Policing and COIN Operations: 

Lessons Learned, Strategies and Future Directions

Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan

Center For Technology & National Security Policy 

The Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office
POLICING AND 

COIN OPERATIONS 
Front cover: 

Ralph Morten is a retired 27-year Los Angeles Police Department ve

and former SWAT member. 
POLICING AND 

COIN OPERATIONS: 

LESSONS LEARNED, STRATEGIES, 

AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan 

2011

Preface .................................................................................................

Chapter 1: Introduction to Policing and COIN Operations ..............

 Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan

Chapter 2: Policy Considerations—The Department of Defense 

 and Department of Homeland Security...........................

 James Schear and Arif Alikhan 

Chapter 3: Visions of Conflict Policing............................................

 John Morgan

Chapter 4: Strategic Lessons from American Policing.....................

 Brian Berrey

Chapter 5: Lessons Learned from Iraq and 

 Afghanistan Operations...................................................

 Samuel Musa 

Chapter 6: Lessons Learned from Past Conflicts..............................

 Matt Keegan 

Chapter 7: COIN Policy and Process................................................

 James M. Keagle and Christopher Mann 

 

Chapter 8: Building Indigenous Capacity.........................................

 Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan 

Chapter 9: Conclusions.....................................................................

 Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan 

Biographies..........................................................................................

About the Editors.................................................................................

v 

The idea for this monograph was started in early January 2010 

initial concept to conduct research on predictive policing and write 

on the subject. After several meetings and many ideas considered 

paper, the co-editors realized that there is a need to expand the targ

role of policing in counterinsurgency. This was a hot topic and the

many diverse views in the literature on what the role should be. As t

on this new direction began to materialize, it became clear that th

monumental task that would require a workshop to gather and e

ideas from a diverse group of experts. The group then began to con

framework for the workshop and the desired outcome to i

policymakers on the future directions of the role of policing. Several 

were then considered on how to go about achieving this goal. The i

monograph then emerged as a good starting point. 

The concept of having multiple sessions with each moderator w

chapter summarizing their session coupled with their ideas on the 

began to evolve. Selecting the moderators and the speakers and re

the attendance to those invited guests became the next task. The w

was then held on September 29, 2010, as a co-sponsored event by th

for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) of the N

Defense University (NDU) and the Combating Terrorism Technical 

Office (CTTSO) of the Threat Support Working Group (TSWG

Department of Defense. The workshop was focused on lessons learn

past campaigns, development of new strategies, and outlining 

directions for implementation. Participants included leading author

subject, selected individuals from Defense, Justice, and State Depa

Law Enforcement, Service Academies, and Training Commands an

Tanks. Also, select National War College (NWC) and Industrial Co

Armed Forces (ICAF) students with recent experience in Iraq/Afg

participated in the workshop. It was a real success based on the f

from the participants. Many of the new ideas generated are presente

monograph. 

The authors would like to take this opportunity to thank the s

moderators, and co-sponsoring organizations. The authors g

acknowledge the financial support of Starnes Walker, former Dir

Research, and Matt Clark, Director of University Programs, Scie

Technology Directorate, Department of Homeland Security. The 

also thank Samuel Bendett, Research Associate at CTNSP, for his e

support and for providing organizational, logistical, and editorial assi

vii 
This effort could not have been produced without Ted Woodco

was the editor for this project. His contributions, support, and dedic

this effort are greatly appreciated. The authors are also very gra

Elizabeth Woodcock for the cover design of this monograph. 



The views expressed in this monograph are those of the authors and the contr

the chapters and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Nationa

University, the Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office, the Depar

Defense, or the U.S. Government. All information and sources for this monogr

drawn from unclassified materials. 

viii 
Chapter 1: Introduction to Policing and 

COIN Operations

Samuel Musa, John Morgan, and Matt Keegan 

INTRODUCTION 

At the time of this writing, the United States and the other member

International Security Assistance Forces are completing nearly a de

conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. What started as more convent

traditional fights has degenerated over time into insurgency 

something U.S. Forces have had to re-learn and re-build to fight. 

and re-build are key elements as U.S. Forces have fought insurgenci

past, but consistently maintained forces to fight more conventional 

Counterinsurgency (COIN) is very different from armored vehicle

through the Fulda Gap, or the race to Baghdad. It is a fight not a

Government as much as it is a fight for control of the mind-se

population by non-state actors in a race to gain popular support

grassroots battle that not only requires military force, but 

established at the local level through everyday police presen

represents the Rule of Law, the national Government, and saf

stability locally. It is against this backdrop that the Center for Tec

and National Security Policy (CTNSP) and the Combating T

Technical Support Office (CTTSO) came together to look at Polic

COIN and the ways, methods, and techniques that could be shared 

overcome the insurgencies Coalition forces face. The efforts of the 

at the National Defense University (NDU) and the CTTSO culmina

one-day workshop held on September 29, 2010, on Policing an

Operations: Lessons Learned, Strategies, and Future Directions. 

It is important to understand who these organizations are in 

establish the value of the contribution. CTNSP combines scient

technical assessments with analyses of current strategic and defens

issues, taking on topics to bridge the gap. The Center has produced 

on proliferation and homeland security, military transfo

international science and technology, information technology, life s

and social science modeling, and provides technical and policy exp

the faculty and students at the National Defense University. CTTS

rapid combating terrorism solutions to meet continually e

requirements defined by end users. Working closely with ov

Government agencies, State, and local government, law enfo

organizations, and national first responders, CTTSO leverages t
expertise, operational objectives, and interagency sponsor funding. 

operates as a program office under the Assistant Secretary of Defens

for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Interde

Capabilities (SO/LIC & IC). Together these two organizations com

“policy with the practical” and through the workshop open

discussions on knowledge sharing that can contribute to enabling th

war fighter to better accomplish the mission. 

The workshop was focused on lessons learned from past cam

development of new strategies and outlining future directi

implementation. Participants included leading authors on the 

selected individuals from Defense, Justice and State Departmen

Enforcement, Service Academies, and Training Commands and 

Tanks. Also, select National War College (NDU) and Industrial Co

Armed Forces (NDU) students with recent experience in Iraq/Afg

participated in the workshop. Together, the many panelists offere

real-world experience in this multi-layered issue of addressing CO

maintaining/returning stability to nations facing insurgency threats. 

As stated earlier, the current conflicts are not the first time 

military has been faced with COIN, but seemingly is re-learning le

the past. In thinking, methods, processes and procedures 

institutionalized. Then, when this threat faces the U.S. again, we may 

to shorten the magnitude and duration of such conflict. Not only 

these military lessons be institutionalized, but they must be 

encompass solutions from across the spectrum of COIN, ranging fr

intensity military operations to day-to-day stability actions at the 

level . . . something traditionally not considered by a “conventio

fighting” machine. To that end, the American military, when co

with irregular warfare actions, should leverage proven methods de

not only in prior military solutions to COIN, but in policing to 

insurgent or terrorist activity and enhance legitimacy of 

governments through extension of the Rule of Law. It is well known 

military has strength in COIN operations, counterterrorism, and 

operations. Concurrently, the police have strength in border con

civilian authority in stability of operations. Relevant policing tec

include identity-fixing, forensic evidence collection, real-time sit

awareness, and community engagement. When applied broad

consistently, these approaches multiply the effectiveness of militar

and build the governance capacity of host countries. 

Many important approaches are being tried by the military th

with policing tactics. What is missing is a strategic approach that us
tactics as a core element of COIN. Further, it is critical that ind

police forces learn to use these techniques to maintain security and 

legitimacy. Properly applied, policing techniques have tran

American cities while greatly improving the regard that communit

for the police. LAPD is a good example. Of course, if used impro

with too heavy a hand, police-type techniques may be counter-pro

They could make foreign forces seem too intrusive or as an occupyin

That’s why the partnership with capable, local forces and com

engagement are critical, in addition to technological approaches. In 

set the stage for the topics to be covered in this monograph, 

introduction to the fundamental assumptions surrounding polic

counterinsurgency operations will be addressed here. 

FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS 

Insurgency warfare is again proving to be a battle with no discernab

lines.” Combatants frequently have no uniforms and don’t fight acco

conventional tenants. They use the population as their hiding place

can allow them to appear suddenly, strike, and disappear back 

crowd. This makes it extremely difficult to pick the good guy out f

bad guy and to do this “picking” in a timely fashion permitting ac

information to be gathered and disseminated. This points to a main p

that of providing information relevant to the “human terrain” in whic

operations are executed. The military/intelligence community 

resources to provide actionable intelligence based on the extensive r

available but may not have the local knowledge or relationships nece

gain timely ground truth. Conversely, the police can provide info

based on trust/legitimacy. In order to understand how these com

interact with each other, it is necessary to start with the fund

assumptions relating to policing operations. The basic applica

policing are: 

1. Use of policing techniques in military operations. 

a. COIN. 

b. Special operations other than war. 

c. Traditional symmetric warfare. 

d. Border control. 

2. Building rule of law within a chaotic area. 

a. Military-Policing combined operations. 

b. AFP International Deployment Group/ICITAP activi

which will be discussed later in the monograph. 

c. The role of existing institutions (central, tribal, NGO, et
3. The influence of military operations on American policing. 

a. Tactical operations, communications, field forensics. 

b. Professional structures (e.g., hierarchical command). 

The key issues are when does the military operation end 

policing operation start? What is then done in the middle of this tr

and how is such a transition executed? How does this transition re

Rule of Law? 

As the leading world power, America is interested in extending 

of Law in unstable areas. This extension allows the following; it p

international stability (assuming that stability will lead in the long 

outcomes in the American national interest, which assumes co

American hegemony). It also prevents the spread of terrori

transnational crime, and it enables the expansion of commerce. In a

it creates the conditions for democratic evolution and development

follows that “develop nation” conceptions of policing and the Rule 

will be welcomed and beneficial in unstable areas. This allows confl

local values to be resolved (e.g., Sharia law). 

Everyone wants to have a sense of safety and security for thei

and community. The responsiveness and capability of policing funct

the bases for the legitimacy of any state. 

There is a conflict between policing functions and federal/

functions. The military should not be expected to perform policing f

or to build Rule of Law in general. The military can support these 

but a commitment from non-DOD partners is essential. There ar

Comitatus concerns as well as operational concerns that undermine 

philosophy. Furthermore, the federal government should not be exp

perform traditional policing functions inside the United States, which 

responsibility of state and local governments. Next, let us consider th

methods and COIN. 

POLICE METHODS AND COIN

There are a number of police methods to counter crime that 

applicable to counterinsurgency. These are described below: 

1. Counterinsurgency and policing have common elements. 

a. In saying this, we recognize that military operations 

fundamentally different from policing operations. Mili

units can benefit from tactics that have been successful i
policing, but these tactics must be adapted to the contex

military engagement. 

b. Engagement with local populations is much more comm

than engagement with enemy combatants. 

i. Legitimacy is a critical measure of success for 

both. 

ii. Understanding of the specific community is 

critical for success because it permits the 

leveraging of local community leaders. 

c. The soldier and police officer encounter many m

situations with risk, but generally much lower risk tha

active combat. 

i. Management of risk is therefore critical. 

Generally, because force is asymmetric, time is 

on the side of the cop and the soldier in a 

particular incident, which can be used to 

mitigate risk. 

ii. Force protection needs to be oriented to the 

mobile individual or unit. Body armor is more 

important than walls. Protection of static 

facilities is about good sensor information 

around the facility to detect threats. 

d. Intelligence is often more important than the ability 

project force. 

i. Every incident is an opportunity to gain 

knowledge that may not provide intelligence 

specific to the incident itself but may be valuable 

in a larger context. 

e. When force is needed, it is generally very directed and 

specific, with limited objectives. 

i. Use of force is not necessarily intended to be 

lethal on the target (almost never in LE), so 

training/doctrine/kit needs to reflect that 

intention. 

f. Breaches of residential and commercial buildings are m

common than defeat of fortified positions. 

2. Insurgency and organized crime have common elements. 

a. Both often rely on illicit activity to provide money. 

i. Financial flows are critical paths. 

ii. Drug markets, counterfeiting, smuggling, 

gambling, prostitution, identity theft: these are 
money-makers for organized crime. How about 

insurgents? 

b. Recruitment/retention/desistance. 

i. Insurgent groups follow 

tribal/family/religious/community loyalties, 

much like organized crime. 

1. Organized crime is opportunity-based. 

Like-minded criminals work together 

for common interests for a time, but that 

may not last if those interests collide. Is 

insurgency similar in that respect? 

ii. Insurgent recruitment may be dependent on 

economic incentives. Although this has been 

argued for crime, it is seldom true today. 

Criminal activity is more about social problems 

like missing fathers and misogynistic culture. 

3. Police have developed tactics to deal with crime that may b

to counter-insurgency. 

a. Identity-fixing and biometrics. 

i. Biometric identification has a long history in 

policing for multiple applications, including 

offender tracking (is this the right prisoner?), 

identification of presence at a crime scene (e.g., 

latent print analysis), and access control. Each of 

these has a COIN analog. 

b. Forensic evidence. 

i. Forensic evidence is used to establish the 

perpetrator and develop the evidence of how the 

individual did a crime. The latter is just as 

important for criminal justice as the former, 

because the mere presence of DNA or latent 

prints do not establish the guilt of the individual. 

Multiple techniques are relevant to these two 

objectives in COIN. Some examples: 

1. DNA analysis. 

a. Bodily fluids are often left at 

crime scenes, including blood, 

semen, saliva. 

b. Trace DNA may be present in a 

variety of places, including 

shattered glass, cigarettes/food 

items, fingerprints, etc. 
c. DNA can be used to source an 

individual apart from STRmatching of identity, e.g., in 

COIN for tribal identification. 

2. Impression evidence, including latent 

prints, tire/shoe marks, etc. 

3. Trace evidence. 

a. Chemical residue: to identify 

individuals who have used a 

firearm or worked in bombmaking. 

b. Other types of residue. 

It is clear from the above key elements that there are many policing 

applicable to COIN. The next step is to identify the information rel

the human terrain and the situational awareness of this “human topog

These are the issues for dealing with situational awareness. 

SITUATIONAL AWARENESS 

There are a number of factors that have impact on situational aw

These are listed below. 

1. Common operating picture: Units share basic informa

concerning identities and activities of insurgent or frien

groups and individuals (or those of unknown loyalty) o

constant basis. There is a basic understanding of the big pic

of operations in the region around an AO. 

2. Community understanding: Units understand the nature 

history (recent history especially) of key groups and leader

their AO. They understand the economics and culture of to

and neighborhoods well enough to detect anomalies. 

3. Patrol awareness: Individual soldiers have awareness of t

areas of patrol. Patrol occurs using the least intrusive leve

protection possible (i.e., on foot) but with the greatest degre

engagement possible (i.e., directly with as broad a cross-sec

of individuals, businesses, and institutions as possible). T

provides daily situational awareness to improve 

identification of criminal or insurgent behavior, individ

who “don’t belong,” and vehicles/structures/goods that may 

associated with insurgent activity. 
4. Geospatial analysis: This should not be underestimated. Po

have used geospatial analysis to allocate and direct patr

predict crime series, guide city planning, and achieve o

objectives, for a long time. Geospatial analysis may be the 

area where COIN has progressed furthest to learn from 

enforcement. 

Community policing has taken many forms in policing, but all 

start with the concept that crime can be prevented through com

engagement and non-kinetic force. Elements include the following: 

1. Neighborhood development, including the design of pu

spaces to promote use by citizens and limit opportunities 

criminal activity (e.g., Biederman rules, lighting, etc.). 

2. Neighborhood-level engagement: Everything f

neighborhood watch groups to community leader engagem

strategies to Project DARE are followed by community po

officers who are dedicated to these purposes. Are t

individuals within COIN operations who are analogous? 

3. Engagement: Two new approaches have each been ca

Ceasefire, but they share the goal of directly engaging offen

and their families and communities to promote their desista

from crime. The idea is to provide a culture of abiding by 

law and contributing to society. (As an aside, the most effec

way to get someone to go “straight” is to either age them ou

crime or get them married or with a long-term girlfriend.) 

Police depend on superior situational awareness within the local 

the human terrain every day. Conversely, conventionally trained 

units are trained to fight based on military intelligence and not the 

“cop on the beat” intelligence police live by. In COIN, where m

warfare of heavy forces has a minimal role at best, the militar

certainly take the lessons learned by the police and test them aga

COIN mission. 

In order to have a better understanding of the relationship 

policing and COIN, it is critical that we examine some of the lessons 

from previous conflicts in this introduction. These are summarize

following section. 
EXAMPLES OF LESSONS LEARNED 

In the following chapters, lessons learned from a number of past and 

operations are explored. These are based on the specific experienc

speakers, particularly in the Iraq and Afghanistan theaters of opera

this section, we cite a few examples based on the open literature as 

of introduction. 

OPERATION BLUE STAR (INDIA, 1984) 

 

Operation Blue Star, which took place in June 1984, was an Indian 

operation ordered by Indira Ghandi, Prime Minister of India, to remo

separatists from the Golden Temple in Amritsar. The separatists

Singh Bhindranwale, were accused of amassing weapons in the tem

operation was carried out by Indian army troops. Although it was m

successful, the operation aroused immense controversy, a

government’s justification for the timing and style of the attack ar

debated. Some of the issues surrounding this operation are as follows

1. A state cannot wait until the insurgents create 

enclave/separate area of operations from which they can st

or conduct their policies. Some of the complaints ab

Operation Blue Star were that the situation should not h

been allowed to get to that point to begin with. 

2. If the insurgents/guerrillas/fighters pose a non-negotiable thr

specific direct policies should be put in place against them e

on—whether such policy is capture, neutralization, or expul

from the state proper. 

3. In the case of religion-backed/inspired insurgency, the s

should promote moderate/non-violent leaders from 

community in question so as to create a powerful counterwe

to more extreme viewpoints. By the time India chose to 

forcefully, Singh Bhindranwale was already considered a sa

guru whose non-compromising stance on Sikh issues was a 

to action. 

4. The state must make intelligence on weap

trafficking/acquisition one of its top priorities when dea

with religion-backed/inspired anti-state movements 

formations. 
5. The state should be aware if any foreign assistance is give

the insurgents/guerrilla fighters. In this case, the Indian mili

was concerned that Pakistan may be supporting Bhindranwa

movement for an independent Sikh state. 

6. Actionable intelligence on the specific target is key, especi

if it is known that civilians as well as militants are going to 

congregating in the target area. Indian military overestim

the rebels’ strength and used overwhelming force. 

7. Attempt peaceful negotiations firsthand, if only to find out 

intent and purpose of the insurgents/guerrilla’s actions. Ar

action should be the choice of the last resort. 

8. If possible, an attack against the insurgents/guerrillas should 

be carried out on a day that is holy or scared for the religio

the other side—such an attack shows disrespect and disreg

of the religious and social norms of the other party. In

military chose to attack the Golden Temple on the holiest 

for the Sikhs worldwide. 

9. A state must remember and recognize the contribution mad

a specific ethno-religious community to the nation—Sikhs w

some of the most active supporters of India’s independe

from Great Britain, and formed a significant portion of 

nascent armed forces. Such respect can be a powe

reconciling tool if/when the conflict has reached the ar

struggle stage. 

10. Private or state media should be discouraged from op

taking sides in the conflict.

 

INDIAN STATE (http://panthic.org/articles/3332) 

At the end of it all, two questions are asked by the Sikhs of Punjab. 

Army action necessary and unavoidable? Secondly, if unavoidable, 

not have taken a different form, avoiding all the destruction 

bloodshed and the brutalities? Kirpal Singh, President of Khalsa 

Amritsar, stated that “if the government had been sincere in its e

solving the Punjab problem, it would have solved it long ago even be

Blue Star Operation, and there would have been no cause for the Ak

others to organize Morchas of the thousands of the people, from 

time, and the extremists would have been isolated and it would have 
known as to who were the extremists, what kind of men they were, a

they had been doing. The Government could have negotiated with 

the Government could talk with Laldenga of Mizos and extremist

Nagaland, who had been fighting with our military for the last 31 ye

what was the difficulty in talking to the extremists of Punjab and 

them what they wanted, what they were fighting and why the

collecting arms?” 

Similarly, S.S. Bhagowalia, who is the Vice-President 

Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (Punjab), was ex

forthright, “when the government in 1948 could control and 

Hyderbad from the Nizam who wanted to secede from independe

without any violence and killing of the common people, w

Government could not capture Bhindranwale with tact, without any 

to the Golden Temple? This has created tension and anger amo

minds of the people.” Surinder Singh Ragi gave another exampl

Indian Army had captured 93,000 soldiers of Pakistan army in Ban

in 1971 without bloodshed. Was bloodshed absolutely necessary 

Golden Temple to flush out a hundred or so terrorists?” 

Hazara Singh Vadale, an employee of the SGPC, echoed a c

sentiment: “The way the government of independent country attac

Golden Temple reminded us of the medieval time when our relig

attacked and we are persecuted. Thousands of women, children, p

had gathered here on June 3 for Gurupurab. They had no connect

politics, why they shot down?” 

Kirpal Singh, elaborating on the excesses committed said, “At 

of Blue Star Act, it could be known how many died of those w

fighting with the military but the fact is that due to Guru Pur

hundreds of pilgrims had come and were staying in the premise

Darbar Sahib. There were children and women among them. These 

were unarmed and the military attacked them and killed them. There

military did not allow their dead bodies to be cremated by the rela

handed over the same to them. Their dead bodies were insulted. N

was made to record their names and addresses. Now it has created 

problem. For example, if any deceased has any insurance or bank ba

any land dispute, his heirs require death certificate but in absence 

record of it, they did not get any compensation. Even in the hi

military wars, the people are allowed to take the dead bodies fro

others’ territories by showing white flags. When General Dyer kille
in Jallianwala Bagh, he also allowed the dead bodies to be taken 

relatives.” 

Shiv Singh Khushpuri, 65 years, a member of the S.G.P.

Gurdaspur district, said, “It was the duty of the State to identify the b

those who died in Operation Blue Star. After the Jallianwala Bagh m

the British Government identified those killed, handed over their b

the next kin and paid Rs. 2000 as compensation for every person 

the incident. Whereas in Operation Blue Star, the present governme

apparently independent country has not only not identified those k

missing, rather they are harassing and persecuting the families and fr

those who are reportedly missing.” 

S.S. Bhagowalia throws light on the efforts of the Govern

suppress information. “The doctors who conducted the post-mortem 

victims of the army action at Golden Temple were simply terrorized

were 20 bullets in a body, they were forced to record only tw

wounds, under the threat of being shot.” This only indicates the exte

massacre that took place and the ferocity with which the Army un

the operation. The common feeling in Punjab is that it was indeed 

Operation against Bhindranwale and other so-called terrorists, acco

the Government; it was an attack on the Sikhs “to teach them a le

they would never again raise their heads or voices in protest. 

Next, let us consider some of the lessons learned from Afgh

More detailed lessons from former theater commanders will be cove

in Chapter 5. 

AFGHANISTAN (2001–PRESENT) 

The ability of American forces to take and hold cities and vil

Afghanistan is severely limited by the ability of the central 

government to provide military and police resources in many part

country. In particular, insurgent strongholds are by their nature t

likely places for the Afghan government to provide effective 

Security, in this sense, is a political objective. A self-sustaining, le

government should be able to police neighborhoods and provid

services, thus enabling the conditions for public support. Any situ

which American military assets provide the most visible security 

nature an unstable situation, even if the dominance of American f

meant to be temporary. Further, sustained foreign presence has be

successful where it is least needed, such as in Tajik or other a
conducive to Taliban influence. In critical areas, the American mili

been successful for a period of time, but these gains are underm

several factors, including the lack of Afghan follow-up to take over 

responsibilities, lack of legitimate government capacity, turn

American military personnel, and the inability of foreign military f

provide police services unrelated to force protection. 

A relevant example is a mounted American military expedition t

about an hour from its base to provide periodic medical services to a 

Insurgents were seen to observe the situation but not interfere. 

operation does not change the fundamental security picture in the v

region and increases the vulnerability of American troops. 

humanitarian benefits, but even these are short-lived, because there 

little “leave-behind” building of indigenous capacity. 

There are several media accounts of Afghan elders complainin

the turnover in American military liaisons. Successive comman

informed by the local Afghan leader about their needs and security s

often at great risk from retaliation. The American commander is rep

eight months to a year, and the local commander must start over wit

person. They never see their counterpart ever again. The prototypical 

One Tribe at a Time, describing the successful liaison of a military u

a tribe along the Afghan-Waziristan border. The relationship bec

close and fruitful that the unit received intelligence about insurgen

from the tribe. Unfortunately, the story ends with the American 

returning home, with a new unit and commander without a 

relationship coming into the area. Past successful COIN campaigns 

that the foreign power could not afford to rotate troops on an annual 

extended tours led to a force that was intimately familiar with th

leadership, and relationships on the ground. The attempt by America

to substitute intelligence analysis or “human terrain” analysis 

knowledge base is not sufficient. 

Alternatively, there have been attempts to transform military 

using policing methods. Cop on the Beat and Combat Hunter 

programs used by the Marine Corps to train soldiers in the art of tra

police methods. These efforts emphasize the development of inte

through engagement with local communities and situational aware

patrol. The programs have been highly effective when employed. Co

Beat is now limited to only military police units within the Marin

thus limiting the effectiveness of the training for COIN operators, 

not in MP units. Further, the programs contradict traditional 
doctrine. Soldiers are not cops, follow very different rules of eng

and authority, and usually avoid non-kinetic contact and methods. 

Thus, counterinsurgency operations are largely dependent 

capacity of Afghan army and police. Alternatively, the military may 

local tribal leaders to provide this capacity, but this option is limite

weakness of Afghan tribes, which have been under siege for over 3

and the influence of the drug trade, which has also undermined tra

tribal loyalties and precepts. Further, reliance on local triba

undermines the central government even further, thus preventing th

of the rule of law and the strengthening of the security forces ess

further gains. 

Unfortunately, the Afghan army is not capable of sustained, inde

actions and the Afghan police are extremely weak or corrupt. T

counterinsurgency is often denied basic intelligence of the type tha

be obtained by police and that would enable effective COIN. Th

always be a “security gap” after the military gains control and befo

police forces can become effective. In Afghanistan, the military is—

most part—incapable of providing enough local security to subst

local police in sufficient quantity and for a long enough period to 

insurgent attacks and maintain local security. Even soldiers trained i

or Cop on the Beat–like methods cannot be expected to provide leg

for a government that does not show effective security on its ow

may—in ideal circumstances—perform some functions usually as

with stability police units (similar to gendarmerie) or border police, 

cannot respond to citizen calls for assistance, investigate crimes, or 

useful crowd control. 

In particular, the situation in Afghanistan mirrors experience wi

violence, such as terrorist groups. In terrorism, groups form a conti

methods from legitimate expression through extreme violence. In t

way, insurgent groups and tribes in Afghanistan form a continuum i

some are very loyal to the Karzai government, others oppose the gov

through democratic means, some maintain independent governance 

violence, some engage in opportunistic violence based on local cond

the drug trade, some seek autonomy through consistent, violent opp

and some are ideologically committed to a violent overthrow of the 

government. Only this last group can be considered implacably opp

the central government and not susceptible to improvements in leg

through COIN operations. Also, very few of these various groups 

engaged through COIN as employed by the military without an e

national civil police authority. 
THE FOLLOWING CHAPTERS 

This book is organized into several topics based on the worksho

Policy considerations from the Department of Defense and Depart

Homeland Security are outlined in the Second Chapter. These are b

the perspectives of senior officials from these departments who have 

policy role. In the Third Chapter, we set the stage with two 

approaches to the conflicts of policing and counterinsurgency. Th

based on the visions of two prominent authors in this subject. In th

Chapter, we cover the strategic lessons from American policing. W

fortunate to have leading representatives from the major police dep

in the United States. They highlighted their experiences and perspec

the fundamentals of American policing and the methods available to 

counterterrorism operations. In the Fifth Chapter, CTNSP and CTTS

pleased to have students from both the National War College 

Industrial College of the Armed Forces who have recently return

theater operations. They provided us with the lessons learne

Iraq/Afghanistan operations. 

In the Sixth Chapter, we go back in recent history and highlight 

the lessons learned in past conflicts. These observations were b

actual experiences of the speakers, complemented by interviews 

recent COIN war fighters. In the Seventh Chapter, we cons

fundamental issues of COIN policy and process. These thoughts we

on in-depth studies conducted by the speakers and published in 

Journals. In the Eighth Chapter, we consider the fundamental i

building an indigenous policing capacity. The examples presented 

result of specific programs in existence such as the Australian Inter

Deployment Group and others in-depth. 

At the completion of reading these pages, the authors hope 

reader walks away armed with increased knowledge of policing an

parallels and is now able to ask better questions about how Americ

better prepared to bring such conflicts to a successful conclusi

answers to the many questions may not lie in these pages, 

information necessary to start the search for the answers does. Whe

answers are here in black and white, or the path to answers begin

these pages, this monograph establishes an attempt to document 

learned in policing and COIN and will hopefully start a trend of r

such lessons so American forces are better prepared and do not 

relearn what they have learned before. 
Chapter 2: Policy Considerations—The Departme

Defense and Department of Homeland Securit

THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

James Schear 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations, 

United States Department of Defense 

Indigenous police success is a key ingredient in the success or failu

counterinsurgency (COIN) mission. Police are an integral part 

stabilization landscape. Police are part of the landscape but the cha

their presence is diverse—including monitoring, enforcing, traini

advising. There are many examples: Kosovo, Israel, and others. W

we say about these experiences? I am eager to learn from you. I wo

to provoke discussion and feedback on the following assertions. 

1. Indigenous policing is absolutely vital to the overall succes

the counterinsurgency mission. Police with contacts to the l

communities will perform better than extended military u

who may not be attuned to the local needs. However, corrup

of the police is a problem and can create severe obstacle

progress. You have probably heard of the story of how Afg

farmers get stopped by police 8 times and are shaken dow

badly they have no money left over to buy produce 

themselves. 

2. Pre-war police traditions are not all alike—there are danger

over-generalizing. Somalian, Haitian, and Bosnian police h

different degrees of politicization in their ranks. One should 

careful at overgeneralizing at the nature of the baseline. 

appropriate precaution would appear to be to withh

judgment until one is actually deployed on the ground. 

3. In police business, gaining physical access is hard, 

achieving cognitive access—which involves figuring out 

people operate, how they react to your presence—is m

harder. 
4. Local supply of police trainers and advisers is chronically s

compared to the demand. Looking all over the world at CO

operations—and beyond COIN—a lot of the missions 

looking like the police missions. In Haiti, I don’t see 

mission for the military other than a police mission. How

exceptions to the rule exist—Brazilian military units patrol

the slums, working with the local police, is an example of a 

for military forces within COIN operations. Available resou

must be used in the best possible way since the supply 

demand for police forces is a chronic problem. 

5. There is a competing demand between achieving quick im

on the one hand and sustainability on the other. As an exam

in the case of the Anbar province in Iraq: while the training 

the Sons of Iraq movement was undertaken quickly, the 

challenge was to achieve sustainability for the force ov

longer timeframe. 

6. The police component is just one part of an overall package 

also must include corrections, the courts, and other syste

How to achieve balanced development and integr

deployment and use of law enforcement, judicial, correctio

and other related assets in diverse types of mission is still un

discussion. 

7. In sustainability projects, tensions exist between the need 

conduct police reform on the national level and the coordin

undertaking of such reforms on the local level. In s

countries, the population diversity is such that the nati

police units tend to look like occupiers when deployed loc

However if the police force is formed and deployed from pu

local personnel, familiarity may increase the likelihood 

corruption. 

8. Washington-level challenge: The United States is not 

structured to be a good player here—DoD and State each h

some capacities that sometimes work. That’s a legal authori

funding challenge. There are new and better ways that 

should be able to structure ourselves. We would like to keep 

security forces’ police capacity front and center as we loo

this problem. 
9. We should not overlook some positive cases, especially in 

Palestinian Authority efforts over the past few efforts (gran

it is an unusual case on the local level). 

QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION 

Discussion involved questions related to security assistance, expandi

civilian capacity, and the development of internationally deployable 

assets. 

 Security Assistance: We are committed to the Presiden

Policy Directive that will address the basic principles 

practices in security assistance management. In broad terms

stakeholders in the community are more diverse than previo

imagined: The Department of State, INL, D

counternarcotics agencies, and OSD. There is an argument 

the current patchwork system is better suited to what we nee

would highlight that there is a high likelihood that we will tr

unveil a new system—a concept of shared responsibility 

works across a large spectrum of training, equipment, 

ministerial capacity. There may be a very focused piece of 

with regard to the rule of law and capacity-building in a

where the civilian providers are challenged. 

 Expanding Civilian Capacity: The questioner suggested 

there never has been political will to have excess capacit

police the way we have excess capacity with the mili

strength. It was observed that excess military capacity does 

get you off the hook when figuring out the scaling and 

ground situation. In Haiti, after the recent earthquake, 

number of U.S. troops deployed in that country was increa

from several hundred boots on the ground to over 20,000. If 

U.S. had more access to appropriate types of civilian exper

it would be possible to get the best out of our military in te

of the types of performance in the civilian area and ach

more sustainable results. It would be nice to have someone 

the team who knows the human terrain, to have the c

military presence, and Afghanistan is probably a laboratory 

that. To focus on the complexity of the overall probl

yesterday, at the Global Leadership Conference, Secreta

Clinton, Gates, Geithner, and the USAID Administrator w

talking about global development with a focus on how 

rebuild the capabilities of USAID. 
 Internationally-Deployable Police: It was observed that 

Australian International Police are capable of deploying po

forces internationally in a rapid and efficient manner and 

the U.S. does not have the structure to create a sim

organization. A question was asked whether there was 

interest or effort to develop a surge capacity in the U.S. in o

to undertake policing. It was observed that developing the r

formula to work that would involve input from the Justice 

State Department authorities, and funding to build that capa

would be helpful. There are people in both Departments 

share a desire to move in that direction, but it is very hard. T

would have to work it out. Furthermore, it was observed 

the biggest difference between the U.S. and Australia in te

of providing support for international policing activities 

that Australia has one clear agency in charge of police, w

the United States has at least a thousand agencies. Ev

country organizes its law enforcement differently. There 

1,000 officers and their support staff in the Australian force

example. 

THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Arif Alikhan 

Assistant Secretary for Policy Development, 

United States Department of Homeland Security 

Perspectives of Arif Alikhan, Assistant Secretary for Policy Devel

on Community-Oriented Policing and Counterinsurgency Strategies 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has a significan

assisting state, local, and tribal governments in building resilience to 

attacks, natural disasters, violent crime, and industrial accidents. 

grant funding, assistance with planning and response, resear

development, and regional coordination, DHS promotes colla

partnerships with the numerous jurisdictions, emergency response a

and communities to build a stronger and safer country. 

DHS believes that government and community partnerships are 

elements necessary to prevent, prepare, respond to, or recover fr

catastrophic event or violent crime. This has been borne out i

circumstances where local communities, in partnership wit

governments, have reduced violent crime, responded to natural disas
built more resilient communities to handle a variety of novel eme

and evolving threats. 

The ability of local communities, such as Los Angeles, to reduce 

crime is an excellent example of violence reduction in a comple

circumstances involving diverse cultures, languages, need

governmental entities. In the past, the Los Angeles Police Departm

not have the best relationship with the many diverse com

throughout the city. This was particularly acute in various low-

culturally diverse neighborhoods in South Los Angeles where the po

was predominantly African American and Latino. Major incidents f

Watts riots of 1965 to the 1992 riots following the acquittal of police 

charged with crimes in the beating of Rodney King have often been 

manifestations of distrustful and resentful relationships between 

represented communities and law enforcement authorities. 

Soon after the 1992 riots, various commissions recommended 

City of Los Angeles implement community-oriented policing appro

building positive and constructive relationships with the communit

serve. This was not intended solely to ease racial tensions but was a

as a mechanism to reduce the high levels of gang-related and other 

crimes that had plagued South Los Angeles for decades. 

According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office of Com

Oriented Policing Services (COPS), community oriented policing 

three elements: (1) development of collaborative partnerships 

police and the communities they serve; (2) collaborative

systematically identify problems and develop prioritized and e

collaborative solutions to address the identified problems; and (3) a

organization’s management, structure, and personnel to support com

partnerships and proactive problem solving. 

Los Angeles took many years to implement the elements of com

oriented policing and build the trust necessary for success. The inves

time, money, and structural change has resulted in dramatic reduc

violent crime, especially in gang-ridden neighborhoods. Community 

for the LAPD has dramatically risen and necessary police actions, su

officer’s use of force or a series of gang-related arrests, rarely b

public protestations and community animosity that accompanied 

actions before community partnerships were developed. In addit

positive partnerships with community members and other gov

agencies have resulted in an integrated whole-of-government and w

community approach to the complex social phenomenon of urban cri
There are several aspects of community-oriented policing tha

highly relevant to a successful counterinsurgency strategy. Giv

counterinsurgency strategy is highly dependent on community invo

and positive relationships, the elements of community-oriented 

appear essential to success. 

First, government authorities, whether military or civilian, must 

trusted and collaborative relationships with the affected populatio

requires intense study and understanding of the different cultural

linguistic, and other backgrounds of the various communities. Oft

factors not only differ significantly from city to city, village to vill

neighborhood to neighborhood and home to home. That is why it is 

that law enforcement authorities have a deep understanding 

communities they serve and a constant and consistent presence 

areas. A short deployment or rotating assignment creates significant 

to the development of successful relationships and has often 

challenge in law enforcement agencies that frequently rotate off

transfer officers to other assignments. 

Second, constructive and collaborative partnerships 

communities and authorities are necessary to develop innovative solu

complex problems whether overseas or in the United States. Com

members, who may have lived in the area for generations, will kno

about their surroundings, its history, and what may or may not 

address a community problem. This has been shown time and again 

communities where the communities provided innovative ideas and 

ownership role in their implementation. Similarly, a su

counterinsurgency strategy requires the indigenous population to 

involved in addressing the threats they face from insurgents and othe

Third, military or police authorities involved in impleme

counterinsurgency strategy must develop a structure and s

organizational approach to develop the expertise, provide incentiv

enable a constant and sustained presence in the community. Man

departments in the United States have proclaimed to use com

oriented policing in their communities but failed to make the organ

changes and provide the structural incentives to promote the develop

the skills necessary to implement a collaborative community p

solving approach. Successful departments, on the other hand, recru

and promote officers who develop the necessary expertise. And the

across the board, and not simply by creating a few specialty assi

within the department while the remainder of the police, who have f

interaction with the public on a daily basis, do not have the necessa
or receive the necessary training. In fact, an untrained beat cop c

unwittingly undermine community-policing efforts and reverse any p

A successful counterinsurgency strategy must also build i

organizations the structural and systemic elements necessary to inc

promote, and implement a true culture of collaborative community p

solving. 

The successes and failures of community-oriented policing in th

States can help inform the development and implementa

counterinsurgency strategies throughout the world given their 

objective of building community support to mitigate the violent ac

criminals and insurgents. This area is ripe for continued 

development, and refinement whether in Afghanistan or America. 
Chapter 3: Visions of Conflict Policing 

John Morgan 

Deputy Director for Science and Technology 

Counter-Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) 

United States Department of Defense 

Dr. John Morgan, Deputy Director for Science and Technolo

Counter-Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO), the U.S. Dep

of Defense, chaired Roundtable I: Visions of Conflict Policing

Members included Colonel Joseph Celeski and Dr. David Bayley. 

Celeski is Senior Fellow of the Joint Special Operations Universit

former commander of coalition and joint special operations forces 

tours in Afghanistan. He is the author of the monograph: Policing a

Enforcement in COIN—The Thick Blue Line, a guide for newly d

military units that provides details about the mechanics of using p

support COIN objectives to military professionals. Dr. Ba

Distinguished Professor in the School of Criminal Justice at th

University of New York at Albany. He is the co-author with Robert P

the book: Police in War, Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violen

that approaches the problem of a gap in curriculum and policy for 

indigenous police units, especially in conflict environments. 

INTRODUCTION 

It has become axiomatic that counterinsurgency (COIN) can

successful unless the populace is secure. Further, COIN 

presupposes that effective, local policing must be present to sat

objective. Nonetheless, very little attention has been paid to the s

and tactics necessary to develop and use indigenous police in 

environments. This gap exists despite the quite extensive academic l

in the two separate fields of COIN and police development. In rece

especially (though dating back at least to T.E. Lawrence), COIN h

the subject of a great deal of discussion, leading up to the develop

the seminal U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Man

its adoption as the central strategic approach of allied operation

General Petraus in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Similarly, policing has developed a rich and influential literatu

several generations of practitioner and academic contributors

community policing and hot spots to management approaches and d
of legitimacy, policing theory has been debated, tested, and adopted 

into practice. Since the mid-90s, much work has been contribute

subset of this literature that deals with the development of pol

stability operations and the developing world. For example, Bruce B

others have written extensively on the development of security system

private and public, in Africa. Nonetheless, the intersection betwee

and policing has not been widely explored, nor have the issues con

military-police cooperation been resolved. 

Two recent works attempt to address these gaps, though fro

different perspectives. Colonel Joseph Celeski, Senior Fellow of t

Special Operations University and a former commander of coalit

joint special operations forces for two tours in Afghanistan, produ

monograph Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—The Thick B

as a guide for newly deployed military units. Because of the d

military literature on COIN, Celeski saw the need to provide detai

the mechanics to military professionals of using police to suppor

objectives. Scholars David Bayley and Robert Perito also produced 

on the subject: Police in War, Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and 

Crime. Bayley and Perito approached the problem of a gap in cur

and policy for training indigenous police units, especially in 

environments. Materials have been developed among contracto

perform such training on behalf of the United States or United Nati

these materials are not readily available and, in any case, do not nec

reflect evidence-based or best practices from policing and research. 

A DISCUSSION WITH CELESKI, BAYLEY, 

AND OTHER EXPERTS 

In the interest of further developing the disparate ideas represented 

two important milestones in the development of a literature ab

development of policing in COIN and other conflict environme

National Defense University and Technical Support Working Group 

a discussion with Celeski, Bayley, Perito and other experts concern

research and conclusions. Because of their different perspective

respective conclusions contained several differences. This paper atte

summarize their views and, to the extent feasible, provide a synt

their conclusions for the interested reader. 

There is a long history of the development of policing in 

environments, as well-described by Celeski and Bayley/Perito. In f

base of evidence is common to both viewpoints, although the examp

finds particularly instructive diverge. Celeski, for example, cit
Lawrence (“the granddaddy of COIN,” as he puts it), who first po

the insurgent paradigm: insurgents race to build their manpowe

government is racing to secure the populace. The upper hand in the 

goes to the side which is more effective in its particular race. Thus, i

evident that police must play a critical role in counterinsurgency 

primary mode for a government to secure its populace on a day-to-d

Celeski also cites success in India with the use of police forces to 

insurgency in the Punjab. Celeski notes that India has accelerated th

police forces to deal with its Maoist Naxalite insurgency. In Andhra 

the Indian government expanded police forces by 37,000, in

intelligence gathering, and occupied what had been a power vacuum 

Naxalites had occupied for many years. This is an interesting contr

Nepal, which was faced with the same insurgency but failed to b

police forces. Some external aid was provided to Nepal to do this, b

insufficient or ineffective and the government fell to the Maoist ins

over two years ago. 

Celeski notes that insurgency is political warfare, where violence 

to achieve political ends. Celeski holds that COIN and violent cr

closely related, though he emphasizes their commonality as su

political violence in many cases. For example, most insurgencies s

criminality, i.e., as a law enforcement problem. If the police h

capacity to respond, then the situation remains stable. Also, the situa

be stabilized by reinforcement of the police, as was the case in N

Ireland after 1976. Once the police are overwhelmed, the milit

typically become involved and the violence is officially recognize

insurgency, although the designation could easily have been appli

earlier stage. Even at this stage, the police are usually the most i

force. In Afghanistan, for example, according to the Special I

General for Afghan Reconstruction, more than twice as many mem

the Afghan National Police have been killed in the war as have mem

the Afghan military. Thus, Celeski insists that police be harden

adequate physical security and supplies of weapons, as well as by 

protection. Police welfare is critical, because they represent the exit 

for COIN. Once the police can protect the public from political viole

insurgency is fundamentally defeated. Ideally, if things are going w

can expect that 95% of insurgents or terrorists will be brought in by 

action. Interestingly, Bayley and Perito hold a similar view. First, th

with Celeski that the responses to insurgency, terrorism, and viole

are closely related. They emphasize the need for police to be fair, a

and responsive to respond to each of these threats. Further, they ag

Celeski that police are the “exit strategy” for COIN. However, they 

that the emphasis must be on the development of core policing th
engaged in kinetic warfare in COIN. Rather, they believe th

“militarization” of police undermines their ties to the populac

legitimacy, and ultimately the legitimacy of the government itself. Th

a much more brightly delineated division of labor between the ind

military and police, as will be described in more detail below. 

As a veteran of Afghanistan, Celeski has seen up close ho

lessons were missed in the early years of that conflict. There w

functioning government or police in many areas of Afghanistan for 

years, and the Karzai government held little sway outside Kab

military, in particular the coalition military, served by necessi

constabulary force in collaboration with tribal elders. In Afghanis

Iraq, military operations quickly decapitated the Taliban and 

governments, respectively, creating a power vacuum. It was not un

the so-called “Year of the Police,” that a concerted effort was made 

to build police forces. This was years after widespread looting and r

Baghdad and elsewhere that was largely unimpeded by the A

military, which lacked the training, doctrine, and weapons (e.g., le

munitions) to deal with policing problems. 

As Celeski notes, the military has many constitutional and legal 

such as restrictions under Title X, to refuse to do police op

especially those related to constabulary or community policing. It sh

noted that military history does not reflect bright lines between the 

and police operations. Military units trained police in Indian tribal 

the American west in the 19th Century. The Marine Corps trained p

Haiti as early as 1915. Title X itself provides that the Army pe

mission includes counter-drug support, security assistance, and 

internal defense, activities that are closely related to police work. In 

Afghanistan, the military has been tasked to perform police 

although these activities are based on specific legal exceptions. 

seems to take a sanguine view of the military’s police-like rol

military performs police functions because there is no alternative. Th

learn to use police tactics, train police, and use police to suppor

because that is the reality the situation demands on the ground. 

Celeski advocates that military units learn the capabilit

indigenous police can provide, especially with respect to special poli

He does not suggest that police perform military operations per se

been done with elements of the Afghan National Police, such as the 

National Civil Order Police. Rather, he notes that certain police cap

are indispensable to effective military COIN. Of course, police inte

is a crucial tool in this regard, and the leveraging of police intellig
COIN is accepted universally as a critical COIN asset. Celeski goe

with the concept of “COIN-enabling” the indigenous police. First, po

substitute for the military in some sectors to free the military to 

elsewhere. Celeski favors police pseudo-operations, in which insurg

“turned” to support the government and then sent back to the enemy 

gather intelligence. The military, he feels, does this poorly, but a goo

unit understands how to conduct snitch operations to gather inte

Counter-drug police have been highly effective in Afghanistan, 

American Drug Enforcement Administration has enormous exper

supporting COIN-like operations through the development of spe

counter-drug law enforcement units, most notably in Colombia. 

patrols, paramilitary and special branch police are also useful in 

according to Celeski, and were critical to success in the police-led 

counterinsurgency. Of course, local, community-based police uni

necessity, as outlined above, to provide the ultimate exit strateg

COIN. Their support does not necessarily conflict with the activ

special police units. Some of the activities that Celeski associa

special police units have a paramilitary flavor and the use of police 

operations may blur the lines between military and police, thus unde

police legitimacy and, by extension, the indigenous government 

seeking to support. Therefore, although these units may hav

immediate utility, especially in counter-drug operations, some 

should be exercised prior to their employment or external reinforce

is also paramount that the training of these units emphasizes rule of 

human rights. 

Celeski notes that his focus is on police and COIN, which 

different from how to manage police in stability operat

reconstruction. His thesis about the use of specialized police is very 

to discussions of conflicts ranging from Rhodesia to Afghanistan, 

should be careful to generalize from any one of these past experien

possible to see that specialized police are useful to COIN becau

necessary to use multiple strategies and tactics to defeat insurgencie

by necessity, tribal police rules and expectations must be respected, 

inadvisable to impose community or democratic ideals of policing in 

village. Celeski foresees that these issues will become more centra

future security environment for the United States. The core needs w

law enforcement, intelligence, military support, and special op

Doing these things well will be the foundation for American secur

Iraq and Afghanistan wind down. 

Bayley and Perito share with Celeski the importance of pri

indigenous police capacity-building in COIN. For them, the 
questions relate to the role of the police and how they should be 

Observing the same history and evidence as Celeski, they come 

different conclusions about the optimal strategy for the role of p

COIN. As outlined above, they share with Celeski a view that insu

terrorism, and violent crime form a strategic continuum with c

challenges. They emphasize the need to build core policing cap

response to each of these threats. They oppose the use of police 

military or paramilitary operations. Their three strategic princi

countering insurgency, terrorism, and violent crime are: 

1. The great effectiveness multiplier in the use of state po

against violence is the allegiance and support of the public. 

2. In order for governments to gain public support, responsib

for security should be entrusted, in so far as possible, to po

deployed among the population, who minimize the use of f

and who act in accordance with accepted standards of hu

rights. 

3. Capturing, killing, or imprisoning people committing vio

acts are unlikely to be effective as a long-term solution 

insecurity unless guided by precise intelligence identify

perpetrators or infrastructure. 

Their first objective, focusing on the critical role of public support in 

is a theme shared by every modern thinker on COIN doctrine, in

Celeski. The third objective, especially with respect to its emph

intelligence, is also a common theme. Most practitioners would ag

intelligence is critical, but would not state this necessity in the same 

Bayley and Perito. Of course, poorly informed and planned 

operations can backfire and antagonize the population, as some o

believe has happened in Afghanistan. In fact, Bayley and Perito beli

kinetic operations are necessary, but that a division of labor between 

military operations and non-kinetic police activities is needed. One m

from one mode to another, mixing and matching depending on 

conditions, but always maintaining the role of police in serv

protecting the local population. 

Thus, Bayley and Perito focus on the second objective, which 

that the development of “core” policing is the most crucial part of the 

policing paradigm. As Bayley has put it, the government’s legitimac

measured by the likelihood that a parent would instruct their childre

911 (or the equivalent) to get assistance from the police in the eve
emergency. So, the exit strategy or measure of success in COIN 

development of core policing capacity to provide essential security 

populace. Ideally, it is not necessary to implement core policing 

model of the developed, Western ideal, which is, after all, not 

universally even in the United States. Rather, for Bayley and Perit

context of active conflict, core policing requires that police be a

responsive, and act fairly. They view these as universal concepts 

understood in every human society. In fact, we may expect the pop

demand police who act in this way. Typically, police in COIN envir

fail to be available, responsive and fair and are often corrupt, nepo

brutal. Such police, it may be said, will also not demonstrate loyalt

government. We may speculate that the situation in Afghanistan w

radically different if police there were perceived to represent core 

values as outlined by Bayley and Perito. 

Of course, much police training does not address the principles 

policing. Firearms training, self-protection, and law enforcement tec

dominate indigenous police training programs, whether they are sp

by the military, civilian agencies, or the United Nations. In fact, Bay

Perito conducted a survey of international police training pr

including some proprietary training programs given by contractor

found that less than 10% of police training dealt with core policing 

while 50% is weapons training. Training is the opportunity to pro

attitude of service among police. Current training models fail to 

opportunity to instill those values. 

What is the role of the police if they are properly traine

government cannot deploy core police everywhere, because they 

killed. The Afghan Federal Police have two to four times the casualt

the Afghan National Army, and Celeski presents a range of data 

that this ratio is typical in COIN. Therefore, it is inadvisable to trai

to be “little soldiers,” as Bayley calls it, because police cannot be eff

kinetic COIN operations. It is difficult to fight kinetically and then 

be responsive local police. Further, Bayley and Perito do not believe 

military should attempt police training and development. The 

cannot deal with the difficult problems in building police capac

example, they don’t have an instrument to deal with internal corru

local forces and therefore must often just have to live with it. 

If we maintain bright lines between military and indigenous pol

we must also maintain a clear division of labor as well. The mi

responsible for “clearing” an area of insurgents. Both the military an

operate in the “holding” of an area. Police, on their own, are respon
“building” security and governance. Celeski sees this division of 

history as a natural outgrowth of weak governance, in which an ins

grows when police are no longer capable of providing security on th

Regardless, the local military commander must be able to make i

judgments about the division of labor in each area and the evol

security to local police. Thus, the success of a COIN campaign is m

by the movement of security responsibilities toward the polic

important to note that success cannot be measured based on the num

police trained or deployed. Rather, the critical performance meas

populace served by police, the populace whose security is solely prov

the police, the extent to which the military is no longer needed in 

operations, and perceptions of police accountability among the p

served. 

Bayley and Perito draw some important lessons about the d

building core policing in conflict environments. As a star

communities and ethnic groups must be engaged in the job of poli

Los Angeles, the police recruited people who were ambassadors 

communities. Today, Latinos make up about a third of police recr

the city police department and the perception of the police amon

communities has improved enormously. In Northern Ireland in 1

British government’s Patten Commission noted that Catholic are

under-policed, even “de-policed.” Only 6% of the Royal Ulster Cons

was Catholic, while 94% was Protestant. Not only did the dire

operations shift at that time from the military to the police, but e

reverse the ethnic divisions within the police were also pursued

efforts did not make much progress until Sinn Fein was brought 

government and became a stakeholder in providing even-handed 

regardless of community. This story is not yet over, and police units 

areas of Northern Ireland remain under siege. In Afghanistan, Bay

argued that local engagement is so critical that it may be necessar

people who “look a lot like the Taliban” but will stabilize the situ

local areas. The implication is that tribal groups can be trained and w

able to perform as available, responsive and fair police. The 

practitioner has two choices to address tribal resistance and limitati

the one hand, the government can devolve policing to local 

regardless of divisions that may escalate—for a time—the visib

divisions. Alternatively, the government can build police an

institutions that can perform across divisions using people who are tr

be fair and even-handed. We can observe that the latter approac

primary strategy in Afghanistan, but its viability is questionable in a 

with a history of almost complete local (i.e., tribal) control. Even in 

of a unified and “peaceful” Afghanistan, the central police played th
arbiter and peacekeeper among tribal-based authorities and police 

similar, hybrid strategy may be needed now. 

Bayley and Perito highlight the issue of corruption as well. 

oversight of police capacity-building has a major weakness in t

because the military has no instrument to deal with internal corrupti

result, American military leaders often advocate that local corru

something “we just have to live with.” Bayley and Perito point out 

can’t have police that are both good and corrupt because equal pr

under the rule of law is a central tenet of good policing. Theref

military needs alternative resources from the U.S. Government to 

civilian issues, particularly with respect to building police fre

corruption. For example, one significant success of the Depart

Justice ICITAP program was the development of processes to 

corruption in the Iraqi security forces. 

At first glance, the Bayley and Perito and the Celeski mod

appear irreconcilable. The former emphasize local, core policing 

latter the development of specialized police units that can suppor

operations in COIN. The fundamental differences should not be 

Celeski sees opportunities to use police to prosecute successfu

operations. Bayley and Perito feel that core policing has been ign

favor of building police to support kinetic operations, thus unde

American COIN efforts. Nonetheless, there are commonalities amo

views, as follows: 

 COIN success can be measured by the degree to which secu

responsibilities have been transferred to the police. This sho

not be confused with metrics about the number of polic

police units. Rather, this should be measured in terms 

populace served and legitimacy. 

 The successful COIN military commander must be awar

available police assets and maintain a strategy for the build

of police capacity in his area of operations. In cur

operations, these assets are a critical intelligence tool to re

the targeting of insurgents. Police assets represent the cen

element of securing the populace, which in turn is the m

important aim of COIN operations. 

 Police assets should only be deployed when they can ope

safely and be equipped to protect themselves. It should 
expected that police will be a primary target of insurgents 

will take more casualties than other units. Their phys

security must be ensured if they are to be effective (and if 

expects they will remain on duty). 

 As a corollary to the above, military units will be neede

maintain security in an area so long as police are unable to 

this job on their own. Successful COIN may be predicated 

the judgment of local commanders about the proper mix 

military and police assets at a particular moment in ti

Further, the local commanders must judge when it is possibl

pass security responsibilities to the police in a particular area

 Civilian (“interagency”) engagement is necessary to b

indigenous police capacity. The military lacks the tools 

doctrine to train, equip, and monitor police, so it is necessar

deploy civilian assets to perform this mission, especially 

areas with communal violence. 

 The training of military commanders should inc

collaboration with police and in the judgments needed to a

commanders in their relationship with police and in 

judgments needed to share and pass security responsibilitie

police in COIN or other conflict environments. 

Although there are strategic differences between the two app

these commonalities show that there are critical lessons that may be 

from past successes and failures. In addition, from our analysis 

presentations, we may infer some ideas that are contrary to aspect

works of either Celeski or Bayley and Perito but that may be 

syntheses. 

First, the development of core policing and specialized police un

not be mutually exclusive. Specialized police units have be

successful in many conflicts, including in Afghanistan. For exam

Drug Enforcement Administration has developed specialized a

police units that have interrupted the opium trade and intercepted f

flows to insurgent groups. Although these units may not be “avail

“responsive” in the traditional policing sense, they are expected to a

and be responsive to the Afghan populace at large. We may concl

specialized police unit development should be a priority for COIN, 

as their training reflects the Bayley/Perito core policing doctrines as 

be clear, Bayley and Perito do not share this view, because they 
building of such special units interferes with the development 

policing capacity and undermines legitimacy. 

Also, policy-makers should be realistic about the development o

in conflict environments. Police development must precede recon

among communal factions or with insurgent groups. As a result, it 

necessary to leverage local or tribal assets that have ambiguous loy

history to establish security in some areas. For Bayley/Perito, th

mean the development of police under local ethnic control that m

example, have Taliban leanings but that will conform to basic con

the rule of law. For Celeski, this could mean the use of informa

police tactical teams to weaken insurgents. In each case, these are 

difficult choices. The situation also demands choices that may seem 

to the ultimate objectives of national engagement but are nece

building police capacity to protect local populations. Such choices 

made consciously and with appropriate training of those invo

minimize the possibility of abuses. 

Finally, it is imperative that the United States resolve the fund

gaps in its ability to perform the task of police capacity-building in 

environments. From Latin America to sub-Saharan Africa to Asia

conflicts will tend to focus on the extension of the rule of law

development of police will be a central need in almost every c

present, we rely on contractor-driven training models and outdated 

that hobble both military and civilian agencies engaged with the pro

should be noted that an ongoing, well-designed capacity in this a

have prevented much of the loss of blood and treasure in I

Afghanistan of the past decade. 

Although much work remains to be done on questions relatin

development of policing in conflict environments, Celeski and Bay

Perito have made major contributions to the field. Police train

capacity-building are now the province of open academic debate. W

hope that advancement of these ideas will serve to extend peace and 

in the world in coming decades. 

REFERENCES 

Celeski, Joseph, 2009. Policing and Law Enforcement in COIN—Th

Blue Line. Hurlburt Field, Florida: Joint Special Operations Univ
Bayley, H. David and Robert M. Perito, 2010. Police in War, F

Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent Crime. Boulder, Colorado

Rienner Publishers. 
Chapter 4: Strategic Lessons from American Poli

Brian Berrey 

Senior Advisor, Irregular Warfare Support Program (IWSP) 

Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) 

e-mail: brian.berrey.ctr@cttso.gov 

Brian Berrey is a senior advisor for the Combating Terrorism T

Support Office’s (CTTSO) Irregular Warfare Support Program 

which focuses on the research and development of non-mater

material concepts and solutions for the conduct of Irregular Warfar

V included three Participants: The Honorable Dr. Richard Fal

former Deputy Commissioner for Counterterrorism, New York Cit

Department, and Deputy Homeland Security Advisor and Deputy A

to the President; and with Former Charlotte Police Chief Da

Stephens, who has assisted CTTSO/IWSP while serving as the P

Vice President, and Legislative Committee Chair of the Major Citie

Chiefs Association Chief. This panel additionally hosted Mr. J

Lewin, Chief Information Technologist, from the Chicago 

Department. 

ABSTRACT 

Regardless of the type of doctrinal term that Iraq and Afghani

currently framed as (COIN versus Phase IV Stability Operation

years into these engagements (and other Phase Zero activities), the ca

gaps for population security and associated policing in conflict rem

unfulfilled requirement for the United States Government within Dep

of Defense as well as within the Interagency “whole of government

The American Police model may not be the most adaptive, socio-

and culturally correct reproducible construct for policing in 

however, it has many very positive attributes, and is a reflection of 

perceive as a socially just model. A confound in COIN polici

principal tenet of warfare in that the “enemy sets the engagemen

based on the asymmetric attributes that the threat uses to destabiliz

environments, are we, as a Nation, prepared for this new fu

expeditionary Police support operations? 
WHY IRREGULAR WARFARE AND POLICING IN COI

One of the greatest challenges DOD has is the cultural language it b

the problems associated with Low Intensity Conflict and these “les

or engagements.” As these lesser engagements are more interag

“whole of government” centric in execution, DOD can be perceive

gorilla in the room by the country team for any support to these activ

Regardless, DOD has devised a deep doctrinal framework to a

various sub-cultures of DOD (U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine 

U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Special Operations). With intertwined d

and instructions, DOD can illuminate where they have a role, 

and/or function with regard to support of anything the National 

apparatus needs to have executed; either supporting or supported. 

The Irregular Warfare Joint Operational Concept (IW–JO

published in September 2007, pointed out that IW was a replacem

Low Intensity Conflict. Version Two1

 of the JOC did not repeat t

statement; however, framed the doctrinal discussion concerning t

activities or operations that are undertaken in sequence, in parall

blended form in a coherent campaign to address irregular 

counterterrorism (CT), unconventional warfare (UW), foreign 

defense (FID), counterinsurgency (COIN), and stability operations 

Coupled to the U.S. Department of Defense Capstone Concept f

Operations (CCJO) what was could draw from the doctrine is a r

critical theme of the role and importance of all blended actions that i

DOD’s role and need to support enabling actions surrounding “pro

control civil populations and territory, improve capabilities of partn

seek and maintain essential civil services.”3

 

The presumption would could draw here is that the func

“policing” has applicability in all five activity areas of IW, not jus

However, in our two country engagement, that is the lens and narra

(the USG) are using to frame the current endeavors and discussions

are in a COIN fight. Thus much as the famous French Officer David 

inferenced in his writings from his Algerian experiences, counterins

(COIN) is a mission for the Police, with military in support as requi

exemplified in iterative lessons learned.4
WHAT DID THE PANEL SAY? 

DARRELL STEPHENS 

Should policing be approached as a COIN strategy, and what is sup

be the exact role of the military? Not a strategic talk; purely 

perspective. “I know policing; I don’t know the military issues.” It s

me that one of the challenges we have—assuming you are going 

policing in COIN strategy—is that the military has not accepted its 

policing entity. Does the COIN doctrine make sense and is it wha

supposed to be doing? 

I thought about the urban policing strategies that may be helpful

policing out should be an important part of that overall perspe

stability operations, where objectives are beyond what the 

objectives originally are, in helping the new governments that co

existence. There are strategies that have values, even in cultur

different from our own, since most people want to live in an envi

free of violence. Policing helps bring back such sought-after stability

“There is a lot of talk about community policing—it’s the 

policing that Bayley and Perito talked about in their book—som

respond to individual issues, someone who will treat people with 

The kind of policing is something that I believe will advance gain

countries that we seek to stabilize.” 

A lot of work has been done in America in urban and rural envir

that utilizes problem-solving principles and helps work through iss

provide safe communities. Even as far as fighting corruption—the c

we talk about have enormous levels of corruption, and local p

America have enormous levels of knowledge about this and are w

share their experience. 

Policing deals with more than just crime. Most police efforts a

on things other than crime even though the only metric you’re judg

the crime rate. “My perception is that policing around the world 

that—they take time to resolve conflict, or intervene in conflicts, th

kind of thing that policing brings to provide a sense of safety and sec

the extent that we possibly can.” That is part of the role of the mi

well. The military is expected to use force in the most economical 

achieve its objectives—protecting people or taking people into 

Legitimacy is incredibly important in regard to policing in America

doubt in the rest of the world. 
Stages that may be helpful to the U.S. as it approaches its operat

 Military is not comfortable with the role it has been give

Iraq from the policing perspective. 

 Military doesn’t plan for the post–major operations period

isn’t normally prepared for policing or long-term stabiliza

efforts. We may not want this responsibility, but we go

anyway. A lot of work is done by people in the field tryin

figure out the policing and security programs. Planning 

critical part. 

 Military will have to play a security role initially; then you 

bring in civilian experts on police training. The planning 

that type of operation has to be made. “I am not arguing 

have to make police officers out of soldiers—that’s 

unrealistic expectation.” We should plan until we have civi

police capacity, at the transition point. 

We have been in Afghanistan for 8 years—we could have bee

further along had we given the planning more attention. Planning, 

in the capacity for civilian policing, then moving toward the transiti

is the natural progression of our involvement. “If we are going 

policing part of COIN ops, we have to give a lot more attention to p

than we have done in the past.” 

RICHARD FALKENRATH 

 The military will continue to do policing—there is 

alternative, it’s just the reality. It’s important in terms of 

message such action sends to the insurgents. The DOD ha

embrace the fact that the military will have to take 

security/policing duties. If the actions are clearly defined, 

can undermine the insurgents because they’ll be identified 

criminals from the beginning. 

 Police training—we spend a lot of money on it in Iraq 

Afghanistan, and these programs have problems. Police train

is necessary but not sufficient. 

 Leadership aspect is extremely important. “That is what str

me the most about NYPD,” said Falkenrath. “The departme
know is dependent on top-down control, in order to make 

that people do their job.” Regular, everyday police duties ar

always what policemen want to do. Leadership must moti

police to do everyday work. 

 Corruption is a huge problem. In the power granted to polic

our society is inherent an enormous potential for abuse—

don’t pay these people enough money but give them powe

life and death.” Natural temptation is there. It’s worse 

society has a larger problem with corruption. Must de

aggressive mechanisms for integrity control—policing 

police, or “internal affairs.” It’s very hard to do, bu

completely essential. 

 We must design a system of checks and balances. Especial

power is centralized like it is in the NYPD, which is a l

force. 

 An important design question is the trade-off betw

centralization and efficiency or decentralization (less tempta

for abuse and control) and inefficiency. You cannot h

centralization of power with police that you want with y

military. 

 In other parts of the world, police are considered “instrum

of control” for the ruling party. Police departments mus

seen as apolitical; as supporting the rule of law. This 

generations-long transition, something that cannot be so

overnight. 

 Force: police cannot lose. “You must maintain ‘escala

dominance’—people must know you will prevail,” stre

Falkenrath. Police must have a reserve to use in 

circumstances. 

 It’s good for the police to come from within the community, 

there is a different model. British (Indian) model, where se

officials in police are in national service. “I am not sure wh

best,” argued Falkenrath, “you sometimes have to parac

people in for leadership.” 
 Police are vital for intelligence. Know the commun

Formerly arrested people are evaluated for their CI potential

 Crime is measurable. Metrics can be tailored to regions or o

filters. That is a spectacular management instrument; it’s a g

guidepost that informs where to deploy your resources. 

CDR. JONATHAN LEWIN 

 Much of policing nowadays is driven by technology and 

modeling—could be used in counterinsurgency, COIN. 

 CLEAR is Chicago’s data modeling system, expanded 

Illinois with possibility for the Greater Lakes regional system

 Provides intelligence to everyday patrol officers. Data rela

from real-time crime center. Web 2.0 map is used for e

intelligence tracking. Everyone in the department has acces

this information. 

 Interactive maps are quickly navigated/created. 

 FIMS used by all first responders in the city. Call center is l

the analysts in the Crime Prevention Information Center w

filter the information—technology fusion center. 

 Technology fusion center—connecting the dots between 

data. 

 Reportable uses of force: complaints, minor infractions, awa

citizen contacts, injury on duty, ratio of complaints to arrests

tracked live. This is updated every day. 

 The system can rank-order various buildings through 

agglomerations of data between agencies in order to monitor 

troubled areas. 

 Blackberry PDAs pilot program: “Officers love it.” 

Blackberrys are currently in circulation. 

 Would like to expand problem-solving techniques with 

community. Researching possibilities of real-time cam
sharing between citizens and police. 3,500 camera-rel

arrests so far, where camera-share played a role. 

 Automated system can track if the camera played a role in th

arrest. And anyone can send us a crime tip by text messages

just by using a phone. 

 Current state—data action state, where we can generate m

Would like to build systems for crime prediction by compi

data in model. We want to be proactive by utilizing any 

source that we can get that we can legally use. We are tryin

generate maps predicting where things may occur. 

PANEL QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Q: So many police officers are almost like overlapping tribes with t

own jurisdictions. There are formal and informal arrangements 

govern them. We don’t try to replicate that in places 

Afghanistan where tribal authority already exists. How does NY

operate in that regard? 

A: In the U.S. we have a unifying principle, which is the rule of 

They operate along same Constitutional guidelines. Ano

answer: “I would not design the system like we have.” I would 

not design a national police system for our country either. S

combination of local to state to federal makes a lot of sense here 

in other countries as well. Some tribal jurisdiction may work if 

can “keep them honest” to adhere to the rule of law. 

Q: All three of you manage large municipal police organizations

there a way that large police organizations can participate 

burden-sharing, how realistic is it, and can we make it work? 

A: It’s a great idea, but in practice it does not work because we hav

slack. Policing in the U.S. is a 24-7-365 job; we have no reser

for additional resources; it will have to be a major federal effor

some kind—people are busy, working every day. We have a sm

effort in Haiti, but the department is too busy. 

Q: Would there be a potential, if a funding source was available

build out an international-type capability. Is the limitation mone

a bureaucracy? 
A: There are risks—officers can get hurt in foreign countries. We 

not configured to support expeditionary expeditions. But we 

now down 60,000 cops since 9-11 (in NYC). When you hire a 

in NYC, it’s a multimillion-dollar proposition, which en

enormous resources. Yes, there is a price, but its a high pric

which a federal government can potentially make a deal with 

police department. It is the right concept, since this is where 

expertise is. It is a theory, but it does not work in practice. 

example, in Haiti, police left the U.S. and came back safely, 

police were there for a little while. It’s an enormous burden 

police forces to make up for the short fall for the police that can 

deployed overseas. This nation can be at a unique time to tak

look at some international models, like the Australian or a Europ

model. But how does it help local police departments if some c

may want to go overseas and we have to make up for the shortf

How about hiring a civil servant in that role with pension 

benefits? 

DO WE KNOW WHAT WE HAVE DONE SO FAR? 

As this symposium was focused on Operation Enduring Fr

Afghanistan (OEF–A), and leveraging Operation Iraqi Freedom 

experiences, one shortfall identified was the capture of the nu

activities undertaken across the services, and interagency partners, in 

of developing a body of knowledge with regard to Policing in 

Environment. Anecdotal discussions, as well as contracted support a

have been executed since 2005. A sampling includes the following: 

• Mobile Embedded Tactical Reconnaissance Operat

(METRO); a look at Police Methodologies for comba

Revolutionaries and Gangs. (DIA/CTTSO effort in Iraq, 200

• Army Science Board, Police Capacity Development—Do 

Understand the Dilemma, 2005. (RRTO/DIA/CTTSO ef

with ASB). 

• COIN—Technical Surveillance Architecture support ef

deploying technical tactical information collection means to 

MEB as it deployed into Al Qaim in 2005 with embed

LAPD advisor/trainer support. (RRTO/JIEDDO/CTT

effort).5
• General Petraeus FM 3–24 rewrite and establishment of 

COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth (2005–2007). 

• Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office Symposiums of L

Enforcement Support to DOD Operations, conducted thro

CTTSO/TSWG and IWSP. (See attached reports). 

• Legacy—Police Informant and Information Business Proce

training for Iraqi Ministry of Interior, in support of U.S. Ma

Corps in Al Anbar, 3rd ID in MND (2006–20

(JIEDDO/RRTO/IWSP effort). 

• Law Enforcement Program—Embedded Law Enforcem

Advisors to Brigade Combat Commanders. (JIEDDO effort)

SO WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 

Opinions vary, perspectives are provided from where one sits; from 

the USG—Allied Nation engagement arena in OEF–A and OIF, 

partner nation capabilities and capacities to absorb the “dogma d

Inconsistency in approach exists based on the local dynamics an

conditions, as well the receptivity of rule of law development to 

population security and economic development in “parting the in

from the rest of the fish in pond.” At times one could perceive 

interagency is not synchronized in the construct of what “Policing in 

means. 

As a research and development program office that has pursu

material solutions in this space, it has been stated by Department 

that policing in conflict is beyond their scope of capability. Coupl

the understanding that “policing” as a complex capability does not m

same thing to many foreigners as it is understood in the 

Hemisphere. In many countries, police are tied to the Ministry of 

and are a tool to suppress the population, not necessarily to pro

serve. 

 

In OIF and OEF–A, DOD has opted for a Police imbed Trainin

(PiTT) construct coupled together with rapid indigenous 

indoctrination and training capabilities to assist in capacity developm

an element of establishing the Rule of Law. The other component

Rule of Law (detainee operations and courts) lagged far beh

rudimentary development of patrolmen. A common perception 

American military and irregular warfare actions should leverage 
developed in policing to interdict insurgent or terrorist activity and 

legitimacy of friendly governments through extension of the rule 

which some of is alluded to in the doctrinal writings within the IW

However, the IW–JOC also identifies in Stability Operations th

Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Deve

(USAID) will be the lead U.S. agencies to support a host-nation’s 

establish or improve key aspects of governance to include rule of la

variety of services.”6

 

One of the most critical aspects that is probably not understoo

integration of the role of “Rule of Law” in the past two engagem

been the timing and sequencing of when, where, and who 

development and sustainment activities of police, courts, and pris

fluid “seize, clear, build” COIN fight. These engagements, and deve

activities, are never uniform across a conflict zone. 

 

It could be easily opined that what we, as a DOD entity, ar

learning was better captured during this workshop lunchtime 

discussions with National Defense University students providing a 

perspective. The better question may be “are they concerned w

Policing in COIN” aspects and if not then what were they concerned 

WHAT HAVE WE MISSED?

As illustrated in the Panel member’s comments; many who have con

from the Law Enforcement community to Department of Defense w

personnel, and insights; the lack of documented understanding of w

have done so far becomes one of the greatest challenges in being pre

not repeat the costs of what we should have learned from a force app

preparedness and doctrinal perspective. 

This is illuminated by solid contextual frame of writings that ex

regard to understanding what is required in Low Intensity Conflict a

conflict stages. Most notably, the Rand Corporation COIN studies p

wide body of literature on the subject. Additionally, the prospec

international community implied moral obligation of “you broke it, n

must fix it” in these expeditionary engagements, which resu

Presidential Decision Directive 56 in 1997 on “Managing C

Contingency Operations” and then eight years later National 

Presidential Directive 44, “Management of Interagency Efforts Con

Reconstruction and Stabilization.” A culmination of these experien

released by Rand in 2007 with former Ambassador Dobbins (an

release of “The Beginners Guide to Nation-Building,” which capita
other work with an experiential-based framework of considerati

planning factors for nation-building. 

Whether it be the failing, or failed, state situation or a tran

reconstruction and stability process, the monograph is an essential pr

understanding force constructs and relationships required to a

planning the elements associated with not only Policing aspects, 

inter-related aspects of nation-building activities inclusive of gov

economic stabilization, and more.7

Added to this complex issue is the fundamental gap that t

Military has been disconnected from this function based on historica

leading back to Viet Nam–era foreign policy issues. A very good tre

the subject illuminating the gap inside the U.S. military and the Inte

is found in the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations 

(PKSOI) Paper from the Army War College in Carlisle titled “U.S. 

Forces and Police Assistance in Stability Operations: The Lea

Option To Fulfill the U.S. Capacity Gap,” by retired Colonel D

Keller. The artful discussion makes a solid case concerning the ch

environment, and engagements in a globalized market space and c

may require re-looking at the prohibitions outlined in the Foreign As

Act of December 1974 inclusive of Section 660.8

 USAID now 

community based policing endeavors as approved through the 2005 

Operations, Export Financing, and Related Program Appropriations A

author points to the difference and the need for stability polici

precursor to community based policing.9

WHAT ARE FUTURE DIRECTIONS? 

The ongoing COIN operation in Afghanistan will continue 

foreseeable future as DOD programming has funding identified well 

2014. Regardless of the force configuration on the ground, the 

support the continued transitional aspects of reconstruction and 

inclusive of security sector support will endure and grow. 

One sitting in the discussion could distinctly feel the dichotomy 

between practitioners from a DOD-centric community, and those w

worked the Law Enforcement community based model in lesser 

from outside DOD. The cultural separation inside the conference ro

have reflected the dilemma that exists on the ground forward and w

in future scenarios, especially in light of the changing globalized thre
The recurring theme about the globalized threat and how th

between criminality, terrorism, gangs and illicit trafficking point to 

greater need and a more robust scrutiny and understanding of ro

missions. A recent monograph on the subject even suggests that or

crime in a failing state could be identified as a form of irregular w

Nation-state weak institutions and the ability of non-state actors to e

authority and the “social contract”11 with the population will emerg

of the most critical elements of planning for the next twenty ye

discourse within the Interagency concerning Security, Stabi

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) versus Security 

Reform/Development (SSR/D) and what it means to the U.S. as a 

Security issue is a critical imperative in addressing what this w

sought to at least put a bit of light on. “Security is a core obligatio

international law, a core service that is demanded by citizens, 

foundation for sustainable economic and social development. Sup

security sector reform (SSR) should be undertaken within a frame

rule of law and through reinforcement of the state-society contract a

the legitimacy of the state.”12

The complexity of providing a U.S. engagement cons

problematic as the issue is a “political activity,”13 and understanding 

relationship to the social contract between state and its citizens is cru

What we can say here at this point is that we have invested he

trying to understand what is needed. This is a unified, partner nat

non-governmental organization–supported mission. DOD can pr

bridge; but the rest of the partners are required to be successful. N

question becomes; how do we build that logical U.S. Gov

framework and bridging capacity for the future and what does it look 

REFERENCES 

1. Irregular Warfare: Countering Irregular Threats, Joint Operational Conce

Version 2.0; 17 May 2010. 

2. Ibid., 5. 

3. Ibid., 10. 

4. OEF-P Counterinsurgency Best Practices; Combined Arms Center Blog; 

http://usacac.army.mil/blog/blogs/llop/archive/2009/05/27/oef-p-counterins

best-practices.aspx (last accessed 21 Oct 10). 
5. Russell, James A., 2010. Innovation in War: Counterinsurgency Operation

Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007; The Journal of Strategic S

no. 4, August 2010, 597–603. 

6. IW–JOC, 19. 

7. Dobbins, James, Seth G. Jones, Keith Crane, Beth Cole DeGrasse, 2007. Th

Beginner’s Guide to Nation- Building; Rand Monograph; http://www.rand.

monographs/MG557 (last accessed 29 Oct 10). 

8. Keller, Colonel (Ret.), Dennis E., August 24, 2010. U.S. Military Forces an

Assistance in Stability Operations: The Least-Worst Option to Fill the U.S. 

Gap, 6–7, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?p

1013 (last accessed 29 Oct 10). 

9. Ibid., iii and 11. 

10. Crime, Violence, and the Crisis in Guatemala: A Case Study in the Erosion 

State. Brands Hal, 2010, 3, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pu

display.cfm?PubID=986 (last accessed 23 Oct 10). 

11. From Fragility to Resilience: Concepts and Dilemmas of State building in F

States; A Research Paper for the OECD Fragile States Group Submitted by 

Center on International Cooperation at New York University & Internation

Academy; 4 March 2008; 3–5, Argument Section para 1–15, http://www.ci

edu/global/docs/fragilitytoresilience.pdf (last accessed 27 Oct 2010). 

12. Ibid., 31. 

13. Scheye, Eric, 2010. United States Institute of Peace Special Report: Realism 

Pragmatism in Security Sector Development, 2, http://www.usip.org/public

realism-and-pragmatism-in-security-sector-development (last accessed 24 O

The views expressed in this report do not necessarily reflect the view

National Defense University, Department of Defense, or Co

Terrorism Technical Support Office, which do not advocate specifi

positions. 
Chapter 5: Lessons Learned from Iraq and 

 Afghanistan Operations

Samuel Musa 

Senior Research Fellow 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

Samuel Musa, Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Technol

National Security Policy, the National Defense University, ch

Roundtable that discussed Lessons Learned from operations in I

Afghanistan. During the Roundtable, presentations were made 

students from the National War College (NWC) and the Industrial 

of the Armed Forces (ICAF). The students had extensive exper

theater operations and were ready to share their lessons 

Commander Peter Phillips, Naval Special Warfare, a student at the N

War College, a Joint Task Force Commander in 2009, command

maneuver elements to include seven with OGA support, and a tota

joint forces on the ground, discussed the differences between 

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Colonel Darrel Wilson, a st

ICAF, discussed the provincial reconstruction teams, focus

governance and development. Colonel Wilson worked on the ope

level with ISAF, doing mostly tactical tasks and had 14 months of exp

in Afghanistan (2007–2008) in Regional Command South. His focus 

the development of the Afghan National Army, Afghan National Pol

Provincial Reconstruction Teams. Commander Mark Fedor, U

student at NWC, had experience with counternarcotics operation

Caribbean and had worked at the House of Representatives Dru

subcommittee oversight of DoD counternarcotics efforts, discussed n

trafficking in Afghanistan and its impact on the effectiveness of gov

programs. Commander Wilson Marks, USN, a student at NWC and 

Commander in Afghanistan from July 2009 to March 2010, and 

ISAF Joint Command in Kabul from March 2010 to July 2010, discu

experience in the Kandahar region. Vangala Ram, a student at ICA

the Department of State, was in Afghanistan for 16 months in 200

and was responsible for State programs, as well as the military eq

programs, discussed problems caused by lack of cultural awaren

corruption. 
INTRODUCTION 

There are several books and manuals dealing with the counterins

operations in Iraq and Afghanistan operations.1–7 The literature is als

papers on lessons learned from these operations. The purpose of this 

is not to summarize what has already been published but rather to f

the deliberations of a roundtable held on this subject at the work

Policing and Counterinsurgency Operations held at NDU on Septem

2010. However, it is important to highlight some of the major pub

on the subject with emphasis on the relationship of polici

counterinsurgency. 

One of the major publications is the counterinsurgency guide is

the government in January 2009 and signed by the Secretary of Defe

Secretary of State, and the Administrator of USAID.8

 It is a hi

document: A synthesis of counterinsurgency theory with recent ex

across the U.S. Government. It also focuses on integrated operati

apply civilian and military capabilities across information, security, 

and economic functional areas. The document identifies Physical se

only one step toward “Human Security,” which is maintenance 

human rights, freedom to conduct economic activity, public saf

health. 

Another major release is by General Petraeus, who iss

counterinsurgency guidance in July 2010.9

 It has many elements, 

ones dealing with relationship-building and potentially policing a

here: 

• Secure and serve the population. 

• Live with the people. 

• Build relationships, but not just with those who seek you out

• Be a good guest—help the community. 

• Walk—engage the population. 

In the area of securing and serving the population, General 

said, “We have learned that the only way to secure the population i

with it. You cannot commute to the fight in a place like Iraq. We hav

our forces, together with those of our coalition partners and our hos

counterparts, in the neighborhoods whose occupants we are str

secure. Often, this is where the violence is the greatest. But when we 

and the people realize that we are there to stay, they typically b

provide information on the enemy; often, they also volunteer to h

areas once we have cleared them.” Furthermore, he highlighted t
have to understand the people, their culture, their social structures a

systems to support them are supposed to work—and how they do wo

our most important tasks have to be to secure and to serve the pe

well as to respect them and to facilitate the provision of basic serv

establishment of local governance and the revival of local economies

One of the co-authors with General Petraeus, of the U.S. Army

Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, is John Nagl. He cited i

Politics Review10 that “The lessons learned are: You have to pro

population first. And learn and adapt. What General Petraeus and h

did in Iraq over the past two years was those two things. They focu

on protecting the population. But they also had a flexible and agile 

that constantly evaluated where they were and what they wa

accomplish and tried to figure out the best way forward based 

continually evolving situation on the ground. And it was that mind

allowed Petraeus’ team to take advantage of things like the 

Awakening through outreach to the tribes.” 

More recently, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, on Novem

2010, approved a list of essential counterinsurgency (COIN) sk

troops need to be successful in Afghanistan.11 The COIN Qual

Standards are a list of nine major skill areas with roughly 52 subtask

to focus units’ training before they deploy to Afghanistan. The list 

the following skill areas: 

 Receive basic individual Afghan-specific COIN education. 

 Understand the operational environment. 

 Conduct relief in place. 

 Conduct decentralized operations. 

 Partner with Afghanistan national security forces. 

 Conduct information operations. 

 Create conditions for stability. 

 Conduct detainee operations. 

 Develop a learning organization. 
In order to examine the role of policing in counterinsurgen

important to begin with the basics. The main problem is to 

information relevant to the human terrain in COIN operatio

military/intelligence community has the resources to provide ac

intelligence based on the extensive resources available. The po

provide information based on trust/legitimacy. There are four 

available: 

1. Train the military in policing tactics. The Marines and SOF 

it well, while the Army has a long way to go. 

2. Utilize police as an adjunct to operations. JIEDDO has po

personnel assigned to specific battalions. 

3. Police take responsibility for the entire operation with visib

upfront and military as backup. Services may object to t

secondary role. 

4. Police and military assume different lanes. 

The principal factors are time and money. If time is not an issue

the above options can be accomplished. However, the policymakers 

time constraints on when the overall mission needs to be comple

forces removed from the country. This constraint then favors the 

options listed above. 

The police have played an important role in current a

counterinsurgency operations. In fact, the police can assume differe

depending on the organization. The centralized police force in Iraq 

work well due to the lack of professionalism as well as trust. They w

in developed countries. By the middle of 2009, the Iraqi Nationa

(INP) had become an effective counterinsurgency force.12 Howev

made it difficult as to whether it is a military or police force. The 

little connection to the judicial system and its procedures. The loca

force is generally corrupt and the justice system needs major cha

make it effective. The private local police force is efficient and wo

in many countries for providing protection to citizens and businesse

there is the use of militia for neighborhood watch. They worked 

they do not have accountability and as result they are not acceptab

Western World. 

The challenges of policing in Afghanistan are the low literacy ra

attrition, corruption, low pay, and lack of training. The literacy rate 
14%, which makes it difficult to ensure that the rules of law and th

of policing are well understood. The high attrition rate of the police 

70% per month makes it impossible to keep any semblance of contin

professionalism. New initiatives have taken place to reduce the attri

to about 40%, which is still high. The low pay is being addressed s

least it is compatible with what the Taliban pays for its police coun

It is estimated that 40% of the police are not trained in the basics of p

New initiatives are also underway to correct this situation. The 

Local Police Initiative (ALP) is managed by the Ministry of Inter

initial capability of 10,000. New professional police education progr

also being developed. The Afghanistan security system is 

complicated by the assignment of several nations to oversee supp

reforms. More specifically, the U.S. was assigned the responsibilit

military; Germany, the police; Italy, the judiciary; and Great Bri

counternarcotics. The Afghan National Police was being pulled into 

disjoint sectors. 

In both Iraq and Afghanistan, creating and sustaining a poli

during an insurgency is difficult. It requires a national army and som

of a national level paramilitary police force. The paramilitary poli

can impose security while the local police force can enforce it loca

also means that local and national institutions will have to be cr

support them. In addition, a judicial system with proper legislation

judges, and other personnel will have to be in place to take care 

disputes and crimes that are committed. The prisons and conf

systems will have to be properly designed and operated so as not to 

an incubation facility for insurgencies and radicalization. There is a 

a rule of law, particularly in Afghanistan. The Afghan Nationa

(ANA) has a judicial system that is well-resourced with inter

advisors under a unified command, while the civilian court system l

leadership and resources. Low pay for prosecutors and judges ha

corruption. There is a need for a single entity to oversee all facets of 

of law.13 One option is to utilize the command structure provide 

International Stabilization Assistance Force (ISAF). Another opti

utilize the State Department combined interagency task force (CJIAT

PANEL DELIBERATIONS 

The Dean of Students at NWC and ICAF identified a number of 

who served recently in theater. The Roundtable was fortunate to h

students from the National War College and the Industrial Colleg

Armed Forces. The students had extensive experience in theater op

and were ready to share their lessons learned. The speakers were 
describe their role in theater operations including location and tim

They were asked to provide comments on any of the three questions:

1. Based on your own experience, what was the role of 

military and the police in the operations? Do you h

examples of operations that worked well and those that did n

2. What were the main obstacles and what are the solutions? 

3. In your opinion, what should be the roles of the police 

military in theater and in combined operations? Should 

military be trained in policing methods? 

COMMANDER PETER PHILLIPS 

First, Commander Peter Phillips, Naval Special Warfare, and a stude

National War College, opened the panel discussion. He was a Jo

Force Commander in 2009, commanding ten maneuver elements to 

seven with OGA support, total 900 joint forces on the ground. Addi

he also served in OIF and HOA. 

Commander Phillips stated that Afghanistan was, and still is, 

work. There is a big difference when it comes to COIN operations 

and in Afghanistan. Once everyone arrived to Iraq, everyone had t

goal to have a stable democracy. The U.S., coalition forces and 

agencies all looked at the WMD program, regional stabilization

violation to U.N. It was good that everyone had the same goal, inclu

Iraqis. While there were many reasons to go to Iraq, there was a sin

in the end as to why everyone was there; nationalism was very impor

was useful in overcoming religion and tribalism. 
Difficulty for Afghanistan Strategy

Decision Point End State

WMD

Regional stability

UN Violations

Democracy

9-11

Axis of Evil

Deny Sanctua

Democracy

Stabilized Cen

Government

Human Rights

Poppy 

Eradication

Disrupt AQ ex

planning

Iraq

Afghanistan

Religion

Nationalism

Tribalism

Literacy

Infrastructure

Resources

Democratic S

2

Figure 1: The Difficulty for an Afghanistan Strategy. 

The Afghanistan mission was decided upon after 9/11. There 

unifying strategies in the coalition because everyone had different p

and RoEs (Figure 1). Depending on who you talked to, there were 

reasons for being there. Depending on the year you went, the resou

strategy changed. Commander Phillips stated that from a military 

perspective it was unclear of the overall strategic mission. Stabiliz

the central government and disruption of Al Qaeda’s external plans 

extremely important. Sometimes his own mission was detrimenta

other organization’s mission. Tribalism and literacy problems 

against U.S. efforts as well. There is no structure in Afghanistan

were no roads during the first year and a half. Resources there were t

While the overall strategy was to support the national goals, h

was to support the General (Figure 2). “What is the strat

Afghanistan? We had no answer.” So what do we do? Pump our 

drain the enemy’s, attract the uncommitted to our side—such as rem

Qaeda and Taliban senior leaders from the battlefield; disrupt netw

end conflict on favorable terms?” 



TF EAST‐TM TF 10

PRT/ETT CJSOTF TM Infantry BN NDS HUMINT T T

ANP ANA

BSO BDE

ANA Div

Bagram

Kabul

ARSIC

CSTC‐A

USFOR‐A/ISAF

MOD MOI N

GIRoA

JTF 373 JTF 714

ISAF‐SOF CFSOCC

RC‐EAST CJSOTF

Regional

Provincial

ANP Div

DoS

Coalition Chain of Command

ISAF SOF TM

Figure 5: The Coalition Chain of Command. 

COLONEL DARREL WILSON 

Second, Colonel Darrel Wilson, a student at ICAF, discussed the Pr

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)—focusing on governance and devel

Colonel Wilson worked on the operational level with ISAF, doing 

tactical tasks. His focus was on the development of the Afghan N

Army, Afghan National Police, and Provincial Reconstruction Te

had 14 months of experience in Afghanistan (2007–2008) in R

Command South. He served as the senior advisor to Major 

Jamaludin in Zabul Province. He worked closely with the Pr

Reconstruction Team and other Agencies. He participated in all m

between the Afghan Commander and the Governor. 

Stability operations—(governance and development); the secu

of operation is intertwined with everything that you do. We had 

Navy, Air Force and National Guard soldiers, a Romanian training t

a US-led PRT, including interagency pieces, like State Departm

Department of Agriculture personnel embedded with the team i

Province; these staffers had more experience on the ground than 

including many years working in various countries. “We had to work 

with agriculture and development teams, as well as with special for

tried to coordinate efforts as best we could. It was important to 
colleagues instead of having an ‘I am your boss’ attitude,” com

Wilson. 

Colonel Wilson’s concerns involved policing. Within our PRT, 

a civil affairs team to mentor/partner with the police in certain are

idea of embedding such a mentoring team was EXTREMELY im

they talked to the chiefs of police and taught a “community policin

including showing the locals how to interact. We would review the 

actions afterwards—it worked well. Little progress was made w

police were of a different ethnic background than the local populat

good thing was that we had the autonomy to implement this on our o

sad part was that we did it all on our own, without the direction from 

His concern was also how to build a police force now that the 

Armed Forces were stood up. Community Policing—how do you ta

people you are supposed to be protecting? 

COMMANDER MARK FEDOR 

Commander Mark Fedor, USCG, student at NWC, spoke ne

experience was with counternarcotics in the Caribbean. He worke

House of Representatives Drug-Policy subcommittee oversight of t

counternarcotics efforts, including what is taking place in Afghanis

the poppies. In the fall of 2006, he was part of a Congressional s

went to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan to examine the 

problem. 

The question of the Afghanistan drug problem soon arose, but th

Staff was not that familiar with the drug problem in 2006 (not at th

the list), so Commander Fedor went to Pakistan, Afghanistan, and T

to get a better look. Drug trade is big business—you have to ackn

that it’s a problem. Lots of lessons have emerged from countern

activities in the Caribbean—the main one being that when the d

running rampant in the country, the government programs’ effectiven

be limited. 

There are connections between drug traffickers, terroris

insurgents. They receive the money and protection they need to mo

products. As we travel in the region, we know that the drugs are 

overseas. The answer was to think of the problem like a water 

When a person squeezes the balloon at one end it will pop in the ot

In other words, the U.S. needed to start thinking ahead of them. O

cannot just focus on one country or one province because when you 

one area it will go to the next. Those drugs are flowing like cr
Russia, Europe, etc., the speaker explained. We needed to start looki

whole perspective, not just law enforcement or military, but DoD an

The idea was for all of these agencies to work together—which i

easy as one would think. 

At the time, officials believed that the best way to combat all th

was aerial spraying. From the law enforcement perspective that seem

but the DoD does not use its assets like that—it needs a protocol, w

DEA was ready to go and grab drug labs. But we also learned 

Afghans did not like aerial spraying because it made many of the

back to the days of the Russians. So how do we eradicate the fie

tried to do it on the ground, but our people were easy targets. Then, 

were given ATVs to disperse spray through fields. This also did not 

because it was unsafe. The number of hectares cultivated for popp

down, but the amount of heroin was still high—the overall problem 

going strong because of the previously stated “balloon theory

activities in one area and they go to the next. 

The overall process needs to produce an alternative means 

farmers to make money. Farmers just want to feed their families a

can get money from the drug business. What incentives can be prod

make the farmer move away? DoD and DEA tried to get ag

involvement, even bring in farmers from the U.S. to speak with th

Lastly, there was a bridge built in order to increase commerce 

Afghanistan and Tajikistan—but who will do the customs and w

monitor the commerce and flow of narcotics? 

COMMANDER WILSON MARKS 

Commander Wilson Marks, USN, a student at NWC, next discu

experience in Kandahar region. He was a PRT Commander in Afg

from July 2009 to March 2010 and then at ISAF Joint Command i

from March 2010 to July 2010. From October 2007 to Decembe

Commander Marks was responsible for Training, Mentoring, and A

primarily the Afghan Army. If you stayed long enough you can sa

gotten a lot better since before in all aspects, but not the police. Gov

overall has made very little progress. His forces developed th

campaign strategies; basically sell the plan for local support. The pl

across everything, such as judicial, economic, education, infras

development, law enforcement; all together, strategy upfront was 

We had no unity of command; we had the unity of effort. 
The biggest lesson while stationed in Afghanistan for Com

Marks was that it is the Afghans’ lives, their country, and it has t

Afghans’ solutions. The Afghan citizens are not going to adopt our 

thinking. We have to help them to understand there is another way to 

it, give them some tools that they can use, be active in their in

session, and then help them execute it and back them up when t

down. In other words, the U.S. and coalition forces need to tr

implement at the same time. 

The roads turned into “tolls” and the military and police would 

people to drive through close to 60 check-points on the main road w

served. To combat this easy way to make drug money was to pull e

off the highway and to essentially establish a “neighborhood 

concept. 

The fact that we were able to secure polling stations was anoth

plus. The election commission wanted to put polling stations in ar

were just not going to be supported. When the Taliban is physi

control of an area, why would you put a polling station in that area? 

centers: the government appointed district chiefs, but locals wo

recognize their authority. Afghan citizens would look at family ori

and their old tribal leaders, not the province leaders put into place a

centers. “We were on a steep cliff automatically because of that.” W

up in securing those district centers, but at the same time, do the 

consider that legitimate? Was it their idea? Was it their solution? W

do consider successful in eradicating poppies was wheat, wheat s

were able to get huge quantities of wheat due to Agriculture folks. T

a big success. This stimulated the economy. 

Some of the negatives in Afghanistan were: 

 Road development did not work well. Afghanistan is a 

country with very difficult terrain and it is extremely har

place roads where you cannot secure them. 

 Education in the area was bad. It came down to money to b

schools, pay teachers, etc., yet if the U.S. could not sustain 

schools over a period of time then there is no point in build

because you lose the confidence of the people. Your credib

will be lost on account of having to pull out from the area, 

abandoning the people. 
 You can have the greatest idea in the world, but will you 

able to put a local face on it? Their heart has to be in it, too. 

example, our idea of policing and their idea of policing are 

the same. The Afghan army supported the police in his area. 

 Policing in this part of the world is more than making sure 

petty criminal isn’t taking things; these criminals are carry

AK-47s and APGs on their shoulders. The Army is v

capable of dealing with this; from their perspective, they are 

best Army they have had been in a while; the police forc

coming along and is doing slightly better. The rule of law 

an issue—we wanted to enforce it, but could not unders

why criminals were released. Once we started talking to 

judges, we understood that the official wanted payoffs beca

the tribal strategy was to “buy” the criminal out of jail in o

to “reform” it; this has worked for centuries. 

MR. VANGALA RAM 

Mr. Vangala Ram, a Department of State FSO now attending 

Training at ICAF, was our final speaker. He focused on his experi

the Senior Civilian Representative (SCR) at RC–West in Herat, Afgh

for 16 months in 2007–08. The RC–West Command is dominated b

and Spanish forces, making communication an issue, at times. M

focused some of his energy on the effective implementation of a wid

of State–INL programs. Since returning to the U.S., Mr. Ram h

volunteered to serve as a Senior Mentor and Subject Matter Exper

for civilians who are now assigned to Afghanistan. He serves as a 

for the training they undergo at Camp Atterbury in Indiana. Concer

INL programs, which were operated through a contractor (Dynco

Ram expressed some reservations regarding the lack of cultural aw

on the part of some personnel, hence the value of the new civilian 

programs. Mr. Ram also highlighted his work at the major border 

point with Iran, known as Musa Qala. He notified the audience 

extensive corruption evident there; where some 60% of the GOA 

derives from. Mr. Ram also pointed out why and how his extensiv

with the Afghan Border Police (ABP) regional commander was so c

mitigating at least some of the evident corruption. 

Mr. Ram performed a great deal of his effort on resolving 

friction between INL and the U.S. military. The INL contracto

housed and co-located with the U.S. military in the region. M

represented the USG in the region—as such, integrating our efforts 
EU was also of critical importance. For example, he helped to integ

work of the Italian Carbinieri with the efforts of the CIVPOL INL 

for the ANSF—particularly the ANP. Finally, Mr. Ram has ad

responsibilities for monitoring the extensive Iranian presence in 

Afghanistan. He stressed the importance of coordination and a

duplication of effort as well as the importance of language and 

awareness in this sensitive region of Afghanistan 

SOME QUESTIONS TO THE PANEL 

Some of the questions to the panel were: 

Q: What was the experience with Afghan border police? 

A: Afghan border police were found severely under-resour

there was no accountability for weapons; they could never g

fix on what weapons were given to them; there was a lo

corruption at the border. A great deal depended on leadershi

Q: The justice system is questionable; there is no strategy. With 

of these problems how can we have an effective poli

system and how can we sustain a safe environment? 

A: No strategy, no concept, no partner. They now have a comb

ANA and ADP who are mutually supporting each other. 

Partnering piece is key—the more the units were partnered 

more effective they became, but still have to work on 

personality-driven they were. 

KEY FINDINGS 

There are many lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan op

Those lessons can be summarized as follows: 

1. There are fundamental differences in overall COIN strate

between Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the goal was and i

generate a democratic society; while in Afghanistan, 

strategy continues to change. It ranged from removing 

Taliban as government to providing security operations 

developing an Afghan army to reconciliation. These change

strategies made it difficult to prosecute a war with a mov

endgame. The impact of this variation in strategies ha
significant impact on the guidance to the military and execu

of COIN operations. 

2. Building the capacity for the military to move within 

population was critical. This freedom of action is importan

engaging the population in defeating the insurgency. 

General Petraeus said, “We have learned that the only wa

secure the population is to live with it.” This engagement of 

population produced many successes but with a high increas

U.S. and Allied casualties. 

3. There was no doctrine and the chain of command was 

unified. There were a number of chains of command work

in parallel and this made it difficult to identify the perso

charge. In fact, there were the ISAF, GIRoA and DoS as 

leading command authorities with multiple and someti

intertwined chains that made it difficult to exercise pro

authority and certainly added to the confusion at the lo

levels of the chain. 

4. Using a civil affairs team to partner with the police is crit

to the operations. This partnership and sometimes mento

resulted in a number of successful operations. However, 

area of concern was when the police were of a different eth

background than the local population. This led to a lack of t

and conflict. The Afghan border police were under resour

and lacked accountability. Corruption was widely spread. 

5. There have been many opportunities to impose the U.S. 

Allied procedures and processes. It is important to recog

that it is the Afghans’ lives, their country, and it has to be 

Afghans’ solutions. The U.S. and Allies have to give t

some tools that they can use, and then help with the execu

and backup when needed. 

6. There were many successes and failures. The ability to se

major roads and polling stations was considered a m

success. Furthermore, one method of eradicating poppies 

wheat (wheat seed). This resulted in stimulating the econo

for the people. Not being able to sustain the schools that w

built was considered a failure. Another failure was cult

awareness. For example, the rule of law was an issue and it 

going to be enforced, but criminals were continually b
released. Thus officials had to be bribed since the tribal stra

was to “buy” the criminal out of jail in order to “reform” him

7. There are connections between drug traffickers, terror

and insurgents. They received the money and protection 

needed to move their products and the drugs were mo

overseas. There needs to be an overall strategy that focuse

multiple provinces and not just one region otherwise 

problem will never be solved. 

There was general agreement that policing is impor

counterinsurgency operations. However, the role of the police nee

clearly defined. There are two approaches to policing in counterinsu

One is to use the police as a force multiplier; we run personnel th

short program, give them a badge, and send them out on the stre

second is to look at the police as a force that builds relationsh

community and protects them. The community will then provide info

about insurgency. The debate will continue as to which approach i

dealing with counterinsurgency. The lessons learned from the I

Afghanistan operations highlighted in this Chapter can be instrument

assessment of the best approach toward policing in such enviro

There are no templates for future conflicts, and as General Petra

stated, we have to protect the population first, then learn and adapt. 

REFERENCES 

1. Sewall, Sarah, John Nagl, David Petraeus, and James Amos, 2007. 

Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, First Edition. 

University of Chicago Press. 

2. Kilcullen, David, 2010. Counterinsurgency. New York: Oxford University 

3. Nagl, John, 2005. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgenc

from Malaya and Vietnam, First Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago P

4. Ricks, Thomas, 2009. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the 

Military Adventure in Iraq, 2006–2008. Penguin Press.

5. Roberts, M.E., 2005. Villages of the Moon: Psychological Operations in 

Afghanistan. Publish America. 

6. Marston, Daniel and Carter Malkasian, 2008. Counterinsurgency in 

Warfare. Osprey Publishing. 
7. Cassidy, Robert, 2006. Counterinsurgency and the War on Terror. Praege

International. 

8. U.S. Government Counterinsurgency Guide, January 2009. Bureau of 

Military Affairs. 

9. General David Petraeus, memo on Counterinsurgency Guidance, July 2010

10. Nagl, John, 2010. World Politics Review, October 18, 2010. 

11. Secretary Robert Gates, 2010. Memorandum to Services. 

12. Greek, E.E., 2010. “The Security Trinity,” Joint Force Quarterly 59, 4th Qu

2010. Washington, DC: NDU Press. 

13. Hagerott, M., T. Umberg, and J. Jackson, 2010. “Establishing the Rule of L

Afghanistan,” Joint Force Quarterly 59, 4th Quarter, 2010. Washington, DC

Press. 
Chapter 6: Lessons Learned from Past Conflict

Matt Keegan 

Visiting Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Po

National Defense University, Fort McNair 

and Chief of Staff and Vice President, U.S. Strategy 

Selex Galileo, Inc., Arlington, Virginia 

Matt Keegan, who is Visiting Fellow, Center for Technology and N

Security Policy, National Defense University, Fort McNair, and 

Staff and Vice President, U.S. Strategy, Selex Galileo, Inc., A

Virginia, chaired Roundtable VI: Lessons Learned from Past Confl

first speaker for the session was Eric Beinhart, Senior Criminal 

Advisor from the Department of Justice, on loan to USAID as pa

Rule of Law Team from the Democracy and Governance Office

presentation touched on key themes of the acceptable nature of the 

law and the local nature of the effort and in its entirety represents a 

at the Phase Zero level. The second speaker on the panel brought 

perspective to the group. Though retired, he was an extremely sen

Government official with significant authority over U.S. Special 

Command. As he remains active in the community today he reques

the author fully embrace the time-honored tradition at National 

University of non-attribution. The last speaker on the panel was Col

Coultrup, U.S. Army. Colonel Coultrup had just returned from comm

the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF–P). Th

was composed of the local Foreign Internal Defense forces (FI

civilian and military personnel from both U.S. and Philippine a

helping each other to overcome insurgent threats within the island na

INTRODUCTION 

To quote the famous Spanish philosopher and novelist George Sa

“those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.”1

 

experiences in counterinsurgency (COIN) of success such as Mal

India, or defeats such as Vietnam offer lessons and methods that sh

remembered and can be applied or avoided in order to achieve a 
outcome in today’s COIN operations. Chapter 5 reviewed the wa

deliberations of our current engagements in Iraq and Afghanista

follow, this chapter will look at other recent successes that have o

over roughly the last decade both large and small to hopefully glean 

or lessons for success. 

The “Lessons Learned” Panel was composed of three leaders w

personally engaged in various counterinsurgency efforts ranging fro

Zero Stability–type “Prevent or Prepare” activities, to Phase Four “E

Security” and Phase Five operations aimed at returning nations 

“Civil Authority” and Rule of Law.2 The speakers offered evidence 

course of the deliberations that police and military both had ro

though they overlap in the COIN operations, point to the police b

key in the final establishment and maintenance of stability. What ap

be the underlying theme is that to achieve and maintain stability 

nation-state it is essential that the government be able to estab

maintain the Rule of Law. Depending on the degree of instability, 

require varied degrees of military and paramilitary force to establi

security. Sustainable and persistent security requires a transitio

acceptable Rule of Law at the local level, which is maintained by a 

local police force, or risk being doomed to failure. 

This author would offer that to defeat an insurgency is as muc

more political activity in nature than military. From a military pract

mindset this is evidenced by an author whose primary work rest

shelves of every War College graduate, Carl Von Clausewitz. Cla

plainly states in his text On War that war is “a true political instru

continuation of political intercourse, carried on by other m

Connecting Clausewitz with DOD’s Joint Publication (JP) 3–24 

definition of insurgency being a form of irregular warfare, allows th

connection that insurgency is a form of politics.4

 This plainly suppor

24 with the quote that opens Chapter II, “Insurgency,” from Anthon

Jones that states, “The beginning of wisdom is to grasp and hold o

to the idea that insurgency is a profoundly political problem.”5

 To 

extend this tenet, a quote from former Speaker of the House Tip 

(which he had borrowed from his father), one that every Capi

politician is always reminded of as election season approaches, is 

politics is local.”5 Combining the thoughts of Clausewitz, JP 3–

Jones, and Speaker O’Neill leads one to “all insurgency warfar

extension of local politics.” To complete the connection, this 

beginning of wisdom,” which becomes the first step and key un

lesson in how to defeat an insurgency. Not only is this theory supp

the experiences of the Panel, but also finds solid support from 
Petraeus’s counterinsurgency guidance of July 2010, where he outli

to secure, serve, live with, and build relationships with the local pop

In General Petraeus’s own words, “We have to put our forces, toget

those of our coalition partners and our host nation counterp

neighborhoods whose occupants we are striving to secure.” 

To paraphrase David Kilcullen and the thinking he offers in h

The Accidental Guerrilla, insurgency is a race between a det

insurgent element and the government with the goal being popular 

and “influence and control at a grassroots level.”6

 This requires the in

force to overcome the government (and its politics) and the Rule 

within a region. Whether rooted in ideology, criminal intent, or in the 

of pure power, an insurgency must gain its “support” from the p

before the government can quell the uprising by eliminating safe h

capturing or killing its leadership, shutting down its financial/e

support, and/or countering and discrediting its message and 

eliminating the necessary popular support. Insurgency must therefore 

establish itself among the local populace from which it recruits its re

finds its safe havens, and grows its strength. 

Two recent examples support the need to defeat insurgents at t

level and “by, with and through” supporting the local population. Fir

original defeat of the FARC in Colombia. Plan Colombia reflects thi

thinking by President Uribe and his administration. Though he 

American training, technical assistance, and aid dollars, the actio

applied by the Colombian Military and National Police, which “succ

diminished the threat of insurgency to the country’s political stability

Colombia, a counterinsurgency plan of Colombian design, ai

“improve security in Colombia by re-claiming control over areas hel

illegal armed groups.”8

 The heart of the plan was a whole-of-gov

approach which applied the national military and police to ree

security in contested regions and then rapidly provided aid and assis

the local “freed” communities that enabled them to “reenter viable c

economic life.” Although narcotics trafficking is still a domina

within Colombia, the threat to governmental stability was eliminate

5-year period.8

Second, is an example from combat operations in Al Anbar Pro

Iraq. The region was one of the most violent regions in Iraq, w

insurgents based much of their activity in the days following the 

Baghdad to Coalition Forces in 2003. Lieutenant Colonel Jame

Kyser, United States Marine Corps, was the Commander of the 2 B

2 Marines in Anbar. Col. Kyser noted when interviewed that t
effective method of eliminating the insurgency was town-by-town 

working with the locals to reestablish control of their villages. The 

would work within the local culture to reinforce (or establish) stab

reinvigorate the local Rule of Law. This Rule of Law was not necess

same as the law of the land, but the law with which the local commu

most comfortable and had the longest established history. Such la

have been religion-based like Muslim Sharia law, tribally based, 

based, depending on the village. Through security (often 

actions/operations, combined with humanitarian aid and e

assistance, the USMC changed Anbar from an insurgent safe haven 

area where Al Qa’ida terrorist and/or anti-government insurgent forc

no longer welcome, and in several instances they were actually chas

towns by the locals themselves. 

Both examples demonstrate, and the panelists’ deliberations tha

will support, that in order to defeat an insurgency one must c

environment of stability, reestablish accepted local Rule of Law, an

in a way that is credible, acceptable and therefore persistent. Though 

support may be necessary to establish (or re-establish) the security

end it must be maintained by the locals. Depending on the degree of 

within the region and the perceived ability (and need) of a foreign m

address the instability, there is a line, in some places thin, 

establishing security and stable, accepted Rule of Law, and 

occupation with levied law. When foreign forces are used, or militar

applied to establish stability, it must be done so with knowled

transition to local police forces is essential to success. Otherwise, th

risk of being viewed as an occupier or oppressor which only creates 

field for the growth of the insurgency it is trying to defeat. 

Persistence of Rule of Law is also a critical element that only l

enforcement/police can establish. Military forces are transitional by 

both economically and politically unsupportable over a longer period 

in both an international and local sense. Local police composed o

personnel and who have grown up in the cultural and social fabri

region can embody the persistent Rule of Law that will keep stability

there is an element of politics and balance. Police who are seen as co

tied to a corrupt or illegitimate government may become a motivatin

in an insurgency, but conversely, when seen as the legitimate and p

arm of the government, it is more frequently welcomed. With the su

the populace, police can protect citizens while respecting their huma

and dignity and keep peace at the local level. The experience of 

panel member and his work in Northern Uganda works to demonstr
the enhancement of a local police force and acceptable Rule of L

worked to keep and enhance stability in the region. 

PANEL DELIBERATIONS 

The first speaker for the session was Eric Beinhart, Associate Direct

Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigative 

Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP), who is serving on a three-year 

USAID’s Office of Democracy and Governance as a Senior Crimina

Advisor. Eric’s presentation touched on key themes of the acceptabl

of the Rule of Law and the local nature of the effort, and in its 

represents a success at the Phase Zero level. This success was a

through the application of a whole-of-government effort ranging f

U.S. Army to the United Nations with the specific program desi

DOJ/ICITAP and USAID. The program itself was aimed at reestabl

statuary legal system in Northern Uganda as well as a juvenile 

system, in order to provide the local populace with a Rule of L

functioned across the spectrum of legal activity . . . from daily 

enforcement through the court system . . . making this a fully fu

system based in the socio-cultural roots of the region and accompli

local officials. This local commitment helped establish a c

acceptable, local method of maintaining regional stability. It also 

mitigate the risk of instability in a nation with a history of insu

government overthrows, and disenfranchised populace/political e

taking up arms against the established authority. 

To understand the environment that drove the need for these eff

in which the whole-of-government team had to operate, Eric offere

note of “Ugandan history must be cited to put information in c

Milton Obote was the first Prime Minister (later President) of Ugan

independence from Great Britain was established in 1962. Ob

overthrown by Idi Amin in 1971, and Amin was in turn overthrow

Tanzanian Army in 1979 after he unsuccessfully tried to invade T

Obote returned as president in 1981. Idi Amin is widely held u

example of a brutal dictator who nearly destroyed his country thro

own excesses. “Obote, however, was no prize either, as his le

contributed to widespread destabilization of Uganda.” In 1985, with 

pressure being applied from an ever strengthening National Resistanc

(NRA) in the north—led by Yoweri Museveni—Obote fled into exi

Basilio Olara-Okello briefly served as president but he fled into 

January 1986 when the NRA consolidated its power. Museveni f

government and has served as Uganda’s president ever since. 
The Acholi people of Uganda—Okello’s ethnic group—did not 

stand up of the Museveni Government well and to this day are sti

about the overthrow of General Okello. This anger, combin

underlying religious tension, has led to an ongoing insurrection 

creation of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 1987, which 

havoc in the country until 2006. Northern Uganda suffered throug

constant turbulence, conflict and insurgency. 

With the history established, Eric then offered the context agains

the program was specifically targeted. 

 From 1986–2006 there was no statuary legal system 

Northern Uganda. Customary law was in place, and l

councils were set up by President Museveni that became 

municipal government. The hierarchy roughly had vil

leaders going up to local councils, and beyond that there w

country districts divided down to the county, sub-county, 

village levels. 

 The program was more than an effort to enhance commu

policing, it focused on reestablishing a functioning legal sys

in Lira Town, located within the Lira District. It made no se

to focus just on the police if nothing else worked in terms of 

legal system. The program had to focus not only on suppor

and developing a local police force and its capabilities, bu

the connection and functioning of the courts system as we

order to create a functioning, credible legal system and cred

Rule of Law that could take a crime from investigation thro

prosecution. 

 The team could test methodologies to see how things worke

they were functioning in an area of relative stability [as oppo

to other regions of Uganda or places like Iraq or Afghanistan

 Lira District in Northern Uganda has a magisterial cour

police headquarters, prosecutor’s office, and court building 

centrally located in Lira Town, but there was poor coordina

between these criminal justice actors. 

This is a complicated issue, as the basis for Rule of Law in 

definition was deeply rooted in the society and operated in a more tra

based fashion than what a western democracy would call a justice 

Eric offered an example from Northern Uganda; if there was a ch
rape in the village the elder of that village would handle it; the 

perpetrator’s family got together with the victim’s family and the

work something out—whether it was the handing over of livestock, 

resources, etc., by the offender to the victim’s family. This is a wa

been done for thousands of years. Then we arrive and start talking 

western statutory legal system when there hasn’t been one in forc

some years. In 2007, we were talking to the detectives, and they s

someone would make a rape charge against another community mem

that is done as a threat in the continuing negotiation over the settlem

as something that the victim’s family actually wants to prosecute, 

method of obtaining payment. If a settlement is reached, a crimina

withdrawn, and as statutory rape was a capital offense, this was the p

way of ending the dispute. Some parents would “game” the system, 

false charges or setting up crimes in order to gain settlements. For e

they would offer their daughters to men and later claim that th

women were less than 16 years of age, the legal age of consent in N

Uganda, and pursue charges of rape. If a settlement was reached be

case was brought before the courts the family would drop the char

thus achieve their objective of receiving some sort of fairly sig

payment through this “gaming.” There was a big backlog of cases 

with no real way to verify the age of the people because the vital 

systems was dysfunctional. 

The program started after an assessment in March of 2007. F

beginning, the program faced a large obstacle in that the fundin

expire and revert to the U.S. Treasury on October 1, 2007. This only 

4.5 months to implement a very serious and ambitious program. Wh

fortune had struck them at the budget level, good fortune had com

form of two experienced teams. “We were fortunate to hav

experienced people who advised police and prosecutors, and w

international experience in places like Bosnia and other sub-Saharan 

countries,” said Beinhart. So, with only 4.5 months of funding the tw

had to execute the ambitious program of melding a community polic

community prosecution into a coordinated, cohesive system w

system had existed for decades prior. 

As a first step in implementing the program, the first team

advisors gathered the police, prosecutors, magistrate, senior advisors

Nations Development Program (UNDP) officials, United Nation

Commissioner for Human Rights officials, U.S. Army Civil Affairs 

and others together to discuss problems in the criminal justice 

Together they focused on a case that had already been adjudicated—

of a 6-year-old girl—and then talked about it among themselves t
understand the failures of the case. Initially, there was normal 

pointing, but after a few hours they got beyond the competit

appointing of blame between departments. They agreed that the loc

were doing a lot of things right, but they looked at ways where thin

be improved in terms of conducting witness interviews, pre-docume

forensic analysis, etc. This went on for several weeks, working clos

the detective units from Lyerla and looking at the developing the inst

Eric continued that it is important to note that this was not train

mentoring. His team brought the groups together and worked alon

the local officers and officials not trying to establish a form of jus

was foreign to the region (such as an American model), but lookin

institutions and how the local authorities by working together could 

the system from within. 

Over the next few months the team, together with the local po

justice officials, undertook multiple efforts aimed at reestablishing a 

Rule of Law in the region. Example activities included: 

 Uganda police were hiring special constables who had 

official training. The U.S. Team worked with the po

prosecutors and the magistrate to develop a curriculum w

focused on very basic things: interview/ interrogation, re

writing, etc. and helped establish a connected and cohe

method for investigation, case development and recording, 

associated prosecution. 

 US Army Civil Affairs unit medics worked with DOJ/ICIT

instructors to prepare first aid training for the local police. T

proved to be particularly effective in teaching simple, prac

things that the police could use to help build trust 

relationships with the people and to significantly enhance t

acceptance, support, and creditability in the local community

 DOJ/ICITAP worked with police, prosecutors, a magistr

and UN officials to develop a course entitled, “Building 

Capacity of Police Constables within a Community Poli

Framework.” In order to optimize time and money the co

was developed to teach 22 local instructors, who in turn tra

200 other officers. 

 The Chief of Police, the State Prosecutor, and the C

Magistrate signed a Memorandum of Understanding in wh
the three offices pledged to work together more effectively. 

DOJ/ICITAP police and prosecutorial advisors worked w

their Ugandan counterparts to institute “Roll Call Training” 

stress 20 minutes of training several times a week on impor

topics. When the State Prosecutor in Lira was reassigne

another district, he immediately instituted this training appro

with the police. 

 There was no juvenile justice system in Uganda. W

ICITAP’s assistance, the Chief of Police, the State Prosecu

the Chief Magistrate, and Catholic priests agreed on 

experimental juvenile justice initiative that was to 

overlooked by priests. The priests agreed to supervise the w

of juvenile offenders—this became the model throughout o

areas of Uganda. This is an interesting note as it did two thi

handled the youth in a more custom-based fashion w

minimizing the strain on the justice system itself. In the en

is keeping the youth out of the penal system that could do m

to make them disenfranchised. 

 The last step was with infrastructure improvem

USAID/ICITAP provided $25,000 in refurbishments to the 

Police Headquarters that included: roof repairs, the installa

of internal electrical wiring (outlets, etc.) throughout 

facility, painting, plastering, and other structural repairs, d

and window repairs, the installation of mosquito netting 

windows and vents, plumbing repairs, and main gate rep

This was done at the end of the program after all stakehol

bought into the institutional development focus of the progr

Police felt pride in their new station and citizens expre

satisfaction in visiting a clean, professional building to re

crimes. 

Unfortunately it was a rushed program, but it offers some 

lessons learned in terms of how institutional development can 

promoted in the criminal justice sector. Most importantly, this mode

replicated not just within Uganda but in other parts of the world. Th

program was a grass-roots, “boot-strapped” effort. It brought loca

together, worked within their traditional social and cultural values, 

facilitated through USG and international donor sources actin

mentoring capacity. The program helped guide Ugandan gov

agencies through a process of institutional development that 

technical assistance and training, but by allowing Ugandans to lead, 
violated the basic regional tenets or in any way gave the appearan

foreign system being levied on a local system. The local commun

ownership quickly and with a guiding hand from experienced profe

was able to more effectively establish the Rule of Law and enha

stability of Northern Uganda. 

The second speaker on the panel brought a global perspectiv

group. Though retired, he was an extremely senior U.S. Governmen

with significant authority over U.S. Special Forces Command. 

remains active in the community today he requested that the auth

embrace the time honored tradition at National Defense University 

attribution. He spoke to the group more from the perspectiv

counterinsurgency war fighter with a view that COIN success requir

term commitment, absolute local commitment, a whole-of-gov

approach, and the establishment of locally acceptable Rule of Law. 

The SOCOM speaker opened his presentation with a basic truth 

about COIN, but also placed it in the context of the “hearts and m

the American “voting” public. He cited the writings of David Kilcull

said it takes 15–20 years to resolve an insurgency. This fact in and 

presents a daunting commitment of military and economic resou

means carrying a coherent strategy through a minimum of four Pre

elections. With that in mind he suggested that this timeframe be co

with the patience of American people when they hear this timefra

compare it to the potential loss of “American treasure,” including 

lives of young men and women and dollars being redirected from a

economy. The result is a dramatic imbalance proven over the hi

American participation in foreign wars. The unfortunate logic beh

time period vs. patience mismatch is something that works 

disadvantage of the American strategy when the necessary patie

long-term commitment is not there to maintain the resolve. This 

unrealistic timelines and the need to more rapidly establish local 

paramilitary and law enforcement forces capable of establish

maintaining the necessary Rule of Law, which is a central obje

defeating any insurgency. 

The term “defeat” then becomes an interesting point for discus

order to “defeat” a COIN adversary you need to understand the loca

cultural and political dynamics of the environment in which the 

being waged. Our speaker’s many years in combating insurgency 

directly echoes General Petraeus’s words and supports the idea 

defeat of an insurgency can only be accomplished by those who liv

its fabric, who understand acceptable and pre-established norms, t
definition of Rule of Law (as opposed to a form of Western law, w

be very foreign to a distant culture and therefore disenfranchising), 

connections to the society. Such an understanding is essential and c

be developed either by having grown up in the society or spendin

years in it. Short rotations of young men and women, which is a ba

in the organizational culture of the American military, is diam

opposed to this sort of long-term assimilation of the local socio

fabric. Without this developed understanding it is nearly impossible t

a COIN enemy or create sustainable conditions to achieve a solutio

long term. The history of COIN warfare notes that even when fightin

long-term or short-term, as much as eighty percent of insurgen

resolved in favor of the government, but usually through an arra

between insurgents and governments. 

This was supported in a RAND study issued early this year 

entitled How Insurgencies End, by Ben Connable and Martin Libicki

negotiated settlement . . . as opposed to “defeat” . . . requires a c

understanding of the socio-cultural element, but also leaves ba

extremist elements of the insurgency within the society. If a p

supported Rule of Law and the associate credible and accep

enforcement authority is not put in place over the course 

counterinsurgent fight (and negotiation), the radical elements can 

unpopular element of the Rule of Law against the Government an

period of time begin the cycle again as a resurgent force. Such is the 

Peru where increased narcotics production is funding the now r

Shining Path. In sum, complete defeat most probably is an un

objective, while a functional arrangement has proven to be his

realistic. 

It is certainly worthwhile to note that long-term does not necessa

with the cessation of hostilities. In order to maintain the “co

balance” within a society, rebuilding a war-torn nation must be comp

risk the growth of local anger against the government and recrea

fertile environment for the extremist insurgence to rebuild (local) 

anti-government. These rebuilding efforts are evident as we are t

come out with stability in Iraq and Afghanistan. It takes years to e

new infrastructures, teach local nationals how to maintain them, an

up a local Rule of Law that is acceptable and locally su

Additionally, studies indicate that Security, Stabilization, Transiti

Reconstruction (SSTR) operations can take five times the e

commitment to rebuild a region as it did for the war to tear it do

speaker noted that in Iraq we are drawing down our forces, but som

people like Special Operators are there for the long term as they 
stability through the rebuilding of the society for many years to com

Civil Affairs units, Engineering and Construction teams, training 

etc.). 

As a COIN fight is one that requires adversaries and governme

to gain or maintain popular support, a sustainable conclusion ca

achieved solely through the application of military force. The true ta

the “hearts and minds” of the populace and trying to create a peacef

and sustainable environment. Traditional military units are not 

accomplish this task, nor are the Special Operations Forces, who ca

varying degrees of training of locals and the rebuilding of infras

(e.g., roads, rail, public works) and other “hearts and minds” operati

do not have the complete expertise of the many other ec

development (e.g., farming, inter-region commerce, banking), and go

elements brought to bear by other agencies who are better prep

achieve this objective. Evidence of this was offered by Eric Beinha

he demonstrated the effective role of the Department of Justice and 

as well as NGOs and the UNDP and UNHCHR. Further evidence 

witnessed when looking at Plan Colombia, where military forces g

to police and police maintained the peace while economically 

government elements helped the locals revitalize the economy

speaker offered his first-hand experience in Kosovo, where he noted 

rebuilding of such things as schools and clinics went a long way to 

the hearts and minds of the people and therefore was extremely im

and effective (he also noted that most of this effort was done by t

Affairs units from the U.S. Reserves forces). In other instances suc

efforts in Southeast Asia, “medical (and veterinarian) capabilities w

important for a lot of these people because a water buffalo might 

most important possession, as it was essential to sustain not ju

economic livelihood, but their very survival!” 

“Anything you can do to first understand the people and 

important to them and then get into the hearts and minds of the peo

are with is essential in establishing the necessary foundation for succ

ending an insurgency.” The only way to go forward in brin

insurgency to an acceptable end is to proceed with a whole-of- gov

approach. As our speaker offered, “look at an operation and the so

which it operates and come up with the center of gravity and go f

today’s world everyone is dependent upon each other for a solution—

about joint, combined, interagency efforts. This really becomes a su

it works. In Thailand, U.S. Forces took the Ambassador to see our 

Operators at work. They were not breaking down doors or shooting 

guys, they were doing medical work throughout the community
percent of what Special Operations Forces do is winning the mi

hearts of the people in the country in which they are located; it’s a

relationships you build in the countries where you work. The ke

whole-of-government (police, NGOs, etc.) and how to bring t

together for a solution. When a solution is established ‘by, w

through’ the local society it will be accepted and therefore will stand 

of time. You need to leave behind a structure that will be resil

withstand adverse conditions or risk returning to fight the same 

again.” 

Resilience goes hand in hand with acceptable Rule of Law. This 

Law must be acceptable to those it governs or it risks alienating 

population it is designed to serve. What it is frequently not accepta

system of law levied by a foreign authority based on foreign cultura

as opposed to local socio-cultural norms. The time tested tradi

bartered justice in Africa or religious-based law used in many 

nations are just two examples of legal systems that would be unaccep

a system based on western legal traditions. It is, however, historic

culturally entrenched, and therefore acceptable, in many societies aro

world. Our speaker offered the example where U.S. Forces suppo

capture of a leading terrorist in Southeast Asia. U.S. Forces wanted 

the person to justice through due process, but “the locals did not se

way. The local solution had a much more immediate and definite end 

former terrorist and that was and is a societal norm for the region. N

how we look at the rule of law, other people have different interpre

If U.S. Forces had attempted to overcome the local Rule of Law by 

American norms on a non-American society, we would have 

acceptable local tenets creating friction and dissension, which wou

been counterproductive to our long-term security goals in the region. 

The final part of the SOCOM presenter’s discussions focused 

establishment or maintenance of the Rule of Law as a central eleme

SSTR operation. Whether sustaining Phase Zero stability or retu

stability from conflict in Phases Four or Five, having a Rule 

maintained by the locals, accepted in method, recognized as fair (w

certainly relative to the society and culture) and maintained by a poli

as opposed to a military is a basic building block. It is impo

differentiate the use of forces for two reasons; (1) the purpose and 

the forces applied and the appropriateness of the role, and (2) the pe

by the populace of fair and acceptable rather than occupier or oppres

To the first point, general-purpose military forces are designed f

term, high energy, and kinetic effect. American forces have nev
designed as occupying forces nor would the American people stan

They are designed for forced entry and sustained combat operatio

there are elements within the force such as military police, civil affai

engineering units, etc., but they are designed as part of the ope

element of supporting combat operations and the transition of op

from combat to reconstruction and sustained peace. Conversely

forces are frequently recruited and operated locally, have a protec

for the people they serve, have limited kinetic capability, and are 

deter. They are part of the fabric of society they protect and gain 

through their connection with the local population. They protect 

violations of law that represent temporary flashes of instability a

sustain a justice system that holds the society together. Time and ex

have proven that military and police forces have clear, distinc

Although they often have a shared gray area of transition, they are 

from each other. Military forces can defeat an opposing force and 

nation back down the road to Rule of Law but without a fair, accept

police force and criminal justice system, the sustainability of the 

impossible. A nation that tries to use military forces in a police role w

transmit a heavy-handed message of occupation that frequently p

future insurgence. Similarly, a police force is ill-equipped or tr

execute sustained military action, but is essential when a popul

returned to everyday life. 

Our Special Operator then offered a model for future COIN op

the Joint Special Operations Task Force–Philippines (JSOTF–P

operation clearly depicts the long-term commitment, absolut

commitment, a whole-of-government approach, and established/ma

locally acceptable Rule of Law necessary to overcome an insu

Conducted side-by-side by U.S. and Philippine forces and agencies, 

Force has been successful in eliminating multiple threats to the sta

the Philippine government through the application of local forces/

with U.S. support and reflects the methods and thinking the U.S. wil

bring to various regions to keep the world a safer place. 

Our SOCOM speaker’s last words for the day acted as a 

transition to the last speaker on the panel, Colonel Bill Coultrup, U.S

Col. Coultrup had just returned from commanding the JSOTF–P. Th

was composed of the local Foreign Internal Defense forces (F

civilian and military personnel from both U.S. and Philippine 

helping each other to overcome insurgent threats within the island 

Col. Coultrup’s presentation demonstrated how many of the ke

discussed by our prior speakers can be brought together in a w

government (military, police, civilian agencies, NGOs, etc.) effort su
by and supporting the local Rule of Law and even in the face of 

constraints (a similar hurdle to the one overcome by Mr. Beinhart’s 

Uganda) to achieve success. 

Col. Coultrup opened his discussion by outlining the resour

objectives of the JSOTF–P. This Task Force, in coordination with 

country team, conducted internal defense activities with the Republ

Philippines Security Forces in order to defeat Jamal-i-Islamiya (JI) 

Sayyaf (AS), arrest high value individuals and neutralize enemy safe 

From a U.S. Country Team perspective this meant supporting, train

equipping while leaving any kinetic or enforcement actions to t

forces. While focused on JI and AS, the Task Force had to also 

other foreign influences in the Philippines such as the communist

elements of Moro Liberation Front, and other elements of Islamic f

is also important to note the Philippines is composed of a littoral ge

and largely jungle-based ecosystem. In total these combined fac

threats stretches the Philippine military forces extremely thin and t

requires options on how and who will react to the threat—it c

military or police depending on where, when and what. To m

challenge the Task Force had up to 600 people in country, partner

the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippines N

Police (PNP) stressing training in basic officer policing, invest

human rights, explosive ordnance disposal (note there was a sig

focus on counter-IED training), civil military operations (infras

medical and educational projects), and many other disciplines. 

As part of the whole-of-government equation the Task Force 

very closely with ICITAP who focused on the basic officer trainin

northern Philippines. In some areas, sixty percent of police person

below the poverty level and they have to buy their own weapons. 

worked with the local government to train the police in basic polic

skills. The Federal Bureau of Investigation also provided two agents 

with both Philippine military and civil police. When the program ra

money Task Force leadership brought in U.S. Military Police (M

Okinawa and had the MPs training the student officers in basic poli

like investigations and proper evidence collection. One other complic

utilizing the ICITAP trainers was getting them to the south of the 

due to threat-driven embassy restrictions. For this reason, the Task F

to facilitate getting other Task Force partners to the conflict areas 

out missions such as police training as well as information op

information gathering and sharing, civil-military engagement, and c

building. Because the ICITAP team was restricted from working 
south, this role was filled by the U.S. Navy SEALs who worked w

Philippine counterparts on a daily basis. 

Rule of Law related efforts did not just stop at training at the 

level. The Task Force also worked with the prosecutor’s offi

Philippine justice system has strict rules as it pertains to obtaining a 

to go after individuals which is out of balance with the time sensitiv

of the pursuit of the high value individuals in question. The team, 

within the local process, engaged with local prosecutors and ju

develop a method of presenting them with evidence packages to 

warrants issued within a shorter time frame, thus allowing the mili

police to go after suspects in a timely and legal fashion. 

Other work with the judges and magistrates included improvi

interaction with the AFP and the Philippine Coast Guard. This expan

reach of the Rule of Law further into the island nation well be

original boundaries, which were heavily dictated by the ecosyst

geography. The coordination permitted the legal reach to extend bey

road networks on the larger islands to those islands where separ

water also meant separation from the Rule of Law. 

One of the most significant elements of the program was th

Military Operations (CMO) component. This demonstrated to the lo

there was a better way to sustain their well-being and that their Gov

was able to help them realize it. CMOs helped in building schools, 

bridges to be able to cross rivers, expanding infrastructure, and 

medical services. Operations like these not only opened inter-city com

but also permitted the Task Force to conduct educational Civil 

Programs. Programs like these brought the police and AFP officials 

face with the public, enabling them to build trusting relationshi

villages and townspeople where distrust or limited trust may have 

before. 

 CMO also helped to reduce safe havens for the insurge

example, a proposed dirt road project would be offered and coordina

everyone in the region. Word would quickly spread to the insurge

would then say “we need to move. The military (Americans) are 

roads and this will give AFP speed of attack. This is going to make 

and our people will not support us anymore.” A very simple proje

dirt road would therefore bring with it enhanced security, but wo

yield the positive secondary effect of promoting and/or increasing co

between local villages to towns, thereby enhancing the economic we
of the residents. In total, one road would equate to two “positiv

points” for the government and against the insurgents. 

A similar simple security-enhancing project was the openin

emergency call center. Until this time there was no U.S. “911”-like 

leaving the locals with no way of rapidly interacting with local poli

shortcoming was rapidly overcome by a joint interagency effort. N

only can the public access emergency help, but the police and mili

better help one another. This enhanced public-government 

communications has enhanced public safety while decreasing the ins

freedom of movement. Initially, there was resistance from local pol

did not want the military to see what kind of corruption was going o

region, but in short course, the benefits outweighed the concern 

Center is up and running. 

Much if not all of the JSOTF–P efforts were conducted with a w

government, heavily interagency dependent methodology. At variou

across the effort the Task Force itself had ten members and the 

Team another eight members. These groups where complemente

many as another dozen partnerships with Philippine military a

agencies as well as NGOs and PVOs. In total the available skill set

from military and police to doctors, engineers and chaplains comi

organizations that span the spectrum of government and gover

support, such as the Peace Corps, the Red Cross, the Departm

Agriculture and Justice, Public Affairs units, and USAID. Man

institutions also contributed. For example, when the Task Force c

work directly with USAID it worked with local institutions in 

induce people to give up weapons in exchange for something else, li

In total, it represented a true whole-of-government/interagency eff

worth noting though, that the interagency process is slow because 

not enough money to take on a multitude of projects while U.S. e

Afghanistan and Iraq are the major focus. In spite of this major lim

however, this program demonstrates that success is possible. 

At the close of his presentation Col. Coultrup offered severa

aways” that he believes underlie the success of the JSOTF–Ps eff

might be worthy consideration when designing future COIN strategie

1. We [the U.S.] are not in charge (nor do we want to be). We 

supporting the government of the Philippines and its Secu

Forces. We accomplish the U.S. strategic objectives throu

by and with the Security Forces of the host nation. 
2. Value long-term success over short-term gains. 

3. Success requires synchronized interagency and whole

government efforts. 

4. The government of the Philippines is changing the condit

that give rise to terrorism. They are enhancing g

governance, the professionalism of their military [and poli

and economic development across their nation. 

5. When it comes to “needs vs. wants,” limited resources dic

that we must focus on key areas. We cannot dictate what th

areas are as it requires local “buy in” from local leadership

community, and the security forces demonstrating the neces

degree of acceptance and commitment that is essential 

success. 

At the conclusion of Col. Coultrup’s presentation, a membe

audience offered an interesting question which actually brings this 

full circle to its opening quote from Santayana. The participan

“There are a variety of organizations involved in peace operations. H

got a system across the government to document the lessons learned

is the short answer,” replied a panelist, “there are examples where 

captured such lessons, but not much more. Unfortunately, in the la

years the bureaucratic turf battles between the Departments of S

Justice have made interagency collaboration increasingly difficult. T

case studies out there, but in terms of the U.S. Government, no. T

time again, it’s “old lessons re-learned.” 

KEY FINDINGS 

The intent of this panel was to look back at recent operations a

lessons learned so we don’t repeat the mistakes of history or have to 

old lessons. The following is an effort to summarize the key po

contribute to the necessary documentation that can keep COIN 

progressing: 

1. Rule of Law is a keystone of stability. It must be seen as l

term and persistent in order to have credibility. Rule of L

must stem from acceptable, traditional and historic so

cultural norms of the local region and not non-local pract

from foreign sources. 
2. Campaigns must be whole-of-government interagency eff

in order to succeed. Success requires working, training 

mentoring the local populations to better their standard of liv

as opposed to a foreign system being levied by a perce

occupation force, a role frequently associated with mili

forces. 

3. Security in the form of military forces may have a role 

either kinetic operations, training, and/or Civil Mili

Operations, but certainly police forces have an essential 

in local, acceptable sustainment of security through lo

Rule of Law. The perception (or reality) of heavy-han

military operations works against the success of CO

operations. The military role is key to establishing stability, 

transition to police is equally essential to lasting peace 

reducing the prospects re-insurgent efforts. 

4. Value of Civil-Military Operations should not 

underestimated. Within COIN Operations CMOs have pro

to be a positive method of lowering public barriers 

enhancing acceptance of government leadership. CMOs c

with them positive messages of support to the local popu

and their economy. 

5. Whether military, CMO or police operations, the opera

force must understand the socio-cultural norms of the reg

or risk alienating the populace and creating fertile fields 

ongoing or future insurgency. 

6. As “all insurgency is local,” it is the locals who must “buy 

and actively participate in establishing stability in t

nation. Insurgency cannot be won by a perceived occupy

force, it can only be won by, with and through the locals. 

7. Long-term success versus short-term gain holds the real va

in establishing persistent stability within a region. 

REFERENCES 

1. Wikipedia.org/George_Santayana. 

2. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3–0, Joint Operations, 17 S

2006. Incorporating Changes 2, 22 March 2010, IV–27. 
3. Clausewitz, Carl Von, 1989. On War. Princeton: Princeton Univers

87. 

4. Department of Defense Joint Publication 3–24, Counterinsurgency Op

5 October 2009. 

5. O’Neill, Jr., Thomas P, 1987. Man of the House: The Life and 

Memoirs of the Speaker Tip O’Neill. New York: Random House. 

6. Kilcullen, David, 2009. The Accidental Guerrilla, Fighting Small W

Midst of a Big One. New York: Oxford University Press, xv. 

7. Killebrew, Bob and Jennifer Beral, 2010. Crime Wars, Gangs, Cartels 

National Security. Washington, DC: Center for New American Studie

8. Ibid. 

9. Ibid. 

10. Ibid. 

11. O’Neill, Jr., Thomas P., 1987. Man of the House. 

12. Kilcullen, David, 2009. The Accidental Guerrilla. 

13. Killebrew, Bob and Jennifer Beral, 2010. Crime Wars. 

14. Ibid. 

15. Ibid. 

16. Ibid. 
Chapter 7: COIN Policy and Process 

James M. Keagle 

Director, Transforming National Security Seminar Series 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

Christopher Mann 

Research Associate 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University 

 “The Afghan government has not integrated or supported 

traditional community governance structures, historically 

an important component of Afghan civil society, leaving 

communities vulnerable to being undermined by insurgent 

groups and power-brokers.” 

 General McChrystal, August 2009 

Dr. James M. Keagle, the Director of the Transforming National 

seminar series at the Center for Technology and National Security 

National Defense University, chaired the Roundtable: COIN Po

Process. Joseph Keefe, a Research Staff Member for the Institute of 

Analyses, discussed the Focused District Development Concept (FD

aim of this six-phase program was initially to reform and profess

local police units. T.X. Hammes, a Senior Research Fellow at the 

for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, argue

successful COIN campaign must be police-led, intelligence-driv

population-centric. Dr. Stephen Metz, currently the Chairman 

Regional Strategy and Planning Department at the U.S. Army War 

Strategic Studies Institute, posited that the central problem is we 

polish and apply 20th-century insurgency principles to 21st-century 

that differ in fundamental ways. Ms. Mary Beth Long, United 

Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonprol

from 2007 to 2009, argued in favor of several important considera

understanding how to better position ourselves for an effective tran

Afghanistan. 
 

INTRODUCTION 

This chapter asserts that the central challenge of the Afghan confli

question of how U.S. and allied forces should assist the central gov

in securing its international borders and policing internal populatio

purpose for the analysis is to identify what steps the DOD must take 

Afghan security forces in professionalizing police and border pa

preparation for a future U.S. military withdrawal. 

This perspective fundamentally differs from others by setting 

priority on Afghan security while conceding low expectations for 

development over the short and medium term. This analysis also 

that elements of the Taliban insurgency will remain active after ma

combat operations in Afghanistan have officially concluded. Fi

contends that American and allied development assistance will con

flow to Afghanistan after the bulk of American military personnel ha

re-deployed elsewhere. 

The results of this analysis are contained in a list of recommend

the final section of this Chapter. They demonstrate two organizing pr

for the development of an effective Afghan security force: (1) the e

of quality over quantity, and (2) the adoption of a decentralized app

rural justice and enforcement. These pragmatic recommendations 

intended to represent an ideal endstate for the development of Afgh

however, it may represent an appropriate medium-term goal for A

military involvement. 

CONFRONTING THE TALIBAN WITH A CT/COIN MI

The Taliban insurgency represents the biggest threat to the creati

stable Afghan security force. Among American military experts, th

continues regarding the preferred model for confronting this danger

capable Afghan enemy; counterinsurgency (COIN), or countert

(CT).1

 Though the current U.S. plan is a composite that includes elem

both strategies, it relies most heavily on COIN. 

This is also known as the Petraeus-McChrystal model, and em

the protection of local populations from insurgent intimidation 

importance of establishing cooperative relations among tra

community leaders. 

1

 Bob Woodward has captured this well in his book Obama’s Wars (Woodw

2010. Obama’s Wars. New York: Simon & Schuster).
The chief disadvantage of an Afghan COIN strategy, from t

perspective, is that it remains “resource intensive” by committin

numbers of allied personnel and development assistance to a deca

conflict.2

 These unremittingly high military expenditures are po

taxing and have the effect of skewing the U.S. force structure to t

end” in order to accommodate sustained combat operations abroad. 

Further, the U.S. is not effectively organized to re-engineer s

Thus, it is problematic that the U.S. has either the willpower and 

power or the capabilities to see such a COIN campaign throu

successful endgame. 

CT, on the other hand, represents a more limited, adversary

strategy designed to aggressively root out enemy strong-holds rat

fortifying large numbers of friendly population centers. Vice P

Biden has advocated this approach, arguing that CT’s relatively low 

terms of deployed ground forces and higher reliance on t

intelligence and advanced equipment are elements that play to A

strengths. Critics maintain, however, that intermittent air strikes and 

Operations missions do not adequately demonstrate American com

to the region. Moreover, they contend CT is not a viable stra

undermining an insurgency and stabilizing an impoverished, 

country like Afghanistan. 

Regardless, as we enter the 10th year of what has become the 

war in U.S. history, the stakes in Afghanistan are indisputab

Building a capable 400,000 man force will need to directly 

national, provincial, district, and tribal divisions; corruption; and illi

to name just three of the challenges. Transition to an Afghan lea

developmental focus, however it is managed, will be elusive and 

determined by arbitrary dates, be they 2011, 2014, or .... 

TRAINING THE AFGHAN NATIONAL POLICE— 

THE KEY TO THE CONFLICT 

The fundamental challenge for the new Afghan regime will be its a

develop an effective Afghan National Police (ANP) force. Li

General William Caldwell, Commander of the U.S. and NATO 

mission in Afghanistan, highlighted this in a 60 Minutes interview b

on November 30, 2010.3

 Consequently, the most critical U.S. an

 

2

 Its defining document is Army Field Manual 3–24. 3

 60 Minutes. CBS and WCBS Television, New York, Nov. 30, 2009. 
 

mission in Afghanistan will be helping the central government tr

equip the ANP to coordinate its operations with the Afghan Nation

and become a force capable of winning the respect and confidenc

Afghan people (Figure 1). 

 

Understanding the ANP 

The ANP is comprised of four components: 

1. Afghan Uniform Police (AUP): Single largest policing elem

Responsible for general law enforcement, public safety, inte

security. 

2. Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP): An elite fo

that patrols high threat areas and is used for civil disturbance

(equivalent to American SWAT teams).

3. Afghan Border Police (ABP): Patrol Afghanistan’s border. 

4. Counter-Narcotics Police–Afghanistan (CNP–A)*: Elimin

narcotics production and trafficking of illicit drugs. 

Figure 1: Understanding the Afghan National Police (ANP). 

According to Joseph Keefe,4

 the International Security Assistan

(ISAF) and Afghanistan’s Ministry of the Interior have taken the 

developing Afghanistan’s main police training program, called the 

District Development Concept (FDD). The aim of this six-phase 

was initially to reform and professionalize local police u

Afghanistan’s 365 districts that have relied on traditional “warlord” p

for enforcing order, such as beatings and extortion.5 

FOCUSED DISTRICT DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 

The FDD is multi-phase program designed to remove and retrain loc

for a period of eight weeks, then return and re-integrate the units 

home districts. It is constructed around a 10-month cycle. 

4

 Joseph D. Keefe is a Research Staff Member for the Institute of Defense 

He has also worked for the Office of National Drug Control Policy, and 

U.S. DEA. Many of the views that follow represent his arguments presen

National Defense University conference “Policing and COIN Operat

September 29, 2010. 5

 The FDD’s primary mission has recently been expanded to include the int

of modest judicial reforms and reconstruction projects.
Though the FDD program was initially conceived as a m

professionalizing ANP units, its primary mission has been co-opted 

program transformed into a platform for training local security f

COIN tactics. Critically, the FDD’s eight-week curriculum now of

than a week of actual “police training.” The remaining seven we

devoted to safety/survival instruction, terrorist tactics, counterte

defense, and weapons qualification (Figure 2). This dearth o

investigative and enforcement training has left ANP units inad

prepared to execute their primary mission at the local level and c

their role as combatants in the COIN fight. As a consequence, ill-e

units are frequently deployed to hostile areas where they are outnu

with limited reinforcements and inadequate armament.6

Phase 1. 6 to 8 weeks District assessment 

Phase 2. 10 to 14 days Relief in place by a covering sec

force (usually ANCOP) 

Phase 3. 8 weeks (plus 

movement 

time) 

Reconstitution of the district pol

force – reorganizing, retraining, 

equipping, reviewing the 

renovation/construction of facilit

Phase 4. 1 week Reinsertion of the trained and ref

police force back into its district 

Phase 5. 2 to 4 months Mentoring by a Police Mentor T

(PMT) with continued collective 

training in the district; concludes 

district police force is validated a

capable of independent operation

Phase 6. Indefinite Operational overwatch and susta

training by the PMT 

Figure 2: The Focused District Development (FDD) 

concept. 

ENDURING CHALLENGES: STRUCTURE, LITERACY

CORRUPTION, RESOURCES 

Any conceivable training program for the ANP faces an impressive 

of cultural, institutional, and financial obstacles. Foremost among 

 

6

 The FDD curriculum has practically created “low-cost trigger-pullers” 

casualty rates (2007–June 2009 = 1,764 KIA/2,885 WIA), high attrition r

30%/yr), and low morale. 
 

the top-down, nationalized approach to policing counter to Afghan 

which has historically been decentralized. The central governm

generally not been present in these significant functions. 

Second is the endemic lack of literacy and math skills amo

recruits. According to recent estimates, the ANP suffers from a liter

of less than 25%, and many personnel are unable to do ele

arithmetic.7

 Such low rates of literacy pose intractable accoun

management, and training problems for a force devoted to enforcing 

of law. 

Third, but perhaps an equally intransigent difficulty, is the p

culture of corruption accepted at all organizational levels. The c

effect of institutional graft handicaps the effective traini

administration of Afghanistan’s judicial and security apparatus whi

broadly, undermining the population’s confidence in the state itself. 

A final difficulty lies in the ANP’s relative poverty. New rec

indoctrinated into the organization’s culture of scarcity where l

inadequate equipment, and low levels prestige create “hoarding” b

and the expectation of abandonment. A dearth of new equipment 

inability to maintain old gear ensures the ANP remains a chronicall

armed force. 

ANP OPERATIONAL VULNERABILITIES 

FDD training challenges generally reflect Afghanistan’s broader p

with the ANP. Low rates of literacy and math, endemic corruption, 

of official resources have resulted in an organization which is 

effective nor sustainable. Yet at an annual cost of $1B/year (estima

for pay, training, equipment, and O&M, the current ANP budget 

Afghanistan’s entire annual national income. What has the 

government purchased for such significant investment? In many w

funds have produced an ANP defined by scarcity, rather than organ

effectiveness. The analysis found significant shortages and vulnerab

the following areas: 

Equipment. 

 Immature logistics capability and transportation infrastr

 Culture of poverty that creates “hoarding”/expecta

abandonment. 

7

 A national program, called the ANSF Literacy Program. 
 Inability to maintain existing equipment. 

 An under-armed ANP vis-a-vis the Taliban. 

Wages and Payment. 

 According to 2009 data, ANP pay of $165/month (with 

hazard pay up to $240/month) cannot compete with 

Taliban fighters earning $300/month.

 The electronic payment system has many serious issues 

as GIRoA moves to a national banking system. 

Currently there are only 50 “bank outlets” in the 

country.

Pervasive Corruption. 

 Corruption exists at all levels within the ANP, which 

the population views as the face of the GIRoA. 

 Unsurprisingly, the population does not trust the 

police, whose confidence is also undermined by low 

and diminishing international regard. 

Accountability Systems. 

 Lack of internal affairs units at the provincial level 

impose severe leadership and management challenges 

on the system. 

 Limited recognition of informal security and justice 

structures means that there is little or no synchronized 

approach to justice reform/Rule of Law. Police, courts, 

and the entire penal corrections systems is woefully 

lacking generally and uncoordinated throughout.8

Police Mentor Teams. 

 In May 2009: 2,375 personnel were required, yet only 

922 personnel were assigned (39%). 

 As security forces grow to the expected 160,000, 

shortfalls will become even more acute. 

 

8

 The top-down, nationalized approach to policing is counter to Afghan cultu

has historically been decentralized. The central government has generally 

present in these significant functions.

 Use incentives (pay, specialty pay, awards, reenlistment bonus) to induce career versus conscription 

environment. 

 Build and sustain In-Service Training. 

2. Narrow the Mission.

 ANP should be used for policing, not as a substitute f

security forces. 

 Emphasize closer coordination between ANA and ANP 

3. Revise Police Training.

 Expand curriculum and increase training to emphasize 

police instruction. 

 Provide continuous mentoring and performance 

assessments. 

4. Leverage Customary Security and Justice Structures in R

Urban Areas.

 Commission on Conflict Mediation—akin to out-ofcourt arbitration for resource and land-based conflicts. 

 Support the shura/jirga by improving existing 

mechanisms. 

 Register shuras/jirgas with district government. 

 Record decisions at district level. 

 Processes to move cases between formal and 

customary systems. 

5. Increase Literacy and Human Capital.

 Mandatory math and literacy training programs. 

 Create (secular) educational opportunities in the 

workplace; advertise benefits. 

 Emphasize importance of written police reports in the 

collection of evidence and preparation for testimony 

and prosecution. 
 the five. 

 

THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGE—APPLYING WHAT WE TH

WE KNOW TO UNIQUE CIRCUMSTANCES 

T.X. Hammes10 argued that a successful COIN campaign must be 

led, intelligence-driven, and population-centric. Beyond that 

campaigns can be differentiated along five vectors or lines of oper

which the counterinsurgent controls only three of

1. Domestic or expeditionary; 

2. Direct or indirect support of host nation; 

3. Major or minor commitment; 

4. Unitary or fragmented enemy; and 

5. Single sponsor or coalition. 

Kalev “Gunner” Sepp’s extensive review of lessons learned 

20th-century insurgencies and COIN responses11 left us pessim

finding answers in history. Afghanistan is “unique.” Key problems c

in both Iraq and Afghanistan include the following: 

1. Corruption rampant. 

2. Abuse of population, 

3. Training too short. 

4. Training poorly done. 

5. Too few trainers, even fewer mentors. 

10 T.X. Hammes is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National 

Studies, National Defense University, and a 30-year veteran of the USMC. 

author of over 100 articles and book chapters on military history and strateg

the recent groundbreaking volume, The Sling and the Stone: On War in 

Century. 11 Dr. Kalev I. Sepp is currently a Senior Lecturer in Defense Analysis at 

Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. Until January 2009, 

as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Ca

Dr. Sepp earned his Ph.D. at Harvard University and served in the U

Special Forces. 
6. Cultural conflicts. 

7. Little or no Rule of Law—and linking security forces to rul

law and governance challenges. 

THREE WAYS TO CONCEPTUALIZE INSURGENCIES/CO

Steve Metz12 posited that the central problem is that we tried to po

apply 20th-century insurgency principles to 21st-century conflicts th

in fundamental ways. Moreover, excessive focusing on operation

levels contributes to the problem, if, indeed, the strategy itself is flaw

1. As a variant of war, one way to think of insurgency/COIN i

enemy-centric in which the objective is victory. It is DO

heavy with emphasis on bilateral mil-to-mil partnerships 

military train-and-equip programs. 

2. Insurgency is a violent competition for support; hence, 

insurgency/COIN is population-centric. This is the essenc

FM 3–24 and dependent on the insurgents needing popula

support, and that such support really is up for grabs. Lien

emphasis here include psyops and a transition from militar

aid programs. 

3. The insurgency/COIN is part of a larger social pathology. 

system-centric in which the lack of economic capacity is a 

eminent challenge. These kinds of transformations will dire

threaten the existing empowered elites. Further, the U.S. is 

effectively organized to re-engineer societies. Thus, it is hig

unlikely that it has either the willpower and staying power 

the capabilities to see such a COIN campaign through 

successful endgame. 

 

12 Dr. Stephen Metz is currently the Chairman of the Regional Strategy and 

Department at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. 

author of more than 100 publications on future war and a frequent cont

strategic and military trade journals. Dr. Metz received his Ph.D. in politic

from the Johns Hopkins University. 
SEVEN KEY CONSIDERATIONS FOR 

WINNING AFGHANISTAN 

Mary Beth Long13 argued in favor of several important considerat

understanding how to better position ourselves for an effective tran

Afghanistan. 

U.S. forces have been particularly prone to judge their military 

by the number of killed and captured enemy forces on the ba

American commanders have often predicted the collapse of the Tali

yet, year after year, the strength of this dangerous adversary has r

practically undiminished. This analysis has yielded a number of key 

which, taken together, help to explain the Taliban’s impressive rege

ability and the way forward for U.S. and coalition strategy in the regi

1. Long-term Commitment: The Afghans want predictabilit

and reliability, which they do not see from the Amer

commitment—and a proposed withdrawal date of July 20

This is why one of the reasons the Taliban succeeds the wa

does. It is there for the long haul—and will be a force to 

with long after U.S. Forces return home. Long-term CO

operations are needed—a generational commitment. 

2. Lower Political Expectations: The Afghans look forward 

modest future. U.S. and allied forces should also lo

expectations for achieving a perfect representative governm

in Afghanistan. An achievable exit strategy for American fo

is to leave behind a relatively stable Afghanistan capabl

defending its internal and external territory, and organize

effectively absorb development assistance over the medium 

long term. 

3. Leave the Wire Behind: Embassy and coalition forces base

Afghanistan remain too often behind the protective cultural 

military umbrella of an armed compound. This chronic lac

engagement with the Afghans prevents American forces f

understanding the priorities of local populations and form

mutually productive alliances with members of the commun

 

13 Ms. Mary Beth Long was United States Assistant Secretary of State for Int

Security and Nonproliferation from 2007 to 2009. She worked for over 1

the Central Intelligence Agency’s Directorate of Operations on a v

international issues, and has earned several awards for her distinguished ser
4. Focus on the Youth: American and Allied commanders sho

begin treating Afghan youth as a key constituency. The me

age in Afghanistan is less than 20 years old. Those 16 to 

year-old youths of today were 7 to 12 years old on Septem

11, 2001. Many villages have median ages approaching 

These young adults do not remember the Soviet invasion, 

their world views are fundamentally different from o

generations. Young Afghans are more tolerant of Wes

views than older (40 to 50-year-old) generations.14 Afg

adults have less influence on their family than we suppose, 

they take up the bulk of American attentions in our relat

with local communities. 

5. Advertise, Inform, and Engage: U.S. information 

psychological operations campaigns have been lar

ineffective and should be re-evaluated. Reaching out to 

public is as important for the stability of the country as train

and equipping security forces. 

6. Local Commanders: A major weakness of the American 

coalition system has been the relatively rapid rotation cycle

local commanders. This means relations with commu

leaders are routinely destroyed as military and contra

personnel leave for other assignments or are sent home. Tw

month tours do not equal the kind of individual-based stay

power that can develop the kinds of personal relationship

necessary in this familial and tribal-based society. Equ

important, when in country, we cannot live and operate beh

the wired compounds. 

7. Re-evaluate Alliances: The DoD should re-evaluate 

effectiveness of two American allies in the Afghan conf

NATO security forces and private contractors. Often 40–6

of a team in-country are contractors. NATO is not curre

prepared for COIN doctrinal analysis, which means the U

often must drag them through the process. Perhaps 

alliances and partners are required. 

 

14 When we started worrying about the Taliban, most of the Afghan popul

under 10 years old. They think the golden years were 2004–2006 w

attended school. Then, all of a sudden, U.S. soldiers entered their country. 
CONCLUSION 

Wicked problems may indeed be the best characterization of polic

COIN operations in Afghanistan. Surely, we face problems that are 

to solve because of incomplete, changing, and/or contradictory requi

Further, just when we believe we have addressed an issue, new p

jump to the forefront. 

Perhaps the Obama administration has moved in the right d

when it shared publicly a reined set of expectations for “succ

Afghanistan. Regardless, the U.S. and the NATO community are n

to execute a precipitous and complete withdrawal from Afghanistan 

or 2014. The engagement will evolve and change in style and substa

engaged we will be. The challenge to all of us remains: to apply w

know to unique circumstances; be flexible and capable of adju

warranted; and be sensitive to the realities of the host nation in whic

operating. 
Chapter 8: Building Indigenous Capacity1

Samuel Musa 

Senior Research Fellow 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University, Fort McNair 

John Morgan 

Deputy Director for Science and Technology 

Counter-Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) 

United States Department of Defense 

Matt Keegan 

Visiting Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Po

National Defense University, Fort McNair 

and Chief of Staff and Vice President, U.S. Strategy 

Selex Galileo, Inc., Arlington, Virginia 

The panel members for the Roundtable: Building Indigenous Capac

Mr. Frank Prendergast, Dr. James Bruce, and Mr. Judd Ray. Mr

Prendergast is a member of the Australian Federal Police, an exped

tool of Australian foreign policy. The AFP supports stability r

security intervention, and long-term community policing and is a fo

unlike anything in the USG national security community. Dr. Jame

Senior Political Scientist of the RAND Corporation, spent his caree

CIA working both for the Directorate of Operations and Direct

Intelligence Analysis. Dr. Bruce’s most recent work for the 

Corporation concerns his evaluation of “Project LEGACY,” the 

effort by the U.S. Government since Vietnam to develop an indigenou

information gathering and analysis capability for COIN. This 

attempts to document these two expert perspectives. Mr. Judd R

member of ICITAP, and is currently assigned as the program man

the Active component of the Civilian Response Corps (CRC–A). M

career in law enforcement spans over 38 years—including 25 years 

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). 

 

1

   The authors acknowledge the contributions of Drew Lomax. His input fo

foundation of the chapter.
INTRODUCTION 

The early stages of the War on Terror spawned hope and even hubri

Defense planners. Small numbers of American troops wielding u

lethal technology seemed to topple or “decapitate” regimes at wi

images of Special Forces soldiers and CIA paramilitary opera

horseback with Northern Alliance guerrillas in Afghanistan were 

some to signal the completion of a revolution in military affairs. Bu

autumn of 2003, an accelerating insurgency in Iraq signaled that the

were veering off script. 

 

By 2005, inside-the-beltway wisdom conceded that the prom

high-tech, “full spectrum dominance” were not sufficient to man

situation, particularly in Iraq. Concurrent with other on-the-fly ch

operations on the ground, DoD issued Directive 3000.05, and soon p

a much-lauded COIN Doctrine, authored by General David Petraeus

 

DoD Instruction 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, S

Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” emphasi

development of police and governance structures during stability op

elevating these so-called “soft” skill sets to a level of parity with maj

intensity combat operations. General Petraeus’s designation of 200

“year of the police,” during some of the most difficult days of the I

heralded a new manpower-intensive phase of the post-9/11 cam

“shock and awe” and “full spectrum dominance” were now little m

discredited marketing slogans. 

More than four years later, and nearly a decade after the invas

Afghanistan, more than 200,000 American Servicemembers—alo

untold numbers of civil servants, other government agencies, NG

contractors—continue to try to secure peace and stability in these 

regions. 

 

Today it is conventional wisdom among COIN planners 

development of indigenous capacity—whether in the “host-nation’s

police or other security services—is the main effort in COIN campai

the manner in which the United States Government (USG) builds ind

security services’ capacity remains ad hoc and is essentially a tas

performed at any Iraq- or Afghanistan-scale, carried out by a conglom

of U.S. Military and a private army of contractors. 

Despite such formal recognition that police are instrumental to 

and after a decade of recent lessons learned in the current South Asi
there remains room to investigate further the intersection of polic

COIN. To this end, the National Defense University and the Co

Terrorism Technical Support Office convened a workshop with 

comprising law enforcement and the military, COIN practition

academics. The panel activities during Roundtable VI: Building Ind

Capacity discussed how to build indigenous capacity among hos

forces during COIN operations. 

MR. FRANK PRENDERGAST: THE AUSTRALIAN 

FEDERAL POLICE— 

INTERNATIONAL DEPLOYMENT GROUP 

Mr. Prendergast opened the discussion with an overview of the Au

Federal Police’s (AFP) International Deployment Group (IDG), i

mission, and organization. Formed in 2004, IDG is comprised o

personnel and maintains the readiness to deploy abroad at any giv

Mr. Prendergast was careful to stress that the AFP’s IDG is n

gendarmerie nor a paramilitary force. The IDG is concerned with 

response and long-term community policing, capacity-building, and 

of Australian foreign policy. 

 

In addition to developing policy and the design and evaluation o

force interventions into trouble areas, the IDG conducts a wide r

operational activities. These include training, both 

academic/classroom setting and in tactical/field environs. “We do

people to be police officers. We train them to train others,” Mr. Pre

reiterated. 

 

Mr. Prendergast then explained the rationale for maintaining 

force. The Australian government invests $300 million annually in t

a testament to Canberra’s recognition that police capacity can play 

preventive role abroad and may in this fashion provide an altern

military intervention. 

Investment in the IDG reflects an understanding of the importan

rule of law—strong association with the rule of law and deve

outcomes. International indicators point to the key importance of th

law in international development—there is “not much bang for yo

from aid assistance without rule of law,” noted Mr. Prendergast. “W

recognized that there has to be a capacity development of the ind

police force. If that does not happen, what is the exit strategy then? 

our focus is on capacity-building,” said Prendergast. 
The confidence of the local community is an indicator 

effectiveness of any police force. To this end, the IDG focuses its ef

institutional strengthening. In so far as COIN is a considerati

Prendergast offered that without a sustained attention to the ind

capacity, there can be no success in the mission. He also stres

correlation between increases in stability and larger role for pol

police responsibilities increase with stability and decline of violence. 

Using the now familiar “clear, hold, build” as a framework, the 

or other security organizations clear and reduce the most capable thre

the police provide the enduring, local security knowledge and firs

defense in security stability. The Australian Federal Police are dev

joint-training, joint-exercise and exchanges with Australian Defens

(ADF). Mr. Prendergast also described the Australian interagency/jo

force structure, where command may reside with either the polic

military. In some contingencies, AFP operates under ADF control

many environments ADF operates under the AFP. This type of w

been representative of AFP IDG operations the last few years and r

clear understanding of roles and missions: “We subscribe to the a

that the military and police have different roles, and we clearly d

differences between roles of military and police.” 

 

While Mr. Prendergast noted that the AFP is currently act

working effectively in Afghanistan, it was in other regions where 

their impact was best illustrated and where the characteristics of t

described earlier could be observed. During the Regional As

Mission–Solomon Islands beginning in 2003, the AFP’s IDG partici

a 6-nation law and order intervention, backed up by a small military 

was stressed that this was not a military intervention and that the p

aim of the deployment, insofar as the IDG was concerned, was 

under control the indigenous police force. 

 

It is important to account for the scale of this intervention into 

of roughly 600,000 people in a maritime environment. The original 

up by the British had disintegrated and the main task for the ID

arrival was to restore law and order and to begin to implement prog

start to deal with endemic corruption. “While we were working thro

security process, we were looking down the road to what happens 

intervention force departs,” he noted. 

Security in the Solomon intervention has waxed and waned de

on the circumstances on the ground. The IDG’s activities have 

towards capacity development supporting regional elections in 200
2006, IDG has been engaged in continuous capacity development 

the most recent general elections in August 2010. These efforts i

institutional strengthening, as police mentoring is only one dimen

stabilization operations. IDG oversaw the implementation of 

housing and health programs and “in the process we are identifyin

leaders,” said Prendergast. 

In closing, Mr. Prendergast stressed the importance of identifyi

is culturally appropriate in a given situation. He offered tha

training/mentoring has real limitations: dialogue must continue o

ongoing issues; institutional strengthening is as important as actua

training. 

DR. JAMES BRUCE: EVALUATING LEGACY 

The panel turned next to a presentation by Dr. Bruce on the LE

program. LEGACY is the largest effort by the U.S. Government s

Vietnam War to develop an indigenous police information gather

analysis capability for COIN. Dr. Bruce’s presentation offered hig

and it identified lessons-learned during implementation of the pro

Iraq, which is now ongoing in Afghanistan. It should be no

LEGACY builds specialized capacity for local police forces; i

primarily about law enforcement or even the rule of law. Rather, L

seeks to build from a zero-baseline in twenty months a functioni

nation intelligence bureaucracy that can penetrate and defeat l

insurgent actors. 

 

Dr. Bruce described two specific implementations of the pro

Iraq—LEGACY, first as a pilot initiative in Al Anbar, supported 

USMC; and GRYPHON, which was an expansion of LEGACY i

more provinces (Ninevah, Salah ad Din, Kirkuk, and Diyala—in 

national Division–North (MND–N)). 

 

The doctrine from which LEGACY mentors instruct is derived 

British experience in COIN, specifically the intelligence mo

developed within the U.K. “Special Branch” and which was used 

effect during the Troubles in Northern Ireland. Dr. Bruce stres

uniqueness of the Special Branch approach, which has no counte

U.S. experience. This is a serious and significant differentiation f

standard resource pool of mentoring/training, which the U.S. t

contracts from among U.S. police forces that have no historic exper

COIN or in police intelligence operations. Additionally, U.S. laws 

the transmission of U.S. tradecraft to foreign organizations or ind
thus the U.K. intelligence model developed under LEGACY is ideal

to building indigenous intelligence capacity. 

 

Effective COIN operations are inherently intelligence-driven. Im

targeting ensures that counterinsurgent forces do not kill or cap

wrong people and thereby worsen local grievances and erode public 

for the government. LEGACY sought to, and achieved, improved ge

of meaningful intelligence by host-nation security forces in Al Anba

MND–North. 

 

In Al Anbar, contractor teams comprised of former U.K. Specia

police mentors and Accredited Cultural Advisors (security-cleared l

were emplaced in January 2008 where they mentored, trained, and 

Iraqi and U.S. Forces through September 2009. These teams were em

within U.S. military Police Transition Teams (PTTs), who partner

local Iraqi police in order to build local security capacity. The rol

ACA was particularly crucial as the mentoring of local Iraqi po

military required a credible, culturally attuned interlocutor betw

Special Branch mentor and the host-nation (Iraqi) security personnel

 

The RAND Corporation evaluated how well the LEGACY 

worked. The evaluation methodology considered infras

performance, effectiveness, and impact. Aside from the 

infrastructure status, which can quickly be evaluated and monit

improvement, metrics for such skill sets are hard to consider, but b

amount to “Are they doing it how they are supposed to be doing it

there an operational impact?” Dr. Bruce reported that the reporting 

the Anbar (LEGACY) and MND–North (GRYPHON) implement

the program was promising and showed that the program was 

effective. 

 

In Anbar province, mentor teams enjoyed near continual prox

the Iraqis as the mentor teams were embedded within the PTTs

Gryphon program mentors were not embedded and in most cases 

“commute” from bases along with the PTTs to which they were a

This posture was the result of more restrictive policies that originate

then-new Status of Forces Agreement between U.S. Forces and Ir

distinction highlights one of the principal lessons learned: embed

mentors is a highly effective means of employment, but the “com

model, not surprisingly, did not work as well. 

 

Overall, RAND concluded that the LEGACY program was effe

Iraq. While police professionalization involves implementing the pr
of the rule of law, the development of an effective intelligence capa

another critical attribute of a host-nation security force that must stan

own after U.S. withdrawal during an active and deep-rooted insu

LEGACY equipped the Iraqi organizations that they mentored w

capability to develop local knowledge and intelligence of value 

counterinsurgency. 

LESSONS IDENTIFIED 

RAND identified 10 lessons learned throughout their evaluation 

LEGACY program, which have been integrated into the L

program’s operations in Afghanistan and which might be of value 

similar mentor-advising capacity development efforts. Chief amon

was that on-site, continuous embedded posture is most effective; 

words, “handholding” is more effective than remote monitoring. 

 

Additionally, for a program like LEGACY to succeed, the U.S. 

must recognize police training is an integral part of COIN. In Al An

in MND–N the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Army, respectively

did so. Dr. Bruce noted that this does not come easy for the milit

nevertheless the operational customers of LEGACY and GRYPHO

the local U.S. Military units) did view police support and integra

crucial. 

 

The host nation must also support and embrace a capacity-

program; there has to be buy-in from the national to the province and 

level. In the Anbar province, support was needed, but it could 

acquired from Baghdad. So the LEGACY program emplaced a 

officer at the Ministry of Interior, a predominantly Shia Ministry, 

and pressure for resources. But steady, reliable support 

predominantly Sunni province of Al Anbar remained an ongoing and 

concern. In a similar way, in such a capacity-building program as LE

where the principal actors are contractors (and in the case of LEGAC

and thus foreign), buy-in from the U.S. military for security/force pro

communication, etc. is absolutely essential. 

 

Cultural sensitivity was also important. The LEGACY 

benefited greatly from culturally-attuned advisors (ACAs) at ever

Understanding the local and national culture was crucial; whe

understanding was better, the results were better as well. 

 

A final characteristic of the LEGACY program which distingu

from other U.S. resourced capacity-building efforts was the presen
comprehensive and proven doctrine that is continually updated 

lessons are learned. LEGACY benefited from more than 1,200 p

USG-approved tactics, techniques, and procedures which professi

not only the host-nation charges who were mentored, but also pro

consistent script for the mentors and ACAs, ensuring a professional d

 

There must also be a mechanism to demonstrate that learning f

instruction and doctrine is occurring and to ensure mentor/staff com

LEGACY employs a cadre of Compliance Officers who act like 

auditors and who visit the mentoring locations monthly to eval

progress and to prescribe corrective action in concert with the 

supported U.S. military command. 

MR. JUDSON RAY: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 

Mr. Ray’s approach was to ask questions. In particular, he asked: 

 “What is the transportability of the Western experience to 

ungoverned areas of the world?” I cannot answer this questi

 “If the police could achieve their goals with their meth

would we as Westerners be satisfied?” My experience is “

Our overarching USG goals are often not the same as what 

indigenous police are willing to accept. I bring this to ask 

final question: 

 “Why are we doing this?” “It’s kind of ironic, because 

matter of policy, [in] the Foreign Assistance Act, it says tha

don’t do this. If there are precedents saying we don’t do 

how are we going to do this now?” 

He stated that we need to re-look at this from the point of 

policy. He said that “I look at all this for one reason only, as 

officer—will these capacity-building policies improve our national s

How will police training improve our national security?” In his exp

the investigative mandate of the USG agencies stops at the water’s e

are totally dependent on the capacity of the local police ability to pro

citizens and interests—“if you are not looking at the mission of the 

don’t need you.” Why can’t we develop something similar to w

Australians have?” 

He was sent to Saudi Arabia right after September 11, 20

experience in the region led him to ask more questions: “What law
concerned with? And whose laws? Where do we begin?” There is 

to look at this holistically; you cannot stovepipe this operation. “

point does an environment become permissive enough to put a 

police perspective in the field?” I can’t find anyone to tell me that. W

have to do is to climb Mount Everest, but we don’t even have the 

base camp. We have to test, operate, re-test, and exit. 

SOME QUESTIONS 

The panel concluded with questions of Mr. Prendergast, Dr. Bruce, 

Ray in regards to what they had presented. Mr. Prendergast descr

development of metrics in capacity-building, noting that they g

remained an ongoing concern in any operation and developed throug

engagement. Dr. Bruce spoke to a question regarding resources 

strategy. And Mr. Prendergast followed up with a description of 

IDG is organized and manned, noting that enjoys human resourc

among Australian state police through a reimbursement framework 

states. Mr. Ray mentioned that he would consider ICITAP at bas

However, he indicated that most of the funding comes from INL for 

programs around the world. DOJ funds only six positions at ICITAP 

expansion has yet to happen. Until they have their own budget, it 

more of the same. 

CLOSING THOUGHTS 

American COIN doctrine is filled with references to “host n

governments ostensibly and willingly harboring/hosting a 

counterinsurgent force or source of assistance. It was beyond the s

this paper and indeed the NDU-sponsored conference to fully exp

various modalities of COIN—e.g., COIN, where the p

counterinsurgent force is foreign; those COIN campaigns wh

counterinsurgent is the threatened regime/government itself and 

alone. But what was discussed in the one-day event must be consi

the context of relatively historical reflection. 

An invading or foreign power hoping to re-order a state is in

deeply disadvantaged, particularly to the extent to which it relies u

invading/intervening power’s own (and inherently foreign) structur

basis for the new state’s re-ordering. As Van Crevald notes, and w

Chi Minh and Mao demonstrated, time is the key fa

counterinsurgency. 
At a time of declining public support for large-scale, monum

expensive entanglements abroad, the U.S.-led campaigns in Afghani

Iraq may be outliers and paradoxically just might belie those very d

artifacts—FM 3–24 and DODI 3000.5—which elevate “stability ope

to parity with major combat operations. After trillions of dollars s

Iraq and Afghanistan, the preventive model of intervention at limit

evident in the AFP’s IDG may be a more sustainable approac

forward. 

 

Finally, it must be noted that the vast majority of the technica

activities—the very DODI 3000.05 “soft skill sets”—carried out u

banner of “capacity-building” are performed by private contractor

are doubtlessly advantages and strong arguments in favor 

arrangement. Americans may not be enamored with so-called mercen

their modern-day cousins, the contingency contractors who are wor

the USG in Iraq and Afghanistan by the hundreds of thousands. B

dislike the notion of sending their loved ones to godforsaken corne

globe even more. 

 

Perhaps the notion of converting so much of our nation’s milita

and attendant sacrifice to a for-profit motive in lieu of patriotic d

profound things about the relationship between the American peo

their government. “Indeed,” writes historian Andrew Bacevic

privatization of war—evident in the prominence achieved by armies

such as the notorious Blackwater—suggests a tacit willingness to tr

military service from a civic function into an economic enterpri

money rather than patriotism the motive.”2 

 

2

   Andrew J. Bacevich, 2008. The Limits of Power: The End of 

Exceptionalism, 1 ed. p. 155. New York: Metropolitan Books.
 

Chapter 9: Conclusions1

Samuel Musa 

Senior Research Fellow 

Center for Technology and National Security Policy 

National Defense University, Fort McNair 

John Morgan 

Deputy Director for Science and Technology 

Counter-Terrorism Technical Support Office (CTTSO) 

United States Department of Defense 

Matt Keegan 

Visiting Fellow, Center for Technology and National Security Po

National Defense University, Fort McNair, 

and Chief of Staff and Vice President, U.S. Strategy, 

Selex Galileo, Inc., Arlington, Virginia 

There was general agreement within the workshop that police are im

in counterinsurgency operations and the United States is challenge

situations of training indigenous police and developing indigenous 

systems. We lack national institutions that are present in other co

For example, the Department of Defense supports a great deal o

training in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the Department of State 

responsibility for supporting police training more broadly. In both ca

training is designed, delivered, and evaluated by contractors, a mo

does not always work very well. In Afghanistan, we are working 

contractors and are engaged in a multinational effort with the E

Union, NATO, and perhaps 40 other countries. The level of confusio

high. Many observers feel that no one is in charge and police deve

has lacked resources and strategic direction. 

1

   The authors acknowledge the contributions of Robert Perito to this Chapter

summary at the workshop formed the foundation for the conclusions outlin
LESSONS LEARNED ABOUT POLICING AND 

COIN OPERATIONS 

FROM IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN 

There are many lessons learned from the Iraq and Afghanistan op

First, there are fundamental differences in overall COIN strategies 

Iraq and Afghanistan. In Iraq, the goal was and is to generate a dem

society; while in Afghanistan, the strategy continues to change

changes in strategies made it difficult to prosecute a war with a 

endgame. Next, building the capacity for the military to move wi

population was critical. This freedom of action is important to enga

population in defeating the insurgency. As General Petraeus said, “W

learned that the only way to secure the population is to live with it.” 

there was no doctrine and the chain of command was not unified

were a number of chains of command working in parallel and this 

difficult to identify the person in charge. Next, using a civil affairs 

partner with the police is critical to the operations. This partner

times combined with mentoring—resulted in a number of su

operations. In addition, attempts to impose the U.S. and Allied pro

and processes have often resulted in failure. Solutions must fit ind

needs and capabilities. It is important to recognize that it is the A

lives, their country, and their future. Ultimately, problems must have 

solutions. Finally, there are connections between drug traffickers, te

and insurgents. Insurgents in Afghanistan are receiving money by pr

and facilitating drug trafficking across the border. In many cases, po

play a central role in responding to this challenge. 

 

There is lack of knowledge of what the United States is t

accomplish in Iraq and Afghanistan with respect to development o

capacity. In the 1960s, Afghanistan did have a national police force, 

history is now all but forgotten. For the present conflict, there 

alternative approaches: 

1. Using police who are inferior to the U.S. as a force multip

We run personnel through a short train-and-equip program, 

them a badge, and send them out on the streets with l

attention paid to the institutions that control the police. 

2. Develop the police as a force that deals with crime, bu

relationships with their community, and protects the people. 

Currently, most police capacity-building in Afghanistan (and els

has used the first approach. The focus has been on the use of police t
military operations. The latter approach will pay greater divid

connecting policing—and by extension the government—to the peop

served. Afghans actually want the police to deal with criminals. To 

police must be available, responsive, and fair. In particular, thr

principles must be followed: 

 The great effectiveness multiplier in the use of state po

against violence is the allegiance and support of the public. 

 In order for governments to gain public support, responsib

for security should be entrusted, in so far as possible, to po

deployed among the population, who minimize the use of f

and who act in accordance with accepted standards of hu

rights. 

 Capturing, killing, or imprisoning people committing vio

acts are unlikely to be effective as a long-term solution 

insecurity unless guided by precise intelligence identify

perpetrators or infrastructure. 

There are lessons that advocates of either approach can apprecia

COIN success should be measured by the degree to which 

responsibilities have been transferred to the police. It should be mea

terms of populace served and legitimacy, not by the overall number o

trained and deployed. During the early stages of counterinsurgency, 

units will be needed to maintain security in an area as long as po

unable to do this job on their own. Police assets should only be d

when they can operate safely and be equipped to protect themselve

police have been established in an area, the COIN military comman

use the police as a critical intelligence tool to refine targeting of ins

Successful COIN depends on the judgment of local commanders a

proper mix of military and police assets at a particular moment 

Civilian (“interagency”) engagement is necessary to build indigenou

capacity. The military lacks the tools and doctrine to train, equ

monitor police, so it is necessary to deploy civilian assets to perf

mission, especially in areas with communal violence. 

OTHER APPROACHES FOR POLICE 

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT 

EMERGED FROM THE WORKSHOP 

Other ideas emerged from the workshop but are not necessarily align

either of the two main approaches to development of police capacit
the development of core policing and specialized police units 

necessarily mutually exclusive. Specialized police units have be

successful in many conflicts, including in Afghanistan. For exam

Drug Enforcement Administration has developed specialized a

police units that have interrupted the opium trade and intercepted f

flows to insurgent groups. 

We may conclude that specialized police unit development sho

priority for COIN, as long as their training reflects rule of law and ot

policing doctrines. To be clear, Bayley and Perito do not share th

because they feel the building of such special units interferes w

development of core policing capacity and undermines legitimacy. 

Furthermore, police development must precede reconciliation 

communal factions or with insurgent groups. It may be necessary to 

local or tribal assets that have ambiguous loyalties or history to e

security in some areas. This could include the development of polic

local ethnic control that may, for example, have Taliban leanings 

will conform to basic concepts in the rule of law. This could also m

use of informants and police tactical teams to weaken insurgents

choices must be made consciously and with appropriate training 

involved to minimize the possibility of abuses. When police protect 

and bond with the community, the community then volunte

information on where insurgents are. 

Success relies on the engagement of experienced police trainer

overall strategy with realistic expectations and ongoing perf

measures. In many cases, the term “police” has been used very broa

in not a very consistent way. We have to think through what we do a

kind of police we train—are the people at the conclusion of our tr

real police force? By this, we mean: will they provide sustainable se

serve their communities? 

How can we create a capacity in the U.S. Government to bu

indigenous police in conflict environments? We don’t have a nation

force, but we do have Federal-level police officers that can be desig

take on this role (at the U.S. Marshal’s Service, for example). The A

policing experience in unique in the world, with 18,000 separat

forces and no single Federal oversight agency. The Federal Bu

Investigation comes closest to this role, but it is not a tra

community-based police agency. The Attorney General is often ca

nation’s top law enforcement official, but this title is based as muc

Department of Justice’s (DoJ) role in Federal prosecution as any ot
The International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 

(ICITAP) is an office in the DoJ, not a full bureau, and falls un

jurisdiction of both the Departments of State and Justice. It lacks r

and capability to sustain police training through the use of an in-hou

such as the International Deployment Group under the Australian 

Police. 

It is in the interest of U.S. national security for the government 

a continuing capability to support police and judicial training. W

save a great deal of money by avoiding the need for military inte

while saving many lives in developing countries that lack the a

protect their own citizens. This does not imply that we would apply 

standards of policing to every single country, but rather that w

enable police who are available, responsive, and fair to the peo

serve. If we merely take a look at the cost of adventures in COIN, w

get more bang for the buck if police capacity-building and 

operations were integrated with the pre-mission planning than 

priorities followed the military and “cleaned up the mess” afterward. 

THE RULE OF LAW IS A KEYSTONE OF STABILITY 

In looking back at recent operations and offering lessons learned so w

repeat the mistakes of history or have to re-learn old lessons, it is 

that the Rule of Law is a keystone of stability. Rule of Law must ste

acceptable, traditional and historic socio-cultural norms of the loca

and not non-local practices from foreign sources. Successful ca

must be whole-of-government interagency efforts in order to suc

requires working, training and mentoring the local populations to be

standard of living as opposed to a foreign system being levied by a p

occupation force. 

Security in the form of military forces may have a role in eithe

operations, training, and/or Civil Military Operations (CMOs), but c

police forces have an essential role in local, acceptable sustain

security through local Rule of Law. Value of Civil Military Op

should not be underestimated. Within COIN Operations, CMOs have 

to be a positive method of lowering public barriers and en

acceptance of Government leadership. Whether military, CMOs, o

operations, the operating force must understand the socio-cultural n

the region or risk alienating the populous and creating fertile fi

ongoing or future insurgency. Finally, as “all insurgency is local,” 

locals who must “buy in” and actively participate in establishing sta

their nation. 
In OIF and OEF–A, DoD has opted for a Police-imbedded T

Team (PiTT) construct coupled with rapid indigenous police indoc

and training capabilities to assist in capacity development for an ele

establishing the Rule of Law. The other components of the Rule 

(detainee operations and courts) lagged far behind this rudi

development of patrolmen. A common perception is that American 

and irregular warfare actions should leverage methods developed in 

to interdict insurgent or terrorist activity and enhance legitimacy of 

governments through extension of the rule of law. In Stability Opera

Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Deve

(USAID) are the lead U.S. agencies to support a host-nation’s e

establish or improve key aspects of governance to include rule of la

variety of services. 

One of the most critical aspects that is probably not understoo

integration of the role of “Rule of Law” in the past two engagem

been the timing and sequencing of when, where, and who 

development and sustainment activities of police, courts, and pris

fluid “seize, clear, build” COIN fight. These engagements, and deve

activities, are never uniform across a conflict zone. 

 
Biographies 

MR. ARIF ALIKHAN 

Mr. Arif Alikhan is the Assistant Secretary for Policy Developmen

Department for Homeland Security. He joined DHS from Los 

Mayor Antonio R. Villaraigosa’s office, where he served as Deputy 

for Homeland Security and Public Safety. As a key adviser to the M

has led the City’s efforts to develop homeland security, em

management and law enforcement initiatives, including ope

oversight of Los Angeles Police, Fire and Emergency Man

departments. Before serving as Deputy Mayor, Alikhan was a 

prosecutor with the U.S. Department of Justice from 1997–2006. Du

time, he served as Chief of the Cyber and Intellectual Crimes Sectio

U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los Angeles and as a Senior Advisor to 

Attorney General in Washington, D.C., where he oversaw the 

Computer Hacking and Intellectual Property Program for the Depar

Justice. Alikhan holds a J.D. from Loyola Law School and a B.A. f

University of California, Irvine. 

MR. BRIAN BERREY 

Brian Berrey is a senior advisor for the Combating Terrorism T

Support Office’s Irregular Warfare Support Program, which devel

solutions for the conduct of Irregular Warfare. Mr. Berrey ma

number of projects that leverage law enforcement lessons and metho

to improve U.S. Forces’ capabilities in today’s overseas con

operations. 

DR. JAMES KEAGLE 

Dr. James M. Keagle is the Director of the Transforming National 

seminar series at the Center for Technology and National Security P

the National Defense University. Prior to this position, Dr. Keagle 

National Defense University’s Provost (effective 2004) and Vice P

for Academic Affairs. Prior to these positions, he served as a prof

National Security Strategy at NDU. In that role Dr. Keagle work

research faculty member assisting with NDU’s modeling and simula

work with interagency education and training. Accepting an appoin

the U.S. Air Force Academy, he graduated second academically in 

in June 1974. Following graduation, he went to the University of Pi

to complete his Masters of Arts degree in political science and e
graduate certificate in Latin American studies. After a tour as a m

maintenance officer, Dr. Keagle went on to become an assistant prof

political science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. In 1980, he we

Princeton University where he completed both a Masters of Arts deg

Ph.D. in politics. He proudly notes his honorary Ph.D. from the 

Technical Academy of Romania—the only United States citizen so h

Following his extensive education, Dr. Keagle’s next six tou

political-military assignments that included direct access and int

with Cabinet-level government officials on national security related 

These assignments included work for two Combatant Command

senior strategist; for the Office of Secretary of Defense pertaining t

Deputy Director, Office of the Secretary of Defense Bosnian Task 

and for the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force in Internationa

as Senior Strategist. Military medals include the Defense Superior 

Award, the Legion of Merit, and the Purple Heart. Since leaving 

service, Dr. Keagle has held the position of adjunct professor at a nu

institutions to include: Syracuse University, American University, 

Michigan University, Catholic University, University of Colorado, a

Superior State College. He also holds honorary professorshi

Transilvania University in Brasov, Romania, as well as the Mo

Defense University—again, the only American so honored. 

MR. MATT KEEGAN 

Matt Keegan is Selex Galileo, Inc.’s (Selex) Chief of Staff, which 

he was promoted to in 2007. In this role he is responsible for suppo

CEO in making decisions and project completion. These projects 

strategic planning, staffing, business operations, contracts, 

development, and alliances. He makes sure that all other staff mem

employees carry out any new mandates, and is responsible for 

meetings in relation to personnel issues, company process, or project

meetings also give him an opportunity to lay out analytical and 

strategies. Mr. Keegan came to Selex in July of 2006 as a direct hir

CEO of Selex S&AS Ltd., to establish the position of the Vice Pres

Strategy (U.S.), a role he continues to play today. His primary 

mission has continued to be to move the U.S. division of Selex out o

business development/product representation organization to 

operational business. Mr. Keegan helped stand up new units such a

integration unit, the Security Assistance unit, and the Huntsville u

initiated the planning and execution of the Stennis expansion p

connective to SOCOM efforts. In his various roles, he has led major 

efforts, business development organizations, and service organizat

products, implementation services, and hosting. In all four organiza
served as a strategic advisor or in the case of his work with con

helped develop strategies for divisions of companies such as N

Grumman, McDonnell Douglas, General Dynamics, and FMC (now 

Mr. Keegan is a distinguished graduate of the National Defense Uni

Industrial College of the Armed Forces. After graduating (in the 

with his M.S. (in National Resource Strategy) from NDU/IC

remained a Visiting Fellow to NDU’s Center for Technology and 

Security Policy (CTNSP), advising on information technology s

with a focus on the use of biometric infrastructure solutions for app

in counterinsurgency warfare. Mr. Keegan has a B.A. in Political 

from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School. He has written articl

studies and white papers on a range of national security topics rangi

technology application for counterinsurgency, Pentagon procuremen

defense market direction, and strategic planning in the post–Co

world. 

MR. DREW LOMAX 

Drew Lomax is a senior program analyst for the Combating T

Technical Support Office’s Irregular Warfare Support Program

develops new solutions for the conduct of Irregular Warfare. Drew m

a number of projects that leverage law enforcement lesso

methodologies to improve U.S. Forces’ capabilities in today’s 

contingency operations. 

DR. JOHN MORGAN 

Dr. John S. Morgan serves as the Deputy Director for Scien

Technology at the Counter-Terrorism Technical Support Office (CT

the Department of Defense. At CTTSO, Dr. Morgan provides s

advice to advance the work of the Technical Support Working Gr

other activities to support the combating terrorism community. H

assignment from the Department of Justice, where he directs the O

Science and Technology, which is responsible for development 

technology for use in law enforcement. While at the Department of 

Dr. Morgan received the Service to America medal for his work to 

the nation’s capacity to use DNA evidence. Prior to coming 

Department of Justice, Dr. Morgan conducted research in detect

mitigation of weapons of mass destruction at the Johns Hopkins Un

Applied Physics Laboratory (APL). His research work at APL also 

non-destructive evaluation, explosives detection, optoelectronic m

and spacecraft contamination. Dr. Morgan served eight years 

Maryland House of Delegates, serving on the Judiciary, Ethi
Commerce and Government Matters Committees. He received his 

Materials Science and Engineering from Johns Hopkins University 

his B.S. in Physics is from Loyola College in Maryland. 

DR. SAMUEL MUSA 

Dr. Samuel Musa is a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Tec

and National Security Policy. Previously, he was Associate Vice P

for Strategic Initiatives and Professor of Electrical and C

Engineering at Northwestern University (1999–2005). From 1995 

he was Executive Director, Center for Display Technolo

Manufacturing, University of Michigan. Prior to that, he was Corpor

President for Research and Advanced Technology, E-Systems (1983

From 1979 to 1983, he served as Staff Specialist and then Deputy D

Military Systems Technology, in the Office of Undersecretary of 

for Research and Engineering. He was also Deputy Director for C

and Requirements Review in OSD (1978–1979). He served as 

Leader and Research Staff Member at the Institute for Defense A

(1971–1978). Also, he was Assistant Professor of Electrical Engine

the University of Pennsylvania (1967–1971). Dr. Musa served 

Defense Intelligence Advisory Board, Army Science Board, Ai

Scientific Advisory Board, Air Force Foreign Technology 

Advisory Board, Air Force Logistics Command Scientific Advisory 

and was Executive Secretary of Defense Science Board Summer Stu

Task Forces, and member of Scientific and Technical Inte

Committee of the Director of Central Intelligence. He was a membe

Board of Directors of Semiconductor Research Corporation, Chai

Aerospace Industries Association Technical and Operations 

Member of Editorial Advisory Board of Journal of Electronic D

Technical Editor on Environmental Monitoring of IEEE Transac

Geoscience and Remote Sensing, and Co-chair of Association of Ol

Technical Symposia. Dr. Musa received Decoration for Exceptional 

Service from the Secretary of the Air Force, Certificate of Appreciati

Secretary of Defense, Certificate of Commendation from Soc

Information Displays. He is a Fellow of the IEEE, Member of Si

Tau Beta Pi, and Pi Mu Epsilon. He has published and presented 

papers in scientific journals and technical meetings. Dr. Musa receiv

and B.S. degrees in Electrical Engineering from Rutgers Univers

M.S. and Ph.D. degrees in Applied Physics from Harvard University
MR. ROBERT PERITO 

Robert M. Perito directs USIP’s Initiative on Security Sector Gov

under the Centers of Innovation. He is also a senior program office

Center for Post-Conflict Peace and Stability Operations where he di

Haiti and the Peacekeeping Lessons Learned Projects. Perito came 

in 2001 as a senior fellow in the Jennings Randolph Fellowship p

Before joining the Institute, he was a Foreign Service officer with 

Department of State, retiring with the rank of minister-counselor. H

as deputy executive secretary of the National Security Council (1988

He was a congressional fellow in 1980. Perito received a Pre

Meritorious Service Award in 1990 for leading the U.S. delegatio

Angola peace talks. Perito served as deputy director of the Inter

Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program at the U.S. Dep

of Justice, which trained police in international peace operations 

2001). As a Peace Corps Volunteer, Perito served as a rural deve

officer in Nigeria (1965–1967). Perito has taught at Princeton, Am

and George Mason universities. He holds a B.A. in international r

from Denver University and an M.A. in peace operations poli

George Mason University. Perito is the author of Where is the Lone 

When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Post Conflict Security 

The American Experience with Police in Peace Operations; and co-a

Police in War: Fighting Insurgency, Terrorism and Violent Crime. 

DR. JAMES SCHEAR 

Dr. James A. Schear was appointed as Deputy Assistant Secr

Defense (Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations) on April 2

A member of the policy team in the Office of the Assistant Secr

Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict and Interde

Capabilities), Dr. Schear advises the Department’s leadership on all 

pertaining to stabilization and reconstruction operations, foreign 

relief, humanitarian assistance, international peacekeeping efforts a

combatant evacuations. He also oversees the Department’s efforts 

foreign partners in their efforts to bolster stability within regions th

by conflict or extremist violence. Prior to assuming his current du

Schear served as Director of Research at the National Defense Uni

Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS). He directed the In

analytic work in the areas of regional studies, national security 

defense planning, strategic concept development, and 

terrorism/transnational threats. From 1997–2001, Dr. Schear se

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Huma

Affairs. In November 1999, he received the Secretary of Defense M
Outstanding Public Service for his efforts during the Kosovo c

widely published scholar in the fields of international security and 

management, Dr. Schear has held research appointments at 

University, the Brookings Institution, the Carnegie Endowm

International Peace, the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 

Stimson Center. From 1984–1987, he served as Executive Office

Aspen Strategy Group. During 1991, he assisted the United 

Secretariat in planning for the implementation of the Gulf War c

resolutions, and he served as an advisor to the leadership of UN mis

Cambodia and former Yugoslavia from 1992–1995. During 2007, h

as a principal member of the Afghanistan Study Group co-cha

General James L. Jones (USMC, ret.) and Ambassador Tho

Pickering. Dr. Schear earned his Ph.D. at the London School of Ec

and Political Science. He also holds an M.A. from Johns 

University’s School of Advanced International Studies and a B.

American University’s School of International Service. 
About the Editors 

SAMUEL MUSA is a Senior Research Fellow in the Center for Tec

and National Security Policy (CTNSP) at the National Defense Un

He has held the Homeland Security Science and Technology C

CTNSP. He has served in various positions in academia, governm

industry, including Northwestern University, University of M

University of Pennsylvania, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Inst

Defense Analysis, and Office of the Secretary of Defense. Dr. Mus

on the Defense Intelligence Advisory Board, Army Science Board, 

Force Scientific Advisory Board, and was Executive Secretary 

Defense Science Board Summer Studies and Task Forces, and a me

the Scientific and Technical Intelligence Committee of the Dir

Central Intelligence. He is the author and co-author of several ar

scientific journals and technical meetings recently dealing with 

Radicalization, Application of Law Enforcement Technology to 

Terrain Mapping and Counterinsurgency, Biometrics, and Risk-I

Decision-Making. Dr. Musa received his B.A. and B.S. degrees in E

Engineering from Rutgers University, and his M.S. and Ph.D. de

Applied Physics from Harvard University. 

JOHN MORGAN is the Chief Scientist at the U.S. Special Op

Command. He has served as the Deputy Director for Scien

Technology at the Counter-Terrorism Technical Support Office (CT

the Department of Defense. At CTTSO, Dr. Morgan provides s

advice to advance the work of the Technical Support Working Gr

other activities to support the combating terrorism community. He 

assignment from the Department of Justice, where he directs the O

Science and Technology, which is responsible for development 

technology for use in law enforcement. Dr. Morgan served eight yea

Maryland House of Delegates, serving on the Judiciary, Ethi

Commerce and Government Matters Committees. He received a B.S

in Physics from Loyola College, and a Ph.D. in Materials Scie

Engineering from Johns Hopkins University. 

MATT KEEGAN is a Visiting Fellow at CTNSP. He is also Selex 

Inc.’s (Selex) Chief of Staff and Vice President. He has written artic

studies, and white papers on a range of national security topics rangi

technology application for counterinsurgency, Pentagon procuremen

defense market direction, and strategic planning in the post–Co

world. Mr. Keegan is a distinguished graduate of the National 

University’s Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Mr. Keegan ha
in Political Science from Syracuse University’s Maxwell School 

M.S. degree from National Defense University’s Industrial Colleg

Armed Forces.