Sc hlu p v . D e lo , 513 U.S. 298 (1995). As we noted in Ex pa rteBr own , 205 S.W .3d 538, 1 544-45 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006): (continued...) 

## IN THE COU RT O F CR IM IN AL AP PE ALS

OF TE XAS

N O S. A P - 75, 580/ 75, 581

EX PA R TE BILL Y FR ED ER I C K A LL EN , A ppl i c ant

ON AP P LI CAT I ON F OR A W RI T OF HABE AS CORP US F ROM THE 1 9 5 TH J UDI CI AL DI S TR I CT COURT

DALLAS CO UNTY

H OL C OM B , J ., anno unc e d t he j udg m e nt

of the Cour t

i n an o pi ni on i n whi c h J OHNS ON and C OCHR AN , J J ., jo in e d . P RI CE and C OCHR AN , JJ. , e a c h fi le d a c o n c u r r in g o p in io n . K ELL ER , P . J. , fi le d

a d is s e n tin g o

p in io n . M E YE RS , J ., fileda d iss e n tin g o p in io n in whi c h K ELL ER , P . J. , jo in e d . H ERVEY , J. , f

i l e d a di s s e nt i ng o

pi ni on i n whi c h K ELL ER , P . J. , jo in e d

. W OMACK , J. , c o n c u r r e d . K EASLE R , J. , di d not par t i ci pat e.

O P I N I O N This is a post-conviction habe as corpus proce eding , broug ht unde r Article 11.07 of the Te x as Code of Criminal Procedur e, in which applicant B illy Fr eder ick Allen pre sents a Schlup -t y pe c la im 1AL L EN - Pag e 2

(...continued) 1 This Court now rec og nizes two ty pes of “ innoce n ce ” claims. The f irst – a Herrera claim – is a substantive claim in which the person asser ts a “bar e cla im of innocenc e” ba sed sol ely

on newly discovere d evidenc e. The other ty pe of innoc ence claim – a Schlup claim – is one that “does not by itself provide a basis for re lief,” but is intertwined with con s tituti onal er ror that r ender s a per son’s conviction constitutionally

invalid. (Citations omi tted.) Applicant also ra ises some due proc ess claims but, in light of our dispositi on of this case , 2 we ne e d n ot a dd

re ss t ho se c la ims

. T EX . P EN . C ODE §19.02(b)( 1). Applica nt was cha

rg ed with L ashbrook’ s murder on 3 April 20, 1983. The or igina l entry on the police of

fense repor

t indicates that applica

nt might have be en initially

char g ed with only

the “attempted capital murde r” of Sewell. B ut Sewell died on J une 17, 1983, as a

result of the br ain damag e ca used by the stab wounds he ha d rec eived on Ap ri l 9. Ap pli c ant w a s th e n c ha rg e d, on July 28 , 1 98 3, wi th t

he mur de r o f S e we ll a s w e ll. of ac tual innocenc e as a proce dural g atewa

y throug h which to ra ise his otherwise ba rre d

c on sti tut ion a l c la im o f i ne ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of tr ia l c ouns e l. We ho ld t hat a pp lic ant i s e nti tle d to 2 relief

. Back ground Applicantwa s s ep ar at el y

ch ar gedwi t h t h e m u rd er s o f R av en Da n n el l e Las hb ro o k and J ames 3 Pe r r y Se w e ll

. T h e tw o c a s e s w e r e tr ie d to g e th e r o n Se p te mb e r 1 4 , 1 9 8 3

. T h e r e c o r d s h o w s the following fac ts pertinent to the issue befor e us. On April 9, 1983, somewher e betwe en 4:00 and 4:30 a.m., Offic er Curtis Clary , of the University Park Police Depa rtment, was dispatche d to the location of a possible shoo t i n g. Upon hi s arr ival, he found a man (late r identified a s Sewell) g ag g ed, handcuf fed, a nd cover ed with blood, standing near a duplex. Sewell t old Clary that he had been shot in t h e b a c k o f th e h e a d tw ic e , c u t an d r o b b e d , an d th a t h is g ir lf r ie n d h a d b e e n k id

n a p p e d . Clary seate d Sewell in the front y ard. Clar y ’s par tner ha d arr ived sepa

rate ly by then, and the two of fice rsAL L EN - Pag e 3

See, e .g., the State’s sec ond closing argument, rec apitulating its own e vidence : 4 The e vidence that y ou ’v e go t i s [applicant’s] handprint on the car wher e Rave n Da nn e lle L a sh

br oo k’ s b od

y wa s f ound and the de c lara

tio ns of Jame s Pe rr

y Se we ll when the poli c e f

o u n d h im

. Ja me s Pe r

r y Se w e ll - - h e s ay s , “ B il ly A ll e n , B e rt a

nd another g uy Idon’t know did it to me.” Wha t possible reason c ould he have for sayingany

thi ngbu t th e a

bs olute tr uth wi th r e g ard

to who ha d d on e it t o h im. went inside the duplex to check f or suspec ts and additional victims. They found none. Me anwhile, some University

Park fire men/para

medics arrived at the sc ene. T hey attended to Sewe ll and then pla c e d h im i ns ide the a mbu lanc e to t a ke him to t he ho sp ita l. B e fo re the y le ft , h ow e ve r, Cla ry c a me out of the house, a

pproac hed Sewe ll from the side of the ambulance , and asked him if he knew who had attac ked him. Acc ording to Clary ’s testimony , Sewell stated that it was “ Bill y Allen, B ert [whose last name he did not know] and another white male he didn’t know at all.” After Sewell was taken to the hospital, the office rs sear ched the house ag ain and discove red the body of a w oman (late r identified a s L ashbrook, the g irlfriend that Sewell had appar ently thought had been kidnapped) in a ca r par ked in the ca

rport. Another

office r ar rived shortly

and dusted the

are a for fing erpr ints. He found four identifiable prints, two of whic h wer e taken from the house and belong ed to Sewell him self. The third print was take n from one of Sewell’s ca

rs and wa s never identified. The f

ourth print was taken from the r oof of the c ar in whic h L ashbrook’ s body was found

and wa s d e te rm ine d to be that of a pp lic ant’ s le ft

pa lm. At trial, the State re li ed primarily on this palm print and Sewell’s statement (a s relate d by Offic er Clar

y , th at S ew el l i dentified “ Billy Allen” a s one of his attac kers) to show applicant’s complicit y i n t h e t wo m urder s. The de fense , in turn, relied on the te stimony of the State’s ow n 4AL L EN - Pag e 4

Following the two murder s, the police investig ator Serg eant Hole man had c onducted a 5 backg round investig ation of the two victims. Acc ording to his testim ony on direc t, he could not deter mine Sewell’s “ma in occupation” or whe ther Sewe ll had “any kind of leg itimate occupation or employ

ment.” Rather , he found that both Sewell and L ashbrook we re “ connec ted with the drugworld” a

nd had extensive criminal re cords. In fac t, he found that L ashbrook’ s “par ticular expertise” wa s that she was “ a cook of methamphetamine,” i.e., that she would c ook the illeg al ingr edients nec essar

y to produce methamphetamine. H e also discove red that Sewell owned a mini-ware house, and f

ound that it contained “nume rous g uns” and thirty -two g allons of PTP, an ingr edient used to produc e methamphe tamine. Offic er Clar

y testified that the house ha d been “ ransa cked.” On cr oss, he clar ified, 6 “[e]very thing torn dow n; stuff piled [on] the floor; fur niture stacke d up -- ha d been tur ned over ; light socke ts ripped out -- se arc h-ty pe ra nsacking .” Another

office r, who ha d photogr aphed the crime sc ene a

nd dusted it for fing erpr ints, testified how “someone [had torn] the heating ve nt off the wall,” “ pulled the bottom of the ref rig erator off,” and “knoc ked holes a nd pulled insulation out of the wa ll.” On cr oss, he stated that pe ople owning drug s often hide them in such pla ces, a nd a g re e d th a t th e dis arr ay

su g g e ste d th a t so me on e wa s lo ok ingfo r d ru g s. witnesses

– wh o ac k nowledg ed the victims’ involvement in drug -traf ficking and ag ree d that the

5

ransa cked c ondition of Sewell’s house at the time of the crime sug g ested that someone might have been lookingfor dr

ug s – to show that the murder s wer e m o re l i kely committed by

some of the 6 victims’ own criminal assoc iates. The de fense was the first to admit that applicant kne w Sewell and visited him frequently . But it tried to s h o w t h at appli cant wa s not one of Sewe ll’s criminal

a sso c ia te s w ho we re mor e lik e ly to h a ve kil le d Se we ll b e c a us e a pp lic ant’ s me e tin g s w ithSe we ll

wer e only in connec tion with applicant’s leg itimate business, i.e. , to se ll Se we ll the sc ra ps of g old that a p p li c an t r e c e iv e d a t h is u s e d

- g o o d s s to r e . T h e d e f e n s e a ls o tr ie d to e xp la in th e p r e s e n c e of

a pp lic ant’ s p a lm p ri nt o n Se we ll’ s c ar t hr ou g h th e te sti mony of a pp lic ant’ s w if

e . A c c or din g to t

his testimony , ap p l i ca nt had met Sewell in a c afé , just a few da y s befor e the murde r, to neg otiate the p ri ce o f t h e s cr ap s o f go l d h e h ads o l d

S ew el l t h e n i gh tb ef

o re at S ew el l ’s h o u s e. Af t er t h e m ee t i n g, applicant went to Sewell’s car and stood leaning ag ainst it, appar ently with his hand on the roof of the ca r, as Sewe ll sat inside counting the mone y to pay him for the scr aps of g old.AL L EN - Pag e 5

We n ote that th is c on tin

ue d to be the law unti l Binder was ove rruled thirte en y ear s later 7 b y Ex Parte Elizondo , 947 S.W .2d 202, 205 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996), which re cog nized for the first time that “cla ims of actual innoce nce a re c og nizable by

this Court i n a postconviction habe as corpus pr ocee ding w hether the punishment assessed is death or confine ment.” Id. The jury , during their deliber ations, sent the trial cour t two notes, asking the cour t to rere ad Offic er Clar

y ’s testimony

reg ardingSewell’s stateme nt as t o who had a ssaulted him. The cour t supplied the jury with the re levant portion of the te stimony and the jury , eventua lly , found applica nt g uilty of both murder s. The punishment phase of the t rial followed, and the jury assessed a

pplicant’s punis hme nt at 99 y e ars imp ri so nme nt in bo th c a se s. Ap pli c ant a pp e a le d, and

the c ourt of a pp e a ls aff irmed the c onvictions. Al le n v . S tate , Nos. 05-83-01297- CR, 05-83- 01298-CR ( Tex

. App.— Dallas, F ebrua

ry 7, 1985, pet. re f’d)

. Applicant filed sever al writs challeng ing these convictions. I n the first writ, filed pr o s e in October , 1984, he ra ised newly discovere d evidenc e (showingthat he had be en misidentified and there fore wrong fully

convicted) as his sole g round for relief . That writ wa s denied without written order beca use ac tual innocenc e base d on newly discovere d evidenc e was not the proper subject of habea s review

at that time. See E

x Parte Binde r , 660 S.W .2d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983). 7 I n th e se c on d w ri t, f

ile d w iththe tr ia l court

in A pr il, 19 92 , a

pp lic ant r a ise d f

our i ssu e s, on ly two of which are rele vant for our purposes beca use they are simil ar to the one s raised in the pr esent application: (1) the “State suppre ssed re levant, mater ial and exculpat ory evidenc e fr om the defe nse,” and (2) applicant wa s “denie d his right to ef fec tive assistance of counse l relative to a motion for new tr ia l pro c e e din g .” Th e tr ia l court he ld an e vid e nti ary he ari ng , f

ound tha t th e a pp lic a tio n h a d me ri t beca use of the ne wly

discovere d evidenc e, and rec ommended g rantinga new trial “in the intere st ofAL L EN - Pag e 6

Although this ca se wa s remande d to the trial court se vera l times and the trial cour t 8 conseque ntly

issued a number

of finding s, this was the only evidentiar

y hear ing he ld. There fore , all ref ere nces to a

n evidentiar

y hear ing a re to that he ld on Dece mber 9 a nd 10, 1992. justice.” 8 The sec ond application wa s filed in this Court i n April, 1993. Applicant filed a supplement to that application in April, 1994, prese nting “fac tual innocenc e” as an additional g round for relief

. The trial court, in its supplemental findings, “re main[ed] of the opinion” that a pplicant was e ntitled to a new tr ial, and that the application had merit and should be g rante d. We r ecog nized that “ the trial judge believes that fairne ss require s a new trial,” but found that he had made no specific finding s as to t he tr ia l couns e l’ s e ff

e c tiv e ne ss, no r o the rw ise pr ov ide d a “ le g a l ba sis ” fo r h is r e c omm e nd a tio ns . We theref ore r emande d the m atter to the t rial court to specific ally deter mine whether , in its opini on, the trial counse l ’s fa i l u re t o raise the newly discovere d evidenc e in his motion for new trial

c on sti tut e d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l. Upon re mand, the trial c ourt specif ically found t hat t he trial counsel “could have discovere d the conten t s o f [ t h e new ly discovere d evidenc e] before trial”; and that, “[a]s a matter of law,” the tr ia l c ouns e l’ s “ fa ilure to inv e sti g a te c on sti tut e d a lac k of d ili g e nc e that is no t r e c og nize d a s a ba sis for g rantinga new

trial.” Ye t, the trial court co n cl u d ed t h at the trial c ounsel’s fa ilure to raise the newly discovered evidenc e in the motion for new trial did not constitute ineffec tive assistance of

c ouns e l be c a

us e he ha d “ c or

re c tly c on c lud e d th a t a

mot ion fo r n e w tri a l w ou ld be re

je c te d” be c a

us e of his own lack of

due dilige nce in discove ring that evidenc e. Thus, the tria l court conc luded that the application had “no mer it with reg ard to the claim of i neff ective assistance of counsel.” The trial court a lso failed to find any merit in applicant’s suppleme ntal claim of “ fact u al i n nocenc e” unde r the ac tual-innoce nce sta

ndard se t out in Sta te e

x re l. Ho lm es v. Thir

d Cour t of Ap pe als , 885 S.W .2dAL L EN - Pag e 7

As we note d in Elizondo, howeve r, there wer e seve ral proble ms with that standard. See, 9 e.g., 947 S.W .2d at 205:

At the outset, we pe rce ive an a nomaly in our Holmes opinion, which de sc ri be s th e ult imate c ri te ri on fo r r e lie f u

nd e r the a c tua l inn oc e nc e te st a s if our t a sk wer e to dec ide whethe r the e vidence of g uilt could suppor t a co n v i ction in light of the newly discovere d evidenc e of innoc ence . Such char acte rization is misl eading beca use, if habea s corpus relief is to be conditioned upon a findingthat no rational juror could convict the applicant afte r i ntroduction of t he newly discovere d evidenc e, it becomes the oretica lly

impossibl e for

any habea s applicant to sustain his burden be c a us e e x culp a tor

y e vid e nc e c an n e ve r o utw e ig h in c ulp a tor y e vid e nc e un de r t

his standard of

sufficie ncy . See H

olmes , 885 S.W .2d at 417-18 (Clinton, J ., dissenting)

. See also id. at 206 (“ I n Holmes, we took this unusual expression of the standa rd direc tly

from Just ice By ron W hite' s perf

unctory concur

ring opinion in Herrera v . Colli ns [506 U.S . 390, 429 (1993)].”). We did not overrule Holmes , howeve r, but we did modify it considera bly

. See, e .g., id. (“it is not re a so na ble to h old , a

nd we re je c t th e imp lic a tio n o f H olm e s, that c on fi dence in a ve rd ic t is un de rm ine d o nly

wh e n n e wl y

dis c ov e re d e vid e nc e re nd e rs the State ' s c a se le g a lly or c on sti tut ion a lly insufficient for

conviction.”)

. T h u s , as the c oncurr ence noted, we “ alter[ed] the Holmes standard and adopt[ed] t he standa rd announc ed by

the Supreme Court in Schlup v. De lo, [513 U.S . 298 (1 99 5) ]”; bu t “ [b]e c a

use t he sta nd ard in H olm e s w a s d e ri ve d f ro m Herrera v . Colli ns ,” the concur renc e ag ree d with “alter ing our standard to follow the S upreme Court's e volution of ‘actua l innocenc e’ jurisprude nce.” See id. at 2 1 0 (B ai rd , J

. , co n cu rr i n g)

. 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). Pursuant to these finding s, the trial cour t rec ommended that re lief be 9 denied; and this Court denied the application, without written orde r, in J anuar y 1995. Applicant filed a

third application pr o s e , in F ebrua ry , 1996, alleg ing ine ffe ctive assistanc e of trial counse l for his failure to adequately investigate t he ca se and to timely discover the

e xcu lpator

y e vid e nc e and

pr e se nt i t to the jur

y duri ng the g uil t ph a se of the tr ia l. We dis mis se d th is application as a

subsequent application in J uly , 1996. I n May 2004, app l i ca nt filed the instant application pr o s e , alleg ing, inte r a lia , ineffe ctive assistance o f c o u n s e l an d d e n ia l o f a f a ir tr ia l ( th e d

u e p r o c e s s c la im )

. We r e c o g n iz e d , in our Dec ember

7, 2005 order , that this w as t he first wr it that applicant had f iled since our de cision in Elizondo

. We a lso noted that “[i] n Elizondo this Court held for the first time that claims of a ctualAL L EN - Pag e 8

The trial c ourt had mer ely noted that “in re sponse to previous applications for writ of 10 habea s corpus filed by

Applicant [it had] rec ommended that Applica nt rec eive a

new tria l”; that we “ c ho se [] not

to a g re e ” wi th i ts r e c omm e nd a tio n a nd de nie d a pp lic ant’ s p re vio us a

pp lic a tio ns ; and that ther e wa s nothing in the pre sent application to lead the trial cour t to chang e its previous finding s, conclusions and re commendations (that a pplicant be grante d a new trial). As noted ea

rlier, this Court has re cog nized both the Schlup- and He rre ra -ty pe cla ims of 11 actua l innocence

. Se e Br own , 205 S.W .3d at 544-45. innocenc e in a non- capital c ase a re c og nizable by

a cour t in a post-conviction habe as cor pus proce eding .” We there fore conclude d that applicant’ s claims wer e not bar red by the Texas Code of Cr imi na l Pr oc e dure , Ar

tic le 11 .0 7, Se c tio n 4 , “ [b]e c a us e Ap pli c ant’ s p ri or

a c tua l inno c e nc e c la ims

wer e denie d at a time whe n such cla ims were not c og nizable on habea s review .” As we note d, howeve r, the trial c ourt had “ ag ain re commend[ed] gra nting Applica

nt a new tr ia l, b u t a g a in

[m a d e ] n o s p e c if

ic f in d in g s a s to th e b a s is for [ that ] r e c o mm e n d a ti o n . ” We 10 there fore rema

nded the matter

to the trial court to re solve the issues. The tri al co u rt issued supplemental finding s, but ag ain did not make any specific finding s reg arding the i ssues in this case. Rather, it only

conclude d that (1) the tr ial counsel ha d not been ine ff ec t i v e, but that (2) applica nt should be g rante d a new

trial bec ause c laims of actua l innocence we re nowcog nizable in habeas corpus pr ocee dings, a

nd (3) because the newly discovere d evidenc e of innoc ence was “ so strong that the Court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial.” We filed a nd set this case to re solve the iss ue s invo lve d in

a pp lic ant’ s a c tua l- inn oc e nc e c la im.

Discussion I n the ca se at ba

r, applica nt asserts a Schlup -ty

pe claim of a ctual innoce nce based on ne w 11 evidenc e discove red a fter tr ial. I n Schlup , the Supreme Court pointed o u t t he main diffe renc eAL L EN - Pag e 9

Herrera v . Colli ns , 506 U.S. 390 (1993). 12 See E x parte Brook

s , 219 S.W .3d 396, 399-400 (Te x . Crim. App. 2007): 13 The subs eq uent-a pplication provision [ Te

x as Cod e of C rim ina l P ro c e du re A rticle 11.07, section 4( a) ] a d o p ts th e a

b u s e - o f

- th e - w r it d o c tr in e u s e d in fede ral prac tice, which limits an inmate to one application for writ of habe as cor

pus except in e xce pti on a l c ir c ums tanc e s. Spe c if ic a lly , th e su

bs e qu e nt- a

pp lic a tio n p ro vis ion s in Articles 11.07

and 11.071 we re en acte d in response to Schlup v. De lo

. . . . Whil e Schlup involved a fe dera l habea s corpus pe tition i n a d eath-penalty case , the rea soning c an be e qually

applied to both Texas Code of Criminal Procedure Articles 11.07, section 4(

a) , and 11.071, section 5(

a) ( 2) . A cr edible cla im of actua l innocence s erv e s t o b r i n g t h e p et i t i o n er wi t h i nt h e “ n arro w c l as s o f c as es ” i mp l i ca t i n g a f u n d a m e n t a l m i s c ar

r i a g e o f j u s t i c e . In o t h e r w o r d s , s h o w i n g a c tu a l i n n o c e n c e b y a (continued...) betwee n the Schlup -ty

pe and the He rre ra - ty

pe claims of actua l innoc ence . As the Court n o t ed, 12 He rr e ra ha d p re se nte d h is c la im o f i nn oc e nc e to su pp or t “ a no ve l substantive constitutional claim.” 513 U. S

. at 314 (empha sis added). Thus, unde r that theory , Her rer a’s innoce nce w ould have

re nd e re d h is e xec uti on

a “ ‘c on sti tut ion a lly

int ole ra ble e ve nt, ’” e ve n if the pr oc e e din g s th a t le d to his conviction had be en “e ntirely fair a nd err or fr ee.” Id. (c itatio n o mitte d) . In c on tr a st, Sc hlu p’ s c la im of innoce nce w as “pr ocedur al, rather than substantive.” Id. Thus, “[h] is constituti onal claims [were ] based not on his innocenc e, but rather on his contention” that the proce dural vi o l at i o ns in the pr oce e din g s le a din g to h is c on vic tio n “ de nie d h im the fu ll p ano ply of pr ote c tio ns a ff

or de d to criminal def

endants by

the Constitut ion.” Id. I n other words, Schlup’s claim of innoce nce w as “‘ not its e lf a c on sti tut ion a l c la im, bu t ins te a d a g a te wa y thr ou g h w hic h a

ha be a s p e tit ion e r m

us t pa ss t o have his other

wise b ar red constituti onal claim conside red on the merits.’” Id. at 315 (quoting He rre ra , 5 06 U. S. at 40 4) . T his “g atewa y ” has been codified in our post -convic tion habeas c orpus statute as a r equire ment for r elief f or a subse quent application. See T EX . C ODE C R IM . P R OC . a rt
. 11.07, § 4(a) (2). 13AL L EN - Pag e 10

(...continued) 13 pr e po nd e ra

nc e of e vid e nc e is a g a te wa y thr ou g h w hic h a

ha be a s p e tit ion e r m

us t pa ss in o rd e r t o h a ve an o the rw ise -b arr e d c on sti tut ion a l c la im c on sid e re d o n th e me ri ts. (Citations omi tted) (stylisti c empha sis in original). Schlup , 513 U.S. at 316. 14 Th e Court us e d thi s imp or tant dif fe re nc e be tw e e n the tw o ty pe s of a c tua l- inn oc e nc e c la ims to justi fy the require ment of a differ ent burden of proof in the two case s. Thus, the Court considere d it “appropr iate to apply an ‘extraordinar ily high’ standard of

revie w” in a He rre ra -t

y pe c la im, in which “a petitioner has be en ‘trie d befor e a jury of his peer s, with the full panoply of protec tions that our Constitut ion affor ds criminal def endants,’” id. a t 31 5- 16 (c itatio ns omi tte d) , bu t no t in the c a se of a Schlup -ty

pe cla im, in which some aspec t of the proc edure itsel f i s at issue. Id. at 316. In the la tte r ca se , the Court he ld t hat e ve n “ if

the ha be a s c ourt

we re me re ly

c on vin c e d th a t th os e ne w f a c ts raised suf ficient doubt about [the petitioner’s] guilt to undermine confidenc e in the result of t he trial wi tho ut t he a ssu ra nc e tha t th a t tr ia l w a s unta int e d by c on sti tut ion a l e rr or , [th e pe tit ion e r’ s] th re sh old showing of innocenc e would justify a re view of the merits of the c onstitut ional claims.” Id. at 317. I no t h e r w o r d s , “ t h e p e t i t i o n e r

m u s ts h o w t h a ti tis mo r e l i kely than not that no rea sonable juror would have c onvicted him in the light of the new e vidence .” Id. at 327 (e mphasis added)

. I n s ho rt , we keep in m ind thi s im po rt ant d ist inc tio n b e tw e e n th e tw o ty pe s o f a c tua linn oc e nc e c la ims , a

nd the se pa rate sta nd ard s of re vie w a

pp lic a ble to t he m, a s w e e xami ne the c a se be fo re us , in wh ic h ap pli c ant “a c c omp anie s his [ Schlup -ty pe] claim of innocenc e with an a ssertion of constitutional error

at trial.” Specifica lly , applicant al l ege s t h at his trial counsel wa s

14AL L EN - Pag e 11

We note that applicant ha d also raise d three other issues in the pre sent application. But 15 the re cord shows that he has a lrea dy litigated two of

them on appea l: a Cra wfo rd -ty pe ( Cra wfo rd v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004)) issue a nd a suff iciency -of- evidenc e issue. Se e Al le n v . S tate , No s. 05 -8 3- 01 29 7- CR, 05 -8 3- 01 29 8- CR, a t 2- 5. We t he re fo re de c lin e to a dd

re ss t ho se iss ue s in the pre sent habe as proc eeding . Applicant had a lso raised a Due Proc ess issue, including three Bradyc la ims (

Brady v. M

aryland , 3 73 U. S. 8 3 ( 19 63 )) . B ut a s w e no te d e arl ie r, we de c lin e to addre ss that issue in light of our disposition of this case. ineffe ctive. We find the t est for reviewing such cla ims in Strickland v. W ashington , 466 U.S. 668 15 ( 1 9 8 4 )

. W e n o t e t h a t S t r ickland does not provide a mecha nical for mula for suc h revie w. Rather, it states that “[t] he benchmark for j udg ing any claim of ineffe ctiveness must be whe ther c ounsel’s conduct so und er m i n ed the proper f unctioning of

the adve rsar ial proce ss that the trial ca nnot be relied on a s having produce d a just result.” Id. a t 68 6. Our “ sc rutiny of c ouns e l’ s p e rf

or manc e mus t be high l y d ef

ere ntial.” Id. at 689. Thus, we “ must indul g e a strongpresumption that counsel’s conduct f alls within the w ide ra

ng e of r easona

ble profe ssional assistance.” Id. But the de fenda nt

can r ebut the pre sumption by showing that (1) “ counsel’s pe rfor mance was de ficient” and (2) “the defic ient perf

ormanc e pre

judiced the de fense .” Id. at 687. T h e C o u rtd i d

n o tg i v e an y

s p e c i f i c g u i d e l i n e s f

o r d e t e r m i n i n g d e f

i c i e n tp e r f

o r m an c e . It simply advised that c ounsel is expected to provide “ rea sonably eff ective a ssistance,” and that such “re asonable ness” should be measure d under “ preva iling prof essional norms.” Id. at 687-88. Essentially , counsel is oblige d to fulfill “cer tain basic duti es,” inc luding “ a duty to bring to bear

such skill and knowledg e as w ill render the trial a re liable adve rsar ial testi n g p ro ce ss.” Id. at 688. Strickland provides g reater guidance , howeve r, in deter mining whe th er the def

icient per formanc e found i n the first step pre judiced the de fense . Specifica lly , Strickland re qu ir e s th e de fe nd ant t o

“ sh owthat th e re is a

re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity tha t, b ut fo r co un se l’ s unp ro fe ssi on a l e rr or s, the re su lt of the pr oc e e din g wo uld

have be e n d if

fe re nt, ” de fi nin g a

“ re a so na ble pr ob a bil ity” a s “ a

pr ob a bil ityAL L EN - Pag e 12

Se e su pra note 4. 16 sufficie nt to undermine conf idence in the outcome.” Id. at 694. I n the ca se bef

ore us, a pplicant ar g ues that the trial counsel r ender ed inef fec tive assistance of counse l for fa iling to: (1) pr operly investigate the ca se and discove r that the vic t i m S ew el l had

name d s ome on e oth e r t

ha n a pp lic ant a s h is atta c ke r; (2 ) m ov e fo r a c on tin ua nc e a t tr ia l to inv e sti g a te the matter w hen he w as surprise d by Offic er Clary ’s testimony reg ardingSewell’s stateme nt to Cl ary in the ambulance; and (3) raise in his motion for new trial the issue of the newly discovere d evidenc e that he dis c ov e re d w he n h e did have the matte r i nv e sti g a te d a ft e r t ri a l. We ag ree . We note at the outset that “a verdic t or conc lusion only weakly supported by

the

rec ord is more li kely to have been affe cted by err ors t han one w ith overwhe lming re cord suppor t.” Strickland, 466 U.S. a

t 696. This r

ule is e specia lly

signific ant in the pre sent ca se in which the r ecor d shows that: (1) there wer e no ey e witnesses ( other than the victim Sewell himself) to any part of the crime; (2) no witnesses t est ified as to any pre- exis ting a

nimosit y betwee n applicant a

nd either murder vic tim; (3) no acc omplice witness testified; (4) applicant made no confe ssion nor any other

se lf -i nc ri min a tin g sta

te me nt; (5 ) no ne of

the pr op e rt

y sto le n f ro m th e vic tim s’ re sid e nc e a t th e tim e of the murders was rec overe d from applicant’ s possession; a nd (6) the State made no showing of a motive on applicant’s pa rt for the se murder s. I n fac t, there wa s n o t even a ny phy sical evide nce

c onne c tin g a

pp lic ant t o th e c ri me , e xce pt f or that o ne pa lm p ri nt f

ound on the ro of of the c ar i n wh ic h L a shbr oo k’ s b od

y wa s f ound . In sh ort, the State , a s it ind ic a te d in

its c los ingargume nt, 16

re lie d pr ima

ri ly on the pa lm pr int and Se we ll’ s st a te me nt, a s r e po rt e d b y Of fi c e r C lary , th a t a “ B ill y Al le n” ha d att a c ke d h im. B ut i t is thi s v e ry state me nt t

hat w a s so str on g ly

c on tr ov e rt e d b y

the ne wl y discovere d evidenc e that it cause d the habe as cour t to lose confide nce in the outc ome of the tria l andAL L EN - Pag e 13

The investig ator a lso testified at the evide ntiary hear ing, c orrobor ating counsel’s 17 testimony perta ining to his own investig ation and finding s in this case. De te c tiv e Ho lma

n a dmi tte d at th e e vid e nti ary he ari ngthat he wa s a

wa re tha t th e de fe ns e 18 inv e sti g a tor

wa s in fa c t a c tin g a s a

re pr e se ntativ e of

a pp lic ant’ s d e fe ns e te a m. I n o the r w or ds , the detec tive seeme d to rea liz e that this was not an infor mal discussion of the ca se base d on the investigator’s ac quaintance or possible frie ndship with the police chief

. to r e pe a te dly

re c omm e nd

g ra nti nga pp lic ant a ne w tri a l. Th e tr ia l c ouns e l te sti fi e d a s f oll ow s at th e e vid e nti ary he ari ng . H e ha d h ir e d a pr ivate investigator to investigate the State’s c ase a g ainst applicant. T h e i n v es tigator had be en a police

17 office r himself with the Da llas Poli ce De p ar t m en t for almost thirty y ear s befor e he r etired a nd beca me a pr ivate investig ator. I t was appa rently beca use of this ser

vice that he knew the c hief of the University

Park Police and me t with him t o discuss the State’s ca se ag ainst applicant. The police chief did not know the details of the c ase himself an d s u mmoned Detec tive Holman, the lea d inv e s ti g a to r

in th e c a s e , to s h ar e th o s e d e ta il s w it h th e d e f e n s e inv e s ti g a to r . D e te c ti v e H o lman 18 purportedly

g ave the defe nse i nvestig ator all the details, i ncluding a two-pa g e police of fense repor

t by Offic er Clar

y detailing the eve nts of the nig ht of t he crime. The defense investigator then g ave t h e t ri al co u n s el b o t h h i s o wn re p o rt o f h i s co n v er s at i o nwi t h De t ec t i v e H o l m an an d t h e t wo -p age police re port that Dete ctive Holman had given to him. But neither Detective Holman northe twopa g e po lic e re po rt ha d men tio ne d a ny thi nga bo ut S e we ll’ s te lli ngCla

ry in t he a mbu lanc e tha

t “ B ill y Allen” wa s one of his assailants. The trial c ounsel was, ther efor e, surpr ised to hear Offic er Clar

y ’s testimony to that e ffe ct and to r ece ive afou r- pag e poli ce of fense repor

t from the State, at tria l. I t was

on the t hird pag e of the repor t, which he ha d never

befor e re ceive d, that Clary had re ported Sewe ll’s te lli nghim

in t he a mbu lanc e that “ B ill y

Al le n” ha d atta c ke d h im. I n spite of this surprise, howe ver, the re cord shows that the trial counsel ne ver a sked for aAL L EN - Pag e 14

A p p l i c an t ’ s n a m e i s B i l l y Frederic k Allen. 19 continuance and pre ssed on with the trial, u s i n g his closing a rg ument to sugg est that the last two pag es of the police offe nse re port wer e added after the f act to streng then Off

icer Clary ’s testimony wh ic h in tur n, c ouns e l se e me d to su g g e st, wa s a lie . I t w a s o nly

a ft e r t he tr ia l th a t c ouns e l se nt h is investigator t o fi n d out if there w ere any other witnesse s to Sewell’s possible statement in the ambulance . The invest igator found two such w itnesses, both fireme n-par amedics f rom the Un ive rs ity

Park F ir e De pa

rtme nt, wh o w e re pr e se nt i n the amb ul ance wh e n Cl ary ha d s po ke n to Sewell. Acc ording to the investigator’s interview s with these par amedics, a nd the par amedics’ own aff idavits, the supervisor pa

rame dic, S onny Kvapil, re called that Sewell did state “B illy Allen,” but that he had a lso mentioned a middle name. K vapil was too busy

at the time, howeve r, to clea rly hear wh a t it wa s. B ut the oth e r pa ra me dic , Phi l Ca stl e , wh o wa s a tte nd ing to Se we ll a t the t im e, did

c l e ar l y h e ar

S e w e l l n a m e a

“ B i l l y W ayne Al le n” a s his att acker. I nd e e d, Ca stl e ha s c on sis te ntl y 19 told everyone that has spoke n with him on the s ubject (for ex ample, the trial counsel’ s investigator, the Dallas County

District Attorn ey ’s Offic e investig ator, a nd the 1992 habe as counse l’s inv e sti g a tor ), su

bmi tte d a n a ff ida vit , an d a lso te sti fi e d at th e e vid e nti ary he a ri ngthat “ Mr . Se we ll

s a i d o v e r an d o v e r . . . t h a tB i l l y W ayn e A l l e ns h o th i m ” ; t h a tS e w e l l c l e ar l y n a m e d a B i l l y W ayne Allen “[a]t least five or six ” times; a nd that Castle will “ never forg et that.” On c ross examination, the State a sk e d Ca stl e if the re wa s “any po ssi bil ity that [he ] co uld

have mis he ard , th a t [Se we ll] c ou ld have sa id some other name besides Way ne? ” Castle re plied, “No, ma’ am.” We note that later investigation by the habea s counsel’s inve stigator reve aled that ther e was a B illy Way ne Allen, who e ven lived in the Dallas-For t Worth area ( the same a rea in which the victims li ved) a

nd had a c riminal rec ord with drugand robb er y convictions. I ndeed, the rec ordAL L EN - Pag e 15

We note that even thoug h Detec tive Holeman a dmitted that Billy Way ne Allen wa s one 20 of the police suspects, the re cord shows that the police neve r showed B illy Way ne Allen’ s picture to any of the witnesse s nor compar ed his fing erpr ints to one of the four pr ints found at the sce ne of the c rime that wa s never identified. In other wor ds, the police ne ver positively eliminated Billy Way ne Allen a s a suspec t. For w hateve r re ason, they simply chose to foc us exclusively on applicant a s their only

suspect once they

deter mined that the palm print found on the r oof of the ve hic le in w hic h L a sh

br oo k’ s b od

y wa s d isc ov e re d b e lon g e d to him

. We n ote that th e se oth e r a ff ida vit s a pp e ar t o b e su

pp lie d e ith e r b y

inm a te s o r p e op le 21 involved in illega l drug transac tions themselves. But in light of Detec tive Holeman’ s 1983 trial testimony that he could not dete rmine if either murder vic tim (Sewell or L ashbrook) had any le g iti mate oc c up a tio n, it i s n ot s ur pr isi ngto s e e that th e pe op le wh o w e re in t he be st p os iti on

to (continued...) shows that this B illy Way ne Allen was even a police suspect on the day of t h e m u rd er s . As De t ec t i v e H o l m an t es t i fi edat t h e e v i d en t i ary h ea ri n g, Iradioe d back to the station when I left Presby

terian Hospital and g ave the m wh a t in fo rm a tio n th a t I

ha d at th a t time . T he y be g an c he c kin g any

and a ll po ssi bil iti e s o f a B ill y Al le n a nd c a me up wi th s e ve ra l at th a t ti me . O ne be inga B ill y Way ne Al le n, the oth e r o ne be ingB ill y F re de ri c k A lle n. As a

matte r of fa c t on

B ill y Way ne Allen I showed that the computer chec k was made on him on the date of the offe nse at a

pproxi mately

8:30 in the morning so I was full aw are of a B illy Way ne Allen at that time. L ater in the testimony , Detec tive Holman stated that in fa ct he ha d three (not “seve ral” ) B illy Allens

a s su sp e c ts i n th is c a se and that B ill y Way ne Al le n w a s o ne of

the m. H e e xpla ine d th a t he c ho se to focus on Billy Fr eder ick All en (applicant) rather than Billy Way ne Allen because of the pa lm print found on the roof

of the c ar in whic h L ashbrook’ s body was found. 20 The ha beas c ounsel’s investig ator also testified at the evidentiary hear ing. He e x plained how h e i n d e p e n d e n t l y a s c e rt a i n e d t h e e x i s t e n c e o f

t h i s B i l l y W ayn e A l l e n . A c c o r d i n g t o h i s t e s t i m o n y, he examined cour

t rec ords, public rec ords and the af fidavits submitt ed by

the par amedics a

nd other pe op le wh o h a d tr ie d to c on ta c t th e po lic e ide nti fy ingthe mse lve s a s a ssociate s o f t he tw o v ic tim s and cla iming to ha v e i n fo rm ati on reg ardingthe murder s. He a lso talked to Paramedic Castle as 21AL L EN - Pag e 16

(...continued) 21 kn owthe vic tim s’ “ bu sin e ss” de a lin g s and a ff ili a tio ns we re tho se tha

t be lon g e d to su c h a

c ir c le the mse lve s. We n ote that th e ha

be a s c ourt

sp e c if ic a lly a sk e d th e inv e sti g a tor

ho w h e ob ta ine d B ill y 22 Way ne Allen’ s identification by these pe ople. As the investig ator e x plained: Iwo uld take the ph oto g ra

ph

. . . I wo uld sa y do y ou kn owwh o th is i nd ivi du a l is or have y ou se e n th is p e rs on

be fo re . B ut I

did n’ t sp e c if ic a lly sa y -- a t no tim e did Isay is this t he B illy

Allen y ou know. Do y ou know this person, have y ou seen him before ? But I

didn’t tell them that was the individual Iwas looking at and they identified him as the per son. well as some of

the people w ho had submitted the aff idavits. Unlike the police, the ha beas investigator eve n car

ried a picture of Billy Way

ne Allen to ascerta in which “B illy Allen” wa s being discussed. Ba sed on his inve stigation, the investigator found that there was only one Billy Way ne 22 Allen in the Dallas- Ft

. W o rt h ar ea that fit the “prof ile” at issue in the c ase, i.e., someone with a

rec ord of dr

ug abuse a

nd violence “ the one e veryone see med to know.” I n addition to the t estimony from the police , the trial prose cutor a nd the def ense inve stigator acknow ledg ing bo t h t h e existence of this B illy Way ne Allen a

nd his criminal rec ord, the ha beas court a lso rece ived af

fidavits from people stating that this B illy Way ne Allen wa s well-ac quainted with Sewell, that he wa s also seen in possession of some of the prope rty

stolen from the victims on the nig ht of their murde r and that he h ad ev en admitt ed to some people that he wa s the one responsible for

Sewell’s murde r. I n short, the ha b ea s co u rt hea rd a lot of testimony

and re ceive d a lot of evide nce at the

e vid e nti ary

he ari ngtha

t ten de d to show the e xiste nc e of a B ill y Way ne Al le n w ho wa s mo re lik e ly to have been the murdere r than applicant who se emed to have no motive at all. I ndeed, the fac t that Sewell, eve n though he expressly claimed to ha

ve been shot in the head twice, cut and stabbed, a ndAL L EN - Pag e 17

For instance, one of the a ffidavits stated: 23 [O] n April 10, 1983 Iboug ht jewelry belong ing to L ashbrook f rom Billy Allen and also purcha sed a 2 5 ca l

. au t o. pistol from Allen which belong ed to L ashbrook. I a sk e d A lle n h owhe c a me int o p os se ssi on of the je we lr

y and pis tol and

he tol d me that he tra ded drug s for them. I t wa s at t h i s point that Allen recognized me as the man w ho pr e ve nte d h im f ro m ki dn a

pp ingL a shbr ook at her A rl ing ton a pa rtme nt. Al le n a sked me if

Iwa s th e same so n- of

-a -b itc h w ho g ot i nto his bu sin e ss a wh ile back at the vi ctim L ashbrook’ s apar tment. When I told Allen t hat I was the one he told me that he had jus t wi p ed a smart-asse d-son-of- a-bitch na med Perry

in Dallas for inter fer ing in his business and that L ashbrook wouldn’ t be making any more dope for me or any one else if that was why Iwas lookingfor he r bec ause he had sent her back to Ke ntucky

to her fa mily and she w ill never c ome bac k. The man w ent on to say

that he “was recently shown pictures of Billy Fr eder ick Allen and he is definitely

not the same Billy Allen m entioned above.” Acc ording to the habea s investigator’s testimony at t h e evidentiary

hear ing, he showed B illy Way ne Allen’ s picture to this man in the mann e r t he inv e sti g a tor

ha d d e sc ri be d to the hab eas cou rt and the man id e nti fi e d h im a s th e B ill y Al le n h e ha d ta lke d a

bo ut i n h is a ff

ida vit

.

As we indicated ea

rlier, the inf

ormation was r eadily

available either a s a matter of court 24 or pu bli c re c or ds , o r w iththe po lic e that th e vic tim ’s “ bu sin e ss” a sso c iate s h a d b e e n tr yingto (continued...) was visi bly bleeding when Office r C lary arr ived at the s cene , still went to the t rouble of naming the middle name (“ Way

ne”) “at lea st five or six” tim es such th at t h e P ara medic Castle would “ne ver fo rg e t” it, te nd s to c on fi rm that Se we ll i n f

a c t kn e w b oth

B ill y F re de ri c k A lle n ( a

pp lic ant) and

B ill y Way ne Al le n a

nd that he wa s d oin g his be st t o id e nti fy the ri g ht “ B ill y

Al le n” a s h is a ssa ila

nt. 23 The trial c ounsel admi t t ed re ceivingthe information about the pa rame dics (re g arding Sewell’s identification of his assailant ) from his inve stigator afte r the trial a nd befor e he ha d filed the motion for new trial on applicant’ s behalf

. Yet, he did not follow up on this information, as the habea s investigator did, a nd thus f ailed to disc over a ll the information that the habe as investig ator found. I ndeed, the trial counsel f ailed to eve n raise the newly discovered ev i d en ce fr om the 24AL L EN - Pag e 18

(...continued) 24 contac t prac tically

since the murde rs took place

. para medics in that motion for new trial. As noted ear lier, he explained this failure on the g round that the motion for new tr ial would not have be en g rante d beca use the trial c ourt would have f ound that the evidenc e in question could have been obtai n ed ea rlier but for the the trial c ounsel’s lac k of diligenc e. Indeed, the habea s court in 1994 spec ifically found t h at t h e trial counsel “could have discovere d the contents of Mr . Castle’s statements befor e trial” a nd that as “a

matter of la

w, . . . [the tr ia l c ouns e l’ s] f

a ilure to i nv e sti g a te c on sti tut e d a la c k o f d ili g e nc e that is no t r e c og nize d a s a ba sis for g rantinga new

trial.” Neve rtheless, the ha beas c ourt was r eluctant to find that the tria l counsel’s failure to raise the c laim of n ew l y d i s co v ered evidenc e in the motion for new trial constituted ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel bec ause the trial counsel ha d “cor rec tly conclude d that a motion for new tria l would be re

jected on g rounds of due diligenc e.” B ut a s a we ll- kn ow n c ri min a l de fe ns e a tto rn e y state d in his e xpe rt -w itn e ss a ff

ida vit , [The trial counsel] was obliga ted to raise this issue in the motion for new tria l and deve lop the record at the hearing

. The trial court may have excused his lack of diligenc e, if a

ny , and g rante d a new trial as a matter of fundamental fa irness. Ha d the tr ia l c ourt do ne so , th e State c ou ld n ot h a ve a pp e a le d und er th e law th e n in e ff e c t. Assuming that the tr ial court ha d denied the m otion, the issue could have be en prese nted on direc t appea l, and the appe llate cour t could have f

ound diligenc e under the circ umstances or

excused the lac k there of. I n o t h er wo rds, as that attorney added, the trial counsel “ should have a cted a s an advoc ate, r ather than a jud ge, an d raised this issue without reg ard to his opinion of the outcome.” The attorney conclude d with his belief that a “ rea sonably competent c ounsel, rende ring rea sonably eff ective assistance , would have inc luded and de veloped this issue in a motion for new t ri al , and if denied, would have r aised the issue on dire ct appe al.”AL L EN - Pag e 19

We note that the trial counse l also ag ree d with that defe nse attorne y ’s opinion, on direct 25 examination at the evidentiary hear ing. O n cross-e x amination, the State aske d him whether he was a g ree ing that he had be en “ine ffe ctive.” A s he then e x plained:

[I ]t depends on how

y ou define ineffe ctive and not trying to be from a judicia l standpoint. I ag ree with the portion. Ijust read [the aff idavit] once when y ou sent it over. [The attorney ’s] opini on in part was [ t h at t h e new ly discovere d evidenc e] sh ou ld h a ve be e n r a ise d in the mot ion

fo r n e w tri a l. I

a g re e wi th t

hat.

“ [W]he n c on sid e ri nga

tr ia l ju dg e ’s fi nd ing s o f f a c t, w e g ive ‘a lmo st t ota l de fe re nc e ’ t o 26 those finding s when they

are supported by

the re cord, ‘ espec ially

when those f

indings a re ba sed upon cre dibilit y

and deme anor,’ ” but “[w]e reviewa trial judg e’s c onclusions of law de novo .” Ex pa rteEl lis , 233 S.W .3d 324, 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citations omitted). W e agr ee . The trial c ounsel himself admitted his “lack of diligenc e” when he e x plained 25 at the evide ntiary

hear ing that he did not raise the newly discovere d evidenc e at the motion for new trial beca use such evidenc e would have been reje cted on the g rounds of due diligenc e. The habea s court a g ree d with his assessment of t he proba ble outcome of

that motion, and we do not disag ree with that probability . But such “l ac k of dilige nce” was pre cisely what depr ived applica

nt of the op po rt un ity to p re se nt c ri tic a l e vid e nc e to t he jur or s a

nd po ssi bly ob tain

a fa vo ra ble ve rd ic t at hi s trial, or at the ve ry

least, p re serve an important issue for appea l: the testimony

of an inde pendent witness, who was found to be cre dible at least by the habe as cour

t, that the victim repe atedly and 26 clea rly named someone other

tha n a pp lic ant a s his as sa ila

nt, jus t hour s b e fo re sli pp ingint o a c oma that lasted until he died more tha n two months later. I nd e e d, the imp or

tanc e of thi s e vid e nc e is un de rs c or e d by the fa c t that the jur or s, duri ngthe ir deliberations in t he guilt phase of the tria l, sent two notes, both o f wh i ch s o u g ht to have the tria l court c larify

the name of

the assailant that Clary

repor ted Sewell had told him in the ambulance

. F ina lly , th e tr ia l c ou ns el do es no t cla im that hi s d e c isi on no t to ra ise the iss ue of the ne wl y d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e i nt h e m o t i o nf o r n e w t r i a l w a s b a s e d

o ns o m e t r i a l s t r a t e g y. O nt h e c o n t r ar y,AL L EN - Pag e 20

I n r e sp on se to t

his a pp lic a tio n, the State ha s a rgue d th a t a

pp lic ant h a d “ fl e d” to 27 California a fter the murders, of fer ing suc h “flig ht” as a dditional evidence of guilt. However , no such evide nce or

argument was pre sented to the jury . The re cord shows only the testimony

of a po lic e of fi c e r t hat he ha d a

rr e ste d a pp lic ant i n L os An g e le s, Ca lif or nia , o n Apr il 2 2, 19 83 , a lmo st two wee ks after

the murder s. Thus, as we ha ve re peate dly

noted, the State’s c ase se ems to have be e n a lmo st s ingula

rl y fo c us e d o n th e pa lm p ri nt a nd Of fi c e r C lary ’s te sti mony

a s to wh a t Se we ll had told him in the ambulance. We sa y “almost” be cause a g reat part of the State’ s closing argument was de voted to ridiculing , without actually denying, the defe nse’s “ char g es” in its own closing argument that the police ha d withheld important information (half of Off icer Clary ’s police off ense r eport a

nd Offic er Clar

y ’s re prese ntation that Sewell had identified a pplicant as his assailant in the ambulanc e) f rom the def

ense, a nd the def

ense’ s sugg estion that the police might have fabr icated suc h information. he agr eed with his fellow criminal defe nse attorney , the ex pert witness, that he should have raised the newly discovere d evidenc e claim in the motion for new tria l. I n short, we f

ind that the “lac k of diligenc e” a dmitted by

the trial counse l, and recog nized by the habeas court as “a matter of la

w,” wa s clea rly defic ient perf

ormanc e under

the Strickland

ine ff e c tiv e -a ssi sta

nc e -o f- c ouns e l ana ly sis

. The pre judice to the def

ense f rom this deficient pe rfor

mance is a l s o cl ea r. I f the jury had dis re g ard e d O ff

ic e r C lary ’s su g g e sti on on the sta nd that th e “ B ill y

Al le n” tha

t Se we ll i de nti fi e d in the ambulanc e wa s ap p licant, B illy Fr eder ick Allen, and instea d believed Par amedic Ca stle’s t e s t i m o n y t h a tS e w e l l h a d

s p e c i f i c a l l y an d r e p e a t e d l y

i d e n t i f i e d a “ B i l l y W

ayne Allen” ( and Parame dic Kvapil’s testimony , if the def en s e h ad put hi m on the stand, that Sewell did mention a middle name that Of

fice r Clary never acknow ledg ed in his testimony), then the only other c ritical

e vid e nc e a g a ins t a

pp lic ant, a c c or din g to t

he State ’s ow n c los ingargume nt, was a pp lic ant’ s p a lm print found on the roof

of the c ar in whic h L ashbrook’ s body was fou n d

. But the State’ s own

27 fing erpr int ex pert testified that the print could have been left there two day s befor e the murde rs. The defe nse t hen put on its own finge rprint expert (who ha d actua lly been the supervisor of

the State’s expert when the latter w as s t i l l in training ), who testified that the print could have been le ft thereAL L EN - Pag e 21

se ve ra l da y s, if no t w e e ks , b e fo re the mur de rs . The State did no t e ve n c ro ss- e xami ne thi s w itn e ss or try to rebut this e vidence

. The de fense also offe red a n innocent explanation of how a pplicant’s palm print was lef

t on the car , throug h the testimony of applica

nt’s wife w h o d escribed how applicant ha d stood leaning ag ainst Sewell’s car, as the l atter sat inside counting the money to give to a pp lic ant, jus t a

da y or tw o b e fo re the mur de rs . I n short, it is unl ikely

that the State would have been ab l e to ga in applicant’s c onviction based on the palm print alone. In light of this state of the evidenc e, it is not surprising that the ha be a s c ourt

fo un d th a t th e ne wl y

dis c ov e re d ev ide nc e “ of inn oc e nc e [wa s] so str on g that [ it c ou ld not] have c onfidenc e in the outcome of the t rial.” We ag ree ; and because it was the trial counsel’s de fi c ie nt p e rf

or manc e tha

t pr e ve nte d s uc h e vid e nc e fr om b e ingpr e se nte d to the jur y in the f ir st place , we hold that such de ficient pe rfor mance prejudice d applicant’ s defe nse. Conclusion We hold that the trial counsel provide d ineffe ctive assistanc e to t h e applica nt in this case . We, theref

ore, g rant applicant relief

from the judg ment and re mand him to the custody of the Sherif

f

o f D a l l a s C o u n t y.

DEL I VERED: Fe bruar

y 4, 2009. DO NO T PU B L I SH