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THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND SHARED 

AUTHORITY OVER INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 5, 2017 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: 

http://www.govinfo.gov 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

BOB CORKER, Tennessee, Chairman

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

JEFF FLAKE, Arizona 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

TODD, YOUNG, Indiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

CHRISTOPHER MURPHY, Connecticut 

TIM KAINE, Virginia 

EDWARD J. MARKEY, Massachusetts 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

CORY A. BOOKER, New Jersey 

TODD WOMACK, Staff Director

JESSICA LEWIS, Democratic Staff Director

JOHN DUTTON, Chief Clerk

(II)

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C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Corker, Hon. Bob, U.S. Senator from Tennessee .................................................. 1 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from Maryland ..................................... 2 

Menendez, Robert, U.S. Senator from New Jersey ............................................... 3 

Bradley, Curtis A., William Van Alstyne Professor, Duke University School 

of Law, Durham, NC ............................................................................................ 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Haines, Hon. Avril D., Former Principal Deputy National Security Advisor, 

Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University, New York, NY ...................... 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to additional questions for the record submitted to Curtis A. Bradley by Senator Edward J. Markey ...................................................................... 34 

New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, a resolution adopted by 

the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2016 ........................ 35 

(III)

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

(1) 

THE PRESIDENT, CONGRESS, AND SHARED 

AUTHORITY OVER INTERNATIONAL ACCORDS 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 5, 2017 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:20 p.m., in Room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Bob Corker, chairman of the committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Corker [presiding], Gardner, Young, Cardin, 

Menendez, Shaheen, Coons, Murphy, Kaine, Markey, and Booker. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BOB CORKER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM TENNESSEE 

The CHAIRMAN. The Foreign Relations Committee will come to 

order. We apologize to our witnesses. We had a photograph with 

100 Senators. There are always three or four who do not show until 

long after it is supposed to start. And then we had a business 

meeting that went for a while. But thank you so much for being 

here. 

Today, we are going to continue a series of hearings to examine 

the executive’s authorities with respect to war-making, the use of 

nuclear weapons, and, from a diplomatic perspective, entering into 

and terminating agreements with other countries. 

We are here today to discuss the shared authority over international accords, an issue of fundamental importance to our national interests and separation of powers. 

Let me be clear. This is not about any effort to constrain the inherent powers of the President with respect to diplomacy. Our Nation must speak with one voice in diplomatic affairs. And under our 

Constitution, the President determines U.S. foreign policy. But 

Congress plays a vital role in providing advice and consent on treaties and authorizing U.S. participation in international agreements 

that shape our foreign policy. 

Our Founders understood the danger of entrusting too much of 

this power to the President alone, and the Constitution clearly provides for a shared authority to enter into binding international 

agreements. 

The House and Senate play an indispensable role in enacting legislation that provides the President with a domestic legal basis for 

fulfilling our international commitments. And with respect to 

agreements that rise to the level of a treaty, the Senate has a 

unique constitutional role in approving treaties. Therefore, we 

must be active participants in the process. 

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Through the years, Presidents from both parties have increasingly abused their authority to enter into and terminate binding 

international agreements with little input from Congress. To avoid 

further ceding of our authority to the executive branch, we must 

fulfill our constitutional role as partners in this effort and be vigilant in our oversight responsibilities. 

This challenge is greater than ever before. As Professor Bradley 

will note in his testimony, more than 90 percent of the thousands 

of binding international agreements entered into by the United 

States over the last 80 years have not been treaties but various 

forms of executive agreements. 

We are stronger internationally when the President and Congress work together. Unilateral presidential action, without a 

meaningful congressional partner, undermines our national 

strength. 

For that reason, I hope this committee will work in a bipartisan 

way to ensure that the Senate will uphold its constitutional role in 

the process of making international agreements. We must work in 

partnership with the President when we can. And we must be 

ready to defend the rights and the obligations of the Senate when 

necessary. 

And with that, I will turn to our distinguished ranking member, 

Ben Cardin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MARYLAND 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you know, we get opening statements that are sometimes prepared by our staff, and I think this one is particularly appropriate, 

so I am going to ask consent that my entire opening statement be 

put in the record, because it gives, in detail, some of my concerns. 

And let me summarize very briefly, so we can get to the witnesses. 

We point out that the number of treaties that we have entered 

into as a Nation, as a percentage of our national agreements entered into by our country, between 1789 and 1939, 66 percent of 

all foreign agreements were treaties. Between 1980 and 2000, that 

dropped to 12 percent. That number is even lower today. 

So we have seen the disuse of treaties as a manner in which to 

enter into international agreements, and that involves the Congress. And I have been told that it was pretty common for Members 

of the Senate to be part of the negotiating teams on treaties, to assist in the relationship between the executive branch and the Senate, which makes sense. And we are not doing that today. 

So when the President of the United States looks at Congress 

and the consideration of treaties today, sees the Law of the Sea 

that cannot be ratified by the United States Senate, sees the 

Rights of Persons with Disabilities not being able to be ratified by 

the United States Senate, which I to this day cannot determine any 

controversy at all in regard to that treaty, we can understand why 

the President would choose to use a method other than a treaty in 

order to enter into international agreements, which compromises 

the appropriate role of the United States Senate, something that 

we should be very concerned about. 

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So the President, when he wanted to enter into a climate agreement, he chose an executive agreement rather than a treaty. When 

he wanted to enter into an agreement with the international community on Iran, he chose an executive agreement rather than a 

treaty. Why? Because he couldn’t get it ratified in the U.S. Senate 

under any scenario. 

It was not this agreement. It is anything. You cannot even get 

tax treaties ratified by the Senate that are there to help us. You 

talk about tax reform, we cannot get tax treaties passed because 

one Member decides to hold up the process? 

So we have problems. And now we have a President who wants 

to withdraw from international agreements, whether they are 

agreements like the JCPOA or they are trade agreements. 

And I must tell you, quite frankly, I have been in the Congress 

for a long time when we have gone over the congressional role on 

trade agreements, and there is a formal process under the Trade 

Promotion Authority. And, yes, we go over the withdrawal procedures, but we never thought we would run into a President who 

would be using the withdrawal as this President has done, in a 

manner that is really contrary to us being involved in the process. 

Now, we have taken some action. INARA was an example where 

Congress decided that it was going to do something about executive 

agreements, and I think we did the right thing in INARA, in regard to the JCPOA. 

But I think this hearing is particularly important, so we have a 

chance to talk about reestablishing the appropriate role for the 

United States Senate as it relates to executive agreements. 

And I thank our two witnesses for being here. They both have 

great expertise here. 

I am interested in, Avril, how you were able to get so many treaties ratified. I think you have a record in modern times, so maybe 

you can give us an idea how that was done. 

But I welcome both of our witnesses here today. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will formally welcome them. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Mr. Chairman, at the appropriate point, as 

I had asked you before we started, I would just like to make a brief 

comment about the resolution that I was not able to get to. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think now would be a very appropriate time. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for reminding me of that. 

STATEMENT OF HON. BOB MENENDEZ, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator MENENDEZ. I appreciate it. 

So I did not go. I had an amendment in Banking, and then I was 

told that the chair’s preference was to have remarks made here, so 

I did not get over to the markup. So I appreciate the moment. 

And I feel really compelled about this. This is a resolution that 

I used to carry before I became chairman of the committee, and 

then Bob Casey did with others, and it is the resolution on the protection of freedom of the press and expression around the world, 

and reaffirming the freedom of the press as a priority in the efforts 

of the United States Government to promote democracy and good 

governance. 

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Normally, that was an expression of our commitment to that fundamental, bedrock principle enshrined in the First Amendment to 

the Constitution of the United States as a global effort. But I have 

to be honest with you, I am really concerned—really concerned— 

when I see that, last month, CNN reported on live auctions of 

human beings, something that I know the chairman cares passionately about, by his work on human trafficking, and active slave 

trade in Libya, and the news network showed footage of human 

beings being sold at auction, which is a stain in our collective consciousness. But adding to this atrocity last week, Libyan authorities questioned the veracity of the reports, citing the President of 

the United States who calls CNN fake news. 

Now, listen, I have had my share over 43 years of public service 

of not being enthralled by some press reports and how they ultimately carried themselves, but I believe in the fundamental, bedrock principle of a free press. And when we are in the league of 

individuals like Maduro in Venezuela and Putin in Russia, who 

constantly try to undermine the essence of a free press in their 

countries in order to promote their dictatorial, autocratic views, it 

really worries me. 

It worries me that attacking the press is one of the most frequently used instruments in a dictator’s toolbox. The fourth estate, 

in my mind, plays a crucial role in our democracy and all over the 

world. So advocacy for it as independent and critical is really important. 

And finally, I am really shocked that, for the first time—for the 

first time—the Committee to Protect Journalists, an organization 

dedicated to protecting journalists doing critically important work 

to hold public officials accountable and uncover stories and expose 

the world to critical events, has concerns about the United States. 

I never thought that I would be in a moment in time in which the 

Committee to Protect Journalists would cite the United States as 

a place that they have concerns about. 

So I appreciate that the chairman put this resolution on. I know 

he is committed to it. I think it is important not only to pass the 

resolution but to speak to these issues, because I do not want to 

be in the company of Putin and Maduro. I do not want the Committee to Protect Journalists to cite the United States as a place 

they now have concern on. 

And I think it is important, when we are facing human trafficking in the world, when we are facing those who have efforts to 

use nuclear weapons, that the credibility that we have in having 

journalists question in those countries what is happening in those 

countries not be undermined. 

I appreciate the opportunity. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much for those important comments. I appreciate your work in this area. 

Our first witness is Mr. Curtis Bradley, the William Van Alstyne 

Professor of Law, and professor of public policy studies at Duke 

University. Professor Bradley has written extensively on the authorities of the Senate in making treaties and the importance of cooperation between the branches. I want to thank you not only for 

being here but your help in the past. 

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Our second witness is the Honorable Avril D. Haines, former 

Deputy National Security Advisor to President Obama. Ms. Haines 

has an extensive resume that includes serving as deputy chief 

counsel for this committee. So thank you for being here. 

If you would give your opening comments, you have done this before, I know, in about 5 minutes. Any written materials will be entered into the record, without objection. Then we will proceed with 

questions. 

In the order introduced, Mr. Bradley? 

STATEMENT OF CURTIS A. BRADLEY, WILLIAM VAN ALSTYNE 

PROFESSOR, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, DURHAM, 

NORTH CAROLINA 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you very much for inviting me to speak 

today. My remarks are going to be focused on what I see as the 

need for more oversight and involvement by both the Senate and 

the full Congress in how this country makes and, to some extent, 

at times withdraws from international commitments. 

The only process that the Constitution specifies for making international commitments is the one set forth in Article II, pursuant 

to which Presidents are supposed to seek the advice and consent 

of two-thirds of the Senate. 

Part of the Founders’ idea behind requiring legislative involvement, in addition to the executive branch, was the thought that 

international commitments can have important and long-term consequences for the United States and, thus, should be determined 

and considered by both political branches. 

For a variety of reasons, and complicated reasons, and historical 

reasons, the Article II process is not used for the vast majority of 

international agreements today. As Senator Corker noted at the 

outset, over 90 percent of binding international agreements that 

the United States has made for decades are made through other 

processes, what we call executive agreements. 

Some of these executive agreements are made with the full participation of the Congress, the majority of the Congress, congressional-executive agreements. And the ones that involve Congress 

looking at an agreement after it has been negotiated, revealing the 

content of the agreements, and deciding whether it is in the national interest, do involve collaboration, obviously, between the two 

branches of government. They are a tiny fraction of the executive 

agreements that are made. 

Many congressional-executive agreements, the vast majority, in 

fact, are made by the President based on, often, old statutes, statutory delegations that date back many decades ago. And those 

agreements are not presented back to the legislative branch. 

Presidents also sometimes make agreements without any legislative participation even at the front end, the so-called sole executive 

agreements. Supposedly, Presidents should do that only when 

these agreements relate to their own independent, constitutional 

authority. 

As I discuss in a forthcoming Law Review article, increasingly, 

and I am not speaking about any particular presidential administration, but Presidents, in general, have concluded more agreements without any legislative involvement and, at times, without 

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any real claim that they have independent constitutional authority 

in the area, whether it be the environment or intellectual property 

or commerce. 

Those are not independent presidential powers. Those are powers 

very much part of legislative authority. And I think this development, if left unchecked, is problematic, from the separation of powers standpoint. 

We also have seen a rise in so-called political commitments. 

Presidents have long made diplomatic promises, and often, I think, 

unproblematically. We have seen a greater use of them in recent 

years, combined with the use of statutory authority, to make agreements that I think in the past would have been concluded with the 

participation of the Senate or the Congress, and that are now being 

done more unilaterally. 

The increased unilateralism also extends to the termination or 

withdrawal from agreements as well. The Constitution does not tell 

us exactly how this process of withdrawing from agreements should 

occur, but in the 19th century, I looked at the history, and Congress was a frequent partner in those decisions. That has been 

much less the case since the 20th century. 

In my written testimony, I suggest some things that Congress 

should at least consider to be a more collaborative partner in the 

international lawmaking that the United States engages in. 

A first step, I think a very good step and one that Congress has 

considered before and made some progress on before, is simply 

more transparency, having more information from the executive 

branch about what it is doing, so that Congress can evaluate it and 

respond, if necessary. 

The Case Act in 1972 was a major enactment in this area and 

has led to more transparency with respect to agreements that do 

not go through the Senate process. But there are many deficiencies 

in the Case Act reporting that have still not been remedied. 

To take one example, there is no public reporting of the executive 

branch’s claims about why it is able to conclude some of these 

agreements without going to the Senate. 

Some of that information is provided to Congress, I think often 

cryptically, without a lot of detail. But in any event, if it were publicly provided, there would be more people watching those claims. 

And I think Congress itself would get better information from the 

executive branch, if we had public disclosure, just like we do for 

lots of areas of domestic law. 

And I give additional examples in my written testimony of ways 

to increase transparency for political commitments and treaty terminations, and also some actions that Congress could take if it 

wanted to do more, such as by revisiting some of these many openended delegations of authority that lead to a lot of the agreements 

that never come back to the legislative branch. 

Thank you. 

[Mr. Bradley’s prepared statement follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CURTIS A. BRADLEY

My remarks will be focused on the need for more oversight and involvement by 

the Senate, and the full Congress, in how the United States makes and withdraws 

from international agreements. I want to emphasize at the outset that my remarks 

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1See U.S. Const. art. II, § 72. 

2 Alexander Hamilton emphasized this point in The Federalist Papers, despite otherwise being 

a strong supporter of executive authority. See The Federalist Papers, No. 70 (explaining that 

the treaty power belongs ‘‘neither to the legislative nor to the executive’’ and that whereas the 

Executive Branch ‘‘is the most fit agent’’ for negotiation, ‘‘the vast importance of the trust, and 

the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the participation of the whole or a portion 

of the legislative body in the office of making them’’); No. 75 (explaining that it would be unwise 

‘‘to commit interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which concern [this country’s] intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole disposal of a magistrate created and 

circumstanced as would be a President of the United States’’). 3See Oona A. Hathaway, Presidential Power Over International Law: Restoring the Balance, 

119 Yale L.J. 140 (2009). 4See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 303(4) (1987) 

(‘‘The President, on his own authority, may make an international agreement dealing with any 

matter that falls within his independent powers under the Constitution.’’). 5See Medellφn v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 664, 

681 (1981). 6See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Presidential Control Over International Law, 

131 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3074833. 

are intended to be non-partisan. My focus is on Congress’s institutional role relating 

to international agreements and how this role has diminished over time, not on particular policy disputes. 

The only process specified in the Constitution for making international legal obligations for the United States is the one set forth in Article II, pursuant to which 

presidents must obtain the advice and consent of two-thirds of the Senate in order 

to make treaties.1 Part of the idea behind requiring legislative involvement in that 

process was that international commitments can have important and long-term consequences for the United States and thus should not be determined by the President 

alone.2 Instead, the Constitution requires collaborative international lawmaking involving both the executive and legislative branches. 

For a variety of reasons, the Article II process is no longer the process used for 

the vast majority of international agreements entered into by the United States. In 

fact, well over 90 percent of all binding international agreements concluded by the 

United States since the 1930s have been concluded without senatorial advice and 

consent. One reason is practical: the number of international agreements rose dramatically during the twentieth century, and more efficient processes for concluding 

international agreements were needed. 

International agreements made with the authorization or approval of the full Congress rather than two-thirds of the Senate are referred to as ‘‘congressional-executive agreements.’’ Some of these agreements involve genuine collaboration between 

the legislative and executive branches-in particular those agreements approved by 

Congress after they are negotiated. This is the process, for example, typically used 

for modern trade agreements. In those instances, Congress can review the content 

of the agreement and decide whether it is genuinely in U.S. interests. But such ‘‘ex 

post’’ agreements represent only a tiny fraction of the congressional-executive agreements. Most congressional-executive agreements involve merely an ‘‘ex ante’’ delegation of authority from Congress that is then used by presidents to make agreements 

that Congress does not review, often many years or even decades after the authorization.3

It is also generally accepted that the President has some ability to conclude ‘‘sole 

executive agreements’’ without congressional authorization or approval.4 But this is 

supposed to be a narrow authority, applicable when an agreement relates to an 

independent constitutional power of the President. It has been thought, for example, 

that the President’s role as the principal organ of diplomatic communications for the 

United States gives the President some authority to conclude sole executive agreements that settle claims with foreign nations.5

As Professor Jack Goldsmith and I discuss in a forthcoming law review article, 

presidents in recent years have sometimes been concluding binding international 

agreements outside of their independent constitutional authority, such as in the 

areas of environmental law or intellectual property law, when they also lack anything that could genuinely be called congressional authorization.6 They have done 

so based on the mere claim that the agreement will, in their view, promote the policies in existing U.S. law. This theory of presidential authority is highly problematic 

from the perspective of the separation of powers. Among other things, such agreements potentially restrict the options of Congress by forcing it to violate an agreement if it wants to modify preexisting law. 

Another development is that presidents increasingly have been entering into socalled ‘‘political commitments’’ and combining them with preexisting statutory auFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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7See Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 773 (2014). 8See U.S. Dep’t of State, Foreign Affairs Manual, 11 Fam § 724.8 (requiring approval of the 

Secretary of State ‘‘or an officer specifically authorized by the Secretary for that purpose’’ and 

preparation of a Circular 175 memorandum ‘‘that takes into account the views of the relevant 

government agencies and interested bureaus within the [State] Department’’), at https:// 

fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx. 9See 1 U.S.C. § 7112b. The Act was amended in 2004 in response to serious deficiencies in 

reporting. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. 108-458, 

§ 77121, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004); see also 150 Cong. Rec. H10994-04, H11026 (noting that in 2004, 

‘‘the House Committee on International Relations learned that, due to numerous management 

failures within the Department of State, over 600 classified and unclassified international agreements dating back to 1997, had not been transmitted to Congress, as required by the Case-Zablocki Act’’). 10S. Rept. No. 92-591, Transmittal of Executive Agreements to Congress, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 

(Jan. 19, 1972). 11State Department regulations, in place since 1981, require the Department to provide Congress with ‘‘background information’’ for each agreement reported under the Case Act, including 

a ‘‘precise citation of legal authority.’’ 22 C.F.R. § 7181.7(c). The regulations describe such background information as ‘‘an integral part of the reporting requirement.’’ Id. 12This problem is compounded by the fact that the State Department currently publishes 

international agreements on its website without indicating whether they are Article II treaties 

or executive agreements, and, if the latter, what type. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Texts of International Agreements to Which the US Is A Party (TIAS), at https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/ . 

thority to create arrangements that in the past would have required either senatorial or congressional approval. Recent examples include the Iran nuclear deal and 

portions of the Paris agreement on climate change. Administrative agencies also 

often make political commitments with their counterparts in other countries on a 

range of issues. Even if these commitments are technically not binding under international law-which in fact is often less clear than the Executive Branch suggeststhey can entail consequential promises by the United States that can be difficult to 

undo later. 

The increased Executive Branch unilateralism in the making of agreements has 

been paralleled by Executive Branch unilateralism in the termination of such agreements. Even though the Constitution does not specifically identify how the United 

States is to terminate agreements, it was generally assumed during the nineteenth 

century that presidents needed to work with Congress when doing so.7 But that has 

generally not been the practice since then. Instead, for almost all treaty terminations since the 1930s, presidents have simply acted alone. The State Department’s current internal regulations relating to treaty termination do not even require consultation with the Senate or Congress, let alone approval.8

I worked in the Executive Branch, and I am sensitive to the particular needs and 

responsibilities of that department of government in the area of foreign affairs. But, 

in my view, there should at least be more transparency in connection with the Executive Branch’s management of this country’s international legal obligations. Only 

with transparency can Congress and the public determine whether the Executive 

Branch is acting lawfully and making good policy decisions. More transparency 

would also help in evaluating whether additional regulatory reforms should be 

adopted. 

Congress has focused at times on the need for more transparency in this area, 

most notably in the 1972 Case Act (also known as the ‘‘Case-Zablocki Act’’), and in 

subsequent amendments to that Act.9 As the Senate Report on the bill that became 

the Case Act stated, ‘‘if Congress is to meet its responsibilities in the formulation 

of foreign policy, no information is more crucial than the fact and content of agreements with foreign nations.’’ 10 But there are still significant deficiencies in the 

transparency of Executive Branch actions relating to international law, which could 

be remedied through congressional action. These deficiencies include: 

First, although the Executive Branch provides Congress in its Case Act filings 

with a citation of its purported legal authority for concluding the various agreements without the Senate’s advice and consent,11 it does not disclose these claims 

of legal authority to the public. 

In other words, the public has no ability to know about the asserted legal authority for more than 90 percent of the binding international agreements made by the 

United States.12 This lack of public disclosure stands in sharp contrast to what is 

required for Executive Branch actions relating to domestic law, where the legal 

basis of rules, regulations, and other actions must be published in the Federal Register. If the Executive Branch’s claims of legal authority for international agreeFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

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13See Ryan Harrington, Understanding the ‘‘Other’’ International Agreements, 108 LAW LIB. 

J. 343, 352 (2016) (noting that ‘‘it is nearly impossible for the researcher to discover whether 

the Executive exceeded his statutory authority for any given agreement,’’ and adding that, ‘‘in 

fact, it can be a challenge to determine whether the agreement had statutory authority at all’’). 14See Department of State Authorities Act, Fiscal Year 2018, S. 1631, 115th Cong. § 7802. 15See U.S. Dep’t of State, Digest of United States Practice in International Law, at https:// 

www.state.gov/s/l/c8183.htm. 16The Executive Branch has sometimes voluntarily provided such an explanation. See, e.g., 

White House, ABM Treaty Fact Sheet (Dec. 13, 2001) (explaining how ‘‘the circumstances affecting U.S. national security have changed fundamentally since the signing of the ABM Treaty in 

1972’’), at https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/12/20011213-2.html. 17See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Foreign Relations Law: Cases and Materials 

395-96, 400-01 (6th ed. 2017). 18See 22 U.S.C. § 77401(a). 19See Bradley, supra note 7, at 824-25. See also Restatement (Fourth) of the Foreign Relations 

Law of the United States: Treaties, Tentative Draft No. 2, § 7113, reporters’ note 6 (Mar. 20, 

2017) (‘‘Although historical practice supports a unilateral presidential power to suspend, terminate, or withdraw the United States from treaties, it does not establish that this is an exclusive 

presidential power.’’); Cong. Res. Serv.,20th Cong., Treaties and Other International Agreements: 

The Role of the United States Senate 208 (Comm. Print 2001) (‘‘To the extent that the agreement 

in question is authorized by statute or treaty, its mode of termination likely could be regulated 

by appropriate language in the authorizing statute or treaty.’’). 

ments were disclosed to the public, interested third parties could review them, and 

then alert Congress when the claims seemed legally problematic.13

Second, reporting under the Act to Congress is still often incomplete or untimely. 

Part of the problem here is that departments of the Executive Branch other than 

the State Department sometimes conclude agreements, and the State Department 

is not always made aware of them in a timely way. I understand that there is a 

provision in a current Senate bill that would add an amendment to the Case Act 

to try to increase agency accountability for reporting agreements to the State Department,14 and I think that would be a good first step. 

Third, there is no systematic reporting to Congress or the public of the many political commitments made by the Executive Branch, even though some of them are 

very consequential. While it might not make sense for Congress to require reporting 

on all of them, it might well make sense for it to require reporting on some subset 

of the most significant ones. 

Fourth, there is currently no mandated reporting of presidential decisions to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from treaties, and there is no readily accessible catalogue of terminated agreements. The Department voluntarily reports on some of 

these actions in its Digests of United States Practice in International Law,15 but it 

is not required to do so, and the Digests often are published long after the events 

that they describe. In addition to mandating the reporting of such actions, Congress 

could also consider requiring the Executive Branch to articulate the reasons for its 

decisions to suspend, terminate, or withdraw from treaties, which would allow for 

greater oversight and accountability.16

These transparency measures would require only fairly modest changes in the 

law, and I do not think they would raise any serious constitutional issues. If Congress wanted to go beyond enhancing transparency and do more to limit presidential 

unilateralism concerning international law, it very likely has the constitutional authority to do so. Occasionally the Senate and Congress have in fact done more, without constitutional controversy. For example, leadership of both parties in the Senate 

have joined together on a number of occasions in pushing back when presidents 

have suggested that they might bypass the Article II process in concluding major 

arms control agreements.17 In 1999, Congress took a more assertive action and 

made clear in a binding statute that, if the United States ever joins the International Criminal Court treaty, it can only do so by going through the process specified in Article II of the Constitution.18

In terms of additional actions to consider, Congress could, for example, conduct 

a comprehensive review of the various ‘‘ex ante’’ grants of authority to make agreements that have accumulated over the years, many of which are quite dated, and 

see how the Executive Branch has been using those statutes. Such a study might 

suggest the need for narrowing, updating, or repealing some of the statutes. 

In addition, I believe that the Senate, when giving its advice and consent to a 

treaty, could validly include a condition in its resolution of advice and consent limiting the circumstances under which a President could invoke the treaty’s withdrawal clause, and I believe that Congress could include a similar provision when 

authorizing or approving a congressional-executive agreement.19 As a policy matter, 

I am not sure that the Senate or Congress would want to include such limitations 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

10 

20When courts do consider issues relating to the separation of powers, they often give substantial weight to longstanding patterns of governmental practice. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 

S. Ct. 2076, 2091 (2015); NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2559 (2014). See generally 

Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 

Harv. L. Rev. 411 (2012). 

across the board, because they might reduce U.S. flexibility too much, but Congress 

might consider doing so for particular agreements. 

As a final point, it is important to keep in mind that the preservation of 

Congress’s institutional authority ultimately depends on congressional action. The 

courts do not typically play a significant role in sorting out the distribution of authority between Congress and the Executive Branch over issues like the ones I have 

discussed. As a result, this distribution often must, as a practical matter, be worked 

out over time through interactions between the governmental branches themselves.20 This means that if Congress allows instances of Executive Branch 

unilateralism to build up with respect to control over international law, there is a 

danger that Congress may, in effect, be ceding away some of its own institutional 

authority through inaction. This is a reason for the Senate, and the full Congress, 

to be vigilant about protecting its institutional prerogatives even in situations in 

which it does not happen to disagree as a policy matter with what the President 

is doing on a particular issue. As I noted at the outset of my remarks, such vigilance 

does not need to be a partisan issue. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Haines? 

STATEMENT OF HON. AVRIL D. HAINES, FORMER PRINCIPAL 

DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR, SENIOR RESEARCH 

SCHOLAR, COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, NEW YORK, NEW YORK 

Ms. HAINES. Thanks for the opportunity to be here today and, 

frankly, for convening a hearing on a subject that I happen to believe is of critical importance to the foreign policy and national security of the United States but is rarely focused on in earnest. 

I am particularly honored to be here for the reason that you 

mentioned earlier, which is having served this committee previously many years ago and having had the honor to brief members 

on various treaties in advance of hearings in the past. I felt lucky 

to have a chance to serve the committee then, and I feel the same 

way today. 

So although this will be obvious to all of you, I think it bears repeating at the outset, that treaties, whether advice and consent 

treaties or otherwise, are absolutely essential enablers of U.S. foreign policy that have helped us meet the challenges we face as a 

country and take advantage of the key opportunities for our prosperity. 

And I think it is worth repeating because though the committee 

has a good appreciation of this act, I found that, over the course 

of my career, the public conversation about treaties has really 

changed. And I think that change is at least partially responsible 

for the diminished role of Congress in relation to international 

agreements and the challenges associated with the United States 

joining advice and consent treaties generally, particularly treaties 

that should be routine, such as tax treaties. 

And I also worry that the current administration’s approach to 

treaties and international law may serve to undermine the international legal order we helped build on a bipartisan basis over the 

history of our country, one that, in my view, is critical to our security, our prosperity, and our values. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

11 

Treaties were, at one time, revered as instruments of foreign policy to be used in service of our country’s interests. But instead, 

they are often perceived negatively without respect to their content, 

perhaps most popularly as illegitimate constraints on our sovereignty. 

And I would never argue that all treaties are in the interest of 

the United States to join. Treaties have to be considered on a caseby-case basis. But the argument should be focused on the content 

and not on treaties generally. For the ability of the United States 

to negotiate and join treaties is absolutely essential to our interests. 

Far more than people realize, treaties have helped us improve 

the lives of everyday citizens, and we need them now more than 

ever in this increasingly complex, mobile world. 

So when you want to call, or email, or even send a letter to a 

friend living abroad, you are able to do so thanks to rules established in treaties. And one of the reasons you can feel reasonably 

safe when getting on commercial fights in countries around the 

world is that ICAO, an organization established by treaty, basically 

issues safety standards. 

Treaties help improve the quality of our air and ensure the food 

imported from abroad does not make us sick. Treaties help American businesses operate and export their products to foreign markets and protect the intellectual property of American innovators. 

And bilateral tax treaties make it so that U.S. companies with an 

overseas presence are not subject to double taxation. 

Yet despite what I view to be the growing importance of treaties, 

as you mentioned at the outset of this hearing, the Senate is finding it harder and harder to deliberate on and approve treaties. 

Since 1960, the U.S. Senate has approved ratification of over 800 

treaties, a rate of more than one treaty every month. And between 

1995 and 2000, when President Clinton was in office and Jesse 

Helms chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate 

approved over 140 treaties, or an average of 23 treaties a year, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the START Treaty, 

treaties dealing with labor rights, law enforcement cooperation, environmental protection, investment protection. But since 2009, the 

Senate has provided advice and consent to just 21 treaties, or 

roughly 2.3 treaties per year, a fraction of the historical average. 

And I know this committee has tried to reverse that trend, but 

the structural and political challenges are really quite formidable. 

And I would argue that the practical implications of not being able 

to get even routine treaties approved by the Senate are really very 

significant. 

First of all, there is no question that, over time, the degree of 

congressional involvement in treaties throughout their life has 

been reduced. And this is not good for democracy, our prosperity, 

our foreign affairs, our national security. And although a number 

of international agreements that are not advice and consent treaties are based on statutory authorizations, the vast majority, as 

has been noted, of international agreements are concluded without 

the involvement of or even the barest consultation with Congress. 

And to do otherwise may be impractical, given the number of 

international agreements that are and should be concluded on an 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

12 

annual basis, but I think it is fair to say that the balance is not 

what it should be. And this is particularly true in today’s complex 

and internationally mobile world in which what we do on the domestic plane and what we do internationally is increasingly intertwined. 

Specifically, congressional involvement, and particularly the Senate’s involvement, would likely enhance the legitimacy of international agreements from a domestic perspective. It would enhance 

the legitimacy and lasting nature of our commitments to foreign 

governments. And congressional involvement would allow for greater deliberation regarding the interaction of international law and 

domestic law, hopefully with the result of greater compatibility and 

mutual reinforcement between the two. And congressional involvement and more public debate would enhance the accountability of 

the executive branch in treaty-making. 

Second, if it remains as difficult as it is today to provide the advice and consent of the Senate for routine treaties, we may lose the 

ability to negotiate and enter into certain critical international 

agreements that historically have been understood to be agreements that require the advice and consent of the Senate, such as 

extradition treaties, boundary treaties, mutual legal assistance 

treaties, tax treaties, all treaties that are viewed on a bipartisan 

basis as critical to U.S. interests. 

Third, at a time when multinational intergovernmental organizations that serve our interests abroad and are at home struggling, 

in need of reform, we have made it increasingly difficult to negotiate changes to their underlying authorities, because many of 

these are based on treaties that get the advice and consent of the 

Senate. 

And fourth, because Congress is less involved, we are feeding the 

perception that international law is not critically important to the 

United States, and the obligations we undertake are ones that do 

not endure from administration to administration. 

So the hard question, of course, is, what do you do about this? 

I provided in my submitted testimony some recommendations on 

that, many of which overlap with what Mr. Bradley’s recommendations are, particularly on the transparency front. 

And then additionally, I indicate that I think it might be worth 

looking at the Senate rules and procedure for considering treaties, 

to see if there is not a way to improve the ability, essentially, of 

overcoming, essentially, when one or two Senators have an issue, 

to at least get to a vote and a consideration of the treaties. 

And third, I would recommend establishing an annual report and 

hearing from the legal adviser’s office of the U.S. Department of 

State regarding international agreements, their development and 

interpretation. I think it could provide the committee with an opportunity, among other things, to engage on issues of particular interest, including trends in treaty-making, while simultaneously 

raising the profile, frankly, of these issues. 

Thank you very much. 

[Ms. Haines’s prepared statement follows:] 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

13 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AVRIL HAINES

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Cardin, and members of the committee, thank 

you for the opportunity to be here today—and for convening this hearing on a subject I happen to believe is of critical importance to the foreign policy and national 

security of the United States, yet is rarely focused on in earnest. I am particularly 

honored to be here, having served as deputy counsel to the Committee many years 

ago, and having had the honor to brief Members on various treaties in advance of 

treaty hearings for the committee during the 110th Congress. I felt beyond lucky 

to have a chance to serve the Committee then and I feel the same way now, particularly knowing how important the work of this Committee is, and how seriously you 

take your responsibilities. 

Although this will be obvious to all of you, I think it bears repeating at the outset 

that treaties—whether advice and consent treaties, or otherwise—are absolutely essential enablers of U.S. foreign policy that have helped us meet the challenges we 

face as a country and take advantage of opportunities key to our prosperity. I say 

it is worth repeating because although the Committee has a good appreciation of 

this fact, I have found that over the course of my career, the public conversation 

about treaties has changed—and I think that change is at least partially responsible 

for the diminished role of the Congress in relation to international agreements, and 

the challenges associated with the United States joining advice and consent treaties 

generally, particularly treaties that should be routine, such as tax treaties. I also 

worry that the current Administration’s approach to treaties and international law 

may serve to undermine the international legal order we helped to build on a bipartisan basis over the history of our country—one that in my view is critical to 

our security, prosperity, and values. 

Treaties were at one time revered as instruments of foreign policy to be used in 

service of our national security and foreign policy, but instead they are now often 

perceived negatively without respect to their content—perhaps most popularly as illegitimate constraints on our sovereignty. I would never argue that all treaties are 

in the interest of the United States to join. Treaties must be considered on a caseby-case basis. Nevertheless, the argument should be focused on the content and not 

on treaties generally, for the ability of the United States to negotiate and join treaties is absolutely essential to our interests. Far more than people realize, treaties 

have helped us improve the lives of every day citizens and we need them now, more 

than ever in this increasingly complex, mobile world. 

When you want to call, email, or even send a letter to a friend living abroad, you 

are able to do so thanks to rules established in treaties. One of the reasons you can 

feel reasonably safe when getting on commercial flights in countries around the 

world is that the International Civil Aviation Organization or ‘‘ICAO’’—an organization established by treaty—issues safety standards. Treaties help improve the quality of our air and ensure that food imported from abroad doesn’t make us sick. Treaties help American businesses operate in and export their products to foreign markets and protects the intellectual property of American innovators. Bilateral tax 

treaties make it so that U.S. companies with an overseas presence are not subject 

to double taxation. 

Moreover, multilateral frameworks—frequently established by advice and consent 

treaties as an historical matter—substantially enhance our ability to address challenges that cross borders, which happens more frequently now than ever before, and 

to prevent and respond to increasingly complex threats that demand coordinated action. For example, when Ebola swept through West Africa, our response benefitted 

greatly from the resources of the World Health Organization, which was established 

by an international agreement. When the globe was gripped by a worldwide financial crisis, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, two institutions 

founded by treaties, allowed us to take measures to respond and mitigate the recession. And when we needed a force to maintain a fragile peace in South Sudan, Haiti, 

or Kashmir, the Security Council, an organ of the United Nations established by 

treaty, was able to react by sending in Blue Helmets. In other words, treaties framing the international order allow us to mobilize unprecedented collective action to 

address challenges central to global prosperity and stability. 

Far from tying our hands, treaty regimes serve as mechanisms through which the 

United States exercises its power and advances its interests and values. The Genocide Convention and other core human rights treaties that promote our interests in 

preventing atrocities and promoting universal rights and fundamental freedoms consistent with our Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, are examples of 

U.S. global leadership. Furthermore, when the United States negotiates environmental treaties that obligate other countries to take measures that we already take 

domestically, we are effectively shaping the world’s approach to dealing with enviFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

14 

ronmental problems, raising foreign standards to meet our own, leveling the playing 

field for our industries, and helping to protect the health of our people. When we 

negotiated the Law of the Sea Convention, we enshrined rules regarding freedom 

of navigation and rights of coastal states that benefit the United States more than 

any other state. Conversely, when we choose to stay outside treaty regimes, such 

as the Law of the Sea Convention, we allow others to shape the terms of international cooperation, in ways that maximize their interests and advance their values rather than our own. It means, for example, that our companies will have to 

operate under others’ rules in many of the places they do business around the 

world—or else, in the absence of international legal frameworks, operate in a less 

predictable and certain environment. 

Yet, despite what I view to be the growing importance of treaties, the Senate is 

finding it harder and harder to deliberate on, and approve treaties. Since 1960, the 

U.S. Senate has provided advice and consent to ratification of over 800 treaties, a 

rate of more than one treaty every month. Between 1995 and 2000, when President 

Clinton was in office and Jesse Helms chaired the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate approved over 140 treaties or an average of over 23 treaties a 

year, including the Chemical Weapons Convention, the START Treaty, treaties dealing with labor rights, law enforcement cooperation, environmental protection and investment protection. But since 2009, the Senate has provided advice and consent to 

just 21 treaties, or roughly 2.3 treaties per year—a fraction of the historical average. 

And I know this Committee has tried to reverse that trend, yet the structural and 

political challenges have become formidable. 

I suppose some might question whether this trend is so terrible. Although the 

Constitution’s only mention of treaties specifically provides that the President make 

treaties by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, the reality is that the 

Executive Branch has for quite some time entered into numerous international 

agreements, considered to be treaties from an international law perspective, without 

the advice and consent of the Senate. In fact, today, the vast majority of international agreements concluded by the United States are what are often referred to 

as ‘‘executive agreements’’ or ‘‘congressional-executive agreements.’’ What, therefore, 

are the practical implications of the fact that it is becoming increasingly difficult 

to get treaties approved by the Senate? 

I would argue that the practical implications are significant. 

First of all, there is no question that over time, the degree of congressional involvement in treaties, throughout their life, has been reduced and this is not good 

for our democracy, our prosperity, our foreign affairs, or our national security. Although a number of international agreements that are not advice and consent treaties are based on statutory authorizations, the vast majority of international agreements are concluded without the involvement of, or even the barest consultation 

with, the Congress. To do otherwise may be impractical given the number of international agreements that are, and should be, concluded on an annual basis but I 

think it is fair to say that the balance is not what it should be, and this is particularly true in today’s complex and internationally mobile world, in which what we 

do on the domestic plane and what we do internationally is increasingly intertwined. Specifically: 

• Congressional involvement, and particularly the Senate’s involvement, would 

likely enhance the legitimacy of international agreements from a domestic perspective, allowing for greater deliberation regarding the interaction of international law and domestic law, making it more likely that our efforts in foreign 

policy are perceived as bi-partisan, long-lasting, and well-considered. 

• Congressional involvement would enhance the legitimacy and the lasting nature 

of our commitments to foreign governments, which we must maintain if we are 

to rely on other countries to follow through on their commitments to the United 

States. I know from personal experience that foreign governments care whether 

a treaty we conclude with them is an advice and consent treaty or an executive 

agreement. They see the former as more significant, more reliable, and potentially longer lasting. We should not lose that option, when it is appropriate to 

pursue. 

• Congressional involvement would allow for greater deliberation regarding the 

interaction of international law and domestic law, hopefully with the result of 

greater compatibility and mutual reinforcement between the two. 

• Congressional involvement, and more public debate, would enhance the accountability of the Executive Branch in treaty-making. 

Second, if it remains as difficult as it is today to obtain the advice and consent 

of the Senate for even routine treaties, we may lose the ability to negotiate and 

enter into certain critical international agreements that historically have been unFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

15 

derstood to be agreements that require the advice and consent of the Senate, such 

as extradition treaties, boundary treaties, mutual legal assistance treaties, and tax 

treaties—all treaties that are viewed on a bi-partisan basis as critical to U.S. interests. Even if over time these treaties are done as congressional-executive agreements, there will be lingering questions regarding their validity in such a form. 

Third, at a time when multinational intergovernmental organizations that serve 

our interests abroad and at home are struggling and in need of reform, we have 

made it increasingly difficult to negotiate changes to their underlying authorities because many of the underlying agreements establishing them were done by treaty 

with the advice and consent of the Senate. 

Fourth, because the Congress is less involved, we are feeding the perception that 

international law is not critically important to the United States and that the obligations we undertake are ones that do not endure from Administration to Administration. 

The harder question, of course, is what can be done about the fact that it has become so difficult to obtain Senate consideration of advice and consent treaties, and 

how can we move toward a more meaningful and productive consultative process between the branches regarding international agreements, grounded in a better informed public debate on these questions? 

I would suggest a few possible ways to approach this question, some of which 

overlap with Mr. Bradley’s recommendations. 

First, I agree that there is a need for greater transparency in this area, as it 

would help to further a more productive conversation and at least allow the Congress and the public to respond to concerning trends in international agreement 

making. Specifically: 

• I would promote making public the legal basis for concluding international 

agreements; • I would support legislation requiring the Executive Branch to report notifications regarding the withdrawal or termination of international agreements to 

which the United States is a party; • I would support legislation requiring the reporting of significant political commitments; • I would support a mechanism for establishing agency accountability for reporting agreements to the State Department; and • Perhaps most importantly, in support of these additional requirements, I would 

support increasing the resources provided to the Legal Adviser’s office for such 

purposes. 

Second, I would recommend having a look at the Senate rules of procedures for 

considering and disposing of treaties. There are a variety of anachronisms associated with the rules of procedures regarding treaties and through a streamlining 

process, it might be possible to make it easier to deliberate on treaties, while at the 

same time making it harder for one or two Senators to effectively block a debate 

on treaties. Such changes might help this Committee pursue a serious treaty agenda 

in future. 

Third, I would recommend establishing an annual report and hearing from the 

Legal Adviser’s Office of the U.S. Department of State regarding international 

agreements, their development and interpretation. Such a hearing could provide the 

Committee with an opportunity, among other things, to engage on issues of particular interest, including trends in treaty-making, while simultaneously raising the 

public awareness of their importance generally. 

Let me just end by thanking you again for your work on these issues and your 

efforts to advance the interests of Americans who rely on treaties for their security 

and prosperity on a daily basis. I often think the skepticism you hear about the importance or value of treaties would have been surprising to our founders, who routinely relied on treaties to build political and economic relationships, leading to their 

prominent placement in our Constitution. Hearings like this help. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you both very much. 

Senator Cardin? 

Senator CARDIN. I thank both of you for your testimony. You 

really raised the key issue. By definition, most treaties involve 

some degree of giving up sovereignty, because it is an effort to develop a more universal standard rather than a one-country standard. Some treaties do not fall into that category, but must do. 

The second problem, where one Senator or a few Senators can 

block the consideration, is not unique to treaties. It is most of SenFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

16 

ate work. But for treaties, you need a two-thirds vote, so there is 

an argument made that we could look at a different procedural 

process for treaties because of the higher threshold. 

So these are the challenges we have. But I am just not optimistic. 

I am curious as to how, Avril, you were able to overcome some 

of the sovereign-adverse Members’ views when taking up treaties 

when you were successful in getting so many done, whether you 

think there is anything we can learn from that in today’s political 

environment. Was there a particular argument that could be used 

to advance some treaties that we are not using today? 

Ms. HAINES. Honestly, I do not know that there is a particular 

argument that you are not using that could be used. I would say, 

though, that it has become increasingly hard to have a public conversation about these issues that is honest and nuanced. 

So, for example, as you say, one of the issues is the sovereignty 

question, right? And when we went through the 110th Congress 

and we did so many treaties, that issue was raised in the context 

of the Law of the Sea Convention. And one of the principal concerns about the Law of the Sea Convention was the dispute resolution mechanism, which was perceived as a particular sovereignty 

concern, as opposed to general treaties without, presumably, such 

dispute resolution mechanisms. 

And yet, all of the tax treaties have dispute resolution mechanisms in them that we passed during that same Congress, and 

none of those issues were raised in relation to them. In fact, the 

tax treaty mechanism is really unusual, insofar as the dispute resolution mechanism is binding on both states when you go to tax 

treaty dispute resolution, but the individual can opt out of the decision. So it is even more, presumably, concerning, from a sovereignty perspective, if that is the issue. 

My point being that it is not clear to me that sovereignty really 

is the issue. It is a proxy for a concern that I think it is harder 

to get to an honest conversation about. 

And I do think you are right on the issue of the fact that there 

is an argument to be made, given that two-thirds is required, that 

the amount of debate for cloture could be smaller. 

It is just very tough. I recognize that it is a high bar to clear to 

change the procedure on this. 

Senator CARDIN. As I understand, we really do still need a cloture vote, even though the cloture vote is below the two-thirds. 

Mr. Bradley, let me ask you this. Is Congress at fault here in 

some of the statutes we pass? When we passed the INARA statute 

in regard to the Iran nuclear agreement, we looked at our review 

statute from the point of view of an overzealous President and a 

reluctant Congress. Boy, are we wrong about that today. So things 

change. 

Should Congress have been more astute in drafting that statute, 

looking at future administrations? 

When we drafted Trade Promotion Authority, I do not think anyone—this is something the President was going to do, the executive 

is going to enter into. So we looked at putting restraints on the 

President entering into an agreement but never thought about 

withdrawing from an agreement having a congressional role. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

17 

Should we draft TPA authority differently, so that there is a continuing role for Congress if a President decides he wants to withdraw from a trade agreement? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

And just to say one word about the last dialogue that you had. 

I, of course, also agree that treaties are often in the U.S. national 

interests. We are a party to thousands of treaties. We often benefit 

tremendously from treaties. And I agree with the comment that the 

mere argument on sovereignty should not itself really be a reason 

not to think about creating agreements. 

My last time I was before this committee I think was about 4 

years ago, testifying about the disabilities convention, which had 

some controversies associated with it. One of the things I think we 

were trying to work out was whether the Senate could craft some 

reservations and other qualifications to address some issues. I 

thought that was a good conversation to have at that particular 

time. 

I would like to point out, sometimes, on the other side of the debate, I hear people say we need to join a treaty because all these 

other countries have joined the treaty, and I think that is equally 

unpersuasive, just because other countries have seen fit to sign on. 

Some of those countries do not have real court systems, or they do 

not actually comply with the treaties, or their values might be different from ours. And I do not think that is enough of an argument 

for why the United States should join, particularly some of the 

more sensitive agreements. 

And there are times when some of the committees under these 

treaties have not helped to the case by asserting jurisdiction that 

the United States certainly never thought it was signing up for at 

the front end, and it has made it more difficult to get some of the 

other agreements through. So it is a more complicated story. 

On the issue of Congress, I do think we should not simply blame 

the executive for being the aggrandizing authority and concluding 

things unilaterally. Congress is a major player in this area, and it 

passed many statutes in the 1940s and 1950s and 1960s in very 

different times, in very open-ended ways. 

One of the suggestions in my testimony is it may be worth doing 

a review of some of those statutes to see if they need to be updated, 

made more specific. I am a fan myself of sunset provisions, which 

are often not included. And I think those are ways to get Congress 

back into looking at statutes that it passes later in time. 

I am a fan of the INARA statute. I do think that intervention did 

allow Congress to have a closer, collaborative look at the Iran deal. 

I would favor more actions like that. 

As for termination of agreements, my own view, and executive 

branch lawyers would probably disagree with me, is that Congress 

certainly could certainly limit in its statutes, in the trade statutes 

or otherwise, the executive use of the withdrawal clauses in the 

trade agreements. Or, in my view, Congress could do that for other 

agreements as well. 

I think Congress should be cautious because it may be in the 

U.S. interests to have flexibility. For example, if there is a material 

breach of a treaty, I am not sure you want your President hamstrung and the other party saying good luck getting your Congress 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

18 

to agree to let you out of that agreement. I think that might hurt 

American interests. 

But there may be times when Congress will want to put some 

conditions in, say in the trade promotion statutes. In my view, 

those would be perfectly constitutional and would require the 

President to follow whatever, whether it be procedural requirements of reporting to Congress, or substantive requirements of actually getting a new vote in Congress. I think those would be perfectly valid measures. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you so much. 

Senator Shaheen? 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you both for being here. 

I was recently in Halifax for the security forum. As you might 

imagine, one of the things that I heard a lot of concern about was 

the President’s threat to withdraw from NAFTA and the ongoing 

negotiations. I wonder if you could help us clarify, given that 

NAFTA was ratified by the Senate and that there would be profound implications for people, for millions of Americans, not to 

mention the rest of North America. 

Can you talk about what role Congress should have in any decision, or what role it has in withdrawing from NAFTA? What is the 

mechanism? 

Ms. HAINES. So NAFTA was not actually given the advice and 

consent of the Senate. It was through a congressional process. 

In point of fact, and I think as Mr. Bradley was indicating, the 

statutory structure for trade agreements currently does not provide 

for or does not indicate that it is required that the President essentially come back to the Congress to get agreement before he withdraws. So the process would essentially be that the President 

would withdraw in accordance with the termination clause or the 

withdrawal clause within the treaty. 

What I do think is possible, I agree with Mr. Bradley, that I 

think it is possible that you could pass legislation, for example, 

that would require some kind of consultation or do some kind of 

notification requirement at the very least, things along those lines, 

that would be part of it. 

In the trade legislation more generally, there are clauses that relate to termination or withdrawal. They tend to go to things along 

the lines, as I understand it, of a sort of notice requirement, but 

after the fact, and one that indicates that the President has to tell 

you when it is that they think is the right thing for the tariffs to 

be dealt with after the trade agreement is ended. So one could 

imagine beefing that up, to some extent. 

But this is an area where, obviously, the Congress has an enormous amount of power and is authorized to deal with foreign commerce. It is also an area where, frankly, from a congressional perspective, Congress has been more effective at getting involved in 

the negotiations and using the leverage that it has to bring the executive branch in more closely. I think you could take advantage 

of that. 

I do think, having been a former staffer of this committee, it is 

true that one of the difficulties is that you are responsible for forFOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

19 

eign affairs in this committee, but you do have a lot of other committees, when you are dealing with congressional-executive, doing 

those things. 

So I think that is also just a piece of this that pulls these together. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Do you have anything to add, Mr. Bradley, to 

that? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you. I largely agree with Ms. Haines on this 

issue. The issue, it has become controversial again, the issue of 

President’s potentially pulling the U.S. out of agreements without 

going back to the legislature. It has been controversial before, most 

famously with the debate over President Carter’s withdrawal from 

the Taiwan treaty in the 1970s, when he recognized Mainland 

China, and there were a number of Senators quite concerned about 

it, and the litigation that went all the way to the Supreme Court. 

The courts have not resolved the question of whether Presidents 

can act on their own, but it does highlight an issue that I think 

should be of concern to both parties in the Senate and to Congress. 

I should point out, I worked in the executive branch. I am quite 

sensitive to the concerns of the executive in foreign affairs. I 

worked in the State Department. But it is a fact that the more the 

executive acts in certain kinds of ways, they set precedent that I 

think ends up mattering in terms of their own claims of authority, 

and also, if it does get litigated, the claims that they will be able 

to make in court. And that is true in this area. 

In the termination of treaties area, really all the way back to 

Franklin Roosevelt, Presidents have asserted the authority to act, 

to decide whether the United States withdraws even from very significant commitments. And Congress, for the most part, has not resisted these claims. The Taiwan event is unusual in that regard. 

There have been several dozen treaty terminations since then, all 

done, often not dramatically and not necessarily high-profile 

events, but by the executive on their own. 

And I think this is something Congress should pay attention to, 

because the more these events accrue, the harder it is, I think, as 

a legal matter, to argue that the executive is required to come back 

to Congress. 

I do agree, though, if Congress writes that in specifically, that it 

should be binding on the President. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Ms. Haines, in your testimony, you talked 

about being concerned that the current administration’s approach 

to treaties and international law may actually undermine the legal 

order that we helped build. 

Can you talk about what happens internationally if that, in fact, 

is the result? What happens to all of those countries that we might 

want to get to engage with us in the future? 

Ms. HAINES. Yes, maybe I could just make a few points. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Just briefly. 

Ms. HAINES. Absolutely. So I think there are a number of issues 

that are worth thinking about in this context. 

One is, the international order, from my perspective, is one that 

really serves the United States, as you indicated, and one that 

helps us not sort of bring our thinking to the world but also allows 

us to address threats and issues, such as Ebola, for example. When 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

20 

it was on its way to the United States, we relied on the World 

Health Organization to help us. When we are talking about financial disasters in different places, we rely on the IMF and the World 

Bank, all of which have been done by treaty. 

But if we start to pull back, and if we are, in fact, not engaging 

on these issues, we cannot help those organizations reform, and 

they do need to be reformed. And I think that is something that 

there is bipartisan support for, in that sense. 

Senator SHAHEEN. I agree. 

Ms. HAINES. But we cannot actually engage in reforming them 

if we cannot actually change those agreements, if we do not engage, 

if we do not bring them back, and we actually get them approved. 

So that is an example of the kind of thing that we might perceive. 

I think it is also true that, through these types of mechanisms, 

we have managed to have an outsized influence on issues where we 

have wanted to and needed to. And if we allow other actors to 

dominate, such as China in a variety of scenarios, we are going to 

lose some of our influence, and we are going to be, again, on the 

retreat on issues. 

Finally, I think another piece of this, I spent a lot of time, obviously, on national security issues. One of the big things that we 

look at are asymmetric threats that the United States faces on a 

variety of fronts, whether it is cyber, whether in space, or in the 

context of even migration or other places. And one of the ways we 

have been able to address asymmetric threats is through an international legal order. 

A perfect example of this is the Law of the Sea where we engaged, and we developed rules of the road for freedom of navigation. That freedom of navigation is something we rely on for our 

military, for our trade, across-the-board. We cannot put a military 

ship in every strait, and we cannot enforce it around the world. But 

instead, we developed an international framework. 

And even though we are not a party to it, Reagan made it customary international law for us, and we led the charge in developing it, and it is something that helps us essentially protect freedom of navigation around the world. 

I think that is a good example of the kind of thing that we need 

to continue to be doing in asymmetric threat areas. 

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you for letting me go over, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Actually, the answers have been very detailed. 

Thank you for those. They have been very good, actually. 

Senator Menendez, if you wish to go, or I can go to Senator 

Kaine and let you get situated. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I am happy to let Senator Kaine go ahead. 

The CHAIRMAN. Sure. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thanks for having this hearing. It is 

very well-timed. And this question in matters of diplomacy, what 

are the appropriate roles for Congress and the President, is very 

vexing. I want to focus on a current example, a very current example. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

21 

In September 2016, the United States joined with other nations 

in passing a unanimous resolution at the United Nations. The New 

York compact recognized the growing global challenge of migrants 

and refugees, and it called on all the nations of the world to develop best practices for dealing with the challenge. The compact is 

being fleshed out at an international meeting that is being held in 

Mexico this week. 

Late last week, the Trump administration announced that the 

U.S. was pulling out of the nonbinding compact and would not participate in the Mexico dialogue to develop better policies for addressing the crisis of refugees and migrants. The asserted reason 

was that the discussion with other nations, a discussion with other 

nations on a nonbinding compact, would invade U.S. sovereignty. 

I was stunned at this announcement. The migrant and refugee 

problem in the world is massive and growing. The U.S. has been 

a leader for decades in this area. There is no invasion of U.S. sovereignty in sitting down and having a discussion about solving a 

problem. And the Trump administration announcement came during the Christmas season when people around the world are hearing the story about a family turned away because there was no 

room at the inn, so their child had to be born in the stable, and 

their subsequent flight to another country to avoid violence. 

Why did the administration take this step? I want to tell my colleagues what I have learned in the last 48 hours from reporting 

and conversations from those involved in the discussions. 

A principals meeting was held in the last 10 days to discuss U.S. 

participation in the compact and the Mexico summit. The CIA director, the U.N. Ambassador, the Secretary of Defense, and the 

State Department all initially argued that the U.S. should stay in 

the compact and exercise leadership to develop the best possible solutions to this current global crisis. But the Attorney General, the 

chief of staff at the White House, and White House adviser Stephen Miller argued that the United States needed to pull out of the 

dialogue not because of sovereignty concerns but because of a desire to cease participating in an initiative that had commenced during the Obama administration. 

In the end, the Attorney General and the White House officials 

prevailed over the wishes of our national security professionals. 

So I want to ask you this. When an administration takes a unilateral action like this, squandering American leadership on a critical humanitarian and national security question, because of a 

petty political calculation, what should the role of the United 

States Senate be? 

Ms. HAINES. Well, it will not surprise you, Senator, to hear that 

I am very much in agreement that this is not the right decision. 

In other words, I think it is important to engage with your international partners on such a particularly and credibly critical issue 

that we are facing. 

And I also think it is fair to say that, given the crisis, the migrant crisis that we face today with 65 million people displaced, 

over 20 million refugees around the world, it is very hard to imagine how on Earth we would actually address this crisis on our own. 

We absolutely need to be engaged with our partners, in order to 

figure this out and work through it. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

22 

It also is not true that the U.N. effort was something that we 

started, by any stretch of the imagination. It is true that the 

Obama administration joined in September, as you identified, the 

declaration or the statement that was made, and were intending 

during that administration at least to engage on this issue. 

And I think there is not much you can do, I suppose, from a legislative perspective to force the executive branch to engage on these 

issues, but it does seem to me it would be worth making a statement to that effect and being as clear as possible in public about 

the fact that this is not even a substantive issue. It is just a question of not wanting to talk to other nations about what is a critical 

issue that we cannot solve alone. 

Senator KAINE. Dr. Bradley? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

I do not want to speak to the specific policy issue of this particular nonbinding compact, but I am in agreement with Ms. 

Haines that, in general, I favor the U.S. staying engaged and offering its very important voice on these sorts of topics. 

This example is a very good reminder of how executive 

unilateralism in international agreements and compacts really generates more unilateralism. 

So as we have seen before, whether it be the Paris or Iran deals, 

which were also called nonbinding compacts, at least in part, they 

also set up the possibility of pulling out unilaterally by the executive branch. And we have seen that in the migration compact—nonbinding at the front end, executive participates on behalf of the 

United States. 

In the last administration, nonbinding means the executive allegedly can just pull us out of the talks now. And it is a reason for 

Congress to be more involved in all steps, because the argument 

would be much harder to make that the President could then just 

unilaterally pull out of these sorts of agreements. 

Thank you. 

Senator KAINE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Senator CARDIN. [Presiding.] Senator Menendez? 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

Senator KAINE. Mr. Chair, can I introduce the U.N. compact as 

an exhibit to the hearing? 

Senator CARDIN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to above is located at the end of this 

transcript on page 35.] 

Senator KAINE. Thank you. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you. 

I think that providing advice and consent on international treaties and accords is a critical function of this committee, and for 

that fact, of the United States Senate. And holding a hearing to explore the Senate’s role in international accords today, however, 

seems to be serving mostly as a reminder that we have abrogated 

that duty at the behest of what I consider a few misguided voices. 

As a long-serving member of this committee and its former chairman, I regret that some of my colleagues on the other side of the 

aisle are driven by an antipathy to treaties and international institutions that ultimately, in my view, undermine American foreign 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

23 

policy. Their belief that participating in rules-based international 

order, including international treaties, joining our peers on the 

global stage to set standards, establish mechanisms for security 

and economic cooperation and vehicles for approaching common 

threats from communicable diseases to nuclear weapons undermines our sovereignty is bluntly wrong, and it is misplaced. 

International organizations and treaties are a critical tool of the 

United States used to further our foreign policy objectives. We utilize treaties and institutions to set the standards by which we 

would like to see other countries and the global community more 

broadly operate. 

Believing we can operate alone in today’s world is as foolish as 

it is impractical. In essence, when the United States unilaterally 

sets rules of engagement when the rest of the world is working together on another set of rules, we are not even playing the same 

game. If we are not at the table, those who are will write the rules, 

and they do so at the expense of Americans and American businesses. 

When I was chairman of this committee, I shepherded through 

the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. Driven 

by a small number of misguided voices from the right, some of who 

bizarrely argued that ratifying this treaty would somehow amount 

to an assault on families who want to homeschool their children, 

this body failed to ratify that treaty. 

The United States is the world’s leader in protecting and having 

the highest standards for those with disabilities through our Federal and State laws, like the Americans with Disabilities Act. Our 

opportunity to ratify that treaty would take that global standard, 

be at the table, create that standard globally so that an American 

living here could, hopefully, at some point in time, travel anywhere 

in the world and expect that they would, ultimately, have the same 

access as they have in the United States. 

To me, that was the motherhood and apple pie of treaties. And 

yet, we could not do it. 

Similarly, as we see increased piracy and threats to American 

businesses that rely on international shipping lanes and international waters to conduct their business, it undermines our security and business interests not to participate in the Convention on 

the Law of the Sea. Being a party to the treaty would enable us 

to participate in a wide range of interdiction operations, be involved in more port security control, be able to work with our allies 

to confront China’s continuing expansion in the South China Sea, 

if we were a party, among other places. 

So now that I got that off my chest—[Laughter.] 

Senator MENENDEZ. Let me ask you, Ms. Haines—yes, it has 

been frustrating—what countries would you say, I think you alluded to China as one, but what countries are taking advantage of 

the United States’ refusal to fully ratify and participate in treaties 

like the Convention on the Law of the Sea, which you mentioned 

in your opening statement? And at what expense? If the average 

American would be listening to this hearing, at what expense does 

it mean to them? How do we make it that it is not something that 

is just up here but actually has a meaning to them? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

24 

And finally, what pending treaties do you believe would best 

serve the interests of the United States citizens and businesses? 

Ms. HAINES. I have spent a lot of time thinking about just how 

can you change the conversation about treaties and really help people to understand the value that they bring to them in their everyday lives. When I think about the Law of the Sea Convention, all 

of the things you mentioned, another thing I would add would be, 

for example, we cannot actually make a submission of our continental shelf, for example, to the continental shelf commission because we are not a party, and get the blessing, essentially, of the 

continental shelf, which, again, hampers American businesses because there is not the sort of predictability, there is not the international recognition. We are not part of the organization that is 

making the rules that effectively affect their interests around the 

world. 

And even though we are an observer, it makes a difference being 

at the table as a party. And that is something that you have to 

focus on. 

And to your question about other countries that take advantage 

of it, I think there have been discussions about Russia, for example, taking advantage of that opportunity in the context of I think 

largely pointing out the fact that we are not a party, pointing out 

the fact that, therefore, our voice should count for less in certain 

circumstances and so on. 

And that is true around these issues altogether. And it is hard 

to predict how other countries and which other countries will take 

advantage of this in the future, but I think you will see many of 

them. Particularly if we are not in the migrant conversation, we 

cannot actually shape the way it turns out. And that is where, I 

think, we really lose out, and people should be able to understand 

that. 

But I would say, trying to translate the value that we get out of 

treaties so that people understand the everyday value is a really 

worthwhile exercise. Maybe I will come back to you with some additional examples. 

Senator MENENDEZ. I would love to hear them, because we are 

going to have to get to a point where it is more than an esoteric 

exercise for the average American, so that they can understand 

what is at stake for them. For me, all the policy we do here is always, how do I make it connected to the average citizen I represent? 

Thank you very much. 

Ms. HAINES. Thank you. 

Senator CARDIN. Senator Coons? 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Ms. Haines, Mr. Bradley, for being 

here. Great to see you again. 

Ms. Haines, you mentioned in your written testimony that certain Senate rules strike you as anachronisms that should be reformed in order to limit obstruction and streamline treaty consideration processes. Given the lengthy recitation we just received, with 

which I agree, of the frustrating difficulties in ratification—Law of 

the Sea Treaty, CRP, others—what would you specifically suggest 

we do to change Senate rules in order to address the concerns you 

raised? 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

25 

Ms. HAINES. Thank you. So in terms of the anachronisms, I will 

just mention two that are sort of interesting. 

One is that you see in the rules explicitly there is the option for 

the Senate to actually amend the treaty, in addition to amending 

the resolution of advice and consent. It sort of never really makes 

any sense that you are going to amend the treaty. Instead, you put 

into the resolution that such an amendment is required before ratification would occur. 

But there are a lot of things like that. It is a very old rule, and 

it is not a very streamlined rule. 

And the kind of things that I could imagine changing, but I 

would sort of recommend, frankly, that brighter minds than I, and 

people who really understand the procedure in a way that would 

be helpful, would put their thoughts on this, but I could imagine, 

for example, given that you have only one option for a cloture 

vote—because cloture in treaties is both on the treaty itself and on 

the resolution, and the motion to proceed to executive session and 

on a particular treaty is nondebatable, so you do not have the same 

thing that you have the legislation where you could have two cloture issues. You only have one. 

I have thought, if you could reduce the hours for cloture—so in 

other words, you still get cloture, but you do not have 30 hours. 

You have significantly less hours. Would it then change the calculus for the majority leader when deciding whether or not to push 

through with essentially an objection and get to a vote on the treaty? I do not know. And I realize it will change over time. 

But it strikes me that it is worth thinking about, because one of 

the main issues is that, as noted, you have a two-thirds vote. There 

has to be bipartisan support for the treaty for it to provide advice 

and consent. 

So perhaps a lower bar for the process would actually make a difference in your being able to actually move on treaties, because I 

do think this committee is committed to doing that. I do think it 

is frustrating when you have the possibility that one Senator can 

really hold it up in a significant way. And that is largely because 

it is, it seems to me, relatively low cost for the majority leader to 

not proceed, in some respects. 

Senator COONS. Thank you. 

Mr. Bradley, in your recent Lawfare article, you claim presidential domination of America’s shaping and termination of international agreements has a significant effect on U.S. States and private actors. Could you just briefly describe some examples, perhaps, of the consequences for U.S. States or for the private sector? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you, Senator. Yes, one of the things that I 

think people do not appreciate is how much international law and 

agreements today matter domestically, and not just for the United 

States international commitments. Many agreements are either directly or indirectly enforceable in litigation or affect the ability of 

agencies to regulate, including in the private sector. A lot of the 

agreements that are made under the old statutes that might be 

repurposed sometimes by the executive regulate sales agreements, 

transfer agreements, aid agreements, and the like that often have 

large effects, obviously, on government contracts and other private 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

26 

sector actors. And a lot of that is managed by the executive branch, 

based sometimes loosely on very old grants of authority. 

At the State level, international law, of course, is generally binding on the entire country and is, therefore, presumptively binding 

at the State and local levels as well. It is not all enforceable in 

court, but it often affects how statutes are interpreted, even with 

respect to localities. 

One of the reasons for the Senate to be involved, in particular, 

by the way, for these agreements is the federalism side of this. 

When I testified on the disabilities convention, one of the biggest 

concerns was, how do we accommodate the federalism and local 

and State interests for that convention? I thought there were ways 

it could have been done, and there was actually a lot of bipartisan 

discussion about how it could be done successfully. 

And when the President is doing these agreements without going 

back to the legislature, the interests of States and localities are not 

even considered, whereas States, of course, are all represented in 

the Senate, and that was by design in the founding. 

Thank you. 

Senator COONS. Thank you both. It is great to be with you. I appreciate your input. 

Senator CARDIN. The chairman is going to be back in a moment, 

I hope. We will see. There is a vote on. We will try to keep the 

hearing going. 

Okay, I want you to just put one thing into the record, and that 

is, I never really fully understood what reservations meant when 

Congress passed the reservations, or what conditions mean, if we 

were to condition our approval. But I at least put that out and appreciate your advice on that, if you could explain that. Senator 

Corker will explain it to me later, as I go to vote. 

Senator CORKER. [Presiding.] Actually, go ahead. 

Mr. BRADLEY. I will go ahead. Thank you. 

The Constitution, of course, talks about the advice and consent 

of the Senate, advice and consent. And from the early days, Presidents, for a variety of reasons, did not heavily seek the actual advice of the Senate. They sought their consent at the end. One of 

the things that the Senate did, actually during the George Washington administration, was basically say, if that is how it is going 

to work, we insist on being able to condition our resolutions of advice and consent. 

We have had over 200 years of the Senate having this prerogative of being able to consent to a treaty on the condition of removing clauses, amending clauses, having certain interpretations that 

the executive has to accept, or other declarations, such as not having direct enforcement of the treaty in litigation. 

So the President is usually the one who benefits from all this historical practice. The Senate, in this instance, should benefit from 

a long tradition of having the ability to limit its consent. 

And it is understood, if the President ratifies a treaty, after that 

happens, the President has accepted the conditions in the advice 

and consent resolution. And Presidents have generally agreed to 

that, and the courts really uniformly have given effect to the Senate’s conditions. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

27 

So this is an opportunity for the Senate. If it has concerns about 

what the President might do under a treaty, I think it is fully within the prerogatives of the Senate to add conditions to the resolution. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. So I think both of you have spoken to, really, the 

Senate, because of the way we are not functioning, just in all honesty, for many, many years—we passed I guess the START Treaty, 

when was that? In 2010? Was that part of your work here? 

Ms. HAINES. No, sir. I had already left the committee at that 

time. 

The CHAIRMAN. So I actually was a part of that, helped write the 

RUDs. To me, it was an important treaty to pass. I think it has 

been good for our country. And it was very controversial, but it 

happened. 

We may have done a few things since then, but actually, because 

of the Senate’s nonfunction, Presidents have chosen different 

routes. Part of it, too, though, in the case of Iran, part of that was, 

too, that the President took actions, because I do not think he believed could—there was not a majority of the Senate that would 

support what he was doing. So there are cases where the United 

States Senate is not functioning, and Presidents do not want to 

come to it. They do not want to go through the hassle. But there 

are also times when Presidents act in that way because they do not 

believe the majority of the Senate is with them. 

Would you agree? 

Ms. HAINES. Yes. 

The CHAIRMAN. So in both cases, the Senate does damage to 

itself by not being willing to take up treaties. The tax treaty is one 

that is prime. It should take no time on the floor. We have one 

Member who opposes. 

On the other hand, there are times when the President can 

abuse his authority. I say that with a light term ‘‘abuse.’’ The 

President can abuse his authority by doing things that they know 

are not majority approval. 

Would you all like to speak to that, in any way? 

Ms. HAINES. I think it is absolutely true that there are times 

when Presidents make a decision not to take the hard road that 

is sort of the traditional route and instead take an alternative option. 

I think it carries costs with it, both in terms of the relationship 

but also, frankly, in terms of what they can do in that agreement 

or in that political commitment just by its very nature. In other 

words, I think the flip side of what I was saying earlier, which is 

to say that I believe there are real costs if the Senate is unable to 

actually provide advice and consent to treaties, because then it 

means there are a lot of things that will not get done. The flip side 

of that is also that when Presidents, basically, and the executive 

branch, take another route, those routes do not have all of the bells 

and whistles that an advice and consent treaty has. 

So if you are doing it as a political commitment, it means that 

there is not a legally binding obligation on the other party either. 

And so to the extent that we want that in our foreign policy, then 

we are not getting that. And if it is an executive agreement and 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

28 

it is not an advice and consent treaty, there may be some things 

that we cannot put into that executive agreement because we know 

that there are things that warrant advice and consent through the 

Senate. 

So I agree with your general proposition, and I think that there 

are costs for our foreign policy and national security as a consequence of the fact that we are not actually able to work together 

effectively. 

The CHAIRMAN. So President Obama—I say none of this to be 

pejorative. It is an observation. President Obama did what he did 

on Iran. We were successful in passing INARA, which took back 

some of those powers, caused it to be frozen for 90 days, caused us 

to be able to examine it, and then caused us to be in a position to 

stop it, if we had the votes to do so. But again, it was a nonbinding 

political commitment. 

The same thing happened on the Paris Accord. The Paris Accord 

was put in place. The Paris Accord could not have, on a treaty 

basis, pass through the United States Senate, and it was undone. 

And it is very possible that that Iran agreement may be undone 

in the January time frame. We are working on ways to try to 

strengthen it, from the standpoint of the President, from his perspective. We are working on ways to change things in such a manner that maybe that does not happen, at his request, I might add. 

But how does that affect, when other countries look on? I would 

assume that, in most other countries, typically, we do not have this 

back and forth. You might share with me whether that is the case 

or not. 

But when other countries then see a President entering into a 

nonbinding political accord that has not gone through the Senate, 

they see what happens as a result, where the other party automatically begins railing against it, like well could happen with tax reform here, right? It passes with only Republican votes, a different 

issue. 

But how will they begin to view, how are they viewing, these 

nonbinding commitments as they see them beginning to be, potentially, one undone and, potentially, another one? 

Ms. HAINES. Yes, we might split this, because I know Mr. Bradley has done a lot of work on how other countries approach treating-making, and that would be useful. I will just give you, from my 

experience, a few things. 

I think one is, particularly on the political commitment piece 

that you just mentioned at the end of your question, I think other 

countries are extraordinarily watchful of this. And I think it will 

make it harder if we pull away from our political commitment to 

Iran, with them not having violated the political commitment to 

begin with. I think it will make it harder, for example, when we 

are facing North Korea and other countries when we are trying to 

enter into a similar political commitment, potentially, or any kind 

of commitment, if they perceive us as simply not living up to the 

terms of what we have signed up to previously. 

I have also found with other countries, repeatedly, they will ask 

us, what is the process that you are engaging in internally? So 

even though it does not matter from an international perspective 

if we do an executive agreement or an advice and consent treaty— 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

29 

in other words, both are legally binding on the United States from 

an international legal perspective—other countries want to know 

whether or not we are sending our agreement to the Senate for advice and consent or whether it is getting some kind of congressional 

approval. And they see that as important because they believe that 

is going to be a longer lasting agreement if, in fact, it sticks. 

And then finally, I have also heard from other countries that 

when they watch the sort of back and forth here, and they see, for 

example, on the Law of the Sea Convention or other things that we 

are not able to get through, after we essentially initiated the idea 

to begin with and we also spent an awful lot of time leading the 

drafting of it, they will bring that up in further multilateral convention negotiations. They will say why do we listen to you anyway, given that when you bring it back, you do not actually get it 

through the Senate? 

Now, that is not always a good reason to join a treaty. Obviously, 

you join a treaty because you think it is the right thing for the 

United States, and the Senate has to deliberate appropriately. But 

I think it does make it more difficult when you have so much of 

the Congress agreeing with it and just a few Members managing 

to pull it down. 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

So I agree with Ms. Haines. One thing that I think we are seeing 

with more unilateral executive agreement-making is just less stable American foreign policy. That is, I believe, how it is being perceived by the rest of the world. 

But there is a more practical effect, in addition to the loss of 

leadership, which is that I think the U.S. is having a harder time 

persuading countries to give concessions in U.S. interests if those 

countries believe that the stability is not there for the commitments. That is one reason why they often do at least desire the 

Senate to be involved, because they think those would be, quite 

rightly, more lasting, stable commitments. 

Another problem, and this is not just true externally but also inside the United States, I think there is just a lot of confusion about 

the nature of these agreements. I remember, just to use those examples of the Iran deal and the Paris Accords, there was confusion 

in Congress and among scholars and the rest of the world about 

what the nature of those agreements were and confusing statements by the executive about whether they were binding, binding 

in part. Some of the world had views that they were binding, and 

the administration said they were not. 

I think that is a transparency problem, as I talked about earlier. 

As to what other countries are doing, we are not alone. The 

United States is not the only constitutional democracy facing questions about the role of its legislature in a world in which a lot of 

agreements are being made. A number of countries, like the U.K., 

are looking for ways to keep Parliament more involved and to get 

it more involved and to be more active in the deliberative process, 

because they realize these commitments matter so much domestically. Of course, there is the famous Brexit decision now by the 

U.K. Supreme Court that insisted that the Parliament have a role 

in deciding on that momentous decision by the U.K. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

30 

So we are at a time when other democracies are studying this 

and actually trying to find ways to keep their legislatures involved 

in the process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Generally speaking, I know you are not going to 

be able to remember what all of the countries did, but generally 

speaking, in an accord like the Paris Accord or in the Iran agreement, the other countries that were involved in that, how did they 

interact with their own legislative bodies? Or did they at all? 

Ms. HAINES. It really depended on the particular country and 

their relationship with their legislative bodies, even though, for example, with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, I am not 

aware of any country that put that through any kind of legislative 

process, per se. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Iran accord? 

Ms. HAINES. Right, exactly. So there was not that kind of formal 

thing. But what my experience was, was that different countries 

talked to people within their parliament, more or less, particularly 

for the Europeans because they were dealing with the sanctions regime just as we were here in the United States. So that was an 

area where they needed to make sure that everybody was at least 

aware of what was happening, in that context. 

The Paris climate, similarly, it is different for others. In that 

case, I believe there were some. I just do not recall right now directly which one put it to a formal vote, but I can obviously bring 

that information back to you, if that is useful. 

Mr. BRADLEY. I could add one comment, Senator. I talked to the 

negotiators, some of the negotiators on the Paris Accord. What I 

was told was that, for all the countries that normally require the 

legislature to participate in treaty-making, those countries did have 

the legislature participate. 

If one just looked at the U.S. Constitution, you would think that 

the United States should also be in that category, since the process 

specifies the legislature’s involvement. 

There are some countries that do not have the legislature participate ordinarily, and those countries have a different process. But 

for those that do, I think they treated the Paris Agreement as they 

would any other important agreement and had the legislature involved. 

The CHAIRMAN. Part of the reason we are having this hearing is 

because we look at what is happening right now with NAFTA. I 

know a number of Senators met today with the President to talk 

about NAFTA and where it is going. We have the South Korean 

agreement, where I know the President has concerns about the tariff on light-duty trucks and what that may, in fact, do to our own 

country. 

And I guess this will be more of a macro question, but a part of 

our role in the world has been our leadership, if you will, on international agreements and creating relationships. The former President negotiated the TPP, and obviously, the political climate led to 

a situation where both the leading candidates on each side of the 

aisle condemned it. And obviously, it ended up not being something 

that we are part of. 

The answer is very obvious, but can you step back—there is the 

world in turmoil. There are the kind moments, if you will, that took 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

31 

place in our country in this last election that are taking place, no 

doubt, in other countries. Can you talk just a little bit about your 

perspective on international agreements in general, the United 

States’ role in those, and how you see that affecting us over time 

as it relates to our U.S. leadership? 

Ms. HAINES. Thank you, Senator. 

When I first joined the State Department, my first job was working in the treaty office as a young lawyer, and I remember going 

to multilateral negotiations for treaties. One of the things that was 

remarkable to me, although I suppose it shouldn’t have been, was 

just how much the international community relied on the United 

States to draft the first draft of proposals of treaties, of so much 

of what we would be doing. 

And really, it is a point of pride in many respects, but it is also 

something that sort of brings home the fact that we have historically exercised enormous leadership in this area. We have seen so 

much of our own law internationalized through conventions, where 

we essentially negotiate things that are consistent with what we do 

domestically, and we have seen the value of it, and we show that 

to our partners, and we believe that it is worthwhile on an international basis. 

So in many ways, we have really just leveraged our own success 

and prosperity to increase it through the international sphere. And 

I think it is an extraordinary thing to look back on how many treaties that are major multilateral treaties that we were really the instigators behind, not the least of which is the Law of the Sea Convention that we are not actually a party to. 

And I think now it is changing. I think the last decade or so has 

seen a real shift in the conversation on treaties and on international law. I think that the American public is not often being 

reminded of the value that international law and the treaties bring 

to them. And I think it has made it more difficult for Members of 

Congress to take tough positions on what are often very complex 

issues in the context of international agreement-making. 

As Mr. Bradley said, there is often a lot of confusion about these 

issues, and they are very tough. And these agreements are very 

long, and they are complicated. And it is a space that I think is 

just becoming less sort of honest, and it is less possible for us to 

have a real public dialogue that actually gets to the real issues. 

And I think the consequence of that are that now, when we walk 

into the room, if we are even invited, that we are not going to be 

looked upon to essentially draft the rules. I think that will make 

a big difference to U.S. interests and our ability to shape the conversation and ensure that what is ultimately developed is in our 

interests. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bradley? 

Mr. BRADLEY. Thank you, Senator. 

One of my experiences in this area came when I was working in 

mid-2000s in the executive branch. And one of the things that became obvious to me, and still is certainly the case, is the U.S. exists in a very dangerous world environment with security threats 

around the world, still an ongoing threat from global terrorism. 

That was one of the major issues the executive was focused on at 

that time, and still is. And it was abundantly clear that the United 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

32 

States could not address these dangers and threats by itself and relied on other countries for intelligence, for law enforcement cooperation, for sanctions. And that required working with partners, 

both allies and other countries who might not always be allies, in 

hopefully constructive ways. 

And some of that involves reaching agreements that are in the 

long-term interests of the United States, and also taking a leadership position on articulating what the U.S. thought should be the 

international norms. 

I think that continues to be in the United States’ interests. The 

world environment is not any less dangerous than it was when I 

had the privilege of working in the executive. So I would hope that 

both the Congress and the executive branch are focused on the 

many gains the United States obtains from cooperation and engagement with other countries. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Listen, we thank you both for being here. I know 

that we have relied upon both of you to help us through issues here 

in the Senate in years past, and we thank you for coming back here 

today. 

I will say, just for my observation as a person who has been here 

now almost 11 years, I really do not see anything changing relative 

to the Senate’s ability—we cannot even confirm nominations right 

now. One Senator will have an issue with a nominee. I was just 

asked, coming back from the Senate floor, about a nominee. We 

have one Senator holding, can we burn the floor time to actually 

have that person confirmed? And the answer is no, we cannot. 

So there is going to have to be a cooperative rule-changing taking 

place on the Senate floor. 

But even if that occurs, honestly, the ability to deal with major 

treaties today is diminished. It is just where we are as a Nation. 

I think the executive branch still will be able to do nonbinding 

agreements and to enter into agreements at the United Nations, 

which I am sure will continue to happen, to a degree. But I think 

what executives have to be careful of is entering into an agreement 

that they know immediately becomes a lightning rod for the other 

side of the aisle. 

Actually, it shouldn’t be a surprise that the next President running against the policies of the President before—that is typically 

what happens in elections—is going to up end that when they have 

the executive pen and are able to do so. 

So I think part of going forward is going to mean that Presidents 

are going to have to think through whether entering into an accord 

that actually destabilizes over time, because it is not agreed to by 

the general public here in our country, I think they themselves are 

going to have to show some moderation. 

But our country is, in fact, I know that while we are showing 

strong leadership in a number of areas—there is no question, as a 

Nation, we are doing that today—we are doing less of it relative 

to agreements like this. And I do think, over time, while it may 

play well today, I think, over time, it is going to hurt America. It 

is going to hurt our standard of living. Certainly, it is going to hurt 

are standing in the world. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

33 

We thank you both for being here today. People are going to have 

questions through the close of business on Friday. I know that both 

of you have other work that you are involved in, but to the extent 

that you can answer them fairly promptly, we appreciate it. 

The CHAIRMAN. And with that, again, thank you. 

The meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:25 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

34 

Additional Material Submitted for the Record 

RESPONSES TO ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED TO

CURTIS A. BRADLEY BY SENATOR EDWARD J. MARKEY

Advice and Consent 

In your testimony, you noted that over 90 percent of all binding international agreements concluded by the United States since the 1930s have 

been concluded without senatorial advice and consent. While this may be 

expedient, the lack of Congressional involvement undermines the legitimacy 

of these agreements, especially when these agreements may be terminated 

as quickly as they were agreed to. 

Question 1. How do our negotiating partners perceive international agreements 

that have been concluded without senatorial advice and consent? 

Answer. My understanding is that, when feasible, our negotiating partners prefer 

to have agreements concluded with either the Senate’s advice and consent or the 

approval of a majority of the full Congress, because they believe that agreements 

that have such legislative approval reflect a more formal commitment by the United 

States and are less likely to undone based on fluctuations in this country’s domestic 

politics. 

Question 2. Do our current agreement frameworks adequately address the evolving global challenges? And the ability of the United States to continue playing a 

leadership role? 

Answer. The established mechanisms under U.S. law and practice for entering 

into international agreements, which include Article II treaties and congressionalexecutive agreements, are adequate to address global challenges. However, collaboration between the executive and legislative branches in concluding international 

agreements has been diminishing, and in my view this development undermines the 

ability of the United States to play a leadership role in international relations. 

Precedent—Iran and Climate Change 

The President’s decision not to certify Iran’s compliance with the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and his decision to withdraw from 

the Paris Climate Agreement because the President doesn’t like the agreements undermines our diplomatic efforts across the globe and sends a message that the United States does not uphold its end of the bargain when 

the political winds change. Undermining these agreements could do untold 

damage to the National Security of the United States. 

Question 3. What signal does withdrawing from these agreements send to the 

broader international community? Should North Korea trust that the United States 

will act on its international agreements? 

Answer. Withdrawal from an international agreement pursuant to its terms can 

be appropriate under some circumstances—for example, if conditions have substantially changed such that the agreement is no longer in U.S. interests or another 

party to the agreement is materially breaching its obligations. But, in my view, the 

United States should only rarely withdraw from international agreements, and 

should never do so lightly. Among other things, if the United States begins withdrawing from agreements without substantial justification, it will likely undermine 

the stability of U.S. foreign policy and make other nations less willing to make concessions to the United States going forward. With respect to the question concerning 

North Korea: If the United States were to withdraw from its agreement with Iran 

relating to its nuclear program without clear evidence that Iran was violating the 

agreement, there is a danger that such an action would make it more difficult to 

conclude other comparable agreements, such as an agreement with North Korea relating to its nuclear program. 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER

35 

New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants 

A Resolution Adopted by the United Nations 

General Assembly on 19 September 2016 

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36 

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New Yor-k Ot-da_ralion for Refugees and tiWAnts 

and susrainable development. Our world is a bener place ror that conrriburion. The 

benefits and opportunities of safe. orderly and regular migration are substantial and 

are oflen underestimated. Forced displacement a nd in-egular migration in lar@e 

movements. 0 11 I he other hand. oOen present complex challenges. 

5. We reaffirm rhe purposes and principles of 1be Chaner of 1he United Nations. 

We reaffirm a lso the Universal Declara1ion of Huma n Rights2 and recall the col'e 

international human rights ueaties. We reaffirm and will fully protecl the human 

righ1s or a ll refugees a nd migrants, regardless or status: all are rights holders. Our 

tesponse will deulonsttl.'l1e full tespec:1 for intetnationnl law and intel'natioual human 

ri&hls law aud, where applicable. intem:Hional refugee law and international 

humanitarian law. 

6. Though their treatment is governed by separate lega l frameworks, refugees and 

migrams have 1be same unive1·sal human rights and fundamental freedoms. They 

t'lso fate 1nany common c:balleoges and have si ilar Vlllnerabiliries. including in rbe 

context of large movements . .. Large movcmcJl1s" may be understood 10 reflect a 

number of cousideralions. including : the number of people arriving. tbe economic. 

social and geographical context. 1he capacity of a receiving State to respond and the 

impact of a movcmcu1 thai is sudden or prolonged. The 1crm docs not. for example. 

cover regular flows of uti grants from one country to ano1ber. "Large movements .. 

may involve mixed Oows of people, whether refugees or migra nts. who move for 

differe ~t reasons but who may use s.inli lar routes. 

7. Large movemems of refugees and migrants have polilical, economic, social, 

developmenta l. humanitarian and human rights ramifications. which cross a ll 

borders. These are global phenomena thai call for global approaches a11d global 

solut ions. No one Slate can manage such movements on i1s own. Neighbouring or 

transit countries. mostly developing cotmtries, a re disproportionately aiTected. l'heir 

capacities have been severely stretched in many cases. affecling !he ir own social 

and economic cohesion and development. lu addition. prolracled refugee crises are 

now commonplace. with Jong·term repercussions for those involved and for their 

hos1 coun1ries and communities. Greater intema1ional cooperation is needed to 

assist hos1 cotuHrles and commm1i1ies. 

8. We declare our profound solidarity with, and support for, the millions or 

people h1 diffe1'en1 parts of the world who, for l'ea.sons beyond 1heir contro l. are 

forced to uproot lhemselves and their families from their homes. 

9. Refugees and migrants in large movements oflen face a desperate ordeal. 

Many take great risks, embarking on perilous journeys, which many may not 

survive. Some feel compelled to employ the services of crimina l groups. including 

smnS!Iers, and others may fall prey to such groups or become victims of trafficking. 

Even if lhey reach lheir destination. they face an uncertain reception and a 

precarious fulure. 

10. We a.re detennined to sa\re lives. Our challenge is above all moral a nd 

humanitarian.. Equa lly. we are derermined to find long ·term a nd sustainable 

solutions. We will comba1 with a ll 1he means a t o ur disposal the abuses and 

exploitation suffered by countless refugees and migrants in vulnerab le situations. 

11. We acknowledge a shared responsibility to ma nage huge movements of 

ren1gees and mlgrams in a humane. senshlve, compassfonate and peop e~cerured 

1 RL":SOIUI.ion 217 A (nl). 
37 

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manner. We will do so thro ugh llucmatioual coopcral iou, wlt.ile recognizing rbal 

there are varying capacities and resources to respond to these movements. 

International cooperation and. in parr-icular, cooperation among countries of origin 

or nationality. transit and destination. has never been more importan1 : "win-win" 

coope1'1Uion in this area has profound bcuefi1s for bumatUty. Large movements o f 

refugees and migrams must have comprehensive policy support, assistance and 

pro1ecrion, consistent wilh States' obligations under inreroarionAI Iaw. \Ve also ··e-c:all 

om obligations to f11lly respect their hm1um rights and fundamcmal freedoms, and 

we stress lheir need 10 Jive their l.ives in safety and digniry. We pledge our supporL to 

those affected today as well ns to rhose who will be part of fUJ ure large movements. 

12. We are determined 10 address the roo1 causes of large movements of refugees 

and mignu11s, including rhrougb increased efforts aimed at early prevention of crisis 

si1llarions based on preventive d iplo macy. We will address them a.lso through the 

prevelltion aod peacefull'esohniou or C:OilOict, greater coordinatio n of htunanitarian. 

development ;md peaccbuilding efforts. the l'romotion of the rule of law at the 

national and international levels a nd the protecLion of human rights. Equally, we 

will address movem.ents caused by poverty. in stability. marginalization a nd 

exclusion and the lack of devclopmem and economic opportunities. with particular 

reference to the most vulnerable populations. We wiU work with countries of origin 

to strengthen their capacities. 

13. All human beintts are boru free and equal in dignily and rights. Everyone has 

the right to recognition everywhere as a person before du: law. \Ve recall lhat o ur 

obligations under international law prohibit discrimination of any kind on tbc basis 

or race, colour, sex. language. religion. political or o ther opinion, national or social 

origin. propeny. birth or other status. Yet in many pans of tbe world we are 

witnessi.ng. witlt great concern, increasingly xenophobic and racist responses 10 

refugees and migrants. 

14. We strongly condc11111 a cls a nd manifestations of racism, rac ial discriminalion. 

xenophobia and related imolerance against refugees and migrants. and the 

stereotypes often a pplied to them, including on the basis of reljgion or belief. 

Diversily enriches every sociely and contributes to sociaJ cohesion. Demonizing 

reft1gees or migrants offends profoundly agains1 the va lues of dignity and equaliry 

for every human being. to which we have conuniued ourselves. Galhered today at 

the United Nations, 1he birthplace and custodian of these universal values. we 

deplore a ll manit"eslations of xenophobia, racial discrimina1ion and iruolerance. We 

will take a tange of steps 10 coumer such aniludes and beha viour, io particular with 

re{C.ard 10 hate crimes. bare speech and racial violence. We welcome the @: lobal 

camp:lie,n propo~ed by 1he Secretary-Ge11eral 10 COluHer xenophobia and we will 

iiHJ)Ienaent it in c:oopel'tllion with the Uuited Nntioos and aU relevnm stakeholders. in 

accordance with international law. The campaign will emphasize , inter alia. direct 

persona l contacl between host communities and refugees and migrants and wHJ 

highlight the positive contributions made by rbe latter. as well a s our common 

humanity. 

IS. We invite rhe private sector and civil society. inc luding rcfogee Bud migrant 

organizations. to participate in multi-stakeholder alliances 10 supporl ctTorls to 

implement 1he couunitme nls we are making today. 

16. In the 2030 Agenda for Sustaillable Developmenl. we pledged chat no one 

would be len b~hind. \Ve dec lared 1hat w.:- wished 10 see the Sustainable 

Development Goals and their targets mel for ~Jll nations a nd peoples and for all 

segments of society. We said also that we would e ndeavour to reach the furthest 
38 

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New Yor-k Ot-da_ralion for Refugees and tiWAnts 

beh ind first We reaffirm today our commitments that relate to lhe specific needs of 

migrants or refugees. The 2030 Agenda Juakes clear. inter a lia. that we will facilitate 

orderly. safe. regular and responsible migralion and mobility of people. including 

through the implementation of p lanned and well-managed migration policies,. The 

needs of reft1gces, ir1ternally displaced persons and migrants are explicitly 

reco~uizcd . 

17. The implemenlation of all relevant provisions of the 2030 Agenda for 

Sustainable Development will enable the positive comriblllion that migrants are 

making to sustainable development to be reinfoteed. At the same time. it will 

address many of the root causes of forced displacemcnl, helping to c reate more 

favourable conditions in countries of origin. Meeting today. a year aflcr our 

adoption of the 2030 Agenda, we are determined to realize the full potemial of that 

Agenda for refugees and mi@,rtlnts. 

18. We l'ecallthe Scodai Fratnev.1ork fol' Disaster Risk Reduction 2015- 2030J aud 

its recommendations conccnaing measures 10 mirigatc risks associated with 

disasters. States tbat have signed and ratified the Paris Agreement on climate 

change" welcome that agreemenr and are commined to il.s implemeotaLion. We 

reaffirm the Addis Ababa Action A$-cnda of rhc Third luteroational Conference on 

iu ancin~ for Development ,~ includi ng its provisions thai are a pplicable to refugees 

and migranrs. 

19. We take note of the report of the Secretary-General. entitled .. Lu safety and 

dignify: addressing large moventents of refugees and migrants''! prepared pursuanl 

to General Assembly decision 70/539 of 22 December 2015. in preparation for this 

high·le\•el meeling. While recognizing that the following conferences eill1er did not 

have an intergovemmenrally agreed outcome ot• were regional in scope, we take note 

of the World Humanitarian Sununit, held in Jstanbul. Turkey, on 23 and 24 May 

2016, the high-level meeting on global responsibilit-y-sharing Lhrougb pa1hways for 

admission of Syrian refugees. convened by the Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees on 30 March 2016, the conference on "Supporting Syria 

and the Region", held in London on 4 Febmary 2016, and lhe J)led2-ing conference 

on Somali refugees, he ld in 13n&ssels on 2 1 October 2015. While recognizing that 

rhe following initiatives are: regional in nature and apply only to those coun1ries 

parlicipatiug in lbem. we lake note of regional initiatives sucb as tbe Bali Process on 

People Smuggling. TraOicking in Persons and Related TransnAtiona l Crime, the 

European Union· Horn of Africa Migration Route lnirialive and the African UnionHom of Africa luitiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants (the 

Khartoum Process). the Rabat Process. the Valletta Acrion Plan and the Orazil 

Declaration and Plan of Action. 

20. We recognize rhe very large numbel' of people who are displnced within 

national borders and the possibility lbat such persons might seek protection and 

assistance in other countries as refugees or migrants. We note tlte need for reOectiou 

on efTecth•e s1rategies 10 eusu.re adequate pro1ecrion and assistance for intemally 

displaced persons and to prevem and reduce such displacemem. 

' Resolution 691283. 3llbeX D. 

' See FCCC/CP/201 S/10/Add.l. decisioo IICP.21. llll!>eX. 

) lte:solutiou 69/313. lltU)C'X. 

• A170J59. 
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Commicmeocs 

21 . We have endorsed 10d~y l' se1 of counuiuncuts that APJ>Iy 10 bo1b refugees a nd 

mi@-r&nls. as well as separacc scls of commitmenc·s for refugees and migrancs. \Ve do 

so taking into accouu1 different national realities, capacities and le\•cls of 

dcvclopruenc and rcspcccing uacioual policies and prioricies. \Ve reaffirm our 

conuniuneut to international law and emphasize that I he present declaration and its 

annexes are to be implemented in a manner thai is consistem with the rights and 

obligations or States under imernational Jaw. While some conl.mitmencs are mainly 

applicable to one group, they may also be applicable to the other. Furthermore. 

while they are all framed in the contexl of the large movements we are considering 

today, many may be applicable also to regular migration. Annex I to the present 

declaration comaius a comprehensive refu$ee response framework and outlines 

steps rowards the achievement of a global compacc o n refugees in 2018. while 

annex n sers out s1eps 1owards 1he ~chievement of a global c.ompacr for S3 fe, orderly 

(llld regular migration in 20 18. 

U. Comm.Jcments lbat apply 10 bolb refugees and mlg:raniS 

22. Underlining the importance of a comprehensive approach to the issues 

involved. we will e nsure A J)COple-cemted. seusi1ive. humnue. diguified. genderresponsive and prompt reception for all persons anivin~ in our countries. and 

particularly those in large movements. whether refugees or mitu:anls. We will also 

cust.ne full rcspccl and prolecliou for 1heir hurnau righ1s and fundamenta l freedoms. 

23. We ··ecognize a11d wil1 address, in accordauce wi1h our oblig•uions under 

inrermuional Jaw. the special uced.s of all peoplc in vulnerable sih_lAiions who are 

travelling within large movements of refugees and mjgrauts, including women at 

tisk, children, especially 1hose who are uuaccontpanied 0 1' SCJ)Ata.ted froul. rheir 

farnme-s. members of ethnic and religious minorilies. viclims of violence. o lder 

persons. persons wilh d isabilities. persons who are discrimiualcd against on any 

basis, indigenous peoples. victims of human trafficking. and victims of exploitation 

and abuse in the contexl of the smuggling of migrants. 

24. Recognizing lhat States have rigbls and responsibililics to manage and control 

their borders. we will implement border control procedures in conformity with 

applicable obligations under international law, including intematioual human ri@:bts 

~w and intemarional refugee lAw. We will promote iulcrnational coopcn11ion on 

border ooutrol and management as an imporlaut clement of security for States. 

including issues relating to bat1liug transnational organized crime, terrorism and 

illici1 trade. We will ensure 1ha1 public officials and law enforcemelll officers who 

work in border areas are trained to uphold the human rights of aU persons crossing, 

or seeking 10 cross. international borders. We will srrengthen internariona l border 

management cooperation. including in rela1ion to craining a nd the exchange or best 

practices. We will inrensify St.•pport in 1his ntea and help to build capaci ty as 

appropriate. We reaffinu that, in line with the principle of non-refoulemenl, 

individuals must not be retunled ac borders. We acknowledge a lso that. while 

upboldi_ng 1bese obliga•ions: and priuciJ>Ies. Stales are eDtirlcd lO lake measures ro 

prevent inegular border crossings. 

25. We will make efforts 10 collect accurate informa tion regarding large 

movements of refugees and migrants. We will also take measures to identify 

correc1ly their ua1ionnlities, as well as their teilSOUS for moventenl. We will take 

measures to identify those wbo n.re seeking intcrnarional protccrion as refugees. 
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26. We will continue to protect the human l'ights and fuudamemal freedoms of all 

persons. iu transit and after arrival. We stress the importance of addressing tbe 

immediate needs of persons who have been. exposed to physical or psychological 

abuse while i11 transit upon their atriva l, without discriminatioll and without regard 

to legal or 1nignuory stMus or means of transporunion. for this purpose, we will 

consider appropriate support to strcug11u:u, al their request, capacity -building for 

countries that receive large movements of refugees and migrants. 

27. We are determined to address unsafe movements of refugees and migrants, 

wilh patticular reference to irregular movements of l'efugees and mig.,·ants. We will 

do so without prej udice to 1hc righ1 to seek asylum. We will combat the cxploir:uion. 

abuse and discrimination suffered by many rcfu ccs and migrants. 

28. We express our profound concern at 1he large number of people who have lost 

their lives in transit. We commend the effons already made to rescue people in 

distress at sea . \Ve commit 10 intensifying imerontionnl cooperation on the 

streugchening of search and rcsc\IC mechanisms. We will a lso work to improve the 

availability of accurate data on tlte whereabouts of people and vessels stranded at 

se;L l.u addition. we wi ll strengthen suppon for rescue efforts over land a long 

dan~c ous or isolated roulcs. We will draw allcntion 10 lhe risks involved in lhe use 

of such routes in the lirst instance. 

29. We recognize and will take steps 10 address the panictllar vulnerabilities of 

women and children during the journey from couu.lry of origin to country of arrival. 

This includes their potential exposure to discrimina1ion and exploitation, as well as 

to SCX\Ia l, physica l and psychological abuse. violence, human trafficking and 

comemporary forms of slavery. 

30. \Vr:. encourage States to address rhc. vulnerabilities to HlV and the specific 

health-care uceds experieuced by migrant t11td mobile J>Opuhnions, as well as by 

refugees and crisis-affected populations. And to lake steps ro reduce stigma. 

discl'huinatiou and vio ence~ as well as 10 review policies related 10 resrrictioos ou 

curry based o n HIV sta1US. wirb a view 10 c liminaliug such restrict ions :md the 

return of people on I he basis of I heir HIV status. and to sup pori their access to HIV 

prevention, trealmeot, care and supporL 

3 I. We will cnst1rc I bat our responses to large movements ofrcfugces and migrants 

ai r~am a gender perspective. promote gender equality :aod the en1powerment of 

all women and @::iris and fully respect and protect rbe human rig1Hs of women and 

girls. We will combat sexual and gcudcr·bascd violence to the greatest extent 

possible. We will provide access to sexual and reproductive healt1J .. care services. We 

will tackle I he mulliple and in1ersec1ing forms of discrimination against 1·efugee and 

migraur women and girls. At the saUJe time. recognizing the significant contribulion 

and leadership of women in refugee and migrant conununities, we will work to 

ensure 1heir full, equa l and meaningful participation in the development of local 

solutions and Ol)p0rtuuilies. We will rake into consideration the different uecd.s. 

vuluerabililics and capacities of women, g irls. boys and men. 

32. We wi ll protccr rhe human righrs tmd fundamcmal freedo•wi of aU re fugee and 

migra111 children, regardless of their status, and giving primary consideration at all 

rimes to the best intetests of the child. This wi ll apply patlieularly 10 

UJH'tccomvanied children and those sepanued fron• their families: we will refer their 

care to the relevant national child proteclion authorities and o ther relevant 
41 

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Kaine12.5-7.eps

authorities. We will comply with our obligations under rhe Convention on the Rights 

of the Child.' We will work to provide for basic health, education and psychosocial 

development and for the regisu·ation or all birchs on our cerritories. We are 

detenuined to ensure that a ll children are receiving education within a rew momhs 

of arriva l, and we will prioritize budgetary provision 10 faciliuue this. iocludiog 

support for host c.oumries as required. \Ve will strive to provide refugee and migrant 

children wich a nurturing euviromueru for thl." f111l tealizatiou of their riglns and 

caJ>I~bi li tic . 

33. Reaffirming that a ll individuals who have crossed or are seeking to cross 

international bordets are entitled to due process in cbe a-ssessment of their legal 

status, entry and stay, we will consider reviewing policies that cl'imi nalize crossbord~r movement$. \Ve will nlso pursue alternatives to detention while these 

a ssessments arc under way. Furthermore. recognizing that detention tOr the purposes 

of determining rnigratio1t status is seldom, if e\1et. in the bes1 interest of the child, 

we will use it o nly as 11 measure of last resort, in the least rcstriclivc selling. for the 

shortest possible period of time, under condltious tluu respect lbeir human rig.h1s and 

in a manner that takes imo account. as a primary consideration, the best interest of 

the child. and we will work 1owards the eudi.ng of this practice. 

34. Reaffirm.iug the impOI'Iance of rhe United Nnt ions Conveu1iou against 

Transnational Ortzanizcd Crime and the two relevant Protocols thereto. 

1 we encourage 

the ralificalion of, accession 10 and implementation of relevant intcrnalional 

instnu ucnts ou JJreventing and co1nbating trafficking in persons and the smuggling 

of migrauls. 

35. We recogniz.c that refugees and migrants iu large movements arc at grea ter risk 

of being trafficked ::md of bdng subjected to forced labour. We will. with full 

res-pec:c for our oblign1ions under international law, vigorously C01nba1 human 

tnJOickiu.g aud migl1l1H smug:.gliug witb a view lO tbei_r elimiuatiou. including 

through targeted measures to identify victims of human trafficking or those a t risk 

ohraffickiug. We will provide support for the victims of human trafficking. \Ve will 

work to prcvenl human traflickin,g among those affected by displacement. 

36. With 1.1 view to disn&ptiug and eliminating the criminal networks involved. we 

will review our national lcttislation to ensure conformity with our obligations under 

international law ou migrant smu{lgliug. human trafJicking and maritime safety. We 

will in1plemen1 the United NtUions Global Plan of Act ion 10 Combat Trafficking in 

Persons. 9 \Ve will establish or upgrade, as appropriate. national aud re,ional 

anti· human trafficking policies. We note regional initiatives such as the African 

Union-Horn of Africa Initiative on Human Trafficking and Smuggling of Migrants, 

the Piau of Action Against l'rafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, 

ofche Associat"ion ofSoutbeas'l Asian Nations, the European Union Strategy towards 

the Eradication of Trafficking in Human Beings 2012- 2016, and the Wo1 k Plans 

against TNtffic::kiug in Persons in the Western Hemisphere. Wt:. welcome reinforced 

technical cooperation, on a regional and bilateral basis. be1ween coumries or origin, 

transit and destinatioil on the preveJHion of human trafficking and migtnrH 

smugg.ling and I be prosecution of trn ffickcrs aud smusg,Jers. 

1 UuittdNtuions. treaty~ries. vol JS17. No. 27S3l. 

• rbid.. \'Ois. 2225, 2237 and 2241, No. 39574. 

9 Resolution 641293. 
42 

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New Yor-k Oeda_ralion for Refugees and ~ti:na nts 

37. We favour 3Jl approach to addressing the drivers and root causes of large 

movements of refugees and migrants. including forced displacement and protracted 

crises, which would, inter alia, reduce vulnerabilily, combat poverty, improve self· 

reliance and resilience. ensure ll stre ngthe ned hmnanitarian-developme nl Jle:<us. and 

improve coordination with peacebtdldiog cffor1s. This will involve coordinated 

prioritized responses based on joint a nd impa rlial needs assessments and facilitat ing 

coopera tion across instjtutiooal ma ndates. 

38. We will take measures to provide, on the basis of bilateral, regional a nd 

imetuntionnl coope1'atiOJ1, huulanitnrian financing that is adequtue, flexible. 

predictable and consiste nt, to e nable host countries a nd conu:uunirics 10 respond 

both to the immediate humanitarian needs and to their longer-term development 

needs. There is a need ro address gaps in humanitarian funding, considering 

additiona l resources as appropriate. We look forward to close cooperation iu this 

regard among Member States. United Nations entities a nd other actors and be tween 

the Unired Nalions and international financial instittuions such as the World Bank, 

where appropria te . We e nvisage innovat ive financing responses. risk financing for 

affect<!d communities and the implemenHIIiOfl o r o ther efficicucies such ns reducing 

management costs. improving tra nSJHtrency. incrcasint. the usc of national 

responders. expa1lding the use of cash assista nce. reducing duplication. increasing 

cn2-agement with beneficiaries, dimiuisbiug cnrmnrked fuudiug aud barmoui4irJg 

reporting. so as to ensure a more effective usc of exist ill@. resources. 

39. We commit to combaliog xenophobia. racism nnd discrilninntiou in our 

scx:icties agains1 refugees and i~ ants. We will take measures to improve Lhcir 

integra tion and inclusion, as apptopria , and with p;u'1icular l'eferel)ce to access 10 

eductuiou. health care. justice a ud language training . We recognize that these 

measures will reduce lhe risks of marg inalization a nd radicaliullion. National 

policies relating to integration and inclusion will be developed, as apr>roprinle, iu 

conj unction wilh re lcvanl civil society organizarions. including faith·based 

organizations, the pl'ivttte sector. ~mJ)Ioyets' and wor-kers· organizations and 01her 

stakeholders. \Ve also nore the obligation for re fugees and migrants to observe tbc 

laws and regulations or their host countries. 

40. We recognize the importance of irnJ)roved dtua collection, particuhlrly by 

national authorities. and will enhance intcrnalional cooperation to th is cud. 

including 1hrongb caJ)ac:ity-building. financial support and technical assistance. 

Such dala .should be disagg.regated by sex a nd age and include information on 

regular and irregular Oows, the economic impacls of migration and refugee 

movements, human 1rafficking. the needs of refugees. migrants and host 

communi1ies and other issues. We will do so consis1en1 wi1h out na1iona l legislalion 

on data protection. if npl)licable. and our inh.wn:uional obligat ions related to privncy. 

as applicable . 

m. Commllmt-nt.s ror mlgrnnts 

41. We are c:onuniued to pro1ec1 ing the safety, dignity a nd human righ1s and 

fundamentAl freedoms of all migr1u11s. regardless of their mig.Nltory slams. at all 

times. We will coopera te c losely to facil itate and ensure sare. orderly and regular 

n)ig_ration, including re111m and readmission. taking into accoa1nt narioual 

lei,islalion. 

42. We commi1 to safeguarding the rights or, protec:ling the imerests of and 

as.sis1ing our u:ajgra11t communities abroad, including throu,gh cons\llar proteclio n. 

assistanc.e and cooperation. in accordance with relevanl imema1ional law. We 
43 

FOREI-42327 with DISTILLER


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Ntw York Dtclan1ion for Rt fUJttt$ and ~tnnts 

reaffirm thai everyone has the righl to leave any country+ including his or her ow~ 

and to return to his or her country. We recall at the same time that each State has a 

sovereign right to determine whom to admit to its territory+ subject to that State's 

international obligations. \Ve recall a lso that States must rendmit tbeir returning 

nationals :;.nd ensul'e that they are duly received without undue delay. following 

confinuation of tbeir nationalities in accordance with national lcgislatjoo. \Ve wi11 

take measures to inform migrants about the various processes relating to their 

arrival and stay in countries or transit, destination and return. 

43 . We coJmuit to addressin~ 1be drivers 1bat create or exacerbate large 

movemems. We will analyse aud respond to the fnctors. iuch1diug. in countries of 

origin, which lead or contribute 10 large movements. We will cooperate to create 

conditions lbat a llow communities and individua ls to live in peace and prosperity in 

their homelands. Migration should be a choice, not a necessity. We will take 

measures, inter alia, to implement 1he 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, 

whose objectives include eradicating ex1reme poveny and inequality. revitalizing 

lhe Global PAr1nership for Suslaiuable Development, pro mo ting peaceful and 

inclusive socie.ries based on intemntional hun)t'Ul rights nud the rule of law, c reating 

conditions for balanced. sustainable :md inclusive economic growlb and 

employment. coiubariog environmental degradation and ensuring eJJecrive responses 

to natural disasters a nd 1be adverse impacts of climate change. 

44 . Recognizing 1luu the lack of educational opportunit ies is often a pusb factor 

for migration, pan icularly for young people . we commit ro strengthening capaci1ies 

in countries of origin. including in educalioual iusthulions. We conunit aJso to 

enhancing employmenl opportunities. particularly for yowtg people. in cowuries of 

origin. \Ve acknowledge also tbe impact or migration on hum.an c.apiral in countries 

of origin. 

45. We will consider reviewing our migration policies with a view to examining 

their J)OSSible unin1cndcd negat ive consequences. 

46. We a lso recognize that international mig.rarion is a multidimensional reality of 

major relevance ror the developmenl of countries of origin, transit and destination, 

which requires coherent aild comprehensive respouses. Mig.n'ulls can make positive 

and profouod cotuributions to economic aod social developmetH ln clteit' host 

societies and to global wealth creation. They can help to respond to demographic 

trends. labour shonages and other challenges in host socielies. and add fresh skills 

and dynamism 10 the latter's economies. We recognize Lhe development benefits of 

migration to countries of origin, including through the involvement of diasporas in 

economic development and recoustmctiou. \Ve will couunit to reducing the costs of 

labour migra1ion and promote ethical recmiuuem policies and practices between 

sending and receiving countries. \Ve wi ll promore fasrer. cheaper and safer 1ransfer·s 

of migrant remittances in both source and rccipiem countries, including through n 

teducrion in transaction costs. as well AS che fad1i1a1ion of interacrion between 

diasporas and their countries of origin. We would like these contribulions 10 be more 

widely recognized and indeed. strengthened in the coute:<.l of implemcntalion of the 

2030 Agenda l"or Susrainab1e Development. 

4 7. We wiU ensure cbat a ll aspects ofmigra1iou arc integra ted inlo global, regiona l 

and nationa l sustainable dcvelopmeul plans and into humanitarian. pcacebuildiug 

and human righls policies and programmes. 

AIRES/71/ 1 
44 

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Kaine12.5-10.eps

New Yor-k Ot-da_ration for Refugees and tiWAnts 

48. We call upon S1a1es lhal have nol done so to consider ra1 ifying. or acceding 10, 

the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All tigrrm t Workers 

and Members of Their Families. 10 We call also upon Stales thai have no1 done so to 

consider acceding to rele\'ant Entel'oational Labour Organizarion conven1ions. as 

"J>propriate, We no1e. in addition, 1bat migrnurs enjoy rights and protect ion under 

various prO\'ISious of intcrual iouallaw. 

49. We commit co strengthening global governance of migration. We therefore 

warmly suppon and welcome lhe agreemen1 10 bring the Enternarional Organiza1ion 

for Mignuion. au org:HliZalion regarded by its Membet Slates as lhe ,;t:lobal lead 

B$ency on mig:nuion. in1o a closer lesal and working: ~lnt onship wilh the Uni1cd 

Na1ious as a related orttaniz::uion.

11 We look forward to the implementation of Ibis 

agreement, which will assist and protecl migrants more comprehensively. help 

SHucs to address migration issues and promote beuer coherence between mi{trntion 

and related policy domains. 

SO. We will assist. impartially and on the basis of needs. mignmts in countries that 

are experiencing conllicts or uaiUrat disasters. working. as applicable. in 

coordina1ion with the relevant national atnhorities. While recognizing lhat not all 

States are panicipatin@ iu them. we note in this regard the Mi@.Tants in Countries in 

Crisis initiative and 1he Agenda for tbe Protection of Cross .. Jlorder Displaced 

Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change resulting from the Nansen 

Initiative. 

51. We cake no1e of the work: done by 1he Global Migration Group to develop 

principles and practical guidance on the protection or lhe human rights of migrants 

in vulnerable situations. 

52. \Ve. will consider developing non-binding guiding principles and voluntary 

guidelines, eonsisrent with imcmational law. o n lbe tretttn1em of migrants in 

vulnerable sit\lations. especially unaccompanied and separated children who do 1101 

qualify for international protection as refugees and who may need assistance. The 

guiding principles and guidelines will be developed using n State-led process wirh 

tbc involvcmenl of a ll rclcvanl stakeholders a nd wirb input from rhe Special 

Represemative of the Secretary·Geueral on lnteruatioua l Migration and 

Developmenl, the Jntema1ional Orgaoiza1ion for Mig_ra1ion. the Office of the United 

Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. the Office of the United Na1ions 

High Commissioner for Refugees and other relevam United Nalions sys1em entities. 

They would complement national efforr.s to protect and assis1 migrants. 

53. We welcome the willingness of some States 10 provide remporary protection 

agai nsl rerum to migrants who do not qualify fot refugee status a nd who are unable 

to l'eiUnl home owing to conditions in their coun1rics. 

54. \Ve will build on existing bilateral. regional and global coopcrariou and 

partnership mechanisms. in accordance with international law. for facilitating 

migration in line with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. We will 

strengthen cooperation to this end among countries of origin, transit and destination. 

including through regional consultalive processes, inlernntionnl organizations, the 

International Red Cross and Red Crescem Movement, regional economic 

organizations and local govct1u.ueut aulboriries, as well as wilb televant pt'ivate 

10 Uuittd Nnlious:. tremySeri&. \"OL 2220. No. 39-181. 

II R('S()IUIIOU 70/296. aJlllC.."<. 
45 

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Ntw York Dtclan1ion for Rt fUJttt$ and Mi~tnnts 

sector rccnaiters and employers. labour unions, civil society a nd migrant and 

diaspora g_roups. We recognize the particular needs of local au1hori1ies. who are the 

firs I receivers of mig_rams. 

SS . We recognize 1be progress made on international mignuion and developmcm 

issues within the Uni1ed Nations system, including 1he first and second High~ evel 

Dia logues on lnternalional Migration and Development. We will support e nhanced 

globrtl and regioual dialogue oind deepened collabora1ion ou mig,ra 1iou, panicularly 

through exchanges or bes1 practice and nuuual learning and the development of 

nalional or regional init iatives. We note in this regard tbe valuable contribution of 

rhc Global Fonnn on Migrarion a nd Development and acknowledge 1hc imponance 

ofmulti ~stakeho der dialogues on migration a nd development. 

56. \Ve affirm rhat children should not be crimiualit cd or subject to punitive 

measures because of their ~:uignnion status or 1ha1 o f their t>arcms. 

57. We will consider faciliuuing opponunities for safe, orderly and regular 

mig.ratiou. including. '-'S apptopri<uc, employmem erea1ion, labour mobility tH t'll 

skills levels, circular mignu ion, fami ly reunilica1ion and educa ion rel3ced 

oppor1uoities. \Ve will pay particular attention to the application of minimum labour 

standards for migrant workers regardless of their stalUs. as well as to recruiuueol 

and olher mignuio re ted costs, remittance flows. transfers of ski lls and 

knowledge and the c reation of employment opportunities for young people. 

58. \Ve strongly encourage coopemtion among countries of orig in or ntationality. 

coumries of transit. countries or destination and other relevant cotullries in ensuring 

that migrants who do not have permission to stay in the country of destination can 

ren.lm , in accordance with inrernational obligations of all Slates, to their counu-y of 

origin or na1ionali1y in a safe. orderly and dignified manner. preferably on a 

voluntary basis. ra king into account national legislation in line with iutemational 

law. We note that cooperation on return and readmission forms an imporlant element 

of international cooperation on migration. Such cooperation would include ensurin~ 

proper identification and the provision of relevant travel documems. Any type of 

renlm, whether voluntary or otherwise, mus1 be consistent with our obligations 

under imeruational human ri,ghts law a nd in compliance wi1h the principle of 

n~refo ulem nt . 11 should also respec1 the nJies of uHenHuional Jaw aud must in 

addjtion be conducted in keeping with the best intcresls of c hildren and with due 

process. \Vhile recogn izintt that they apply only to States 1bat have entered io1o 

them. we acknowledge that existing readmission agreements should be fully 

implemented. We support enhanced reception and reintegration assistance for those 

who are returned. Particular attention should be paid to the needs of migran Is in 

vulnerable situarions who et rn~ suc-h as children, older persons, persons with 

disabilities and vic1ims of rrafficking. 

59. We reaffirm ou1' commiunent to protec1 che human rights of migrant children, 

given their vulnerability. panicularly unaccompanied migran1 children, and to 

provide access 10 basic health. education a nd psychosocial services. ensuring that 

the best intel'CSIS of the c:hild is a primnry C·Onsideration in all relewuu polic ies. 

60. We recognize the need to address lhe special situation and vulnerability of 

1nig.rant women a nd g il'ls by, inter a lia, incorporating a gender petspective into 

mig_ra1ion policies a1ld strengt hening na1iooal laws, insti1u1ioos and programmes to 

combat gender~ba sed violence, inc udi ~ 1ranicking in persons and discrimination 

8@aiust women and e:irls. 

AIRES/71/ 1 
46 

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Kaine12.5-12.eps

New Yor-k Ot-da_ralion for Refugees and tiWAnts 

61 . White recognizing the contribution or civil society, including non -gove111mental 

organizations, to promoting the well ~beiutt of migrants nod their integration into 

societies, especially a t times of extremely vulnerable conditions, and the support of 

the irHemational community to the efforts of such organizations. we. encourage 

deeper ill1cractiou between Governments and c ivil society to find responses to the 

cba llcn@.CS a nd the opportunities posed by intermnional migration. 

62 . We note that the Special RepreseDiative of the Secre ary~Gene al on 

Internationa l Migration and Development, Mr. Pe ter Sutherland, will be providing. 

befol'e the end or 2016, a report that will propose ''-'ays or suengtbening 

inleruat ioual cooperation and the engagement of the United Nations on migrtnion. 

63 . We commit to launching, iu 2016, a process o f intergovel'r_Hneutal neg.otiat iOI)S 

leading to the adoption of a global compact for safe. orderly and regular migration 

at an intergovernmental conference 10 be held in 2018. We invite che President of 

the General Assernb ty to make aJTa ngeaoents for the dete•·miotuion of the modalities. 

timclinc and other prac;:tica litics relating to lhc negotiation process. Further details 

regarding the proc;:ess are set out in annex lito the present decl:uatiou. 

JV. Commllmenl.s for refugees 

64 . Recognizing that armed con flicl. persecution and violence, i_oc loding 

terrorism, arc among the factors which ttive rise to large rcfup:ee movements. we 

will work to address the root causes of such crisis situations a nd to prevent or 

resolve connict by peaceful means. We will work in every way possible for the 

peaceful senlement of dlsptlles. abe prevention of conllict and the achievement of 

the long•term political solutions required. Prevent ive diplomacy and early response 

to connic t on the part of Sta tes and the United Nations are cri tical. The promotion 

of human righ ts is also critical. ln addition. we will promote good govemance. the 

rule or taw, effective, accountable and inclusive instiuuioos, and susta inable 

development at the international. rc@ional. national and loca l levels. Recogniz ing 

that displacement could be reduced if international humanitarian Jaw were respected 

by a ll par1ies to armed conflict, we renew our commiuuem to uphold humanitarian 

principles a 1ld intemational humanitarian law. We con finn a lso our respect for the 

n•les that safeguard civiliaus in connict. 

65. We l'eaffirm the 1951 Convention relating to the Sta tus o f Refugee.s n and the 

1967 Protocol thereto 13 as the foundariou of the international refugee protection 

regime. We recogni7,.e the importance of their full and effective application by Sta tes 

parties nnd the values. they embody. \Ve note with satisfaction that 148 Stares are 

now par1ics 10 one or both iustnlmems. We encourage Stares not parties 10 consider 

acceding to those instnuue nts and Slates parties with reservations to give 

consideration to withdrawing them. \Ve recoguit-e a lso that a number o f States not 

parties to the intcmationa I refugee instruments have shown a generous approach to 

hosting refugees. 

66. We reaffirm thai international refugee law, international human ritz.bts law and 

internationa l hum:tnitarian law provide the legal framework to strengthen lbe 

protection o f refugees. We wi ll e nsure, in this context, protection for a ll who need it. 

We lake note of regional refugee iustrumeuts. such as the Organization of African 

u Uuittd Nnlious. fi'MI)'Series. vol 189. NO. 254S. 

u £bid.. vol. 606. No. 879L 
47 

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Ntw York Dtclan1ion for Rt fUJttt$ and Mi~tnnts 

Unity Convention governing tbe specific aspects of refugee problems in Africa •• and 

the Cartagena Declaration on Refugee§. 

67. \Ve reaffinu respect for lltc institution of asylum and the right to seek asylum. 

\Ve reaffirm also respect for and adherence to the fundamell1al principle of 

non·refoulemem in accordance with imemational refugee Jaw. 

68. We underline the centrality of intcmatioua1 cooperation to the refugee 

protection regime. We recognize the burdens that large movements of refugees place 

on national resources, especially in the case of developing countries. 1'o address the 

needs of refugees and receiving States, we couuuit to a more equitable sharing of 

the burden and responsibility for boslintt and supporting the world 's refugees. while 

taking account of existing contributions and the differing capacities and resources 

amon$ States. 

69. We be lieve that a comprehensive refugee response should be developed and 

iniliated by the Office of the United Nalions High Commissioner for Refttgees. in 

dose coordinacion wi1h relevarH Suues. including: hosl countries, and invo lving 

other relevanl Uniled Na1 ions entilies. fo·r each situa tion involving large tuovements 

of refugees. This should involve a muh i-stakeboldcr approach that includes nationAl 

and local authorilics. intcrualional organiz.atious, internat ional tiuancia l instilulious. 

civil society partners (including faith·based organizations, diaspora organizations 

and academia), Lbe private sector. the media a nd refttgees themselves. 

A comprehensive framework of this kind is annexed 10 I be present dec.lat'alion. 

70. We wi ll ensure llull refugee admission policies or a rrangements 1.1re in line wltb 

our obligations under intern1.1tional law. We wish to .see adm.iuislrat ive barriers 

eased, with a view to acceleracing refugee admission J)rocedures 10 the extent 

possible. We will. wbere • l>propriate. assist States to conduct early and effective 

regislration and documentation of refugees. We will also promote access for 

children to ch.itd·appropriate procedures. At lhe same time. we recognize that the 

ability of refugees to lodge asylum claims in the country of their choice may be 

regulated, subject to the safeguard 1ha1 they will have access to, and enjoymenl of, 

protection e lsewhere . 

71. We encourage the adoption of measures to facilit:ue access to civil registration 

and documentation for refugees. \Ve recognize in 1his regard the importance of early 

and effective registration and documentation, as a protection tool a nd to facilitate 

the provision of humanitadnn assistance. 

72. We recognize that statelessness can be a root cause o f forced displacement and 

that forced displacement, in turn. can lead to state lessness. \Ve take note of the 

campaign of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to 

end statelessness wi1hin a decade and we encourage S~tlles to consider actions they 

could take 10 reduce 1he incidence of statelessness, We encourage those S1a1cs that 

have not yet acceded 10 the 1954 Convemion relat ing to the SlaJus of Stateless 

J>ersons 15 and the J96 J Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 16 to consider 

doing so. 

73 . \Ve recognize that refugee camps should be the exception and, 10 1he extent 

possible . a temporary measure in response to an emergency. We note that 60 per cent 

,. £bid .• \'OL 1001 . No. 14691. 

U Ibid .. voL 360. No. S 1 SS. 

" Ibid .. vol. 989. No. 144SS. 

AIRES/71/ 1 
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New Yor-k Ot-da_ralion for Refugees and tiWAnts 

of refugees worldwide are in urban senings and only a minorily are in camps. We 

will ensure that the delivery of as.sistauce to refugees and host cooununities is 

adapted to the relevant context. We underline that bosl States have lhe pl'imary 

responsibi lily 10 e11sure the civilian and humanilarian characrer of refugee camps 

and s:culemcuts. We will work 10 e nsure that this character is not compro mised by 

lbe presence or activities of armed elements and to ensure thai camps arc not u.sed 

for purposes that are incompatible with their civilian character. We will work to 

Slrengthen security in rcfu~ce camps and surrounding local communities. at cbc 

request 8Jld with the consent of the host country. 

74 . We welcome the txtnordinarily g.encro us contribution made to dart by 

countries that hosl large refugee populations and will work to increase the support 

for lhose countries. We call for pledges made at relevant conferences to be disbursed 

promptly. 

75. We c:ommit to working tO\\'Brds solutions from the o utset of a rc-fugee 

siHmtion. We will actively promole durable solutions, parlicularly in protracted 

refugee situations. with a focus oo sustainable and timely return in safety and 

dignity. This will encompass repalriatioo, reintegration, rehabilitat'ion and 

reconstnaclion acrivitics. We encourage States and other relevant actors to provide 

support through. ituer alia. the allocalion of funds. 

76. We rtamnn thai voluntary repatriation should nor necessarily be conditioned 

on the accomplisluueut ofpolilical solutions in the country oforigiJL 

77. We intend to expand the number and range of legal palhways available for 

refugees to be admincd to or l'esettled iu third countries. lu Jtddition to easing the 

plight of refugees. rhis bas benefits for countries rhat host large refugee populations 

and for lhird counlries that receive refugees. 

78. We urge States that have not yet esrablished resenlement programmes to 

consider dointt so at the earliest opportunily. Those which have already done so are 

encouraged to consider increasing the size of 1heir programmes. H is our aim 10 

provide reseulemenl places and other legal pathways for admission o n a scale 1ha1 

would enable Lhe annual reseulement needs idenlified by the Office of the United 

Nations High Couuuissioner for Refugees 10 be met. 

79. We wlll consider the e.xpansiou of existing humanitarian admission 

prograuunes, possible temporary evacuation progranunes. including evacuation for 

medical reasons. flexible arrangements 10 assist family reunificaciou. private 

sponsorship for individua l refugees and opportunilies for labour mobility for 

refugees. including 1brough priva1e sector partuersbips. and for edocaciont such as 

scbolarsbips and student visas. 

80. We are commined to providing humanitarian assislance to refugees so as to 

ensure essential SUJ>port in key life-saving sectors, such as health care. sheller, food, 

water and snnihuion. We C01mui1 10 suppOrling host countries and conuuuuities in 

lhis regard. including by usiug locally available knowledge and capacities. We will 

suppor1 conuuuuity·based development prograuunes 1bat benefit both refugees and 

host conununities. 

81. We are deler•nined to pl'ovide quality primnry a ud secondRI'Y education in safe 

learnin.Q. cnviromueuts for a ll refucee children. and to do so wicbin a few monlhs of 

lhe initial displaccmcnl. We commit to providing host countries wilb support in this 

regard. Access 10 quality educaliou. including for host coJnmunities, gives 

f\mdamental protec tion 10 children and youth in displaccmcnl contexts. partic\llarJy 

in situat ions of conOict and crisis. 
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82. \Vc wiU support early childhood educalion for refugee children. We will also 

promote teniary education, skills training and vocational education. Jn conflict and 

crisis silualions, higher education serves as a powerful driver for change, shellers 

and prorects a critical @:roup of youne; men and women by maintaining lhei_r l•oJ>es 

for 1he fuiUre, fosters inclusion and non-discriminalion and acts as a cata lyst for the 

recovery and rebuilding of posl·couilicl countries. 

83. We will work ro ensure 1hat the basic health ueeds of refugee couunuuities are 

me1 and thai women and girls have access 10 essen1ial heafth.care services. We 

couunil 10 providing host countries wilb suppon in this regard. We will a.lso develop 

ua1ioual slrale@.ies for rhe protec tion of refu$CCs within the [ramework of ua1ioual 

social prorecl'ion systems, as appropriate. 

84. \Vc lcoming tbc positive steps Utken by individual SHlles. we eucoura$e host 

Govcnu uents to consider opening 1beir labour IUMkets 10 refugees. We will work 10 

streugtbeo host couulries' and couuuuui1ies• resilience. assisling them. for example. 

with employment creation and income generation schemes. ln Ibis regard. we 

recognize The polential of young people and will work to create 1he condi1ions for 

growth, employment and education thai will allow them to be Lhe drivers of 

developmcru. 

85 . ln order to meel the challenges posed by large movements of refugees, close 

coordination will be required among a range of humauilarian and development 

actors. \Ve commit to pulling those most affected at rhe centre of p lanning and 

acrion . Host uovemments and commmulies may need support from relevant United 

Nalions enlit ies. local authorities. international financia l institutions, regional 

developulCUI banks. bilalcral donors. the priv!liC sctlor aud civil socie1y. We 

strongly encourage joint responses involving all such actors in otder to s Trengthen 

the nexus between humanitarian and developmem ac1ors. facilitate cooperatio11 

across inslitmional mandates and. by he lping 10 build self-reliance and resilience, 

lay a basis for suslainable solutions. In addition to rneetiug. direct humanita rian and 

development ueeds. we will work 10 support envitoou1coHtl. social oud 

iufrastmctural rebabiliHUioo in areas atTccled by large movements of refugees. 

86. \Ve note wilh concern A signiticam @.3P between tbe ueeds of refugees nnd 1he 

available resources. We encourage sup(>Ort from a broader range of donoi'S tU)d will 

take measures to make bumanilarian financing more flexible and predictable. with 

diminished earmarkin@: and increased muhi· year funding. in order 10 close Ibis gap. 

Unhed Nations entities such as the Office of1be United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees and the Uni ted Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palesline 

Refugees iu the Near Easl and olber relevanl organizalioos require sufficient 

funding to be able 10 carry out their activities effectively and in a predictable 

manner. We welcome the jncreasing engageme111 of the World Bank and multilateral 

deve lopmcm banks and imJ>rovcmcnts in ttcccss 10 conces.sional development 

fi nancing fo1· affected conuounities. 11 is cleat. funhel'more, thar pl'ivare sector 

invest men I in supporl of refugee communi Lies and bost countries will be of critical 

importance over lbe coming years. Civil society is also a key parlner in every region 

of the world in responding 10 the needs of refugees. 

87. We note t_haL the United States of America. Canada. Ethiopia. Gennany. 

Jordan. Mexico. Sweden and the Secretary-Geueral will bos1 a high-level meeting 

on refugees ou 20 September 2016. 

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V. Follow-up to and rc\r)ew of our commhments 

88. We rccog.uize that a•·n.mge111eots l)re needed ro ensure sysrcmaric follow-\•P 10 

and review of all of the commitments we arc making today. Accordin$1y. we rcqucsl 

the Secretary·Geueral co e nsure that the progress made by Member States and the 

United Nations in unplementing the conuniunems made a t today•s high-level 

meering will be lhe subjec l of penodic assessments provided 10 the General 

Assembly with reference, as appropriate , to 1be 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 

Developmenl. 

89. ln addition, a role in reviewing relevam aspecls of the preselll declaration 

should be envisaged for the periodic High-level Dialogues on Jnternational 

Migrruion nod Development and for tbe nnuual report of lbe Uni1ed Na.1ions Hig.h 

Commissioner for Refugees to lhe General Assembly. 

90. ln recoguilion of I he need for significant financial and programme support to 

host counlries and communities affected by large movements of refugees and 

migrants. we re-quest the Secretary-Ge neral to report to I he Genera l Assembly at its 

seventy-first session on ways o f achieving g.rearer efli c ieucy, operational 

effectiveness and system-wide coherence, as we ll as ways of streue.tbeuing the 

engagement of the U11i1ed Nations with i1Hemalionnl financial institutions a nd the 

priva te sector. wilb n view 10 fully implemeutiug 1be couuuitments O\lrli_ued i.u 1be 

present declara liou. 

Annex [ 

Comprehensive o·efugee responsl' fmmework 

3rt! plenary meeting 

19 S<pt•mhor 1016 

I. The SCAle 1u1d nature of l'efugee displacement today l'equi•·es us 10 net in a 

comprehensive and predictable manner in large-scale rcfue.ce movements. Throu@;.h 

a comprehensive refugee response based on the princ iples of inlcmationa l 

coopera tion and on burdeu .. and responsibility .. sharing, we are better able to protec t 

and assist refugees and to sopport lbe host States and couummities involved. 

2. The comprehensive refugee response framework will be developed and 

iui1ia1ed by the Office of 1he United Nations High Commissioner for Rcfu1-ces. in 

close coordination witb relevant States. including bost countries. a nd involving 

olhcr rclevanl Uni 1cd Nations e ntilics. for eacb situarion involvin~ large movements 

of refugees. A comprehe nsive refugee response should involve a muhi-stakeboldcr 

approach. including national aud local amboricies. international organizations. 

intema1ional financ1al ins1itutions, regional organizations, regional coordina1ion and 

parlnel'ship •nee:banisms. civil society p~nners. including faillt-based organizations 

and academia, 1he private sec1or. media and the refugees themselves. 

3. While each large movemenl of tef,.tgees will diffel' in l.liUUI'e, the e lements 

uolcd below provide a framework for a comprehensive and pcople -cenlred refue-ee 

response, which is in accordance with international law and besl international 

practice and adapted 10 the specific coutcx:l. 

4. \Ve envisas.:o a con,prehen!,live refug.ee res pons e frnmework for e:\eh si1ut11io n 

involving large movements of re fugees. including in protracted situalions, A$ an 

iutcgral and distinct pari of Bn overall humanitarian response, where it ex isis. and 

wbicb would nonually contain the elemems set out below. 
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RNepUon a.nd adntis-slon 

S. AI 1be otHser of 3 large movcmem of refugees. reeeivins S1o1es. bearing. in 

mind Lbeir national capacities and interoalional legal obligalions, in cooperation. as 

appropriate, with the Office of lhe Uuilcd Na1ions High Commissioner for 

Refugees. intcrnaliooal orgauizalions and otltcr panucrs and wilb the supporl of 

olher States as requested. in confonnity with international obligalions, would: 

(a) Ensure, to the extenl possible. that measures are in place to identify 

persons in need of international protection as rcfutz,ccs. provide for adcqu;tte. safe 

and di$oifled reception coudilions. with a parliculnr emphasis ou iJcrsons with 

specific needs, victims of human 1rnfficking, child protection, family unity. and 

prcveuliou of and response to sexual and gender·based violence, aud supporl the 

crilical conlributiou of receiving communi lies and socielics iulhjs regard: 

(b) Take account of the righ1s. speciiac nteds. contributions and voices of 

women and girl refugees:; 

(c) Assess and meel I he essential needs of refugees. including by providing 

access to adequate safe drinking water, sanitation, food, nutrition, sheller. 

psychosocial suppon and heahh care, including sexual and reproductive health, and 

providing assistance to host countries and conummilies in lhis regard, as required; 

(d) Rcgisrer iudjvidually and docmuenl 1hose seckin@. protection as refugees. 

includintz. in 1be first country where lbey seek asyl\lm, as Q\litkly as possible \lpou 

their arrival. io achieve I hi . as:sistance may be needed. in areas such as biometric 

technology and other technical and financial support. 10 be coordinated by tl1e 

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees wilh relevant actors 

and panners, where necessary; 

(e) Use the regislration process 10 identify specific assistance needs and 

protection arrangements, where possible. including btu not exclusively for refugees 

wi1h special protection concerns. such as women at risk. children. especially 

unaccompanied children and ebjldreu stpanued from lbcir families. ehiJd-headed 

and sing.le-parenl households, victims of trafficking, victims of trauma and survivors 

of sexual violence. as well as refugees wilh disabi lilies aud older persons: 

(j) Work to ensure lhe inuuediale birlh rtgistra•ion for all refugee children 

bom on 1heir tenirory and provide adequate assis1ance at the earlies1 opponunity 

with oblaiuin! other necessary documents, as approprhuc, relating to civil status. 

such as marriage. divorce and death ccni flcatcs: 

(g) Put in place measures. wilh approprialc legal safeguards. which uphold 

refugees' human righ1s, wuh a view 10 ensuring ihe security or refugees. as well as 

measures to respond to host coumries' legitimale security concerns: 

(h) Take measures to mainrain Lhe civilian and humanilarian nature of 

refugee c-amps And scnlemcrus; 

(i) Take steps co ensure the credibility of asylum sys1ems. including through 

collaborariou among the counlrics of origin. rrausit and deslinntion and 10 facilitate 

the rettm:1 and readmission of Those who do not qualify for refugee starus. 

Support for lmmedl;Ut and ongoing ne("(l.s 

6. States. in cooJ)etatiou with mull ilatcral donors and private sector partners. as 

approptiale, would. in coordinarion wilh l'ec.eiving Stales: 

(n) Mobilize adequouc financial and 01her reS;ource:ot 10 cove.- 1he lutfniUlilarian 

needs identified within the comprehensive refugee response framewo k~ 

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(b) Provide resources in a prompt, predictable , consistent and nexible 

manner. including through wider partnerships involving State. civil society. faith· 

based and privare sector parlners: 

(c) Take 1neasures 10 exreod rhe finance leodins schemes lhar exisr for 

developing counlrics 10 middle-income coulllries hosting large numbers of refugees. 

bearing in mind the economic and social costs to those co1uHries; 

(d) Consider esrab hin ~ developmeor funding mcc::hanisms for such 

cou1ltries: 

(~) Provide assistance to hosl countries to prorcct the environment and 

strengthe n infrastructure affected by large movemenrs o f refugees; 

(/') Increase supporl for cash-based delivery mcc::hauisms and other 

innovative means for the efficient provision o f humanitarian assistance. where 

appropriate, whi le increasing accountability to ensure 1Jul1 humanitarian assistance 

reaches its beneficiaries. 

7. Host States, in cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High 

Commissioner for Refugees and other Unired Nations entities. financial inslitutions 

and other relevant partners, would, as appropriate: 

(n) Ptovide prompl. sa fe and unhindered access to huma ni1arian assistance 

for refugees in accordance with exisling ltumanitarian principles: 

(b) Deliver assista nce , to the exte1H possible, through appropriate nati01lal 

Bud local service providers, S1.1 c-b as public aotborities for benllb. educ-ation. socia l 

services and c hild protection: 

(c) Encourage and CHIJ10wcr refugees. ar the outset or an emergency phase. to 

establish supportive sysrems 11nd netwotks that involve refugees and hos1 commun ities 

;md 31'e age- a nd gender-sensitive, with a panicull_lr emphasis o n the prorectiou (Utd 

empowerment of women and children and other persons with spcci ftc:: needs; 

(lf) Sui'>POrt local c ivil soc:ic-ty partners 1ha1 eoutribute to htunanitatiau 

rcSI>onscs. in recognition of their ~ompl cmeutary coturibution; 

(e) Ensure close cooperation and eucour~ge joint plnnniog., ~s appropriate, 

between humanilarian and development actors aud other n:lcvant aclors. 

Support for bosl countries and communJtles 

S. Slates. the Office of the Uni1ed Nations High Colllmissioner for Refugees And 

relevant panners would: 

(a) lmplemem a joint, impanial a nd l'apid risk a nd/or impact Assessmelll, in 

aulicipation or after the onset of a large refugee Juovemcnt. in order 10 identify a_nd 

priorilize lhe assistance required for refugees. national and local authorities, and 

conununitics affected by a refugee presence: 

(b) Incorporate. where appropriate. the comprehensive refugee response 

framework in national development planning, in order to strengthen the delivery of 

essential services and infrasti'UCiure for The benefit of host communities and 

refugees: 

(c.•) Work to provide l.'ldc:qurtte resources, without prejudice: to officil'tl 

devcJopunml ass s~: ce. for national a nd local government authotiries and o ther 

service providers in view of lhe increased needs and pressures on social services. 

Programmes should benefit refugtes and the host eounTry and COilHHunities. 
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Durable solullons 

9. We recogni ze tha t millions of refugees around the world at present have no 

access to timely and durable solutions. the securing of which is one of the principal 

goals of iuteruation31 protection. The success of the search for solutions depends in 

large measure on resohHe and sustained internacional cooperation and supporL 

10 . We believe lbat actions should be taken i..n pursuit of the following durable 

solutions: volumary repatriation., local solutions and resettlement and complementary 

pathways for admission. 1'hese actions should include the elements set out below. 

11. We reaffirm the primary goal of bringing about condit ions tluu would he lp 

refugees re tum in safety and dittnity to the ir countries and emphasize the need to 

tackle the root causes of violence a nd armed contlict and to achieve necessary 

po litical solutions and the peaceful scuJcment of disputes. as well as to assist in 

reconstmc1ion efTor1s. ln I his contex1. States of origin/narionaliry would: 

(a) Acknowledge that everyone bas lbe right to leave any country. including 

his or her own, and to retum to his or her count ry~ 

(b) Respect Ibis ri@.ht and a lso respect abe obliga1ion to receive back Lhci.r 

nationals. which should occur iu a safe. digniticd and humane manner and with full 

respect for human rights in accordance wi11t obligations under intcmational law: 

(c) Provide necessary identification and travel documents: 

(d) facilita te the socioeco nomic reintegration of re-turnees ~ 

(~) Consider measures to enable the restilution of property. 

12. To ensute sustainable rerum and reinteg.nu iou. State s. United Nations 

organizations and relevant pa1·tners would: 

(a) Recognize that the voluntary nature of repatria tion is necessary as long 

as refugees continue to require international protection. that is, as long as they 

cannot regain fully rbe protection of their own cotm ry~ 

(b) Plan for aud support measures to encourage volunlary a nd informed 

repatriation, reintegration a nd reconci liation; 

(c) Support countries of origin/nationality. where appropriate. including 

through funding fbr rehabilitation. reconstruct ion and devclopmen1. and with the 

necessary legal s.1feguards to enable refugees to access lega l. physical and other 

support mechanisms needed for the restoration of national protection and their 

re integration: 

(tf) Support efforts to foster reconcil iation a nd dialogue, particularly with 

refugee couuuunities and with the equal participation of women and youth. and to 

ensure respe-ct for 1he ntle of law at the national and local leve ~ 

(~) Facilitate the partjcipation of refugees. including women. in peace and 

reconciliation processes, and ensure that che outcomes of such processes duly 

suppon their return in safety a nd dignity: 

(/) Ensure that nat ional dcvclopmem planning incorporates the specific 

uecds of returnees and promo1es sustainable aud inclusive reintegration. as ;t 

measure to prevent future displacement 

13. Host States. bearing in mind their capacities and imcmatioual lc@:al 

ohlig.suitm!l:, itt tOOJ)Cnuio tl wi1h the Office ttf the Uoited Nsuittni> High 

Commissioner for Refugees, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for 

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Palestine Refugees in the Near Easl, where appropriate, and other United Na1ions 

entilies, financial iustittltions and other relevant parUlers. would: 

(a) Provide legal stay to those seeking and in need of intemationa l protection 

as refugees, recognizing lbat nny decision regarding permanent settlement in any 

form. including possible namraliz.ation. rests with the host country; 

(b) 'rake measures to foster se f~re iance by pledging to expand opportunities 

for refugees to access. as appropriate. education, heahb care and services. livelihood 

opportunities and labour markets. witbotlt discriminating amon~ refugees and in a 

manner which also supports host conunuu.ities: 

(c) Take measures to enable refugees. including in panicular women and 

youth, to make the best use of their skills and capaciti es, recognizing that 

empowered refugees are beuer able to contribute to their own and their 

couunuuities• weiJ .. beiog: 

(d) lnvesl in building human capital. self-reliance and transferable ski lls as 

au essential step towards enabling long-term solutions. 

14. Third countries would: 

(a) Consider making available or expanding, including by encouraging 

private sector engagement and ac1ion as a supplementary m.easure, resenlement 

opporlunities and comp eme t:~ry pathways for admission of refugees tlu·ough such 

means as medical evRcunrion and Juunaniladan admission programmes, family 

reunification and opportunities for skilled migration, labour mobilit y and cductuion: 

(b) Commit 10 sharing best practices, providing refugees with sufficient 

informa tion to make informed decisions and safeguard ing protection standards: 

(c) Consider broadening 1he cri1eria for reseulemem and humanirMiau 

admission programmes in mass displacement aud prolracted sil\lalions. coupled 

with, as appr'OJ>finte, remporary hutnAnital'ian evacuation prog.Nltnrnes and orher 

forms of ndmission. 

15. Stares that ho ve no1 yet established reseulement programmes are e.ncouraged 

to do so at the earliest opportunity. Those thai have already done so are encouraged 

to consider increasing the size of their programmes. Sucb programmes should 

iucorponue a non-discriminatory approach and a gender J>crspec:tivc throughout. 

16. States aim 10 provide resenlement places and other legal pa1hways on a scale 

that would enable the l:UHlual reseulemeut needs idenrified by the Office of the 

Uniled Nat ions Higb Commissioner for Rcfutz,ccs lObe met 

Tbt' way rorward 

17. We c:ommi1 to implementing th is comprehensive refugee response framework. 

18. We invite the Oflice of tbe United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to 

engage wi1h States and consult with a ll relevanl stakeholders over the coming two 

years. with a view 10 evaluating lhe delail~d prac1ical application of the 

comprehensive refugee response framework and assessing I he scope for refinement 

and funber development. This process should be informed by practical expcl'ie-uce 

wirb the implcmcmation of 1be framework iu a rnn$:C: of SJ)ecific situations. Tbe 

objective would be to ease pressures ou tJ1c host countries involved. to enhance 

refugee sclf~relinnce. to expand access to Lhird·country solutions and to suppor1 

conditions in countries of ori~i n for retum in safety and dignity. 
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19. \Vc wiU work lowards the adopliou in 2018 of a global compacl oo refugees. 

based on the comprehensive refugee response framewol'k and on the outcomes or the process described above. We invite the United Nations High Commissioner for 

Rcfu~ecs 10 include Sttch a proposed ~:lobal compae1 on refugees in his annual report 

10 the Genen)l t\sseOlbly in 2018, for consideration by lhe Assembly a1 i1s sevemytbird session in conjuncliou with ils annual resohuion on the Office of 1be United 

Natjons High Commissioner for Refugees. 

Annex n 

Towat·ds a global compact for safe, ordel'ly and t·cgulat· mig.-ation 

J. lntroducllon 

1. This year. we wi ll launch a process or intergovernmental negotiations leading 

to the adop1iou of a global compac1 for safe. orderly and regular migration. 

2. The global compact would set out a range or principles, conunirments and 

understandings among Member Stases regat·ding imemational migration in all its 

dimensions. II would make au important comribution 10 global governance and 

enhance coordintuion on intemtuiona l migration. h would preseu1 a framework for 

comprehensive international cooperation on uti grants and human mobilily. 11 would 

deal with all aspects of intemational migration, including the humanitarian. 

developmental, human ri@llls·rclated and o ther aspects of migration. It would be 

guided by the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development 11 and the Addis Ababa 

Aclion Agenda of lhe Third International Conference on Financing for 

OeveiO(Hnent. 

11 and iuformed by the Declaration of the High-level Dialogue on 

Jntemational Migration and Oevelopmem adopted in October 2013.

19 

U . Context 

3. We acknowledge lhe important conlribution made by migrants and ntigratiou 

to development in countries of origin. transit and deslination, as well as the complex 

interrelationship between migration and development. 

4. \Ve recognize the positive contribution of n1igrants to sustainable And inclusive 

development. We also recognize that inlernational migration is a multidimensional 

reality of major relevance for lbe development of countries of origin. transit and 

destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses . 

.S. We will coopenue iuternatiouaHy ro ensure safe, orderly and regular mittration 

involving full respect for human riglus and 1hc humane lreatmcnt of migrants. 

regardless of migration status. We underline rhe need to ensure respecc for the 

dignity of migranls and the protection of their rights under applicable international 

laW, including the pri llCiple or UOil·discritninat iOn under intCn\atiOnaJ Ja\Y, 

6. We emphasize the multidimensional character of inlernalional migration, the 

imporlance of inlcrnational. regional and bilateral cooperation and dialogue in Ibis 

regard. and the. need 10 protect rhe human rights of all migrants, regardless of status.. 

panicularly at a rime when migra tion nows have increased. 

n R.t501ofion 70!1. 11 Resolution '913 13. :umex. 

" RtSOlotion 68/4. 

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7. We bear in mind 1ha1 policies and ini1ia1ives on 1he issue of migra1ion should 

promote holistic approaches 1hat take into accotwl the causes a nd consequences of 

the pheno me non. We acknowledge thai poveny, underdevelopment, lack of 

opportunilies. poor govenuulce a11d e nvironmental factors are among 1he drivel'S of 

migration. In 1urn, pro-poor policies relating to trade, employmenl and producl ive 

in vestme nts c.::au stimulate growt h a nd create e nonno us devclopmcnl potcnlial. We 

nole that internationa l economic imbalances. poverty and environmental degradation. 

combined wilh I be absence of peace and secmily and lack of rcs-pcc.::t for hmnon riglus, 

are all factors aiTecLing international migration. 

OJ. Conlt:'UI 

8. The globa l compact could include, but would not be limited to. the following 

clements: 

(n) lmernational mign"'lion as a rnultidimcosional reality of major re levance 

for the development of countries o f origin, transit and destination. as recognized in 

lhe 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development; 

(b) lntennuionaJ migration as a potential OPI>Orltmity for migrants a nd the ir 

f.1milies: 

(c) The. need to address the drivers of migra tion, including through 

strengthened e ffons in developme111, poverty eradication and conflict prevent ion and 

resolucion; 

(d) The contribution made by migrants to sustainable development and the 

complex interrel:nionship between migration and development ; 

(e) The facil italion of safe. orderly. regular a nd responsible migra tion and 

mobility o f people , including through the implementatio n of planned a nd wenmanaged migration policies: this may include the creation and expansion of safe. 

regular J>albways for 10i gntiou ~ 

(j) The scope fo•· grea1er international coope ration .. with a view to improvinp: 

nligration governance: 

(g) The impact of migration on buanan capilal in countries o f origin: 

(h) Remionnces as an important ~o urce o f private capital and the ir 

contri bution to development and promotion of faste r. cheaper a nd safer transfers of 

remiuanccs through lc.gaJ channels. iu both source and recipient couulrics. including 

through a reduction in transaction costs; 

(/) Effective protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms of 

llli@r:'HHS. inc luding women and c hildren. reg,ardless of their migrn10ry sta tus. and 

the specific needs of migrants in vulnerable siiUations: 

(}) l11ttrnational cooperation for border cootro l. wilh full respect for the 

human righls of mi~rant ; 

(k) Combating: trafficking in persons, smuggling o f migrants a nd 

contemporary forms of avery~ 

(I) ldcnt i fying those who have been trafficked a nd considering providing 

assistance. Including temporary or permanem residency. and work permits, as 

appropr-ia1c; 

(m) Reduction of the incidence and impac l of irregular migration; 
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Ntw York Dtclan1ion for Rt fUJttt$ and Mi~tnnts 

(n) Addressing tl1e situaLions of migrants in countries in crisis: 

(o) Promotion, as appropriate. of lhe inclusion of migrants in bost societies, 

access to basic services for migrants and gender·respousive services: 

(p) Consideration Of policies tO regularize the SIB IUS of migrants: 

(q) Protection of labour rights and a safe environmelll for migran1 workers 

and 1 hose iu precadous employment. protection of women migl'anr workers in all 

sectors and promolion of labour mobiluy. including c ircular migration: 

(r) The responsibilit ies and obligations of migrants towards host countries: 

(.t) Re turn a nd readmission, and improving cooperation in this regard 

be tween countries of origin and destination: 

(t) H31'nessing the contribution of diasporas and slreng:thening, lio.ks with 

counLries of origin; 

(u) Combating racism. xcuOJlhObia. discl'im.imuion and iruolerauce 10\\'ards all 

migrants: 

(v) Disaggregatcd data on imentational auignuion: 

(w) Recognition of foreign qualifications. education and skills and 

cooperation in access to a nd portability of earned benefits: 

(x) Coopcraaion 11:1 ahe national. re,gionnl and intemaaional levels o n all 

aspects of migration. 

IV. The way ron,'ard 

9. The global compact would be elaborated through a proce.ss or 

ime.rgovenunental negori.ations. ror which preparations will begin immediately. The 

negotiations. which will begin in early 2017. are to cuhuioate in au 

iUlergoverumcmal cooJereuce ou intcrnn1ioual mig:mtiou in 2018 at wbjcb 1be global 

compact will be presented for adoption. 

10. As the Third High -level Dialogue on lnterna1iona l Migration a nd Development 

is to be held in New Yol'k llO later tha1l 2019,10 a tole should be e nvisased for the 

Higb-level Dialogue in the process. 

11. The P1·esident of the General Assembly is invited to UJake early arransctuems 

for the appointmem of cwo co-facilitators to lead open, rransparent and inclusive 

consuhations with States. with a view to the determination of modalities. a timeline. 

the possible holding or preparatory conferences and other practicalities rc:latlug_ 10 

the intergovernmeural negot iarions, including the integration of Geneva·based 

miyation expertise. 

12. The SeCI'CtMy·Gencral is requested 10 provide 3PJ)I'0J)ti31e support ror rhe 

negotiations. We envisage that tbc Secretarial of lbe United Nations a nd the 

ll1ternatioual Organiz:alion for .Migration would joinrly service the negoriatious. lbe 

former providing capacity and suppon and the laner extending Lhe technical and 

policy expertise required. 

13. We envisage a lso tbat the Special Representative of t11e Secretary-General for 

lntematioual Migration and Development, Mr. Peter Sutherland. would coordinate 

;!0 See reso1Ulioo 691229. para. !2. 

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