### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON JU L Y 22, 200 9 S es sio n 

### IRI S TERES A BOWLI NG CHAM BERS v
. FAYE BOWLI NG DEVORE, ET AL 

### . Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Fayett e County No. 14533 William C. Cole, Chancellor

No. W2008-02548-C OA-R3-C V - Filed Novem ber 9, 2009

This case involves the interpre tation of the term “ bodily heirs.” Testator’ s will, probated in 1942, left ce rtain lands to his d au gh t er for her life, and the n to her “ bodily heirs.” T he life te nant’s g ra nd da ughter c on c e de s th a t sh e is n ot e nti tle d to ta ke thr ou g h h e r d e c e a se d f a the r, a s h is i nte re st lapsed whe n he p re d ec eased the life tena nt. Howeve r, she c ontends that she is entitled to take direc tly as a “ bodily

heir” of the life te nant. We ag ree that if g randda ug hter is her fathe r’s issue, a nd her f ather is the life tenant’ s issue, she is a “bodily heir” of the life te nant. Thus, we r ever se the trial court’s grant of summar

y judgme nt to defenda

nts, and we r emand to the t ri al cour t for fur ther proce eding s consistent with this opi nion.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al a s o f R igh t; Judg me nt of th e Cha nc e r y C our t R e ve r se d and Rem anded
A LA N E. H I G H ERS , P.J.,W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which H OL LY M. K I RBY , J., and J. S TE VE N S TA FF O RD , J., joined. Thomas M. Minor, Somerville, TN, for Appellant Robert Stephen Butl er , S r. , Somerville, TN, for A ppellees Faye Bowling Devore, T annis Ann Bowling P leasa nts and Allan Bruce Bowling
Lee S. Saunders, Somerville, TN; Steven R. Wa lker, Memphis, TN, f or Appe llee He len McKnightT he W i l l was execut ed on N o vem b er 30 , 19 4 0

. T he d at e o f T est at o r’ s d eat h i s uncl ear f rom t he reco rd 1 b e fo re us
.

It i s uncl ear whet her t he p art i es di sput e t hat T

. W

. was N el l i e’ s b i o l o gi cal chi l d

. W e m ake no f i nd i ng 2 regardi ng s uch.

Rober t M i l t on B owl i n g di ed on J an u ar y 16, 1951, w i t h ou t i s s u e, a n d T

. W

. B owl i n g , I I I di ed on M ay 29, 3 1 9 8 9

.
I r i s al l ege s t hat Fay e a nd T ann i s ar e T

. W

. ’ s s t ep- chi l dren

. W e make no f i ndi ng r ega r di ng t he bi ol ogi cal 4 i d en t i t i es o f

an y of t he p arti es. -2- OP IN ION
I. F A C TS & P R OC EDU R A L H I S T ORY
The L ast Wil l and Testame nt (“Will”) of Robert Milt on Stone (“Te stator”) was probated on November

16, 1942, in F ay ette County , Tenne ssee. The Will devised five trac ts of land at issue. 1 Testator’ s daug hter , Ne llie Stone Bowling , was g rante d a life e state in four tra cts, totaling 1070 acr es. Upon Ne llie’s death, the Will provided:
At the death of my

daug hter, Ne llie, Ig ive these la nds that are set [] out above in fe e sim ple to he r b od

ily he irs , share and shar e alike. (empha sis added). Afifth 442-a cr e tra ct was de vised to Testator’ s wife f or her life, and upon he r death, to Te stator’s daughters, Ne llie and Fr edda, f or their lives. Upon the dea ths of Nellie and Fr edda, the Wil l provided that
at their de ath, I

g ive and dire ct the shar e ea ch held to the ir b od ily he irs

. (empha sis added). A fter the death of Testator’ s wife in Ma rch of 1960, Nellie and F redda executed a par tition deed, leavingeac h sister with a life e state in her 221 a cre s.
Ne lli e die d o n M ay

8, 20 06 , at th e a g e of 10 1. Helen Ma be l Mc Kn ig ht w a s h e r o nly surviving c hild, as Ne llie’s two sons, Robert M ilton Bow ling and T.W. Bow ling, I I I , prede cea sed 2 he r. Ho we ve r, Ne lli e ha d f our s ur viv ing“ g ra

nd c hil dr e n, ” all “ch ild

re n” of T. W.: Iri s T e re sa 3 Bow ling Chambe rs (sometimes her einaf ter “ Ap p el l an t”); F ay e B owling D evore , Tannis Ann B ow lin g P lea san ts, and

Al lan B ru c e B ow lin g , T .W. ’s a do pte d c hil d. A q ue sti on of fa c t e xists reg ardingwhether

I ris, Fa y e, Ta nnis, and Allan ar e T.W.’s biologic al childre n. 4

In September of

2007, Nellie’s g randd a

u ghte r , I r is , f il e d a “ Co mp la in

t to Determine H eirship, t o Qu i etT i t l e a n d

fo r P art i t i o n ” i nth e F ay et t e C o un ty , T en n e s s ee , C h an ce ry C o urt , s ee k i n g a deter mination of her r ights in the subjec t property and alleg ing that Allan, as an adopted c hild, had no rig hts to the property . Iris later amended her complaint to further alleg e that Fa y e and T annis had no ri g hts to t

he su bje c t pr op e rt

y , a s sh e a lle g e d th e y

we re no t T .W. ’s bio log ic a l c hil dr e n. I ri s’H el en l at er f i l ed a “ Res t at ed M ot i on t o D i s mi s s f or Fa i l u r e t o St at e a Cl ai m U pon W h i ch Rel i ef c an be 5 G rant ed [, ]” as ki ng t he t ri al co urt t o co nsi d er her m o t i o n one f o r s um m ary judgm ent , as t he m o t i o n ref erred t o m at t ers o u tsid e o f t h e p le a d ing s. -3- sib lin g s, F ay e , T ann is, and Al lan, a s we ll a s Iri s’ a un t, He le n, fi le d mot ion s to dis mis s fo r fa ilure to state a c la im u po n w hic h r e lie f c ou ld b e g ra nte d. Th e mot ion s argue d th a t Iri s la c ke d s tand ingto f ile the complaints, as He len, Nellie’ s only surviving c hild, owned 1 0 0 % o f the fe e simple title to the p r o p e rty. 5
On Janu a r y 1 5 , 2 0 0 9 , th e tr i a l c o urte n t e r e d an“ A m e n d e d

O r d e r G r an t i n g M o t i o n s to Di smi ss a nd /or fo r S umm ary

Judg me nt. ” Th e or de r s tate d in pa rt : based upon the decision of the Te nnessee Supreme Court in the ca se of Rutherf ord County v. Wil son, 121 S.W .3d 5 9 1 (T en n. 2003) which the Court finds to be deter minative of the c u

r r e nt m o tion, and specific ally , the languag e of the Court which state s a s f oll ow s: “An intent to conve y

a conting ent remainder would manifest a c lear intention to preclude a

dece ased c lass member[’]s iss ue fr om taking the share of the proper

ty that the dec ease d class member would have taken[. Ru the rfo rd ,] 121 S .W.3d at 597[ .]” the Court finds that by using the term “bodily heirs[,] ” R obert Mil ton Stone cre ated a c on tin g e nt r e ma ind e r a

nd sin c e T. W. B ow lin g , I I I , p re de c e a se d the lif e te na nt, his int e re st l a ps e d a nd his iss ue , inc lud ingthe Pla int if f, Iri s T e re sa

B ow lin g Cha

mbe rs , are prec luded from takingthe s hare that T.W. Bow ling, I I I would have taken had he survived the life tenant and f urt h er that Defe ndant Hele n Mabel McK night, who survived the life tenant is the 100% owne r of the pr operty at issue.
Iris appea ls.

II. I SSU ES P R ESENTED Appellant has timely

filed her notice of appea l a nd prese nts the following issue for r eview, summa ri zed a s f oll ow s:
1. Whether the issue of a child who prede cea ses the life tena nt is included within the class of “bodily heirs” of the life tena

nt.

III
. S TA N D A R D O F REVIEWT he T enn es s ee C l as s G i f t St at ut e “ i s ge ner al l y cons i dere d t o hav e been i nt ended t o re l i eve t he har s h e f f ect 6 of t he com mo n l aw doct r i ne, at l eas t i n s om e i ns t anc es , by al l owi ng t he s ur vi vi ng i s s ue of a c l as s memb er wh o di es bef ore t he t i me t he cl as s woul d hav e c om e i nt o po s s es s i on of t he gi f t t o t ake t hat cl as s memb er ’ s s har e. ” R u th erfo rd -4- In th e ins tant c a se , w e are a sk e d to re vie w t he tr ia l c ourt ’s grant o f s umm ary jud g me nt t o defe ndants. Summary judgme nt is appropr iate when “ther e is no g enuine issue as t o any materia l fac t and . . . the moving party i s en t i t led to judgme nt as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. Rul ingon

a mot ion fo r s umm ary

jud g me nt d oe s n ot i nv olv e di spute d is su e s o f f a c t, b ut o nly questions of law. Owner-Operator Indep. Drive rs Ass’n v. Con cord EFS, In c. , 59 S.W .3d 63, 68 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T hu s, our s tand ard fo r r e vie wi nga

g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt i s de novo with no presumption of corr ectne ss a s to the trial court’s finding s. See Webbe r v. State Farm Mut. A uto. Ins. C o. , 4 9 S. W.3 d 2 65 , 2 69 (T e nn . 2 00 1) . T he e vid e nc e mus t be vie we d “ in t he l ight mos t favor able to the nonmovingparty ,” and all re asonable infere nces must be dr awn in the non- moving party ’s favor. Sta

ple s v . CB L & Ass oc

s. , 15 S.W .3d 83, 89 (Tenn. 2000)

. IV. D I S CUS S I ON
A. I nte re st o f I ssu eof T. W. Bow ling

, I II
“A c lass g ift is a g ift to a g roup of pe rsons wh o are not named, who have one or more char acte ristics in common, and whose numbe r m ay v ary .” Rut herford Coun ty v. Wilson , 121 S.W .3d 591, 595 (Tenn. 2003) (op i n i o n o n petition to rehea r) cert. de nied , 543 U.S. 815 (2004) (c i t i n g Jennings v . Jennings , 1 B e e le r 2 95 , 1 65 Te nn . 2 95 , 5 4 S.W.2 d 961 , 9 63 (1 93 2) ; W illiams v. McFarland , 9 S m i th ( T N ) 4 6 8 , 1 6 2 T e n n
. 4 6 8 , 3 7 S

. W

. 2 d 1 1 6 , 1 1 8 ( 1 9 3 1 ) )

. O ur G e n e r a l A s s e mb l y, in 1927, enac ted the Te nnessee Class Gift Statute , wh i ch at t h e time of the Te stator’s death, provided: Where a bequest, de vi s e, co n v ey ance, transf er or g ift is made to a cla ss of persons subject to fluctuation by

incre ase or

diminuti on of its number i n co n s eq u ence of future bir ths or deaths, a

nd the t ime of pay

ment, distribution, vesti ture or e njoy ment is fix ed at a

subsequent per iod or on the happe ning of a future event, a nd any member of such c lass shall die befor e the a rrival of such per iod or t h e h appening of such e ve nt, and sh a ll have iss ue surv ivi ng wh e n suc h pe ri od arr ive s o r s uc h e ve nt h a

pp e ns , such issue shall take the share of the prope rty that the member so dying w ould take if living, un l es s a cl ea r intention to the contrar y is manifested by

the will, deed or oth e r i ns tr

ume nt.

Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 32-3-104 (1934)

. The Te nnessee Class Gift Statute abolished a rule of construction known as the “Te nnessee Class Doctrine,” which “he ld that remainde rs to a fluc tuating c lass of persons re mained conting ent until the t ime set in the i nstrument for distribution or pay ment.” Ruthe rf

ord Co unty , 121 S.W .3d 6Count y v. Wi l s on , N o
. M 2 0 0 2

- 0 1 3 8 2

- C O A

- R 3

- C V , 20 0 2 W L 3 1 2 5 0 6 , at * 1 4 (T enn. C t

. A p p
. Feb

. 28 , 20 0 2 ) rev’d on ot hergr ounds , 12 1 S.W

. 3 d 59 1 (T enn. 20 0 3 ). U nd er t he co m m o n l aw d o ct ri ne, t he i nt erest of a no n- sur vi vi ng c la ss m e m b e r la p se d , d e p riv ing his c h ild re n o f his inte re st. I d.

A re mai nder t o a cl as s “ wi l l be t r eat ed as ve s t ed un l es s t he cont r ar y i s ex pres s l y provi ded f or i n t he wi l l

. ” 7 R u th e rf o rd C o u n ty , 20 0 2 W L 3 1 2 5 0 6 , at * 1 8 (quo t i ng K ars ch , 2 0 3 T e n n . at 3 5 4 -5 5 , 3 1 3 S .W .2 d a t 2 5 5 ). -5- at5 9 6 (c i t i n g Nicholson v. Nicholson , 496 S.W .2d 477, 479 (Tenn. 1973) ; W alker v . A pp le bu ry , 22 McCanless 91, 218 Tenn. 91, 400 S.W .2d 865, 868-6 9 (1 9 6 5) overruled by Rutherford County v. W ilson , 1 21 S.W. 3d

59 1 ( Te nn . 2 00 3) ; Satterfield v. Maye s , 30 Tenn. 58, 59 (1850) supersede d by sta tute as stated

in Rutherford County v. W ilson , 121 S.W .3d 591 (Tenn. 2003) ). “The ref ore, the rule now is that eve n if the time of distribution or pay ment is set at a subseque nt period or upon the ha pp e nin g of

a futur e e ve nt, ‘t

he ind ivi du a l me mbe rs of the c la ss w ill ta

ke ve ste d tr ans mis sib le int e re st[s ] unl e ss t

he [ins tr ume nt], c on sid e re d a s a

wh ole in the li gh t of

a ll the c ir c ums tanc e s, manifests a c lear

intention to the contrary .’” Id. (q u o t i n g Karsch , 313 S.W .2d at 255).
In order for the T ennesse e Class Gift Statu t e t o ap p l y , the g rantinginstrument must: “1) convey the prope rty

to a c l as s ; 2 ) s et t he time for distribution ‘at a subsequent per iod or on the ha pp e nin g of

a futur e e ve nt’ ; [] 3) no t sh ow a c le ar int e nti on to pr e c lud e the iss ue of a de c e a se d c la ss member f rom takingthe share of prope rty that the dece ased class member would have taken if living at the time for distribution[; ] ” and 4) “a me mber of the class must d i e before the time for 7 distribution and must have issue living at the time for distribution.” Id. (quoting Tenn. Code Ann. § 32-3-104)

. As we state d a

bo ve , T e stator ’s Will, c on c e rn ingthe 10 70 a c re s, pr ov ide s that “ At the de a th of my daug hter, Ne llie, Ig ive these la nds that are set

. . . out above in fe e simple to h e r b od ily he irs , sh are and sh are a lik e .” (e mph a sis a dd e d) . L ik ewi se, re g ard ingthe a dd iti on a l 22 1 a c re s, the Will s tate s th a t u

p o nN e ll ie ’ s d e a th , “ Ig iv e an d d ir e c t t h e s h ar e [s h e ] h e ld

to [h e r ] bo dil

yhe irs .” (empha sis added).
The ter ms “bodily

heirs” a nd “heir s of the body” ar e sy nony mous. See Feh r i n ger v. Fehrin ger , 2 6 M cC an less 585, 222 Tenn. 585, 439 S.W.2d 258, 261 (Tenn. 1969) ( citing Restatement of the L aw of Property , Future Intere sts, Chapter 23, § 306 cmt. b (1940)) . Our Sup re me Court

ha s e xpla ine d th e e ff

e c t of de fi nin g a s c la ss i n s uc h te rm s, a s f oll ow s: Case law de fines the ter m ‘heirs of the b o d y ’ as t he lineal de scenda nts of a desig nated pe rson who would succ eed to the proper ty of t he designated person if that person died intestate owning the proper ty

. As such, the leg al definition of this term require s that the heirs of a desig nated pe rson’s body survive that per son. There fore , if the cla ss is defined as ‘ the heirs of [t he life e state owner ’s] body ,’ the individual me mbe rs of

the c la ss c ann ot b e de te rm ine d unti l the tim e of [the lif e e state ow ne r’ s] death, a nd the intere st of any class member who pre dece ases [the life estate owner ]
w o u l d l a p s e
. T hu s , th e r e m a i n d e r w o u l d b e c o n t i n g e n t

. . . . A n i n t e n t t o c o n v e y a c on tin g e nt r e ma ind e r wo uld manif e st a c le ar int e nti on

to p re c lud e a

de c e a se d c la ssM artha ’ s d au gh t er-i n-l aw arg ue d t ha t ea ch o f M artha ’ s t hre e c hil d ren ha d a 1 / 3 ve st ed rem aind er interest 8 in th e p ro p e rty, w h ic h c o u ld b e tra n sfe rr e d d u rin g li fe, o r in d e a th, b y w ill o r in te sta te su c c e ssio n
. R u th erfo rd C o u n ty , 20 0 2 W L 3 1 2 5 0 6 , at * 6

. A p p arent l y , her ar gum ent co nt i nued t hat when her hus b and died i nt est at e, s he and h e r d a u g h te r e q u a lly sp lit his 1 /3 sh a re o f t h e p ro p e rty. -6- member’ s issue from takingthe share of the prope rty that the dec ease d class member would have taken.
Ruthe rf ord Co unty , 121 S.W .3d at 597. (interna l citations omit ted).
B e c a us e the Will c onve y e d th e su bje c t prope rt

y , u po n N e lli e ’s de a th, to N e lli e ’s “ bo dil y heirs,” a cl ea r i ntention to create a c ontinge nt remainde r wa s shown. See Burton v. Kinn ey , 27 Be eler 1, 191 Tenn. 1, 6, 231 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tenn. 1950) (“A remainder to the heirs of the life tenant is g ener ally

a conting ent re mainder, f or, there being n o h ei rs to a living pe rson, until the termination of the life e state, no one c an cla im as the heir of the life tena

nt.”) (quoting23 R.C.L ., Section 95, 551). T.W.’s interest in the prope rty was c ontinge nt upon his sur vival to the termination of Ne lli e ’s lif

e e state , a nd the Te nn e sse e Cla ss G if

t Statut e did

not op erat e to p re ve nt h is i nte re st from lapsingat his death. Thus, whe n he pr ed ec ea sed Ne llie, his int ere st was extinguished. Acc ording ly , his issue are not e ntitled to take his share pur suant to the Class Gift Statute.

B. Int erest of Class of “Bodily Heirs” Although w e have found that T.W.’s issue are not entitled to take a sh ar e o f t h e subjec t pr op e rt y purs ua nt t o th e Cla ss G if

t Statut e , our inq

uir y do e s no t e nd

the re . We mus t no w a dd re ss Iris’ conte ntion that she is entitled to take dir e c tly as a “ b o d i l y h eir” of Nellie. The case of Rutherford County v. W

ilson is instructive on this is sue.
In Ru the rfo rd

Cou nty , th e te stator

c on ve y e d c e rt a in p ro pe rt y , b y de e d, a s f

oll ow s: The intere st herein c onvey ed t o [ m y d au g hter, Mar tha,] is a life estate . . . the rema inder intere st to go to the heirs of her body on her de ath, in acc ordanc e with the laws of de scent a

nd distribution; and should

. . . M ar t h a . . . have no children or represe ntatives of chi l d

r en a t he r d e a th, the n th e re ma ind e r i nte re st s ha ll g o to my next of kin as provided by law.
2002 WL312506, at *1. (e mphasis added) . Condemnation proce eding s were comm ence d by Rutherford County , seekingto t ak e a p ortion of the prope rty Martha he ld as a life te nant. Id. Martha, Ma

rtha’s da ug hter, a nd Martha’ s g randda

ug hter (the daug hter o f Mar tha’s dec ease d son) wer e named as parties to the condemnation procee dings. Id. Martha’ s daug hter-in- law (the widow o f M arth a ’ s d e c e a s e d

s o n , an d m o th e r o f M arth a ’ s g r a n d d a

u g h t e r w h o w a s n am e d

a s a p arty) intervene d in the case , claiming that she had inhe rited, throug h intestate succ ession, a one sixth (1/6) i n t e r e s ti nth e p r o p e rty. Id. 8O u r S u p re m e C o u rt, no n e the le ss, fo u n d tha t M a rth a ’s d a u g h te r-in-la w ha d no inte re st in the p ro p e rty 9 b e c a u se sh e w a s n e ithe r a c h ild o f t h e li fe te n a n t, n o r a re p re se n ta tive o f a c h ild o f t h e li fe te n a n t. I d. a t 5 9 8

. -7- This Court found that the languag e of the g rant de edingMartha’ s remainde r intere st to the “heir s of her body ” evide nced a clea r intention to crea

te a c ontinge nt remainde r. Id. a t *4 . T hu s, the Tenne ssee Class Gift Statute did not operate to preve nt Martha’ s son’s interest fr om lapsing when he prede cea sed the life tena nt. Id. at * 4 -5

. Ho we v er , o ur S u p re m e C o urt re v er s ed th i s fi n d i n g, s ta ting that “[t] h e d e e d

. . . mu s t b e c o n s id e r e d

a s a w h o le in li g h t o f a ll th e c ir c u ms ta

n c e s [, ]” Ruthe rf ord Co unty , 1 2 1 S

. W

. 3 d

at5 9 7 (c i t i n g Karsch , 313 S.W .2d at 255), and point ing out that “[t] he deed’ s second clause ref er[red] to the class as [Martha’ s] ‘children or re prese ntatives of [her] children.’ ” Id. The c ourt found t hat bec ause the deed r efe renc ed Mar tha’s “c hildren or re pr e se ntativ e of

[he r] c hil dr en[ ,] ” the c la ss m e mbe rs ’ i nte re sts we re no t c on tin g e nt u po n th e ir survival to the termination of the life estate. Id. Thus, under the Tenne ssee Cl ass Gift S tatute, “[t] he share of the prope rty

of a c hild who prede cea se[d] [Martha] would p as s t o that child’s repr esentatives.” Id. 9
Al tho ug h our

Sup re me Court ’s Ru the rfo rd Cou nty opinion r ever sed this Court reg ardingthe status of the cla ss members’ inter ests as vested or conting ent, finding that the testator intende d the broad la ng uag e of “ children or repr esentatives of children” to de fine the c lass, rathe r than the na rrow leg al def inition of “heirs of the body ,” the languag e utiliz ed in this Court’s opin i o n re garding the term “he irs of the body” is, nonethele ss, instructive. I n deter mining whe ther the life tenant’s daug hter-in- law wa s included within the class, we discussed the ter m “heirs of

the bo dy” a s f

oll ow s: Ab se nt l angua g e to t

he c on tr ary , “ he ir s o f t

he bo dy” me ans lin e a l des cend ants

. Fehringer v . Fehringer , 222 Tenn. 585, 590 429 S.W.2d 258, 260 (1969). . . .
I t is se ttl e d la

w i n T e nn e sse e tha

t in its pr ima

ry se ns e , a re ma ind e r to the “ he ir s o f h is [lif e te na nt’ s] bo dy” is a

re ma ind e r to the lif

e te na nt’ s lin e al d

esc e nd an ts

. Cam

pb e ll v. Lewisburg & N.R. Co. , 160 Tenn. 477, 26 S.W.2d 141 (1930). . . .

. . . . The ter m “heirs of

the body” also c onnotes a g ift to a multigene rational c lass of lineal desce ndants. [(citing Restate ment (S econd) of the L aw of Property (Donative Tr ans fe rs ) § 25 .9 ). ] Ab se nt l angua g e or c ir c ums tanc e s in dic a tin g a c on tr ary int e nt, it i s p re sume d th e do no r a do pte d th e se me anin g s.
Ab s e n tc i r c u m s t an c e s r e qu i r i n g a d i f f e r e n ti n t e r

p r e t a t i o n , “ h e i r s o f

th e b o dy” includes gene rations after children as we ll as children. Cam pb e ll , 160 Tenn. at 477, 26 S.W .2d at 141. . . .
Ruthe rf ord Co unty , 2002 WL312506, at *4, 9. We further explained that-8-

“When a limitation is i n favor of the ‘he irs of the body ’ of a desig nated pe rson
. . . then, unless a c ontrary

intent of the conve y or is foun d fr om additional lang uag e or circ umstances, the pe rsons so descr ibed by the limitation as convey ees a re the lineal de sc e nd ants of

the de signate d a

nc e sto r who un de r t

he app li c a

ble loc a l la

w w ou ld succe ed to the prope rty

if such anc estor died owning the proper ty and intestate at the time when the g roup is to be asc erta ined. . . .”
Id. at* 4 (q u o t i n g Fehringer , 222 Tenn. at 591, 439 S.W .2d at 260). Thus, “bodily heirs” must be not only lineal desc endants, “ but also must be the intestate heirs of the per son.” Id. at *10.
In a footno t e t o t he Ru the rfo rd Cou nty opinion, we stated that the te stator’s g randda ug hter–the da

ug hter of t h e testator’ s dece ased son–wa s “a me mber of the g rante e cla ss of heirs of [the life tena

nt’s] body [,] ” and that if “she survive [d the life tenant, she would] take a portion of the re mainder unde r the ter ms of the g rant itself.” Id. at * 2 5 n
. 3 5. Simi larly , we f ind in the instant case, that if T.W. was Nellie’s issue, and I ris is T.W.’s issue, then Iris is a “bodily heir” of the lif e te na nt, and the re fo re , s he is e nti tle d to take dir e c tly un de r t he Will.
As we state d above, to be a “bodil y h ei r” o f a life te nant, one must be both a “ lineal desce ndant” a

nd an intestate “heir .” Bla ck’s L aw Dic tionary define s a “linea l desce ndant” a s “[a] blood re lativ e in t

he dir e c t li ne of

de sc e nt[, inc lud ing ] ch ild re n, g ra nd c hil dr e n, and

g re a tg randc hildren[.] ” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). It is clear that biologica l gr andchildre n are lineal descendants of their g randpa rents. See Cam

pbell v. Le wisbu rg & N.R. Co. , 26 S.W .2d 141, 144 (Tenn. 1930) (“ Heirs of the body

include g randc hildren as we ll as children–linea l d es ce n d an t s
. ”) (c i t i n g W

ar d v . S au nd e rs , 3 5 T e nn . ( 3 Sn e e d) 38 7 ( Te nn . 1 85 5))

. Th us , if I ri s is Nellie’s biolog ical g randc hild, then she is also her linea l desce ndant.
“The leg al meaningof the wor d ‘heirs’ is the class of pe rsons upon whom desce nt is cast by the statute of de scent an d d i s t ri bution.” Id. at * 1 0 (q u o t i n g Fisher v. Malmo , 650 S.W .2d 43, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)). Be cause a will must be “interpr eted in the light of the law in e x istence at the time of the de ath of the te stator[,] ” Thi rd Na t’ l Bank in Na shv ill

ev . St e v e ns , 755 S.W .2d 459, 46 2- 63 (T e nn . Ct. App . 198 8) (c iti ngTe nn . Co de . A nn . § 32 -3 -1 01 ; Bell v. Shannon , 212 Tenn. 28, 367 S.W .2d 761 (1963)) , we look to the 1934 statute c oncer ning de sce n t an d d i s tribution, which pr ov ide d th a t
The land of an intestate owner s hall be inherited in the foll owing manner by his lineal de sc e nd ants , c oll a te ra l ki nd re d, or a sc e nd ants :

. . . (a) By

desce ndants.– By

all the sons and daughters of the d ec ea s ed , t o be div ide d amon g st the m e qu a lly

. An d if any c hil d o f s a id i nte state sh a ll h ave die d in his lifetime, his li neal de scenda nts shall repre sent their par ent, and be entitl ed to t he same p o rti o no f

th e e s tate o f

th e d e c e a s e d

a s th e ir p ar e n t w o u ld

h av e b e e ne n titled-9-

t o i f l i v i n g.
I f Iris is in fac t T .W.’s issue, as she alleg es, had Nellie died intestate, Iris would have be en entitled to a n intestate share of Nellie’s share by repr esentation. “The term ‘by repr esentation’ ref ers to the pr inc ipl e by

wh ic h the iss ue of a de c e a se d pe rs on take or inh e ri t th e sh are of

an e state wh ic h th e ir immediate ance stor would have taken or inherited if living .” Doram us v. Rogers Group, In c. , No. M2008-00918-COA- R3-CV, 2001 WL 196974, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Fe b. 28, 2001) app. denied (S ep t

. 1 0 , 2 0 0 1 ) ( ci t i n g Barnes v. Re dmond , 19 Cates 4 5, 127 Tenn. 45, 152 S.W. 1035, 1036 (1913); B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary 1301 (6 ed. 1990)). Acc ording ly , if T.W. wa s Nellie’s issue, a nd th Iris is T.W.’s is sue, then Iris is Nellie’s intestate “ heir.”
I f Iris is both N el l i e’ s “h ei r” and her “lineal de scenda

nt,” she is also her

“bodily heir.” Be cause Iris is potentially a member

of the class of Nellie’s “bodily heirs” to whom T estator’ s land was de vised at Ne llie’s death, the tr ial court erre d in g rantingsummary judgme nt to defenda

nts.

V. C ONCL US I ON
For the aforementioned rea sons, we rever se t he chance ry court’s grant of summar y judgme nt to defe ndants, and we rema nd to the trial court for furthe r proc eeding s consistent with this opi nion. Cos ts o f thi s a

pp e a l are ta xed to Ap pe lle e s, F ay e B ow lin g De vo re , Ta nn is Ann B ow lin g Ple a sant, A l l anB r u c e B o w l i n g , an d

H e l e nM a

b e l M c K n i g h t , f o r w h i c he x e c u t i o nm ay

i s s u e i f n e c e s s a r y.

ALANE. HI GH ERS , P. J., W.S

.