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U.S. Department of Energy 

Office of Inspector General 

Office of Inspections and Special Inquiries 

 Inspection Report 

40 MM Grenade Launcher Qualification 

Requirements at Department of Energy 

Sites 

DOE/IG-0806 November 2008 
Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

November 25, 2008 

MEMORANDUM FOR 

FROM: 

Inspector General 

SUBJECT: INFORMATION: Inspection Report on "40 mm Grenade Launcher 

Qualification Requirements at Department of Energy Sites" 

BACKGROUND 

The Department of Energy and its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), operate 

some of the most sensitive Federal facilities in the United States. Because of the mission 

requirements, safeguards and security is a top priority at these sites. As part of its security 

regime, the Department maintains a cadre of armed protective force officers to prevent and 

defend against malevolent acts. In recent years, the Department has worked to enhance security 

by increasing the capabilities of weapon systems used by the protective force officers. One such 

weapon is the 40 mm grenade launcher, which utilizes high explosive ammunition to defeat 

adversary personnel and equipment. A number of Department sites have procured these 

weapons. 

Department elements and contractors responsible for security must establish formal training and 

qualification programs. These programs ensure that protective force officers are competent to 

safely and effectively perform assigned tasks, including defending protected facilities under all 

environmental conditions, such as reduced visibility. We initiated this inspection to gain a 

broader perspective on Department qualification programs for the use of 40 mm grenade 

launchers and to ascertain if the qualification courses were consistent with Department policy. 

We inspected six sites, four that report to NNSA and two that report to other Department 

organizations. Due to security concerns, the six sites are not specifically identified in this report. 

RESULTS OF INSPECTION 

During the course of our fieldwork, we concluded that three of the six sites did not conduct 

40 mm grenade launcher qualification courses in accordance with Department policy. 

Specifically, we found that: 

Despite Department policy requirements, three sites (two NNSA and one non-NNSA) 

had not conducted protective force officer qualification under reduced visibility 

conditions (night qualification) for their 40 mm weapons. The lack of night 

qualification called into question the ability of the protective force officers to 

effectively utilize the 40 mm grenade launcher to protect the site under all 

environmental conditions, as required. 

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The three noncompliant sites had not submitted requests for approval of a deviation 

from the Department's officer night qualification requirements, per Department 

policy. Following the prescribed deviation process ensures that appropriate 

compensatory measures are in place to: (i) alleviate security vulnerabilities; and, 

(ii) to meet Department site protection requirements. 

The 40 mm grenade launcher is a powerful defensive weapon. Any reductions in the capabilities 

of the protective force to make maximum use of the weapon are of concern. As a consequence, 

we recommended that personnel qualification requirements for the 40 mm be fully implemented. 

MANAGEMENT REACTION 

In responding to a draft of this report, management generally concurred with our findings and 

identified corrective actions taken or planned to address our recommendations. Management 

comments are provided in their entirety in Appendix B of the report. 

Attachment 

cc: Acting Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Under Secretary for Energy 

Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration 

Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management 

Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy 

Chief Health, Safety and Security Officer 

Director, Policy and Internal Controls Management (NA-66) 

Director, Office of Internal Review (CF- 1.2) 
40 MM GRENADE LAUNCHER QUALIFICATION 

REQUIREMENTS AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SITES 

 

TABLE OF 

CONTENTS 

OVERVIEW

Introduction and Objective 1 

Observations and Conclusions 2 

DETAILS OF FINDINGS 

Reduced Visibility Qualification 3 

Deviation Process 4 

RECOMMENDATIONS 6 

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS 6 

INSPECTOR COMMENTS 6 

APPENDICES

A. Scope and Methodology 7 

B. Management Comments 8 
Overview 

INTRODUCTION The U.S. Department of Energy (Department), a multi-faceted 

AND OBJECTIVE agency, supports diversified scientific, engineering, environmental 

and national security activities. The National Nuclear Security 

Administration (NNSA), a separately organized agency within the 

Department, supports science and technology and is responsible 

for maintaining the safety, security, reliability and performance of 

the United States' nuclear weapons stockpile. 

Department facilities, including those managed by the NNSA, are 

required to develop and implement protection strategies based 

upon the Department's Design Basis Threat (DBT). The DB'I' 

describes threats that are postulated for the purpose of analyzing 

safeguards and security programs, systems, components, 

equipment, information, or material. In addition, Department 

facilities that maintain special nuclear materials and other items of 

significant national security interest must develop a Site 

Safeguards and Security Plan (SSSP) to describe the physical 

protection programs, evaluate risk, and identify facility targets 

associated with the DBT. 

The nature of this security environment necessitates the 

implementation of formal security programs with increased 

emphasis on the protection of critical assets. To successfully 

defend its sites, the Department maintains a cadre of armed 

protective force officers to prevent and defend against malevolent 

acts. A critical part of the Department's effort to enhance security 

has been to increase the capabilities of weapon systems used by 

officers. One such category of weapon is the 40 mm grenade 

launcher, which utilizes high explosive ammunition to defeat 

adversary personnel and equipment. A number of Department 

sites have procured these weapons. 

In accordance with the Department's safeguards and security 

policy, Department elements and contractors responsible for 

security must establish formal training and qualification programs. 

These programs ensure that officers are competent to safely and 

effectively perform assigned tasks, including defending assigned 

areas under all environmental conditions, such as reduced 

visibility. Department and contractor entities unable to comply 

with safeguards and security regulations are required to follow the 

Department's formal deviation process to correct, alleviate. or 

eliminate the deviant condition. In correcting non-compliant 

Page 1 40 mm Grenade Launcher 

Qualification Requirements 

at Department of Energy Sites 
conditions. Department policy also requires departmental elements 

to monitor compensatory measures, establish schedules of actions 

needed to correct the non-compliant conditions. ensure that 

funding is effectively managed to address safeguards and security 

interests, and monitor compliance with schedules when applicable. 

In a prior inspection, we found that an NNSA site utilized 40 mm 

grenade launchers in a manner that was inconsistent with 

Department policy. Subsequently, we initiated this inspection to 

gain a broader perspective on Department qualification programs 

for the use of 40 mm grenade launchers. The objective of this 

inspection was to ascertain if 40 mm grenade launcher 

qualification courses at Department sites were conducted in 

accordance with Department policy. We inspected six sites: four 

report to NNSA, and two report to other Department organizations. 

Due to security concerns, the six sites are not specifically 

identified in this report. 

OBSERVATIONS AND During the course of our fieldwork, we concluded that three of the 

CONCLUSIONS six sites did not conduct 40 mm grenade launcher qualification 

courses in accordance with Department policy. Specifically, we 

found that: 

Despite Department policy requirements, three sites did not 

conduct protective force officer qualification under reduced 

visibility conditions (night qualification) for their 40 mm 

weapons. The lack of night qualification calls into question 

the ability of the protective force officers to protect the site 

under all environmental conditions. 

The three noncompliant sites had not submitted requests for 

approval of a deviation from the Department's officer 

qualification requirements, per Department policy. 

Following the prescribed deviation process ensures that 

appropriate compensatory measures are in place to alleviate 

vulnerabilitics and meet Department site protection 

requirements. 

Page 2 Observations and Conclusions 
Details of Findings 

REDUCED VISIBILITY We found that three sites (one Department and two NNSA) did not 

QUALIFICATION conduct protective force officer qualification under reduced 

visibility conditions (night qualification) for their 40 mni weapons, 

as required by Department policy. Consequently, protective force 

officer proficiency with these weapons could not be assured under 

all environmental conditions. Table 1 provides a sunimary 

regarding 40 mm grenade launcher reduced visibility qualification 

at the six sites. 

Reduced Visibility Qualification and Deviations for 

40 mm Grenade Launchers 

-- - - - 

Year Year Night 

Site Acquired ~ielded' Qualification 

1 1992 1993 No 

2 2006 2006 Yes 

3 2005 2005 No 

4 1998 1998 Yes 

5 2006 2007 Yes 

Deviation 

Obtained 

No 

N/A 

No 

N/A 

NIA 

No 

Table 1 

Department Manual 470.4-3, '-Protective Force," establishes 

requirements for weapon qualification to validate user proficiency. 

The Manual states that where departmental firearms qualification 

courses do not exist or do not cover site-specific deployment of a 

weapons system (e.g., grenade launchers), both daylight and 

reduced lighting site-specitic supplemental qualification courses 

must be developed by the cognizant security authority and 

submitted to the Director, Officc of Security Policy (for 

Department sites). or the Associate Administrator for Defense 

Nuclear Security (for NNSA sites) for review and approval. The 

reduced visibility qualification course is required for protective 

force officers to demonstrate full capabilities and skill levels under 

all environmental conditions. As noted previously, three of the six 

sites reviewed did not have reduced visibility qualification courses 

for grenade launchers to validate user skills under such conditions. 

' We noted that the sites had not conducted night qualification nor had the Department a~~thorized a deviation from 

that requirement since the weapons were fielded. 

Page 3 Details of Findings 
DEVIA'l7ON 

PROCESS 

Officials at the three sites provided us with various reasons why 

their sites were not in compliance with the Department's weapons 

qualification policy. An official at one site said they could not 

qualify during periods of reduced visibility because they did not 

possess appropriate night vision sighting systems, nor did they 

have such systems on order. An official at another site said they 

could not accurately grade a reduced visibility qualification course 

because their grenade launcher range was also an impact range for 

high explosive rounds and they were prohibited from walking out 

to the targets to confirm hits. Additionally, that official stated it 

was too difficult for qualification course graders to use night vision 

devices due to the inability to accurately confirm when targets 

were hit. An official at the third site, which began using grenade 

launchers in June 2006, said they did not currently conduct night 

qualification. but they were in the process of having a proposed 

night qualification course validated. 

We noted that the three sites that were conducting reduced 

visibility training were using innovative methods that potentially 

could be applied to the other sites. One site used the standard iron 

sights that come with the weapons and illuminated the firing range 

with the appropriate candle power as prescribed by the Manual. 

Additionally, the site modified its targets so that the chalk training 

rounds would have a more evident explosion when a round 

impacted the target. The other two sites qualified using a 

combination of electro-optical and iron sight systems aimed at a 

slightly illuminated target. 

We found that the three sites not conducting reduced visibility 

qualification had not submitted requests for deviations from the 

Department's officer qualification requirements, per Department 

policy. Following the prescribed deviation process ensures that 

appropriate compensatory measures are in place to alleviate 

vulnerabilities and meet Department site protection requirements. 

Per Department Manual 470.4-1, "Safeguards and Security 

Program Planning and Management," a formal request for 

deviation must include: 1) a specific description of the deviation 

and the rationale for the deviation request; 2) a description of the 

current measures used for protection and an evaluation of their 

effectiveness; 3) a description of alternate or compensatory 

measures or levels of protection to be provided as an alternative to 

the directive requirements; 4) the expected duration of the 

condition for which the deviation is requested, including 

milestones for correcting, alleviating, or eliminating the deviant 

condition; and 5) an evaluation of risks associated with the 

Page 4 Details of Findings 
deviation, if approved. The results of vulnerability analyses and 

performance tests conducted on the proposed alternatives must be 

included as well. Deviation requests must be submitted to the 

Director, Office of Security Policy (for Department sites), or the 

Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security (for NNSA 

sites) for review and approval. Officials at the three sites without 

night qualification courses acknowledged they had not submitted 

the required deviation requests. This was also confirmed by 

Department and NNSA officials responsible for those sites. 

We interviewed a senior Department Headquarters Safeguards and 

Security official regarding the lack of a deviation request for the 

Department site. The official said the site is required by 

Department Order to establish approved day and night 

qualification courses for their weapon systems and that if the site 

were not complying with the Order, they need to follow the 

deviation process. 

We also interviewed a senior NNSA Headquarters Safeguards and 

Security official regarding the NNSA sites. Despite the lack of 

deviation requests, NNSA Headquarters had approved their 

grenade launcher qualification courses without the reduced 

visibility requirement. The official told us it was NNSA's position 

that their approval of the qualification courses without a reduced 

visibility requirement included was "tantamount to approving the 

deviation from policy" for each site. As noted previously, the 

required deviation process includes a rigorous examination of the 

rationale for the deviation; current protection measures; 

compensatory measures to be employed as alternatives; the 

duration of the deviation; and a risk assessment. Approvals of 

deviation requests are to be based on analyses of these factors. We 

could find no evidence that NNSA, in approving the courses in 

what it termed as tantamount to a formal deviation, considered 

such factors with respect to the 40mm grenade launchers. Under 

the circumstances, we cannot be sure that NNSA fully considered 

the security implications of the lack of qualification in a reduced 

visibility environment. 

Subsequent to the completion of our fieldwork, we were advised 

by contractor officials that the Department site and one of the two 

NNSA sites had taken actions to address the lack of night 

qualification. Therefore, our recon~mendations include that the 

Department review these corrective actions for adequacy in 

addressing departmental requirements. 

Page 5 Details of Findings 
RECOMMENDATIONS We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Environmental 

Management: 

1. Ensure the Department site that was not conforming to grenade 

launcher reduced visibility qualification requirements has takcn 

corrective actions to comply with applicable Department 

requirements. If such actions are determined to be incomplete, 

direct the site to request an appropriate deviation in accordance 

with Department safeguards and security requirements. 

We recommend that NNSA's Principal Deputy Administrator: 

2. Ensure the IVIVSA sites that were not conforming to grenade 

launcher reduced visibility qualification requiremcnts takc 

corrective actions to comply with the applicable Department 

requirements. As an interim measure if corrective actions have 

not been completed, direct the site(s) to request an appropriate 

deviation in accordance with Department safeguards and 

security requirements. 

MANAGEMENT In comments on a draft of this report, the Office of Environmental 

COMMENTS Management agreed that the Environmental Management site 

addressed in this report had not conducted 40 mm grenade 

launcher qualification courses consistent with Department policy 

and stated that the deficiency has since been corrected by 

implementing an approved course. 

In its comments, NNSA generally agreed with the report and its 

recommendations. In a subsequent conversation with a senior 

NNSA official, the official said that one of the NNSA sites 

addressed in the report is now in compliance with Department 

qualification policy, while the other site is in the process of 

correcting issues related to 40 mm reduced lighting qualification 

requirements. 

INSPECTOR 

COMMENTS 

We found management's comments to be responsive to 

our report recommendations. 

Page 6 Recommendations 

Management and Inspector Coniments 
Appendix A 

SCOPE AND The fieldwork for this inspection was conducted between June 

METHODOLOGY 2007 and January 2008. As part of this inspection, we conducted 

interviews, document reviews and analysis that included: 

10 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 1046, "Physical 

Protection of Security Interests"; 

DOE Order 470.4, "Safeguards and Security Program"; 

DOE Manual 470.4-3, "Protective Force"; 

DOE Manual (Draft) 470.4-3A, "Contraclor Protective Force"; 

DOE Manual 470.4-1, "Safeguards and Security Program 

Planning and Management"; and, 

Grenade launcher qiialification courses for the six sites 

included in this review. 

This inspection was conducted in accordance with the "Quality 

Standards for Inspections" issued by the President's Council on 

Integrity and Efficiency. 

Page 7 Scope and Methodology 
Appendix B 

Department of Energy 

Wdbhlr~gt~lrl, U(- LOStiSI 

heplcn~l~e~ '12. 2OUX 

SUIJJLC 1': Inspector <;c~ieral I)ralr 1tcpol.t on "30 IIIIII (jl.~'lladt' 1,;1~1n~liel. 

()rr:lliiicatio~~ Ilcil~~ircmcrlts a1 1 Icpartmeli~ ol' [incry): Sites" 

l'he Ot'tice 01' I,;nvirorl~ncnta) h.1~1iage1ncnt (I:.h'l) has reviewed the ddrati rcpori. "40 111111 

(irel~adc 1,aunctrcr ()ualiticz~tion J<eq~~ire~ncnts a( LI~~pa~ltner~( of ICrlzrgy Sift.'' by the 

Olliec aflnspzctor (Isrleral. We ayrst. \vith the crhseuvat~on that 311 I.iRI site iliJ lrill 

conducl 40 nlm grellade qunli ticaticui caurszb consistent wit11 I)cpa~.tmznlal policy. 1:I\,1 

Iias cor~-<-cieii tllis dclicizncy by inipleuncrlling tlie course. "30 inln Cire~lade I .auncll~l. 

I I.igllt ()u:~lificatior~ ('oursen ulrish was approved 1-IY thc Of'ticc oil Ieiillh. Salkty 

aid S~x~irity. 

Page 8 Management Comments 
Appendix B (continued) 

Department of Energy 

Nrtional Nuclear Security Administrallon 

Wasti~ngtori 0(: :!0!1h5 

October 2.7-008 

hli- M( )KA NIIIJM F01(: (.'Iiristophcr L<. SI1iirple)i 

l>cl'llty II~S~L"L'~VI. Ger1craI 

for Investigatwrls and Inspection:; 

(:ommenls to DraIi Inspection liepork or1 3Onini 

(irenade I;~u~rcl~cr (Jualification; Job (3otle 

S071S033; IDRMS No. ?008--O'2740 

I'lic N;ltlorlal Nuclca~ Security Adnlilrisl~.ation (NNSA) appreciates the oppi!~iunity to 

ICVICW tllc 1111;pc~Lt)r ( ie11er:11's (ICr) draf report. 40 Alhl G'r~~lnde f.c~irncl~o~ Q~iol{fic~zlio~i 

ICt.~l"ir-c.,,re,lr.,.iiir~t.s c~r I)V[IUI.III~L.~~~ (!f'Ener.~ Sites. \Ire understand tlrat d~is ir~spection was 

llri~ii~tctf in i,ltier Col tile 1i.i to gain a broatlcr perspective on qualitication programs tt~r 

the use ot 40~11111 grenade laln~cllers and to ascc~tain if the qual~fication courses were 

co~iducrcd in at:~ortlancc with pohiy. 

l'11e NNSA gcner:rlly agrces with thc report anti its reco~rl~r~endations. '10 kllat elltl, we 

ofrel- lhc lblit~wi~~y colnlnenls us tileg rclatc to the repori in general and to the 

reco~rl~nendation directed towards NNSA's I'rincipal Ileputy Adlninistrator. 

During tllc 1)eriod ot'the f'icld work fi~r this irlspccrion and as noteti in the repoi-t; three 

NNSA sltes wc1.c Ihllrld to be not firily cclnlpliant with policies reql~iring grenade 

laullcl~cr q~ralit'icirtic~n progranls "u~ltier all cnvil-onmcrltal corlditions. such 21s sctluccd 

v~slliiliiy." Sillce the time that tile Ti; contll~utcd its fieltl work., olre oi'ol~r sites has 

eli~~ri~~atcd the 40r11n1 yr-euade launclrer tiorn its prt~tectron strategy, and tlre otber twct 

lure rel3laccd dxir night lirr~iliarizatiarl courses with qualitication coirrses that iricluch: a 

sct,rctl colllpollellL fi~ retlucetf lighting conditiolls. All NNSA fixcd sites tl~i~l usc IOnlrn 

grcrlatle lal~llcllers low have approved qualification courses ibr both dy ant1 low lighl 

cor~d~li~~rls. 

As tl~e draft I('; rcpol-t points out, there ax no I)eparl~ner~tal crtcria specific LC.) gl-er~adc 

laullcber qualificatioli courscs. 'I'his lack of guidance reilnireil our sites to develop ~IIC 

caul-ses basc~i OII the iiltendcd site-spccilit: application of the wcapolls systcrn, rclyi~lg 

Ilcavrly IBII lilllitary doctl.inc arid resitlcilt sut~jeci nlattcr expertise. We also CIICOLII-age 

i~uer-site cvllaboratioi~ wllcn establisllirlg n~ln-sri~ndard weapons trainillg a~ld 

Page 9 Management Comments 
Appendix B (continued) 

il~jalific;itio~~s stiu~~.lar.~ls; ti~erctore, this issue - as well as oll~crs - will Oe tliscc~ssed in an 

ul.,corning I'rr>teL:tive Iyorce Firearins Working (3roi.1[1 meeting ill ordor to cletel.minc l.)cst 

1,r~cticcs dn~l esralilisl~ comruorialit)~. 

'rile hNSA I,clicvss tllat we have already ulel the intelllion of ~lle recc~milietidation. 

Sl)c,t~ld you trnvu any clueitions ahoat this resi>onse, plcase co~lt~lct Riellard Speitlel, 

I)irccttir, I14)lrcy ant1 Inkenlal C:onlrols blallagetrlcnt at 202-586--500'). 

Page 10 Management Corr~ments 
IG Report No. DOEIIG-0806 

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