U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

35–612PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

NATO AT 70: AN INDISPENSABLE 

ALLIANCE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MARCH 13, 2019 

Serial No. 116–13 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Flournoy, Michele, Co-Founder and Managing Partner, Westexec Advisors ..... 7 

Chollet, Derek, Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor for Security 

and Defense Policy, The German Marshall Fund of the United States .......... 13 

Lute, Douglas, Senior Fellow, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs .......................... 22 

Brzezinski, Ian, Resident Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, 

Atlantic Council .................................................................................................... 27 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 74 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 75 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 76 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Cicilline ..................... 77 

Materials submitted for the record from Chairman Engel .................................. 79 

Materials submitted for the record from Chairman Engel .................................. 90 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Question submitted from Representative Wagner ................................................ 106 

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NATO AT 70: AN INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 13, 2019 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Washington, DC 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Eliot Engel (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

Mr. ENGEL. The hearing will come to order. Let me first of all 

welcome our witnesses and members of the public and the press. 

Without objection, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject 

to the length limitation in the rules. 

Today’s hearing takes place just a few weeks from the 70th anniversary of the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization known as NATO. There are many pressing issues facing 

NATO today, but for us to really assess where the alliance stands 

in the year 2019, we need to take a step back and look at the history of this great political and military relationship. 

The first half of the 20th century was marked by periods of widespread suffering, instability, and fear. And at the start of both 

World Wars, the United States stayed out of the fray, grateful that 

the Atlantic Ocean kept us far away from the terrors in Europe 

and the rest of the world. By putting our heads in the sand and 

trying to stay away from the conflicts, those wars grew into direct 

threats to our own economy, security, and very way of life. Not to 

mention the immense suffering that happened while we waited on 

the sidelines, including the unprecedented horror of the Holocaust. 

So after World War II, American leaders understood that it was 

in our strategic interest, and also our moral obligation, to band together with countries that shared our commitment to democracy, 

human rights, and the rule of law. We joined with European democracies to form NATO, an organization built on the principle 

that we are stronger when we stand together. 

Now, 70 years later, NATO is widely recognized as the most successful political-military alliance in history. Its achievements include facing down Soviet communism and winning the cold war, 

advancing freedom and democracy in Europe, stopping genocide 

and bringing peace to the Balkans, and fighting the international 

threat of terrorism. And in the United States, across the decades, 

our transatlantic partnership has consistently won overwhelming 

bipartisan support. 

But a few years ago things started to change. Since before he 

even came into office, President Trump has taken opportunities to 

denigrate our allies and undermine NATO in his personal dealings 

with European leaders, his policy proposals, and rhetoric. I wit-
2 

nessed that personally when I attended the Munich Security Conference last month and heard from leader after European leader 

that America’s word and security guarantee underpinning the 

transatlantic alliance is now being questioned, while President 

Trump often depicts the NATO partnership as some kind of oneway street where the United States bears inordinate cost with little 

benefit, and that is just not true. 

Our European partners have contributed immensely to our 

shared missions and they have come to America’s defense when we 

were most in need. After September 11th, 2001, our allies stood 

with us. The only time, I might say, in NATO’s history that Article 

5, the principle that an attack on one is an attack on all, has been 

invoked. And in recent years, Europeans, Canadian, and American 

troops have fought bravely together side by side to defend the national security of all allies. 

One of President Trump’s most frequent criticisms is that allies 

habitually free-ride and that allies hosting American military 

forces do not pay the United States enough money. Earlier this 

week, we learned about his latest proposal to address this concern, 

the so-called cost plus 50 plan. In this system, allies would pay the 

full cost of stationing American troops on their territory plus an 

outlandish additional 50 percent. 

This whole scheme reveals just how little the President seems to 

understand about how our alliances advance our own strategic interests. When we base troops in a NATO country, we are not just 

providing that nation with free security. Our presence strengthens 

the alliance’s position in Europe and extends America’s strategic 

reach. And our alliances, especially NATO, directly benefit the 

United States by enhancing our military power, global influence, 

economic might, and diplomatic leverage. 

That is not to say I expect our allies to not provide any financial 

contribution at all. NATO countries have already agreed to pay 2 

percent of their GDP on defense by the year 2024. And I agree with 

President Trump when he said that they should fulfill that obligation. We should hold them to that obligation. 

But the conversation should be more than only financial burden 

sharing. Instead, we need to see the big picture of how our allies 

contribute to our collective goals. But the President’s constant denigration of our allies presents a real threat to our foreign policy and 

national security objectives and, frankly, it is just baffling. President Trump is much more critical of our European allies, societies 

that share our commitment to core values, than he is of brutal dictators such as North Korea’s Kim Jong-un or Russia’s Vladimir 

Putin, and that is why it is so important that we in Congress take 

a leadership role on this front. 

I am pleased that in this body, support for our European allies 

and partners continues to be bipartisan. You can see that in a resolution that the ranking member and I are introducing that would 

reaffirm the House’s support for America’s alliances and partnerships around the world. Simply put, NATO is one of our most precious geopolitical assets and should stay that way. It is important 

that we stand together to send this message because the NATO alliance is needed now as much as ever before. 
3 

We are seeing a rise in authoritarianism, continued threats from 

international terrorism and extremism, and aggressive attempts by 

Putin to invade Russia’s neighbors and attack democratic elections 

throughout the world. It is by working with our NATO allies, 

standing side by side that we can successfully face these challenges 

head on. 

So it is critical that we have a full understanding of the current 

state of the alliance. We need to explore the role that NATO plays 

in America’s foreign policy and discuss ways we can improve the 

organization, including efforts to make sure our allies follow 

through on all their obligations. 

I am eager to hear from our witnesses about these issues, but 

first I will recognize our ranking member, Mr. McCaul of Texas, for 

his opening remarks. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization or NATO was created on 

April the 4th, 1949. This was an historic moment. At that time, the 

international community was still recovering from the most devastating conflict the world has ever seen. Born out of the chaos of 

World War II, my father’s war, NATO was formed to protect European democracies against Soviet totalitarianism and prevent a 

Third World war. Seventy years later, the greatest military alliance 

ever created has proven that the free peoples of the world are the 

strongest when we stand together. 

From that confrontation with communism during the cold war to 

the defeat of Milosevic in Kosovo to the battlefields of Afghanistan, 

American soldiers and those of our NATO allies have fought and 

bled together. In fact, the only time that Article 5, as the chairman 

said, has ever been invoked was after 9/11 terror attacks. 

This collective defense agreement and acknowledgment that an 

attack on one is an attack on all is a cornerstone of the alliance 

and we must keep it that way. NATO has enhanced our military 

capability, increased our intelligence collection, and created a bulwark against international terror. It is critical to our national security and solidifies our friendships with member States. 

NATO continues to grow as countries in Europe meet important 

objectives. And as I was pleased to see that North Macedonia will 

be joining the alliance as its newest member. However, friends 

must also be honest with each other. Some of our allies have not 

been living up to the decision at the Wales Summit in 2014 to 

spend 2 percent of their GDP on national defense. 

Thankfully, under pressure from the administration, member 

countries have begun to spend more. NATO’s Secretary General recently announced that by the end of next year an additional $100 

billion will be contributed by our European partners. This is bad 

news for Vladimir Putin, but good news for the future of NATO’s 

common defense. 

And over the next 70 years we will be challenged again and 

again. We have already seen a resurgent Russia attack its neighbors from cyber attacks in Eastern Europe to military conflicts in 

Georgia and Ukraine. It is clear that Putin wants to reclaim the 

superpower status of the Soviet Union. We can meet our challenges 

if they are confronted with unity and strength. Division and weakness will only tear us apart. 
4 

Each of today’s witnesses have served our country well and I 

know all of you personally. You have developed an expertise on foreign policy and national security affairs. I look forward to having 

a thoughtful and bipartisan discussion and hearing on their 

thoughts on how to maintain a strong and effective NATO. And 

with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. McCaul. 

It is now my pleasure to introduce our witnesses. Michele 

Flournoy is co-founder and managing partner of WestExec Advisors 

and a former co-founder and CEO of the Center for New American 

Security. She previously served as the under secretary of defense 

for policy and co-led on President Obama’s transition team at the 

Department of Defense. 

Ambassador Douglas Lute is a senior fellow with the Project on 

Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship at the Belfer Center for 

Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He was 

formerly the United States’ permanent representative to the North 

Atlantic Council, NATO’s standing political body. He also previously served as deputy director of operations for United States 

European Command. 

Derek Chollet is the executive vice president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He was formerly assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs where he managed U.S. defense policy toward Europe and NATO, the Middle 

East, Africa, and the Western Hemisphere. Previously, he was special assistant to the President and senior director for strategic 

planning on the National Security Council’s staff. 

Finally, Ian Brzezinski is a resident senior fellow with Transatlantic Security Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and 

Security at the Atlantic Council. He was previously the deputy assistant secretary of defense for Europe and NATO policy. He also 

served as the senior professional staff member on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations—we will not hold that against you, Mr. 

Brzezinski—implementing legislative initiatives and strategic 

strategies concerning U.S. interests in Europe, Russia, the 

Caucasus, and Central Asia. 

We are grateful to all of your service and your time this morning. 

You can see it is a very prominent panel that we have. Our witnesses’ testimony will be included in the record of this hearing, and 

I would like to now recognize our witnesses for 5 minutes each. 

Let’s start with Ms. Flournoy. 

STATEMENT OF MICHELE FLOURNOY, CO-FOUNDER AND 

MANAGING PARTNER, WESTEXEC ADVISORS 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the committee, thank you very much for the 

opportunity to testify this morning about the importance of NATO 

and our alliances more broadly for U.S. national security. 

At the end of World War II, the United States had a remarkable 

foresight to establish a set of alliances in Europe and Asia as a 

means of protecting and advancing U.S. interests and also as pillars of a new rules-based international order. These alliances have 

underwritten 70 years of unprecedented prosperity, economic 

growth, security, and stability. They are without precedent in his-
5 

tory and they are of great strategic value to the United States and 

the American people. 

Our NATO alliance as well as our bilateral alliances in Asia provides the United States with enormous strategic advantages. Our 

allies are our most reliable partners in confronting a host of shared 

challenges from proliferation to climate change, challenges that no 

single nation no matter how powerful can address alone. 

Our allies tend to be our closest trading partners. Look at the 

U.S. and Europe with more than a trillion dollars in trade every 

year. Our allies contribute to U.S. national security as our closest 

military partners, going into harm’s way shoulder to shoulder with 

American troops, providing essential basing and support to military 

operations overseas, enhancing the familiarity of U.S. forces with 

their overseas theaters of operation, and cementing military to 

military relationships that are the human foundation for interoperability and effectiveness in coalition operations. Perhaps most importantly, these allies help us underwrite deterrence, prevent conflict, and address persistent threats like terrorism. 

Our allies can also be incredibly powerful partners in advancing 

our shared values, our commitment to democracy and human 

rights. Our transatlantic alliance is particularly valuable. Over its 

70-year history NATO has provided a number of strategic benefits 

to the U.S. that are, frankly, too often forgotten in today’s political 

discourse. Thanks to NATO we were able to contain the Soviet 

Union, prevent the spread of communism, deter a potentially nuclear confrontation, and ultimately win the cold war. 

Thanks to NATO, when the Berlin Wall fell we were able to create a Europe whole, free, and at peace. Thanks to NATO, we were 

able to conduct military operations that helped end the war in Bosnia and enforce a negotiated peace. Thanks to NATO, America was 

not alone in fighting al-Qaida in Afghanistan and globally. NATO, 

as was noted, invoked Article 5 for the first time in its history on 

our behalf after 9/11. 

Our NATO allies sent and sustained a rotational force of some 

40,000 troops in Afghanistan fighting alongside us. They took a 

lead in providing stability and security in the north and saved the 

U.S. an estimated $49 billion in the process. They have contributed 

2.3 billion to the support of the Afghan National Army. They are 

still with us today with 17,000 troops in resolute support providing 

training and support to the Afghan forces now leading the fight. 

Most importantly, we should never forget that more than 1,000 

non-U.S. NATO troops lost their lives in Afghanistan, making the 

ultimate sacrifice. 

Today, our NATO allies remain among our most critical partners 

in dealing with 21st century challenges. Many of our NATO allies 

are our closest partners fighting terrorism globally. Think France 

in the Maghreb or the U.K. in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, NATO has 

provided 350 trainers, AWACS aircraft for surveillance, and so 

forth. 

The European allies have also been among our closest partners 

in combating nuclear proliferation. After Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea and the invasion of Eastern Ukraine, it was our 

European allies who stood up and helped us impose the harshest 

sanctions against Russia in history and they have borne the brunt 
6 

of the cost. More than 90 percent of the costs of those sanctions 

have been borne by Europeans, including the loss of hundreds of 

thousands of export-related jobs across Europe. 

NATO has also stepped up to strengthen deterrence vis-a-vis 

Russia particularly in the Baltics, Poland, and the front line States 

with the enhanced former presence involving 4,500 NATO troops 

and initiatives to enhance NATO readiness. They have stepped up 

to prepare for cyber attacks, other shared missions like counter piracy, humanitarian relief, and so forth. 

So my point is, there are many other factors besides just measuring defense spending to assess that we have to weigh in assessing the value of these alliances. We should implore our NATO allies to spend more on defense, but that should not be the only metric of our burden sharing especially given their shared sacrifice. 

That would be disrespectful, shortsighted, and wrong. I think given 

our allies’ track record of invaluable contributions, the President’s 

persistent disparagement of NATO and our partners there, our allies there, constitutes foreign policy malpractice and undermines 

our U.S. interests. Most disturbingly, the continued bad-mouthing 

of our NATO allies has created uncertainty in the mind of our closest partners, has opened up a serious debate in Europe about 

whether the U.S. remains a credible partner and a reliable leader. 

So after 70 years of shared sacrifice and success, I think it is appalling that we are in this position today. We should be honoring 

and celebrating that 70 years of success. We must take stock of the 

many ways in which our allies have contributed to our security. 

Now is not a time to disparage or abandon or nickel-and-dime 

NATO. It is a time to double down on our shared, and make the 

shared investments that are necessary to deal with an era of strategic competition. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Flournoy follows:] 
7 

WESTEXEC ADVISORS 

March 13, 2019 

"NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance" 

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee 

The Honorable Michele Flournoy, Co-Founder and Managing Partner, WestExec Advisors 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the Committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to testify before you today about the importance of NATO, and our 

alliances more broadly, to U.S. national security. 

At the end of World War II, the United States had the remarkable foresight to build a set of 

alliances in Europe and Asia as a means of protecting and advancing U.S. national interests 

and as pillars of a new rules-based international order designed to prevent another world 

war, safeguard democracy, and promote prosperity. These alliances have underwritten 70 

years of unprecedented economic development, prosperity, security, and stability. This 

system of alliances, which we too often take for granted today, is without precedent in 

human history and has proven to be of great strategic value to the United States and the 

American people. 

Our NATO alliance- as well as our bilateral alliances in Asia with countries like Australia, 

Japan and South Korea- provide the United States with enormous advantages: 

Our allies are our most reliable partners in confronting shared challenges- from WMD 

proliferation to climate change- global challenges that no single nation, no matter 

how powerful, can address alone. 

Our at lies tend to be our closest trading partners: The United States and the European 

Union (EU) have the largest bilateral trading relationship in the world, totaling more 

than $1 trillion in goods and services per year. 

Our allies contribute to U.S. national security as our closest military partners, going 

into harm's way, shoulder to shoulder with American troops, providing essential 

basing and support to our military operations overseas, enhancing the familiarity of 

U.S. forces with overseas theaters of operation, and cementing military-to-military 

relationships that are the human basis for interoperability and effectiveness in 

coalition operations. 

Perhaps most importantly, these allies help underwrite deterrence, prevent conflict, 

and address persistent threats like terrorism. 

875 15th St NW, Suite sso -+ washington, DC 20005 + 202.688.3336 

info@westexec.com -+ WestExec.com 
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Our allies can also be incredibly powerful partners in advancing our shared values, 

from supporting democracy to protecting human rights. 

Our transatlantic alliance, embodied for nearly 70 years in NATO, is particularly valuable. 

Over its long history, NATO has provided a number of strategic benefits to the United States 

that are too often forgotten or overlooked in today's political discourse: 

• Thanks to NATO, we were able to contain the Soviet Union, prevent the spread of 

communism, deter a potentially nuclear confrontation, and ultimately win the Cold 

War. 

• Thanks to NATO, after the Berlin Wall fell, we were able to create a Europe whole, free, 

and at peace. 

• Thanks to NATO, we were able to conduct military operations that set the conditions 

to end war in Bosnia and brought the Serbs to the negotiating table. NATO then 

provided the Stabilization Force to secure Bosnia-Herzegovina's reconstruction. Five 

years later, NATO ended the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo and provided a 

peacekeeping force there. 

• Thanks to NATO, America was not alone in fighting AI-Qaeda in Afghanistan. NATO 

invoked the Article V collective defense clause for the first time in its history after 

9/11, when our European allies pledged their support for us after the worst terrorist 

attacks on American soil. 

• Our NATO allies sent and sustained a rotational force of some 40,000 troops to fight 

alongside us in Afghanistan, and they took the lead in providing security and stability 

in the north, saving the U.S. an estimated $49 billion. 

• They have also contributed $2.3 billion to the NATO Afghan National Army (ANA) Trust 

Fund to date and have pledged to support the Afghan military through 2024. 

NATO remains at our side today with 17,000 troops in the Resolute Support mission 

providing support and training to the Afghan forces now leading the fight. 

Most importantly, we should never forget that more than 1,000 non-US NATO troops 

lost their lives in Afghanistan, making the ultimate sacrifice. 

Today, our NATO allies remain among our most critical partners in dealing with the array of 

21" century threats we now face: 

Many of our NATO allies are our closest partners in fighting terrorism globally. For 

example, France is leading the fight againstjihadists in the Magreb, where it has 

deployed 4,500 troops. In Syria, the United Kingdom (UK) has participated in US-led 

airstrikes and offered 2.7 billion pounds in humanitarian assistance since 2012. 

In Iraq, NATO has provided 350 trainers and NATO Airborne Warning and Control 

Systems (A WACs) have flown more than 1,000 hours in support of the Counter-ISIL 

campaign since 2015. This year, NATO will set up a new non-combat mission to advise 

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the Iraqi government on post-conflict governance, including several hundred trainers, 

advisors, and staff. 

• Our European allies are also among our closest partners in combating the spread of 

nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. The UK, France and the EU 

were critical partners in concluding the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), 

which sharply curtailed Iran's nuclear program. 

• After Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea and its invasion of Eastern Ukraine, it was 

our European allies who stood united with us in imposing the harshest economic 

sanctions Russia has ever experienced. And they have borne the brunt of the costs of 

this policy. The total loss of exports to sanctioning western countries is estimated to 

be over $44 billion, of which 90% fell to EU countries, not to mention the loss of 

hundreds of thousands of export-related jobs across Europe. 

• Our NATO allies have also stepped up to strengthen deterrence in order to prevent 

Russian aggression in the Baltics, Poland and other frontline states. 

o NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence consists of four multinational 

battlegroups in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, including 4,500 troops. 

In addition, NATO has bolstered the readiness of its forces via: 

o The Very High Ready Joint Task Force (VJTF), including 13,000 personnel. 

o The Enhanced NATO Response Force (eNRF), including 40,000 personnel. 

o NATO Force Integration Units (NFIUS), including eight new command centers 

(Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia). These 

support the rapid deployment of 20,000 forces, including 5,000 ground troops. 

o The "Four 30s" Readiness Initiative, which seeks to have 30 heavy or medium 

maneuver battalions, 30 battleships, 30 air squadrons available within 30 days 

notice. 

• As cyberattacks have become more frequent and more severe, NATO has established a 

new NATO Cyber Operations Center which has three core functions: (a) situational 

awareness, (b) centralized planning for cyberspace, and (c) coordination for concerns 

about cyberspace operations. 

• This is in addition to two other key entities: 

o NATO Computer Incident Response Capabilities (NCIRC): A staff of 200 that 

provides round-the-clock cyber defense and maintains a rapid reaction team 

that can be sent to member states, and 

o Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence: (CCD CoE): A policy institute 

that organizes large-cyber exercises and gives allies the opportunity to test 

their systems. 

NATO allies continue to make substantial contributions to a host of other shared 

missions, from conducting joint counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, the 

Horn of Africa and the Indian Ocean, to providing humanitarian relief after natural and 

manmade disasters. 

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All of this is to say that there are many factors to weigh in assessing the value of these 

alliances and the fairness of our burden sharing arrangements. The Trump administration 

has been right to implore our European allies to spend more on defense, particularly at a time 

of intensifying strategic competition- the Bush and Obama administrations did so as well. 

The good news is that our allies are stepping up and spending more: 

o In 2017, non-US NATO members spent $300 billion on defense, an increase of $28 

billion since 2014. 

o They have also promised to spend an extra $100 billion on defense by 2020. 

o Half of NATO members plan to meet the 2o/o GDP-defense spending benchmark by 

2024. 

The bad news, however, is that using the 2o/o of GDP goal as the only measure of burden 

sharing ignores their other critical contributions and, most importantly (and unforgivably), 

their shared sacrifice. This is disrespectful, short-sighted, and wrong. 

Given our allies' track record of invaluable contributions to U.S. national security over the 

years, President Trump's persistent disparagement of the NATO alliance constitutes foreign 

policy malpractice and undermines U.S. interests. 

Most disturbingly, Trump's continued bad-mouthing of our NATO allies -and the question 

mark he has drawn over whether the United States would come to Europe's defense in a crisis 

- has opened up a serious debate in Europe about whether the U.S. remains a credible leader 

and a reliable partner. If the U.S. is no longer willing to lead NATO, if it no longer values its 

allies, what should Europe do to chart its own course? After 70 years of shared sacrifice and 

success, it is appalling that the last two years could put this historic alliance in jeopardy. 

As NATO's 70'h anniversary approaches, it is worth honoring and celebrating the most 

powerful alliance in human history. The United States must take stock of the many ways in 

which our allies have contributed to our security. Now is not a time to disparage, abandon, or 

nickel-and-dime NATO. As we face an increasingly complex set of security challenges and a 

period of intensifying competition with a revisionist Russia and a rising China, now is the time 

to double down and make the shared investments necessary to adapt and strengthen this 

invaluable alliance for the future. 

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Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Ms. Flournoy. 

Mr. Chollet. 

STATEMENT OF DEREK CHOLLET, EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND SENIOR ADVISOR FOR SECURITY AND DEFENSE 

POLICY, THE GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED 

STATES 

Mr. CHOLLET. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today. This year marks a pivotal moment for NATO commemorating landmark anniversaries in the alliance’s history, yet 

also confronting fundamental questions about its future. For an alliance forged in the rubble of the Second World War, NATO stands 

today as the most successful security partnership in history. 

I believe a strong NATO remains essential to advancing U.S. national security interests. It is an indispensable force multiplier for 

American power. If NATO did not exist today we would be racing 

to invent it. Yet, at a time of significant turbulence at home and 

abroad, many are asking about whether the U.S. still believes in 

NATO. They watch our debates or read our Twitter feeds and wonder how committed the U.S. remains. That is why Congress is essential to affirming and bolstering U.S. leadership in NATO. 

Now taking stock of the alliance today, one could easily depict 

things only in dire terms, focusing on discord and disagreement. 

Yet, the alliance is also exhibiting renewed energy. This can be 

measured in at least four ways. 

First, in the area of territorial defense, where member States are 

stepping up deployments, adapting to evolving threats, and spending more on their militaries; second, in the alliance’s commitment 

to some of its basic principles such as the open-door policy bringing 

new members into the organization; third, this renewed energy can 

be measured by public opinion where support for NATO remains 

very high throughout Europe and particularly in the United States; 

and fourth, it can be seen in NATO’s enduring commitment to common security especially in places like Afghanistan. 

For these reasons, NATO continues to show that it is a unique 

asset to the United States. However, NATO faces no shortage of 

challenges. These include threats from rival powers, especially Russia’s efforts to test, divide, and weaken the alliance as well as China’s rising military threat which is getting greater attention among 

our European partners. These include such challenges as cyber 

threats and hybrid warfare, enduring challenges along NATO’s 

southern flank where State failure, violent extremism, and refugee 

flows pose the primary threats. 

And finally there are internal tensions that undermine alliance 

unity. This last challenge is perhaps the most worrying. NATO 

faces a growing crisis within its ranks. NATO is about much more 

than armaments and military capabilities. It is an alliance rooted 

in common values. The preamble of the 1949 Washington Treaty 

stipulates that the alliance was founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Yet, democratic backsliding and nationalist politics are on the rise in too many places. 

This makes it harder to maintain allied unity. It raises questions 

about common commitment to NATO’s future. Across European 
12 

capitals and here in Washington too many are wondering whether 

the U.S. would fulfill its commitment to collective defense. 

For this reason, Congress has an especially urgent and important 

role to play in maintaining U.S. leadership in NATO. Continued 

support for funding of the U.S. military and diplomatic efforts in 

Europe will remain essential. So will the continued willingness of 

so many Members of Congress to travel to NATO headquarters and 

other European capitals to show support for the alliance and press 

for its continued reforms. And your legislative efforts such as the 

recent passage of the bipartisan NATO Support Act are indispensable. 

We must rekindle the spirit that helped energize U.S. leadership 

in NATO in the first place and also recall that sustaining this leadership over decades has never been easy. We would be wise to remember history’s lessons. Allow me to conclude on one of them. Exactly 68 years ago, a similar debate about NATO gripped Washington and specifically the U.S. Congress. Back then, the many 

major political figures doubted the wisdom of NATO claiming that 

deploying American troops to Europe was not in the Nation’s best 

interests. It fell to General Dwight Eisenhower a year before he became President to come out of retirement and galvanize American 

support to send troops to Europe. In February 1951, Eisenhower 

came here to Capitol Hill to make his case. Speaking before both 

houses of Congress he passionately argued for what he called the 

enlightened self-interest of American leadership in NATO. Congress embraced Ike’s call to action. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee, at a moment when we hear echoes of the same doubts 

about NATO’s value to U.S. national interests, we would be well 

served to recall Eisenhower’s wisdom. And as we approach NATO’s 

70th anniversary this spring, we must again look to Congress to 

embrace this mission as it did seven decades ago. Thank you and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Chollet follows:] 
13 

Prepared Statement for the Record 

"NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance" 

Derek Chollet 

Executive Vice President, The German Marshall Fund of the United States 

Committee on Foreign Affairs 

U.S. House of Rept·esentatives 

Mat·ch 13, 2019 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, members of the committee I appreciate the 

opportunity to appear before you today. This year marks a pivotal moment for NATOcommemorating landmark anniversaries in the Alliance's history, yet also confronting 

fundamental questions about its future. 

This week in Prague, past and present leaders gathered to celebrate the two-decade 

anniversary of NATO's first round of enlargement, which extended membership to 

Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Next month in Washington, NATO foreign 

ministers will meet on the occasion of the organization's 70th Anniversary. For an 

alliance forged in the rubble of the Second World War to thwmt Communist aggression, 

NATO stands today as the most successful security partnership in history. It has 

transformed in ways far beyond what its founders could have dreamed. While I believe a 

strong NATO remains essential to advancing U.S. national security interests- and is an 

indispensable force-multiplier for American power- we must be clear-eyed about the 

challenges ahead. 

Debates about NATO's purpose are nothing new. In fact, such questions stretch back to 

its founding. During the Cold War. the questions focused on how to stand up to the 

Soviet threat, the role of nuclear weapons, and how to best establish deterrence. When 

the Cold War ended thirty years ago. there were questions about how the Alliance would 

address crises in places like the Balkans and take on new missions out of area; some 

argued that with the Soviet threat dissolved, NATO should disappear with it. Then, after 

the September II attacks, NATO adapted to a new fight against terrorism, especially in 

Afghanistan. For the past five years, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the 

explosion of the ISIL crisis in 2014, NATO has worked to handle the twin challenges of 

resurging geopolitical competition and persistent global instability. 

Yet this moment is uncertain for another reason: at a time of significant turbulence at 

home and abroad, many are asking about whether the U.S. still believes in NATO. They 

watch our debates or read our Twitter feeds and wonder how committed the U.S. 

remains. It is precisely at this time that Congress has an urgent and important role to play 

in affirming and bolstering U.S. leadership in NATO. 
14 

A Modern Alliance 

As NATO's Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, observed recently, the current moment 

presents a paradox. One could easily depict things only in dire terms, focusing on 

discord and disagreement. Yet the Alliance is also exhibiting renewed energy. This can 

be measured in four ways: first, in the area of territorial defense, where Member States 

are stepping-up force deployments, adapting to evolving threats, and spending more on 

their militaries. Second, it can be seen in the Alliance's commitment to some of its basic 

principles, such as the Open Door Policy. Third, it can be measured by public opinion, 

where support for the Alliance remains high in the United States: And fourth, it can be 

seen in the Alliance's enduring commitment to common security in places like 

Afghanistan. 

First, NATO is bolstering deterrence and defense capabilities, doing more together than it 

has in years. Following the Cold War, force deployments to Europe dwindled. However, 

as Russia started to pose a renewed threat, Allies realized the need to bolster the defense 

of Europe. Force deployment- and the budgets to support it- became a new priority. In 

2013, the last American tank left Europe as part of the post-Cold War withdrawaL Yet 

today, as just one example, there is an Armored Brigade Combat Team- comprised of 

3,500 personnel and 87 tanks- deployed in Poland. 

In the latter half of the Obama Administration, the U.S. increased its force deployments 

and spending related to European security; efforts which have expanded in the last two 

years. I applaud the Administration's FY20 19 request for the European Defense 

Initiative- which at $6.6 billion, nearly doubles the FY20 17 spending level. 1 This 

impottant initiative is a primary source of funding for the European Command and works 

to enhance our deterrence and defense posture. In turn, this further assures NATO Allies 

and pattncrs that America will stand behind its security commitments, while also 

improving the capability and readiness of U.S. forces. 2 

Non-U.S. members of NATO are also stepping up their commitment to Transatlantic 

Security. This is most visible when considering the deliverablcs from the past three 

NATO summits- which have steadily improved the Alliance's capacity to defend 

territory and mobilize its forces in response to a crisis. 

At the Wales Summit in 2014, Member States stood-up the Very High Readiness Joint 

Task Force (''VJTF"). This rapidly deployable, multinational force spearheads the 

Alliance's "Reaction Force." And in a sign of our Allies commitment to burden sharing, 

European nations have and will continue to rotate as the "lead nation" for this brigadesized force. 

At the Warsaw Summit in 2016, Alliance members launched the Enhanced Forward 

Presence ("EFP"), which builds on the immediate reassurance steps the Alliance took in 

1 'The U.S., NATO, and the Defense of Europe: Shaping the Right Ministerial Force Goals," Anthony H. 

Cordesman, Centerfor Strategic and International Studies, June 27,2018 2 "European Deterrence Initiative," C?ffice oft he Under Secretwy of Defense (Comptrollo), February 2018 

2 
15 

the wake of the Ukraine crisis and bolsters defense and deterrence in NATO's vulnerable 

flanks. 3 Non-U.S. Member States are taking an important lead in this initiative 

commanding and organizing three of the EFP's four multinational battalion-sized 

battlegroups, which arc based in Estonia (led by the United Kingdom), Latvia (led by 

Canada), Lithuania (led by Germany), and Poland (led by the U.S.) 

At the most recent 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO instituted the "Four Thirties" initiative, 

which aims to have 30 mechanized battalions, 30 air squadrons, and 30 combat vessels 

prepared for use within 30 days' notice or less. This initiative, which was a U.S.-Ied 

effott, brings a much needed "Follow-on-Force" capability to augment the rapid reaction 

forces stood-up during the 2014 and 2016 summits. 

Last July's Brussels Summit also brought other achievements. Member States committed 

to increasing military mobility across Europe and made several important changes to its 

command structure to address the shifting threat environment- standing up the Joint 

Force Support and Enabling Command in Germany and the Joint Force Norfolk 

Command, which will coordinate military movements in Europe and protect lines of 

communications across the Atlantic (respectively) in the a crisis. 4 Moreover, NATO 

maintains a steady pace of major military exercises- for example, last year's Trident 

Juncture, hosted by Norway, was the largest since the end of the Cold War. 

While these achievements are important, popular debates on NATO often fixate on the 

goal for all Member States to spend 2% of total GOP on defense. This priority is not 

unique to the current Administration. In fact, Acting-Secretary Shanahan is the 6th 

consecutive Secretary of Defense to prod NATO allies to spend more on their defensethus far, we can claim modest progress. 

In 2014, only three NATO Member States spent more than 2% of their total GOP on 

defense. In 2018, that number rose to nine countries. 5 By 2024, NATO reports that a 

majority of Member States have plans in place to meet the "2%" spending goal. Even 

countries who will not hit the mark by then have significantly increased in their defense 

spending. 

Yet we need to be clear: the 2% goal alone is not a recipe for NATO success. It is also 

imperative that these defense dollars are invested wisely- with at least 20% of new 

defense spending going towards major equipment, including related Research and 

Development. In turn, these investments will ensure that increased spending will boost 

critical military capabilities such as Joint Intelligence, Surveillance, and 

Reconnaissance, NATO Airborne Warning & Control System, and eyber defense- that 

directly contribute to Transatlantic defense. And it is important that NATO countries 

invest in the other tools of national power that remain vital to the organization's mission, 

such diplomacy and development. 

3 "NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence," NATO, February 2019 4 "Brussels Summit Declaration," NATO, August 30,2018 5 "NATO Members Drive Fastest Increase in Global Defence Spending for a Decade, Jane's by JHS Markit 

Reveals," The Associated Press, December 18, 2018 

3 
16 

Second, it is good news the Alliance continues to live-up to it'> commitment to Article I 0 

of the North Atlantic Treaty known as the Open Door Policy. In 2017, Montenegro 

became the organization's 29th Member State. And with the naming dispute with Greece 

resolved, NATO nations have signed onto an accession protocol for North Macedoniapaving its way to become the 30th member as early as December. 

Third, it is notable and positive that despite all the turbulence in discussions about NATO 

and a lot of loose talk about whether Alliance partners have taken advantage of the U.S. 

American public support remains resilient. In 2017, Gallup reported that 80% of 

Americans support NATO, a figure that stood at 64% in 1995.6 In another recent survey, 

The Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that 75% of Americans support 

maintaining or increasing the nation's commitment to NAT0. 7 

Finally, eighteen years after Member States invoked the NATO Charter's Article V 

clause of mutual self-defense to support the U.S. NATO allies remain a vital component 

of common security efforts in Afghanistan. Non-U.S. allies and partners contribute nearly 

half of the 17,000 troops deployed as a part of the Resolute Supp01i Mission. Every day, 

these forces increase the effectiveness and accountability of Afghanistan's security forces 

and institutions.8 These forces run programs that increase fighting capabilities, confront 

corruption, provide mission support through operations planning, budget development, 

logistical sustainment, and civilian oversight. In a further positive sign ofNATO's shared 

commitment to the mission in Afghanistan. Member States recently extended funding to 

Afghanistan's National Defense and Security forces through 2024. 

From increased defense capabilities to the Open Door to Afghanistan, NATO continues 

to show that it is a unique asset to the United States. None of this was inevitable. Over 

four years ago, in Wales, NATO leaders met at a moment of great uncertainty. Just 

months after Russia's war against Ukraine started and as the Islamic State crisis 

exploded. there were many concerns about the ability of the United States and Europe to 

face these twin challenges. From that perspective, the collective response must be 

considered a success: Putin has been stymied, and the Islamic State's "caliphate" is 

nearly routed. 9 

Hard Work Remains 

Y ct NATO faces no shortage of challenges. I will focus on several: first, threats from 

rival powers; second, emerging threats like cyber and hybrid warfare; third, enduring 

challenges along NATO's southern Hank; and fourth, internal tensions that undermine 

Alliance unity. 

6 "Most Americans Suppmt NATO Alliance," Gallup, February 17, 2017 7 "America Engaged: American Public Opinion and U.S. Foreign Policy," Dina Emltz, lvo Daalder, Karl 

Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Lily Wojtowicz. 'l11e Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2, 2018 8 "Resolute Suppmt Mission: Key Facts and Figures," NATO, December 2018 9 See Derek Cho!let, "Why isn't Trump bragging about his NATO successes,'' The Hashing/on Post, July 

4, 2018 

4 
17 

First, as a defensive alliance, NATO is tested every day- particularly from Russia. 

Moscow makes no secret of its disdain for NATO, and one of Vladimir Putin's core goals 

is to divide and weaken the Alliance. And recent history provides an abundance of 

examples. Starting with the occupation of Georgia in 2008, Russia's revanchist behavior 

increased in scope and size. In Ukraine, it has continued to illegally occupy Crimea since 

2014. In Moldova, Russia threatens territorial integrity and sovereignty by supporting the 

breakaway region of Transnistria. In the skies above the Baltic Sea, NATO fighter jets 

regularly scramble- I I 0 times in 2016 alone- to confl·ont aggressive and reckless 

Russian incursions of airspace. 10 In Latvia, Russia's military interrupted the nation's 

mobile communications network as a patt of the annual Zapad exercises. Beyond these 

territorial threats, Russia continues to exett its influence over NATO allies and partners 

through election meddling and disinformation campaigns that exploit societal and 

political cleavages. 

NATO Allies are also discussing ways they should respond to the growing military 

competition with China. It remains unclear how NATO should address the rising 

Chinese military threat, yet it is a positive sign that European pattners acknowledge its 

priority. 

Which brings us to a second set of challenges: those posed by emerging threats such as 

cyber and hybrid warfare. The Alliance made some modest progress in these areas. For 

example, NATO established the Cooperative Cybcr Defense Center of Excellence in 

Estonia- which bolsters cyber defense by facilitating cooperation and information 

sharing. Furthermore, the Alliance is standing up a cyber military command center to 

directly confront cyber-attacks- to be opened in 2023. Despite these positive 

developments, emerging threats pose unique challenges, and NATO leaders concede that 

more needs to be done. 

Third, NATO needs to maintain its focus on challenges on its southern flank. Instability 

endmes along the Mediterranean, in the Middle East, North Africa, and beyond. In these 

areas, state failure, violent extremism, and refugee flows pose the primary threats to 

Member States. NATO is stepping up its efforts to respond to these challenges. 

Following up on its participation in the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO deployed 

AWACS to support the anti-ISIS mission in 2018. NATO is training the Iraqi security 

forces in areas such as C-JED, civil-military planning, maintaining armored vehicles, and 

providing medical services. And at the 2018 Brussels Summit, NATO leaders endorsed a 

··Package on the South," which will strengthen the Alliance's deterrence and defense 

posture in the Middle East and Nmth Africa, and improve the organization's ability to 

manage and respond to crises and security threats emanating from the region. 11 

The fourth challenge is perhaps the most worrying: NATO is facing a growing crisis 

within its ranks. NATO is about much more than armaments and military capabilities; it 

10 "NATO: Russian Aircraft Intercepted 110 Times Above Baltic in 20 16," Damicn Sharkov, .Vewsweek, 

January 4, 2017 11 '"Brussels Summit Key Decisions: 11 - 12 July 20 18," lVATO, November 2018 

5 
18 

is an Alliance rooted in common values. The preamble of the Washington Treaty 

stipulates that members states are "determined to safeguard the freedom, common 

heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, 

individuallibetty and the rule of law." 12 

Yet democratic backsliding and nationalist politics arc on the rise in too many places. 

This makes it harder to maintain allied unity, and raises questions about common 

commitment to NATO's future. These ills are seen throughout the Transatlantic space, 

including, 1 regret to say, in the United States. 

Across European capitals, and in Washington itsclJ~ people arc wondering whether the 

United States would fulfill its Article V commitment to collective defense. lt did not go 

unnoticed that in his recent letter of resignation, former Secretary of Defense Mattis 

singled out his disagreements with the President's view of alliances generally, and NATO 

specifically, as a key reason for his departure. 

For this reason, Congress has an especially urgent and important role to play in 

maintaining U.S. leadership in NATO. Continued support for funding of the U.S. 

military efforts in Europe will remain essential. So will the continued willingness of so 

many Members of Congress to travel to NATO Headquarters and other European capitals 

to show support for the Alliance and press for its continued reforms. And your legislative 

effmts arc indispensable, whether it is your continued support for funding of U.S. effotts 

in NATO, or the recent passage of the bipartisan "NATO Support Act." 

Remembering the Past to Imagine the Future 

We must recapture the spirit that helped energize U.S. leadership in NATO in the first 

place- and also recall that sustaining this leadership has never been easy. We would be 

wise to remember history's lessons. 

Almost exactly 68 years ago. a similar debate about European security gripped 

Washington, and specifically the U.S. Congrcss. 13 In ~arly I 95 I, some political leaders 

claimed that deploying American troops to Europe to support NATO was not in the 

nation's best interest. 

The nascent alliance was still taking shape, and it fell to General Dwight Eisenhower to 

create ami litary command structure, prod European nations to rebuild their militaries, 

and galvanize American support to send troops to Europe. The question of whether the 

United States should assume the lead in NATO and deploy significant forces proved 

politically explosive. Many leading members of Congress and major political figures 

remained skeptical. 

""The North Atlantic Treaty," NATO, April 4, 1949 13 The following paragraphs draw on Derek Chollet, "Republicans threatened NATO once before. Dwight 

Eisenhower stopped them.," The Washington Post. February 4, 2019 

6 
19 

With Eisenhower's unique credibility and stature, it was his task to push back against this 

formidable wave of opposition, and in February 1951 he came to Capitol Hill to make his 

case. Speaking before both chambers of Congress, Eisenhower passionately argued for 

what he called the "enlightened self-interest" of American leadership in NATO. 

Eisenhower was not blind to the war-weariness of the American public or the skepticism 

about overseas commitments. He stressed that this was not the United States' problem 

alone. The Europeans needed to step up as well, so the United States was not "merely an 

Atlas to catTy the load on its shoulder." Yet Eisenhower believed the U.S. had arrived at 

its "decade of decision" and had a unique role to play. As he argued before Congress, 

Eisenhower asked "what nation is more capable, more ready, of providing this leadership 

than the United States"? 14 

This episode came at a pivotal moment for the Alliance. If Eisenhower had faltered and 

other political forces prevailed, it is hard to sec how NATO, then so new and fragile, 

would have sustained enough U.S. political support to survive. 

Back then, Dwight Eisenhower won the argument. Today, we must wage the battle 

anew, with some echoing the exact arguments used against NATO. As we 

approach NATO's 70th anniversary this spring, we must again look to Congress to 

embrace this mission as it did seven decades ago. 

### 

14 "Text of Eisenhower's Speech to Senate and House of Representatives," Dwight D. Eisenhower, .~·ew 

York Times, February 2, 1951 

7 
20 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Chollet. 

Mr. Lute. 

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS LUTE, SENIOR FELLOW, PROJECT 

ON EUROPE AND THE TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP, 

BELFER CENTER FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 

Mr. LUTE. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you 

for bringing us together today to discuss the NATO alliance, a cornerstone of American national security policy for the last 70 years 

but a cornerstone that I think we all too often take for granted. 

The topic of today’s session is NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance. Coincidentally, just last month, Harvard University’s Belfer 

Center published a report that I co-authored with Ambassador 

Nicholas Burns and the title of our report was ‘‘NATO at 70: An 

Alliance in Crisis.’’ So as NATO approaches its 70th anniversary in 

just a few days both descriptions strike me as accurate. NATO is 

both indispensable and in crisis. 

Our report outlines ten major challenges facing the alliance. 

These challenges are diverse, complex, and happening simultaneously. That is why we conclude that the alliance is in crisis. The 

report identifies four challenges from within the alliance, and others have already mentioned some of these: reviving American leadership of the alliance; restoring European defense strength that is 

defense spending; upholding NATO’s democratic values; and 

streamlining NATO decisionmaking. Another four challenges come 

from beyond NATO’s borders: containing Putin’s Russia, ending the 

Afghan war, refocusing NATO’s partnerships, and maintaining an 

open door to future members. Finally, the last two of the ten challenges are challenges that loom on the horizon; winning the technology battle in the digital age and competing with China. 

I would like to highlight just a couple points out of this report, 

and request that the full report be entered into the record. First, 

NATO’s single greatest challenge today is, for the first time in 

NATO’s history, the absence of strong, committed U.S. Presidential 

leadership. Every previous President since 1949, both Democrats 

and Republicans, has understood the value of NATO. Most fundamentally, allies today are unsure of this President’s commitment 

to the Article 5 collective defense commitment. This shakes the 

core of the alliance. Here, the U.S. Congress can play a role to reassure allies and check and balance the President, as the House did 

in January this year by approving the NATO Support Act. More 

specifically, on a bipartisan basis Congress should reaffirm regularly the U.S. commitment to NATO, should continue to fund the 

European defense initiative, and should pass legislation requiring 

congressional approval should the President attempt to alter our 

treaty commitments or to leave the alliance altogether. Approval of 

the NATO treaty in 1949 required two-thirds majority in the Senate. The same should be required to leave the alliance. 

Second, Europeans must contribute more to their defense. Mr. 

Chairman, you mentioned this in your opening comments. I was 

the U.S. Ambassador to NATO in 2014 when allies committed to 

the 2-percent pledge. It is an appropriate and necessary metric. 
21 

Today, only seven allies reach that level of defense spending. This 

administration is right to hold allies to the pledge. 

At the same time, however, 2 percent was never intended to be 

the only meaningful measure of an ally’s contribution, so NATO 

should broaden its metrics. Most important, spending on capabilities to counter hybrid tactics including cyber attacks, 

disinformation campaigns, and interference in our democratic processes should be taken into account as these may represent NATO’s 

greatest vulnerability. 

Third, a challenge on the horizon, NATO needs to pay more attention to China’s increasing influence in Europe, and I will leave 

that for now. But as it, in my view, in the coming decades NATO’s 

importance will only grow because of the U.S. competition with 

China. 

And, finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to point out a false narrative 

that ignores the values and erodes the cohesion of NATO. This 

false narrative claims that NATO is an anachronism, outdated and 

obsolete, that our allies are ripping us off taking advantage of our 

generosity. This is simply not true. The truth is that U.S. created 

NATO and has maintained the alliance for 70 years because NATO 

is in America’s vital national security interest. America benefits 

economically, politically, and militarily from the alliance. 

NATO and our other treaty allies are the single greatest 

geostrategic advantage we hold over any peer competitor. Russia 

and China have nothing to compare. In short, NATO is indispensable. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lute follows:] 
22 

Ambassador (Retired) Douglas E. Lute 

Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 

Harvard Kennedy School 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs 

"NATO at 70: An Indispensible Alliance" 

March 13,2019 
23 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for bringing us together to 

discuss the NATO alliance, a cornerstone of American national security for the past 

70 years that we too often take for granted. 

The topic oftoday's session is "NATO at 70: An lndispensible Alliance." Just last 

month Harvard University's Belfer Center published a report I co-authored with 

Ambassador Nicholas Burns entitled "NATO at 70: An Alliance in Crisis." As NATO 

approaches its 70th anniversary in a few weeks, both descriptions are true: NATO is 

both indispensible and in crisis. 

Our report outlines 10 major challenges facing the Alliance. These challenges are 

diverse, complex and simultaneous that's why we conclude the Alliance is in crisis. 

Four challenges come from within NATO: 

• Reviving American leadership of the Alliance 

• Restoring European defense strength 

• Upholding NATO's democratic values 

• Streamlining NATO decision-making 

Another four challenges come from beyond NATO's borders: 

• Containing Putin's Russia 

• Ending the Afghan war 

• Refocusing NATO's partnerships 

• Maintaining an open door to future members 

Finally, two additional challenges loom on the horizon: 

• Winning the technology battle in the digital age 

• Competing with China 

I would like to highlight a few points from the report and request that the full report 

be entered into the record. (https://www.belfercenter.orgjpublicationjnatoseventy-alliance-crisis) 

First, NATO's single greatest challenge is-- for the first time in NATO's history-- the 

absence of strong, committed US presidential leadership. Every previous president 

since 1949, both Democrats and Republicans, has understood the value of NATO. 

Most fundamentally, Allies today are unsure of our president's commitment to the 

Article 5 collective defense commitment. This shakes the core of the Alliance. Here 

the United States Congress can play a role to reassure allies and check and balance 

the president, as the House did in January this year by approving the NATO Support 

Act. More specifically, on a bipartisan basis, Congress should reaffirm regularly the 

U.S. commitment to NATO, continue to fund the European Defense Initiative, and 

pass legislation requiring Congressional approval should the president attempt to 

alter our treaty commitments or to leave the alliance altogether. Approval of the 

NATO treaty in 1949 required two-thirds majority in the Senate; the same should be 

required to leave the Alliance. 

2 
24 

Second, Europeans must contribute more to their own defense. I was the US 

ambassador to NATO in 2014 when allies committed to the 2% pledge- it is an 

appropriate and necessary metric. Today only five allies reach that level of defense 

spending. This Administration is right to hold allies to the pledge. At the same time, 

however, 2% was never intended to be the only meaningful measure of an ally's 

contribution, so NATO should broaden its metrics. Most important, spending on 

capabilities to counter "hybrid tactics" like cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns 

and interference in our democratic processes should be taken into account, as these 

represent NATO's greatest vulnerability. 

Third, a challenge on the horizon: NATO needs to pay attention to China's increasing 

influence in Europe. China's commercial investments in Europe today, especially in 

transportation and communications infrastructure, will lead to political influence 

tomorrow. The US-Chinese competition will define coming decades. The United 

States will be best positioned for that competition with a strong NATO alliance, 29 

(soon 30) democracies that are nearly 50% of the world's GOP. 

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to point out a false narrative that ignores the value 

and erodes the cohesion of NATO. This false narrative claims that NATO is an 

anachronism, outdated and obsolete; that our allies are ripping us off, taking 

advantage of our generosity; that past presidents have been naive and overly 

generous. This is simply not true. The truth is that the United States created NATO 

and has maintained the alliance for 70 years because NATO is in America's vital 

national security interest. America benefits economically, politically and militarily 

from the Alliance. NATO and our other treaty allies are the single greatest geostrategic advantage we hold over any potential peer competitor. Russia and China 

have nothing to compare. This simple truth is why NATO is worth leading, worth 

sustaining, and worth improving as it faces a daunting array of challenges. In short, 

NATO is indispensible. 

Thank you. 

3 
25 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Lute. 

Mr. Brzezinski. 

STATEMENT OF IAN BRZEZINSKI, RESIDENT SENIOR FELLOW, 

TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY INITIATIVE, ATLANTIC COUNCIL 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the committee, as we approach NATO’s 

70th anniversary thank you for conducting this hearing and allowing me to participate in this stock-taking of the alliance. 

NATO is an invaluable alliance. The transatlantic security architecture it provides has transformed former adversaries into allies 

and deterred outside aggression; European allies that are secure 

and at peace are inherently better able to work with the United 

States addressing challenges beyond Europe. NATO has been a 

powerful force multiplier for the United States. Time and time 

again, European, Canadian, and U.S. military personnel have 

served and sacrificed shoulder to shoulder on battlefields in Iraq, 

Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world. 

The alliance provides the United States with the ability to leverage unmatched political, economic, and military power. NATO’s actions benefit from the political legitimacy unique to this community 

of democracies. Its economic power, a combined total of some $40 

trillion in GDP, dwarfs that of any rival. No other military alliance 

can feel the force as capable as NATO. 

These assets only become more important in today’s increasingly 

challenging security environment. That environment features, one, 

the return of great power competition featuring Russia’s revanchist 

ambitions and China’s growing assertiveness; second, a disturbing 

erosion of the rules-based order that has been the foundation of 

peace, freedom, and prosperity around the globe; third, a growing 

collision between liberal democracy and authoritarian nationalism. 

Another significant dynamic is what some call the fourth industrial revolution. It features the advent of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and other technologies. 

These capabilities portend to radically redefine the requirements of 

military stability and security. These are reasons why NATO has 

only become more important. 

But as we look forward, NATO’s agenda must include the following five priorities: First, the alliance must accelerate its efforts 

to increase its preparedness for high-intensity conflict. After the 

cold war, NATO’s force posture shifted toward peacekeeping and 

counterinsurgency. These were the demands generated by operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Today, Russia’s 

military aggressions and sustained military buildup have reanimated the need to prepare for high-intensity warfare, the likes of 

which we have not had to face since the collapse of the Soviet 

Union. This is a matter of real concern. 

It is notable—it is deeply concerning that the commander of the 

United States European Command last week testified that he is 

not yet, quote, ‘‘comfortable with the deterrent posture we have in 

Europe’’. He warned that, quote, ‘‘a theater not sufficiently set for 

full spectrum contingency operations poses increased risk for our 

ability to compete, deter aggression, and prevail in conflict, if necessary’’, end quote. 
26 

This reality underscores a second NATO priority. Canada and 

our European allies must invest more to increase their military capability and readiness for these kinds of contingencies. Their investments must address key NATO shortfalls including air and 

missile defense, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance and 

long-range fires, among others. Time is long overdue for these allies to carry their share of the security burden. 

Third, NATO must reinforce, must further reinforce its flanks in 

North Central Europe, the Black Sea Region, and the Arctic. These 

are foci of Russia’s military buildup, provocations, and aggression. 

In North Central Europe the challenge is acute. The alliance has 

four Enhanced Forward Presence battalions stationed in Poland, 

Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. They are positioned against divisions of Russian ground forces backed by sophisticated aircraft, air 

defense, helicopters, ships, and missiles. 

Fourth, the alliance must more substantially embrace and support the membership aspirations of the Ukraine and Georgia. 

NATO enlargement is one of the great success stories of post-cold 

war Europe. It expanded the zone of peace and stability in that region and strengthened the alliance’s military capability. But the alliance needs to provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to membership, recognizing it will take them time to meet the alliance’s 

political and military requirements. 

There is a clear lesson from Moscow’s invasions of Ukraine and 

Georgia. NATO’s hesitancy regarding membership aspirations of 

these two nations has only animated Vladimir Putin’s sense of opportunity to reassert Moscow’s control over what has been allowed 

to become a destabilizing gray zone in Europe’s strategic landscape. 

Finally, the alliance needs to actively consider the role it will 

play in the West’s relationship with China. I agree with Doug. 

While China is not an immediate threat, military threat to Europe, 

its actions against the rule-based international order affects Europe as it does America. NATO can play a constructive, if not significant role in the West’s strategy to shaping a more cooperative 

relationship with Beijing. 

As the United States confronts the challenges of the 21st century, there is no instrument more essential, indeed, more indispensable than NATO. The political influence, economic power, and 

military might available through this community of democracies 

cannot be sustained in the absence of a robust U.S. military commitment to the alliance. That is the price of leadership and it is 

one whose returns have been consistently advantageous to the 

United States. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Brzezinski follows:] 
27 

Prepared Statement 

By 

I an J. Brzezinski 

Resident Senior Fellow, Brent Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council 

Before 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, United States House of Representatives 

Hearing on "NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance" 

13 March 2019 

Chairman Engel, Ranking Member McCaul, distinguished members of the Committee, 

thank you for conducting this hearing and sharing the opportunity to highlight the value of the 

NATO Alliance. 

As we approach the Alliance's 70th anniversary on April 4th, we should also note that this 

is a year of other significant transatlantic anniversaries. This November will mark thirty years 

since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. Yesterday, was the 20th 

anniversary of the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO and on March 

29th we will cross the 15th anniversary of accession of seven other central European 

democracies into the Alliance -the "big bang" round of NATO enlargement. These are 

important milestones in the effort to build a transatlantic community featuring a Europe that is 

"whole, free and at peace" -and they underscore the success of NATO. 

Thus, it is an opportune time to take stock of the Alliance and its pivotal role in 

transatlantic security, the challenges before this unique community of democracies, and what 

needs to be done to strengthen the Alliance and adapt it to current and anticipated realities. 

NATO provides a transatlantic security architecture that has sustained peace among its 

members on a continent that over the last two centuries was ravaged by some six major wars, 

including two world wars. Through sustained US leadership, the Alliance's consensus based 

decision making process, and its joint commands, exercises and operations, NATO has helped 

transform former adversaries into partners and deterred outside aggression. European 

democracies that are secure and at peace are inherently better able to work with the United 

States in addressing challenges within and beyond the North Atlantic arena. 

The Alliance has been a powerful force multiplier for the United States. It generates 

among our allies and a growing number of NATO partners-- militaries that are interoperable 

with the US armed forces and that have earned the confidence of our military commanders. 

Time and time again European, Canadian and US soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines have 

served and sacrificed shoulder to shoulder on battlefields often far from Europe, in places like 

Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere around the world. 

Above all, the Alliance provides the United States the ability to leverage unmatched 

political, economic and military power. NATO's actions benefit from the political legitimacy 
28 

unique to this transatlantic community of democracies. The economic power of this 

community- a combined total of over $39 trillion in GOP-- dwarfs that of any rival. The 

Alliance's military capability remains unsurpassed. No other military alliance can field a force as 

integrated and as capable as NATO. 

NATO's value to the United States has only increased in today's increasingly complex 

and dynamic security environment. This committee has repeatedly documented the return of 

great power competition driven by Russia's revanchist ambitions and China's growing 

assertiveness. Moscow's invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, its military provocations, 

assassinations, interference in foreign elections and abandonment of international arms control 

treaties are but one set of examples of how the rules based order that has been a driver of 

peace, freedom and prosperity around the globe is under threat. 

The collision between liberal democracy and authoritarian nationalism is another 

profound feature of today's security environment. The latter's emergence among NATO's own 

member states has indigenous causes, but it is also being fueled significantly by both Moscow 

and Beijing, in large part to weaken and sow division within the West. 

And, the world today is on the cusp of what some call the fourth industrial revolution 

featuring the advent of hypersonic weapons, artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and 

other technologies that promise to transform the battlefield and redefine the requirements of 

military stability and security. 

When navigating these challenges to protect US values and interests, NATO's military 

capacity as well as the political and economic power offered by this community of democracies 

only becomes more essential. 

Despite its advantages, NATO and its member states must still adapt in order for this 

Alliance to remain effective in the new and evolving security environment. Toward this end, 

NATO must address the following five challenges: 

First, the Alliance must accelerate its efforts to increase preparedness for highintensity conflict. Following the end of the Cold War, the Alliance's force posture shifted 

toward the requirements of peacekeeping and counter-insurgency. These were demands 

generated by operations in the Balkans, Afghanistan and elsewhere. Today, Russia's military 

aggressions and provocations and sustained military build-up, particularly in its Western 

Military district, underscore the renewed need to defend against high intensity warfare 

contingencies, the likes of which we have not had to face since end the Cold War. 

The Alliance's readiness for such contingencies is a matter of real concern. It is notable 

that General Curtis Scaparrotti, the Commander of United States European Command, testified 

last week that he is not yet "comfortable with the deterrent posture that we have in Europe" 

and warned that "a theater not sufficiently set for full-spectrum contingency operations poses 

increased risk to our ability to compete, deter aggression, and prevail in conflict if necessary." 

2 
29 

Addressing this challenge is the responsibility of all NATO allies. This is the second 

challenge before NATO. Our European Allies and Canada must invest more to increase the 

capability and readiness of their armed forces. Their investments must address key NATO 

shortfalls, including air and missile defense, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), 

and long-range fires, among others. Europe must build the infrastructure necessary to facilitate 

the rapid movement of heavy forces to NATO's frontiers in times of crisis and conflict. 

It is true that our Allies are finally making tangible progress toward meeting their 

longstanding commitment to spend an equivalent of 2% GDP on defense. NATO Secretary 

General Jens Stoltenberg recently stated that since 2017, our European Allies and Canada have 

increased their defense spending by $41 billion and that figure is on track to increase to $100 

billion by 2020. That is real progress and it must continue. 

The 2% benchmark and the concurrent commitment by NATO allies to direct 20% of 

defense spending into military procurement provides a simple, politically useful metric to prod 

more equitable burdensharing. However, its effectiveness can and should be reinforced in two 

ways. First, NATO should reanimate the inspections it used during the Cold War to assess the 

readiness, deployability and sustainability of committed Allied military units. Such inspections 

should be executed by one the Alliance's two strategic commands, NATO's Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe and Allied Command Transformation. Data from such 

inspections should be reported to NATO Defense ministers and, where possible, incorporated 

into the annual public reports the NATO Secretary General publishes on Allied defense 

spending. 

Third, NATO needs to reinforce its increasingly vulnerable flanks in North Central 

Europe, the Black Sea region and the Arctic where military stability has been undermined by 

Russia's military build-up, provocations, and aggression. In North Central Europe, the challenge 

is acute where the Alliance's four Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) battalions stationed in 

Poland, Lithuania, latvia and Estonia are juxtaposed against divisions of Russian airborne, 

mechanized infantry, artillery, and tank units and the sophisticated aircraft, air defense, 

helicopters, ships, and missiles that support them. 

If these NATO battalions are to be a truly effective deterrent against an aggressor of this 

magnitude, they must be able to survive for at least a limited amount of time amidst an 

aggressive attack. They must have sufficient lethality to impose costs on the adversary, and the 

Alliance must have a demonstrable capacity to reinforce them in real time. To become truly 

credible, NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence must be a central focus of the Alliance's 

readiness initiatives and the investment priorities of NATO member states. 

Fourth, the Alliance must more substantially embrace and support the membership 

aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia. NATO enlargement has been one of the great success 

stories of post-Cold War Europe. The extension of NATO membership to Central European 

democracies reinforced peace and security in Europe and strengthened the Alliance's military 

3 
30 

capability. The newest members of the Alliance have been among Europe's most stalwart 

transatlanticists and most willing to contribute to US-led operations, including those beyond 

Europe. 

The recent accession of Montenegro and the impending accession of Macedonia to 

NATO are important steps toward completing the vision of an undivided Europe, but the 

Alliance needs to also provide Ukraine and Georgia a clear path to NATO membership, 

recognizing it will take them time to meet the political and military requirements. 

Toward this end, these two nations should be more deeply incorporated into the 

maritime, air, and ground force initiatives the United States and NATO is developing for the 

Black Sea region. Their territories would be useful to anti-submarine, air-defense, surveillance, 

and other operations needed to counter Russia's efforts to leverage its occupation of Crimea 

into an anti-access/area-denial bastion spanning that sea. And, NATO Allies should expand the 

lethal security assistance provided to Georgia and Ukraine to include anti-aircraft systems, antiship missiles and other capabilities that would enhance their capacities for self-defense. 

One clear lesson from Moscow's invasions of Ukraine and Georgia is that the ambiguity 

of these two countries' relationships with the Alliance only whetted the appetite of Russia's 

President, Vladimir Putin, and animated his sense of opportunity to reassert Moscow's 

hegemony over what has been allowed to become a de facto and destabilizing grey zone in 

Europe's strategic landscape. 

Finally, the Alliance needs to actively consider the role it will play in the West's 

relationship with China. While China is not an immediate military threat to Europe, its actions 

against the rule based international order affects Europe as it does America. The Alliance 

should expand and deepen its network of partnerships in the Asia-Pacific region that now 

include, among others, Japan, Korea, and Australia. As the transatlantic community's military 

arm, NATO can play a constructive, if not significant role, in the West's broader diplomatic, 

economic and military strategy to counter China's provocative actions and to shape a 

cooperative and mutually beneficial relationship with Beijing. 

As the United States confronts the complex and dynamic challenges of the 21'' century, 

there is no instrument more essential and indispensable-- than NATO. The political influence, 

economic power, and military might available through this community of democracies cannot 

be sustained in the absence of a robust US military commitment to the Alliance. That is the 

price of leadership, and it is one whose returns have been consistently advantageous to the 

United States. 

4 
31 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mr. Brzezinski. 

Let me ask this question and let me have, starting with Ms. 

Flournoy, let me have each of you answer this. 

NATO has been called the most successful political-military alliance in history. Yet, as we have all mentioned, some critics have 

claimed that NATO is obsolete or that the U.S. shares too large of 

a burden within the alliance. The architects of the alliance—Truman, Acheson, Marshall, and Eisenhower—would be incredulous to 

learn that their creation, NATO and the lasting Atlantic partnership, is now in question. 

Let me ask each of you, in your previous positions, would you 

have been able to execute our foreign policy and national security 

objectives without the support and contributions from our allies in 

NATO? 

Ms. Flournoy, let’s start with you. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. The short answer is no. NATO was a critical 

partner in enabling us to surge forces in Afghanistan. They were 

a critical partner in bolstering deterrence in Europe in the face of 

a more assertive and aggressive Russia. And NATO members individually have been critical partners in other operations like 

counterterrorism the world over. 

So NATO, in my experience, remained absolutely critical. It is 

the first place we would turn to for partners to accomplish shared 

objectives. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Chollet. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Mr. Chairman, I completely agree with that. In my 

capacity at the Pentagon serving for the Secretary of Defense, three 

times a year we would travel to NATO headquarters in Brussels 

to meet with his minister of defense counterparts. Secretary of 

State has their own meetings with their counterparts. And this became a way for us to coordinate, to plan, and to talk about crisis 

response and also issues over the horizon. 

NATO was absolutely our partner of first resort and much of 

what we have been able to accomplish in Europe and elsewhere is 

unimaginable without having such a strong, enduring alliance. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Lute. 

Mr. LUTE. Mr. Chairman, I can only agree. I would argue further 

that as Ms. Flournoy mentioned in her opening comments, if we 

did not have NATO today when we confronted the kind of challenges that the panel has outlined, we would actually be racing to 

discover NATO and to invent NATO. So it is, in fact, indispensable. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Brzezinski. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I concur with my colleagues. We would not have been able to execute what we have 

done in Afghanistan and Iraq and the Balkans without our NATO 

allies. Sitting in the Pentagon, I saw firsthand how absolutely invaluable it is to have other countries whose militaries are not only 

fully interoperable, but have deep personal relationships among 

their commanders, among their NCOs. That is the reason why 

when we have a contingency that requires multinational support 

we turn to our NATO allies first. NATO is indispensable to U.S. 
32 

security and too often to U.S. military operations beyond our border. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. Mr. Brzezinski, let me just stay with you 

and expand on something that you mentioned. I could not agree 

with you more when you spoke about NATO enlargement. I think 

NATO, frankly, missed the boat back in 2008 when they did not 

expand to include Ukraine and Georgia. I think that gave Putin 

the idea that he could do whatever he wanted and that we would 

not stand up to him, including all his things in Crimea [and all his 

other belligerent actions.] 

So I do not know if you wanted to expand on that. I just wanted 

to say that I agree with your comments. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, sir. You know, when we look at the 

Black Sea Region, that is a zone of increasing confrontation with 

Russia. I do agree with you that if we had provided Ukraine and 

Georgia a more robust commitment to their transatlantic aspirations it is less likely that Putin would have made his move against 

Georgia and it is even less likely they would have made its move 

against Ukraine. 

Putin thrives on weakness and he exploits hesitancy and uncertainty. And unfortunately the West’s posture toward these two 

countries has created a de facto gray zone in European security 

and that just whets the appetite of someone like Putin. He sees an 

opportunity or senses there is a lack of commitment to support another country along its border in the former Soviet space. He sees 

that as an opportunity to reanimate the hegemony that Moscow exerted during the cold war. That is what he is about and unfortunately that is the position that we have put these countries in. 

And it is sad, because these countries seek NATO membership 

and more often than not they have actually sent troops to support 

our operations in the Balkans and in Afghanistan. I remember the 

dramatic footage of a Georgian platoon fighting in Afghanistan defending our embassy and doing a really good job of it. They need 

more support than we are providing them. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Ms. Flournoy, let me ask you this. What would be the consequences of pulling our troops home or reducing the size of the 

U.S. presence in Europe? How would it impact our ability to project 

power globally and could an ad hoc coalition take the place of our 

NATO basing and alliance network? If not, why not? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. As we saw during the surge in Afghanistan and 

our combat mission there, our basing in Europe was absolutely critical as a hub for our rotational forces going in and out of that conflict. In addition, the fact that we had been in Europe working with 

our allies in exercises and training and constantly working on 

interoperability, we experienced the benefits of that when we had 

to deploy together whether it was in the Balkans or Afghanistan 

or elsewhere. So that basing has been a critical hub. 

Now that there is a returned threat to Europe itself with Russia’s behavior that those bases become absolutely critical as a both 

a symbol of the U.S. commitment and resolve to defend Europe and 

our interests there, but also, a caution, a blinking yellow light to 

Vladimir Putin to say, if you come into NATO, cross NATO’s bor-
33 

ders, you are immediately declaring war not only with Europe but 

with the United States. 

So I think it is very important to maintain and strengthen— 

there are things I would do to strengthen that infrastructure in Europe, but I think it is very important to maintain it as a starting 

point. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

A few of you have mentioned China as a country that we need 

to be looking at very carefully for its aggressiveness and what it 

might do in the future. I am wondering if any of you would, Mr. 

Chollet or Mr. Lute, would you want to comment on that? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, I can take a first crack. I think China is 

something that NATO members need to begin to engage more seriously. I think there is more talk in Europe about looking at China 

as a security threat. Of course there has been a lot of news recently 

about disputes between the United States and some European 

partners on China’s investment particularly in the technology 

space within Europe, but we are seeing China invest in infrastructure in Europe, ports, critical technologies, engaging more in the 

high north, and China engaging much more with Russia. 

Last year, there was a very large exercise in the Far East called 

Vostok–18 that involved hundreds of thousands of Russian troops, 

thousands of Chinese troops, and this is something that got a lot 

of attention by our military commanders in Europe and in Asia. It 

is evidence of greater cooperation between Russia and China, cooperation that our intelligence community has testified publicly before Congress as something they are watching. 

So although there are many aspects to the China challenge and 

the security piece is just one, I think this is something that I see 

NATO engaging much more deeply in, in the coming five to 10 

years and I think that there is a willingness in Europe to do so. 

Mr. LUTE. Mr. Chairman, I am not so concerned about China’s 

military impact on Europe, but I am concerned about, as Derek 

Chollet mentioned, China’s increasing commercial influence. It is 

buying its way into transportation infrastructure, IT communications infrastructure and so forth. We have seen early signs that 

those commercial investments are leading to political influence. 

They expect a political return on their commercial investment. 

And even more I think strategically important over the next two 

to three decades, it is clear that the U.S.-Chinese competition will 

be at the forefront of world politics. And we should ask ourselves 

as Americans, do we wish to compete with China alone or would 

we favor an arrangement where we have 29 like-minded allies on 

our side as we enter into this geostrategic competition that is going 

to define the rest of our lives? I would clearly prefer to go in with 

a NATO team. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

I am going to go to Mr. Smith of New Jersey. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

First of all, let me say unequivocally, I believe the value of 

NATO is absolute or as near absolute as it gets to mitigate war, 

to deter, and when there is a problem to act decisively as a team 

to thwart any potential adversary. I do not think it is at risk. I 

think there is a lot of hyperbole about NATO’s continuance being 
34 

thrown about. I do not think it is at risk at all. I have been in Congress for 39 years. There is bipartisan support for it. There is 

White House support for it. So I think there is a lot of hyperbole 

about that issue. 

I led a delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly. We had 

a bilateral with the Germans with members of the Bundestag as 

well as other people in their defense establishment there last July, 

and I came away profoundly disturbed by their unwillingness and 

inability to meet that 2 percent GDP target. As a matter of fact, 

it is at 1.24 percent now and their excuse is—and I would appreciate perhaps Mr. Lute or others who might want to speak to this 

where—well, their population just will not go along with that kind 

of defense increase. 

It is OK for the U.S. to do it. I am glad we do. But to step up 

and say they cannot do this politically I thought was as weak as 

it gets, if you could speak to that. 

Second, to Michele Flournoy, during the 2012 Presidential election you appeared in a political commercial in reaction to Mitt 

Romney’s statement ‘‘that Russia was our No. 1 geopolitical foe.’’ 

You stated in the commercial that it is really a curious statement 

given that the cold war has been over for some time, indicating 

that Russia was not the threat that Mr. Romney had suggested 

and that he was stuck in the past. 

In your testimony before us today, however, you term Russia ‘‘revisionist,’’ and cite Moscow’s continued aggression in the region. I 

was in Tbilisi a week after they invaded South Ossetia. Anyone 

who had any thoughts that Putin was somehow matriculating from 

dictatorship to democratic leader—I will sell you the Brooklyn 

Bridge if you believe that. 

And they might have even gone further if there was not at least 

some strong statements coming out of the administration at that 

point, but I was wondering if you could tell us which of those statements should the committee believe today. 

Third, let me ask with regards to INSTEX, many of us are very 

concerned about the roundabout efforts that are being made by 

many, including Germany, France, and the U.K., to undermine our 

ability to sanction, whether it be Global Magnitsky or whether it 

be our efforts against Tehran. When you find some other way of 

circumventing what the U.S. is doing with often very strong support of the Congress, I think it undermines our ability to promote 

Iranian regime sanctions that in my opinion are very justified as 

well as again the Global Magnitsky Act. 

Mr. Lute, if you could maybe start on that first, what about Germany? I mean 1.24 percent is weak and it is, in my opinion, indefensible. 

Mr. LUTE. Congressman, I can only agree with you. Germany 

was present at the Wales Summit. Germany agreed as all allies did 

on the 2-percent pledge and Germany is underperforming at 1.24 

percent. It is the largest, strongest economy in the alliance next to 

ours. It is a political ally that aspires to European and maybe even 

global leadership, and leadership comes with a price. 

And this is simply a matter of German political leaders coming 

together and forming a coalition as their system requires and 

building political support for this. Political support does not fall 
35 

from trees. It has to be built as the Congress obviously knows. So 

I can only agree with you. There is no excuse. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, Congressman. So I did make that statement 

and it was at a time when we were actually having some success 

in cooperation with Russia. This is before Putin sort of increased 

his more aggressive behavior. We were negotiating New START 

arms control. We were policing up nuclear materials, and cleaning 

out proliferation risks. We had Russian agreement to allow us to 

transit Russian territory and their near abroad—— 

Mr. SMITH. I understand. But—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. So I am just saying it was a moment in time. I 

think now looking back, knowing what we know now and how 

Putin has behaved and where Russia has gone with its aggression, 

I think that I would revise that statement or I would not have 

made that statement. 

Mr. SMITH. I appreciate it. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would have thought that now, you know, Romney had a certain degree of foresight that I think was not apparent 

at the time. 

Mr. SMITH. OK. And Romney was not alone in that. Many of us 

strongly objected to those kinds—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Right, but I think we can all agree that Russia 

is—— 

Mr. SMITH. Matter of fact, I am glad Secretary Albright said it 

as well—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY [continuing]. Very much a threat today. 

Mr. SMITH [continuing]. That we underestimated Russia. 

And that last question, if anybody can speak to it, circumventing 

our sanctions regimes with and working actively against us and 

there are members of NATO doing it with INSTEX. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, it—yes, on the Russia or on Iran and the 

JCPOA, obviously that has not been a NATO issue although NATO 

members are very much party to this dispute. And of course this 

issue has been incredibly divisive between the U.S. and Europe and 

will remain divisive. Europe is indeed trying to find a way to maintain the integrity of the JCPOA with this new mechanism. I have 

my doubts, frankly, whether this new mechanism is going to get 

anywhere. They just launched it, whether it will prove successful 

or not. 

Nevertheless, whether that exists or not there will still remain 

a profound disagreement with our U.S. and European partners on 

the JCPOA and how to handle the threat from Iran’s nuclear program. That is not a subject—the JCPOA specifically is not a subject 

that NATO talks much about within the councils of Brussels. However, the threat from Iran is something that NATO talks about 

around the table in Brussels and thinks quite a bit about from a 

military planning perspective. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Meeks. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all of the 

witnesses. 

You know, NATO has undoubtedly been one of the most successful alliances in history promoting peace, security, democracy since 
36 

its inception. And at the signing of the original Washington treaty 

70 years ago, President Truman remarked that NATO would, and 

I quote, ‘‘would create a shield against aggression and fear of aggression, a bulwark which will permit us to get on with the real 

business of achieving a fuller and happier life for all of our citizens.’’ To me those words are truer now than ever before. And prior 

to this administration, it would have been unimaginable to question the value of our NATO alliance and pass resolutions prohibiting the President from pulling out of this strategic partnership of 

which he has threatened to do and yet that is exactly where we are 

here, why, where we are today. 

And when I was recently in attendance at the Munich Security 

Conference, I was deeply concerned that at that time not just a few 

weeks ago, that the President went on to Twitter to threaten the 

release of 800 captured ISIS fighters on the streets of Europe. Just 

think about that for a second. Today, we are here in agreement on 

the importance of NATO, a point that I think our President disregards. 

And the only thing I will say also in regards to Germany, I understand that they need to step up. But they are not talking about 

building a wall, they are letting millions of refugees in and spending money on that. Not building a wall to separate themselves, but 

accepting many individuals and trying to make sure that there is 

better integration into the European—and they do not get credit for 

that. 

And just think about that cost to the German people and what 

the Chancellor is subjecting herself to by just doing that. And those 

things should be taken into consideration at all times, I think, and 

we do not talk about that enough where we are building a wall and 

separating people and dividing people and not supporting our 

NATO. 

So let me ask Ms. Flournoy that how has President Trump’s 

questioning of the value of our NATO allies affected our ability to 

effectively push back against Russia’s aggression? 

And I agree with you because I too was fooled. I started, that is 

the reason why I was a supporter of PNTR right before Putin came 

back. I thought that we were moving in a post-cold war and Putin 

came back and we are where we are. But how effectively did we 

push back against Russia’s aggression, and address other security 

challenges that is now confronted in Europe. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. So for all the strength of our military to military 

cooperation with our allies, I think the statements coming from the 

President questioning not only our allies’ contributions but the U.S. 

commitment to NATO and the value of the alliance, I think that 

has frankly played right into Vladimir Putin’s hands. If you look 

at Russia’s objectives, Putin is trying to reassert Russia as a great 

power. He is trying to recreate a sphere of influence. 

And he is going to try to undermine democracy as a model of government. There is nothing that makes him happier than to see division inside the alliance, to try to so division and weaken the 

transatlantic relationship, and so this is playing right into Putin’s 

hands. 

He is—this is far more effective than the disinformation campaigns that he has been launching that the meddling in our elec-
37 

tions and European elections has resulted in. So I think we—I am 

very worried that at the strategic level the lack of U.S. clear commitment and resolve and consistency and leadership in the alliance 

is frankly strengthening Putin’s hand and undermining our own. 

Mr. MEEKS. Thank you. 

Mr. Chollet, let me ask you, because NATO has an open-door policy and we now look that maybe North Macedonia, a new ally and 

part of the NATO. Now what would you say to those who argue 

against NATO’s enlargement, and are there any real concerns that 

newer, smaller members of NATO could drag us into a conflict, and 

can you elaborate on why enlargement has benefited NATO? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Well, as my fellow panelists have said, NATO enlargement, in my view, is one of the great success stories of the 

NATO alliance. It was just yesterday that we celebrated the 20th 

anniversary of NATO’s first round of post-cold war enlargement letting in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. 

Something that the United States—it is important to remember 

a process U.S. drove and brought these countries into the alliance 

working with our partners. I think, first, having more capable partners serves the U.S. interest and the process of getting into NATO 

just does not happen overnight. This is a long, rigorous process 

that requires many, many political and military reforms from member States. 

So I think it is very, very important that to achieve our goals of 

having more capable partners and ensuring that we have a Europe 

that is whole, free, and at peace, that we keep this door open. That 

is why I think we should celebrate the fact that North Macedonia 

appears on the cusp of entering the alliance later this year. 

And I want to concur with my colleague, Mr. Brzezinski, that it 

is very important for the alliance to clarify a pathway for it, for 

those allies that has already said 1 day we will be in the alliance 

and that is Georgia and Ukraine, and I think it is time to try to 

take the next step in our articulating more concretely how that will 

happen. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. McCaul. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

You know, Russia has been in violation of the INF Treaty for 

many years. Putin has indicated his intent to build new and more 

sophisticated missiles to threaten our allies. I agreed with the 

President’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty and I commend our NATO allies for supporting that decision unanimously. 

Mr. Brzezinski and I guess Mr. Chollet, what can NATO do now 

to prevent this and deter this Russia missile development program? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Thank you, sir. You know, the Russians have 

been in violation of INF Treaty for some at least 10 years. And 

when you have one party of a treaty not abiding by it, its utility 

diminishes and maybe even becomes counterproductive if you are 

not willing to directly address that digression, that violation. 

Mr. MCCAUL. OK. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think the administration made the smart move 

in pulling out or announcing its intent to withdraw from the INF 

Treaty. I think it has wisely signaled to the Russians that if they 

are ready and demonstrate that they will destroy the existing in-
38 

ventory of intermediate range missiles they have built—and I think 

it is about a brigade’s worth—that we will go back. I think that is 

the right thing to do. 

The goal is to now figure out how we can avoid another destabilizing arms race, so to speak, an arms race with two sides building nuclear-capable, intermediate range missiles ground launched. 

That is what the INF pulled off the table, so to speak. 

Looking forward, I think the following things: One, it would be 

useful for—if the Russians will not take up the administration’s 

offer, we might consider proposing to the Russians an agreement 

in which we would agree that we will not deploy nuclear-capable, 

ground launch, intermediate range missiles. We could complement 

that maybe with limits on the number of missiles each side can 

have, and of course this would have to include also very, very robust inspection regimes. We could consider joint renunciation of 

not—renunciation of deploying nuclear INF range missiles. 

Our response also has to figure out what would we do as the 

Russians move forward with these deployments, and there are conventional responses we can take into account, the deployment of 

more robust air and missile defense systems. 

If there is one thing that it lacking in the administration’s response, I think it is as follows: They have not publicly stated what 

are the implications of this violation. They have just said basically 

they are in violation and so therefore we are going to get out of it. 

To me, but it is clear this can be potentially extremely destabilizing and the administration should be articulating in how is it 

destabilizing, what are the military implications of this. I am wondering if they tasked the alliance or NATO’s military commander 

to do an assessment of what happens if the Russians deploy a hundred, 200, 500 of these systems. What are the implications for the 

alliance’s posture? What should be the response? Such an assessment and such a public articulation of such an assessment would 

do a lot to help garner a more public and international support for 

the administration’s position. 

Mr. MCCAUL. In the remaining time I have I want the other 

three to comment. Turkey has become a precarious ally in many 

ways. Their rejection of the Patriot missiles and now willingness to 

buy the Russian S–400 missile system is a challenge for NATO 

members, and the NATO Supreme Allied Commander said that if 

they went ahead with this purchase that the United States should 

not follow through with selling them F–35s. 

Could Michele and Mr. Chollet and Mr. Lute, could you comment 

on that? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, I completely agree with your assessment of the concern of Turkey’s purchase of the Russian air defense system. This has been something that going back to the 

Obama Administration has been made clear to Turkish counterparts the mistake this would be both in terms of what we believe 

is their cooperation within NATO and the fact that there would be 

real consequences beyond NATO, as you mentioned the F–35, for 

example, and so one would hope that the Turks change their minds 

on this. 

I am doubtful, having had conversations with some Turkish officials recently that they are going to do so. They feel quite defiant 
39 

about it. I think this would be a mistake. It would weaken alliance 

unity. This is one of those issues that is an irritant in alliance debates. 

And Turkey is a front line partner. I mean Turkey has been, we 

should not forget, been living with a hot war on its border for quite 

some time. And so there many ways NATO has come to Turkey’s 

support as it has dealt with the ramifications of the Syria crisis. 

But—— 

Mr. MCCAUL. My time is—if I could just get a quick response 

from Ms. Flournoy and Mr. Lute. And I apologize. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I was not fully supportive of General 

Scaparrotti’s testimony in terms of it from a technical and, you 

know, intelligence risk perspective. It is impossible if they go ahead 

with the deployment of this for hundreds and integrate that into 

their systems, it will mean, it will create very real constraints on 

what we are able to do with them in terms of any kind of advanced 

defense cooperation or future, provision of future systems including 

the F–35. 

And so I think this is a real problem, and what Turkey needs to 

understand is that they are making not just tactical choices, systems choices, but strategic choices and this will limit their ability 

to cooperate effectively within the alliance. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Mr. Lute. 

Mr. LUTE. I agree this is a tactical bad choice on behalf of Turkey. But the broader, more strategic issue is Turkey’s significant 

slippage from the democratic values of the alliance. There is no ally 

among the 29 who has slipped further and faster from the founding 

core values of the alliance and has moved toward authoritarianism. 

So that is the big strategic issue. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Keating. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to get back to the earlier remarks about China. You 

know, 2 weeks ago I was in Munich and in Brussels talking to political and security leaders as well as NATO leaders, and came 

away with the strong feeling that in the longer term that China 

could be our greatest challenge right now. If we were going to look 

back 25 years from now if things stay the same, that is where I 

think we might be showing we have the greatest concern. 

So I would just like to go further with this. There is so much 

Chinese activity investments. They just purchased a robotics company in Germany. They are working with Hungary with proposed 

rail lines through Serbia. Bulgaria, they are doing investments in 

ports, all with strings attached. And we are hearing in North Africa some of the buyers’ remorse from some of the countries that 

have been dealing with China, but in Europe this is a real threat. 

So what can our NATO members do to insulate members from 

this? What can the U.S. do? I know I am involved in alternatives 

in terms of energy investment, alternatives in Europe to provide 

more options and to help our exporting now that we are in there, 

but what kind of things can we do to insulate ourselves and to deal 

with what I think is the greatest long-range threat that we have 

through China and these investments? 
40 

Ms. FLOURNOY. If I may, sir, I think it is an excellent question. 

I do think the strategic competition with China will be kind of the 

pacing issue for our national security going forward. Europe is sort 

of a back door to get in to get Western technology for China. If they 

cannot—if they are thwarted in their intellectual property theft 

from us, they will try to get it through our European allies. 

They are making infrastructure investments. The case of the port 

in Italy is just the most recent example. Not because of some economic driver, but because they are trying to get political influence, 

they are trying to gain leverage. And ultimately they are also, with 

their companies like Huawei and others, trying to put in networks 

an infrastructure that could be used by the State for intelligence 

and espionage purposes in the future if it came to that. So we have 

to be very clear-eyed. I think we want to intensify our discussions 

with each of our NATO partners in Europe and the EU. We want 

to encourage them to put in place CFIUS-like regulation, meaning 

they need to be very careful to review foreign investment in their 

countries from a national security perspective and be very cleareyed. We need to be doing better in sharing intelligence about, 

what we see China doing. 

But to Doug’s point earlier, Ambassador Lute’s point, we are 

missing an opportunity. The best way for the U.S. to compete with 

China is, first of all, to invest at home in our domestic drivers of 

competence, but also to band together with our European allies and 

our Asian allies. Together we are 60 percent of the world’s GDP. 

If we were taking China on not in a bilateral tariff tit-for-tat kind 

of dispute, but banding together with the EU, Japan, Korea, all of 

our allies in Asia, we would have so much more leverage to force 

China into to address some of the unfair practices that it has had 

on trade over the years. 

Mr. KEATING. I could not agree with you more. I think we are 

talking just the opposite approach. Tariffs are divisive and if we 

ever move on the automobile tariffs it will be more divisive. It is 

a lose-lose proposition. 

But we share the same values with our European Union allies 

and it is those values that are in competition right now with China 

and why not deal from a position of strength and move forward for 

free trade agreements there and then really be in a strength position to deal with China? So I could not agree more. 

Just one quick question, you know, the elections are coming in 

Europe and we are seeing, you know, I think democracies more a 

threat with autocratic leaders and autocratic. How is that backslide 

a concern and what can we do with the NATO countries and our 

European allies to try and help in that regard? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, I can take a crack at that. It is a 

big concern. The democratic backsliding we are seeing in many 

countries in the alliance is something that is becoming increasingly 

divisive within the alliance and making it harder to maintain alliance unity. There is not just disputes between the U.S. and European partners, there are disputes within Europe over the direction 

of politics on the continent. 

That is why I think it is important to remember NATO’s core, 

which is the values. It is a military alliance, but it is about much, 

much more than capabilities. And I think that is why it is so im-
41 

portant for NATO to remain strong, for the U.S. to uphold those 

values and remain committed to its leadership in the alliance. A 

lot of these issues have nothing to do with NATO, but NATO as 

that core of the transatlantic partnership will be an absolutely indispensable tool in helping us address some of the democratic backsliding in the European Union. 

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you. I would just say it has everything 

to do with it too, if you look at it from that perspective. I yield 

back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. And thank you very much, Chairman Engel and Republican leader McCaul. What extraordinary time to have recognition of the 70th anniversary of NATO and I want to thank each 

of you for being here. And as I think of the 70th anniversary of 

NATO, we now have the broadest spread of freedom and democracy 

than in the history of the world. Particularly with the former Warsaw Pact members now members of NATO, how exciting this is and 

the success of NATO needs to be recognized. 

Mr. Brzezinski, Secretary General Stoltenberg has actually 

praised the President for his efforts to have all of the members of 

NATO increase their participation financially. What is your view 

about the financial contributions by our NATO allies? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think those contributions are still short. They 

are making improvement. Secretary General Stoltenberg likes to 

emphasize that since 2016 we have had a $41 billion increase in 

their defense spending and it is on track to be $100 billion by 2020. 

That is good and it should be recognized. 

I think it is actually eight countries now that are going to be this 

year at the 2-percent mark and ten have pledged to meet that by 

2024, which is progress, but there are about to be 30 members in 

the alliance, so we are just over 50 percent of the alliance living 

up to the 2-percent pledge. It is urgent, because challenges that we 

face today are growing increasingly ominous. I mean the risks 

posed by Russia’s military buildup in North Central Europe in the 

Black Sea Region require more robust investment. 

We were talking about Germany. It is appalling the German 

spending levels particularly in the light of the readiness of their 

forces. I am not convinced they really have the capability to even 

generate two brigades in 30 days to reinforce NATO’s Eastern frontier and they are in the backyard, so to speak. 

So yes, there is progress being made. I think the administration 

can be commended for prodding that process in sometimes 

undiplomatic way, sometimes even a counterproductive way, but 

the progress is happening but a lot more needs to be done. Fifty 

percent meeting 2 percent is not sufficient. That is not the instate 

we see. We need a hundred percent commitment to 2 percent and 

we need to kind of, think more broadly about how we measure the 

outputs of that 2 percent. 

I would like to see a return to inspections of committed allied 

forces. That is, during the cold war I think it was SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, would do inspections of 

the forces that NATO members committed to alliance operations or 
42 

alliance contingency plans. Those inspections ought to be reinstated. 

They could be conducted by SHAPE or Allied Command Transformation, and they ought to be reported to the ministers. And I 

think there ought to be a public dimension of that reporting because that is a good way to increase the pressure on governments 

and also to get public’s confidence that their money is being well 

spent. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. Another, to me, extraordinary achievement has been NATO forces being placed in the Baltic republicsEstonia, Latvia, Lithuania-the presence of American troops in Poland. For each of you, how significant is this as a deterrent, and 

in particular in Poland—I had the opportunity to meet with President Duda in New York last summer and it was so exciting to hear 

him explain how he would like to have actually a permanent American military presence that they would pay for, they would provide, 

and the relationship that we have with Poland has just never been 

better. 

But Secretary Flournoy, everyone, what is the significance of 

having these troops as a deterrent, peace through strength? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think having NATO troops, including U.S. 

troops, in the Baltics is essential to signal to Vladimir Putin that 

if he comes across the border he is not just attacking Estonia or 

Latvia or Lithuania, he is taking on the United States and the full 

force of NATO. 

I do think there are things we can do to strengthen our presence 

along the front line States including pre-positioning more heavy 

equipment, including readying more bases to be able to receive 

forces if it came to that in a crisis. I think the question of whether 

any additional presence in Poland should be permanent versus rotational deserves further study. But I really applaud Congress’ support and this committee’s support for the European Reassurance 

Initiative and the continued funding that DoD is providing. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Mr. Sherman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We are arguing that they should spend 2 percent 

on their national defense. We are also trying to argue to the American people that if they hit 2 percent they are doing enough. So we 

have the foreign policy establishment is arguing in both directions. 

Tell the American people settle for what you get and tell the NATO 

countries to spend more. Two percent is a benchmark that needs 

to be compared with what percent are we spending, and what is 

the commonly used figure that we use to talk to the Europeans 

about what percent of our GDP we are spending? Do we typically 

say something like 3 percent or three and a half percent? 

Which of you is most familiar with what number we use? I see 

Mr. Chollet—oh, Mr. Lute. 

Mr. LUTE. So we have consensus here. We typically cite 3.5 percent. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Right. And the fact is that is our effort to lie to 

the American people because we have a two-angle here. We do not 

spend—we spend much closer to five and a half percent. Now how 

can you lie to the American people to tell them what Europe is 
43 

doing is adequate? Well, what you do is you exclude veterans benefits as if the pension costs—you know, I am an old CPA. If you had 

a company that in not listing the costs of product excluded its pension costs, they would go to jail. That is how big of a violation it 

is of accounting principles. 

So you exclude veterans. You exclude the Coast Guard. You exclude the CIA. And that helps with one part which is trying to tell 

the American people Europe is doing enough, but it undercuts our 

efforts to get Europe to do more because they say, well, you know, 

if we hit 2 percent, you guys are three and a half percent, we are 

in the ballpark. Why is it in arguing with Europe that we decide 

that the Coast Guard does not count, the CIA does not count, and 

veterans benefits does not count? 

Mr. LUTE. So I think I can address that. So NATO actually has 

rules about what counts and what does not count, so typically the 

shorthand. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And why have we agreed to rules that all lie, that 

massively understate what any reasonable accountant would say 

we are spending? 

Mr. LUTE. So I am not sure, Congressman, why we agreed to 

that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. OK. 

Mr. LUTE. But the standard has been for decades that basically 

ministry of defense—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand. Europe’s—there is Article 5 and 

there is Article 5. No one in the world knows what the U.S. response would be to an attack on an Eastern European country. We 

would clearly do something. There is an image that as long as we 

are legally in NATO we will respond as we did in World War II 

and/or with the full force of our nuclear weapons. 

Is there any discussion in Europe that goes along the lines of, 

hey, if the American people think that we are only doing 2 percent 

or we are doing less than 2 percent, we are on the front lines and 

that is all we did that maybe the U.S. response would not be any 

greater than NATO’s response that when America was attacked by 

the Taliban and al-Qaida. 

That is to say, the U.S. might send a few hundred troops, a few 

thousand troops, but would not reinstitute the draft, endanger 

American cities. Is there any discussion in Europe that Article 5 

compliance could be anything between a few hundred troops on the 

one hand and massive nuclear war on the other, or do they just assume that they get a World War II-level response? 

Mr. LUTE. So, Congressman, NATO actually conducts war games 

often with our secretary of defense participating and they go 

through scenarios. 

Mr. SHERMAN. But it will ultimately be a political decision. That 

you do war games in 2019 that does not mean that the United 

States in 2029 will allow the—use tactical nuclear weapons against 

a Russian army. 

Mr. LUTE. Right. But these exercises reflect your point, which is 

that there is a lot of ambiguity in Article 5 and there is a range 

of potential national response. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Is there any discussion in Europe that the ultimate political decision within that range to their defense and, more 
44 

importantly for them, the image to Russia of what that would be 

is dependent upon the American people’s view as to whether they 

are carrying their own weight. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sure, if I could share my perspective. What I 

think Europeans who are in decisionmaking capacities do is they 

look at what our footprint is in Europe, how much we spend on Europe, and what kind of operations we do in Europe. So when they 

look at our footprint, they have seen actually a return of U.S. 

forces to Europe, and not only just a return of U.S. forces, but a 

forward deployment of those forces in North Central Europe. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I understand that the elites of Europe look at 

what the establishment in the United States does which is engage 

in those war games. But ultimately the decision in 2029 or 2039, 

or God hope this never happens, will not be made in Washington. 

It will be made in Peoria, in Wichita, and the American people will 

decide. 

And I know that had the decision been made in Washington by 

the establishment we would have responded robustly to Assad’s use 

of chemical weapons. And then we heard from constituents when 

President Obama asked for congressional support and I got four 

calls saying go bomb Assad and 500 calls on the other side. 

So are the Europeans—and I realize I have gone over time. But 

it seems like the Europeans are focusing on whether they are meeting Washington standards and not whether they are meeting the 

American people’s standard. And I will yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank the panel for 

being here. 

I do not personally believe that the American people think that 

there is a threat to the NATO alliance. And I think they certainly 

appreciate the value to the free world and that it is better to stem 

the tide of totalitarianism, communism, socialism, and violence on 

those borders as opposed to having come to our shores. 

So I kind of reject and I completely reject the straw man argument that this President is flirting with leaving NATO legitimately 

even in the face of the fact that only eight of the NATO countries 

as you, Secretary Brzezinski, have pointed out have met the requirement and while 21 are falling well short, including Germany. 

And the American taxpayer, they understand that as well. They do 

not mind making the investment, but they do not want to be used 

and abused to defend Europe wholly and completely from here. 

But let me ask a couple of questions. Secretary General 

Stoltenberg just last month at the Munich Security Conference 

said, ‘‘I am saying that President Trump’s message has been very 

clear and that his message is having an impact on defense spending and this is important because we need fair burden-sharing in 

the NATO alliance.’’ 

Secretary Flournoy, is he wrong? Was he wrong to say that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. I think that President Trump’s pressure and 

Secretary Mattis’ pressure along with their predecessors Secretary 

Gates, Secretary Panetta, others, we have been at imploring the allies to do more. 

Mr. PERRY. Right. 
45 

Ms. FLOURNOY. And that is correct. I think the objection is to 

using the 2-percent as the sole criteria for evaluating allied contributions—— 

Mr. PERRY. But nothing has worked in the past, right? Let me 

move on here. This is a statement we have heard recently. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think the Ukraine and Crimea has had something to do with the increased spending as well. 

Mr. PERRY. And it should. But these are some other statements. 

This is a statement we have heard recently. ‘‘If we have got collective defense it means that everybody has got to chip in. And I have 

had some concerns about a diminished level of defense spending 

among our partners in NATO, not all but many.’’ And then another 

statement, ‘‘One of the things that I think medium and long term 

we will have to examine is whether everybody is chipping in.’’ 

Secretary Brzezinski, do you know who said those two things? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. No, sir. 

Mr. PERRY. That was President Obama that said that. 

And so my question for you is, to many people he made disparaging comments about our NATO allies going as far as calling 

them free-riders. And if that is the case, why is it that President 

Obama, who seemed to have some of the very similar rhetoric toward our allies, was not successful in getting them to try and meet 

their obligation but also was not criticized for it? Why do you suppose that is? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think it is politics. 

Mr. PERRY. Sounds fair to me. I mean, but we are talking about 

international and national security and it does not seem to be the 

place for politics. I mean, Secretary Gates under President Obama 

said that in 2011 in Brussels that NATO had a dim, if not dismal, 

future unless more member nations scaled up their participation in 

alliance activities. 

Let me ask you this, Secretary Flournoy. In your testimony you 

say that using the 2-percent GDP goal as the only measure of burden sharing ignores other critical contributions and, most importantly and unforgivably, their shared sacrifice. Moving on, this is 

disrespectful, shortsighted, and wrong. 

Now your former boss, Secretary Gates, criticized NATO members for not meeting their commitments. Would you say that he 

was disrespectful, shortsighted, and wrong as well? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, because he was not using the 2-percent metric as the only metric of NATO contribution. I helped write the 

speech that you are referring to from Secretary Gates. We have bipartisan support from Bush, Obama, and Trump trying to get the 

allies to do more and that is a correct policy. But it should not be 

the only metric by which we judge their contributions to our security. 

My point was they have fought and died alongside us. We should 

never overlook that in the way that we address our allies in terms 

of their contribution. 

Mr. PERRY. So then let me just ask you this, rhetorically, if that 

is the case. And, OK, I will have an open mind about it. Will our 

NATO partners and allies be upset and be critical of the United 

States if we reduce our contribution lower than 2 percent saying, 

well, look, we do a whole lot of other things as well and we do not 
46 

want to only be measured by this 2 percent because we do a whole 

lot of other things as well that are not included in the 2-percent. 

Is that going to be fair? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Again, no. Again I think the 2-percent metric is 

important and valid and should be met. It is just not the only metric that we should use to browbeat our advocate. 

Mr. PERRY. But it cannot be a one-way street. It cannot be a oneway street. The American taxpayer realizes—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Now that is true, absolutely. It should not be a 

one-way street. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Respects the investment. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. We are in violent agreement. 

Mr. PERRY. But we demand our NATO partners and allies meet 

their obligations as well. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, but we should do it without calling into 

question their ability to rely on us as the leader of the alliance—— 

Mr. PERRY. We are not calling into question—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY [continuing]. And our commitment to work with 

them. 

Mr. PERRY [continuing]. Their ability to rely on us, but I would 

say that past administrations had demanded the same thing as 

this President and gotten zero results. And with that I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. BERA. Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Listening to my colleagues’ line of questioning and I think in a 

bipartisan way we would like our NATO allies to step up and carry 

more of the burden. I think the difference between prior administrations and the current administration, I do not think we disagree 

with President Trump asking the question and pushing for greater 

contribution. I do think many of us are uncomfortable and disagree 

with the premise that we should pull out of NATO and even that 

rhetoric, I think, is very dangerous and sends the wrong signal to 

our friends and allies. 

We can modernize what this alliance looks like. We share values. 

And, you know, if our allies across the world are listening as well 

as our adversaries, I think this body, when we passed the NATO 

Support Act 357 to 22 in a broad bipartisan way saying that we 

would not be pulling out of NATO, is speaking loudly and that is 

what Congress should be doing. I urge my colleagues in the Senate 

to take this act up and send it to the President and I would urge 

the President to sign this because that is the message of this body. 

You know, in that light as we start to think about Congress’ role 

in supporting our alliances and sending the message, you know, 

many Members of Congress will be here longer than 4 years and 

from one administration to the next. And I think NATO has served 

us incredibly well in the post-World War II environment. We are 

not suggesting that we do not need to modernize those alliances 

and look at it, but these are institutions that have served us well. 

You know, maybe starting with Ms. Flournoy and just going 

across, what would you like to see Congress’ oversight role be and 

how can we best provide that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would welcome, as Mr. Chollet recommended, 

a strong congressional vote, both houses, in support of NATO and 
47 

the value of NATO to U.S. national security and the continued U.S. 

commitment to the alliance. Beyond that in terms of your oversight 

role, I think it is important we get beyond the—you know, yes, the 

2-percent metric is important. I acknowledge that and fully support 

it. I spent a lot of time in my previous capacity pushing our allies 

on this issue. 

But I think it is much more important to ask how is that money 

being spent? How is NATO really investing to be prepared for a different set of future challenges than the ones that have defined our 

operational focus over the last two decades? That is the key question. It is a question of the type of readiness. It is the type of posture and positioning. It is the technology investment. It is all of 

those things and so getting beyond the just the 2-percent to say, 

how are we actually spending money and is that going to bolster 

deterrence and prevent conflict in the future. 

Mr. BERA. Mr. Chollet. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, three ways that Congress’ role is indispensable, first, on the oversight obviously ensuring that the 

United States maintains robust funding for its security and diplomatic efforts in Europe is something that we are going to look to 

Congress to ensure. I took note that in the administration’s budget 

request this week there is a $600 million cut in the European defense initiative and that is something I know your colleagues on 

the Armed Services Committee will take a close look at what is behind that. 

No. 2, efforts that as Ambassador Lute has mentioned for Congress to not just show its support, but help protect NATO in some 

ways and U.S. leadership in NATO by ensuring that there is a very 

high bar that the executives should get over if there is a desire to 

pull out or diminish in some way the U.S. role in NATO. 

And then third, as has been mentioned by many members of this 

committee, just your personal engagement in these issues, traveling to NATO headquarters, traveling to Europe not just to listen 

and talk about your support, but also to press NATO on the important reforms that we all agree in a bipartisan fashion it needs 

whether that is on defense spending or defense modernization, I 

think that is a very critical role that you all can play. 

Mr. LUTE. Congressman, I would only cite the 50-some Members 

of the Congress both on the Senate and the House who went, as 

some members of this committee did, to Munich just within the 

last month. That is the largest congressional delegation in the 55- 

year history of the Munich Security Conference. That sends a very 

important message. So Congress to parliamentary engagement is 

really important and I would not—aside from that I would echo everything my colleagues have said. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I will just quickly reiterate what my colleagues have said. I would start by saying thank you for the resolutions that this body has passed in real time to demonstrate congressional support for the alliance. That was incredibly important 

last summer. I would second Derek’s call, whatever can be done to 

kind of ensure this continued funding for the European Deterrence 

Initiative, it is important in light of the threat scenario as we face 

in Europe. 
48 

And in terms of oversight, I would recommend that you look into 

on a regular basis what are the readiness levels not just for the 

United States but for our allies. Do a deep dive on how ready are 

German, French, U.K., Polish battalions, brigades, aircraft, how 

sustainable and how deployable they are. Then I would also do a 

deep dive into what kind of contributions are our allies making to 

military operations? 

And you will get a mixed picture from such oversight, but it will 

be helpful because it will help prompt our allies in the right direction. 

Mr. BERA. Great, thank you. And I will yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Kinzinger. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 

being here today. I appreciate it. 

We all know that NATO is an important institution. And it is not 

just—I think it is important to remember that it is not just a benefit to Europe. I think we get as much of a benefit out of NATO 

as Europe gets out of it, out of our involvement. We all know the 

invocation of Article 5 after 9/11, the importance of that, NATO’s 

role, including some folks that are not in NATO when you think 

of the Nation of Georgia, for instance, helping us in Afghanistan 

is important to keep in mind. 

But I think we all understand the importance of NATO, but I do 

not think there is anything wrong with us or an administration 

pointing out weaknesses in an alliance. In fact, I think that is essential. And sometimes in our fervor to reaffirm NATO we skip 

over the reality that—I remember hearing about one European 

country that I will not mention that in the Balkans was unable to 

muster any combat power for that conflict because they realized 

the vast majority of their defense budget was actually just being 

spent on paying salaries, which makes it just a jobs program and 

not a military at that point. 

The importance of our job in that so reaffirming that is important, but I think you also have to give the administration some 

flexibility in terms of calling NATO out on their weakness like 

that. Congress can play an important role, but I think Congress 

can overplay our hand sometimes too in consistently saying that 

you know, we are going to affirm NATO no matter what, regardless 

of their percent of GDP they are spending, as an example. 

This committee later today is going to hear a bill to prohibit military action or authorization or action in Venezuela, which out of 

nowhere I found out we are doing, and, you know, where in the 

world? How do you—you take away the power of an administration 

to use military as even a carrot in terms of a diplomatic negotiation. And the first thing this committee did was already de-authorize the administration’s involvement in Yemen. 

So I think empowering an administration is extremely important, 

but we all realize the importance of NATO today. 

So Ukraine I want to talk specifically about. They continue to 

face, as we know, significant challenges from Russia, from Russian 

meddling and aggression as Vladimir Putin seeks to rebuild the 

former Soviet Union. And I think the best way to push back 

against Russia is to give the Ukrainians what they need to defend 
49 

their sovereignty such as anti-tank Javelin missile systems that we 

delivered last year and any further support that they need in that. 

Back in November, Russia violated Ukraine’s sovereignty yet again 

when it seized three Ukrainian vessels along with its 24 sailors as 

they passed through neutral waters in the Kerch Strait. 

Mr. Brzezinski, General Scaparrotti, the current Supreme Allied 

Commander of NATO, recently testified that the administration is 

looking to deliver more lethal weapons to Ukraine. Do you believe 

this will help to defer actions, further conflicts between Russia and 

Ukrainian forces? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Absolutely. I think while our support has improved to Ukraine in providing lethal assistance, we need to do 

more so that Ukraine is better able to defend itself. Right now it 

remains very vulnerable. I would add to the list that we have—and 

we are doing things that are useful like helping the Ukrainians 

train their forces and such, but the only lethal assistance we have 

provided have been the Javelins. 

We should complement that with more capable ISR systems they 

can use. We may even want to do our own ISR flights over Ukraine 

just to keep the Russians on notice that we are watching. We 

should give them air defense assets and we should also give them 

anti-ship missiles like the harpoon, so that we do not have events 

occurring like we saw in the Sea of Azov again. 

Mr. KINZINGER. Thank you. You know, and I think the important 

thing to note is, well, I do not always agree with the administration’s words or lack of words on Russia and I call that out every 

time I can, but words versus actions are really significant. I think 

this administration’s actions against Russia and actions Ukraine 

are far different than what we have seen in the past. 

I am not a point back to the past kind of guy, but when you look 

at the prior assistance to the Ukrainian military it was basically 

blankets. That really does not do a lot in terms of pursuing allowing Ukraine to defend its territory. And there are reports that Germany and France declined the United States’ request to exercise 

freedom of navigation drills through the Kerch Strait last year. 

While both countries were willing to do a single maneuver, they 

were unwilling to navigate those waters out of fear of provocation. 

Mr. Brzezinski, how can we help to entice our NATO allies that 

we so strongly believe in to join us in showing Vladimir Putin that 

we will not accept his illegal activity in the Crimean Peninsula? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I think in that case you always find allies that 

will be in disagreement with you and so you have to move forward 

without them sometimes. That is why I think it was very important for the administration to move forward by providing lethal 

weapons, the Javelins, to Ukraine and to Georgia. If we are going 

to lead our allies we actually have to lead by doing. 

And so the recommendations I outlined for you would be actions 

that I would take that would benefit the Ukrainians, it would help 

deter the Russians, and would also, I think, help lead some of our 

European allies to recognize our actions are sound rather than unwise. 

Mr. KINZINGER. I think Vladimir Putin is a smart guy, but I do 

not think he is eager to cross red lines. I just think we need to 
50 

paint those red lines brighter with our allies. So thank you, and 

I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Lieu. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Since we are at a Foreign Affairs hearing I just thought it might be appropriate to announce 

that today is day 26 of our national emergency. I note for the 

record that the President played golf in the middle of our national 

emergency. 

But I want to talk about a real emergency right now which is the 

destabilization of NATO by Donald J. Trump and his enablers. And 

we know based on various news articles and public reports that in 

2018 Donald Trump talked about withdrawing from NATO. 

So Ms. Flournoy, let me ask you. If the U.S. were to withdraw 

from NATO would that help U.S. national security? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No. I believe it would be catastrophic. 

Mr. LIEU. Would it help Russia? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, as I have said, I think any weakening of the 

transatlantic alliance it plays into Vladimir Putin’s hand, weakens 

deterrence, and strengthens Russia’s ability to meddle in our affairs and to advance their objectives. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. 

Donald Trump also questioned Article 5 of NATO which is the 

core of NATO’s alliance. If the United States were to not abide by 

Article 5 would that help U.S. national security? Any of you can 

answer that. 

Mr. CHOLLET. It would be devastating. 

Mr. LIEU. Would it help Russia? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Absolutely. 

Mr. LIEU. All right. I also want to just quote from the national 

security strategy of the Trump administration. Quote, ‘‘experience 

suggests that the willingness of rivals to abandon or forego aggression depends on their perception of U.S. strength and the vitality 

of our alliances’’, end quote. Another quote, ‘‘we will redouble our 

commitment to establish alliances’’. And then a third quote, ‘‘the 

NATO alliance of free and sovereign States is one of our greater 

advantages over our competitors and the United States remains 

committed to Article 5 of the Washington treaty’’. I hope the President reads his own national security strategy. 

So, Ms. Flournoy, you had mentioned about this 2 percent metric 

and that it might not make a lot of sense, so I agree that clearly 

our NATO allies ought to do more. But one reason the United 

States does more that we have a higher percentage of military 

spending on GDP is because we are a global superpower that responds to threats all over the world, not just Europe and Russia. 

Is that not right? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Right. I do not think the 2-percent is an appropriate standard for the U.S. because we have global responsibilities 

that other European nations do not. 

Mr. LIEU. Right. So, in fact, we have bases in Japan and Korea 

in a way that Belgium does not, right? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Correct. 

Mr. LIEU. Now the metric itself also does not make a lot of sense, 

because for example Germany could say, hey, we are going to in-
51 

crease our defense spending by giving higher pensions to our military officers. That does not somehow help reduce U.S. defense 

costs, correct? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. That is correct. It is also why NATO has said a 

certain portion of the money needs to be spent on actual capability 

development and modernization, not just personnel. 

Mr. LIEU. Thank you. And it seems like there is also, at least the 

way the President talks about it that somehow all these countries 

should be super grateful that the United States has some military 

forces in their countries. I just believe that it is really mutually 

beneficial to both the U.S. and these other countries. 

So, in fact, in one of the NATO countries, Turkey for example, 

it is true, is not it, that we launch airstrikes from Incirlik Air Base 

to go after ISIS targets in Syria? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, that is true. 

Mr. LIEU. And these NATO countries, having our forces there allows us to project force in a way that we otherwise could not; is 

not that right? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. The forward basing is very much in service 

of U.S. interests in addition to benefiting NATO. 

Mr. LIEU. One of my colleagues asked, well, why did not the 

media also sort of talk about this when the Obama Administration 

made similar statements about NATO? Well, let me just suggest 

Presidents Obama and Bush never talked about withdrawing from 

NATO. They did not disparage Article 5 of NATO. They did not 

beat up on our allies the way that Donald J. Trump has. 

I previously served on active duty in the United States military. 

I believe our military is one of the greatest forces in the world. 

However, we are only stronger when we have our allies working 

with us and I think Donald Trump is hurting our national security 

with his sort of bizarre view of NATO. And it also seems to me that 

he does not quite understand how the funding works with NATO, 

because whether or not France decides to increase its military 

spending does not mean that somehow U.S. defense spending 

through appropriations committees makes any difference at all. 

And with that I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mrs. Wagner. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this hearing and thank you to our witnesses for their time. 

As a former United States Ambassador having served in Western 

Europe, I understand just how central the NATO alliance is to 

safeguarding peace and prosperity and security in Europe and 

around the world. 

General Lute, I understand that inadequate and unstandardized 

transportation infrastructure in Europe could make it difficult to 

move troops and equipment across the continent curtailing NATO 

readiness. At the same time, China is seeking to invest billions of 

euros in infrastructure projects in Eastern Europe as part of its 

Belt and Road Initiative that we have all heard about. 

How is NATO incorporating China’s growing infrastructure footprint into its plan to correct the mobility problem, I will say, in 

Eastern Europe? 
52 

Mr. LUTE. So it is responding insufficiently. In my opening comments I made the point that I think NATO needs to pay more attention to these Chinese investments. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. 

Mr. LUTE. Particularly in transportation and communications infrastructure, because with those commercial investments they expect a return in terms of political influence. And at the same time, 

the Chinese investments do not necessarily help the NATO mobility problem because they are not taking place in the areas we need. 

We need investment in transportation infrastructure. So we have 

problems today moving troops from the depth of NATO to the front 

lines. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Correct. 

Mr. LUTE. That is the transportation challenge we need to take 

on. 

Mrs. WAGNER. And what are we doing in this and what is the 

U.S. bringing forward? I will ask Mr. Brzezinski. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I would like to raise one important initiative 

that merits U.S. support and that is the Three Seas Initiative. It 

refers to a Central European initiative to accelerate the development of cross-border infrastructure, the three seas being the Baltic 

Sea, the Adriatic Sea, and the Black Sea. This initiative has received rhetorical support from the administration. It is all about 

roadways. It is all about highways. It is all about railroads, energy 

pipelines, and such. 

And it is interesting to me the point you made about the Chinese. Both the Chinese and the Russians are trying to pull the 

Central Europeans away, in part, through gaining control over infrastructure. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Right. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. The Chinese announced $17 billion commitment 

to the upcoming Helsinki-Tallinn Tunnel. We need to get in that 

game. And we ought to support the Three Seas Initiative because 

it would have direct implications for military mobility because 

these roads and these highways would enable the alliance to move 

more directly to its Eastern frontiers. We ought to think about how 

we can financially incentivize Western capital to invest in the 

Three Seas projects. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I appreciate that and thank you for that testimony and for that input. 

Ms. Flournoy, Russia has increasingly focused on waging hybrid 

rather than conventional warfare to undermine the West without 

incurring decisive countermeasures. We have seen this in Russia’s 

cyber attacks on Estonia and other NATO members and in its creation of frozen conflict zones in Moldova, Ukraine, and Georgia, I 

believe, too. How should Russia’s reliance on hybrid warfare 

change the way we think about collective defense? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think this is—you are right to highlight this because it is one of the areas where NATO is currently weakest and 

needs to get much stronger both member States and as an alliance. 

I think one step in the right direction is some of the cyber infrastructure NATO has put in place with a new Centres of Excellence 

and incident response capability, a smart defense initiative on 

cyber capacity building, and so forth. 
53 

So the alliance is starting to take the kinds of steps we need to 

see, but that more needs to be done and it needs to be done more 

urgently. 

Mrs. WAGNER. And to that point, is our recently enhanced forward-deployed presence in Poland and the Baltics improving 

NATO’s ability to deter hybrid warfare, would you say? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I do think that presence is a very important 

sign of commitment. I think a lot of the capacity building that we 

do with the Baltic States to make them look like indigestible porcupines to the Russian bear, I mean those kinds of—— 

Mrs. WAGNER. Indigestible porcupine. That is exactly the right 

term. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. I think that is very, very important. But I 

would like to see our posture in Europe continue to evolve with 

more emphasis on these infrastructure and transportation issues, 

more pre-positioning of heavy equipment and so forth, to really 

look at what would it take to deter Russia in an actual crisis. 

Mrs. WAGNER. I thank you. I am out of time. I have additional 

questions that I am going to submit for the record. I appreciate the 

chairman, thank you, and all of your testimony. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you, Mrs. Wagner. 

Mr. Levin. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank all the witnesses for coming today and for your testimony. 

I wanted to ask you a question to begin, Ambassador Lute, about 

withdrawal from the INF Treaty. I think President Trump’s withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty represents a huge mistake for both America’s security and for global 

peace. I do not think we should accept or be quiet about Russia 

noncompliance. I think we should redouble our push for full implementation of this and other treaties to keep Russia moving in the 

right direction on arms control. 

This move on the other hand takes us backward. To make matters worse, the official withdrawal date is August 2d and the 

Trump administration still has not laid out a diplomatic plan for 

how the U.S. together with allies will pressure Russia to come back 

into compliance. So my question is whether there is any viable 

path forward either to save the treaty or to better ensure that the 

U.S. and Europe are in lockstep in sustaining arms control with 

Russia. In other words, what is next here? 

Mr. LUTE. Well, Congressman, I think the good news here is that 

the administration deliberately went to the NATO alliance and secured consensus at 29 for condemning the Russian violation, and 

apparently the allies are in support of the administration’s move to 

move away from the treaty. I think that the 6-month period between this announcement and August when we actually withdraw 

should feature every diplomatic opportunity, every diplomatic effort 

to try to cause Russia to come back into compliance so that in fact 

we can preserve the INF Treaty. I say this because the INF Treaty 

itself is a very stabilizing influence in Europe. That is why we have 

an INF Treaty. 

Mr. LEVIN. Right. 

Mr. LUTE. But also because just beyond next August is the renewal of the New START agreement and I am concerned that if we 
54 

take one cornerstone out of the arms control structure that you 

begin to erode trust and confidence in the whole structure. So this 

is not just about INF. I think it could have a carry-on effect—— 

Mr. LEVIN. So how do you prevent an unraveling like that? 

Mr. LUTE. Well, I think, first of all, you preserve, you make every 

effort to preserve the treaty, hold Russia accountable, and then 

make sure you do so in alliance with the other 29 members of 

NATO. I would, frankly, have not left the treaty. I think our position is stronger and continues to focus on Russia, the violator of the 

treaty, if we stayed into the treaty. By the way we have apparently 

no intent to deploy INF-capable systems ourselves, so we left the 

treaty—— 

Mr. LEVIN. Then why walk? It does not make any sense to me. 

Mr. LUTE. That is my position as well. 

Mr. LEVIN. OK, thank you. Let me ask you about another matter. 

In your testimony you say that so-called hybrid tactics like cyber 

attacks, disinformation campaigns, and interference in our democratic process pose the greatest threats to NATO. Would you talk 

a bit more about why you feel that these sorts of threats pose perhaps even more of a danger than a military threat, say? 

Mr. LUTE. Because I think the red lines established for nuclear 

aggression or conventional force aggression are quite clear and 

bright and I think Putin understands that. I think he would prefer 

to play in the cloudy, ambiguous arena of hybrid warfare where he 

complicates attribution of impacts, he uses cyber and these other 

tools. So it is in that part of the deterrence spectrum from nuclear, 

conventional to hybrid, where we need to actually spend the most, 

pay the most attention. 

And candidly, most of the capabilities in the hybrid arena do not 

count today against the 2-percent pledge. So there is a disconnect 

here between what we are requiring allies to do, how much they 

spend, and what they actually spend it on. 

Mr. LEVIN. And I guess the question for today’s hearing particularly is, do you feel like NATO helps our European partners, and 

for that matter us, to combat these kind of threats, you know, 

these hybrid threats? 

Mr. LUTE. So the U.S. has been a leader in highlighting cybersecurity in particular to the NATO alliance, but I think there is much 

more we can do. I mean, and another significant hybrid tactic is 

interference in our electoral processes. And now with our 2016 experience here in the United States we have some experience in 

what it is like to face that kind of interference. 

So there is more we can do in this hybrid arena and that should 

be of real focus for us. That is where we are vulnerable. 

Mr. LEVIN. All right, thank you. My time has expired. I yield 

back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Mast. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. I would take the opportunity 

to answer a question with a question that was asked a moment 

ago, why walk from a treaty, and I think the answer is relatively 

simple to state and not simple in terms of geopolitics. But if you 

have a partner in a treaty that is year after year, decade after decade not being a good partner in that treaty, then that is an answer 
55 

why you walk from that treaty. And I think that is the answer that 

President Trump came to as well. 

Now I want to speak on a different issue. I am certainly willing 

to acknowledge that sometimes caution can be the better part of 

valor. I would say that the work of a statesman and work of policymakers in the U.S., it should not be conducted by those that are 

so cautious that they are viewed as scared. I am very thankful that 

we do not have a President that is so cautious that he is viewed 

as scared. 

And I would say that NATO will better enable itself to address 

today’s challenges if, in fact, it does shake itself to the core. 

Ms. Flournoy, you said that NATO in some of your remarks is 

being shaken to its core. I think NATO is better off being shaken 

to its core for a number of reasons. The Soviet Union no longer exists. Russia is not the Soviet Union. It is still a massive threat, but 

it is not the Soviet Union. China is different today in 2019 than 

it was in 1989 and 1969, and China is not the Soviet Union. 

The attack of today, it is different. It is a cyber attack. It is a 

currency attack. It is financial markets. It is trade. China is not 

acting yet today in the same kind of global military that the Soviet 

Union was. They do certainly act as a global cyber threat. They are 

trading with all. China is trading with all. They are not isolating 

themselves from all in the West. China, you know, they are not yet 

exporting communism. My friend and I, Mr. Yoho, were speaking 

about this yesterday. China is not yet exporting communism, but 

they are certainly spreading their own brand of Chinese socialism 

around the world. 

So I believe that NATO in order to enable itself for the future, 

they should shake themselves down to the core. They need to shake 

off the rust. I think they probably should have done this after Germany was reunited many years ago. They failed to do it at that 

time. They probably should have done it at that time. 

So I want to ask in that line to any of you—and probably certainly to you, sir—how do you suggest that we shake that rust off 

to ensure that NATO has strength through its relevancy to the current threats both beyond conventional military that exists today 

that are different, they are different types of direct attacks, how do 

we shake NATO to its core to recognize that a cyber attack is a 

cyber attack on all and get that kind of recognition so that we go 

out there and attack in the same way that we would expect 

through conventional military forces coming against us? 

And to go beyond that can you give an estimate of costs as we 

constantly speak about the 2-percent, give an estimate of costs that 

are associated with a robust cyber defense as an alliance as well 

as having that ability to have a robust cyber attack ability as a 

NATO alliance. What is the difference in costs that are associated 

either up or down related to that? Sir? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I cannot give you an answer on cyber cost. 

It is just out of my area of expertise. But your point about shaking 

up the alliance, I have a great degree of discomfort with much of 

the President’s rhetoric. It can be divisive in an unhelpful way. It 

can communicate a lack of commitment that is not healthy to the 

alliance and maybe even animate some of the aspirations of the 

likes of Putin. 
56 

But he has brought and with almost like a sledgehammer a longstanding concern that has been bipartisan and has been shared by 

multiple administrations over the lack of, or the inability or lack 

of willingness of our allies to spend the money they need to do in 

order to meet their not just their 2 percent because it is not just 

2 percent, it is their commitment to be ready to live up to the responsibilities they have in execution of Article 5. And when the 

President hits them hard on that it does shake them up. 

I think when you have hearings like this, I think when the alliance has public reports that report on the readiness of allied forces 

that helps shake them up. You know, when I think about the German move to higher levels of defense spending, it is true they are 

not yet committed to 2 percent fully, even though they say they 

have done it through the Wales Summit. 

But they have not put their idea into a plan on how to get there, 

the fact is they are making progress. Part of it is from U.S. direct 

pressure, part of it is from looking East and seeing what is happening, and part of it is because of news reports and parliamentary 

inquiries into the embarrassing state of readiness of the German 

military. When you have exercises being conducted with broomsticks as opposed to rifles and tanks, the German taxpayers do not 

like to see that. They are uncomfortable with it; it is a pride issue. 

So the more the alliance can do, the more you can do to dig into 

and bring out the facts and figures about the readiness of our allies 

and relate that readiness to kind of the contingency plans we are 

planning for will help shake up the alliance in the way you wish. 

Mr. MAST. My time is long expired. Thank you for your comments. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Ms. Spanberger. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 

witnesses today. 

In an article last year, the Atlantic Council highlighted not only 

the defense and security benefits of NATO, but also the economic 

importance of the alliance in securing and protecting European 

economies and incentivizing European acquisition of U.S. military 

equipment and platforms. And in a recent congressional Research 

Service report, they added the point of information that the EU, of 

which 22 member States are also NATO allies, the EU is the 

United States’ largest trading and investment partner and through 

the promotion of security and stability in Europe NATO protects 

the extensive economic partnership that accounts for 46 percent of 

global GDP. 

So my question for you all today is what are the economic impacts of the NATO alliance and are there benefits and, if so, could 

you speak to them to the U.S. economy and our own trade relationships that are tied to the existence and the continued strength of 

NATO? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I will take a quick shot at that. NATO provides 

a transatlantic security architecture that over the last 70 years has 

provided for peace among its members and defended them against 

external aggression. And I would say that is a core criteria for robust and sustained economic growth and that is how NATO contributes to the economic well-being of the transatlantic community. 
57 

Mr. LUTE. I would only add that first I agree with your data. I 

mean 46 percent of the world GDP, if you combine the United 

States and our European allies, is a substantial weight which is 

useful on our side if we are going to compete with China. So I 

think that is obvious. And then very much agree with Ian’s point 

that the security architecture that secures that 50 percent of world 

GDP is NATO. So this is simply a matter of securing our investments. 

Mr. CHOLLET. And just to build on that, when we talk about a 

Europe whole, free, and at peace it is often thought of in a political 

context. But of course one of the great triumphs of the post-cold 

war era has been the economic dynamism and growth of Europe. 

That has helped Europe a lot, which is why all of us have concerns 

about Europe’s lack of spending on defense because Europeans are 

more able to spend on their defense than they were 25 years ago. 

But that is also a huge benefit to the United States. Europe’s 

success also can equal American success. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I would just add, in addition to modernizing and 

adapting NATO for the future, the most important thing we could 

do to shore up the transatlantic community for all the reasons you 

described is to negotiate a free trade agreement with the EU. That 

would give us tremendous leverage vis-a-vis China and tremendous 

additional prosperity for Americans here at home. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much. And to buildupon the 

answers that you just provided and the prior line of questioning 

from my colleague from Florida, we are speaking a lot about moving into the future but he referenced the fall of the Soviet Union. 

He referenced the fall of the Berlin Wall. 

And I am curious if you could comment on what impact you 

think the stabilization and strength that was provided to Europe 

as a whole, to the United States and our relationship with our fellow NATO countries, were in fact how the strength of NATO perhaps played into those changes that we saw shifting with the fall 

of the Berlin Wall and the fall of communism. 

Mr. LUTE. Well, I think the image, the aspiration to join the alliance but also to join the EU was a great motivation for these newly 

freed, former Warsaw Treaty members and also some Soviet republics, the Baltics, for example, so it created for them an incentive to 

move toward. And when the wall came down, the Soviet Union 

broke apart, they voted with their feet. They were now free to 

make a choice and they voted to join NATO and they voted to join 

the EU. 

So it has been a real inspiration and an incentive and I think 

it remains that way today, which is why a number of us have highlighted the importance of sustaining the open-door policy because 

it continues to serve as an incentive for the kind of political, economic, and military reforms that we favor. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you so much for your comments on this 

topic related to economic strength that NATO brings or stabilization that NATO allows for the economic growth for the United 

States and also NATO member countries. I appreciate your time 

today. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Pence. 
58 

Mr. PENCE. Thank you, Chairman Engel, Ranking Member 

McCaul, and the witnesses for being here today. 

I am a strong supporter of NATO and believe our shared security 

interests are and should remain a feature of the transatlantic relationship. I will continue to support the President and his administration in strengthening NATO. 

As you know, since the late 1990’s, the EU has been working 

with limited success to form a unified European defense policy complete with independent EU defense capabilities. These efforts appear to have gained momentum in the past year or two. I want to 

rattle off a series of questions which are really basically the same, 

if you could each answer these. 

What is your assessment of these efforts? Could the development 

of a more robust and independent EU defense capability benefit 

NATO and the United States? And is there a risk that EU efforts 

could undermine NATO’s effectiveness and diminish its capabilities? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Congressman, I think that the intensification of 

this discussion within the EU on an independent defense capability 

is, in part, a result of the greater uncertainty they feel about the 

U.S. commitment to NATO. That said, I think if EU defense efforts 

spurs additional European defense spending, we should count that 

as a plus. What worries me is if the EU were to develop a sort of 

view of strategic autonomy that would sort of have Europe go its 

own way without really coordinating with, working closely with the 

United States in addressing shared challenges, I think that would 

be a loss for us and for our security. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, I concur with that. I think on the 

one hand discussions within Europe which are only increasing 

about developing some sort of independent capability is a reflection 

of uncertainty about the U.S. and hedging about U.S. behavior, but 

it is also a response to an increase by all of us to urge them to 

spend more on their defense. 

And it is also a recognition that—and I think this part is positive—that there are going to be things they do in the world where 

the U.S. is not going to do that, for example, in West Africa where 

the U.S. may not be as engaged as France and other EU partners. 

I think it is important though as they embark on this—this is not 

a new story. Twenty years ago we were also dealing with Europeans talking about developing a more independent defense capability. 

Three rules to keep in mind or three principles, the three Ds: the 

Secretary of State, then Secretary of State Albright enunciated no 

duplication between what the EU is going to do and what NATO 

is going to do, to make sure this is complementary; no discrimination, so making sure that as Europe develops this capability they 

are not discriminating against those few countries that are members of the EU, but not of NATO or vice versa; and no duplication, 

so—sorry, no decoupling, meaning that this is not about Europe 

separating itself from the United States fully so it can go on its 

own. 

I think as long as we keep in mind those core principles we 

should be supportive of Europe trying to make itself stronger on 

defense. 
59 

Mr. LUTE. Congressman, I think we can have it both ways. We 

can on the one hand say you must do more, and then when the EU 

comes up with incentive programs or ways to create efficiencies 

among EU members then we critique those as well. So I would err 

on the side of applauding the EU initiatives to try to generate capabilities. 

I very much agree with no duplication and so forth. But quite 

candidly, in my view we are decades away from being in a position 

where we have to actually compare EU capabilities to NATO capabilities and worry about duplication. They have a long way to go. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Sir, I would just add on the duplication point, 

my concern is that there is a drive to create an independent command structure that would be duplicative of NATO. That is what 

the French are driving. That would be unhelpful. And when we 

look back at the history of EU defense initiatives it has not been 

that impressive. They have created battle groups that have never 

been used. They have talked about being a driver of increased defense spending. I have not really seen any evidence that the EU 

has been an effective driver of defense spending. 

But if they are willing to talk about leveraging the EU and its 

economic capacities to increase the capacity to invest and the development of technologies and capabilities and capacities for defense 

operations, then I am kind of interested and I would make these 

recommendations to the EU. One, I would focus less on autonomy 

and more on the European pillar, because when we talk about the 

European pillar we are talking about European capability within 

the transatlantic framework. 

I would urge them through projects like the European Defence Fund that they are standing up, a $13 billion fund and the PESCO 

initiative, to focus on things that are substantive, that are real 

NATO shortfalls. It would be far more useful if we could see the 

EU be a driver of increased air and missile defense capabilities 

within our European armed forces, more airlift, more air refueling 

capability, more in air and missile defense. If these EU initiatives 

were used to drive forward those capabilities I would be highly, 

highly supportive. 

Then I would note that there is one area where they are actually, 

potentially, on the cusp of doing something useful. The EU will be 

directing in its next big 7-year budget 6.5 billion euros to help improve military mobility. That is, investing the infrastructure, the 

roadways and the highways and the airports and the ports that 

will help facilitate the more ready movement of heavy equipment 

for military operations. That kind of infrastructure investment is 

something that the EU is perfectly positioned to do and I encourage 

you to encourage them to move, you know, with dispatch on that. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Malinowski. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Let me start with you, Ms. Flournoy, back to the 2-percent of 

GDP target. That is, the whole point of that target is to get our 

allies to invest more in their actual military capabilities so that 

they can partner with us. If they spent that money on uniforms or 

increased salaries for their troops it would defeat the whole purpose of the 2-percent. Is that a fair assessment? 
60 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. If we were to demand that NATO allies pay us 

billions of dollars for the so-called privilege of being allowed to base 

our forces overseas that presumably could count against their 2 

percent but it would not be investing money in their own defense 

capabilities. Is that a fair statement? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. That is correct. And, you know, I think the truth 

is our allies already do defray much of, you know, a substantial 

portion of the costs of our basing overseas. It varies from country 

to country, but those are negotiated agreements. But we are there 

for our own interests. Our real interest on the 2-percent is to ensure that money is going into the capabilities we will need for the 

future, be it high-end military readiness capabilities or capabilities 

for the gray zone that Ambassador Lute talked about. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Exactly. And they would have less money to invest in those capabilities if we were somehow to force them—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Yes. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI [continuing]. To spend billions for hosting—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. And I also do not think they would accept that 

deal. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Indeed. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think we would be invited to bring all of our 

forces home, which would be both detrimental to our security and 

very, very costly to the American taxpayer. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Exactly. So would we save any money if we 

brought our forces home where we pay—— 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, it is generally in most cases it will be far 

more expensive to bring those forces home and rebase them in the 

United States. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. Lute, I wanted to ask you a couple of questions about Afghanistan. A number of us, and you have heard this I am sure 

from our colleagues, were in Munich. We had an opportunity to engage with our allies on these decisions potentially to withdraw from 

Syria and from Afghanistan. We are all very keenly aware of the 

anxiety that this has caused our allies who have been with us all 

the way in these deployments. They have no idea what we plan to 

do. 

Let me ask you about one particular angle related to Afghanistan. If we were to follow through on the publicly stated plan to 

withdraw our regular forces from Afghanistan, assuming that there 

are still terrorists in Afghanistan’s future, al-Qaida or ISIS, is it 

fair to assume that we would still have special forces, units operating in Afghanistan? 

Mr. LUTE. I am sorry. That is the topic of the ongoing negotiations led by Ambassador Khalilzad. So how is it that we could by 

way of this negotiation with the Taliban and eventually the 

Taliban with the Afghan Government buy some insurances that the 

Taliban pledge that they will not allow ISIS or al-Qaida is actually 

enforced, so the nature of this enforcement mechanism is exactly 

what Ambassador Khalilzad is working on. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Yes, I am just trying to bear down on what realistically will happen because the American people are being told 

we are leaving and my expectation is we will still have special 
61 

forces operating in Afghanistan. We may not talk about it so much. 

We will still have CIA bases as we currently do in Afghanistan in 

the hinterlands. We may not talk about it as much. 

And if I am right about that then the result of the withdrawal 

will be that we will still be in Afghanistan, but instead of 

partnering with our allies, instead of partnering with an elected Afghan Government that has some legitimacy, we will be partnering 

with warlords who are raping little boys and girls and doing things 

that actually will make the long-term mission harder to achieve. 

Bottom line, we will still be in Afghanistan. So is this really an 

honest conversation that we are having? 

Mr. LUTE. So it is very hard for me to comment on negotiations 

that I am not participating in, but I know for sure that this question of how you sustain a Taliban pledge and how you enforce it 

if we were to withdraw, how it is actually done in practice. And so, 

you know, we are talking about conjecture—— 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. But in a future in which there is still al-Qaida 

and ISIS there, pledge or no pledge, we would not ignore that. 

Mr. LUTE. I think we have to assume that al-Qaida and the Islamic State in that region would have some residual presence and 

we need to buy some insurance against that. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. OK, anybody else, thoughts on that? 

Mr. CHOLLET. I would just say although I am not privy to the 

negotiations either, your assumptions are reasonable about what 

sort of presence we would seek to keep in Afghanistan given the 

threats that I think we all agree will remain there. 

Mr. MALINOWSKI. Thank you. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Yoho. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, panelists. I appreciate you being here and going through this long hearing. 

We are at 70 years of NATO and it has been good. You know, 

there has not been another world war since NATO. Here we are 

70 years later, yet the world is going through a challenge in world 

powers we have not seen since World War II, and a big part of that 

reason we have not is again because of NATO. It has been effective 

in that. 

But things are changing. And if you look back—I am 64 and I 

have changed a lot in the last 64 years. And so things get stale 

after a while and they have to be updated. And, you know, I think, 

you know, the testimoneys we have heard today, the comments, 

you know, whether NATO is paying their fair share or not, I mean 

it has been hashed over and over again. President Obama said 

that. President Bush said that the people are taking advantage of 

us or free-riding. 

At what point—and Ms. Flournoy you said that this is not the 

time to nickel-and-dime NATO. When would be the time? You 

know, do we wait another three to 5 years? Keep in mind we are 

at $22 trillion in debt, 5 years we are going to be about $30 trillion 

in debt. Our interest that we owe at that time will be equal what 

we are spending on our military. So when do we get other people 

to pay and, you know, pony up? 
62 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think we should continue to press for our 

NATO allies to pay their fair share, but my focus would be on what 

else are they doing to shore up deterrence against Russia. 

Mr. YOHO. Sure. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. What else are they doing to contribute to 

counterterrorism globally? What else are they doing to help us 

build gray zone? 

Mr. YOHO. All right. But can we wait another 5 years before people do that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. No, and we are not and we should not. 

Mr. YOHO. OK. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. And no administration in recent memory has 

waited. They all pressed. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. And as we look at the results, it was interesting. I went to the Cleveland Convention when it was Candidate 

Trump going into the Convention, and I spoke to a group of Ambassadors from around the world on energy. And it was interesting because there was a reception after that. They came up to me—I had 

my wife with me and our deputy chief of staff—and they says, we 

want to introduce ourselves, we are members of NATO but we have 

not been good members. 

And this was when President Trump, Candidate Trump was 

talking about NATO is not paying their fair share. This is what 

happened. They told me they had been bad members but they were 

looking to increase their payment to 2 percent as was the pledge, 

in addition to pull up the arrears that they owed. So the rhetoric 

that he spoke, whether you liked his tactic or not, the results I 

think we are all in agreement was pretty effective. And, you know, 

people are not used to that kind of rhetoric, you know, we could 

say things better maybe. 

But I would rather look at the results and get the positive results 

because it does get people to pay attention and kind of reorganize 

what NATO—and I think what my colleague, Mr. Mast, brought 

up, you know, we need to update this into the 21st century for the 

cyber attacks. I mean I just read today that China is hacking into 

our naval intelligence and our construction and all the new weapons that we are creating. Is that an attack on us? And when do 

we all come together collectively to do that? 

And, Mr. Brzezinski, you were talking about Putin thrives on 

weakness indecisiveness—hence, Georgia; hence, Crimea. They 

walk into and they take over. We see that the freedom of navigations are not happening in the Azov Sea or the Baltic Seas and so 

Putin, as Xi Jinping, sees weakness so they aggress, Xi Jinping in 

the South China Sea. Putin is going to aggress unless we stand up 

definitely as a bloc. 

And if they know we have been ineffective that members are 

kind of stale, yes, we are in this NATO thing but we do not really 

have to pay, it just shows weakness. And I think that is one of the 

reasons Putin did what he did. Am I wrong in that? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Yes, sir—no, sir, you are not wrong in that. 

Mr. YOHO. I was hoping you would say no. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Just a quote on burden sharing in talking about 

decades, my favorite quote goes back to 1953 when Secretary of 

State John Foster Dulles threatened, quote unquote, an agonizing 
63 

reappraisal of the U.S. commitment to European security if its allies do not step up. I think it is interesting. It shows how long a 

debate we have had on this, but at least we are making progress. 

Mr. YOHO. You know and that is a great point because that has 

come up over and over, and through my notes I read it has come 

up over and over again. I mean some of this goes back, it says, two 

decades ago they were talking about this. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. It is time for a—— 

Mr. YOHO. I was going to say, well, damn it, when do you stand 

up and do it? But I should not say that. So dang it, when do you 

stand up and do something? 

And I am thankful this President had the backbone. You know 

and he will admit, I am not your typical politician, but he is looking for the results and I think we should applaud the results that 

he is getting to get people to come forward because it makes us all 

collectively stronger. I mean would you agree in that? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I think that we should applaud the burden sharing results, but the other result has been this sort of existential 

doubt that has been created on the part in the minds of our allies 

about whether they can count on the U.S. That is also a result of 

the same rhetoric. So there has been positive, but there has also 

been a negative and we need to take account of that as well. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. Well, you go back to the criticism of NATO 

burden sharing have been articulated by both Republican and 

Democratic Presidents, and you go on and it says—I think you 

wrote this. It was Secretary Gates’. 

It said President Obama called a number of American allies freeriders toward the end of the administration and also Secretary 

Robert Gates did a hard line against NATO’s inability to share 

more of the burden during the farewell speech. The blunt reality 

is there has been a dwindling appetite patience, and it goes on. 

And the end result is the General now, Stoltenberg, also said 

that President Trump is helping us adapt the alliance and has 

made these people pay up. So I think the results are good. Let’s 

look forward and what we are going to do on the cybersecurity. 

And I am way over. Sorry, Mr. Chairman and members. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you. 

Mr. Trone. 

Mr. TRONE. Thank you all for coming here today. 

My first question, let’s go back to Turkey again. The case right 

now, they are working to look at buy the Russian defense, the S– 

400. They have already ordered, we have not delivered yet, the F– 

35. It is unacceptable that they buy this system and have the F– 

35. What is the response that Congress should have? What can we 

do here to make that crystal clear that we cannot go down this 

road? 

Ms. Flournoy? 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Well, I think as you review foreign military sales, 

I think you will have your opportunity to send signals to Turkey. 

But I would encourage delegations to go visit and to talk to, you 

know, Turkish, the Turkish President, his administration, other 

members of Parliament there, to let them know that this will really 

complicate our ability to provide the kind of U.S. defense capabilities that they like to have as part of the alliance. 
64 

And I think the backsliding on democracy needs to be part of the 

conversation. We have not been raising that issue enough with our 

Turkish counterparts. We need to press them on this issue. We 

need to connect what goes on in that sphere with what we can, you 

know, the degree to which we can cooperate in the security sphere. 

Mr. TRONE. There is no question I think we need to connect that 

plus the democracy and the Kurds and the treatment we have had 

there and the potential for more atrocities in the Kurds as we pull 

out Syria. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. Absolutely. 

Mr. TRONE. Is there any point at all that you have to reconsider 

this, them being part of NATO? Are we going to reach that point 

at some point? 

Mr. LUTE. So if I may, so unlike the EU treaty, which has provisions for sanctioning member states who drift from core values, the 

NATO treaty has no similar provision. In fact, the only thing that 

the Washington Treaty says is that if you wish to leave NATO you 

have got to give 1 years’ notice. 

So I think there are ways that we could pressure Mr. Erdogan 

and his political elite to come back into line, closer into line with 

U.S. interests, for example, the S–400 and F–35 debate. But also 

to underline Michele Flournoy’s point about values, they need to 

understand that there is no NATO ally today which has slipped 

further from the founding values of the alliance than Mr. Erdogan’s 

Turkey. And that is simply unacceptable. 

Mr. TRONE. Agreed. The Baltics, lots of hybrid warfare there, 

cyber capabilities happening through the small Baltic States. Is 

this an area where these small NATO partners are innovating in 

any way that we could learn and that would be an advantage to 

us as we look to more problems with cyber and hybrid warfare 

from Russia down the road? 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. Absolutely. I mean if you look at the Baltics 

they are on the cutting edge when it comes down to combating hybrid warfare. There is a reason why NATO has a Cyber Centre of 

Excellence in Estonia, because they have been most forward-leaning. They are the ones who experienced the first kind of nationwide 

cyber attack in 2007, so they are thinking in very innovative ways 

how to deal with cyber attacks. 

You go to Lithuania, they have one of the more sophisticated 

public response teams that deal with social media attacks. For example, when a NATO unit was deployed over there, there was false 

accusations made of a rape conducted by NATO soldiers. They, in 

real time, responded to dissipate the impact of that story. So there 

are many lessons we can learn from our Baltic allies. 

Mr. CHOLLET. And if I can just add, what NATO is doing in the 

Baltics today is a great example of the distributed responsibility 

that the alliance can bring. This is not a U.S.-only effort in the Baltics to try to defend the Baltics and bolster them. This is something 

where there are four battalion-sized battle groups there: one led by 

the U.S., one led by the Brits, one led by the Canadians, and one 

led by the Germans. 

So this is an example of how a strong alliance of capable allies 

willing to step up and lead can share the responsibility for the common good. 
65 

Mr. LUTE. I would just cite another dimension of this, and this 

is an effort to break the energy dependence that the Baltic States 

have on Russia. So, most important, there is an example of a recently opened LNG terminal in Lithuania which now opens them 

up to the potential of importing LNG energy gas from the world 

marketplace and not be wholly reliant on their ties to Russia. 

Mr. CONNOLLY [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has 

expired. The gentleman from Kansas, Mr. Watkins, is now recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. WATKINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to 

the panel for being here. 

I would like to talk about the Arctic, questions are open to anybody. Obviously the Arctic has geopolitical ramifications. What is 

the NATO’s strategy with regard to the Arctic? 

Mr. LUTE. It is very light on strategy, Congressman. I would say 

that there has been especially with regard to the climate, impacts 

in the Arctic and the potential that a sort of a northern tier transit 

route from China into the Atlantic becomes more and more a possibility over the coming years that NATO is paying more attention 

here. I would also highlight the Arctic though as an example of engaging with Russia. 

Even though we have, the hearing has suggested many ways in 

which we compete with Russia, right, one effective way to engage 

with Russia is exemplified by the Arctic Council—I think that is 

the correct name—which brings together the seven Arctic nations 

to include other NATO allies, with Russia, to discuss about the climate but also security implications in the Far North. So this is becoming more important in climate here intersects NATO strategy. 

Mr. WATKINS. Thank you. And I know we talked a lot about 

China today, but would NATO describe China as a threat to transatlantic security? 

Mr. LUTE. Not today and not, I think, in the foreseeable future. 

But NATO needs to wake up to China as a competitor and in particular in the commercial investment space, transportation and information systems, and increasingly in the political space. They 

tend to buy their way into influence on the commercial side and 

then expect political payoff. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. If I could add on that, I mean NATO does have 

a foundation to work with when it comes down to dealing with 

China. Over the last decades it has developed partnerships with 

countries like Japan, Korea, Australia, and New Zealand. This provides a foundation upon which it kind of deep and a more elaborate, a more substantive set of engagements in the region. 

It is something the United States should be encouraging NATO 

to do as we try to develop a more comprehensive strategy to dealing with an increasingly assertive China. And I think if we make 

the case to our Europeans we will find them somewhat more receptive than before because they are beginning to feel the pressure 

from China themselves in the economic and the cyber domains. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. The other thing I would just add, sir, is that I 

think China watches U.S. behavior very carefully, globally, and 

that includes how we interact with our allies. So if there are troubles or tensions with our NATO allies, they—it often makes our 
66 

Asian allies very nervous as well and China looks for ways to divide and exploit that. 

Mr. WATKINS. Well, let me ask about then what strategy, and if 

not strategy, roles, responsibilities, do NATO have with regards to 

North Korea? 

Mr. CHOLLET. Other than these partnerships that Mr. Brzezinski 

mentioned, none. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. But I think as politically, you know, the NATO 

allies become very, very important allies to stand with us politically to press for the objective of denuclearization and to make sure 

that North Korea and provocative behavior is deterred if not answered. So I agree there is no military role, but politically they can 

be very important. 

Mr. WATKINS. Sure. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Allred, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

distinguished panel for being here today. 

I am of the opinion that NATO is the most successful human alliance in history and that with this being the 70th anniversary of 

this historic alliance I want to make sure that we are doing everything we can in Congress to be a counterweight to some of what 

we have seen from obviously our President. 

And I just want to talk to you a little bit about I try to drill 

things down for folks in my district, folks in Texas, I represent 

parts of Dallas, of what the impact of our foreign affairs and our 

foreign policy has on us at home and, you know, obviously NATO’s 

ability for us to maintain kind of this era of post-World War II 

peace has been critical in that. 

But, Ms. Flournoy, if you could just talk a little bit about our 

trade with that NATO empowers and enables, how that interaction 

with our allies is good for our economy and how this is really a critical relationship for us across more than just some of the things 

that might be people need to be more aware of. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. So NATO has provided the foundation of stability 

on which the transatlantic economic relationships have been built, 

more than a trillion dollars of trade and goods and services between the U.S. and Europe every year. That accounts for, you 

know, a significant percentage of our GDP. It also accounts for a 

number of export-related jobs in the United States. I do not have 

the figures for your district in Texas, but I guarantee you there are 

some jobs in your district that are dependent on our trade with the 

Europeans. 

So it is really, that trade relationship is an engine for the economies on both sides of the Atlantic. And as we all have said before, 

as a matter of strategy it would be very beneficial for the United 

States to leverage that in pushing back on China when we talk 

about its unfair trade practices or its theft of IP or its denial of our 

market access. We are much stronger when we push back together 

with our European-Asian allies than when we do it by ourselves. 

Mr. ALLRED. Absolutely. I agree with you. The rules-based order 

that NATO and our transatlantic alliances have allowed to enforce, 

I think we underestimate its importance for our economy. 
67 

We had Secretary Albright in here recently, and in addition to 

being just an incredible person she said that this was Article 1 

time and that it was time for the Congress to reassert itself in our 

foreign policy. 

And I would just ask each of you, if you could, to touch a little 

bit—I am sure you have been asked this previously here in the 

hearing—about what you think Congress can do, what we can do 

and what I can do individually as a member and what we can do 

as a body to make sure that our allies understand our commitment. 

We obviously had a vote a couple weeks ago that was overwhelmingly bipartisan showing our support for NATO, but what we can 

do to make sure that the rest of the world understands that we are 

committed to this alliance and that we are not going to let us backtrack? 

Mr. LUTE. So three quick things, Congressman. First of all, the 

NATO Support Act is a big step in the right direction. And, you 

know, it may seem like something that does not sort of have an impact outside of Capitol Hill; our NATO allies read that and appreciate it. So that is step No. 1. Step No. 2 is fully fund the European 

defense initiative which promotes the kind of work that we have 

talked about here this morning. 

Step No. 3, I think Congress needs to go one step further and 

that is to pursue bipartisan legislation that prohibits the President 

from unilaterally withdrawing from our most important alliance. 

And as I said in my opening statement, it took two-thirds of the 

Senate under advise and consent, a constitutional requirement, to 

approve the NATO treaty; should not simply be an executive move 

to depart. 

Mr. CHOLLET. Congressman, if I could just add, I concur with 

those three points and the fourth, which has come up several times 

so far this morning, which is having you all engage directly. The 

incredible show of support by the size of the delegation in Munich 

was widely noticed throughout Europe. 

There is going to be another opportunity obviously in less than 

a month when the Secretary General of NATO comes to speak before a joint session of Congress. And also many NATO ministers 

will be here in Washington and I know will be anxious to interact 

and hear from all of you about your views not just on the U.S. role 

in the alliance and the importance of U.S. leadership, but also 

ways the alliance needs to get sharper and needs to reform. And 

I think that is an important message that comes from Congress as 

well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

And before I call on Mr. Zeldin, I just, Mr. Chollet, to your point 

we had the largest delegation in living memory both at the Munich 

Security Conference—I think there were 55 of us there—and at the 

first, the opening session of the Parliamentary Assembly and the 

North Atlantic Assembly meetings in Brussels. It was also the first 

time ever a speaker of the House attended both meetings and 

which having the third ranking member of the U.S. Government 

there to reinforce. And then as you know, subsequently we have invited Secretary General Stoltenberg who I believe may be the first 

Secretary General of NATO ever to be invited to address a joint 

session of the Congress. 
68 

So I think we are making statements and we certainly, I think 

we will followup legislatively, Mr. Lute, on what you cited as well. 

But I think on a bipartisan basis, Senate and House, statements 

could not be clearer in terms of where we are in our support for 

this alliance. 

And with that I call on the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Zeldin. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Well, thank you. And as someone who was also at 

the Munich Security Conference I would echo Mr. Connolly’s point. 

I believe that it was important to have such an important bipartisan showing there. And the support for this alliance should not 

just remain strong, but as Mr. Chollet just pointed out we need to 

find ways to make it even stronger. 

I wanted to talk briefly about Turkey and Syria, but as two different topics. And like can we go into a little bit more into detail, 

I believe, Mr. Lute, you started to get into it as you were discussing 

with Mr. Trone the dynamics of Turkey purchasing an S–400 surface-to-air missile from Russia, purchasing F–35s from the United 

States, I believe the S–400 acquisition would be made by Turkey 

before the F–35s are scheduled to be delivered. 

If you could just—and I would hate to see that S–400 operating 

in that particular airspace whether it is our F–35s or anything else 

as far as the United States military and our allies go. So you can 

just get—and the question is open to all four of you. If you could 

talk a little bit more about what this means and why this is problematic. 

Mr. LUTE. So the original challenge here is the Turkish decision 

to buy the S–400. That is important because that Russian-based 

system will never be integrated into the overall air and missile defense system in NATO. And we will simply block that integration 

because integrating the Russian system would open vulnerabilities 

to the whole NATO integrated system. So Turkey is essentially 

spending money to buy a national-only system which from the outset they have been told will never be integrated. 

So it is a very sort of selfish nationalist sort of decision which 

is shortsighted and will never be used. It will never contribute to 

NATO. It is further complicated if we were to proceed with an F– 

35 purchase, because now you would have under one national command structure the premier Russian-built air defense system 

against our premier aircraft. And you can imagine that we would 

never be certain enough to ensure that these did not game one 

against the other and open up vulnerabilities for the rest of the F– 

35 fleet. So this is a two-part story and they are both bad news. 

Mr. ZELDIN. Anybody like to add anything? 

Mr. CHOLLET. If I could just add, just to complicating this further 

on the F–35 side, my understanding is that part of the Turkish 

purchase of F–35 involves some co-production, so which means part 

of the plane would actually be built in Turkey. And so I know that 

our EUCOM commanders are talking through with the Turks 

about how that in itself would be extremely problematic. Let alone 

them acquiring but then producing the F–35 at the same time they 

also are trying to stand up a Russian system on their own territory 

will, I think, make it even harder to see how that would go forward. 
69 

What I can say is my sense is this administration, really actually 

going back two administrations now as this has been on the table, 

it has been very consistent and very clear with the Turkish Government about the mistake we believe this would be and the fact 

that it will jeopardize other elements of our military partnership 

with them. 

Mr. ZELDIN. It seems like there is some kind of a game of chicken 

going on here between Turkey and the United States to see who 

blinks first. And I think the United States needs to remain resolute 

in insisting that if Turkey wants to acquire F–35s that they are not 

going to be able to proceed with their S–400’s. Either of the other 

two witnesses want to add anything else on this topic? 

Shifting gears to Syria, at the Munich Security Conference there 

was a discussion of what our European partners thought about taking on a bigger role in Syria. I would like you, if any of you could 

comment on what that would look like from a NATO standpoint, 

please. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I do not foresee NATO taking on a much larger 

role because I do not think there is consensus across the alliance 

for that. But I, you know, we have had key allies individually step 

up sort of relying on the backbone of U.S. Special Operations 

Forces and our enablers and our Command and Control to contribute as whether it is as trainers or in reconstruction or in ISR 

overhead combat air missions. 

I think if the U.S. were to withdraw or sharply reduce our presence, the backbone that they rely on would—those capabilities 

would not be there and you would see a commensurate reduction 

if not complete withdrawal of our European allies. So I do think 

the U.S. posture is critical as kind of the linchpin to the coalition 

posture against ISIL. 

Mr. ZELDIN. And then real briefly—— 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I could add to that. I agree with what Michele 

has said. It is also a little bit of issue in getting the cart before the 

horse. You are not going to get NATO involved——in Syria until 

there is a real clear path toward peace and stability and reconciliation in that war-torn country. So when thinking about NATO and 

Syria I would look at the example set by NATO and Afghanistan, 

where an ally went in with some other allies and took control of 

the country, and when things reach a certain point with a certain 

degree of confidence that an alliance contribution would be part of 

a coherent strategy toward peace and reconciliation in the country, 

then the alliance would be more prepared. And actually I would 

say those are the circumstances under which we would want the 

alliance to get engaged. 

Mr. ZELDIN. My time has expired. I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Connolly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

And just another footnote, Mr. Lute, the resolution denying the 

President unilateral authority to pull out of the agreement is actually H.J. Res. 41 here in the House and that was introduced by Mr. 

Gallego and myself. And we have a companion bill in the Senate 

introduced by Senator Tim Kaine of Virginia, so we will work on 
70 

that and with the help of the chairman we will get it before our 

committee. 

I want to followup a little bit on Turkey too. Mr. Lute, you kind 

of, I think you said something that I would call provocative. Not 

necessarily bad, but here is a NATO ally, one of the staunchest historically and yet they seem to be testing almost everything. They 

seem to be testing the common values that presumably unite 

NATO members, not just what we are against but what we are for, 

what we stand for. 

They are challenging us with respect to the Kurds who are the 

only group that consistently, successfully, fought by our side and 

won territory from the ISIS. And yet, the Turks would have you 

believe that all of those Kurdish fighters in Syria are, in fact, terrorists or affiliated with terrorists and we need to force them to 

give up territory they won with their own blood and our support 

and create some kind of cordon sanitaire, I guess, between Syria 

and Turkish border that presumably would be patrolled by the 

Turks. One does not know what the fate of the Kurds would be in 

that set of circumstances. 

Purchasing Russian equipment almost in defiance, maybe not almost, maybe in defiance of any kind of norm in terms of standardsetting by NATO, a crackdown on freedom of press, crackdown on 

opposition, on and on, using the coup maybe as a pretext to do all 

of that, what is one to conclude and what do you think ought to 

happen? Because there are other NATO members that are sliding 

too, Hungary and Poland come to mind, and it seems to me we 

have to have a current message or we become this disparate groups 

of 28 or 29 members that the only thing we have in common is, 

I guess, resisting Russian aggression in Central Europe. 

Mr. LUTE. Congressman, I could not agree more. I think the values that are in the second sentence of the Washington Treaty, well 

before you get to Article 5 you have passed through the values, 

right, and that was agreed by all 29. So I think it is right for us 

both within the alliance, largely led by the Secretary General, to 

have quiet, diplomatic engagement with Turkish leaders about 

what they are placing at risk with their behavior. 

I also think though there is some introspection here for us. I 

mean we have no U.S. Ambassador in Turkey. We have a vacancy 

in the European bureau of the State Department. Who will do this 

engagement with Turkey if we have only people in acting positions? 

So we have to sort of vote with our own time and space and get 

senior level diplomats in place and then engage relentlessly with 

the Erdogan regime. But they are heading in the wrong direction. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Chollet, you are shaking your head yes. 

Mr. CHOLLET. I could not agree more. I mean Turkey is, as Ambassador Lute said, the one member of NATO that has gone the 

furthest, the fastest in terms of its democratic backslide and that 

is only going to be a continuing irritant in the alliance. And, in 

fact, as you suggested, Congressman, could, you know, undermine 

the second sentence of the preamble of the Washington Treaty 

which is all about democratic values. And we are not, frankly, in 

a good position right now to address this issue and deal with the 

Turkish Government on this issue. 
71 

So beyond the military challenges we have which are significant 

with them with the acquisition of the Russian system, these political challenges of which NATO has an important role to play are 

going to be paramount. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I want to give Ms. Flournoy and Mr. Brzezinski 

an opportunity also to comment and it is primarily about Turkey, 

but it also, feel free to include our concerns about Hungary and Poland, and then I would yield back with the indulgence of the chair. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I agree with what my colleagues have said. I just 

think that one of the things that has gone missing in our diplomacy 

is an emphasis on democracy and human rights and the protection 

of minority rights. It is so much about who we are as a Nation, it 

is so much about who we are as an alliance that that has to be part 

of the hard conversation we have with allies who demonstrate some 

degree of backsliding. 

You cannot have it both ways. You cannot be, you know, a member in good standing in an alliance that was formed to protect democracy and be in the process of obliterating democracy in your 

own country. 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. I concur with my colleagues. I would just add 

it is interesting to me the forward edge of the Russian sword is social media and hybrid attacks designed to undercut the commonality of values we have in the alliance that is binding it. By 

attacking those values and by attacking the unity around those 

values, our adversaries are actually trying to weaken one of our 

strongest assets which is the NATO alliance. 

Mr. ENGEL. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Titus. 

Ms. TITUS. Well, thank you. 

Just to followup, when you talk about Turkey, nobody has mentioned the relationship with Greece and what is happening in Cyprus. Those are kind of sidelines to the main event, I guess. Also, 

I would say it is very difficult for us to take some of the members 

to task when we set such a bad example ourselves and I go back 

to the comment you made. 

You know, we heard a lot of praise for the President and getting 

the NATO countries to pay more of their share, but Ambassador 

Lute, you said that our single greatest challenge is the lack of real 

leadership now. I just want to put on the record the tweets, and 

I will use their word, the President’s words, not just my paraphrasing of them. 

In July 2018 he said, ‘‘While I had a great meeting with NATO 

raising vast amounts of money, I had an even better meeting with 

Vladimir Putin of Russia. Sadly, it is not being reported that way. 

The fake news is going crazy.’’ Then he followed up and said, 

‘‘While the NATO meeting in Brussels was an acknowledged triumph with billions of dollars more put up by member countries, 

the meeting with Russia may prove to be in the long run an even 

greater success. Many positive things will come out of that meeting.’’ 

So what are our fellow members of the alliance supposed to 

think, do as I say or do as I do, or you do something different from 

the message that we are putting out? I can understand your frustration and I share it. 
72 

I would like to talk about the contribution they make besides 

arms and besides dollars when you look at the countries of NATO. 

I serve on the House Democracy Partnership and we meet with a 

lot of new democracies trying to have exchanges between legislatures to buildup democratic institutions, whether it is parties, 

whether it is the media, whether it is the courts and the rule of 

law. You mentioned Ukraine and Georgia. Those are two partners. 

Would you just talk about how being part of NATO helps to either create, buildup, or strengthen democratic institutions, because 

I think that is one of our greatest successes, potentially. 

Ms. FLOURNOY. I will say just a few words and then hand it off. 

When we went through the first round of NATO expansion we had 

the Perry principles from Secretary Perry and there were certain 

criteria that we laid out for new, for NATO aspirants. One of them 

was you have to be a functioning democracy that protects minority 

rights. You had to be a free market economy. You had to make certain, meet certain milestones in terms of interoperability in your 

military capabilities and so forth. 

But democracy and has always been, whether it is at the founding of the alliance or the expansion of the alliance, it has always 

been a key criteria. And I will defer to others to add. 

Mr. CHOLLET. I agree with that. And I think that is a further 

reason for why enlargement in the open-door policy of enlargement 

has been so important and I think remains so important, because 

NATO serves as a kind of a magnet, an incentive system for countries to make those transition in countries in the post-Soviet space, 

the post-communist countries to make the kinds of decisions in 

terms of their political system, and also the way the role their militaries play within their governments because many of these countries coming out of the Soviet system, the military and the security 

service has played an outsized role in the governance of those countries. 

And so ensuring that their ministries of defense reform and that 

they are budgeted in a way with transparency is also critical to 

democratic health. So I think NATO, the values at NATO’s core we 

need to keep them there, and NATO operationally by serving as a 

magnet and incentivizing countries to maintain their democratic 

core values will remain indispensable. 

Mr. LUTE. So I applaud focus on this. You know, yesterday was 

the 20th anniversary of the welcoming of the first three post-cold 

war allies to the alliance, so Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Today, 20 years later, they are allies, right, and Poland and 

Hungary are among the worst in terms of slippage or backsliding 

on democratic values, which they signed up to when they joined the 

alliance. 

So going back to basics here and remembering what it takes to 

become a member of the alliance and then quietly, diplomatically, 

with discretion holding allies accountable is really a very important 

initiative both for the Secretary General, but ideally from the 

United States because we would be doing so from a position of example, of good example. And I am actually as an American citizen 

concerned today that we are not maybe as strong an example on 

these core principles as we have been in the past. 
73 

Mr. BRZEZINSKI. The alliance has been extremely effective in 

helping particularly transitioning countries to understand the 

value and importance of civilian control over the military and that 

has been its most direct contribution to democratic principles. As 

an alliance, as members, we contribute to democratic principles 

that Doug and others have talked about, not necessarily through 

NATO but more bilaterally. 

So when I think of NATO, I think of a political military organization whose primary mission is putting lead downrange, but as part 

of its contributions it helps governments more effectively do that by 

helping them institutionalize the culture and practices of civilian 

control of the military. 

Ms. TITUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. ENGEL. Well, thank you very much. I think this brings the 

hearing to an end. I want to thank our four excellent panelists. 

And you notice we had so much interest in it, so many people kept 

coming and leaving when they had to but making sure that they 

came back and it really was, I think, one of the best panels we 

have had and I want to thank all four of you for doing that. 

I want to remind the committee that at 2 o’clock we have a meeting with King Abdullah of Jordan over in the Capitol, so I would 

hope the members of the committee would attend that. And again 

I want to thank our witnesses and the hearing is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 1:01 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
74 

APPENDIX 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Eliot L. •:ngel (D-NY), Chairman 

March 13,2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held 

in Room 2172 of the Rayburn House Office Building (and available live on the Committee website at 

https://forcignalfairs.house.gov{): 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, March 13,2019 

10:00 a.m. 

NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance 

The Honorable Michele Flournoy 

Co-Founder and Managing Partner 

WestExec Advisors 

(Former Under Secretm}' ofDefense.for Policy) 

The Honorable Derek Chollet 

Executive Vice President and Senior Advisor for Security and Defense Policy 

The German Marshall Fund of the United States 

(Former Assistant Secretary ()(D~fimse.fi>r International Security Affairs) 

The Honorable Douglas Lute 

Senior Fellow, Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship 

Belfer Center for Science and lnternational Affairs 

(Former United Stales Permanent Representative to NATO) 

Mr. ian Brzezinski 

Resident Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security lnitiative 

Atlantic Council 

(Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO) 

By Direction of the Chairman 
75 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date~_--...:O.::.J/.:.::'J.::.J/.:.::'J:.:.9 ___ Room, _ _::21:.:7c.::2c.::RH=:O::.:B::___ 

Starting Time 10:07 a.m. Ending Time 1:01 p.m. 

Reeesses _0_ L_to __ ) L_to __ ) L_to _) L_to _) L_to _) L_to _) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairman Eliot L. Engel 

Check all of the following that apply: 

Open Session 0 Exeeutive !<:!!>sed) Session 0 Televised 0 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

NATO AT 70: AN INDISPENSABLE ALLIANCE 

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

See attached. 

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

N/A 

Electronically Reeord~taped) 0 

Stenographic Record l..d 

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? YesEJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

SFR CiciUine 

IFR~Engel (I) 

IFR_Engel (11) 

QFR_Wagner 

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE ____ ?: r ' - '\) 

;"IMEADJOURNED 1'

01 P·m· ~"'- D 
76 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

PRFSD\T M!OMBER 

X Eliot l Engel, NY 

X ,CA ··-

X Gregory W. Meeks, NY 

Albio Sires, NJ 

X Gerald E. Connolly, VA 

X Theodore E. Deutch, Fl. __ 

~X- Karen Bass, CA ~-_c.____ 

~~------1-:'W~illia'-::m':=,:; Keat::cin"":g,=-:..MA ____ ----1 X David Cicilline, Rl 

X Ami Bcra, CA 

X Joaquin Castro, TX 

X Dina Titus. NV 

Adriano Espai"ll'"-at'-, Nc.'c.Y ____ _, 

~ ~r'-'e-"d-'-L--'ie"'u'-, C-:-A-::-:--------1 

X Susa_n:-:W'-i:c:ld-'-'· _PA-:--:-:-:------1 

X Dean Phillips, MN 

X Ilhan Omar. MN --------1 

X Colin Allred, TX 

X Andy Levin, Ml 

X 

X --X 

X 

_X 

X 

Abigail Span berger, VA 

nnssy p, 

-- Tom Malino\Vski, N.l 

_ David Trc>ne, MD 

··-----

PRESENl MEMBER 

X Michael T. McCaul, TX 

X Christopher f I. Smith, ~J 

X ()J 

X Joe Wilson, SC 

X Scott Perry, PA 

X Ted Yoho, FL 

X II 

X !din NV 

James Senscnbrenncr, Jr., WI 

_X Ann Wagner, MO 

X Brian J. Mast FL 

X Francis Roo~~ey, FL 

X Brian K. fitzpatrick, PA 

John Curtis, UT 

X Ken Buck, CO 

X Ron Wright, TX 

f---~ Gux Reschenthaler, PA 

X 'l'im Burchett, :!'N 

X Greg Pence, IN 

X Steve Watkins, KS 

Michael Guest. MS 

--

--
77 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM 

REPRESENTATIVE CICILLINE 
78 

Poland, Hungary, and Turkey, for example, that show an erosion of basic democratic principles. 

American leadership is crucial, yet President Trump, far from upholding democratic principles, 

often attacks them. That is why Congress must continue to resolutely speak out and send a clear 

message to our allies about what we stand for and what NATO stands for. 

Over the last seventy years, NATO has grown and adapted to face new threats, while remaining 

true to its core mission of collective defense, defense of shared, democratic values, and a defense 

ofpeaee. As we face new emerging threats NATO remains truly indispensable, and Congress 

must ensure President Trump does not try to walk away from this vital alliance. 
79 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM 

CHAIRMAN ENGEL 
80 

Challenges from Within NATO 

Reviving American Leadership of the Alliance 

NATO's single greatest challenge is the absence of strong, principled 

American presidential leadership for the first time in its history. President 

Donald Trump is regarded widely in NATO capitals as the Alliance's most 

urgent, and often most difficult, problem. NATO leaders, for example, 

considered not holding a 2019 summit to mark the seventieth anniversary 

this spring as they did in decades past. They feared President Trump would 

blow up a meeting in controversy as he has done each time he has met with 

NATO leaders during the past two years. Wary of his past behavior, NATO 

plans a scaled down leaders meeting for December 2019. 

President Trump's open ambivalence about NATO's value to the U.S., 

his public questioning of America's Article 5 commitment to its allies, 

persistent criticism of Europe's democratic leaders and embrace of its 

anti-democratic members and continued weakness in failing to confront 

NATO's primary adversary President Vladimir Putin of Russia, have hurtled the Alliance into its most worrisome crisis in memory. 3 

There is no reason to believe President Trump's attitude will change for 

the better during the next two years. He believes NATO allies are taking 

advantage of the U.S.4 These are the same allies and partners who came 

to America's defense on 9/11, suffered more than 1,000 battlefield deaths 

alongside American soldiers in Afghanistan,5 are fighting with the U.S. 

now against the Islamic State and shoulder the main burden sustaining a 

fragile peace in the Balkans, in both Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 

President Trump is the first U.S. president to view the European Union 

as an economic competitor rather than a vital partner of both the U.S. 

and NATO. His troubling anti-NATO and anti-Europe bias has caused 

European governments to question the credibility of the U.S. as the leader 

of the West for the first time since the Second World War.6 The European 

public confidence in American leadership is also at historically low depths.7 

Every American president before Trump has encouraged the strength and 

2 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
81 

unity of Europe as a core interest of the U.S. Trump may well cause even 

greater damage to the Alliance while he remains in office. 

For this reason, Republicans and Democrats in Congress must act together 

as a blocking force against President Trump's dangerous policies. Congress, 

on a bipartisan basis, should reaffirm the U.S. commitment to the Article 

5 defense clause in the NATO Treaty. Congress should pass legislation this 

year requiring Congressional approval should President Trump attempt 

to alter U.S. treaty commitments to NATO allies or to have the U.S. leave 

the Alliance altogether. 8 Congress should continue to fund the "European 

Deterrence Initiative" to bolster U.S. military strength in Europe that is the 

primary deterrent against Russian adventurism. 

Restoring European Defense Strength 

NATO's European members and Canada pose their own challenge to the 

Alliance-the weakness of their collective defense spending for NATO's 

common defense. President Trump has been right to push allies to spend 

more on defense. He has the support of the U.S. Congress and many 

Americans in doing so. It is simply unfair that only five of the twenty-nine 

allies are currently spending at least 2 percent of their Gross Domestic 

Product (GDP) on their military budgets, while the U.S. is spending 3.5 

percent and shouldering much of the defense burden.9 

Germany, the largest and wealthiest of the European allies, has a major 

shortfall as it is currently spending only 1.24 percent of its budget on 

defense. Its coalition government has not summoned the strength and 

determination to convince the Bundestag and the German public to 

reach the minimum 2 percent level soon. Germany is thus abdicating this 

most basic obligation as a member of NATO. Italy, Canada, Spain, the 

Netherlands and other allies are also spending well below the agreed 2 

percent level. 10 

Having made his point, President Trump should also acknowledge 

that aggregate NATO defense spending trends are actually heading 

in the right direction, despite insufficient spending by some allies. 

NATO allies have produced four consecutive years of real growth for a 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs I Harvard Kennedy Schoo! 3 
82 

collective increase in spending of $87 billion, particularly in reaction 

to Putin's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and President Trump's public 

pressure since 2017. 11 A majority of NATO members plan to reach 

the 2 percent level by the agreed target date of 2024. More than half 

will spend 20 percent of their defense budgets on new equipment and 

research and development. 12 This new spending is critical to produce 

added NATO defense capabilities, including intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance, cyber and digital technologies. 

The challenge for President Trump on NATO defense spending is to pivot 

from chief critic to chief cheerleader. His administration should also 

support new European Union efforts to strengthen the EU's own defense 

capacity as long as it complements, and not duplicates, NATO's existing 

capabilities and programs. 

Upholding NATO's Democratic Values 

NATO is struggling to confront a potentially cancerous threat from within. 

Three allied governments-Poland, Hungary and Turkey-have undermined 

their own democracies in varying degrees by suppressing free speech and a 

free press and limiting the independence of the courts. 13 As NATO is, first 

and foremost, an alliance of democracies, the actions of these governments 

threaten the core values-democracy, individual liberty and the rule of lawto which each ally is committed in the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Nearly every current and former NATO official with whom we talked for 

this report worried that a recommendation for NATO to discipline these 

anti-democratic governments would be highly problematic and divisive. 

Nonetheless, we believe NATO must find a way to shine a light on these 

recalcitrant allies. For example, NATO could review annually each ally's 

democratic practices, perhaps in a report prepared by a high-level, outside 

group. Allies that violate basic democratic standards could be suspended 

from NATO military exercises or denied access to NATO training and 

common infrastructure funding. 

More than one European mentioned to us the ironic fact that the U.S. itself 

may be chastised for a deterioration of its own democratic standards in 

4 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance ln Crisis 
83 

such a process. Nevertheless, ignoring this challenge of democratic principles will undermine the core convictions that brought NATO together 

seventy years ago. 

Streamlining NATO Decision-Making 

NATO allies have always reached critical decisions by consensus. 1his 

continues to make sense for all allies to agree on how NATO should act 

on major issues. But, it is time for the Alliance to empower the Secretary 

General on the administrative and resource issues that impede focusing 

on more significant challenges. The Secretary General must have the 

operational power to move an often-unwieldy Alliance forward in the way 

it plans and operates on a daily basis. Also important is improving decision-making in crisis scenarios. 

Challenges from Beyond NATO's Borders 

Containing Putin's Russia 

NATO faces a challenge to deter further Russian aggression in Eastern 

Europe. Russian President Vladimir Putin is destabilizing NATO partners 

Ukraine and Georgia by the continued occupation of their territories. He 

also seeks to weaken the three Baltic allies from within. 14 And Russian 

cyber attacks, political subversion and aggressive social media campaigns 

pose a threat to all the NATO democracies and their electoral processes. 

NATO allies thus need to take much stronger measures against Moscow 

than they have to date by: 

Reaffirming economic sanctions on Russia will remain in place for 

as long as it occupies Ukrainian territory; 

Sustaining indefinitely current back-to-back NATO rotational 

troop deployments to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, while 

adding enablers and improving readiness of reinforcements; 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy Schoo! 5 
84 

Addressing vulnerabilities in the area of hybrid warfare urgently, 

the most likely form of Russian aggression against the Alliance; 

Preparing cyber offensive options to deter Russia from further 

cyber attacks. 

At the same time, it makes sense for NATO leaders to maintain continuing 

contacts with the Kremlin on the many issues that divide NATO allies 

and Russia: Russia's violation of Ukraine's sovereign territory, dangerous 

Russian air and sea maneuvers in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, the 

Russian Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) violation, 

Afghanistan and measures to prevent miscalculation that could lead to 

conflict that all wish to avoid. 

Containing Russian power will be a generational challenge until Putin's 

Soviet-trained leadership circle leaves power during the next decade, perhaps beyond. There is no more important external challenge for NATO. 

Ending the Afghan War 

NATO's largest and longest combat mission in Afghanistan is at a critical 

juncture. The war with the Taliban is at a stalemate. Afghan civilian and 

military casualties are at an all-time high. 15 Few believe the war can be 

won outright. President Trump appears determined to have the U.S. depart 

quickly sometime in 2019 after nearly 18 yoors of combat. President Trump 

and his advisors should proceed carefully, in close coordination with the 

Afghan government, to avoid a precipitous U.S. departure that would jeopardize American interests and risk further instability in Afghanistan. 

1he Trump administration is right to engage directly with the Taliban to 

explore a political process to end the war. A durable, sustainable settlement 

ultimately must be made among Afghans, including the elected Afghan 

government and the Taliban. The interests and views of Afghanistan's 

neighbors and the NATO allies with troops on the ground must be considered as well. The U.S. should proceed slowly and carefully, conditioning 

troop withdrawals on the Taliban's meeting agreed security and political 

benchmarks beginning with a ceasefire and including agreeing to engage 

6 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
85 

with the Afghan government. NATO allies should adhere to the "in 

together, out together" principle, avoiding unilateral national withdrawals. 

Refocusing NATO Partnerships 

NATO maintains a partnership with forty-one countries outside the 

Alliance from Mauritania in West Africa to Japan. 16 Many states have 

been invaluable members of coalitions in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Balkans 

and in the fight against the Islamic State. Most important, NATO should 

strengthen its partnership with the European Union. Partnerships with the 

Gulf Coordination Council, the African Union and the Arab League could 

promote stability along NATO's periphery. 

Maintaining an Open Door to Future Members 

Following a historic two-decade expansion of the NATO Alliance with 

thirteen new members, NATO would be well advised to consolidate that 

expansion once North Macedonia joins the Alliance in the coming months. 

Over the next decade or two, however, NATO should keep the door 

open for any European democracy that meets the strict qualifications for 

membership. Georgia and Ukraine may not meet the conditions for years 

to come, but it is in NATO's interest to hold open the possibility of membership in the long term. No country outside the Alliance, most especially 

Russia, can have a veto over who NATO accepts as it pursues its goal of 

providing for a free and peaceful European continent. 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy School 7 
86 

Challenges on the Horizon 

Winning the Technology Battle in the Digital Age 

NATO faces yet another critical challenge in adapting quickly to a rapidly changing, global, military technology landscape. Its often-byzantine 

defense planning processes date to the Cold War, long before the extraordinary, current advances in military arms powered by artificial intelligence, 

cyber, robotics, quantum computing and biotechnology-perhaps the most 

decisive change in military technology since the start of the nuclear age. 

NATO allies, led by the United States, must now commit a far greater share 

of their military budgets to acquiring these new military technologies, lest 

China and Russia gain a decisive advantage in the decade ahead. 

Competing with China 

While China does not pose a direct military threat to most NATO allies, it 

is emerging as a global competitor politically, economically and in seeking 

dominance in digital military technologies. Europe, the United States 

and Canada need to adopt a more cohesive approach to China. Beijing is 

emerging as the strongest strategic competitor of both North America and 

Europe in this century. The European allies need to focus more intently on 

the challenge from Chinese economic and technological power and industrial espionage. NATO allies should thus tighten restrictions on Chinese 

investments in key technology sectors on both sides of the Atlantic. And 

NATO should strengthen its military partnerships with Japan, South 

Korea, Australia, New Zealand and others. 

China will be the main geo-strategic competitor of the United States in the 

decades ahead. It is in the interest of NATO allies to take on the defense 

burden in the trans-Atlantic region more equitably, to enable the U.S. to 

focus increasingly on the competition with China. In this strategic sense, 

NATO's military strength and unity could be a potentially decisive factor in 

the long-term competition ahead in the Indo-Pacific. The goal is to live and 

work with China where possible, but to compete to maintain the primacy 

of the free, democratic countries in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific. 

8 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
87 

Summary 

1he United States bears a special responsibility to help its allies to meet these 

tests. President Trump is wrong to question NATO's central importance to 

American security. On its own, the United States is a powerful nation. But 

America's European and Canadian allies expand and amplify American 

power in ways that Russia and China-with few allies of their own-can 

never match. United States access to European air and naval bases alone 

bring American forces a continent closer to the Middle East, Africa and parts 

of Asia. 17 The United States is substantially stronger in NATO than it would 

be on its own. 1here is ample evidence President Trump does not understand-and certainly does not appreciate-this basic strategic fact about 

NATO. 

This is why decisive action by the Congress this year to reassert America's 

commitment and leadership in NATO is imperative. And it is also why 

NATO allies, on both sides of the Atlantic, must work together to narrow 

the growing divisions within the Alliance and to meet these historic challenges as NATO turns seventy. 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy School 9 
88 

Notes for Executive Summary 

The population of East European countries in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is approximately 109 million. See "NATO Countries: Statistical Proffle," Nation Master. accessed January 3, 

2019, https://www.nationmaster.com/country·info/groups/NATO·countnes. 

"NATO Countries: Statistical P~ofile," 2018; "US Population," U.S. Census Bureau, accessed January 

3. 2019, https:l/www.census.gov/popclock. 

Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper, "Trump Discussed Pulling US From NATO. Aides Say Amid 

New Concerns Over Russia." The New York Times. January 14, 2018, https:!/www.nytimes. 

com/2019/01/14/us/politics/nato-presidenHrump.html: Aaron Blake, "Trump's Montenegro 

comments make it abundantly clear he doesn't understand NATO." The Washington Post, July 28. 

2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the·fix/wp/2018/07/18/trump·makes·it-abundantly-clear-he-doesnt-know-how-nato-works/. 

4 David Welna, "Fact Check: Trump's Claims On NATO Spending: National Public Radio, July 18,2018, 

https://www.npr.org/2018/07/11/628137185lfact-check·trumps-claims·on-nato·spending. 

"Afghanistan Fatallties, Fatalities by Country:· iCasualties, accessed December 26. 2018. www. 

lCasualties.org. 

6 Ange!ique Chrisafis, "Europe can no longer rely on US for security, says Emmanuel Macron." The 

Guardtan, August 27, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/aug/27/europe·can-no·Jon· 

ger·rely-on~us-for-security-says-emmanue1-macron: Michael Birnbaum and Rick Noack, "Following 

Trump's trip, Merkel says Europe can't rely on 'others.' She means the US," The Washington Post, 

May 28, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/following-trumps·trip-merkel·says-europe· 

cant·rely·on·us·anymore/2017/05/28/4c6b92cc-43cl-lle7-8de1-cec59a9bf4b1_story.html. 

"Confidence in Trump remains low in key EU countries," Pew Research Center, September 28. 

2018, http://www.pewglobal.org/2018/10/01/trumps-international-ratings·remain-low·especially-among·key·allies/pg_2018·10-l_u-s-image_0-5/. 

8 Tt1e United States House of Representatives passed the NATO Support Act on January 2, 

2018, which prohibits the appropriation or use of funds to withdraw the United States from the 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. United States Congress. House, NATO Support Act. HR 676, 

116th Congress, 1st sess .. introduced in House January 17.2019, https://www.congress.gov/ 

blll/116th-congress/house-bil!/676; Similar action is under consideration in the Senate. See United 

States Congress. House, NATO Support Act. HR 676, 116th Congress. 1st sess, introduced January 

17,2019, hltps://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/676. 

9 "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018)," NATO Press Release PR/CP(2018)091. July 

10. 2018, https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2018_07/20180709_180710-

pr2018-91-en.pdf. However, data on defense spending can be misleading. While the U.S. devotes 3.5 

percent of GOP to defense, not all of that rs committed to NATO. 

10 "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018),'' 2018. 

11 Nicholas Burns. "What America Gets Out of NATo:· The New York Times, July 11,2018, https://www. 

nytimes.com/2018/07/11/opinion/what·america·gets-out-of·nato.html. 

12 "Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2011-2018):' 2018. 

13 Jonathan Katz and Torrey Taussig, "An inconvenient truth: Addressing democratic backsriding 

within NATO," Brookings Institution. July 10,2018, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order·from·chaos/2018/07/10/an·inconvenient-truth·addressing-democratic·backsliding-within·nato/. 

10 NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis 
89 

14 Paul Stronski and Richard Sokolsky, T!Je Return of Global Russia: An Analytical Framework 

(Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. December 2017), https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return·of-global-russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003. p. 3-30. 

15 "Quarterly Report on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: 1 January to 30 September, 

2018," United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. October 10, 2018, https://unama. 

unmissions.org/sites/defaultlfiles/unama_protection_of_civilians_in_armed_conflict_3rcLquar· 

ter__report_2018_10_oct.pdf; Jdrees Ali, "Afghan security forces' deaths unsustainable: US military 

official." Reuters. December 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-afghanistan·military/ 

afghan-security-forces-deaths-unsustainable-u-s-military-official·idUSKBN1032CS. 

16 Partnership for Peace: Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan. Belarus. Bosnia and Herzegovina. Finland, 

Georgia, Ireland, Kazakhstan. Kyrgyz Republic, Malta, The Republic of Moldova. Russia, Serbia, 

Sweden, Switzerland. Tajikistan, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkmenistan, 

Ukraine, Uzbekistan: Mediterranean Dialogue: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan. Mauritania. Morocco, 

Tunisia: Istanbul Cooperation Initiative: Bahrain, Kuwait. Qatar. United Arab Emirates: Partners 

from across the globe: Afghanistan. Australia, Colombia, Iraq, Japan. Republic of Korea. Mongolia, 

New Zealand. Pakistan; International organizations: United Nations, European Union. Organization 

for Security and Cooperation in Europe. See "Partners," NATO, last updated November 11, 2015. 

https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/51288.htm. 

17 Jens Stoltenberg, "The Value of NATO in the 21st Century," Heritage Foundation. Washington, DC, 

September 14. 2018, https://www.heritage.org/defense/eventlthe-value-nato-the-2lsl·century/. 

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs 1 Harvard Kennedy School 11 
90 

MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM 

CHAIRMAN ENGEL 
91 

16 Parameters 47(2) Summer 2017 

seems to be turning away from its most important friends. 5 Yet despite 

the reaction they have provoked, Trump's critiques have nonetheless 

revealed a fundamental asymmetry in the cost-benefit assessment 

of US alliances. 

The fact of the matter is that the costs and risks associated with 

America's alliances have always been more visible and easily understood 

than the benefits. Moreover, because US foreign policy elites have 

long become accustomed to military alliances as facts of geopolitical 

life, even proalliance obserYers often struggle to specify, in concrete 

terms, why those institutions are so valuable. Supporters are thus at a 

rhetorical disadvantage in these arguments. They often defend alliances 

by pointing to vague and ill-defined benefits, or simply by invoking 

tradition, whereas critics can point to specific dangers and burdens, 

including those more easily reduced to a campaign trail slogan or a pithy 

tweet. And Trump is not alone in his attacks on US alliances-many 

leading "realist" academics have long offered similar critiques, which 

the president has now effectively appropriated as his own. "The U.S. 

net gain from its alliance relationships is ... not commensurate with the 

cost," Barry Posen writes: "the bargain has become unprofitable to the 

United States."6 

ln this essay, we offer a more accurate net assessment of America's 

alliances by detailing the purported costs and considerable-if less 

widely understood-benefits. \Ve first summarize the most common 

critiques of US alliances and explain why many of those critiques are less 

persuasive than they initially seem. We then provide a detailed typology 

of the myriad benefits-military and otherwise-of US alliances. As this 

analysis shows, the net assessment of US alliances is strongly positive, 

and the balance is not e\'en particularly close. Today as always, there 

remain significant challenges associated with alliance management and 

reasonable debates to be had about addressing them. But those debates 

need to be informed by a better understanding of what US alliances are 

good for in the first place. 

Costs, Real and Perceived 

Trump is not the first prominent observer to critique US alliances. 

Ever since the country's t(mnding, permanent military alliances have 

been a source of controversy. The alliance structure built from the ashes 

of \\;'oriel \\'ar II, and gradually expanded in the decades thereafter, has 

itself been the subject of heated debate. Leading political figures such 

as Senator Robert Taft initially opposed an American commitment to 

NATO; Senator Michacll\1ansfield sought to force withdrawal of half 

the US troops deployed to Europe in the early 1970s. The post-Cold 

\Var expansion of NA'l '0 touched off perhaps the most intense foreign 

policy debate of the 1990s. And in recent decades, there has been a lively 

cottage industry among academics who deem US alliances expensive, 

unrewarding, and dangerous, and who argue for attenuating or simply 

abandoning those commitments. The standard academic critique-much 

5 Krishnadcv Cahmur, "Germany);; i\icrkd Urges 'Europe to Take Our 11atc into Ouf Own 

JJands,"' At!ant;t~ i\'lay 30,2017. 

6 Barry R Posen, Re.f!raint: ..,4 1\"ew Founrlrltioll for US. Gra;;d S!nttegr (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press~ 2014), 34. 
92 

REFVALUATING DIPlOMATIC & MiliTARY PowER Brands and Fe aver 17 

of which Trump has adopted or adapted as his own-adduces several 

key costs and dangers associated with US alliances. 

First, ,\merica's military alliances require \X'ashington to defend 

countries whose security is not vital to the Cnited States. Second, US 

alliances compel military expenditures far higher than would be necessary 

simply to defend America itself. Third, maintaining the credibility of US 

alliances forces America to adopt aggressive, forward-leaning defense 

strategies. Fourth, having allies raises the risk of the United States 

being entrapped in unwanted conflicts. Fifth, America's allies habitually 

free ride on J\mcrica's own exertions. Sixth, alliances limit America's 

freedom of action and cause unending diplomatic hcadaches.7 

So how accurate arc these critiques? \Vc consider each in its turn. 

In sum, America's alliance system is hardly costless, and all of these 

critiques contain at least a kernel of truth. In many cases, however, the 

costs arc significantly exaggerated-or critics simply ignore that the 

United States would have to pay similar costs even if it had no alliances. 

A!liana.r req11ire de{e11ding countries uJ/10.re .remri~y is not vital to tbe U11ited 

Jtate.r. The United States has formal security commitments to over thirty 

treaty allies in Europe and the i\sia-Pacific and informal or ambiguous 

security commitments to over thirty additional countries 8 These 

commitments, particularly the formal treaty commitments, represent 

something approaching a solemn vow to shed blood to defend nonAmerican lands. And some of the countries protected by US guarantees 

are not, in and of themselves, critical to the global balance of power or 

the physical security of the United StatesY The United States could be 

called upon to resist a Russian seizure of Estonia, and yet the American 

people could survive and thrive in a world in which Estonia was occupied 

by Russian forces. 

Yet if this critique is not baseless, it is often overstated, because the 

United States does have a vital interest in defending many of its current 

allies. The basic geopolitical lesson of World \Vars I and II-a lesson 

many critics of US alliances endorse-is that \v'ashington should not 

allow any hostile power to dominate a crucial geopolitical region such as 

Europe, East Asia, or the Middle East.10 Accordingly, the United States 

could still find itself compelled to fight to defend those regions-and 

9 It i:' important to note that all of America'~ dcfcn~c commitment~ pmvidc an "out'' through 

cb.u~cs allowing \\:ashington to act in accordance with its own constitutional processes. In essence, 

trcatic;;--although they arc ratified by the Senate and carry the force of hw-t·cpn.;sent more of a 

moral obligation than a tightly binding legal obligation to other states. 

10 l\1earshdmcr and Stephen \t \X<'alt, , .. l.hc Case for Offshore Balancing:;-\ Superior 

U.S. 4 (luly/ Augu<r 2016): 70-83. 
93 

18 Parameters47(2) Summer 2017 

many key countries therein-even if formal alliance relationships did 

not exist. This was, after all, precisely what happened during both world 

wars and the Persian Gulf \var, when American officials concluded 

that US security required defending or liberating key countries in these 

regions, even though \Vashington had not previously had military 

alliances there. Alliances do not cause US entanglements m·erseas; 

entanglements cause alliances. 

UJ a!!iallces compel military expenditures far bigber than 1/lott!d be 1/eces . .-a~y 

to defend /1merica itJ-e/f To detcnd allies in the western Pacific or Europe, 

the United States requires global power-projection capabilities and a 

military that can win not just in its own backyard but in the backyards of 

its great-power rivals. America thus needs a larger, more technologically 

advanced, more sophisticated force than would be necessary strictly for 

continental defense, along with an accompanying global-basing network. 

For these reasons, the US military is indeed more expensive than it 

would be absent US alliances. Yet this critique is also overblown. After 

all, if the United States has an interest in preventing any hostile power 

from dominating a key region of Eurasia, then alliances or no alliances, 

Washington would still require a military capable of projecting decisive 

power into these regions in an emergency. 11 Likewise, because J\merica 

has geopolitical objectives beyond the protection of allies-such as 

counterterrorism and securing the global commons-the need for 

advanced power projection capabilities and overseas bases would remain 

even in a world without alliances. 

Such a force might still be smaller than today's military. If the 

United States pursued a strategy in which it rolled back or attenuated 

key alliances, one critic suggests, it could reduce defense spending to 

2.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), as opposed to 3.5 or 4 

percent.12 Yet America would still have the world's largest defense budget 

by a considerable margin under this approach, and such a force-which 

would consist, for instance, of only four carrier strike groups instead of 

10 to 11 today-might not actually be sufficient to command the global 

commons and fight its way back into key regions in a crisis.11 

In fact, if the United States pulled back from its alliance commitments 

and waited for a crisis to develop before surging back into key regions, 

it might find such a mission more difficult-and more expensivethan simply protecting its allies in the first place. It was precisely this 

fact-that the United States ended up deploying millions of troops to 

liberate \"~;'estern Europe and East Asia during \\iorld \\'ar II, at financial 

and human costs that would be almost unimaginable today, that led 

.American policymakers to adopt a difterent approach featuring formal 

alliances and forward deployments thereafterH Nor would eliminating 

parts of the US basing network associated with protecting American 

11 LYan Braden Montgomery, "Contested in the \Vc::.tcrn Pacific: China's Ri:->c and 

the Future of U.S. Power Projection,'' Intenw.tio;u11 S,wm;!), no. 4 (Spring 2014): 121, doi:1 0.1162 

/ISEC_a_OO 160. 

12 Posen, Restraint. 

13 1 hi Hrands, The Limi!J· if Q[jj-hore Bal(md!zf?, (Carlisle Fku::rad\.s, PA: Strategic Stuclics Institute, 

2015), 23-28. 

14 Sec Hobert j .. Art, A NY: Cornell University Prcsg, 2003), 

205; R. holmes and Toshi "1\n Too Far: Offshore Balancing in the 

Indian 1 (i\larch 2012): doi:l0.1080/14799855.2011.652025. 
94 

REEVALUATI'JG DIPLOMATIC & MiliTARY Powm Brands and Feaver 19 

allies save much money absent corresponding force reductions, because 

host-nation support arrangements often make it roughly as cheap, if not 

cheaper, to station American forces overseas than to station them in the 

United States.'' American defense expenditures could slightly decrease 

in a world without US military alliances, at least in the short-term, but 

the savings would be less dramatic-and perhaps more ephemeralthan one might expect. 

Mai11tainil~l!, the credibility of ~1merica;t a!liaHce.r adoptil(l!, fonvardlealliJzg defimse .rtrategies. This critique comes closer to the mark. Prior to 

the Cold \Var, the US strategic posture was essentially one of allowing 

aggressors to conquer friendly states in Europe and East 1\sia, and then 

mobilizing to liberate those areas. Since the late 1940s, howe\·er, US 

policymakers have worried that American allies will be unlikely to risk 

aligning with Washington-and thereby antagonizing hostile neighbors 

such as the Soviet Union-if they believe the United States will simply 

allow them to be overrun in a conflict. If being liberated first requires 

being conquered, who wants to be liberated?'" 

Accordingly, since the early Cold \Var, the United States has focused 

on defending rather than liberating allies. This strategy required 

\v'ashington to pledge to defend \\/est Germany at the Rhine despite 

the enormous difficulty of doing so, to forward-station forces in 

Europe and East A.sia, and even to pledge rapid nuclear escalarion to 

defend vulnerable European alliesY Since the end of the Cold \v'ar, the 

dilemmas associated with forward defense have been far less dangerous 

and agonizing because the United States has not confronted a rival 

superpower. But the return of great-power competition in recent years 

has begun to raise these issues anew, albeit in less dramatic fashion. Part 

of the rationale for the Pentagon's much-hyped i\ir-Sea Battle concept 

appears to be to cripple China's power-projection capabilities before it 

can subdue US allies in the \\'estern Pacific.1g The recent stationing of 

US and NATO battalions in the Baltic states-in some cases, less than 

200 miles from major Russian cities such as St. Petersburg-reflects 

similar imperatives. 

tlatJtl{l!. allie.r raise.r tbe ri.rk ofentrapmmt. Critics of US alliances point to 

the danger of "reckless driving" and "chain-ganging." Reckless driving 

occurs when an ally, protected by a US security guarantee, behaves more 

provocatively than would otherwise be prudent. Reckless driving, in 

tum, can trigger chain-ganging. If an ally intentionally or unintentionally 

triggers conflict with an adversary, a formal security commitment may 

force the guarantor to enter the conflict whether it desires to or not. 

There is some irreducible danger of reckless driving and chain-ganging 

in any credible alliance, of course. Yet historical evidence suggests that 

this problem is actually less severe in US alliances than one might expect. 

Admim:f/m!ion, 

17 ..\hrc Trachtenbng, A Pea~·e: Tbe lo.lakil{f!, of EuropeaH Se!tlemtnt, 19-1-5-1963 

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton tJniversity l)rcss, 1999). 

18 On Au·Sca Battk (now called 

Comm<ms), !'CC 1\ndrcw l ·: Krcpincvich, 

and Hudg<.:tary Assessments, 2010). 
95 

20 Paramecers 47(2) Summer 2017 

As .Michael Beckley and Victor Cha have shown, US policymakers 

have long been sensitiYe to this dilemma, and ha\·e thus inserted 

loopholes or escape hatches into security agreements with potentially 

problematic partners, such as Syngman Rhee's South Korea or Chiang 

Kai-Shek's Taiwan'" Today, for instance, the US security commitment 

to Taiwan is ambiguous for this very purpose: to prevent Taipei from 

assuming \\'ashington will automatically rescue Taiwan if its leaders 

provoke China. NATO forbids new members from having outstanding 

territorial disputes for the same reason. 

In recent decades, moreover, the United States has repeatedly 

pressured allies and security partners to behave with restraint and 

warned those allies against provoking stronger neighbors. American 

officials underscored this point in dealings with Taiwan during the 

George W. Bush administration, and reportedly, with the Philippines 

and other allies in their more recent maritime disputes with China. 2'' 

As a result, scholars have found few, if any, unambiguous cases over 

the past 70 years in which the United States was dragged into shooting 

wars solely because of alliance commitments.c' Reckless driving and 

chain-ganging are risks, but US officials have so far proven fairly adept 

at managing them. 

/11/ie.r babitllal!yfree ride. The opposite of reckless driving and chain 

ganging is free-riding. Logically, because 1\merica is committed to 

defend its allies, those states can spend less than they would otherwise 

on their own defense. J n 2011, for instance, the United States spent 

around 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense, compared to 1.6 percent of 

GDP for European NI\ TO allies and roughly 1 percent for Japan. 22 

To be fair, these statistics exaggerate the free-riding problem because 

America's defense budget includes higher-than-a\'erage personnel costs 

as a way of recruiting and retaining an all-volunteer force in contrast to 

many allies and partners whose labor markets enable them to recruit 

personnel at lower wages or who rely primarily on conscription.21 

Moreover, this gap was subsequently narrowed as US military spending, 

which had been inflated by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, fell after 

2010. Yet free-riding is nonetheless real enough, as lJS officials have 

frankly recognized. As Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told N/1:1'0 

in 2011, "The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and 

patience in the U.S. Congress-and in the American body politic writ 

large-to expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that 

are apparently unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make 

the necessary changes to be serious and capable partners in their own 

defense." 24 Indeed, this problem has troubling implications, for it renders 

Victor Cha, 

Univcr;-;ity Press, 

20 Thoma:> J. Christensen, Tbe China Lb,111et<ee:Jbtltm2 

\'C \\: Norton, 2015), chapter 7. Sec al:;o ]a Jan 

Rca::~c~::-;ing the Security Risb of 

doi: l0.1162/lSEC_a_00197; and 

A.ria (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

Fast r\s1a Today: l\'fissing the Trees for the Forest," Intemm'iotuJ/ S,eam'[y 39, 1 (Summer 2014): :?3-24, 

doi:10.1162/fSFC_a_001 65. 

21 :Beckley, "Myth of Ent:mgling Allia1Kcs." 

22 Posen, Rutmint, 35-36. 

23 Lindoay l~ Cohn, fm,;j\fuch i< l 'n<>ugll>?,'' Sti"ate!;id"tudiex~?uartm)9,no .. 3 (l•all2015):47--61. 

24 
96 

RFFVAt.UATING D1P1 OMATIC & MILITARY PowER Brands and Feaver 21 

the allies less capable of contributing to either out-of-area interventions 

or collective defense operations. 

1f free-riding is indeed a dilernma, however, it is also an implicit 

goal of US alliances, and it probably costs less-when "cost" is defined 

holistically-than the likely alternatives. As extensive scholarship 

demonstrates, a primary reason \vashington created its postwar military 

alliances was to break the cycle of unrestrained geopolitical competition 

in Europe and East Asia, for fear such competition would give rise 

to arms races and wars. Moreover, another prominent goal of US 

alliances has been to restrain nuclear proliferation, for tear the spread 

of nuclear weapons would make nuclear war more likely and dilute 

American influence." 

In other words, some degree of free-riding is a feature of America's 

alliances, not a glitch. The United States has traditionally preterred 

for allies to spend less on defense than they otherwise might, because 

this restraint creates a world in which America itself is safer and more 

influential. To put it another way, does \X1ashington really want a world in 

which Germany and Japan both spend 5 percent of GDP on defense and 

engage in nuclear arms-racing with adversaries? The answer is surely no, 

even if US officials might still urge these countries to spend moderately 

more than they do today. 

A!limlin !iJJlit Atl!erii"a:r freedom of adio11 a11d ml!JI! t!lleJldity!, diploll!atic 

!JeadadJeJ. This is true enough. In international politics, it can be harder 

to do things multilaterally than unilaterally. In many cases, relying on 

allies means relying on less capable military forces to perform functions 

the US military could better perform on its own, as \X'ashington 

discovered during the intervention in Kosovo in the late 1990s. Allies 

bring their own idiosyncrasies into the relationship, often with messy 

and frustrating results. A vivid example of this dynamic was the set 

of caveats each NJ\TO ally brought to the mission in Afghanistanrestrictions on when, where, and how its forces could tight-ensuring 

that, in terms of combat punch, the whole was somewhat less than the 

sum of the parts. 2

" 

Making alliances work also requires continual "gardening," in the 

phrase of George Shultz-continually massaging difficult relationships 

and suftering insufferable allies such as Charles de Gaulle. As Jimmy 

Carter once remarked, a meeting with allies represented "one of the 

worst days of my diplomatic life."27 Yet there arc obvious counterpoints 

here: frustrations are inherent in any diplomatic relationship, the United 

States undoubtedly finds it easier to address those frustrations within the 

context of deeply institutionalized alliances, and any constraints on US 

freedom of action have to be weighed against the myriad other ways in 

which alliances enhance US flexibility and power. 
97 

22 Paramerers47(2) Summer 2017 

Overall, the costs and frustrations of US alliances are not illusory, 

but many of those costs arc actually less severe or salient than they 

appear. The benefits of US alliances, by contrast, are both more diverse 

and more significant than often appreciated. 

Benefits, Direct and Indirect 

Just as critics overstate the costs of alliances, so they dramatically 

understate the benefits. The most direct and obvious advantages irlYolve 

the way allies allow the United States to punch above its own weight 

by augmenting US military strengths across a range of issues and 

contingencies. Yet alliances also offer additional geostrategic, politicaldiplomatic, and economic advantages that enhance American power 

and support a number of critical US national objectives. In other words, 

America's alliances arc less entangling than empowering. By binding 

itself to the defense of like-minded nations, the world's sole superpower 

makes itself all the more effective and influential. 

Military Punching Power 

First and foremost, having allies significantly increases the military 

power the l.Jnited States can bring to bear on a given battlefield. During 

the Cold \var, European forces were vital to maintaining something 

approximating a balance of power vis-a-vis \varsaw Pact forces.~' N1\TO 

countries and other treaty allies also contributed to nearly every major 

US combat operation of the postwar era, even though nearly all of those 

operations occurred "out of area." The United States may have waged 

the Korean \var in part to pnwe its willingness to defend its treaty allies 

in Europe, but the NATO allies contributed over 20,000 troops-in 

addition to other capabilities-to the fight. 29 Even during the Vietnam 

\v'ar, treaty allies South Korea and Australia contributed substantial 

fighting clements (and bore substantial casualties); South Korea sent 

over 300,000 soldiers to Vietnam over the course of the conflict and lost 

over 4,500 in combat."' Virtually everywhere the United States fought 

during the Cold War, it did so in the company of allies. 

fn the post-Cold \Var era, this benefit has sometimes seemed less 

irnportant, because of the vast margin of US dominance vis-a-vis its rivals, 

and because the gap between what Washington could do militarily and 

what even its most capable allies could do militarily widened markedly. 

Yet even so, the United States has relied hea\·ily on allied participation 

in nearly all of its major interventions. 

During the Persian Gulf\v'ar, key NATO allies such as France and 

the United Kingdom made large contributions to the coalition effort, 

with the British providing 43,000 troops along with significant air 

and naval contingents. The NATO allies provided roughly half of the 

60,000 troops who policed Bosnia as part of the Implementation Force 

mission in that country from 1995 through 1996, and a majority of the 

31,000 troops who made up the subsequent Stabilization Force. NATO 

The 

l\~ew YOrk Time.~·, 
98 

REEVALUATING DIPLOM,\liC & MiliTARY Powm Brands and Feaver 23 

contributions to the US-led war in Afghanistan peaked at around 40,000 

troops; this contingent helped sustain the mission at a time of heavy 

US focus on Iraq and made it possible for \Vashington to surge 30,000 

additional troops into Iraq when its forces were strained to the limit." 

Other US wars-in Iraq, Libya, and against the Islamic State-have 

also featured noteworthy contributions from treaty allies in Europe and 

the Asia-Pacific region. Both critics and defenders of US alliances often 

speak of the frustrations of unequal burden sharing. But America's 

military burdens would be much higher if it did not have allies willing 

to share them. 

Having formal allies as opposed to relying on ad hoc partnerships 

also yields a second and related military benefit: it eases the process of 

mobilizing cobelligercnts for action in a crisis. It is possible to assemble 

military coalitions on the flv, of course, and every coalition military 

ventur~ in which the United States participated pt·ior to 1945 was i;1 

some sense improvised. Moreover, even in the post-\Vorld \X'ar II era, 

the United States has solicited ad hoc contributions from nonallied 

partner states. lt is even possible, as the United States has repeatedly 

demonstrated, to make a purely transactional alliance of convenience 

with a "devil"-a countrv that otherwise shares ,-cry few interests 

with America, such as the Soviet Union in World \\!ar II or Syria in the 

Persian GulfWar. · 

The possibility of improvising military cooperation when needed 

has led some critics to argue the United States can do away with formal, 

institutionalized alliances altogether32 But turning every military 

operation into the equivalent of pickup basketball greatly increases the 

difficulty of building an effective combined force. Pushing the analogy 

further, pickup basketball is very hard to arrange in the absence oflongstandi ng arrangements and customs that increase the predictability of the 

other actors. Economists refer to these difficulties as transaction costs; 

the routines and institutionalization of formal alliances make it much 

easier to bring military power to bear at much lower transaction costs. 

In tormal alliances, the partners practice together in peacetime, 

develop interoperability, and may even de\-elop common equipment, thus 

easing logistics challenges. They also establish diplomatic forums and 

longstanding, fairly predictable relationships, thereby making it easier to 

coordinate interests and achieve the political consensus necessary to usc 

force in the first place." To be sure, everything could be negotiated on 

the fly, but the price America would pay for this flexibility would be the 

33 Roth the 

srephcn 

Univcr~ity I\1 Pn:ss, s,:~~~,~~,I~iJ~~J:~~~,~;(t~;:'~~~::~;;;~:;':,;,~;;~lt\:~"~h;',~~:~:,;r;;,S:: {!,~~;~,;'~~, tion and innovation, 

eclipsed. Seth A. Johnston, 

1950 (Haltimorc, !Vll): Johns llnpkins 
99 

24 Paramerers47(2) Summer 2017 

significantly greater difficulty-and, most likely, the significantly longer 

timelines-of piecing together a coalition in a crisis. 

i\ third major military contribution of allies is the specialized 

capability they can bring to the table. Sometimes this is material 

capability: British, French, and Australian special operations forces have 

all made vital contributions to the Global \var on 'Ienor. The Japanese 

have some of the finest antisubmarine warfare capabilities in the world, 

which would be essential in a US conflict with China.14 J\'forc often US 

allies contribute geographical capability in the form of proximity to the 

theater of interest. This proximity allows forward staging of the strike 

and intelligence assets, particularly air assets, on which the American 

way of war depends. It also allows for spccialiled technical intelligence 

collection that would be nearly impossible to conduct without local 

partners. The counter-ISIS campaign, for instance, would have been 

vastly more difficult had the United States not had access to key facilities 

controlled by either treaty allies (Turkey) or long-standing military 

partners (Qatar or Bahrain). 15 Similarly, the United States would face 

a nearly impossible task in any North Korean contingency without the 

extensive US basing network in Japan. 

And, of course, the United States has also traditionally relied on 

another allied contribution: intellectual capability. By virtue of their 

history, US allies have unique networks of relationships, along with the 

distinctive insights those relationships afford, in many regions of interest. 

This translates into intelligence-particularly human intelligence-that 

would be almost impossible for America to generate on its own; consider, 

for instance, the intelligence ad\'antages possessed by the French in 

northwest Africa or the Italians in Libya.v. 

The existence of formal, deeply institutionaliled alliances, in 

turn, facilitates the sharing of such intelligence. Three out of the four 

countries that make up the Five Eyes intelligence partnership with the 

United States are longstanding treaty allies; Washington also cooperates 

extensiYely "I.Vith its NATO allies on intelligence matters. In this as in 

other respects, .America's alliances make it far stronger and more capable 

militarily than it would otherwise be. 

Geostrategic Influence and Global Stability 

If alliances arc thus helpful in terms of the conflicts America wages, 

they are more helpful still in terms of the conflicts they prevent and 

the broader geostrategic influence they confer. Indeed, although the 

ultimate test of America's alliances lies in their efficacy as warfighting 

3--t- Sec, for 

\Vorldview, June 24, 

-submarine-abilities. 

Strarfor 

Turkey, as a "game changer" in the counter-

(',.,""". "11. ~ to Usc Turkish Bases in \'\/ar on ISIS," 
100 

REEVALUATING DIPLOMAlJC & MJUJARY PowER Brands and Feaver 25 

coalitions, the most powerful benefits they provide come in the normal 

course of peacetime geostrategic management and competition. 

First, US alliances bind many of the richestandmostmilitarily capable 

countries in the world to \Vashington through enduring relationships of 

deep cooperation. Alliances reflect shared interests rather than creating 

them, of course, and the United States would presumably have close ties 

to countries such as the United Kingdom even without formal alliances. 

But alliances nonetheless serve as "hoops of steel." They help create 

a sense of permanence and shared purpose in key relationships; they 

provide forums for regular interaction and cooperation; they conduce to 

deeply institutionalized exchanges (of intelligence, personnel, and other 

assets) that insulate and perpetuate friendly associations even when 

political leaders dash.38 And insofar as US alliances serve these purposes 

with respect to immensely influential countries in Europe and the 

Asia-Pacific, they help \Vashington preserve a significant overbalance of 

power vis-a-vis any competitor. 

Second, alliances have a strong deterrent effect on ·would-be 

aggressors. American alliances lay clown "recllines" regarding areas 

in which territorial aggression is impermissible; they complicate the 

calculus of any potential aggressor by raising the strong possibility that 

an attack on a US ally will mean a fight with the world's most formidable 

military. The proposition that "defensive alliances deter the initiation of 

disputes" is, in fact, supported by empirical evidence, and the forward 

deployment of troops strengthens this deterrence further stilJ.39 

NATO dearly had an important deterrent effect on SoYiet 

calculations during the Cold \v'ar, for instance; more recently, Russia 

has beha\'ecl most aggressively toward countries lacking CS alliance 

guarantees (Georgia and Ukraine), rather than toward those countries 

possessing them (the Baltic states or Poland). In other words, alliances 

make the geostrategic status quo-which is enormously favorable to the 

United States-far "stickier" than it might otherwise be. 

Third, and related to this second benefit, alliances tamp down 

international instability more broadly. American security guarantees 

allow US allies to underbuild their own militaries; while always annoying 

and problematic when taken to extremes, this phenomenon also helps 

avert the arms races and febrile security competitions that plagued 

Europe and East Asia in earlier eras. In fact, US alliances are as useful 

in managing tensions among 1\merica's allies as they arc in constraining 

America's adversaries. 

NATO was always intended to keep the "Americans in" and the 

"Germans down" as well as the "Russians out"; US presence, along 

with the creation of a framework in which France and Germany were 

38 ()n deep institutionalizat1{l1l, sec (:dcstc A. \V'allander, "'Institutional Assets and ,-\daptabtlity: 

NATO after the Cold \Var,"' 5-t, 5 (\utumn 2000): 705-35; and Aldrich. 

"U.S.-I ~uropcan lntdltgcrrccCo·-Opcr·ati<m." 

39 Jesse C lohn:;on arHJt>rcrrc '''"'"'' 

Po!l~y Analj·JiJ 1, 1 

.·\shky I ,ccds. ''Do 

(lf l\lilit:u-i%cd Intcr~tafc 

Joi:10.2307 /3186107; Paul 

Po/l!iciJI Jde&T Reden; 82, 2 Qune 423-43, doi:10.2307/1957394; and Ve;\!1:l l)anilovic, "'I'hc 

Sources of Threat Credibility in Extended Deterrence," Jwmw! qf Conjiirl ReJ-o!ution 45, 3 (2001): 

3-+ 1-69, doi:l 0.1177/002200270! 045003005. 
101 

26 Paramerers47(2) Summer 2017 

incentivized to cooperate rather than compete with one another, would 

help stifle any resurgence of tensions between these historical rivals.·'" 

Similarly, US alliance guarantees in the o'\sia-Pacific were designed, in 

part, to create a climate of security in which Japan could be revived 

economically without threatening its neighbors, just as the expansion 

of NATO after the Cold War helped prevent incipient rivalries and 

territorial irredentism among former members of the \\'arsaw Pact.41 

US alliances keep things quiet in regions \l?ashington cannot ignore, 

thereby fostering a climate of peace in which J\mcrica and its partners 

can flourish. 

Fourth, US alliances impede dangerous geostrategic phenomena 

such as nuclear proliferation. As scholars such as Francis Gavin have 

emphasized, US security guarantees and forward deployments have 

played a critical role in convincing historically insecure, technologically 

advanced countries-Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, among 

others-to forego possession of the world's absolute weapon. In several 

of these cases, moreover, the United States has used the security leverage 

provided by alliance guarantees to dissuade allies from pursuing the 

bomb after they had given indications of their intent to start down that 

path:12 It~ as seems likely, a world with more nuclear powers is likely to 

be a more dangerous world in which crises more frequently take on a 

nuclear dimension and the risk of nuclear conflict is higher, then the 

value of American alliances looms large indeed. 

In sum, as the framers of the post-\vorld \X/ar II order understood, 

phenomena such as massive instability, arms racing, and violence in key 

regions would e\Tntually imperil the United States itself:13 \\'hatever 

modest reduction in short-term costs might come from pursuing a "tree 

hand" or isolationist strategy was thus more than lost by the expense 

of fighting and winning a major war to restore order. Accordingly, 

America's peacetime alliance system represents a cheaper, more prudent 

alternatiYe for maximizing US influence while also preventing raging 

instability by deterring aggression and managing rivalries among friends. 

The fact that so many observers seem to have forgotten why, precisely, 

America has alliances in the first place is an ironic testament to just how 

well the system has succeeded. 

Political Legitimacy and Consultation 

Beyond their military and geostrategic Yirtues, alliances provide 

important political benefits that facilitate the use of American power 

both internationally and with respect to the domestic audience. The chief 

political advantage of alliances is enhanced international legitimacy. 

43 J ,cffkr, Prepo!lffem!fi.:e qf PmPer. 
102 

REEVAlUATING D1P1 OMATIC & MiliTARY PowER Brands and Feaver 27 

Formal alliances and the partnership of allies-particularly democratic 

allies-in cooperative ventures confer the perceived legitimacy of 

multilateral action. This perception is especially important when 

an administration is unable to secure the formal legitimacy of a UN 

Security Council Resolution authorizing the use of force. In the case 

of the Kosovo conflict, for example, being able to conduct the mission 

under NATO auspices somewhat mitigated charges of "American 

unilateralism.''"~ Similarly, the ability of the United States to muster a 

coalition of the willing involving both NATO and Asia-Pacific allies 

in the Iraq \v'ar provided some rebuttal to critics who declaimed the 

invasion as a "unilateral" endeavor. 

Allied support also enhances the perceived legitimacy of the actions 

for domestic audiences, thus strengthening the political foundations for 

military ventures!' The willingness of other states to participate in a 

military intervention can signal that the resort to force is a wise and 

necessary move, has reasonable prospects for success, and will enjoy 

some minimal moral legitimacy. All of these factors can shore up public 

support and give the intervention greater political resilience should it 

prove more difficult than expected, and this international cooperation 

is easier to achienc in the framework oflongstanding military alliances. 

Finally, allies provide useful input on use of force decisions. 

Particularly when the deliberations involve long-standing treaty allies, 

US officials can have more honest discussions about difficult policy 

choices because the participants are "all in the family." Put another 

way, every US president resenTs the right to usc force unilaterally when 

I\merican interests demand. Yet as presidents have generally understood, 

the failure to persuade other partners to approve and to join America 

in the effort is itself a powerful cautionary warning:16 The need to make 

persuasive arguments to allies and partners is a useful disciplining device 

to prevent policy from running off the rails. 

Diplomatic Leverage and Cooperation 

Beyond their military, geostratcgic, and political impact, having 

formal military alliances greatly increases the diplomatic leverage US 

leaders can bring to bear on thorny international challenges. Formal 

alliances and long-standing partnerships give US leaders myriad fora 

in which to raise concerns and advocate favored courses of action. 

Europeans are obliged to listen to the United States on European issues 

because \\'ashington's leading role in NATO makes it the central player 

in European defense; the same dynamic prevails vis-a-vis US allies in 

the Asia-Pacific. To give just one concrete example, the United States has 

repeatedly prevented the European Union from lifting its arms embargo 

on China because of the security leverage it has through NATO."' 

44 hn· an argument 

Koso\~O sec Robert Kagan, 

April 2004): 

Juring the 

2 (March/ 

45 Joseph lvf. Grieco ct al., «Let's Get a Second 

\mcdcan Public Support for \\'ar," Intematiollal StttdieJ· 

doi:10.1111 fl.1468~2478.2011.00660.x. 

International Institutions and 

55, no. 2 (lunc 2011): 563-83, 

46 l<'or instance, the Bush was stymied un the Sudan 

re:-:t of the international community to Condolcc;.:a Rice, 1\ro nte'DerJ·to,,wr: 

ti[;- 1far.• in fF(uhin~~ton (New York: Cro\VH Publi:'hcr::;, 2011)) 582-85. 

47 Sec Glenn Kc:-:~lcr, "Rice \V'arns Europe Not to Sell A.dvanced \\'eaponry to Chin:1," 

W'"mhi11gton PoJI, J\farch 21, 2005. 
103 

28 Parameters47(2) Summer 2017 

Having allies also increases US diplomatic options vis-a-vis 

adversaries. Here, the danger of entrapment (getting drawn into conflicts 

America might otherwise have avoided) must be weighed against 

the benefits of having more options in dealing with the ad\Trsaries 

\vashington cannot ignore. One such benefit is the increased range 

of signaling options available to strategists during an unfolding crisis. 

Consider US efforts to constrain the North Korean nuclear program. 

Without military alliances with South Korea and Japan, the United States 

would have only two baskets of military options short of actual resort to 

force in order to signal resolve and to shape North Korean calculations: 

either taking relatively meaningless actions, such as changing the alert 

levels in the homeland or in other theaters, or taking relatively dramatic 

escalations, such as moving an aircraft carrier battle group within range 

of the Korean peninsula or flying sorties close to the North Korean 

border. \\!ith South Korea and Japan as allies, however, \Vashington 

has a wider variety of midrange actions-increasing missile defense 

capability or readiness in theater, raising local alert levels, and so on!" 

These steps give leaders ways of responding, and thereby influencing 

diplomatic negotiations, while also better positioning America to 

respond if diplomacy fails. 

Finally, alliances enhance US diplomatic efforts on security issues 

bevond those directly related to collective defense. The United States 

ha~ used its alliances as vehicles for cooperation on counterterrorism 

(both prior to and since September 11, 2001), as well as for countering 

cybercrime, proliferation, and piracy; addressing climate change; and 

responding to other challenges. All of these eftorts involve substantial 

intelligence sharing, information pooling, and coordination across law 

enforcetnent and other lines of action. And all of this coordination 

is greatly facilitated when conducted thmugh deeply institutionalized 

alliances and long-standing cooperative· relationships. 49 

The United States has, of course, also been able to achieve tactical 

cooperation even from long-standing adversaries on issues such as 

counterterrorism, but such cooperation is frequently less significant, 

harder to obtain, and comes at a higher price in terms of the reciprocal 

American "gives" required in transactional relationships. It is thus with 

good reason that, when an international crisis breaks or a new global 

challenge emerges, the first phone calls made by US leaders are usually 

to America's closest allies. 

Economic Benefits 

As noted, the economic costs of US alliance commitments are lower 

than conventionally assumed because the alliances allow \Vashington to 

project military power much more cheaply than otherwise would be the 

case. Alliances also generate numerous indirect economic benefits-so 

many that they may constitute a net profit center for the United States. 

As a recent analysis of the deployment of US troops abroad and of US 

treaty obligations shows, both of these forms of security commitments 

48 Sc~,. for example,. the US-South Korean incremental tit-for-tat rc~pon"'c _to n;ccnt North 

Korean mdttary provocahon::>, Dan "U.S . .Anny and Sourh Korean Military Re::;pond to 

North Korea·~ Launch with Missile W'fLrhington Po.f!,July 4, 2017. 

-19 Art, Grand Stmt~gy, 201 ··2. 
104 

REEVAlUATING DIPlOMATIC & MiliTARY POWlR Brands and Feaver 29 

are correlated with several key economic indicators, including US 

bilateral trade and global bilateral tradc 50 The more US troops are 

deployed to a given country, the greater US bilateral trade is with the 

country in question. Furthermore, the effect extends to non-US global 

bilateral trade: "Countries with U.S. security commitments conduct 

more trade with one another than they would otherwise." Adding all 

the economic costs and benefits of these treaty commitments together 

produces the estimate that the alliances offer rnore than three times as 

much gain as they cost. 

American alliance commitments advance US economic interests in 

other ways, as well. For decades, US diplomats and trade negotiators 

have used the security leverage provided by alliance commitments 

to extract more favorable terms in bilateral financial and commercial 

arrangements. During the Cold \'?ar, \\/est Germany made "offset" 

payments to the United States-transfers to shore up the sagging US 

balance of payments-as a means of pre-serving the American troop 

presence in Europe." 1 

More recently, American negotiators obtained more favorable 

terms in the South Korea-United States trade agreement than the 

European Union did in a parallel agreement with Seoul. "Failure would 

look like a setback to the political and security relationship," one US 

official noted; this dynamic gave \Vashington additional negotiating 

leverage." 5

2 Additionally, as other scholars have shown, the US willingness 

to defend other states and police the global commons reinforces the 

willingness of other countries to accept a global order which includes 

favorable economic privileges for the United States, snch as the dollar 

as the primary global reserve currency. 51 And, of course, by sustaining a 

climate of overall geopolitical stability in which trade and free enterprise 

can flourish, alliances bolster American and global prosperity in broader 

ways, as well. 

Conclusion 

The balance sheet on America's alliances, then, is really not much 

of a balance at all. There are costs and dangers associated with US 

alliances, and some of these arc real enough. But many of those costs 

and dangers are exaggerated, blown out of proportion, or rest on a 

simple misunderstanding of what the United States would have to do in 

the world even if it terminated n"cry one of its alliances. The benefits of 

US alliances, conversely, are far more diverse and substantial than critics 

tend to acknowledge. In sum, any grand strategy premised on putting 

America first should recognize that by creating and sustaining its global 

alliance network, _America has indeed put itself first for generations. 

50 l)anid Egd and I Inward Shatz, '"J~conom.ic Benefit~ <)f Ll.S. Ovcr:->cas Security Con11nitmcnts 

Appear to Outweigh Co:'t~," The RAND Blog, September 23, 2016, http:/ /www.rand.org 

/blog/ 2016/09/ economic -bcncfi ts-o f- us-overseas-security-commitments. h tmL 

51 FrancisJ Gavin, Gold. 1958-

1971 (Cl1"pd llill: University of 

52 Stephen G. "Brooks, G. John 

Am('I~Ca: The Case against Retrenchment," I!!temm'iO!UII s,,mn/y 

53 W'orld 
105 

30 Par.1metcrs47(2) Summer 2017 

If this is the case, then why have alliances proven to be such 

lightning rods for both academic and presidential criticism of late? 

Part of the answer lies in the dynamic noted at the outset of this piece. 

The dangers and risks inherent in US alliances are mostly obvious and 

intuitive, whereas the benefits are often subtler, more indirect, or require 

digging deeper into the underlying logic of American internationalism 

to understand. Those benefits, moreoYer, often reside in things that do 

not happen-and are thus harder to observe, let alone measure. Yet part 

of the answer also undoubtedly lies in the fact that American alliances, 

like so much of American foreign policy today, appear to be in danger of 

becoming a Yictim of their own success. The fact that US alliances haye 

been so effective, for so long, in maximizing US influence and creating 

an advantageous international environment has made it all too easy to 

take their benefits for granted. It would be a sad irony if the United 

States turned away from its alliances, only then to realize just how much 

it had squandered. 

American alliances do not function pet·fectly, of course, and today 

as at virtually every point since the late 1940s, there are challenges on 

the horizon: the relative decline of many key OS allies vis-a-Yis US 

adversaries, the difficulties of prodding partr~crs in Europe and Asia 

to do more on defense, the threat posed by coercion and intimidation 

meant to change the geopolitical status quo without triggering alliance 

redlines. Likewise, reasonable observers can debate what military strategy 

the tlnited States should pursue for upholding its alliance commitments 

in the Baltic or the western Pacific. But the vexations of addressing 

these challenges within the framework of America's existing alliances 

are undoubtedly less than the costs and perils to which the United States 

would be exposed without its alliances. Winston Churchill had it right 

when he said, "There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, 

and that is fighting without them." The US policy community would do 

well to heed this admonition today. 

Hal Brands 

Dr. Hal Brands is the Henry A 1-:.issingcr Distinguished Professor of Global 

,\ffairs at the Johns Hopkins School of ,\dvanced International Studies and a 

Senior Fdlo\V at the Center for Strategic and Assesstnents. 

Peter D. Feaver 

Dr. Peter n Feaver, a professor of political science and public policy at Duke 

Uni\'ersity, directs the Triangle Institute for Security Studies and the Duke 

Program in .-\mcrican Grand Strategy. 
106 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Question: 

Questions for the Record from Representative Ann Wagner 

NATO at 70: An Indispensable Alliance 

March 13,2019 

Mr, Chollet, I am deeply concerned that the recent authoritarian drift in Hungary, Turkey, 

Romania, and elsewhere is hurling NATO's ability to eftectively deter adversaries like Russia and 

China. How can the United States work with our NATO partners to reverse democratic backsliding 

within the alliance? 

Mr. Derek Chollet: NATO is facing a growing crisis within its ranks. As an alliance rooted in 

common values, the organization is about much more than armaments and military capabilities. 

The Washington Treaty clarifies those values, stipulating that Members States are ''determined to 

safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilization of their peoples, founded on the 

principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law." Therefore, any form of 

democratic backsliding is a serious threat to the purpose of the Alliance. 

While NATO's day-to-day work focuses largely on bolstering territorial defense and deterring 

aggressors, there remains ample opportunities for combatting the rise of authoritarianism within 

the Alliance. More specifically, the United States and its partners can use NATO's mechanism 

for political deliberation- the North Atlantic Council (NAC)- as a venue to work with Member 

States who arc not fully living up to the Alliance's core values. The U.S. can raise these concerns 

during the weekly meeting of Permanent Representatives, or at special NAC meetings of 

Ministers of State or Heads ofGovermnent. 

Congress also has an impottant role to play in keeping our allies faithful to NATO's founding 

values. One venue for such engagement is NATO's Parliamentary Assembly (NATO PA). While 

this body is not an official component ofNATO, it is an important consultative mechanism that 

brings together parliamentarians from across the organization's Member States, Congress should 

use this forum to foster frank conversations about embracing democratic principles. 

Finally, NATO must guard against democratic backsliding caused by meddling adversaries. 

Countries such as China and Russia are adept at identifying and exacerbating social cleavages, 

leading to the rise of extremist candidates and civil strife. Therefore, the United States and its 

NATO partners should combat its adversaries' use of methods short of war, such as election 

interference and propaganda, in order to protect the integrity of our democratic political 

processes. 

Question:, 

Mr. Brzezinkski, I'm glad you mentioned Georgian and Ukrainian accession to NATO. Many of 

our newer members, such as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Poland, have proven invaluable and 

committed partners. How might NATO countries work with Russian interlocutors to offer Ukraine 

and Georgia a path to membership without unduly antagonizing Russia? 
107 

Æ 

Mr. Ian Brzezinkski: The accession to NATO by Ukraine and Georgia would in no-way threaten 

any legitimate Russian interest. It would in no way threaten Russia's territorial integrity. The only 

thing that NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia would antagonize would be President 

Putin's revanchist ambitions, including his efforts to reassert Moscow's control over the space of 

the former Soviet Union and part of what was once the occupied Soviet Bloc. 

Any decision regarding NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is an issue between solely 

the members of the Alliance and these two democracies, respectively. There is no role for any third 

party, including Russia, in such decisions. Russia cannot be allowed to have any say over the 

legitimate transatlantic aspirations of any European nation, including NATO membership. 

It is also important to remember that NATO member states, including Latvia, Lithuania, and 

Norway have bordered Russia proper for many years. Their NATO membership has helped 

normalize and stabilize their relations with Russia just as NATO membership has for the other 

NATO member states of Central Europe. There is no reason why NATO membership for Ukraine 

and Georgia would be any different. 

In response to Moscow's invasions of Ukraine and Georgia, the West's should further limit its 

engagement with Russia, pa1iicularly its senior officials. Economic sanctions should be 

strengthened as part of this strategy. 

With that said, some consultations with selected members of the Russian media, academia, and 

officialdom, including members of the Duma, to share perspectives on issues of concern and to 

explore areas of potential collaboration, such as arms control and the Arctic melt, are in order. 

They can play a constructive role in an effort to foster a more stable and peaceful relationship with 

Russia. 

These consultations can and should be used to articulate the falseness and illegitimacy of the 

assertions that underpin President Putin's efforts to prevent nations of Europe from pursuing 

NATO and EU membership. They can also underscore how NATO membership, by providing 

greater security for Georgia and Ukraine, will make it easier these two democracies to normalize 

their relations with Russia amidst the fresh experience of Russian aggression - assuming that 

Moscow returns the territories it has seized from these two nations.