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STRATEGIC

STUDIES

INSTITUTE

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SSI MONOGRAPH

CHINA-LATIN AMERICA MILITARY 

ENGAGEMENT:

GOOD WILL, GOOD BUSINESS, AND 

STRATEGIC POSITION

R. Evan Ellis

August 2011

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ISBN 1-58487-501-1
iii

FOREWORD

The reemergence of China on the global stage is 

arguably one of the most important phenomena of 

our time. With its sustained high rates of economic 

growth, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has dramatically increased trade and investment flows with 

the rest of the world, including regions such as Latin 

America, with which it historically has had very little 

interaction. In many of these countries, the PRC has 

gone from having an almost negligible economic presence to replacing the United States as the number one 

or number two trading partner. Moreover, particularly since the end of the global financial crisis, Chinese 

companies, in coordination with the Chinese government and banks, have begun to make multibillion dollar loans and investments in Latin America, creating 

a rapidly expanding presence of Chinese companies 

and workers in the region in such sectors as construction, logistics, manufacturing, telecommunications, 

and retail. In terms of “soft power,” the PRC has arguably captured the imaginations of Latin American political leaders, businessmen, and students as a power 

meriting attention and, in some cases, courtship.

While a great deal of attention has been given to 

Chinese commercial activity in Latin America, very 

little has been written in the open press regarding Chinese military engagement with the region. While visits by senior military leaders and major arms sales are 

reported in the Latin American press, there has been, 

to date, almost no detailed, comparative analysis of 

the PRC-Latin America military relationship. This is 

particularly striking, given the emphasis placed on 

military relationships in determining whether Chi-
iv

nese engagement with the region constitutes a threat 

to U.S. national security interests.

Dr. Evan Ellis of the Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies fills an important void in the burgeoning literature regarding China’s activities with Latin 

America. This monograph provides a detailed, region-wide analysis of PRC military engagement with 

Latin America, including not only arms sales, but also 

senior-level military visits, personnel exchanges, and 

activities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 

the region, ranging from its 6-year participation in the 

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in Haiti, to 

its November 2010 humanitarian exercise in Peru, Angel de la Paz. The work leverages the extensive Spanish 

and English-language primary research by Dr. Ellis in 

the open source literature of the region, as well as offthe-record interviews with current and former Latin 

American military officers who have directly participated in the activities treated.

Dr. Ellis explains that Chinese military activity in 

Latin America is far more extensive than is commonly 

recognized. At the same time, it also goes against conventional wisdom by arguing that, in the short term, 

such activity does not seek to achieve formal alliances 

or a permanent military presence in the region, but 

rather to advance commercial and political objectives 

to include increasing China’s understanding of, and 

influence within, Latin American governments.

While the arguments of Dr. Ellis may be surprising 

to some, the monograph will undoubtedly serve as an 

important reference point for scholars from multiple 

perspectives: those following the rise of China, those 

studying Latin American security issues, students of 

international relations, and students of U.S. national 

security, among others. 
v

In the course of these expanding interactions, the 

PRC has emphasized the “peaceful nature” of its interactions, which have profound implications not only 

for the world’s economy, but for its security environment as well. The growth of China has played out differently in each region.

 

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

Director

Strategic Studies Institute

vii

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

R. EVAN ELLIS is a professor of national security 

studies, modeling, gaming, and simulation with the 

Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, with a research focus on Latin America’s relationships with 

external actors, including China, Russia, and Iran. 

His work in this area includes the 2009 book, China 

in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores, and over 

20 articles in English and Spanish published over the 

past 6 years in magazines and journals ranging from 

Joint Forces Quarterly to Air and Space Power Journal en 

Espanol to the Revista de Dinámica de Sistemas. Dr. Ellis 

has presented his work in a broad range of business 

and government forums in Argentina, Belize, Bolivia, 

Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, 

Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Jamaica, Mexico, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United Kingdom, 

the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. He is a 

frequent guest lecturer at the U.S. Air Force Special 

Operations School. Dr. Ellis holds a Ph.D. in political 

science with a specialization in comparative politics.

ix

SUMMARY

Over the past several years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has expanded its military ties with 

Latin America in multiple important ways. High-level 

trips by Latin American defense and security personnel to the PRC and visits by their Chinese counterparts have become commonplace. The volume and 

sophistication of Chinese arms sold to the region has 

increased. Officer exchange programs, institutional 

visits, and other lower-level ties have also expanded. 

Chinese military personnel have begun participating 

in operations in the region in a modest, yet symbolically important manner. 

Military engagement among Western countries 

traditionally has focused on securing greater capability for confronting an adversary, including alliances 

and base access agreements, that confer strategic 

geographical position. By contrast, Chinese military 

engagement primarily supports broader objectives 

of national development and regime survival. This 

includes building good will, understanding, and political leverage among important commercial partners 

and technology sources, creating the tools to protect 

PRC interests in countries where it does business, selling Chinese products and moving up the value-added 

chain in strategically important sectors, and positioning the PRC strategically, even while avoiding alarming the United States over its activities in the region.

Chinese military engagement with the region may 

be understood in terms of five interrelated types of 

activities: (1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions, 

(3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial in-
x

teractions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within 

Latin America with military-strategic implications.

Based on official visits documented in the press, 

the number of visits by senior Chinese defense officials to Latin America, and visits by their counterparts 

to China, has increased over the past several years. In 

the second half of 2010, the number of contacts was 

particularly high, including nine visits at the Minister 

of Defense or Chief of Staff level between senior Chinese military officials and their Latin American counterparts, in Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, Brazil, 

Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

The PRC has expanded the quantity and scope 

of its military-to-military contacts at the institutional 

level, including its ongoing participation in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and an increasing number of 

personnel exchanges for training and education, joint 

exercises, institutional visits, and symbolic activities. 

Chinese institutions host Latin American military 

personnel from at least 18 states in Latin America in 

a range of Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 

institutions including the PLA Defense Studies Institute in Changping; the Army Command College 

and the Chinese Navy Command School, both in the 

vicinity of Nanjing; and a facility in Shijiazhuang. In 

November 2010, the PLA also conducted its first bilateral military exercise in the region, the humanitarian 

assistance exercise Angel de la Paz. 

In the domain of military sales, Chinese activities 

in Latin America are also much more extensive than is 

generally recognized. Although such sales were once 

impeded by concerns over quality, maintenance, and 

logistics support, Chinese arms conglomerates such 

as NORINCO are moving up the value-added chain, 

leveraging the opening provided by Venezuelan pur-
xi

chases of K-8 aircraft and JYL-1 radars, selling similar 

equipment to Venezuelan allies Ecuador and Bolivia, 

and proving their goods in the region in general. 

Other landmark purchases include the lease of MA60 transport aircraft to Bolivia, with a sale of 4 of the 

same aircraft under negotiation with Ecuador, as well 

as the sale of WMZ-551 armored personnel carriers 

to Argentina, and the subsequently cancelled sale of 

MBT-2000 main battle tanks to Peru. Training of military personnel, as well as command and control packages such as that by Huawei for the Venezuelan organization DICOFAN, have also been important, as has 

the donation of nonlethal goods. Bolivia stands out for 

the quantities of trucks, busses, and other goods donated to the Bolivian military by the PLA since 2006, 

as does Jamaica, whose very small defense force received a $3.5 million donation of nonlethal goods in 

the months following the exposure of serious capability gaps associated with its forced entry into the Tivoli 

Gardens neighborhood.

In addition to arms sales and contacts between the 

PLA and Latin American militaries, select commercial 

interactions must be considered as part of its military 

engagement. In Latin America, this includes collaboration between the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer 

Embraer and China Aviation Industrial Corporation 

(CAIC) II to produce ERJ-145s business jets in Harbin, 

China, as well as sales of Y-12 turboprop aircraft to 

Venezuela. In the space industry, ties include four major ongoing space-related projects in Latin America, 

the China-Brazil Earth Research Satellite (CBERS), 

Venesat-1, the Venezuela Remote Sensing Satellite, 

and the Tupac Katari satellite, as well as other projects 

in development and more modest collaboration initiatives. In the telecommunications industry, Chinese 
xii

firms such as Huawei and ZTE are major players in 

the leading nations of Central and South America.

Finally, China has a low-profile but important 

physical military presence in Latin America , including military police in Haiti since September 2004, as 

well as a reported presence in at least three Soviet-era 

monitoring facilities: Lourdes, Bejucal,1

 and Santiago 

de Cuba.2 In addition, the presence of Chinese logistics 

companies in major ports of the region could facilitate 

operations by the PRC in the region should relations 

between the United States and the PRC significantly 

worsen in the coming decades. 

In analyzing the implications of the Chinese military presence in the region, this author recognizes that 

such presence can contribute to legitimate regional 

security needs, but also foment misunderstanding. It 

argues that the United States should work with China 

to achieve greater transparency regarding those activities, and to engage the PRC in a positive fashion 

regarding their activities in the hemisphere, including 

regular dialogue and the establishment of mechanisms 

for resolving misunderstanding. In addition, however, 

it must improve its understanding of the specific dangers and threats that could flow out of this presence, 

using methodologies such as scenario-based gaming, 

to see how different actors in the region could seek to 

leverage or be influenced in their actions by the presence of China, including indirect pressures, and how 

the commercial and other interests in Latin America of 

actors such as Russia, Iran, and India might play into 

the unfolding dynamic.
xiii

ENDNOTES - SUMMARY

1. Manuel Cereijo, “Inside Bejucal Base in Cuba: A Real 

Threat,” The Americano, August 27, 2010, available from theamericano.com/2010/08/27/bejucal-base-cuba-real-threat/. Cereijo’s allegations concerning Bejucal, however, have been questioned 

by Cuba scholar William Ratliff, among others, noting that the 

radar domes in the photo accompanying Cereijo’s article are not 

located at Bejucal, as represented, but rather at the U.S.-operated 

Menwith Hill facility in the United Kingdom. See “Cereijo, Bejucal, China and Cuba’s adversary foreign intelligence (Bill Ratliff, 

U.S.),” Stanford, CA: World Association of International Studies, 

April 3, 2006, available from waisworld.org/go.jsp?id=02a0&objectT

ype=post&objectTypeId=3776&topicId=10.

2. “Chinese Signals Intelligence and Cyberwarfare in Cuba,” 

AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes, No. 23-06, June 12, 2006, available 

from www.afio.com/sections/wins/2006/2006-23.html#ChinaInCuba. 

1

CHINA–LATIN AMERICA MILITARY 

ENGAGEMENT:

GOOD WILL, GOOD BUSINESS, AND 

STRATEGIC POSITION

INTRODUCTION

One of the most common statements made in discussions of Chinese engagement with Latin America 

is that such ties are primarily “commercial” in nature. 

While true, the focus on the commercial dimension of 

the relationship conceals the fact that, over the past 

several years, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) 

has also expanded its military ties with Latin America 

in multiple important ways, consistent with its own 

public declarations of intention. In November 2008, 

for example, the PRC issued its first official policy 

paper on Latin America in which it announced that 

it sought to enhance “mutual visits by defense and 

military officials of the two sides as well as personnel 

exchanges,” and to deepen “professional exchanges in 

military training, personnel training and peacekeeping.”1

China’s military engagement with Latin America 

in recent years has both expanded and deepened 

in a quite public manner. High-level trips by Latin 

American defense and security personnel to the PRC 

and visits by their Chinese counterparts have become 

commonplace. The volume and sophistication of Chinese arms sold to the region have increased. Officer 

exchange programs, institutional visits, and other 

lower-level ties have also expanded. Chinese military personnel have begun participating in operations 

in the region in modest, yet symbolically important 

ways. 
2

Since the granting of port concessions in Panama 

to the Hong-Kong-based firm Hutchison Whampoa 

in 1999, Chinese military engagement with Latin 

America has been one of the most broadly discussed, 

but misunderstood, dimensions of PRC activities in 

the region.2

 The PRC’s military initiatives in Latin 

America are arguably not the largest or most strategically significant part of its rapidly expanding interactions with the region. Nor do they visibly threaten the 

United States or undermine pro-Western regimes in 

the same fashion as Soviet military engagement with 

Latin America during the Cold War. The initiatives, 

however, are significant and growing, and continue 

to be a key to the evaluation by U.S. decisionmakers 

as to whether the Chinese presence in Latin America 

constitutes a strategic threat to U.S. interests.

The purpose of this monograph is to analyze PRC 

defense and security ties in Latin America. While it 

also touches upon commercial and scientific activities 

that may have military relevance, its focus is on activities in the military and police sphere, which have not, 

to date, been analyzed in detail in a single document. 

The monograph is divided into three sections: 

1. Objectives of PRC defense and security engagement with Latin America, 

2. Manifestations of that engagement, and 

3. Conclusions.

OBJECTIVES OF PRC DEFENSE AND SECURITY 

ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA

Given the predominantly commercial nature of 

Chinese interactions with Latin America, it is important to begin the analysis of PRC military activities in 

the region with a discussion of Chinese motivations 
3

for engagement with Latin America in general, and 

how military ties and transactions simultaneously 

support and put at risk those goals.

While the PRC has publicly professed its interest 

in expanding military linkages with Latin America, it 

has given very little explanation of its reasons for doing so, or how its military activities fit into its broader 

engagement with the region. This does not imply 

that such motivations are inherently nefarious—only 

that they must be examined, based on the available 

evidence as well as current and historical patterns of 

Chinese decisionmaking.

In the spirit of Chinese thinkers such as Sun Zi, 

PRC military initiatives in Latin America should be 

understood as subordinate to, and in support of, longterm PRC national objectives in the region. In general, these objectives involve promoting and protecting China’s reemergence as a major global actor. The 

imperatives and risks involved are a product of the 

export-led growth strategy that the PRC has pursued 

and refined since 1978. Specifically, it has leveraged 

the opportunities presented by global information 

and trade flows, and its initial comparative advantage 

in abundant inexpensive labor to serve as a global 

manufacturing hub, attracting and using foreign investment in a deliberate fashion to build its physical 

and technological infrastructure and diversify its economic base, and thus moving progressively into ever 

higher value-added economic activities.3 

China’s pursuit of this strategy, and the nation’s 

place in the global economy, has created a number of 

imperatives: 

1. securing access to reliable sources of primary 

products in support of manufacturing activities and 

capital formation, 
4

2. assuring the ability to feed the Chinese population as it both urbanizes and consumes more protein,

3. establishing and protecting markets for Chinese 

goods as its producers continue to expand production 

and move up the value-added chain, 

4. securing access to technology and global information flows, 

5. maintaining a presence in institutions key to 

China’s global economic transactions, and 

6. avoiding the consolidation of an international 

coalition opposing the “rise” of the PRC.

Chinese military engagement with Latin America 

supports each of these imperatives, albeit often in indirect ways. Chinese President Hu Jintao addressed 

the role of the Chinese military in support of national 

development objectives in his call for the Chinese 

People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to carry out its “new 

mission in the new century.”4

 Similarly, China’s 2006 

National Defense White Paper refers to the role of the 

PLA in “fostering a security environment conducive 

to China’s peaceful development.”5 Similar language 

is contained in the November 2007 constitution of the 

Chinese Communist Party, and the 2008 National Defense White Paper.

6

 Chinese authors have written about 

the new “interest frontier” of the PRC, suggesting that 

the PLA has an obligation to defend not only Chinese 

interests within the physical territory of the PRC, but 

to protect those interests which are found outside it as 

well.7

Because U.S. political leaders generally view military activities in a manner very distinct from trade 

and investment, Chinese leaders have incentives to be 

quite cautious in their military engagement to avoid 

undermining important national strategic goals in 

Latin America. As a result, the imperatives for the 
5

PRC of military engagement in Latin America contrast 

sharply with conventional wisdom regarding the use 

of the military instrument. These imperatives may be 

inferred as follows: 

1. Building good will, understanding, and political 

leverage,

2. Creating the tools to protect PRC interests incountry,

3. Selling Chinese products and moving up the 

value-added chain, 

4. Positioning the PRC strategically in the region, 

and

5. Reassuring the United States.

Building Good Will, Understanding, and Political 

Leverage. 

For the PRC, military engagement is one tool 

among many for building political good will and leverage in a country to make more likely that it will not 

oppose the entry of Chinese products or act against 

its investments. Military activities are useful in this 

context because the armed forces remain an important 

political actor in most Latin American countries, although thinking of the military as a political instrument is also consistent with both Chinese communist 

and pre-communist philosophy. 

Knowing and being on good terms with the military leadership of a Latin American country help the 

Chinese to understand the overall political dynamic 

of that country, anticipate actions that could be taken 

against PRC commercial interests, influence the political leadership through military friends where necessary, and anticipate or avoid actions that could be 

taken by the armed forces in the political arena that 

could impact Chinese interests. 
6

Within the larger framework of military engagement, people-oriented activities such as leadership 

visits, training, and exchange programs are particularly useful because they allow the PRC to confer personal benefits and establish relationships with current 

and future defense leaders, while avoiding the type 

of symbolism that military bases or military end-item 

sales generate for Western analysts.

Creating the Tools to Protect Chinese Interests 

In-Country. 

As Chinese companies and businessmen expand 

their physical presence in Latin America, they will experience a corresponding increase in the security challenges to people and operations that have confronted 

the companies of other countries operating in the region, including kidnapping, extortion, and violence 

associated with strikes, political protest, and terrorism. Chinese petroleum and mining firms operating 

in remote areas are particularly vulnerable, as seen 

by violence against Andes Petroleum and Petroriental north of Ecuador in 20068

 and 2007.9 Problems 

may also be expected with the transportation of goods 

on newly opened highways and rail routes over the 

Andes and through the Amazon jungle, such as the 

northern and southern “bioceanic corridors” crossing 

Peru, the “interoceanic corridor” from the north of 

Chile through Bolivia and Brazil, and the future Manta-Manaus corridor.10 Cultural differences between 

the Chinese and local populations are also likely to 

contribute to tensions and increase the possibilities for 

violence, as seen in the 2007 truckers’ strike against 

Chinese shopkeepers in Buenos Aires, Argentina,11 or 

the November 2004 violence against Chinese communities in Maracay and Valencia, Venezuela.12
7

In the near term, PRC companies will have to rely 

upon Latin American police and armed forces, as well 

as private security and the payment of protection 

money, in order to avoid harm to Chinese personnel 

and operations. As the value of Chinese investments 

in the region and the resources flowing from it grow, 

the PRC will have an increasing incentive to improve 

the functionality of these security forces, and to ensure that the protection of Chinese personnel and operations receives priority. Similarly, it will have incentives to become involved in issues of port and airport 

security in the region, as well as high-value geography which impacts the movement of goods, such as 

the Panama Canal, as well as highway, rail, and alternative canal routes crossing the continent.13

Indeed, the PRC has already demonstrated a willingness to use its military to protect its commercial 

interests in Africa, citing threats to these interests as 

justification for deploying naval forces to conduct anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden in December 

2008.14 Also, there is already an ongoing debate within 

the PRC regarding the best ways to protect Chinese 

commercial operations, including discussions by retiring PLA military officers to form private security 

companies to support commercial ventures abroad.15

Selling Chinese Products and Moving Up the 

Value-Added Chain. 

Although Chinese military exports are relatively 

small by comparison to other goods, they contribute 

to PRC national development in multiple ways. As 

with other commercial products, military products 

generate export revenues for Chinese companies such 

as the defense conglomerate NORINCO, and sustain 
8

employment. Sales of nonlethal military goods such 

as clothing and personal equipment in Latin America 

by Chinese companies, for example, are often overlooked, but are a nontrivial business. Such sales also 

sustain the health of the PRC defense industrial base, 

and help it to advance its technical capabilities in support of national defense goals. This is particularly the 

case with respect to high-end goods such as radars, 

aircraft, armored vehicles, and other sophisticated 

military end items or “dual-use” commercial goods, 

where sales in Latin America help China to test, prove, 

and refine its capabilities under field conditions in 

strategically important sectors.

Positioning China Strategically in the Region. 

Chinese military thinkers, as others around the 

world, recognize the implications of the emergence of 

the PRC as a principal global actor, including the need 

to prepare for large-scale hostilities to protect these 

global interests. Although the PLA is very careful to 

cast its military preparations as “defensive” in nature, debates within the PLA over the need to develop 

a “deterrent force,” and references to an “active defense”16 implicitly acknowledge that Chinese thinkers 

have contemplated the necessity of carrying a future 

conflict to the adversary. Moreover, although the PRC 

currently lacks the capability to project significant military capability beyond Asia, the pursuit of “defense 

in depth” by the PLA Navy foresees conducting the 

battle as far away from its shores as capabilities will 

allow, while references in the 2008 Defense White Paper

to close coordination between military struggle and 

political, economic, and diplomatic endeavors17 suggest a global approach to thinking about warfare. 
9

Nothing in the public discourse of the Chinese 

leadership, policy papers, or debates suggests that 

Latin America is considered in the short term as a 

base for military operations. Nonetheless, in the long 

term, when the PRC is both economically and militarily more powerful than it is today, the ability to deter a 

strategic adversary such as the United States through 

holding it at risk in its own theater, and to disrupt its 

ability to project power at home before those forces 

can reach the PRC, is consistent with the aforementioned concepts, including a holistic, asymmetric approach towards warfare.18

Within this broad approach, China’s military ties 

in Latin America afford geographically-specific benefits, such as collecting intelligence on the operation of 

U.S. forces, creating diversionary crises, closing down 

strategic chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, or 

conducting disruption operations in close proximity 

to the United States.

Reassuring the United States. 

As noted previously, the PRC’s pursuit of military 

objectives in the region is subordinate to its broader 

national objectives. Where the two conflict, the exact balance will reflect the perceptions and self-confidence of the Chinese leadership and its propensity 

for risk-taking, factors which continue to evolve with 

each successive generation of Chinese leadership. 

Direct forms of security assistance, for example, may 

support the objective of protecting Chinese companies and resource flows, yet undermine the more 

important strategic objective of preserving access by 

the PRC to Western technology and markets. At the 

very least, China has strong incentives to portray all 
10

military interactions with Latin American states in 

a way that avoids an appearance of threatening the 

United States, so as to minimize the risk of damage 

to its broader objectives. In many cases, this goal not 

only will impact how China represents its activities, 

but how it structures them. Gifts of military medical 

capabilities or logistics gear, for example, may be preferable to selling or donating more lethal end items because the former generates similar institutional good 

will and contacts, while appearing less threatening.

In general, as this section has suggested, the course 

taken by Chinese military engagement with Latin 

America in the medium or long term is likely to differ significantly from that witnessed with respect to 

Soviet military activities in the region during the Cold 

War. In general, the PRC is more likely to refrain from 

overtly provocative activities, such as the establishment of bases with a significant Chinese presence, 

overt military assistance to groups trying to overthrow 

a regime, unilateral military intervention in the region 

in a contested leadership situation, or participation in 

anti-US military alliances.

MANIFESTATIONS OF CHINESE MILITARY 

ENGAGEMENT WITH LATIN AMERICA

Chinese military engagement with the region may 

be understood in terms of five interrelated types of 

activities: (1) meetings between senior military officials, (2) lower-level military-to-military interactions, 

(3) military sales, (4) military-relevant commercial interactions, and (5) Chinese physical presence within 

Latin America with military-strategic implications.
11

Meetings Between Senior Military Officials. 

Based on official visits documented in the press, 

the number of visits by senior Chinese defense officials to Latin America, and visits by their counterparts 

to China, has increased over the past several years. 

The press accounts of the agendas of these visits suggest that the purpose is often to establish or strengthen 

relationships, including not only exchanging views on 

security matters, but also to discussing or finalizing 

agreements for arms purchases, military exchanges, 

or other contacts and transactions.

In the second half of 2010, the number of high-level 

military-to-military contacts was particularly high, including eight clusters of visits at the Minister of Defense or Chief of Staff level between senior Chinese 

military officials and their Latin American counterparts, including Venezuela, Ecuador, Chile, Mexico, 

Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.

1. In August 2010, Bolivian minister of Defense 

Ruben Saavedra traveled to the PRC to meet with his 

counterpart, then Chinese Minister of Defense Cao 

Gangchuan.19

2. In September, Cuban General Leopoldo Cintra 

Frias traveled to Beijing to meet with Minister Cao 

and other senior PRC defense leaders.20

3. Later the same month, Chief of the PLA General 

Staff Chen Bingde traveled to Lima, Peru, for a visit 

that included a joint military-humanitarian exercise 

between Chinese and Peruvian armed forces and the 

donation of a $1.3 million mobile field hospital to the 

Peruvian Army.21

4. Also in September, the new Chinese Minister of 

Defense, Liang Guanglie, traveled to Bogota, Colombia, on the first of a three-nation visit to Latin America, 
12

meeting with Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo 

Rivera and other senior Colombian officials, and signing a defense cooperation agreement. 22

5. Following his visit to Colombia, Minister Liang 

traveled to Brasilia, where he met with Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim,23 reciprocating a visit 

paid by Jobim to China at the beginning of the same 

month.24

6. The third leg of the September 2010 trip by Minister Liang took him to Mexico, where he met with the 

senior leadership of both of the institutions of the Mexican armed forces: The Ministry of National Defense 

(SEDENA) and the Ministry of the Navy (SEMAR).25

7. In November 2010, Chief of Staff Chen traveled 

to Quito, Ecuador, on the first stop of a two-nation 

visit, meeting with the Ecuadoran Minister of Defense 

Javier Ponce, as well as the head of Ecuador’s Joint 

Chief of Staff, Luis Ernesto Gonzalez.26

8. In the second stop of his trip, General Chen 

traveled to Caracas, Venezuela, where he met with 

his counterpart, Defense Minister Carlos Figueroa, to 

prepare the military portion of the agenda for the 9th 

annual ministerial-level meeting of the “China-Venezuela High-Level Mixed Commission,” held in Beijing 

during the subsequent month.27

Although little of the substance of the discussions 

during these visits makes it into the open press, their 

role in advancing military relationships between China and the Latin American counterpart nation has arguably been greater than is generally recognized: such 

visits allow the leaders involved to build familiarity 

and confidence by speaking face-to-face, and to explore possibilities for future projects, from arms sales 

to expanded military exchanges. Such visits also gen-
13

erally include tours of host nation facilities and opportunities for informal discussion, raising possibilities for collaboration on issues which have captured 

the attention of the leaders involved, within the limits 

of their national policies. In some cases, initiatives 

prepared prior to the trip by staff officers or other officials are ratified during the high-level visit, while 

ideas generated during discussions become initiatives 

to be subsequently explored, administratively driven 

by the declared interest of the senior leadership. 

Lower-Level Military-to-Military Interactions. 

In the past several years, the PRC has expanded the 

quantity and scope of its military-to-military contacts 

at the institutional level, including its ongoing participation in the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and an increasing number of personnel exchanges for training 

and education, joint exercises, institutional visits, and 

symbolic activities. In each of these, the primary value 

for the PRC is arguably building relationships at the 

institutional level, as well as at the personal level with 

future key figures in Latin American militaries. In the 

process, it has also been able to increase its understanding of Latin American militaries and the security 

environment of the region.

In Haiti, military police from the PLA continue to 

serve as part of the United Nations peacekeeping force 

(MINUSTAH) present in the country. Chinese peacekeepers have had a continual presence in Haiti since 

the first contingent was deployed in September 2004. 

Haiti also has the dubious distinction of having been 

the site of the first officially-recognized Chinese military casualties on Latin American soil. Eight members 

of the PLA were among the personnel killed in Haiti 
14

in January 2010, in conjunction with the earthquake 

that devastated the country.28 Four of the Chinese 

killed were members of the MINUSTAH police force, 

while the other four were part of a six-person working 

group from the Ministry of Public Security which was 

visiting the United Nations (UN) headquarters facility 

when its roof collapsed due to the earthquake.29 The 

bodies of the victims were subsequently returned to 

the PRC, where they posthumously received various 

honors.30 

The participation of the Chinese military in MINUSTAH for more than 6 years has arguably yielded 

great benefits for the PRC. It has given the PLA and 

hundreds of its soldiers first-hand experience in operating in the Latin American environment in a police 

and security role—something which will be of particular value in the future if China begins to provide 

security assistance to allies in the region in support of 

the protection of its nationals and ongoing operations. 

In addition, its presence in MINUSTAH has allowed 

the PLA to better understand and build relationships 

with the militaries of Brazil and other nations working alongside it in the operation, even while fostering good will in the region toward the PRC as a contributor to the international order. Finally, the Chinese 

presence in Haiti has also arguably advanced its campaign to isolate Taiwan internationally, since it puts 

pressure on the government of Haiti, which currently 

affords diplomatic recognition to Taiwan, rather than 

the PRC.31

In the realm of training and military education, 

Chinese institutions host Latin American military personnel from at least 18 states in Latin America—virtually every country in the region with which the PRC 

has diplomatic relations. The examples listed in the 

following paragraphs are merely illustrative:
15

The National Defense University of the PLA has 

multiple institutions offering courses in both English 

and Spanish to Latin American officers. These include:

1. The Defense Studies Institute in Changping 

(near Beijing), a school especially for foreigners within 

the broader university, offering courses in both Spanish and English, including the following:

• A 5-month senior staff course, taught primarily in Spanish. The course is presented by a 

combination of Chinese instructors and Communist-party vetted translators. Latin American nations sending officers have included 

Mexico, Peru, Chile, Colombia, and Uruguay. 

The Chilean army has been sending officers 

to the course since 1999, while the Uruguayans have been sending students since at least 

March 2009.

• A 3-month course on strategy, campaign 

planning, and military thinking, attended by 

officers of the Chilean Navy, among others, 

since 1997.

• A 10-month course on “national defense and 

command,” taught in English and attended 

by officers from the Peruvian Army, the Chilean Navy and Air Force, and the Uruguayan 

Navy and Air Force, among others.32

• A 5-month course on Military Strategy, 

taught in Spanish, and attended by Peruvian 

Army officers and Chilean Air Force personnel, among others.

2. The Army Command College, located in Nanjing, offers a 4-month course in English and French, 

which has been attended by military officers from 

Latin American countries including Colombia, Peru, 
16

Barbados, and Jamaica, as well as Africa and other regions.

3. The Chinese Navy Command School, outside 

of Nanjing, offers a 1-year senior command course in 

English. The course has been attended by Latin American military officers, among others, including officers 

from Uruguay33 and Brazil.34

4. In a facility near Shijiazhuang:

• A 5-month course on special forces operations at the tactical-operational level. It has 

been attended by officers from Uruguay 

for at least the past 2 years, and perhaps by 

members from other armed forces.

• A 5-month infantry company course, attended by an officer from Uruguay in 2010, and 

perhaps others.

5. The Center of Military Instruction of the PLA 

offers a course on martial arts which has been attended by Chilean Marines, among others.

Other Chinese military institutes which have hosted students from Latin American countries include 

the following:

1. The Naval Research Institute, near Beijing, 

which hosted a low-ranking officer from the Uruguayan Navy and perhaps others for a “masters” course 

in naval radar and sonar, during an 11-month stay in 

Beijing from 2008-09.

2. An institute in Beijing hosted two low-ranking 

officers from the Uruguayan Air Force and perhaps 

others during an 11-month stay in the city from 2008 

to 2009:

• One for a “masters” course on aerial communication.

• One for a course on artillery repair.
17

In parallel with these programs, Latin American 

militaries also hosted Chinese officers. Examples include the following:

1. For several years, beginning in 2005, the Chilean Army language school hosted two Chinese professors for the Mandarin Chinese language,35 although 

as of January 2011, these instructors were no longer 

present.

2. In 2006, during a visit by a delegation from the 

Chinese National Defense University, the Chilean war 

college ANEPE signed an agreement regarding officer 

exchanges and collaborative activities, although it has 

not yet been ratified.

Chinese collaboration with Latin American militaries on education and training is increasingly extending to tactical-level programs as well. During the 

November 2010 meeting between Chinese Defense 

Minister Liang Guanglie and Colombian Defense Minister Rodrigo Rivera, an expansion of Sino-Colombian 

military exchanges was agreed to, including the establishment of 10 places for Colombian generals and colonels in Chinese military academies, and the sending 

of Colombian trainers to China for courses in sharpshooting, combat under-water diving, survival, and 

riverine combat.36 Similarly, during General Liang’s 

September meeting with Brazilian Defense Minister 

Nelson Jobim, expanded cooperation between the two 

countries in the area of basic training was discussed.37

In addition to opportunities for building personal 

relationships and gathering intelligence, such tacticallevel courses also help the PRC to develop military 

capabilities in areas which may be useful in working 

more directly in the region’s unique operating environments.
18

An additional element of China’s forming of military relationships with Latin America is institutional 

visits. Such visits typically involve more people, but 

are much shorter in duration than training exchanges. 

Although the opportunities to develop personal ties 

are by necessity more superficial, such institutional 

visits allow the PRC to reach larger groups of personnel whose work touches many others, such as military 

professors and mid-grade officers, while also building 

or strengthening institution-to-institution linkages. 

Examples include the following: 

• Visits between Chinese and Chilean naval officers have occurred on an occasional basis since 

July 1996, but increased to one or two per year 

starting in 2005.

• In Argentina, there has been a similar increase 

in recent years, including visits by Chinese officials to the Argentine National Defense University and the senior war colleges.

• In Colombia, delegations from China’s National Defense University visit the nation’s war college on an annual basis.

Beyond institutional visits, other ongoing contacts 

between Chinese and Latin American militaries include port visits by military training ships and warships by each side. The first such visit was made by 

the Chilean Navy training ship Esmeralda to the port 

of Shanghai in 1972. By 2009, the Esmeralda had made 

10 trips to Chinese ports. Reciprocally, in April 1997, 

the first Chinese naval flotilla visited Latin America. 

It included the missile destroyers Harbin and Zhuhai

and the logistics ship Nancang, which made port calls 

in Mexico, Peru, and Chile, as well as the U.S. base 

at Pearl Harbor.38 The most recent such visit, at the 
19

time of this writing, came in 2009 from a Chinese naval flotilla which included the destroyer Shijiazhuang

and the supply ship Hongzehu, making port calls in 

Valparaiso, Chile; Callao, Peru; and Guayaquil, Ecuador.39 Benign in character, such visits benefit the PLA 

Navy, helping it to identify requirements for the use 

of Latin American ports by its ships in the future for 

maintenance, resupply, or other purposes.40

In addition to bilateral contacts, such as those 

mentioned above, Chinese and Latin American militaries have occasional contact through conferences 

and other forums. The Chilean and Chinese navies, 

for example, have regular contact through the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, with the PRC having 

supported Chile’s admission to the organization.41 The 

Chinese, for their part, host various forums to which 

Latin American officers are invited, including an annual “symposium for upper level officers” in Beijing, 

which has been held at least five times. In addition, 

from November to December 2007 in the city of Qingdao, the headquarters of the PLA North Sea fleet, the 

Chinese held a seminar on the management of search 

and rescue operations in which a Uruguayan naval 

lieutenant and perhaps other Latin American military 

officers were present.

It is also important to mention Chinese military actions in Latin America which are important primarily 

at the symbolic level. These include one on September 

16, 2010, when an honor guard of 34 persons from the 

PLA participated, alongside representatives from 15 

other countries, in a parade in Mexico City in commemoration of the 200th Anniversary of Mexico’s independence from Spain.42

Finally, military-to-military contacts also have 

come to include joint exercises. In November 2010,39
20

Chinese military personnel participated with 50 Peruvians in the humanitarian exercise Angel de la Paz, 

including deployment to the village of Villa Maria 

del Trunfo to perform medical services for the local 

population.43 The joint exercise simulated a response 

by the two armed forces to an earthquake, with an associated chemical fire,44 and was tied to the donation 

by the PLA to the Peruvian military of a mobile field 

hospital and training of the recipients on its use in the 

facilities of the 1st Special Forces Brigade in Chorrillos, near Lima.45 

While not threatening in and of itself, Chinese participation in a humanitarian exercise in Latin America 

may be understood as a logical step toward its participation in the response to an actual disaster, outside the framework of a multilateral force such as the 

UN. Such an offer of direct military involvement in 

a Latin American country would put U.S. policymakers in an awkward position, since publicly blocking 

humanitarian assistance from the PRC could be construed as increasing the number of Latin American 

deaths from the disaster in order to keep the Chinese 

military “out of the U.S. backyard.” The U.S. response 

to future PRC offers of direct military humanitarian 

assistance should thus be considered carefully by U.S. 

policymakers before they occur.

Military Sales to Latin America. 

As with military sales by other countries, Chinese military sales to Latin America help the PRC to 

strengthen its ties with the purchasers by meeting their 

specific needs, and by tying those nations logistically 

to Chinese maintenance and training infrastructures. 

Such transactions also help the PRC to develop and 
21

sustain its own national defense industry, and earn 

export sales revenues.

Innocent or not, Chinese arms sales to Latin America are arguably one of the most closely watched facets 

of China’s engagement with Latin America. Although 

U.S. leaders such as Assistant Secretary of Defense 

Frank Mora have observed that Chinese arms sales 

can contribute to security in the hemisphere,46 many 

politicians and other policymakers look at such sales 

as indications that Chinese activities in the region constitute a threat to U.S. national security.

In general, PRC military sales to Latin America 

have followed the pattern of its commercial sales. The 

first Chinese defense goods sold in the region were 

relatively inexpensive, unsophisticated items such as 

military clothing and personal equipment. In some 

cases, such goods entered Latin American militaries 

as donations, such as the annual $1 million dollars 

worth of hats, gloves, and other nonlethal equipment 

donated by the PLA to Colombia. Frequently, Chinese 

goods have been offered by third party importers, 

representing companies such as the China North Industries Corporation (NORINCO) in the PRC, but licensed to do business with Latin American militaries.

As with commercial goods, China’s ability to sell 

sophisticated military hardware to Latin America 

has been impeded by concerns over quality, as well 

as the difficulty of maintaining and supporting the 

equipment. Such concerns have been particularly 

acute with respect to materiel such as ships, aircraft, 

armored vehicles, weapons, and communication systems, regarding which lives on the battlefield could 

depend on the proper functioning of the equipment. 

The lack of a Chinese military presence in the region 

has compounded such concern; the absence of sales 
22

of Chinese gear in Latin America meant that Chinese 

military goods were “unproven” in the region, and 

thus more difficult to sell. Moreover, without a Chinese military presence in the region, maintenance and 

obtaining spare parts for Chinese goods were, in the 

minds of many leaders, a great risk.47

Despite such obstacles, as in the commercial realm, 

with time, the PRC and its defense companies have begun to move up the value-added chain to sell increasingly sophisticated military goods in Latin America. 

In doing so, it has exploited opportunities provided 

by regimes hostile to the United States, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia, whose political orientation and inability to acquire Western military technology have led them to look to Chinese equipment.

The first major breakthrough for the PRC in making 

military sales to Latin America was arguably Venezuela’s 2008 announcement that it would purchase K-8 

(Karakorum) aircraft, co-developed with Pakistan.48

Venezuela’s decision to purchase the aircraft was 

driven in part by its inability to purchase U.S. fighters, 

or spare parts for its existing fleet of U.S. aircraft, as 

well as successful U.S. efforts to block other Western 

countries from selling to Venezuela similar aircraft 

that incorporated U.S. technology.49 The agreement 

to ultimately purchase a total of 18 K-8 aircraft from 

China National Aero-Technology Import and Export 

Corporation (CATIC), along with armaments and a 

supporting logistics package, was made in August 

2008. In the second half of 2009, 11 Venezuelan pilots 

and 56 technicians were sent to China for training on 

the aircraft as pilots and maintenance and logistics 

support staff.50

The first 6 K-8s were officially received in March 

2010,51 with the other 12 arriving in August. They 
23

were assigned to the 12th Fighter Air Group, based 

at the air base Rafael Urdaneta de Maracaibo, and to the 

15th Special Operations group, at the air base Vicente 

Landaeta Gil de Barquisimeto.

52 As a result of Venezuelan satisfaction with the transaction, the number of 

K-8s desired was expanded to 40. In addition, the 

Venezuelan military leadership has been evaluating 

the more capable Chinese L-15 Air King, with a proposal by Hongdu Aviation Industry Corporation to 

sell the Venezuelans 24 of the aircraft.53 

Despite highly positive statements by the Venezuelan leadership regarding the K-8s, and the increase 

of the purchase to 40 aircraft, the acquisition has had 

its problems. In January 2010, one of the K-8s piloted 

by a newly trained Venezuelan crashed on takeoff at 

the military airport in Barquismetro, near Caracas.54

While the Chinese blamed improper maintenance by 

the recently trained Venezuelans, the Venezuelans 

pointed the finger at the Chinese for poor translations 

of the aircraft technical manuals into Spanish. Beyond 

fighters, the government has also declared that it will 

purchase 10-12 Y-8 Chinese medium military transport aircraft, each capable of carrying up to 88 persons 

or 20 tons of cargo.55

With the support of President Hugo Chavez, 

purchases of Chinese equipment by the Venezuelan 

armed forces also expanded into other areas. In 2005 

the Venezuelan air force acquired JYL-1 radars, usable 

for air defense, from the firm China National Electronics Import and Export Corporation (CEIEC), at a 

cost of $150 million.56 The radars were acquired by the 

Venezuelan organization Compañía Anónima Venezolana de Industrias Militares (CAVIM), with the first 

delivered in January 2008 and subsequently put under 

the command of the Venezuelan Air Force. They were 
24

used publicly for the first time in 2008 in an exercise 

with Brazil.57

The Chinese also installed a command and control 

center for the Venezuelan radars at a military base near 

Caracas at the end of 2008. Between April and August 

2008, Venezuela sent a total of 70 officers to the PRC 

for training on the operation and maintenance of the 

system.58 By mid-2009, the Venezuelan military leadership was referring to a total of 10 Chinese radars as 

being operational.59 Moreover, as of June 2009, Venezuela was evaluating the purchase of other Chinese 

radars to complement the capabilities of the JYL-1s.60

In addition to the radars and aircraft, the Venezuelans have also spearheaded the introduction of 

Chinese command and control equipment into Latin 

America, with the Venezuelan defense organization 

DICOFAN working with the Chinese civilian telecommunications firm Huawei to implement the system.61 

In support of the system, China has funded a training 

program executed by Huawei for students of the Venezuelan military institute Universidad Nacional Experimental Politécnica de las Fuerzas Armadas (UNEFA),62 as 

well as construction of a $54 million laboratory in the 

Venezuelan Armed forces technical university Instituto Universitario Militar de Comunicaciones y Electrónicas 

de las Fuerzas Armadas (IUMCOELFA).

Despite press accounts which suggest that Chinese 

military sales in Latin America have been relatively 

limited, by the end of 2010, the Venezuelan military 

leadership was evaluating purchase of a broad range 

of Chinese systems, including such command and 

control systems as high frequency (HF), ultra high 

frequency (UHF), and very high frequency (VHF) 

communications systems; IGLA missile systems; antiaircraft guns; biodegradable mines; water purification 
25

equipment; bridging equipment; utility aircraft; antisubmarine aircraft; ground-attack aircraft; long-range 

sea surveillance aircraft; costal patrol aircraft; frigates; 

submarines; and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) helicopters.

Beyond purchases of PRC military hardware, 

Venezuelan officials have also reportedly facilitated 

indirect purchases of military goods by criminal and 

insurgent groups such as the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). An investigation by 

the Colombian prosecutor’s office, for example, implicated the Venezuelan government official Amílcar 

Figueroa, who presented a shopping list of weapons 

for the FARC during his visit to the weapons manufacturer NORINCO in the PRC.63

In addition to direct purchases of military goods 

and systems from the PRC, Venezuela has greatly facilitated the ability by the PRC to sell its military end 

items to other, like-minded governments in the region, 

including both Ecuador and Bolivia. Following the lead 

of Venezuela, in September 2009 Ecuador negotiated 

a deal with the PRC for two radars, manufactured by 

China Electronics Technology Corporation (CETC), to 

be deployed to its northern frontier with Colombia for 

evaluation, with the option to purchase an additional 

four units.64 Although there were problems with the 

suitability of the first radars for the operating conditions they encountered, in August 2010 the Ecuadoran 

government announced that it was going ahead with 

the purchase of the four additional radars, at a cost of 

$80 million, and would begin taking delivery on them 

by the end of the year.65

In addition to the radars, Ecuador has acquired 

MA-60 medium transport aircraft from the PRC. The 

first two aircraft acquisitions were in 2006.66 Ecuador 
26

continues to flirt with the purchase of more Chinese 

mid-sized transport aircraft. In July 2009, Ecuadoran 

Defense Minister Javier Ponce noted Ecuadoran interest in purchasing four military aircraft from the PRC 

for $60 million to replace its aging fleet of Brazilian 

Avro military transport aircraft.67 Although no purchases immediately followed the declarations, during 

the February 2010 visit to China by Chairman of the 

Ecuadoran Joint Chiefs of Staff General Fabian Varela, 

the PRC mentioned that it was investigating the possibility of providing Ecuador with four MA-60s68 at a 

price of $80 million.69 Subsequently, in August 2010, 

Ponce announced that he was sending a delegation to 

the PRC to negotiate the purchase of two of the MA60s for $38 million, to be delivered by the end of the 

year,70 although there have been no further reports in 

the press on the status of the transaction. 

In addition to these transactions, the PRC has donated military trucks and ambulances and other nonlethal goods to Ecuador. Indeed, during the February 

2010 visit by General Varela to the PRC, China announced that it planned to double such donations.71 

Like Ecuador, Bolivia has followed the lead of Venezuela in acquiring military equipment from the PRC. 

Prompted in part by the personal recommendation of 

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to his colleague 

Evo Morales in October 2009, Bolivian Defense Minister Walker San Miguel announced the planned purchase of a squadron (6) of Chinese K-8 aircraft for $58 

million.72 The aircraft are to be deployed in the vicinity of Cochabamba for counterdrug interception missions, and represent the first combat aircraft acquired 

by the Bolivian military.73 The deal was financed with 

a 25-year concessional credit, with the aircraft to be 

delivered over the course of 18 months beginning in 

April 2010.74
27

Although the K-8s are Bolivia’s first fighters, they 

are Bolivia’s second transaction with the PRC involving aircraft for its military. In March 2007, Bolivia announced the leasing of two MA-60 military cargo and 

passenger aircraft from the PRC, as part of a larger 

deal that included the acquisition of military transport 

aircraft from Venezuela.75 The Chinese MA-60 aircraft 

were paid for by a $38.3 million loan from the PRC76

and delivered in February 2008.

In addition to its purchase of end-items, Bolivia 

has also received a series of donations of other military goods from the PRC. These donations have come 

in four major installments: In December 2006, the 

PRC announced the donation to Bolivia of 25-person assault craft, infantry and artillery munitions, 

night-vision goggles, and kevlar helmets.77 In 2007, 

the Bolivian armed forces received 34 trucks from the 

manufacturer First Auto Works (FAW), five busses, 

three Toyota Land Cruiser SUVs, and a tow truck.78 In 

February 2009, it received 2 gunboats from the PRC.79

In March 2010, it received 27 busses for military transport, manufactured by the Chinese company Hinger, 

21 Nissan light trucks, and 40 Yamaha outboard motors.80 Beyond these items, over the period 1987-96, the 

PRC also reportedly provided 10,000 AK-47 assault 

rifles,81 in addition to having donated motorcycles, bicycles, and other gear to the Bolivian police.

Although the most significant arms transactions 

between the PRC and Latin America have come in 

the “socialist” countries of the Bolivarian Alliance for 

the Americas (ALBA) bloc—Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Honduras, Dominica, Ecuador, plus a 

few small island nations—significant advances and 

near-advances have occurred in other countries as 

well. In 2009, Peru almost became the first nation in 
28

Latin America to make a major purchase of armored 

vehicles from the PRC. A series of five Chinese MBT2000 tanks were accepted from the PRC for evaluation 

by the Peruvian army, and were featured prominently 

in a military parade in December 2009.82 The purchase 

came under significant criticism within Peru, and was 

eventually canceled by the Minister of Defense in the 

interest of dedicating more resources to fighting narcotraffickers and recouping the state presence in the 

Apurimac and Ene valley region (VRAE) in the interior of the country.83

As noted previously, in 2010 Peru was also the recipient of the first major donation of military humanitarian equipment from the PLA, with the delivery of 

a mobile field hospital and other equipment during 

the second half of 2010, having a total value of $300 

million, including training of Peruvian personnel on 

the equipment, and culminating in a joint ChinesePeruvian humanitarian exercise in November of that 

year. At a lower level, Peru has also purchased Chinese nonlethal equipment, and in 2007 signed defense 

accords with the Chinese to allow them to participate 

more directly in the Peruvian military acquisition system.84

However, Peru has not been the only U.S. ally in 

the region to consider major purchases of Chinese 

military equipment. Since as early as 2006, Chinese 

military officials have discussed the possibility of 

selling armored vehicles and other equipment to the 

Colombian military.85 To date, Colombia has not pursued such transactions, in part due to concern over 

complications in the maintenance and support of such 

equipment, and also because of the close ColombiaU.S. defense and security relationship.
29

Beyond explicit military sales, the Uruguayan police, the Peruvian National Police (PNP), and perhaps 

other police forces in the region have explored purchases of Chinese equipment. The police force in Montevideo, for example, has purchased police cruisers of 

the Chinese brand, Geeley.86 Similarly, in August 2007 

the PNP contracted with a South Korean intermediary for the purchase of 700 Geeley police cars.87 As 

with the military sales, however, the transaction came 

under significant public scrutiny and was eventually 

canceled.

At a lower level, the Colombian military has also 

been the recipient of approximately $1 million per year 

of nonlethal equipment, including gloves and winter 

hats to equip Colombian high-mountain battalions. It 

affirmed and deepened that relationship in November 2010 with the signing of a defense cooperation 

accord.88

Costa Rica is also a strong candidate for the receipt 

of Chinese equipment and other assistance for its security forces. In November 2010, during a visit to Beijing, Costa Rican Prime Minister Rene Castro made a 

formal request to China for assistance in training and 

equipping its national police for operations against 

narcotrafficking.89

Other countries in the region have also flirted with 

the possibility of acquiring significant military material from the Chinese. These include Argentina, which 

in 2007 was reportedly considering purchase of the 

Chinese X-11 helicopter90 as well as military trucks 

and radars to provide coverage for the Northern frontier.91 It ultimately decided not to purchase any of 

these from the PRC.

The Argentine military did, however, agree to purchase WMZ-551 wheeled armored vehicles from the 
30

Chinese manufacturer NORINCO as part of its contribution of a mechanized battalion to the joint Argentine-Chilean peacekeeping force “Cruz del Sur.” In 

2008, the Argentine Joint Staff purchased four of the 

armored vehicles for evaluation at a price of $2.6 million, including a training and spare parts package.92 

The vehicles initially saw service with the Argentine 

mechanized battalion in Gonaives, Haiti, where the 

Argentine combined mechanized battalion was deployed as part of MINUSTAH.93 In the end, however, 

numerous problems with these vehicles led Argentina 

to suspend their procurement.94

In the case of Brazil, which has its own well-developed defense industry, there have been no significant 

purchases of Chinese military hardware. Nonetheless, 

the possibility of China-Brazil co-production of such 

items was discussed during the September 2010 meeting between Chinese Defense Minister Liang Guanglie and his Brazilian counterpart, Nelson Jobim, in 

Brasilia.95

Although Chile has made significant military purchases in general, it has not, to date, made significant 

purchases of Chinese military goods. As with Colombia, this resistance reflects Chile’s close military 

institutional ties with the United States, including an 

existing military infrastructure built around U.S. and 

European equipment, as well as a relative emphasis on 

quality, over price—a luxury permitted in part thanks 

to its large military acquisition budget, which receives 

10 percent of export revenues from the state mining 

firm Corporación Nacional del Cobre de Chile (COLDELCO), per the 1976 Copper Reserves Law.96

Finally, PRC donations of military equipment to 

Jamaica in January 2011 deserve mention. The delivery of $3.5 million in nonlethal goods, principally uni-
31

forms and tents, but also including helmets, binoculars, backpacks, and bulletproof vests to the Jamaica 

Defense Force (JDF) was based on a 2008 defense cooperation agreement between the two countries.97 Although the donation was small in absolute terms, and 

did not involve weapon platforms or sophisticated 

munitions, it is significant because of the small size 

of the JDF, and because it came at a time in which the 

overtaxed Jamaican security forces were evaluating 

new ways of dealing with narco-violence such as that 

which killed 73 persons during the forced entry into 

Tivoli Gardens to capture Dudus Coke in May 2010. 

Such gifts, in combination with Chinese experience in 

neighboring Haiti, potentially position the PRC to expand its role in police-related activities among those 

nations that recognize the PRC in the Caribbean.

There have also been some suggestions that Chinese small arms have made their way into the arsenals 

of Latin American countries. For example, a version of 

the Colt M-4 rifle, manufactured by the Chinese arms 

conglomerate NORINCO as the CQ-M4, was reportedly spotted in 2008 photos of activities by the Paraguayan armed forces.98

Chinese military sales to non-state actors in the 

region also deserve mention. In addition to the previously discussed sale of Chinese arms to the FARC 

and other anti-governmental groups, a significant 

portion of the military-caliber weapons purchased by 

narcotrafficking organizations in Mexico are Chinese 

in origin, albeit purchased through third-party arms 

dealers.99
32

Military-Relevant Commercial Interactions in Latin 

America. 

In addition to arms sales and contacts between the 

PLA and Latin American militaries, select commercial 

interactions must be considered as part of its military 

engagement because of the impact they confer upon 

Chinese military capabilities and its strategic posture 

globally. Although virtually all commercial interactions indirectly contribute to the resources and technological capability of the Chinese state, this section 

focuses on three strategic commercial areas whose 

military benefits are most explicit: aircraft, satellites, 

and telecommunications.

Chinese sales of aircraft to Latin America, as well 

as collaboration in aircraft manufacturing, benefit the 

Chinese military aviation industry. Both major cases 

of their collaboration involve the group Aviation Industry of China (AVIC), a holding company for CAIC 

I and II, also involved in the development of military 

aircraft and associated technology. 

In the Brazilian case, CAIC collaborated with the 

Brazilian aircraft manufacturing firm Embraer to 

jointly manufacture the mid-sized ERJ-145 jet in the 

Chinese city of Harbin. Embraer viewed collaboration 

with CAIC as necessary in order to gain access to the 

Chinese market, although by 2010 the relationship 

had broken down, with the PRC resisting Embraer requests to move beyond the ERJ-145s and sell the larger 

E-190 to the Chinese market.100 The relationship was 

also soured by the perception within Embraer that the 

Chinese had used the partnership to steal Embraer’s 

technology to support their own aircraft development 

initiatives.
33

In the case of Venezuela, in April 2010, the two 

governments signed an agreement for the establishment of a new mid-sized airline to serve rural Venezuela.101 China Development Bank agreed to lend the 

Venezuelan government $300 million to establish a regional airline. In return, the Venezuelan government 

would purchase the 33 aircraft for the airline, Y-12s, 

from AVIC.102

Satellites and space technology are other areas 

whose technology has both significant commercial and 

military applications for the PRC. Today, concurrent 

with the economic and technological development 

of the PRC, the Chinese space program is pursuing 

a diverse array of objectives, ranging from commercial satellite launches, to manned space flight (Project 

921),103 to missions to the moon,104 Mars, and beyond.

Within this broader context, the PRC is attempting 

to secure a presence in the commercial satellite market. Under the supervision of China National Space 

Agency (CNSA), space launches and related activities are executed by the state-owned enterprise China 

Aerospace and Technology Corporation, with a series 

of companies falling within this framework. These 

include Great Wall Industry Corporation (GWIC), 

the sole organization authorized by the Chinese Government to provide satellite in-orbit delivery (IOD) 

services, commercial launch services, and aerospace 

technology applications.105

The PRC currently has four major ongoing spacerelated projects in Latin America: the China-Brazil 

Earth Research Satellite (CBERS); Venesat-1; the Venezuelan Remote Sensing Satellite (VRSS); and the Tupac Katari satellite, as well as other projects in development and more modest collaborative initiatives. 

The primary venue for China-Brazil space cooperation is the China-Brazil Earth Resources Satellite pro-
34

gram, established in 1998. To date, a total of three satellites have been launched through the program from 

the Taiyuan Satellite Launch Center in Shanxi, China, 

in 1999, 2003, and 2007.106 A fourth launch is scheduled in mid-2011.107 Brazil assumed approximately 30 

percent of the project cost, while China assumed the 

remaining 70 percent, including ground stations.108

The importance of the project in the broader BrazilChina relationship is evidenced by the fact that a key 

stop during President Hu’s visit to Brazil in November 2004 was to a CBERS project site at the National 

Institute for Space Research (INPE) in the state of Sao 

Paulo.109

The China-Brazil space collaboration via the CBERS 

program has not been without problems. The launch 

of the first joint satellite, originally scheduled for 1992, 

was delayed until 1998.110 Moreover, in August 2003, 

the first CBERS satellite experienced a malfunction 

that put an end to all of its data transmissions, and in 

April 2005 one of two PRC-supplied imaging devices 

on the second CBERS satellite stopped working due to 

a power supply failure.111

Such difficulties have not, however, significantly 

impeded China-Brazil space cooperation.112 Upon assuming his post in March 2008, the new head of the 

Brazilian Space Agency stated that Brazil cherished its 

ties with the PRC and would deepen its cooperation 

with China in the field of space technology.113 In the 

cases of Venezuela and Bolivia, the PRC has contracted to develop and launch satellites, to build associated 

ground control stations, and to train personnel in their 

use.

Venezuela was the first country in Latin America to 

pay a Chinese company, GWIC, to develop and launch 

a satellite.114 Venezuela paid the PRC $406 million for 

the project, including $241 million to develop and put 
35

it into space.115 As part of the project, the Chinese also 

built a series of ground control stations, including facilities at Camatagua and El Sombrero (the “Manuel 

Rios” military base). In addition, 90 Venezuelans were 

sent to the PRC for education and training associated 

with the project, including 15 technicians sent for a 

12-month doctoral-level program, and an additional 

15 sent for a shorter program to obtain their master’s 

degrees.

The satellite was launched from the PRC in October 2008 and put into a 78-degree geosynchronous 

orbit, becoming operational in January 2009.116 It initially had problems due to an irregular orbit, requiring adjustments from booster rockets that ultimately 

consumed a significant percentage of its operational 

life. Venezuela has discussed plans to launch a second 

satellite in 2013, the VRSS, which would conduct reconnaissance.117 

In the case of Bolivia, on April 2, 2010, the government of Evo Morales contracted with the Chinese 

Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation 

(CASC) for the development and launch of the Tupac 

Katari satellite.118 As in the Venezuelan case, the Bolivian project also included the construction of ground 

control stations: one in Pampahasi and one in La 

Guardia in the department of Santa Cruz.119 Of the total $295 million cost of the program, all but $44 million 

was financed by credit from the China Development 

Bank.120

In addition to their contributions to the enhancement of the PRC space capability, China’s construction of ground control stations and tying them into 

national telecommunication networks gives it unprecedented opportunities to understand the communication and space-technical architectures of each host 
36

country, and to tap into them in the future, if necessary, to collect information or disrupt them. In the case 

of Venezuela, it is relevant that the Chinese telecommunication company Huawei plays an intimate role 

not only in the construction of the satellite command 

and control facility, but also in the construction of the 

Venezuelan fiber optic network.121

From a military perspective, the utility of projects 

such as those with Brazil, Venezuela, and Bolivia, is 

that they help major Chinese companies in their bid 

to become a commercially viable space launch and 

technology provider, in competition with established 

providers such as Ariane and Thales. Moreover, associated training of Latin American personnel in the 

PRC arguably provides China the opportunity to 

build relationships with, collect information from, 

and in some degree indoctrinate virtually the entire 

cadre of the recipient country’s military and civilian 

space-technical personnel. 

As part of the development of its space sector, the 

PRC has also been pursuing initiatives in Argentina, 

Chile, and Peru, albeit with mixed success. With respect to Argentina, in May 2005 the Chinese government signed an agreement to provide technical support 

and equipment to the national satellite manufacturer 

Investigaciones Aplicadas (INVAP) in support of the 

development of a satellite by the Argentine national 

company Empresa Argentina de Soluciones Satelitales 

(ARSAT).122 In the end, however, Astrium and Thales 

Alenia Space, rather than the PRC, were selected as 

the major equipment suppliers to INVAP. Moreover, 

although the PRC was interested in providing Argentina with launch services, ARSAT contracted with the 

French firm Arianespace to launch the satellite in mid2012 from the equatorial launch site in New Guinea.123
37

In the case of Chile, China expressed an interest in participating in the development and launch of Chile’s 

first satellite, the Sistema Satelital de Observación de la 

Tierra (SSOT).124 But when the final decision was made, 

the development work was awarded to the European 

firm EADS Astrium,125 and the launch contract won by 

Arianespace.

In the case of Peru, the nation is currently the only 

Latin American member of the Asia-Pacific Space 

Cooperation Organization (APSCO), a Beijing-based 

entity which began functioning in 2008, focusing on 

space science and technology, training, and cooperative research.126

In Mexico, the April 2010 legislation establishing a 

Mexican Space Agency127 opened a window for ChinaMexico space cooperation, with a delegation from the 

China National Space Agency participating in the new 

organization’s kickoff event, the “Space Conference of 

the Americas,” held in November 2010 in the Mexican 

state of Hidalgo.128

With respect to telecommunications, another sector with strategic value in the information operations 

and defense technology realm, Chinese firms are major players in virtually every major nation in Central 

and South America. The principal companies involved 

are Huawei, ZTE Corporation, and to a lesser extent 

Shanghai Alcatel Bell. Both Huawei and ZTE have 

established regional hubs for operations and training 

in Brazil. Both have participated in various projects 

in the modernization and expansion of major South 

American telecommunications architectures, including those of Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela.129

In the cases of both Huawei and ZTE, Venezuela 

presented the companies, and the PRC, with a major 

commercial opportunity, with each establishing a cell 
38

phone manufacturing facility in the country, with 

plans to export production from the factories into 

other parts of the region.130 In addition, Huawei has 

played a major role in building Venezuela’s fiber optic 

network, and has been involved in a series of military 

projects as noted earlier, such as the establishment of 

a command and control facility, and the training of 

Venezuelan military personnel.

In the case of Shanghai Alcatel Bell, the company is 

the principal contractor laying a new fiber optic cable 

tying Cuba and Jamaica into the China-built Venezuela telecommunications infrastructure.131 In Honduras, 

although the nation does not diplomatically recognize 

the PRC, a Chinese consortium was reportedly interested in purchasing the state telecommunications firm 

Empresa Hondureña de Telecomunicaciones (Hondutel), 

pursuant to plans to privatize it.132

As in aviation and space, Chinese activities in telecommunications have strategic military implications 

in two areas. First, they support Chinese efforts to acquire and improve technical capabilities in this strategically important sector. Second, as a complement to 

space cooperation, when Chinese companies sell hardware and build the telecommunications infrastructure 

in a region, the PRC is afforded opportunities to exploit 

these networks for future information collection and 

disruption activities in the unlikely but possible event 

of a future conflict with the United States. Moreover, 

such a presence makes possible the use of commercial 

telecommunication offices and activities as cover for 

the potential introduction of personnel into the region 

and performance of information operations.
39

Chinese Physical Presence within Latin America 

with Military-Strategic Implications. 

To date, the PRC has been extremely cautious to 

avoid establishing an overt military presence in Latin 

America that could facilitate the emergence of a consensus within the United States and its allies to oppose PRC engagement with the region. Where it has 

done so, it has maintained a very low profile, or emphasized the scientific or nonmilitary character of that 

presence.

As noted previously, the PRC has had military police in Haiti as part of the MINUSTAH peacekeeping 

force since September 2004.133 Such participation has 

arguably provided a valuable learning experience and 

engagement opportunity for them. While far more 

benign than other forms of presence, such as military 

bases, its activities in Haiti allows the PRC to gain 

experience and develop contacts in the region, while 

fostering good will among Latin American militaries 

that could facilitate its military access to the region in 

the future.

In Cuba, the PRC reportedly has a physical presence at three or more Soviet-era monitoring facilities: 

Lourdes, Bejucal,134 and Santiago de Cuba.135 With their 

proximity to the United States, the bases are reportedly used by the Chinese for the collection of signals 

intelligence, such as intercepting radio and cellphone 

transmissions, and also for the operation of a cyber 

espionage and training facility in the country.

In addition to their explicitly military presence in 

Haiti and Cuba, the PRC also has a series of government-operated scientific bases in Antarctica, since establishing its first base there, “Great Wall,” in 1985.136

Although the sites are not of a military character, they 

are supported by the PLA Navy, with the 1st Task 
40

Group established in 2004 for the specific purpose of 

supporting the base and conducting operations in the 

“southern ocean.”137 Although the frigid temperatures 

and remoteness of its Antarctic facilities from the majority of Latin American states limit their military utility, as with Haiti they have provided opportunities 

to interact with the Argentine and Chilean militaries. 

The Chilean base in Antarctica, for example, is located in close physical proximity to that of the Chinese, 

providing opportunities for communication and collaboration. In addition, some have speculated that the 

PRC presence in Antarctica may strengthen its claim 

to exploit mineral deposits there,138 particularly when 

the current international treaty banning mining in 

Antarctica expires in 2048.139

Beyond Haiti, Cuba, and Antarctica, the presence 

of Chinese logistics companies in major ports of the 

region arguably has some strategic military value, presenting a platform from which the PRC could smuggle people or material into the region under the cover 

of commercial operations, in the event that relations 

between the United States and the PRC significantly 

worsen in the coming decades. Indeed, there is a precedent for the use of Chinese commercial shipping for 

military purposes. In 1991, the PRC enlisted the help 

of the commercial cargo ship Yongmen, owned by China Overseas Shipping Company (COSCO), to evacuate Chinese embassy personnel from Somalia.140

While it is important to acknowledge the long-term 

strategic military value of the PRC physical presence 

in Latin America, it is also necessary to put it in proper context. It would be very difficult for the PLA to 

employ this commercial presence to support its own 

projection of military power in the region, since com-
41

mercial facilities cannot be readily transformed into 

military bases. Moreover, the proximity to the United States of any improvised military facilities would 

make them highly vulnerable to military action in the 

event of overt hostilities. Nonetheless, in such a worst 

case scenario, such a presence would arguably allow 

the PRC to more easily deny the use of those facilities 

in the future by U.S. and allied warships, or to disrupt 

commercial flows that support the United States. The 

possibility that the firm Hutchison-Whampoa could 

use its port operations at Cristobal and Balboa in the 

Panama Canal Zone to close the canal to U.S. warships 

is illustrative.141 

CONCLUSIONS

The PRC military relationship with Latin America 

is not as insignificant as much of the current discourse 

suggests, yet the challenges that it presents are often 

mischaracterized as a “China threat” to the region. 

From a U.S. national security perspective, the most 

important dimensions of China’s military engagement with Latin America have to do with how the relationship is evolving as the PRC pursues its arguably 

legitimate national security interests, while remaining 

attentive to the United States, the most important strategic actor in the region. Chinese military interactions 

with Latin America, in and of themselves, are not necessarily a problem. The risk stems from what happens 

when the PRC, like the United States, is confronted 

with imperatives to protect its growing interests in 

the region in the face of organized crime or political 

turmoil that threaten its people, investments in Latin 

America, or commercial flows. Obviously, such disruption could in the future cause serious damage to the 
42

Chinese economy. Equally troubling is how Chinese 

capital and weaponry could be used by regimes in the 

region hostile to their neighbors and the United States, 

or by terrorist groups and transnational criminal organizations. The principal risk is that such groups might 

acquire such weapons due to inadequate controls over 

them by the region’s governments, or because of inadequate attention by Chinese companies regarding 

their weapons’ ultimate customers. Chinese arms sales 

and the PRC physical presence in Latin America also 

become problematic in the event that U.S.-China relations degenerate, creating the paradox that U.S. fears 

over how such weapons and ties could be used would 

contribute to the very friction that could increase the 

possibility of their use.

Aside from such scenarios, even in the best of cases 

growing China-Latin America military engagement 

means that the United States will find its freedom of 

action in the region constrained in ways that were not 

the case in the past. Latin America is increasingly acquiring options beyond those offered by the United 

States, particularly as regarding its security cooperation, arms purchases, and personnel training. This 

dynamic will change how the region’s governments 

bargain when it comes to access to bases, intelligence 

sharing, joint operations, and permission for U.S. direct action in the region, for example, counterdrug 

and counterterrorism operations. At a minimum, 

Latin American regimes will be more likely to resist 

agreeing to U.S. requests that are perceived to violate 

their sovereignty. 

Based on its behavior to date, it is likely that the 

PRC will continue to expand its military engagement 

with Latin America, including arms sales, which will 

increase in volume and sophistication, building on the 
43

demonstration of its equipment in the ALBA countries, capitalizing on key breakthrough transactions 

when they occur—whether with Peru and Colombia, 

or elsewhere—in order to introduce end items into 

the mainstream arms market of the region. In following this course, although the PRC will likely remain 

highly attentive to the U.S. response, it is also likely to 

become bolder over time, particularly as the current 

4th generation Chinese leadership is superseded by 

younger leaders who have grown up in a PRC that is 

an accepted political and economic power, confident 

of its place in the world. 

What Should the United States Do? 

Growing Chinese military contacts with Latin 

America are, in some ways, an understandable part 

of the expansion of the PRC as key global actor with 

global interests. Although the example of Japan suggests that a country that builds its economic power on 

international commerce in the modern era does not 

necessarily have to develop security ties with its trading partners, China seems bent on developing such 

ties. 

As a long-standing military partner of Latin America, the United States has an opportunity to forge a 

new type of partnership with countries of the region, 

to help them exploit the opportunities and avoid the 

pitfalls that military and other forms of engagement 

with the PRC present. Indeed, as an integral part of 

the region through geographic, economic, and human 

ties, the United States has an obligation to itself and to 

its neighbors in Latin America to forge this new type 

of partnership.

Because of the importance of the United States for 

the PRC as a source of technology and as a market, 
44

and because of the damage that animosity with the 

United States could do to the economic and technological development of the PRC, Chinese leaders have 

traditionally been very sensitive to possible adverse 

U.S. responses to their initiatives. The PRC is unlikely 

to bow before U.S. demands, yet the character of the 

U.S. response, among other factors, will shape how 

the PRC and its companies behave in Latin America 

and the pace at which they proceed.

Such analysis is not intended to imply that the 

United States should initiate a new “Monroe Doctrine,” telling the PRC to “stay out” of the region. Although such rhetoric might play well politically, and 

although it might induce China to proceed more cautiously in the short term, it would also work against 

U.S. strategic interests in the long term by strengthening the hand of more conservative forces in the PRC, 

and by fueling accusations in Latin America that its 

powerful neighbor to the north is “once again” trying 

to interfere with the sovereign right of countries in the 

region to maintain relations with whom they choose. 

Beyond such a likely negative reaction from the 

region, trying to prevent the PRC from establishing 

military ties with Latin America would also deny the 

United States some of the real benefits that may be 

realized from Chinese military engagement with the 

region. To the extent that it proves reliable, for example, Chinese military hardware and supplies, in addition to training programs, may provide the region 

with cost-effective ways to meet security needs in the 

face of serious threats, such as those posed by transnational criminal organizations.142 Cooperation between 

the PRC and Latin American police forces with data, 

personnel exchanges, and translation support, could 

be of great benefit in combating the activities of mafias 
45

operating in Latin America with ties to PRC criminal 

enterprises such as the Red Dragon, with its involvement in human trafficking networks in the region143—

or in stemming the flow of precursor chemicals from 

China to cocaine laboratories in the Andes and Amazon jungle.144 Revenue from export sales to China, if 

carefully managed, may also help Latin American 

states meet their security needs, as seen in the case of 

Chile, where by law, 10 percent of copper export revenues are channeled to fund defense modernization.145

Given both the positive and negative attributes 

of Chinese military engagement with the region, the 

United States should work to obtain greater transparency with regard to those activities, and to engage 

the PRC in a positive fashion regarding its pursuits 

in the hemisphere, including regular dialogue and the 

establishment of mechanisms for resolving misunderstanding. To this extent, the decision by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Arturo Valenzuela to resume 

the U.S.-China Strategic Dialogue on Latin America146

initiated by his predecessor, Thomas Shannon, was a 

constructive move.

As a complement to transparency, the United 

States must also improve its understanding of the 

dangers and the threats presented by that engagement in the specific, evolving Latin American context. 

Scenario-based gaming could play an important role 

in such analysis by generating insight with respect 

to how political crises and other potential future dynamics in the region could play out, with a particular 

focus on crises that threaten specific PRC interests in 

the region, and options for the PRC to protect those 

interests in unilateral as well as collaborative ways. 

Such analysis should also focus on how different actors in the region might react to the presence of China, 
46

including its indirectly applied pressures, and how 

the commercial and other interests in Latin America 

of such actors as Russia, Iran, and India might play 

into the unfolding dynamic.

Overall, it is important for the United States to forge 

its response to PRC military engagement with the region in strategic terms, considering both the long-term 

implications of Chinese actions, as well as how that 

response affects the U.S. position among the countries 

of the region. Chinese military engagement with Latin 

America is likely to be a growing and enduring part of 

the regional dynamic. How the United States adapts 

and reacts to that reality will have profound implications for the future security environment of the region, 

and the position of the United States within it.

ENDNOTES

1. “Full text: China’s Policy Paper on Latin America and the 

Caribbean.” China View, Beijing, China, November 5, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com. 

2. For an example of the controversy, see “Panama Canal: 

America’s strategic artery,” BBC News, December 8, 1999, available from news.bbc.co.uk. See also Nelson Chung, “US faces surprise attack with canal giveaway: Analyst,” Global Security, November 17, 1999, available from www.globalsecurity.org.

3. See, for example, Kevin P. Gallagher and Roberto Porzecanski, The Dragon in the Room, Stanford, CA: Stanford University 

Press, 2010.

4. See Murray Scott Tanner, “How China Manages Internal 

Security Challenges and Its Impact on PLA Missions,” in Roy 

Kamphausen, David Lai, and Andrew Scobell, eds., Beyond the 

Strait: PLA Missions Other than Taiwan, Carlisle, PA: Strategic 

Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, April, 2009, p. 52. 
47

5. See “II. National Defense Policy,” available from www.china.org.cn/english/features/book/194485.htm.

6. David Lai and Mark Miller, “Introduction,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait, p. 16.

7. See, for example, Editorial, “On the PLA’s Historical Mission in the New Stage of the New Century,” Jiefangjun Bao, January 9, 2006. For references on calls for the PLA to create a “strategic deterrent force” to protect its interests abroad, see PLA Daily

editorial, “On the Military’s New Mission in the New Century,” 

January 9, 2006. Also see Luo Yabo, “A Scientific Interpretation of 

the PLA’s New Mission in the New Century,” Theoretical Studies 

on PLA Political Work, Vol. 6, No. 3, June 2005. For a good overview of the debate over how the PLA should defend its interests 

abroad, see Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” in Kamphausen, Lai, 

and Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait. 

8. “Petrolera china desestima que protesta en Tarapoa haya 

afectado sus intereses,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, November 16, 2006, available from www.eluniverso.com. See also “Andes 

Strikes Deal, Ends Tarapoa Protests,” Rigzone, November 14, 2006, 

available from www.rigzone.com/news/article.asp?a_id=38140.

9. “Heridos 24 militares en incidentes en protestas en Orellana,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, July 5, 2007, available from 

www.eluniverso.com.

10. “Corredor logístico Manta-Manaos generará nuevas industrias locales,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, May 6, 2007, 

available from www.eluniverso.com.

11. “Los camioneros ratifican el boicot a los super y autoservicios chinos,” Clarin, Buenos Aires, Argentina, June 26, 2006, available from www.clarin.com.

12. Yolanda Ojeda Reyes, “Ciudanos chinos reciben protección,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 11, 2004, available from www.eluniversal.com.

13. With global warming in the future, this could also include 

the Straits of Magellan.
48

14. Christopher D. Young and Ross Rustici, “China’s Out of 

Area Naval Operations: Case Studies, Trajectories, Obstacles and 

Potential Solutions,” China Strategic Perspectives, No. 3, Washington DC: National Defense University Press, December 2010.

15. Song Xiaojun, “Will China Send Forces to Somalia?” Blog 

commentary, December 1, 2008.

16. Lai and Miller, “Introduction,” in Kamphausen, Lai, and 

Scobell, eds., Beyond the Strait. 

17. Information Office of the State Council, China’s National 

Defense in 2008, Beijing, China, available from www.china.org.cn/

government/central_government/2009-01/20/content_17155577.htm. 

See also Information Office of the State Council, China’s National 

Defense in 2006, Beijing, China, December 29, 2006.

18. For a good discussion of the Chinese approach towards 

“asymmetric warfare,” see Nichalos R. Reisdorff, “Winning the 

Hundred Battles: China and Asymmetric Warfare,” Master's Thesis, ADA430913, Ft. Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, June 6, 2003.

19. “Bolivia y China fortalecen cooperación militar,” Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, August 18, 2010, available from www.

lostiempos.com. 

20. “Militares Cubanos Visitan China” (“Cuban Military Visits China”), Cuba a la Mano, September 4, 2010, available from cubaalamano.net.

21. “Saludan fortalecimiento de cooperación militar entre 

Fuerzas Armadas de Perú y China,” Andina, Novembeer 23, 2010, 

available from www.andina.com/pe. 

22. “China dona US$1 millón a Colombia para armamentos,” 

ABC, Asunción, Paraguay, September 6, 2010, available from 

www.abc.com.py. 

23. “Brazil seeks closer defense relationship with China: defense minister,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 

30, 2010, available from english.people.com. 
49

24. “Chinese, Brazilian DMs hold talks on military cooperation,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 9, 2010, 

available from english.people.com. 

25. “Chinese military open to more int’l cooperation: senior 

officer,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 15, 2010, 

available from english.people.com.cn. 

26. “Ecuadoran defense minister meets with Chinese military 

delegation,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, November 14, 

2010, available from english.people.com.cn. 

27. “Jefe del Estado Mayor chino está desde el martes en Venezuela,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 18, 2010, 

available from www.eluniversal.com. 

28. “China confirms death of all 8 Chinese police officers in 

Haiti quake,” China View, January 17, 2010, available from www.

chinaview.cn. In the days following the earthquake, the PLA police 

contingent was temporarily augmented by rescue workers and 

other personnel from the PRC. “Chinese rescue team arrives in 

Haiti, eight Chinese still missing,” Peoples Daily Online, Beijing, 

China, January 14, 2010, available from english.people.com.cn. 

29. “Chinese rescue team arrives in Haiti, eight Chinese still 

missing.” The official list of casualties associated with MINUSTAH, 

listing only four Chinese peacekeepers, can be found at MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti, available from 

www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minustah/memoriam.shtml.

 An account of the collapse of the MINUSTAH headquarters can 

be found at “UN Headquarters in Haiti Collapsed in Quake,” 

CBS News, January 13, 2009, available from article.wn.com/

view/2010/01/13/UN_Haiti_headquarter_collapses_in_earthquake/. 

30. “China further honors peacekeepers killed in Haiti earthquake,” Peoples Daily Online, Beijing, China, January 26, 2010, 

available from english.people.com.cn. 

31. See, for example, Florencia Jubany and Daniel Poon, “Recent Chinese Engagement in Latin America and the Caribbean: A 

Canadian Perspective,” FOCAL, March 2006, available from www.

focal.ca/pdf/china_lat-am.pdf.
50

32. There may be separate Air Force and Navy versions of this 

course.

33. The formal legal request to the Uruguayan Congress for 

the Naval Captain Sergio Dos Santos to attend the year-long 

course appears as Resolucion 56.547. Ministerio de Defensa Nacional. Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores, Montevideo, Uruguay, April 29, 2009.

34. “Simpósio Internacional no Naval Command College do 

Exército Popular de Libertacão de China,” PlanoBrazil, December 

18, 2010.

35. “Curso de Chino Mandarín,” Ejército de Chile, August 

2, 2007, available from www.ejercito.cl/detalle_noticia.php?noticia

=3260. 

36. “China dona US$1 millón a Colombia para armamentos,” 

ABC, Asunción, Paraguay, September 6, 2010, available from 

www.abc.com.py. 

37. “Brazil seeks closer defense relationship with China: defense minister,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 

30, 2010, available from english.people.com. 

38. Robert Benson, “Chinese Navy’s Historic Pearl Harbor 

Visit,” Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Fall 1997, available from forum.

apan-info.net/fall_97/China_r.html. See also Young and Rustici.

39. The ships in question left the Chinese port of Qingdao in 

October 2009, and completed their South American port calls in 

December 2009. “Dos buques militares chinos de última generación visitan Ecuador,” Observatorio de la política China, December 

12, 2009, available from www.politica-china.org. 

40. One analysis notes that reports from past deployments 

suggest that issues such as repairing or replacing critical parts, 

and obtaining supplies such as fresh fruits and vegetables are critical obstacles for long-range force projection by the Chinese Navy. 

See Young and Rustici. 
51

41. See, for example, “Chinese, Chilean navy commanders discuss ties,” China Daily, Beijing, China, November 9, 2010, available 

from chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-11/09/content_11524530.htm. See

also “Hawaii to Host 10th Western Pacific Naval Symposium,” 

U.S. Navy, October 29, 2006, available from www.navy.mil/search/

display.asp?story_id=26329. 

42. “Chinese honor guards shine at Mexico’s independence 

parade,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 19, 2010, 

available from english.people.com.cn. 

43. “Ejércitos de Perú y China Concluyen operación de acción humanitaria conjunta en Lima,” Andina, Peru, November 30, 

2010, available from www.andina.com.pe. 

44. “Operación Conjunta China-Peru de Rescate Medico Humanitario ‘Angel de la Paz,” Maquina de Combate, November 24, 

2010, available from maquina-de-combate.com/blog/archives/10429. 

45. “Ejercitos de Peru y China Popular culminan operación 

militar conjunta en salud,” Andina, Peru, November 30, 2010, 

available from www.andina.com.pe. 

46. Frank O. Mora, “Strategic Implications of China’s Evolving Relationship with Latin America,” Presentation to the Conference on China in Latin America, Washington DC, November 6, 

2009, available from www.ndu.edu/chds/China-Wksp/Presentations/

CHDS-ChinaSpeech-Frank_Mora.pdf. 

47. Interview with General Carlos Ospina-Ovalle, Former 

Commander of the Colombian Armed Forces, Washington, DC, 

January 12, 2011, regarding his personal perspective on why Colombia had not purchased significant military end items from the 

PRC. 

48. “Venezuela’s Chavez to buy Chinese K-8 planes,” Reuters, 

May 11, 2008, available from www.reuters.com.

49. “Venezuela Air Force to take delivery on Chinese jet trainer K-8 Karakorum next year,” World Military Forum, November 

28, 2009, available from www.armybase.us/2009/11/venezuela-airforce-to-take-delivery-on-chinese-jet-trainer-k-8-karakorum-next-year/. 
50. “Aviación recibe primeros seis aviones chinos de combate 

K-8W,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, March 13, 2010, available from www.el-universal.com. 

51. Ibid.

52. “En agosto llegan 12 nuevos aviones K-8,” El Universal. 

Caracas, Venezuela, June 30, 2010, available from www.el-universal.com. 

53. The possibility of purchasing the L-15 was discussed in 

meetings between the Chinese and Venezuelan military leadership in October 2009.

54. “Se cayó avión militar en Barquisimeto,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, July 21, 2010, available from www.el-universal.

com. 

55. “Venezuela compra a China 12 aviones de transporte,” El 

Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, November 29, 2010, available from

www.el-universal.com. 

56. “Consideran comprar radares de baja cota,” El Universal, 

Caracas, Venezuela, June 6, 2009, available from www.el-universal.

com. 

57. Maria Daniela Espanoza, “FAN utilizará radar de origen 

chino en ejercicio con Brasil,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, 

August 21, 2008, available from www.el-universal.com. 

58. Noriega. 

59. “Instalarán 10 radares chinos para mayor control del espacio aéreo,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, December 29, 2010, 

available from www.el-universal.com. 

60. The JYL-1 radars purchased by Venezuela from the Chinese reportedly have an effective detection range of 240 nautical 

miles. For more information about the transaction, see “Consideran comprar radares de baja cota,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, June 6, 2009, available from www.el-universal.com. 

52
53

61. Some confirmation of this activity appears in the resumes 

of Huawei personnel who mention having worked on the modernization of the DICOFAN network. See, for example, Monica 

Suinaga, Huawei Design Engineer, On-Line Resume, available 

from ve.linkedin.com/pub/monica-suinaga/3/996/111.

62. Huawei establece alianzas con el sector académico venezolano,” Caracas Digital, January 24, 2011, available from www.

caracasdigital.com. 

63. “Colombia pide la captura de un diputado venezolano por 

‘Farcpolitica’,” El Tiempo, December 5, 2009, available from www.

eltiempo.com; See also “Fiscalía colombiana ordena detención de 

diputado venezolano Figueroa,” El Comercio, Quito, Ecuador, December 6, 2009, available from www.elcomercio.com. 

64. “Ecuador recibirá radares chinos para su frontera con Colombia,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, September 29, 2009, 

available from www.el-universal.com. 

65. “Ecuador instalará cuatro radares en la frontera con Colombia este año,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, August 16, 

2010, available from www.el-universal.com. 

66. Interview with Guido Zambrano, Ministry of Transportation and Public Works, Quito, Ecuador, July 8, 2007. 

67. “Ecuador negocia con China compra de aviones logísticos 

Javier Fernandez,” El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, July 30, 2009, 

available from www.eluniverso.com. See also “Ecuador comprará 

aviones a China, para reemplazar gran parte de su flota actual,” 

Aviación Argentina-over-blog, July 30, 2009, available from aviacionargentina.over-blog.com/article-34443350.html. 

68. “China Duplicará Colaboración Militar Copn Ecuador, 

Según Fuerzas Armadas Del Vecino Pais,” El Tiempo, Bogota, Colombia, February 15, 2010, available from www.eltiempo.com. 

69. “Ecuador comprará aviones de transporte militar chinos,” 

El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, August 16, 2010, available from 

www.eluniverso.com. 
54

70. “Proyectos de la Fuerza Aerea Ecuatoriana,” Saorbats, 

Ecuador, available from www.saorbats.com.ar/news/1611. See also 

“Ecuador comprará aviones de transporte militar chinos.” 

71. “China Duplicará Colaboración Militar Copn Ecuador.”

72. “Bolivia comprará aviones chinos para lucha antidroga,” 

El Universo, Guayaquil, Ecuador, October 2, 2009, available from 

www.eluniverso.com. 

73. “Bolivia to receive combat aircraft from China,” Asia One, 

January 19, 2011, available from www.asiaone.com. 

74. “Gobierno ratifica compra de naves chinas y rusas,” Los 

Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, January 15, 2010, available from 

www.lostiempos.com. See also “Bolivia to receive combat aircraft 

from China,” Asia One, January 29, 2011, available from www.asiaone.com. 

75. “El gobierno decide potenciar la fuerza aérea,” La Razón, 

La Paz, Bolivia, February 19, 2007, available from www.la-razon.

com. See also “La FAB se fortalece con un avión de carga,” La 

Razón, La Paz, Bolivia, August 2, 2007, available from www.larazon.com. 

76. “In 2007, Bolivia sextuplico su deuda,” El Deber, Santa 

Cruz, Bolivia, January 31, 2008, available from www.eldeber.com.bo. 

77. “China dono equipos a las fuerzas armadas,” Los Tiempos, 

Cochabamba, Bolivia, December 16, 2006, available from www.

lostiempos.com. 

78. “China regaló 43 vehiculos a las fuerzas armadas,” El Deber, Santa Cruz, Bolivia, September 11, 2007, available from www.

eldeber.com.bo.

79. “China donó a las FF.AA. de Bolivia US$2,6 millones,” 

AmericaEconomia, March 31, 2010, available from www.americaeconomia.com. 
55

80. “Bolivia y China fortalecen cooperación militar,” Los Tiempos, Cochabamba, Bolivia, August 18, 2010, available from www.

lostiempos.com. 

81. “Bolivia aclara que 10.000 fusiles fueron donados por 

China y no por Venezuela,” Terra, June 26, 2008, available from 

noticias.terra.es. 

82. “Novedad en Parada Militar fue la presentación de cinco 

nuevos tanques chinos MBT 2000,” Agencia Peruana de Noticias, 

December 8, 2009, available from www.andina.com.pe. See also 

“Tanques chinos: El Ejército está de acuerdo con la compra,” 

Peru21, Lima, Peru, December 10, 2009, available from peru21.com.

pe. 

83. “El Ejecutivo busca postergar la compra de tanques chinos,” Gestion, Lima, Peru, April 6, 2010, available from gestion.pe/

noticia/457657/ejecutivo-buscar-postergar-compra-tanques-chinos.

84. “Perú y China firman un convenio de cooperación por 800 

mil dólares,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, November 11, 2007, available from www.elcomerciol.com.pe. 

85. Carlos Ospina-Ovalle. Former Commander-in-Chief of 

the Colombian Armed Forces, Interview, Washington, DC, December 1, 2009.

86. For photos of these cars in the colors of the municipal 

pólice of Montevideo, see “Geely Policía de Montevideo,” Flickr, 

available from www.flickr.com/photos/13328329@N06/4191019109/. 

87. “En el Perú ya se venden autos de la marca Geely,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, August 1, 2007, available from www.elcomercio.

com.pe. 

88. “China dona US$1 millón a Colombia para armamentos,” 

ABC, Asuncion, Paraguay, September 6, 2010, available from 

www.abc.com.py. 

89. “Costa Rica pidió a China Continental entrenamiento policial,” El Nuevo Diario, Managua, Nicaragua, November 3, 2010, 

available from www.elnuevodiario.com.ni. 
56

90. “Negocia la Argentina comprar helicópteros militares a 

China,” La Nación, Buenos Aires, Argentina, May 17, 2007, available from www.lanacion.com.ar. 

91. Guido Bratslavsky, “Licitación de radares: Ya hay trece 

empresas interesadas,” Clarín, Buenos Aires, Argentina, January 

29, 2007, available from www.clarin.com. 

92. “Norinco Wmz-551b1 Ea,” Socyberty, October 3, 2010, 

available from socyberty.com/military/norinco-wmz-551b1-ea. 

93. Christian Vilada, “Argentina evalúa la adquisición de 

blindados chinos,” Saorbats, August 27, 2008, available from www.

saorbats.com.ar/news/494. 

94. Jorge Elias, “Opinión: Llegaron los VCTP WMZ-551B1 

chinos,” Desarrollo y Defensa, September 10, 2010, available from 

desarolloydefensa.blogspot.com. 

95. “Brazil seeks closer defense relationship with China: defense minister,” People’s Daily Online, Beijing, China, September 

30, 2010, available from english.people.com. 

96. “¿Privatización de Codelco? El rescate de los mineros 

pone en vitrina a la estatal,” AmericaEconomia, December 12, 2010, 

available from www.americaeconomia.com. 

97. “China sends $3.5M in military equipment to Jamaica,” 

Today Online, January 15, 2011, available from www.todayonline.

com. 

98. “Paraguay soldiers using Chinese M4 (CQ 5.56) carbines,” 

MilitaryPhotos.Net, February 9, 2008, available from www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?141091-Paraguay-soldiers-usingChinese-M4-(CQ-5.56)-rifles.

99. Firearms Trafficking: US efforts to face Arms Trafficking to 

Mexico Face Planning and Coordination Challenges, GAO-09-709,

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, June 

2009.
57

100. Christopher Bodeen, “Future of Embraer China Plant Depends on Beijing,” ABC News, November 17, 2010, available from 

abcnews.go.com. See also Macauhub, November 26, 2010, available 

from Macau. www.macauhub.com.mo. See also “Brazil’s Embraer 

admits possibility of abandoning operations in China,” Macauhub, 

Macau, Brazil, May 6, 2010, available from www.macauhub.com.mo. 

101. “China invertirá 300 milliones de dólares en linea aerea 

venezolana,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, April 23, 2010, 

available from www.el-universal.com. 

102. According to the agreement, within the umbrella of 

AVIC companies, two helicopters will be acquired from Changhe 

Aircraft Industries Group, while a total of 31 Y-12 fixed wing aircraft will be manufactured by Hafei Aviation Industry Co. Lan 

Lan and Mao Lijun, “AVIC Bags Big Deal in Venezuela,” China 

Daily, July 13, 2010, available from www.chinadaily.com.cn. 

103. Peter Ritter. “The New Space Race: China vs. US,” Time, 

February 13, 2008, available from www.time.com.

104. In October 2007, China put an unmanned probe in orbit around the moon, and contemplates manned missions to the 

moon in the future. Jeffrey Logan, “China’s Space Program: Options for U.S.-China Cooperation,” Document RS22777, Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, September 29, 2008.

105. Great Wall Industries, available from www.cgwic.com. 

106. “Satellites: CBERS-1, 2 and 2B | CBERS-3 and 4,” ChinaBrazil Earth Resources Satellite (CBERS), available from www.

cbers.inpe.br. 

107 . “Chinese Space Policy: Collaboration or Competition,” 

Washington, DC; Center for Strategic and International Studies, 

March 23, 2010, available from csis.org.

108. Fabíola de Olivera. O Brasil Chega Ao Espaço: SCD-1 satélite de coleta de dados, São José dos Campos, São Paolo, Brasil : Instituto Nacional de Pequisas Espaciais, 1996, p. 81.

109. “Hu Jintao Visits the China-Brazil Aeronautics and Space 

Cooperation Project in Sao Paulo,” Beijing, China: Ministry of 
58

Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, November 15, 

2004, available from www.fmprc.gov.cn. 

110. De Olivera. 

111. Gyanesh Chander, “An Overview of the CBERS-2 satellite and comparison of the CBERS-2 CCD data with the L5 TM 

data,” Presentation, Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 

March 16, 2006.

112. Ironically, China and Brazil both ultimately joined the 

Missile Technology Control Regime. Luis Bitencourt, “Developing Countries and Missile Proliferation: The Cases of Argentina, 

Brazil and India,” Ph.D. dissertation, Washington DC: Catholic 

University of America, 2001, p. 149.

113. “Brazil To Deepen Space Cooperation With China,” Space 

Daily, March 27, 2008, available from www.spacedaily.com. 

114. See R. Evan Ellis, “New Frontiers? China – Latin America 

Space Cooperation,” Security and Defense Studies Review, Vol. 10, 

Spring-Summer 2010, p. 125.

115. “Chávez celebra satellite para construer el socalismo,” El 

Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, October 30, 2008, available from diario.

elmercurio.cl. 

116. “Venezuela inicia operaciones del Satélite Simón Bolívar,” 

El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, January 10, 2009, available from 

www.eluniversal.com.

117. James Suggett, “Venezuela to Launch its First Satellite 

from China in November,” Venezuelanalysis, August 18, 2008, 

available from www.venezuelanalysis.com. 

118. “Bolivian, Chinese Tupac Katari Satellite Partnership 

Now Official,” Satellite Today, April 6, 2010, available from www.

satellitetoday.com/civilspace/yheadlines/Bolivian-Chinese-Tupac-Katari-Satellite-Partnership-Now-Official_33806.html. 

119. “Bolivia firmó convenio con China para construcción 

de satélite Túpac Katari,” El Comercio, Lima, Peru, April 1, 2010, 

available from elcomercio.pe. 
59

120. “China aprueba crédito para satélite boliviano,” Los 

Tiempos, La Paz, Bolivia, December 24, 2010, available from www.

lostiempos.com. 

121. “Venezuela CANTV Selected Huawei Technologies to 

Upgrade Its Optical Fiber National Backbone Network,” Huawei, 

December 31, 2004, available from www.huawei.com.

122. Jamie Hulse, China’s Expansion into and U.S. Withdrawal 

from Argentina’s Telecommunications and Space Industries and the Implications for U.S. National Security, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies 

Institute, U.S. Army War College, September 2007.

123. “Arianespace Lands Arsat-1 Launch Contract,” SpaceNews, June 28, 2010, available from www.spacenews.com. 

124. “Defensa sondea 25 empresas para construir el nuevo satélite chileno,” El Mercurio, Santiago, Chile, April 18, 2007, available from diario.elmercurio.cl.

125. “Astrium presents the completed SSOT satellite to the 

Chilean government,” EADS Astrium, February 9, 2010, available 

from www.astrium.eads.net/en/news/astrium-presents-the-completedssot-satellite-to-the-chilean-government.html. 

126. “Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation Organization starts operation,” China View, December 16, 2008, available from news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-12/16/content_10514901.htm. 

127. Juan Arvizu and Horacio Jimenez, “Crean diputados 

agencia especial Mexicana,” El Universal, Mexico City, Mexico, 

April 20, 2010, available from www.eluniversal.com.mx. 

128. “Invitados,” Conferencia Espacial de las Americas, 

available from conferenciaespacialdelasamericas.org/agencias_

espaciales.html.

129. The projects are described in general terms in the the 

websites of both companies. See, for example, “Huawei America 

Latina,” available from www.huawei.com/es/catalog.do?id=343. See 

also Hulse. 
60

130. See, for example, Daniel Ricardo Hernandez, “Móvil bolivariano costar BsF 30,” El Universal, Caracas, Venezuela, March 

5, 2009, available from www.el-universal.com. 

131. The 1,000-mile cable will extend from Camurey, Venezuela, to Siboney, Cuba, and is expected to be functional in July 

2011. “Cuba, Venezuela Link Via Undersea Cable,” The Right Perspective, January 23, 2011, available from www.therightperspective.

org.

132. “Preocupados trabajadores por possible privatizacion de 

Hondutel,” La Tribuna, Tegucigalpa, Honduras, October 23, 2010, 

available from www.latribuna.com. 

133. Jia Wen. “Remembering Chinese peacekeepers in Haiti,” 

Global Times, January 19, 2010, available from opinion.globaltimes.

cn/observer/2010-01/499318.html. 

134. Manuel Cereijo, “Inside Bejucal Base in Cuba: A Real 

Threat,” The Americano, August 27, 2010, available from theamericano.com/2010/08/27/bejucal-base-cuba-real-threat/. Cereijo’s allegations concerning Bejucal, however, have been questioned by Cuban scholar William Ratliff, among others, noting that the radar 

domes in the photo accompanying Cereijo’s article are not located 

at Bejucal, as represented, but rather, the U.S.-operated Menwith 

Hill facility in the United Kingdom. See “Cereijo, Bejucal, China 

and Cuba’s adversary foreign intelligence (Bill Ratliff, US),” Stanford, CA: World Association of International Studies, Stanford 

University, April 3, 2006, available from waisworld.org/go.jsp?id=0

2a0&objectType=post&objectTypeId=3776&topicId=10. 

135. “Chinese Signals Intelligence and Cyberwarfare in Cuba,” 

AFIO Weekly Intelligence Notes, No. 23-06, June 12, 2006, available 

from www.afio.com/sections/wins/2006/2006-23.html#ChinaInCuba. 

136. “China begins 26th Antarctica season with a team of 

251 scientists,” Mercopress, October 14, 2009, available from 

en.mercopress.com/2009/10/13/china-begins-26th-antarctica-seasonwith-a-team-of-251-scientists. 

137. Young and Rustici.
61

138. “China bolsters Antarctica posts,” BBC News, November 

6, 2007, available from news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7080888.stm. 

139. Andrew Darby, “China flags its Antarctic intent,” The Sidney Morning Herald, January 11, 2010, available from www.smh.com.

au/opinion/politics/china-flags-its-antarctic-intent-20100111-m287.

html.

140. Young and Rustici.

141. J. Michael Waller, “China’s Beachhead at Panama Canal,” BNet, August 16, 1999, available from findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_30_15/ai_55481519/. 

142. A similar argument was made by Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of Defense Frank O. Mora, “Strategic Implications of 

China’s Evolving Relationship with Latin America,” Presentation 

to the Conference on China in Latin America, Washington, DC, 

November 6, 2009, available from www.ndu.edu/chds/China-Wksp/

Presentations/CHDS-ChinaSpeech-Frank_Mora.pdf. 

143. José Melendez, “La mafia china aumenta el tráfico de 

personas en AL,” El Universal, Mexico City, Mexico, May 10, 2007, 

available from www.eluniversal.com.mx. 

144. “China Tightens Restrictions on Online Transactions of 

Drug Precursor Chemicals,” Xinhua, September 27, 2010, available from english.cri.cn/6909/2010/09/27/45s596567.htm.

145. See, for example, Daisy Johnson, “Developments regarding the Copper Reserve Fund in the Chilean Defence Funding 

Strategy,” Defense Viewpoints, January 21, 2011, available from 

www.defenceviewpoints.co.uk/articles-and-analysis/developmentsregarding-the-copper-reserve-fund-in-the-chilean-defence-fundingstrategy.

146. “Assistant Secretary Valenzuela’s Travel to China,” U.S. 

Department of State, August 12, 2010, available from www.state.

gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/08/145941.htm. 
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General Gregg F. Martin

Commandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Antulio J. Echevarria II

Author

Dr. R. Evan Ellis

Director of Publications

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil