Illinois Official Reports 

Appellate Court

In re Marriage of Lasota, 2014 IL App (1st) 132009

Appellate Court 

Caption

In re MARRIAGE OF ELZBIETA LASOTA, Petitioner-Appellee, 

and JANUSZ LUTEREK, Respondent-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Third Division

Docket No. 1-13-2009

Filed August 13, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

In marriage dissolution proceedings arising from circumstances 

showing that the parties were married in Poland, moved to Illinois, 

purchased real estate and were living in Illinois when respondent 

returned to Poland and obtained a judgment ending the marriage, and 

petitioner then filed a dissolution action in Illinois, the trial court did 

not err in finding that the Polish court did not have jurisdiction over 

petitioner, and that the Illinois court did have jurisdiction to dispose of 

the parties’ marital property pursuant to section 503(d) of the Illinois 

Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act and award temporary 

maintenance and interim attorney fees; furthermore, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying respondent’s motion to reconsider 

and properly held him in contempt for failing to comply with the trial 

court’s order.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-D-940; the 

Hon. Debra B. Walker, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Paul J. Bargiel, P.C., and Donald M. Goldman, both of Chicago, for 

appellant.

Greg Gancarczyk, of Gan Law Group, of Chicago, for appellee.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE HYMAN delivered the judgment of the court, 

with opinion.

Justices Neville and Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.

 OPINION 

¶ 1 While Janusz Luterek ended his nine-year marriage to Elzbieta Lasota by obtaining a 

judgment in Poland where the couple married, that was far from the conclusion of their 

dissolution proceedings, which took place in Illinois, where they had resettled before their 

marriage broke down. After the Polish court judgment was registered in Cook County, Elzbieta 

sought her share of the martial property and an award of temporary maintenance and attorney 

fees, all issues unaddressed by the Polish court. Janusz argued, however, that the court in 

Poland and not the circuit court in Cook County had jurisdiction to deal with the marriage, and, 

in any event, res judicata barred Elzbieta’s petition. The circuit court rejected Janusz’s 

contentions and held that under the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Act) 

(750 ILCS 5/101 et seq. (West 2012)), jurisdiction existed here because Janusz had not served 

Elzbieta with process and Elzbieta had not made a general appearance before the court in 

Poland. The circuit court then ordered Janusz to pay Elzbieta temporary maintenance and 

interim attorney fees and held him in civil contempt when he failed to comply. 

¶ 2 Janusz seeks reversal of the order of civil contempt as void due to the circuit court’s 

erroneous determination that Elzbieta had not appeared before the Polish court. The record, 

however, supports a finding that in addition to never having been served process, Elzbieta at no 

time submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the Polish court for purposes of the divorce. 

Therefore, we affirm. 

¶ 3 BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 Elzbieta Lasota married Janusz Luterek on July 8, 2000, in Lublin, Poland. During their 

marriage, the parties, who did not have children, bought a home and moved to Inverness, 

Illinois. On August 27, 2007, Janusz filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in Cook 

County. Janusz voluntarily dismissed the petition in September 2007, and in April 2008, filed a 

petition for dissolution of marriage in Lublin, Poland. On May 2, 2008, Elzbieta filed a petition 

for dissolution of marriage in Cook County. On March 24, 2009, the Cook County circuit court 

dismissed Elzbieta’s marital dissolution petition on the basis that Janusz’s petition was still 

pending in Poland. 
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¶ 5 On September 8, 2009, the court in Lublin entered a judgment for dissolution of the parties’ 

marriage. The judgment did not address the division of the parties’ real estate and other assets 

or the issues of maintenance, debts, or other financial issues. On January 31, 2011, Elzbieta 

filed a petition to register the Polish judgment in Cook County. Janusz filed a motion to 

dismiss alleging, in part, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to hear Elzbieta’s petition. On 

March 10, 2011, after a hearing, the circuit court denied Janusz’s motion to dismiss Elzbieta’s 

petition and the Polish judgment for dissolution of marriage was registered in the Cook County 

circuit court. Elzbieta claimed the marital assets included $380,000 she transferred from a bank 

account in Poland to bank accounts in Illinois controlled by Janusz, as well as the marital home 

and real estate Janusz purchased with money from their joint bank accounts. 

¶ 6 On April 1, 2011, Elzbieta filed a petition in the circuit court requesting disposition of the 

parties’ marital property under section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012)). 

Section 503(d) permits the circuit court to dispose of marital property “following dissolution of 

marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked 

jurisdiction to dispose of the property.” Id. Thus, the circuit court’s authority to dispose of the 

parties’ marital property depended on its finding that the Polish court lacked jurisdiction over 

Elzbieta. 

¶ 7 On May 16, 2011, Janusz filed a motion to dismiss Elzbieta’s petition for disposition of 

marital property. Janusz alleged in count I that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction under 

section 2-619(a)(1) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(1) 

(West 2012)), because the parties were divorced in Poland not Illinois, and the order 

registering the Polish judgment did not confer jurisdiction under section 503(d) of the Act (750 

ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012)) on the circuit court to dispose of marital property. In count II, 

Janusz sought to bar Elzbieta’s petition by “other affirmative matter” under section 

2-619(a)(9) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2012)), including a postnuptial 

agreement the parties executed that delineates the parties’ interests in the marital assets under 

Polish law and Elzbieta’s participation in the Polish divorce proceeding. In count III, Janusz 

sought to bar Elzbieta’s petition under section 2-619(a)(3) of the Code (735 ILCS 

5/2-619(a)(3) (West 2012)), because on December 10, 2008, she filed in the Polish court a 

“petition to obtain payment,” which is still pending and involves the same funds she now 

claims in the petition she filed in Cook County. 

¶ 8 On September 16, 2011, the circuit court, after hearing arguments, dismissed counts II 

and III but found the evidence insufficient to rule on count I, alleging lack of jurisdiction. The 

court noted that under section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012)), the court 

had subject matter jurisdiction to dispose of marital property if the Polish court lacked either 

personal jurisdiction over Elzbieta or jurisdiction to dispose of the property. The court gave the 

parties 60 days to submit additional and relevant documents relating to the Polish dissolution 

of marriage proceedings and memorandums regarding the Polish court’s personal jurisdiction 

over Elzbieta. 

¶ 9 On March 16, 2012, having considered the supplemental evidence, the circuit court issued 

a well-reasoned memorandum and order denying the remaining count I of Janusz’s motion to 

dismiss. The circuit court determined under the doctrine of comity to follow the laws of Illinois 

because they provided greater due process safeguards than the laws of Poland. The circuit 

court concluded that the Polish court did not have personal jurisdiction over Elzbieta because 

she had not been properly served with Janusz’s petition for dissolution of marriage under 
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section 2-203(a) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-203(a) (West 2012)) and no evidence in the record 

indicated that Elzbieta filed an appearance or the equivalent of an appearance in the Polish 

dissolution of marriage proceeding. The court also found that none of the documents submitted 

by Janusz, including answers to interrogatories and transcripts from proceedings in which 

Elzbieta and her Polish attorney did not appear or in which Elzbieta’s Polish attorney sought to 

suspend the proceeding, showed that Elzbieta submitted to the jurisdiction of the Polish court 

or waived her objection to personal jurisdiction under section 2-301(a-5) of the Code (735 

ILCS 5/2-301(a-5) (West 2012)). Thus, the court found it had subject matter jurisdiction under 

section 503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012)) to rule on her petition. 

¶ 10 On April 4, 2012, Janusz moved for reconsideration. He attached to his motion a document 

entitled “Respondent’s Motion and Answer to Petition” from the Polish proceeding. 

According to Janusz’s motion, a translation of the petition (a translation Elzbieta disputed) 

showed that Elzbieta, through her Polish attorney, asked for dissolution of marriage due to the 

exclusive fault of Janusz and for attorney fees. Janusz contended that this document 

established that Elzbieta consented to the Polish court’s jurisdiction and deprived the circuit 

court of jurisdiction. 

¶ 11 The circuit court first noted that Janusz failed to cite legal authority for his motion to 

reconsider, which offered grounds for striking it sua sponte. Instead, the court opted to address 

the merits of the motion under section 2-1203(a) of the Code, which permits a party, within 30 

days of the entry of a judgment in a nonjury case, to file a motion for a rehearing or retrial or a 

modification or vacation of the judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1203(a) (West 2012). The court 

determined that it could not consider the petition attached to the motion, purported to be 

Elzbieta’s consent to the dissolution of her marriage in Poland, because Janusz failed to 

exercise due diligence in obtaining the document and providing it to the court before the March 

16, 2012, ruling. The circuit court stated further that even if Janusz had exercised due diligence 

in producing Elzbieta’s response, it would not have changed the court’s ruling–“[t]he 

document as translated by Janusz (which Elzbieta argues is an inaccurate translation) contains 

multiple statements which indicate Elzbieta objected to the Polish court’s jurisdiction over the 

dissolution of marriage proceedings.” Thus, the circuit court denied the motion to reconsider.

¶ 12 On October 23, 2011, Elzbieta filed a petition seeking temporary maintenance under 

section 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2012)), and interim and prospective 

attorney fees under sections 501(c-1) and 508(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/501(c-1), 508(a) 

(West 2012)). On August 10, 2012, Janusz moved to dismiss Elzbieta’s petition, again arguing 

that the Polish judgment was final in all respects and that under the principle of res judicata, 

the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to grant the temporary relief requested. 

¶ 13 On September 14, 2012, the circuit court amended its order to include its jurisdiction to 

award both temporary maintenance and interim attorney fees. The court noted that section 504 

permits the circuit court to award temporary or permanent maintenance “following dissolution 

of the marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction.” 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 

2012). Based on its earlier finding that the Polish court lacked jurisdiction over Elzbieta, the 

circuit court held it likewise had jurisdiction to award temporary maintenance. The same 

reasoning applied to awarding interim attorney fees under section 508(a), which permits an 

award for the maintenance or defense of any proceeding under the Act. 750 ILCS 5/508(a) 

(West 2012). 
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¶ 14 On April 26, 2013, after an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court ordered Janusz to pay 

Elzbieta $30,000 in attorney fees and monthly maintenance in the amount of $1,500 plus 

$1,000 per month toward the $27,000 retroactive judgment entered in Elzbieta’s favor, 

commencing on May 1, 2013. On May 29, 2013, after Janusz failed to pay Elzbieta the 

monthly and retroactive maintenance on May 1, the circuit court held Janusz in civil contempt. 

¶ 15 On June 5, 2013, Janusz filed a notice of appeal from the circuit court’s March 16, 2012, 

order denying his motion to dismiss Elzbieta’s petition for disposition of property, the July 13, 

2012, order denying Janusz’s motion to reconsider, the September 14, 2012, order finding it 

had jurisdiction to award temporary maintenance and interim attorney fees, and the May 29, 

2013, order holding him in civil contempt. On June 24, the circuit court approved a $30,000 

appeal bond and directed the money be held by the Cook County circuit court clerk until the 

end of the appeal. The court also awarded Elzbieta $17,500 in appellate attorney fees but 

stayed the payment pending the mandate of the appellate court. 

¶ 16 ANALYSIS 

¶ 17 Personal Jurisdiction 

¶ 18 The circuit court’s authority to dispose of the parties’ marital property, to order Janusz to 

pay maintenance and attorney fees, and to hold him in contempt for disobeying its order is 

governed by sections 503(d) and 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d), 504(a) (West 2012)) 

and turns, here, on the circuit court’s finding the Polish court without jurisdiction over Elzbieta 

when it entered its judgment dissolving the parties’ marriage. Section 503(d) provides: 

“[I]n a proceeding for disposition of property following dissolution of marriage by a 

court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse or lacked jurisdiction 

to dispose of the property, the court shall assign each spouse’s non-marital property to 

that spouse. It also shall divide the marital property without regard to marital 

misconduct in just proportions considering all relevant factors ***.” (Emphasis added.) 

750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012). 

¶ 19 Section 504(a) similarly states: 

“In a proceeding *** for maintenance following dissolution of the marriage by a court 

which lacked personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, the court may grant a 

temporary or permanent maintenance award for either spouse in amounts and for 

periods of time as the court deems just ***.” 750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2012).

¶ 20 According to Janusz, the circuit court erred in finding it had personal jurisdiction under 

sections 503(d) and 504(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d), 504(a) (West 2012)) to grant the 

relief requested by Elzbieta. Although Janusz concedes that Elzbieta was not properly served 

under section 2-203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-203 (West 2012)), he maintains she generally 

appeared and participated in the Polish proceeding to such an extent that she submitted herself 

to the Polish court’s jurisdiction. Janusz points to powers of attorney Elzbieta gave two Polish 

lawyers to represent her, the pleadings those lawyers filed on her behalf, and a transcript from 

a September 8, 2009 hearing in Poland in which Elzbieta allegedly consented to an uncontested 

dissolution of marriage and agreed that each party should pay his or her own attorney fees. 

Janusz contends Elzbieta’s participation in the Polish proceeding through her attorneys 

constitutes a submission to jurisdiction and forfeiture of her right to later contest personal 

jurisdiction. He cites several Illinois decisions indicating that a party waives objection to 
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personal jurisdiction by participating in a proceeding and, thereby, acknowledging the case. 

See, e.g., In re Marriage of Gorman, 284 Ill. App. 3d 171, 178 (1996) (finding that circuit 

court had personal jurisdiction in dissolution action over wife who was not served with a 

summons but who recognized and participated in the case by signing and returning the forms 

necessary to the dissolution of marriage proceedings, including the judgment and settlement 

agreement). He asks for reversal of the denial of his motion to dismiss Elzbieta’s petition, the 

order granting her temporary maintenance and attorney fees, and the order holding him in 

contempt. 

¶ 21 When the trial court bases its decision regarding personal jurisdiction over a party solely on 

documentary evidence, we review a trial court’s dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction 

de novo. McNally v. Morrison, 408 Ill. App. 3d 248, 254 (2011). But when the trial court 

conducts an evidentiary hearing and hears testimony on jurisdictional issues, as here, a 

manifest weight of the evidence standard has historically been applied. Madison Miracle 

Productions, LLC v. MGM Distribution Co., 2012 IL App (1st) 112334, ¶ 33. Under this 

standard, this court should reverse a trial court’s determination “only when the opposite 

conclusion is clearly evident or where the factual findings upon which it is based are 

unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence.” 1350 Lake Shore Associates v. Randall, 

401 Ill. App. 3d 96, 102 (2010). 

¶ 22 We disagree that Elzbieta submitted to the jurisdiction of the Polish court. That Elzbieta, 

who resided in Illinois, hired Polish attorneys and signed powers of attorney allowing an 

appearance on her behalf does not alone establish her participation in the Polish proceeding or 

her consent to the Polish court’s jurisdiction. A party can hire an attorney to appear solely to 

object to a court’s jurisdiction. See 735 ILCS 5/2-301(a) (West 2012) (“Prior to the filing of 

any other pleading or motion other than a motion for an extension of time to answer or 

otherwise appear, a party may object to the court’s jurisdiction over the party’s person, either 

on the ground that the party is not amenable to process of a court of this State or on the ground 

of insufficiency of process or insufficiency of service of process, by filing a motion to dismiss 

the entire proceeding or any cause of action involved in the proceeding or by filing a motion to 

quash service of process.”).

¶ 23 Further, the documents considered by the circuit court were either discovery documents 

which, under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 201(l) (eff. July 1, 2014), do not constitute waiver of 

that party’s objection to the court’s jurisdiction or transcripts and documents that do not show 

Elzbieta submitted to Polish jurisdiction. For instance, Janusz submitted an order from the 

Polish court that denied Elzbieta’s motion to suspend proceedings and found it had jurisdiction 

and an order that denied her request to reconsider its prior finding that it had jurisdiction to 

hear the dissolution proceeding. As the circuit court observed, these orders demonstrate that 

the jurisdiction of the Polish court was a matter of dispute between the parties. Thus, we agree 

with the circuit court that the materials from the Polish proceeding show that Elzbieta objected 

to the Polish court’s jurisdiction and did not acquiesce or otherwise submit herself to its 

jurisdiction. 

¶ 24 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err in finding the Polish court lacked jurisdiction over 

Elzbieta in the dissolution proceeding. Moreover, its finding of jurisdiction under section 

503(d) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503(d) (West 2012)) to hear Elzbieta’s petition to dispose of the 

marital property and award temporary maintenance and interim attorney fees under sections 

504(a) and 501(c-1) and 508(a) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/504(a), 501(c-1), 508(a) (West 2012)) 
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was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 

¶ 25 Denial of Motion to Reconsider 

¶ 26 Janusz next contends the circuit court erred in treating his motion to reconsider the court’s 

March 16, 2012, order as a section 2-1203 motion and in refusing to consider Elzbieta’s 

response to his petition for dissolution of marriage on the ground that he failed to exercise due 

diligence in producing the document. As noted, the circuit court found that Janusz had failed to 

cite any legal authority for his motion and decided that instead of striking the motion, it would 

consider the motion under section 2-1203 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1203 (West 2012)). 

¶ 27 Janusz asserts the March 16, 2012, order denying his motion to dismiss was an 

interlocutory order and not a judgment and thus the circuit court erred in relying on section 

2-1203 in denying his motion to reconsider. See Mund v. Brown, 393 Ill. App. 3d 994, 996 

(2009) (denial of motion to dismiss is not final and appealable order under Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 307 (eff. Feb. 26, 2010) but mere interlocutory order). 

¶ 28 A motion to reconsider brings to the trial court’s attention newly discovered evidence not 

available at the time of the first hearing, changes in the law, or errors in the previous 

application of existing law to the facts. River Village I, LLC v. Central Insurance Cos., 396 Ill. 

App. 3d 480, 492 (2009). A trial court is well within its discretion to deny the motion and 

ignore its contents when the motion contains material that was available before the hearing but 

never presented. Weidner v. Midcon Corp., 328 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1061-62 (2002). Litigants 

should not be allowed “to stand mute, lose a motion, and then frantically gather evidentiary 

material to show that the court erred in its ruling.” Gardner v. Navistar International 

Transportation Corp., 213 Ill. App. 3d 242, 248 (1991). Rather, “the interests of finality and 

efficiency require that the trial courts not consider such late-tendered evidentiary material, no 

matter what the contents thereof may be.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 248-49. Generally, the 

denial of a motion to reconsider is reviewed de novo. River Village I, LLC, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 

492. But where the denial is based on new matters, such as additional facts that were not 

previously presented during the course of proceedings leading to the order being challenged, 

we employ an abuse of discretion standard of review. Id. 

¶ 29 The circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Janusz’s motion to reconsider and 

in the process was justified in opting not to consider the new evidence. As the circuit court 

noted, Elzbieta’s petition for disposition of property was filed on April 1, 2011, and the circuit 

court did not rule on Janusz’s motion to dismiss for almost a year, giving him ample time to 

produce that document. In a September 16, 2011 order, the circuit court specifically asked the 

parties to provide the court with original and translated copies of all documents filed or 

submitted to the Polish court related to the Polish dissolution proceedings. Janusz produced 

numerous documents but did not produce Elzbieta’s response, without providing a reason why 

that document was not produced. Given that Janusz filed the dissolution of marriage petition in 

Poland and participated in the proceeding, the circuit court could reasonably conclude that 

Janusz should have been able to produce a translated copy of Elzbieta’s response along with 

the other documents he provided, particularly given its claimed significance to the issue of 

jurisdiction. Thus, because the document relied on by Janusz in his motion to reconsider was 

available to him at the time the circuit court ruled on his motion to dismiss, the court did not 

abuse its discretion in refusing to consider it. 
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¶ 30 Further, we agree with the circuit court that even if Elzbieta’s response was taken into 

consideration, it would not provide grounds for reversing the denial of Janusz’s motion to 

dismiss. Although Janusz contends the document demonstrates that Elzbieta submitted to the 

jurisdiction of the Polish court, when read in its entirety, the response shows her continued 

objection to the Polish court’s jurisdiction, stating that “a dissolution of marriage granted by a 

court in Poland would be against the law” and that because both parties’ last place of residence 

was in Inverness, Illinois, “the Lublin court is not the proper venue to hear this case.” 

Throughout the duration of the Polish proceeding, Elzbieta, through her attorneys, objected to 

the jurisdiction of the Polish court. She continued to object in this pleading, and the circuit 

court did not err in finding that the document cannot be considered conclusive evidence 

showing she submitted herself to the Polish court’s jurisdiction. Thus, the circuit court did not 

abuse its discretion in denying Janusz’s motion to reconsider.

¶ 31 Contempt Finding 

¶ 32 Janusz contends that based on the lack of jurisdiction of the circuit court, the contempt 

order entered was void and must be reversed. But having had jurisdiction under sections 

504(a), 501(c-1), and 508(a) (750 ILCS 5/504(a), 501(c-1), 508(a) (West 2012)) to award 

temporary maintenance and interim attorney fees, we find it did not err in holding Janusz in 

contempt when he failed to comply with the order. 

¶ 33 CONCLUSION 

¶ 34 The orders of the circuit court are affirmed in all respects. 

¶ 35 Affirmed.