IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-20621

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

FELIX MADUKA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. 4:14-CR-24-2

Before KING, CLEMENT, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Felix Maduka pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to structure bank 

withdrawals to avoid reporting requirements and eight counts of structuring 

bank withdrawals to avoid reporting requirements. See 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3)

and (d)(2); 18 U.S.C. § 371. He was sentenced to concurrent, within-guidelines 

sentences of 60 months in prison on each count, to be followed by three years 

of supervised release. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

October 28, 2015

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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2

On appeal, Maduka asserts that the legislature did not intend for a 

person to violate § 5324 in the absence of further criminal activity. Questions 

of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. United States v. Lawrence, 

727 F.3d 386, 391 (5th Cir. 2013). Section 5324, plainly and unambiguously, 

makes it unlawful for a person to structure a currency transaction for the 

purpose of evading federal reporting requirements. There is simply no 

requirement that the person’s motivation for evading the federal reporting 

requirements be related to further criminal activity, and Maduka points to 

nothing that calls the plain reading of the statute into question. See Salinas 

v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 57 (1997); United States v. Rodriguez, 132 F.3d 

208, 212 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 742-43 (5th Cir. 

2004). This issue is unavailing.

Next, Maduka argues that the district court erred in applying the twolevel enhancement for abuse of a position of trust. Under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, an 

enhancement is appropriate if the defendant occupies a position of trust and 

the defendant abused that position in a manner that significantly facilitated 

the commission or concealment of the offense. § 3B1.3; United States v. 

Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 165 (5th Cir. 2009). Because Maduka objected to this 

enhancement in the district court, the district court’s application of § 3B1.3 to 

the facts is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Miller, 607 F.3d 144, 147-

48 (5th Cir. 2010); United States v. Dial, 542 F.3d 1059, 1060 (5th Cir. 2008). 

The district court did not clearly err when it applied the position of trust 

enhancement to Maduka’s sentence. Maduka was an administrator, 

authorized official, director, and owner of Joystar Home Health Service, LLC 

(Joystar), which was a Texas corporation that provided services to Medicare 

beneficiaries and received payments for such services from Medicare. 

Maduka’s position with Joystar provided him with broad discretion in 

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structuring the currency withdrawals (in an unlawful manner) and the ability 

to act in a manner to conceal the unlawful structuring of currency withdrawals. 

United States v. Pruett, 681 F.3d 232, 248-49 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2012). As for 

Maduka’s claims that there was no abuse of trust because there were no 

victims of his offense of conviction, this court has “never held . . . nor do the 

guidelines explicitly require, that the determination whether a defendant 

occupied a position of trust must be assessed from the perspective of the 

victim.” United States v. Buck, 324 F.3d 786, 794 (5th Cir. 2003). Further, 

there were collateral victims of the offense of conviction as a result of Maduka’s 

fraudulent healthcare scheme – patients of Joystar, Medicare, the government, 

Chase Bank, and Bank of America. See United States v. St. Junius, 739 F.3d 

193, 209 (5th Cir. 2013); Miller, 607 F.3d at 149; United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 

432, 459-61 (5th Cir. 2007); Buck, 324 F.3d at 795; United States v. Gieger, 190 

F.3d 661, 665 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Sidhu, 130 F.3d 644, 647, 655-

56 (5th Cir. 1997). Accordingly, Maduka has failed to show that the district 

court clearly erred when it assessed a two-level increase to his offense level 

under § 3B1.3 for abuse of position of trust. 

Lastly, Maduka contends that his within-guidelines sentences are

substantively unreasonable because they are greater than necessary to satisfy 

the sentencing goals set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and do not account 

sufficiently for his mitigating factors. He also contends that his sentence is 

excessive because a violation of § 5324 merely deprives the government of 

information and is a non-violent crime. 

Generally, appellate courts review the sentence for reasonableness, 

under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49-

51 (2007). Where, as here, the district court imposes a sentence within a 

properly calculated sentencing guidelines range, this court “will give great 

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deference to that sentence,” and the sentence is entitled to a rebuttable 

presumption of reasonableness. See United States v. Campos-Maldonado, 531 

F.3d 337, 338-39 (5th Cir. 2008); United States v. Cooks, 589 F.3d 173, 186 (5th 

Cir. 2009). The fact that this court might reasonably conclude that a different 

sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal. United States v. 

Williams, 517 F.3d 801, 809 (5th Cir. 2008); see Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. 

The record shows that the court heard and considered Maduka’s 

mitigating arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, and it concluded that a withinguidelines sentence would satisfy the § 3553(a) goals. The district court 

specifically recalled Maduka’s arguments in favor of a sentence lower than the 

advisory sentencing guidelines range but also noted Maduka’s participation in 

the planning, organizing, and execution of the healthcare fraud and structured 

transactions that took place over four years and involved a substantial sum of 

money. Maduka has not shown a clear error of judgment on the part of the 

district court in balancing the necessary sentencing factors. See Cooks, 589 

F.3d at 186. 

Additionally, to the extent Maduka argues that the district court erred 

by failing to grant a downward departure, and to the extent Maduka requested 

a downward departure, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the denial of a 

request for a downward departure unless the denial was based on the district 

court’s incorrect belief that it lacked authority to grant the departure. United 

States v. Lucas, 516 F.3d 316, 350 (5th Cir. 2008). Maduka does not assert and 

nothing in the record suggests that the district court believed it could not grant 

a request for a downward departure. See id. at 350-51; United States v. 

Landerman, 167 F.3d 895, 899 (5th Cir. 1999). 

Accordingly, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.

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