J-S38033-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMAL WILLIAMS

 Appellant No. 1708 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 18, 2016

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division

at No(s): CP-51-CR-0011845-2015

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED JULY 10, 2017

Appellant, Jamal Williams, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after the trial court found him guilty of robbery, a felony of the 

third degree,1and attempted theft by unlawful taking.2 Appellant claims the 

evidence was insufficient to sustain his robbery conviction because he did 

not take or remove property from the victim. We reverse the robbery 

conviction, vacate the judgment of sentence, and remand this case for 

resentencing.

The trial court summarized the evidence presented at trial as follows.

On October 19, 2015, Arneatha Branch-Chenery, a 77-

year old woman, was at Beneficial Bank at 6401 Woodland 

Avenue in Philadelphia withdrawing money from her 

 

*

Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
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account. She observed [Appellant] standing at the exit 

door. Upon completing her transaction and putting her 

cash away, Ms. Branch exited the bank through that door 

and headed in the direction of her parked car. [Appellant] 

then approached Ms. Branch from behind, with his hands 

in his pockets, and demanded money from her. Ms. 

Branch was fearful that [Appellant] was concealing a 

weapon in his pocket. [However, Ms. Branch testified she 

never saw a weapon. Appellant never put his hands on 

Ms. Branch, nor did Appellant lunge at her. There was 

about two to three feet between Appellant and Ms. 

Branch.] Ms. Branch told [Appellant] to get away from her 

and she went back into the bank. [Appellant] turned 

around and followed her back into the bank.

Once inside the bank, Ms. Branch told a teller about the 

incident. [Appellant] had returned to his position at the 

door. The teller told her supervisor, who then called the 

police. Officer Mosel[e]y[3] #2500 testified that he 

responded to the radio call for assistance at Beneficial 

Bank. Upon arriving at the scene, Officer Mosel[e]y spoke 

with Ms. Branch, who was visibly shaken up. Ms. Branch 

reported to Officer Mosel[e]y that she completed her 

transaction at the bank and while on her way out, a 

gentleman inside the bank approached her and demanded 

money. Ms. Branch then gave a statement to Detective 

[Matthew] Carey and identified [Appellant] in a photo 

array.

Trial Ct. Op., 10/20/16, at 1-2 (record citations and footnotes omitted).

Following a nonjury trial, the trial court found Appellant guilty of 

robbery and attempted theft. On May 18, 2016, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant on the robbery charge to one-and-one-half to three years’ 

imprisonment followed by three years’ probation, with no further penalty for 

attempted theft.

 

3 Officer Moseley’s first name is not apparent in the record.
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Appellant timely appealed from the judgment of sentence, and both 

Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents the following question for review:

Was not the evidence insufficient to support a conviction 

for robbery as a felony of the third degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 

3701(a)(1)(v)), where there was no evidence that 

anything was taken from the person of the complainant?

Appellant’s Brief at 3.

Appellant argues there is insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction 

for robbery under section 3701(a)(1)(v) because the Commonwealth failed 

to prove a taking or removal of property from the victim’s person. We 

agree. 

 When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,

[t]he standard we apply . . . is whether viewing all the 

evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the 

verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the 

fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may 

not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts 

regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the factfinder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that 

as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn 

from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth 

may sustain its burden of proving every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly 

circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above 

test, the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence 

actually received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of 

fact[,] while passing upon credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.
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Commonwealth v. Talbert, 129 A.3d 536, 542-43 (Pa. Super. 2015), 

appeal denied, 138 A.3d 4 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted).

The Crimes Code provides: “[a] person is guilty of robbery if, in the 

course of committing a theft, he . . . (v) physically takes or removes 

property from the person of another by force however slight . . . .” 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v). “Force however slight” occurs when the victim is 

actually compelled to part with the conscious control of her property. See

Commonwealth v. Brown, 484 A.2d 738, 741-42 (Pa. 1984) (grabbing 

purse from victim’s shoulder constitutes force). 

Two decisions illustrate the element of “physically tak[ing] or 

remov[ing] property from the person of another[.]” See Commonwealth 

v. Moore, 494 A.2d 447, 449 (Pa. Super. 1985); Commonwealth v. 

Lloyd, 151 A.3d 662, 664 (Pa. Super. 2016); 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v). 

In Moore, a grocery store security officer witnessed the defendant take a 

steak from the meat counter. Moore, 494 A.2d at 448. The defendant 

argued that, because robbery requires a theft of property from the person of 

another, there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. Id. at 

449. This Court agreed and reversed the robbery conviction, reasoning that: 

“[I]n interpreting the phrase ‘taking from the person of another’ under 

section 3701(a)(1)(v), we are aware that we are bound to accept the plain 

meaning of a statute and are not free to discard that plain meaning to 

achieve some desired result.” Id. (citation omitted). 
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In Lloyd, the defendant was convicted under section 3701(a)(1)(v) for 

pushing past a parking attendant and taking car keys from the wall of a 

parking garage valet-booth. Lloyd, 151 A.3d at 664-65. Citing Moore, the 

defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient because he did not take 

the keys from the parking attendant’s person but rather the wall of the 

valet-booth. Id. at 664-65. This Court held that, unlike the security officer 

in Moore, the parking attendant was not a mere observer of the crime, but 

instead had exercised dominion and control over the keys when the 

defendant used force to take them away. Id. at 665. Therefore, we 

affirmed the defendant’s conviction under section 3701(a)(1)(v). Id. at 

666.

In this case, the Commonwealth failed to prove the elements of force 

or “tak[ing] or remov[ing].” See 18 Pa.C.S. § 3701(a)(1)(v). Appellant 

never touched the victim, let alone removed the victim’s money from her 

person or control. See Lloyd, 151 A.3d at 665. The victim refused to 

succumb to Appellant’s demands and told Appellant to get away from her. 

The fact that Appellant put his hands in his pockets did not establish “force 

however slight,” as it did not compel the victim to hand over her money. 

See Brown, 484 A.2d at 741-42. Thus, finding the evidence sufficient 

would be wholly inconsistent with the language and purpose of section 

3701(a)(1)(v). See Moore, 494 A.2d at 449-50. 
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Because we reverse the conviction for robbery, we have upset the trial 

court’s sentencing scheme and the case must be remanded for resentencing 

on attempted theft. See Commonwealth v. Wilson, 67 A.3d 736, 745 

n.11 (Pa. 2013). 

Conviction for robbery reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Case 

remanded for resentencing. Jurisdiction relinquished. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/10/2017