[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Pivonka v. Corcoran , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3476.]

NOTICE This slip opinion is subject to f ormal revision before it is pu blished in an advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are reques ted to promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohi o, 65 South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

S LIP O PINION N O
. 2020-O HIO -3476
P IVONKA ET AL ., A PPELLEES , v . C ORCORAN , 1 D IR ., A PPELLANT
. [Until this opinion appears in t he Ohio Official Reports advanc e sheets, it may be cited as Pivonka v. Corcoran , Slip Opinion No. 2020-Ohio-3476.] Class action—Subject-matter jurisdic tion—Medicaid—R.C. 5160.37 established sole remedy for named plaintiffs and unnamed class members who reimbursed Ohio Department of Medi caid on or after September 29, 2007, pursuant to department’s right of recovery under former R.C. 5101.58— Common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over class action for named and prospective class plain tiffs whose claims for recovery fall within R.C. 5160.37’s express language —Court of appeals’ judgment reversed and cause remanded to common pleas court. (No. 2019-0084—Submitted Janua ry 28, 2020—Decided June 30, 2020 .)

A PPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, No. 106749,

1. Under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.06(B), Maureen Corcoran, the current d irector of the Ohio Department of Medicaid, is automatically substituted for Barbara Sears, the f ormer director, as a party to this action.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

2 2018-Ohio-4866.

_________________ F RENCH , J. {¶ 1} In this appeal, we are asked to determine whether the common pl eas court had subject-matter jurisd iction over a class action filedby plaintiffsappellees, Michael A. Pivonka and Lisa Rijos. That class actio n seeks a declaratory judgment that former R.C. 5101.58, which relates to Medicaid re imbursements, is
unconstitutional and also seeks t o recover all sums paid to the Ohio Department of Medicaid (the “Department”) under that statute. {¶ 2} Because R.C. 5160.37 now provides the sole remedy for Medicaid program participants to recover excessive reimbur sement payment s made to the Department on or after Septemb er 29, 2007, we conclude that the common pleas court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the class action for the named and prospective class plaintiffs whos e claims for recovery fall wit hin the statute’s express language. We therefore reverse the judgment of the Eig hth District Court of Appeals affirming the trial court’s decision to certify the class. We remand this
cause to the trial court to det ermine whether unnamed prospecti ve class plaintiffs who reimbursed the Department before September 29, 2007, can ma intain an action in the common pleas court.
I. THE MEDICAID PROGRAM {¶ 3} The federal government established the Medicaid program in 1965 through Title XIX of the Social Security Act, as amended in 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn , 547 U.S. 268, 275, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 164 L.Ed.2d 459 (2006). The program provides joint feder al and state funding for medical care for i ndividuals who cannot afford to p ay their own medical

costs. Id. States are not required to participate in the Medicaid program, but they
all do. Id. ; see also Medicaid.gov, Program History: Medicaid , https://www.medicaid.gov/about-us/program-history/index.html (a ccessed JuneJanuary Term, 2020

3 18, 2020) [https://perma.cc/D8C7-YRTE]. Through the program, t he federal government pays the majority of the costs a state incurs provid ing medical care for Medicaid participants; the state pays the rest. Ahlborn at 275. Each state must
create its own scheme to oversee and administer the Medicaid pr ogram. 42 U.S.C. 1396a. In doing so, a state must comply with all federal statu tory requirements for making eligibility determinations, collecting and maintaining i nformation, and administering the program. Id. {¶ 4} Federal law also requires that each participating state give it self subrogation rights to recover ce rtain costs the state paid unde r the Medicaid program. This means that each state must enact legislation giv ing it the right to seek reimbursement from a third-party tortfeasor (that is, a th ird-party wrongdoer) for medical expenses the third-party wrongdoer caused and that the state paid on behalf of a Medicaid participan t. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(25)(H). The state must first
take reasonable measures to deter mine whether a third party is liable to pay for a Medicaid participant’s medical c osts. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(25)(A ). This third-party liability can arise when a health insurer is responsible for pa ying the participant’s
medical costs. Id . But it can also arise if a third-party tortfeasor injures th e Medicaid participant and the injury requires the participant to seek medical care. When a third party is liable to pay for the Medicaid participan t’s medical costs, the
state must seek reimbursement for the medical costs that it pai d under the Medicaid program. 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(25) (B). The state may seek reimbu rsement directly from the third party. Id. It may also seek reimbursement from a Medicaid participant who received payment from the third party for the m edical costs. 42 U.S.C. 1396k(a)(1) requires that all participating states expre ssly condition an individual’s eligibility for Medicaid on the individual’s assig nment to the state of any rights the individual has t o recover medical costs from a t hird party.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

4 II. OHIO’S MEDICAID SUBROGATION RIGHTS STATUTES

{¶ 5} Ohio’s Medicaid subrogation rights statute was originally conta ined in former R.C. 5101.58, repealed in 2013 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 59. T hat statute gave the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS” or “the Department”) 2 a “right of recovery” against a third party’s liability to a Me dicaid participant for medical services and care resulting from an injury, disease or disability caused by the third party. Under that stat ute and prior to September 29, 2007, if the Medicaid participant brought an action against a third-party tortfeasor, the entire amount the participant received under a settle ment or court judgment was s ubject to the state’s right of recovery. 2003 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 95, 150 Ohio Laws, Par t II, 1592-1594. The state could automatically r ecover up to the full amount of the costs it paid on behalf of the participant, even if the settlement, compromise, judgment or award
excluded reimbursement for the m edical costs or allocated a les ser amount to those

costs. See id. {¶ 6} Other states, including Arkansas, had similar Medicaid subrogat ion statutes allowing those states t o recover up to the entire amou nt of the medical costs they paid on the Medicaid partic ipant’s behalf without regard t o whether the settlement or court ju dgment allocated a lesser amount for reim bursement of medical expenses. In Ahlborn , 547 U.S. at 292, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 164 L.Ed.2d 459, the United States Supreme Court held that the federal Medicaid statute’s anti-lien provision, 42 U.S.C. 1396p, prohibited Arkansas from enforcing its Medicaid subrogation statute because it a llowed the state to assert an a utomatic lien on a

2. The ODJFS was the agency responsible for administering Ohio ’s Medicaid program until September 29, 2013, when the state created the Ohio Department of Medicaid to administer the program. See R.C. 5162.03. As used in this decision, the term “the Departm ent” refers to either the Ohio Department of Medicaid or the ODJFS.January Term, 2020

5 beneficiary’s settlement or judg ment proceeds in excess of the portion of the settlement or judgment that expressly represented reimbursement for medical costs. {¶ 7} Although no court declared Ohio’s statute, R.C. 5101.58, invali d or
unconstitutional after Ahlborn , the General Assembly amended the statute in 2007. 2007 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 119. Effective September 29, 2007, the am ended statute continued to give the Department an automatic right of recoveryover certain thirdparty payments to Medicaid participants, but it created a presu mption regarding the amount of the settlement or judgme nt that was subject to reimbu rsement to the Department for its payment of medical costs if the settlement o r judgment did not specifically allocate those sums. After deducting attorney fee s, litigation costs, and other expenses from the total judgment, award or settlement, th e statute provided that the Department was en titled to receive “no less than one-h alf of the remaining amount, or the actual amount of medical assistance paid, whiche ver is less.” Former R.C. 5101.58(G)(2). {¶ 8} In Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson , 568 U.S. 627, 133 S.Ct. 1391, 185 L.Ed.2d 471 (2013), the United States Supreme Court struck down the portions of North Carolina’s Medicaid subroga tion statute that created a pr esumption similar to the one former R.C. 5101.58(G )(2) contained. The court held that a state could not comply with 42 U.S.C. 1396p by using a “conclusive presumpt ion” that onethird of the participan t’s recovery represe nted compensation fo r medical costs. Id

. at 635-636. The presumption operated to allow the state to tak e a portion of the judgment or settlement that was not designated as reimbursement for medical costs. The North Carolina statute violated the Supremacy Clause becaus e it failed to provide a process for determinin g the portion of a participant’ s recovery that was
attributable to medical costs. Id . at 636. Because the federal statute’s anti-lien provision prohibits a state from claiming any part of a Medicai d participant’s judgment or settlement not designated as payment for medical co sts, it preempted
North Carolina’s Medicai d subrogation statute. Id.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

6 {¶ 9} After the decision in Wos , and again without a court’s declaration that former R.C. 5101.58 was invalid or unconstitutional, the Genera l Assembly amended Ohio’s Medicaid subroga tion statute and renumbered it a s R.C. 5160.37.
The new statute took effe ct on September 29, 2013, see 2013 Am.Sub.H.B. No. 59, and the General Assembly amende d it yet again on September 29, 2015, see 2015
Sub.H.B. No. 64. The 2015 version of R.C. 5160.37 still contai ned language
similar to that in former R.C. 5101.58(A) and (G)(2), giving th e Department an automatic right of recovery against liability for medical costs paid by a third-party tortfeasor. But, the 2015 version of R.C. 5160.37 created a “r ebuttable presumption” that the Departme nt would receive no less than one -half of the remaining amount of the judgment, award or settlement after fee s, expenses, and costs were deducted. R.C. 5160.37(G )(2). The statute also pro vided a mechanism for a Medicaid participant to rebut the statute’s presumption b y way of an administrative hearing. See R.C. 5160.37(L). Relevant to the class of plaintiffs involved in this case, the statute created a process to address overpayments made after the September 29, 2007 post- Ahlborn amendments to R.C. 5101.58:

A medical assistance recipient who has repaid money, on or afte r September 29, 2007, to the departme nt or a county department pu rsuant to the department’s or county depar tment’s right of recovery under this section, section 5160.38 of the Revis ed Code, or former section 5101.58 or 5101.59 of the Revised Code may re quest a hearing to rebut the presumption in division (G) of this section. The request shall be made in accordance with the procedure the departme nt establishes for this purpose in rules required by division (O) of this section. It must be made not later than one hundred eighty days after September 29, 2015, or ninety days after the payment is made, whichever is later. A party successfully rebu ts theJanuary Term, 2020

7 presumption by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that a different
allocation is warranted.

R.C. 5160.37(L)(2). If a Medicaid participant disagrees with t he hearing examiner’s decision under that provision, the participant may f ile an administrative appeal with the Medicaid dir ector. R.C. 5160.37(M). Following an administrative appeal, either party may appeal the Medicaid director’s decisio n to the common pleas court in accordance with R.C. 119.12. R.C. 5160.37 does n ot provide a process for challenging alleged overpayments made to the Depart ment before the September 29, 2007 amendments to R.C. 5101.58. {¶ 10} The statute expressly provides th at the administrative procedur e outlined in divisions (L) through (N) is “the sole remedy avail able to a party who claims the department or a count y department has received or is to receive more money than [it is] entitled to receive under this section, sect ion 5160.38 of the Revised Code, or former sec tion 5101.58 or 5101.59 of the Revis ed Code.” R.C. 5160.37(P). According to the Department, it sent notices to pa rticipants who had reimbursed the Department under th e older versions of the Medic aid subrogation statute regarding the new administrative-hearing process under R.C. 5160.37.
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {¶ 11} Pivonka and Rijos filed their cla ss-action complaint in the Cuy ahoga County Common Pleas Court on April 5, 2013, before R.C. 5160.37 was enacted. Their complaint seeks disgorgement and repayment of all sums th e Department received pursuant to its right of recovery under former R.C. 51 01.58 and a declaration that former R.C. 5101.58 is preempted by federal la w and is unconstitutional under the Supremacy Clause. They argued that former R.C. 5101.58 is invalid pursuant to the decision in Wos

. {¶ 12} The named plaintiffs filed their complaint on behalf of themsel ves and similarly situated individuals who had both “received a dem and from [theS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

8 Department] for repayment of med ical expenses pursuant to” form er R.C. 5101.58 and had “paid any amount to [the Department] pursuant to the Su brogation Statute.” As to the named plaintiffs, Pivonka reached a settlement with a third-party tortfeasor in July 2012. Because he had received Medicaid bene fits relating to his injuries, the Department co llected $7,108.74 from the settlemen t. In 2013, Rijos received a compensatory-damages award in a negligence action ag ainst a thirdparty tortfeasor following a jury verdict. The Department coll ected $703.16 of Rijos’s award pursuant to its s tatutory right to subrogation. {¶ 13} On April 10, 2013, Pivonka and Rijos moved to certify as a clas s “[a]ll persons who paid any amount to [the Department] pursuant to [former R.C. 5101.58], from April 6, 2007, to the present, without requireme nt of court order.” {¶ 14} The Department filed a motion to dismiss the complaint and late r filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that former R.C. 5 101.58 is constitutional and that the Department had the right to collect the reimbursements
under the statute. The trial cour t denied both motions. The D epartment also moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the General Assembl y divested the common pleas court of jurisdiction when it enacted R.C. 5160.37 . Pivonka and Rijos argued in opposition that the General Assembly violated t he Ohio Constitution’s single-subject rule for legislation when it incl uded the Medicaid subrogation statute in a budget bill and further that the legis lature cannot strip a court of jurisdiction it alread y has in a pending case. Pivonk a and Rijos also argued that R.C. 5160.37 does not apply to their action because it app lies only to claims alleging that the Department received “more money than [it is] entitled [to],” R.C. 5160.37(P), whereas they asserted that the Department was not e ntitled to receive any money because former R.C. 5101.58 is unconstitutional. The trial court denied the Department’s motion for judgment on the pleadings on Januar y 4, 2016, finding
that the issue should not be d ecided on the pleadings alone.January Term, 2020

9 {¶ 15} The trial court cer tified the class on December 21, 2017. In i ts memorandum opposing class certific ation, the Department again a rgued that R.C. 5160.37 divested the court of jurisdiction. As it had done bef ore, the trial court rejected the Department’s argument, determining that plaintiffs ’ claims were not for mere overpayment to the Depa rtment. The trial court also f ound the argument
irrelevant to its decision whether to certify the class because a court’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction is an affirmative defense that can be raised later in a
class action. {¶ 16} The Department urged the trial court to adjudicate plaintiffs’ constitutional arguments before deciding whether to certify the class because that
determination affected whether t he proposed class satisfied the class-certification requirements under Civ.R. 23. The trial court declined to do s o, finding that a determination on the merits of plaintiffs’ constitutional claim s would best be made
after class certification when the claims could be decided as t o all members of the class instead of throug h individual lawsuits. {¶ 17} The Department appealed the trial court’s December 21, 2017 decision granting plaintiffs’ motion for class certification to the Eighth District Court of Appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the trial cour t’s decision. It
determined that R.C. 5160.37 did not divest the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction because Pivonka and Rijos sought a declaratory jud gment that former R.C. 5101.58 is unconstitutional. 2018-Ohio-4866, 125 N.E.3d 3 43, ¶ 39-42. The
court determined that because ad ministrative agencies cannot de cide the constitutional validity of a statute and because that was the s ole issue underlying plaintiffs’ claims, it would be futile and impractical to requi re plaintiffs to first seek redress through the ad ministrative process. Id. {¶ 18} We accepted jurisdiction to consider the Department’s two propositions of law. See 155 Ohio St.3d 1412, 2019-Ohio-1205, 120 N.E.3d 30. In its first proposition of law, the Department contends that “ [b]y statute, claimsS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

10 that the State overcollected for Medicaid recovery may not be b rought in common pleas courts, except as an admin istrative appeal.” In its seco nd proposition of law, the Department argues that “[a] class action may be certified o nly if rigorous analysis reveals that all prerequisites have been met—even if t hat analysis also touches upon the merits of the dispute.” {¶ 19} The Department also argues in its merit brief for the first tim e in this case that absent the applicability of the administrative-r eview process contained in R.C. 5160.37 to plaintiffs’ claims, the Ohio Court of Claims has jurisdiction because plaintiffs’ claims involve a lawsuit for m oney damages against the state.
IV. ANALYSIS {¶ 20} Subject-matter jurisdiction refers to the constitutional or sta tutory power of a court to adjudicate a case. State v. Harper , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020- Ohio-2913, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 23. Without subject-matter jurisd iction, a trial court has no power to act. State ex rel. Jones v. Suster , 84 Ohio St.3d 70, 78, 701 N.E.2d 1002 (1998). A trial court cannot certify a class if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. {¶ 21} The Ohio Constitution gives the General Assembly the power to define the limits of the common pleas courts’ jurisdiction. State v. Wilson , 73 Ohio St.3d 40, 42, 652 N.E.2d 196 (1995), citing Article IV, Section 4(B), Ohio Constitution. The General Assembly has given the common pleas courts subjectmatter jurisdiction over all civil cases that it has not expres sly excluded from their jurisdiction. See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kuchta , 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, 21 N.E.2d 1040, ¶ 20, citing R.C. 2305.01. {¶ 22} The General Assembly has, from time to time, limited the common pleas courts’ jurisdiction and c onferred jurisdiction to anothe r court. See, e.g. , R.C. 2743.03 (granting Court of Claims e xclusive jurisdiction over c ertain claims filed against the state). It has also given jurisdiction to certain administrative agenciesJanuary Term, 2020

11 over cases that the agencies are particularly well suited to ha ndle. See, e.g ., R.C. 4905.26 (granting the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio exclu sive jurisdiction over claims alleging discriminatory utility rates). The Genera l Assembly vests exclusive jurisdiction in an administrative agency when it enac ts a comprehensive statutory scheme for review by that agency. State ex. rel. Cleveland Elec. Illum. Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common Pleas , 88 Ohio St.3d 447, 451, 727 N.E.2d 900 (2000), citing Kazmaier Supermarket, Inc. v. Toledo Edison Co. , 61 Ohio St.3d 147, 153, 573 N.E.2d 655 (1991).

A. R.C. 5160.37 provides the sole remedy for the unnamed class members who

reimbursed the Department for medical costs on or after September 29, 2007 {¶ 23} By enacting R.C. 5160.37, the General Assembly created an administrative-review process for Medicaid participants challen ging their overpayment of money to the Dep artment subject to the statutory presumption contained in former R.C. 5101.58(G) . That administrative proce ss is, by its own terms, the “sole remedy” availa ble to those individuals. R.C. 5160.37(P). It is complete and comprehensive. The s tatute identifies the steps r equired to request a hearing, the timing requirements for requesting a hearing, and the evidentiary standard required to rebut the statutory presumption. R.C. 516 0.37(L)(1) and (2). It prescribes the hearing exa miner’s authority to consider and weigh the evidence, the Department’s ability to rai se affirmative defenses, and oth er rules that apply to the hearing. R.C. 5160.37(L)(3). It provides a process for ap pealing the hearing examiner’s decision to the Department’s director. R.C. 5160.37 (M). And it provides a process for appealing the director’s decision to the common pleas court. R.C. 5160.37(N). Accordingly, it has given tribunals acting un der R.C. 5160.37 exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over claims alleging that the Department received more money than it was entitled to receive under forme r R.C. 5101.58, beginning September 29, 2007. It applies equally to individual s who believe, as the purported class does here, tha t the Department was not enti tled to receive anyS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

12 money because that claim necessarily subsumes any claim that th e Department
received more money than it was entitled to receive. {¶ 24} Pivonka and Rijos argue that the class members should not be required to utilize the administr ative-review process under R.C . 5160.37 because their entire action is based on a constitutional challenge to f ormer R.C. 5101.58. But even though administrative ag encies cannot adjudicate const itutional questions, s ee Mobil Oil Corp. v. Rocky River , 38 Ohio St.2d 23, 26, 309 N.E.2d 900 (1974), a party cannot circumve nt the administrative-review process by first raising a constitutional challenge in the common pleas court. Rather, the proper procedure for raising a constitutional challenge is to first ex haust all administrative remedies. A party can then raise the constitutional challenge in the court that hears the administrative appeal. See id .; State ex. rel. Kingsley v. State Emp. Relations
Bd ., 130 Ohio St.3d 333, 2011-Ohio-5519, 958 N.E.2d 169, ¶ 18. {¶ 25} Pivonka and Rijos filed this ac tion before R.C. 5160.37 was ena cted, but the trial court did not certify the class until after R.C. 5160.37 took effect. As we have recognized, “unnamed puta tive class members are not par ties to an action prior to class certification.” Gembarski v. PartsSource, Inc ., 157 Ohio St.3d 255, 2019-Ohio-3231, 134 N.E.2d 1175, ¶ 29; see also Smith v. Bayer Corp ., 564 U.S. 299, 313, 131 S.Ct. 2368, 180 L.Ed.2d 341 (2011) (the argument that an unnamed class member is a party to the class action before the class is certified is a “novel and surely erroneous argument”). Because the General Assembly created an administrative-review process be fore any unnamed prospective cl ass members became parties in this action, that process governs the prospec tive class members’ claims. Unnamed prospective class members whose claims fall un der R.C. 5160.37(L)(2) may seek redress only through that administrative process. Therefore, we hold that the trial court lacked subject-matter j urisdiction over the claims of the unnamed prospectiv e class members who reimbursed the Department on or after September 29, 2007.January Term, 2020

13 B. Pivonka and Rijos’s claims are also s ubject to the administrative-review process under R.C. 5160.37 {¶ 26} We next consider whether the co mmon pleas court had jurisdictio n over the claims asserted by the two named plaintiffs, Pivonka a nd Rijos. Both Pivonka and Rijos repaid money to t he Department after Septembe r 29, 2007, pursuant to the Department’s exe rcise of its subrogation rights under former R.C. 5101.58(G). They fall within the class of individuals whose cl aims are covered by R.C. 5160.37. Although they filed this action before R.C. 5160 .37 took effect, we conclude that R.C. 5160.37 provide d the sole remedy by which th e named plaintiffs
could seek redress after it was enacted. {¶ 27} The Ohio Constitution provides that the General Assembly “shall have no power to pass retroactive laws.” Ohio Constitution, Ar ticle II, Section 28. This anti-retroactivity clause protects vested rights from new legislative encroachments and nullifies a new statute that creates burdens, duties, obligations
or liabilities that did not exist when the statute became effec tive. Longbottom v. Mercy Hosp. Clermont , 137 Ohio St.3d 103, 2013-Ohio-4068, 998 N.E.2d 419, ¶ 21. A statute that both applie s retroactively and is substan tive violates this clause.
Id . at ¶ 22. A substantive law is one that creates duties, right s, and obligations. State ex. rel. Holdridge v. Indus. Comm ., 11 Ohio St.2d 175, 178, 228 N.E.2d 621 (1967). {¶ 28} In contrast, remedial legislation does not create, remove or af fect any rights; it merely affects the methods and procedure by which ri ghts are recognized, protected, and enforced. Longbottom at ¶ 25; see also Holdridge at 178 (a procedural or remedial law “pres cribes methods of enforcement o f rights or obtaining redress”). The anti-retroactivity clause does not pr ohibit remedial laws. Longbottom at ¶ 25. Rather, the legislature has complete control over th e remedies afforded to parties. It is a f undamental principle of law that a party may not acquire a vested right in a remedy or any part of it. Morgan v. W. Elec. Co., Inc ., 69 OhioS UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

14 St.2d 278, 281, 432 N.E.2d 157 (1982), fn. 5. Litigants have n o right to a particular remedy or procedure, and nothing prohibits the legislature from altering or modifying methods, procedures or remedies as it sees fit. Id. ; see also State ex rel.
Michaels v. Morse , 165 Ohio St. 599, 605-606, 138 N.E.2d 660 (1956). To that end, both this court and the Unite d States Supreme Court have r ecognized that legislatures can enact remedial laws that affect a tribunal’s j urisdiction without offending a constitution’s anti-retroactivity clause. See Longbottom at ¶ 25-27 (Ohio Constitution); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods ., 511 U.S. 244, 275, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994) (United States Constitution). Thi s includes legislation that affects a cour t’s jurisdiction over a pending case. See, e.g ., Morgan
at 284-285. {¶ 29} In Landgraf , the United States Supreme Court recognized that it has “regularly applied intervening statutes conferring or ousting j urisdiction, whether or not jurisdiction lay when the underlying conduct occurred or when the suit was filed,” without violatin g federal anti-retroactivity principles

. Landgraf at 274. As the court explained, application of a new jurisdictional rule d oes not take away any substantive right; it simply changes the tribunal authorized to hear the case. Id

. Jurisdictional statutes speak to the power of the court, not th e rights or obligations of the parties. Id ., citing Republic Natl. Bank of Miami v. United States , 506 U.S. 80, 100, 113 S.Ct. 554, 121 L.Ed.2d 474 (1992) (Thomas, J., con curring). {¶ 30} Here, R.C. 5160.37 has established an administrative-review pro cess that is expressly “remedial in nature.” R.C. 5160.37(P). Rath er than affecting any substantive rights, it changes the tribunal available to a Medi caid participant who claims the Department received more money than it was entitled to receive under the Medicaid subrogation statutes. {¶ 31} Because the statute does not affect a substantive right, we app ly it as written. The administrative-review process contained in R.C. 5 160.37(L) through (N) provides the sole avenue of redress for any “medical assist ance recipient whoJanuary Term, 2020

15 has repaid money, on or after September 29, 2007, to the depart ment or a county department pursuant to the depar tment’s or county department’s right of recovery under this section, section 5160.38 of the Revised Code, or for mer section 5101.58 or 5101.59 of the Revised Code,” R.C. 5160.37(L)(2), and “who c laims the department or a county departme nt has received or is to receive more money than [it is] entitled to receive,” R.C. 5160.37(P). This includes n amed plaintiffs Pivonka and Rijos. Pivonka and Rijos were required to raise their clai ms with the Department pursuant to the pr ocess set forth in R.C. 5160.37(L) through (N).

C. The trial court must decide whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs who are not subject to R.C. 5160.37 {¶ 32} Our application of R.C. 5160.37 doe s not address the entire cer tified class. R.C. 5160.37(L)(2), by its terms, applies only to parti cipants who repaid money to the Department on or after September 29, 2007. But th e class that the trial court certified includes participants who repaid money to the Department beginning on April 6, 2007. Those participants who repaid mone y to the Department between April 6 and September 28, 2007, are not requ ired to request a hearing with the Department to challenge the Department’s exerc ise of its subrogation rights. {¶ 33} The Department argues for the first time on appeal here that in the absence of the applicability of the administrative-review proce ss contained in R.C. 5160.37 to the plaintiffs’ claims, the Court of Claims has excl usive jurisdiction over this action because plaintiffs seek legal, rather than equitabl e, relief. Subject-matter jurisdiction involves the power o f a court to adjudicate a case . As such, it can never be waived, and it may be c hallenged at any time. Pratts v. Hurley , 102 Ohio St.3d 81, 2004-Ohio-1980, 806 N.E.2d 992, ¶ 11. {¶ 34} When subject-matter jurisdiction is challenged, “ ‘the party cl aiming jurisdiction bears the burden of demonstrating that the court h as jurisdiction over the subject matter.’ ” Marysville Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v.S UPREME C OURT OF O HIO

16 Union Cty. Bd. of Revision , 136 Ohio St.3d 146, 2013-Ohio-3077, 991 N.E.2d 1134, ¶ 10, quoting Ohio Natl. Life Ins. Co. v. United States , 922 F.2d 320, 324 (6th Cir.1990). We have explained tha t the classification of a clai m for restitution as either equitable or legal depends on the traceability of the fu nds the plaintiff seeks

to recover. Cleveland v. Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. , ___ Ohio St.3d ___, 2020- Ohio-337, ___ N.E.3d ___, ¶ 11, 16. {¶ 35} Here, because the Department did not raise its jurisdictional challenge in the trial court, the record has not been fully dev eloped as to the relevant jurisdictional facts, including the disposition of the funds fo r which plaintiffs seek
restitution. We therefore will not consider whether the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction ov er plaintiffs’ claims. {¶ 36} Because R.C. 5160.37(L)(2) does not apply to claims made by participants who repaid money to the Department between April 6 and September 28, 2007, and we will not consider w hether the Court of Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over those claims w ithout further development of t he record, we
remand this cause to the trial court for further consideration. On remand, the record can be fully developed and the trial court can determine whethe r those unnamed plaintiffs who repaid money to the Department between April 6 a nd September 28, 2007, can maintain their action.
V. CONCLUSION {¶ 37} We hold that R.C. 5160.37 created the sole remedy for the named plaintiffs and the unnamed class members who repaid money to th e Department on or after September 29, 2007, pursuant to the Department’s right of recovery under
former R.C. 5101.58. We remand this cause to the trial court t o determine whether it has jurisdiction over claims made by participants who repaid money to the Department between April 6 and September 28, 2007. Based on ou r disposition of the Department’s first proposition of law and our remand to the trial court for it to consider the remaining unnamed pl aintiffs’ claims, we need not address theJanuary Term, 2020

17 Department’s second proposition of law. We reverse the judgmen t of the Eighth District Court of Appeals and remand this cause to the trial co urt for further
consideration. Judgment reversed
and cause remanded.
O’C ONNOR , C.J., and K ENNEDY , F ISCHER , D E W INE , and S TEWART , JJ.,

concur. D ONNELLY , J., concurs in judgment only.

_________________ Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A., and Patrick J. Perotti; Garson Johnson, L.L.C., and James A. Deroche; a nd McCarthy, Lebit, Crystal & Li ffman Co., L.P.A., and Christian R. Patno, for appellees. Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, State Solicit or, Michael J. Hendershot, Chief Deputy Solicitor, and Henry G. App el, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant.

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