### THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TEXAS

January 25, 1989

Honorable Terra1 Smith OpinionNo. JM-1011 Chairman Natural Resources Committee Re: Computationof the outTexas House **of** Representatives standing obligations of a P. 0. Box 2910 metropolitan transit authoAustin, Texas 78769 ritywhen an election unit withdraws from the authority
, and related matters (RQ-1559)

Dear Representative Smith:

You have requested our opinion concerning a dispute between the City of Westlake Hills and the Capital Metropolitan Transit Authority (Capitol Metro), an authority createdunder article 1118x,~V.T.C.S. Until early in 1988, the City of Westlake Hills constituteda "unit of election" that, togetherwith others (the principal one of which was the City ofAustin), comprised the authority. See V.T.C.S. art. 1118x, 9 5(f). One January 16, 1988, pursuant to statutory leave,Westlake Hillswithdrew from the authority.

When a unit of electionwithdraws from an article 1118x metropolitan transit authority, the statute requires a determination of the outstandingobligations of the authority as of the time of withdrawal. $8~ V.T.C.S. art. 1118x, 5s 6F, 6G. Specifically,you ask:

Should the liquidassets of a Metropolitan TransitAuthoritybe deducted from the amount of bonded indebtedness to determine the amount of debt as requiredby HB 943[?]

Article 1118x is a complex statute that governs the creation and dissolution of metropolitan rapid transit authorities. It has been judiciallyconstrued on very few occasions. m Brvant v. MetrODOlitan TransitAuth., 722 S.W.2d 738 (Tex.App. - Houston [14thDist.] 1986,no writ):

. Citv of Humble

.MetrODOlltan TransitAuth, 636 S.W.2d 484 (Tex.App. -Azstin 1982,writ ref*d n.r.L.). S Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469U.s':!also 528,

p. 5207Honorable Terra1 Smith - Page 2 (JM-1011)

U.S. 1049 (1985):&&&rue2 v. VIA Metro. 802 F.2d 126 (5thCir. 1986).

The answer to your question is complicatedbecause the statutehas two different sections, 6F and 66, that purport to control the withdrawal of units of election from metropolitan transit authorities and the determination of an authority's obligationsat the time. Both the sectionswere added to article 1118xduring the **regular** session of the 70th Legislature.1 Acts 1987, 70th Deg., ch. 790, at 2774: Acts 1987, 70th Deg., ch. 804, at 2796. The operative part of section 6G, for our purposes, is composed of subsections 6G(g) and 6G(h). The comparable parts of section 6F are subsections 6F(;L) and 6F(m).

A study of the parallel subsectionsreveals that two of them are exactly alike, word **for** word. Both subsection 6F(1) and subsection 6G(g) read:

The withdrawal of a unit of electionunder f;hissecti n is ,subiectto the reou'

fed&al an ren& of the d state constitutions orohibitina the mrment of contracti. Taxes shall continue to be collected in the unit of electionuntil an amount of taxes equal to

1. Another.provision **of** article 1118xpurporting to deal with withdrawals, section 6D, is obsoletebecause it authorizeswithdrawals onlypursuant to electionsheld "on any date from April 1, 1980, to September 1, 1980." Both sections **6F** and 6G **were** added to article 1118xduring the regular session of the 70th Legislature in 1987, different acts, but by

neither of which expressly referred to the other. Section 6Fwas added as part of a **bill** (H.B. finallypassed on May 943) **22, 1987,~**  that was expressly made effective September 1, 1987.a Acts 1987, 70th Deg., ch. 790, at 2774. The bill (H.B.2008) containing the other withdrawalprovision, section 66,was finallypassed on June 1, 1987. Itwas passed **later** than the other bill but became effectiveAugust 31, 1987, one day before the other one took effect. &.g Acts 1987, 70th Deg., ch. 804, at 2796. Both statutoryprovisions generally speak of wobligationswrather than "debt"and, thus, includeobligationsnot classified as "debt" forpurposes of constitutionalrestrictions regarding the assumption of debt. % Tex. Const. art. III, 5 49: art. XI, 58 5, 7;McNeil1 v. Citv of Waco, 33 S.W. 322 (Tex. 1895).

**p. 5208** Honorable Terra1 Smith - Page 3 (JM-1011)

of election to the authority has been collected. To determine the amount of the total financialobligations **of** the unit of election, the board shall compute, as of the date of withdrawal, the total of:

(1) the current obligations of the authority authorized in the current budget and contracted forby the authority:

(2) the amount of contractualobligations outstandingat that time for capital or other expenditures in the current or subsequent years, the payment of which has not been made

or provided for from the proceeds of notes, bonds, or other obligations;

(3) all amountsdue and to become due in the current and subsequent years on all notes, bonds, or other securitiesor obligations for debt issuedby the authority and outstanding:

- : (4)~the amount reguiredby the authority to be reserved for allyears to comply with financialcovenantsmade with lenders, bond
or note holders, or other creditors or contractors:

(5) any additional amount, which. may includean amount for contingent liabilities, determinedby the board to be the amount necessary for the full and timelypayment of the current and continuingobligations of the authority, to avoid a default or impairment of those obligations;and

(6) any additional amountdetermined by the board to be Bcessarv and aooropriate to allocate to the unit of electionbecause of current and continuing financial obligations of the authoritythat relate specifically to the unit of election. (Emphasisadded.)

It is important to realize that the six items of computationare used to determine the obligation of the withdrawingunit of election fo the authority
, and not the continuing obligation of thewithdrawingunit to the creditors of the authority imposedby constitutional "contract1

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clauses. The first five items of computationmay be of aid in illuminatingthe continuing financ,ialexposure of both the authority and thewithdrawing unit to creditors of the authority,,but statutoryprovisions cannot control constitutional requirements.

That iswhy the distinction is important. The statutory provisions control the division ofprimary responsibility between the withdrawing city and the continuing transit authority for the discharge of transit authority obligations existing at the time of the withdrawal,but thoseprovisions do not purport to (anddo not) control the actual liability of either the city or the authority for the discharge of such obligations. The liabilityof all components of the authority is fixedby the contractualterms under which the indebtednesswas undertaken at the time, and subsequent internal arrangementsby componentunits forpayment do not affect their common obligation to pay constitutionally protected third-parties in full if the transit authority does not do so. Constitutionally-imposedliability protecting the obligation of contracts exists entirely apart from statutory formulas attempting to define it. U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Tex. Const. art. I, 5 16. See Morris & Cumminasv. State ex rel. Gussett, 62 Tex. 728, 743 (1884);~

Burnsv. Dillev Coufitv Line'IndeD. School Dist., 295 S.W. 1091 (Tex.Comm'nApp. 1927, judgmt. adopted):Attorney General Opinions JM-605, JM-453 (1986). Cf. Cardenas v. State, 683 writ).2 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.App. - San Antonio 1984, no

2. Neither subsection 6F(m) ~nor subsection 6G(h) expressly relieve a withdrawing unit of any part of the unretired contractual obligations of the transit authority in the **obligation of contract" sense. The withdrawing unit will remain liable to authority creditors if the authority defaults -- even after "an amount of taxes equal to the [statutorilydefined] total financialobligations of the [withdrawing]unit" has been previously collected from the withdrawn unit. &8 Citv of Austinv. Cahill, 88 S.W. 542, reh'a denied, 89.S.W. .552(Tex.1905). That is particularly the case regarding obligations incurredbefore sections 6F and 6G were added to the statute. It couldbe argued that contractual obligationsundertakenby the transit authority after sections 6F and 6G were added to the statute incorporated the new statutoryprovisions so as to limit the claims of those creditors against withdrawing units (FootnoteContinued)

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The sixth item **of** computation is clearly of a different sort than the first five. The first fivemeasure obligations shared alike by all the units of election composing the authority. The sixth concerns an amount to be "allocated" to the withdrawingunit alone.
Although the legislaturecannot constitutionally withdraw from creditors of the transit authority their contractual remedies fordefault (orcurtail their security) without substituting somethingof equal efficacy and value, see Citv ofAransas Pass v. Keelb 247 S.W. 818 (Tex. 1923), the legislaturecan require, as between the public obligors,

a balancing of equities and an adjustment of primary responsibility for the discharge of their joint obligations. a bexar Countv HOSD. Dist.v. Crosby, 327 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. 1959).

Just as private'joint debtorsmay agree among themselves that one will individuallypay their joint obligation for the benefit of both -- without such an agreement affecting the right and opportunityof the creditor to 'proceedagainstboth debtors if the debt is not satisfied -- the legislature, in adjusting the relationshipbetween the authority and thewithdrawing unit, can require that the transit authoritywill .be primarily responsible-for satistying the joint outstandingobligationsonce the withdrawing unit has contributeda certain amount toward that end. In arriving at the amount which the withdrawing unit must contribute, the legislature may consider both the obligations of the authority that relate specifically to the withdrawingunit and the unencumbered **assets** available to the authority for use in discharging obligations. a. Board of Manaaersv. Pension Bd., 449 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. 1969); Wheeler v. Citv of Brownsville, 220 S.W.2d 457 (Tex. 1949) (obligationto pay tax by reason of legislative adjustment of equities). Such an internaladjustment between joint debtors~doesnot affect the rights of creditors. They may stillpursue -- againstboth debtors -- all remedies they had before, so no impairment of the obligation of contract
occurs.

(FootnoteContinued) accordingly. &S CochranCo tv v. Mann ZEatute 172 S.W.2d 689 (Tex.1943). However, the itself **makes** such distinctionbetween "ob1igations.w We need not decigz this questionhere.

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None of the six itemsmentions "liquidassets," although the second item speaks of outstanding contractual obligations "the payment of which has not been made or provided for from the proceeds of notes, bonds, or other obligations." This provision requires only that the computation of outstanding contractual obligationsbe reduced by those fundsMitted to the payment of those obligations ('I& or provided &r from the proceeds"). It does not **require** that unencumbered liquid assetspossessed by the authoritybe deducted from the liabilityof the withdrawing unit to the authority.3

However, the six provisions of subsections 6F(l) and 6G(g) set out **above** establish only the items to be considered in computing the Votal financial obligations of the unit of election" to the authority. The manner inwhich the computations are to be employed is controlledby subsections 6F(m) and 6G(h). Unlike the 6F(l) and 6G(g) subsections,

3. "Liquid assets" consist of cash, or assets

_ immediatelyconvertible **to** cash. **Black ’** **s** Law Dictionary, at 83~8(5thed. 1979). Prior to thewithdrawal of a unit of election from an authority, creditors of the authority have

a call upon the assets of the authority and sources of
revenue contractually committed to satisfy their claims. The existence of other assets I& so encumbereddoes not
seme to release encumbered assets from any part of the claims against them. The later-discussed provision at issue in section 6G(h)would be constitutionally objectionable if read as an attempt to limit the liability of a withdrawing unit -- so far as authority creditors are concerned -- to an amount-less than the total outstanding amount of the financialobligations of the authority. The .prohibitionagainst impairingthe obligation of contracts is not **absolute,** but, to avoid constitutional invalidity, a statute that withdraws or substantiallydiminishes the contractual security of holders of bonds or other obligations issuedby public bodies must substantially substitute an equally effective remedy for that taken away. Citv of Aransas Pass v. Keelinq suora. The statute makes no attempt to substitute a n;w source of payment for the value of "unencumbered" liquid assets thatmight be deducted from the share of nobligationsBO to **be** assumedby a withdrawing unit of election. a -as Countv Levee I nrovement Dist. PO. 6 v Rua 1 judgmt.Adoptzdi. 36 S.W.2d 188 (Tex.Comm:n. App. 1931,

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subsections 6F(m) and 6G(h) are not identical,although the match isvery good.

Subsections 6F(m) and 66(h), are each composed of five sentences. The final three sentencesof each subsection are exactly the same, and the only difference in the first sentence of each one is the alphabeticaldesignation of the preceding subsection to which it refers. The important difference is in the second sentence. The second sentence of subsection 6F(m) reads:

The unit of election's total financial obligation is the sum of the first five computations required by Subsection (1) of this section plus the amount allocated directly to the unit of electionunder the last computation required of this section.4 by Subsection (1)

Comparison shows that subsection (h)of section 6G is word-for-word the same as subsection (m) of section 6F except in the passagesunderscoredbelow --most notably in the second sentence. Subsection 6G(h) reads:

The unit of election's share of the financial obligations~

of the authorityunder the first five computations requiredby Subsection (9) of this section shallbe in the same ratio that the population of the unit of election has to the totalpopulation of the authority, according to the most recent and available population data of an agency of the federal government, as determinedby the board. The unit of election*s total financialobligation is i.tsshare the first five computations requiredby Subsection (g) of this section plus the amount allocateddirectly to the unit of election under the last computation requiredby Subsection (g) of this section

4. Although the form is somewhat different, the languageof subsections 6F(&) and 6F(m) of article 1118x, V.T.C.S., is the same as that found in subsection 9A(j) of article 1118y,V.T.C.S.,which controls the withdrawal of a unit of election from a regional transportation authority. The provision was added to article 1118~ in 1985. Acts 1985, 69th beg., ch. 101, at 541.

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gnd less the unit of election's share of the otal amount of the unencumbered assets of,

stocks, unit of election's share of those assets i determined accordina to DODU~ tion in thz g sm e te ' * the unit of electson#s share of the first five

.c mn tation r ouiredbv Subsection la)

. The bzari shallsce%ify to the governingbody of the unit of election and to the comptroller of public accounts the amount of the total financialobligation of the unit of election. The comptroller of public accounts shall continue to collect taxes in the unit of electionuntil an aggregateamount equal to the total financialobligation of the unit of electionhas been collectedand actuallypaid to the authority. After that amount has been collected, the comptroller of public accounts shall discontinue collecting in the unit of election the taxes imposed under this Act, (Emphasisadded.)

It is readily apparent that subsection 6G(h) expressly requires that certainunencumbered liquid assets be considered in applying the preceding calculationswhile subsection 6F(m)does not. On the surface, the language of subsection 6G(h) appears to be substantiallymore generous to withdrawingunits than the language of subsection 6F(m),but we have concluded that the express provisions of section 6G(h) are implicitlycontained in subsection 6F(m), and that your question should be answered in the subsection 6G(h) context.

That conclusion is importantto the resolution of your questionbecause Capital.Metro fallsunder section 6F, not section 6G. Subsection 6G(a) declares that section 6~ applies "only" to an authority created before January 1, 1980,with a principal cityhaving a population less than 1,200,000. Austin has a population of less than 1,200,000, but the rapid transit authority at issue was not created before January 1, 1980. &=.g City of Austin Ordinance 83-1013U,October 13, 1983;Capital Metropolitan Transit AuthorityResolutionNo. CMTA-85-0126-10,January 28, 1985. Section 6F(a) states, on the otherhand, that section 6F applies "only" to authorities inwhich the principal city has a population of less than 750,000 and inwhich the rate of sales and use tax is one percent. CapitalMetro meets each such criterion. a Capital Metropolitan Transit

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Authority Resolution No. 1984.5 CNTA-84-1119-04, November 19,

Sections **6F** and 6G are parts of the same statute, added at the same session of the legislature. When different sections of a statute are addedduring the **same** session by different acts, they are to be read together as if embodied in a single act 1968): Shults v. mdix v. Kendrj,&, 430 S.W.2d 461 (Tex.

. **ate** 1985,writ ref'd n.r.ej.696 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.App. - Dallas The subsection 6F(m) languagemust be read in contextwith subsection 6G(h),and if its literal meaning,when read alone,does not comportwith the evident underlyingpurpose of the complete statute, itwill not be construed literally. &S Short v. W.T. Carter 8 Brother,

**5.** Because we have concluded that other passages clearly indicate that the legislature intendedno difference in the manner inwhich the obligationsof a withdraw,ing unit

are determined,we need not explore all the implications of subsection 6F(c),which reads:

A unit of election may withdraw from an authori-ty~

created under this Act only in accordancewith **&his section.**  An attempt to withdraw from an authority in a manner other than thatprovidedby this section is void. (Emphasisadded.)

Section **6F(c)** introducesambiguity because in referring to
nanauthority createdunder as Act," it obviously refers to article 1118x in its entirety. (The legislation that amended article 1118x to add section 6F did not itself create or authorize the creation of any rapid transit authorities.) See Acts 1987, 70th Deg., ch. 790, at 2774; 2AN.J. Singer, Sutherland StatutoryConstruction 5 22.35 at 296 (C.Sands 4th ed. 1985) (phrase "this act" in amended sectiongenerally refers to whole act). It is equally obvious that transit authoritiesgovernedby the section 6~ withdrawalprovisionswere created "underthis Act" (i.e., article 1118x, V.T.C.S.). Under the literal language of section 6F(c), units of election comprising section 6G authoritiesmay withdraw only in accordancewith section 6F. According to that section,an attempt to do so in any other
manner is void. It **may** be argued, of course, that subsection 6G(a), enacted later than **6F(c),** impliedly repealed the indicatedportion of 6F(c). $88 note 1, sunra. The conclusionwe reach remedies thematter, in any **event.**

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126 S.W.Zd 953 (Tex.1938). See a.&2 State v. Estate of Loomis, 553 S.W.Zd 166 (Tex.Civ.App. - Tyler 1977, writ ref'd).

The primary objective in the interpretationof statutes is to ascertain the intent of the legislature and, to do that, courts look to an act as a whole and not to its isolatedprovisions. Morrisonv. Cm 699 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. 1985). Once legislative intent isde&mined from a general view of the enactment as a whole, the statute should be construed so as to give effect to the purpose of the legislature. Citizen Ba k of Brvanv. First State Bank, S.W.Zd 344 (Tex.5979;. 580 The statute is to be construedwith reference to itsmanifest object, and if it is susceptible to one of two constructions -- one of which will carry out and the other defeat themanifest object -- it should receive the construction that carries out the legislative intent. a at 345. With those principles in mind, we examine the statutoryprovisions.
Notwithstanding the additional words in the 6G(h) subsection, the purposes of both subsection 6F(m) and subsection 6G(h) are apparently identical,b, to determine (using an identical population-ratio formula) "the total amount of the financial obligations of the [withdrawing]unit" as a percentage of the total financial obligations of the authority of which ithas been a part -- ;~i;;",'y adjusting the financial responsibilityof one to

. There are no grounds for supposing, so far as we
can ascertain, that the legislaturemeant to impose an inecuitablgadjustment of financial responsibilities upon any participant, or any group of participants, composing any metropolitan transit authority.6

6. Section **6F(b)** of article 1118x,V.T.C.S., allows the withdrawal of any "unit of election," including a "principalcity." Section 6G(c), on the otherhand, states: "In addition to any othermanner providedby law, a unit of election other than a nrincinal citv may withdraw from an authority as provided by this section." (Emphasis added.) We do not believe this difference is intendedto justify different treatment of withdrawing units. Some units of election,&, those participating in authorities created before January 1, 1980,with a principal city of.less than 750,000people 8& with a one percent sales and use tax rate, could fallunder the terms of &&h section **6~** and section 6G.

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When the second sentence of subsection 6F(m) is read alone,without the advantage of the subsection 6G(h) text for comparison, something is obviouslymissing: it obviously does not correctly state the true legi,slative intention because it states that the withdrawingunit's "total financial obligation" is Vhe ~~j2of [not itsshare of] the first five computations

. . .plus the amount allocated directly to the unit

. . . under the last computation.Q1 If the second sentence of subsection 6F(m)were applied literally, the withdrawingunit would be responsibleto the authority for the entire indebtednessof the authorityDlus a double liability for any indebtednessrelating specificallyto the unit.

It seemsplain that the legislature intendedthe "total financial obligations"of a subsection 6F(m)unit of election, for the purpose of adjusting equities, to be its share nf the first five computations,as clarifiedby subsection =(h), rather than the total amount owed by the entire authority, as 2" "Y'FL~ subsection literally reads. Cf. Sweenv HOSD. Di

.v 378 S.W.Zd 40 (Tex. 1964). It also seemsplain to us thatwhen subsection 6F(m) speaks only of "the amount allocateddirectly to the unit of electionunder the last [sixth] computation,V* its literal languagemust Abe expanded if ~the-underlying legislative purpose is to be fully expressed -- a purpose clarified by subsection 6G(h). Additional words are needed. Texas courts will add words orphrases to statutes when it is necessary to effect the legislative intent. m Sweeny HO D. Dist. Gary, S~BIB; ' 'e lo;0 (Tex. lz27). e, 296 S.W.

In Trimmier v. Carlton, suora, the Texas Supreme Court considered two statutes that were enacted as parts of one act dealingwith the creation of conservationand reclamation districts. One statute expressly authorized the -considerationof certain factorsby a commissioners court authorizing the creation of such a district,but the other, which involveddistricts authorized by a state agency, did not. The court said:

The language used with reference to the duties of the commissioners8court in the creation of a one countydistrict, and that with reference to the duties of the board of water engineers where the district lies in

more than one county, is not precisely the same,but we think themeaning is the same in each instance. Clearly the purpose of each method of organization is the same -- that

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is, to authorize the creation of a public corporation, each of which is to have and exerciseprecisely the same'power and perform the same functions.

. . . . These articles of the statute are not only inpari materia, but they are part of one and the same act, having the samepurpose, and must, of course, be construed together in the light of the general **object** of the law.
, .-. Where the Legislature has provided a system for the government of any subject, it is the duty of the court to effectuate that intention by such a constructionas will make the system consistent in all its parts and uniform in its operation. 'Whenthe Legislature has clearly laid down the rule for one class of cases it is not readily to be supposed that in its choice of words and phrases, or in the enactment **of** various provisions in the same act, ithas prescribed

a different rule for another class of cases within the same reason. as the- first.' 25 R.C.L. p. 1024, S 259.
Applying the above rule, it is clear that
we ought to say, as we do say, that the general, but comprehensive, language of article 5107--80 (Vernon'sSupplement 1922) has the samepurpose andmeaning as articles 5107--2, 5107--3 (Vernon's1918 Supplement), and since the latter expressly authorizes the commissioners'courts to determinewhether or -notthe creation of a one county district would be \abenefit to the lands included in the district,# the former in the use of the statutorywords intendedto and did authorize the board of water engineers to determine whether or not the creation of a district through them 'wouldbe a benefit to the lands included in the district.'

296 S.W. **at 1078.** 

Here, the sixth item in the computation of the Wotal financial obligationsof the unit of election" is

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any additionalamount determinedby the board to be necessary and anoroarti to allocate to the unit of election because of current and continuing financial obligationsof the authority that relate specifically to the unit of election. (Emphasisadded.)

The statutory requirementthat the amountdetern$;drb,y the board be fuaoronriate, as well as necessary, guirement that any amount allocated to the withdrawing unit be reasonable. See Frost v. Frost 695 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. APP. - SanAntonio 1985,no writ) ("Appropriate" synonymous with Hreasonable"). The explicit terms of subsection 6G@)
are implicit in subsection 6F(m) because the sixth item of computation is designed to adjust the equities of the situation on an appropriatebasis -- an adjustmentwhich, to be reasonable and appropriate,must also take into account,
as subsection 6G(h) does, assets of the authority alreadv contributedby the unit of election that are available to retire the joint obligations of the two entities. Cf. hirshfield D is 155, 161 (1875);Cass v. 61 S.W.2d &0,az041 tie?Crirn. State, App. 1933) ("reasonable," "fair," "honest," "impartial,"and @'eguitableBN equated).

In our opinion, the. express reguirement.of ,.subsectjon 6G(h) that there be subtracted from the computation of the "amount of the total financialobligations"of the authority

the total amount of the unencumbered assets of the authority that consist of cash, cash deposits, certificatesof deposit, and bonds, stocks, and othernegotiable securities

forpurposes of determiningthe financialobligations for which the withdrawing unit will remain responsible to the authority,merely clarifies, but does not enlarge, the subsection 6F(m)provision. Trimmierv. Carlton, suora.

Inasmuchas the situationsof withdrawing units of electionunder both section 6F and section 66, and of the authorities,are the same whether the authority is one createdbefore January 1, 1980,or later, and inasmuch as their joint outstandingcontractual obligationsare based upon identical items of computationwithout regard to when the authoritywas created, the equitable considerations in

one case are the same asin the other. In our opinion, the explicit language of subsection 6G(h) is implicit in subsection 6F(m).

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In keepingwith ourunderstanding of the intent of the legislature,we therefore advise that the City of Westlake Hills, upon its withdrawal from the CapitolMetro transit authority,was entitled to a proportional credit **for** cash and other unencumbered liquidassets (specifiedby statute) that remained in the hands **of** CapitolMetro, the credit to be applied against the amount of taxes.to be thereafter collected fromWestlake Hills forpayment to Capitol Metro. Statutory responsibility for the retirement of CapitolMetro obligations existing at the time of the Westlake Hills withdrawal restswith CapitolMetro, but Westlake Hills

commonwith all constituentunits of the transit (in

remains liable for the total amount of any authority) then-existin.g, constitutionallyprotected contractualobligations.

Because of the construction we give the statute, we need not engage issues, in the discussion of equal protection

equal and uniform taxation issues,or local or special law issues that a different constructionwould require.
a U.S. Const. amend. art. III, 5 56; Wheeler ;T"Cit 1; Tex. Const. art. I, 5 3;

v f Brownsvill

e, of Humble v MetroDolitanTr pmra; *

. ansitAuth., suDrq.

**SUMMARY**

Upon its withdrawal from the Capitol Metro transit authority, the City of Westlake Hills became entitled to a credit for unencumbered liquid assetsheld by CapitolMetro, the credit to be applied against the taxes to be collected from the city thereafter for payment to CapitolMetro. In commonwith the other constitituent units of the transit authority,Westlake Hills remains liable for certain (then-existing) Capitol Metro contractual obligations if CapitolMetro fails to properly discharge them. Constitutional protection of contractual obligations prevents the statute from operating to relieve the withdrawing city of obligations to bondholders.

JIM MATTOX Attorney General of Texas

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MARYKELLER FirstAssistantAttorney General

LOU MCCRJ2ARY ExecutiveAssistantAttorney General

JUDGE ZOLLIE STEAKLEY SpecialAssistantAttorney General

RICK GILPIN Chairman,Opinion Committee
Preparedby BNce Youngblood AssistantAttorney General

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