UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

_________________________________________ ) Saundra M. McNair, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil N o. 15-cv-00729 (APM) ) District of Columbia, et al., ) ) Defendants. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
I. BACKGROUND From March 2009 to October 2013, Plaintiff Saundra M. McNair wo rked as an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) for the District of Columbia O ffice of Employment Services (“DOES”), an agency of Defendant District of Columbia. Am. Com pl., ECF No. 12, ¶¶ 15, 49. Plaintiff suffers from a variety of physical disabilities. To accommodate her disabilities, DOES initially allowed her to work a modified schedule, starting her day at 7:00 a.m. and ending it at 3:30 p.m. Id. ¶¶ 16-17. Later, Plaintiff sought further accommodation in th e form of working from home, which DOES denied. DOES then rescinded her initial accommodation—working a modified schedule—and insisted that she work from 8:30 a.m. to 5:30 p.m. Notwithstanding her employer’s action, Plaintiff con tinued to work the modified sch edule. In response, DOES treated her as absent without leave (“AW OL”) for the hours that she was not physically present in the workplace. Id. ¶¶ 19, 24-29. Eventually, Plaintiff accrued nearly 200 hours of AWOL time, leading to her termination. Id. ¶¶ 43, 49.2 In her Amended Complaint, Plaintiff advances a host of federal and District of Columbia statutory claims and common law claims, contesting the legality of her treatment and termination. Her pleading is a not model of either clarity or brevity. Plai ntiff has advanced no less than twelve separately labeled “Claims for Relief.” Many of these claims—s pecifically her Third, Fourth, and Fifth Claims—are predicated on multiple statutory bases. The c ourt has attempted to untangle the knot that is Plaintiff’s pleadi ng—with Defendant’s commendable assistance—and understands her Amended Complaint to allege the following claims: (1) failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) (First Claim); (2) disa bility discrimination under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act (“DCHRA”) (Second Claim); (3) race and gender discrimination under Title VII, the DCHRA, the Equal Pay Act, a nd the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act (Third Claim); (4) failure to compensate under the Fair Lab or Standards Act (Third Claim); (5) retaliation under the ADA, Title VII, and the DCHRA (Fourth Claim); (6) ret aliation under the National Labor Relations Act (Fourth Claim); (7) retaliation un der the federal Whistleblowers Protection Act and the analog of that Act under District of Col umbia law (Fifth Claim); (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress (Sixth Claim); (9) negligent infliction of emotional distress (Seventh Claim); (10) n egligent supervision (Eighth Cl aim); (11) negligence per se (Ninth Claim); (12) defamation per se (Tenth Claim); (13) civil conspi racy (Eleventh Claim); and (14) constitutional tort (Twelfth Claim). See generally Am. Compl. This matter is now before the c ourt on Defendant District of Co lumbia’s Motion to Dismiss Counts 3 through 11 of the Amended Complaint. See generally Mot. to Dismiss Counts 3 through 11 of the Am. Compl., ECF No. 17; Mot. to Dismiss, Mem. in Supp ort, ECF No. 17-1 [hereinafter3 Def.’s Mem.]. 1 For the reasons discussed below, the court grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s Motion.
II. LEGAL STANDARD In evaluating a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil P rocedure 12(b)(6), the court must accept a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true and “cons true the complaint ‘in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of all inferences th at can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Hettinga v. United States , 677 F.3d 471, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Schuler v. United
States , 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). The court need not acce pt as true “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain , 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or “inferences . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint,” Kowal v. MCI Commc’ns Corp. , 16 F.3d 1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffi cient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 ( 2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570 ( 2007)). A claim is facially plausible when “the plaintiff pleads factual content t hat allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misco nduct alleged.” Id. The factual allegations in the complaint need not be “detailed”; however, t he Federal Rules demand more than “an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Id. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory sta tements, do not suffice.” Id. If the facts as alleged fail to establish that a plaintiff has stated a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court must grant the defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Am. Chemistry Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 922 F. Supp. 2d 56, 61 (D.D.C. 2013).

1 The individual defendants have separately moved to dismiss all claims against them. See ECF No. 17. That motion is not yet fully briefed.4 IV. DISCUSSION
A. Race and Gender Discrimination Claims (Third Claim)
1. Title VII and DCHRA The court begins with Plaintiff’s race and gender discriminatio n claims under Title VII and the DCHRA. During her time at DOES, Plaintiff alleges that she “was both sexually (gender) and racially discriminated against i n respect to hiring, promotion, equal work for equal pay, and the use of the [reasonable accommodation] system,” in violation of Title VII and the DCHRA. Am. Compl. ¶ 75. Title VII prohibits an employer from “discriminat[ing] against any individual . . . because of such individual’s race, colo r, religion, sex, or national or igin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Similarly, the DCHRA makes it illegal for an employer to discri minate on the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal a ppearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, family r esponsibilities, genetic inform ation, disability, matriculation, or political affiliation.” D.C. Code § 2-1402.11. Under both of these statutes, at the motion-todismiss stage, a plaintiff does not need to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. Swierkiewicz
v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 510–12 (2002); see also Twombly , 550 U.S. at 569–70 (affirming that Swierkiewicz remains good law). Instead, a pl aintiff need only allege that she (1) suffered an adverse employment action (2) because of her membership in a pr otected category. See Hill v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of the D.C. , 146 F. Supp. 3d 178, 184 (D.D.C. 2015); see also Baloch v. Kempthorne , 550 F.3d 1191, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Daka v. Breiner , 711 A.2d 86, 94 (D.C. 1998) (noting that Title VII cases are particularly persuasive in eva luating DCHRA claims). Courts in this Circuit “have cons istently recognized the ease w ith which a plaintiff claiming employment discrimination can survive . . . a motion to dismiss .” Fennell v. AARP , 770 F. Supp.5 2d 118, 127 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Rouse v. Berry , 680 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236 (D.D.C. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted) . In other words, “the factu al detail required to survive a motion to dismiss can be quite limited.” Hill , 146 F. Supp. 3d at 184-85 (citations omitted). Yet, although a plaintiff asserting a discrimi nation claim is not required to plead a prima facie case, she still must plead sufficient facts to show a plausible entitlement to relie f. Spaeth v. Georgetown Univ ., 839 F. Supp. 2d 57, 63 (D.D.C. 2012). Here, Plaintiff has pled a plausible Title VII race discriminat ion claim. She alleges that “ALJs and AAJs” that “were members of a different race and colo r than Plaintiff,” “[were] permitted to work from home” but that she was prohibited from d oing so. Am. Compl. ¶ 19. Although the complaint admittedly l acks in specifics, Plaintiff has alleged the basic elements of a race-based discrimination claim—that DOES took an adverse emplo yment action 2 against her while not taking the same action against similarly situated emp loyees of a different race. This is sufficient to put Defendant on basic notice of her claim agains t it and to satisfy the pleading standard for discrim ination claims. See Vaughan v. Acheson , Civ. No. 10–2184 (A BJ), 2011 WL 1515733, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 20, 2011) (noting that “the plainti ff’s obligation at the pleading stage is to put the defendant on notice of claims against it,” which can be accomplished even in a “complaint [that] is short on detail”). The court has conclude d that Plaintiff has pleaded at least one racially-motivated adverse employment action—DOES’ refusal to allow her to work from home. Therefore, Plaintiff’s race discrimination claim shall b e permitted to proceed, including to the extent it alleges other a dverse actions, such as failure to promote and termination.

2 Because Defendant does not contend that the refusal to permit an employee to work from home is not, in fact, an adverse employment action, the court will accept only for purpo ses of this opinion that it is an adverse employment action.6 In contrast, Plaintiff’s claim of gender discrimination does no t satisfy the Swierkiewicz

Twombly pleading standard. Not once in her Amended Complaint does Pla intiff allege that DOES specifically treated men differently than they treated her as a woman. 3 Instead, she avers that she “was the only employee in her office who was either denied an [alternative work sched ule] or who had their [alternative work schedule] rescinded/removed.” Am. Compl. ¶ 74 (emphasis added). She further states that she “was not considered for promotion a s similarly situated ALJ’s although she performed the exact same job duties.” Id. ¶ 77. Neither of these statements indicate that Plaintiff was treated differently than her male counterparts on account of her gender; rather, they suggest that, at best, she was treated differently from all oth er employees—which presumably includes both men and women. See, e.g. , Greer v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of D.C. , 113 F. Supp. 3d 297, 310-11 (D.D.C. 2015) (noting that the “unavailability of d etails”—including whether positions went to others outside the protected class—“does not excuse Plaintiff from alleging, on information and belief if necessary, the general sequence of ev ents and basic facts”); see also
Belton v. Palisades Med. Ctr. , 2013 WL 2444046, at *2 (D.N.J. 2013) (dismissing a Title VII claim where the plaintiff failed to “allege that non-members of a protected class were treated more favorably . . . [and did] not allege any facts that would give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination”). The only other allegations that Plaintiff ma kes that plausibly could be construed to involve gender, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 7, 21, 75, are conclusory statements that are “not entitled to the assumption of truth,” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiff thus has not successfully alleged a claim of gender discrimination unde r Title VII and the DCHRA.

3 In her Opposition, Plaintiff attempts to remedy this error by referring to “male counterparts” and “male ALJ counterparts.” Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss C ounts 3 through 11 of the Am. Compl., ECF No. 23 at 23. Because she may not amend her Amended Complaint in her Opposition, however, those characterizations do not affect the court’s opinion. See Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray , 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 160 n.7 (D.D.C. 2014) (“It is well settled law that a plaintiff cannot amend his or her co mplaint by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”).7 2. Equal Pay Act Plaintiff’s discrimination claim under the Equal Pay Act (“EPA” ) likewise must be dismissed. To plead an EPA violation, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) she was “doing substantially equal work on the job, the performance of which required substa ntially equal skill, effort, and responsibility as the jobs held by members of the opposite sex” ; (2) “the job was performed under similar working conditions”; and (3) she was “paid at a lower w age than members of the opposite
sex.” Cornish v. District of Columbia, 67 F. Supp. 3d 345, 360–61 (D.D.C. 2014) (citations omitted). Courts in this Circuit have recognized that the EPA “overlaps” with Title VII, and that the two statutes should be “construed harmoniously with the res ult that the principles developed under each . . . [be] applied interchangeab ly” with the other. Hardy v. Bowen , Civ. No. 85–2119, 1986 WL 15710, at *8 (D.D.C. Nov. 19, 1986) (citing Cnty. of Washington v. Gunther , 452 U.S. 161 (1981)). Similar to her “overlapping” Tit le VII gender discrimination cl aim, Plaintiff does not allege that DOES treated her differently than her male counterparts. As discussed, the Amended Complaint alleges that she “bega n employment at a lower grade a nd pay scale that other similarly situated employees,” but fails to allege that those similarly s ituated employees were “members of the opposite sex” as required under even the liberal pleading s tandard applicable here. Stated simply, Plaintiff fails to allege that she was “paid at a lower wage” than men in her office for “doing substantially equal work” and thus her claim must be dis missed. Cornish, 67 F. Supp. 3d
at 360–61.
3. Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act Plaintiff also alleges that “she was both sexually (gender) and racially discriminated against . . . in violation of . . . the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.” Am. Compl. ¶ 75. The Lilly8 Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, however, does not grant plaintiffs a st and-alone cause of action. Rather, it “amend[s] [Title VII and the ADA] to clarify that a discrimi natory compensation decision . . . occurs each time compensation is paid pursuant to the [discrimi natory decision].” Pub. L. No. 111–2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009). The Act essentially functions to ex tend the statute of limitations for discriminatory compensation claims and thus does not provide a separate cause of action. To the extent that Plaintiff is alleging a separate discrimination cla im under the Act, the claim must be dismissed.
B. Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (Third Claim) Plaintiff also alleges that DOES “erroneously charge[d] [her] w ith AWOL . . . in spite of knowledge that [she] worked a full 40 hour work week . . . [and thus] illegally withheld pay and benefits” in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) . Am. Compl. ¶ 43. A plaintiff may state a claim for relief unde r the FLSA if they demonstrate that they “have in fact performed work for which [they were] improperly compensated.” Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co ., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946). Plaintiff has alleged facts in support o f her claim by alleging that DOES refused to compensate her for those hours for which DOES declar ed her AWOL, but which she claims to have worked. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50, 72, 80. Thus, Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s FLSA claim will be denied.
C. Retaliation under the ADA, Title VII, and the DCHRA (Fourth Claim) Next, Plaintiff assert s that DOES retaliated against her in vio lation of the ADA, Title VII, and the DCHRA. The Amended Complaint specifies only one advers e action as the basis for her retaliation claims: her termination. Am. Compl. ¶ 83 (“discri minatory termination”), ¶ 84 (“removed the Plaintiff from her position as an ALJ in retaliat ion”), ¶ 85 (“removed the Plaintiff from her job in retaliation”). Although in her Opposition, Pla intiff suggests that she has raised9 other adverse employment actions —namely, the denial of reasonab le accommodations and the docking of her pay, see Pl.’s Mem. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss Counts 3 through 11 of the Am. Complaint., ECF No. 23 [hereinafter Pl.’s Opp’n], at 27—Pla intiff’s Opposition cannot amend her pleading, see Kingman Park Civic Ass’n v. Gray , 27 F. Supp. 3d 142, 160 n.7 (D.D.C. 2014) (“It is well settled law that a plaintiff cannot amend hi s or her complaint by the briefs in opposition to a motion to dismiss.”). Accordingly, the court w ill evaluate only whether Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded that DOES fired her for exercising equ al employment opportunity (“EEO”) rights. In order to sustain a claim for retaliation at the motion-to-di smiss stage, “a plaintiff must show that “(1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) his employer took an adverse personnel action against him; and (3) a causal connection exist s between the two.” Keys v.
Donovan , 37 F. Supp. 3d 368, 372 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth. , 791 F. 3d 65, 68 (D.C. Cir. 2015). The third prong of the plea ding standard—causation—“may be established if the plaintiff alleges that the employer had k nowledge of the protected activity and that the adverse action o ccurred soon thereafter.” Greer , 113 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The court agrees with Defendant that “the temporal proximity be tween [Plaintiff’s] alleged protected activity and [the] alleged retali ation is too remote to support an inferen ce of causation.” Def.’s Mem. at 10. Courts that accept that “mere temporal prox imity” between a protected activity and an adverse employment action can establish sufficient evide nce of causality “uniformly hold the temporal proximity must be ‘ very close. ’” Keys , 37 F. Supp. 3d at 372 (collecting cases). Although “neither the Supreme Court nor the [D.C. Circuit] has established a bright-line three-10 month rule,” id. , “three months is pe rceived as approachi ng the outer limit,” Greer , 113 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (citing Hamilton v. Geithner , 666 F.3d 1344, 1357-58 (D.C. Cir. 2012)). Here, the only protected EEO activity under Title VII that Plai ntiff undertook occurred in May 2010, when she filed a race and gender discrimination compl aint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Am. Com pl. ¶ 21. Plaintiff, however, was not terminated until October 2013, nearly three-and-a-half years later. Id. ¶ 43. Clearly, the temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s protected Title VII activity and her termination ca nnot support a claim of relation on its

own. See, e.g. , Greer , 113 F. Supp. 3d at 311-12 (gran ting motion to dismiss a retal iation claim that alleged a two-year gap between the protected activity and retaliation); cf. Keys , 37 F. Supp. 3d at 373 (holding that a retaliation claim “just clear[ed] the bar” on a motion to dismiss where there was a three-month interva l between the pr otected activity and retaliation). Plaintiff appears to argue in her Opposition that there is temp oral proximity between her EEO complaint and DOES’ alleged retaliatory actions because she went on disability leave for two years soon after the complaint was filed and experienced retali atory action soon after she returned. Pl.’s Opp’n at 27. In other words, she contends that the time that she was away from work should not factor into the causation inquiry. Plaintiff has offered n o authority to support such a proposition. And, even if she had, it would not help her. Pla intiff returned to work in April 2012, and DOES terminated her employment in October 2013. The passag e of 18 months negates any plausible inference that might support causation. Accordingly, the court dismisses her retaliation claim under Title VII and her related retaliation claim under t he DCHRA. The court, however, reaches a di fferent conclusion with respect to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the ADA and her related claim under the DCHRA. Acc ording to the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff’s last pro tected activity under the ADA oc curred on September 16, 2013,11 when she submitted a written justification for her request for an alternative or modified work schedule, which was denied. Am. Compl. ¶ 47; see Ellison v. Napolitano , 901 F. Supp. 2d 118, 129 (D.D.C. 2012) (“[R]equests for accommodation may constitute protected activity and therefore . . . allegations reg arding those requests may suppor t . . . claims of retaliation . . . .”); Ellis v. Georgetown Univ. Hospital , 631 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Requests for accommodation are ‘protected activities' within the meaning of the ADA.” (quoting DuBerry v. District of Columbia , 582 F. Supp. 2d 27, 37 (D.D.C. 2008))). Plaintiff’s terminat ion occurred slightly over a month later on October 18, 2013. Id. ¶ 49. The approximately one-month temporal proximity between Plaintiff’s protected activity under the ADA and the adverse employment action is sufficient to support a plausible inference of causat ion at the motion to dismiss stage. See
Hamilton , 666 F.3d at 1358 (stating, in a Title VII case, that “tempora l proximity can indeed support an inference of causation, but only where the two event s are very close in time” and that typically three months is the outer limit) (citation and intern al quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the court denies Def endant’s motion to dismiss as to Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the ADA and her related retaliation claim under the DCHRA

. D. Retaliation under the National Lab or Relations Act (Fourth Clai m) Plaintiff similarly alleges that DOES retaliated against her by terminating her for union activities. Specifically, she c ontends that DOES removed her f rom her position for “seeking to organize the ALJs within the Agency to become members of the un ion . . . in violation of the [National Labor Relations Act ( “NLRA”)].” Am. Compl. ¶ 88; see also id. ¶ 89 (asserting “her termination for participation in a protected activity, such as seeking to organize the ALJs within the Agency”). However, federal courts lack jurisdiction to hea r such matters in the first instance and must defer to the exclusive jurisdiction of the National La bor Relations Board. See San Diego12 Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen’s Union, Local 2020 v. Garmon , 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (“When an activity is arguably subject t o § 7 or § 8 of the [NLRA], th e States as well as t he federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Re lations Board if the danger of state interference with nationa l policy is to be averted.”). Plaintiff argues in her Opposition that the court can resolve h er retaliation claim under the NLRA under relevant Supreme Court precedent. Pl.’s Opp’n at 28 -31. However, Plaintiff cites to cases standing for the proposit ion that the federal courts m ay only assume jurisdiction in the first instance over NLRA claims that are collateral to a fair r epresentation claim. See, e.g., Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc. , 525 U.S. 33, 50 (1998) (“Federal courts can only resolve § 7 and § 8 claims [under the NLRA] that are collateral to a du ty of fair representation claim.”). However, those cases are inappli cable here, as Plaintiff has no t alleged a fair representation claim. As a result, the court dismisses Plaintiff’s retaliation claim under the NLRA for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
E. Retaliation under the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protec tion Act (Fifth Claim) Next, Plaintiff alleges that DOE S retaliated against her in vio lation of the District of Columbia Whistleblower Protection Act (“DC-WPA”) for “disclosin g to members of the District of Columbia City Council . . . [ DOES’] unlawful use of private company worker’s compensation fund money.” Am. Compl. ¶ 94. To sustain a claim under the DC-WPA, a plaintiff must plead “(1 ) a protected disclosure; (2) a prohibited personnel actio n; and (3) a causal connection between the protected disclosure and the prohibited personnel action, s uch that the protected disclo sure was at least a contributing factor in the personnel action.” Bowyer v. District of Columbia, 910 F. Supp. 2d 173, 191–92 (D.D.C.13 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Freeman v. District of Columbia, 60 A.3d 1131, 1141 (D.C. 2012). Plaintiff has sufficiently allege d both that she made a protect ed disclosure and that Defendant retaliated against her for making that disclosure. F irst, Plaintiff’s disclosure of potential misuse of public funds qualifies as a protected disclosure unde r the DC-WPA. See D.C. Code § 1–615.52(a)(6) (listing “gross mi smanagement . . . [and] misu se or waste of public resources or funds” as protected disclosures). Further, and contrary to Def endant’s position, Plaintiff has also sufficiently alleged facts indicating that her protected disclo sure was the basis for her termination. Defendant contends that Plaint iff “cannot show causation” becau se “at least three months passed” between her protected disclosure and her termination. Def.’s M em. at 13. In support of its argument, Defendant cites to several cases from this Circuit st anding for the proposition that three months represents the outer limit of casual connection between a protected disclosure and an adverse employment action when a plaintiff bases causation on “ temporal proximity alone .” Id

. (quoting Payne v. District of Columbia , 4 F. Supp. 3d 80, 88-89 (D.D.C. 2013)). Defendant reads Plaint iff’s claim too narro wly. Plaintiff is n ot alleging causation through temporal proximity alone . Rather, reading the Amended Complaint in the light most favo rable to the Plaintiff, she alleges that, after she engaged in protected activity in June or July 2013, her supervisors “continued to erroneously charge [her] with AWOL . . . in spite of knowledge that [she] worked a full 40 hour work week . . . [and thus] illegall y withheld pay and benefits.” Am. Compl. ¶ 43. As the DC-WPA “borrows its standards from the Tit le VII context,” Mentzer v.
Lanier , 677 F. Supp. 2d 242, 251 n.6 (D.D.C. 2010), illegally withhol ding pay constitutes an adverse employment action, which can be considered for the purp ose of establishing causation. See Freedman v. MCI Telecomm. Corp. , 255 F.3d 840, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that14 “diminution in pay” is a sufficiently adverse employment action to trigger liability under Title VII). If proven true, the adverse employment actions leading t o Plaintiff’s termination—namely, the ongoing AWOL accrual—occurred throughout the three-month pe riod between Plaintiff’s whistle-blowing activity and her termination, thus establishing a plausible inference to support the element of causation. See Greer , 113 F. Supp. 3d at 311 (stating that “[a] large gap between protected activity and retaliat ion is not necessarily fatal to a claim when the plaintiff can point to other factors leading to an in ference of causation”). Accordin gly, Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged her DC-WPA claim. Plaintiff also brings a similar claim under the Whistleblower P rotection Act (WPA). That claim must be dismissed, however, because the WPA only protects federal employees, Stella v.
Minetta , 284 F.3d 135, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2002), thus rendering that statu te inapplicable to Plaintiff.
F. Common Law Claims (Sixth through Eleventh Claims) In addition to her federal and District of Columbia statutory c laims, Plaintiff has advanced several common law claims: int entional infliction of emotional distress; negligent infliction of emotional distress; negligent supervision; negligence per se; d efamation per se; and civil conspiracy. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103-142. Defendant argues that all of these clai ms must be dismissed because Plaintiff “has not provided the notice requir ed under D.C. Code section 12- 309.” Def.’s Mem. at 22. The court agrees. D.C. Code § 12-309 provides: [A]n action may not be maintained against the District of Colum bia for unliquidated damages . . . unless, within six months after the injury or dam age was sustained, the claimant . . . has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in r egular course of duty, is a sufficient notice.15 D.C. Code § 12-309. “Compliance with the notice requirement is mandatory” and must be “strictly construed.” Blocker-Burnete v. District of Columbia , 730 F. Supp. 2d 200, 203 (D.D.C. 2010). Here, Plaintiff concedes that sh e did not provide notice to the Mayor (and did not file a police report). She neverthele ss contends that she has satisfi ed the requirements of Section 12- 309 because she gave notice of her claims to the District’s EEO office. Pl.’s Opp’n at 38-39. Plaintiff is wrong, however. Courts in this District have cons istently held that, to satisfy Section 12-309’s notice requirements, a p laintiff must give notice eith er to the Mayor or i n a relevant police report prepared in the regular course of duty. See Cornish , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (stating that “§ 12-309 requires notice to the Ma yor, not to any other District agency or administrative body”); Blocker-Burnette v. District of Columbia , 730 F. Supp. 2d 200, 204 (D.D.C. 2010) (stating that “[o]nly two types of n otice can satisfy the requirements of Sec tion 12-309”—written notice to the Mayor or a police report prepared in the regular course of duty ). Notice to any other District government agency, including to the District’s EEO office, does not satisfy the notice requirement.
See Cornish , 67 F. Supp. 3d at 371 (rejecting notice through the District of Columbia courts or the EEOC); Blocker-Burnette , 730 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (rejecting notice through the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights); Faison v. District of Columbia , 664 F. Supp. 2d 59, 68 (D.D.C. 2009) (rejecting notice through the EEOC, “which was cr oss-filed with the District of Columbia Office of Human Rights”). Accordingly, having failed to give notice of her common law claims to the Mayor, Plainti ff’s common law claims must be dismissed. 4

4 The court recognizes that D.C. Code § 12-309 applies only to u nliquidated damages. However, the court does not construe Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint to allege liquidated dam ages in regard to her common law claims. Nor has Plaintiff argued that her common law claims can survive, even i n part, because they seek recovery of liquidated damages. Therefore, the court d ismisses those claims in their entirety.16 V. CONCLUSION AND ORDER For the foregoing reasons, Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is gra nted in part and denied in part. More specifically, the motion to dismiss is granted, wit hout prejudice, as to the following claims:
1. Third Claim for gender discrimi nation under Title VII and the D CHRA;
2. Third Claim under the Equal Pay Act;
3. Fourth Claim for retaliation under Title VII and related retali ation claim under the
DCHRA. The Motion to Dismiss is granted as to the following claims, wi th prejudice:
1. Third Claim under the Lily Ledbetter Fair Pay Act;
2. Fourth Claim for reta liation under the NLRA;
3. Fifth Claim under the federal WPA;
4. Sixth Claim for intentional inf liction of emotional distress;
5. Seventh Claim for negligent in fliction of emotional distress;
6. Eight Claim for neg ligent supervision;
7. Ninth Claim for negligence per se;
8. Tenth Claim for defamation per se;
9. Eleventh Claim for conspiracy. The Motion to Dismiss is denie d as to the following claims:
1. Third Claim for race discrimina tion under Title VII and the DCH RA;
2. Third Claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act;
3. Fourth Claim for retaliation unde r the ADA and related retaliat ion claim under the DCHRA;
4. Fifth Claim for reta liation under the DC-WPA.17 Dated: September 30, 2016 Amit P. Mehta United States District Judge