Filed 1/4/22 Talib v. Van Lingen Towing CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

TALMADGE ADIB TALIB,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

VAN LINGEN TOWING, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B288525

Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC580054

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Robert Broadbelt, Judge. Affirmed.

Talmadge Adib Talib, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and 

Appellant. 

No appearance for Defendants and Respondents.

________________________
2

Police stopped Talmadge Adib Talib just before midnight on 

April 26, 2013. His car lacked headlights and a current 

registration sticker, and he was driving on a suspended driver’s 

license. Police impounded Talib’s car, which was towed, and cited 

him to appear in court on June 2, 2013, for driving on a 

suspended license. Talib sued in federal court to challenge this 

police stop. The federal court apparently adjudicated the matter 

for the defense. 

In state court, Talib then sued Van Lingen Towing, Inc. 

and Robert Van Lingen (collectively, “Van Lingen”) because, at 

police direction, these defendants towed Talib’s car from the 

arrest scene. The trial court granted Van Lingen’s motion for 

summary judgment in 2018. The court reasoned Van Lingen had 

acted in good faith and as the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s

Department’s agent when it towed Talib’s car. This situation 

defeated Talib’s conversion claim, the court ruled, because Talib 

had no possessory interest in his car once police impounded it. 

Talib’s fraud claim failed because Van Lingen gave Talib proper 

notice of the auction when Talib failed to pay storage fees for his 

car. Neither could a negligence claim survive Van Lingen’s 

undisputed evidence that it breached no duty of care. And Talib’s 

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress failed, the 

court finally ruled, because Van Lingen’s conduct was neither 

extreme nor outrageous. The court entered judgment against 

Talib. 

On appeal, Talib objects to what he maintains was 

oppressive and unfair police treatment in 2013. He does not, 

however, contest the trial court’s 2018 summary judgment ruling. 

We affirm this legal reasoning on the merits. The court’s 

analysis was straightforward and correct. 
3

Talib directs his legal argument at the trial court’s failure 

to appoint a court reporter for him. The trial court’s settled 

statement recounts that the court overruled Talib’s first request 

for a reporter because he was required “to arrange for the 

presence of a court reporter prior to the hearing.” The court 

denied Talib’s second request at a later hearing, citing California 

Rules of Court, rule 2.956, and the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Local Rules, rule 2.21. The latter rule includes the 

following language: 

“A party who has received a fee waiver may request an 

official court reporter pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 

2.956(c)(2). The request must be made by using the local form, 

Request for Court Reporting Services by a Party with Fee Waiver 

(LACIV 269), or Judicial Council form FW-020 and should be 

filed at least ten calendar days before the hearing or trial for 

which the reporter is requested. If the requesting party received 

less than ten days’ notice of the hearing or trial, the requesting 

party must file the request as soon as practicable.”

Talib does not argue he complied with this rule. Nor does 

his brief cite anything in the record showing compliance. We 

reject Talib’s attack on the court reporter ruling.

As an alternative and independent ground, even if we were 

to assume there was error about the court reporter, we would 

affirm nonetheless. Talib has not shown, nor has he undertaken 

to show, how the absence of a court reporter could have 

prejudiced him, either in the trial court or on appeal. The trial 

court set out in writing its correct analysis of Talib’s conversion, 

fraud, negligence, and emotional distress claims. Nothing about 

a court reporter’s presence could change the rectitude of this 

analysis, either in the trial court or on appeal. 
4

This case thus differs decisively from Jameson v. Desta

(2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, which Talib cites, where the trial court 

granted a nonsuit on the basis of a plaintiff’s oral opening 

statement at trial. The Court of Appeal affirmed without 

reaching the merits on the ground the merits were not cognizable 

in the absence of a reporter’s transcript. (Id. at pp. 623–625.) 

Here, by contrast, the key trial court decision was written, and 

our appellate decision is on the merits. In this setting, Talib has 

failed to tell us why the transcript of the hearing is necessary to 

our consideration of the merits of his appeal. Any error was 

harmless.

DISPOSITION

We affirm.

WILEY, J. 

We concur:

STRATTON, Acting P. J. 

HARUTUNIAN, J.*

* Judge of the San Diego Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.