IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

:

Appellant :

:

 v. : No. 960 C.D. 2022

: Submitted: June 5, 2023

City of Reading Police :

Pennsylvania Department :

of Transportation :

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

PER CURIAM FILED: June 26, 2023

Gilbert M. Martinez (Martinez) appeals, pro se, the order of the Berks 

County Court of Common Pleas (trial court) dismissing his Action for Declaratory 

Judgment (Action), and Motion for Preliminary Injunction (Motion), filed against 

the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT) and the City of Reading 

Police Department (Reading Police) pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil 

Procedure (Pa.R.Civ.P.) 240(j)(1).1 We affirm.

1 Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1) states, in pertinent part: “If, simultaneous with the commencement 

of an action or proceeding . . . , a party has filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, 

the court prior to acting upon the petition may dismiss the action [or] proceeding . . . if it is satisfied 

that the action [or] proceeding . . . is frivolous.” As this Court has observed: “A frivolous action 

has been defined as one that ‘lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.’ Note to Pa. R.C[iv].P. [] 

240(j) (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989)). Stated differently, a frivolous action 

fails to state a valid cause of action on its face. McGriff v. Vidovich, 699 A.2d 797, 799 (Pa. 

Cmwlth. 1997).” Laramy v. Garman (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 928 C.D. 2018, filed February 12, 2020), 

slip op. at 4.
2

On July 18, 2022, Martinez filed the unverified Action, pursuant to 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 1601 and 1602, and the unverified Motion,2 pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P.

1531, in which he sought declaratory and injunctive relief against DOT and the 

Reading Police.

3

 Along with the Action and Motion, Martinez also filed an 

unverified application to proceed in the matter in forma pauperis (Application).

2 Pa.R.Civ.P. 1024(a) states, in relevant part: “Every pleading containing an averment of 

fact not appearing of record in the action . . . shall state that the averment . . . is true upon the 

signer’s personal knowledge or information and belief and shall be verified.” As the Pennsylvania 

Superior Court has observed: 

As noted in Goodrich Amram, “[t]he requirement of a 

verification is not waivable because without it a pleading is mere 

narration, and amounts to nothing.” 2 Goodrich Amram 2d 

§1024(a):[2 (2023) (footnotes omitted)]. While our cases 

acknowledge that amendment should be liberally allowed to cure 

technical defects in a verification, see, e.g., George H. Althof, Inc. 

v. Spartan Inns of America, Inc., [441 A.2d 1236 (Pa. Super. 1982)]; 

Monroe Contract Corp. v. Harrison Square, Inc., [405 A.2d 954 

(Pa. Super. 1979)], there is no doubt but that the verification 

attached to the complaint in the instant case falls so far short of the 

statutory mandate that the verification is wholly defective and 

inadequate to support entry of a [] judgment against [the] appellants.

Atlantic Credit and Finance, Inc. v. Giuliana, 829 A.2d 340, 344 (Pa. Super. 2003). Likewise, in 

the instant matter, the complete lack of a verification is wholly defective and inadequate to support 

the entry of the requested relief against DOT and the Reading Police.

3

In particular, in the Action, Martinez sought the following declaratory relief: (1) “[a] 

declaration decreeing that [he] has a common law right to travel freely for pleasure and to conduct 

his business in his automobile unimpeded by police and that [he] is not required in accordance 

with his common law right to possess a driver’s license to use his property on the highway, streets, 

or roads, and that no registered license plate, liability insurance, or state inspection shall be 

required”; (2) “[a] declaration decreeing that [DOT and the Reading Police] willfully violated [his] 

4th, 5th, and 14th [A]mendment right[s under] the U.S. [C]onstitution, [U.S. Const. amend. IV, V, 

and XIV,] as well as the [D]ue Process and [E]qual [P]rotection [C]lause[s] by unlawfully entering 

my automobile, unlawful[ly] us[ing] tracking devices, and vandalizing my property for no 

legitimate reason or lawful purpose”; (3) “[a]n award of reasonable cost[s] to repair the computers 

(Footnote continued on next page...)
3

On August 10, 2022, the trial court issued an order denying Martinez’s 

in forma pauperis Application because: (1) the Application was not properly 

verified; (2) the declaratory and injunctive relief requested in the Action and Motion 

is in violation of the laws of this Commonwealth; and (3) the allegations in the 

Action and Motion do not allege causes of action because they are “vague and 

without the necessary detail.” Trial Court 8/10/22 Order. Martinez then filed the 

instant timely appeal of the trial court’s order.

On appeal,4 Martinez claims that the trial court erred in dismissing the 

Application because: (1) Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(b) specifically provides that a party who 

is without the financial resources to pay the costs of litigation is entitled to proceed 

in forma pauperis; and (2) the trial court’s summary dismissal of the Action and 

and door lock[s] in my automobiles”; (4) “[a]n [a]ward of reasonable attorney fees and costs”; and 

(5) “[i]njuncti[ve] relief ordering [relief requested in] number (1) as demanded here until the outset 

of this case, and whatever relief the court deems just and proper in the interest[s] of justice.” 

Action at 11.

In addition, in the Motion, Martinez sought the following injunctive relief: 

[Martinez] respectfully demands an injunction ORDER decreeing 

that [he has] a common law right to travel freely for pleasure and to 

conduct his business in his automobile unimpeded by the [Reading 

Police] and that he is not required in accordance with his common 

law right to possess a driver’s license to use his property on the 

highway, streets, or roads, and that no registered license plate, 

liability insurance and[/]or state inspection shall be required. 

[Martinez] further requests an order directing the [Reading Police] 

to provide [him] with [its] policy manual.

Motion at 8.

4

In reviewing a trial court’s order dismissing Martinez’s Application pursuant to 

Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1), this Court is limited to determining whether his constitutional rights were 

violated, and whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law. Jones v. 

Doe, 126 A.3d 406, 408 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015).
4

Motion without disposing of his Application demonstrates an ill will toward him 

thereby violating his “right to the fair, orderly, and expeditious administration of 

justice.” Brief for Appellant at 10. However, Martinez misapprehends the manner 

in which the trial court was required to proceed on his Application under Pa.R.Civ.P. 

240.

As the Pennsylvania Superior Court has noted:

The purpose of granting in forma pauperis status to 

indigent litigants is to enable them to access the court 

system without having to pay the costs normally 

associated with court proceedings. As society grows more 

litigious and economic resources become more scarce, it 

is increasingly important that both litigants and courts act 

responsibly. An individual seeking to proceed in forma 

pauperis, thus requesting to have court costs paid for from 

funds provided to this Commonwealth by its taxpayers, 

has a responsibility to present a valid cause of action. To 

hold otherwise would violate [Pa.R.Civ.P.] 240(j) and 

would display a blatant disregard for the notion of judicial 

economy. Courts should not allow a litigant seeking in 

forma pauperis status to use the court’s time and the 

taxpayer’s money to support a frivolous claim.

Conover v. Mikosky, 609 A.2d 558, 560 (Pa. Super. 1992). “In other words, an action 

is frivolous, and therefore subject to dismissal before the court considers the petition 

to proceed in forma pauperis, if, on its face, the action does not set forth a valid 

cause of action.” 25A Standard Pa. Practice 2d §127:101 at 107 (2006) (footnotes 

omitted).

In the opinion filed in support of its order in this case, the trial court 

explained its rationale for dismissing the Action, Motion, and Application as 

follows:

This court denied the in forma pauperis

[Application] because the pleading was not properly 
5

verified, the relief requested in the [Action and Motion 

are] in violation of the laws of the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania, and the allegations are so vague that they 

did not allege any causes of action. Due to these defects 

and [Martinez’s] failure to state a cause of action for which 

relief can be granted, this court denied [his] in forma 

pauperis [Application]. [Martinez] has been the defendant 

in approximately fourteen different actions filed by 

various municipalities because he refuses to believe that 

laws and regulations apply equally to him as a citizen of 

the United States. He does not pay, inter alia, water bills 

and taxes, so municipal[] claims are filed against him. In 

the case sub judice, he is attempting to sue governmental 

units because they enforce laws that every citizen must 

obey to protect other members of our society. [Martinez] 

declares himself “a[n] unfranchised Common law free 

man” (sic) which does not have to be obligated by laws or 

contracts to pay for a driver’s license to travel in his 

automobile, to be forced to register his license plate, to be 

forced to buy automobile insurance, and to be forced to 

have his vehicles undergo state inspections. He is 

therefore suing [DOT and the Reading Police] to obtain 

injunctions against them to stop them from enforcing 

motor vehicle laws. Since this relief is not permitted under 

the law, this court did not grant [him] in forma pauperis

relief. This court determined that it could not aid [him] in 

pursuing a case that had no basis for relief and sought 

illegal remedies.

Trial Court 8/25/22 Opinion. The foregoing demonstrates that the trial court 

properly considered the merits of the claims presented in Martinez’s Action and 

Motion before ruling on his Application to proceed in forma pauperis in accordance 

with the requirements of Pa.R.Civ.P. 240.

Moreover, with respect to the merit of the claims raised in Martinez’s 

Action and Motion, article II, section 1 of the Pennsylvania Constitution declares 

that “[t]he legislative power of this Commonwealth shall be vested in a General 

Assembly . . . .” Pa. Const. art. II, §1. In this regard, the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court explicated long ago:
6

The plenary power of the Legislature over the 

highways of the [C]ommonwealth is of ancient standing, 

and seldom, if ever, has been questioned. It was said . . . 

in an early case: ‘In England, a highway is the property of 

the King as parens patriae. * * * In Pennsylvania, it is the 

property of the people, not of a particular district, but of 

the whole state. * * * Highways, therefore, being 

universally the property of the state, are subject to its 

absolute direction and control.’

It must be treated as elementary law that public 

roads are laid out and opened for the use of all persons on 

equal terms; that is, to all who comply with the reasonable 

regulations of the duly constituted authorities. The right 

to use a public highway for travel or in the transportation 

of merchandise is not unrestricted. It is for the 

[C]ommonwealth, acting through the Legislature, to direct 

the conditions under which this limited right shall be 

exercised. It alone has the power to regulate the manner 

and circumstances under which automobiles may be 

operated upon the highways of the [C]ommonwealth. This 

power is vested in the Legislature, and is based, not only 

upon its right to control and regulate the use of the 

highways, but is buttressed by the inherent police power 

of the state.

This power of the state has been upheld by the 

Supreme Court of the United States. In Kane v. New 

Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 167 [(1916)], the Supreme Court 

said: ‘The power of a state to regulate the use of motor 

vehicles on its highways has been recently considered by 

this court and broadly sustained.’ See Hendrick v. 

Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 [(1915)]. Mr. Justice Butler said, 

in Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 [(1927)]: ‘Motor 

vehicles are dangerous machines, and, even when 

skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by 

serious dangers to persons and property. In the public 

interest the state may make and enforce regulations 

reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, 

residents and nonresidents alike, who use its highways.’

See also Hodge Co. v. Cincinnati, 284 U.S. 335 [(1932)].
7

The permission to operate a motor vehicle upon the 

highways of the [C]ommonwealth is not embraced within 

the term civil rights, nor is a license to do so a contract or 

a right of property in any legal or constitutional sense. 

Although the privilege may be a valuable one, it is no more 

than a permit granted by the state, its enjoyment depending 

upon compliance with the conditions prescribed by it, and 

subject always to such regulation and control as the state 

may see fit to impose.

Commonwealth v. Funk, 186 A. 65, 67-68 (Pa. 1936) (citations omitted). Thus, 

“[t]he right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highway is subject to regulation 

under the police power and such regulations have been embodied in the Vehicle 

Code[, 75 Pa. C.S. §§101 - 9805].” Commonwealth v. Irwin, 29 A.2d 68, 69 (Pa. 

1942).

Specifically, pursuant to its clear constitutional authority, the General 

Assembly has enacted the following relevant provisions of the Vehicle Code: (1) 

Section 1301(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1301(a) (“No person shall drive or move and no owner 

. . . shall knowingly permit to be driven or moved upon any highway any vehicle 

which is not registered in this Commonwealth. . . .”); (2) Section 1331(a), 75 

Pa. C.S. §1331(a) (“Registration plates shall be provided by [DOT].”); (3) Section 

1332(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1332(a) (“Every registration plate shall, at all times, be 

securely fastened to the vehicle to which it is assigned or on which its use is 

authorized in accordance with regulations promulgated by [DOT].”); (4) Section 

1501(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1501(a) (“No person . . . shall drive any motor vehicle upon a 

highway or public property in this Commonwealth unless the person has a driver’s 

license valid under the provisions of this chapter.”); (5) Section 1511(a), 75 Pa. C.S. 

§1511(a) (“Every licensee shall possess a driver’s license issued to the licensee at 

all times when driving a motor vehicle and shall exhibit the license upon demand by 

a police officer, and when requested by the police officer the licensee shall write the 
8

licensee’s name in the presence of the officer in order to provide identity.”); (6) 

Section 1786(a), 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(a) (“Every motor vehicle of the type required to 

be registered under this title which is operated or currently registered shall be 

covered by financial responsibility.”); (7) Section 1786(b), 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(b) 

(“[DOT] shall require that each motor vehicle registrant certify that the registrant is 

financially responsible at the time of registration or renewal thereof.”); (8) Section 

4701, 75 Pa. C.S. §4701 (“No owner or driver shall refuse to submit a vehicle . . . to

any inspection and test that is authorized or required by the provisions of this 

chapter.”); and (9) Section 4728, 75 Pa. C.S. §4728 (“The appropriate certificate of 

inspection shall be affixed to the vehicle . . . as specified in regulations adopted by

[DOT].”).

Martinez has not cited any legal authority undermining the validity of 

any of the foregoing well-settled law. As a result, the trial court did not err or abuse 

its discretion in dismissing the Action and Motion pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(j)(1), 

before ruling on Martinez’s Application under Pa.R.Civ.P. 240(b), because the 

claims raised in the Action and Motion are patently frivolous and Martinez may not 

obtain the requested declaratory and injunctive relief.

5

 

Accordingly, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

5

See, e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 332 (1921) (“Our whole system of law is 

predicated on the general fundamental principle of equality of application of the law. ‘All men 

are equal before the law,’ ‘This is a government of laws and not of men,’ [and] ‘No man is above 

the law,’ are all maxims showing the spirit in which legislatures, executives and courts are 

expected to make, execute, and apply laws.”).
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Gilbert M. Martinez, :

:

Appellant :

:

 v. : No. 960 C.D. 2022

: 

City of Reading Police :

Pennsylvania Department :

of Transportation :

PER CURIAM

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 26th day of June, 2023, the order of the Berks County 

Court of Common Pleas dated August 11, 2022, is AFFIRMED.