Enclosure 1 

Response to Remaining Questions 

Senator Edward J. Markey 

Letter Dated June 30, 2016 

Question 1: The NAS report recommended that the NRC “should perform a spent fuel 

storage risk assessment to elucidate the risks and potential benefits of 

expedited transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks.” 

a. Do you agree with this recommendation? If not, why not? 

b. If you agree with this recommendation, when will the Commission 

initiate its assessment? When do you expect the assessment to be 

completed? 

Answer: 

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) staff has previously evaluated expediting the 

transfer of spent fuel from pools to dry casks. Based on the staff’s assessment, the 

Commission decided that, due to the low risk to public health and safety from spent fuel pool 

storage, additional regulatory action is not needed. The agency’s evaluation was supported by 

several studies of spent fuel storage, for both pools and dry cask storage, performed or 

sponsored by the NRC. The NRC also evaluates operational experience and risk assessments 

performed by the scientific and international community, industry, and members of the public to 

ensure the risks posed by spent fuel pools and dry cask storage are understood and are 

adequately addressed by regulatory requirements. In addition, the NRC staff participates in 

international activities associated with assessing and addressing potential issues related to the 

storage of spent fuel. As discussed in more detail in its paper to the Commission (Enclosure 2), 

the NRC staff reassessed the NAS recommendation and found that existing studies and 

ongoing activities noted above are sufficient to support regulatory decisions on the safety and 

security of spent fuel pools. 

Question 2: The NAS report recommended that the NRC “strengthen their capabilities 

for identifying, evaluating, and managing the risks from terrorist attacks,” 

and that the NRC’s spent fuel storage risk assessment “should address 

accident and sabotage risks.” These recommendations substantiate 

concerns I raised in my September 2013 letter. As I explained, the NRC 

limited its analysis to studying the risk of spent-fuel fires resulting 

primarily from a severe earthquake, and failed to consider the risk posed 

by terrorist attacks. Accounting for the risk of terrorism is vital in light of 

reports that ISIS terrorists responsible for the recent Paris and Brussels 

attacks conducted video surveillance of a high-ranking Belgian nuclear 

official. Without incorporating the risk of terrorism into its analysis, the 

NRC cannot adequately consider the full range of scenarios that could lead 

to a catastrophic spent-fuel fire, and cannot fully assess the benefits to 

public safety of taking steps to mitigate the risk of this eventuality. 

a. Do you agree with the NAS recommendation that the NRC must fully 

account for the risk of terrorism and sabotage in its re-assessment of 

spent-fuel risks? If not, why not? 
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b. What steps, if any, is the NRC taking to strengthen its capabilities to 

identify, evaluate and manage the risk of terrorist attacks on nuclear 

facilities, including spent fuel storage sites? 

Answer: 

Plant security is one of many topics within the NRC’s risk-informed, performance-based 

framework that are assessed in combination with, but not fully integrated into, probabilistic risk 

assessment models. The NRC has used and will continue to use risk insights in the security 

area to ensure an appropriate level of security is maintained at NRC-regulated facilities. 

Security issues were extensively assessed in various studies and regulatory analyses following 

the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, enhanced security requirements were 

established to reduce the risks of radiological sabotage at nuclear power plants, including 

consideration of spent fuel pools. The NRC works in close cooperation with other Federal 

agencies to continually assess the possible nature and likelihood of security threats, and 

determine if changes to plant security programs are needed. In addition, the NRC and industry 

response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks included plant changes as part of 

mitigating strategies to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool 

cooling capabilities under the circumstances associated with loss of large areas of the plant to 

explosions or fire. The NRC staff assessed the NAS recommendation (see Enclosure 2) and 

did not identify a need to initiate new activities or to otherwise redirect resources to revise 

existing programs or to accelerate initiatives to enhance the use of risk assessment techniques 

in the security area. 

Question 3: As the Fukushima disaster demonstrated, a major release of radioactivity 

at a nuclear plant could have significant societal effects. These include 

psycho-social distress and more than 1,600 deaths resulting from largescale disruptions and population relocations; the loss of economic activity 

caused by the shut-down of all nuclear power plants in the country and the 

long-term evacuation of large geographic areas; and the loss of revenue 

from declining food exports and from tourism in contaminated regions. 

The Fukushima disaster also led to health problems, injuries, and 

casualties among clean-up workers, and there have been reports linking 

the radioactive release to elevated rates of thyroid cancer among children 

living in Fukushima prefecture. As such, to fully capture spent-fuel storage 

risks, the NAS report recommended that the NRC’s analysis “[c]onsider 

societal, economic, and health consequences” of spent-fuel fire, as well the 

direct risks of a radioactive release. Do you agree with this 

recommendation? If so, how and when does NRC plan to adopt this 

recommendation? If not, why not? 

Answer: 

As noted in our letter of August 23, 2016, the NRC staff evaluated changing its approach to 

analyzing severe accident scenarios and related costs and benefits of new regulatory requirements 

after the accident at the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant in Japan. The staff’s 2012 

assessment was provided to the Commission in the publicly available report, "Consideration of 

Economic Consequences within the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission's Regulatory 

Framework,"(SECY-12-0110). At that time, the Commission determined that major changes such as 
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those cited in the NAS recommendation were not needed to support its regulatory decisions on 

whether new requirements were needed for operating nuclear power plants. Further, as noted in 

Enclosure 2, in performing economic analyses, the NRC does consider public health, occupational 

health, environmental considerations, and property impacts. The staff is currently enhancing the 

NRC’s guidance documents used for performing regulatory analyses in response to direction from 

the Commission. 

Question 4: According to the NAS report, the NRC “has not carried out an independent 

examination of surveillance and security measures for protecting stored 

spent fuel,” as recommended by the NAS’s 2006 report. As such, the 2016 

NAS report recommended that the NRC fulfill this recommendation, and 

that the NRC’s analysis “should include an examination of the 

effectiveness of [the NRC’s] programs for mitigating insider threats.” 

b. Does the NRC intend to carry out an independent examination, as 

recommended by both NAS studies? If not, why not? 

c. Will this examination address insider threats, as the NAS recommends? 

If not, why not? 

Answer: 

b. The NRC establishes strategic goals and measures and issues routine reports regarding its 

performance related to its safety and security goals. As discussed in more detail in Enclosure 2, 

in the security arena, the NRC also works closely with other Federal agencies to identify and 

address possible threats. In addition to the NAS studies, the NRC has obtained independent 

assessments in the security area from the NRC’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG), 

U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), and other oversight bodies. Further, the staff 

routinely assesses information gained from operating experience, the inspection program, 

insights from drills and exercises, and the agency’s participation in various international 

activities. Therefore, after evaluating the NAS recommendation, the NRC staff concluded that 

another independent assessment is not necessary, given that the NRC’s requirements to 

ensure security of nuclear power plants and spent fuel storage will continue to be the subject of 

independent reviews by the OIG, GAO, and other organizations. The staff will also continue to 

benefit from independent insights gained from interactions with other Federal agencies, 

international bodies, licensees, and other stakeholders. 

c. All commercial nuclear power plants are required to have an insider threat mitigation 

program, in accordance with 10 CFR Part 73, “Physical Protection of Plants and Materials.” The 

approach for complying with this requirement is incorporated into each plant’s security plan. 

The monitoring of individuals includes a criminal history check with the FBI, pre-access alcohol 

and drug testing, random and for-cause drug and alcohol testing, psychological testing and 

evaluation, documented annual reviews by immediate supervisors, and periodic reinvestigation 

of individuals in selected positions. Instrumentation, inspections, and other aspects of plant 

operation that provide confidence in the readiness of plant equipment to maintain or restore 

safety functions also complement the security requirements.