Staff Ride Handbook 

for the Saratoga Campaign, 

13 June to 8 November 1777

 

 

 

 

 

 

Steven E. Clay

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Cover image: “Surrender of General Burgoyne,” John Trumbull, 1821, 

Library of Congress, Prints & Photographs Division, Detroit Publishing 

Company Collection.
Staff Ride Handbook 

for the Saratoga Campaign, 

13 June to 8 November 1777

Steven E. Clay

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

An imprint of The Army University Press
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Clay, Steven E., 1957- author. | Combat Studies Institute (U.S.). Press, issuing body.

Title: Staff ride handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 June 

to 8 November 1777 / Steven E. Clay.

Description: 1st edition. | Fort Leavenworth, Kansas : Combat 

Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center, 2018. | 

Includes bibliographical references.

Identifiers: LCCN 2018007420 (print) | LCCN 2018008404 

(ebook) | ISBN 9781940804347 | ISBN 9781940804347 | ISBN 

1940804345.

Subjects: LCSH: Saratoga Campaign, N.Y., 1777. | Staff rides-

-New York (State)--Handbooks, manuals, etc. | United States--

History-Revolution, 1775-1783--Campaigns.

Classification: LCC E241.S2 (ebook) | LCC E241.S2 C53 2018 

(print) | DDC 973.3/33--dc23 | SUDOC D 110.17:SA 7.

LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018007420.

ii

2018

Editor

Diane R. Walker

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide 

variety of military topics. The views expressed in this CSI 

Press publication are those of the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department 

of Defense. A full list of digital CSI Press publications is 

available at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/combat-studies-institute.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an official publication of the CSI Press. It is prohibited to use the CSI’s official seal on 

any republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

Army University Press is pleased to publish this staff ride 

handbook for the Saratoga campaign under the imprint of the Combat 

Studies Institute. The campaign culminated in one of the most 

significant battles in American history, as colonial forces trapped an 

entire British army in the uplands of New York state, compelling its 

surrender and earning the fledgling republic international recognition 

from France and eventually military assistance from French forces. 

With this support, the Continentals forced the surrender of a second 

British army at Yorktown four years later, earning the United States 

its independence from Great Britain.

In addition to the national significance, the campaign 

offers a wealth of lessons for students of military history. The 

Americans employed a Fabian strategy against Burgoyne’s army, 

whittling away his strength and threatening his logistics until he 

was defeated in battle and forced to surrender. The technique was 

duplicated two centuries later by the Vietnamese resistance against 

the French at Dien Bien Phu. By controlling key terrain, interdicting 

vital lines of communication, and using a remote and inaccessible 

locale with difficult terrain to their advantage, both revolutionary 

armies successfully defeated a much stronger and better-equipped 

opponent. Thus, the campaign continues to offer lessons, both for 

those fomenting rebellion and those charged with suppressing it. 

This volume is labeled the “Saratoga Campaign” rather than 

the “Battle of Saratoga” because it includes stands and guidance 

for the peripheral battles at such locales as Bennington, Vermont, 

and Fort Schuyler (Stanwix), New York, that made significant 

contributions to the eventual outcome of the campaign. The staff 

ride can be executed as a single-day focusing exclusively on the 

battles around Saratoga, but the CSI staff strongly feels that Saratoga 

is best studied as an operational campaign, with the full context that 

it deserves. Traveling the varied terrain of upstate New York—from 

the shores of Lake Champlain to the Adirondack Mountains—will 

give the military professional a much better appreciation of the 

immense challenges the crown forces faced in attempting to seize 

and hold this difficult terrain.
 

Leadership remains a key component of military operations, 

and the Saratoga Campaign offers a wealth of lessons for military 

professionals on managing command relationships, the vital 

importance of unity of command, and the critical qualities of 

initiative and discipline for leaders at all levels. The American 

forces successfully leveraged Continental regulars and militia, with 

several important exceptions, in bringing combat power to bear, 

while Burgoyne’s army ultimately succumbed to the British high 

command’s inability to formulate and direct a coherent strategy 

for the 1777 campaign season among its subordinate commanders. 

Identifying capable leaders and assigning them tasks that best suit 

their talents and abilities remain important keys to success for 

military commanders of any era.

CSI hopes that military professionals through the region—

from active-duty forces at Fort Drum to cadets at the various 

institutions of higher learning across the Mid-Atlantic and New 

England—will take advantage of the resources available in this 

volume to carefully study the Saratoga Campaign and apply the 

distilled wisdom in their own lives and careers. The study and 

knowledge of military history has been an essential component of 

any successful military career; military professionals of all ranks 

have improved themselves, their service, and their nation by 

devoting countless hours to studying and mastering past events. We 

publish this guide in hopes of facilitating those efforts. CSI—The 

Past Is Prologue!

 Donald P. Wright

 Combat Studies Institute
v

Acknowledgements

The author would like to acknowledge a number of people for 

their assistance with the creation and preparation of this staff ride 

handbook. The first of these individuals is Lieutenant Colonel Kurt 

Ebaugh (US Marine Corps, Retired), a former member of the Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride Team. Lieutenant Colonel Ebaugh 

did yeoman’s work on creating the original Saratoga walkbook for 

the team; much of his content was incorporated into this study. Also 

thank you to Lieutenant Colonel Gary Linhart (US Army, Retired) 

for his assistance on our reconnaissance trip in October 2015. The 

trip was undertaken to view the terrain and help develop a better 

understanding of this important campaign. Having conducted a 

number of earlier Saratoga staff rides, Lieutenant Colonel Linhart 

provided excellent insights as to where he thought various stands 

should or should not be located as well as recommendations on 

handbook structure. Mr. Eric Schnitzer, Park Ranger and Historian 

for the Saratoga National Historical Park, was also a tremendous 

help. Together with the author and Lieutenant Colonel Linhart, Mr. 

Schnitzer sat for several hours at the Saratoga battlefield to discuss 

key actions during the two battles fought there in 1777. He also gave 

liberally of his time to review and edit the Orders of Battle for this 

handbook to ensure that the often-confusing designations of both 

American and British units as well as notes details were accurate. In 

addition, Mr. Schnitzer subsequently answered numerous questions 

via e-mail to help clarify the author’s understanding of key campaign events and issues. Finally, the author would like to thank his 

staff ride mentor, Dr. William G. Robertson, former Chief of Staff 

Rides and former Director of the Combat Studies Institute. Dr. Robertson, who created the modern military staff ride in the early 1980s, 

took a great deal of time and effort to train the author and other staff 

riders on the tactics, techniques, and procedures of how to properly 

create and conduct a staff ride. Hopefully this work reflects the common sense and orderliness of his mentorship. 

 
 
vii

Contents page

Foreword ....................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgements .........................................................................v

Introduction ................................................................................. xiii

I. Revolutionary War Armies ..........................................................1

Introduction .................................................................................1

Organization ................................................................................1

The State Militias and the Continental Army ..........................1

Manning the Force—The Continental Army ........................10

The American Northern Army ...............................................12

The British Army and its Allies .............................................14

Manning the Force—The British Army and its Allies ...........18

The British Army from Canada ..............................................22

Revolutionary War Staffs .......................................................24

Weapons ....................................................................................30

Infantry ...................................................................................30

Cavalry ...................................................................................33

Artillery ..................................................................................34

Offensive Tactics ......................................................................38

Infantry Tactical Doctrine in 1777 .........................................38

Cavalry Tactical Doctrine in 1777 .........................................42

Artillery Tactical Doctrine in 1777 ........................................43

Fortifications and Tactics .......................................................44

Tactics in the Saratoga Campaign .............................................46

Logistics Support ......................................................................49

Strategic Logistics ..................................................................49

Operational Logistics .............................................................52

Tactical Logistics ...................................................................55

Engineer Support ......................................................................58

Mobility..................................................................................60

Countermobility ....................................................................60

Survivability ...........................................................................61

Communications Support ..........................................................62

Strategic Communications .....................................................62

Operational Communications ................................................63

Tactical Communications .......................................................64

Medical Support ........................................................................65
viii

page

II. Campaign Overview .................................................................71

Introduction ...............................................................................71

The Rebellion Begins .............................................................71

The Invasion of Canada 1775–1776 ......................................71

Reorganization and Carleton’s Counteroffensive 1776 .........73

The Strategic Overview of the Saratoga Campaign ..................75

Development of the 1777 Campaign Plan .............................75

The Campaign ...........................................................................77

Burgoyne’s Movement South ................................................77

Fort Ticonderoga ....................................................................79

The Battle of Hubbardton .....................................................84

The Battle of Fort Anne .........................................................87

Burgoyne’s Decision ..............................................................88

The Battle of Bennington .......................................................93

The Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany .........98

The Armies Move ..................................................................99

The Pawlet Expedition .........................................................102

The Battle of Freeman’s Farm .............................................104

An Operational Pause ..........................................................110

The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield (2nd Battle of Saratoga) .113

Retreat and Surrender ..........................................................117

III. Suggested Routes and Stands ................................................123

Introduction .............................................................................123

Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride Stand List ...............................126

Day 1: Campaign Day ..........................................................126

Day 2: Saratoga Day ............................................................127

Saratoga Campaign One-Day Staff Ride .............................128

Saratoga Campaign Two-Day Staff Ride .............................129

The Results and Costs of the Battle ........................................158

IV. Integration Phase ...................................................................273

Introduction .............................................................................273

V. Support ...................................................................................277

1. Information, Access, and Assistance ...................................277

2. Logistics ..............................................................................280

3. Other Considerations ...........................................................281
ix

page

Appendix A. Order of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga .........................283

Appendix B. Order of Battle, Hubbardton .................................293

Appendix C. Order of Battle, Fort Anne .....................................295

Appendix D. Order of Battle, Fort Schuyler/Oriskany ...............298

Appendix E. Order of Battle, Bennington ..................................301

Appendix F. Order of Battle, Saratoga ........................................305

Appendix G. Biographies of Key Participants ............................315

Appendix H. Saratoga Campaign Chronology ...........................367

Appendix I. Glossary of Terms ...................................................379

Appendix J. Campaign and Battle Maps .....................................385

Bibliography ...............................................................................409

About the Author .........................................................................413
x

Figures page

Figure 1. Continental Infantry Regiment. ........................................7

Figure 2. Continental Dragoon Regiment ........................................8

Figure 3. Continental Artillery Regiment ........................................9

Figure 4. British Infantry Regiment. ..............................................16

Figure 5. German Infantry Regiment. ............................................21

Figure 6. American and British Coalition Guns. ...........................37

Figure 7. Saratoga Campaign Casualties. ......................................69

Figure 8. Casualties at Fort Ticonderoga. ....................................151

Figure 9. Battle of Hubbardton Casualties. ..................................158

Figure 10. Fort Anne Casualties. ..................................................169

Figure 11. Battle of Bennington Casualties. ................................196

Figure 12. Battle of Schuyler Casualties. .....................................207

Figure 13. Battle of Oriskany Casualties. ....................................208

Figure 14. 1st Battle of Saratoga Casualties. ...............................233

Figure 15. 2nd Battle of Saratoga Casualties. ..............................262

Figure 16. Campaign Casualties. .................................................269
xi

Maps page

Map 1. Day 1 Overview Map. .....................................................130

Map 2. Day 1 Route to Stand 1. ...................................................132

Map 3. Day 1 Stand 1. .................................................................133

Map 4. Day 1 Route to Stand 2. ...................................................144

Map 5. Day 1 Stand 2. .................................................................145

Map 6. Day 1 Route to Stand 3. ...................................................152

Map 7. Day 1 Stand 3. .................................................................153

Map 8. Day 1 Route to Stand 4. ...................................................159

Map 9. Day 1 Stand 4. .................................................................160

Map 10. Day 1 Route to Stand 5. .................................................164

Map 11. Day 1 Stand 5. ................................................................165

Map 12. Day 1 Route to Stand 6. .................................................170

Map 13. Day 1 Stand 6. ...............................................................171

Map 14. Day 1 Route to Stand 7. .................................................177

Map 15. Day 1 Stand 7. ...............................................................178

Map 16. Day 1 Route to Stand 8. .................................................183

Map 17. Day 1 Stand 8. ...............................................................184

Map 18. Day 1 Stand 8A. .............................................................186

Map 19. Day 2 Overview. ............................................................197

Map 20. Day 2 Stands 9 and 10. ..................................................199

Map 21. Day 2 Stand 11. ..............................................................214

Map 22. Day 2 Stand 12. .............................................................221

Map 23. Day 2 Stand 13. .............................................................234

Map 24. Day 2 Stand 14. .............................................................242

Map 25. Day 2 Stand 15. .............................................................248

Map 26. Day 2 Stand 16. .............................................................256

Map 27. Day 2 Stand 17. .............................................................259

Map 28. Day 2 Route to Stand 18. ...............................................263

Map 29. Day 2 Stand 18. .............................................................264

Map 30. Territorial Departments 1777. ........................................386
xii

Map 31. British Campaign Plan for 1777. ...................................387

Map 32. Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves Jun–Aug 1777. ....388

Map 33. Siege of Fort Ticonderoga 1–6 Jul 1777. .......................389

Map 34. Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–12 Jul 1777. ...........390

Map 35. Battle of Hubbardton 7 Jul 1777. ...................................391

Map 36. Saratoga Campaign Movements 12–30 Jul 1777. .........392

Map 37. Saratoga Campaign Movements 30 Jul–31 Aug 1777. ..393

Map 38. Siege of Fort Schuyler 2–23 Aug 1777 .........................394

Map 39. Battle of Oriskany 6 Aug 1777. .....................................395

Map 40. Battle of Bennington Baum’s Heights 16 Aug 1777. ....396

Map 41. Battle of Bennington Breymann’s Defeat 16 Aug 1777. 397

Map 42. Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–26 Sep 1777. ..........398

Map 43. Battle of Freeman’s Farm First Contact 19 Sep 1777. ..399

Map 44. Battle of Freeman’s Farm 1300–1500 19 Sep 1777. .....400

Map 45. Battle of Freeman’s Farm 1500–1700 19 Sep 1777. .....401

Map 46. Clinton’s Highland Campaign 5–6 Oct 1777. ...............402

Map 47. American Defenses Bemis Heights Oct 1777. ...............403

Map 48. Saratoga Campaign Movements 27 Sep–17 Oct 1777. .404

Map 49. Barber’s Wheatfield 7 Oct 1777. ...................................405

Map 50. Fighting at the Redoubts 7 Oct 1777. ............................406

Map 51. British Defenses at Saratoga. .........................................407

page
xiii

Introduction

As a vehicle for the education of the military professional, 

the staff ride has long proven its efficacy. Analysis of a battle or a 

campaign through an examination of the actual terrain is a concept 

deeply rooted in military study. The term “staff ride” originated 

in Europe with the Prussian (later German) Army. Field Marshal 

Helmuth Karl Bernhard Graf von Moltke often took members of the 

General Staff on horseback (hence staff ride) to potential battlefields 

to conduct exercises based on possible future conflicts. The term also 

was used for mounted visits by General Staff students to historical 

battlefields—something more akin to the US Army’s modern staff 

rides. In the United States, Captain Arthur L. Wagner made an 

initial proposal for a staff ride, and Major Eben Swift brought the 

concept to fruition in 1906 at the General Service and Staff School, 

the forerunner of the Command and General Staff College (CGSC). 

The essential elements of Wagner and Swift’s staff ride concept 

included a detailed classroom study of a campaign followed by 

an in-depth visit to the sites associated with that campaign. Later 

pioneers of the staff ride added an integration phase in order to 

mesh the classroom and field study phases for further insights into 

the military profession. Thus, the classroom, field, and integration 

phases are the cornerstones of the modern staff ride.

Today, the US Army considers the staff ride an essential aspect of historical education for the modern military professional 

throughout its system of schools and a crucial facet of the continuing professional development of its officers and noncommissioned 

officers in line units. The CGSC, the Army War College, and institutions throughout the Army school system conduct staff rides with 

the extensive resources necessary to fully execute the preliminary 

study, field study, and integration methodology. Units outside of the 

schoolhouse environment also can benefit extensively from staff 

rides, but they also are more restricted regarding resources, particularly time. The staff ride handbook is a valuable tool to help the line 

unit prepare for a staff ride. It provides background to the campaign, 

a suggested list of sites to visit (called “stands”), material for discussion at the stands, and advice for staff ride logistics support. The 
xiv

intent of this handbook is not to replace the detailed study needed 

for the ride, but it does provide a starting point that should make the 

unit’s preparation easier.

This handbook is one in a series of works from the Combat 

Studies Institute (CSI) designed to facilitate staff rides for US 

Armed Forces personnel. The foundational document of this series 

is The Staff Ride by Dr. William Glenn Robertson (Washington, DC: 

Center of Military History Publication 70–21, 1987). The Staff Ride 

describes the staff ride methodology in detail and gives advice on 

how to build any staff ride. Other published handbooks focus on 

particular battles and campaigns and include works on Chickamauga, 

Cowpens, Shiloh, the Overland Campaign, and Vicksburg among 

others. (CSI staff ride handbooks can be obtained from the CSI 

website: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Books/combat-studiesinstitute). These publications are outstanding tools for the military 

professional or anyone interested in the detailed study of battles and 

campaigns. This work on the Saratoga Campaign has borrowed from 

all of its predecessors, and the author is grateful for the excellent 

efforts of other handbook authors. Although similar to many, the 

Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign differs from most 

staff ride handbooks. First, this is the first handbook that covers a 

Revolutionary War campaign. In addition, this Saratoga Campaign 

study is an operational-level staff ride and thus a departure from the 

more common tactical staff rides conducted on most battlefields. 

Like Overland and Vicksburg, the Saratoga Campaign consisted 

of multiple engagements with complex unit movements covering 

considerable distances and an extended period of time. These 

factors create unique challenges and opportunities for both staff ride 

instructors and participants.

One of these unique aspects is the nature of the “ride” itself. 

In short, the Saratoga Campaign requires more vehicular travel and 

less walking than most staff rides. Participants have the opportunity to explore unit march routes and gain commander insights for 

both sides—making full use of vehicle travel time to show unit route 

maps and orient the students before they arrive at each stand. Students also will benefit from using operational maps to analyze the 

movements while they are en route from stand to stand.
xv

Another challenge for this staff ride is to relate each of the major 

battles within the campaign. The students need to understand the 

connection between the battles and how each engagement affected the 

next battle, even if the effect was unintended. The Saratoga Campaign 

consisted of ten key tactical actions: Fort Ticonderoga, Hubbardton, 

Fort Anne, Bennington, Oriskany, Fort Schuyler, the Pawlet Raids, 

Freeman’s Farm, Barber’s Wheatfield, and the siege at Saratoga. 

There are multiple stands at some of these battle sites, and others 

cover events between the major clashes that lacked dramatic battle 

actions but are crucial for understanding and linking the campaign. 

To benefit more senior participants, staff ride leaders are 

encouraged to emphasize tactical details for brigade level and 

above, without becoming overly focused on small unit actions. 

Even so, they should help reinforce numerous lessons at the tactical 

level—concepts about leadership, doctrine, and the face of battle. 

For example, the Battle of Fort Anne provides a superb contrast 

in small unit leadership styles as well as challenges for leaders to 

think on their feet. Similarly, the ride should address the tragedy of 

war, such as the deaths of Jane McCrae and General Simon Fraser. 

Although this is generally laid out as an operational staff ride, leaders 

can choose tactical details and human-interest stories (vignettes) 

to illustrate key points. If the audience is composed primarily of 

participants such as Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) cadets, 

enlisted personnel, or junior officers, the ride should be weighted to 

the tactical level. Staff ride leaders must ultimately tailor the stands 

to support the goals of the audience.

While this handbook is structured for a two-day ride with 

twenty-nine stands and sub-stands, staff ride leaders can modify the 

stands to fit their schedules. With one- or modified two-day rides, they 

should keep a sense of connection between stands so that students 

understand the context of the campaign. Staff ride leaders can pick 

selected stands that perhaps focus on only one or two battles as time 

permits—ensuring that students have an opportunity to conduct 

research and prepare before actually visiting the campaign locations. 

The Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign

systematically analyzes this strategically important Revolutionary 

War campaign. Part I describes American and British Army 
xvi

organizations—detailing their weapons, tactics, logistics, engineer, 

communications, and medical support. 

Part II consists of a campaign overview which establishes the 

context for individual actions to be studied in the field.

Part III provides a suggested itinerary of sites and a concrete 

view of the campaign in its several phases. Each stand description 

includes travel directions, an orientation to the battle site, discussion 

of the action that occurred there, vignettes from the campaign, and 

suggested discussion questions and topics.

Part IV addresses the final phase of the staff ride—when students integrate the classroom portion of the staff ride with the field 

phase and gain relevant insights and lessons.

Part V offers practical information on conducting a staff ride 

in the Saratoga Campaign area, including resources and logistical 

considerations.

Appendices A through F provide the orders of battle for the 

forces included in the various key actions. Appendix G gives 

biographical sketches of key participants, Appendix H shows a 

chronology of the campaign, and Appendix I explains military terms 

used in this handbook. Appendix J provides campaign and battle 

maps. Finally, the bibliography outlines source details.

In summary, the Saratoga Campaign provides a magnificent 

example of commanders locked in a classic military struggle, giving 

testimony to the grim ordeal of war and the price paid by the common 

Soldier. Lessons learned from this complex struggle can provide an 

unmatched tool for educating the modern military professional.
1

I. Revolutionary War Armies

Introduction

Before a staff ride covering a complex campaign such as 

Saratoga, staff ride leaders and participants need to understand the 

broader context of how and why the campaign was prosecuted. The 

following section covers the “how” by describing the organization, 

weapons, tactics, and support functions of the Revolutionary War’s 

primary opponents (for the “why” of this campaign, see Section 

II Campaign Overview). This account is detailed enough to help 

readers understand the organization and capabilities of campaign 

leaders and units as well as various military actions and decisions. For 

uniformity and clarity, this volume follows the outline of previous 

Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride handbooks—borrowing material 

and ideas from previous volumes while focusing on Revolutionary 

War and Saratoga Campaign command structures, organizations, 

military strategy, and tactics. 

Organization

The State Militias and the Continental Army

From almost the beginning of efforts to colonize what is now the 

United States of America, European emigrants established military 

formations to provide for the common defense. These organizations, 

commonly referred to as “militia,” typically consisted of all ablebodied males in the colony between the ages of sixteen to sixty. On 

call from the colonial governor, each man was required to bring his 

own musket (later, his own rifle) along with powder horn, bullets, 

and other accoutrements for military field service or scheduled 

military training. Unless there was a grave threat from a massive 

Indian attack or foreign military power, regular troops typically did 

not assume security duties outside major population centers such as 

Boston, Philadelphia, or New York. Even in those locations, British 

regulars seldom provided security prior to the French and Indian 

War. Americans relied on local militia to provide for their safety and 

generally did not look to the British government.

This arrangement began to evolve during and after the French 

and Indian War (1754–63). A sideshow of the arguably worldwide 
2

Seven Years’ War, the French and Indian War was waged largely between the British colonies in America and the people of New France 

(now Canada). A significant number of American colonists fought 

with British regular army troops against French regulars, militia, 

and Indian allies predominantly in areas of southern Canada, New 

England, New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Among the colonists 

who served in the French and Indian War was a young officer from 

Virginia named George Washington. 

Problems arose during the conflict when the British crown 

required Americans to pay for or provide the quartering and feeding 

of regular troops. Though most colonies grudgingly complied during 

the war, colonists resisted the requirement once the war ended. They 

argued that a standing regular force was no longer needed after the 

French were defeated; their existing militia formations could provide 

for this security and manage any extant Indian threats. Frustrated 

by colonialist resistance, Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, who commanded 

British forces in North America, turned to Parliament. Parliament 

passed the Quartering Act of 1765 which required the colonies to feed 

and quarter any British troops that could not be housed in barracks 

(which were paid for by Americans) or “publick houses” such as inns 

and ale houses. Although the law did not specify private homes could 

be occupied, British leaders assumed this power as well. This action 

and later requirements, collectively referred to as the “Intolerable 

Acts,” prompted many Americans to encourage breaking ties with 

Britain and contributed to their resistance to the idea of a colonial 

standing army and the rule of King George III. 

At the beginning of the Revolutionary War in the spring of 1775, 

the colonists had no standing army other than British Army units. 

During a prior September–October 1774 First Continental Congress 

meeting in Philadelphia, Virginia’s Richard Henry Lee and others 

proposed creating a “national militia,” but the Congress rejected the 

idea in favor of continued protest and civil disobedience. Six months 

later, Massachusetts began to raise a force of twenty-six countybased militia regiments. After the battles at Lexington and Concord in 

April 1775, Connecticut, Rhode Island, and New Hampshire quickly 

followed suit by forming additional active service militia consisting 

of Massachusetts troops besieging the British forces in Boston. On 
3

14 July 1775, the Second Continental Congress authorized creation 

of the Continental Army and formally adopted the existing regiments 

outside Boston and New York City as its own army. The Congress 

appointed George Washington as the commander-in-chief the 

following day—creating the US Army and the first “regular” force 

raised in America by Americans for Americans.

Referred to initially as the “New England Army,” these 

regiments consisted of about 15,000 troops that were re-designated as 

Continental units and re-enlisted for a period of six months beginning 

1 July 1775. Washington soon assumed overall command of these 

“Main Army” units. In addition, Congress authorized ten companies 

of Continental riflemen from Pennsylvania (six), Maryland (two), and 

Virginia (two)—later consolidated into the 1st Continental Regiment. 

The formal organization of the remaining Continental Army 

proceeded into the fall of 1775 and the winter of 1776. Washington 

inherited the lion’s share of these units as part of the Main Army 

positioned before Boston, though Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler, newly 

appointed commander of the Department of New York, received a few 

Continental regiments from Connecticut as well. The commanderin-chief faced two major problems with raising and maintaining his 

force. First he needed to address the organizational structure of these 

regiments. The units under his command had been organized by the 

various states and all differed in size and composition, though units 

formed within a given state were uniform. Washington convened an 

officer team to study the problem. The committee developed a list of 

recommended organizational standards which Washington forwarded 

to the Continental Congress to consider. On 4 November, Congress 

approved the recommendations and the reorganization of all the 

Continental infantry into twenty-six uniformly organized regiments.

With regiments now standardized, Washington focused on the 

second problem: the terms of enlistment were about to expire on 31 

December for most of his officers and men. Congress authorized 

him to begin reenlistments as soon as possible so that there would 

not be a major impact on military activities at the end of the year. 

The additional time also ensured that the general-in-chief could 

identify problems early if reenlistments went slower than expected. 

In fact, the reenlistment of officers for the new regiments proved 
4

to be relatively smooth. A sufficient number of currently serving 

officers committed to reenlist, so achieving regimental quotas for 

commissioned leaders was fairly easy. Reenlisting experienced 

soldiers and new recruits, however, proved far more significant 

challenging. Some 17,000 men were needed to flesh out the ranks of 

the Continental regiments, but only about 9,600 had signed up by the 

end of the year. Recruiting and cajoling continued along with various 

incentives to entice reenlistment. In mid-January, the Congress even 

removed the restrictions on enlisting African-American freemen, 

but that step added only a handful of men to the ranks. By February, 

only another 2,800 men had enlisted and most regiments were still 

only between half and three-quarters full. Still, by March 1776, 

Washington’s forces had successfully recruited and reorganized to 

adequately form all twenty-seven Continental regiments (including 

the 1st Continental Regiment organized earlier). The Main Army 

now included more than 13,600 officers and men. Though not the 

numbers Washington had hoped for, the regiments represented a 

viable force facing the besieged British garrisons. 

Like any professional force, the Continental Army required 

functional organization and structure beyond the regiment in order 

to be sustained and employed en masse. On 16 June 1775, the day 

after Washington’s appointment, the Continental Congress created 

a series of staff positions to support the new commanding general’s 

efforts to raise, equip, and sustain the force. These positions included 

an adjutant general, a commissary of musters, a paymaster general, 

a commissary general, and a quartermaster general. These officers 

and their assistants would become the forerunners of the various 

bureaus that would manage the US Army into the early twentieth 

century. Functionally, their mission was to assist Washington with 

the administration of the “grand army,” which included all field 

forces of the Continental Army and those under Schuyler in New 

York. Washington was also authorized a military secretary for 

correspondence, three aides, and six engineers (two for each of the 

main departments: Northern, Middle, and Southern). Eventually, 

the Continental Army added positions to manage other necessary 

requirements such as ordnance, medical, judge advocate, and 

chaplain. Given its importance to the overall Continental effort at 
5

the time, the Northern Department commander was authorized a 

similarly organized staff to manage military affairs in that area.

In addition to providing staff officers to administer and sustain 

the Continental Army, the Continental Congress began to provide 

for much of the institutional structure needed to manage, equip, and 

sustain a standing military force. Unofficially, the Continental Congress established what would become the Northern Department by 

appointing Schuyler to command the Department of New York on 

25 June 1775. This move was the genesis for the organization of later territorial departments established for the command, control, and 

support of troops in given geographical areas (see map 30, Appendix J, Territorial Departments 1777). Congress initially organized 

the Southern and Middle Departments in February 1776; these were 

followed by several others later that year, including the Northern 

Department on 14 April 1776. The Continental Congress appointed 

a major general as commander in each department consisting of one 

or more states. All military organizations—both Continental Army 

as well as militia units released by the governor for Continental service—were commanded by the department commander. Units moving into a department from another department also came under the 

jurisdiction of the receiving department commander. The department commander could function as field commander of troops engaged in tactical operations, or he could appoint another officer to 

command the troops if he felt he was unable to take to the field. 

The department commander did not absolutely control all 

military forces in his area of responsibility. Though all Continental 

forces were his, respective governors had to release their state militia units. Governors also could exempt state troops from service 

under the department commander because they were required for 

the state’s own security needs. Typically militia units released to 

the department commander were enlisted or drafted as a group for a 

specified period, often as little as 30 days. 

All forces under a department commander’s control were 

designated as an “army,” typically referred to by the department 

name. For example, troops in the Northern Department were called 

the “Northern Army.” This command, like all organizations in the 

Continental Army above regimental level, was considered to be a 
6

temporary ad hoc organization and would function primarily when 

units were assembled for field operations. An army commander 

generally assembled a staff by drafting officers from various 

regiments under his command. The commander also could appoint 

certain key civilians who possessed special skills to staff positions. 

The commander and his staff functioned as the army headquarters as 

long as the army was in the field during active operations.

Depending on the size of the force in the field, an army 

commander could further divide his army into “wings,” or divisions, 

and brigades. These levels of command were intended to be temporary 

organizations, though once organized, army commanders maintained 

existing Continental brigades in active service throughout the war 

under one or more unit designations. As a result of this dynamic, 

the brigade rather than the regiment became the Continental 

Army’s basic tactical unit. Additionally, unlike British commands, 

the brigadier general rank was a permanent grade approved by the 

Continental Congress in 1775 (as was major general, the rank held 

by wing and division commanders).

Wings were typically composed of three or more brigades but 

could be as few as two. A wing commander could exercise adequate 

control over up to five brigades, if they were small. Brigades also 

were typically composed of two to five regiments. Brigadier generals generally commanded wings and brigades, though it was not 

uncommon for the senior regimental colonel to command a brigade. 

The regiment was the largest permanent organization in 

the army. The Continental infantry regiment was commanded by 

a colonel who was assisted by two field officers—a lieutenant 

colonel and a major. The regiment’s fighting strength consisted 

of a single battalion (see Appendix I, Glossary for explanation 

of unit terminology) of eight companies divided into four squads 

for ease of control. Each company was commanded by a captain. 

Other authorized company officers included a first lieutenant, a 

second lieutenant, and an ensign. The companies also included eight 

noncommissioned officers, two musicians, and seventy-six privates.

A full-strength regiment totaled 728 officers and enlisted men and 

could place 640 musket-armed privates and corporals, or 88 percent 

of its assigned strength, in two ranks on the firing line. 
7

As described earlier, the Continental Army initially consisted 

of twenty-six infantry regiments and a regiment of riflemen. 

However, the army organized a number of other Continental units 

during the year, including two regiments of Canadian infantry. 

Eventually, four artillery regiments, four cavalry regiments, and 

two regiments of artificers (men with specialized skills such as 

wheelwrights, blacksmiths, coopers, and carpenters) also were 

raised for Continental service. 

Frequently, the Continental Line was supplemented by state 

militia regiments enlisted for varying terms of active service. The 

size, strength, and organization of these units varied from state to state 

though most states attempted to standardize their own units. Using 

militia organizations offered both advantages and disadvantages. On 

the plus side, the units generally arrived with their own equipment 

and arms and usually did not require much more than food, powder, 

and sometimes lead to make bullets. However, some arriving militia 

needed food and made other demands on the Continental’s provisions. 

Frequently shelter also had to be provided, especially during cold 

weather. These men were often very familiar with the surrounding 

countryside and knew the area residents who were patriots and 

loyalists. If well-led, they would stand for a time under heavy fire. 

However, even the best would break under threat of a bayonet charge 

since few of these men owned bayonets themselves. On the downside, 

Staff

1 Chaplain

III

I I I I I I I I

Staff

HQ

Continental Infantry Regiment 

1777 Headquarters

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

1 Major

Aggregate Strength

32 Officers

68 Noncommissioned Officers

624 Junior Enlisted

Total: 724 Personnel

Companies

1 Captain 

1 First Lieutenant

1 Second Lieutenant

1 Ensign

4 Sergeants

4 Corporals

1 Drummer

1 Fifer

76 Privates

1 Paymaster

1 Sergeant Major

1 Drum Major

1 Fife Major

1 Surgeon 

1 Surgeon’s Mate 

1 Adjutant

1 Quartermaster

Figure 1. Continental Infantry Regiment.
8

militia units were generally available for service during a campaign 

for relatively short periods due to enlistment agreements. Men who 

were farther from home were less reliable due to their concern about 

family and private property and also did not know the local area 

as well. Discipline in militia units ranged from very good to very 

bad. Most were adequate when times were good, but disciplinary 

infractions and desertions increased with a downturn in fortunes 

or harsh conditions. The same was true of course for Continentals, 

but not to the degree as for militiamen. Nevertheless, competent 

Continental commanders learned to maximize the strengths of their 

militia forces and minimize their weaknesses. 

For both the Continental and British armies, the mounted combat 

arm—cavalry (light and heavy), dragoons, hussars, etc.—played only 

a minor role in the American Revolution. In fact, four regiments of 

light dragoons raised in the Continental Army were the only major 

American cavalry contribution to the war effort, though there were a 

few mounted militia units. Like the infantry regiments, the dragoon 

counterparts were authorized three field officers. They also possessed 

a staff of thirteen and six troops of forty-four officers and men. This 

gave the dragoon regiment a nominal strength of 280 officers and 

men. The four Continental units never reached full strength and 

usually numbered less than 150 men and usually even fewer horses.

During the Saratoga Campaign, only a single troop of the 

2nd Regiment of Continental Light Dragoons served with the 

Continental Dragoon Regiment 

1777

III

Staff

HQ

Headquarters

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

1 Major 1 Surgeon 

1 Surgeon’s Mate 

1 Adjutant

1 Quartermaster

1 Paymaster

Aggregate Strength

26 Officers

44 Noncommissioned Officers

624 Junior Enlisted

Total: 694 Personnel

Companies

1 Captain 

1 Lieutenant

1 Cornet

1 Sergeant

1 QM Sergeant

4 Corporals

1 Trumpeter

1 Farrier

1 Armorer

32 Privates

I I I I I I

1 Riding Master

1 Trumpet Major

1 Chaplain

1 Saddler

1 Supernumeraries

Staff

Figure 2. Continental Dragoon Regiment.
9

Northern Army plus a small battalion of dragoons known as the 

2nd Connecticut Light Horse Regiment that served with Gates’ 

command. Unfortunately, little is known about how these units 

contributed to the army’s efforts during the campaign. 

Despite the technical nature of the artillery arm, which normally 

demanded strong industry and highly skilled specialists, the 

Continental Army fielded a fairly robust and effective artillery force. 

Initially organized as separate companies, by 1777 the Continental 

Army had formed several artillery regiments. The regiments were 

strictly administrative organizations and never functioned as such 

in the field. The basic element was the gun crew, but full companies 

could be, and were, employed as such in combat. 

In November 1776, a separate artillery unit, known as 

Stevens’ Independent Continental Artillery Battalion commanded 

by Maj. Ebenezer Stevens, was formed in the Department of 

New York. The battalion consisted of three gun companies and 

an artificer company mostly with men from Massachusetts. The 

artificer company was formed at Albany to provide ordnance repair 

and other support to the battalion’s guns and carriages. The gun 

companies initially manned the big fixed guns at Fort Ticonderoga 

and later mobile artillery pieces at Bemis Heights. The battalion’s 

twenty-two guns eventually expanded to thirty-two guns by the 

Figure 3. Continental Artillery Regiment.

Continental Artillery Regiment 

1777 III

Staff

HQ

Headquarters

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

Aggregate Strength 1 Major

68 Officers

96 Noncommissioned Officers

480 Junior Enlisted

Total: 644 Personnel

Companies

1 Captain 

1 Captain-Lieutenant

1 1st Lieutenant

2 2nd Lieutenants

4 Sergeants

4 Corporals

1 Drummer

1 Fifer

8 Bombardiers

8 Gunners

22 Matrosses

I I I I I I

I I I I I I

Staff

Cadets

1 Adjutant

1 Surgeon

1 Drum Major

1 Paymaster

1 Quartermaster

1 Surgeon’s Mate

1 Fife Major

1 Chaplain
10

end of the campaign. In 1778, Stevens’ command was consolidated 

with the 3rd Battalion of Continental Artillery.

The Continental Army also raised at least two regiments of 

artificers. The company formed by Ebenezer Stevens later became 

a component of the Regiment of Artillery Artificers organized by 

Col. Benjamin Flower for the Main Army. This command consisted 

of an artillery shop and a laboratory company which operated in a 

fixed location (probably in Philadelphia). Flower later organized a 

field company, an additional laboratory, and two depot companies as 

well. Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, engineer for the Northern Department, 

was authorized to raise a number of artificer companies for the 

Quartermaster Department. Several of these were in the Northern 

Department and, along with the artillery artificer company, 

supported the Northern Army during the Saratoga Campaign. All of 

the Quartermaster artificer companies also were consolidated into a 

regimental structure later in the war. 

Manning the Force—The Continental Army 

The rush to arms after the Battles of Lexington and Concord 

made recruiting and organizing the initial contingent of regiments 

a relatively easy task. As mentioned earlier, Massachusetts raised 

26 militia regiments within a matter of weeks after the battles of 

Lexington and Concord. New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and 

Connecticut raised an additional three regiments each during roughly 

the same period. This rush to the colors was one of the outstanding 

features that differentiated American from British forces. While 

both armies were largely all-volunteer forces, the Continental Army 

and the various state militias were made up of men who strongly 

believed in their cause. No soldier was forcibly pressed into service 

although a small number were drafted by local state and local 

authorities in some states later in the conflict. Moreover, few joined 

the ranks as a life-long career or for the pay—which was neither 

good nor reliable anyway. Many joined to defend hearth and home, 

although others enlisted for reasons that men still enlist today: to 

join friends who enlisted, for comradeship or adventure, to prove 

themselves, or simply to get away from a humdrum life.
11

As described earlier, the largest problem for New England 

Army units was that their service officially ended in December 

1775. When Congress formed the units in the spring of 1775, its 

members (as well as most people including the British) believed the 

conflict would be resolved by the end of the year, so longer enlistments were thought to be unnecessary. Therefore, in the middle of 

fighting a military campaign in the fall of 1775, Washington and 

his officers had to undertake a major reenlistment effort. The effort 

eventually raised the Continental Army’s total strength to just over 

13,000 officers and men (of 20,000 authorized) by March 1776, but 

that was as good as it got. Washington had to rely heavily on shortterm militia units for the remainder of 1776.

To avoid a repeat of the reenlistment distraction that the army 

experienced the previous autumn, American leaders discussed extending the term of enlistment. Washington proposed a three-year 

enlistment, but Congress initially demurred. American leaders understood that one-year enlistments would require Washington to go 

through the difficulties of recruiting and reenlisting an entirely new 

army once again in the fall of 1776 but feared that some Americans 

would view the three-year term as an effort to create a standing army. 

In 1777, Congress finally approved making enlistments for the duration of the war. However, the prospect of enlisting for what could be 

a very long period proved to be unpopular. New enlistments almost 

dried up altogether by the end of that year. Washington realized that 

the indefinite enlistment term was unrealistic and had depleted the 

Continental forces so much that he readily concurred when Congressional leaders changed the enlistment term to three years. 

In the fall of 1776, Congress also expanded the Continental Army 

authorized force to eighty-eight battalions, which would require about 

60,000 men to bring to full strength. That number was increased to 110 

battalions in December 1776 following the expulsion of Washington’s 

army from New Jersey to Pennsylvania. Although higher numbers 

were authorized, the Continental Army never reached a peak strength 

of much more than 30,000 troops. Moreover, Washington could never 

muster more than about 15,000 men in the field at any one time. Since 

there was no national recruiting system, states were responsible for 

raising their own militia units as well as manning Continental units. 

They simply could not muster enough manpower.
12

The American Northern Army

On 23 June 1775, Washington departed Philadelphia to join 

the Main Army before Boston and was accompanied by Major 

General Schuyler who was en route to take command of the troops 

in New York. Before his departure from New York City on 25 June, 

Washington advised Schuyler to pay close attention to his command’s 

organization and developing an adequate logistics system to 

support them. Though Schuyler had limited combat experience, his 

administrative skills would hold him in good stead while he worked 

to create a smaller version of Washington’s Main Army in the New 

York Department. On 20 July, Congress notified Schuyler about the 

establishment of his department and instructed him to “dispose of and 

employ all the troops in the New York department in such manner as 

[you] may think best for the protection and defense of these colonies 

. . . subject to future orders of the commander in chief.”1

For such an important geographical area, Schuyler’s ground 

component command (initially the “Separate Army,” later the 

“Northern Army”) was very small when compared to Washington’s 

main force. It initially consisted of only the 1st, 4th, and 5th 

Connecticut Regiments. On 27 June, New York’s Provincial Congress 

approved a plan to organize and recruit its quota of four regiments, 

but that process had not begun when Schuyler arrived at New York. 

Two subordinate brigadier generals assisted Schuyler with raising 

and commanding these units: Richard Montgomery, a former British 

Army officer from New York, and David Wooster of Connecticut. 

Both men would play key roles in the upcoming invasion of Canada 

but like Schuyler initially were busy creating an army.

Next the Northern Army organized four New York Continental 

regiments. These units began forming on 30 June with the 

appointment of regimental officers. Within a few weeks, all four 

New York regiments were close to full strength, with ten companies 

of seventy-five officers and men each for a grand total of about 3,000 

men. New York also formed Lamb’s Artillery Company, a six-gun 

company organized along the same lines as those raised previously 

in Boston. Additionally, as a reward to Ethan Allen for his role in 

capturing Fort Ticonderoga from the British, Congress authorized 
13

New York to raise a special unit of men with wilderness combat 

skills. Though the regiment was formed from Allen’s own Green 

Mountain Boys, the regiment members elected Seth Warner as their 

Continental Army commander. They mustered into Continental 

service as “Seth Warner’s Continental Battalion.” The colony of 

New Hampshire also raised three companies of New Hampshire 

Rangers commanded by Maj. Timothy Bedel that were added to 

Schuyler’s command that summer.

On 31 August 1776, Schuyler launched the ill-fated invasion of 

Canada (see Section II, Campaign Overview for a brief description 

of this campaign). During the campaign, Schuyler’s command grew 

slightly in strength as a new Continental unit was added to his order 

of battle. Canada organized the 1st Canadian Regiment commanded 

by Col. John Livingston during the late fall of 1775. Formed largely 

from French-Canadians who were unhappy with British rule in 

Canada, the regiment assisted with Northern Army operations in 

Quebec until it disbanded in 1781. The 1st Canadian Regiment was 

one of the longest-serving Continental units during the war. The 

remnants of almost all organizations that served in Canada during 

1775–76 ultimately ended up at Crown Point in June 1776 after their 

expulsion from Quebec. Most of these units formed the basis of the 

Northern Army’s new field force for that year.

In January 1777, Schuyler’s command and the rest of the 

Continental Army underwent additional changes and redesignations 

when the Continental Congress adopted the 88/110 battalion plan. 

By the spring of that year Schuyler had three brigades of Continentals 

(see Appendix A, Order of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga) and a couple of 

Ranger companies concentrated at Fort Ticonderoga. He also posted 

the 3rd New York Regiment at Fort Schuyler (also known as Fort 

Stanwix) in the Mohawk Valley, and a few militia units arrived at 

both forts shortly before Burgoyne’s army landed at Crown Point 

in late June 1777.2 Those were only the forces that Schuyler had 

available to oppose the British invasion at the outset of the Saratoga 

Campaign. Over the next several months, however, the Northern 

Army grew dramatically as additional Continental and militia units 

made their way to Bemis Heights (see Appendix F, Order of Battle, 

Saratoga). At its height, the Northern Army consisted of 10 brigades 
14

or brigade equivalents, at least fifty-six infantry regiments (not 

including those at Fort Schuyler), and more than 23,000 men. 

One set of warriors made a notable contribution to the 

American order of battle. The Oneida Indians of central New York 

were the only tribe of the five nations of the Iroquois Confederation 

which supported the patriot cause during the war. As such, the 

Oneidas provided invaluable services to Schuyler and later Gates—

performing scouting and intelligence missions against Brigadier 

Barry St. Leger’s British forces. A number of Oneidas fought beside 

Herkimer’s command at Oriskany and several others assisted in 

the deception operation to convince Leger that Brig. Gen. Benedict 

Arnold’s relief force bound for Fort Schuyler was much larger that it 

was. Unlike most of the other Iroquois tribes, the military conduct of 

the Oneidas during the Saratoga Campaign was generally considered 

to be within the acceptable bounds of warfare contemporaneous with 

the times. This was likely due to the significant number of Oneidas 

converted to Christianity by the Presbyterian missionary Samuel 

Kirkland in the 1760s and 70s. There were instances, however, of 

some Oneidas operating for a brief period with Gates’ forces who 

committed what would be considered war crimes today.

The British Army and its Allies

There were many organizational similarities between the British 

Army (and its German allies) and the Continental Army. Likewise, 

loyalist units (pro-British Americans) and state militia units shared 

many common features. Early American military experience and 

traditions were clearly shaped by British practices. The organization 

and conditions under which early colonial militias organized and 

served were an almost direct result of perceived abuses by Oliver 

Cromwell’s New Model Army in the mid-1600s. After the struggles 

of 1645–1660, the English relied predominantly on county-based 

militia units for the kingdom’s security rather than a standing army. 

By 1700, however, the British public was more amenable to a 

standing regular army due to continuing threats from France and 

other unfriendly nations on the European mainland. As described 

earlier, the American colonies continued to rely on local militias for 

security until the French and Indian War.
15

As with the Continental Army, regiments were the largest permanent force in the British Army during the Revolutionary War period. All field echelons above that command level were intended to 

be entirely temporary, usually dissolving after a given campaign or 

definitely after the cessation of hostilities. Moreover, those levels of 

command were only used outside of the United Kingdom. Within 

the realm, regimental commanders answered directly to the British 

Army general-in-chief. However, leaders understood that outside the 

kingdom, armies had to be prepared to take the field and oppose Britain’s foes and therefore needed to be organized for such operations.

In a given area of operations, the British Army would organize 

field armies to conduct operations. Commanded by a major general 

or lieutenant general, these armies typically consisted of multiple 

regiments organized into brigades which in turn might be grouped 

into divisions or “wings.” However, due to warfare experiences in 

Europe, the British field organization often modified their structures. 

For example, a commander might designate a division or brigade as 

an “advance guard” or “advance corps” and give it a specialized 

mission to precede the army and protect its advance. American units 

did this as well, though in a less formal way. The British advance 

corps commander usually received instructions and actions to take 

once his troops made contact with the enemy. Similarly, a rear 

guard or reserve corps could be organized to protect the army’s 

rear. Otherwise, division and brigade echelons looked very similar 

to their American counterparts. The brigadiers and major generals 

commanding these organizations, however, were commonly 

appointed to that rank on a temporary basis. They would command 

the formation until it was disbanded. At that point, the commander 

would revert to his regular army position and grade.

Although the standard permanent organization for British and 

American forces was a regiment, the British Army’s regular army 

regiment was different in several significant aspects. Unlike its 

Continental equivalent, the British regiment was more complex in 

its command structure and organization. As with most regiments 

of any nation at that time, the unit was commanded by a colonel 

who was assisted by a lieutenant colonel, a major, and a small staff. 

The regiment consisted of twelve companies. Two companies—
16

one in Great Britain and one in Ireland—essentially functioned as 

recruit depots. Five of the eight line companies were commanded by 

captains. The other three—termed “Field Officer’s Companies”—

were nominally commanded by field officers but actually led by 

each company’s lieutenant. Two specialized companies rounded 

out the twelve. These units were the Light Infantry Company and 

the Grenadier Company. The men of the Light Infantry Company 

were athletically fit and agile. Their usual mission was to function 

as skirmishers before falling in as the left flank company on the 

line. Members of the Grenadier Company (a holdover designation 

from the days in which grenadiers were largely employed to hurl 

grenades in combat) typically were the largest men and were posted 

to the right of the line, that is, the place of honor. Though intended 

to protect the flanks of their regiment in battle, army commanders 

frequently pulled the light and grenadier companies from their 

regiments and formed two ad hoc battalions—one of grenadiers and 

one of light infantry.

Strength-wise, the British regiment appeared slightly stronger 

than the Continental regiment, consisting of 45 officers and 768 

men. However, with depot companies, fifers, drummers, and 

contingent men removed, the British regiment could put only 514 

men on the firing line of which 448 shouldered muskets. A fullstrength Continental regiment by contrast could put 640 muskets 

on the line. During the Saratoga Campaign, however, neither side 

Figure 4. British Infantry Regiment.

III

I I I I

Staff

HQ

British Infantry Regiment 

1777 Headquarters

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

1 Major Staff

1 Chaplain

1 Surgeon 

1 Surgeon’s Mate 

1 Adjutant

1 Quartermaster

Light

1 Captain 

2 Lieutenants

3 Sergeants

3 Corporals

2 Drummers

56 Privates

Grenadier Field Officers

Battalion & 

Replacement

1 Captain 

2 Lieutenants

3 Sergeants

3 Corporals

2 Drummers

2 Fifers

56 Privates

1 Lieutenant

1 Ensign

3 Sergeants

3 Corporals

2 Drummers

56 Privates

1 Captain 

1 Lieutenant

1 Ensign

3 Sergeants

3 Corporals

2 Drummers

56 Privates

Aggregate Strength

40 Officers

73 Noncommissioned Officers

624 Junior Enlisted

Total: 737 Personnel

Companies
17

fielded full-strength regiments. Typically, regiments were manned at 

about half-strength, though this varied from unit to unit. American 

units enjoyed a slight manpower, and thus firepower, advantage 

when opposing regiments met on the battlefield. 

As with the rebel forces, the British Army in North America 

boasted only a small contingent of mounted soldiers. Only the 16th 

and 17th Light Dragoon Regiments deployed to America, serving 

primarily in the Boston and New York City areas and farther south. 

The United Kingdom also formed a few troops of loyalist cavalry, 

but none of these served in the Saratoga Campaign. The only mounted unit available to Burgoyne was the Braunschweiger Dragoon 

Regiment von Ludwig, and these troops fought almost exclusively 

as a dismounted unit. 

During this period, the British Army’s artillery arm was encapsulated in what were termed the Royal Artillery Regiment and 

the Royal Regiment of Irish Artillery. These units were nominally 

organized into battalions, but like the regiment, the battalion was 

essentially an administrative echelon. The battery, or “company” 

as they were then termed, was the primary tactical echelon. These 

companies typically organized based on the weapons available to 

them locally. For the Saratoga Campaign, Royal Artillery units under Burgoyne’s command were tailored to the general’s plan of action for the campaign and modified as the situation required.

Finally, at the highest echelons of command, the entire area 

of operations actually was managed by one man. In the case of 

North America, that man was Lord George Germain, secretary of 

state for the American colonies. A former army general, Germain 

was responsible for managing the affairs of the colonies, including 

military operations. He was assisted by two commanders who had a 

defined geographical area of responsibility. Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, 

Governor-in-Chief of Quebec Province, was both the political and 

military head of operations in Quebec. As such, he was essentially 

equal to a combined colonial governor and department commander 

in America. He could raise militias and commanded all British 

regular troops in the province.

The second commander on whom Germain relied was initially 

Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, commander-in-chief in North America and 
18

governor general of Massachusetts. However, Maj. Gen. William 

Howe replaced Gage in September 1775 as the commander-in-chief in 

America. In his new post, Howe was responsible for all British troops 

from West Florida to Newfoundland, less Quebec Province. Assuming 

the post, Howe commanded British ground forces but only exercised 

political control over British-occupied areas as many colonies had 

been taken over politically by rebel “Committees of Safety.”

To help put down the growing rebellion in the colonies, Howe 

was assisted by two generals who arrived in America at the same time 

as he did the previous May, Brigadiers John Burgoyne and Henry 

Clinton. Howe, Burgoyne, and Clinton would soon be promoted and 

all three would fill key roles with various actions in America over 

the next two and a half years.

Manning the Force—The British Army and its Allies

The British Army clearly had numerous advantages over 

the Continental Army. First and foremost, this well-established, 

organized, and disciplined military force had a long and proud 

tradition. The various regiments of the army had been rigorously 

trained and drilled in peacetime, and many of their officers and 

noncommissioned officers (NCOs) had gained experience on 

the battlefields of Europe. Their men were professional soldiers, 

many of whom made the army their life’s work. From a practical 

standpoint, British commanders kept their men well-equipped, fed, 

and trained, not so much to prevent the spillage of blood in battle, 

but to win wars. This did not mean that the commanders did not care 

about their soldiers or about casualties. They did care, but primarily 

because they knew that they could not easily replace casualties. 

Thus, their efforts to train, discipline, and equip their troops ensured 

that the British Army’s regiments were generally effective on the 

battlefield. Indeed, the red-coated regulars of the British line were 

usually successful against their foes. The British Army of the 1770s 

could stand man-to-man with any other army and usually defeat it if 

the odds were not too great.

However, the British Army was small—in part because it was 

difficult to entice men in England to join the colors. This was true 

for a host of reasons, not the least of which was that a substantial 
19

portion of the force was constantly deployed overseas to locations 

that most civilized Britons considered hellholes. The pay was not 

good, the risk of death was high, and the soldier experience was 

not what most men aspired to, especially among the merchant and 

upper classes. Often, countrymen scorned British soldiers. An old 

saying in England reflected both the higher status of the navy and 

the general public’s attitudes toward the army: “A messmate before 

a shipmate, a shipmate before a stranger, a stranger before a dog, 

and a dog before a soldier.”3

Many men in England also did not relish the idea of fighting 

fellow countrymen. Indeed, scars from English civil wars during the 

previous century had not yet fully healed. But internecine fighting 

in a faraway place that was known to be relatively wild and dangerous further dampened ardor for military service among Britons. 

Thus, the Parliament resorted to a number of enticements to encourage young and old men to join the colors. At the time of the battles 

of Lexington and Concord in 1775, for example, a British soldier 

enlisted for “life.” What this meant realistically was that a soldier 

would serve in the army until he was no longer capable due to the 

infirmities of age, complications from illness, disabling combat 

wounds, or death. He could not expect to be discharged otherwise, 

though in reality the British army released men from this obligation 

for any number of reasons. The requirement to enlist for life was 

clearly an obstacle to manning an army, even a small one.

In December 1775, Parliament reduced the enlistment period 

to three years, or for the duration of the war if the king so desired. 

This temporary change, however, did not result in a rush to the 

recruiting offices. Other incentives and recruiting techniques were 

needed to increase the number of men in service. Additionally, the 

government increased its practice of pardoning criminals for their 

crimes if they agreed to join up and agreed to forgo punishment 

for deserters if they returned to their regiments. Under the “Press 

Acts” of 1778 and 1779, men arrested for disorderly conduct or 

found guilty of being out of work could be forcefully impressed 

into service by special army impressment teams. The teams were 

given strict processes for putting these men into the army. Politicians did not want to anger eligible voters by accidentally impress-
20

ing one into service. None of these practices, however, brought in 

enough men to fully flesh out the army’s regiments. These difficulties, however, were no worse than those faced by the Continental 

Army, which also was often understrength.

Typical for European armies, officers in the British Army were 

largely from the aristocracy and landed gentry. This was almost a 

prerequisite due to the need for money to purchase a commission. 

Men from the middle and lower classes could not afford to buy 

them.4 The higher the commission rank, the more money it cost. 

This system was open to corruption. Men with the most money 

or the best social connections were promoted rather than the most 

experienced or the most competent. Despite this shortcoming, most 

British officers advanced and gained experience at each level, and 

they were generally competent even though they had no formal 

military schooling. This did not apply to Royal Artillery and Royal 

Engineers officers. In those institutions, commissions were awarded 

to those who graduated from a course at the Royal Military Academy

at Woolwich, and subsequent promotion was by seniority.

In addition to aristocrats, many general officers were members of Parliament and thus were politically well-connected. Some 

received their appointments to military positions not so much due 

to their known abilities but because it was politically expedient to 

help them receive the appointment. Among the group of generals 

sent to put down the rebellion in America, none other than possibly 

Burgoyne were particularly happy to accept the task of making war 

on fellow countrymen. Howe—and to a lesser extent Clinton—was 

reluctant to make “hard war” against his American cousins. Officers sometimes broached diplomatic channels to seek a compromise 

peace. Nevertheless, all went overseas to fulfill their duties to king 

and country and win back the American colonies for Great Britain.

Unlike British Army officers and men, the German contingents 

contributing to the war effort in America were there solely to help 

fill the coffers of the prince they served.5 Because England was not 

able to raise enough troops for the task of subduing the rebels (it 

was indeed a large area the British Army needed to conquer), King 

George III hired troops from the continent. British envoys succeeded 

in arranging for a good number of “mercenary” units from several 
21

German states, particularly from the principalities of Hesse-Kassel, 

Hesse-Hanau, Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, Waldeck, and AnsbachBayreuth. Hesse-Kassel provided about a third of these units and 

was the largest contributor to the British effort. Colonists referred 

to all German troops as “Hessians” whether they came from HesseKassel or not. 

The German troops were not mercenaries in the traditional 

sense of the word. These professional soldiers were organized, 

trained, disciplined, and equipped to fight conventional wars on the 

European mainland. They received no additional pay or incentives 

for fighting in America. They were there to do their prince’s bidding on behalf of Britain. The princes received the hard cash from 

the frequently exorbitant prices charged for their work. Nonetheless, 

Britain found it easier to pay for the extra manpower than to raise 

and equip their own troops.

The German regiments were organized differently than their 

British or American counterparts. The units varied somewhat 

between the various German states as well. Still, the German 

organizations had a distinctly European flavor. As with the other 

regiments, each German unit was authorized a colonel, lieutenant 

colonel, and a major plus a staff of about eighteen other officers 

and men. However, the structure of the German regiments was 

different. A typical regiment was composed of five or six companies, 

III

I I I I

Staff

HQ

German Infantry Regiment 

1777 Headquarters

1 Colonel

1 Lieutenant Colonel

1 Major 1 Senior Surgeon

1 Adjutant

1 Quartermaster

1 Judge Advocate

1 Chaplain

Companies

1 Captain 

2 First Lieutenants

1 Ensign

3 Sergeants

1 Quartermaster Sergeant

1 Provost Sergeant

7 Corporals

1 Junior Surgeon

3 Drummers

1 Clerk

104 Privates

4 Orderlies

Aggregate Strength

33 Officers

67 Noncommissioned Officers

560 Junior Enlisted

Total: 660 Personnel

I

1 Wagonmaster

1 Drum Major

1 Armorer

1 Provost

1 Assistant Provost

Staff

2 Drivers

Figure 5. German Infantry Regiment.
22

including one grenadier company. Each company was commanded 

by a captain with two or three lieutenants to assist him. The German 

companies tended to be about two or three times the size of British 

companies and possessed about 10 NCOs and between 114 and 165 

other ranks. Thus a German regiment could typically put between 

525 and 690 muskets on the firing line depending on how it was 

organized. In terms of brigade and higher organization, the German 

commands in America tended to be organized similar to those for 

the British Army.

The British Army from Canada

Moving south in late June 1777, Burgoyne’s Army from 

Canada (sometimes referred to as the “Northern Army” or the 

“Canadian Army”) appeared to be an unstoppable force. Composed 

of about 8,000 British and German troops (joined later by some 

500 Iroquois warriors), Burgoyne organized his army into two 

wings and a few specialized commands (see Appendix A, Order 

of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga). The Right Wing was commanded 

by Maj. Gen. William Phillips and consisted of three brigade-size 

elements. The Right Wing’s 1st Brigade was commanded by Brig. 

Henry W. Powell, who was the lieutenant colonel of the 53rd Foot. 

The brigade was composed of the 9th, 47th, and 53rd Regiments of 

Foot, minus their light and grenadier companies as with all infantry 

regiments in the army. Brig. James Hamilton (colonel of the 21st 

Foot) commanded the 2nd Brigade, which included the 20th, 21st, 

and 62nd Regiments of Foot. The Right Wing’s Advanced Corps 

was commanded by Brig. Simon Fraser, lieutenant colonel of the 

24th Foot, and consisted of Fraser’s own 24th Regiment, the ad hoc 

Grenadier Battalion with all the grenadier companies in Burgoyne’s 

army, and the ad hoc Light Infantry Battalion composed of the 

army’s light infantry companies.

The army’s Left Wing, commanded by Maj. Gen. Friedrich 

Adolph Riedesel, also consisted of three brigades of German 

regiments. The 1st Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Johann 

Friedrich Specht contained three Braunschweiger infantry 

regiments: Regiment Riedesel, Regiment von Rhetz, and Specht’s 

own Regiment Specht. The 2nd Brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. 
23

Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall included the Braunschweiger Prinz 

Friedrich Regiment and the Erbprinz Regiment from Hesse-Hanau. 

The third element in the 2nd Brigade, the army’s Reserve Corps, 

was headed by Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann. The Reserve Corps 

was a fairly robust, diverse, and strong unit. Breymann’s command 

included the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig, 

a company of Braunschweiger Jägers (riflemen), and the HesseHanau Artillery Battery. Like Fraser’s Advance Corps, Breymann 

also commanded a battalion of grenadiers and a battalion of light 

infantry composed of companies from the line regiments.

Burgoyne’s artillery park was impressive and significantly larger 

than typical for an army of this size. Under the command of Maj. 

Griffith Williams, the park consisted of three companies of Royal 

Artillery, a Royal Irish Regiment of Artillery detachment, a 33rd Foot 

infantry company, and several other artillery detachments. In all, the 

army artillery consisted of 139 guns of varying sizes (not including 

those later captured from the Americans at Forts Ticonderoga, Anne, 

and Edward). Burgoyne maintained an artillery reserve with the park 

and also detailed gun sections to his wings. Riedesel’s Hesse-Hanau 

Artillery Battery generally remained with Breymann’s Reserve Corps 

but could be pulled in to support other army missions if needed.

In addition to these main force units, Burgoyne possessed a 

number of other organizations. These included the Loyalist Corps, 

an Indian Department detachment, and a small element composed 

of artificers and pioneers (engineers). The Loyalist Corps was made 

up of two small battalions and three companies of Canadians and 

American militiamen who remained loyal to the crown. Never more 

than about 400 men, the numbers rapidly shrank as the campaign 

proceeded. Burgoyne had hoped to have as many as 1,000 of these 

men to supplement his forces and was sorely disappointed in their 

actual numbers and performance during the campaign. 

The Indian Department detachment under Maj. John Campbell 

would also prove to be a disappointment. The command was to be 

about 1,000 warriors from various Iroquois tribes, but only about 

500 showed up at the Bouquet River camp in June. The Indian 

numbers fluctuated and quickly dwindled during the campaign. 

Meanwhile, the warriors committed many atrocities on American 
24

troops and civilians (and even on a few British troops). To Burgoyne’s 

detriment, the Iroquois actions caused many fence sitters in New 

York and New England to join the patriot cause. Supplementing the 

Indian Department were two small companies of Canadian militia 

and the Company of Marksmen under Captain Alexander Fraser 

(Simon Fraser’s nephew).

The small Artificers and Engineers detachment was mainly 

composed of two Canadian militia units: an element of the Royal 

Highland Emigrants 1st Battalion, and the Pioneer Company. The 

Highland Emigrants functioned as artificers for the army. These men 

were trained as carpenters, gunsmiths, ironsmiths, coopers, shipwrights, and other journeyman trades which were militarily valuable. They could be employed in crafting certain defensive works, 

bridge building, weapons repair, and like efforts. Pioneers were 

men who performed general construction or destruction duties for 

the army. Typically they built or improved roads, built temporary 

bridges, and constructed basic defensive works. When Burgoyne’s 

army arrived at the Bouquet River in late June 1777, it consisted of 

about 4,000 British regulars, 3,600 German regulars, 500 Canadian 

or loyalist militiamen, 470 artillerists, and 500 Indians.

 Burgoyne also owned another element which he sent on a 

separate mission to support the overall campaign. This was the Mohawk Valley Expedition under Brigadier St. Leger. St. Leger’s command consisted of two regiments, four companies, a mortar battery, 

and about 800 Iroquois Indians. St. Leger’s main force included the 

34th Regiment of Foot (for which he was the lieutenant colonel), the 

8th Regiment of Foot, and the King’s Regiment of New York comprised of American loyalists. The brigadier also had a German jäger 

company, Butler’s Ranger Company, the Quebec Canadian Militia 

Company, and approximately 400 bateaux-men. If they were successful in taking Fort Schuyler and advancing down the Mohawk 

Valley, St. Leger’s approximately 2,000 troops would reinforce Burgoyne on arrival in Albany.

Revolutionary War Staffs

Though small by today’s standards, the army staffs of the 

opposing Saratoga Campaign commanders were somewhat robust 
25

for the time period and functioned adequately. Most American 

staff members were appointed to their positions by the Continental 

Congress based on recommendations from the commanders of the 

departments in which they would serve. The congress was not bound 

to honor commander recommendations and sometimes appointed 

whoever they wished—generally for some political reason. These 

occasional instances usually caused friction between the congress 

and the department commander.

Appointed staff officers were technically assigned as deputies 

to the senior Continental Army staff officer in their area of expertise. 

For example, Col. Morgan Lewis (who served both Schuyler and 

Gates) was appointed as a deputy quartermaster general to Maj. Gen. 

Thomas Mifflin, quartermaster general of the Continental Army. As 

such, Lewis was bound to follow Mifflin’s directions and guidance. 

His mission, however, was to work within those constraints to 

support the Northern Department and Northern Army. He served 

both as the deputy quartermaster general. 

The Continental Army and British Army staffs during the Revolutionary War differed considerably from modern military staffs 

in terms of size, function of the staff as a whole, and the duties of 

individual staff officers. As is still the case, the primary staff function was to address routine administrative, operational, and logistical matters of importance that did not require the commander’s constant attention and to provide information the commander needed to 

make decisions and successfully accomplish an operation, mission, 

or task. However in the late 1700s, the staff did not provide the commander with routine access to processed intelligence or with planning capabilities for future or current operations. The commander 

had to think through and develop all likely courses of action for an 

operation, as well as analyze and filter all intelligence as it came into 

the headquarters. In short, there was no equivalent S2/G2 or S3/G3 

capability on the staff. Also absent were more modern staff capabilities such as communications, information operations, public affairs, 

civil affairs, etc. The Revolutionary War-era staffs were simple and 

comparatively small.

A 1770s army staff typically consisted of at least four key 

staff officers, including an adjutant, a quartermaster, a commissary 
26

of subsistence, and at least one aide-de-camp. The adjutant had a 

large range of duties and was usually one of the commander’s most 

trusted officers. He typically prepared the commander’s correspondence; wrote and sent orders and instructions in the commander’s 

name even under combat conditions; and would help form the command for formations, drills, reviews, and parades. He would act as 

the commander’s assistant on the battlefield and, under dire circumstances, function as a commander’s messenger if no aides were present. The adjutant maintained the personnel rolls of the command 

and forwarded strength reports and any requests for replacements. 

The quartermaster was arguably the most important man on the 

staff. Like the adjutant, the quartermaster had myriad duties many of 

which are no longer performed by modern quartermaster officers. As 

the name implies, the quartermaster was responsible for the quartering of troops. He would ride ahead to find suitable quarters for the 

army, or at least for key commanders. He would also scout out good 

locations for the army to encamp or bivouac, usually near a good 

water source. Given these duties, the quartermaster performed a rudimentary form of reconnaissance and intelligence gathering for the 

commander as well. Since he was frequently far forward, he would 

often be the first senior officer to gain intelligence from captured enemy stragglers or those captured in a skirmish as the army advanced. 

Some of the quartermaster’s additional responsibilities were similar 

to today’s S4/G4. If no commissary or ordnance officer was on the 

staff, he also equipped and resupplied the army in all classes of supply except food, ammunition, and weapons and managed most army 

transportation functions, including waterborne operations.

Commissaries were officers appointed to act for the commander in certain narrowly defined but important areas such as food, purchases, or contracts. Most common, the commissary of subsistence 

was charged with storing, transporting, and supplying the army with 

subsistence. In addition to food, he was responsible for acquiring 

other items to maintain the health and welfare of the soldiers, including candles, lamp oil, firewood, cooking utensils, and medical 

supplies. Another was the commissary of purchase, similar to the 

modern contracting officer. He was responsible for purchasing food 

and other subsistence items and could also execute contracts with 
27

various businesses to support the army with wagons, boats, ships, 

etc. If the commissary of subsistence was given additional responsibility to purchase subsistence items, the quartermaster would typically function as the commissary of purchase for all other items. 

Because the commissary and quartermaster managed large sums of 

money for supply purchases, commanders took special care with 

these appointments. Even so, history is rife with examples of men 

who carried on corrupt practices in these positions.

Each aide-de-camp served only the commander and typically 

functioned as a personal messenger and as the commander’s “eyes 

and ears.” On the battlefield they would frequently circulate the area 

and keep subordinate commanders focused on the commander’s intent. They would often be empowered to speak for the commander 

and issue orders based on his intent. They would also personally relay messages between the commander and a subordinate commander 

to ensure that the junior officer understood the army commander’s 

intent. Aides needed to be articulate and capable of communicating exactly what was needed. Some commanders also gave these 

officers the right to issue written orders in their name and perform 

secretarial duties between battles. The senior aide was generally a 

personal friend of the general, and junior aides were often a son or 

other relative of the general. 

Additional staff officers included the engineer, surgeon or medical director, judge advocate, paymaster, and additional commissaries. The engineer, of course, was usually a school-trained officer 

with skills needed for military engineering projects such as barracks, 

defensive works, bridge, signal tower, and road construction—and 

destruction. If an army needed to know how to build something, the 

opposing force needed to know how to destroy or at least make it 

ineffective. The engineer also needed to understand terrain and how 

it could be used to help the army and hinder the opposing army, as 

well as understanding topography and how to transfer that information onto a plat or map. 

The army’s surgeon was often the general’s personal physician. 

He also looked out for the command’s overall health and advised the 

commander on topics such as reliability and cleanliness of camps, 

local water sources, and food. He provided guidance to junior 
28

surgeons and medical orderlies (referred to as a surgeon’s mate) 

in subordinate commands as well. Physicians of the day were not 

knowledgeable about germs and other microscopic causes of disease 

and infection so did not take as much care regarding cleanliness as 

field hospitals starting at the beginning of the twentieth century. 

Like today, the judge advocate was essentially the commander’s lawyer. He advised the commander on the legality of his decisions and actions, also functioning as the command’s prosecutor for 

court-martial proceedings. If the advocate was too busy or had to 

recuse himself, the commander could appoint a subordinate officer 

to fill the role. The appointed advocate would provide legal guidance to that officer for the length of the trial. Prosecutions were not 

carried out by the commander but instead conducted “in the name 

of the United States” in Continental commands or “in His Majesty’s 

Name” in the case of a British command. 

The paymaster’s duty was simply to accept, account for, and 

properly disburse moneys allocated to an army for operations. His 

most common disbursal was paying the troops on muster day. This 

action was performed only periodically; paydays could take place 

as much as a year apart. In a garrison environment, troops were paid 

bi-monthly, but quarterly was the norm in the field. During an actual 

campaign, periods between paydays could be much longer. 

Some Revolutionary War staffs included positions that required some technical knowledge or filled a critical need to manage 

army operations such as liaison officer, wagonmaster, and chief of 

artillery. Liaisons were typically officers attached from other services or coalition commands and often were foreign to the army’s 

main nationality. A wagonmaster managed the army’s wagon trains, 

which could be several miles long. In closed-in terrain like that of 

the Northern Department, the wagonmaster’s duties could be extremely taxing and difficult. The wagonmaster typically worked 

for the quartermaster, or with the quartermaster if the wagons were 

largely contracted. 

The chief of artillery advised the commander on employing 

this highly technical combat arm. Interestingly, at the time of the 

Revolutionary War, the Royal Artillery served under royal warrant 

of the king and was managed by the British Board of Ordnance. Its 
29

officers and men were promoted outside the standard army promotion system and were not allowed to hold commands in organizations possessing infantry or cavalry units. Artillery officers could 

only command artillery units. Officers of the Royal Engineers were 

likewise managed by the Board of Ordnance, but no standing engineer units existed in the British Army or under the board. Thus engineer, artificer, sapper, and pioneer-type units were generally formed 

on an ad hoc basis. On the other hand, American artillery and engineer officers and their units were part of the Continental Army and 

promoted in the same way as officers from other branches.

One staff officer with no direct counterpart among British commands operating in rebel areas was the Conductor (or Keeper) of 

Military Stores. This man was largely responsible for the storage, 

upkeep, and maintenance of ordnance materials, ammunition, and 

artillery kept in depot. He typically remained at the arsenal or depot 

where the materials awaited issue. The conductor was technically a 

department staff officer rather than on the army commander’s staff, 

even though the same person usually served as army commander 

and department commander. This position was also later added to 

brigade staffs.

Below the army level, staffs were much smaller until reaching 

the regiment. Oddly, a division or wing commander had the smallest 

staff—usually one or maybe two aides. These men usually served 

as the commander’s adjutant and performed secretarial duties. Early 

in the war, brigade commanders normally had two staff officers—

a brigade-major and an aide. For both the British and Continental 

armies, the brigade-major functioned as a combination quartermaster and adjutant—forwarding orders and correspondence between 

the army’s adjutant and quartermaster general to the regimental adjutants and quartermasters. He also posted army and division general 

orders, issued and posted brigade orders to the regimental adjutants, 

compiled brigade personnel returns, and personally coordinated 

with the regimental commanders on a variety of issues and topics. 

Though titled as a “major,” the position was typically filled by a 

captain as a temporary grade in the British Army and by a permanent major in the Continental Army. After 1777, the brigade became 

the Continental Army’s basic unit of operation, and the number of 
30

brigade staff positions grew as well. By 1779, the brigade staff was 

authorized a quartermaster, an inspector, a chaplain, and a conductor 

of military stores, in addition to the two original positions.

A Continental regiment staff was a more robust organization 

than for a division/wing or brigade. Though it varied by regiment 

type—and also between American and British organizations—a 

regimental staff characteristically consisted of eight to ten 

personnel. In addition to an adjutant and quartermaster, each staff 

usually included a surgeon, paymaster, and chaplain who were 

considered officers. Several noncommissioned personnel such as a 

sergeant-major, drum-major, and fife-major rounded out the staff. 

The staff of a British infantry regiment was smaller and typically 

included only an adjutant, quartermaster, surgeon, and chaplain. 

A Continental cavalry regiment included a riding master, saddler, 

and trumpet-major (instead of the sergeant-major), drum-major, and 

fife-major of the infantry regiment. Continental artillery regiment 

staffs mirrored the infantry but also included a number of cadets 

undergoing technical training to become artillery officers.

Of course the staffs described above all varied depending on 

numerous factors. Army commanders would organize their staff 

based on their specific situation, needs, and area of operation (see 

Appendix A for the organization of Schuyler’s and Burgoyne’s 

respective staffs, and Appendix F for Gates’ staff). Burgoyne, 

for example, had a naval liaison officer on his staff who assisted 

with the shipping requirements on Lake Champlain. Schuyler and 

Gates did not need such an officer, especially after the loss of Fort 

Ticonderoga. Regimental staffs grew and shrank based on the actual 

strength of the unit, casualties, and the availability of officers to fill 

positions. Regardless of organization and strength, all staffs were 

responsible to provide their commander with the critical assistance 

required to command his forces. Commands with strong staffs 

tended to function efficiently. Those with poor staffs did not. 

Weapons

Infantry

During the American Revolution, the Continental Army’s 

standard firearm was initially the British Long Land Pattern musket 
31

commonly referred to as the “Brown Bess.” This .75 caliber flintlock 

musket was fitted with a socket bayonet. The most common versions 

of the Brown Bess used in the War for Independence were the Long 

and Short Land Pattern muskets. The long version was 62.5 inches 

long (without bayonet) and weighed 10.4 pounds. The short version 

was manufactured after it was discovered that reducing the length of 

the barrel by about four inches had no effect on accuracy. It was 58.5 

inches long, but oddly, weighed 10.5 pounds. The weapon possessed 

no sights as it was intended to be a mass fire (i.e., volley fire) 

weapon. Prior to 1775, the colonies issued the various Brown Bess 

versions for use by militia forces. Although the mixture of weapons 

for American units is unknown, a majority were likely armed with a 

version of the Brown Bess and a substantial number with the French 

Charleville musket. 

With the new regimental structure adopted in 1776 and new 

tactical formations prescribed in 1777, the Continental Army 

adopted a new standard weapon—the French Army musket known 

as the “Charleville.” The army purchased and secretly imported at 

least 48,000 of the 1763 and 1766 models from France in the spring 

of 1777 and provided them to many Continental units, including 

many of the units in the Saratoga Campaign. The Charleville was 

fifty-seven inches long and fired a one-ounce, .69 caliber lead ball 

or “buck and ball” ammunition similar to a shotgun. This musket 

was more durable, reliable, and accurate than the Brown Bess. Its 

slightly longer range also fit well with the American preference for 

aimed shots versus massed musket fire.

British Army units used a different mix of weapons from 

their American counterparts. About half of British regiments 

involved in the Saratoga Campaign were armed with the Long 

Land Pattern Brown Bess and about half with the shorter version. 

The Braunschweiger musketeers, who were the largest German 

contingent with Burgoyne’s army, carried the Prussian Model 1740 

Potsdam musket as well as an essentially identical weapon produced 

in Braunschweig. Like the British musket, these weapons had a .75 

caliber bore, so interoperability of ammunition was no problem. The 

barrel was forty to forty-one inches long and the weapon weighed 

about 8.5 pounds—significantly lighter than the Brown Bess. The 
32

maximum effective range for all of these muskets was about 50 to 

100 yards depending on environmental conditions.

The Braunschweiger Jäger Battalion used a short rifle referred 

to as the “Büchse.” It was originally developed as a hunting rifle 

in Germany, thus the designation “jäger,” which means “hunter” in 

German. Armed with the Büchse, the jägers were the only British 

coalition unit in the Saratoga Campaign exclusively armed with a 

rifle.6 The Büchse fired a .67 caliber ball and was accurate to about 

175 yards, somewhat less effective than the American rifle. They were 

about forty-five inches long with a thirty-inch barrel and weighed 

about nine pounds. Like the American rifle, the weapon was hard to 

load. Each came with a mallet to pound the patched balls into place 

with a ramrod. The process took about a minute compared to the three 

rounds per minute a trained musketeer could fire. For faster loading, 

the ball could be placed in the barrel without the patch, but there was 

a corresponding loss of accuracy and range. The Büchse could not 

mount a bayonet, so a musketeer unit (usually a light infantry unit) 

usually employed the jägers, reducing the likelihood they would be 

overrun while reloading. In lieu of a bayonet, jägers were armed with 

a “Hirschfänger” short sword for secondary protection. 

A few American units (the most notable of which was 

Morgan’s Rifle Regiment) and a number of individuals at Saratoga 

were also equipped with rifles rather than muskets. In contrast with 

issued weapons like the Brown Bess and Charleville muskets, these 

“Pennsylvania Rifles” were owned outright by their users—many 

custom-made by local gunsmiths. 

Rifles were clearly superior to the musket in terms of accuracy 

and distance. American riflemen often engaged targets out to 250 

and 300 yards. The rifles of this period, however, were somewhat 

difficult to load. Whereas a musket ball was slightly smaller than 

the musket bore and was easily pushed into place with the ramrod 

once the powder was loaded, the rifle ball had to be slightly larger 

than the rifle bore partly to ensure maximum compression. The snug 

fit ensured the ball would grip the rifling for greater accuracy. This 

process caused much friction and the rifleman used a fair amount of 

energy and took a longer time to load the weapon. Also the weapon 

would quickly foul after a few shots; carbon in the tight barrel would 
33

make the weapon impossible to load. Still the casualty rates inflicted 

by troops using these weapons were much higher per shot than with 

muskets. One drawback: Like the Büsche, the Pennsylvania Rifle 

was not designed to carry a bayonet. 

The bayonet was a critical item for line soldiers. After using 

firepower to reduce the strength of an enemy’s formation, the line 

would press forward with the bayonet. This weapon is credited 

with inflicting about a third of all casualties on the Revolutionary 

War battlefield. During the Saratoga Campaign, bayonets mounted 

on muskets were all similar in their basic design. Blades varied 

by manufacturer but were typically about fourteen to eighteen 

inches long. British and German troops carried muskets that were 

universally equipped with bayonets. Some Continental units were 

well-equipped with the weapon, but in militia units and some other 

regiments, only a few men possessed them. 

In addition to bayonets, many Continentals and militiamen 

possessed a tomahawk. This small hatchet was a secondary weapon 

issued to some men in lieu of bayonets. American riflemen were 

known to be especially fond of them since they had no bayonets. 

The tomahawk was also extensively used by the Iroquois Indians 

on both sides, as well as a good number of loyalists and Canadians. 

With this close-quarters weapon, the ideal stroke was a head blow 

that generally killed the opponent instantly or at least immobilized 

him so that he was no longer an immediate threat. The weapon could 

be thrown with good accuracy for up to ten to fifteen yards or used 

to effectively parry the blows of other bladed weapons and even 

disarm a less skilled opponent. 

Cavalry

The cavalry organizations on both sides in the Saratoga Campaign 

were light dragoon units rather than cavalry. In other words, these 

soldiers were essentially mounted infantrymen. A typical dragoon 

was equipped with a carbine, usually two flintlock pistols carried in 

a saddle holster, and a heavy bladed saber as a secondary weapon. 

The main problem was that dragoon-type weapons were in short 

supply, so units were issued or otherwise acquired a large variety of 

weapons. In most units there was little standardization. 
34

The 2nd Connecticut Light Horse, a militia regiment, was 

apparently equipped with sabers, pistols, and muskets of unknown 

manufacture. Captain Jean de Vernejoux’s troop of the 2nd 

Continental Light Dragoons likely carried only pistols during most 

of the campaign, precluding these troops from fighting as dismounted 

infantry. While they apparently were not equipped with carbines, they 

may have possessed sabers, possibly including some acquired from 

the Braunschweiger Prinz Ludwig Dragoons captured at Bennington.

The Prinz Ludwig Dragoons were armed with a carbine and a 

German dragoon saber known as a “pallash.” The carbine was a 

relatively short weapon about four feet, three inches long. The Hessian 

version, which may be the same weapon carried by the Prinz Ludwig 

Regiment, was a rifle with a .75 caliber bore. Like jäger troops, the 

dragoon’s carbine did not mount a bayonet so they generally needed to 

operate in coordination with standard infantry formations. The pallash 

carried by the Prinz Ludwig Dragoons was a heavy, two-edged, straight 

broadsword that could be mounted to use in a standard cavalry charge. 

During this period, the regiment was almost entirely on foot. Only one 

troop was ever mounted and then only for a short time.

Artillery

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of artillery weapons in 

the Saratoga Campaign were of British manufacture. These guns, 

mortars, and howitzers had specific uses depending on the type of 

operation to be undertaken. All cannon were smoothbore, muzzleloaded weapons cast in either iron or bronze. Iron cannon were 

stronger, could take a larger powder charge, and boasted a longer 

range. For example, a 6-pounder iron gun could throw a solid shot 

accurately about 1,500 yards versus 1,200 yards for a similar-size 

brass cannon. The iron pieces were, however, heavier and more 

difficult to move. They were also more susceptible to corrosion 

from the elements and metal fatigue from firing. Because of their 

lighter weight, smaller field pieces were more often cast in bronze 

and were the preferred choice for mobile artillery companies. Larger 

pieces were usually cast in iron and used for fixed positions. 

These weapons fired various types of rounds, including shot, 

grape, canister, and shell. A solid shot round was simply an iron ball. 
35

These rounds were fired against massed infantry and cavalry targets 

but were more effective when used to batter enemy fortifications 

and ships. Also used as counterbattery ammunition, solid shot could 

fire between 800 and 2,000 yards. 

Grape shot was a naval round consisting of six to twelve 

softball-size balls fired from the larger guns found on ships or siege 

artillery. At sea, the round was elevated at close range against other 

ships to cut rigging, smash spars, and shred sails. To a lesser extent, 

grape shot was fired against the hulls and into the gun compartments 

of smaller, thin-skinned vessels in an anti-personnel mode. 

Canister or analogous case shot was used in smaller field guns 

and howitzers. Similar to but much smaller than grape shot, canister 

shot consisted of a number of balls packed into a container usually 

made of tin straps. When fired, the container disintegrated and released the balls in a conical pattern at the target. With a range of 50 

to 400 yards, canister shot was more effective than solid shot against 

infantry and cavalry formations as they closed. Both grape and canister shot acted much like a large shotgun blast. 

Like its name implied, the shell round was a hollow sphere 

filled with explosives. These rounds were generally fired from howitzers and mortars at high angles to land inside fixed fortifications. 

The intent was to destroy positions and sympathetically explode 

stored ammunition and powder. The shell, which broke into several 

large pieces and produced a shrapnel-like effect, also could be used 

against troops. In those cases, shell rounds were predominantly used 

for demoralization purposes because the shell pieces were too few in 

number to cause many casualties. 

The British system of nomenclature for the various sizes of 

guns which fired these rounds was based on the weight of the solid 

shot round used in the weapon. At different points in the Saratoga 

Campaign, for example, units fired 3-, 6-, 12-, 16-, and 24-pounder 

British cannon. The smaller pieces (3-, 6-, and 12-pounders) were 

used as mobile artillery against infantry, cavalry, and opposing artillery units on the battlefield. The 3-pounders were very mobile and 

could be relatively effective when firing canister rounds at close 

range. Iron and bronze 6-pounders were the most common guns in 

the light artillery companies—effective for supporting the infantry 
36

fight. While they possessed good firepower and range, the 12-pounders were considered “medium” guns because they were harder to 

maneuver in woodland fighting like that experienced during much of 

the campaign. Guns larger than 12-pounders were generally used in 

fixed positions such as Fort Ticonderoga, for siege artillery against a 

fortification, or on the ships of the Lake Champlain Squadron. These 

guns typically fired 1,000 yards for a brass 6-pounder to 2,000 yards 

for an iron 24-pounder.

Howitzers weighed less than guns and, therefore, could be 

moved more easily. Like mortars, their nomenclature was determined by the inch width of the bore. The most common howitzer in 

the campaign was a 5.5-inch model. Burgoyne possessed a number 

of 8-inch howitzers as well. Howitzers were high-angle weapons 

that had to be positioned closer to their targets, typically firing 800 

to 1,000 yards. They used a smaller charge but threw a larger round 

than comparable-size guns. Though the shell round was its primary 

projectile, a howitzer also could fire canisters. 

A variety of mortars were employed in the Saratoga Campaign, including 4.4-, 5.5-, 8-, 10-, and 13-inch mortars. Like the 

howitzer, mortars were high-angle weapons—though smaller in 

size and heavier in weight. Mortars were mounted on fixed blocks 

called “baulks” and were aimed by line-of-sight. Since the tube was 

mounted at a fixed 45-degree angle, throw distance was adjusted by 

smaller or larger amounts of powder. The various models listed here 

could lob a solid shot anywhere from 800 to 1,000 yards. 

Unlike today, all types of artillery during the Revolutionary 

War period were direct fire weapons. In other words, gunners had 

to see what they were aiming at regardless of the angle of fire. This 

was generally simple for artillery pieces since they needed to see the 

target. The same was true for mortars, but the round’s actual strike 

might not be observed. Still, the target—usually some sort of fortification—had to be visible so that the gunners could estimate the 

range and determine if the rounds were falling in the desired area.

British cannon were not the only artillery used during the Saratoga Campaign. Though small in number, French, Spanish, and even 

Swedish guns were found in the artillery parks. At least 200 French 

cannon were imported in the spring of 1777 for use by the Ameri-
37

Figure 6. American and British Coalition Guns. 

American and British Coalition Guns

Fort Ticonderoga July 1777*

1 x 2-pounders

13 x 6-pounders

6 x 9-pounders

5 x 12-pounders

2 x 18-pounders

Fort Schuyler August 1777

4 x 3-pounders

4 x 6-pounders

3 x 9-pounders

Bemis Heights October 1777

2 x 3-pounders

15 x 4-pounders

4 x 6-pounders

1 x 9-pounders

Burgoyne’s Army from Canada (British)

Advance Corps Artillery

4 x light 6-pounders

4 x light 3-pounders

2 x 4.4-inch mortars

Right Wing Artillery Brigade

4 x 6-pounders

Left Wing Artillery Brigade

4 x 6-pounders

Independent (Center) Brigade of Artillery

4 x 6-pounders

Reserve Corps Artillery

2 x light 6-pounders

2 x light 3-pounders

Artillery Park

2 x light 24-pounders

4 x medium 12-pounders

2 x 8-inch howitzers

2 x 4.4-inch mortars

* This is a list of artillery pieces captured from the American forces at Fort

Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on 6 July 1777. It may not be a

complete list of all pieces that were actually in the defenses, but few if any

additional guns were evacuated.
38

can forces. The French de Vallière system of guns consisted of 4-, 

8-, 12-, and 24-pounder field guns and 8- and 12-inch mortars. Ten 

of the 4-pounder weapons were delivered to Maj. Ebenezer Stevens, Gates’ chief of artillery, on 26 July 1777 and were among the 

twenty-two guns known to be employed by American artillerymen 

at Bemis Heights.

Offensive Tactics 

Infantry Tactical Doctrine in 1777

By the early 1700s, the older system of pikemen and musketeers 

had been replaced by infantry armed with bayonet-tipped flintlock 

muskets who formed in linear formation to maximize the effect of 

musket volleys. The regiments of musketeers formed in a line three 

ranks deep and would fire volleys en masse or by lines in rapid 

succession. These organizations were the heart of what became 

known as “linear tactics.” The regiments that made up the bulk of 

these formations were the basis of any army—referred to as the 

“heavy infantry” or the “line infantry.” This reference later became 

shortened to the “line,” or for United States troops in America, the 

“Continental Line.” Additionally, state contingents of the Continental 

Line were referred to by state, as in the “Pennsylvania Line.” On the 

battlefield, every army’s goal was to break the enemy’s infantry line 

of battle. All efforts of the combined arms team of infantry, cavalry, 

and artillery were geared to achieve that end. The line that broke first 

was the most likely to be defeated and swept from the field.

The standard sequence of events in a European-style linear 

battle was for the armies to march to approach the vicinity of the 

other army. One commander or the other would choose a piece 

of ground—generally fairly open—and deploy his forces. Ideally 

there would be a natural obstacle, such as a river or a heavy forest, 

to protect the army’s flanks. If the other army commander chose 

to give battle, he would form his battle line, generally out of cannon shot, or at about 1,000 yards. One line or both would advance, 

under artillery fire, until they were 100 to 50 yards apart then commence firing volleys at the opposing line.

The massed volley fire by heavy infantry was intended to beat 

down the other opponent’s line and disorganize them so that at 
39

an appropriate time, the army commander could order a bayonet 

charge against a weakened point in the line. The more effective and 

well-disciplined European armies spent much of their peacetime 

activities on the drill field practicing approach marches, linear battle 

formations, maneuvers, and musket-loading drills. A well-trained 

unit could load and fire weapons about three times a minute while 

under fire. A regiment of 300 men could launch 900 lead balls at 

their opponents, sometimes as close fifty yards, within one minute, 

and rapidly disable them with superior firepower while concurrently 

diminishing the enemy’s own firepower. Some units became so good 

that they could reload and fire four times a minute.

Under ideal open field fighting conditions, only about fifteen 

to twenty percent of volley rounds would strike an opposing soldier 

standing in a similar line of fire about fifty yards away. Using the 

twenty-percent figure as a guide for a volley fired by a 300-man 

regiment against an opposing 300-man regiment, about fifteen men 

would be killed or mortally wounded outright and another fortyfive would be wounded. Of course, these figures would be lower at 

greater distances, in wooded environments, or if one side was behind 

defensive works. The eventual effect of the volleys would be that 

some part of the enemy line would suffer high casualties and show 

less effective fires. Then the side with the advantage would charge 

with bayonets, followed by fierce hand-to-hand fighting if the men in 

the weaker line stood and fought, or more likely, break and retreat by 

the weaker line. Few regiments, even well-trained ones, possessed 

the discipline to receive a bayonet charge and attempt to resist it. 

In the case of militia and those Continental units with few or no 

bayonets, the unit would likely retreat precipitously as soon as the 

enemy began its bayonet charge.

In addition to the line (heavy) infantry, other specialized organizations used different tactics or performed tasks other than manning the line. These included the previously mentioned light infantry, grenadiers, jägers, and American rifle units. British, German, 

and American regiments all possessed a light infantry company. 

Normally, these units would operate well ahead of the regimental 

line. Usually two to four men would move forward in open order 

known as a “skirmish line.” The small teams spread out to present 
40

a reduced target to the enemy’s skirmishers and main battle line. 

Armed with muskets, these men were trained to take aimed shots. 

One or two men would aim and fire while the other team reloaded. 

The skirmishers would attrite, harass, and demoralize the opposing 

infantry. During the Saratoga Campaign, the American side generally used light infantry in this manner. Burgoyne chose instead to 

consolidate his light infantry companies into an ad hoc battalion and 

use them as elite shock troops. 

The grenadiers, for which there was no American equivalent, 

were considered elite troops. Early manifestations of the grenadiers 

were men chosen for their size and strength. They were selected 

because they could throw grenades long distances so that they or 

their comrades were not injured by the explosion. They usually performed their task out front and under fire. As the use of grenades 

declined, these units evolved into elite assault troops—assigned difficult or desperate missions where only they could be expected to 

succeed. This usually meant attacking to destroy or capture a heavily held defensive position. By this time, the British army generally 

selected men based on their veteran status, past performance, and 

known courage under fire. It was an honor to be selected and transferred to the grenadier company. As with his light infantry companies, Burgoyne opted to consolidate his grenadiers into a single 

large battalion. 

Jäger troops were similar to light infantry and generally used 

the same tactics. The major difference was that jägers carried a 

short rifle rather than a musket; they had a slower rate of fire than 

musket-equipped light infantry. At distances more than 100 yards, 

this tended to be less of a problem since, like the American riflemen, jägers could hit targets accurately from 175 to 200 yards away. 

Jägers carried no bayonets, so German commanders typically assigned regular infantry troops to operate with them to provide some 

level of protection as they closed in. 

 American rifle units operated far differently than other infantry 

units. Rather than placing the bayonet-less riflemen on or near the 

battle line, commanders kept these troops at a distance where the 

reach and accuracy of their weapons could be used to maximum 

effect and they had less fear of being caught in a bayonet attack. 
41

Thus, they had less concern during the longer time it took to recharge their rifles. Nevertheless, these men remained vigilant since 

British commanders would always seek opportunities to charge with 

the bayonet when their enemies were vulnerable. The distance from 

the enemy also reduced the amount of bullets whizzing by to distract 

them as they took aim at their targets. The riflemen were encouraged 

to inflict casualties on enemy officers and artillery crews. At Saratoga, Morgan’s men were also employed to counter the Indian threat 

posed by Burgoyne’s fierce Iroquois warriors. 

Another aspect of infantry tactics must be mentioned here. It 

is a myth that Americans only fought behind trees and stone walls 

while their bright red-coated adversaries stood in straight lines waiting to be shot down by keen marksmen. This image was reinforced 

by stories of Lexington and Concord where the Minutemen took 

advantage of the cover afforded by trees and rock walls along the 

British route. 

Unlike the typical European battlefields of the time, many battles during the American War for Independence were indeed fought in 

heavily wooded and hilly terrain. While this was true during the Saratoga Campaign, most battles were fought using linear tactics. The 

reality is that both sides were led by men who had at least a modicum 

of training in military tactics, techniques, and procedures common 

to armies of the day. Even on the American side, many generals and 

colonels had some professional military experience serving with the 

British Army or during the French and Indian War. Most had the benefit of periodic militia training and excursions against Indian raiders. 

With the possible exception of the forays against the Indians, their 

experience and training generally focused on conventional operations 

and tactics of the period. Moreover, the British regiments did not always fight in “close order” formation, that is, shoulder-to-shoulder. 

In America, British units usually fought in “open order,” maintaining 

about an 18-inch distance between soldiers. Regiments also formed 

in two lines rather than three as one would see on a European battlefield. This was largely due to the relative ineffectiveness of the fires of 

the third line. Whether in relatively flat, open or heavily wooded and 

hilly terrain, both sides typically formed lines of battle in open order 

with line infantry screened by skirmishers. Both sides also used trees, 
42

walls, earth, and defensive structures for cover and concealment. 

Even then, fighting was generally accomplished in a linear fashion.

Cavalry Tactical Doctrine in 1777

During the Revolutionary War period, most European armies 

used a variety of mounted organizations, including heavy and 

light cavalry, lancers, and dragoons. Of these, only dragoons were 

raised and employed in any appreciable numbers during the War for 

Independence. In reality, neither side employed many mounted units. 

This was particularly true of the Saratoga Campaign. Burgoyne’s 

army possessed only the Prinz Ludwig Dragoons Regiment, which 

had just over 300 men at the beginning of the campaign but no 

horses. The American Northern Army’s dragoons, on the other hand, 

were mounted but never consisted of more than about 250 troopers 

at any given time. As noted previously, these troops were also poorly 

armed and thus of limited utility.

Dragoons who participated in the Saratoga Campaign were organized and equipped to ride to their place of battle, dismount, and 

fight on foot with their rifles or carbines. Since this meant that the 

unit would usually have to move away from their horses to take up 

a firing position, every fourth man was detailed to hold the horses of 

three other men. This effectively reduced the firepower of a dragoon 

organization by a quarter. 

Instead of being employed on the battle line, dragoons were 

typically sent to attack the flanks or rear of vulnerable infantry 

units. They also could engage or chase off light cavalry, conduct 

reconnaissance missions, and pursue broken infantry formations. 

When dismounted, the dragoon’s carbine was his most effective 

weapon. Like an infantry regiment, mounted or dismounted dragoons 

could volley fire to attack an enemy unit. On horseback, his weapon 

of choice was the short, heavy-bladed broadsword or saber (if one 

had been issued). The carbine and pistols were next to useless when 

fired from the back of a jostling horse. Rarely could a dragoon hit a 

target with a firearm while mounted, and pistols were only good out 

to about thirty yards at best. Moreover, a pistol or rifle was extremely 

difficult to reload on horseback. Still, many dragoons preferred a 

firearm over a saber. 
43

Artillery Tactical Doctrine in 1777

In terms of employment, both infantry and cavalry 

organizations and their tactics were relatively simple and 

straightforward. Artillery, on the other hand, tended to be much 

more technical and difficult to employ properly. Each type of 

cannon had peculiarities and variables that could significantly 

impact its effectiveness—size of the powder charge, elevation, 

angles of attack, weather, and others. Understanding and mastering 

these variables took time. Thus, artillery units were not organized 

and trained as quickly or easily as the other two combat arms. 

Moreover, while virtually all infantrymen and cavalry troopers in 

a given unit performed functions like marching, loading, and firing 

concurrently, each man in a cannon crew had different functions 

to perform when moving, loading, and firing a cannon. Each man 

in the crew also needed to know how to perform the other men’s 

functions in case of casualties. The crews also needed to know how 

to function within the gun section or company as well.

Tactically, American field cannon were generally employed in 

a section of two or three guns. One section was assigned to each 

brigade to provide direct support. Thus, the brigade commander 

deployed the section and controlled its fires. When forming for 

battle, guns were set up about 1,000 yards from the enemy with the 

section placed on a flank so that the guns could engage in a cross 

fire of the enemy infantry as the lines closed. During an attack, the 

guns could be pushed forward by hand as the line advanced and 

start firing at the halt. The intent was to aim the round so it would 

bounce or ricochet through the enemy ranks to maximize casualties. 

As the infantry closed, the guns could sweep the line from the left 

or right. Canister was the preferred round. However, round shot 

was very effective when fired against the flank of a formation as 

the ball would bounce along the long axis of the formation—killing 

or maiming more soldiers. Once the infantry closed and there was 

the potential to hit friendly troops with canister, the section could 

be turned to protect the friendly flank from attack by other enemy 

infantry formations or cavalry charges. Those guns not serving with 

the brigades could be placed in the army artillery park. These guns 

were the army’s general support batteries. They could be dispatched 
44

to bolster a weakened part of the line or concentrated to help beat 

down a weakened section of the enemy line. 

In defensive positions, guns were placed on the line with 

their assigned brigade to prevent enemy infantry formations from 

reaching and penetrating the friendly works. Canister rounds also 

were the preferred ammunition in these situations once the enemy 

closed to canister range. Those guns in the artillery park could be 

employed to reinforce the most likely approaches for the main 

attack or other threatened sectors, while the larger pieces were used 

in a counterbattery role against enemy artillery attempting to batter 

the walls of the defense positions. 

Fortifications and Tactics

During the Revolutionary War and particularly the Saratoga 

Campaign, both sides extensively used improved defensive positions 

to limit casualties for the defending force and increase casualties on 

the attacking force. In simple terms, improved defensive positions 

during this campaign tended to be: a permanent fortification such as 

Fort Ticonderoga; a semi-permanent structure such as a blockhouse 

fort or fortified building; or temporary field works such as those 

prepared by both sides near Bemis Heights. Each type of fort was 

built for specific defensive reasons.

Most permanent-type forts in the Saratoga Campaign were 

built similar to the “star” fort designs perfected by the great French 

engineer and soldier, Marshal Sébastien Le Prestre de Vauban. Forts 

Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Schuyler, George, and Edward were 

all substantial permanent fortifications and the largest defensive 

structures in the campaign area. These American forts, however, were 

much simpler in design than those in Europe and were predominantly 

constructed of earth and wood rather than stone. Still, for an 

investing (besieging) commander, these were significant obstacles, 

especially if well-defended. Burgoyne’s train of 139 artillery pieces 

was so large because he calculated that Fort Ticonderoga would be 

more strongly defended than it was. Ticonderoga was a threat to 

his line of communications from Canada as it prevented naval (and 

thus resupply) traffic between Canada and points farther south on 

Lakes Champlain and Lake George. Each of the other star forts also 
45

guarded some key point along various waterways. For example, 

Fort Schuyler secured the portage route between Wood Creek and 

the Mohawk River, Fort George protected the south end of Lake 

George and the entrance into the Hudson River, and Fort Edward 

controlled movement to the south on the Hudson.

Star forts were not easily subdued. A commander had to give 

much thought and prepare his army to defeat such a fortification, 

typically through starvation, siege operations, and direct assault. The 

former method was far too lengthy for a campaign on a relatively 

short timeline such as Burgoyne’s. If the enemy had stockpiled 

enough rations and ammunition, the process could take months or 

longer than a year. It might not even work at all if a relieving army 

reached the site. Aggressive siege operations generally lasted only 

a month or two but required significant effort to dig a series of saps 

and parallels (see Appendix I, Glossary for terminology related 

to fortifications and sieges). Interspersed throughout these lines 

were artillery positions to continuously batter the walls of the fort 

in an effort to breach them. The sappers or miners could also dig 

underground to create galleys reaching to locations beneath the fort 

walls. There, the sappers would emplace powder charges and tamp 

them in to cause the blast to go upward. Thus the exploded charges 

would normally blow a huge hole in the wall through which the 

assaulting enemy would attack. Even this process, however, took 

a great deal of time, resulted in friendly casualties, and physically 

and mentally wore out the troops. Direct assault against a star fort 

generally was not considered unless the garrison was so weak 

it could not defend portions of the walls. Even if a direct assault 

succeeded, an assault force was likely to incur heavy casualties. 

Semi-permanent fortifications consisted primarily of blockhouses 

and stockade forts. Blockhouses typically were two-story log structures. 

The ground story was used as a storage and sleeping area and usually had 

no windows or loopholes (firing ports). The second story was usually 

larger, so the “house” appeared to be sitting on a block. The second 

story had several loopholes in each wall from which men could fire 

down on attackers. Stockade forts were little more than a wall of logs, 

driven or dug in to the round and often cut to form a point at the tips. 

The walls were anywhere from twelve to eighteen feet high. Dirt was 
46

sloped behind the wall to reinforce it and form a flat sentry walk high 

enough for men to fire over the wall. If large enough, a stockade fort 

could have additional log structures inside such as barracks, kitchens, 

and storerooms. Some stockades included one or more blockhouses 

as well. Fort Anne may have been an example of such a combined 

structure (the fort’s actual structure in 1777 is not clear). Blockhouses 

and stockades were constructed primarily to protect local citizens 

against Indian attack and as protective way stations for supplies and 

equipment that were en route from one place to another. These types 

of forts could also be used to close down small rivers and creeks to 

navigation and deny the use of nearby key facilities to smaller bands 

of enemy troops. Neither type of fortification was much good against 

a larger body of well-trained troops, particularly if the attackers were 

equipped with some artillery. 

Field works were constructed using many of the same techniques 

used for star forts and stockades, such as a basic trench line with 

a sloped earth curtain, redans, redoubts, lunettes, or traverses (see 

Appendix I, Glossary). All would be constructed and reinforced with 

gabions, fascines, abitis, chevaux-de-frise, and fraise. Each had a 

specific purpose but all were designed to protect troops and artillery 

and strengthen the defending army. Though most were integrated 

into a major defensive line, many were built as stand-alone positions. 

The stand-alone field works would be located to take advantage of 

the terrain and provide interlocking fires with other positions for 

mutual support. These fortifications could be reduced relatively 

quickly with artillery but, if constructed well, could withstand a 

significant amount of abuse. Because artillery round shot generally 

buried itself in earthen slopes rather than tearing holes in the walls 

and shell, it caused relatively little damage against field works. 

Conversely, a well dug-in force could inflict enormous casualties on 

an attacking infantry force. In short, the more time an enemy force 

spent preparing such defenses, the harder they were to overcome.

Tactics in the Saratoga Campaign

In the Revolutionary War, the tactical offense was the preferred 

form of operations over the tactical defense. This was especially 

true in an open field fight where both sides were generally equal 
47

in strength. Commanders preferred to use the full strength of their 

infantry line at relatively close quarters to weaken the enemy. 

Artillery could be used in an offensive mode by wheeling the guns 

forward as the line advanced, and cavalry could attack the flanks 

and rear of enemy troops to help break the opposing line. Once the 

line was broken, commanders would use the cavalry charge and 

shock power to further destroy or route the opposing army. When 

necessary, one side would assume the defensive to protect a key 

facility or route of advance, or to husband the strength of the weaker 

force. Both sides in the Saratoga Campaign generally followed 

those tactics but also deviated somewhat because of terrain, training 

and discipline, equipment, and logistics, among others. In general, 

tactics in the campaign were characterized by the following:

• British coalition units tended to fight in “doctrinal” combined 

arms mode—adjusted for North America with infantry in two (not 

three) lines and more space between the soldiers. They employed 

field guns up front in the infantry line at every opportunity.

• American attacks were rarely supported by cannon. However, 

commanders utilized their various infantry to great advantage. This 

was especially true of riflemen used to attrite British leaders and 

artillery crews and an emphasis on aimed shots by men of the line.

• When on the deliberate defense, the American forces did not 

remain behind their fortifications but left the works with at least part 

of their strength to conduct a movement to contact. This tactic disrupted the enemy’s advance and forced them to fight at locations or 

times they were not expecting to engage and in ways they could not 

bring their full line to bear.

• Mounted forces played minor roles at best for both sides. The 

German dragoons were ineffective due to lack of horses, and the 

American dragoons lacked proper weapons.

• The need to fight in wooded and hilly terrain caused both 

sides to deemphasize neatly ordered ranks, although they generally 

remained in a loose battle line even in open areas. Commanders 

opened the distance between individuals in the line, and all troops 

used cover when available. As a result, casualty rates were much 

lower in wooded areas but remained somewhat higher during combat in open areas.
48

• The “press of bayonets” by either side was rarely achieved 

because many, if not most, American soldiers lacked bayonets. The 

American troops would simply fall back when British or German 

troops pressed forward with bayonets.

• Both Burgoyne and Gates used Indians as “eyes and ears” in 

lieu of cavalry, but they were not effective in pitched battles. Burgoyne especially took advantage of the intelligence the Indians provided regarding troop positions and movements. 

• Indian depredations against civilians and prisoners resulted 

in a major information operations and publicity problem for Burgoyne’s army. Their actions also prompted more Americans to rally 

to the Patriot cause.

• The wooded and hilly terrain complicated the pursuit of 

broken or retreating forces, especially when the retreating force 

emplaced obstacles on the route behind them.

• Both sides used engineer-type mobility-countermobilitysurvivability operations to greatly increase their offensive and 

defensive effectiveness. 

In summary, the tactical conduct of the Saratoga Campaign 

largely followed the tactical doctrine of the day—with some 

modifications due to the somewhat unique American area of 

operation. Clearly, the British and German generals were more 

experienced in and knowledgeable of modern warfare than the 

American commanders. The coalition forces in the campaign were 

the better trained, equipped, and disciplined army. The Americans, 

however, were more familiar with the operational environment, 

especially the terrain, weather, and local population, and they used 

this knowledge to their advantage. Attacks by both sides were 

often piecemeal, frontal, and uncoordinated. Deliberate defenses 

were rarely tested and generally effective for both sides, with 

the exception of the defense of Fort Ticonderoga. Ultimately, the 

fighting qualities of one side or the other did not determine the 

fate of the Army from Canada. That fault can largely be laid at 

the feet of the British strategic planners (Lord George Germain 

and Gen. William Howe) and the operational commander, Gen. 

John Burgoyne. Why that is the case will be analyzed in Section II, 

Overview of the Saratoga Campaign.
49

Logistics Support

By almost any measure, the system of arming, equipping, 

and supplying the Army from Canada was superior to that of the 

Continental and state militia forces tasked with defeating it. This 

was particularly true, at least initially, of the Army from Canada 

that marched out of St. John’s in Quebec Province in June 1777. 

Though well-organized and effective at the start of the campaign, the 

British system’s advantage steadily degenerated as the army moved 

south. Burgoyne had miscalculated regarding needed resources and 

underestimated difficulties of operating in the New York wilderness 

as his final plans for the mission solidified. Some historians have 

argued that Burgoyne’s mission was doomed to failure from the 

beginning. 

Given the key role played by logistics in this campaign it is 

particularly useful to review the logistical organizations and procedures of both sides and the corresponding advantages and disadvantages of both systems. 

Strategic Logistics

The wartime logistical effort in America was at a severe 

disadvantage to the British, who had a longstanding, though 

somewhat byzantine, national logistical structure. Unlike the 

British, the Americans had to build a “system” almost from scratch 

without the benefit of a strong national government to provide 

central direction and reinforce priorities. The Second Continental 

Congress functioned somewhat as a central government but in 

reality had little power to impose its logistic decisions and priorities 

on state governments that possessed most of the governing power 

and authority.

For all intents and purposes, the American national logistic 

system began in 1775 when Congress created three key positions on 

George Washington’s Main Army staff: the Commissary General, 

Quartermaster General, and the Commissary of Artillery. Each of 

these positions developed, originally, into a department or bureau 

consisting of a principal and one deputy. The men initially appointed 

to these positions were John Trumbull (19 July), Thomas Mifflin (14 

August), and Ezekiel Cheever (17 August). Charged with oversee-
50

ing the Main Army’s logistics requirements, these men also had the 

responsibility for the broader Continental Army and so functioned 

somewhat analogous to today’s Deputy Chief of Staff G4 on the 

Army Staff. They primarily accomplished the latter mission through 

coordinating with deputies assigned to the various geographical 

departments (e.g., the Northern Department) and armies (e.g., the 

Northern Army). Their duties with the Main Army left them little 

time to focus on supporting the larger Continental Army as a whole. 

In terms of an industrial base in America, almost all businesses 

that produced goods of any military value were locally owned and 

operated by private entrepreneurs. Any controls or priorities placed 

on these businesses were imposed at the state level. State governments also were largely responsible for raising and equipping their 

own militia organizations as well as Continental Army regiments 

designated for their states. States that took seriously the ownership 

of their designated Continental units generally did at least an adequate job of equipping and providing supplies for “their” regiments. 

A state’s governor or legislative body was the real authority that 

guided and directed businesses regarding the production and issue 

of troop supplies. Food and various types of supply had to be purchased directly from the producer by a purchasing agent. Both the 

states and the commanders of the various geographical departments 

employed purchasing agents to acquire goods and materials to support their army units. These agents were often in competition for the 

same goods, which drove up prices.

Paying higher prices for military goods prompted problems 

like rampant speculation, fraud, and inflation. Leaders at the national and state levels devoted significant energy to curb these problems. 

Adding to the headaches, Continental paper money rapidly became 

next to worthless which made the challenge of acquiring supplies 

even more problematic. At times, due to the lack of confidence in 

the paper money, authorities were forced to “impress” supplies (i.e., 

forcibly acquire them and issue a receipt for later payment), particularly animals, from the owners. This practice could drive otherwise 

neutral citizens to support the loyalist cause. 

Perhaps the most successful national procurement effort prior 

to the Saratoga Campaign was the surreptitious acquisition of mili-
51

tary materiel from France through Roderique Hortalez & Company. 

This was a front company created in 1776 by a Frenchman—with 

French and Spanish government support—to transfer arms and 

equipment to the American rebels. The company shipped more than 

100,000 Model 1763 Charleville muskets and bayonets; more than 

200 cannon; and many tons of powder, ammunition, uniforms and 

other items—purchased on credit by the Continental Congress—to 

America to support the revolution against Great Britain.

In contrast with the rudimentary American effort, the British 

logistical system was mature, though not necessarily efficient; government agency responsibilities and powers were delineated and 

understood. By almost any measure it was significantly better and 

more reliable than the American system.

The British system did have certain advantages but also some 

disadvantages. On the plus side, a significant number of industries 

in England and other parts of Great Britain had been in the business of making implements of war for a very long time. Much of 

what they produced was state-of-the-art weapons, ammunition, uniforms, and other items. England boasted a virtual army of trained 

and skilled packers, coopers, blacksmiths, wagonsmiths, harness 

makers, wheelwrights, tent makers, and other laborers capable of 

producing large quantities of goods. Furthermore, the British Navy 

consistently moved supplies directly to the army’s overseas field 

forces or at least to overseas depots for distribution. 

However, the British system had a very long supply line compared to the relatively short distances to move bulk supplies to Continental troops. Because its logistical needs in America were huge, 

the British army had to bring most of the things it would need in 

the field. This necessitated requirements for large purchase and supply production contracts in both England and America. Purchasing 

agents had to find, buy, and ship significant numbers of wagons and 

small boats to move the supplies once arrived, or arrange to purchase or produce those vehicles on site. Any foodstuffs shipped to 

US would spoil if not properly prepared, packed, and maintained 

while in shipment and storage. Agents had to contract for ships, 

shippers, and clerks to schedule movements, supervise the loading 

of supplies, and account for shipments. To ensure that supplies and 
52

the ships that carried them were cared for, they also contracted for 

warehouses, docks, and ship maintenance at harbors in both England and America. Moreover, the fraud and speculation problems 

that haunted the American system riddled the British system as well.

Operational Logistics

At the operational level, the Continental Army’s Northern 

Department was fortunate that General Schuyler was department 

commander. Regardless of any shortcomings as a field commander, 

he provided top-notch logistical support to the field units in his 

department—as good as any in the Continental Army and far better 

than most. After assuming command in 1775, Schuyler identified 

men who could help him build and supply his army and appointed 

many of them to his staff. Over the next two years, he and his staff 

worked tirelessly to acquire all types of supplies to arm and sustain 

the troops under his command. Often Schuyler did much of the staff 

work and coordination himself. 

Among his key logistical actions, Schuyler raised and equipped 

the Northern Army units that invaded Quebec during 1775–76. He 

also ordered construction and helped supply an American naval force 

at Skenesborough, New York, in the summer and fall of 1776. That 

fleet fought a battle on Lake Champlain that October and successfully delayed the British invasion of the Hudson River Valley until 

1777. Additionally, Schuyler set up supply and support depots at Albany, Stillwater, and Bennington, all of which would play important 

roles in the Saratoga Campaign. Moreover, he acquired a significant portion of French weapons which came into Portsmouth, New 

Hampshire, that spring. Thanks to his efforts, the American forces 

at Saratoga were equipped on a par with the British in terms of capabilities and serviceability of firearms during the two final battles.

However, Schuyler’s substantial Northern Department efforts 

did not ensure that the Continental Army or its supporting militia units were in superlative condition during the entire campaign. 

Though the army typically received adequate weapons and ammunition, there were times—especially after the Battle of Freeman’s 

Farm—where the Americans were woefully short of ammunition in 

particular. Acquiring enough food for the troops was an even larg-
53

er problem at times. In both cases, Schuyler and other logisticians 

worked hard to ensure that any shortages were alleviated in due time. 

As noted earlier, dealing with shortages was not always a simple process. Though food could be purchased locally, local civilians often refused to accept Continental dollars in payment for food, 

supplies, and animals as well. Unit commanders would impress the 

needed items, much to the disgust of the farmer or businessman. 

Also, some contracted teamsters pilfered supplies. 

Schuyler’s operational equivalent on the British side was Maj. 

Gen. Guy Carleton, governor general of Canada. Carleton provided 

logistical support for Burgoyne’s army during the Saratoga Campaign, 

though with less alacrity and interest than Schuyler showed for the 

Northern Department. Carleton’s support facilities at Quebec and 

Montreal functioned as the main depots for the campaign operation. 

However, these sites were basically inaccessible for about half the 

year due to winter ice. Once the ice cleared, additional sub-depots 

were established at St. John’s, Fort Ticonderoga, Fort George, and 

Diamond Island as Burgoyne’s army moved south. An additional 

complication: the farther Burgoyne moved south, the longer the 

distance to support the troops. 

Both British and German regular troops assigned to Burgoyne’s 

army were initially well-equipped and uniformed. Their musket ammunition was the same caliber and powder charge, so ammo compatibility was not an issue. The non-regular forces generally arrived 

with their own weapons and most supplies, so their primary logistics 

requirement was food. 

Prior to the Army from Canada’s departure, the biggest logistics problem facing Carleton and Burgoyne was the need for wagons 

and animals to pull them as the army traveled south. Initially, moving Burgoyne’s supplies was relatively easy. A small fleet of ships 

and bateaux carried the supplies until the troops reached the Fort 

Ticonderoga area. From there, the supplies could move south by 

water to Skenesborough and then be transloaded into wagons for 

further movement south. The other option was to shift the materiel 

to wagons at the Ticonderoga portage, cart it about four miles to the 

Lake George landing, then transload it back onto bateaux for the trip 

to Fort George. There, the supplies would again be reloaded onto 

wagons that would be shipped by bateaux then moved by land.
54

A standard four-wheeled British Army wagon with four horses 

could pull 4,000 pounds on a good, level road. In terrain similar to 

what the British Army would encounter between Fort Ticonderoga 

and Bemis Heights, however, the maximum haul capacity was more 

like 2,000 pounds—requiring at least twice the number of wagons 

for the move. Burgoyne had few four-wheeled wagons and, in 

any case, they were too heavy to use on the poor American roads 

and trails. Just before the start of the campaign, Burgoyne ordered 

500 two-wheeled carts of a Canadian design that was useful in 

forested areas. These carts, however, could only carry about 800 

pounds at best. Also, they were built of green wood, which was not 

as strong as dried, seasoned wood. As a result, many of the carts 

broke down early in the campaign. Consequently, only about half 

of the carts were usable at any given time once the army moved 

from the Skenesborough and Fort Ticonderoga areas. Additionally, 

at least thirty of the carts were used to carry the personal baggage 

and tentage for Burgoyne and his staff entourage. 

Hundreds of horses or oxen were needed to pull the wagons and 

carts. Assuming that each cart required two horses, Burgoyne needed 

at least 1,000 head just for the wagon train. Additionally, Burgoyne 

believed he would need to take along about forty pieces of artillery 

to reduce Forts George and Edward as well as Continental field 

fortifications they would encounter later. The artillery train would 

add at least eighty more horses, with some of the artillery actually 

requiring more than two. Additionally, horses needed twenty pounds 

of hay and six pounds of oats per day, which further added to the 

total number of required carts.

Ultimately, Burgoyne and Carleton acquired only about a third 

of the horses needed for the campaign. These animals were mercilessly overworked especially when the army moved the bateaux, 

artillery pieces, and supplies over the portage between Fort Ticonderoga and the Lake George landing. Many died during the journey, 

adding to the difficulty of moving the army thereafter.

Burgoyne also lacked sufficient manpower to man the bateaux 

and repair many of the notoriously poor roads and trails in that part 

of New York, or create new ones. Though soldiers could do much of 

this work, the labor would wear them down rapidly at a time when 
55

they needed their strength and energy for battle. To fill this void, 

Governor Carleton instituted the old French “corvée” law which was 

still on the books in Canada. This law required able-bodied males 

to provide free labor to the government on an “as needed” basis—in 

this case for projects such as roads, bridges, fortifications and transport. This enforcement of labor was legal but of indeterminate duration. The French typically only enforced the unpopular requirement 

for short periods of time. Burgoyne planned to use the corvées as 

bateaux men and road work crews, and to carry the supplies across 

portages for the duration of the campaign. He had hoped to acquire 

as many as 2,000 of these men. Eventually, only about 200 reported 

for duty and many of these deserted during the campaign leaving 

soldiers to fill the void anyway.

Tactical Logistics

Once the armies came into contact, logistics challenges shifted 

largely to the local and tactical realms. The loss of Fort Ticonderoga 

was a severe psychological blow to the American side, but the major 

military impact was actually the large loss of supplies left by the 

retreating Continental forces. A partial tally of the supplies that fell 

into British hands gives one an idea of the disastrous implications: 

significant amounts of ammunition and powder; 1,768 barrels of 

flour; 649 barrels of pork; 5 barrels of beef; 36 bushels of salt; 100 

pounds of biscuits; 1,880 pounds of peas; and 120 gallons of rum (this 

was a particular source of sorrow for many of the American troops). 

Not only did the Continentals lose these supplies, Burgoyne’s troops 

would now receive their benefits. 

Despite these losses and the calamity of losing Fort Ticonderoga, Schuyler looked for opportunities to both improve his position 

and wear down Burgoyne’s. The Northern Department commander’s 

subsequent decisions and actions detrimentally affected the British 

force, particularly related to logistics. Among them, Schuyler adopted a “scorched earth” policy for areas through which the British 

forces would advance. The general ordered his soldiers and asked 

local civilians to destroy or move animals, food, crops, wagons, and 

other militarily useful materials out of Burgoyne’s reach. Because of 
56

these actions and other voluntary efforts by local civilians, British 

and German logisticians had difficulty foraging for needed supplies. 

Schuyler also stockpiled supplies at the depots he created and 

continued to support the Northern Army even after he was relieved 

by Gates in August. In September when Gates’ army was low on 

lead for ammunition after the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, Schuyler 

organized an effort to strip lead weights from window sashes in Albany homes, had them melted down and molded into bullets, and 

shipped the ammunition to Bemis Heights in time for the October 

fight. Schuyler also personally purchased the wood Gates’ men used 

to build a pontoon bridge across the Hudson River.

In addition to Schuyler’s efforts, Gates worked to supply his 

army that September and October. He asked Gen. Israel Putnam in 

the Highlands Department to replace foodstuffs that were running 

low. Though his own department was under attack during Clinton’s 

foray from New York City, Putnam sent the Northern Army 300 

barrels of hard bread and 1,250 barrels of flour from his Fishkill 

Depot and another 300 each from depots at Esopus, New York, and 

Sharon, Connecticut. Additionally, he later sent 1,250 barrels of 

flour and another 300 of bread.

At the same time the Northern Department was successfully 

supporting a rapidly growing army in the Hudson River Valley, 

Burgoyne’s dwindling command was struggling to sustain itself in 

a largely static location. By the time Burgoyne crossed the Hudson 

River on 13 September, his line of communication stretched 330 

miles through mostly enemy territory to Quebec. A several day 

journey under the best of conditions, by this time only a trickle of 

supplies from Canada was reaching him. Even though he had the 

windfall of foodstuffs and other supplies captured in early July at 

Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough, by mid-August Burgoyne was 

tempted to send a column under Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum to capture 

the American food depot at Bennington and forage for additional food 

and horses. After that expedition ended in disaster at the Battle of 

Bennington, the British army never again attempted anything similar. 

The Bennington foraging fiasco was followed in midSeptember by Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln’s three-pronged attack 

against Burgoyne’s line of communication. During those successful 
57

raids, Continental units seized Skenesborough and its port and 

storage facilities, the Lake George landing, Mount Defiance, and 

Mount Independence. Col. John Brown’s column also demonstrated 

against Fort Ticonderoga for several days then attempted to seize 

Burgoyne’s supply point at Diamond Island near Fort George. The 

latter efforts availed nothing, but overall the raids were a noteworthy 

success against the British line of communication. In addition to 

taking almost 300 British prisoners at Lake George landing, Brown’s 

men freed more than 100 American prisoners of war captured just 

after Fort Ticonderoga fell. They also captured 200 bateaux, a sloop, 

several gunboats, a number of cannon, and other supplies. Most 

of these items were destroyed or hauled away by Brown’s men. 

Additionally, the raiders captured an unspecified, but apparently 

large, number of draft horses and cattle. During the Skenesborough 

seizure, Col. Benjamin Woodbridge’s column burned all the port 

facilities, docks, and warehouses and removed or destroyed other 

items of military value. Though these raids did not sever Burgoyne’s 

supply lines, they clearly affected General Powell’s later actions. 

As Fort Ticonderoga commander, Powell essentially functioned 

as Burgoyne’s rear area commander. After losing 300 men, Powell 

resisted releasing St. Leger’s force to link up with Burgoyne once it 

arrived at the fort in late September. Additionally, losing 200 bateaux 

as well as draft horses made it much more problematic to move St. 

Leger and his supplies forward. Partially because of these actions, 

Burgoyne cut his men to one-third rations by 3 October. 

Although logistical shortcomings did not ensure that Burgoyne’s 

army was destined to lose, the quality of logistics planning and support for both sides influenced the final outcome of the Saratoga Campaign. Several logistical factors contributed to the American victory 

and Burgoyne’s defeat. Despite a cumbersome logistical system that 

left the execution of national supply priorities and decisions in the 

hands of state officials, proactive logistical efforts by key American 

leaders and staff officers ensured the system worked at least adequately during the Saratoga Campaign. Thanks to leaders like Schuyler, Putnam, and Gates, the Continental Army’s Northern Army was 

adequately equipped prior to and during the campaign—with efforts 

improving as time went by. While some supply types were always 
58

ample, others were at times perilously low but always sufficient in 

quantity to conduct active operations. Finally, the American line of 

communications was never seriously hindered even during General 

Clinton’s foray into the Highlands in September and October.

Conversely, the British logistics system increasingly operated 

on a wing and a prayer following the capture of Fort Ticonderoga. 

Even from the beginning of the operation, the British commander 

struggled to arrange adequate transportation assets and animals. 

Then after Fort Ticonderoga fell, both wagons and animals were 

strained by unnecessarily large amounts of baggage, cannon, and 

artillery ammunition carried forward—conditions that continued to 

deteriorate as the campaign progressed. Finally, when the corvée 

system failed to generate enough men for road renovation, portage 

duties, and bateaux crewmen, Burgoyne’s column slowed to a crawl 

and gave the Americans more time to recover and rebuild from the 

loss of Fort Ticonderoga. As historian James A. Huston noted:

Burgoyne allowed logistics to become his master rather 

than his servant. He was so concerned with getting 

everything up to meet all possible contingencies that he 

was too paralyzed to meet any contingency. In moving 

his heavy ordnance and stores he lost one of the most 

important elements in warfare—timing.7

Engineer Support

In many respects, engineer operations during the Saratoga 

Campaign were similar to a modern battlefield. Both sides conducted 

engineer tasks like road building, demolitions, fortification 

construction and reinforcement, bridge construction, materials 

fabrication, and vertical and horizontal construction. 

As in most areas of military service, the British Army had a 

distinct advantage in terms of professionally trained engineers. 

America had few institutions of higher learning that offered academic 

training in the various engineering fields, so the few academically 

trained engineers were in high demand everywhere. Consequently, 

many engineers who served with the Continental Army were foreign 

born, mostly French with a smattering of other nationalities. Two 
59

exceptionally capable examples were Col. Thaddeus Kościuszko 

from Poland and his boss and the chief engineer for the Northern 

Army, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, an extremely energetic and intelligent, 

though self-taught, engineer.

The army engineer for the Army from Canada was thirty-oneyear-old Lt. William Twiss. An experienced engineer officer, Twiss 

was commissioned in the Ordnance Corps in 1760. He performed 

work at the British defenses at Gibraltar and helped direct the building 

of the British Lake Champlain fleet that defeated Benedict Arnold’s 

flotilla in October 1776. During the campaign, he determined it was 

possible to place cannon on Mount Defiance then led the expedition 

to move the guns up there. He later directed the clearing of the Fort 

Anne road to Fort Edward and the construction of British defenses 

at the Great Redoubt.

During the Saratoga Campaign, only a small number of units 

performed engineer-type tasks. The American Northern Army had 

several artificer companies made up of civilian or military mechanics and artisans employed by the Army to provide necessary services 

such as construction and fabrication. An artificer company included 

skilled workers such as blacksmiths, carpenters, coopers, harness 

makers, nailers, and wheelwrights. Several of these companies were 

extant in the Northern Department by the time of the campaign, all 

under Baldwin’s command and control. Some worked on various 

construction, renovation, and fabrication tasks at Fort Ticonderoga 

before Burgoyne’s arrival while others did similar work at the department supply depot in Albany and later at the Bemis Heights defenses. In addition to the previously mentioned corvée troops, Burgoyne’s army had two pioneer units—the closest thing to a modern 

engineer formation—a small element of the 1st Battalion, Royal 

Highland Emigrants (a Canadian provincial unit) and Wilcox’s Pioneer Company (a Canadian militia unit). These units primarily constructed field fortifications, military camps, bridges, and roads.

While all three modern military engineer disciplines—general 

engineering, combat engineering, and geospatial engineering—were 

utilized during the Saratoga Campaign, most efforts involved combat engineering. Simply put, combat engineering is capabilities and 

activities that closely support the maneuver of land combat forces: 

mobility, countermobility, and survivability.
60

Mobility

Mobility operations mitigate the effects of natural and manmade 

obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver. During the 

Saratoga Campaign, these engineer tasks included construction or 

improvement of roads, bridges, and waterways as well as reduction 

or penetration of enemy fortifications and obstacles through 

pioneering, sapping, and mining operations. 

At Fort Ticonderoga, numerous engineer projects were initiated prior to the onset of combat operations. One of the most significant mobility efforts was construction of the footbridge from the 

fort across Lake Champlain to Mount Independence. Additionally, 

shipwrights, carpenters, and other artificers under Baldwin’s direction constructed a large number of bateaux at Skenesborough, even 

though that would technically be a quartermaster function. These 

vessels later helped ensure freedom of movement for St. Clair’s garrison as they escaped from the fort and some were subsequently 

used to help construct pontoon-type bridges on the Hudson River.

Arguably, the most significant mobility effort of the campaign 

was the road cleared and rebuilt by Burgoyne’s troops between Fort 

Anne and Fort Edward. Over a three-week period, the advancing 

British troops were forced to painstakingly clear trees felled by 

Schuyler’s troops while concurrently widening and improving the 

trail to handle heavy cart traffic. They also had to corduroy the road 

or, in some places, build several miles of raised causeway to make 

the swampy and flooded areas passable.

Countermobility 

Countermobility operations use or enhance the effects of 

natural and man-made obstacles to deny an adversary freedom of 

movement and maneuver such as siting, building, emplacing, and 

maintaining obstacles. Just after the American retreat from Fort 

Ticonderoga and Skenesborough in July, for example, Schuyler 

wanted to slow the advance of Burgoyne’s forces and buy more 

time to gather American forces and supplies. He ordered St. Clair to 

have his men thoroughly obstacle the already miserable track from 

Fort Anne to Fort Edward; they felled huge trees across the trail in 

such a way that the branches intertwined. Anyone clearing the trees 
61

would need to cut through the branches and haul them away before 

reducing and removing the massive trunk. St. Clair’s men also felled 

trees in Wood Creek to prevent bateaux traffic and placed dams in 

areas where the creek would overflow and flood portions of the 

trail itself. The American countermobility operations on this road 

significantly slowed Burgoyne’s road improvement effort to three 

weeks, increasing the amount of supplies and energy consumed by 

the British. 

Survivability

Survivability operations are military activities that alter the 

physical environment to provide or improve cover, concealment, and 

camouflage—used to enhance survivability when existing terrain 

offers insufficient cover and concealment. Generally speaking, this 

simply means construction of fortifications such as shelters and 

barracks, normally thought of as general construction projects. 

The campaign’s major survivability project was the American 

effort to restore Fort Ticonderoga defenses so they could withstand a 

major assault if manned properly. Besides renovating Ticonderoga, 

the Continental Army also built or improved a number of fortifications immediately outside the fort, including blockhouses, fortified 

cabins, trench lines, and artillery positions forward of the fort and on 

Mount Independence. St. Clair, Baldwin, Kościuszko, and the men 

of the garrison also expended a great deal of effort in the months 

leading up to the initial confrontation, though all came to naught and 

the defenses were never truly tested. 

American units also worked to renovate other forts such as 

Anne, Edward, and George during this time. However, these improvement efforts were lackluster and ultimately ineffective. Forts 

Anne and Edward were later largely destroyed to prevent British 

forces from using them without investing time, energy, and resources for renovation. 

The most significant survivability efforts for both armies came 

near the end of the campaign. These were the American fortifications at Bemis Heights and the Great Redoubt and several smaller nearby fortifications constructed by Burgoyne’s men. Although 

these fortifications were not very far from each other, there were 
62

no serious attempts to breach an opponent’s line through sapping 

or other engineer-type measures. Only the British positions at Balcarres Redoubt and Breymann Redoubt were tested by assault, on 7 

October during the Battle of Bemis Heights. The fortifications generally faced west and were reinforced stockade walls designed to 

protect troops manning positions to the front and sides but open in 

the rear. The Balcarres Redoubt included several smaller outworks 

that provided interlocking fires with each other and the main position. The troops of Poor’s Brigade captured one small outwork, later 

known as “Bloody Knoll,” but the assault could go no further due to 

the heavy defensive fires. The Breymann Redoubt, just to the north 

of the Balcarres positions, also had a number of outworks manned 

by jägers and light infantry and a few reinforced cabins manned 

by the Canadians. The main position, however, was only manned 

by about 200 Braunschweiger troops under Breymann himself. Under the heroic leadership of Benedict Arnold, the troops of Poor’s 

and Learned’s Brigades captured the cabins and the main redoubt, 

prompting the remaining German troops to flee. 

Communications Support

Communications operations in the Revolutionary War period 

were relatively unsophisticated, with no special signal units or 

personnel as one would see in later armies. Communications tended 

to be face-to-face meetings, written documents, and various audio 

and visual signals. Meetings and messages were used at the strategic, 

operational, and tactical levels. Audio and visual signals were used 

almost exclusively in the tactical realm. 

Strategic Communications

Strategic communications between the Continental Congress 

and its armies tended to be much easier than for the British 

government. Continental armies operated on interior lines of 

communications over relatively short distances. Face-to-face 

meetings and courier messaging were much safer and also much 

faster. A courier traveling by horseback could deliver a message 

from the Northern Department to an intended Continental Congress 

recipient in about a week, even when having to bypass British forces 
63

in the New York City area. Timing was similar for a commander 

going to a meeting personally. Schuyler, Gates, and others made 

such trips to Philadelphia before and during the campaign. If a relay 

of fresh horses was set up, a courier could reach Philadelphia in 

about three days. 

In contrast, strategic communications between Germain and 

Howe—or Germain and Carleton or Burgoyne—only traveled as 

fast as Atlantic Ocean or St. Lawrence River weather and conditions 

allowed. Under the best of conditions a journey from London to 

New York took sixty to ninety days, although the trip was about 

two to three weeks shorter on the return voyage. In addition to letter 

traffic, Clinton and Burgoyne traveled to England for face-to-face 

meetings with Germain to discuss plans for the 1777 campaign 

season. They traveled between late fall and spring during a time 

when active operations were normally suspended. 

The extended travel time forced Germain and his generals to 

communicate primarily through written messages. In these letters, 

however, the secretary only provided general guidance to his commanders in America, leaving the vast majority of operational decisions up to them. Conditions on the ground might change between 

the time a message left England and when it arrived in America. As 

will be discussed in the following overview, strategic communications between Germain and his commanders also were largely ineffective due to poorly thought-out plans and directives.

Operational Communications

At the operational level, both sides tended to use courierdelivered written messages; due to their interior lines, American 

leaders occasionally met face-to-face, and their courier messages 

arrived much sooner as well. At this level, someone selected to be a 

courier had to be a most trustworthy man. He was charged with getting 

the message to the recipient as quickly as possible, without risking 

compromise. That, of course, was easier said than done, especially 

for the British couriers. Because couriers frequently traveled through 

rebel-controlled areas, they needed to be familiar with the country and 

know locations to avoid. These men usually traveled in civilian clothes 

which put them in great danger because they could be executed as 
64

spies if caught. For exceptionally important messages, more than one 

courier was dispatched to help ensure that at least one letter or verbal 

message would be delivered. Both sides also employed encoding 

systems for written messages to help ensure the information did not fall 

into enemy hands. For example, Clinton used a so-called “dumbbell 

code” to respond to Burgoyne’s request for assistance in July 1777. 

Tactical Communications

Tactically, army field commanders generally employed couriers 

to communicate with their subordinate commanders—especially 

Gates, who did not leave the entrenchments at Bemis Heights on 

either 19 September or 7 October. Burgoyne, on the other hand, 

frequently was up front and near the line of battle—often speaking 

directly to subordinate commanders during the fighting. Similarly, 

wing/division commanders used both communication methods. 

Commanders also used other tactical communication methods, 

including flags, signal guns, bugles, fifes, and drums. During the 

winter of 1777, Maj. Gen. Friedrich von Steuben, Washington’s 

inspector general and drillmaster, developed a system of signals to 

help direct and coordinate Continental units on the battlefield. Von 

Steuben’s system included a series of drum beats to tell troops when 

to assemble, advance, and retreat. How flag bearers carried the colors 

also signaled any changes in direction for troops and when to halt. The 

songs played by a band would indicate whether the rate of march for 

a regiment was to be a standard step or quick step while advancing. 

All of these could generally be seen or heard above the din of battle. 

Sometimes signals could help the other side. On 16 September, 

Burgoyne was alerted to the rebel presence by the American morning 

bugle call. On 19 September during the Battle of Freeman’s Farm, 

British troops fired a signal gun to indicate their battalions were 

in position to begin the general advance. The signal reinforced 

to the American lines that an important British action was taking 

place. Col. Daniel Morgan developed a rather unorthodox signaling 

system, using a turkey call to assemble his regiment riflemen in 

the confusion of fighting at Freeman’s Farm. Though rudimentary, 

signal support was an important aspect of military operations during 

the Revolutionary War.
65

Medical Support

The Continental Army general employed three kinds of 

hospitals during the war: general hospitals, “flying” hospitals, and 

regimental hospitals. A general hospital was normally a sizable 

fixed structure located in a city that was central to or near an area of 

expected operations. These general and intensive-care facilities were 

established in public or private buildings. The structures themselves 

could be a single building or a series of buildings, including homes, 

barns, churches, and colleges. General hospitals and flying hospitals 

were run by doctors and medical directors who were members of the 

Continental Army. Flying hospitals were mobile and moved with the 

army. They were typically established in local houses, cabins, huts 

or tents, or a combination of these locations. The facilities had only 

a few beds and an area set aside for surgery. Regimental hospitals, 

which were established and run by regimental surgeons, were more 

like aid stations where first aid and immediate medical care were 

rendered on or near the battlefield. The patients were stabilized there 

then relocated to a flying hospital for further treatment or a general 

hospital for long-term care once they could be moved.

Medical support for both armies at Saratoga was generally 

poor, though not due to lack of effort. Medical knowledge and 

training among caregivers at the time made the hospitalization 

experience in 1777 less than ideal. Additionally, the mortality 

rate among wounded and sick soldiers tended to be high because 

of largely inadequate medical resources. Even so, by the spring of 

1777, the medical system set up by Schuyler’s Medical Director 

General, Dr. Jonathan Potts, had significantly improved the health 

of Schuyler’s command compared with the preceding year. With 

Schuyler’s active support, Potts set up several medical facilities to 

care for department soldiers. The department’s main hospital was 

established at Albany, the department headquarters. Essentially a 

general hospital with the capability of taking care of about 200 or 

so patients, this facility had reasonably trained doctors and staff. 

Because it was away from the front, readily accessible businesses 

provided good food, some medical supplies, and other items useful 

for patient care. Schuyler also ordered construction of a sixty-bed 

facility at Mount Independence to care for troops who were near 
66

the front lines but did not require long-term care—a hybrid between 

a department hospital and a regimental hospital. By the time 

Burgoyne’s expedition arrived, a number of patients were being 

cared for there even though it was not fully ready. The one bright 

spot was that Colonel Baldwin established a vegetable garden at the 

Mount Independence hospital, a move that helped prevent scurvy 

and other nutrition-related maladies within the garrison.

In June, Schuyler arranged to move patients who required more 

long-term care to a temporary hospital at Fort George and relieve 

some of the load on the yet-to-be-completed Mount Independence 

facility. Later when Fort Independence was evacuated, Dr. James 

Thacher moved Mount Independence medical supplies and patients 

by bateaux to Skenesborough. En route to Fort George, the British 

Navy intercepted the party at Skenesborough. Although the medical 

supplies were destroyed or captured, Thacher successfully moved 

the patients to Fort Anne. The wounded men remained there in tents 

until 25 July when they were moved to the general hospital at Albany over a three-day period. The patients from Fort George were 

apparently moved to Albany as well.

At about the same time as the temporary hospitals at Forts Anne 

and George were abandoned, another was set up at Bennington in 

what would become the state of Vermont. This facility would support the health care needs of the significant number of militia forces gathering there. However, the hospital was soon overwhelmed 

by casualties from the battle fought near there on 16 August. The 

overflow of American wounded were placed in local homes, barns, 

and tents. Captured British and German wounded were moved to a 

meetinghouse and cared for by captured German doctors. In addition to facility challenges, medical stores of any kind were in short 

supply in Bennington and cold weather was approaching.

To the southwest, Dr. John Bartlett, physician and surgeon 

general of the Northern Army, set up a flying hospital at Van Schaik’s 

Island on 18 August. This hospital faced numerous challenges, not 

the least of which was its location. Bartlett considered the island to 

be an unhealthy spot due to swampy areas and insects. His staff of 

thirty-two surgeon’s mates (a type of nurse) was nearly overtaxed by 

a patient load of about 335 men. Moreover, medical provisions were 
67

in short supply. Regimental surgeons began to complain that Bartlett 

refused to provide them with items for their sick men. In reality, there 

was little to share. Bartlett countered that he needed the support of at 

least three additional regimental surgeons and surgeon’s mates. The 

regimental surgeons, in turn, refused to help Bartlett, indicating that 

Gates had forbidden them from helping the hospital. Fortunately, the 

patient load had been reduced to about 192 men by the beginning of 

September, easing logistical problems so that the hospital could be 

moved to Bemis Heights when Gates transferred the army there on 

12 September. Bartlett set up a hospital at Bemis right next to Gates’ 

headquarters and south of the main defenses there.

Most American casualties from the Continental Army’s 19 September and 7 October fighting near Saratoga were initially treated at 

the flying hospital then evacuated to Albany, New York. By the end 

of October, the Albany department hospital was overwhelmed with 

almost a thousand casualties ensconced in churches, public buildings, private homes, and other locations around the city. To relieve 

the pressure on the hospital staff, some patients were transferred to 

a temporary hospital in Schenectady and others were furloughed to 

go home or return to their units. Albany also cared for the 250 or 

so British and German wounded abandoned by Burgoyne’s retreating army. With the transfers of American patients to Schenectady 

and recovering enemy wounded to Boston, the Continental Army 

reduced the number of patients at Albany to about 436 in mid-November and 297 by mid-December. 

Like most everything military, the American military medicine 

system was largely a product of the British experience. The types of 

British military hospitals used in the Saratoga Campaign were essentially the same as those for the Continental Army. Burgoyne and 

his chief of medicine, Acting Physician John Wood, set up or utilized a series of treatment centers during the campaign that provided 

decent and perhaps better care than their American counterparts, although the evacuation distances were much farther and procedures 

were more difficult. 

The primary British hospital in Quebec was generally equivalent to the department general hospital in Albany. Evacuation back 

to that location, however, was reserved for patients who would not 
68

be able to recover to the point where they could return to duty. Those 

patients were initially sent to a hospital set up in the ruins of the 

fortress at Crown Point. After the Americans abandoned Mount Independence, the British used the former American hospital to treat 

their sick and wounded. From all of these locations, evacuating sick 

and wounded men to Canada was logistically relatively simple. 

Once they recovered enough to travel, invalids were loaded aboard 

a vessel and sailed north to Quebec via the Richelieu River.

Evacuating troops south of Skenesborough and Fort Ticonderoga was more problematic. During the Battle of Hubbardton on 

7 July, about 60 men were killed and 140 wounded from Brigadier 

Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps and a follow-on detachment of General Riedesel’s command. The numbers were high enough that Fraser decided not to continue the pursuit of St. Clair’s troops. Instead 

he remained at the battlefield to tend to his wounded. Those men 

eventually had to walk or be carried 25 miles over poor, hilly roads 

to Mount Independence.

Some of the wounded captured at Bennington on 16 August were 

from Fraser’s command, though most were Riedesel’s Braunschweiger 

troops. They were taken to a meeting house at Bennington where they 

were cared for by German doctors who accompanied the column. 

Concerned about the health of the wounded men of his Advance 

Corps, Fraser wrote to General Gates and offered to provide the 

hospital at Bennington with medicines and more surgeons to support 

his troops. Gates responded to Fraser that the captured personnel were 

well supplied with doctors, medicines, and other comforts. This was 

not true, of course, as supplies were low even for treating American 

wounded. Exacerbating the problem was that the British and German 

troops quarreled frequently. Additionally, only two German physicians 

were assigned to care for the British and German wounded. To the 

American doctors, the two appeared to be poorly trained and careless 

about treating the wounded, regardless of nationality.

Similar to Bartlett’s flying hospital, Wood set up a field hospital 

for British and German troops at Saratoga in a hollow near the Great 

Redoubt. The wounded men were well-protected from artillery and 

rifle fire in the facility, which consisted of one large and several 

small barns interspersed with several tents. The hospital was near 
69

the river road, so the men could be easily moved to the Hudson 

River to be placed on bateaux for evacuation northward. The journey 

from there to Fort Ticonderoga would be perilous as the entire route 

was by then under rebel control. This plan of evacuation was never 

implemented. When Burgoyne finally resolved to retreat from the 

Great Redoubt position, he made the painful decision to abandon 

his several hundred wounded to the Americans as discussed earlier 

in this chapter. To ensure they were cared for, he left a number of 

attending physicians and mates, along with medical supplies. All 

would eventually be evacuated by river to the American department 

hospital at Albany. There, the British wounded were temporary 

inmates along with Benedict Arnold and James Wilkinson, the 

former due to a leg wound suffered on 7 October and the latter due 

to illness. In Albany, the British doctors were once again gainfully 

employed treating their own wounded.

Figure 7. Saratoga Campaign Casualties.

Battle KIA WIA MIA/POW KIA WIA MIA/POW

Fort Ticonderoga 5 - - 7 11 -

Hubbardton 60 168 - 41 96 230

Fort Schuyler 5 47 41 7 18 9

Oriskany1 - - - 385 50 30

Bennington2 207 (2) 700 30 40 -

1st & 2nd Saratoga 440 695 6,222 90 240 -

Total 717 910 6,963 560 455 269

British Continental

Notes:

1. British casualties at the Battle of Oriskany are combined with Fort Schuyler. Indian losses are not depicted.

2. Wounded for Bennington figures are included in MIA/POW.
70

Notes

1. Robert K. Wright Jr., The Continental Army (Washington, DC: US 

Government Publishing Office, 1966), 41.

2. Fort Stanwix was originally named for British Gen. John Stanwix 

when it was built in 1758. When his troops reoccupied the post in 1776, Col. 

Elias Dayton renamed the post Fort Schuyler for the Northern Department 

commander. Though renamed, it was still often referred to as Fort Stanwix even 

during the revolution.

3. David Higginbotham, The War of American Independence: Military 

Attitudes, Policies, and Practice 1763–1789 (Boston: Northeastern University 

Press, 1983), 123.

4. Indeed, the system was designed in part to prevent men of lesser social 

standing from becoming officers, thereby keeping the institution an aristocratic one. 

5. It is incorrect to believe, however, that the only reason the German princes rented out their forces to serve the British crown was to become rich through 

the blood of their soldiers. Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig, for example, used 

the money he received to offset high taxes for his people.

6. In this handbook, the term “coalition” refers to the entire British, German, 

Canadian, loyalist, and Indian force composing Burgoyne’s Army from Canada.

7. James A. Huston, The Sinews of War: Army Logistics. 1775–1953

(Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1966), 57.
71

II. Campaign Overview

Introduction

The Rebellion Begins

In February 1775, the Parliament declared that the colony of 

Massachusetts was in a state of rebellion against King George III. 

Long-festering issues over perceived unfair taxation, the nature of 

representation in Parliament, and the quartering of British troops in 

Boston had finally boiled over. In the event fighting should break out 

with the British Army, the rebels began to stockpile gunpowder and 

other military stores in earnest. On 18 April, Lt. Gen. Thomas Gage, 

commander-in-chief of the British forces in North America, ordered 

a 700-man detachment to seize a rebel ammunition depot at Concord. En route, fighting broke out at Lexington and later at Concord. 

By the end of the day, 120 British troops and American Minutemen 

lay dead and more than 200 were wounded. Massachusetts was now 

on a path to a war for independence and other colonies would soon 

follow.

The Invasion of Canada 1775–1776

In May, soon after the battles at Lexington and Concord, an 

expedition led by Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold and Col. Nathan Hale 

successfully captured the British forts at Ticonderoga and Crown 

Point on Lake Champlain. The column then proceeded north to 

raid the British outpost at St. Johns on the Richelieu River in Quebec Province. The following month, there was much public outcry 

against the Second Continental Congress’s orders to abandon the 

recently seized forts along the Lake Champlain line. The tumult 

increased over the discovery that Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, British governor of Quebec, was now reinforcing Fort St. Johns and 

building ships there, ostensibly to prepare an invasion of the Lake 

Champlain-Hudson River region. Congress therefore authorized 

Maj. Gen. Phillip Schuyler to conduct an investigation to determine 

whether it was feasible to invade “Canada” (i.e., Quebec Province). 

They also wanted to know whether the Canadians, particularly 

French-Canadians, might join the effort. Schuyler soon determined 
72

that it was indeed feasible and planned to lead a column up the Hudson River-Lake Champlain-Richelieu River line to capture Montreal 

and Quebec City. 

After conducting his fact-gathering mission in July, Schuyler 

bolstered his efforts by hosting a conference at Albany in late August 

to convince the Oneida and Tuscarora Indian tribes of southern New 

York to remain neutral during a fight between the colonists and the 

mother country. During the conference, however, Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery, Schuyler’s second-in-command of the New York 

Department, received intelligence that Carleton’s fleet of ships being built at St. Johns was nearing completion. Instead of waiting for 

Schuyler to take command, Montgomery seized the initiative and 

began the campaign without the New York Department commander. 

Schuyler, who became ill during the conference, soon departed Albany and caught up with Montgomery’s forces near St. Johns in September. Too sick to continue, however, he turned over command of 

the expedition to Montgomery who went on to capture St. Johns and 

fight two sharp skirmishes as the American invasion force continued 

north. Montgomery’s troops occupied Montreal on 13 November 

and almost captured Governor Carleton in the process.

Meanwhile, Arnold convinced George Washington to allow 

him to lead a column of 1,100 men across Maine (then still a part of 

Massachusetts Colony) to capture Quebec. After an arduous journey 

through the wilds of Maine, Arnold arrived at Quebec the day after 

Montreal fell—with only 600 men left in his command. He demanded that the city surrender but to no avail. The city’s garrison commander knew his defenses were too strong for 600 men to overcome. 

On 28 November, Montgomery departed Montreal to join Arnold at Quebec. Reinforced along the way by the newly formed 2nd 

Canadian Regiment, he merged his forces with Arnold before Quebec on 2 December. In a failed joint assault on 31 December, Montgomery was killed, and Arnold was wounded. Arnold attempted to 

continue the siege with a much-reduced command (known after 17 

January as the “Canadian Department”). The pitiful siege continued 

until March 1776 when Arnold was ordered back to Montreal and 

replaced by Brig. Gen. David Wooster. The Continental Congress 

was unsure what to do next. Spring was coming and so were fresh 
73

British reinforcements. To help determine its next course of action, 

Congress sent a delegation under Benjamin Franklin to Montreal 

to try to win the Canadians over to the American cause before British reinforcements arrived from England. The effort largely failed. 

While in Montreal, the delegation learned on 11 May that the Canadian Department forces had retired from Quebec City in some 

disorder when they heard that British ships were in the St. Lawrence 

River with fresh troops. After losing two minor skirmishes in the 

retreat, the Canadian Department forces, now under the command 

of Brig. Gen. John Sullivan, departed Quebec Province altogether 

by 18 June and arrived at Crown Point in early July. 

Reorganization and Carleton’s Counteroffensive 1776

In June 1776, the Second Continental Congress appointed Maj. 

Gen. Horatio Gates to command the Canadian Department and its 

army. Shortly thereafter, Washington provided Gates orders to move 

north and relieve Sullivan at Crown Point. Gates’ new command, 

however, was now physically located in the New York Department 

and therefore technically under Schuyler’s overall command. When 

he arrived at Schuyler’s Albany headquarters en route to Crown 

Point and discovered this fact, Gates immediately objected to being 

placed under Schuyler’s command. Gates argued that the forces at 

Crown Point were his alone as the Canadian Department commander. Congress partially fixed this problem by abolishing the Canadian 

Department on 8 July 1776 but did not actually direct Gates to take 

his orders from Schuyler. It was a command relationship problem 

that would fester for a year; as a result, Schuyler, though senior to 

Gates, was unable to freely determine the best use of resources in 

his own command without some level of interference from Gates.

Gates’ (and therefore Schuyler’s) biggest problem was that the 

former Canadian Department command at Crown Point was in very 

bad shape. The troops were utterly demoralized from the terrible 

conditions they suffered in Canada the previous winter—especially 

the series of defeats and retreats they encountered after the embarrassing decision to withdrawal from Quebec. Pay problems, poor 

food and clothing, and poor living conditions further exacerbated 

the bad attitude displayed by Gates’ soldiers. Moreover, most regi-
74

ments were far understrength due to desertions, small pox and other 

diseases, and expired enlistments. Over the remainder of the summer and fall of 1776, these issues were gradually resolved for the 

most part, but Gates and Schuyler were fortunate that Carleton was 

not an energetic field commander.

Now reinforced with a large contingent of fresh regular troops, 

including some German units, Carleton’s command executed a determined though slow counteroffensive that retook Montreal and 

drove the American forces out of Canada. Once again in possession 

of St. Johns, the British general began building another invasion 

fleet. His plan was to sail down Lake Champlain and retake the forts 

at Crown Point and Ticonderoga. But events that summer and autumn would lay waste to that plan.

On 7 July, Schuyler, Gates, Arnold and Sullivan held a council 

of war where they determined that Crown Point was untenable and 

decided to drastically reduce the number of troops at the post. Gates 

would move most of his forces to reinforce Fort Ticonderoga and take 

command there. He also determined to build a new supporting position at Rattlesnake Hill (later renamed Mount Independence) across 

the lake from Ticonderoga. Meanwhile, Schuyler directed Arnold to 

build a fleet of ships and gunboats at Skenesborough (now Whitehall, 

New York) to oppose any naval advance southward by Carleton’s vessels. The result of all this hurried shipbuilding was a significant naval 

action on 11 October 1776 off Valcour Island on Lake Champlain. 

In an all-day fight, Carleton’s fleet handily defeated Arnold’s flotilla. 

Arnold’s remaining four vessels escaped to Crown Point. Once there, 

Arnold quickly decided the fort should be totally abandoned and destroyed. When Carleton’s troops reoccupied Crown Point on the 13th, 

they found burned-out shells where barracks and other buildings once 

stood. Therefore, the British commander felt compelled to abandon 

the position on 4 November since there were no viable quarters remaining to shelter his troops for the winter. Because of this decision, 

Carleton lost the confidence of the Secretary of State for the American Colonies, Lord George Germain, and therefore command of any 

further military operations against the colonies.

Meanwhile, Schuyler recovered from his illness during the Canadian campaign and busied himself with New York Department 
75

tactical and logistical concerns. Schuyler’s efforts had focused on 

authorizations for new regiments, levying new troops, establishing supply depots, and reinforcing existing fortifications. After 

the American failure in Canada, his major concern was preventing 

the British from using the Lake Champlain-Hudson River line of 

advance to isolate the New England colonies. If Carleton’s forces 

could achieve that objective, he would likely separate New England 

from the rest of the country and defeat Schuyler’s forces in detail. 

British success in such an effort might effectively end the war. 

The Strategic Overview of the Saratoga Campaign

Development of the 1777 Campaign Plan

On 30 November 1776, soon after Carleton’s return to Quebec, 

Maj. Gen. William Howe, British Commander-in-Chief in America, 

wrote a letter to Lord Germain. He proposed that the campaign for 

1777 consist of a two-pronged operation. The main effort would be 

a heavy column sent north on the Hudson River to join with Carleton’s Army from Canada advancing south. The other prong would 

attack and seize Boston. Meanwhile, a demonstration in New Jersey 

would keep Washington’s Main Army occupied in Pennsylvania. 

Howe also requested another 15,000 troops to finish the rebellion 

in 1777. The letter was placed that day aboard a vessel bound for 

London. 

Before Germain had even seen the first letter, Howe wrote him 

a 20 December letter proposing that the campaign for 1777 consist 

instead of an overland movement to capture Philadelphia, the American capital city. In this letter, his only reference to a Hudson River 

movement was that it would likely not reach Albany before the middle of September. He also said nothing about cooperating with the 

Army from Canada. While this letter was en route but before it arrived in London, the circumstances facing Howe radically changed. 

Six days after Howe sent the second letter, Washington successfully 

attacked Trenton, New Jersey, and captured about 1,000 Hessian 

troops on the day after Christmas. After Washington’s successful 

raid on Trenton, Howe wrote Germain once again stating that in addition to capturing Philadelphia, he wanted to destroy Washington’s 
76

army. This belief was reinforced on 3 January 1777 when Washington’s Main Army defeated a British force at Princeton, New Jersey—another daring raid in which about 400 British troops were 

killed, wounded, or captured.

On 14 January, Germain responded to Howe’s 30 November 

letter saying that no course of action was yet agreed upon. Further, 

he approved 7,000 additional men instead of the 15,000 that Howe 

originally requested. Incensed when he received the Secretary’s reply about his troop request, Howe determined that he would readopt 

his 20 December plan to seize Philadelphia (see map 31, Appendix 

J, British Campaign Plan for 1777). 

In the interim, Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne—known by his 

friends and soldiers as “Gentleman Johnny” for his flamboyant lifestyle—had returned from New York to his home in London.1

 There 

he penned a document titled “Thoughts for Conducting the War from 

the Side of Canada” and sent this communiqué to Germain on 28 

February 1777. Burgoyne outlined three options for the 1777 campaign. The first was similar to Howe’s 30 November proposal and 

called for the Army from Canada, as Burgoyne’s command would 

be termed, to move south on the Lake Champlain-Hudson River 

line to Albany. He also included a diversionary column that would 

move southeast through the Mohawk River Valley via Lake Ontario 

and effect a junction with Burgoyne’s forces at Albany. He indicated that his force might join up with Howe’s army moving north 

to cut off the New England colonies from the rest of America. A 

second option was to capture Fort Ticonderoga, turn east along the 

Connecticut River and join forces with the British troops in Rhode 

Island. The third option was to move the Army from Canada by 

ship to join Howe’s command in New York for whatever operations 

Howe chose to pursue. After reading Burgoyne’s three courses of 

action, King George III opted for the first and designated Burgoyne 

to lead the Army from Canada (along with a promotion to lieutenant 

general) for the 1777 campaign. 

On 3 March, Germain wrote Howe and authorized him to attack and seize Philadelphia. Incredibly, he made no mention of 

Burgoyne’s planned campaign to take Albany. Moreover, Germain 

wrote at least seven additional letters to Howe between that date and 
77

19 April and failed to mention Burgoyne’s expedition (and Howe’s 

expected role in relation to it) in any of them. Howe wrote Germain again on 2 April to inform him that he (Howe) would move on 

Philadelphia by ship via the Chesapeake Bay or the Delaware River 

rather than overland. Now aware of Burgoyne’s plan, he also wrote 

that he could not send a detachment up the Hudson to link with the 

Army from Canada since he would have insufficient troops. When 

Germain received this letter on 8 May, he should have understood 

that the lion’s share of Howe’s command would be tied up with 

securing Philadelphia—reducing the likelihood he could join with 

Burgoyne in New York. The combined force would certainly not be 

capable of effectively cutting off and isolating New England. Yet, by 

this time, the Secretary and King George had approved Burgoyne’s 

plan and assumed that Howe would still move troops north to link 

up with Burgoyne at Albany. 

Germain responded to Howe’s 2 April letter on 18 May by telling 

the general that the movement by sea to Philadelphia was approved. 

Germain went on to say, however, that he expected that Howe’s expedition to take the capital would be completed in time for the general to then turn north and link up with the Army from Canada at or 

near Albany. Lord George apparently failed to grasp the time-distance 

factors involved with Howe’s plan and the general’s ability to meet 

Germain’s expectations. Had Germain sent copies of his reply to Carleton or Burgoyne, either would have immediately understood the 

impossibility of the requirement. Howe and Burgoyne were now set 

on a course where each would focus on his own immediate campaign 

objectives, precluding achievement of the plan approved by the king.

The Campaign

Burgoyne’s Movement South

Burgoyne sailed from London for Canada on 27 March. After 

a difficult voyage up the ice-clogged St. Lawrence River, he arrived 

at Montreal on 12 May and presented Germain’s letter regarding 

the plan to seize Albany, New York, to Carleton. Carleton now was 

aware that Burgoyne would command the expedition while he, Carleton, would remain in Quebec to defend the province and provide 

logistical support. Despite the obvious rebuff by Germain (due to 
78

Carleton’s decision the previous fall to abandon Crown Point), Carleton set about to assist Burgoyne with preparing the army for the 

coming campaign. By early June, all was largely in order. The major 

shortcoming was an insufficient number of carts to haul supplies 

and draft animals to pull those carts. Nevertheless, on 3 June, Burgoyne’s army—more than 9,000 strong—marched from its assembly point at Chambly, Quebec, to St. Johns, Quebec, on the Richelieu River (see Section I and Order of Battle appendices for details 

on the composition of the opposing armies).

After final preparations at St. Johns, the Army from Canada 

boarded ships there and sailed south for Lake Champlain on 13 

June (see map 32, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves 

June–August 1777). That same day, Brig. Simon Fraser, commander 

of the army’s Advance Corps, arrived at a frequently used campsite 

on the Bouquet River to await the main body. After a brief stay at 

Cumberland Head, the army joined Fraser at the Bouquet River camp 

on 21 June. There, several hundred Iroquois Indians from various 

northern tribes had gathered, ostensibly to serve as part of Fraser’s 

Advanced Corps and as the army’s eyes and ears. Later that day, 

Burgoyne assembled the Indians and issued a proclamation intended 

to rally loyalists to side with the king’s men and to demoralize, and 

perhaps even terrorize, the rebel forces opposing him. He threatened 

the use of the Iroquois against anyone who resisted his advance. 

The proclamation did not specifically threaten that the Indians 

would attack families, other non-combatants, and settlements, but 

the Americans in New York and New England were well-acquainted 

with Iroquois Confederacy warrior tactics. Ultimately, Burgoyne’s 

proclamation backfired, steeling the resolve of many rebels and 

causing many formerly neutral observers to join the rebellion. 

Due to stormy weather on Lake Chaplain, Burgoyne’s command 

remained at the Bouquet River camp for over a week. In the interim, 

Brig. Barry St. Leger’s force left Montreal by boat on 24 June to 

begin the Mohawk River expedition to Lake Ontario. Despite the 

stormy weather, Fraser’s Advanced Corps also left Bouquet River to 

take Crown Point, which it successfully occupied the next day. On 

30 June, the Army from Canada once again sailed south and joined 

Fraser’s Advanced Corps at Crown Point. Burgoyne’s command was 
79

now poised to begin active operations against the rebels of Schuyler’s 

now renamed Northern Department. His army had already travelled 

two-thirds of the distance to Albany. The journey had all been 

relatively simple up to this point, but that was about to change.

Fort Ticonderoga

Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 

12 June to take command of the rebel forces there. He had been 

appointed as Gates’ nominal deputy at Fort Ticonderoga in April but 

was placed in effective command on 5 June while Gates mulled over 

whether to continue to serve under Schuyler or return to the Main 

Army as Washington’s adjutant general. What St. Clair found on 

arrival depressed him. The garrison consisted of about 2,800 troops, 

mostly Continentals. That was the good news. The bad news was 

that it would take at least twice that number to adequately defend the 

fort. Indeed, St. Clair and his brigade commanders believed that the 

defenses required at least 10,000 men. The fort and its various outer 

defenses were in poor shape despite garrison efforts to improve them 

over the past year. A hard winter, disease, inadequate resources, 

and poor morale had prevented the troops from making sufficient 

improvements to withstand a determined attack by a professional 

army. St. Clair clearly understood the challenge before him but was 

determined to make the best of a less-than-ideal situation.

Six days after St. Clair’s arrival, Schuyler arrived from Albany 

to personally examine the fort and assess needs for additional troops, 

supplies, and skilled workers. He and St. Clair inspected the defenses; like St. Clair, Schuyler was dismayed at the lack of progress. 

That same day, 18 June, two British spies who were captured at Colchester, New York, arrived at the fort under guard. They provided 

Schuyler and St. Clair with the intelligence that Burgoyne was now 

advancing down Lake Champlain with Albany as his objective. This 

bit of news prompted the Northern Department commander to hold 

a meeting with his generals on 20 June. Schuyler and St. Clair were 

joined by the three Continental brigade commanders, Brig. Gen. 

Benjamin Poor, Brig. Gen. John Paterson, and Brig. Gen. Roche de 

Fermoy. At the end of the council, the consensus was that the garrison would defend the main fort as long as practicable. If the fort had 
80

to be evacuated, the garrison and all stores would be moved across 

the footbridge extending between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence and the defense continued from there. If that location also had 

to be abandoned, the garrison would retreat south to Skenesborough 

in a fleet of bateaux. Satisfied that he had provided an appropriate 

contingency plan, Schuyler departed for Albany leaving St. Clair to 

continue preparations.

Three days after the council, one of St. Clair’s scouts arrived 

with more news. He reported British ships anchored at Otter Creek 

and Burgoyne’s sizable camp at Bouquet River. Furthermore, there 

was a noticeable uptick in skirmishes between Indian scouting parties and St. Clair’s patrols as they tried to gather information on the 

British expedition. Indeed, bloody attacks against St. Clair’s soldiers and non-combatants outside the fort had become an almost 

daily occurrence. Troops began to refuse to leave the safe confines 

of the outer defenses. The signs were clear that the British invasion 

force was approaching.

On 1 July, Burgoyne landed most of his army on the west bank 

of Lake Champlain three miles north of Fort Ticonderoga and Maj. 

Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riesedel’s division of German troops on the 

east bank (see map 34, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 

1–12 July 1777). From there, Fraser’s Advanced Corps headed 

southwest toward Mount Hope to envelop the fort from the west. 

Riedesel’s column moved south on the east side toward Mount Independence in a pincers movement with Fraser’s effort. Burgoyne’s 

main body headed down the river road toward the American fortifications. The following day, as Fraser’s troops advanced on the saw 

mills near Mount Hope, the American defenders set fire to those 

facilities and withdrew inside the “Old French Lines.” These were 

a series of entrenchments and other positions which had originally 

been dug by French troops during the French and Indian War. The 

Ticonderoga garrison had been steadily improving the positions, but 

there were still too few men to adequately defend them. Bringing on 

a brief skirmish, Fraser tested the American defenses. The British 

then pulled back out of rifle range as Fraser and Burgoyne pondered 

their next move. 

On the west side of the lake, the British continued intermit-
81

tent skirmishing and reconnaissance efforts for the next two days 

to feel out the rebel defenses. On the east side, Riedesel’s Braunschweigers struggled through a thick tangle of swampy forest and 

slogged through several murky water courses. The German advance 

was extremely slow and frustrating as the men also had to contend 

with oppressive heat and insects. On 4 July, St. Clair received a very 

welcome reinforcement of 700 New Hampshire militia led by Col. 

Seth Warner. In response to this good news as well as the fact that 

it was the first anniversary of Independence Day, St. Clair ordered a 

feu de joie to celebrate both events.2

That same day, General Fraser identified the potential importance of Mount Defiance as he conducted a visual reconnaissance 

of the area. He sent Lt. William Twiss, Burgoyne’s engineer, and 

a reconnaissance party up to the top of the promontory to see if 

cannon placed there could range the fort. Twiss determined that it 

was possible and soon another expedition was dispatched with two 

12-pounder cannon and a corps of axemen to cut a road to the top. By 

the morning of 5 July, St. Clair learned that the British were cutting 

the road and that his sentries had spotted cannon being hauled up 

the slope. St. Clair once again called his generals together to determine what to do next. They knew that a battery on Mount Defiance 

could fire into the fort. Even if it could not quite range the position 

(which it could), British observers would know every move within 

the American lines. The generals initially decided to shift the entire 

garrison to Mount Independence that night under cover of darkness. 

However, the approaching German column would soon block any 

retreat and the American units would be forced to surrender their 

men and stores to the enemy. Instead, St. Clair decided to load the 

stores, non-combatants, and the wounded and sick on bateaux and 

move them by water to Skenesborough. From there they would go 

by land to Fort George. The remainder of the garrison would move 

on foot through Hubbardton and Castle Town (now Castleton, Vermont) to Fort George. The plan would go into effect that night as 

soon as darkness allowed movement.

At the same time these events were transpiring at Fort Ticonderoga, Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton arrived back in New York from England 

to take command of the New York City garrison. Like Burgoyne, he 
82

had returned home to England to try to change the course of the war 

by offering Germain his thoughts on how to proceed. Clinton’s visit 

to London, however, had availed him little. When he learned of the 

plan to send an army south from Canada down the Lake ChamplainHudson River route, he had hoped to win command of that invasion 

force. Burgoyne had received that appointment instead. Clinton was 

loath to return to New York as he did not care for his immediate 

superior, General Howe, and chafed under his command. Instead of 

an independent command, Germain simply reappointed Clinton to 

his position as second-in-command under the commander-in-chief 

of North America. Clinton had few alternatives other than to resume 

his duties as commander of British forces in New York. On his return 

to the city, Clinton met with his immediate superior and quickly discovered that Howe did not plan to move north into the Hudson River 

Valley and merge with Burgoyne’s forces as had been briefed in London. Instead, Howe planned to move southwest to capture Philadelphia. Clinton and Howe had a rather heated discussion regarding the 

latter’s intentions, but Clinton was unable to move Howe from his 

plan. Clinton would broach the subject several times over the next 

few days, all with the same result. 

Over the next few days, both St. Clair’s and Burgoyne’s forces 

experienced a series of ups and downs. As darkness closed in on 5 

July, rebel garrisons at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence 

sprang into a frantic flurry of activity. At the Ticonderoga docks, St. 

Clair’s quartermaster, Lt. Col. Udney Hay supervised the hurried 

loading of supplies, women and children, and sick and wounded 

soldiers on some 200 bateaux. Other soldiers moved supplies and 

equipment to the docks or across the footbridge leading from the 

Ticonderoga peninsula to Mount Independence. Others worked to 

move or spike guns and destroy or make useless other items they 

could not take. The same general actions took place on Mount Independence as well. Throughout these activities, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens’ artillerymen kept up a steady fire toward the British to cover 

the noises of an army preparing to retreat. 

After midnight, Hay realized that significant amounts of supplies could not be hauled away. A great deal of food and other items 

were tossed into the lake so they could not be used by the British. As 

the night progressed, so did the level of confusion. Despite the activ-
83

ity and noise, however, the darkness successfully cloaked the retreat. 

British sentries, including those on Mount Defiance, remained ignorant of the American activities until at least 0200 on 6 July. That was 

when General Fermoy, apparently in a drunken stupor, set his quarters 

on fire and ordered other buildings torched as well. Soon, huge flames 

leapt into the night sky and sentries on Mount Defiance saw a massive 

bateaux fleet below the fort and a steady stream of soldiers flowing 

over the footbridge to Mount Independence. The sentries instantly 

recognized what was going on and sent runners to inform Burgoyne. 

Fortunately it took some time for the runners to alert Burgoyne 

at the main British camp and even longer for his troops to assemble 

and start probing the American defenses. Despite Fermoy’s appalling actions, the bateaux fleet managed to escape with a large amount 

of weapons, supplies, and human passengers under the command 

of Col. Pierce Long, commander of a New Hampshire militia regiment. The foot column also barely evaded British probing efforts 

and proceeded off Mount Independence before dawn led by St. Clair 

himself. Burgoyne’s men gingerly crept into the now-abandoned defenses, proceeded through the fort, and followed the retreating rebels over the footbridge to the burning ruins of Mount Independence. 

Along the way they scooped up a number of prisoners and quantities 

of supplies that had not been destroyed in the American rush to get 

away. Burgoyne had easily captured the “Gibraltar of the Hudson” 

without the bloody losses he feared. The general ordered his naval 

forces, along with Brig. Henry W. Powell’s brigade, to chase down 

the bateaux fleet while Fraser’s Advanced Corps and Riedesel’s Reserve Corps pursued the retreating American foot column.

As part of Fort Ticonderoga’s defenses, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin, 

the post’s engineer, had constructed a heavy log boom and chains to 

slow a pursuer and block the passage of a British fleet. The American 

bateaux flotilla commander, Long, and others believed the boom and 

chains would prevent any quick pursuit by Burgoyne’s ships, but 

the works proved ineffective. The British naval commander rapidly 

figured out how to cut the boom. Within a relatively short time, the 

enemy vessels were quickly pursuing the American boats.

Meanwhile, Long’s bateaux fleet was in no hurry to reach 

Skenesborough. As a result, the British ships caught Long’s flotilla at 

Skenesborough in the middle of unloading. Now in a panicked rush, 
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Long’s men raced to set the remaining four ships of Arnold’s Valcour 

Island fleet and all the bateaux on fire. They also burned the Skenesborough blockhouse as well as port facilities and then those who were 

able quickly made for Fort Anne to the south or scattered into the surrounding woods. Although the British were able to rescue substantial 

amounts of food from destruction, as well as some of the vessels, 

most other items were destroyed. Most of the Americans escaped capture, but the situation was another demoralizing defeat for the rebels.

The Battle of Hubbardton 

The foot column led by St. Clair departed Mount Independence 

in the morning darkness of 6 July and headed for Castle Town. After an all-day march in the July heat, the head of the column passed 

through the little hamlet of Hubbardton. The rear guard of the command, consisting of two units under Col. Ebenezer Francis, had fallen 

far behind due to the need to police the many stragglers. As he passed 

through Hubbardton, St. Clair ordered Col. Seth Warner and his Continental Regiment to wait for Francis’ rear guard and bring them into 

Castle Town later that evening. On arrival at Hubbardton, however, 

Francis informed Warner that his command was too worn out to continue. The combined force remained there for the evening. 

Unknown to the two colonels, Simon Fraser’s Advanced 

Corps was not far away. Fraser’s troops stopped for the evening 

only three miles from Hubbardton. After posting a few sentries 

along Sucker Creek and feeding their troops, the two American 

commanders bedded down their men for the night. The next morning as the first streaks of dawn broke over the mountains, Major 

Robert Grant’s 24th Regiment of Foot unexpectedly piled into the 

rebel sentries along the creek while much of the rest of the rebel 

force was cooking breakfast. The first British volley felled a number of men from Col. Nathan Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Battalion. Though surprised and confused, the rebels did not break. They 

grabbed their muskets, dashed to find cover behind trees and rocks, 

and returned fire. Grant was killed by the American return fire during the heavy musketry that followed. Francis, who had formed his 

11th Massachusetts Bay Regiment for the march to Castle Town, 

quickly turned them into line and formed on Hale’s right. Warner 
85

began assembling his force at the first volley and rushed his men 

downhill toward the sound of the guns to support Hale and Francis. 

Given the volume of rebel gunfire, Fraser realized he had run 

into a sizable force, likely stronger in numbers than his own. He sent 

a courier back to urge Riedesel to send support, then turned to press 

his attack and take advantage of the initiative he had gained. Seeking to flank the rebel forces and cut off their retreat, Fraser sent the 

Grenadier Battalion under Major John D. Acland around the rebel 

left to seize a promontory called Zion Hill which overlooked the 

road to Castle Town. This move also put Hale’s left flank at risk of 

being rolled up by the grenadiers.

While the grenadiers scrambled up Zion Hill, the 24th Foot and 

the Light Infantry Battalion under Major Alexander Lindsay (6th 

Earl of Balcarres) pressed forward toward the American line in an 

attempt to get close enough for a bayonet charge. Their movement 

carried them toward another prominence which would later become 

known as Monument Hill. It was an excellent defensive position, 

and both Francis and Hale now raced back to get there before the 

British. Arriving there first, Francis’ men quickly reformed behind a 

low stone wall on the left. Somehow in the confused retreat, Hale’s 

men had crossed behind the 11th Massachusetts and now formed 

on the right. The rebels settled into position just in time to receive 

another charge by Fraser’s main effort. The volleys were effective 

on both sides. Numbers of men fell dead and wounded, including 

Colonel Hale. The effect was particularly heavy on the redcoats, 

however. The Americans were provided a modicum cover by the 

wall while the British had none. As a result of the heavy rebel volleys, the British line was compelled to retreat. 

As Fraser’s main line pulled back to reform for another attack, 

Acland’s grenadiers—now reinforced with two of Lindsay’s light infantry companies—swept across Mount Zion and placed effective fire 

on the Castle Town Road. Warner’s men, who had fallen back to the 

vicinity of the Selleck cabin near the junction of the Castle Town Road 

and the road to Mount Independence, made a stand there to oppose 

any further advance by the grenadiers. They failed in this effort due 

to the weight of numbers and the aggressiveness of the British attack. 

Warner soon ordered his men back into positions across the Castle 
86

Town Road, which was now effectively cut by Acland’s battalion.

At about the same time as Warner’s fight at the road junction, 

Francis’ 11th Massachusetts and the 2nd New Hampshire—now under Major Benjamin Titcomb—battled fiercely with Fraser’s main 

force on Monument Hill. The lines were generally only sixty to 

eighty yards apart. Though taking heavy casualties, Fraser’s line finally forced the Americans to abandon the stone wall. Francis’ and 

Titcomb’s men joined Warner’s regiment behind a stout log fence 

on the east side of the Castle Town Road. From this new defensive 

position, the rebels battled Fraser’s troops for about two more hours. 

At about 1000, troops from both sides noticed a strange noise 

coming from the north. A military band was announcing the arrival 

of Riedesel’s jägers and a detachment of light infantry. The German 

general skillfully maneuvered his troops into the right flank of the 

American position, which broke under this new assault—hastened 

after Colonel Francis fell dead from an enemy bullet. The rebels 

now fled in an unorganized mob over Pittsford Ridge to the east of 

the battlefield, leaving about forty-one dead and ninety-one wounded behind. Roughly 230 men were captured, most of them the sick 

and wounded of the straggler brigade. Despite the defeat, most rebel 

troops reached Rutland, Vermont, a number of days later and reformed their units for additional operations. 

As for Fraser, he opted not to pursue the broken Americans. 

Though he had won the field, the victory had cost him dearly. At 

least fifty of his soldiers were killed and 134 wounded. In the short 

time they were involved, ten of Riedesel’s troops were killed and 

fourteen wounded. Out of the roughly 1,000 men of Fraser’s command roughly one of five were killed or wounded—a twenty-percent casualty rate. Instead of pressing home his advantage, Fraser 

decided to turn his force around and return to Skenesborough with 

his many wounded men. The Battle of Hubbardton was the first indicator to the confident troops of the Army from Canada that the 

Americans would not be easily defeated.

From his bivouac near Hubbardton, St. Clair could hear sounds 

of the battle involving his rearguard. He sent word to two militia 

colonels whose units were slightly ahead of the rear guard and ordered them to march to Warner’s assistance. Their men chose instead 
87

to continue the retreat away from the Hubbardton fight, so Warner 

received no help. Meanwhile, St. Clair continued his command’s 

march toward Fort Edward to make a junction with Schuyler.

The Battle of Fort Anne

Burgoyne arrived at Skenesborough on the morning of 6 July 

after the Americans were scattered by the British troops. Realizing 

that the main body of Long’s fugitives had headed south toward 

Fort Anne, Burgoyne directed a pursuit to catch them. Lt. Col. John 

Hill’s 9th Regiment of Foot conducted the chase by the land route, 

while two other regiments, the 20th and 21st, attempted to intercept 

the Yankee fugitives moving via Wood Creek in bateaux. Hill’s men 

set out the morning of 7 July and quickly discovered how poor the 

Fort Anne road was, especially when combined with the fact that 

the retreating rebels had destroyed all the bridges en route. Hill’s 

unit covered only ten miles the first day. Reaching a point less than a 

mile from Fort Anne that evening, Hill’s column ran into an American militia force of about 160 men. They immediately engaged in 

a sharp fight that lasted more than three hours until the rebels withdrew. 

The next morning, an American “deserter”’ entered Hill’s camp 

and relayed that there were now about 1,000 men at Fort Anne. Hill 

immediately dispatched a courier to Burgoyne to request reinforcements. In the meantime, the deserter slipped away and reported 

back to Fort Anne with the news that Hill’s command was roughly 

200 strong. Colonel Long and the remnants of his New Hampshire 

Militia Regiment, Col. Henry Van Rensselaer’s 4th New York Militia, and a mish-mash of various other militiamen streamed out of 

Fort Anne to attack Hill’s command about mid-morning. Realizing 

that the advancing Americans would soon surround him in the thick 

forest, Hill moved his regiment to the top of a craggy hill on the 

west side of the road. Heavy firing broke out as both sides began 

to volley. The Americans pressed their attack in an ever-smaller 

concentric ring around Hill’s 9th Foot. After some time, Hill’s command had taken significant casualties and the men were running out 

of ammunition. Fortunately for them, Long and Van Rensselaer’s 

men were running low as well. Just as it appeared that Hill might 
88

have to surrender his command, Indian war whoops could be heard 

along the road from the direction of Skenesborough. It appeared 

that British reinforcements, along with some of their Indian allies, 

had arrived to save the day. Long reluctantly ordered a rebel retreat 

back to Fort Anne. 

Unbeknownst to Long and Van Rensselaer—and even to Hill 

himself—the arriving reinforcements consisted of one man, Capt. 

John Money, deputy quartermaster of the Army from Canada. He 

had been leading a group of Iroquois to Hill’s rescue when the Indians suddenly deserted after they heard a general action taking place. 

Money had continued on without them and simply whooped like the 

Indians using psychological warfare that worked admirably. However, Hill had learned as Fraser discovered the day before that battles were often costly when engaging American troops, even militia 

forces. Of about 200 men involved in the fight, the 9th Foot suffered 

sixty-five casualties, or about thirty percent of Hill’s force. 

Burgoyne’s Decision

On 8 July, the day after the fight at Hubbardton, Burgoyne 

moved his headquarters down to Skenesborough. At this point in 

the campaign, the British commander had to decide whether to take 

his command via Lake Champlain back north to Fort Ticonderoga, 

transport it over the four-mile portage to the Lake George landing, 

and proceed down that lake to Fort George (see map 36, Appendix 

J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 12–30 July 1777). From there, he 

would move the army overland to the vicinity of Fort Edward where 

he could use the Hudson River as his logistical supply line. This 

route covered eighty-five miles and would entail hauling supplies, 

ammunition, cannon, bateaux, wagons, animals, and other impedimenta over two overland portages. The portages themselves represented twenty-three of the total miles to be traveled. His other option 

was to move eleven miles from Skenesborough via Wood Creek to 

Fort Anne, then improve the twenty-three-mile road from Fort Anne 

to Fort Edward. 

Burgoyne saw problems with the first option: It was much longer, required two portages, and could demoralize the army because 

the retrograde to Fort Ticonderoga appeared to be a retreat. Addi-
89

tionally, a route west of Lake George would communicate to Schuyler that Burgoyne’s objective was Albany rather than New England. 

Ultimately, he decided to use both routes. The main army would 

advance to Fort Edward using the Fort Anne road, while most supplies, wagons, animals, ammunition, and cannon would move via 

the Lake George route. 

Burgoyne set his plan in motion on 10 July. He ordered Powell to begin reconditioning the Fort Anne road and clearing obstacles 

and obstructions in Wood Creek. He also directed his second-in-command, Maj. Gen. William Phillips, to begin moving selected troops, 

equipment, and supplies via the Lake George route. Meanwhile, he 

sent a letter to General Carleton in Quebec asking for desperately 

needed horses and wagons. In due course, this request as well as Burgoyne’s later request for additional troops came to nothing.

As St. Clair’s column struggled toward Fort Edward and Burgoyne’s army began its movement toward the same objective, Schuyler used his time to greatly improve the American situation in the 

Northern Department. He ordered his assistant engineer, Col. Thaddeus Kościuszko, to take troops from Fort Edward and cut down 

huge trees to block both the Fort Anne Road and Wood Creek. They 

were also to build dams to block the flow of water so that the creek 

would overflow onto the road and into surrounding areas to create 

swamps and bogs to help make the trail impassable. When St. Clair’s 

command and Brig. Gen. John Nixon’s brigade of Continentals arrived at Fort Edward on 12 July, Schuyler assigned them to the same 

task. This tactic delayed Burgoyne’s advance over that route by almost three weeks while creating more time for Schuyler to gather additional reinforcements and supplies for the next major showdown.

As Burgoyne’s troops struggled in the humid July heat to clear 

the passages to Fort Edward, a number of key events took place 

that would directly and indirectly affect the course of the campaign. 

On 17 July, General Howe finally wrote to inform Burgoyne that 

his campaign objective was to seize Philadelphia rather than join 

the Army from Canada in Albany. Six days later—well before Burgoyne received the letter—Howe’s 15,000 troops boarded ships at 

New York City and sailed south for Chesapeake Bay. Before he departed, Howe gave General Clinton the option to assist Burgoyne if 
90

he had the opportunity. 

On the same day Howe wrote to Burgoyne, another large party 

of Iroquois joined the Army from Canada at Skenesborough. Thus 

far, Iroquois contributions to the campaign had been mixed. While 

they sometimes provided excellent intelligence on American troop 

locations and movements, their depredations greatly frustrated and 

concerned Burgoyne and his officers. The situation came to a boiling point with the death of Jane McCrae in late July. 

Jane McCrae was the fiancée of a loyalist officer serving in 

Burgoyne’s command. On 27 July, McRae and another woman were 

captured by several Wyandot Indians on a mission for the British. 

While returning to Skenesborough with their captives, two of the 

Indians squabbled over the young woman. In a fit of rage, one of the 

men killed McRae and scalped her. When the war party arrived in 

the British camp, the captain to whom McRae had been betrothed 

immediately recognized the red haired scalp of his future wife 

tucked in the belt of the man who killed her. This incident created 

great tension in the camp. Burgoyne, disgusted by the barbarous 

act, demanded that the Indian be put to death. He only relented on 

his demand after learning the brave was a favored Mohawk chief. 

If he were executed, virtually all the army’s Indian allies would immediately desert. The incident had much greater psychological effects when the story was circulated in rebel areas and by newspapers 

throughout the states. Outrage over this incident, as well as the employment of the Iroquois braves against Americans in general, inspired greater turn out when militia units were called. Many Americans who had been neutral or ambivalent about the war moved to the 

Patriot cause. The incident also further dampened loyalist desires to 

openly support the king and his troops. 

Well to the west of the main area of operations, the lead elements of St. Leger’s expedition arrived at Oswego, New York, on 23 

July. On the 26th, St. Leger’s command—consisting of 280 British 

and German regulars, 470 Canadian militiamen and American loyalists, and 800 Indians—departed from Oswego headed inland for 

Fort Schuyler in the Mohawk River Valley. His mission was to capture the post that guarded and controlled the Oneida “Great Carrying Place” linking Lake Ontario to the Mohawk River. The portage 
91

was vital to trade and military communications between the Hudson 

River (and therefore New York City) and the Great Lakes region. 

Once Fort Schuyler was in British hands, that source of trade would 

be cut off from the rebels and St. Leger could make his way southeast to link with Burgoyne at Albany. As with Burgoyne’s advance, 

St. Leger’s command appeared to have the upper hand. That would 

change as events unfolded before Fort Schuyler.

Far to the east of Fort Schuyler, a more positive development 

was taking place. In early July, the irascible John Stark was commissioned as brigadier general in the New Hampshire militia. Earlier in the war, Stark had served admirably at Bunker Hill, Trenton, and Princeton. Then a colonel, Stark had disgustedly resigned 

from United States service the previous March after the Continental 

Army awarded brigadier general promotions to other officers who 

he believed had inferior records of service. Now with his new commission, Stark set about raising an entire brigade of New Hampshire 

militia to fight against Burgoyne. Within a week, he successfully enlisted about 1,500 men. This substantial addition to the rebel cause 

came with a string attached. The New Hampshire legislature exempted Stark and his command from orders issued by anyone other 

than that body. Stark was to act independently against Burgoyne to 

protect his state, its people, and their interests. Naturally cantankerous, Stark would very soon demonstrate his independence.

On 24 July, Schuyler sent newly arrived Maj. Gen. Benjamin 

Lincoln to command all rebel forces in the New England region. 

Lincoln, who had Washington’s greatest confidence, had been sent 

by the commander-in-chief to assist Schuyler in any way he could. 

Schuyler determined Lincoln (who was from Massachusetts and 

thus a fellow New Englander) should oversee the raising and equipping of newly formed New England area militia units and conduct 

operations against Burgoyne’s line of communication at the first opportunity. Lincoln set out for Manchester, New Hampshire, to set up 

his headquarters and begin efforts to help defeat Burgoyne.

While St. Leger advanced on Fort Schuyler and Lincoln made 

his way to Manchester, the Army from Canada worked to move 

massive amounts of materiel to the Lake George landing and clear 

obstacles along the route to Fort Edward via Fort Anne. By 27 July, 
92

the road had been largely cleared. Two days later, the main body 

of the army departed Skenesborough and marched toward Fort Edward. As Burgoyne approached the fort, Schuyler decided to move 

his forces south again, this time to Stillwater. The roughly 4,000 

men at his immediate disposal were too weak to oppose the British with any reasonable chance of success (see map 37, Appendix 

J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 30 July–31 August 1777). As 

they moved, Schuyler’s men continued destroying bridges and anything else useful to a British advance. Almost as soon as his troops 

reached Stillwater on 1 August, Brig. Gen. John Glover’s brigade of 

Massachusetts Continentals also arrived. 

At Stillwater, Schuyler initially directed Baldwin and Kościuszko 

to begin building defensive works to prepare for any further British 

advance but changed his mind within a few days. On 6 August, the 

Northern Army’s main force departed Stillwater and headed farther 

south to Van Schaik’s Island at the confluence of the Hudson and 

Mohawk Rivers. The army arrived two days later and began digging 

in once again. Schuyler’s plan was to defend this region of little islands known as “the Sprouts.” If successful, they would prevent any 

British army movement south of that point, because Burgoyne would 

be limited to supplying his army by land. Two days after arriving at 

the Sprouts, Schuyler learned that he had been relieved of command 

of the Northern Department and Gates appointed in his stead. St. 

Clair was concurrently relieved from the army. 

Despite the bad news and since Gates was not yet present to 

assume command, Schuyler continued to set the conditions for the 

American Northern Army to succeed. He had received communiques from Col. Peter Gansevoort, American commander at Fort 

Schuyler, about St. Leger’s actions and the defeat of a New York 

militia column attempting to reach the fort. On the 13th, Schuyler 

dispatched a Continental brigade under Benedict Arnold to reinforce 

Gansevoort’s command. On the 16th, Schuyler sent Baldwin and 

a work detail of artificers back to Stillwater to gather lumber and 

other construction materials and then destroy any remaining items 

of military value. The construction materials were later used to build 

the American lines at Bemis Heights. On 19 August, Gates arrived at 

Van Schaik’s Island and assumed command from Schuyler. Sorely 

disappointed by the action, Schuyler acted honorably and departed 
93

for his home in Albany. This would not be the last that the Northern Department heard of Phillip Schuyler, however. From his home 

in Albany, he would continue to logistically support the army with 

his personal time and treasure—supporting the eventual triumph of 

American arms in this campaign. 

Schuyler was not the only commander who received bad news 

during this time. On 3 August, Burgoyne received Howe’s letter of 

17 July informing him that the commander-in-chief’s intentions 

were to seize Philadelphia rather than make junction with the Army 

from Canada at Albany. Burgoyne immediately understood that he 

would be receiving little or no support from that quarter. Confident 

as ever, however, “Gentleman Johnny” forged ahead with his plans 

to take Albany. He could not turn back. That kind of action was what 

sank Carleton’s fortunes with Germain the year before. 

Burgoyne’s main problem with continuing the advance was 

sustaining his army. Fortunately, he had received reports that food, 

fodder, and animals were plentiful on the farms eastward in Vermont. If he could successfully seize a major food depot at Bennington, the stores would provide a great deal of sustenance for his army. 

Moreover, loyalists with Burgoyne convinced him that Americans 

faithful to the king’s regime would join with the British if a show 

of force entered the area. Burgoyne dispatched a foraging expedition toward Bennington to gather needed resources and, hopefully, 

gain more loyal auxiliaries for his army. The expedition was placed 

under the command of Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum, commander of the 

Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig. Consisting of about 723 officers 

and men, the expedition was composed of mostly German units and 

detachments, along with several small loyalist, Canadian, and Indian detachments. On 9 August, Baum’s expedition departed from 

its camp at Fort Miller and headed for Bennington. 

The Battle of Bennington

On 8 August, the same day Baum departed from Fort Miller, 

John Stark made his way to Manchester where his units were assembling. He arrived in time to see that the brigade he had worked so 

hard to enlist and organize was drawn up in marching order as if to 

march away. Stark learned that General Lincoln had arrived earlier 
94

and ordered the brigade to march to Stillwater to join the Northern 

Army assembled there. Stark became livid and quickly sought out the 

Continental general and informed Lincoln in no uncertain terms that 

the soldiers were under his command and his command only. Stark 

showed Lincoln the New Hampshire Legislature orders indicating 

that this independent command was not controlled by the Continental 

Congress. Therefore, he, Stark, would order these men to any location 

he chose—in this case the supply depot at Bennington. 

When Stark arrived at Manchester, he also found the remnants 

of Seth Warner’s Continentals. Following Hubbardton, Warner’s 

regiment had rested, refitted, and recruited, and now was almost 

ready for further service. With this addition, forces under or cooperating with Stark included one Continental and two small militia 

regiments under Warner, four regiments of New Hampshire militia, 

a small cavalry troop, and a small collection of unattached militia—

about 2,300 men to defend the depot. Warner’s troops would remain 

in Manchester for the time being and would not depart for Bennington until 14 August.

Baum’s column, meanwhile, was sporadically under fire from 

rebel militia as it advanced toward Bennington. Even so, Baum 

was still able to collect some provisions and animals for the army 

along the way. Additionally, a number of loyalists made their way to 

Baum’s procession as well. Most of them were unarmed, however, 

and asked to be equipped with muskets. As the column approached a 

place called Van Schaik’s Mill (also known as Sancoick Mill) on the 

Walloomsac River on 14 August, the men encountered a detachment 

of about 200 militiamen which had been posted there the day before 

at Stark’s order. After a skirmish where Baum’s weight of numbers 

carried the day, the rebels withdrew but not before setting fire to 

the bridge there and losing several men to capture. The prisoners 

informed Baum about a large American force in Bennington that 

outnumbered his unit by at least a thousand men. The German colonel did not appear concerned and probably believed that the rebel 

militia would break and run when his regulars made a determined 

attack. Nevertheless, he dashed off a message to Burgoyne to report 

his findings and request reinforcements.

After rebuilding the bridge at the mill, Baum pushed on to an-
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other bridge on the Walloomsac River where he once more scattered 

a small detachment of rebels. This time Baum’s men seized the bridge 

intact while the German commander developed plans to hold it until 

reinforcements arrived. Baum would need the bridge to haul the large 

quantity of provisions and other supplies he expected to seize at Bennington. He set up defensive positions on a hill immediately overlooking the stream. Baum also sent his 200 loyalists across the bridge 

to construct a redoubt (the “Tory Redoubt”) on a slight rise on the 

south side of the river as well as about 50 Canadians to defend several 

cabins located closer to the bridge. Together these troops would prevent a rebel approach from the southeast. He sent the majority of the 

Regiment von Ludwig dragoons, half of the Company of Marksmen 

under Capt. Alexander Fraser (General Fraser’s nephew), and one of 

his two 6-pounder cannon up to the hilltop where they constructed 

another large redoubt (the “Dragoon Redoubt”). Baum placed the 

other 6-pounder on a shelf on the hill that overlooked the bridge, his 

grenadier detachment to the east of this gun, and his light infantry to 

the west. He then settled in to await reinforcements. 

Baum’s message arrived that evening at Burgoyne’s headquarters at the Duer House near Fort Miller—an astonishingly short time 

given the time it took Baum to get to Van Shaik’s Mill. Reading 

Baum’s report, Burgoyne sensed the danger facing Baum’s command (even if Baum himself did not) and quickly ordered reinforcements to join the expedition. On the morning of 15 August, about 

650 additional German troops and two additional cannon under Lt. 

Col. Heinrich Breymann set out to link up with Baum, who was only 

twenty-four miles away. Normally a long day’s march, Breymann’s 

column moved much more slowly because heavy rains turned the 

unimproved roads into quagmires. The men trudged along all day 

at about a half mile an hour, halting frequently to close up the lines 

of struggling men and losing time at one point because of a missed 

turn. As a result, Breymann was unable to reach Baum’s position 

that evening. His men bivouacked seven miles short of Cambridge 

and still sixteen miles from Baum. 

Despite the rain on August 15, Stark’s men had not been dormant. A number posed as local inhabitants and passed freely through 

the German defenses. Patrols sent out by Stark probed the enemy 
96

lines, noted locations of defenses, and skirmished with the German 

regulars. These bits and pieces of information gave Stark a clearer 

picture of what he was facing. Additionally as the day progressed, 

more militia detachments arrived at the rebel camp located only a 

mile or so east of Baum’s position. These additional troops gave 

Stark an even greater strength advantage. 

Armed with fairly good intelligence about what he faced and 

possessing a numerically superior force, Stark developed a threepronged attack plan for the next day. One prong consisting of 300 of 

Col. Samuel Herrick’s Vermonters, would move south of the Walloomsac River (out of sight of the Tory Redoubt), wade the stream at 

a location west of the German defenses, and enter the rear of Baum’s 

position at the Dragoon Redoubt on top of the hill. Another 250 New 

Hampshire men under Lt. Col. Moses Nichols would circle around 

the German left and approach the redoubt from the northeast. The 

third prong of New Hampshire men under Col. Thomas Stickney 

and Col. David Hobart would attack the Tory Redoubt east of the 

river. When he sensed that the time was right, Stark would personally lead his reserve force in a headlong frontal attack against the German main defenses. Most of Stark’s men were raw militia, although 

he had a few men who had fought in the French and Indian War or 

some earlier revolution battles. Though excellent, the plan was very 

complicated—difficult even for seasoned regulars. Stark expected 

these amateur soldiers to pull it off almost flawlessly.

Seth Warner’s Continentals had arrived at Bennington in the 

rain on 15 August. Warner himself had already joined Stark at the 

rebel camp, and so the Continentals were commanded by Lt. Col. 

Samuel Safford, Warner’s second-in-command. About noon on 16 

August, in accordance with Warner’s summons, Safford put the 

Continentals on the road headed west for the Walloomsac River 

Bridge. Just about an hour before Safford began his march, Stark’s 

three columns and his reserve moved toward their attack assault positions. It took about three hours for Herrick’s troops to stealthily 

make their way past the Tory Redoubt, across the Walloomsac, and 

into position on the west side of the Dragoon Redoubt. By that time 

Nichols’ men were in place as well. At about 1500, Nichols gave 

the order to advance. To his west, Herrick gave a similar command. 
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Within a minute or so, Herrick’s men advanced into the open before 

the redoubt and fired a volley. Volleys from Nichols’ men and the 

Germans immediately followed. Stark, located on the south side of 

the river, recalled that the initial blasts sounded like “a continual 

clap of thunder.”3 The fight was on. 

Just after the firing opened on the hill, Stickney and Hobart 

attacked the Tory Redoubt and the Canadians’ cabins. After a brief 

resistance, the loyalists folded and fled and the Canadians rapidly 

followed suit. The bridge was quickly in American hands. Stark now 

led his reserve across the fields from his camp past the Tory Redoubt 

and over the bridge. His men pitched into the enemy defenders on 

the north side of the bridge. Up on the hill the dragoons and Fraser’s 

men fared better, but only for a time. They prevented Nichols’ and 

Herrick’s men from overrunning their position but only until they 

began to run out of ammunition. Now desperate, the dragoons—

personally led by Baum—began to try a breakout using their short 

swords until Baum fell mortally wounded. At that point, the dragoon 

defenses collapsed. The Indian allies and the loyalists and Canadian 

contingents had already scattered into the woods to escape the trap. 

They need not have been so concerned as Stark’s men soon turned 

to looting the German camp and baggage trains rather than pursuing the fugitives. By about 1630, the fight on the hill was over and 

Baum’s command ceased to exist as a fighting unit.

To the west, Breymann’s relief force was now bearing down on 

Stark’s disorganized and tired clusters of milling troops. Stark received 

word about Breymann’s approach and frantically began to collect any 

men he could find and push small detachments down the road to oppose 

the German advance. As the German column arrived at Van Schaik’s 

Mill, panicked troops from Baum’s forces began running down the 

road to get away. From these men, Breymann learned that a superior 

force of American militia had surrounded Baum. Not sure of Baum’s 

fate, Breymann quickly pushed on until he met resistance from the random collections of militia that Stark was urging forward. Fortunately 

for Stark, Warner’s Continentals were about to arrive. Continuing west 

on the road, they soon engaged the head of Breymann’s command. In 

short order, the fighting was once again general and heavy. 

The weight of American firepower gradually began to tell 
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as more and more militiamen dropped what they were doing and 

marched toward the sound of the guns. Before long, the Braunschweigers were being attacked from at least three directions and began to run short of ammunition. Eventually the German commander 

realized he would suffer the same fate as Baum if he did not break 

contact. He ordered a fighting retreat and started back toward the 

Hudson River and safety. Though wounded in the leg, Breymann 

skillfully kept Stark’s and Warner’s troops at bay as he fought his 

way westward. Soon after dark, Stark and Warner broke off the 

fight, allowing the Germans to complete their withdrawal unmolested—but not before Breymann lost at least twenty-five percent of 

his troops as well as the two 6-pounder cannon that the Braunschweigers had brought along. Between the two German contingents, 

Burgoyne lost about fifteen percent of his fighting strength on 16 

August. These were losses the British command could ill-afford. 

The Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany

On 2 August, two weeks before the fighting at Bennington, St. 

Leger’s column arrived at Fort Schuyler (see map 32, Appendix J, 

Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves June–August 1777). Col. Peter 

Gansevoort, Fort Schuyler’s American commander had learned of 

St. Leger’s advance on 25 July when it arrived at Oswego. The day 

after St. Leger arrived at the fort, he sent a message to Gansevoort 

and demanded that he surrender Fort Schuyler and its garrison. Having seen the small number of regular troops in St. Leger’s command 

and the large numbers of Iroquois (who were unlikely to participate 

in an organized assault of the fort), Gansevoort wisely demurred. St. 

Leger now had little choice but to lay siege to the American position.

Thirty miles away at Fort Dayton in Tryon County, Brig. Gen. 

Nicolas Herkimer had been assembling four small regiments of 

New York Militia since the end of July. Each regiment consisted 

of about 200 men, giving Herkimer a force of about 800 troops. On 

4 August, Herkimer set out for Fort Schuyler to provide relief and 

reinforcement to Gansevoort and his command. St. Leger learned 

of Herkimer’s column the following day and dispatched a force of 

about 400 Iroquois and 150 loyalists to attack the Americans. On 

6 August, the loyalist/Iroquois force ambushed Herkimer’s brigade 
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as it was moving through a deep ravine near the Indian village of 

Oriskany about six miles from the fort. Heavy fighting ensued as 

the attackers pressed their advantage. The militiamen sought cover 

on the wooded slopes and engaged their attackers while taking very 

heavy casualties. Herkimer was wounded in the leg (a wound that 

eventually proved to be mortal), but he gamely directed the defense 

of his command while propped against a tree and smoking a pipe. 

About noon, the fighting ended. By that time, more than half of the 

militia force was dead, wounded, or captured, with at least 100 or 

more loyalist and Indian casualties. 

During the desperate fighting in the ravine, Gansevoort sent a 

raiding party from the fort into the Indian camp. The raiders basically stole or destroyed everything the Indians had with them. On their 

return from Oriskany, the Indians found they not only had nothing 

to show for their work with St. Leger but had now lost everything 

they brought with them. Enraged by the turn of events, most of the 

Iroquois quickly decided to leave. This event drastically reduced St. 

Leger’s command, which now faced an even greater challenge in its 

efforts to capture Fort Schuyler. 

During most of the siege at Fort Schuyler, the post’s namesake, 

General Schuyler, still commanded the Northern Department. When 

he learned of the Oriskany defeat and that Herkimer had not been 

able to reinforce the fort, he dispatched another relief force consisting of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s 700-man Continental brigade. 

Schuyler assigned overall command of the relief force to Benedict 

Arnold, who left Stillwater for Fort Schuyler on 12 August. As he 

approached the beleaguered post, Arnold devised a stratagem that he 

would send a captured loyalist to convince St. Leger that Arnold’s 

relief force was much larger than it was. His ruse worked completely. 

St. Leger departed the Fort Schuyler vicinity on 22 August and headed by boat back around to Fort Ticonderoga. Arnold had lifted the 

siege without a fight. The following day he sent Learned’s Brigade 

back to Van Schaik’s Island where they would rejoin the Northern 

Army, now under Gates’ command, on 31 August.

The Armies Move

During the month of August, while St. Leger was attempting to 
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invest and overcome Fort Schuyler, Burgoyne’s Army from Canada 

remained largely dispersed and dormant at Forts Ticonderoga, Anne, 

George, Edward, and Miller. The army commander was forced to remain mostly inactive while waiting for additional supplies and reinforcements to catch up to him from Canada. Even so, several events 

of varying import affected the British situation beyond the tactical 

defeats at Bennington and Fort Schuyler. On 15 August, Brigadier 

Powell replaced Brig. James Hamilton as commander at Fort Ticonderoga. At about the same time, Hamilton’s 62nd Foot was replaced 

by Powell’s 47th Foot. Evidently, Burgoyne believed Hamilton was 

the more capable of the two brigadiers and wanted to have Hamilton 

with him for any impending actions. 

Far to the south of Burgoyne, Howe finally debarked his command at Head of Elk, Maryland, on 25 August after more than a 

month at sea then headed overland toward Philadelphia to effect its 

capture. Five days later, the general finally received Germain’s 18 

May letter that instructed Howe to link up with Burgoyne in Albany. 

Somewhat baffled by the instructions, Howe responded to Germain 

that he would not be able to accomplish that mission given that he 

had almost his entire army—save those with Clinton in New York 

and a few other minor detachments—engaged in operations south 

of Philadelphia.

As for Burgoyne and his army, the fortunes of war had turned. 

After defeats at Bennington and Fort Schuyler, Burgoyne experienced added distress as hundreds of Indian allies departed his service on 1 September. Combined with those of Bennington and now 

potentially St. Leger’s command, these added up to a substantial loss 

of combat power that the general would need to defeat the American 

Northern Army and capture Albany. Additionally, Howe would not 

be coming to Albany, which further increased the odds against Burgoyne’s army. Nevertheless, Gentleman Johnny remained confident 

of his eventual victory.

On 10 September, Burgoyne headed his army south once 

again, having gathered enough provisions for another move toward 

Albany (see map 42, Appendix J, Saratoga Campaign Movements 

1–26 September 1777). The troops at Forts George and Anne abandoned their posts and moved to join the main army at Fort Edward. 
101

Concurrently, Burgoyne moved forces forward to the Batten Kill (a 

“kill” is a creek) where Twiss began constructing a pontoon bridge 

to cross to the west side of the Hudson. The engineer then took up 

the bridge after the last contingent crossed the Hudson on the 13th. 

In removing the bridge, Burgoyne had cut his line of communications to Canada. From here on out he would have to either forage for 

food or break through to Albany. Undeterred, Burgoyne continued 

south in search of Gates’ Northern Army—known to be nearby—

and on 17 September, the leading elements of Burgoyne’s command 

arrived at Sword’s Farm. The Army from Canada was down to about 

8,400 effective troops at this point.

During this same timeframe, the new Northern Army commander was also active. On the same day Burgoyne lost most of his 

Indian allies, Gates and Lincoln met at Van Schaik’s Island to develop a new plan. Given that Gates’ army had dramatically grown in 

strength in recent weeks, the American commander wanted to deal 

a blow that would not only logistically damage his opponent’s army 

but also deliver a severe psychological blow. Gates ordered Lincoln 

to go to Pawlet in Vermont and organize a raid against the British 

line of communications. Since Lincoln’s militia troops were already 

well to the northeast of the British coalition forces, they also could 

strike the British army if Burgoyne decided to retreat. Lincoln could 

attack Burgoyne’s head and flank while Gates snapped at his heels. 

In short, Lincoln was ordered to divide, divert, and harass enemy 

forces in the rear areas between Burgoyne and Fort Ticonderoga. 

Meanwhile, Gates’ plan for the main portion of his army was to 

effectively block Burgoyne’s advance and force the British to attack 

him in fixed defenses. On 8 September, the same day that Lincoln 

arrived at Pawlet with the lead elements of his militia forces, Gates 

set the rebel army in motion northward on a collision course with 

Burgoyne’s Army from Canada. Departing from Van Schaik’s Island, the army initially traveled back to Stillwater. After a reconnaissance of that area, Gates determined the terrain was too wide and flat 

and would make the defenses vulnerable to attack by a well-trained 

army. Instead, Gates went to inspect another suggested site—some 

high ground known as Bemis Heights located about three miles to 

the north of Stillwater. The position was on a long, generally east-
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west ridge that provided a relatively good vantage point over the direction from which the British would have to approach. On the right 

flank there was a 100-foot bluff above the river road. The road was 

on the flood plain which itself was relatively narrow, extending only 

about 200 to 300 yards east to the Hudson. A few well-placed cannon could effectively block any forces advancing south on the flood 

plain by boat or along the road by foot. Satisfied that the position 

would provide excellent defensive terrain, Gates’ his army moved 

north on 12 September then began digging in at Bemis Heights.

The Pawlet Expedition

When Gates and Lincoln met on 1 September at Van Schiak’s 

Island, the two generals developed an outline plan that required 

Lincoln to assemble about 2,000 militiamen and make a somewhat 

complex attack against Burgoyne’s line of communication. Lincoln 

departed that day and after arriving in Manchester began meetings 

with the various militia commanders to craft details of the operation. The final plan was for a 500-man composite regiment under 

Col. Benjamin R. Woodbridge of the 1st New Hampshire County 

Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, to move on Skenesborough from 

the west; attack and defeat any enemy troops found there; and remove or destroy any supplies, equipment, and machinery of military 

use. A second 500-man force under Col. Samuel Johnson, 4th Essex County Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, was to move via Hubbardton and seize Mount Independence as a diversion against Fort 

Ticonderoga. The main effort was a third 500-man column under 

Col. John Brown, Middle Berkshire Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, which would attack British forces at the landing on the north end 

of Lake George and perform similar tasks to Woodbridge at Skenesborough. At a later time, Lincoln and his 600 to 700 troops would 

move toward Skenesborough—approaching from the southwest—

and link with Woodbridge there to reinforce that effort. Ultimately, 

all columns would link up at Skenesborough to present a sizable 

force in Burgoyne’s rear. The actions undertaken by these forces 

were intended to be raids rather than a pitched battle. The columns 

were to hit hard, gather supplies, move away as quickly as possible, 

then reassemble. 
103

Lincoln’s command, which had assembled at Bennington, 

marched toward Pawlet on 6 September and arrived two days later. 

On arrival, the troops were short on food and Lincoln himself was 

short on intelligence about his three objectives. The general held in 

place at Pawlet for several days while some men were dispatched 

to retrieve flour and others to spy on the objective sites. Both necessities, flour and intelligence, had arrived back at Pawlet by 12 

September. Though Lincoln was not fully aware of the location of 

the British main army or of Burgoyne’s intentions, Lincoln knew 

his planned objectives were all only lightly held by enemy troops, 

to include Fort Ticonderoga itself. He also learned of a significant 

number of American prisoners of war being held at the landing, as 

well as a large supply depot located there. Convinced that the opportunities were worth the risks, Lincoln assembled his three force 

commanders. He instructed Brown that he should only seize Fort 

Ticonderoga if he could succeed with little or no risk to his men. The 

general then ordered Brown to start his movement on the afternoon 

of the 12th and Johnson and Woodbridge to depart no later than the 

morning of the 13th. 

Arriving at their objectives on 18 September, Johnson’s and 

Woodbridge’s columns were generally successful. Johnson’s men 

easily seized Mount Independence and provided a suitable distraction to Powell’s troops at Fort Ticonderoga. By occupying the position, Johnson helped ensure that the British garrison did not sally 

forth to attack Brown’s men at the landing. Farther south, Woodbridge’s troops found Skenesborough had been abandoned by the 

enemy, with nothing of military value left behind. Brown’s force, 

however, accomplished a great deal more. 

Arriving at Lake George Landing on 18 September, Brown’s 

command rapidly overwhelmed the British force there. Brown’s men 

also freed 118 American prisoners who had been captured at Fort 

Ticonderoga, Skenesborough, and Hubbardton. They also seized a 

great deal of enemy stores including several hundred head of beeves 

and horses and burned about 200 bateaux and numerous wheeled 

carts and carriages. His men captured roughly 300 enemy prisoners of war who were sent to Skenesborough under the guard of the 

former American prisoners. Meanwhile, Brown’s column moved on 
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to capture Mount Defiance. After two days of demonstrations and 

demands to surrender Fort Ticonderoga (which Powell refused, of 

course), Brown put his men in the few remaining bateaux at the landing and set off southward on Lake George to seize Diamond Island, 

the next British supply depot. Unfortunately, the British garrison 

there was forewarned and the effort failed. Still, Brown’s raid caused 

significant damage to the Army from Canada. In addition to reducing 

Burgoyne’s already short supplies, he crippled the British ability to 

move supplies south to the main army. Furthermore, Powell—with 

his own forces significantly reduced as well—was now loath to send 

reinforcements to Burgoyne for fear of losing Ticonderoga itself. 

When St. Leger’s force from the Mohawk Valley arrived at the fort 

on 27 September, Powell refused to let St. Leger move south to join 

Burgoyne. Moreover, due to the destruction caused by Brown’s raid, 

Powell no longer possessed the transport capabilities to reach Burgoyne even if he was amenable to the idea. 

With nothing more to gain after failing to take Diamond Island, Brown headed back to Pawlet via Skenesborough. Arriving 

at Pawlet in late September, Brown discovered that Lincoln had 

already departed to return to the Northern Army’s positions at Bemis Heights. He also received orders from Lincoln (as had Johnson 

and Woodbridge) directing him to proceed to Bemis Heights to join 

General Gates. The orders were urgent as there had already been a 

major engagement between the two opposing armies on 19 September at a place called Freeman’s Farm. 

The Battle of Freeman’s Farm

Even as Brown’s men were demanding Fort Ticonderoga’s surrender on the morning of 19 September, Burgoyne’s army was on 

the move to attack Bemis Heights. The general’s decision to finally 

attack the American position was driven as much by circumstance 

as strategy. Since the action at Fort Anne during the second week 

of July, the Army from Canada’s situation in the Hudson River Valley had continually grown worse. Imperceptible at first, the state 

of affairs between the armies had clearly shifted in the five weeks 

since Burgoyne had launched Baum toward Bennington. The British army was continually low on supplies with little prospect for 
105

any major improvement. Moreover, loyalist support promised by 

Phillip Skene and others had failed to materialize, and the army’s 

Indian allies were deserting in droves. The defeats of Baum and 

Breymann at Bennington had cost Burgoyne casualties and time he 

could ill-afford. Then on 28 August, Burgoyne received word of St. 

Leger’s rebuff at Fort Schuyler. Reinforcements from that quarter 

would not reach him for weeks, if at all. In addition, the first signs 

of autumn were setting in with leaves changing color and cooler 

weather. Burgoyne knew he could not stay where he was, yet retreat 

was abhorrent given how he came to command the expedition in the 

first place. In short, Burgoyne felt he had to continue forward even 

though he knew his enemy’s position had improved while his own 

had deteriorated.

America’s Northern Army now held a much stronger hand than 

just a month previous. Gates had tumbled to an excellent plan that 

required nothing of his command but to sit in place and let the enemy attack him in fortified positions. Meanwhile, reinforcements 

streaming in from George Washington and the various northeastern 

states had bolstered his army to something around 10,000 troops. 

Burgoyne would have to attack—against fortified positions held by 

troops who outnumbered him—or face a devastating retreat. Though 

rebel supplies were not great, they were sufficient for the moment 

and more was on the way. Moreover, American morale soared after the victories at Bennington and Fort Schuyler, and, as a result, 

American strength in numbers grew. Most troops knew a big fight 

was imminent and were itching to face the enemy. 

But not all was well in the American camp. Gates, who took 

pains to maintain cordial relations with the impetuous Arnold, was 

now turning sour on his energetic subordinate. After Gates relieved 

Schuyler of command of the Northern Army, the latter officer released his staff to seek other assignments. Two of these men ended 

up on Arnold’s staff. Correctly believing these men to be Schuyler 

loyalists, Gates addressed his concern with Arnold. However, Arnold essentially ignored Gates’ apprehensions and took no action 

on the matter. Arnold’s indifference frustrated Gates and the tension 

reached a critical stage by mid-September. 

Though Burgoyne was ignorant of the issues facing the American high command, he was keenly aware of the difficult situation 
106

that now faced him. Determined to take the offensive, he had built up 

enough supplies by mid-September that he determined his army was 

ready to try to break through the American defenses. One course of 

action was to attack up the River Road into what were ostensibly the 

American main defenses. Even with a successful attack, Burgoyne 

knew he was likely to suffer heavy casualties. The option he chose 

was a flank attack against the American position, which would hopefully break the line and could be followed by a general British attack 

along the front to force the rebels out of position. The key terrain for 

Burgoyne’s main effort was a piece of unoccupied high ground to 

the west of the American position. Fraser’s Advanced Corps was to 

seize the ground then use it to make the main assault into the American flank defenses.

On the morning of 19 September, a heavy fog enveloped the 

entire area. Nevertheless, the Army from Canada, divided into three 

columns in preparation for a move against the American defenses. 

Fraser’s Advance Corps (the Right Wing), which consisted of the 

Grenadier and Light Infantry Battalions, the 24th Foot, and a few 

other smaller attachments traveled west along a small road that paralleled a large gorge, soon to become known as the “Great Ravine,” 

in search of a suitable site to cross the chasm. Initially, Fraser’s column was followed by Hamilton’s brigade (Burgoyne’s center), which 

consisted primarily of the 9th, 20th, 21st, and 62nd Foot and four 

6-pounder cannon. This column turned south after a time onto a track 

that brought it down into the massive, tangled ravine and up the far 

side with much difficulty. The western column (the Left Wing), which 

consisted of the Riedesel, Specht, and von Rhetz Regiments and four 

6-pounder cannon all under Riedesel, avoided the ravine by advancing generally southwest along the River Road. Their mission was to 

demonstrate against the right of the American line. The 47th Foot 

remained behind to guard baggage and the bateaux near the Sword 

House.

Around 1000 as the fog began to dissipate, the columns began 

to move. The terrain made for slow, rough going—especially for 

the center column and Right Wing as each negotiated the Great Ravine. Riedesel’s men on the left were slowed by various obstacles 

left behind by the Americans such a downed trees and destroyed 
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bridges. Hamilton’s center column was the first to cross the ravine. 

As the column struggled up the far side, its lead elements turned 

west again and paralleled the ravine, pushing through heavy woods 

after regaining the top of the bluff. After moving about 200 yards, 

the column halted in the forest, faced south, and waited there for 

Fraser’s command to come up on Hamilton’s right in the west while 

Riedesel moved up the River Road, generally on line to the east. In 

the meantime, Hamilton sent an advanced guard company of the 

9th Foot forward which soon encountered a large, open farm field. 

Major Gordon Forbes, the regimental commander, spied a few rebel 

troops in the distance around the cluster of small structures that constituted the Freeman farm. Hamilton quickly ordered Forbes to clear 

out the rebels. In open order, Forbes moved his reconnaissance forward while the rest of his regiment rested in the woods.

Shortly after the British movement began that morning, Gates 

began to receive reports from rebel scouts that the enemy was on the 

move. Although he wanted to remain in position and let Burgoyne 

break his army against the rock of his defenses, Gates reluctantly 

agreed to allow Arnold to move a force forward to more fully determine British intentions and harass the movement if possible. A short 

time later, Daniel Morgan’s riflemen and Dearborn’s light infantry 

moved northward out of the American lines to find the enemy. After 

pushing through the woods for a time, the lead elements of Morgan’s men also came upon the large, open field at Freeman’s Farm. 

Spreading out along the edge of the woods, Morgan’s men took positions behind trees or up in the branches, while a small number of 

men moved into the open toward the buildings. Once there, some 

of the men moved in or behind the buildings while others knelt or 

stood behind a rail fence in the yard. Within minutes, several men 

noticed about 100 British regulars advancing in open order toward 

their position. These men were Forbes’s advanced guard moving to 

clear out the rebels. Little did Forbes know that the main American 

line—located in the tree line to the south—vastly outnumbered his 

skirmishers. As the thin line of redcoats closed in on the buildings, 

hundreds of unseen riflemen and light infantry took aim and fired. 

The Battle of Freeman’s Farm had begun. 

The sudden and unexpectedly intensity of the initial blast froze 
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the British troops in their tracks. Many were felled by the fire. Several officers were instantly killed or wounded as rebel riflemen specifically targeted them. Forbes himself was wounded but remained 

in command of the skirmish line. He quickly realized that it was useless for his men to advance or even remain where they were. He directed a general retreat to the wood line at the north end of the field. 

The sudden clatter of fire prompted commanders in Hamilton’s column to begin moving through the woods and take positions for a 

battle line. Once on line, however, the British troops were restrained 

from opening fire due to the fact that Forbes’ men were still forward. 

On the British right, Fraser’s Advance Corps was just now 

coming out of the ravine and within a few minutes began forming 

another British battle line at the McBride Farm, the next open field 

to the west. Morgan and his men only saw the retreat of Forbes’ 

advanced guard and were unaware of that new line formation. Apparently thinking they had routed the enemy, a sizable number of 

Morgan’s troops jumped up and pursued Forbes’ men toward the location where Hamilton was forming his brigade. Moreover, a company of Fraser’s light infantry, attracted by the sounds of battle to 

the east, moved into a position which put them on the left flank of 

Morgan’s “charge,” and the British infantry opened fire. Now it was 

the Americans who were halted in their tracks and forced to retreat 

pell-mell. As fast as they could, they returned to the southern line 

of woods after suffering a number of casualties. Fortunately, Dearborn had stopped his men just short of the open field at a location 

where they could see Fraser’s command forming. The rebel light 

infantry soon engaged Fraser’s light troops on Morgan’s left, providing covering fire for the disorganized riflemen and their confused 

retreat. The men in Hamilton’s battle line chafed to return fire since 

some units were taking casualties without even seeing the enemy. 

Unexpectedly and without orders, a number of British troops began 

to fire wildly into Freeman’s field and other men followed suit. Before Hamilton’s officers could get their men to stop firing, several of 

Forbes’ men were killed or wounded by friendly fire as they retreated for the safety of the wood line. The heavier firing then tapered off 

to skirmishing and seesaw fighting over parts of the Freeman field. 

Meanwhile on the main American defensive lines, the firing 
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attracted the attention of Gates and his officers. After a brief 

discussion with Arnold, Gates directed his subordinate to send 

additional troops to Morgan’s aid. Arnold initially sent the 1st, 2nd, 

and 3rd New Hampshire Regiments from Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor’s 

brigade. Poor soon formed his brigade to the left rear of Morgan’s 

reconstituting line. These units were followed by the rest of Poor’s 

Brigade (the 2nd and 4th New York Regiments and two battalions 

of Connecticut militia), which extended the American line even 

further west. With the additional troops on hand, the Americans 

briefly attempted to turn Hamilton’s flank, but the effort failed. Still 

more Americans troops arrived, now from Learned’s Brigade, and 

these went into the line facing Fraser’s Right Wing. Over the next 

two hours, British and American units made numerous advances 

and retreats across the Freeman and McBride fields. Each attack 

left a swath of dead bodies and wounded men in its wake. The rebel 

superior strength became more obvious as the fighting grew more 

intense through the afternoon. Although Fraser’s command was 

holding firm, Hamilton’s Brigade in the center was taking fearful 

casualties and on the brink of collapse. The 62nd Foot and the British 

artillery were in the most dire circumstances. Morgan’s expert shots 

targeted the artillerymen, and the gun crews were becoming combat 

ineffective due to casualties. Several guns could not be manned as 

there were not enough gunners left to service them. Now taking 

action to prevent a disaster rather than looking to crush the American 

defenses, Burgoyne sent orders to Riedesel in the late afternoon to 

find and attack the American right flank. 

Receiving this change in mission, Riedesel immediately selected his own regiment, two companies of the von Rhetz Regiment, 

and Capt. George Pausch’s two-gun 6-pounder battery and set out 

for the sound of the guns. Deftly picking his way through the forest, 

the German general successfully located the right of the rebel line 

and deployed his units for the attack. The Americans failed to detect 

the German approach and assault until it was too late. Around 1700, 

Riedesel launched the German line against the flank of Morgan’s line 

of riflemen who had shifted right during the day. Instead of breaking, Morgan’s men refused the right flank and were soon joined by 

some of the New Hampshire troops. However, the rebel line was 
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becoming untenable. The American troops—mostly Continental 

regulars—conducted a relatively disciplined fighting withdrawal to 

the south bank of a creek that ran parallel to the American defense 

line. The British commanders made little or no attempt to pursue 

the Americans. Instead, they were content to let the rebels leave and 

turned their attention to caring for their numerous wounded. 

Though Burgoyne and his men could crow about holding the 

field at the end of the day, they had little to brag about. The British 

commander’s entire plan was thrown off balance early in the fight by 

unexpected American aggressiveness. Instead of advancing on the 

American works, he was forced to fight an essentially defensive battle just to keep his center from being overrun. By the end of the day, 

Burgoyne had lost more than 560 troops, including 160 men killed 

in action. Though the British believed that they must have punished 

the Americans severely, rebel losses of all categories were about 300 

men. In short, though Burgoyne was slightly closer to Albany, he had 

made no dent in the main American defenses (indeed, he still did not 

know exactly where the rebel defensive line was located) and now 

had fewer troops to fight them. Meanwhile, rebel strength on Bemis 

Heights and in Burgoyne’s rear continued to grow.

An Operational Pause

Neither Gates nor his men believed that the 19 September battle would be the end of the matter. Indeed, most anticipated that Burgoyne would likely renew his attack on the 20th. When he did not, 

the Americans continued to dig in and improve their positions by 

felling more trees and constructing abitis (see Appendix I, Glossary 

of Terms). Meanwhile more troops from Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire and New York continued to stream into the 

defenses over the next two weeks. Around 6,000 men arrived to add 

to Gates’ numbers, though not all were with the main army at Bemis 

Heights. The forces there increased to as many as 12,000 troops, 

clearly outnumbering the British force. Burgoyne, on the other 

hand, could only hope for a trickle of reinforcements. St. Leger’s 

command was the largest likely addition but only if he could get his 

troops through. Now that Howe was clearly not moving north, Maj. 

Gen. Sir Henry Clinton might attempt to assist by advancing from 
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New York City into the Highlands region. 

In fact, two days after the Freeman Farm fight, Burgoyne received a coded message from Clinton that in 10 days’ time he would 

make a foray with 3,000 men to attack the rebel post of Fort Montgomery, about 100 miles south of Albany. Clinton, however, did not 

mention whether he would push north to link up with Burgoyne if 

he was successful at Fort Montgomery. Still, Burgoyne welcomed 

news of any potential support. At the very least, Clinton’s offensive movement would likely draw away some of Gates’ command 

to weaken it. In any event, the message prompted Burgoyne to delay 

further action against Bemis Heights, dig in, and see what developed 

as a result of Clinton’s efforts.

Like the American troops now facing them, Burgoyne’s British 

and German troops began to prepare well-constructed defense positions to ward off any rebel attacks while they waited for Clinton to 

advance. The Army from Canada’s rearmost positions were situated 

on the bluffs above the River Road about a mile northeast of Bemis 

Heights. These three fortifications became known collectively as the 

“Great Redoubt.” In essence the position was the army’s logistics 

base. To the southwest were four additional small redoubts faced to 

the south for protection from that direction. Burgoyne’s headquarters was located near the eastern most of these four. Southwest of 

there was the main British line—a series of smaller redoubts facing 

toward the rebel lines. These positions were constructed on the high 

ground north of Mill Creek and presented a formidable obstacle for 

any American advance. The weakest portion of the British line was 

in the west at the Freeman and McBride farms where the fighting 

on the 19th had occurred. The relatively flat though slightly rolling terrain offered no significant barriers to an army’s advance. The 

water courses in the area generally flowed west to east and so posed 

no obstacle to a force attacking from the west. Still, the redoubts 

built in this area were well-positioned and, for the most part, mutually supporting. The two main positions, the Balcarres Redoubt on 

Freeman’s Farm and the Breymann Redoubt on McBride’s Farm to 

the northwest were not within supporting distance, but the smaller 

works in each of those two defensive complexes were mutually supporting of the main position as well as with the other smaller posi-
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tions sprinkled about the landscape. 

Despite the security of these positions, however, the troops of 

the Army from Canada had daily reminders that they were not safe. 

Rebel reconnaissance and harassment patrols harassed and sniped 

at the harried enemy troops every day and continually gathered intelligence to keep Gates apprised of British actions and intentions. 

Everything seemed to be going the Americans’ way—except the 

American command climate, which was reaching a low point at 

this time.

On 22 September, Gates prepared a report on the battle at Freeman’s Farm and sent it to the Continental Congress. The report, 

while generally accurate, failed to mention the role played by Arnold and the fact that Arnold’s men carried the weight of the battle 

on their shoulders. Moreover, Gates issued a general order the same 

day making Morgan’s command an independent unit under the direct command of Gates himself. Arnold was clearly a brave and 

aggressive leader, but he was also vain and sensitive to perceived 

slights. Arnold clearly believed that these were intentional slights 

against him by the American commander. Probably egged on by the 

two officers whom he had adopted from Schuyler’s staff, Arnold 

angrily confronted Gates about the report and the missing details. 

After a series of verbal and written confrontations over the next 

couple of days, Gates ostensibly removed Arnold from command 

and assigned the Northern Army’s Right Wing to Lincoln; Gates assumed direct command of the Left Wing, Arnold’s former division. 

Though incensed and insulted, Arnold remained in camp—creating 

an awkward situation for the various commanders and staff.4

Over the next two weeks, Burgoyne’s situation became more 

grim, despite some potentially good news that Howe had succeeded 

in capturing Philadelphia on 26 September. Though a positive for 

the British, capturing the American capital failed to radically affect rebel attitudes about continuing their resistance. The following 

day, St. Leger’s command finally arrived at Fort Ticonderoga from 

the failed Mohawk Valley Expedition (see map 48, Appendix J, 

Saratoga Campaign Movements 27 September–17 October 1777). 

However, because of the recent attack by Brown’s Pawlet raiders, 

no water transportation was available to move St. Leger’s troops 
113

to Burgoyne in a timely manner. Additionally, no carts or animals 

were available to haul his supplies if St. Leger chose to travel overland. On 3 October, Clinton departed New York City en route to the 

Highlands with 3,000 British, German, and loyalist troops. Three 

days later, he successfully captured Forts Montgomery and Clinton, 

two rebel outposts which guarded the Hudson River. These actions 

effectively opened the water passage through the Highlands up to 

at least the fortifications at West Point. Unfortunately, neither Burgoyne nor his troops were aware of these positive developments. 

In fact, the very day Clinton departed New York City, the weather 

turned colder and Burgoyne announced that the daily food ration 

would be cut by one-third.

The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield (2nd Battle of Saratoga)

On 4 October, Burgoyne held a council of war with his generals. After reducing rations for his men, he knew he could not wait 

much longer to take action. The British general suggested to his 

commanders that the army should leave a small detachment to guard 

their supplies, make a roundabout march to the west, and attack the 

rebel defenses from the left rear. His generals balked at the idea, arguing that such a movement would take too long and that the detachment and supplies left behind would be quickly overwhelmed by the 

enemy. The council ended inconclusively. The following day, Riedesel suggested to Burgoyne that the army fall back to Batten Kill 

and reestablish communications with Fort Ticonderoga. That way if 

Clinton should fail, the army had a reasonable chance to retreat back 

to the fort and safety. Burgoyne refused the German’s plan. He felt 

such a move would be too disgraceful and would signal Burgoyne’s 

defeat to the Americans. Instead, he settled on a modification to his 

original plan. He decided to send Simon Fraser on a reconnaissancein-force to the west to gather food supplies and scout the condition 

of American defenses there. If Fraser’s scout revealed that attacking 

the positions looked promising, Burgoyne would launch an all-out 

attack the following day. If not, he would retreat to Batten Kill as 

Riedesel recommended. Burgoyne scheduled the reconnaissance-inforce for the morning of 7 October.

For this mission, Fraser selected an elite brigade from across the 
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army. Consisting of about 1,700 hand-picked men from every unit 

except the 47th Foot, the command was formed and ready to move by 

late morning. The force consisted of British grenadiers, light infantry, 

and 24th Foot, as well as German grenadiers and jägers. Supporting 

the brigade was an unusually strong artillery battalion (for this size 

of force) of 10 guns manned by 100 artillerymen. The remainder of 

Burgoyne’s command remained at their posts to defend against an 

American foray. About noon, Fraser led his command westward out 

the Quaker Road—accompanied by Burgoyne, Phillips, and Riedesel. 

After passing through the Coulter farm, the lead elements of 

the column entered the fields of the Barber farm. Around the collection of buildings near the center of the open area, the advanced 

guards spied a rebel picket and quickly drove them off. Discovering 

wheat standing in the abandoned fields, Fraser deployed his command to cover the field’s perimeter and sent for men from the camp 

to come forage the grain. Meanwhile, Burgoyne, Phillips, and Riedesel climbed on top of a cabin to look at the American lines but 

could see absolutely no sign of them. The reconnaissance force was 

still too far away to determine anything about the rebel defenses. 

The force would have to move closer to accomplish anything useful 

along those lines. In the meantime, the wheat needed to be cut and 

hauled away, so the troops settled into a hasty defense. 

The British protective line ran generally from the wood 

line on the west flank of the Barber field along the southern 

fringe of woods and east back into the Freeman field. Unknown 

to the British generals, Gates had sent his adjutant general, Lt. 

Col. James Wilkinson, to the area to investigate reported British 

activity. Wilkinson watched the British deployment into the fields 

and other actions, then quickly rode back to Gates to inform him of 

the enemy dispositions. 

Wilkinson found Gates, Arnold, and Lincoln at lunch and relayed what he had seen. Gates was initially reluctant to send more 

than Morgan’s regiment out to bolster the American pickets. Not 

long after Morgan had departed, however, sharp firing from the 

picket line informed Gates that more troops might be needed. Arnold and Lincoln rode out next to assess the situation themselves 

and within 30 minutes returned to report their impressions. Arnold 
115

pushed for a major foray and so irritated Gates with his urgings that 

the commander dismissed his impetuous subordinate by telling him, 

“General, I have nothing for you to do. You have no business here.” 

(See endnote 4 at the end of this chapter). At that, Arnold apparently 

left for his headquarters. More circumspect, Lincoln gently advised 

Gates to send more troops. At that point, Gates agreed to send two 

additional brigades from the Left Wing. 

Leading the American advance guard, Morgan spent some time 

maneuvering his force of riflemen and light infantry into a position to the west of the British battle line. Not long after, Poor’s Brigade came up on the British left (to the east). Learned’s Brigade, the 

reserve, moved into a position to attack the enemy center. Around 

1500, Poor’s Brigade launched a determined attack against the 

front and left flank of Major John D. Acland’s Grenadier Battalion. 

Following an initial volley, Poor ordered a bayonet charge. After 

a period of heavy fighting, the grenadiers could not hold against 

the massive American tide and rapidly fell back, leaving many dead 

and wounded at their former position, including Acland who was 

shot through both legs. On the American left, Morgan’s Corps of 

Riflemen and Light Infantry had stealthily moved into position on 

some high ground that enfiladed the British right. Almost concurrent 

with Poor’s assault, Morgan’s men opened fire on Major Alexander 

Lindsay’s Light Infantry Battalion holding the right flank. While 

the British Light Infantry troops had difficulty acquiring targets that 

were largely concealed by heavy woods, the Americans were bringing very heavy and accurate fire on the redcoats standing in the open 

field. As with the grenadiers, the light infantry suffered galling casualties in relatively short order. Soon, Dearborn ordered his men to 

make a bayonet charge. The assault of Dearborn’s own light infantry 

forced Lindsay’s men to retreat behind the jägers on their left, where 

they formed a new line. Sensing that his men were shaken and to 

keep order in his command, Fraser rode forward to steady his light 

infantry. About the time he moved to their location and began rallying his troops, the British general was mortally wounded by an 

American rifleman. Lord Balcarres (Lindsay) assumed command of 

the forces on the British right at that point. 

The British situation was becoming critical. Both flanks had 
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been forced out of position and now Learned’s Brigade, backed up 

by Brig. Gen. Abraham Ten Broeck’s brigade of New York militia, 

struck the German lines in the center. The Braunschweigers held for 

a time and even initially drove the American attack back. However, 

Benedict Arnold, mounted on a horse, appeared as if from nowhere 

and began to rally the rebel center. Technically a general without a 

command, Arnold had disregarded Gates’ admonition and—anxious 

to get into the fight—rode toward the firing. He immediately began 

riding down the line urging the two brigades forward. Inspired by 

the general’s leadership, the men charged ahead once again; within 

minutes the German line collapsed. The battle was becoming a rout. 

Only the safety of the redoubts could save what remained of Lindsay’s forces.

The retreating British and German troops fled east and northeast to seek the safety of the Balcarres and Breymann Redoubts. 

Not satisfied with “holding the field,” Arnold hailed Poor’s Brigade 

and headed them northeast toward Freeman’s farm where the Balcarres Redoubt barred the way. Waving his hat and sword and yelling orders wildly to the troops, the general led the brigade against a 

small outpost located on a slight rise forward of the main position. 

Poor’s men successfully seized the position, later known as “Bloody 

Knoll,” but only after suffering severe casualties. The intense fire 

from the large Balcarres Redoubt effectively ended any further 

American advance in that direction. 

Sensing that the attack could go no further there, Arnold rode 

north and encountered Learned’s Brigade and Morgan’s men about 

to attack the Breymann Redoubt. That position was relatively strong 

in terms of construction but lightly held in terms of actual troops on 

hand. Breymann himself was in command of somewhere between 

150 and 200 grenadiers and other assorted troops. As the rebels 

swept forward, Arnold joined them—once again yelling and urging them forward. The lightly defended redoubt stood no chance 

and resistance quickly folded. Breymann himself was killed, probably shot accidentally by his own troops (though some accounts say 

that one of his men purposely shot him for threatening to kill men 

attempting to desert from the position). The hero of the day, Benedict Arnold, was shot in the leg by a Braunschweiger grenadier but 
117

survived his wound to fight another day. After the rebels repulsed 

a feeble German counterattack led by Lt. Col. Ernst von Speth, the 

fighting effectively ended as darkness fell over the battlefield.

This second battle of Saratoga (Barber’s Wheatfield) was an 

even greater debacle for Burgoyne than the first (Freeman’s Farm). 

His command suffered almost 900 casualties, including more than 

270 killed. The casualty count was easily over 50 percent of all 

troops employed on the reconnaissance force. By comparison, the 

rebel units lost about 200 men, only 30 of whom were killed—out 

of more than 7,000 American troops who actually took part in the 

action. British and German commanders as well as their troops now 

understood that the enemy they faced was not a disorganized mob 

who refused to stand and fight and ran away at the sight of regular 

troops. Indeed, most of the rebel soldiers who participated in these 

actions were Continentals, many of whom had at least one year and 

several campaigns’ worth of experience. In short, the Continentals 

themselves had become regulars.

Realizing that his remaining positions south of the Great Ravine were now untenable, Burgoyne moved his entire command 

that night into the Great Redoubt positions. The following day the 

American troops closed in on the Great Redoubt to reconnoiter the 

remaining British defenses while also moving up artillery to further 

harass and demoralize the enemy. Burgoyne saw clearly that he had 

lost any chance to reach Albany. At this point, he really had only 

two viable options: retreat or surrender. Both were anathema to him.

Retreat and Surrender

Giving in to the inevitable conclusion, Burgoyne ordered the 

Army from Canada to retreat on 8 October. The movement, which 

began that afternoon, was slow, fraught with anxiety, and wet. Sporadic, but at times heavy, rain made the going difficult along the 

muddy River Road. The advanced guard was composed of the 47th 

and 9th Regiments of Foot under Lt. Col. Nicolas Sutherland, which 

led the army northward toward the village of Saratoga (today’s 

Schuylerville, New York). The last unit to leave the Great Redoubt 

was the Advance Corps, now under Phillips, which formed the rearguard. They left behind the hospital, which contained about 400 
118

British and German casualties plus a number of doctors and medical 

orderlies to care for them. Burgoyne gave the doctor-in-charge a letter addressed to Gates that asked the American commander to take 

care of his wounded. 

On the approach to Saratoga, Sutherland encountered the troops 

of Brig. Gen. John Fellows’ Massachusetts Militia Brigade dozing in 

their bivouac, but nevertheless blocking the way. Notwithstanding the 

fact that he only possessed about 250 men, far less than half that of 

Fellows, Sutherland sent word back to Burgoyne about the obstacle 

and requested permission to attack the rebel camp. Burgoyne decided 

against the move but kept his command moving north to close on 

Sutherland’s position. Fellows—soon warned about the approaching 

British by a messenger from Gates—did not wait to be attacked. He 

withdrew east of the Hudson River to occupy high ground there. Now 

with an open path, Burgoyne’s troops crossed Fish Kill and occupied 

a very defensible piece of high ground at Saratoga.

While Burgoyne’s army attempted its low-speed getaway 

northward, Gates made no initial effort to pursue. Instead, the main 

body of the Northern Army remained in camp trying to stay dry, 

rest, rearm, and eat on the 9th. The following day, Gates set his army 

in motion to follow Burgoyne. The Americans did not have to move 

too far. When they arrived at Fish Kill just after noon, Gates’ lead 

elements found the Army from Canada still in position at Saratoga. 

The rest of the army arrived throughout that afternoon. Ebenezer 

Stevens’ artillery took positions near Schuyler’s house, which had 

been burned by the retreating enemy to prevent its use as cover and 

concealment. The artillery opened fire on the British positions while 

Gates pondered his next move.

Reports that evening and into the next morning indicated that 

Burgoyne planned to continue his retreat. To prevent such a plan, 

Gates ordered Nixon’s and Glover’s Brigades to attack the British 

defenses from the south and east early on the following morning, 

11 October. They would be supported by additional brigades to the 

west and northwest as the assault unfolded. Just as the rebel units 

moved into position to attack, a British deserter warned Glover that 

Burgoyne’s army was not retreating and was still in position. After 

probes by Morgan and Learned met stiff resistance, the American 
119

forces moved to good firing positions around the British perimeter 

just as the fog lifted. As the haze cleared, the British and German 

infantry began heavy rifle fire on the American troops—confirming 

that Burgoyne’s forces still manned the defenses. 

Burgoyne’s situation was worse than he knew. Down to about 

3,500 effective troops, he was far outnumbered by Gates’ command 

of 12,000. Even more important than the immediate threat, the British commander was not aware of Fellow’s Brigade just across the 

Hudson which consisted of an additional 2,000 men. Farther north 

at Fort Edward was another brigade of about 2,000 Vermont Militia under Brig. Gen. Jacob Bailey. South of there near Batten Kill, 

Stark’s new brigade of 2,500 New Hampshire men was blocking 

that crossing point of the Hudson. In short, Gates now had command 

of more than 18,000 men to throw against the Army from Canada. 

The American commander held all the cards, save one—Clinton’s 

offensive into the Highlands. Burgoyne still held out hope that he 

could play it. 

Two days after capturing Forts Montgomery and Clinton on 

6 October, Clinton captured and destroyed the patriot fortifications 

on Constitution Island opposite West Point, New York. From there, 

he sent a 1,700-man detachment under Maj. Gen. John Vaughn up 

river to see if he might be able to make contact with Burgoyne. 

On 16 October, Vaughn captured and burned the town of Esopus, 

New York, then proceeded north again to Livingston Manor. There, 

Vaughn encountered more than 6,000 rebel militia and determined 

that he could go no farther. He was still almost 80 miles from the 

Army from Canada. Burgoyne was on his own.

On 14 October, Burgoyne called a council of war to learn what 

his more senior officers thought of surrender. To a man, his subordinates agreed that the army had fought a good fight and capitulating would be an honorable course of action. Reluctantly convinced, 

Burgoyne sent an officer to inform Gates that he wished to begin 

negotiations. To his surprise, Gates demanded immediate surrender. 

Instead, the two commanders agreed to an armistice that extended 

into the following afternoon. This was followed by a second message from Gates demanding that Burgoyne lay down his arms. Burgoyne began to detect some desperation in Gates’ actions and came 
120

to believe that perhaps Clinton’s advance might be putting pressure 

on the American commander. Burgoyne responded with a letter demanding a series of stipulations to include the rendering of honors 

of war and safe return for the Army from Canada to England on the 

condition that no man take up arms against the United States again. 

To Burgoyne’s amazement, Gates immediately agreed to the conditions. Staff officers from the two armies drew up a treaty and presented it to Burgoyne that evening. Over the next twenty-four hours, 

a series of exchanges took place over details such as replacing the 

term “capitulation” with “convention” in the treaty. Meanwhile, 

Gates and Burgoyne both received new reports on Clinton’s actions. 

At one point Burgoyne determined he might forsake the agreement, 

but the British commander ultimately resigned himself to the inevitable and signed the document on 16 October. 

At about 1000 the following day, Burgoyne and his general officers with their staffs, rode across the Fish Kill ford toward Gates’ 

headquarters. Drawn up along both sides of the road, were the troops 

of the American Northern Army. No man shouted taunts or showed 

any disrespect or indiscipline toward their recent foes. Despite the 

fact that most units possessed few or no uniforms, the British officers noted that the discipline and bearing of these soldiers would 

prompt pride in the heart of any European army commander. Arriving at Gates’ headquarters, Burgoyne offered his sword to the 

American commander, who held it briefly then returned the weapon 

to its owner. Meanwhile, north of Fish Kill and out of the eyes of 

the rebel troops, British and German soldiers stacked their arms and 

colors then marched the same route as their army commander across 

the creek and through the silent rows of Yankee warriors. They, too, 

noted the discipline—and great numbers—of their recent adversaries. Suddenly an American band broke the silence by playing “Yankee Doodle,” a ditty created by a British army surgeon during the 

French and Indian War to make fun of the rustic American soldiers 

serving with the professional soldiers of the crown. The tune and its 

origins were widely known, and the irony of the moment was likely 

not lost on those who heard it. 

Burgoyne surrendered only 5,895 soldiers of the almost 10,000 
121

who started on the campaign. About 1,300 continued to man Fort 

Ticonderoga under Powell’s command, and another 2,800 men were 

dead or had deserted. American losses were far less. Moreover, most 

of them could now be released to oppose Clinton’s venture in the 

Highlands or join Washington’s Main Army to the south, thereby increasing the difficulties for Howe in Pennsylvania. Gates sent some 

of his forces to escort what now became referred to as the “Convention Army” to Boston for extradition to England. That was not to be, 

however, because Burgoyne, Howe, the British government, and the 

Continental Congress could not agree on parole terms for the British 

and German forces. As a result, the vast majority of the Convention 

Army remained in the United States as prisoners until the end of the 

war, though Burgoyne and Riedesel were eventually exchanged and 

returned home much earlier. In addition, hundreds of Burgoyne’s 

surrendered troops, especially the Germans, escaped captivity and 

ended up settling in the United States. 

The overall impact of the Saratoga Campaign was felt well 

beyond the battlefield, or even in the halls of Congress. Arguably, the 

most significant result of the campaign was the French belief that the 

Americans might just well win their independence. On 5 December 

1777, word reached Paris of the American victory at Saratoga. King 

Louis XVI extended recognition to the United States the following day 

(though France had already been supporting the rebels with supplies 

for some time). On 6 February 1778, France went the next step and 

declared war on the United Kingdom, preparing to send ships and 

men to further support the rebel cause. Of course, France’s actions 

were not for altruistic reasons but borne of a desire to seek revenge 

on the country that humiliated her only fifteen years before. Still, the 

alliance was greatly welcomed and helped ensure that independence 

for the United States of America was eventually secured. 
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Notes

1. Some historians note that Burgoyne’s troops used this as a term of affection because of the way he treated them.

2. A feu de joie was a rifle salute fired by soldiers on a ceremonial occasion. 

Muskets were fired successively by each man in turn along a line and back again, 

making a continuous sound.

3. Richard M. Ketchum, Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 307.

4. It is important to note here that there are no known copies of any general 

or special orders, personal accounts (save the original source of the story), or other documents verifying the claim that Arnold was ever relieved of command. In 

2015, a letter was discovered from a staff officer written to his wife two days after 

the second battle at Saratoga. This letter lends credence to the idea that Gates’ actions to remove Arnold from command may not be accurate. This is discussed in 

further detail in Section III, Stand 15, The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield.
123

III. Suggested Routes and Stands

Introduction

As with most military campaigns, the Saratoga Campaign took 

place over a large area and several disparate battlefields. If one includes the Army from Canada’s assembly area as the start point for 

the campaign at St. John’s, Quebec, as well as Fort Montgomery, 

Fort Stanwix (later named Fort Schuyler) and the Bennington battlefields, the campaign area was roughly 312 miles long north to south 

and 130 miles east to west—a huge region. To adequately cover all 

important locations of the campaign in a single staff ride would likely take a week and require some doubling back over routes traveled 

before. No military unit, and few other organizations, could devote 

that much time to a staff ride for its members. Thus, this handbook 

is designed to provide a staff ride leader several options to cover 

the campaign in a one- or two-day ride and still include the most 

important locations and aspects of the campaign for maximum educational and training value. The leader can reduce and tailor these 

stands to best fit their time available and the education/training objectives for the event. Keep in mind, however, that the shorter the 

ride, the more it will focus on tactical actions and issues (i.e. battles 

and skirmishes) rather than the larger issues of the operational art 

such as campaign planning and logistics.

This staff ride involves significant bus or car travel and some 

walking—covering a wide variety of terrain with different sources 

of ownership and rules for access. The battlefield stands are located 

mostly on government-owned lands with easy public access, though 

some may be executed in parking lots or roadside pull-overs.

Most of the actual campaign battlefields are preserved in federal or state-owned military parks (see Section V for more details 

on the various battlefield parks). The main battlefield, Saratoga, is a 

unit of the National Park Service (NPS). The park is adequately interpreted with signs and monuments which help the staff ride leader 

in various ways, especially to orient students to the terrain. Most of 

the interpretive aids at the Saratoga National Historical Park refer 

to combat actions on 7 October 1777. Facilitators need to use care 

when discussing the 19 September fight at Freeman’s Farm. Crown 
124

Point and the Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site are units of 

the New York State Office of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation. Both battlefields can be easily accessed by vehicle and on 

foot, though both include some steep stretches for walkers. These 

sites are lightly interpreted, and Crown Point’s interpretation mainly 

focuses on the French and Indian War era. Fort Ticonderoga and 

Mount Defiance are units of the Fort Ticonderoga Association, a private venture. Both are easily accessible by vehicle and neither is particularly strenuous for walking. These sites also require an entrance 

fee. Tickets for Mount Defiance may be purchased separately if the 

group will not be visiting the fort. The Hubbardton Battlefield State 

Historic Site—operated by the Vermont Department of Housing and 

Community Development—can be reached by vehicle, but the remainder of the battlefield beyond the visitors’ center is accessible 

only by walking. The only difficult area is walking toward Sucker 

Creek crossing, if time allows. This area also can be accessed by 

car or bus. All battlefields are relatively pristine in appearance and 

condition and close to their appearance at the time of the battle. Not 

surprisingly, some areas that were once open terrain are now grown 

over with trees and vice versa. Generally speaking however, the locations selected for stands in this handbook look similar to what 

they did at the time of the campaign. The only man-made structures 

from the campaign that still exist are primarily fortifications.

Prior to the event, staff ride leaders should coordinate with 

the points of contact listed in Section IV of this handbook to verify 

times and dates of operation for all parks as well as other locations 

and facilities. 

Some of the stands between the battlefields—those portraying 

march routes, forts, headquarters sites, and smaller skirmishes—are 

on roadside pull-overs or in restaurant, bank, or storefront mall parking lots. Staff ride leaders must coordinate in advance to use some 

of these stands and exercise tact in cooperating with civilians in the 

area. Staff ride leaders should execute a reconnaissance just prior 

to the ride to ensure that all stands and routes are accessible—then

develop alternative routes or stand locations as needed. As part of 

that reconnaissance, inform public and private property owners that 

you will be visiting the site.
125

The best starting point for the two-day Saratoga Campaign 

staff ride is the town of Ticonderoga, New York, which offers the 

best motel accommodations in the region. Your first stand will be 

Crown Point State Historic Site, 15 miles to the north, or Fort Ticonderoga itself can be used as an alternative. After the first day, Clifton 

Park, New York, provides the best close-by lodgings for Saratoga 

National Historic Park, which is the starting point for day two of the 

ride. For a one-day staff ride, Clifton Park is also the recommended 

location for overnight accommodations.

The following stands include a variety of quotations and vignettes for staff ride instructors to consider. Likewise, each stand 

has a series of analysis questions that could be used for the end of 

the stand. Choose the ones that help best achieve your group’s staff 

ride training objectives. Finally, a note of caution is provided to 

users of this handbook. Recordkeeping of personnel strengths and 

casualties during the Revolutionary War was notoriously poor for 

both sides—especially for American units, whether Continental or 

militia. The unit personnel strengths and casualties listed in this 

handbook are largely estimates. A search of available sources on 

the Saratoga Campaign reveals a variety of personnel and casualty estimates for the various battles which took place during the 

campaign. The statistics provided in this section are shown only to 

provide an idea of the approximate numbers for each side involved 

in a given action and the casualties sustained. They are not intended 

to be definitive.
126

Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride Stand List

Day 1: Campaign Day

Meet and remain overnight before day 1: Ticonderoga, New York

Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 1 Crown Point, The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s 

Campaign Plan (sixty minutes)

Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 2 Mount Defiance-Ticonderoga (thirty minutes)

Movement: (forty minutes not including ferry time)

Stand 3 Battle of Hubbardton (thirty minutes)

Sub-stand 3A, Monument Hill

Sub-stand 3B, The Final Line

Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 4 Whitehall-Skenesborough (twenty minutes)

(lunch stop)

Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 5 Fort Anne (ten minutes) 

(Note: can be conducted as a drive-by stand if pressed for time)

Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 6 Fort Edward (drive by stand)

Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 7 Fort Miller (drive by stand)

Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 8 Battle of Bennington (sixty minutes)

Sub-stand 8A, Baum’s Heights

Sub-stand 8B, Tory Redoubt

Sub-stand 8C, Breymann’s Defeat

Movement: sixty minutes to Clifton Park/hotel
127

Day 2: Saratoga Day

Note: Stands 9 and 10 can be done at the hotel on the evening of day 

1 to save time on day 2, or first thing day 2 at the Saratoga National 

Historic Park Visitors Center or Freeman’s Farm Overlook stop.

Stand 9 Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany

(offsite) (ten minutes)

Movement: N/A

Stand 10 Pawlet Expedition (offsite) (ten minutes)

Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 11: Continental Positions at Bemis Heights (thirty minutes)

Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 12: First Battle of Saratoga-Freeman’s Farm

(ninety minutes)

Sub-stand 12A, The Advance

Sub-stand 12B, The Opening Fight

Sub-stand 12C, American Reinforcements Arrive

Sub-stand 12D, Advance and Retreat

Sub-stand 12E, Riedesel Saves the Day

Sub-stand 12F, The Results and Cost

Movement: ten minutes

Stand 13: Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign 

(thirty minutes)

Movement: thirty minutes

Bag lunch at Visitors’ Center

Movement: fifteen minutes

Stand 14: Leadership Friction in the Northern Army

(twenty minutes)

Movement: fifteen minutes
128

Stand 15: Second Battle of Saratoga-Barber’s Wheatfield

(thirty minutes)

Movement: ten minutes

Stand 16: Second Battle of Saratoga-Balcarres Redoubt

(twenty minutes)

Movement: ten minutes

Stand 17: Second Battle of Saratoga-Breymann Redoubt

(twenty minutes)

Movement: thirty minutes

Stand 18 (Stand S-8): The British Retreat, Surrender, and 

Impact of Saratoga (55 minutes)

Schuylerville, New York (Burgoyne Surrender Site)

Movement to hotel: thirty minutes

Saratoga Campaign One-Day Staff Ride

The Saratoga Campaign staff ride is best conducted as a twoday event. If, however, a one-day staff ride is required, Campaign 

Day topics can be compressed and covered in an overview class or 

presentation at home station before arriving at the campaign area. 

Another option is to conduct the class/presentation at the hotel the 

night before beginning day 2, Saratoga Day stands. As a less favorable alternative, day 1 could be covered in two separate Campaign 

Day overview stands at the Saratoga National Historic Park Visitors’ 

Center and the Freeman’s Farm Overlook stop, or a combination of 

the two. Splitting the overview stands between the two locations 

will help break up what would otherwise be a very long stand. The 

following outline offers a possible one-day ride solution that can 

be modified by eliminating specific stands or cutting the amount of 

material covered by topic.
129

Overview Stand 1 Topics (at Visitors’ Center): 

The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan 

Mount Defiance-Fort Ticonderoga 

Battle of Hubbardton 

Skenesborough

Fort Anne

Overview Stand 2 Topics (at Freeman’s Farm overlook):

Fort Edward

Fort Miller

Battle of Bennington

Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany

Pawlet Expedition

Note: From this point forward, conduct the stands in accordance 

with the instructions outlined in this handbook.

Stand 11, Northern Army Positions at Bemis Heights

Stand 12, First Battle of Saratoga-Freeman’s Farm

Stand 13, Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign

Stand 14, Leadership Friction in the Northern Army

Stand 15, Second Battle of Saratoga-Barber’s Wheatfield

Stand 16, Second Battle of Saratoga-Balcarres Redoubt

Stand 17, Second Battle of Saratoga-Breymann Redoubt

Stand 18, The British Retreat, Surrender, & Impact of Saratoga

Saratoga Campaign Two-Day Staff Ride

The full two-day Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride detailed in 

the following pages offers the best educational value. Each stand 

contains the directions (with maps), an orientation, description, vignettes, and analysis. For additional guidance on conducting a oneday Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride, see Section IV.
130

Map 1. Day 1 Overview Map.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Crown Point

Mount 

Defiance

Hubbardton

Whitehall

Fort Anne

Fort Edward

Fort Miller

Bennington

Lake

Champlain

Ticonderoga

Glen 

Falls

Saratoga 

Springs

Clifton Park

Route Map

Day 1

Stands 1–8

N

87

Road or Highway

State Boundary

Other Boundary

Walking Trail

River or Creek

Map Legend

Town

Bridge

Fortification

Tree Line

Information Sign

Greenwich

Gate

Station

Interstate Highway

US Highway

State Road or Highway

County Road

Stand Location

Sub-stand Location

Alternate Stand Location

3

8B

4

22

338

6

87
131

Day 1

Strategic Setting through the Battle of Bennington

Stand 1, Crown Point-The Strategic Setting and Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan 

Stand 2, Mount Defiance-Fort Ticonderoga

Stand 3, Battle of Hubbardton 

Sub-stand 3A, Monument Hill

Sub-stand 3B, The Final Line

Stand 4, Skenesborough (Whitehall)

Stand 5, Fort Anne 

Stand 6, Fort Edward (drive-by stand)

Stand 7, Fort Miller (drive-by stand)

Stand 8, Battle of Bennington

Sub-stand 8A, Baum’s Heights

Sub-stand 8B, Tory Redoubt

Sub-stand 8C, Breymann’s Defeat

Day 1, Stand 1 Crown Point-The Strategic Setting and 

Burgoyne’s Campaign Plan (Events up to 30 June 1777)

Directions: From the traffic circle in Ticonderoga, New York, 

drive north on Wicker Street/New York State Route 9N. Proceed 

north and turn right onto Lake Road/New York State Route 22 East. 

Drive north to New York State Route 185 and turn right onto Bridge 

Road/New York State Route 185. Proceed north to Adirondack 

Road and turn left at Crown Point State Historic Site. Proceed to the 

parking lot next to the Visitors’ Center/Museum. It is recommended 

to conduct the stand somewhere on the northeast bastion of Fort 

Crown Point (also known as Fort St. Frederic).

Orientation: You are currently standing on the northeast bastion of Fort Crown Point. The French, who originally established 

the post in the 1730s, destroyed and abandoned it in 1759 when the 

area passed to British control at the end of the French and Indian 

War. The British soon rebuilt the fortifications and renamed the post 

Fort Crown Point. At that point it was part of a chain of forts that 
132

included Forts Ticonderoga, George, Edward, and Miller along the 

Lake Champlain-Hudson River line of communication—maintained 

by the British Army between 1759 and 1775. Seth Warner and the 

Green Mountain Boys captured Fort Crown Point in May 1775 from 

a skeletal British force. The patriots captured 111 cannon at the fort, 

some of which were later used in the siege of Boston. 

Visible to the north of the fort is Lake Champlain. About 100 

miles up the lake and the Richelieu River is Saint Jean-sur-RicheRoute to Crown Point

Stand 1

N

Crown Point

1

Crown Point

State Historic 

Site

Traffic 

Circle

Ticonderoga

9N

22E

185

9N

Bridge

Road

Map 2. Day 1 Route to Stand 1.
133

lieu, Quebec, formerly known as Fort St. John. Fort St. John was 

the next major post to the north in the chain and served as the staging area and port of embarkation for Burgoyne’s Army from Canada. To the east across the lake is the State of Vermont. At the time 

of Burgoyne’s departure from Fort Saint John, Vermont was known 

as the “Hampshire Grants.” The area was under dispute between 

the colonies of New York and New Hampshire until declaring itself 

as a separate republic in 1777. Though technically a separate nation, Vermont continued to support the Patriot cause with troops 

and treasure before becoming a state of the union in 1791. To the 

south about 15 miles is Fort Ticonderoga, the next fort in the chain 

in that direction. 

Description [Campaign Overview]: On 10 May 1775, Benedict Arnold along with Ethan Allen and other members of the Green 

Mountain Boys captured Fort Ticonderoga in a much-celebrated 

victory. The day after, Capt. Seth Warner with a detachment of 

Green Mountain Boys captured Fort Crown Point from the British. 

N

Crown Point

Stand 1

1

Lake

Champlain

Adirondack Park Road

185

Visitors’ 

Center, 

Museum & 

Restrooms

Parking Area

Crown Point

Historic Site

Entrance

Fort

Crown Point

Restrooms

Map 3. Day 1 Stand 1.
134

It was not an impressive victory as the post was garrisoned by only 

nine British soldiers, but it did garner 111 pieces of much-needed 

artillery—29 pieces of which were later used by the Patriots in their 

siege of Boston. Soon after Fort Crown Point fell, Arnold’s troops 

seized a schooner and several bateaux farther south at Skenesborough (modern-day Whitehall, New York). Boarding those vessels, 

Arnold proceeded north with his men and captured Fort St. Jean in 

Quebec on 18 May. In addition to securing a great deal of useful 

military supplies during the bold attack, Arnold captured a 70-ton 

sloop, the HMS Royal George, which Arnold soon renamed the Enterprise. The Enterprise was considered to be the first commissioned 

vessel of the United States Navy.

The capture of Forts Ticonderoga, Crown Point, and St. Jean 

in May 1775 eventually set off a chain of events that resulted in 

the invasion of Canada by American forces that August. Launching 

north from Fort Crown Point, that failed venture eventually culminated with the arrival of the rag-tag remnants of that army back here 

at Crown Point on 7 July 1776. Although the American “Canadian 

Army” had been defeated, Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton, governor general of Quebec, intended to complete its destruction by launching an 

invasion of his own into central New York. He needed to construct 

a fleet of ships and boats to transport his invading army south on 

Lake Champlain to recapture the lost forts there and proceed to cut 

off New England from the rest of the colonies (as the British still 

referred to them) to the south. 

The news of Carleton’s shipbuilding efforts was not lost on 

Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler, commander of the Continental Army’s 

Northern Department. Schuyler ordered Arnold to construct a number of gunboats and equip them with some of the smaller cannon 

seized from the forts and acquired from various other sources. By 

October, both fleets were prepared for operations as best as they 

could be. To be successful that fall, Carleton had to move south before cold weather set in. However, Arnold’s vessels effectively challenged his move south. On 11 and 12 October, the two fleets met in 

battle off Valcour Island. Though decisively defeated, the American 

fleet inflicted a fair amount of damage to the British ships. Moreover, Arnold supervised a thorough destruction of Fort Crown Point 
135

on 14 October before retreating south. When Carleton’s forces landed shortly after, the British general realized he could not adequately 

shelter his men here over the severe New York winter. He departed 

Crown Point on 4 November and returned to Canada. Although the 

Americans were defeated and lost the fort, they successfully turned 

back the British invasion of 1776. Carleton would later regret his 

decision to retreat.

On 30 November 1776, Maj. Gen. William Howe, British commander-in-chief, America, wrote the first of several letters to Lord 

George Germain, the British secretary of state for the American 

Colonies, proposing plans for the campaign of 1777. The first plan 

was a two-pronged operation that began with a column moving up 

the Hudson River to join with Carleton’s Northern Army. The other 

prong was to attack Boston (see Section II, Campaign Overview, 

Development of the 1777 Campaign Plan for an in-depth discussion 

of the letters and plans exchanged between Germain, Howe, and 

Burgoyne). A demonstration in New Jersey would keep Washington occupied in Pennsylvania. In a 20 December letter to Germain, 

Howe now proposed that the campaign consist of an overland movement to capture Philadelphia but made no mention of any cooperation with the Northern Army. Six days later on the day after Christmas, Washington successfully attacked Trenton, New Jersey, and 

captured about 1,000 of Howe’s Hessian troops. After Washington’s 

Trenton raid on 29 December, Howe wrote Germain yet again and 

proposed that in addition to capturing Philadelphia, it was critical for 

him to also destroy Washington’s army. This opinion was no doubt 

reinforced when Washington’s Main Army defeated a British force 

at Princeton, New Jersey on 3 January 1777—killing, wounding, or 

capturing about 400 enemy troops. Howe withdrew his forces from 

all New Jersey outposts except New Brunswick and Perth Amboy 

and ordered them into winter quarters in and around New York City.

Brig. John Burgoyne, Carleton’s deputy in Canada, also had 

some ideas on how to prosecute the 1777 campaign. After the moderately successful 1776 campaign, Burgoyne received permission 

to return home to England in the late fall ostensibly to take care 

of personal affairs. While there, however, he provided his ideas for 

the coming campaign to Germain in a document titled, “Thoughts 
136

for Conducting the War on the Side of Canada.” His plan was very 

similar to Howe’s 30 November proposal, with an added detachment of troops sent west through Lake Ontario to advance southeast 

through the Mohawk River Valley. This column’s mission was to 

take Fort Schuyler and secure the Oneida “Great Carrying Place” 

then advance up the valley to link with Burgoyne at Albany. King 

George approved Burgoyne’s plan and its provisions for implementation. Carleton and Burgoyne believed that Howe would move 

north at some point in the 1777 campaign season and take control 

of the Army from Canada when it arrived in Albany, New York. 

Then the two forces under Howe would conduct operations into the 

rebellious New England states. If successful, that approach would 

remove those colonies from the war effort and effectively end the 

war. Despite various exchanges between Howe and German after 

Burgoyne’s plan was adopted, Burgoyne would follow his plan described above for all operations and decisions he made thereafter. 

On 27 March 1777, Burgoyne set sail from Portsmouth harbor and arrived at Quebec City on 6 May. Six days later, he met 

with Carleton at Montreal and presented a letter from Germain to 

the Governor General. In the missive, Germain informed Carleton 

about the 1777 campaign plan and the fact that Burgoyne, not he, 

would command the Northern Army on its invasion of New York. 

Further, Germain ordered Carleton to remain in command in Canada 

and support Burgoyne’s efforts as far as possible. Carleton and Germain had not been on the best of terms for some time. Carleton realized that this slight was in retaliation for his decision to withdraw 

from Fort Crown Point the previous fall. Nevertheless, the Governor 

General, to his credit, initially attempted to support the junior officer 

to the best of his ability, though Carleton’s support would not be as 

forthcoming after the campaign started.

Burgoyne’s plan assumed—probably correctly—that the New 

England colonies were the center of the rebellion. He envisioned a 

three-pronged campaign design aimed at seizing Albany, the only 

inland city of any significance in New York. The campaign’s first 

axis of advance would be a movement down the Lake Champlain 

corridor and along the Hudson River, a time-tested avenue of approach dating back to the French and Indian War. This approach had 
137

been used the previous year during Carleton’s unsuccessful attempt 

to penetrate deep into New York. The second axis of advance would 

penetrate from the west via Lake Ontario and the Mohawk River 

Valley. Presumably Howe would lead the third axis, a cooperating 

thrust up the Hudson River from New York City. The three columns 

would begin cooperating at or near Albany and from there—based 

on the military situation and colonial threat—Howe would assume 

command of all three. From there he would direct follow-on operations to isolate the New England states and force them out of the rebellion, prompting the remaining resistance to collapse. In concept 

it was an excellent plan.

At the start of the campaign, Burgoyne was to assemble about 

8,300 troops. These included 3,700 British regulars as well as 3,000 

German regulars plus 650 Canadian and Tory (i.e., “loyalist”) militiamen. About 400 to 500 Iroquois Indians would join them later to 

largely function as the army’s reconnaissance force. His principle 

subordinates for the campaign were Maj. Gen. William Phillips, 

deputy commander; Brig. Simon Fraser, Advance Corps commander; and Maj. Gen. Baron Friedrich Adolph von Riedesel, commander of German forces. Burgoyne also brought a large artillery train 

consisting of 138 artillery pieces of varying size to support a siege 

to reduce Fort Ticonderoga (see Appendix A, Fort Ticonderoga for 

more details on the initial order of battle for the Army from Canada). 

As the machinations regarding the development of the campaign 

plan took place between Germain, Howe, and Burgoyne, American 

troops in the Northern Department were slowly attempting to 

renovate Fort Ticonderoga and build troop strength in the Hudson 

River Valley and in the Hampshire Grants (i.e. Vermont). Because of 

the harsh New York winter as well as setbacks the Continental Army 

had experienced the previous year, very little was accomplished. 

When Col. Jeduthan Baldwin arrived in February to serve as the post 

engineer, he quickly organized details to build additional facilities 

on Mount Independence. These included a bridge from that location 

to the Fort Ticonderoga peninsula, a log boom obstacle to prevent 

the passage of ships south of the fort, and blockhouses to defend 

key locations such as the Lake George Landing. He also renovated 

the old French defenses which protected the fort from ground attack 
138

along the western approaches. However, the garrison consisted 

of only about 3,000 troops and 10,000 were needed to adequately 

prepare and defend the location. Due to the manpower shortage, 

several commanders disregarded the need to place defenses on 

Mount Defiance. 

In April, the commander of Fort Ticonderoga, Brig. Gen. Anthony Wayne, departed the post to join Washington’s Main Army in 

Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, he was not replaced with a permanent 

commander until the arrival of Maj. Gen. Arthur Sinclair on 12 June. 

Although Sinclair brought reinforcements, he was disturbed because 

the garrison was too small even with the additional troops and because the myriad efforts to improve post facilities and defenses had 

accomplished less than half of the work needed to properly defend 

the various positions. To add to his concerns, he soon met with two 

captured British spies who informed him that Burgoyne would soon 

advance down Lake Champlain with Albany as his objective. Six 

days after St. Clair reached Fort Ticonderoga, Schuyler arrived to 

inspect the progress and came away with the same concerns as St. 

Clair. They concluded that the existing garrison would need at least 

another six weeks of work (and good weather) to prepare Fort Ticonderoga and the surrounding defenses to withstand an attack. On 

20 June, Schuyler held a council with St. Clair and the three Continental Army brigade commanders. The generals concluded they 

would defend Ticonderoga as long as practicable then retreat across 

the footbridge extending between Ticonderoga and Mount Independence to continue the defense from there. If St. Clair’s forces were 

driven from there, the garrison would retreat south to Skenesborough 

and move overland to Fort Edward where resistance would continue. 

Schuyler then returned to Albany to do what he could to find additional troops and resources for St. Clair.

As St. Clair struggled with preparing to ready Fort Ticonderoga, 

Burgoyne moved his forces from their assembly point at Chambly to 

St. John’s, Quebec, on the Richelieu River. On 17 June, Brig. Simon 

Fraser’s Advance Corps, the Army from Canada’s vanguard arrived 

at the mouth of the Bouquet River (now Gilliland Creek) on Lake 

Champlain. The day after, Burgoyne’s army departed Fort St. John 

in a large armada of ships and bateaux heading for the same location. 
139

After a brief stop at Cumberland Head, the army arrived at Bouquet 

River on 21 June. On arrival, Burgoyne issued his directive to the 

“Congress of Indians”—basically welcoming the Indians into the 

fold and urging them to fight the enemies of the king and his laws. 

To his credit, Burgoyne cautioned them not to engage in barbarous 

acts such as scalping live persons (dead rebels were fair game) or 

killing non-combatants. The following day, however, in a bit of theater probably designed as psychological warfare and intimidation, 

the general issued his infamous proclamation to American colonists 

in which he essentially threatened to turn loose his Indians on those 

who refused to submit to the king’s will. Given past outrages conducted by Indians in the region, this announcement no doubt conjured up pictures of wanton slaughter. These statements would soon 

come to haunt Burgoyne and his army and have the opposite of the 

intended effect—especially after the Indians began to actually inflict 

outrages on both rebel and loyalist Americans in the campaign area. 

Several key events took place on 23 June. First, St. Leger’s expedition departed Montreal by boat, traveling up the St. Lawrence 

River. The expedition would then turn south on Lake Ontario headed for Oswego, New York, and the Mohawk Valley. That same day, 

Sergeant Heath of an American scouting party notified Schuyler that 

Burgoyne’s troops and ships were at Bouquet River. Fortunately for 

the Americans, a series of storms which began that day prompted Burgoyne to remain at the Bouquet River camp for another week. Though 

Burgoyne remained, Fraser’s Advance Corps departed on the 24th and 

arrived at Crown Point on 26 June to begin preparing for Burgoyne’s 

main body. The Army from Canada finally departed Bouquet River on 

30 June and arrived here at Crown Point that evening. 

Vignette 1: General Burgoyne issued the following order of the 

day to his troops:

The Army embarks tomorrow, to approach the Enemy. We 

are to contend for the King, and the constitution of Great 

Britain, to vindicate Law, and to relieve the oppressed—

a cause in which his Majesty’s Troops and those of the 

Princes his Allies, will feel equal excitement. The Services require of this particular expedition, are critical and 
140

conspicuous. During our progress occasions may occur, 

in which, no difficulty, nor labour, nor Life, are to be regarded. This Army must not retreat. (Max M. Mintz, The 

Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne and Horatio Gates, 

Binghamton, New York: Vail-Ballou Press, 1990, 140.)

Vignette 2: An extract from Lord George Germain’s 26 March 

1777 letter to General Carleton explains Carleton’s responsibilities 

for the upcoming campaign:

With a view of quelling the rebellion as soon as possible, 

it is become highly necessary that the most speedy junction of the two armies should be effected; and therefore, 

as the security and good government of Canada absolutely 

requires your presence there, it is the King’s determination to leave about 3,000 men under your command, for 

the defence and duties of that province, and to employ the 

remainder of your army upon two expeditions, one under 

the command of Lieutenant General Burgoyne, who is to 

force his way to Albany, and the other under the command 

of Lieutenant Colonel St. Leger, who is to make a diversion on the Mohawk River. (The Scots Magazine 40, January 1778, 87.) 

Vignette 3: Gen. Sir Henry Clinton’s assessment of the two 

impending campaigns (i.e. Howe’s and Burgoyne’s):

When the design of employing an army under General 

Burgoyne on the Upper Hudson was mentioned to me; I 

took the liberty of suggesting the Hazard of miscarriage 

unless it was supported from below; and the consequent 

propriety of directing an early cooperation of Sir William 

Howe’s whole force on the lower District of the River. 

For the attacking [of] Philadelphia (which I understand 

to be the object of that General Officer’s first operations 

in the ensuing campaign) could be undertaken only upon 

the principal [sic] of drawing on a general action with the 

Rebels; I humbly presumed that End (if anything could 

effect it) was more likely to be obtained by a vigorous ex-
141

ertion of the two British Armies on the Hudson; the passes 

of which must consequently fall under their power. (John 

F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive 

Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas 

Beatie, 2008, 30.)

Vignette 4: Interestingly, Burgoyne was ordered to cooperate 

with the Commander of the Department of Canada as he fielded 

and supplied his expeditionary force. In so doing, Burgoyne spent 

little time planning his own logistics and in some cases deployed on 

the cheap in order to appease his higher leadership. Per Burgoyne, 

“Your Excellency will observe, that, in order to save the public expense as much as possible, I have reduced this requisition much 

below what would be adequate for the service, and I mean to trust 

to the resources of the expedition for the rest: 500 carts will barely 

carry fourteen days provisions at a time, and Major General Phillips 

means to demand as few horses as possible, subject to whatever future augmentations future services may require: the present number 

wanted will be about 400; there will then remain unprovided for (for 

expeditious movement) the transport of bateaux from Lake George 

to Hudson’s River, and the carriage of the tents of the army, and 

many other contingencies that I need not trouble your Excellency 

to point out to you.” As the Saratoga Campaign unfolds during this 

staff ride, Burgoyne’s poor logistics planning will manifest itself 

through significant logistical challenges that arise soon after the 

capture of Fort Ticonderoga. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military 

History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New 

York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 38.)

Vignette 5: Lord Germain advised Burgoyne to employ as 

many loyalists and natives as possible to bolster his numbers. Burgoyne sought to recruit Americans into his army, even those now 

serving in the militia/army against him:

It is known that there are many men in the rebel Army 

who are well effected to the Cause of the King. Some 

have been compelled into the Service, others engaged only 

with a view of joining the King’s Troops. The Savages are 
142

therefore cautioned against firing upon any single men or 

small parties that may be endeavoring to come over, and 

the Army in general will consider these men in a very different light from common Deserters, and treat them with 

all possible encouragement; and should it unfortunately 

happen that any Soldier of this Army should fall into the 

hands of the Enemy, it will be his Duty to let this order 

be known to the Enemy’s Army. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: (A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the 

American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 54.)

Vignette 6: Enlisting the help of loyalists and Indians was one 

of the main reasons for the secondary effort advancing down the 

Mohawk River under Brigadier St. Leger. Recognizing the liability 

that an unrestrained Indian force might have upon the campaign, 

however, Burgoyne published the following guidance:

[The] necessity of restraint and their passions, and that 

they must be under control, in accordance with the religion, laws of warfare, principles and policy which belonged to Great Britain. . .positively forbidding bloodshed, when not opposed in arms, [declaring] aged men, 

women, children, and prisoners sacred from the knife, 

even in the time of conflict; . . .the war must not be made 

as when they went forth alone, but under the absolute will 

and control of the army of the king. (Henry B. Carrington, 

Battles of the American Revolution. 1775–1781. Historical and Military Criticism, with Topographical Illustration, New York: A.S. Barnes, 1876, 306.)

Analysis 

1. Germain had six months to develop and refine the 1777 campaign plan with his two key subordinate generals. Evaluate German’s efforts and that of his generals.

a. What was Germain’s strategy?

b. What is your evaluation of Germain’s strategy? 
143

c. What was the apparent objective and end state of the 1777 

campaign plan?

d. Who should have had responsibility for implementing the 

campaign plan?

e. What were Howe’s and Burgoyne’s perceptions of the plan?

f. Was the Burgoyne plan realistic in terms of the capabilities of 

the British forces available (including Howe’s)?

h. How could Germain have improved the planning process? 

2. Schuyler had a year to prepare for a British invasion down 

Lake Champlain once the “Canadian Army” returned to Crown 

Point in July 1776. Evaluate Schuyler’s efforts and that of his subordinate generals over that period.

a. What was Schuyler’s plan to defend the Lake Champlain/

Hudson River approach in 1777?

b. Were the American commanders more effective in their coordination for the 1777 campaign in central New York than the British? Why or why not?

c. What were the major obstacles facing Schuyler in implementing his plans for the Northern Department?

d. What would you have done differently than Schuyler in preparing for the British invasion?

3. What were the some of the key events during the last half of 

1776 and the first half of 1777 that had an impact on the campaign, 

and why do you think each event was significant?

4. How did the area’s terrain affect British planning for the 

campaign?

5. How did the area’s terrain affect American planning for the 

campaign?
144

Day 1, Stand 2 Mount Defiance-Fort Ticonderoga (1–6 July 

1777)

Directions: From the Crown Point State Historic Site, drive the 

previous route in reverse until you arrive at the traffic circle in the 

town of Ticonderoga. At the traffic circle, head east on Montcalm 

Street for 0.6 miles. Turn right onto Champlain Avenue and head 

south for 0.2 miles. Veer left onto The Portage (see Note 1 below) 

and proceed for 0.2 mile. Turn left on Defiance Street for 0.3 miles. 

Turn right to remain on Defiance Street (look for the sign). Place the 

entry ticket stub (see Note 3 below) in the slot at the gate station. 

When the gate arm raises, travel one mile to the top and park in the 

designated area. Conduct the stand at the outdoor shelter at the top. 

Note 1: The portage is the route over which Burgoyne’s troops 

hauled bateaux, cannon, wagon carts, and supplies to load at Lake 

George Landing for the water journey to Fort George. 

9N

74

22

9N

77

5

2

Lake

Champlain

Montcalm St.

Traffic

Circle

Route to

Mount Defiance

Stand 2

Lake George Ave.

Fort Road

Ticonderoga

Larrabees Point

Ferry

Fort

Ticonderoga

Mount

Defiance

Gate Station

N

Map 4. Day 1 Route to Stand 2.
145

Note 2: The parking area on Mount Defiance is not ideal for 

busses. If a bus is used, offload participants at the graveled lower 

parking lot and turn around for ease of departure while the participants walk up to the outdoor shelter for the stand. 

Note 3: The Mount Defiance Park entrance fee is $10 per vehicle. To avoid a delay, the recommendation is to send someone 

ahead from Stand 1 to the Fort Ticonderoga Visitors’ Center (see 

Fort Ticonderoga map below) to purchase tickets then link up with 

the group at the entry gate at the base of Mount Defiance. Each 

vehicle will need a ticket stub to activate the gate arm at the Mount 

Defiance Park.

Gravel

Parking Area

Mount Defiance

Stand 2

N

2

Cannon

Shelter

Map 5. Day 1 Stand 2.
146

Note 4: As an alternative, the staff ride leader may want to consider using Fort Ticonderoga as the location for this stand. If time is 

an issue, stands 1 and 2 may be conducted there as well.

Orientation: You are standing on the summit of Mount Defiance 

(see map 33, Appendix J, Siege of Fort Ticonderoga 1–6 July 1777). 

Note the pair of cannons immediately north of the shelter which approximate the position of the two British cannons initially brought to 

the top of Mount Defiance. These cannons are reproductions and are 

not accurate as to the type of cannon that would have been placed at 

this location on 5–6 July 1777. The British hauled two 12-pounder 

cannon to the top of this hill. These reproductions are 18-pounder 

weapons. To the north of this location is Mount Hope, which typically 

cannot be seen when there are leaves on the trees. Crown Point is approximately ten miles due north in a direct line, or about fifteen miles 

by road. To the northeast of this position is Fort Ticonderoga, which is 

plainly visible below unless there is fog. Directly east is Lake Champlain, and on the other side of the lake, the low hill to the direct east 

is Mount Independence. On the east side of Mount Independence is 

East Creek, a marsh that delayed Riedesel’s German forces as they 

attempted to block St. Clair’s forces from leaving the Mount Independence defenses. Hubbardton, Vermont, is approximately sixteen 

miles to the southeast. Skenesborough (now Whitehall, New York) is 

approximately twelve miles due south of this location. To the west is 

the town of Ticonderoga (which did not exist during the campaign) 

and Lake George Landing on Lake George.

As you observe the various battlegrounds and other sites on the 

staff ride, keep in mind that the woods and other vegetation looked 

different in the late 1700s. At that time, America was a wood burning society. Much of the deadfall in forested areas, especially around 

settlements, would have been cleared and burned for heat and cooking. If forested areas were not cleared for farming, they would have 

been thinned by selective cutting for heat and cooking. Additionally, 

farm animals such as cattle, horses, and sheep as well as abundant 

wildlife like deer often roamed free through those woods and would 

have grazed on and thinned out secondary growth around settlements and farmsteads. The woods in those areas—often the scene of 
147

Revolutionary War battles—would therefore have been more open 

and one could see longer distances.

Description: Fort Ticonderoga was built by the French in 1755 

and originally named Fort Carillon. The fort was originally located 

to guard the southern approaches into the Lake Champlain region 

from a potential British invasion from the direction of the American 

colonies to the south. The fort had seen service during the French 

and Indian War; after the French lost that conflict to England, 

the fort—and Canada—became British possessions. As a result, 

Ticonderoga was now poorly sited to defend against invasion from 

the north since it was situated on the south side of the peninsula 

to defend in that direction. Moreover, with Canada also in British 

hands, the post later fell into disrepair since there was little fear of 

invasion from that quarter. At the start of the Revolutionary War, 

the fort suddenly regained its tactical importance. In May 1775, the 

forces of Ethan Allen and Benedict Arnold seized and subsequently 

occupied Fort Ticonderoga. Like Crown Point, the fort served as 

a staging and supply base to support the American expedition into 

Canada in 1775 and 1776. 

As you can see, Fort Ticonderoga is surrounded by hills, most 

significantly by Mount Defiance itself, which rises 700 feet above 

both Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence. In 1776, several 

Continental Army commanders and officers visited Mount Defiance 

and discussed using it to help defend the fort. They were also concerned that if left unguarded, Mount Defiance was accessible to the 

enemy. Ultimately they disregarded its value as a defensive position, deciding the promontory was out of mutually supporting rifle 

range of Fort Ticonderoga and inaccessible to artillery (though they 

knew that artillery rounds could range the fort from its heights if 

guns could be successfully placed there). St. Clair ultimately decided not to occupy Mount Defiance primarily because he did not have 

enough soldiers to adequately defend Fort Ticonderoga and Mount 

Independence as well as Mount Defiance. 

On 1 July, Burgoyne landed most of his army on both sides 

of Lake Champlain about four miles north of Fort Ticonderoga. 

Fraser’s Advance Corps, which had landed earlier a mile south at 
148

Three-Mile Point, initially remained in place as a vanguard but soon 

headed inland to envelop the fort from the west. Riedesel’s German 

Left Wing crossed to the east bank of the lake, debarked there, and 

headed for Mount Independence in a kind of pincers movement. 

Meanwhile, Burgoyne’s main body headed down the River Road 

toward Fort Ticonderoga. 

The following day, General Phillips’ Right Wing with Fraser’s 

Advance Corps and Brig. James Hamilton’s brigade moved west 

toward an eminence named Mount Hope. The American forces there 

rapidly set fire to their works and retreated into the safety of the old 

French lines. Soon Phillips’ forces deployed on line and began engaging the American troops manning the northwestern perimeter of 

the French lines. Though there was much firing, the action resulted 

in very few casualties on either side before the shooting died down. 

Meanwhile Riedesel’s Braunschweigers slowly pushed forward 

through heavy forest and swampy ground. The Germans struggled 

through the difficult approach all day but failed to reach a point 

where they could take Mount Independence under fire.

On 3 July, the main action was an artillery duel between British 

and American gunners without much effect on either side, except 

the reduction of ammunition. The following day, Burgoyne recognized that Mount Defiance (also known as Sugar Loaf Hill) might be 

the key to Fort Ticonderoga’s demise. Burgoyne directed the engineer, Lt. William Twiss, to reconnoiter the heights to see if artillery 

might be placed there. After scouting the eminence that night, Twiss 

reported the next morning that it was indeed possible to get artillery 

on Mount Defiance. Burgoyne realized that even if cannon could 

not range the fort, they could command the line of communications 

to the south, thus effectively cutting off resupply from or retreat toward that direction. On 5 July, Twiss’ pioneers began clearing a road 

up the reverse slope to Mount Defiance trying to retain the element 

of tactical surprise. However, St. Clair learned about the efforts and 

quickly called for a council of his general officers to discuss their 

options.

After St. Clair laid out the facts and the options as he saw them, 

the other generals unanimously agreed to evacuate the fort during 

the hours of darkness on the night of 5–6 July. They would send 
149

the wounded, sick, and supplies on ships, gunboats, and bateaux to 

Skenesborough via Lake Champlain. The able-bodied men of the 

Continental and militia units would evacuate to Mount Independence via the foot bridge, destroying it after the last man crossed. 

This column would head toward Castleton, Vermont and thence to 

Skenesborough or Fort Edward to join with Schuyler and any other 

forces the Northern Department commander could muster there. For 

deception, St. Clair ordered the firing of small arms and artillery 

throughout the night to indicate a sense of American resolve to the 

British attackers and cover the noises of the rebel movements. Also, 

no torches or fires were to be lit during the withdrawal process.

Though things started generally well, two problems arose during the night which made the operation go awry. The rebels were 

not able to move all the food, supplies, powder, ammunition, and 

wounded men onto the vessels. The process was slow, and it became 

evident that many supplies would have to be destroyed in place. 

The second problem was more serious. Around midnight, Brig. Gen. 

Matthias La Roche de Fermoy, one of St. Clair’s brigade commanders (and an incompetent, habitual drunk), ordered his troops to set 

fire to his quarters and other buildings despite St. Clair’s orders. 

These actions, of course, alerted the British that the fort was being 

abandoned when the flames revealed a long column of men moving 

over the foot bridge.

Despite the American difficulties, Burgoyne’s command took 

some time to organize a pursuit. In the meantime, St. Clair had successfully evacuated Fort Ticonderoga by the morning of 6 July and 

escaped with his men and most of the supplies. He ordered a small 

four-man detachment at Mount Independence to fire a cannon at 

the British if they attempted to cross the pontoon bridge in pursuit. 

Unfortunately, these men found some alcohol and were captured 

asleep and drunk at their posts. As a result, Burgoyne’s men quickly 

crossed the pontoon bridge on the trail of St. Clair’s column now 

headed for Hubbardton. Moreover, Burgoyne’s naval commander 

instructed his ships on how to easily knock down the boom blockade 

across the cross channel. In short order, those vessels were in hot 

pursuit of St. Clair’s bateaux fleet. 
150

Vignette 1: General Schuyler wrote to Colonel Varick on 1 July 

before the fall of Fort Ticonderoga: 

The insufficiency of the garrison at Ticonderoga, the imperfect state of the fortifications, and the want of discipline in 

the troops, give me great cause to apprehend that we shall 

lose that fortress, but as a reinforcement is coming up from 

Peekskill, with which I shall move up, I am in hopes that 

the enemy will be prevented from any farther progress. 

(Benson J. Lossing, The Life and Times of Philip Schuyler

2, Bedford, MA: Applewood Books, 2009, 206.)

Vignette 2: Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates to Gen. George Washington regarding the problems with Fort Ticonderoga: 

Time, & bad Construction of those Works, had completely 

effected that business long before General Schuyler came 

with me to Crown Point. The Ramparts are Tumbled 

down, the casemates are fallen in. The barracks burnt, and 

the whole so perfect a ruin, that it would take five times 

the number of our army for several summers, to put those 

works in defensible repair. Your excellency also mentions 

the troops expected to reinforce this army; it would be to 

the last degree improper, to order those troops to crown 

point, or even hither [Ticonderoga] until obliged by the 

most pressing emergency, as that would only be heaping 

one hospital upon another. . . . Everything about this army 

is infected, the clothes, the blankets, the air and the ground 

they walk upon.” (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military 

History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 159–60.)

Vignette 3: General Schuyler would later be relieved of command of the Department of the North due mainly to the loss of Fort 

Ticonderoga. Despite his relief by General Washington, Schuyler 

retained backers in Congress. On 2 October 1777, Congress issued 

the following declaration:

That the president be desired to write to General Schuyler, 

and inform him that the Congress cannot consent, during 
151

the present situation of our affairs, to accept his resignation, but request, that he continue the command which he 

now holds; that he be assured, that aspertions [sic] which 

his enemies have thrown against his character, have had 

no influence upon the minds of the members of this house, 

who are fully satisfied of his attachment to the cause of 

freedom, and are willing to bear testimony of the many 

services which he has rendered to his country; and that, 

in order effectually to put calumny to silence, they will, 

at an early date, appoint a committee of their body, to enquire fully into his conduct; which, they trust, will establish his reputation in the opinion of all good men. (John 

F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive 

Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas 

Beatie, 2008, 165.)

Analysis 

1. Was a siege the only option available to Burgoyne to neutralize or destroy Fort Ticonderoga? What other options could he 

have considered? 

2. How did terrain affect Burgoyne’s plans?

3. Given the defenses and ground for which he was responsible 

and the resources he possessed, what options did St. Clair have to 

defend the Fort Ticonderoga/Mount Independence complex? Which 

of these options would you choose and why? 

4. If you had St. Clair’s force at Fort Ticonderoga, how would 

you delay a force the size of Burgoyne’s?

5. Was St. Clair’s decision to evacuate the right one? Why or 

why not?

6. How would you evaluate the conduct of the evacuation?

7. How did the terrain affect St. Clair’s plans and actions?

Battle KIA WIA MIA/POW KIA WIA MIA/POW

Fort Ticonderoga 5 - - 7 11 -

British Continental

Figure 8. Casualties at Fort Ticonderoga.
152

Day 1, Stand 3 The Battle of Hubbardton (6–7 July 1777)

Directions: Head north on Defiance Street toward Mount Defiance Road for one mile. Turn left to stay on Defiance Street and 

proceed 0.1 miles. Turn right onto Cossey Street and proceed for 0.5 

miles. Veer left then turn right to stay on Cossey Street for about 100 

yards, then turn right onto Montcalm Street (NY-74 East). Proceed 

on NY-74 East (which will turn into Fort Ticonderoga Road) for 3.2 

miles to the Ticonderoga-Larabees Ferry. (Note: The one-way ferry 

cost is $10 per vehicle. Service is seasonal, generally May to September. An off-season staff ride may require traveling to Hubbardton via 

Whitehall on NY-22 South and US 4 North). On the Vermont side, 

continue on VT-74 East for 0.5 miles. Turn right onto VT-73 East and 

remain on this road for 11 miles. Turn right onto VT-30 South for 6.5 

miles. Turn left onto Monument Hill Road for 0.9 miles. Turn right 

onto Woods Road for 1.3 miles (portions of Woods Road are an improved dirt road). Woods Road turns into St. John Road. Remain on 

Orwell

Sudbury

Lake

Champlain

Monument

Hill Road

Hubbardton

Battlefield State

Historic Site

St. John Road

22A

22A

30

30

3

74

73

Route to Hubbardton

Stand 3

N

Wood Road

22

Ticonderoga

Larrabees Point 

Ferry

Map 6. Day 1 Route to Stand 3.
153

St. John Road, turning sharp left onto Monument Hill Road. Travel 

0.3 miles then turn left into the Hubbardton Battlefield State Park. 

Signs mark the battlefield park entrance. Move to the stone wall in 

open field to the west of the Visitors’ Center for Stand 3. 

Note: If time permits, this stand can be divided between Monument Hill (Sub-stand 3A) and a second location (Sub-stand 3B) at 

the monument south of the parking lot. The second location will 

give participants a better view of the American second and final defense line. If time is short, conduct the entire stand at Sub-stand 3A. 

Another option for a shorter day or if traveling to Hubbardton by the 

Fort Ticonderoga ferry is not a timely option, this entire stand can 

be done at Stand 2 or 4.

Stone

Wall

Battle of Hubbardton

Stand 3

N

3B

3A

Gravel

Parking Area

Francis

Monument

Museum &

Visitors’ 

Center

Map 7. Day 1 Stand 3.
154

Orientation: You are standing on the summit of Monument Hill 

where the Americans initially established their main defense line 

(see map 35, Appendix J, Battle of Hubbardton 7 July 1777). To 

the west, in the valley below this ridge is Sucker Brook. The initial 

action of the battle took place there at the Military Road ford at the 

creek. To the south is Zion Hill over part of which the British Grenadier and Light Infantry Battalions advanced to gain the left flank 

of the American forces and cut the Castleton Road. Much of the 

straggler camp was located on the slope of the hill. To the northwest 

is Sergeant Hill through which the Military Road from Fort Ticonderoga passed. To the east is the Castleton Road which led south to 

that town and northwest to Crown Point. The American second and 

final defense line was established along the Castleton Road. Also to 

the northeast and east is Pittsford Ridge, the high ground where the 

American troops would eventually make their retreat. Fort Ticonderoga is approximately 16 miles northwest of the Hubbardton Battlefield. The town of Castleton is approximately seven miles south 

of this position.

Day 1, Sub-stand 3A Monument Hill

Description: Once St. Clair saw his waterborne column off 

safely to Skenesborough in the early dawn of 6 July, he led the 

land column southeast over the hilly Military Road between Mount 

Independence and Castleton, his initial destination. St. Clair had 

Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor’s Continental Brigade lead the march, 

and Fermoy’s Continentals brought up the rear. Various militia 

organizations were placed between the two regular formations. 

Generally unaccustomed to the hardships of war, lack of sleep, and 

long marches that were the lot of the regular soldier, the militia 

rapidly dissolved into little more than armed mobs. Moreover, the 

prescribed period of service for which they had been enlisted had 

expired for some of the units. These men were loud in their demands 

to leave and go home. Other commands were ill-disciplined simply 

due to poor leadership. All were negatively affected by the heat of 

the July sun and the mountainous terrain, and straggling quickly 

became a major problem. 

Col. Ebenezer Francis, commander of the Continental 11th 

Massachusetts Bay Regiment, was assigned as rear guard for St. 
155

Clair’s command. In addition to protecting the rear of the American 

column from attack, he was responsible for sweeping up the large 

number of stragglers who were lagging behind the column. The lead 

elements of St. Clair’s command marched to a location about two 

miles shy of Castleton before stopping that evening. As he paused 

at Hubbardton to rest his men, St. Clair tasked Col. Seth Warner, 

commander of the Continental Regiment that contained the remnants of the Green Mountain Boys, to bring the rear guard and stragglers to the main camp that evening. He also left behind Col. Nathan 

Hale’s 2nd New Hampshire Battalion under Warner’s control, then 

St. Clair and the main body moved on. After a hot, miserable march, 

Francis’ regiment and more than one hundred stragglers arrived bit 

by bit at Hubbardton beginning about 1600. On his arrival, Francis 

informed Warner that he had no intention of driving his men, or the 

stragglers, farther that evening. They badly needed the rest. Though 

the action went against St. Clair’s orders, Warner acquiesced. Both 

officers were unaware that Fraser’s Advance Corps was on their trail 

and would camp only three miles from Hubbardton that evening. 

On the following morning, 7 July, Warner was about to start his 

troops south for Castleton and Francis’ men were cooking breakfast 

when Maj. Robert Grant’s 24th Regiment of Foot leading the Advance Corps attacked the troops of 2nd New Hampshire Battalion 

posted along Sucker Brook. Although the British attack caught them 

by surprise, the American troops rapidly recovered, taking cover 

behind any available boulders and trees then opening a brisk fire 

against the advancing redcoats. 

As Fraser surveyed the fighting and terrain before him, he identified Zion Hill to the south as the key to his plan. If he could move 

a column to take that high ground, he could then advance a force 

to cut the road south to Castleton and capture the ragged band of 

rebels. He sent orders to Maj. John Acland to have the Grenadier 

Battalion seize Zion Hill and cut the road. As the Grenadiers moved 

out on their mission, the rest of the Advance Corps swung east and 

began to advance on what would become known as Monument Hill. 

Meanwhile, Fraser sent word to Riedesel to hurry his men forward. 

Warner, whose regiment had formed near the Selleck cabin, 

knew that his plan to march to Castleton was no longer an option. 
156

Instead, he ordered his men to load their muskets and move down 

the slope to confront Acland’s advance. Fighting now centered on 

the American left as Warner attempted to keep the Grenadiers from 

flanking his command and, therefore, the entire American line. After his regiment was forced back to a fence line around the Selleck 

cabin, Warner refused his left (i.e., bent it back to form an angle) to 

conform with the terrain and thereby established a strong position—

preventing the Grenadiers from eventually gaining the road. 

Meanwhile on the American right, Francis rushed his regiment 

to a low stone wall on Monument Hill to prevent the naturally strong 

position from falling into the hands of the advancing 24th Foot and 

Balcarres’ Light Infantry. Forming on the left of the 2nd New Hampshire troops who had retreated to the location after being driven from 

the valley, the men of the 11th Massachusetts now added the weight 

of their fire against the British advance. The initial volleys of this new 

force, coupled with an unexpected counterattack by the rebels, initially halted and then drove back Fraser’s regulars with heavy losses. 

Near the bottom of the hill, Balcarres and his officers rallied 

their shaken troops and reformed the lines to start up the hill once 

again. On the British right, Maj. John D. Acland’s Grenadiers had 

successfully skirted Warner’s Continentals and gained the road to 

Castleton. The rebel avenue of retreat was now cut off. Still, the 

Americans continued to fight with unexpected courage. Indeed, 

Francis now saw an opportunity to turn the tables on Fraser. The 

American right overlapped Fraser’s line on the British left, and 

Francis prepared to have the right of his line advance and flank Fraser—just as Fraser had done to the rebel left. 

Unbeknownst to Francis, however, Riedesel’s column was approaching the rebel line from the north. As the New Hampshire men 

prepared to flank Fraser’s left, the sounds of German martial music 

echoed to the north. Soon after, a line of jägers advanced on the 2nd 

New Hampshire’s flank while Fraser’s line was concurrently coming up the west slope of Monument Hill. The American line was 

now forced to retreat eastward toward the Castleton Road.

Return by the walking path to the visitor’s center and proceed 

to the monument at the southwest corner of the parking lot. 

Day 1, Sub-stand 3B The Final Line
157

Orientation: You are now located at the monument to Col. Ebenezer Francis, commander of the Continental 11th Massachusetts 

Bay Regiment. To the west is Monument Hill and the stone wall 

where the initial main defense was conducted. Riedesel’s troops advanced against the American right flank from the north. To the east 

is Castleton Road. Along the east side of the road, a log rail fence 

extended well to the north and south. To the north and south, several 

additional fences extended from the road eastward to create several 

boxed-in fields. Farther to the east is Pittsford Ridge over which 

the Americans would escape. To the south beyond the junction was 

where the Grenadiers cut the Castleton Road. 

Description: The American troops retreated and successfully 

formed behind the log rail fence line along the east side of the Castleton Road, commencing a heavy fire against the advancing redcoats. 

Already severely wounded once in the arm, Francis, was struck 

again during the confused retreat and killed outright. Grenadiers on 

the Castleton Road to the south finally turned Warner’s flank and 

caused him to fall back to this location as well. It soon became evident that the Continentals would have to break contact and retreat if 

they wanted to fight another day. After Francis died, the Massachusetts troops and New Hampshire men lost their will to fight. After 

about thirty minutes of additional fighting, the rebel line began to 

dissolve, and the men headed for the various trails over Pittsford 

Ridge. Seeing that the militia on his right was disintegrating, Warner 

ordered his men to scatter and find their way to Manchester where 

he would meet them in a few days. As the rebels broke contact and 

made their way over the ridge, British troops attempted to pursue 

but found that the Americans excelled at conducting a delaying action in the woods. After suffering many casualties in the main battle 

and still more during the woods pursuit, the officers of the tired and 

decimated British formations soon called off the hunt and returned 

to Monument Hill. Fraser had paid a high cost to win the field. Instead of moving on toward Castleton to find St. Clair’s column, the 

general opted to stay at Hubbardton to lick his wounds and then 

return to Skenesborough. St. Clair’s command continued to move 

unimpeded. 

The Results and Costs of the Battle
158

By remaining at Hubbardton, Francis and Warner purchased—

at a heavy cost—time that St. Clair needed to escape. Although he 

won the tactical fight, Fraser did not pursue further and was unable 

to interdict St. Clair’s main body. As a result, the Americans eventually rejoined Schuyler’s command, which would soon gather at Fort 

Edward. These troops would face Burgoyne’s army again later.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of the decision by Warner and Francis to remain at Hubbardton on the night of 6 July? How do you 

think the decision affected the outcome of the battle?

2. What is your assessment of Fraser’s pursuit?

3. How did leadership play a role in the American actions? The 

British actions?

4. How did the terrain affect Fraser’s efforts to defeat the 

American rearguard? How did the terrain affect American actions to 

counter Fraser’s attack?

5. What is your assessment of the role that Riedesel and his 

Braunschweigers played in this action?

6. What do you see as the significance of this battle?

7. How did the outcome affect each commander’s (Burgoyne 

and Schuyler) operational options?

8. What are some branches and sequels to their original campaign plan that each commander should have considered at this point?

Figure 9. Battle of Hubbardton Casualties.

Estimated Casualties

from Battle of Hubbardton

Killed 55 41

Wounded 150 96

Captured - 230

Total 205 367

British American
159

Day 1, Stand 4 Skenesborough (Whitehall) (6 July 1777)

Directions: From the parking lot at Hubbardton Battlefield State 

Historic Site, head south on Monument Hill Road 1.3 miles toward 

St. John Road. The road will turn into East Hubbardton Road. Continue south 4.9 miles. Turn left to merge onto US-4 West. Follow 

US-4 West for 14 miles to Whitehall, NY (at Whitehall, US-4 West 

will become Poultney Street). Turn right onto Williams Street and 

continue straight about 500 feet to the bridge over the Champlain 

Canal. Once across the bridge, Williams Street becomes Saunders 

Street. Turn right onto Main Street and proceed about 500 feet to the 

paved parking area next to Lock 12 on the right. 

Orientation: This is the town of Whitehall, New York. At the 

time of the Saratoga Campaign, it was known as Skenesborough—

Castleton

Hubbardton

Battlefield State

Historic Site

3

22

Battle Hill

Route to Skenesborough

(Whitehall)

Stand 4

N

5

4

22

4 4

4

Whitehall

Fort Anne

Map 8. Day 1 Route to Stand 4.
160

named for Phillip Skene, a former British Army officer who had 

seen a significant amount of action in Britain’s various wars between 1739 and 1769. During his time as the commander of Crown 

Point in 1759–60, Skene developed an affinity for this region. He 

later sold his commission in 1769, acquired a royal patent for 25,000 

acres in this area, and became a local entrepreneur and opportunist. 

When the war began, he remained a loyalist and would receive a 

colonel’s commission to serve with Burgoyne’s Northern Army during the Saratoga Campaign. 

The town itself was the center of commerce in a largely uninhabited region. Because it was located at the south end of Lake 

Champlain and had access to Wood Creek which flowed to the Hudson River, the area was ideal for trade and shipbuilding. At the beginning of the Revolutionary War, the town boasted four boatyards, one 

or two saw mills, a forge, and a significant number of skilled laborers Champlain Canal

Lock 12

Route to Skenesborough

(Whitehall)

Stand 4

N

Whitehall

4

22

4

4

Map 9. Day 1 Stand 4.
161

for such a small community. All of Skenesborough’s facilities and 

items of military value, including Philip Skene’s new schooner, soon 

fell into the hands of Benedict Arnold and Nathan Hale as they made 

their way north to seize Fort Ticonderoga in May 1775.

Over the next two years, because of its location and facilities, 

Skenesborough became a significant logistical hub for the Patriot 

cause in New York. Significantly, Arnold used its shipbuilding facilities to construct his fleet in the summer of 1776. Through yeoman’s 

efforts, Arnold built at least 12 row galleys and gondolas with which 

he opposed Carleton’s fleet at Valcour Island. Arnold also undertook 

additional work to upgrade Skenesborough’s defenses which included a small palisade fort and a blockhouse for protection. 

The area where you stand was the location of the shipyards that 

built most of Benedict Arnold’s Lake Champlain fleet. The Champlain Canal (i.e., the locks and other canal facilities) did not exist 

then. The dock areas to the north that you now see on both sides of 

the canal are where many of the docks and slipways were located on 

Wood Creek at the time of the campaign. Farther north Wood Creek 

connects with South Bay. About 25 miles by water beyond that is 

Fort Ticonderoga. About 21 miles to the northeast is Hubbardton. 

US Highway 4 heads south out of Whitehall, generally following 

the old military road to Fort Anne. Fort Anne is about 11 miles to 

the south. To the west about two miles is South Bay and seven miles 

beyond that over the mountains is Lake George. 

Description: (Note: The events of this stand go back in time 

one day to 6 July—the morning when the Americans evacuated Fort 

Ticonderoga and the day before the Battle of Hubbardton.) 

In the early morning darkness of 6 July 1777, a fleet of approximately 200 bateaux and the five surviving vessels of Arnold’s Lake 

Champlain fleet departed the dock areas tucked under the south side 

of Fort Ticonderoga on Lake Champlain. The vessels carried a large 

amount of supplies and other materials of military value, along with 

the wounded and sick men from the Fort Ticonderoga garrison. The 

fleet was under the command of Col. Pierce Long, commander of 

the New Hampshire Militia Regiment at Fort Ticonderoga. Long’s 

mission was to move the evacuated supplies and the wounded and 
162

sick men by water to Skene’s Landing and from there move them 

overland through Fort Anne to Fort Edward.

Jeduthan Baldwin, the Northern Army’s engineer, had constructed a substantial log boom and chain barrier across the lake 

to prevent British ships from moving farther south. Confident that 

the obstacle would slow any pursuing forces, Long slowly moved 

his mass of tiny boats toward Skenesborough. Commodore Skeffington Lutwidge’s sailors broke through about thirty minutes after 

starting to batter the barrier with their naval cannon. In short order, 

Lutwidge directed his squadron through the hole in the opening and 

pursued the American fleet.

Because of his miscalculation, Long did not push his men to 

row the distance to Skenesborough as quickly as possible. Moreover, he made no effort to land men to set up what would have been 

an excellent defensive position at a chokepoint on the Wood Creek 

channel leading to Skenesborough. Such an action might not have 

stopped the British, but it certainly would have delayed them long 

enough for Long to at least get a large share of the supplies away 

before the enemy arrived at the town. 

Long’s mélange of vessels began to arrive at Skenesborough 

around noon on 6 July. Some of his troops were sent to occupy some 

of the meager fortifications around the town, while others began 

the slow process of unloading the bateaux. To his credit, Long immediately sent the sick and wounded men off for Fort Anne. Not 

long after their departure and to everyone’s surprise, British vessels 

sailed up Wood Creek toward the town. Lutwidge’s gunners quickly 

opened fire. Within minutes, the whole landing area was a confused 

mass of sinking and burning bateaux. Most of them were fired by the 

Americans to prevent capture. The flaming boats soon set the docks 

and nearby structures on fire. While his gunners took the American 

vessels and burning fortifications, the commodore began landing 

troops of the 9th, 20th, and 21st Foot to cut the escape route across 

the Fort Anne Road, while the 47th Foot moved to attack the town. 

Meanwhile, American troops who were not already fleeing the area 

were setting fire to anything of military value in Skenesborough. 

Despite their efforts, a substantial amount of the supplies so painstakingly spirited away from Fort Ticonderoga fell into enemy hands. 
163

Long and about 150 men were able to escape down the Fort Anne 

Road before it was cut. The remainder of his regiment fled to the 

hills or was captured. 

Vignette: None

Analysis

1. What does US Army doctrine teach about the employment 

and defense of obstacles?

2. How would you compare and contrast the leadership of Long 

with that of Lutwidge?

3. What is your assessment of the British pursuit of Long?
164

Day 1, Stand 5 The Battle of Fort Anne (7–9 July 1777)

Directions: Head south on Main Street toward Division Street 

for 0.2 miles. Continue straight onto Skenesborough Drive and 

proceed 0.4 miles. Turn right onto Poultney Street and proceed 0.1 

miles, then left onto Broadway for 0.6 miles. Broadway becomes 

NY-22 South/US-4 West. Proceed 8.7 miles to the Fort Anne Battlefield marker, which is located on a cliff face on the east side of Battle 

Hill which will loom on the right (west). 

Note: Carefully watch for the marker as it is not readily observable until you are close, especially when foliage is present. There is 

a narrow pull-off on the left (east) side of the road.

Caution: While the pull-off is capable of parking a bus, the bus 

must cross oncoming traffic lane to park. There is no ideal location 

Route to Fort Anne

Stand 5

N

Castleton

Hubbardton

Battlefield State

Historic Site

3

22

Battle Hill

5

4

22

4 4

4

Whitehall

Fort Anne

Map 10. Day 1 Route to Stand 5.
165

for this stand due to the potential for heavy traffic and corresponding noise, which interferes with conducting the stand here. An alternative location is the Glen Falls (Fort Ann) Bank which is located 

about two miles farther south on US-4 West, on the left (east) side 

of the road just after crossing the Halfway Creek bridge. The bank is 

a replica blockhouse that sits on or near the site of old Fort Anne. If 

this site is chosen, a staff ride representative will need to coordinate 

with the bank or an adjacent business in advance to park a bus. If 

pressed for time, this stand may be conducted as a drive-by.

Primary Orientation: Battle Hill Location. You are standing 

below the hill on which Lt. Col. John Hill’s detachment of the 9th 

Regiment of Foot made its stand against the attacks of the American 

Fort Anne

Fort Anne

Stand 5

Battle Hill

16

4

149

N

Battle Hill

Marker

Gravel

Pull-off

5

Map 11. Day 1 Stand 5.
166

forces from Fort Anne on 8 July 1777. The British forces would have 

defended near the top of the rise in front of you. Facing the hill, the 

American attacks would have approached from your left (south), the 

direction of Fort Anne. The foliage here in July would have been less 

than today because of grazing by farm animals and the gathering of 

wood for fires. Since this area was very sparsely settled at this time, 

the surrounding flatlands would have been under far less cultivation 

and not nearly as open as today. Due west about 13 miles was Fort 

George at the south end of Lake George. To the south-southwest 13 

miles was Fort Edward on the Hudson River. Wood Creek is about 50 

yards to your south, just beyond the railroad tracks.

Alternate Orientation: Glen Falls (Fort Ann) Bank Location. 

You are standing at the approximate location of the Fort Anne stockade. At the time of the campaign, Fort Anne consisted of a blockhouse and a relatively small stockade with wood palisade walls. The 

fort was largely rundown and not capable of withstanding a determined attack by a superior force, especially if the attacking force 

possessed any artillery. Due west about 13 miles was Fort George at 

the south end of Lake George. To the south-southwest 12 miles was 

Fort Edward on the Hudson River. Wood Creek is about 200 yards to 

the east. The creek flowed from Skenesborough (Whitehall) through 

Fort Anne and emptied into the Hudson River near Fort Edward.

Description: After the successful seizure of Skenesborough 

and unsuccessful attempt to capture the American commander Long 

and his men, Burgoyne was anxious to keep up the pressure on St. 

Clair’s retreating forces. In addition to Fraser’s column, which was 

marching rapidly toward Hubbardton to catch St. Clair’s rearguard, 

Burgoyne sent Lt. Col. John Hill’s 9th Regiment of Foot to pursue 

Long’s New Hampshire men down the Fort Anne Road. Concurrently, the 20th and 21st Regiments of Foot would move by bateaux 

via Wood Creek toward the same destination. The three regiments 

were to join forces near Fort Anne and destroy any rebel forces consolidating there. 

Hill’s column departed early the morning of 7 July. Even under 

normal circumstances, traveling the small road was difficult as it 

was a barely discernable footpath in many places and crossed over 
167

numerous ridges, creeks, and swampy areas where footing was often difficult. The journey was even more difficult with the July heat 

and stuffy, humid air under the canopy of thick trees and underbrush. In addition, the rebels had destroyed every foot bridge and 

boardwalk over the creeks and swamps, so the British column had to 

stop periodically and build makeshift crossings. As a result, the 9th 

Foot traveled only 10 miles by the end of the day, and the regiment 

was so strung out that Hill only had about 190 men with him when 

he made camp that afternoon.

On the American side, refugees from Long’s New Hampshire 

Regiment had gathered under the command of Capt. James Gray, 

combining with Gray’s company of the Continental 3rd New Hampshire Regiment as it made its way back to Fort Anne. All told, Gray 

had about 220 men, including about seventeen rangers, when he arrived at the fort. There he found another detachment of American 

troops and more refugees from Long’s regiment crowded into the 

fort’s small confines. Confusion and demoralization reigned. Gray 

decided to remove his men from the area to avoid bringing down 

their morale. He moved his company northward back up the Fort 

Anne Road, rangers in the lead. After moving a relatively short distance, the rangers bumped into the pickets from the 9th Foot, which 

was now camped only about a mile north of the fort. The rangers and 

pickets began sniping at one another—making Hill and Long aware 

of each other’s presence. 

The good news for the Americans was that after Gray departed, 

a 400-man New York Militia Regiment under Col. Henry K. Van 

Rensselaer arrived at Fort Anne. Long and Van Rensselaer were discussing options when the gunfire erupted to the north. Both agreed 

that the New Yorkers—militia but at least a cohesive unit—should 

march toward the sound of the guns. Van Rensselaer led his men 

north and shortly arrived at the scene. The two American units—

now outnumbering Hill by three to one—began pressing the small 

British command. The fight continued in a somewhat desultory manner for four hours until darkness set in. Hill realized that he had been 

lucky that the rebel troops, who clearly outnumbered him, did not 

overwhelm his command. He quickly sent runners to urge his other 

troops forward as well as the elements of his own regiment which 

were strung out far behind him. He would need reinforcements to 
168

survive the fighting on the morrow. 

The following morning an American “deserter” walked into 

camp and told Hill that the American force—depleted somewhat by 

casualties the day before—now consisted of about 1,000 troops. Unfortunately for Hill, the deserter left shortly thereafter, returning to 

the American camp to inform Colonel Long about the exact dispositions of Hill’s command as well as its strength. Armed with the new 

information, Colonel Long moved to attack the diminutive redcoat 

band. Around 1000, Long’s combined command pushed forward and 

engaged the skirmishers and then the main body of the 9th Foot. Hill 

realized he would have to move to a better defensive location to be 

able to hold long enough for reinforcements to arrive. He chose a 

heavily wooded hill on the west side of the road. Leaving behind his 

wounded from the day before, he urged his troops forward to form a 

circular perimeter on top of the hill just in time to fend off the initial 

rebel attack. Combined with the expenditure of ammunition from the 

day before and the ongoing fight, the British troops soon began to run 

low. The situation was becoming desperate, and Hill contemplated 

surrendering his command to prevent further bloodshed.

Hill was not aware that the American troops also were low on ammunition. Long and his men were uncertain whether they themselves 

still had enough bullets and powder to press their advantage. At about 

that time, both British and American troops heard the fast-approaching 

whoops of what sounded like an Indian war party. The sounds were 

actually coming from a single man, Capt. John Money, Burgoyne’s 

Deputy Quartermaster. Money had been traveling with a group of 

Iroquois warriors who deserted the officer soon after they heard the 

sounds of battle. Now alone, Money did his best to run through the 

woods and whoop like many Indians. The belief that the British were 

about to be reinforced by the Iroquois—coupled with his own men’s 

dwindling ammunition—caused Long to break off the fight. 

Back at Fort Anne, Long conferred again with his subordinate 

leaders. The consensus was to withdraw to Fort Edward, particularly due to the shortage of ammunition as well as the news that Maj. 

Gen. William Phillips was about to arrive and reinforce Hill with 

some 2,000 troops. Accordingly, Long continued the American retreat south to Fort Edward, directing his men to destroy the road’s 

bridges and fell large trees across the trail as they went. Long need 
169

not have worried so much. Once the fight broke off, Hill retreated 

farther north on the road to avoid what he thought might be a final 

American assault. The British pursuit on the Fort Anne Road was 

at an end. Like Fraser at Hubbardton, Hill learned first-hand at Fort 

Anne that even though the British might drive the American rebels 

from the battlefield, they would likely sustain heavy casualties in the 

process. Though Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough may have 

been rather easy and essentially bloodless victories, the “victors” 

came away from the two subsequent fights with a bloody nose and a 

much diminished desire to press the pursuit. 

Vignette: None

Analysis 

1. Assess Hill’s pursuit of the retreating American forces. How 

well did Hill react after contact? How did the terrain affect Hill’s 

decisions?

2. Why do you think the American forces were largely demoralized on the morning of 7 July but were able to decisively end the 

British pursuit by noon on July 8?

3. What are the key insights to be gained about the action at 

Fort Anne? How much can we take away from both sides lack of 

situational awareness and the effects of the fog of war?

4. What is the key significance of the battle as it pertains to the 

campaign?

5. Both sides seemed to have poor situational awareness at 

times in this battle. What aspects of intelligence (good and bad) can 

we learn from the battle that would still apply today?

Day 1, Stand 6 Fort Edward (Drive by) (Events 7–29 July 

Estimated Casualties

from Battle of Fort Anne

Killed 13

Wounded 22

Captured 3

Total 38 50–2001

British American

Notes:

1. Estimates of American casualties for this action vary wildly. The higher figure likely includes those captured and deserters.

Figure 10. Fort Anne Casualties.
170

1777)

Directions: From the blockhouse bank in Fort Ann, head south 

on US-4 West for 9.8 miles. As you enter the town of Fort Edward, 

US-4 West will also be named Main Street. Follow Main street to 

Juckett Park. At Juckett Park, US-4 West becomes Park Place. Follow Park Place to the right then turn left onto River Street/US-4 

West (which turns into Main Street). Continue on Main Street to 

follow US-4 West for 2.5 miles. Note: The grave of Jane McCrae 

is located in Union Cemetery in Fort Edward. Union Cemetery is 

Route to Fort Edward 

Stand 6

N

Glens

Falls

Hudson Falls

7

32

4

6

5

32

4

9

9

Fort Anne

Fort Edward

Fort Miller

87

87

Map 12. Day 1 Route to Stand 6.
171

located on your left about one mile from the turn). Watch for Bridge 

Street on your right. 

Orientation: This is intended to be a “drive-by” stand. If you 

wish to stop, the best location is on Rogers Island. To get there, turn 

right on Bridge Street then the first left on Rogers Island Drive. Park 

in the parking lot of the Rogers Island Visitors Center. If no stop 

is desired, continue to head south on US-4 West while the stand is 

conducted on the bus. As you drive by the intersection of US 4 and 

State Highway 197, point out Bridge Street on the right. The bridge 

crosses over to Rogers Island where the barracks area for Fort Edward was located. The intersection itself is located where the fort’s 

north bastion stood. US-4 West cuts through the middle of the fort’s 

original location (on the east bank of the Hudson River) as it passes 

by Bridge Street. Fort Edward protected the local portage, which 

bypassed the falls on the Hudson River near here. Originally constructed in 1755 as Fort Lyman, it was renamed Fort Edward in 1756 

Rogers

Island

Fort Edward

Stand 6

N

4

6

Rogers Island

Visitors’ Center

Alternate

Stand

6

4

Fort Edward

Map 13. Day 1 Stand 6.
172

in honor of Prince Edward, the grandson of King George II. Edward 

was a younger brother of King George III.

Fort Edward itself was a log and earthen structure built in the 

star fort style with bastions, lunettes, and ramparts. The fortification, 

however, did not provide all-round protection since its west side was 

the Hudson River itself. Built to protect the area from French attack, 

its primary defenses were oriented to the north. A log pontoon-type 

bridge connected the fort with the barracks area on Rogers Island. At 

the time of the Revolutionary War, it was largely run-down. Much of 

the wood in the fort had been removed in 1767 to build houses and 

other structures in the area. Most of the remaining wood buttresses 

and walls had decayed and collapsed by 1777. The rebels frequently 

used the dilapidated barracks area for a cantonment but had done 

little to improve the fort’s defensive capabilities by the time Schuyler arrived here about 10 July. 

Description: At 0500 on 7 July, a messenger arrived at Schuyler’s headquarters in Albany with the news that Ticonderoga and 

Mount Independence had fallen. Shocked by this news, Schuyler 

soon departed for Fort Edward, the most logical place to try and 

assemble his now-dispersed and retreating forces. En route, the 

Northern Department commander sent a series of messages to General Washington keeping him informed of events and requesting reinforcements. He also sent word to St. Clair and Brig. Gen. John 

Nixon (whose brigade was at Peekskill) to have them and their commands meet him at Fort Edward. At this point, Schuyler was uncertain whether St. Clair still had a command or if his subordinate was 

a prisoner of war. On arrival at Fort Edward, Schuyler found the 

remnants of Long’s command and the other troops the colonel had 

brought with him from Fort Anne.

Meanwhile, after the battle at Hubbardton, St. Clair received 

word that Burgoyne’s troops had taken Skenesborough. Realizing 

his help would not arrive in time, St. Clair wisely headed for Fort 

Edward instead. Moving on a more circuitous route, he marched his 

men from Castleton through Pawlet then to Dorset, where he paused 

briefly to rest his men and send a letter to Schuyler explaining his 

situation. He then proceeded through Manchester to Bennington. 
173

The note that St. Clair sent from Dorset did not reach Schuyler until 10 July. Although relieved to receive word from his subordinate, Schuyler became concerned that St. Clair might remain at 

Bennington to rest and resupply his force rather than consolidating 

at Fort Edward. One element of good news in the letter: St. Clair explained that his command had gotten away in relatively good order 

then fought a battle (Hubbardton). He added that although many of 

his men were scattered, they were returning to the fold on a daily 

basis. Schuyler’s letter must have reached St. Clair as well since his 

column turned west, reaching the Hudson River at Batten Kill on 

11 July and then moving north to Fort Edward, where it arrived the 

following day. By coincidence, Nixon’s 580-man Continental Army 

brigade arrived the same day. Brig. Gen. John Fellows’ militia brigade arrived a few days later, further strengthening Schuyler’s command and giving him enough troops to provide a credible threat to 

Burgoyne’s front. In short, the Northern Army was gradually gathering to block, or at least delay, its British counterpart. Schuyler was 

preparing to make the most of it. 

The Northern Army commander issued orders to Nixon and 

Fellows to take their brigades north on the road toward Fort Anne 

and continue working to make the route impassable. Over the next 

several days, Continentals and militiamen went to great lengths to 

destroy all bridges and causeways over swampy areas. They also 

felled huge trees across the road to slow or block British progress. 

Sometimes the Americans cut two or three trees so the branches 

would interlock, causing a tangled mess that would take hours to 

chop away. They placed similar obstacles across navigable streams 

and dug trenches to divert streams so they would feed into low 

ground along the trail and create a morass that would require a 

bridge or at least a boardwalk to cross. The rebel soldiers did their 

work so well that British troops were later forced to build a causeway and corduroy (See Appendix I, Glossary of Terms) a two-milelong stretch of trail. 

Not content with simply slowing British progress, Schuyler 

also worked to improve other aspects of the Northern Army’s situation. In addition to asking Washington for more troops, he sent appeals to the governor of New York and the Vermont legislature for 
174

more militiamen. He pulled other units in his department away from 

other assignments to converge on Fort Edward and made every effort to acquire ammunition, food, and other supplies his army would 

need. His efforts to build up men and supplies would continue over 

the next several weeks. 

Having failed to capture the American garrison at Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence—and drawn further inland and eastward by pursuits to Skenesborough and Hubbardton—Burgoyne 

now had to decide whether to continue moving south via the east 

or west side of the Hudson River. His original plan was to move 

his army on the La Chute River and over the portage between Fort 

Ticonderoga and Lake George Landing. From there they would float 

down Lake George to Fort George then portage to the Hudson River at Fort Edward. However, he quickly realized that the La Chute 

“River” was nothing more than a rocky creek that rapidly climbed 

some 200 feet to Lake George. All wagons and artillery, as well as 

the bateaux used to move the army south from St. John, would have 

to be pulled, pushed, and otherwise dragged over a three-mile route 

to the Lake George Landing. The land route itself posed a problem 

since the heavy equipment would have to ascend the same 200 feet 

in elevation before reaching the landing on Lake George.

There were two additional problems with this option. For one 

thing, the water route back to Fort Ticonderoga was almost thirty 

miles in the wrong direction—what might seem a retreat to the enemy as well as to Burgoyne’s troops. He feared that returning to Fort 

Ticonderoga might boost rebel soldier morale while demoralizing 

his own troops. Additionally, choosing the water route would end 

speculation that his ultimate objective might be to turn east and advance into New England. Staying the course on the west side of the 

Hudson telegraphed that his goal was indeed Albany. 

Burgoyne discovered the eastern route when his army originally occupied Skenesborough. Though the route was primarily overland, the bateaux loaded with supplies, ammunition, and equipment 

could be floated down Wood Creek to its junction with the Hudson 

River. Wagons and artillery could go by land. In theory, this was the 

easiest route. In practice, road conditions and rebel-placed obstacles 

significantly complicated the movement forward from Skenesbor-
175

ough to Fort Edward. Ultimately Burgoyne decided to move by both 

routes. On 10 July, he directed Phillips to move the army’s artillery, and most of the wagons and bateaux, over the portage to Lake 

George Landing. Concurrently, he ordered Riedesel and Brig. Henry 

W. Powell to have their men clear and improve the road to Fort Edward. Both columns would meet at the fort. Burgoyne would decide 

his next steps once he arrived there.

Over the next 19 days, Burgoyne’s men labored to chop, dig, 

and build their way slowly southward toward Fort Edward, while 

others toiled across the portage to Lake George Landing and later 

from Fort George to Fort Edward. Other than the obstacles, the British advance was uncontested. Although he arranged for many impediments to bar Buygoyne’s path, Schuyler recognized that Fort 

Edward was no place to make a determined stand. On 14 July, he 

ordered his troops to retreat southward to Moses Kill. Two weeks 

later on 29 July, Burgoyne’s advance party arrived at Fort Edward, 

exhausted and hungry. Almost three grueling weeks had been spent 

to move only twenty-three miles. Phillips’ column and its lead elements arrived at Fort Edwards at nearly the same time via the water route. Burgoyne decided to take an operational pause to rest his 

tired men. The next major hurdle he faced—and it was a problem he 

would grapple with from this point forward—was how to adequately 

feed his soldiers. The Army from Canada was running out of food. 

Vignette: Sergeant Roger Lamb, 23rd Regiment of Foot, kept a 

diary during his service in America and described the challenges of 

clearing the Fort Anne–Fort Edward Road:

The Americans, under the direction of General Schuyler, 

were constantly employed in cutting down trees on both 

sides of every road, which was in the line of march. The 

face of the country was likewise so broken with creeks 

and Marshes, that there was no less than forty bridges as 

to construct, one of which was over a morass two miles in 

extent. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of 

the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New 

York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 81.)

Analysis 
176

Note: It is difficult to conduct the analysis at drive-by stands 

(especially if the participants are on a full bus or multiple vehicles 

one van is doable). You may wish to consider holding the analysis 

questions until arriving at the next stand. Conduct the analysis of 

the drive-by stand there before doing the next on-the-ground stand.

1. Given the problems faced after the disasters at Fort Ticonderoga and Skenesborough, what is your analysis of Schuyler’s actions after those events?

2. What is your assessment of St. Clair’s actions?

3. Do you think Burgoyne’s decision to proceed on both routes 

was a good one? Why or why not? 

4. How did the terrain affect Burgoyne’s and Schuyler’s decisions and actions at this point in the campaign?

5. One of the objectives of operational planners and their commanders is to make decisions and take actions that expand the options 

available to the commander. Whose options were expanding at this 

point and whose were diminishing (or both or neither) and why?
177

Day 1, Stand 7 Fort Miller (Drive-by) (Events 7–30 July 1777)

Directions: From Fort Edward, continue south 7.5 miles on 

US-4 West until reaching the town of Fort Miller. Looking across 

the Hudson River at the point where Fort Miller Road and the North 

River Road converge, one can still observe the remnants of the fortification’s glacis, a low-graded artificial slope of earth.

Orientation: The town of Fort Miller takes its name from an 

old fort positioned here on the west bank of the Hudson River. The 

Route to Fort Miller 

Stand 7

N

Glens

Falls

Hudson Falls

7

32

4

6

5

32

4

9

9

Fort Anne

Fort Edward

Fort Miller

87

87

Map 14. Day 1 Route to Stand 7.
178

fortifications were originally constructed in 1709 and renovated in 

1755 during the French and Indian War. The fort protected a portage 

known as the “Little Carrying Place,” which ran north of the mouth 

of the Batten Kill. The post was maintained as a supply link to Forts 

Edward and George. However, its fortifications fell into disuse when 

the area came under British control at the conclusion of the French 

and Indian War.

Description: Like Fort Edward, Fort Miller was an untenable 

position to hold against Burgoyne’s professional army, especially 

when the British were equipped with such a large amount of artillery. Thus, Schuyler’s command, having now grown to 4,000 men, 

simply passed by this area on the east side of the river on 30 July 

while moving from Moses Kill to Stillwater. Schuyler ordered his 

men to remove or destroy any livestock, food, or supplies that would 

7

Fort Miller

Stand 7

N

4

7

4

Site of

Fort Miller

46

Alternate

Stand

Champlain Canal

Map 15. Day 1 Stand 7.
179

be of value to the enemy as they made their way south. When he 

arrived at Batten Kill, Schuyler crossed the Northern Army over to 

the west bank of the Hudson and arrived at Stillwater on 1 August. 

There he developed plans to build defenses to block any further advance south by the British.

As Burgoyne’s ground column was hacking its way toward 

Fort Edward, Howe prepared to sail his expedition to seize the rebel 

capitol at Philadelphia. From his headquarters in New York, Howe 

wrote to Burgoyne on 17 July informing him he was about to depart 

on his quest. Howe also stated that he was not moving any troops 

toward the north at the moment, but assured Burgoyne that if Washington should move the rebel army northward, Howe would “soon 

be after him to relieve you.” On 21 July, a messenger from Burgoyne arrived in New York with the news that Fort Ticonderoga 

had been captured and the Army from Canada was building a road 

toward Fort Edward. 

Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton, Howe’s deputy and commander 

of British troops in New York City, had arrived back at New York 

from England on 5 July. He immediately petitioned Howe to move 

north and support Burgoyne’s advance—then repeated the request 

over the next two weeks. When the messenger arrived on the 21st 

with Burgoyne’s report, Clinton became more convinced than ever 

that Burgoyne’s foray needed to be supported by Howe’s command. 

That day Clinton made the argument directly to Howe, who disagreed. The Commander-in-Chief simply disregarded his subordinate’s recommendation. Two days later, Howe boarded a ship in 

New York Harbor (his whole command had previously embarked) 

and sailed for Chesapeake Bay and, ultimately, Philadelphia. 

Arriving at Fort Edward, Burgoyne paused to assemble and rest 

his Army from Canada in preparation for the operation’s next phase. 

He also determined that he needed to reduce his reliance on supplies 

coming from Canada, especially food stocks. The farther south he 

went, the longer his line of communications stretched. He needed to 

carry as much ammunition, powder, and other purely military supplies as possible. He knew it was only a matter of time before the 

Americans would stand and fight. The less food he had to haul, the 

more other supplies he could bring with him. Additionally, just feed-
180

ing his troops was becoming problematic. Patrols around the Batten 

Kill reported the rebels had left the area bare of any useful supplies, 

especially food. 

Earlier when the army had been concentrated in the Skenesborough area, Riedesel asked Burgoyne if he could conduct small 

raids to the east in Vermont to forage for food, and more importantly, 

secure badly needed horses for his dragoons. Though Burgoyne rejected the request during the previous visit, he reconsidered the concept upon returning to Fort Edward. Given the worsening logistics 

situation, he planned for a more ambitious effort.

In the first week of August, Burgoyne planned for a sizable raiding party to travel east from the Batten Kill area through Manchester 

to Rockingham in Vermont. From there, the column would descend 

the Connecticut River to Battleboro, then turn west again toward 

Albany and reconsolidate with Burgoyne’s army. The mission was 

to test the “affections of the country, to disconcert the councils of 

the enemy, to mount Riedesel’s dragoons, to complete Peter’s corps, 

and to obtain large supplies of cattle, horses, and carriages.”1 In addition to animals, wagons, and food, Burgoyne wanted to see if the 

country harbored loyalists who would enlist and help increase the 

numerical strength in Lt. Col. John Peters’ Queen’s Loyal Rangers 

Battalion. 

Though he originally proposed such a mission, Riedesel was 

not enthusiastic about the new plan given its much larger scale and 

broader objectives. Moreover, a number of British officers believed 

it was foolish to entrust the mission to Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum of 

the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig. Baum spoke 

no English, did not understand the Vermont culture, and was not familiar with the country in the Grants. Nevertheless, Baum departed 

Fort Edward on 9 August with almost 500 Braunschweigers, Canadians, and Iroquois warriors as well as two small 3-pounder cannon 

from the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery. His contingent arrived at 

Fort Miller later that day.

In the interim, Burgoyne received intelligence that the rebels 

had assembled a large food depot at Bennington, Vermont. Responding to the news, the British commander mounted his horse on 

the morning of the 10th and rode to Fort Miller to confer with Baum. 
181

There he directed him to head to Bennington and the reported depot. 

Baum led his column out of Fort Miller about noon on 11 August 

1777 bound for Bennington. 

Vignette 1: Colonel Specht recorded his impressions of Fort 

Miller:

The so-called Fort Miller lies on that side of the river and 

had once consisted of two other buildings: a blockhouse, 

surrounded by palisades and a magazine. Some time ago, 

it served as a depot for victuals and war necessities when 

the Forts Edward and George had to be occupied by English Detachments to preserve these parts against an attack 

by the Savages. These forts have not been occupied for a 

long time. This post has gone almost completely to ruin 

and hardly any traces of its previous palisades can be seen. 

Vignette 2: After Howe sailed toward the Chesapeake, a disgusted Clinton expressed his views in a letter to his friend Lord 

Hugh Percy:

I fear it bears heavy on Burgoyne. If this campaign does 

not finish the war, I prophesy that there is an end of British 

domination in America. (Michael O. Logusz, With Musket 

& Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness 

War of 1777, Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 160.)

Vignette 3: In a report to Germain referencing the battle at 

Bennington, Burgoyne explained his actions and rationale for the 

expedition:

It was soon found that in the situation of the transport-service at that time, the army could barely be victualed from 

day to day, and that there was no prospect of establishing 

a magazine in due time for pursuing present advantages. 

The idea of the expedition to Bennington originated upon 

this difficulty, combined with the intelligence report by 

General Riedesal, and with all I had otherwise received. I 

knew that Bennington was the great deposit of corn, flour, 

and store cattle, that it was only guarded by militia, and 
182

every day’s account tended to confirm the persuasion of 

the loyalty of one description of inhabitants and the panic 

of the other. Those who knew the country best were the 

most sanguine in this persuasion. The German troops employed were of the best I had of that nation. The number 

of British was small, but it was the select light corps of the 

army, composed of chosen men from all the regiments, 

and commanded by Captain Fraser, one of the most distinguished officers in his line of service that I ever met with. 

(Henry B. Carrington, Battles of the American Revolution. 1775–1781. Historical and Military Criticism, with 

Topographical Illustration, New York: A.S. Barnes, 1876, 

328.)

Analysis

None (Analysis items that could be addressed here are covered 

in other locations).

Note: As stated earlier, it is difficult to conduct an analysis at 

drive-by stands, especially if the participants are on a full bus or 

multiple vehicles (one van is doable). You may wish to consider 

holding the analysis questions until arrival at the next stand. Conduct the analysis of the drive-by stand there before doing the next 

on-the-ground stand.
183

Day 1, Stand 8 The Battle of Bennington (Events between 11 

and 16 August 1777)

Directions: Head south on US-4 West for 0.8 mile. Turn left 

onto Bald Mountain Road/NY-77 South and travel four miles to 

junction with NY-40 South. Turn right onto NY-40 South. Travel 

0.5 miles to traffic circle in Middle Falls and head east on NY-29 

East from traffic circle 1.5 miles to junction with NY-372 East in 

Greenwich (NY-29 East becomes NY-372 in Greenwich). Travel 

southeast on NY-372 East for nine miles to the junction with NY22 South in Cambridge. Turn right onto NY-22 South/South Park 

Street in Cambridge and travel 7.8 miles to North Hoosick. At 

North Hoosick, continue east on NY-67 East (NY-22 South turns 

to the right). Travel east on NY-67 East for 2.2 miles. Follow the 

signs to Bennington Battlefield and turn left onto the park access 

7

Bennington

Battlefield State 

Historic Site

Fort MillerHudson River

North Hoosick

40

77

Route to Bennington 

Stand 8

N

4

8

40

29

29

372

22

22

67

67

Middle Falls

Greenwich

Cambridge

Map 16. Day 1 Route to Stand 8.
184

road. Continue up this road to the parking lot. Walk uphill to the 

area near the flagpole. 

Note 1: At the top of the hill above the parking lot, adjacent to 

the flagpole, is a raised block platform on which a bronze map of 

the battlefield and the surrounding terrain is located. This is an ideal 

location to conduct the initial stand. The platform map may also be 

used as a visual for orientation and briefing purposes.

Orientation: You are standing on what would have been about 

the center of the defenses that Lieutenant Colonel Baum’s Braunschweigers occupied on the morning of 16 August 1777 (see map 

40, Appendix J, Battle of Bennington, Baum’s Heights 16 August 

1777). To the open field in the north was the Dragoon Redoubt. To 

the southeast about eight miles is the town of Bennington, Baum’s 

initial objective. Stark’s militia camp was located along the Walloomsac River between here and Bennington. Just down the hill to 

the southeast is the Walloomsac River, the bridge, and the Tory ReBennington

Battlefield Park

Entrance

Baum’s

Heights

Battle of Bennington 

Stand 8

N

Gravel

Parking Area

Tory

Redoubt

Breymann

Marker Gravel

Parking Area

Cottrell Road

8A

8B

8C

67

Map 17. Day 1 Stand 8.
185

doubt. To the west were the crossroads of Sancoick (now known as 

North Hoosick) through which Baum’s command moved to reach 

this location. The vegetation here is somewhat thicker than in 1777. 

Given the farmsteads in the area at the time, the secondary growth 

beneath the tree canopy would have been thinned somewhat by 

grazing farm animals, etc.

Note 2: If time permits, this stand is best conducted at three 

separate locations: Baum’s Heights, the Tory Redoubt, and Breymann’s Defeat. Otherwise, the entire stand can be conducted from 

Baum’s Heights.

Day 1, Sub-stand 8A Baum’s Heights

Description: On 18 July 1777, John Stark, formerly a colonel 

in the Continental Army, was commissioned a brigadier general in 

the New Hampshire militia. Earlier in the war, Stark had served admirably at Bunker Hill, Trenton, and Princeton, but Congress had 

not seen fit to promote him to brigadier general the previous March. 

Several other officers whom Stark viewed as less capable were promoted over him, so he soon resigned from United States service 

and was now in the service of his home state. Between the time he 

received his commission and the end of July (remarkably, less than 

two weeks), Stark raised a 1,500-man brigade of New Hampshire 

militia to serve against Burgoyne. The New Hampshire legislature 

exempted Stark and his command from orders issued by anyone other than that governing body. Stark was to act independently against 

Burgoyne to protect the state, its people, and their interests; and that 

suited John Stark fine.

By the end of July, Stark had concentrated his brigade at 

Charlestown, New Hampshire. He sent half of his brigade—about 

700 men—on a forty-five-mile march west to Manchester, Vermont. 

The first contingent departed on 2 August and the remainder followed over the next several days. At Manchester, they were to link 

up with Seth Warner’s Continental Regiment, which now consisted 

of only 140 men. After splitting up and retreating from Hubbardton, 

Warner’s men travelled in small groups to Manchester, where the 
186

colonel had ordered them to assemble. Though there were undoubtedly some deserters, the majority of the men who survived the battle at Hubbardton showed up in Manchester as ordered. They were 

rested, fed, and otherwise prepared for the next mission. Having 

collected most of his regiment, Warner was ready to lead them into 

action when Stark’s men began to arrive. 

Unknown to Stark or Warner, Brig. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln was 

also en route to Manchester to take control of all Continental and militia 

units in the Vermont and New Hampshire areas. Washington had sent 

Lincoln, who hailed from Massachusetts, to assist Schuyler. A New 

Yorker and an antagonist to New Englanders regarding the struggle 

over the Grants (i.e., Vermont) between New York and New Hampshire, Schuyler was an unpopular commander in that region. Some 

felt that as a fellow New Englander, Lincoln would hold more sway 

Bennington

Battlefield Park

Entrance

Restrooms

Battle of Bennington 

Stand 8A

N

Parking Area

Caretaker 

Road

8A

67

Picnic

Area

Dragoon

Redoubt

Map 18. Day 1 Stand 8A.
187

over the northeast militiamen. When Lincoln arrived at Manchester on 

8 August, he immediately informed Warner and Stark’s deputy commander that he was now in charge and began issuing orders to march 

the men assembled there to join Schuyler at Stillwater. 

That same day, Stark arrived to find his command lined up and 

prepared to move. When he discovered why, Stark brusquely informed Lincoln that his men were under his orders and that neither 

he nor they worked for the Continental Army. Stark then directed 

his command to march for Bennington and asked Warner to join 

him there when his Continentals were prepared to move. Lincoln 

diplomatically deferred to Stark then returned as rapidly as possible 

to inform Schuyler about the turn of events. Rather than challenge 

Stark, Schuyler instructed Lincoln to return to Vermont with a 500-

man brigade, gather Warner’s regiment, and make plans to attack 

Burgoyne’s supply line at Skenesborough. Although that plan would 

not be put into effect until sometime later, the concept was the genesis of the later Pawlet Expedition. When Stark arrived at Bennington 

the following day, he found that additional militia units had already 

arrived and others were en route. Though he was not yet aware of it, 

Baum’s expedition was among those on their way.

After departing Fort Miller on 11 August, Baum’s movement 

toward Bennington experienced little resistance. On the 12th, his 

advance guard skirmished with some rebel militia near Cambridge 

and captured about 150 head of cattle and 1,000 bushels of wheat 

which Baum sent back to Fort Edward. Baum also captured several 

prisoners who informed him that between 1,000 and 1,800 militiamen were at Bennington guarding the depot. Baum was further assured that the rebel forces planned to retreat, assuming that his column advanced that far. Despite the large number of enemy reported, 

Baum chose to move forward.

Stark received word the following day—probably from the 

Cambridge militia—that Baum’s column was en route to Bennington. Stark wisely sent a 200-man reconnaissance force under Lt. Col. 

William Gregg forward to make contact with Baum. Gregg moved 

to a bridge which crossed the Owl Kill at a place called Sancoick’s 

Mill (now named North Hoosick) about three miles west of where 

the impending battle would take place. There his troops made camp 
188

to await developments. Baum’s column approached the mill about 

0800 the morning of 14 August. Dressed in fringed hunting shirts and 

taking cover in the trees flanking the road, Gregg’s men fired a volley 

and began to withdraw eastward toward Bennington. Before escaping across the Owl Kill, Gregg’s men heavily damaged the bridge, 

failing to destroy it as they intended. Stopping to repair the bridge, 

Baum sent Burgoyne a message relaying the events and estimates of 

rebel troop numbers, as well as a request for reinforcements. 

An hour or so after the skirmish at Sancoick, Stark received 

word of the action. He assembled his command and prepared to 

move west from camp. Before departing, he sent a messenger with 

a note to urge Warner to move his men forward at once. He then put 

his men on the road toward Sancoick. 

Once the bridge over the Owl Kill was repaired, Baum’s force 

continued forward. Stark’s and Baum’s columns were now on a collision course. As Stark approached the bridge over the Walloomsac 

east of Sancoick, he saw Baum’s column in the distance. They had 

almost arrived at the crossing. At about the same time, Baum spied 

Stark’s command and received intelligence that the rebel forces at 

Bennington were expecting additional reinforcements at any moment. Noticing a hill on the north side of the road that dominated 

the eastern approach to the Walloomsac Bridge, Baum wisely began 

to deploy his forces into defensive positions there—knowing that 

his command now faced a significantly superior force in numbers, if 

not in quality. Observing Baum moving into position, Stark opted to 

withdraw to his camp and develop a plan of attack. 

The remainder of 14 August and into the 15th, Baum’s men 

prepared a number of defensive positions on the high ground overlooking the Walloomsac Bridge and on the far side of the river. He 

placed his headquarters on top of the hill, with a commanding view 

toward Bennington. Baum positioned the dismounted dragoons of 

the Regiment von Ludwig generally to the north of his headquarters, where they built a fortified redoubt. On the left end of the dragoons, Capt. Alexander Fraser’s Company of Marksmen extended 

the position to the southwest a short distance. Down the slope to 

the southeast, the soldiers placed two 3-pounder cannon on a small 

shelf overlooking the bridge and established another redoubt on the 
189

near side of the bridge (note: one of the 3-pounders was later moved 

up to the Dragoon Redoubt on the morning of 16 August). These 

positions were protected by about 60 German grenadiers and British 

light infantrymen. The “Tory Redoubt” (as it became known) across 

the river was manned by about 250 men of the Queen’s Loyal Rangers and other local loyalists under Lt. Col. John Peters and Lt. Col. 

Francis Pfister, respectively. Behind them, a small detachment of 

Canadian militia was clustered in a collection of three or four cabins near the bridge—positioned to support the redoubt and defend 

the crossing itself. The small collection of Indians made their camp 

on the hill to the west of Baum’s headquarters but still relatively 

close. Inexplicably, despite being substantially outnumbered and 

concerned enough about rebel intentions to request reinforcements 

from Burgoyne, Baum failed to post any skirmishers or outposts to 

help protect the main position. 

August 15th was a miserably wet day, so little action took place 

on either side other than the efforts of American patrols to feel out 

the enemy positions on the hill and snipe at Baum’s Indian contingent (at which they had some success). On the hill, Baum possessed 

nearly 800 men to hold his position until reinforcements arrived. In 

theory, he would not have to wait too long since shortly after receiving Baum’s request, Burgoyne had dispatched a Reserve Corps detachment of more than 700 men under Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann. 

The problem was that the rainy day slowed Breymann’s column to a 

crawl. In dry conditions, he could have marched to Baum’s location 

in one day. As events transpired, Breymann was still seven miles 

from Cambridge when he stopped for the night on 15 August, and 

he would not arrive at Baum’s location until late the following day. 

While Breymann’s men struggled along the muddy road from 

Fort Miller, Seth Warner’s Continentals were making a similar difficult trek from Manchester to Bennington. Warner himself had ridden ahead to learn the situation at Stark’s location and better understand how to best employ his regiment on its arrival. The regiment, 

marching under the direction of Maj. Samuel Safford, would not 

arrive at the town of Bennington until shortly before midnight—wet 

and exhausted. 

Throughout the day, Baum’s men made leisurely progress 
190

developing their defenses in the rain. In addition to failing to put 

out guards, Baum allowed a number of “civilians” to pass though 

his area during the day. At least one of them wandered unescorted through Baum’s positions on the hill. Some of these seemingly 

harmless non-combatants were from Stark’s command. It is highly 

likely that some of the civilians who passed through the German 

positions also sent their observations to Stark. 

Stark also used the 15th to prepare a plan for engaging the 

enemy force. The plan itself, finalized on the morning of 16 August, called for a complex attack. Even experienced soldiers would 

find the complicated maneuvers difficult to execute—much more 

than would normally be expected of the amateur militiamen under 

Stark’s command. Stark’s concept called for a double envelopment 

of Baum’s main positions on the hill. One 300-man column under 

Lt. Col. Moses Nichols was to circle east and north of the hill to attack Baum’s redoubt from the north. The second equally sized column under Col. Samuel Herrick was to circle south and west and 

attack from the west. Two smaller elements under Colonels Thomas Stickney and David Hobar were to attack due west through the 

Tory Redoubt to seize the bridge on the Walloomsac River. Once 

the main position was fixed in place and the bridge in Patriot hands, 

Stark would conduct a frontal assault to attack the hill from the east 

and south, personally leading the remaining 1,200 militiamen. 

Unlike the day before, the morning of 16 August dawned bright 

and sunny. Since Stark’s troops would execute this operation in daylight, the three columns worked much of the day to prepare. About 

1100, the columns began to stealthily move into position for the 

attack. Once in position, the troops of the three columns went to 

ground. By pure luck, all three assaults began about 1500. Nichols’s 

men in the north and Herrick’s men from the west stood up, advanced a number of paces until the Dragoon Redoubt was in view, 

and let loose aimed volleys. From there, they advanced using trees 

and boulders for protection, loading and firing independently. The 

dragoons and nearby Indians dropped steadily under the assault. 

Within about twenty minutes of fighting, the Americans were in the 

redoubt and the Germans were fleeing south. Some surviving Indians somehow made their way between the two American assault 
191

lines, and the remainder soon disappeared from the fight altogether.

Day 1, Sub-stand 8B Tory Redoubt

Directions: From the parking lot on Baum’s Heights, return 

downhill to NY-67. Turn left (east) on NY-67 East and proceed 

about 100 yards then turn right on Caretaker Road. Proceed about 

100 yards on Caretaker Road and turn right (south) on Cottrell Road. 

Proceed about 300 yards south on Cottrell Road until you approach 

a “Y” junction. Veer to the left onto the gravel road and drive another 300 yards to a small gravel parking area on the left. Park there. 

Orientation: The open field to the north and northwest is the approximate location of the Tory Redoubt, which was little more than 

a dirt embankment hurriedly thrown up toward the east and southeast. Also to the northwest is Baum’s Heights and the Walloomsac 

River Bridge. The cabins defended by the Canadians were located in 

the area around the bridge on both sides of the river. Due east is the 

town of Bennington and a bend southward of the Walloomsac River. 

It was generally along that bend where Stark’s militia units camped 

before the battle.

Description: Once the other rebels heard the initiation of Nichols’s and Herrick’s attacks, Stickney and Hobar ordered their men to 

advance toward the Tory Redoubt. The Americans plunged forward 

downhill into a gully and proceeded up the far side. As the rebels 

emerged, both sides seemed surprised at how close they were to 

each other. As at the Dragoon Redoubt, the attack carried the militiamen forward and over the rampart. Within minutes both sides were 

engaged in close-quarters fighting. The Tories quickly lost their 

nerve once the rebels were among them and soon broke headlong 

for the bridge. The pursuing Americans chased the loyalists over the 

river, drove out the Canadians, and captured the bridge itself. 

About the time the Tory Redoubt fell, Stark and his remaining 

1,200 men launched their final attack against Baum’s position on 

the hill. Baum’s dragoons, now collected around the headquarters, 

and an assortment of others from the command, stood their ground 
192

against this onslaught for a time until they began to run low on ammunition. With the steady advance of Nichols and Herricks from the 

north, and now Stark’s new attack coming in from the east, however, 

Baum was forced to grab his remaining men and fight his way off 

the high ground in a southwesterly direction. Reaching a meadow 

located between the hill and the Walloomsac, Baum and his men 

started through the open field heading west but were almost immediately fired on by the rebels in pursuit and others advancing from 

the east down the road. Out in the open, Baum was struck in the 

abdomen and went down. His injury took all the fight out of his dragoons. The remaining Braunschweigers joined the long line of other 

Germans, Britons, Canadians, and Tories who had been swept up as 

prisoners of war during the rout.

Day 1, Sub-Stand 8C Breymann’s Defeat

Directions: From the parking area at the Tory Redoubt, return 

by the same route to NY-67. Turn right (west) on NY-67 West. Proceed 1.2 miles to the junction of NY-67 and Cottrell Road in North 

Hoosick, New York. Turn left (south) onto Cottrell Road and park 

near the Breymann Monument.

Orientation: This is where the major fighting took place between 

Breymann’s relief column and Warner and Stark’s troops late the afternoon and evening of 16 August (see map 41, Appendix J, Battle 

of Bennington, Breymann’s Defeat 16 August 1777). The monument 

marks the farthest advance of Breymann’s column. To the east two 

miles is Baum Heights. To the northwest about twenty-four miles is 

Fort Miller. Due west about twenty-five miles is Bemis Heights.

Description: On the morning of 16 August, Breymann’s column was still at least 18 miles from Baum’s location. Marching all 

day on muddy but slowly drying roads, Breymann finally reached 

the repaired bridge at Sancoick’s Mill about 1700. There he met 

Phillip Skene, who informed Breymann about reports that a disaster 

had befallen Baum’s command. Breymann weighed the information 

and decided to proceed across Owl Kill to assist Baum. Within a 

minute or two, the head of the column came under fire (at this loca-
193

tion) from a small rebel force that had taken up positions behind a 

rail fence ahead. These men from Herrick’s command had been pursuing Baum’s refugees and moving to secure the bridge on Owl Kill. 

Seeing the fresh column of German regulars, Herrick’s men began 

skirmishing to slow its movement while messengers raced east to 

inform Stark of the new menace. 

During the initial volleys, Breymann’s horse was killed, although the German commander himself was unharmed. He quickly brought forward his two 6-pounders, which opened a brisk fire 

against the rebel skirmishers. Seeing they were outnumbered, Herrick’s men fell back toward the main battlefield. Meanwhile, one of 

Herrick’s messengers found Stark as he tried to identify the cause 

of the new firing to his west. Shocked at the news of another major 

German force approaching, Stark scrambled to assemble his scattered units. Some of his men had been consuming whiskey and other 

spirits that day. Many were now scattered through the woods rifling 

through discarded enemy equipment and captured baggage wagons. 

Others were tending to the wounded, guarding prisoners, or simply 

resting in the woods savoring what they believed to be a great victory. All of that was now in jeopardy unless Stark could pull enough 

of them together to oppose Breymann’s advance. 

Luckily for Stark, Warner’s Continentals were approaching the 

scene. Unbeknownst to both Stark and Warner (who was nearby), 

a mounted Massachusetts dragoon troop under Maj. John Rand, a 

former and elderly British Army officer, was about to arrive. Warner 

recommended that Stark gather as many men as he could and form 

a skirmish line to check the German advance on the road. Encountering Rand, Warner directed the major to add his troop’s weight to 

the effort. As fast as Stark could find men, he sent them running to 

reinforce the skirmish line. Little by little the American line strengthened, and its fire increased. Apparently one of Rand’s men succeeded 

in shooting Breymann in the leg. Determined he would press forward, however, Breymann sent a detachment of Light Infantry under 

Maj. Ferdinand von Barner to turn Stark’s right flank.

As Barner moved to Stark’s flank, Warner dispatched part of 

his Continentals to counter that move while the remainder went to 

bolster Stark’s line. Soon, Barner was shot in the head and killed, 
194

causing his troops to break apart. As dark closed in, Breymann’s 

troops began running low on ammunition so the German commander ordered a fighting retreat. The rebels pursued for a time, 

but Breymann escaped successfully. In the short battle, however, 

Breymann’s command suffered 160 men killed and captured. Additionally, all his cannon and part of his wagon train were captured. 

Burgoyne’s losses sustained at Bennington were irrecoverable. 

There was no way he could make up the loss of German forces in 

the Bennington expedition. Compounding this significant loss in 

military manpower and equipment, Baum’s troops collected few 

supplies, horses, or foodstuffs, which was the primary purpose for 

conducting the expedition to begin with. Despite stiff encounters 

with the Americans at Fort Anne and Hubbardton, Burgoyne and his 

commanders still had supreme confidence in their soldiers’ ability 

to defeat what they still believed to be a rag-tag mob of militiamen. 

Initially, there was some truth to this opinion. After Bennington, 

they needed to reconsider, especially in light of their growing logistical problems and the fact that thus far even when the British did 

win on the battlefield, they won only pyrrhic victories. 

Vignette: Bennington caused Burgoyne to question the campaign’s progress and perhaps begin to shift blame for its outcome. 

Shortly after the battle he wrote to Lord Germain:

Had I a latitude in my orders, I should think it my duty 

to wait in this position, or perhaps as far back as Fort 

Edward, where my communications with Lake George 

would be perfectly secure, till some event happened to assist my movement forward; but my orders being positive 

to “force a junction with Sir William Howe,” I apprehend 

I am not at liberty to remain inactive longer than shall 

be necessary to collect twenty-five day’s provision, and 

to receive the reinforcement of the additional companies, 

the German drafts and recruits now (and unfortunately 

only now) on Lake Champlain. The awaiting of the arrival of this reinforcement is of indispensible [sic] necessity, because from the hour I pass the Hudson’s River 
195

and proceed toward Albany, all safety of communication 

ceases. I must expect a large body of the enemy from my 

left will take post behind me. (William Digby, The British Invasion from the North: The Campaigns of Generals 

Carleton and Burgoyne, 1887 Reprint, London: Forgotten Books, 2013. 25–26.)

Analysis 

Additionally, the German columns lost four brass field pieces: 

two 3-pounders and two 6-pounders.

1. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s decision to conduct 

the Bennington expedition? How did it fit into his overall operational 

design? Though in hindsight it failed, was Burgoyne right to order the 

expedition? Was it the best course of action to help his overall plan?

2. What is your assessment of Baum’s leadership?

3. What is your assessment of Baum’s defense plan? Was there 

a better way to conduct the defense of this area?

4. What is your assessment of Stark’s actions on 14–15 August?

5. What is your assessment of Stark’s plan for 16 August?

6. How did the terrain affect Stark’s plan?

7. How did leadership play either a positive or negative role in 

the American actions? The German actions?

8. What is your assessment of Breymann’s leadership in this 

action?

9. Why do you think this expedition was not more successful 

in rallying loyalist support to the crown’s efforts? What lessons can 

we learn today about assessing the opinions and motivations of the 

local populace? What are some of the difficulties in understanding 

human terrain in which an army campaigns?

10. What do you see as the significance of this battle?

11. What do you see as the impacts of this battle on the Army 

from Canada’s operational situation? The Northern Army’s situation?

This stand ends the Day 1 portion of the Saratoga Campaign 
196

Staff Ride. 

Figure 11. Battle of Bennington Casualties.

Estimated Casualties

from Siege of Fort Schuyler

Killed 207 30

Wounded 40

Captured 7001 -

Total 907 70

British American

Notes:

1. Includes wounded.
197

Day 2 Siege of Fort Schuyler to Surrender at Saratoga

Stand 9, Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany 

(Offsite Stand)

Stand 10, Pawlet Expedition (Offsite Stand)

Stand 11, Northern Army Positions at Bemis Heights

Stand 12, First Battle of Saratoga-Freeman’s Farm

Sub-stand 12A, The Advance

Sub-stand 12B, The Opening Fight

Sub-stand 12C, American Reinforcements Arrive

Sub-stand 12D, Advance and Retreat

Sub-stand 12E, Riedesel Saves the Day

Sub-stand 12F, The Results and Cost

Stand 13, Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands Campaign

Stand 14, Leadership Friction in the Northern Army

Stand 15, Second Battle of Saratoga-Barber’s Wheatfield

Stand 16, Second Battle of Saratoga-Balcarres Redoubt

Stand 17, Second Battle of Saratoga-Breymann Redoubt

Stand 18, The British Retreat, Surrender, & Impact of Saratoga

Park 

Entrance

32

Stand 18

Located at

Stillwater

9

18

10

11

12 13

14

15

16

17

Middle

Ravine

Route Map

Day 2

Stands 9–18

N

Main Park 

Road is 

One Way

32

4

Park HQ &

Visitors’

Center

Map 19. Day 2 Overview.
198

Day 2, Stand 9 Siege of Fort Schuyler and the Battle of Oriskany 

(Offsite) (Events between 24 June and 23 August 1777)

Directions: Stand 9 is conducted offsite rather than at Fort 

Schuyler or the Oriskany Battlefield. The stand may be done the evening of day 1 at the hotel or can be covered at the hotel on the morning of day 2. A third option is to conduct the stand at the Saratoga 

National Historical Park somewhere near the Visitors’ Center (see 

directions to Saratoga National Historical Park at Stand 11).

Orientation: The use of handout maps showing the operational 

areas around Fort Schuyler, the Mohawk River Valley, and the Oriskany Battlefield is recommended to orient participants (see map 38, 

Appendix J, Siege of Fort Schuyler 2–23 August 1777, and map 39, 

Appendix J, Battle of Oriskany 6 August 1777). 

Description: British Gen. John Stanwix built Fort Schuyler 

(known during the French and Indian War and today as Fort Stanwix) in 1758 at what is the present-day city of Rome, New York. 

The fort was built to guard the Oneida Carrying Place, a portage that 

connected Lake Ontario and Wood Creek with the Mohawk River. 

The portage was a trade and commerce crossroads between the Hudson River Valley and the Great Lakes region, making it a strategically important position. 

After years of neglect, Fort Stanwix was reoccupied in July 

1776 by the 3rd New Jersey Regiment, Continental Army, under Col. 

Elias Dayton. Dayton renamed the post as Fort Schuyler in honor of 

Gen. Philip Schuyler, the commander of the Northern Department. 

On 17 April 1777, Schuyler ordered Col. Peter Gansevoort to take 

command of the fort from Dayton. Gansevoort’s 3rd New York, also 

a Continental regiment, arrived piecemeal between 3 and 10 May. 

In addition to the 3rd New York, Gansevoort had several small detachments of Massachusetts Continentals as well as 2nd Continental 

Artillery troops who manned the fort’s cannon. Rounding out the 

garrison of about 750 troops was a handful of Oneida Indians who 

had pledged their service to the Patriot cause. The garrison’s mis-
199

sion was to prevent enemy incursions into the Mohawk River Valley 

and protect the Hudson River Valley. 

The Mohawk River Valley played an important role in Burgoyne’s plan to capture Albany. The Army from Canada commander had entrusted Brig. Barry St. Leger with the mission to move 

through Lake Ontario and Wood Creek to seize Fort Schuyler from 

the rebels. From there, St. Leger was to advance down the Mohawk 

to the Hudson and link up with Burgoyne in the Albany area. The 

Mohawk Expedition consisted of about 750 regulars and militia

from St. Leger’s 34th Regiment of Foot, the Kings Regiment of New 

York (a loyalist militia unit), a German jäger company, a company 

from the 8th Regiment of Foot, a Royal Artillery mortar company, 

Butler’s Ranger Company, the Quebec Canadian Militia Company, 

and about 800 Iroquois Indians largely under Chief Thayendanagea 

(Joseph Brant) (see Appendix D, Order of Battle, Fort Schuyler and 

the Battle of Oriskany). All told, St. Leger possessed about 1,700 

Fort Schyler & Oriskany

Stand 9

Pawlet Expedition

Stand 10

Parking Area

Turn-off to

Freeman’s Farm 

Overlook

9

10

N

Park Tour Stop #1

Freeman’s Farm Overlook

Map 20. Day 2 Stands 9 and 10.
200

troops of various types. As with Burgoyne, St. Leger hoped that loyalists flocking to the king’s colors would add to his numbers advancing toward Albany.

Well before St. Leger departed on his mission, the threat of 

Indian attack against the valley’s American residents increased dramatically. Actual physical attacks in the Fort Schuyler area increased 

in June and July—with vicious attacks against soldiers and family 

members taking place on 25 June, 3 July, and 27 July. The brutal 

nature of Indian warfare frequently involved grossly mutilating at 

least one victim. When attacking a small group, the Indians often 

allowed at least one person to escape so he or she could relate the 

horror to the troops in the fort. It was a kind of psychological warfare intended to demoralize garrison troops and weaken their will to 

fight. As often as not, the reports only served to enrage the soldiers, 

who vowed to take vengeance on the Indians at every opportunity. 

This form of terror attack climaxed with the infamous murder of 

Jane McCrae near Fort Edward on 27 July 1777. The incident, which 

involved the killing and scalping of a loyalist officer’s fiancée, bolstered American claims that the Indians were not warriors serving 

a cause but only bloodthirsty savages who cared little for who they 

killed or robbed. Combined with Burgoyne’s earlier threats about using 

his Indians against those who opposed the king, the actions inflamed 

Americans everywhere and drove many fence sitters to the rebel cause. 

Killings around Fort Schuyler prompted Gansevoort to order 

the garrison’s family members to move back to Fort Dayton. Additionally, repeated Indian attacks caused a number of soldiers to 

desert their posts. To prevent further desertions, Gansevoort withdrew the garrison’s pickets within the confines of the fort. Frustrated 

by his dwindling numbers, the post commander mustered his entire 

force and had the garrison pass by a mutilated body single file to see 

firsthand what the Indians were doing to those they captured. Gansevoort’s extreme measure to embolden his soldier’s courage seems 

to have worked as desertions dramatically slowed afterward.

On 24 June, St. Leger’s expedition departed Montreal and moved 

up the St. Lawrence River. Before departing, the expedition commander 

received positive but decidedly incorrect intelligence that Fort Schuyler was held by only about sixty troops. Sailing through Lake Ontario, 
201

the expedition arrived at Oswego, New York, one month later. Moving 

down Wood Creek, St. Leger’s command encountered the same type 

of obstacles that Burgoyne’s troops had faced on the Fort Anne-Fort 

Edward Road. Rebels had felled large trees over Wood Creek, significantly delaying the advance and slowing the movement of St. Leger’s 

artillery in particular. Moving on foot, infantry elements of Schuyler’s 

command arrived before Fort Schuyler on 3 August. By now, St. Leger 

learned that Fort Schuyler was more strongly held than he was led to 

believe. Prior to beginning a siege of the fort, he sent a note to Gansevoort under flag of truce demanding that the rebel commander surrender the fort. Gansevoort refused. 

That same day, St. Leger received word that additional rebel 

troops were en route to Fort Schuyler. On hearing reports that the 

British intended to attack Fort Schuyler, General Schuyler had ordered Brig. Gen. Nicolas Herkimer of the Tryon County militia to reinforce Gansevoort. Herkimer mustered about 800 men at Fort Dayton and departed for Fort Schuyler on 4 August. As he neared Fort 

Schuyler on the night of 5 August, Herkimer sent word to the fort 

commander that if St. Leger’s men attacked Herkimer’s column as it 

approached the fort, Gansevoort should launch a sortie to help fight 

off the British attack. Further, Herkimer requested that Gansevoort 

fire three rounds of artillery as Herkimer’s command approached the 

fort as a signal that Gansevoort received the message and agreed to 

cooperate in the plan to turn the tables on St. Leger. 

However, the British commander initially got the upper hand. 

After learning about the reinforcing column, St. Leger sent Colonel 

Johnson’s Kings Regiment, Butler’s Ranger Company, the German 

jäger company, and about 400 Iroquois under Joseph Brant to attack 

Herkimer’s militiamen. Selecting an excellent ambush site along a 

deep ravine with steep banks, the British forces lay in wait. The 

light infantry troops and Tories positioned to attack the head of the 

column and flanks while the Indians were supposed to strike the 

remainder and rear guard.

On the morning of 6 August, the Tryon Count militia continued its march toward the fort. Herkimer’s column of four battalion 

groups stretching almost 2 miles from head to tail, passed near the 

Indian village of Oriskany as it slowly headed east along the mili-
202

tary road. The military road, approximately 16 feet wide and corduroyed in spots, followed the natural flow of the terrain over ridges 

and through high-walled ravines. Thick woods on either side of the 

road were choked with vines and deadfall, providing ideal hiding 

positions for an ambush force. Conversely the brush would be a 

substantial obstacle for a force trying to break out of an ambush. 

Nearing the fort, Herkimer halted the column. He had not yet 

heard the signal and wanted to wait. His subordinate commanders 

(some of whom did not trust Herkimer) disagreed and wanted to 

continue the march. After a heated debate during which some officers accused Herkimer of being a secret Tory, the militia commander 

reluctantly resumed the movement. About 6 miles from the fort, the 

column entered the ravine around 1000. The head of the column was 

about to exit the far end of the ravine when the Indians at the east 

end of the ambush prematurely opened fire then rushed the troops on 

the road there. The rear guard battalion of about 200 men was still 

well back and outside the ambush zone. Instead of coming forward 

to help their comrades, the rear guard fled the field. 

Meanwhile, the troops in the ravine were caught in a deadly 

crossfire. After the initial surprise, the militiamen fought back with 

a fury borne of desperation. Fighting in pairs, one man loaded while 

the other aimed and fired from trees and any other cover they could 

find. Using the technique, the pockets of surrounded rebels kept up 

a steady volume of fire. Their fire was particularly concentrated on 

the Indians, who took the heaviest casualties on the British side. 

The rebels, of course, suffered far worse. Many who attempted to 

flee were chased down and killed by Mohawk warriors. Down in 

the ravine, Herkimer himself was shot in the leg but continued to 

calmly command his troops while smoking his pipe. After a drenching cloudburst that wet gunpowder and thus slowed the rate of fire, 

a small detachment of British troops reversed their coats to deceive 

the rebels that reinforcements had arrived from the fort. The ruse 

was discovered and readily driven off. 

The fighting at points devolved into hand-to-hand and closequarter battle. The three battalions caught in the trap eventually contracted into small semi-circles to return fire against the attackers. 

The Indians had difficulty penetrating, isolating, and picking off in-
203

dividual targets. As they had at Bennington, the militiamen concentrated much of their fire on the Indians, and several Mohawk chiefs 

were killed or wounded. Believing he had done as much damage as 

was possible, Colonel Johnson, the loyalist commander, decided to 

break contact at about 1500. Realizing that his command was now 

too cut up to proceed, Herkimer ordered the column to return to Fort 

Dayton. There, the Tryon County militia commander died on 16 August due to complications after having his leg amputated.

During the Indian ambush on Herkimer’s force, Gansevoort 

tasked Lt. Col. Marinus Willett, the 3rd New York’s second-incommand, to link up with Herkimer’s force as planned. Willett took 

charge of a mixed force of about 250 New York and Massachusetts 

Continental soldiers and sallied forth from Fort Schuyler at about 

1400. Along the way, however, Willett’s column encountered what 

appeared to be the Indian camp, including the King’s Regiment of 

Loyalists. The camp had been left virtually undefended as those elements had left to help ambush Herkimer at Oriskany. Willett immediately changed missions and raided the encampment. In this essentially unopposed raid, the rebels captured food and other supplies, 

six battle flags, and various written records, including some with 

the names of local loyalists on whom retribution was later meted 

out. After significantly damaging the encampment, Willett’s force 

returned to Fort Schuyler after a brief skirmish with British troops. 

None of the troops under Willett’s command suffered so much as a 

wound.

Word of the raid rapidly made its way to the Indians, who were 

still fighting against Herkimer’s militiamen at Oriskany. Many Indians left the field in the middle of the fight and rushed back to 

their camp, finding it destroyed and thoroughly looted. The Iroquois 

were furious at the British for failing to defend their camp and possessions. The raid, coupled with the loss of some of their chiefs, 

caused Indian morale to plummet. Moreover, they had not agreed 

to participate in siege warfare. A sizable number of Indians left that 

evening, disgusted they had nothing to show for their long trip and 

tribulations. The Indians who stayed—still the majority—vowed to 

take revenge on the rebels. The following day many returned to the 

Oriskany battlefield, where they killed and scalped any remaining 
204

wounded Americans they found. Morever, the Iroquois forced four 

captured rebel officers to run a gauntlet near the fort. These unfortunates were brutally mutilated and beaten to death under the watchful 

eyes of the American garrison. 

The British losses sustained at Oriskany, though relatively light, 

and the departure of part of the Iroquois contingent somewhat lessened St. Leger’s chances to successfully wage a siege against Fort 

Schuyler. Two days later on 8 August, however, St. Leger’s cannon 

finally arrived at the fort. The British commander quickly sent another negotiation party forward that afternoon to demand the fort’s 

surrender, but Gansevoort once again refused. St. Leger opened fire 

on the fort with his artillery and mortars but soon learned they caused 

no visible damage; the earthen walls merely absorbed the impact of 

the rounds. Realizing that his cannon were almost useless against 

the fort, the British general decided to conduct a proper siege. He set 

his men to work digging saps toward the northeast bastion. 

Meanwhile, back in Stillwater, General Schuyler was working 

to arrange relief for Gansevoort. Recognizing the seriousness of his 

situation due to Herkimer’s defeat, Gansevoort dispatched Lieutenant Colonel Willett to give Schuyler a situation report and request 

reinforcements to help break the siege. Even before Willett departed the fort on 6 August, Schuyler dispatched Brig. Gen. Ebenezer 

Learned’s brigade of Massachusetts Continentals to march to Fort 

Schuyler. A week later, he sent General Arnold to take command 

of the Mohawk Valley forces and break the siege. When he reached 

Albany, Arnold encountered Willett, who had been heading for Stillwater. Instead, the two traveled to Fort Dayton while Willett briefed 

Arnold on the happenings at Fort Schuyler during their journey. At 

Fort Dayton, Arnold assumed command of Learned’s Brigade and 

about 100 additional militiamen. 

At this point, the characteristically aggressive Arnold appeared 

to have developed a case of cold feet. With the addition of Gansevoort’s command and Learned’s Brigade, Arnold essentially had 

parity of numbers with St. Leger. Rather than boldly move forward 

to Fort Schuyler’s aid, he sent Willett to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, 

who had by then replaced Schuyler as commander of the Northern 

Department, with a request for an additional 1,000 men. Nothing 

would come of Arnold’s request, but ultimately it mattered little. Ar-
205

nold soon stumbled on a masterful plan involving a superb example 

of culturally centric psychological warfare.

After Arnold arrived at Fort Dayton, rebel militia captured a 

loyalist militiaman near German Flats, New York, and brought him 

to the American commander. Hon Yost Schuyler was mentally deficient, but the Indians believed such people had a special relationship 

to the supernatural and thus put great stock in anything the man said. 

Threatened with execution for traitorous activities, Hon Yost agreed 

to go to St. Leger’s camp and inform the British general that Arnold 

was en route with 2,000 Continentals and artillery to bolster Fort 

Schuyler. Arnold held Yost’s brother Nicholas as a hostage at Fort 

Dayton for insurance. An allied Oneida Indian agreed to follow Yost 

at a respectable time interval and tell the same story, thus reinforcing what Yost was saying. The ruse worked marvelously. Swayed by 

the fact that his Indian allies were convinced of the news, St. Leger 

ordered a retreat to Oswego on 22 August. In the interim, Arnold 

ordered Learned’s Brigade to march for Fort Schuyler then pursue 

the British column after St. Leger had retreated. The chase did not 

catch the British column, however. Arnold and his men arrived at 

Oswego just as St. Leger’s force was sailing away. Still, the threat to 

the Mohawk Valley had been eliminated. 

Vignette 1: The following is an account of Indian torture outside Fort Schuyler prior to St. Leger’s arrival:

Captain Robert Crouse of the [leading] 1st Battalion was 

resented less for his actions than for his intimidating size. 

A truly huge man, Crouse, a year and a half earlier, had 

led General Schuyler’s New Jersey Continentals over the 

ice of the Mohawk to arrest Sir John at Johnson Hall. During the crossing he found the strength to wave a streaming regimental flag in each hand; this remarkable feat was 

now remembered. His tormentors in their anger and spite 

amputated his legs at the knees with hatchets, and having cut him down to ‘human size,’ forced him to walk on 

the bleeding stumps until he collapsed [and later died]. 

Six others, forced to run a gauntlet of assembled Senecas, 

were clubbed to death in full view of the fort. (Richard 
206

Berleth, Bloody Mohawk, The French and Indian War & 

the American revolution on New York’s Frontier, Hensonville, New York: Black Dome Press, 2010, 238).

Vignette 2: Gansevoort refused to meet the two junior officers 

sent to the fort to deliver St. Leger’s second demand to surrender 

Fort Schuyler and its garrison: 

It is with concern we are to acquaint you that this was the 

fatal day in which the succours, which were intended for 

your relief, have been attacked and defeated with great 

loss of numbers killed, wounded and taken prisoners. Our 

sincere advice to you is, if you will avoid inevitable ruin 

and destruction, to surrender the fort you pretend to defend . . . We are sorry to inform you that most of the principal officers are killed, to wit—Gen. Herkimer, Cols. Cox, 

Seeber, Isaac Paris, Captain Graves and many others too 

tedious to mention. The British army from Canada being 

now perhaps before Albany, the possession of which place 

of course includes the conquest of the Mohawk River and 

this fort. (Michael O. Logusz, With Musket & Tomahawk: 

The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777, 

Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 169.)

Vignette 3: A day later, St. Leger sent another contingent of 

officers to appeal for surrender—with an added threat, ostensibly 

with St. Leger’s blessing: 

The Indians were so exceedingly provoked and mortified 

by the losses they have sustained, in the recent actions, 

having had several of their favorite chiefs killed, that they 

threaten—and the Colonel [St. Leger], if the present arrangements should not be entered into, will not be able 

to prevent them from executing their threats—to march 

down the country, and destroy the settlement with its inhabitants. In this case, not only men, but women, and children will experience the sad effects of their vengeance, 

and he could not prevent it. (Michael O. Logusz, With 

Musket & Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the 
207

Wilderness War of 1777, Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 179–80.)

Vignette 4: Lieutenant Colonel Willett delivered Gansevoort’s 

reply to St. Leger: 

Do I understand you, Sir? I think you say, that you come 

from a British colonel, who is commander of the army 

that invests this fort; and by your uniform, you appear to 

be an officer in the British service. You have made a long 

speech on the occasion of your visit, which, stript [sic] 

of its superfluities, amounts to this, that you come from 

a British colonel, to the commandant of this garrison, to 

tell him, that if he does not deliver the garrison into the 

hands of your Colonel, he will send his Indians to murder 

our women and children. You will please to reflect, sir, 

that their blood will be on your head, not on ours. We are 

doing our duty: this garrison is committed to our charge, 

and we will take care of it. After you get out of it, you 

may turn around and look at its outside, but never expect 

to come in again, unless you come a prisoner. I consider 

the message you have brought, a degrading one for a British officer to send, and by no means reputable for a British officer to carry. For my part, I declare, before I would 

consent to deliver this garrison to such a murdering set as 

your army, by your own account, consists of, I would suffer my body to be filled with splinters and set on fire, as 

you know has at times been practiced, by such hordes of 

women and children killers, as belong to your army. (Max 

M. Mintz, Seeds of Empire: The American Revolutionary 

Conquest of the Iroquois, New York: NYU Press, 2002, 

37–38).

Figure 12. Battle of Schuyler Casualties.

Estimated Casualties

from Siege of Fort Schuyler

Killed 13 7

Wounded 22 18

Captured 3 9

Total 38 34

British American
208

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of St. Leger’s plan to advance down 

the Mohawk River Valley?

2. Was it realistic for St. Leger to believe he could conduct a 

successful siege of Fort Schuyler? Why or why not?

3. If not, what additional resources do you think St. Leger 

needed to execute a successful siege?

4. What are some of the potential negative aspects of using indigenous forces in coalition warfare? What are some of the potential 

positive aspects of using indigenous forces in coalition warfare? 

Figure 13. Battle of Oriskany Casualties.

Estimated Casualties

from Battle of Oriskany

Killed 385 7 651

Wounded 50 21

Captured 30 Unknown -

Total 465 28 65

American British Indians

Notes:

1. Includes wounded.
209

Day 2, Stand 10 The Pawlet Expedition (Offsite)

(Events between 24 July and 27 September 1777)

Directions: Stand 10 is conducted offsite. As with Stand 9, the 

stand may be conducted the evening of day 1 at the hotel or can be 

covered at the hotel on the morning of day 2. A third option is to 

conduct the stand at the Saratoga National Historical Park somewhere near the Visitors’ Center just after Stand 9 (see directions to 

Saratoga National Historical Park at Stand 11). 

Orientation: Using handout maps that show the area of operations between Pawlet, Fort Ticonderoga, Skenesborough, and Diamond Island will help orient the participants. 

Description: After Burgoyne successfully captured Fort Ticonderoga, General Washington determined that he needed to send assistance to his Northern Department commander. Beyond a few regiments of continental troops, he also sent Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln 

to Schuyler’s aid. In addition to being very competent and efficient, 

Lincoln was from Massachusetts. Washington figured that Lincoln, 

who was very popular in Vermont and New Hampshire, could help 

Schuyler organize and control the various New England militia units 

that were assembling in southern Vermont. Lincoln arrived at Schuyler’s field headquarters at Moses Kill about 24 July. After several days 

getting acquainted with the overall situation in New York and New 

England and conferring with Schuyler, Lincoln was ready to begin 

his new mission. Schuyler had instructed Lincoln to proceed to Manchester, Vermont, where most of the militia units were assembling. 

Once there, Lincoln was to organize the militia (ostensibly forming 

brigades) and return with those forces to Stillwater, the new location 

where Schuyler would be moving his army.

On 3 August, Lincoln set off for Manchester, where he found 

several Massachusetts and Vermont militia units as well as the 700 

or so troops from Stark’s newly raised New Hampshire Brigade. On 

8 August, Lincoln and Stark had their confrontation (See Stand 8), 

after which Stark marched his men off to Bennington while Lincoln 
210

remained at Manchester to continue organizing the remaining militia units to join the Northern Army now at Stillwater. 

General Gates, who had replaced Schuyler in command of the 

Northern Army on the 19th of August, summoned Lincoln to Van 

Schaik’s Island about the third week of the month. The army had 

arrived the day before. On the 24th, the two generals met to discuss 

how to best utilize the militia forces now assembled at Manchester. They agreed that the militia would remain in Vermont and look 

for opportunities to act against Burgoyne, ideally against his line of 

communication. Gates and Lincoln also agreed to use Lincoln’s militia force for operations that might increase its distance from the main 

army and, in doing so, might prevent prompt mutual assistance in 

case of emergency.

Eight days later on 1 September, the two men met again at 

Van Schaik’s Island. This time, they developed the outline concept 

for what became known as the Pawlet Expedition. The plan was 

to move Lincoln’s troops northeast to the hamlet of Pawlet, a very 

defensible area well to the rear of Burgoyne’s main army at Fort 

Edward. When Burgoyne learned that Lincoln’s force had moved 

to Pawlet, he might detail strong security detachments from his 

army to guard supply convoys, thereby further weakening his army. 

Moreover, should Burgoyne decide to retreat rather than advance, 

Lincoln would be in a good position to move west to block or hinder 

the retrograde while Gates attacked the rear of Burgoyne’s command. In short, Gates’ guidance to Lincoln was to find opportunities 

to divide, divert, and harass the enemy.

After receiving Gates’ basic intent, Lincoln returned to Manchester to begin implementing the general plan of action. On 6 September, Lincoln marched about 2,000 men out of Manchester. They 

arrived at Pawlet two days later. 

Over the preceding weeks, both Gates and Lincoln had received 

intelligence reports about the reduced garrison manning Fort Ticonderoga. They were also informed that a large number of American 

prisoners of war were held at Lake George Landing, as well as a sizable amount of food, ammunition, and other supplies. A successful 

raid at the fort would cut Burgoyne’s supply line and might force him 

to retreat and fight his way north to get out of the trap. 
211

Lincoln met with his militia commanders at Pawlet and began to outline an ambitious raid operation. The main target was to 

be Fort Ticonderoga itself. On 12 September, General Lincoln met 

again with his militia commanders and finalized the scheme of maneuver which would consist of a three-pronged attack against Burgoyne’s supply line. Each raiding column would contain about 500 

men. Col. John Brown would command the main effort to attack 

Lake George Landing and, if successful, attempt to convince the 

Fort Ticonderoga garrison to surrender. Meanwhile, a supporting 

effort under Col. Samuel Johnson would advance on Mount Independence and demonstrate from there to reinforce Brown’s efforts 

to take the fort. The third column under Col. Benjamin Woodbridge 

would move to seize Skenesborough then remove supplies and any 

other militarily significant materiel and send it back to supply dumps 

in Vermont. At some later point, Lincoln would bring his remaining 

militia forces to Skenesborough to join with Woodbridge and assist 

in withdrawing the two Fort Ticonderoga raiding columns in the 

event they were being pursued. 

Once the plan was finalized, Lincoln wasted no time. The expeditions departed Pawlet on the 12th and 13th of September. Over 

the next five days, the raiders stealthily made their way toward their 

respective targets. On the 17th, Lincoln himself left Pawlet with 

about 600 men headed for Skenesborough to link up with Woodbridge before he seized his objective the following day. In the morning darkness of 18 September, Brown’s column arrived undetected 

at Lake George Landing. There, the raiders surprised and captured 

a sizable number of British troops without a fight as well as significant amounts of supplies, cattle, and horses. The latter included 

about 200 bateaux which had been used to help resupply Burgoyne’s 

army south of Lake George. The Americans burned almost all the 

bateaux but retained a few for future operations. Johnson also freed 

118 American prisoners whom he armed and appointed as the guard 

force to escort about 300 British prisoners back to Skenesborough. 

The raiders then moved down the portage, captured Mount Defiance, and ultimately occupied positions in the Old French Lines. For 

two days, Brown’s and Johnson’s troops across the lake at Mount 

Independence conducted various demonstrations to convince Brig. 
212

Henry W. Powell, the Fort Ticonderoga garrison commander, to 

surrender. Powell, however, refused—realizing that the Americans 

were too weak to take the fort (even though his own command had 

just been reduced dramatically). 

Recognizing that any further efforts at bluff and bluster were 

a waste of time, Brown left in the few remaining bateaux and traveled south on Lake George to seize Diamond Island, the next British 

supply depot. However, the British garrison at Diamond Island had 

been warned of his approach, so the raider’s efforts there came to 

naught. Brown then headed back to Pawlet via Skenesborough. 

On 18 September, the day after he arrived at Skenesborough, 

Lincoln received a message from Gates directing him to proceed 

with all his militia to Stillwater. The following day, Lincoln returned 

to Pawlet with the men under his direct command and sent messages to Brown and Johnson to join him at Stillwater at their first 

opportunity. On 21 September, Lincoln left for the Northern Army’s 

new location at Bemis Heights, leaving instructions for any arriving 

militia to follow him there. All, except Brown’s command, started 

for Bemis Heights the next day. When he arrived at Pawlet several 

days later, Brown received Lincoln’s instructions and set his men on 

the march to Bemis Heights as well.

The Pawlet Expedition—and Brown’s actions in particular—

significantly hampered the Army from Canada’s logistics operations. 

The raids had not only reduced Burgoyne’s already short supplies; 

Brown’s actions had also crippled the British ability to move supplies south to the main army. Powell, with his own forces now significantly reduced, was loath to send any reinforcements to Burgoyne 

for fear of losing Ticonderoga itself. When St. Leger’s force from 

the Mohawk Valley arrived at the fort later on 27 September, Powell 

refused to let St. Leger continue the move south to join Burgoyne. 

Instead, Powell kept the regiment to help protect the fort. Even if 

Powell had wanted to send reinforcements to Burgoyne, he no longer 

possessed the water and wagon transport capabilities to do so. 

Vignette: None
213

Analysis 

1. What do you see as the major strengths and weaknesses of 

Burgoyne’s efforts to protect his extended line of communication?

2. What is your assessment of the Pawlet Expedition plan? 

What do you see as the major strengths and weaknesses of the plan?

3. What do you see as the most significant outcome of these 

raids? How did the raids affect the operational options now available to both Schuyler/Gates and Burgoyne?
214

Day 2, Stand 11 The Northern Army Positions at Bemis Heights 

(Events 10 August and 15 September 1777)

Directions: Starting at Clifton Park Center, New York, take Exit 

9 on I-87 North and proceed north 3.5 miles to Ushers Road. Veer 

right from I-87 North onto the Exit 10 ramp. Turn right onto Ushers 

Road. Proceed 2.9 miles then right on NY-67 East. Proceed 1.3 miles 

then left on George Thompson Road/Meehan Road (note: George 

Thompson Road turns into Meehan Road after about half a mile). 

Proceed 3.7 miles then turn right onto Lake Road, then the first left 

onto County Road 75. Proceed about a mile then right onto County 

Road 423. Proceed about a mile then turn left onto County Road 32. 

Proceed about 2 miles to the Saratoga National Battlefield Park entrance on the right. Proceed to the Visitors’ Center. If stands 9 and 10 

have already been conducted off-site, continue driving south along 

Parking Area

11

Park Tour Stop #3

American River

Fortifications

Continental Positions &

Bemis Heights

Stand 11

N

4

Map 21. Day 2 Stand 11.
215

the park access road. As you approach Saratoga Park Stop #2 (Neilson’s Farm), bring the vehicle(s) to a brief stop at the pull-out opposite the Neilson Farm and explain that this is the extreme left of the 

American line on Bemis Heights. Continue to Saratoga Park Stop #3 

and turn into the parking lot. Dismount and walk to the interpretive 

marker to the east, overlooking the Hudson River.

Orientation: You are standing on what was the extreme right/

eastern flank of General Gates’ Continental Army in early September 

1777 during both Saratoga battles. To the east is the Hudson River. 

Approximately 3 miles north of this position is the Great Redoubt 

which is where the British situated their primary army encampment 

during the two Saratoga battles. About 11 miles north of this location was the town of Saratoga (known today as Schuylerville). The 

Northern Army defensive perimeter extended about a mile and half 

west of this location. The town of Albany, New York, which was the 

campaign objective of Burgoyne’s army, is approximately 35 miles 

south of this location. At the time of the battles, this immediate area 

would have been much less wooded. The trees would have been cut 

to use for building the various fortifications in the area and for fire 

wood, or felled to create abitis and clear fields of fire for artillery. The 

flats below would have been clear and under cultivation, thus providing clear fields of fire against any enemy approach through the valley. 

This is about where the main redoubt was for this part of the line, 

protected by a redan to the north and another to the south. There was 

a large trench line in the trees to the southeast near the river to oppose 

ground attacks and block southward movement on the Hudson.

Description of the American situation: On 10 August 1777, 

General Schuyler received notice at his Stillwater field headquarters 

that he had been relieved of command of the Northern Department 

and its army. This was a bitter blow for the man who had worked 

tirelessly since the fall of Fort Ticonderoga to set the conditions 

for an American resurgence of fortunes in the Hudson River Valley. Much had happened since then. In addition to irreplaceable 

losses sustained by Burgoyne’s forces at Fort Anne and Hubbardton, Schuyler’s leadership of the Northern Army had significantly 
216

delayed Burgoyne’s advance. This, in turn, provided time for the 

surrounding states to assemble their militia forces and move them 

within striking distance of the British invasion force. Additionally, more Continental forces were joining the Northern Army on a 

weekly basis. Finally, Schuyler had taken decisive action by sending 

Arnold and Learned to ensure Fort Schuyler’s survival, though that 

outcome would not be apparent for another two weeks. 

Even Schuyler’s retreats made military sense. Each time he had 

retreated it was from what were essentially poor defensive locations 

or at least inadequate for the forces he had at hand. Additionally, 

he delayed Burgoyne’s movements where he could. Schuyler’s intent was to continue moving south—preserving his forces—until he 

found a battle position where he could stop the British advance or, 

ideally, build enough strength to assume the offensive. 

Even after his official relief, Schuyler ordered an additional 

retreat to what he believed would be the Northern Army’s best location to make a stand. The army, now consisting of about 4,000 

troops, reached Van Schaik’s Island on 18 August. General Gates 

arrived the following day and assumed command at that point. No 

doubt feeling dejected, Schuyler returned home to Albany, where he 

would remain an important player throughout the rest of the campaign despite his lack of an official position.

Over the next month, several events transpired (discussed at 

earlier stands) which increased the fortunes of Gates and the Northern Army. Even before Gates assumed command, Stark and Warner 

won the battle of Bennington on 16 August. One week later on 22 

August, Arnold’s ruse succeeded in lifting the siege of Fort Schuyler. At the end of that month, Arnold with Learned’s Brigade as well 

as Col. Dan Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen transferred from Washington’s army arrived at Van Schaik’s Island to further reinforce Gates’ 

command. Gates now had about 7,000 troops under his direct control at Van Schaik’s. By the time he advanced the Northern Army 

from Van Schaik’s Island to Stillwater on 8 September, Gates had 

more than 10,000 troops under his command (due in large part to 

Schuyler’s calls for reinforcement) and still more were on the way. 

On 10 September, Burgoyne’s Army moved south from Fort 

Edward toward Batten Kill where his engineers were building a 
217

bridge to the west side of the Hudson River. At about the same time, 

British troops abandoned Forts George and Anne. Gates, who was 

dissatisfied with the Van Schaik’s location as well as the Stillwater 

site, was preparing to move his forces for the final time before the 

two armies met on the field of battle. Once at Stillwater, Gates sent 

his engineer, Col. Thaddeus Kosciuszko, and several other officers 

to look for a good position to build defenses which Burgoyne would 

be forced to attack if he wished to get to Albany. Kosciuszko found 

the ideal location several miles north of Stillwater—known locally 

as Bemis Heights. 

Upon inspection, Gates approved the position, which was 

a long generally east-west ridge that provided a relatively good 

vantage over the direction from which the British would approach. A 

100-foot bluff on the right flank overlooked any movement on both 

the river road and the Hudson River itself. The road was located 

on a relatively narrow flood plain that was only about 200 to 300 

yards wide. On the east side of the plain, the Hudson River was 

unfordable anywhere nearby. In short, a few well-placed cannon 

could effectively block any troops advancing on foot or by boat 

south on the flood plain or along the road. Satisfied with the location 

and convinced it would provide the advantages he sought, Gates 

ordered the army to move farther north and began digging in on 

Bemis Heights on 12 September.

Though the position was strong, Gates and his officers soon 

discovered it was not perfect. The left of the American battle line 

had no natural terrain feature on which to anchor the western flank, 

at least not one that could be readily incorporated into the American line with the number of troops that were present. A small hill 

about half mile to the west was too far to be integrated into the line 

but would be an excellent position for placing artillery if the British wished to enfilade the American breastworks. The rebels would 

need to closely watch that location if the British attempted to circle 

in that direction. 

As initially designed, Gates split his defenses into two “wings.” 

On the right, Gates positioned three Continental brigades under 

Brig. Gen. John Glover, Brig. Gen. John Nixon, and Brig. Gen. 
218

John Paterson, left to right respectively. In theory, Lincoln would 

command the right wing. However, due to that general’s other duties, such as being sent to organize Vermont militia forces and conducting the Pawlet Raid, Gates typically maintained direct command over those troops. On the left, he placed Poor’s and Learned’s 

Continental brigades, right to left respectively. Brig. Gen. Abraham 

Ten Broeck’s New York Militia Brigade was positioned, most likely, on the far left or immediately behind Learned’s or Poor’s Brigade (sources are unclear on the specific location). Arnold would 

command these units, which composed the left wing. Between the 

two wings at a salient near the Neilson House, Gates positioned 

Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen and Light Infantry. Although an independent command, Arnold believed these troops were under his 

control. Interspersed between the various brigades and regiments 

along the front were 22 cannon of various sizes. On 15 September, 

about 150 mostly Oneida Indians arrived at Bemis Heights to serve 

with the Northern Army. The Indians were employed scouting the 

British lines and were the last significant reinforcements Gates received prior to the battle on 19 September. His immediate force 

now stood somewhere close to 11,000 men.

Vignette: On 4 October, Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, Gates’ 

adjutant general, described the American defenses:

Gates’ right occupied the brow of the hill near the river, 

with which it was connected by a deep entrenchment; his 

camp, in the form of a segment of a great circle, the convex 

toward the enemy, extended rather obliquely to his rear, 

about three-fourths of a mile to a knoll occupied by his 

left; his front was covered from the right to the left of the 

centre, by a sharp ravine running parallel with his line and 

closely wooded: from thence to the knoll at his extreme 

left, the ground was partially cleared, some of the trees being felled and others girdled, beyond which in front of his 

left flank, and extending to the enemy’s right. . . . The extremities of this camp were defended by stoney batteries, 

and the interval was strengthened by breastwork without 

entrenchments, constructed of the bodies of felled trees, 
219

logs, and rails with an additional battery at an opening left 

of the center. The right was almost impracticable; the left 

difficult of approach. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American 

Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 249.)

Description of the British situation: During the same period 

that the fortunes of the American forces were waxing, those of the 

British were waning. The 16 August battle of Bennington dealt a 

major blow to Burgoyne’s efforts to resupply his army. He also lost 

a significant number of regular troops. St. Leger’s retreat from Fort 

Schuyler on 22 August further diminished the forces on which Burgoyne might rely and also released more American troops for use 

against the Army from Canada. Three days later, General Howe debarked his command at Head of Elk, Maryland, and headed overland toward Philadelphia, thus ensuring that no British forces would 

converge with Howe in the Hudson River Valley that fall (Burgoyne 

finally learned of this plan on 3 August). When Burgoyne departed 

from Fort Edward on 10 September, the forces under his direct control were down to slightly more than 6,000 troops. 

Notwithstanding all the misfortunes that had plagued his command since 16 August, Burgoyne doggedly drove toward Albany. 

On 13 September, his army began crossing to the west bank of the 

Hudson River at Batten Kill on a makeshift pontoon bridge. Two 

days later he ordered the bridge pulled up behind him, effectively 

cutting off resupply from Powell at Fort Ticonderoga. On the 17th, 

Burgoyne led a scouting party that arrived at a place called Sword’s 

House—within four miles of Bemis Heights. Though his troops had 

skirmished with rebel forces over the past several days, Burgoyne 

was still unsure about the actual strength of the main American army 

opposing him. From deserters, whose information could be suspect, 

he had learned that Gates had upward of 10,000 men. Burgoyne was 

also certain that Gates’ army was now located nearby. Nevertheless, 

satisfied with the Sword House location as a defendable bivouac, 

Burgoyne sent orders for his troops to join him there. The army arrived the following day and set up camp. The stage was now set for 

the next clash between the American and British Northern Armies—

the largest to date.
220

Analysis

1. Why do you think the 1777 British strategic plan failed to 

achieve synergy? Consider the actions of the key players: Germain, 

Howe, Clinton, Carleton, Burgoyne. Who was responsible and why?

2. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s operational plan up 

to this point in the campaign? 

3. What are the reasons you think that Burgoyne’s decision to 

sever communications with Fort Ticonderoga was advantageous? 

What were the disadvantages?

4. What is your assessment of Gates’ plan to defend here at 

Bemis Heights? 

5. How would you exploit any weaknesses in the American 

positions if you were commanding the British army here?

6. What options does Burgoyne have at this point? What are 

Gates’ options? Do both commanders need a battle here; either; neither? Explain how a tactical engagement here would fit (or not) into 

the operational goals of either side.
221

Day 2, Stand 12 The Battle of Freeman’s Farm

(Events of 19 September 1777)

Directions: From Stand 11, return to the park road and drive to 

Saratoga Park Stop #7 (Breymann Redoubt). Turn into the parking 

lot then dismount and walk alongside the road heading southeast 

to the intersection of the park road with the Wilkinson Trail. Turn 

right and walk the trail headed west into the woods. (Note: This path 

closely follows the path that Hamilton’s infantry brigade used on 19 

September 1777.) At the intersection of the Wilkinson and Liaison 

trails (trail marker D), turn left (south) onto the Liaison Trail and 

follow that trail to the creek crossing (Stand 12A).

Orientation: You have just moved along a path that approximates the route used by the British army center column (Hamilton’s 

Freeman’s Farm

Stand 12

N

Stream Crossing

Park Road

Park Tour Stop #7

Breymann Redoubt

Turn into

Wilkinson Trail

Parking Area

Tree Line

12D

12C

12F

12E

12A

12B

Map 22. Day 2 Stand 12.
222

Brigade) as it approached Freeman’s Farm on 19 September (see 

map 43, Appendix J, Battle of Freeman’s Farm 19 September 1777, 

First Contact 1300). The forest in those days would have looked 

about like it does today except that secondary growth at ground level would have been less apparent due to the grazing of loose livestock and more plentiful forest animals. To the east of here was the 

dirt farm road leading from the River Road adjacent to the Hudson 

River (running north/south) which brought Riedesel’s relief column 

to the Freeman’s Farm area in the late afternoon that day. Also to 

the east was the main British Army encampment at the Great Redoubt near the Hudson River. To the west was the McBride Farm, 

and the Freeman Farm to the south was the main battle area where 

the fighting took place. Bemis Heights is located about a mile and a 

half farther south of this location and was the tactical objective for 

the British Army. 

Day 2, Sub-stand 12A The Advance

Description: Due to ongoing skirmishing and scouting on 16 

and 17 September, Burgoyne slowly developed a general idea of 

the American location. He knew enough by the morning of 18 September that he did not want to continue the main advance down the 

River Road due to the now-visible American defenses there. He had 

a general idea of the extent of the American lines but not the exact 

locations of the rebel left flank. One prominent historian noted that 

Burgoyne was aware of a rise to the west of the American defenses 

on which he could place artillery to support an attack on the west 

end of the position. He correctly calculated that the American left 

would not be as strong as the positions along the road, so he decided 

to move a strong force to the west and then turn south to develop the 

situation and perhaps locate a weakness in the rebel lines there. Burgoyne’s plan was to conduct a reconnaissance-in-force by advancing in three columns. Fraser’s column would travel the farthest west. 

At some point during the march, he would turn south and, hopefully, 

come upon the rebel left and the desired artillery position. If the 

ground and the circumstances seemed favorable, Fraser’s command 

would make the main assault. The remainder of the army would turn 

south and advance, more or less on line, to keep the rebels’ attention 
223

focused to their front and prevent reinforcements from moving to 

the threatened sector.

At about 1000 on the morning of 19 September, several cannon shots were fired in the British encampment as a signal for the 

Army from Canada to begin its movement. Brig. Simon Fraser’s 

3,000-man Advance Corps of British, loyalists, Canadians, and Indians comprised the right column and moved on a dirt road headed west. Burgoyne and his aides accompanied the center column, 

which consisted of the 1,700 British regulars of Brig. James Hamilton’s brigade. Hamilton’s men followed Fraser for a short distance 

then turned south on a road leading into the Great Ravine. They 

would then cross the ravine, move on line, and advance toward the 

western face of the defenses. The left column, moving generally 

down the River Road, was composed of 2,500 German and British 

troops under Riedesel. This column was to generally perform the 

same mission as the center but would advance against the northern face of Gates’ position on the east end. All three columns were 

accompanied by artillery detachments. None of the columns were 

within visual range of each other and, therefore, none were mutually 

supporting. The logistics elements, hospital, bateaux company, and 

women and children remained behind under the guard of the 47th 

Foot in and near the Great Redoubt.

Moving south from the Great Redoubt, Riedesel discovered 

that the rebels had destroyed every bridge in the path of the German 

column along the River Road. Progress would be very slow on all 

fronts that morning. A major chasm, soon to be known as the Great 

Ravine, was situated between the British right and center columns 

and the American defenses. Both columns would need to cross that 

obstacle before they could close with the American positions on Bemis Heights. The head of Fraser’s column on the British right (west) 

reached the ravine first but was forced to march farther west to find 

a suitable crossing point. Hamilton’s Brigade arrived at the ravine at 

about the midway point of its length and crossed there. As the morning mist and fog began to clear, rebel scouts began sending reports 

that the British were crossing the ravine. 

Back at Bemis Heights, Gates received the reports and ordered all units to strike tents, load wagons, and man the lines—
224

routine measures taken under the circumstances. Additionally, the 

aggressive Benedict Arnold began pressing Gates to take some 

kind of positive, offensive action. Initially Gates resisted but then 

he reluctantly authorized Arnold to send Daniel Morgan’s Corps of 

Riflemen and Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry (attached to 

Morgan) to discern the British intentions and conduct harassment 

attacks. Morgan’s men departed the defenses sometime after noon 

and headed north on a trail toward Freeman’s Farm. When Morgan’s 

men reached the clearing at the south edge of the farm, the riflemen 

dispersed behind rocks and in trees, and a number of them took positions in the Freeman house and outbuildings. They would not have 

to wait long for developments.

Move south to Stand 12B (see stand map).

Day 2, Sub-stand 12B The Opening Fight

Orientation: Sometime during 1766, John Freeman and wife, 

Effelina, moved onto “Great Lot 16” of the Saratoga Patent located here. 

On 2 January 1768, they paid six pence per acre to lease an additional 

170 acres from the patentee, one Philip Schuyler. The Freemans lived 

in a farm house (likely a clapboard frame structure rather than log 

construction) that was located at the small clump of trees to the south. 

A barn and two other buildings were adjacent to the house on the farm. 

You are at the tree line where the skirmishers of the 9th Regiment of 

Foot of Hamilton’s brigade entered the open fields of Freeman’s Farm. 

(Note: Disregard the red-tipped white picket posts at this time. These 

posts mark fortifications that were integral to the 7 October battle but 

have no meaning for this battle.) To the far south is the woodline where 

most of Morgan’s men occupied positions. The open field to the east 

was partially planted in corn at the time of the battle.

Description: By mid-day, the lead regiment in Hamilton’s Brigade, the 9th Foot, had struggled its way through the Great Ravine 

and was about to arrive at the north side of the Freeman clearing. 

Fearing an ambush once they detected the clearing, Hamilton and 

Lt. Col. John Hill, commander of the 9th Foot, wisely deployed a 

skirmish force led by Maj. Gordon Forbes into the open fields be-
225

yond the tree line while the remainder of the brigade arrived. As the 

skirmishers moved south in open order, they began to see movement 

around the Freeman outbuildings. Almost immediately, Morgan’s 

men opened a fierce fire. In short order, the shooters wounded Forbes 

and killed or wounded all the remaining officers in the skirmish line. 

After several minutes of firing, the British line began to waver and 

Morgan’s men impetuously rushed forward to finish off their prey. 

However, Capt. Alexander Fraser’s Company of Marksmen, part 

of Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps, had rushed to the sound of the 

guns from the west. Supported by a light cannon, he quickly placed 

fire on Morgan’s left flank. Soon the rebel advance was in serious 

trouble. Realizing he might lose his entire command, Morgan began 

a series of turkey calls to recall his men. Before long they were all 

in headlong retreat. 

During the initial fight, Hamilton rushed his remaining units 

forward into line and was ready to receive an attack. By about 1300, 

the four center column regiments were deployed with the 21st Foot 

on the right, the 20th Foot on the left, the 62nd Foot in the center, 

and Hill’s 9th in reserve. Hamilton moved the brigade out of the 

woods and into the clearing. Immediately rebel fire picked up and 

began dropping men in the ranks. The men in the battle line were unable to return fire at the unseen rebels across the field since some of 

Forbes’ skirmishers were still deployed to the front. Annoyingly, the 

brigade line was steadily taking casualties without being able to respond. In frustration, several men suddenly began to discharge their 

weapons at the invisible foes across Freeman’s field. Dozens of others began to follow suit. Before their officers could stop the shooting, several of Forbes’ men were killed or wounded by the friendly 

bullets. The firing soon tapered off to skirmishing and seesaw efforts 

to control small parts of the Freeman field. Then a lull descended on 

Freeman’s Farm, interspersed with desultory small arms bursts here 

and there.

By now, Gates was aware of Riedesel’s advance in the east 

and had detected both Hamilton’s Brigade in the center and the lead 

elements of Fraser’s Advance Corps in the west. Reports were also 

trickling in to Gates about the size of the enemy he faced, including one from Gates’ own deputy adjutant general. Without permis-
226

sion, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson had gone forward earlier to assess 

the situation. Based on the various information, Gates ordered Arnold to send additional troops to support Morgan’s efforts. Two regiments—the 1st and 3rd New Hampshire Continentals from Poor’s 

Brigade—were heading north, followed by the impulsive Arnold. 

Gates sent several additional regiments from the brigade, including 

the 2nd New Hampshire, 2nd New York, 4th New York, and two 

Connecticut militia battalions. In the meantime, some of Morgan’s 

Riflemen and Dearborn’s Light Infantry kept up a heavy skirmish 

fire that continued to inflict casualties on Hamilton’s redcoats. 

Move south to Sub-stand 12C (see stand map).

Day 2, Sub-stand 12C American Reinforcements Arrive

Orientation: You are currently standing in the vicinity where 

the Freeman house and outbuildings stood (see map 44, Appendix J, 

Battle of Freeman’s Farm 19 September 1777, 1300-1500).

Description: During the lull, the 1st and 3rd New Hampshire 

Regiments quietly moved into positions at the south edge of the field 

where Morgan’s men had once been. Having largely regrouped, 

Morgan’s Riflemen moved to the extreme right of the American line 

near a heavily wooded ravine. There, the riflemen opened accurate 

harassing fire against the 20th Foot lined up in the open field across 

from the ravine. On the extreme left, Dearborn’s Light Infantry took 

up a position behind a small knoll that gave them cover from British 

return fire. The firing intensified as the new arrivals took up their 

positions around 1500. 

Perceiving that the two New Hampshire regiments were not 

strong enough to move the British line, Arnold ordered Col. Thaddeus Cook’s Connecticut Militia Battalion and the 2nd New Hampshire Regiment to extend the line farther to the left (west). The 

American line was now positioned in a somewhat concave manner 

along the south edge of the field, with the two ends closest to the 

British line. By this time, Hamilton’s line had pushed forward to the 

vicinity of the Freeman house and held most of the open field. The 
227

2nd New Hampshire now overlapped Hamilton’s right flank, and 

Cook’s Connecticut Militia pressed Hamilton’s left. In response to 

Cook’s threat, the 62nd Foot—in battle line just south of the Freeman house—refused its two left flank companies and posted two 

6-pounders at the angle, and the 21st Foot was brought up to protect 

the 62nd Regiment’s right flank. All three regiments on Hamilton’s 

line were taking a beating, but the 62nd was sustaining the worst 

and was soon in danger of collapsing. The British line began giving 

ground back to the press of American infantrymen. 

As the British line slowly fell back, Arnold sensed that he 

might have an opportunity to flank Hamilton’s line to the right of 

the 21st Foot. Arnold ordered the troops on the American left to 

press forward, but this attack was stopped short by the advance of 

the 24th Foot and some grenadiers from Fraser’s command to the 

west. Meanwhile, Fraser sent part of the 24th Foot into the woods to 

eliminate or disperse Dearborn’s Light Infantry, which was tasked 

with defending the American left wing. Like many British charges 

that day, that blow struck air when the light infantry simply fell back 

and advanced again as the British regiment withdrew. 

Move south to Sub-stand 12D (see stand map).

Day 2, Sub-stand 12D Advance and Retreat

Orientation: You are currently standing between the British and 

American lines. The American forces would have been located in 

the tree line to your south, east, and west until advancing into the 

open area late in the battle (see map 45, Appendix J, Battle of Freeman’s Farm 19 September 1777, 1500–1700).

Description: From their hidden and naturally protected position in the woods, Morgan’s Riflemen on the far right of the line 

found a position from which they could shoot at the flank and even 

into the rear of the 62nd Regiment. As the grueling battle wore on, 

the two British cannon with the 62nd fell silent after thirty-six of the 

forty-eight gunners as well as other crew members were killed or 

wounded. These guns were charged and countercharged and traded 
228

hands several times during the seesaw fighting at Freeman’s Farm 

that day. While experiencing significant losses, the 62nd Foot also 

was inflicting heavy casualties on Cook’s militia posted between 

Morgan’s Riflemen and the 1st New Hampshire Regiment. General 

Poor ordered the 8th Massachusetts Continentals commanded by 

Maj. William Hull to relieve the Connecticut militia. During the relief, the 62nd advanced to exploit the momentary weakness of the 

American line. However, Hull ordered a bayonet attack into the diminished British regiment, and the redcoats were checked and fell 

back. Sensing the danger of the 62nd’s condition, General Phillips 

sent the 20th Foot to bolster that regiment’s left flank. The 20th Regiment rushed into the woods to check Hull’s advance and prevent 

Morgan’s Riflemen from shooting at the backs of their retreating 

comrades. Once back in position, the 62nd Foot reorganized then 

conducted a counterattack—forcing Hull’s men to fall back all the 

way to their original position so that the 62nd regained its two guns. 

As the 21st, 62nd, and 20th Regiments of Foot incurred casualties, Hamilton piecemealed his reserve, the 9th Foot, into the fight. 

Detachment by detachment, 9th troops were sent forward to replace 

fallen men from the other regiments. When they entered the line, of 

course, the 9th Foot troops also began taking significant casualties. 

By the end of the day, the regiment had sustained about as many casualties as either the 20th or 21st. The 62nd Foot, however, would be 

the most worn-down, with only sixty men of the regiment answering 

the roll call that evening. 

To support Dearborn and bolster the left flank of the main battle 

line, Arnold sent Col. Jonathan Latimer’s Connecticut Militia Battalion and the last two regiments of Poor’s Brigade, the 2nd and 4th 

New York Continental Regiments. While Latimer’s Battalion and 

the 4th New York moved to support Dearborn, the 2nd New York 

collided with Maj. Alexander Lindsay’s Light Infantry Battalion. 

The New Yorkers were forced to pull back under pressure. Lacking 

specific orders, the four regiments of Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s 

Brigade stumbled into the fight on the British far right flank and 

traded fire with German grenadiers and other troops of Fraser’s Advance Corps—to no real effect on either side.

Though fighting bravely, the British army took heavy casual-
229

ties during the bitter fighting at Freeman’s Field. Capt. John Money 

(Burgoyne’s deputy quartermaster general) related: “the 62nd Regiment charged four times . . . quitting their position each time . . . the 

rebels fled at every charge deeper still into the woods; but when the 

British troops returned to their position, they were slowly followed, 

and those who had been the most forward in the pursuit were the 

first to fall.”2

Burgoyne later stressed the cost of this struggle: “Few actions 

have been characterized by more obstinacy in attack or defense. The 

British bayonet was repeatedly tried ineffectually. Eleven hundred 

British soldiers, foiled in these trials, bore incessant fire from a succession of fresh troops in superior numbers, for above four hours; 

and after a loss of above a third of their numbers (and in one of 

the regiments above, two thirds), forced the enemy at last. Of a detachment of a captain and forty-eight artillerymen, the captain and 

thirty-six were killed or wounded.”3

Move northeast to Sub-stand 12E (see stand map). Ensure you 

can see the open field to the east of the Freeman house location.

Day 2, Sub-stand 12E Riedesel Saves the Day

Orientation: Looking due east, you are viewing the direction 

from which Riedesel’s relief column approached in the late afternoon to come to the aid of Hamilton’s brigade. You would have 

seen a stand of corn in the field in front of you. A dirt trail would 

have run along the edge of the tree line to the north and northeast 

about where the park road is now, then curved into the tree line to 

your east and southeast. That is the route from which Riedesel approached. 

Description: For at least five hours that day, Riedesel’s men 

slowly toiled forward, rebuilding bridges and roads and skirmishing 

with rebel scouts as their column approached Gates’ eastern defenses along the River Road. Riedesel and his men had been listening 

to the sounds of firing off to the west all afternoon, and the German 

general wondered what was happening in that quarter. He had heard 
230

almost nothing from Burgoyne since the operation began, so he sent 

a British aide to find the commanding general and inquire what actions he wanted Riedesel to take. 

About 1630 or perhaps a little later, Riedesel received an order 

from Burgoyne to leave men to protect the artillery and baggage 

trains along the River Road and move west with all the troops he 

could spare to attack the American right flank. Wasting no time, Riedesel directed part of his command to protect the trains. He then assumed personal command of his own regiment (the Braunschweiger 

von Riedesel Regiment), two companies of the Regiment von Rhetz, 

and two 6-pounders from Capt. Georg Päusch’s Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery. After locating a dirt road heading west, he proceeded 

with this force toward the fighting. 

Anxious, Riedesel moved ahead with the two companies of the 

von Rhetz Regiment. The Riedesel Regiment would have to catch 

up later. After moving about a mile and a half, Riedesel rested his 

troops briefly so that they would be fresh when they entered the 

fight. While they rested, he proceeded to a nearby hill (to your eastsoutheast but no longer visible due to the trees), where he discovered that he could see the American right flank in the woods and the 

British battle line in Freeman’s Field. He quickly directed Päusch’s 

artillery to move to a hill on the north side of the field where the 

entire British line was being pushed back. He then ordered the von 

Rhetz Regiment detachment to get up and marched them on line 

forward at the double quick toward the American right. 

The sudden appearance of the German troops on the American 

flank had two immediate effects. It surprised and demoralized the 

advancing Americans and stopped them in their tracks while simultaneously causing British morale to soar. The British line quickly 

rallied and pressed forward as the balance of von Riedesel’s own 

regiment came up in the field to further extend the German line to 

the left (south). The weight of the German fire fell on Morgan’s 

Riflemen and the 1st New Hampshire. This new threat forced the 

rebel line to retreat. Even so, the Americans conducted a creditable 

fighting withdrawal back to their defenses as darkness descended on 

the battlefield. Burgoyne did not pursue.

Return northwest to Sub-stand 12C (location of Freeman’s Farm).
231

Day 2, Sub-stand 12F The Results and Costs

Description: The strain of the day was telling on both sides. 

The Northern Army sustained more than 300 dead and wounded 

(65 KIA/218 WIA/38 MIA). The Army from Canada suffered even 

greater casualties at more than 600 (245 KIA/444 WIA). Additionally, many of the British casualties were combat-experienced officers. Though a tactical victory for the British, who had remained on 

the field, it was once again pyrrhic in nature due to their tremendous 

losses. Operationally, however, the battle did not help the British. 

Burgoyne’s losses could not be replaced and his supplies would 

continue to dwindle. Gates, who already outnumbered Burgoyne, 

replaced his losses within a day or two as new troops continued to 

arrive. Moreover, Gates made excellent defensive use of the terrain 

to effectively block Burgoyne’s movement south. Meanwhile, the 

rebel defenses and strength would improve almost daily. 

Vignette 1: Sergeant Roger Lamb, 23rd Regiment of Foot described the fighting at Freeman’s Farm:

The Americans being unable from the nature of the country, of perceiving the different combinations of march (as 

the country is thickly covered with woods, movements 

may be effected without a possibility of being discovered) 

advanced a strong column, with a view of turning the British right, here they met the grenadiers and light infantry, 

who gave them a tremendous fire. Finding it was impossible to penetrate the line at this point, they immediately 

counter-marched and directed their principal effort to the 

centre. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of 

the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New 

York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 238–40.)

Vignette 2: Lt. Joshua Pell Jr. (a loyalist volunteer) also related 

what he saw: 

About two o’clock the 9th, 21st, and 62nd regiments were 

engaged by the Rebels near Freeman’s Farm, they were 
232

strongly posted in a wood with a deep Ravine to their 

front, the fire was so hot upon the 20th, 21st, and 62nd, 

that they broke, but by the spirited behavior of their officers were immediately rallied, and drove them from there. 

Major Agnew with the 24th Regiment, advanced into the 

woods in order to flank them; on the first onset the Rebels 

retired in confusion, but the fire from the [Hamilton’s] line 

having abated considerably by this time, and the Rebels 

finding their left flank in danger, poured a strong force 

upon this regiment. Which caused them to retire about one 

hundred yards behind an inclosure [sic] in a grass field 

[McBride’s]; the rebels fought bravely in the woods but 

darst (sic) not. ( John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military 

History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 238–40.)

Vignette 3: Lt. James Hadden, Royal Artillery, later recorded 

the actions of the Royal Artillery:

The Enemy being in possession of the wood almost 

immediately attacked the Corps which took post behind 

two log huts on Freeman’s Farm. Capt. [Thomas] Jones’ 

Brigade [Company] was hasten’d to their support, I was 

advanced with two guns to the left of the 62nd Regiment. 

And ye two left companies being formed en potence I took 

post in the angle. Lieutenant [George] Reid remain’d with 

Capt. Jones and the other two [guns] was posted between 

the 9th and the 21st Regiments.” (John F. Luzader, 

Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of 

the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 

238–40.)

Analysis 

1. What do you think are the primary strengths and weaknesses 

of Burgoyne’s plan on this day?

2. Does Burgoyne’s plan reveal anything about his opinions 

regarding the American army facing him (especially after his defeat 

at Bennington)?
233

3. Gates and Arnold disagreed on the approach to this battle. 

Who, if either (or both), was right, and why? Their views reflect 

the typical conflict between aggressiveness and caution. What can 

we take away from this tension today? Clearly, aggressiveness and 

caution are not mutually exclusive. How should a planner balance 

the two?

4. Was Gates correct in not committing more forces to the battle at Freeman’s Farm? Why or why not?

5. Which side won this battle tactically? Which commander 

accomplished more to further his operational goals? Which army 

seems to be in better condition for the next battle and why?

6. How did each side use the terrain to its advantage?

7. How did the terrain affect Burgoyne’s plan and the conduct 

of the battle?

Return to the Breymann Redoubt parking lot by walking the 

same trail network in reverse when this stand series is complete.

Figure 14. 1st Battle of Saratoga Casualties.

Casualties from

1st Battle of Saratoga

(19 September 1777)

Killed 160 100

Wounded 364 200

Captured 421 23

Total 566 323

British American2

Notes:

1. Missing, presumed captured or deserted.

2. American casualties are estimated
234

Day 2, Stand 13 Burgoyne’s Dilemma and the Highlands 

Campaign (Events between 20 September and 22 October 1777)

Directions: From Breymann Redoubt parking lot, return to the 

park road and head east to Park Stop #8, Burgoyne’s Headquarters. 

Turn into the parking lot and park. Walk the blacktop trail to the 

Park Stand #8 location, Burgoyne’s Headquarters.

Orientation: You are standing near the location where General 

Burgoyne established his headquarters after the battle at Freeman’s 

Farm. Just to the east are the British positions at the Great Redoubt 

and beyond that position is the Hudson River. Approximately 8 

miles north of this location is the town of Saratoga (now Schuylerville, New York), toward which Burgoyne would eventually retreat 

(and ultimately surrender) in late October 1777. To the west are Balcarres Redoubt and Breymann Redoubt, which were the westernBurgoyne’s Dilemma &

Highlands Campaign

Stand 13

N

Park Tour Stop #8

Burgoyne’s HQ

13

Parking Area

Map 23. Day 2 Stand 13.
235

most of the British positions established during the period between 

the two battles. Bemis Heights, the main Continental defensive encampment, is approximately a mile and a half south of this position.

Description of Burgoyne’s Dilemma: After the Battle of Freeman’s Farm on 19 September, Gates’ army blocked Burgoyne’s 

only feasible route to Albany. However, the left of the Continental 

line was weak on the day after the battle. The troops under Arnold’s 

command were exhausted from the previous day’s fight and largely 

out of ammunition. Unit quartermasters had generally failed to distribute powder to the regiments that night after the battle, and they 

had few bullets to distribute at all. Now back in Albany, Schuyler received word that much of the army was very low on bullets 

and powder. Ever the workhorse, he began gathering gunpowder 

and lead from any source he could find. He acquired the lead largely from the window weights in Albany homes. He forwarded the 

weights to Bemis Heights so the lead could be melted and formed 

into bullets. Though Schuyler’s efforts were admirable, the supplies 

were unlikely to get to Bemis Heights in a timely fashion. In short, 

Burgoyne would have had a great chance of success if he had repeated his plan the following morning.

Burgoyne was indeed planning to do just that on the morning of 

the 20th. Fraser and Phillips urged him to attack once again despite 

the losses on the previous day. In fact, a British deserter from the 

62nd Foot came into Arnold’s lines and informed the Americans that 

an attack was imminent as soon as the morning fog lifted. The rebels stood behind their guns and waited, but the attack did not come. 

After reconsideration, Burgoyne decided against resuming offensive 

operations that day ostensibly because the hospitals were already full 

and he felt that the army’s supply trains were not adequately protected. He postponed the attack to the 21st. However, sometime before 

dawn the next day, Burgoyne received a coded letter from General 

Clinton in New York. Clinton’s message stated in part: “You know 

my good will, & are not ignorant of my poverty. If you think 2000 

men can assist you effectually I will make a push at Montgomery in 

about ten days but ever jealous of my flanks; if they make a move 

in force on either of them, I must return to save this important post. 
236

I expect reinforcements every day. Let me know what you would 

wish.” That force was supposed to leave New York on or about 22 

September according to the letter. Burgoyne decided at that point to 

dig in and see how Clinton’s Highlands campaign developed. At the 

most, it would succeed in linking up with Burgoyne to help defeat 

Gates (which was never Clinton’s intent). At the worst, Burgoyne 

concluded, it would draw away substantial forces from Gates’ army, 

making it easier for him to destroy or at least defeat the Northern 

Army. Burgoyne decided to entrench and await developments. 

In the end, the British did not attack on 21 September. That day 

the British troops heard great cheering and a thirteen-gun salute in 

the rebel camp as the Americans celebrated news of Lincoln’s attack 

on Fort Ticonderoga, Mount Independence, and Skenesborough. 

The fact that Burgoyne did not attack on the 20th or the 21st did 

not alleviate American concern about an imminent British attack. 

They continued to improve their defenses, receive reinforcements 

and supplies, and make bullets while the Army from Canada waited 

for the outcome of Clinton’s actions in the Highlands. As additional 

militia reinforcements from New York and New England arrived 

during the days following the battle at Freeman’s Farm, the size of 

Gates’ army eventually grew to about 12,500 officers and men under 

his immediate control. The longer Burgoyne waited, the stronger the 

Northern Army grew.

Description of the Highlands Campaign (Offsite) (see map 46, 

Appendix J, Clinton’s Highland Campaign, Attack on Forts Clinton 

and Montgomery 5–6 October 1777): When General Howe departed 

on his quest to capture Philadelphia in July, he left Clinton with a 

force of about 6,000 British and German soldiers and roughly 3,000 

Tory loyalists to defend New York. Clinton felt that the force was not 

sufficient to defend the approaches to the big city and simultaneously 

move up the Hudson to conduct sustained operations in the face of 

the growing Continental force. Clinton’s concern for New York was 

more imagined than real, especially since Howe had defeated Washington at Brandywine on 16 September, three days before the battle 

of Freeman’s Farm. Then, in late September, an additional 2,000 

troops arrived from Britain to bring Clinton’s forces up to almost 
237

10,000 men. However, only 7,000 were considered capable of taking the field. The rest were sick or in detachments detailed to other 

duties. Still, with the new reinforcements on hand, Clinton opted to 

leave about 4,000 men to defend the city and embark about 3,000 

men, mostly regulars, aboard three Royal Navy frigates and a collection of other small boats. On 3 October, Clinton departed for the 

Highlands to provide some assistance to Burgoyne’s stranded army.

Clinton’s two main tactical objectives were Forts Clinton and 

Montgomery. The Continental commander responsible for the area, 

Maj. Gen. Israel Putnam, had been tapped numerous times by General Washington to supply troops elsewhere—mostly to the main 

army in New Jersey. Putnam now had only about 1,500 men under 

his immediate control at Peekskill. This did not include troops at the 

two forts, which were located on the west side of the Hudson River 

about forty miles north of New York. The forts were positioned at a 

narrow defile and provided cover for a chain barrier which blocked 

vessel traffic north and south on the river. In short, they commanded 

the river so that passage between them on the Hudson was essentially impossible unless one controlled the forts. The positions, however, were inadequately defended. Both garrisons totaled only about 

600 men under another Clinton, Maj. Gen. George Clinton, who was 

also the Governor of New York. Additionally, the fortifications were 

built primarily to control movement on the river. They had not been 

constructed to adequately defend against ground attack like the one 

that Sir Henry Clinton planned. 

Clinton employed a rather wise tactical move to keep Putnam’s 

mobile forces separated from the American defenders at Forts Clinton 

and Montgomery. On 5 October, the British general landed a force of 

about 1,000 men on the east side of the Hudson at Verplanck’s Point 

(opposite Stony Point) and sent a naval detachment farther north to 

demonstrate opposite Peekskill on the east bank. Putnam’s assumption was that this British force was advancing to fix him in place 

so that another British force could be landed north or west of him, 

thereby trapping Putman’s command in a classic hammer and anvil 

attack. Therefore, Putnam retreated east, away from the river—removing his support for the forts. Putnam’s retreat allowed Clinton to 

concentrate his entire force against Forts Clinton and Montgomery. 
238

On the morning of 6 October, Clinton landed the remainder of 

his army at Stony Point and immediately marched north through a 

pass on Dunderberg Mountain toward Doodletown. At Doodletown, 

Clinton split his forces, sending 900 soldiers under Lt. Col. Mungo 

Campbell to the east around Bear Mountain to attack Fort Montgomery. Clinton personally led the remaining 1,200 troops west and 

north around Bear Mountain to attack Fort Clinton.

As the British expedition approached the forts, Gen. George 

Clinton, the American general in charge, was located in Esophus 

(now Kingston, New York) conducting state business in his capacity as governor. Learning of the British movements, the governor 

departed Esophus to assume direct command of the forts, reaching 

Fort Clinton before the British arrival. As the British columns were 

wending their way toward their respective objectives, the American 

general dispatched two companies of skirmishers to delay and force 

deployment of the British advance guard. One of the companies encountered the British column under Lieutenant Colonel Campbell 

(composed of the 52nd and 57th Regiments of Foot) before they 

reached the perimeter of Fort Montgomery. However, the rebels 

failed to stop the British advance. Both British columns arrived in 

the rear of their respective forts and demanded surrender which the 

Americans at both forts promptly rejected. 

The British wasted no time assaulting the forts. Taking heavy 

casualties from accurate American musket fire, the British managed 

to quickly overwhelm the rebel defenses at Fort Montgomery. The 

British commander, Campbell, was killed in the assault, which enraged some of his soldiers. Many Americans were driven into the 

nearby forests by the attack. Others abandoned their weapons and 

deserted. Some of the Americans who stayed and fought at Fort 

Montgomery were massacred by the soldiers of the 52nd and 57th 

Regiments of Foot in retaliation for Campbell’s death. To the south 

of Popolopen Creek, which separated the two positions, Fort Clinton was assaulted by the 63rd and 23rd Foot and elements of three 

other regiments. Overwhelmed by the British attack, Fort Clinton 

capitulated after brief but heavy fighting. At the end of the attacks, 

American losses at both forts numbered about 75 men killed and 

wounded and 263 captured. Around 100 cannon were also lost. Brit-
239

ish losses numbered about 41 killed and 142 wounded.

After the forts were captured, Royal Navy crews cut through 

the chain and log barriers designed to block movement of vessels. 

Advancing north from there, the British ships engaged a small 

squadron of American ships, including two frigates and a few 

smaller vessels. The British captured a schooner, but the Americans set fire to the remainder of their fleet so the boats would not 

fall into British hands.

On 7 October (the same day as the second battle at Saratoga to 

be covered later), Clinton sent another small amphibious force north 

to Fort Constitution. As the British approached, the rebel garrison 

quickly burned and abandoned the fort and fled into the nearby 

forests without a fight. At this point, all barriers designed to block an 

enemy advance up the Hudson River were effectively removed. The 

river was now open to free navigation for at least another 40 miles 

north, though Albany itself was still another 60 miles beyond that. 

On 22 October, Clinton ordered a small force under Brig. Gen. John 

Vaughn to continue upriver to the vicinity of Esophus, located about 

halfway to Albany. Though Vaughn succeeded in capturing and 

burning the town, Burgoyne’s expedition was surrounded at Saratoga 

(now Schuylerville), so the event had little impact on the campaign. 

Clinton’s expedition to the Highlands did not have the desired 

effects. Ultimately, neither Gates nor Washington released any of 

their forces to address Clinton’s incursion into southern New York. 

Burgoyne continued to face a significantly superior force, in numbers, throughout Clinton’s actions during the Highlands Campaign. 

The impact of an unreliable supply line continued to take a toll 

on Burgoyne’s army during the period of waiting. While Clinton 

operated in the south and Burgoyne pondered his next move, the 

Army from Canada commander was forced to reduce his troops’ rations by one-third. 

Vignette: Burgoyne attempted to keep up his men’s morale 

while concurrently reducing their rations. He told them: 

There is reason to be assured, that other powerful Armies 

[i.e., Clinton’s force] are actually in cooperation with 

these troops; and although the present supply of provi-
240

sions is ample, it is highly desirable to be prepared for 

any circumstances in the field that the King’s service 

may require, without the delay of bringing forward further stores for those purposes; the ration of bread or flour 

is, for the present fixed at one pound. (John F. Luzader, 

Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign 

of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 

2008, 275.)

After almost three weeks of idle expectancy, Burgoyne finally 

realized he would not receive substantial assistance from any quarter. Therefore, on 4 October, Burgoyne called for a council of war 

with his subordinate leaders to discuss options for the army’s next 

move. The British commander was still offensively minded and 

wanted to force a decision with Gates. However, his subordinate 

commanders—Riedesel especially—were not as certain. They fully 

recognized the army’s unfavorable circumstances. Nevertheless, the 

council decided to conduct a reconnaissance in force to the west 

which, if successful in locating a weakness in the American defenses, could be quickly reinforced into a full-blown assault. If no weakness was apparent, Burgoyne agreed to retreat back to at least Fort 

Edward, where communications could be opened with the north. 

Subsequently, Burgoyne directed that the movement would begin 

on the morning of 7 October and the council ended. The British and 

German generals returned to their commands and began preparations for the operation. 

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s decisions and actions regarding Clinton’s offers to help?

2. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s decisions and actions during the period of Clinton’s Highlands Campaign?

3. Were Burgoyne’s expectations unrealistic about the results 

due to Clinton’s assistance?

4. Could Clinton have done more to help Burgoyne?

5. Operationally, what are Burgoyne’s options at this point? 

6. Is it too late for Burgoyne to revive the campaign? Has his 
241

army operationally culminated?

7. Tactically, what are Burgoyne’s options at this point? 

8. How do you think Burgoyne could have made better use of 

the time during the period of Clinton’s Highlands Campaign?

9. What is your assessment of Gates’ use of time during Clinton’s Highlands Campaign?
242

Day 2, Stand 14 Leadership Friction in the Northern Army

(Events between 22 September and 6 October 1777)

Directions: Return to your vehicle from Park Stop #8 then follow the park access road back toward the Visitors’ Center. You will 

cross a bridge over the Great Ravine and head toward the Great 

Redoubt. At the first stop sign, turn left. Head down a hill to a Tintersection where you will turn right and head west, staying on this 

road all the way to the Visitors’ Center intersection. At the four-way 

intersection near the Visitors’ Center, turn left and proceed to Stand 

#14 at Park Stop #2 (Neilson’s Farm). Turn into the parking lot and 

follow the walking trail depicted in the map below.

Orientation: You are standing near the Neilson House, which 

served as Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor’s headquarters. The house and the 

farm on which it stood were the property of John Neilson. There was 

also a barn located just to the north of the house which the ContinenLeadership Friction

in the Northern Army

Stand 14

N

Park Tour Stop #2

Neilson Farm

14

Parking Area

Map 24. Day 2 Stand 14.
243

tal soldiers turned into a small fortification dubbed “Fort Neilson.” 

During the battles at Saratoga, John Neilson was a soldier serving 

in Benedict Arnold’s Left Wing and, in fact, was one of the soldiers 

manning Fort Neilson. Arnold would also use Neilson’s farmhouse 

as his headquarters between the two battles. The American defense 

perimeter extended east from here to the banks of the Hudson River. 

North of this position is Freeman’s Farm and to the northwest is 

Barber’s Wheatfield, site of the opening stages of the second battle 

of Saratoga. To the west is the small hill that some historians infer 

was the objective of the 7 October British reconnaissance in force. 

By then, Arnold had already established a picket post on the hill 

to provide an initial defense and early warning of the enemy’s approach. To the south of this point across New York Highway 32 is 

the Woodworth Farm where Gates’ headquarters and the American 

field hospital were located.

Description: While Burgoyne sat idle for almost three weeks 

awaiting good news and hoping for reinforcements, the Americans 

were having troubles of their own. A crisis arose between Horatio 

Gates and Benedict Arnold. As was customary, Gates drafted a report to send to the Continental Congress that detailed the fighting 

and results of the Freeman’s Farm battle. Gates, either by co-mission or omission, left out any mention of Arnold’s role in the battle. 

Moreover, Gates credited Morgan’s Riflemen and Light Infantry for 

the success, failing to mention all the other units involved (which 

belonged to Arnold’s command). When Arnold discovered these 

facts on 22 September, he believed that Gates had intentionally 

slighted him (which was certainly possible). He also learned that 

Gates issued an order that placed Morgan’s command directly under 

his (Gates’) control. Incensed, Arnold went to Gates’ headquarters 

and confronted the commanding general. 

At the impromptu meeting, Arnold grew hotter and angrier as 

the discussion wore on, and he threatened to leave the Northern Department. Gates replied with sarcasm, chiding Arnold about submitting a resignation letter in July and then never withdrawing the letter (in fact Arnold had only threatened to resign). The commanding 

general then told Arnold that it was doubtful he held any official 
244

position in the army. Gates said he was under no obligation to assign Arnold to a command. Indeed, Gates told him that he had ordered Lincoln to return to the army from Vermont upon which Gates 

would give him Arnold’s command. Furthermore, Gates stated, he 

would be happy to give Arnold a written pass to depart anytime 

he wished. Arnold then stormed out and sat down to write Gates a 

long letter airing his grievances and requesting a pass to go and see 

Washington. That led to a series of back and forth letters that only 

exacerbated the friction between the two. 

As the animosity grew, the officers of the camp began to catch 

wind of the interpersonal squabble. Several officers who were loyal 

to one general or the other fanned the flames through rumormongering or writing letters of their own. When rumors started floating 

around in early October that Arnold planned to leave the army, a 

group of officers drew up a petition appealing to Arnold to stay. The 

petition was signed by all general officers except Gates and Lincoln who had now returned to find himself in the middle of all this 

command turmoil. Arnold relented and remained. As for Gates, he 

had technically relieved Arnold of command and replaced him with 

Lincoln, but Arnold had not been ordered away from the army. He 

simply no longer commanded any troops. 

Vignette 1: On 22 September, Col. Richard Varick, the Northern Army’s commissary general of musters, wrote to General Schuyler regarding the quarrel earlier that day between Arnold and Gates: 

Had Gates complied with Arnold’s repeated desires, he 

would have gained a general & complete victory over the 

enemy. But it is evident to me, he never intended to fight 

Burgoyne till Arnold urged, begged & entreated him to 

do it. Nay, he meant by moving the army to cast an [illegible] on your reputation, in hopes that Burgoyne would be 

frightened by his movement from the south & north. I apprehend much that a certain person, whose conduct much 

bespeaks the character of a sycophant, & who affects 

great friendship for you, has no small share in attempting 

to injure your reputation when set in competition with 

General Gates’ & is at bottom of the dispute between Ar-
245

nold and Gates. I apprehend if Arnold leave us, we shant 

move unless the enemy run up the river. He had the full 

confidence of the troops & they would fight gallantly under him. If he [Arnold] quits I shall not stay longer unless 

I can probably see Saratoga [Schuyler’s estate 10 miles 

north of the Bemis Heights]. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga:

A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 265.)

Vignette 2: Col. Henry B. Livingston, commander of the 4th 

New York Continental Regiment, also wrote to Schuyler on 23 September: 

He [Arnold] is the life and soul of the troops. Believe me 

sir, to him & him alone is due the honor of our late victory [Freeman’s Farm]. Whatever share his superiors may 

claim they are entitled to none. He enjoys the confidence 

& affection of officers & soldiers. They would, to a man, 

follow him to conquest or death. His absence will dishearten them to such a degree, as to render them of but 

little service. The difference between him & Mr. G[ates] 

has arisen to too great a height to admit a compromise. I 

have, for some time past observed the great coolness, & 

in many instances, even disrespect with which Gen. Arnold has been treated at Head Qr. His proposals have been 

rejected with marks of indignity. His own orders have 

frequently been contravened—and himself set in a ridiculous light by those of the Commander-in-Chief. (John 

F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive 

Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas 

Beatie, 2008, 266.)

Vignette 3: Benedict Arnold, still fuming over the way he felt 

Gates willfully mistreated him, wrote another letter to the Army 

commander on October 1:

Notwithstanding the repeated ill treatment I have met 

with, and continued daily to receive, treated only as a cipher in the army, never consulted or acquainted with one 
246

occurrence in the army, which I know only by accident, 

while I have every reason to think your treatment proceeds from a spirit of jealousy, and that I have everything 

to fear from the malice of my enemies, conscious of my 

own innocency and integrity, I am determined to sacrifice 

my feelings, present peace and quiet, to the public good, 

and continue in the army at this critical juncture, when my 

country needs every support . . . I beg leave to say, that 

when Congress sent me into the department at the request 

of his excellency General Washington, they thought me of 

some consequence, and I believe expected the commander-in-chief, would consult with me, or at least would have 

taken my opinion on public matters. I think it my duty 

(which nothing shall deter me from doing) to acquaint you 

the army are clamorous for action. The militia who compose a great part of the army are already threatening to 

go home. One fortnight’s inaction will, I make no doubt, 

lessen your army by sickness and defection at least four 

thousand men, in which time the enemy may be reinforced 

to make good their retreat . . . I have reason to think, from 

intelligence since received, that had we improved the 20th 

of September it might have ruined the enemy, that is past, 

let me entreat you to improve the present time. . . . I hope 

you will not impute this hint to wish to command the army, 

or to outshine you, when I assure you it proceeds from my 

zeal for the cause of my country in which I expect to rise 

or fall. [Gates did not respond to this correspondence.] 

(As quoted by Rupert Furneaux, The Battle of Saratoga, 

New York: Stein and Day, 1971, 204–05.)

Orientation (continued): Before leaving this stand, take a moment to view the low hill to the west. This hill was ostensibly the 

piece of ground which was the objective of Burgoyne’s 7 October 

advance. Should Burgoyne’s forces reach that location, the British 

general intended to post much of his artillery there to batter a hole 

in the American defenses. Once the defenses were pierced, he could 
247

then send his disciplined regulars forward into the breach and complete the destruction, or rout, of the Northern Army.

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of the American command climate 

in the interim between the two major battles at Saratoga? Who, if 

anyone, is at fault for the difficulties? How would you have handled 

such a leadership challenge, either as the commander or the subordinate? What can we learn about Mission Command from this challenge—especially about building a cohesive team?

2. What was the impact of this period of relative inactivity between the two battles? This was a classic operational pause. Who 

benefitted the most and why?
248

Day 2, Stand 15 The Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield 

(Events of 7 October 1777)

Directions: From the Neilson Farm parking area, return to 

the one-way road and head east. At the stop sign, turn left heading 

northwest. Proceed to Park Stop #5 (Barber’s Wheatfield) and turn 

into the Barber’s Wheatfield parking lot. Walk on the footpath to the 

center of the field where the interpretive tablet is located.

Orientation: You are standing in the middle of Barber’s Wheatfield, site of the initial contact between Fraser’s Advance Corps and 

Poor’s Brigade during the second battle of Saratoga (see map 49, 

Appendix J, Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield 7 October 1777, 1300–

1500). To the east is the Hudson River. To the northeast are the Balcarres Redoubt (Freeman’s Farm) and the Breymann Redoubt, the 

two main defensive positions that many of Burgoyne’s troops would 

Park Tour Stop #5

Barber’s Wheatfield

15

Parking Area

Barber’s Wheatfield

Stand 15

N

Map 25. Day 2 Stand 15.
249

fall back to after their tactical repulse here at Barber’s Wheatfield. 

The initial British line would extend through here to the west beyond the woods across the park road. To the south is Bemis Heights. 

The Barber house stood in this vicinity. The British battle line was 

formed here generally west to east and facing south. The Americans 

would have assaulted from the south, with Morgan’s men coming up 

on the British right flank to the west.

Description: On 4 October, Burgoyne met with his three top 

generals, Phillips, Riedesel, and Fraser, in a council of war. He proposed leaving them 800 men to guard the trains and bateaux at the 

river and take the rest of the army on a wide swing to the west to 

attack the American lines there. Not knowing the actual strength and 

location of the enemy defenses, his subordinates all informed him 

that they felt the plan was too risky. Gentleman Johnny then proposed 

a modified approach. Instead, he would take his best troops, 1,500 

of them, and push west on a reconnaissance in force. Captain Fraser 

and the remnants of his Company of Marksmen—supplemented by 

about 90 rangers and Indians—would push ahead of the column to 

seek out the American left flank and gather information about its 

location, strengths, and weaknesses. If the defenses appeared weak 

enough, Burgoyne would order his entire army (less the guard for 

the trains and bateaux) out of its lines to attack the following day. If 

the defenses were too strong, Burgoyne would wait for a few more 

days. If no changes developed in his favor, he would retreat to Batten Kill to reestablish communications with Fort Ticonderoga. That 

was the primary purpose of the foray. Since no foraging details had 

been through the area, a secondary purpose of the reconnaissance in 

force was to traverse and gather any foodstuffs and animal forage 

that could be found to help feed the army. Riedesel was still dubious, but since Burgoyne was now at least considering a retrograde 

(which Riedesel had already suggested), he agreed to the plan as did 

the other two generals.

On the morning of 7 October, Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps 

began forming to draw rations and ammunition and otherwise prepare to begin their movement toward the west. As planned, Captain Fraser’s reconnaissance force departed early to scout the paths 
250

through the woods to the west and south for the army to follow, to 

seek the American defenses, and otherwise provide early warning. 

The inspections of the main column were completed by 1000, but 

for some reason, movement did not begin until about 1300. 

For this mission, General Fraser’s Advance Corps consisted 

of only Balcarres’ Light Infantry Battalion and the 24th Foot. This 

group was followed by Riedesel’s force, which was composed of 

the Braunschweiger von Riedesel Regiment plus a mixture of troops 

from other regiments and the jäger company. Bringing up the rear 

was Acland’s Grenadier Battalion. All told, Burgoyne’s ad hoc force 

consisted of 1,700 men. The column marched past Freeman’s Farm 

then through the Marshall Farm. At about 1330, the column arrived 

at the wheatfield of Simeon Barber. 

The field was about 300 yards square, full of standing wheat, 

and contained one small cabin. The British and German troops approached the field along what is now the walking trail from the direction of the Balcarres Redoubt to the northeast. The column filed into 

the field and halted. Noting the standing wheat and desirous of reaping it to feed the troops, Fraser began deploying his men on line to 

protect a harvesting effort. Burgoyne apparently agreed with Fraser’s 

action. Besides, the generals had not yet heard back from Fraser’s 

nephew as to what he had discovered on his reconnaissance of the 

American lines. While waiting, their troops could cut and haul the 

wheat. Fraser sent word back to the camp to bring foragers and wagons forward. 

In the interim, Balcarres’ Light Infantry formed the right of 

the line, extending its line into the woods on the west. Next came 

the 24th Foot and the German troops who halted generally in the 

middle of the field. Bringing up the rear were the Grenadiers who 

extended into the woods to the east. All the units halted along the 

trail and faced left toward Bemis Heights. The Grenadiers were bent 

back slightly to the left to conform with the trace of the road. While 

the troops rested, the foragers arrived from the British camp began 

to harvest the much-needed grain. Meanwhile, Burgoyne, Riedesel, 

and Phillips climbed onto the cabin roof to observe the American 

lines. Once up there, they could see nothing but more trees. 

What the generals did not realize was that the movement into 
251

the field and their ascent onto the cabin roof were being closely 

watched. The British column’s arrival had forced several American 

soldiers on picket to fall back and report this large concentration 

of British troops at Barber’s wheatfield. On receiving the report, 

Gates sent his adjutant general, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson, to observe 

and report on the British activity. The foragers were already at work 

when Wilkinson arrived. He also watched as the enemy generals 

climbed onto the cabin roof. Wilkinson returned and informed Gates 

about everything he had seen. He also offered the opinion that the 

British were looking for battle and that they intended to turn the 

American left flank. 

Gates decided to send Morgan’s rifle corps, including Dearborn’s Light Infantry, to investigate this threat more fully. Then as 

events unfolded, Gates also sent Poor’s and Learned’s Brigades to 

conduct an attack on the enemy lines. Morgan’s troops were to swing 

to the west to a small hill from which they could enfilade the right 

(west) of the enemy line. Poor’s Brigade was supposed to hit the 

enemy’s left (east) flank, and Learned would then attack the middle 

of the line. As planned, Morgan’s Riflemen and Dearborn’s Light 

Infantry moved quickly toward the wooded height commanding the 

British right flank but ran into elements of Captain Fraser’s Indians 

and the Company of Marksmen which held up the American advance briefly. Poor’s Brigade on the right marched to the Chatfield 

Farm clearing and proceeded toward the ditch of a wooded ravine 

opposite Acland’s Grenadiers. Just past 1600, the Grenadiers began 

to volley fire at the approaching rebel brigade. However, because of 

the higher ground on which the redcoats stood, their fire largely went 

high. Poor halted his troops and opened fire with a massive volley 

in which Acland, the Grenadier commander, fell with wounds in 

both legs. The volley was followed by the command, “Charge!” and 

suddenly, the Grenadiers were being subjected to something which 

they typically foisted on their own enemies—a bayonet charge. The 

surprised Grenadiers, their own commander down and faced with a 

howling mob of rebel troops with fixed bayonets, quickly folded and 

began to break for the rear. 

After brushing off Fraser’s troops, Morgan’s men on the American left gained the small hill to Balcarres’ right. From there, Mor-
252

gan’s Riflemen began to extract a heavy toll on Balcarres’ men who 

attempted to trade fire with the Americans. Meanwhile, Dearborn 

had led his men farther north beyond the high ground and positioned 

them almost in the rear of Balcarres’ line. Because he believed some 

of the American troops were being driven back, Dearborn ordered 

a charge into the right rear of the British position. At just about 

this time, Learned’s Brigade in the center appeared before the 24th 

Foot and the Braunschweigers, and both sides began trading volleys. Capt. Georg Päusch, commander of the Hesse-Hanau Artillery 

Battery, kept Learned’s men from making an all-out assault against 

the line by expert employment of his two 6-pounders located at the 

German line. After finding that his own main line had fallen back, 

Päusch withdrew his guns to a small log wall in front of the little 

cabin. There the captain positioned the cannon—one at each end of 

the wall—so he could place fire at both Poor’s and Learned’s troops 

and help keep them at bay. He continued the battle while the German line supported him from the rear.

Meanwhile, Gates remained at his Bemis Heights headquarters 

throughout the day just as he had done during the battle at Freeman’s 

Farm. He depended solely on the reports of others rather than venturing forward to assess the situation himself. Arnold, however, became 

impatient listening to all the small arms and cannon fire north of Bemis Heights. Anxious to get into the battle, Benedict Arnold rode out 

of the defenses and headed toward the sounds of the guns. On arrival, 

he came upon Learned’s Brigade in action against the Braunschweigers. Technically, Arnold was a man without a command and had no 

authority to assume tactical control of any kind (see note on the next 

page). However, many of the Continental soldiers recognized Arnold 

riding by and cheered his presence on the battlefield. Undoubtedly 

this led Arnold to follow through on his desire to once again lead in 

battle. Caught up in the excitement of the moment, Arnold cheered 

the men forward, urging them to attack the enemy line. Three of 

Learned’s regiments moved forward against the British center but 

made no real headway. The Germans and the 24th Foot held steady 

against the American attack, at least for a time. 

On the British right, Balcarres regained control of his Light In-
253

fantry after their shock of Dearborn’s men surprising them from the 

rear. Balcarres reformed his men on the right of the 24th Foot and 

continued the firefight with Morgan and Dearborn. The rebel fire and 

advance, however, soon caused the Light Infantry to falter again. 

General Fraser, noting the danger of collapse on his right, rode there 

to bolster their courage as well as those of the 24th Foot. In the process of this effort, Fraser was shot in the stomach by a rebel rifleman 

and mortally wounded as he attempted to rally his men.

Fraser’s mortal wound seemed to signal the final collapse of 

the remaining British line in Barber’s Field. Sensing his men were 

wavering on the verge of a rout, Burgoyne realized that he had to 

break off the engagement and try to get his remaining forces back 

under the cover of prepared defenses. He sent orders to retreat to 

the redoubts. On the left, the Grenadiers had already broken and 

fled. In the center, the Braunschweigers were also crumbling. At the 

fenceline near the Barber cabin, Päusch’s men continued to serve 

their guns. However, when the captain turned to signal the German 

line to cover his retreat, he discovered that the German and British 

infantry protecting the house and log wall had already fled. With the 

approach of overwhelming American forces, Päusch and his men 

successfully limbered their guns and got them to the wood line, but 

there they were nearly overrun by advancing rebels at the new location and eventually had to abandon their guns.

As the British and German troops fled for the safety of the prepared positions to the east, many of them saw Brig. Gen. Abraham 

Ten Broeck’s New York Militia Brigade—some 1,300 strong—

march into view on the field. The militia played no major role in this 

part of the fight, but the appearance of a single fresh brigade which 

almost rivaled the size of the whole British force in this fight must 

have been a shock to the fleeing enemy troops. 

Note: The standard historical account of Arnold’s relief and actions after the battle at Freeman’s Farm may be largely inaccurate. 

First, no official documentation (general orders, special orders, letters of relief, etc.) or personal accounts verify later claims that Gates 

relieved Arnold of his command. Moreover, the account of a second 
254

quarrel with Arnold on the day of the second battle on 7 October 

seems unlikely as well as the following excerpt from a recently discovered letter that Capt. Nathaniel Bacheller wrote to his wife two 

days after the battle. Bacheller was the adjutant of a New Hampshire 

regiment in Arnold’s command. He overheard and observed several key conversations and actions at Arnold’s headquarters at the 

Neilson House on 7 October. The letter describes the two generals 

discussing an attack on approaching British forces, which is at odds 

with conventional stories of the men in conflict. It also seems to 

oppose the story of Arnold’s reportedly drunken, wild, and insubordinate behavior on the battlefield that day. Bacheller wrote (original 

misspellings corrected):

General Arnold soon went out into the woods on horseback with his aid-de-camp to view the enemy which then 

engaged with [Morgan’s] riflemen. The news was that he 

saw them marching towards us but could not give any account how many as they did not see their front nor rear. 

General Gates soon arrived to our lines and inquired for 

General Arnold and was told he was out of the lines to 

view the enemy. He soon ordered an officer on horseback 

to go to General Arnold to order him to give orders the 

riflemen not to fire on Colonel [Alexander] Scammell’s 

regiment [the 3rd New Hampshire]. . . . General Arnold 

soon returned and told General Gates that the enemy design was to take possession of a hill about a quarter of a 

mile to the west of our lines. . . . General Arnold says to 

General Gates, ‘It is late in the day but let me have men 

and we will have some fun with them before sunset,’ upon 

which the brigades began to march out the lower lines 

three quarters of a mile from us, but in plain sight of us. 

Soon a very heavy fire began with both cannon and small 

arms. (Nathaniel Bacheller, Nathaniel Bacheller to Susanna Bacheller letter, 9 October 1777, Ed. Eric Schnitzer, 

Nathaniel Bacheller file, Saratoga National Historical 

Park.)
255

Vignette: Capt. George Pausch, commander of the HesseHanau Artillery, described the rout of the British center near the 

Barber house:

Seeing that all was irretrievably lost, and that it was impossible to save anything, I called to the few remaining 

men to save themselves. I myself took refuge through a 

fence, in a pick of dense underbrush on the right of the 

road, with the last ammunition wagon, which, with the 

help of a gunner, I saved with the horses. Here I met 

all the different nationalities of our division running pell 

mell—among them Capt. Schoel, with whom there was 

not a single man left of the Hanau Regiment. In this confused retreat all made for our camp and our lines. (George 

Paush, Journal of Captain Pausch, Chief of the Hanau 

Artillery during the Burgoyne Campaign, William Leete, 

annotator and translator, Albany, New York, Joel Munsell’s Sons, 1886, 171–72.)

Analysis

1. What is your assessment of Burgoyne’s plan for this operation? Was this the best tactical plan to further his operational aims? 

Why or why not?

2. What is your assessment of Gates’ plan for this operation? 

He seems to have a sound, if cautious, approach to the battle. Should 

he have been more aggressive?

3. How effective is Gates’ command over the American forces 

at this point?

4. What is your assessment of Gates’ tactical leadership thus 

far during this battle? Where should Gates position himself in such a 

battle to provide the best command and control? How do his actions 

support or violate the concept of Mission Command?
256

Day 2, Stand 16 Balcarres Redoubt (Events on 7 October 1777)

Directions: From Barber’s Wheatfield, return to the parking 

area. Follow the one-way park road to the north. Turn into Park Stop 

#6 (Balcarres Redoubt/Freeman Farm). Take the walking path to the 

south until you arrive at the Bloody Knoll.

Orientation: You are standing on a British defense position that 

was in the path of Poor’s Continental Brigade units as they pursued 

the British forces from Barber’s Wheatfield toward the Balcarres 

Redoubt (see map 50, Appendix J, Fighting at the Redoubts 7 October 1777, 1600–1900). The view here is similar to what the Continentals would have seen as they emerged from the woods near this 

knoll and came within visual and small arms range of the main reBalcarres Redoubt

Stand 16

N

Park Tour Stop #6

Balcarres Redoubt

16

Parking Area

“Bloody Knoll”

Map 26. Day 2 Stand 16.
257

doubt. Visible to the east is the location of Balcarres Redoubt. To the 

north is the Breymann Redoubt (not in view). Barber’s Wheatfield 

is to the southwest. The Bemis Heights defenses are approximately 

a mile and a half south of this location.

Description: Once the British and German lines in Barber’s 

Field collapsed, the battle became a foot race between Burgoyne’s 

troops fleeing for the safety of their prepared positions and the Continentals and militiamen hell-bent on running their prey to ground. 

The Poor’s Brigade troops followed the retreating enemy through 

the woods and along a trail exiting Barber’s meadow at the northeast corner of the field. After pushing northeast for about 300 yards, 

Poor’s men trotted into the open in time to see many of the enemy troops scramble into and beyond a number of British earth and 

breastworks. Poor’s men hardly hesitated and charged the nearest 

work. This position, later known as “Bloody Knoll,” was located 

on a small rise and sported a short stockade wall. The position soon 

fell to Poor’s men, but they suffered heavy casualties in taking it. A 

number of the other small outposts around the large main position 

known as Balcarres Redoubt also fell to the advancing rebels of Paterson’s and Glover’s commands.

Arnold, who had arrived at about the time Bloody Knoll fell, 

sent an aide to direct Poor to organize his brigade for an attack on 

the main redoubt. It took the general a little time to form his ranks 

but then Poor ordered his men forward, cheered on by Arnold who 

was mounted on horseback and flailing the air with his sword. The 

brigade charged forward from the Bloody Knoll, picked their way 

through the abatis, and advanced toward the main position. Behind 

the redoubt’s stockade defenses, the once-panicked 24th Foot, interspersed with refugees from the Light Infantry and Grenadiers, had 

used the few precious moments to catch their breath and load their 

weapons. They now stood firm and poured a heavy fire on their attackers. Realizing that the position was too strong, Poor’s Brigade 

reeled back with heavy casualties. The troops retreated to the surrounding trees or other positions for cover and began trading shots 

with the enemy crouching behind the stockades.
258

Vignette: Col. Phillip van Cortlandt, commanding the 2nd New 

York Regiment of Poor’s Brigade, described some of the confusion 

and chaos that reigns in most combat situations: 

I being yet with Poor’s brigade and advancing, the British retiring towards their battery, as the Hessians towards 

theirs. General Arnold, now on the field and in sight of 

the nine gun battery [Balcarres Redoubt] sent his aid [sic] 

to the right, ordering General Poor to bring his men into 

better order as we were pursuing. This order arrested our 

progress and prevented our taking the British battery in 

less than ten minutes; as we should have entered it almost 

as soon as the British, as Morgan did that of the Hessians, 

which Arnold discovered after sending the above order to 

General Poor, and as he had also sent another order by his 

aid, he now rode as fast as he could to counteract his own 

orders. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A Military History of 

the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New 

York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 287–88.)

Analysis

1. What factors allowed the Americans to gain the upper hand 

at Bloody Knoll?

2. What had changed by the time Poor attacked Balcarres Redoubt? Why did that attack fail?
259

Day 2, Stand 17 Breymann Redoubt (Events on 7 October 1777)

Directions: Return to parking lot at Park Stop #6. Proceed north 

to Park Stop #7 (Breymann Redoubt) parking lot. Follow the foot 

path to the stand location to your west.

Orientation: You are standing within the defensive perimeter 

of the Breymann Redoubt (see map 50, Appendix J, Fighting at the 

Redoubts 7 October 1777, 1600–1900). The British defensive line 

extended to the east from here toward the Great Redoubt adjacent 

to the western shore of the Hudson River. The town of Saratoga 

(now known as Schuylerville) is located about eight miles north of 

this position. A lone picket manned by German soldiers was located 

approximately 100 to 150 yards forward of this position. South of 

Breymann Redoubt

Stand 17

N

Park Tour Stop #7

Breymann Redoubt

17

Parking Area

Arnold Boot

Monument

Restrooms

Canadian Cabins

Map 27. Day 2 Stand 17.
260

this position (see the white posts that delineate positions) were three 

houses used by Canadian militia to provide supporting positions between the Breymann and Balcarres redoubts.

Description: As Poor’s Brigade was being repulsed, Arnold observed Learned’s Brigade and Morgan’s troops advancing on line 

in a northerly direction behind Poor’s Brigade. They appeared to be 

moving to attack another enemy position. This was the Breymann 

Redoubt, built to be defended by 500 soldiers but now held by only 

200 jägers of Breymann’s command. To the south of the redoubt were 

three cabins manned by Canadian militia and fortified to provide defensive support to the redoubt. Spurring his horse forward, Arnold 

ordered several companies from Learned’s right hand regiments to 

attack the cabins. They did so with alacrity. Once the Canadian positions fell, the way was open to the rear of Breymann’s position. 

Arnold directed Lt. Col. John Brooks’ 8th Massachusetts Regiment 

to attack into the rear of the stockade. Concurrently, Morgan’s and 

Dearborn’s men attacked Breymann’s position frontally.

The final American assault was so quick and the distance to the 

redoubt so short that the Germans and loyalists inside could do little 

more than fire a volley or two before they stampeded toward the 

woods to the east and toward safety of the Great Redoubt. Lieutenant Colonel Breymann attempted to keep his men from retreating 

by threatening them and swatting some with the flat of his sword. 

He was shot and killed in the process, most likely by one of his own 

men desperate to get away (attested to by at least one eyewitness, 

though the evidence is not clear). In the few minutes of close-quarters fighting in and near the redoubt, General Arnold himself became 

a casualty. As Arnold rode into the rear of the position, a German 

soldier raised his weapon and fired at the general. The round struck 

Arnold’s leg, passed through, and killed his horse. The animal fell 

and pinned him beneath its carcass and broke the general’s already 

injured limb. A nearby American soldier was about to bayonet the 

German when Arnold intervened and ordered the man not to do any 

harm to the enemy soldier as he was only doing his duty.

As these actions were taking place, dusk settled on the battlefield. The Balcarres Redoubt and a number of smaller nearby supporting positions still held. The collective British efforts were too strong 
261

for the Americans to try another assault, and the position effectively 

blocked any further direct advance toward the Great Redoubt. The enfilade fire from the Breymann Redoubt and other locations, however, 

soon made Balcarres’ position untenable. Once darkness descended, 

Balcarres’ men kept up their fire and vigilance until slipping away to 

the east into the murky woods and making their way to the Great Redoubt. The rebels failed to detect the move, or at least failed to pursue.

The last action of the day was performed by a small detachment 

of about fifty men from the Braunschweiger von Riedesel Regiment 

under Lt. Col. Ernst von Speth. Learning of the Breymann Redoubt’s 

fall, Speth determined to recapture the position under cover of darkness. As the patrol moved westward through the dark woods, the soldiers encountered a “loyalist” who offered to take Speth to the position. 

Instead, the man abandoned the detachment even deeper in the woods. 

Speth and his men stumbled around in the dark until they were surrounded and captured by rebel skirmishers the following morning.

Speth’s capture capped a disastrous day for Burgoyne’s command. In all, the Army from Canada lost almost 900 men killed, 

wounded, and missing (including loyalists, Canadians, and Indians). 

Six of the command’s cannon were also lost to the Americans. Despite 

the heavy fighting during the day, the rebels had only lost somewhere 

between 150 and 200 men, of which just thirty were killed in action. 

Vignette 1: Colonel Wilkinson described the defenses at the 

Breymann Redoubt:

The right flank defense of the enemy occupied by the German corps of Breymann, consisted of a breastwork of rails 

piled horizontally between perpendicular pickets, driven 

into the earth, formed en potence to the rest of his line, and 

extended about 250 yards across an open field, and was covered on the right by a battery of two guns. The interval from 

the left to the British light infantry was committed to the 

defence of the provincials, who occupied a couple of log 

cabins [of the McBride farm]. The Germans were encamped 

behind the rail breast work, and the ground in front of it 

inclined in a very gentle slope for about 120 yards, then it 

sunk abruptly, our troops had formed a line under this declivity, and covered breast high were warmly engaged with 

the Germans. From this position, about sunset, I perceived 
262

Brigadier General Learned advancing toward the enemy 

with his brigade in open column. I think with Colonel M. 

Jackson’s regiment in front. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A 

Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American 

Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 290.)

Vignette 2: Lieutenant Colonel Wilkinson, who was in the vicinity of Balcarres Redoubt when it fell, recorded Arnold’s actions there:

[Arnold] finding himself on our right, dashed to the left 

through the fire of the two lines and escaped unhurt; he then 

turned to the right of the enemy, as I was informed by that 

excellent officer, Colonel Butler [of Morgan’s Corps], and 

collecting 15 or 20 riflemen threw himself with his party 

into the rear of the enemy, just as they gave way, where his 

leg was broke, and his horse killed under him; but whether 

by our fire or that of the enemy, just as they fled from us, 

has never been ascertained. (John F. Luzader, Saratoga: A 

Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution, New York: Savas Beatie, 2008, 292.)

Analysis

1. Why did the assault against the Breymann Redoubt succeed 

when the attack against the Balcarres Redoubt failed?

2. Assess Benedict Arnold’s leadership on 7 October. Was Arnold exercising disciplined initiative (as in Mission Command), or 

was he a subordinate out of control? Define the difference.

3. To what do you attribute American success on 7 October? 

British failure?

4. What are Burgoyne’s options now? Gates?

Figure 15. 2nd Battle of Saratoga Casualties.

Estimated Casualties

from 2nd Battle of Saratoga

(7 October 1777 &

Final Surrender 17 October 1777)

Killed 440 90

Wounded 695 240

Captured 6,2221 -

Total 6,640 330

British American

Notes:

1. Includes some wounded listed above.
263

Day 2, Stand 18 The British Retreat and Surrender: 

The Impact of Saratoga (Events between 7 and 17 October 1777)

Directions: From Park Stop #7 (Breymann Redoubt) parking 

lot, head east on the park battlefield road for 1.9 miles. You will 

cross over the Great Ravine. At the first stop sign, turn left and travel 

another 0.6 miles to the intersection of the park road and Phillips 

Road. Turn left heading east and proceed 0.7 miles. Phillips Road 

ends at a T-intersection with US-4. Turn left (north) onto US-4 East 

and proceed north 7.2 miles toward Schuylerville, New York. As 

you enter Schuylerville, you will cross over Fish Creek. Turn left 

onto Burgoyne Street and travel 0.6 miles to the Surrender Site, 

which is marked by a large obelisk monument on your left. Turn left 

18

Saratoga

Surrender Site

29

113

32

Route to Surrender Site

Stand 18

N

4

18

338

Schuylerville

69

Map 28. Day 2 Route to Stand 18.
264

after the monument and immediately turn left into the parking lot. 

Walk to the stand location on the east side of the monument.

Note: General Schuyler’s home was on the south side of Fish 

Creek on the east side of the road just before you cross the creek. 

Burgoyne’s troops burned it during the fighting here after the retreat.

Orientation: You are standing near the location of Burgoyne’s 

headquarters after his army retreated north to Saratoga shortly after 

the second battle of Saratoga (see map 51, Appendix J, British Defenses at Saratoga 11–17 October 1777). To the east was the town of Saratoga (now known as Schuylerville). Beyond that is the Hudson River. 

Fort Miller is approximately 3 miles to the north on the east side of the 

Hudson. Fort Edward is approximately 20 miles north of this location 

also on the east side of the river. To the south about 8 miles is Bemis 

Heights. Albany is about 35 miles downriver from this location. At the 

Retreat & Surrender

Stand 18

N

18

Parking Area

Restrooms

Saratoga

Monument

338

Map 29. Day 2 Stand 18.
265

time this hill was occupied, the British fortified this location similar 

to the redoubts at Freeman’s Farm (low stockade walls, abatis, etc.). 

In addition to this main position, three additional fortifications were 

located on high ground beginning about 500 yards to the northeast.

Description: On the evening of 7 October, Burgoyne ordered 

all his forces to withdraw into the confines of the Great Redoubt. 

Generally speaking, his troops successfully accomplished this directive overnight. The next day, the American forces moved up the 

river valley road with their newly captured artillery, as well as some 

of their own pieces, and began bombarding the British positions. 

Small arms fire was prevalent all day long as well. The persistent 

harassment interfered with the funeral services for General Fraser, 

who was buried within the confines of the Great Redoubt. 

With so many men and weapons lost and the low levels of supply, Burgoyne’s options were now realistically down to one—retreat—and that was only if his army was able. Late on 8 October, 

the general made the inevitable decision and ordered the army to 

begin movement back to Fort Ticonderoga. That evening, the 47th 

Foot began the trek followed by the 9th Foot and Riedesel’s troops. 

Just as the march began, the heavens released a pouring rain. The 

British rearguard departed the redoubt about 0400, leaving about 

300 wounded men and doctors behind for Gates to attend to. Due to 

destroyed bridges to the north, the column only made about 5 miles 

and one halt lasted ten hours. 

On the 9th, Gates’ troops walked into Burgoyne’s old camp 

and assumed control of the British and German wounded. Clearly Burgoyne’s army was retreating but Gates made no attempt to 

pursue. Perhaps Gates felt the pursuit was not really necessary. He 

possessed eight brigades in his immediate command, and six others 

barred the way east across the river and north toward Fort Miller. 

Brig. Gen. John Fellows alone commanded about 3,000 men of his 

Massachusetts Militia Brigade. Other elements which were positioned across the Hudson River covering a ford just north of the 

village of Saratoga. John Stark’s newly raised militia command, located about three miles farther north, consisted of about 2,500 men. 

He was positioned to cover the ford at Batten Kill and the point 

where Burgoyne had built his bridge to cross the river earlier. Brig. 
266

Gen. Jacob Bayley’s Vermont Militia Brigade, composed of more 

than 1,000 men, was still farther north at Fort Edward. 

Despite the lack of a pursuit, or perhaps because of it, Burgoyne’s army did not reach Saratoga until the afternoon of the 9th 

and did not complete the Fish Kill crossing until the next morning. 

At Saratoga, Burgoyne halted his army and prepared strong positions on some high ground north of the creek—hoping that Gates 

might attack him. The same day, Gates left to follow the Army from 

Canada north. He arrived at Saratoga in the afternoon. On the foggy 

morning of 11 October, Gates ordered his brigades forward across 

Fish Kill, assuming that Burgoyne was still retreating. Once across, 

a British deserter warned General Glover that the British and German troops were in positions on the high ground. On receiving this 

information Gates stopped all movement. The fog soon lifted exposing Poor’s and Paterson’s Brigades on the slopes below the British 

positions. The British quickly opened fire with musketry and cannon, but fortunately the two American brigades were able to scramble to safety without heavy casualties. 

With the British positions now visible, the rebel brigade commanders shifted their commands to effectively surround Burgoyne’s 

men. The rebels opened a heavy fire of their own with both small 

arms and artillery. This was the state of affairs until Burgoyne called 

a council of war on 14 October to discuss the idea of capitulation. 

His officers unanimously agreed that at this point surrender was honorable, especially since the Army from Canada was down to about 

3,500 effective troops compared to more than 20,000 for Gates. 

Burgoyne sent one of his officers to Gates with a proposal to negotiate the Army from Canada’s capitulation. The letter read in part:

After having fought you twice, Lieutenant-General Burgoyne has waited some days, in his present position, determined to try a third conflict against any force you could 

bring to attack him. He is apprised of the superiority of 

your numbers, and the disposition of your troops to impede his supplies, and render his retreat a scene of carnage 

on both sides. In this situation he is impelled by humanity, 

and thinks himself justifiable by established principles and 

precedents of state, and of war, to spare the lives of brave 
267

men upon honourable terms. Should Major-General Gates 

be inclined to treat upon that idea, General Burgoyne 

would propose a cessation of arms during the times necessary to communicate the preliminary terms by which, in 

any extremity, he and his army mean to abide. (The Scots 

Magazine 39, Edinburgh: A. Murray and J. Cochran, December 1777, 658.)

To his surprise, Burgoyne received a response from Gates that 

in effect demanded total surrender. This incident began a series of 

communications between the two generals seeking conditions under 

which the British would surrender. After the next round of negotiations, Gates suddenly agreed to almost all of Burgoyne’s demands. 

This complicated the negotiations since Burgoyne believed that 

Gates’s sudden change of heart was due to the possibility that General Clinton’s expedition up the Hudson was achieving some success. Eventually learning that Clinton would not be able to rescue 

him, Burgoyne agreed to sign a “convention” rather than a surrender 

document. Almost a meaningless term in the long run, one article in 

the convention allowed Burgoyne’s army to return to Europe on the 

condition that they would not return to service in North America. 

Gates agreed to the article, which later caused him much grief with 

the Continental Congress. 

The surrender of Burgoyne’s Army began about 1100 on 17 October at a place known known as the “Field of Grounded Arms” just 

north of Fish Kill, near the ruins of Fort Hardy (now Fort Hardy Park 

in Schuylerville) on the flood plain next to the Hudson River. Under 

the command of Burgoyne and his officers, and with only Lieutenant 

Colonel Wilkinson and two other American officers observing, the 

British, German, Canadian, and American loyalist troops of the Army 

from Canada marched by and deposited their weapons. Once the arms 

were piled, Burgoyne asked Wilkinson to introduce him to General 

Gates. The two generals saluted and then Burgoyne, dressed in his 

best uniform, raised his hat and said, “The fortune of war, General 

Gates, has made me your prisoner.” Gates magnanimously responded, “I shall always be ready to bear testimony that it has not been 

through any fault of your excellency.” At that point, Gates invited 
268

Burgoyne and his staff to sit down for a meal. 

Vignette: After laying down their weapons, Burgoyne’s troops 

were marched south over the Fish Kill south into what would be 

captivity. After crossing, the captives were awed to see the thousands of Continental and militia troops of the massive American 

army drawn up on both sides of the road. One of the German officers 

later wrote down his impressions of his erstwhile enemies:

Not one of them [the American troops] was properly uniformed, but each man had on the clothes in which he goes 

to field, to church or to the tavern, but they stood like soldiers, erect with a military bearing which was subject to 

little criticism. All their guns were provided with bayonets 

and the riflemen had rifles. The people stood so still that 

we were greatly amazed. Furthermore, nature had formed 

all the fellows who stood in rank and file, so slender, 

so handsome, so sinewy, that it was a pleasure to look 

at them and we were all surprised at the sight of such a 

finely built people. And their size! The officers wore very 

few uniforms and those they did wear were of their own 

invention. All colors of cloth are usable, e.g. brown coats 

with sea green facings, white linings and silver trimmings, 

and grey coats in abundance, with buff facings and cuffs, 

and gilt buttons; in short every variety of pattern. I must 

still say there was not a man among them who showed the 

slightest sign of mockery, malicious delight, hate, or other 

insult. It seemed rather as if they wished to do us honor. 

(Christopher Ward, The War of the Revolution 2, Albany, 

New York: Joel Musell, 1867. Translated by William L. 

Stone. Reprint New York: Arno Press, 1968, 538–39; and 

by Michael O. Logusz, With Musket & Tomahawk: The 

Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777, 

Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2012, 305.)

Description (continued): On receiving the convention 

document from Gates, the Continental Congress quickly abrogated 

the article concerning returning Burgoyne’s army to Europe on the 
269

condition they would never serve in North America again. Instead, 

Burgoyne’s men and most of his officers were imprisoned for the 

remainder of the war. Burgoyne himself was returned to England the 

following April. Most of the remaining officers and men were first 

incarcerated at a camp in Cambridge, Massachusetts. In November 

1778, the “Convention Army” as it became known, moved to 

Charlottesville, Virginia, and then in 1781 moved a final time to 

Lancaster, Pennsylvania. By the time the men were released to go 

home, a large number had deserted from the camps and made their 

homes in America. Others, of course, died in captivity, mostly from 

disease. Ultimately, only about 3,000 of the 5,900 members of the 

Convention Army were shipped home in 1783.

Analysis

Campaign Results:

News of this major Continental victory was quite slow to 

reach the opposite side of the Atlantic Ocean; once it did, Benjamin Franklin’s delegation in France achieved a negotiation breakthrough resulting in an alliance with France which was signed in 

February 1778. Within six months, French military forces arrived in 

the United States to fight with the Continentals against their British 

rivals. The alliance would eventually combine to achieve victory at 

Yorktown in 1781 and complete American independence in 1783.

1. What is your assessment of Gates’ decision not to pursue 

once Burgoyne retreated? 

2. Under what conditions should a pursuit be undertaken?

Battle KIA WIA MIA/POW KIA WIA MIA/POW

Fort Ticonderoga 5 - - 7 11 -

Hubbardton 60 168 - 41 96 230

Fort Schuyler 5 47 41 7 18 9

Oriskany1 - - - 385 50 30

Bennington2 207 2 700 30 40 -

1st & 2nd Saratoga 440 695 6,222 90 240 -

Total 717 910 6,963 560 455 269

British Continental

Notes:

1. British casualties at the Battle of Oriskany are combined with Fort Schuyler. Indian losses are not depicted.

2. Wounded for Bennington figures are included in MIA/POW.

Figure 16. Campaign Casualties.
270

3. What are the most effective ways to use militia/reserve forces in conjunction with regular forces?

4. What do you see as the key factors/events which allowed 

American forces to achieve victory in this campaign?

5. What are the reasons behind the British defeat? 

6. Could Burgoyne have been successful in this campaign? Why?

7. If so, what should have been done differently on the part of 

the British? 

8. What role did terrain play in the outcome of this campaign?
271

Notes

1. Richard M. Ketchum, Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s Revolutionary War (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 293.

2. Matthew H. Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British 

Army on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783 (Norman, OK: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 2010), 257.

3. Matthew H. Spring, With Zeal and With Bayonets Only: The British 

Army on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783 (Norman, OK: University of 

Oklahoma Press, 2010), 257.
 
273

IV. Integration Phase

Introduction

As this handbook has previously emphasized, a staff ride consists of three phases. The “Preliminary Study Phase” is conducted 

before the visit to the battlefield and prepares the students for the 

visit. The “Field Study Phase” on the battlefield enables students 

to understand historical events through analyzing the actual terrain. 

The final “Integration Phase” is critical to help the students understand what happened, why it happened, and, most importantly, what 

can be learned from the study of the battle or campaign.

Staff ride leaders should consider several factors when planning for and conducting the integration phase. First, the leader must 

work with the participating organization to select a time and location for the integration session. Following the field study phase, 

preference is to give students at least one day for personal reflection 

and thought before the integration phase. If the extra time is not 

an option, the integration session should be conducted at a location 

different from the last stand—a comfortable and dry place that will 

encourage open discussion from all participants. For units that need 

to depart shortly after the last stand of the field phase, the staff ride 

leader can conduct the integration phase on the battlefield immediately after completing the field study phase.

The staff ride leader should organize the integration phase 

based on the unit, time available, and training objectives. The leader can conduct the integration phase in a format similar to an after 

action review (AAR), or may simply lead a discussion with participants on what they learned. One option is to ask specific students to 

brief particular items, or consider having an open discussion with 

minimal structure. Regardless of the format, keep in mind that the 

integration phase is not an AAR of the ride itself (i.e., ways to improve the ride). While constructive criticism about the conduct of 

the staff ride itself is valuable, this should be done at another time 

or perhaps through written AAR comments. Instead, the integration phase is an opportunity for the students to integrate their preliminary study with the fieldwork to gain insights that are relevant 

to their current duties and enhance their professional development. 
274

The most important thing to remember is that the participants 

should do the majority of the talking. 

One method that often produces a fruitful integration phase 

is to conduct the session in three parts based on three broad questions. Sometimes the leader will ask one general question and then 

let others carry the conversation, or more follow-up questions may 

be needed to prod the discussion. Each of the three questions is 

discussed below.

What aspects of the campaign had you developed in the 

preliminary study phase that changed or were strongly reinforced because of your study of the ground/terrain? 

This is a crucial question because seeing the terrain is central to 

a staff ride. Otherwise the campaign could simply be studied in the 

classroom. Of course, students may develop a wide range of answers 

based on personal study and observations in the field. Some of the 

more popular aspects of the terrain discussion for the Saratoga Campaign include the large distances encompassed by the operational 

maneuver, the wooded and hilly nature of the region, how both sides 

used water routes for transportation and supply, Gates’ use of terrain 

to successfully block Burgoyne’s movement south, the effective use 

of terrain for engineer operations to slow British movement, and 

the Hudson River as both help and hindrance to movement. The 

staff ride leader can ask a related question, which may also generate 

good discussion: Did seeing the terrain alter your opinion of any of 

the leaders? A common response to this question is that Burgoyne 

failed to realize the difficulties he would encounter logistically and 

tactically in operating in the central New York area.

What aspects of warfare have changed and what aspects 

have remained the same since the Saratoga Campaign? 

The answers to the “changed” aspects will probably seem more 

obvious to the modern military professional and often will be related 

to technology. This may include changes in weapons, transportation 

systems, communications, and numerous other pieces of equipment. 

The aspects that have “remained the same” may not seem as numerous at first, but the students will often build on some initial answers 

and find many good items. The role of personalities; command re-
275

lationships; the importance of proper logistics planning; the need 

for strong, positive leadership and an ability to motivate soldiers; 

and the importance of operational maneuver, determination, courage, and fear are just some of the items of warfare that seem to have 

changed little since 1777. Depending on the group, you may want to 

ask a few more focused questions. For example, if you are instructing a quartermaster unit, you can ask: What aspects of logistics have 

changed, and what aspects have remained the same?

What insights can the modern military professional gain 

from the Saratoga Campaign that are relevant today? 

Clearly, the participants can take this discussion into a vast number of arenas. Once again, the type of unit participating in the staff 

ride might help guide the discussion. For example, a military intelligence unit might focus on the commander’s situational awareness, intelligence gathering, and the importance of reconnaissance. Keeping 

in mind that the Saratoga Campaign is as much an operational-level 

staff ride as it is tactical, it might be useful to prompt discussion by 

using the operational art elements as a framework for relevant lessons. In accordance with Army Doctrine Reference Publication 3-0, 

Unified Land Operations, these elements are:

• End state and conditions.

• Center of gravity.

• Decisive points.

• Lines of operations and lines of effort.

• Operational reach.

• Basing.

• Tempo.

• Phasing and transitions.

• Culmination.

• Risk.

These terms are provided as a tool. The staff ride leader may 

use some of these or another framework, or simply let students take 

the discussion in the direction they choose. The three suggested integration phase questions are to help spark discussion rather than 

provide hard and fast “rules” of warfare. Note that the handbook 

provides examples of possible answers to the questions but does 

not attempt to provide a list of “right” answers. The staff ride leader 
276

should take time before the session to write down his or her answers 

to these questions and thus gain potential ideas to generate student 

discussion. More importantly, the staff ride leader should help participants develop their own answers. Be prepared to let the discussion roam many different paths, and encourage healthy debate.
277

V. Support

1. Information, Access, and Assistance. 

a. The Combat Studies Institute Staff Ride Team, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, has conducted numerous Saratoga Campaign Staff 

Rides and can provide advice and assistance on almost every aspect 

of the staff ride. The Staff Ride Team also can provide facilitators 

to lead a Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride. Visit the Combat Studies 

Institute website for information on obtaining staff ride assistance 

and/or leadership. Staff Ride Team support includes background 

information, detailed knowledge of the battle and battlefield, and 

familiarity with the Saratoga Campaign area. 

Address: The Army University Press

 ATTN: Staff Ride Team 

 290 Stimson Avenue, Unit 1

 Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

Telephone: (913) 684-2131

Website: https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Educational-Services/Staff-Ride-Team-Offerings/

b. Saratoga National Historic Park. The largest part of the 

Saratoga Campaign Staff Ride takes place on National Park Service 

(NPS) grounds. Be sure to contact the NPS staff before conducting a staff ride. Members of the US military can enter NPS parks 

free if conducting a staff ride, and the park staff at all locations are 

extremely helpful. The battlefield for the two Saratoga battles and 

the Saratoga Surrender Site belong to the Saratoga National Historic Park. The park’s Headquarters and Visitors’ Center is located 

near the Town of Stillwater, in eastern New York 40 miles north of 

Albany. Note that while the park Headquarters and Visitors’ Center 

are open year-round (except certain holidays), park roads generally 

are closed from November to May. The roads are not plowed for 

snow. Staff Rides conducted there during off-season months can 

only be conducted on foot.
278

Address: Saratoga National Historic Park

 648 NY Route 32

 Stillwater, NY 12170

Telephone: (518) 664-9821

Season/Hours: Open all year except some holidays, 0900 to 1700

Cost: Free

Website: https://www.nps.gov/sara/index.htm

c. Crown Point Battlefield State Historic Site. The Crown Point 

Battlefield State Historic Site is a unit of the New York State Office of 

Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation. Although the site is open 

year-round, the Visitors’ Center and Museum have seasonal hours.

Address: Crown Point State Historic Site

 21 Grandview Drive 

 Crown Point, NY 12928

Telephone: (518) 597-4666

Park: Season/Hours: Open all year, 0900 to 1800

Museum: Season/Hours: May–October, Thursdays–Mondays, 

0930–1700 (Closed Tuesdays & Wednesdays).

Cost: Free

Website: http://parks.ny.gov/historic-sites/34/details.aspx

d. Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site. The Bennington 

Battlefield State Historic Site is a unit of the New York State Office 

of Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation. There is no visitors’ 

center, and park staff members are not always on site during operating hours. Like the Saratoga National Historic Park, the Bennington 

Battlefield State Historic Site is closed from November to May.

Address: Bennington Battlefield State Historic Site

 Route 67

 Walloomsac, NY 12090

Mailing Address:

 c/o Grafton Lakes State Park

 PO Box 163

 Grafton, NY 12082
279

Telephone: (518) 860-9094 or (518) 279-1155

Season/Hours: 1 May–Veterans Day, 7 days a week 0800 to 

Sunset

Cost: Free

Website: http://nysparks.com/historic-sites/12/details.aspx

e. Fort Ticonderoga. Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Defiance 

are units of the Fort Ticonderoga Association, a private organization. Both sites require an entrance fee. Group tickets for Mount 

Defiance may be purchased separately at the park entrance or at the 

Visitors’ Center.

Address: Fort Ticonderoga

 30 Fort Ti Road

 Ticonderoga, NY 12883

Telephone: (518) 585-2821

Season/Hours: May–October, 0930–1700 daily. Hours for Fort 

Ticonderoga and Mount Defiance are subject to change. Call beforehand to verify available dates and hours.

Cost: $10 per person for Fort Ticonderoga. Mount Defiance 

car/bus pass $10

Website: http://www.fortticonderoga.org/ 

f. Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site. The Hubbardton 

Battlefield State Historic Site is operated by the Vermont Department of Housing and Community Development.

Address: Hubbardton Battlefield State Historic Site

 5696 Monument Hill Road

 Hubbardton, VT 05732

Telephone: (802) 273-2282 or (802) 759-2412

Season/Hours: May–October, Monday and Thursday–Sunday, 

0930–1700. Specific opening and closing dates vary from year to 

year. Call beforehand to verify available dates and hours.

Cost: $3 per adult (fee may be waived for military staff rides)

Website: http://historicsites.vermont.gov/directory/hubbardton
280

2. Logistics.

a. Meals. Dining opportunities in and near Ticonderoga, New 

York, are limited. A few locations can handle a group of 20 to 30 

people including at least one of the local hotel restaurants, which 

also serves breakfast. Many restaurants in Clifton Park, New York, 

are convenient to hotel locations and can provide breakfast (if the 

hotel doesn’t include it as part of the room rate) and dinner on the 

second night. Lunch on day 1 (Campaign Day) can be at Whitehall, 

New York. A number of local restaurants can handle staff ride-size 

groups. As with the battlefield visits themselves, call ahead and arrange for lunch with one of the restaurants beforehand. The second 

day (Saratoga Day) lunch will need to be consumed at the park—a 

pre-purchased bag lunch carried on the vehicles or sandwiches, pizzas, or other easily consumed/transported foods that students purchase at nearby establishments in Schuylerville or Stillwater. For 

both days, the stand description includes recommended times to 

pause for lunch. Bag meals need to be consumed at locations authorized by the Saratoga National Historic Park staff. 

b. Lodging. Lodging in the Ticonderoga area is very limited, 

particularly during the high-peak tourist season. Unfortunately, no 

nearby larger towns provide a better selection. Lodging elsewhere 

will require thirty to sixty minutes of additional drive time to reach 

the first stand in the morning of day 1. Recommendation is to arrange for rooms as early as possible for the first night. Conversely, 

Clifton Park provides numerous lodging opportunities for staff ride 

groups.

c. Travel. If the group is flying to the area, the Albany airport 

is the most convenient to use. Once on the ground, larger groups 

will need to contract for a bus with a microphone and public address 

system as well as a restroom. For smaller groups (less than twentyfive), parking and maneuvering may be easier with rental vans or a 

small twenty-five-passenger “party” bus.
281

3. Other Considerations.

a. A successful staff ride requires a reconnaissance of the stands 

and route just prior to execution of the ride. Check for conditions of 

planned routes, detours, availability of parking at or near planned 

stands, and access to required sites.

b. Ensure that every member of the group has water. Also 

identify locations of restrooms along the route to maximize use of 

these facilities.

c. Ensure that your group has proper clothing for inclement 

weather. Thunderstorms can occur in any season. Also, because 

some walking is required for each of the major battlefields, suggest 

that participants wear comfortable boots or hiking shoes and avoid 

sandals or running shoes.

d. Mosquitoes, ants, chiggers, ticks, and other insects are prevalent from March to October, so insect repellent is advised. Poison 

ivy is also present in some of the more remote areas.

e. Road traffic in campaign areas is generally light, or moderate during peak traffic periods when people are heading to work or 

coming home. Traffic in the Clifton Park area can be heavy. The 

most dangerous area for traffic in terms of stands is at Fort Anne. 

The staff ride instructor needs to weigh carefully whether he/she 

wants to conduct the stand at the roadside pull-off at Battle Hill or 

at the bank/blockhouse in town. Traffic passing Battle Hill along 

US Highway 4 can get heavy and loud. If the stand is conducted at 

Battle Hill, ensure that traffic guards are employed as necessary and 

stress that group members be observant when exiting or entering 

vehicles and when moving across or near roads.
 
283

Appendix A—Order of Battle, Fort Ticonderoga

1–7 July 1777

1. American Forces (3,000).

Commanding General, Northern Department & Northern Army

Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler1

Aide-de-Camp, Lt. Col. Henry B. Livingston

Aide-de-Camp and Militia Liaison, Col. Cornelius Van Vechten

Deputy Adjutant General, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson

Deputy Quartermaster General, Col. Morgan Lewis

Engineer, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin

Deputy Commissary General of Musters & Military Secretary,

Lt. Col. Richard Varick

Deputy Commissary General of Stores, Walter Livingston

Deputy Commissary General of Purchases, Jacob Cuyler

Deputy Commissary General of Issues, Elisha Avery (before 6 Aug)

Deputy Paymaster General, Jonathan Trumbull

Deputy Commissioner for Indian Affairs, Timothy Edwards

Medical Director General, Dr. Jonathan Potts

Apothecary, Josiah Root

Chaplain, Reverend Enos Hitchcock

Commanding General, Forces Defending Fort Ticonderoga

Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair

Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Isaac Dunn

Chief of Artillery, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens

Chief of Scouts, Capt. Benjamin Whitcomb

Deputy Adjutant General, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson

Deputy Quartermaster General, Lt. Col. Udney Hay 

Engineer, Col. Thaddeus Kościuszko

Surgeon, Dr. James Thacher

Chaplain, Reverend Enos Hitchcock
284

Poor’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor

1st New Hampshire, Col. Joseph Cilley

2nd New Hampshire, Col. Nathan Hale

3rd New Hampshire, Col. Alexander Scammell

Paterson’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. John Paterson

10th Massachusetts, Col. Thomas Marshall

11th Massachusetts, Col. Ebenezer Francis

12th Massachusetts, Col. Samuel Brewer

14th Massachusetts, Col. Gamaliel Bradford

Roche de Fermoy’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Matthias La Roche de Fermoy

Warner’s Continental Regiment, Col. Seth Warner2

8th Massachusetts, Col. Michael Jackson

New Hampshire Militia Regiment, Col. Pierse Long

Massachusetts Militia Regiment, Col. David Leonard

Massachusetts Militia Regiment, Col. David Wells

Independent Units:

Whitcomb’s Rangers, Capt. Benjamin Whitcomb

Lee’s Rangers, Capt. Thomas Lee
285

American Naval Squadron

Squadron Commander

Commodore Jacobus Wynkoop

USS Enterprise (Sloop-of-War)3

Crew: 60

Displacement: 70 tons

Armament: 12 x 4-pounder guns, 10 swivel guns 

USS Liberty (Schooner)4

Crew: 35

Armament: 4 x 4-pounder guns, 4 x 2-pounder guns, 8 swivel guns

USS Revenge (Schooner)5

Crew: 40

Length: 50 feet

Beam: 15 feet

Armament: 4 x 4-pounder guns, 4 x 2-pounder guns, 10 swivel guns

USS Gates (Row Galley)6

Crew: 40

Length: 63 feet

Beam: 18 feet

USS Trumbull (Row Galley)7

Crew: 24

Length: 63 feet

Beam: 18 feet

Armament: 1 x 18-pounder guns, 1 x 12-pounder guns, 2 x 9-pounder 

guns, 4 x 6-pounder guns
286

2. British Coalition Forces (9,500)8

Commanding General, Army from Canada9

Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne

Staff

Chief of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams

Engineer, Lt. William Twiss

Adjutant & Quartermaster General, Lt. Col. Thomas Carleton

Deputy Quartermaster (British), Capt. John Money

Deputy Quartermaster (German), Capt. Heinrich Gerlach

Assistant Quartermaster, Capt. George Vallancay

Wagonmaster, Robert Hoaksley

Commissary & Loyalist Liaison, Col. Philip Skene

Judge Advocate, Capt. James Craig

Paymaster, David Geddes

Surgeon, Acting Physician John Wood

Royal Navy Liaison, Lt. John Schank

Aides-de-Camp:

Capt. Sir Francis Clerke

Capt. Henry Gardner

Capt. Lord Petersham

Lt. Richard Wilford

Right Wing (British), Maj. Gen. William Phillips

Advance Corps, Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser

 Grenadier Battalion (631),10 Maj. John D. Acland

 24th Regiment of Foot (391), Maj. Robert Grant11

 Light Infantry Battalion (611), Maj. Alexander Lindsay12

1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. Henry W. Powell

 9th Regiment of Foot (394), Lt. Col. John Hill

 47th Regiment of Foot (380), Lt. Col. Nicholas Sutherland13

 53rd Regiment of Foot (-) (391), Maj. Paul Irving
287

2nd Brigade, Brig. Gen. James Hamilton14

 20th Regiment of Foot (-) (383), Lt. Col. John Lind

 21st Regiment of Foot (393), Maj. George Forster

 62nd Regiment of Foot (377), Lt. Col. John Anstruther

Left Wing (German), Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Baron Riedesel

1st Brigade, Brig. Gen. Johann Friedrich Specht

Braunschweiger von Rhetz Regiment (535), Maj. Balthasar 

von Lucke

Braunschweiger Riedesel Regiment (537), Lt. Col. Ernst 

Wilhelm von Speth

Braunschweiger Specht Regiment (536), Maj. Carl Friedrich 

von Ehrenkrook

2nd Brigade, Brig. Gen. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall

Braunschweiger Prinz Friedrich Regiment (533), Lt. Col. 

Christian Praetorius

Hesse-Hanau Erbprinz Regiment (546), Lt. Col. Otto von 

Lentz15

Reserve Corps,Lt. Col. Heinrich Christoph Breymann16

Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig (307), Lt. 

Col. Friedrich Baum

Braunschweiger Grenadier Battalion (456), Maj. Otto von 

Mengen 17

Braunschweiger Light Infantry Battalion (398), Maj. Ferdinand Albrecht von Bärner

Braunschweiger Jäger Company (124), Capt. Carl von Geyso

Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery (103), Capt. Georg Päusch

Loyalist Corps (American-Canadian)18

King’s Loyal American Battalion (150), Lt. Col. Ebenezer Jessup

Queen’s Loyal Rangers Battalion (150), Lt. Col. John Peters

Loyal Volunteers Company, Capt. Samuel MacKay

McAlpin’s Company, Capt. Daniel McAlpin

Adams’ Company, Capt. Adams
288

Indian Department, Maj. John Campbell

Company of Marksmen (102), Capt. Alexander Fraser

Quebec Militia Company (50), Capt. René Amable Boucherville

Montreal Militia Company (50), Capt. David Monin

Mohawk Indians (250), Chevalier St. Luc de la Corne

Iroquois/Algonquin Indians (250), Capt. Charles-Michel Mouet de 

Langlade

Artificers and Engineers, Lt. William Twiss

1st Battalion, Royal Highland Emigrants, Capt. George Lawes

Pioneer Company, Capt. Wilcox

Brigade of the Park of Artillery (422 including attached infantry), 

Maj. Griffith Williams

8th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Major 

Griffith Williams

5th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Captain John Carter 

7th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery,

Captain Ellis Walker19

Detachment, Royal Irish Regiment of Artillery, Unknown Company, 33rd Regiment of Foot, Lieutenant George Anson Nutt

Detachment (Right Division), 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery, 

Capt. Walter Mitchelson

Detachment (Center Division), 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery, 

Capt. Thomas Blomefield

Detachment (Left Division), 1st Battalion, Royal Artillery, Capt. 

Thomas Hosmer

Totals

British Regulars 4,000

German Regulars 3,600

Artillery 500

Canadian/Loyalist Militia 600

Indians 500

Misc. Troops & Support Personnel 300

Total for the Northern Army 9,500
289

British Lake Champlain Squadron

Squadron Commander

Commodore Skeffington Lutwidge20

Capt. Samuel Graves

HMS Royal George (Square-rigged ship)

Displacement: 384 tons

Armament: 26 guns 

 

HMS Inflexible (Square-rigged ship)

Displacement: 180 tons

Armament: 18 x 12-pounder guns

HMS Maria (Schooner)

Length: 66 feet

Beam: 21.6 feet

Armament: 14 x 6-pounder guns

HMS Carleton (Schooner)

Length: 59.2 feet

Beam: 20 feet

Armament: 12 x 6-pounder guns

HMS Thunderer (Radeau)

Length: 91.9 feet

Beam: 33.4 feet

Armament: 6 x 24-pounder guns, 6 x 12-pounder guns, 2 x 8 inch 

howitzers

HMS Washington (Row Galley)

Crew: 80

Armament: 1 x 18-pounder guns; 1 x 12-pounder guns; 2 x 9-pounder 

guns; 6 x 6-pounder guns

HMS Lee (Row Galley)

Crew: 65

Armament: 12 x 4-pounder guns, 10 swivel guns
290

HMS New Jersey (Gondola)

Crew: 45

Armament: 12 x 4-pounder guns, 8 swivel guns

HMS Loyal Convert (Gondola)

Crew: 

Length: 62.10 feet

Beam: 20.3 feet

Armament: 1 x 24-pounder gun; 7 x 9-pounder guns, 6 swivel guns 
291

Notes

1. Schuyler was not present at Fort Ticonderoga during the 1–7 July 1777 

“siege.”

2. Warner’s Regiment arrived 4 July. 

3. The USS Enterprise was the first of a long and prestigious line of US 

Navy ships to bear that name. Enterprise was originally a British topsail schooner 

named George, built at St. Johns in Quebec, Canada. It was captured at St. Johns 

on 18 May 1775 during an American forces raid led by Col. Benedict Arnold. On 

28 August 1775, the Northern Department used the vessel to transport troops for 

another attack on St. Johns as a prelude to the later attacks on Montreal and Quebec 

that fall and winter. The Enterprise later participated in the Battle of Valcour 

Island on 11 October 1776 near Plattsburg, New York. Most of Arnold’s fleet 

was sunk, but five vessels including the Enterprise escaped. After the fall of Fort 

Ticonderoga, the Enterprise and the other four surviving vessels (the Trumbull, 

Liberty, Revenge, and Gates) were detailed on 7 July 1777 to protect Col. Pierse 

Long’s bateaux convoy to Skenesborough. Unfortunately, the British fleet caught 

up with the slow-moving convoy as it reached the town. No match for the British 

ships, the Enterprise’s crew ran her aground and burned her to prevent her capture.

4. USS Liberty was built at Skenesborough, New York, as the Katherine

for Philip Skene. The Katherine was captured at Skenesborough on 11 May 1775 

during an American forces raid under the command of Capt. Samuel Herrick. It 

was renamed the USS Liberty to honor the cause for which the American forces 

were fighting. The Liberty participated in Benedict Arnold’s 18 May 1775 raid 

on St. John when the British schooner George was captured and renamed USS 

Enterprise. The Liberty was absent on a supply run to Fort Ticonderoga during 

the battle of Valcour Island and thus survived to participate in the opening stages 

of the Saratoga campaign. The British captured the vessel at Skenesborough on 7 

July 1777.

5. The USS Revenge was built in 1775 at Fort Ticonderoga, New York. 

Like the Enterprise, she participated in the Battle of Valcour Island that October. 

The Revenge was captured by British forces at Skenesborough on 7 July (although 

some sources indicate that she was burned to prevent her capture).

6. The Gates was launched on about 2 October 1776, too late to participate 

in the Battle of Valcour Island. On 7 July 1777, the USS Gate’s crew ran her 

aground at Skenesborough and burned her to prevent her capture.

7. The USS Trumbull was captured by the British at Skenesborough on 7 

July 1777.

8. The strengths shown in this appendix for the British Coalition forces 

were derived from official returns compiled on 1 July 1777 by the British and 

German contingents.

9. Also sometimes referred to as the British “Northern Army” and “Canadian Army.”
292

10. The British Grenadier Battalion was composed of grenadier companies 

from the regiments under Burgoyne’s command, plus those from the 29th, 31st, 

and 34th Regiments of Foot, which remained in Canada.

11. Brigadier General Fraser was the lieutenant colonel of the 24th Foot.

12. Major Lindsay was the 6th Earl of Balcarres—often referred to simply 

as “Balcarres” or “Lord Balcarres.” The Light Infantry Battalion was composed 

of the light infantry companies from the regiments under Burgoyne’s command, 

plus those from the 29th, 31st, and 34th Regiments of Foot, which remained in 

Canada.

13. Major General Carleton was colonel of the 47th Foot.

14. After Fort Ticonderoga was captured, Hamilton remained in command 

there with the 62nd Regiment of Foot and the Erbprinz Regiment as the defense 

force. Hamilton and the 62nd would be replaced in August by Powell and the 

53rd Foot.

15. The musketeer companies of this regiment were detailed as part of 

Hamilton’s forces to man the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga after its capture from 

the Americans.

16. The German Reserve Corps is sometimes referred to as the “Advance 

Corps” because it essentially functioned as such on at least two occasions.

17. The German Grenadier Battalion consisted of the Grenadier companies 

from each of the line regiments in Riedesel’s command.

18. The Loyalist Corps, or parts of it, frequently operated as part of Fraser’s 

Advance Corps.

19. Detailed as part of Hamilton’s forces to man the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga after its capture.

20. Lutwidge was commander of the squadron until 4 October 1777, after 

which Graves was in command.
293

Appendix B—Order of Battle, Hubbardton 

7 July 1777

1. American Forces (1,300).

American Force Commander

Col. Ebenezer Francis

Rear Guard, Col. Ebenezer Francis1

2nd New Hampshire Battalion, Col. Nathan Hale/Lt. Col. 

Winborn Adams2

Francis’s (11th) Massachusetts Bay Regiment, Col. Ebenezer 

Francis/Lt. Col. Noah Littlefield3

Warner’s Continental Regiment,Col. Seth Warner4

Hampshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia Battalion, Col. 

David Leonard5

Hampshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia Battalion, Col. 

David Wells6

2. British Coalition Forces (1,030). 

British Force Commander

Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel

Advanced Corps, Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser

British Grenadier Battalion, Maj. John D. Acland

24th Regiment of Foot,Maj. Robert Grant7

British Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Alexander Lindsay

Braunschweig Detachment, Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel

Combined Grenadier and Light Infantry Detachment, Capt. Carl 

von Geyso

Jäger Company,Capt. Maximillian Schotteliu8

Grenadier Battalion,Lt. Col. Christoph Breymann9

Light Infantry Battalion,Maj. Ferdinand Albrecht von Bärner10
294

Notes

1. Colonel Francis was killed in action on 7 July. With his death, resistance 

at Hubbardton almost instantly dissolved.

2. Colonel Hale was wounded and captured at Hubbardton. His second-incommand, Lt. Col. Winborn Adams, assumed command of the regiment.

3. Colonel Francis was killed in action at Hubbardton. His second-incommand, Lt. Col. Noah Littlefield, assumed command of the regiment.

4. Warner’s Continental Regiment included the remnants of the “Green 

Mountain Boys.”

5. Present but not engaged at Hubbardton.

6. Present but not engaged at Hubbardton.

7. Five companies only. Major Grant was killed in action on 7 July.

8. The jäger company was part of the Braunschweig light infantry battalion 

von Bärner but during the battle operated separately from the combined grenadier 

and light infantry detachment.

9. The German Grenadier Battalion was present but not engaged at 

Hubbardton.

10. The German Light Infantry Battalion was present but not engaged at 

Hubbardton.
295

Appendix C—Order of Battle, Fort Anne

8 July 1777

1. American Forces (210-400).

American Force Commander

Col. Pierce Long / Lt. Col. Henry K. Van Rensselaer1

1st New Hampshire Battalion,Col. Pierse Long2

Albany County, New York Militia Battalion, Lt. Col. Henry K. Van 

Rensselaer3

1st New Hampshire Regiment (detachment), Capt. Nathaniel 

Hutchins

3rd New Hampshire Regiment (detachment), Capt. James Gray

2. British Forces (160).

British Force Commander

Lt. Col. John Hill

9th Regiment of Foot (detachment), Lt. Col. John Hill

First Nations warriors, Claude-Nicolas-Guillaume de Lorimier

 
296

Notes

1. Colonel Long commanded the garrison but was not engaged. Lt. Col. 

Van Rensselaer commanded in the field.

2. The 1st New Hampshire Battalion (1776–1777), a Continental army 

regiment commanded by Colonel Long, is separate from the 1st New Hampshire 

Regiment (1777–1783), a Continental army regiment commanded by Col. Joseph 

Cilley. 

3. Col. Van Rensselaer was wounded in action on 8 July.

4. Estimates of American casualties for this action vary wildly. The higher 

figure likely includes those captured and deserters.
297
298

Appendix D—Order of Battle, Fort Schuyler/Oriskany

1. American Forces (2,250).

American Force Commander

Col. Peter Gansevoort

Fort Schuyler Garrison Defenses (750)

3rd New York, Col. Peter Gansevoort

Battalion, Massachusetts Detachments, Lt. Col. Marinus Willet

Detachment, 2nd Continental Artillery

Oneida Indians 

*First Relief Force, Tryon County Militia (800), Brig. Gen. 

Nicholas Herkimer

*1st Battalion, Col. Ebenezer Cox1

*2nd Battalion, Col. Jacob Klock

*3rd Battalion, Col. Frederick Vissher 

*4th Battalion, Col. Peter Bellinger

Second Relief Force (700), Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold2

Learned’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned

2nd Massachusetts, Col. John Bailey

8th Massachusetts, Col. Michael Jackson

9th Massachusetts, Col. James Wesson

2. British Coalition Forces (1,550).

British Force Commander

Brig. Gen. Barry St. Leger

Assistant Adjutant General, Capt. William Ancrum

Assistant Adjutant, Lt. William Crofts

Assistant Quartermaster General, Lt. James Lundy

Bateaux Master, James Kusick
299

Commissary, John Farquharson

Conductor of Artillery, Austin Piety

Military Secretary, Lt. William O. Hamilton

Military Secretary, Ensign George Clergis

Mohawk Valley Expedition

34th Regiment of Foot (-), Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger

*Kings Regiment of New York, Col. John Johnson

Company, 8th Regiment of Foot, Capt. Richard B. Lernoult

Company, Royal Artillery, Lieutenant Glennie

2 x 6-pounder guns

2 x 3-pounder guns

2 Coehorn mortars

*Butler’s Ranger Company, Col. John Butler

Quebec Canadian Militia Company, Capt. Hertel de Rouville

*Jäger Company, Lieutenant Hildebrandt

*Iroquois Indians, Thayendanagea (Joseph Brant)
300

Notes

1. Killed in action.

2. Arnold’s relief column was en route to Fort Schuyler when St. Leger 

decided to depart. The column returned to the main army soon thereafter.

*Units engaged at the Battle of Oriskany.
301

Appendix E—Order of Battle, Bennington

16 August 1777

1. American Forces (2,350).

American Force Commander

Brig. Gen. John Stark

Continentals and Massachusetts & Vermont Militia, Col. Seth Warner

Warner’s Continental Regiment, Lt. Col. Samuel Safford 

Simonds’ Regiment of Massachusetts Militia, Col. Benjamin 

Simonds

Herrick’s Vermont Militia Regiment, Col. Samuel Herrick

Additional Vermont Rangers

Brigade of New Hampshire Militia, Brig. Gen. John Stark

Gregg’s Regiment of Militia, Col. William Gregg

Hobart’s Regiment of Militia, Col. David Hobart

Nichols’ Regiment of Militia, Lt. Col. Moses Nichols

Stickney’s Regiment of Militia, Col. Thomas Stickney

Langdon’s Company of Light Horse Volunteers, Capt. John 

Langdon1

Additional New Hampshire Militia, Unknown

2. British Coalition Forces (1,400).

Coalition Force Commander

Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum2

Baum’s Detachment, Lt. Col Friedrich Baum

Braunschweig Dragoon Regiment Prinz Ludwig, Maj. Christoph von Meibom3

Detachment, Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, Lt. Heinrich 

Burghoff4

Company of Marksmen, Capt. Alexander Fraser
302

Detachment, Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, Capt. 

Friedrich Dommes5

Detachment, Braunschweig musketeers,Ensign Conrad Andrée6

Hessen-Hanau Artillery Battery, Lt. Johann Bach (2 light 

3-pounder guns)7

Queen’s Loyal Rangers, Lt. Col. Commandant John Peters8

Loyal Volunteers, Lt. Col. Franz (“Francis”) Pfister9

Québec Indian Department,Maj. John Campbell10

Company of French Canadian militia draftees, Unknown

Breymann’s Detachment, Reserve Corps, Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann11

Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, Capt. Daniel von Löhneisen

Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Ferdinand von 

Bärner12

Hessen-Hanau Artillery Battery, Lt. Carl Spangenburg (2 light 

6-pounder guns)13

All four German artillery pieces were captured.
303

Notes

1. Langdon’s company functioned as dismounted infantry.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Baum was mortally wounded 16 August at Bennington 

and died 18 August. On arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Breymann assumed overall 

command of German forces.

3. Major von Meibom was captured 16 August.

4. Lieutenant Burghoff was captured 16 August.

5. Captain Dommes was captured 16 August.

6. This musketeer detachment was principally drawn from the Braunschweig 

musketeer regiments von Riedesel and Specht. Its commander, Ensign Andrée, 

was captured 16 August.

7. Lieutenant Bach was slightly wounded and captured 16 August.

8. Lieutenant Colonel Peters was slightly wounded in action 16 August at 

Bennington.

9. Lieutenant Colonel Pfister was mortally wounded 16 August and died 18 

August.

10. The department oversaw joint British-allied First Nations operations. 

First Nations men present in the Battle of Bennington included warriors from the 

Seven Nations of Canada, Lakes Nations, and Western Nations.

11. Lieutenant Colonel Breymann was slightly wounded in action 16 

August. 

12. Major von Bärner was severely wounded in action 16 August.

13. Lieutenant Spangenburg was severely wounded in action and captured 

16 August.
 
305

Appendix F—Order of Battle, Saratoga

19 September and 7 October 1777

1. American Forces (8,000/12,000)1.

Commanding General, Northern Department & Northern Army

Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates

Staff

Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Robert Troup

Aide-de-Camp, Maj. Isaac Pierce

Aide-de-Camp, Maj. John Armstrong

Aide-de-Camp, Maj. James Miles Hughes

Chief of Artillery, Northern Department, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens

Chief Engineer, Northern Department, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin

Deputy Adjutant General, Lt. Col. James Wilkinson

Deputy Quartermaster General, Col. Morgan Lewis

Deputy Commissary General of Purchases, Jacob Cuyler

Deputy Commissary General of Issues, Ebenezer Winship

Deputy Paymaster General, Col. Jonathan Trumbull Jr.

Deputy Muster Master General Lt. Col. Richard Varick

Deputy Commissary General of Clothing Maj. George Measam

Deputy Commissary General of Prisoners Daniel Hale

Deputy Judge Advocate General, 2nd Lt. George Smith

Deputy Director General of Hospital, Jonathan Potts, MD

Left Wing, Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold2

Morgan’s Corps of Riflemen & Light Infantry (700), Col. 

Daniel Morgan3

*Morgan’s Rifle Corps,Lt. Col. Richard Butler4

*Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Henry Dearborn5

Poor’s Brigade (1292/1323), Brig. Gen. Enoch Poor

*1st New Hampshire Regiment, Col. Joseph Cilley
306

*2nd New Hampshire Regiment, Lt. Col. Winborn Adams/

Capt. John Drew6

*3rd New Hampshire Regiment, Col. Alexander Scammell

*2nd New York Regiment, Col. Phillip Van Cortlandt

*4th New York Regiment, Col. Henry B. Livingston

*Cook’s Connecticut Militia Battalion, Col. Thaddeus Cook7

*Latimer’s Connecticut Militia Battalion, Col. Jonathan 

Latimer8

Learned’s Brigade (1393/1801), Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned

2nd Massachusetts Regiment, Col. John Bailey

8th Massachusetts Regiment, Lt. Col. John Brooks

9th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. James Wesson

Livingston’s Battalion of Forces, Col. James Livingston

Evans’ New Hampshire Militia, Col. Stephan Evans9

Drake’s New Hampshire Militia, Col. Abraham Drake10

New York Militia Brigade (1,260), Brig. Gen. Abraham Ten 

Broeck11

1st Regiment, Col. Jacob Lansing

3rd Regiment, Col. Francis Nichol

4th Regiment, Col. Robert Killian

5th Regiment, Col. Gerrit G. Ven Den Bergh

6th Regiment, Col. Stephen John Schuyler

7th Regiment, Col. Abraham Van Alstine

9th Regiment, Col. Peter Van Ness

10th Regiment, Col. Henry Livingston

11th Regiment, Col. Anthony Van Bergen

12th Regiment, Col. Jacobus Van Schonbeven

13th Regiment, Col. John McCrae

Knickerbocker’s Regiment, New York Militia, Col. John 

Knickerbocker

Van Woert’s Regiment, New York Militia, Col. Lewis Van 

Woert
307

Right Wing, Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln12

Glover’s Brigade (1555/2091), Brig. Gen. John Glover

1st Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Joseph Vose

4th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. William Shepard

13th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Edward Wigglesworth

15th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Timothy Bigelow

Battalion of Albany County, New York Militia,Col. Abraham 

Wemple13

Battalion of Albany County, New York Militia, Col. William 

Whiting14

Dutchess and Ulster County Militia Battalion (New York), 

Col. Morris Graham

Nixon’s Brigade (1270/1545), Brig. Gen. John Nixon

3rd Massachusetts Regiment, Col. John Greaton

5th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Rufus Putnam

6th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Thomas Nixon

7th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Ichabod Alden

2nd New Hampshire County Regiment, Massachusetts 

Militia, Col. Ezra May15

Paterson’s Brigade (1243/1801), Brig. Gen. John Paterson

*10th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Thomas Marshall

11th Massachusetts Regiment, Lt. Col. Noah Littlefield

12th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Samuel Brewer

14th Massachusetts Regiment, Col. Gamliel Bradford

*1st South Berkshire Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, Col. 

John Ashley Jr.16

3rd York County Regiment, Massachusetts Militia, Lt. Col. 

Joseph Storer17

Warner’s Brigade (1833),Brig. Gen. Jonathan Warner18

Battalion of Berkshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, 

Col. John Brown

Battalion of Middlesex County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, 

Col. Samuel Bullard
308

Battalion of Suffolk County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, 

Col. Benjamin Gill

Battalion of Hampshire County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, 

Col. Benjamin Woodbridge

Battalion of Essex County, Massachusetts Bay Militia, Col. 

Samuel Johnson

Cavalry (200/326)

2nd Connecticut Light Horse Regiment, Maj. Elijah Hyde

Sheldon’s 2nd Regiment of Light Dragoons, Capt. Jean de 

Vernejoux/Lt. Thomas Seymour19

Artillery (400), Maj. Ebenezer Stevens

Independent Corps of Artillery, Maj. Ebenezer Stevens

Engineers and Artificer companies, Col. Jeduthan Baldwin

Independent Commands20

New Hampshire Militia Brigade (497), Brig. Gen. John Stark

New Hampshire Militia Brigade (388), Brig. Gen. William 

Whipple

Vermont Militia Brigade (1147), Brig. Gen. Jacob Bailey

Massachusetts Bay Militia Brigade (1019), Brig. Gen. James 

Brickett

Massachusetts Bay Militia Brigade (497), Brig. Gen. John Fellows

Battalion of Connecticut militia volunteers (250), Brig. Gen. 

Oliver Wolcott21

Oneida and Tuscarora warriors, Hon Yerry Tewahangagahken & 

Louis Atayataronghta22

Algonquian Mohican “Stockbridge” warriors, Capt. Abraham 

Nimham23
309

2. British Coalition Forces (7,200/6,600)

Commanding General, Army from Canada

Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne

Chief of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams

Chief Engineer and Comptroller, Lt. William Twiss

Deputy Adjutant General, Maj. Robert Kingston

Deputy Adjutant General (German), Capt. Julius von Pöllniz

Deputy Quartermaster General, Capt. John Money24

Deputy Quartermaster General (German), Capt. Heinrich Gerlach

Wagon Master General, Robert Hoaksley

Assistant Commissary General, Jonathan Clarke

 Commissioner of Supplies and Loyalty Oaths, Col. Philip Skene

Deputy Judge Advocate General, Capt. James Craig

Deputy Paymaster General, David Geddes

Contractor for Horses, Maj. James Hughes

Commissary of Forage, Ephraim Jones

Provost Martial, Lt. Phineas Atherton

Acting Physician, Surgeon John Wood

Royal Navy Liaison and Acting Commissioner, 1st Lt. John Schank 

(Canceaux)

Chaplain to the staff, Rev. Edward Brudenell

Aides-de-Camp:

Capt. Sir Francis Carr-Clerke25

Captain Charles

Lord Petersham

Lt. Richard Wilford

Left Wing (British), Maj. Gen. William Phillips 

Advanced Corps, Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser26

British Grenadier Battalion, Maj. John D. Acland27

24th Regiment of Foot, Maj. William Agnew

British Light Infantry Battalion, Maj. Alexander Lindsay

Company of Marksmen, Capt. Alexander Fraser

Quebec Militia Company, Capt. René Amable de Boucherville
310

Montreal Militia Company, Capt. David Monin/Lt. JeanBaptiste Beaubien28

7th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, 

Capt. Ellis Walker

Indian Department,Maj. John Campbell29

Fort Hunter Mohawk Indians, Chief John Canadagaia

Iroquois/Algonquin Seven Nations of Canada Indians, War 

Chief Tehoragwanegen (Thomas Williams)

Fort Ticonderoga-Mount Independence Garrison, Brig. Gen. 

Henry W. Powell30

Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment Prinz Friedrich, Lt. Col. 

Christian Prætorius

53rd Regiment of Foot, Capt. William Hughes31

34th Regiment of Foot detachment, Lt. Col. Barry St. Leger32

Hessen-Hanau Jägerbattalion, Lt. Col. Carl von Creutzbourg33

Kings Royal Regiment of New York, Col. John Johnson34

8th Company, 3rd Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, 

Capt. William Borthwick

Royal Naval Detachment, 1st Lt. John Starke (Maria)

Hamilton’s Brigade, Brig. Gen. James Hamilton

9th Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. John Hill

20th Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. John Lind

21st Regiment of Foot, Maj. George Forster

62nd Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. John Anstruther35

Royal Regiment of Artillery (detachment), Capt. Thomas 

Jones

Right Wing (German), Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, 

Freiherr zu Eisenbach

Braunschweig Dragoon Regiment Prinz Ludwig, Rittmeister 

Carl von Schlagenteufel

Hessen-Hanau Artillery Company, Capt. Georg Päusch
311

1st Brigade, Brig. Johann Friedrich Specht

Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment von Rhetz, Maj. 

Balthasar von Lucke

Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment Riedesel, Lt. Col. Ernst 

von Speth36

Braunschweig Musketeer Regiment Specht, Maj. Carl von 

Ehrenkrook

2nd Brigade, Brig. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall

Hessen-Hanau Regiment Erbprinz, Brig. Wilhelm Rudolph 

von Gall

Reserve Corps, Lt. Col. Heinrich Breymann37

Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion, Capt. Albrecht Daniel 

von Löhneisen

Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, Capt. Maximillian 

C. Schottelius

Hessen-Hanau Artillery company detachment, Bombardier 

Conrad Wall

American Loyalist Corps

The King’s Loyal Americans, Lt. Col. Commandant Ebenezer 

Jessup

The Queen’s Loyal Rangers, Lt. Col. Commandant John Peters38

The Loyal Volunteers, Capt. Samuel MacKay

McAlpin’s Company of Volunteers, Capt. Daniel McAlpin

Adams’s Company of Rangers, Capt. Samuel Adams

Bateaux Company, Capt. Peter Van Alstine

Artificers and Engineers, Lt. William Twiss

Detachment, 1st Battalion, Royal Highland Emigrants, Capt.-

Lt. George Lawes

Pioneer Company, Capt. Hazard Wilcox

Brigade of the Park of Artillery, Maj. Griffith Williams39

8th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Maj. 

Griffith Williams
312

5th Company, 1st Battalion, Royal Regiment of Artillery, Capt. 

John Carter 

Additional company and German recruits, 33rd Regiment of 

Foot, Lt. George Anson Nutt40

Not Brigaded

47th Regiment of Foot, Lt. Col. Nicholas Sutherland41
313

Notes

1. Personnel figures in this appendix are typically listed for two dates—19 

September and 7 October—to correlate with the two major battles fought at Saratoga. The first figure is for the former date and the second is for the latter. Continental and militia forces under Gates’ command would swell to more than 17,000 

by the time Burgoyne surrendered on 17 October.

2. Historians remain unclear whether Gates ever technically relieved 

Arnold of command for the Left Wing. There are no known documents that 

confirm the action.

3. Morgan’s command was relieved from the Left Wing on 22 September 

and placed directly under Gates’ command.

4. Morgan’s command arrived to join the Northern army on 3 September. It 

was formed from riflemen from the 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th and 11th Virginia Regiments and the 1st, 5th, 8th, and 12th Pennsylvania Regiment, all of whom were 

serving with Washington’s forces in New Jersey. Washington sent the Rifle Corps 

to assist Schuyler, then Gates, to counter the British Indian threat.

5. Dearborn was appointed on 10 September to command the recently 

formed Corps of Light Infantry. It was an ad hoc battalion formed with men drafted from all existing Continental regiments in the Northern Army other than the 

Rifle Corps.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Adams was killed in action. As the regiment’s 

colonel, Nathan Hale, and major, Benjamin Titcomb, were prior casualties of the 

Battle of Hubbardton (captured, severely wounded, and furloughed, respectively). 

Four other senior captains were casualties at Hubbardton or Freeman’s Farm. 

Captain Drew commanded the regiment through the rest of the campaign.

7. Cook’s battalion arrived 10 September and was attached to Poor’s Brigade.

8. Latimer’s battalion arrived 10 September and was attached to Poor’s 

Brigade.

9. Evans’ command arrived 7 October and was attached to Learned’s Brigade.

10. Drake’s command arrived 7 October and was attached to Learned’s 

Brigade.

11. Ten Broeck’s Brigade was called to duty by Governor Clinton on 18 

September and had assembled its battalions at Bemis Heights by 4 October.

12. Lincoln was appointed commander of the Right Wing on 25 September.

13. This ad hoc unit was made up of Albany men drafted from various 

regiments for service until 15 November 1777. It was also known as the “First 

Regiment.” Wemple was normally the commander of the 2nd Albany County 

Regiment, New York Militia.

14. This ad hoc unit was made up of Albany men drafted from various 

regiments for service until 15 November 1777. It was also known as the “Second 

Regiment.” Whiting was normally the commander of the 17th Albany County 

Regiment, New York Militia.

15. This battalion was assigned to Nixon’s Brigade on 4 October.

16. This battalion was assigned to Paterson’s Brigade 3 October.
314

17. This battalion was assigned to Paterson’s Brigade 3 October.

18. Warner’s Brigade arrived 24 September.

19. Vernejoux remained “sick” at Albany and subsequently deserted, never 

having joined the Northern Army. In his stead, Seymour commanded the troop.

20. The militia brigades and battalions listed were all present with Gates’ 

Northern Army when Burgoyne surrendered on 16 October.

21. Arrived on, or sometime before, 4 October.

22. These Indians (about 150) arrived on 20 September and largely departed 

on 27 September.

23. Nimham commanded a small body of Mohican warriors from 

Stockbridge, MA, who served with the Rifle Corps as “scouts and spies.”

24. Captured 7 October.

25. Mortally wounded and captured in action 7 October.

26. Mortally wounded 7 October then died the following day.

27. Wounded and captured 7 October.

28. Killed in action 19 September. Replaced by Lieutenant Beaubien.

29. The large majority of Indian allies had departed Burgoyne’s army by 

late August.

30. Powell relieved Hamilton as Fort Ticonderoga commander on 15 August.

31. The 53rd Foot, less Grenadiers and Light Infantry companies, took over 

the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga from the 62nd Foot on 10 August. The 62nd 

Foot returned to Burgoyne’s main force and served with Hamilton’s Brigade. The 

53rd lost seven officers and 130 other ranks, who were captured during Brown’s 

18 September raid on Fort Ticonderoga.

32. Arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 27 September.

33. Arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 27 September.

34. Arrived at Fort Ticonderoga on 27 September.

35. The 62nd Foot, less Grenadiers and Light Infantry companies, manned 

the defenses of Fort Ticonderoga until 10 August when it was relieved by the 53rd 

Foot and returned to Burgoyne’s main force at Saratoga.

36. Captured at night following the 7 October battle.

37. Killed in action 7 October.

38. Wounded in action 7 October.

39. Captured 7 October.

40. This company also included recruits for a number of different infantry 

regiments serving in Howe’s army.

41. Six companies only. One grand division was previously sent to Fort 

George. The 47th Foot was typically assigned to guard the army’s bateaux flotilla, 

supply points, landings, and artillerypark. Two companies also protected the 

supply depot at Diamond Island on Lake George.
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Appendix G—Biographies of Key Participants

One key aspect of the Combat Studies Institute’s approach to 

the Staff Ride is assigning roles to staff ride participants. 

American Commanders and Staff

Maj. Gen. Philip John Schuyler. Schuyler was born 20 

November 1733 in Albany, New York. He became a member of the 

New York Assembly in 1768 and served as an Assemblyman until 

1775, when he became increasingly disenchanted with the colonial 

government. Around this time, New York Governor Henry Moore 

appointed Schuyler as the commander of the local Albany militia 

regiment due to his previous military experience.

That same year Schuyler was elected to the Continental 

Congress and served in that body until appointed as a major 

general in the Continental Army in June of that year. He was 

quickly appointed commander of the New York Department (later 

redesignated as the Northern Department). After American rebels 

seized several forts on Lake Champlain from the British in the spring 

of 1775, Schuyler planned an invasion of Canada that summer. 

However, health problems precluded him from directly leading the 

expedition. Instead, he directed Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery to 

take command of the expeditionary force while Schuyler remained 

in Albany to logistically and administratively support the invasion 

from there.

The “Canada Army,” as the expedition became known, returned 

to Crown Point in June 1776 after failing in its efforts to turn Canada 

to the side to the revolution. Schuyler next moved to prevent Lt. 

Gen. Sir Guy Carleton, British governor general of Canada and 

commander of British forces there, from invading New York along 

the Lake Champlain-Hudson River approach. Schuyler then gave the 

very capable Brig. Gen. Benedict Arnold an assignment to construct 

a small fleet of naval vessels to counter Carleton’s growing fleet at 

St. John’s in Quebec. Meanwhile, Schuyler set about doing what 

he could to rebuild and resupply the Canada Army, which was now 
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integrated into the Northern Army since it was located in Schuyler’s 

jurisdiction. For the next year Schuyler supervised the building 

and reconstruction of fortifications on Lake Champlain, as well as 

on the Hudson and Mohawk Rivers. Though Arnold’s small fleet 

was defeated at the Battle of Valcour Island that fall, the generalturned-admiral bought time for Schuyler to continue his defensive 

preparations into the 1777 campaign season. 

Schuyler accurately determined that British forces in Canada 

would attempt a similar venture down Lake Champlain in the late 

spring or early summer that year. Placing Maj. Gen. Arthur St. 

Clair in charge of renovating Fort Ticonderoga—considered to be 

the key fortress along the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route—

Schuyler focused his attention on other fortifications such as Fort 

Schuyler (formerly Fort Stanwix) on the Mohawk and Forts Clinton, 

Montgomery, Edward, George, and Putnam farther south on the 

Hudson River. His logistician skills notwithstanding, Schuyler was 

not able to ensure that the forts would be ready to effectively oppose 

a British attack. This was not due as much to supplies as a lack of 

available manpower to adequately prepare or reconstruct the defenses.

When Fort Ticonderoga fell to Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s Army 

from Canada on 6 July 1777, Schuyler was immediately attacked by 

his political enemies in the Continental Congress and elsewhere. He 

was even accused of being complicit in the disaster. Congressional 

pressure began to mount—especially among members from New 

Hampshire and other northeastern states—to remove Schuyler 

from command in favor of Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, who hailed 

from Massachusetts. Nevertheless, Schuyler immediately went to 

work finding ways to reassemble the ground forces that the British 

had dispersed in order to slow down and defeat the invaders. In 

retrospect, Schuyler’s efforts after the fall of the fort appeared to 

be the best course of action as later events demonstrated. These 

efforts included reassembly of the Fort Ticonderoga force and its 

reinforcement by various Continental and militia units, placement 

of obstacles along the Fort Anne to Fort Edward road, and Fort 

Schuyler’s reinforcement by militia and Continental forces. Despite 

his best efforts, the pressure became too much and by mid-August 

Congress relieved Schuyler of the Northern Department in favor 
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of General Gates. Nevertheless, Schuyler continued to support the 

Northern Army logistically in an unofficial capacity up to the British 

surrender at Saratoga. 

After his relief from command, Schuyler petitioned the 

Continental Congress for a court martial to clear his name. The 

court convened in October 1778 and soon vindicated him based on 

his efforts, actions, and decisions. Even though he was cleared of 

all charges, Schuyler left the army on 19 April 1779 and returned 

to politics. He served in two more Continental Congress sessions 

in 1779 and 1780 before joining the New York State Senate from 

1780 to 1784. Additionally, he served as New York state surveyor 

general. After a two-year absence, Schuyler served in the New York 

State Senate from 1786 to 1790—actively supporting adoption of 

the United States Constitution. Schuler twice served as a US Senator 

from New York in 1789 to 1791 and 1797 to January 1798 when he 

resigned due to health issues. Schuyler died 18 November 1804 at 

the Schuyler Mansion in Albany.

Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates. Horatio Gates was born 26 July 1727 

in Maldon, England. Early in his youth, Gates decided to pursue a 

military career. In 1745, he secured a lieutenant’s commission in the 

20th Regiment of Foot and served in Germany during the War of the 

Austrian Succession. During that conflict, he proved himself to be 

an excellent staff officer but nevertheless found himself discharged 

from the army when the 20th Foot was disbanded. 

Before the French and Indian War, Gates reentered the British 

Army and served in America under Col. Edward Cornwallis and Maj. 

Gen. Edward Braddock. In 1763, Gates’ career once again looked 

to be over when he was unable to obtain a lieutenant colonelcy. 

He left the army once again in 1769 and moved to America. He 

purchased land on the Potomac River near Shepherdstown, Virginia 

(now West Virginia) and soon developed an acquaintance with 

George Washington. 

On hearing about rebel actions at Lexington and Concord in 

late May 1775, Gates travelled to Washington’s home at Mount 

Vernon and learned that Washington had been appointed as the 

commanding general of the Continental Army. Washington was 
318

aware of Gates’ skills as a staff officer and recommended that the 

Continental Congress commission him as a brigadier general and 

appoint him as adjutant general for the Continental Army. 

In May 1776, Gates was appointed to command the “Canada 

Army,” which was en route after being driven out of Canada. 

Soon after assuming command, Gates began quarreling with the 

commander of the Northern Department, Maj. Gen. Philip Schuyler, 

who had command jurisdiction for the forces in the department 

including Gates’ command. Chafing under the requirement to work 

for Schuyler, Gates engineered orders so that he and part of his 

command would join Washington’s Main Army in Pennsylvania that 

fall. Claiming illness while Washington developed his plans to attack 

Howe’s forces at Trenton and Princeton, Gates instead traveled to 

Baltimore to urge the Continental Congress to give him command 

of the Main Army. With Washington’s twin victories at Trenton 

and Princeton, however, the Congress opted to keep Washington as 

commander rather than appointing Gates. 

In the early spring of 1777, Gates nominally resumed command 

of Northern Department mobile troops under Schuyler. However, he 

spent time trying to politick his way into a different command rather 

than focusing on preparing to fight the British. Thus, he was away 

from New York making an appeal to General Washington when 

Fort Ticonderoga fell to Burgoyne’s invasion force. Loss of the fort 

and renewed political pressure from Gates’ friends and Schuyler’s 

enemies finally prompted the Continental Congress to relieve 

Schuyler and place Gates in command of the Northern Department. 

On 19 August 1777, Gates assumed command of the Northern 

Department and its army at Van Schaik’s Island. Dissatisfied with 

the army’s position at Van Schaik’s, Gates began looking for another 

location where he could effectively block Burgoyne’s advance. In 

early September, Gates selected a place called Bemis Heights, a few 

miles south of the village of Saratoga. He moved the army there on 

7 September and began digging in. Burgoyne’s army arrived 11 days 

later and then on the following day, 19 September, the British general 

attempted to flank the American position. During the ensuing battle 

at Freeman’s Farm, Gates issued orders but never ventured from the 

American defensive position well away from the actual field of battle.
319

Gates’s actions during the second battle of Saratoga on 7 October 

were not much different. Nevertheless, his Northern Army troops 

were once again victorious and placed Burgoyne in a predicament 

that was serious and eventually fatal for the British Army. 

While accounts differ on Gates’ actions during the two days of 

fighting near Saratoga, one certainty is that his decision to defend 

at Bemis Heights left Burgoyne no options but to retreat or fight 

the American army there. Burgoyne chose to fight and lost. He 

surrendered his army to Gates on 17 October. That action proved to 

be the turning point of the American Revolution. The victory ensured 

France would come into the war on America’s side. In appreciation 

for his achievement, Gates received a gold medal from Congress, 

which later that fall appointed to him to head the Board of War.

In May 1780, the Continental Congress (against Washington’s 

recommendations) ordered Gates to take over the Southern 

Department. Arriving in the Carolinas, Gates almost immediately 

marched the American forces there against the British base at 

Camden, South Carolina. Against his subordinate commanders’ 

recommendations, he marched though a region largely devoid of 

people—and therefore food—so his troops would arrive quickly. As 

a result, Gate’s command was routed by troops under Lt. Gen. Lord 

Charles Cornwallis. His military reputation was now in tatters.

In December 1778, Gates returned to his Virginia home. He was 

ordered to stand before a court of inquiry to examine his command 

of the Southern Department, but his supporters in Congress once 

again rallied to quash the action and save what was left of his 

reputation. In 1782, Gates was ordered to join the Main Army’s 

headquarters at Newburgh, New York. While there, members of his 

staff were involved in the 1783 Newburgh Conspiracy, though no 

clear evidence indicated that Gates was personally involved. After 

the war, Gates served a term in the New York State Legislature then 

died on 10 April 1806. 

Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair. Arthur St. Clair was born in 

Thurso, Caithness, Scotland in 1737. St. Clair secured a commission 

in the British Army’s Royal American Regiment at the age of 20 

and was sent with that regiment to America to participate in the 
320

French and Indian War. He and his regiment were with Gen. Jeffrey 

Amherst when his army captured Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, in 1758. 

He later served with Gen. James Wolfe’s command in the Battle of 

the Plains of Abraham, which resulted in the capture of Quebec City.

St. Clair decided to leave the army and resigned his commission 

on 16 April 1762. He moved to the Pennsylvania colony in 1764, 

where he built a successful milling operation In 1774, St. Clair 

once again took up arms briefly during what was dubbed Lord 

Dunsmore’s War.

St. Clair opted to support the Patriot cause when the rebellion 

broke out in 1775. In January 1776, he accepted a commission as 

colonel of the 3rd Pennsylvania Regiment, a Continental Army unit. 

For his regiment’s service in Canada, St. Clair was appointed as 

brigadier general in August 1776. Shortly thereafter, Gen. George 

Washington ordered him to New Jersey to help organize the militia 

there. While in New Jersey, St. Clair crossed the Delaware River 

with Washington’s army on the night of 25–26 December 1776 

and participated in the Battle of Trenton. St. Clair also helped plan 

Washington’s capture of Princeton, New Jersey, on 3 January 1777. 

Congress promoted him to major general the following month.

In April 1777, St. Clair assumed command of Fort Ticonderoga 

during Horatio Gates’ absence. He quickly learned that there were 

not enough troops or resources to adequately defend the fort and he 

was forced to abandon the location to General Burgoyne’s army on 6 

July 1777. St. Clair was able to lead the bulk of his command out of 

Fort Ticonderoga and successfully deliver them to the commander 

of the American Northern Army, Maj. Gen. Phillip Schuyler, at Fort 

Edwards on 12 July. However, he was relieved of command on 10 

August for his role in the loss of Fort Ticonderoga. The following 

year, St. Clair faced a court-martial for losing the fort, but the court 

exonerated him. He was returned to duty although never assigned 

to another battlefield command. Because George Washington had 

respect and a high opinion of the rebel leader, the commander-inchief made St. Clair a personal aide and he was present at Yorktown 

when Lord Cornwallis’s army surrendered.

After the war, St. Clair served as the governor of the Northwest 

Territory and established his capital at what would become 
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Cincinnati, Ohio, (named by St. Clair himself after the Society of 

the Cincinnati). A US Army major general in March 1791, St. Clair 

succeeded Maj. Gen. Joshua Harmar as commander of the United 

States Army (due to seniority) after that officer’s poor showing in 

several battles with Indian forces in the Northwest Territories in 

what is now Ohio. However, St. Clair was no more successful than 

Harmar. On 4 November near the headwaters of the Wabash River, 

more than 600 soldiers and scores of women and children were killed 

in what has become known as “St. Clair’s Defeat” and the “Battle 

of the Wabash.” A court of inquiry later examined St. Clair’s actions 

then exonerated him. St. Clair resigned his army commission in 

March 1792 at the request of President Washington but continued to 

serve as Governor of the Northwest Territory. Removed as territorial 

governor by President Thomas Jefferson in 1803, St. Clair died in 

poverty in Greensburg, Pennsylvania, on 31 August 1818.

Maj. Gen. Benedict Arnold. Benedict Arnold was born 14 

January 1741 in Norwich, Connecticut. Originally from a well-to-do 

family, Arnold joined the Connecticut militia at the age of 15 and 

served with the colonial militia against the French during the French 

and Indian War. As troubles with England increased in 1775, Arnold 

was elected captain of the Governor’s 2nd Company of Connecticut 

Guards. After the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the 2nd Company 

opted to join the revolution. Arnold marched his unit to Boston, 

Massachusetts, to confront the British forces there. On the way, he 

developed the idea to capture Fort Ticonderoga and its cannon for the 

resource-poor Continental Army. Arriving in Boston, he went before 

the Massachusetts Committee of Safety and convinced them to fund 

the expedition. The Committee also appointed Arnold as a colonel in 

the Massachusetts militia and ordered him to lead the mission. On 

10 May 1775, Arnold’s new command—joined by Ethan Allen and 

his Green Mountain Boys—captured not only Fort Ticonderoga, but 

also Forts George and Crown Point. 

Arnold followed up his actions at the central New York forts 

with a bold raid against Fort Saint-Jean on the Richelieu River 

in Quebec. After capturing several vessels and many supplies of 

military value, he returned to Fort Ticonderoga. In June, Arnold 
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resigned his Massachusetts commission and traveled to Philadelphia 

to lobby in the Continental Congress for an invasion of Canada. 

The invasion was authorized, but the Congress directed Maj. Gen. 

Philip Schuyler to plan and execute the mission. Undeterred, Arnold 

convinced George Washington to let him lead a second expedition 

through Maine to Quebec. Washington liked the idea and arranged a 

colonel’s commission in the Continental Army for Arnold as leader 

of the expedition. 

In September 1775, Arnold departed Cambridge, Massachusetts, 

with 1,100 men headed for Quebec City where he arrived in 

November. On 31 December 1775, Arnold’s force joined that 

of Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery and participated in the failed 

assault on Quebec City. During the attack, Montgomery was killed 

and Arnold received a severe wound to his left leg. Despite the failed 

attack, Arnold was promoted to brigadier general and took charge to 

maintain an ineffectual siege of the city until he was replaced by 

Maj. Gen. David Wooster in April 1776. 

Arnold briefly served as the military commander of Montreal 

before advancing British reinforcements under Gen. Guy Carleton 

forced Arnold and his troops to retreat from Quebec in May. Arnold 

next arrived at Fort Ticonderoga, where Schuyler directed him to 

begin constructing a small naval fleet to defend Lake Champlain and 

prevent further encroachment southward by Carleton’s troops. Though 

he was an army general, Arnold led the small American naval flotilla 

in the Battle of Valcour Island in October 1776. The American fleet 

was overwhelmed and defeated, but Arnold successfully prevented 

British movement farther south than Crown Point.

After Valcour Island, Arnold resumed his duties as a ground 

commander but became increasingly frustrated with what he viewed 

as the army’s and the Continental Congress’ failure to properly 

recognize his leadership and successes. Arnold watched as other 

men who had far fewer achievements received promotion to major 

general while he did not. Then in April 1777 after the Battle of 

Ridgefield (Connecticut), Arnold was finally promoted to major 

general—a recognition that he considered to be long overdue. 

Working initially under the command of General Schuyler 

of the Northern Department, Arnold remained frenetically busy 
323

in summer 1777 operations against Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne’s 

Army from Canada in central New York. Sent by Schuyler to lift 

the siege of Fort Schuyler on 10 August, the American general 

successfully feinted the British commander, Brig. Barry St. Leger, 

into believing Arnold’s command had much greater strength than it 

did. The deception prompted St. Leger to end the siege and depart 

before American reinforcements arrived. Arnold—with Brig. Gen. 

Ebenezer Learned’s Brigade in tow—arrived back at Van Schiak’s 

Island on 31 August. There he met Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, who 

had taken charge of the Northern Department and its army. Soon 

after, Arnold assumed command of what would become the Left 

Wing of the Northern Army and its defenses at Bemis Heights.

The relationship between Arnold and his new commander soon 

took a turn for the worse. After Arnold demonstrated his courage and 

leadership during the American victory at the Battle of Freeman’s 

Farm, Gates—probably intentionally—did not report the key role 

that Arnold and the units under his command played in the battle. 

Indeed, Arnold and his units represented the majority of troops 

that were involved. Arnold confronted Gates and accused him of 

slighting him personally among other charges. Gates responded 

by ostensibly dismissing Arnold from command of the Left Wing 

(although there is no primary source evidence that this action ever 

took place). 

On 7 October, Burgoyne led a reconnaissance force west to 

try and find the American left flank at Bemis Heights. Once again 

Arnold’s Left Wing troops bore the brunt of the fighting and once 

again Arnold’s leadership was conspicuous on the battlefield. Arnold 

was shot by a German soldier—unfortunately in the same leg that 

was wounded in Canada. The shot killed his horse, which fell on the 

leg as well. These injuries were serious enough to keep him out of 

active service for the next eight months. 

When the British evacuated Philadelphia the following month 

in June 1778, Washington appointed Arnold as the city’s military 

commander. While there, he met and then married Peggy Shippen, 

the 18-year-old daughter of Judge Edward Shippen. 

Peggy was a loyalist, and their marriage coupled with festering 

resentment of his superiors helped turn Arnold away from the Patriot 
324

cause. In 1780, Arnold—now very bitter toward the Continental 

Congress—received a new command. He was placed in charge of 

the fortifications at West Point, New York. Arnold offered to hand the 

positions over to British forces for a large sum of money. However, 

his plan was eventually discovered, and Arnold quickly fled down 

the Hudson River to a British ship that took him to New York.

After his defection, Arnold went a step further. Swearing 

allegiance to the British, he took a commission as a brigadier in 

the British Army. then commanded British forces in several small 

battles. However, by 1783, the war was ended and America was free. 

Despised in his own country, Arnold sailed to London then died in 

1801—virtually penniless and buried there without military honors.

Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln. Benjamin Lincoln was born 

24 January 1733, in Hingham, Massachusetts. In 1755, he became 

a member of the 3rd Regiment, Suffolk County Militia (of which 

his father was the colonel) and was appointed as the regimental 

adjutant. He and his regiment were called up for service in the 

French and Indian War but did not see any action. By 1763, Lincoln 

had been promoted to the rank of major, and he was made lieutenant 

colonel of the 3rd Regiment in 1772. In 1775, Lincoln was elected 

to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress. His militia experience 

made him a logical choice for the Congress’ militia organization and 

supply committees. When the American Revolution began in April 

1775, Lincoln became involved in ensuring that the Continental 

Army outside Boston was supported with appropriate supplies.

For his service in and around Boston, Massachusetts, the 

Massachusetts legislature approved promotion of Lincoln to major 

general in January 1776 and commander of the colony’s militia. With 

this promotion he became responsible for Boston’s coast defenses. 

After the British evacuated the city, Lincoln set about to improve 

Boston’s seaward fortifications and the state’s militia forces in case 

the British attempted to return. Due in part to his improvements 

effort, Lincoln and the militia drove out the last Royal Navy remnants 

from Boston Harbor in May.

Despite his lack of combat experience, Lincoln was placed 

in command of a short-term Massachusetts militia brigade sent to 

join General Washington’s Main Army at New York in September 
325

1776. As the brigade was making its way through Connecticut to 

New York, Washington ordered Lincoln to prepare his brigade to 

raid British positions on Long Island. The mission was abruptly 

cancelled when Washington was forced to retreat from New York 

after the Battle of Long Island. Washington next ordered Lincoln 

to join the Main Army as it retreated northward. Lincoln’s brigade 

joined the army’s rearguard and secured the Continental Army’s line 

of retreat to White Plains, New York. After the inconclusive battle 

at White Plains on 28 October, Lincoln’s brigade and the rest of the 

Continental Army retreated northward following two more days of 

skirmishing but no major fighting.

Lincoln returned to Massachusetts and took command of 

a group of new recruits for the next year’s campaign season. His 

short service with the Main Army must have impressed Washington, 

because the commander-in-chief sent a recommendation to Congress 

that fall to commission Lincoln in the Continental Army. On 14 

February 1777, Congress appointed Lincoln as a major general in 

the Continental Line.

Lincoln’s first command with the Main Army was a forward 

outpost line at Bound Brook, New Jersey. For the next six weeks 

or so, his men skirmished with British sentries about three miles 

away. In April 1777, a large force under Lord Cornwallis attacked 

Lincoln’s command and drove it from the field at the Battle of 

Bound Brook. His brigade was easily defeated and Lincoln himself 

was almost captured.

When Washington received word that Burgoyne’s Army 

from Canada had arrived at Fort Ticonderoga in early July, the 

commander-in-chief sent Lincoln north to assist General Schuyler, 

Commander of the Northern Department. Since Lincoln was from 

New England, Schuyler immediately sent him to Manchester, 

New Hampshire, to organize and coordinate the activities of New 

England militia units forming there. Schuyler further directed 

Lincoln and his militia forces to harass Burgoyne’s supply line as 

the British moved south from Fort Ticonderoga toward Albany. 

New Hampshire’s militia leader, Brig. Gen. John Stark, refused to 

put his forces under Lincoln’s command when the leader arrived at 

Manchester. Lincoln returned to Van Schaik’s Island to confer with 

Gates, the new commander of the American Northern Army. Gates 
326

essentially confirmed Schuyler’s earlier directives about raiding 

Burgoyne’s lines of communication so Lincoln set out to return to 

Manchester to resume his mission. 

By early September, Lincoln had at least 2,000 men under his 

command and the count was growing daily. On 12 September, Lincoln 

sent three 500-man detachments to attack Burgoyne’s supply line and 

otherwise wreak havoc. One of these columns successfully overran 

the British forces at Lake George landing and Mount Defiance. In the 

process, they freed more than 100 American prisoners and captured 

more than 200 British soldiers and a supply depot. Lincoln led another 

700 or so men to Skenesborough several days later to support further 

actions behind Burgoyne. However, soon after arriving, he received 

new orders from General Gates. Gates directed Lincoln to bring 

his militia forces to Bemis Heights for what would undoubtedly be 

another—perhaps decisive—battle. Lincoln reached Bemis Heights 

on 22 September with most of his forces. 

At Bemis Heights, Gates assigned Lincoln command of the 

Right Wing of the Northern Army. As such, his newly arrived 

militia—along with others already in position—were to hold the 

right half of the American line on the Heights. The location was 

largely positioned on the high ground facing north and the bluffs on 

the eastern bank of the Hudson River. As events evolved, Lincoln’s 

command saw little action and almost no role in the final battle 

on 7 October. Virtually all the action took place on the left of the 

American line in Arnold’s sector. In short, Burgoyne’s forces were 

defeated once again and took heavy losses. 

Later that night, Gates held a war council during which Lincoln 

suggested the need to fortify the ford at Fort Edward against the 

possibility that Burgoyne might attempt to retreat during the night. 

Gates directed Lincoln to take appropriate actions to block the ford. 

Effecting the plan, Lincoln’s column bumped into a British force 

and in the confused fighting, Lincoln was struck in the right ankle by 

a musket ball. His ankle was shattered, which effectively removed 

Lincoln from any remaining actions at Saratoga. He was evacuated 

to a hospital in Albany, where he learned of Burgoyne’s surrender 

on 17 October. 

After 10 months of rest and recuperation, Lincoln rejoined 

Washington and the Main Army near New York City in August 
327

1778. Washington soon appointed him commander of the Southern 

Department and sent him south to oppose the British forces there. 

Lincoln, operating with the French navy and French colonial troops, 

departed Charleston, South Carolina, on 2 September with 2,000 

American soldiers to help retake Savannah from the British. The 

siege lasted from 16 September to 18 October 1779 but failed to 

retake the town. 

After the siege, Lincoln returned to Charleston. Five months 

later, he himself was under siege by some of the same British troops 

which had stopped him at Savannah. In March 1780, those forces 

and another British contingent dispatched from New York under the 

command of General Clinton surrounded the city. After six weeks 

of siege, Lincoln surrendered Charleston and about 5,000 men on 12 

May 1780. Soon after, Lincoln was paroled and returned to Hingham 

to await formal exchange. In November, he was exchanged for Maj. 

Gen. William Phillips and Baron Friedrich von Riedesel, both of 

whom had been captured at Saratoga.

Soon after, Lincoln rejoined Washington’s Main Army. The 

following year, he led the march of a portion of the Main Army 

south to Yorktown where British troops under Lord Cornwallis 

were encamped. At Yorktown, Lincoln led the army’s 2nd Division. 

Besieging the British, the Franco-American army compelled 

Cornwallis to accept surrender terms on 17 October, the same date 

that Burgoyne capitulated to Gates in 1777. Washington designated 

Lincoln, his second-in-command, to accept the surrender which he 

did at noon on 19 October.

After Yorktown, Lincoln served as the first US Secretary of 

War from 1781 to 1783. In 1787, Lincoln was a member of the 

Massachusetts state convention that ratified the United States 

Constitution. Lincoln also helped put an end to Shays’ Rebellion, 

which ended when his militia forces attacked the rebels and forced 

them to surrender in February 1787. Lincoln retired from public life 

in 1809 and died in Hingham on 9 May that year.

Brig. Gen. John Stark. John Stark was born 28 August 1728 

in Nutfield (now Londonderry), New Hampshire. In 1757, during 

the French and Indian War, Stark was commissioned as a first 

lieutenant in the famous Rogers’ Rangers and eventually rose to be 
328

second-in-command. Stark gained formative military experience as 

a member of Rogers’ Rangers. By the end of the war, Stark had risen 

to the rank of captain and acquired a wealth of military experience. 

Because of his recognized knowledge and skill, the Massachusetts 

Provincial Congress unanimously appointed Stark as colonel of the 

1st New Hampshire Regiment on 23 July 1775. 

Commanding the 1st New Hampshire, Stark played significant 

roles in a number of early key actions during the revolution. At the 

siege of Boston, Stark’s New Hampshire Regiment was assigned 

to protect the northern flank of the American position. He had his 

men build a low stone barricade which formed a breastwork of 

sorts, perpendicular to the shore line below Breed’s Hill along the 

beach of the Mystic River. Stark himself then paced a distance stake 

out about 30 yards in front of the wall to mark the spot where his 

troops would open fire. As Stark predicted, about 350 British light 

troops with fixed bayonets pushed along the shore route before the 

main attack on Breed’s Hill. Firing by file sequence from behind 

the wall, Stark’s men killed at least 90 attackers and wounded 

twice that number. Nevertheless, Howe was able to seize Breed’s 

Hill and Stark’s regiment formed part of the rearguard when the 

Americans retreated.

After the retreat from Boston, Stark led his regiment to New 

York. As at Boston, they were eventually forced to retreat that fall 

with General Washington’s Main Army out of the city and across 

New Jersey. Washington, however, soon developed plans for two 

counterattacks. Stark competently led the 1st New Hampshire 

Regiment in the 25 December 1776 attack on Trenton, New Jersey, 

and a second on 3 January 1776 at Princeton, New Jersey, that 

resulted in the defeat of British forces there.

After the victories in New Jersey, Stark was forced to return to 

the New Hampshire to recruit replacements. While home, he learned 

that Congress selected certain officers for appointment to the rank 

of brigadier general. Despite his own impressive performance, Stark 

was not on the list. However, a number of colonels he considered 

to be far less worthy were identified for promotion. Outraged at 

what he considered unjust and a personal slight, Stark resigned his 

commission on 23 March 1777 and remained at home. 
329

By late June, it was well-known that Burgoyne’s Army from 

Canada had invaded central New York. In early July, the New 

Hampshire legislature offered Stark a commission as brigadier 

general of the New Hampshire Militia. Stark agreed to take the 

commission with the proviso that his orders would come from 

the state only, and not from Continental Army authorities. The 

government agreed and within a very short period, Stark had raised a 

brigade of almost 1,500 men. He sent most to Manchester, Vermont, 

and followed them there a short time later. At Manchester, he 

encountered Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln (one of the inexperienced 

Continental Army brigadiers for whom he had little regard), who 

was busy organizing the militia there. Rather than take orders from 

Lincoln, Stark departed with the comment that he was taking his 

men to Bennington to protect the depot there. 

On 13 August, Stark learned of a German force moving to seize 

the supply depot at Bennington, Vermont. Three days later, Stark led 

a complex attack against the main German position on a hill near the 

Walloomsac River bridge about 10 miles northwest of Bennington. 

Stark’s command ultimately killed or captured the vast majority of 

the enemy troops, including the commander.

Stark’s victory at Bennington had a significant impact on both 

Burgoyne and the American Northern Army. The German expedition 

not only failed to gather much in the way of supplies, but Burgoyne lost 

more than 900 sorely needed men from his command. On the British 

side, the news dampened the morale of the British and their German 

allies while at the same time raising the spirits of the Americans who 

faced them. The achievement also brought Stark’s name back into 

the limelight with the Continental Congress, who appointed him as a 

Continental Army brigadier general on 4 October 1777. 

After the victory at Bennington, Stark’s tone regarding 

cooperation with Continental commanders softened some, perhaps 

because of his new appointment. He soon moved his force to a 

position named Stark’s Knob near Fort Edward to cooperate with 

Gates in blocking Burgoyne from retreating to Fort Ticonderoga. In 

the 7 October Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield, militia units like Stark’s 

helped surround Burgoyne and cut his line of communications. He 

ultimately surrendered at Saratoga on 17 October 1777. 
330

After Saratoga, Stark’s service in the Continental Army was 

varied but valuable. Between 1778 and 1781, he served as the 

commander of the Northern Department on three occasions. He 

also served as a judge in the court martial that found British Maj. 

John André guilty of spying and helping with Benedict Arnold’s 

conspiracy to surrender West Point to the British in September 1780. 

On 30 September 1783, Congress promoted him to major general in 

recognition of his services to the army and nation. In November, he 

resigned his commission after the war officially ended. Stark retired to 

his Manchester home and never held any further political or military 

positions. He remained content with his private life and lived to the 

age of 94, becoming the last surviving American general officer from 

the Revolutionary War.

Col. Seth Warner. Seth Warner was born on the western 

Connecticut frontier near Woodbury (now Roxbury). His extensive 

military service began as a teenager when he served two summers 

with the New Hampshire militia during the French and Indian War. 

Warner’s next experience with things military was as the captain 

of the local militia company, which eventually formed part of what 

became known as the “Green Mountain Boys.” Warner’s militia 

company was incorporated into a regiment-size force commanded 

by Ethan Allen. The Green Mountain Boys’ basic mission was 

to defend the legitimacy—forcefully if necessary—of claims by 

settlers who held property in the New Hampshire Grants. Warner, 

who was Allen’s cousin, was named second-in-command.

After the Battles at Lexington and Concord, the Green Mountain 

Boys were dispatched to capture Fort Ticonderoga. Warner and his 

men remained on the east shore of Lake Champlain as a rearguard 

while Allen and the rest of the Green Mountain Boys—accompanied 

by newly arrived Col. Benedict Arnold and his men—surprised and 

captured the fort’s garrison on the morning of 10 May 1775. The 

following day, Warner and his men captured Fort Crown Point, 13 

miles farther north, along with 111 cannon. 

After capturing the two forts, Warner accompanied Arnold and 

Allen to attack Fort St. John, Quebec, on the Richelieu River north 

of Lake Champlain. Arnold’s troops captured the post and seized its 
331

supplies, along with a large British ship. After loading all the supplies 

that would fit on the ship, they burned the rest and sailed south back 

to Fort Ticonderoga. Meanwhile, Allen, Warner, and the Green 

Mountain Boys attempted to hold Fort St. John but were forced to 

withdraw by British reinforcements sent by General Carleton.

Returning south, Allen and Warner traveled to Philadelphia to 

petition the Continental Congress to recognize the Green Mountain 

Boys as a Continental regiment. On 23 June 1775, Congress 

recommended to the Provincial Congress of New York that they 

recognize the unit as part of their allotment of troops. Most people 

assumed that Allen would be elected as the new regiment’s leader, 

but on 26 July, the men selected Warner to be the lieutenant colonel 

by a vote of 41 to 5.

The first mission for the new battalion was to join General 

Schuyler’s invasion of Canada in the fall of 1775. In midSeptember, Warner’s battalion participated in the siege of Fort St. 

John. Afterward, Warner and his men returned home to the Grants 

to reequip and recruit, perhaps with the idea that the regiment would 

return to Canada in early 1776. 

On 31 December 1775, Montgomery was killed during an 

ill-fated attack on Quebec City. Brig. Gen. David Wooster, who 

commanded American forces in Montreal, wrote a letter asking 

Warner to return and within a few days, Warner’s men were headed 

north. After marching about 400 miles in winter conditions, the 

column arrived at Quebec. Unfortunately, a smallpox epidemic soon 

decimated the American forces, including Warner’s men. By early 

April many in Warner’s Battalion were returning to health, but they 

would soon be engaged in retreating rather than fighting when British 

reinforcements arrived at Quebec in early May. Warner’s Battalion 

was employed as a rearguard in the retreat to Crown Point but he 

also had the challenge of moving his many still-ill troops. Through 

superb leadership and planning, he safely returned his men—losing 

only a few who either died en route or deserted.

Almost immediately after the battalion arrived at Crown Point, 

the men were released from service since their term of service was 

complete. On 5 July 1776, the Continental Congress authorized 

Warner to form a new regiment to be organized from the remnants 
332

of those who served with him in Canada. Warner was appointed 

as colonel, and the new regiment was designated as Warner’s 

Continental Regiment. Meanwhile, Schuyler and Arnold were 

feverishly preparing to meet an expected incursion into central 

New York during the summer and fall of 1776. By January 1777, 

Warner had sent the initial elements of his new regiment to help 

defend Mount Independence. By mid-June, however, the regiment 

had grown to only 228 men—the small number with which Warner 

would fight the Saratoga Campaign. 

After Fort Ticonderoga was abandoned on 6 July, Warner’s 

Regiment helped bring up the rear of the American column. Col. 

Ebenezer Francis, commander of the 11th Massachusetts Bay 

Regiment, had command of the rearguard while Warner’s Regiment 

was the next unit to the front. The rearguard reached Hubbardton in 

the late afternoon and instead of continuing to Castleton as ordered, 

Warner and Francis decided to remain at Hubbardton so that Francis’ 

tired men could recover. 

The next morning on 7 July, Simon Fraser’s Advance Corps 

composed of more than 850 British and German troops attacked and 

drove the rearguard troops to a defensible hill (i.e., Monument Hill) 

on which Francis’ regiment began to form. To the south, Warner’s 

regiment attempted to block British Grenadiers attacking over Zion 

Hill and prevent them from cutting off the road to Castleton. Warner 

held back the Grenadiers for a time, but Francis and Warner ordered 

their men to fall back after Riedesel’s detachment of Germans 

attacked the American right. They took up new positions on the 

east side of the Castleton Road and held for about an hour. Francis 

had been killed in the retreat to the Castleton Road, so Warner took 

charge until Francis’ men on the right began to break. Warner then 

ordered his men to scatter and meet him in Manchester as soon as 

they could get there. 

After his men reassembled at Manchester, Warner received 

orders from Schuyler to take command of any Vermont and 

Massachusetts militia he found there (less Stark’s New Hampshire 

militia brigade), as well as several small Vermont ranger companies. 

When Stark’s brigade departed Manchester for Bennington, Warner 

agreed to send the other militia along and bring his own regiment, 
333

which was still resting and refitting, to Bennington a short time later. 

On 16 August, Stark’s forces, along with other militia units 

that reported to Warner, engaged a 700-man detachment of 

Germans, loyalists, Canadians, and Indians. The unit under Lt. Col. 

Friedrich Baum was on a mission to raid the rebel supply depot at 

Bennington. The battle took place several miles west of the town 

and resulted in a devastating defeat for Baum, who was mortally 

wounded in the action. With the help of Warner and his men, Stark 

also soundly defeated a reinforcing column under Lt. Col. Heinrich 

Breymann. Warner’s regiment had made a forced march from east 

of Bennington then launched directly into the battle with Breymann. 

Warner’s leadership was conspicuous on the battlefield that day.

Operating under orders from Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln, 

Warner’s regiment and the Vermont ranger companies participated 

in the Pawlet raids the following month against Fort Ticonderoga 

and Mount Independence. Part of Warner’s Continental Regiment 

and one Ranger company went with Col. John Brown’s column 

that attacked Lake George Landing and Mount Defiance. The rest 

of the regiment accompanied Col. Samuel Johnson’s movement on 

Mount Independence. Whether Warner participated in the actions is 

unclear, but the raids resulted in the capture of more than 200 British 

soldiers and the freeing of more than 110 American prisoners, most 

of whom had been captured at the Battle of Hubbardton. 

After returning to Pawlet, Warner received the order for 

all units in the area to join Gates’ Northern Army near Saratoga. 

Warner moved his troops to Stark’s Knob on the Hudson River on 

13 October to help block any retreat by Burgoyne’s Army. Four days 

later, Burgoyne surrendered his army at Saratoga. 

Between 1778 and 1780, Warner’s Continental Regiment 

continued to serve along the upper Hudson River and at Fort George. 

On 6 September 1780, Warner, along with two of his officers, was 

returning to Fort George from an inspection trip to one of his outlying 

companies. Near a place called “Bloody Pond,” Indians sprang an 

ambush and killed Warner’s two companions straightaway. Warner 

himself was severely wounded and his horse was killed. Five weeks 

later, the portion of Warner’s regiment posted at Fort George was 

attacked and essentially destroyed. Still recuperating from his 
334

wounds, Warner was not present at the demise of his command. The 

regiment was officially disbanded in December, and Warner soon 

retired from the service due to his failing health.

Col. Daniel Morgan. Daniel Morgan was born on 6 July 1735, 

probably in either Hunterdon County, New Jersey, or Bucks County, 

Pennsylvania. During the French and Indian War, Morgan worked 

as a teamster for the British Army and later was appointed as an 

ensign in a colonial ranger unit that was attached to the British 

forces. After that conflict, he served as a militia lieutenant during 

Pontiac’s Rebellion from 1763 to 1764 and once again during Lord 

Dunmore’s War in 1774.

After the Battles of Lexington and Concord, the Continental 

Congress authorized Virginia to form two companies of riflemen. 

Morgan was assigned to command one of them. After recruiting 

almost 100 skilled marksmen, Morgan and his unit left Winchester 

on 14 July 1775 and arrived at Boston on 6 August. Employing highly 

accurate and long-range weapons, Morgan’s expert marksmen soon 

began to make their presence known along the siege lines. Morgan’s 

company along with two other rifle companies placed under his 

command were selected to accompany Benedict Arnold’s brigade of 

1,000 men on a trek that fall through Maine on an expedition to help 

American forces capture Quebec City in Canada. The column linked 

up with the American Canada Army and attacked Quebec City on 31 

December. The attack was a failure. Morgan and many of his troops 

were captured when they became trapped in the city. They were held 

as prisoners of war until paroled September 1776.

Once paroled, Morgan returned to service with the Main Army 

and learned he had been promoted to full colonel for his service 

in Canada. After raising the 11th Virginia Regiment that spring, 

Morgan was tasked to raise a provisional 500-man regiment of 

riflemen designated as the “Corps of Riflemen.” During the summer 

of 1777, Morgan and his men conducted attacks against British 

forces in New Jersey until General Washington instructed him to 

support Gates’ Northern Army at Van Schaik’s Island. Arriving on 

30 August, Morgan’s command was bolstered by the addition of 

Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry Battalion. Their combined 
335

actions were key to the American victory at the 19 September Battle 

of Freeman’s Farm. Subsequently, the Corps of Riflemen conducted 

attacks on the British army’s right flank in the 7 October Battle of 

Barber’s Wheatfield and on the Breymann Redoubt.

Soon after Burgoyne’s 17 October surrender at Saratoga, 

Morgan and the Corps of Riflemen rejoined Washington’s Main 

Army near Philadelphia. Almost a year later on 14 September 

1778, the Americans reorganized the Virginia Line and apparently 

disbanded the Corps of Riflemen. Morgan himself was appointed as 

colonel of the Continental Army’s 7th Virginia Regiment. 

By this time, Morgan had repeatedly proven his abilities in 

battle and potential for higher command. Yet he was passed over for 

promotion to brigadier general several times in favor of less capable 

men. Due to his frustration at being ignored by Congress, coupled 

with injuries he had suffered during campaigns, he decided to leave 

the army. Morgan was placed on furlough 30 June 1779 and went to 

his home in Winchester. 

After a one-year hiatus, Morgan received a letter from General 

Gates, who had now taken over the Southern Department. Gates 

asked him to rejoin the army. Morgan initially declined due to pain 

in his legs from sciatica and the fact that he would be outranked 

by a number of militia officers in Gates’ army down there. After 

Gates’ August defeat at Camden, however, Morgan reconsidered 

and departed home immediately. Rejoining Gates at Hillsborough, 

North Carolina, Morgan was given command of a 600-man corps of 

light infantry on 2 October. Eleven days later, he was promoted to 

brigadier general.

On 2 December, Gates was relieved of command of the 

Southern Department and Maj. Gen. Nathanael Greene took over. 

Green now faced the forces of Cornwallis, which was the major 

British command operating in the Southern Department. Increasingly 

pressured by forces, Greene divided his army and gave Morgan 

instructions to move into South Carolina, while Greene and his men 

headed northwest. In South Carolina, Morgan was to draw forces 

away from Cornwallis’ main army and harass them without bringing 

on a general engagement. Greene hoped to gain breathing room to 

forage his main forces and rebuild them after the defeat at Camden. 
336

Recognizing Greene’s plan, Cornwallis sent Col. Banastre 

Tarleton’s British Legion to track down Morgan. Morgan talked 

with many of the militia who had fought Tarleton before and became 

convinced that he could defeat Tarleton’s forces. After leading 

Tarleton on a three-week chase, Morgan decided to disobey orders 

and turned to counterattack Tarleton’s pursuit. On the morning of 

17 January 1781, Morgan’s command met Tarleton’s forces at the 

Battle of Cowpens. Morgan’s command decisively defeated the 

British and sent Tarleton and his handful of survivors fleeing after 

suffering more than 80-percent casualties. 

After the battle, Morgan’s sciatica returned and on 10 February, 

he was once again forced to leave the army and return to Winchester. 

Later that year, Morgan campaigned with the Marquis de Lafayette 

and Gen. Anthony Wayne against British forces in Virginia for a 

short time, but his medical problems soon precluded any further 

service to the Continental Army for the remainder of the war.

Lt. Col. James Wilkinson. James Wilkinson was born 24 

March 1757 on a farm about three miles northeast of Benedict, 

Maryland. Prior to the Revolutionary War, he had no military 

experience. He enlisted in Thompson’s Pennsylvania Rifle Battalion 

in 1775 and was commissioned as a captain in September. After the 

battalion was sent to participate in the siege of Boston, Wilkinson 

became an aide to Brig. Gen. Nathanael Greene. When the guns 

seized from the British at Fort Ticonderoga arrived at Boston in 

March 1776, Wilkinson helped emplace the guns on Dorchester 

Heights which, in turn, precipitated General Howe’s abandonment 

of the city. Wilkinson next traveled with Greene and the rest of the 

Continental Army south to New York to oppose the British there. 

There he was reassigned to command an infantry company in 

Thompson’s battalion.

In January 1776, Wilkinson’s battalion, including his company, 

was ordered to Canada to reinforce Benedict Arnold’s troops laying 

siege to Quebec City. They arrived in March, but 8,000 British and 

German troops under Gen. John Burgoyne arrived less than two 

months later and forced the American Army from Canada to retreat. 

By this time, Wilkinson had become an aide to General Arnold and 
337

assisted him in directing the final retreat. Wilkinson left Canada 

with Arnold on the very last boat out of St. John’s on 15 June 1776. 

On August 1776, Wilkinson left Arnold’s service and became an 

aide to Gen. Horatio Gates, who commanded Northern Department 

forces at Fort Ticonderoga. He remained in Gates’ service for the 

next 19 months, rising to the rank of lieutenant colonel and the 

position of deputy adjutant general of the Northern Army. Wilkinson 

functioned somewhat as a scout for Gates during the Saratoga 

Campaign’s battles of Freeman’s Farm and Barber’s Wheatfield. 

Gates also employed him as a negotiator and intermediary during 

negotiations for Burgoyne’s surrender. Following the surrender, Gates 

sent Wilkinson to deliver official dispatches concerning the battles 

and the results. However, Wilkinson first attended to a number of 

personal matters and kept Congress waiting until he decided to show 

up. Nevertheless, after Wilkinson delivered the reports—providing 

highly embellished accounts in which he extolled the virtues and 

actions of his own participation—Congress voted a brevet for him as 

a brigadier general. He was only 20 years old at this point.

Wilkinson’s promotion precipitated an outcry from many 

quarters, especially from colonels who had bravely led their men in 

combat on the field of battle. Moreover, Wilkinson was suspected 

of being involved in the so-called Conway Cabal, which was a 

conspiracy to replace George Washington with Horatio Gates 

as commander-in-chief of the Continental Army. Gates—either 

disenchanted with Wilkinson or wanting to distance himself—

compelled Wilkinson to resign from the army in March 1778. With 

assistance from friends in Congress, Wilkinson secured a July 1779 

appointment as clothier-general of the Army. The job apparently did 

not suit him and he resigned from the position in March 1781.

After his resignation from the Continental Army, Wilkinson 

would later reenter the US Army and eventually rise to be the army’s 

commanding general. His later life, however, was marked by a 

series of scandals. In the late 1780s, he was implicated (and later 

conclusively proven) to be involved in treasonous activities with the 

Spanish government. Wilkinson provided the Spanish with sensitive 

US intelligence and conspired to have Kentucky placed under the 

Spanish as a vassal protectorate. Involved in a personal battle with 
338

the army general who preceded him, Maj. Gen. “Mad” Anthony 

Wayne, he narrowly avoided a court-martial due to Wayne’s untimely 

death. He became enmeshed in Aaron Burr’s plans to peel off part 

of the western United States and establish a separate nation. After 

Burr’s plans were exposed, Wilkinson quickly distanced himself 

and denounced Burr—narrowly avoiding indictment as part of the 

scheme. During the War of 1812, he mishandled the army in two 

battles. He was relieved from active duty then finally discharged 

from the army on 15 June 1815.

British Coalition Commanders and Staff

Lt. Gen. William Howe. Gen. William Howe, 5th Viscount 

Howe, was born 10 August 1729 in England. Before the American 

Revolution, Howe had served in the War of the Austrian Succession 

and the Seven Years War. During the latter conflict (known in North 

America as the French and Indian War), Howe led a British force 

that captured the cliffs at Anse-au-Foulon near Quebec City in 1759 

and enabled Gen. James Wolfe to defeat the French in the Battle of 

the Plains of Abraham. 

As trouble brewed in the North American colonies, Howe 

publicly advocated a light-handed approach to governing there. 

As tensions grew, he opposed the so-called Intolerable Acts and 

urged reconciliation with the colonies. Although he stated publicly 

that he had no desire to serve against the rebellious Americans, he 

nevertheless accepted the position as second-in-command of British 

forces in America under Gen. Thomas Gage. In March 1775, Howe 

sailed for Boston accompanied by Maj. Gen. Henry Clinton and Maj. 

Gen. John Burgoyne, along with additional troops to help temper 

American actions. Arriving 15 May, after the battles of Lexington 

and Concord, he discovered that the American Revolution had 

already begun and the city was under siege.

When the rebels entrenched on Breed’s Hill on the Charlestown 

Peninsula, Gage ordered Howe to take the hill and defeat the upstart 

Americans. On 17 June, Howe conducted a frontal attack on the 

position and drove them off, sustaining more than 1,000 casualties 

in the process. The battle convinced Howe that the rebellion was 
339

not just a small number of disaffected rebels but ran deeper among 

the Americans than most British leaders believed. Despite his 

misgivings about prosecuting further violence against his erstwhile 

countrymen, Howe accepted a 10 October appointment as temporary 

commander-in-chief in North America when Gage returned to 

England. Gage never returned to the colonies, and the appointment 

was made permanent in April 1776. 

On 2 March 1776, Washington began bombarding Boston 

using some of the cannon hauled there from Fort Ticonderoga and 

emplaced on Dorchester Heights overlooking the harbor. By midmonth, 59 guns were in action and Howe decided to withdraw his 

forces from the city and move them to Halifax, Nova Scotia. At 

Halifax, Howe developed a new plan to seize New York. On 2 July, 

his army began landing on Staten Island and soon swelled to more 

than 30,000 men. Crossing over to Long Island, Howe engaged 

Washington’s army in the 26–27 August Battle of Long Island, 

defeating Washington and forcing his troops to retreat to Brooklyn 

Heights. There the Americans entrenched and waited for Howe to 

attack. Remembering the high casualties his command sustained 

at Breed’s Hill, Howe declined to attempt another frontal attack 

and opted instead to conduct a siege. Howe’s delay in attacking, 

however, allowed Washington’s army to escape to Manhattan. On 

15 September, Howe’s forces drove Washington from the island as 

well. From Manhattan, the American army retreated to White Plains, 

New York, where once again Washington attempted a defense. 

Howe’s pursuit forced Washington to withdraw in defeat once again 

at the Battle of White Plains. Washington then marched his army 

into Pennsylvania to rest, refit, and recuperate.

Rather than pursue the rebel army and try to destroy it, Howe 

returned to New York City and sent his command into winter 

quarters. To ensure that the army in New York had a buffer against 

attacks from Washington’s forces, Howe directed Maj. Gen. Lord 

Charles Cornwallis to create a robust outpost line in northern New 

Jersey. Washington, however, was not content to sit out the winter 

and was able to engineer notable victories at Trenton and Princeton 

in December and January. Howe’s response was to reduce his 

outpost line and develop a plan to attack Philadelphia during 
340

the coming campaign season. Philadelphia was the seat of the 

Continental Congress government and thus the perceived center 

of the rebellion. In Howe’s estimation, attacking the city would 

force Washington to meet him in open field battle where British 

professionalism and discipline would defeat the Continental Army 

once and for all. In this, Howe miscalculated on several levels. 

In England on personal business during the winter of 1777, 

Burgoyne proposed a campaign plan to Lord George Germain, 

Secretary of State for the Americas. He would lead an army south 

through Lake Champlain to Albany while a second column advanced 

east from Lake Ontario. Meanwhile, Howe would advance north 

from New York and assume command of all further operations into 

New England, the hot bed of rebellion. While the plan received the 

blessings of King George III and Germain, the colonial secretary 

never issued direct orders to Howe to support or operate with 

Burgoyne until late in the season. As Burgoyne moved south, 

Howe instead proceeded with his campaign to capture Philadelphia. 

Because of this coordination and communications failure between 

key decision makers and commanders, Burgoyne’s incursion was a 

failure and he and his army were captured.

As Burgoyne marched south in the summer, Howe embarked 

his forces at New York. They landed at Head of Elk on Chesapeake 

Bay on 25 August 1777. Howe marched his command north from 

there then defeated Washington at the Battle of Brandywine on 11 

September. Eleven days later, his army marched into Philadelphia 

without a fight, but the Continental Congress had simply left 

the city, moved to Baltimore, and continued operations there. 

Howe left a force to garrison Philadelphia and set out to engage 

Washington once again. Washington, learning that Howe had left 

about 3,000 men at Philadelphia, determined he would attack the 

now-smaller British force. On 4 October, the Continental Army 

attacked Howe’s command at Germantown. Initially the attack 

went well for Washington’s men, but several commanders made 

blunders due to the fog and confusion. Ultimately, Howe’s troops 

drove the Continental Army back, but the fight was close and the 

American soldiers and commanders realized they had generally 

performed well despite the confusion. Following yet another defeat, 
341

Washington moved the army to Valley Forge, where it went into 

winter quarters.

After the Battle of Germantown, Howe came under severe 

criticism for his repeated failures to destroy the Continental Army. 

Believing that he had lost the confidence of King George III, Howe 

forwarded his letter of resignation on 22 October. After several 

meager attempts to lure Washington out in the fall, Howe sent his 

troops into winter quarters. On 14 April 1778, Howe was notified 

that his resignation had been accepted and he was superseded on 18 

May by General Clinton. Howe returned to England, where he faced 

severe criticism and a court of inquiry on the handling of his duties in 

America. After he was acquitted, Howe remained in military service 

and later served in Parliament. He died at Twickenham in 1814 after 

a long illness.

Lt. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton. Guy Carleton was born 3 September 

1724 in Ireland. In 1741 at the age of 17, he commissioned as an 

ensign in the 25th Regiment of Foot. In 1747, Carleton was sent 

to Flanders where his regiment fought the French at the fortress of 

Bergen-op-Zoom. His regiment returned to England the following 

year after the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle signing. In 1751, he 

transferred to the 1st Foot Guards and was promoted to captain the 

following year. 

A lieutenant colonel by 1757, Carleton served with the German 

Army of Observation assigned to protect Hanover from French 

invasion then returned to Britain the following year. In 1758, 

he transferred to the newly formed 72nd Regiment of Foot and 

participated in the British attack on the French fortress of Louisbourg 

(in present-day Nova Scotia, Canada). He was selected as aide 

to Brig. James Wolfe, but King George denied his appointment 

(probably due to disparaging comments that Carleton reportedly 

made about Hanoverian soldiers). Left in assignment limbo by the 

denial, Carleton was finally appointed to serve as aide-de-camp to 

Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig.

In December 1758, Wolfe was appointed a major general 

and given command of the upcoming campaign against the city of 

Quebec and he selected Carleton as his quartermaster general, a duty 
342

Carleton performed well throughout the campaign. Wounded during 

the Battle of the Plains of Abraham, Carleton returned to England in 

October 1759. Returning to his regiment (72nd Regiment of Foot), 

Carleton was wounded again in the 29 March 1761 attack on Belle 

Île off the coast of France. He then took part in the British expedition 

against Cuba in 1762 and was wounded a third time on 22 July. 

Carleton was named acting lieutenant governor and administrator 

of Quebec on 7 April 1766. He arrived the following September to 

assume his post. Two years later, he was appointed captain general and 

governor-in-chief of Quebec. From 1768 to 1775, Carleton’s duties 

were largely political and administrative. That began to change in 

May 1775 with the start of the American Revolution. He had sent two 

regiments to Boston before the rebellion began and was now down 

to only 800 regular troops to defend his province. Alarmed by news 

of the Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point seizures and Arnold’s raid 

on Fort St. John, Carleton began to raise militia units to supplement 

his defenses. The effort was largely unsuccessful initially because 

neither local Englishmen, nor the French who remained after Britain 

assumed control of Canada, had much desire to serve with the British 

Army. The Iroquois Indians in the area were willing, but Carleton 

dismissed the idea due to fears of what the Indians might do to noncombatants in the areas of operation.

After the American attacks on the British forts earlier that spring, 

Carleton began preparations to better defend the province. The first line 

of defense was Fort St. John, but that location fell in November to the 

invading rebel Canada Army under Brig. Gen. Richard Montgomery. 

That loss led to the attack on Montreal, which prompted Carleton to 

move his seat of governance from Montreal to Quebec City. In doing 

so, he barely evaded capture himself. For the next six months, Carleton 

directed the British efforts to resist the American siege of Quebec. The 

siege was finally lifted in May 1776 when Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne, 

Carleton’s newly appointed second-in-command, arrived with 

substantial reinforcements. With these new troops, Carleton pursued 

the now-retreating American army and defeated them at the Battle of 

Trois-Rivières. By June, all American forces had been driven out of 

Canada. For his victory, he was appointed a “Knight Commander of 

the Order of the Bath” that June.
343

At Fort St. John, Sir Guy set about building a fleet of mostly 

small gunboats and bateaux at a nearby boatyard. His intent was to 

build enough gunboats and transport boats to move an invasion force 

and supplies south into central New York along the lake ChamplainHudson River route. It took several months, but by October his fleet 

was ready. The Americans under Benedict Arnold had also built a 

small gunboat fleet during the summer and fall and met Carlton’s 

flotilla off Valcour Island on Lake Champlain on 11 October 1776. 

The British, with a significantly superior fleet, won a decisive 

victory. The battle and Arnold’s thorough destruction of Fort Crown 

Point, however, delayed Carleton’s advance. The destruction of 

Crown Point also eliminated any place that Carleton could winter 

his troops over to the following spring, so he was compelled to 

return to Canada.

Because Carleton returned to Canada that fall rather than 

staying at Crown Point, Lord George Germain, secretary of state 

for the American Colonies, gave command of the 1777 expedition 

into central New York to Burgoyne, rather than Sir Guy. Despite the 

slight by Germain (and Burgoyne’s complicity in getting appointed 

as campaign commander at the expense of his boss), Carleton 

pitched in to do what he could to support Burgoyne’s preparations 

for the mission. Once Burgoyne departed south, however, Carleton’s 

willingness to provide troop and supply support decreased 

significantly. Ultimately, Burgoyne’s campaign came to naught due 

in large part to the lack of adequate supplies for the task at hand. 

When he learned that Burgoyne was to lead the campaign, 

Carleton felt slighted and was distraught that he did not receive the 

command. He tendered his resignation that fall and in 1778 returned 

to England, where he continued to work at various government 

posts. In the aftermath of the 1781 surrender at Yorktown, Carleton 

was recalled in 1782 to replace Gen. Sir Henry Clinton in New York 

as commander-in-chief of British forces in North America. Carleton 

remained in command until the official end of the conflict in 1783 

and returned to England in November. 

In England, Carleton was appointed governor-in-chief of all 

provinces in British North America. He was concurrently appointed 

as governor for Quebec, New Braunschweig, Nova Scotia, and St. 
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John’s Island (present-day Prince Edward Island). He arrived back 

in Quebec on 23 October 1786 and served in this post for almost 

10 years. On 9 July 1796, Carleton sailed from Canada on his final 

journey to Britain. He died suddenly on 10 November 1808 at his 

home at Stubbings House, Burchett’s Green, Berkshire, England.

Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne. John Burgoyne Jr. was born in 

Sutton, Bedfordshire, England on 24 February 1723. Burgoyne 

began his military career at the age of 15 when he purchased a 

commission in the Horse Guards Regiment in August 1737. Due 

to the fancy uniforms he favored and his penchant for gambling 

and the high life, his soldiers soon referred to him as “Gentleman 

Johnny.” In 1741, he was forced to sell his commission to satisfy 

his gambling debts. He was able to recover somewhat by securing a 

cornet’s commission in April 1745 with the newly raised 1st Royal 

Dragoons. He would serve in this role during the War of Austrian 

Succession. With the 1st Dragoons, he was quickly promoted to 

lieutenant and by year’s end had come up with enough money to 

purchase a captaincy. With the end of the war in 1748, Burgoyne’s 

active service came to an end. 

Soon in debt again, Burgoyne sold his commission a second 

time to support himself and his new bride. In June 1756, he obtained 

another commission—this time as a captain in the 11th Dragoons. 

Burgoyne served with the dragoons during the Seven Years War until 

1758 when he transferred to the Coldstream Guards. With his new 

regiment, he took part in raids on the French coast, participating in 

the seizure of Cherbourg and the failed attempt to take St. Malo.

Burgoyne’s next wartime service was in 1762, when he served 

as a brigadier general in the Anglo-Portuguese forces. He won 

distinction by leading his cavalry in capturing the towns of Valencia 

de Alcántara and of Vila Velha de Ródão—returning from Portugal 

as a successful war hero. 

As trouble in the American colonies grew, Burgoyne as well 

as Generals Howe and Clinton were sent to Massachusetts to assist 

the governor general, Thomas Gage, with forestalling a rebellion. 

When he arrived in Boston in May 1775, Burgoyne learned the war 

had already begun. He participated in the siege of Boston for a time 
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but was not there when Howe attacked Breed’s Hill. As the junior 

general present—and frustrated by the lack of opportunity for his 

skills—he returned to England that fall. 

In May 1776, Burgoyne arrived in Canada at the head of British 

reinforcements sent to help Governor General Sir Guy Carleton 

break the siege on Quebec by the American Continental Army. 

Under Carleton, he led forces in the counteroffensive that drove 

the Continental Army from Quebec Province. Carleton then led the 

British forces south in an offensive drive down Lake Champlain to 

Crown Point. Burgoyne was not impressed with Carleton’s efforts. 

He believed Carleton was too timid, especially as Carleton failed 

to even attempt the capture of Fort Ticonderoga after winning the 

naval Battle of Valcour Island in October.

Returning to England on 9 December 1776, Burgoyne 

persuaded King George III and Lord Germain to let him invade 

central New York from Canada for the campaign of 1777. He would 

send the main column south to capture Albany, New York, and a 

smaller column through Lake Ontario to clear the Mohawk River 

Valley and link up with him in Albany. From there, Burgoyne could 

operate under Howe’s command for further operations into New 

England. The king and secretary liked the daring plan and appointed 

Burgoyne as commander of the expedition (over Carleton, who was 

senior to him). They also provided him with additional regiments, 

including a sizable German contingent from Braunschweig. 

Sailing down Lake Champlain in late June, Burgoyne was surprised how easily he captured Fort Ticonderoga. After that initial 

victory, however, things began to progressively worsen for Gentleman Johnny. He had to slow his campaign’s progress to build a road 

and move most of his artillery, wagons, and other supplies over a 

difficult water and land route to Fort Edward. By the end of July, 

he had his army consolidated at Fort Edward but was now running 

low on supplies. His army suffered two key defeats in August at 

Bennington, Vermont, and Fort Schuyler, New York, which reduced 

his combat forces significantly and failed to improve his worsening 

supply problems.

Continuing to push south on 10 September, Burgoyne’s army 

ran into Gates’s American Northern Army dug in at Bemis Heights 
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near Stillwater, New York. The American army was barring Burgoyne’s way south, so he attempted to move to the west and attack 

the Americans’ left flank on 19 September. A battle took place at 

Freeman’s Farm when rebel forces under Benedict Arnold and Daniel Morgan sallied forth from Bemis Heights to attack Burgoyne’s 

army. Burgoyne’s troops fought heroically (as did the Americans) 

and drove the Americans off at the end of the day. In doing so, however, Burgoyne’s army suffered heavy manpower losses.

Burgoyne decided to wait for Gen. Henry Clinton to arrive with 

additional supplies and reinforcements. Clinton did send a column 

up the Hudson from New York City to wreak havoc and try to draw 

away some of Gates’ forces facing Burgoyne. It was unrealistic, 

however, to think that Clinton’s forces could ever effect a junction 

with Burgoyne. On 3 October 1777, Burgoyne was forced to put his 

men on reduced rations and four days later he attempted another foray 

to find the American left flank. The Americans charged forth again, 

but this time soundly defeated Burgoyne’s professionals. Burgoyne 

was soon compelled to retreat north to the town of Saratoga, where 

his army was besieged by the Americans. On 17 October, Burgoyne 

was forced to surrender his entire army to General Gates and the 

American Northern Army.

Unlike most of his army, Burgoyne was exchanged in 1778 and 

returned home to England. There he faced a great deal of criticism 

about the defeat at Saratoga. He demanded an inquiry in the House 

of Commons, attempting to defend his actions and decisions. The 

inquiry largely found in his favor but never really cleared his name. 

He was deprived of the command of his regiment and the Fort 

William, Scotland, governorship he had held since 1769. 

When his political allies returned to power in 1782, Burgoyne 

was eventually restored to his rank, given a colonelcy, and made 

commander-in-chief in Ireland and a privy councilor. He died 

unexpectedly on 4 August 1792 at his home in Mayfair and is buried 

in Westminster Abbey.

Maj. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton. Henry Clinton was born 16 

April 1730 in Newfoundland, Canada. Clinton began his long 

association with things military when he joined a local militia unit 
347

in 1748. He sailed to England in 1751 and purchased a captain’s 

commission in the Coldstream Guards. Although he was clearly a 

competent officer, Clinton rapidly climbed through the ranks through 

family connections and by purchasing commissions rather than by 

reputation. By 1758, he was lieutenant colonel of the elite 1st Foot 

Guards. After the start of the Seven Years War, he was selected to 

be an aide-de-camp to Duke Ferdinand of Braunschweig in 1760. 

Due to his exemplary performance during that conflict, Clinton was 

promoted to colonel in 1762 then appointed as colonel of the 12th 

Regiment of Foot in 1763 after the war ended.

Continuing to climb the ladder, Clinton was promoted to 

major general on 25 May 1772. In March 1775, he was ordered 

to go to Boston with Generals Howe and Burgoyne when troubles 

in the American colonies were coming to a head. Arriving in 

May, Clinton found that Boston was already under siege by the 

American rebels. After assessing the situation, he recommended to 

Gen. Thomas Gage that British troops land behind the rebel army 

and break the encirclement. Gage rejected his recommendations 

and on 17 June 1775, Clinton watched as British forces sustained 

more than 1,000 casualties in frontal attacks against the American 

positions at Bunker Hill. 

Gage returned to England in October for what was to be a 

temporary visit and Howe replaced him as acting commanderin-chief of British troops in North America. In early 1776, Howe 

sent Clinton with a 2,500-man force to assess the opportunities 

for military action in the Carolinas. Initially delayed by stormy 

weather and problems with acquiring provisions, Clinton’s 

expedition reached the Cape Fear area on the coast of North 

Carolina in March. Finding that conditions there were unfavorable 

for their objectives, Clinton and Admiral Sir Peter Parker decided 

instead to seize Charleston, South Carolina. That expedition failed 

when Clinton discovered that his men could not wade across the 

channel between Long Island and Sullivan’s Island on which Fort 

Moultrie stood. The fort, safe from ground assault, withstood a 

naval bombardment in which the American garrison gave better 

than it received. After a day of the failed bombardment effort, 

Parker picked up Clinton’s men and sailed away.
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The British ships moved Clinton’s expedition force to Staten 

Island near New York City to link up with other Howe forces who 

recently moved there from Boston and Halifax, Nova Scotia. After 

building supplies and a troop strength of 32,000 men, Howe directed 

Clinton and Cornwallis to cross a 4,000-man advance guard over to 

Long Island on the morning of 22 August, followed by another 15,000 

men and artillery later in the day. Through intelligence acquired from 

local loyalists and personal reconnaissance of American positions in 

the area, Clinton developed a plan for a night march and flanking 

attack against the main American position on Brooklyn Heights. 

Because of Clinton’s plan and personal leadership on the battlefield, 

the British troops were victorious during the Battle of Long Island 

on 27 August. The battle was one in a series that ultimately drove 

Washington from the city and into Pennsylvania. The victory earned 

Clinton a knighthood and permanent promotion to lieutenant general. 

Despite the recent victories, a great unease developed between 

Clinton and Howe during 1776. Clinton requested leave and returned 

to England—largely to petition for Howe’s job. Given a knighthood 

instead, Clinton returned to New York on 5 July 1777 to reassume his 

secondary position. He discovered on arrival that Howe planned to 

sail up Chesapeake Bay to capture the rebel capital at Philadelphia. 

Aware of Burgoyne’s mission to invade New York to capture Albany, 

Clinton argued to Howe that cooperating with Burgoyne would 

achieve more in defeating the rebellion than capturing Philadelphia. 

Howe disagreed and departed on his mission on 23 July.

While Howe sailed south to march on the rebel capital, he left 

Clinton with 7,000 men to defend New York. Clinton—needlessly 

as it turned out—feared that Washington might ignore Howe and 

attack to seize the city. As Burgoyne’s army moved south, he began 

sending messages to Clinton requesting his support with an advance 

up the Hudson River toward Albany. Soon after reinforcements 

arrived from England in early October, Clinton sent an expeditionary 

force north up the Hudson to support Burgoyne’s efforts. It was too 

little too late, however, and Burgoyne was forced to surrender at 

Saratoga on 17 October.

The defeat at Saratoga created much criticism about Howe’s 

conduct of the war. He subsequently tendered his resignation. On 
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21 March 1778, Clinton assumed the role of commander-in-chief of 

British forces in North America at Philadelphia—with Cornwallis as 

his second-in-command.

Frustrated by the perceived strength of the rebellion in the 

north, Clinton shifted his attention to the southern colonies, where 

he anticipated greater support from loyalists. He dispatched a 3,100-

man force under Lt. Col. Archibald Campbell to seize Savannah, 

Georgia, which Campbell accomplished on 28 December 1778. 

Clinton’s next plan was to return to Charleston to capture that city 

and its harbor, then use the facilities to support operations farther up 

the coast. Due to a dearth of troops, however, Clinton had to bide 

his time through much of 1779 until enough reinforcements arrived 

to attempt the venture. In January 1780, Clinton sailed south with 

almost 14,000 men and arrived before his objective in March. Advancing on the city from James Island, Clinton began a siege of the 

city on 1 April. After almost six weeks of skirmishing, Maj. Gen. 

Benjamin Lincoln, commander of the American Southern Department, surrendered the city on 12 May 1780. 

When he learned that a French fleet was en route to New 

York, Clinton turned over command of the southern troops to 

Cornwallis and returned to the city. Unfortunately for Clinton (as 

it was for Howe), his relationship with his second-in-command 

was strained. Cornwallis did not respect his boss and, given the 

distance between them, Cornwallis increasingly functioned as an 

independent commander, especially while Clinton was distracted 

with Washington’s army at New York. Thus, when Cornwallis 

failed to effectively neutralize Greene’s Continentals and militia 

in the Carolinas and eventually became trapped by the combined 

forces of Washington and Lafayette, Clinton was unable to help 

extract him from his errors. By the time Clinton was able to send 

a relief force, Cornwallis had already surrendered to Washington. 

The disaster led to Clinton’s resignation in March 1782. He was 

replaced by Lt. Gen. Sir Guy Carleton.

Maj. Gen. Henry W. Powell. Henry W. Powell was born 

in England in 1733. He entered service with the British Army 10 

March 1753 as a lieutenant with the 46th Regiment of Foot. Three 
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and a half years later he was promoted to captain and transferred to 

the 11th Regiment of Foot (later redesignated as the 64th Regiment 

of Foot). Powell served with the 64th in the French West Indies during the Seven Years War in 1759 and later served with the regiment 

in the Americas in 1768. Powell continued to receive promotions in 

various regiments until 1771, when he was promoted to lieutenant 

colonel and assigned command of the 53rd Regiment of Foot.

Powell and the 53rd arrived in Canada in May 1776 and 

participated in Maj. Gen. John Burgoyne’s attacks on, and pursuit of, 

the American Canada Army which had been besieging Quebec City. 

On 10 June 1776, Sir Guy Carleton, governor general of Quebec 

Province, appointed Powell as a temporary brigadier general to take 

command of his 2nd Brigade. 

In the spring of 1777, Burgoyne formed his Army from Canada 

to conduct his drive down the Lake Champlain-Hudson River route 

to seize Albany, New York. Burgoyne selected Powell to command 

his 1st Brigade which consisted, at least initially, of the 9th, 47th, 

and 53rd Regiments of Foot. Powell was apparently not one of 

Gentleman Johnny Burgoyne’s favorites. One of Burgoyne’s staff 

officers described Powell as “not very refined.” Perhaps as a result 

of that, Burgoyne sent Powell to replace Brig. John I. Hamilton as 

commander of Fort Ticonderoga, a post which he assumed on 15 

August 1777 while the latter went to join Burgoyne at the front. In 

the switch, Powell’s command was reduced to his own regiment and 

the Braunschweiger Prinz Friedrich Regiment. 

Powell’s command of Fort Ticonderoga was marked by 

setbacks and ineptitude. On 18 September, the Lake George Landing, 

Mount Defiance, and Mount Independence installations—all under 

Powell’s immediate command—were attacked by two 500-man 

militia forces. At Lake George Landing, Powell’s command lost 118 

American prisoners (mostly captured at the Battle of Hubbardton) 

and a great deal of supplies, including several hundred head of beeves 

and horses plus about 200 bateaux and numerous wheeled carts and 

carriages that were carried away, burned, or otherwise destroyed. 

Perhaps most importantly, about 225 of his professional soldiers 

were captured, a loss he could ill-afford. Additionally, Mounts 

Defiance and Independence were both captured by the Americans, 
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and Fort Ticonderoga itself was placed under an ineffectual siege, 

albeit for only two days. To his credit, Powell steadfastly refused to 

surrender the fort to Col. John Brown, the commander of the Lake 

George Landing/Mount Defiance raiding party.

Later, when St. Leger’s force arrived at the fort from the 

Mohawk Valley on 27 September, Powell refused to send St. 

Leger south to reinforce Burgoyne. This was no doubt due to his 

own diminished troop strength as well as the fact that all Powell’s 

transportation assets were lost during the raid. On 8 November, 

about three weeks after Burgoyne surrendered at Saratoga, Powell 

ordered the abandonment and destruction of Fort Ticonderoga and 

returned to Canada with his remaining troops. 

Later during the war, Powell held commands at Montreal, Fort 

St. John, Fort Niagara, and Quebec. While stationed at Quebec in 

1780, Powell purchased an estate on the banks of the St. Lawrence 

River, which he named Powell Place. Eventually purchased from 

his family and renamed Spencer Wood, the property was where 

the present Government House of the Province of Quebec was 

built. Powell returned to England after the war and was eventually 

promoted to lieutenant general on 3 May 1796 and full general on 1 

January 1801. He died in July 1814 in Lyme, England.

Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel. Friedrich Adolf 

Riedesel was born 3 June 1738 in the city of Lauterbach in the 

German state of Hesse. In 1755 at the age of 17, Riedesel enlisted as 

an ensign in the Marburg Battalion. For his initial assignment, he was 

posted to England in 1755 near London where his battalion served 

with the British Army under King George II. Although Riedesel 

knew no French or English, he learned both during his brief sojourn 

in England. In 1756, his battalion was recalled to serve in the Seven 

Years War. Soon Riedesel was transferred to the staff of Ferdinand, 

Duke of Braunschweig. In that capacity, he distinguished himself at 

the 1759 Battle of Minden by undertaking numerous missions to carry 

messages for the duke under dangerous circumstances. Riedesel’s 

actions also caught the attention of Frederick the Great, King of 

Prussia. After the battle, Riedesel was awarded a captaincy and a 

transfer to command a Braunschweiger hussar battalion squadron.
352

In 1761, the Landgrave of Hesse overlooked this remarkable 

young officer for further promotion and, Riedesel, upset, resigned. 

Ferdinand realized the error and immediately appointed Riedesel as 

lieutenant colonel and commander of the Black Hussars Regiment. 

Two months later, he also appointed Riedesel to command the Bauer 

Cavalry Regiment. At the age of 23, he commanded what in essence 

was a cavalry brigade. During May the following year, a French 

Chasseur shot Riedesel in the chest during a battle. He was sent 

home to recover from the wound, which was not too serious. 

In 1767, Riedesel’s regiments were disbanded at the end of the 

Seven Year’s War. With no command, the duke transferred him to be 

the adjutant general of the Braunschweig Army. In 1772, however, 

he was appointed colonel of a carbineer regiment that soon became 

known as the Braunschweiger Riedesel Regiment.

In early 1776, Ferdinand signed an agreement with the British to 

provide 4,000 foot soldiers and 350 heavy dragoons to serve in North 

America. The duke then appointed Riedesel as the Braunschweig 

contingent’s commander and promoted him to major general. On 21 

March 1776, Riedesel and his new command sailed for Quebec and, 

after a brief stop in England, they finally reached the city on 1 June. 

The timely advent enabled Riedesel and his troops to assist Governor 

General Carleton’s counteroffensive to expel the American rebels’ 

Canada Army (which had invaded Quebec the previous fall) from 

the province. Riedesel’s units were assigned to various posts around 

Quebec Province to conduct defensive operations during the fall and 

winter of 1776–1777. 

In the late spring of 1777, most of Riedesel’s command 

was selected to accompany General Burgoyne’s incursion into 

central New York and what has become known as the Saratoga 

Campaign. Burgoyne appointed Riedesel as commander of the 

Left Wing in his Army from Canada. Riedesel reorganized his 

command with two brigades under Brig. Gen. Johann Friedrich 

Specht and Brig. Gen. Wilhelm Rudolph von Gall plus a Reserve 

Corps under Lt. Col. Heinrich Christoph Breymann. In all, his 

force made up about half of Burgoyne’s army. Even though 

these troops were well-trained professionals, both Riedesel and 

Burgoyne would soon learn that fighting against the American 
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rebels in the American wilderness was far different than on a 

European battlefield.

The initial Left Wing operations came in early July 1777 when 

Riedesel’s units landed on the east bank of Lake Champlain to conduct 

an assault on Mount Independence located across the lake from Fort 

Ticonderoga. The jungle and swamp-like terrain caused the German 

commanders no end of trouble as they tried to maneuver their units 

for several days through the tangle toward Mount Independence. 

They never launched an assault because St. Clair, the American 

commander, ordered the fort and Mount Independence evacuated on 

the early morning of 6 July—before any major fighting took place. 

Burgoyne ordered a pursuit after the retreating rebels. Riedesel 

and part of his Left Wing would support Brig. Simon Fraser’s 

Advance Corps in pursuing rebel troops who had taken the land route 

southeast from Mount Independence toward Castleton, Vermont. 

On the morning of 7 July 1777, Fraser’s Advance Corps caught 

up with the rebel rearguard at the village of Hubbardton. Fraser’s 

disciplined troops, including the elite British light infantry and the 

expedition’s grenadier companies, had a more difficult time than 

they expected with the attack. The Americans fought determinedly 

and were about to gain the upper hand against Fraser’s battle line 

when Riedesel led his troops into the rebel flank from the north. 

The surprise move caused the Americans to retreat to an alternate 

position and allowed the British to take the hill on which the 

rebels had anchored their line. By noon, the rebels had once again 

retreated, this time over the mountains and largely out of Fraser’s 

grasp. Thanks at least in part to Riedesel’s flank attack, the battle 

was a British victory, albeit a bloody one.

For the next five weeks, Burgoyne’s army was stuck in the 

vicinity of Skenesborough—struggling to build a road south to Fort 

Edward and move its artillery and trains via Lake George Landing 

to the same location. In the meantime, Burgoyne’s command began 

to run low on supplies. Riedesel suggested that Burgoyne send a 

raiding column into Vermont to forage for food, horses, and wagons. 

Initially reluctant, Burgoyne agreed to send out a detachment. 

Inexplicably, he selected Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum, commander of 

Riedesel’s Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig, a mounted unit which 
354

possessed no horses. It made sense to send a cavalry commander 

since his unit desperately needed horses. On the other hand, Baum 

spoke no English and had absolutely no knowledge of the country 

in which he was expected to move. Though Riedesel was opposed 

to this version of the mission, Burgoyne insisted that it go forward. 

The raid, in short, came to naught at the Battle of Bennington on 

16 August. Baum’s force was almost entirely killed or captured. A 

reinforcing column under Lieutenant Colonel Breymann was also 

severely defeated by the Americans and lost all its artillery and 

baggage trains. In one fell swoop, Riedesel’s command was reduced 

by almost 1,000 men.

Burgoyne finally restarted his move toward Albany on 10 

September, arriving a week later near Bemis Heights. There he 

learned the rebel army’s defensive position south of the village of 

Saratoga was barring his way south. On 19 September, Burgoyne 

attempted a turning movement to the west of the defenses but was 

forced to fight an open field battle when a large contingent of the 

American forces under Benedict Arnold sallied forth to interdict him. 

The fight was bloody. Once again, Riedesel and part of his command 

arrived on the battlefield on the right flank of Arnold’s troops—just 

in time to help avert defeat for the British army. Riedesel’s role in 

the follow-on battle at Barber’s Wheatfield on 7 October was less 

glamorous, but this time, Burgoyne’s army was clearly defeated and 

driven from the field. As with the British forces, Riedesel’s troops 

lost heavily in the fighting, including Lieutenant Colonel Breymann 

who was killed defending his redoubt. 

On 17 October at the village of Saratoga, Riedesel and his 

command surrendered along with the rest of Burgoyne’s Army from 

Canada to Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates, commander of the American 

Northern Army. Riedesel and his wife, who accompanied him on the 

campaign, were imprisoned initially in Cambridge, Massachusetts. 

They were later transferred to Charlottesville, Virginia, and 

subsequently to New York City, where he spent a year on parole 

before being exchanged for American Gen. Benjamin Lincoln.

Once paroled, Riedesel returned to duty to take charge of troops 

on Long Island. He held that command for the winter of 1780–1781 

until the new governor of Quebec, Gen. Frederick Haldimand, 
355

appointed him as the commander of the Sorel District in Quebec 

Province. Riedesel held that command until he left North America 

at the end of summer 1784. He returned to Braunschweig and 

assumed new duties under Ferdinand, who was by then the duke of 

Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel. Later he was promoted to lieutenant 

general then in 1787 was given command of the Braunschweig 

troops in the southern provinces of Holland. In 1793, he retired from 

military service but was soon named as commandant for the city of 

Braunschweig. He remained at this duty until his death there in 1800. 

Brig. James I. Hamilton. The early years of James Inglis 

Hamilton are sketchy. He was born into an aristocratic family in 

Scotland sometime before 1742 and entered the British army on 

28 February 1755. His first duty assignment was at Portsmouth, 

England, but his stay there was short. His regiment, the 34th Foot, 

soon departed to serve in the Seven Years War. During that conflict, 

Hamilton first saw action in June 1756 fighting under the command 

of Gen. William Blakeney at Minorca Island during the Siege of Fort 

St. Philip. Unfortunately for Blakeney, 15,000 Frenchmen under the 

Duke de Richelieu and Roland-Michel Barrin de La Galissonière 

sailed to Fort St. Philip and forced the British to surrender on 29 

June 1756. The French allowed Hamilton’s regiment to depart the 

island with their arms.

In June 1758, Hamilton and the 34th Foot participated in the 

St. Malo raid on the coast of Brittany, France, as part of a British 

amphibious/naval expedition led by the Duke of Marlborough to 

seize the town and close the port. Although they dropped the plan 

to take the town, the raiders destroyed a great deal of shipping and 

supplies before re-embarking a week later. 

In 1761, Hamilton participated in yet another amphibious 

expedition to capture the French island of Belle Île off the Brittany 

coast. Led by Gen. Studholme Hodgson, the first British attempt to 

land was unsuccessful and they lost approximately 500 troops or ten 

percent of the whole force. With reinforcements, they succeeded in a 

second attempt on 7 June. After a six-week siege, Hodgson’s troops 

stormed the island’s main citadel at Le Palais, which effectively 

gave the British control of the island. 
356

On 17 October 1761, while still a major, Hamilton was 

appointed as “major commandant” (i.e., colonel) of the recently 

formed 113th Regiment of Foot. The 113th Foot, however, was not 

a combat regiment because it served as the depot for sending drafts 

(i.e., replacements) to other Highland regiments serving overseas. 

The regiment was disbanded in 1763 and Hamilton was retired on 

half pay. On 25 May 1772, he became the lieutenant colonel of 

the 15th Foot, and two years later was given command of the 21st 

Regiment of Foot.

Hamilton and the 21st Foot were serving in Ireland in 1776 

when the regiment received orders to go to Quebec, Canada, which 

was under siege by the American Canada Army. Sailing from Cork 

in 1776, the regiment arrived in May and participated in the British 

counteroffensive to relieve Quebec and drive the Americans from 

Canada. On 15 September 1776, Hamilton was appointed as the 

temporary commander of the 1st Brigade of Governor Carleton’s 

forces when the assigned commander, Brig. William Nesbit, fell 

ill and soon died. On Nesbit’s death, Hamilton was promoted to 

brigadier and assigned to command the 2nd Brigade, which consisted 

of the 34th, 53rd, 62nd, and 20th Regiments of Foot.

Hamilton played a key role in assisting General Burgoyne to 

prepare his newly formed Army from Canada for a campaign into 

central New York in the late spring of 1777. For the expedition, 

he was returned to command the 1st Brigade, now composed of 

the 9th, 47th, and 53rd Regiments of Foot. After the fall of Fort 

Ticonderoga, Burgoyne appointed Hamilton to command the fort 

and manage and secure the army’s lines of communication. He was 

replaced by Brig. Henry W. Powell on 16 August 1777 and rejoined 

Burgoyne in the field. There, his brigade assumed additional control 

of the 62nd Regiment (formerly of Powell’s brigade).

At the Battle of Freeman’s Farm on 19 September 1777, 

Hamilton commanded about 1,100 men of the center column, which 

essentially consisted of his four regiments. Hamilton’s troops fought 

valiantly and held the field at the end of the battle despite sustaining 

very high casualties (the highest ratio of any in Burgoyne’s command). 

During the Battle of Bemis Heights or Barber’s Wheatfield almost 

a month later, Hamilton’s troops were not engaged as heavily as at 
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the previous fight. The second battle, however, was a clear rout of 

the British and German forces. Ultimately, Hamilton and his brigade 

surrendered at Saratoga along with the rest of the Army from Canada 

on 19 October 1777.

The Convention Army, as Burgoyne’s command then became 

known, was marched to Cambridge, Massachusetts and arrived on 8 

November 1777. Maj. Gen. William Phillips commanded the army 

until he was exchanged in 1780. Hamilton, the next in line in terms 

of seniority, assumed command. On 3 September 1781, Hamilton 

was released by his American captors under the provision that he 

not return to America until the war was officially over. Though the 

expedition ended in disaster for Hamilton and his men, Burgoyne 

later indicated the British leader was “the whole time engaged and 

acquitted himself with great honor, activity, and good conduct.”

Brig. Simon Fraser. Simon Fraser was born in Invernesshire, 

Scotland, on 26 May 1729. Rather than the British Army, Fraser’s 

military career began with the Dutch army. He was in service with 

the Earl of Drumlanrig’s regiment when he was wounded at the 

siege of Bergen-op-Zoom in 1747. He was then pensioned and 

joined the British army in 1755 as a lieutenant in the 62nd Royal 

American Regiment.

Fraser joined the 78th Highland Regiment of Foot during the 

French and Indian War. His new regiment was sent to Canada, where 

it participated in the Siege of Louisbourg, Nova Scotia, in June and 

July 1758. He was soon promoted to captain before taking part in 

the Battle of Quebec in 1759. He was in Gen. James Wolfe’s boat 

when it crossed the St Lawrence River and approached the French 

shore in fog. When French sentries challenged the approach, Fraser 

responded in fluent French and fooled the guards, enabling the 

British Army to land and proceed unopposed before ascending to 

the Plains of Abraham.

After the successful conclusion of that war, now Major 

Fraser was sent to Braunschweig to serve on the staff of Duke 

Ferdinand. While there, he no doubt became acquainted with 

Friedrich Adolph Riedesel, with whom he would serve again in 

the Saratoga Campaign. Promoted to lieutenant colonel of the 
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24th Regiment of Foot in 1768, he next served a stint of garrison 

duty in Gibraltar before being posted to Ireland as aide-de-camp 

to Gen. Jeffrey Townshend, lord lieutenant of Ireland. In 1770, 

Townshend appointed Fraser as quartermaster general for the 

Irish Establishment. When the 24th Foot received orders to go to 

Canada in 1776, Fraser transferred with his regiment to Quebec, 

where they arrived in May. Fraser led the 24th in the Battle at Trois 

Rivieres in June, helping to drive the American Canada Army 

out of the province. In recognition of his leadership skills, Gen. 

John Burgoyne promoted Fraser to brigadier general and put him 

in charge of the Army from Canada’s Advance Corps, which was 

composed of the army’s elite troops.

At the start of the Saratoga Campaign, Fraser’s Advance Corps 

was about 1,000 men strong. The corps was composed of the grenadier 

battalion, the light infantry battalion, and the Company of Marksmen 

commanded by his nephew Capt. Alexander Fraser. The command 

also included two companies of Canadian militia, a company of Royal 

Artillery, and the “Indian Department” of Iroquois warriors, as well 

as his own 24th Regiment of Foot. The Advance Corps was engaged 

briefly at Fort Ticonderoga on the day it arrived there. 

Following the American retreat from Fort Ticonderoga, Fraser’s 

corps was dispatched to pursue the rebel ground column headed 

for Castleton, Vermont. He caught up with the American rearguard 

at the town of Hubbardton early on the morning of 7 July 1777. 

During the battle, Fraser sent the grenadier battalion south to cut the 

rebel retreat route to Castleton while concurrently making several 

frontal attacks against the main rebel line on what is now called 

Monument Hill. His corps succeeded in driving off the rearguard 

in disorder over the mountains but lost a good number of troops in 

doing so. The casualties were such that Fraser decided to return the 

Advance Corps and its many wounded to Skenesborough instead of 

continuing the pursuit. 

After employing his troops for more than two weeks in building 

a road between Fort Anne and Fort Edward, Fraser led the Advance 

Corps south again until they reached a place called Sword’s Farm 

on 17 September. Two days later at Freeman’s Farm, he commanded 

the Army from Canada’s right flank units in an open field battle. Due 
359

to his steady leadership, his men held firm against the attacks of 

Brig. Gen. Ebenezer Learned’s Brigade and Maj. Henry Dearborn’s 

Light Infantry at the nearby McBride Farm. The battle was a British 

victory, but General Hamilton’s troops at Freeman’s Farm sustained 

severe casualties. 

After a two-and-a-half week standoff between the Army from 

Canada and the American Northern Army dug in on Bemis Heights, 

General Burgoyne sent a reconnaissance in force to the west to find 

the American left flank on 19 October. Fraser’s Advance Corps was 

the largest contingent of the reconnaissance and led the movement. 

As in the previous battle, American forces sortied from their defenses 

and conducted a meeting engagement with the British troops in 

Barber’s Wheatfield. This time, the British forces were swept from 

the field after Fraser was mortally wounded with a rifle shot to the 

abdomen. He was carried to the Taylor House in the rear of the 

British lines, where General Riedesel’s wife cared for him until he 

died that evening. At six o’clock on the evening of the following 

day, Fraser was buried on a hill within the Great Redoubt. 

Brig. Barry St. Leger. Barry St. Leger was born in 1733 in 

County Kildare, Ireland. He joined the British Army in April 1756, 

serving initially as an ensign in the 28th Regiment of Foot. With 

that regiment, he served in the French and Indian War under the 

command of Gen. Jeffrey Amherst and was with Amherst at the siege 

of Louisbourg in 1758. The following year, the 28th transferred to 

the command of Gen. James Wolfe then served with him at the Siege 

of Quebec. For his performance of duties during the war, St. Leger 

was appointed brigade-major in July 1760 and served as a staff 

officer for Gen. James Murray in the campaign against Montreal. 

On 16 September 1762, St. Leger was promoted to permanent major 

in the 95th Regiment of Foot.

By the time of the American Revolution, St. Leger had advanced 

to the rank of lieutenant colonel in the 34th Regiment of Foot. He 

commanded that regiment when it was ordered to Canada in the 

spring of 1776. After the regiment arrived in May, St. Leger led the 

34th against the remnants of the American Canada Army and helped 

drive the rebels out of Canada.
360

In 1777, Gen. John Burgoyne selected St. Leger to lead a special 

mission and temporarily promoted him to the rank of brigadier. St. 

Leger would lead the western arm of a pincers movement during 

Burgoyne’s advance into central New York to seize Albany. St. 

Leger’s command consisted of a mixed force of British regulars, 

German jägers, Indians, Canadians, Loyalists, and Iroquois. The plan 

was to move this force up the Saint Lawrence River by boat, through 

Lake Ontario to Fort Oswego, and from there by foot and bateaux 

to Fort Schuyler (also commonly referred to as Fort Stanwix). The 

purpose of the mission was to open the Mohawk River Valley to use 

it as a line of communication for British troops, deny its use to the 

Americans, and descend on Albany from the west to link there with 

Burgoyne’s army. 

When he arrived at Fort Schuyler, St. Leger was dismayed to 

discover that the fort was more strongly defended than spies had led 

him to believe. With no other choice, he laid siege to the post once 

his artillery arrived from Oswego. More trouble developed when he 

was made aware that a strong American militia column was en route 

from Fort Dayton to reinforce Fort Schuyler and break the siege. 

St. Leger sent a detachment composed mostly of his Indians and 

Loyalist troops to stop the column. On 6 August, the detachment 

ambushed Brig. Gen. Nicholas Herkimer’s Tryon County militia 

brigade near the village of Oriskany. The battle went poorly 

for Herkimer’s command, which suffered numerous casualties. 

Herkimer himself was mortally wounded and his brigade was driven 

back to Fort Dayton in defeat. The attack at Oriskany, however, 

created a golden opportunity for the rebel garrison at Fort Schuyler. 

Some of the soldiers sortied from the fort to raid the Loyalist and 

Indian camps while they were away fighting Herkimer’s command. 

This action caused an immediate drop in morale for the Oriskany 

victors as they now had no supplies, extra clothes, or shelter from 

the weather. Moreover, the Loyalists and Indians blamed St. Leger 

for failing to protect their camp while they were gone.

New reports came to St. Leger that another relief column—this 

one composed of a brigade of Continental regulars under Benedict 

Arnold—was en route. The reports exaggerated Arnold’s strength, 

causing St. Leger’s Indian allies to abandon his cause, and St. 
361

Leger felt compelled to abandon the siege as well. On 22 August, 

he withdrew back to Quebec. From Quebec, St. Leger led the rest 

of his force down Lake Champlain to Fort Ticonderoga to link up 

with Burgoyne from that direction. When he arrived at the fort on 

27 September, St. Leger found that its commander had lost all his 

boat and wagon transportation assets to an American raiding party. 

General Powell no longer possessed the assets to support St. Leger’s 

move farther south to consolidate with Burgoyne. 

After Burgoyne’s surrender in October 1777, St. Leger returned 

with Powell and his command to Quebec. For the next several years, 

St. Leger led the British frontier war against the Americans in upper 

New York then was promoted to colonel in 1780. In August 1781, 

he personally selected the men to accompany a loyalist-led attempt 

to kidnap Gen. Philip Schuyler at his home in Albany, but the plot 

failed. St. Leger was also involved in secret negotiations between 

Governor Gen. Frederick Haldimand of Quebec and Vermont 

Republic representatives concerning a proposal to readmit Vermont 

into the British camp as a separate province. When Cornwallis 

surrendered at Yorktown and it became clear that the United States 

would win its independence, the negotiations collapsed.

After the revolution, St. Leger briefly remained in command 

of British forces in Canada until he was forced to resign due to ill 

health. He died in Quebec in 1789.

Lt. Col. Heinrich Christoph Breymann. Heinrich Christoph 

Breymann was born in 1733 near Wolfenbüttel in Lower Saxony. He 

was in command of the Braunschweig Grenadier Battalion when it 

received orders in the winter of 1776 to embark for Canada as part 

of Major General Riedesel’s command contracted to support the 

British army there. Sailing from Stade near Hamburg, Breymann and 

his grenadiers arrived at Quebec in late May 1776. When Burgoyne 

organized his Army from Canada expedition into northern New York 

in the spring of 1777, he appointed Breymann commander of the 

Reserve Corps consisting of his own grenadiers, the Braunschweiger 

Light Infantry Battalion under Maj. Ferdinand Albrecht von Bärner, 

the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig under Lt. Col. 

Friedrich Baum, a Braunschweiger Jäger Company under Captain 
362

Carl von Geyso, and the Hesse-Hanau Artillery Battery commanded 

by Captain Georg Päusch.

When Burgoyne’s army advanced on Fort Ticonderoga in 

early July 1777, Breymann’s Reserve Corps was put ashore on the 

east side of Lake Champlain north of Mount Independence. After 

struggling through jungles and swamps, the Braunschweigers 

approached the American defenses there, but there was no assault. 

The rebels instead retreated from Mount Independence on the night 

of 6 July and marched southeast for Castleton, Vermont. Meanwhile, 

Breymann’s command moved south to Skenesborough, where it 

camped for the next several weeks to conduct local security and 

help build the road to Fort Edward. 

On 11 August, a large foraging party under the command of 

Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum departed Fort Miller on a mission to seize 

supplies at an American supply depot at Bennington, Vermont. West 

of Bennington, his column encountered a large militia force under 

Brig. Gen. John Stark. Due to the unexpected size of the rebel force, 

Baum sent for reinforcements and on 15 August Breymann led his 

650-man reinforcing column toward Baum’s position 24 miles away. 

Due to the rain and muddy roads, Breymann’s troops were still 16 

miles from Baum by the end of the day. Starting forward the next 

morning, Breymann’s force finally approached Baum’s last-known 

position in the afternoon, but it was too late. Baum’s command had 

been destroyed. All 700 men were killed or captured, save a few.

From the few escapees, Breymann learned of Baum’s disaster. 

Not sure that the seemingly wild tales of calamity were accurate, 

Breymann continued to move forward but soon ran into stiff 

resistance followed by concerted attacks by the American militia and 

Continental troops under Col. Seth Warner. By the time Breymann 

extracted his force from the fighting that night, he had lost at least 

another 200 troops killed, wounded, or captured, as well as the two 

6-pounder cannon that had accompanied him. Breymann himself 

had been wounded in the leg.

During 19 September fighting at Freeman’s Field, Breymann’s 

Reserve Corps was moving with Brig. Gen. Simon Fraser’s 

Advance Corps on the far right of the British army. Initially, 
363

Breymann posted his grenadiers on a small rise on the west side 

of the McBride Farm. Later in the fight, he moved his force south 

to support Fraser’s grenadiers near the Coulter Farm. There it 

briefly engaged with Maj. Henry Dearborn’s Light Infantry and 

Learned’s Brigade of Continentals. The fighting in that vicinity 

was inconclusive but at the end of the day, Burgoyne’s troops held 

the field against the rebel forces.

After the battle at Freeman’s Farm, Breymann’s troops were 

assigned a sector at the extreme northwest corner of the British 

army’s defenses. There, Breymann had his men construct a 

substantial redoubt, large enough to hold about 500 men and two 

cannon from the Hesse-Hanau artillery. Supporting the redoubt were 

several cabins which were converted into block houses by Canadian 

and loyalist troops. On 7 October, Burgoyne sent a reconnaissance 

in force to find the American left flank at Bemis Heights. A 

major portion of Breymann’s Reserve Corps accompanied the 

reconnaissance, leaving only about 200 men to man the redoubt. 

Breymann, probably still suffering from his leg wound, did not 

accompany his troops west that morning. He remained with the 

redoubt and was present there when Learned and Morgan’s troops 

attacked it after the rout at Barber’s Wheatfield. Breymann was a 

strict disciplinarian and suffered no indiscipline or faltering from 

his soldiers. As the rebels attacked, a number of Breymann’s men 

abandoned their posts because of the force and size of the assaulting 

regiments. The tough German colonel began to beat some of the 

men back to their positions with the flat of his sword (by some 

accounts, he actually sabered them). The fighting at the redoubt was 

brief and concluded when the American troops swept into it from the 

south. Breymann was killed, ostensibly by one of his own soldiers 

desperate to get away.

Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum. Friedrich Baum was born near 

Braunschweig in 1727. During the Seven Years War, Baum served in 

several engagements as a young officer but received little battlefield 

command experience as a result. Still, he continued to advance 

and at some point in the early 1770s was appointed as lieutenant 

colonel of the Braunschweiger Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig. In 
364

the winter of 1776, Baum received orders to embark the Dragoon 

Regiment von Ludwig without its horses at the port of Stade near 

Hamburg. His regiment had been selected to be part of Major 

General Riedesel’s command, which had been contracted to support 

the British army in Canada and would ostensibly receive mounts 

there. Baum’s regiment sailed in February and, after a brief stopover 

in England, arrived at Quebec in late May 1776. On arrival, however, 

Baum discovered there were no horses to be had for cavalry mounts 

in Quebec. The plan now apparently changed to acquiring mounts 

from the rebels in New York.

In the spring of 1777, Gen. John Burgoyne began to organize 

his Army from Canada expedition into northern New York. He 

assigned the Dragoon Regiment von Ludwig to Lt. Col. Heinrich 

Breymann’s Reserve Corps, a brigade-size element of Riedesel’s 

“Left Wing” which formed part of Burgoyne’s Army from Canada 

for the 1777 campaign into central New York. In early July 1777, 

Baum’s regiment was put ashore along with the rest of Breymann’s 

Reserve Corps on the east side of Lake Champlain. Its initial 

objective was Mount Independence, an American defensive position 

across the lake from Fort Ticonderoga. Before the Reserve Corps 

could reach the American defenses and prepare to assault, the rebels 

retreated from Fort Ticonderoga and Mount Independence on the 

night of 6 July. Meanwhile, Baum moved with the Reserve Corps 

south to Skenesborough, where it camped for the next several weeks 

to conduct local security and help build the road to Fort Edward. 

Once at Fort Edward in late July, Burgoyne’s army would need 

to glean food and other supplies from the American countryside to 

supplement what it was receiving from Canada. When intelligence 

revealed the presence of an American supply depot at Bennington 

in Vermont, Burgoyne ordered Baum’s regiment to march there and 

seize supplies, acquire mounts for his dragoons, and secure loyalist 

reinforcements for Burgoyne’s army. Baum left Fort Miller on 11 

August with more than 700 men en route to Bennington. His force 

included his own regiment and detachments of the Braunschweig 

Grenadier Battalion, the Braunschweig Light Infantry Battalion, 

and the Company of Marksmen under Captain Alexander Fraser 

from Fraser’s Advance Corps. The force also included two 
365

3-pounder cannon from the Hessen-Hanau Artillery Battery and 

three diminutive companies of Canadians, loyalists, and Indians.

On 14 August, Baum’s column bumped into a small detachment 

of militia sent out by General Stark, Bennington’s American 

commander. The militia unit was guarding a bridge over the 

Walloomsac River at a place called Sancoick’s Mill. After a brief but 

stiff skirmish there, the rebels burned the bridge. However, Baum’s 

troops drove them off and proceeded to repair the structure. Due 

to the determined resistance of the rebels and the intelligence that 

there was a force at Bennington that exceeded his own in strength, 

Baum sent a message to Burgoyne requesting reinforcements. The 

following day, Burgoyne put a 650-man force on the road under 

Lieutenant Colonel Breymann.

Meanwhile, late on the 14th, Baum moved forward and seized 

another bridge over the Walloomsac nearer to Bennington. He 

observed a nearby high hill and moved his troops there to provide 

defense for the bridge and a secure place for his command to stay 

while Baum waited for reinforcements. However, due to his lack of 

experience as a commander, Baum positioned his forces in such a 

way that they were too separated and unable to communicate easily. 

Nor could they adequately support each other by fire. The following 

day was very rainy, with very light and occasional skirmishing as 

Stark’s men gathered information on Baum’s defenses. Once again 

because of his inexperience, Baum allowed a number of locals (or 

more likely militiamen posing as such) to pass through his position, 

enabling them to gather intelligence on the German defenses. 

Moreover, due to the rain, Breymann’s reinforcing column traveled 

very slowly and was still 16 miles away at the end of the day.

About mid-afternoon on 16 August, Stark led a complex attack 

against Baum’s position by three separate columns that took the 

German commander and his troops by surprise. Within about an 

hour and a half, Stark’s troops had overrun Baum’s main position 

on the hill and recaptured the bridge. They had also captured most 

of Baum’s men and killed or wounded the rest after they ran low 

on ammunition. Baum and a small detachment of dragoons and 

grenadiers fought their way out of the encirclement on the hill and 

cut their way downhill close to the river. There the party was once 
366

again decisively engaged by rebel troops. During the brief fighting, 

Baum was struck in the abdomen by a rebel bullet and mortally 

wounded. The rebels placed him in a cart and carried Baum to a 

house about two miles from where he was wounded. After two days 

of suffering, he passed away on 18 August and was buried near the 

battlefield on the north bank of the Walloomsac River. The precise 

spot of his burial is unknown today.
367

Appendix H—Saratoga Campaign Chronology

1776

4 July The Second Continental Congress issues the 

Declaration of Independence.

5 July Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates appointed to command 

the Canadian Department and army.

7 July Canadian Army troops of the failed Canadian 

expedition arrive at Crown Point.

11–12 October Maj. Gen. Guy Carleton defeats Brig. Gen. 

Benedict Arnold’s fleet at the Battle of Valcour 

Island on Lake Champlain.

14 October American Troops destroy the facilities at Crown 

Point and retreat south.

4 November Carleton’s forces depart Crown Point to return to 

Canada.

30 November Gen. William Howe writes Lord George Germain 

a letter proposing that the 1777 campaign consist 

of a two-pronged operation: a column up the 

Hudson River to join with Carleton’s Army from 

Canada and a second prong to attack Boston. 

A demonstration in New Jersey was to keep 

Washington occupied in Pennsylvania.

9 December Lt. Gen. John Burgoyne arrives in England. 

Carleton’s letter arrives informing Germain that 

he has ended campaigning for the season and is 

returning to Canada from Crown Point. 

10 December Burgoyne meets with Germain and the Cabinet.
368

20 December Howe writes Germain a letter proposing that the 

1777 campaign should be an overland movement 

to capture Philadelphia. He makes no mention of 

cooperating with the Army from Canada. With a 

British force approaching, the Continental Congress 

departs Philadelphia and moves to Baltimore.

26 December Gen. George Washington attacks Trenton, New 

Jersey, and captures about 1,000 Hessian troops.

29 December After Washington’s successful raid on Trenton, 

Howe writes Germain again stating his opinion 

about the need to not only capture Philadelphia but, 

just as important, to destroy Washington’s army.

1777

3 January Washington defeats a British force at Princeton, 

New Jersey—killing, wounding, or capturing 

about 400 British troops.

6 January Washington’s forces encamp for the winter at 

Morristown, New Jersey.

10 January Howe withdraws his forces from all New Jersey 

outposts except Brunswick and Perth Amboy and 

orders them into winter quarters in and around 

New York City.

14 January Germain responds to Howe’s 30 November letter 

and indicates that no course of action has been 

agreed upon.

28 February Burgoyne submits his “Thoughts on Conducting 

the War from the Side of Canada” to Germain. 

Clinton arrives in England.

3 March Germain writes Howe and authorizes him to attack 

and seize Philadelphia.
369

12 March The Continental Congress returns from Baltimore 

and convenes in Philadelphia.

26 March Germain gives Burgoyne a letter with the final 

approved plan to give to Carleton. The letter indicates 

Carleton will remain in Canada while Burgoyne 

leads the expedition down the Hudson to Albany 

then eventually operates with Howe. However, 

Germain sends no such instructions to Howe.

27 March Burgoyne sails from Portsmouth toward Quebec.

2 April In a letter to Germain, Howe describes his new 

plan to go to Philadelphia through Chesapeake 

Bay by ship rather than overland. He also says he 

cannot send a detachment up the Hudson to link 

with Burgoyne since he has insufficient troops. He 

sends a copy of the letter to Carleton.

6 May Burgoyne arrives in Quebec.

12 May Arriving in Montreal, Burgoyne meets with 

Carleton and presents Germain’s letter regarding 

the final approved plan to seize Albany, New York. 

Carleton is informed that Burgoyne will command 

the main body.

18 May Germain receives Howe’s 2 April letter. He 

responds that he approves Howe’s planned 

movement on Philadelphia and expects that the 

Philadelphia capture will be completed in time so 

that Howe can link up with Burgoyne’s Army from 

Canada. However, a copy of this letter was not sent 

to Carleton or Burgoyne.

29 May Washington moves his Continental Army forces 

from Morristown to positions near Philadelphia to 

oppose any moves Howe may make on the city.
370

3 June Burgoyne’s columns march from their assembly 

point at Chambly, New York, to St. John’s, New 

York, on the Richelieu River.

5 June Maj. Gen. Arthur St. Clair appointed to command 

Fort Ticonderoga.

12 June St. Clair arrives at Fort Ticonderoga with 

reinforcements and assumes command.

13 June Burgoyne reviews most of his army at St. John’s 

then sets sail for Lake Champlain. Two British 

spies captured at Colchester, New York, provide 

St. Clair with intelligence that Burgoyne will 

advance down Lake Chaplain with Albany as his 

objective.

17 June Maj. Gen. Philip John Schuyler inspects Fort 

Ticonderoga defenses to assess needs for 

assistance, troops, and supplies. Fraser’s advance 

corps arrives at Bouquet River.

18 June Schuyler visits Fort Ticonderoga and is dismayed 

by the lack of progress toward completing the 

defenses. Burgoyne’s main body departs from St. 

John’s. 

19 June Burgoyne’s main body arrives at Cumberland 

Head.

20 June Burgoyne’s main body departs Cumberland Head.

21 June Burgoyne’s main body arrives at Bouquet River 

(Gilliland Creek). Burgoyne issues his directive to 

the “Congress of Indians.”

22 June Burgoyne issues his proclamation at Bouquet 

River to colonists threatening that he will turn 

loose his Indians.
371

23 June St. Leger departs Montreal for the Mohawk Valley. 

Sergeant Heath delivers a report to Schuyler 

regarding British ships at Otter Creek and the 

British camp at Bouquet River.

23–29 June Storms prevent further movement south by 

Burgoyne’s main body.

24 June Brig. Simon Fraser’s advanced corps departs 

Bouquet River.

26–27 June Fraser’s advanced corps arrives at Crown Point.

30 June Burgoyne’s main body departs Bouquet River then 

arrives at Crown Point.

1 July Burgoyne lands his army three miles north of Fort 

Ticonderoga. Fraser heads west with the Advanced 

Corps to envelope the fort from the west. Germans 

cross to the east bank toward Mount Independence 

in a pincers movement. The main body heads down 

the river road.

2 July Fraser makes initial gains against the “French 

Defenses” northwest of the fort.

3 July Maj. Gen. Friedrich Adolph Riedesel’s Brunswick 

troops struggle through the forest to approach 

Mount Independence.

4 July Col. Seth Warner arrives at the fort with 700 

additional troops. St. Clair orders a feu de joie to 

celebrate the 4th of July.

5 July British troops pull guns up to Mount Defiance 

that will make defending Fort Ticonderoga all 

but impossible. St. Clair orders a retreat from the 

fort. Clinton arrives at New York from England 
372

and takes command of the garrison. He learns that 

Howe has no intention of supporting Burgoyne in 

New York.

6 July The American garrison withdraws from Fort 

Ticonderoga during the early morning, then British 

rear guard attacks it at Skenesborough. Maj. Gen. 

Sir Henry Clinton confronts Howe about Howe’s 

refusal to assist Burgoyne. No resolution regarding 

assistance for the Army from Canada.

7 July Battle of Hubbardton (Warner versus Fraser and 

Riedesel). Schuyler moves troops to Fort Edward 

in hopes of linking up with St. Clair. Burgoyne 

moves his headquarters to Skenesborough.

7–8 July Battle at Fort Anne (Col. Pierce Long versus Lt. 

Col. John Hill).

9 July St. Clair’s column arrives at Dorset, Vermont. 

Fraser’s command arrives back at Skenesborough 

from Hubbardton.

10 July Burgoyne orders the trail between Fort Anne and 

Fort Edward to be improved in order to move his 

infantry to Fort Edward. All baggage and artillery 

trains are to be sent back to the portage between 

Fort Ticonderoga and Lake George then floated 

down to Fort Edward on bateaux. Concurrently 

Burgoyne sends a letter to Carleton appealing for 

more horses and wagons.

12 July Brig. Gen. John Nixon’s brigade joins Schuyler 

at Fort Edward. Nixon’s men begin obstacle 

operations along the road between Fort Anne and 

Fort Edward.

14 July Schuyler abandons Fort Edward and moves his 

forces to Moses Kill.
373

17 July 500 Indians arrive at Skenesborough to join 

Burgoyne’s Army. Howe writes Burgoyne that he 

is headed for Philadelphia, not Albany.

23 July Howe and his 15,000 troops sail from New York 

en route to Philadelphia. Brig. Barry St. Leger’s 

advanced party arrives at Oswego, New York, on 

Lake Ontario.

24 July Maj. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln departs Fort Edward 

for New Hampshire to organize militia forces 

there. Arnold arrives at Fort Edward. 

25 July St. Leger and his main body arrive at Oswego. 

Much of Burgoyne’s army moves to Fort Anne. 

26 July St. Leger, with about 2,000 troops start from 

Oswego headed for Fort Schuyler in the Mohawk 

River Valley.

27 July Burgoyne’s forces complete reconstruction/

improvement of the road to Fort Edward. Jane 

McCrae murdered en route to Fort Anne.

28 July Maj. Gen. William Phillips’ column with artillery 

and wagon trains arrives at Fort George.

29 July Burgoyne’s army departs Fort Anne and arrives at 

Fort Edward.

30 July Schuyler orders a further retreat from Moses Kill 

to Stillwater. Soon after, Brig. Gen. John Glover’s 

Brigade of Continentals arrives.

2 August St. Leger’s column arrives before Fort Schuyler.

3 August Schuyler and the Headquarters, Northern Army 

arrive at Stillwater (Headquarters, Northern 

Department remained at Albany). About this time, 
374

Lincoln departs Stillwater for Manchester to help 

organize New England militia forces in Vermont 

and bring them back to join the Northern Army. 

At Fort Schuyler, Col. Peter Gansevoort refuses 

St. Leger’s terms of surrender and St. Leger begins 

siege operations. At Fort Edward, Burgoyne 

receives Howe’s 17 July letter that informs him 

Howe is headed for Philadelphia, not Albany. 

6 August Schuyler and Headquarters, Northern Army 

depart Stillwater for Van Schaik’s Island. Brig. 

Gen. Nicholas Herkimer’s relief column to Fort 

Schuyler is attacked at Oriskany. Gansevoort’s 

men sally from Fort Schuyler then attack and loot 

St. Leger’s Loyalist camp. 

7 August Brig. Gen. John Stark arrives at Manchester, 

refuses to cooperate with Lincoln.

8 August Schuyler with Headquarters, Northern Army and 

about 4,000 troops arrive at Van Schaik’s Island 

and begin building fortifications. Stark departs for 

Bennington. 

9 August Lt. Col. Friedrich Baum’s main body for the 

foraging expedition to Bennington departs Fort 

Edward for Fort Miller.

10 August Schuyler is relieved from command of the Northern 

Department and Gates appointed in his stead. St. 

Clair is also relieved. Schuyler sends Arnold with 

a brigade to relieve Fort Schuyler.

11 August Baum’s foraging expedition to Bennington departs 

from Fort Miller. Col. Jeduthan Baldwin and a 

work detail of artificers begin gathering lumber and 

other construction materials at Stillwater. These 

items will later be used to construct the American 

lines at Bemis Heights.
375

15 August Brig. Henry W. Powell replaces Brig. James 

Hamilton as commander of Fort Ticonderoga.

16 August Battle of Bennington.

19 August Gates arrives at Van Schaik’s Island to take 

command of the Northern Department and 

Northern Army from Schuyler.

20 August Burgoyne writes Germain to apprise him of the 

Army from Canada’s situation. 

22 August Siege of Fort Schuyler ends as a relief column 

under Arnold approaches the fort. St. Leger retreats 

and heads for Fort Ticonderoga via Lake Ontario 

and Lake Champlain.

23 August Arnold heads back from Fort Schuyler to rejoin 

Gates at Van Schaik’s Island.

25 August Howe debarks at Head of Elk, Maryland, and heads 

overland toward Philadelphia.

28 August Burgoyne learns that St. Leger was forced to lift 

the siege at Fort Schuyler.

30 August Howe receives Germain’s 18 May letter indicating 

Howe is supposed to link up with Burgoyne in 

Albany. Howe responds to Germain that he will 

not be able to accomplish that mission. 

31 August Arnold with Learned’s Brigade and Col. Dan 

Morgan’s riflemen arrive at Van Schaik’s Island. 

1 September Gates and Lincoln meet at Van Schaik’s Island and 

plan the Pawlet Expedition. Lincoln has orders to 

divide, divert and harass the enemy. Hundreds of 

Burgoyne’s Iroquois allies leave for home.
376

8 September Gates advances the Northern Army from Van 

Schaik’s Island to Stillwater. He now has more 

than 10,000 troops in the Albany area. Lincoln 

arrives at Pawlet from Bennington. 

10 September Burgoyne’s Army moves south from Fort Edward. 

Forts George and Anne are abandoned. Burgoyne 

moves to Batten Kill and begins building a bridge 

to the west side of the Hudson River.

11 September Washington’s army defeats Howe along 

Brandywine Creek in Pennsylvania.

12 September Gates’ command begins digging in on Bemis 

Heights. Lincoln’s troops depart Pawlet on a 

three-pronged attack on Fort Ticonderoga-Mount 

Independence-Skenesborough. Burgoyne’s troops 

totally abandon Fort Edward.

13 September Burgoyne’s army begins crossing to the west 

bank of the Hudson at Batten Kill on a makeshift 

pontoon bridge.

15 September After the army finishes crossing at Batten Kill, 

Burgoyne orders the bridge pulled up to cut 

communications with Fort Ticonderoga. About 

150 mostly Oneida Indians arrive at Bemis Heights 

to be employed with scouting the British lines for 

the Northern Army.

17 September Burgoyne’s Army arrives at Sword’s Farm/House. 

18 September American detachments conduct a raid near 

Fort Ticonderoga and capture about 300 of 

Burgoyne’s troops in an attack on the British line 

of communications. They also recover about 118 

American prisoners of war. Stark’s Brigade arrives 

on the east side of the Hudson near Bemis Heights.
377

19 September Battle of Freeman’s Farm.

21 September Lincoln departs Pawlet to return to Stillwater in 

response to Gates’ summons. Burgoyne receives 

a letter from Clinton offering to send a column 

of 2,000 men into the Highlands to help distract 

Gates and draw away some of Gates’ forces.

26 September Howe captures Philadelphia.

26–7 September Pawlet Expedition troops return to Pawlet.

27 September St. Leger’s column arrives at Fort Ticonderoga 

following the failed Mohawk Valley Expedition.

3 October Burgoyne orders troop food rations cut by onethird. Clinton and 3,000 British, German, and 

loyalist troops depart New York City en route to 

the Highlands.

6 October Clinton captures Forts Clinton and Montgomery, 

which guard the entrance to the Hudson River 

passage through the Highlands. This diversionary 

move by Clinton is intended to relieve pressure on 

Burgoyne’s advance.

7 October Battle of Bemis Heights (also known as Barber’s 

Wheatfield and 2nd Saratoga). Brig. Gen. Joseph 

Bayley deploys 2,000 militiamen across Burgoyne’s 

line of retreat just north of Fort Edward.

8 October Burgoyne begins retreat toward Fort Edward. 

Clinton captures and destroys patriot fortifications 

on Constitution Island opposite West Point, New 

York.

9 October Americans block Burgoyne’s line of retreat at Fish 

Kill. Burgoyne digs in.
378

11 October Abortive American attack against Burgoyne’s 

defenses at Saratoga.

12 October Sutherland begins movement toward Fort Edward. 

Burgoyne makes the decision to retreat, then 

countermands the order and orders Sutherland to 

return. The British Army is surrounded.

13 October Burgoyne holds a council of war then drafts initial 

surrender document.

14 October Burgoyne begins surrender negotiations with 

Gates.

16 October Part of Clinton’s force attacks and burns Esopus 

(Kingston), New York. Clinton’s actions, while 

failing to extricate Burgoyne and his army, help 

persuade Gates to grant Burgoyne liberal terms of 

surrender.

17 October Burgoyne surrenders his army. The British Army 

from Canada stacks its arms at the Field of 

Grounded Arms at Saratoga and begins its march 

into captivity.

6 November The Convention Army arrives at Cambridge, 

Massachusetts.

8 November Powell destroys Fort Ticonderoga and retreats 

toward Canada. 

1778

6 February France signs the agreement to enter the war on the 

side of the Americans.
379

Appendix I—Glossary of Terms

The Revolutionary War era was rife with many military terms 

which are no longer in use today or have changed somewhat in 

meaning. This glossary of terms is provided to give the staff ride 

participant a better understanding of the military tactics, techniques, 

and procedures of the Saratoga Campaign.

Abatis – A defense formed by placing felled trees lengthwise, 

one over the other, with the branches pointing toward the enemy.

Aide-de-camp – A confidential ex-officio officer that general 

officers appointed to their staffs. An aide-de-camp reported directly 

to his commander and took orders only from him. In this position of 

great responsibility, an aide would write orders; personally deliver 

them if necessary; and be thoroughly knowledgeable about troop 

positions, maneuvers, columns, routes, and officer quarters locations. 

Bastion – A pointed projecting part of a fortification thrust out 

from the face of the main line or at an angle at its corners.

Bateaux – A shallow-draft, flat-bottomed riverboat generally 

used in eastern and central North America to transport trade goods 

and people. Most could carry 30 to 40 soldiers with equipment, but 

sizes varied.

Battalion – This basic tactical unit of 18th century warfare 

consisted of eight platoons and usually was commanded in combat 

by a lieutenant colonel. In both the British and Continental Armies, 

most regiments possessed only a single battalion, so the terms 

battalion and regiment were virtually synonymous. In the French 

Army, a regiment normally had two battalions.

Berm – The narrow space between the ditch and the base of the 

parapet of a fortification.

Bivouac – A sleep or rest area in the open, i.e., without tents.
380

Bombardier – An artillery rank given to privates who 

specialized in handling ammunition and firing mortars. During 

times of hazardous duty, bombardiers merited extra pay.

Breastworks – a hastily constructed barricade made of wood, 

stones, and dirt usually about breast high that shielded defenders 

from enemy fire.

Case Shot – Properly, case shot refers to all forms of grape, 

canister, or spherical case shot. This type of artillery round 

purposely breaks apart on firing and is used as an anti-ship (grape) 

or antipersonnel (canister) round. Depending on the cannon, its 

effective range was 500 to 1,500 yards.

Chevaux-de-frise – In army usage, a chevaux-de-frise was a 

portable barrier of spikes, sword blades, etc., used to obstruct the 

passage of cavalry. In naval usage, the term refers to a framework 

of heavy timbers fitted with iron spikes on top that were sunk into a 

channel to prevent the passage of ships.

Commissary – A staff officer who is appointed with specific 

powers by the general-in-chief of a field army. This individual 

typically has some form of logistical responsibility such a food, 

supplies, or clothing. However, the title can be for someone with 

other duties such as mustering new troops into the army. 

Corduroy – A type of road made by placing logs or planks 

perpendicular to the direction of the road over a low or swampy area. 

Sand or gravel can be thrown over the surface to improve mobility. 

Used to improve impassable mud or dirt roads, the end result was 

still very rough under the best of conditions, and the shifting logs 

posed a hazard to horses and marching soldiers.

Cornet – Originally the third and lowest grade of commissioned 

officer in a British cavalry troop after captain and lieutenant. 

The rank—equivalent to today’s second lieutenant—was largely 

abolished in 1871.
381

Curtain – The part of a fortification’s wall that connects its 

bastions.

Embrasure – An opening in a parapet that permits the firing 

of a gun.

Enfilade – To fire along the length rather than the face of an 

enemy position or line. Enfilading an enemy allows a varying range 

of fire to find targets while minimizing the amount of fire the enemy 

can return.

Ensign – A military rank normally associated with naval forces 

(it can also refer to a naval flag). The British Army and American 

Continental and militia units used the term to refer to the junior 

officer in a company. This could also indicate a temporary rank for a 

junior officer who was waiting for an authorized lieutenant position 

to become available. 

Envelopment – The object of this offensive tactic—directed 

against a flank of a fixed position—was to pour an enfilading fire 

along the enemy’s line. A double envelopment, usually a risky 

operation, involved a simultaneous attack against both flanks. A 

similar though longer-range operation was known as a Turning 

Movement, or Strategic Envelopment. The offensive was directed 

not against the enemy position itself but toward a point in its rear, 

compelling the enemy to leave his works and defend that point, 

making him more vulnerable. 

Fascine – A long cylindrical bundle of brushwood or the like, 

firmly bound together, used to fill ditches, construct batteries, etc.

Fraise – A palisade of pointed timbers planted in an upward 

slanting position.

Gabion – A cylindrical wicker basket open at both ends to 

be filled with earth and stones and used in fortifying a position or 

erecting a battery.
382

Gunner – The term used for an artillery private responsible for 

loading and aiming the piece. He received higher pay than a matross.

Kill – This term refers to a creek and comes from the Middle 

Dutch “kille,” meaning “riverbed” or “water channel.” The term is 

commonly used in areas of Dutch influence in the Delaware and 

Hudson Valleys.

Matross – The term used for an artillery private who performed 

semi-skilled tasks related to firing a cannon, such as manhandling 

the piece into position and carrying ammunition forward.

Mortar – The barrel length of a mortar was smaller than a cannon, 

but its bore diameter was larger. Normally mounted on a flat bed, a 

mortar resembled a large block of wood. An elevating wedge raised 

the barrel, enabling the mortar to fire an exploding shell or “bomb” in 

a high trajectory. Fired properly, the bomb would fly over earthworks 

and explode while still airborne, raining shrapnel over the enemy.

Parapet – The wall of a fortification.

Pioneer – Troops responsible for repairing roads and occasionally 

preparing fortifications.

Redoubt – An independent earthwork that was usually square 

or polygonal and most of the time completely enclosed.

Salient – A salient is an area of a defensive line or fortification 

that protrudes beyond the main works. In the Revolutionary War, 

this area extended closest to an enemy’s position and usually invited 

an attack. Generals erected salients primarily to cover dominating 

ground beyond their entrenchments.

Sally Port – An opening in a fortification for the passage of troops.

Sap – A covered trench or tunnel for approaching or undermining 

a fortification.
383

Sapper – Special troops who dug the most exposed part of 

entrenchments (“saps”) during sieges.

Skirmish – Of the various terms applied to Revolutionary War 

military actions, “skirmish” denoted a clash of the smallest scope. 

In general, a skirmish was limited combat involving troops other 

than those of the main body. When the latter participated, the fight 

was known as an engagement, affair, or battle, depending on its 

scale. More specifically, a skirmish denoted an encounter between 

opposing skirmish lines, composed of troops assigned to protect the 

front and/or flanks of a deployed unit.

Traverse – A barrier thrown across an approach to a fortification, 

usually from the flank, or across its interior to cut off a part.

Works – In military usage, standard terminology for fortifications.
 
385

Appendix J—Campaign and Battle Maps

The maps in this appendix serve two major purposes. First, the 

maps should aid the staff ride leader in following the unit movements while reading the text. Second, the maps will help the staff 

ride leader to prepare visual aids to use during the field phase of the 

staff ride. It is recommended that in making visual aids from the 

maps, the staff ride leader expand the maps to about twenty by thirty 

inches, mount the maps, and cover the maps with plastic or acetate 

to waterproof them.

The maps are generally in chronological order grouped into 

two sections for Day 1 and Day 2.

Fort

Fort

Battery Position

Cannon Position

Battle/Explosion

Map Legend

Fortified Line

Camp

Town/Village

Bridge

Road or Trail Schuyler

Retreats

British Major Force

British Unit

US Major Force

US Unit

Information Sign

XXXX

Burgoyne

XX

St. Clair

II

III

24

Morgan
386

HIGHLANDS

Boston

Montreal

Quebec

Detroit

Territorial Departments

1777

0 100 200 300 400

Miles

Savannah

Charleston

VIRGINIA

NORTH

CAROLINA

SOUTH

CAROLINA

GEORGIA

CT

SOUTHERN

EASTERN

James River

N

MASSACHUSETTS

New York

Philadelphia WESTERN Pittsburgh

PENNSYLVANIA

DELAWARE

RI

Fort

Ticonderoga

Map 30. Territorial Departments 1777.
387

Quebec

The British Campaign Plan

for 1777

XXXX

Burgoyne

X

Clinton

Trois

Rivieres

Pennsylvania

Boston

Albany

New York

City

Philadelphia

New Hampshire

Maine

(part of Massachusetts) Fort St. John

Fort Edward

Green

Mountains

Bennington

Maryland Virginia

XXXX

Howe Planned Operations

Actual Operations

Howe’s Plan

Head of Elk

Atlantic

Ocean

N

0 50 100 150 200

Miles

Massachusetts

Montreal

Crown Point

O Fort George swego

Fort Schuyler

Fort Ticonderoga

X

St. Leger

Connect RI icut

Fort Montgomery

Map 31. British Campaign Plan for 1777.
388

Crown Point

Stillwater

Lake

George

Oriskany

Fort

Schuyler

Fort Anne

Lake

Champlain

Albany

Lake

Ontario

Lake

Oneida

Montreal

Fort St. John

Burgoyne

Fort Edward

XXXX

III

Gansevoort

St. Leger arrives at

Oswego 25 July

Burgoyne arrives at

Fort Ticonderoga 1 July

St. Leger arrives at

Fort Schuyler 2 August

III

St. Leger

Saratoga Campaign

Opening Moves

June–August 1777

Oswego

XX

St. Clair

Schuyler

Hubbardton

Skenesboro

St. Leger departs

Montreal 23 June

Fort George

N

0 10 20 30 40 50

Miles

Fort Ticonderoga

XXXX

Burgoyne departs

13 June

Map 32. Saratoga Campaign Opening Moves Jun–Aug 1777.
389

Old

French

Lines

Workshop

XX

Riedesel

XX

St. Clair

Siege of Fort Ticonderoga

1–6 July 177

M

7

ount

Defiance

Mount

Hope

Artillery Battery

Blockhouse Wooden Bridge

Dock

to Hubbardton

to

Skenesboro

daoRegatroP

Lake George

Landing

Dock

Hospital

“Horseshoe”

Battery

Footbridge

Hospital

Workshops

XX

Fraser

XXXX

Burgoyne

XX

St. Clair

Lake

Champlain

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500

Yards

N

Lake

Champlain

AmericanBritish

III

Long

Fort

Ticonderoga

Mount

Independence

Map 33. Siege of Fort Ticonderoga 1–6 Jul 1777.
390

Saratoga Campaign

Movements

1–12 July 1777

St. Clair’s column arrives

in Manchester 11 July

Schuyler, St. Clair &

Nixon’s Brigade all arrive

at Fort Edward 12 July

Fort

Miller

Fort Anne

0 5 10 15 20 25

Miles

Hubbardton

Castleton

Pawlet

Dorset

Manchester

Pultney

Sword’s Farm

Stillwater

Bemis

Heights

Saratoga

Arlington

Warner

III

Battle of Fort Anne

7–8 July

Warner & Rear Guard

meet St. Clair in

Manchester 11 July

Battle of Hubbardton

7 July

Pierce routed at

Skenesboro 7 July

Fort Ticonderoga

abandoned 6 July

Lake George

XXXX

Burgoyne Fort Ticonderoga

Mount Independence

Fort George

Fort Edward

Skenesboro

N

XXXX

Schuyler

XX

St. Clair

Lake Champlain

Cambridge

Map 34. Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–12 Jul 1777.
391

Battle of Hubbardton

7 July 1777

Log Wall

0 1⁄4 1⁄2 3⁄4 1

Miles

Mount

Zion

Monument

Hill

American

First Line

Sergeant Hill

III

N

Francis

II

Grenadiers

American

last line

Initial

contact

Hale’s

Camp

Riedesel’s

flank attack

Disorganized

retreat over

Pittsford Mountain

American

first line

Grenadiers block

road to Castleton

Map 35. Battle of Hubbardton 7 Jul 1777.
392

Saratoga Campaign

Movements

12–30 July 1777

Schuyler retreats to

Moses Kill 14 July

Fort

Miller

Fort Anne

Lake

Champlain

0 5 10 15 20 25

Miles

Hubbardton

Castleton

Pawlet

Dorset

Manchester

Pultney

Sword’s Farm

Stillwater

Bemis

Heights

Saratoga

Arlington

Cambridge

Burgoyne builds Fort Anne Road

10–28 July; Burgoyne and Phillips

both arrive at Fort Edward 30 July

Phillips with trains arrive

at Fort George 28 July

Lake

George

Mount Independence

Fort George

Skenesboro

X

Hamilton

XXXX

Burgoyne

XXXX

Schuyler

N

Fort Ticonderoga

XX

Phillips

Fort Edward

Map 36. Saratoga Campaign Movements 12–30 Jul 1777.
393

Saratoga Campaign

Movements

30 July–31 August 1777

Stark departs

Manchester 8 August

Fort

Miller

Fort Anne

Lake

Champlain

0 5 10 15 20 25

Miles

Hubbardton

Castleton

Pawlet

Dorset

Manchester

Pultney

Sword’s

Farm

Stillwater

Bemis Heights

Saratoga

Arlington

Gates assumes command of the

Northern Army from Schuyler at

Van Schaik’s Island 19 August

Lake

George

Fort George

Fort Edward

Skenesboro

X

Hamilton

III

Baum

X

Stark

Baum departs

Fort Miller 11 August

Schuyler arrives at

Stillwater 3 August;

departs for

Van Schaik’s Island

6 August

Schuyler retreats to

Stillwater 30 July

Burgoyne

XXXX

XXXX

Schuyler

N

Fort Ticonderoga

Mount Independence

Battle of Bennington

16 August

Cambridge

Map 37. Saratoga Campaign Movements 30 Jul–31 Aug 1777.
394

1

2

5

7

8

Siege of Fort Schuyler

2–23 August 1777

0 1⁄4 1⁄2

Miles

Cleared

Land

Elevated

Plain

Cypress

Swamp

Woods

Woods

1. 3-Gun Battery2. 4-Mortar Battery

3. 3-Gun Battery4. Infantry Redoubts

5. Saps (not complete)

6. British Camps7. Loyalist Camps8. Indian Camps

9. Ruins of Fort Newport

10. Route of Willet’s attack

8

8

8

8

9

3

4

10

8 8

6

N

III

St. Leger

II

34 Ft(-)

I

8 Ft(-) Lernoult

I

H-H Jäger Hildebrandt

Fort Schuyler

Gansevoort 3 NY

Map 38. Siege of Fort Schuyler 2–23 Aug 1777.
395

Battle of Oriskany

6 August 1777

0 200 400 600 800 1000

Yards

Mohawk River

N

Final American

position

Map 39. Battle of Oriskany 6 Aug 1777.
396

Baum’s

Advance

14 August

Sancoick Mill

Battle of Bennington

Baum’s Heights

16 August 1777

0 1⁄2 1 11⁄2 2

Miles

N

Nichols

Stickney

Hobart

Herrick

Baum’s advance

14 August

Initial skirmish

14 August

Baum’s Heights

Dragoon

Redoubt

Tory

Redoubt

Stark’s

Camp

Map 40. Battle of Bennington Baum’s Heights 16 Aug 1777.
397

Battle of Bennington

Breymann’s Defeat

16 August 1777

0 1⁄2 1 11⁄2 2

Miles

Sancoick Mill

X

N

Breymann

Breymann’s initial

line halted here

and driven back

Breymann’s

second line

Breymann’s retreat

16 August

Map 41. Battle of Bennington Breymann’s Defeat 16 Aug 1777.
398

Saratoga Campaign

Movements

1–26 September 1777

Battle of

Freeman’s Farm

19 September

Hudson River

Fort

Miller

Fort Anne

Lake

Champlain

0 5 10 15 20 25

Miles

Hubbardton

Pawlet

Dorset

Sword’s

Farm

Bemis

Heights

Saratoga

Arlington

Lake

George

Fort George

Fort Edward

X

Powell

X

Stark

XX

Lincoln

Diamond

Island

Lake George

Landing

Burgoyne

arrives at

Sword’s Farm

17 September

Raid on Diamond

Island 24 September

Gates arrives at

Bemis Heights

12 September

Stark moves to join

Gates 18 September

III

Johnson

XXXX

Gates

III

Brown

III

Woodbridge

Cambridge

Stillwater

XXXX

Burgoyne

N

Pawlet Expedition raids

against Fort Ticonderoga,

Mount Independence,

and Skenesboro

18–19 September

Lincoln assembles

Pawlet Expedition

8 September

Fort Ticonderoga

Mount Independence

Castleton

Skenesboro

Pultney

Manchester

Map 42. Saratoga Campaign Movements 1–26 Sep 1777.
399

Barber

Farm

Freeman

Farm

Great

Ravine

McBride

Farm

Coulter

Farm

Middle

Ravine

X

II

N

III

Battle of Freeman’s Farm

19 September 1777

First Contact 1300

0 .10 .20 .30

Tenth Mile

Morgan Dearborn

Breymann

Sawmill

Cornfield

Field

rooP

9

20 Sawmill

X

Fraser

24

21 62

Map 43. Battle of Freeman’s Farm First Contact 19 Sep 1777.
400

Barber

Farm

Freeman

Farm

Great

Ravine

Coulter

Farm

Middle

Ravine

N

Battle of Freeman’s Farm

19 September 1777

1330‒1500

0 .10 .20 .30

Tenth Mile

Sawmill

Cornfield

Field

X

Breymann

X

Fraser

20

62(-)

Poor

Arnold

XX

Phillips

XX

Burgoyne

I

Jägers McBride

Farm

Sawmill

Map 44. Battle of Freeman’s Farm 1300–1500 19 Sep 1777.
401

Barber

Farm

Freeman

Farm

Great

Ravine

Coulter

Farm

Middle

Ravine

N

Battle of Freeman’s Farm

19 September 1777

1500‒1700

0 .10 .20 .30

Tenth Mile

Sawmill

Cornfield

Field

McBride

Farm

Sawmill

X

Breymann

X

Fraser

20

9

Poor Arnold

XX

Phillips

XX

Burgoyne

II

II

CT Militia

I

Jägers

XX

Riedesel

X

Hamilton

Map 45. Battle of Freeman’s Farm 1500–1700 19 Sep 1777.
402

XX

Stoney

Point

Verplanck’s

Point

I

Peekskill

5 Oct: Clinton lands a

force at Verplanck’s

Point to feint Putnam

out of position.

5 Oct: Putnam retreats

north & northeast.

Doodletown

Bear

Mountain

West

Mountain

Dunderberg

Mountain

6 Oct: Naval gunfire

supports attacks.

Hudson

River

Fort

Clinton

Night of 5–6 Oct:

Naval demonstration

off Peekskill.

X

G.Clinton (600)

N

6 Oct: Clinton lands

2,100 men at

Stoney Point 0600.

Fort

Montgomery

Fort

Independence

XXXX

Clinton

(2,100)

6 Oct: Forts Clinton &

Montgomery are

captured at dusk.

0 1⁄2 1 1 1⁄2 2

Miles

Clinton’s Highland Campaign

Attack on Forts Clinton &

Montgomery

5–6 October 1777

Putnam

(1,000)

Map 46. Clinton’s Highland Campaign 5–6 Oct 1777.
403

N

American Defenses

Bemis Heights

October 1777

0 1⁄4 1⁄2

Quarter Mile

Reidesel’s

Defenses

XXXX

Gates Woodworth

House

Middle Ravine

N

Bemis

Tavern

Neilson

House

Map 47. American Defenses Bemis Heights Oct 1777.
404

Saratoga Campaign

Movements

27 September–

17 October 1777

Hudson River Fort Miller

Fort Anne

Lake

Champlain

0 5 10 15 20 25

Miles

Lake

George

Fort George

Fort Edward

Diamond

Island

St. Leger arrives at

Fort Ticonderoga

27 September

Battle of

Barber’s Wheatfield

7 October

X

Powell

III

St. Leger

Burgoyne surrenders

17 October

Great Redoubt XXXX

Gates

N

Mount Independence

Fort Ticonderoga

Hubbardton

Pawlet

Dorset

Pultney

Saratoga

Arlington

Skenesboro

Castleton

Bemis Heights Cambridge

Stillwater

X

Bailey

Bates Kill

X

Stark

Manchester

X

Fellows XXXX

Burgoyne

Map 48. Saratoga Campaign Movements 27 Sep–17 Oct 1777.
405

Middle

Ravine

N

32

Wheatfield

XXX

Burgoyne

Freeman

Farm

LtInf

Arnold

Battle of Barber’s Wheatfield

7 October 1777

1300–1500

0 .10 .20 .30

Tenth Mile

Cornfield

Field

24 Lt Inf Lt Inf

Balcarres

redoubt

Chatfield

Farm

X

Learned

Poor

Barber

Farm

Inf (Det)

Coulter

Farm

Inf (Det)

British route

of retreat

X

Fraser

Map 49. Barber’s Wheatfield 7 Oct 1777.
406Fighting at the Redoubts

7 October 1777

1600–1900

0 .10 .20

Tenth Mile

“Bloody

Knoll”

II

N

II II

II

II

Coulter

Farm

McBride

Farm

III

2MA

III

9MA

XX

Arnold

III

HN3

X

Poor

III

HN1

Lt Inf

9 21

62

20

I

Lt Inf

24 Freeman

Farm

I

Jägers

Cornfield

Field

British & German

Forces withdraw to the

Great Redoubt

7–8 October evening X

Learned

Balcarres

redoubt

Breymann

redoubt

Learned’s brigade

overruns Breymann’s

redoubt

Poor’s Brigade

is repulsed at

Balcarres redoubt

Map 50. Fighting at the Redoubts 7 Oct 1777.
407

Stark’s Knob

Saratoga

II

(3,000)

(600)

(1,400)

(1,500) (2,000)

(1,900)

Hudson River

Artillery

Battery

Artillery

Park

II

XXXX

Gates

XXXX

Burgoyne

(1,500)

X

X

X

X

X

III

Loyalists

I

X

N

21

II

Lt Inf

(2,500)

X

Stark

Specht

II

Riedesel

II

Surrender Field

17 October

British Defenses at Saratoga

11–17 October 1777

0 100 200 300 400 500

Yards

Poor

Nixon

Glover

Learned

Dearborn

Fellows

Morgan

Patterson

Map 51. British Defenses at Saratoga.
 
409

Bibliography

The following bibliography is not meant to be comprehensive. 

Instead, it is intended to provide a list of sources consulted in 

preparing this handbook and a list of sources to aid the staff ride 

leader with research, augment the information in this handbook, and 

assist in the preparation of the staff ride. 

Campaign and Battle Studies. These books generally cover the 

Saratoga Campaign or one of the individual battles or other actions 

which took place during the campaign. They also cover other campaigns or actions leading up to Saratoga that had a direct bearing on 

the conduct of the campaign.

Berleth, Richard. Bloody Mohawk: The French and Indian War & 

American Revolution on New York’s Frontier. Hendersonville, 

NY: Black Dome Press, 2010.

Bratten, John R. The Gondola Philadelphia & the Battle of Lake 

Champlain. College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002.

Coakley, Robert W. and Stetson Conn. The War of the American 

Revolution. CMH Pub 70-6-1 (Reprint). Washington, DC: US 

Government Publishing Office, 2010.

Cubbison, Douglas R. The American Northern Theater Army in 

1776: The Ruin and Reconstruction of the Continental Force. 

Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2010.

Furneaux, Rupert. The Battle of Saratoga. New York: Stein & Day, 

1971.

Gabriel, Michael P. The Battle of Bennington: Soldiers and Civilians. Charleston, SC: History Press, 2012.

Higginbotham, Don. The War of American Independence: Military 

Attitudes, Policies, and Practice, 1763–1789. Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1983. 
410

Ketchum, Richard M. Saratoga: Turning Point of America’s 

Revolutionary War. New York: Henry Holt, 1997.

Logusz, Michael O. With Musket & Tomahawk: The Saratoga Campaign and the Wilderness War of 1777. Philadelphia: Casemate 

Publishers, 2012. 

Luzader, John F. Saratoga: A Military History of the Decisive Campaign of the American Revolution. New York: Savas Beattie, 2008. 

Mintz, Max M. The Generals of Saratoga: John Burgoyne & Horatio Gates. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990. 

Morrissey, Brendan. Saratoga 1777: Turning Point of a Revolution. 

Oxford, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2000.

Nelson, James L. Benedict Arnold’s Navy: The Ragtag Fleet That 

Lost the Battle of Lake Champlain but Won the American Revolution. New York: McGraw Hill, 2006.

Starbuck, David R. The Great Warpath: British Military Sites from 

Albany to Crown Point. Hanover, NH: University Press of New 

England, 1999.

Venter, Bruce M. The Battle of Hubbardton: The Rear Guard Action 

that Saved America. Charleston, SC: History Press, 2015.

Watt, Gavin K. Rebellion in the Mohawk Valley: The St. Leger Expedition of 1777. Toronto, Canada: Dundurn Press, 2002. 

US Army Organizational and Branch Histories. These books 

cover the creation and organization of the Continental Army, one of 

its branches, or various aspects of how the army operated during the 

Revolutionary War. 

Berg, Fred A. Encyclopedia of Continental Army Units. Harrisburg, 

PA: Stackpole, 1972.

Gillett, Mary C. The Army Medical Department, 1775-1818. CMH 

Pub 30-7-1 (Reprint). Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2004
411

Hittle, John D. The Military Staff, Its History and Development. 

Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1949. 

Huston, James A. Army Historical Series, The Sinews of War: Army 

Logistics 1775–1953, Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1966. 

Kreidberg, Marvin A. and Merton G. Henry. History of Military Mobilization in the United States Army, 1775–1945. CMH Pub 104-

10. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1989 

(facsimile copy). 

McGrath, John J. The Brigade: A History. Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004.

McKenney, Janice E. Army Lineage Series, The Organizational 

History of Field Artillery 1775–2003. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2007.

Risch, Erna. Quartermaster Support of the Army: A History of the 

Corps, 1775–1939. CMH Pub 70-35. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1989.

—. Special Studies Series, Supplying Washington’s Army. 

Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1981.

Steffen, Randy. The Horse Soldier, 1776–1943: The United States 

Cavalryman, His Uniforms, Arms, Accoutrements, and Equipments, Vol. 1. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Wright Jr., Robert K. Army Lineage Series, The Continental Army. 

Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 2006.

British Army Histories. The books cover the organization and operations of the British Army, or various aspects of how that army 

operated during the Revolutionary War. 

Hagist, Don N. British Soldiers, American War: Voices of the American Revolution. Yardley, PA: Westholme Publishing, 2012.
412

Houlding, John A. Fit For Service: The Training of the British Army, 

1715–1795. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1981.

Mallinson, Allan. The Making of the British Army, From the English 

Civil War to the War on Terror. London: Bantam Press, 2009.

Spring, Mathew H. With Zeal and Bayonets Only: The British Army 

on Campaign in North America, 1775–1783. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008. 

Other Sources. This book provides excellent information which 

does not fit into the categories above. 

Robertson, William G. The Staff Ride. Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1987.
413

About the Author

Lt. Col. Steven E. Clay was commissioned in the US Army 

in June 1979 from North Georgia College. He was assigned to the 

Combat Studies Institute (CSI), Fort Leavenworth as an assistant 

professor and as the executive officer from 1997 to 2001. Then after a 

year’s tour in South Korea, he returned to CSI in 2002 as the chief of 

the Staff Ride Team. After a 27-year US Army career, Clay retired in 

September 2006 then continued to serve the US Army as team chief 

of CSI’s Contemporary Operations Study Team. As such, he and his 

team were charged with researching, documenting, and writing the 

history of US Army operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Since 2002, 

Clay has authored or co-authored 15 manuscripts for the US Army, 

many of which detail the operations of US Army organizations in 

those two conflicts. Independently, he has authored a number of 

other books and articles, including Blood and Sacrifice: The History 

of the 16th Infantry Regiment from the Civil War through the Gulf 

War and the four-volume reference set, US Army Order of Battle 

1919–1941. The latter work was selected for the Society of Military 

History’s 2012 Distinguished Book Award. He currently serves as 

the contractor team lead and as a staff ride instructor for the Staff 

Ride Team at CSI.
 
 
 
Staff Ride Handbook for the Saratoga Campaign, 13 Jun to 8 Nov 1777

Clay

CSI

Press

AUP

Combat Studies Institute Press

An imprint of Army University Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas