Opinion issued June 8, 2023

In The 

## Court of Appeals For The 

## First District of Texas

———————————— NO. 01
- 22
- 00964
- CV

——————————— IN THE INTER EST OF S.C.M., A CHILD

On A p peal from the 315th District Court

Harris County, Texas Trial Court Ca se No. 2021
- 00 637J

MEMORANDUM OPINION B.C. ( “ Father ” ) appeals from a judgment that terminated his parental right s to his child, S.C.M. ( “ Sarah ” ). 1 See T EX
. F AM
. C OD E § 161.001. Father complai ns tha t the evidence was legally and factually insufficient for th e trial cou rt to have found that he committed the predicat e acts in Texas Family Code s ection

1 We use a pseudonym to refer to the child and parent involved in this case. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 109.002(d ) ; T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 9.8(b) (2).2

161.001(b)(1)(D) ( endanger ing environment ) and ( E) (endangeri ng conduct) , and that terminat ion was in the best interest of the child. We affirm. Background Three years b efo re Sarah was born, Father was convicted o f felony aggravated robbery involving a deadly weapon. He wa s placed on community supervision for eight years , which re quired him to avoid i llegal drugs, report to a supervision officer , and not commit illegal of fen ses. Sarah was born in January 2021 , and one month later , Father tested positive for an illegal drug in viol ation of his community supervision

. At the time o f Sarah ’ s birth, Father and Sarah ’ s m other were in an o n - and

- off relationship and did not have sec ure housing , moving between hotels. Mother told a caseworker that she had bee n in a re lationship with Father for about two years. In March o f 2021, the Departme nt received a referral of neglectful supervision concerning Sa rah. Mother believed that Fathe r m ade the report. The reporter stated that Father and Mother were having a verbal altercation in fr ont of Sarah in a hotel lobby. When Father leaned in to kiss Sarah, Mother p unched him , and he fell. The police were called. Upon investigating the referra l , t h e Department noted that Mother had prior involvement with the Department regarding her mental hea lth and medi cations and that she had been d iagnosed wit h bipola r disorder, depression, and atte ntion de ficit3

hyperactivity disorder. There was concern that he r mental health was impairing her judgment and ability to care for a n infant. A caseworker from t he Departm en t contacted Mother , who indicat ed she was staying at the Star of H o pe homeless shelter

. Mother acknowled ged that she had mental health issues bu t s tated that the referral happened because Father was upset that she did not want to be in a relati onship with him

. The Department attempte d to contact Father at different addresses and phone numbers but was unsuccessful

. In April 2021, the Departm e nt re ce ived a referral from the shelt er that Mother was not taking her prescribed medications. She was disorgan iz ed a nd confuse d. She was disassociating during the rapy, and there were concerns about her ability to care for her self and a baby. A therapist r ec omm en ded that Mother go to the hospital, and a maternal grandparent agreed to c are for Sarah. One week later , Mother was released fr om the hospital back to the shelter. Due to concerns about Mother ’ s ability to care for her self and Sarah, Mother was

as k ed if s he would be willing to place Sarah outside her c are while she completed services. A family member was no t availab le for a placem ent. Mother told the

casewor ker that she did not agree t o the child being cared for by some one else, and she also had no fa mil y members or friends available. The next day, the Department4

requested temporary managing conservatorship of Sarah , listing Mother and Father as the child ’ s a lleged parents, and noting that Father ’ s location was unknown. Mother and Father appeared a t t he fi rst adversary hearing. The court continued the appointment of the Department as temporary managing conse rvator

. The court ordered that the pare nts compl y with certain actions and advised that failure to do so could l ead to termination. Father w as re qu ire d to provide a caregiver resource form and contact information within 30 days. In June 2021, Father w as form al ly served with the suit and his service pla n

was filed with the court. The plan noted concerns with Father ’ s history of intimate partne r vio le nce t hat had not been resol ved and that Father was unemp loyed and without stable housing. The plan req uired Father to (1) obtain and maintain

em p loyment, (2) obtain and maintain housing, (3) participate in mee tings, conferences, and cour t , ( 4 ) submit to pa ter ni ty testing , (5) participa te in monitored visits with the child, (6) refrain from crimina l activit y, (7) provide drug testing samples, and (8 ) participate in a psychological assessment and follow its

recom mendations.
O n June 30, 2021 , Father appear e d a t th e court ’ s status hearing and paternity was established. Father ’ s service p lan was m ade an order of the court. Father was also found to be in violation of the court ’ s order from a pre vious he aring, and5

Father had not pr ovided a caregiver resource for m. Th e next day, both parents were ordered to drug testing. Father did not appear

. In Jul y and August 2021 , Father did not report to his community supervi sion officer. At some point in August, Father became incarcerated in F ort Bend County
Ja il. He was la te r t ra n sferred to Harris County Jail , and in December 2021, the criminal court r evoked Father ’s community supervision for his prior aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon c harge. He was sentenced to eight year s ’ imprisonmen t. From December 202 1 through t he en d of trial, Father frequently moved unit s within the Texas prison s yste m. A t a perma nency hearing in December 2021, Father was found not in compliance with the family plan. Mother also tested positive for drugs in both hair and urine samp le s . The ca s e pr oc eeded to trial , which took place in April, June, August , and
N o vember 202 2

. 2 Over the course of the four court dates, the cas eworker and child advocate testified. 1. April 2022 trial A t trial, the D e partmen t ’ s c ase worke r tes tified that the Department r e cei ve d a referral about a physical disp ute between the parents in a hotel lobb y. Mother allegedly pu nched Father while she was holding the baby. The parents did not have

2 At the conclusion of trial, the district court terminated mother ’ s parental rights to Sarah. Moth er ’ s parental right s a re n ot the subject of this appeal.6

stable housi ng and ha d be en staying in hotels . A t some point after the alterc ation , Mo ther went to a homeless shelter with Sarah and expressed that she did not w ant a rel ationship with Father due to domestic viole nce. The Department was concerned that Sarah could be harmed due to domestic violence. Mothe r had one prior case with th e Dep a rtm ent r egarding her mental health . The case was closed after Mother began cou nseling , and Mother later placed the child who was the subjec t of that prior case for adoption. The caseworker testified that whi le the intake of the current case was s till

o pen, the De partment received a se c ond intake report alleging that Mother was not taking her medication, that she was expe riencing confusion, and that she required

“ prompting to re alit y ” during therapy. When ask ed to explain the prompting to reality, th e caseworker st ate d that it was as if M o the r was gazing off and inattentive. Mother ’ s lack of mental pr esence had been a concern in her first cas e with the Department, and the Department w as especially concerned wi th this allegation because a baby requi res constant atten tion and care. Mother w a s a dmitted to Ben Tau b hospital and diagnosed with postpartum depressio n , and a m a ternal relative cared fo r the child

. After her hospital iz ati on, Mother returned to the sh elter. The caseworker remained conce rn ed that Mother

was una ble to care for a n ewb orn while ad dressing her own mental health issues.7

Mother did not na me any family or friends who co uld care for the child, and the Departmen t sought temporary managing conservatorship of Sarah. The casewo r

ker did not confirm or deny th at Father made t he initial referral to the Department in Mar ch of 2021

. The caseworker testified that Father nev er aff irmatively contacted the Department durin g its in itial investigation. The Department was unable to reach Father

. Neither parent provide d s uggestions for
p lac emen t of the child with relatives. 2. June 2022 trial T he casew orker testified tha t Sa rah w as doing well in her foster placement and t hat her foster parent met her needs. The Department ’ s goal was adoption

. The caseworker last spoke wi th Mother in May , a nd she had moved back to Houston from Illinois

. Though he had reached out several ti mes, t he caseworker did no t receive a response from Mother

. Mother ’ s instability continued to be a concern. The c aseworker noted issues with M other ’ s p sy chological healt h an d noted that she had tested positive for drugs in December 2021 and February 2022

. T he ca seworker ackno wledged that Fa ther ’ s pate rni ty was not adjudicated until after the lawsuit began. Therefo re, Mother was the parent with rights an d responsibilities bef

ore the Department became involved

. By the time Father ’ s rights were adjudicated , the Depa rtment bore re sponsibility for the child.8

3. August 2022 trial The caseworker testified that his last contact with Father was i n June 2022. Fath er informed the De p art ment of his u nit in prison and asked for a photograph of Sarah. The casew orker testifie d that Father was in prison f or aggravated robbery wi th a deadly weapon and that Father h ad been sentenced to eig ht years ’ imprisonment after he fa il ed to report to a su pervision officer. The caseworker confirmed that pri or to his incarcerati o n, Father had received the family ser vi ce plan and that it had bee n explained to him. Father comple ted a paternity test a nd psychol ogical assessment. He did not c omplete co urt

- or d ere d drug testing . While
h e completed parenting classes and indi vidual th erapy, he did not provide proof that he had completed dom estic violenc e classes. As for Father ’ s relationship with Sarah, he a ttended only one scheduled visit in J un e 2021. Father b e cam e in car cerated in August 2021 . The caseworker reitera ted that Father never provided contact information a nd potential placement names to the Department. He acknowled ged that Father had char ges for domestic violence in addition to his in carceration for a ggr avated robbery. Father did not provide any financial support o r gifts for the child during the case, and Sar ah was
not bonded to Father

.9

4. No vember 2022 The casework er testified that he did not believe that Father h ad shown that he co ul d provide a safe an d stable environment for Sarah

. According to the caseworker, bo th paren ts were l iving in and out of hotels when the case be gan. When Mother took the child to a shelter, Father did not contact the Department or oth er wise at tempt to esta bl ish his rights. Father did participate in a s t atu s hearing and completed some services bef ore going to jail. T he caseworker stated that Father ’ s pot en tial release date i s in 2028

. The case worker testified that Mother had complained that Father was physic al ly th reatening and that , at some point, a cour t ha d ordered no contact between the parent s. At this trial date, a pat ernal cou sin who was interested in carin g for Sarah was present

. Th e c aseworker testified that t he Department completed a home study , an d the relative was willing to adop t Sa rah. Sarah was near ly two years old and had no relationship with the r elat i ve . The caseworker testified that Fathe r had
pro vided the cousin ’ s n a me following the last court date and expressed concern about the best plac em ent o ption f or Sarah. A coordina tor for Child A dvo cates testified that Sa rah had been in her
current foster placement for 14 months and was doing we ll. She w as secur ely bonded to the foster m other , who wanted to adopt Sar ah. The chil d advocate did
not re commend moving Sarah due to her ag e. B ased on wh a t s he knew of Father ,10

he could not provide a safe and stable environment for Sa rah . She confirmed tha t she was asking for terminatio n of Father ’s rights and believed it was in Sarah ’ s best interest.
T h e t ri al court terminated Father ’ s rights to Sarah , fi n din g that termination was authorized based on s ection s 161.001(b)(1) (D ), (E), (N), and (O ). The co urt also foun d that the termina tion was in the Sarah ’s b est interest. The court ordered that Sarah remain w it h her foster mother

. O n appeal, Fa ther chall e nge s the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court ’ s predicate act findings and the t ria l court ’ s finding th at termination was in Sarah ’ s bes t interest. We a f firm. Standard of Review A trial co ur t may order termination of the paren t

- child r e l at i onship if the Department proves, by clea r and co nvincing evidence, on e of the sta tutorily

enume rat ed predica te f

i ndings for termination and proves that termination of parental rights is in t he b est intere st o f the child. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161. 001(b) ; s e e I n re E.N. C. , 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 20 12 ) (r ec ognizing that federal D ue P rocess C lause and Te xas Family Co de both mandate “ heightened st a ndard of

re view ” of clear and convincing evidence in pa rental

- rig ht s termination cases). The
D e p artment must pro v e by clear and convincing evidence b oth a st at utor ily prescribed predicate finding and tha t termina tio n is in th e ch ild ’ s b est interest

. Id.11

at 803. The Fa mily Code define s “ clear and convincing evi dence ” a s “ t he m easure or degree of proof that w ill prod uc e in the mind of the trier of fact a f irm be li ef o r conviction a s to th e trut h of the allegations s oug h t to be e stablished

. ” T EX
. F A M
. C ODE § 10 1 .007.
To assess the legal sufficiency of the evi denc e in a te rmi na ti on proceeding, we consider all e vidence in t he light most favorable to the trial court ’s fin d ing and decid e “ whet her a reasonable trier of fa ct c ould h ave formed a f irm be l ief or conviction that it s finding was true. ” I n re J. F.C. , 96 S.W.3 d 256, 26 6 ( Te x. 2002); see City of Keller v. Wi lson , 16 8 S

. W. 3d 802, 817 (T ex. 2005). We assume that

an y di sputed facts w ere res olved in favor of the findin g i f a reason able factfinder

c o uld have done so. J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266. When “ no reasonable fact finder

co uld f or m a firm belief or conviction ” t hat the m a t t er on which the Department bears the burde n of p roof is true, we “ m us t conclude that the evidence is legally
i n suffici ent. ” Id. In revi ew i ng the evi dence ’ s factual sufficiency, we consider the
ent ire recor d, i n cluding disp u ted evidence. Id. The evidenc e i s f actually insufficient if, considering th e enti re record, the disput ed evidence tha t a reasonabl e f

act finder c ould not have resolve d i n f avor of the fin ding is so signifi cant tha t t he factfind er could not re as onabl y have formed a fi rm belief o r convic ti o n . Id.12

We defer to the factfi nd er ’ s findings, and we can not substitute our own judgm ent for that o f the fact finder. S ee In r e H.R. M. , 209 S. W.3d 105, 108 ( Tex. 2006). The fact finder i s the sol e arbiter when a ss essing the credibilit y and de me a n or of the witnesses. See id. at 109. Predicate Acts In his first issue, Father cont ends that th e ev ide nce is insufficient to support a fi nding based on the predicate acts of endanger ment. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161.001(b)(1 )( D) , ( E ). The Departme nt respond s th at Father failed to challenge all the predicate acts on which his rights were terminate d , nam ely sectio n 161.001(b)(1)(N) ( aban donment ) and sectio n 161.001( b) (1)(O) (failure to comp lete
court

- ordered service plan)

. The De partment contend s that we m ust affirm the trial
court ’ s predicate act finding because Father failed to challenge all the f inding s. Father filed a late reply brief alleging that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial co urt ’ s finding s under sect io n 161.001 (b)(1)( N) (constr u cti ve abandonment ) and (O ) (failure to c omplete court

- ordered service plan). 3 Father argues tha t we s hould cons ider the sufficiency of the evidence to sup port the remaining predicate act findings in the interest of justice and be cause the Depart ment ’ s bri e f a lleged that they were waived

.

3 Father did not file a motion to file a late reply brie f.13

The termin ation judgment reflects that Father ’ s parental rights were terminated based on four predica te grounds : en dangering environment ( subs ection (D)); endangering conduct ( subsection (E)); co nstructive a bandon ment (subs ecti o n (N)) ; and fai lure to comply with a c ourt

- ordered service plan (subsection (O)). See
T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161.001( b)(1)( D ), (E), (N) , (O). Fat h er ’ s ori ginal appellate brief challenges only the endangering environment and end an gering condu ct grounds, but no t the g rounds of c o nstructive aban donment and fail ure to complete a service plan. While the Rules of Appellate Procedure permit a n appellant to file a reply brief to addre ss matters in the appellee ’ s brief , the Rules of App el late Procedu re

“ do not allow an appellant to include in a reply brief a new issue in respons e to some matter pointed out in the appel lee ’ s brief bu t not raised by ap pellant ’ s original brief. ” Howell v. Texas Workers ’ Comp. Comm ’ n , 143 S.W.3d 416, 439 (Te x. App.

— Austin 2004, pet. denied) ( citing T EX
. R. A PP
. P. 38.1); accord Boze v. Cartwright , No. 01

- 19

- 00892

- CV, 2020 WL 7776018, at *3 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 31, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) ; Warwick Oil & Gas, Inc. v. FBS Prop s. , Inc. , No. 01

- 14

- 0 0290

- CV, 201 5 WL 3637988, at *9 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] June 11, 2015, no pet.) (mem . op.)

. B y failing to challenge the finding under subsections (N) a nd (O) , Fa t her waived any complaint about the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findi ng s .14

Because of this, if we deter mine t hat the evi dence was legal ly suf f icient for the trial court to have f

ound that termination was in the best interest of the child, we will affirm the judgment of terminati o n a s to Father

. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE §
1 61.0 01 ( b) (requi r ing only one pr edicate ground to sup port termination); In re
Z.M. M

. , 577 S.W.3d 541, 542 ( Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (stating that “ only one
gro und is required to terminate parental rights ” ). However, we note that Father challenged the suffi ciency o f the evid ence under subsections (D) and (E), which raise due process concerns that require us, nevertheless, to address the merits of his
conten tions. In re N.G. , 577 S.W.3d 230, 235

– 36 ( Tex. 2019). Because we find the evidence was sufficient to satisfy sub sections (D) and (E), we note that Father ’ s briefing waiver was harmless. A. S ubs ectio ns 161.011(b)(1) (D ) or (E) Because Father challenges the trial co ur t ’ s findings under subs ections (D )

an d (E ), thus implicating due process c oncerns , we analyze the suf fic iency of the evi d ence of these two subsec tions. In re N. G. , 57 7 S.W.3d at 235

– 36

. Family C ode sub section 161.001(b)(1)(D ) provides that the trial court may order terminati o n o f the parent

- child relati onship if it finds by clear and c onvincing evidence t hat the parent has “ kno w ingly placed or k n owingly allowed the child to

re main in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well

- being of t he child. ” T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D). Termination under15

Family C ode sub section 161.0 01( b)(1) (E) requir e s clear and convincing evidence the parent “ engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child w ith perso n s who engaged in conduct which endange rs the physic a l o r emotional well

- bein g of the child. ” T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161 .001( b)(1)(E). “ Cond uct ” includes acts a nd failure s
to act. In re V.A. , 598 S.W.3d 317, 331 ( Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). Subsections (D) and (E) differ in that (D) requir e s a showing that the environment or conditions in which the c hild is placed endan ger ed the chi l d ’ s ph ysical or emotional we ll

- being, while subsection (E) requires tha t the cause of the endangerment be the parent ’ s conduct alone, as evidenced by either the
par ent ’ s actions or omissions. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161.001( b)(1) (D), (E ). “ Because

s ubs ection s D and E b oth concer n endangerme nt and the evidence on each may

over lap in some respects, we address both of these predicate findings together. ” In
re S.R

. , 452 S.W

. 3d 351, 359

– 60 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. den ied). As used in se cti on 161

. 001, “ ‘ end anger ’ mea ns more than a threat of metaphysical injur y or the possible ill effects of a less

- than

- ideal family environment. ” T

ex. Dep ’ t of Human Servs. v. Boy d , 727 S.W. 2d 53 1, 533 (Tex. 1987). In this context, endan ger means to expose a c hild t o loss or i njury or t o16

jeopardize a child ’ s emotional or physica l well

- being. Id. ; see In re M.C. , 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996). The Department does no t need to e sta blish that a parent intended to endanger a child to supp or t termination based on endang e rment. M.C

. , 917 S.W.2d
at 270. N or is it necessary to establish that the pa rent ’ s conduct was directed at the child or caused actual harm; rather, it is sufficient if the parent ’ s conduct endangers the child ’ s well

- b eing. See Boyd , 727 S. W.2d at 5 3 3. Danger to a child ’ s well

being may b e inferred from parental misconduct. Walker v. Tex. D e p ’ t of Fam

. &
Protect ive Servs. , 312 S.W.3d 608, 616

– 17 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houston [1s t Di st.] 2009, pet. denied) (citing Boyd , 727 S.W.2d at 533 )

. “ As a general rule, co n duct that subjects a child t o a life o f uncertain ty and instability endangers the physical a nd emotional well

- being of a child. ” In re R.W. , 129 S.W.3d 732, 73 9 (Tex. App.

— For t Worth 2004, pet. denied). Among the types of actions or omissions constituti n g evidence meeting this standa r d are cri m inal activ ity , convictions, and incarceration. See In re V. V. , 349 S.W.3d 548, 554 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied) (en banc)

. “ Evidence of criminal conduct , convictions, imprisonment and its effec ts on a par ent ’ s life and ability to pare n t, may e stablish

an endangering course of conduct. ” In re S.M

. , 389 S.W.3d 483, 492 (Tex. App.

— El Paso 2012, no pet.)

. Imp risonment a lon e is not an endange ring course of conduct but i s a fact properly considered on th e endangerment i ssue. Boyd , 72717

S.W.2d at 533

– 34. When all the evidence, including evidence of imprisonment , shows a course of conduct that has the effect of endangering th e p hysica l or emotional well

- being of the child, a finding of endangerment is sup por table. Walker , 312 S.W.3d at 617. Routi nely subjecting a child to t he probability th at she will be left alone because her parent is in ja il endangers children’s physic a l a nd

em otio nal wel l

- being. Id

. A parent ’ s pas t en dangering conduct may support a n i nfer e nce that pa st conduct may recur and f urther jeopardize the child’s present or future physical or em otional well

- being. See id. The record refle cts that in 2019, three ye ars befor e Sarah wa s born, Father pleaded guilty to felony aggravated robbery wit h a d eadly weapo n. He was place d

on commun ity supervision for eight years. The supervision r equired that he not use illega l dr ugs, refrain from committing illegal offe n ses, an d r eport to a superv ision officer as directed. The State ’ s motion to adjudicate doc umented that w ithin one m onth of
Sara h ’ s birth, Father tested positive for an illegal drug . This behavior put him at risk for impairing his ability to prot e ct and provide for Sarah ’s wel fare because it put him at risk of incarcerati on for viol ating the ter ms of his supervision. Parents ’ criminal conduct that exposes them to the possibility o f incarceration can negatively impa ct a child ’ s li ving environment and emotional well

- being. In r e18

A .A.H. , No. 01

- 19

- 00612

- CV, 2020 W L 1056941, at *10 (Tex. A pp.

— Houston [1st Dis t.] Mar. 5, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The record reflects that at the time of Sar ah ’ s birth in February 202 1 , Mother and Father had been in an o n - and

- off rel a tionship fo r t wo yea rs. They did not have stable housing and were moving between ho tels

. The Department became invo lved when Father and Mother had an altercation in a hotel lobby. Sara h was present and about two months old. It was reported that Mother punc hed Father whe n he

a ttempted to kiss the baby good bye. Mother then went to Sta r of Hope shel ter with the baby. When the D epartment interviewed Mother at Star of Hope, she stated that Father had ca lled in the ref erral and that she was f

leeing from d o mestic violence.
A t t rial, the caseworker testified that Mother told her s he was not the a ggressor and that Father hit her. “ Domes t i c violence, want of self control, and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment

. ” I n re J.I.T. P. , 99 S.W.3d 841, 8 45 (Tex. App.

— Houston [ 14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.). Violence do es not ha v e to be d irected toward t h e child or resu lt in a final conviction. In re V.V. , 349 S.W.3d at 556 ( “ Texas courts routinely consider evidence of parent

- on - parent phys ical abuse in termin ati on cas es without spe cifically requiri ng evidence that the

c onduct re s ulted in a criminal convi c tion. ” )

. The di strict court could have formed a firm belief that Sarah was at risk for exposure to domestic violence both based on environ ment and Father ’ s co ndu ct.19

F ather argues t hat he could not have endangered Sarah because h e was not adjudicated the parent until aft er the Department was her conservator. But the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Father was aware of at l east the

su bstantial likelihood th at he was Sarah ’ s f ather . At the time of Sar ah ’ s birth, Father had b e en in a r elationship with Mother for a f e w years. Father was seen with Sarah when she was about two month s old during the hotel lobby altercation

. The record reflects that once Mother too k Sara h to a shelte r, Father did not attempt to establish his pa tern i ty, c usto dy, or rights. At minimum, it is alleged that he contacted the Department to report that Mother h it him in front of Sarah, Father did not pursue establi s hment of his paternity or seek opportunities to care for Sarah and ensure her s afety

. Further mo re, t he record reflects that once the Department became the temporary man aging conservator of Sarah, Father failed to provide names of potential placemen ts for Sarah , jeopard izi ng Sar ah ’ s welfare. The court eventually ordered Father to pro vide the care g i ver resou rce and c hild placement resources forms to the Department

. The rec ord does not reflect that he completed the resource form , and he only provided a possible placement f or Sarah near the en d of trial

. The uncontroverted evidence al so establishes th at Father did not have or obtain stable housing or employment either befo re or during the pendency of the20

case. In June 20 21, Father reported to the D e partment that he was unem plo yed an d did not h ave stable housing

. T hroughout the pendency of this case, Fa ther fa il ed to provide financial or material support to Sarah or to arrange for a relative or friend
to provide for her in his stead. Finally, the c ourt could have considered Father ’ s refusal to submit to drug
t est ing an d his crimi nal ac tivity

. Shortly af ter his r ights were adjudicated , Father failed to submit to cou rt

- o rdered drug testing. The trial court was e ntitled to find his failure to p articipate in the drug tests as equivalent to a positive test resu lt

. S ee In re J. H.G. , No. 01

- 16

- 01006

- CV, 2017 WL 23781 41, at *6 (Te x. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2017, pet. d enied) (mem. op.) (stating failure to participate in court

- ordered drug te st may be treated as positive test result by trial
court )

. T he record r efl ects tha t while the parental

- rights ca se was pendi ng, Father violated the terms of his community supervision by fa iling to re port to his supervision officer for two mon ths. He was s enten ce d to eight year s ’ imprisonment. Wh ile the mere fact of a conv i cti on do es not support termination, the fact of a convic tion

— when considered with the durat ion and consequences of the i ncarceratio n

— are relev ant to determining if the result ing aband on m en t presents a risk to the child ’ s physical or emotio nal w ell

- being. I n r e J .F

. - G. , 627 S.W.3d 304, 31 5 (Tex. 20 21). On this r e co rd, the trial court could have found that Father ’ s robbery co nviction, c ombined wit h his lack of employment or hous ing,21

the al legations of domestic violence between him and Sarah ’ s m other , the failure to
p rovide financial support or surrogate c aregivers during the case, the skipped drug
test , and fail u re to report to h is probatio n officer, put Sarah ’ s physical and emotion al well

- being at risk. Viewing the evidence in the li ght most favorable to the tria l c ou rt’s findings ,

a reasonable factfind er could have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
D epartment ’ s alleg ations that Father “ kn owingly allowed the child to rem ain in conditions o r surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well

- being of
t he child ” and “ knowingly placed the child wit h person who engaged in conduct which endangers th e physical or emo tional well

- being of t he child ” were true. T EX
. F A M
. C ODE § 161.001(b )(1)(D), (E); In re E.N.C. , 384 S.W.3d at 802 ( stating standard of rev iew in termination of parental rights cas es ). W e h old that legally and factually suffic i ent evidence supports the trial court’s fin dings that Father committed thes e statutory predicate grounds for termination of his parental rights to Sarah.
B. Additional Is sue s Raised in Reply Brief Since there is sufficie nt evidence to support the trial court ’ s findings regarding the predic ate acts related to endangerment , we are not required to address the suffi ciency of the evidence for the remaining two predicate acts. In re
Z.M. M

. , 5 77 S.W.3d at 542 (stati ng t hat “ only one ground is requ ired to ter minate22

parental rights ” ). In this case, however, the e v idence support s the tri al court ’ s findings under both additional predicate grounds

. 1. S ubs ection 161.001( b) (1)(N) A tria l c ourt may ord er terminat ion of the paren t

- child r elationship if the

co urt finds by clear and convincing evidence that t he parent ha s constructively abandoned the child. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161.001(b)(1 )(N). To prove constructive abandonment, the D epartment m us t establish four elemen ts: (1) the chil d has bee n in the permane nt or temporary managing conservatorship of the Depart ment for not less than six months ; (2) the Department has made reasonable efforts to return the

c hild to the parent ; (3) the parent h a s no t regularly visited or maintained conta ct with t he child ; and (4 ) the parent has demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. Id. ; see In re L.E.R. , 650 S.W.3d 771, 78 5

– 8 6 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, no pet.) (applyi ng statutory re quirements to fact ); In re G.K.G.A. , No . 01

- 16

- 00 996

- CV, 2017 WL 2376534, at *4

– 7 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] June 1, 2017, pet. denied ) (mem . op.) ( sa me ). On appeal, Father disputes only the fourth element . He contends that the Departme nt failed to me et its burden to concl usive ly establ ish that he demonstrate d an inability to provide the child with a safe environment. He argues that any evid e n ce of his failur e to provide a safe environment is conclusory. H e also argues that he met this r equ irement by providing a cousin willing t o adopt S arah

.23

At the final tr ial date, the Department testified that Father ’ s purported cousin was present and will i ng to adopt Sarah. The Department had conducted a home study o f the cousin and her husband, and tho ugh there we r e some concerns with it,
t he Depart ment believed that placement with the cousin co uld be appropriate. The caseworker testified that the cousin h ad no relationship with Sarah. While the availability of family members or other surrogate careg ive rs to take c are of a child while a pare nt may be temporarily unable to do so should be considered in a de terminati on o f whether a parent has constructively a bandoned a child, it is not the only factor. In re D.S.A. , 113 S.W.3d 567, 573

– 74 (Tex. App.

— Ama ril lo 2003, no pet.) (considering availabi lity of f amily members to care for child, parent ’ s lack of permanent resident, unstable employment hist ory, drug use, and failure to maintain contact with child). The trial court could have credited the cousin ’ s in ter est in placement of Sarah in favor of F ather and yet found that Father could
not provide a safe environment for Sarah. Several factors are relevant to a determination th at a parent cannot provide a safe environment , including (1) the degree to which a par ent participated in services ; (2) whethe r the par ent had steady housing and employment; ( 3) whether the parent missed opportunities for counseling and a p sychological evaluation. In

re S. M

. M. , No. 01

- 22

- 00 482

- CV, 2022 W L 17981669, at *9 (Tex. App.

— Houst on [1st Dist.] Dec. 29, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op. ). “ The factfinder should also24

consider a parent’s financial resource s, employment history, home environm ent , parenting skills, and demonstrated pa s t ability or inability to care for a child. ” Id. (quotat ion and citation r emoved)

. “ T he burden is n ot on the parents to prove that they can provide a safe environment for the ch il dren ; the burden is on the Department, as the party seeking terminati o n of parental rights, to prove that the parents are unable to p rov ide a safe environment for the child. ” I d.
T he u ncontroverted evidence showed that Father had no employment history , n o financial resources , and no s ta ble housing

. When Sa r ah was one month old, Father and Mother were staying at various ho tels. The record does not support that Father found stabl e housin g after Mother and Sarah wen t to a shelter. Father also did not demonst rate a rel ationship with Sarah

. Father , Mother , and S arah were together in March 2021. After that point, Father did not hing to assert his rights or establish custod y to Sarah. Once h is parental ri ghts were adjudicated in June 20 21, he was ordered to have weekly visi ts with Sarah. The

re cord re f

lects that he attended only one weekly visit

. The record rev eals that Father lik ely knew Sarah to be his child as early as one or two mon ths after her birth, when he was in th e physical alt ercat ion with Mother in front of Sarah. The

ev idence shows that Father has not maintaine d a relationship with Sarah, paid support, or made any a rra ngements to provide Sarah with food, clothing, or car e.25

I n June 20 21, Father was ordered to drug

- testing by t he court. He did not appear. In July and Augus t 2021, Father did not report to his super v ision officer. Father was on community s upe rvision for an aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. H e was requi red as part o f that supervision to report to the supervi sion officer. This failure le d to his incarcer ation for eight years , until 2026

. “ Intenti o nal criminal activity that exposes a parent to incarce rat ion is conduct that endangers the physical and emotion al well

- bein g of a child. ” V.V. , 349 S.W.3d at 554 (cit ing Boyd , 727 S.W. 2d at 533) ( “ [I]mprison ment is certainly a factor to be considere d b y the trial court on the issue of endang erment .)); see Ave ry v. State , 963 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dis t.] 1997, no writ ) ( holding parent ’ s p ast criminal c onduct , before and after child ’ s birth, r elevant to show ing of inability to parent)

. The trial court as factfinder could have reached a negative co n clusion about Father ’ s ability t o parent based on his in stability

. The evidence adduced at trial supported the trial court ’ s c onclusion that Father constructively ab andoned Sarah, and the disputed evide nce regarding Sarah ’ s po ten tial placement with the cousin is not so si gnifi cant that a reasonable factfinder could not form a firm beli ef or conviction of this finding

. J.F.C. , 96 S.W.3d at 266

.26

2. Subsection 161.0 01(b)(1)(O) F ather ’ s reply brief also contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court ’ s predicate findings t hat termi nation was

war ranted under Family Code subs ection 16 1.001(b)(1)(O). Subsection (O) provides t hat the co urt may order terminat io n o f the parent

child relationship if the court finds by clear and conv incing evidence that the parent has failed to c omp ly wit h the prov i sio ns of a court or der th at spe cifical ly esta blished the a ctions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of t he c h ild who has been in the permanent or temporary managing conservators hip of the Depar tment of Family and Prot ec tive S erv ices f or not less th an nine months a s a re su lt o f the c hil d ’s removal from the parent under [Family Code] Chap ter 262 for the abuse or n e glect of the child. T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 161.001(b)(1)(O ) . Thus, pursua nt to subsection (O), the Department must pr ove tha t (1) it has been th e child ’ s tempor ary or p erma nent

ma n ag ing conserv ator f

or at least nine months; (2) it took custody of the child as a

resu lt o f a removal from the parent under C h apter 262 for abuse or neglect; (3) a court issu e d an order establishi n g t he act ions necess ary for the parent to obt ai n th e
retur n o f th e child ; and (4) the parent did not co mply with the court order. See i d. On appeal, Father argues that Sarah was not removed for abuse o r neglect, but ins tead for lack of a vailability of a c aretaker while Mother s ought treatment for mental illness. He also argues that it was impossible for Fa ther to complete the27

family serv ice plan because Father was incarcerated and subject to frequent moves

w ithin the prison system. The record reflects tha t Sarah w as removed for neglect. The Departmen t ’ s original pe titio n requests permission to take possess ion of Sarah because “ [t] here is an immediate danger to the physical health or safety of the child , or the child has been the vict im of neglect or sexual abuse or of traffic kin g . . . . ” T he removal affidavit st a tes that once Mother w as released from Ben Ta ub hos pital, the Department remained concerned that Sarah would be neglected and placed in harm’s way by Mother. The Department aske d Mother if she w as w illing to place the child wit h someone while she compl eted me ntal health services. Mother refused. She was unable to prov ide the names of anyone her daughter could b e placed with and told the Department that the agency w ould need a co urt order to remove he r child

. Th e Department attempted to speak with staff of S tar of Hope regarding monitoring Mother and S arah , but the faci lity does not provide monitor s. The Department ’ s caseworker testified at trial that the Department was concerned that Mother ’ s men tal h ealth i ss ues would impair her ability to care for Sarah, a s
y ou ng infants require constant attention. D uring this time, F ather was unreachable

. He did not contact the Department, seek custody, call authorities, or otherw ise attempt to ensure Sarah ’ s well

- b eing. C on trary to Father ’ s assertion on appeal, t he record re flects that Sarah was removed for neglect.28

Re garding Father ’ s service plan requirements, the cou rt

- ordered plan required him , among other things, to obtain an d maintain s table housing and employ ment, t o attend all court hearings and meetings, to attend we ekly visits with Sarah, to submit to drug testing, to avoid criminal ac tivity , to submit to DNA testing, to complete a parenting class , and to complete a psych osocial evaluation. Father was prese nt in c ou rt when the service plan became a court order. Th e r ecord reflects that Fath er did not complet e the service plan

. There is no evidence in the record that Father obtained stable housing nor is there any evidence of Father ’ s employment. While he com pleted DN A testing and a psychosocial evalu ation, he did n ot complete the re commended follow

- up service s. The Department did not receive proof that he completed domestic violence services or participated in individual co unseling. Father also did not appear for co ur t

- ordered drug testing. Texas courts generally t ake a strict approach to subsection (O) ’ s app lication , In r e D. N. , 40 5 S.W.3d 863, 877 (Tex. App.

— Amaril lo 2013, no pet.), and a parent ’ s fai lure to complete one req uirement of h is fa mily se rvice pl an supp or ts
t er mina tion under that s ubsection, In re J.M.T

. , 519 S.W.3d 258, 2 68 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1s t Dist.] 2 017, pet

. denied). Nonetheless, Father a ppears to argue that termination unde r subse ction (O ) is not justif ied based on t he affirmative def en se fo und in Family Code s ub sect ion 161

. 001(d): (d) A c ourt may not order termination under Subsection (b )(1)(O) based on t he failure b y the parent to comply with a speci fic provision29

of a cou rt orde r if a p aren t proves by a preponderan ce of evidence tha t: (1) the p arent was unab le to comply with specific pro visio ns of the court order; and (2) the parent ma de a good faith e f fo rt to comp ly with the order and the failure t o comply with the orde r is no t attrib utab le to any f ault of the pa rent. T EX
. F AM
. C O DE § 16 1.00 1( d). Specifically , Father argues that once he beca me in carcerated in August 2021, he could not complete the servi ce plan. Section 161.001(d) places the burden on the parent to prove by a preponderance of the ev idence that he was unable to comply with th e court

- ordered service plan, that he made a good f ait h effort to comply with the order, and tha t his failure to c omply is not attributable to any fault of his own. See id. The record supports the district court ’ s finding that Father failed to satis fy that b urden

. T he

case began in April 202 1 and the servi ce plan became a court order in June 20 2 1.
Fa ther was not incar cerated until August 2021. The caseworker testified that Father did not complete services before he was incarcerated. Father did not ob tain pr oo f of stable housing or employment. He did not par tic ipate in drug testing. He attended only on e weekly visit wit h Sarah beginning in June 2021. While he completed a psychosocial assessment, he did not complete a ny of the recommended services such as a pa re nting class, individual therapy , or domestic viol enc e clas ses. To the extent Father ’s failure to comply with the service plan30

could be explained in part due to his incarceration, the record supports the district
court ’ s finding that, in the months before h is incarceration, Father had not attempted in goo d f

aith to comply with the order and that his failure to comply was attributable at least in part to his o wn fault. See D .L.S. v. Tex. Dep ’ t of Fam . &
Protective S ervs. , No. 03

- 20

- 0036 9

- CV, 2020 W L 7041564 , at *4 (Tex. App.

— Austin Nov. 30, 2020, no pet. ) ( mem . op.) (holding Father did not meet sectio n 161.001(d) burde n whe n he did not complete services in five months before incarceration) ; W.C. v. Texas Dep ’ t of Fa m. & Protective Servs. , No. 03

- 19

- 0 0 713

- CV , 2 020 WL 1281643, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Austin Mar. 18, 202 0, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (con cluding tha t record supported district court’s finding that parent failed to meet his burden to show good

- faith attempt to compl y when evidence

“ showed that he did not com pl y with the court

- ordered services during t he time
pe riod that the case was pending and he was not incarcerated ” )

.

* * * Having concluded that Father failed to challenge all the predicate act findings in his original brief, that the evi dence was legally a nd factually sufficient to support the two endangerment grounds, and that, even if we were require d to analyze it, the evidence further supported the (N ) and (O) grounds, w e overrule Father ’ s f irst i ss ue related to the predicate act fi ndings.31 B es t I n teres t Father challenges the legal and factual sufficien cy of the trial court ’ s best

interest finding. A. L egal Principles In Holley v. Adam s , the Supreme C ourt of Texas identified several non

excl us iv e fa ctors that we consider when determin ing whether t he termin ation of a parent ’ s rights is in the child ’ s be st i nte rest

. 54 4 S.W.2d 367, 371

– 72 (Tex. 1976). The factors include: (1) the chi ld ’ s desires ; (2) t he chi ld ’ s current and future physical and em ot iona l needs; (3) the current and future physical dang er to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the perso n se eki ng custo dy; (5 ) w heth er progr ams

ar e available to assi st the p erson seekin g cus tody in promot in g th e best interests of the child; (6) the pl ans for the child by the person seeking custody; (7) the stabi lity of the home or proposed placement; ( 8) the act s o r omissi ons of th e pa rent tha t
may indicate the parent

- child r elationship is no t prope r; and ( 9 ) an y excuse for acts or omissions of the p ar ent. Id. These factors are not exhaustiv e, and it is not

neces sary that the Depar tment prove all these factor s “ a s a co nditi on preced ent to parental te rmin ation. ” In re C.H. , 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 ( Te x. 20 02 ). The ab senc e of evidence concerning some of the fa ctors does n ot preclude a factfinder f rom formin g a fir m b elief or conviction that termination is in the childr en ’ s be st32

inter est. In r e A. C. , 394 S.W.3d 633 , 642 (Tex. App.

— Housto n [1st Dist.] 201 2, no
p et.).
I n add ition, the Family Co de sets out factors that courts should consider i n determinin g whether a c hil d ’ s pa rent is willing and able to provide the child with a

s afe environment, including: (1) the child ’ s age and phy si ca l and mental vulnerabilitie s; (2) th e fr equ ency and nature of out

- of

- home place ments; (3) the magnitude and f

requency of harm to the c hil d; (4) whether the child has be en the victim of repeated har m after the initi al interventio n by the Department ; (5) whe ther the re is a history of abus iv e o r as saultive cond uct o r subst ance abuse by the ch ild ’ s family or others who have ac ce ss to the chi ld ’ s home ; ( 6) the results of psyc hiatric, psychological, or de velopmental evaluations of the chil d, the child ’ s
paren ts, other family members, or others w h o have access to the child ’ s home; ( 7 ) the wi llingn ess of the child’s fami ly to seek ou t, a ccept, an d c omplet e counsel ing services; ( 8 ) the wi llin gness an d abil ity of the child ’ s family to effect
po s itive enviro nmental and personal changes within a reason a bl e pe rio d of time ; and ( 9 ) whether the child ’ s fam ily demonstrates adequate parenting skills, inclu din g prov iding min imally adequate care for the child ’ s healt h a nd nutri tional needs, care consiste n t wit h t he c hild ’ s physical an d psychological developmen t , guid anc e and supervision consistent with th e chil d ’ s safety, a safe physical home

env iro nment, and an under standing of the child ’ s n eeds and cap abilitie s. T EX
. F AM
.33

C ODE § 263.307(b ) ; In re A.C. , 560 S.W.3d 6 24, 631 n.29 (Tex. 2018). Evidence establishing one of the predicat e acts under section 161.001(1) also may be relevant to determinin g the best in ter est of the child. C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 27

– 28. The best

- interest a na lysi s may consider circumstantial ev idence, subje ctive factors, and the totality of the evidence as well as the direct evidence. In re Y.G. , No. 01

- 22

- 00181

- C V , 20 22 W L 33629 53 , at * 1 3 (T ex. App.

— H ouston [1st Dist.] Aug. 16 , 202 2 , pet. denied) (mem. op.) (c itin g In re B. R. , 456 S.W.3d 6 12, 616 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 2015, no pet.). “ A tri er of fact may measure a parent ’ s future condu ct by h is past conduc t an d de te r min e whether terminat ion of parent a l rights is in the child ’ s best i nte res t. ” B.R. , 456 S.W. 3 d at 6 16 ; see C.H. , 89 S.W.3d at 28 (st ating that p ast pe rformance as parent “ c ould certainly have a bearing on [ parent ’ s ] fitness to prov ide for [the c hild] ” a nd indi cating c ourts shou ld con sider
p rior history of child negle ct in b est

- i nterest analysis )

. B. A nalysis Multiple facto rs support the trial court’ s finding that termination of Father ’ s parental rights to S a rah w as in the child ’ s best interest. T he eviden ce s howed that
F ather failed to comple te all the tasks and services required in his service plan. S ee In re E.C.R. , 402 S.W .3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2013) (holding that evidence that parent failed to complete court

- ordered services can su pport best interest findi ng). While Fathe r completed a ps ychoso cial assessment, he did not complete any of the34

recommended servi ces such as a parenting class, individual t herapy , or domestic violence clas ses. The p lan a lso r equ ired Father to obtain stable housing and employment, submit to drug te sting, and av o id crimi nal co nvictions. Father did not complete any of these tasks

. Father ’ s lack of employment and housing is probative of Sarah ’ s best i nterest beca us e, “ [a] parent who lacks stability, income, and a home is unable to provid e for a child ’ s emot ional an d physica l need s. ” In re J.R.W. , No. 14

- 12

- 00850

- CV , 2013 W L 507325, at *9 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 12, 2013, pet. denied ) (mem. op.) ; see H ol ley , 544 S.W.2d at 372 (best inter es t factors include stability of home an d child ’ s physical and emoti onal need s). Father subse quently violated the terms of his community supervision and

was senten ced to eight year s ’ impriso nmen t

. Father did not provide for Sarah ’ s physical or emotional needs during the case. Father also faile d to s ubmit to the firs t drug test ord ered by the court. See In
re W. E.C. , 110 S.W.3d 231, 239 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth 2 003, no pet.) (recogn izing t hat factfinder could reasonably infer that parent ’ s failure to comp lete scheduled screening indicated she was avoidi ng testing because she was using drugs). Father also tested positive for drugs just one month after Sarah was bo rn . This drug use expo sed Fa the r to the possibility of incarcerati on for violating the terms of his community s upervision and jeopardized his a bility to pr ovide for
Sa rah physi cally and emotionally

. The trial court could reasonably in fer that Father35

was at ri sk for continuing drug use. Fa the r ’ s drug use was relevant to multiple Holley factors, including hi s parenting abilities and the stability o f the home as well as Sa rah ’ s emo tional and physical needs now and in the future, and the physical danger in which S ar ah could be placed no w and i n t he future. See Holley , 544 S .W.2d at 372 (factors two, three, fo ur, and seven). Sarah was nearl y tw o at the ti me of trial. The H olley fac tor regarding the desires of the child is neutral in this case. S ee Holley , 544 S.W .2 d at 372 (fa ctor one)

. Sarah ’ s age does weigh in f avor of the best

- interest determination. See T EX
. F AM
. C ODE § 263.307(b)(1) (providing t hat co urt may consider c hild’s ag e and physical and mental vul nerabilit ies in the best

- interest determination); J .M. T. , 519 S.W.3d at 270 (noting 14

- month

- old child ’ s age weighed in f avor of trial court’s finding that termination was in best interest); see also In re A.L.B. , No. 01

- 17

- 005 47

- CV, 2017 WL 6519969, at *5 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, pet. denied) (me m. op.) (stating c hildren ’ s yo ung ages, five and six y ears old, rendered them “ vulnerable if left in the custody of a p arent unable or unwil ling t o protect them or to attend to their needs )

. The uncontroverted evidence showed that, at the time of trial, S ar ah had been with a foster fa mil y for over a year , and she was nearly two year s old

. I n itially, Father was allowed weekly visits with Sar a h, but he only attended o ne visit

. When a child is too young to express h er desires, the factfinder may consider36

tha t the child has bonded with th e f oster family, is well cared for by them, and ha s spent mi nimal t ime with her parent. In re J. D. , 436 S.W.3d 105, 118 (Tex. App.

— Hous ton [14t h Dist.] 2014, no pet. ). The witnesses testified that Sarah was bonded with the fos te r parent and that all Sarah ’ s n eeds were met. Though Father prov ided a family member as a possible place ment for Sarah, he did not do so until duri ng tri al. The De partment conduc ted a home study of that relative , though the Child Advocate did not recomme nd moving S arah due to her age an d lack of relationship with the cousin. On balance, the evidence showed that the applicable statutory fa ctors and
H olley factors we igh in f avor of the trial court ’ s best

- interest finding. After viewing all the evidence in the light m ost favorable to th e b est

- interest finding, we conclude that the evidence was sufficien t ly clea r and convincing t hat a reasonable factfind er cou ld have fo rmed a f irm belief or conviction that termination of the parent

- child relationship between Father and Sarah was in the ch ild ’ s best interest.
We ov er rule Father ’ s challenge to the best interest fi nding

.37 C onclusion We affir m the trial cour t ’ s de cree o f termin ati on.

Peter Kelly Justice Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Ke lly and Goodman.