RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2929-22

 A-2930-22

NEW JERSEY DIVISION 

OF CHILD PROTECTION 

AND PERMANENCY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

I.J.R. and Z.T., JR., 

 Defendants-Appellants, 

and 

THE BIOLOGICAL FATHER OF 

R.T.R., WHOMSOEVER HE MAY BE, 

 Defendant. 

_________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

GUARDIANSHIP OF P.D.R. 

and R.T.R., minors. 

_________________________________

Submitted April 15, 2024 – Decided May 20, 2024 

Before Judges Gilson, Bishop-Thompson, and Jacobs. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2929-22

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Hudson County, 

Docket No. FG-09-0105-23.

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant I.J.R. (James Daniel O'Kelly, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs). 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant Z.T., Jr. (Mark Edward Kleiman, Designated 

Counsel, on the briefs). 

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for 

respondent (Janet Greenberg Cohen, Assistant Attorney 

General, of counsel; Meaghan M. Goulding, Deputy 

Attorney General, on the brief). 

Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, Law 

Guardian, attorney for minors (Meredith Alexis 

Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Melissa 

R. Vance, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of 

counsel and on the briefs).

PER CURIAM 

 I.J.R. (Irene) appeals from a judgment terminating her parental rights to 

her two sons, P.D.R. (Paul) and R.T.R. (Robbie).1 In a consolidated appeal, 

Z.T., Jr. (Zane), who is the biological father of Paul, appeals from the judgment 

terminating his parental rights. The judgment granted guardianship of Paul and 

1

 We use initials and fictitious names to protect privacy interests and the 

confidentiality of the record. See R. 1:38-3(d)(12). 
3 A-2929-22

Robbie to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) with 

the plan that both children will be adopted by their resource parent, K.A. (Kay). 

 Irene and Zane argue that the family court erred in finding the Division 

proved by clear and convincing evidence the four prongs of the best-interests 

test necessary for termination of parental rights. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). 

In opposition, the Division and Law Guardian urge this court to affirm the 

judgment and allow the adoptions to proceed. Having reviewed the record, the 

parties' contentions, and the applicable law, we affirm the judgment because the 

family court correctly applied the law and its findings of fact are supported by 

substantial, credible evidence. 

 I.

 We summarize the facts from the record, including the evidence presented 

at a four-day guardianship trial conducted in March and April 2023. Irene is the 

biological mother of three children: L.R. (Lisa), born in April 2014; Paul, born 

in August 2020; and Robbie, born in October 2021. As noted, Zane is Paul's 

biological father. Irene never identified, and the Division could not locate, the 

biological father of Robbie. Lisa was removed from Irene's care, and Irene's 

parental rights to Lisa were terminated at an earlier proceeding. Kay, who had 

been Lisa's resource parent, subsequently adopted Lisa. Consequently, in this 
4 A-2929-22

consolidated opinion, we address the termination of the parental rights to Paul 

and Robbie. 

 The Division's involvement with Irene began in February 2014, when it 

received a referral reporting that Irene had tested positive for phencyclidine 

(PCP) and marijuana when she was seven months pregnant with Lisa. The 

Division offered Irene various substance abuse services; however, on the day 

that Irene gave birth to Lisa, both Irene and Lisa tested positive for PCP. Lisa 

was admitted into the neonatal intensive care unit (NICU) due to her withdrawal 

symptoms, and she remained in the NICU for over a month.

 Following Lisa's discharge from the hospital, the Division obtained 

custody of Lisa for several months and then returned Lisa to Irene's care in 

September 2015. Over the next five years, Lisa was removed from Irene's care 

twice more due to Irene's drug use. Ultimately, Irene's parental rights to Lisa 

were terminated in May 2021, and, thereafter, Kay adopted Lisa. 

 Meanwhile, in August 2020, the Division received a referral alleging that 

Irene had given birth to Paul, Paul had tested positive for PCP, and Irene had 

tested positive for PCP and marijuana. Paul was treated in the NICU for six 

days after being diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome and exhibiting 

signs of withdrawal, including body tremors and constant sucking. Irene was 

interviewed and admitted to using PCP and marijuana prior to Paul's birth. 
5 A-2929-22

When Paul was discharged from the hospital, the Division removed Paul from 

Irene's care and placed him with Kay. Paul suffers from several medical issues, 

including a cardiac murmur, torticollis, a spinal bulge, and periodic fevers. Paul 

also struggled to eat and swallow normally and thus required specialty care, in 

addition to regular visits with a cardiologist. 

 In September 2020, Dr. Alison Strasser Winston conducted a 

psychological evaluation of Irene and noted that Irene appeared to be under the 

influence of drugs and "present[ed] with multiple factors that would impair her 

ability to safely parent her children." Winston recommended that Irene engage 

in therapeutically-supervised visitation with her children, attend in-patient and 

out-patient treatment for her substance abuse, and receive individual 

psychotherapy. 

 Thereafter, Irene attended and completed in-patient treatment from 

October 2020 to February 2021. Irene then began out-patient treatment but was 

discharged in March 2021 because she tested positive for PCP during treatment. 

Over the next six months, Irene reentered out-patient treatment at several 

facilities but was discharged due to her non-compliance and ongoing use of 

alcohol, marijuana, and PCP. Irene also failed to attend the intake appointment 

for the therapeutically-supervised visitation with her children. 
6 A-2929-22

 Irene identified Zane as the potential father of Paul. In March 2021, a 

Division worker spoke with Zane, but he denied knowing Irene and requested 

that the Division cease contact with him. Several months later, Zane 

acknowledged he had slept with Irene, and both he and his mother indicated their 

interest in meeting Paul and being involved in his upbringing. Subsequently, in

June 2021, Zane and Paul completed DNA testing, which confirmed that Zane 

was Paul's biological father. 

 In July 2021, Zane visited with Paul and was informed of Paul's special 

needs, medical issues, developmental delays, and doctors' appointments. Zane 

explained that he lived with his mother and expressed a desire to have Paul live 

with them. Thereafter, Zane attended supervised visits with Paul. 

 In December 2021, Zane attended a psychological evaluation with 

Winston, who recommended that he engage in parenting skills classes, 

individual psychotherapy, and a support group focused on caring for medicallyfragile children. Winston also urged Zane and his mother to attend all of Paul's 

medical appointments. Winston noted that Zane did not have any serious mental 

health or substance abuse issues, but she expressed concern because he was a 

"first-time parent of a young, special-needs child . . . who lacks adequate coping 

strategies" for dealing with the stressors associated with being Paul's primary 

caregiver. 
7 A-2929-22

 Irene gave birth to Robbie in October 2021. The Division received a 

referral alleging that after Robbie's birth, Irene had tested positive for marijuana 

and PCP, and Robbie had tested positive for PCP. Robbie was placed in the 

NICU for three weeks and was diagnosed with Neonatal Abstinence Syndrome 

that caused him to have difficulty feeding and swallowing, as well as muscle 

rigidity. Following Robbie's discharge from the hospital, the Division removed 

him from Irene's care and placed him with Kay. 

 Thereafter, the Division continued to offer Irene services, including 

individual therapy, parenting skills classes, substance abuse evaluations, and 

anger management services. Irene, however, failed to comply with treatment 

and tested positive for PCP, alcohol, cocaine, and fentanyl. In July 2022, the 

family court relieved the Division of its obligation to provide reasonable efforts 

to Irene pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(c). 

 Meanwhile, Zane failed to participate in the recommended therapy and 

parenting skills classes. Accordingly, in April 2022, he was discharged from 

the therapy and parenting skills program. In December 2022, however, Zane 

completed a parenting skills program at a different facility and engaged in 

individual therapy. Nevertheless, he sporadically attended Paul's medical 

appointments, and when he did attend, his participation was minimal. Zane also 
8 A-2929-22

failed to join any of the recommended support groups for parents of medicallyfragile children. 

 In August 2022, the family court approved the Division's permanency plan 

of termination of Irene's and Zane's parental rights followed by adoptions by 

Kay. The guardianship trial was conducted on March 13, March 20, March 27, 

and April 3, 2023. The court heard testimony from five witnesses: Winston; 

Kay; Rashidat Aladesanmi, a registered nurse with the Division; Jason 

Smartwood, an adoption caseworker; and Dr. Karen Wells, a psychologist with 

expertise in attachment and bonding. Neither Irene nor Zane testified. 

Winston was certified as an expert in psychology without objection. She 

testified about the psychological and bonding evaluations she had conducted 

with both Irene and Zane. Winston explained that from January 2019 to 

December 2022, she completed five psychological evaluations of Irene. She 

also testified that she had completed two psychological evaluations of Zane in 

December 2021 and November 2022. 

 Regarding her evaluations of Irene, Winston detailed her concerns about 

Irene's long-standing history of PCP use, Irene's lack of understanding as to the 

triggers for her substance abuse, and Irene's tendency to minimize her substance 

use. Winston also discussed Irene's history of being sexually abused and 

neglected as a child and its impact on Irene's ability to overcome her substance 
9 A-2929-22

abuse issues. Winston explained that following her second evaluation of Irene 

in September 2020, she consistently diagnosed Irene with severe PCP use 

disorder, moderate alcohol use disorder, unspecified personality disorder, 

unspecified bipolar and related disorder, a personal history of sexual abuse in 

childhood, and a personal history of neglect in childhood. Winston opined that 

it was not, and would never be, safe for the children to return to Irene's care. 

 Concerning her psychological evaluations of Zane, Winston testified that 

as of December 2021, Zane had not attended many of Paul's medical 

appointments and he had a "cursory knowledge" of Paul's special needs. 

Winston testified that it was significant that as of the second evaluation in 

November 2022, Zane had missed approximately fifty-five appointments and 

was not consistently attending early intervention sessions. She diagnosed Zane 

with an unspecified personality disorder and testified that he continually failed 

to adjust his lifestyle to accommodate Paul's medical and developmental needs. 

She opined that reunifying Zane with Paul would place Paul at an extremely 

high risk of harm. 

Winston also testified regarding the bonding evaluations she conducted 

with Irene, Zane, and Kay. She explained that Paul and Robbie appeared to have 

a "secure and emotional attachment" to Kay. She also opined that Paul and 

Robbie had insecure bonds with Irene, despite being familiar with her. Winston 
10 A-2929-22

explained that Paul had an insecure bond with Zane, and Paul viewed him as a 

visiting companion rather than a caregiver. Ultimately, Winston opined that 

separating the three siblings from one another would cause them serious 

emotional harm, and neither Irene nor Zane could give Paul or Robbie the 

permanency that Kay was able to provide. 

 Wells was certified as an expert in psychology, attachment, and bonding 

without objection and testified on behalf of the Law Guardian. She detailed the 

psychological evaluations she conducted on Irene and Zane and the bonding 

evaluations she conducted with Irene, Zane, Kay, and the children. Wells opined 

that Paul and Robbie did not view Irene as their psychological parent because 

they had not been in her care since birth and Kay had provided them day-to-day 

care. She also expressed concern over Irene's ability to be physically, 

psychologically, and emotionally present for her children given her history of 

relapse. Based on her testing and interviews of Irene, she concluded that Irene 

would not be capable of safely parenting Paul or Robbie then or in the 

foreseeable future. 

 Wells also expressed concern regarding Zane's neglect of Paul due to his

inconsistent attendance at Paul's appointments and intervention services. Wells 

opined that Paul viewed Zane as a familiar adult but that Paul would not suffer 

any emotional or psychological harm if permanently separated from Zane 
11 A-2929-22

because Paul did not view him as a psychological parent. Conversely, Wells 

opined that both Paul and Robbie had secure bonds with Kay and both children 

would regress if separated from Kay. 

 On May 10, 2023, the family court issued an oral and written decision 

finding that the Division proved by clear and convincing evidence each of the 

four prongs of the best-interests test necessary for the termination of Irene's and 

Zane's parental rights. In making that decision, the court considered all the 

evidence presented at trial, including the witnesses' testimonies and the 

documentary evidence. The court then analyzed each prong of the best-interests 

test as applied to Irene and Zane. 

 Under prong one, the court found that the Division presented clear and 

convincing evidence that Paul's and Robbie's health and development had been 

and would continue to be endangered by a parental relationship with either Irene 

or Zane. In that regard, the court found that Irene's extensive history of PCP use 

prevented her from caring for Paul and Robbie. The court credited Winston's 

and Wells' testimonies that the children would be at an "unimaginable" or "high" 

risk of harm if reunited with Irene. The court also found that Irene's consistent 

failure to comply with services and treatment offered by the Division—

including her premature departure from facilities, positive drug tests, and non-
12 A-2929-22

compliance with parenting and anger management classes—significantly 

impaired her ability to parent the children. 

 As to Zane, the court found that he lacked "a commitment to and 

understanding of his duties in raising a medically[-]fragile child" like Paul. The 

court noted that Zane repeatedly failed to attend Paul's medical appointments 

and participate in early intervention services. Moreover, the court found that 

Zane failed to make any changes to his work schedule to accommodate Paul's 

appointments or to take advantage of increased visitation time with Paul. 

Additionally, the court determined that it was unreasonable to prolong the 

children's foster care placement until Irene might obtain a significant period of 

sobriety or until Zane might make meaningful progress complying with the 

Division's recommendations.

 As to prong two, the court found that the Division had presented 

"uncontroverted and credible evidence" that Irene and Zane were unable or 

unwilling to eliminate the harm facing Paul and Robbie. The court cited to 

Irene's continued use of PCP and the cycle of Irene "beginning substance abuse 

treatment, leaving prematurely, not benefitting from what she learned, and 

relapsing." Although the court found that Zane was not deliberately putting Paul 

in danger, the court found that Zane expected that Paul's activities would revolve 

around his work schedule. The court also credited Winston's and Wells' 
13 A-2929-22

opinions that any further delay in permanent placement of the children would 

add to the children's harm. 

 In analyzing the third prong, the court found that the Division had made a 

"comprehensive number of reasonable efforts" to remedy the circumstances that 

led to the children's removal. The court observed that the Division had offered 

Irene numerous services, including referrals to substance abuse treatment 

facilities, urine screens, hair follicle testing, therapeutic visitation, 

transportation services, parenting skills classes, individual counseling, and 

psychological, psychiatric, and bonding evaluations. The court also found that 

the Division had provided Zane with DNA paternity testing, parenting and 

individual counseling, psychological and bonding evaluations, supervised 

visitation, notice of Paul's medical appointments, and a list of support groups 

for parents of medically-fragile children. 

 Moreover, the court found that there were no alternatives to adoption and 

that the Division had assessed numerous placement options that were ultimately 

ruled out. In finding that kinship legal guardianship was not a viable option, the 

court found that Kay's desire to adopt was "informed and unequivocal" given 

the children's extensive medical needs that required continued monitoring. 

 Lastly, as to prong four, the court found that prolonging permanent 

placement when "the parents lack the ability to care for the child[ren] for a 
14 A-2929-22

protracted period of time" did not serve the children's best interests. The court 

relied on Winston's and Wells' "uncontested evaluations" and opinions that 

terminating the parental rights of Irene and Zane would not cause more harm 

than good. Additionally, the court credited Wells' opinion that severing the 

children's bond with Kay would likely result in "extensive and pervasive 

regression in [the children's] overall functioning." 

 II. 

On appeal, Irene contends that the family court erred in terminating her 

parental rights to Paul and Robbie and challenges the court's findings on prongs 

three and four of the best-interests test. In that regard, Irene argues that the 

family court failed to properly consider kinship legal guardianship with Kay or 

placement of the children with Paul's paternal grandmother, T.R. (Tara), as 

alternatives to terminating her parental rights. Irene also asserts that the court's 

conclusion that terminating her parental rights would not do more harm than 

good was based on "an incomplete record and insufficient legal conclusions." 

 Zane challenges the family court's conclusions on each of the four prongs. 

He argues the court erred in considering Zane's employment status as evidence 

that his parental relationship would continue to endanger Paul. He also contends 

the family court erred in finding that he was unable or unwilling to eliminate the 

harm facing Paul. Third, Zane alleges the family court failed to properly 
15 A-2929-22

consider appointing Tara as a kinship legal guardian for Paul and as an 

alternative to adoption by Kay. Lastly, Zane argues the court ignored the 

legislative amendment favoring kinship care over adoption in finding that 

termination of his parental rights to Paul would not do more harm than good. 

 Having considered all these arguments, we reject them because they are 

not supported by the record and the governing law. Accordingly, we affirm the 

judgment. 

A. The Standard of Review. 

 An appellate court's review of a trial court's decision to terminate parental 

rights is limited. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.J.R., 452 N.J. 

Super. 454, 468 (App. Div. 2017) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 

M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 278-79 (2007)). An appellate court will not reverse the 

trial court's "termination decision 'when there is substantial credible evidence in 

the record to support the court's findings.'" Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008)). So, "[o]nly when the trial court's 

conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate 

court intervene and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of 

justice." E.P., 196 N.J. at 104 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 

G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). No deference is given to the trial court's 
16 A-2929-22

interpretations of the law, which are reviewed de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 

232, 245-46 (2012). 

B. The Four Prongs for Termination of Parental Rights. 

 To terminate parental rights, the Division must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence each element of the "best interests of the child" test, 

codified by N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). M.M., 189 N.J. at 280. That test is 

comprised of the following four prongs: 

(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been 

or will continue to be endangered by the parental 

relationship; 

(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the 

harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to 

provide a safe and stable home for the child and the 

delay of permanent placement will add to the harm; 

(3) The [D]ivision has made reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the 

circumstances which led to the child's placement 

outside the home and the court has considered 

alternatives to termination of parental rights; and 

(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more

harm than good. 

[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).] 

These prongs "are not discrete and separate," but rather "relate to and overlap 

with one another to provide a comprehensive standard that identifies a child's 

best interests." In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 348 (1999). 
17 A-2929-22

 Effective July 2021, various sections of statutes concerning child 

protective services were amended. See L. 2021, c. 154. Those amendments 

included a change to prong two of the best-interests test. The Legislature 

removed from that prong the following sentence: "Such harm may include 

evidence that separating the child from his resource family parents would cause 

serious and enduring emotional or psychological harm to the child." L. 2021, c.

154, § 9; see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) (2015). Accordingly, any harm a child 

might suffer by removing him or her from the resource parent should no longer 

be considered by a court under prong two. Nevertheless, a court may still 

consider the child's bond with the resource parent, including harm resulting from 

the destruction of that bond, under prong four of the best-interests test. N.J. 

Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. D.C.A., 256 N.J. 4, 26 (2023) (explaining 

that in amending N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(2) in 2021, the Legislature "acted to 

preclude trial courts from considering harm resulting from the termination of a 

child's relationship with resource parents when they assess parental fitness under 

the second prong, but not to generally bar such evidence from any aspect of the 

trial court's inquiry"). 

1. Prongs One and Two. 

 Under the first prong of the best-interests test, "the Division must prove 

harm that 'threatens the child's health and will likely have continuing deleterious 
18 A-2929-22

effects on the child.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 25 

(2013) (quoting K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352). The concern is not only with actual 

harm from the parent-child relationship, but also with the risk of harm to the 

child and the effect of harm over time on the child's health and development. In 

re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 383 (1999); K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 348. 

In that regard, courts "need not wait to act until a child is actually irreparably 

impaired by parental inattention or neglect." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 383. "When 

the condition or behavior of a parent causes a risk of harm . . . and the parent is 

unwilling or incapable of obtaining appropriate treatment for that condition, the 

first subpart" of the best-interests test has been proven. N.J. Div. of Youth & 

Fam. Servs. v. H.R., 431 N.J. Super. 212, 223 (App. Div. 2013). 

 The focus is on the "cumulative effect, over time, of harms arising from 

the home life provided by the parent." M.M., 189 N.J. at 289. The harm also 

need not be physical as "[s]erious and lasting emotional or psychological harm 

to children as the result of the action or inaction of their biological parents can 

constitute injury sufficient to authorize the termination of parental rights." In re 

Guardianship of K.L.F., 129 N.J. 32, 44 (1992). A parent's "withdrawal of . . . 

solicitude, nurture, and care for an extended period of time is in itself a harm 

that endangers the health and development of the child." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 

379.
19 A-2929-22

 Prong two relates to parental unfitness. K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352. The 

inquiry "centers on whether the parent is able to remove the danger facing the 

child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 451 (2012) 

(citing K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 352). This prong "may be met by indications of 

parental dereliction and irresponsibility, such as the parent's continued or 

recurrent drug abuse, the inability to provide a stable and protective home, [and] 

the withholding of parental attention and care." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 353. "The 

determinative issue is whether the circumstances surrounding the parental 

relationship, including any relationships with [others], cause harm to the child." 

M.M., 189 N.J. at 289. 

 A court may consider elements that apply both to prongs one and two 

because these prongs "are related to one another, and evidence that supports one 

informs and may support the other as part of the comprehensive basis for 

determining the best interests of the child." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 379. 

 Zane argues that the family court erred in finding that the Division proved 

by clear and convincing evidence prongs one and two. In support of that 

argument, Zane notes that he does not have a "specifically definable mental 

pathology," and has no history of substance abuse, domestic violence, or 

criminality. Zane further contends that he has never physically or mentally 

abused Paul, and that the court's sole basis for its findings was his inability to 
20 A-2929-22

make changes to his work schedule to accommodate Paul's appointments and 

services. 

 Initially, as noted, the "harm" that prong one contemplates need not be 

physical, K.L.F., 129 N.J. at 44, and thus the absence of mental and physical 

abuse of Paul by Zane is not dispositive. Here, the family court found that the 

harm Zane posed to Paul "manifest[ed] itself in his lack of commitment to and 

understanding of how to raise a medically[-]fragile child" like Paul. The court 

did not consider solely Zane's employment schedule in making that finding. 

Instead, the court found Zane repeatedly failed to "attend [Paul's] medical 

appointments and participate in [Paul's] [e]arly [i]ntervention services, despite 

repeated recommendations by . . . Winston and the caseworker." 

 The court emphasized Winston's testimony that Paul requires a caregiver 

who not only takes Paul to his medical appointments nearly every day, but also 

understands the work required between services to ensure Paul's progress. 

Additionally, the court highlighted Zane's denial of some of Paul's medical 

needs, including Paul's partial deafness and complex hand condition, which 

raised concerns about Zane's ability to provide appropriate care. 

 Contrary to Zane's contentions, there is substantial, credible evidence in 

the record supporting the family court's findings under prongs one and two, 

including Winston's and Wells' unrebutted expert testimonies. Zane consistently 
21 A-2929-22

missed Paul's medical appointments despite Winston's recommendation that he 

attend them all. Moreover, Zane failed to join any of the recommended support 

groups for parents of medically-fragile children. Both experts also opined that 

Zane could not care for Paul at the time of the trial, nor would he be able to care 

for him in the foreseeable future. Lastly, both experts opined that delaying a 

permanent placement of Paul would add to the harm given his significant 

medical needs. 

2. Prong Three. 

 Prong three requires the Division to have made "reasonable efforts to 

provide services to help the parent correct the circumstances which led to the 

child's placement outside the home" and to have "considered alternatives to 

termination of parental rights." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(3). Reasonable efforts 

"depend on the facts and circumstances" of the case. N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. 

Servs. v. R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 557 (2014). Generally, the Division must "provide 

services to the family according to a case plan, including enlisting the assistance 

of relatives, providing direct services, or providing referrals to community 

services providers." D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 387. The Division "must monitor the 

services, change them as needs arise, and identify and strive to overcome 

barriers to service provision or service utilization." R.G., 217 N.J. at 557 

(quoting D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 387). The Division should, among other things, 
22 A-2929-22

"encourage, foster and maintain" the parent-child bond, "promote and assist in 

visitation," and inform the parent of "appropriate measures he or she should 

pursue" to strengthen their relationship. D.M.H., 161 N.J. at 390. 

 Further, the Division must also "perform a reasonable investigation of 

[timely-presented alternative caretakers] that is fair, but also sensitive to the 

passage of time and the child's critical need for finality and permanency." N.J. 

Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.S., 433 N.J. Super. 69, 87 (App. Div. 2013). 

Nevertheless, "[d]elay of permanency or reversal of termination based on the 

Division's noncompliance with its statutory obligation is warranted only when 

it is in the best interests of the child." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. 

K.L.W., 419 N.J. Super. 568, 581 (App. Div. 2011). 

 Both Irene and Zane argue that the trial court did not properly consider 

kinship legal guardianship with Kay or Tara as an alternative to termination of 

their parental rights. They argue that the court ignored the 2021 amendments, 

L. 2021, c. 154, to the Kinship Legal Guardianship Act, N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -

7.

 Irene and Zane rely on the following language added in the 2021 

amendments: 

Kinship care is the preferred resource for children who 

must be removed from their birth parents because use 

of kinship care maintains children's connections with 
23 A-2929-22

their families. There are many benefits to placing

children with relatives or other kinship caregivers, such 

as increased stability and safety as well as the ability to 

maintain family connections and cultural traditions. 

[L. 2021, c. 154 § 1(b).] 

In citing to this language, Zane and Irene argue that the Legislature proclaimed 

kinship care as the preferred plan for children who are removed from their 

parents. Contrary to this expansive interpretation, the 2021 amendments did not 

elevate kinship legal guardianship over adoption; rather, the amendments placed 

these options on equal footing. A court is not required to impose kinship legal 

guardianship where the caregiver has decided against guardianship in favor of 

adoption and when adoption is in the child's best interests. See L. 2021, c. 154, 

§ 4 (removing the requirement in N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-6(d)(3) that a court find by 

clear and convincing evidence that adoption is "neither feasible nor likely" 

before awarding kinship legal guardianship, but preserving subsection (d)(4), 

which requires a court to find by clear and convincing evidence that "awarding 

kinship legal guardianship is in the child's best interest"); see also N.J. Div. of 

Child Prot. & Permanency v. M.M., 459 N.J. Super. 246, 275 (App. Div. 2019) 

(explaining that when a resource parent "unequivocally, unambiguously, and 

unconditionally" wants to adopt "irrespective of [kinship legal guardianship]" 
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and "termination of parental rights and adoption is clearly in the children's best 

interests, the final judgment to that effect should be reaffirmed"). 

 Here, there was substantial, credible evidence that Kay's preference for 

adoption was clear and informed. The court relied on Kay's testimony that she 

was "committed to adopting the children and [was] not willing to do [kinship 

legal guardianship] due to [the children's] medical needs that require continued 

monitoring." Kay also testified that she "knows the children very well and has 

a unique perspective on their needs and care, which will enable her to ensure 

their proper development." Accordingly, the court found that her decision to 

adopt was "informed and unequivocal." 

 Lastly, Irene and Zane argue that the Division failed to meet its burden 

under the third prong because it did not consider a kinship legal guardianship or 

placement with Tara as an alternative to termination. The record reflects that 

the Division considered Tara as a placement option for Paul, but Tara initially

removed herself from consideration due to impending hip surgery and recovery. 

Thereafter, Tara stated that she would provide kinship legal guardianship to 

Paul; however, the trial court found that the passage of time made that belated 

offer not a viable option. 
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3. Prong Four. 

 Prong four requires the court to determine that the "[t]ermination of 

parental rights will not do more harm than good." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a)(4). 

This prong does not require a showing that no harm will come to the child "as a 

result of the severing of biological ties." K.H.O., 161 N.J. at 355. Instead, the 

issue is "whether a child's interest will best be served by completely terminating 

the child's relationship with that parent." E.P., 196 N.J. at 108. "The crux . . . 

is the child's need for a permanent and stable home, along with a defined parentchild relationship." H.R., 431 N.J. Super. at 226. This prong may be satisfied 

by "testimony of a 'well qualified expert who has had full opportunity to make 

a comprehensive, objective, and informed evaluation' of the child's relationship 

with both the natural parents and the foster parents." M.M., 189 N.J. at 281 

(quoting In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 19 (1992)). 

 Irene and Zane argue that the trial court's findings concerning prong four 

were not supported by substantial, credible evidence. The record does not 

support that argument. 

 The trial court relied on uncontroverted expert testimony in finding that 

termination of Zane's and Irene's parental rights would not do more harm than 

good. Specifically, the court relied on Winston's bonding evaluations, which 

demonstrated that the children were securely attached to Kay because she had 
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been their "only constant caretaker . . . throughout their lives and the Division's 

involvement." Winston opined that both Paul and Robbie had an insecure bond 

with Irene and did not view her as a caregiver who would consistently meet their 

needs. Likewise, Winston opined that Paul had an insecure bond with Zane and 

explained that Paul sees Zane as someone he visits as opposed to a caregiver. 

The court also relied upon Winston's testimony that the children showed a strong 

emotional attachment to Kay, who was knowledgeable of their needs and related 

to them as their primary parental figure. Furthermore, the court credited 

Winston's testimony regarding the deleterious effects of separating the siblings, 

which she opined would cause all the children serious emotional harm. The 

court also acknowledged Wells' opinion that severing the children's bond with 

Kay would likely result in "extensive and pervasive regression in their overall 

functioning." Lastly, the court credited both experts' testimonies that severing 

the relationship between Paul and Robbie and their biological parents would not 

have any adverse effects on them. In short, the family court's finding that the 

Division met its burden under prong four of the best-interests test was supported 

by substantial, credible evidence in the record, and we discern no basis for 

rejecting that finding. 

Affirmed.