on the plant's current environmental and safety problems also pointed to the "theoretical" risk of an accidental nuclear chain reaction at the plant, citing large quantities of "uncharacterized" 

radioactive material stored there. 

The problems were among dozens uncovered in the first of two department probes of current and past hazards 

at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, one of two U.S.-owned facilities that produce enriched uranium. 

Yesterday's report gives the plant's managers 30 days to come up with a plan for addressing problems ranging 

from lax safeguards to radioactive seepage from a half-mile-long pile of contaminated scrap metal. 

"We have concerns about exposure, but we don't think any of them reach the level of imminent danger," said 

David Michaels, assistant energy secretary for environment, safety and health. 

Michaels promised quick action to eliminate any risk of a "criticality"--an inadvertent nuclear reaction similar to 

last month's serious accident at the Tokaimura uranium plant in Japan. Agency officials said the chances of 

such a reaction were remote. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson launched investigations at Paducah in August after reports of worker exposure to and sloppy handling of radioactive waste. Preliminary findings released last month faulted the 

agency and its contractors for weaknesses in identifying and cleaning up contaminants--hazards that included 

highly radioactive plutonium. 
Page 21 

Energy Dept. Faults Paducah Contractors; Deficient Plant Hazard Warnings Cited The Washington Post 

October 21, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Yesterday's report contained the first results from independent laboratory tests that confirmed the presence of 

plutonium and other radioactive metals in ground water as well as in ditches and streams outside the plant 

fence. The agency's tests found new areas of off-site contamination and also documented "relatively high 

levels" of plutonium, thorium and cesium in two ditches that feed a tributary of the Ohio River. 

The contaminated areas had not been properly controlled or marked with signs, the report said. Plutonium can 

cause cancer if inhaled in minuscule amounts. 

Although plant officials discovered off-site plutonium contamination in the early 1990s, most public reports 

listed plutonium levels at near zero. The discrepancy has been a sore point with lawmakers who have grilled 

former contractors as part of their own Paducah probe. 

Rep. Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R-Va.), chairman of the House Commerce Committee, expressed dismay yesterday 

after one former contractor, CH2MHill, insisted in a letter that the plutonium problem was contained within the 

plant's security boundaries. 

"For many years the Paducah community has been plagued by misinformation and outright deceit," Bliley said. 

He vowed to press for "full accountability and the highest level of safety" for Paducah workers and residents. 

 Energy Department investigators pointed to the "theoretical" risk of an accidental nuclear chain reaction at the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. 

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The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High 

Radiation Levels

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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DATELINE: PADUCAH, Ky. 

 

One worker collapsed on the factory floor, his body ravaged by lymphoma. Two others died within 105 days of 

different forms of leukemia. By the time Challie Freeman came down with a rare bone disease in the fall of 

1979, questions had morphed into suspicions: 

Was something at the U.S. government's uranium plant making workers sick? 

One possible answer--radiation exposure--seemed persuasive to Freeman's doctor. He fired off a letter to the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. "It is imperative," he wrote, "that we learn as soon as possible the extent, 

nature and type of radiation to which he was exposed." 

The reply--"no significant internal exposure"--was brief and emphatic. It was also false. 
Page 22 

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

While the plant was denying knowledge of significant hazards to Freeman's doctors, confidential records 

showed the opposite: Freeman had tested positive multiple times for exposure to radioactive uranium and had 

even been restricted from working around uranium, an internal company memo shows. 

In August, The Washington Post reported that Paducah workers were unwittingly exposed to highly radioactive plutonium and neptunium on the job from the 1950s to the 1970s. A subsequent four-month Post investigation has found additional evidence that plant officials kept employees uninformed about chemical and 

radiation hazards. In some cases, such as Freeman's, the plant withheld accurate medical information on 

radiation exposure--even while it privately tracked cancer deaths among workers. 

A limited review of Paducah employee death records also turned up rates of leukemia among workers that 

appear higher than normal, based on government mortality statistics. Epidemiologists who reviewed the 

findings described the data as intriguing but cautioned that a much more intensive scientific study was needed, 

involving investigators with full access to employee records and medical histories, to establish whether a 

pattern existed. Such a study has not been done at Paducah. 

The 48-year-old uranium plant is the subject of an Energy Department investigation into worker health and 

safety practices. Union Carbide Corp., which allowed its operating contract to expire in 1984, declines to 

comment, saying its Paducah managers are long gone from the company. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, 

whose agency owns the facility, has apologized for the failure to disclose plant hazards and has promised 

compensation for sick workers. 

Any outside attempt to review medical issues at Paducah is complicated by a lack of complete information. 

The Energy Department, citing privacy laws, declined to release lists of workers and their assignments. But 

The Post obtained company rosters listing more than 200 Paducah employees who were hired to work in 

some of the plant's most dangerous uranium-handling areas between 1951 and 1971. Scores of death certificates were examined and more than 120 surviving employees who worked in those areas were interviewed. 

Professional help was retained to categorize deaths, and a software program developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was used to compare incidences of cancer to national rates. 

The result: The incidence of leukemia at Paducah appeared elevated, according to epidemiologists who reviewed the data. Of the 211 people on the lists who could be located--about 13 percent of the plant's work force 

in an average year--10 died of cancers of the blood and lymphatic system, including six of leukemia. By 

comparison, government mortality statistics suggest that only a single leukemia death would be expected in a 

group of adults of that size. 

Cancer clusters are difficult to document, and cancers are not necessarily caused by radiation. Some studies 

at other Energy Department plants have suggested links between workplace hazards and cancers; others 

have not. Whether chronic exposure to low doses of radiation causes cancer has been hotly debated for 

decades. 

Still, several epidemiologists who reviewed the results said the unusual incidence of leukemia and other rare 

diseases suggests the need for a closer look. 

"The findings are interesting and noteworthy and are grounds for a more complete study of the question," said 

David Richardson, an epidemiologist who is researching radiation health effects for the World Health Organization. 

Senior Energy Department officials said the findings highlight a major policy dilemma for the agency: whether 

to pursue more studies or to expand pilot programs to directly compensate workers who get sick. Yesterday, 

the department announced that it had shifted spending priorities in its fiscal 2000 budget to increase money for 

health studies and medical monitoring at Paducah. However, officials worry that studies may not be the right 

approach. 

"Epidemiology is not going to answer the questions precisely enough," said David Michaels, an epidemiologist 

and the assistant energy secretary for environment, safety and health. 

Energy Secretary Richardson said he has proposed legislation to change the way his agency deals with its sick 

workers. 
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Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

"Instead of fighting claims, we're actually helping workers without the debate about the rates of illness," he said. 

"The legislation we sent to Congress takes the burden of proof off those who are sick." 

Documents obtained in October under the Freedom of Information Act show that Union Carbide began tracking 

the repeated cancer cases in its work force in the 1970s. 

The first to die was Wade McNabb, a 20-year veteran who succumbed to chronic leukemia in 1972. That same 

fall, another worker died of multiple myeloma, a bone marrow disease. 

Alton Henson died of leukemia in 1976. Two years later, three workers--Arvil Bean, Leonard Lindblad and 

David Wilson--died of leukemia or bone marrow diseases within a span of six months. 

By 1982, the company had counted 13 fatal cancers of the blood or lymphatic system out of a relatively stable 

work force that ranged from 1,200 to 2,000 people. The list appears on a single sheet of paper--stamped 

"confidential" and copied to senior plant officials--identifying workers sometimes by initials. How Union Carbide 

intended to use the list is unclear, but the plant's records show no attempt by contractors to investigate possible 

links between the deaths and workplace hazards. 

Meanwhile, plant workers were told everything was fine. When Challie Freeman fell ill with his deadly bone 

marrow disease at 59, plant officials offered a lot of sympathy but little truth, family members say. 

Responding to a hematologist's queries about possible radiation exposure, a plant physician in a letter described Freeman as a "very fine man" whose exposure to hazardous materials had been near zero. Medical 

records produced by the plant showed "no significant internal exposure," based on years of weekly urine tests 

for uranium. 

Not until 15 years after his death in 1984 did family members obtain his medical records from the Energy 

Department and learn the full story: Company tests had indeed found high levels of uranium in his body in the 

1950s--so much, in fact, that Freeman once had to be moved to a different work area. His widow, Sue, recalls 

that he was transferred to a different job in the 1950s after being told simply that his urine was "hot." 

Freeman's physician, Nashville hematologist John Flexner, remembered that the company's response 

"downplayed the exposures." 

"They made you think there was no way this could be a case of cause-and-effect," Flexner said. "I guess I was 

naive to think they were telling the truth." 

Union Carbide said that it did not have the ability to respond in the Freeman case because of the 20-year 

passage of time. 

Plant policies required that workers exposed to certain amounts of radiation be moved to other, less hazardous 

jobs. But new records show this was ignored in some cases in which workers received up to twice the maximum dosage. 

One who never got the word was A.B. Burris, a 74-year-old retiree who learned of his past exposures when he 

asked the Energy Department for his medical files this fall. 

"They say I was put on 'strict restriction,' but I never found out about it until weeks ago," he said. "I can tell you 

they never changed my job or said anything to me about it." 

Workers knew even less about potentially deadly plutonium and neptunium that spread through the plant in 

shipments of recycled nuclear reactor uranium fuel from the 1950s to the 1970s, plant documents show. 

Confidential, 40-year-old memos released by the Energy Department in September showed that Union Carbide officials had decided against testing workers for exposure to the radioactive metals because of fears that 

workers would "use it . . . as an excuse for hazardous-duty pay." 

Newly released memos show that senior managers were aware of the plutonium and neptunium problem as 

early as 1959 but concluded in classified studies that contaminants were not a health hazard because the 

amounts in each shipment were small--a maximum of 10 parts per billion of plutonium in each uranium 

shipment. 

But over the years, the two metals began accumulating in soil and waste materials. 
Page 24 

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

In a survey of Paducah plant buildings conducted in the early 1990s, more than half of the work areas sampled 

exceeded the plant's safety limits for plutonium and neptunium--in some cases by a factor of 10. A survey of a 

men's locker room found high levels in shower stalls and even on toilet seats. 

Workers did know enough about radiation hazards to formally request additional safeguards. 

When Union Carbide decided to stop providing mechanics with coveralls, the plant's union demanded in 1986 

that the company take responsibility for "radiation carried into our homes, autos and other areas." Union 

Carbide denied the request, although in 1975 the union negotiated the right to protective clothing on demand. 

The union was less successful in efforts to secure workers' rights to take regular breaks in a radiation-free 

lunchroom. In a written grievance in 1979, the union said workers "should not have to eat in a contaminated 

area." 

The company denied the request. 

Ailing workers in the past have had difficulty proving harm because they lacked accurate monitoring data, 

David Fuller, president of the Paducah chapter of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers 

Union, testified at a Senate hearing on Paducah in October. 

While applauding government promises to financially aid ailing Paducah workers, Fuller and other union officials called for a compensation program for all workers that "reverses the burden of proof onto the government" 

while expanding medical monitoring for those most at risk. 

"Monitoring is imperative," Fuller said, "but without any other remedy, monitoring is simply a process to watch 

people get sick and die." 

Director of computer-assisted reporting Ira Chinoy, database editor Sarah Cohen, and staff researchers Alice 

Crites, Nathan Abse and Nancy Shiner contributed to this report. 

Challie Freeman 

Job: Cascade worker, security officer 

Age at death: 64 

Illness: Myelofibrosis 

Did radioactive exposure on the job make Challie Freeman sick? His doctor suspected a link, but plant 

managers said no. Asked by doctors to provide details of Freeman's work history, a Union Carbide memo 

described light exposure to the skin but "no significant internal exposures." 

Fifteen years after Freeman's death, the family obtained confidential plant memos that showed the opposite: 

Freeman had been restricted from uranium work in the 1950s because of "repeated positive urine samples" for 

radioactive uranium. The uranium remained high after weekends away from the job, the memo said. 

Freeman became sick from a slowly progressing bone marrow disease in the 1970s and died in 1984. Near the 

end his weight plummeted from 190 pounds to 100 and he was in constant pain, said his wife, Sue, who quit 

her job to care for him. 'We always wondered if it was the plant that made him sick,' she said. 'Now I have no 

doubt.' 

David R. Wilson 

Job: Cascade operator 

Age at death: 54 

Illness: Lymphosarcoma 

Like most Paducah workers, Wilson said little about his job, though sometimes he'd confide to his wife when 

he was exposed to unusually high levels of radiation. "He would say just he had been 'hot,'" remembers his 

widow, Winnie. One day in early 1978 he was rushed to the hospital after becoming ill at work. Tests confirmed 

he suffered from a form of lymphoma, which ended his life just four months later. 

Wade McNabb 
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Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Job: Cascade operator 

Age at death: 55 

Illness: Leukemia 

The doctor's eyes spoke volumes. After breaking the awful news to McNabb -- a diagnosis of leukemia at age 

40 -- he asked the ailing man where he worked. The reply, "Atomic Energy Plant, Paducah," prompted a nod 

and a knowing look. "Oh, yes," the hematologist said, "I'm treating several patients from Oak Ridge," 

Paducah's sister plant in Tennessee. McNabb began treatment and returned to the same job to preserve his 

salary and health benefits. "We didn't know what else to do," Dove, his widow, says. "You couldn't even talk 

about it at work, not if you wanted to keep your job." 

Jack Owens 

Job: Cascade operator, emergency crew 

Age at death: 36 

Illness: Rare blood/bone marrow disease 

Owen's emergency crew job brought him into some of the most dangerous areas to clean up spills of chemicals 

and radioactive material. "Some days he'd come home with chemical burns at every orifice," remembers his 

widow, Norma Rebik. "Later, when his doctor asked what he had been exposed to, he said, 'Everything.'" In 

1961, at 36, he died of a form of thrombocytopenia, a condition sometimes linked to environmental exposures. 

"He went from perfectly well to dead in a week," his widow said. 

Leon Lindblad 

Job: Cascade supervisor 

Age at death: 62 

Illness: Leukemia 

An avowed believer in Paducah's "mission," Lindblad was ambivalent about whether the plant posed risks. 

"He'd say the radiation levels were not that high," remembers his widow, Virginia, and yet, he always "took his 

shoes off at the door because he didn't want to bring that stuff inside the house." Lindblad's suspicions multiplied after he became sick with leukemia. He drew up a list of accidents and dates. "If I die, you can sue them," 

Lindblad explained to his wife, "because they're the ones who did this to me." Virginia never got the chance: On 

a Friday in 1976, Linblad stashed the list in his desk, never suspecting that he would become gravely ill over 

the weekend. He never returned to work. 

C. Arvil Bean 

Job: Process maintenance 

Age at death: 64 

Illness: Leukemia 

Bean's retirement plans included firing up the '49 Cadillac he was restoring and taking his wife on a trip to the 

Dakotas, where he was once stationed with the Army. Those ambitions faded the day he was diagnosed with 

acute leukemia at age 55. He replayed in his mind the times he had been exposed to radiation -- like the day he 

worked 16 hours cleaning up radioactive debris from a 1962 explosion. Despite his illness, Bean clung to his 

vacation dreams to the end. "Every few days he'd go out there and crank up that old car," daughter Nita said, 

"even in the snow." 

Charles Edward Harris 

Job: Machinist 

Age at death: 62 

Illness: Cancer, multiple organs 
Page 26 

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

For 25 years, Harris worked in the plant's machine shop, grinding down and repairing the nickel-plated pipes 

and gear used to convert uranium powder to nuclear fuel. Unknown to Harris and most other workers at the 

time, the metals were contaminated with small amounts of plutonium and neptunium, radioactive elements far 

more dangerous than ordinary uranium. His son, David, may have been exposed to the same hazards during 

summer jobs at the plant: College students mowed grass and cleaned up pond sludge in areas now known to 

be contaminated with the highly radioactive metals. "At the time they told us point-blank there was nothing 

there but uranium," David said. 

Eugene Ragland 

Job: Chemical operator 

Age at Death: 49 

Illness: Lung cancer 

The accident and Ragland's death will always be connected, at least in the mind of his widow, Marie. She still 

remembers his worried voice the night in March 1978 when he called to say he wouldn't be coming home from 

work. Ragland had been exposed to radiation during a mishap and had been asked to stay overnight for 

testing. Four months later, a separate medical test found "something wrong" with his blood, she said -- a result 

that led to the discovery of a rapidly spreading cancer in his lungs and chest. His death on Aug. 4 came so 

suddenly that Ragland had little time to ponder his illness, or the possible causes. "He always thought he was 

safe at the plant," Marie said. "They never let him know differently." 

 When Challie Freeman got sick, Paducah managers claimed he had suffered "no significant" radiation exposure, above, even though years earlier they had restricted his work near uranium, as noted below, because 

his urine had tested "hot." The body of Paducah plant worker Joe Harding was exhumed in November for 

tests. He had feared that the cancer that eventually killed him in 1980 was caused by radiation exposure. 

LOAD-DATE: December 23, 1999 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 

Copyright 1999 The Washington Post 

9 of 9 DOCUMENTS 

 The Washington Post 

February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of 

Hazards In Secret Program

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01 

LENGTH: 1290 words 

 
Page 27 

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In Secret Program The 

Washington Post February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

More than 1,600 tons of nuclear weapons parts reportedly lie scattered around the Energy Department's 

Paducah, Ky., uranium plant, a safety manager informed regulators yesterday in a new disclosure of potential 

hazards unknown to workers or civilian plant supervisors. 

Some of the bomb parts are stored in above-ground shelters and could pose a risk of exposure or even an 

accidental nuclear reaction at the plant, if the components are contaminated with radioactive substances such 

as enriched uranium and plutonium, the official reported in a signed statement to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The U.S. Enrichment Corp. (USEC), the government-chartered private company that now runs the plant, 

acknowledged yesterday that its senior officials recently discussed the issue with the Department of Energy. 

"USEC has been assured that DOE is not aware of any conditions that create a radiological hazard to USEC 

personnel at the site beyond those already known and controlled," company spokeswoman Elizabeth Stuckle 

said. 

Energy Department officials involved with the country's classified nuclear weapons program apparently were 

aware of the shipment of bomb components to Paducah over many years, but the department did not until 

recently inform the plant's civilian overseers and safety officials who were in charge of evaluating threats to 

workers. 

The statement by Raymond G. Carroll, a senior manager of health and safety programs at the plant since 

1992, quotes a conversation with another senior civilian plant official who reportedly told Carroll he was worried 

about the bomb parts after hearing of their existence from a DOE official. 

Carroll also said he was told that DOE officials recently began hauling away documents related to weapons 

dismantlement. 

A DOE spokesman confirmed that the department is investigating "classified national security programs" 

conducted at Paducah in the past, along with the Justice and Defense departments. 

"This review includes the examination of potential worker exposures and any safety, health and environmental 

issues associated with these national security programs," the official said. 

Carroll's statement was obtained by The Washington Post yesterday as the government was making its most 

detailed acknowledgment to date of historically unsafe practices at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, a 

hulking industrial complex that has produced enriched uranium for nuclear bombs and power plants since 

1952. 

The 77-page DOE report faults a "climate of secrecy" for keeping workers and neighbors uninformed and 

unprotected while radioactive contaminants spread through factory buildings and surrounding areas. A few 

volunteers were deliberately exposed to uranium in a series of previously undisclosed human experiments, the 

report said. 

The DOE report does not mention nuclear bomb parts. A worker lawsuit against plant contractors last summer 

revealed that some weapons parts had been melted down at the plant to recover gold and other metals. But 

details of the scope and purpose of the bomb program have remained shrouded in secrecy. 

Both DOE and Justice are investigating whistleblower allegations of improper handling of radioactive waste at 

the plant. 

Yesterday's disclosure by Carroll suggests the bomb program may have introduced yet another unknown 

hazard at a facility where workers had been lulled by assurances that their jobs were virtually risk-free. 

"Personnel could conceivably encounter highly enriched uranium or plutonium (or even tritium) without even 

knowing it," said Carroll, a 30-year veteran of the nuclear safety field who now works for USEC. Tritium is a 

radioactive component of the hydrogen bomb. 

Carroll, in a five-page memo filed with NRC and DOE officials, said he learned about the bomb parts from a 

senior USEC supervisor, radiation protection manager Orville Cypret. Carroll wrote that Cypret said he learned 

about the bomb parts from Dale Jackson, the former DOE manager of the Paducah site. 
Page 28 

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In Secret Program The 

Washington Post February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

Carroll said Cypret told him that 1,600 tons of weapons components had been shipped to Paducah since the 

1950s. Although some parts were buried, others were dispersed in various storage areas across the sprawling 

complex, according to Carroll's statement. 

Cypret became alarmed after a Justice Department investigator told him "he would not ask about a 'classified 

tritium project' or past nuclear weapons handling at Paducah," Carroll wrote in his statment. 

In keeping with security policy, the weapons parts were not labeled, though "DOE thinks it knows where most 

of the material is," Carroll wrote. 

Cypret and Jackson did not return phone calls from The Post. A Justice Department official in Louisville said he 

could not comment on the department's investigation into whistleblower complaints at the plant. 

Carroll said he was told that "large quantities" of plutonium and highly enriched uranium had been brought into 

the plant, and "not just in reactor tails." Last summer, following allegations by current and former workers, DOE 

acknowledged for the first time that radioactive plutonium and neptunium had entered the plant in uranium 

"tails," recycled uranium metal from military reactors that produced plutonium. 

Carroll said in his statement that Cypret said a team of DOE officials had been assembled to investigate the 

matter but their findings "would not be voluntarily shared" with the plant's civilian managers. Instead, as records 

relating to the bomb program were found, they were held in a special vault for classified material. 

"Someone from [the DOE's Oak Ridge, Tenn., site] would drive down each night to pick them up," Carroll 

wrote, quoting Cypret. 

Carroll said the new disclosures had left him deeply concerned about the safety of the plant's workers. Besides 

the risk of radioactive contamination, improperly stored nuclear material could trigger a lethal "criticality," an 

accidental nuclear reaction. 

"A decision had apparently been made that national security would take precedence over personnel radiological safety," Carroll wrote. "I find this situation to be unconscionable." 

The risk posed by weapons parts could range from high to minimal, depending on the materials and how they 

are stored. 

DOE's report on historical practices at Paducah wraps up the second of two major probes ordered by Energy 

Secretary Bill Richardson in August. DOE officials described it as one of the most thorough in the department's 

history. 

The report concludes that the plant's lapses in worker safety in many ways reflected the culture of the time. 

"The Cold War was a reality," and federal oversight of the plant "was primarily directed at cost, schedule and 

production," the report said. 

Although the "intention to protect workers was apparent," plant managers frequently failed to meet even the 

relatively lenient safety and environmental standards of the day, the report states. 

The risks posed by plutonium and neptunium were "neither fully understood or appreciated," the report states. 

"The presence of these materials, the increased risks involved and the rationale for additional controls was not 

shared with workers." 

In addition, radioactive and chemical wastes were routinely discharged into the water and air. Investigators 

documented nighttime smokestack emissions--dubbed "midnight negatives"--involving tens of thousands of 

pounds of uranium dust and smoke. 

Richardson said the findings underscore his efforts to win compensation and other aid for ailing workers. 

"I'm going to continue to be up front with the Paducah workers and the community about environmental, safety 

and health conditions at our sites during the Cold War," he said. 

LOAD-DATE: February 11, 2000 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
Page 29 

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In Secret Program The 

Washington Post February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

Copyright 2000 The Washington Post 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: mary eddy <maryjensen@copper.net>

Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2015 3:49 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. 

2. i am concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want to 

bring a new waste stream. 

3. I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. 

4. I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. It makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into 

the Class A category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. 

I urge the NRC to finally classify this waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

mary eddy 

776 emerson ave 

salt lake city, UT 84105 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608115
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Bob Brister <bbrister@q.com>

Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2015 5:10 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules (NRC-2011-0012)

As a resident of Salt Lake City, I do a lot of recreating in the West Desert of Utah. In am very unhappy that the 

West Desert has become a dump for the nation's toxic and radioactive waste. 

Please make sure that your proposed revisions allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification tables to 

enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our 

state. 

I am very concerned that the new regulations irresponsibly reduce the compliance period. At first staff, chose a 

10,000 year period, but that's been reduced to only 1,000 years. What could be more immoral than to subject 

future generations for thousands of years to the threat of radioactive waste exposure? 

We live in an age of state terror and retail-scale terror. A very wide range of intruder scenarios to be 

considered. New types of threats that may develop in the future must be considered. 

Because of depleted uranium's qualities that cause it to grow more radioactive for 2.1 million years, depleted 

uranium needs to be reclassified to reflect its most radioactive stage. 

It is tragic that depleted uranium continues to be produced. Its production should be ended and existing waste 

should be held in secure, retrievable storage at the point of production. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Bob Brister 

1102 S 800 E #A 

Salt Lake City, UT 84105 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608116
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Suzanne Stensaas <suzanne.stensaas@hsc.utah.edu>

Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2015 5:37 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Please listen to the experts who study the effects of radiation and its life span. I am a Utah resident, but care 

should be given to our entire country not just here. Why is the government listening to lobbyists for the 

industry and not scientific data and advisers? 

Suzanne Stensaas 

2460 E Lynwood Dr 

Salt Lake City, UT 84109 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608117
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Richard Kanner <richard.kanner@hsc.utah.edu>

Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2015 5:41 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

If you permit Energy Solutions to bury depleted uranium in the west desert of Utah I and my fellow residents of 

Salt Lake City will be downwind from the dust from this dangerous material. It may start out as being 

underground but changing lake levels can bring it to the surface. 

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Richard Kanner 

2460 Lynwood Dr. 

Salt Lake City, UT 84109 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608118
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Steven Haycock <jelliclespcat@hotmail.com>

Sent: Wednesday, June 24, 2015 9:43 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

It's discouraging to hear that the US Government seems to be siding with profiteers (like Energy Solutions) 

who will poison the State of Utah forever for their own short-term gain. Please do not weaken or compromise 

your regulations and traditions - stand up for the health of the people. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Steven Haycock 

136 Braewick Rd 

Salt Lake City, UT 84103 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608119
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: SUSAN MICHETTI <SUNLIGHTRISING@GMAIL.COM>

Sent: Wednesday, July 08, 2015 12:44 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

I am very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially since so 

much of that waste ends up in our backyards. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow states to maintain their reliance upon 

classification tables, for example to enforce bans on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the 

final rules. States must have the right to keep hotter wastes out, if they violate state laws. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

IT IS IRRESPONSIBLE TO NOT USE THE FULL TIME SPAN IN WHICH THE RESULTS OF DECISIONS 

MADE NOW WILL ADVERSELY IMPACT THE FUTURE GENERATIONS. IT IS SAYING TO FUTURE 

GENERATIONS THAT IF YOU CANNOT BEAR CHILDREN AND ARE STERILE BECAUSE WE WERE 

NEGLIGENT, TOO BAD AS IT IS IRREVERSIBLE. THAT COULD HAPPEN TO THE ENTIRE POPULATION 

OF HUMANS AND WIPE HUMANITY OFF THE FACE OF THE EARTH DUE TO RECKLESS, CARELESS, 

DECISIONS MADE WITH HUBRIS AND LACK OF SUFFICIENT CONCERN FOR ALL LIFE NOW AND IN 

THE FUTURE. STERILITY IS A KNOWN FACT AFTER 4 GENERATIONS. WE HAVE YET TO SEE THE 

IMPACTS OF THREE MILE ISLAND, CHERNOBYL, AND FUKUSHIMA ON HUMAN REPRODUCTION, AND 

THE EFFECTS OF SMALLER EXPOSURES HAS ALSO NOT BEEN SUFFICIENTLY STUDIED FOR 

REPRODUCTION SAFETY INTO FUTURE GENERATIONS AFTER GENETIC DAMAGE. HOWEVER, IT IS 

PREDICTABLE, JUST NOT FULLY OBSERVED YET IN HUMANS DUE TO THE TIMEPERIOD REQUIRED 

TO PASS THAT EXISTS INTO THE FUTURE, BUT IT HAS BEEN OBSERVED IN ANIMAL STUDIES. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. STUDIES ARE NOT SCIENTIFIC 

AND NOT VALID UNLESS THEY ARE VIGOROUS, THOROUGH, REPLICABLE, AND PEER REVIEWED. 

THESE ARE THE TYPE OF STUDIES THAT RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES DEALING WITH ANY TYPE OF 

TOXIC OR ANY TYPE OF CHEMICAL THAT MAY POSE DANGER TO LIVING ORGANISMS AND HUMANS, 

LIKE RAD WASTE ABSOLUTELY DOES, MUST REQUIRE. ANYTHING LESS IS RECKLESS, 

IRRESPONSIBLE, AND UNSCIENTIFIC, AND DOOMING OUR ENVIRONMENT AND VIRTUALLY ALL OF 

ITS LIVING ORGANISMS, INCLUDING HUMANS. STUDIES FUNDED BY THOSE WHO PROFIT FROM 

BUSINESSES RELATED TO THE STUDIES TEND TO BE NOTORIOUS FOR FLAWED SCIENCE AND 

UNREPLICABLE FINDINGS AS WELL AS TOO NARROW FINDINGS THAT DO NOT PERTAIN THE 

COMPLETE OVERALL CONSEQUENCES OF EXPOSURES TO THEIR WASTE PRODUCTS. ANYTHING 

LESS THAN ACTUAL SCIENTIFIC STUDIES FUNDED BY INDEPENDENT SOURCES WITHOUT DEEP 

ARMS TO REACH INTO THE RESULT OR TO IMPACT THE FINDINGS IS UNACCEPTABLE WHEN IT 

COMES TO ANY TOXIC, PARTICULARLY NUCLEAR WASTE. 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608120
2

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. FULL CONSIDERATION OF PLANNED TERRORISM, CHILDREN'S UNMONITORED 

ACTIVITIES, AND HOMELESSNESS AND MENTAL ILLNESS MUST BE CONSIDERED, FOR EXAMPLES. 

THE IMPACTS OF MAJOR PLANETARY CATASTROPHES MUST BE CONSIDERED, SUCH AS CLIMATE 

CHANGE, FLOODING, GLACIERS, VOLCANOES, EARTHQUAKES, ASTEROID AND OTHER OUTER 

SPACE INTRUSIONS AND HITS, FOR EXAMPLES. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. CALLING RAD WASTE LOW LEVEL, MEDIUM LEVEL, 

OR HIGH LEVEL ARE ARBITRARY AND MISLEADING AND CONFUSING DESIGNATIONS, BECAUSE 

VIRTUALLY ALL NUCLEAR WASTE HAS DECAY PRODUCTS WITH VARIOUS DIFFERENT HALF-LIVES. 

THESE HALF-LIVES CAN CONTINUE DOWN A CHAIN OF RADIOACTIVE DECAY EVENTS THAT CAN 

EXTENT HUNDREDS, THOUSANDS, AND MILLIONS OF YEARS WITH CERTAIN RADIOACTIVE 

MATERIALS. IN FACT VIRTUALLY ALMOST ALL OF IT DOES LAST MUCH LONGER THAN MOST 

PEOPLE RECOGNIZE. THE LENGTH OF RADIOACTIVITY AND ITS DAMAGE TENDS TO BE 

SCIENTIFICALLY UNDERESTIMATED IN MOST GOVERNMENT ANALYSES, AND THIS REQUIRES 

CORRECTIONS IF AGENCIES ARE TO BE RESPONSIBLE AND SUFFICIENTLY ACCURATE. 

ALL EXPOSURES TO RADIOACTIVITY CAUSE DAMAGE TO LIVING ORGANISMS AND TO HUMANS. IT 

IS A QUESTION OF HOW MUCH DAMAGE. THE DAMAGE IS REPRESENTED STRAIGHTFORWARD BY 

A LINEAR LINE THAT DIRECTLY CORRESPONDS TO EXPOSURE AND TO LENGTH OF TIME OF THAT 

EXPOSURE. THIS IS STRAIGHT SCIENCE OF THE MOST PREDICTABLE TYPE. THE MEMBRANES ON 

THE RED BLOOD CELLS APPEAR TO SHOW THE FIRST LINE OF DAMAGE IN HUMANS AND WARMBLOODED ORGANISMS. ANY EXPOSURE, HOWEVER BRIEF, SHOWS SOME DEFORMITY TO THE 

MEMBRANE ON THE RED BLOOD CELLS. THIS IS UNDISPUTED MEDICAL SCIENCE. THE QUESTION 

IS HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE AN INDIVIDUAL'S IMMUNE SYSTEM TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE AND IF IT 

CAN REPAIR ALL THE DAMAGE. HEALTHIER ORGANISMS MAY BE ABLE TO REPAIR THE DAMAGE 

FROM VERY SHORT EXPOSURES. OLDER ORGANISMS AND VERY YOUNG ORGANISMS AND THOSE 

ALREADY CHALLENGED WITH OTHER PROBLEMS MAY NEVER RECOVER AND MAY HAVE 

SHORTENED LIFE SPANS AS A DIRECT RESULT OR OTHER CHALLENGING MEDICAL PROBLEMS, 

SUCH AS THYROID MALFUNCTIONS AND THYROID CANCER OR LEUKEMIA OR STILL BIRTHS, ETC. 

THESE ARE SCIENTIFIC AND MEDICAL FACTS THAT MUST BE CONSIDERED AND PROTECTED 

SUFFICIENTLY FROM NEGLIGENT AND IRRESPONSIBLE EXPOSURES TO THE GENERAL PUBLIC, TO 

WORKERS, AND TO SCIENTISTS AND OTHERS. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

SUSAN MICHETTI 

605 SHEILA ST 

MT HOREB, WI 53572 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Deb Olivier <Debdayolivier@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2015 9:36 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] My comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Utah's number one business is tourism. This is NOT compatible with being the world's nuclear waste dump. 

Energy Solutions has tried to accept waste from Europe! 

Skiers and outdoor enthusiasts are not interested in traveling long distances to a dump site for their vacation. 

We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to govern low level nuclear waste, especially 

since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Deb Olivier 

1941 S Wasatch Dr 

Salt Lake City, UT 84108 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608121
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Nancy Halden <nfhalden@gmail.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 09, 2015 10:10 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

 As you might know, Utah has one of the youngest populations of any state, as well as a history of people who 

were downwind of nuclear fallout and suffered the consequences. These two factors make us vigilant to the 

health implications of nuclear storage. We in Utah are very interested in the rules that the NRC makes to 

govern low level nuclear waste, especially since so much of that waste is stored here. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

4. Finally, I request that the NRC classify Depleted Uranium. As a unique waste stream that continues to grow 

more radioactive for 2.1 million years, it makes no sense this has been arbitrarily lumped into the Class A 

category -- with waste that's only hazardous for a few hundred years. I urge the NRC to finally classify this 

waste accurately to inform ongoing disposal efforts. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Nancy Halden 

8872 S Silverstone Way 

Sandy, UT 84093 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608122
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Debbie Don <dbeedon@outlook.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 16, 2015 5:39 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

July 15, 2015 

Regarding – Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

Dear United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 

I am writing regarding the proposed rule change on Low-Level Radioactive Waste. 

I appreciate the opportunity to voice my concerns. However, I am skeptical that the die has 

already been cast. 

I am a concerned citizen of Utah, and want to request you, the Commissioners, to please take a 

long hard look at the following concerns: 

1. Leaving depleted uranium classified as a Class A waste.

a. I do not understand how you as Commissioner’s, can let this loophole in the law

continue. Class A waste is the lowest level waste classification by the federal

government. Class A waste decays away after 100-200 years. Depleted

Uranium, by Energy Solutions’ own estimate will remain with us and get “hotter

and hotter for 2.1 million years.” Forever. Forever.

My fellow Utahns and I urge you to correct this classification error. 

At the June 10, 2015 meeting in Salt Lake City, the NRC representatives stated 

the NRC “recognized there were other issues that we would need to address and 

should address, and those issues had to do with trying to address any other 

waste streams that might come along in the future so that we don’t have to 

continuously revise our regulation for new waste streams.” 

My fellow Utahns and I urge you to not disguise depleted uranium as a Class A 

waste category, a move that everyone knows is an unwise decision, and that 

your own professional staff has questioned. Please do the right thing. 

Please create a classification that addresses elements that get hotter and hotter, 

for over 500 years. Risk inform the public of the waste classification tables that 

PR-20, 61

80FR16081 23
2

are in the regulation. This new classification would include depleted uranium 

and “any other waste streams that might come along.” 

b. To do nothing, at this time, when you know it has been proven that depleted 

uranium is hotter than traditional Class A waste is negligent. Even our Governor 

Gary Herbert “has a hunch it’s hotter than Class A waste and should be 

reclassified as something else.” Doing nothing sets up the State of Utah for legal 

cases and will become a drain on our legal system. 

 

Utah Code Ann Section #19-3-103.7 reads: 

“No entity may accept in the state or apply for a license to accept in the state for 

commercial storage, decay in storage, treatment, incineration, or disposal: 

(1) class B or class C low-level radioactive waste; or 

(2) radioactive waste having a higher radionuclide concentration than the 

highest radionuclide concentration allowed under licenses existing on February 

25, 2005, that have met all the requirements of Section 19-3-105.” 

Waste hotter than Class A waste is illegal in our State. Without your proactive 

leadership and preemptive response to federal direction on this waste 

classification, this issue could be tied up in the Utah court systems for years. 

c. To allow this loophole to continue sets up the opportunity for Energy 

Solutions’ to slide depleted uranium into Utah under the radar, while you, the 

NRC Commissioners drag your feet on classifying depleted uranium correctly 

once and forever. This creates mistrust among the public for our federal agency 

that is to regulate and take charge of this issue. Depleted uranium has been on 

your radar screen since the 1980’s. Estimates on the government contracts that 

Energy Solutions may likely earn range from $15 to $20 million dollars per 

year. 

2. Requiring that each state issue a Performance Assessment to companies’ that 

want to dispose of depleted uranium. 

a. This will surely result in consultant companies, across the board, fighting their 

sides – whether it be for the people of the state, or for the companies that want 

the very lucrative government contracts to dispose of this very toxic waste. 

b. Please consider that Energy Solutions and their consultants have been going 

around and around with the state of Utah for approximately five (5) years. To 

reiterate, it will be the “consultants’ wars.” And the companies/consultants that 

have the most money and time to keep back-and-forth consultant reports going -

wins. Not only do the tax payers get taken advantage of and exploited, but 

eventually payola can get in the way and the only ones that profit are the 

consultants. There is a long history here in Utah, in which Energy Solutions’ 
3

once known as Enviro Care bribed Radiation Control Board persons to get their 

way, and licenses approved. As you must know, the waste industry is a huge 

mean machine with a lot of money to be made. The federal government needs 

to dispose of over 750,000 metric tons of depleted uranium. Allowing Energy 

Solutions’ to accept depleted uranium before you classify depleted uranium as a 

waste hotter than B or C class waste is allowing the cart before the horse. 

c. As discussed in the SLC meeting, the foxes will pretty much be guarding the 

hen house. As referenced in the SLC discussion, “you have made an elaborate 

calculation system analyses that is done by the same people who will receive 

the waste and profit from it, and all they have to do is carry out some 

equations. Then you guys see if the equations look right, and then they can 

pretty much put any waste into these disposal sites that they want, and there will 

never be any consequences that they have to bear. 

d. This system of every state having a different performance assessment process 

with different local requirements, different local storage conditions, different 

local climate controls, different local environmental demands, different intruder 

scenarios, different control procedures, different on and on and on. Every state 

will have different requirements and laws/statues to follow. 

e. Another example of the fox guarding the hen house was discussed in SLC on 

June 10, 2015. NRC staff stated the existing regulation does not require an 

intruder assessment. It was stated, “So, that is the key part that the waste 

streams that are significantly different than what was analyzed in the early 

1980’s you had – somebody has to do a new intruder assessment, whether it’s 

the regulator or the licensee. And in these “proposed regulations, it is the 

licensee that is going to perform that analyses.” 

3. Burying depleted uranium in a shallow grave approximately 10 feet 

underground, on top of a water table, is sound reasoning for millions of years.

a. This just doesn’t pass the smell test. Don’t let this come back and 

haunt your legacies, don’t go against what your own experts have found and 

documented. Sheer ignorance, coupled with poor government oversight and 

pure-old greed, is often a recipe for disaster. One of the worries at Clive, Utah 

is site abandonment. The hedge fund that now owns Energy Solutions’ could 

flip the site after receiving government contracts. New owners may be foreign 

and not grasp their responsibilities due to the lack of regulation and oversight. 

There are so many stories of waste, contamination and destruction of people’s 

lives. Ten (10) feet is the height of a professional basketball standard. 

Love Canal, Three Mile Island, and our own Utah Down Winders. 

b. In our June 10, 2015 meeting in Salt Lake City it was stated that 

your staff was directed by you, the Commissioners, to “conduct an analysis to 

determine whether or not we believe that the large quantities of depleted 
4

uranium were, in fact, suitable for near surface disposal. ... Our analysis 

showed us that it was, provided certain – under certain conditions. ...we also 

recognized there were other issues we would need to address and should 

address, and those issues had to do with trying to address any other waste 

streams that might come along in the future so that we don’t have to 

continuously revise our regulation for new waste streams. There was 

considerable direction from the commission direction to us...meaning the five, 

the five commissioners.” 

 4. Rulemaking Extension

a. I would like to request that the NRC extend the rulemaking with 

 additional sections to include: 

1. New Classifications for waste that gets hotter over 500 years and also risk

inform the waste classification tables that are in the regulation. 

2. An extension on the Comment Period and the technical back up 

documents. 

b. Yes, as discussed at the SLC meeting on June 10, 2015, I do believe the NRC – 

MUST present and offer another rulemaking forum that definitely addresses the 

specific classification of depleted uranium and also risk inform the waste 

classification tables that are in the regulation. The states and the public that have 

depleted uranium anywhere near -they MUST be informed and involved in another 

rulemaking specific to these issues. 

5. Scope of Analyses – Compliance period, the protective assurance 

 period, and the performance period and the defense-in-depth 

 protections. 

a. It was mentioned in our SLC Meeting, that siting characteristics are in section 

61.50 and reference things that are looked at regarding the site. Three of the 

four topics mentioned are at best questionable regarding the Energy Solutions’ 

site. 

1. Is the site going to flood – and Is the water table going to 

fluctuate? To quote a recent local newspaper article “Most Utahns are 

familiar with Lake Bonneville that filled the valley of western Utah as 

recently (geologically) as 15,000 years ago. The Great Salt Lake, Utah 

Lake and Lake Bonneville are manifestations of a single expanding and 

contracting lake system that has flooded Clive many times. There can 

be little doubt that it will happen again. The only question is when.” 

 2. How much seismicity might you have? I hope all of you 

 have heard of the Wasatch Fault. 

3...I have to mention the fact that the performance assessment 

 timeframe goes from zero to 10,000 years although all data 
5

 points to this toxic material being hot for 2.1 million years. 

b. As discussed with us in the June 10, 2015 SLC Meeting, Yes, I believe the

NRC – MUST present and offer another rulemaking that definitely addresses

the specific classification of depleted uranium and also risk inform the waste

classification tables that are in the regulation. The public and states that may

have depleted uranium anywhere near them, must be informed and involved in

another rulemaking specific to the classification of depleted uranium and

also risk inform the waste classification tables that are in the regulations.

I urge you to please: 

Reclassify depleted uranium and require risk information regarding the waste 

classification tables that are in the regulation. 

Stop the Consultant Wars. Let your professional staff do the jobs they were hired to 

do. Support the recommendations they have made without interfering with their expertise. Do 

the job you were commissioned to do listen to your own experts. 

 Consider historical scenarios and model leadership with a proactive direction on this 

serious issue of depleted uranium disposal. 

 Extend the rulemaking and comment periods if you need additional studies and 

information. Do not rush to a judgement that may have long lasting, health-related risks and 

environmental consequences that may harm others and haunt you. 

 Look at the overall Clive Utah site, for geological, seismic, and environmental concerns 

and repercussions. 

Please reconsider this rulemaking. Even the NRC experts are uneasy with this proposed 

rulemaking and guidance document. 

Debbie Don 

Salt Lake City, Utah 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Robert Cerello <dionor888@yahoo.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:33 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Enter Your Action Subject

Dear Secretary, 

Your Action Content 

Any weakening, lessening or other negative changes to the already lax rules in place is morally and ethically 

unacceptable to us as citizens. Is this all extremists have to do with our money and value time--attack 

regulations designed to shield citizens against corporate. government and extremists' wrongdoing? 

Extremism in the defense of crime and vice is no virtue. 

End the farce--name this design for what it is and stop it in its tracks. That's why you have powers. 

The "radpoison" act should not harm human lives. 

I will not permit it--and you should not do so. 

thanks for doing the job you were loaned powers to do. Whatever the extremists of both left and right are 

calling this anti-regulatory idea, I assert that it's radpoison to the rest of us. That's all it can be. 

And by the way--please shut down Indian Point, now, before it's too late. 

Robert Cerello 

8070 Orange Avenue Apt. 705 

8070 Orange Avenue Apt. 705 

La Mesa, CA 91942 

PR-20, 61

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24
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Linda Andersson <llandersson4@gmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:41 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Enter Your Action Subject

Dear Secretary, 

There is no good reason to have nuclear energy plants. They create huge amounts of waste that end up in our 

waters, air and soil poisoning us and our animals and plant life. Solar and wind energy is more than abundant 

in the US. We're tired of watching explosions happen and kill workers and poison the earth with cancercausing chemicals while generations later, innocent children are still being born with defects and cancer -- and 

the only benefactors are profiteers who make their huge profits from this industry. The fluoride they sell to the 

water industry is sodium fluoride instead of calcium fluoride, which only poisons consumers. 

Nuclear power should be stopped altogether. Please work to make that happen. 

Linda Andersson 

2424 79th Ave NE 

Medina, WA 98039 

PR-20, 61

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1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: John Boomer <boomerart62@yahoo.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 4:09 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] New Rules

Please do not weaken the rules for nuclear waste definitions or disposal standards. I live in a uranium mining 

area of the South west and we are struggling to clean up mining and mill waste. It has been a long and difficult 

process and trust and faith in the process is essential. Thank you. 

PR-20, 61

80FR16081 26
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: wilkds@optonline.net

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 4:33 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Don't weaken radioactive waste rules.

It is time to act for the good of our country and our world. 

I oppose the proposed 10 CFR 61 changes and ask NRC to make changes in the direction of greater isolation of 

waste. Radioactive releases and exposure to humans and other species must be prevented, not increased. 

I especially reject and ask that you remove the following provisions in your proposal: 

No deregulation of radioactive waste waste: 

Remove all provisions that would allow nuclear waste to go to regular trash or other unregulated places or into 

commercial recycling into consumer goods. This approach has been consistently rejected by the American 

public and explicitly by Congress in the 1992 Energy Policy Act. Delete the existing "§ 61.6 Exemptions" and 

the proposed addition to "§61.7 Concepts" that would allow deregulating, exempting and releasing radioactive 

waste and materials from radioactive regulatory control. 

No increase in radiation to the public: 

Reduce radiation releases: the goal should be to prevent all releases. Reject the proposed change from the 

current allowable public dose of 25 millirems/year to the higher 25 millirems EDE, 100 millirems EDE, 500 

millirems EDE or even more per year. 

No "black box" Performance Assessments by dump operators: 

Remove all provisions that would allow dump operators to do their own "Performance Assessments" and make 

"Safety Cases" to claim they can put more kinds of radioactive waste and longer-lasting nuclear waste in 

shallow land burial trenches. This presents an obvious conflict-of-interest issue, as operators would have a 

vested interest in a favorable outcome of such assessments. 

No preemption of state's authority: 

Allow states to continue setting stricter, more protective standards than NRC. Remove the "Level B" 

compatibility requirement. 

Radioactive materials hazardous for 100 years or more should be kept out of burial grounds. Simply labeling 

various time periods (compliance, performance, protective assurance, etc) and assigning increasing allowable 

doses does not protect anyone--it simply makes it legal to pollute. 

Sincerely, 

Doris S. Wilk 

PR-20, 61

80FR16081 27
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: ed christwitz <echristwitz@yahoo.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 7:00 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Please strengthen radiation standards

Greetings. Please raise the bar on regulations for 

radioactive waste. The evidence shows we are already 

getting more cancer from the present levels. Thank you. 

PR-20, 61

80FR16081 28
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Janie Roman <Janie.Roman@tceq.texas.gov>

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 1:02 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: Gallagher, Carol

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Attachments: letterNRC.pdf; NRC Part 61 comments_TCEQ 7-24-15.docx

On behalf of TCEQ here is our letter and comments regarding the Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 20 and 

10 CFR Part 61 for Docket ID NRC-2011-0012. 

If you have any questions please contact Mr. Brad Broussard (512) 239-6380 or by email at 

brad.broussard@tceq.texas.gov . 

Thank you, 

Janie Roman 

TCEQ 

512-239-0604

Janie Roman 

Texas Commission on Environmental Quality 

Intergovernmental Relations 

Legislative Coordinator/EA 

239-0604 

Janie.roman@tceq.texas.gov

PR-20, 61

80FR16081 29
Bryan W. Shaw, Ph.D., P.E., Chairman 

Toby Baker, Commissioner 

Richard A. Hyde, P.E., Executive Director 

TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 

Protecting Texas by Reducing and Preventing Pol/11/ion 

July 20, 2015 

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 

Re: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

Dea r Sir or Madam: 

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) appreciates the opportunity 

to comment on the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed 

revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 provided in Request For Comments on The Draft Proposed 

Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (10 CFR PART 61)(RIN 3150-Al92). TCEQ 

previously advised NRC staff that comments would be submitted. 

Enclosed please find the TCEQ's detailed comments relating to the NRC's proposed 

revisions referenced above. If you have any questions concerning the enclosed 

comments, please contact Mr. Brad Broussard of the Radioactive Materials Division, at 

(512) 239-6380, or at brad.broussard@tceq.texas.gov. 

Sincerely, 

Richard A. Hyde, P.E. 

Executive Director 

AP.O. Box 13087 • Austin, Texas 78711-3087 • 512-239-1000 • tceq.texas.gov 

How is our customer service? tceq.texas.gov/customcrsurvey 

" 11 l d r y p n 1r d t 'l J t .i l ~ 
Page 1 of 4

Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 20 and 

10 CFR Part 61 

 Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Overview: 

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) values the opportunity to 

provide comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) proposed revisions 

to 10 CFR Part 20 and 10 CFR Part 61. The TCEQ supports the proposed changes to 10 

CFR Part 20 and has no comments on those revisions at this time. 

The TCEQ supports the proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 requiring technical 

analyses and the associated compliance period, protective assurance period, and 

performance period. The TCEQ also supports the proposed requirement for 

development of waste acceptance criteria based on site-specific analysis. There is further 

support for conducting an intruder analysis and the related dose/dose target for 

protection of human health. Further, the TCEQ supports identification and evaluation of 

features, events, and processes (FEPs) and a demonstration of defense-in-depth through 

engineering design and site characteristics. 

The TCEQ has the following comments as noted below in both a general and specific 

context. 

General Comments 

The TCEQ suggests adding definitions in the regulations for defense-in-depth and the 

safety case, which were always present in the performance objectives and facility design 

and location requirements. This will explain more clearly to the public the methodology 

used to ensure that a LLRW disposal facility will protect public health and safety while 

providing a means for taking care of the need to dispose of LLRW waste. The proposed 

requirements for the licensee to submit a safety case analysis of the LLRW disposal 

facility that includes a defense-in-depth analysis will clarify and make more transparent 

to the public the decision-making and analysis necessary in determining that the waste 

acceptance criteria and the facility design and location will result in the safe disposal of 

the LLRW. 

The proposed changes will allow the use of a performance assessment to determine 

waste acceptance criteria for waste that was not considered in the original analysis that 

lead to the current LLRW classification. This will give the states and licensees additional 

flexibility while maintaining public health and safety. Texas has already employed the 

use of a performance assessment to determine what concentrations, total activity, and 

additional restraints are required for the disposal of depleted uranium since the original 
Page 2 of 4

waste classification analysis did not include large amounts of depleted uranium and 

agrees that this methodology should be standard throughout the country. 

The proposed three-tiered approach, with staggered dose limits over three time periods 

of a disposal site, provides a reasonable balance between the need to assess site 

performance and the inherent uncertainty in predicting dose to the public and intruders 

very far into the future. The three-tier approach will still allow Texas to analyze the 

performance of the LLRW disposal facility up to peak dose as is currently required in 

Texas rules. However, those rules require the compliance period to be 1,000 years or 

peak dose, whichever is longer. Adopting the proposed compliance period with a 

compatibility category B may be perceived as a lowering of the standards for radioactive 

waste disposal. The TCEQ requests that NRC assign those requirements as compatibility 

category C, as further detailed below.

Specific Comments 

1.) Amended Section 61.13(e), Technical Analyses. 

61.13(e) states “Analyses that assess how the disposal site limits the potential 

long-term radiological impacts, consistent with available data and current 

scientific understanding. The analyses shall be required for disposal sites with 

waste that contains radionuclides with average concentrations exceeding the 

values listed in table A of this paragraph, or if necessitated by site-specific 

conditions. For wastes containing mixtures of radionuclides found in table A, the 

total concentration shall be determined by the sum of fractions rule described in 

paragraph 61.55(a)(7). The analyses must identify and describe the features of the 

design and site characteristics that will demonstrate that the performance 

objectives set forth in §§ 61.41(c) and 61.42(c) will be met.” 

Comment: The TCEQ suggests that the NRC consider removing Table A and 

references from the proposed rule and move the table to the draft guidance 

document, NUREG-2175. The TCEQ supports the remaining proposed revisions 

in 61.13 for conducting technical analyses and the compatibility categories. 

2.) Amended Section § 61.41(a), Protection of the General Population 

From Releases of Radioactivity. 

61.41(a) states “Concentrations of radioactive material that may be released to 

the general environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or 

animals must not result in an annual dose exceeding an equivalent of 0.25 

milliSievert (25 millirems) to any member of the public within the compliance 

period. Reasonable effort should be made to maintain releases of radioactivity in 

effluents to the general environment as low as is reasonably achievable during the 

compliance period. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated 

through analyses that meet the requirements specified in § 61.13(a).” 
Page 3 of 4

Comment: The compatibility category for this amended section is proposed to 

remain unchanged as category A. The TCEQ suggests the NRC consider a 

compatibility category of C so that Texas can keep the requirement of peak dose 

or it may be perceived as a lowering of the standards for radioactive waste 

disposal. This will allow Texas to retain the flexibility in regulations more 

stringent than the NRC.

3.) New Section § 61.41(b), Protection of the General Population From 

Releases of Radioactivity. 

61.41(b) states “Concentrations of radioactive material that may be released to 

the general environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or 

animals shall be minimized during the protective assurance period. The annual 

dose, established on the license, shall be below 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) or 

a level that is supported as reasonably achievable based on technological and 

economic considerations in the information submitted for review and approval 

by the Commission. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated 

through analyses that meet the requirements specified in § 61.13(a).” 

Comment: The TCEQ suggests removing “established on the license.” Since this 

will already be stated in the rule there is no need to state it in the site’s license as 

well. Also, this new section is being proposed with a compatibility category B. The 

TCEQ suggests that the NRC consider changing the compatibility to category C. 

This will allow the sited states greater flexibility in meeting the requirements 

proposed in 61.41(b) and will be consistent with the compatibility category in 

61.13. 

4.) Amended Section § 61.42(a), Protection of Inadvertent Intruders. 

61.42(a) states “Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility must 

ensure protection of any inadvertent intruder into the disposal site who occupies 

the site or contacts the waste at any time after active institutional controls over 

the disposal site are removed. The annual dose must not exceed 5 milliSieverts 

(500 millirems) to any inadvertent intruder within the compliance period. 

Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the requirements specified in § 61.13(b).” 

Comment: The compatibility category for this amended section is proposed to 

be changed from compatibility H&S to compatibility category A. The TCEQ 

suggests that the NRC consider changing the compatibility to category C. This 

will allow the sited states greater flexibility in meeting the requirements proposed 

in 61.42(a) and will be consistent with the compatibility category in 61.13. 

5.) New Section § 61.42(b), Protection of Inadvertent Intruders. 
Page 4 of 4

61.42(b) states “Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility shall 

minimize exposures to any inadvertent intruder into the disposal site at any time 

during the protective assurance period. The annual dose, established on the 

license, shall be below 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) or a level that is supported 

as reasonably achievable based on technological and economic considerations in 

the information submitted for review and approval by the Commission. 

Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the requirements specified in § 61.13(b).” 

Comment: The compatibility category for this new section is proposed to be 

compatibility category B. The TCEQ suggests that the NRC consider changing the 

compatibility to category C. This will allow the sited states greater flexibility in 

meeting the requirements proposed in 61.42(b) and will be consistent with the 

compatibility category in 61.13. 

6.) Revised Section § 61.58 Waste acceptance. 

61.58 states “Waste acceptance criteria. Each applicant shall provide, for 

approval by the Commission, criteria for the acceptance of waste for disposal that 

provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance objectives of 

subpart C of this part. Waste acceptance criteria shall specify, at a minimum, the 

following:....” 

Comment: The compatibility category for this amended section is proposed to be 

changed from compatibility D to compatibility category B. The TCEQ suggests 

that the NRC consider changing the compatibility to category C. This will allow 

the sited states greater flexibility in meeting the requirements proposed in 61.58.
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Ashley Soltysiak <ashley@healutah.org>

Sent: Monday, July 20, 2015 5:36 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comments for ID: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Attachments: HEAL NRC Part 61 Comments 2015.pdf

To Whom It May Concern,

We appreciate the opportunity to provide comments on the 10 CFR Part 61 proposed rule-making. 

Attached you will find the comments for HEAL Utah, an environmental non-profit based in Salt Lake 

City, UT. Please contact me if you have any questions regarding this submission.

Kind Regards,

Ashley

-- 

Ashley Ann Soltysiak 

Policy Associate, HEAL Utah 

(616) 485-8290 

Ashley@healutah.org

824 South 400 West 

Suite B111 

Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 

PR-20, 61

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30
To:	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission		

From:	HEAL	Utah	

Re:	Comments	on	10	CFR Part 61	rulemaking	on	Low-Level	Radioactive	Waste	Disposal

(Federal	Register	Number:	2015-06429,	Docket	Number:	NRC-2011-0012)

Date:	July	16,	2015

Thank	you	for	providing	the	opportunity	to	comment	on	the	Part	61	Rulemaking	for	Lowlevel	Radioactive	Waste	Disposal.	We	would	like	to	raise	several	issues	that	we	urge	the	

staff	and	Commissioners	to	consider	as	the	NRC	moves	forward	with	its	ongoing	efforts	to	

review	and	revise	the	LLRW	plans	and	rulemaking.		

Please	consider	the	following	comments,	to	help	states	most	effectively	regulate	disposal	

facilities	within	their	borders,	to	ensure	that	public	health	and	the	environment	are	

protected	and	to	permit	the	public	and	NGOs	to	adequately	monitor	these	activities.		

1.	Recognize	Flaws	and	Limits	of	the	WAC	approach.	

Movement	towards	the	Waste	Acceptance	Criteria	(WAC)	approach	relying	upon

Performance	Assessments	(PA)	has	been	guided	by	the	desire	to	shift	policy	away	from	

rigid	rules	and	categories	towards	a	flexible	system	that	focuses	on	detailed	technical	

reviews.		These,	it	can	be	argued,	will	more	accurately	determine	if	a	particular	waste	can	

be	disposed	of	safely	in	a	specific	way	and	area.	

At	first	glance,	these	are	worthy	goals	and	a	seemingly	reasonable	strategy.	However,	in	

our	experience,	the	emphasis	on	the	WAC	and	PAs	has	one	clear	outcome	that	needs	to	be	

understood	and	addressed:	It	makes	the	process	for	states	to	manage	LLRW	much	more	

cumbersome	and	increases	the	difficulty	of	engaging	the public	meaningfully	in	the	

process.	

The	advantage	of	the current	LLRW	system	is	that	by	drawing	bright	lines	and	creating	

distinct	categories,	it	makes	it	easier	for	policymakers	to	institute	policies	and	pass	law	that	

reflect	their	values	and	policy	judgments.	So,	for	example,	here	in	Utah,	our	State	

Legislature	decided	that	it	was	prudent	to	allow	waste	that	would	pose	a	hazard	for	a	

century	or	so	(Class	A)	but	not	waste	that	would	remain	hazardous	for	300-500	years	

(Classes B	and	C).	Thus	our	state	has	had	a	ban	on	such	waste	since	2005.
The	robust	debate	that	ensued	over	this	ban,	which	took	place	over	several	years	in	a	range	

of	forums,	including	the	press,	allowed	for	the	engagement	of	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders	

–	from	representatives	of	the	nuclear	waste	industry	itself,	to	state	legislators,	to	health	

specialists,	academics,	and	the	general	public	–	to	express	an	opinion	and	be	part	of	the	

process.	This	has	resulted	in	a	system	that	might	not	be	terribly	flexible,	but	is	certainly	

representative	of	the	diversity	perspectives held within	the	state.	

Let’s	contrast	that	with	the	WAC	process,	based	upon	PAs.	Here	in	Utah,	we	have	an	

example	of	this	process	that	has	been	ongoing	with	EnergySolutions	and	their	2011	PA.	In	

this	example,	the	corporation	seeks	to	prove	that	near	surface	disposal	at	the	Clive	site	is	

appropriate	and	safe	for	more	than	700,000	tons	of	long-lived	depleted	uranium	waste.		

That	PA	is	comprised	not	just	of	thousands	of	pages	of	documents,	but	also	includes	a	

complex	proprietary	computer	model.	Built	into	that	model	–	and	its thousands	of	pages	of	

text	–	are literally	hundreds	and	hundreds	of	assumptions,	some	critical,	that	all	lead	to	the	

conclusion	that	the	PA	produced	by	EnergySolutions’	consultant shows that	the	DU	

disposal	on	site	is	safe.		

The	state	of	Utah	has	an	experienced	staff	given	many	years	of	experience	handling	LLRW	

matters	and	overseeing	the	Clive	site.	However,	they	simply	didn’t	have	the	staff-power	or	

expertise	to	unpack	everything	in	the	DU	PA.	Consequently,	they	hired	an	outside	

consultant	who	spent	over	a	year	reviewing	the	PA,	in	an	expensive process	that	continues	

to	this	day,	after	the	company	recently	sought	a	delay.	

Who	else	in	Utah	has	had	a	chance	to	review	the	PA?	Frankly,	our	organization	doubts	that	

anyone	outside	of	the	few	involved	state	employees,	the	consultants,	and	those	of	us	at	

HEAL	Utah	have	been	able	to	even	begin	to	unpack	it.	And	even	we	—	a	professional	

grassroots	organization	with	a	decade-plus	of	experience	in	nuclear	waste	regulation	and	

oversight	(a	unique	institution	in	the	United	States)	–	have	struggled	to	review	more	than	a	

fairly	small	percentage	of	the	PA.	We	think	that	we’ve	raised	some	of	the	most	important	

issues,	but	realistically,	there	are	hundreds	of	pages	of	the	PA	that	we	don’t	have	the	

resources	and	technical	expertise necessary	to	provide	meaningful	comments.	

And,	for	what	its	worth,	we’re	very	lucky	in	Utah,	since	we	have	a	state	agency	that	actually	

makes	it	fairly	easy	for	us	to	review	documents	like	the	PA.	The	documents	may	be	

dauntingly	long	and	complex,	but	at	least	they	are	available.		

What	other	commercial	facilities	in	the	U.S.	are	large	quantities of	DU	being considered	for	

disposal?	Waste	Control	Specialists,	of	Andrews,	Texas.	The	state	of	Texas	in	fact	has	now	

approved	their	permit	for	disposal,	despite	a	lack	of	transparency	and	engagement	

following	that	company’s	PA.	HEAL	tried	to	find	out	specifically	how	their	DU	would	be	

stored,	under	what	conditions,	and	what	assumptions	went	into	the	decision	to	allow	it	at	

the	facility	and their	process	has	proven	to	be	considerably	less	transparent.

We	emailed	the	Media	Relations	representative	for	the	Texas	environmental	agency,	
seeking	a	link	to	the	WCS	Performance	Assessment.	Here	is	her	response	(in	a	screenshot	

form):	

And	so,	not	only	does	Texas	not	even	make	its	review	of	the	PA	available	to	the	public	–	let	

alone	the	PA	itself	–	it	makes	very	clear	that	even	asking	to	review	it	will	be	very	expensive.

This	disturbing	example	strikes	to the	heart	of	the	fundamental	problem	with	building	a	

LLRW	decision-making	system	around	WAC	and	PAs:	It	serves	to	make	it	much	more	

difficult	for	the	public	to	have	any	meaningful	input	into	critical	nuclear	waste	decisionmaking	processes.	Reading	and	comprehending	thousands	of	pages	of	documents	and	

complex	computer	models	–	let	alone	offering	comment	on	those	–	is	far	beyond	the	reach	

of	nearly	everyone.	And,	then,	of	course,	we	have	states	that	apparently	don’t	even	plan	to	

make	those	documents	available	to	the	public	without	a	hefty	sum	of	money.	This	situation	

represents	government	at	its	worst	–	incomprehensible	and	out	of	reach	for	the	average	

citizen.

Allow	us	to	make	one	more	point	about	the	WAC	and	PA	approach:	It	puts	an	incredible	

amount	of	power	and	input	into	the	hands	of	consultants.	The	waste	disposal	companies	of	

course,	pay	the	consultants	who	develop	the	PAs.	There	are	very	few	such	companies,	and	

very	few	such	consultants.	Therefore,	it	is	fundamentally	in	the	interest	of	the consultant	to	

“game”	the	PA,	by	manipulating	the	thousands	of	assumptions	built	into	them,	and	to	

decide	which	scenarios	are	and	are	not	considered,	to	ensure	that	the	model	reaches	the	

conclusion	which	the	consultant	is	being	paid	handsomely	to	reach.	To	not	do	so,	assuredly,	

would	affect	the	consultant’s	ability to	win	the	next	big	contract.		

When	state	and	federal	regulators	and	policymakers	make	critical	LLRW	policy	judgments,	

in	contrast,	they	do	so	based	upon	what	one	hopes	are	less	self-interested	criteria.	
In	short,	we’d	like	to	see	the	NRC,	as	parts	of	its	Strategic	Assessment,	ensure	that	its	

overall	shift	towards	“flexibility,”	using	this	new	WAC	and	PA	system	doesn’t	make	it	more	

difficult	for	states	to	make	their	own	LLRW	policy	decisions	–	and	for	the	public	to	have

significant	input	on	LLRW	license	and	permitting	decisions.	

2.	Clarify	language	of	the	“Hybrid	Waste	Acceptance	Approach”	

We	support	the	NRC’s	apparent	intent	to	allow	our	state	to	maintain	its	ban on	higher-level	

wastes,	as	established	under	the	current	LLRW	classification	table	system.	As	previously	

described,	the	State	of	Utah	currently has	a	ban	on	Classes	B	and	C low-level	radioactive	

waste.	

However,	the	language,	“to	allow	licensees...	to	develop	site-specific	WAC	from	the	results	

of	the	technical	analyses	or	from	the	requirements	of	the	existing	LLRW	classification	

system,”	1	seems	to	imply	that	the	licensee	can	dictate	which	approach	is	applied.		This	

contradicts	what	we	have	heard	NRC	Staff	at	public	hearings	attest	to,	which	is	that	state	

regulators	will	have	this	authority.	Therefore,	we	suggest	that	the	rules	be	amended	to	

explicitly	clarify	that	the	state	will	indeed	have	the	jurisdiction,	as	we	aim	to	ensure	that	

the	integrity	of	our	state’s ban	is	maintained	under	the	proposed	new	framework.		

3.	Classify	Depleted	Uranium

We	continue	to	believe	it	critical	that	the	Commission	budget	staff	time	as	soon	as	is	

feasible	to	determine	whether	Depleted	Uranium	is	Class	A,	B,	C,	or	Greater	Than	Class	C	

waste.

Our	understanding	is	that	DU	was	classified	as	Class	A	waste	effectively	because	of	a	

historical	slip-up.	Since	the	original	Part	61	rules	didn’t	envision	significant	quantities	of	

DU	being	disposed	of	by	commercial	facilities,	regulators	chose	not	to	figure	out	where	DU	

belonged.	And,	so,	like	any	LLRW	that	wasn’t	classified,	Class	A	became	DU’s	default	

category		

But	Depleted	Uranium	is	plainly	different	from	its	Class	A	cohorts.	Instead	of	gradually	

degrading,	DU	actually	increases	in	hazard	for	2.1	million	years.	It	will	eventually	exceed	

Class	A	requirements	–	which	unequivocally	violates	our	state’s	ban.	The	following	graph,	a	

re-creation	of	one	used	by	the	NRC	itself,	clearly	depicts	this	differential.	

																																																							

1		Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission.	Low-Level	Radioactive	Waste	Disposal;	Proposed	Rule	. Rockville,	

MD:	Federal	Register	,	2015,	16100.
And	while	DU	currently	meets	the	requirements	for	Class	A	waste,	in	terms	of	long-lived	

radionuclides,	according	to	NRC	classification	tables,

2	these	are	not	reflective	of	its	peak	

hazard,	which	is	what	LLRW	should	be	classified	as	to	best	direct	safe	disposal	efforts

And	while	the	“A,	B,	C”	classifications	define	current	hazard,	they	also	have	grown	to	

encompass	the	length	of	hazard.	For	example,	in	the	Federal	Register	document	describing	

the	Part	61	revisions	we’re	commenting	upon	here,	these	commonly	used	time	frames	are	

referenced.		First,	in	regard	to	Class	B	waste,	“wasteforms	or	containers	should	be	designed	

to	maintain	gross	physical	properties	and	identity	over	300	years,	approximately	the	time	

required	for	Class	B	waste	to	decay	to	innocuous	levels.”	In	regard	to	Class	C,	the	document	

states,	“Class	C	LLRW	may	require	either	greater	burial	depth	or	an	engineered	barrier	that	

will	prevent	inadvertent	intrusion	for	500	years.”	3

As	you	can	see,	these	classifications	are	regularly	used	to	also	incorporate	the	timeframes	

of hazard	duration.		

As	previously	alluded	to,	length	of	hazard	heavily	influenced Utah’s	decision	to	ban	B	and	C	

level	wastes.		This	information	was	easily	accessed,	digested,	and	discussed	by	numerous	

stakeholders	around	the	state.	However,	the	average	person,	who	lacks	a	significant	depth	

of	knowledge	regarding	Depleted	Uranium,	could	easily	get	the	perception	that	DU	has	a	

																																																							

2 Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission.	"§	61.55	Waste	classification."	10	July	2014.	

<http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/cfr/part061/part061-0055.html>.

3 Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission	.	Low-Level	Radioactive	Waste	Disposal;	Proposed	Rule	. Rockville,	

MD:	Federal	Register	,	2015,	16085.
much	shorter	hazard	length,	as	implied	by	its	current	classification.	But,	Depleted	Uranium	

is	clearly	not	a	traditional	Class	A	waste	under	the	lens	of	hazard	duration.			

The	difference	in	duration	of	hazard	between	typical	Class	A	waste	–	which	Utah	takes	now	

–	and	Depleted	Uranium	are	so	radically	different	that	to	lump	the	latter	in	with	the	former	

seems	absurd.	We	can’t	fathom	a	reasonable	argument	why	one	would	allow	waste	that	

does	not	reach	a	peak	hazard	for	2.1	million	years	to	be	treated	just	like	waste	that	loses	90	

percent	of	its	hazard	in	less	than	200.

The	lack	of	resolution	over	how	DU	should	be	classified	doesn’t	help	states,	regulators,	or

our citizens	grapple	with	its	disposal.	Depleted	Uranium ought	to	be	classified	at	its	

potential	hazard level	–	if	not	at	even	greater	level,	due	to	the	sheer	duration	of	hazard	–	

but	certainly	not	as	Class	A	waste.	

Prominently	in	Utah,	Governor	Gary	Herbert	has	explicitly	called	upon	the	NRC	to	classify	

depleted	uranium.	He	recently	stated,	“I	expect	the	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission	to	

follow	up	on	that	and	make	their	decision,”	he	added,	“Until	that	happens,	I’m	not	

comfortable	having	depleted	uranium	in	Utah.”4 Thus,	our	state’s	decision	to	accept	or	deny	

the proposal	by	EnergySolutions	hinges,	in	part,	on	this	classification.	Defaulting	

classification	of	unique	waste	streams	to	Class	A,	obfuscates	the	process	and	make	its	

difficult	for	regulators	and	the	public	to	set	boundaries,	in	accordance	to	their	values.	

Given	the	stated	desire	of	Utah	officials	to	retain	the	classification	system,	we	would	urge	

the	NRC	to	prioritize	the	classification	of	Depleted	Uranium.	It	is,	we	believe,	the	most	

significant	“unique	waste”	out	there,	and	it	is	a	baffling	gap	in	regulation	to	not	incorporate	

it	into	a	regulatory	system	that	Utah—one	of	the	most	important	states	in	the	LLRW	

arena—wishes	to	preserve.		

If	depleted	uranium	is	actually	disposed	of	commercially	as	Class	A	waste,	we	believe	it	

may	make	it	much	more	difficult	to	place LLRW	facilities elsewhere	in	the	country. The	

nation’s	current	disposal	facilities	–	in	Utah,	Washington,	Texas	and	South	Carolina	–	exist	

to	safely	get	rid	of	low-level	radioactive	materials,	like	medical	waste	or	lightly	

contaminated	materials	from	the	nuclear	power	industry.			

When	a	community	signs	on	to	take	waste	like	this	though,	they	aren’t	being	asked	to	sign	a	

2.1	million	year	contact,	with	a	company	that	might	be	there	to	monitor	it	for	a	century	or	

two—at	best.	This	will	ultimately	dis-incentivize	communities	from	allowing	new	LLRW	

facilities	in	their area,	despite	the	obvious	need.	Allowing	a	material	like	DU	to	be	disposed	

of	as	class	A,	will	make	it	more	of	an	eternal	commitment	and	hazard	than	most	

communities	are	willing	or	prepared	to	deal	with	–	so	they	will	simply	opt	out.	

																																																							

4 Maffley,	Brian.	"Governor	has	a	‘hunch’	depleted	uranium	is	hotter	than	the	waste	EnergySolutions	

is	allowed	to	take."	Salt	Lake	Tribune.	April	16,	2015.	http://www.sltrib.com/news/2408870-

155/state-grants-energysolutions-request-for-a.
This	must	be	a	major	consideration,	because	new	low-level	waste	disposal	facilities	will	be	

needed	by	2050.	According	to	comments	by	the	Northwest	Interstate	Compact,	many	

nuclear	facilities	will	be	decommissioned	in	the	next	20-40	years,	but	the	facilities	in	

Richland,	Washington	and	here	in	Utah,	will	only	be	around	until	2056	and	2045,	

respectively.	This	means	that	although	the	need	for	this	type	of	facility	will	continue	to	

grow,	support	from	the	public	will	diminish,	given	the	unique	hazard	posed	by	Depleted	

Uranium.	This	may	make	states	unlikely	to	encourage	development	of	commercial	disposal	

sites	because	of	the inconsistent	rules	and vastly	different	allowed	waste	streams	than	

those	originally	decided	through	an	active	public	process.	

4.	Amend	the	Compliance	Period	for	Long-Lived	Waste	

We’d	like	to	elaborate	on	a	previously	mentioned	issue.	We	do	not	believe	that	long	livedwaste	streams,	such	as	depleted	uranium	should	only	be	modeled	for	a	compliance	period	

that	is	“reasonably	foreseeable,”	for	the	simple	reason	that	concentrated	DU	does	not	have	

a	“reasonably	foreseeable”	hazard	life.	We	believe	that	“safe	disposal”	can	only	be	

demonstrated	if	the	public	will	be	protected	from	unacceptable	doses	over	the	hazard	life	

of	the	waste	stream	under	evaluation.		

If,	as	some	in	the	nuclear	waste	disposal	industry	complain,	such	modeling	over	very	long	

timeframes	(10,000	to	one	million	years)	leads	to	unacceptably	large	uncertainty	in	the	

calculation,	then	that	uncertainty	should	be	viewed	as	evidence	that	near-surface	disposal,	

with	the	corresponding	likelihood	that	the	stored	materials	come	into	contact	with	human	

populations,	is	not	acceptable.	A	compliance	period	of	1,000	years	for	Depleted	Uranium,	a	

waste	that	grows	more	dangerous	from	hundreds	of	thousands	of	years,	is	difficult	to	

justify.		

Additionally,	this	ruling	seems	inconsistent	with	the	guidance	language	“licensees	should	

examine	plausible	scenarios	for	site	evolution	and	characteristics	in	the	site	stability	

analysis.”5		Just	because	it’s	difficult	to	project	what	will	happen	to	this	waste	over	such	

long	time	frames	doesn’t	mean	that	a	company	that	wishes	to	dispose	of	it	should	be	

relieved	of	the	challenge	of	doing	so.

Similarly,	a	“qualitative”	evaluation	–	which	must	conclusively	demonstrate	irreversible	

and	catastrophic	impacts	in	order	for	a	waste	stream,	such	as	concentrated	depleted	

uranium,	to	be	found	unacceptable	for	disposal	–	places	far	too	large	a	burden	on	states,	

like	Utah,	that	host	nuclear	waste	disposal	sites.	For	long-lived	waste	streams	like	

concentrated	depleted	uranium,	the	compliance	period	should	be	a	minimum	of	10,000	

years.	Again,	it	would	be	better	to	consider	up	until	the	peak	activity	of	the	waste	stream	in	

question.	

																																																							

5 D.	Esh,	C.	Grossman,	H.	Arlt,	C.	Barr,	P.	Yadav.	"Guidance	for	Conducting	Technical	Analyses	for	10	

CFR	Part	61."	2015.	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission	.	Office	of	Nuclear	Material	Safety	and	

Safeguards.	<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1505/ML15056A516.pdf>.
5.	Overruling	Staff	Reduces	Public	Faith	in	Rulemaking		

This	final	point	addresses	several	red	flags	that	our	organization	has	noted	during	the	

evolution	of	these	rules.	Commissioners	have	repeatedly	overruled	staff	in	an	apparent	

effort	to	comply	with	industry	requests.		

For	example,	in	2011	NRC	staff	members	recommended	a	20,000-year	compliance	period	

to	demonstrate	the	site	safety.	They	state,	“20,000	years	would	better	capture,	compared	to	

shorter	time	frames,	the	in-growth	of	daughter	products	(e.g.	Ra-226,	Rn-222)	from	longlived	parents	that	can	occur	in	some	waste	streams.	For	example,	as	shown	in	Figure	2,	the	

in-growth	of	Ra-226	from	uranium	doesn’t	peak	until	after	one	million	years	with	no	loss	of	

parent	from	the	system.”	6	Additionally,	they	discuss	the	benefits	of	longer-term	

compliance	periods,	because	of	their	increased	ability	to	capture	changing	climate	cycles.		

To	this,	EnergySolutions	submitted	the	following	comments	to	the	NRC.	“EnergySolutions	is	

of	the	view	that	while	a	compliance	period	of	10,000	years	may	be	workable,	a	compliance	

period	of	1,000	years	is	preferable.”	7		Conceding	that	10,000-year	compliance	periods	had	

precedent,	after	expressing	outrage	over	the	recommended	20,000	year	limit.		

Eventually,	staff	recommendations	reduced	to	a	10,000-year	compliance	period.	“The	staff	

stated	that	because	of	the	in-growth	of	progeny	from	DU,	analysis	time	periods	of	1,000	

years	or	less	result	in	significant	truncation	of	estimated	risk	from	disposal	of	DU,	and	this	

is	the	main	reason	why	they	propose	a	10,000	year	time	of	compliance	for	meeting	the	

revised	performance	objective.	“	8

However,	after	receiving	additional	commentary	by	EnergySolutions,	urging	a	shorter	time	

frame,	the	commissioners	eventually	over-ruled	staff	and	lowered	the	compliance	period	to	

1,000-years.

In	the	same	letter,	EnergySolutions	proposed	a	standard	of	“reasonably	foreseeable”	

scenarios for	the	intruder	assessment,	not	including	the	assumption	that	an	intruder	would	

ever	inhabit	the site. 9	This	comment	was	also	implemented	into	the	proposed	rule	making,	

verbatim,	and	in	direct	opposition	to	the	initial	staff	recommendations—who	had	sought	to	

																																																							

6 "Technical	Analysis	Supporting	Definition	of	Period	of	Peiformance	for	Low-Level	waste	Disposal	

."	May	2011.	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commisssion	.	

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1110/ML111030586.pdf>.

7 Magette,	Thomas	E.	"EnergySolutions	Letter."	17	June	2011.	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission.	

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11172A181.pdf>.

8 Letter,	Advisory	Committee	on	Reactor	Safeguards.	"10	CFR	PART	61	–	REVISIONS	TO	LOWLEVEL	RADIOACTIVE	WASTE	DISPOSAL	REQUIREMENTS	."	19	Feb	2014.	

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1404/ML14041A152.pdf>.

9 Magette,	Thomas	E.	"EnergySolutions	Letter."	17	June	2011.	Nuclear	Regulatory	Commission.	

<http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1117/ML11172A181.pdf>.
consider	the	evolution	of	the	site	and	consider	a	much	broader	array	of	intruder	scenarios.

Over-ruling	the	recommendations	of	staff,	in	favor	of	industry,	deteriorates	public	faith	that	

these	rules	were	made	in	the	genuine interest	of	their	health	and	safety.	

In	sum,	we	appreciate	the	opportunity	to	comment	on	the	proposed	revisions	to	10	CFR	

Part	61.	Allow	us	to	reiterate	our	central	points:	We	oppose	any	system	that	would	

overturn	a	ban	on	hotter	waste	for	which	Utahns	fought	so	hard,	or	force	the	state	to	accept	

waste	streams	it	has	deemed	unnecessarily	risky.	Additionally,	we	urge	the	NRC	to finally

classify	Depleted	Uranium	to	reflect	its	true	hazard	level	and	duration.		

Thank	you	for	your	time	and	consideration.		Please	feel	free	to	contact	us	with	any	

questions or	clarifications.		

Kind	Regards,

Matt	Pacenza

Executive Director

HEAL	Utah	

matt@healutah.org

(801)	355-5055	(office)

824	South	400	West,	Suite	B-111

Salt	Lake	City,	Utah	84101
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Welling, Mike (VDH) <Mike.Welling@vdh.virginia.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, July 21, 2015 12:19 PM

To: Comfort, Gary

Cc: OAS Executive Board; Einberg, Christian; Rusty Lundberg; Charles Maguire; 

ganttaa@dhec.sc.gov; Fordham, Earl W (DOH)

Subject: [External_Sender] STC-15-016 OAS Comments

Attachments: STC-15-016 LLW OAS Comments.pdf

Attached are the OAS Board comments. 

Michael Welling Director Radioactive Materials Program Virginia Dept of Health 109 Governor St, 7th Floor Richmond, VA 23219 (T) 804-864-8168 (F) 804-864-8155 

http://www.vdh.virginia.gov/Epidemiology/RadiologicalHealth/ 

Ben Franklin once said “Without continual growth and progress, such words as improvement, achievement and success 

have no meaning” 

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PR-20, 61

80FR16081 31
Michael Welling, Chair, Virginia

Sherrie Flaherty, Chair-Elect, Minnesota

Alan Jacobson, Past-Chair, Maryland

Debra Shults, Treasurer, Tennessee

Megan Shober, Secretary, Wisconsin

Michael Ortiz, Director, New Mexico

Jennifer Opila, Director, Colorado

July 21, 2015 

Gary Comfort

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555 

RE: Request for Comments on the Proposed Amendments to Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Regulations, 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 (STC-15-016) 

Dear Mr. Comfort, 

The Organization of Agreement States (OAS) Executive Board (Board) has reviewed the above 

document and respectfully submits the following comments for consideration by the NRC. 

The Board objects to redoing the site’s performance assessment unless that site opts to take significant 

quantities of long-lived alpha emitters (e.g., DU). 

The Board proposes Compatibility C designation instead of Compatibility B designation for the new 

parts of Part 61. Many states that currently regulate low-level radioactive waste sites have state 

standards that are more stringent than the requirements in the proposed rule. These states should not be 

forced to reduce their standards to conform to the new NRC rules. These states should be allowed to 

implement standards that are acceptable to the state and the communities that host these disposal 

facilities as long as those standards are at least as stringent as the NRC standards. 

The proposed rules primarily impact the four Agreement States who have low-level radioactive waste 

disposal facilities in their states; South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Washington. The Board supports the 

comments of these states on the proposed rules.

We appreciate the chance to comment on this subject, and stand ready to answer any questions you may 

have.

Sincerely,

Michael Welling

OAS Chair 

Director Radioactive Materials Program 

Virginia Dept of Health 

109 Governor St, Room 730 

Richmond, VA 23219 

Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, 

Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, 

New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, 

Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Steve Shearer <zmbe76@gmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:28 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Don't weaken radioactive waste rules

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

Dear Secretary, 

Nuclear power generates more than 95% of the radioactivity buried at commercial radioactive waste dumps in 

the U.S. Some of that waste stays dangerous for literally millions of years. 

All of the six "first generation" "low-level" radioactive waste dumps that opened in the 1960s have leaked; 

some are still leaking. Operating dumps currently are open in UT, TX, SC and WA. In addition, a lot of nuclear 

waste is processed in Tennessee and then sent on to those states. The NRC is proposing a rule change that 

would apply to these operating sites as well as any new dumps. 

These weakened rules would let the public be exposed to a lot more radioactivity than is currently allowed by 

adopting the "updated" radiation regimen called EDE (Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) allows more 

radioactivity per millirem for many radionuclides; we opposed this when NCR adopted it in other parts of its 

regulations and oppose incorporating it here for the same reasons). Allowable doses to the public would be 

raised from the existing 25 millirems a year to 25, 100, 500 or more millirems EDE per year. Of course, the 

NRC continues to ignore resarch that shows radiation causes even more cancer and cancer deaths in women 

and children than men and threatens the reproductive phase of our life-cycle. 

This proposal is unacceptable; if there are to be any changes to radioactive waste rules, it should be to make 

them more protective of human health and the environment, not less so. 

Steve Shearer 

475 DOLORES ST 

APT 6 

SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94110 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608132
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Lynne Preston <bluelynne@sbcglobal.net>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:28 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Enter Your Action Subject

Dear Secretary, 

If there are to be any changes to radioactive waste rules, it should be to make them more protective of human 

health and the environment, not less so! 

Lynne Preston 

638 Rhode Island St. 

San Francisco, CA 94107 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608133
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Carolyn Pressley <carolynpressley@gmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:30 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Proposed NRC changes to radioactive wast regulations NOT OK

Dear Secretary, 

Any changes to the radioactive waste regulations need to be more protective not less. Don't weaken the rules. 

Carolyn Pressley 

64 A Front Street 

Belfast, ME 04915 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608134
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: James Dixon <james@harehill.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:32 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Enter Your Action Subject

Dear Secretary, 

Dear folks, 

Fukushima. Chernobyl. Three Mile Island. Radioactive poisoning. Children dying. Perhaps even you dying. 

Need more be said, really? 

No weakening of radioactive waste rules. 

Strengthen radioactive waste rules. 

Public health and safety is your job. 

Do your job. 

Sincerely, 

James Dixon 

Concerned Citizen 

James Dixon 

206 W. Washington Ave. 

Terra Alta, WV 26764 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608135
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Saab Lofton <saablofton@hotmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:32 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Enter Your Action Subject

Follow Up Flag: Follow up

Flag Status: Flagged

Dear Secretary, 

Nuclear power generates more than 95% of the radioactivity buried at commercial radioactive waste dumps in 

the U.S. Some of that waste stays dangerous for literally millions of years. 

All of the six "first generation" "low-level" radioactive waste dumps that opened in the 1960s have leaked; 

some are still leaking. Operating dumps currently are open in UT, TX, SC and WA. In addition, a lot of nuclear 

waste is processed in Tennessee and then sent on to those states. The NRC is proposing a rule change that 

would apply to these operating sites as well as any new dumps. 

These weakened rules would let the public be exposed to a lot more radioactivity than is currently allowed by 

adopting the "updated" radiation regimen called EDE (Effective Dose Equivalent (EDE) allows more 

radioactivity per millirem for many radionuclides; we opposed this when NCR adopted it in other parts of its 

regulations and oppose incorporating it here for the same reasons). Allowable doses to the public would be 

raised from the existing 25 millirems a year to 25, 100, 500 or more millirems EDE per year. Of course, the 

NRC continues to ignore resarch that shows radiation causes even more cancer and cancer deaths in women 

and children than men and threatens the reproductive phase of our life-cycle. 

Under the proposal, dump operators could accept and bury just about any kind of nuclear waste that they want 

simply by doing a computer-model "performance assessment" and then claiming it's safe. The same entities 

that would profit by expanding their waste streams would do their own calculations to claim they can be safely 

managed for millions of years! 

NRC also wants to prevent states from setting their own stricter standards, even though states usually end up 

with the liability from nuclear waste sites. 

NO radioactive waste deregulation! Any rules changes should lead to more protective standards, not increased 

radiation exposures! 

Saab Lofton 

619 Third Avenue 

Seattle, WA 98104 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608136
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: MC Hagerty <mc@matrixmasters.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:35 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Don't weaken radioactive waste rules

Dear Secretary, 

 Don't weaken radioactive waste rules. Any new rule must be more protective and not less. This is not the 

place to save money and this is not a partisan issue. This affects all of us, including the .01% also known as 

the billionaires! 

We need stricter safety rules for any kind of nuclear waste, including allowing individual states to set their own 

stricter rules. 

This is important for all human beings and the entire ecosystem. 

MC Hagerty 

POBox 131133 

Catlsbad, CA 92013 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608137
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Joshua Seff <mv9508@sbcglobal.net>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:36 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] radioactive waste regulations.

Dear Secretary, 

Please do not weaken rules related to radioactive waste exposure. 

Joshua Seff 

9508 George Washington Dr. 

McKinney, TX 75070 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608138
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Vincent Hardt <vvince2001@hotmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 3:40 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Please do not weaken waste disposal rules

Dear Secretary, 

I am concerned with the proposed rule changes, which would weaken standards of care for muclear waste 

and, in some cases, allow waste disposal sites to self-report on their compliance. We need stronger standards 

to protect the public. 

Vincent Hardt 

29w424 Butternut Ln 

Warrenville, IL 60555 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608139
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Sharon Feissel <stardust@sonic.net>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 4:25 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] weakening radioactive waste rules

Dear Commission: 

Sometimes what I read is as shocking as if someone walked up and socked me in the face for no reason. That 

was the kind of jolt I got when I read that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission wants to weaken the rules on 

radioactive waste. Do you not understand radioactivity, its human consequences, its long, long, long lifespan 

and ability to do harm over that time span? PLEASE think of the public well-being from directly increased 

radiation exposure, to ground and water contamination, to reproductive disruption of humans and animals, to 

the well-documented link to cancer. YOU KNOW this element is not at all safe, so instead of weakening 

regulations, you should be tightening up all loop holes and work-arounds to secure more protection and 

complete safety. And in a country where States' Rights is often a rallying cry, for Heaven's sake, please allow 

States the right to even further regulate what goes on within their boundaries. 

Sometimes the guiding principle just needs to mean doing "what's right," not what's convenient, what's 

economical, what's favored by lobbyists, or what's easiest or pushes the problem off onto others, including 

other generations. 

Please do your job--stand firm. Do what's right. 

Sharon Feissel 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608140
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Marion Lakatos <mplakatos@gmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 5:03 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Make rules more stringent

I am concerned that you plan on weakening rules for the disposal of nuclear waste. I feel this is a 

terrible mistake. The protection of the public and the environment should be your main concern. If 

states want more stringent rules governing waste this should be allowed and not restricted to the 

government rules. Do your job and protect the public from this hazard. 

Thank you, 

Marion Lakatos

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608141
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Susan Griffin <griffinsusan@comcast.net>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 6:19 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Radioactive

Dear Ms or Sir, 

I urge not to weaken restraints against radioactive materials. These laws should be stronger not weaker! 

Susan Grffin 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608142
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Katherine Forrest <kaforrest@earthlink.net>

Sent: Friday, July 17, 2015 11:54 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Radioactive waste regulations

NRC Commissioners:

  

As a public health physician, I am concerned that you are considering changes in the radioactive waste

regulations that will increase the threat to human beings and other living things.  You should be acting in the

interest of the public welfare, not in the interest of industry.

  

The radiation protection standards should be strengthened, if anything—certainly not weakened.  Monitoring

and safety assessment should be done by independent parties not affiliated with dump operators or other

parties in the nuclear industry.  Moreover, if states wish to have even stricter safety standards for radioactive

waste, they should be allowed to do so.

  

If you change radioactive regulations, you should tighten them, if anything.

  

Katherine Forrest, MD, MPH

  

  

  

  

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608143
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Jonathan von Ranson <commonfarm@crocker.com>

Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 6:10 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Radioactive waste rules

There is no good scientific basis for weakening the rules governing the handling of radioactive wastes, so I 

strongly urge you in the new round of rulemaking not to weaken them. 

Jonathan von Ranson 

PO Box 153 

Wendell MA 01379 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608144
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Janice Palma-Glennie <palmtree7@hawaiiantel.net>

Sent: Saturday, July 18, 2015 11:20 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Don't weaken rules

Aloha, 

I am very disturbed to hear that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is considering 

changes to its radioactive waste regulations which would weaken, rather than 

strengthen, regulation of radioactive waste, i.e., corporations writing the rules. 

Rule changes would also deny states a say in having stricter standards as well as 

creating a clear conflict-of-interest by allowing waste dump operators to perform their 

own safety assessments in order to accept more kinds of waste at their sites. 

Please use your integrity to do what’s right for the people and planet: deny these 

weaker rules which threaten all of us, including your childrens’ children. 

Sincerely, 

Janice palma-glennie 

Kailua-kona hawai`I 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608145
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/22/15 9:18 AM

Received: July 21, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k3h-r4jp

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0106

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Christopher Lish

General Comment

Sunday, July 19, 2015

Secretary

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001

ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff

Subject: Don't weaken radioactive waste rules -- Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (Docket ID: NRC2011-0012-0077)

Dear Secretary of the Commission Annette Vietti-Cook

I strongly oppose the proposed 10 CFR 61 changes and ask the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to 

make changes in the direction of greater isolation of waste. Radioactive releases and exposure to humans and 

other species must be prevented, not increased.

I especially reject and ask that you remove the following provisions in your proposal:

No deregulation of radioactive waste:

Remove all provisions that would allow nuclear waste to go to regular trash or other unregulated places or 

into commercial recycling into consumer goods. This approach has been consistently rejected by the 

American public and explicitly by Congress in the 1992 Energy Policy Act. Delete the existing " 61.6 

Exemptions" and the proposed addition to "61.7 Concepts" that would allow deregulating, exempting and 

Page 1 of 2

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0106.html 07/22/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608146
releasing radioactive waste and materials from radioactive regulatory control.

No increase in radiation to the public:

Reduce radiation releases: the goal should be to prevent all releases. Reject the proposed change from the 

current allowable public dose of 25 millirems/year to the higher 25 millirems EDE, 100 millirems EDE, 500 

millirems EDE, or even more per year.

No "black box" Performance Assessments by dump operators:

Remove all provisions that would allow dump operators to do their own "Performance Assessments" and 

make "Safety Cases" to claim they can put more kinds of radioactive waste and longer-lasting nuclear waste 

in shallow land burial trenches. This presents an obvious conflict-of-interest issue, as operators would have a 

vested interest in a favorable outcome of such assessments.

No preemption of state's authority:

Allow states to continue setting stricter, more protective standards than NRC. Remove the "Level B" 

compatibility requirement.

Radioactive materials hazardous for 100 years or more should be kept out of burial grounds. Simply labeling 

various time periods (compliance, performance, protective assurance, etc.) and assigning increasing allowable 

doses does not protect anyone--it simply makes it legal to pollute.

Thank you for your attention to my comments. Please do NOT add my name to your mailing list. I will learn 

about future developments on this issue from other sources.

Sincerely,

Christopher Lish

Olema, CA

Page 2 of 2

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0106.html 07/22/2015
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Snyder, Michael <msnyder@epri.com>

Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 10:30 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: Wilmshurst, Neil; Stark, Randy; Camper, Larry; Edwards, Lisa; Kim, Karen

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC-2011-0012; NRC-2015-0003 “Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Comment Letter

Attachments: Part61-LimitedRulemaking_EPRI CommentLetter_7-22-2015.pdf

On behalf of Lisa Edwards, Senior Program Manager for EPRI Chemistry, Radiation Safety, & Used Fuel Management

please find attached a comment letter regarding the proposed revisions to 10CFR61 and 10CFR20 related to low‐level

radioactive waste disposal as presented for public comment on March 26, 2015.  EPRI thanks you for the opportunity to

comment.   

Sincerely,  

Michael Snyder

Senior Technical Leader 

Electric Power Research Institute 

3420 Hillview Avenue | Palo Alto, CA 94304 

Tel: 650.855.8591 | Mobile: 650.223.3656 

Email: msnyder@epri.com

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608147
July 22, 2015 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 

ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff 

Subject: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012; NRC-2015-0003 “Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal” 

Dear Madam Secretary: 

The Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) is an independent non-profit organization that 

conducts scientific research and development relating to the generation, delivery and use of 

electricity for the benefit of the public. We thank the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) for 

allowing EPRI to provide comment on the proposed rulemaking on Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Disposal (Site-Specific Analysis Rulemaking). 

The purpose of this letter is to provide comments to the NRC regarding the proposed revisions to 

10CFR61 and 10CFR20 related to low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal as presented for 

public comment on March 26, 2015. These comments are based on EPRI’s technical research in 

the area of LLRW and comments previously submitted to the NRC on this topic. 

EPRI Report 1021098, “Options for Improved Low Level Waste Disposal Using 10CFR61.58,” 

recommended a number of changes to the regulatory requirements based on our research. All 

have been incorporated in the proposed rule in one form or another. The recommendations are 

summarized as follows: 

 The risk from radionuclides typically present in nuclear power plant waste is primarily 

driven by relatively short half-life radionuclides. Longer lived radionuclides, such as the 

transuranic isotopes, dominate the risk after 500 years and are initially limited by 

concentration to ensure safety. EPRI research results indicated that after 1,000 years, 

LLRW generated during the course of the normal operation of a nuclear plant poses little 

risk to the public. The proposed rule recognizes the general nature of LLRW and limits 

the time period for the performance assessment for compliance to 1,000 years. 

 The concentration limits tabulated in 10 CFR 61.55 are based upon International Council 

on Radiation Protection (ICRP) 2 dose conversion factors. These dose conversion factors 

have been updated in more recent ICRP publications. The proposed rule recognizes this 

fact and permits the use of more up-to-date dose assessment methods. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 2 

 The concentration limits tabulated in 10 CFR 61.55 were based on a set of generic site 

assessment models and conservative assumptions intended to make the limits generally 

applicable. Current LLRW disposal site development is occurring in dry climate areas 

where many of these assumptions are overly limiting with respect to radionuclide 

transport and projected doses. The use of site-specific performance assessments could 

result in different concentration limits while maintaining safety factors. The proposed 

rule recognizes this and establishes guidance to perform these kinds of analyses and 

establish site-specific criteria for LLRW disposal. 

These proposed revisions enable a more technically accurate and risk-based approach to LLRW 

disposal. EPRI offers the following additional comments for consideration by the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission: 

1. Protective Assurance Period: Long time frames of analysis (greater than 1,000 years for 

the protective assurance period) have high levels of uncertainty that make the results of 

such analyses difficult to quantify and open to a high degree of interpretation. There are 

few points of comparison with past human activity to benchmark such analyses against. 

The need for analysis beyond 1,000 years should be more clearly limited to specific 

waste streams that are dominated by long-lived radionuclides. The typical LLRW streams 

that have already been evaluated and are not dominated by these long-lived radionuclides 

should not be subject to this new requirement. 

2. Institutional Control Period and Inadvertent Intrusion: The scientific or technical 

basis for the 100-year active institutional control period and timing of inadvertent 

intrusion is unclear. An active institutional control period of 300 years is more probable, 

provides a more accurate assessment of the risk to an inadvertent intruder, and would 

better align with U.S. and international practices. 

A recent expert elicitation study conducted on behalf of the Nevada National Security 

Site (NNSS) and the Department of Energy (DOE)1

 concluded that the greatest 

probability of inadvertent human intrusion into disposal sites would occur some time 

after the loss of active institutional controls. The NRC’s deterministic assumption that 

inadvertent human intrusion into disposal sites occur immediately after the loss of 

institutional controls is therefore a reasonable, simplified and conservative approach. 

However, the timeframe of the loss of institutional control and inadvertent intrusion 

should be re-evaluated to reflect DOE and international study results. 

 

1 Black, P., et. al. DOE/NV-593-Vol. 1, Assessing the Probability of Inadvertant Human Intrusion at the Nevada 

Test Site Radioactive Waste Management Sites. Oak Ridge : USDOE, 2001. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 3 

The NNSS, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and Washington 

Department of Public Health consider active institutional controls to be effective for 

several hundred years after disposal site closure. The IAEA “Safety Assessment for Near 

Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste”2 state that active institutional controls “are 

generally considered to have an effectiveness of up to a few hundred years.” The 

Washington Department of Public Health stated that the Richland site’s “’institutional 

control period’ could last for several centuries.”3

 The NNSS study concluded that the 50th

percentile for intrusion occurred at greater than 300 years after site closure and that the 

probability of intrusion at 100 years after site closure at the less than the 20th percentile. 

Based on these studies, a sound technical basis exists to place the time for inadvertent 

intrusion at 300 years after site closure. 

EPRI research indicates that the majority of activity in LLRW from nuclear utilities 

consists of radioisotopes that will decay to minimal levels within 300 years. This 

recognition was fundamental to the original framing of 10 CFR 61, which concentrated 

primarily on non-fuel waste generated from power plant operations (EPRI, 2010). A 

graph of average concentrations of primary radionuclides from nuclear utilities is shown 

below. 

 

2 IAEA. WS-G-1.1, Safety Assessment for Near Surface Disposal of Radioactive Waste. Vienna : IAEA, 1999. 3 Thatcher, Andrew H. Radiological Risk Assessment: Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Site Richland, 

Washington. Washington Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection. October 2003. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 4 

The concentration values identified above can be divided by the existing 10 CFR 61.55 

concentration limits as a measure of risk. The results are shown below. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 5 

For the first 300 years disposal risk is driven almost entirely by 137Cs and 63Ni. After 500 

years, only 14C and TRU continue to stand as dominant risk contributors, but at reduced 

levels from that observed during the first 300 years. Neither 14C nor TRU in this mixture 

are ever more than about 10% of the Class A limits (EPRI, 2010). 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 6 

This data indicates that the relative total intruder risk at 100 years is 24% of the intruder 

risk at the time of site closure. However, based on the international studies referenced 

above, the more probable time for the failure of institutional controls is 300 years after 

site closure. The relative total intruder risk at 300 years is 7% of the risk at the time of 

site closure. As such, when 100 years is used as the time period for intrusion (coincident 

with the loss of active institutional controls), the risk is three times higher compared to 

when intrusion is more likely to occur. While the proposed rule assumption that 

inadvertent intrusion occurs immediately after the loss of institutional control is a 

reasonable and conservative approach, the time of the loss of institutional control should 

be re-evaluated. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 7 

3. Blended Waste Described as Unanalyzed Waste Stream: A motivation to amending 

the current regulations is to ensure that waste streams not analyzed during the 

development of the current regulation can be disposed of safely. Explicitly identified are 

depleted uranium and blended waste streams. The addition of 61.13 (e) Table A and the 

greater than 10,000 year performance period analysis requirement has resolved this 

concern for depleted uranium and the 2015 revision of the BTP has resolved this concern 

for other wastes. 

The NRC position in the draft rule is that “the blending of different classes of LLRW 

could also result in LLRW streams with concentrations that are inconsistent with the 

assumptions used to develop tables 1 and 2 of 10 CFR 61.55,” which could pose an 

increased risk to an inadvertent intruder. This position is inconsistent with Revision 1 of 

the Concentration Averaging and Encapsulation Branch Technical Position (BTP). For 

development of the BTP, NRC staff analyzed several well drilling scenarios to determine 

under which conditions blending of waste streams would be safe (i.e. an annual exposure 

to inadvertent intruder of less than 5 mSv (500 mRem)). Using the results of the analysis, 

NRC staff placed constraints on blending waste streams to ensure that such waste streams 

are generated and disposed of in a manner to ensure public safety. Therefore, EPRI 

recommends that references to blended waste streams as not being analyzed be removed. 

4. Requirement for Site Closure Site-Specific Technical Analysis: The site-specific 

technical analysis is identified to include: a) a performance assessment, b) an intruder 

assessment, c) performance period analyses, and d) demonstration of defense-in-depth 

protections. The site-specific technical analysis is to be provided to the regulatory 

authority by all operating licensees for continued operation of the disposal sites. The 

proposed rule further states that the site-specific technical analysis is required at the time 

of site closure. The rationale behind this is to provide assurance that previously 

unanalyzed waste streams meet performance objectives. If all of the waste that was 

disposed of at a particular site was analyzed in the initial site-specific technical analysis 

and only disposed of in accordance with the initial-site specific technical analysis, the 

requirement to submit a second analysis at closure should be unnecessary. An alternative 

to the proposed analysis requirement at closure would be to allow sites to analyze for 

“new” waste streams during operation prior to accepting them for disposal. This option 

provides greater assurance of compliance and eliminates the potential for disposal of 

waste streams that may not meet performance objectives. 

5. Generator’s Certification Statement: The use of NRC Form 540 is a regulatory 

requirement for all waste shipments regardless of the consignee (processor, collector or 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 8 

disposal site) (Part 20 Appendix G III, 6.) Form 540 includes a generator’s certification 

statement as follows: 

This is to certify that the herein-named materials are acceptable for 

disposal, are properly classified, described, packaged, marked and 

labeled, and are in proper condition for transportation according to the 

applicable regulations of the department of transportation and the 

commission. 

The words “disposal” and “classified” should be removed from the certification 

statements in NUREG/BR-0204, Form 540 and 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix G to account 

for such situations where waste is not being shipped for disposal and as a result may not 

be classified. 

The statement could be modified to bound all waste shipments regardless of the 

consignee (processor, collector, or disposal facility) as follows: 

This is to certify that the herein-named materials are acceptable for the 

consignee’s waste acceptance criteria, are properly characterized, 

described, packaged, marked and labeled, and are in proper condition for 

transportation according to the applicable regulations of the department 

of transportation and the commission. 

Alternatively a second Generator Certification Statement could be provided that applies 

to shipments not intended for disposal. In its current form, the certification statement 

may constitute a material false statement when used for shipments to processors or for 

Class B and C wastes requiring structural stability. 

Furthermore, certification statements should not be tied exclusively to waste acceptance 

criteria for disposal sites, as proposed in the revised 10 CFR Part 20 Appendix G Section 

II, because certification is required for all shipped waste regardless of consignor 

(generator) or consignee (processor, collector or disposal facility). Not all wastes shipped 

are suitable for disposal in the shipped form and may require further conditioning prior to 

disposal. 

6. Clarification Regarding Average Concentrations: The discussion of the performance 

period analysis defines average concentrations as disposal site concentrations (volume of 

waste, stabilizer materials, material placed with disposal units and the materials used to 

construct disposal units). The proposed language for 10 CRF 61.13 (e) states “... waste 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 9 

that contains radionuclides with average concentrations exceeding the values listed in 

table A of this paragraph...”. It does not, however, explicitly state that the concentrations 

of the waste are the disposal site concentrations. The language should state this explicitly 

to avoid confusion. 

7. Dose Level and Effective Dose Equivalent: When referring to waste disposal, ICRP 

103 (2007) states: 

...[D]ose estimates should not be regarded as measures of health 

detriment beyond times of several hundred years into the future. Rather 

they represent indicators of the protection afforded by the disposal system. 

The commission [ICRP] has given specific guidance for disposal of long 

lived solid radioactive waste in publication 81 and this guidance remains 

valid. 

The proposed reference dose thresholds in 61.42 are not risk informed when the same 

numerical values are used for 0-1,000 years and 1,000 to 10,000 years given the increases 

in uncertainty that occur as time elapses. The dose thresholds in the proposed rule should 

align with the latest ICRP guidance for international consistency and in recognition of the 

increased uncertainty of dose projections for long time periods into the future, as follows: 

 The dose values in 61.41 (a), 61.41 (b), 61.42 (a), and 61.42 (b) should state that the 

units are presented as effective dose equivalents (EDE) to be consistent with latest 

dose assessment science and terminology. 

 The value in the proposed 61.41 (a) for doses to the public during the compliance 

period (0-1,000 years) should be changed from 0.25 mSv/a (25 mrem/a) to 0.3 mSv/a4

(30 mrem/a) for consistency with ICRP 103 and ICRP 81. 

 The value in the proposed 61.41 (b) for doses to the public during the protective 

assurance period (1,000 to 10,000 years) should be changed from 5 mSv/a (500 

mrem/a) to 10 mSv/a (1 rem/a). This is consistent with ICRP 81 recommendations for 

doses below which interventions5

 are likely not justified. 

 The value in the proposed 61.42 (a) for doses to the inadvertent intruder during the 

compliance period (0-1,000 years) should be changed from 5 mSv/a (500 mrem/a) to 

10 mSv/a (1 rem/a). This is consistent with ICRP 81 recommendations for doses 

below which interventions are likely not justified. 

 

4

 0.3 mSv/a (30 mrem/a), in ICRP 103 and as recommended by EPRI, remains a fraction of the recommended total 

individual public dose limit of 1 mSv/a (100 mrem/a) in ICRP 103 and a fraction of the same required individual 

public dose limit of 1mSv/a (100 mrem/a) in 10CFR20.1301. 

5

 Examples of interventions when used in this context could mean additional protective measures in the disposal site 

design, a different disposal site location, etc. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 10 

 The value in the proposed 61.42 (b) for doses to the inadvertent intruder during the 

protective assurance period (1,000 to 10,000 years) should be changed from 5 mSv/a 

(500 mrem/a) to 100 mSv/a (10 rem/a). This is consistent with ICRP 81 

recommendations for doses above which interventions are almost always justified. 

8. Structural Stability and the Proposed 61.58: All three of the U.S. disposal sites 

accepting waste that require structural stability (normally Classes B and C) attain that 

stability primarily, or entirely, through actions taken at the disposal site during waste 

emplacement. The shipped waste package does not necessarily provide the required 

structural stability. The shipped package may be a licensed component of the disposal 

method (for example, a polyethylene high integrity container used at the Barnwell, SC 

facility); it is the concrete overpack applied during the disposal process, however, that 

fulfills the waste stability requirement in 61.56 (b) (1). Therefore, the proposed 61.58 (a) 

(2) is likely not achievable as written because, in general, waste as shipped does not meet 

the stability requirement. The proposed 61.58 (a) (2) should be reworded to specify 

containers and/or conditioning required by the disposal site as a component of stability 

recognizing that stability requirements may be fulfilled completely by the actions of the 

disposal site or partially by the waste container (shipped package) then completed by 

activities at the disposal site. 

9. Introduction of the Term “Waste Acceptance Criteria” for Site Specific Technical 

Analyses: All waste consignees (processors, collectors and disposal sites), already have 

some form of waste acceptance criteria (WAC) or waste acceptance guidelines (WAG). 

This terminology, while not currently in regulation, has existed and been used for many 

years. In order for a consigner to ship waste (classified or not) to a consignee, it must 

meet the consignee WAC or WAG (hereafter WAC will be used for simplicity). 

When the term WAC is used in the proposed rules (Parts 20 and 61) and guidance 

(NUREG-2175), it could be construed to have a different definition depending upon 

where it is used. It may refer only to sites using a site specific technical analysis in 

accordance with the proposed revision to 61.13 and 61.58 or it may have a more generic 

meaning for all consignees accepting waste. 

It would be helpful to add clarity to the regulations and guidance to refer to “waste 

acceptance criteria” as “site specific waste acceptance criteria,” “alternative waste 

acceptance criteria,” “61.13 waste acceptance criteria,” or something similar when the 

term “waste acceptance criteria” is referring to a disposal site that has implemented a site 

specific technical analysis in accordance with the proposed revisions to 61.13 and 61.58 

in lieu of a more traditional 61.55 waste classification approach. 
Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 22, 2015 

Page 11 

The results of EPRI research related to this topic have been published in several publicly 

available technical reports: 

 An Evaluation of Alternative Classification Methods for Routine Low Level Waste from 

the Nuclear Power Industry. EPRI, Palo Alto, CA, 2007, 1016120 

 Proposed Modifications to the NRC Branch Technical Position on Concentration 

Averaging and Encapsulation (BTP): Technical Bases and Consequence Analysis. EPRI, 

Palo Alto, CA, 2008, 1016761 

 Options for Improved Low Level Waste Disposal Using 10 CFR 61.58. EPRI, Palo Alto, 

CA, 2010. 1021098. 

Thank you for consideration of this letter in finalizing the revisions to 10 CFR Part 20 and 61. 

Sincerely, 

Lisa Edwards 

Senior Program Manager 

EPRI Chemistry, Radiation Safety, & Used Fuel Management 

c: Larry Camper, US NRC 

 Neil Wilmshurst, EPRI 

 Randy Stark, EPRI 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: llwforuminc@aol.com

Sent: Wednesday, July 22, 2015 11:58 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Attached Please Find Comments re Proposed New 10 CFR Part 61 

Rule (Docket ID NRC 2011-0012) from LLW Forum's Part 61 Working Group

Attachments: P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language - FINAL (7.22.15).pdf

To whom it may concern: 

Attached please find comments from the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum (LLW Forum) Part 61 Working Group 

(P61WG) on the proposed rule to amend 10 CFR Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive 

Waste, as published for public comment at 80 Federal Register 16,081 on March 26, 2015. 

The LLW Forum is a non-profit organization of representatives appointed by Governors and compact commissions that 

seeks to facilitate state and compact implementation of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and its 1985 

amendments, as well as to promote the objectives of regional low-level radioactive waste disposal compacts. 

 

In 2012, the LLW Forum formed the P61WG—which is comprised of representatives from the four sited-states of South 

Carolina, Texas, Utah and Washington, as well as a representative from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—to provide 

input from the states and compacts on the 10 CFR Part 61 rule making initiative. 

 

Thank you in advance for your consideration. 

Regards, 

Todd D. Lovinger, Esq. 

Executive Director of the LLW Forum, Inc. 

Project Director of the Part 61 and Disused Sources Working Groups 

(754) 779-7551 - office 

(202) 423-6920 - cell 

www.llwforum.org 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608148
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 1 

LOW-LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE FORUM, INC.

2657 Bayview Drive – Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33306

(754) 779-7551 * (754) 223-7452 FAX

P61WG Comments re NRC’s Proposed Amendments to 10 CFR Part 61,

Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste,

as Published for Comment at 80 Federal Register 16,081

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Forum (LLW Forum) is a non-profit organization of representatives 

appointed by Governors and compact commissions that seeks to facilitate state and compact 

implementation of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980 and its 1985 amendments, as 

well as to promote the objectives of regional low-level radioactive waste disposal compacts. In 2012, 

the LLW Forum formed the Part 61 Working Group (P61WG)—which is comprised of representatives 

from the four sited-states of South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Washington, as well as a representative 

from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania—to provide input from the states and compacts on the 

10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking initiative. 

On March 26, 2015, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) published a proposed rule to

amend 10 CFR Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, at 80 Federal 

Register 16,081 for public comment. On the same day, NRC also published a notice of availability of 

associated guidance, Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal, for public comment at 80 Federal Register 15,930. 

The P61WG developed and hereby submits for consideration by NRC the following comments in 

response to the Part 61 proposed rule and associated technical guidance document as published in the 

Federal Register on March 26, 2015. 

SPECIFIC COMMENTS 

The P61WG has identified the following areas of agreement with the proposed new rule language and 

offers the following comments with regard to proposed changes concerning intruder analysis, 

institutional control period, performance assessment, defense-in-depth, and site stability. 

Areas of Agreement

The P61WG agrees with statements made by the NRC that the current 10 CFR Part 61 regulations 

ensure public health and safety at all the commercial low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) facilities and 

also supports the following Federal Register notice statements: 

• “The regulations in 10 CFR Part 61 are risk-informed and performance-based, and ensure public 

health and safety are protected in the operation of any commercial LLRW disposal facility.”1

																																																												

1 Federal Register notice dated March 26, 2015, “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,” (80 Federal Register 16,082), 

page 16,084.
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 2 

• “Regardless of whether the assumptions regarding the LLRW, operational practices, facility 

design, or site characteristics of the reference LLRW disposal facility are consistent with current 

facilities, the NRC believes that the 10 CFR Part 61 LLRW classification system remains 

protective of public health and safety for the LLRW streams that were analyzed in the 

development of the regulations because of the reasonably conservative nature of the analysis 

used to develop the LLRW classification system.”2

• “Because of the conservative nature of the assumptions used in the original 10 CFR Part 61 

regulatory basis to develop the LLRW classification, the LLRW classification system is expected 

to be protective of public health and safety as long as LLRW disposal facilities operate within 

the regulatory basis of the original 10 CFR Part 61 regulations.”3

In addition, the P61WG agrees with the following changes to 10 CFR Part 61 as proposed by NRC: 

1. Revisions to the existing technical analysis for protection of the general population to include a 

1,000 year compliance period and explicitly requiring a site specific analysis using modern dose 

methods. 

2. Adding a new site-specific technical analysis for the protection of inadvertent intruders that 

would include a 500 mSv/yr dose limit. 

3. Providing licensees and regulators flexibility by allowing waste acceptance criteria (WAC) to be 

developed using site-specific analyses for LLRW disposal of unique waste streams (based on the 

results of these technical analyses) or to continue using the existing LLRW classification 

requirements. 

4. Use of the total effective dose equivalent (TEDE) in § 61.41 and the dose limit of 25 mSv/yr. 

5. Allowing licensees the flexibility to use International Commission on Radiation Protection 

(ICRP) dose methodologies in a site-specific performance assessment. 

6. The new requirement to redo performance assessments within five years of closure, provided no 

new additional sampling should be done (unless absolutely needed) and provided only updating: 

• the inventory; and, 

• equation values such as kd and potential exposure scenarios appropriate to the specific 

location. 

																																																												

2 Federal Register notice dated March 26, 2015, “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,” (80 Federal Register 16,082), 

page 16,099. 3 Federal Register notice dated March 26, 2015, “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,” (80 Federal Register 16,082), 

page 16,099.
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 3 

Intruder Analysis 

The P61WG offers the following comments and questions concerning intruder analysis considerations: 

7. NRC has stated that there may be site-specific conditions that require licensees to assess disposal 

facilities beyond the compliance period even when long-lived waste is limited. This statement is 

not consistent with other NRC statements and inspection findings. NRC should state in detail 

what specific concerns they have with current sited state facilities that would require additional 

analysis beyond the currently accepted 500-year timeframe, associated with the current waste 

classification system, for the more traditional LLRW streams. 

8. The inadvertent intruder assessment would be a new requirement under § 61.13 to demonstrate 

compliance with the performance objective to protect inadvertent intruders at § 61.42. The 

inadvertent intruder assessment would have to demonstrate that the annual dose would not 

exceed a proposed 500 mSv/yr limit over a newly defined 1,000-year compliance period. 

Current LLRW sites operating under current Part 61 regulations should not need to demonstrate 

protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity, and protection of inadvertent 

intruders using the 1000-year compliance period analysis, because the current waste 

classification system already ensures protection at 500 years. If use of the waste classification 

system ensures protection at 500 years, why is NRC requiring proof at 1,000 years for sites that 

are not going to accept non-traditional waste streams? 

Institutional Control Period 

The P61WG offers the following comments concerning the institutional control period: 

9. As part of the defense-in-depth philosophy, NRC should allow Agreement States the flexibility 

to fund institutional control periods beyond the 100-year institutional control period. NRC 

should recognize the need for a “passive” institutional control period beyond the first 100 years 

and for the remainder of the life of the facility. The timeframe for the institutional period should 

be established on a state-specific basis. 

10. NRC should reconsider its argument that although the longevity of government may reasonably 

be assumed to extend beyond 100 years, the 100-year institutional control period is also tied to 

the possibility of bureaucratic error. Such an argument is unreasonable in light of the fact that 40 

CFR 192.12 requires post-closure care and maintenance in perpetuity at reclaimed uranium mill 

sites.4 NRC should address the inconsistency between LLRW institutional control periods and 

perpetual institutional control periods required at uranium mill tailings facilities. 

																																																												

4 See also Appendix A to Part 40, “Criteria Relating to the Operation of Uranium Mills and the Disposition of Tailings or 

Wastes Produced by the Extraction or Concentration of Source Material from Ores Processed Primarily for Their Source 

Material Content,” and NUREG-1620, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a Reclamation Plan for Mill Tailings Sites 

Under Title II of the Uranium Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act.”
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 4 

Performance Assessment 

The P61WG offers the following questions and comments regarding issues concerning performance 

assessments: 

11. The uncertainties associated with the long period of performance assessment are large enough 

that it is very challenging to make a credible prediction about the long-term performance of the 

disposal facility (10,000 years and beyond). This will complicate the licensing process for any 

future commercial LLRW disposal facilities and currently operating sites that elect to only 

accept traditional LLRW streams. Therefore, the most appropriate action for the NRC would be 

to develop a new stand-alone § 61.60 or a new Subpart H for sites that propose to accept large 

volumes of long-lived radionuclides. (See the following sections for additional information.) 

12. Provide the basis for defining long-lived waste as waste that contains more than l0 percent of 

its initial radioactivity after 10,000 years. Does this correlate to the annual dose limit of 500 

mSv for the inadvertent intruder scenario?

13. The protective assurance period should be applied only to sites that pursue acceptance of large 

volumes of long-lived waste streams. This makes sense and ensures that the disposal of these 

new or previously unanalyzed waste streams would not present an unacceptable risk to future 

generations by minimizing radiation doses from the end of the compliance period until 10,000 

years. In addition, the assigned dose stated in § 61.41(b) and § 61.42(b) for the protective 

assurance period is not clear. As stated in these paragraphs, the annual dose shall be below 

5 mSv or a level that is supported as reasonably achievable. Is the 5 mSv an upper limit or are 

higher levels allowed if supported as reasonably achievable based on technological and 

economic considerations? 

14. Establishing a three-tiered approach is not efficient, clear or reliable. Implementation of a threetiered approach will place a significant burden on Agreement States, facility operators and 

generators without providing added safety protection. A two-tiered approach with a compliance 

period of 1,000 years and an analysis out to peak dose as a second tier would be protective and is 

more clear, efficient and reliable. A two-tiered approach out to peak dose will close the current 

gap for risks that increase for long-lived radionuclides.

15. Some sited states have concerns about revisiting the site performance assessment unless they opt 

to take significant quantities of long-lived alpha emitters (e.g., depleted uranium). The concept of 

requiring all facilities to redo the performance assessment, even when a state will not accept the 

new waste streams, brings in to question the cost/benefit of the action. 

16. Section 61.13(e) seems to state that a performance assessment is only needed if a site is going to 

take long-lived alpha emitters. 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 5 

Defense-in-Depth 

The P61WG offers the following comments related to defense-in-depth considerations: 

17. The proposed rule should include a clear (explicit) statement that licensing decisions are based 

on defense-in-depth protections. The extensive proposed text explaining the “safety case” and 

describing its attributes should be removed and provided in guidance. The proposed language is 

not clear (understandable), efficient, and will be very difficult to implement reliably. It is 

understood that explicitly identifying and describing the features of the design and site 

characteristics that provide defense-in-depth protection should be required. However, no specific 

new analyses beyond identifying and describing the features of the design and site characteristics 

that provide defense-in-depth protection should be required. 

18. The revised regulations introduce a new term called the “Safety Case.” Safety Cases (SC) are, in 

their simplest terms, a collection of arguments and evidence showing that a facility can be sited, 

designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and shutdown/closed in a safe manner. A key 

component of the SC is the analytical safety (performance) assessment. The NRC equates the 

Safety Case to a Performance Assessment + Defense-in-Depth. Sited states will also be 

constrained by the state laws and regulations governing safety. Currently operating sites believe 

their processes (radioactive materials licensing, including a performance assessment and a site 

environmental review (e.g., National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or similar state laws)) 

will produce as robust a safety case. 

19. Defense-in-depth information (e.g., several independent barriers) should be available in preoperational documents for each site. For current sites, retrofitting may be extremely difficult if 

the site is dependent on only one or two robust barriers. For example, in Washington, the site 

operator buries radium sources, stabilized in concrete, in state-approved packages at depth in 

stable trenches. 

Site Stability 

The P61WG offers the following comments related to site stability considerations: 

20. If a site accepts only LLRW that meets the current waste classification system (500-year safety 

standard), that site should be exempted from the NRC’s proposal to revise § 61.44 to specify that 

stability of the disposal site must be demonstrated for the compliance and protective assurance 

periods of 10,000 years. 

21. NRC states, because NRC regulations already require a site stability analysis, the NRC does not 

anticipate any additional cost to the licensee resulting from the changes to § 61.44. The P61WG 

disagrees. Revised § 61.44, requiring stability for 10,000 years, is unreasonable. The NRC, the 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Congress (e.g., Uranium Mill Tailings 

Remediation Control Act legislation) have recognized that requiring stability beyond 200 to 

1,000 years cannot be proven. Current stability requirements for Part 61 sites are largely met. 

22. The “Concepts” § 61.7 refers to 100, 300 and 500-year timeframes in multiple instances, but not 

timeframes on the order of thousands of years. Specifically, § 61.7(a)(2) for waste 

characterization requires that site characteristics should take into account the radiological 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 6 

characteristics of the waste and be evaluated for at least a 500-year timeframe and § 61.7(f)(3) 

suggests that the effective life of an intruder barrier be at least 500 years. Section 61.7(f)(1) 

suggests that Class B and C waste forms or containers should be designed to be stable over 300 

years. However, the language proposed in § 61.44 requires long-term stability of the disposal site 

for the newly defined compliance (1,000 years) and protective assurance (10,000 years) periods 

that are much longer timeframes.

The concept of stability for a period of 10,000 years seems incommensurate with the overall 

concept of near-surface disposal of LLRW given the constantly changing surface environment 

over time. Also, ensuring stability of surface soil in 10,000 years presents an obvious challenge, 

yet Class C waste can be buried up to 5 meters below the ground surface of a near-surface 

disposal facility in accordance with § 61.52(a)(2). In addition, engineered barriers for nearsurface disposal have finite lifespans.

GENERAL COMMENTS 

The P61WG offers the following comments regarding applicability of the proposed new requirements 

and policy considerations related to the Part 61 rulemaking initiative. 

Applicability of the Requirements

NRC should consider the following comments regarding the potential impact of the new proposed rule 

language: 

23. In the section titled, “Why do the regulatory requirements need to be revised?” as contained on 

page 16,087 of the Federal Register notice, one of the reasons provided is related to new waste 

streams that were not envisioned during the development of 10 CFR Part 61. These waste 

streams include, but are not limited to, depleted uranium from enrichment facilities, LLRW from 

U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) operations, blended LLRW streams in quantities greater than 

previously expected, and the generation of different LLRW streams that may result from new 

technologies. The concerns related to the disposal of these waste streams are not entirely 

applicable to all existing facilities. For example, only two of the existing facilities are candidates 

for the disposal of depleted uranium from commercial enrichment facilities or from DOE. Also, 

one of the disposal facilities disposes of all waste with intruder barriers so the “large scale 

blending of Class B and C concentrations of LLRW with Class A to produce a Class A mixture 

that could result in a dose to an inadvertent intruder that is above 500 mrem” would not be 

relevant. Since the waste streams described will be considered for future disposal, the associated 

new requirements should only affect those facilities that pursue these waste streams in the future. 

24. For those sites that continue to use the existing classification requirements, any new 

requirements should be determined on a case-by-case basis and implemented through terms and 

conditions of the license consistent with the provisions in § 61.1(a). [Note: NRC’s recent 

explanation of § 61.1(a) purpose and scope is problematic. Section § 61.1 states that 

“Applicability of the requirements in this part to Commission licenses for waste disposal 

facilities in effect on the effective date of this rule will be determined on a case-by-case basis.” 

This language recognizes that new requirements introduced after a facility is sited, licensed and 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 7 

operated under previous requirements would not necessarily be binding on either Agreement 

States or operators that, in good faith, committed to, and were licensed under, specific site 

conditions and licensing requirements. NRC staff interprets that this only applies to the early 

1980’s timeframe. NRC’s new interpretation is changing those commitments and licensing 

requirements and adding burdens on Agreement States, operators and generators by changing the 

criteria for long-term operation, closure and decommissioning for a specific site as a form of 

back-fit. Without some form of grandfathering, Agreement States will be subject to significant 

burdens and future litigation risks.]. 

25. The applicability of the original rule published in 1982 was set forth in § 61.1(a) which states in 

relevant part, “Applicability of the requirements in this Part in effect on the effective date of this 

rule will be determined on a case-by-case basis and implemented through terms and conditions 

of the license or by orders issued by the Commission.” Many of the Part 61 requirements were 

eventually applied through license conditions to near-surface disposal facilities in operation on 

the effective date of the rule, and the applicability was determined on a case-by-case basis as 

stated in § 61.1(a). This language afforded regulators of licensed disposal facilities the flexibility 

to consider when, and if, each facility should comply with the new requirements based on 

practical, economical and technical considerations. 

26. Language is proposed to be added in § 61.13 requiring that technical analyses shall be submitted 

by all “[l]icensees with licenses for land disposal facilities in effect on the effective date of this 

subpart...at the next license renewal or within 5 years of the effective date of this subpart, 

whichever comes first.” The case-by-case decision-making afforded by § 61.1(a) is thereby taken 

away in the proposed language of § 61.13. The proposed rule language should be clarified to 

reflect that the case-by-case application afforded by § 61.1(a) also applies to the proposed rule. 

27. During a public meeting in Columbia, South Carolina on June 2, 2015, an NRC representative 

indicated that the language in § 61.1(a) was only intended to apply to the initial Part 61 

requirements and not to subsequent revisions to Part 61. We disagree. That interpretation is not 

made clear by either the current or the proposed language. If available, the NRC should identify 

information in documents related to the original promulgation of Part 61 that supports this 

interpretation. We recommend providing explicit language to allow flexibility regarding 

subsequent revisions to Part 61 for licensed facilities with licenses in effect on the effective date 

of the original rule. 

28. While the use of the term “case-by-case” may have been intended to refer to a facility, the 

proposed changes to Part 61 are the most significant since its promulgation and warrant 

flexibility for each requirement. It is unclear what flexibility exists in the applicability of the 

original and the proposed new Part 61 requirements. 

29. NRC should also consider revising the language to clearly indicate that the applicability of 

individual requirements of the rule would be determined on a case-by-case basis. In support of 

this suggestion, please note that the current and proposed language “implemented through terms 

and conditions of the license” implies that the individual requirements of Part 61 may be applied 

separately since only a single condition of a license to require compliance with Part 61 as a 

whole. 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 8 

30. The NRC should revise the language to indicate that “case-by-case” refers to each individual 

licensed facility and to each individual requirement. It is understood that many of the 

requirements of Part 61 are related. Therefore, the regulator would have to carefully consider 

how to individually apply the requirements of the regulation. NRC should structure the 

regulation to be amenable to individual application of requirements where practical. This could 

be accomplished by separating the proposed new requirements for technical analyses into a 

separate section, an appendix or a subpart. 

31. NRC should allow flexibility in determining the applicability of the proposed requirements to 

waste already disposed and future waste disposal, taking into consideration established 

precedence, technical and economic issues, and the effect on overall site design. 

32. Although many Part 61 requirements were eventually applied to waste disposal facilities that had 

licenses in effect on the effective date of the original Part 61 rule, the requirements were 

typically only applied to future waste disposal operations. For example, waste already disposed 

was not required to be evaluated to determine whether it may have been considered Class B or 

Class C waste under the then-new waste classification system. Such an evaluation was not 

considered necessary since a decision to apply new stability and intruder protection requirements 

to waste already disposed would likely be disruptive to the disposal system, result in an increase 

in dose to workers and potentially the general population, and create an unnecessary technical 

and economic burden for the licensee and the regulator. 

33. The proposed language in § 61.7(f)(2) states that waste classified under § 61.55(a)(6) may not 

decay to acceptable levels in 100 years and safety is provided by limiting quantities and 

concentrations of the material consistent with the disposal site design. Such limitations on 

quantities and concentrations can only reasonably be applied to future waste disposals. 

34. Similarly, § 61.7(f)(3) states that waste that will not decay to acceptable levels in 100 years 

“...must be stable and be disposed at a greater depth...” and “where site conditions prevent deeper 

disposal, intruder barriers such as concrete covers may be used.” For waste already disposed, 

classified under § 61.55(a)(6), and where site conditions prevent deeper disposal, the only option 

would be to use intruder barriers. The incorporation of such barriers into site design as a 

remedial measure could have negative consequences. For example, high integrity containers 

(special containers designed to provide stability) within the disposal unit have structural design 

requirements based in part on the overburden expected in the disposal environment. In this 

example, adding concrete barriers on the surface would be incompatible with the overall site 

design and could compromise the integrity of the high integrity containers. Also, for LLRW 

disposal facilities, one of the major activities is typically to install a final engineered cap as an 

engineered barrier and to enhance site stability. For one site, the final cap has been installed for 

the majority of the disposal area. Once the final cap is installed and the related drainage features 

of the site are designed, any modification such as adding concrete barriers would compromise 

the overall site design. 

35. It is clear that, at the time of the initial promulgation of the requirements in Part 61, NRC 

recognized the need to allow for flexibility in applying new regulations to existing facilities by 

explicitly addressing its applicability to existing facilities in § 61.1(a). The language in § 61.1(a) 

aligns with the philosophy that waste disposed in good faith and in accordance with applicable 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 9 

standards in place at the time should not necessarily be subject to new requirements that may be 

technically impractical and/or financially prohibitive. The reasons to adopt such a philosophy 

remain valid regardless of whether disposal facilities were able to eventually comply with some 

of the, then-new, requirements. The NRC should continue to adhere to this philosophy. 

36. This philosophy is also evident in the following examples found in EPA’s regulations: 

Example One 

EPA’s 40 CFR 191, “Environmental Radiation Protection Standards for Management and 

Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel, High-Level and Transuranic Radioactive Wastes - Subpart B, 

Environmental Standards for Disposal” originally promulgated September 19, 1985: The 

applicability paragraph found at 40 CFR 191.11(b)(2) states that the Subpart does not apply to 

“Wastes disposed of before November 18, 1985.” 

The explanation for the decision not to apply the new rule to wastes already disposed can be 

found in the document, “The US EPA’s Re-Promulgation of Environmental Standards for the 

Management and Disposal (40 CFR Part 191) Update 1990,” by Raymond Clark, et al. The 

document, which can be found at http://www.wmsym.org/archives/1990/V1/87.pdf, states as 

follows: 

As it was originally promulgated, 40 CFR 191 did not apply to wastes already disposed 

of. The various provisions of Subpart B were to be met through a combination of steps 

involving disposal system design and site selection and operational techniques. The 

agency believed that it was appropriate that subpart B apply only to disposal occurring 

after promulgation so that the full range of site selection and design controls could be 

taken into account in complying with this rule. 

It is reasonable to apply the same logic to LLRW that has already been disposed. For existing 

LLRW disposal facilities and waste already disposed, site selection is fixed, disposal system 

design is either fixed or offers limited options for changes, and operational techniques may offer 

more options for changes but only for future disposals. Given these limitations, actions that have 

been taken prior to the effective date of the rule should be subject to new standards on a case-bycase basis.

Example Two 

EPA’s “Amendments to the Corrective Action Management Unit Rule,” which can be found at 

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2000-08-22/pdf/00-20534.pdf: While the entire context of 

this rule is not relevant to the applicability of new requirements for LLRW disposal, the concepts 

applied regarding “grandfathering” are of interest. In providing an explanation for the flexibility 

offered by “grandfathering” certain corrective action management units, the EPA states that 

“...good-faith work has been done ...” and the “... imposition of the new requirements would be 

an inefficient use of a facility’s and the agency’s cleanup resources.” (EPA also suggests using 

the proposed amendments as guidance.) 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 10 

This idea is relevant in terms of an existing licensed LLRW disposal facility where both the 

licensee and regulator may have already expended resources in the development of a closure plan 

and, more significantly, in performing and completing activities associated with closure of the 

disposal facility, such as final cap installation and the construction of site drainage features. 

Policy Considerations 

The P61WG encourages NRC to take note of the following policy considerations: 

37. If the NRC proceeds with the proposed rulemaking approach, it will likely make future site 

development much more difficult and it will: 

• Considerably change the dynamics of the site development process, including the ability 

of states and compacts to gain public support for the development of new LLRW disposal 

facilities. There needs to be a significant separation in the LLRW regulations between 

what is considered a traditional LLRW disposal facility (using waste classification tables 

to ensure safety after 500 years), and those facilities that intend to pursue the disposal of 

large volumes of long-lived radioactive wastes, in which the peak dose will not occur for 

tens of thousands of years. 

• Impact one of the most important arguments for both regulators and state officials, as 

regulators will no longer be able to inform the public that the vast majority of activity of 

the LLRW disposed at a facility will decay to a safe level that is only a fraction of its 

original activity within 500 years (1% of the original activity)—a statement the public 

can relate to and accept. 

• Adversely impact current operating sites that have no intention of accepting for disposal 

large quantities of long-lived radionuclides, such as large volumes of depleted uranium. 

Such action is unnecessary and burdensome, especially when one considers that NRC has 

already determined that public health and safety and the protection of an inadvertent 

intruder is adequately addressed by the current language found in Part 61, as long as the 

waste classification system is followed. If NRC moves forward with the proposed 

revision, it is likely that any new states considering the development of a traditional 

LLRW site may decide against it, as they recognize that the rules can change at any time 

to allow extremely different waste streams than were contemplated during the original 

public process. 

38. Where practical, NRC should avoid the “one size fits all” approach in the development of new 

regulations or requirements for disposal of LLRW. For example, the design of the Pennsylvania 

regional facility requires an above-grade construction with multiple barriers (e.g., engineered 

cover, over-packs and disposal modules) and shallow land burial is prohibited. The facility 

design and other state-specific requirements would not allow disposal of large quantities of 

certain types of waste (low activity - high volume waste and depleted uranium) at a future 

facility in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The regulations in Pennsylvania, as well as the 

regulations in the four current sited states of South Carolina, Texas, Utah and Washington, 

establish a concentration limit for disposal of Ra-226 at their regional facility. 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 11 

39. It is extremely important that NRC maintain the current LLRW classification system in 10 CFR 

Part 61 and not remove it. Removal would present many challenges because the LLRW 

classification requirements are well integrated with other requirements of 10 CFR Part 61 as well 

as with some sited states’ LLRW disposal requirements and as individual licensee programs. 

Complete replacement of the LLRW classification system would likely expand the effect of the 

rule revisions beyond the intended scope of this rulemaking. 

40. The Regulatory Analysis of the proposed rule is inadequate because staff has significantly 

underestimated the burden and cost of implementation of the complex proposal on the 

Agreement States, operators and generators. The estimated costs (burden) of implementation are 

off by a factor of two or more. 

41. The NRC fails to identify un-quantified liabilities created by the proposed language. It will also 

likely generate extensive litigation risk for existing sites as closure plans are implemented. 

The NRC staff, in its goal to develop new requirements governing the disposal of large quantities and 

concentrations of long-lived radionuclides in a near surface disposal facility, has proposed a framework 

of requirements largely based on high-level radioactive waste guidance documents. This extensive “how 

to” guidance, applied to all LLRW disposal facilities, is both unnecessary and overly restrictive. The 

discussion is wordy, not concise, rambling and ambiguous. Certain language used in the “Concepts” 

section of the regulation (e.g., “insights provide input for making regulatory decisions”) is undefined, 

broad, unclear and ambiguous and therefore not appropriate language for a regulation. This language is 

more suitable for regulatory guides or the statements of consideration that should accompany the rule, 

not for the regulation itself. 

The proposed new rule could have significant unintended consequences including the following: 

existing sites may consider early closure to avoid litigation risks incurred by the proposed rule 

amendments; the proposed rule will likely be a barrier for development of new sites for LLRW disposal; 

and, the burdensome and unnecessary new language included in the proposed rule may deter investment 

in new disposal capacity. The rule should not overlie the new set of requirements on existing sites that 

desire to continue to use and apply the existing Part 61 requirements. 

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: MAINTAIN CURRENT 10 CFR PART 61 

REGULATIONS AS WRITTEN FOR TRADITIONAL WASTE STEAMS AND DEVELOP A 

NEW STAND-ALONE § 61.60 OR A NEW SUBPART H TO ADDRESS NEW 

UNANTICIPATED WASTE STREAMS

The P61WG provides the following analysis in support of keeping the 10 CFR Part 61 regulations as 

written for traditional LLRW streams, as well as retaining the current language in § 61.58 and its 

intended flexibility for NRC and Agreement States. In regard to waste streams that were not previously 

anticipated, the P61WG recommends that NRC develop a new stand-alone § 61.60 or a new Subpart H 

as more fully explained below.5

																																																												

5 The State of Texas, which has already authorized the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium at the Waste Control 

Specialists LLC facility in Andrews County, does not concur with the approach that is described in this section as advocated 

by the States of South Carolina, Utah, Washington and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 12 

Reasons to Keep the Current Part 61 Regulations as Written for Traditional Waste Streams 

The P61WG believes that NRC should keep the current 10 CFR Part 61 regulations as written for 

traditional LLRW streams and should retain the current language in § 61.58 and its intended flexibility 

for NRC and Agreement States for the following reasons: 

42. The principle basis used for setting the current 10 CFR Part 61 classification limits, LLRW 

characteristic requirements, and operational requirements, focused on limiting public exposures, 

as well as limiting exposure to an inadvertent intruder. Other considerations at the time included 

long-term environmental impacts, LLRW disposal facility stability, institutional control costs, 

and financial impacts. NRC has stated on numerous occasions that all four operating sites have 

been found to be in compliance with Part 61 and protective of public health and safety. This 

finding illustrates how valuable the current regulations are for safe disposal of LLRW. It is very 

important to keep Part 61 as written for traditional LLRW streams. 

43. In its Federal Register notice, NRC stated that regardless of whether the assumptions concerning 

the LLRW regulations, operational practices, facility design, or site characteristics of the 

referenced LLRW disposal facility are consistent with current facilities, NRC believes that the 10 

CFR Part 61 LLRW classification system remains protective of public health and safety for the 

LLRW streams that were analyzed in the development of the regulations because of the 

reasonably conservative nature of the analysis used to develop the LLRW classification system. 

44. NRC’s contention that the proposed rule will balance the consideration of the risks from the 

disposal of large volumes of long-lived LLRW with significant uncertainties that may be 

associated with long-term analysis is not necessary for sites that continue to only take the 

traditional waste streams allowed under the current classification system. Traditional sites 

follow the current regulations, and the protection of inadvertent intruders is demonstrated by 

compliance with the LLRW classification language (§ 61.55) and segregation requirements 

(§ 61.52, “Land disposal facility operation and disposal site closure”), and by providing adequate 

barriers to inadvertent intrusion. 

45. The statement in the Federal Register notice that “the development of concentration limits by 

generic analysis or policy works well for countries that only have one disposal site” fails to 

properly acknowledge that the current system has a long history of success and has worked well 

for the four operational sites in the United States. 

46. The current classification system establishes concentration limits for all of the LLRW sites. This 

approach involves using an analysis that demonstrates the safe decay of waste within 500 years, 

with regulator-derived concentrations and quantity limits for long-lived isotopes. This approach 

has been used successfully in this country and has the advantage of effectively mitigating the 

questions of long-term performance uncertainties, and ensuring the protection of public health 

and safety for present and future generations. 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 13 

Proposed Alternative Approach that Addresses Traditional Waste Streams and the New 

Unanticipated Waste Streams 

The P61WG recommends the following alternative approach to address the new unanticipated waste 

streams: 

47. A Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) approach should be included. However, removing the 

current language in § 61.58 and its intended flexibility for NRC and Agreement States is not the 

most preferred approach. A new stand-alone § 61.60 or a new Subpart H should be developed 

that addresses use of the WAC approach and incorporates the following additional changes: 

• Section 61.7, “Concepts,” has been overwhelmed by an attempt to provide unnecessary 

and burdensome “how to” guidance in the rule. In general, the proposal is an overreach 

with inclusion of excessively prescriptive language taken from high-level radioactive 

waste (HLW) guidance documents that is not necessary for rulemaking and should be 

limited to guidance. 

• Similarly, § 61.13, “Technical Analysis,” has been overwhelmed with very prescriptive 

“how to” guidance in the rule. Section 61.13(e) is not clear and will be very difficult to 

implement in a contested case. Table A is unclear and subject to interpretation, which 

will place an unnecessary burden on states and operators.

• Add a subsection to § 61.7, “Concepts,” to reflect the new structure and requirements in 

Part 61 governing acceptance and disposal of “the newer and additional waste streams” 

containing higher concentrations and larger quantities of longer-lived radionuclides. This 

would include reference to a new stand-alone § 61.60 or a new subpart H that would 

apply prospectively to new long-lived waste streams. It would specify the new 

incremental requirements and analyses that an applicant would need to complete in order 

to receive and dispose of the newer waste streams. The incremental requirements would 

be based on the proposed revisions to § 61.13, “Technical Analyses” (Performance 

Assessment), § 61.42 “Protection of Individuals to Inadvertent Intrusion,” and § 61.58 

“Alternative Requirements for Waste Classification and Characteristics.” 

48. NRC staff indicates that a currently operating site, or a new proposed LLW disposal site, could 

choose to continue to use and apply the existing waste classification system and associated waste 

form and disposal requirements set out in Part 61, or could apply a new set of WAC developed 

through the analyses prescribed in the proposed rule changes. For example, the staff states: “In 

defining LLRW streams with acceptable radionuclide concentrations or activities and waste 

forms, licensees or license applicants would be allowed to use either the results of the sitespecific technical analyses set forth in 10 CFR 61.13, or the LLRW classification requirements in 

10 CFR 61.55.” NRC further states as follows: “In the proposed rule, the NRC is proposing the 

hybrid waste acceptance approach (Option 3) as the regulatory LLRW acceptance framework for 

the near-surface disposal of LLRW. The hybrid waste acceptance approach provides a 

framework for the use of either the generic LLRW classification system specified in 10 CFR 

61.55 or the results of the technical analyses required in 10 CFR 61.13.” This distinction does 

not appear to be clearly delineated in the rule changes. It is not clear how the regulator and 

operator would implement this approach. Moving this language to a new stand-alone § 61.60 or a 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 14 

new subpart H would be efficient, effective and clarify that it applies only to any new waste 

streams accepted after the date of the new rule. 

49. The proposed language in 61.58(a)(1) states that “Allowable activities and concentrations shall 

be developed from the technical analyses required by either 61.13 for any land disposal facility 

or the waste classification requirements set forth in 61.55 for a near-surface disposal facility.” 

The discussion of "Option 3. Hybrid waste acceptance approach" on page 16,100 of the Federal 

Register notice uses the term hybrid but then describes an "either/or" approach. NRC should 

clarify whether a WAC could be approved that proposes limits for individual radionuclides 

from both the results of the technical analyses and the waste classification tables, a true hybrid 

approach. (i.e., can the licensee pick and choose limits for each specific radionuclide from the 

waste classification tables and the results of the analysis carte blanche or does the licensee have 

to choose one or the other exclusively?). 

50. As currently written, the proposed changes in paragraph 61.58(h) create at least four important 

concerns. First, it inappropriately predetermines the outcome of a decision about the use of 

waste acceptance criteria by using the phrase “will be approved.” Second, with the apparent 

certainty in the approval of the waste acceptance criteria, it limits flexibility and undermines the 

ability to exercise the option proposed by the hybrid approach, which allows for the continued 

use of the existing waste classification system. Third, it creates regulatory confusion by 

implying that with the approval of waste acceptance criteria, application of the waste 

classification system is unnecessary or even completely moot. Fourth, the reference to applying 

the criteria of § 61.23 is overly broad and should at least specifically exclude paragraph (h), 

which addresses financial surety, and is not directly tied to a determination of the approval of 

waste acceptance criteria. Additionally, given the proposed language in § 61.7, “Concepts,” 

regarding waste acceptance, the reference to using the criteria of § 61.23 is inconsistent. As 

described in § 61.7, waste acceptance is based on meeting the performance objectives and is not 

specifically linked to the criteria of § 61.23. 

51. Notwithstanding the substantive comments above, the language in 61.58(a)(1) should be 

grammatically revised to move the word “either” and add the word “from,” as follows: 

“Allowable activities and concentrations shall be developed either from the technical analyses 

required by either 61.13 for any land disposal facility or from the waste classification 

requirements set forth in 61.55 for a near-surface disposal facility.” 

COMPATIBILITY CATEGORIES, ADMINISTRATIVE COMMENTS AND 

RECOMMENDATION TO PERFORM REGULATORY AND BACK-FIT ANALYSES 

The P61WG offers the following comments regarding compatibility categories and administrative 

issues. In addition, the P61WG recommends the performance of regulatory and back-fit analyses for the 

proposed rulemaking. 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 15 

Compatibility Categories 

The P61WG provides the following comments related to compatibility categories for the proposed 

rulemaking: 

52. NRC and the host Agreement States should collaborate to determine an appropriate 

compatibility category and to minimize the potential for unintended consequences that could 

result from the implementation of the final rule.

53. Key revisions to Part 61 are designated as Compatibility Category B. Such a designation creates 

a conflict with Utah’s existing depleted uranium performance assessment rule. In April 2010, 

Utah adopted a rule specifically addressing when a performance assessment is required for 

depleted uranium disposal, as well as the framework and nature of the performance assessment. 

The use of Compatibility Category B removes the flexibility that an Agreement State, such as 

Utah, needs in order to address state-specific needs and circumstances. For example, the 

proposed compliance period of 1,000 years is inadequate for a depleted uranium performance 

assessment. The certainty of progeny ingrowth requires a minimum compliance period of 

10,000 years in order to determine compliance with the required performance objectives. The 

P61WG strongly encourages the Commission to offer the needed flexibility to the Agreement 

States by removing the Compatibility Category B designations in the proposed rule. While the 

10,000-year timeframe may be workable, the breakdown between compliance period and 

protective assurance period should be left to the states with a minimum compliance period of 

1,000 years. 

Administrative Comments 

The P61WG offers the following administrative comment related to the proposed rulemaking: 

54. Changes are proposed for the language in § 61.28(a); however, there is no listing for § 61.28(a) 

in the “Proposed Compatibility Category for 10 CFR Part 61” on page 16,112 of the Federal 

Register notice. There is, however, a listing for § 61.28(a)(2) that also has proposed changes. 

Regulatory Analysis and Back-fit Analysis 

The P61WG encourages NRC to consider performing a regulatory analysis and back-fit analysis for the 

following reasons: 

55. NRC should perform a rigorous cost-benefit analysis so that it fully understands the impacts of 

this important rulemaking on all affected licensees. 

56. The NRC voluntarily performed a regulatory analysis and published Draft Regulatory Analysis 

for Proposed Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (10 CFR Part 61) in February 2015. 

The NRC did not perform a back-fit analysis as described in 10 CFR 50.109. Neither a back-fit 

analysis nor a regulatory analysis is required by statute or regulation for 10 CFR Part 61. 

However, the NRC has been voluntarily performing regulatory analyses since 1976. 
P61WG Comments re New Proposed Part 61 Rule Language * July 22, 2015 * Page 16 

57. Although this regulatory analysis does provide assumptions of the estimated costs for 

implementation of revisions to Part 61, the estimated implementation costs presented are generic 

in nature and do not include site specific considerations that could substantially increase these 

costs. Also, there are potential additional costs that may not have been considered. These 

include, but may not be limited to, costs associated with procuring regulatory technical expertise 

required to review and comment on the performance assessments that utilize the new complex 

methods proposed, and costs associated with potential remediation activities at existing sites 

under the current Part 61 requirements. 

NRC estimates that the regulators of existing facilities will need to expend substantial resources 

in implementing the proposed new requirements. Many states do not have the resources or 

expertise to review analyses that are substantially more complex than the current required 

analyses and will likely need to seek assistance from the NRC staff or private companies to 

perform the reviews. External review assistance is more expensive than internal reviews and 

most states do not have funds set aside for this. License fees could potentially be increased to 

support the more complex reviews, but license fees are typically set in regulation and would 

require legislative support to increase and therefore could not be guaranteed. It is our 

understanding that actual costs incurred by licensees that completed similar performance 

analyses (to meet state requirements for depleted uranium acceptance that are already in place), 

and those incurred by Agreement States reviewing the analyses, substantially exceeded the NRC 

cost estimates published in the Regulatory Analysis document. NRC should reconsider the basis 

for these cost estimates and publish updated information. 

58. Given the significant costs to licensees, license applicants, and regulators associated with 

implementing the new proposed requirements, and considering that the proposed revisions 

represent the most substantial changes to Part 61 since its promulgation, the NRC should 

consider performing an expanded regulatory analysis, including a back-fit analysis. This 

analysis should assess whether the proposed revisions will provide for a substantial increase in 

the overall protection of the public health and safety at sites that will not accept these new 

unanticipated waste streams and at the sites that will take them and that the associated direct and 

indirect costs are justified by the benefits. In performing the expanded analysis, the NRC should 

address the pertinent items listed in 10 CFR 50.109(c). 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Charles Brexel Sr. <cbrexel@aol.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 6:38 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Radioactive Waste Disposal 10 CFR61 Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Dear Secretary, 

I, along with probably more than 225 million Americans (i.e. 9 out of 10 Americans in recent surveys), who 

want the least local pollution and health risk from nuclear power reactors, and along with more than 24.36 

million members and supporters of the supporting organizations listed below and more supporting 

organizations, strongly oppose the proposed 10 CFR 61 changes and ask the NRC to make changes in the 

direction of greater isolation of waste. 

Radioactive releases and exposure to humans and other species must be prevented, not increased. 

We especially reject and ask that you remove the following provisions in your proposal: 

No deregulation of radioactive waste: 

Remove all provisions that would allow nuclear waste to go to regular trash or other unregulated places or into 

commercial recycling into consumer goods. This approach has been consistently rejected by the American 

public and explicitly by Congress in the 1992 Energy Policy Act. Delete the existing "§ 61.6 Exemptions" and 

the proposed addition to "§61.7 Concepts" that would allow deregulating, exempting and releasing radioactive 

waste and materials from radioactive regulatory control. 

No increase in radiation to the public: 

Reduce radiation releases: the goal should be to prevent all releases. Reject the proposed change from the 

current allowable public dose of 25 millirems/year to the higher 25 millirems EDE, 100 millirems EDE, 500 

millirems EDE or even more per year. 

No "black box" Performance Assessments by dump operators: 

Remove all provisions that would allow dump operators to do their own "Performance Assessments" and make 

"Safety Cases" to claim they can put more kinds of radioactive waste and longer-lasting nuclear waste in 

shallow land burial trenches. This presents an obvious conflict-of-interest issue, as operators would have a 

vested interest in a favorable outcome of such assessments. 

No preemption of state's authority: 

Allow states to continue setting stricter, more protective standards than NRC. Remove the "Level B" 

compatibility requirement. 

Radioactive materials hazardous for 100 years or more should be kept out of burial grounds. Simply labeling 

various time periods (compliance, performance, protective assurance, etc) and assigning increasing allowable 

doses does not protect anyone--it simply makes it legal to pollute. 

The members and supporters of the supporting organizations for this letter include more than the listed 

members and supporters for each of the following organizations (more than 24.36 million total): 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608149
2

National Wildlife Federation – 4 million Credo Action – 3.5 million Sierra Club – 2.4 million National Audubon 

Society – 2 million Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) – 2 million World Wildlife Fund (WWF) – 1.09 

million Earthjustice – 1 million Environment America – 1 million The Nature Conservancy – 1 million Defenders 

of Wildlife – 1 million Environmental Defense Fund – 1 million Clean Water Action – 1 million Center for 

Biological Diversity – 825,000 League of Conservation Voters – 700,000 The Wilderness Society – 500,000 

Public Citizen – 400,000 Greenpeace – 250,000 Friends of the Earth US – 210,200 Union of Concerned 

Scientists – 200,000 NukeFree.org – 120,000 Southern Alliance for Clean Energy – 50,000 Physicians for 

Social Responsibility – 50,000 Waterkeeper Alliance – 24,000 South Florida Wildlands Association – 17,400 

Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) – 9,130 Beyond Nuclear – 8,990 San Luis Obispo Mothers 

for Peace - 2,145 Mothers for Sustainable Energy (The Mothers Project) – 1,935 Florida Consumer Action 

Network – 1,810 Nuclear Watch South - 615 Alliance for Nuclear Responsibility in San Luis Obispo - 170 

In addition, by virtue of its outrageous and extreme expense; the deceptively high carbon footprint of the 

nuclear fuel chain; and the inherent contradiction of integrating "baseload" power with the variable nature of 

21st century energy technologies, nuclear power is actually counterproductive at addressing the pressing issue 

of climate change. 

Moreover, while nuclear is lower carbon than coal or oil, it delivers a range of other poisons - plutonium, 

strontium, cesium, etcetera - to our environment through routine releases, radioactive waste, and the less 

frequent, but devastating, atomic meltdowns. 

We urgently need greater support, encouragement and deployment of clean solar power, wind power, energy 

efficiency, geothermal power, smart grid interfaces for rooftop solar (in Hawaii as just one urgent example), 

battery storage technologies, other smart grid technologies and other clean renewable energy technologies. 

Instead of propping up obsolete, 50-year-old technologies like nuclear power, we should be embarking on our 

own energy transition to a new nuclear-free, carbon-free energy system that can power our nation cleanly, 

safely, sustainably and affordably. 

Furthermore, nuclear power is the most expensive form of power and, without question, could not exist without 

massive taxpayer subsidies, including the “Price-Anderson” law that places a cap on industry liability in the 

event of a nuclear accident. 

The market price evidence is overwhelmingly clear and compelling - nuclear power is an outrageously and 

extremely more expensive energy solution. In fact, the US energy market continues to move, faster and faster, 

toward an extremely better value energy future, reliant on solar and wind power, not the outrageously and 

extremely expensive and risky nuclear power. 

As of 7/5/15, it has already been costing our manufacturing industry, our businesses and our homeowners 

much less to buy solar power than natural gas, coal, oil, timber, biomass or nuclear power. And, it is expected 

to continue to cost them typically another 20% less per year for, at the least, the next few years. It is at 

http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2015/07/05/motley-fool-solar-energy/29583021/ 

As of 7/5/15, all bids for selling power from solar power utility-scale projects are now in the 4 cents to 5 cents 

per kWh range – this is much less than what it costs you to build a natural gas, coal, oil, timber, biomass or 

nuclear power plant. It is at http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2015/07/05/motley-fool-solarenergy/29583021/ 

As of 7/9/15, two bids for selling power from solar power utility-scale projects have now come in below 4 cents 

per kWh, with one bid coming in below 3.9 cents per kWh – this is much less than what it costs you to build a 

natural gas, coal, oil, timber, biomass or nuclear power plant. It is at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/nvenergy-buys-utility-scale-solar-at-record-low-price-under-4-centskwh/401989/ 

As of 6/23/15, the price of wholesale solar power has been forecasted by independent analysts at Bloomberg 

New Energy Finance to continue to decrease, at the least, for the next 25 years. It is at 
3

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-06-23/renewables-to-beat-fossil-fuels-with-3-7-trillion-solarboom 

As of 7/5/15, according to GTM Research, the cost of utility-scale solar projects has fallen 67% in the past five 

years, and is expected to fall another 44% in the next couple of years. 

As of 7/5/15, “Since solar costs are beating those of competing energy sources, there are expectations of a 

boom in demand -- and it's going to be a global solar boom. GTM Research predicts that solar installations will 

triple to 135 GW annually by 2020.” 

On 7/5/15, investment analyst Travis Hoium of The Motley Fool said: “We're past the point of no return -- solar 

energy will be the biggest new energy source in the future.” 

US wind power, as of 8/22/14, hit an all-time national average low purchase price of 2.5 cents per kWh – this is 

much less than what it costs you to build a natural gas, coal, oil, timber, biomass or nuclear power plant. It is at 

http://www.theenergycollective.com/eric-wesoff/468266/price-us-wind-power-all-time-low-25-cents-kilowatthour 

As of 5/31/15, lawyers for Wal-Mart, a hospital group and a coalition of other ratepayers found that Florida 

utilities were buying Oklahoma wind power for just 2 cents per kilowatt hour: “Henry and the lawyers for 

OG&E’s corporate customers formed a kind of tag team, taking turns blasting the company for refusing to even 

study new wind power. They repeatedly pointed out that in-state competitors as well as Florida and New 

Mexico utilities were buying Oklahoma wind for just 2 cents per kilowatt hour, even cheaper than coal without 

pollution controls, while OG&E hadn’t purchased new wind in four years—even though its ads boasted about 

its commitment to wind. When its witnesses claimed their transmission lines were too congested to add new 

wind, Henry produced internal documents suggesting the congestion could be fixed for about 3 percent of the 

cost of the new coal scrubbers.” 

http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/inside-war-on-coal-000002 

As of 3/12/15, the price of wholesale wind power will continue to decrease, at the least, for the next 10 years 

according to a Department of Energy report. It is at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-03-

12/wind-energy-without-subsidy-will-be-cheaper-than-gas-in-a-decade 

On 8/8/14, Amory Lovins, a physicist and chief scientist at the Rocky Mountain Institute, found that “Wind and 

solar become the most economical options while gas and nuclear become the least economical”. It is at 

http://www.theenergycollective.com/eric-wesoff/468266/price-us-wind-power-all-time-low-25-cents-kilowatthour 

In addition, 9 out of 10 Americans, including Republicans, Democrats and Independents, want more solar and 

wind power installed, rather than using natural gas, coal, oil and nuclear power. 

According to a comprehensive 12-year Harvard survey as of 1/1/15, 90% of all Americans, including 

Republicans, Democrats and Independents, said that they wanted solar and wind energy to increase and 80% 

of all Americans said that they wanted solar and wind energy to “increase a lot”. It is at 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/jeffmcmahon/2015/01/01/americans-want-america-to-run-on-solar-and-wind/ 

The Harvard study found that all Americans overwhelmingly prefer solar and wind power, rather than natural 

gas, coal, oil and nuclear power, because solar and wind power provide the least local pollution and health 

risk. 

On 9/19/14, a UBS investment banking report called nuclear power plants the “the DINOSAUR of the future 

energy system” and Amory Lovins, a physicist and chief scientist at the Rocky Mountain Institute, said that 

nuclear power was an “OBSOLETE technology”: “Banking giant UBS calls the big, slow, lumpy, expensive coal 

and nuclear plants “the dinosaur of the future energy system: Too big, too inflexible, not even relevant for 

backup power in the long run.” Such obsolete technologies are less at risk from regulatory mandates than from 
4

market defeat by a swarm of agile competitors that their promoters don’t even recognize.” It is at 

http://www.forbes.com/sites/amorylovins/2014/09/19/micropowers-quiet-takeover/2/ 

As of 7/6/15, worldwide investments in solar, wind and other renewable power are already running at a rate 

that is ten times greater than investments in nuclear power. It is at 

http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/renewables-outpace-nuclear-in-major-economies 

As of 7/6/15, not one single new generation (i.e. Generation III) nuclear reactor has been able to come into 

service in the past 20 years. Most new generation nuclear reactors are delayed three to nine years and are 

extremely far over budget. It is at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/renewables-outpace-nuclearin-major-economies 

As of 7/16/15, Jonathon Porritt, co-founder of the Forum for the Future and former Chairman of the U.K. 

Sustainable Development Commission, wrote in the forward to the “World Nuclear Industry Status Report 

2015” that: “The impressively resilient hopes that many people still have of a global nuclear renaissance are 

being trumped by a real‐time revolution in efficiency‐plus‐renewables‐plus-storage, delivering more and more 

solutions on the ground every year.” It is at http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/renewablesoutpace-nuclear-in-major-economies 

Nuclear power is clearly an obsolete and old technology. Nuclear power is clearly an energy of the past. 

Nuclear power is clearly not where the overwhelming amount of innovation in new energy technology is 

occurring. 

As of 2014 and 2015, most of the major power companies and utilities in the EU have already transitioned 

away from both nuclear power and fossil fuels. On 12/18/14, David Elliott, an Emeritus Professor of 

Technology Policy at the Open University, said: “It’s hardly surprising then that most of the major power 

companies and utilities in the European Union (EU) have backed away from nuclear, including SSE, RWE, 

Siemens and most recently E.ON, in favor of renewables.” It is at 

http://ecowatch.com/2014/12/18/renewables-outpace-nuclear-energy/ 

Solar and wind power are clearly the most innovative and newest technologies. Solar and wind power are, 

overwhelmingly, the energies of the present and future. Solar and wind power are clearly where the 

overwhelming amount of innovations and developments are rapidly occurring. 

As of 5/29/15, for the year so far, 84.1% of all new power installations for U.S. utility companies were solar 

power, wind power and other renewables. Natural gas power supplied the rest of the new power installations. It 

is at http://safeenergy.org/2015/05/29/checking-in-on-the-energy-transition/ 

Germany and Sweden continue to very rapidly decommission all of their nuclear power plants and to very 

rapidly transition to solar and wind power. France is also rapidly cutting down its amount of nuclear power and 

is also rapidly transitioning to solar and wind power. 

California has only two, very old nuclear reactors left in operation at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant. 

Like the overwhelming majority of states and countries, California is also continuing to very rapidly transition to 

solar and wind power. 

On 1/7/15, Governor Brown of CA called for increasing the state renewable portfolio standard (RPS) to 50% by 

2030, reducing petroleum use in cars and trucks in California by 50%, and doubling building energy efficiency, 

all by 2030. As of 6/5/15, the Senate has already passed a bill for the plan and the Assembly is expected to 

also act in 2015. It is at http://www.lawofrenewableenergy.com/2015/04/articles/renewable/governor-brownannounces-new-2030-greenhouse-gas-reduction-target-for-california/ 

NRG Energy had already reorganized the entire company in 2014 and early 2015 to quickly and massively 

ramp up converting their business services to supply zero carbon emission, clean energy such as solar and 

wind power. It is at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/what-happened-when-nrg-energy-disrupted-its-ownbusiness-model/401472/ 
5

Since 2008, Duke Energy, the largest US power company, has been working on becoming one of the largest 

renewable energy developers in the nation. It is at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/how-americas-largestpower-company-plans-to-become-a-leading-renewables-de/401539/ 

Since 2014 and earlier, Arizona Public Service, Tucson Electric Power, Southern Company, Georgia Power, 

Southern California Edison, the Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) and many other US electric utility and 

power supply companies have all been quickly and massively ramping up their installations of zero carbon 

emission, clean energy such as solar and wind power. It is at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/grid-edge-live2015-the-trends-behind-the-explosion-in-distributed-resourc/401417/ 

On 6/29/15, Pacific Gas and Electric Corporate Strategy Officer Elizabeth Brinton said about electric power 

utility companies quickly and massively transitioning to become major renewable energy suppliers: “Business 

as usual for the [electric power] utility cannot continue. There is urgency for us to recognize disruption is an 

opportunity.” 

As of 6/11/15, Vermont has a law for electric utilities to be at 75% renewables by 2032 and at 55% renewables 

by 2017. It is at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/new-vermont-law-mandates-75-renewables-by-2032-targetsresidential-emissi/400777/ and http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21852 

As of 6/29/15, Governor Cuomo of NY presented an energy plan under NY's REV plan to be at 50% renewable 

energy by 2030. The Assembly has already passed a bill for the plan and the Senate bill is awaiting a vote. It is 

at http://www.governorswindenergycoalition.org/?p=13551 and file:///C:/Users/Charles/Downloads/2015-

overview.pdf and http://energyplan.ny.gov/Plans/2014.aspx 

Effective 7/1/15, it is the law in Hawaii that 100% of its electricity come from renewables by 2045, with 30% by 

2020, 40% by 2030 and 70% by 2040 as interim targets. It is at http://www.utilitydive.com/news/100-

renewables-by-2045-is-now-the-law-in-hawaii/400495/ and 

http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=21852 

Nuclear power is clearly in rapid decline in use in the US and throughout the world, while solar and wind power 

are, clearly and compellingly, experiencing exponential growth for the next 25 years and longer. 

It will be even harder and even more expensive to get parts, operation, maintenance, support and engineering 

services for nuclear power as the decline in the use of nuclear power plants continues to accelerate over the 

next couple of decades. 

In addition, nuclear power plants use outrageous and extreme quantities of precious fresh water supplies for 

cooling. New reactors on the drawing board would still need to withdraw more than 1,140,000 gallons of water 

per minute from nearby lakes, rivers or oceans. 

The United States is highly vulnerable to continuing and worsening drought as climate change continues to 

worsen. 

Nuclear power plants in Alabama and Tennessee and other states have been shut down because of drought. 

More nuclear power plants will be shut down when drought continues to get worse because of climate change.

Nuclear reactors also imperil fish larvae and other forms of aquatic life, which are strained from the water as it 

travels through thousands of metal tubes to become steam that turns the turbines to make electricity. A 2005 

study found that one coastal power plant in Southern California destroyed nearly 3-and-a-half million fish in just 

one year. 

Solar and wind power do not require any use of our extremely precious fresh water drinking and agricultural 

irrigation supplies. 
6

In addition, any more new nuclear reactors would produce even more radioactive waste that would not decay 

for the next 250,000 and millions of years. Solar and wind power do not produce any radioactive pollution. 

Nuclear power has been proven to be dangerous, dirty, harmful and obsolete. We need proven 21st century 

energy technologies, not failed, 50-year-old technology holdovers. 

We, every regulator, every world leader, every world lawmaker, every environmental organization and every 

consumer must keep strongly urging every nuclear, oil, natural gas, coal and electric utility company to quickly 

and massively ramp up converting their business services to supply zero carbon emission, clean energy such 

as solar, wind and geothermal power. 

We, every regulator, every world leader, every world lawmaker, every environmental organization and every 

consumer must also keep strongly urging every nuclear, oil, natural gas, coal and electric utility company to 

quickly and massively ramp up converting their business services to supply other clean energy products and 

services, such as: 

1. Batteries for electric vehicles, home power storage, business power storage and utility-scale power storage 

2. Home, business and utility-scale inverters with advanced capabilities (such as ultra-fast trip times and 

battery-backup) and settings, to allow for more connection of renewable energy to the grid. 

3. Smart grid technology products and services 4. 2-way smart grid communication systems and services as 

part of a modern smart grid 5. Energy efficiency products and services - plus renewable energy (like solar and 

wind) products and services - plus battery storage products and services 6. Electric car, truck, bus and/or train 

manufacturing 

With the success of the Tesla Model S and its impending large-scale lithium ion battery manufacturing from 

Tesla's Gigafactory, it appears that Big Oil and Gas could now become even more interested in transitioning to 

becoming a large-scale supplier in the battery business. It is at http://ecowatch.com/2015/07/14/elon-musktesla-model-s/ 

As just one example, it has been suggested and discussed that a Big Oil and Gas company, like ExxonMobil, 

could purchase a successful battery manufacturer, like Tesla, and thereby massively and quickly ramp up 

electric car and truck manufacturing and use. It is at http://www.albertaoilmagazine.com/2015/07/is-teslasmodel-s-the-beginning-of-the-end-for-oil/ 

In 11/28/07, ExxonMobil Chemical was originally involved in developing a new battery technology that made 

lithium-ion batteries usable for electric cars. It is at http://www.chron.com/business/article/Exxon-to-unveilhybrid-car-battery-breakthrough-1811103.php 

In addition, on 9/19/11, CEO Peter Loscher of Siemens, one of the world’s leading nuclear reactor 

manufacturers, explained that the company did not see a future in building any more new nuclear power 

plants. Siemens announced that it would no longer manufacture nuclear reactors and that it was leaving the 

nuclear industry. Siemens transitioned massively and quickly into a leading supplier of wind, solar and 

geothermal products and services. It is at http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2011/09/19/321935/siemens-quitsnuclear-industry/ 

Also, since 9/9/11 and before, Alstom, another major nuclear power manufacturer, has significantly transitioned 

and increased its offshore wind power, onshore wind power, solar and geothermal power products and 

services. It is at http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2014/12/20/offshore-wind-uk-siemens-better-watchout-for-gene.aspx and http://www.alstom.com/microsites/power/products-services/renewables/ 

Also, since 9/9/11 and before, Areva, one of the world's largest nuclear reactor manufacturers, has significantly 

transitioned and increased its rapidly growing offshore wind power products and services and formed Adwen in 

a joint venture with Gamesa. It is at http://www.adwenoffshore.com/about-us/profile/ and 

http://suppliers.areva.com/EN/home-256/index.html 
7

In place of any more new, harmful and wasteful nuclear power, we very strongly urge you to urge every 

nuclear and electric power utility company to quickly and massively ramp up converting their business services 

to supply zero carbon emission, clean energy such as solar, wind, geothermal power and other clean energy 

products and services. 

Thank you for seriously considering our requests. 

Charles Brexel Sr. 

12085 Wexford Overlook 

Roswell, GA 30075 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/23/15 9:19 AM

Received: July 22, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k4o-v4pw

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0119

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Kurt Harris

General Comment

See attached file(s)

Attachments

ANS USU Statement

Page 1 of 1

https://www.fdms.gov/fdms/getcontent?objectId=0900006481b9a39d&format=xml&showorig=false 07/23/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608150
American Nuclear Society Student Chapter – Utah State University 

After reviewing the NRC’s proposed rule changes to 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61, we have concluded that the 

NRC’s proposed rules are sufficient to safely regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste 

(LLRW), and, furthermore, the costs to industry, Agreement States, and the NRC are not overlyburdensome. Site-specific analyses will allow for safe disposal of large amounts of long-lived LLRW like 

depleted uranium (DU), which was not considered during the development of the previous regulations. 

The site-specific approach for licensees and license applicants is thorough. First, they must complete a 

performance assessment to protect the general population. Second, they perform an intruder assessment to 

protect inadvertent intruders. Third, they analyze the performance period to mitigate long-term risk, 

followed by a demonstration of defense-in-depth, which shows layers of overlapping provisions that 

compensate for each other should one failure occur. Finally, they demonstrate site-stability, focusing on 

stability of the wasteform, stability of the facility, and geologic stability. 

EnergySolutions’ Clive facility in Utah (located over 60 miles west of Salt Lake City) is one of only four 

LLRW disposal facilities in the United States. The company plans to ship over half of the 750,000 tons of 

DU stored in Kentucky, Ohio, and South Carolina to Clive for disposal. [1] The NRC reports that the total 

amount of DU LLRW requiring disposal is 109 kg, or roughly 1 million tons. 

The quantity of DU LLRW to be disposed of in Utah is relatively small. 1 million tons pales in 

comparison to the 1.6 billion tons of CO2 emitted by coal plants in the U.S. in 2014 alone. These carbon 

dioxide emissions do far more harm to human health and the environment than this small amount of DU. 

Furthermore, even if all 109 kg were deposited in Utah, given the high density of DU (19.1 g/cm3), the 

waste would only occupy a volume of 52,000 m3, or a cube about 37 meters on each side. [2] 

DU is about 60% as radioactive as the same mass of natural uranium. The high concentration of DU at 

disposal sites creates the problem. DU is weakly radioactive because of its long half-life of about 4.5 

billion years. It emits alpha radiation which cannot penetrate the skin and only travels about 4 cm in air, 

though it is harmful if ingested. Decay products include gaseous radon-222, an alpha emitter that is more 

mobile than the parent radionuclides. However, with a half-life of 3.8 days, site-specific analyses will 

place disposal sites a sufficient distance from large populations that any leaking gas would decay to 

negligible amounts before reaching anyone that could inhale it long-term. 

After over one million years of DU storage, secular equilibrium is reached, where daughter product 

production rates roughly equals their respective decay rates. It is at this point that peak radioactivity 

occurs, at levels roughly 14 times that initially used for waste classification. Concentrations of the decay 

product radium-226, an alpha emitter with a half-life of 1,600 years, may increase beyond Class A and 

Class C. [3] This would be a problem if Utah law does not allow for the disposal of anything except Class 

A LLRW. The potential change of LLRW classifications over long periods of time does not seem to be 

addressed well in the NRC’s proposed rules, but is particularly important in Utah given our restrictions. 

However, we would prefer that Utah take the lead on disposing of nuclear waste of all classifications, so 

that clean nuclear power can expand here in the United States. It is not reasonable to expect the NRC to 

promise to never change the classification of DU, though their definition of long-lived waste is clear, 

under which DU would definitely fall. This clarity in rulemaking will allow for clear distinctions between 

waste types and ensure safe disposal. We also hope that as research is done on the health effects of low 

doses of radiation, updates can be made to the limits specified, as small doses may not cause any adverse 

health effects if our bodies may be able to repair themselves faster than the damage caused. 

Many people in Utah are concerned that the location of EnergySolutions’ Clive facility is above an 

aquifer and in the path of Lake Bonneville as it returns and recedes over time. The risks are that 
groundwater could be contaminated, and that above-ground storage containers of LLRW could be washed 

away. Fortunately, a performance assessment – required by the NRC – will address the potential 

contamination of groundwater, and analysis of the performance period should address concerns such as 

Lake Bonneville’s return. Disposal of DU will be safe as long as EnergySolutions and other companies 

can perform the analyses proposed by the NRC with sufficient thoroughness to satisfy federal and state 

regulators. If EnergySolutions can demonstrate that Clive is safe, according to the NRC’s standards, then 

Utah should follow the science and allow them to dispose of DU there. 

Realistically, we don’t expect DU to sit unused forever. It is valuable as fuel in breeder reactors, which 

are likely to be used again in the United States or for re-enrichment. A 2008 estimate valued only a third 

of the U.S. DU inventory at $7.6 billion. [4] Breeder technology was been proven safe and effective in the 

Integral Fast Reactor in 1986 at Idaho National Lab, and in many other locations. With Utah’s coal plants 

aging, we believe our state is ideal for the eventual construction of such nuclear power plants. 

Utah stands to benefit greatly from the expansion of nuclear power. In 2005, there were 16 aging coalfired generating stations, with 5,080 MW of capacity, representing 74% of the state's total electric 

generating capacity. In 2006, Utah's coal-fired power plants released approximately 41 million tons of 

CO2 – 66% of the state’s total CO2 emissions – as well as 34,000 tons of sulfur dioxide and 68,000 tons 

of nitrogen oxide. Although emissions controls have lowered these figures slightly, nuclear power could 

make substantial reductions to Utah’s pollution. Furthermore, the aging power infrastructure already has 

water allocations from the state, and so could be replaced with small modular reactors – all while 

retaining and likely increasing the local employment opportunities. 

In conclusion, we believe the NRC’s proposed rules will provide for safe disposal of long-lived LLRW 

like DU without overly-burdening the nuclear energy industry. Long-term analyses should be performed 

for storage, but DU will likely be used as fuel in future reactors, providing great benefits to the states 

storing it, and potentially eliminating the risks associated with daughter products of U-238. 

EnergySolutions will perform the analyses required, and should find storage of DU in Utah to be feasible 

and profitable. Though there is a lot of misinformation spread regarding nuclear waste (for example, 

images of green glowing barrels of waste), we feel it is important that good policies be made by the NRC 

and by Utah according to sound science and engineering principles. Doing so will allow for cleaner 

energy production in Utah and nation-wide, and a brighter future for everyone. 

Kurt Harris Landon Hillyard 

PhD Candidate, Mechanical Engineering President, ANS at USU 

[1] B. Maffly, "EnergySolutions pauses plan to dispose of nation's depleted uranium in Utah landfill," 

The Salt Lake Tribune, 13 April 2015. 

[2] "U.S. Energy Information Administration," [Online]. Available: 

http://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.cfm?id=77&t=11. [Accessed 28 May 2015].

[3] U. DEQ, "Depleted Uranium (DU) Waste," May 2015. [Online]. Available: 

http://www.deq.utah.gov/businesses/E/EnSolutions/depleteduranium/performassess/docs/2015/05M

ay/DUWaste.pdf.

[4] "Depleted Uranium," [Online]. Available: 

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Depleted_uranium#Uranium_hexafluoride. [Accessed 29 May 2015].
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Bill Logue <Bill@LogueGroup.com>

Sent: Thursday, July 23, 2015 9:38 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: Snyder, Amy; Ray Vaughan; Bill Logue

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC–2011–0012

Attachments: 2015-07-23_CTF_comment_letter_on_proposed_10-CFR-61_revision.pdf; ATT00001.htm

Good morning, 

On behalf of the West Valley Citizen Task Force, attached please find comments on Docket ID NRC–2011–

0012 

Should you have any difficulty opening this document please contact me. 

Bill Logue, Facilitator 

West Valley Citizen Task Force 

Email: Bill@LogueGroup.com

Phone: 860.521.9122 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608151
The	
  West	
  Valley	
  Citizen	
  Task	
  Force

c/o	
  The	
  Logue	
  Group | PO	
  Box	
  270270 | West	
  Hartford,	
  CT	
  06127-­‐0270

860.521.9122	
  | www.westvalleyctf.org

THE	
  WEST	
  VALLEY	
  

CITIZEN	
  TASK	
  FORCE 

 July 23, 2015 

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555–0001 

ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 

Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Docket ID NRC–2011–0012 

Dear Secretary: 

We submit the following comments on NRC’s proposed revision of 10 CFR 61. This revision 

would, among other things, ensure that low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) streams “that are 

significantly different from those considered during the development of the current regulations 

(i.e., depleted uranium and other unanalyzed waste streams) can be disposed of safely and meet 

the performance objectives for land disposal of LLRW...”1

 We recognize the importance of 

ensuring safe disposal of wastes not previously considered when the 10 CFR 61 regulations were 

initially written in the early 1980s. At the same time, we are concerned that the proposed 

revision makes fundamental changes that go beyond filling such gaps. Some of these proposed 

changes would add too much flexibility and would make the regulations less protective. For 

example: 

Conceptual basis and site characterization 

1. Section 61.50(a)(1) (part of “Disposal site suitability requirements for land disposal”) would 

be weakened by eliminating existing language that says “The primary emphasis in disposal site 

suitability is given to isolation of wastes, a matter having long-term impacts, and to disposal site 

features that ensure that the long-term performance objectives of subpart C of this part are met, 

as opposed to short-term convenience or benefits.” This is an interpretive statement rather than a 

substantive requirement, but its deletion seems illustrative of some of the changes that are being 

proposed. We believe that the existing wording (“The primary emphasis in disposal site 

suitability is given to isolation of wastes, a matter having long-term impacts, and to disposal site 

features that ensure that the long-term performance objectives of subpart C of this part are met, 

as opposed to short-term convenience or benefits”) needs to be retained within these regulations2 

and should remain a guiding principle of 10 CFR 61. 

2. The proposed change in section 61.50(a)(2), which is another part of “Disposal site suitability 

requirements for land disposal,” would make that requirement essentially meaningless. The 

existing requirement is that “The disposal site shall be capable of being characterized, modeled, 

 

1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 80 Federal Register 16082-125 (March 26, 2015) at 16082.

2 We recognize that similar wording can be found in the Federal Register notice for the proposed rule (id. 

at 16103) but believe that the wording needs to remain within the actual regulations at 61.50(a)(1).
2

analyzed and monitored.” This seems like an obvious and crucial requirement. The proposed 

revision would weaken it by saying, “To the extent practicable, the disposal site shall be capable 

of being characterized, modeled, analyzed and monitored.” This change should not be made. In 

order to qualify for a license, any LLRW disposal site should be capable of being characterized, 

modeled, analyzed and monitored with the best available techniques. Sites incapable of meeting 

this requirement should not be eligible for land disposal of LLRW, and the requirement should 

not be weakened by adding the words “To the extent practicable.” 

3. Section 61.7(a)(1) would be weakened by a new sentence that emphasizes the availability of 

exemptions under existing section 61.6 and suggests that such exemptions are available “as 

needed.” Exemptions are already available under section 61.6 but should be the exception rather 

than the rule. It’s not appropriate to feature them in section 61.7(a)(1) as part of the “concept” of 

the 10 CFR 61 disposal requirements. 

Radiological protection and dose limits 

4. New section 61.7(c)(5), in combination with 61.41(a), would change and weaken the dose 

methodology for thyroid protection. The allowable dose to the thyroid would be increased by a 

substantial factor (ranging up to a factor of 11) in an exposure scenario dominated by 

radioiodine.3 We recognize the attraction of using a revised method of dose calculation that 

combines internal and external dose into a single value, as currently used in 10 CFR 20; 

however, such a revision should not be portrayed as a neutral or purely scientific change in 

calculation method. The Federal Register notice for the proposed rule explains the change by 

claiming that “A holistic approach [using a dose limit expressed as an effective dose such as 

TEDE] provides a large benefit in LLRW disposal dose assessment because of the range of 

radionuclides that comingled within the LLRW.”4 In our view, the claimed “large benefit in 

LLRW disposal dose assessment” is primarily a short-term computational convenience which 

relies unduly on an assumption that the radionuclides “comingled within the LLRW” would 

remain comingled at the point of human exposure. This is not likely to be true for long-lived 

mobile radionuclides such as Iodine-129 which may migrate more quickly than other 

radionuclides into contact with humans and (in the case of I-129) be taken up by the thyroid. 

Given the importance of thyroid protection, we believe that the existing thyroid dose limit in 10 

CFR 61.41 should be retained as a more protective standard than the proposed revision. If and 

when the standard is revised, it should be supported by a more complete and explicit analysis 

than is provided in the Federal Register notice for the proposed rule. 

5. Standards for protection of the general public (section 61.41) are currently not restricted to any 

particular time span but would be revised to provide a 25 mrem/year whole-body dose limit 

during the next 1,000 years, followed by a 500 mrem/year whole-body dose limit for the period 

beyond the next 1,000 years. In our view, the 25 mrem/year whole-body dose limit should be 

applied in perpetuity (or as long as the radiological hazard persists) to ensure protection of 

 

3 The increase in thyroid dose “ranging up to a factor of 11” is based on a tissue weighting factor of 0.03 

for the thyroid, as expressed in 10 CFR 20.1003 and ICRP Publication 26.

4 Federal Register, op. cit., at 16104.
3

human health. There is no justification for offering future members of the general public a 20-

fold lower standard of protection than is set for the general public during the next 1,000 years. 

The primary emphasis in disposal site suitability should be given to isolation of wastes and to 

minimization of long-term impacts, as opposed to short-term convenience or benefits. Thus, the 

general public’s whole-body exposure limit from a closed disposal facility should continue 

indefinitely at a 25 mrem/year standard. 

6. Standards for protection of inadvertent intruders (section 61.42) are currently expressed 

qualitatively (“must ensure protection”) but would be revised by setting a quantitative annual 

exposure limit of 500 mrem/year. We recognize the value of a quantitative limit but believe that 

the whole-body dose limit should be set at 25 mrem/year rather than 500 mrem/year, consistent 

with the 25 mrem/year whole-body dose limit for the general public in section 61.41. There is 

no justification for offering “inadvertent intruders” a 20-fold lower standard of protection than is 

set for the general public. NRC asserts that “it is possible, though unlikely, that an inadvertent 

intruder might occupy a disposal site in the future and engage in normal pursuits without 

knowing that they are receiving radiation exposure.”5 However, for various closed waste sites, 

including the West Valley site when closed, it seems likely (rather than unlikely) that inadvertent 

intruders will occupy the site in the future and engage in normal pursuits without knowing that 

they are receiving radiation exposure. In other words, inadvertent intruders are members of the 

general public who may come into closer contact with radiological contamination through no 

fault of their own – and as such, they deserve the same protection as the general public. An 

inadvertent intruder’s whole-body exposure limit from a closed disposal facility should be set at 

25 mrem/year and should continue indefinitely at a 25 mrem/year standard. 

7. According to a new definition of “Intruder assessment” that is proposed in Section 61.2, 

“Intruder assessment is an analysis that: (1) Assumes an inadvertent intruder occupies the site 

and engages in normal activities or other reasonably foreseeable pursuits that are realistic and 

consistent with expected activities in and around the disposal site at the time of site closure and 

that might unknowingly expose the person to radiation from the waste...” This proposed new 

language contains unduly restrictive words (“consistent with expected activities in and around 

the disposal site at the time of site closure”) that should be eliminated from the definition of 

“Intruder assessment.” An intruder assessment should cover site occupation and normal 

activities “or other reasonably foreseeable pursuits that are realistic and that might unknowingly 

expose the person to radiation from the waste...” Expected activities in and around the disposal 

site “at the time of site closure” are not a realistic indicator of reasonably foreseeable pursuits in 

the future (e.g., 1,000 years from now). 

8. Revised standards for protection of the general public and of inadvertent intruders beyond 

1,000 years (sections 61.41 and 61.42) could allow relatively unprotective standards “based on 

technological and economic considerations.” Technological and economic considerations should 

not supersede the dose limits in sections 61.41 and 61.42. The primary emphasis in disposal site 

suitability should be given to isolation of wastes and to minimization of long-term impacts, as 

opposed to short-term convenience or benefits. 

 

5 Id. at 16090.
4

Agreement State Compatibility

9. As part of the proposed revision, NRC may limit the ability of Agreement States to set more 

protective requirements for certain sections of 10 CFR 61.6 The CTF does not support any part 

of the proposed revision that would limit New York State’s ability to set more protective 

requirements. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment and trust that NRC will give these comments full 

consideration. 

Sincerely, 

The West Valley Citizen Task Force 

 

6 This is discussed under the heading “Agreement State Compatibility,” id. at 16111-114.
PR-20, 61 

80FR1608152
2

Nuclear Energy Institute 

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[1] The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the organization responsible for establishing unified industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear energy industry, including 

the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all entities licensed to operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United 

States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations and entities involved in the 

nuclear energy industry. 

 
 

JANET R. SCHLUETER

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1201 F Street, NW, Suite 1100

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P: 202.739.8098

jrs@nei.org

nei.org

July 23, 2015 

Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook

Secretary

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff

Subject: Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 Rule on Low Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (80FR16082); NRC 

Docket NRC-2011-0012 

Project Number: 689

Dear Madam Secretary: 

On behalf of the nuclear energy industry, the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI)1 appreciates the opportunity to 

provide comments on the proposed Part 61 rulemaking published in the Federal Register on March 26, 2015 

(80FR16082). We appreciate the many public meetings held by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) staff on this rulemaking, and look forward to future interactions on this and other low level 

radioactive waste (LLRW) regulatory matters. We also appreciated the opportunity afforded to NEI to 

participate as a panel member in the June 25, 2015 Commission briefing. It was clear during the briefing 

that this rulemaking raises several complex regulatory and policy issues, and we trust that this letter along 

with those of other stakeholders will help inform the agency’s decision on how to proceed. 

At first glance, one might assume that the current operators of the existing Agreement State-licensed LLRW 

disposal sites are the only stakeholders impacted by this rule. However, it should be recognized that any 

modification to the existing radioactive waste regulatory framework has a direct and potentially unintended 

impact on radioactive waste processors and generators, e.g., nuclear power plants, uranium enrichment 

facilities, and broad scope licensees. Therefore, we offer comments on the proposed rule and have 

identified potential or unintended impacts from its implementation, which we trust will be fully considered 

by NRC.

 

1 The Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) is the organization responsible for establishing unified industry policy on matters affecting the nuclear 

energy industry, including the regulatory aspects of generic operational and technical issues. NEI's members include all entities licensed to 

operate commercial nuclear power plants in the United States, nuclear plant designers, major architect/engineering firms, fuel cycle facilities, 

nuclear materials licensees, and other organizations and entities involved in the nuclear energy industry.
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook

July 23, 2015

Page 2 

In Summary, the current rulemaking should be discontinued or, at minimum, its scope 

narrowed. 

We acknowledge the staff’s exhaustive and transparent efforts to date in developing the proposed rule 

made available for comment. However, the current rule’s scope has expanded beyond its original intent, the 

current Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis is deficient, and future NRC decisions on the Part 61 Waste 

Classification (WC) Tables could require subsequent conforming modifications to this proposed rule (see 

item 5 below). Therefore, this rulemaking should be discontinued in its current form and other options 

pursued (see item 2 below). As was discussed during the June 25, 2015 Commission briefing, a question 

regarding the safe disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium (DU) arose during the licensing of the 

Louisiana Energy Services facility now operating in New Mexico (CLI-05-20). Since then, the issue of unique 

LLRW streams other than DU was raised and the rulemaking’s scope expanded. The rule expansion is 

unnecessary and will introduce undue burden and unintended consequences that will negatively impact the 

industry and Agreement States, as well as the potential for new LLRW disposal sites. 

Should NRC proceed with this rulemaking, the scope of the rule should be narrowed to its original intent, 

i.e., the safe disposal of large quantities of DU. Further, the rule should only apply prospectively to those 

sites that seek authorization from their regulators to dispose of large quantities of DU. With this approach, 

current licensees or future applicants would not be required to conduct an initial or updated Performance 

Assessment (PA) at site closure if they do not plan to accept large quantities of DU for disposal. Should 

circumstances change, it is reasonable that a PA would be required. (See item 3 below). 

General Comments:

We offer the following comments, which we trust will inform NRC’s decision on whether or how to proceed 

with this rulemaking. 

1. First and most importantly: Current regulations “ensure public health and safety are protected in the 

operation of any commercial LLRW disposal facility.”

2 The staff recognizes and industry supports the 

NRC statement that LLRW disposed of in accordance with Part 61 or its Agreement State equivalent 

ensures public health and safety today through, in part, application of the integrated systems 

approach. NRC, Agreement States and industry work to ensure that all forms of LLRW are disposed 

of in accordance with applicable regulations and with pre-approval by the appropriate regulatory

agency. There is no information to suggest that disposal of LLRW pursuant to the current regulatory 

framework is unsafe or is not adequately protective of public health and safety and the environment. 

Current disposal practices include, but are not limited to safe disposals authorized under the 

alternate pathway allowed under 10 CFR 20.2002. In fact, adequate pathways for LLRW disposal 

exist nationwide and are utilized as allowed under the current national regulatory framework. 

Therefore, from a public health and safety perspective, this rulemaking is not necessary. 

 

2 Federal Register Notice dated March 26, 2015, “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal,” (80FR16082), page 16084. 
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook

July 23, 2015

Page 3 

2. Draft Regulatory Analysis is Deficient – The current Draft Regulatory Analysis considers only two 

options, i.e., do nothing or proceed with a limited site-specific rule. Further, no benefits from the 

current rulemaking were identified. We believe that other viable options, not all of which include 

rulemaking, should have been analyzed and included for completeness. Such options include: 

• Option 1: discontinue the rulemaking, finalize the NRC guidance and work with the sited

Agreement States (each of which has an existing site-specific regulatory framework in place) to 

address the disposal of large quantities of DU; 

• Option 2: option 1 without finalizing the NRC guidance; or 

• Option 3: revise the proposed rule to limit it to its original intent as directed by the Commission 

in its 2009 staff requirements memorandum3

. For example, the rule would simply require 

licensees or applicants to submit, and receive prior approval from the appropriate regulatory 

authority of, a site-specific PA if they seek authorization to dispose of large quantities of DU.

This approach is consistent with that currently allowed under 10 CFR 61.58 and compatible 

Agreement State regulations. Such flexibility should be retained. 

With any of the options, it should be recognized that the sited Agreement States, who are the only 

regulators of existing commercial LLRW disposal sites, have the necessary regulatory framework in 

place today to address this matter. In fact, each Agreement State has made, or is in the process of 

making, licensing decisions about the need for site-specific PAs and whether disposal of the waste 

streams captured by this proposed rule would be allowed at their respective sites. In addition, the 

NRC has an effective oversight tool in place today to coordinate with the sited Agreement States. 

Specifically, NRC determines the adequacy and compatibility of each sited States’ LLRW 

management regulatory program through its Integrated Materials Performance Evaluation Program 

(IMPEP) and reports its findings publicly. 

Draft Cost-Benefit Analysis is Deficient: NRC has stated that the rule’s impact is limited to LLRW 

disposal site operators. However, as was discussed during the Commission briefing, the regulatory 

analysis fails to: 1) identify and consider the impacts to all categories of NRC licensees impacted by 

this proposed rule; and 2) conduct the necessary cost-benefit analysis for such licensees. Such 

licensees include but are not limited to commercial uranium enrichment facilities licensed under Part 

70 which generate DU and LLRW, and commercial nuclear power plants, fuel fabricators, byproduct 

materials licensees and other generators of LLRW. It is clear that costs imposed on the LLRW 

disposal site operators to comply with this rule would ultimately be borne by the LLRW generators 

since the site operators must recoup any rule implementation costs. To that end, the LLRW 

Northwest Compact representative stated during the June Commission briefing that increased 

associated permit costs was currently estimated at approximately 8% should the rule go into effect.

Further, and equally important, is the fact that NRC did not evaluate the cost-benefit associated with 

requiring a disposal site operator, who does not intend to dispose of DU and where the sited

 

3 Staff requirements memorandum dated March 18, 2009 in response to SECY-08-147, “Staff Response to Commission Order CLI-05-20 

Regarding Depleted Uranium.”
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook

July 23, 2015

Page 4 

Agreement State will not allow future disposals of DU, to perform a PA. Again, these unjustified and 

unanalyzed costs would likely be borne by waste generators and processors. 

3. The rule should only apply prospectively to those sites that seek authorization to dispose of large 

quantities of DU. First, a prospective approach is consistent with that implemented by NRC and the 

Agreement States when the original Part 61 went into effect. The regulators recognized that there 

was no safety basis to apply all or some of the new requirements to LLRW that had already been 

disposed of in accordance with requirements in effect at the time. In fact, implementing some of the 

then new Part 61 requirements, e.g., intruder protection would result in unjustified or impractical

technical and economic burdens to licensees and the regulator. Thus, requirements were imposed 

on a case-by-case basis. In that regard, the case-by-case decision making currently allowed under 

10 CFR 61.1(a) should be retained; however, it appears that the language proposed for 10 CFR 

61.13 would supersede 10 CFR 61.1(a). NRC should clarify this issue. 

Secondly, LLRW is safely disposed of today in accordance with site-specific licenses issued by the 

sited Agreement State. There is no evidence to suggest otherwise or that the current regulatory 

framework is inadequate from a public health and safety perspective. The sited Agreement State 

programs, in combination with NRC’s oversight through the IMPEP, help ensure that current and 

future waste management operations are in compliance with all applicable regulations. Therefore, 

should NRC proceed with this rulemaking, the rule should only apply prospectively to those sites that 

seek authorization from their regulators to dispose of large quantities of DU. With this approach, 

current licensees or future applicants would not be required to conduct an initial PA or updated PA 

at site closure if they do not plan to accept large quantities of DU for disposal. Should circumstances 

change, it is reasonable that a PA would be required.

4. Compatibility Level for the Rule. Should the rulemaking proceed, we offer the following comments 

on the complex issue of compatibility. Industry generally supports and is sensitive to the need for 

national consistency and uniformity in most regulatory arenas. As such, we recognize that a 

Compatibility Level B designation for this rule has appeal to some. However, for all intents and 

purposes, a designation of Level B may not be a practical or implementable approach for this rule, 

nor is it meaningful in its application. Further, the location of the LLRW disposal facilities and the 

fact that LLRW is transported across the nation from generators and processors to the disposal sites 

is not, in and of itself, a “transboundary implication” necessitating a Compatibility Level B. Rather, 

the determination of “transboundary implications” has most often been applied to address the 

movement of goods and services under reciprocity between NRC and the Agreement States and not 

simply the transport of radioactive material or waste from one location to another, e.g., LLRW, 

sealed sources, used fuel. Further, the issue of more clearly defining “transboundary implications” 

under Compatibility Level B is discussed in SECY-15-0087 now before the Commission for 

consideration. 

In addition, unlike other NRC regulatory business lines where NRC either has sole jurisdiction or has 

relinquished its authority to an Agreement State, there are no LLRW disposal sites licensed by NRC 

under Part 61. Rather, each sited Agreement State has a Part 61-compatible regulation in place to 

address LLRW disposal, including the disposal of DU and other waste streams envisioned by this
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook

July 23, 2015

Page 5 

rule. As such, disposal site-specific waste acceptance criteria is in place today and would continue to 

be used by LLRW disposal site operators when implementing the proposed rule as written. This fact 

remains regardless of the compatibility level designation assigned to Part 61, and we fully support 

the necessary flexibility afforded by the current rule. Therefore, unless NRC demonstrates that, 

based on public health and safety, the Agreement States must adopt a rule that is either “identical” 

or “essentially identical” to NRC’s rule (as required by Compatibility Levels A and B, respectively) 

national uniformity is not necessary. While we recognize that the Compatibility Level is a matter of 

consultation between the NRC, Agreement States and the Commission, we respectfully suggest that 

the most appropriate Compatibility Level appears to be C. Specifically, Level C would allow 

Agreement States to be more restrictive than the NRC’s rule (which some already are) and allow 

each sited Agreement State to retain its current approach to regulating LLRW disposal. Finally, we 

are confident that NRC will continue to monitor the adequacy and compatibility of the Agreement 

State programs through the IMPEP.

5. Part 61 Waste Classification (WC) Tables: As stated by NRC staff, the Part 61 WC tables are 

maintained for now, but could be revised during a subsequent rulemaking which could necessitate 

conforming changes to the final version of this proposed rule, i.e., “a whiplash effect on licensees.” 

Therefore, we are commenting on this proposed rule without the benefit of being fully aware of or 

informed by potential impacts from future Part 61 rulemakings. Such modifications could include 

incorporating up to date science or removal of the Part 61 waste classification tables4

. Clearly, this is 

a significant disadvantage of proceeding with a limited rulemaking at this time and perhaps, in 

combination with the Agreement State programs and safe disposal practices in place today, reason 

enough not to proceed. Instead, the issues surrounding the WC tables should be fully vetted and 

evaluated by NRC to determine which impacts might be realized from such modifications. It should 

also be recognized that there are significant statutory implications of modifying the WC tables or 

removing them in their entirety from Part 61—and compatible Agreement State regulations--since 

the WC tables are explicitly referenced in the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1985. These 

issues are not insurmountable but should be carefully identified and analyzed for impacts to this 

rulemaking. 

6. Use of the word “analysis” versus “consideration”: NRC’s introduction of the word, “analysis” in the 

context of “defense-in-depth” is a new requirement and a concept without definition in the proposed 

rule. “Analysis” implies the need for an unprecedented and perhaps unjustified, unnecessary and 

impractical quantitative approach for evaluating long-term site performance in addition to the 

explicit consideration of uncertainty and variability. Therefore, NRC should delete “analysis” and use 

a term that more clearly reflects the historical approach to defense-in-depth used by licensees, NRC 

and the Agreement States, e.g., “consideration.”

 

4 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Staff Requirements Memorandum on SECY-2013-0001.
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook

July 23, 2015

Page 6 

We trust the comments above help inform any decision on whether to proceed with this rulemaking 

and we look forward to learning how stakeholder comments are resolved. I would be pleased to 

answer any questions on the comments contained herein.

Sincerely, 

Janet R. Schlueter

c: Mr. Larry Camper, NMSS/DUWP, NRC

Ms. Marissa Bailey, NMSS/FSCE, NRC

Mr. David Esh, NMSS/DUWP/PAB, NRC
PR-20, 61 

80FR16081

53 




PR-20, 61 

80FR16081

54 
(5 ~ R Savannah River 

R med atlon 

AECOM !BECHTEL CH2 I B&W I AREVA 

JUL 2 3 Z015 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

11555 Rockville Pike 

Rockville, MD 20852 

SRR-CWDA-2015-00093 

RSM Track#: 10065 

COMMENTS ON PROPOSED REVISION TO 10 CFR PART 61- DOCKET ID NRC-2011-0012 

Savannah River Remediation LLC (SRR) is transmitting for your consideration the attached comments on 

your proposed revision to 10 CFR Part 61. SRR appreciates the opportunity to review the proposed rule 

and in general supports the revision especially in the area of explicit definition of a time of compliance 

that is consistent with that defined in existing U.S. Department of Energy requirements. This consistency 

is a benefit to .S. Department of Energy contractors such as SRR which develop Performance 

Assessments to meet U.S. Department of Energy requirements and to meet 10 CFR Part 61 Subpart C 

performance objectives as required by Section 3116 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 

FY2005. 

Please direct any questions to Kent Rosenberger at (803)557-9328 or kent.rosenberger@srs.gov. 

Kent H. Rosenberger 

Waste Disposal Authority 

KHR/khr 

c: S. R. Ross, DOE-SR, 704-S 

D. J. Ferguson, 704-S 

J. K. Fortenberry, SRR, 766-H 

V. A. Franklin, 705-1 C 

S. A. Thomas, 705-lC 

T. F. England, 705-lC 

L.B. Romanowski, 705-lC 

S. P. Hommel, 705-lC 

R. R. Seitz, SRNS, 773-43A 

I S vanna Site 

1k n, : . 8 

v srre 1ation com 
SRR-CWDA-201 S-00093 

July 23, 2015 

Page2 of4 

Savannah River Remediation LLC Comments on Proposed Revision to 10 CFR Part 61 

Comment Part 61 Section Comment ID 

SRR-1 § 61.2 The clarification of an explicit compliance period is considered 

Compliance an improvement to the rule and the use of 1,000 years consistent 

period with that defined in existing U.S. Department of Energy 

requirements is a oositive change. 

SRR-2 § 61.2 The definition of disposal unit includes the statement "For nearDisposal wiit surface disposal the unit is usually a trench". This statement was 

soecificallv deleted from§ 61.7(a)(2). 

SRR-3 § 61.2 An inadvertent intruder may not always be a human being. 

Inadvertent Animals and plants can also intrude upon a site. Recommend 

intruder revising the term from inadvertent intruder to inadvertent hwnan 

intruder in order to clarifu this distinction. 

SRR-4 § 61.2 The definition oflong-lived waste is confusing. The definition 

Long-lived waste appears to be defining long-lived radionuclides. While many 

waste forms may contain some quantity oflong-lived 

radionuclides, not all of these waste forms may be long-lived 

waste. The definition should be refined to fit the context of the 

use of the term in the proposed rule. 

SRR-S § 61.2 Item 3 in the definition states "Estimates the annual dose to l!!!Y 

Performance member of the public ... ". The use of the term "any" could imply 

assessment the Maximum Exposed Individual (MEI) or other such exposure 

context which is not consistent with evaluating exposures based 

on typical regional human behaviors and consumption rates. It is 

recommended to simply state to a member of the public versus 

anv. 

SRR-6 § 61.2 The defmition of performance period states it is a timeframe 

Performance without any end time after the protective assurance period. The 

period definition should explicitly cite an end time such as the time of 

peak dose. In the absence of such an end time one could interpret 

the definition as a requirement to model to infmitv. 

SRR-7 § 61.2 The clarification of an explicit protective assurance period is 

Protective considered an improvement to the rule and a reasonable 

assurance ""riod comoromise to orevious orooosed revisions to the rule. 

SRR-8 § 61.2 The definition states that stability means structural stability. The 

Stability term stability is often used in the context of the long-term 

stability of the closure cap which typically involves erosional 

impacts. While this may alter the engineered function of the 

closure cap it would not impact structural stability. The context 

for the term stability should be elaborated upon in the definition 

such as applying to the stability of the waste form or disposal 

container. 

SRR-9 § 61.7(a)(l) The term earthen is deleted in this paragraph in the first use with 

orotective covers but not in the second use. 
SRR-CWDA-2015-00093 

July 23, 2015 

Page 3 of4 

Comment Part 61 Section ID 

SRR-10 § 61.7(a)(2) 

SRR-11 § 61.7(c)(5) 

SRR-12 § 61.7(c)(5) 

SRR-13 § 61.12(b) 

SRR-14 § 61.13(a)(l) 

SRR-15 § 61.13(a)(4) 

SRR-16 § 61.13(b)(3)(i) 

SRR-17 § 61.13(b)(3)(iii) 

SRR-18 § 61.13(e) 

Table A 

Comment 

This paragraph indicates disposal site characteristics should be 

considered for at least a 500-year timeframe which appears 

inconsistent with other considerations of changing site conditions 

over longer time periods. Please clarify the context of the 500-

year timeframe use in this parmrraph. 

Allowing for the use of"updated factors incorporated by the U.S. 

Environmental Protection Agency" and "the most current 

scientific models and methodologies" for the implementation of 

the dose methodolo"" is considered an imorovement to the rule. 

It is not clear when the 100-year institutional control period 

begins. Does it begin today, at the time of waste emplacement or 

at the time that the facility is closed? For relatively short-lived 

radionuclides (such as Sr-90 or Cs-137) the implications could be 

significant. Additional clarification would be helpful for 

avoiding conflicts that mav arise from this ambi1mitv. 

The context and timeframe of consideration for 

geomornhological and climatologic features should be defined. 

Some features, events, and processes (FEPs) are difficult to 

provide technical bases for inclusion or exclusion; either because 

studying the FEP is very expensive and/or timely, or the very 

nature of the FEP is difficult to observe under real conditions or 

has an extreme element of uncertainty (e.g., impact oflong term 

climate change on various man-made materials that have not yet 

existed for a long period of time). Requiring a technical 

justification for every FEP may, therefore, be an unrealistic 

expectation. Rather than requiring a technical basis/justification 

for inclusion or exclusion of every FEP, it may be more 

feasible/conducive to require a documented justification instead. 

A documented justification does not have to be technical but still 

requires the applicant to put an appropriate level of thought into 

eachFEP. 

This paragraph implies that items such as climate change may not 

be necessary to evaluate if either the peak dose occurs within the 

compliance period or protective assurance period if evidence of 

climatic change for the disposal site is not expected in these 

timeframes. Please clarifV if this was the intent of the revision. 

''Normal" activities might not always include all of these 

activities. Recommend revising the middle of this section to read 

" ... and engages in normal activities which may include ... " 

This statement is ambiguous and could benefit from additional 

clarification, such as examples of how uncertainty can be 

accounted for. 

The definition of "Average Concentrations" should be provided. 

Is this the average of the waste package, disposal unit, disposal 

site, etc.? Without a definition it may have an unintended 

consequence in which sites may feel encouraged to mix their 

waste with "clean" material to dilute the waste concentration. 
SRR-CWDA-2015-00093 

July 23, 2015 

Page4 of4 

Comment Part 61 Section ID 

SRR-19 § 61.B(e) 

Table A 

SRR-20 § 61.23(c) 

SRR-21 § 61.4l(a) 

SRR-22 § 61.42(a) 

SRR-23 § 61.50(2)(iii) 

SRR-24 § 61.57 

Comment 

The term long-lived alpha-emitting nuclides should be defined 

such as done in§ 61.55 Table 1 which indicates a half-life greater 

than 5 vears. 

The term "individual" should be deleted from individual 

inadvertent intruders to be consistent with other uses of 

inadvertent intruder. 

This paragraph refers to dose "to any member of the public ... ". 

The use of the term "any" could imply the Maximum Exposed 

Individual (MEI) or other such exposure context which is not 

consistent with evaluating exposures based on typical regional 

human behaviors and consumption rates. It is recommended to 

simplv state to a member of the public versus anv. 

This paragraph refers to dose "to any inadvertent intruder. .. ". 

The use of the term "any" could imply the Maximum Exposed 

Individual (MEI) or other such exposure context which is not 

consistent with evaluating exposures based on typical regional 

human behaviors and consumption rates. It is recommended to 

simPlv state to an inadvertent intruder versus anv. 

The language could be interpreted as excluding humid sites as a 

suitable location for waste disposal due to the shallow water 

table. This requirement should be revised or removed. It is 

reasonable to assume humid sites may require more engineered 

features and technical justification than arid sites but the 

requirement should be that the performance objectives of Subpart 

C of the rule must be met. 

This requirement seems to only apply if waste is being 

transported between facilities. Please clarify how to address 

these requirements for waste that is generated and disposed on 

site and is not transported from a different location given that 

requiring workers to apply labels to waste that will not be 

transnnrted off site poses a health risk to the workers. 
7124/2015 N RC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0124.hlm I 

PUBLIC SUBMISSION 

Docket: NRC-2011-0012 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0124 

Comment on FR Doc# 2015-06429 

As of: 7/24/15 10:47 AM 

Received: July 23, 2015 

Status: Pending_Post 

Tracking No. ljz-8k57-nuuo 

Comments Due: July 24, 2015 

Submission Type: Web 

Submitter Information 

Name: Jay Laughlin 

General Comment 

Comments from URENCO USA on proposed rule making for Low-Level Radioactive Waste, 80 

Fed. Reg. 16081(March26, 2015) 

Attachments 

UREN CO USA Comments of 10 CFR 61 Proposed Rule Making 

file:///C:/Users/CAGIDownloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0124.hlm I 1/1 

PR-20, 61 

80FR16081

55 
Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

A TIN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 

Subj: Comments of URENCO USA on NRC "Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; 

Proposed Rule" (RIN 3150-Al92; Docket ID NRC-2011-0012), 80 Fed. Reg. 16081 (March 26, 

2015) 

On March 26, 2015, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published a proposed rule to amend its 

regulations in 10 C.F.R. Part 61 governing low level radioactive waste (LLRW) disposal facilities, to 

require new and revised site-specific technical analyses and to permit the development of sitespecific criteria for LLRW acceptance based on the results of these analyses. The proposed rule 

would affect LLRW disposal licensees or applicants that are regulated by the NRC or the Agreement 

States. Importantly, the proposed rule would also significantly affect uranium enrichment facility 

licensees such as URENCO USA (UUSA), which is fully responsible for the management and 

disposal of its depleted uranium (DU) waste in a LLRW disposal facility. 

UUSA, the only operating commercial enrichment facility in the United States, is concerned that the 

proposed rule would result in new waste acceptance criteria and other restrictions that would make it 

more difficult for enrichment facilities to dispose of significant quantities of DU waste, which in turn, 

for example, could have impacts for onsite DU storage under the UUSA license. In UUSA's view, 

the NRC should: 

1) Clarify the proposed new "minimization" requirements under Sections 61.41 and 

61.42 (and any other relevant provisions) by adding objective criteria similar to those 

used for implementing the ALARA principle under Part 20. Alternatively, given the 

inherent difficulty of implementing such minimization requirements over the extremely 

long time horizons addressed by the rule, the NRC should consider dropping the 

minimization requirements and utilize only the prescribed dose limits. 

2) Perform a backfitting analysis that quantifies the impacts and safety benefits of the 

proposed new waste acceptance requirements for affected generators of LLRW, 

such as enrichment facilities, as required by 10 C.F.R. 70.76. 

3) Rather than delay resolution of the critical issue of the waste classification related to 

DU, pursue an integrated rulemaking that resolves that issue in a coordinated 

fashion in conjunction with the changes proposed in the present rulemaking. 

UUSA is not opposed to the NRC's present rulemaking, and appreciates the NRC staffs significant 

efforts with respect to addressing complicated LLRW disposal issues. However, UUSA believes 

that, as a matter of sound regulatory policy, the NRC should evaluate the impacts the rulemaking 

could have on the overall regulated community, including generators of LLRW, and not just disposal 

facilities. 
UUSA's Interest 

The NRC's Part 61 rulemaking came about as a result of the licensing of the UUSA facility. During 

initial facility licensing, the Commission directed the NRC staff to evaluate the disposal of significant 

quantities of DU waste generated by uranium enrichment facilities. While the staffs original 

rulemaking efforts were subsequently expanded and bifurcated into the present rulemaking and a 

separate waste classification rulemaking, they both originated with the issues raised in the UUSA 

initial licensing proceeding regarding the potential for disposal of large quantities of DU waste from 

uranium enrichment facilities. 1 

The UUSA facility, located near Eunice, New Mexico, is the only operating commercial enrichment 

facility in the United States today. UUSA is in the process of expanding the capacity of the facility 

from the original nominal capacity of some 3 million separative work units (SWU) to over 5 million 

SWU. If the Part 61 rulemaking results in the imposition of more stringent criteria for disposing of 

DU waste in LLRW disposal facilities or otherwise restricts the number of LLRW disposal facilities 

that are able to accept DU waste in significant quantities, then UUSA's disposal options could 

decrease and its related costs could significantly increase, possibly forcing UUSA to store 

significantly more quantities of DU waste onsite and/or for longer periods. The disposal issue is 

further complicated by the Part 61 waste reclassification issue that could potentially result in some 

existing LLRW disposal facilities being unable to accept DU waste. 

These outcomes could have significant adverse financial impacts on UUSA. Given the soft market 

conditions for uranium fuel following the Fukushima accident, any increase in operational or LLRW 

disposal costs could potentially create a challenge to continued future operations and adversely 

affect any need for further capacity expansion of the UUSA facility. 

Based on UUSA's contact with several disposal facility operators across the United States, we 

understand that increased costs of new requirements resulting from the rulemaking will be passed 

on to generators, like UUSA, on a dollar-for-dollar basis. The NRC's current cost-benefit analysis of 

the proposed rule, as discussed in the Regulatory Analysis, shows increased costs to disposal 

facility licensees.2 Thus, there can be no doubt that the pass-through of such costs will have a direct 

and substantive impact on generators like UUSA. 

The UUSA facility is critical for economic, energy security, and national security/nonproliferation 

reasons. Uranium enrichment is necessary for the production of fuel for U.S. commercial nuclear 

power plants. The demand for uranium enrichment services is expected to remain relatively strong 

in the United States and worldwide, particularly with the continued increased growth of nuclear 

1 The waste classification tables in Part 61 specify criteria for classifying LLRW for land disposal at a near-surface 

facility. The original development of Part 61 did evaluate depleted uranium, but not in the quantities generated at 

uranium enrichment facilities. See, e.g., NUREG-0945, Vol 1, "Final Environmental Impact Statement on 10 CFR 

Part 61 Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste: Summary and Main Report" at S-21 (in the 

discussion of "Isotopes Considered for Waste Classification Purposes,'' the NRG noted that in the draft environmental 

impact statement, a total of 23 different moderately or long-lived radionuclides were considered in the analysis, 

including DU). 2 Draft Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rufe: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal (10 CFR Part 61) (Feb. 2015) at iv, 23. 

2 
energy around the globe. For these reasons, Congress has recognized the strategic importance of 

U.S. domestic uranium enrichment capability. 3 

In terms of long-term U.S. energy security, the Energy Information Administration's annual reports 

on uranium marketing show that the bulk of enrichment supply (generally over 70%) for U.S. nuclear 

power plants is foreign-based - including suppliers in Russia, China and France that are typically 

subsidized by their governments and would not be subject to the differential costs resulting from new 

requirements imposed by the present rulemaking. In this environment, discouraging the expansion 

of U.S.-based commercial enrichment services, by imposing new LLRW disposal requirements and 

costs not borne by most foreign providers, could significantly challenge the availability of long-term 

domestic enrichment services to U.S.-based utilities. This result could present a further challenge to 

the U.S. nuclear industry at a time when many merchant nuclear generating plants in competitive 

markets are facing economic stress despite the significant environmental and economic benefits 

nuclear energy produces for the country.4 

UUSA's History with the Part 61 Rulemaking 

For several years, the NRC has been undertaking an effort to amend its Part 61 regulations to 

account for the disposal of significant quantities of DU waste from commercial and Department of 

Energy uranium enrichment operations. The NRC has been approaching the Part 61 rulemaking 

from two angles. First, during the UUSA initial licensing proceeding, the Commission directed the 

staff to consider, outside the UUSA case, whether Part 61 should be amended after the staff 

evaluated the quantities of depleted uranium at issue in the waste stream from uranium enrichment 

facilities. Specifically, the Commission explained: 

The Commission is aware that in creating the § 61.55 waste classification 

tables, the NRC considered depleted uranium, but apparently examined only 

specific kinds of depleted uranium waste streams - "the types of uraniumbearing waste being typically disposed of by NRC licensees" at the time. The 

NRC concluded that those waste streams posed an insufficient hazard to 

warrant establishing a concentration limit for depleted uranium in the waste 

classification tables. Perhaps the same conclusion would have been drawn 

had the Part 61 rulemaking explicitly analyzed the uranium enrichment waste 

stream. But as Part 61 's [Final Environmental Impact Statement] indicates, 

no such analysis was done. Therefore, the Commission directs the NRC 

staff, outside of this adjudication, to consider whether the quantities of 

depleted uranium at issue in the waste stream from uranium enrichment 

3 Congress has characterized uranium enrichment as a "strategically important domestic industry of vital national 

interest," "essential to the national security and energy security of the United States,'' and "necessary to avoid 

dependence on imports." S. Rep No. 101-60, 101st Congress, 1st Session 8, 43 (1989); Energy Policy Act of 1992, 

42 U.S.C. Section 2296b-6. National security and defense interests require assurance that the nuclear energy 

industry in the United States does not become unduly dependent on foreign sources of uranium or uranium 

enrichment services (S. Rep. No. 102-72, 102nd Congress 1st Session 144-45 (1991)), and domestically produced 

enriched uranium may also further non-proliferation goals. Ibid. 

4 See The Nuclear Industry's Contribution to the U.S. Economy, the Brattle Group (July 2015) (estimating that the 

U.S. nuclear industry contributes some $60 billion annually to GDP and lowers average annual C02 emissions by 

573 million tons). 

3 
facilities warrant amending section 61.55(a)(6) or the section 61.55(a) waste 

classification tables. 5 

Second, in a Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM-SECY-08-0147), dated March 18, 2009, the 

Commission directed the staff to pursue a limited scope rulemaking to specify a requirement for a 

site-specific analysis and associated technical requirements for unique waste streams including the 

disposal of so-called "large quantities" of DU waste. Specifically, the Commission's SRM stated: 

Previously, in the adjudicatory proceeding for the [UUSA] license application, 

the Commission determined that depleted uranium is properly classified as 

low-level radioactive waste. Although the Commission stated that a literal 

reading of 10 CFR 61.55(a)(6) would render depleted uranium a Class A 

waste, it recognized that the analysis supporting this section did not address 

the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium. 

The proposed rule is the result of this rulemaking effort that grew out of the UUSA licensing 

proceeding. In the proposed rule, the NRC explains (with emphasis added}: 

In pursuing this limited rulemaking, the NRC is not proposing to alter the 

waste classification scheme. However, for unique waste streams including, 

but not limited to, significant quantities of depleted uranium, there may be a 

need to impose additional criteria on its disposal at a specific facility or deny 

such disposal based on unique site characteristics. Those restrictions would 

be determined through a site-specific analysis, which satisfies the 

requirements developed through the rulemaking process.6 

Thus, the Part 61 rulemaking is intimately linked with the operation of uranium enrichment facilities, 

and the disposal of the DU waste generated at these facilities. 

Comments on Proposed Rule 

Comment 1: The proposed "minimization" requirements for the protective assurance and 

performance periods have not been adequately justified. 

The proposed rule would impose ongoing dose "minimization" requirements that could apply 

throughout the life cycle of a disposal facility. Sections 61.41 (b) and 61.42(b) (and perhaps other 

sections) would provide that for the "protective assurance period," which is between 1,000 and 

10,000 years following closure of a LLRW disposal facility, the annual dose to the public or an 

inadvertent intruder from the facility shall be minimized. More specifically, these provisions would 

require that the annual dose shall be below 5 mSv (500 mrem) "or a level that is supported as 

5 See Louisiana Energy Services (National Enrichment Facility), CLl-05-20, "Commission Memorandum and Order" 

~Oct. 19, 2005) at 17 (citations omitted). 

NRC Website, "Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (Site-Specific Analysis Rulemaking)" (last updated June 5, 

2015), available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatorv/rulemaking/potential-rulemakinq/uw-streams.html 

4 
reasonably achievable based on technological and economic considerations." (Emphasis 

added.) The NRC has termed this approach a "minimization analysis." Similarly, proposed Sections 

61.41(c) and 61.42(c) require efforts to "minimize" releases to the general environment and 

exposures to any inadvertent intruder during the "performance period" (the timeframe after the 

10,000-year protective assurance period). 

The proposed new minimization concept raises concerns for UUSA as a generator of DU waste. 

The proposed rule does not provide any substantive discussion of the technical or regulatory basis 

for the minimization requirements. As a result, unless the NRC carefully explains and limits the new 

minimization requirements with objective criteria, it will create uncertainty and a moving target for 

affected licensees and LLRW generators. 

a. Lack of basis for new minimization standard 

It appears that the minimization analysis concept was first introduced into the rulemaking in a 

February 12, 2014 Staff Requirements Memorandum (SRM), where the Commission approved 

publication of the proposed rule and draft guidance subject to certain conditions. The 2014 SRM 

directed the addition of a protective assurance period analysis that "should strive to minimize 

radiation dose with the goal of keeping doses below a 500 mremlyr analytical threshold. The 

radiation doses should be reduced to a level that is reasonably achievable based on technological 

and economic considerations." (Emphasis added.) The Commission vote sheets for the SRM do 

not provide a source for this language, although two Commissioners suggested that "as low as 

reasonably achievable" (ALARA) principles should apply to the protective assurance period analysis. 

This appears to be the origin of the proposed new minimization requirements, although there is no 

further discussion of the concept in the rulemaking record. 

Neither the proposed rule nor the NRC's Regulatory Analysis for the rulemaking provides any 

technical or cost-benefit justification for the new minimization requirements. Similarly, the NRC's 

Draft Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

(released with the proposed rule) does not provide any meaningful detail on this subject. The most 

in-depth discussion can be found in the Draft Guidance, which states: 

These requirements to minimize releases and exposures are intended to be 

conceptually similar to aspects of the ALARA requirement found in 1 O CFR 

Part 20, which includes the use of optimization, feasibility analyses, and 

traditional cost-benefit analyses . . . The minimization analysis is 

conceptually similar to ALARA, but it is not identical.7 

To provide regulatory certainty, the NRG, at a minimum, should develop a technical and regulatory 

basis to support any new minimization standards and clarify the proposed new requirements in any 

final rule. The language of the proposed rule is fraught with subjective terms, such as "should be 

reduced," "reasonably" achievable, and "technological and economic considerations." Without 

clarification of these subjective concepts, there will be uncertainly about how to comply with the 

7 NUREG-2175, Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61, Draft Report for Comment (Mar. 

2015) at 6-11. 

5 
standards over the extremely long time horizons covered by the protective assurance and 

performance periods. 

If the NRC intends to retain ongoing minimization requirements in the final rule, it should add 

objective criteria to the proposed language of Sections 61.41 and 61.42 to keep the minimization 

requirements from being overly subjective. As an example, the definition of ALARA in 10 C.F.R. 

Section 20.1003 contains certain objective limitations (emphasis added): 

ALARA (acronym for "as low as is reasonably achievable") means making 

every reasonable effort to maintain exposures to radiation as far below the 

dose limits in this part as is practical consistent with the purpose for which 

the licensed activity is undertaken, taking into account the state of 

technology, the economics of improvements in relation to state of technology, 

the economics of improvements in relation to benefits to the public health and 

safety, and other societal and socioeconomic considerations, and in relation 

to utilization of nuclear energy and licensed materials in the public interest. 

In addition, 10 C.F.R. Section 20.1101 (b) states (emphasis added): 

The licensee shall use, to the extent practical, procedures and engineering 

controls based upon sound radiation protection principles to achieve 

occupational doses and doses to members of the public that are as low as is 

reasonably achievable (ALARA).8 

Thus the ALARA principle is defined by reference to objective standards of practicality and costbenefit criteria, as well as being linked to the specific radiation protection requirements contained in 

Part 20 and nationally and internationally recognized standards. In contrast, the new minimization 

analysis requirement in proposed Sections 61.41 (b) and 61.42(b) provides that the annual dose to 

the public or an inadvertent intruder shall be below 5 mSv (500 mrem) "or a level that is supported 

as reasonably achievable based on technological and economic considerations." With such 

potentially broad standards, it would be very difficult for licensees, generators, Agreement States, 

and the NRC to determine how to apply the new requirements, especially for the long-term time 

horizons for the protective assurance and performance periods. In fact, the ongoing minimization 

concept will be very difficult to implement for multiple Agreement States that may be using different 

regulatory approaches. 

Accordingly, if the NRC retains the minimization requirements in the final rule, UUSA urges the NRC 

to clarify the language of the proposed new minimization requirements in proposed Sections 61.41 

and 61.42 by adding objective criteria similar to those used in the well-established ALARA principle. 

The NRC should consider publishing the revised rule text for comment by stakeholders before 

finalizing the rule in order to ensure that the new requirements will be workable in practice. In any 

final rule, the NRC should also provide a full explanation of the new standards in the Statement of 

8 Presumably, the reference to "sound radiation protection principles" includes the well recognized standards 

provided by the International Commission on Radiation Protection (ICRP) and the National Council on Radiation 

Protection (NCRP). 

6 
Considerations so that licensees, LLRW generators, and Agreement States have a clear 

understanding of the intent of the new provisions. 9 

Alternatively, the NRC should consider dropping the proposed minimization concept from the final 

rule in view of the practical difficulties that will be created for implementing such a subjective 

requirement over thousands of years. Instead, the NRC could rely on the specific dose limits set 

forth in proposed Sections 61.41 and 61.42, which would provide objective criteria for licensees, 

generators, and Agreement States to meet. 

In any event, if any ongoing minimization requirement is retained in the final rule, the NRC should 

give serious consideration to adding a backfitting protection provision to Part 61. The Commission 

adopted backfit rules for Part 50 and Part 70 as a matter of good regulatory policy, to ensure that the 

costs and benefits of proposed new requirements would be thoroughly analyzed before being 

imposed on affected licensees. The same policy holds true for LLRW disposal facilities licensed 

under Part 61. As the limited number of LLRW disposal facilities age, it will be increasingly 

important for the licensees, as well as the LLRW generators that depend on the disposal facilities, to 

have protection against the imposition of new regulatory requirements or positions that have not 

been properly justified. This is particularly true since an ongoing minimization standard could be a 

source of new regulatory positions imposed by the NRC or Agreement States. 

b. Legal precedent on similar standards 

In considering a minimization requirement for Part 61, the NRC should be mindful that, in some 

contexts, a "minimization" standard has been problematic. The basic problem is that a minimization 

standard can establish a moving target, since developments in technology and even the concept of 

what is "reasonably achievable" can change over time and lead to differences in opinion. 

Such an approach can create considerable uncertainty for the regulated community. As the 

Supreme Court discussed in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U.S. 208 (2009), the 

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for some three decades made determinations on a case-bycase basis about the "best available technology" for power plant cooling water intake structures for 

purposes of "minimizing" adverse environmental impacts as required under the Clean Water Act. 

As illustrated by the Entergy case, EPA's best available technology (BAT) standard has created 

debates over the extent to which cost could be taken into account in determining the BAT and how 

far a power plant would have to go in minimizing- as distinct from reducing -- impacts. In the 

Entergy case, the Supreme Court upheld the EPA's use of cost-benefit analysis to determine what 

technology is the BAT. In addition, the Court discussed the meaning of the Clean Water Act 

provision requiring use of the BAT "for minimizing adverse environmental impact."10 The Supreme 

9 If the NRC does not clarify the new ongoing minimization requirements by incorporating objective criteria, the 

problem with subjectivity and uncertainty could be compounded for LLRW disposal facilities in Agreement States if 

the states were to seek to impose more specific restrictions or limits in the interest of "minimizing" releases or 

exposures. 

10 33 u.s.c. 1326(b). 

7 
Court focused on the word "minimize" and concluded that "'minimize' is a term that admits of degree 

and is not necessarily used to refer exclusively to the 'greatest possible reduction."'11 

In line with the Entergy case, if the NRC were to retain a minimization concept in the final rule, it 

should clarify that the analysis of "technological and economic considerations" as set forth in 

proposed Sections 61.41 and 61.42 should be based on cost-benefit determinations, so that not 

every new and conceivably better technology must be adopted for reducing dose, but only a 

technology that is determined to be cost-justified because it would produce a substantial safety 

benefit and impose costs that are commensurate with the safety benefit. This would be consistent 

with the ALARA principle under Part 20. Further, based on the Entergy case, the NRC should clarify 

in the final rule that any "minimization" requirement is intended to be understood in relative terms, 

considering the costs and benefits to public health and safety, and is not intended to demand the 

greatest possible reduction of dose regardless of costs. 

Comment 2: The NRC should perform a backfitting analysis to quantify the impacts and 

safety benefits of the proposed new requirements. 

The proposed rule would require new and revised site-specific technical analyses that would be 

used to develop site-specific performance criteria for LLRW acceptance. In particular, these 

analyses would be used to establish site-specific Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC), which 

generators and shippers of LLRW would be required to meet. The NRC nevertheless concluded that 

a backfit analysis is not required for the proposed rule, simply stating that the "requirements in this 

proposed rule do not involve any provisions that would impose backfits on nuclear power plant 

licensees licensed under 1 O CFR Part 50 or 52 or fuel cycle licensees licensed under 10 CFR Part 

70."12 

Respectfully, UUSA disagrees and believes that the rulemaking should be treated as a backfit for 

enrichment facilities like UUSA and a backfitting analysis should be performed in accordance with 

the standards of 10 C.F.R. 70.76(a)(3). As a matter of sound regulatory policy, the NRC should 

perform a rigorous cost-benefit analysis so that it fully understands the impacts of this important 

rulemaking on all affected licensees, including uranium enrichment facilities that must dispose of 

significant quantities of DU waste. 

a. The rule would have a significant impact on enrichment facilities. 

The proposed rule would result in the imposition of new WAC that generators of LLRW will be 

required to meet, including uranium enrichment facility licensees. The statement in the "Backfilling" 

section of the proposed rule that the new provisions would not impose backfits on reactor or fuel 

cycle licensees is merely conclusory, and does not articulate a rational explanation for why the 

proposed rule would not result in the imposition of backfits.13 Given that UUSA is one of the main 

11 556 U.S. at 219. 12 80 Fed. Reg. at 16116. 

13 In contrast to the proposed rule here, in other cases the NRC has articulated a logical and specific explanation to 

justify why a proposed change does not constitute a backfit. See, e.g., Proposed Revisions to Site Characteristics 

and Site Parameters, 80 Fed. Reg. 30285, 30286-87 (May 27, 2015) (explaining why proposed revisions to review 

standards for site characteristics did not represent a backfit for applicants and future applicants). If the NRC has 

8 
generators of DU, and the fact that the rulemaking largely originated from the UUSA initial licensing 

proceeding, it is apparent that the proposed rule changes would result in new requirements that 

have a significant impact on enrichment facility licensees like UUSA. 

In concluding that the proposed rule would not impose backfits on reactors or fuel cycle facilities, the 

NRC appears to construe the rule narrowly as affecting only LLRW disposal facilities. In fact, the 

new requirements of the proposed rule can have a "domino" impact on tails management and 

disposal procedures and operational activities at waste generators like UUSA. While the LLRW 

disposal facility licensees would be required to perform new site-specific analyses in the first 

instance, the resulting site-specific WAC and other restrictions would be imposed on generators and 

shippers of LLRW. Thus a significant part of the burden of the new requirements would actually fall 

squarely on generators like UUSA. In addition, UUSA has been informed that the economic costs 

incurred by a disposal facility for complying with the new site-specific analysis requirements would 

be passed on to generators like UUSA on a dollar-for-dollar basis. 

On its face, the proposed rulemaking clearly indicates that it is aimed at addressing the disposal of 

large quantities of DU waste from enrichment facilities. As the NRC states, the central focus of the 

rulemaking is to "ensure that LLRW streams that are significantly different from those considered 

during the development of the current regulations (i.e., depleted uranium and other unanalyzed 

waste streams) can be disposed of safely and meet the performance objectives for land disposal of 

LLRW."14 

Despite the central focus of the rulemaking, the NRC has not analyzed the cost and other impacts of 

the proposed rule on affected generators of DU waste. As a matter of sound regulatory policy, 

UUSA believes the NRC should prepare a "systematic and documented analysis" in accordance with 

Section 70.76 to analyze the impacts of the proposed rule on fuel cycle and other affected licensees. 

The Commission recently recognized the importance of performing such a "systematic and 

documented analysis" as required by Section 70. 76 in order to ensure that new requirements are 

properly justified under the NRC's backfitting standards. 15 

b. The proposed rule meets the definition of "backfitting" under 10 C. F.R. 70. 76. 

While the new site-specific analysis requirements of the proposed rule would be imposed directly on 

disposal facility licensees, we believe the rule also constitutes a backfit for enrichment facility 

licensees under the definition of "backfitting" in 1 O C.F.R. 70.76. Specifically, under 10 C.F.R. 

70.76(a)(1), "backfitting" is defined to include "the modification of, or addition to, systems, structures, 

or components of a facility" or changes to "the procedures or organization required to operate a 

facility," any of which "may result from a new or amended provision in the Commission rules." The 

definition is broadly worded to include any new or modified regulation that has the effect of causing 

such changes for Part 70 licensees. 

developed an internal analysis of why the proposed rule does not involve any backfitting, the agency should make the 

analysis available to the public for comment as part of the rulemaking. 14 80 Fed. Reg. at 16082. 

15 See Commission Voting Record, dated June 18, 2015, on SECY-15-0045, Issuance of Generic Letter 2015-01, 

Treatment of Natural Phenomena Hazards in Fuel Cycle Facilities (comments by Commissioner Svinicki and 

Commissioner Ostendorff on backfitting implications of the proposed generic letter). 

9 
Significantly, NRG precedent shows that a backfit can result not just from a rulemaking that amends 

Part 70 itself, but by any "new or amended provision in the Commission rules." In previous 

rulemakings with wide ranging impacts, the NRG has looked at how the new requirement would 

burden different types of licensees. The NRC has recognized that changes in, or new staff positions 

related to, other parts of the NRC regulations that affect Part 70 licensees can also be covered by 

the Part 70 backfitting rule. In connection with guidance for a recent rulemaking involving new Part 

71 quality assurance requirements for transportation of radioactive materials, the NRG articulated 

the standard for determining whether a change under one Part of the regulations (such as Part 71) is 

a backfit for facilities licensed under another Part (such as Part 50 or 70) with backfitting protection. 

The NRG stated that the backfit rule will apply "where the activity regulated under other parts without 

backfitting or issue finality protections [e.g., Part 71] is an inextricable part of the regulated activity 

subject to backfitting or issue finality [e.g., Parts 50 and 70]."16 

Clearly, with UUSA generating DU waste that needs to be disposed of in the LLRW disposal facilities 

and the impacts that changes to DU disposal criteria could have directly on the UUSA facility and 

license, the activities regulated under Part 61 are an "inextricable part" of a uranium enrichment 

facility's activities regulated under Part 70. In this regard, the Part 61 disposal facilities would be 

required to develop new WAC based on the site-specific analysis in the first instance.17 The new 

requirements of the rule would then flow down as the disposal facilities would impose the new WAC 

and related restrictions on shippers and generators, such as UUSA, who would be required to meet 

the new WAC in order to dispose of their DU waste. 

Due to the "domino" impact of the new requirements, the proposed rule would likely result in 

changes to facilities, procedures and operations of uranium enrichment plants, and thus would 

constitute a backfit within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. 70.76. Fundamentally, if the Part 61 

amendments restrict the ability to dispose of DU waste in a LLRW disposal facility, then the rule 

could jeopardize the viability of commercial disposal paths for DU waste from uranium enrichment 

facilities. In any event, the new requirements of the proposed rule could result in the following types 

of changes at the UUSA facility: 

16 Establishing Quality Assurance Programs for Packaging Used in Transport of Radioactive Material, 78 Fed. Reg. 

29016, 29017 (May 16, 2013) (emphasis added). The NRC also recognized this principle, for example, in a 

rulemaking updating Part 26 fitness-for-duty requirements, where the NRC explained that a backfilling analysis was 

performed as required by Section 70. 76 (as the rule applies to formula quantity strategic special nuclear material 

licensees who are subject to Part 26 requirements) and Section 50.109 (as applied to reactor licensees). Fitness for 

Duty Programs; Final Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. 16966, 17172 (Mar. 31, 2008). 

17 The proposed rule contains a number of new or amended NRC requirements and positions for Part 61 facilities. 

These include the new minimization analysis provisions in Sections 61.41 (b) and 61.42(b) and the new defense-indepth analyses to demonstrate that the disposal site and design meet the performance objectives. As noted by the 

NRC's Office of General Counsel in a backfilling presentation during the NRC's annual Regulatory Information 

Conference, in order to be a backfit, a staffs "changed position" must either be a "new position" or a position that is 

"different from a previously applicable Staff position." See G. Mizuno, NRC Office of General Counsel, "Backfilling: 

'Changed' versus 'New' Guidance: A Presentation for the 2011 RIC NRC" (Mar. 20, 2011) at 6. The absence of a 

backfitting provision in Part 61 provides the NRC with the opportunity to avoid doing a cost-benefit analysis of the 

rule's impacts on LLRW disposal facilities that sound regulatory policy would dictate is necessary. For this reason, if 

the final rule retains such provisions as ongoing minimization requirements, we recommend that the Commission 

include a backfit rule provision in Part 61. 

10 
• Possible amendments to the materials limits and DU cylinder storage limits contained 

in the UUSA facility license. See License Conditions 6 (materials limits), 21 (limiting 

onsite cylinder storage to a capped amount), and 22 (limiting onsite storage of any 

one DU cylinder to 25 years). The rule could require license amendments to account 

for any need to expand capacity at existing storage space or constructing new 

storage facilities onsite. 

• Changes to UUSA's tails management and disposal procedures and operational 

activities, as well as changes to the design of the facility to account for any 

additional onsite storage of DU. 

• Changes to UUSA's financial assurance for decommissioning and decommissioning 

planning because the cost estimate for DU disposal may increase and to account for 

any new restrictions on DU disposal in LLRW disposal facilities. See License 

Condition 16(d), requiring updated decommissioning cost estimates and revised 

funding instruments for DU disposition on an annual basis to reflect projections for 

DU (note that the DU disposal cost estimate is contingent upon the DOE disposal 

path, which can only be used if DU is considered to be low level waste). 

During the UUSA licensing proceeding, many of these issues were heavily contested, including the 

cost of depleted uranium disposal and onsite storage of depleted uranium. In fact, the UUSA license 

includes a specific condition setting onsite DU cylinder storage limits, both in terms of amount and 

duration. These potential impacts are squarely of the type contemplated under the definition of 

backfitting in 10 C.F.R. 70.76. Therefore, the proposed new or modified requirements of Part 61 

would constitute a backfit for uranium enrichment facility licensees, and a backfitting analysis 

meeting the cost-benefit standards of Section 70.76(a)(3) should be performed. 

c. The NRC's Regulatory Analysis is insufficient to justify the proposed rule. 

Under 10 C.F.R. 70.76(a)(2), the NRC must prepare a "systematic and documented analysis" to 

show that a proposed backfit will produce a "substantial increase" in the overall protection of public 

health and safety and that the direct and indirect costs are justified in view of the increased 

protection. As explained below, while the NRC prepared a Regulatory Analysis for the present 

rulemaking, that analysis does not meet the NRC's standards of the backfit rule. 

As part of the Regulatory Analysis, the NRC performed a cost-benefit analysis that addressed only 

the four affected disposal facilities and relevant agreement states. 18 Thus, the Regulatory Analysis 

does not address the impacts on large segments of the affected industry, such as Part 50 and 70 

licensees that generate LLRW, even though the focus of the rulemaking is on disposal of large 

quantities of DU waste from enrichment facilities. 

Further, the NRC acknowledges that the Regulatory Analysis did not quantify the safety or risk 

benefits of the proposed rule, but only considered the safety benefits in a "qualitative fashion."19 The 

18 See Proposed Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 16082. 

'' Id. 

11 
Regulatory Analysis concluded that "[s]everal of the proposed amendments would increase 

operational flexibility for the licensees," but found that "this benefit for the licensees is difficult to 

quantify."20 

Notably, the NRC's discussion of the qualitative benefits does not include a showing of any 

significant safety improvements. Without a showing of a substantial increase in safety from the 

proposed new requirements, the added costs resulting from the rule cannot be justified. A purely 

qualitative analysis of the safety benefits is simply inadequate for a rulemaking of this magnitude. 

Congress has cautioned the NRC against relying on qualitative factors to justify backfits. In a Letter 

from Representative Upton and a number of other members of the House Committee on Energy and 

Commerce to then Chairman Macfarlane, dated September 19, 2014, the Committee questioned the 

NRC's reliance on qualitative factors as the sole basis to justify imposing new requirements and 

noted the importance of cost-benefit analyses to help ensure that regulatory changes yield safety 

benefits commensurate with the costs. The present rulemaking falls well within the scope of 

Congress' criticism because it does not analyze how any increased safety benefits would be 

commensurate with the costs of the rulemaking. 

Indeed, a recent Supreme Court decision expressly addresses the importance of an agency 

evaluating costs when it adopts regulations. In Michigan v. Environmental Protection Agency, 576 

U.S._ (June 29, 2015), the Court found it unreasonable for the EPA to refuse to consider cost 

when determining whether the agency should regulate power plant emissions of mercury and other 

hazardous air pollutants. In its decision, the Court notes: 

Agencies have long treated cost as a centrally relevant factor when deciding 

whether to regulate. Consideration of cost reflects the understanding that 

reasonable regulation ordinarily requires paying attention to the advantages 

and the disadvantages of agency decisions. It also reflects the reality that 

"too much wasteful expenditure devoted to one problem may well mean 

considerably fewer resources available to deal effectively with other (perhaps 

more serious) problems." Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 556 U. S. 208, 

233 (2009) (BREYER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 

Id., slip op., at 7. 

Any agency action, the Court further explains, must "rest 'on a consideration of the relevant factors," 

which includes costs. Id., slip op., at 5 (citation omitted). In making this evaluation, an agency 

should be mindful that "'costs' includes more than the expense of complying with regulations; any 

disadvantages could be termed a cost." Id., slip op., at 7. "No regulation is 'appropriate'," the Court 

explains, "if it does significantly more harm than good." Id. 

Similarly, the NRC's proceeding with the Part 61 rulemaking without fully considering the impacts on 

affected segments of the industry runs counter to the agency's policy initiative to reduce the 

20 Draft Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Disposal (10 CFR Part 61) (Feb. 2015) at 20, and 23, 'Table 4-4 Summary of Benefits and Costs." 

12 
"Cumulative Effects of Regulation" (CER). The NRC has characterized its CER efforts broadly as 

developing "tools that will allow the agency to consider more completely the overall impacts of 

multiple rules, orders, generic communications, advisories, and other regulatory actions on licensees 

and their ability to focus effectively on items of greatest import."21 The NRC has focused much of its 

CER improvements to date on the rulemaking process, including ways to enhance stakeholder input 

and provide more accurate cost-benefit analyses to justify new rules, particularly with respect to 

improving the accuracy of estimates of licensee implementation costs for new regulatory 

requirements.22 If the NRC were to ignore the impact of the proposed rule on affected generators of 

LLRW, the NRC would effectively be avoiding its own CER policy. 

In sum, UUSA recommends that the Commission perform a backfitting analysis of the rulemaking as 

related to affected uranium enrichment facilities, which are the focus of the proposed rule. 

Comment 3: The NRC should take an integrated approach to the Part 61 rulemaking by 

resolving the waste classification issue related to DU in conjunction with the present 

rulemaking. 

The NRC undertook the present rulemaking, in large part, to determine the appropriate disposal path 

for large quantities of DU that are generated at domestic uranium enrichment facilities. The outcome 

of any Part 61 rulemaking could affect whether such facilities, including UUSA, have a viable 

commercial disposal path for DU. 

Two important aspects of Part 61 influence the commercial disposal path for DU: (1) the Part 61 

performance objectives applicable to any form of land disposal of LLRW, and (2) the Part 61 waste 

classification scheme, which establishes the type of waste that can be disposed of in a near surface 

disposal facility. 23 While the Commission is undertaking a significant revision to Part 61 to regulate 

disposal of DU waste, it has elected-seemingly without any reasoned basis-to take a "two-step" 

approach and address any waste classification rulemaking separately from the present rulemaking 

focused on the performance objectives. The NRC's plan for the future waste classification 

rulemaking would include risk-informing the Section 61.55 waste classification tables. 

The NRC has not articulated a clear basis for proceeding in this two-step manner. In approving the 

Staffs request to cease work on a comprehensive rulemaking to revise Part 61 that would also cover 

the waste classification issue, the Commission simply noted that it would improve "efficiency."24 The 

NRC should not move forward with one rulemaking on the performance criteria for waste disposal 

facilities under Part 61 and a separate rulemaking that will address the waste classification structure 

for DU waste under Part 61 because these criteria are intrinsically intertwined. As the NRC has 

noted, the waste classification tables and the site-specific waste acceptance criteria are designed to 

establish two "gates" for the disposal of LLRW - a generator can use either gate to determine if 

disposal of its waste is acceptable. 

21 SECY-12-0137at1(Mar.2013). 22 See SECY-12-0137 and COMSECY-14-0014. 

23 See, e.g., Louisiana Energy Services (National Enrichment Facility), CLl-05-05, "Commission Memorandum and 

Order' (providing description of Part 61 and its relevance to disposal of DU from the UUSA facility). 24 See SECY-13-0001 at 1; and Commissioners' Staff Requirements Memorandum, dated March 26, 2013. 

13 
Notably, the waste classification issue establishes when a certain type of low level waste (such as 

Class A, B, C or Greater than Class C) can be disposed of in a certain type of facility, and the 

performance objectives apply to all methods of disposal, regardless of the type of facility. If the NRC 

engages in lengthy and unpredictable separate rulemakings involving these two gates, then there 

will be significant regulatory uncertainty. Both aspects of the contemplated Part 61 revisions clearly 

interrelate and arose from the same UUSA initial licensing proceeding. Because the two aspects are 

closely related, a subsequent rulemaking on the waste classification framework could undermine or 

at least substantively change how the current Part 61 rulemaking is to be implemented. A change to 

the waste classification of DU, for example, could require longer storage of DU or result in the 

removal of DU waste already disposed of in certain LLRW facilities. In any event, if the NRC 

proceeds with both rulemakings separately, licensees will likely be required to modify their 

procedures and facilities twice to implement each new rule. 

Another reason to address the waste classification issue in conjunction with the site-specific criteria 

for LLRW acceptance is that the waste classification for DU is a matter that should be determined at 

the federal level by the NRC to ensure consistency nationwide in accordance with the NRC's "Policy 

Statement on Adequacy and Compatibility of Agreement State Programs."25 As a matter offairness 

to all stakeholders, the NRC should not "kick the can down the road" by failing to resolve the waste 

classification issue for DU now. Rather, the NRC should resolve the issue now either as part of a 

risk-informed re-examination in the present rulemaking or by determining that the waste 

classification issue no longer needs consideration and the waste classification Tables do not need to 

be revised.26 

As a matter of good regulatory policy, an agency should evaluate significant revisions to a regulatory 

scheme in a single rulemaking so that it can fully evaluate and understand the impact that all the 

contemplated revisions to the rule could have on the regulated community and other stakeholders 

such as Agreement States. In these types of circumstances, the courts have discouraged agencies 

from taking a piecemeal-or "one step at a time"-approach to adopting revisions to regulations. As 

a general matter, an agency should take an integrated approach to rulemakings so that the full 

extent of the rulemaking efforts can be evaluated holistically. See, e.g., Nat'/ Ass'n of Broadcasters 

v. FCC, 740 F.2d 1190, 1211 (D.C. Cir.1984) (quoting ITT World Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 725 

F.2d 732 at 754 (D.C.Cir.1984)), where the D.C. Circuit made clear that an agency must provide a 

reasonable rationale for proceeding one step at a time so that it is not "oblivious to the problems it 

was postponing or to their likely resolution." 

Here, there is no pressing need to move forward with the present near-term rulemaking on 

performance criteria for disposal of DU when the resolution of a critical issue - the waste 

classification of DU - has been deferred. A better approach for all stakeholders would be to address 

both of these important issues in a single integrated rulemaking. 

25 62 Fed. Reg. 46517 (Sept. 3, 1997). 

26 As discussed above, if the final rule retains the proposed ongoing minimization requirements, we believe the 

Commission should include a backftt rule provision in the revised Part 61. Such a provision would allow affected 

licensees to seek relief from overly restrictive new requirements or regulatory staff positions implementing the Part 61 

requirements that are not well justified. In areas where an Agreement State may seek to deviate from or go beyond 

the NRC's requirements, backfitting protection may provide a regulatory mechanism to allow licensees to resolve the 

issue so that it does not become a political (state vs. federal) issue. 

14 
* * * * * 

UUSA appreciates the efforts of the NRC and the opportunity to comment on this important 

rulemaking. If you have any questions on these comments, please contact Amy Johnson at 575-

394-6203 or Amy.Johnson@URENCO.com. 

;z~,,.~ ........ 

URENCO USA Chief Nuclear Officer and Head of Operations 

15 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Greevesj@aol.com

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 10:55 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: phlohaus@gmail.com; greevesj@aol.com

Subject: [External_Sender] NRC 10 CFR PART 61 “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; 

Proposed Rule” 

Attachments: 61 comments final 7-24-15.pdf; Part 61 Final letter to NRC 7-24-15.pdf

 

Annette L. Vietti‐Cook

Secretary of the Commission

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Washington, DC 20555–0001

ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff

Subject:   Comments on NRC 10 CFR PART 61 “Low‐Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule” (RIN 3150–AI92;

Docket ID NRC–2011–0012), 80 Fed. Reg. 16081 (March 26, 2015)

  

Attached are pdf files with our submittal letter and attached detailed comments on NRC 10 CFR PART 61 “Low‐Level

Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule” (RIN 3150–AI92; Docket ID NRC–2011–0012).

  

We regret that most of our comments are critical of the proposed rule.  It is our opinion that the rule as proposed does

more harm than good.  Many of the proposed additions add unnecessary burdens and likely cannot be reasonably

demonstrated.

  

We stand ready to assist the Commission in any why we can to support a modified path forward to a final rule.

  

John Greeves

Paul Lohaus

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608156
7/24/2015 

Annette L. Vietti-Cook 

Secretary of the Commission 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555–0001 

ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 

Subject: Comments on NRC 10 CFR PART 61 “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule” 

(RIN 3150–AI92; Docket ID NRC–2011–0012), 80 Fed. Reg. 16081 (March 26, 2015) 

Dear Ms. Vietti-Cook: 

The purpose of this letter is to provide the Commission with our views concerning the 

Staff's approach outlined in the above Proposed Rule. We share the goal of both the 

Commission and the Staff, to make Part 61 a more risk-informed and performance-based rule. 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend its regulations 

to require new and revised site-specific technical analyses and to permit the development of criteria for 

LLRW acceptance based on the results of these analyses. These amendments would ensure that LLRW 

streams that are significantly different from those considered during the development of the current 

regulations (i.e., depleted uranium and other unanalyzed waste streams) can be disposed of safely and 

meet the performance objectives for land disposal of LLRW. 

We agree the rule needs to be updated to reflect changes which have occurred since the original rule 

was promulgated such as development of newer dose assessment methodology, and to reflect changes 

in waste streams. However, the rule applies the new requirements developed to address new waste 

streams to all sites (both those sites desiring to accept the new waste streams and those sites which 

desire to continue to use the existing waste classification requirements). The rule should only apply the 

new requirements to sites which desire to accept the new waste streams (e.g. large quantities of 

depleted uranium). Therefore, we believe the final rule should clearly differentiate requirements that 

would be applied to sites developing specific waste acceptance criteria and accepting larger quantities 

of long lived material from those sites which will continue to use the existing waste classification system 

set out in Part 61. This is described in our detailed comments attached which propose development of a 

new section (61.60) to describe the additional incremental requirements which sites desiring to accept 

larger quantities of long lived radionuclides must meet. Existing or new sites which continue to use the 

existing waste classification requirements would not be subject to the new 61.60 requirements. 

Our comments set out in the attachment; address 5 major areas of comment as follows: 

1. We agree the rule should add and incorporate new dose assessment methodology and an explicit 

dose limit for the inadvertent intruder; 
2. New requirements established by this rule making should be applied to existing operating sites on a 

case by case basis through terms and conditions of licenses similar to how requirements of the initial 

Part 61 rule were handled through Section 61.1. Existing sites should not automatically be subject to all 

of the new requirements as has been proposed by the NRC staff during the public meetings; 

3. Clearly separate new requirements applicable to sites (new and existing) which desire to accept 

larger quantities of long lived material and develop site specific waste acceptance requirements from 

those sites (both existing and new) which will continue to use the existing Part 61 waste classification 

system. A new section 61.60 should be established to specify site specific waste acceptance 

requirements. Do not modify existing section 61.58. This suggested approach would also eliminate the 

need for a separate new rulemaking to address waste classification for waste streams containing large 

quantities of long lived material. 

4. A two-tiered analysis should be proposed rather than a three-tiered analysis approach. A two-tiered 

approach would be adequate to ensure safety through a 1,000 year compliance period and analysis to 

peak dose for long lived radionuclides present in disposed waste; and 

5. Eliminate from the proposed amendment revisions the extensive detail and unnecessary new 

requirements currently proposed. This would include eliminating the need for a separate safety case, 

the detailed defense in depth analysis, and the need for a new extensive stability analysis. Appropriate 

revisions to 61.7, 61.13, and the performance objective for stability should, therefore, be made 

accordingly. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the proposed amendments. 

Questions regarding these comments may be directed to John Greeves at (301) 452-3511 or 

greevesj@aol.com and Paul Lohaus at (815) 303-8404 or phlohaus@gmail.com. 

Respectively submitted, 

John T. Greeves 

Senior Regulatory Nuclear Consultant 

Paul H. Lohaus 

Senior Regulatory Nuclear Consultant 

Enclosure: Comments on NRC 10 CFR Part 61 “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule” 

(RIN 3150–AI92; Docket ID NRC–2011–0012) 

cc:

Chairman Stephen G. Burns 

Commissioner Kristine L. Svinicki 

Commissioner William C. Ostendorff 

Commissioner Jeff Baran 
1 

Comments on NRC 10 CFR Part 61 “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule” (RIN 3150–

AI92; Docket ID NRC–2011–0012) 

Prepared by: John T. Greeves and Paul H. Lohaus 

July 24, 2015 

We agree the rule needs to be updated to reflect changes that have occurred since the original rule was 

promulgated such as development of newer dose assessment methodology, and to reflect changes in 

waste streams. We agree the final rule should revise the existing technical analysis for protection of the 

general population to include a 1,000-year compliance period. We also agree the proposed rule should 

add and incorporate new site-specific technical analysis (using modern ICRP dose methods) and an 

explicit 500 mr/y dose limit for the inadvertent intruder. 

The rest of our detailed comments address major areas of concern as follows: 

New requirements established by this rule making should be applied to existing operating sites on a case 

by case basis through terms and conditions of licenses similar to how requirements of the initial Part 61 

rule were handled through Section 61.1. Existing sites should not automatically be subject to all of the 

new requirements as has been proposed by the NRC staff during the public meetings; 

The rule should clearly separate new requirements applicable to sites which desire to accept larger 

quantities of long lived material and develop site specific waste acceptance requirements, from those 

sites which will continue to use the existing Part 61 waste classification system. A new section 61.60 

should be established to specify site-specific waste acceptance requirements. Do not modify existing 

section 61.58. This suggested approach would also eliminate the need for a separate new rulemaking to 

address waste classification for waste streams containing large quantities of long lived material; 

A two-tiered analysis should be proposed rather than a three-tiered analysis approach. A two-tiered 

approach would be adequate to ensure safety through a 1,000 year compliance period and analysis to 

peak dose for long lived radionuclides present in disposed waste; 

Eliminate from the proposed amendment revisions the extensive detail and unnecessary new 

requirements currently proposed. This would include eliminating the need for a separate safety case, 

the detailed defense in depth analysis, and the need for a new extensive stability analysis. Appropriate 

revisions to 61.7, 61.13, and the performance objective for stability should, therefore, be made 

accordingly; and 

Add a new requirement to allow either development of site-specific Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) 

for LLRW disposal of unique waste streams (based on the results of the technical analyses) or continue 

to use the existing Part 61 LLRW classification requirements. 
2 

Following are further details by specific section or subject area: 

Section 61.1

For those sited States that continue to use the existing classification requirements any new 

requirements should be determined prospectively on a case-by-case basis and implemented through 

terms and conditions of the license consistent with provisions in 61.1(a). 

NRC’s recent explanation of section § 61.1(a) Purpose and scope is a problem. Section § 61.1 states that 

“Applicability of the requirements in this part to Commission licenses for waste disposal facilities in 

effect on the effective date of this rule will be determined on a case-by-case basis.” This language 

recognizes that new requirements introduced after a site is sited, licensed and operated under previous 

requirements would not necessarily be binding on either agreement states or operators that committed 

to, and were licensed under, specific site conditions and licensing requirements in good faith. NRC’s 

staff interprets that this only applies to the early 80’s timeframe. NRC’s new interpretation is changing 

those commitments and licensing requirements and adding unnecessary burdens on agreement states, 

operators and generators by changing the criteria for long term operation, closure and decommissioning 

for a specific site as a form of back fit. NRC staff states this as an exemption. Exemptions are covered in 

61.6, not 61.1. Without some form of grandfathering, agreement states will be subject to significant 

burdens and future litigation risks. 

Back Fit 

NRC should give serious consideration to adding a back fit protection provision to Part 61. The 

Commission adopted back fit rules for Part 50 and Part 70 to ensure that the costs and benefits of 

proposed new requirements would be thoroughly analyzed before being imposed on affected licensees. 

The same policy holds true for LLRW disposal facilities licensed under Part 61. It is important for Part 50 

and Part 70 licensees, as well as the other LLRW generators that depend on the disposal facilities, to 

have protection against the imposition of new regulatory requirements or positions that have not been 

properly justified. 

Proposed three-tiered approach 

One of the questions NRC posed included “Is the proposed three-tiered approach (a compliance period, 

followed by a protective assurance period, followed by a performance period, if applicable) 

appropriate”? No, a three-tier approach is not appropriate. Establishing a three-tier approach is not 

efficient, clear or reliable. Implementation of a three-tier approach will be a significant burden on 

Agreement States, Operators and generators without added safety protection. A three-tier approach is 

inconsistent with DOE’s LLW disposal practices and international recommendations. A two-tiered

approach with a first tier compliance period of 1,000 years and an analysis out to peak dose as a second 

tier would be protective and is much clearer, efficient and reliable. A two-tier approach out to peak 

dose will provide adequate protection and close any current gap for risks that increase for long-lived 

radionuclides. 
3 

Defense in depth 

The proposed rule should include a clear (explicit) statement that licensing decisions are based on 

defense in depth (DID) protections. The extensive proposed text explaining the “safety case” and 

describing its attributes should be removed and provided in guidance. The proposed language is not 

clear (understandable), efficient, and will be very difficult to implement reliably. Explicitly identifying 

and describing the features of the design and site characteristics that provide defense-in-depth 

protection should be required. However, no specific defense in depth new analyses beyond identifying 

and describing the features of the design and site characteristics that provide defense-in-depth 

protection should be required. 

Draft Regulatory Analysis 

The draft Regulatory Analysis of the proposed rule is inadequate. The proposed rule will be a significant 

burden on the Agreement States, Operators and generators. Staff has significantly underestimated the 

burden and cost of implementation of the complex proposal on the Agreement States, Operators and 

generators. The estimated costs (burden) of implementation are off by a factor of 2 or more. The 

burden and costs associated with recent applications for Depleted Uranium (DU) disposal exceed the 

estimated costs in the draft Regulatory Analysis. 

The NRC fails to identify un-quantified liabilities created by the propose language. It will also likely 

generate extensive litigation risk for existing sites as closure plans are implemented. 

Guidance or Rule language 

The staff, in its goal to develop new requirements governing disposal of large quantities and 

concentrations of long lived radionuclides in a near surface disposal facility, has proposed a framework 

of requirements largely based on HLW guidance documents such as NUREG-1854 NRC Staff Guidance for 

DOE Waste Determinations. This extensive “how to” HLW guidance applied to all LLW disposal facilities 

is unnecessary and burdensome. The discussion is wordy, not concise, rambling and ambiguous. 

Discussions such as “insights serving as input for making regulatory decisions” are so broad, undefined, 

unclear and ambiguous as to be inappropriate in a regulation. Existing sites could consider early closure 

to avoid litigation risks incurred by the proposed rule amendments. As the State of Washington 

representative stated in the recent Commission meeting, the proposed rule will likely be a barrier for 

development of new sites for LLW disposal. The burdensome and unnecessary new language included 

in the proposed rule will deter investment in new disposal capacity. The extensive “how to” guidance 

should be eliminated. 

Waste Acceptance Criteria 

A Waste Acceptance Criteria (WAC) approach should be included. However, removing the current 

language in 61.58 and its intended flexibility for NRC and agreement states is not appropriate. The 

current language in 61.58 should be retained. 
4 

It is particularly important to retain the current requirements in 61.58 given the requirements in 

61.55(a)(2)(iv) which rely on the provisions of 61.58 to provide a basis for approving “...proposals for 

disposal of such waste in a disposal site licensed pursuant to this part...” as specified in 61.55(a)(2)(iv). 

61.55(a)(2)(iv) does not identify criteria which the Commission would use to approve such a proposal. 

The criteria are contained in 61.58. 

It also important to retain 61.58 given the definition of TRU waste contained in the WIPP Land 

Withdrawal Act as amended by Public Law 104-201. The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act contains wording 

reflecting the provisions of 61.58 in section 2(18)(C) where it provides reference to “...waste that the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission has approved for disposal on a case-by-case basis in accordance with 

Part 61...” The provisions of Part 61 referenced in this portion of the TRU waste definition can only be 

those set out in 61.58, as there are no other provisions in Part 61 providing for such site specific case-bycase approvals. 

The existing definition of LLW contained in Section 2 “Waste” should be amended through this 

rulemaking action to conform to the statutory definition of LLW contained in the Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The term “transuranic waste” should be removed. The 

definition, taken from the LLRWPAA of 1985, should read: “...radioactive material that is not high-level 

radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or byproduct material (as defined in section 11e.(2) of the Atomic 

Energy Act of 1954...” Updating the definition would also serve to conform the definition of waste in 

Part 61 to the existing provisions in Section 61.1(b) dealing with purpose, scope and applicability of the 

rule. 

In lieu of amending existing section 61.58, a new stand alone section 61.60 should be developed and 

added to the rule that addresses use of the WAC approach. We provide further details below and 

sections 61.7 and 61.13 should be modified accordingly. A new stand alone section 61.60 that 

addresses use of the WAC approach is described below. 

Section 61.7 Concepts and Section 61.13 Technical Analysis 

Section 61.7 Concepts has been overwhelmed by an attempt to provide detailed “how to” guidance in 

the rule. In general the proposal is an overreach with inclusion of extensive language taken from HLW 

guidance documents that is not appropriate for the LLW Section 61.7 Concepts. Technical analyses to 

assess the impact of site-specific factors over the longer term for new waste streams should be provided 

in a new stand alone section 61.60. 

Similarly section 61.13 Technical Analysis has been overwhelmed with very extensive “how to” guidance 

in the rule. The exiting relatively simple and clear section 61.13, intended to require demonstration that 

the performance objectives of subpart C of this part be met, has been injected with HLW guidance on 

features, events, and processes taken from NUREG-1854. Section 61.13 (e) is not clear and will be very 

difficult to implement in a contested case. Table A is unclear and subject to interpretation, which will be 

a burden on states and operators. 
5 

Simply adding a subsection to 61.7 “concepts” to reflect the new structure and requirements in Part 61 

governing acceptance and disposal of “the newer and additional waste streams” containing higher 

concentrations and larger quantities of longer-lived radionuclides would be useful. This would include 

reference to a new stand alone section 61.60 that would apply prospectively to new long-lived waste 

streams. It would specify the new incremental requirements and analyses that an applicant would need 

to complete in order to receive and dispose of the newer waste streams. The incremental requirements 

would be based on the proposed revisions to Sections 61.13, 61.42, and 61.58, modified to remove the 

“how to” guidance. 

Hybrid waste acceptance approach 

In the proposed rule, the NRC is proposing the hybrid waste acceptance approach (Option 3) as the 

regulatory LLRW acceptance framework for the near-surface disposal of LLRW. 

NRC staff indicates that a currently operating site, or a new proposed LLW disposal site, could choose to 

continue to use and apply the existing waste classification system and associated waste form and 

disposal requirements set out in Part 61, or could apply a new set of WAC developed through the 

analyses prescribed in the proposed rule changes. For example, the staff states: “In defining LLRW 

streams with acceptable radionuclide concentrations or activities and waste forms, licensees or license 

applicants would be allowed to use either the results of the site-specific technical analyses set forth in 

10 CFR 61.13, or the LLRW classification requirements in 10 CFR 61.55.” We support this approach and 

believe the alternative needs to be clearly delineated within the final rule and associated Statement of 

Considerations (SOC). 

The hybrid waste acceptance approach provides a framework for the use of either the generic LLRW 

classification system specified in 10 CFR 61.55 or the results of the technical analyses required in 10 CFR 

61.13.” This distinction does not appear to be clearly delineated in the rule changes. Rather, the rule 

changes, as proposed, appear to overlay on the existing operating sites and existing Agreement State 

regulatory agencies who desire to remain under the current regulatory regime set out in existing Part 61 

an unnecessary new set of requirements (and extreme regulatory burdens). These new requirements 

should only apply to (1) existing sites which desire to accept and dispose of new waste streams 

containing higher concentrations and larger total quantities of long lived radionuclides, and (2) any new 

sites which desire to accept and dispose of the newer waste streams containing higher concentrations 

and larger total quantities of long lived radionuclides. The rule should not impose the new set of 

requirements on sited states that will not take new waste streams and desire to continue to use and 

apply the existing Part 61 requirements. 

How this approach would be implemented by the regulator and operator is not clear. Who decides 

which approach is used, the regulator or the operator/applicant? Moving this language to a new stand 

alone section 61.60 would be efficient, effective and clarify that it applies only to any newer waste 

streams taken after the date of the new rule. 

Technical analysis revision at closure 
6 

The requirement to revise the technical analyses at closure for existing sites that have met all previous 

requirements to date, unless new unexpected conditions are identified is a significant and unnecessary 

burden on both licensees and regulators. 

Performance Objectives 

The existing Performance Objectives have stood the test of time for over three decades and should not 

be expanded as proposed. 

Section 61.41 Protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity should not be 

expanded, other than substituting “0.25 milliSievert (25 millirems)” for “the whole body, 75 millirems to 

the thyroid, and 25 millirems to any other organ. The proposed additions are an unnecessary burden. 

Trying to demonstrate minimizing concentrations and releases will be an ordeal in any litigation.

Section 61.42 Protection of individuals from inadvertent intrusion should not be expanded other than 

adding “The annual dose must not exceed 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) to any inadvertent intruder.” 

Trying to demonstrate minimizing concentrations and releases will be an ordeal in any litigation. A 500 

mrem/yr standard is an appropriate analytical threshold for inadvertent intrusion protection. 

The proposed rule does not provide any substantive discussion of the technical or regulatory basis for 

the minimization requirements. It will create uncertainty and a moving target for affected licensees and 

LLRW generators. Neither the proposed rule nor the NRC’s Regulatory Analysis for the rulemaking 

provides any technical or cost-benefit justification for the new minimization requirements. NRC should 

drop the proposed minimization concept from the final rule in view of the practical difficulties that will 

be created for implementing such a subjective requirement over thousands of years. NRC should rely on 

the specific dose limits set forth in proposed Sections 61.41 and 61.42, which would provide objective 

criteria for licensees, generators, and Agreement States to meet.

Section 61.44 Stability of the disposal site after closure should not be changed. The inserted language 

“for the compliance and protective assurance periods” should be removed. The insert will be an ordeal 

in any litigated case and is unnecessary.

NRC states, because NRC regulations already require a site stability analysis, the NRC does not anticipate 

any additional cost to the licensee resulting from the changes to 10 CFR 61.44. We disagree. Revised 

section § 61.44 Stability of the disposal site after closure is un-implementable. Requiring stability for 

10,000 years is unreasonable. NRC, EPA and congress (Uranium Mill Tailings Remediation Control Act 

legislation) have recognized that requiring stability beyond 200 to 1,000 years cannot be proven. 

Current stability requirements for part 61 sites are largely met by complying with guidance developed 

for uranium recover facility sites that implement a 200 to 1000 year standard consistent with the 

URMCA requirements. Requiring stability for a 10,000 year period is unworkable and cannot be 

reasonably demonstrated. Other regulatory agencies do not have a comparable requirement for LLW 

disposal. Agreement states or operators will not be able to withstand adverse litigation in a contested 

hearing on proving stability for 10,000 years. 
7 

NRC Questions

One of the questions NRC posed included “Should there be a quantitative goal or dose limit associated 

with the performance period analysis, and if so, what should that goal or dose limit be?” A public dose 

limit of 25 mrem/yr and a 500 mrem/yr intruder dose limit are appropriate for adequate protection. 

One of the questions NRC posed included “Is Compatibility Category B appropriate for the compliance 

period, protective assurance period, and the waste acceptance criteria?” 

First we believe the final Performance Objectives, that we described above, should be Compatibly A or 

B. The Performance Objectives have always been considered the primary criteria for LLW disposal. 

Other Part 61 sections should allow states appropriate flexibility depending on local conditions. 

We note some sited states (e.g., Texas and Utah) have already invested in siting, design and licensing 

conditions that are not compatible with the proposed rule language. The flexibility provided in section 

61.1(a) should be maintained for such existing sited states. 

We recommend in developing the final rule NRC seek greater consistency among the Agreement States, 

NRC and DOE for regulation of LLW. 

Classification Tables 

The present rulemaking should determine the appropriate disposal path for large quantities of DU and 

address whether the waste classification tables should be revised. The current proposal is to consider a 

future waste classification rulemaking that would include risk-informing the Section 61.55 waste 

classification tables. This would result in another lengthy rulemaking process with great uncertainty. 

Any subsequent changes to the waste classification of DU could require removal of DU waste already 

disposed of in certain LLRW facilities. Such uncertainty will delay the final decisions by many parties on 

disposition of DU waste. The NRC has not provided any basis for proceeding in this two-step manner. 

The NRC should not move forward with one rulemaking on criteria for waste disposal, and a delayed 

separate rulemaking that will address the waste classification structure for DU waste. NRC should 

resolve this issue now as part of the present rulemaking. The proposed changes in part 61 will close any 

gaps that exist in this rule and the waste classification Tables should not need to be revised. 
7124/2015 N RC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0125.hlm I 

PUBLIC SUBMISSION 

Docket: NRC-2011-0012 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0125 

Comment on FR Doc# 2015-06429 

As of: 7/24/15 10:54 AM 

Received: July 23, 2015 

Status: Pending_Post 

Tracking No. ljz-8k59-5jmi 

Comments Due: July 24, 2015 

Submission Type: Web 

Submitter Information 

Name: Earl Fordham 

Address: 

309 Bradley Blvd., Suite 201 

Richland, 99352 

Email: earl.fordham@doh.wa.gov 

General Comment 

State of Washington comments are included in the uploaded file. 

Attachments 

Washington State comments on proposed 10 CFR Part 61_July 23 2015 

file:///C:/Users/CAGIDownloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0125.hlm I 1/1 

PR-20, 61 

80FR16081

57 
STATE OF WASHINGTON 

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH 

OFFICE OF RADIATION PROTECTION 

July 23, 2015 

309 Bradley Blvd., Suite 201 • Richland, Washington 99352 

TDD Relay Service: 1-800-833-6388 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 

ATTN: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 

RE: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

On behalf of the state of Washington, below for your consideration are comments on 10 CFR 

Parts 20 and 61 Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule, as published in the 

Federal Register Vol. 80, No. 58, dated Thursday March 26, 2015. 

1. The state highly recommends Part 61 be left "as is" as much as possible. Updating 

existing requirements in the sections is a good practice. However, since half of the 

existing sites do not plan on accepting significant quantities of the new long-lived alpha 

emitting radionuclides, the new requirements should be inserted into a new section (e.g., 

61.60), or alternatively a new set of standalone regulations. 

2. The state does not agree with the requirement to redo the site's performance assessment 

(PA) unless that site decides to take significant quantities of long-lived alpha emitters 

(e.g., DU). Ifwe read 61.13(e) correctly, the PA is only needed if we are going to take 

long-lived alpha emitters. 

3. The state concurs with the new requirement to redo a site's PA within 5 years of 

closure. This allows assumptions that were made years earlier to be reviewed and 

updated where needed. Unless absolutely needed, no new sampling should be need to be 

performed.; only updating: 

a. the inventory (adjust projected quantities), 

b. equation values such as kct, 

4. The state concurs that Defense-in-Depth information (e.g., several independent redundant 

ban-iers) should be available in pre-operational documents for each site. For cun-ent sites, 

retrofitting may be extremely difficult if the site is dependent on only one or two robust 

ban-ier(s). 

Public Health - Always Working for a Safer and Healthier Washington 

55 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page 2of4 

5. The revised regulations introduce a new term called the Safety Case. Safety Cases (SC) 

are, in their simplest terms, a collection of arguments and evidence showing a facility can 

be sited, designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and closed in a safe manner. A 

key component of the safety case is the analytical safety assessment. The NRC equates 

the SC's to a PA + Defense-in-Depth. The exact form of a SC depends on the laws and 

regulations at a given site. Between radioactive materials licensing, performance 

assessments and a site environmental review (e.g., NEPA or state equivalent laws), the 

critical components of a SC will be addressed. Is this consistent with the NRC 's Safety 

Case expectation? 

6. The state supports a sited state's ability through regulatory/licensing action to develop 

site-specific waste classification levels (e.g., similar to 10CFR61.55 Tables). Site 

specific values will provide flexibility not currently in the regulations. The wording in 

the current proposed rule seems to allow the site operator to decide if other than 

1 OCFR61.55 tables will be used. The rule needs to be clearly worded that the site 

regulator decides if site-specific values will be used. 

7. Impacts ofregulation changes on the development of new sites are unknown. The 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission in its Regulatory Basis for Proposed Revisions to LowLevel Waste Disposal Facilities (10 CFR Part 61) states in part that Performance 

Assessments' (PA) will be based largely on inference, development of models, and data 

acquisition to demonstrate 10 CFR Part 61 PA's are met. 

The state understands the nature of the uncertainty associated with near surface disposal 

of Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) and the need for flexibility in a performance 

based regulatory approach. However, because the proposed rule is ambiguous in some 

parts it leaves open the opportunity for the following unintended consequences: 

• New proposed sites that want to dispose of alpha emitters may walk away from the 

siting process due to the risk associated with uncertainty within the regulation. 

• Varying interpretation of inference could create regulatory mission creep and a 

regulatory process that becomes too burdensome. 

• Creation of a complex patchwork of regulations that don't allow for a single standard 

of LLR W packaging. 

The unintended consequences can be minimized in the new proposed rule by adding 

context to its framework while at the same providing flexibility for existing LLRW sites. 

8. The state supports the proposed Compatibility Levels for: 

a. 61.4l(a), (b), and (c) 

b. 61.42(a), (b), and (c) 

9. A regulatory back-fit analysis, although not required, should be performed for this 

rev1s1on. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page 3of4 

10. Further details should be provided for review and comment on how the financial burden 

for implementation of this revision placed on sited Agreement State programs was 

derived. Initial review suggests the burden for some sites is underestimated by a factor of 

two. 

11. Predictions of site stability for 10,000 years (required in 61.44) are subjective and filled 

with uncertainty. The state agrees with NRC staff in that site stability is critical to 

achieving the performance objectives of 61.41 and 61.42. What is not readily apparent is 

why the site stability performance objective (61.44) needs to stand alone in the NRC's 

world of performance based regulations. Due to concern over uncertainty, the NRC in 

the past several years, has reduced its timeframe for its public dose limit (0.25 mSv 

annually) compliance to 1000 years. Isn't the site stability performance objective subject 

to the same uncertainty? 

12. The assigned dose stated in 61.41(b) and 61.42(b) for the Protective Assurance Periods 

(PAP) is not clear. As stated in these paragraphs, the annual dose shall be below 5 mSv 

or a level that is supported as reasonably achievable. Is the 5mSv an upper limit or are 

higher levels allowed if supported as reasonably achievable based on technological and 

economic considerations? 

13. The state understands the Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 

61 (NUREG-2175) supports the current proposed rulemaking. The state appreciates the 

ability to review both the proposed rule and corresponding guidance at the same time. 

However, we suggest a new draft guidance document be released for additional review 

after the Commission approves Part 61. 

14. The NRC has stated in public meetings and in the Federal Register Notice that the main 

reason for proposing changes to the current 10 CFR 61 is to ensure that low-level waste 

streams that are significantly different than the low-level waste streams that were 

considered in the current Part 61 can be addressed and disposed of in a manner that fully 

protects public health and safety. Furthermore, it has been stated that the existing set of 

regulatory criteria is adequate to protect public health and safety and the four operating 

disposal facilities have gone well above the fundamental requirements of Part 61. (See 

page 9 of Barnwell public meeting transcripts) In light of these statements, we believe 

that the current 61.1 (a) regarding applicability and flexibility of the requirements for 

current waste disposal facilities be retained for the sites that do not plan to take new 

waste streams or significant quantities of the new long-lived alpha emitting radionuclides 

that were not envisioned in the original 10 CFR 61 analysis. 

15. The Waste Acceptance Criteria is more subjective in the proposed rule. There should be a 

set of uniform criteria that is applicable to all LLR W disposal facilities as there currently 

is, and alternate characteristics should be allowed on a case by case basis as currently 

allowed in 10 CFR 61.58. Alternate characteristics would need to be well documented 

and reviewed by the NRC for compatibility and adherence to performance objectives. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page 4of4 

If you should have any questions regarding these comments, please do not hesitate to contact me 

at (509) 946-0234 or at earl.fordham@doh.wa.gov 

~~IV.~~~~--- Earl Fordham, CHP, PE 

Deputy Director 

Office of Radiation Protection 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/24/15 11:02 AM

Received: July 23, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k5b-aslq

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0126

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Mike Garner

General Comment

Thank you for providing the opportunity for the Northwest Compact to submit comments on NRC's 10 CFR 

Part 61 rulemaking (See attached file(s)

Attachments

20150723154258023

Page 1 of 1

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0126.html 07/24/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608158
Northwest Interstate Compact 

On Low-Level Radioactive Waste Management 

P.O. Box 47600. Olympia, Washington 98504-7600. Mike Garner, Executive Director (360) 407-7102 

July 23, 2015 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff 

Subject: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 (Proposed Rule Changes, 10 CFR Part 61) 

Submitted Online via Regulations.gov 

Dear Madam Secretary: 

The Northwest Interstate Compact would like to thank the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

(NRC) for the opportunity to comment on the 10 CFR Part 61 proposed rulemaking. We 

strongly support the efforts ofNRC to engage stakeholders and greatly appreciate the public 

meetings that NRC held in the sited states during May and June of2015. 

The following comments are offered by the Northwest Interstate Compact. 

Background 

The Low-Level Radioactive Policy Amendments Act of 1985 identifies those low-level 

radioactive wastes that are a state or interstate compact responsibility and those that are a federal 

government responsibility. 

The U.S. Enrichment Corporation Privatization Act explicitly states the U.S. Department of 

Energy (USDOE) is responsible for LLRW (depleted uranium) generated by any uranium 

enrichment facility. States and interstate compacts have no liability for LLR W generated by 

these operations. 

NRC is proposing significant changes to 10 CFR Part 61 as a result of two commercial disposal 

sites, Waste Control Specialists' Andrews County, TX and EnergySolutions' Clive, UT, that are 

pursuing large volumes of depleted uranium for disposal. As a result, NRC needs to develop 

regulations that address the disposal oflarge volumes of depleted uranium at commercial sites. 

The country will need additional LLRW disposal sites by 2050. The Richland, WA disposal site 

will begin final closure activities in 2056; EnergySolutions' Clive, UT disposal site has 30 years 

of licensed capacity remaining and; additional nuclear utilities are scheduled to be 

decommissioned in the next 20-40 years. 

ALASKA. HAWAII. IDAHO. MONTANA. OREGON. UTAH. WASHINGTON. WYOMING 
Secretary 

U.S Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page2 

Future LLRW disposal site development depends .on the following factors: 

I. Technical analysis demonstrating LLRW is disposed in a manner protective of public 

health and safety. 

2. Just as importantly, site development requires local community, state, and public support 

before it can commence. 

3. Stability in regulations governing LLR W disposal site operation. 

Unintended Consequences of Proposed Rulemaking 

NRC's proposed implementation of the rule undermines the dynamics found in the Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 as it universally incorporates rules that 

apply to a waste stream, depleted uranium, which is not even a state or interstate compact 

responsibility. This does not seem equitable. 

Those commercial disposal sites that have no intention of accepting large volumes of depleted 

uranium for disposal will be subject to the economic burden of implementing the rule without 

receiving any economic benefit. 

• Any licensee expense associated with the implementation of the proposed new 

regulations for the Richland, WA disposal site will be passed on to the generators in the 

form of higher disposal fees. The disposal rates of the Richland, WA license, US 

Ecology, are regulated by the Washington State Utilities and Transportation Commission. 

Seeing as this is a necessary expense to meet the new regulatory requirement, this 

expense would be added to US Ecology's annual revenue requirement which will result 

in increased disposal fees for LLRW generators using the Richland, WA facility. 

Application of the rule to all commercial disposal sites undermines the stability ofregulations 

governing traditional LLR W disposal. 

• States may be hesitant to support site development as the rules can change at any time to 

allow extremely different waste streams than those contemplated during the original 

public process. 

• It may make the public hesitant to support LLR W disposal site development as they 

recognize the rules can change significantly at any time which makes it difficult to know 

what they are truly supporting. 

It is unlikely that a new disposal site meeting the requirements of the proposed rule could receive 

the public support necessary for site development. This results from the incorporation of large 

volumes of depleted uranium or other long-lived radionuclides and likely makes such a site unsiteable. 

• Currently, state and compact representatives can inform the public the activity ofLLRW 

disposed at a commercial disposal site will decay to I% of its original activity within 500 

years following disposal. The mere association of large volumes of depleted uranium 

compromises the ability of representatives to state this and this is an important loss. 
Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page 3 

• At the June 10, 2015 NRC public meeting in Salt Lake City, UT an NRC representative 

was asked ifNRC had evaluated how the new rule may impact future site development. 

The representative indicated NRC had not evaluated this. I think it is in the best interest 

of our country to ensure that new regulations do not preclude the development of new 

LLRW disposal sites. If this were to occur, what good are the new rules if you have no 

commercial LLRW disposal sites in the future to apply the rules to? 

Methods to Reduce Unintended Consequences 

The new rule should apply only to those commercial LLRW disposal sites that seek to dispose of 

large volumes of depleted uranium; a USDOE responsibility. 

• This could be accomplished through the incorporation of these requirements within a 

separate section or subpart of 10 CFR Part 61 that applies only to those disposal sites that 

choose to accept large volumes of depleted uranium for disposal. 

o One option is to include these regulatory requirements in a new subpart, Subpart 

H. 

o Another option is to include a new section under Subpart D, 61.60. 

In each case these new regulations would apply only to those commercial LLRW disposal 

facilities seeking large volumes of depleted uranium or other long-lived radionuclides for 

disposal. This separation is needed in an effort to preserve future site development opportunities. 

Without such separation new site development is unlikely. Three of the four sited states support 

this approach. 

Benefits of Alternate Implementation 

• Aligns more closely with the tenets of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy 

Amendments Act of 1985. 

• Limits the economic burden to those commercial LLR W disposal sites that will benefit 

economically from the acceptance of large volumes of depleted uranium for disposal. 

• Maintains a higher level of stability in the regulations governing the disposal of 

traditional LLRW. 

• Makes future site development more difficult, but much less difficult than if the rule is 

applied to all commercial LLRW disposal sites. 

Additional Comments 

It is important to recognize it is unlikely there would be a current 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking if 

two of the four commercial sites had not expressed an interest in accepting large volumes of 

depleted uranium for disposal. 
Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page4 

There would seem to be significant benefit to be gained by leaving the current regulations 

governing the disposal of traditional LLR W in place. The current regulations are effective for 

traditional LLRW as NRC states on page 16099 of the Federal Register Notice the following: 

Because of the conservative nature of the assumptions used in the original JO CFR Part 

61 regulatory basis to develop the LLRW classification, the LLRW classification system is 

expected to be protective of public health and safety as long as LLRW disposal facilities 

operate within the regulatory basis of the original 10 CFR Part 61 regulations. 

These regulations have been effective for the disposal of traditional LLRW and the public is 

familiar with them. This approach provides stability for the disposal of traditional LLR W; 

whereas the universal application of the new regulations will disrupt this stability as the public 

will have to learn an entirely new, very complicated system it is currently unfamiliar with. 

In an attachment to a February 19, 2014 letter submitted to Chairman Macfarlane by the 

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Dr. J. Sam Armijo states in his last paragraph: 

Absent a safety concern or benefit, it is not reasonable to impose such uncertainties or 

burdens on licensees who choose to make no changes in the waste streams they receive in 

the future. Imposition of more stringent requirements on fature disposals could also 

raise public concerns regarding the safety of low level waste previously disposed of in 

compliance with existing regulations. This problem could be corrected by making the 

new rule applicable only to licensees engaged in the disposal of large quantities of DU 

The Northwest Compact agrees with the above statement made by Dr. Armijo. 

The Northwest Compact strongly supports the separation ofregulations governing the disposal of 

large volumes oflong-lived radionuclides such as depleted uranium from those regulations 

governing the disposal of traditional low-level radioactive waste. This separation is necessary if 

new, traditional low-level radioactive disposal sites are to be developed in the future. It is much 

more equitable as these regulations are being developed to address the disposal of a waste 

stream, depleted uranium, which is not a state or interstate compact responsibility. 

Specific Questions 

Why is NRC so set on the universal application of the proposed 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking 

when the option exists for including the requirements governing the disposal oflarge volumes of 

long-lived radionuclides, such as depleted uranium, in a new section or subpart? The separation 

of these requirements would be more equitable; less disruptive; doesn't require the public to 

assimilate complex, new regulations for traditional LLRW streams; and reduces the negative 

impact on future site development. The separation of these requirements still allows NRC to 

develop regulations that address the disposal oflarge volumes oflong-lived radionuclides, such 

as depleted uranium, at those commercial facilities that choose to accept such waste streams. 
Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

July 23, 2015 

Page 5 

Why did NRC choose not to evaluate the potential impact of the universal application of this 

proposed rulemaking on future site development? This seems like an important issue to consider 

ifNRC expects states and interstate compacts to successfully site future commercial LLRW 

disposal sites prior to the closure of the current sites. 

The Northwest Compact would like to thank NRC for the opportunity to provide comments on 

the proposed 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking. 

/' /'1 . ) ,~ ,.// )

·ncerely, t}t) !rt/~ ,-A~ 

Mike Garner, Chair/Executive Director 

Northwest Interstate Compact 

cc: Northwest Interstate Compact Committee 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/24/15 11:09 AM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k5q-ywwf

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: API

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0127

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Scott Kirk

Address: 

Three Lincoln Ctr, Suite 1700

5430 LBJ Fwy

Dallas, TX, 75240

Email: skirk@valhi.net

Submitter's Representative: Roy King

Organization: Waste Control Specialists LLC

General Comment

Please see comments of Waste Control Specialists LLC in attached file.

Attachments

7-24-15 Waste Control Specialists Comments on Proposed Changes to 10 CFR 61 Docket NRC-2011-0012

Page 1 of 1

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0127.html 07/24/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608159
Corporate Facility 

5430 LBJ Freeway, Ste. 1700 P.O. Box 1129 

Three Lincoln Centre Andrews, TX 79714 

Dallas, TX 75240 888-789-2783 

972-715-9800 Fax. 432-525-8902

Fax. 972-448-1419 

July 24, 2015 VIA EMAIL and FEDERAL EXPRESS

Ms. Annette L. Viette-Cook, Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

ATTEN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff 

Washington, DC 20555-001 

References: (1) Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

(2) Federal Register, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, 

 Volume 80, No. 58, published on March 26, 2015 

(3) Commissioners’ Briefing on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 and 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal, June 25, 2015 

Subject: Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 

Dear Madam Secretary: 

Waste Control Specialists LLC (WCS) herby submits written comments regarding proposed 

revisions to Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 61, Licensing Requirements 

for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, as requested in Reference 2. WCS is appreciative of the 

invitation and opportunity to share our views on the proposed rule with the Commissioners of the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on June 25, 2015 (Reference 3). Our comments 

contained herein serve to supplement those provided to the Commissioners at the referenced 

briefing on the proposed revisions to 10 CFR 61. 

WCS supports the proposed rule, but encourages the Commission to provide flexibility to the 

Agreement States to maintain existing regulations, by designating this rule as a Compatibility 

Category C requirement. We also encourage the Commission, once this rulemaking is finalized, 

to complete the task of providing a specific waste classification to the category of waste known 

as large quantities of Depleted Uranium (DU). WCS’ comments are provided herein to address 

both of these areas. 
Ms. Viette-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page 2 of 3 

Support for the Proposed Rule 

WSC supports the proposed rule especially as it relates to the “large quantities of DU” waste 

stream. WCS believes that the requirements governing disposal of unique waste streams like 

large quantities of DU, as specified in the proposed rulemaking, provide a defensible approach 

for protecting public health and safety. WCS also supports the three-tiered approach specified in 

the proposed rulemaking. However, WCS recommends that Agreement States should not be 

required to promulgate less stringent federal requirements than those already established in those 

states for the disposal of such waste streams. 

On August 28, 2014, the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) authorized 

disposal of large quantities of DU in both the WCS Texas Compact Waste Disposal Facility and 

the WCS Federal Waste Disposal Facility, located at WCS’ Andrews County, Texas site. The 

TCEQ regulatory requirements governing the disposal of large quantities of DU are more 

stringent than those contemplated in the proposed changes to Part 61 (Reference 2). The WCS 

disposal facility was the first new commercial disposal facility since Congress enacted the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Act of 1980, as amended in 1985. Other previous attempts were 

proven unsuccessful at ten other locations across the U.S., not necessarily because of technical 

issues, but more often because of the lack of community support. Not long after the failed 

attempt to license the Sierra Blanca Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal Facility near El 

Paso, the Texas legislature created the framework for a new commercial disposal facility for 

Class A, B and C Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LLW) requiring a state-of-the-art facility with 

siting and engineering criteria more rigorous than any of those in existence at the time. 

In line with that directive, TCEQ promulgated disposal regulations that were more stringent than 

those required by the NRC either under the existing or proposed changes to Part 61. These more 

stringent standards were applied to the WCS site in the authorization process. We believe the 

support our facility received from the State of Texas and local communities in west Texas and 

southeastern New Mexico was in part due to the more stringent Texas requirements. Community 

support in hosting a waste disposal facility for Class A, B, and C LLW cannot be overstated. For 

these reasons, while WCS supports the proposed rule, WCS strongly recommends that the NRC 

provide flexibility to the Agreement States to maintain existing regulations in those states that 

may be more stringent than those specified in the proposed rulemaking. Accordingly, WCS 

respectfully encourages the NRC to assign such requirements as a Compatibility Category “C”, 

as specified in the proposed changes to 10 CFR Parts 61.13(e), 61.41(a), 61.41(b), 61.42(a), 

61.42(b), and 61.58. 

Waste Classification for Depleted Uranium 

Upon finalizing the proposed rule, WCS encourages the NRC to proceed forward and determine 

a specific waste classification for disposal of large quantities of DU. It was our understanding 

that initially this Part 61 rulemaking was to include a waste classification for large quantities of 

DU, a waste category that was not contemplated, and thus not specifically classified in the 

original Part 61 rule. However, the current proposed rule does not contain a resolution of that 

classification issue. 
Ms. Viette-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page 3 of 3 

During a public meeting on this proposed rulemaking, NRC staff noted that the proper 

classification of large quantities of DU, if based on science, would be “hotter” than Class A 

LLW. However, at present Part 61, including the classification tables, does not provide a 

specific classification for this waste stream. Thus, large quantities of DU are considered Class A 

LLW by default. However, consistent with the comments of NRC staff at the public meeting, 

large quantities of DU are more hazardous than Class A LLW. During the licensing of the WCS 

facility conducted by the TCEQ, it was well understood that disposal of DU, especially large 

quantities of DU, required more stringent requirements than those which apply to Class A LLW. 

TCEQ’s licensing review specifically considered the impacts from climate change, potential 

erosion or degradation of the cover system, proximity to a water table, and the recognition that 

DU should be disposed of as deep as possible within the disposal unit. The licensing review also 

evaluated time periods well beyond the 10,000 years given that DU becomes more radioactive 

over time. Based on the review, TCEQ included license requirements that large quantities of DU 

must be containerized and disposed of at the greatest depth possible within the disposal unit, 

requirements that are more stringent than those which apply to other Class A LLW. We ask that 

this same consideration be given to this waste stream by NRC. 

Accordingly, WCS strongly urges the NRC to complete the proposed rulemaking and then 

proceed to determine the proper waste classification for disposal of large quantities of DU as 

contemplated in the revised staff requirements in SECY-13-0001, issued on March 26, 2013. 

WCS appreciates the opportunity provided by the Commission to share our views on this 

important rulemaking. WCS requests that all correspondences regarding this matter be emailed 

directly to my attention (skirk@valhi.net) as soon as possible after issuance. If you have any 

questions or need additional information, please contact me at 972-450-4284. 

Sincerely, 

J. Scott Kirk, CHP 

Vice President of Licensing and Regulatory Affairs, Corporate Radiation Safety Officer 

cc: Larry Camper, NRC 

 Charles Maguire, TCEQ 

 Rodney Baltzer, WCS 

 Betsy Madru, WCS 

Elicia Sanchez, WCS 

WCS Regulatory Compliance 

WCS Records Management 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Khayyat, Adnan <Adnan.Khayyat@illinois.gov>

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 11:20 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Attachments: IEMA's Comments RE Docket ID NRC-2011-0012.pdf

Please find attached IEMA’s comments RE Docket ID NRC‐2011‐0012.  

Thanks for the opportunity to comment,

Adnan

Adnan G. Khayyat 

Chief, Bureau of Radiation Safety 

Illinois Emergency Management Agency 

Adnan.Khayyat@illinois.gov 

217.558.3945 


1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Roger Seitz <rogerseitz5@msn.com>

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 11:25 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Attachments: Roger Seitz.pdf

Dear Sir/Madame

Please find attached my comments on the propose rule for 10 CFR Part 61.

Regards,

Roger Seitz

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608161
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Comments from Roger Seitz

NRC’s Proposed Rule: 10 CFR Part 61

Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Published March 26, 2015

I appreciate the opportunity to review the language for the proposed rule. The effort from NRC 

staff to provide draft guidance along with the rule was very helpful in better understanding the

intent regarding implementation of the rule. However, I do have a number of concerns related to 

the proposed rule. I have provided responses to the specific requests for feedback followed by

comments on specific language in the rule. 

Note that although the guidance was helpful, I believe that substantial revision will be necessary 

to accommodate the needed changes for the proposed rule, thus I request that the guidance be 

revised and then resubmitted for public comment after the proposed rule is updated (I have also 

submitted a similar comment in response to the request for comments on the guidance).

NRC requests for comment in Federal Register notice

The NRC is seeking feedback on the proposed approach, especially with regard to whether 

a 5 milliSievert (500 mrem) annual dose target is appropriate for the protective assurance 

period and whether it is appropriate to require licensees or license applicants to consider 

alternative levels to minimize exposures to an inadvertent intruder. (80 FR 16090)

Comment #1: I believe that the protective assurance period should be eliminated. After 

reviewing the proposed rule and associated guidance, it is my opinion that the use of an 

intermediate “protective assurance” period (from 1000 to 10,000 years after closure) with a 

numerical dose target does not really enhance protectiveness with respect to long-lived 

radionuclides and does not appropriately acknowledge and recognize the uncertainties and 

limitations of modeling over very long time frames. A two-tiered approach using the 1,000 year 

compliance period and performance objectives followed by the more qualitative performance 

period more appropriately addresses uncertainties and also provides a means to address the 

potential for catastrophic impacts that could potentially occur. Much of the excessive complexity 

of the proposed rule and guidance can be attributed to trying to accommodate the added

protective assurance time frame.

If the protective assurance period is retained, the use of 500 mrem as a dose target or goal seems 

reasonable because it reflects the uncertainty and speculative nature of calculations extending 

into extreme times beyond 1,000 years. 500 mrem/yr is below the average annual dose for people 

living in the United States today (see NCRP Report 152) and is also not inconsistent with risks 

considered acceptable resulting from radon exposure in residences.

1 Internationally, there is good 

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1 The EPA’s radon action level—the level below which the Agency does not recommend actions to further reduce radon levels—

is 4 pCi/L. At that level of exposure over a lifetime, the increased risk of lung cancer is up to 62 in 1000, which is equivalent to 

doses well above 100 mrem/yr. See. A Citizen’s Guide to Radon, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, 

http://www.epa.gov/radon/pubs/citguide.html
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acceptance that exposures on the order of natural background are reasonable reference points for 

very long term assessments. The IAEA suggests that “[i]n very long time frames . . . 

uncertainties could become much larger and calculated doses may exceed the dose constraint [of 

100 mrem]. Comparison of the doses with doses from naturally occurring radionuclides may 

provide a useful indication of the significance of such cases.”2

In addition, several changes to the proposed regulatory language would also be needed to align 

the requirements with NRC’s stated intentions if the protective assurance period is retained. 

Importantly, the proposed regulatory language does not set forth 500 mrem as a “goal,” but 

rather imposes requirements. This is inconsistent with the NRC’s stated intent in the preamble 

and with the Commission's direction in its February 12, 2014 Memorandum, which calls for a 

"goal of keeping doses below a 500 mrem/yr threshold." The use of the term minimize is also 

problematic and can be interpreted to be more stringent than the dose limits applied during the 

compliance period. 

If the 500 mrem annual dose is properly conveyed as a target, then consideration of alternative 

levels is inherently included; that is, a goal allows some flexibility, especially in view of 

appropriate qualifying terms such as “reasonably achievable.” Beyond 1000 years after closure, 

measures to further reduce doses below the target level are not justifiable, because they may 

entail large costs for little change in modeled doses to a hypothetical future member of the public 

and a hypothetical future inadvertent intruder; such an approach is inconsistent with ethical 

principles that state that emphasis for the very long term should be on averting catastrophic 

consequences. If the protective assurance period is retained (noting that I think it should not be 

retained), I recommend the proposed regulatory language be changed to reflect that additional 

efforts need not be made to further reduce doses if the goal of 500 mrem is met for these times 

far in the future.

As previously stated, the NRC is making available the draft guidance document (see Docket 

ID NRC–2015–0003) for public comment concurrent with the publication of this proposed 

rule and is seeking comments on whether the approaches described in the guidance are 

adequate or if further specification for inadvertent intruder scenarios in the proposed rule 

is necessary. (80 FR 16091)

Comment #2: I recommend that the definitions for intruder assessment and inadvertent intruder 

be clarified. Although including the text that the intruder assessment should consider only 

activities that are “realistic and consistent with expected activities in and around the disposal site 

at the time of site closure” is helpful, I would recommend adding further clarification in the 

inadvertent intruder definition to specify “reasonably foreseeable” pursuits. For full clarity, I 

recommend that the definition of “intruder assessment” more specifically state that consideration 

of the scenarios used originally in the development of Part 61 is sufficient to comply with the 

proposed requirements for intruder assessment, which confirms that those scenarios remain 

sufficient. I also believe the need for the phrase “resource exploration or exploitation” is not 

clear and thus I suggest it should be eliminated from the definition of “inadvertent intruder.” 

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2 ‘‘Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste,’’ DS154, IAEA, 2005, Section A.7.
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The NRC is seeking feedback on the proposed approach, especially with regard to whether 

a dose limit is needed for the long-term analyses or whether the proposed metric combined 

with barrier analyses is more appropriate. (80 FR 16092)

Comment #3: It is my view that a dose limit is not needed or appropriate for the extremely long 

timeframe addressed by the performance period. I do believe there is benefit in considering

potential impacts beyond the time when the results can be assigned quantitative meaning. Such 

an assessment can provide valuable information to guide waste acceptance criteria, design 

optimization, and defense-in-depth measures. I believe it is most appropriate during the 

performance period and the approach to use analytical results only qualitatively. I recommend 

that the protective assurance period be eliminated and that the performance period, with no 

quantitative dose criterion, begins immediately following the compliance period, at 1000 years 

after closure. The results from any performance period analyses after 1000 years should be 

viewed recognizing the increasingly speculative and uncertain nature of the results especially as 

the likelihood of catastrophic natural processes becomes high (e.g., ice ages). 

Due to the increasingly speculative nature of calculations over hundreds or thousands of years, a 

dose limit or goal for timeframes beyond 1,000 years is difficult to justify. Recommendations 

from a number of organizations, including the IAEA, NEA, ICRP, and ACNW tend to recognize 

the lack of credibility when trying to quantitatively interpreting modeling results for timeframes 

beyond even several hundred years. The proposed approach with no dose limit or target during 

the performance period is appropriate and reasonable. I also believe that it is not necessary to 

establish a requirement for a barrier analysis as a formal criterion. Such an analysis can help to 

better understand the relative roles of different components of a disposal system, but is not 

appropriate as a formal criterion.

The NRC is seeking feedback on the proposed approach, especially with regard to whether 

a 5 milliSievert (500 mrem) annual dose goal is appropriate for the protective assurance 

period and whether it is appropriate to consider alternative, higher levels based on 

technological and economic considerations. (80 FR 16098)

Comment #4: As stated above (see comment 1), I recommend that the protective assurance 

period be eliminated. I recommend that a two-tiered approach be adopted that retains the 

proposed 1000-year compliance period, eliminates the protective assurance period, and applies 

the qualitative performance period approach to modeling assessments beginning at 1000 years 

after closure.

However, if the protective assurance period is retained, I support the use of 500 mrem as a dose 

target or goal because it reflects, better than lower dose levels would, the uncertainty and 

speculative nature of calculations extending into extreme times beyond 1,000 years. A target 

dose of 500 mrem/yr is below the average annual dose for people living in the United States 

today (see NCRP Report 152) and is not inconsistent with risks considered acceptable resulting 

from radon exposure in residences. See more details in Comment #1.
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Is the proposed three-tiered approach (a compliance period, followed by a protective 

assurance period, followed by a performance period, if applicable) appropriate?

(80 FR 16106)

Comment #5: It is my opinion that a three-tiered approach is not appropriate. A two-tiered 

approach with a compliance period of 1,000 years is preferred. See comments 1 and 4 above for 

additional discussion. 

Is 500 mrem/yr an appropriate analytical threshold for the protective assurance period?

(80 FR 16106)

Comment #6: As described previously, I do not support a protective assurance period, but if such 

a period is retained, I support a 500 mrem/yr dose target or goal for the protective assurance 

period, recognizing the increasingly speculative nature of calculations over hundreds and 

thousands of years. This is also consistent with the fact that 500 mrem/yr is less than annual 

average exposures considered acceptable in the United States today (see NCRP Report 152). 

Should there be a quantitative goal or dose limit associated with the performance period 

analysis, and if so, what should that goal or dose limit be? (80 FR 16106)

Comment #7: As described in preceding comments, no quantitative goal or dose limit should be 

established for the performance period.

The NRC requests comment on the proposed rule with respect to the clarity and 

effectiveness of the language used. (80 FR 16114)

Comment #8: I believe the proposed rule language needs revision to improve its clarity and 

effectiveness, including removal of content that is better suited for guidance. A number of the 

updates proposed for the regulation are unnecessarily complex and difficult to understand in 

places. This appears largely related to trying to define considerations related to the protective 

assurance period and highlights the consequences of being too prescriptive and not fully 

embracing a performance based approach. The prescriptive approach leads to content in multiple 

sections using language more appropriate for guidance. Sections such as “concepts” are 

excessively detailed (with much information that would be more appropriately included in 

guidance) and contain some discussions that imply possible requirements; at the same time, the 

discussions omit clarifying details essential to bound the regulatory analyses and prevent 

unfettered discretion in implementation. The proposed regulation would require new analyses 

while retaining (and even adding to) detailed, directive criteria on aspects that would be 

addressed more appropriately in site-specific PA and intruder assessment analyses. 

Another source of confusion is that the proposed regulation would add new definitions for 

several terms, which do not follow well-established, internationally accepted concepts described 

clearly in published documentation. This leaves open questions about whether or not the NRC’s 

proposed definitions signify a meaningful departure from the accepted concepts, and for what 

reasons. I suggest that NRC be consistent with established definitions as much as possible. See 

more detail below.
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General Concerns (followed by specific comments)

Risk-informed approach

Comment #9: I agree with the NRC’s intention for the proposed changes to reflect a riskinformed approach to regulation of low-level waste disposal (See, e.g., 80 FR 16083, col. 1; 

16089, col. 3; 16091, col. 2. . .), but the proposed rule does not fully implement a risk-informed 

and performance-based approach. The proposed regulations would add numerous new 

requirements for site-specific analyses. However, the proposed regulations appear to not embrace 

the use of performance based site specific analyses to form the basis on which compliance is 

evaluated. 

The proposed rule appears to embrace a more prescriptive regulatory approach approach using

technology-based and generic (i.e., non-site-specific) requirements related to engineered 

components, stability, determination of analytical timeframes, and siting criteria, among others. 

Such prescriptive criteria are unnecessary and at odds with a truly risk-informed approach to 

regulation. As the NRC has stated, “the risk-informed, performance-based approach . . . 

eliminates arbitrary or prescriptive siting and design criteria, as well as detailed requirements 

such as quantitative subsystem performance objectives.” (See 66 FR 55737) A sound conceptual 

model of the site and a comprehensive performance assessment (PA) provide the means to assess 

the significance of site attributes, the components of the disposal system, their interactions, and 

their effects on performance. 

For a performance based approach, the emphasis should be on the use of site-specific analyses 

demonstrate a reasonable assurance of compliance with the dose limits or targets based on the 

relevant features of the site and facility (including those that may be beneficial as well as those 

that may be detrimental to performance). Numerous additional requirements and separate 

analyses that are implied in the proposed rule are merely burdensome without adding to 

protectiveness. For example, with site-specific analyses, the definition and table for “long-lived 

waste” are not needed and can be removed. Likewise, a separate, quantitative site stability 

analysis (as implied by the technical analysis mentioned in §§ 61.7(c)(1), 61.13(d) and 61.23(e) 

and as suggested in the Guidance) is not necessary; rather, the focus should be on whether the 

PA provides reasonable assurance that the performance objectives at §§ 61.41 and 61.42 will be 

met, taking account of the longevity of the hazard and site stability. I suggest that the NRC 

carefully review the proposed rule to eliminate extraneous prescriptive criteria and analyses that 

do not align with a risk-informed and performance-based approach.

Three-tiered approach to compliance over different timeframes

Comment #10: I recommend that a two-tiered approach be adopted that retains the proposed 

1000-year compliance period (and associated dose limit), eliminates the protective assurance 

period (and associated reference dose), and applies the qualitative performance period approach 

to modeling assessments beginning at 1000 years after closure. A two-tiered approach would 

provide important information about the performance implications of long-lived nuclides into the 
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very far future, while reducing the unnecessary complexity of the proposed rule and 

appropriately accommodating greatly increased uncertainties at very long timeframes.

I support the 1000-year timeframe and associated dose limit for the initial compliance period; the 

period appropriately limits speculation and reflects the limitations on how long performance 

assessment results for low-level waste disposal can reasonably be used in a quantitative manner 

to assess compliance. 

I also support the concept of considering analyses and intruder assessments over longer periods. 

There is value in considering, qualitatively, potential impacts beyond the time when the results 

can be assigned quantitative meaning with respect to potential health effects. Such an assessment 

can provide valuable information to guide waste acceptance criteria, design optimization, and 

defense-in-depth measures. I support, in principle, the performance period and the approach to 

use analytical results only qualitatively. Several changes are suggested to better align the 

proposed rule language with the declared intentions of the NRC; these are discussed in more 

detailed comments. 

However, the imposition of an intermediate “protective assurance” period (from 1000 to 10,000 

years after closure) with a numerical dose limit (as written) or dose target (as NRC apparently 

intended) does not appropriately accommodate the uncertainties and limitations of modeling over 

very long time frames. It establishes de facto requirements over very long timeframes without 

adding materially to an understanding of the relevant behavior of long-lived nuclides—depleted 

uranium, in particular.

• The IAEA says, for example, that for engineered near-surface disposal facilities, a modeling 

period on the order of “a few thousand years may still be reasonable.” (IAEA Safety Guide 

SSG-23, 2012) The ICRP observes that doses and risk “cannot be forecast with any certainty 

beyond around several hundreds of years into the future.”(ICRP-81) The NEA acknowledges 

that, “while some hazard may remain for extremely long times, increasing uncertainties mean 

that there are practical limitations as to how long anything meaningful can be said about the 

protection provided by any system against these hazards. These practical limitations need to 

be acknowledged in safety cases.” A 10,000-year period for quantitative assessment and 

comparison against a dose criterion for low-level disposal facilities goes well beyond these 

recommendations. 

• In addition, the NRC’s primary justification (as described in the “Technical Analysis 

Supporting Definition of Period of Performance for Low-Level Waste Disposal”) for a 

10,000-year “break-point” is consistency with regulatory precedents that relate solely to highlevel waste and deep geologic repositories. The characteristics of the waste and the 

predictability of the disposal systems both differ substantially from the context of nearsurface low-level waste disposal and therefore are not appropriate precedents. More relevant 

are existing regulations for materials and sites that are comparable to low-level waste; those 

regulations establish compliance periods of 1000 years, at most. (See 10 CFR Part 20.2002; 

10 CFR Part 40, Appendix A; 40 CFR Part 192.) The NRC’s own Advisory Committee on 

Nuclear Waste (ACNW) noted, regarding earlier staff proposals to impose a 10,000-year 
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period of performance, that the timeframe was “arbitrary and lacked bases in either standards 

or regulations.” 

• The ACNW further warned that assessments beyond an initial compliance tier should “be 

used to evaluate the robustness of the facility over long periods of time and should not 

become de facto regulation.” (See NRC Technical Analysis, pp. 1, 2.) As discussed in further 

detail in later comments, the proposed regulations would establish dose limits rather than 

goals—and, in fact, with greater stringency than for the compliance period. 

• The protective assurance period also is not necessary in view of intergenerational equity 

considerations to avoid “actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or 

catastrophic consequences” for future generations. (See “Technical Analysis Supporting 

Definition of Period of Performance,” p. 10.) The proposed compliance period alone is 

sufficient to satisfy that ethical obligation. That is, providing reasonable assurance that doses 

(which will be extremely localized) will be limited to 25 mrem/yr—much less than 

background radiation or routine medical exposures—for the next forty generations covered 

by a 1000-year compliance period goes well beyond averting “catastrophic consequences.” 

This is especially true considering that exposures from a disposal system, even in the 

extremely far future, would be localized and will be considered qualitatively.

I recommend, therefore, that the proposed requirements related to a protective assurance period 

be eliminated. Instead, the performance period (and the qualitative approach to further modeling) 

should begin at 1000 years after closure. 

New definitions

Comment #11: The proposed regulation includes some new definitions. Among these are several 

that are justified (in the Federal Register discussions) primarily on aligning the U.S. approach 

with those endorsed in international guidance: specifically, defense-in-depth, performance 

assessment and safety case. However, the proposed regulations do not use definitions that have 

been developed through consensus approaches, including participation from U.S. regulatory 

agencies. I believe that linking the concepts to international and national guidance, as applicable, 

is a reasonable approach. But this would be best accomplished by adopting the documented 

definitions that have been established for these terms. 

Uncertainty and limitations of PA over long time frames

Comment #12: The FR notice appropriately discusses the increasing uncertainties, and the 

decreasing confidence—and thus meaningfulness for quantitative decision-making—that can be 

placed in numerical analyses over longer time frames. (See, e.g., 80 FR 16091, col. 3.) As noted 

previously, such limitations on the use of PA are also well-recognized internationally by the 

IAEA, ICRP and OECD Nuclear Energy Agency. More generally, a performance assessment, 

even for several hundred years into the future, cannot be regarded as a “prediction” of future 

disposal system behavior. Rather, it is a hypothetical projection of possible behavior, based on 

reasonably conservative assumptions and simplifications. These concepts and limitations on PA 
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are acknowledged in some of the FR discussions, but are not well reflected in the regulatory 

language. 

I suggest that additional caveats and explanation be added in the concepts section and throughout 

the rule to appropriately reflect the issue with meaningfulness of speculative and uncertain 

results in the context of decision-making. The use of terms such as “ensure” protectiveness 

should be avoided. The regulatory language should instead be consistent with the concept of 

reasonable assurance.

Reasonable assurance

Comment #13: There is a need to define or clearly explain the term “reasonable assurance” in 

the context of the increasingly speculative nature of calculations over hundreds or thousands of 

years. Given the longer time frames that are associated with the proposed rule, there is a need to 

better describe the concept, especially compared to the expectations for operations of nuclear 

facilities.

Exclusion of radon

Comment #14: I believe that radon be excluded from the dose-based performance objectives. 

The inclusion of radon is significantly inconsistent with expectations applied to other EPA, NRC 

and DOE regulations that address management of uranium-containing materials ([e.g., 40 CFR 

Part 190.10, 40 CFR Part 61 (subpart H), 40 CFR Part 61.192 (subpart Q), 10 CFR Part 40 

(Appendix A, criterion 6), 10 CFR Part 20.1101(d), DOE Order 435.1]. The proposed 

performance objectives in Part 61 should be updated to be more consistent with other national 

requirements related to radon for wastes containing uranium. One of the main reasons for 

considering the update to Part 61 is to address DU, so modifications to the existing rule in the 

interest of consistency with other EPA and NRC regulations addressing uranium is appropriate. 

NRC should exclude uranium from the all pathways dose objective and also add a performance 

objective for radon flux, consistent with the approaches in other promulgated rules.

Concepts and Technical Analyses

Comment #15: These sections of the proposed rule include information that reflects a 

prescriptive rather than risk informed approach and is better suited for guidance. For example, 

the discussions in concepts on “intruder assessment,” “waste with significant concentrations and 

quantities of long-lived radionuclides,” defense-in-depth, and also the discussion of stability in 

the waste classification discussion do not appear necessary. The use of words such as “can,”

“may,” and “should” are indicators that statements are more appropriate for guidance rather than 

for a rule.

Long-term analyses

Comment #16: I am concerned about the messages that are implied by references to “long-term 

analysis” (e.g., 80 FR 16091) in the context of 10,000 years. This undermines the fact that for 

near surface disposal of radioactive waste, regulations consistently consider much longer time 
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frames than are considered for disposal of other wastes. Five hundred or 1,000 years are very 

long-term analyses and should be described as such. Statements that give the impression that 

analyses for 500 or 1,000 years are not considering long-term impacts are misleading and should 

be avoided and greater emphasis should be placed on how robust the approach has been, and is, 

for assessments to support safe disposal of radioactive waste. 

Closure terminology

Comment #17: The proposed regulation contains inconsistent use of the term “closure.” The 

definition of intruder assessment (proposed § 61.2), for example, refers to “the time of site 

closure.” The definition of compliance period refers to “closure of the disposal facility.” An 

existing definition for site closure and stabilization describes a set of actions rather than a point 

in time. The definition for the protective assurance period uses the terminology “following 

closure of the site.” There is similarly inconsistent usage throughout the rule, with various terms 

being used: closure, final closure, site closure, final site closure, time of site closure, site closure 

phase, disposal site closure, and closure of the land disposal facility. It is not clear if the terms 

are meant to be interchangeable or if the differences in terms carry significance. It is 

recommended to review and terminology and make it consistent as much as possible; where 

there are differences, the reasons should be made clear by context or explanation.

Specific Comments

§ 61.2, Compliance period definition

Comment #18: The definition for compliance period describes when it ends, but is unclear about 

when it begins. This leaves some ambiguity regarding whether the provision should be applied 

during the operational period. It is suggested that the definition be revised to clarify that the 

compliance period for the purposes of § 61.41 and § 61.42 begins at the time of closure of the 

disposal facility. I suggest that the cross-reference in § 61.43 (to § 61.41) be deleted, and either 

the salient requirements incorporated directly into § 61.43 or, given the existing cross-reference 

to Part 20, the requirements concerning effluents in § 20.1302 and § 20.1301 be used.

§ 61.2, Defense-in-depth definition

Comment #19: The definition of defense-in-depth does not reflect the accepted use of the term, 

either in the U.S. or internationally (e.g., in IAEA SSR-5 and the IAEA Safety Glossary) and is 

inconsistent with the preamble. As noted in the preamble, “The NRC’s defense-in-depth 

approach to risk management ensures that safety is not wholly dependent on any single element 

of the design, construction, maintenance or operation of a regulated facility. . . . Defense-indepth for a land disposal facility includes, but is not limited to, the use of remote siting, 

consideration of waste forms and radionuclide content, engineered features, and natural geologic 

features of the disposal site.” Other relevant features mentioned in the preamble are, for example, 

land ownership and institutional control requirements. (See 80 FR 16102, col. 2.) It is suggested 

that the definition be revised to reflect the broader consideration that are discussed in the 

preamble as well as in § 61.7(d).
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§ 61.2, Inadvertent intruder and intruder assessment definitions

Comment #20: I support the clarification that the intruder assessment should consider only 

activities that are “realistic and consistent with expected activities in and around the disposal site 

at the time of site closure.” Further, I note that NRC has stated that the approach used to develop 

the classification tables remains protective. I agree, and thus suggest that the use of scenarios 

similar to those considered in the development of Part 61 is sufficient to meet inadvertent 

intruder protection requirements. I suggest clarifying this approach in the definitions in the 

proposed rule. This is a reasonable approach to limit speculation regarding potential scenarios 

and emphasizes the continued protectiveness of the existing classification system. It also reduces 

the regulatory burden because there already exists considerable experience in implementing 

these scenarios. 

§ 61.2, Long-lived waste definition

Comment #21: I suggest that the definition of long-lived waste be deleted. The definition 

appears to imply a definition of a new class of waste, which is not necessary in a true risk 

informed, performance based approach. The appropriate basis to determine whether longer-term 

analysis is needed is the site-specific performance assessment rather than arbitrary numerical 

criteria using the tables for Class A waste. Note that implementation of a two tier approach with 

a compliance time of 1,000 years would remove the need for the prescriptive definition and 

table. See also comments on § 61.13(e).

§ 61.2, Performance assessment definition

Comment #22: The definition should include a consideration of associated uncertainties, as is 

done in the definition of intruder assessment, especially in view of the proposed requirement in 

§§ 61.13(a)(3), (a)(8) and (a)(9) to consider probabilities and uncertainties regarding various 

aspects of performance assessment including unlikely features, events and processes; variability 

in the disposal facility and environment; and alternative conceptual models. It is suggested to use 

language as consistent as possible with existing definitions (e.g., NCRP Report No. 152, p. 18, or 

IAEA SSG-23 on safety assessment) rather than developing a new definition.

The proposed definition also places unnecessary focus on the concept of features, events and 

processes (FEPs), which is at odds with other definitions that have been widely used (e.g., from 

the ICRP, the IAEA, and the NEA). By using this terminology, the proposed rule appears to be 

requiring a single methodology to achieve a conceptual site model, an approach that is 

inconsistent with recent positions from the international community. (See, e.g., the IAEA Safety 

Guide No SSG-23 on safety assessment and the OECD NEA Methods for Safety Assessment of 

Geological Disposal Facilities: Outcomes of the MeSA Initiative, 2012.) The use of an existing 

definition from one of these sources would resolve this issue as well.

Finally, the consideration of all FEPs (or whatever terminology is ultimately used)—namely, 

FEPS that “might affect the disposal system”—is too broad and could entail consideration of 

highly unlikely or fantastic events or combinations of events. Consideration should be limited to 
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“reasonably foreseeable and significant” FEPs or factors that are relevant to performance. See 

also the comments on §§ 61.13(a)(1) through (a)(5).

§ 61.2, Performance period definition

Comment #23: The proposed definition of the performance period specifies no end point and no 

criteria for establishing what period of time must be covered by analyses beyond 10,000 years. 

NRC makes clear that the period is left undefined in order to allow site-specific factors to be 

considered (80 FR 16097, col. 1) Additional discussion highlights that the time of peak dose 

would be a substantial consideration in determining how far into the future the modeling 

projections should run. (See ibid. and 80 FR 16092, col. 1) This is, in general, an approach that is 

consistent with a risk-informed process. It is not appropriate to imply there is no end to the 

potential time frame to be considered. NRC (in its “Technical Analysis Supporting Definition of 

Period of Performance”) rejects a peak dose approach with an undefined performance period, in 

part because “peak dose could occur beyond the period of geologic stability, which would render 

quantitative values essentially meaningless.” (p. 11) 

I recommend that, at a maximum, the performance period should not extend beyond peak dose 

(or impacts) or the period of near-surface geologic stability, whichever is sooner. I understand

that a significant motivator for the performance period is to gain information regarding long-term 

performance—but 1,000 years is very long-term performance. Modeling beyond 1,000 years 

should be conducted with the recognition of the growing speculation and uncertainty. At some 

time beyond 1,000 years, the loss of value of the information obtained from additional modeling 

as a quantitative basis for decisions needs to be acknowledged. The value of quantitative results 

for decisions will always be limited by whether site-specific characteristics dictate that it might 

be useful and there is a valid scientific and technical basis on which assessment may be founded. 

For near-surface disposal, the second condition is fulfilled only during the period of surface 

geologic stability, and this is the maximum amount of time that any assessments in the regulation 

should cover. As the NEA aptly noted, “while some hazard may remain for extremely long 

times, increasing uncertainties mean that there are practical limitations as to how long anything 

meaningful can be said about the protection provided by any system against these hazards. . . . 

These practical limitations need to be acknowledged in safety cases.”3

The NRC has already recognized, in its draft NUREG-2175 (p. 2-24) that it is necessary to 

establish an end point for the performance period; the essential criteria to do so belong in 

regulation, not in guidance. The definition of “performance period” should be revised, therefore, 

to clarify that the performance period extends until peak dose or impacts are reached or the 

period of surface geologic stability, whichever is sooner. This is consistent with the approach 

NRC presents in its draft guidance (NUREG-2175). Note that this approach does not exclude 

discussing what may happen beyond a performance period, but helps to maintain proper 

perspective regarding the utility of such speculation.

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3 NEA&2009&Timescales)Report,&p.&27.
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§ 61.2, Safety case definition

Comment #24: I support including the concept of the safety case in the proposed regulation, as it 

provides a fuller view of site and disposal system understanding, and provides a means to 

document and address the non-quantitative factors that can enhance confidence in safety. While 

these concepts have long been an implicit part of the licensing process, using the term safety case

emphasizes that the U.S. approach is in concert with international approaches. However, it is 

unclear why NRC staff have developed their own definition of safety case rather than using those 

established in international guidance (e.g., IAEA SSG-23, Paragraph 1.3). I suggest using a 

definition from existing publications.

§ 61.7(c)(4), Intruder assessment concept

Comment #25: The use of a strictly enforced dose limit as the performance objective for an 

inadvertent intruder assessment covering any period after closure is inconsistent with DOE and 

international positions regarding inadvertent intrusion. The general position internationally is 

that intruder assessments are hypothetical cases used to identify features that can help reduce the 

potential for and/or consequences of intrusion. That is, human intrusion analyses are used as a 

tool to assist in optimization of the disposal facility design. The IAEA safety standards, for 

example, recommend no limits regarding human intrusion, but instead offer guidelines for what 

doses may warrant efforts to reduce the probability or consequences of intrusion. (See IAEA 

SSG-5, para. 2.15.) The ICRP similarly recommends no dose constraint for human intrusion, 

saying that a constraint “is not applicable in evaluating the significance of human intrusion 

because, by definition, intrusion will have bypassed the barriers which were considered in 

optimization of protection for the disposal facility . . . any protective actions required should be 

considered during the development of the disposal facility.” The ICRP considered that 

“reasonable efforts should be made to reduce the probability of human intrusion or to limit its 

consequences” when doses exceed 100 mSv.” (See ICRP-81, paragraphs 63-64). 

I recommend that the dose limit for intruder protection be recast as a goal that is used to develop 

waste acceptance criteria and demonstrate added robustness of the disposal approach. If this is 

not done, then I recommend that additional clarifying discussion be provided in the concepts 

section to include the points mentioned above. See also comments on § 61.42(a).

§ 61.7(c)(6), Waste with significant concentrations of long-lived radionuclides

Comment #26: In a risk-informed approach, a site-specific analysis will inherently address 

whether the proposed waste inventory poses longer term hazards or not and, thus, whether 

analyses will need to address longer time frames. The site-specific analyses required over the 

compliance period and beyond, in themselves, constitute a case-by-case evaluation that provides 

the basis for determining whether relevant performance aspects (such as time of peak dose) have 

been adequately captured. This is true regardless of what characteristics (longevity, mobility, 

etc.) contribute to the need for longer-term assessment. The specificity defining and categorizing 

“long-lived waste” is unnecessary and the concept should be deleted from the rule.
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

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§ 61.7(d), Defense-in-depth

Comment #27: The discussion of defense-in-depth, while broader than the proposed definition 

in § 61.2, does not reflect the accepted use of the term, either in the U.S. or internationally (e.g., 

in IAEA SSR-5 and the IAEA Safety Glossary) and is inconsistent with the preamble. As noted 

in the preamble, “The NRC’s defense-in-depth approach to risk management ensures that safety 

is not wholly dependent on any single element of the design, construction, maintenance or 

operation of a regulated facility. . . . Defense-in-depth for a land disposal facility includes, but is 

not limited to, the use of remote siting, consideration of waste forms and radionuclide content, 

engineered features, and natural geologic features of the disposal site.” Other relevant features 

mentioned in the preamble are, for example, land ownership and institutional control 

requirements. (See 80 FR 16102, col. 2.) The more inclusive view of defense-in-depth, including 

administrative and operational controls, should be included in the discussion of the concept.

§ 61.7(f), Waste classification and stability

Comment #28: The emphasis on details related to “long term” stability is not needed. Stability is 

important for the several hundred year time frame assumed for the classification system (e.g., 

assumptions for the classification tables), but over many hundreds or thousands of years, stability 

as a criterion, becomes less meaningful for assessing level of protectiveness. If the site-specific 

PA demonstrates that performance objectives can be met with reasonable assurance for extreme 

time frames (e.g., thousands of years or more), even if there are increases in infiltration or other 

changes in the system, then “stability” as a separate and specific criterion is not needed. In 

addition, such requirements may be very difficult to meet, but at the same time may have little 

impact on the protection of human health (e.g., calculated dose). In a performance-based 

approach, the performance assessment is the appropriate means to account for the relevance of 

factors such as this. It is recommended that the discussion of stability in this section be deleted; if 

it is kept, no changes from the existing rule language in § 61.7 are necessary and, in the interest 

of reducing complexity and confusion, the existing language in the current rule should be 

retained. See also comments on §§ 61.13(d) and 61.51.

§ 61.13, Application to existing facilities

Comment #29: The preamble to the proposed regulations (at page 16088) states that the 

proposed rule would become effective 1 year after the final rule is published for NRC licensees, 

and that Agreement States would have 3 years to adopt compatible provisions. In turn, the 

proposed regulatory language for § 61.13 and in § 61.58(d) would require existing licensees to 

conduct various additional technical analyses and apply new waste acceptance provisions at the 

next license renewal or within 5 years of the effective date of the proposed new requirements, 

whichever comes first. In contrast to both approaches, the existing general provisions in Subpart 

A (§ 61.1(a))—which would not be amended by the proposed regulation— state that 

applicability of requirements in Part 61 to existing licensees “will be determined on a case-bycase basis.” I recommend conforming revision to § 61.1(a) and, as necessary, the final preamble 

to the regulations, so that the provisions are consistent with each other. Given the numerous new 

provisions and new analysis that would be required by the regulations, it seems more appropriate 
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

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to delay application of the proposed regulations until a reasonable time in the future, with an 

emphasis on new waste streams and new operations. 

§§ 61.13(a)(1) to (a)(5), Technical analyses (FEPs consideration)

Comment #30: The focus on the term “features, events and processes” does not align well with 

more recent international best practice, in which approaches based on “safety functions” have 

emerged. (See, for example, http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwm/reports/2012/nea6923-MESAinitiative.pdf) It is recommended that the rule be revised to reinforce and place more emphasis on 

the more current approaches for scenario development involving the use of safety functions, 

either through revisions to this section or with additional discussion added in the concepts 

section. 

If the protective assurance period is retained (which I do not support), the approach to the 

identification of relevant FEPs in performance assessment beyond the compliance period seems 

reasonable (i.e., FEPs applicable in the compliance period (up to 1000 years) be extended and 

that new FEPs be added only if scientific information compelling such changes is available (See 

80 FR 16090, col. 1.)). However, the proposed regulatory language may require revision to 

properly reflect the stated intention. To this end, § 61.13(a)(1) should be revised to more clearly 

apply to the compliance period performance assessment, as in “Consider features, events and 

processes that might affect compliance with § 61.41(a).” 

It is not clear why a separate requirement is provided [in § 61.13(a)(5)] regarding degradation or 

alteration processes. The requirement in § 61.13(a)(1) already requires a technical basis for 

inclusion or exclusion of all FEPs, so the provisions on degradation are redundant. I suggest that 

the proposed § 61.13(a)(5) be deleted.

§ 61.13(a)(10), Roles of natural and engineered features

Comment #31: I do not understand the purpose for the requirement to “identify and differentiate 

between the roles performed by the natural disposal site characteristics and design features of the 

disposal facility.” The relevant aspects of both the site and the engineered features, as well the 

interactions between them, are appropriately captured by requirements to consider relevant FEPs.

Prescriptively requiring further analyses seems to imply redundant requirements. Further, it is 

not clear what value is added to risk-informed decision-making and licensing, while at the same 

time adding to potential confusion, especially since it implies the possibility of sub-system 

requirements. I suggest that this paragraph be deleted.

§ 61.13(b), Inadvertent intruder analyses

Comment #32: The description of the inadvertent intruder analyses is confusing and inconsistent 

with the definition proposed for an intruder assessment in § 61.2. The “analyses” appear to 

include additional requirements beyond the assessment, as described in §§ 61.13(b)(1) to 

61.13(b)(2). However, the required information is vague and adds little apparent value to riskinformed decision making and thus does not appear necessary in the proposed rule. I&

recommend&removing this detail from the rule. 
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

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§ 61.13(d), Long-term stability

Comment #33: The proposed rule retains an existing requirement to analyze long-term stability 

of the disposal site, with slight changes to the language. However, the implications of this 

requirement are very different from the original intent of the rule, when applied over timeframes 

of thousands to tens of thousands of years that are addressed in the proposed rule. It is not 

possible for extreme time frames (thousands of years or more) that long-term stability of the site 

“can be ensured,” as the revised language now states. Furthermore, the requirement is 

superfluous in view of the risk informed, performance based approach advocated in the new rule.

In a risk-informed, performance-based approach, the site specific analysis is the appropriate 

means to account for the relevance of factors such as this. If performance objectives can be 

demonstrated to be met with reasonable assurance for extreme time frames (e.g., thousands of 

years or more), even if there are increases in infiltration or other stability-related changes, then 

“stability” as a separate and specific criterion is not needed. A requirement on long-term 

stability may be very difficult to meet, and at the same time may have little impact on the 

protection of human health (e.g., dose calculation). It is recommended that the requirement for a 

separate analysis of site stability be deleted. If the provision is retained, the proposed language 

that stability “can be ensured” should be dropped, and the analysis should extend no longer than 

the compliance period. See also comments on § 61.44.

§ 61.13(e), Potential long-term radiological impacts (Table A)

Comment #34: The proposed provisions require analyses over the performance period (i.e., 

beyond 10,000 years after closure) “for disposal sites with waste that contains radionuclides with 

the average concentrations exceeding the values listed in Table A of this paragraph, or if 

necessitated by site-specific conditions.” Several changes from the proposal are suggested to 

enhance the technical basis and better align it with the intent to use site specific performance 

analyses:

• Table A should be eliminated. The technical basis described for the derivation of the 

concentrations is limited and unclear. The preamble states that the values are “primarily, but 

not solely, based on the Class A LLRW concentration values” (80 FR 16097, col. 1), but 

does not explain why the Class A limits are an appropriate indicator or technical basis to 

determine the need for analyses beyond 10,000 years. There is no justification for defining 

hazards over extreme time frames based on the Class A limits, since such time frames were 

not considered in developing those limits. Furthermore, Table A may be rendered moot by 

the clause regarding “site-specific conditions,” where the table alone will not be 

determinative of whether a longer-term analysis is needed. Given this, the results of sitespecific analyses already required for the compliance and protective assurance period should 

be used to determine whether it is appropriate to conduct longer-term analyses. This 

approach is technically supportable and better aligns with the declared intent to establish a 

risk informed, performance-based approach using site-specific analysis.

• To establish clear expectations on the part of licensees, further explanation should be 

provided on what “site-specific conditions” might necessitate performance period analyses
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

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(e.g., results of site specific analyses). The preamble discussion on timeframes (80 FR 

16093 et seq.) makes clear that the peak dose, including potential in-growth of progeny 

(from uranium, in particular) is a central consideration, and this could provide an appropriate 

basis for delineating the need for analysis extending into the extremely far future. I

recommend that the site-specific analysis be used to determine the appropriate duration to be 

considered.

• As noted in my general comments, I recommend that the protective assurance period be 

eliminated. 

Therefore, it is suggested that § 61.13(e) be revised to read, “The time period required to be 

considered shall be determined based on site-specific conditions addressed in the PA. 

Performance period calculations shall be performed if the analyses for compliance period in 

§§ 61.41(a) and 61.42(a) indicate that peak doses have not been attained (i.e. doses are stable or 

rising) at 1000 years, including consideration of the in-growth of progeny from the intended 

waste streams.”

§ 61.13(f), Defense-in-depth

Comment #35: The basis for the need to conduct a defense in depth analysis is not clear. This 

effort should be focused on documenting the contributors to defense-in-depth rather than a 

quantitative analysis. As noted earlier, the accepted use of the term (and NRC’s own discussions 

of it in the preamble to, and other sections of, this proposed rule) encompass siting and 

operational aspects. Furthermore, as NRC observes, “The capabilities of any of those design 

features and site characteristics may not be either independent or totally redundant. . . . The 

capabilities of site characteristics and engineered features over the long timeframes are subject to 

interpretation and include many uncertainties. . . . Therefore, the NRC expects that licensees will 

rely on both the characteristics and the engineered features, in combination, to provide 

reasonable assurance that the overall performance of the disposal site will be adequate over long 

time periods.” (80 FR 16092) The function of the various engineered and natural barriers, and 

their interactions, is required to be accounted for in the performance assessment. As NRC has 

observed in other regulations related to radioactive waste disposal, “a complete performance 

assessment . . . will illustrate the effectiveness of the multiple barriers, and the implementation of 

the philosophy of defense in depth, such that the individual protection standard is shown to be 

met even when barriers are challenged. . . . The Commission is confident that evidence for the 

resilience, or lack of resilience, of a multiple-barrier system will be found by examining a 

comprehensive and properly documented performance assessment of the behavior of the overall 

repository system.” (See 66 FR 55759.)

Further quantitative assessment, as implied by the term “analyses,” of redundancy over long time 

frames is likely to be highly uncertain and difficult to interpret—and ignores many other 

important facets of defense-in-depth. To address these concerns, it is suggested that the language 

in § 61.13(f) be revised to read, “A description of defense-in-depth measures applied at the 

proposed disposal facility, and discussion of the means by which they provide passive safety, 

provide redundancy, or enhance confidence in the safety case and long-term performance.”
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

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§ 61.41(a), Protection of the general population

Comment #36: No definition is provided for “any member of the public.” The requirement 

should be restricted to a representative member of the public located in the general environment 

(i.e., outside the boundaries of the disposal system, including the buffer zone) of the disposal 

facility. Such an approach is also consistent with the application of updated dosimetry methods 

that would be allowed by the proposed changes. More recent ICRP guidance discusses the 

applicability of limits and constraints to a “representative person.” (See ICRP 103, 

Section 5.4.2.). Since one intent of the update to Part 61 is to address new dosimetry, a change to 

consider the concept of a representative person seems to be reasonable as well.

§ 61.41(b), Protection of the general population during the protective assurance period

Comment #37: As noted in my general comments, I recommend that the protective assurance 

period be deleted, and that the performance period be designated to begin at 1000 years after 

closure. Accordingly, I recommend that the proposed provisions of § 61.41(b) be eliminated.

If the protective assurance period and the associated analyses are retained, then several important 

changes and clarifications should be made to align the provision with NRC’s stated intentions. 

• The requirement to “minimize” releases of radioactivity for the protective assurance period 

is inappropriately stringent and does not seem to reflect the intention of the NRC. The 

preamble discussion states that “The protective assurance analyses are being proposed as a 

minimization process (i.e., optimization) with guidance provided on the goals to use in the 

minimization process.” (80 FR 16089, col. 3) The term minimize does not properly reflect 

the multi-faceted optimization process, which entails consideration of numerous factors; 

indeed, “minimize” as used in the proposed regulatory language can be interpreted as being 

more stringent than the ALARA requirement applied to the compliance period, since it does 

not clearly allow for consideration of what is feasible or reasonable. 

• Furthermore, proposed § 61.41(b), as written, does not set forth “goals,” but rather imposes

requirements. As such, it is not consistent with the Commission's direction in its February 

12, 2014 Memorandum, which calls for a “goal of keeping doses below a 500 mrem/yr 

threshold.” NRC expresses its intention that the dose level for the protective assurance 

period should function as “a goal rather than a limit.” (80 FR 16097, col. 3) While this 

intention is reflected in the language allowing “a level that is supported as reasonably 

achievable,” the requirement to minimize releases adds confusion. 

• No definition is provided for the “general environment.” A definition should be added, here 

or in § 61.2, to clarify that the general environment means that area outside the boundaries 

of the disposal system and its buffer zone. 

In order to better align the regulatory language with the stated intentions of the NRC for the 

protective assurance period, it is suggested that the following alternative language be used:
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Efforts shall be made to reduce releases to a level that is reasonably achievable based on 

technical and economic considerations, provided that licensees shall be presumed to meet 

this goal if the annual dose does not exceed a dose target of 5 milliSieverts (500 millirem). 

Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that meet the 

requirements specified in § 61.13(a).

§§ 61.41(a)-(b), Protection of the general population 

Comment #38: The treatment of radon should be consistent with that in other rules that address 

Uranium from the NRC and other U.S. regulatory agencies. Radon should be specifically 

excluded from consideration in assessing compliance with the dose limits and targets in these 

sections. A separate radon performance objective (e.g., a flux limit) would be consistent with 

other NRC, EPA, and DOE rules [e.g., 40 CFR Part 190.10, 40 CFR Part 61 (subpart H), 40 CFR 

Part 61.192 (subpart Q), 10 CFR Part 40 (Appendix A, criterion 6), 10 CFR Part 20.1101(d), 

DOE Order 435.1]. A major factor in the update to Part 61 is to address DU, so consistency with 

other national regulations addressing uranium is appropriate. NRC should address radon using a 

performance objective for radon flux similar to other existing rules.

§ 61.41(c), Protection of the general population during the performance period

Comment #39: As noted in my general comments, I support the concept of a performance 

period, for which the potential impacts beyond 1000 years are considered qualitatively to inform 

site understanding and contribute to optimization of design. I recommend that the performance 

period begin at 1000 years after closure, directly following the compliance period. Whether or 

not this change to the performance period timeframe is made, the use of the term “minimize” is 

not appropriate in the requirements for the performance period. The term “minimize” does not 

properly reflect the multi-faceted optimization process, which entails consideration of numerous 

factors; indeed, “minimize” as used in the proposed regulatory language can be interpreted as 

being more stringent than the ALARA requirement applied to the compliance period, since it 

does not clearly allow for consideration of what is feasible or reasonable. It is suggested that the 

language be revised to read, “Effort shall be made to reduce releases of radioactivity . . . .”

§ 61.42(a), Protection of inadvertent intruders during the compliance period

Comment #40: The application of a dose limit for an inadvertent intruder assessment covering 

any period after closure is inconsistent with international positions regarding inadvertent 

intrusion. The general position internationally is that intruder assessments are hypothetical cases 

used to identify features that can help reduce the potential for and/or consequences of intrusion. 

That is, human intrusion analyses are used as a tool to assist in optimization of the disposal 

facility design. The IAEA safety standards, for example, recommend no limits regarding human 

intrusion, but instead offer guidelines for what doses may warrant additional optimization: for 

annual doses in the range of 1-20 mSv (100 mrem-2 rem), “reasonable efforts are warranted at 

the stage of development of the facility to reduce the probability of intrusion or to limit its 

consequences.” (See IAEA SSG-5, para. 2.15.) The ICRP similarly declined to recommend a 

dose constraint for human intrusion, saying that a constraint “is not applicable in evaluating the 

significance of human intrusion because, by definition, intrusion will have bypassed the barriers 
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

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which were considered in optimization of protection for the disposal facility. . . any protective 

actions required should be considered during the development of the disposal facility” (i.e., in 

optimization). The ICRP considered that “reasonable efforts should be made to reduce the 

probability of human intrusion or to limit its consequences” when doses exceed 100 mSv. (See 

ICRP-81, paragraphs 63-64). I recommend that the 500 mrem dose limit for intruder protection 

during the compliance period be recast as a goal that is used to develop waste acceptance criteria 

and to demonstrate added robustness of the disposal approach. Corresponding changes are also 

needed in § 61.13(b)(3) to reflect that dose-based performance objectives in § 61.42 are goals (or 

guidelines) and not strict dose limits. See also comments on § 61.7(c)(4).

The requirement that the disposal facility must “ensure” protection is an overstatement of what 

can be demonstrated in performance assessment projections for even the compliance time period. 

The language should be revised to more accurately reflect the reasonable assurance concept 

(which is applied through the proposed provision at § 61.23(b)), to read, “Design, operation and 

closure of the land disposal facility must provide protection of an inadvertent intruder . . . .”

§§ 61.42(a)-(b), Protection of inadvertent intruders during the compliance and protective 

assurance periods

Comment #41: The treatment of radon should be consistent with that in other rules addressing 

Uranium from the NRC and other U.S. regulatory agencies. That is, radon should be specifically 

excluded from consideration in assessing compliance with the dose limits and targets in these 

sections. Instead, NRC should develop a separate radon performance objective consistent with 

other NRC, EPA, and DOE rules (e.g., the flux limit). All agencies that address uranium related 

wastes that lead to radon generation exclude radon from all pathways and treat it separately [e.g., 

40 CFR Part 190.10, 40 CFR Part 61 (subpart H), 40 CFR Part 61.192 (subpart Q), 10 CFR Part 

40 (Appendix A, criterion 6) 10 CFR Part 20.1101(d)], all of which specifically exclude radon in 

the air/all pathways objectives]. A major factor in the update to Part 61 is to address DU, so 

consistency with other EPA and NRC regulations addressing uranium is appropriate. 

§ 61.42(b), Protection of inadvertent intruders during the protective assurance period

Comment #42: As noted in my general comments, I recommend that the protective assurance 

period be deleted, and that the performance period be designated to begin at 1000 years after 

closure. Accordingly, I recommend that the proposed provisions of § 61.42(b) be eliminated.

If the protective assurance period and the associated analyses are retained, then important 

changes and clarifications should be made to align the provision with NRC’s stated intentions. 

The use of the term “minimize” is problematic in this context, as discussed regarding the 

requirements for protection of the general public for the protective assurance period. (See 

comments on § 61.41(b).) For the same reasons, it is suggested to revise the requirement to read:

Reasonable and practicable measures shall be taken in the design, operation and closure of 

the land disposal facility to control exposures to an inadvertent intruder during the protective 

assurance period. Efforts shall the made to reduce releases to a level that is reasonably 
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

Page&20 of&21

achievable based on technical and economic considerations, provided that licensees shall be 

presumed to meet this goal if the annual dose does not exceed a dose target of 5 milliSieverts 

(500 millirem). Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the requirements specified in § 61.13(b).

Corresponding changes are also needed in § 61.13 to reflect the NRC’s stated intention that the 

reference dose is intended as a target and not a limit. In paragraph 61.13(b)(3), the phrase “doses 

that exceed the limits set forth in § 61.42” should be revised to reflect that dose-based 

performance objective in § 61.42(a) (see preceding comment) and § 61.42(b) are goals (or 

guidelines) and not strict dose limits. 

§ 61.42(c), Protection of inadvertent intruders during the performance period

Comment #43: The use of the term “minimize” is problematic in this context, as discussed 

regarding the requirements for protection of the general public for the performance period

(§ 61.41(c)). For the same reasons, it is suggested to revise the requirement to read: “Efforts shall 

be made to reduce exposures to an inadvertent intruder . . . .”

§ 61.44, Stability of the site after closure

Comment #44: The proposal retains an existing requirement regarding stability of the site after 

closure, with proposed wording that extends the requirement to cover the compliance period and 

the protective assurance period. As noted in my general comments, I recommend that the 

protective assurance period be eliminated. Whether or not this is done, the extension of the 

existing requirements to extremely long time frames—out to ten thousand years—is unjustified 

and burdensome. The value in separate requirements for site stability over thousands of years is 

questionable. More importantly, in a performance-based approach, the performance assessment 

is the appropriate means to account for the relevance of factors such as this. If performance 

objectives can be demonstrated to be met with reasonable assurance for extreme time frames 

(e.g., thousands of years or more), even if there are increases in infiltration, then “stability” as a 

separate and specific criterion or performance objective is not needed. A requirement on longterm stability may be very difficult to meet, and at the same time may have little impact on the 

protection of human health (e.g., dose calculation). 

It is recommended that this performance objective be deleted. If it is retained, the language 

should reflect that the requirement is relevant for only a limited, reasonable period of time 

following closure. I suggest that it could be appropriate to demonstrate stability for the period of 

time over which Class B and Class C wastes forms are expected to endure (as discussed in the 

proposed concepts in § 61.7(f)), in order to support continued use of the classification tables. 

Another period may be justifiable, but in no case should stability be evaluated separately beyond 

the compliance period (i.e., 1000 years). The language should also be modified to require that 

measures “eliminate to the extent practicable the need for ongoing active maintenance of the 

disposal site during the institutional control period so that only surveillance, monitoring, or 

minor custodial care are required.” See also comments on §§ 61.7(f) and 61.13(d).
Roger&Seitz&Comments&7/24/2015

Page&21 of&21

§ 61.50 (a)(2), Site suitability for near-surface disposal

Comment #45: The value of the enhanced specific requirements for site-suitability is 

questionable, and this section is unduly prescriptive and detailed for a performance based 

approach. More importantly, while such provisions were meaningful complementary 

requirements to the table-based classification approach, such criteria are unnecessary and at odds 

with a truly risk-informed approach to regulation. As the NRC has stated, “the risk-informed, 

performance-based approach . . . eliminates arbitrary or prescriptive siting and design criteria, as 

well as detailed requirements such as quantitative subsystem performance objectives.” (See 66 

FR 55737) A sound conceptual model of the site and a comprehensive performance assessment 

(PA) provide the means to assess the significance of site attributes. In a performance-based 

approach, the appropriate method to evaluate the site suitability is the site-specific performance 

assessment. Performance-relevant site characteristics and associated disruptive events (and 

uncertainties) must be considered (as is required already by other parts of the proposed 

regulations); if the performance objectives can be shown to be met with reasonable assurance, 

then additional criteria are not necessary. Such restrictions may eliminate potentially viable sites 

without adding public protection. It is recommended that the detailed site suitability criteria in § 

61.13(a)(s) be eliminated to reflect the implementation of a performance-based approach.

§ 61.58, Waste acceptance criteria exceptions

Comment #46: NRC’s proposed approach allows that the WAC may be established based on 

site-specific analyses that account for the site and facility performance, or based on the preexisting classification tables. Once the WAC is established, the provisions of § 61.52(12) 

prohibit the disposal of any waste that does not meet the acceptance criteria. According to the 

proposed rule, any adjustments to the WAC would require a license modification [§ 61.58(g)].

There is no provision for considering exceptions from the WAC. Under the proposed regulation, 

a license amendment would be required in order to accept waste with characteristics that were 

not addressed in the PA and WAC. However, as NRC acknowledges throughout its regulatory 

discussion, small amounts of waste falling outside the PA assumptions (i.e., small amounts of 

DU or other long-lived waste) may be accommodated in a disposal facility without affecting its 

protectiveness. Given this, it would be useful to provide a means for exceptions by a less onerous 

method than submitting a license amendment. An appropriate mechanism might be by special 

analyses as a supplement to the PA that would be reviewed by the regulator, which shows 

reasonable assurance that the performance objectives can still be met. Alternatively, NRC may 

consider an alternative approach that does not incorporate the WAC directly in the license.
Jul 241512 02p Christopher Forinash 

Secretary 

Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

July 23, 2015 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatmy Comnussion 

Washington, DC 20555 

ATlN: Rulemakings and A~judicalion Staff 

Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

To Whom It May Concern: 

703 9080796 p.1 

The enclosed document provides comments from the U.S. Department of Energy, O!Jlce of 

Envirom11ental Management. on the proposed rule (published on March 26 at 80 FR J 6082) for 

revisions to I 0 CFR Part 61, Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal. 

Enclosure 

Sincerely, 

'~~bt/lh., ' i fr/~-- ,11,{ (} .... ,, __ _ ' Frank Marcinowski 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for 

Waste Management 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608162
Jul 24 15 12 02p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p2 

"Cnclosurc 

Department of Energy's Comments on 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Proposed Rule: 10 CFR Part 61. 

Puhlished March 26, 2015 

Department of Energy's Comments - General Issues 

Risk-informed approach 

We agree with the Nuclear Regulatory Cornmiss1on's (:\JRC) intention for the proposed changes 

to reflect a risk-informed approach to regulation of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) disposal 

(See. e.g, 80 FR 16083, col. 1; 16089, col. 3; 1609;, col. 2 ... ), but the proposed rule does not 

fully implement a risk-informed and performance-based approach. TIH; proposed regulations 

would add numerous new requirements for site-specific analyses. However, the proposed 

regulations would not allow these analyses to form the basis on which compliance is evaluated. 

Instead, the proposed rule retains vestiges of a mandatory, non-site-specific approach, which 

preserves-· and, in fact, adds to- ·technology~based and generic (i.e., non-site-specific) 

requirements related to engineered components, stability, determination of analytical timcframes. 

and siting criteria, among others. Such criteria are mmecessary and at odds with a truly 

risk-mforrncd approach to regulation. As the ~RC has stated, ''the risk-informed, 

performance~based approach ... eliminates arbitrary or prescriptive siting and design criteria. as 

well as detailed requirements such as quantita:ive subsystem performance objectives" (66 FR 

55737). A sound conceptual model of the site and a comprehensive performance assessment 

(PA) provide the means to assess the significance of site <ittributes, the components of the 

disposal system, their interactions, and their effects on performance. Again, as NRC has 

observed. "advance::. in pl:rfo1mancc assessment technology support the use ofpcrfonnuncc 

assessment results fo1 estimating long-term repository performance. They also obviate, m the 

C:ommis.;;ion's view. the need to prescribe arbitrary, minimum performance standards for 

subsystems to build confidence in the system's overall performance" (66 FR 55758). While 

these observations vverc made in the context of regulations for the Yucca Moun tam repository, 

the cor:clusions were based on high-level regulatory approaches and technological cvolutionnot site-specific considerations-and therefore the reasoning is equally applicable to this 

rulcmaking. 

Thus, it should be sufficient that the PA and other site-specific analyses demonstrate a 

reasonable as~urance of compliance with the dose limits or targets--considc1 ing the relevant 

features of the site and facility (including those that may be beneficial as well as those that may 

be detrimental to performance). Numerous additior.al requirements and separate analyses arc 

merely burdensome without adding to protectiveness. For example, with site-specific analyses, 

the definition and lable for "long-lived waste .. arc not needed and can be removed. Likewise, a 

separate, quantitative site c;tahility analysis (as implied by the technical analysis mentioned in 

§§ 6 l.7(c)( l ), 6 l.13(d) and 61.23(c) and as sugges1cd in the Guidance) i~ not necessmy; rather, 
Jul 24 15 12·03p Chri~opherForinash 703 9080796 p3 

the focus should be on whether the PA provides reasonable assurance Lhat the perforrnance 

objectives at §§ 61.4 l and 61.42 will be met, taking account of site stability. We note specific 

instances where requirements should be deleted, and we also suggest that NRC carefully review 

the proposed rule to eliminate extraneous criteria o.nd analyses that do not align with a risk. 

informed and performance-based approach. 

Three-tiered approach to compliance over different timeframes 

We do not support tbe proposal for a three-tiered approach to compliance. We recommend that a 

two-tiered approach be adopted that retains the proposed 1,000-year compliance period (and 

associated dose limit), e]iminates the protective assurance period (and associated reference dose), 

and applies the qualitative performance period approach to modeling assessments beginnir.g at 

1,000 years after closure. A two-tiered approacl~ would provide important information about the 

pcrfor:11ance implications of long-lived nuclides into the very far future, while reducing the 

unnecessary complexity of the proposed rule and appropriately accommodating greatly increased 

uncertainties at very long timeframes. 

We endorse the 1,000-year timcframe and associated dose limit for the initial compliance period; 

the period apprnpriatc!y limits speculation and reflects the limitations on how long performance 

assessment results for low-level radioactive waste disposal can reasonably be used in a 

quantitatn'c manner to assess compliance. 

We also support the concept of extending perfom1ance analyses and intruder assessments over 

longe1 periods. There is value in considering, qualitatively, the results of modeling beyond the 

time when the results can be assigned quantitative meaning with respect to potential health 

effects. Such an assessment can provide valuable information to guide waste acceptance criteria. 

design optirrnzation, and defense-in-depth measures. We support, in principle, the performance 

period and the approach to use analytical results only qualitatively. Several changes are 

suggested to better align the proposed rule language vvith the declared intentions of NRC; these 

are discussed in more detailed comments. 

I lowever. the imposition of an intermediate "protective assurance·' period (from 1,000 to 

! 0,000 years after closure) with a numerical dose limit (as written) or close target (as ~RC 

apparently intended) does not appropriately accommodate the ur.certainties and limitat10ns of 

modeling over very long tuncframcs, ft establishes de fc1cto requirement~ over very long 

timcframcs without adding materially to an unden;tan<lmg of the relevant behavior of long-lived 

nuclides and does not provide additional protectiveness to members of the public or to the 

hypothetical inadvertent intruder: 

@ The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) says, for example, that for engineered 

near-surface disposal facilities, a modeling period on the order of"a fow 1,000 years may still 

be reasonable" (IAE/\ Safety Guide SSG-23, 2012). The International Commission on 

Radiological Protection (ICRP) obse:·vcs that doses and risk "cannot be forecast with any 

ccrtam~y beyond around several hundreds of years into the tuturc" (ICRP-81 ). The 

Organization for Economic Coopetation and Development's (OECD) Nuclear Energy 

Agency (NEA) acbowlcdges that. ''While some hazard may remain for extremely long 

DOE Comments' Proposed 10 CF!? Part 61 
Jul 241512·03p Chri~opherFonnash 703 9080796 p4 

tnncs, mcreasing uncertainties mean that there arc practical limitation~ as to how long 

anything meaningful can be said about the protection provided by any system against these 

h1mird."i. These practical limitations need to be acknowledged in .~aFety cases." NEA further 

states. regard mg the application of quantitative criteria at J .000 to J 0,000 years and beyond. 

that it i~ "recognized in regu1ations and safety cases that the actuai 1eve\s of dose and risk. if 

any, to which future generations are exposed cannot be forecast with certainty over such time 

frames'" .

1 A 10,000-ycar period for quantitative assessment and comparison against a dose 

criterion for low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities goes well beyond these 

rcco111mendat10ns. 

e In addition, NRCs primary justification (as dcscnbcd in the 'Technical Analysis Supporting 

Definition of Period of Performance for Low-Level Wm.tc Disposal") for a l 0,000-ycar 

"break-point'" is consistency with regulatory precedents that relate solely to 

high-level waste and deep geologic repositories. 111e charactenstics of the waste and the 

predictability of the disposal systems both differ substantially from the context of 

near-surface low-level radioactive waste disposal and therefore arc not appropriate 

precedents More relevant arc existing regulat10ns for materials and sites that are comparable 

to low-level waste; those regulations establish compliance periods of l .000 years, at most 

(See 10 CFR Part 20.2002, l 0 CFR Part 40. Appendix A; 40 CFR Part 192 ) NRC's 

Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste (ACNW) noted, regarding earlier staff proposals to 

impose a 10,000-ycar period of performance, that the t1mcframc was "arbltrary and lacked 

bases in either standards or regulations."' 

111 The J\CNW further warned that assessments beyond an initial compliance tier should "be 

used to evaluate the robustness of the facility over long periods of time and should not 

bccom~ clefacro regulation·· (NRC Tccli:.iical Analysis, pp. :, 2). As discussed in further 

detail in later comments. the proposed regulations would establish dose limits rather than 

goals-and, 111 fact, with greater stnngency than for the compliance period . 

., Quantitative-or "semi-quantitative" (as described at 80 FR 16096, col. 2)-assessment of 

modcl111g results up to 10,000 years after closu:·e also contributes little to protectiveness. The 

discussion accompanying the proposed regulations states repeatedly that disposal of depleted 

uranium (DU) low-level radioactive waste is a driv:ng factor m the proposed rule revisions 

However, the activity of DU low-level waste (taking account of ingrowth of progeny) is 

expected to be relatively constant until well beyond I 0,000 years ("Tecbmcal Analysis 

Supportmg Definition of Period of Perfonnance," Figure 1 ). 

o The protective assurance period also is not necessary in view of intergenerational equity 

considerations to avoid •·actions that pose a realistic threat of irreversible harm or 

catastrophic consequences" for future generations (''Technical Analysis Supporting 

Definition of Period of Pcrrormance," p. 10). The proposed compliance period alone is 

sufficient to satisfy that ethical obligat10n. That is, providing reasonable assurance that do~cs 

(which will be extremely localized) will be limited to 25 mrem/yr-much less than 

1 Sec Comidertng Timescales in the l'ost-Closiwe Safety of Geological Disposal of Radioactive Waste, 

OECD Nuclear Energy J\gcncy, 2009, pp. 8, 9. 

DOE Comments. Propo<;ed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul24151204p Chri~opherForinash 703 9080796 

backgrnund rac!iat10n or routine medical exposures-for the next.forty generations covered 

by a 1,000-year compliance period goes well beyond averting "catastrophic consequences''. 

We rcc(>rnmend, therefore, tha\ the proposed requirements related to a protective assurance 

penod be eliminated. Instead, the performance period (and the qualitative approach to further 

modeling)" should begin at l ,000 years after closure 

J\'cw definitions 

The proposed regulation would add ne"v definitions for a number of terms. Among these are 

several that arc justified (in the Federal Register (fR) discussions) primarily on aligning the C.S 

approach with those endorsed in international guidance: specifically, defense-in-depth, 

performance assessment and safety case. 1 fowevcr, the proposed regulations do not use 

definitions that have been developed through international consensus, including participation 

fiom U.S. regulatory agencies. No explanation is provided for the depaiture from accepted 

published definitions. We believe that linking the concepts lo international and national 

guidance is a laudable goal, and that it will be best accomplished by adopting the documented 

definitions that have been established for these terms in intcrnat:onal and national guidance and 

technical reports. Sec comments on specific definitions in § 61.2. 

Uncertainty and limitations of PA over long timcframcs 

FR notice appropriately discusses the increasing uncertainties, and the decreasing confidcncc--

ancl thus meaningfulness for quantitative decision-making-that can be placed in numerical 

analyses over longer timcframes (Sec, e.g., 80 FR 16091, col. 3.) As noted previously, such 

limitations on the use of PA arc also well-recognized internationally by the IJ\EA, ICRP and 

NEA. (Sec general comment on the thrcc-tierecl compliance approach.) ~fore generally, a PA, 

even for several hundred years into the future, cannot be regarded as a "prediction" of future 

disposal system behavior. Rather, it is a hypothetical projection of possible behavior, based on 

reasonably conservative assumptions and simplificaLions. These views reflect international 

consensus. NEA says: "Calculated values are to be regarded not as predictions but ratheJ as 

indicators that are used to test the capability of t11e system .... Doses and risk evaluated in 

safety assessments are to be interpreted as illustrations of potential impact to stylized, 

hypothctica! individuals based on agreed sets of assumptions."2 These concepts and limitations 

on PA arc acknowledged in some of the FR discussions, but are not well reflected in the 

1 egulatory langL1age. 

We suggc'>t that additional caveats and explanation be added in the concepts section and 

throughout the rule to appropnatcly reflect the issue and the balance to be struck (sec subscqucm 

comment) The use of terms such a<> "ensure·· protectiveness should be avoided. The regulatory 

language should instead be consistent with the concept of reasonable assurance. 

z NEA 2009 Timescales Rcpn:l, pp. 9. 12 

DOE Comments· Proposed 10 CFT< Pnrt 61 

p 5 

4 
Jul241512·04p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p6 

Reasonable assurance 

{n a similar vein, a definition or discussion (m § 61.2 or § 61 7) should be added for the tenn 

''reasonable assurance." None is provided in the proposed rule though the term is used 

extensively in the regulatory language. The concept, when applied to the timeframcs 

incorporated in the proposed :·u:e, has implications very different than i~s application in other 

contexts in which it is applied by NRC (during operation of nuclear facilities, for example) and, 

therefore, deserves particular attention. We suggest that the concept adhere to NRC's 

interpretation as used in the context of geological disposal, which is consistent \-Vith the 

Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) term '·reasonable expectation," as applied to analyses 

up to or beyond 10,000 years: 

Performance assessments need not provide complete assurance tJ1at the requirements ... will 

be met. Because of the long time period involved and the nature of the events and processes 

of interest, there will inevitably be substantial uncertainties in prnjecting disposal system 

performance. Proof of Lhc f uturc performance of a disposal system is not to be had in the 

ordinary sense of the word in situations that deal with much shorter time frames. Instead, 

what is required is a reasonable expectation, on the basis of the record before the 

implementing agency. that compliance ... will be achieved. [40 CFR 191. I J(b)] 

This is consistent with NRC's explanation m the "Technical Analysis" (p. 5) that the results of 

compliance analysis ·'arc no; interpreted as unequivocal numerical proof of the expected 

bchav:or of a waste disposal facility". 

i;:xclusion of radon 

It is recommended that radon be excluded from the dose-based perfonilance objectives. The 

inclusion of radon is sigmficantly inconsistent with expectations applied to other EP /\,".\!RC and 

the Department of Energy's (DOE) regulations that address management of uranium-containing 

materials [e.g., 40 CFR Part 190 10, 40 CFR Part 61 (subpart H), 40 CFR Part 61.192 (subpart 

Q), l 0 CFR Part 40 (Appendix A criterion 6), 10 CFR Pmi 20.1101 ( d), DOE Manual 43 5. l -1 l 

The proposed performance objectives in Part 61 should be updated to be more consistent with 

other national requnements related to radon for \vastes containing uranium. A major factor in 

the update to Part 61 is to address DU, so modifications to the existing rule in the interest of 

consistency with other EPA and NRC regulations addressing uranium is app!'opriate. NRC 

might consider instead adding a performance objective for radon flux, consistent with the 

approaches in other promulgated rules. 

Concepts and Technical Analyses 

These sections of the proposed rule include information that appears overly prescnplive and is 

better suited for guidance. Furthermore, some of the detail is not appropriate (see specific 

comments below). For ex.ample, the discussions m concepts on ''intrnder assessment;· "waste 

with significant concentrations and quantities oflong-lived radionuclides." defense-in-depth, and 

also the discussion of stability in the waste classification discussion do not appear necessary. 

DOE Comment,·: Proposed 10 CPR Part 61 
Jul 24 15 12·05p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p7 

6 

The use of words such as "can," "may,'' and ''should" are indicators that statements are more 

appropriate for guidance rather than for a rule. See specific comments on§§ 61 7 and 61.13. 

Long-term analyses 

The references to "long-term analysis'' in the FR notice (e g., 80 FR 16091) seem to emphasize 

analysis covering 10.000 years or more; however, depending on the context, analyses for 500 or 

1,000 years are also long-term analyses and should be described as such. Statements that give 

the m1press10n that analyses for 500 01 1,000 years are not considering long-term impacts should 

be avoided 

Closure terminology 

The proposed regulation contains inconsisll~nt use of the term "closure." The definition of 

mtt udcr assessment (proposed § 61.2), for example, refers to c.thc time of site closure." The 

definition of compliance period refcr5 to "closure of the disposal facility." An existing definition 

for site closure and stabilization describes a set of actions rather than a point in time. The 

definition for the protective assurance period uses the terminology "followmg closure of the 

site''. There is similarly iaconsistent usage throughout the rule, with various terms being used. 

closure. final closure, site closure, final site closure, time of site closure, site closure phase, 

disposal site closure, and closure of the land disposal fac1iity. It is not clear if the terms are 

meant to be interchangeable or ift:1e differences in terms cany significance. It is recommended 

that NRC review such terminology and make it consistent as much as possible; where there arc 

differences. the reasons should be made clear by context or explanation. 

DOE Comments - Proposed Regulatorv Provisions 

§ 61.2, Compliance period definition 

The definition for compliance period describes when it ends, but is unclear about when it begins. 

This leaves some ambiguity regarding whether the provision should be applied dunng the 

operational period It is suggested that the definition be revised to clarify that the cornpl1ancc 

period fo1 the purposes of§ 61.4 J and § 61.42 begms at the time of closure of the disposal 

facility. As a conforming change, the cross-reference in § 61.43 (to § 61.41) should be deleted, 

and either the salient requirements mcorporatcd directly into § 61.43 or, given the cx1~tmg 

cross-reference to Par: 20, the requirements concerning effluents m § 20. 1302 and§ 20.1301 be 

used 

§ 61.2, Defense-in-depth definition 

The definition of defense-in-depth does not reflect the accepted use of the term. either in the lJ.S 

or internat10nally (e.g., in lAEA SSR-5 and the IAEA Safety Glossary) and is inconsistent with 

the preamble. As noted in the preamble, "The NRC's defense-in-depth approach to nsk 

management ensures that safety is not wholly dependent on any single element o!'the design. 

con5truction, maintenance or operation of a regulated facility. . . Dcfcnsc-111-depth for a land 

DOE Comments Propo~ed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul 24 15 12·05p Chri~opherForinash 703 9080796 08 

1 

disposal facility includes, bu1 1s not \im.ited to, the use of rem<)te sitmg, consideration of waste 

forms and radionuclide content, engineered foatures, and natural geologic features of the di<>posal 

site.'' Other relevant features mentioned in the preamble are, for example, land ownership and 

institutional control requirements (80 FR 16102, col. 2). Even in operating nuclear facilities, the 

Lenn is understood to encompass a range of strategies, procedures, and operational considerations 

that go well beyond simply redundant physical barriers. (See 

https://wvv\v.iaea.org/ns/tutorials/rcgcontrol/assess/assess32 l 3 .htm.) It is suggested that the 

definition be revised to reflect the broader consideration that arc discussed in lhe preamble as 

well as in proposed§ 6 l.7(cl). 

§ 61.2, Inadvertent intruder and intruder assc&sment definitions 

We support the clarillcation that tl~e mtrnder assessment should consider only activ1tie~ that arc 

"realistic and consistent with expected activities in and around the disposal site at the time of site 

closure." NRC no:es that the approach used to develop the classification tables remains 

protective. We agree, and note that this implies that the use of sccnanos similar to those 

considered in the development of Part 61 is sufficient to meet the intent of the requirements We 

suggest clarifying this point in the regulatory language, in the definition for either the inadvertent 

intruder or the intruder assessment. This is a reasonable approach to limit speculation regarding 

potential scenarios and emphasizes the continued protectiveness of the existing classification 

system. It also reduces the regulatory hurdcn because there already exists considerable 

experience in implementing these scenarios. 

The use of the term "resource cxplora:10n or exploitation'" 111 the definition of inadvertent 

intruder 1s problematic. It could be interpreted to include mining, which has not been considered 

within the realm of inadvertent intruder analyses in the past and could be complex to model and 

quantify. More imp01tantly, the inclusion of resource cxplonation adds little to no value to the 

intruder analysis for low-level radioactive waste. For geologic disposal. such scenarios can be 

impo1tant becm:sc they may serve as the sole means for intruders to access waste. For 

near-surface disposal, however, the potential outcomes o[ resource exploration would be very 

similar to (and likely bounded by) the "standard'' intruder scenarios (i.e .. resident farmer, wclldrillmg, and basement excavation), which already account for the possibility of waste bcmg 

encountered directly. ll is recommended that the te1111 resource "exploitation'· be eI:minatcd 

fl om the definition of inadvc1tent mtruder and, as noted above, that the definition of inadvertent 

intruder assessment be clarified to focus on the intruder scenarios used to establish the waste 

classification tables. 

§ 61.2, Long-lived waste definition 

The definition oflong-lived waste should be deleted (and if retained, technical justification 

should be provided). Furthermore, the dcfimtion is extraneous; after being defined, the term 

appears only in G 61 7' Concepts. A quantitative interpretation or the term is not needed 01 

relevant to its single use m that context. The appropriate basis to determine whether longer-term 

analysis is needed is the site-specific performance assessment rather than arbitrary numerical 

criteria. Implementation ofa two tier approach with a compliance time of 1.000 years, as we 

DOE Comments. Propow~d 10 CFf~ Part 61 
Jul 24 15 12 06p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p.9 

8 

recommend, would remove the need for the definition and table. See also comrncnts on proposed 

§ 61.I3(c) 

§ 61.2, Performance assessment definition 

The definition should include a consideration of associated unce11amtics, as is done in the 

definition of hwuder assessment. This is especially important in view of the proposed 

requirement in § 6 l. I 3(a)(3), (a)(8) and (a)(9) to consider probabilities and uncertainties 

regarding various aspects of performance assessment including unlikely features, events and 

processes; variability iD the cltsposal facility ancl environment; and alternative conceptual modeb. 

It is suggested to use language that is as consistent as possible with existing definitions (e.g., 

NCRP Repo1t No. 152, p. 18, 01 IAEA SSG-23 on safety assessment) rather than developing a 

new definition. 

The proposed definition also places unnecessary focus on the concept of features. events and 

p1 ocesscs (FEPs ), which is at odds with other definitions that have been widely used ( e g .. from 

ICRP, IAEA, and NEA) By using this terminology, the proposed rule appears to be requiring a 

single methodology to achieve a conceptual site model, an approach that is inconsistent with 

recent positions from the international community (e.g., the IAEA Safety Guide No SSG-23 on 

safety assessment and the NFA Methods for Safc1y Assessment of Geological Disposal 

facilities: Outcomes of the McSA Initiative, 2012 ). The use of an existing definition from one 

of these sources would resolve this issue as well. 

Fina~'.y, the corn:,idcration of all FEPs (or whatever terminology rs ultimately uscd)-namely, 

FEPS that "might affect the disposal system··-is too broad and could entail consideration of 

highly unlikely or fantastic events or combinations of events. Consideration should be limited to 

"reasonably foreseeable and significant'" FEPs 01 factors that are relevant to performance. See 

also the comments on proposed§ 61.13(a)(1) through (a)(S). 

~ 61.2, Performance period definition 

The proposed defimtion of the performance period specifies no end point and no criteria for 

establishing what period of tirne must be covered by analyses beyond 10,000 years. NRC makes 

clear that the period is left undefined in order to allow site-specific factors to be considered (80 

FR 16097, col. I). Additional discussion highlights tha1 the time of peak dose would be a 

substantial consideration in determining how far into the future the modeling projections should 

run (ibid. and 80 FR 16092, col. I). This is, in general, an approach that is consistent with a nskinformed process and that DOE supports. 

However, it is not appropriate to forego any ultimate end-point for the performance period. 

Without an endpoint (or factors to be considered) for the performance period and associated 

analysis, the proposed regulations would impose an arbitrary and hurdcnsomc approach and 

would risk generating uncertain analyses withou~ potential uscti.llness for iisk-infonncd decision 

making Jn this regard, >.:RC (in its ·'Technical Analysis Supporting Definition of Penod of 

Performance") rejects a peak dose approach with an undefined perfonm111cc penod, in part 

DOE Commencs· Proposed 1 O CF!? !'art 61 
Jul 24 15 12·07p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 

because "peak dose could occur beyond the period of geologic stability, which would render 

quantitative values essentially meaningless" (p. 11 ). 

An unrestrained performance period would not only extend modeling analyses beyond potential 

usefulness. but would also impose additional :·equircments. The proposed requirements in 

§ 61.42( c), for example, require that "cffo:t shall be made to minimize releases . . at any tune 

during the performar:cc period." (Sec also DOE comments on minimization, in general 

comments and regarding proposed sections§ 61.41(b) and (c), § 61.42(b) and (c).) With no end 

to the performance period, this means that licensees could be required to take measures now to 

reduce future potentiai releases, based on highly uncertain and limited analyses. This is not 

JUst1fiable and conflicts with ethical principles that assign greater weight to 11ear-te1111 hazards 

than to hypothetical long-tenn risks. Ir. this regard, DOE generally conducts perfonnancc 

assessments for low-level radioactive waste disposal to the time of peak dose or a shorter time 

period, as appropriate, to ris.k inform decisions. Howcve:-, DOE docs not impose dose limi:s or 

performance measures during time frames beyond 1,000 years post-closure. 

p 10 

9 

Consistent with the above principles, we recommend that, at a maximum, the performance period 

should not extend beyond peak dose (or impacts) or the period of surface geologic stability, 

whichever is sooner. 

NRC has apparently dismissed par\ of this approach, stating in the proposed supporting guidance 

(NURE.G-2175) that "It would not be appropriate to constrain tbc analyses to the period of 

near-surface geologic stability, as one of the reasons for undertaking the performance period 

analyses is for a licensee to communicate to decision-makers the potential range of consequences 

from the disposal action. Near-surface geologic in:::.tability may result from a process such as 

fluvial erosion (e.g., driven by lake formation). which could have severe impacts at an unstable 

site. Near-surface geologic instability may indicate that the site is unsuitable for disposing of 

sig111ficant c;uant1t1cs of long-lived radioactive waste. A licensee should not use near-surface 

geologic instability as a basis for lnmting the analysis. If the analysis for LLW disposal was 

limited to the pcnocl of near-surface geologic stability, the analysis could bt:: ti uncated 

prematurely and the long-1e1rn risks and uncertainties may not be understood. In addition, 

instability could be used as a basis to select a site, which is not acceptable." (p. 2-24) 

While NRC's staff express legitimate concerns, these concerns nonetheless do not justify the 

reg"J.latory approach proposed in the rule and supporting guidance. We agree that it wou:c.l be 

objectionable to provide an incentive for picking an unstable site in order to avoid the regulatory 

burden of extended analyses, but we find it unlikely that such a site would fulfill the other 

significant requirements in the rule. Furthe1more, there are means to counter such an cff ect 

without extend mg modGling. lndecd, requiring a description and justification of when and why 

the performance period is truncated would give significant insights into the site characteristics 

and stability. It is within NRC's discretion to consider such information as part of the safety case 

on which the licensing process will be based. 

Most impo1tant, the extension ofperforma11ce analyses beyond the period ofsurfaee geologic 

stability is unsupportable from a technical perspective. Geologic repositories may rely on longer 

t1mcfrarn.es for analysis precisely because, being at dep!h, they are not likely to be significantly 

DOE Comments. Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul 24 15 12·07p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 11 

10 

affected by events and processes at the surface The timeframe for surface effects from geologic 

processes is notably less than that for deeper geologic stability (NEA 2009 Timescales Report', 

Figure 5.12a and pp. 27-28). Once processes affecting the surface at a ce11ain magnitude ::ind 

breadth occm·, the analy~is of the site is unreliable even qualitatively. Any results are, 

furthermore, much less likely to be relevant, since populations near a site affected by, for 

example, a new ice age are likely to face much more significant and immediate threats to their 

lifestyle and survival than the potential for a localized incremental increase in cancer risk. 

NEA says, "Truncating calculat1ons too early may run the 1isk losing information . for example 

on the po-;sible timing and magnitude ofpcak consequences. . . At sufficiently distant times. 

however, uncertaml!e!:> call into question most of the assumpt10ns made in evaluating 

radionuclide releases.'' The NEA further cautions that re'.ying on such modeling can undermine 

confidence in the safety case (~EA 2009 Timescales Report, p. 73 ). While calculations can 

always be extended, they add no value if they cannot be meaningfully interpreted, and to require 

them implies a level of confidence that is not warranted. As noted in our general comments on 

the three-tiered approach, doses and risk "cannot be forecast with any certainty beyond a1ound 

several hundreds of years into the future·· (ICRP-81 ), so calculations for longer time periods 

already test the limitations of PA. The interpretation, even qualitatively, of assessments beyond 

the time of relevant geologic stability is truly questionable. Even if peak impacts might occur 

beyond the period of surface geologic stability, the reliance on modeling at that poinc with its 

inherent uncertainties regarding ncariy every aspects of assessment 4 is entirely msuffic1ent as a 

ba5is for regulatory decision making and the requirement for "effort to minimize ... to the extent 

rea~onably achievable". (See proposed § 61.41 (c) and proposed § 6 I .42(c); sec also DOE 

comments regarding minimization, in general comments and regarding proposed sections 

§ 61.41 (b) and ( c ); § 6 J .42(b) and ( c) ) 

We understand also that a significant motivator for the performance period is to gain information 

regarding Jong-term p:::rformancc-but even 1.000 years already is long-ter:n performance. 

Analyses for longer-term performance should be conducted witJ1 the recognition of the growing 

spccu\at1on and unccrtmnty over time. As NEA aptly noted, "while some hazard may remain for 

extremely Jong times, increasing unccrtaintie<; mean that there are practical limitations as to how 

long anything meaningful can be said about the protection provided by any syskm against these 

hazards .... These practical limitations need to be acknowledged in safety cases "s Modeling 

should be extended further only if site-specific characteristics dictate that 1t might be useful and 

there is a valid scientific and technical basis on which assessment may be founded. for ncarsurface disposal, the second condition is fulfilled only during the period of surface geologic 

stabVi1ty, and this is the maximum amount of time that any assessments in the regulation should 

cover. 

~RC has already recogrnzcd. in its draft NUREG-2175 (p. 2-24) that it is necessary to establish 

an end point for the performance period; the essential criteria to do so belong in regulation. not in 

guidance. The definition of''pcrformance period" should be revised, therefore. to clarify that the 

3 C 011.11denn.rc: T1mescole,< 111 rhe Post -cf osw e Safety of Geological Disposal nf l?ad1oact1ve 1-Vasie. OECD Nuclear Enc1 gy Agcn~y. 2009, p 39 Future citatirm< rcfi:, to 1111, report il< "'1\/LA 200? 1'h1csrnlcs l~cpor: .. 

'Sec· Tcchn1cnl l\na!ys1s Supporllng Dcfin1t1011 of Pc nod of Performance lor Low-Level Waste D1o:po,al. Figures ) and 4 1 NL/\ 2009 lime<eales RepOI t, p 27 

DOE Comments: Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul24151208p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 

1)el'formancc period extends until peak dose or impacts are reached or the period of surface 

geologic stability, whichever is sooner 

§ 61.2, Safety case definition 

p 12 

l l 

We support including the concept ofthe safety case in the proposed regulation, as it provides a 

fuller view of site and disposal system understanding, and the non-quantitative factors that can 

enhance confidence in safety. While these concepts have long been an implicit part of the 

licensing process, using the term safety case emphasizes that the C.S. approach is in concert with 

international approaches. It is puzzling, therefore. that NRC provides its own definition or safety 

case rather than using those established in international guidance. The existing international 

guidance is sufficient and applicable for the case of LL W disposal, thus there is no need for 

significant elaboration of the concept in the rule. We suggest that NRC, as much as possible, use 

language consistent with the safety case definition issued by IAEJ\. See The Safely Case and 

Safely Assessment for the Disposal of Radiooct1ve Waste. Specific Safety Guide No. SSG-23, 

IAEA, 2012 (Paragraph 1.3, for example). 

§ 61.7(c)(4), Intruder assessment concept 

The proposed new performance objective (cross-referenced in proposed§ 6l.7(c)(4)) uses a dose 

limit during the compliance and protective assurance periods (or, for the protective assurance 

period only, an alternative level, if approved, that is reasonably achievable based on teclmical 

anc economic considerations). The use of a strictly enforced dose limit as the performance 

objective for an inadvertent intruder assessment covering any period after closure i:s inconsistent 

with DOE and international positions regarding inadvertent in::-usion. The general position 

internationally is that intruder assessments are hypothetical cases used to identify features that 

can help reduce the potential for a11d/or consequence<; of intrusion. That is, human intrusion 

analyses are used as a tool to assist in optimization of the disposal facility design. IAEA 's safety 

standards, for example, recommend no limits regarding human intrusion, but instead offer 

gmdclmes for what doses may warrant efforts to reduce the probability or consequences of 

intrusion (1AEA SSG-5, para. 2.15). ICRP similarly recommends no dose cor.straint for human 

intn:sion, ~aying that a constraint "is not applicable in evaluating the sigmficancc of human 

intrusion because, by definition, intrusion will have bypassed the barriers which were considered 

in optimization of protection for the disposal facility ... any protective actions required should 

be considered during the development of the disposal facility'-. ICRP considered that 

"'reasonable efforts should be made to reduce the probability of human intrusion or to limit its 

consequences'' when doses exceed 100 mSv (ICRP-81, paragraphs 63-64). 

We recommend that the dose limit for intruder protection be reca<>t as a goal that is used to 

develop waste acceptance criteria and demonstrate added robustness of the disposal approach. If 

this 1s not done, then we recommend that additior1al clarifying discussion be provided 111 the 

concepts section to include the points mentioned above. See also comments ori proposed 

§ 61.42(a). 

DOE Comments: Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul 241512·09p Chri~opherForinash 703 9080796 p 13 

12 

§ 61.7(c)(6), Waste with si~nificant concentrations of long-lived radionuclides 

The site-spec1fic P /I. will inherently address whether the proposed waste inventory poses longer 

term hazards or not and, thus, whether analyses will need to address longer timeframes. The 

site-specific analyses required over the compliance period and beyond, in themselves, constitute 

a case-by-case evaluation tbat provides the basis for determining whether relevant performance 

aspects (such as time of peak dose) have been adequatc!y captured. This is trnc regardless of 

what characteristics (longevity, mobility, etc.) contribute to the need for longer-term assessment. 

The specificity defining and categorizing"'long-lived waste" is unnecessary and the concept 

should be deleted from the rule. 

§ 61.7(d), Defense-in-depth 

The discussion of defense-in-depth, while broader than the proposed definition in § 6 J .2, does 

not reflect the accepted use of the term, either in the G.S. or internationally (e g .. in IJ\EA SSR-5 

and the IAEA Safety Glossary) and is inconsistent with the preamble. As noted in the preamble. 

·'NRC s defense-m-depth approach to risk management ensures that safety is not wholly 

dependent on any single clement of the design, construction. maintenance or operation ofa 

regulated facility .... Defense-in-depth for a land disposal facility includes, but is not limited to, 

the use of remote siting, consideration of-waste forms m1d radionuclide content. engineered 

features, and natural geologic features of the disposal s1Le.'' Other relevant features mentioned in 

the preamble arc, for example, land ownership and institutional control requirements (80 fR 

I 6102, col. 2). The more inclusive view of defense-in-depth, including adn:inistrative and 

operational controls, should be included in the discussion of the concept. 

§ 6 I.7(t), Waste classification and stability 

The emphasis on details related to "long term" stability is not needed. Stability is imp01tar.t for 

the 500 year timeframe for the classification SY'>tcm (e.g., assumptions for the classification 

tables), but over thousands of years, stability becomes less meaningful for assessing level of 

protectiveness If the site-specific PA demonstrates that performance ohjcctives can be met with 

reasonable assurance, even if there arc inc: eases in infiltration or other changes in the system, 

then "stability'' as a separate and specific criterion is not needed. Such requirements may be 

very difficult to meet, but at the same time may have little impact on the protection of human 

health (e.g, calculated dose). In a performance-based approach, PA is the appropriate means to 

account for the relevance of factors such as this. It is recommended that the discussion of 

stability in this section be deleted. See also comments on §§ 61.13( d) and 61.51. 

§ 61.13, Application to existing facilities 

The preamble to the proposed regulations (at page 16088) slates that the proposed rule would 

become effective l year after the final rule is published for NRC licensees, and that Agreement 

States would have 3 years to adopt compatible provisions. In turn, the proposed regulatory 

language in the chapeau to§ 61.13 and in§ 61.58(d) would require existing licensees to conduct 

various additional technical analyses and apply new waste acceptance prnvisions at the next 

hccnsc renewal or within 5 years of the effective date of the proposed new requirements, 

DOE Comments Proposed 10 CfR Part 61 
Jul 2415 12 09p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p.14 

13 

whichever comes first. In contras1 to both approaches, the existing general prov1sions in 

Subpait A(~ 61.1 (a)}-which would not be amended by the proposed regulation -state that 

applicability of rcquircmer.ts in Part 6 l to existing licensees "will be determined on a 

case-by-case basis." We iecornmer.d conforming revision to § 61.1 (a) and, as necessary, the 

final preamble to the regulations, so that the provisions arc consistent with each other. Given the 

numerous new provisions and new analysis that would be required by the regulations, DOE also 

supports delaying application of the proposed regulations until a reasonable time in the future, 

with an emphasis on new waste streams and new operations. 

§ 61.13(a)(l) to (a)(S), Technical analyses (FEPs consideration) 

The focus on the term "features, events and processes" does not align well with more recent 

international best practice, in which approaches based on "safety functions" have emerged (sec, 

for example, http://www.oecd-nea.org/rwrn/reports/20 l 2/nea6923-MESA-initiative pdi). It is 

recommended that the proposed rule be revised to reinforce and place more emphasis on the 

more current approaches for scenario development involving the use of safety functions, either 

through revisions to this section or with additional discussion added in foe concepts section. 

Furthermore, as noted 111 our general comments. DOE does not support the imposition of the 

protective assurance period and recommends that it be eliminated. However, if the protective 

assurance period is retained, DOE suppmts the approach to the identification of relevant FEPs in 

pe1formance assessment beyond the compliance period: that FEPs applicable in the compliance 

period (up to 1.000 years) be extended and that new FEPs be added only if scientific infonnation 

compelling such changes is available (80 FR 16090, col. 1 ). However, the proposed regulatory 

language mr.y require revision to properly reflect the stated intention. To this end, § 61.13( a)(!) 

should be revised to more clearly apply to the compliance period performance assessment, as in 

"Consider features. events and processes that might affect compliance with § 61.41 (a)." 

It is not clear why a separate requirement is provided [in § G 1.13( a)(5) J regarding degradation or 

alteration processes. The reqmrement in § 61.13{a)(l) already requires a technical basis for 

inclusion or exclusion of all FEPs. so the provisions on degradation are redundant. We suggest 

that the proposed§ 61 13(a)(5) be deleted. 

§ 61.13(a)(10), Roles of natural and engineered features 

It is not clear what purpose is served by the requirement to "identify and differentiate between 

the roles perfonned by the natural disposal site characteristics and design featu1cs of the disposal 

facility." The relevant aspect::> of both the site and the engineered features, as well the 

mtcractions between them. arc appropriately captmcd by requirements to consider relevant FEPs 

(or safety functions). To require further analyses and differentiation impose<> redundant 

requirements and provides no value-added to risk-informed decision-making and licensing- -but 

docs add confusion, especially since it implies the possib11Ity or sub-system requirements. We 

suggest that this paragraph be deleted. 

§ 61.B(b}, Inadvertent intruder analyses 

DOE Comments. Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul24151210p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p.1b 

14 

The description of the inadvertent intruder analyses is con[ using and inconsistent with the 

definition proposed for an intruder m·sessmenf in proposed § 61.2. The "analyses·· appear to 

include additional rcqunerr.ents beyond the assessment, as described in proposed§ 6 l. l 3(b)(l) to 

61 13(b)(2). However. the required information is vague and adds little apparent value to 

risk-informed decision making: 

o It is not clear how (or what type of) "human intrusion analyses·· can demonstrate that the 

waste acceptance criteria will be met [proposed § 6 l.13(b)(l )J The allowable activity levels 

in waste acceptance criteria (WAC) may, in fact, be based on an intruder assessment, among 

other analyses (see proposed§ 61.58(a)(l)). To hase the WAC on an intruder assessment 

and then to require a human intrusion analysis to confirm compliance with the WAC is 

circular and meaningless On-the-ground compliance with the WAC is adequately addressed 

by the waste characteri.rntion and certification requirements in§ 61.58. The provis10n at 

p10posed § 6l.l3(b)(1) should be deleted. 

0 It is not clear how (or what type of) analyses can demonstrate that "adequate barriers to 

human mtrusion w11\ be provided" f proposed § 6 l. l3(b)(2)] In a performance-based and 

risk-informed approach, the means to demonstrate that bamcrs are adequate is to show that 

performance objectives can be met with the performance assessment and mtruder 

assessme:it. As NRC has observed in other regulations related to radioactive waste c11sposal, 

''A complete performance assessment ... will illustrate the effectiveness of the multiple 

barriers, and the implementation of the philosophy of defense in depth. such that the 

individual protection standard is shown lo be met even when barriers are challenged. . . The 

Commission is confident that evidence for the resilience, or lack of resilience, of a 

multiple-barner system will be found by examining a comprehensive and properly 

documented perf01111ance assessment of the behavior of the overall repository system." (66 

FR 55759) The analysis at proposed§ 61.13(b)(2) adds no specificity or substance and 

should be deleted. 

Proposed paragraph 61. l 3(b)(3)(ii) would require "adequate" barriers to intrusion. No definition 

or criteria are provided to judge the adequacy of baniers. The remaining language in the 

paragraph appropriately describes the relevant features of a barrier that may contribute to its 

effectiveness and the need to provide a basis for the period of effectiveness. The term 

"adequacy" adds little value but raises the question ofaddit10nal (but arbitrary. given that they 

are not specified) criteria being applied; the term should be dropped from the requirement. 

§ 61.13(<1), Long-term stability 

The proposed rule retains an existing requirement to analyze long-term stability of the disposal 

site. with slight changes to the language However, the implications of this requirement are very 

different when applied over timeframcs of thousands to tens of thousands of years. It is not 

possible for such timeframes (thousands of years or more) that Jong-term stability of the site "can 

be ensured," as the revised language now states. Furthermore, the requirement is superfluous in 

view of the numerous other site-specific analyses r.ow proposed. In a performance-based 

approach, the pe:-formance assessment is the appropriate means to account for the relevance of 

factors such as this. If performance objectives can be demonstrnted to be met with reasonable 

DOE Comments: Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul24151211p Chri~opherFoonash 703 9080796 p 16 

15 

assurance, even if there are increases in infiltration or other stability-related changes, then 

"'stability" as a separate and specific criterion is not needed. A requirement on long-term 

stability may be very difficult to meet, and at the same time may have little impact on the 

protection of human health (e.g, dose calcuiation). It is recommended that the requirement for a 

separate analysis of site stability be deleted. lf the provision is retained, the proposed language 

that stability ··can be ensui·cd" should be dropped. and the analysis should extend no longer than 

the compliance period. Sec also comments on§ 61.44. 

§ 61.13(e), Potential long-term radiological impacts (Table A) 

The proposed provisions require analyses over the performance period (i.e., beyond I 0,000 years 

after closure) "fo1 disposal sites with waste that contains radionuclidcs with the average 

concentrations exceeding the values listed in Table A of this paragraph, or if nece~sitated by 

site-specific conditions''. Several changes from the proposal are suggested to enhance the 

technical basis and better align it with the intent to use site specific performance analyses: 

"' Table A should be cl1minatcd. The technical basis described for the derivation of the 

concentrations is limited and unclear. The preamble states that the values arc "primarily, but 

not solely, based on the Class A LLR W concentration values'" (80 FR 16097, col. 1 ), but 

does not explain why the Class A limits arc an appropriate indicator or technical basis to 

determine the need for analyses beyond 10,000 years. There is no justification for defining 

hazards over this duration based on the Class A limits, since such timcframcs were not 

considered in developing those limits. Furthermore, Table A may be rendered moot by the 

clause regarding "site-specific conditions,'' where the table alone will not be determinative 

of whether a longer-term analysis is needed. Given this, the results of site-specific analyses 

already required for the compliance period (and the protective assurance period. if it is 

retained) should be used to dctcnnine whether il is appropriate to conduct longcr-tern1 

analyses. This approach is technically supportable and better aligns with the declared intent 

to establish a risk-based approach using site-specific PAs. 

• To establish clear cxpcctat10ns on the pait of licensees, further explanation should be 

provided on what "site-specific conditions" might necessitate performance period analyses. 

The preamble discussion on timcframes (80 FR 16093 et seq) makes clear that the peak 

dose, including potential in-growth of progeny (from uranium, in particula1") is a central 

consideration, and this could provide an appropriate basis for delineating the need for 

extending the analysis. We recommend that the site-specific analysi5 be used to dctermmc 

the need for analyses into the far future. 

" As noted in our general comments, we recommend that the protective assurance period be 

eliminated. 

Therefore, it is suggested that § 6 l. l 3(e) be revised to react, ''The time period requii ed to be 

considered shall be determined based on site-specific conditions addressed in the PA. 

Performance period calculations shall be performed if the analyses for compliance period in 

§§ 61.41 (a) and 61.42(a) indicate that peak doses have not been attained (i.e. doses arc stable or 

nsmg) at 1,000 years. mcludmg consideration of the in-gro\,vth or progeny from the intended 

DOE Comments. Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul24151211p Chri~opherFonnash 703 9080796 p 17 

16 

waste strearns." See also DOE"s comments on § 6) .2, performance period definition, for 

discussion of the recommended limits on the performance period. 

1 f the protective assurance period is retained, then the language in § 61.l J{ c) should be revised to 

read· "The time period required to be considered shall be determined based on site-specific 

conditions addressed in the PA. Performance pe1 iod calculations shall be performed if the 

analyses for comp;iance and protec6ve assurance periods in §§ 61.41 (a)-(b) and §§ 61.42(a)-(b) 

indicate that peak doses have not been attamed (i.e. doses arc stable or rising) at 10,000 years, 

including consideration of the in-grovvth of progeny from the intended waste streams." Sec also 

DOE's comments on § 61.2, performance period definit10n, for discussion of the recommended 

lnnits on the performance period. 

§ 61. l 3(f), Defense-in-depth 

It is unclear what value ts provided by "analyses" to be conducted to demonstrate that 

defense-in-depth measmes are included at a disposal facility. This effort should be focused on 

documenting the contributors to clefcnsc-in-clepth rather than a quantitative analysis. J\s noted 

earlier, the accepted use of the term (and NRC's own discussions of it in the preamble to, and 

other sections of, this proposed rule) encompasses siting and operational aspects Furthermore, 

as NRC observes, "The capabilities of any of those design features and site charactenstics may 

not be either independent or totally redundant. ... The capabilities or site characteristics and 

engineered features over the long timcfr&mcs are c:;ubject to interpretation and i:1cludc many 

uncertainties .... Therefore, NRC expects that licensees will rely on both the charn.cterisLics and 

the engineered features, m combination, to provide reasonable assurance that the overall 

perfonrn:mee of the disposal site will be adequate over long time periods."' (80 fR l 6092) The 

function of the various engineered and natural barriers, an<l their interactions, is required to be 

accounted for in the performance assessment. As NRC has observed in other regulations related 

to rad:oactivc waste dispo:;al, "A complete performance assessment ... will illustrate the 

effectiveness of the multiple barriers, and the implementation of the philosophy of defcme m 

depth. such that the individual protection standard is shovvn to be met even when barriers arc 

challenged .... 1 he Commission is confident that evidence for the resilience, or lack of 

resilience, of a multiple-barrier system will be found by examining a comprehensive and 

properly documented performance assessment of the behavior of the overall repository system,. 

(66 FR 55759) 

Further quantitative assessment, as implied by the term "analyses,"' of redundancy over Jong 

timeframes is likely to be highly uncertain and difficult to interpret-and ignores many other 

important facets of ddensc-in-dcpth. To address these concerns, it is suggested that the language 

111 § 61.13(f) be revised to read, "A description of defonse-in-dcpth measures applied at the 

proposed disposal facility, and cl!scussion of the means by which they provide passive safety, 

provide redundancy, or enhance confidence in the safety case and long-term performance." 

§ 61.41 (a), Protection of the general population 

\lo definition is provided for "any member of the public". The requirement should be restricted 

to a representative member of the public located in the genera] environment (i.e., outside the 

DOE Comments· Proposed 10 CFR Parl 61 
Jul241512·12p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 18 

17 

boundaries of the disposal system, including the buffer zone) of the disposal faci\1ty. Such an 

approach is also consistent with the application of updated dosimetry methods that would be 

allowed by the proposed changes. More recent ICRP guidance discusses the applicability of 

limits and constraints to a "representative person·• (ICRP 103. Section 5.4.2). 

§ 61.41(b), Protection of the general population during the protective assurance period 

As noted m our general comments, we recommend that the protective assurance period be 

deleted, and that the pe1 formance period be designated to begin at 1,000 years atter closure 

Accordingly, we recommend that the proposed provisions of§ 61.41 (b) be eliminated. 

If the protective assurance period and the associated analyses are retained. then several important 

changes and clarificat10ns should be made to align Lhc provision with NRCs stated intentions. 

0 The requirement to "'111inim1zc" releases of radioactivity for the protective assurance period 

is inappropriately stringent and docs not seem to reflect the intention of NRC. The preamble 

discus~ion states that '"The protective assurance analyses arc being proposed as a 

mmimization process (i.e., optimiz.ation) with gmdance provided on the goals to use in the 

minimization process." (80 FR 16089, col. 3) The term minimize does not properly reflect 

the multi-faceted optimization process, which entails consideration of numerous factors; 

indeed, "minimize" as used in the proposed regulatory language can be interpreted as being 

more stringent than the As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) requirement applied 

to the compliance period, since it does not clearly allow for consideration of what is feasible 

or reasonable. 

o f urtherrnore, proposed § 61.41 (b ), as written, docs not set forth "goals," b'Jt rather imposes 

requirements. /\s such, it is not consistent with the Commission's direction in its 

February 12, 2014 Memorandum, which calls for a ··goal of keeping doses below a 

500 1mem/yr analytical threshold". 1'-:RC expresses its intention that the dose level for the 

protective assurance period should function as ''a goal rather than a limit"' (80 FR 16097, 

col. 3). While this intention is reflected in the language allowing "a level that is supported 

as reasonably achievable,"' the requircn:ent to minimize releases adds confus1on. 

"' No definition 1s provided for the "general environment". A defimtion should be added, here 

or in§ 61.2. to clanfy that the gene:·aJ environment means that area outside the boundaries 

of the disposal system and its buffer zone. 

In order to better align the regulatory language with the stated intentions of NRC for the 

protective assmance period, it is suggested that the following alternative language be used. 

Efforts shaE be made to reduce releases to a level that is reasonably achievable based on 

technical and economic considerations, provided that licensees shall be presumed to meet 

this goal if the annual dose docs not exceed a dose target of 5 milliSieverts (500 millircm) 

Compliance wnh this paragraph muc;! be demonstrated through analyse.<; that meet the 

rnquiicmenb specified in§ 61.!J(a). 

DOE Comments: Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul241512·13p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 19 

18 

§ 61.4l{aHb), Protection of the general population 

The treatment of radon should be consistent with that in other rules from NRC and other U.S. 

regulatory agencies. Radon should be specifically excluded from consideration in assessing 

compliance with ~he dose limits and targets in these sections. A separate radon pcrfonnance 

ohjectivc (e.g .. a flux limit) would be consistent with other NRC, EPA, and DOE rules I e.g., 40 

CFR Part 190.10, 40 CFR Part 61 (subpart H). 40 CFR Part 61.192 (subpait Q). 10 CFR Part 40 

(Appendix A, critcnon 6), 10 CFR Part 20. l lOl(d), DOE Manual 435.1-1 J. A major factor in 

the update to Part 61 is to address DU, so consistency with other national regulatinns addressing 

urarnum is appropriate. NRC might consider imtcad adding a performance objective for radon 

i)ux. 

§ 6l.4l(c), Protection of the general population during the performance pe1·iod 

As noted in our general comments, we support the concept of a performance period, for which 

the results of modeling analyses arc considered qualitatively to inform site tmderstanding and 

contribute to optimization of design. We recommend that the performance period begin at 

1,000 years after closure, directly following the compliance period. Whether 01 not this change 

to the performance period timcframc is made, the use of the term "minimize·• is problematic in 

the requirements for the performance period. The term ''minimize" docs not properly reflect the 

multi-faceted optimi,~;ation process, which cntmls consideration of numerous factors; indeed, 

"minimize" as used in the proposed regulatmy language can be interpreted as being more 

stringent than the ALJ\RA requirement applied to the compliance period, since it docs not 

clearly allow for consideration of what is feasible or reasonable. Jt is suggested \hat the language 

be revised to read, "Effi:Ht shall be made to reduce releases of radioactivity .... " 

§ 61.42(a), Protection of inadvertent intruders during the compliance period 

·1 he application of a dose limit for an inadvertent intruder assessment covering any period after 

closure is inconsistent with internat10nal positions regarding inadvi:;rtcnt intrusion. The general 

position internationally is that intruder assessments are hypothetical cases used to identify 

features that can help reduce the potential for and/or consequences of intrusion. That is, human 

intrusion analyses arc used as a tool to assist in optimization of the disposal facility design. The 

JAEA safety standards, for example, recommend no limits regarding human intrusion, bat 

instead offer guidelines for what doses may warrant additional optimization: for annual doses m 

the range of 1-20 mSv (l 00 mrem-2 rem), "reasonable efforts arc warranted at the stage of 

development oftJ1c facility to reduce the probability of intrusion or to limit its con~equcnces'' 

(IAEA SSG-5, para. 2.15 ). ICRP similarly declined to recommend a dose constraint for human 

intrusion, saymg that a constraint "is not applicable in evaluating the significance of human 

intrusion because, by definition, intrusion will have bypassed the barriers which were considered 

m optimiLat1on ofprotect1011 for the disposal facility ... any protective actions required should 

be considered during the development of the disposal facility" (i.e., in optimization). ICRP 

considered that "reasonable efforts should be made to reduce the probability of human intrusio71 

or to limit i :s consequences" when doses exceed 100 mSv (1CRP-8 l, paragraphs 63-64). 

DOE Comments· Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul24151214p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 20 

19 

The establishment of a dose Ji1111t for intrusion is also inconsistent with N'RCs approach in 

estahlishing 10 CFR Part 6 J initially. While NRC originally proposed to adopt a 500 mrem 

inadvertent intruder standard, this approach was dropped from the final rule because (as 

explained in the final EIS6

) NRC concluded that the dose level could reasonably be used as the 

basis for deriving waste classification tables (i.e., as a target for identifying measures to reduce 

potential impacts of inadvettent intrusion}, but its use as a regulatory limit was not justified or 

practical. We recommend that the 500 mrem dose limit for intruder protection durmg the 

compliance period be recast as a goal that is used to develop waste acceptance criteria and to 

demonstrate added robustness of the disposal approach. Corresponding changes arc also needed 

in proposed § 6 l .13(b )(3) to reflect that dose-based performance objectives in proposed § 61 42 

are goals (or guidelines) and not strict dose limits. Sec also comments on proposed§ 61.7(c)(4). 

The requirement that the disposal facility must "ensure·· protection is an overstatement of what 

can be demonstrated in performance assessment projections for even the compliance :ime period. 

The language should be revised to more accurately reflect the reasonable assurance concept 

(which is applied through the proposed provision at§ 61 23(b)), to read, "Design. operation and 

closure of the land disposal facility must provide protection of an madvertent intruder ... ."' 

(Suggested language changes are shown underlined.) 

§ 61.42(a)-(b), Protection ofinadvertent intruders during the compliance and protective 

assurance periods 

The treatment of radon should be consistent with that in other rules from NRC and other U.S. 

regulatory agencies. That is, radon should be specifically excluded from consideration in 

assessing compliance with the dose limits and targets in these sections. Instead, :-JRC should 

develop a separate radon performance objective consistent with other NRC, EPA, and DOE rules 

(e.g., the flux limit). All agencies that address uranium related wastes that iead to radon 

generation exclude radon from all pathways and treat it separately re.g., 40 CfR Part 190. l 0, 40 

CFR Part 61 (subpart II), 40 CFR Part 61.192 (subpart Q), 10 CFR Part 40 (Appendix A. 

c1ite11on 6) 10 CFR Part 20.110 J (d), DOE Manual 435. l-1 ], all of which specifically exclude 

radon in the air/all pathways objectives]. A major factor in the update to Part 61 is to address 

DC. so consistency with other EPA and NRC regulations addressing u:-anium is appropriate. 

§ 6J.42(b), Protection of inadvertent intrnders during the protective assurance period 

As noted in our general comments, we r::!commend that the protective assurance period be 

deleted, and that the performance pc1iod be designated to begin at l ,000 years after closure. 

/\ccordingly, we recommend that the proposed provisions of§ 6 l .42(b) be eliminated. 

If the protective assurance period and the associated analyses are retained, then important 

changes and clarifications should be made to align the provision with 1'RC's stated intentions 

The use of the term "minimi?:e" is problematic in this context, as discussed regarding the 

requirements for protection of the general public for the protective assurance period. (See 

<· NlJRCG-09~5 F1oal Environmental hnp:icl Statement on 10 CfR Part 61 "l. 1censmg Rt:qmrcmcr1~s for Lund Disposal of 

Rad1oacl1vc Wa~tc." Vol I - S;1rnmary ancl Vlam Report. Nov. 1982,p. 5-4. 

DOE Comme11ts· Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul 2415 12 14p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 

comments on proposed § 6 J .4] (b).) For the same reasons, it is suggested to revise the 

requirement to read: 

p.21 

20 

Reasonable and prnctical measures shall be taken m the design, operation and closure of the 

land disposal facility to control exposures to an inadvertent intruder duri11g the protective 

assurance period. Effo1ts shall the made to reduce releases to a level that is reasonably 

achievable based on tech~1ical and economic considerations. provided that licensees shall be 

presumed to meet this goal if the annual dose docs not exceed a dose target of 5 milliSicverts 

(500 111ill1rem). Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the rcquire1m:nts specified in§ 6 l. l 3(b). 

Concsponding changes are also needed in proposed § 61.13 to reflect NRC' s stated intention 

that the reference dose is intended as a target and not a limit. In proposed paragraph 6 l. l 3(b)(3), 

the phrase '·doses that exceed the limits set fo1th in§ 61.42'" should be revised to reflect that 

dose-based performance objectives in§ 61 42(a) (sec preceding comment) and§ 61 .42(b) are 

goals (or guidelines) and not strict dose limits. 

Note that we also recommend using the term "practical" rather than "practicable·· in the 

regulatory language. Sec comments on proposed section § 61 44 for further explanation. 

§ 61.42(c), Protection of inadvertent intrnders during the performance period 

The use of the term "minimize" is problematic in this context, as discussed regarding the 

requirements for protection of the general pubhc for the performance period (proposed 

§ 61.41 (c)). For the same reasons, it is suggested to revise the tcquirement to read· "Efforts 

shall be made to reduce exposures to an inadvertent intruder ... :· 

§ 61.44, Stability of the site after closure 

The proposal retains an existing requirement rcgm dmg stability of the site after closure, with 

proposed wording that extends the requirement to cover the compliance period and the protective 

assurance period As noted in our general comments, we recommend thal the protective 

assu1ance period be eliminated Whether or not this is done, the extension of the existing 

requirements out to 10,000 years is unjustified and bmdensome. The value 111 separate 

requirements f'or site stability over thousands of years is questionable It is also inconsistent with 

previous NRC evaluations of stability relevant to disposal of Jong-lived radionuclides In 

considering disposal of DU-contaminated materials in near-surface disposal. NRC accepted that 

design measures and cell construction practices provided a ''technical basis sufficient for 

demonstrating long-term site s~ability''. 7 

Most impo11antly, in a performance-based approach, the performance assessment is the 

appropriate means to account for the relevance of factors sucb as this. If performance objectives 

can be demonstrated to be met with reasonable assurance, even if there are increases in 

mfiltrntion, then "stability .. as a separate and specific criterion or performance objective is not 

7 "Salety [valuation Report Req11~st f'or Alternmc D1~po;~l Appre>val And [x.empt1ons For Specific flemat1tc Dcco:nnu;.51oning. 

l'rojcct W.1stc J\t US 1.:co!ogy·~ klilhO I ac1Jrty. October 28, 201 I. ADAMS ML 1114-41087. p 7 

DOE Comment.~ Propo~ed 10 CFR Pait 6.Z 
Jul241512·15p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 22 

21 

needed A requirement on long-term stability may be very difficult to meet. and at the same time 

may have little impact on the protection of human health (e.g., dose calculation). 

It is recommended that this performance objective be deleted. If it is retained, the language 

should reflect that the requirement is relevant for only a limited, reasonable period of time 

following closure. We suggest that it could be appropriate to demonstrate stability for the pe1 iod 

of300 years over which Class 13 and Class C wastes forms are expected to endure (as discussed 

in the proposed concepts in § 6 l. 7(f)), in order to support continued use of the classification 

tables. Another period may be justifiable, but in no case should stability be evaluated separately 

beyond the compliance period (i.e., 1,000 years). We also recommend changing "practicable·· to 

"practical" in the existing regulatory language; as commonly understood, "practicable'' means 

capable of being put into effoct, ·whereas "practical" refers to something that is al.so sensible or 

worthwhile. 8 The language should also be modified to require that measures "eliminate to the 

extent practical the need for ongoing active maintenance of the disposal site duting the 

institutional control pcri..9.9 so that only surveillance, monitoring, or minor custodial care arc 

required.'' (Suggested language modification arc shown underlined.) See also comment<; on 

p10posed §§ 61.7(f) and 61.13(d). 

§ 61.50 (a)(2), Site suitability for near-surface disposal 

NRC's proposal retains (but reorganizes) detailed site suitability requirements. Jn view of the 

numerom, other site-specific analyses now proposed, the value of specific requirements for sitesuitability is questionable, and this section is unduly detailed. More importantly, while such 

provisions were meaningful complementary requirements to the table-based classification 

approach, such criteria arc unnecessary and at odds with a truly risk-informed approach to 

regulation. J\s NRC has stated, "the risk-informed, perfonY1ance-based approach . . eliminates 

arbitrary or prescriptive siting and design criteria, as well as detailed requirements such as 

quantitative subsystem performance objectives" (66 FR 55737). A sound conceptual model of 

the site and a comprehensive performance assessment provide the means to assess the 

significance of site attributes. In a pcrfmmance-b<lscd approach, the appropriate method to 

evaluate t.he site suitability is the site-specific performance assessment. Performance-relevant 

site characteristics and associated disruptive events (and uncertainties) must be considered (as is 

required already by other parts of the proposed regulations); if the performance objectives can be 

shown to be met with reasonable assurance, then additional criteria are not necessary. Such 

restrictions may eliminate potentially viable sites without adding public protection. It is 

recommended that the detailed site suitability criteria in proposed § 6 l. l 3(a)(s) be eliminated. 

§ 61.58, Waste acceptance criteria exceptions 

NRC's proposed approach allows that the WAC may be established based on sitc-spec1:ic 

analyses that account for the site and facility perfo1mance, or based on the pre-existing 

classification tables. Once the WAC is established, the provisions of proposed § 61.52(12) 

prohibit the disposal of any waste that does not meet the acceptance criteria. According to the 

proposed rnle, any adjustments to the WAC would require a license modification [proposed 

§ 6 l.58(g)J. 

"See, e.g .. 1Vebste1 's If NL'W R1ve1s1de Un1vers11y D1ct1rJ1ia1J'. ! 984 

DOE Comments Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Jul241512 16p Chri~opherForinash 703 9080796 p 23 

22 

There is no provision for considering exceptions from WAC. Under the proposed regulation, a 

rcquc~t for a license amendment would be required in order to accept waste with characteristics 

that were not adclre~~ed in the PA and WAC. However, as NRC acknowledges throughout 1ts 

regulatory discussion, small amounts of waste falling outside the PA assumptions (z.e., small -

amounts of DU or other long-lived waste) may be accommodated in a disposal facility without 

affecting its protectiveness. Given this, it would be useful to provide a means for exceptions by 

a less onerous method than submitting a license amendment. An appropriate mechanism might 

be by special analyses as a supplement to the PA, which shows reasonable assurance that the 

performance objectives can still be met Alternatively. ;-.JRC may consider an alternative 

approach that docs not incorporate the W /\C directly into the license. 

DOE responses to NRC's specific requests for comments in the Federal Register notice 

~RC is seel<lng feedback on the proposed approach, especially with regard to whether a 

5 miHiSicvert (500 mrcm) annual dose target is appropriate for the protective as<;urancc 

period and whether it is appropriate to require licensees or license applicants to consider 

alternative levels to minimize exposures to an inadvertent intruder. (80 FR 16090-16091) 

As discussed in our general comments (above), we recommend that the protective assurance 

period be eliminated. The imposition of an intermediate '·protective assurance'' period (from 

1,000 to 10,000 years after closu1 e) docs not appropriately accommodate the uncertainties and 

limitations of modeling over very long timcframes. It establishes defac10 requirements over 

very long timeframes without adding materially to an understanding of the relevant behavior of 

long-lived nuclides· -depleted uranium, in particular. We recommend that a two-tiered approach 

be adopted that retains the proposed J ,000-ycar compliance period (and a5sociatcd dose limit), 

eliminates the protective assurance period (and associated reference dose), and applies the 

qualitative performance period approach to modeling assessments beginning at 1,000 years after 

closure. 

If the protective assurance period is retained, we support the use of 500 mrcm as a dose goal for 

the hypothetical inadvc11ent intruder (and the hypothetical future member of the public) because 

it reflects, better thm1 lower dose levels would, the uncertainty and speculative nature of 

calculations extending into timeframes beyond 1,000 years. A target dose of 500 mrem/yr is 

below the average annual dose for people living in :he United States toda/ and is on the same 

order as risks considered acceptable resulting from radon exposure in residences, for example. 10 

Internationally, there is good acceptance that exposures on the order of naturnl background are 

reasonable reference pomts for very long term assessments. TAEA suggests that "In very long 

time frmnes ... unccrtamties could become much larger and calculated doses may exceed the 

-------~--

q The "-ational Council on Rad1at•on Protection nnd :V1ca;uremcnts ('\lCRP) estrn1:11cs that the average annual c'<posmc 111 th.: 

US is 620 1nrcm/yr Approximately hal!"that amount is due to natural bncl,ground rnd1allon. Sec NCRP Report No 160· lom;ing 

Rad1a11011 Exporn1·e of 1h1: Populotron of the Urured States (2009). as cited al 

http'l/w'''"' cpn.g.ov/rad1at1onfundcrstand/perspcct1ve h••nl 10 The EPA's rndon act1on level-the level below which tl1c Agency doc; not recommend ;;ction~ to further n:d;_ic~ radon 

lcvcls----1s 4 pClfL. Al that level of exposure over a Jilclimc. the i•1c1cascd risJ, of lung cancer·~ up to 62 in 1000. Sec A 

Crll::en s Grutle to Radon~V-3 C!'Y..'I!2L1J.!1Cntal Prnl!;£!!.9l1-l'.-fil<W::Z..11!!J2//www.mu,£QY/i:£\do11fpubs/citguids.h!ml 

DOE Comment'i: Proposed 10 CFR Part 61 
Ju124151217p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 24 

23 

dose constramt f of I 00 mrcm] Comparison of the doses with doses from nalura\ly OCC'clrring 

radionuclides may provide a useful indication of the significance of such cases. " 11 

In addition. several changes to the proposed regulatory language would also be needed to align 

the requirements with NRC"s stated intentions if the protective assurance period is retained 

Importantly, the proposed regulatory language does not set fo11h 500 mrcm as a ·'goal,., but 

rather imposes requirements. As such, it is inconsistent with NRC's stated intent in the p1 camble 

and with the Commission's direction in its February 12, 2014 Memorandum. which calls for a 

"goal of keeping doses below a 500 mrcm/yr analyticai threshold". The use of the tenn 

"minim11.c" rs also problematic and can be mterprcted to be more stringent than the dose limits 

applied during the compliance period. See comments on §§ 61.41 (b), 61.41 (c). 6 l .42(b), and 

61.42(c). 

If the 500 mrem annual dose is properly conveyed as a target, then consideration of alternative 

levels is inherently included; that is, a goal allows some flexibility, especially in view of 

appropriate qualifying terms such as "reasonably achievable". Beyond 1,000 years after closure, 

measures lo further reduce doses below the target level arc not justifiable, because they may 

entail laige costs for little change in modeled doses to a hypothetical future member of the public 

and a hypothetical foture inadve1ient intruder: such an approach is inconsistent with ethical 

principles that state that emphasis for the very long term should be on avc1ting catastrophic 

consequences (NRC's "Technical Analysis Supporting Defi:1ition of Period of Performance:· 

p. I 0). We recommend changes to the proposed regulatory 1 anguagc to eliminate the protective 

assurance period or, in the alternative, to reflect that additional efforts need not be made to 

further reduce doses if the goal of 500 mrcm i5 met. 

As previously stated, NRC is making available the draft guidance document (see Docket ID 

~RC-2015-0003) for public comment concurrent with the publication of this proposed rule 

and is seeking comments on whether the approaches described in the guidance are 

adequate or if further specification for inadvertent intruder scenarios in the proposed rule 

is necessary. (80 FR 16091) 

We recommend that several changes he made to the intruder asscssmenL and inadvertent intruder 

definit10ns m the proposed regulatory language. 1hese recommended changes provide important 

clarification and boundaries that should not be left to guidance. We support the clarification that 

the intruder assessment should consider only activities that are "realistic and consistent with 

expected activities in and around the disposal site at the time of site closure". We also support 

clarification in the inadvertent intruder definition regarding "reasonably foreseeable" pursuits; 

however. we recommend that the phrase "resource exploration or exploitation (e.g., well 

drilling)" be eliminated from the definition of •·inadvertent intruder'·. We IUrther recommend 

that the definition of ''intruder assessment" be revised to clarify that consideration of the 

scenarios used originally in the development of Part 61 is sufficient to comply with the proposed 

requirements for intruder assessment. Refer to our comments on § 61 2, inadve11cnt intruder and 

intruder assessment definitions, for further explanation. 

-------·--- ""Gco!og1cal Disposal ofRad.oactive W;1stc." DSl54. JAE.A. 2005. Section A.7. 

DOE Comments· Proposed 1 D CFR Part 61 
Jul 241512·17p Chri~opherForinash 703 9080796 p 25 

24 

NRC is seeking feedback on the proposed app1·oach, especially with regard to whether a 

dose limit is needed for the long-term analyses or whether the proposed metric combined 

with barrier analyses is more appropriate. (80 FR 16092) 

No dose limit is needed or apprnpriatc for the timeframe beyond J 0,000 years addressed by the 

performance period. We support the concept of extending performance analysis and intruder 

assessments over periods beyond the compliance tirneframe There is value in consicte1 mg, 

qual.itatively, the results of modeling beyond the time when the results can be assigned 

quantitative meamng. Such an assessment can provide valuable information to guide waste 

acceptance criteria, design optimization, and defense-in-depth measures. We support, in 

principle, the performance period and the approach to use analytical results only qualitatively. 

As noted in our general comments, we recommend that the protective assurance period be 

eliminated and that the pcrfo1ma11cc period, with no dose criteria, begins immediately following 

the compliance period, at 1,000 years after closure. fn any case, the performance period should 

extend no longer than the time of peak dose or impact is reached or the pe:"iod of smfacc 

geologic stability, whichever is sooner. See comments on§ 61.2, performance period definition. 

Regardless of whether a two-tier or three-tier approach is chosen. a dose limit or goal for 

timcframes encompassed by the proposed pe1formance period would not be justified. Advisory 

bodies --including IAEJ\, };EA, ICRP, and ACNW-have cautioned strongly against 

quantitatively interpreting periormancc assessment and modeling results as health indicators for 

timeframes beyond even several hundred years. (Refer to our general comments, above, on the 

three-tiered approacr.. for fu1iher details and citations.) To impose a limit for longer time periods 

1~ unsupportable, and no clear purpose is served by providing a reference dose for the 

performance period, whenever it is designated to begin. To do ~o would imply a degree of 

certainty and reliance on the quantitative modeling results that is unjustified fo1 near-surface 

disposal over such timeframes. The proposed approach, with no dose limit or targel dming the 

performance period, is appropriate and reasonable. 

However, no separate barrier analysis is appropriate as a complementary criterion, separate 

analysis of barriers constitutes sub-system pcrlormance criteria, which is widely discounted as a 

regulatory strategy for waste disposal, in whicb complex interactions between natural and 

engineered systems may be central to the maintenance of safety functions and the overall 

performance of the disposal facility. OECD NE/\ states, for example, '"The detailed specification 

in regulation of requirements on system components is generally avoided; the current view is that 

this would unnecessarily reduce the flexibility of the implementer to adapt system components to 

the specific characteristics of the waste and the geological environment under consideration, and 

would potentially undermine the need for the implementer to take full responsibility for the 

safoty case."' 1 

Furthermore, retaming a separate barrier analysis would be inconsistent with a si:c-specific. 

performance-based approach. As NRC itself has said. "'The Commission is confident that 

evidence for the resilience or lack of resilience, of a multiple-ball'icr system will be found by 

examming a comprehensive and properly documented performance assessment of the behavior 

•: N[A 2009 Timescales l?eport. p. 39 

DOI? Comments· Proposed 10 CFR Port 61 
Jul241512'18p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 

of the overall repository system.·· (66 FR 55759) See comments on§ 61.13(b), intruder 

analyses. 

p 26 

25 

NRC is seeking feedback on the proposed approach, especially with regard to whether a 5 

mHU:Sievert (500 mrem) annual dose goal is approprinte for the protective assunrnce period 

and whether it is appropriate to consider alternative, higher levels based on technological 

and economic considerations. (80 FR 16098) 

As discussed in our general comments (above), we recommend that the protective assurance 

period be eliminated The imposition of an intermediate "protective assurance'' period (from 

LOOO to 10,000 years after closure) does not appropriately accommodate the uncertainties and 

limitations of modeling over very long timeframes. It e~tablishes de facto requirements over 

very long timcframes without adding materially to an understanding of the relevant behavior of 

long-lived nuclidcs -depleted uranium. in particular. We recommend that a two-tiered approach 

be adopted that retains the proposed l ,000-year compliance period (and associated dose limit), 

eliminates the protective assurance period (and associated reference dose), and applies the 

qualitative performance period approach to modeling assessments beginning at 1.000 years after 

closure. 

If the protective assurnncc period is retained, we support the use of 500 mrem as a dose target 

because it reflects. better than lower dose levels would. the uncertainty and speculative nature or 

calculations.extending into timcframes beyond 1,000 years. A target dose of 500 mrem/yr is 

below the average annual dose for people living in the United States today and is on the same 

order as risks considered acceptable resulting from radon exposure in residences, for example.'' 

In addition, :;everal changes to the proposed regulatory language-in both proμosed § 61.41 (b) 

and proposed§ 61.42(b)-would be needed to align the proposed 1cgulations with NRC's stated 

intentions, 1f the protective assurance period is retained. Importantly, the proposed regulatory 

language does not set forth 500 mrem as a "goal," but rather imposes requirements in both 

proposed§ 61.4 l(b) and proposed§ 61.42(b). As such, it is inconsistent with NRC's stated 

intent in the preamble and with the Commission's direction in its Pebnmry i 2, 2014 

Memorandum, which calls for a ''goal of keeping doses below a 500 1111 cm/yr threshold". 

The use of the term "minimize" is al.;;o problematic and can be inte1vrcted to be more stringent 

than the dose limits applied during the compliance period Sec comments on§§ 61.41 (b). 

61.4l(c), 61.42(b), and 6l .42(c). 

If lhe protective assurance pcnod is retamed, 1t is entirely appropriate to consider alternative, 

higher potential exposures that are reasonably achievable based on technological and cconomi<.: 

considerations. Indeed, these factors are central to the concept of a target dose. If cons1dcration 

of alternative, higher dose levels is excluded, the "target" becomes a de facto limit. Similarly. 

technological and economic considerations arc essential components of an evaluation of wha~ is 

··reasonably achievable". Measures to fmther reduce doses below the target level beyond 

1.000 years are not justifiable, because they may entail large costs fo1 little change in modeled 

doses to a hypothetical future member of the public and a hypothetical future inadvertent 

intrnder: such an approach is inconsistent with ethical principles that state that emphasis for the 

"See. as before. NCR P Report "<o 160 and A C1/l::cn s Gurde 10 Radon 

DOE Comments Proposed 10 CFR !'art 61 
Jul241512·19p Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 27 

26 

very long term should be on averting catastrophic consequences CTechnical Analysis 

Supporting Definition of Period of Performance, .. p. 10). If the protective assurance period is 

retained, we recommend changes to the proposed regulatory language to reflect a goal dose level 

that is reasonably achievable based on technical and economic considerations, and that additional 

efforts need not be made to further reduce doses if a goal of 500 mrem per year is met. 

Is the proposed three-tiered approach (a compliance period, followed by a protective 

assurance period, followed by a performance period, if applicable} appropriate? 

(80 FR 16106) 

A three-tiered approach is not appropriate. /\s described in our general comments, we 

recommend that the protective assurance penod be eliminated and that the performance period 

begin at 1,000 years after closure, ending once peak dose or impact is reached or the period of 

surface geologic stability. whichever is soonest We fu1ther note that the proposed regulations 

are inconsistent with the request for comment concerning the performance period; the request for 

comment includes the qualifier ''if applicable" for the performance period, whereas the proposed 

rcgulatrons are written such that "performance period" is always applicable, with requirements 

that "effort shall be made to minimize ... to the extent reasonably achievabie" f emphasis added]. 

See proposed§ 61.41(c) (releases to general population),§ 61.42(c) (protection of inadvertent 

intruders). 

Is 500 rnrcm/yr an appropriate analytical threshold for the protective assurance period'? 

(80 FR 16106) 

As described in preceding comments, we support a 500 mrem/yr analytical threshold for the 

protective assurance period, if that period is rctai:1ed. The 500 mrem/yr threshold should 

function as a dose target or goal--not a limit-and changes to the proposed rule language arc 

needed to appropriately convey that intent. 

Should thcr·e be a quantitative goal or dose limit associated with the performance period 

analysis, and if so, what should that goal or dose limit be? (80 FR 16Hl6) 

As described in preceding comments, no quantitative goal or dose limit should be established for 

the performance period. /\quantitative, or even sem1-quant1tativc, interpretation ofmodcling 

results for such timcframes is unjustified, unsupportable for near-surface disposal, and 

inconsistent with international guidance ("Techmcal Analysis Supporting Definition of Penod of 

Per formancc,'' p. 10). Refer to our general comments on the three-tiered approach for further 

details. 

NRC requests comment on the propoc;;cd rule with respect to the clarity and effectiveness of 

the language used. (80 FR 16114) 

The proposed rule language merits signific<mt attention to improve it5 clarity and effectiveness 

In our view, the proposed regulation is unnecessarily complex and difficult to understand. For 

example, requirements are found in multiple sections, with difficult-to-follow cross-referencing. 

In our view, sections such as '"concepts" arc excessively detailed (with much information that 

DOE Comments Proposed 10 CF!< Part 61 
Jul 24 15 12·2op Christopher Forinash 703 9080796 p 28 

27 

would be more appropriately included in guid<mct;) and contain some discussion5 that imply 

P°"~1hlc requirement"; 1.1t the same rime, the discussions omit clarifying details essential to bound 

the regulatory analyses and prevent unlettered discret1011 111 implementation. The complexity and 

confusion throughout the proposed regulation are due in large part ro a failure to folly implement 

a site-specific, performance-ha~ed ap11r0nch. The proposed regulation would require new 

analyses while retaming (and even adding to) detailed criteria on aspects that would be addressed 

more appropriately by site-specific P J\ and intrndcr assessment analyses. Mnny of the analyses 

previously reqi..iircd to complement the table-based classification approach arc unnecessary and 

burdensome in light of the new site-specific analyses. and should be eliminated We note such 

cases in our specific comments above. 

Another source of conJUsion is that the proposed regulation would add new definitions for 

several terms, which do not follow well-established, internationally accepted concepts described 

clearly in published documentat1on. This leaves open questions about whether or not NRCs 

proposed definitions signify a meaningful depaiturc from the accepted concepts. and for what 

reasons. It is suggested that NRC be consistent with established definitions as much as possible. 

We note specific instances on our detaiied comments regarding definitions in§ 61.2 

DOT: Comments: Pro1;osed 10 CFR Part 61 
0712412015 13:33 FAX 

?lf-v? c':I''\•( ci.~ .:;7-" 

\.J 

, -c; ') ( t..r?.4_, 

1./ 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608163
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/24/15 4:24 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k5u-y5ob

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0130

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: David Scaturo

Address: 

2600 Bull Street

Columbia, SC, 29201

Email: scaturdm@dhec.sc.gov

General Comment

Please see attached comments from South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. See 

attached file(s)

Attachments

SCDHEC Comments to 10 CFR Part 61 7-24-15 FINAL

Page 1 of 1

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0130.html 07/24/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608164
H E C 

"""'"' C:11lminr • E.. Hdi,:l. Din=cror ~ Promoting mu/ proucti11g the health of the public a11d the m virom11mt 

July 24, 2015 

Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook 

Secretary 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff 

RE: Proposed 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 Rule (80 FR 16082) 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

Dear Madam Secretary: 

The South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SCDHEC) appreciates 

the opportunity to provide comments to the proposed 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 rulemaking 

regarding low-level radioactive waste disposal, as published in the Federal Register on March 

26, 2015 (80 FR 16082). SCDHEC believes the proposed revisions to the existing regulations 

directly impact the State of South Carolina as an Agreement State and as one of the four sited 

states, and looks forward to receiving the full consideration of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission. 

1. Administrative Comments 

Changes are proposed for the language in 61.28(a); however there is no listing for 61 .28(a) in the 

"Proposed Compatibility Category for 10 CFR Part 61" on page 16112 of the Federal Register. 

There is, however, a listing for 61.28(a)(2) which also has proposed changes. 

2. Applicability of Part 61 to Existing Licensed Facilities 

NRC should provide clarification regarding the conflicting requirements in 61.l(a) and 

those in 61.13. 

The applicability of the original rule published in 1982 was set forth in 61.1 (a) which states, 

"Applicability of the requirements in this Part in effect on the effective date of this rule will be 

determined on a case-by-case basis and implemented through terms and conditions of the license 

or by orders issued by the commission." Many of the Part 61 requirements were eventually 

applied through license conditions to near-surface disposal facilities in operation on the effective 

date of the rule, and the applicability was determined on a case-by-case basis as stated in 61. l(a). 

This language afforded regulators of licensed disposal facilities the flexibility to consider when 

and if each facility should comply with the new requirements based on practical, economical and 

technical considerations. 

SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL 

2600 BullStrccl • Columhia,SC29201 • Phonc:(803)898-3432 • www~c;cdhcc.gov 
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page 2of6 

Language is proposed to be added in 61.13 requiring that technical analyses shall be submitted 

by all "Licensees with licenses for land disposal facilities in effect on the effective date of this 

subpart ... at the next license renewal or within 5 years of the effective date of this subpart, 

whichever comes first." The case-by-case decision making afforded by 61. l (a) is thereby taken 

away in the proposed language of 61 .13. 

At the very least, the proposed rule language should be clarified to reflect which requirement, 

61.l(a) or 61.13, is the overarching one. 

NRC should reconsider its interpretation of 61.l(a). 

During a public meeting in Columbia, SC on June 2, 2015, an NRC representative indicated that 

the language in 61 .1 {a) was only intended to apply to the initial Part 61 requirements and not to 

subsequent revisions to Part 61 . That interpretation is not made clear by the current or proposed 

language. 

While the use of the term "case-by-case" may have been intended to refer to a facility, the 

proposed changes to Part 61 are the most significant since its promulgation and warrant 

flexibility for each existing requirement given the nature of the new requirements. It is unclear 

what flexibility exists in the applicability of the original and the proposed new Part 61 

requirements. 

The State of South Carolina does not support "grandfathering" as a means to relieve the 

licensee's regulatory obligation to protect public health and the environment without discretion. 

The applicability of the requirements should continue to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 

The NRC suggested in the public meeting that states can exempt licensees from the requirements 

using the provision found in 61.6. This would seemingly shift the burden from the NRC to the 

states to determine whether such an exemption would be appropriate; however, this action would 

be subject to review by the NRC for adequacy during its formal Agreement State program 

evaluation. 

NRC should clearly indicate that the applicability of individual requirements of the rule would be 

determined on a case-by-case basis. In support of the suggestion, note that the current and 

proposed language: "implemented through terms and co11ditions of the license", implies that the 

individual requirements of Part 61 may be applied separately, since only a single conditi011 of a 

license is necessary to require compliance with Part 61 as a whole. 

In summary, the NRC should revise the language to indicate that "case-by-case" refers to each 

individual licensed facility and to each individual requirement. It is understood that many of the 

requirements of Part 61 are related; therefore, the regulator would have to carefully consider how 

to individually apply the requirements of the regulation. NRC should structure the regulation to 

be amenable to individual application of requirements where practical. This could be 

accomplished by separating the proposed new requirements for technical analyses into an 

appendix or subpart. 
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page 3of6 

Since the main reason for revising the requirements in Part 61 are related to the generation 

of unexpected new waste streams, the new requirements should focus on future disposal at 

all facilities and consider the relevancy to existing licensed facilities. 

In the section titled, "Why do the regulatory requirements need to be revised?" (p. 16087 of the 

Federal Register), one of the reasons provided is related to new waste streams that were not 

envisioned during the development of 10 CFR Part 61. These waste streams include, but are not 

limited to, depleted uranium from enrichment facilities, LLR W from DOE operations, blended 

LLR W streams in quantities greater than previously expected, and the generation of different 

LLR W streams that may result from new technologies. The concerns related to the disposal of 

these waste streams are not entirely applicable to all existing facilities. For example, only two of 

the existing facilities are candidates for the disposal of Depleted Uranium (DU) from enrichment 

facilities or from DOE. Also, one of the disposal facilities disposes all waste with intruder 

barriers so the "large scale blending of Class Band C concentr~tions of LLRW with Class A to 

produce a Class A mixture that could result in a dose to an inadvertent intruder that is above 500 

mrem" would not be relevant. Since the waste streams described will be considered for future 

disposal only, the associated new requirements should affect future disposal operations only. 

The proposed amendments should not apply to closed portions of a facility undergoing postclosure care, where significant resources have been expended to achieve closure, and where 

additional engineering controls to meet the inadvertent intruder standard are technically and 

economically impracticable. Excavation of DU waste presents a real dose to workers, as opposed 

to a hypothetical dose to someone sometime in the geologic future. 

3. Applicability of Part 61 to Waste Already Disposed 

NRC should allow flexibility in determining the applicability of the proposed requirements 

to waste already disposed and future waste disposal taking into consideration established 

precedence, technical and economic considerations, and the effect on overall site design. 

Although many Part 61 requirements were eventually applied to waste disposal facilities that had 

licenses in effect on the effective date of the original Part 61, the requirements were typically 

only applied to future waste disposal operations. Waste already disposed was not required to be 

evaluated to determine whether it may have been considered Class B or Class C waste under the 

then new waste classification system. Such an evaluation was not considered necessary since a 

decision to apply new stability and intruder protection requirements to waste already disposed 

would likely be disruptive to the disposal system, result in an increase in dose to workers and 

potentially the general population, and create an unnecessary technical and economic burden for 

the licensee and the regulator. 

The proposed language in 61 . 7(t)(2) states that waste classified under 10 CFR 6 l .55(a)(6) may 

not decay to acceptable levels in 100 years and safety is provided by limiting quantities and 

concentrations of the material consistent with the disposal site design. Such limitations on 

quantities and concentrations can only reasonably be applied to future waste disposals. 
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page4of6 

Similarly, 10 CFR 61. 7(f)(3) states that waste that will not decay to acceptable levels in 100 

years " ... must be stable and be disposed at a greater depth ... " and "where site conditions prevent 

deeper disposal, intruder barriers such as concrete covers may be used." For waste already 

disposed, classified under IO CFR 61.55(a)(6), and where site conditions prevent deeper 

disposal, the only option would be to use intruder barriers. The incorporation of such barriers 

into site design as a remedial measure could have negative consequences. For example, high 

integrity containers (special containers designed to provide stability) within the disposal unit 

have structural design requirements based in part on the overburden expected in the disposal 

environment. Jn this example, adding concrete barriers on the surface would be incompatible 

with the overall site design and could compromise the integrity of the high integrity containers. 

Also, for LLRW disposal facilities, one of the major activities is typically to install a final 

engineered cap as an engineered barrier and to enhance site stability. For one site, the final cap 

has been installed for the majority of the disposal area. Once the final cap is installed and the 

related drainage features of the site are designed, any modification such as adding concrete 

barriers would compromise the overall site design. 

It is clear that at the time of the initial promulgation of the requirements in Part 61, NRC 

recognized the need to allow for flexibility in applying new regulations to existing facilities by 

explicitly addressing its applicability to existing facilities in 61 .1 (a). The language in 61.1 (a) 

aligns with the philosophy that waste disposed in good faith and in accordance with applicable 

standards in place at the time should not necessarily be subject to new requirements that may be 

technically impractical and/or financially prohibitive. The reasons to adopt such a philosophy 

remain valid regardless of whether disposal facilities were able to eventually comply with some 

of the, then new, requirements. The NRC should continue to adhere to this philosophy. 

4. Regulatory Analysis and Backlit Analysis 

While back.fitting is not required by regulation for the new proposed Part 61 revisions, 

NRC should consider performing a comparable analysis. 

The NRC voluntarily performed a regulatory analysis and published Draft Regulatory Analysis 

for Proposed Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (10 CFR Part 61) in February 

2015. The NRC did not perform a backfit analysis as described in 10 CFR 50.109. Neither a 

backfit analysis nor a regulatory analysis is required by statute or regulation for 10 CFR Part 61 . 

However, the NRC has been voluntarily performing regulatory analyses since 1976. 

Given the significant costs to licensees, license applicants and regulators associated with 

implementing the new proposed requirements, and considering that the proposed revisions 

represent the most substantial changes to Part 61 since its promulgation, the NRC should 

consider performing an expanded analysis similar to a backfit analysis in order to assess whether 

the proposed revisions will provide for a substantial increase in the overall protection of the 

public health and safety and that the associated direct and indirect costs are justified by the 

benefits. In performing the expanded analysis, the NRC should address the pertinent items listed 

in IO CFR 50. I09 ( c ). 
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page 5of6 

5. Long-term Stability Requirements 

The proposed requirement to demonstrate stability for a period of 10,000 years seems 

incommensurate with the overall concept of near-surface disposal of LLRW. 

The concepts section 61. 7 refers to I 00, 300 and 500 year timeframes in multiple instances, but 

not timeframes on the order of thousands of years. Specifically, 61.7(a)(2) for waste 

characterization requires that site characteristics should take into account the radiological 

characteristics of the waste and be evaluated for at least a 500 year timeframe and 61 . 7(t)(3) 

suggests that the effective life of an intruder barrier be at least 500 years. 61. 7(t)(l) suggests that 

Class Band C waste forms or containers should be designed to be stable over 300 years. 

However, the language proposed in 61.44 requires long-term stability of the disposal site for the 

newly defined compliance (1000 years) and protective assurance periods (10,000 years) which 

are much longer timeframes. 

The concept of stability for a period of I 0,000 years is not realistic with the overall concept of 

near-surface disposal of LLRW given the constantly changing surface environment over time. In 

addition, engineered barriers for near-surface disposal have finite lifespans, which is inconsistent 

with the concept of surface stability for 10,000 years. Further, computational models that are 

required to determine whether a disposal facility can achieve site stability out to 10,000 years are 

only as good as the inputs that are used, and these inputs are probabilistic at best. 

6. Adequacy of the Cost and Benefit Estimate developed in the Regulatory Analysis 

document [Executive Summary, Section 111.M.(5)1 

The Draft Regulatory Analysis for Proposed Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

(10 CFR Part 61) February 2015, Executive Summary states the following: 

"Cost to the Industry. The proposed rule would result in an average undiscounted 

implementation cost per licensee of an estimated $1,000,000, followed by an estimated 

undiscounted annual cost of $4,000 per licensee. Overall, the industry will incur an 

estimated undiscounted implementation cost of $4.0 million, followed by an estimated 

annual cost of $16,000. 

Cost to the Agreement States. The proposed rule would result in additional costs to 

the Agreement States with all costs resulting from implementation. On average, each 

Agreement State would incur an estimated undiscounted implementation cost of 

$525,000. Overall, the Agreement States will incur an estimated undiscounted 

implementation cost of $2.1 million." 

Although this regulatory analysis does provide assumptions of the estimated costs for 

implementation of Revisions to Part 61 , the estimated implementation costs presented are 

generic in nature and do not include site specific considerations that could substantially increase 

these costs. Also, there are potential additional costs that may not have been considered. These 

include, but may not be limited to, costs associated with procuring regulatory technical expertise 

required to review and comment on the perfonnance assessments that utilize the new complex 
Ms. Annette Vietti-Cook 

July 24, 2015 

Page 6 of 6 

methods proposed, and costs associated with potential remediation activities at existing sites 

under the current Part 61 requirements. 

The regulators of existing facilities are estimated by NRC to expend substantial resources in 

implementing the proposed new requirements. Many states do not have the resources or expertise 

to review analyses that are substantially more complex than the current required analyses and 

will likely need to seek assistance from the NRC staff or private companies to perform the 

reviews. External review assistance is more expensive than internal reviews and most states do 

not have funds set aside for this. License fees could potentially be increased to support the more 

complex reviews but license fees are typically set in regulation and would require legislative 

support to increase and therefore could not be guaranteed. It is our understanding that actual 

costs incurred by licensees that completed similar performance analyses (to meet state 

requirements for DU acceptance that are already in place), and those incurred by Agreement 

States reviewing the analyses, substantially exceeded the NRC cost estimates published in the 

Regulatory Analysis document. NRC should reconsider the basis for these cost estimates and 

publish updated information. 

Any site that does not intend to accept large quantities of DU waste (the main driver behind the 

proposed new regulations) at their licensed disposal facilities should not incur the significant 

expenditures necessary to review and implement proposed Part 61 requirements. 

Thank you for considering these comments in finalizing the revisions to I 0 CFR Parts 20 and 61. 

Sincerely, 

~~. 

David Scaturo, PE, PG, Radiation Control Program Director 

Director, Division of Waste Management 

Bureau of Land and Waste Management 

South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 

cc: Elizabeth A. Dieck 

Daphne G. Neel 

Stan L. Clark 

Susan E. Jenkins 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/24/15 4:29 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k5v-7awn

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0131

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: anonymous anonymous

General Comment

Any radionuclides which are short-lived enough to be safely buried from a radiological perspective (half-life 

of one year or less) can be more safely held on site until they are no longer radioactive. Furthermore, many, 

like DU, act as chemical poisons (e.g. cause kidney damage). Thus, there should be no burial of radioactive 

waste at all. 

For much less than what is being charged by these nuclear waste burial dumps, the radioactive waste could be 

put in good quality containers, inside a solid compound. 

It must remain monitored for perpetuity, which is still cheaper than medical care for cancers caused if it is let 

loose into the environment. Also cheaper to monitor it than to care for the mentally and physically disabled 

children, born disabled due to genetic damage from letting the radionuclides into the environment. Cancers 

and disabilities caused by you refusing to do your job. 

20 years of your 5 mSv, for instance, will lead to 1% or more having life-shortening cancer. Your 1 mSv will 

lead to 1% or more having a life-shortening cancer within a lifetime. So says the US government funded 

BEIR report. 

Burying this falsely called "low level" waste, which includes things like plutonium, and other radionuclides 

which are deadly for hundreds, thousands and even millions of years is a major crime. You will eventually be 

put on trial for crimes against the American people and humanity, even in your 90s it can happen, like the 

Nazis and Nazi collaborators. 

I agree with the NIRS, Sierra Club, and SEED when they say: "We call in NRC to stop wasting its resources 

Page 1 of 2

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0131.html 07/24/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608165
trying to come up with more ways to let nuclear waste out of control and to charge those who make the wastes 

with whatever costs are needed to isolate and regulate them for at least 10 to 20 half-lives of the radionuclides 

present."

Page 2 of 2

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0131.html 07/24/2015
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Kosson, David S <David.Kosson@Vanderbilt.Edu>

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 4:56 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: Clarke, James H; 'Stewart, Richard'; Kosson, David S; 'Charles Powers'; 

kathryn.higley@oregonstate.edu; craigbenson@gmail.com; 'lbliss@cresp.org'

Subject: [External_Sender] Comments on 2015 proposed LLW rule 80 FR 16802

Attachments: Final_CRESP comments on 2015 proposed LLW rule 80 FR 16802.pdf

Attached please find comments on the 2015 proposed LLW rule 80 FR 16802, which I am hereby submitting on behalf of

the CRESP review team.

Sincerely,

David S. Kosson, Ph.D.

CRESP Principal Investigator

Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Engineering

Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Professor of Chemical Engineering

Professor of Earth and Environmental Sciences

Vanderbilt University

Office:  (615) 322‐1064

Mobile: (615) 337‐5889

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608166
The Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder

Participation III Consortium Universities: Vanderbilt University, Howard University, Oregon State University, New 

 York University, Robert Wood Johnson Medical School, Rutgers University, University of Arizona, 

University of Wisconsin - Madison

Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering

 VU Station B Number 351831

Nashville, TN 37235 

Phone: 615-322-2697 Fax: 615-322-3365 

 www.cresp.org

•

CRESP Comments on 2015 Proposed NRC LLW Rule, 80 FR 16082, by

David Kosson on behalf of the CRESP Review Team

david.kosson@vanderbilt.edu

(615) 337-5889

July 24 2015

These comments on the NRC proposed Low-Level Waste Disposal Rule, 80 FR 61082 (March 26, 

2015) are offered by David Kosson on behalf of a CRESP Review Team consisting of Craig H. 

Benson, James H. Clarke, Kathryn A. Higley, Charles W. Powers, Richard B. Stewart and him. 

Each of these commenters has extensive experience in nuclear waste management and 

environmental regulatory issues. They are senior researchers and members of the Management 

Board of the Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation (CRESP), and share 

CRESP's commitment to performance-based regulatory approaches, that are informed by risk,

and are protective, science-based, flexible, and cost-effective.

1

Experience and Qualifications of Commenters

David S. Kosson is Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Engineering at Vanderbilt University,

where he has appointments as Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering,Chemical

Engineering and Earth and Environmental Sciences. He is principal investigator of the multiuniversity Consortium for Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Evaluation (CRESP). Dr. Kosson has

led the development of the US EPA Leaching Environmental Assessment Framework (LEAF)

and leads the Cementitious Barriers Partnership which is a multi-institution initiative focused

on developing advanced tools for predicting the long-term performance of cementitious

materials in nuclear applications. Dr. Kosson also has been a member of the leadership

 

1 CRESP worksto advance cost-effective, risk-informed cleanup ofthe nation's nuclear weapons production facility

waste sites and management of potential future nuclear sites and wastes. CRESP carries out multi-disciplinary

research, education and review in waste processing and special nuclear materials; remediation, near surface disposal

and long-term stewardship; nuclear waste management policy and strategy; and, stakeholder engagement and 

communication. Principal Investigator David Kosson and Co-Principal Investigator Charles Powers lead the multiuniversity consortium that has served the DOE and its stakeholders since 1995, currently through a cooperative

agreement (2006- 2017) awarded to Vanderbilt University . The CRESP Management Board is comprised of technical,

engineering, scientific, medical and policy experts from eight university consortium member institutions: Vanderbilt

University, Howard University, New York University School of Law, Oregon StateUniversity, Rutgers, TheState

University ofNew Jersey, UniversityofArizona,University ofWisconsin-Madison andGeorgia Institute of

Technology.
2 

committee for the Risk and Performance Assessment Community of Practice (formerly the 

Performance Assessment Community of Practice) and served as an advisor on several major

projects for the DOE Office of Environmental Management.

Craig H. Benson is Dean of the School of Engineering and Applied Science and the Hamilton 

Professor of Civil & Environmental Engineering at the University of Virginia. Previously, he was 

Wisconsin Distinguished Professor and Chair of the Departments of Civil and Environmental

Engineering and Geological Engineering at the University of Wisconsin- Madison. Dr. Benson

has been conducting experimental and analytical research in geoenvironmental engineering for

nearly three decades regarding containment of solid, hazardous, radioactive, and mining

wastes. Benson directs the CRESP Landfill Partnership in collaboration with Professor Clarke. 

His research includes laboratory studies, large-scale field experiments, and computer

modeling. Dr. Benson has received numerous awards for his work on containment systems 

modeling including the Ralph Peck Award in 2012 from the American Society of Civil

Engineers and the Award of Merit from ASTM International. Dr. Benson is a member of the

National Academy of Engineering, Past President of the ASCE Geo- Institute and former Vice 

Chair of the Executive Committee of ASTM Committee D18 on Soil and Rock. He is a participant 

and has been a member of the leadership committee of the Risk and Performance Assessment 

Community of Practice.

James H. Clarke is Professor of the Practice of Civil and Environmental Engineering and Professor

of Earth and Environmental Sciences at Vanderbilt University. Dr. Clarke was a member of the

former Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Advisory Committee on Nuclear Waste and

Materials and is a consultant to the NRC Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards. He is a 

Board Certified Environmental Scientist (BCES) and a member of the American Academy of

Environmental Engineers and Scientists, a Fellow of the American Academy of Forensic 

Scientists, and a member of the Association of Environmental Engineering and Science 

Professors. He is also a participant in the Risk and Performance Assessment Community of

Practice and, with Professor Craig Benson, in CRESP's Landfill Partnership.

Kathryn A. Higley is Professor and Head of the School of Nuclear Science and Engineering at 

Oregon State University. She is a member of the National Council on Radiation Protection and 

Measurements, Vice-Chair of the International Commission on Radiological Protection’s 

Committee 5 (Protection of the Environment), a Fellow of the Health Physics Society, and a 

Certified Health Physicist. She works extensively in the development and application of tools to 

assess environmental dose and impact from radionuclide releases.

Charles W. Powers is Professor of Environmental Management at Vanderbilt University, coPrincipal Investigator and founding chief executive officer of the Consortium for

Risk Evaluation with Stakeholder Participation and was active in the initial efforts to build the

Risk and Performance Assessment Community of Practice. He has published extensively on

how to achieve integrated, technically-based risk- informed environmental policy. In addition

to having served on the faculties of Yale, Harvard and Princeton Universities and the Robert
3 

Wood Johnson Medical School, he was chief environmental officer and Vice President for

Public Policy at Cummins Engine Company. In addition to CRESP he helped create and was

first chief executive officer of the Health Effects Institute, Clean Sites, Inc., and The Institute

for Evaluating Health Risks and for a decade chaired the New York Academy of Sciences' New

York/New Jersey Harbor Consortium.

Richard B. Stewart is University Professor and John Edward Sexton Professor of Law at New

York University (NYU) and Director of NYU's Center on Environmental and Land Use Law. He

has published extensively on environmental law and policy and administrative law and

regulation, including (with Jane Stewart) Fuel Cycle to Nowhere: US. Law and Policy on 

Nuclear Waste (2011), the first comprehensive history and account of U.S. nuclear waste

regulation and policy. During 1989-1991 Stewart served as Assistant Attorney General for

Environment and Natural Resources at the US Department of Justice, where he was

extensively engaged inthe implementation of CERCLA and environmental issues at DOE

defense facilities. He was formerly Chair and currently serves as Advisory Trustee of the

Environmental Defense Fund.

Comments on the Proposed Rule

Risk-informed, performance-based low-levelwaste regulation

We strongly support and commend NRC’s commitment, reflected in a number of recent

decisions and statements, to a risk-informed performance-based approach to low-level waste 

(LLW) regulation. In its deft use of scientific methods and structure, this approach ensures

protection while providing needed flexibility to tailor regulatory requirements to the

characteristics of particular wastes and disposal sites in the context of managing risk.

Consequently, the approach is pragmatic and cost-effective. CRESP has long espoused this

approach and has worked with waste managers, regulators, and communities to implement

it in a variety of settings. In January, 2013, CRESP filed comments on the preliminary proposed 

version of the LLW rule urging this approach.

Many key provisions in the proposed rule commendably reflect and implement the riskinformed performance-based approach. These include the provisions for a 1000-year 

compliance period rather than the 10,000-year period in the 2011 preliminary proposed rule, a 

risk-based approach to inadvertent intruder protection, site-specific waste acceptance criteria 

using risk-based performance assessments, and insistence on the use of updated dosimetry. In

CRESP’s 2013 comments on the preliminary proposed rule, we recommended just such 

provisions and are pleased to see that NRC has proposed their adoption.

Other provisions in the proposed rule, however, impose rigid and uniform requirements 

inconsistent with this same risk-informed performance-based approach. These include 

requirements for a three-tier regulatory structure that includes a 10,000-year period for all LLW 

that includes not only the 1000-year compliance period but an additional second tier “Protective 

Assurance” period extending to 10,000 years for all LLW, not just long-lived wastes, and a third 
4 

tier “Performance Period” for long lived LLW with concentrations exceeding those in Table A of 

10 CFR 61.13(e), beginning 10,000 years after facility closure and extending for an indefinite 

period. Given the uncertainties presented and limits of knowledge regarding circumstances over 

millennial time periods, these proposed provisions are unrealistic and may well be lacking in 

technically-specifiable rigor while concealing the fact that they could result in unacceptably 

variable application. Hence, they should be deleted.... in favor of a single Tier 2 measure for the 

period after 1000 years that would use a qualitative analysis of the risks posed by specific 

quantities of wastes at specific sites and apply an ALARA approach for assessing protectiveness. 

This approach should be complemented with an appropriate and pragmatic performance 

monitoring requirement during operation and a limited post-closure period that ensures that 

permit assumptions are being met and provides early warning if key assumptions are not being 

achieved. Where appropriate and feasible, exposure goals may be used as a guideline for 

qualitative evaluation of risk and protectiveness. 

As explained in the Federal Register discussion of the proposed rule, the rule must respond to 

the circumstance that long-lived LLW were not considered in the development of the LLW 

classification tables. This circumstance does not, however, justify imposing burdensome 

regulatory requirements for ordinary low level wastes extending beyond 1000 years. Further, 

the risks posed by depleted uranium (DU) and the potential risks posed by other such “unique 

wastes” that require additional analysis may, depending on circumstances, require special 

protective measures. But these risks should be addressed through a flexible, site-specific 

performance-based approach rather than specifying unrealistically long periods for 

demonstrating conformance with regulatory standards including quantitative exposure limits for 

a very diverse universe of LLW. The special issues posed by long-lived wastes should be resolved 

on a site-specific, waste-specific basis through a collaborative approach involving input from the

Risk and Performance Assessment Community of Practice. 

CRESP’s comments on specific provisions of the proposed rule are as follows:

Proposed rule provisions that appropriately reflect and implement a risk-informed, 

performance-based regulatory approach and that accordingly should be adopted

Site-specific waste acceptance criteria. The proposed provisions for 10 CFR § 61.58 provide for

development and implementation of waste acceptance criteria that will ensure compliance with 

the performance objectives of Subpart C, based either on waste classifications set forth in 

§61.55 or the technical analyses of the particular land disposal facility required by §61.13, 

including the information required by §61.12. Providing the option of using waste acceptance 

criteria based on analysis of the specific location, conditions, and design of a specific site 

appropriately provides site-specific flexibility while ensuring risk-informed performance-based 

protectiveness. 

Site specific performance assessments. The provisions in the proposed rule, §§61.7 and 61.13 

regarding performance objectives, technical analyses, and performance assessments, both for 
5 

sites using site-specific waste acceptance criteria and sites using the §61.55 waste tables, also 

rely on principles of risk-informed, performance-based protectiveness and will provide the basis 

for assessing and demonstrating compliance with the regulatory requirements . These 

assessments will serve as a sound basis for establishing waste acceptance criteria and site 

selection and design features that ensure compliance with the performance objectives in 

Subpart C, while taking site-specific variables into account.

Reducing the Tier 1 Regulatory Compliance period from 10,000 years to 1000 years. CRESP 

commends NRC for withdrawing the provision in §61.2 of the preliminary proposed rule for

a uniform 10,000-year Tier 1 compliance period. As explained in CRESP’s 2013 comments on the 

preliminary proposed rule, and as also acknowledged at various points in the proposed rule 

Discussion,2 reliable demonstration of compliance with exposure limits for such a long period of 

time into the future is infeasible and unrealistic in the context of current scientific

understanding. Demonstrating compliance-with a regulatory limit at 1000 years is at the

limits of practicality associated with the current body of knowledge. Current experience and

knowledge associated with engineered near-surface disposal facilities is limited to a few

decades and only a limited number of studies have been conducted to determine whether

these facilities are functioning in accordance with predictions. Consequently, a shorter Tier 1 

period, in the range of around 500 to 1,000 years, is appropriate and consistent with the

characteristics of typical LLW and the logic of a tiered approach. A 1000-year compliance

assessment period has been used for low-level wastes at various sites by agencies such as

DOE and Agreement States. For example, the State of Texas uses a 1000-year period for 

assessing the performance of a waste disposal facility, with a second tier analysis where needed 

in the case of long-lived highly mobile radionuclides.3 A 1000-year period is provided in DOE's 

Radioactive Waste Management Manual, DOE Manual 435.1-1.

Inadvertent intruder provisions providing for site specific assessment of exposure potential. We 

strongly support the provisions in the proposed rule that provide for a site-specific, wastespecific assessment of potential risks to inadvertent intruders in place of the provisions in the 

preliminary proposed rule that assumed a 100% probability of intruder exposure in all 

circumstances. 

Risks to inadvertent intruders are highly specific to particular sites, the character and design

of the particular waste disposal facilities at a site including defense in depth measures, the

specific wastes disposed of at a site, and the location of higher-hazard wastes within the site. 

The likelihood that an intruder will enter a site and engage in activities that may result in

inadvertent exposure depends on the accessibility of the site and the likelihood that it may

be used in the future for agriculture, construction, drilling, or similar activities. The likelihood

 

2 See 80 FR 16089, 16090, 16091, 16092, 16108.

3 The proposed compliance periods reviewed by ACRS were 20,000 years and 10,000 years (See ACRS 

Letters to the Commission dated September 22, 2011 and July 22, 2013, respectively).In both cases, the 

ACRS recommended a 1000 year compliance period.
6 

that the intruder will be exposed to significant levels of radiation depends on the nature of

the wastes disposed of, waste disposal depth, the presence and type of engineered barriers,

and the location of higher-hazard wastes within the site. Further, depending on the nature of

the intruder activity, any exposure that occurs may be lower or higher, short-lived or

chronic. A site-specific and risk-informed, performance-based approach is needed to address

all of these different variables, assess the resulting risk to inadvertent intruders, and provide

the most practical means to manage any potentially significant risks in order to secure

appropriate protectiveness. Among other matters, this allows the most appropriate intruder

scenarios to be developed and applied on a site- and waste-specific basis. 

The proposed rule provisions regarding inadvertent intruder assessments appropriately follow 

this approach and represent a very positive development. Assessments must assume an 

inadvertent intruder occupies the site and engages in normal activities or other reasonably 

foreseeable pursuits that are realistic and consistent with expected activities in and around the 

disposal site at the time of site closure and that might unknowingly expose the person to 

radiation from the waste, examine the capabilities of intruder barriers to inhibit an intruder’s 

contact with the waste or to limit the inadvertent intruders exposure to radiation; and estimate 

an inadvertent intruder’s potential annual dose, considering associated uncertainties. In the 

proposed rule Discussion, the NRC states: “In addition the NRC is not assuming the probability is 

100% that contact with the LLRW by an intruder will occur. ... engineered barriers and disposal 

practices, such as greater disposal depth, are to be included in the intruder assessment.” 80 FR 

at.1609.

Defense in Depth. Defense in depth has always been a major tenet with nuclear power 

generation and we support explicit inclusion of defense-in-depth in the proposed rule for LLW 

disposal. The inclusion of a performance-based provision in the proposed rule can help ensure 

that appropriate protections are provided for the risks posed by long-lived wastes and for the 

potential risks to inadvertent intruders. We believe that the defense-in-depth analysis should 

follow a qualitative approach to assessing resilience, taking into account the nature and quantity 

of waste, the natural and engineered features of the site, the performance analysis, and the 

safety case. 

Safety Case. Safety case and safety case evaluations, as developed and promoted by the 

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have been valuable concepts and tools and we 

support their use in the assessment of the management and disposal of LLW. We also strongly 

support provisions in the proposed rule requiring applicants and licensees to demonstrate a 

safety case that is updated on an ongoing basis to reflect new information and knowledge. The 

safety case provisions are another performance-based provision that can help ensure that 

appropriate protections are provided for the risks posed by long-lived wastes, and dealing with 

possible risks to inadvertent intruders.

Updateddosimetry. This is another notable provision in the proposed rule is S61.7(g),which

requires licenseesto demonstrate compliance with the Subpart C performance objectives, 
7 

using dosemethodology specified in the standards forradiation protection setforth in 10

Part 20,that are based on more current dosimetry than that used in the development ofthe

§61.55waste tables. The proposed rule also allows applicants and licenses to use updated

factorsthat have been issued by consensusscientificorganizations(e.g., International

Commission onRadiological Protection) and incorporated into federalradiation guidance by

the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (US EPA). Additionally, applicants and licensees

may use the most current scientific models and methodologies (e.g., those accepted by the

International Commission on Radiological Protection) to calculate the dose for site-specific

circumstances. This provision represents an important step towards ensuring that LLW 

disposal is based on current science and is consistent with the objective of risk-informed, 

performance-based protectiveness.

Proposed rule provisions that are inconsistent with a risk-informed, performance-based 

regulatory approach and should accordingly be modified or deleted

Several other provisions of the proposed rule are unduly prescriptive, are not appropriately riskinformed, and preclude appropriate performance-based consideration of site- and wastespecific circumstances, as required ensuring implementation of risk-informed, performancebased protectiveness principles. These provisions should be modified or removed. They are as 

follows: 

The Tier 2 and Tier 3 provisions in §61.2. These provisions, which provide for a second tier 

uniform 10,000-year protective assurance period for all LLW and third tier performance periods 

of indefinite duration beyond 10,000 years for long-lived wastes with concentrations exceeding 

the Table A concentration limits, are unrealistic, unsound, and should be deleted in favor of a 

single Tier 2 measure for the period after 1000 years that would use a qualitative analysis of the 

risks posed by specific quantities of wastes at specific sites and apply an ALARA standard to 

determine the need for further protective measures in cases where they are indicated.

As explained in our 2013 comments to the preliminary proposed rule, demonstrating 

compliance with exposure limits over many millennia exceeds our current capacities and 

knowledge. Any such demonstration, as required by the proposed Tier 2 provisions, would be an 

arbitrary and hypothetical exercise. For the same basic reason, we believe that the proposal for 

a post 10,000 year Tier 3 analysis and demonstration of risk minimization for long-lived wastes is 

unsound and should be removed. There may well be circumstances, particularly in the case of 

disposal of appreciable quantities of long-lived wastes, where consideration of risks and 

protective measures in the period after 1000 years is required. But these circumstances should 

be determined on a site-specific, waste specific basis. The time horizon for analysis should be 

determined on a case-by-case basis, as should any needed protective measures.

Another unjustified feature of the Tier 2 provisions is their imposition of across-the-board 

requirements, extending to 10,000 years, that are applicable to all LLW, most of which will have 

levels of radioactivity that have decayed to insignificance after 1000 years. Post-1000 year 
8 

analyses should be limited only to those wastes/sites for which convincing justification can be 

provided. 

Finally, the proposed rule provisions unjustifiably introduce two novel standards, a Tier 2 

standard based on a dose level that is “reasonably achievable based on technological and 

economic considerations,” and the Tier 3 standard that exposures will be “minimized to the 

extent reasonably achievable.” The substance of these respective standards is not clear. How

these standards differ is also not clear. The ALARA standard is long-established and well 

understood through many years of application. There is no justification for introducing new and 

untried standards, which will introduce needless confusion and uncertainty, in place of ALARA.

In all these respects, the proposed Tier 2 and Tier 3 provisions depart from the regulatory policy 

that NRC has followed since issuing Part 61 in 1982, and are contrary to NRC's risk-informed, 

performance-based approach to protectiveness. We also believe that the Discussion 

accompanying the proposed rule does not provide sufficient justification for these departures 

from current policy and practice. These requirements are at odds with the explicit recognition 

elsewhere in the proposed rule Discussion of the grave uncertainties and difficulties in assessing 

exposures and performance over such long future time.4 While we understand and commend 

NRC's concern with the potential risks posed by Unique Waste Streams that were not 

considered when Part 61 was adopted, these risks can be appropriately addressed without 

imposing highly prescriptive, burdensome and unrealistic requirements that are not riskinformed or justified in the case of typical low-level wastes and sites. The special issues 

presented by Unique Waste Streams can be in our view appropriately be addressed through a 

single Tier 2 provision for a qualitative assessment of post 1000 year risks and other provisions 

in the proposed rule, including the site-specific waste acceptance criteria using risk-based 

performance assessments, defense in depth measures for disposal sites, and requirements for 

demonstration of a safety case that is periodically updated. These safeguards can and will 

ensure that the risks posed by long-lived wastes will be analyzed and protected against on a sitespecific, waste-suit specific basis. 

The provisions in in §61.42 for demonstrating compliance with respect to inadvertent intruder 

protection standards. These provisions require a showing of compliance with a regulatory limit 

of 500 mrem for a 1000-year Tier 1 period and for a 10,000 year Tier 2 period. They also 

represent an unnecessary and unjustified departure from regulatory policy that NRC has 

followed since issuing Part 61 in 1982, and are contrary to NRC's risk-informed and 

performance-based approach to protectiveness. We submit that instead, an ALARA standard

should be adopted for inadvertent intruders for both Tier 1 and Tier 2 as the appropriate

reference point for protective measures to be assessed and enhanced if necessary in

particular site -specific circumstances. 500 mrem should appropriately be used as a 

guideline to be included in the evaluation, but not as a quantitative limit that requires 

compliance demonstration. In adopting Part 61.55, NRC had originally proposed a 500-mrem

 

4 See 80 FR 16089, 16090, 16091, 16092, 16108.
9 

inadvertent intruder regulatory exposure limit, but deleted it on US EPA's advice that 

operationalizing such a limit as a regulatory requirement was not feasible. NRC thereupon 

dropped this proposal, explaining in the Part 61 FEIS, p. 5-4:

"The EPA commented that it was not appropriate to state the 500 mrem (whole 

body) dose limit as a regulatory limit in the Part 61 rule, since the licensee 

would not be able to monitor or demonstrate compliance with a specific dose 

limit that applies to an event that might occur hundreds of years from now. 5

 

The Federal Register NPR discussion of the proposed rule fails to acknowledge or provide 

justification for reversing this longstanding decision. The reasons for EPA’s objections to an 

inadvertent intruder regulatory limit remain valid today. ACRS in its comments on the 

preliminary proposed LLW rules also indicated opposition to an inadvertent intruder exposure 

limit, stating that the main objective of performance assessments is the avoidance of 

catastrophic consequences, rather than strict adherence to dose limits.6

Reinvigoration of a Risk and Performance Assessment Community of Practice

As discussed above, we find that, while many parts of the proposed rule exemplify the riskinformed, performance-based approach to regulation and waste management that the

Commission has endorsed, the provisions requiring a 10,000-year compliance period in all 

circumstances and those relating to inadvertent intruders contain elements we find 

unnecessarily rigid and even unrealistic. We submit that these elements should be revised in 

favor of a more flexible approach geared to require performance more directly tied to 

circumstances of particular sites and wastes and the risks that they may pose.

In order to implement this approach, both in respect of this rule and the other elements of lowlevel waste regulation and disposition, we recommend that the NRC continue its commitment to 

mobilizing the professional judgment of regulators, the regulated community, and academic and 

other experts to define the sound science and risk-based assessments, determinations, and 

waste management decisions, and how they can best be applied in varying circumstances. The 

capacity to make such judgments would be greatly strengthened, and regulatory decisions 

significantly improved, if the professionals in different organizations, including NRC, DOE, and 

Agreement States along with non-government experts, collaborate closely and on a regular basis 

to share experience, best practice, and new developments in the relevant disciplines, including 

risk analysis and containment technologies. We believe that such a collaborative approach to 

low level waste regulation is necessary to ensure that regulations are practical and effective and 

minimize the potential inconsistency in low level waste management policies and practices. In 

particular, the Risk and Performance Assessment Community of Practice initiative, in which 

some of these commenters are active participants, has been revitalized and is regularly holding

targeted web-based meetings, in which CRESP representatives have been presenters, on topics 

 

5 http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0525/ML052590184.pdf, p. 136. 6 ML11256A191, 3 (Sept 22, 2011), ACRS Report on proposed Part 61 revision, p. 4.
10

of importance to LLW management. We urge NRC (and its DOE counterparts as well) to continue 

to provide leadership to this effort. We are ready to work in any way possible to support such 

important collaboration, and believe it can achieve consensus risk-informed approaches that 

best meet the requirements of the different regulatory regimes that shape this complex area of 

waste management. 

Respectfully submitted,

David S. Kosson, Ph.D.

CRESP Principal Investigator

Cornelius Vanderbilt Professor of Engineering

Professor of Civil and Environmental Engineering

Professor of Chemical Engineering

Professor of Earth and Environmental Sciences

Vanderbilt University

Office: (615) 322-1064

Mobile: (615) 337-5889

e-mail: david.kosson@vanderbilt.edu
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Dan Shrum <dshrum@energysolutions.com>

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 5:16 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 and NRC-2015-0003

Attachments: EnergySolutions Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 and NRC-2015-0003.pdf

Reference: Docket ID NRC–2011–0012 and Docket ID NRC-2015-0003 

Subject: Comments to Proposed Rule and Part 61 Guidance, Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal, 80 FR 16082 and 80 FR 15930 

Dear Ms. Bladey: 

Please find our attached comments in response to the Federal Register notices regarding the U.S. Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land 

Disposal of Radioactive Waste and Draft NUREG-2175, “Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 

CFR Part 61.” We look forward to future opportunities to comment on this and other potential changes to Part 

61. 

Daniel B. Shrum

ENERGYSOLUTIONS

Senior VP, Regulatory Affairs

Office: 801-649-2109

Mobile: 801-580-3201

dshrum@energysolutions.com

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608167
299 South Main Street, Suite 1700 ▪ Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 

(801) 649-2000 ▪ Fax: (801) 880-2879 ▪ www.energysolutions.com

July 24, 2015 CD15-0163

Cindy Bladey 

Chief, Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch 

Office of Administration 

Mail Stop: OWFN-12-H08 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, D.C. 20555-0001 

Reference: Docket ID NRC–2011–0012 and Docket ID NRC-2015-0003 

Subject: Comments to Proposed Rule and Part 61 Guidance, Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste Disposal, 80 FR 16082 and 80 FR 15930 

Dear Ms. Bladey: 

EnergySolutions appreciates the opportunity to provide comments in response to the 

Federal Register notices regarding the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC) 

proposed changes to 10 CFR Part 61, Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of 

Radioactive Waste and Draft NUREG-2175, “Guidance for Conducting Technical 

Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61.” The proposed rulemaking and guidance affects many 

aspects of EnergySolutions business operations. Our detailed comments on both the rule 

and the associated guidance are attached.

EnergySolutions appreciates the effort that the NRC staff has invested in this proposed 

rule. We also appreciate the degree of openness and receptivity to stakeholder comments 

that have characterized this proceeding. We believe that there are positive elements to 

the rulemaking, most notably the revisions to §61.58 that would allow for the derivation 

of site-specific waste acceptance criteria that could be used in lieu of the tables in §61.55. 

However, we believe that rulemaking as proposed is overly complicated and simply does 

not constitute the limited rulemaking that was envisioned by the Commission at the onset.

In SRM-SECY-08-0147 issued in March of 2009, the Commission directed the staff to 

undertake a limited rulemaking to “...specify a requirement for a site-specific analysis for 

the disposal of large quantities of depleted uranium...” While much has happened 
regarding the rule over the ensuing years, that fundamental basis has not changed. The 

broad and far from limited nature of the proposed changes would impose additional 

requirements that are not realistic and do not serve to provide added assurance in meeting 

performance objectives. Additionally, the proposed changes have generated confusion 

through inconsistent language when defining the technical analyses in both the proposed 

rule and the supplemental technical guidance document. 

One of the most significant consequences of this increase in scope is that the rule would 

significantly and adversely affect the operations of LLW disposal facilities that have no 

desire to dispose of the waste streams that the NRC has concluded were not adequately 

evaluated in the promulgation of the original Part 61. EnergySolutions believes this is a 

regulatory overreach that is not justified, nor has the cost of this overreach been correctly 

assessed by the NRC. EnergySolutions recommends modification to either § 61.1 

Purpose and Scope to include a provision for “grandfathering” active Agreement State 

sites, or that § 61.6 Exemptions be restructured to specifically exempt active sites that can 

demonstrate they have restricted and will continue to restrict access to their sites for the 

disposal of the waste streams in question. 

While we do not agree with the extent of some aspects of the proposed rule, 

EnergySolutions applauds the adoption of an individual site-specific basis for the 

development of waste acceptance criteria that can be used in lieu of the tables in 10 CFR 

61.55. We believe every aspect of that approach is superior to uniform use of the 

generically-derived classification tables and that their promulgation and use would 

constitute a significant advancement in protecting human health and safety and protection 

of the environment. We also compliment the NRC on proposing that the site-specific 

values be determined using contemporary guidance from the International Commission 

for Radiation Protection. This further enhances the technical credibility of the sitespecific WAC approach. It is clear that the use of site-derived WAC is preferable over 

use of the classification tables no matter how well-informed their development. 

Given the superiority of this approach, it is also clear that there is no value in the NRC 

revisiting the question of classification of any isotope, including uranium, or of 

restructuring the classification tables. There simply is no generic approach to defining 

waste streams or disposal sites that will be superior to the site-specific approach 

envisioned by the proposed 10 CFR 61.58. In addition to the benefits and technical 
superiority of the site-specific approach, it enables a licensee or applicant to account for 

specific volumes of waste and associated radioactive isotopes, which is superior to the 

existing classification system that is concentration based. As such, there is no benefit, 

although there would be significant disruption and cost, to the Commission pursuing an 

additional Part 61 rulemaking following the completion of the ongoing proceeding. 

We also appreciate the Commission’s identification of defense-in-depth as constituting a 

safety case for the operation of a LLW disposal site. Unfortunately, the proposed rule 

goes far beyond the direction of the February 12, 2014 SRM that “...the proposed rule 

should include a clear statement [emphasis added] that licensing decisions are based on 

defense in depth (DID) protections...” and instead includes a new requirement for a 

defense-in-depth “analysis.” The implementation of defense-in-depth strategies to 

improve robustness is not new in the nuclear industry; however, as articulated in the 

proposed rule it does represent a new requirement, one which is neither reasonable nor 

rationale.

By proposing the institution of a requirement for an analysis, the proposed rule suggests a 

quantitative assessment of multiple independent and redundant layers of defense. This 

concept of redundancy is misapplied in the context of a disposal site, where defense-indepth is achieved by a reliance on the combined protection provided by proper siting, 

waste forms, and radionuclide content, engineered features, and natural geologic features 

of the disposal site (as contemplated by the SRM), such that no single layer, no matter 

how robust, is exclusively relied upon. In fact, the preparation of a performance 

assessment represents the analysis required to demonstrate the requisite level of 

protection and reasonable assurances that the performance objectives will be met are 

sufficient. No additional analysis to demonstrate defense-in-depth is necessary.

Another new requirement of the proposed rule that is not technically justified is the 

requirement in §61.44 to demonstrate site stability for 10,000 years. This requirement is 

related to the new requirement for a three-tier analysis, which in general contributes to 

the unreasonable complexity of the proposed rule. Previously the Commission, the 

Environmental Protection Agency and our federal legislators recognized in the Uranium 

Mill Tailings Radiation Control Act that demonstrating stability beyond 1,000-years was 

not achievable scientifically. There is no new evidence that would indicate that the 

science in this regard has changed. While there is no doubt that models can be run that 
purport to demonstrate condition in deep time, the credibility of an analysis that pretends 

to demonstrate conditions of man-made materials over such time scales is questionable. 

This requirement should be eliminated from the proposed rule. 

Finally, we would like to offer our comments on the proposed Agreement State 

Compatibility Category of B, with which we are in complete agreement. It is the 

responsibility and obligation of the NRC to establish credible limits for protecting human 

health and safety associated with the beneficial uses of atomic energy. It simply cannot 

be argued that having safety standards vary from state-to-state is scientifically or 

rationally justified. It also cannot be argued that the benefits of this rule change, a multiyear endeavor to regulate a waste stream that the NRC believes is not currently being 

effectively regulated, will even be realized if a lesser compatibility category is selected. 

Doing so would give states the latitude to ignore these important changes that have taken 

years even to come to the proposed rule stage. 

This letter serves to highlight our concerns and most significant comments regarding the 

proposed rule. More detailed comments are contained in the attachments which delineate

our specific comments, concerns and recommendations for your consideration. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to comment. Questions regarding these comments 

may be directed to me at (801) 649-2109 or dshrum@energysolutions.com. 

Sincerely,

Daniel B. Shrum 

Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED REVISIONS TO 10 CFR PART 61 

EnergySolutions has reviewed the proposed rule and we are in general agreement with several of 

the proposed changes, principal among them: 

• The proposed revision to include a 1,000 year compliance period. 

• Including a specific dose limit of 500 mrem/y for the protection of inadvertent 

intruders. 

• Adding an alternative to develop site-specific waste acceptance criteria (WAC) for 

use in lieu of the tables currently in §61.55. This approach clearly is superior to any 

generic approach that makes assumptions that will not accurately represent the 

disposal conditions at any given site. 

The rule as proposed could have several unintended consequences, including the following: 

• The NRC fails to identify or quantify potential liabilities and litigation risk for 

existing sites as closure plans are implemented. The NRC also fails to properly 

identify or quantify the potential burden the proposed rule will have on new sites. 

• The staff, in its efforts to develop new requirements governing disposal of large 

quantities and concentrations of long lived radionuclides in a near surface disposal 

facility, has proposed a framework of requirements largely based on high level 

radioactive waste (HLW) guidance documents. Applying these prescriptive 

requirements, which are both unnecessary and overly restrictive, to all low level 

radioactive waste (LLW) disposal facilities is unreasonable and unnecessary. 

Existing sites could consider early closure to avoid litigation risks incurred by the 

proposed rule amendments. Furthermore, the burdensome and unnecessary new 

language included in the proposed rule could be a barrier for development of new 

sites for LLW disposal capacity. Only two sites have been developed since 10 CFR 

Part 61 was promulgated – the proposed rule will significantly impact future 

development. 

• The complexity associated with the proposed rule will be to make it easier to dispose 

of LLW in RCRA or unregulated disposal sites using the 20.2002 exemption process,

rather than at a LLW facility that is much better suited to manage radioactive waste. 

While this approach is acceptable for some waste streams, it is not desirable nor 

adequately protective of human health and safety to drive LLW into unregulated 

disposal sites.

Our specific comments below address these and other concerns with the proposed rule. 

NRC’s calculation of the average implementation cost of per licensee is incorrect. The 

proposed rule will be a significant burden on the Agreement States, licensees, and generators. 

Staff has significantly underestimated the burden and cost of implementation of the complex 
proposal on the Agreement States, licensees, and generators. EnergySolutions is in the process 

of completing a performance assessment specifically designed to assess the impact of disposing 

of depleted uranium at its Clive site, and has already spent over $4,000,000 on this effort. It 

should be noted that this cost does not include the preparation of a stand-alone DID analysis.

Recommendation – Revise the implementation burden to correctly address the financial impact 

to licensees and Agreement State regulators.

Implementation of the proposed rule would place an undue burden on Agreement States – 

Currently, the Agreement States do not have the resources or capabilities needed to review the 

PA requirements set forth in the guidance document. There are a limited number of experts who 

can effectively perform these analyses. While the NRC alludes to the fact that they can provide 

technical expertise to States for their reviews in the guidance document, historically, these

resources have not been made available to assist Agreement States even when requested. For 

example, when the state of Utah requested support from the NRC to review EnergySolutions’ 

Clive DU PA, NRC did not provide this support on the basis that they cannot act on behalf of an 

Agreement State unless the Agreement State relinquishes their authority to them.

Recommendation – EnergySolutions proposes that NRC explicitly clarify in the rule the 

availability of its PA resources to assist in the review of licensee submittals. This would not only 

help address the availability of necessary expertise, but it would also address the issue of the 

undue burden imposed on the states. 

The Licensing Process as proposed is not clear and is too complex to be consistently 

applied. In general, the process for development of the safety case for licensees and applicants 

is unclear. The language throughout the proposed regulation and the technical guidance needs to 

be minimized and clarified. Specific comments are provided below. 

We attempted to create a flowchart to fit the pieces of the proposed rule together (see Figure 1). 

This flowchart clearly illustrates the cumbersome nature of the process. We recommend several 

changes that should streamline the process, including using a two-tier system. These are 

discussed in further detail in the following sections. 

Recommendation – We propose that the NRC include a flowchart of the process so that an 

applicant or licensee can understand the components, requirements, key decision points, and how 

they fit together.

The language used to describe the technical analyses is inconsistent throughout the rule 

and the technical guidance contained in NUREG-2175. In the proposed rule, the analyses are 

discussed in some form in sections 61.2, 61.7, and 61.13. The types and number of analyses and 

how they are referred to are different in each section. In addition, the guidance document uses 

inconsistent language when referring to the analyses. The FRN has yet another way of referring
to (and ordering) the analyses (80 FR 16089-16093). The end result is confusing and difficult for 

an applicant or licensee to follow. Examples of these inconsistencies include:

• The Inadvertent Intruder Assessment is referred to using several different names 

throughout the rule and guidance document (e.g. Intruder Assessment, Inadvertent 

Intrusion Assessment, Inadvertent Intrusion);

• The long-term stability analyses is referred to using different names in the rule and 

guidance document (Long-Term Stability in the rule, Site Stability Analyses in the 

guidance document) 

• The Protective Assurance Analyses is only referred to in the guidance document.

• Section 16.13(e) is entitled “Long-Term Radiological Impacts” but Table A refers to 

the Performance Period Analysis. The guidance document also refers to the 

Performance Period Analysis.

Recommendation – The definitions included in §61.2 should be consistently applied throughout 

the rule and guidance documents. 

The language regarding the inadvertent intruder should be revised to more accurately 

account for site-specific conditions. As written, the proposed rule requires the analysis of an 

intruder who occupies the site and “...engages in normal activities including agriculture, 

dwelling construction, resource exploration or exploitation (e.g., well drilling)...” It goes on to 

require consideration of “...other reasonably foreseeable pursuits that are consistent with 

activities in and around the site at the time of closure...” The requirement that potential 

activities be “consistent with activities in and around the site” should apply to all elements of the 

intruder analysis. One might infer that this is the intent of the proposed regulation, but the 

wording does not make this clear. To remove doubt and avoid confusion, the section should be 

revised to move the modifying language regarding site-specific activities to the beginning of the 

description of activities.

Recommendation – Revise this section to clarify that all aspects of the intruder analysis should 

account for site-specific conditions.

Remove the requirement for a protective assurance period analysis. We do not agree that a 

three tier approach is needed. The performance assessment and inadvertent intruder analyses are 

good tools for evaluating long-term risks at a site. However, as discussed in more detail in 

following sections, there is unnecessary confusion and complexity added to these analyses due to 

the three-tiered assessment timeframe. The three tiers make for a cumbersome and overly 

burdensome process. Establishing a three tier approach is not efficient, clear or reliable, nor is 

there any evidence that it would contribute meaningfully to human health and safety. 

Implementation of a three tier approach will be a significant burden on Agreement States, 

licensees, and generators without added safety protection. 
Recommendation – A two tier approach with a compliance period of 1,000 years and an 

analysis out to peak dose as a second tier would be protective and is much clearer, more efficient 

and reliable. A two tier approach out to peak dose will close the current gap for risks that 

increase for long lived radionuclides that are not adequately addressed by the current regulations. 

There is no technical basis for a stability requirement of 10,000 years, nor is it possible to 

credibly demonstrate compliance with such a requirement. Proposed revisions to §61.44 

require a disposal site to “...achieve long-term stability ... for the compliance and protective 

assurance periods.” While we agree that stability is an important component to the ability of a 

disposal site to properly isolate waste, 10,000 years is not a reasonable stability standard for a 

LLW disposal site. NRC, EPA and congress (Uranium Mill tailings control act legislation) have 

recognized that requiring stability beyond 200 to 1,000 years cannot be proven. Current stability 

requirements for Part 61 sites are largely met by complying with guidance developed for 

uranium recovery facility sites that implement a 200 to 1,000 year standard consistent with the 

URMCA requirements. Requiring stability for a 10,000 year period is unworkable. No other 

regulatory agency has a comparable requirement for LLW disposal. No Agreement State or 

licensee would be able to demonstrate stability for 10,000 years because the data to assess 

engineered features over this time period simply do not exist. 

Recommendation – Reduce the stability requirement to 1,000 years. §61.44 should be revised 

to delete the words “and protective assurance.” 

The timeframes associated with the Site Stability and Site Characteristics analyses are 

unclear and inconsistent. Section 61.44 says the site stability must be analyzed over the 

compliance and protective assurance periods (10,000 years after closure); Section 61.50(a)(2) 

talks about characteristics the site must have over 500 years; Section 61.50(a)(3) and (4) say that 

the hydrogeological characteristics must not affect the ability to meet the performance 

objectives, which cover all three time frames including the performance period. Section 2.3.2.4 

of the guidance document gives concentration based criteria for determining the timeframe to 

evaluate the site characteristics with three tiers: 500 years, 10,000 years, and the performance 

period. The required time period must be clarified in order for a licensee to even begin the 

process of evaluation. 

Recommendation – Simplify the time period for site characteristics to either 500 or 1000 years. 

Make clear where the analyses of site characteristics fits into the safety case. 

The requirement for a defense-in-depth “analysis” should be removed. EnergySolutions is 

in agreement with the direction from the Commission in SRM-SECY-13-0075 that licensing 

decisions be based on defense-in-depth (DID) protections such as siting, waste forms and 

radionuclide content, engineered features, and natural geologic features of the disposal site. We 

also agree that taken together with the PA, DID can help form the safety case for licensing. 

Where the proposed rule deviates from the Commission’s direction, however, is in the 
requirement for a DID analysis. The SRM articulates no such requirement, and in fact there is 

no basis for a DID “analysis.” The requirement to perform an analysis suggests the need for a 

quantitative analysis of redundant safety systems, such as would be the case in a nuclear power 

plant. 

The requirement to perform a DID analysis is neither appropriate nor necessary. The effect of 

the various elements that provide DID for a waste disposal site (siting, engineered features, etc.) 

is to ensure compliance with the performance objectives in Subpart C. The analysis to 

demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives is the PA and the intruder analysis. 

Staff seemingly acknowledges as much by inclusion of the following statement in NUREG2175, the proposed guidance for implementing the rule: 

Therefore, licensees should be able to draw, principally, upon the results and risk 

insights gained from those other analyses to identify and describe defense-in-depth 

protections at the land disposal facility rather than developing separate analyses for 

demonstrating defense-in-depth. 

And yet in the very next sentence in the guidance, staff states:

In some cases, licensees may need to consider whether additional features, events, 

and processes or alternative scenarios might be appropriate to consider solely for 

demonstrating that defense-in-depth protections are included. 

This is a perfect illustration of our concern that the requirement for an “analysis” will lead to 

additional modeling that will be time consuming and expensive without contributing 

meaningfully to demonstrating the suitability of a site or compliance with the performance 

objectives. Defense-in-depth for the sake of defense-in-depth renders the concept meaningless. 

Each defensive element of the disposal system contributes to the safety of the site, which is 

demonstrated by compliance with the performance objectives. If the value of a given element, 

e.g., a site feature or engineered barrier, cannot be demonstrated in the PA, then it has no merit. 

Recommendation – Delete the requirement for a separate DID analysis. Revise the proposed 

rule to clarify that DID is an important element of the safety basis and that each applicant or 

licensee must address how DID has been accounted for in its technical analyses. 

The requirement to update the technical analyses at closure for existing sites that have met 

all previous requirements to date should be deleted. This is a significant and unnecessary 

burden on both licensees and regulators and no basis for this new requirement has been provided. 

As we have discussed repeatedly in our comments and in testimony before the Commission, the 

technical analyses required by the rule are expensive to prepare and to review. To require them 

to be updated for a site that is at the end of its licensed life and has operated in accordance with 

the regulations and the technical analyses that provide the licensing basis for the site simply 

makes no sense. It is not apparent what different outcome might be expected from repeating 
analyses given no change in operating conditions previously analyzed. The only reasonable 

rationale for such a requirement is when conditions have changed, whether they be related to site 

conditions or waste inventory. 

Recommendation – Revise the proposed rule so that this requirement applies only to sites that 

have encountered new, unanalyzed conditions. 

The proposed rule should be revised to grandfather existing sites that do not dispose of the 

unanalyzed waste streams that led to the development of the proposed changes. The rule 

makes clear that the new requirements apply to all currently operating sites. However, the NRC 

has provided no justification for revising the rules currently in effect for licensed sites unless 

they accept waste streams that were not sufficiently analyzed in the development of Part 61 as 

originally constituted. In fact, the agency has gone to great lengths to state that the current rules 

are sufficiently protective of human health and safety. 

The intent of section §61.1 is that “Applicability of the requirements in this part to Commission 

licenses for waste disposal facilities in effect on the effective date of this rule will be determined 

on a case-by-case basis.” This language recognizes that new requirements introduced after a site 

is sited, licensed and operated under previous requirements would not be binding on either 

Agreement States or licensees that committed to specific site conditions and licensing 

requirements in good faith. This is a reasonable regulatory approach where there has been no 

demonstration of a need for a change to reflect changed conditions or the scientific 

understanding of a particular condition. It also is consistent with the NRC’s Principals of Good 

Regulation, which in reference to Efficiency, state:

Regulatory activities should be consistent with the degree of risk reduction they 

achieve. Where several effective alternatives are available, the option which 

minimizes the use of resources should be adopted. 

Requiring additional costly analyses that provide no reduction in risk is in direct conflict with the 

agency’s own principals. 

The NRC staff indicates that a currently operating site, or a newly proposed LLW disposal site, 

could choose to continue to use and apply the existing waste classification system and associated 

waste form and disposal requirements set out in Part 61, or could apply a new set of WAC 

developed through the analyses prescribed in the proposed rule changes. For example, the staff 

states:

In defining LLRW streams with acceptable radionuclide concentrations or activities 

and waste forms, licensees or license applicants would be allowed to use either the 

results of the site-specific technical analyses set forth in 10 CFR 61.13, or the LLRW 

classification requirements in 10 CFR 61.55. (80 FR 16100) 
Staff goes on to state:

In the proposed rule, the NRC is proposing the hybrid waste acceptance approach 

(Option 3) as the regulatory LLRW acceptance framework for the near-surface 

disposal of LLRW. The hybrid waste acceptance approach provides a framework for 

the use of either the generic LLRW classification system specified in 10 CFR 61.55 

or the results of the technical analyses required in 10 CFR 61.13. (80 FR 16101) 

Currently operating sites already have had to conduct technical analyses as required by §61.13 to 

demonstrate that they will comply with the performance objectives of Subpart C when disposing 

of LLW that meets the concentration limits in §61.55. As written, the proposed rule would 

require these sites to prepare new technical analyses at the cost of millions of dollars even if they 

do not propose either to accept new waste streams or to derive new operating limits as would be 

allowed under the proposed revisions to §61.58. Thus, the rule changes, as proposed, impose an 

unreasonable regulatory burden on the existing operating sites and existing Agreement State 

regulatory agencies who desire to remain under the current regulatory regime set out in existing 

Part 61. These new requirements should only apply to existing sites and any new sites that

accept and dispose of new waste streams containing higher concentrations and larger total 

quantities of long lived radionuclides. 

Recommendation – Provide an exemption for sites that are currently operating under approved 

licenses, as discussed in detail in the following section.

EnergySolutions agrees with the NRC proposal to make significant portions of the 

proposed rule be Agreement State Compatibility Category B. In undertaking the rulemaking 

to revise Part 61 to address waste streams not previously accounted for in its regulatory scheme, 

NRC has recognized the importance of requiring Agreement States to implement these 

regulations as proposed. EnergySolutions emphatically concurs in this conclusion. This is true 

for two reasons: 

1) The benefits of this proposed rule, a multi-year endeavor to regulate a waste stream that 

the NRC believes is not currently being effectively regulated, may not be realized if a 

lesser compatibility category is selected. Agreement States should not have the latitude 

to ignore these important changes that have taken years just to bring to the proposed rule 

stage.

2) Human health and safety standards do not vary from state-to-state. It is incumbent upon 

the federal regulator to ensure scientific defensibility and consistency in the 

establishment of standards that are important to human health and safety. It also is 

important for the credibility of the regulatory framework to clearly acknowledge that 

there can be only one scientifically-based standard. 
This is not a matter of flexibility for the states, it is a matter of scientific credibility, protecting 

human health and safety, and maintaining regulatory consistency in what is undoubtedly and 

indisputably a nationwide enterprise.

Recommendation – Retain the Compatibility Category B as published in the Federal Register 

request for comment notice. 
SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

Section Comment Comment 

Type

61.7 This section needs to be reconfigured. The flow of concepts is not 

logical, it is too detailed, and there is overlap with §61.13. The 

proposed language includes excessively prescriptive language that 

is not appropriate for regulation and should be removed to 

guidance. Specific comments are given by subsection below.

Technical

61.7€ Remove the majority of this language and replace with language to 

describe the new structure and requirements governing acceptance 

and disposal of the newer and additional waste streams containing 

higher concentrations of long-lived radionuclides. Provide a brief, 

concise summary of the technical analyses and refer to §61.13 for 

details.

Technical

61.7€ This is a good example of clear, concise language that then refers 

to a different section for details.

61.12 In subsection (j)(2) include a reference to §61.13 after “technical 

analyses.”

Editorial

61.13 This section should be the one section where the technical analyses 

are defined. Any subsequent reference to the analyses in the rule 

or guidance should use the identical names used in this section. 

Each subsection describing an analysis should begin with the name 

of the analysis underlined. The details of the analyses, such as 

subsections (a)(1) – (a)(10) should be removed and placed in the 

guidance, and only minimal, concise language used in this section.

Technical

61.13 In the first paragraph of this section, delete the text: “Licensees 

with licenses for land disposal facilities in effect on the effective 

date of this subpart must submit these analyses at the next license 

renewal or within 5 years of the effective date of this subpart, 

whichever comes first.” The applicability of the new rules is 

addressed in §61.1, which properly notes that their applicability to 

existing licenses will be considered on a case-by-case basis.

61.13(a)(9) Delete. This requirement to consider “alternative conceptual 

models of features and processes” is illogical and unjustified. The 

applicant or licensee has the obligation to submit and justify its 

modeling approach, and the regulatory agency has the 

responsibility to confirm the technical suitability of the approach. 

To require a NEPA-esque alternatives approach is excessive, 

overly burdensome regulation that would be ripe for abuse. This 

requirement invites the prospect of incessant regulatory “what 

ifs?” that are not productive, protective, or justified. 

Technical

61.13(b)(3) Revise to read as follows: “An intruder assessment shall:

(i) Assume that, at any time after the period of institutional 

controls ends, an inadvertent intruder engages in pursuits that are 
consistent with activities in and around the site at the time of 

closure, potentially including agriculture, dwelling construction, 

resource exploration or exploitation (e.g., well drilling) or other 

reasonably foreseeable pursuits and that unknowingly expose the 

intruder to radiation from the waste.

61.13(e) This section is not clear and will be very difficult to implement. 

Table A is unclear and subject to interpretation, which will be a 

burden on states and operators. This section should be reworded 

and clarified so that it is clear that the Table A is to be solely used 

to determine whether or not a Tier II analyses is required.

Technical

61.13(f) Revise by deleting the phrase “Analyses that demonstrate” and 

replacing it with “Description of how.” 

Technical

61.28(a)(2) Revise so that the revised analyses for §61.13 are only required for 

sites that have identified new unexpected conditions. 

Technical

61.41 Delete subsection (b) to be consistent with the two-tier system. Technical

61.42 Delete subsection (b) to be consistent with the two-tier system. Technical

61.44 The words “and protective assurance” should be removed so that 

the stability analyses is only required for the compliance period.

Technical

61.51(a) Delete the phrase “defense-in-depth.” This wording suggests that 

a site would have multiple layers or redundant systems built into 

the design. This is a misapplication of the concept of defense-indepth for a disposal site. Defense-in-depth is provided by the 

additive protection arising from proper site selection and design 

and there should be no specific requirement for DID to be built 

specifically into the site design. The extent to which design 

features are necessary to ensure compliance with the performance 

objectives should be driven by the overall technical analyses, not a 

DID focused “analysis.”

Technical
Choose Site/Characterize 

Area

Define Waste 

Streams/Source Term

Develop Site Design and 

Process

Compare Waste Concentrations 

to Table on 2-25 of Guidance 

Document

Evaluate 61.50 Site 

Characteristics to 500 years

Evaluate 61.50 Site 

Characteristics to 10,000 years

Evaluate 61.50 Site 

Characteristics to performance 

period

Less than 1/10th Class A Greater than Class A

Between 

1/10th Class A 

and Class A

Choose WAC Basis

Meet criteria

Meet criteria

Meet criteria

Site not suitable Criteria not 

met

Criteria not 

met

Criteria not 

met

Perform PA over compliance 

period (see Figure 3-1)

Meet 

61.41a?

Change Design, Change WAC

No

Perform PA over Protective 

Assurance Period

Level 0 Level 1 Level 2 Level 3

Evaluate changes to 

design, WAC, process

Are changes 

justified 

economically and 

technically? 

Yes

Evaluate changes to 

design, WAC, process

Are changes 

impractical 

economically and 

technically? 

No

Finalize Safety Case (Integrate All Changes)

Yes

Compare Concentrations to 

Table A in 61.13

Performance Period Assessment (PA and 

Inadvertent Intrusion) Required

Meet 

61.41c and 

61.42c 

(ALARA)?

Evaluate Resources to further 

reduce releases??

No

Are changes 

impractical 

economically and 

technically? 

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Complete Inadvertent Intruder 

Analyses for Compliance and 

Protective Assurance 

Periods(See Figure 4-2)

Complete Site Stability Analyses 

(pages 5-15 and 5-17)

Complete Defense in Depth 

Analyses

Meet 61.42 

(a) & (b)

No

Yes

Integrate with other Analyses Integrate with other Analyses

Regulatory Review License Approval

Meet 

61.41c and 

61.42c 

(ALARA)?

Yes

No

61.13

Determine Waste Class 

per 61.55

Demonstrate 

compliance with 

stability requirements 

at 61.56(b)

Demonstrate compliance 

with intruder barrier 

requirement at 

61.52(a)(2)

Generally not 

acceptable for nearsurface disposal per 

61.55. Evaluate on 

case by case basis

Does waste 

meet stability 

requirements 

of 61.56(b)

Class A waste is 

required to be 

segregated per 

61.52(a)(1)

Waste is not required 

to be segregated per 

61.52(a)(1)

Demonstrate compliance with minimum 

requirements at 61.56(a)

Class A

Greater than Class C

Class C

Class B

Choose New Site
1 

COMMENTS ON NUREG-2175, GUIDANCE FOR CONDUCTING TECHNICAL 

ANALYSES FOR 10 CFR PART 61

CHAPTER 1

Summary Comment – The document introduces designations for individual technical analyses 

that are not cited in the proposed rule and inconsistently refers to these analyses in multiple 

chapters. This lack of consistent language throughout the documents would create an 

opportunity for the user community to misinterpret or possibly misapply the Commission’s intent 

when developing the safety case. 

Recommendation – Align guidance document section/subsection titles with analytical 

designations in §61.13 and ensure they are consistently cited through its entirety.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 1.0 The document would be improved by providing detailed guidance on how to 

prepare a technically defensible safety case and this would be best stated in 

Chapter 1. This section describes the approach for implementing the 

requirements for the technical analyses and the waste acceptance criteria to 

demonstrate compliance with the performance objectives, although never 

fully describes the underlying basis for the developing the safety case.

2 1.1 In each subsection, the titles should match the terminology in the proposed 

rule, and any repetitive, unnecessary content should be removed.

3 1.1.2 Because the WAC is relied upon to ensure that the performance objectives 

are met, the WAC should be included as part of the safety case.

4 1.1.2 Updating the safety case as part of the application for site closure is 

unwarranted and unnecessarily burdensome for licensees with sites having 

conditions that have been determined to adhere to the existing safety case. 

The section should be modified to discuss circumstances which an update is 

required, and to make an allowance for facilities with no changes to retain 

the existing safety case.

5 1.1.3 The placement of this subsection implies that defense in depth is a separate 

analysis, yet the text itself re-iterates our position that the concept of 

defense-in-depth should be incorporated into the other technical analyses and 

is not an independent analysis. This section should focus more on how the 

Commission would like the defense in depth protections highlighted 

throughout the other technical analyses.

6 1.1.4 The term “technical analyses” is redefined in this section differently than in 

the rule. It is technically careless to intentionally use the same term to mean 

different things in the context of a single regulatory application. Uniform 

terms and designations for technical analyses should be used throughout the 

rule and guidance.

7 1.1.4 To align with our comment that the rule should only contain definitions of 
2 

the analyses and the discussion around the analyses should be relocated to 

the guidance, we suggest that much of the language in §61.13 of the 

proposed rule be removed and relocated to this section, which provides 

explanations of the technical analyses required.

8 1.1.4.2 The background regarding the basis for an inadvertent intrusion is helpful by 

citing the corresponding technical basis for the analyses. We recommend 

including a similar basis for each analysis referenced in this section.

CHAPTER 2

Summary Comment – The requirements outlined in this chapter are overly burdensome, and the 

staff did not adequately assess the time and effort for licensees to complete the technical 

analyses. The level of effort required to evaluate FEPs and perform technical analyses with 

respect to the performance objectives rivals high level waste geological repositories. The 

technical analyses for the Yucca Mountain Repository required over 20 years to complete. 

Appendix C, referenced in this chapter, provides examples of FEPs to consider for repositories, 

including EnergySolutions’ site in Clive, Utah. As Staff state in this section, the level of effort 

required to perform technical analyses should be commensurate with the risk associated with the 

waste. LLW, including LLW with long-lived radionuclides, still poses significantly less risk to 

the public and environment than HLW. Therefore, the technical analyses requirements outlined 

in this guidance should be reduced. Specifically, requiring a licensee to consider alternative 

scenarios and provide model validation and uncertainty quantification for analyses beyond 1,000 

years provides little benefit to providing assurance of results, especially given the level of effort 

required to perform these tasks, and is not commensurate with the risk.

Recommendation – Staff should reassess the requirements for technical evaluations, eliminating 

overly burdensome suggestions, such that the anticipated level of effort and costs associated with 

the technical analyses are more appropriately aligned with the associated risk. The requirements 

for model validation, data adequacy review, and uncertainty quantification should be 

significantly reduced or eliminated.

Summary Comment – The content regarding the considerations of FEPs, scenarios, model 

development presented in this chapter are too prescriptive, unnecessarily conservative, and in 

some instances circular. The iterative processes suggested can lead to a never-ending analyses 

period that provide little return with respect to providing greater confidence that performance 

objectives are met. Such requirements include requiring the licensee to consider and run 

multiple models when data are sparse, to validate efforts by modeling similar sites modeled by 

alternative agencies, and to update FEPs when new information is found. Overall, the 

considerations in this chapter ask the licensee to go beyond providing “reasonable assurance” of 

long-term site stability and adequate protection of the public. These specific examples are 

expanded upon in the specific comments below.

Recommendation – The level of detail describing how to perform the technical analyses should 

be reduced, such that the chapter describes a clear path for performing technical analyses that 

allows licensees flexibility in the overall approaches used to demonstrate compliance objectives 

are met. 
3 

Summary Comment – Time periods for analyses and additional considerations based on waste 

concentration are introduced in this chapter, including for example those in §2.3.4, that are not 

included in the rule.

Recommendation – Revise the guidance and rule to ensure consistency throughout both 

documents. Analysis requirements should not be in the guidance that are not included in the rule.

Summary Comment – Accounting for uncertainty is a theme that is addressed numerous times 

throughout this chapter in separate subsections. In many cases, the discussions and examples for 

addressing uncertainty are incomplete. In other cases, redundancy and over-conservatism in the 

design and analyses are presented as necessary to address the uncertainties. As a result, the 

proposed guidance is overly prescriptive, particularly in light of there being other techniques 

available to address uncertainty which are considered leading practices in the nuclear power 

industry. 

Recommendation – Instead of weaving comments and requirements around uncertainty through 

the text, we recommend the Staff draft a subsection to specifically address how to perform an 

uncertainty quantification analysis. The uncertainty quantification should be used to inform the 

numerical models and overall design such that the licensee and regulator have confidence that 

the site meets or exceeds performance objectives while minimizing the costs associated with 

model development and validation and overall site construction costs. 

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 2.1 The discussion around accounting for uncertainty is overly simplistic 

and incomplete. Model uncertainty cannot be accounted for simply by 

developing and analyzing conceptual models. Accounting for model 

uncertainty is an iterative process that requires evaluation of the model 

form, parameters, and representation of parameters within the model in 

order to address and potentially correct bias and calibrate parameters. 

Because the assessment process relies upon multiple models with some 

model outputs being inputs of other models, uncertainty quantification 

becomes a computationally expensive and time consuming exercise. 

Researchers specializing in uncertainty quantification are only now 

developing defensible techniques to address uncertainty propagation 

through multiple models. The guidance should include a more thorough 

discussion on uncertainty quantification and propagation. 

2 2.2.1 Parameter uncertainty is described in §2.2.2.1.3, not §2.2.2.1.2 as 

referenced in the text

3 2.2.2 The italicized emphasis on scenario uncertainty when describing 

uncertainties in the performance assessment is confusing and might lead 

the licensee and/or reviewer to place a greater emphasis on scenario 
4 

uncertainty. We recommend staff provide better support for the 

emphasis or eliminate the use of italics. 

4 2.2.2 Figure 2.2 is oversimplified does not provide an adequate representation 

of uncertainty analysis and the treatment of uncertainty. The figure 

seems to imply that the same parameter sets might be used in all models, 

potentially modeled using the same distributions and or discretization, 

and that all parameter sets will be incorporated into making a decision, 

which might not be appropriate. Additionally, the figure does not depict 

model interaction and parameter interaction which is common to model 

building for performance assessments. The performance assessment can 

be comprised of many submodels interwoven together to ultimately 

predict radiation release. We recommend the figure be updated to reflect 

the true level of effort required to account for future, model, and 

parameter uncertainty, or the figure should be removed the text. 

5 2.2.2.1.2 The requirement that when data are sparse, multiple conceptual models 

should be evaluated and the most conservative model selected is overly 

burdensome. It is difficult to assess which model is actually the most 

conservative for the data considered without actually constructing and 

running the model. This requirement should be eliminated.

6 2.2.3 We agree with Staff that the technical analyses required by the 

performance assessments and site stability analyses cannot be validated. 

We also agree with comments that the greatest sources of uncertainties 

in the performance assessment are due to projecting out models 

calibrated with relatively brief histories across periods of time that are 

orders of magnitude greater than the calibration periods. Given the level 

of effort required to perform the technical analyses, including the 

iterative process of parameter characterization, model calibration and 

model verification, we question the validity and benefit of performing 

quantitative analyses beyond 1,000 years. For example, post-audit 

reviews of groundwater models show that the predictive capability of 

groundwater models is generally poor. Prediction accuracy is even 

poorer in models that are recalibrated to better fit historical data, even 

with calibration periods of 40 years. 

7 2.2.3 With respect to the quantity and quality of model support being dictated 

by consistency with past experiences in similar conditions, the example 

presented using an engineered barrier is nonsensical and should be 

removed from the text. Little evidence (if any) is available showing the 

performance of an untouched engineered barrier beyond 1,000 years, as 

required by the performance assessment and site stability analysis for 

sites accepting long-lives radionuclide waste. Because no such 

examples exists, the example is superfluous and licensees will still have 

to provide a great amount of model support for engineered barriers. 

8 2.2.3 The guidance suggesting that licensees might have to prepare analyses 

and provide comparisons of results to similar sites modeled by other 

organizations is not reasonable. Such a suggestion goes against the 

concept of site-specific analyses, and poses an unjust burden on 
5 

licensees that have been provided the flexibility to model sites 

differently than other organizations in order to provide reasonable 

assurance of site stability and public health protection at their site. We 

recommend that the suggestion be removed from the text.

9 2.3.2 The guidance that licensees should perform quantitative analyses for the 

protective assurance period contradicts the guidance in Chapter 6.0, 

which states that for dose limits below 0.25 MSv/yr, qualitative or 

quantitative analyses can be performed. The guidance should remain 

consistent throughout the entire document. 

10 2.3.4 The introduction of additional requirements for the assessment of site 

characteristics based on waste concentration adds additional confusion to 

an already burdensome and convoluted process. It is unclear how these 

time frames for analyses based on concentration limits should be 

incorporated into other analyses including site stability, intruder analysis 

and protective assurance period compliance analyses. As the 

requirements are not included in the rule, they should be removed from 

the guidance. 

11 2.3.5 The table for required analyses based on site characteristics again adds 

confusion to the burdensome licensing process. It is unclear if the 

analyses required are dependent upon the waste concentration as

prescribed in §2.3.4. We recommend providing additional context for 

the table and including guidance regarding the site characteristic 

requirements. 

12 2.5.3.1.1.1 The iterative process for FEP identification and the consideration of 

additional FEPs when information is available is unnecessarily 

burdensome. Staff should provide guidance regarding when it is 

acceptable for the licensee to stop the iterations. Without such 

information, the FEP identification process is circular and has no clear 

end point. 

13 2.3.5.1.2.1

 

The quality of the hazard maps in Appendix B related to features and 

phenomena that can be used to screen FEP’s are of poor quality and can 

easily be misinterpreted by both the regulator and licensee. We 

recommend removing the hazard maps from the Appendix and as an 

alternative, providing digital map files (such as ESRI Shapefiles) that 

allow for viewing on a finer scale. 

14 2.5.4.1 The statement that “a licensee should use scenarios to describe the 

scenario uncertainty associated with the system” is circular and 

confusing. We recommend revising the statement or removing it from 

the text, as it is ripe for misinterpretation by both licensees and 

regulators.

15 2.5.4.1 The paragraphs describing alternative scenarios is confusing and seems 

to be in contradiction to the descriptions of FEPS that can be excluded 

based on regulations. The benefit of developing and analyzing highly 

improbable scenarios has not been demonstrated and poses unnecessary 

burdens on both the licensee and reviewer. The requirement should be 

removed from the guidance.
6 

CHAPTER 3

Summary Comment – The majority of this chapter is devoted to describing modeling efforts for 

radionuclide release and subsequent transport to receptor locations. Each subsection focuses on 

a specific model, and primarily referencing existing guidance or literature to consult for more indepth specifications while providing commentary on general considerations. The focus on 

existing guidance is understandable and warranted, but the reader could benefit from additional 

context describing the referenced sources. 

Recommendation – Develop a table, similar to Table 11-4, which references existing guidance 

or literature by model/topic and also provides a description of the source and its potential use. 

Given the current layout of the chapter, it would be beneficial to create two of these tables: one 

for source term modeling and another for transport modeling.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 3.1.1, 

Line 14

The reference to “Step 8” should be revised and corrected to “Step 9.”

CHAPTER 4

Summary Comment – Generic scenarios do not inherently account for site-specificity, and

numerous viable disposal sites across the country can be seen to demonstrate the inaccuracies in 

NRC staff’s claim on line 28 of page 4-11 that such generic scenarios represent “normal 

activities that humans typically engage in . . .” For example, Clive Utah’s groundwater is of 

extremely poor quality and very low yield. The generic inadvertent intruder scenarios not only 

completely misrepresent any potential inadvertent intruder exposure from Clive Utah’s 

groundwater, the generic scenarios also arbitrarily underestimate the sites’ ability to comply with 

the inadvertent intruder protection performance objective. Such arbitrary support of generic 

inadvertent intruder scenarios by NRC staff is also dramatically inconsistent with NRC staff’s 

own claim on line 38 of page 4-11 that “depending on the method used, licensees should provide 

justification for their selection.” Similarly, simple reliance by a licensee on the generic 

inadvertent intruder scenarios is also contrary to NRC’s own guidance on line 20 of page 4-7 that 

the inadvertent intruder analysis is an “iterative process involving site-specific, prospective 

modeling evaluations . . .” 

Recommendation – Place greater emphasis throughout the text on the importance of considering 

reasonably foreseeable and site-specific scenarios at the site location. A table of lines from the 

text that we recommend be edited to provide such additional clarity are shown below. 

Table 4.1 Lines Needing Additional Clarity

No. Section Page Line

1 4.1 4-3 28
7 

2 4.2.3 4-6 26

3 4.3 4-9 8

4 4.3.1 4-11 7

5 4.3.1 4-13 40

6 4.3.1 4-16 1

7 4.3.1 4-19 3

8 4.3.2 4-26 33

9 4.3.2 4-27 2

10 4.3.2.2 4-30 10

11 4.3.2.2 4-34 35

12 4.3.2.4 4-35 37

13 4.3.2.4 4-25 43

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 4.0, 

Line 14 

Figure 4-1 is inconsistent with the text of Section 4.0. The caption in the 

top circle of the Figure should be revised to “Demonstrate Compliance 

with Waste Acceptance Requirements” to remain consistent with the text. 

2 4.2 For added clarity, Section 4.2 could be adjusted to reinforce that the 

chapter’s focus is for protection of an inadvertent intruder.

3 4.3.1 Line 26 of page 4-11, regarding the assessment that generic receptor 

scenarios are reasonably conservative should be deleted. 

4 4.3.1 The intent behind NRC’s justification of generic inadvertent intruder 

receptor scenarios provided on line 9 of page 4-13 does not automatically 

equate to their projection of conservatisms and bounding results without 

adaptation to reasonably-expected site-specific analysis and justifications 

suggested throughout subsection 4.3.1.2. Rather, the generic receptor 

scenarios provide conservative bounds for the sites that existed at the 

time 10 CFR 61 was first promulgated. Such qualifications should be 

added to the text.

5 4.3.1 We appreciate that NRC staff realizes that when drilling resistance is 

encountered (as part of the Intruder-Driller Receptor Scenario), a driller 

will typically adapt by moving the drill rig to a more suitable location. It 

is recommended that the guidance also note in subsection 4.3.1.1.2 that 

when extremely low yield or extremely poor quality groundwater is 

encountered, the driller will also adapt by moving sufficiently far to be 

located over completely different hydrogeologic conditions of higher 

yield and quality. 

6 4.3.1 Since Staff recognizes that prior to construction and dwelling intrusion 

scenarios, the inadvertent intruder must first excavate a viable production 

groundwater well, the text should be revised to note that when failing to 

do so, it can be reasonably expected that neither the construction, 

dwelling, nor agricultural intrusion receptors will represent site-specific 

conservatisms. 
8 

7 4.3.1 Licensees should only be allowed to adopt generic receptor scenarios 

after providing justification that facility design, operations, and site are 

reasonably represented in the generic scenario characteristics. Line 22 

should be revised to reflect this position.

8 4.3.1 Estimated exposures from generic receptor scenarios might not always be 

higher than site-specific scenarios. A generic scenario does not 

automatically equate to conservativism without appropriate consideration 

and analysis of reasonably expected site-specific conditions. It should be 

the burden of the licensee to demonstrate, and the reviewer to confirm, 

whether or not results produced by the application of generic-receptorscenarios are more conservative (e.g., higher projected doses). The 

statement on line 17 of page 4-17 should be revised to reflect that the 

generic scenarios represent greater exposure estimates.

9 4.3.1.2. The main advantage of site-specific intruder receptor scenarios is not the 

flexibility provided the licensee; rather, the main advantage to the 

licensee and the reviewer is that site-specific intruder receptor scenarios 

more closely reflect reality. This adds to the degree of confidence that a 

technically-based and reproducible assessment is achieved. Statements 

within this section should be edited to reflect the true advantages of sitespecific analyses.

10 4.3.2.2

Page 4-30 

Line 44 

Because the statement regarding conservative estimates of waste 

inventory is given without qualification, it is easily misinterpreted by 

reviewers. The statement should be removed or better qualified. 

11 4.3.2.2 This section (and this chapter in general) is replete with references to 

“conservatives;” conservative designs, scenarios, estimates, limits, 

assumptions, parameters – the list goes on and on. It is inappropriate to 

urge conservatism at every step, particularly in the case of site 

parameters. Staff should promote site-specific input parameters and only 

use (conservative) default values where the input parameters either don’t 

matter (based on sensitivity) or are impossible to obtain. It also is 

important to recognize that an input parameter that is conservative for one 

analysis may not be conservative for another (take, for example, staff’s 

own caution of using conservative releases for 61.41 compliance vis a vis 

61.42 compliance). Incessantly compounding conservatisms is a 

reflexive and inappropriate approach to preparing an analysis with a 

suitable safety margin.

12 4.3.2.2 The first clarification for appropriate inadvertent intruder assessment 

source term on line 33 of page 4-34 should be revised to clarify that 

environmental contamination generated by the inadvertent intrusion is not 

included in demonstration of the protection of the general public. 

13 4.3.2.2 Line 45 of page 4-34 describing the importance of assessing waste 

accessed via excavation by the intruder should be clarified so that it is 

clear that performance assessment demonstrating protection of the 

general public does not require and should not include an assessment of 

the transport of waste via intruder excavation. 
9 

14 4.3.2.3 The two examples cited in this section of gaseous diffusion and an 

intruder well inappropriately imply that these transport mechanisms are 

always reasonably expected. If non-potable and of extremely low yield, a 

site’s aquifer may not be a viable target for an intruder well. It is 

suggested to remove the sentence beginning on line 17 of page 4-35. 

15 4.3.2.3 General public exposures are not modeled for any radionuclides 

transported off-site due to the actions of an inadvertent intruder. Line 20 

of 4-35 should be amended to include this qualification. For example, if 

an inadvertent intruder drills into disposed waste in preparation for a 

garden, the dust generated from doing so is not modeled when projecting 

doses to the general public nor included when comparing to regulatory 

limits for post-closure general public exposures. 

16 4.3.2.4 The statement beginning on line 25 of page 4-35 is misleading. Any 

contact by anyone (whether on the site or downstream) with waste that 

has transported away from its original disposal placement will be the 

result of “onsite releases from the LLW disposal facility.” The reference 

to direct contact with waste should be removed. 

17 4.3.2.4 The inadvertent intruder methodology summarized on line 30 of page 4-

35 should be revised to clarify, “Dose modeling consists of converting 

radionuclide concentrations generated in environmental media from the 

inadvertent intrusion onto the licensed site and/or into the waste to dose 

through various onsite exposure pathways.”

18 4.4 The statement made on line 10 of page 4-37 stating that licensees may 

assume institutional controls provide durable site protection seems to 

contradict the entire theme of this chapter, which is a guidance on how a 

licensee can demonstrate, through analyses not assumptions, reasonable 

assurance that performance objectives are met. This statement should be 

eliminated from the text.

CHAPTER 5

Summary Comment – The guidance for proving site stability is convoluted and limits the 

ability of an applicant or licensee to determine how to develop a site stability analyses. Adding 

to the confusion already considered in the guidance, Chapter 2 presents new time periods for 

analyses, and then this chapter introduces another time period based on waste concentration. 

Recommendation – Clarify the time period for analyses. The licensee and reviewer would both 

greatly benefit from the addition of a table or flow diagram that outlines all analyses 

considerations and time frames for analyses presented in the rule in Section 61.44, Section 

61.50(a)(2), Section 61.50(a)(3), and guidance in Chapter 2.3.2.4, and this chapter. 

Summary Comment – Requiring quantitative analyses periods beyond 1,000 years for low-level 

waste is unreasonable, unprecedented, and without scientific merit. The use of natural 

analogues, though helpful to support the design and technical basis for engineered barriers, 

cannot be used to prove with confidence stability of a man-made or engineered barrier
10

Recommendation – Remove requirements to prove site stability past 1,000 years. 

Summary Comment – The frequent shifts between the requirements and scope of “site stability 

analysis” and “stability analysis” is confusing and in some instances seem to be used 

interchangeably and in other instances “stability analyses” seems to reference a larger analysis of 

which “site stability analyses” are a component. This is also demonstrated in Chapter 2, which 

provides guidance for analyses required with respect to site characteristics. 

Recommendation – Use language that is consistent throughout both the rule and the guidance.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 5.1 Staff should eliminate or provide context for the requirement that 

licensees that choose to use site-specific scenarios over generic receptor 

scenarios must consider low frequency natural events in the site stability 

analyses. An explanation of why generic receptor scenarios “may bound 

the impact” from these events, and site-specific scenarios would not is 

missing. 

2 5.1.1.3 The guidance suggests that site stability against other disruptive 

processes should include climate change for sites accepting waste with 

long-lived isotopes. The concept that climate change is a disruptive 

process and should be modeled as such is never referenced in the 

proposed rule. Furthermore, the guidance suggesting climate change 

should be considered within the site stability analyses seems to directly 

contradict guidance in §5.1.2 which states that licensees should evaluate 

natural climate cycling, but are not required to evaluate “anthropogenic 

climate change.” There are no conservative scenarios with respect to

the concept of climate change, and as such any climate change 

projections cannot be considered reasonably foreseeable at the individual 

site. The suggestions around climate change should be stricken from the 

guidance. This also is in direct conflict with Commission direction that 

analyses beyond the compliance period not rely on such assumed 

conditions: “Given the significant uncertainties inherent in these long 

timeframes, and to ensure a reasonable analysis, this performance 

assessment should reflect changes in features, events, and processes of 

the natural environment such as climatology, geology, and 

geomorphology only if scientific information compelling such changes 

from the compliance period is available.” (SRM-SECY-13-0075) 

3 5.2.2 The suggestion that refinement of a model with results showing a FEP to 

be significant could lead to new results showing the FEP is actually 

insignificant, and thus site stability is proved, should be eliminated from 

the text. The suggestion encourages the licensee to massage data,

parameterization, boundary conditions, and model form to produce 

satisfactory compliance results. 

4 5.3.1 If as suggested, the existing guidance for uranium mill tailings is 

applicable to LLW disposal sites, and as such, the limitations of the 
11

existing guidance should also be applicable. Comments on the uranium 

mill tailings analyses recognized that stability over 1,000 years cannot be 

proven. We reiterate our comments that the licensee should not be 

required to make attempts to demonstrate site stability from 1,000 to 

10,000 years.

5 5.3.1 The comment that the Staff “plans to periodically assess the sufficiency” 

of the guidance around proving engineered barrier stability and 

“supplement it when necessary” is disturbing. NRC’s Principles of 

Good Regulations state that regulation should be reliable and not in a 

state of transition. The proposed actions to reassess the guidance goes 

against this principle. If Staff lack technical confidence in the actions 

outlined in the Guidance, then the steps should be stricken from the text.

6 5.3.1 Additional content is needed discussing how the requirement to provide 

a technical basis for engineered barriers are to be incorporated into the 

overall site stability assessment. The engineered barrier technical basis 

considerations are only referenced in the discussion of design based 

approach, yet the text in this section suggest it is a requirement, and thus, 

not subject to the type of analyses approach used. 

7 5.3.2 The concept of defense-in-depth is implied in this section, demonstrating 

as we suggest that defense-in-depth is adequately woven throughout the 

analyses such that a separate independent analyses is not required. That 

said, we do not agree with the Staff that licensees should have to 

consider “multiple, independent, and redundant barriers” in the design of 

engineered barriers for long-term waste disposal. Redundancy is 

demonstrated in the multiple layers of defense including proper site 

selection, waste inventory, natural barriers and engineered barriers. The 

suggestion should be removed from the text.

8 5.3.3 We agree with Staff in the benefit of site monitoring and that site 

monitoring results can be used to assess both site performance and 

evaluate model predictions and performance. When monitoring results 

for the institutional control period support initial analyses, the technical 

analyses should not have to be updated upon site closure 

CHAPTER 6

Summary Comment – The protective assurance analysis, as it is described in the guidance, is 

based on both engineering and economic theory that cannot be defended. As we discussed in 

Chapter 5, site stability cannot be proven with confidence past 1,000 years. Additionally, very 

long-term discounting has not been demonstrated beyond 1,000 years. With the uncertainties 

that surround economic models, calculating the net present value of an asset out to 10,000 years 

should not be used as a decision basis to prove that a design alternative minimizes dose exposure 

with respect to what is economically feasible. Furthermore, the guidance in Chapter 6 is too 

prescriptive with respect to methodology, and falls short with respect to providing clear 

examples of how to implement the detailed methodologies. Though licensees have the liberty to 
12

perform alternative cost-benefit analyses to demonstrate protective assurance compliance, most 

of the chapter is dedicated to describing a singular approach that is suspect. 

Recommendation – Eliminate this chapter and the entire protective assurance analysis 

requirement from both the rule and the guidance in favor of a two-tiered assessment, with the 

second tier requiring analyses out to peak dose. Alternatively, the requirement to provide 

comparisons out to 10,000 years can be eliminated, requiring only the comparison of peak dose 

of design alternatives.

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 6.2 Figure 6-1 should be removed from the guidance, or a detailed legend 

should be provided to help convey the meaning. As it is currently 

presented, the color gradation and gradient size can be subject to multiple 

inaccurate interpretations of required level of effort by both the regulator 

and licensee.

2 6.2.1.2 The minimization analysis as it is presented in the guidance is not 

optimized with respect to mathematics, nor does it provide assurance that a 

design to reach a true minimum dose has been reached, as suggested in the 

guidance. A mathematical optimization requires the evaluation of function 

with alternative values to find a maximum or minimum, which is 

potentially restricted to a domain based on variable or value constraints. 

The analysis presented in the guidance is a comparison of viable and 

reasonable alternatives, and should be renamed as such.

3 6.2.1.2 The prescribed discount rates of 1 to 7 percent for the long-term net 

present value analysis have no basis in economic research. Additionally, 

requiring licensee to perform the analysis with multiple discount rates is 

overly burdensome and only serves to add additional confusion to decision 

making. The suggested discount rates, and the requirement to perform 

economic discounting across very-long time periods is a misapplication of 

the singular research source presented to defend the suggested approach. 

The reference only demonstrates economic discounting out to 999 years 

and provides no basis for extending analyses beyond 1,000 years. These 

concepts should be removed from the guidance. 

4 6.2.1.2 The term “prohibitively large” with respect to uncertainties is used as a 

metric or quantity to determine when inventory limits might be warranted. 

This definition for this term is not found within the rule or guidance. We 

recommend defining this term.

5 6.2.1.2 We believe Example 6.1 is flawed in the use of significant digits and 

evaluating precision in dose predictions. For example, the time periods to 

peak dose are calculated out to the single digit, while net present value 

costs are rounded to the millionth. The assumption that peak dose 

calculations can be computed with a precision of one digit is misguided 

and does not adequately address the uncertainties associated with the peak 

dose calculations. The rounding of net present value costs seems 

reasonable given the extreme uncertainties associated with long-term 
13

discounting. We recommend using the same conservatism with peak 

dosage estimates and time to peak dosages. 

CHAPTER 7

Summary Comment – The subtitles and text in this section are inconsistent when referring to 

required analyses. These inconsistencies exacerbate the confusion around how licensees can 

adequately demonstrate compliance. The rule specifically states that a “qualitative analysis 

covering a performance period of 10,000 years or more” is required. Contradicting the proposed 

rule, the guidance requires a “quantitative risk assessment” which is never detailed, but includes 

a section around “quantitative analyses.” Edits to enhance the clarity and content of this chapter 

are suggested.

Recommendation – Develop a more detailed approach to better inform licensees in 

demonstrating performance period compliance when the results initial screenings necessitate 

additional analyses. 

Summary Comment – The requirements to evaluate additional FEPs that are the result of 

scenarios that have “as low as a 10 percent chance of occurrence over the analysis timeframe” is 

in direct conflict with the direction given by the Commission in SRM-SECY-13-0075. 

Regarding the analyses for the Protective Assurance Period, the Commission directed the staff as 

follows: 

Given the significant uncertainties inherent in these long timeframes, and to ensure a 

reasonable analysis, this performance assessment should reflect changes in features,

events, and processes of the natural environment such as climatology, geology, and 

geomorphology only if scientific information compelling such changes from the 

compliance period is available. 

The comments made by Staff in §7.3.1 state that the information regarding FEPs will be 

“limited” and “more susceptible to bias,” implying that the additional FEPs considered in this 

time frame would not have a scientific basis for supporting the frequency estimates. This clearly 

is a standard far below “compelling,” and based on the direction from the Commission, is 

inappropriate. 

It is unclear if these less likely but plausible FEPs represent “key” FEPs as described on page 7-

12, line 6. The guidance suggest that the existence of these FEPs might require the licensee to 

modify conceptual and numerical models, rather than extending calculations or the analyses 

period. Requiring the licensee to develop alternative conceptual and numerical models for 

scenarios that lack a defendable scientific basis is unreasonable and overly burdensome.

Recommendation – Remove the requirements for consideration of less-likely but plausible 

FEPs. 
14

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 7.3.3 The recommendation to perform a side-by-side comparison of generic 

receptor scenarios to the assumed characteristics of the receptors should be 

limited to the performance period. If this comparison is necessary for 

other evaluation periods, then the suggestion should be explicitly made in 

the appropriate sections of the guidance and rule.

2 7.4 The site-specific conditions that warrant the performance analyses listed in 

Figure 7-1 should be explicitly written into the guidance.

3 7.4 The use of “quantitative risk assessment” should be removed as a 

quantitative risk assessment is not warranted by the proposed rule. The 

caption in Figure 1 should be revised to read “Qualitative Analyses.”

4 7.4 The guidance to perform additional analyses with bounding values when 

reasonable averages are available is not reasonable. As stated in the 

guidance, bounded values, especially those that span many values, can 

result in illogical and impossible model results. These additional analyses 

would add nominal value if any to the assessment.

5 7.4.1.1.1 The required evaluations for screening of potential waste streams should 

be limited to site-specific and reasonably foreseeable radiation exposure 

pathways.

6 7.4.1.12 It is unclear what additional analyses can be performed to demonstrate 10 

CFR 61.41(c) and 10 CFR 61.42(c) requirements will be met when the 

screening analyses results are unacceptable. This section requires far more 

explanation and context than what is currently included. 

7 7.4.1.1.2 The section title, “Quantitative Analyses” should be renamed to 

“Qualitative Analyses” to remain consistent with the proposed rule. The 

content in the section should reflect the shift in the type of analyses 

required. 

8 7.4.1.1.2 Additional content is needed to describe how the analyses in Chapter 6.0 

can be applied to the performance period analyses, when there is no dose 

goal available. The crux of Chapter 6 is the minimization analyses, which 

includes leveling scale factors based on dosage goals for 10 CFR 61.41 

and 10 CFR 61.42. Without a dose context for the leveling scale factor, 

viability of the design cannot be evaluated using the prescribed methods.

9 7.4.1.1.3 Additional time periods for analyses are presented, including the 500 year, 

Class C waste intruder barrier period. The Class C waste intruder barrier 

period is never explicitly referenced in the proposed rule and as such 

should be removed from consideration.

10 7.4.1.1.3 Performing cost analyses over multiple time frames is not justified, and 

these suggestions should be removed the guidance. Requiring cost 

analyses for time periods that pre-date the performance period does not 

align with the scope of the performance period analyses

11 7.4.1.2 The barrier analyses again models the defense-in-depth concept, requiring 

that multiple, independent, redundant barriers be included in the design 

and consequentially analyzed. Again, we do not see the merit in requiring 
15

a separate, independent, defense-in-depth analysis, when it is already 

woven into the requirements for the compliance period analyses. 

CHAPTER 8 

Summary Comment – Much of Chapter 8 is general language about the meaning and usefulness 

of defense-in-depth (DID) and is appropriate for inclusion even should the Commission adopt 

our recommendation that the requirement for a DID “analysis” be removed. However, section 

8.3 is focused on analytical elements necessary for compliance, and is in need of extensive 

reduction and revision, if not complete elimination. Its description of analyses necessary to 

prove the efficacy of DID have not been shown to provide any additional protection for health 

and safety beyond that provided by preparing the other analyses required by the new regulations. 

In fact, the guidance itself, although inconsistently, implies the acceptability of this approach 

(relying on the other analyses) to some extent.

Many of the concepts of DID are misapplied in this document. We highlight a few merely to 

illustrate the point.

Independent Layers – The individual elements that provide defense-in-depth for a LLW site are 

by their very nature inherently independent. For example, the location of a site is dependent 

upon no other aspect of the design and operation of a site in terms of the protection it provides. 

A site that is distant from potentially affected populations or sensitive environments is protective 

by virtue of this distance and isolation. Should a container fail earlier than projected, the time 

for its contents to reach a receptor and provide a dose to the member of the public is increased by 

(among other things) this distance. The extent to which this distance mitigates or eliminates the 

potential hazard is determined by fate and transport modeling in the performance assessment. 

But the extent to which this proximity-derived protection can be diminished by some other 

aspect of the design or operation of the site is zero. The same is true for each of the other 

elements of the disposal system. There is no “analysis” necessary to demonstrate independence.

Redundant Layers – The concept of redundancy is misapplied in the guidance. In a more 

traditional application, e.g., a nuclear power plant, redundancy is important because there are 

certain systems that perform a function that is vital to maintain, thus the concept of duplication. 

If the principal method of keeping water in the core is lost, another – redundant – method is 

necessary because keeping the reactor core cooled is essential. It is not acceptable to simply 

default to relying on the containment to retain the release of radioactivity because the 

consequences of its failure are potentially very high. There is no comparably important system 

in a LLW disposal site and certainly no comparable risk in the event of failure. 

There is not now and should not be imposed a requirement for redundancy of anything at a LLW 

site because there is no implicit need for redundancy per se. It is understood that there are 

varying times for which LLW must be isolated from the environment. For waste that decays 

quickly, this may be a very short time period. It is the role of the performance assessment to 

demonstrate that any given waste stream can be isolated from the environment for an adequate 

period of time. The components of the waste disposal system are evaluated to assess their 

contribution to this task and to ensure that the overall operation of the system is acceptable. 

There is no element of the system that is so essential that the risk of its failure is intolerable. 
16

This is not to say that a given applicant or licensee should not be allowed to propose and take 

credit for redundant systems, e.g., multiple liners, at its discretion. However, there should be no 

requirement for an analysis that proves that redundancy has been incorporated into the design of 

a LLW disposal site.

Our complaint is not that it is unreasonable to expect an applicant or licensee to demonstrate that 

its disposal can be expected to properly isolate waste, operate safely, and demonstrate 

compliance with the performance objectives. Our complaint is in the requirement that a separate 

analytical exercise – a DID analysis – is necessary to demonstrate safety, or that an “analysis” is 

necessary to demonstrate that defense-in-depth has been accounted for in the siting and design of 

the site. In addition, we do not believe that a DID analysis was the direction given by the 

Commission in SRM-SECY-13-0075. Instead, the Commission directed that the rulemaking and 

guidance document include, “a clear statement that licensing decisions are based on DID 

protections.” 

In section 8.3.2, staff states that: 

In some cases, layers of defense may not be amenable to representation in one of the 

other 10 CFR 61.13 analyses. 

We reject that logic. Layers of defense that cannot be accounted for in the other analyses 

should not be relied upon for demonstrating compliance. 

Recommendation – EnergySolutions submits that this section requires extensive editorial 

revision and as such should be revised and published again in draft form for public comment. 

CHAPTER 9

Summary Comment – A clear explanation of the hybrid WAC system is not presented in this 

Chapter. The process for using either the generic waste classification tables in 61.55 or the 

results of the technical analyses in 61.13 as a basis for the WAC is unclear, and the chapter is 

dense with unnecessary language. As previously noted, the distinction between the application

of these two approaches is unclear in the regulation, and the guidance seems to indicate that 

these two options are not mutually exclusive. In fact, in reviewing this section of the guidance, 

we are not able to conclude that there is a way for an applicant or a licensee to choose to comply 

with the classification tables in §61.55 in lieu of developing WAC that would be used for 

regulating the site. We do not believe this is the intent of the revised regulations and we are not 

in agreement that this is reasonable. The two options are intermingled in the chapter so that the 

path for using one versus the other remains unclear (as is the case with the proposed rule.) 

Recommendation – Outline the waste acceptance process clearly for each approach. We 

suggest that Chapter 9 be split out into two chapters, one dealing with using the old classification 

system and the other outlining the process for developing the WAC from the technical analyses. 

A section should be provided at the very beginning of the chapter that discusses the applicability 

of the new requirements to existing or new sites which desire to accept and dispose of newer 

waste streams with higher concentrations and quantities of long-lived radionuclides. 
17

Provide a clear description of the waste acceptance process for sites that do not dispose of waste 

containing significant quantities of long-lived radionuclides. As with our companion comments 

on the proposed rule, the guidance should be revised to provide current and future disposal sites 

that do not dispose of significant quantities of long lived isotopes with the alternative to operate 

under the existing regulatory regime. The guidance should be revised to include a clear 

discussion of the process for such sites that does not include the preparation and regulatory 

review of extensive new technical analyses that provide no public benefit or improvement in 

human health and safety. 

SPECIFIC COMMENTS BY SECTION

No. Section Comment

1 9.1 This section does not provide a clear distinction between the technical 

analyses required to generate site-specific WAC and those required to 

demonstrate compliance with the classification tables in 61.55. As stated 

above, everything discussed in this section should be specifically focused 

on one option or the other to eliminate confusion.

2 9.1.1.1 In general, the language in this section is not clear should be simplified as 

much as possible.

3 9.1.1.1 This section should include a more detailed summary regarding the 

development of allowable limits from the technical analyses. Clear 

guidance is missing, while obvious information is repeated (i.e. paragraph 

1 of the section). A flow chart, similar to Figure 9-4 should be created to 

outline the documentation process for proposed waste classification limits 

determined using technical analyses in order to satisfy the requirements in 

§61.13 of the rule. 

4 9.1.1.2 The first paragraph in this section includes statements that are in direct 

conflict with the regulations in 10 CFR Part 61 and are not appropriate for 

including in guidance. Take for example the last sentence in this 

paragraph: “Guidance on developing limits on radionuclides not listed in 

the waste classification tables is also provided in this section.” Given that 

the regulations impose no limits on nuclides not listed in the tables, but 

rather designate them as Class A waste, it is not acceptable that the NRC 

would issue guidance that essentially imposes limits on other nuclides. 

5 9.1.1.2 Another issue with the language cited in the point above is that it creates a 

significant unintended consequence of the rule in that it fundamentally 

undermines the either-or (WAC or classification tables) approach that is 

created in §61.58. It is anticipated that in the process of developing a 

WAC to comply with §61.68, an applicant or licensee would have to 

create a matrix of nuclides, including concentration and inventory limits, 

that would go beyond the isotopes listed in the tables in §61.55. 

However, if the result of the new regulations is to require applicants and 

licensees who propose only to comply with the tables in §61.55 to also 

calculate limits for nuclides not listed in the tables, then what is the point 

of the tables? In fact, there would be no circumstance where an applicant 

or licensee could comply only with the tables. This is a fundamental 
18

change to the status quo that extends far beyond what is suggested by the 

proposed rule language or has been discussed by the staff in the many 

public meetings on the proposed rule.

6 9.1.1.2 The statement that existing limits “are not intended to provide reasonable 

assurance that all of the performance objectives are met” and that 

technical analyses might also be required for sites that rely on the current 

waste classification limits negate the purpose of retaining the current 

classification system. It could be argued that Part 61 licensees and 

applicants always have had to prepare analyses (a performance assessment 

by any other name) in order to demonstrate compliance with §61.41 

(performance objective for the protection of the general population); but 

compliance with §61.42 (performance objective for the protection of the 

inadvertent intruder) was demonstrated by compliance with the 

classification tables. The suggested requirements in this section place an 

unnecessary burden on facilities that intend to rely on the current 

classification system and not dispose of long-lived radionuclides. A 

process by which the facilities can simply rely on the current 

classification system is needed in order to have a true hybrid system, 

otherwise there is no use for the current classification system. These 

comments should be eliminated and a discussion of a streamlined process 

for facilities relying on the existing classification system should be added.

7 9.1.1.3 The concept of “insignificant radionuclides” introduced in this section 

appears arbitrarily. There is no mention of this concept in the proposed 

rule and the concept is only implied, but not explicitly referenced in one 

other place in the guidance, under the Inadvertent Intruder scenario. The 

sum of radionuclide contribution concept is presented in the rule and 

Chapter 4 of the guidance. The definition of “insignificant radionuclides” 

should be added to the proposed rule and discussed in further detail in 

Chapter 2.

8 9.1.2 The two approaches for waste classification are again intermingled in this 

section, specifically regarding the applicability of stability requirements, 

wasteform characteristics, and wasteform test methods. As stated 

previously, these approaches should be discussed separately. 

9 9.1.2 The three approaches for demonstrating stability requirements should be 

made obvious to the reader through edits such as highlighting, bulleting or 

some other mechanism.

10 9.2 The format of this section is easy to follow, and could be useful to help 

streamline other sections that have been noted to be unclear or wordy.

11 9.2 Another new term “significant radionuclides” is introduced that is not 

reference anywhere else in the regulation or guidance. It is suggested that 

the concept be discussed in Chapter 2. 

12 9.2 Page 9-16 lines 20-22 state: “For waste acceptance criteria developed 

from the waste classification requirements specified in 10 CFR 61.55, 

waste characterization methods should be commensurate with the 

assumptions and approaches employed to develop the waste classification 

requirements.” As mentioned previously, these “assumptions and 
19

approaches” need to be presented and discussed in the document, since 

they are so critical to the use of the waste classification system. One 

example is provided later in the text but additional detail is required. 

13 9.2.1.1 The use of the new term “significant radionuclides” appears again in this 

section.

14 9.2.1.1.1 

and 9.1.1.2 

We commend the staff for providing a clear delineation of the processes 

for using each different basis for the WAC in this section. 

15 9.2.1.2 The content in this section should be divided into a discussion for waste 

classification and separate discussion for technical analyses. 

16 9.5 Mitigation is a concept that is applicable to more than just the WAC. This 

section should be moved to Chapter 2 and a flowchart would help clarify 

the process. 

17 9.5 This section refers to the updated technical analyses at closure, which we 

do not agree with. This section should be modified to explain 

circumstances when this requirement applies, which as when new 

unexpected conditions are identified at a site.
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Helene Cuomo <helenecuomo@hotmail.com>

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 7:10 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Comment on Waste Rules: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Please, DEPLETED URANIUM SHOULD NOT BE CLASSIFIED AS CLASS A. IT CONTINUES TO GROW 

MORE RADIOACTIVE AS TIME GOES ON and this needs to be seriously considered, especially when some 

companies who are allowed to accept Class A waste will be then be having depleted uranium buried in not the 

proper way for such a potentially high level waste. It's really scary for my family and future generations. 

I have some significant concerns about the proposed revisions to Part 61, but first wanted to express my 

support for one part: The proposed revisions appear to allow Utah to maintain its reliance upon classification 

tables, to enforce its long-standing ban on Class B&C wastes. Thank you for including that in the final rules. 

Utah must have the right to keep hotter wastes out of our state. 

There are several key concerns that I'd like to highlight. 

1. The new regulations reduce the compliance period. At first staff chose a 10,000 year period, but that's been 

reduced to only 1,000 years. This is less protective of public health and the environment. It may be hard to look 

so far ahead, but we owe it to future generations to model in detail to ensure safety. 

2. We are concerned that licensees (such as EnergySolutions) can choose to simply order a study if they want 

to bring a new waste stream. This move towards the WAC approach has the potential to transfer decisionmaking power to consultants and overwhelm states with complex models. 

3. Next, I disagree with the dramatic limitations placed on the number of intruder scenarios to be considered. 

This approach is not appropriate for long-lived nuclear waste streams that will require more advanced 

predictive modeling. Just looking at scenarios happening now is absurdly restrictive given the potential for 

harm for millennia. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

Helene Cuomo 

3627 E. hermes DR 

Salt Lake City, UT 84124 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608168
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Dennis Welch <blakeprof@gmail.com>

Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2015 8:40 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] Proposed rule change for nuclear waste dumps

The NRC's proposed rule change applying to operations of waste dumps in SC, TX, UT, and WA as well as 

future dumps should be more protective of the environment and human health--NOT less, as the rule change 

would be 

As human populations increase and the resulting assaults on the environment and human health worsen, 

federal agencies such as the NRC will have to regulate and limit pollution more stringently, not less. 

Otherwise, this world will eventually become uninhabitable. 

Please avoid contributing to this eventuality. 

Sent from my iPad 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608169
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Dennis Welch <blakeprof@gmail.com>

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 1:06 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: Re: Proposed rule change for nuclear waste dumps

Office of the Secretary 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Dear Secretary: 

Thank you for your request of clarification. My previous note of concern relates to the updated radiation 

regime called EDE (Effective Dose Equivalent). 

The updating would allow more radioactivity per millirem for many radionuclides. This would allow doses to the 

public to be raised from the current 25 millirems a year to 100, 500 or more millirems EDE per year. 

Such elevated exposures will harm both the environment and human health, increasing in particular the 

number of cancers n the pathways of the updated exposure regime. 

Sincerely, 

Dennis Welch, Ph.D. 

701 Eldridge Loop 

Cary, NC 27519 

Sent from my iPad 

> On Jul 27, 2015, at 12:20 PM, RulemakingComments Resource 

<RulemakingComments.Resource@nrc.gov> wrote: 

> 

> Mr. Welch, 

> The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Office of the Secretary has received your e-mail below. Please verify 

which rulemaking this comment is in reference to so that we may process the comment properly to the correct 

NRC staff for review. 

> 

> Thank you. 

> 

> -----Original Message----- 

> From: Dennis Welch [mailto:blakeprof@gmail.com] 

> Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2015 8:40 AM 

> To: RulemakingComments Resource 

> Subject: [External_Sender] Proposed rule change for nuclear waste dumps 

> 

> The NRC's proposed rule change applying to operations of waste dumps in SC, TX, UT, and WA as well as 

future dumps should be more protective of the environment and human health--NOT less, as the rule change 

would be 

> 

> As human populations increase and the resulting assaults on the environment and human health worsen, 

federal agencies such as the NRC will have to regulate and limit pollution more stringently, not less. 

Otherwise, this world will eventually become uninhabitable. 

> 
2

> Please avoid contributing to this eventuality. 

> 

> Sent from my iPad 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/28/15 2:58 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k63-8p5e

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0138

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Diane D'Arrigo NIRS

Address: 

6930 Carroll Ave # 340

Takoma Park, MD, 20912

Email: dianed@nirs.org

Organization: NIRS + over 100 organizations-see comment

General Comment

See 2 attached file(s) on NRC20110012; NRC20150003 

10 CFR 61 Proposed Rule 10 CFR 61 Radioactive Waste Disposal Regulations

Comments Opposing Proposed NRC Regulations on so-called Low-Level Nuclear Waste Disposal which 

would allow more than 33 times higher radiation than from high level dumps and 20 times more than from 

operating nuclear power reactors.

The Comments are from over 100 organizations: 

Nuclear Information and Resource Service, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Sierra Club, Friends of the 

Earth, Beyond Nuclear, Greenpeace, Nuclear Energy Information Service, Public Citizen, Food and Water 

Watch, Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes, Crabshell Alliance, Alliance for Environmental Strategies, 

Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition, SEED Coalition, Rachel Carson Council, Three Mile Alert, Inc., 

Southern Alliance for Clean Energy, Nukewatch, Public Citizen TX, Nuclear Watch South, SUN DAY 

Campaign, Tennessee Environmental Council, Don't Waste Arizona, Work on Waste, USA, American 

Environmental Health Studies Project, Inc., Citizens Allied for Clean Energy, Inc., Fluoride Action Network, 

Arise for Social Justice, Citizens Resistance At Fermi Two (CRAFT), New England Coalition on Nuclear 

Pollution,

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PR-20, 61 

80FR1608170
Columbus Free Press, Alliance for a Clean Environment, California Communities Against Toxics, The Stella 

Group, Ltd., Natural Capitalism Solutions, North American Water Office, Ecological Options Network, Cape 

Downwinders, Citizens Action Coalition, Tallahassee Area Community, Utah Physicians for a Healthy 

Environment, Institute of Neurotoxicology & Neurological Disorders, Nuclear Hotseat, Tri-Valley CAREs, 

Don't Waste Michigan, Oregon and Washington Physicians for Social Responsibility Joint Task Force on 

Nuclear Power, Physicians for Social Responsibility-KC, San Francisco Bay Area Chapter Physicians for 

Social Responsibility, Physicians for Social Responsibility Western North Carolina Chapter, Environmental 

Priorities Network, Colorado Citizens Against Toxic Waste, Inc., Georgia Women's Action for New 

Directions (Georgia WAND), Concerned Citizens for SNEC Safety, California Safe Schools, Concerned 

Citizens of Lake Twp./Uniontown IEL Superfund Site, Pax Christi Florida, Residents Organized For a Safe 

Environment (ROSE),

PRESS Portsmouth/Piketon Residence for Environmental Safety and Security, Grandmothers, Mothers and 

More for Energy Safety, Energa Ma, Chez Sven Bed & Breakfast, West Shore Unitarian Universalist Faith 

Communities Together

Michigan Safe Energy Future, Redwood Alliance, Peace and Freedom Party, Rocky Mountain Peace and 

Justice Center

Heart of America Northwest, San Luis Obispo Mother for Peace; Concerned Citizens Ohio/Hiram, 

Ohio/Shalersville

Ohio Organizing Collaborative; Pilgrim Coalition, Hilton Head for Peace, Citizens for Alternatives to 

Chemical Contamination, Alliance to Halt Fermi 3, SBLDF, Breathe Easy Susquehanna County, 

RadiationTruth.org, Citizens for Clean Water, Mid-Missouri Peaceworks/Missourians for Safe Energy, Waste 

Action Project, Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone, Mother's Milk Project, Vermont Yankee 

Decommissioning Alliance, People Against a Radioactive Chesapeake 

The Enviro Show, Southern Maryland CARES (Citizens Against Radioactive Energy Sources), World 

Business Academy

Peace Action Wisconsin, Peace Education Project of Peace Action, Topanga Peace Alliance, Hudson River 

Sloop Clearwater, Inc., Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, Council on Intelligent Energy & Conservation 

Policy, DDMT Concerned Citizens Committee, Oregon Conservancy Foundation, Citizens for Safe Water 

Around Badger (CSWAB)

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, Promoting Health and Sustainable Energy, NY Citizens Environmental 

Coalition 

Lone Tree Council, Detroit Branch Womens International League for Peace and Freedom

Northwatch, Durham Nuclear Awareness (DNA), Justice and Global Issues Committee Toronto South East 

Presbytery of 

The United Church of Canada Friends of Bruce

Attachments

100+ Groups' Comments 10CFR61 Prop Nuclear Waste Disp Regs 7-24-15 NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015

–0003 [1of2]

Washington Post Paducah Articles 1999-2000 (2 of 2; Attachment to 100+Organizations comments NRC2011-0012)

Page 2 of 2

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0138.html 07/28/2015
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Diane D'Arrigo <dianed@nirs.org>

Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2015 12:08 AM

To: Dembek, Stephen

Subject: [External_Sender] additional commenters NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003

Attachments: 100+ Groups' Comments 10CFR61 Prop Nuclear Waste Disp Regs 7-24-15 

NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003 [1of2].pdf

Comment: NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003 

Please add to the 100+ Organization Comments on Radioactive Waste Disposal Regulation 

William Peil 

Calvert Citizens for a Healthy Community (CCHC). 

Lusby, Maryland 

and 

Ted Robinson 

Citizen Power 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Thank you 

Diane D’Arrigo 

NIRS 

dianed@nirs.org

301 270 6477 x 15
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Diane D'Arrigo <dianed@nirs.org>

Sent: Monday, July 27, 2015 5:18 PM

To: Dembek, Stephen

Subject: [External_Sender] 2 More additional commenters NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003

Attachments: 100+ Groups' Comments 10CFR61 Prop Nuclear Waste Disp Regs 7-24-15 

NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003 [1of2].pdf

Patricia Ameno

Citizens’ Action for a Safe Environment

Hyde Park, PA

Nancy Braus

Clean and Green

Brattleboro, VT

From: Diane D'Arrigo 

Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2015 12:08 AM 

To: Dembek, Stephen 

Subject: additional commenters NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003 

Comment: NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003 

Please add to the 100+ Organization Comments on Radioactive Waste Disposal Regulation 

William Peil 

Calvert Citizens for a Healthy Community (CCHC). 

Lusby, Maryland 

and 

Ted Robinson 

Citizen Power 

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

Thank you 

Diane D’Arrigo 

NIRS 

dianed@nirs.org

301 270 6477 x 15
1

Comments of Over 100 Organizations* to 

NRC on 10 CFR 61 Proposed Radioactive Waste Disposal Regulations 

Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 58 / Thursday, March 26, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 [NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003] RIN 3150–AI92 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Proposed rule. 

New NRC so-called “Low-Level” Nuclear Waste Dump Rules Would Allow More than 

33 Times Higher Radiation than High Level Dumps! 

And 20 Times more than from Operating Nuclear Power Reactors! 

The banner on the webpage of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission flashes “Protecting 

People and the Environment.” Critics of the NRC have challenged this claim and the proposed 

10 CFR 61 regulation changes substantiate that challenge. 

The proposed rule flies in the face of common sense and weakens already-inadequate regulations 

for licensed disposal of radioactive waste. 

The proposed regulations allow more than 33 times higher radioactive releases and exposures 

from so-called “low-level” radioactive waste dumps than from a high level waste dump formerly 

proposed at Yucca Mountain. Federal regulations1for a high level waste repository allow the site 

to release radioactivity that would deliver doses of up to15 millirems/year 2

for the first 10,000 

years. From 10,000 to 1 million years, the annual dose limit is 100 millirems. The NRC proposed 

regulations allow 25 mr/year during operation but up to and beyond 500 millirems per year from 

so called “low-level” radioactive waste disposal sites. The proposed rule allows so-called “lowlevel” nuclear waste disposal sites, after closure, to emit more than 20 times more radioactivity 

than operating nuclear power reactors3under the Environmental Protection Agency’s 

regulations. 1 in 25 adults exposed to 500 mr/year will get cancer,4assuming a lifetime dose 

(which is permitted by the rule). 

We oppose the proposed rule 10 CFR 61 and demand that NRC actually enforce its current 

minimum regulations at existing sites. 

The EnergySolutions-operated site in Barnwell, South Carolina which has been leaking for 

decades, despite a court order against both the company and the agreement state regulator 

(DHEC), has no plan to stop or prevent future leakage. 

 

1

EPA 40 CFR 197 

2

 Millirems are units of dose that cannot be verified or enforced but that are used to justify planned routine releases from nuclear 

facilities. 

3

 EPA 40 CFR 190 

4

500 millirems per year for a lifetime equals 1 in 25 adults getting cancer (higher for females). Environmental Protection Agency 

Blue Book EPA 402-R-11-001 April 2011, Page 59: Cancer incidence risk for “age averaged” adult = 1160 cancers per 10,000 

person-Gy; 1 Gy= 100 R; 1 R= 1000 mr; 0.5 R=500 mr; 1160 cancers per 1,000,000 person-R is the same as 1.16 cancers per 

1000 person-R. The proposed 10 CFR 61 would allow 500 mr per year. Assuming a 70 year life, that is 500 mr x70 years = 

35,000 mr over a 70 year lifetime =35 R; 1.160 cancers per 1000 person-R = X cancers per 35 person-R; 

X=(1.16x 35)/1000=.4060 or 40.6 in 100 or ~1 in 25. (1 millirem= 1 millirad for gamma emitters.)
2

The Waste Control Specialists (WCS) waste site was licensed by two out of the three politicallyappointed Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) Commissioners, despite the 

technical review team recommending denial or additional changes needed to protect water. A 

request by the Sierra Club for a contested case hearing was denied by the TCEQ Commissioners 

and Sierra Club has appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, arguing that TCEQ denied a 

legitimate hearing request. Since the license was granted and the site started receiving 

commercial and federal radioactive waste, WCS has changed the license through a series of 

amendments. First, they asked for and received an amendment allowing disposal of waste even if 

water is present in the area. Second, more recently, an amendment (known as Number 26) allows 

the WCS to increase the amount of waste, lowers financial assurance requirements and adds new 

waste streams to the site, including Depleted Uranium (DU). This amendment was approved 

with minimal public input and allows “flexibility” for how DU is to be disposed, including 

potentially allowing it go into non-containerized units. 

The proposed rule makes the existing 10 CFR 61 even worse and makes radioactive waste 

dumps more dangerous. The current rule does not require isolating the waste for the entire time it 

is radioactively hazardous but the proposed rule enables increasing the amount, radioactivity and 

longevity of the waste while removing dose limits “based on technological and economic 

considerations.”

5

It dubs future populations “intruders” and allows unlimited doses in the future 

from nuclear waste generated and buried today. 

The proposed rule allows private dump-operators to do “black box” calculations to allegedly 

justify putting whole new kinds and amounts of radioactive wastes to existing waste sites, clearly 

a conflict of interest—profit for them and not in the interests of the public or environment. It 

overrules states that have or might set stricter than federal standards for public and 

environmental protection. NRC appears to be lowering its own federal standards for public and 

environmental protection and for democratic participation, possibly in order to facilitate weaker 

standards at one or more existing radioactive waste facilities. At a time when NRC should be 

enforcing its own administrative and technical regulations, it is weakening them. 

Some of the provisions in the proposed rule violate common sense, the Atomic Energy Act, the 

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, the Administrative Procedures Act, the National 

Environmental Policy Act and the International Declaration of Human Rights. We insist that 

NRC correct these errors. 

Many of our groups have long advocated for better public protection in regulations for nuclear 

waste disposal, including: 

 No waste that lasts longer than the sites are actively monitored, repaired and 

institutionally controlled (with resources to remediate) should be allowed into a disposal 

site. We support redefining “radioactive waste” eligible for shallow land burial under 10 

CFR 61 and Agreement State regulations to keep long-lasting wastes out of near-surface 

burial. 

 

5

Proposed 10 CFR 61.41b allows the dump operator to do a calculation projecting a dose “...level that is supported as 

reasonably achievable based on technological and economic considerations...” 
3

10 CFR 61.55 Definitions: The A, B, C, >C waste classifications in 10 CFR 61.55 make 

assumptions that have never been publicly accepted but have become the norm. We continue to 

oppose the use of those misleading classifications, thus are more strongly opposed to allowing 

even more longer lasting and hazardous radionuclides into 10 CFR 61 disposal sites. 

For example, there is no level of plutonium that is “safe” or acceptable. Yet Class A waste, 

supposedly only dangerous for 100 years, the shortest lasting and least concentrated class, 

includes plutonium-239, hazardous for a quarter to half million years, up to 10 nanocuries per 

gram, with no limit on the number of grams. It also includes iodine-129 hazardous for 160 to 320 

million years. Clearly adding the proposed DU which decays into other, even longer-lasting 

radioactive elements, with its long decay chain has no business in 100 year Class A disposal. 

 NRC should define the appropriate class, if there is one, for DU. Initiate plans to consider 

it as high level waste. 

 Keep uranium (including DU), irradiated fuel reprocessing waste (including WIR--Waste 

Incidental to Reprocessing—a downward reclassification of high level waste), and other 

long-lasting wastes out of so-called “low-level” waste 10 CFR 61 disposal sites. 

 Make a goal of isolating radioactive waste, not legalizing releases. Do not increase 

allowable radioactive releases or the projected doses to people during or after the 

operational period. 

Under the existing 10 CFR 61the sites can legally leak into “the general environment in 

ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants and animals,” an amount calculated to 

deliver up to 25 millirems to the whole body, 75 millirems to the thyroid and 25 

millirems to any other organ of the body of members of the public, annually. By adopting 

the 10 CFR 20 definitions of radiation dose (doing away with organ dose limits), the 

proposed rule increases the radioactivity per millirem for many of the radionuclides. 

The proposed rule makes this much worse, as it allows not 25 but up to 500 millirems 

(EDE) or more per year, from a closed site. The unspecified doses are based on technical 

and economic considerations of the waste site operator. See the proposed 10 CFR § 

61.42. 500 millirems/year is an amount that is expected to cause cancer in 1 in 25 

exposed6, clearly an unacceptable risk from closed nuclear waste sites. This is criminal 

and disgraceful for an agency claiming to protect the public and environment. 

The existing radioactive waste sites have historically leaked – some in less than 20 years 

and well before site closure. One can only hope that institutional controls will exist for 

100 years post-closure, keeping in mind that institutional controls are not accompanied 

by resources to capture or control leaks and releases when they are revealed. 

 No Preemption of State Authority; Require States to Regulate as Strictly as NRC - 

The proposed rule supersedes the rights and authority of states to set more protective 

standards for facilities in their boundaries by making the entire 10 CFR 61 Level B 

 

6Op.cit.4 
4

Compatibility. As public interest advocates who participated in the setting of state 

regulations and siting of radioactive disposal sites, we strongly oppose this compatibility 

designation and support and encourage all state level opposition to this designation. 

NRC should drop the proposed requirement that all provisions of the new rules be 

adopted verbatim, Level B Compatibility, by Agreement States. The ‘Low-Level’ 

Radioactive Waste Policy Act and its Amendments (PL 99-240) makes states responsible 

for so-called “low-level” radioactive waste that is generated within their boundaries 

(although the provision requiring states to take title to the waste if disposal was not 

provided was overruled by the US Supreme Court in 1992). NRC should not undercut 

states by preempting their ability to set standards that are more protective than federal 

requirements. This undercuts states’ ability to be responsive to its citizens and residents. 

NRC should retain and expand the ability for states to be more protective, to regulate 

more strictly than the federal 10 CFR 61 regulations. This was part of the commitment 

and incentive to encourage and enable states to site new nuclear waste disposal sites. 

Changing the rules now looks a lot like a broken promise. It is predicted that there will be 

a need for new waste sites in the decades to come. Reneging on previous commitments 

and insisting that states adopt the more lax regulations that NRC is proposing will make 

that more difficult. 

Rather than relaxing standards and advocating for more hazardous and long-lasting waste 

going into waste sites, the US NRC, at minimum, should be enforcing the existing 

requirements and regulations and holding states to those. 

In cases in which the state or states that are increasing the risks to the public or providing 

weaker protections that 10 CFR 61 currently allows, NRC should assert its authority to 

maintain federal standards and require Agreement States to do so. This rulemaking 

appears to be an effort by NRC to join the lower common denominator, at least with DU, 

projections of long term doses from closed facilities and possibly other provisions. 

 “Below Regulatory Concern-” 

deregulates, exempts and releases radioactive waste and materials from radioactive 

regulatory control. NRC under its 10 CFR 20.2002 process allows radioactive waste, 

material and sites to be managed without radioactive regulatory controls on a case by 

case basis. Applications for these exemptions are not easily publicly available thus 

devoid of necessary options for public input and intervention. We are not aware of public 

reporting of 10 CFR 61.6 applications and call on NRC to stop treating nuclear waste, 

property and materials as if not radioactive whether it goes to solid, hazardous or other 

facilities and especially if it is allowed into the recycling streams or is released for 

unrestricted or restricted use. 

DELETE the added phrase in proposed rule under §61.7 Concepts ...“Alternative 

methods of disposal may be approved on a case-by-case basis as needed under § 61.6.” 

(Page 9 of the Comparison between Current Rule Language and Rule Language in 

Proposed Rule, "Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal” (80 FR 16082)). The NRC 
5

must not forget that the American public and our elected officials have repeatedly 

rejected the deregulation of nuclear waste. It should not be inserted into this rule which is 

about licensed radioactive disposal. The proposed rule re-asserts the publicly rejected 

concept of deregulation and we demand the deletion of this and any provisions that allow 

for manmade radioactive waste, materials, emissions and practices to be released from 

radioactive regulatory control. Deregulation, release, exemption, clearance and 

deminimus are completely unacceptable. 

DELETE the existing § 61.6 Exemptions7from the regulations. If it is retained, at 

minimum, CLARIFY that there is must be advance public notice, comment and 

opportunity for hearing, adjudicatory hearing and intervention, as with other license 

amendments and changes in regulations. Public notice, comment and opportunity for 

intervention should be required for any and all exemption, clearance, release of 

radioactive waste or materials from radioactive regulatory control. 

 We oppose increasing the amount and longevity of radioactivity that goes into shallow 

land burial.

The proposed rule would allow even longer-lasting waste into unlined soil trenches than 

the current regulations—waste that will be dangerous much longer than the sites will be 

controlled or monitored. These include: 

o Plutonium-239 (240,000 to 480,000 year hazard) and iodine-129 (160 to 320 

million year hazard) from nuclear power reactors are already allowed in set 

concentrations in dumps that can be institutionally controlled for up to just 100 

years. Sierra Club and other public interest and environmental groups have called 

for limiting the waste that can go into these dumps to that which is hazardous for 

100 years or less. Pennsylvania extended the institutional control period so if a 

facility is opened in that state, the site would be tracked longer than NRC 

assumes. Rather than consider the public demands for letting only shorter-lasting 

waste into the burial grounds, NRC is now opening the door to very large 

amounts of long-lasting waste and waste that gets more radioactive as it decays 

into other more radioactive materials. We direct that NRC analyze and adopt 

stricter disposal site requirements, keeping long-lasting waste out of shallow 

burial sites. 

o Uranium, referred to as Depleted Uranium (DU) after much of the uranium-235 is 

removed to make nuclear power and weapons fuel, because it is “depleted” of that 

one isotope, is biologically hazardous and radioactive due to all the other uranium 

isotopes present and the decay products of those isotopes increase in radioactivity 

over time. Thus DU can deliver increasing doses to the public, giving the peak or 

highest dose in more than 2 million years. (See 

http://www.deq.utah.gov/businesses/E/EnSolutions/depleteduranium/ and 

http://www.healutah.org/campaigns/nuclear-utah/nuclear-waste/ ) We support 

 

7

Existing regulation: 10 CFR § 61.6 Exemptions. The Commission may, upon application by any interested person, or upon its 

own initiative, grant any exemption from the requirements of the regulations in this part as it determines is authorized by law, 

will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. 
6

HEAL Utah, Institute for Energy and Environmental Research’s (IEER) and all 

other technical comments throughout this entire rulemaking process against 

allowing DU into shallow land burial sites and opposing its de facto inclusion in 

Class A with no justifiable, technical analysis. NIRS and IEER challenged the 

commercial generation of more DU during the licensing of the LES uranium 

enrichment facility now operating in New Mexico. We continue to hold that DU 

is not “low-level” waste or Class A, and that there is no safe permanent way to 

“dispose” or isolate it from the public and the environment. Because of the 

longevity of the hazard, it must be considered high level radioactive waste, or at 

least Greater than Class C, unsuitable for shallow land burial. We oppose the 

default and pretense NRC is making to allow it into shallow land burial where it 

cannot be isolated for the length of it hazard. 

o “Dirty” DU: 

So-called Depleted Uranium or DU could have and has had fission products 

present which exacerbate the health effects even further. Uranium recovered from 

the reprocessing of highly radioactive irradiated nuclear fuel, became highly 

radioactive and was sent back through enrichment facilities without notifying or 

protecting the workers from this deadly additional hazard. The DU generated 

during that subsequent enrichment processes was contaminated with fission 

products as well as the heavier transuranic residue that came with the “dirty” 

uranium. Absolutely no calculations have been done for this rulemaking by NRC 

nor are there requirements for disposal licensees to include such information in 

their Performance Assessments. 

This is a clear example that the process will not protect the public and 

environment. There is no justification for failing to incorporate this reality into the 

rulemaking, further discrediting the inadequate assessments of harm this proposed 

rule presents. 

We submit as attachments to these comments emails between NIRS and NRC 

regarding this omission including the actual Washington Post investigative reports 

on this scandal which resulted in involuntary, uninformed exposures of workers to 

fission products at enrichment facilities and failure to provide protection. Many 

other parameters of the Performance Assessments would change with this 

correction. Accurate inclusion of this “dirty” DU must be required in the 

assumptions NRC Staff and disposal companies have made about inadvertent 

intruder doses and the timeframes and amounts of “peak exposure.” There may be 

several peaks that should be factored. 

o High level radioactive waste from reprocessing of irradiated fuel—dubbed 

“Waste Incidental to Reprocessing” or even other high level waste could 

theoretically be disposed in shallow land burial grounds. Commercial 

reprocessing is not happening now in the US and NRC should not change its rules 

to accommodate reprocessing. 
7

In 2002 NRC had to admit that the only commercial reprocessing site in the US, 

at West Valley, NY, which only operated for 6 years, could not comply with the 

NRC License Termination Rule (10 CFR 20 subpart E), thus stated that it would 

require significant “flexibility.” In the intervening years, DOE’s has solidified 

much the primary extraction liquid into 275 high level radioactive waste “logs” at 

West Valley and generated huge amounts of waste in other waste streams with 

unknown but large amounts of radioactive sludge in underground tanks. It is been 

projected to cost roughly $5 Billion to clean up the reprocessing waste part of the 

site and another ~$5 Billion to clean up the commercial “low-level” radioactive 

burial ground, which operated for about a dozen years, at West Valley. NRC is 

failing to consider the long term costs of its weakened 10 CFR 61 regulations as it 

facilitates new reprocessing and waste sites that can take more kinds of waste.

o Other “unique” waste streams never originally intended for such unlined shallow 

land burial grounds have no business being thrown in the ground at the behest of 

the profit-making operators of waste sites. We understand that NRC wants to 

“solve” as many waste problems as it can, but pretending burial will isolate waste, 

and removing dose limits that could prevent burial are not acceptable. We demand 

that NRC strengthen the dose limits...make them low enough to protect the 

reproductive stage of our life cycle from not only cancer but all other radiationinduced negative health effects, including but not limited to teratogenic and 

genetic. 

o Blended waste and Averaging 

Years after the 1982 rule10 CFR 61 was adopted, NRC reinterpreted that rule to 

mean that classifying of waste (into A, B, C or >C) should be done at the point of 

disposal. This facilitated all sorts of waste processing, largely done in Tennessee 

but also in other states including Ohio. This has led to unnecessary transport and 

routine radioactive releases to the environment around processing facilities. 

A disturbing idea is being considered of bringing waste to disposal sites and then 

mathematically averaging the amount of radioactivity with the amount of 

radioactivity already at the site to allow much more radioactivity and higher 

concentration waste to be buried. We object to these practices. 

 NRC is not abandoning the A B C and >C concentration tables 10 CFR 61.55 but 

providing many other methods to comply and apparently leaving it up the waste operator, 

not the state or the public. 

 NRC creates and exacerbates a serious conflict of interest by encouraging and permitting 

profit-making dump-operators to do their own computer models and projections to allow 

more radioactive and longer lasting waste into trenches. NRC’s claim that computergenerated “Performance Assessments” can predict a “Safety Case” is false. Increasing 

hazards does not provide greater protection. 
8

o NRC admitted that it had not considered that some uranium is laced with fission 

products. As we stated above, some reprocessed uranium was put through 

uranium enrichment facilities. NRC should be aware of this well documented and 

publicly disclosed history at Paducah and reflect it and other such historical 

knowledge. It is not clear if other sites may also have similar wastes, and certainly 

if the ill-advised prospect of reprocessing is pursued, there will be more. 

o NRC admits that Waste Incidental to Reprocessing possibly could go to shallow 

land burial. 

o Greater-that Class-C waste and Transuranics above 10 or 100 nanocuries per 

gram, previously guaranteed NOT to go to these facilities would be allowed. 

o Dump operators will make more money; generation of more new waste will be 

encouraged; the public will not be protected. The NRC, some Agreement state 

regulators and the waste site operators are making no “safety case” for us, the 

public.

 NRC’s proposed rule would allow higher amounts of radioactive exposure --higher doses and 

in some cases, unlimited radiation doses to the public, as mentioned above. 

o First, this done by “updating,” using a different way to calculate doses which 

allows more radioactivity per millirem or unit of dose for many of the 

radionuclides. Depending on which radionuclides are being considered, there can 

be different amounts in each new millirem EDE (the ‘updated’ dose units) than in 

each of the existing millirems in the current rule. Neither of these are ever 

measured, verified or enforced. They serve to justify allowing more radioactivity 

in the waste and waste sites. We oppose the adoption into 10 CFR 61 of the 10 

CFR 20 methods of dose calculation in all cases that increase radioactivity per 

millirem, or increase allowable concentrations, releases and exposures. 

o Second, NRC is increasing and allowing unlimited millirems/year. The existing 

rule limits doses to the public during operations to 25/75/25 millirems per year 

and does not expressly specify higher amounts post-closure. This would be an 

enormous relaxation of the standards and must be dropped. 

NRC opening these sites to DU is a mistake since the radioactivity/radiation 

levels will rise over time. At one time DU was expected to be part of wastes that 

should be permanently isolated from our environment like irradiated fuel. NRC 

should adopt that plan for DU. 

 Radiation is more dangerous for females, youth, and threatens the reproductive stage of 

the human and other life cycles. 

The proposed rule ignores the now-known reality that external ionizing radiation causes 

50% more cancer and fatal cancer in female adults compared to male adults and 7 times 
9

more cancer incidence when the exposure happens in very young females, compared to 

exposure of adult males.8 Young males and females are both at higher risk, but half of the 

global population needs greater protection and NRC dodges this in its role as regulator. 

This is irresponsible. Juvenile females are not a “subpopulation” they are an inextricable 

link in the human lifecycle. There is no biological “Reference Man” who did not come 

from someone who was in this most sensitive age group. NRC continues to unacceptably 

ignore non-cancer health effects, synergistic effects with other toxic exposures and 

reproductive effects. 

 NRC should not “update” the radiation dose part of this regulation 10 CFR 61 by 

incorporating its 10 CFR 20 standards because those are less protective than 10 CFR 61 

current limits. Any change should “update” the scientific reality that radiation is more 

harmful than previous assessments identified and reduce allowable releases and 

exposures. 

NRC is failing to protect the reproductive phase of the human lifecycle (and that of all 

other species as well). We have commented on this in the 10 CFR 20 rulemaking and 

oppose expanding those failures to protect from radiation into this regulation 10 CFR 61. 

Radiation is clearly being found to be more harmful every time it is reviewed (rather, 

each batch of new data shows that regulators have failed repeatedly to honestly report the 

true hazards of ionizing radiation) yet NRC stubbornly moves to let the radioactive 

pollution levels rise as it increases allowable concentrations and emissions into air and 

water and doses to this and future generations. Scientifically, it is unacceptable. 

 There is no meaningful limit on the Performance Assessment. Allowing the option of the 

waste site operator choosing his or her own allowable dose level, means pretty much any 

kind of waste can go to these sites. This is worsened by the fact that allowable dose limits 

are used for calculations only, never enforced or verified; It is not scientifically justifiable 

for NRC allow Performance Assessments and Safety Cases to be done by those who 

stand to profit, inevitably allowing more dangerous and long lasting wastes into shallow 

land burial sites. 

It is a conflict of interest to allow those who profit from disposal, the waste site owners 

and or operators, to do essentially “black box” calculations to allow more dangerous 

nuclear waste into their own facilities. The rule should not have this provision and any 

provision it does have should have a requirement for public notification, comment, 

intervention and intervenor funding. 

 The Emergency Access Clause, Section 6 of the Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy 

Act, provides that in emergency situations, operating nuclear waste facilities could be 

required to take waste not normally designated or intended. We have always contended 

 

8

See: “Atomic Radiation is More Harmful to Women” October, 2011: 

http://www.nirs.org/radiation/radhealth/radiationwomen.pdf as well as other items on radiation and gender posted: 

http://www.nirs.org/radiation/radhealth/radhealthhome.htm 
10

that sites must not be required, forced, or allowed to take wastes for which they were not 

originally intended or characterized. The proposed regulations could do the exact 

opposite, provide for any kind of radioactive waste to be accepted. Under the 

Environmental Protection Agency’s Protective Action Guides, such facilities could be 

expected to take large amount of waste from emergencies. States should not be forced to 

accommodate the nuclear industry polluters in this way. It is time for the federal 

regulators to adopt a role of incentivizing waste reduction, not the opposite. 

 Performance Assessments are tools that can easily be used to justify polluting practices 

and facilities, not just radioactive. They are not practically transparent or reviewable by 

the public. We support HEAL Utah’s comments on 10 CFR 61 against Performance 

Assessments. 

Performance Assessments are only predictions and especially not trustworthy when 

carried out by those who stand to profit from the conclusions. 

NRC highlights the Performance Assessment proposed for the West Valley nuclear waste 

site in its 10 CFR 61 Technical Guidance,9but the public opposes the Performance 

Assessment being planned for that site because the Agencies responsible refuse to 

provide transparency and the public is being denied input on the contractor, real time 

access to the necessary assumptions, documents, expert declarations, computer programs 

and codes and resources to hire independent reviewers. The West Valley experience 

should be a warning for communities and states where other nuclear waste sites are 

located. The site itself has been estimated to cost $9.7 to $10 billion to fully clean up and 

it threatens to release its contents into the surrounding streams and the Great Lakes. The 

performance assessment is being carried out to justify leaving waste in rapidly eroding 

unstable ground. 

 Both the current and proposed 10 CFR 61 allow for unlined soil trench burial of 

radioactive wastes that will inevitably leak out. Both fail to protect the public. The 

current regulations should be strengthened and the proposed rule which allows higher 

radiation exposure to the public than operating nuclear reactors or a high level radioactive 

waste repository should be scrapped. 

Submitted by Over 100 Organizations* listed below, pages 11-15. 

Contact: Diane D’Arrigo, Nuclear Information and Resource Service dianed@nirs.org

Attachments: NRC-NIRS Correspondence re Washington Post series on fission product and 

transuranic contamination at uranium enrichment facilities and in depleted uranium; Washington 

Post series (by separate submission on regulations.gov) 

 

9

D. Esh, C. Grossman, H. Arlt, C. Barr, P. Yadav, "Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10CFRPart 61." Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission, Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, 2015. 

http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML1505/ML15056A516.pdf>.file:///U:/My%20Documents/LLRW/10-cfr-part-61%20redline%20changes.pdf
11

100+ Organizations 

Diane D'Arrigo 

Nuclear Information and Resource Service 

Takoma Park, MD 

Catherine Thomasson, MD 

Physicians for Social Responsibility 

Washington, DC 

Susan Corbett 

Sierra Club 

Washington, DC 

Damon Moglen 

Friends of the Earth 

Washington, DC 

Kevin Kamps 

Beyond Nuclear 

Takoma Park, MD 

Dave Kraft 

Nuclear Energy Information Service 

Chicago, IL 

Michael J Keegan 

Coalition for a Nuclear Free Great Lakes 

Monroe, Michigan 

Regina Minniss 

Crabshell Alliance 

Maryland 

Rose Gardner 

Alliance for Environmental Strategies 

Eunice, NM 

Gary Shaw 

Indian Point Safe Energy Coalition 

New York 

Karen Hadden 

SEED Coalition 

Austin, TX 

Allison Fisher 

Public Citizen 

Washington, DC 

James P. Riccio 

Greenpeace 

Washington, DC 

Wenonah Hauter 

Food and Water Watch 

Washington, DC 

Robert Musil 

Rachel Carson Council 

Washington, DC 

Eric Epstein 

Three Mile Alert, Inc. 

Harrisburg, PA 

Sara Barczak 

Southern Alliance for Clean Energy 

Knoxville, TN 

John LaForge 

NUKEWATCH 

Luck, Wisconsin 

Tom Smith 

Public Citizen 

Austin, TX 

Glenn Carroll 

Nuclear Watch South 

Atlanta, Georgia 

Ken Bossong, Ex. Dir. 

SUN DAY Campaign 

Takoma Park, MD 

John F. McFadden, PhD. 

Tennessee Environmental Council 

Nashville, TN 
12

Stephen Brittle 

Don't Waste Arizona 

Phoenix, AZ 

Paul Connett, PhD, 

Work on Waste, USA 

American Environmental Health Studies 

Project, Inc. 

Binghamton, NY 

Barry J White 

Citizens Allied for Clean Energy, Inc. 

Miami, FL 

Ellen Connett 

Fluoride Action Network 

Binghamton, NY 

Michaelann Bewsee 

Arise for Social Justice 

Springfield, MA 

Jessie Pauline Collins 

Citizens Resistance At Fermi Two (CRAFT) 

Michigan 

Clay Turnbull 

New England Coalition on Nuclear 

Pollution 

Brattleboro, VT 

Suzanne Patzer 

Columbus Free Press 

Columbus, OH 

Dr. Lewis Cuthbert 

Alliance for a Clean Environment 

Pottstown, PA 

Jane Williams 

California Communities Against Toxics 

Rosamond, CA 

Scott Sklar 

The Stella Group, Ltd. 

Arlington, VA 

L. Hunter Lovins 

Natural Capitalism Solutions 

Longmont, CO 

Lea Foushee, George Crocker 

North American Water Office 

Lake Elmo, Minnesota 

Mary Beth Brangan 

Ecological Options Network 

Bolinas, CA 

Diane Turco 

Cape Downwinders 

Harwich, MA 

Kerwin Olson 

Citizens Action Coalition 

Indianapolis, IN 

Kay M. Hawklee 

Tallahassee Area Community 

Canon City, CO 

Dr. Brian Moench 

Utah Physicians for a Healthy Environment 

SLC, Utah 

Steven G. Gilbert, PhD, DABT 

INND (Institute of Neurotoxicology & 

Neurological Disorders) 

Seattle, WA 

Libbe HaLevy, M.A., CAC 

Nuclear Hotseat 

California

Marylia Kelley 

Tri-Valley CAREs 

Livermore, CA 

Alice Hirt 

Don't Waste Michigan 

Holland, Michigan 
13

Kathryn Barnes 

Don't Waste Michigan Sherwood Chapter 

Sherwood MI 

Charles Johnson 

Oregon and Washington Physicians for 

Social Responsibility 

Joint Task Force on Nuclear Power 

Oregon and Washington 

Ann Suellentrop MSRN 

Physicians for Social Responsibility-KC

Kansas City, KS 

Robert M. Gould, MD 

San Francisco Bay Area Chapter 

Physicians for Social Responsibility 

California 

Terry Clark, MD 

Physicians for Social Responsibility 

Western North Carolina Chapter 

Lillian Light 

Environmental Priorities Network 

Manhattan Beach, CA 

Sharyn Cunningham 

Colorado Citizens Against Toxic Waste, Inc. 

Canon City, CO 

Becky D. Rafter 

Georgia Women's Action for New 

Directions (Georgia WAND) 

Atlanta, GA 

Ernest Fuller 

Concerned Citizens for SNEC Safety 

Six Mile Run, PA 

Robina Suwol 

California Safe Schools 

Los Angeles, California 

Chris Borello 

Concerned Citizens of Lake 

Twp./Uniontown IEL Superfund Site 

Stark County, Ohio 

Nancy O'Byrne, Coordinator 

Pax Christi Florida 

St. Augustine, FL 

Gene Stone 

Residents Organized For a Safe 

Environment (ROSE) 

San Clemente, CA 

Vina Colley 

PRESS Portsmouth/Piketon Residence for 

Environmental Safety and Security 

Ohio

Paula Gotsch 

Grandmothers, Mothers and More for 

Energy Safety (GRAMMES) 

Normandy Beach, NJ 

Cynthia Weehler 

Energía Mía 

San Antonio, TX 

Alexandra Grabbe 

Chez Sven Bed & Breakfast 

Wellfleet, MA 

Dorothy A. Faller 

West Shore Unitarian Universalist Faith 

Communities Together 

Olmsted Falls, OH 

Iris Potter 

Michigan Safe Energy Future 

Kalamazoo, MI 

Michael Welch 

Redwood Alliance 

Arcata, CA 
14

Norma J F Harrison 

Peace and Freedom Party 

Berkeley, CA 

Judith Mohling 

Rocky Mountain Peace and Justice Center 

Boulder, CO 

Peggy Maze Johnson 

Heart of America Northwest 

Seattle, Washington 

Jane Swanson, Spokesperson 

San Luis Obispo Mother for Peace 

San Luis Obispo, CA 

Gwen Fischer 

Concerned Citizens Ohio/Hiram 

Mary Greer 

Concerned Citizens Ohio/Shalersville 

Ohio Organizing Collaborative 

Anna Baker 

Pilgrim Coalition 

Marshfield, MA 

Finian Taylor 

Hilton Head for Peace 

Hilton Head, SC 

Wes Raymond 

Citizens for Alternatives to Chemical 

Contamination 

Lake, MI 

Ethyl Rivera 

Alliance to Halt Fermi 3 

Livonia, MI 

Olive Hershey, AC Conrad 

SBLDF 

Houston, TX 

Rebecca Roter 

Breathe Easy Susquehanna County 

Montrose, PA 

Gail Payne 

RadiationTruth.org 

Centerport, NY 

Vera Scroggins 

Citizens for Clean Water 

Brackney, PA 

Mark Haim 

Mid-Missouri Peaceworks/Missourians for 

Safe Energy 

Columbia, MO 

Greg Wingard, 

Waste Action Project 

Seattle, WA 

Nancy Burton 

Connecticut Coalition Against Millstone 

Mother's Milk Project 

Redding CT 

Debra Stoleroff 

Vermont Yankee Decommissioning 

Alliance 

Montpelier, Vermont 

C. Clarrene Ballard Peil 

People Against a Radioactive Chesapeake 

(PARC) 

Dunkirk, Maryland 

Don Ogden 

The Enviro Show 

Florence, MA 

Cynthia Peil 

Southern Maryland CARES 

(Citizens Against Radioactive Energy 

Sources) 

Dunkirk, Maryland 

Jerry B. Brown, Ph.D. 

World Business Academy 

Santa Barbara, CA 
15

Angelique Rogers

Peace Action Wisconsin 

Peace Education Project of Peace Action 

Milwaukee, WI 

Michael Adler 

Topanga Peace Alliance 

Topanga, CA 

Manna Jo Greene 

Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. 

Beacon, NY 

Joni Arends 

Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety 

Santa Fe, NM

Michel Lee 

Council on Intelligent Energy & 

Conservation Policy (CIECP) 

Doris Bradshaw 

Defense Depot Memphis TN 

Concerned Citizens Committee 

Memphis TN 

Lloyd Marbet, Cathryn Chudy 

Oregon Conservancy Foundation 

Boring, Oregon 

Laura Olah 

Citizens for Safe Water Around Badger 

(CSWAB) 

Merrimac, WI 

Alice Slater 

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation 

New York, NY

Scarsdale, NY 

Susan Hito Shapiro Barbara Warren 

Promoting Health and Sustainable Energy Citizens Environmental Coalition 

New York Albany, NY 

Terry Miller 

Lone Tree Council 

Bay City, MI 

Laura Dewey 

Detroit Branch Women’s International for Peace and Freedom 

Grosse Pointe, MI 

CANADA 

Brennain Lloyd 

Northwatch 

North Bay 

Northeastern Ontario, Ontario 

Canada 

Janet McNeill 

Durham Nuclear Awareness (DNA) 

Whitby, Ontario 

Canada 

Vicki Obedkoff 

Justice and Global Issues Committee 

Toronto South East Presbytery of 

The United Church of Canada 

Toronto, Ontario 

Canada 

Eugene Bougeois 

Friends of Bruce 

Inverhuron, ON 

Canada
16

ATTACHMENT 1 to 100+ Organizations’ Comments to NRC on 10 CFR 61 Proposed Radioactive Waste 

Disposal 

Regulations From: "Grossman, Christopher" <Christopher.Grossman@nrc.gov> 

Date: June 16, 2015 at 2:56:18 PM EDT 

To: "'maryo@nirs.org'" <maryo@nirs.org> 

Cc: "Dembek, Stephen" <Stephen.Dembek@nrc.gov>, "McKenney, Christepher" 

<Christepher.McKenney@nrc.gov>, "Yadav, Priya" <Priya.Yadav@nrc.gov>, "Comfort, Gary" 

<Gary.Comfort@nrc.gov>, "Esh, David" <David.Esh@nrc.gov> 

Subject: Correction Regarding a Question at June 2, 2015 10 CFR Part 61 Public Meeting in Columbia, 

SC

Ms. Olson -

During the June 2, 2015 public meeting on the rulemaking for 10 CFR Part 61, you inquired 

about whether U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff considered contaminated 

depleted uranium from U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) facilities in its analysis to support the 

Commission Paper, SECY-08-0147. In response at the meeting, I replied that we had 

considered contaminated depleted uranium. I have had some time to review our analysis and 

would like to correct my response to your question. While we considered the quantities of 

depleted uranium associated with DOE’s facilities in the analysis, we, in fact, did not consider 

radionuclides associated that might result from contamination of depleted uranium with 

reprocessed materials at DOE facilities. Rather our analysis only considered radionuclides 

associated with clean depleted uranium. As indicated during the meeting, Enclosure 1 to 

SECY-08-0147 includes a description of our analysis including the specific radionuclides 

considered. 

I apologize for any confusion my response may have created. NRC staff plans to correct the 

public record in the future, but I wanted to let you know personally as the originator of the 

question. In the near future, staff will also be placing this email in the NRC’s Agencywide 

Document Access and Management System (ADAMS) and on the NRC’s Low-Level 

Radioactive Waste Disposal public website for the 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking. ADAMS is 

available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. NRC’s 10 CFR Part 61 rulemaking 

public website is available at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/potentialrulemaking/uw-streams.html. You will be able to find it under “2015 Public Workshop 

Information”, “Public Meeting 5 — June 2, 2015 (Columbia, SC)” once it is available. If you 

have any further questions about our analyses or the rulemaking, please feel free to contact me 

or any of the project managers for the rulemaking.

Respectfully,

Christopher J. Grossman 

Risk Analyst 

Division of Decommissioning, Uranium Recovery, & Waste Programs 

Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

301-415-0140 

christopher.grossman@nrc.gov
17

From: Mary Olson 

Sent: Thursday, June 18, 2015 9:46 AM 

To: Grossman, Christopher 

Cc: Dembek, Stephen; McKenney, Christepher; Yadav, Priya; Comfort, Gary; Esh, David; Tim 

Judson; Diane D'Arrigo 

Subject: RE: Correction Regarding a Question at June 2, 2015 10 CFR Part 61 Public Meeting in 

Columbia, SC 

Second Reply: 

Mr. Grossman, 

Cc above list; adding Diane D’Arrigo and Tim Judson at NIRS, 

I would like this reply, and the attached document to be also posted with public access in 

ADAMs. 

I asked NRC the question about whether it had considered DU (Depleted Uranium) originating 

from Paducah (and possibly other process sites) because of the history of the US Department of 

Energy sending uranium from plutonium separation (reprocessing) back through the enrichment 

phase as documented in the attached file by the “Paper of Record” the Washington Post. The 

uranium that was sent back through post-reprocessing was laced with fission products and 

activation products, including plutonium and other transuranics. 

In its discussion of the proposed changes to Part 61, which anticipate the inclusion of DU in socalled “low-level” radioactive waste trenches, NRC has assumed that the DU is pure 238 and 

while somewhat radioactive itself would only contribute other radioactivity as decay products 

over time (a long time) to the inventory at the site. 

The DU from Paducah is not pure DU. The enrichment process results in a more pure U235, not 

a more pure U238. 

The attached file contains a series of 9 articles that together are the report of an independent 

investigation of the impact of the contaminated uranium on workers at Paducah. The impacts 

were not trivial. It is very important that NRC as a regulator not fall into the trap of using broad 

assumptions that are purely theoretical with no “process history.” 

A broad policy change such as proposing to call material with a 4.5 billion-year half-life “lowlevel,” should not overlook the actual history of this material, nor the possible implications for 

the future since reprocessing is one of the reasons NRC cites for making changes at this time. An 

inventory of cesium, strontium and plutonium as well as the rest of the fission-product soup 

riding as “hitch hikers” on uranium must be factored since the impact would be today, not in the 

distant future of radioactive decay. 
18

I am sure that the over-all plan to allow the dump-operator to make a “safety case” will 

compensate for any possible material that it wants to bury...but, on behalf of the drivers, waste 

handlers, dump workers, and the groundwater, please do not assume all DU is only U238. 

Sincerely, 

Mary Olson 

Mary Olson 

maryo@nirs.org 

NIRS Southeast www.nirs.org 

828-252-8409 / 828-242-5621 cell 

ATTACHMENT 2 to 100+ Organizations’ Comments to NRC on 10 CFR 61 Proposed Radioactive Waste 

Disposal being submitted separately as support for the concerns raised in these comments. 

The 9 Part Washington Post Series re Uranium Enrichment 

The Washington Post, Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

August 8, 1999 through February 11, 2000 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant

Richardson Orders Probe Of Uranium Plant in Ky.

A Deathly Postscript Comes Back to Life; After Being Rejected, Warnings of 

Paducah Atomic Worker Now Hailed as Heroism 

Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones

U.S. Will Propose Payments to Sick Paducah Workers; $20 Million Fund Eyed For 

Radiation Cancers

Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public 

Outcry

Energy Dept. Faults Paducah Contractors; Deficient Plant Hazard Warnings Cited

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation 

Levels 

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In 

Secret Program
Page 1

1 of 9 DOCUMENTS 

The Washington Post 

August 8, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. 

Plant

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01 

LENGTH: 4790 words 

DATELINE: PADUCAH, Ky. 

 

Thousands of uranium workers were unwittingly exposed to plutonium and other highly radioactive metals here 

at a federally owned plant where contamination spread through work areas, locker rooms and even cafeterias, 

a Washington Post investigation has found. 

Unsuspecting workers inhaled plutonium-laced dust brought into the plant for 23 years as part of a flawed 

government experiment to recycle used nuclear reactor fuel at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, according to a review of court documents, plant records, and interviews with current and former workers. The 

government and its contractors did not inform workers about the hazards for decades, even as employees in 

the 1980s began to notice a string of cancers. 

Radioactive contaminants from the plant spilled into ditches and eventually seeped into creeks, a state-owned 

wildlife area and private wells, documents show. Plant workers contend in sealed court documents that radioactive waste also was deliberately dumped into nearby fields, abandoned buildings and a landfill not licensed 

for hazardous waste. 

The sprawling Kentucky plant on the Ohio River represents an unpublished chapter in the still-unfolding story 

of radioactive contamination and concealment in the chain of factories across the country that produced 

America's Cold War nuclear arsenal. Opened in 1952 in an impoverished region, the 750-acre plant built a 

fiercely loyal work force of more than 1,800 men and women who labored in hot, stadium-sized buildings 

turning trainloads of dusty uranium powder into material for bombs. 

Today, the Department of Energy contends that worker exposure was minimal and that contamination is being 

cleaned up. A lawsuit filed under seal in June by three current plant employees alleges that radiation exposure 

was a problem at Paducah well into the 1990s. 

The Post's investigation shows that contractors buried the facts about the plutonium contamination, which 

occurred from the mid-1950s to the mid-1970s, in reports filed in archives. Plutonium, a core ingredient in 

nuclear bombs, is a highly radioactive metal that can cause cancer if ingested in quantities as small as a millionth of an ounce. The Paducah plant was designed to handle only uranium, a mildly radioactive metal. 

"The community to this day has no idea of the kinds of contaminants they were exposed to," said James W. 

Owens, a Paducah lawyer representing residents whose water has been polluted by the plant. 

Health consequences remain unclear. No comprehensive study of worker medical histories has been attempted at Paducah. In neighborhoods where older workers live, stories abound of cancer clusters and unusual illnesses. One 20-year veteran worker who died in 1980 compiled a list of 50 employees he worked with 

who had died of cancer. 
Page 2

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

"Everything was so safe, so riskless," the worker, Joe Harding, said in an interview just before his death. 

"Today we know the truth about those promises. I can feel it in my body." 

Even though the plant's procedures and purpose have changed -- Paducah's enriched uranium is now used in 

commercial nuclear power plants -- problems have continued. Workers weave between makeshift fences that 

cordon off hundreds of radioactive "hot spots" scattered across the complex. In one corner of the plant, mildly 

radioactive runoff trickles from a nearly half-mile-long mound of rusting barrels that still contain traces of uranium. 

"The situation is as close to a complete lack of health physics as I have observed outside of the former Soviet 

Union," Thomas Cochran, nuclear program director for the Natural Resources Defense Council, said in 

documents filed in the lawsuit. 

The Department of Energy, which owns the plant, said it could not comment on allegations made in the suit 

because of the court-ordered seal. The agency is investigating the charges and dispatched a team to Paducah

to determine if conditions posed an immediate threat to workers or the public. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson said the agency's national security goals had "sent many of our workers into 

harm's way," but he said the agency must now live up to its responsibility to "right the wrongs of the past." Two 

weeks ago, Richardson pledged millions of dollars for medical monitoring of nuclear workers who were exposed to beryllium, a highly toxic metal. 

"The Department of Energy will continue to take any actions that are necessary to ensure the protection of 

public health, the workers and the environment," he said. 

Still, agency officials, in a written response to questions from The Post, strongly defended past safety practices 

at Paducah and said no workers are at risk today. 

"The plant's monitoring data did not indicate an accumulation of [plutonium and other highly radioactive 

wastes] in the workplace or the environment that would be a health concern to workers or to the public," the 

DOE said. 

That position is vigorously contested in more than 2,000 pages of documents filed in the lawsuit by two of the 

plant's health physicists, or radiation safety experts, and a veteran worker who had his esophagus removed 

after three decades of work inside contaminated buildings. Copies of the documents were obtained by The 

Post from government sources. 

"The management line for years has been there was an insignificant amount" of plutonium at Paducah, said 

Mark Griffon, a health physicist at the University of Massachusetts at Lowell who is participating in a federal 

study of radiation conditions at nuclear weapons plants, including Paducah. Griffon reviewed plant documents 

provided by The Post. 

"If the levels were this significant," he said, "it raises an important question: Why weren't workers ever monitored?" 

The two health physicists suing the plant say in court documents they tried to call attention to the radiation 

problems but were confronted by a culture of unconcern. 

"I was told by my superior . . . in so many words that 'this is Paducah -- it doesn't matter here,' " said one of the 

physicists, Ronald Fowler, 50, who came to the plant in 1991. 

The suit was brought under a law that allows employees to collect payment for exposing fraud against the 

government. It was filed under seal to give Justice Department officials an opportunity to decide whether to join 

the suit or begin a criminal investigation. 

The suit names Lockheed Martin and Martin Marietta, which managed the uranium enrichment plant during the 

1980s and 1990s. It does not name the original manager, Union Carbide, which ran the facility for a 32-year 

period during which the bulk of the contamination occurred. None of the companies had been served with the 

suit and none would comment on the allegations. 

The current plant operator, U.S. Enrichment Corp., a government-chartered private company that assumed 

management this year, concedes past problems but says safeguards are now in place. USEC, which sold 
Page 3

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

shares to the public last year, says it has fully disclosed the plant's environmental problems to regulators, 

workers and stockholders. 

"It was acknowledged by all sides that contaminated conditions existed, . . . but USEC wasn't responsible for 

them," said Jim Miller, USEC executive vice president. 

Paducah is the latest DOE facility to be rocked by lawsuits and revelations of contamination. Cleaning up the 

complex is expected to cost $ 240 billion and take at least 75 years. 

Measured by the gram, the contamination at Paducah isn't nearly as extreme as that in plutonium production 

plants such as Washington state's Hanford Nuclear Reservation, where vast swaths of land have been sealed 

off from humans. But unlike the workers at those plants, employees at Paducah did not know of the risks in the 

uranium dust they breathed every day. 

Worker exposure to such dust has cost the government in the past. The Energy Department paid a $ 15 million 

settlement five years ago to former workers who had breathed uranium dust at the Fernald Feed Materials 

Production Center near Cincinnati. 

The difference between the dust at Fernald and that at Paducah comes down to one word: plutonium. 

For 2 Decades, Freight Cars 

Brought Unknown Danger 

The Paducah complex was the second of three U.S. government plants designed after World War II to create 

enriched uranium. The plants were operated for the government by private contractors who over time were 

paid bonuses for running safe, efficient facilities. 

In the beginning, uranium ore was scarce. The Atomic Energy Commission, forerunner of today's Energy 

Department, tried to fill the gap by "recycling" leftover uranium -- from nuclear reactors that made plutonium for 

bombs -- through the enrichment process at Paducah. 

From 1953 to 1976, more than 103,000 metric tons of used uranium was shipped to Paducah, records show. It 

arrived in freight cars as a fine black powder. Unknown to workers, the powder contained dangerous substances left over from the plutonium-making process -- fission byproducts such as technetium-99 and heavy 

metals known as "transuranics": neptunium and plutonium. 

"Plutonium is roughly 100,000 times more radioactive per gram than uranium," said Arjun Makhijani, president 

of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. 

Over time, through spills and waste discharges, the contaminants accumulated in the miles of pipes used to 

gasify and enrich uranium, around loading docks and in ditches, documents show. 

Plant officials were aware of the plutonium and other contaminants as early as the mid-1950s -- it made their 

recycled uranium less efficient. But they believed the amounts were too small to pose a health threat. 

Today, the DOE is able to rely only on a contractor's estimate of the total amount of contaminants introduced in 

that period: 12 ounces of plutonium, 40 pounds of neptunium and 1,320 pounds of technetium-99.

The government today takes the same position as it did in the 1950s: The amounts were most likely not enough 

to harm workers. "The general protection provided to workers from the hazardous effects of uranium would 

have provided adequate protection" from the contaminants, the DOE statement said. 

But documents obtained by The Post show that plant officials became increasingly concerned about the 

contaminants. A 1992 report by Martin Marietta concluded that they caused "significant" environmental problems and "also pose a radiation hazard to the workforce." A 1988 study done for the DOE by a private contractor said the plutonium could "represent a significant internal dose concern even at very low mass concentrations."

Plant records draw an instructive comparison that underlines the hazards posed by plutonium: The 12 ounces 

of plutonium in the black powder delivered more than twice as much radiation into the environment as the 

61,000 pounds of uranium that flowed out of the plant in waste water into the Ohio River between 1952 and 

1987. 
Page 4

In Harm's Way, And in the Dark; Workers Exposed to Plutonium at U.S. Plant The Washington Post August 8, 

1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Bosses Took Threat 

With a Grain of Salt 

In the noisy, cavernous buildings where uranium was processed, workers did not receive the warnings. The 

conditions there were "extremely dusty . . . sometimes to the point where it was very difficult to see or breathe," 

said Garland "Bud" Jenkins, 56, a 31-year-veteran uranium worker and one of the three employees involved in 

the lawsuit against Lockheed Martin. 

To protect their skin from the uranium dust, workers wore cotton coveralls and gloves. But respiratory protection was optional -- old Army gas masks, which fit poorly and were seldom used, former and current workers 

said. 

At lunchtime, workers brushed black powder or green uranium dust off their food. "They told us you could eat 

this stuff and it wouldn't hurt you," said Al Puckett, a retired union shop steward. To dramatize the point, he 

said, some supervisors "salted" their bread with green uranium dust. 

The workers took the dust home at shift's end. 

"We frequently discovered that our bed linens would be green or black in the morning, from dust that apparently absorbed into our skin," Jenkins said. 

Exposure to uranium dust decreased after the late 1970s, when the plant stopped receiving the black powder 

and began processing a more refined form of uranium. In 1989, the DOE adopted more stringent worker safety 

rules. 

By then the plutonium had permeated the land around the plant. In the 1960s and 1970s, when the powder 

spilled, workers would shovel it up and wash the remnants into the nearest ditch, Jenkins said. More than a 

dozen ditches flow directly from the plant onto state property and private lands. 

There are no nationwide limits for plutonium in soil; cleanup standards depend on modeling the degree of 

public access to the contaminated spot. But the DOE has set cleanup limits at nuclear blast sites in the South 

Pacific of 15 picocuries of plutonium per gram of soil. 

Contractors measured plutonium at levels up to 47 picocuries in ditches outside the plant and 500 picocuries 

on plant grounds. 

Those measurements were made after the first evidence of environmental problems outside the plant surfaced 

in 1988, when a county health inspector found technetium and chemical carcinogens from the plant in a 

farmer's well. The discovery of the poisoned wells prompted a multimillion-dollar ground-water cleanup under 

the Environmental Protection Agency's oversight. 

Although plant managers posted creeks and ditches with warning signs in the early 1990s, the signs do not 

refer to plutonium or any other radioactive contaminants. Some warn of possible contamination with cancer-causing chemicals; others merely caution against eating local fish. 

Lawsuit Alleges 

Deliberate Dumping 

In addition to the substances that flowed or spilled out of the plant through the drainage ditches, the employees 

contend in their lawsuit that a wide variety of contaminated substances were deliberately dumped into the 

environment. Spilled black powder and empty radioactive waste containers allegedly were placed in dumpsters 

and trucked to a sanitary landfill on DOE property licensed only for trash and garbage. Rubble from demolished 

buildings and contaminated railroad ties allegedly were dumped in nearby woods and fields. Slag from uranium 

smelters was put in abandoned concrete bunkers in a state wildlife area outside the plant, according to the 

lawsuit. 

"There was only one dumpster for all waste, whether radioactive, hazardous, toxic or ordinary," Jenkins said. 

Plant records describe at least two dozen unlicensed radioactive debris piles on state lands outside the plant. 

Last year, ground-water tests turned up technetium directly beneath the sanitary landfill. 
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1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

A 1990 DOE audit of Paducah found inadequate controls over waste disposal and a faulty system for tracking 

contamination that forced managers to rely on "word of mouth." 

Charles Deuschle, 56, a health physics technician and the third employee in the lawsuit, said he was "shocked" 

when his surveys discovered radioactive contamination in such places as the plant's cafeteria. 

"I saw conditions that would never have been tolerated in any other nuclear location where I have worked," 

Deuschle, who came to Paducah in 1992, said in court documents. 

Internal plant surveys included in the suit found high levels of radiation on street surfaces, manhole covers and 

loading docks and in locker rooms as recently as 1996. 

The plant's current managers maintain that all significantly contaminated areas have been addressed. "Hot" 

surfaces have been coated with absorbent paint, and warning signs have been posted, they said. Rope fences 

keep passersby away from radioactive equipment rusting in the open. Drain pipes and fire hydrants are coated 

with warning paint. Two dilapidated buildings where the black powder was once processed are padlocked. In 

1997, regulatory oversight of the plant was transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which declined 

to comment on allegations in the sealed lawsuit. 

Even the employees involved in the suit concede that safeguards have improved recently. But they insist that 

problems remain. This spring, elevated radioactivity was found in a parking area near the administration 

building, plant documents show. 

Soil collected from a ditch outside the plant's fence by The Post in June and analyzed at a commercial lab 

contained 2.6 picocuries of plutonium, slightly higher than the NRC's suggested guideline for cleaning up 

nuclear sites. 

The Post, using two hand-held detectors, also found sharply elevated radiation levels in the debris piles on the 

state wildlife lands. One such area was an unmarked pile of rotting railroad timbers near fishing ponds and 

campgrounds. 

Public Reports Tell 

Only Part of the Story 

Environmentalists, plant workers and neighbors claim that plant officials play down the hazards. 

"They cloak it in jargon," said Mark Donham, a member of a citizens advisory board that meets monthly with 

plant cleanup officials. "You have to order the documents and then spend hours and hours looking at them to 

learn anything." 

DOE officials say the facts and figures about the plutonium contamination inside the plant have been duly 

recorded since 1991 in thick inspection reports. But these are kept in archives rarely visited by the public. 

In the annual environmental reports that circulate to the public, the contamination is described as "trace" 

amounts of "radionuclides," a catchall term that can include mildly radioactive uranium as well as highly radioactive plutonium. 

A 1991 "site investigation" report, done by the plant's contractor and stored in the archives, shows much higher 

levels of plutonium than the annual environmental reports. The DOE said the reports use different methods and 

measure different things. 

The result has been that the DOE can claim full disclosure about the contamination while plant workers and 

neighbors remain in the dark, said Owens, the attorney for the plant's neighbors. 

"The company has engaged in a cynical disinformation campaign that centered on downplaying risks and 

presenting confusing and misleading information," he said. 

Inside the plant, the first disclosure of plutonium to workers came around 1990 after managers summoned top 

union leaders to discuss the results of tests ordered after the state found the poisoned wells. 

"They took it seriously," a union official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said of Martin Marietta's 

presentation. But "the health effects weren't viewed as serious. We just vehemently stressed that the contamination should be cleaned up." 
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Plant managers insist that workers today are fully aware of the potential hazards. USEC cites worker training 

programs that it says include a briefing on plutonium and other radioactive hazards at the plant. 

But officials with the union's Washington office contend workers still don't know a fraction of what they were 

exposed to. "What we're seeing now," said Daniel Guttman, former staff director of the federal Advisory 

Committee on Human Radiation Experiments, "is the outcropping of the glacier." 

Deficient Monitoring 

Compounded the Risk 

The health effects for Paducah workers remain an open question. 

The DOE said 442 Paducah workers were tested in 1997 and only 8 percent displayed measurable amounts of 

radiation. It said screening tests since 1992 have found no evidence of plutonium exposure in workers. 

But the greatest exposure to workers would have occurred before the enhanced monitoring that began in the 

late 1980s. 

In 1990, the DOE audited safety practices at Paducah and found scores of deficiencies in radiation monitoring 

and worker protection. The audit team said Paducah failed to properly monitor radiation to workers' internal 

organs -- even though plant managers had been repeatedly warned to do so. 

Radiation-measuring equipment was either missing or not properly calibrated, the report said, and workers 

weren't being tested for the kinds of radiation known to exist at Paducah. Whether the plant's equipment and 

personnel were even capable of detecting exposure to plutonium and other transuranics was "questionable," 

the audit said. 

Bolstering claims by workers that they had been left in the dark about radioactive hazards, the report found no 

mention of transuranics in plant safety procedures. 

"Onsite environmental radiological contamination conditions are largely unknown," the report said. "A formal 

program with well-defined monitoring, sampling and analysis requirements does not exist." 

Independent experts are investigating Paducah as part of two national studies of environmental and safety 

issues in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. Both studies are relying primarily on data supplied by the plant. 

Officials brought in two years ago to review past radiation hazards told The Post they were not informed that 

Paducah workers may have been exposed to significant amounts of plutonium. 

Neither was Harold Hargan, a plant worker for 37 years. Hargan was one of about six workers who he says 

were told in 1990 that a test had found plutonium in their urine. 

"It surprised me. Hell, it surprised the doctor," Hargan said. "Everybody knew there was no plutonium at 

Paducah."

What Happened Inside the Plant 

Uranium is a naturally radioactive element that comes mainly in two forms, or isotopes: uranium-238 and a 

small amount of uranium-235. Only U-235 is fissile, or capable of being split in a nuclear chain reaction. To 

make bombs or nuclear fuel, uranium must be "enriched" by increasing the proportion of U-235.

The Mission: Uranium Enrichment 

1. Uranium ore from mines is milled in a process to extract uranium oxide, known as yellowcake. The yellowcake is sent to Paducah. 

2. At the Paducah plant, yellowcake is burned with hydrogen to form uranium dioxide, a black powdery substance called "black oxide." 

3. The black oxide is mixed with hydrofluoric acid to make uraniun tetrafluoride, known as greensalt. 

4. The greensalt is burned with fluorine to make uranium hexafluoride 

Since the late 1970s, Paducah has purchased uranium hexafluoride from other companies. Today, the enrichment process begins here. 
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1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

5. Finally comes the gaseous diffusion process for which the plant is named: The liquid uranium hexafluoride is 

heated and passed through a series of barriers, which separate and concentrate the U-235 isotope. The 

low-enriched uranium is condensed to a solid and packed into drums for shipping. 

The enriched uranium is shipped to another plant for further enrichment to make commercial nuclear fuel. In 

the past, some was converted to highly enriched uranium for bombs. 

4%-5%U235 Nuclear fuel for power plants 

90%U235 Nuclear weapons 

Enormous amounts of uranium are left over after enrichment. 

The processes used at Paducah also can move backward, turning uranium hexafluoride back into greensalt, 

or into depleted uranium metal for use in armor-piercing munitions or armor plating. 

Uranium hexafluoride mixed with magnesium yields greensalt,uranium metal and slag. 

Contamination Spreads 

Beginning about 1953, uranium from spent nuclear fuel was sent to Paducah to be enriched. Each shipment 

contained small amounts of plutonium and other radioactive contaminants. 

Worker exposure 

Processing uranium generated large amounts of contaminated airborne dust inside the buildings. Also, radioactive material often was spilled, then swept up by hand, hosed into gutters or placed in regular trash receptacles, whistle-blowers say. 

Workers carried uranium home on their skin and clothes. 

Metals Recovery 

Old nuclear warheads were dismantled at Paducah, where the radioactive material was extracted and gold 

and other precious metals were recovered. 

The recovered gold was melted into bars. Whistle-blowers allege some was shipped away without being 

measured for radiation. 

Tens of thousands of drums used to ship uranium are stored outdoors at the plant. Many drums still contain 

radioactive material. 

This "depleted" uranium -- still radioactive -- is stored in tens of thousands of cylinders in open lots. 

The plant continues to store significant amounts of various recovered metals deemed too contaminated to ship. 

The concrete-like gray slag, a contaminated 

byproduct of the process, allegedly was trucked to sanitary landfills and dumped in public areas near the plant. 

Large amounts of contaminated slag remain on the site. 

Hazards Inside the Plant 

For decades, plutonium and other radioactive hazards quietly spread through this Kentucky uranium plant, 

exposing unsuspecting workers to an invisible and potentially lethal threat. Red areas on this diagram denote 

contamination that was detected around the main work areas in 1992. 

'Barrel Mountain': A nearly half-mile mound of large piles of rusted metal scrap and other waste materials, 

some of it contaminated. 

Classified burial ground: This landfill contains nuclear weapons components. Workers who dismantled 

weapons may have been exposed to beryllium, a highly toxic metal. 

Burial pits: Enormous amounts of radioactive material lie in shallow landfills on plant grounds, and some are 

believed to be leaching into ground water. One pit contains hundreds of barrels of a highly flammable form of 

uranium stored in PCB-tainted oils. 
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1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Waste-water discharges: Company documents acknowledge the release of tens of thousands of pounds of 

uranium into creeks. Toxic chemicals and metals also were discharged in waste water. 

Dirty runoff: Rain washes uranium and other hazards into ditches that flow past outdoor scrap yards. Some of 

the ditches are posted as radioactive inside the plant fence, while just outside the fence there are no such 

warnings. 

Fouled ditches: Uranium, plutonium and other radioactive materials were flushed into ditches, such as this one, 

that flow into tributaries of the Ohio River. A test commissioned last month by The Washington Post found 

plutonium here. Earlier tests of the ditch inside plant grounds found plutonium at a level 100 times above what 

the government certifies as safe. 

One of the most contaminated buildings still in use, C-400 contained chemical solvent tanks for cleaning radioactive equipment. Workers this year found an old canister that contained radioactive technetium at levels 

millions of times above the safety standard. 

Outdoor hazards: Plant officials recently discovered radioactive contamination in this gravel parking lot near 

the main administration building. Dozens of "hot spots" around the plant grounds mark the sites of old spills or 

dumps. 

Buildings 410 and 420: Hundreds of workers were exposed to radioactive dust in these buildings, which were 

used to process uranium before enrichment. 

Contaminated buildings: Elevated radiation levels have been found in hundreds of areas frequented by 

workers, including a cafeteria. 

Tainted wells: Two large plumes of contaminated ground water extend more than a mile north of the plant into 

residential neighborhoods. The water is contaminated with chemical and radiological wastes. 

Cylinder piles: More than 30,000 metal tanks containing a toxic mix of depleted uranium and fluorine are 

stacked in open lots. Until recently, some were stored in a nearby residential neighborhood. 

Process buildings: The heart of the plant, these stadium-sized buildings now enrich uranium for commercial 

nuclear fuel. The truck alleys along the sides of each building are contaminated from spills during deliveries. 

Chemical spills: Thousands of gallons of toxic chemicals -- including suspected carcinogens -- were released 

into the environment in a series of leaks and spills. Some ended up in nearby creeks. 

Airborne releases: Exhaust fans vented radioactive dust into the atmosphere. Workers say the biggest releases were always at night. 

Switchyards: The plant requires enormous amounts of electricity -- two generating plants are dedicated to its 

needs. As recently as 1996, the plant also was the nation's largest single emitter of freon, the coolant blamed 

for damaging the Earth's ozone layer. 

SOURCES: "Radiological Survey of Selected Outdoor Areas, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, Paducah, 

Kentucky," prepared by Oak Ridge Associated Universities, April 1992; Washington Post research. Satellite 

photo from U.S. Geological Survey. 

Spreading Toxins 

Radioactively contaminated slag and rubble from demolished buildings was dumped outdoors in more than two 

dozen places around the plant. For decades, waste water containing uranium, plutonium and cancer-causing 

chemicals was discharged into ditches and creeks that flow into the Ohio River, three miles away. 

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The Washington Post 

August 9, 1999, Monday, Final Edition 

Richardson Orders Probe Of Uranium Plant in Ky.

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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Energy Secretary Bill Richardson ordered an immediate investigation yesterday into reports that thousands of 

unsuspecting employees at a Kentucky uranium plant were exposed on the job to cancer-causing plutonium. 

Richardson said he would meet with workers at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and would request a 

National Academy of Sciences study to probe the links between worker illnesses and exposure to radioactive 

materials that occurred over decades at the federally owned plant. 

He also called for expanding a newly created program to bring health screening and medical treatment to 

thousands of workers who may have been put in harm's way at Paducah and similar facilities that were part of 

the government's nuclear weapons complex. 

"I have long maintained that we must correct the sins of the past by compensating workers who have been 

medically damaged," Richardson said in an interview. "I don't want this to be known as the department of 

excuses for not dealing with workers who have been harmed." 

His remarks came after The Washington Post reported that workers at the Paducah plant had been unwittingly 

exposed to plutonium and other radioactive metals that entered the plant over decades in shipments of used 

uranium from military nuclear reactor fuel. The report was based in part on sealed court documents filed as part 

of a lawsuit by workers and an environmental group, the Natural Resources Defense Council. The suit alleges 

that government contractors concealed evidence of the exposure for decades while allowing plutonium and 

other hazards to spread into the environment. 

The workers also allege that former plant managers allowed contaminated waste to be dumped into a 

state-owned wildlife area and a landfill not licensed for hazardous waste. They further contend that radioactively contaminated gold and other valuable metals may have been shipped out of the plant without being 

properly tested. 

Thomas Cochran, a nuclear expert with the NRDC who reviewed conditions at the plant, said health and safety 

practices there were the worst "outside the former Soviet Union." Former plant operators had not been served 

with the suit and declined to comment. The whistleblowers and their Washington attorney, Joseph Egan, said 

they also could not comment because of the judge's seal on the case. 

Energy officials sent a team to Paducah for an initial probe after the documents were first filed in June, 

Richardson confirmed. "They did not uncover any imminent threats . . . but we are continuing to investigate 

these concerns," Richardson said. 

The expanded investigation he announced yesterday would seek to uncover "what actually occurred, who was 

responsible and what must be done to assure that it never happens again," he said. 

Among the specific measures: 
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Richardson Orders Probe Of Uranium Plant in Ky. The Washington Post August 9, 1999, Monday, Final Edition 

Top Energy Department officials will be dispatched to Paducah this week to check compliance with environmental and safety regulations. The agency's Office of General Counsel will assess whether former contractors, including Lockheed Martin Corp. or Union Carbide Corp., had fulfilled their responsibilities to protect 

workers and the environment. 

Besides the health study by the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Medicine, the Energy Department 

will institute a medical surveillance and screening program for employees. A screening of former Paducah

workers is just beginning as part of the Former Worker Program, a congressionally ordered study of past 

exposures of employees in the U.S. nuclear complex. 

The department's fiscal 2000 budget request will be reassessed and revised as necessary to include money to 

probe and rectify environmental and health concerns at the government's uranium enrichment plants. 

Richardson will ask the White House to expand a newly created program to provide millions of dollars in 

medical screening and other benefits to Energy Department workers who were exposed to beryllium, a highly 

toxic metal used in nuclear weapons. "These actions are warranted given the concerns raised . . . and I will not 

rest until these issues are fully dealt with and any injured workers are fairly compensated," Richardson said. 

Paducah workers were exposed to plutonium through shipments of contaminated uranium that arrived at the 

plant from 1953 to 1976, a period when national security priorities often surmounted concerns over risks to 

workers and the environment. The plutonium shipments stopped, but contaminants remain spattered over 

hundreds of acres of buildings and grounds. Workers did not learn of the problems until at least 1990, and 

some contend they were never told. 

The U.S. Enrichment Corp., a government-chartered private corporation that took over management of the 

plant this year, contends that all significantly contaminated areas have been cleaned up or marked with 

warning signs. 

Although no comprehensive study of worker medical histories has been conducted, current and former workers 

at the plant have linked past exposures to a string of cancers and other diseases. 

Richardson said although many of the exposures at Paducah were historical, the government bears responsibilities for those who may have been injured. 

"Even though it was the 1950s and everyone was gung-ho," he said, "it doesn't mean that you can forget about 

workers who have been made sick." 

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The Washington Post 

August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

A Deathly Postscript Comes Back to Life; After Being Rejected, Warnings of Paducah Atomic Worker Now Hailed as Heroism

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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A Deathly Postscript Comes Back to Life; After Being Rejected, Warnings of Paducah Atomic Worker Now 

Hailed as Heroism The Washington Post August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

DATELINE: PADUCAH, Ky. 

 

Stricken with cancer, his body mottled with painful sores, uranium worker Joe Harding picked up a pen for a 

final postscript to his nine-year struggle against the U.S.-owned factory he blamed for his fatal illness. "It is 

absolutely futile," he wrote just before his 1980 death, "like fighting a tiger with a toothpick." 

Two decades later, Harding is being proclaimed a "Cold War hero" by the same government that brushed aside 

his claims of dangerous radiation inside the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in western Kentucky. 

Revelations this week of worker exposure to plutonium at the Paducah plant have rekindled interest in the 

Harding case, which was championed briefly by anti-nuclear groups in the early 1980s as an example of the 

human cost of building America's nuclear arsenal. Although experts at the time linked Harding's ailments to 

radiation, the Department of Energy in 1981 dismissed Harding's reports of dangerous working conditions and 

declared the plant to be safe. Harding's disability pension and medical insurance were dropped and he was left 

nearly penniless. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, who has launched a probe into worker exposures at Paducah, said yesterday the government owed Harding and other workers a thorough investigation into whether their service in 

the nation's nuclear weapons complex had placed them in harm's way. 

"Joe Harding was a hero of the Cold War," Richardson said in statement to The Post. "But in the past, I believe 

that the government basically said -- without any review -- that there is no established linkage between the 

exposure these workers had and their illness. The Clinton administration is saying that's not our policy. We're 

going to make sure these workers are taken care of." 

The renewed interest in Harding came amid a flurry of calls for an expanded probe into environmental and 

safety problems at the plant. Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) Monday demanded a congressional hearing into 

reports that contaminated material was dumped outside the plant. Kentucky Gov. Paul E. Patton (D) has 

appointed a state task force to examine claims of environmental damage. And Rep. Ted Strickland (D-Ohio) 

has asked the Department of Energy to account for contaminated uranium from Paducah that was shipped to 

a sister plant in Portsmouth, Ohio. 

David Michaels, the department's assistant secretary of environment, safety and health, told workers at 

Paducah the agency had let them down in failing to inform them about contaminants in the workplace. "There's 

been a real communications problem here," he told a news conference Monday. 

The Washington Post reported on Sunday that plutonium and other highly radioactive metals slipped into the 

plant over 23 years in shipments of recycled uranium from U.S. plutonium production factories. 

Sealed documents filed as part of a lawsuit against the plant's former operators allege that workers were 

exposed to plutonium-laced dust through the 1970s in the hot, smoky buildings where uranium was turned into 

fuel for bombs and nuclear power plants. 

One of those workers was Joe Harding, whose case has emerged as a powerful symbol of environmental and 

bureaucratic ills that allegedly plagued the facility. Although no comprehensive medical studies have been 

done of the health effects on plant workers, union officials and others have been tracking cases of cancer at the 

plant. Harding himself kept a list of more than 50 cancers among 200 people who began working with him at 

the plant in the early 1950s. 

Richardson has ordered a comprehensive medical review of current workers and an investigation of links 

between radiation exposures and illnesses. 

Union officials said yesterday the government not only failed to protect Harding, but also fought vigorously to 

prevent the worker and his widow from receiving a pension or medical insurance. 

"The DOE took the Joe Harding case very seriously: No dollar was spared in seeking to deny his claims," said 

Richard Miller, a policy analyst for the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers International Union, 
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Hailed as Heroism The Washington Post August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

which represents workers at the plant. "No effort was spared in their scorched-earth campaign to deny what 

was overwhelmingly obvious." 

In the months before succumbing to cancer at age 58, Harding meticulously documented environmental 

problems at the plant in tape recordings and in letters and journal entries obtained by The Post. 

It was "important, patriotic, secret work," Harding wrote of the job he started in 1952, the year the plant opened. 

"Brainwashing started in training school: 'Don't talk to anyone. Never mention radiation. The public is stupid 

about radiation.' " 

Soon Harding was put to work as a "process operator," mixing powdered uranium with fluorine and other 

chemicals. Inside the buildings, he wrote, the air was "heavy" with uranium dust, which is mildly radioactive and 

toxic if ingested or inhaled. Unknown to workers at the time, it also contained small amounts of plutonium and 

other radioactive metals that are thousands of times more dangerous than uranium. 

"I spent all those years breathing uranium hexafluoride gas so thick and heavy that you could see the haze in 

the air," Harding said in a hand-written account in 1979. "You could taste it coated on your teeth and in your 

throat and lungs. . . . Powder on the floor was thick enough that you would leave tracks." 

If workers worried about radioactive exposure from the dust, their concerns were brushed aside, Harding said. 

He said the official line from supervisors was: "You will not get any more radiation in this work than you would 

get from wearing a luminous dial wristwatch." 

Harding had worked at the plant less than a year when the first medical symptoms appeared, according to 

records made available by his widow. Lesions appeared on his legs, and slowly spread through the rest of his 

body. His weight dropped from 175 to 125 pounds. Searing pain radiated from his stomach and he vomited so 

frequently his co-workers mockingly called him "Joe Erp." 

Later, fingernail-like calcium growths began emerging from his finger joints, elbows and knees. X-rays of his 

lungs turned up odd-looking pockmarks. He lost most of his stomach to cancer. 

Physicians were mystified by Harding's ailments, though privately, he recalled, some suggested a possible 

cause: Radiation exposure. Harding didn't believe it. 

"Radiation? Hell, no!" he remembered saying. Later, though, as the symptoms worsened, Harding began to 

doubt assurances by Union Carbide, the plant operator, about safety. He remembered feeling nervous about 

maintenance jobs that required him to crawl inside large pipes used to carry radioactive uranium gas between 

buildings. 

"Pitch dark, full of UF6 [uranium hexafluoride] smoke and powder," he said of the pipes. "Felt like saying 

'Goodbye, world,' on entering." 

Eventually Harding's increasingly vocal complaints about working conditions earned him a reputation as a 

troublemaker, and he bounced around from one section of the plant to another. Finally, in 1971, the plant 

offered him a full-disability pension, citing a leg injury that Harding had received on the job. 

Harding accepted the offer and went home to wait for his first check. It never came. He later learned that his 

disability claim had been rejected, and along with it his pension and medical insurance. 

"This left me 50 years old with no job, and a crippled leg to get worse," he wrote. "No stomach. Bad lungs. No 

way to get a job, no way to make a living." 

Months after his death from stomach cancer in 1980, Harding's medical records were reviewed by Karl Z. 

Morgan, an internationally known radiation expert who concluded Harding's health problems were "strongly 

suggestive" of radiation exposure from chronic inhalation of uranium dust. Later, Harding's body was exhumed 

for testing, and uranium was found in his bones. 

Meanwhile, Energy Department officials were conducting their own investigation, at Harding's request. After 18 

months and a two-day visit to Paducah, the department concluded that Harding's illnesses were more likely 

caused by smoking and by the fact he "frequently ate country ham," according to the 1981 report. Based on 

computer modeling, the report's writers said the radiation exposures at Paducah were not sufficient to cause 

illnesses. 
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Hailed as Heroism The Washington Post August 11, 1999, Wednesday, Final Edition 

"The presence of thick dust in the air which Mr. Harding stated occurred . . . is not consistent with the mode of 

operation," the report said. 

The department's findings are now contradicted in court documents and interviews with current and former 

workers who also describe high exposures to uranium dust in the plant. Workers say the dust clung to their hair 

and skin and even contaminated the food they ate. 

Whether the new evidence from whistleblowers will ultimately vindicate Harding is unclear. If it does, it will 

provide little consolation for his widow, Clara, who lost both a husband and the financial security that was 

supposed to see her into twilight years. 

Clara Harding sold her house and moved to a small duplex on the outskirts of town. She continued to fight for 

the pension in court for several years before finally settling the case for $ 12,000. 

For her, the battle was clearly over from the first hearing, when Harding and her lawyer arrived in court to find 

a phalanx of attorneys and experts from the plant and the Energy Department representing the other side. 

"There were 14 of them and only two of us," she remembered. "So that was pretty much that." 

NAME: JOE HARDING 

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4 of 9 DOCUMENTS 

The Washington Post 

August 22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's 

Bones

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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The exhumed bones of a long-dead uranium worker have given a powerful boost to current employees' claims 

of dangerous exposures inside a government-owned Kentucky plant that supplied radioactive fuel for the 

nation's nuclear bombs. 

The long-overlooked medical evidence from the case of Joseph Harding suggests that for some workers radiation doses at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant were far higher than previously believed, and may have 

been dozens of times above federal limits, according to one analysis of the data. 

The hazards for uranium workers are further underscored by unpublished research from a sister plant in 

Tennessee. A draft study of workers at the K-25 plant in Oak Ridge shows unusually high death rates for 

former uranium workers, as well as sharply higher rates of lung and bone cancers. 
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Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones The Washington Post August 

22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

The results of Harding's posthumous tests, conducted as part of a lawsuit in 1983 but never published, offer the 

strongest corroboration to date of hazardous conditions inside the Paducah plant, where workers labored for 

decades in a haze of radioactive dust that was sometimes laced with deadly plutonium. 

"Uranium content of the bone was far in excess of normal expectations," wrote Alice Stewart, an internationally 

known British researcher who reviewed the results of laboratory tests of Harding's remains for his estate. "The 

terminal finding overrules all earlier impressions [from U.S. government officials] of NO internal depositions of 

uranium." 

Lab technicians were unaware of the presence of plutonium at the plant and did not test for it. Plutonium is 

about 100,000 times more radioactive per gram than uranium and can cause cancer if inhaled in microscopic 

amounts. Workers only recently learned that plutonium and other highly radioactive metals entered the plant in 

contaminated uranium shipments from the early 1950s to the mid-1970s. 

The Department of Energy has launched an extensive investigation into claims of worker exposures at the 

Paducah plant as well as the K-25 plant and a third facility in Ohio. While the department had not evaluated the 

results of Harding's bone tests as of last week, agency officials said it is now clear that uranium workers were 

not properly protected until at least 1990, when new safety guidelines were implemented. 

"This reaffirms our decision to get out of the business of fighting sick workers," David Michaels, assistant 

secretary for environment, safety and health, said in an interview Friday. "This case is an example of how the 

DOE placed mission and secrecy in a paramount position in the past. Right now, we should be bending over 

backward to help those workers who helped win the Cold War for us." 

Both the Paducah and K-25 plants were owned by the federal government and operated by the same group of 

corporate contractors: Union Carbide from the 1950s to the early 1980s, followed by Martin Marietta and 

Lockheed Martin Corp. 

The latter two are the targets of a lawsuit filed by a group of current employees who allege unsafe working 

conditions and environmental contamination. Former workers also have alleged that radiation monitoring 

equipment at the Paducah plant was defective; in some cases, they say, "film" badges used to monitor exposures contained no film. 

"The dose evidence corroborates our allegations that the health physics program at Paducah has been essentially nonexistent," said Thomas Cochran, nuclear program director at the Natural Resources Defense 

Council, which joined workers in the lawsuit. "The contractors have been operating in callous disregard for the 

health and safety of the work force." 

Harding, an 18-year veteran plant worker who died of cancer in 1980, was hailed last week by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson as a "hero of the Cold War." But for the nine years before his death his claims of radiation 

exposure were vigorously challenged by contractors and Energy Department officials, who said conditions in 

the plant were safe. 

The department disputed Harding's allegations -- verified years later by other workers -- of a dense fog of 

uranium dust and smoke that would cling to workers' skin and coat their throats and teeth. A department study 

in 1981 attributed Harding's death to a combination of smoking and eating country ham. 

Eventually Harding developed stomach cancer along with an array of unusual maladies that are sometimes 

linked to radiation exposure, including perforations in his lungs and strange fingernail-like growths on his 

palms, wrists and shoulders. But after being discharged from the plant in 1971, Harding was denied a disability 

pension and lost his medical insurance. His widow's efforts to reclaim the pension were opposed by lawyers for 

Union Carbide and the Energy Department, and she eventually settled her claim for $ 12,000. 

The exhumation of Harding's remains in 1983 was a final attempt by Harding's widow to verify his assertions of 

exposure to radioactive uranium dust in the plant. His bones were analyzed by a Canadian lab for uranium, but 

for reasons now unclear the results were never published. 

The lab report -- obtained last week by The Post -- not only supported Harding's claims of radiation exposure 

but also suggested hazards at the plant were far greater than previously believed: More than a dozen years 

after Harding left the plant, his body contained uranium at levels up to 133 times higher than is normally found 

in bones. 
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Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones The Washington Post August 

22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Moreover, the type of uranium found was "not from natural sources," and apparently came from the plant's 

uranium enrichment process, the report said. 

Because uranium is slowly purged by the body over time, the levels in Harding's bones would have been 

"several-fold higher" during the time he was employed, the lab report stated. 

Exactly how much higher is unclear. But Carl Johnson, a Colorado physician and radiation consultant who 

analyzed the test results for Harding's widow in 1983, said Harding's uranium "bone burden" in the 1970s 

would have been between 1,700 and 34,000 times higher than normal. Based on those levels, the annual 

radiation dose to Harding's bone tissue would have been 30 to 600 rems a year. Under current standards, U.S. 

nuclear industry workers are allowed a maximum full-body dose of 5 rems a year. 

Radiation experts who reviewed the data for The Post said the results could have been skewed by a number of 

factors, including the possible presence of plutonium in Harding's bone tissue. But by any measure, the exposure was certainly high. 

Arjun Makhijani, president of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research, said conditions at Paducah

appear to have been similar to an Energy Department site at Fernald, Ohio, where concentrations of radioactive particles in the air are now known to have far exceeded then-allowable limits, in one instance by 97,000 

times. 

"The DOE and its contractor Union Carbide committed a gross injustice on Joe Harding," Makhijani said. "The 

DOE is perpetuating that injustice upon the half-million people who worked in the nuclear weapons complex 

since it has not yet provided the vast majority of the survivors among them with medical monitoring and medical 

help." 

Energy Department officials are now pledging increased medical tests and possibly compensation to thousands of men and women who were exposed to chemical and radiological hazards at Paducah and other 

facilities in the U.S. nuclear weapons complex. The department's investigative team at Paducah in coming 

weeks will attempt to determine exactly what the hazards were, and who was exposed. 

The task is fraught with obstacles, including a dearth of monitoring data from the early years when radiation 

exposures were likely to be highest. Unlike the K-25 plant, no comprehensive study of worker histories has 

been attempted at Paducah. 

The draft study of uranium workers at the K-25 plant appears to offer further support for concerns about hazards inside such facilities. The mortality study of about 11,000 former workers at the plant was conducted by 

the Oak Ridge Institute for Science and Education. Although the research essentially was completed in 1994, 

funding for the study was dropped before it could be peer reviewed and published in a scientific journal. 

The draft report, obtained by The Post, shows higher rates of death for all causes among former workers, a 

finding that is significant in itself, given that government workers are typically healthier than the general population because of higher salaries and access to health care. 

The study also shows higher rates of cancers of the lung (19 percent) and bone (82 percent) among white male 

workers compared with the general population. Both cancers are sometimes linked to radiation exposure. 

Researchers point to several factors that could have skewed the results, including the inclusion in the survey of 

a sample of thousands of people who worked at the K-25 plant for a relatively brief period during World War II. 

Since many able-bodied men were in the military during that period, the remaining work force may have been 

less healthy than the general population, the authors said. 

A new study is underway to track death rates among K-25 workers who were exposed to the highest amounts 

of radiation. Similar mortality studies at the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio have shown relatively 

low rates of cancer. 

Another possible problem in evaluating risks for Paducah workers is the reliability of the data. Previous Energy 

Department audits of the plant's safety records cited extensive problems with monitoring programs and 

equipment. And former and current workers at the plant say they believe radiation monitoring was shoddy in 

the past. 
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Paducah's Silent Witness; Excessive Uranium Level Found in Worker's Bones The Washington Post August 

22, 1999, Sunday, Final Edition 

Al Puckett, a retired union shop steward who worked at the gaseous diffusion plant in the 1960s and 1970s, 

said workers would sometimes open their "film" badges only to find no film inside. Suspecting that no one ever 

examined workers' radiation monitors, Puckett and his colleagues sometimes exposed the badges to radiation 

by leaving them for hours on top of barrels of enriched uranium. 

"We turned the badges in and that was the last we heard of it," he said. "No one ever said anything to us." 

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The Washington Post 

September 16, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

U.S. Will Propose Payments to Sick Paducah Workers; $20 Million Fund 

Eyed For Radiation Cancers

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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The Clinton administration today will propose spending tens of millions of dollars to compensate ailing workers 

at the government's Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant in what is described as a step toward acknowledging 

abuses committed against thousands of men and women who helped build America's nuclear arsenal. 

The proposed pilot program, which eventually could be expanded to encompass other Energy Department 

facilities, will be unveiled by Energy Secretary Bill Richardson during a visit to the plant, department officials 

confirmed to The Washington Post. 

If approved by Congress, the program would compensate current and former employees who have developed 

specific cancers related to radiation after working at the western Kentucky plant, which has made enriched 

uranium for nuclear weapons and power plants since 1952. In addition, Richardson will propose $ 21.8 million 

in new spending to pay for cleanup and for expanded medical monitoring of workers at Paducah and at sister 

plants in Ohio and Tennessee. 

"I'm going to Paducah to hear firsthand from the community and workers," Richardson said in an interview. 

The visit to Paducah comes two days after the release of preliminary findings from a month-long investigation 

of safety practices at the plant. A team of Energy Department inspectors cited numerous weaknesses in environmental programs and criticized federal managers and cleanup contractors for a "lack of discipline, formality and oversight" in the plant's management of radiation risks. 

The team found no evidence of imminent health threats to workers or the public but said radiation controls 

should be strengthened. In response, Richardson ordered immediate upgrades in safety practices, including 

enhanced training for workers. 

A separate investigation is examining alleged illegal dumping of radioactive waste, as well as claims of worker 

exposure to harmful levels of plutonium and other radioactive metals before 1990. 
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U.S. Will Propose Payments to Sick Paducah Workers; $20 Million Fund Eyed For Radiation Cancers The 

Washington Post September 16, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Energy Department inspectors were due to report additional findings at a House Commerce subcommittee 

hearing on the Paducah plant, scheduled for today but canceled because of Hurricane Floyd's approach 

toward Washington. The hearing was rescheduled for Wednesday. 

Details of the proposed compensation package for Paducah workers had not been completed, but Energy 

Department officials said the cost of the program could exceed $ 20 million, depending on how many workers 

qualified. 

But the program's initially narrow limits have drawn criticism from the plant's union. The critics noted that 

workers at other plants were exposed to similar hazards and also deserved to be compensated. 

"You've got a worker population at risk, but the administration wants to triage this thing," said Richard Miller, a 

policy analyst with the Paper, Allied Chemical and Energy Workers International Union who was briefed on 

details of the plan. "How do you justify compensating workers at one plant, while saying another plant across 

the river doesn't merit the same compensation?" 

Limits on compensation for exposed workers have been the subject of debate in the administration for weeks. 

Earlier in the summer, the Energy Department announced plans to separately compensate workers who had 

been exposed to beryllium, a highly toxic metal that was widely used in making nuclear weapons components. 

The White House also has launched an interagency review that will look at a wide range of workplace hazards 

at Energy Department plants, especially uranium plants in Piketon, Ohio, and Oak Ridge, Tenn. 

Richardson ordered the probe at the Paducah plant on Aug. 8 after a Washington Post investigation highlighted radioactive contamination at the plant, including worker exposure to plutonium. Documents filed in a 

worker lawsuit accuse the plant's former operators of failing to protect workers from -- or even to warn them of 

-- radioactive hazards. 

The Paducah plant is owned by the Energy Department but has been managed by a series of corporate 

contractors. In May, management of uranium processing passed to U.S. Enrichment Corp., a government-chartered private company that is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Energy Department's investigation at Paducah has focused mainly on policies and practices of department managers, as 

well as separate government contractors charged with cleaning up contamination. 

The $ 21.8 million that Richardson will announce includes $ 7 million for environmental health programs to 

analyze past safety risks and current health hazards. The information will be provided to the National Academy 

of Sciences' Institute of Medicine to help determine compensation for worker illnesses. 

Yesterday, an Ohio newspaper reported that workers at the Paducah facility's sister plant in Piketon also 

handled a greater amount of the type of plutonium-laced uranium oxide that caused widespread problems in 

Paducah than was previously acknowledged. 

Like the Paducah facility, the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant in Ohio received shipments of contaminated recycled uranium directly from nuclear power plants, the Columbus Dispatch quoted Energy Department 

officials as saying. The uranium contained small amounts of plutonium and other radioactive material normally 

not present at gaseous diffusion plants. 

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The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 
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Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public Outcry The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 

Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of 

Public Outcry

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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LENGTH: 1396 words 

 

Managers of the government's Paducah, Ky., uranium plant knew for decades of unusual radiation hazards 

inside the complex but failed to warn workers because of fears of a public outcry, according to documents to be 

released by a congressional panel this week. 

Faded memos unearthed by workers and federal investigators shed new light on what early plant officials knew 

about the presence of plutonium and other highly radioactive metals in the plant -- knowledge that was kept 

from the workers for nearly four decades. 

In one 1960 document, a government physician wrote that hundreds of workers should be screened for exposure to "transuranics" -- radioactive metals such as plutonium and neptunium -- but he said plant officials 

feared such a move would cause alarm and lead to higher labor costs. 

"They hesitate to proceed to intensive studies because of the union's use of this for hazard pay," says the 

memo, discovered by Energy Department officials investigating the plant. 

The documents from government archives have been turned over to a House Commerce Committee panel, 

which is holding hearings Wednesday into allegations of unsafe conditions at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion 

Plant. The Washington Post obtained advance copies of the documents and prepared testimony of some 

current and former plant officials. 

Accounts of plutonium contamination and illegal waste dumping at the facility have triggered an Energy Department investigation and a class action suit by employees who believe the plant put them at risk. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson toured the plant on Friday and formally apologized to workers for the government's failure to fully inform them about the risks. He pledged millions of dollars in new spending to compensate ailing workers and to accelerate the cleanup of the plant. And he presented an award to the family of 

the late Joe Harding, an employee who had tried vainly for years to convince Energy officials that hazards in 

the plant had caused his fatal illness. 

"On behalf of the government I'm here to say I'm sorry," Richardson said. "The men and women who have 

worked in this facility helped the United States win the Cold War and now help us keep the peace. We recognize and won't forget our obligation to them." 

Plant officials, while acknowledging the presence of plutonium at Paducah, have said the amounts were small 

and were likely of little threat to workers. 

Government contractors who ran the plant over the last 47 years have declined to comment because of 

pending litigation. A Union Carbide Corp. spokesman, in a statement last month, said the alleged acts at 

Paducah occurred long ago, and none of the current managers had any detailed knowledge of what had 

happened. Union Carbide operated the plant from 1952 to 1983. 

The documents and testimony to be presented at the congressional hearing suggest that the federal government and private contractors running the plant ignored decades of warnings to protect workers from plutonium, a man-made metal that can cause cancer if inhaled in amounts as small as a millionth of an ounce. 

"What is clear is that the [government] contractors knew of the need to protect workers from plutonium and 

other transuranics . . . as early as 1952," Jim H. Key, the ranking environmental and safety official for the plant's 

unionized employees, states in prepared testimony to be delivered Wednesday. 
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Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public Outcry The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 

Key, who has not yet spoken publicly about the allegations of workers' exposure, alleges "widespread, systematic and documented failures" by the government and its contractors to control the spread of radioactive 

hazards. He describes smoky, radioactive fires inside the plant and thick clouds of radioactive uranium dust --

workplace hazards for which workers were neither trained nor equipped. 

Former workers also have come forward with evidence suggesting that past managers viewed the contamination as a practical and economic problem. John Tillson, a hydrologist who analyzed early operations at the 

plant while working for a cleanup contractor, said Paducah managers tried to recover the transuranics from the 

plant's waste stream in the 1950s and 1960s, when the metals were in high demand for nuclear materials 

research. 

By 1970 the prices had dropped, and the recovery programs were halted, he said. 

Plant officials even began processing sewage sludge from the plant after it was found to contain high levels of 

uranium. Harold Hargan, a 37-year employee who was detailed to the recovery program, said the uranium in 

sludge came exclusively from the plant's sanitary system, which included lavatories, wash rooms and laundry 

facilities. "All that uranium was either on workers' clothes or bodies -- or inside their bodies," he said. 

Although no formal epidemiological study has been completed for Paducah, some workers have long raised 

questions about what they believe are unusual rates and types of cancers in their communities. Those fears 

have risen sharply in the wake of reports that plutonium and other highly radioactive metals were also present 

in the workplace, Key, the union safety officer, says in his statement. 

"The majority of current and former workers are afraid that they may have been exposed to substances like 

plutonium without proper protection and that they will, as a result, be stricken with a fatal disease," Key wrote. 

"I myself have this fear from my 25 years at Paducah."

Hired by the plant's original contractor, Union Carbide, in 1974, Key said he began witnessing safety problems 

almost immediately. During his first year on the job, he was engulfed in radioactive smoke after helping dump 

drumloads of highly flammable uranium metal into an open pit on the plant's grounds. 

"The uranium spontaneously ignited . . . and a pungent and irritating smoke enveloped us," said Key, an hourly 

worker and officer in the local chapter of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical and Energy Workers International Union. "To my knowledge this dumping ground has never been characterized." 

Workers inside the building where powdered uranium was processed were not required to wear respirators, 

even though the dust at times was so thick it was difficult to see, Key said. 

"I recall having to hold my breath to get through clouds of unknown fumes," he said. 

In the 1970s, Key would observe workers cleaning up spills of "black powder," which he later learned consisted 

of recycled uranium from the government's plutonium production facilities. Not until 1990 did plant officials tell 

the union that the powder contained small amounts of "transuranics" -- a class of highly radioactive metals that 

includes neptunium and plutonium. Plutonium is 100,000 times more radioactive per gram than uranium. 

Key cited a 1952 Union Carbide memo that suggests the need for special labeling of "plutonium contaminated 

locations." 

Years later, in a 1985 memo, Energy officials advised Paducah's managers to test workers who handled the 

recycled uranium for exposure to transuranics. Key notes, "We have no evidence that these recommendations 

were acted upon or communicated to the workforce." 

In 1991, Martin Marietta Energy Systems, which was now operating the plant, began a voluntary program to 

test workers for exposure. Thirty workers participated, but the test results were "invalidated" due to what the 

company termed "concerns and discrepancies" regarding the testing lab, Key said. 

He said the company refused to release the results to the union, explaining in a memo that "management is 

reluctant to release this information due to concerns about how it would be used." 

Concerns about public reaction were echoed in the 1960 memo from H .D. Bruner, a physician, to Union 

Carbide and Atomic Energy Commission medical officials. He expressed concerns about relatively large 
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Radiation Risks Long Concealed; Paducah Plant Memos Show Fear Of Public Outcry The Washington Post 

September 21, 1999, Tuesday, Final Edition 

amounts of neptunium in recycled uranium delivered to the Paducah plant. "But I am afraid the policy of the 

plant is to be wary of the unions and any unfavorable public relations," the memo states. 

Although workers in some buildings were furnished with gas masks, Bruner said the respirators were not used 

and did not appear to be effective against the tiny uranium particles in the air. 

"The human factor in handling [the recycled material] should be considered a source of potential exposure," he 

wrote. 

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The Washington Post 

October 21, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Energy Dept. Faults Paducah Contractors; Deficient Plant Hazard 

Warnings Cited

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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The Energy Department, ending the first phase of its investigation of the troubled Paducah, Ky., uranium plant, 

faulted contractors yesterday for failing to properly warn the public about radioactive hazards, including "relatively high" levels of plutonium in ditches outside the plant. 

Investigators zeroing in on the plant's current environmental and safety problems also pointed to the "theoretical" risk of an accidental nuclear chain reaction at the plant, citing large quantities of "uncharacterized" 

radioactive material stored there. 

The problems were among dozens uncovered in the first of two department probes of current and past hazards 

at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, one of two U.S.-owned facilities that produce enriched uranium. 

Yesterday's report gives the plant's managers 30 days to come up with a plan for addressing problems ranging 

from lax safeguards to radioactive seepage from a half-mile-long pile of contaminated scrap metal. 

"We have concerns about exposure, but we don't think any of them reach the level of imminent danger," said 

David Michaels, assistant energy secretary for environment, safety and health. 

Michaels promised quick action to eliminate any risk of a "criticality"--an inadvertent nuclear reaction similar to 

last month's serious accident at the Tokaimura uranium plant in Japan. Agency officials said the chances of 

such a reaction were remote. 

Energy Secretary Bill Richardson launched investigations at Paducah in August after reports of worker exposure to and sloppy handling of radioactive waste. Preliminary findings released last month faulted the 

agency and its contractors for weaknesses in identifying and cleaning up contaminants--hazards that included 

highly radioactive plutonium. 
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Energy Dept. Faults Paducah Contractors; Deficient Plant Hazard Warnings Cited The Washington Post 

October 21, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Yesterday's report contained the first results from independent laboratory tests that confirmed the presence of 

plutonium and other radioactive metals in ground water as well as in ditches and streams outside the plant 

fence. The agency's tests found new areas of off-site contamination and also documented "relatively high 

levels" of plutonium, thorium and cesium in two ditches that feed a tributary of the Ohio River. 

The contaminated areas had not been properly controlled or marked with signs, the report said. Plutonium can 

cause cancer if inhaled in minuscule amounts. 

Although plant officials discovered off-site plutonium contamination in the early 1990s, most public reports 

listed plutonium levels at near zero. The discrepancy has been a sore point with lawmakers who have grilled 

former contractors as part of their own Paducah probe. 

Rep. Thomas J. Bliley Jr. (R-Va.), chairman of the House Commerce Committee, expressed dismay yesterday 

after one former contractor, CH2MHill, insisted in a letter that the plutonium problem was contained within the 

plant's security boundaries. 

"For many years the Paducah community has been plagued by misinformation and outright deceit," Bliley said. 

He vowed to press for "full accountability and the highest level of safety" for Paducah workers and residents. 

 Energy Department investigators pointed to the "theoretical" risk of an accidental nuclear chain reaction at the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. 

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The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High 

Radiation Levels

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

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LENGTH: 2883 words 

DATELINE: PADUCAH, Ky. 

 

One worker collapsed on the factory floor, his body ravaged by lymphoma. Two others died within 105 days of 

different forms of leukemia. By the time Challie Freeman came down with a rare bone disease in the fall of 

1979, questions had morphed into suspicions: 

Was something at the U.S. government's uranium plant making workers sick? 

One possible answer--radiation exposure--seemed persuasive to Freeman's doctor. He fired off a letter to the 

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant. "It is imperative," he wrote, "that we learn as soon as possible the extent, 

nature and type of radiation to which he was exposed." 

The reply--"no significant internal exposure"--was brief and emphatic. It was also false. 
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Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

While the plant was denying knowledge of significant hazards to Freeman's doctors, confidential records 

showed the opposite: Freeman had tested positive multiple times for exposure to radioactive uranium and had 

even been restricted from working around uranium, an internal company memo shows. 

In August, The Washington Post reported that Paducah workers were unwittingly exposed to highly radioactive plutonium and neptunium on the job from the 1950s to the 1970s. A subsequent four-month Post investigation has found additional evidence that plant officials kept employees uninformed about chemical and 

radiation hazards. In some cases, such as Freeman's, the plant withheld accurate medical information on 

radiation exposure--even while it privately tracked cancer deaths among workers. 

A limited review of Paducah employee death records also turned up rates of leukemia among workers that 

appear higher than normal, based on government mortality statistics. Epidemiologists who reviewed the 

findings described the data as intriguing but cautioned that a much more intensive scientific study was needed, 

involving investigators with full access to employee records and medical histories, to establish whether a 

pattern existed. Such a study has not been done at Paducah. 

The 48-year-old uranium plant is the subject of an Energy Department investigation into worker health and 

safety practices. Union Carbide Corp., which allowed its operating contract to expire in 1984, declines to 

comment, saying its Paducah managers are long gone from the company. Energy Secretary Bill Richardson, 

whose agency owns the facility, has apologized for the failure to disclose plant hazards and has promised 

compensation for sick workers. 

Any outside attempt to review medical issues at Paducah is complicated by a lack of complete information. 

The Energy Department, citing privacy laws, declined to release lists of workers and their assignments. But 

The Post obtained company rosters listing more than 200 Paducah employees who were hired to work in 

some of the plant's most dangerous uranium-handling areas between 1951 and 1971. Scores of death certificates were examined and more than 120 surviving employees who worked in those areas were interviewed. 

Professional help was retained to categorize deaths, and a software program developed by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health was used to compare incidences of cancer to national rates. 

The result: The incidence of leukemia at Paducah appeared elevated, according to epidemiologists who reviewed the data. Of the 211 people on the lists who could be located--about 13 percent of the plant's work force 

in an average year--10 died of cancers of the blood and lymphatic system, including six of leukemia. By 

comparison, government mortality statistics suggest that only a single leukemia death would be expected in a 

group of adults of that size. 

Cancer clusters are difficult to document, and cancers are not necessarily caused by radiation. Some studies 

at other Energy Department plants have suggested links between workplace hazards and cancers; others 

have not. Whether chronic exposure to low doses of radiation causes cancer has been hotly debated for 

decades. 

Still, several epidemiologists who reviewed the results said the unusual incidence of leukemia and other rare 

diseases suggests the need for a closer look. 

"The findings are interesting and noteworthy and are grounds for a more complete study of the question," said 

David Richardson, an epidemiologist who is researching radiation health effects for the World Health Organization. 

Senior Energy Department officials said the findings highlight a major policy dilemma for the agency: whether 

to pursue more studies or to expand pilot programs to directly compensate workers who get sick. Yesterday, 

the department announced that it had shifted spending priorities in its fiscal 2000 budget to increase money for 

health studies and medical monitoring at Paducah. However, officials worry that studies may not be the right 

approach. 

"Epidemiology is not going to answer the questions precisely enough," said David Michaels, an epidemiologist 

and the assistant energy secretary for environment, safety and health. 

Energy Secretary Richardson said he has proposed legislation to change the way his agency deals with its sick 

workers. 
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Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

"Instead of fighting claims, we're actually helping workers without the debate about the rates of illness," he said. 

"The legislation we sent to Congress takes the burden of proof off those who are sick." 

Documents obtained in October under the Freedom of Information Act show that Union Carbide began tracking 

the repeated cancer cases in its work force in the 1970s. 

The first to die was Wade McNabb, a 20-year veteran who succumbed to chronic leukemia in 1972. That same 

fall, another worker died of multiple myeloma, a bone marrow disease. 

Alton Henson died of leukemia in 1976. Two years later, three workers--Arvil Bean, Leonard Lindblad and 

David Wilson--died of leukemia or bone marrow diseases within a span of six months. 

By 1982, the company had counted 13 fatal cancers of the blood or lymphatic system out of a relatively stable 

work force that ranged from 1,200 to 2,000 people. The list appears on a single sheet of paper--stamped 

"confidential" and copied to senior plant officials--identifying workers sometimes by initials. How Union Carbide 

intended to use the list is unclear, but the plant's records show no attempt by contractors to investigate possible 

links between the deaths and workplace hazards. 

Meanwhile, plant workers were told everything was fine. When Challie Freeman fell ill with his deadly bone 

marrow disease at 59, plant officials offered a lot of sympathy but little truth, family members say. 

Responding to a hematologist's queries about possible radiation exposure, a plant physician in a letter described Freeman as a "very fine man" whose exposure to hazardous materials had been near zero. Medical 

records produced by the plant showed "no significant internal exposure," based on years of weekly urine tests 

for uranium. 

Not until 15 years after his death in 1984 did family members obtain his medical records from the Energy 

Department and learn the full story: Company tests had indeed found high levels of uranium in his body in the 

1950s--so much, in fact, that Freeman once had to be moved to a different work area. His widow, Sue, recalls 

that he was transferred to a different job in the 1950s after being told simply that his urine was "hot." 

Freeman's physician, Nashville hematologist John Flexner, remembered that the company's response 

"downplayed the exposures." 

"They made you think there was no way this could be a case of cause-and-effect," Flexner said. "I guess I was 

naive to think they were telling the truth." 

Union Carbide said that it did not have the ability to respond in the Freeman case because of the 20-year 

passage of time. 

Plant policies required that workers exposed to certain amounts of radiation be moved to other, less hazardous 

jobs. But new records show this was ignored in some cases in which workers received up to twice the maximum dosage. 

One who never got the word was A.B. Burris, a 74-year-old retiree who learned of his past exposures when he 

asked the Energy Department for his medical files this fall. 

"They say I was put on 'strict restriction,' but I never found out about it until weeks ago," he said. "I can tell you 

they never changed my job or said anything to me about it." 

Workers knew even less about potentially deadly plutonium and neptunium that spread through the plant in 

shipments of recycled nuclear reactor uranium fuel from the 1950s to the 1970s, plant documents show. 

Confidential, 40-year-old memos released by the Energy Department in September showed that Union Carbide officials had decided against testing workers for exposure to the radioactive metals because of fears that 

workers would "use it . . . as an excuse for hazardous-duty pay." 

Newly released memos show that senior managers were aware of the plutonium and neptunium problem as 

early as 1959 but concluded in classified studies that contaminants were not a health hazard because the 

amounts in each shipment were small--a maximum of 10 parts per billion of plutonium in each uranium 

shipment. 

But over the years, the two metals began accumulating in soil and waste materials. 
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Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

In a survey of Paducah plant buildings conducted in the early 1990s, more than half of the work areas sampled 

exceeded the plant's safety limits for plutonium and neptunium--in some cases by a factor of 10. A survey of a 

men's locker room found high levels in shower stalls and even on toilet seats. 

Workers did know enough about radiation hazards to formally request additional safeguards. 

When Union Carbide decided to stop providing mechanics with coveralls, the plant's union demanded in 1986 

that the company take responsibility for "radiation carried into our homes, autos and other areas." Union 

Carbide denied the request, although in 1975 the union negotiated the right to protective clothing on demand. 

The union was less successful in efforts to secure workers' rights to take regular breaks in a radiation-free 

lunchroom. In a written grievance in 1979, the union said workers "should not have to eat in a contaminated 

area." 

The company denied the request. 

Ailing workers in the past have had difficulty proving harm because they lacked accurate monitoring data, 

David Fuller, president of the Paducah chapter of the Paper, Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers 

Union, testified at a Senate hearing on Paducah in October. 

While applauding government promises to financially aid ailing Paducah workers, Fuller and other union officials called for a compensation program for all workers that "reverses the burden of proof onto the government" 

while expanding medical monitoring for those most at risk. 

"Monitoring is imperative," Fuller said, "but without any other remedy, monitoring is simply a process to watch 

people get sick and die." 

Director of computer-assisted reporting Ira Chinoy, database editor Sarah Cohen, and staff researchers Alice 

Crites, Nathan Abse and Nancy Shiner contributed to this report. 

Challie Freeman 

Job: Cascade worker, security officer 

Age at death: 64 

Illness: Myelofibrosis 

Did radioactive exposure on the job make Challie Freeman sick? His doctor suspected a link, but plant 

managers said no. Asked by doctors to provide details of Freeman's work history, a Union Carbide memo 

described light exposure to the skin but "no significant internal exposures." 

Fifteen years after Freeman's death, the family obtained confidential plant memos that showed the opposite: 

Freeman had been restricted from uranium work in the 1950s because of "repeated positive urine samples" for 

radioactive uranium. The uranium remained high after weekends away from the job, the memo said. 

Freeman became sick from a slowly progressing bone marrow disease in the 1970s and died in 1984. Near the 

end his weight plummeted from 190 pounds to 100 and he was in constant pain, said his wife, Sue, who quit 

her job to care for him. 'We always wondered if it was the plant that made him sick,' she said. 'Now I have no 

doubt.' 

David R. Wilson 

Job: Cascade operator 

Age at death: 54 

Illness: Lymphosarcoma 

Like most Paducah workers, Wilson said little about his job, though sometimes he'd confide to his wife when 

he was exposed to unusually high levels of radiation. "He would say just he had been 'hot,'" remembers his 

widow, Winnie. One day in early 1978 he was rushed to the hospital after becoming ill at work. Tests confirmed 

he suffered from a form of lymphoma, which ended his life just four months later. 

Wade McNabb 
Page 25

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

Job: Cascade operator 

Age at death: 55 

Illness: Leukemia 

The doctor's eyes spoke volumes. After breaking the awful news to McNabb -- a diagnosis of leukemia at age 

40 -- he asked the ailing man where he worked. The reply, "Atomic Energy Plant, Paducah," prompted a nod 

and a knowing look. "Oh, yes," the hematologist said, "I'm treating several patients from Oak Ridge," 

Paducah's sister plant in Tennessee. McNabb began treatment and returned to the same job to preserve his 

salary and health benefits. "We didn't know what else to do," Dove, his widow, says. "You couldn't even talk 

about it at work, not if you wanted to keep your job." 

Jack Owens 

Job: Cascade operator, emergency crew 

Age at death: 36 

Illness: Rare blood/bone marrow disease 

Owen's emergency crew job brought him into some of the most dangerous areas to clean up spills of chemicals 

and radioactive material. "Some days he'd come home with chemical burns at every orifice," remembers his 

widow, Norma Rebik. "Later, when his doctor asked what he had been exposed to, he said, 'Everything.'" In 

1961, at 36, he died of a form of thrombocytopenia, a condition sometimes linked to environmental exposures. 

"He went from perfectly well to dead in a week," his widow said. 

Leon Lindblad 

Job: Cascade supervisor 

Age at death: 62 

Illness: Leukemia 

An avowed believer in Paducah's "mission," Lindblad was ambivalent about whether the plant posed risks. 

"He'd say the radiation levels were not that high," remembers his widow, Virginia, and yet, he always "took his 

shoes off at the door because he didn't want to bring that stuff inside the house." Lindblad's suspicions multiplied after he became sick with leukemia. He drew up a list of accidents and dates. "If I die, you can sue them," 

Lindblad explained to his wife, "because they're the ones who did this to me." Virginia never got the chance: On 

a Friday in 1976, Linblad stashed the list in his desk, never suspecting that he would become gravely ill over 

the weekend. He never returned to work. 

C. Arvil Bean 

Job: Process maintenance 

Age at death: 64 

Illness: Leukemia 

Bean's retirement plans included firing up the '49 Cadillac he was restoring and taking his wife on a trip to the 

Dakotas, where he was once stationed with the Army. Those ambitions faded the day he was diagnosed with 

acute leukemia at age 55. He replayed in his mind the times he had been exposed to radiation -- like the day he 

worked 16 hours cleaning up radioactive debris from a 1962 explosion. Despite his illness, Bean clung to his 

vacation dreams to the end. "Every few days he'd go out there and crank up that old car," daughter Nita said, 

"even in the snow." 

Charles Edward Harris 

Job: Machinist 

Age at death: 62 

Illness: Cancer, multiple organs 
Page 26

Plant Hid Risk From Workers; Paducah Bosses Knew Some Had High Radiation Levels The Washington Post 

December 23, 1999, Thursday, Final Edition 

For 25 years, Harris worked in the plant's machine shop, grinding down and repairing the nickel-plated pipes 

and gear used to convert uranium powder to nuclear fuel. Unknown to Harris and most other workers at the 

time, the metals were contaminated with small amounts of plutonium and neptunium, radioactive elements far 

more dangerous than ordinary uranium. His son, David, may have been exposed to the same hazards during 

summer jobs at the plant: College students mowed grass and cleaned up pond sludge in areas now known to 

be contaminated with the highly radioactive metals. "At the time they told us point-blank there was nothing 

there but uranium," David said. 

Eugene Ragland 

Job: Chemical operator 

Age at Death: 49 

Illness: Lung cancer 

The accident and Ragland's death will always be connected, at least in the mind of his widow, Marie. She still 

remembers his worried voice the night in March 1978 when he called to say he wouldn't be coming home from 

work. Ragland had been exposed to radiation during a mishap and had been asked to stay overnight for 

testing. Four months later, a separate medical test found "something wrong" with his blood, she said -- a result 

that led to the discovery of a rapidly spreading cancer in his lungs and chest. His death on Aug. 4 came so 

suddenly that Ragland had little time to ponder his illness, or the possible causes. "He always thought he was 

safe at the plant," Marie said. "They never let him know differently." 

 When Challie Freeman got sick, Paducah managers claimed he had suffered "no significant" radiation exposure, above, even though years earlier they had restricted his work near uranium, as noted below, because 

his urine had tested "hot." The body of Paducah plant worker Joe Harding was exhumed in November for 

tests. He had feared that the cancer that eventually killed him in 1980 was caused by radiation exposure. 

LOAD-DATE: December 23, 1999 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 

Copyright 1999 The Washington Post 

9 of 9 DOCUMENTS 

 The Washington Post 

February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of 

Hazards In Secret Program

Joby Warrick, Washington Post Staff Writer 

SECTION: A SECTION; Pg. A01 

LENGTH: 1290 words 

 
Page 27

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In Secret Program The 

Washington Post February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

More than 1,600 tons of nuclear weapons parts reportedly lie scattered around the Energy Department's 

Paducah, Ky., uranium plant, a safety manager informed regulators yesterday in a new disclosure of potential 

hazards unknown to workers or civilian plant supervisors. 

Some of the bomb parts are stored in above-ground shelters and could pose a risk of exposure or even an 

accidental nuclear reaction at the plant, if the components are contaminated with radioactive substances such 

as enriched uranium and plutonium, the official reported in a signed statement to the federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 

The U.S. Enrichment Corp. (USEC), the government-chartered private company that now runs the plant, 

acknowledged yesterday that its senior officials recently discussed the issue with the Department of Energy. 

"USEC has been assured that DOE is not aware of any conditions that create a radiological hazard to USEC 

personnel at the site beyond those already known and controlled," company spokeswoman Elizabeth Stuckle 

said. 

Energy Department officials involved with the country's classified nuclear weapons program apparently were 

aware of the shipment of bomb components to Paducah over many years, but the department did not until 

recently inform the plant's civilian overseers and safety officials who were in charge of evaluating threats to 

workers. 

The statement by Raymond G. Carroll, a senior manager of health and safety programs at the plant since 

1992, quotes a conversation with another senior civilian plant official who reportedly told Carroll he was worried 

about the bomb parts after hearing of their existence from a DOE official. 

Carroll also said he was told that DOE officials recently began hauling away documents related to weapons 

dismantlement. 

A DOE spokesman confirmed that the department is investigating "classified national security programs" 

conducted at Paducah in the past, along with the Justice and Defense departments. 

"This review includes the examination of potential worker exposures and any safety, health and environmental 

issues associated with these national security programs," the official said. 

Carroll's statement was obtained by The Washington Post yesterday as the government was making its most 

detailed acknowledgment to date of historically unsafe practices at the Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant, a 

hulking industrial complex that has produced enriched uranium for nuclear bombs and power plants since 

1952. 

The 77-page DOE report faults a "climate of secrecy" for keeping workers and neighbors uninformed and 

unprotected while radioactive contaminants spread through factory buildings and surrounding areas. A few 

volunteers were deliberately exposed to uranium in a series of previously undisclosed human experiments, the 

report said. 

The DOE report does not mention nuclear bomb parts. A worker lawsuit against plant contractors last summer 

revealed that some weapons parts had been melted down at the plant to recover gold and other metals. But 

details of the scope and purpose of the bomb program have remained shrouded in secrecy. 

Both DOE and Justice are investigating whistleblower allegations of improper handling of radioactive waste at 

the plant. 

Yesterday's disclosure by Carroll suggests the bomb program may have introduced yet another unknown 

hazard at a facility where workers had been lulled by assurances that their jobs were virtually risk-free. 

"Personnel could conceivably encounter highly enriched uranium or plutonium (or even tritium) without even 

knowing it," said Carroll, a 30-year veteran of the nuclear safety field who now works for USEC. Tritium is a 

radioactive component of the hydrogen bomb. 

Carroll, in a five-page memo filed with NRC and DOE officials, said he learned about the bomb parts from a 

senior USEC supervisor, radiation protection manager Orville Cypret. Carroll wrote that Cypret said he learned 

about the bomb parts from Dale Jackson, the former DOE manager of the Paducah site. 
Page 28

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In Secret Program The 

Washington Post February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

Carroll said Cypret told him that 1,600 tons of weapons components had been shipped to Paducah since the 

1950s. Although some parts were buried, others were dispersed in various storage areas across the sprawling 

complex, according to Carroll's statement. 

Cypret became alarmed after a Justice Department investigator told him "he would not ask about a 'classified 

tritium project' or past nuclear weapons handling at Paducah," Carroll wrote in his statment. 

In keeping with security policy, the weapons parts were not labeled, though "DOE thinks it knows where most 

of the material is," Carroll wrote. 

Cypret and Jackson did not return phone calls from The Post. A Justice Department official in Louisville said he 

could not comment on the department's investigation into whistleblower complaints at the plant. 

Carroll said he was told that "large quantities" of plutonium and highly enriched uranium had been brought into 

the plant, and "not just in reactor tails." Last summer, following allegations by current and former workers, DOE 

acknowledged for the first time that radioactive plutonium and neptunium had entered the plant in uranium 

"tails," recycled uranium metal from military reactors that produced plutonium. 

Carroll said in his statement that Cypret said a team of DOE officials had been assembled to investigate the 

matter but their findings "would not be voluntarily shared" with the plant's civilian managers. Instead, as records 

relating to the bomb program were found, they were held in a special vault for classified material. 

"Someone from [the DOE's Oak Ridge, Tenn., site] would drive down each night to pick them up," Carroll 

wrote, quoting Cypret.

Carroll said the new disclosures had left him deeply concerned about the safety of the plant's workers. Besides 

the risk of radioactive contamination, improperly stored nuclear material could trigger a lethal "criticality," an 

accidental nuclear reaction.

"A decision had apparently been made that national security would take precedence over personnel radiological safety," Carroll wrote. "I find this situation to be unconscionable." 

The risk posed by weapons parts could range from high to minimal, depending on the materials and how they 

are stored. 

DOE's report on historical practices at Paducah wraps up the second of two major probes ordered by Energy 

Secretary Bill Richardson in August. DOE officials described it as one of the most thorough in the department's 

history. 

The report concludes that the plant's lapses in worker safety in many ways reflected the culture of the time. 

"The Cold War was a reality," and federal oversight of the plant "was primarily directed at cost, schedule and 

production," the report said. 

Although the "intention to protect workers was apparent," plant managers frequently failed to meet even the 

relatively lenient safety and environmental standards of the day, the report states. 

The risks posed by plutonium and neptunium were "neither fully understood or appreciated," the report states. 

"The presence of these materials, the increased risks involved and the rationale for additional controls was not 

shared with workers." 

In addition, radioactive and chemical wastes were routinely discharged into the water and air. Investigators 

documented nighttime smokestack emissions--dubbed "midnight negatives"--involving tens of thousands of 

pounds of uranium dust and smoke. 

Richardson said the findings underscore his efforts to win compensation and other aid for ailing workers. 

"I'm going to continue to be up front with the Paducah workers and the community about environmental, safety 

and health conditions at our sites during the Cold War," he said. 

LOAD-DATE: February 11, 2000 

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH 
Page 29

Bomb Part Storage at Ky. Plant Disclosed; Nuclear Agency Is Told of Hazards In Secret Program The 

Washington Post February 11, 2000, Friday, Final Edition 

Copyright 2000 The Washington Post 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: John Tauxe <jtauxe@neptuneinc.org>

Sent: Friday, July 24, 2015 4:58 PM

To: Gallagher, Carol

Cc: pblack@neptuneinc.org

Subject: [External_Sender] RE: comments submittal

Attachments: NRC Comments Neptune 2015-07-24 - 10 CFR 61.pdf; NRC Comments Neptune 

2015-07-24 - NUREG-2175.pdf

Ms Gallagher - 

Neptune is submitting the two attached memoranda in response to NRC's call for public comment on 10 CFR 

61 and NUREG-2175. 

Please see to it that these are appropriately entered into the NRC Docket. 

Thank you! 

- John 

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 

John Tauxe, PhD, PE 

Principal Engineer 

Neptune and Company 

1505 15th St. Suite B 

Los Alamos, NM 87544-3063 

voice: 505.662.0707 ext 15 

jtauxe@neptuneinc.org 

http://www.neptuneinc.org/~jtauxe 

::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 

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Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 1 

Comments on Proposed Revisions to Low-Level Waste Disposal 

Requirements 10 CFR part 61 and 10 CFR part 20, and to Possible 

Revisions to NUREG/BR-0204 

Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed language for Code of Federal 

Regulations Title 10 Part 61 Licensing Requirements for Land Disposal of Radioactive Waste, on 

10 CFR part 20 Standards for Protection Against Radiation, and on NUREG/BR-0204, 

Instructions for Completing NRC’s Uniform Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manifest (Rev. 2, July 

1998). We believe the NRC efforts are timely, and that revisions to these documents are sorely 

needed. 

Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 

The document entitled Comparison between Current Rule Language and Rule Language in 

Proposed Rule, “Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal” (80 FR 16082) was provided for 

comment, and it contains sections of proposed revisions to the text of Part 61. Revisions are 

indicated in the document by the use of underlined text, and changed or omitted text is identified 

with strikeout. The proposed revisions have implications for most of the rule, and so we consider 

the entire rule to be “proposed”. Some of the following comments therefore are oriented toward 

parts of 10 CFR 61 that are not proposed for revision, but are nevertheless in need. 

Neptune has provided comments on previously proposed revisions to 10 CFR 61, in a memo 

dated 7 January 2013. While many of the issues raised in that submittal remain, we are pleased to 

see that many suggestions were adopted in the current proposed changes. This submittal focuses 

on the latest proposed revisions, but in some cases reiterates issues that were pertinent in 2013 

and remain so today. 

The comments below are organized into a General Comments section, with application to the 

overall rule, and a Specific Comments section, with comments following the same order as they 

appear in the proposed revisions document. 

General Comments 

Neptune is pleased to see most of the proposed changes to the regulation. We applaud the 

invocation of site-specific technical analyses and WAC development, and the incorporation of 

the structure of compliance and performance periods. While we still see little value in intruder 

assessments in supporting decision making, we are glad to see that these are no longer part of the 

performance assessment. Splitting these into separate analyses allows decision makers to more 

cleanly evaluate each on its merits. 

The language of Part 61 could still use tightening up. A significant example of this is in the 

definition of the performance objectives, which apply in the title of §61.41 to the “general 

population”, but in the text of the same subsection refer to “any member of the public”. These 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 2 

terms are quite different from each other, but are sprinkled throughout Part 61 as if they were 

equivalent. Protection of the “general population” implies that a population risk assessment 

should be developed, and protection of “any member of the public” implies protection of anyone, 

including the most vulnerable members of the public. This is different from protecting an 

“average” member of the public, such as the “reference man” that is commonly used. It is good 

that the regulation strives to protect both the general population and any member of the public, 

and this can be done in a site-specific performance assessment, but the language needs to be 

cleaned up so that the two concepts are made to be clear and distinct. While the dose to any 

member of the public can be assessed against the performance objective of an annual maximum 

of 0.25 mSv, the population dose must be expressed differently. Note also that the term “general 

population” needs to be better defined in terms of the potentially affected population. The 

“general population” is too vague. That said, it may be that with the proposed site-specific 

performance assessment analysis both the individual and population doses can be assessed 

together. A population dose assessment will be required at any rate in order to assess whether 

doses are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). 

We are encouraged to see explicit references to site-specific analysis of features, events, and 

processes, (FEPs), but would like to suggest that rather than FEPs being used to define exposure 

scenarios, that such possible scenarios be included in the analysis itself, making it an analysis of 

features, events, processes, and scenarios (FEPSs). Not all exposure scenarios results from an 

analysis of FEPs—some need to developed at the same fundamental level, rather than being an 

outcome of the FEPs analysis. Please consider adoption of the acronym “FEPS” in place of 

“FEP,” in recognition of the evolution of this concept. 

Other items relevant to radioactive waste disposal under the purview of the NRC include the 

effects of the disposals on the environment. Since NRC is tasked with “protecting people and the 

environment”, one might expect that the analyses required in 10 CFR 61 would include 

ecological risk assessment as well as assessments of human health effects. 

We also note that this is intended to be a regulation, but also contains guidance that should be 

removed to the supporting guidance document. The proposed regulation would benefit from 

being concise with supporting guidance in a separate document, instead of interspersing the 

regulations with text that is, essentially, guidance. Some examples are provided in our comments 

below. 

Specific Comments 

§61.2 Definitions. 

Several terms are used in the existing and the proposed rule language that require definition in 

this section. These are 

• member of the public 

• general population 

• reasonable assurance 

• unacceptable risk 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 3 

• disposal facility, disposal site, disposal unit (though these are covered in §61.7(a)) 

• low-activity waste 

• high-activity waste 

• radiation from the waste 

The following existing definitions are proposed for revision, with specific comments following 

each. We note, again, that if a proper risk assessment is applied, then some of these terms are 

unnecessary, and the regulation could be simplified and brought in line with modern risk 

assessment practices. 

Proposed definition: 

Inadvertent Intruder means a person who might occupy the disposal site after closure and 

engage in normal activities, such as agriculture, dwelling construction, resource exploration or 

exploitation (e.g., well drilling) or other reasonably foreseeable pursuits that might unknowingly 

expose the person to radiation from the waste. 

Comments: 

We maintain that the distinction between an inadvertent intruder and any other member of the 

public should be dissolved. It is a completely unhelpful distinction that obfuscates a proper risk 

assessment. 

The separation of the analyses for site-specific performance assessment and site-specific intruder 

assessment has ameliorated the problems introduced by previous use of generic intruder 

scenarios, but the definition of the inadvertent intruder remains troublesome for the following 

reasons. 

Use of the word “person” (twice) becomes immediately problematic when the definition of 

“person” is considered: 

Person means (1) any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, association, trust, estate, public or 

private institution, group, government agency other than the Commission or the Department of Energy 

(except that the Department of Energy is considered a person within the meaning of the regulations in 

this part to the extent that its facilities and activities are subject to the licensing and related regulatory 

authority of the Commission pursuant to law), any State or any political subdivision of or any political 

entity within a State, any foreign government or nation or any political subdivision of any such 

government or nation, or other entity; and (2) any legal successor, representative, agent, or agency of 

the foregoing. 

Given this definition of “person”, it is hard to imagine that this is all to be considered in the 

definition of inadvertent intruder, or anyone receiving a dose. A clarification is in order, perhaps 

by substituting another word for “person”. 

What is the meaning of the word “occupy” in this context? Does it mean that someone must set 

up residence on the site, or is a temporary visitation of the site considered an occupation? If a 

recreational hunter, for example, crosses the site and is unknowingly exposed to waste, or 

radionuclides that migrated from the waste, is that considered an occupation? Is such a visitor 

considered an inadvertent intruder? How is an analyst to consider the case where an intruder 

occupies the site, and while not receiving exposures, causes changes to the site that would 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 4 

expose some other member of the public? This could happen if the intruder triggers an erosional 

event that could expose waste and subsequent off-site migration of radionuclides that could 

result in exposures to a member of the public. The intruder is not exposed, but the member of the 

public is exposed due to actions of the intruder. This could potentially all be accounted for as a 

scenario (see FEPSs issue above) in a site-specific performance assessment, but it would not 

come to light in an intruder assessment. 

Use of the terms “reasonably foreseeable” and “might” makes this definition quite vague in 

practice. Is it left up to the applicant to determine what constitutes “reasonable foreseeable 

pursuits”, and what “might” means in this context? Is an inadvertent intruder one who “might 

occupy the disposal site”, or one who actually “occupies the disposal site”? Our recommendation 

is that the “foreseeable future” should be defined site-specifically by the local (potentially 

affected) population and by considering economic arguments. This is how society operates in 

practice in our everyday lives. 

Finally, the phrase “radiation from the waste” remains problematic in the context of inadvertent 

intrusion. Does this mean radiation only from the waste that is still in place as it was disposed? 

What if the waste has migrated, or what if the radionuclides that originated in the waste have 

migrated to a location where the intruder might come into contact with it, or at least be irradiated 

by it? Consider that radionuclides from the waste may have migrated to the ground surface, or to 

surface waters, and that such radionuclides would irradiate anyone who might traverse the area. 

Is such an individual to be considered an inadvertent intruder? 

Ultimately, the distinction between an inadvertent intruder and other members of the public, or 

the general population, becomes blurred. We recommend that the concept of the inadvertent 

intruder be abandoned, replaced by a performance assessment that assesses risks to populations 

of individuals that are expected to occur at any given site. Such an approach would be far easier 

to communicate to the stakeholders, which is very important to gain approval and hence be able 

to open a disposal facility. 

Proposed definition: 

Intruder assessment is an analysis that (1) assumes an inadvertent intruder occupies the site or 

contacts the waste and engages in normal activities or other reasonably foreseeable pursuits 

that might unknowingly expose the person to radiation from the waste; (2) examines the 

capabilities of intruder barriers to inhibit an inadvertent intruder’s contact with the waste or to 

limit the inadvertent intruder’s exposure to radiation; and (3) estimates an inadvertent intruder’s 

potential annual dose, considering associated uncertainties. 

Comments: 

Given our views on the concept of the inadvertent intruder (above) it will be no surprise that we 

feel that the definition of an “intruder assessment” as distinct from a “performance assessment” 

is still not needed. If a performance assessment examines all site-specific exposure scenarios, 

then it will naturally account for all receptors as part of the general population, be they 

“intruders” or “members of the public”. This is overcomplicating what should be a 

straightforward problem. 

Proposed definition: 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 5 

Long-lived waste means (1) waste where more than ten percent of the initial radioactivity 

remains after 10,000 years (e.g. long-lived parent), ... 

Comments: 

We are glad to see that this definition has been clarified to the point where it can be clearly 

included in a technical analysis. 

Proposed definition: 

Site closure and stabilization means those actions that are taken upon completion of operations 

that prepare the disposal site for custodial care and that assure that the disposal site will remain 

stable and will not need ongoing active maintenance. 

Comments: 

It is not clear how such assurance can be provided. The language should be softened to explain 

the true intent. It is not possible to guarantee (assure) that stability will be maintained and that 

ongoing active maintenance will not be needed. Inserting the word “reasonably” in front of 

“assure” would at least make this consistent with other language in the rule. 

Proposed definition: 

Stability means structural stability. 

Comments: 

This definition is self-referential, and not particularly useful, even though we realize that the 

proposed revision is simply to correct a spelling error. The definition begs for discussion. What 

is the issue, actually? Is it exposure of the waste that is of concern? What about structural 

changes that do not release waste? What if waste is exposed to the environment through a 

structural failure but no one is exposed, and there is no dose or risk? Is the concern about 

stability simply for stability’s sake? 

This issue is raised again in §61.7(f)(1) below, which further defines stability as minimizing 

contact with water (not really a structural stability issue), and also states that stability “isn’t 

necessary from a health and safety standpoint for most waste...” Well, if it is not necessary, what 

is the need for stability? 

Since the regulation is supposed to support risk-informed decision making, it seems that the 

subject of site stability should also be framed in terms of risk. The basic definition in §61.44 

indicates that the intent is to “eliminate to the extent practicable the need for ongoing 

maintenance of the disposal site following closure, so that only surveillance, monitoring, or 

minor custodial care are needed”. This, by itself, is a far better definition of site stability. 

Although it would be better again to regulate such that measures of site stability correspond to 

risk (dose). 

§61.7 Concepts. 

Proposed language: 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 6 

§61.7(a) The disposal facility. [The contents of (1) and (2) are not reproduced here.] 

Comments: 

Sections 61.7(a)(1) and (2) clearly define the terms “disposal facility”, “disposal site”, and 

“disposal unit”, but the use of these terms in the entire Part 61 seems to be inconsistent at times. 

Inconsistencies are identified in the comments below as they are identified. The entire text 

should be carefully reviewed to assure consistency in the use of these terms. 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(a)(2) ... In choosing a disposal site, site characteristics should be considered in terms of 

the indefinite future, take into account the radiological characteristics of the waste, and be 

evaluated for at least a 500-year timeframe [in order] to provide assurance that the performance 

objectives can be met. 

Comments: 

It is not clear what this means. How does this relate to the concept of a Compliance Period or a 

Performance Period? If a performance assessment is to estimate doses or risks for 10,000 years 

into the future, why would site characteristics be evaluated for only a 500-yr time frame? 

§61.7(b) Performance objectives. Disposal of radioactive waste in land disposal facilities has the 

following safety objectives: protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity, 

protection of inadvertent intruders, protection of individuals during operations, and ensuring 

stability of the site after closure. Achieving these objectives depends upon many factors 

including the design of the land disposal facility, operational procedures, characteristics of the 

environment surrounding the land disposal facility, and the radioactive waste acceptable for 

disposal. 

Comments: 

We think that the concept of an inadvertent intruder should be removed, and the performance 

assessments should be aimed at doing a reasonable risk assessment. Protection of individuals 

during operations is handled through worker safety, and site stability can be folded into the risk 

assessment. Presumably a site would be judged sufficiently stable if the risks are low enough, or 

is there another reasonable approach to evaluating site stability? 

Protection of the “general population” is called for, but, as pointed out above, this is different 

from protection of “any member of the public”, which is required in §61.41. Again, a 

clarification of terms is needed. This seems to imply that the performance assessment should 

perform a population risk assessment, as opposed to (or perhaps in addition to) an assessment of 

dose to an individual. This is in concordance with the title of §61.41: Protection of the general 

population from releases of radioactivity. That title also seems to suggest that a population dose 

assessment is in order. As discussed in the comments below for that section, however, this is in 

conflict with the text within that section, which mentions dose to “any member of the public”. 

The point of this comment is that the “general population” is in practice quite different from “any 

member of the public”. Since §61.7 discusses concepts, it would be good to clarify the intent of 

the rule here as well as in §61.41. 
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July 2015 7 

Note that we support the need to perform a population risk (dose) assessment to support decision 

making, whether performed using the principles of ALARA or otherwise. Ultimately, siting of 

disposal sites was done by considering population risks. 

The proposed text also neglects to identify the significance of human behavior and demographics 

in the assessment of risk to the general population and inadvertent intruders. These are among 

the “many factors” that should be mentioned specifically. 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(c)(3) ...some form of intruder barrier that is intended to prevent contact with the waste. 

Comments: 

This phrase appears at the end of the paragraph for (3). The problem here is that “receiving 

radiation exposure” is different from “contact with the waste”. A future human could be some 

distance from the waste, at least from where it was originally placed, and still be exposed to 

radiation, while being exposed to radionuclides that have migrated away from the waste, or the 

progeny of those radionuclides. This begs the question of what is meant by “waste”. Is it the 

waste form itself as disposed, or is it the radionuclides that were at one time part of the waste? 

This lack of firm definition plagues the bulk of part 61. These details may seem trivial to the 

casual reader, but they are critical to the analyst who must develop assessments that address the 

performance objectives in detail. 

This could be perhaps rephrased, “...some form of intruder barrier that is intended to prevent 

contact with the disposed radionuclides.” 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(f)(1) A cornerstone of the waste classification system is stability of both the waste and the 

disposal site, which minimizes the access of water to waste that has been emplaced and 

covered. Limiting the access of water to the waste minimizes the migration of radionuclides, 

which may avoid the need for long-term active maintenance and reduces the potential for 

release of radioactivity into the environment. While stability is desirable, it isn’t necessary from a 

health and safety standpoint for most waste because the waste doesn’t contain sufficient 

radionuclides to be of concern. 

Comments: 

This seems contradictory, in saying that stability is both a cornerstone of the waste classification 

system and that stability is not necessary. It also extends the original definition of “stability” (in 

§61.2, which says that stability means “structural stability”) to claim that stability minimizes the 

access of water to waste. This seems to be confusing different concepts. Structural stability 

means that the site will not collapse, as in subside or erode—that it will retain its shape and 

strength. That really has little to do with keeping water out. Further, this focus on water belies a 

humid site bias—that water is universally the most significant process for contaminant transport 

in radioactive waste disposal. There are sites where water has a minor or even insignificant role 

to play—where, for example, biotically-induced transport or gas phase diffusion is of far greater 

significance than waterborne transport. 
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July 2015 8 

Structural stability has another unspoken but much more significant role: It keeps the waste from 

being exposed to the environment and especially from being directly exposed to human 

receptors. That function of stability is not even mentioned in this section. 

It is somewhat jarring to read that “most waste ... doesn’t contain sufficient radionuclides to be 

of concern.” If that is the case, when what is all the fuss about in creating regulations for it in the 

first place? Perhaps this is just a confusion generated by poor presentation of context, however, 

as this section eventually seems to identify the waste under discussion as Class A waste, in the 

next part. 

Why is site stability an issue? If it’s tied to potential risk (dose), then that could make sense. But 

requiring stability with no metrics does not make sense, and the metrics should be dose (or 

release of radionuclides to the environment), which should be evaluated against the long term 

costs. Note that the Utah rule contains language that essentially suggests the intent of the stability 

requirement is to ensure that long-term maintenance is not needed—this suggests the need to 

evaluate risk and cost, which makes sense. The language in §61.44 already provides the 

necessary impetus for framing site stability in the context of risk (dose): “The disposal facility 

must be sited, designed, used, operated, and closed to achieve long-term stability of the disposal 

site and to eliminate to the extent practicable the need for ongoing active maintenance of the 

disposal site following closure so that only surveillance, monitoring, or minor custodial care are 

required.” 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(f)(1) [continued] This lower-activity waste (e.g. ordinary trash-type waste) tends to be 

unstable. If unstable waste is disposed with the waste requiring stability, the deterioration of 

unstable waste could lead to the failure of the system. The failure of the system could permit 

water to penetrate the disposal unit, which may cause problems with the waste that requires 

stability. 

Comments: 

This further confuses concepts. The real concern seems to be stability, which again is couched in 

terms of water even though it should not be assumed that water is the principal mode of 

contaminant transport at any given site. But, water aside, stability of the system (meaning the 

site, one presumes) may be compromised by unstable waste. Fair enough—so the operator 

should not mix structurally unstable waste with structurally stable waste. Activity has nothing to 

do with it, except that apparently we are not to be overly concerned with unstable low-activity 

waste, since it is not “of concern”. If the classification of waste is driven by stability, which this 

section seems to imply, then let it be defined by stability, and not by concentration of specific 

radionuclides. Having classification tables based on radionuclide concentrations does not make 

sense if the real driving factor is structural stability of the wastes. Also, a properly formed risk 

assessment would take care of all of this, since it should factor in stability of waste. 

Isn’t “ordinary trash-type waste” what goes in a municipal landfill? This term is undefined and 

potentially misleading. 

The language in this section goes on to discuss unstable Class A waste as opposed to stable Class 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 9 

A waste, but makes no formal definitions of what “stability” means. §61.2 defines stability only 

as “structural stability”, which is insufficient. Here, at least somewhat more of a definition is 

provided “”to maintain gross physical properties and identity [for] over 300 years.” And, is this 

“stability” meant to apply to the waste form itself, or to the disposal unit (or perhaps even 

disposal site) as a whole? 

It’s interesting that 300 years is chosen. What is the basis for this value? Why is this different 

from other periods of concern in the proposed regulation? Consideration of dose to humans 

beyond 200 to 300 years has been documented as inappropriate in some articles. Is this the basis? 

Or, is the basis more simply that guaranteeing sufficient engineering for longer is not possible. 

This raises a few issues: Stability should be evaluated through risk, and if we cannot guarantee 

stability for more than 300 years, then why is a dose assessment needed much further out than 

that? An approach that is based on a revolving window of evaluation of shorter time frames 

would be preferable. Such an approach implicitly would acknowledge discounting, but in a 

reasonable way, and would need to be tied to funding guarantees. 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(f)(3) Waste that will not decay to levels which present an acceptable hazard to an intruder 

within 100 years is typically designated as Class C waste. Class C waste must be stable and be 

disposed of at a greater depth than the other classes of waste so that subsequent surface 

activities by an intruder will not disturb the waste. Where site conditions prevent deeper 

disposal, intruder barriers such as concrete covers may be used. The effective life of these 

intruder barriers should be at least 500 years. 

Comments: 

If it is true that “waste that will not decay to levels which [sic—should be “that”] present an 

acceptable hazard to an intruder within 100 years is designated as Class C waste”, how is DU not 

a Class C waste? It decays to levels that are increasingly hazardous for over 2 million years. 

“Decay” does not imply a reduction in hazard. 

It is also not clear why Class C waste must be disposed at greater depth. This statement is too 

general. A performance assessment should be performed, no matter the waste stream, to 

determine if a waste stream can be disposed in a given disposal configuration or engineered 

system. This also seems to presume that the pathway of interest is unvaryingly upwards. This 

might not be the case—for example, it is not clear that disposing deeper in a system that has 

potable groundwater at, say 5 meters below ground surface, would make sense. 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(g)(3) During the period when the final site closure and stabilization activities are being 

carried out, the licensee is in a disposal site closure phase. Following that, for a period of 

5 years, the licensee must remain at the disposal site for a period of post-closure observation 

and maintenance to assure that the disposal site is stable and ready for institutional control. The 

Commission may approve shorter or require longer periods if conditions warrant. At the end of 

this period, the licensee applies for a license transfer to the disposal site owner. 

Comments: 
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July 2015 10 

In the context of a 10,000-year Compliance Period, it is not clear how it is helpful to have a 

five-year post-closure period. In general, the language in §61.7(g) is very vague. Time frame is 

not well defined, and the nature and intent of the monitoring program is not well defined. It 

would be better to use some of the concepts from the DOE and from NUREG/CR-6948 on longterm PA maintenance, reduction in uncertainty, etc. to provide a technical framework and basis 

for long term monitoring and maintenance. 

Proposed text: 

§61.7(g)(4) After a finding of satisfactory disposal site closure, the Commission will transfer the 

license to the State or Federal government that owns the disposal site. If the U.S. Department of 

Energy is the Federal agency administering the land on behalf of the Federal government the 

license will be terminated because the Commission lacks regulatory authority over the 

Department for this activity. Under the conditions of the transferred license, the owner will carry 

out a program of monitoring to assure continued satisfactory disposal site performance, perform 

physical surveillance to restrict access to the site, and carry out minor custodial activities. 

During this period, productive uses of the land might be permitted if those uses do not affect the 

stability of the site and its ability to meet the performance objectives. At the end of the 

prescribed period of institutional control, the license will be terminated by the Commission. 

Comments: 

In this section, a “program of monitoring to assure continued satisfactory disposal site 

performance” is specifically mentioned. NRC would do well to broaden the concept of 

monitoring to encompass more than simply sampling for radionuclides that are headed for the 

fence line. As pointed out in NUREG/CR-6948, monitoring can and should include key elements 

of those processes that are known to be sensitive in the performance assessment in contributing 

to migration of radionuclides, and ultimately to receptor exposures. This could include, for 

example, monitoring for excessive water content in unsaturated materials, or a particularly dense 

population of deeply-rooted plants, if these are known to contribute to human exposures. This is 

addressed further in §61.12(l). 

If a decision analysis structure based on a properly formed risk assessment were required, then 

all decisions concerning disposal of radioactive waste could be optimized (disposal, closure) and 

long term monitoring programs could be designed with stopping rules. Otherwise, long-term 

monitoring could continue indefinitely. As such, the performance assessment would become the 

decision document that it should be. 

What happens to the site after the license has been “terminated by the Commission”? Is it 

assumed that the site poses no further risk to the public? How can the license ever be terminated 

in a case where radioactivity concentrations continually grow in time, such as for the disposal of 

DU? 

§61.12 Specific Technical Information

Proposed text: 

§61.12(a) A description of the natural and demographic disposal site characteristics as 

determined by disposal site selection and characterization activities. The description must 
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July 2015 11 

include geologic, geotechnical, geochemical, geomorphological, hydrologic, meteorologic, 

climatologic, and biotic features of the disposal site and vicinity. 

Comments: 

The second sentence should also include the word “demographic”. We also suggest adding this 

sentence: “These features, events, processes, and exposure scenarios (FEPSs) must be related to 

their respective roles in both migration of and human exposure to radionuclides originating in the 

disposed waste.” 

Proposed (existing) text: 

§61.12(b) ... For near-surface disposal, the description must include those design features 

related to infiltration of water; integrity of covers for disposal units; structural stability of backfill, 

wastes, and covers; contact of wastes with standing water; disposal site drainage; ... 

Comments: 

Somewhere in there should also be added “occurrence and activity of biota;”. 

Proposed (existing) text: 

§61.12(l) A description of the environmental monitoring program to provide data to evaluate 

potential health and environmental impacts and the plan for taking corrective measures if 

migration of radionuclides is indicated. 

Comments: 

As mentioned above in the discussion of §61.7(g)(4), NUREG/CR-6948 demonstrates that 

monitoring can and should include key elements of those processes that are known to be 

sensitive in the performance assessment in contributing to migration of radionuclides, or more to 

the point, risks to future humans. 

The change to §61.12(l) that we would recommend, then, is to include more than simply 

monitoring for the migration of radionuclides. Once a sensitivity analysis of a probabilistic 

performance assessment is completed, the most significant features, events, processes, (FEPs) 

and exposure scenarios (FEPSs) in contaminant transport and human exposure can be identified, 

and it is these FEPSs that can be monitored (perhaps indirectly) to flag conditions that would 

lead to migration of radionuclides. It is best to mitigate migration pathways before migration has 

occurred. Language to this effect could be added to this section. 

§61.13 Technical Analyses

Proposed text: 

§61.13 The specific technical information must also include the following analyses needed to 

demonstrate that the performance objectives of subpart C of this part will be met. The technical 

analyses are one of the elements of the safety case. Licensees with licenses for land disposal 

facilities in effect on the effective date of this subpart must submit these analyses at the next 

license renewal or within 5 years of the effective date of this subpart, whichever comes first. 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 12 

Comments: 

We agree strongly that including all existing LLRW facilities in the regulatory update is 

important. If a facility is not able to demonstrate compliance with performance objectives as 

outlined in part 61, then they must engage in remedial actions that will bring about compliance, 

even if (or especially if) the facility is poised to be closed. Anything short of that is not fully 

protective of human health and the environment. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(1) Consider only features, events, and processes that might affect demonstrating 

compliance with §61.41(a). 

Comments: 

This language implies a scoping analysis, commonly known as a FEPs analysis. We would 

modify the language to include phenomena related to human exposures, as in “features, events, 

processes, and exposure scenarios”: FEPSs. As discussed above, the inclusion of human 

exposure scenarios should be considered at this fundamental level of laying out the groundwork 

for the technical analyses, rather than developing scenarios based on just the features, events, and 

processes at work. Many scenarios do not naturally result from an analysis of FEPs alone, and 

are foundational in their own right, and they deserve a place in the expanded acronym, FEPS. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(5) Provide a technical basis for either inclusion or exclusion of degradation, 

deterioration, or alteration processes (e.g., of the engineered barriers, waste form, site 

characteristics) and interactions between the disposal facility and site characteristics that might 

affect the facility’s ability to meet the performance objective in §61.41(a). 

Comments: 

It’s not clear why this is being separated out, as this is a natural part of the FEPs scoping process. 

It could be eliminated because it is already covered by the FEPs process additions, and because 

Part 61 is meant to be regulation, not guidance. This entire section has become guidance it 

seems. The regulation would be better served by requiring a reasonable risk assessment (which 

should naturally include a scoping analysis) and providing performance objectives for 

comparison. This type of technical guidance should be removed. 

If it is to remain, the word “naturalization” should replace “degradation, deterioration, or 

alteration”, since it does not have a negative connotation. As discussed extensively during the 

NRC Workshop on Engineered Barriers in August 2010, the change of engineered barriers (and 

other parts of the system) to move toward natural conditions is not always detrimental to 

performance, and in any case must be recognized. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(4) Provide a technical basis for models used in the performance assessment such as 

comparisons made with outputs of detailed process-level models or empirical observations 

(e.g., laboratory testing, filed investigations, and natural analogs). 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 13 

Comments: 

This is a surprise as well. Why is this in the regulation? It is worthwhile, but not as part of the 

regulation. This is technical guidance. 

It also would be good to specify what sorts of models are meant, here. It seems that it would 

mean computational models, but it could apply to conceptual models or mathematical models as 

well. Perhaps it should. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(7) Evaluate pathways including air, soil, groundwater, surface water, plant uptake, 

and exhumation by burrowing animals. 

Comments: 

There is a mix of categories, here. Some of these are contaminant transport processes (plant 

uptake and exhumation by burrowing animals) but the others (air, soil, ground water, and surface 

water) are environmental media, rather than pathways or processes. Contaminant transport 

processes within these media might be diffusion, advection, chemical partitioning, etc. This 

distinction could be made. One drawback to include these, and only these, is that the list may 

become dated. As we learn more about the world of radionuclide contaminant transport, we find 

previously unknown or at least underappreciated mechanisms. For example, the only biotic 

pathways mentioned here are for plants and animals, but the potentially significant roles of 

mycological and microbiological entities are only now beginning to be appreciated. 

Again, this is technical guidance and not regulation (it opens the door to dealing with biota, 

which is a good thing, but should be in guidance rather than regulation). As such, its presence in 

the regulation may not be appropriate. If it is retained, it should use more general language, 

rather than calling out specific mechanisms or materials. 

Change “groundwater” to “ground water” in keeping with established NRC style. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(6) Account for uncertainties and variabilities in the projected behavior of the disposal 

system (e.g., disposal facility, natural system, and environment). 

Comments: 

This implies that the performance assessment be probabilistic. However, nothing else in the 

regulation explicitly requires this accounting for uncertainty. Obviously, we think this is needed, 

but some other adjustments to the regulation are really needed to go along with this. 

As a companion section, we would also propose the following (to follow §61.13(a)(6): 

§61.13(a)(81⁄2) Account for uncertainties and variabilities in the projected demographics and 

behavior of human receptors. 

Since the principal performance objectives for future humans is one of dose (or risk) to any 

member of the public (and/or to the general population), uncertainties and variabilities in the 
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July 2015 14 

human element must be considered. These have the potential to be of greater significance than 

disposal system behavior in determining the risk and its uncertainty. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(9) Consider alternative conceptual models of features and processes that are 

consistent with available data and current scientific understanding, and evaluate the effects that 

alternative conceptual models have on the understanding of the performance of the disposal 

facility.) 

Comments: 

In addition to alternative conceptual models, alternative implementations as mathematical 

models could be considered (e.g. various representations of porous medium tortuosity). This 

could further be extended to alternative computational modeling implementations. The same 

system could be modeled as a system model, or as a process model using finite-difference, finiteelement, or some other discretization paradigm. Solutions could be implicit, explicit, or hybrid. 

All of these variations could produce somewhat different results, and all will no doubt evolve as 

better technologies are developed. The question is how far do we want to take this evaluation of 

alternative approaches? Perhaps the proposed language is sufficient. 

At any rate, this is guidance, not regulation. It is not useful for the regulation to instruct analysts 

to merely “consider” an approach, but it would also be inappropriate to here require that specific 

approaches be tried. 

If this section is to remain, then we would further suggest that “features and processes” be 

expanded to “features, events, processes, and exposure scenarios” so that alternative 

conceptualizations of events and of the human element would be considered. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(a)(10) Identify and differentiate between the roles performed by the natural disposal site 

characteristics and design features of the disposal facility in limiting releases of radioactivity to 

the general population. 

Comments: 

While this is an important activity to be performed as part of performance assessment, this is 

again guidance, not regulation. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(b) Inadvertent intruder analyses that demonstrate there is reasonable assurance that: 

(1) the waste acceptance criteria developed in accordance with § 61.58 will be met, 

(2) adequate barriers to inadvertent intrusion will be provided, and 

(3) any inadvertent intruder will not be exposed to doses that exceed the limits set forth in § 

61.42 as part of the intruder assessment. An intruder assessment shall: 

(i) Assume that an inadvertent intruder occupies the disposal site at any time after the period of 
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July 2015 15 

institutional controls ends, and engages in normal activities including agriculture, dwelling 

construction, resource exploration or exploitation (e.g., well drilling), or other reasonably 

foreseeable pursuits that are consistent with activities in and around the site at the time of 

closure and that unknowingly expose the intruder to radiation from the waste. 

(ii) Identify adequate barriers to inadvertent intrusion that inhibit contact with the waste or limit 

exposure to radiation from the waste, and provide a basis for the time period over which barriers 

are effective. 

(iii) Account for uncertainties and variability. 

Comments: 

NRC is moving in the wrong direction with respect to assessing inadvertent intrusion. It’s not 

that inadvertent intrusion should not be evaluated—it must be—but rather that it be considered 

fundamentally different from other types of site occupation. Rather than develop or suggest 

particular scenarios as done in (i) above, and rather than develop a separate “intruder 

assessment,” a site-specific performance assessment can cover all of this by evaluating likely 

future scenarios of who might occupy the site and what they might be doing. It must be 

recognized that agriculture, dwelling construction, and resource development are not universally 

normal activities. There could be disposal sites where none of these would be considered likely 

enough to survive a scoping analysis, let alone become part of a model. On the other hand, there 

are sites where all of these could happen, although with some likelihood that is probably less 

than 1 every year for in 10,000 years. There are still other activities that could lead to future 

waste releases or exposures, but would not of themselves be considered intrusive—consider the 

recreationalist who may intrude into the site and, while not being exposed, causes future failures 

of waste containment that might expose others in the future. The variation in likely activities 

between sites is part of what makes them different, and is important information for a sitespecific performance assessment to incorporate. 

Future humans who would intrude inadvertently into the waste should be considered just as any 

future member of the public would be considered, and with the same dose or risk metrics. 

However, the likelihood of any activity should also be considered, as the risk to future 

individuals is consolidated into a composite risk for the general population. There will be some 

individuals who experience greater exposures through their behavior or the activities of others, 

and there will be differences in how each individual responds to a given exposure. The language 

of risk to the general population and to any member of the public has been in Part 61 all along, 

but it has never been adequately spelled out. More of this discussion follows in comments to 

§61.41 below. 

Under our recommendation it would still be possible to distinguish between receptors that are 

deemed MOP or IHI, but only for the purpose of comparison to the appropriate performance 

objective. This would, however, assume that an inadvertent intruder should not be as protected as 

a MOP, which might not make sense when performing a proper risk (dose) assessment. 

In the proposed construction of both a PA and an IA, the decision making driver is not clear. 

How will the IA be used to support decision making? Since an IA is by design likely to be highly 

conservative, it is important that the results of the IA be used to provide insights into the disposal 

system, rather than to supplant, or even append to, the decisions that are supported by a properly 
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July 2015 16 

formed PA. Too often in the past intruder analyses have been used to set WACs, for example. 

This is very unfortunate, since it unnecessarily limits disposal capability, and disposal systems 

are a precious commodity under current regulation and licensing requirements. 

Proposed text: 

§61.13(e) Analyses that assess how the disposal site limits the potential long-term radiological 

impacts, consistent with available data and current scientific understanding. The analyses shall 

be required for disposal sites with waste that contains radionuclides with average 

concentrations exceeding the values listed in table A of this paragraph, or if necessitated by 

site-specific conditions. For wastes containing mixtures of radionuclides found in table A, the 

total concentration shall be determined by the sum of fractions rule described in paragraph 

61.55(a)(7). The analyses must identify and describe the features of the design and site 

characteristics that will demonstrate that the performance objectives set forth in §§ 61.41(c) and 

61.42(c) will be met. 

Table A - Average Concentrations of Long-lived Radionuclides Requiring Performance 

Period Analyses 

Radionuclide Concentration (Ci/m3

)

1

C-14 0.8 

C-14 in activated metal 8 

Ni-59 in activated metal 22 

Nb-94 in activated metal 0.02 

Tc-99 0.3 

I-129 0.008 

Long-lived alpha-emitting nuclides2 3 10 

Pu-241 3 350 

Cm-242 3 2,000 

1

 Values derived from § 61.55 Class A limits. 

2

 Includes alpha-emitting transuranic nuclides as well as other long-lived 

alpha-emitting nuclides. 

3

 Units are nanocuries per gram. 

(f) Analyses that demonstrate the proposed disposal facility includes defense-in-depth 

protections.. 

Comments: 

Clarification is needed for use of the term “waste” in the phrase “waste that contains 

radionuclides with average concentrations exceeding the values listed in table A of this 

paragraph”. Is the waste to be the waste that was originally disposed, but has gone through 

10,000 years of decay and ingrowth? Or is it the concentration of radionuclides that remain in the 

waste zone (that volume where the waste was originally disposed) at 10,000 years, or something 

else? This requires clarification for analysts to be able to implement it properly. 

With respect to Table A formatting: In other parts of part 61, the NRC has adopted metric units, 

as it should by Executive Order 12770 (56 FR 35801, 1991), but switching dose units from rem 

to Sieverts. The same approach needs to be taken here, replacing Curies (which are not SI) with 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 17 

Becquerels (Bq, or GBq, as appropriate.) For reference, 1 Ci/m3 = 37 GBq/m3. It may be 

permissible to include units in Ci for transitional use, as is done with mrem. Further, to have part 

of the table in volumetric concentration units GBq/m3

 (or Ci/m3) and part in mass concentration 

units Bq/g (or nCi/g) with the title in volumetric units is confusing. A clearer version of this table 

follows, though our preference would be to remove the decremented Ci units altogether: 

Table A - Average Concentrations of Long-lived Radionuclides Requiring Performance 

Period Analyses 

Radionuclide Concentration1

C-14 30 GBq/m3 (0.8 Ci/m3) 

C-14 in activated metal 300 GBq/m3 (8 Ci/m3) 

Ni-59 in activated metal 810 GBq/m3 (22 Ci/m3) 

Nb-94 in activated metal 0.74 GBq/m3 (0.02 Ci/m3) 

Tc-99 11 GBq/m3 (0.3 Ci/m3) 

I-129 0.3 GBq/m3 (0.008 Ci/m3) 

Long-lived alpha-emitting nuclides2 370 Bq/g (10 nCi/g) 

Pu-241 13,000 Bq/g (350 nCi/g) 

Cm-242 74,000 Bq/g (2,000 nCi/g) 

1

 Values derived from § 61.55 Class A limits. 

2

 Includes alpha-emitting transuranic nuclides as well as other long-lived 

alpha-emitting nuclides. 

§61.41 Protection of the general population from releases of radioactivity

Proposed text: 

§61.41(a) Concentrations of radioactive material that may be released to the general 

environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or animals must not result in an 

annual dose exceeding an equivalent of 0.25 milliSievert (25 millirems) to any member of the 

public within the compliance period. Reasonable effort should be made to maintain releases of 

radioactivity in effluents to the general environment as low as is reasonably achievable during 

the compliance period. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrate[d] through 

analyses that meet the requirements specified in §61.13(a). 

(b) Concentrations of radioactive material that may be released to the general environment in 

ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or animals shall be minimized during the protective 

assurance period. The annual dose, established on the license, shall be below 5 milliSieverts 

(500 millirems) or a level that is supported as reasonably achievable based on technological 

and economic considerations in the information submitted for review and approval by the 

Commission. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the requirements specified in § 61.13(a). 

(c) Effort shall be made to minimize releases of radioactivity from a disposal facility to the 

general environment to the extent reasonably achievable at any time during the performance 

period. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that meet the 

requirements specified in § 61.13(e). 

Comments: 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 18 

This is a welcome direct invocation of ALARA, which is appropriately applied to assessments of 

dose (or risk) to the general population. But while the term “general population” is used in the 

title, the text of this section uses the phrase “any member of the public”. These are conceptually 

different. If we are to accept the phrase “any member of the public” at face value, then this 

implicitly means that the most vulnerable members of the public should be protected. This would 

include children, for example, who generally incur higher risks from exposure to radionuclides in 

the environment than do adults, due to both behavioral and physiological differences. 

In performing a risk assessment of the general population, such members of the public should be 

considered, as should anyone else deemed to be exposed to radionuclides disposed at the site. 

This is where the so-called “inadvertent intruder” can be included as well, as a member of the 

public (i.e., as a potential receptor), rather than couched in some distinct assessment. The proper 

way to go about doing a population risk assessment is to consider who the receptors would be, 

what activities they would be pursuing, and what exposures they would encounter. Each receptor 

has its own likelihood of encountering radioactivity, for different amounts of time, in different 

exposure media, and with different physiological responses based on age, for example, as 

outlined in ICRP documents. This approach evaluates risks to each individual member of the 

public as well as the general population, and is required to satisfy the language of the title and 

text of this section. 

The same comments (see response to §61.13(a)(7)) about using language that considers only part 

of the biotic spectrum applies here as well. 

An additional problem is presented with the use of the term “effluents” in §61.41(a). It seems to 

be assumed that the only mechanisms for the migration of radionuclides from the waste into the 

larger environment involves effluents, but this is not the case. Plants translocate chemicals 

(including radionuclides) within their tissues, though the fluids in plant tissues might be 

considered effluents. Burrowing animals move bulk soils, which are not effluents. Erosion can 

cause bulk movement of solid materials as well—again, not effluents. Atmospheric dispersion 

transports radionuclides from the ground surface that are not “effluents”. Perhaps this language 

can be remedied by substituting something like “...effluents and other mechanisms of 

contaminant transport...”. Alternatively, a sentence structure could be used that does not use the 

word “effluents” at all, as in §61.41(c). 

This is another instance of guidance being included in the proposed regulation. 

§61.42 Protection of inadvertent intruders

Proposed text: 

§61.41(a) Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility must ensure protection of 

any inadvertent intruder into the disposal site who occupies the site or contacts the waste at any 

time after active institutional controls over the disposal site are removed. The annual dose must 

not exceed 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) to any inadvertent intruder within the compliance 

period. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that meet the 

requirements specified in § 61.13(b). 

(b) Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility shall minimize exposures to any 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 19 

inadvertent intruder into the disposal site at any time during the protective assurance period. 

The annual dose, established on the license, shall be below 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) or a 

level that is supported as reasonably achievable based on technological and economic 

considerations in the information submitted for review and approval by the Commission. 

Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that meet the 

requirements specified in § 61.13(b). 

(c) Effort shall be made to minimize exposures to any inadvertent intruder to the extent 

reasonably achievable at any time during the performance period. Compliance with this 

paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that meet the requirements specified in 

§ 61.13(e). 

Comments: 

This language clarifies the allowable dose to an inadvertent intruder, but still we have members 

of the public who might be considered intruders who “fall through the cracks”. Consider the case 

where an initial visitor to the site causes a disturbance to the engineered or natural barriers, and a 

later visitor is exposed to radioactivity. The initial visitor is not considered an intruder by the 

definition in this part, since s/he does not actually come into contact with the waste. Assume that 

this initial disturbance, however, compromises the integrity of the site in such a way that it 

causes radioactivity to be released after some time. A later visitor to the site, who would be a 

member of the public because s/he would cause no disturbance of the site, could be exposed to 

that released radioactivity, or conceivably to the waste itself. How is this case to be considered 

given the definitions of “inadvertent intruder” and “member of the public” in this part? Here we 

have what seems to be an inadvertent intruder who is not exposed and a member of the public 

who could come into direct contact with the waste. 

As described in comments made above, it would be far more straightforward to dispense with 

these definitions, and consider this receptor as someone who should be protected to the standard 

presented in §61.41. 

§61.50 Disposal site suitability requirements for land disposal.

Comments: 

Neptune has only two editorial comments for this section: 

§61.50(a)(1)(ii): Change “which” to “that”. 

§61.50(a)(4)(i): Remove the superfluous phrase “Within the region or state where the facility is 

to be located,”. 

§61.58 Waste Acceptance

Proposed text: 

§61.58(b) Waste characterization. Each applicant shall provide, for Commission approval, 

acceptable methods for characterizing the waste for acceptance. The methods shall identify the 

characterization parameters and acceptable uncertainty in the characterization data. The 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 20 

following information, at a minimum, shall be required to characterize waste: 

(1) Physical and chemical characteristics; 

(2) Volume, including the waste and any stabilization or absorbent media; 

(3) Weight of the container and contents; 

(4) Identities, activities, and concentrations; 

(5) Characterization date; 

(6) Generating source; and 

(7) Any other information needed to characterize the waste to demonstrate that the waste 

acceptance criteria set forth in § 61.58(a) are met. 

Comments: 

This gets to the practical approach of defining a methodology. It is good to require “acceptable 

methods for characterizing waste for acceptance”, and the data required are reasonable for 

supporting development of a WAC, in addition to a site-specific performance assessment. Since 

these data will change as disposal operations proceed, however, it is not sensible to require the 

data itself as part of a license application. It is reasonable to indicate that these data could be 

made available, and it is reasonable to indicate how the data would be used in developing a 

WAC. 

Section 61.58 (b)(7) asks for “any other information”, leading to two issues that we think need to 

be addressed in waste manifesting. Those are lower limits of detection (LLDs) and an estimate of 

uncertainty in reported values. The lack of uncertainty information frustrates the ability of a 

probabilistic performance assessment to “provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the 

performance objectives of subpart C of this part,” as required in §61.58(a). Further discussion of 

these issues is developed in our comments on NUREG/BR-0204 included in this submittal. 

Proposed text: 

§61.58(c)(1-4) Waste certification. Each applicant shall provide, for Commission approval, a 

program to certify that waste meets the acceptance criteria prior to receipt at the disposal 

facility. ... 

Comments: 

We interpret this as asking for a program that will need to be statistically based in order to justify 

that the waste that is accepted is properly characterized for disposal. We are pleased that NRC 

encourages better characterization and specification of waste concentrations so that disposal can 

be more effectively managed. With improved characterization and manifesting, including 

appropriate reporting of LLDs, radioactive waste disposal resources can be better utilized. 

This concludes comments from Neptune and Company, Inc. on the proposed revisions to 

10 CFR part 61. 

 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 21 

Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 20 

Neptune has but one substantive comment on the proposed changes to 10 CFR part 20. We 

encourage NRC to consider the inclusion of language regarding uncertainty in the 

characterization of radioactive wastes manifested for disposal. Uncertainty in reported estimates 

is certainly present, and understanding the degree of uncertainty is critical to efficient use of 

disposal resources and to estimations of risks to workers and to the public. 

Other issues that seem to be unaddressed include the role of LLDs in determining compliance 

with WACs, and methods for establishing WACs based on a probabilistic performance 

assessment. If WACs are based on mean concentrations (for example) from a PA, then it is not 

clear that all manifested waste needs to meet the WAC, but only that on average the waste needs 

to meet the WAC. Perhaps the intent is to determine a WAC such that satisfying the WAC for 

each waste manifest guarantees that the mean will be less than the WAC, but the guidance is not 

clear on this issue. 

This concludes comments from Neptune and Company, Inc. on the proposed revisions to 

10 CFR part 20.
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 22 

Comments Regarding Revisions to NUREG/BR-0204 

Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on 

possible changes to the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) Instructions for 

Completing NRC’s Uniform Low-Level Radioactive Waste Manifest (NUREG/BR-0204, Rev. 2) 

of July 1998. Comments were requested by NRC as part of the Public Workshop to Discuss 

Potential Revisions to NUREG/BR-0204 Rev. 2 on 1 March, 2013, in Phoenix, AZ. This seems to 

be associated with Docket ID NRC-2013-0035. 

The comments below are organized into a General Comments section, with application to the 

overall document, and a Specific Comments section, with more specific and editorial comments. 

General Comments 

Definition and use of the lower limits of detection 

Comment: 

Discussion of using the lower limit of detection (LLD) occurs on page 12 of the Brochure. This 

discussion is a bit confusing in that the LLDs get reported in different ways, but the larger 

problems are 1) how the values reported on the manifests are used by radioactive waste disposal 

operators, and 2) how the LLDs are defined in the first place. 

It is our understanding that some operators enter the LLD values, as reported, into their waste 

inventory databases, and other enter values of zero for reported LLD values. This has the 

potential of introducing error and uncertainty into the waste inventory for a disposal site, which 

runs counter to the efficient use of the site. Uncertainties in this case are difficult to quantify, and 

so must be overestimated. This obfuscates effective decision making on the part of the disposal 

site operator and regulator. 

There are other issues that need to be addressed in manifesting or reporting waste concentrations. 

These include the number of samples that need to be taken on a waste stream, and when and 

where in the waste cycle those samples should be collected. This could be framed in terms of 

EPA’s DQO process. This could also address scaling (which should be done statistically between 

lab data and screening measurements so that uncertainty is honored, and the necessary 

relationships can be formed – single values for scaling factors are insufficient). 

The main focus of the changes to BR-0204 is the “phantom four”, and issues that arise when 

measuring low quantities, or counts. An apparent challenge for the environmental/waste industry 

is understanding the power of statistical methods, and how they should be used. Chemists tend to 

censor data, essentially making datum-based decisions (this is natural since chemists are trained 

to think about each individual sample). However, it is rare that decisions are made on a datum 

rather than on data. Enough data should be collected for a waste stream to evaluate the data 

collectively. This is also appropriate from the perspective of supporting risk (dose) assessment, 

which is based on averages (i.e., data, not datum). If this approach were taken, then the need for 

LLDs for low-level radioactive measurements could be removed. Radioactivity data include 

ambient background subtractions, which can cause negative responses. Statistical methods can 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 23 

account for this properly. In fact, statistical methods are better suited to handle such uncensored 

data than censored data. Censoring implies loss of information, which is difficult to overcome. 

So, an option is to abandon LLDs in favor of straightforward waste characterization. 

Otherwise, if LLDs continue to be entertained, the approach that Currie first described for 

estimating LLDs is reasonable, but was not adequately implemented in NRC’s 

NUREG/BR-0204. The challenge, which Currie addressed, is that multiple samples of LLDs 

should not be combined. 

The more complicated situation is waste that is characterized through scaling factors. Low counts 

then present different challenges, because the regression between lab data and (field) screening 

data can depend on the relationship at low counts, and the screening instruments are not usually 

set up for ambient subtractions. In effect, applying scaling at the sensitivity of the methods is 

unlikely to work very well. 

In general, these types of statistical issues need to be addressed, and, based on this research, 

some simple, better, rules for manifesting are needed that will better support Performance 

Assessment. 

Specific Comments 

Existing text, p. 3: 

Note: The NRC requires all uses of the Uniform Manifest forms to report information in metric 

units, and all the forms have been developed for the use of metric units.

Comment: 

The manifest forms themselves go so far as to specify use of SI units in many cases, which is 

even more strict than “metric”. This is all to the good, and we appreciate that NRC has adopted 

metric and SI units (and metric units, where SI is impractical, such as the use of “yr” rather than 

“s” for time) in its work. This needs to be extended into the revisions of 10 CFR part 61 and part 

20 as well. 

Existing text, p. 9: 

13. Transport Index – See DOT regulations at 49 CFR 173.403. This is a dimensionless number 

which, for nonfissile material packages, is equivalent to the radiation dose in millirem per hour at 

one meter from the surface of the package. 

Comment: 

This is inconsistent with NRC’s use of SI (or metric) units, and is also somewhat nonsensical. 

Rather than being dimensionless, this number indeed has dimensions of dose rate, and even 

specifies the units as millirem per hour. However, it is recognized that this may stem from a 

DOT regulation, and that the linkage to 49 CFR 173 needs to be maintained. Unfortunately, if 

the “Transport Index” is enshrined in that regulation and is reported as a dimensionless number, 

(even though it is not) then changing its basis from millirem per hour to milliSieverts per hour 

would introduce significant confusion. So, it may be best left alone. At any rate, NRC could 
Neptune Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR 61, 10 CFR 20, and NUREG/BR-0204

July 2015 24 

provide in this brochure the SI equivalent to millirem, as in “...millirem per hour (equivalent to 

10 microSieverts per hour) at one meter...” 

Existing text, p. 11: 

1. Manifest Totals - ... and the total net weight (kilograms). 

Comment: 

Kilograms are not a unit of weight, but rather mass, so the text should be changed to “...and the 

total net mass (in kilograms).” This error is repeated in several places in the Brochure, including 

two in the second paragraph on page 12. Just search on “weight” and find the others. This is also 

incorrectly referred to as “weight” on Forms 540 and 541, even when the units of “kg” are 

specified. 

Existing text, p. 18: 

15. Radiological Description – This information may be presented in either of two ways. First, list 

all significant radionuclides... 

Comment: 

The definition of “significant” is provided on p. 20, with several trigger concentrations that make 

it so. But all these trigger values are given in terms of activity concentration, such as MBq/cm3. 

It needs to be clarified what is in the denominator of this calculation—that is, cm3 of what, 

exactly? Is it a local concentration within the larger package, or is it a bulk concentration 

considering the entire volume of the shipped package? 

Existing text, p. 19: 

[15. Radiological Description – continued] OR, alternatively, for container containing a single 

waste type, enter the total megabequerels [sic] in the container ... and enter the percentage of 

each radionuclide. 

Comment: 

The problem here is that what is not specified is percentage by what? These values could have 

radically different values depending on if they are reported as percentage by volume, percentage 

by mass, or percentage by activity. This needs to be clarified. 

Also, “megabecquerels” is misspelled in the Brochure. 

This concludes comments from Neptune and Company, Inc. on revision of NUREG/BR-0204. 
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Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 1 

Comments on Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 

10 CFR Part 61 (NUREG 2175) 

Neptune and Company, Inc. (Neptune) appreciates the opportunity to provide comments on the 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) proposed Guidance for Conducting Technical 

Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61 (NUREG-2175), provided as a draft report for comment. 

The comments below are organized into a General Comments section, with application to the 

overall rule, and a Specific Comments section, with comments following the same order as they 

appear in the proposed revisions document. 

General Comments 

This guidance for technical analyses required by the proposed revisions to 10 CFR 61 is 

welcome. The bulk of the document is well written, and it is clear that the authors put a lot of 

thought and care into its development. 

The draft NUREG-2175 suffers from occasional redundancy, and some disconnects in the flow 

of development of concepts, especially in the early sections, but these shortcomings could be 

addressed with some additional careful technical editing. 

Specific Comments 

§ 1.1.2 Safety Case 

It remains unclear how the safety case is to be constructed. It seems that this is a collection of 

documents and analyses required to demonstrate adequate protection of public health, but the 

mechanics of how all these analyses are to be collected into a Safety Case is lacking. Admittedly, 

this is a new concept (for US regulators) and will require vetting and the development of 

examples. Is the Safety Case a document that serves as a wrapper for the performance 

assessment (PA), intruder assessment (IA), defense-in-depth analysis, etc.? Please provide clarity 

on what is expected in terms of a license applicant’s submittal. 

§ 1.1.4.1 and 3.0 Performance Assessment 

Bullet (8): Uncertainty addresses the contaminant transport part of a PA, whereas the exposure 

part is better addressed through variability (population characteristics per EPA’s description of 

probabilistic risk assessment). Variability should not be used directly in the projected behavior of 

the system except to inform the uncertainty in the mean estimates. 

An issue with section 1.1.4.1 is that it addresses modeling for the sake of modeling. Modeling 

should be performed in some context of the decisions to be made. Compliance decisions are 

insufficient for evaluating the efficacy of a disposal system and optimizing disposal, which are 

critical for maximizing use of these precious resources (disposal systems). Modeling should be 

performed to evaluate options, in which case a framework for options analysis is needed within 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 2 

which the modeling implied here should be performed. The beginnings of addressing this appear 

in Item (10) of Section 1.1.4.1, but this does not go far enough. 

§ 1.1.4.2 and 4.0 Inadvertent Intrusion Assessment 

Consider this text from p. 1-5: “Because there is no scientific basis for quantitatively predicting 

the probability of a future disruptive human activity over long timeframes, an inadvertent 

intruder assessment does not consider the probability of inadvertent intrusion occurring.” 

This simply is not true. This has been done before and can be done again (at NNSS and WIPP, 

for example). We are not in the role of prediction, we are in the role of modeling. We are 

modeling a reasonable facsimile to provide insights into what might happen, while conditioning 

on current knowledge of the system. Otherwise, a dose assessment beyond a few decades (let 

alone hundreds of years, or even thousands) is futile. 

We do not know what the future holds—we know that it will be different from today, but all we 

can do for decisions that depend on the long term future is to project current conditions as we 

best understand them. This applies just as much to inadvertent intrusion scenarios as the 

environmental system. 

Using IA to establish WACs is a mistake. This will not allow the nation to effectively use the 

limited disposal facilities that we have, and will arbitrarily cause disposal facilities to function 

sub-optimally. The arbitrariness is palpable. For example, this would cause sites in less 

populated areas to be evaluated the same as sites in more populated areas, since the probability 

of intrusion is assumed to be 1 for either case in the IA. This approach subverts the idea that sitespecific analyses should drive decisions. Forcing the probability of intrusion to be unity removes 

the site-specific nature of the probability of intrusion, which can be a significant discriminator of 

between sites. WAC should be based on site-specific PA, not on IA. 

The IA should be folded into the PA, and intruders should be addressed as potential receptors 

just like any other MOP, with probability of occurrence included in the analysis. All animals are 

equal, and some should not be more equal than others. Our approach in developing models has 

been to develop appropriate probabilities of exposure for all receptors, without labeling them as 

MOP or IHI, which is an artificial and sometimes misleading distinction. Models can provide for 

a special case in forcing the probability of an even (e.g. drilling through waste) in order to 

examine the consequences of that event in detail, but those consequences should not enter in 

decision making out of context, which is what the IA does. We expect that this approach will fit 

into the proposed requirement of having both a PA and an IA by using the very same model, 

with the only difference being forcing of a particular (and otherwise potentially unlikely) event. 

That special case of the PA modeling would be an IA, but the resulting IA should not be 

considered out of context of its probability of occurrence. 

It is therefore curious that the last statement in Section 1.1.4.2 is that “An intruder assessment 

shall... Account for uncertainties and variability” when the largest uncertainty may be whether an 

intrusion event would occur at all. 

On a positive note, it is encouraging to see the language that an inadvertent intruder is in fact a 

member of the public (§2.2.4.2, p. 2-14, lines 39-41.) 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 3 

§ 1.1.4.3 and 5.0 Site Stability Analysis 

The point of the stability analysis is not clear. How will it be evaluated? It needs metrics. We 

strongly suggest that risk (dose) be used to evaluate stability, along with cost. That is, this should 

be folded into the PA, with potential options for stability evaluated. Stability for the sake of 

stability, removed from the context of risk, is not useful except for appearances. 

§ 1.1.4.4 and 6.0 Protective Assurance Period Analyses 

This statement is most welcome: “The primary purpose of the protective assurance period 

analyses is to provide information that demonstrates that releases of radioactive from a LLW 

disposal facility are minimized during the protective assurance period...” What is refreshing here 

is the use of the term “releases”, which makes the analyses reminiscent of the Containment 

Requirements for transuranic waste, in EPA’s 40 CFR 191. Given the long time frame of these 

analyses, it is good to be rid of the term “dose”, since this is burdened with the unfathomable 

uncertainties of human behaviors past 10,000 years. 

Later discussions of the protective assurance period analyses sometimes revert to the use of the 

term “dose” as a performance metric, and we encourage that such references be modified to 

make reference to “releases” instead. 

§ 1.1.5 and 9.0 Waste Acceptance Criteria 

As mentioned above, a site-specific WAC should be based on a site-specific PA, and not on an 

IA, or even on the classification tables. 

At the end of section 1.1.5 is a bulleted list of requirements for a certification program. Missing 

from this list is the characterization of uncertainty in waste documentation. In our experience, 

having developed PA models for over half a dozen radioactive waste disposal sites, the 

uncertainty in inventory is the most significant and most irreducible variable in the model. 

Unless positive steps are taken to require generators to characterize uncertainty in their wastes, 

this will continue to be the case. Without this uncertainty characterization, decisions about waste 

acceptance and disposal site operations will continue to be clouded, leading to inefficiencies in 

the de facto national radioactive waste disposal program and a squandering of the precious 

resources that are waste disposal facilities. 

§ 1.4 Risk-Informed Approach 

The term “risk-informed” is promising, but there is little of substance here. How should a riskinformed decision be made? This guidance sets up an approach based on ad hoc decision 

making—some people get together and make a decision. We have the technology to do better 

than that. “Risk-informed” would have meat if it were framed in a decision analysis context. This 

is the paradigm shift that is needed to support effective decision making, and remove the 

confusions that stigmatize this industry. 

§ 2.2.1 Data Adequacy 

It is unclear what is meant by “some amount of incompleteness in the data may be overcome by 

appropriately accounting for parameter uncertainty.” This indicates a confusion of ideas. 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 4 

Incompleteness of data leads to greater uncertainty in the sense that there is less data than there 

might have been otherwise. Parameter uncertainty is based on the amount of data available. 

Hence, this sentence makes no sense. We suggest it be deleted. 

Note also that there are other ways to obtain data to support a specific parameter. These include 

model abstraction and meta analysis. It’s not clear what is meant by “last resort” for expert 

elicitation. There is nothing inherently problematic with expert elicitation. If “last resort” is 

meant to imply cost-effectiveness, then this should be stated, but it is incorrect to imply that 

expert elicitation is not a reasonable approach, which seems to be the intent here. 

Upscaling is not needed only to achieve representativeness. It is critical to the whole approach of 

modeling fate and transport of the radionuclides. A probabilistic PA must be built around 

averaging over large spatial and temporal scales, which is the essence of upscaling (though the 

analyst needs to be careful about what is being averaged, per the precipitation example). This is 

how a contaminant fate and transport model ultimately characterizes and addresses uncertainty. 

Then receptors are exposed to average concentrations and the uncertainty associated with that 

average. 

§ 2.2.2 Uncertainty 

The final sentences of Section 2.2.2 state, “For example, an uncertainty analysis could provide 

information about where a licensee should focus model support activities, which in turn could 

reduce uncertainty. Parameter uncertainty is uncertainty in the parameters used in the technical 

analyses.” This is not the role of uncertainty analysis—this is the role of sensitivity analysis, 

which is not discussed much in this document. Uncertainty analysis (UA) addresses uncertainty 

in the decision. Sensitivity analysis (SA) addresses what drives the outcome and how to reduce 

uncertainty. There should be a separate and distinct discussion of sensitivity analysis to clarify 

the different roles of UA and SA. 

§ 2.2.2.1 General Structure of Uncertainty 

It is not clear that uncertainties are greater for long-lived waste. In fact some things become 

certain for long-lived waste even if the exact time frame is uncertain (the exact time frame is not 

very relevant in deep time). For example, in the Clive DU PA Model, it is relatively clear (not 

uncertain) that in 2 million years (My) all waste disposed below grade will be part of an 

organically developed geologic repository (i.e., under about 300 m of sediment). Whereas, for 

short lived waste disposed above grade, for example, the waste will be dispersed at some point 

well before 2 My. DU does not actually reach secular equilibrium until about 2.1 My—there is a 

lot of certainty then, even if the exact time is not known. The sentence needs to be qualified. 

§ 2.2.2.1.1 Scenario Uncertainty

A challenge here is that probabilistic modeling essentially considers a continuum of scenarios. 

For example, climate variation spans a continuum of possibilities, which can be handled through 

probabilistic modeling (i.e., through probabilistic specification of input parameters). Scenarios 

are best left for truly discrete distinctions that cause the system to move in a different direction, 

and not for changes that are unknown but possible across a continuum. 

§ 2.2.2.1.2 Model Uncertainty
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 5 

In this case, different distinct models could be proposed. So, model uncertainty should involve 

evaluation of distinct models (for example, there are several models of tortuosity in the 

literature—which one is best for a specific PA and site?) For this type of model uncertainty, 

some model averaging could be brought in to support the PA effort. 

Conceptual model uncertainty, on the other hand, can probably be handled for the most part 

through uncertainty characterization of the parameters. Simulation uncertainty is different yet 

again, and should be separated into its own section. Model uncertainty, conceptual model 

uncertainty, and simulation uncertainty are really all different enough that they need separate 

sections. 

§ 2.2.2.1.3 Parameter Uncertainty

Parameter uncertainty is not reducible or irreducible. Parameter uncertainty is simply reducible 

by collecting more data/information. It could be argued that variability is irreducible, but 

variability should not be applied to the fate and transport model (except to support development 

of uncertainty estimates—more or less standard deviation (variability measure) divided by n). 

This is always a difficult discussion because of the number of literature articles on the subject, 

most of which cause greater confusion. It would be better to define terms here, and, since these 

are statistical/probabilistic issues, that should be the basis for the definitions. 

Note that the approach to parameter uncertainty depends on how the simulations are performed. 

Most models involve drawing random numbers at the beginning of time, and then using those as 

deterministic values through the model’s propagation in time. If, instead, random numbers are 

pulled at each time step, then some further thought needs to be put into how parameters are 

probabilistically specified. 

Note also that in a probabilistic risk assessment (which is essentially what a probabilistic PA is), 

the exposure parameters need to cover the potentially exposed population, in which case they are 

based on variability rather than uncertainty. If the terms uncertainty and variability are not 

palatable here, then at least it should be recognized that some parameters (fate and transport 

leading to concentration assessment) are addressed through upscaling (distributions of means, 

essentially, which implies characterizing uncertainty), whereas, some are addressed without 

upscaling (because PRA is about addressing all members of the population, not the average 

member). 

§ 2.2.2.1.4 Uncertainty Example—Transfer Factors

Applying conservative values does not address uncertainty. It addresses misplaced value 

judgments. It obfuscates effective decision analysis and decision making. 

This document would benefit from further sections that specifically address upscaling and 

correlation. Why do large variances only require careful treatment in an intruder analysis—this 

makes no sense. Since transfer factors are applied to fate and transport components, they address 

uncertainty and upscaling. The degree of skew in the supporting data (or expert opinion) is 

mitigated to some extent through upscaling. It is important that the fate and transport parameters 

(those that are used to lead towards estimation of concentrations in various media, locations, etc.) 

are established as upscaled (averaged) quantities. The care that needs to be taken in upscaling 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 6 

must address the dilution effect mentioned. The role of inter- and intra-site values is not made 

clear. This is an issue of ability to generalize data from one site to another. In general, we 

probably do not assign sufficient uncertainty to that generalization, but a combination of data 

from another site and expert opinion can be used to at least address some of the missing 

uncertainty. Note again that this must be in terms of uncertainty in the upscaled values. 

Conservative values should not be used. One is reminded of the question asked Charles Babbage: 

“Mr. Babbage, if I provide you the wrong inputs, can your machine produce the right output?” 

His answer was, “I fail to understand the confusion of ideas that led to such a question.” And yet, 

that is what is proposed here. If there are no data, then use expert elicitation. If there are no 

experts, then put a wide distribution in, and let the sensitivity analysis determine if it matters. If it 

matters, then put more effort into it (at greater cost.) If it doesn’t matter, then leave it alone and 

move on. 

Page 2-10, line 24: Replace “uncertainty” with “sensitivity”. This is an example of the confusion 

between the UA and SA concepts that exists in this document. 

If this section is to remain, it should be re-cast as a section on data generalization issues, instead 

of being presented as an uncertainty example. 

Also, the NRC Regulatory Guide 1.109 (NRC 1977) should not be cited as an example, as it is 

quite dated and has values in it with no support. 

§ 2.2.3.1 Peer Review, Expert Judgment, and Expert Elicitation

Peer review does not belong in a section with expert judgment and elicitation. Peer review is a 

form of model support (which could be described in Section 2.2.3), whereas expert judgment and 

elicitation are methods to specifying a model (akin to data collection). These are different 

concepts that do not belong in the same section. 

§ 2.2.4.1 Human Activity - Scenarios

Receptor scenarios should be based on site-specific knowledge, and projected into the future 

based on that knowledge (i.e., conditioning on current knowledge). The point is made more 

effectively on page 2-16, line 11, but should be reinforced in this section. This is also an example 

of how use of the term “FEPS” works better than merely “FEP” (see editorial comments below.) 

§ 2.3.1 Context of the Performance Assessment

Although the data quality objectives (DQO) process has some problems in its implementation, 

philosophically it is a sound rendition of the scientific method. It basically starts with the 

question, “What decision needs to be made?” The same should be true here. The decisions 

include compliance, but much more importantly, should include optimization of waste disposal: 

the best cover design, best placement of waste, best institutional controls, etc. Rather than 

DQOs, it would be better if this were all framed in a decision analysis construct. More 

specifically, it should be framed as a stakeholder-engaged structured decision making process—

this is the paradigm shift that is needed so that the public is protected rationally and defensibly, 

while allowing for the disposal of waste in responsible ways. 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 7 

§ 2.3.2 Approach to Different Time Frames

Evaluation against these time periods is unfortunate. It is not clear why radionuclides are treated 

so differently technically than wastes that will never change and might pose greater hazards 

(lead, arsenic, asbestos), and other wastes that have effective decay sequences that lead to more 

hazardous waste (PCE to TCE to VC, for example). There are several reasons why 1,000 years is 

too long—these include reasonableness of evaluating dose beyond 200 to 300 years, change that 

is inevitable, vastly increased uncertainty with time, and economic considerations (e.g., 

discounting, which is a natural phenomenon) coupled with the need for long term financial 

planning. There is a great confusion of regulations and guidance across different radioactive 

waste issues, let alone expanding further to include hazardous waste regulations. There are 

occasional opportunities to make real effective change. This is one of them, but this is not being 

achieved. 

§ 2.3.2.3 Performance Period

The reference to “releases” (p. 2-23, line 24) is appropriate, but that positive is quickly negated 

with mention of the metric “peak annual doses that are projected to occur after 10,000 years” (p. 

2-23, line 30, and again on p. 2-24, line 15). We recommend sticking to the “releases” or 

“activity concentrations or fluxes” concept, as invoked again at the top of p. 2-24. 

§ 2.3.2.4 Site Characteristics

The term “C” in the equations on p. 2-25 (lines 26 – 28) requires a careful definition in order for 

it to be implemented consistently. Is this the activity (or mass) concentration in disposed wastes 

at the time of closure? At 1000 years after closure, accounting or decay and ingrowth? Some 

other time? IS it radionuclides that are in the original waste volume, or would it account for 

radionuclides that have been transported elsewhere in the environment? These questions must be 

answered, or an analyst will be forced to guess what the intent is. 

§ 2.5 Scenario Development

The use of stylized scenarios is potentially problematic. Their use implies conservatism, which is 

essentially misplaced value judgments. It is perfectly fine to make conservative decisions, but it 

is not fine to make important decisions based on conservative models. Conservatism should be 

addressed through value judgments, so that it is properly characterized. 

FEPS screening should take place, and should be based on an understanding of probability and 

consequence. Refer to The Foundations of Statistics (Savage, 1954). This reference lays out 

exactly how models should be built, what considerations should be given, etc. It addresses both 

marginalization (ignoring distinctions between events), and conditioning (ignoring events), and 

offers useful insight for how a FEPS screening process could be implemented. 

§ 2.5.3.1.2.2 Probability

Page 2-42, last bullet, lines 3-4: It’s interesting that FEPSs that do not have information or data, 

and nothing is known about the process, are included automatically here. There are many 

processes that are never included in a PA because we don’t know how to include them. For 

example: microbiological degradation of containers, colloid transport. However, NRC implies 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 8 

here that they should be included. 

Uncertainty associated with probability: Possibly most FEPSs evaluations would have to be 

evaluated based on expert elicitation. It is difficult to see how the FEPSs can be evaluated 

probabilistically otherwise. At the very least, expert elicitation is likely to play an important role. 

Perhaps this can be noted and referenced to the section on expert elicitation. Some more 

explanation is needed here. The Yucca Mountain Project evaluated the probability of volcanic 

hazard as part of the FEPSs process (at very large cost). This was done by building a complex 

model that led to (uncertain) estimates of this probability. 

§ 2.7.4 Analysis and Evaluation of Results

This section discusses, among other things, the concept of SA, but subtly mischaracterizes it in 

saying that “...the purpose of sensitivity analysis is to evaluate uncertainty and variability in the 

assessment. (p. 2-61, lines 16-17.) The purpose of an SA is to identify which model input 

parameters contribute most to that uncertainty. Further discussion on this page revolves around 

the flawed approach of on-at-a-time (OAT) SA, which will not allow one to thoroughly evaluate 

the contributions of input parameters to uncertainty in the model results. The text on p. 2-62, 

while a bit garbled, attempts to put OAT-SA in its appropriate context, identifying its limitations, 

but this OAT-SA approach needs to be more forcefully deprecated. 

§ 3.2.7 Direct Release

It is interesting to see the reference to “Anthropogenic direct releases...” (p. 3-16, line 41.) This 

would suggest that releases of radionuclides that might occur from intrusion into wastes should 

be considered as part of the contaminant transport in a model. For example, drill cuttings brought 

to the surface should be incorporated into the larger contaminant transport calculations, as they 

could result in exposures to not only the drilling crew but to other receptors as well, perhaps 

much later in time. We agree with this approach. 

§ 4.0 Inadvertent Intrusion

See our comments above about why the IA is not useful for making decisions about radioactive 

waste disposal. 

§ 4.3.1.1 Generic Intruder Receptor Scenarios

A generic IA is of even less use than a site-specific one. 

At lines 12-13 on p. 4-13, the statement is made that “Loss of intuitional control is not 

expected...” Quite the opposite is true. Loss of IC is certain—it is only a matter of when control 

is lost. 

§ 4.3.1.1.2 Intruder-Drilling Receptor Scenario

The drilling referred to in this scenario is for water wells. It should be made more generic to 

include drilling for petroleum resources (gas and oil) as well. 

§ 4.3.2.2 Source Term
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 9 

Included in an exposure source term should be not only radionuclides in the original waste 

layers, but those that have migrated upwards into the column above the waste, towards the 

ground surface. These, especially the decay products of 222Rn which may have diffused upward, 

can add significantly to the receptor dose. 

§ 4.3.2.2.1 Inventory

The last paragraph on p. 4-31 has problems. It says that licensees “may conservatively assume no 

decay.” This is at odds with the very next sentences, which recognizes the “impacts of significant 

progeny”, and that “radioactive decay can result in significant ingrowth of progeny at future 

times.” (“at future times” should be deleted, as it is redundant.) As we know, using depleted 

uranium as an example, assuming no decay is in some cases definitely not conservative. The 

following sentence attempts to make this clear, but should be changed from “For example, doses 

from depleted uranium may increase for more than one million years due to ingrowth of shorterlived and more highly mobile decay products.” to “For example, activities from depleted 

uranium will increase for more than two million years due to ingrowth of shorter-lived and more 

highly mobile decay products.” 

§ 5.0 Site Stability Analyses

As stated above, we do not see the need for a special site stability analysis. Site stability and its 

consequences should simply be modeled as part of the PA. If an unstable site produces no added 

risk, then why should we care? We agree that all the processes that contribute to loss of stability, 

as discussed in the subsections of 5.0, should be included in the FEPS analysis, and if they 

survive screening, in the PA modeling. The consequences to receptor dose will then naturally fall 

out of the PA. 

Lines 17-19 contain an adequate definition of “stability” that should be used as a definition in 10 

CFR 61.2. The current definition in 61.2 is self-referential and wholly inadequate. 

§ 6.2.1.1 Alternatives Analysis

An alternative analysis as described is a decision (options) analysis. It should be described this 

way, and should describe how such an analysis is performed. It seems that this is simply a 

comparison of doses, but, if so, that is inadequate. Doses can be reduced to zero if money is no 

object (put a titanium box around the whole facility), but in reality the costs can be prohibitive, 

and still might not satisfy all stakeholders (because in that simple example, the waste is still 

there). Based on this approach, the titanium box is the best alternative, because cost doesn’t 

come into it. This discussion should be deleted, or merged with the next section while 

maintaining the title of this section (that is, alternatives analysis should include costs). 

This section also references “peak of the mean”. This is a very poor decision metric for sites that 

have no receptors for long periods of time. This is why PA decisions should be based on 

population risk instead of individual risk (which was part of the original basis for the selection of 

many of the disposal sites in the country anyway). 

We applaud the consideration of alternative sites for disposal. The final paragraph of this section 

hints at a larger scope of decision making with respect to radioactive waste disposal for the 

nation. IT is appropriate to consider that one site may be more suitable than another for disposal 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 10 

so specific wastes, and yet this has received very little discussion in the waste disposal 

community. We are happy to see the issue raised here. 

§ 6.2.1.2 Minimization Analysis

Discounting is difficult to deal with, but perhaps because of how little research has been done to 

date. A reframing of the decision problem to address both discounting and a long-term financial 

plan. With discounting, including discounting of receptor doses (contrary to bullet 2 on p. 6-8), 

compliance periods become unnecessary. Recall Neptune’s presentation at the Spring 2013 

meeting of the LLW Forum in Charleston, SC. 

While we understand NRC’s position, some further research on discounting coupled with 

financial planning seems warranted. At the moment the effective discount function on dose is 

zero discounting until the end of the compliance period, and then complete discounting (zero 

value) thereafter. (NRC has inserted one more step in there potentially with the second period 

having a different dose limit). This is not a reasonable discount function, so some research is 

needed. 

A better approach would be to shorten compliance periods, and have financial planning that 

implies discounting. The net effect of the revolving time window that this approach would 

engender would be longer term management of the disposal facility. Under current regulations, 

at the end of institutional control the Government can simply walk away—does it make sense to 

make decisions under that paradigm? A paradigm shift is needed. 

Also, decision analysis for radioactive waste disposal should depend on population dose rather 

than individual dose. Or, better, it should depend on risk. Even better, it should depend on 

mortality and morbidity, as is done in risk assessment within the medical community. Dose is 

used as a proxy for these, but it is not a good proxy. 

§ 6.2.1.3 Other Decision Analyses

It is not clear how this would differ from what is presented in Section 6.2.1.2. Please clarify. 

§ 7.0 Performance Period Analyses

p. 7-1, line 26 contains the statement, “The level of detail in the assessment should be riskinformed”. It is not clear at all what that means. The term risk-informed has been used for 

several years now, but without definition. Metrics are needed to make decisions. What are the 

risk-informed metrics in this case? 

The footnote to Table 7-1 says “Any isotope [sic] that is to be disposed of in sufficient quanitites 

should be considered as part of the LLW PA inventory.” Please define “sufficient quantities”. 

Top of p. 7-4: It is not clear why more expert judgment is needed in this case. This seems to be a 

continued “knock” on expert elicitation as a “poor man’s data analysis”. This is not the case. 

Expert elicitation should be used when it is most cost-effective to do so. Since these long-term 

models essentially project today’s conditions into the future, it is not clear why longer term 

modeling requires more expert elicitation. Most of the input distributions will not change from 

the 1,000-year model. 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 11 

Further, why would simple conservative analyses be used? The model is already set up for 

1,000 yr (unless there are new events)—it is trivial to project out the same model for 10,000 yr or 

longer. This section should be re-written. As former Commissioner Magwood once said a 

problem we face in waste management is “conservatism on top of conservatism on top of 

conservatism”. Conservatism has no place in modeling for important decisions. Its place is in 

specification of value judgments in a complete decision analysis, based on realistic—not 

conservative—analysis. 

Otherwise this section seems to ramble some, and might benefit from some reorganization and 

deletion of material. 

p. 7-4, line 28: Change “is variability in hydrogeology” to “may be variability in hydrogeology”. 

There are sites where hydrogeology is simply unimportant. 

Editorial Comments 

“FEPS”, not “FEP” 

This is not merely an editorial comment. We strongly recommend that the traditional term 

“FEP”, for features events, and processes, be replaced with the term “FEPS”, which includes 

receptor scenarios. Receptor scenarios are not merely the result of the assessment of other 

FEPs—they are fundamental to the scoping of analyses, and deserve “top billing”, in the 

principal acronym. The development of modeling scenarios indeed is the product of the analysis 

of FEPs, as the document discusses, but such scenarios are also dependent on the receptor 

scenarios that are identified as being fundamental to the scoping of a PA. As an example, section 

2.6, Conceptual Model Development, should include receptor scenario development as a 

foundation leading to CSM development. 

This guidance is a great opportunity to start making this point more clear to the PA community. 

Please consider replacing all instances of “FEP” with “FEPS”. 

“radionuclide”, not “isotope” 

The word “isotope” is used throughout the document, in most cases incorrectly. There are a few 

cases where it is used appropriately to mean various isotopes of a single chemical element (e.g. 

p. 2-25 line 32, in reference to “uranium isotopes”), but in most cases, “isotope” should be 

replaced with “radionuclide”, or even simply “nuclide”. This is something NRC should strive to 

correct in general. Isotopes have the same number of protons, and hence the same atomic 

number. Isotones are chemical elements having the same number of neutrons. Isobars have the 

same atomic mass, meaning the same sum of protons + neutrons. All are nuclides, and 

radioactive ones are radionuclides. The difference in usage is perhaps best illustrated by 

example. These are isotopes: 234U, 235U, and 238U (same number of protons, therefore same 

atomic number. These are not isotopes, though they are isobars: 238Pu, and 238U (same atomic 

mass, P+N). These are also not isotopes, but are isotones: 29K and 37Cl (same number of 

neutrons). These are none of the above, but are radionuclides: 3

H, 36Cl, 99Tc, 222Rn. All of the 

above examples are radionuclides, and that is the best term to use, unless there is a specific 

reason to use “isotopes”, as in, “All isotopes of uranium share the same geochemical 
Neptune Comments on NUREG-2175

July 2015 12 

characteristics.” 

“naturalization”

In the context of the degradation, deterioration, and alteration of engineered features of a 

disposal facility, such as the cover, we would promote use of the term “naturalization,” first 

introduced at the NRC Workshop on Covers. “Naturalization” includes all these processes, and 

more, and suggests the idea that these processes are natural and inevitable, and that engineers 

should work with nature in developing designs that will age well. 

“disposed” not “disposed of”

Inclusion of the word “of” in essentially all occurrences is superfluous. 

minor edits 

p. 2-4, line 38: Remove “large quantities of”, since depleted uranium “may pose a long-term risk 

to the public” in even small quantities. Don’t let previous disposals of DU hide behind the “large 

quantities” terminology. 

p. 2-5, line 2: Change “predominately” to “predominantly”. 

p. 2-24, line 2: Remove “rate”. A flux is already a rate, as in mass per time. A “flux rate” is 

nonsensical, and would mean mass per time per time . See: Stauffer, P.H. (2006). "Flux 

Flummoxed: A Proposal for Consistent Usage". Ground Water 44 (2): 125–128. 

p. 2-28, line 42: Change “which to “that”. There are other instances of this grammatical error 

throughout the document. Fortunately, you got most of them (though introduced some new 

instances) in the proposed 10 CFR 61 rule changes. 

p. 2-30, line 24: Change “Sandia National Laboratory” to “Sandia National Laboratories”. 

p. 2-42, line 20: Change “phenomena” to “phenomenon”. 

p. 2-42, line 32, and p. 2-55, line 43: Change “are” to “be”. 

p. 2-47, line 41: Replace “less” with “fewer”. 

p. 2-49, line 13: Remove “a” 

p. 3-22, line 17 and p. 12-7, second reference: The last name of Ghislain de Marsily is “Marsily, 

not “de Marsily”, and certainly not “deMarsily”. He told me this personally. He should be 

referenced as “Marsily, G. de” 

p. 7-8 et seq., Examples 7.2 and 7.3: Use SI units: Bq (or MBq) instead of Ci. 

This concludes comments from Neptune and Company, Inc. on the proposed Guidance for 

Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61 (NUREG-2175). 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/28/15 2:28 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k5w-sifq

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0133

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Shane Gallagher

Submitter's Representative: Shane Gallagher

Organization: Brigham Young University American Nuclear Society student Chapter

General Comment

-See AttachedAttachments

BYUANS_NRC_comments

Page 1 of 1

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Downloads/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0133.html 07/28/2015

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608172
The American Nuclear Society Student Section at Brigham Young University has reviewed the proposed 

rule for 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 regarding Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal and have concluded 

that when approaching this decision with the correct perspective the NRC’s proposed rules are sufficient 

to safely regulate the disposal of low-level radioactive waste without overbearing costs to industry. Of 

particular interest to our student section was the question posed by the NRC for public feedback on 

whether 5 mSv (500 mrem) per year is an appropriate analytical threshold for the protective assurance 

period. Based on calculations and appropriate references, we have concluded that 5 mSv per year is a 

reasonable and safe threshold. 

Some would argue that any exposure to radiation is harmful. However, 5 mSv represents a radiation 

dose comparable to 1 CT chest scan, and is less than the dose we receive in the U.S. as reported by the 

NCRP. Utah experiences even higher doses because of higher elevation. Therefore, we believe 5 mSv is a 

reasonable and safe threshold.1

We have also performed calculations suggesting that the activity of DU does not increase significantly 

until around 100,000 years after its disposal (see included charts). These calculations are based on the 

analytical solution to the differential equations governing the radioactive decay of uranium-238 and 

uranium-235. Our calculations also show that more important than the increase in radioactivity per se is 

maintaining a long-term barrier between the public and the alpha emissions of the decay products 

(especially 222 Rn). This is why, once again, we approve of the NRC taking steps to ensure such a barrier 

is in place to limit the public dose rate to 5mSv.Also, we believe that the best way to protect the public 

is to move this waste from its current on site storage to a long term storage facility such as Energy 

Solutions.

Furthermore, we believe that if EnergySolutions passes the NRC’s proposed three tier performance 

assessment, the threat to the general public will be sufficiently mitigated while concurrently providing 

Utah with a valuable resource. Depleted Uranium can be used as fuel in advanced reactor designs and so 

even though this waste can be safely disposed of for thousands of years, this waste will likely be used as 

fuel well before the disposal facility degrades. Utah already has a well-established nuclear fuel industry. 

According to Energy Fuels, a uranium mining company, its White Mesa Mill in Blanding UT can produce 8 

million lbs of uranium annually.2 Extending Energy Solutions ability to store this low level waste would 

provide Utah with a potential fuel source could potentially benefit Utah’s economy for decades.

Some have raised concerns that in the case of the return of Lake Bonneville there is a chance of 

exposure to the public. We believe this is not a concern. If Lake Bonneville were to return, there would 

be major complications that heavily outweigh the threat of radiation including major cities being 

 

1

 http://www.ncrponline.org/PDFs/Poster.pdf 

2

 http://www.energyfuels.com/mobile/white_mesa_mill 
submerged. The Salt Lake City International Airport standing at 4227 ft in altitude would be submerged 

before the Clive facility standing at 4288 ft.3

In conclusion, we believe that the 5 mSv exposure limit is a safe and reasonable limit. Moreover, we 

believe that the NRC’s proposed performance assessment is sufficient to protect the public from any 

potential harm. 

 

3 http://www.mappery.com/map-of/Lake-Bonneville-Levels-Map
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/28/15 2:40 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k5z-ikd5

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0135

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Tami Thatcher

General Comment

Public Comment to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regarding the Proposed Rule Changes for LowLevel Waste Disposal (10 CFR Part 61; Docket NRC-2011-0012)

Tami Thatcher 

July 24, 2015

The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is proposing to amend regulations that govern low-level 

radioactive waste disposal facilities. These are shallow land burial facilities that bury radioactive materials. 

These facilities will be allowed to bury large amounts of long-lived radionuclides radionuclides that do not 

substantially decay away within 500 years. Long half life or the increase of radioactivity due to ingrowth of 

decay progeny will cause these disposal sites to eventually leach radioactive contaminants into our 

groundwater for hundreds of thousands of years.

We appreciate that the NRC has acknowledged shortcomings in its current regulation of low level radioactive 

waste burial regulations due to waste blending. We appreciate that the NRC recognizes that its current focus 

on the first 100 or 500 years of operation of these facilities is inadequate to protect the public from the large 

amounts of long-lived radionuclides being disposed of. But the proposed rule changes are not protective of 

human health or the environment.

The NRC is recognizing how inadequate the capability of limiting the migration of these radionuclides into 

the environment is over the long term. But despite nice-sounding phrases like defense-in-depth disguise the 

fact that significant amounts of radioactive contaminants will leach into our groundwater over time. 

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The NRC is recognizing the inadequacy of attempts to model the performance of these waste sites for 

anything past a few hundred years. They know that these performance assessments depicting unrealistically 

slow and constant trickle out of contaminants are indefensible and unsupportable. The NRC is requiring that a 

performance analysis be conducted yet accepting unlimited contamination and radiation dose levels as long as 

there was the pretense to minimize the contamination. 

This is a regulation that pretends to be concerned with protecting human life. But this is a regulation 

concerned only with protecting the nuclear industrys ability to dispose of radioactive materials in the most 

unfettered way possible.

The Compliance period (within 1000 years following closure of the disposal facility), the Protective 

Assurance Period (between 1000 and 10,000 years following closure of the disposal facility) and the 

Performance Period (after 10,000 years) have varying performance objectives. It is an immoral act to pretend 

to regulate the disposal of radioactive material with concern for human health but to actually not provide any 

assurance of this protection.

After the initial compliance period, the proposed rule requires only that an effort be made to minimize 

releases to the extent reasonable achievable at any time Do only what is reasonably achievable based on 

technological and economic considerations. Doses greater than 25 mrem/yr? No problem. Doses greater than 

500 mrem/yr? No problem, says the NRC. Yet, we know that these levels will damage children and shorten 

lives. A limit of 25 mrem/yr is barely protective. Anything above 4 mrem/yr is going to damage health. The 

proposed rule could accurately be called the anything goes rule and it is not protective of human health. In 

fact, the proposed rule practically guarantees extensive contamination of our country. 

The public has not been provided an adequate description of the devastating ramifications of this inadequate 

proposed rule. NRC presentations and descriptions of this rule have been inadequate to explain the extensive 

contamination that will be allowed and actually encouraged by this proposed regulation. Anyone concerned 

with human health and the environment cannot be satisfied with the proposed lowlevel waste disposal 

anything goes rule.

This regulation will permit unlimited contamination of our groundwater for millennia despite the charade of 

lengthy discussions that would make it appear otherwise. 

The NRC must not be allowed for make the proposed rule into law. In this regulation the NRC claims to be 

addressing public health and safety and the requirements for meeting health and safety standards. But instead 

the NRC throws existing and future health standards out the window after the initial compliance period. The 

NRC wants to allow any level of contamination by the disposal of long-lived waste as long as the dumper 

tried to minimize the inevitable migration of contamination. Throwing all health standards out the window is 

not responsible and is not protective of human health or the environment. 

I submit these comments with Chuck Brocious, Environmental Defense Institute, Troy Idaho 

www.environmental-defense-institue.org

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PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/28/15 2:47 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k61-m34p

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0136

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Jeffery Taylor

Address: 

1186 South 1680 West

C/O Dymicron, Inc.

Orem, UT, 84058

Email: jktaylor.med@gmail.com

General Comment

I appreciate the opportunity to provide a comment on the proposed rule change reclassifying depleted uranium 

as as Class A Waste, with all of the consequences which may follow.

The successful long term disposal and storage of toxic materials is a challenge which we may not ignore. In 

the case of depleted uranium, the challenge is particularly troubling and complex. The long term safety of our 

community and environment are not the only consideration. This material will retain its toxic potential for 

millions of years. We cannot disregard the potential impact it may have in the far future. Generations to come 

who shall inherit the consequences of our actions.

As a physician and scientist, I would suggest that the long term toxicity of depleted uranium is far from being 

well characterised and understood. Critical unresolved issues of toxicity have been raised with regard to DU 

in multiple government and private studies. With that persistent uncertainty, it is extremely unwise to propose 

its disposal under the Class A Waste rules. To do so prematurely could lead to severe long term problems of 

health risks and environmental degradation which may be unmitigatable. 

I urge you to set this reclassification aside for the time being while the critical issues that have been raised 

may be adequately addressed. We cannot afford to make a potentially colossal mistake in the disposition of 

this extremely long-lived waste material.

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PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/28/15 2:52 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k62-pvjj

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0137

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Rusty Lundberg

General Comment

Utah Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control comments on the proposed Part 61 rulemaking.

Attachments

UDWMRC_Comments_Part61_ProposedRule_2015-7-24

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80FR1608175


July 24, 2015

UTAH DIVISION OF WASTE MANAGEMENT AND RADIATION CONTROL 

COMMENTS ON THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO 10 CFR PART 61 

(DOCKET ID: NRC-2011-0012)

The Utah Division of Waste Management and Radiation Control (UDWMRC) appreciates the 

opportunity to provide the following comments that address the proposed changes to 10 CFR 

Part 61 as published in the Federal Register on March 26, 2015 (80 FR 16082). 

GENERAL COMMENTS 

As noted in the cover letter, the UDWMRC is a member of the Low-Level Waste Forum’s Part 

61 Working Group and as such expresses support for the comments submitted by the working 

group. 

PART 61 CHANGES 

The proposed rule changes incorporate the need for various technical analyses, including a 

site-specific performance assessment in order to determine appropriate waste acceptance criteria, 

particularly for low-level radioactive waste (LLRW) that was not considered in the development 

of the current rules governing LLRW disposal. In comparison, the existing rules establish a 

regulatory framework that, in part, is premised on a LLRW classification system that serves as a 

means to ensure protection of the public health and safety with respect to the management and 

disposal of LLRW. More specifically, the waste classification system is designed to protect an 

individual who unknowingly encounters the contents of a closed LLRW disposal site from a 

potential unsafe exposure to radioactive material. In constructing the waste classification 

system, various generalized assumptions were made in order to provide a level of confidence and 

consistency in the requirements governing the actual disposal of LLRW. 

The NRC is now proposing to revise the existing disposal requirements in order to provide a less 

“generic” approach by taking advantage of various site-specific analyses to determine the 

acceptability of LLRW for disposal at a commercial facility. 

It is well known that for about a decade, Utah has had in place a law that prohibits the receipt, 

management, and disposal of Class B and Class C LLRW. Consequently, the waste 

classification system is vital to Utah’s low-level radioactive waste management program. Given 

this importance, we support NRC’s proposed “hybrid” approach that allows the use of waste 

acceptance criteria (WAC) derived from the proposed technical analyses requirements while 

preserving the use of the existing waste classification system for determining the acceptability of 

LLRW for disposal at a commercial facility. The proposed hybrid approach will allow Utah the 

ability to maintain its reliance on the waste classification system in administering its LLRW 

program. 

Although a licensee or license applicant can determine whether to develop waste acceptance 

criteria as a result of the technical analyses or use the current waste classification system, as 
UDWMRC July 24, 2015

Page 2 of 6

noted in the preamble to the proposed rulemaking, the appropriate regulatory agency, in 

accordance with the proposed language of § 61.58, will have the authority to approve (or 

disapprove) the licensee’s or applicant’s waste acceptance approach. 

We believe that the national implementation of the hybrid approach has the potential to create a 

significant resource impact on a sited state. LLRW generators and brokers will have a choice in 

commercial disposal options that may differ in their waste acceptance requirements, i.e., waste 

classification based or waste acceptance criteria based. This has the potential to create some 

confusion among waste generators and brokers in complying with the applicable waste 

classification and packaging requirements and may result in added oversight resources for 

monitoring incoming shipments. 

COMPATIBILITY 

The rulemaking proposal identifies several changes to the compatibility designation for selected 

areas of Part 61. As an Agreement State, Utah supports the need for national consistency among 

state programs. However, it is equally vital to afford states the ability to address and tailor 

regulatory standards and requirements that are not less stringent than the NRC in order to meet 

specific or unique needs and circumstances that exist within a state. 

Such was the case when the Utah Radiation Control Board adopted two important rule changes 

related to performance assessments. Both rulemakings are similar in nature to NRC’s proposed 

Part 61 rulemaking. The first rulemaking specifically addresses depleted uranium and the second 

establishes criteria for when other performance assessments are required—such as LLRW not 

previously analyzed in the development and adoption of the radioactive waste land disposal 

requirements. Based on NRC evaluations of the rules, both were determined to meet NRC’s 

criteria of being adequate and compatible. 

Specifically, for this proposed rulemaking, UDWMRC requests the NRC to re-designate those 

areas that are compatibility category B to category C in order to preserve the flexibility necessary 

to maintain our existing performance assessment rules. This will provide greater public 

confidence in our efforts to address a proposal to dispose of large quantities of depleted uranium 

and a separate proposal to dispose of large quantities of wastewater treatment resins near the 

Class A limits. Similarly, compatibility category C will avoid having to redo, at a significant 

cost, the technical analyses (performance assessments) now nearing completion. To perform a 

complete re-evaluation of these analyses within the relatively short time horizons proposed by 

the rulemaking will not be productive, beneficial, or more protective of health and safety. 

POTENTIAL WASTE CLASSIFICATION CHANGES 

During the recent public meetings the NRC held in each of the sited states, NRC staff noted that 

the Commission expressed an interest in receiving comment on the need for a second rulemaking 

addressing the waste classification system and more specifically, the classification of depleted 

uranium. We appreciate the Commission’s ongoing interest in addressing such an important and 
UDWMRC July 24, 2015

Page 3 of 6

critical matter for Utah with respect to LLRW management in the U.S. The management and 

disposal of unique waste streams, such as depleted uranium, at commercial facilities places the 

importance of this matter at the forefront of the regulatory agenda. 

While the current approach is to complete the site-specific performance assessment rulemaking 

before initiating a waste classification rulemaking, we believe it is more reasonable to pursue and 

complete the waste classification rulemaking, or at least the classification of depleted uranium, in 

advance of the current site-specific rulemaking. NRC staff have stated the reason for the current 

sequence of the rulemakings is that completing the site-specific rulemaking will serve to inform 

the need for and/or determine the scope of the waste classification rulemaking. 

However, we believe that the overwhelmingly significant differences in the radioactive 

characteristics of depleted uranium (tens of thousands of years of increased radioactivity due to 

progeny ingrowth) and traditional Class A LLRW (one or two hundred years of decreased 

radioactivity), including other long-lived radionuclides, justifies the need to determine the 

classification of depleted uranium before completing the site-specific rulemaking. Classifying 

depleted uranium will actually better inform the site-specific rulemaking since depleted uranium 

is used so frequently as the primary example of how the site-specific rulemaking proposes to 

address long-lived radionuclides. The unique nature of depleted uranium compared to all other 

LLRW, particularly Class A wastes, seems to compel the need for an earlier waste classification 

action rather than later. 

SPECIFIC COMMENTS 

§ 61.1 PURPOSE AND SCOPE 

During the recent public meetings the NRC held in each of the sited states, NRC staff stated that 

although no specific changes are being proposed to § 61.1 for the current rulemaking proposal, 

the requirements of paragraph (a) newly apply to the proposed changes. Although noted above 

and for added emphasis, UDWMRC concurs with the comments of the Low-Level Waste Forum 

Part 61 Working Group on this matter. 

§ 61.2 DEFINITIONS 

COMPLIANCE PERIOD – UDWMRC recommends that the definition for compliance period be 

revised to indicate that for purposes of applying the required analyses for the performance 

period, the compliance period is considered to be a minimum of 10,000 years. 

§ 61.7 CONCEPTS 

While helpful and instructive in setting the context of the Part 61 requirements, the proposed 

changes emphasize the value of placing this entire section within the accompanying guidance 

document (“Guidance for Conducting Technical Analyses for 10 CFR Part 61,” NUREG-2175). 

The section could possibly then be retitled and used to reference the guidance document. 
UDWMRC July 24, 2015

Page 4 of 6

The proposed revisions to this section, particularly paragraph (f) regarding waste classification 

and near-surface disposal, underscore the need to perform the waste classification of depleted 

uranium in advance of completing this proposed rulemaking. It is clear that depleted uranium 

does not fit within or is consistent with the waste classification description within this section. 

§ 61.12 SPECIFIC TECHNICAL INFORMATION 

Paragraph (j)(2) – Requiring the submittal of a “description of the quality assurance 

program...for the development of technical analyses” is overly broad and ambiguous and will 

create confusion in its implementation. A suggested revision would be: 

 “(2) The development of the applicable technical analyses required in § 61.13; and” 

§ 61.13 TECHNICAL ANALYSES 

Performance Assessment (PA) 

From our experience, we recognize the difficulty in conducting a technical analysis over 

extreme time periods that inherently create a significant level of variability and uncertainty. 

We appreciate the flexibility in addressing such critical factors. While § 61.13 does not 

explicitly prescribe the analytical approach (i.e., deterministic vs. probabilistic), the 

regulatory agency will need the authority to approve (or disapprove) the approach selected by 

the licensee or applicant. 

Paragraph (3) may be difficult to address since a licensee or applicant is required to consider 

the likelihood of disruptive or other unlikely items.

Paragraph 61.13 (a)(9) “consider alternative conceptual models” How to address and 

evaluate, as a regulator and how to determine the acceptability of the licensee’s or applicant’s 

consideration? 

The UDWMRC concurs with the value of performing a site-specific technical analysis since 

it moves away from a more generic or one-size-fits-all approach and fosters greater 

confidence in the results. 

Exclusions, limits, or boundaries are based on site conditions and critical or key dynamics 

over the appropriate time periods associated with a given waste. This is especially valid for 

depleted uranium. 

The UDWMRC supports requiring a PA at closure, but only to capture any significant 

changes such as the source inventory or key dynamics associated with the operational life of 

the facility, but should not be automatically required if the waste inventory primarily 

consisted of traditional LLRW envisioned and analyzed at the time of the development of 

Part 61 (61.28) 

Table A – may be difficult to implement due to the likelihood of incorrectly determining the 

appropriate/applicable waste concentration. 
UDWMRC July 24, 2015

Page 5 of 6

§ 61.41 PROTECTION OF THE GENERAL POPULATION FROM RELEASES OF 

RADIOACTIVITY 

The UDWMRC recommends for those paragraphs where the proposed compatibility category is 

designated as category A or B to be revised to category C in order to allow the flexibility an 

Agreement State will need in order to address site-specific needs/conditions, as described in 

additional detail in the “Compatibility Section” above. 

§ 61.42 PROTECTION OF INADVERTENT INTRUDERS 

The UDWMRC recommends for those paragraphs where the proposed compatibility category is 

designated as category A or B to be revised to category C in order to allow the flexibility an 

Agreement State will need in order to address site-specific needs/conditions, as described in 

additional detail in the “Compatibility Section” above. 

§ 61.58 WASTE ACCEPTANCE 

The UDWMRC recommends the compatibility category of this section be revised from the 

proposed category B to category C in order to allow the flexibility an Agreement State will need 

in order to address site-specific needs/conditions, as described in additional detail in the 

“Compatibility Section” above. 

Paragraph 61.58(f) – UDWMRC recommends requiring the licensee to prepare a report of the 

annual review of the required items and submit the report to the Commission (Agreement State) 

in order to determine the adequacy of the licensee’s implementation and determine any necessary 

revisions. 

Paragraph 61.58(h) – As currently written, the proposed changes in paragraph 61.58(h) create at 

least four important concerns. First, it inappropriately predetermines the outcome of a decision 

about the use of waste acceptance criteria by using the phrase “will be approved.” Second, with 

the apparent certainty in the approval of the waste acceptance criteria, it limits flexibility and 

undermines the ability to exercise the option proposed by the hybrid approach, which allows for 

the continued use of the existing waste classification system. Third, it creates regulatory 

confusion by implying that with the approval of waste acceptance criteria, application of the 

waste classification system is unnecessary or even completely moot. Fourth, the reference to 

applying the criteria of § 61.23 is overly broad and should at least specifically exclude paragraph 

(h), which addresses financial surety, and is not directly tied to a determination of the approval of 

waste acceptance criteria. Additionally, given the proposed language in § 61.7, “Concepts,” 

regarding waste acceptance, the reference to using the criteria of § 61.23 is inconsistent. As 

described in § 61.7, waste acceptance is based on meeting the performance objectives and is not 

specifically linked to the criteria of § 61.23. 
UDWMRC July 24, 2015

Page 6 of 6

REGULATORY ANALYSIS 

In association with the proposed rule changes to Part 61, the NRC prepared a regulatory analysis 

to evaluate the potential costs of the proposed changes. Based on our experience with evaluating 

and reviewing a performance assessment for the potential disposal of large quantities of depleted 

uranium in a near-surface disposal facility, the implementation cost estimate for Agreement 

States is significantly understated. The NRC should re-evaluate the rationale and assumptions 

made to determine the implementation costs since such costs can be difficult to cover under state 

budgets. 

As frequently noted in the proposed rulemaking, the various site-specific technical analyses that 

will be required are complex, complicated and typically encompass large amounts of data and 

information. Consequently, the resources associated with the review and evaluation process are 

extensive and easily exceed the estimated costs in the regulatory analysis. Additional 

implementation costs also stem from public and stakeholder outreach efforts. Perhaps equally 

important are the potential added costs incurred by a sited state to enhance its compliance 

oversight of incoming shipments from LLRW generators and brokers that may be confused as to 

which waste acceptance requirements (waste classification limits or WAC) apply at a given 

commercial disposal facility. 
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 7/28/15 3:09 PM

Received: July 24, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8k63-dsvy

Comments Due: July 24, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0077

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0139

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-06429

Submitter Information

Name: Stephen Taylor

General Comment

Regarding Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Dear United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

I am writing regarding the proposed rule change on Low-Level Radioactive Waste.

I appreciate the opportunity to voice my concerns.

Classifying depleted uranium as Class A waste:

The classification of depleted uranium as Class A was is demonstrably false. That classification is intended 

for low level nuclear waste that will become benign in a relatively brief period of time. Depleted uranium 

becomes more radioactive over time.

Considering the chemical toxicity of uranium oxides as equivalent to its present radioactive toxicity:

The present radioactivity of the material is relatively low, of course, but the chemical toxicity of uranium 

oxides is anything but. Numerous studies available on the internet demonstrate that the toxicity of DU is at 

best unresolved. In fact, the history of the effect of this material on soldiers and civilians in theaters of war 

where it has been used for projectiles demonstrates that its long term effects include death and chronic illness 

and perhaps birth defects. It is unfortunate that the NRC has been amenable to Energy Solutions requests to 

lessen the protections that the proposed Clive disposal site will afford by a factor of ten, and that unfriendly 

agencies could fairly easily create conditions leading to the dispersal of finely pulverized DU oxides into the 

atmosphere. The chemical toxicity of hte material would cause widespread health effects downwind in the 

heavily populated Wasatch Front communities.

Failing to consider the possibility of terrorist intrusion into the Clive site:

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80FR1608176
In fact, airborne or rocket intrusion by use of explosives could cause DU to be finely pulverized and expelled 

into the air, as just stated. The Clive site has no means of protection from such actions.

Lining the excavation with a thin layer of clay:

Such a lining provides a minimum of protection from intrusion by animals, insects and covert personnel 

action.

Thank you for consideration of the foregoing points. 

Page 2 of 2

file:///C:/Users/CAG/Documents/XPMigratedFolders/NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0139.html 07/28/2015
Bryan W. Shaw, Ph.D., P.E., Chairman 

Toby Baker, Commissioner 

Richard A. Hyde, P.E., Executive Director 

TEXAS COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 

Protecting Texas by Reducing and Preventing Pollution 

July 20, 2015 

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 

Attention: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff 

Re: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

Dear Sir or Madam: 

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) appreciates the opportunity 

to comment on the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed 

revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 provided in Request For Comments on The Draft Proposed 

Rule: Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal (10 CFR PART 61)(RIN 3150-Al92). TCEQ 

previously advised NRC staff that comments would be submitted. 

Enclosed please find the TCEQ's detailed comments relating to the NRC's proposed 

revisions referenced above. If you have any questions concerning the enclosed 

comments, please contact Mr. Brad Broussard of the Radioactive Materials Division, at 

(512) 239-6380, or at brad.broussard@tceq.texas.gov. 

Sincerely, 

Richard A. Hyde, P.E. 

Executive Director 

P.O. Box i3087 • Austin, Texas 78711-3087 • 512-239-1000 • tceq.texas.gov 

How is our customer service? tceq.texas.gov/customersurvey 

printed on recycled paper using vegetable-based •nk 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608177
Comments on Proposed Revisions to 10 CFR Part 20 and 

10 CFR Part 61 

Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 

Overview: 

The Texas Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ) values the opportunity to 

provide comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) proposed revisions 

to 10 CFR Part 20 and 10 CFR Part 61. The TCEQ supports the proposed changes to 10 

CFR Part 20 and has no comments on those revisions at this time. 

The TCEQ supports the proposed revisions to 10 CFR Part 61 requiring technical 

analyses and the associated compliance period, protective assurance period, and 

performance period. The TCEQ also supports the proposed requirement for 

development of waste acceptance criteria based on site-specific analysis. There is further 

support for conducting an intruder analysis and the related dose/dose target for 

protection of human health. Further, the TCEQ supports identification and evaluation of 

features, events, and processes (FEPs) and a demonstration of defense-in-depth through 

engineering design and site characteristics. 

The TCEQ has the following comments as noted below in both a general and specific 

context. 

General Comments 

The TCEQ suggests adding definitions in the regulations for defense-in-depth and the 

safety case, which were always present in the performance objectives and facility design 

and location requirements. This will explain more clearly to the public the methodology 

used to ensure that a LLRW disposal facility will protect public health and safety while 

providing a means for taking care of the need to dispose of LLRW waste. The proposed 

requirements for the licensee to submit a safety case analysis of the LLRW disposal 

facility that includes a defense-in-depth analysis will clarify and make more transparent 

to the public the decision-making and analysis necessary in determining that the waste 

acceptance criteria and the facility design and location will result in the safe disposal of 

the LLRW. 

The proposed changes will allow the use of a performance assessment to determine 

waste acceptance criteria for waste that was not considered in the original analysis that 

lead to the current LLRW classification. This will give the states and licensees additional 

flexibility while maintaining public health and safety. Texas has already employed the 

use of a performance assessment to determine what concentrations, total activity, and 

additional restraints are required for the disposal of depleted uranium since the original 

Page 1of 4 
~·. 

waste classification analysis did not include large amounts of depleted uranium and 

agrees that this methodology should be standard throughout the country. 

The proposed three-tiered approach, with staggered dose limits over three time periods 

of a disposal site, provides a reasonable balance between the need to assess site 

performance and the inherent uncertainty in predicting dose to the public and intruders 

very far into the future. The three-tier approach will still allow Texas to analyze the 

performance of the LLRW disposal facility up to peak dose as is currently required in 

Texas rules. However, those rules require the compliance period to be 1,000 years or 

peak dose, whichever is longer. Adopting the proposed compliance period with a 

compatibility category B may be perceived as a lowering of the standards for radioactive 

waste disposal. The TCEQ requests that NRC assign those requirements as compatibility 

category C, as further detailed below. 

Specific Comments 

1.) Amended Section 61.13(e), Technical Analyses. 

61.13{e) states "Analyses that assess how the disposal site limits the potential 

long-term radiological impacts, consistent with available data and current 

scientific understanding. The analyses shall be required for disposal sites with 

waste that contains radionuclides with average concentrations exceeding the 

values listed in table A of this paragraph, or if necessitated by site-specific 

conditions. For wastes containing mixtures of radionuclides found in table A, the 

total concentration shall be determined by the sum of fractions rule described in 

paragraph 6t.55(a)(7). The analyses must identify and describe the features of the 

design and site characteristics that will demonstrate that the performance 

objectives set forth in§§ 6i.41(c) and 6i.42(c) will be met." 

Comment: The TCEQ suggests that the NRC consider removing Table A and 

. references from the proposed rule and move the table to the draft guidance 

document, NUREG-2175. The TCEQ supports the remaining proposed revisions 

in 61.13 for conducting technical analyses and the compatibility categories. 

2.) Amended Section§ 61.41(a), Protection of the General Population 

From Releases of Radioactivity. 

61.41(a) states "Concentrations of radioactive material that may be released to 

the general environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or 

animals must not result in an annual dose exceeding an equivalent of 0.25 

milliSievert (25 millirems) to any member of the public within the compliance 

period. Reasonable effort should be made to maintain releases of radioactivity in 

effluents to the general environment as low as is reasonably achievable during the 

compliance period. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated 

through analyses that meet the requirements specified in§ 61.13(a)." 

Page 2of 4 
Comment: The compatibility category for this amended section is proposed to 

remain unchanged as category A. The TCEQ suggests the NRC consider a 

compatibility category of C so that Texas can keep the requirement of peak dose 

or it may be perceived as a lowering of the standards for radioactive waste 

disposal. This will allow Texas to retain the flexibility in regulations more 

stringent than the NRC. 

3.) New Section§ 61.41(b), Protection of the General Population From 

Releases of Radioactivity. 

61.41(b) states "Concentrations of radioactive material that may be released to 

the general environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or 

animals shall be minimized during the protective assurance period. The annual 

dose, established on the license, shall be below 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) or 

a level that is supported as reasonably achievable based on technological and 

economic considerations in the information submitted for review and approval 

by the Commission. Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated 

through analyses that meet the requirements specified in § 6i.13(a)." 

Comment: The TCEQ suggests removing "established on the license." Since this 

will already be stated in the rule there is no need to state it in the site's license as 

well. Also, this new section is being proposed with a compatibility category B. The 

TCEQ suggests that the NRC consider changing the compatibility to category C. 

This will allow the sited states greater flexibility in meeting the requirements 

proposed in 61.41(b) and will be consistent with the compatibility category in 

61.13. 

4.) Amended Section § 6i.42(a), Protection of Inadvertent Intruders. 

61.42(a) states "Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility must 

ensure protection of any inadvertent intruder into the disposal site who occupies 

the site or contacts the waste at any time after active institutional controls over 

the disposal site are removed. The annual dose must not exceed 5 milliSieverts 

(500 millirems) to any inadvertent intruder within the compliance period. 

Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the requirements specified in§ 6i.13(b)." 

Comment: The compatibility category for this amended section is proposed to 

be changed from compatibility H&S to compatibility category A. The TCEQ 

suggests that the NRC consider changing the compatibility to category C. This 

will allow the sited states greater flexibility in meeting the requirements proposed 

in 6i.42(a) and will be consistent with the compatibility category in 6i.13. 

5.) New Section§ 6t.42(b), Protection of Inadvertent Intruders. 

Page3of4 
61.42(b) states "Design, operation, and closure of the land disposal facility shall 

minimize exposures to any inadvertent intruder into the disposal site at any time 

during the protective assurance period. The annual dose, established on the 

license, shall be below 5 milliSieverts (500 millirems) or a level that is supported 

as reasonably achievable based on technological and economic considerations in 

the information submitted for review and approval by the Commission. 

Compliance with this paragraph must be demonstrated through analyses that 

meet the requirements specified in§ 6t.13(b)." 

Comment: The compatibility category for this new section is proposed to be 

compatibility category B. The TCEQ suggests that the NRC consider changing the 

compatibility to category C. This will allow the sited states greater flexibility in 

meeting the requirements proposed in 6t.42(b) and will be consistent with the 

compatibility category in 6t.13. 

6.) Revised Section§ 61.58 Waste acceptance. 

61.58 states "Waste acceptance criteria. Each applicant shall provide, for 

approval by the Commission, criteria for the acceptance of waste for disposal that 

provide reasonable assurance of compliance with the performance objectives of 

subpart C of this part. Waste acceptance criteria shall specify, at a minimum, the 

following: .... " 

Comment: The compatibility category for this amended section is proposed to be 

changed from compatibility D to compatibility category B. The TCEQ suggests 

that the NRC consider changing the compatibility to category C. This will allow 

the sited states greater flexibility in meeting the requirements proposed in 6i.58. 

Page4of 4 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Gabriel Bohnee <gabeb@nezperce.org>

Sent: Thursday, July 30, 2015 12:25 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: Amanda Rogerson; David Bernhard

Subject: [External_Sender] Nez Perce Tribe ERWM comments

Attachments: Docket ID NRC-2015-0003 LLW Disposal Comments from NPT ERWM.pdf

Attached are the Nez Perce Tribe’s Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Division’s comments on the

Proposed Rule for Low‐Level Radioactive Waste Disposal.

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608178
July 29, 2015 

ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION & WASTE MANAGEMENT 

P.O. BOX 365 · LAPWAI, IDAHO 83540-0365 · (208) 843-7375 /FAX: 843-7378 

Cindy Bladey, Chief Rules, Announcements, and Directives Branch (RADB) 

Office of Administration Mail Stop: 3WFN-06-A44M 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

Washington DC 20555-0001 

Re: Comments on Docket ID NRC-2015-0003, proposed changes to Low Level Waste 

Disposal 

Dear Ms. Bladey: 

The Nez Perce Tribe appreciates the opportunity to comment on Proposed I 0 CFR Part 

61 Technical Requirements and Guidance. The Nez Perce Tribe is committed to 

protecting, preserving, and perpetuating the natural resources on which our people have 

depended since time immemorial. These resources are critical to our cultural and 

economic survival. When these resources are contaminated or lost, part of our connection 

to the land, and hence part of our culture, is lost. The Tribe relies on NRC, as our federal 

fiduciary trustee, to protect the Nez Perce Tribe's treaty resources. 

The Tribe largely agrees with the changes NRC has made. Many of the changes will 

ensure the safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste. The Tribe does have two core 

concerns regarding the proposed changes, however. The Tribe is concerned that the 

proposed changes constitute a relaxation of exposure standards for tribal members and 

the general public for commercial, near-surface Low Level Radioactive Waste (LLRW) 

disposal facilities for the timeframe that begins 1,000 years after closure and extends for 

the subsequent 9,000 years. This relaxation increases "acceptable" exposure limits 

approximately twenty fold from the previous standard, and potentially prohibits the full, 

safe utilization of natural resources by tribal members and the general public during that 

time period. In addition, the changes, in some instances, allow the near-surface disposal 

of large quantities of depleted uranium, which has been proven unsafe, by NRC's own 

analysis. The previous standards would require large quantities of depleted uranium to be 

disposed at a deeper site like the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) and not in nearsurface LLRW disposal facilities, especially when a time frame greater than 10,000 years 

is considered. 

The Tribe appreciates your consideration of our comments and a timely response. Please 

contact Gabriel Bohnee, ERWM Director, at (208) 621-3746 or gabeb@nezperce.org, 
with any questions on these comments. We look forward to an inclusive, open decisionmaking process with the goal of protecting the Nez Perce Tribe's retained treaty rights 

and the Columbia River. 

Sincerely, 

Gabriel Bohnee 

ER WM Director 

Cc: Rod Skeen, CTUIR 

Russell Jim, YIN 

Ken Niles, Oregon 

Dennis Faulk, EPA 

Jane Hedges, Ecology 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Marv Lewis <marvlewis@juno.com>

Sent: Sunday, August 02, 2015 5:02 PM

To: Comfort, Gary; maryo@nirs.org; dianed@nirs.org; RulemakingComments Resource; 

janetmike@comcast.net

Subject: One comment on 10cfr61 rulemaking.

Dear Mr. Comfort, 

 Thank you for allowing me to get one ,last comment in on this rulemaking . 

 My point is that the proposed rule will mesh in an unfortunate timing with the TPP, Transpacific Partnership 

treaty, to force the USA to become the National Sacrifice area for the dumping of low level radioactive waste 

from the entire World! 

Respectfully submitted, 

Marvin Lewis 

marvlewis@juno.com 

3133 Fairfield Street 

Philadelphia, PA 19136 

2152789963 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608179
PR-20, 61 

80FR1608180

1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: ed trever <trev.ed@gmail.com>

Sent: Saturday, July 25, 2015 12:55 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] 

It is critical for the NRC to maintain tough standards for radioactive waste. Any safety assessments should be 

made by an entity that does not have a clear conflict-of-interest of a close relationship with waste dump 

operators. States should not be prevented from setting their own, stricter safety standards, especially in denser 

population areas. 

Please keep the general public's interest at heart. 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608181
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1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Barbara <warrenba@msn.com>

Sent: Monday, September 21, 2015 2:58 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource; Gallagher, Carol

Subject: [External_Sender] Final Comments LLRW Disposal Docket ID NRC-2011-0012

Attachments: Final Comments NRC proposed rule 10 CFR 61 Sept. 21. 15.pdf

We are submitting Final Comments on this Proposed Rule 10 CFR Parts 20 and 61.

  

On behalf of multiple organizations,

  

Barbara Warren, RN,MS

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608183
Alaska Community Action on Toxics * Beyond Nuclear * 

Alliance for A Green Economy * Citizens’ Environmental Coalition * 

Dr. Whyte Pediatrics * Citizens to End Nuclear Dumping in Tennessee*

Nukewatch * Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes * 

Empire State Consumer Project * Nuclear Age Peace Foundation * 

Long Branch Environmental Education Center * Uranium Watch* 

 New York Public Interest Research Group * 

Sierra Club Atlantic Chapter * Sierra Club Niagara Group * 

 

 September 21, 2015 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission Submitted via website and Email 

Washington, DC 20555-0001 Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Re: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012; NRC-2015-0003; 

RIN 3150A- 192

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

NRC proposed rule 10 CFR Parts 20 & 61 

Summary 

We appreciate the granting of our extension request on this important proposed rule. 

Unfortunately, the NRC proposal misrepresents the nature and significance of the 

proposal in order to evade what should be the normal process of review. NRC offers the 

fact that it is promulgating requirements for more technical analysis from applicants 

and licensees to ensure safety. The safety conclusion was arrived at without analyzing 

the increased radioactive hazard, involving potentially one million metric tons of long 

lived radionuclides being handled by careless disposal. This conclusion does not protect 

the public for the long term. 

While we have supported earlier comments by the Nuclear Information and Resource 

Service, these comments are focused on why a Full Environmental Impact Statement is 

necessary under the National Environmental Policy Act, NEPA. The nature of the 

hazard for thousands or millions of years into the future, its size, potential magnitude 

of severe impacts and the limited recommended protections for just a fraction of the 

hazard time period, require far more careful analysis than an Environmental 
2 

Assessment can provide. The finding of no significant impact is not supported by the 

actual proposal and its clear potential of harm. 

Furthermore, NRC’s proposal undertakes risk management in the absence of the 

required risk assessment, which is standard in federal policy development and NRC 

itself identified as necessary for its LLRW program in 2012. We also identify other 

required considerations that were not undertaken by NRC—children’s health, 

environmental justice and climate change. 

Detailed Comments 

A full Environmental Impact Statement is necessary to address the many concerns 

raised by this proposal. Below we discuss some of the rationale that support the 

necessity of an EIS (see bullets below) , however we acknowledge that we are not 

planning to highlight every issue, only the major areas that required a more thorough 

analysis. 

 This is a major federal action involving potentially over a million metric tons of 

radioactive waste and depleted uranium including long- lived radionuclides that 

are still present thousands, even millions of years after the 10,000 year protective 

assurance period ends. The Agency has provided no analysis of health and 

environmental impacts in this proposal and there clearly was no analysis for the 

long time frame post 10,000 years in which hazardous long lived radionuclides 

will largely be ignored. This stands in stark contrast to the fact that the proposal 

is talking about requiring analyses from applicants and licensees to license or 

expand a disposal site and operate it. 

 This federal action largely requires states to accept this regulatory plan by 

agreeing to adopt the entire plan in order to be compatible with what NRC 

proposes. This certainly restricts states’ rights to utilize more health protective 

standards or to factor in local or regional issues of concern. It also 

underestimates overall state costs by calculating only the implementation costs of 

the rule --- not the long term management of a hazardous site and preventing 

public health and environmental impacts. The implementation costs appear to be 

focused on the costs for the private entity obtaining a license. As a result the 

estimated costs of $2.1 million for all states in no way reflects the true long term 

costs for states. Why would any state agree to this plan unless they are 

completely duped by orchestrated misinformation? 
3 

 The implications of the Public- Private nexus was not explored and evaluated in 

the proposal. The NRC tells us that states or the federal government would have 

to be the owners of the disposal site, but the proposal assumes that a private 

entity would operate the disposal site. The transfer of the site to the owner would 

occur approximately 5 years after site closure, although the Commission could 

even shorten this period. Thus the site owner would likely bear 95% of costs of 

the more than 11,000 years of site management that will be necessary. The 

alternative, of no public health protections is ethically unacceptable. Amazingly 

no detailed financial assurance requirements were discussed related to the 

private disposal operator. This suggests that the operator will be able to earn 

profits for perhaps a few decades and then transfer all responsibilities and all 

potential future environmental and health impacts with no funds to do the job. 

Of course this also means that taxpayers will be paying the true costs that are the 

result of the inadequate analysis associated with this proposal. 

 In fact the entire Part 61 proposal relies on the private sector to conduct a variety 

of technical analyses that establish the stability of a surface disposal site and its 

ability to contain radioactive waste without releasing it to the environment. A 

private entity with interest in short term profits has a built in conflict of interest 

in relation to society’s goals for long term protection of the environment, 

drinking water, and public health. Strict compatibility with this new Part 61 

requires states to assume liability, but they are not provided with any 

opportunity in this proposal to have stronger financial assurance requirements or 

to adopt stricter standards that go above and beyond what NRC is 

recommending. State authority to be more protective must be retained for the 

viability and credibility of the facilities. The pros and cons of this approach 

should have been evaluated in a thorough EIS. In addition there should have 

been some discussion in an EIS of what happens if states don’t agree to this deal. 

 An enormous loophole in the NRC proposal exists concerning the federal 

Department of Energy—a loophole that has had no environmental review. IF 

DOE is the site owner, the entire proposal falls apart—with absolutely no 

substitute or alternative management post site closure. This loophole alone 

should have necessitated a full EIS. Yet the entire subject is dealt with in a small 

paragraph in the proposed rule §61.7 g) (4). If DOE is the site owner, the license 

is terminated after site closure because NRC has no authority over DOE. No 

further explanation is provided. Given the enormity of the DOE complex of 
4 

radioactive facilities, DOE is likely to be the site owner of many of the disposal 

sites contemplated in this rule. The absence of a joint promulgation of this rule or 

announcement of DOE’s intention to agree to NRC’s compatibility requirements 

means that we potentially have a proposal to officially deregulate vast quantities 

of long-lived radioactive waste with no entity responsible to protect the public. 

DOE has major responsibilities over many radioactive waste generator activities, 

nuclear production facilities, weapons work and cleanup and remediation of a 

vast complex of contaminated sites. DOE will certainly be contributing waste to 

the disposal sites contemplated in this proposal, but if DOE is the owner, there 

will be no 1000 year compliance period, no performance assessment period and 

no protective assurance period of 10,000 years. For this reason alone, the NRC 

proposal must be abandoned as unacceptable. 

 Climate change was not considered when the original 10 CFR Part 61 was 

adopted December 27, 1982. Thirty-three years have passed since that time. 

Climate change is now a significant issue internationally, nationally and at the 

state and local levels. President Obama has signed a number of Climate Change 

Executive Orders, some with specific requirements for Federal Agencies to take 

account of climate change (both mitigation and adaptation) in the specific areas 

of their work and in relation to facilities they manage. Not only do we know that 

urgent action is needed on climate change to reduce greenhouse gas emissions 

before a runaway and uncontrollable situation occurs; it has also been made clear 

that climate change impacts are occurring NOW. Notably the NRC has a 

particularly brief and weak Climate Change Adaptation Policy Statement, issued 

in June, 2011. This proposal fails to address Climate Change factors that should 

be considered associated with this proposal. 

The LLRW proposal identifies that “Many features, events and processes can 

influence the ability of a LLRW disposal facility to limit releases of radioactivity 

to the environment.” Unfortunately, the proposed rule fails to define “features, 

events and processes” so that climate change is included and its multiple 

potential impacts appropriately evaluated in order to ensure that protective 

measures are instituted. We know for example that the occurrence of extreme 

rainfall events has increased by 74% in the Northeast of the US. Extreme rainfall 

events accelerate erosion, cause landslides, and flood surface disposal sites –

with the potential to release radioactive materials. Other areas of the US are more 

vulnerable to drought and wildfires and fires have been raging in the West and 
5 

Southwest destroying millions of acres. Radioactive waste stored at Los Alamos 

was actually threatened by wildfire recently. 

The magnitude and frequency of severe events associated with climate change 

have increased dramatically. There is no indication in this proposal that 

applicants and licensees will be required to factor in climate change in any of 

their technical analyses, since climate change is not discussed at all and no EIS 

has evaluated the implications of climate change on surface disposal of 

radioactive materials. 

 There are few specific requirements in the proposal, other than the idea that an 

applicant or licensee must conduct technical analyses. NRC is proposing 

disposing of dangerous, long term hazardous materials in clearly inadequate 

surface disposal facilities that cannot be expected to last over the periods 

necessary. NRC leaves the type of analysis open to the applicant, although 

suggesting qualitative and quantitative analyses. Primarily site factors are listed, 

but this proposal is unlike even EPA’s municipal landfill rule for non-hazardous 

solid waste, which clearly identifies prohibitions to siting a landfill. There are no 

prohibitions here such as for protection of an aquifer. There are no explicit 

requirements for barriers to prevent radioactive releases. Shallow land burial of 

nuclear waste has been a failure across this country—all 6 of the original “lowlevel” nuclear waste sites have leaked or are leaking. States are paying to 

maintain them in perpetuity. The “new” proposed 10 CFR 61 still allows unlined 

soil trench burial for wastes that are dangerous much longer than the ground in 

which they are buried will continue to be solid and stable. NRC really needs to 

be strengthening the regulations—requiring greater integrity and isolation of the 

waste. Instead the proposed rule allows even more dangerous and longer lasting 

waste into inadequate waste sites. NRC should be providing requirements and 

incentives for greater isolation. This proposal is talking about surface disposal 

but provides no requirements or specifications for robust barriers and structures 

to limit rainfall infiltration and in fire prone areas, possibly concrete covers. 

We do not believe that adequate review of all of these technical analyses will 

occur for a variety of reasons. Each applicant or licensee will choose their own 

model and their own inputs, making it difficult for states and federal agencies to 

thoroughly review the accuracy and validity of the results. Standardization could 

help but not eliminate this problem. The NRC, in the absence of any plan to 
6 

verify or conduct vigorous enforcement, is placing complete reliance on these 

technical analyses to claim that Radioactive Releases and Public Health Impacts 

will not occur. However, thorough review is absolutely essential with full 

knowledge of the input parameters on the part of the reviewer, and the 

opportunity for independent review by the public. We strongly oppose this 

proposed rule. Based on the weakness of this proposal, we have no confidence 

that the NRC’s version of reasonable assurance that performance objectives will 

be met from these technical analyses would match that of any “reasonable and 

prudent” person. 

 The so-called inadvertent intruder is also the subject of a licensee analysis. 

However, an inadvertent intruder is not defined. This proposal assumes there 

will be no barriers and signage that might cause an intruder to hesitate. Even 

though requirements for such may not be enforceable, and should certainly not 

counted as credit in performance assessments, NRC should require barriers, 

signage and institutional controls for the entire time period necessary for full 

decay of the radionuclides. It is bizarre to talk about an inadvertent intruder as 

being someone who might undertake home construction or engage in 

agricultural activities. This person is someone taking up long term residence or 

farming activities and much more likely to have higher exposure levels than an 

inadvertent or unintentional intruder. Building a house requires a property title 

search which should indicate that a long term hazard exists at the site. Is NRC 

suggesting that you will require no records to be kept of what was put in these 

sites and how long it will be dangerous? 

Clearly institutional controls are needed for much longer than 100 years if the 

disposal facility contains long lived radioactivity. If an EIS had been prepared 

maybe we would not be guessing about what NRC intends. 

 Public health impacts are actually certain to occur under this proposal given that 

there is no articulated plan to restrict site access and no plan for any 

management after site closure if DOE is involved. Using an exposure limit of 500 

millirems/year is also guaranteed to result in public health impacts. The rule 

allows greater than 500 mr/year in some cases. However, the NRC failed to 

conduct any health and environmental analyses themselves associated with the 

likely radioactive releases and public health impacts that will occur. We strongly 

object to the granting of exemptions or relaxation of standards related to 
7 

technical or economic considerations, when there has been no assessment of the 

public health and environmental impacts. NRC also makes specious claims that 

the proposed technical analyses by licensees will fully protect the public and 

there was no factual basis developed to support this idea in the absence of an 

EIS. 

 Children’s Health Risk assessments address not only the hazard but also the 

populations impacted and whether there exist particular vulnerabilities. NRC 

did not do a risk assessment and did not evaluate for example the unique 

vulnerability of children, which is required under the Executive Order on the 

Protection of Children from Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks, signed 

on April 21, 1977. This Executive Order requires all federal agencies to assign a 

high priority to addressing health and safety risks to children, coordinate 

research priorities on children's health, and ensure that their standards take into 

account special risks to children. The Order also created a President's Task Force 

on Environmental Health Risks and Safety Risks to Children to implement the 

Executive Order. 

The nature of the hazard is critical to this discussion. We are talking about 

radioactivity which damages genes, causing mutations and affecting 

reproduction, in addition to a long list of other organ and system impacts. Some 

of the radionuclides are long-lived and therefore can affect many generations 

into the future. The health of our children and of the whole reproductive part of 

the human life cycle is critical to the survival of humans as a species. The 

required consideration of children did not occur. 

Environmental Justice is addressed in Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to 

Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income 

Populations. The Order states that federal agencies must identify and address, as 

appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or 

environmental effects of their programs, policies, and activities on minority 

populations and low-income populations. These communities often experience 

high pollution levels as well as inadequate oversight and enforcement from 

environmental agencies. We challenge NRC to identify a radioactive waste 

disposal site in a wealthy community. In fact we know that any new radioactive 

disposal facility will be located in some sort of disadvantaged community. 
8 

Multiple pollution burdens contribute to public health disparities based on race, 

ethnicity and income level. The consideration of vulnerable populations was not 

included. An environmental impact statement is necessary to accomplish this 

objective. 

 Intergenerational Injustice 

This proposal involves massive quantities of radioactive waste that must be 

isolated from humans for thousands to millions of years and thus many 

generations. Yet the proposal contemplates short term operation of a disposal 

facility with the subsequent transfer to the government. No funding or details 

about the thousands of years of government management are provided. What is 

provided is very troubling—in the case of DOE the license is merely terminated. 

In the case of states, how are we to ensure the management over thousands of 

years? Few governments have existed continuously for a 1000 years yet we are 

talking about greater than 10,000 and possibly a million years of management. 

Very recently states experienced extraordinary economic problems as a direct 

result of financial deregulation. What amount of funds should be put aside for 

long term future management of these disposal sites and protection of future 

generations? 

In the absence of analysis we are merely transferring enormous hazards and cost 

consequences to our children and grandchildren along with no funds for them to 

manage the risks. 

Risk Assessment & Environmental Review are necessary to develop an adequate 

Risk Management program. In this proposal NRC is starting with what should be the 

end result: the risk management program. 

Risk Assessment is an essential foundational element for developing and undertaking 

to manage risks, such as through a performance assessment program. The current 

proposal was not risk-informed. In fact, the NRC ignored earlier Agency 

recommendations regarding the development of a stronger risk basis for LLRW. The 

current NRC proposal primarily advances risk management in the absence of the 

needed first step, which is Risk Assessment. 

The Agency did make a finding regarding the need for a “stronger risk basis to the 

program” for LLW disposal in its report in 2012 from the Risk Management Task Force 
9 

(RMTF). 1 Several products were supposed to be produced as a result. However, we 

find no discussion of the development and finalization of a stronger risk basis in this 

current proposal. 

The Agency also proposed to “help ensure that current and future regulatory initiatives 

had a stronger, more well-defined risk basis” mentioning at the same time planned 

revisions to 10 CFR 61. The current proposal is a regulatory initiative. A stronger risk 

basis would mean producing a risk assessment. Yet despite the apparent adoption of 

the 2012 recommendations, the Agency did not develop a risk assessment to inform its 

proposed risk management plan, which is primarily reliant upon a performance 

assessment. 

Defense In Depth 

According to the NRC, defense- in-depth is only implicitly contained in the revised Part 

61 proposal. We believe that a factual basis is needed to support the conclusion that this 

proposal constitutes defense in depth. Merely saying that defense in depth is present 

implicitly, without a detailed discussion of the key elements and how they interact to 

provide layers of defense in depth over the various time periods involved, is simply 

insufficient. Also fundamental to developing defense methods is adequate assessment 

of the risks; this is an integrated process involving extensive feedback. 

The RMTF did find that “NRC has not developed an explicit characterization of 

defense-in-depth considerations for the LLW program.” The Task Force also 

recommended that NRC develop an explicit characterization of how defense-in-depth 

within the proposed risk management framework applies to the LLW program and 

build this into current and future staff guidance documents and into training and 

development activities for the staff.”

2

The RMTF also found that “Consideration of environmental risks as well as safety risks 

is a central part of the LLW regulatory program.” It recommended that the NRC 

“ include environmental reviews within the scope of its risk management framework.”

A thorough environmental review in a full environmental impact statement would 

appear to be indicated for the many reasons provided above. We do not believe this 

 

1

 A proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework, from the Risk Management Task Force, NUREG2150, April 2012. 

2

 Ibid, Section 4.4 
10

proposal should be finalized. It is not acceptable and we have only covered a few of the 

reasons. 

Conclusion 

Our nation has failed to grapple effectively with the problems connected to the nuclear 

era and the development of the nuclear bomb. Massive quantities of nuclear waste are 

generated in the entire nuclear chain from the mining of fuel to the use and disposal of 

nuclear waste. All things “nuclear” create radioactive waste. A few decades of fuel in a 

nuclear reactor requires millions of years of isolation. We have NO solutions for this 

waste. The nation has no long term repository and by 2050, we will need 2 repositories. 

Careless handling of nuclear waste has created many environmental releases and 

catastrophes. In 6 years, a private entity, Nuclear Fuel Services, so contaminated the 

West Valley Nuclear Reprocessing site in NY that more than 40 years later there is no 

end in sight for the cleanup, while burial areas threaten to dump their contents to 

waterways leading to the Great Lakes and the drinking water for millions. Annually 

there is a battle over adequate funds to continue the cleanup, which will not be 

completed in the lifetime of any of those participating. One of the nation’s disposal sites 

– WIPP- is now out of service after it suffered a catastrophic explosion, closing it to 

transuranic waste. This particular catastrophe occurred because multiple layers of 

protective barriers, and operational requirements were systematically discontinued, as a 

result of budget cuts, weakening the protections previously deemed necessary. 

At the same time, we are generating more nuclear waste by refurbishing weapons, 

building new nuclear facilities and importing nuclear waste originally provided to 

other countries. In the name of repatriation we are also re- acquiring this waste to be 

managed for millions of years. 

The current nuclear system and its waste are not sustainable. Over the years our 

agencies have weakened public health and safety requirements in multiple ways. As the 

waste quantities grow, the costs also grow, and it is impossible to find a nuclear facility, 

dump or other operation that is not leaking, or posing serious safety and health threats. 

Declassifying hazards, weakening standards, relabeling, and disposing of massive 

volumes of highly hazardous radioactive materials will increasingly contaminate our 

world and impact habitability. This NRC proposal reflects more of the same 

irresponsible approach to our nuclear waste problem. This approach must be ended in 

favor of one that values the earth and future generations. 
11

Respectfully submitted, 

Barbara Warren, RN, MS, Executive Director 

Citizens’ Environmental Coalition

Albany, NY 

Judy Braiman 

Empire State Consumer Project 

Rochester, NY 

Pamela Miller, Executive Director 

Alaska Community Action on Toxics

Anchorage, Alaska 

Kathleen Ferris 

Citizens to End Nuclear Dumping in Tennessee 

Tennessee 

Paul Gallimore, Director 

Long Branch Environmental Education Center 

Leicester, NC 

Alice Slater 

Nuclear Age Peace Foundation 

New York 

Lynda Schneekloth 

Sierra Club Niagara Group 

Buffalo, NY 

Sarah Fields, Director 

Director 

Uranium Watch 

Moab, Utah 
12

John LaForge

Nukewatch, Co-Director,

Luck, Wisconsin

nukewatchinfo.org

Yolanda Whyte, MD 

President, Dr. Whyte Pediatrics 

Vice chair, National Medical Association Commission on Environmental Health 

Atlanta, GA 

www.yolandawhytemd.com

Joanne Hameister 

Steering Committee 

Coalition on West Valley Nuclear Wastes 

Springville, NY 

Russ Haven 

Senior Staff Counsel 

New York Public Interest Research Group 

Albany, New York 

Carl Arnold 

Chair 

Sierra Club Atlantic Chapter 

Albany, New York 

Kevin Kamps 

Radioactive Waste Watchdog 

Beyond Nuclear 

Takoma Park, Maryland 

Jessica Azulay 

Director 

Alliance for a Green Economy 

Syracuse, New York
PR-20, 61 

80FR16081

84 






1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Lois Chalmers/IEER <lois@ieer.org>

Sent: Monday, September 21, 2015 5:56 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Subject: [External_Sender] IEER Comments re: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 (proposed rule) LLRW 

disposal

Attachments: IEER Comments on revision of 10 CFR 61 on NRC LLRW disposal Dkt NRC-2011-0012 

filed 2015-09-21.pdf

Attached please find:  IEER Comments on revision of 10 CFR 61 on NRC LLRW disposal Dkt NRC‐2011‐0012 filed 2015‐09‐

21.pdf

IEER Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Proposed Rule on Low-Level Radioactive Waste 

Disposal (10 CFR Part 61; Docket NRC-2011-0012)1 

Arjun Makhijani 

September 21, 2015

Sincerely yours,  Lois Chalmers for IEER

Ms. Lois Chalmers

Librarian

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research (IEER)

6935 Laurel Avenue, Suite 201

Takoma Park MD 20912  U.S.A.

Phone: 1‐301‐270‐5500; Fax: 1‐301‐270‐3029

e‐mail: lois@ieer.org

website: http://www.ieer.org

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608185
Submitted via e-mail to Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov

IEER Comments on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Proposed Rule on

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal 

(10 CFR Part 61; Docket NRC-2011-0012)1

Arjun Makhijani 

September 21, 2015 

The following are the Comments of the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research 

concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s Proposed Rule on Low-Level Radioactive 

Waste Disposal as it appeared in the Federal Register on March 26, 2015. 

1. I have made a number of comments formally and informally on elements of NRC 20112

on many occasions, including at the invitation of the NRC staff. By-and-large, the

proposed revisions ignore essentials of my comments at best. The NRC has ignored

sound science and common sense in many aspects of the proposed rule.

2. The proposed rule revisions constitute a major federal action. For instance, the revisions

would potentially allow large amounts of extremely long-lived radionuclides, including

hundreds of thousands of tons of depleted uranium from enrichment plants and possibly

even wastes currently defined as Greater-than-Class-C waste, to be disposed of in

shallow land facilities. It is therefore incumbent on the NRC to prepare an

Environmental Impact Statement on the proposed revisions, setting forth and analyzing

reasonable alternatives as well as a no-action alternative.

3. A definition of the term “member of the public” should be provided in the rule. It should

explicitly include people of all ages, including infants and children, and including males

1 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, “10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 [NRC–2011–0012; NRC–2015–0003] 

RIN 3150–AI92. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed Rule,” Federal Register v.80, no.58

(March 26, 2015), pages 16081-16125, on the Web at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-03-26/pdf/2015-

06429.pdf, hereafter 80 FR 16081-16125 (2015-03-26). 2 NRC 2011
2

as well as females. Annual dose compliance should be explicitly assessed to the member 

of the public who is estimated to get the largest dose according to this definition. 

Specifically, for the purposes of 10 CFR 61, the term “member of the public” should be 

defined as 

A member of the public is (i) a male or female of any age affected by the 

operations of a facility covered by this rule except during a period when he or 

she is carrying out any operation which is part of management or disposal of 

low-level radioactive waste, nuclear fuel cycle or (ii) a male or female of any 

age affected by the facility covered by this rule and/or the waste disposed of in 

it after the closure of the facility into the indefinite future. 

4. The definition of “inadvertent intruder” in the proposed rule is absurd. How can a person 

be an “intruder” if they engage in normal activities, such as agriculture, after all 

institutional controls have expired and after all passive barriers are assumed to no longer 

be effective? An “intruder” by definition is someone who is not authorized to be on the 

site but enters anyway. After 500 years, people who enter the site will be members of the 

public who may gain access by purchasing land, by using in a manner that may then be 

authorized, or may simply be using land that has been opened up to the public by design 

or lapse of institutional memory. At that time, anyone on the former disposal site is 

simply a member of the public as defined in paragraph #3 above. We therefore suggest 

that the term ”intruder” be confined to those entering the site without authorization or by 

crossing barriers for the first 500 years, as follows: 

Intruder: Any person who enters the site inadvertently or deliberately 

without authorization or in violation of barriers during the 100-year period 

of institutional control after closure or during the 400 years after that when 

manmade barriers are expected to be effective. 

Dose limits for intruders should be applied only to persons fitting this description. 

5. The proposed revised language of 10 CFR 61.41 (the proposed 10 CFR 61.41(a)) drops organ 

doses altogether from the rule on the grounds that equivalent dose, calculated using organ 

weighting factors is a “modern” approach because such weighting factors did not exist at the 

time of the publication of ICRP 2 (in the late 1950s) on which the current rule is based. This 

is disingenuous and misleading. It would also cause a massive relaxation of allowable 

pollution and organ doses from many radionuclides, including all actinides, strontium-90, 

and various radioiodines. 

While the ICRP has created a methodology for calculating effective dose using organ 

weighting factors, it has not done away with organ doses. Indeed, organ dose

calculations are the foundation of committed effective dose. In other words, organ 

doses must first be calculated before effective dose can be calculated; they remain the 

most fundamental quantity in estimating internal dose.

The calculation of effective dose from organ doses requires the interposition of 

“weighting factors” whose crude nature and even arbitrariness is evidenced, among other 
3

things, by the fact that they have changed greatly in several ways since ICRP 60 was

published in 1991. Table 1 shows the weighting factors in ICRP 60 published in 1991 

and in ICRP 103 published in 2007. 

Table 1: Organ or Tissue weighting factors in ICRP 60 (1991) and ICRP 103 (2007) 

Organ or Tissue

ICRP

60

ICRP

103

Gonads 0.20 0.08

Bone marrow (red) 0.12 0.12

Colon 0.12 0.12

Lung 0.12 0.12

Stomach 0.12 0.12

Bladder 0.05 0.04

Breast 0.05 0.12

Liver 0.05 0.04

Oesophagus 0.05 0.04

Thyroid 0.05 0.04

Skin 0.01 0.01

Bone surface 0.01 0.01

Brain N/A 0.01

Salivary glands N/A 0.01

Remainder (Notes 1 and 2) 0.05 0.12

Source: ICRP 60 (1991) p. 8 and ICRP 103 (2007) p. 65. “N/A” means" not applicable.” 

Notes: 1. Remainder in ICRP 60: adrenals, brain, upper large intestine, small intestine,

kidney, muscle, pancreas, spleen, thymus, and uterus.

2. Remainder in ICRP 103: adrenals, extrathoracic (ET) region, gall bladder, heart, kidneys, 

lymphatic nodes, muscle, oral mucosa, pancreas, prostate (males), small intestine, spleen, 

thymus, uterus/cervix (females).

Note the large differences in the weighting factors for gonads (down by 60 percent in

ICRP 103), breast (up by 140 percent in ICRP 103) and the “remainder” (up by 140 

percent in ICRP 103). 

The list of radiosensitive organs that had individual weighting factors is longer in ICPR

103; the list of organs in the “remainder” also increased in ICRP 103. For instance the 

lymphatic nodes were not included in weighting factors at all in ICRP 60. Indeed, seven 

new organs appeared in ICRP 103 that were not mentioned at all in ICRP 60: salivary

glands, the ET region, gall bladder, heart, lymphatic nodes, oral mucosa, and prostate 

(males). One organ was eliminated: upper large intestine, which, in ICRP 60 was part 

of the “remainder”; this was in addition to the colon being listed as a separate organ.

The averaging of male and female gonads (testes and ovaries, respectively) also does not 

make sense in the context of the rule of protecting the most exposed member of the 

public. It is also highly prejudicial to women and to future generations. Specifically, 

primary oocytes are formed in utero; females are typically born with a million or more of 

them. Sperm, in contrast, are continuously created. Moreover, the contribution of the 
4

ovum to a person is far greater than that of the sperm; for one thing, all mitochondria, 

which are the foundation of the human energy system, come from the ova. In contrast, 

radiation damage to an embryo arising from damaged sperm would typically occur due 

to exposure in the weeks just before conception; moreover sperm contribute no 

mitochondria. 

Similarly, averaging the male and female breast makes no sense from the point of view of 

a rule seeking to protect all members of the public to a standard that is equal to or better 

than that of the most exposed member of the public. Female breast cancer is 100 times 

more common than the male breast cancer.3 The risk factors for breast cancer incidence 

in BEIR VII show the female breast to be a highly radiosensitive organ; the male breast 

cancer risk was low enough that it was lumped together with the remainder of the 

cancers not explicitly listed. Female infants have a risk of 0.117 cancers per sievert for 

breast cancer alone. This risk is about the same as the lifetime average for all cancers

(male and female average risk). In contrast, the prostate cancer risk for male infants is 

more than ten times lower – 0.0093 cancers per sievert. A weighting factor that

averages male and female breasts therefore is highly stacked against females, especially

female children who are highly vulnerable to breast cancer risk compared to almost all 

other cancers except non-fatal skin cancers, for which male infants have the greatest

radiosensitivity, according to the EPA.4

It is clear that sex averaging of weighting factors is unjustified for a dose-based rule that 

seeks to protect “any member of the public.” 

Averaging organ weighting factors by age also makes no sense in a regulatory context in 

which the aim is to limit dose to the most exposed member of the public, who will often 

be a child. Children’s organs are still developing; for some organs that process extends 

through puberty. Averaging them with adult organ weighting factors is scientifically

unacceptable in a dose-based standard.

The NRC’s argument that organ dose should be eliminated because the ICRP 2 approach 

was based on an obsolete “critical organ” approach is specious. Organ dose is still 

fundamental to internal dosimetry. There is nothing obsolete about this approach. 

Moreover, current science continues to show that many radionuclides target specific 

organs like the thyroid or bone surface. This means that limiting organ doses is the most 

protective way to limit harm to public health.

The organ dose approach is entirely modern; as noted, organ doses are the basis for 

effective dose estimates. The method of calculating organ doses has been updated, and 

the updated dose conversion factors have been published by the EPA in Federal Guidance 

Report 13. This new method of calculation should be adopted. That is the proper way

 

3 American Cancer Society 2014

4 NAS/NRC 2006 Table 12-D1 (p. 311); units converted to risk per sievert. The EPA estimates female breast cancer 

incidence risk as 0.126 cancers per Sv (EPA 2011 Table 3-12b (p. 54)). It is the most radiosensitive cancer of all 

excluding non-fatal skin cancers, for which male infants have the greatest radiosensitivity at 0.172 cancers per Sv 

(EPA 2011 Table 3-12a and Table 3-12b (p. 54)). 
5

to update the rule to reflect recent scientific understanding. For internal dose this will 

mean limiting the committed equivalent organ dose due to intake in one year to any

member of the public plus the external dose to that organ to a specified limit.

As further evidence of the current validity of organ dose, we note that U.S. government is 

implementing a large compensation program for current and former nuclear weapons 

complex workers stricken with cancer likely caused by radiation exposure at work based 

entirely on organ dose calculations. Internal doses to a specific target organ (relevant for 

a particular cancer) from a multiple radionuclides are calculated; external organ doses 

are added to them. Effective doses are not involved in determining probability of 

causation or in compensation decisions. 

Further, the ICRP itself has explained that effective dose, while convenient for regulatory 

purposes and for estimating risk to the public on some aggregated basis, is not intended 

for individual protection: 

Effective dose is an indicator for stochastic risk but it is not intended for the

assessment of risks of individuals.

5

The reason is that there are “uncertainties in the low-dose range, underlying 

approximations, simplifications, sex and age - averaging).”6 While the uncertainties and

the degree of arbitrariness in weighting factors and the variable grouping of organs under 

the rubric of “remainder” of the body is not explicitly mentioned in this quote, any

reasonable understanding of current dose estimation methods and of cancer induction 

points to organ doses as the most fundamental quantity in radiation dosimetry and the 

protection of public health if a dose-based standard is used. 

ICRP 103 explains that the weighting factors are averages over populations do not apply 

to particular individuals: 

They represent mean values for humans averaged over both sexes and all 

ages and thus do not relate to the characteristics of particular individuals.7

10 CFR 61 and other basic radiation protection rules, like 40 CFR 190, are fundamentally 

about the limitation of individual dose. By limiting the dose to “any member of the 

public” to a specified value, the rule ensures that all members of the public are protected 

to the same or higher levels than the most exposed member of the public (that is, to a 

level of dose or risk that is lower than the most exposed member of the public). This 

goal is substantially compromised when average weighting factors are used. It is utterly 

compromised when male and female weighting factors for all age groups are averaged, 

as is the case with present weighting factors in both ICRP 60 and ICRP 103. This is 

because current understanding of radiation risk shows that females and children face 

substantially higher risk for most cancers than adult males for the same radiation dose. 

 

5 Menzel 2011 Slide 20, italics added

6 Menzel 2011 Slide 20

7 ICRP 103 (2007) p. 68, italics added 
6

Children also generally get higher committed equivalent organ doses than adults per unit 

of radioactivity inhaled or ingested.8 These understandings of the higher risk faced by 

females and children and the higher doses experienced by children represent the most 

fundamental updating of the science that needs to be reflected in the revised rule. 

Effective dose, which uses average weighting factors, does not and cannot do that job.

It would be unacceptable and unscientific to drop organ doses; it is all the more egregious 

that the NRC is proposing to do so on the grounds of modernizing and updating the 

science. As I have pointed out more than once, both to the NRC and to the EPA, we still 

have organs. Organ doses are still calculated in the most up-to-date science, though

somewhat differently than before. The present science still shows that many

radionuclides preferentially target certain organs, as a simple fact of human biology. 

Organ doses are the most fundamental quantities in modern internal radiation dose 

estimation. It is the weighting factors that are used to calculate effective dose that add a 

large element of uncertainty and even arbitrariness to the process. As they currently

stand, they also obliterate essential differences between males and females and between 

children and adults. Effective dose may be convenient for regulators and licensees 

because it enables them to roll everything into a single number. But regulation is not for 

the convenience of licensees and regulators. It is for the protection of the public. 

Modernizing and updating the science points in the direction of dropping effective dose 

and limiting the rule to organ doses, including internal doses from combinations of 

radionuclides added to the external dose. It is also relevant in this context to note that 

whole bodies do not get cancer (though, once contracted, it can spread throughout the 

body). Cancer initially affects a particular organ or system. Even circulatory and 

lymphatic system cancers have target organs, like the bone marrow and lymph nodes. 

In sum, the most reliable current science points in the direction of focusing 10 CFR 61 

on organ dose alone and rejecting committed effective dose.

Finally, it is important to note that dropping organ doses from the rule in favor of 

effective dose alone would substantially relax the implicit permissible concentrations of

all radionuclides that preferentially target certain organs. Examples include all actinides 

and strontium-90, which target the bone surface, and radioactive isotopes of iodine which 

target the thyroid. This was pointed out in a study commissioned by the EPA as long 

ago as 1997.9 It would be completely unacceptable to relax radiation protection under 

the guise of modernizing and updating the science, especially when recent science,

including the risks published by the EPA in 2011,10 has concluded that the cancer risks of 

radiation are far greater than those estimated when 40 CFR 190 was first promulgated. 

In light of the above, we recommend that 10 CFR 61.41 be revised to read:

 

8 FGR 13 CD Suppl. (2002)

9 SC&A 1997

10 EPA 2011
7

Concentrations of radioactive material which may be released to the general

environment in ground water, surface water, air, soil, plants, or animals 

must not result in an annual dose exceeding an equivalent of 25 millirems to 

the whole body or to any organ of any member of the public, with annual

internal dose being defined as committed equivalent dose to any organ due 

to intakes of radionuclides in one year; all pathways are included in the 

estimation of dose, including the drinking water pathway from all sources of 

drinking water affected by the facility. Drinking water concentrations

specified in or implicit in 40 CFR 141.66 must not be exceeded in surface 

water or groundwater at any point on or beyond the site boundary due to 

operations of the facility or disposal of radionuclides at the facility. 

Reasonable effort should be made to maintain releases of radioactivity in 

effluents to the general environment as low as is reasonably achievable. 

We have reduced the allowable dose to the thyroid from 75 millirem per year in the 

existing rule to 25 millirem per year. The BEIR VII risk assessment for thyroid cancer 

shows that 75 millirem per year to the thyroid of female children from infancy to five 

years of age would by itself produce a thyroid cancer risk of about 2 in 10,000.11 

Exposures after that would further increase the risk. The new assessment of this disease 

and of sex differences in risk requires a lowering of the allowable thyroid organ dose to 

25 millirem per year at most.

Note that the doses from all sources of drinking water should be included in the revised 

10 CFR 61.41. One way to ensure protection of offsite water resources to the drinking 

water standard would be for the NRC to require groundwater and surface water at or 

beyond the site boundary to comply with EPA’s drinking water limits. Even Milton 

Friedman, an eminent apostle of the free market and limited government, noted that the 

freedom of individuals should be limited in a variety of ways. Among other things he 

noted that “one man’s freedom to murder his neighbor must be sacrificed to preserve the 

freedom of the other man to live.” He noted this in the context of determining the 

“appropriate activities of government.” In the same general context, he also opined that 

they should not be free to pollute the water flowing through their property because that 

action “in effect forc[es] others to exchange good water for bad” involuntarily: that is, an 

exchange when people are in situations where “it is not feasible for them, acting 

individually, to avoid the exchange or to enforce appropriate compensation.”12 This 

precisely describes the situation in which neighbors of NRC licensees find themselves. 

It is therefore the responsibility of the NRC, even in a minimalist interpretation of the 

appropriate role of government, to prevent that enforced exchange of good water for 

bad. 

 

11 Calculated from NAS-NRC 2006 Table 12D-1 (p. 311). EPA 2011 estimates thyroid cancer risks to be somewhat

lower at 1.4 in 10,000 (calculated from EPA 2011, Table 3-12b). In any case, even with the lower thyroid cancer

risks in EPA 2011, the life risks from thyroid cancer alone at 75 millirem per year would exceed 3 in 10,000 were

exposure at 75 millirem per year permitted. This clearly points to a lowering of the annual thyroid exposure limit by

at least a factor of three, which is the recommendation in these comments. 12 Friedman 1962 Chapter 2, on web at http://books.cat-v.org/economics/capitalism-and-freedom/chapter_02 the rule. 
8

As noted above, the structure of the drinking water rule was originally meant to protect

individuals and small water systems from possible large expenditures of a federal 

mandate. This was reasonable enough; but the same structure has, all too often, allowed 

corporate polluters to force their neighbors to involuntarily exchange good water for 

bad. It is time to plug this hole in the drinking water rule. The free pass that the EPA 

and the NRC have given to licensees to pollute their neighbors’ water supplies must be 

revoked. 

6. External dose calculations should take into account that children are smaller and hence 

their various organs are closer to the ground (and hence to contamination that is present 

on the ground). These organs include their reproductive organs. This is especially 

important for female children. 

7. The proposed language of 10 CFR 61.41(a) does not specify what guidance document 

will be used for dose calculations. It should specify that the EPA’s current guidance – 

Federal Guidance Report 13 – will be used. At present FGR 13 does not contain separate 

dose conversion factors13 for males and females. Therefore, the rule should also specify 

that when the EPA publishes separate dose conversion factors for males and females that 

they will be automatically incorporated into compliance assessment.

8. One thousand years as a compliance period is both too short and too long. It is too long 

because the proposed rule makes no provisions for any barriers to be effective in ensuring 

that compliance can be achieved for beyond 500 years. It is too short because some 

radioactive materials have half-lives that are far longer. For instance, the half-life of 

uranium-238, the main constituent of depleted uranium, is over 4.4 billion years. Its 

specific activity grows over hundreds of thousands of years due to the growth of progeny 

(uranium-234, thorium-230, and radium-226). The proposed rule recognizes this 

problem but it unacceptably increases doses to the public to 500 millirem for a 

“protective assurance” period defined as the period from 1,000 years to 10,000 years. 

There is no basis on which to relax the protection of people far into the future compared 

to those alive today or those in the next 500 or 1,000 years. As noted above, doses to any 

organ of any member of the public should be limited to 25 millirem per year. 

While the rule proposes that analysis of shallow land burial performance can be done for 

10,000 years, this is unrealistic. From what we know about the past, 10,000 years is a 

very long-time for analysis of performance of shallow land systems. Ice ages can occur 

and have occurred on time scales that are similar. Severe climate disruption due to 

warming is already occurring, according to the best available scientific evidence and 

analysis. The NRC’s own invited experts to the 2009 depleted uranium workshop 

considered 10,000 years far too long for reasonable modeling of shallow land facilities. 

Specifically, Peter Burns, a geochemist, stated “I was particularly amused by the 

climatic divisions, none of which can be relied on, even perhaps at 1,000 but certainly not 

in 10,000 or 100,000 [years]. As an example, I am a geoscientist. So I have this rare 

 

13 Dose conversion factors for internal dose convert an intake (inhalation or ingestion) of a unit of radioactivity of a 

particular radionuclide into an organ dose.
9

ability to see into the far distant past. (Laughter.) And I know, for example, that Death 

Valley was filled with about 1,000 feet of water 10,000 years ago. And that tells you how 

much the climate can change in the arid regions.”14 The NRC has ignored this advice 

and the underlying science. No scientifically sound calculation for shallow land disposal 

can be done over such a long period; the uncertainties would be huge even for parameters 

that one might foresee, not to speak of those that one cannot. The uncertainty in the dose 

calculations could easily be several orders of magnitude. The proposed 10 CFR 61.13 

would require that “uncertainties” be taken into account (at (a)(8)) in providing the 

“reasonable assurance” of compliance. But it provides no clue as to how climate 

disruption would be taken into account. Indeed, the word “climate” does not even appear 

in the proposed text, let alone a definition of climate change or climate disruption. The 

language regarding uncertainties in the proposed 10 CFR 61 is clearly pro forma; as it 

currently stands it would have little scientific connection to the real world over thousands 

of years. 

At the same time, a 10,000 year time frame for reasonable assurance of limiting doses is 

not enough for certain radionuclides. IEER has shown that disposal of depleted uranium 

even in the very dry climate of southwestern Texas (Andrews County) can result in doses 

that would be thousands of times the 25 millirem limit, dependent on assumptions about 

erosion rate. At an erosion rate of 0.01 cm per year, the dose from grouted depleted 

uranium disposal at 100,000 years would be essentially zero; however, at an erosion rate 

of 0.032 cm per year, the peak external dose, (occurring at about 78,000 years) would be 

about 121 rem, or almost 5,000 times the 25 millirem annual limit.15

These are heuristic calculations (done with the DOE-created computer program 

RESRAD). They do not estimate dose in the future in any realistic sense, since erosion is 

only one parameter to be taken into account. But they do show that the doses from very 

long-lived radionuclides can be huge and that the uncertainties are also enormous. Both 

are irremediable problems of shallow land burial of large amounts of depleted uranium 

and other very long-lived wastes.

9. The rule should acknowledge that the risks from disposal of long-lived radionuclides, like 

plutonium-239 or the constituents of depleted uranium over time in shallow land 

facilities, are too uncertain to be accurately modeled. It is unacceptable to dispose of 

large total amounts of long-lived radionuclides even in low concentrations or long-lived 

radionuclides in high-concentrations in shallow land facilities. This means that longlived radionuclides must have both total radioactivity and concentration limits. Examples 

include depleted uranium from enrichment plants, recycled uranium, and other such 

waste streams that resemble Greater-than-Class-C waste or transuranic waste. They 

should be banned from shallow land facilities and be explicitly designated for deep 

disposal without exception and without any loopholes. 

10. It is acknowledged here that wastes containing mainly short-lived radionuclides cannot 

exclude every iota of long-lived material. This is the reason for having concentration 

 

14 NRC 2009, pp. 94-95. Emphasis added. 15 Makhijani and Smith 2005, table on p. 16 
10

limits. The current GTCC limits should be maintained. Table 1 in the present rule at 10 

CFR 61.55(a) should be amended by dropping the word “transuranic.” This simple 

change would limit the concentrations of a number of long-lived alpha-emitting 

radionuclides that are not covered by the present rule, including uranium-238, thorium232, thorium-230, and radium-226. 

11. Long-lived radionuclides should be defined as those having half-lives of more than 10 

years, which is compatible with an institutional control period of 100 years (ten halflives). The definition of long-lived waste in the proposed rule at 61.2 is far too expansive 

in the context of shallow land burial. 

12. Total curie limits are needed, in addition to concentration limits in 10 CFR 61.55 and 

those recommended just above. For instance, Class C waste containing less than a 

hundred curies of carbon-14 (half-life 5,730 years), even under the current Class C 

concentration limits, can pollute groundwater (at least at Hanford) to levels exceeding 

safe drinking water standards as well as the 10 CFR 61 dose limits. This was the result as 

estimated by the Department of Energy’s calculations for the reactor graphite disposal at 

the Hanford site.16 Hundreds of curies disposed of in similar conditions would violate 

the present 10 CFR 61.41 without violating Class C concentration limits. The depleted 

uranium example discussed above provides another example. 

13. The above considerations indicate that a method must be found to protect the public 

without crossing the boundaries of scientific reasonableness and common sense. The 

current rule does not do that; the proposed rule would make the problem a lot worse. 

This requires a multi-pronged approach that must be adopted as a whole given the 

complexity and variety of waste streams that are included under the unfortunate rubric of 

“low-level waste.”

14. First, the compliance period should be limited to 500 years. 

15. Second, for long-lived radionuclides that do not have decay products that build up 

beyond 500 years, curie limits could be set by examining a hypothetical pulse release of 

the entire inventory of long-lived radionuclides into the environment in various ways 

immediately after the end of the compliance period. The limits for long-lived 

radionuclides could be set so that the dose criteria would not be exceeded with any 

combination of long-lived radionuclides or release modes. This could allow upper curie 

limits to be derived in a scientifically reasonable way that would also ensure compliance 

with dose criteria. This is a reasonable approach for radionuclides such as carbon-14. 

16. Third, a modified approach is needed for radionuclides that have build-up of decay 

progeny, such as uranium-238. In such cases, the peak inventory should be assumed to 

 

16 The DOE calculated that disposing of 37,000 curies of carbon-14 on the Central Plateau would cause a 

contamination of 1.3 million picocuries per liter, or 650 times the drinking water limit of 2,000 picocuries per liter. 

See Yakama Nation ERWM 2010, Attachment 3, pages 13 and 14. Assuming the same concentration and 

environmental conditions, a total source term of 57 curies would produce contamination to the drinking water limit. 

Adding pathways other than drinking water would of course add to the dose.
11

be released instantly at the end of the compliance period. For instance, in case of 

depleted uranium disposal, the peak future inventory of radium-226 would be assumed to 

be exposed to the surface at 500 years; external doses would be calculated based on that. 

In the case of internal dose. The equilibrium mixture of uranium-238 and its progeny 

would be assumed to be deposited in groundwater instantly and doses to a resident farmer 

family estimated on that basis. This would not be modeling in the conventional sense of 

choosing parameters such as erosion for the long-term. It would be a heuristic 

calculation that would indicate maximum conceivable dose without involving methods of 

estimating shallow land burial performance that are technically indefensible for periods 

of thousands of years. The goal would be to assure protection of the public according to 

the same standards we expect for ourselves today. Wastes exceeding the concentrations 

or quantities as discussed above should be slated for deep geologic disposal, as is the case 

for DOE transuranic waste.

17. The proposed “intruder” dose limit of 500 millirem per year is unacceptably high. There 

is no moral rationale for allowing doses to future generations beyond 500 years, the 

proposed period of barrier life after which “intruders” could come into the site 

unrestricted, to be greater than those for those of the present public or the public in the 

coming decades. The proposed limit is five times bigger than the 10 CFR 20 limit for 

members of the public from all sources of man-made radioactivity (except medical and 

sewer). Intruder doses should be limited to the same doses as for the present and 

immediate future. Only the method of calculating them after the formal modeling 

performance period would change. 

18. With the above provisos, and only with the above provisos, the compliance calculations 

done by formal modeling such as by the use of RESRAD or similar approaches, can be 

limited to 500 years. This is a reasonable period, especially in view of the NRC proposed 

requirement for the durability of intruder barriers of 500 years. While the proposed rule 

states the requirement as “at least 500 years” (at 61.7(f)(3)), there is no regulatory 

mandate for durability beyond that time. If the NRC does not adopt total radionuclide 

and concentration limits as above and the calculation methods for long-term public health 

protection along the lines suggested above, then the present language of 10 CFR 61, 

Subpart C, which does not have a time limit of compliance, should be maintained. This 

would not be a very good result but greatly preferable to the proposed changes to 10 CFR 

61 regarding compliance period. 

19. The revised rule should address how the NRC is going to assure the scientific soundness 

of the modeling. It should also create a process for making corrections of errors if and 

when they occur in licensing-related technical documents along with license amendments 

as needed in such cases. I have pointed out the problem of some specific egregious errors 

and their persistence over many years in a number of forums. It is important for the NRC 

to have a formal external, independent review procedure in done through blind contracts 

awarded from an escrow fund not controlled by the industry or by the NRC. The NRC 

should also have a procedure for promptly addressing technical errors pointed out by the 

public as part of the rule and for making the needed corrections should they be verified. 

Verification calculations should be published promptly. 
12

References

40 CFR 141 

(2013) 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 40--

Protection of Environment. Part 141--National Primary Drinking Water Regulations. 

7-1-13 Edition. Washington, DC: Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and 

Records Administration; U.S. GPO, 2013. On the Web at 

www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title40-vol24/pdf/CFR-2013-title40-vol24-

part141.pdf. 

40 CFR 190 

(2013) 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. Code of Federal Regulations. Title 40--

Protection of Environment. Part 190--Environmental Radiation Protection Standards 

for Nuclear Power Operations. 7-1-13 Edition. Washington, DC: Office of the Federal 

Register, National Archives and Records Administration; U.S. GPO, 2013. On the Web 

at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2013-title40-vol26/pdf/CFR-2013-title40-vol26-

part191.pdf. 

80 FR 

16081-16125 

(2015-03-26) 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. “10 CFR Parts 20 and 61 [NRC–2011–0012; 

NRC–2015–0003] RIN 3150–AI92. Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Proposed 

Rule,” Federal Register, v. 80, no. 58 (March 26, 2015): pp. 16081-16125 [FR DOC # 

2015-06429]. On the Web at www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-03-26/pdf/2015-

06429.pdf. 

American 

Cancer 

Society 2014 

American Cancer Society. What are the key statistics about breast cancer in men? 

Atlanta: ACS, last medical review: 9/30/2013; last revised: 1/31/2014. On the Web at 

http://www.cancer.org/cancer/breastcancerinmen/detailedguide/breast-cancer-in-menkey-statistics. 

EPA 2011 U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. EPA Radiogenic Cancer Risk Models and 

Projections for the U.S. Population. (EPA 402-R-11-001) Washington, DC: EPA, 

Office of Radiation and Indoor Air, April 2011. On the Web at 

http://epa.gov/rpdweb00/docs/bluebook/bbfinalversion.pdf. Known as the Blue Book. 

FGR 13 CD 

Suppl. (2002) 

Keith F. Eckerman, Richard W. Leggett, Christopher B. Nelson, Jerome S. Puskin, and 

Allan C.B. Richardson. Cancer risk coefficients for environmental exposure to 

radionuclides. (EPA 402-R-99-001. Federal Guidance Report No. 13, CD Supplement. 

Rev. 1). Oak Ridge, TN: Oak Ridge National Laboratory; Washington, DC: Office of 

Radiation and Indoor Air, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, April 2002. Includes 

original 1999 FGR no. 13, which is also on the Web at 

http://www.epa.gov/radiation/docs/federal/402-r-99-001.pdf. 

Executive 

Order 13045 

U.S. President. Executive Order 13045, Protection of Children from Environmental 

Health Risks and Safety Risks. [Washington, DC: Office of the President, 1997-2003]. 

On the Web at 

http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/nepapub/nepa_documents/RedDont/ReqEO13045childenvtlhealth.pdf. First signed by William J. Clinton and amend by 

George W. Bush and 2001 and 2003. 

Friedman 

1962 

Milton Friedman, with the assistance of Rose D. Friedman. Capitalism and Freedom. 

Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962. On the Web at http://books.catv.org/economics/capitalism-and-freedom/chapter_02. 

ICRP 2 

(1959) 

International Commission on Radiological Protection. Report of Committee II on 

Permissible Dose for Internal Radiation (1959). Recommendations of the 

International Commission on Radiological Protection. (ICRP Publication 2; [Annals of 

the ICRP]) Oxford; New York: Pergamon, 1959. 
13

ICRP 60 

(1991) 

International Commission on Radiological Protection. 1990 Recommendations of the 

International Commission on Radiological Protection. (ICRP Publication 60; Annals 

of the ICRP v. 21 nos. 1-3). Oxford; New York: Pergamon, 1991. 

ICRP 103 

(2007) 

International Commission on Radiological Protection. 2007 Recommendations of the 

International Commission on Radiological Protection. (ICRP Publication 103; Annals 

of the ICRP v. 37 nos. 2-4). Kidlington, Oxford: Elsevier, 2007. 

Makhijani 

and Smith 

2005 

Arjun Makhijani and Brice Smith. Update to Costs and Risks of Management and 

Disposal of Depleted Uranium from the National Enrichment Facility Proposed to be 

Built in Lea County New Mexico by LES. [Takoma Park, MD: Institute for Energy and 

Environmental Research], July 5, 2005. On the Web at http://ieer.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2004/11/LESrptupdate.pdf

Menzel 2011 Hans Menzel. Effective Dose: A Radiation Protection Quantity. [Presented at the] 

ICRP Symposium on the International System of. Radiological Protection. Bethesda, 

MD, USA. October 24-26, 2011. [Ottawa, Ont.: ICRP, 2011]. On the Web at 

http://www.icrp.org/docs/Hans%20Menzel%20Effective%20Dose%20A%20Radiation

%20Protection%20Quantity.pdf. Slides 

NAS-NRC 

2006 

Richard R. Monson (Chair) et al. Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing 

Radiation: BEIR VII – Phase 2. Committee to Assess Health Risks from Exposure to 

Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation, Board on Radiation Effects Research, National 

Research Council of the National Academies. Washington, DC: National Academies 

Press, 2006. On the Web at http://www.nap.edu/catalog.php?record_id=11340. 

NRC 2009 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Public Workshop 1 on Unique Waste Streams -

Depleted Uranium, September 2, 2009, Bethesda, Maryland. [Washington, DC: NRC, 

2009]. On the Web at http://www.nrc.gov/about-nrc/regulatory/rulemaking/potentialrulemaking/uw-streams/workshop-1-transcripts-day1.pdf. 

NRC 2011 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. November 2012 Preliminary Rule Language for 

Proposed Revisions to Low-Level Waste Disposal Requirements (10 CFR Part 61): 

[NRC-2011-0012]. [Washington, DC: NRC, November 2012]. On the Web at 

http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=NRC-2011-0012-0045, with a link to 

http://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?objectId=0900006481182f26&dispositio

n=attachment&contentType=pdf. 

SC&A 1997 S. Cohen & Associates, Inc. Comparison of Critical Organ and EDE Radiation Dose 

Rate Limits for Situations Involving Contaminated Land. Prepared for US. 

Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Radiation and Indoor Air. McLean, VA: 

SC&A, April 18, 1997. 

Yakama 

Nation 

ERWM 

2010, 

Attachment 3

Yakama Nation Environmental Restoration and Waste Management Program. [Letter 

from Harry Smiskin, Chairman, Yakama Tribal Council to David A. Brockman, 

Manager, Richland Operations Office, U.S. Department of Energy and Mary Beth 

Burandt, Document Manager, Office of River Protection, U.S. Department of Energy], 

March 19, 2010]. "Attachment 3: Detailed Comments on Draft Tank Closure and 

Waste Management Environmental Impact Statement for the Hanford Site, Richland, 

Washington (TC & WM EIS) (DOE/EIS-0391), EIS October 2009,” by the Yakama 

Nation Environmental Restoration and Waste Management (ERWM) Program and the 

Institute for Energy and Environmental Research. (March 18, 2010). On the Web 

http://ieer.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/Tanks-Hanford-EIS-Comments-2010-

YakamaNation_with_IEER.pdf. 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Ellen Thomas <et@prop1.org>

Sent: Monday, September 21, 2015 9:03 PM

To: RulemakingComments Resource

Cc: greenpalmetto@yahoo.com; et@prop1.org

Subject: [External_Sender] Ruth Thomas Re Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 - 10 CFR Part 61 - 

Proposed Rule and Guidance

To: Rulemaking.Comments@nrc.gov 

Re: Docket ID NRC-2011-0012 - 10 CFR Part 61 - Proposed Rule and Guidance re shallow burial of low-level 

radioactive waste 

Here are our observations and recommendations regarding low-level radioactive waste and the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC)'s proposal to amend 10 CFR Part 61 by including the unanalyzed nuclear waste 

streams which were left out of the original ruling. 

Our principal reference source is the official transcript of proceedings of the NRC which took place on Tuesday, 

November 19, 2013. The purpose of this meeting was for the Department of Energy (DOE) to advise the 

members of the NRC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards' Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and 

Nuclear Materials about the shallow burial of low-level radioactive waste. 

After introductions, those representing the Savannah River National Laboratory, the DOE's Office of Health, 

Safety, and Security, the DOE's Savannah River Site, and a member of the Nevada site office of the Nevada 

National Security Site, gave presentations on their approach to land burial of low-level radioactive waste. They 

talked about various processes they used to reach decisions, defense-in-depth, and how all of these various 

processes fit into their way of thinking. Their use of a thousand-year time frame for quantitative compliance 

was discussed at length. However, their choice of that particular time frame was not based on scientific 

data, but was picked at random. 

Those from the NRC had difficulty understanding this approach of the DOE. 

On page 10 of the transcript, a member of the NRC's Subcommittee on Radiation Protection and Nuclear 

Materials raised questions, e.g: "In the case of uranium where there is no peak, you know, how do you 

terminate that? I mean, what's the end point for let's say depleted uranium? That's an issue that's churning 

around here, you know, it's always building up, it's riskier in the future than it is today.... What does the DOE 

do?" (Page 10 of the transcript) 

The DOE put off answering these questions. Instead they continued on with their presentation. 

The chairman of the Subcommittee, on page 20 of the transcript, returned to the subject of uranium. He says, 

"The hard thing to get some folks to think about is a thousand years is a long time. Well, forever is even longer, 

because uranium will be here when the planet is cleaved in half. It's ten to the ninth year half-life? It's not 

going anywhere soon. So it's a forever waste.... I'll be curious when you get to that stuff. We'd like to hear 

about your strategies for dealing with these longer-lived radionuclides and their persistence in the environment 

beyond almost any kind of engineering you can think of. So with that little tidbit laid out there for the future 

discussion, go ahead." 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608186
2

Instead of directly addressing this, a DOE spokesman started talking about hazardous waste rather than 

radioactive waste. 

The majority of the discussion is from the viewpoint of what the DOE has experienced, and how they think 

there is no need to do the calculations to know what this would mean for the exposure of future generations. 

We in Environmentalists, Inc., disagree with the DOE and call attention to the changes that have been going on 

since nuclear weapons were manufactured and nuclear power has been used to generate electricity. Before both 

of these, avoiding exposure to radiation was a matter of limiting the time you spent in the sun, only having XRays when absolutely necessary. People knew where the sources of radiation were, and how to keep from 

having skin cancer. There were no sources of radiation taken internally, only external radiation. 

Throughout the meeting, no one mentioned stopping the production of this waste material for which there is no 

solution on how to isolate it from people and the environment. 

Our recommendation to the NRC is to focus on isolation projects and phasing out nuclear power 

projects, both the reactors and the fuel cycle facilities. There is a crucial need to stop making radioactive 

waste. 

We request a dialog on the subject of low-level radioactive waste, a dialog which includes our group and other 

public interest and civic organizations, as well as independent researchers. By independent we mean those who 

do not benefit from taking a pro-nuclear position. 

We ask that you accept our being a party to these decisions. Serious mistakes have been avoided because of 

input from the public and public interest organizations. Expensive mistakes have been made because public 

input was not considered. 

Ruth Thomas 

Environmentalists, Inc. 

354 Woodland Dr, 

Columbus, NC 28722 

828-894-6305 
1

RulemakingComments Resource

From: Marv Lewis <marvlewis@juno.com>

Sent: Tuesday, September 22, 2015 2:36 AM

To: RulemakingComments Resource; CHAIRMAN Resource; Blake, Kathleen; 

kevin@beyondnuclear.org; support@khouse.org; dianed@nirs.org

Subject: [External_Sender] Comments NRC Rulemaking on 10CFR Part 61 , LLW Land Disposal

Dear Chairman and Commissioners, 

 Please accept this email as my comments on the present rulemaking on Part 61. 

 I point out that the Staff has not coordinated fully with the TransPacific Partnership ,TPP, disclosure 

officer,Tom Reif. This was not due a deficiency on the part of the Staff, but because the Office of TPP 

Disclosure Officer was filled yesterday. 

 Depending on the words of the TPP treaty, our beloved United States can be turned into a sacrifice zone for 

the dumping of nuclear waste from the entire world. 

 I respectfully request that the comment period for this present rulemaking be extended to make sure that the 

TPP does not conflict with this rulemaking , and our great country does not wind up as a dumping ground for 

the radioactive wastes from the entire world! 

 Respectfully submitted 

Marvin Lewis 

 

3133 Fairfield Street 

 Philadelphia, PA 19136-1107 

Marvlewis@juno.com 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608187
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 9/24/15 10:21 AM

Received: September 14, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8l4c-vu5v

Comments Due: September 21, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0165

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Reopening of Comment Period

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0178

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-21169

Submitter Information

Name: Pia Jensen

General Comment

Docket ID: NRC-2011-0012 

There are many reasons why this proposal regarding low level nuclear waste disposal facilities ought be 

stopped in it's tracks. I am quickly reminded of the radiation protection model proposal (LNT v Hormesis) in 

reading the proposal and other's comments. There is no justification for increasing exposure potential nor for 

changing rules in favor of industry interests. 

Comments by Helene Cuomo (#68), Jim Lieberman and J. T. Greeves (#11), and Matt Pacenza on Behalf of 

Heal Utah on Site-Specific Analyses for Demonstrating Compliance (#3) highlight issues of industry 

influence, logistics, time management, capacity, policy/rule alignment, historic record, and health, which 

require further attention before any new rules are proposed. 

It appears that the NRC is taking on more than it can actually handle. I believe that some rule proposals 

should be tabled while the NRC and industry re-direct their attention to more pressing concerns such as fixing 

failing infrastructures at Hanford, WIPP, LANL, South Carolina MOX, and the many aging nuclear power 

plants around the country as well as international agreements for receiving more waste form other countries. 

I do not believe the NRC can handle it's current work load and lacks capacity to appropriately prioritize their 

work in order to fulfill it's mandates to protect health and the environment. The liability issues are stacking 

up. 

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80FR1608188
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 9/24/15 10:28 AM

Received: September 14, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8l4j-5zyc

Comments Due: September 21, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0165

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Reopening of Comment Period

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0179

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-21169

Submitter Information

Name: Judith Zitko

Address: 

12 Alina Lane

Hot Springs Village, AR, 71909

Email: spiritwalker63@sbcglobal.net

General Comment

Since exposure to radiation is cumulative, no amount of radiation should ever be considered "safe", not even 

so called "low level" radiation. I am old enough to recall when the peaceful use of nuclear energy was first 

proposed for use as an energy source in the US and that they had no safe way to dispose of the radioactive 

waste but it was felt that by the time they would have to deal with it, they (the scientists) would know how to 

dispose of it....safely. Fast forward to today and no surprise we don't know how to safely dispose of it. 

Common sense would dictate that we cease to build and operate nuclear power plants. They are the most 

expensive form of energy, but also the most dangerous. Three Mile Island, Cheronobyl and now Fukushima in 

Japan where tons of radioactive water is being dumped into the Pacific Ocean on a daily basis. Our 

government seems to be silent and is not even monitoring the radiation off the West Coast of the US, or 

anywhere in this country, which begs the question as to why not? We tried nuclear energy and in my opinion 

it's been a huge failure with no one private insurance company willing to insure any of these plants, so my tax 

dollars are at risk as well as my life and well being. So, when you consider all this why would you even 

consider changing the safe level of radiation from zero to small doses?

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PR-20, 61 

80FR1608189
PUBLIC SUBMISSION

As of: 9/24/15 11:31 AM

Received: September 21, 2015

Status: Pending_Post

Tracking No. 1jz-8l9d-1xeu

Comments Due: September 21, 2015

Submission Type: Web

Docket: NRC-2011-0012

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal

Comment On: NRC-2011-0012-0165

Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal; Reopening of Comment Period

Document: NRC-2011-0012-DRAFT-0182

Comment on FR Doc # 2015-21169

Submitter Information

Name: Anonymous Anonymous

General Comment

Docket ID: NRC-2011-0012 LL Radioactive Waste Disposal

No burial of radioactive waste should be allowed. Public radiation exposure of 5 mSv per yr is unacceptable 

for radioactive waste dumps (closed or open) & anything else where the individual has no choice. By 

conservative gov (BEIR, EPA) estimates 5 mSv per year leads to 1 excess cancer per 25 people (lifetime 

exposure). Some experts put this rate as double. 

This is planned leakage. It is 33 times more than that for Yucca Mountain (0.15 mSv); 20 times more than 

that allowed by EPA for operating nuclear reactors (0.25 mSv), & 50 times the ICRP "constraint" standard for 

public exposure to prolonged component of long-lived radionuclides (0.1 mSv) (ICRP 103. p. 116). 

Radioactive waste with short-lived radionuclides can be held in containment, until no longer radioactive, 

more cheaply than the overpriced burial. Rad waste must be monitored in proper, retrievable, containment & 

not buried. Burial speeds up the degradation process of any containment & keeps leaks from being stopped 

before they reach the environment. Accessible monitoring allows replacement of waste containers before they 

fail. Along with leaking into the environment, the buried waste can catch fire & explode. Monitoring the 

radiation leak rates after leakage is unacceptable. The storage containment must be replaced before leaks 

reach the environment. This can only happen in a proper storage facility. 

There should be no radioactive leaks at all! Only zero millisieverts is acceptable. 

Dilution & tricks used for calculating mSv exposure are unacceptable. Assumptions regarding food intake, 

dispersal into air & water must be clear. But, dispersal is unacceptable risk, anyway. 

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80FR1608190
This 5 mSv results in 20 excess cancer deaths per 1000 compared to less than one, 0.38 per 1000 for 

hysterectomy surgery. The risk to women of 5 mSv per year is even higher than this average of 20 deaths. It 

would be 50 cancers per 100 women. Approximately 25 will die. A hysterectomy is supposed to have some 

benefit. Nuclear waste has none, and there is no choice. Where is the informed consent notice and approval by 

each American? There is none. These are cancers above and beyond other risks or medical exposures. 

So-called "exempt" radioactive waste is unacceptable. It is unacceptable to declare radioactive waste, nonradioactive and to cease tracking it! This is so-called "exempt" waste and it is still dangerous radioactive 

waste! 

It is important to recall that radioactive half-lives are half of half of half, etc. so that even radioactive cesium 

137, half-life 30 years, stays radioactive for over 300 years. Iodine 131, half of 8 days will be radioactive for 

months. 

1 half life = 50% left

10 half life = 0.097% left

20 half life = 0.0001% left

Concrete linings will crack sooner or later from both age and dry-wet shrinkage; cracking and swelling of the 

underlying clay, and most soil types. If it is constantly saturated this speeds the spread of radiation throughout 

the environment. Cracking due to wet-dry shrinkage could happen quickly. Irradiation speeds up concrete 

degradation; concrete is permeable. Even proper underground structures always leak, and require some 

pumping to keep dry (e.g. parking garages, tunnels, etc). Your proposal of "increasing the amount and 

longevity of radioactivity that goes into shallow land burial." and allowing "even longer-lasting waste into 

unlined soil trenches" (See Arrigo-NIRS comment) is patently unacceptable murder. 

The 5 mSv radioactive leaching into the environment is intentional, known, and planned leaking. In the event 

of an accident it becomes more. 

Diane Arrigo, on behalf of over 100 organizations says that the NRC "must not forget that the American 

public and our elected officials have repeatedly rejected the deregulation of nuclear waste. It should not be 

inserted into this rule which is about licensed radioactive disposal. The proposed rule re-asserts the publicly 

rejected concept of deregulation and we demand the deletion of this and any provisions that allow for 

manmade radioactive waste, materials, emissions and practices to be released from radioactive regulatory 

control. Deregulation, release, exemption, clearance and deminimus are completely unacceptable." 

I also agree that the NRC must "adopt stricter disposal site requirements, keeping long-lasting waste out of 

shallow burial sites". I concur that there should be no blending or averaging of radioactive waste. 

I support the entire comment of Diane Arrigo and the 100 organizations. However, there should be absolutely 

no burial of radioactive waste whether in lined or unlined trenches. It will leach into groundwater & probably 

explode like WIPP did. It's a major disaster waiting to happen and, in the event of explosion, the dumps in the 

arid western states will empty their contents upon much of America when it rains. 

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Confederated Tribes and Bands 

of the Yakama Nation 

Established by the 

Treaty of June 9, 1855 

September 21 , 2015 

Secretary, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 

ATTN: Rulemaking and Adjudications Staff 

Washington, DC 20555001 

Subject: Vakama Nation Comments to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission Regarding the 

Proposed Rule Changes for Low-Level Waste Disposal (10 CFR Part 61; Docket NRC2011-0012} 

Dear NRC Secretary, 

The Yakama Nation appreciate the opportunity to review and provide comments on the Nuclear 

Regulatory Commission (NRC) Proposed Rule, "Low-Level Radioactive Waste (LL W) Disposal" This 

letter transmits our main issue and comments on areas of concern for the Yakama Nation. 

The Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakama Nation is a federally recognized sovereign pursuant of 

the Treaty of June 9, 1855 made with the United States of America (12 Stat. 951 ). New NRC 

regulations are only applicable to the US Ecology LL W Disposal Facility, located on the Hanford Site. 

The Hanford Site is Yakama Nation ceded lands and they retain reserved rights to the Site lands under the 

Treaty. 

The existing and new LLW Disposal rules have a far reaching impact to the Yakama Nation, because the 

US Ecology LL W Disposal Site is located on the Hanford Central Plateau and surrounded by numerous 

DOE managed LL W Disposal Sites. In fact the US Ecology site sets in a sea of radiological and 

chemical contamination on the Central Plateau from DOE managed facilities. A concern is how DOE 

will adopt these new LL W Disposal rules since DOE is self-regulating and the NRC lack regulatory 

authority over DOE management ofLLW disposal. This DOE concern includes the US Ecology Site that 

will be turned over to DOE upon closure. 

Because of the location of the US Ecology Site and DOE's LLW disposal sites located throughout the 

Central Plateau, the review we conducted addressed future land-uses of the Central Plateau after the 1,000 

year Compliance Period, when all institutional controls, intruder barriers, and other precautions have 

failed. The future land-use was based on the Yakama Nation's vision of fully exercising their treaty 

rights that include hunting, gathering, cattle grazing, sweat lodge use, tribal ceremonies, and maybe 

someday the development of a small community. 

The community development excavates into the waste sites (where covers have eroded away and the site 

resembles natural landscape), for housing construction, water/electrical/sewer installations, a local landfill 

(for construction debris), and drilling through the waste sites for drinking water - that is radiological 

contaminated. During the community development no one knows they are being exposed to radiation. 

For radiation is an invisible threat to human health that cannot be seen, felt, or smelled. Detection 

requires specialized radiation meters. Future developers will not have radiation meters in hand - since 

1 

PR-20, 61 

80FR1608191
they have no idea the long-lived radionuclides are present. The first cancer victim occurs within 10 years. 

Twenty years later 40% of the community population has cancer and "cluster" is declared that requires 

investigation. The investigation identifies radiological contamination in the soils, groundwater, drinking 

and irrigation water systems, and subsequently almost everything within the community that contacted 

the contaminated water. The contaminated water was used for drinking, bathing, cooking, swimming, 

watering lawns and gardens, and washing anything and everything including carpets, interior/exterior of 

houses, cars, etc. Spreading contamination throughout the community. 

The outcome. The community has to be abandoned and fenced off to keep people and animals out. The 

people of the community have to find a new home and live with the health consequences of being 

exposed to long-lived radionuclides. How the community would be cleaned and the contamination 

disposed of in the future is another unknown. 

Long-lived radionuclides have extremely long half-lives in the thousands years, such as plutonium-239 

and -240, and technetium-99, if not millions of years as with uranium and iodine-129. These 

radionuclides are an invisible threat to human health and the environment. These are the reasons why the 

Yakama Nation does not support the disposal of long-lived radionuclides in LL W Disposal Sites - no 

matter what waste form, depth of burial or concentration. There are no assurances that these LLW 

Disposal Site that contain long-lived radionuclides will remain protective over the life of the nuclide, 

especially when this document points out that institutional control will fail in 100 years and intrusion 

protection in 500 years. 

The best action for long-lived radionuclides is disposal in a deep geologic repository like the DOE Waste 

Isolate Pilot Project in New Mexico. Deep geological disposal is the only method that can ensure 

protectiveness of human health and the environment over the long-term. 

The Yakama Nation looks forward to dialog on these concerns and comments. Jf you have any questions 

please contact Russell Jim at (509) 945-6741. 

Sincerely, 

Russell Jim 

Yakama Nation 

ER WM Program Director 

2 
Yakama Nation ERWM Program Comments: 

The Y akama Nation has no comments on the new NRC regulations for the disposal of Class A and B 

waste, and Class C waste with no concentrations of long-lived radionuclides. LLW Disposal Facilities 

were originally designed for short-lived radioactive waste where the radiological threat to human health 

and the environment decays away in l 00 to 500 years. 

The Yakama Nation does not find the current and new LLW Disposal rules protective of human health 

and the environment when LLW disposal sites contains long-lived radionuclides. The following 

comments pertain to disposal of Class C waste that contains long-lived radionucides, and how these 

nuclides are unsuitable for disposal in LLW Disposal Facilities - as shown repeatedly throughout this 

document. 

Waste Forms, Classifications, Stabilization 

§Section 61.7 (t) Waste classification and near-surface disposal. Waste that must be stable for proper 

disposal are classified as Class B and C waste. To the extent that is practicable, Class B and C waste 

forms or containers should be designed to be stable (i.e., maintain gross physical properties and identity), 

over 300 years. For long-lived waste and certain radionuclides prone to migration, a maximum disposal 

site inventory based on the characteristics of the disposal site may be established to limit potential 

exposure and to mitigate the uncertainties associated with long-term stability of the disposal site. Some 

waste, depending on its radiological characteristics, may not be suitable for disposal if uncertainties 

cannot be adequately addressed with technical analyses. 

Comments: 

Class C containers designed to be stable for over 300 years are not adequate when it comes to long-lived 

radionuclides that will outlive the containers. Some long-lived radionuclides first half-life are thousands 

of years and pose the same radiological threat to human health and the environment in a 1, 000 years as 

they do today. In order to be protective Class C waste forms and containers, that contain long-lived 

radionuclides, need to be designed to ensure no mitigation of the nuclides for the life of the radiological 

threat. Since there is currently no technology to allow for a waste form or container to last the life of 

long-lived radionuclides shows that long-lived radionuclides are not suitable for disposal in LLW 

Disposal Facilities. 

Establishing maximum inventory limits for LLW Disposal Site should be done for all radiological waste 

sites - no matter what the classification, but especially where long-lived radionuclides are going to 

buried. Current LLW regulations provide long-lived radionuclide concentration limits based on cubic 

meters. The concentration limits per cubic meter may appear to be small, but when you add up all of the 

cubic meters in a waste site, that could hold millions of cubic yards, these small concentrations become 

large radiological sources and a threat human health and the environment 

Long-lived radionuclides are not suitable for disposal in LL W Disposal Site as stated repeatedly 

throughout this document due to their extremely long half-lives that will outlast institutional controls, 

waste stability, and waste container integrity. The future of the long-lived radionuclides is not uncertain. 

They will remain radioactive and a threat to human health and the environment for a very long time. 

1 
§Section 61.44 Stability of the disposal site after closure. The disposal facility must be sited, 

designed, used, operated, and closed to achieve long-term stability of the disposal site for the compliance 

( 1,000 years) and protective assurance (10,000 years) periods .. . . 

Comments: 

The compliance and protective assurance periods end at 11, 000 years, which doesn 't mean much when it 

comes to the radiological threat posed by long-lived radionuclides, especially those with extremely long 

half-lives. Because the long-lived radionuclides will outlive the protective assurance period shows they 

are unsuitable for disposal as LLW 

§61.52(a)(2) Waste designated as Class C pursuant to §61 .55 must be disposed of so that the top of the 

waste is a minimum of 5 meters below the top surface of the cover or must be disposed of with intruder 

barriers that are designed to protect against an inadvertent intrusion for a least 500 years. 

Comments: 

Placing 5 meters of soil over the top of Class C waste that contains long-lived radionuclides is not 

protective of human health and the environment. This actions is considered protective by the NRC due to 

shielding affect of the cover, but 5 meters of soil will not stop future intrusions. 

An intrusion barrier that will last 500 years means nothing when it comes to long-lived radionuclides 

with half-lives in the thousands of years. When an intrusion is done (after the 500 year period), and the 

barrier is encountered it will simply be seen as construction debris or an old /and.fill. Without radiation 

detection equipment, people who drill or dig into these waste sites will not know they are being exposed. 

A protective intrusion barrier needs to last the life of the long-lived radionuclides - which is impossible, 

and thus the nuclides are not suitable for disposal in LLW Disposal Site. 

§61.55 Waste Classification. (a) Classification of waste for near surface disposal. (1) 

Considerations. Determination of the classification ofradioactive waste involves two considerations. 

First, consideration must be given to the concentration of long-lived radionuclides (and their shorter-lived 

precursors) whose potential hazard will persist long after such precautions as institutional controls, 

improved waste form, and deeper disposal have ceased to be effective. These precautions delay the time 

when long-lived radionuclides could cause exposures. In addition, the magnitude of the potential dose is 

limited by the concentration and availability of the radionuclide at the time of exposure. Second, 

consideration must be given to the concentration of shorter-lived radionuclides for which requirements on 

institutional controls, waste form and disposal methods are effective. 

Comments: 

Long-lived radionuclides hazard will persist long after precautions as institutional controls, improved 

waste form, and deeper disposal have ceased to be effective. This statement clearly shows the 

radiological threat of long-lived radionucides and that they are not suitable for disposal in LLW Disposal 

Site. 

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Institutional Controls/Intrusion 

§61.7 Concept (t)(3) Waste that will not decay to levels which present an acceptable hazard to an 

intruder within 100 years is typically designated as Class C waste. Class C waste must be stable and be 

disposed of at a greater depth than the other classes of waste so that subsequent surface activities by an 

intruder will not disturb the waste. Where site conditions prevent deeper disposal, intruder barriers such 

as concrete cover may be used. The effective live of these intruder barriers should be at least 500 years. 

A maximum concentration of radionclides is specified in table 1 and 2 of §61 .55 so that the end of the 500 

year period, the remaining radioactivity will be at a level that does not pose an unacceptable hazard to an 

inadvertent intruder or to public health and safety. Waste with concentrations above these limits is 

generally unacceptable for near-surface disposal. There may be some instances where waste with 

concentrations greater than permitted for Class C would be acceptable for near-surface disposal with 

special processing or design. Disposal of this waste will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis with the 

technical analyses required in §61.13. 

Comments: 

The document states "Class C waste must be stable and be disposed of at a greater depth than the other 

classes of waste for that subsequent surface activities by an intruder will not disturb the waste. " No 

matter how deep you bury Class C waste that contains long-lived radionuclides will not prevent human 

and subsequent environmental exposures if the intruder drills through the waste site to obtain water 

underneath (that may be contaminated and result in spreading contamination throughout the water 

systems). 

Table 1 and 2 of § 61.55 identify a few long-lived radionuc/ides, but not all. These table need to identify 

all long-lived radionuclides. The table should also include the radiological half-lives and the total time it 

will take for these long-lived radionuclides to decay to a safe level. 

The document states "Waste with concentrations above (table 1 and 2) limits is generally unacceptable 

for near-surface disposal. Disposal of long-lived radionuc/ides in unacceptable for near-surface or 

deep burial due to the long-term radiological threat to human health and the environment. 

The document states "There may be some instances where waste with concentrations greater than 

permitted for Class C would be acceptable for near-surface disposal with special processing or design. 

Disposal of this waste will be evaluated on a case-by-case basis . . . " Disposal of any long-lived 

radionuclides in LLW Disposal Site is unacceptable in low concentrations and this regulations states an 

exception to increase the concentration. This goes against the NRC "limit concentrations " statements 

throughout this document. The NRC needs to develop very strict regulations on Class C waste that do 

not require a case-by-case decision. 

§61.7 Concept (t)(4) Regardless of the classification, some waste may require enhanced controls or 

limitations at a particulate land disposal facility. A performance assessment and an intruder assessment 

are used to identify these enhanced controls and limitations, which are site- and waste-specific. 

Enhanced controls or limitations could include additional limits on waste concentration or total activity, 

more robust intruder barriers, deeper burial depth, and waste-specific stability requirements. These 

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enhanced controls or limitations could mitigate the uncertainty associated with the evolutionary effects of 

the natural environment and the disposal facility performance over the compliance period. 

Comments: 

Enhanced controls or limitations including additional limits on waste concentration or total activity, 

more robust intruder barriers, deeper burial depth, and waste-specific stability requirements will not 

increase the protectiveness when it comes to long-lived radionuclides. As stated earlier there is not 

waste form, container, intruder barrier, etc., that can be implement that will last the life of the 

radiological threat long-lived radionuclides pose to human health and the environment. 

§61.59 Institutional Requirements. (b) Insitutional control. The land owner or custodial agency shall 

carry out an institutional control program to physically control access to the disposal site following 

transfer of control of the disposal site from the site operator. The institutional control program must also 

include, but not limited to, carrying out an environmental monitoring program at the disposal site, 

periodic surveillance, minor custodial care, and other requirements as determined by the Commission; 

and administration of funds to cover the cost for these activities. The period of institutional will be 

determined by the Commission, but institutional controls may not be relied upon for more than I 00 years 

following transfer of control of the disposal site to the owner. 

Comments: 

Institutional Controls (!Cs) to the Yakama Nation mean: 

• Access controls - fences, signs, camera, guards, etc. 

• Intruder controls - waste site cover 

• Land and Groundwater restrictions (deed restrictions, drilling restrictions, land-use/excavation 

restrictions). 

• Environmental monitoring (surface areas, vadoze zone and groundwater). 

• Surface/Barrier monitoring and repairs. 

!Cs to prevent exposure to the radiological hazards by humans - through isolation. Keeping people away 

from the waste site - prevents exposure. But !Cs are only good as long as they are maintained until the 

radiological hazard is no longer a threat. For LLW Disposal Sites, without long-lived radionuclides !Cs 

may provide this protection if maintained. But for long-lived radionuclides there is no assurance !Cs 

will remain in place (per the NRC IC fail at 100 years). Thus !Cs are not protective of human health and 

the environment when it comes to long-lived radionuclides - making them unsuitable for disposal in LLW 

Disposal Sites. 

To ensure protectiveness the NRC needs to establish regulations that !Cs for LLW must last at least 500 

to 1, 000 years depending on the waste site radiological characteristics. 

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Compliance and Protective Assurance Periods 

§61.2 Definitions. 

Compliance period is the time out to 1,000 years after closure of the disposal facility. 

Protective assurance period is the period from the end of the compliance period through I 0,000 years 

following closure of the site. 

Comments: 

The definitions above say nothing but provide a timeframe. What is to be complied with after closure 

and up to I, 000 years. This document only states that certain aspect of disposal must last through the 

compliance period. The compliance period does not include the !Cs (which cannot be relied upon after 

JOO years). The compliance period does not include the intruder barrier (which only needs to last for 

500 years). The NRC needs to establish strict regulations on what compliance really means to ensure 

protectiveness for 1,000 years. The 1,000 compliance period may keep people out of the area, but it does 

not reduce the radiological threat of long-lived radionuclides with the first half-life of 20, 000 years or 

more. 

What does protective assurance mean? This time period is used in the document to show that certain 

aspect of the disposal must last through the protective assurance period. How is the protective 

assurance actions assured when protective precautions (!Cs, intruder barriers, etc.) have failed - as 

stated in this document. The NRC needs to establish strict regulations to ensure protective assurance is 

properly conducted for I 0, 000 years. The 10, 000 year period may sound good, but when it comes to 

long-lived radionuclides, with the first half-live in the 100, 000 year range, 10, 000 years does not reduce 

the radiological threat. 

Summary Comment: 

The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Disposal document clearly showed that long-lived radionuclides are 

not suitable for disposal in LLW Disposal Site. These radionuclides will outlive any precautions, (!Cs, 

waste form stability, container structural stability, environmental monitoring, etc.) taken to prevent 

exposure to humans or the environment. The invisible radiological threat from these radionuclides will 

last for thousands, if not millions of years with no way to assure no exposure. The only safe disposal 

method for long-lived radionuclides is in a deep geological repository - like DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot 

Project (WIPP) in New Mexico. 

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