Enclosure 1 

Update on Tier 1 Activities 

This enclosure includes an update on significant activities associated with Tier 1 

recommendations. Background and historical information on U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission (NRC) and licensee activities on these recommendations can be found in 

SECY-15-0059, Enclosure 1, “Update on Tier 1 Activities” (Agencywide Documents Access and 

Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML15069A552). 

Mitigation Strategies Order (EA-12-049) 

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-049, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard 

to Requirements for Mitigation Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis External Events” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML12056A045). The order addressed and expanded on Recommendation 4.2 of 

SECY-11-0093, “Near-Term Report and Recommendations for Agency Actions Following the 

Events in Japan,” dated July 12, 2011 (ADAMS Accession No. ML11186A950, the Near-Term 

Task Force (NTTF) report). The order requires a three-phased approach for mitigating 

beyond-design-basis external events. The initial phase requires the use of installed equipment 

and resources to maintain or restore core cooling, containment, and spent fuel pool (SFP) 

cooling capabilities. The transition phase requires providing sufficient portable onsite equipment 

and consumables to maintain or restore these functions until they can be maintained with offsite 

equipment and support. The final phase requires obtaining sufficient offsite resources to sustain 

those functions indefinitely. 

Licensees are required to notify the NRC when they achieve full compliance with the order. 

Once all units at a site are in compliance, the NRC staff will issue a final safety evaluation (SE) 

(within approximately 6 months). The NRC staff will inspect (within approximately 1 year) for 

compliance with the order using Temporary Instruction (TI) 2515/191, “Inspection of the 

Implementation of Mitigation Strategies and Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Orders and 

Emergency Preparedness Communication/Staffing/Multi-Unit Dose Assessment Plans” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML14273A444), dated October 6, 2014. 

Substantial progress towards full implementation of Order EA-12-049 has been made during the 

previous 6 months: 

• The NRC staff completed six audits to review the closeout of open and confirmatory 

items identified in the interim staff evaluations (ISEs). Audits for a total of 55 of 61 sites 

have been completed. The NRC staff expects to complete the remaining audits by 

June 2016. 

• The licensees for 22 of the 61 sites have notified the NRC that they are in compliance 

with Order EA-12-049. The NRC staff expects that most sites will be in compliance no 

later than December 2016, as originally scheduled, with the exceptions noted in the 

discussion below. 

• The NRC staff completed four final SEs for Clinton Power Station, Unit No. 1; Donald C. 

Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2; and Pilgrim 

Nuclear Power Station. A total of 5 of 61 SEs have been completed. 
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• The NRC staff completed a pilot post-compliance inspection per TI 2515/191 at the 

Watts Bar site in April 2015 to verify the licensee is in compliance with Order EA-12-049. 

The NRC staff will be conducting post-compliance inspections per TI 2515/191, starting 

with the North Anna Power Station inspection conducted the week of February 22, 2016. 

• On February 29, 2016, the NRC staff issued Japan Lessons-Learned Division (JLD) 

Interim Staff Guidance (ISG) JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15357A163). This ISG endorses the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) guidance 

document NEI 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible Coping Strategies (FLEX) Implementation 

Guide,” Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16005A625), dated December 2015. The 

revision reflects lessons learned and acceptable alternatives to the original guidance for 

Order EA-12-049. Revision 2 includes Appendices E, G, and H to provide guidance for 

licensees to assess their mitigating strategies against the reevaluated seismic and 

flooding hazards, as discussed in the staff requirements memorandum (SRM) for 

COMSECY-14-0037, “Integration of Mitigating Strategies for Beyond-Design-Basis 

External Events and the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards,” dated March 30, 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15089A236). 

The order established a schedule for all licensees to achieve full compliance within two refueling 

outages after submittal of their integrated plans and no later than December 2016. Licensees 

for eight sites—boiling-water reactors (BWRs) with Mark I and II containment designs—have 

asked for, and been granted, schedule relaxation to align with the schedule requirements of 

Order EA-13-109, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment 

Vents Capable of Operation under Severe Accident Conditions” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML13130A067). For most BWRs with Mark I and II containments, mitigation strategies rely 

on the installation of the containment vents to remove heat from the containment and maintain 

the function of equipment used for the initial phase of the order. Schedule relaxation for these 

nine sites was needed because the final installation of the vents per Order EA-13-109 will not be 

completed before December 2016. Although the full compliance date for these sites will extend 

past December 2016 with this schedule relaxation, all other aspects of Order EA-12-049 will be 

in place before December 2016. 

Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation Order (EA-12-051) 

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-051, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard 

to Reliable Spent Fuel Pool Instrumentation” (ADAMS Accession No. ML12056A044), requiring 

all U.S. nuclear power plants to install reliable water level measurement instrumentation in their 

SFPs. The order addresses and expands on Recommendation 7.1 of the NTTF report. The 

instrumentation must remotely monitor at least three distinct SFP water levels: 

(1) normal level 

(2) low level but still high enough to shield workers above the pools from radiation 

(3) a very low level near the top of the spent fuel rods (indicating that more water should be 

added without delay) 
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Licensees are required to notify the NRC when full compliance is achieved. Once all units at a 

site are in compliance, the NRC staff will issue a final SE (within approximately 6 months) and 

inspect (within approximately 1 year) for compliance with the order using TI 2515/191. 

Substantial progress towards full implementation of Order EA-12-051 has been made during the 

previous 6 months: 

• The NRC staff completed six audits to close open items and requests for additional 

information from the ISEs. Audits for a total of 55 of 61 sites have been completed. The 

NRC staff expects to complete the remaining audits by June 2016. 

• The licensees for 46 of the 61 sites have notified the NRC that they are in compliance 

with Order EA-12-051. The NRC staff expects that licensee compliance with Order 

EA-12-051 will be achieved at all sites before the end of December 2016. 

• The NRC staff has completed four final SEs for Clinton Power Station, Unit 1; Donald C. 

Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2; North Anna Power Station, Units 1 and 2; and Pilgrim 

Nuclear Power Station. A total of 5 of 61 SEs have been completed. 

• The NRC staff completed a pilot post-compliance inspection per TI 2515/191 at the 

Watts Bar site in April 2015 to verify the licensee is in compliance with Order EA-12-051. 

The NRC staff will be conducting post-compliance inspections per TI 2515/191, starting 

with the North Anna Power Station inspection conducted the week of February 22, 2016. 

Flooding and Seismic Hazard Walkdowns 

On March 12, 2012, the NRC staff issued a request for information under Title 10 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations, Section 50.54(f) (hereafter referred to as the 50.54(f) letter) asking 

licensees of U.S. nuclear power plants to walk down their installed flooding-protection, seismicprotection, and hazard-mitigation features and review associated manual actions. This portion 

of the 50.54(f) letter addresses and expands on Recommendation 2.3 of the NTTF report. 

The operating reactor fleet completed the plant walkdowns (except for those portions of the 

seismic walkdowns that were not accessible at power) and submitted their walkdown reports by 

November 2012. The NRC staff completed staff assessments of the walkdown reports by 

July 2014. The NRC staff assessments determined that the plant walkdowns consistently 

followed the intent of the NRC-endorsed guidance, thereby verifying that the walkdowns met the 

objectives of the 50.54(f) letter. Subsequently, all seismic walkdowns on inaccessible items 

were completed. The NRC staff documented the reviews of the inaccessible walkdown items in 

a memo dated September 25, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15268A477). All actions to 

address Recommendation 2.3 are complete, and this recommendation is closed. 

Seismic Hazard Reevaluations 

The NRC’s March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter requested licensees for the U.S. nuclear power 

plants to use current regulations and guidance to reevaluate the seismic hazards that could 

affect their sites. If these newly reevaluated hazards are not bounded by the current design 

basis, the licensee is required to determine whether interim protection measures are needed 
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while a longer-term evaluation of the impacts of these hazards is completed. This portion of 

the 50.54(f) letter addresses and expands on the seismic reevaluations discussed in 

Recommendation 2.1, “Seismic,” of the NTTF report. 

The NRC staff has completed its assessment and closed NTTF Recommendation 2.1, 

“Seismic,” for 16 sites. The reevaluated seismic hazards for these sites was either bounded by 

the site’s current design bases or had a limited high-frequency exceedance. 

The NRC staff and licensees completed the following seismic hazard evaluation activities during 

the previous 6 months: 

• On September 17, 2015, the NRC staff endorsed (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15218A569) the NEI high-frequency application guidance for sites with 

exceedance above facility licensing and design bases in the high-frequency range (i.e., 

above 10 Hertz). 

• On October 27, 2015, the NRC staff issued a letter providing its final determination of 

which licensees need to perform a seismic risk evaluation (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15194A015). Specifically, the letter completes the NRC staff action included in 

the May 9, 2014, letter to further assess the need for a seismic probabilistic risk 

assessment (SPRA) for plants with low-to-moderate hazard exceedances. The letter 

discusses the rationale for the NRC staff decision that an SPRA was not necessary for 

13 sites. The letter also replaced the due dates for SPRAs previously described in 

letters dated May 9, 2014 for Central and Eastern U.S. (CEUS) plants, and 

May 13, 2015, for Western U.S. (WUS) plants, with a staggered submittal schedule. The 

NRC staff anticipates that this schedule will accelerate certain key milestones by 

3 months to 1 year and will better address resource challenges in the area of seismic 

risk assessment for both the NRC staff and industry. 

• Based on the October 27, 2015, letter, there are 20 sites that will perform an SPRA. The 

first SPRAs are due to the NRC in March 2017 and all SPRAs will be received by 

December 2019. There are 11 sites that screened out and will not need any further 

seismic evaluation. Of the remaining sites, 30 will perform limited-scope evaluations 

(i.e., a high-frequency evaluation, low-frequency evaluation, SFP evaluation, or a 

combination thereof). 

• The NRC staff has issued 58 seismic hazard staff assessments. This completes the 

seismic hazard staff assessments for the CEUS sites. 

• All three WUS sites (Columbia Generating Station (Columbia); Diablo Canyon Power 

Plant, Units 1 and 2 (Diablo Canyon); and Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station, 

Units 1, 2, and 3 (Palo Verde)) submitted their seismic hazard reports in March 2015. 

The NRC staff issued requests for additional information for all three sites, and it held 

public meetings with each licensee to support its review. The NRC staff also conducted 

two audits to support its review of the Diablo Canyon’s seismic hazard report. 

• On December 18, 2015, and January 29, 2016, the NRC staff issued letters to Columbia 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15329A225) and to Diablo Canyon (ADAMS Accession 
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No. ML15364A530), respectively, informing them that the reevaluated seismic hazard 

information is suitable for use in the development of an SPRA according to the NRC 

staff’s preliminary review results. Columbia and Diablo Canyon are expected to submit 

their SPRA by March 31, 2019, and September 30, 2017, respectively. As stated in a 

letter dated October 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15194A015), Palo Verde 

screened out from additional seismic evaluations. 

• The NRC staff completed the technical review of all CEUS Expedited Seismic Evaluation 

Process (ESEP) reports and documented its review in response letters to licensees. 

Thirteen licensees have committed to completing limited plant modifications 

(e.g., replacement of relays, strengthening of anchorages for components, or removal of 

structural interference around valves and conduit). The NRC staff expects the 

modifications not requiring an outage to be completed by December 2016. The NRC 

staff expects the modifications requiring shutdown to be completed within two refueling 

outages, no later than December 2018. 

• By December 31, 2015, the NRC staff received the high-frequency confirmation letters 

related to the seismic hazard reevaluation for plants whose ground motion response 

spectra had low exceedances (on the order of 10 percent or less) in the frequency range 

above 10 Hertz. The NRC staff issued a response documenting the review of these 

letters on February 18, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15364A544). Additionally, as 

discussed above, the response letter closed Phase 2 of Recommendation 2.1 for 

identified licensees that have provided sufficient information to complete the response to 

the recommendation. 

• On March 11, 2016, the NRC staff issued a letter (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15350A158) to NEI endorsing Electric Power Research Institute guidance for the 

seismic evaluation of SFPs. Licensees are encouraged to use this guidance to support 

completion of SFP seismic evaluations for plants where the ground motion response 

spectrum (GMRS) peak spectral acceleration is less than or equal to 0.8g. Additionally, 

licensees that use this guidance can demonstrate that SFP spray capability is not 

necessary as described in NEI 12-06, Rev 2. This guidance supports the sites expected 

to submit SFP seismic evaluations by December 2016. 

• On February 29, 2016, the NRC staff issued JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1. This ISG 

endorses the NEI guidance document NEI 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible Coping 

Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,” Revision 2, dated December 2015. The 

revision reflects lessons learned and acceptable alternatives to the original guidance for 

Order EA-12-049. Revision 2 includes Appendices E, G, and H to provide guidance for 

licensees to assess their mitigating strategies against the reevaluated seismic and 

flooding hazards, as discussed in the SRM for COMSECY-14-0037. 

Future work to be completed includes: 

• The NRC staff expects to issue seismic hazard staff assessments for two of the three 

WUS sites by September 2016, and the final staff assessment by December 2016. 
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• The NRC staff plans to support development or comment on licensee submittal 

templates for SPRA, high-frequency evaluations, and SFP evaluations during 

spring 2016. 

• By July 31, 2016, the NRC staff expects to issue a response letter to Energy Northwest 

documenting its review of Columbia’s ESEP report. 

Flooding Hazard Reevaluations 

The NRC’s March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter requested all U.S. power reactor licensees and 

holders of construction permits in active or deferred status to reevaluate the flooding hazards 

that could affect their sites. This portion of the 50.54(f) letter addresses and expands on the 

flooding reevaluations discussed in Recommendation 2.1 of the NTTF report. 

In COMSECY-14-0037, the NRC staff requested Commission direction to more clearly define 

the relationship between Order EA-12-049, the related mitigation of beyond-design-basis events 

(MBDBE) rulemaking, and the flood hazard reevaluations and assessments. In the SRM to 

COMSECY-14-0037, the Commission affirmed that licensees for operating nuclear power plants 

need to address the reevaluated flooding hazards within their mitigating strategies. The 

Commission also directed the NRC staff to provide a plan for achieving closure of the flooding 

portion of NTTF Recommendation 2.1 to the Commission for its review and approval. On 

June 30, 2015, the NRC staff provided a plan to the Commission in COMSECY-15-0019, 

“Closure Plan for the Reevaluation of Flooding Hazards for Operating Nuclear Power Plants” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15153A104). On July 28, 2015, the Commission approved the plan 

in the SRM to COMSECY-15-0019 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15209A682). 

The action plan identifies two primary activities that define the response to flooding issues. 

These are: 

(1) Ensure licensees put into effect mitigating strategies to address reevaluated flooding 

hazards. 

(2) Develop a graded approach to identify the need for, and prioritization and scope of, 

plant-specific integrated assessments and evaluation of plant-specific regulatory actions. 

The NRC staff is implementing the plan for ensuring that the reevaluated flooding hazards are 

addressed within mitigating strategies, as described in COMSECY-15-0019. 

• On February 29, 2016, the NRC staff issued JLD-ISG-2012-01, Revision 1. This ISG 

endorses the NEI guidance document NEI 12-06, “Diverse and Flexible Coping 

Strategies (FLEX) Implementation Guide,” Revision 2, dated December 2015. The 

revision reflects lessons learned and acceptable alternatives to the original guidance for 

Order EA-12-049. Revision 2 includes Appendices E, G, and H to provide guidance for 

licensees to assess their mitigating strategies against the reevaluated seismic and 

flooding hazards, as discussed in the SRM for COMSECY-14-0037. 

• The NRC staff issued 45 of 61 letters to licensees providing feedback on the staff’s 

review of the licensees’ flood hazard reevaluations. The NRC staff anticipates issuing 
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five additional letters by the end of March 2016. Some sites have requested assistance 

from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers for dam failure assessments or are finalizing 

calculations because of licensee analysis changes or site layout changes. The NRC 

staff expects letters will be issued to majority of these licensees by the end of calendar 

year 2016, except for those sites that submit their flood hazard reevaluation report in late 

2016. 

• If necessary, licensees are modifying or upgrading their mitigating strategies to ensure 

they can be implemented under the reevaluated flood hazard conditions. The NRC staff 

expects that most licensees will complete their mitigating strategies assessment by 

December 2016 and pursue related actions. Implementation of the modifications will 

vary depending on the complexity. A large number of sites are expected to be bounded 

by current mitigating strategies design or only require procedural modifications. 

• The NRC staff is documenting the technical bases for its conclusions by continuing to 

issue staff assessments. To date, the staff has completed 14 of 61 staff assessments. 

The plans for closing NTTF Recommendation 2.1 are also described in COMSECY-15-0019. 

The NRC staff is addressing the issues associated with the flooding hazard reevaluations 

(Phase 1) and related decisionmaking (Phase 2) of NTTF Recommendation 2.1 by using a 

graded approach to narrow the list of potential plants subject to an integrated assessment. 

Key elements of the plan include: 

• Revise the guidance for performing the integrated assessments for external flooding by 

June 2016. On March 9, 2016, NEI submitted NEI 16-05, “External Flooding 

Assessment Guidelines,” as draft guidance on the focused evaluation and revised 

integrated assessment for flooding. The NRC staff will complete review of the industry 

guidance document and inform the Commission by May 29, 2016. If appropriate, the 

NRC staff will endorse the industry guidance by means of a new interim staff guidance, 

with any necessary exceptions and clarifications. 

• It is expected that most sites will screen out from the integrated assessments, and 

licensees will instead do focused evaluations to ensure appropriate actions are identified 

and taken to protect the plant from the reevaluated flood hazard, and that these actions 

are reasonable, effective, and implemented in a timely manner. These focused 

evaluations will be submitted by June 2017. 

• A limited number of plants will submit integrated assessments by December 2018. 

• The NRC staff will evaluate the integrated assessments and determine the need for 

further regulatory action. The final plan for the decisionmaking criteria as part of 

Phase 2 will be established following development of guidance and further stakeholder 

interactions. The NRC staff plans to complete the Phase 2 guidance and inform the 

Commission by September 30, 2016. 
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Emergency Preparedness Staffing and Communications 

The NRC’s March 12, 2012, 50.54(f) letter requested licensees to assess their means to power 

communications equipment on site and off site during a prolonged station blackout event and to 

assess and implement enhancements to help ensure that communications can be maintained 

during such an event. Also, licensees were requested to assess the staffing required to fill all 

necessary positions to respond to a multiunit event with impeded access to the site. This 

portion of the 50.54(f) letter addresses and expands on the emergency preparedness staffing 

and communications discussed in Recommendation 9.3 of the NTTF report. 

All licensees submitted their communications assessments, and the NRC staff issued safety 

assessments documenting the staff’s review. 

Licensees are responding to the staffing portion of the 50.54(f) letter in two phases to account 

for the implementation of mitigation strategies. Phase 1 staffing assessments are based on 

existing station blackout coping strategies with an assumption of multiple reactors being 

affected concurrently. All Phase 1 staffing assessments have been submitted, and the NRC 

staff has issued all Phase 1 staffing assessment response letters. 

In Phase 2, licensees will assess the staffing necessary to carry out the mitigating strategies 

developed in response to NTTF Recommendation 4.2. Thus, Phase 2 of the staffing 

assessment will occur in conjunction with the implementation of Order EA-12-049. 

Substantial progress toward completion of the emergency preparedness staffing assessments 

has been made during the previous 6 months: 

• The NRC staff received six additional Phase 2 staffing assessments. Five Phase 2 

staffing assessments remain to be submitted, of the total 61 expected. 

• The NRC staff issued 22 of 61 Phase 2 staffing assessment response letters. These 

letters document the NRC staff’s conclusion that the Phase 2 staffing submittals 

adequately address the strategies needed to respond to a beyond design basis event. 

Nine Phase 2 staffing assessment response letters remain to be issued. 

• The NRC staff completed a pilot inspection per TI 2515/191 at the Watts Bar site in 

April 2015 to verify that communications and staffing plans and multi-unit dose 

assessment capabilities have been implemented. The NRC staff will be conducting 

inspections per TI 2515/191, starting with the North Anna Power Station inspection 

conducted the week of February 22, 2016. 

Future work to be completed includes: 

• The NRC staff expects to receive the remaining five Phase 2 staffing assessments by 

August 31, 2016. 

• The NRC staff will issue response letters within approximately 4 months of receiving the 

assessment. 
- 9 - 

• The staff will use TI 2515/191 to inspect activities completed in this area in conjunction 

with the inspections for Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051. 

Proposed requirements concerning emergency preparedness staffing and communications are 

included in the MBDBE rulemaking activity approved in the SRM to SECY-14-0046, “Staff 

Requirements: Fifth 6-Month Status Update on Response to Lessons Learned from Japan's 

March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML14218A703). 

Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events 

 

The NRC staff continues to make progress on the MBDBE rulemaking. The NRC staff provided 

the proposed rule to the Commission on April 30, 2015, in SECY-15-0065, “Proposed 

Rulemaking: Mitigation of Beyond-Design-Basis Events (RIN 3150-AJ49)” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15049A201). The NRC staff subsequently briefed the Commission on July 9, 2015, and 

the Commission issued its SRM on August 27, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15239A767). 

The proposed rule, including its supporting guidance, was revised to reflect the Commission 

direction. The revised proposed rule was published in the Federal Register (80 FR 70609) for a 

90-day public comment period on November 13, 2015. The proposed rule issued for public 

comment consolidates a significant number of ongoing regulatory actions that the NRC initiated 

as a result of NTTF Recommendations 4, 7, 8 and portions of Recommendations 9, 10, and 11. 

The proposed rule would: 

• make Orders EA-12-049 and EA-12-051 generically applicable, 

• establish new requirements for an integrated response capability, 

• establish new requirements for actions related to onsite emergency response, and 

• address a number of petitions for rulemaking submitted to the NRC following the 

March 11, 2011, Fukushima Dai-ichi event. 

The following are major MBDBE rulemaking milestones: 

• The proposed rule public comment period closed on February 11, 2016. Twenty 

comment letters were received. 

• The NRC staff is currently reviewing the public comments. The NRC staff will revise the 

rulemaking package as needed and provide the draft final rule to the Commission by 

December 16, 2016. 

In the SRM to SECY-15-0065 addressing the MBDBE rulemaking, the Commission also 

directed the staff to “update the Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to explicitly provide periodic 

oversight of industry’s implementation of the SAMGs” [Severe Accident Management 

Guidelines]. NEI submitted a letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML15335A442), dated 

October 26, 2015, describing the industry initiative to update and maintain the SAMGs. The 

industry’s Nuclear Strategic Issues Advisory Committee approved this initiative. As specified in 
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the letter, all 100 operating plant licensees have submitted site-specific regulatory commitments 

on the docket. These commitments ensure the following: 

(1) Maintenance of SAMG strategies. 

(2) Integration with emergency operating procedures and other guideline sets. 

(3) Timely incorporation of owners group revisions. 

(4) Establishment of configuration controls. 

In a February 23, 2016, letter to NEI (ADAMS Accession No. ML16032A029), the NRC staff 

outlined its approach for making changes to the ROP in accordance with the Commission 

direction. The NRC staff has begun to engage NEI and other stakeholders to identify the 

near-term and longer-term changes to the ROP consistent with the Commission direction and 

the near-term and longer-term commitments that licensees have made regarding SAMGs. 

Reliable Hardened Containment Vents for Boiling-Water Reactors with Mark I and II Designs 

(Orders EA-12-050 and EA-13-109) 

On March 12, 2012, the NRC issued Order EA-12-050, “Order Modifying Licenses with Regard 

to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents” (ADAMS Accession No. ML12054A696), requiring all 

operating BWRs in the United States with Mark I and II containments to install a reliable 

hardened vent. Subsequently, the NRC staff considered the possibility of venting after reactor 

core damage occurs and provided its recommendation to the Commission in SECY-12-0157, 

“Consideration of Additional Requirements for Containment Venting Systems for Boiling Water 

Reactors with Mark I and Mark II Containments,” dated November 26, 2012 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML12345A030). In the SRM to SECY-12-0157 (ADAMS Accession No. ML13078A017), the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to require licensees with Mark I and II containments to 

“upgrade or replace the reliable hardened vents required by Order EA-12-050 with a 

containment venting system designed and installed to remain functional during severe accident 

conditions.” In response to that SRM, the NRC staff issued Order EA-13-109, “Order Modifying 

Licenses with Regard to Reliable Hardened Containment Vents Capable of Operation under 

Severe Accident Conditions” (ADAMS Accession No. ML13130A067), to ensure that those 

vents will remain functional in the conditions that could exist in the event of reactor core 

damage. Order EA-13-109 supersedes Order EA-12-050 and addresses and expands on 

Recommendation 5.1 of the NTTF report. 

Order EA-13-109 contains two distinct phases of implementation. Phase 1 requires affected 

licensees to upgrade the venting capabilities from the containment wetwell to provide a reliable 

hardened vent to help prevent core damage. The vent must also remain functional during 

severe accident conditions. Phase 2 requires affected licensees to do one of the following: 

• Increase protection for severe accident conditions through installation of a reliable 

severe-accident-capable drywell vent system 

• Develop a reliable containment venting strategy that makes it unlikely that there would 

be the need to vent from the containment drywell during severe accident conditions. 
- 11 - 

For both phases, licensees will submit an overall integrated plan (OIP). The NRC staff then will 

conduct any necessary audits and issue an ISE. In accordance with the requirements of the 

order, licensees will notify the NRC when full compliance is achieved with Phases 1 and 2. 

Once all units at a site are in compliance, the NRC staff will issue a final SE and inspect 

compliance with the order. 

Substantial progress towards full implementation of Order EA-13-109 has been made during the 

previous 6 months: 

• The NRC staff previously issued 18 of the 19 Phase 1 ISEs. In lieu of a Phase 1 OIP, on 

June 2, 2014, Exelon Generating Company, LLC, (Exelon), the licensee for Oyster 

Creek, submitted a request for an extension to comply with both phases of 

Order EA-13-109 until January 31, 2020. Oyster Creek is expected to be permanently 

shut down at that time. On November 16, 2015, the NRC staff issued a letter (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML15092A159) approving Exelon’s requested schedule relaxation from 

Phase 1 of the order at Oyster Creek. Exelon submitted additional information regarding 

the Phase 2 relaxation request on February 15, 2016 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML16047A094). Exelon’s request for relaxation from Phase 2 of the order remains 

under review. 

• The NRC staff issued a letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML15271A148) to NEI on 

October 8, 2015, endorsing the OIP submittal template and responses to a number of 

frequently asked questions associated with Phase 2 of the hardened containment vent 

order. The purpose of this template and the questions is to assist licensees when using 

NEI 13-02, “Industry Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109,” Revision 1, 

published April 2014 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15113B318), in meeting the 

requirements of Order EA-13-109. 

• The NRC staff issued a letter (ADAMS Accession No. ML15240A072) to NEI on 

September 14, 2015, endorsing an NEI/Industry Working Group white paper 

HCVS-WP-04, “Missile Evaluation for HCVS Components 30 Feet above Grade,” 

Revision 0, dated August 18, 2015 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15231A491). The 

purpose of the white paper is to supplement guidance provided in NEI 13-02, “Industry 

Guidance for Compliance with Order EA-13-109” (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15113B318), regarding reliable hardened containment vent systems capable of 

performing under severe accident conditions at BWR with Mark I and Mark II 

containments. 

• The NRC received all Phase 2 OIPs by December 31, 2015, except for Oyster Creek. 

As discussed below, the NRC staff is reviewing the Oyster Creek extension request for 

Phase 2 of the order. 

Future work to be completed includes: 

• The NRC staff will review the Phase 2 OIPs, conduct audits (if necessary) of licensee 

progress toward compliance with Phase 2, and then issue ISEs. The staff plans to 
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complete the ISE reviews in two groups. The staff expects to complete the first group of 

ISEs (12 sites) by June 30, 2016, and the second group (7 sites) by December 31, 2016. 

• The NRC staff will inspect compliance with the order. 

Order EA-13-109 established a schedule for applicable licensees to achieve full compliance with 

Phase 1 of the order by June 30, 2018, and full compliance with Phase 2 of the order by 

June 30, 2019. The NRC has rescinded Order EA-13-109 for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear 

Power Station, which has permanently shut down. As discussed above, for Oyster Creek, the 

NRC staff approved Exelon’s requested schedule relaxation from Phase 1 of the order and is 

reviewing the Phase 2 relaxation request. The NRC staff expects that all other applicable 

licensees will meet the compliance dates specified in the order. 

Containment Protection and Release Reduction Rulemaking 

In addition to directing the NRC staff to require installation of severe-accident-capable venting 

systems for Mark I and II containments (discussed above) in the SRM to SECY-12-0157, the 

Commission directed the NRC staff to develop the regulatory basis and proceed with a 

rulemaking for filtering strategies with drywell filtration and severe accident management of 

BWRs with Mark I and II containments.

Using the normal rulemaking process, the NRC staff developed a Commission paper and the 

draft containment protection and release reduction rulemaking regulatory basis, which were 

provided to the Commission on June 18, 2015, in SECY-15-0085 (ADAMS Accession 

No. ML15022A218). In the SRM to SECY-15-0085 (ADAMS Accession No. ML15231A471), 

dated August 19, 2015, the Commission approved Alternative 1, which discontinued rulemaking 

activities and left Order EA-13-109 in place without additional regulatory actions. The NRC’s 

Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research is preparing a NUREG report to document the technical 

analysis completed, including risk evaluation, accident progression and source term 

calculations, and offsite consequence calculations. 

Enhancements to the Capability to Prevent or Mitigate Seismically-Induced Fires and Floods 

This lessons-learned activity originated from NTTF Recommendation 3, and was intended to 

evaluate potential enhancements to the capability to prevent or mitigate seismically-induced 

fires and floods (SIFF). In the SRM to SECY-11-0137, “Staff Requirements: Prioritization of 

Recommended Actions To Be Taken in Response to Fukushima Lessons Learned” (ADAMS 

Accession No. ML113490055), dated December 15, 2011, the Commission directed the staff to 

start the development of probabilistic risk analysis (PRA) methods to evaluate potential 

enhancements to plants’ capabilities to prevent or mitigate SIFFs as part of Tier 1 activities. 

However, to be consistent with the program plan for NTTF Recommendation 3 in Enclosure 3 to 

SECY-12-0095, “Tier 3 Program Plans and 6-Month Status Update in Response to Lessons 

Learned from Japan’s March 11, 2011, Great Tohoku Earthquake and Subsequent Tsunami” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML12208A210), and as directed by the Commission, carrying out the 

broader evaluation (i.e., beyond the PRA methods) of potential enhancements to the capability 

to prevent or mitigate SIFFs would remain a longer-term Tier 3 activity. 
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The NRC staff evaluation and closeout plan for this recommendation is contained in 

SECY-15-0137, Enclosure 3, “Proposed Resolution Plan for Tier 3 Recommendation Potential 

Enhancements to the Capability to Prevent or Mitigate Seismically Induced Fires and Floods” 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML15254A013). With respect to the Tier 1 portion of this 

recommendation, the staff contracted with Brookhaven National Laboratory to finalize a 

feasibility study on the development of a PRA methodology for SIFFs. The final feasibility study 

was documented in the report entitled, “Brookhaven National Laboratory Report—Scoping 

Study for a PRA Method for Seismically Induced Fires and Floods,” dated December 2015 

(ADAMS Accession No. ML16004A250). The feasibility study identified a number of key issues 

associated with the development of qualitative or quantitative PRA methods for SIFFs. 

Through the workshops and expert consultation, the NRC staff has identified several technical 

issues that would need further evaluation to develop a fully usable PRA methodology. As 

discussed in SECY-15-0137, the staff determined that the potential benefits of fully developing 

and piloting a PRA approach for SIFFs will not justify the costs of continuing this effort. The 

Commission approved the staff’s recommendation to close this recommendation in the SRM to 

SECY-15-0137 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16039A175). Therefore, the staff has closed the 

Tier 1 activity to develop a PRA method for evaluating the risk of SIFFs.