1

Vladimir Putin and the Russian Military

Mr. Ray Finch

Eurasian Analyst

Foreign Military Studies Office 

Intended Place of Publication: FMSO Monograph

Synopsis: Since his return as Russian president in May 2012, Putin has made military 

modernization a top priority. Yet strengthening the Russian military is only one 

component in the larger Kremlin strategy of building a multi-polar global order, where 

Russia serves as an opposing pole to the West, especially the US. He understands the 

importance of a strong ideology, as well as the dangers of inordinate military spending. 

His views toward security and defense go far beyond pure military means and encompass 

all elements of national power (e.g., economic, information, cultural, espionage, 

diplomatic, etc.). The military is merely one instrument in his arsenal to strengthen the 

Russian state and the survival of his regime. This monograph examines the geopolitical 

background to the Russian military’s evolution under Putin, its current status, and some 

possible future implications. 

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and 

do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the 

Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
2

Vladimir Putin and the Russian Military

Ray Finch, FMSO

Introduction

Vladimir Putin served on the front lines during the Cold War as a KGB agent in Dresden, 

helping to defend the Soviet-communist order. As the Party was ending, Putin had a front 

row seat to the collapse of Communism and Soviet influence in Eastern Europe. Despite 

the presence of overwhelming military superiority, he saw firsthand how useless all the 

Soviet weaponry had become without backing of political will. The Soviet leadership had 

lost faith in the communist ideal, and when protests broke out against the ruling regime in 

East Germany, and Putin turned to Moscow for guidance, the response was silence.1

Some of the Kremlin’s reticence stemmed from the conviction that their form of political 

and economic system needed to be reformed. Using military force to crush popular 

protests did not align with the party leadership’s “new thinking.” Protests against the old 

order continued to spread and it was not long before the new Russian leadership 

renounced Communism and pledged to adopt an ideology more aligned with Western 

forms of democracy and a market economy. These pledges, however, became largely 

discredited in Russia during the 1990s, as the political system veered toward 

authoritarianism and where much of the national economy was pilfered. With regard to a 

new ideology, the Kremlin remained adrift. 

Before Putin became president he had completed a dissertation built around the thesis

that to modernize the Russian economy and improve the general well-being of the 

population, the country’s leadership needed to gain greater control over key sectors of the 

Russian economy. Revenues from the sale of natural resources could help “in building up 

the economy, providing revenue and jobs, and promoting economic integration within 

Russia, with the CIS and with the world economy.” As the Cold War had just recently

ended and country’s leadership was still looking for closer cooperation with the West, 

there was no specific mention in Putin’s dissertation of harnessing this wealth to rebuild 

Russia’s military forces.2

During his first two terms as president (2000-2008) Putin did more than just pay lip 

service to his dissertation’s thesis. While higher fossil fuel prices certainly helped, and 

although he and close associates amassed huge fortunes, incomes and the standard of 

living improved for most Russians. The Russian economy grew at an impressive rate, 

pensions were paid on time and a portion of the country’s resource wealth was spent on 

capital improvements (e.g., healthcare, roads, education). Though not dramatic, there 

were also steady improvements within Russia’s Armed Forces. 

Concomitant with this improvement with living conditions were increasing signs that 

Russia did not accept the post-Cold War, Washington-led global order. A new Kremlinsupported ideology began to emerge under Putin which claimed that Russia remained a 

great power and that Russia enjoyed a certain sphere of influence. The ideology asserted 

that a multipolar global order (where Russia serves as a pole) was more stable than a 
3

unipolar version. The emergence of this ideology coincided with increasing domestic 

political repression. As relations with the West became more strained, the Kremlin 

leadership began to place greater emphasis on strengthening its global pole, to include 

Russian military power. 

Since his return as Russian president in May 2012, Putin has made military 

modernization a top priority. Yet strengthening the Russian military is only one 

component in the larger Kremlin strategy of building a multi-polar global order, where 

Russia serves as an opposing pole to the West, especially the US. Putin clearly 

remembers the utility of all that military hardware in East Germany as the Soviet system 

began to collapse. He understands the importance of a strong ideology, as well as the 

dangers of inordinate military spending. His views toward security and defense go far 

beyond pure military means and encompass all elements of national power (e.g.,

economic, information, cultural, espionage, diplomatic, etc.). The military is merely one 

instrument in his arsenal to strengthen the Russian state and the survival of his regime. 

This brief chapter will examine the geopolitical background to the Russian military’s 

evolution under Putin, its current status, and some possible future implications. 

Putin’s Evolving View toward the Russian Military

As in other aspects of his role as Russian leader, Putin’s views toward the military have 

evolved over the past fifteen years. When he was appointed as prime minister (and 

possible successor to Yeltsin) in August 1999, he inherited a military which was in 

disarray. The decade following the collapse of the USSR had largely been an unmitigated 

tragedy for those serving in the military. After the humiliating retreat of Soviet/Russian 

forces from Eastern Europe and most of the republics of the former USSR, Russian 

military personnel confronted near economic collapse at home and a general disregard for 

their welfare. The catalog of illnesses was long: corruption flourished while many 

officers went months without being paid; decent housing was in short supply; draft 

dodging was rampant while criminality within the ranks increased; equipment 

maintenance deteriorated and research-development funding was slashed. 

These weaknesses were manifested when Russian military forces were tasked to crush the 

separatist revolt in Chechnya in late 1994. Over the next two years Russian military 

forces displayed low morale and poor counterinsurgency skills. These weaknesses were 

aggravated by a lack of effective command and control (C2) and a casual disregard for 

the loss of human life—whether the “enemy,” civilian non-combatants, or their own 

soldiers. When a ceasefire agreement was signed in August 1996, many Russian senior 

military personnel again felt humiliated and betrayed. They would later claim that 

military operations had been hampered by short-term political constraints (e.g., the reelection of Yeltsin in May 1996) and high-level corruption. There was a growing divide 

between the Kremlin and Russia’s disaffected military leadership. 

President Yeltsin’s declining physical health from 1997-99 was an apt metaphor for the 

general deterioration of the country and the military. Despite an influx of IMF loans, 
4

Russia defaulted on its sovereign debt in late summer 1998, crashing the ruble and the 

country’s banking system. Russia’s economic uncertainty coincided with even greater 

political ambiguity as the Kremlin cycled through a number of possible Yeltsin 

replacements. 

Against this background of almost total economic and political paralysis, US and other 

NATO countries began offensive military operations (without a UN resolution) against 

Serbia in March 1999. The argument that Western forces were responding to Serbian 

aggression against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo carried little weight in Moscow. Russian 

leaders bemoaned this unilateral use of air power against their Serb-Orthodox brothers. 

The Kosovo conflict proved to be a watershed in Russia’s later foreign and military 

policy, “proving” that Russian concerns would only be heeded if backed by strong and 

robust military forces. Russian political and military leaders began to coalesce around the 

idea of reclaiming its global status by rebuilding its military. 

The troubled Kremlin leadership was also concerned with the deteriorating conditions 

around Chechnya and the North Caucasus. The 1996 Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement had 

left Chechnya’s with an ill-defined political status, allowing the war-torn province to 

devolve into banditry and religious extremism, which began to spread to adjacent regions

in the summer of 1999. 

Thus when Putin was appointed prime minister in August 1999, he confronted both 

significant domestic and international challenges. He began by promising to crush the 

Chechen insurgency in the North Caucasus. His tough rhetoric raised his profile to 

national (and electable) prominence. The decrepit state of Russia’s conventional Armed 

Forces became painfully apparent to him: to assemble sufficient forces to stop the 

Chechen incursion into neighboring Dagestan, the Russian security agencies had to 

cobble combat- ready units together from around the country. They also relied heavily 

upon local defense forces in Dagestan.3

After defeating this incursion, the Kremlin went on to establish its mandate throughout all 

of Chechnya. During this stage of the Chechen conflict, Putin gained the respect among 

many military leaders by supporting and defending their often brutal strategy. Russian 

military forces enjoyed a distinct advantage in sheer firepower, employing massive 

artillery and air bombardment to flush out the separatists. Putin combined this mailed-fist 

strategy with an equally aggressive counterinsurgency effort, successfully co-opting 

important elements of the Chechen leadership. 

As president, Putin had been in office less than six months when the nuclear submarine

Kursk exploded and sank in the Barents Sea with a total loss of crew. This tragedy 

revealed to Putin not only the dire straits of Russia’s strategic deterrent, but also the 

mendacity among some within the military’s chain of command. It certainly also 

impressed upon the Russian leader the dangerous fallout from negative media coverage. 

This incident provided additional impetus for the Kremlin’s consolidation and control 

over the country’s major media, which, in turn, became an important tool in gaining 

domestic support.

4
5

After the attacks on 9-11, Putin expressed both condolences and a willingness to 

cooperate with the US in the fight against Islamic extremism. Although some Russian 

military leaders complained, he allowed open access to the American military into 

Russia’s Central Asian backyard. These goodwill gestures toward greater security 

cooperation were seemingly rejected three months later when the US unilaterally pulled 

out of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. From the Kremlin’s perspective, this 

treaty abrogation was indicative of Washington’s ingratitude and signaled that American 

military leaders were determined to pursue global military dominance by neutralizing

Russia’s nuclear retaliatory capability. The Kremlin would need to develop adequate 

nuclear countermeasures. 

Kremlin concerns that the US was intent upon becoming the indispensable global 

hegemon were further confirmed during the run-up and initial stage of the Iraq conflict in 

early 2003. Russian officials argued that in employing armed force against Iraq, 

Washington would exceed the UN resolution, acting as though impervious to the 

objections of other UN members.5That Kremlin objections to the Iraq War were not 

heeded was expected; less understandable was the US-led plan to enlarge NATO right up 

to Russia’s borders. 

After the inclusion of the Baltic countries in March 2004, Russian officials continued to 

ask, somewhat rhetorically, “against whom was NATO planning to defend?” An ominous 

sign that the geopolitical climate within the Kremlin was changing occurred after the 

September 2004 terrorist attack in Beslan, North Ossetia (sometimes referred to as 

“Russia’s 9-11”). Pro-Chechen fighters seized an elementary school in Beslan, 

demanding the removal of Russian military forces from Chechnya. Visiting the town 

once the fighting had stopped (330 killed, about of whom half children), Putin suggested 

that perhaps foreign security agencies had played a hand in the tragedy.6 Russia would 

need robust security forces to handle both the domestic and foreign threats. 

The Kremlin again saw Western meddling in the post-Soviet space during the Orange 

Revolution in Ukraine in late 2004 and early 2005. Large demonstrations in Kiev against 

fraudulent election results resulted in the Kremlin-backed candidate losing to his proWestern rival. They also saw Washington further spreading its influence in the Caucasus, 

when the pro-Western president in Georgia (who had come to power in the November 

2003 Rose Revolution) invited his American counterpart to visit Tbilisi in May 2005. 

From the Kremlin’s perspective, “democracy promotion” was merely a façade for the 

spread of greater American geopolitical influence. Putin would need to tailor his security 

forces to meet this new kind of threat. 

As relations began to chill with the West, the Kremlin began to push back with more than 

just rhetoric. Three events from 2007 reflect this more assertive strategy. At the Munich 

Security Conference in February 2007, President Putin claimed that the US had abused 

its role as global leader, disregarding the legitimate interests of other countries, 

“overstepping its national borders in every way. This is visible in the economic, political, 

cultural and educational policies it imposes on other nations.”7
6

In April 2007 ethnic Russian protesters took to the streets of the Estonian capital, Tallinn, 

after city officials decided to relocate a Soviet war memorial. These protests were 

followed by other forms of intimidation, including a massive cyber-attack against 

Estonia’s digital infrastructure. Subsequent forensic evidence pointed to Kremlinsponsored hackers. The Kremlin would continue to develop its cyber and information 

capabilities.8

US plans to install a missile defense system in Europe to protect against a possible 

missile strike from Iran were interpreted by the Kremlin as possibly weakening their 

strategic retaliatory capability. Negotiations in 2007-08 to include some level of Russian 

expertise into this system went nowhere. In December 2007, after years of diplomatic 

haggling, the Kremlin announced it would no longer abide by the provisions of the 

Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, claiming that the treaty no longer served 

Russia’s security interests and signaling that it was less willing to engage in mutual 

discussions with its Western counterparts over European security.9 Russian military 

planners began to more frequently cite an observation attributed to Tsar Alexander III: 

“Russia has only two allies-her army and navy.”

Relations between Russia and the West continued to deteriorate after Kosovo declared 

independence in February 2008, which was soon recognized by most Western countries. 

In early April 2008 the Kremlin reacted strongly when the US lobbied for a NATO 

membership plan for Ukraine and Georgia at the Bucharest Summit. Nor did they 

appreciate the high-level visit by President Bush to meet with his Ukrainian counterpart 

in Kiev that same week. During the Victory Day celebration in Moscow on 9 May, the 

Kremlin again sent a strong message, when for the first time in 20 years it decided to 

include its latest military equipment in the Red Square parade. Putin understands the 

power of spectacle and virtual hard-power in mobilizing public support. 

During Putin’s second tour as president (2004-08) the Kremlin supported a significant 

increase in media programming dealing with the Russian military and other security 

services. Besides the creation of a dedicated television and media conglomerate within 

the Ministry of Defense (Zvezda TV network), the Kremlin has helped to fund a number 

of military programs within the other major television networks.10 Alongside informing 

viewers of the latest positive developments within the Russian military, these programs 

have helped to raise overall defense consciousness among viewers. As mentioned earlier, 

Putin clearly understood the importance of harnessing Russia’s information space in 

defending the Kremlin’s interests. 

Tensions continued to escalate between Russia and Georgia (new US ally) throughout the 

summer of 2008, leading to open hostilities in August. From the Kremlin’s perspective, 

even though Russian military forces had experienced some difficulty in routing the 

Georgian forces, this brief conflict was “proof” that Russia would no longer be pushed 

around, particularly in its traditional sphere of influence. Under the new placeholder 

president, Dmitry Medvedev, the Kremlin continued to insist that it would not accept a 

US-led global order and that it reserved the right to protect Russian interests in what it

termed the “near-abroad.”

11 Such protection would demand modern and combat-ready 
7

forces. The Kremlin announced a number of significant military reforms following the 

conflict, mostly designed to improve responsiveness and command and control.

The US plan to “reset” relations with Russia after the conflict in Georgia was likely 

interpreted by Putin as an attempt to marginalize or weaken his position as prime 

minister. By fostering greater cooperation with the more liberal elite under Medvedev, 

the US could steer Russia toward a less confrontational path (while still pursuing its geopolitical goals). The reset, however, was doomed to fail, as it was based on the false 

assumption that Putin was no longer in control. Despite warmer diplomatic rhetoric 

during Medvedev’s presidency, the Kremlin remained determined to change the postCold War global security order. 

Russia’s resistance to perceived American hegemony was also reflected in major military 

exercises in 2009 directed against a nominal Western enemy.12 Despite earlier talk of 

rapprochement, where Russia would work with NATO and the US in combatting 

common threats, the Kremlin began to openly plan to defend against Western aggression. 

Continued US plans to deploy elements of a missile defense system in Europe riled 

Kremlin leaders, who insisted that this system was directed against them. Although 

Russia and the US were able to hammer out a new strategic nuclear weapons treaty, it 

was clear to the Kremlin that Washington and Brussels were still reluctant to accept 

Russia as an equal power. Improving Russia’s military capabilities grew increasingly 

important. 

Midway through Medvedev’s presidency the Kremlin began to unleash a virulent 

information campaign which portrayed the West, and the US in particular, in an 

increasingly negative light. In its jaundiced portrayal, the US/West was becoming the 

source of every global ailment. For instance, unrest stemming from the Arab Spring was 

blamed on US geopolitical meddling, where, under the guise of democracy promotion, 

the Americans were stoking unrest to strengthen their position on the global chessboard. 

Even Russian weather reports were open to manipulation. During the summer heat wave 

in Central Moscow in 2010, one popular explanation was the US use of climate weapons 

against Russia.13 The Kremlin displayed increasing facility in weaponizing information, 

firing this propaganda at the Russian people. 

Kremlin proposals in 2009-10, under the “liberal” Medvedev government, to restructure 

the European security system were ignored or ridiculed by the US and NATO.

14 In the 

fall of 2011 the Kremlin grew indignant when, after supporting a UN resolution 

authorizing the use of force to protect civilians in Libya, certain NATO countries 

exceeded this mandate to remove the Libyan leader. Here again was “proof” that the USled Western order believed that it could act with impunity. From Putin’s perspective (or 

at least from their propaganda machine), only robust and modern armed forces could stop 

the US and NATO from using the same superior military force against the Kremlin.

Relations became more strained in September 2011 after Putin announced his intention to 

return to the presidency. After the December 2011 Duma elections (where the proKremlin party won an overwhelming majority of seats), relatively large demonstrations
8

took place in Moscow and other cities protesting against alleged election fraud and 

Putin’s automatic claim to the presidency. Putin and the Kremlin’s media machine 

quickly identified the West/US as the instigator behind these protests and the antiAmerican rhetoric was ratcheted up.15 Russian defense officials increasingly began to talk 

about the need to defend against the bacillus of color revolutions. 

One of Putin’s key platforms before returning to the presidency in May 2012 dealt with 

modernizing Russia’s Armed Forces. He pledged to invest some 23 trillion rubles ($770 

bn) “over the next decade to purchase more than 400 intercontinental ballistic missiles, 

more than 600 combat aircraft, dozens of submarines and other navy vessels and 

thousands of armored vehicles.”

16 While some of this increased military spending was 

designed to attract the support of Russians working within the defense industry, part of it 

also stemmed from the growing belief military strength would be the key component in 

defining the country’s future. It was not long before the Kremlin found the opportunity to 

test this hypothesis. 

Ministers of Defense under Putin

Another way of tracking Putin’s evolving view toward the military is by examining the 

four individuals who have served as minister of defense since he has been president. His 

first minister of defense was General Igor Sergeyev, who was a holdover from the Yeltsin 

administration. Sergeyev had been chief of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces, and his 

appointment may have reflected the Kremlin’s reliance upon nuclear forces during the 

chaotic late 1990s as its primary means of defense. Sergeyev lasted only one year under 

Putin and was replaced in March 2001 by Sergey Ivanov, Putin’s close KGB associate. 

Ivanov’s appointment was interpreted by many as the Kremlin’s attempt to truly 

subordinate the military to civilian control. It might also be construed as instilling a 

KGB-type mind-frame into the military, where not only the political commissar keeps 

control over the military, but also elite forces or the use of espionage takes precedence 

over conventional operations. During the Soviet period the military had assumed a 

disproportionate role within the government, economy, and society, and by appointing a 

nonmilitary officer to the top position, Putin made clear who would direct the military. 

Ivanov remained minister of defense for almost six years, helping to reduce the size of 

the bloated military structure and helping to construct the institutional groundwork for 

future reforms. 

Ivanov’s replacement in February 2007 was a surprise to most within the military. 

Anatoliy Serdyukov, who had served as the Kremlin’s chief tax inspector, had minimal 

military or security experience, and was perhaps best known for his aggressive 

investigation during the trial of Russia’s most famous imprisoned oligarch, Mikhail

Khodorkovsky. Some Russian commentators suggested that this appointment signaled 

that the Kremlin was serious about cracking down on one of Russia’s most pernicious 

problems within the military—corruption. 
9

It was under Serdyukov that Russia began one of the most substantial military reforms 

over the past century. After the brief conflict with Georgia in August 2008, the Kremlin 

leadership had concluded that Russian interests could only be protected with robust and 

combat-ready military forces. Mobilization units were eliminated and the overall number 

of officers was slashed. Many senior military personnel spoke out against these radical 

reforms, claiming that the “new look” military merely mimicked reforms in the US and 

would weaken Russia’s overall defense posture. A few aspects of the reform plan were 

later modified, but the major structural changes were implemented. The Kremlin political 

leadership was able to deflect criticism of the reforms and direct it toward the 

increasingly unpopular Serdyukov. 

Prior to Putin’s return as president in May 2012 (though, in reality, he had never left), he 

had announced a massive plan to modernize the country’s Armed Forces. More than 20 

trillion rubles would be allocated to improve the country’s defense industrial 

infrastructure and to rearm the military. The Kremlin had been under increasing pressure 

to replace the unpopular Serdyukov, and when details of the rearmament plans (and 

possible control over these revenue flows) were released, media attacks alleging highlevel corruption and malfeasance among Serdyukov and his associates increased 

dramatically. He was relieved in November 2012 for corruption-related charges and 

replaced by Sergey Shoygu, Putin’s close associate. 

Shoygu’s appointment as defense minister might indicate the Kremlin’s continued high 

priority for military modernization. He had built a reputation as an extremely effective 

manager, having served as Emergency Affairs Minister for nearly 20 years, where he 

developed a responsive C2 system. Among other initiatives as defense minister, Shoygu 

has focused thus far on creating responsive military units and a strong C2 system. 

Current State of Russian Military

A military often reflects the strengths and the weaknesses of the country it purports to 

defend. While the country still faces serious problems, over the past 15 years Russia has 

made many material and social improvements, and these advances are replicated within 

its Armed Forces and other security agencies. First and foremost, the soldier as defender 

of the Russian state has been returned to his revered pedestal. The Kremlin has been able 

to largely transform the sorry, discredited image of the Russian soldier, which had 

developed after the collapse of the USSR, into the proud and professional “polite green 

man.” 

Infrastructure and Equipment

Overall living conditions for military personnel have improved since the latest round of 

reforms began in 2008. Officer and contractor pay is largely competitive with other 

government agencies. Living conditions for one-year draftees (e.g., barracks, food, 

uniforms, etc.) have become much better. The waiting list for adequate housing for 

military officers has finally shrunk to manageable levels. Discipline within the ranks has 
10

improved and there are far fewer reported cases of hazing.17 The military continues to 

develop a nascent non-commissioned officer (NCO) corps to provide training expertise, 

discipline, and continuity within the contract and draftee ranks. 

There have been similar improvements in the realm of military equipment and training 

facilities. Significant funding has been allocated toward modernizing everything from the 

soldier’s basic kit to advanced weapon systems. Russia is in the midst of developing 

modern combined arms training facilities where military personnel can test the latest 

tactics and equipment in a realistic training environment.18 The confusion after the 2008 

reform of the military’s education system (where nearly75% of the military schools were 

closed or consolidated) has subsided and the reorganization has resulted in greater 

efficiency and less redundancy. 

Manpower

The Kremlin has recently enacted legislation which provides incentives for young 

Russian men to fulfill their military obligation while enrolled in college. Select students 

will gain credit for military service by working on projects related to the country’s 

defense industry.19 Legislation has also been introduced whereby future government 

service and the right to travel abroad are contingent upon completing some form of 

military service.20 Theoretically, this legislation should reduce draft evasion. 

Even with these improvements, however, defense officials still struggle to attract a 

sufficient number of soldiers as one-year draftees or to enter contract service. 

Demographic challenges combined with a general reluctance to join the armed forces 

have stymied plans to staff the military with around one million personnel (220,000 

officers, 425,000 contract personnel and 350,000 draftees). The draft contingent today 

would have been conceived during the economic-stressed period of the late 1990s. Not 

only is the potential draft pool considerably smaller, but, according to some reports, a 

significant percentage is also simply unfit for military duty due to health problems and 

criminal records.21

There are also questions as to the combat readiness and technical expertise of a draftee 

manning system. One year is hardly long enough to become fully proficient in even the 

most basic soldier skills, and the constant turnover of personnel weakens combat 

readiness. Earlier, defense officials claimed that conscript soldiers would not be 

deployed, but there is evidence that draftees fought in both Georgia and Ukraine.22 Some 

have suggested that the one-year draft is primarily designed to raise patriotic awareness 

and create a large mobilization reserve in the event of major hostilities.23 Defense 

officials also envision those who have completed their one-year draftee service as the 

primary pool for contract soldiers. 

Similarly, there have been considerable problems attracting sufficient qualified contract 

soldiers within the Russian military.24 From its inception in the 1990s, the program has 

been poorly managed and funded. Up until quite recently, many contract soldiers were 

the wives of officers. As the administrative promises sometimes did not correspond with 
11

reality, those who signed contracts often left the military when contract provisions were 

unmet.25 To date, the infrastructure to support contract personnel (e.g., family housing) 

remains insufficient. Questions also remain regarding long-term career progression for 

contract soldiers and retirement benefits.26

According to Kremlin reports, as the prestige, living conditions and salary for military 

officers have improved over the past few years, so has recruitment and retention. The 

reality appears to be less sanguine. While there has been an increase in applications to 

attend military officer schooling, many of those who graduate prefer to serve in the 

reserves. The officer promotion and assignment system remains arbitrary, where the 

immediate commander holds inordinate sway over the officers serving in his command. 

Military Organization

One of the key reforms enacted after the 2008 conflict with Georgia dealt with 

transforming the old Soviet mobilization model of manning to creating some 85 combatready brigades. To simplify command and control, three intermediate levels of command 

were mostly eliminated (divisional, corps and army levels). Part of the justification 

behind this change was the conviction that the demands of modern war would not allow 

for a slow, deliberate period of mobilization. The enemy could strike quickly and hard, 

and unless Russian forces were prepared to fight on a moment’s notice, the war might be 

over by the time mobilization was completed.27 While exact statistics are classified, given 

the current manpower challenges, likely only a certain percentage of these brigades are 

truly combat-ready.

28

Prior to this reform to create combat-ready brigades, Russian military leaders had relied 

upon their airborne forces as their rapid reaction force. For instance, airborne forces 

played a key role during the conflict with Georgia in 2008, helping to seize key territory. 

As problems have developed with manning and training sufficient draftees to maintain 

these conventional combat-ready brigades, greater emphasis has now been placed upon

airborne or special-forces-type units, which are primarily manned with contract or 

professional soldiers. These forces would likely serve as the nucleus in any future 

combat. 

At the other end of the defense spectrum, there have been continued developments and 

improvements within Russia’s strategic nuclear forces.29 Russia’s nuclear weapon arsenal 

remains a chief hallmark of its superpower status. Faced with the perceived conventional 

superiority of US/NATO forces, Russian defense officials have suggested the possible 

use of nuclear weapons to thwart an attack. Even more disconcerting than Russia’s plans 

to modernize its nuclear arsenal have been the not-so-casual suggestions over the past 

year that the Kremlin might launch nuclear weapons to protect its interests.30

Another key reform from 2008 helped to streamline the command and control of the 

Russian Armed Forces. The previous six military districts were consolidated into four 

joint-like commands, oriented toward a specific threat.31 In this new model, parochial 

interests of the former branches have theoretically been subordinated to an overall 
12

command structure, which also incorporates elements of other power ministries. Overall 

command and control is now exercised by a massive new national military control center 

in Moscow.32 On paper at least (and on the virtual screens of the new control center in 

Moscow), there is much greater unity of effort among the various Russian security forces

(e.g., MVD, FSB, Emergency Ministry, etc.). 

Situation Today

The ongoing conflict in SE Ukraine has had a profound effect upon both Russian security 

agencies and the larger population. The massive information campaign depicting this 

conflict as an attack upon ethnic Russians and defense against Western-sponsored 

Ukrainian-fascist nationalists has elevated patriotic sentiments among a wide portion of 

the population to feverish levels. To date, there has been no shortage of young and 

middle-age Russian men who are willing to volunteer, though not necessarily in the 

Russian military, to defend against this perceived threat. There is some question, 

therefore, as to the degree that these patriotic sentiments translate into actual service in 

the Russian military, either as a draftee or contract soldier. 

The Kremlin’s insistence that regular Russian military forces are not involved in this 

conflict has helped to confound the military’s manpower challenge. A Russian patriot 

(who may also be attracted by the alleged high mercenary pay) would likely see little

advantage in joining the official military when he can fight on his own terms, and 

presumably for a higher salary, under the proxy forces in SE Ukraine. Despite the 

patriotic fervor of the media, parents of young Russian men, who clearly remember the 

horrors and deception of the Kremlin in the Chechen Wars, are likely taking additional 

measures to ensure that their sons avoid military service. Already Russian military 

officials have resorted to secrecy and intimidation to silence the grieving families who 

have lost soldiers in this conflict.33 

In gauging the strength of Russia’s military today, one other point bears mention. Just as 

in other areas of society, the Kremlin-supported media have played a prominent role in 

transforming the sorry image of the Russian military of the 1990s into the professional, 

proud and presumably combat-ready force of today. Virtually, the Russian military has 

become a force to be reckoned with. There remain questions, however, to what degree 

this image corresponds to reality. In this regard, one might recall the comment made by 

Putin in 2002 (who was quoting Churchill): “Russia was never so strong as it wants to be 

and never so weak as it is thought to be.”

34

Putin’s Future Military Plans

Given the nature of the current Russian political system and the inherent fickleness of 

human nature, making any firm prediction regarding Putin’s future military plans is 

nearly impossible. Keeping hold on presidential power remains Putin’s primary objective. 

The current Russian constitution will allow Putin to remain president until 2024, when he 

will then be 72 years old. Even without the threat of foreign invasion, provided fossil fuel 
13

revenues remain healthy (allowing for moderate economic growth), the Kremlin will 

likely be able to continue persuading the Russian people that their form of managed 

democracy is preferable to a more genuine version. This economic stability will also 

provide for some degree of continued military modernization, which could translate into 

a more assertive foreign policy. 

Conversely, should fossil fuel revenues fall sharply and prolonged Western sanctions 

deepen, the Russian economy would likely fall into a serious recession. There are serious 

doubts, however, whether a profound economic downturn would weaken the Kremlin 

leadership and/or ameliorate Russian foreign policy approaches, particularly in the near 

abroad. Theoretically, a weakened Russian economy would hamper plans to modernize 

the military, which, in turn, might make the Kremlin more risk averse. The Kremlin 

leadership, however, has proven itself adept at both import substitution and convincing its 

population of the priority of bullets over beans. 

To date, there are similar doubts as to the effectiveness of Western-imposed economic 

sanctions upon altering the Kremlin’s aggressive position toward Ukraine. While Russian 

economic growth has declined over the past year, the Kremlin leadership has blamed this 

decline on a nefarious Western plan to weaken Russia. Anti-American and anti-Ukrainian 

sentiments have reached dangerous levels. Despite the current economic hardship, Putin 

enjoys extremely high approval ratings, and this support could be channeled into further 

aggression against Ukraine or other regions where the Kremlin perceives it has legitimate 

security interests.

Realpolitik considerations will also help to shape Putin’s future military plans. He 

apparently sincerely believes that a multi-polar system of global governance is superior to 

a uni-polar model. Many within the Kremlin leadership maintain that US global 

supremacy stems largely from its military prowess. To serve as a counter-pole to the US, 

Russia must develop an equally robust and combat-ready military. 

The continued conflict in SE Ukraine also serves to support and justify the Kremlin’s 

anti-Western narrative and continued military modernization. In its rendition, the 

US/West stage-managed the forceful change of government in Kiev in order to gain a 

staging ground from which it can attack and weaken Russia. From the Kremlin’s 

perspective, the conflict in SE Ukraine has less to do with the fate of “Novorossiya” 

(historical name given to areas under separatist control in Donetsk and Lugansk regions) 

than with the very survival of the Russian state. If the Kremlin were to back down, this 

perceived weakness would be exploited by nationalists or those interested in genuine 

political reform. Despite the growth of an equally virulent Ukrainian nationalism which 

depicts Russia as the greatest threat, Putin continues to refer to Ukraine as an integral part 

of the Russian world.35 To retreat or return to the status quo could fatally damage the 

very legitimacy of Putin’s regime. 

The logic of the Kremlin’s current predicament points toward continued attempts to 

reconstruct this Russian world. Soft power will likely remain the preferred strategy 

behind this expansion, but the overt or covert use of military or harder forms of power 
14

cannot be ruled out. As such, the plans to reform and modernize Russia’s Armed Forces 

will remain a high Kremlin priority. Foreign economic pressures could delay these 

efforts, but Russia retains a relatively strong military-industrial base, where research and 

development of new weapon systems has increased over the past decade. Moreover, even 

if they are unable to develop their own modern military technology, Russian security 

managers have proven skillful at procuring key components via other means. 

The conflict with Ukraine has revealed a number of other important aspects as to how the 

Kremlin might employ force in the future. For years Russian military theorists have been 

arguing that there are a number of preliminary coercion measures that should be 

employed before using military power. These entail everything from information

operations to diplomatic and economic pressure, from the employment of local proxy 

forces to co-opting cultural, religious and business leaders. Espionage, targeted 

assassinations and other indirect methods of suasion are used against the target country

before the possible introduction of “polite green men.”

36

Conclusion

In the Kremlin’s narrative, Vladimir Putin has strengthened the Russian state over the 

past 15 years. After the chaos and humiliation of the 1990s, he has worked to lift Russia 

off its knees to stand strong as a global power. The country’s economy and the material 

well-being of a majority of Russians have improved dramatically. There have been 

similar improvements within Russia’s Armed Forces. The image of the demoralized, 

poorly equipped and defeated soldier of the mid-1990s has been replaced by the patriotic, 

professional and combat-ready “polite green man” of today. 

These improvements have, however, come at a cost. In constructing and consolidating 

this strong Russian state, the Kremlin leadership has restricted a number of civic 

freedoms. Russia today lacks genuine political opposition, media freedom or truly 

independent courts. Most major business interests are closely tied to the Kremlin. The 

seedlings of civil society which developed during the 1990s have been largely 

suppressed. Russia’s foreign policy has also changed direction since Putin’s arrival at the 

Kremlin. The pro-Western orientation of the 1990s has been replaced with a Eurasian 

vector where a military powerful, conservative Russia has become the counterweight to 

the liberal West. 

A critical component of the Kremlin’s consolidation of power has been the development 

and propagation of a dangerous nationalist ideology, which posits that the West/US is 

determined to weaken Russia. Playing upon the resentment and humiliation of the 1990s, 

the Kremlin-supported media juggernaut has convinced the majority of Russians that the 

West/US/NATO present a dire threat. To protect Russia from this danger, the country 

needs a modern and combat-ready military. 

The effects of this perilous ideology have been on display in Ukraine over the past year, 

where Russia’s closest neighbor has been transformed into a dangerous enemy. Today, a 
15

significant percentage of the Russian population believes that they have an obligation to 

defend their ethnic brethren in Eastern Ukraine from the predations of the pro-Western 

government in Kiev. 

The Kremlin leadership has thus constructed a governance model and ideology largely 

predicated upon defending ethnic Russians, regardless of national borders. The extent to 

which this ideology is realized could depend, to a significant degree, on the continued 

modernization of its Armed Forces. 

 

1

http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32066222

2

There is much debate as to the authorship of Putin’s dissertation. It is clear that whoever wrote it 

borrowed material (without citation) from other sources. http://nationalinterest.org/article/vladimir-putinon-russian-energy-policy-600

3 C.W. Blandy, “Dagestan: The Storm, Part 2,” Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 2000, pp. 46-8. 

4 Much has been written over the past few years on this topic. The Kremlin control over the country’s 

national media has profound security implications. See for example: 

http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-123-2-5.pdf For a more recent example see: 

http://time.com/rt-putin/

5 As in the earlier Iraqi war (1990-91), some Russian military leaders predicted that US-led forces would 

suffer significant casualties after engaging the Iraqi forces. As in 1991, they were duly impressed with the 

initial advances of the 2003 conflict, particularly with western high-precision weapons. However, Russian 

security officials soon adopted a “told-you-so” attitude once the conflict transformed into an insurgency.

6

Putin’s logic apparently goes something like this: Various Chechen leaders were given asylum in the 

West, from where they could help orchestrate terrorist acts. For a fuller explanation, see: 

http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/pm_0334.pdf

7

For the text of Putin’s full speech, see: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html

8

For a recent example, see: http://www.mk.ru/politics/2015/04/05/studentov-postavyat-podkiberruzhe.html

9

 http://rt.com/news/239409-russia-quits-conventional-europe/

10 The list is long and continues to evolve. For instance, the two major Russian TV stations each host at 

least one program dedicated to military affairs. For a sample, see: 

http://russia.tv/brand/show/brand_id/12506

or http://www.1tv.ru/sprojects/si=30 

11 For a brief review of Russia’s foreign policy under Medvedev, see: 

http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/redcol/Medvedevs-Foreign-Policy-Period-of-Stabilization-15453

12 The scenario for the Zapad 2009 exercise was built around defending Belarus from a possible NATO 

invasion. For additional details, see: 

http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=35558#.VSQqitzF_-4
16

 

13 These allegations began on the fringe of Russian media, yet as the temperatures increased were widely 

circulated and cited by mainstream sources. For background, see: 

http://www.rferl.org/content/Russian_Scholar_Warns_Of_Secret_US_Climate_Change_Weapon/2114381.

html

14 For an example of western commentary on this initiative, see: 

http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/russia-s-proposed-new-european-security-treaty-a-nonstarter-for-the-us-and-europe

15 See for instance: http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/putin-calls-colorrevolutions-an-instrument-of-des-118993.html

16 http://www.cbsnews.com/news/putin-russian-military-to-get-770b-upgrade/ A key Kremlin constituency 

during Putin’s 2012 presidential campaign were the millions of Russians involved with the country’s 

military-industrial complex. 

17 The lower numbers may reflect an improvement in discipline; they might also reflect tighter media 

control within the media. 

18 For additional background, see: https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/tag/mulino/

19 http://www.mk.ru/editions/daily/2015/03/31/stranu-zashhitit-inzhenernyy-specnaz.html

20 Russian officials are attempting to make mandatory military service a requirement for all young Russian 

men. See: http://www.newsweek.com/russia-require-officials-undertake-military-service-316950 

However, there will likely be mechanisms which will still allow the well-connected to avoid military 

service. 

21 http://sputniknews.com/military/20131004/183935173.html

22 There have been a number of unofficial reports which have alleged that Russian draftees have fought 

(and died) in SE Ukraine. See: http://www.ibtimes.com/young-russians-dodge-draft-more-more-avoid-riskfighting-ukraine-1804246

23 http://rt.com/politics/defense-draft-russia-shoigu-529/

24 See entry dated 4 April 2015: https://russiandefpolicy.wordpress.com/category/manpower/

25 There are also concerns that some draftees have recently been forced to sign contracts, allegedly to help 

support combat operations in SE Ukraine. See: https://en.informnapalm.org/involuntarily-military-servicerussia-conscripts-imposed-contract-trip-rostov/

26 For a current analysis of manpower problems within the Russian military, see: 

https://dgap.org/en/article/getFullPDF/26625

27 For a detailed examination of these reforms, background and preliminary results, see: 

http://vid1.rian.ru/ig/valdai/Military_reform_eng.pdf

28 Officially, Russia has no military units involved in SE Ukraine. However, there is some evidence that 

Russia has deployed battalion-sized units from distant regions to the Ukrainian border. See, for instance: 

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31794523 Those Russian brigades situated close to the Ukrainian 

border are presumably in a higher state of combat-readiness. 

29 http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/experts-see-russian-strides-nuclear-force-updates/
17

 

30 While some of these not-so veiled threats have been made by (Kremlin-sponsored) journalists, even 

President Putin has indulged in nuclear saber-rattling. See: http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-putincrimea-documentary/26901915.html

31 They have since added a 5th joint strategic command directed at protecting their Arctic interests. See: 

http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/OEWatch/201410/Russia_03.html

32 There has been considerable conjecture as to which power ministries will be coordinated from this new 

C2 center. As in other countries, bureaucratic coordination among similar agencies can prove difficult. For 

a brief snapshot of the new center, see: http://rt.com/news/210307-russia-national-defence-center/

33 While the Russian Ministry of Defense continues to deny official involvement, there is considerable 

evidence that Russian soldiers have fought and died while fighting in Ukraine. See: 

http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/19/russia-official-silence-for-families-troops-killed-in-ukraine

or https://news.vice.com/article/it-is-a-government-crime-the-coffins-of-russias-ghost-soldiers-in-ukraineare-coming-home

34 http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2006/07/10/Policy-Watch-Is-Russia-strong-orweak/39541152565695/

35 On various occasions, Putin has suggested that Ukraine may not be a truly sovereign nation. See, for 

example: http://www.newsweek.com/putins-ukraine-war-about-founding-new-russian-empire-319832

36 For an explanation on this “new” form of Russian warfare from a Baltic perspective, see: 

http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx

In this ‘power-vertical’ strategy, there is no division between state and private interests; all elements of 

state power are exploited. For those charged with defending the besieged Russian state and advancing its 

interests, this approach results in a mindset of persistent, unending 24/7 conflict. As during the communist 

period, Russia remains in a state of constant war. As the Chief of the Russian General Staff remarked in 

2013, “In the 21st century, a tendency toward the elimination of the differences between the states of war 

and peace is becoming discernible. Wars are now not even declared, but having begun, are not going 

according to a pattern we are accustomed to.” General Gerasimov, Chief of the Russian General Staff, 

February 26, 2013. https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the-gerasimov-doctrine-andrussian-non-linear-war/