FILED

January 28, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt

Clerk

 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

RHONDA G. GOLEY, ) C/A NO. 03A01-9809-CV-00293

)

Plaintiff-Appellant, ) KNOX CIRCUIT

)

v. ) HON. DALE WORKMAN,

) JUDGE

ANDREW J. BROYLES, II, )

) REVERSED AND

Defendant-Appellee. ) REMANDED

FARRELL A. LEVY, McDONALD, LEVY & TAYLOR, Knoxville, for PlaintiffAppellant.

JAMES S. MacDONALD, DUNN, MacDONALD & COLEMAN, P.C., Knoxville,

for Defendant-Appellee.

O P I N I O N

Franks, J.

This appeal arises from an automobile accident that occurred on October

8, 1996. Plaintiff Rhonda Goley filed suit against defendant Andrew Broyles on

September 23, 1997. Process was issued the next day. At the time of the accident,

Goley had an insurance policy with defendant State Farm Automobile Insurance

Company that provided uninsured motorist coverage. Goley’s attorney mailed a copy

of the complaint to State Farm on September 22, 1997.

Goley later learned that Broyles was uninsured. A summons was issued

to State Farm on January 12, 1998, and served on January 21, 1998. State Farm

moved for summary judgment, claiming that the one-year statute of limitations barred

Goley’s claim. The Trial Judge agreed, and granted the motion. The Trial Court erred
1

The unreported case of Robbins v. City of Chattanooga, (Tenn. App. Filed Jan. 29, 1995,

Knoxville), determined that a plaintiff’s failure to serve process on the uninsured carrier within the

one-year statute of limitations was not fatal.

2

in dismissing the action, because, in our view, plaintiff complied with T.C.A. §56-7-

1206(a). 

State Farm contends it was not properly served with process, and that

the statute of limitations bars this claim, since the statute of limitations for personal

injuries is one year from the date of the injury. T.C.A. §28-3-104(a)(1). T.C.A.

§56-7-1206(a) addresses the procedure for claims against uninsured motorist carriers:

Any insured intending to rely on the coverage required by this part shall,

if any action is instituted against the owner and operator of an uninsured

vehicle, serve a copy of the process upon the insurance company issuing

the policy in the manner prescribed by law, as though such insurance

company were a party de fendant.

Neither pa rty cites any reported Tenness ee case dire ctly addressing this

issue, and our research has revealed none.1

The Virginia Supreme Court has faced the issue before us in Glenn

Falls Ins. Co. V. Stephenson, 367 S.E.2d 722 (Va. 1988). The Virginia Court relied

upon statutory language identical to T.C.A. §56-7-1206:

The phra se “in the manner pres cribed by law” modifies the words “shall

serve,” indicating a clear legislative intent to limit the requirement to the

manner of service of process, specifically described elsewhere in the

Code. Nowhere in the language of [the statute] do we find any mention

of a time period within which service is to be made. If the legislature

had intended to create a limitation of time for such service, we think it

would have done so in explicit language . . . [A] plaintiff in a personal

injury case may not discover that the tortfeasor is uninsured or

underinsured (as in this case) until after the tortfeasor has been served

with process, which may occur at a time after the statute of limitations

has run.

Id. at 724.

This reasoning is persuasive. See also 7A Am.Jur.2d Automobile

Insurance §589 (citing Glenn Falls and noting that the insured “need not serve the
3

insurer before the expiration of the limitations period against the tortfeasor, provided

the tortfeasor was sued before the expiration of such limitations period.”) 

We reverse the summary judgment in favor of State Farm and remand

with cost of the cause assessed to appellee.

__________________________

Herschel P. Franks, J.

CONCUR:

___________________________

Don T. McMurray, J.

___________________________

Charles D. Susano, Jr., J.