June 2019

DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY:

LESSONS FROM U.S. SECURITY SECTOR 

ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN AFGHANISTAN
Cover photo credit: U.S. Army photo by Tyrone Walker

PAKTIKA

KHOWST

TAKHAR

BADAKHSHAN

BAGHLAN

BAMYAN

FARYAB

WARDAK

KUNAR

KUNDUZ

NURISTAN

NANGARHAR

FARAH

NIMROZ

HELMAND

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

GHOR

GHAZNI

BALKH

BADGHIS

KABUL

KAPISA

PAKTIYA

LOGAR

LAGHMAN

JOWZJAN

PARWAN

SAR-E PUL

HERAT

DAYKUNDI

SAMANGAN

PANJSHIR
Divided Responsibility: Lessons from U.S. Security Sector Assistance Efforts in 

Afghanistan is the sixth lessons learned report to be issued by the Special Inspector 

General for Afghanistan Reconstruction. This report follows and expands upon a 

previous lessons learned report, Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and 

Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. Specifically, 

Divided Responsibility examines the patchwork of security sector assistance programs 

undertaken by dozens of U.S. entities and international partners to develop the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), Ministry of Defense (MOD), and 

Ministry of Interior (MOI) since 2001.

The report uses the Afghan experience to identify lessons that can inform U.S. policies 

and actions through each phase of a security sector assistance engagement in a foreign 

country. The report also provides recommendations for improving the impact of such 

efforts. These lessons are relevant for ongoing efforts in Afghanistan, where the United 

States may remain engaged for years to come, and for future efforts to rebuild security 

forces in states emerging from protracted conflict. 

Our findings highlight the difficulty of conducting security sector assistance during 

active combat and the challenges of coordinating the efforts of an international 

coalition. In Afghanistan, no single person, agency, military service, or country had 

ultimate responsibility for all U.S. and international activities to develop the ANDSF, 

MOD, and MOI. The mission also lacked an enduring and comprehensive plan to guide 

its efforts. For the United States, security sector assistance activities largely rested with 

the U.S. military; however, no Department of Defense (DOD) organization or military 

service was assigned ownership of key aspects of the mission. Responsibilities for 

developing the ANDSF’s capabilities were divided among multiple agencies and services, 

each of which assigned these tasks to advisors usually deployed for a year or less. 

Unlike traditional U.S. security sector assistance activities conducted bilaterally 

through the U.S. Embassy, the United States’ efforts in Afghanistan were conducted 

multilaterally under a NATO mission. This has had benefits and drawbacks. While it 

distributed the burden of building Afghan security forces among several nations, it 

complicated coordination of the effort, both internationally and among U.S. agencies. 

Moreover, even within the military command, the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander did 

not have absolute authority over how the ANDSF was trained and advised in different 

parts of Afghanistan. This created asymmetries in ANDSF development and impeded the 

standardization of security sector assistance programs.

Special Inspector General

for Afghanistan Reconstruction

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
This report also highlights positive steps taken by Congress, DOD, and the military 

services to improve security sector assistance in Afghanistan. For example, DOD’s 

Ministry of Defense Advisors program has been largely effective in its development 

and deployment of civilian experts to advise the Afghan MOD and MOI. In addition, 

the U.S. Army has taken initial steps with its Security Force Assistance Brigades by 

incorporating combat advisor teams into its military structure. Both of these initiatives 

addressed critical deficiencies in the U.S. approach to security sector assistance.

SIGAR began its lessons learned program in late 2014 at the urging of General John 

Allen, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and other senior officials who had served in 

Afghanistan. Lessons learned reports such as this one comply with SIGAR’s legislative 

mandate to provide independent and objective leadership and recommendations to 

promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; prevent and detect waste, fraud, 

and abuse; and inform Congress and the Secretaries of State and Defense about 

reconstruction-related problems and the need for corrective action. 

Congress created SIGAR as an independent agency. Unlike most inspectors general, 

SIGAR is not housed inside any single department. SIGAR is the only inspector general 

focused solely on the Afghanistan mission, and the only one devoted exclusively 

to reconstruction issues. While other inspectors general have jurisdiction over the 

programs and operations of their respective departments or agencies, SIGAR has 

jurisdiction over all programs and operations supported with U.S. reconstruction 

dollars, regardless of the agency involved. Because SIGAR has the authority to look 

across the entire reconstruction effort, it is uniquely positioned to identify and address 

whole-of-government lessons. 

Our lessons learned reports synthesize not only the body of work and expertise of 

SIGAR, but also that of other oversight agencies, government entities, current and 

former officials with on-the-ground experience, academic institutions, and independent 

scholars. The reports document what the U.S. government sought to accomplish, assess 

what it achieved, and evaluate the degree to which these efforts helped the United States 

reach its reconstruction goals in Afghanistan. They also provide recommendations to 

address the challenges stakeholders face in ensuring efficient, effective, and sustainable 

reconstruction efforts, not just in Afghanistan, but in future contingency operations. 

SIGAR’s Lessons Learned Program comprises subject matter experts with considerable 

experience working and living in Afghanistan, aided by a team of seasoned research 

analysts. I want to express my deepest appreciation to the team members who produced 

this report. I thank the report team: James Cunningham, Divided Responsibility project 

lead; Zachary Martin, senior analyst; Brittany Gates, Samantha Hay, and Ashley Schortz, 

research analysts; and Brian Tarpley, student trainee. I also thank Nikolai CondeePadunov, program manager; Tracy Content, editor; Vong Lim, senior visual information 

specialist; and Joseph Windrem, Lesson Learned Program director. In producing its 

reports, the program also uses the significant skills and experience found in SIGAR’s 

Audits, Investigations, and Research and Analysis directorates, and the Office of Special 

Projects. I thank all of the individuals who provided their time and effort to contribute 

to this report. 

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
In addition, I am grateful to the many U.S. government and military officials at the 

U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Defense 

Security Cooperation Agency, Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Department of 

State, and international partners at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, who provided 

valuable insights and feedback. This report is truly a collaborative effort meant to not 

only identify problems, but also to learn from them and propose reasonable solutions to 

improve future reconstruction efforts.

I believe lessons learned reports such as this will be a key legacy of SIGAR. Through 

these reports, we hope to reach a diverse audience in the legislative and executive 

branches, at the strategic and programmatic levels, both in Washington and in the field. 

By leveraging our unique interagency mandate, we intend to do everything we can to 

make sure the lessons from the most ambitious reconstruction effort in U.S. history are 

identified, acknowledged, and, most importantly, remembered and applied not just to 

reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, but also to future conflicts and reconstruction 

efforts elsewhere in the world. 

John F. Sopko 

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

2530 CRYSTAL DRIVE, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY VIII

CHAPTER 1 1

INTRODUCTION

Why Policy Makers Should Care 1

What Is Security Sector Assistance? 2

SSA in Context: Its Role in U.S. History 2

CHAPTER 2 7

FIELD ADVISING

Embedded Training Teams 9

Augmented BCTs and Security Force Assistance Teams 16

Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams 19

Security Force Assistance Brigades: The 

U.S. Army’s Effort to Institutionalize Best Practices 26

Air Advising 31

Key Findings 36

Recommendations 36

CHAPTER 3 41

MINISTERIAL ADVISING

Role of a Ministerial-Level Advisor 42

Diverse Means for Selecting and Training 

Ministerial Advisors 46

Lack of Afghan Input Hinders Ministerial Development 58

Key Findings 60

Recommendations 61

CHAPTER 4 67

EQUIPPING THE FORCE

Background: The Pseudo FMS Process 68

Equipping Decisions through 2014 

Not Guided by Enduring, Comprehensive Plan 69

Equipping Decisions Lacked Consistent 

Afghan Involvement and Input 73

Post-2014 Equipping Decisions Made with 

Limited Data and Input from Field 79

FMS Stakeholders Do Not Coordinate Sufficiently, 

Lack Expertise 81

Total Package Approach Not Consistently Applied 87

Changes to ASFF Increase Flexibility but Limit Oversight 91

Key Findings 92

Recommendations 93

TABLE OF CONTENTS | DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY
CHAPTER 5 97

U.S.-BASED TRAINING

State and DOD Implement Different Programs 

Using Different Authorities 98

DOD and State Lack Ways to Evaluate U.S.-Based 

Training and Track Alumni 107

AWOL Trainees Undermine Program Effectiveness 108

Key Findings 110

Recommendations 110

CHAPTER 6 115

BY, WITH, AND THROUGH NATO

NATO Gets Involved in Afghanistan 116

NATO’s Policies and Processes Create Challenges in 

Establishing Unity of Effort 123

The United States Enables and Optimizes NATO 

Involvement in Afghanistan 128

NATO’s Efforts to Build Security Sector 

Assistance Capabilities 134

Key Findings 136

Recommendations 137

CHAPTER 7 141

CONCLUSIONS

Lessons 144

Recommendations 148

CHAPTER 8 153

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES 

Appendix A: Methodology 153

Appendix B: Acronyms 156

Endnotes 160

Acknowledgments 188 

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FIGURES

Figure 1: Comparison of Field Advising Team Models 8

Figure 2: Embedded Training Teams 9

Figure 3: Security Force Assistance Teams 16

Figure 4: SFA Advisor Teams 19

Figure 5: SFAB Advisor Teams 26

Figure 6: Ministerial Advising: Examples of Core Functions Required to 

Govern Security Forces 42

Figure 7: Total DOD Contractors, DOD Civilians, and U.S. Military 

Advising at the MOD and MOI 51

Figure 8: Advisory Effort Consolidated Under One Command (2005) 63

Figure 9: Field Advising Teams Moved Under Operational Command (2009) 64

Figure 10: Advisor Teams Remain Under Operational Control (2015) 65

Figure 11: Comparison of FMS and Pseudo FMS Processes 70

Figure 12: U.S.-funded Vehicles Provided to the ANDSF by 

Type and Force, FY 2003–2016 75

Figure 13: Requirement Generation and Case Development Process in Afghanistan 81

Figure 14: Beyond Procurement 95

Figure 15: Annual Cost of U.S.-Based Training for the ANDSF 98

Figure 16: Cost and Number of U.S.-Based Training 

Courses by Program, 2003–2016 99

Figure 17: Number of Afghan Students Trained in the 

United States by Location, 2003–2016 103

Figure 18: ISAF Regional Commands and PRT Locations 120

Figure 19: Troops Committed to Afghanistan as a Percentage 

of Country’s Total Military Strength 132

TABLES

Table 1: Senior Leader Advisor Training Schedule 48

Table 2: Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Predeployment Training 49

Table 3: Ministry of Defense Advisors Program: Training Program in Phases 55

Table 4: Number of U.S. Airstrikes in Afghanistan, 2015–2018 76

TABLE OF CONTENTS | DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY
HIGHLIGHTS

Highlight 1: Transition to Resolute Support: Full-Time Advisors at the Tactical 

and Operational Level, Replaced with Part-Time, Visiting Advisors 25

Highlight 2: Evolution of the Structure of Ministerial Advising 44

Highlight 3: 2018 SIGAR Audit Found DOD Lacks Performance Data to Evaluate 

MOD and MOI Advisors 56

Highlight 4: Limited Command Emphasis on Teaching FMS Process 

Hinders Institutional Development 77

Highlight 5: Armored Ambulances 89

ESSAYS

Essay 1: Air-to-Ground Synchronization Challenges 39

Essay 2: Optimizing Command and Control 63

Essay 3: Beyond Procurement 95

Essay 4: A-29 Training Program: A Successful, Integrated Model 112

Essay 5: NATO’s Command Structure Creates Coordination Challenges 139

TABLE OF CONTENTS | DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY
VIII | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

After 17 years of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan and security-related U.S. 

appropriations totaling $83.3 billion (approximately 63 percent of the nearly $133 billion 

of U.S. reconstruction funding), there is not one person, agency, country, or military 

service that has had sole responsibility for overseeing security sector assistance (SSA).1

Instead, the responsibility for security sector assistance was divided among multiple 

U.S. and international entities. This report examines how these divides had unintended 

consequences and created challenges to the effectiveness of the mission, as well as 

some benefits. 

While the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander is largely responsible for reconstructing 

the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), the Ministry of 

Defense (MOD), and the Ministry of Interior (MOI), the commander has no direct 

authority over civilian actors operating within embassies, the European Union, and 

other international organizations. Moreover, the commander does not have absolute 

authority to dictate the exact methods and activities NATO countries use to train and 

advise the ANDSF in different parts of Afghanistan. Rather the commander provides 

overarching guidance and coordinates the countries’ various activities. This has created 

asymmetries in ANDSF development and has impeded the standardization of security 

sector assistance programs.

This report also highlights how the unity of command and effort was strained because 

no U.S. executive branch department or military service had full ownership of key 

components of the mission, responsibility for assessing progress toward meeting 

U.S. strategic objectives, or accountability for vetting and deploying experts to 

accomplish mission tasks. Within the NATO-led coalition, the United States implemented 

a patchwork of SSA activities and programs involving dozens of U.S. government 

entities and international partner nations. 

In addition, the lack of institutional focus on developing a cadre of SSA professionals 

and the short-term nature of deployments created serious staffing challenges. For 

most of the conflict, the United States and NATO have deployed individual advisors or 

pickup training teams and assigned them to frequently shifting and temporary military 

command structures in Afghanistan. Most of these advisors came from backgrounds 

unrelated to advising foreign security forces and were often underprepared for their 

tours of duty. In addition, since these advisors and ad hoc training teams typically 

deployed for only six to 12 months, they had little opportunity to establish long-term 

rapport with their Afghan counterparts or take ownership of multi-year SSA programs. 

Following their deployments, most returned to unrelated careers. 
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JUNE 2019 | IX

In 2017, SIGAR published a lessons learned report, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, which 

focused on the U.S. effort to develop the ANDSF. That report found: 

• The U.S. government was ill-prepared to conduct SSA programs of the size and scope 

required in Afghanistan. The lack of commonly understood terms, concepts, and 

models undermined interagency communication and coordination, damaged trust, 

intensified frictions, and contributed to under-resourcing of the U.S. effort to develop 

the ANDSF.

• Initial U.S. plans for Afghanistan focused solely on U.S. military operations and did 

not include the construction of an Afghan army, police, or supporting institutions. 

• Critical ANDSF capabilities, including aviation, intelligence, and special forces, were 

not included in early U.S., Afghan, and NATO force design plans.

• The lag in developing Afghan ministerial and security sector governing capacity 

hindered planning, oversight, and the long-term sustainability of the ANDSF. 

• Providing advanced weapons and management systems to a largely illiterate and 

undereducated force without also providing the appropriate training and institutional 

infrastructure created long-term dependencies, required increased U.S. financial 

support, and hampered efforts to make the ANDSF self-sustaining.2

Divided Responsibility is a follow-on report that builds on SIGAR’s earlier work. 

As retired Lt. Gen. David Barno observed: 

Arguably, the greatest flaw in our 21st-century approach to 

[counterinsurgency] is our inability to marshal and fuse efforts from all the 

elements of national power into a unified whole. This failure has resulted 

in an approach akin to punching an adversary with five outstretched fingers 

rather than one powerful closed fist.3

As this report shows, his concerns are just as applicable to SSA. 

This report’s five main chapters examine each of the core functions of the SSA mission 

in Afghanistan: field advising, ministerial advising, equipping the force, U.S.-based 

training, and coordination with NATO. In addition to identifying key stakeholders 

responsible for these efforts, each chapter examines how personnel were selected, 

trained, and organized to carry out each function. Where applicable, we identify 

coordination challenges and best practices. Each chapter ends with a list of key 

findings and recommendations specific to the core function being discussed. Essays 

between chapters provide a snapshot of specific coordination and synchronization 

issues. The conclusion, lessons, and recommendations comprise the final chapter. While 

each chapter can be read as a stand-alone product, taken together they illustrate the 

disjointed and complex matrix of activities the United States undertook to develop and 

support the ANDSF and the ministries that oversee it. 

The introductory chapter examines the importance of security sector assistance to 

the success of all reconstruction activities, including economic development, building 

government capacity, and stabilization. However, understanding the United States’ 
X | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

approach to security sector assistance faces definitional challenges. While the term 

“security sector assistance” encompasses all U.S. government activities to develop 

a partner nation’s security forces and supporting ministries, many U.S. executive 

branch agencies use alternative terms to describe similar programs and activities. 

The introduction also covers the history of U.S. security sector assistance from the 

Revolutionary War to the post-9/11 era and the Global War on Terror. 

Chapter 2 examines how the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps deployed military 

advisors to train, advise, and accompany Afghan National Army (ANA) units at the 

tactical and operational level. The U.S. military’s approach to field advising underwent 

four iterations, each designed to improve on prior efforts. Despite these efforts, the 

U.S. military continues to struggle with staffing units, providing tailored predeployment 

training, and retaining personnel long enough to maintain expertise and long-term 

relationships with ANDSF partners. This chapter also discusses the selection and 

training of U.S. air advisors to the Afghan Air Force. Since most U.S. advisors were 

deployed individually or to temporary units, consistent historical data was often difficult 

or impossible to obtain. This chapter’s findings rely heavily on interviews conducted by 

SIGAR, the Center for Army Lessons Learned, the Government Accountability Office, 

and other government organizations. The essay following this chapter highlights the 

lack of coordination between the field advising and air advising missions, which at times 

resulted in advisors providing contradictory guidance.

Chapter 3 focuses on the U.S. advisory mission at the Afghan Ministries of Defense 

and Interior. While ground-based forces focused on improving Afghan war-fighting 

capabilities, U.S. advisors at the ministerial level were focused on developing systems 

and policies to govern the force. In Afghanistan, where literacy rates are low and 

education is limited, it was nearly impossible to recruit the necessary staff. Instead, 

U.S. advisors often performed critical functions themselves, such as developing policy, 

budgets, and human resources, and managing the design of the forces—rather than 

actually advising Afghans on how to do it. Moreover, the U.S. military had limited 

to no capability to train its own military officers on how to advise at the ministerial 

level, which resulted in untrained and underprepared U.S. military officers advising 

the highest echelons of both ministries. To address this issue, the U.S. Department of 

Defense (DOD) created the Ministry of Defense Advisors (MODA) program in 2010. 

MODA deployed civilian experts who received extensive predeployment training and 

served longer tours. However, MODA advisors never accounted for more than 15 percent 

of the advisory mission. The essay following this chapter discusses the evolution of 

command-and-control responsibilities for the SSA mission and the lack of a command 

structure linking advisors at the ministries and in the field.

Chapter 4 describes how the United States equipped the ANDSF and examines the 

effectiveness of equipping decisions. Specifically, the chapter considers the benefits and 

drawbacks of the equipping process used in Afghanistan and whether the right people 

and organizations were tasked with making equipping decisions. While the foreign 

military sales process used in Afghanistan allowed the United States to rapidly equip 
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JUNE 2019 | XI

the ANDSF, the United States often provided equipment without adequate training and 

sustainment, and provided equipment that did not meet ANDSF-identified needs. The 

essay that follows identifies the challenges associated with an equipping process that did 

not consistently integrate ministerial and operational advisory efforts. 

Chapter 5 examines efforts to bring ANDSF personnel to the United States to receive 

advanced professional training. Since 2003, more than 3,000 ANDSF students have 

attended training in the United States, at a cost of approximately $112.6 million.4

While the U.S. Department of State traditionally authorized the training of foreign 

military personnel at U.S. military schools, in the 1980s Congress began to give DOD 

that authority, in coordination with State. But because DOD and State face challenges 

tracking alumni of U.S. training programs, they struggle to evaluate the effectiveness 

of U.S.-based training programs. While one of the primary goals of such programs 

is to build professional relationships with foreign military officers that will last as 

former students rise through the ranks, only 13 of the thousands of ANDSF students 

trained in the United States have risen to “positions of prominence” (loosely defined 

as senior ministerial officials or general officers), a key metric used to evaluate the 

impact of U.S.-based training.5 While U.S.-based training programs were successful in 

professionalizing the ANDSF, Afghan military students absconded from training at a 

higher rate than students from any other country, putting the sustainability of U.S.-based 

training programs at risk. The essay that follows identifies best practices gleaned from 

the U.S. Air Force’s A-29 aviation program in choosing and developing advisors, making 

equipment and sustainment decisions, and linking U.S.-based aviation training with U.S. 

aviation training programs in Afghanistan. 

Chapter 6 focuses on how the United States worked with NATO and the challenges 

related to NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, such as strained unity of command and 

effort, varying restrictions placed by coalition nations on the use of their forces, and the 

lack of standardized predeployment training. This chapter also describes the various 

ways the United States enabled NATO’s involvement by providing coalition nations 

with financial support and, on occasion, providing intelligence and close air support 

for their advisors. Finally, this chapter examines the ways the United States could have 

better leveraged the support of other NATO countries. The essay following discusses 

the fractures in the U.S. and international effort to develop the ANDSF. Since 2001, 

there has been no command-and-control relationship between the most senior U.S. 

military commander in Afghanistan and the U.S. ambassador, nor is there an enduring 

mechanism in place to ensure effective coordination between the United States and 

other countries and international organizations.

While each chapter concludes with a list of key findings for each topic, below is a list of 

the major findings from this report:

1. No single person, agency, military service, or country has ultimate responsibility 

for or oversight of all U.S. and international activities to develop the ANDSF and 

the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Instead, the NATO-led Resolute Support 
XII | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Mission relies on command directives and orders to provide overarching guidance 

and less formal mechanisms, such as weekly operations and intelligence briefings 

between Resolute Support and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan (USFOR-A), to coordinate 

military activities. 

2. SSA efforts in Afghanistan have been hindered by the lack of clear command-andcontrol relationships between the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy, as well as 

between ministerial and tactical advising efforts. This has resulted in disjointed 

efforts to develop ANDSF capabilities. 

3. There is no formal mechanism to resolve conflicts between SSA activities led 

by the United States through the Combined Security Transition Command 

– Afghanistan (CSTC-A), and those conducted by other national embassies, 

international governmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations working 

directly with the Afghan government. While international working groups and 

coordination boards have been created to resolve conflicts, they are often temporary 

and lack authority.

4. The SSA mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring, comprehensive, expert-designed 

plan that guided its efforts. As a result, critical aspects of the advisory mission were 

not unified by a common purpose, nor was there a clear plan to guide equipping 

decisions over time.

5. DOD organizations and military services were often not assigned ownership of key 

aspects of the SSA mission. Responsibilities for developing ANDSF capabilities were 

divided among multiple agencies and services, each of which provided advisors who 

were usually deployed for no longer than one year. 

6. Most predeployment training did not adequately prepare advisors for their work 

in Afghanistan. Training did not expose advisors to Afghan systems, processes, 

weapons, culture, and doctrine. It also did not expose advisors to other parts of 

the advisory efforts, nor did it link advisors who operated at different tactical, 

operational, and ministerial levels.

7. The U.S. government has taken incremental steps to improve SSA activities, 

such as creating the MODA program, implementing core aspects of defense 

institution building, and deploying advisor units like the Security Force Assistance 

Brigades (SFAB). However, these capabilities have not been fully realized.

8. The United States has not adequately involved the Afghans in key decisions and 

processes. As a result, the United States has implemented systems that the Afghans 

will not be able to maintain without U.S. support.

9. The NATO command structure had benefits and drawbacks. While NATO’s command 

structure broadened international military SSA coordination, it complicated U.S. 

interagency coordination.
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LESSONS

This report identifies 10 lessons to inform U.S. policies and actions to improve the U.S. 

mission in Afghanistan and to better prepare for future SSA operations. These lessons 

are derived from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan but can be applied to any current 

SSA operation or at the start of any future SSA activities. 

1. The lack of a comprehensive and consistent long-term plan to train, advise, assist, and

equip a partner nation’s military and security forces results in misalignment of advisors 

and ad hoc decision-making. 

2. Conducting SSA activities while the United States is engaged in major combat operations

fractures the traditional way the United States develops partner forces and creates a 

disjointed command-and-control relationship between the U.S. military and civilian 

leadership. A long-term vision is required in order to transfer responsibility from the 

senior military commander back to the embassy and ambassador.

3. SSA missions that involve NATO require a plan to improve coordination among all 

international stakeholders involved in the development of the host nation’s defense and 

security forces.

4. Unless there is a plan to transition responsibilities to a partner nation, the foreign

military sales process used in Afghanistan will likely limit the institutional development 

of a partner nation as well as that nation’s ownership of and responsibility for its 

own resources. 

5. U.S. financing of partner nation security forces may be a continued requirement even as

their capabilities improve. 

6. Creating professional military advisors requires long-term assignments, proper

incentives, and the ability to refine advisor skills through multiple deployments and 

training cycles.

7. Advisors are best prepared when they are selected based on technical expertise, are

trained and vetted for their ability to advise, and when they receive predeployment 

training focused on the partner nation’s military structures, processes, culture, 

and equipment. 

8. Filling advisor requirements strains the U.S. military and civilian agencies, as advisors

are typically in high demand, yet there are very few trained and readily available. Special 

hiring authority allows the United States to recruit and retain civilian specialists and fill 

advisor requirements. 

9. Equipping partner forces requires determining the capabilities the United States will

train and advise on for the long term, versus those capabilities the United States will 

assist with in the short term to help the host nation reduce or remove a particular threat. 

Failure to determine this will result in equipping a partner nation with capabilities it may 

not need or be able to sustain. 

10. Failure to establish lead organizations with unified command over SSA from the

ministerial to tactical levels results in an inability to identify needs, fragmented command 

and control, and limited accountability and oversight. 
XIV | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

RECOMMENDATIONS

Because SSA in Afghanistan has evolved from a secondary mission supporting 

counterinsurgency operations to serving as the cornerstone of the U.S. military effort 

in Afghanistan today, SIGAR provides actions that can be undertaken by Congress and 

executive branch agencies to improve the effectiveness of SSA activities. This report 

provides recommendations in each of its major chapters on ways to improve actions 

related to a specific core function. At the conclusion of this report, SIGAR provides 

overarching recommendations to improve coordination among U.S. agencies and other 

coalition nations. 

Overarching Recommendations

1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-Policy), in coordination 

with the U.S. Central Command, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA), State, and the National Security Council, should lead 

an interagency review to determine the long-term SSA posture for Afghanistan based 

on current and long-term programming. This review should determine if the United 

States will continue to engage in SSA activities as part of a NATO-led coalition, or if it 

will transition to a more conventional model led by the U.S. Embassy.

2. USFOR-A, in coordination with NATO, should conduct a review to determine which 

SSA activities are dependent on the current size of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and 

which activities can continue to be carried out with fewer U.S. security personnel.

3. OSD-Policy, in partnership with DSCA, Resolute Support Mission, and the NATO 

Joint Force Command, should conduct an assessment to determine where U.S. and 

other international advisors are currently located, how missions are organized, 

and the requirements to keep advisor positions filled. Based on the results of this 

assessment, Resolute Support should create a common advisory picture outlining 

U.S. and NATO efforts with the aim of standardizing the mission among all of the 

military services and NATO coalition countries. This will lower the risk of advisors 

working at cross purposes.

4. The Resolute Support Mission should create a command-and-control relationship 

among all elements of the advisory mission. This includes aligning the Train, Advise, 

and Assist Commands, regional task forces, and SFABs under the Deputy Chief of 

Staff for Security Assistance. 

5. OSD-Policy should organize a group of U.S. military and civilian force management 

experts to partner with the Afghan government and NATO to develop an ANDSF 

force design plan based on expected long-term military, police, and ministerial 

capabilities. Based on this plan, the United States should validate advisor 

requirements and ensure the pipeline for equipment matches the current and future 

needs of the force. 

6. The Joint Staff should create a DOD-led and Pentagon-based Security Cooperation 

Coordination Cell for Afghanistan with the mission of improving coordination of all 

SSA activities. The staff assigned to this organization should be required to serve at 

least a three-year tour with regular deployments into Afghanistan.
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7. Resolute Support should host a quarterly SSA conference in Kabul for all civilian 

and military stakeholders with the intent of resolving conflicts that have a direct or 

indirect impact on the ANA, Afghan National Police, MOD, or MOI.

8. Predeployment training should expose attendees to all U.S. and international 

advisory efforts in Afghanistan and should be tailored to the Afghan context. 

Field Advising

9. The U.S. military should create a clear career path for combat advisors and continue 

to provide incentives to improve recruitment. Part of this career path should include 

postdeployment assignments at SSA commands and U.S. military training centers. 

10. Congress should consider directing the military services to conduct an internal 

human capacity assessment of combat advisor requirements around the globe. 

This assessment should also consider U.S. military force readiness requirements to 

maintain combat capabilities, a top priority of the U.S. National Security Strategy. 

The assessment should pay specific attention to those positions in high demand, such 

as military officers with a specialty in intelligence, medical, and logistics. 

11. In addition to training and building the SFABs, Security Force Assistance 

Command (SFAC) should also certify outgoing teams to ensure they are properly 

staffed, trained, and equipped; institutionalize a formal feedback mechanism to 

collect the SFABs’ observations and formulate lessons learned; and create an 

assessment tool that SFAC can use to evaluate the effectiveness of SFAB units. 

12. The military services should comply with DOD policies to track advisor experience, 

training, and deployments.

13. The Joint Readiness Training Center should institutionalize Theater-Specific Advisor 

Training (TSAT) for all advisors and should address country-specific command-andcontrol relationships, procedures, and military culture. All advisors should complete 

TSAT in order to properly advise their Afghan counterparts in the processes and 

systems the Afghans employ.

14. Resolute Support should create an independent assessment, monitoring, and 

evaluation division and create mobile assessment teams responsible for tracking 

ANDSF capabilities. The mobile teams should track the frequency in which tactical 

and operational training and advisory teams visit and engage with ANDSF units, as 

well as the core tasks advisors perform.

15. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should create a Joint Security Force Assistance 

Command to monitor advisor requirements among the different military services and 

provide a level of standardization in unit organization and predeployment training. 

Ministerial Advising

16. DSCA should take ownership of the ministerial development mission in Afghanistan 

and establish a cadre of civilian professionals for this task. The director of DSCA, in 

close coordination with the senior U.S. military commander in Afghanistan, should 

approve all U.S. candidates serving in senior leadership roles at CSTC-A, including 

the CSTC-A commander. 

17. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management, in coordination with the U.S. military, 

should request that Congress reinstate special hiring authority allowing DSCA to 
XVI | EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

hire individuals outside of DOD. This would allow DSCA to capitalize on internal 

and external civilian expertise and fulfill its civilian requirements through the 

MODA program.

18. The Joint Readiness Training Center should institutionalize Senior Leader Advisor 

Training. This training should be conducted in close partnership with the MODA 

training center and take advantage of core aspects of the MODA program of 

instruction. USFOR-A should make this training a requirement for all military 

personnel deployed to serve as advisors at the ministerial level.

19. As with MODA, predeployment training academies should be empowered to vet and 

remove candidates who do not meet training qualifications.

Equipping the Force

20. OSD-Policy, DSCA, and the military services should conduct a thorough analysis of 

U.S.-procured equipment for the ANDSF to determine short- and long-term security 

assistance. The analysis should consider how best to balance long-term sustainability 

against near-term threats. 

21. Resolute Support, in coordination with the appropriate organizations in the ANDSF, 

should conduct an analysis of how ANDSF casualties occur and then work with the 

Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to make equipping decisions aimed at 

reducing casualties. 

22. When the U.S. government empowers a temporary organization like CSTC-A to 

transfer equipment to a partner nation, DSCA must establish a formal process 

that ensures all relevant U.S.-based stakeholders approve of and provide input on 

equipping decisions. 

23. DSCA should create a course that familiarizes U.S. personnel with the pseudo FMS 

process. To ensure that U.S. efforts are geared toward increasing partner nation 

capabilities, this course should educate U.S. personnel on how best to involve a 

partner nation in the equipping process over time. 

24. CSTC-A should formalize Afghan involvement in the pseudo FMS process. 

25. Congress should consider evaluating the benefits and challenges associated 

with using the pseudo FMS process and its impact on overall U.S. foreign 

policy objectives.

U.S.-Based Training

26. DOD and State should develop new metrics of effectiveness for foreign military 

training. Current metrics of effectiveness are misleading, as they are often based 

on the future career prospects of students. This “position of prominence” criterion 

reflects a statistically insignificant number of Afghans who have trained in the 

United States.

27. DOD and State should track the performance of Afghan students trained in the 

United States by implementing a system to consolidate information and should 

inform advisors of its availability. This can be done through enhancing the existing 

Security Cooperation Training Management System.

28. State, in coordination with DOD, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and 

state and local governments, should strengthen efforts aimed at preventing foreign 
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JUNE 2019 | XVII

military students from going AWOL. This can include changing the visa status of 

AWOL students to make obtaining U.S. identity documents more difficult, and 

working with local authorities to ensure students only have access to limited or 

restricted documents. 

By, With, and Through NATO

29. DOD should establish a close working relationship with NATO SSA-related centers of 

excellence and schools to share best practices and lessons learned. DOD should also 

provide staff to SSA-related centers of excellence to leverage capabilities for future 

operations.

30. In planning the drawdown of U.S. forces, DOD should analyze NATO partner 

dependency on U.S. support of their operations in Afghanistan to determine how to 

maintain NATO support while the United States reduces its military forces.

31. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should update U.S. doctrine to clarify how the 

U.S. military conducts SSA efforts as part of a multinational coalition. The doctrine 

should provide clear guidance for establishing and maintaining coordination between 

U.S. departments and agencies operating at the embassy in the host country.

32. DOD and State, in coordination with NATO, should conduct an assessment of NATO’s 

core functions and capabilities related to SSA efforts. This effort should determine 

which activities should be military-led and therefore under the purview of NATO and 

which are civilian-led and may be conducted outside of a NATO command. Based on 

this analysis, NATO should consider updating its doctrine on conducting SSA efforts 

in the future. 

JUNE 2019 | 1

DOD photo

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since 2001, the United States has appropriated approximately $133 billion  for Afghanistan reconstruction, 63 percent of which ($83.3 billion) has gone 

toward reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF).6

This investment not only supports the forces responsible for protecting the Afghan 

population and prevents the resurgence of terrorist safe havens, but is critical to the 

overall success of the U.S. reconstruction effort. Without security, the United States and 

its international partners cannot carry out other activities, such as building effective 

government institutions and promoting economic development. To help build a capable 

ANDSF, the United States has deployed tens of thousands of military, civilian, and 

contractor personnel as trainers and advisors. U.S. advisors have partnered with Afghan 

units and senior officials to improve warfighting functions and strengthen governance 

and oversight of the force. Security sector assistance (SSA) efforts in Afghanistan will 

likely continue in some form even as the U.S. military presence draws down. 

WHY POLICY MAKERS SHOULD CARE

SIGAR’s audits, inspections, quarterly reports, and lessons learned reports have shown 

that security is necessary to the success of all other aspects of reconstruction, including 

economic development, building government capacity, and stabilization. In addition to its 

key role in battling the Taliban insurgency, the ANDSF is an important partner in the United 

States’ global effort to counter terrorism and protect the U.S. homeland by battling al-Qaeda, 
2 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

the Islamic State, and other international terrorist organizations. By looking at past and 

current efforts to develop the ANDSF, we can learn what has and has not worked over the 

past 17 years. 

According to senior U.S. military officials, the ANDSF will require U.S. support for the 

foreseeable future, even if U.S. combat forces are drawn down.7 The United States will likely 

continue to deploy advisors to partner with ANDSF units and provide guidance to senior 

Afghan officials. Moreover, the ANDSF will continue to require U.S. financial support and 

military equipment. Without support, the ANDSF would be unable to maintain its current 

capabilities and would be at risk of collapse. At the peak of the U.S. effort, the yearly budget 

for the U.S. command responsible for developing Afghan security forces was $11 billion, 

more than the U.S. Missile Defense Agency’s annual budget.8 Learning from the past can 

improve the likelihood of achieving U.S. strategic goals at reduced costs to the U.S. taxpayer. 

Like most SIGAR products, this report is for the U.S. Congress and Secretaries of State and 

Defense, and is also available to the public. It is also designed to inform the decisions of 

senior policy officials and those currently working on SSA. As the title notes, U.S. efforts 

are divided among many stakeholders. As a shared responsibility between the Department 

of State and the Department of Defense (DOD), security sector assistance requires a shared 

assessment of the effectiveness of our security cooperation and development programs. 

Yet most of those working on SSA are exposed to only one part of the effort and rarely 

get insight into how the mission works as a whole. As this report shows, that can lead to a 

number of problems. While SSA professionals may skip directly to the chapter that deals 

with their specific interest, there is value in seeing the effort as a whole and applying lessons 

and recommendations from a place of greater understanding. 

WHAT IS SECURITY SECTOR ASSISTANCE?

For the purpose of this report, SSA is defined as U.S. government efforts to “help 

foreign partners build and sustain the capacity and effectiveness of legitimate [foreign 

partner nation] institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for their people.”9

While the term security sector assistance accounts for all activities taken on behalf 

of the U.S. government, U.S. agencies use a variety of terms when describing SSArelated programs and efforts: security cooperation; security force assistance (SFA); 

security assistance; train, advise, and assist; train and equip; building partner capacity; 

defense institution building; or by, with, and through. Ultimately for this report, SIGAR 

will examine the U.S. government’s holistic approach to developing the ANDSF and 

supporting institutions. 

SSA IN CONTEXT: ITS ROLE IN U.S. HISTORY

The United States’ experience with security sector assistance predates our founding as a 

nation. During the Revolutionary War, France provided the Continental Army with naval 

support and military advising from embedded military officers. This served French interests: 

France wanted the British military distracted so France could expand its own military and 
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commercial presence in Europe.10 But it also helped the colonies win their independence 

from Britain. France supplied arms and other aid, and French troops provided military 

training to the Continental Army. The American victory at Yorktown would not have 

been possible without the support of French soldiers, who directed the siege, and French 

warships, which repelled the Royal Navy’s attempt to rescue its forces.11

In the Civil War, British businesses privately provided ships to the Confederacy to keep 

Southern cotton flowing to Britain. Despite the British government’s public declaration 

of neutrality, British shipbuilders circumvented laws by coordinating with Portugal to 

convert British-built civilian vessels into naval war ships. British ships ran naval blockades 

against Union ships to supply and arm the Confederacy, which had just 10 percent of the 

North’s industrial capacity.12 Historian Peter Tsouras estimates the Confederacy would have 

collapsed in 12 to 18 months had it not been for British aid. After the siege of Vicksburg, 

the Union Army found 30,000 surrendered Confederate fighters armed with new British 

Enfield rifles.13

During World War I, the United States emerged as the leading global supplier of arms, 

despite a declaration of neutrality at the beginning of the war. From August 1914 to March 

1917, the United States exported around $2.2 billion in war supplies to Europe.14 By 

1920, the United States accounted for more than 50 percent of all global arms exports—a 

development that prompted prominent international lawyer Charles Hyde to petition the 

Secretary of State to reduce arms sales.15 Hyde wrote, “The success of armies, possibly the 

fate of empires, may ultimately rest upon the output of American factories.”16 In the 1930s, 

Congress established the Special Committee on Investigation of the Munitions Industry 

to determine if commercial profit was a motive for continuing war. In response to the 

committee’s findings, Congress created a munitions control board to strengthen oversight of 

the U.S. arms industry.17

Starting in 1939, despite President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s public declaration of neutrality, 

Congress allowed the United States to sell arms to Britain and other allies then at war with 

Germany and Japan. Two years later, the United States passed the Lend-Lease Program, 

which lent arms, food, and other aid to Britain and its allies with the understanding that they 

would pay it back over time.18 In reality, the $50 billion loan was mostly a gift; U.S. allies 

repaid less than $10 billion.19

During the Cold War, to counter Soviet expansionism and the propagation of communist 

ideology, the United States used security assistance to increase its sphere of influence and 

prevent the rise of pro-Soviet regimes. Under the Truman Doctrine, the United States sought 

to contain Soviet expansion by providing hundreds of millions of dollars in aid to Greece 

and Turkey, mostly for security assistance.20 The United States also sent military personnel 

to advise and assist the Turkish and Greek armed forces. This marked a new chapter in 

security sector assistance: the creation of advisory units to support the development of 

foreign military forces.21 By 1949, the United States had 527 military advisory personnel in 

Greece and 410 in Turkey.22
4 | INTRODUCTION

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

In 1948, Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act (FAA), which authorized the United 

States to enter into collective agreements with foreign nations “based on continuous and 

effective self-help and mutual aid.”23 A few months later, the United States signed the North 

Atlantic Treaty, which led to the creation of NATO. To meet U.S. obligations under the North 

Atlantic Treaty, Congress authorized the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, which 

authorized the United States to provide military assistance to NATO countries, and provided 

funds to Greece, Turkey, Iran, Korea, and the Philippines.24

In 1954, in response to burgeoning Cold War foreign aid spending, Congress enacted the 

Mutual Security Act, aimed at increasing congressional oversight.25 “Even strong supporters 

of foreign aid,” wrote Senator John Sparkman of Alabama, “had become more than a little 

disgusted with what seemed to be the self-perpetuating activities of the ever-growing foreign 

assistance bureaucracy.”26 The legislation established the Foreign Military Sales program, 

which allowed the United States to provide military equipment via grants or loans over a 

three-year period.27

Yet the increasingly tangled web of foreign assistance bureaucracy prompted one 

administration official of the early 1960s to say, “We are tackling 20-year problems with 

five-year plans, staffed with two-year personnel working with one-year appropriations.”28

Congress passed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, which consolidated multiple 

authorities—Foreign Military Sales, the Economic Support Fund, and the Military Assistance 

Program—and transitioned the three-year credit period for repaying the United States 

for military equipment to a system of long-term loans repayable on agreed-upon terms.29

Because the Senate Foreign Relations Committee believed that poor countries could not 

absorb large amounts of aid, the FAA provided recipient countries with low-interest loans 

for up to 50 years.30 The act also provided two-year authorization for military assistance.31

To streamline legislation related to military exports, Congress enacted the Foreign Military 

Sales Act of 1968. The act authorized the United States to sell military equipment to allies 

that had enough resources to sustain the equipment without putting a strain on the economy 

of the recipient nation, and divided foreign military sales into two categories: cash and 

credit.32 For sales that relied on credit, the President of the United States could authorize 

the financing and purchasing of defense articles and services under terms set by the United 

States, as long as those terms did not exceed 10 years.33

The Vietnam War marked another transformation in the way the United States distributed 

security assistance. To support the war effort in Vietnam, Congress created the Military 

Assistance Service Fund (MASF), a special account that was a part of the regular Department 

of Defense appropriation.34 For more than a decade (1964–1975), MASF received almost 

double the U.S. military assistance than the rest of the world combined, and from 1966 to 

1976, the United States exported as many weapons as the rest of the world collectively.35 In 

reaction to regional arms races and national debates over U.S. foreign policy, and as a means 

to control the export of defense articles and services, Congress passed the International 

Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act in 1976.36 The legislation amended the 

Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, consolidated existing legislation pertaining to arms sales, and 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 5

applied additional regulation.37 It further called for the dissolution of the Military Assistance 

Program and included provisions to create the International Military Education and Training 

program. The act also stipulated that Congress approve all military assistance advisory groups’ 

missions or any other organization of the U.S. armed forces that deployed personnel to carry 

out advisory duties after September 1977.38

President Jimmy Carter, a vocal critic of the unrestrained spread of the global arms 

industry, put new restrictions on providing U.S. security assistance abroad, albeit with 

notable exemptions in the Middle East, Africa, and Afghanistan.39 President Ronald Reagan 

revitalized security assistance. His administration worked with Congress to increase 

security assistance funding levels in reaction to Soviet military expansion, Soviet influence 

in Afghanistan, and the Soviet threat to Poland. Between 1981 and 1986, security assistance 

funding grew by 84 percent.40

The United States faced new challenges in the early 1990s: the spread of democracy and 

capitalism throughout former Soviet-controlled territory, the restart of talks between Israel 

and Palestine, and the expulsion by U.S. forces of Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi army in Kuwait. 

By 1990, security assistance to Israel, Egypt, Turkey, Greece, and Pakistan accounted for 

88 percent of all foreign military spending.41

President Bill Clinton’s administration saw the sale of U.S.-made military equipment as a 

means of boosting the U.S. domestic economy. By 1993, foreign military sales hit a record 

high of $33 billion.42 At the same time, the United States became heavily involved in armed 

humanitarian missions in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo.43 In 2000, then-candidate 

George W. Bush campaigned on a platform against U.S. involvement in nation-building 

activities and opposed armed humanitarian actions taken by the previous administration.44

The 9/11 terrorist attacks introduced new complexities into security sector assistance. No 

longer was the United States reconstructing security forces in post-war countries such as 

Korea, Japan, and Germany. In Afghanistan and Iraq, it was engaged in active combat against 

terrorist groups who had little regard for national borders. 

Following the collapse of the Saddam Hussein and Taliban governments, the United 

States committed to building Iraqi and Afghan security forces and supporting ministerial 

institutions. Recognizing that the U.S. Department of State was unprepared to respond 

rapidly to complex threats against the United States, Congress passed the 2005 National 

Defense Authorization Act, which created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF). 

A DOD-run program that requires only concurrence from the Secretary of State, ASFF is 

authorized to provide funds for DOD to offer equipment, supplies, services, training, and 

transportation to the Afghan security forces.45

In addition to the more than $83 billion the United States has appropriated to reconstruct 

security forces in Afghanistan, it provides approximately $5 billion annually in security 

sector assistance to Afghanistan, and deploys thousands of American soldiers to train, 

advise, and assist these forces.46

JUNE 2019 | 7

U.S. Army photo

CHAPTER 2

FIELD ADVISING

The U.S. military has long considered advising critical to the continued development  and professionalization of a partner nation’s security forces following basic 

training.47 In 2003, to ensure the continued development of fielded ANDSF units, 

the United States began advising at the tactical and operational level.48 This chapter 

describes the four field advising models implemented in Afghanistan, and examines the 

challenges, lessons learned, and best practices associated with each model. Specific 

attention is paid to how advisors were selected, trained, and organized. 

Generally, field advising involves a team of U.S. soldiers working directly with an 

Afghan unit to advise on decision-making and to provide access to U.S. resources and 

combat enablers.49 While the basic theory behind advising partner nation security forces 

has remained relatively unchanged, the U.S. approach to advising ANDSF units has 

not. Specifically, the U.S. military’s approach to field advising in Afghanistan has gone 

through four iterations: Embedded Training Teams (ETT), Security Force Assistance 

Teams (SFAT), Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams (SFAAT), and Security Force 

Assistance Brigades (SFAB) (See Figure 1.). These changing approaches reflected 

attempts within DOD to address challenges associated with each advisor model, 

especially as it related to command-and-control issues, staffing, and training concerns. 

Recently, as DOD requirements have increased, the U.S. military has taken steps to 

apply best practices and institutionalize tactical and operational advising teams. 
8 | FIELD ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

EMBEDDED ETT TRAINING TEAMSSECURITY FORCE SFAT ASSISTANCE TEAMSSECURITY FORCE SFABASSISTANCE BRIGADESSFA ADVISOR SFAAT TEAMS

X 16 48

organized

into twoperson teams

X X9 to18 X 20

Relationship to

Combat Element

Team Advising

Capabilities

Externally sourced; 

different command

Internally sourced;

same command

Varied Externally sourced;

different command

Included representatives 

of all warghting 

functions

Teams tailored to specic 

functional areas

Composed of four primary 

advisors, eight specialists, 

and eight security 

personnel

No specic specialties; 

relied on brigade combat 

team for specialized 

personnel

COMPARISON OF FIELD ADVISING TEAM MODELS

FIGURE 1

In 2017, the U.S. Army announced the creation of SFABs.50 While institutionalizing the 

concept of advisor teams within the military is a step forward, several challenges remain. 

As it has in past advising efforts, the U.S. Army continues to struggle with staffing these 

units with the required number of skilled personnel, and with keeping personnel assigned 

to these units long enough to create enduring partnerships with a foreign force.51 Recruiting 

soldiers in unique military specialties (for example, logistics, intelligence, and medical) at 

the right rank remains a challenge, since those soldiers are in high demand and there are 

relatively few in the military. Senior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCO) do not 

serve in advisory billets long-term because of career progression concerns, so attrition rates 

for these advisor units will likely continue to be high, potentially hindering the building of 

long-term relationships and theater-specific knowledge.52 While predeployment training now 

focuses more on advisor-specific skills, there still is not enough theater-specific training 

focused on the host nation’s security institutions, systems, processes, and weapons. 

Further, it is worth noting that while some of the advisor models suggest a specific focus on 

training partner forces rather than advising partner forces and vice versa, these activities 

often occurred simultaneously. This happened for several reasons. First, while the U.S. 

Army distinguishes between training (which focuses on refining basic skills such as 

marksmanship and tactics) and advising (which focuses on improving decision-making, 

systems, and processes), this distinction was often not emphasized even when advising was 

the primary effort.53 Absent clear guidance, advisors defaulted to training, a task military 

leaders are more familiar with, rather than advising.54 Often, advisor teams felt the need 

to both train and advise their Afghan counterparts—a situation 1st SFAB’s advisor teams 

found themselves in after being partnered with Afghan units that had been without a U.S. or 

coalition partner for several years.55
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JUNE 2019 | 9

EMBEDDED TRAINING TEAMS

The U.S. military began fielding ETTs as early as 2003. Responsible for providing infield mentoring and training to Afghan National Army (ANA) units, ETTs were seen 

as critical to the continued development of the ANDSF.56 In addition to providing 

mentoring and training, ETTs provided ANDSF units direct access to U.S. resources and 

enablers (such as close air support, medical and casualty evacuation, and intelligence) 

and assessed ANDSF unit capabilities, strength, and shortfalls.57 At full strength, 

ETTs were composed of 16 personnel, a mix of officers and middle- to senior-grade 

noncommissioned officers.58 ETTs were also designed to be largely self-contained units, 

with assigned personnel covering each of the basic warfighting functions: mission 

command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, supporting arms, sustainment, and 

protection (See Figure 2.).59

ETTs were considered external to the U.S. brigade combat teams (BCT) operating in 

Afghanistan. Even though ETTs operated alongside BCTs, ETTs were not considered 

part of the formal BCT structure. As Brig. Gen. James Yarbrough, a former commander 

of the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), described it, ETTs “were a different 

entity, trained differently. . . . [ETTs and BCTs] met on the battlefield.”60 Problems 

with this command-and-control arrangement would drive later changes to the overall 

advisory model. 

U.S. Military Struggles to Staff ETTs

Because ETTs did not exist as units in any of the services’ force structures and were 

not staffed with BCT personnel, each ETT had to be individually sourced and staffed.61

According to the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2011, the number of 

individually sourced advisors required to fill training teams in Iraq and Afghanistan for 

the Army at any one time totaled about 8,000 personnel.62

The U.S. military was generally unable to meet these personnel requirements, however. 

In 2008, for example, the Army was able to fill only 50 percent of the training team 

The brigade combat team

is the U.S. Army’s basic 

deployable combined arms 

warfighting unit. BCTs often 

operated as part of a division 

or joint task force and were 

assigned responsibility for a 

specific area of operations. 

Source: U.S. Army, Brigade Combat 

Team, FM 3–96, October 2015, p. 1-1. 

FIGURE 2

ETT EMBEDDED TRAINING TEAMS

• 16-person teams; personnel 

covered basic warghting functions 

• Operated alongside BCTs, but 

were externally sourced and 

reported to a different command

• Relied on BCTs for capabilities 

such as medical evacuation, 

close air support, and logistical 

sustainment
10 | FIELD ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

requirements in Afghanistan.65 The following year, the Department of Defense Office of 

Inspector General (DOD OIG) noted that of 3,313 personnel required for U.S. ETTs in 

Afghanistan, only 1,175 had been assigned.66

Personnel shortfalls often resulted in significantly understaffed teams. While teams were 

supposed to be composed of 16 members, most teams did not meet this requirement. 

In May 2009, the DOD OIG reported that many ETTs assigned to advise Afghan military 

units were at less than 50 percent strength, with some having only four to six personnel, 

far short of the 16 required.67 The same issue had been identified one year earlier 

in a U.S. Army unit after-action report, which noted that ETTs operating in central 

Afghanistan were often below the required 16 personnel mark.68

Understaffed teams faced several operational and advising challenges. For example, 

ETTs that were unable to meet the minimum number of force protection personnel 

required to move off a U.S. base were unable to mentor their Afghan counterparts in the 

field. Attempts to mitigate shortfalls included borrowing additional security personnel 

and support from nearby combat units.69

U.S. Central Command’s (CENTCOM) requirement for officers and middle- to seniorgrade noncommissioned officers further complicated staffing efforts. While this rank 

requirement often resulted in leaders being pulled from other units or commands to 

fill ETTs, higher command elements, such as Task Force Phoenix and CSTC-A, often 

reassigned these personnel to their headquarters in Afghanistan.70 As one 2008 Regional 

Corps Advisory Command after-action report on the ETT mission noted, “CSTC-A [and 

Task Force] Phoenix . . . routinely siphoned personnel from incoming ETTs for their 

own staffs. Teams are routinely stripped of [military occupational specialty] skill sets 

to augment or fill vacancies in the above-mentioned staffs, often to the detriment of 

the ETTs.”71

Police Mentoring Teams Complicate Staffing

Personnel challenges increased significantly in 2005 when the United States took over primary 

responsibility for training and equipping the Afghan National Police (ANP) in addition to the 

ANA.63 As it had with ETTs, the U.S. military struggled to staff Police Mentoring Teams (PMT). In 

May 2009, for example, the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A) 

identified the required number of PMTs as 635, but had only 90—most of which were 

understaffed. As a result of team shortages, commanders were frequently forced to cut down on 

their training and mentoring missions. CSTC-A was also often forced to transfer personnel from 

the already short-staffed ETTs to PMTs.64

Police Mentoring Teams

was a term used to refer to 

embedded training teams 

that advised the ANP rather 

than the ANA. 

Source: DOD OIG, Report on the 

Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans 

to Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan 

National Security Forces, SPO-2009-

007, September 30, 2009, p. 39.
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U.S. Military Unable to Source Teams with Desired Personnel

In theory, ETTs were supposed to be staffed with people with the appropriate 

experience, expertise, and mindset. As the U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance field 

manual states: 

Not every soldier is well suited to perform advisory functions; even those considered 

to be the best and most experienced have failed at being an advisor. Effective advisors 

are only the most capable individuals. . . . Recognizing that not all soldiers are capable 

of performing as advisors, leaders should immediately remove advisors who do not 

exhibit these qualities.72

The U.S. Army’s purported emphasis on filling training teams with highly qualified 

individuals was also highlighted in a 2007 U.S. Army briefing, which stated that 

“resourcing [training] teams with the right soldiers is one of the Army’s top 

priorities. . . . Only fully qualified officers and NCOs are chosen to fill these critical 

positions, based upon their grade, skill, and experience match, balanced with [time 

spent between deployments].”73

“Recognizing that not all soldiers are capable of performing 

as advisors, leaders should immediately remove advisors 

who do not exhibit these qualities.”

—U.S. Army’s Security Force Assistance field manual

In reality, past experiences and relevant skills were not primary factors when selecting 

personnel. While efforts were made to ensure that ETT leaders were selected based 

on experience, this was not the case when it came to the selection of a team’s other 

members. Because the U.S. Army was focused on producing and fielding ETTs, 

volunteers were readily accepted and officers were assigned to teams based on 

availability.74 A DOD civilian involved in the eventual creation of the SFABs described 

the creation of ETTs as “sheer ad hoc,” with people “thrown in” teams that were 

dissolved upon returning to the United States.75 In 2009, it was reported that many of 

the regional commands in Afghanistan lacked ETT personnel with the skills required for 

their positions.76 The U.S. Marines had the same problem. Prior to 2013, the U.S. Marines 

did not track advising experience, so personnel selection was often haphazard.77

Further, the advising effort was generally perceived to be a low staffing priority. As 

one former ETT member remarked in a postdeployment survey, “In general, it seems 

the army is selecting the bottom [third] of its majors, colonels, and senior NCOs to 

lead [training teams]. This must end. If [training teams] were properly resourced 

and supported in addition to properly led, the effectiveness of the mission would 

skyrocket.”78 This was echoed by another former ETT member, who stated, “My 

impression from the past 15 months is that the military is dredging the bottom of both 

the officer and NCO ranks to fill ETT slots.”79
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Predeployment Training Not Afghanistan- or Advisor-Specific

Before 2006, advisor teams were trained at several U.S. Army installations. In 2006, the 

U.S. Army formally consolidated predeployment training and preparation for all military 

personnel assigned as advisors to the Afghan and Iraqi security forces at Fort Riley, Kansas.80

While predeployment training at Fort Riley was intended to prepare personnel for an 

advising mission, the 72-day program of instruction focused primarily on combat skills, 

force protection, and tactical training. It placed little attention on developing culture, 

language, and counterinsurgency (COIN) training. Only 12 of 105 of the course’s tasks 

covered mentoring and advising skills.81

The focus on combat skills likely stemmed from the fact that a considerable number 

of personnel assigned to serve on ETTs had been out of a tactical unit for some time. 

To mitigate advisor shortfalls, the U.S. Army looked to the other military services. As 

one DOD OIG report noted, most military personnel assigned to ETTs and PMTs before 

2009 were U.S. Army reservists, National Guardsmen, or active-duty personnel from the 

U.S. Navy or U.S. Air Force.82 One former ETT member, for example, described himself 

as an “Air Force guy advising an Afghan Army guy on how to be an Army guy.”83 Such 

mismatches meant that training often had to be, as one former ETT member described, 

“lowest-common-denominator training . . . geared for Navy and Air Force personnel with 

no combat or operational experience.”84

Predeployment training at Fort Riley was heavily criticized by ETT members who served 

in Afghanistan, who often described it as irrelevant or not applicable to their assignment 

in country. Language training was often in Dari, even though some units that operated 

in southern and eastern Afghanistan spoke Pashto, and training was largely based on 

A U.S. Navy sailor assigned to a U.S. Marine Corps ETT speaks with an ANA partner. (Photo by Lance Cheung)
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U.S. military experience in Iraq, not Afghanistan.85 This was reflected in comments from 

postdeployment surveys, where respondents noted, “All Riley talked about was Iraq,” 

“They kept on referring to Iraq when they knew we were going to [Operation Enduring 

Freedom],” and “Reading materials on combat advisors/ETT activities were amply 

available only for [Operation Iraqi Freedom].”86

The limited focus on Afghanistan was noted in other critiques as well. For example, field 

advisors often did not receive foreign weapons training and received no information 

on Afghan systems or processes. One advisor commented that predeployment training 

“did not teach [U.S. advisors] anything about the systems that the [ANA and ANP] 

use for personnel, intelligence, operations or supply. 90 percent of mentoring is spent 

working with [their] systems.”87 To some, these training gaps hindered their ability to 

be immediately effective in the field. As one advisor noted, “Many [advisors] do not 

feel comfortable with [foreign weapons and vehicles] in the field, and we have to teach 

these.”88 Personnel also often did not know where they were going in Afghanistan prior 

to deployment, or if they would be advising the ANA or ANP. As one DOD OIG report 

noted, “In many instances, personnel who were trained at Fort Riley did not know 

whether they would be assigned as ETTs or PMTs until arrival in country.”89

“Many [advisors] do not feel comfortable with [foreign weapons and 

vehicles] in the field, and we have to teach these.”

—Former ETT member

Many ETT members also believed not enough attention was paid to advising during 

training. One former ETT member described training at Fort Riley as “100 percent 

irrelevant to advising,” while another wrote that training “was relevant to combat 

[operations] but lacked anything to do with mentoring.”90 Another former ETT advisor 

told SIGAR that he did not receive any training on how to be an advisor. The advisor 

recalled only one session on how to use an interpreter, little to no language training, 

and no cultural training. The advisor was “thrown a couple of books” for help with 

cultural awareness.91 Multiple responses from the ETT survey described training as 

“half-hearted” and “check-the-box” in its execution.92 It was not until March 2009, over 

two years after the U.S. Army consolidated training for advisors deploying to Iraq and 

Afghanistan, that Fort Riley’s program of instruction was modified to increase the 

amount of advisor-specific training and COIN training from three days to 12.93

At least some of these training gaps can be attributed to the fact that trainers assigned to 

Fort Riley had never been advisors themselves, and instructors had limited experience or 

expertise in the content they were teaching.94 In 2007, while in command of a unit at Fort 

Riley, U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Nagl noted that soldiers had been posted to the training unit 

on an ad hoc basis, and that few of the officers selected to train had previously served in 

advisor roles.95 Poor communication and coordination between Fort Riley and the training 

command in Afghanistan also limited the feedback received from teams in Afghanistan. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

While 1st Brigade, the unit responsible for training at Fort Riley, was closely linked with 

the Iraq Assistance Group and had a system in place to receive feedback from personnel 

deployed to Iraq, no such relationship or mechanism was in place for personnel deployed to 

Afghanistan.96 As a result, CSTC-A did not consistently send training information and lessons 

learned back to Fort Riley, and Fort Riley did not actively seek out this information.97

Some ETT members received no predeployment training whatsoever. One former ETT 

member told SIGAR that everything he learned about Afghanistan or the advisory 

mission he learned on his own.98 Another former ETT advisor told SIGAR that he did 

not receive any advisor-specific predeployment training because his team changed from 

a security force and personal security detail mission to an advisory mission en route 

to Afghanistan.99

Challenges in Country: Team Cohesion, Command and Control, 

and Resource Allocation

ETTs faced several challenges in Afghanistan. While ETTs were supposed to train and 

mobilize as a team to ensure cohesion and enhance effectiveness, training teams were 

often split up when they arrived in Afghanistan. According to postdeployment surveys 

and SIGAR-led interviews, ETT personnel rarely stayed with their original team for the 

duration of their tour; one team, for example, was split up three different times while in 

country.100 In some instances, team leaders were unable to deploy with their teams.101

This directly contradicted claims made by one general, who testified to Congress in 2007

Marine Corps ETTs Implement Separate Advisor Training

The U.S. Marine Corps did not attend U.S. Army-led training and instead institutionalized its own process 

to prepare units for deployment. Initially, the majority of predeployment training for U.S. Marine ETTs 

occurred at Twentynine Palms, California. However, some U.S. Marine ETTs received mountain warfare 

training at Bridgeport, California, and Hawthorne, Nevada, where conditions more closely resembled 

Afghanistan’s more mountainous terrain.102

Like their U.S. Army counterparts, U.S. Marine ETT members generally found that predeployment training 

did not adequately prepare them for the advisor mission. Language training was often irrelevant to their 

assigned area of operation, and insufficient attention was placed on weapons and equipment used by 

the ANA. The Afghan interpreters and role-players assisting with training also lacked relevant experience.103

One anthropologist who studied the U.S. military’s reliance on Afghan-Americans to provide cultural 

knowledge told SIGAR that most Afghan-Americans supporting predeployment training had no recent 

experience living or working in Afghanistan.104

Given the U.S. Marines’ purported focus on advising, U.S. Marine ETT advisors often found the selection, 

assignment, equipping, and sustaining of U.S. Marine ETTs surprisingly poor.105 For example, at a 2006 

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned conference on foreign military advising, U.S. Marine advisors 

expressed concern over the ad hoc manner in which training teams were sourced and trained. Almost 

all participants relayed stories of last-minute selection and notification of assignment to training teams, 

which prevented teams from training together before deployment.106
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that “the Army is ensuring that all deploying units are manned not less than 90 percent 

of their authorized strength 90 days prior to their Mission Rehearsal Exercise in order to 

allow them to train together and form a cohesive unit.”107

ETTs in Afghanistan also faced several command-and-control challenges. Because ETTs 

operated externally from major combat units operating in the same area and reported 

to a different command structure, coordination and communication issues between 

training teams and combat units were common.108 Additionally, because the command 

responsible for U.S. and NATO combat units had no responsibility to support advisors, it 

was often a challenge for training teams to acquire necessary resources and support.109

As one report stated, “ETTs do not have on-site support staff. The primary mission of 

ETTs is to train and advise the [ANA]. Currently, far too much time is spent trying to 

support/sustain [themselves] when [their] focus should be on the ANA.”110 Another 

advisor wrote, “Teams are not supported at all in Afghanistan and need to be entirely 

self-sustaining.”111 Obtaining resources was often done on an ad hoc basis or was 

dependent on personal relationships, and ETT personnel were often required to perform 

administrative or logistical duties for the ETT itself that were distractions from their 

primary responsibility to advise the Afghans.112

The ETT concept also suffered from the lack of a clear, uniform mission statement and 

shared objectives.113 Training teams operated based on varying commanders’ intents and 

therefore different understandings of what it meant to advise and mentor their Afghan 

counterparts. For some, advising entailed executing missions alongside the Afghans; 

to others, advising involved the ETT unit executing the mission themselves and only 

bringing the Afghans in order to show an “Afghan face.”114

A senior U.S. Marine Corps ETT advisor discusses operational tactics with an Afghan battalion commander 

and company commander. (Photo from OSD Public Affairs)
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

AUGMENTED BCTS AND SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TEAMS

In 2009, to address some of these staffing and training challenges, the U.S. Army began 

augmenting BCTs with additional advisors. The U.S. Army referred to these BCTs as 

“brigade combat teams augmented for security force assistance,” or augmented BCTs, 

and the advisor teams were known as Security Force Assistance Teams, or SFATs.115

Augmented BCTs were considered “full-spectrum operations, standard go-to-war 

brigades that [are] augmented with additional majors, lieutenant colonels, and colonels 

to build [advisor] teams from within the brigade.”116 The augmentation package that 

created SFATs generally consisted of 48 advisor personnel—24 field-grade officers and 

24 noncommissioned officers—who underwent cultural, language, and advisor training 

and who were assigned to a BCT during predeployment training. The original concept 

foresaw the 48 advisors being organized into 24 two-person advisor teams that would 

receive all necessary support (for example, specialized personnel, equipment, and 

transportation) from the BCT (See Figure 3.).117 Therefore, unlike the ETTs, SFATs did 

not cover all warfighting and staff functions.

This new model moved responsibility for the advisory mission from externally sourced 

training teams to the standard combat brigades, and was intended to help overcome 

the personnel shortages and resource constraints associated with the ETTs.118

Further, augmented BCTs were designed to improve command and control over the 

mission by placing personnel assigned to the advisory mission under a single brigade 

commander—a feature the U.S. Army’s Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force 

Assistance Handbook identified as a “key advantage.”119

Under this new model, each Afghanistan-bound commander had full responsibility for 

manning, integrating, and overseeing the advisory and training mission within the BCT’s 

area of operations. According to the Modular Brigade Augmented for Security Force 

Assistance Handbook, the BCT commander’s tasks included determining the degree to 

which BCT resources supported the advising mission, organizing the augmented advisor 

FIGURE 3

SFAT SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE TEAMS

• Package of 48 advisor personnel 

organized into 24 two-person teams

• Advisor personnel augmented 

BCTs prior to deployment 

• Teams relied on BCTs for all 

necessary supporting resources 

(e.g., specialized personnel, 

equipment, transportation) 

Advisors Combat Soldiers

Field-grade officers are 

senior officers ranking below 

generals: majors, lieutenant 

colonels, and colonels.
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

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personnel into advisor teams based on requirements, and providing resources to the 

advisor teams.120 By June 2011, nine augmented BCTs were operating in Afghanistan.121

New Advisor Model Increases Demand for High-Ranking Personnel

The shift to augmented BCTs and SFATs posed unforeseen personnel challenges. The 

U.S. Army’s augmented BCT concept assumed that specialized personnel needed by 

the advisor team, such as logisticians and intelligence personnel, would be pulled from 

the BCT. However, because specialized personnel were also in high demand within 

the BCT, BCT commanders could not always grant advisor teams the specialized 

personnel needed.122

The need for specialized personnel was highlighted in 2011, when U.S. Army and 

augmented BCT officials told GAO that including advisors with specialized capabilities 

as part of the augmented BCT advisor requirements would be very beneficial for the 

advising mission. Doing so would ensure that advisor teams had the personnel needed 

to advise effectively on all functional areas, as advisors frequently advised their Afghan 

counterparts in specialized areas.123

While the augmented brigade concept decreased the total number of advisors required 

for the advising mission and alleviated the strain on the U.S. Army’s pool of companygrade and noncommissioned officers, it increased the requirement for field-grade 

officers. This occurred because the ranks of the advisors required for the SFATs 

were higher than the rank requirements for ETT personnel. According to U.S. Army 

Human Resource Command data reviewed by GAO in 2011, augmented BCT advisor 

requirements increased demand for deployable field-grade officers by 463 in Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2010 and by 398 in the first two quarters of FY 2011. At the same time, the 

U.S. Army reported shortages of 2,469 majors and 1,297 lieutenant colonels within 

the service.124

While eventual decisions to prioritize meeting advisor requirements mitigated most 

shortfalls, the U.S. Army struggled to provide officers to units being augmented in time 

to ensure proper preparation.125 According to U.S. Army and augmented BCT officials, 

it was critical for advisors to arrive 45 days prior to a unit’s mission rehearsal exercise 

in order to integrate advisors into the unit, form advisor teams, and establish commandand-control relationships between the BCT and SFATs.126 However, multiple augmented 

BCTs did not receive all of their assigned advisor personnel until the mission rehearsal 

exercise. According to the 2011 GAO report, one augmented BCT in Afghanistan 

received only six of its 24 noncommissioned officer advisors and none of its 24 fieldgrade officer advisors prior to its mission rehearsal exercise.127

U.S. Army Consolidates All Training for Advisors

In October 2008, the U.S. Army announced that by the fall of 2009 the mission of 

preparing advisors and training teams for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan would shift 

to the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. The 162nd Infantry 

Brigade was activated to conduct specialized advisor training on topics such as 
18 | FIELD ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

language, culture, the host nation’s government and security forces, cross-cultural 

communications, key leader engagements, and rapport building.128 With the move to Fort 

Polk, the general concept of training advisory teams shifted. Rather than assembling 

and training teams through a residency course, as was the case at Fort Riley, the 

162nd Infantry Brigade sent mobile training teams to a deploying BCT’s home station 

to conduct training in three sessions as the BCT prepared for its mission rehearsal 

exercise.129 Team members designated for Afghanistan that had yet to be assigned to 

a BCT, as well as individual members of the U.S. National Guard, U.S. Navy, and U.S. 

Air Force who had been designated to serve with advisory teams, attended residence 

training at Fort Polk.130

Prior to training, the BCT commander determined which units within the augmented 

BCT would be trained to partner in combat with Afghan forces and which units would 

be trained to advise Afghan forces.131 Whereas partnering units received training on fullspectrum operations, SFATs received language, cultural, translator, and train-the-trainer 

training, as well as foreign weapons and equipment training.132

SFATs Face Familiar Challenges in Afghanistan

The shift from externally sourced teams to brigade combat teams did not alleviate 

all challenges facing advisor teams in country. According to the U.S. Army’s Security 

Force Assistance field manual, advisor teams require “a clearly defined and structured” 

chain of command to ensure logistics and resource support and to ensure that advisor 

personnel remain focused on developing partner nation security forces.133 However, 

theater commanders did not define the minimum level of support that BCTs were 

required to provide advisor teams, and CENTCOM provided no guidance to commanders 

on how the brigades should balance resources and make tradeoffs between the two 

different missions.134 In Afghanistan, where U.S. forces were under political pressure to 

reverse Taliban momentum and set conditions to begin the drawdown of combat forces, 

BCT commanders tended to prioritize the fight over the advisory mission.135

As a result, advisory teams struggled to acquire personal and operational equipment, 

as well as transportation and security support.136 Advisors from one augmented BCT 

in Afghanistan told GAO in 2011 that the advising mission was a low priority for the 

brigade; advisors from another augmented BCT described support for the advisory 

mission as haphazard and as coming from other units outside of the brigade.137 Because 

brigades often lacked the resources needed to support 24 dispersed teams, augmented 

BCTs often organized their advisors into teams consisting of more than two advisors.138

There were also multiple instances of advisors being pulled from the augmented BCT to 

support division headquarters. When this happened, advisor teams under new division 

commanders were generally used as a division resource, much as previous training 

teams were used to fill needed staff positions at higher headquarters.139 For example, 

one division commander tasked a five-person advisor team from one of the augmented 

BCTs to mentor the brigade of a NATO partner, not an Afghan unit.140
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SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE ADVISOR TEAMS 

In early 2012, in response to requests from the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF) and in preparation for the January 1, 2015, transition to ANDSFled security, the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps began to deploy small teams of 

advisors with specialized capabilities to work directly with Afghan army and police 

units.141 The teams, known as Security Force Assistance Advisor Teams, were designed 

to help with the shift toward “functional” security force assistance, or the specific focus 

on key functions, systems, and processes (See Figure 4.).142 This shift entailed moving 

away from advising along unit and organizational structures and toward advising along 

functional areas, such as command and control, intelligence, and logistics. In addition to 

advising Afghan police and army units, SFAATs also advised at Operational Coordination 

Centers, which were ANDSF command-and-control centers that coordinated security 

operations and civil responses in their respective areas of responsibility.143 Ultimately, 

SFAATs were to provide the training, advising, assisting, and development functions 

needed to prepare ANDSF units to assume full responsibility of security by the 

January 1, 2015, transition.

By December 2012, approximately 250 U.S. SFAATs were operating in Afghanistan. Due 

to the drawdown of U.S. forces, by June 2014 that number was down to 77.144

Personnel Requirements Continue to Demand High-Ranking 

Individuals with Specific Skills

SFAATs generally comprised nine to 18 advisors, made up of a mix of company and 

field-grade officers and senior noncommissioned officers. In theory, each member of the 

SFAAT had specialized experience, and each team was tailored to meet the needs of its 

ANDSF counterpart. For example, teams working with higher echelons of the ANDSF 

had a higher rank requirement. SFAATs typically deployed for nine months and were 

expected to remain with the same ANDSF unit for the duration of their deployment.145

FIGURE 4

SFAAT SFA ADVISOR TEAMS

• Nine- to 18-person teams 

• Most teams augmented BCTs prior 

to deployment

• Advised along functional areas 

(e.g., intelligence, command and 

control) 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps used a variety of approaches to meet ISAF’s 

initial requirements for SFAATs. To form the first SFAATs deployed to Afghanistan, 

the U.S. Army tasked certain non-deployed brigades to form the bulk of the advisor 

teams using personnel from their units. Once in Afghanistan, the advisor teams were 

attached to combat brigades. Similarly, the U.S. Marine Corps created some teams out 

of non-deployed personnel, as well as out of personnel already in Afghanistan.146 While 

this sourcing technique enabled the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps to meet theater 

requirements for SFAATs, it also resulted in brigades leaving large numbers of personnel 

at home-station locations. This meant that units back in the United States were without 

leadership and the full command structure needed to maintain readiness.147 Further, 

both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps worked with their force providers 

to draw soldiers from active and reserve non-deployed units to help meet rank and 

skill requirements.148

Because SFAATs generally required higher-ranking personnel with specific skills, theater 

commander guidance allowed for some substitutions when specific ranks or skills were 

unavailable—for example, allowing the rank requirements to be substituted with an 

individual one rank above or below the requirement. Since the required number of ranks 

and specialties for SFAATs exceeded the total number of such personnel in a typical 

brigade, the ability to substitute certain ranks and skills with other available personnel 

was critical to meeting requirements.149 Further, the ability to substitute was critical 

for filling those specialties in which the U.S. Army had few personnel, such as police 

and intelligence. However, challenges filling these positions continued. For example, in 

early 2012, the United States was required to deploy 36 SFAATs to eastern Afghanistan 

with a military intelligence captain attached to each team. The brigade combat team 

responsible for supporting these teams was staffed with only five military intelligence 

An ANA officer listens to a U.S. Army officer from an SFAAT outside of a temporary tactical operations center 

in Bati Kot, Nangarhar Province, during an ANA-led clearing operation. (U.S. Army photo by Jenny Lui) 
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captains, and was therefore unable to staff the required position for all 36 SFAAT teams. 

The brigade raised the issue with the division headquarters, which referred it to the 

U.S. Army Human Resource Command, which was unable to fulfill the requirement. The 

SFAATs deployed significantly understaffed on a critical advisory function.150

It is unclear how much an advisor’s experience or military occupational specialty 

influenced the advisor’s role on an SFAAT. A field artillery officer who served with an 

SFAAT recalled that expertise and experience did not appear to be a factor in manning 

decisions. On his first team, he was slotted as the fire support officer; on his second and 

third teams, he was assigned as the executive officer; on his final team, he was assigned 

as the manpower and personnel officer.151

Predeployment Training Hindered by Late Team Formation, Lack of 

Advisor- and Afghanistan-Specific Training

Recognizing that advisor personnel required specific training, ISAF established minimum 

training requirements for U.S. and coalition SFAATs.152 In response, the U.S. Army and 

U.S. Marine Corps each developed a program of instruction for predeployment training 

designed to occur in three stages: home-station training, advisor-specific training, and a 

culminating training exercise.153

Generally, home-station training covered individual and team-level combat skills 

training, while advisor-specific training focused on language, culture, COIN, and advisor 

skills. Most U.S. Army advisor teams received advisor-specific training during an eightday course (known colloquially as “SFAAT Academy,” or “Advisor Academy”) provided 

by the 162nd Infantry Brigade at Fort Polk, although some personnel received an eightweek course which included both combat and advisor skills training.154 The culminating 

training exercise included situational training exercises that integrated ANDSF role 

players and assessed advisor teams on their ability to advise their Afghan counterparts. 

These exercises were meant to be tailored to the level (corps, brigade, or battalion) and 

type (army or police) of the ANDSF unit the team would be advising.155

In principle, SFAATs were to be formed prior to home-station training so that the SFAAT 

could participate in training as a team. However, similar to the ETTs, several teams were not 

fully assembled prior to predeployment training, and some units were not fully formed until 

arrival in country. One former SFAAT member told SIGAR that some teams changed about 

10 times over the course of the year prior to deployment; he was on four different teams 

prior to his final team, which he was assigned to about three months before deployment.156

Another SFAAT member recalled that team members were not task-organized until one 

month prior to deployment. Setting up the teams earlier, the member noted, would have 

“given them time to properly prepare, solidify standard operating procedures, [and] train 

to be an advisor team.”157 Still another former SFAAT member said that not one SFAAT 

team was 100 percent task-organized or formed until arrival in theater, while another—

commenting on the late team formations—described “the lack of predictability and 

advanced notification in the [U.S.] Army [as] always frustrating.”158
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Descriptions of the training sequence designed to support the SFAATs suggest only minimal 

improvements in preparation compared to prior predeployment efforts. During home-station 

training, for example, advisor personnel generally found that the BCTs they were assigned to 

devoted insufficient attention to the overall security force assistance mission. As one SFAAT 

member described, “The BCT did not task-organize or focus on the SFA mission early 

enough. Had the BCT focused on the SFA mission, the BCT would have had plenty of time to 

identify many shortcomings for the deployment.”169

After-action reports, SIGAR-led interviews, and other anecdotal evidence suggest that 

training at Fort Polk did not adequately prepare SFAATs for the advisory mission. 

According to one former counterinsurgency advisor in Afghanistan who embedded 

Marine Corps Training: Advisor Training Cells and the Advisor Training Group

U.S. Marine SFATs and SFAATs completed training through a 12-week program.159 Generally, U.S. 

Marine advisor teams received training at the Advisor Training Cells (ATC) at their respective Marine 

Expeditionary Force (MEF) home stations, as well as at the Advisor Training Group (ATG).160 This 

training occurred in three phases: an eight-week program conducted at home station with the 

MEF’s ATC, three weeks of predeployment training and a mission rehearsal exercise at the Marine 

Air-Ground Task Force Training Command’s ATG, and a four-week remediation block prior to arrival 

in theater.161

Most advisors were unimpressed with the initial weeks of training provided by the home station’s 

ATC, which was supposed to cover combat and advising skills. Advisors expressed concern with the 

hurried nature of the training, the quality of instruction, and the attention placed on combat skills 

at the expense of advisor skills.162 One former advisor commented in a postdeployment survey that 

“I have not met one individual that went through the program of instruction [who] was satisfied 

with it.”163

Located at the U.S. Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center in Twentynine Palms, California, the 

ATG was established in 2007 to prepare and certify U.S. Marines deploying to Afghanistan as part 

of advisor teams. The ATG was a formal school under the U.S. Marine Corps’ Training and Education 

Command, and trained around 225 U.S. Marines each year.164 Training at the ATG lasted 25 days 

and entailed completing an advisors skills course as well as a final mission rehearsal exercise. 

To make the training as realistic as possible, contractors supplied approximately 200 AfghanAmerican citizens who impersonated such roles as ANA officers, ANP officers, shopkeepers, or village 

elders.165 The advisor teams were graded on how they advised and interacted with their Afghan 

counterparts.166

Compared to the ATC, U.S. Marine advisors were generally pleased with the training offered at the 

ATG. One former police advisor who attended both told SIGAR that “the leadership at the ATG was 

highly competent and well respected, [and] the overall environment at the ATG was much more 

conducive to a beneficial training experience. . . . The ATCs [did not attract] the same caliber of 

leaders.”167 Recommendations for improving the ATG included more rigorous team member selection 

and more tailored training—for example, providing battalion-level teams with more combat training 

and providing corps level teams with more “soft skills” training.168
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with and observed 120 SFAATs, the vast majority of advisors did not think highly of the 

training offered at the Joint Readiness Training Center.170 Training was often based on 

what the colonel of the BCT wanted rather than what the SFAATs’ leaders wanted; as 

a result, training tended to focus on combat skills rather than the roles and activities 

of an advisor.171 Another former SFAAT member described the predeployment training 

experience as “not for the purpose of the SFAATs . . . [but] geared toward the support of 

the SFAAT through convoy and operational training.”172 Another former SFAAT leader 

described their predeployment training as “almost solely based on [forward operating 

base] defense.”173 One soldier who served on two SFAATs told SIGAR that he did not 

receive any thorough language or cultural training before either of his deployments, that 

he often had to rely on his noncommissioned officers who had completed prior rotations 

in Afghanistan to gain familiarity, and that most of his training focused on weapons 

training and team combat exercises.174

Teams that were formed late also often did not receive U.S.-based advisor training. 

Former SFAAT members noted that some advisor personnel “did not receive any training 

due to last-minute notice,” and that “instead of focusing on training and learning about 

the specifics of the mission, [SFAAT personnel] were consumed with figuring out 

whether or not they were deploying.”175

Unlike the 1st Brigade at Fort Riley, however, the 162nd Infantry Brigade employed 

liaison officers at ISAF, the regional commands, and other places to collect lessons 

learned and after-action reports from advisor teams in Afghanistan. According to GAO’s 

interviews with the 162nd Infantry Brigade, these feedback mechanisms were critical to 

modifying the program of instruction at Fort Polk.176

An ANA officer with 4th Brigade, 201st Corps, discusses the current situation in a clearing operation 

with a U.S. Army SFAAT member inside a temporary ANA tactical operations center in Bati Kot, Nangarhar 

Province. (U.S. Army photo by Jenny Lui) 
24 | FIELD ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Challenges Remain with Resource Allocation, Command and Control

Like the ETTs that the U.S. Army deployed to Afghanistan, SFAATs suffered from 

unclear command-and-control arrangements, inconsistent access to resources, and a 

lack of clear guidance on the overall SFA mission. As one former counterinsurgency 

advisor told SIGAR, the SFAATs had their own chains of command, which created 

communication issues between the BCT and SFAAT leaders.177 However, placing 

the advisor teams under the brigade combat team did not necessarily alleviate all 

problems. According to one former SFAAT leader whose police advisor team fell under 

the command and control of the brigade combat team, the BCT “did not care about 

the advisory effort” despite the fact that it was supposed to be the primary focus. His 

advisor team was not integrated in any broader efforts, and he often felt that his advisor 

team and the BCT were working at cross purposes.178

Like ETTs, some SFAATs struggled to get necessary resources from higher headquarters 

or from the brigade combat team to which they were attached, often because the brigade 

combat team was limited in personnel and resources to begin with. Because the BCT 

was short on numbers, security personnel assigned to the SFAATs were sometimes 

pulled or assigned to different duties, hindering the SFAAT’s ability to conduct the 

advising mission.179

Limited personnel also meant that some advisor personnel were pulled to support the 

brigade staff or carry out multiple roles; as one former advisor said, “SFAAT members 

were required to do the organic unit mission as well as the SFAAT mission.”180 Another 

former advisor told SIGAR that his team medic had to serve as both the medical leader 

for his squadron as well as the advisor to the medical officer for the ANA; still another 

advisor said that some personnel were taken from the SFAATs and placed onto Regional 

Command – East’s headquarters staff.181 This advisor also explained that there were 

often issues with the SFAATs getting equipment from the brigade combat team to which 

they were assigned. Some advisor teams did not receive vehicles for their first four to 

five months of their nine-month deployment, or were left with vehicles that had been 

stripped of their weapons and radios.182

As with prior advisory efforts, SFAATs suffered from a lack of direction from leadership 

in Afghanistan. Personnel have described SFAAT advisory efforts as a “collection 

of good activities conducted by individual teams over time without a synchronized 

approach driving towards a tangible end state.”183 While SFAATs were required to 

coordinate with the regional command and the BCT to which they were attached, what 

the advisor teams advised on and worked toward was largely left to the advisor teams. 
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TRANSITION TO RESOLUTE SUPPORT: 

FULL-TIME ADVISORS AT THE TACTICAL AND 

OPERATIONAL LEVEL, REPLACED WITH PARTTIME, VISITING ADVISORS

Following the 2014–2015 drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces, the Resolute Support Mission adopted 

a limited, regional approach to the train, advise, and assist mission.184 As part of this transition, it was 

determined that a full-time advisor presence was no longer needed at the tactical and operational level. Rather, 

full-time advising would occur at the ANA corps level, the ANP zone level, and at the MOD and MOI in Kabul. 

Partnering with Special Forces and the Afghan Air Force would continue to receive full-time U.S. support at 

the operational level. It was also decided that a full-time advisor presence would not be needed at the 203rd 

Corps in Paktika Province or the 215th Corps in Helmand Province.185

To offset the lack of advisors at the tactical and operational level, and to ensure continued support of the 

203rd Corps and the 215th Corps, the U.S. military turned to expeditionary advisory packages (EAP) to provide 

tailored advising to ANDSF units as needed. Expeditionary advisory packages refers to teams of advisors that 

periodically travel to advise Afghan units. The mission and duration of these fly-to-advise and drive-to-advise 

missions were both situational and flexible. Missions that involved advising an Afghan unit in a functional area 

could last a few days; operational crises or missions that involved assisting Afghan units with an operation 

could last several weeks.186 The frequency of these missions also varied, with some Afghan units receiving inperson advising once a week and others receiving in-person advising once every couple of months.187

The U.S. military expanded its use of EAPs in late 2015 and throughout 2016, as it became clear that the 

ANDSF struggled to operate effectively without advisors.188 In late 2016, for example, each of the Train, Advise, 

Assist Commands (TAAC) either had or was in the process of establishing its own internal EAPs to deploy to 

the brigade level and lower.189 In December 2016, DOD reported that Resolute Support “is increasingly relying 

upon expeditionary advising teams that provide immediate, focused, and tailored train, advise, and assist 

support to the ANDSF for both enduring and emergent capability gaps.”190 To provide oversight of expeditionary 

advising efforts in southeast and southwest Afghanistan, where the 203rd Corps and 215th Corps are located, 

Resolute Support established Task Force Forge and Task Force Anvil, respectively.191

Because EAPs are generally ad hoc formations that deploy on an inconsistent basis, their effectiveness has 

been the subject of scrutiny. A persistent, continued presence has long been considered critical to advising, 

as it provides continuity and conveys a level of commitment necessary for rapport building. However, 

anecdotal evidence suggests that EAP missions did not occur as frequently as desired. One interviewee 

told SIGAR that while his EAPs were intended to be 10- to 14-day missions, most visits lasted only five to 

eight hours.192 Another advisor who served in Afghanistan for a total of 20 months from 2014 to 2017 wrote 

that his advising visits were often canceled “due to weather, security concerns, and VIP visits.”193 In 2012, 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Martin Dempsey testified that, “You can’t commute to work to 

train and advise someone you’re trying to develop. You can’t be there for three or four hours a day, and gone. 

You can’t commute. You’ve just got to be part of their lives. It does, in some level, put you at greater risk 

initially, but as the relationship builds, it actually lowers the risk.”194
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SECURITY FORCE ASSISTANCE BRIGADES: THE U.S. ARMY’S EFFORT 

TO INSTITUTIONALIZE BEST PRACTICES

Starting in 2017, the U.S. military took several steps to institutionalize combat advisor 

teams within the services. In February 2017, the U.S. Army announced the creation of 

six SFABs to serve three important functions: to preserve readiness by removing advisor 

requirements from the BCTs, to capture security force assistance expertise, and to 

complement the U.S. Special Forces that are engaged in several conflicts globally.195 In 

emergency situations, if the environment transitions from a security assistance effort to 

active combat, SFABs are structured to transition from an advisor unit to a fully capable 

BCT with the addition of lower-rank soldiers. In November 2018, the U.S. Army activated 

the Security Force Assistance Command (SFAC), responsible for the training and 

assessment, selection, and vetting of all candidates for SFAB positions.196

SFABs consist of about 800 personnel organized in 36 multifunctional advisor teams 

each composed of 12 advisors and eight security personnel assigned to support the 

development of a partner nation’s military (See Figure 5.). According to the U.S. Army, 

each advisor team would be staffed with a commander, NCO in charge, two maneuver 

advisors, a medic, a joint force operator, a communications officer, a mechanic, an 

intelligence analyst, and specialists in logistics, operations, and explosives—all tasked 

with advising their Afghan counterparts while also providing sustainment for the 

SFAB. An SFAB can also employ 18 functional advising teams specializing in logistics, 

engineering, or field artillery. Each SFAB is led by a one-star general responsible for 

coordinating all SFAB operations in a partner nation.197

In Afghanistan, SFABs were initially designed to partner with the ANDSF at the corpslevel and below; accompany ANDSF units on operations; and coordinate access to 

coalition enablers such as intelligence assets, sustainment, close air support, and 

medical evacuation. SIGAR was told by the Security Force Assistance Command that 

SFABs are designed to develop a partner nation’s military and are not currently staffed 

to partner with other types of security forces, such as police or special forces.198

SFAB SFAB ADVISOR TEAMS

• 800-person brigade organized 

into 20-person teams

• Deployed with a command 

element but operationally 

assigned to the TAACs

• Relied on the TAACs for 

resources and enablers 

Primary Advisors Specialists

Security Personnel

FIGURE 5
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JUNE 2019 | 27

According to USFOR-A, however, the 1st SFAB advised some Afghan police and 

special forces units in addition to the ANA. In reality, then, SFAB personnel are used in 

whatever manner TAAC commanders think would best accomplish the mission, which 

may differ across the TAACs. Since redeployment back to the United States in late 2018, 

the 1st SFAB has shared their experiences with the 2nd SFAB and the U.S. Army to share 

lessons learned and reflections from its first tour in Afghanistan.199

1st SFAB Improves Personnel Selection but Struggles with Retention

According to the U.S. Army, staffing for the SFABs is based on recruiting volunteers 

from the U.S. Army’s active military component and National Guard. The 1st and 2nd 

SFABs implemented a multiple-step process to vet candidates. After a soldier expressed 

interest and submitted an application, the application was screened to make sure the 

soldier met the criteria for individual assessment by the SFAB. Soldiers who passed the 

initial screening were assessed by the SFAB commander.200

According to the U.S. Army, the assessment and selection process consisted of multiple 

exercises over a two-day period. Tasks included a height and weight assessment, a 

physical training evaluation, a leader reaction course, a warrior skills test, a military 

occupational specialty proficiency test, an ethical dilemma essay, peer evaluations, and a 

selection board interview.201 SIGAR was told that while advisory experience is preferred, 

about 20 percent of the 1st SFAB had never deployed prior to their first assignment 

in Afghanistan.202

As highlighted in SIGAR’s 2017 lessons learned report on U.S. security sector 

assistance activities in Afghanistan, serving as a military advisor is not considered 

career enhancing.203 Personnel have expressed concern over the unclear career paths 

associated with being an advisor.204 To incentivize officers to join the SFABs and 

improve recruitment, the U.S. Army offered a $5,000 bonus for enlisted personnel, 

retention bonuses, selection of duty station following tour completion, and an additional 

Skill Identifier.205 Even so, the 1st SFAB struggled to achieve the desired number of 

personnel. Only after altered recruiting efforts and the addition of augmentees was the 

brigade filled. This effort meant that the 1st SFAB was receiving personnel right up to 

their deployment.206

SFAB Predeployment Training: Increased Focus on Advisor Skills

Current predeployment training for SFAB units is an improvement over previous efforts. 

After a soldier is selected as a member of an SFAB, that soldier is required to go through 

the U.S. Army’s Military Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning, Georgia, which 

was activated in August 2017.207 After that, members of the SFAB attend additional 

advisor training at the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk, Louisiana. SFAB 

personnel will also receive home-station training focused on additional language and 

cultural training, and those SFABs going to Afghanistan as a whole will return to the 

Joint Readiness Training Center to conduct a mission readiness exercise geared toward 

advising the ANDSF.208
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Military Advisor Training Academy instructors initially designed a six-week training 

program intended to train advisors at the ministerial level, but the U.S. Army Chief of 

Staff and the Secretary of Defense informed them that the training needed to be altered 

to meet the SFAB mission of providing combat field advising. With a limited amount 

of time to change the program of instruction, the 1st SFAB received a 10-day training 

program on the context of operations, cultural considerations, the NATO Resolute 

Support Mission, the use of interpreters and translators, Afghan interactions, the role 

of an advisor, force protection, and security force assistance operations. The 1st SFAB 

was exposed to limited language training and no training on small unit planning prior 

to deployment. For the 2nd SFAB, academy instructors expanded its training to four 

weeks, with follow-up language training through the U.S. Army’s partnership with North 

Carolina State University, which is close to the 2nd SFAB’s home station at Fort Bragg, 

North Carolina. The 2nd SFAB also received training on small unit planning by a certified 

U.S. Army Special Forces instructor. The academy plans to transition to a nine-week 

Combat Advisor Training Course; however, doing so will require additional military and 

civilian instructors.209

The 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment replaced the 162nd Infantry Brigade as the training 

organization at the Joint Readiness Training Center. As a smaller organization, it focuses 

specifically on the advisory mission and currently provides four different training courses 

for advisors. The Security Force Assistance Course targets advisor units deployed to the 

CENTCOM area of responsibility; the Joint Security Force Assistance Course is for nonU.S. Army advisors assigned to operational advisor billets; the Regionally Aligned Forces 

Course is designed for units deploying outside of the CENTCOM area of responsibility 

and that will provide more traditional advising in non-combat zones; and the Senior 

Leader Advisor Training is a pilot course designed for military advisors assigned to a 

partner nation’s ministry of defense (For more on the Senior Leader Advisor Training 

course, see pp. 47–48.). During a site visit to JRTC in December 2018, SIGAR learned that 

filling classes for the Joint Security Force Assistance Course is a challenge. This may be 

due to recent reductions in U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force requirements to advise at the 

operational and tactical level in Afghanistan and Iraq.210

The 1st SFAB attended the Security Force Assistance Course, which focused on basic 

military advising techniques and provided limited information on ANDSF systems, 

weapons, and structure. The training did not include discussions on how the unit would 

sustain itself and work with other deployed military commands. Recognizing issues 

with previous predeployment courses, the 2nd SFAB worked with the 3rd Battalion, 

353rd Regiment to implement Theater-Specific Advisor Training (TSAT), which was 

tailored completely to advising the ANDSF. It exposed advisors to ANDSF structures, 

processes, and weapon systems and partnered with advisors from the 1st SFAB to hear 

lessons learned and best practices from advising the ANDSF and sustaining the SFAB 

in country.211

Despite these improvements, 1st SFAB training was still not tailored to the current 

environment. Breakout sessions designed to teach advisors how to work through 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 29

complex problems focused on issues in which the SFAB will not have the authority to 

effect change. For example, during a training scenario, SFAB personnel were tasked 

with advising the MOD and MOI on topics such as fiscal sustainability and force 

allocations—issues no operational or tactical unit will face.212

While Joint Readiness Training Center instructors are not required to be experienced 

advisors, the 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment has implemented its own training program 

for instructors. Through this training plan, instructors attend multiple military 

schools to learn basic and advanced techniques on how to be an effective advisor in a 

deployed environment.213

First Tour Reflections: Some Improvements, but Challenges Remain

In February 2019, SIGAR attended the 1st SFAB’s after-action review at Fort Benning, 

Georgia. During the review, 1st SFAB leadership and personnel noted the positive 

contribution SFABs made to the mission in Afghanistan by providing a window into how 

the ANDSF was performing tactically on the battlefield. SFAB personnel attributed this 

to teams deploying to locations where there had not been a U.S. or coalition presence 

for several years. Advisor teams provided the TAACs with insights into the activities and 

operational capabilities of some previously unmonitored kandaks, or battalions.214 The 

mission also benefited from the advisor teams’ ability to take on tasks outside of their 

regular duties, such as supporting coalition partners. 1st SFAB leadership presented 

several potential indicators of success, such as a two- to threefold increase in ANA-led 

offensive operations in areas where SFAB teams advised.215

During the review, 1st SFAB personnel made several recommendations on ways 

to improve the mission. For example, in their selection process, the SFAC should 

A kandak is the ANA 

equivalent of a U.S. Army 

battalion.

Advisors with the 1st SFAB speak with their ANA counterparts during a routine fly-to-advise 

mission. (Photo by Sean Kimmons) 
30 | FIELD ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

consider an advisor’s ability to work as part of a small team, something ETT personnel 

identified as early as 2008. It was stated that some advisors did not have the patience 

or personality needed to work with a small group of people for nine months.216 Another 

recommendation was that personnel should be selected based on their ability to teach: 

Team leaders noted that many people had technical expertise but were unable to 

transfer what they knew to others.217 Several advisor team members also suggested that 

SFABs should not be touted as an all-volunteer force, as many of them were strongly 

encouraged—“voluntold”—or were simply ordered to join the 1st SFAB.218

Personnel also recommended more training on insider threat attacks (attacks by Afghan 

soldiers on U.S. troops), interpersonal training, training focused on teaching systems 

and processes, and training as a team.219 Additionally, they stressed the need for early 

planning to ensure sufficient theater-specific training. As of this report’s writing, the 1st 

SFAB is preparing for an October 2019 deployment but has not been told where they will 

be going.220

Several advisor team members also suggested that SFABs should not 

be touted as an all-volunteer force, as many of them were strongly 

encouraged—“voluntold”—or were simply ordered to join the 1st SFAB.

Personnel also stated that resource availability varied. While some reported they 

had adequate support (one battalion commander remarked that “people bent over 

backward to get the [SFAB] assets”) several teams reported that resources were not 

readily available and that there was no clear guidance on how to acquire them.221 Some 

reported that acquiring support and resources required reaching out to as many people 

as possible and often came down to personal relationships established with other units. 

As one advisor put it, getting resources involved “calling through the TAAC – South 

phonebook.”222 Further, limited assets meant that there were few empty seats open on 

vehicles or helicopters, which resulted in some teams being able to send only two or 

three advisors to visit their counterparts. Depending on location, advisor teams met with 

their counterparts once a week or once a month; consistent communication had to be 

done via phone calls.223

Some teams identified limited assets and a risk-averse leadership as factors limiting 

the amount of advising they could do. Drive-to-advise and fly-to-advise missions often 

required a lengthy approval process. According to one team leader, driving five minutes 

to advise their Afghan counterparts required too much supervision and a considerable 

amount of paperwork.224

Personnel also identified the need for a more effective chain of command. SFABs 

reported to the military operations command (DCOS-Ops) which was focused on 

battlefield requirements, rather than the train, advise, and assist command (Deputy 

Chief of Staff for Security Assistance or DCOS-SA/CSTC-A), which better understood the 

advising mission. DCOS-Ops and the TAACs could organize advisor teams as they saw 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 31

fit, but this resulted in some advisors being tasked with filling staff billets, conducting 

tactical operations, or other duties outside of an advisor’s expected responsibilities.225

In TAAC – South, for example, a battalion was tasked with running an airfield, and in 

TAAC – West, another battalion was tasked with helping the Italians coordinate air 

attacks.226 Other challenges included the lack of standardized assessment tools to assess 

their Afghan counterparts and mid-deployment changes, such as some advisor teams 

switching from advising the ANA to advising the ANP.227

2nd SFAB Reflects on Their Predeployment Training

Following the 1st SFAB’s after-action review, SIGAR attended the 2nd SFAB’s afteraction review at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which focused on predeployment training. 

Several challenges were identified. For example, less than one month prior to their 

deployment, 2nd SFAB personnel learned that their missions had changed.228 Specifically, 

advisor teams will only be advising at the corps and brigade level and not at the kandak 

level.229 This means that some Afghan units that benefited from a renewed U.S. advisor 

presence under the 1st SFAB will no longer have access to U.S. advisors. In addition, 

the 2nd SFAB continued to receive new personnel just two months prior to their 

deployment.230 This limits the amount of training possible and hampers team cohesion. 

2nd SFAB personnel also noted the need for more advisor-specific and Afghanistanspecific training.231 As in the 1st SFAB’s review, 2nd SFAB personnel raised concerns 

about the criteria used to select advisors. Specifically, 2nd SFAB personnel expressed 

concern with the overemphasis on physical fitness rather than a candidate’s ability to 

advise.232 In addition, like the 1st SFAB, the 2nd SFAB does not have a standardized tool 

to assess their Afghan counterparts.233

AIR ADVISING 

In June 2004, the Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan (OMC-A) determined 

that Afghanistan required an air corps capable of providing more than a presidential lift 

capability. Specifically, OMC-A concluded that while providing airlift to the president 

of Afghanistan would serve as the primary effort, the nascent Afghan Air Force (AAF) 

should be expanded to provide a troop airlift capability. Thereafter, developing Afghan 

air power gained more attention and momentum. In 2005, the Afghan National Army 

Air Corps (ANAAC) was reconstituted and, in 2006, U.S., coalition, and Afghan leaders 

agreed to develop a 7,000-member air corps, more than double the number envisioned 

in 2005.234 By 2009, DOD reported that ANAAC training was building Afghan capability 

for “missions ranging from [medical evacuation] to battlefield mobility and presidential 

airlift.”235 In June 2010, Hamid Karzai, then the president of Afghanistan, announced that 

the ANAAC would be called the Afghan Air Force. Karzai also introduced a new longterm strategy for the development of Afghan air power. Specifically, U.S. and coalition 

partners agreed to support the creation of a COIN-capable air force that by 2016 would 

be capable of airlift, rotary and fixed wing close air support, medical evacuation, 

reconnaissance, and presidential transport.236
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. Air Force’s Early Advisor Training Programs Were Ad Hoc 

In September 2006, as the U.S. Air Force was preparing to take over air advising 

responsibilities in Afghanistan, the U.S. Air Force Central Command teamed with 

6th Special Operations Squadron to lead the first formal air advisor training course, 

which produced over 120 general purpose forces advisors. Although an effective course, 

it was described as “ad hoc and not designed for an enduring demand.”237 In March 2007, 

therefore, the U.S. Air Force identified a need for a sustainable training program capable 

of producing 600 air advisors for both Iraq and Afghanistan.238

In March 2007, the headquarters of the U.S. Air Force designated Air Education and 

Training Command (AETC) as the lead command to provide predeployment training 

education for air advisors.239 Training classes were first held at Camp Bullis and at 

Lackland Air Force Base in Texas until February 2008, when the AETC moved the course 

to Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst in New Jersey.240 Air advisors attending this course 

received nine days of advanced combat skills training, 12 days of advisor training, and 

two days of area-specific instruction at the Expeditionary Center, for a total of 23 days 

of training and 230 hours of instruction. The maximum class size was 72 students, but 

the largest class was only 59 students.241

U.S. Air Force Establishes the Air Advisor Academy

On April 19, 2010, General Norton Schwartz, then the U.S. Air Force’s chief of staff, 

ordered AETC to establish a permanent Air Advisor Academy (AAA) for general purpose 

forces, which formally opened in May 2012 at Joint Base McGuire-Dix-Lakehurst.242

The course for air advisors deploying to Afghanistan was known as the Air Advisor 

Basic Course – Afghanistan (AABC-A). The school provided training in three areas: 

air-advising core skills; language, region, and cultural training; and advanced forceprotection skills.243 According to U.S. Air Force officials interviewed by GAO, the Air 

Advisor Academy provided training to advisors deploying to Afghanistan, mobility 

support advisory squadrons, and mobile training teams. By 2014, the academy had 

trained more than 4,300 students and had the capacity to train up to 1,500 students per 

year, producing 1,227 graduates in 2013.244

AAA Training Program for Afghanistan Insufficient

A 2013 report conducted by the Air Force Central Command Air Advisor and Training 

Division found that the Air Advisor Academy did not advise on appropriate teaching 

techniques, and that Afghan cultural training was “too focused on village type environments 

and [did] not necessarily represent the culture air advisors face in the field.” Although 

advisors received language training, some were trained in the wrong language (for example, 

some advisors were trained in Dari but were deployed to a Pashto-speaking area). The 

report also noted that advisors needed more training in AAF structure and processes.245

Another criticism was that the academy did not prepare air advisors to work in an 

environment that included working alongside coalition partners, other military services, 

and U.S. and foreign national contractors.246 Air advisors said they felt unprepared to 

handle issues such as contractual restrictions and the national caveats of coalition 
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partners.247 To further complicate the situation, non-U.S. Air Force air advisors from 

these other participating groups did not attend an equivalent formal air advisor school, 

yet they operated in the same capacity as U.S. air advisors.248 Although the 2013 report 

noted that personnel from other military services and contract personnel could attend 

the Air Advisor Academy, this was not a requirement and few personnel attended.249 As a 

result, predeployment training was not standardized across air advisors in Afghanistan. 

The report recommended that the U.S. Air Force reach out to NATO advisor training 

in Poland and advisor training in Canada to ensure that all members of the 438th Air 

Expeditionary Wing (AEW), the U.S. Air Force’s air advisor organization in Afghanistan, 

received compatible training.250

At least some of the Air Advisor Academy’s shortcomings could be attributed to the 

fact that there was no instructor cadre with air advising experience within the U.S. Air 

Force. Although there was an opportunity for those who graduated to return as guest 

instructors, doing so placed a strain on home units that had already gone without those 

personnel for up to 15 months.251

Training Responsibilities Shift to U.S. Air Force Expeditionary Center

In September 2015, the Air Advisor Academy closed and training responsibilities were 

shifted to the Air Force Expeditionary Center, also located at Joint Base McGuire-DixLakehurst. The primary advising course that airmen complete at the Expeditionary 

Operations School before going to Afghanistan is known as “Advisor C Course.” 

According to the DOD OIG, this course “includes instruction and training on air advisor 

core knowledge skills, region-specific languages (Dari or Pashto), and other tactical 

skills, such as weapons training.” The attendees also receive briefings about current 

ground, air, and counterinsurgency operations, as well as courses on Afghan culture, 

religion, government, and legal system.252

An AAF pilot and U.S. Air Force advisor fly an advisory mission near Kabul. 

(U.S. Air Force photo by Jason Robertson) 
34 | FIELD ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Advisor C Course Critiques

Air advisors reported that the course prepared them to encounter Afghan culture, but 

did not provide training in AAF organization and the procedures needed to effectively 

advise their counterparts—for example, how to use a basic form for AAF logistics 

requests. Nor did they learn about the relationship between the AAF and the ANA 

and the associated consequences regarding staffing and command and control. Both 

critiques had been offered by graduates of the previous Air Advisor Academy. As a 

result, graduates of the Advisor C Course felt that they were not as effective at advising 

their counterparts until they had gone through on-the-job training, which delayed the 

development of a productive relationship with their counterparts.253

The Expeditionary Operations School collects feedback through post-course critiques 

and in-country interviews every 18 months, which in theory should enable it to identify 

training gaps.254 However, additions to the curriculum do not always specifically address 

those concerns. In response to the DOD OIG’s findings, the NATO Air Command – 

Afghanistan (NAC-A) and the U.S. Air Force’s AETC agreed to change predeployment 

training curriculum and provide incoming advisors with Afghan-specific information. 

Additionally, AETC agreed to update the curriculum for the air advisor course and collect 

observations, lessons learned, and best practices from air advisors in Afghanistan.255

U.S. Air Force Assumes Control of Advisory Mission and Creates 

Command Structure to Coordinate Efforts 

As the U.S. Air Force assumed responsibility for developing Afghan air capabilities 

in 2007, the U.S. Air Force created the Combined Air Power Transition Force, the 

initial air training entity responsible for advising Afghan pilots.256 In 2008, U.S. Central 

An Afghan A-29 pilot begins preflight preparation of his aircraft at Kandahar Airfield. 

(U.S. Air Force photo by Alexander W. Riedel) 
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Command activated the 438th Air Expeditionary Wing (AEW) as the U.S. Air Force 

advisor organization in Afghanistan. The commander of the 438th AEW would also 

serve as the commander of the NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan (NATC-A), 

the organization responsible for all key aspects of the mission: training, advising, and 

equipping the Afghan Air Force.257 NATC-A reported to the NATO Air Command – 

Afghanistan (NAC-A) which was led by a U.S. Air Force general officer. In 2015, as 

the NATO mission changed from ISAF to Resolute Support, NATC-A was renamed 

Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air (TAAC-Air) to better streamline the advisory 

effort and to ensure air advising efforts were included in planning and synchronization 

activities conducted by the regional commands.258

Air Force Lead Creates Opportunities and Challenges

As discussed above, in 2007, the U.S. Air Force was designated as the lead for 

developing what was then the ANAAC, under the Combined Air Power Transition 

Force. A year later, the U.S. Air Force stood up the 438th AEW as the unit responsible 

for this mission. The institutionalization of an Air Force-specific element presented 

both advantages and challenges. The leadership of the 438th AEW felt that the primary 

advantage was in recruiting U.S. Air Force advisor personnel: As a U.S. Air Force 

command, the unit had access to service candidate lists and other tools for recruiting 

desirable personnel. Another advantage was having a familiar structure to assimilate 

and organize new staff.259 Other senior officers, however, thought this traditional staff 

organization caused confusion when the 438th AEW worked with the combined and 

joint staff structure of NTM-A/CSTC-A.260 A 2018 DOD OIG report found that TAACAir’s plan for developing the AAF did not align with NAC-A’s guidance and was not 

synchronized with Resolute Support campaign-level plans.261

Nor did having a U.S. Air Force unit designated as the lead for air advising in 

Afghanistan alleviate the friction of operating in a joint environment. By 2012, the U.S. 

Air Force had provided most of the U.S. military advisors in the NATC-A. While the 

U.S. Navy and U.S. Army did contribute personnel, both services restricted the use 

of their personnel with service-specific caveats. For example, U.S. Navy personnel 

were restricted to staff or aviation-related ground operations positions. The U.S. 

Army adopted a different airworthiness standard for the Mi-17 aircraft than those 

established by the 438th AEW commander and the AAF, which meant that U.S. Army 

aviators were unable to fly on the Mi-17 and could not serve as advisors to Afghan 

aviator counterparts. The U.S. Army could offer waivers with approval from the deputy 

commanding general of CSTC-A, but only on an individual, per-mission basis.262 This 

issue created significant shortfalls for the training of the AAF and put a strain on the 

Air Force to produce more air advisors to minimize the deficit. In 2012, for example, the 

DOD OIG reported that there was a need for additional advisor personnel, especially 

those from the U.S. Army, for the Mi-17 rotary air training mission.263
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, this study of U.S. field advising efforts in Afghanistan finds: 

1. No military service was assigned responsibility or ownership for developing ANDSF 

combat capabilities. Instead, DOD looked to the various services to fill staffing 

requirements for training and advising teams. The design for training teams and 

predeployment training for advisors varied across the military services. 

2. While DOD has sought to address field advising challenges with new advisor team 

models designed to mitigate command-and-control issues between combat-focused 

military elements and advisory teams, the U.S. military has struggled with setting 

priorities for the mission, resource allocation, and enabler support. 

3. Despite efforts to improve advisor selection and predeployment training, advisor 

units face many of the same challenges previous advisor teams faced: delayed team 

formations, being assigned non-advisor tasks, and mid-deployment assignment 

changes. Advisor roles continue to be seen as not career enhancing, which 

contributes to high attrition rates and limited continuity. 

4. Due to rank and specialty requirements, the U.S. military has struggled to staff field 

advisor teams. The current supply of field-grade officers, senior noncommissioned 

officers, and certain military occupational specialties cannot always meet demands. 

5. Predeployment training did not adequately expose advisors to Afghan military 

systems, weapons, doctrine, and history. Nor does it adequately expose advisors to 

other U.S. advisory efforts that directly impact their mission. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. The U.S. military should create a clear career path for combat advisors and

continue to provide incentives to improve recruitment. Part of this career 

path should include postdeployment assignments at SSA commands and U.S. 

military training centers. 

Establishing a career path for combat advisors within the U.S. military will allow 

the military services to retain expertise and experience. The military services 

should station former advisors at training centers (such as the Military Advisor 

Training Academy, Twentynine Palms, or the Joint Readiness Training Center) so 

they can provide relevant expertise to teams preparing to deploy. Additionally, 

assigning former advisors to roles at SSA commands such as the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Security Force Assistance Command, or the U.S. 

Marine Corps Security Cooperation Group will allow advisors to share recent firsthand experiences with those responsible for overseeing the mission. To improve 

retention, SFAC should consider phasing in incentives to SFAB personnel over time 

to counter yearly attrition. The U.S. Army should also consider creating a primary 

military occupational specialty for combat advisors. 
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2. Congress should consider directing the military services to conduct an

internal human capacity assessment of combat advisor requirements around 

the globe. This assessment should also consider U.S. military force readiness 

requirements to maintain combat capabilities, a top priority of the U.S. 

National Security Strategy. The assessment should pay specific attention to 

those positions in high demand, such as military officers with a specialty in 

intelligence, medical, and logistics. 

For 17 years, the U.S. military has struggled to meet minimum staffing requirements 

for advisor teams. With renewed attention on adversaries such as China, Russia, 

and Iran, and continued high demands for advisory teams to build partner 

capabilities in fragile states such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and several African 

countries, the services would benefit from a capacity analysis to efficiently allocate 

resources according to national security interests. This will allow Congress to 

properly allocate resources through the annual National Defense Authorization Act 

and defense budget. 

3. In addition to training and building the SFABs, SFAC should also certify 

outgoing teams to ensure they are properly staffed, trained, and equipped; 

institutionalize a formal feedback mechanism to collect the SFABs’ 

observations and formulate lessons learned; and create an assessment tool 

that SFAC can use to evaluate the effectiveness of SFAB units. 

To do this effectively, SFAC needs to be properly staffed to meet mission demands. 

As the command element, SFAC should validate that all SFAB personnel are 

assigned to advisor teams with enough time to receive predeployment training 

and that they have appropriate expertise and teaching abilities. SFAC should 

be empowered to remove candidates from the program who do not meet SFAB 

standards. SFAC should also create a tool that will allow the U.S. Army to assess, 

monitor, and evaluate SFAB performance during predeployment training and 

during deployment. 

4. The military services should comply with DOD policies to track advisor

experience, training, and deployments.

DOD Instruction 5000.68 requires the military services and elements of DOD to 

track the security cooperation activities of personnel, but a 2018 SIGAR audit found 

that the services lacked any consistent and functional means of doing so. In order 

to effectively use advisors’ background for future needs or to staff training entities, 

DOD must be able to identify those with advisor expertise. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

5. The Joint Readiness Training Center should institutionalize TheaterSpecific Advisor Training for all advisors and should address country-specific 

command-and-control relationships, procedures, and military culture. All 

advisors should complete TSAT in order to properly advise their Afghan 

counterparts in the processes and systems the Afghans employ.

Advisors often received predeployment training that was not focused on the 

specific mission, organization, and equipment of their Afghan counterparts. TSAT, 

tailored to ANDSF forces and incorporating feedback and best practices from 

previous deployments, will better prepare advisor for their missions compared to 

past efforts. Training programs such as TSAT should use existing training curricula, 

such as the Ministry of Defense Advisors program’s Advisor Fundamentals Training. 

6. Resolute Support should create an independent assessment, monitoring,

and evaluation division and create mobile assessment teams responsible for 

tracking ANDSF capabilities. The mobile teams should track the frequency in 

which tactical and operational training and advisory teams visit and engage 

with ANDSF units, as well as the core tasks advisors perform. 

Resolute Support and the U.S. military lack an assessment, monitoring, and 

evaluation tool to measure the effectiveness of U.S. advising at the tactical and 

operational level. As the United States has elevated its advising mission from the 

battalion to the corps level, U.S. advisory teams’ engagement with ANDSF units 

have become sporadic and inconsistent. This assessment tool must be able to 

measure the frequency of U.S. advisors’ engagements and record actions taken 

during “fly-to-advise” or “drive-to-advise” missions. 

7. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should create a Joint Security Force 

Assistance Command to monitor advisor requirements among the different 

military services and provide a level of standardization in unit organization 

and predeployment training. 

Since multiple military services deploy advisors at the operational and tactical 

level, the Joint Staff should create an organization that can evaluate the 

effectiveness of all military advisor activities. This organization can recommend 

ways to improve standardization among training centers and identify areas in which 

advisor teams from different services may overlap in mission and requirements. 
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AIR-TO-GROUND SYNCHRONIZATION 

CHALLENGES

Various U.S. advisors have supported the development of Afghan ground and air capabilities. U.S. Air Force 

personnel (along with small numbers of U.S. Army and U.S. Navy aviation personnel) have predominately 

focused on advising the AAF, while U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps advisors predominately supported ANA 

ground operations.264 While dividing these responsibilities was consistent with the services’ core functions, it 

resulted in uncoordinated advisory missions. It also failed to fit the organization of the Afghan military, since 

both the AAF and the ANA report to a unified command under the Chief of the General Staff.265 The resulting 

command-and-coordination gap between air and ground advisors resulted at times in U.S. ground and air 

advisors working at cross purposes.

On the Afghan side, ANA commanders lacked visibility of—or did not consider—AAF limitations or needs 

when calling for air support. ANA commanders could direct the use of air assets without taking into 

consideration AAF maintenance requirements, policy restrictions, or the availability of replacement assets. 

Some ANA leaders also used Special Mission Wing air assets for purposes other than their intended 

purpose of supporting Afghan Special Security Forces. Misuse of AAF assets has also been a problem. Some 

ANA misuse of air assets arose from senior leaders bypassing normal command-and-control channels or 

from giving misleading or insufficient information to correctly plan and source air missions. Sometimes 

misuse became actual abuse, such as deliberately mischaracterizing the nature of a mission in order to 

assign it a higher priority.266

In addition to diverting aircraft from their designated roles, excessive tasking of assets disrupted the normal 

maintenance cycle for Afghan aircraft, which resulted in potential safety issues and created a backlog for 

major maintenance. Depot-level maintenance must be performed outside of Afghanistan and can take up 

to 12 months, which puts greater demands on remaining operational aircraft. Eventually, this reduces the 

long-term service life of the Afghan aircraft inventory.267 In order to reduce misuse and encourage adherence 

to required maintenance cycles, CSTC-A began levying fines in August 2018, eventually reaching $150,000 

per flight hour for misuse of Mi-17 helicopters. These fines had some short-term effectiveness.268

At least some field advisors were aware of these issues, but disregarded them to accomplish short-term 

tactical and operational goals. Some advisors felt that, due to insufficient resources, ANA corps commanders 

had no choice but to violate policy. These attitudes represent not only conflicting mission priorities, but 

cultural differences among the U.S. services when it came to advising their Afghan counterparts.269

ANA forces at the corps, brigade, and battalion level are currently advised by SFABs and U.S. Marine 

units, which fall under regional Train, Advise, and Assist Commands and task forces. AAF advisors 

fall under Train, Advise, and Assist Command – Air, located in Kabul. There is no established way of 

resolving conflicts between the regional TAACs and TAAC-Air; coordination occurs informally through ad 

hoc channels, or through the military operations chain of command.270

In 2017, the number of AAF combat operations surpassed coalition combat air support operations—a notable 

improvement from 2015, when AAF headquarters was incapable of planning independent AAF offensive 

operations.271 The Director of Operations for Resolute Support noted that by early 2017, the AAF had assumed 

some aerial resupply duties previously provided by U.S. forces.272 As the AAF becomes more capable and flies 

more missions, ensuring proper coordination between AAF and ANA advisors is more important than ever. 

JUNE 2019 | 41

Resolute Support photo

CHAPTER 3

MINISTERIAL ADVISING

Building institutional capacity and governing capabilities in a partner nation’s  security ministries is critical to developing an independent and self-sustaining 

national defense and security force. Without effective governing institutions, a partner 

nation’s fighting force will be unable to contribute to the security and prosperity of the 

state and will remain dependent on U.S. support, as is the case in Afghanistan today. 

This chapter analyzes the U.S. approach to developing key governance and oversight 

functions at the Afghan Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior and examines the 

selection and predeployment training of advisors. 

Overall, SIGAR found that the ministerial advising effort in Afghanistan suffered 

from a lack of ownership. This resulted in the deployment of individual advisors from 

multiple DOD agencies and military services, each with varying levels of experience 

and training, all of whom were ultimately assigned to a temporary command structure. 

The U.S. approach to developing institutional capacity within the ministries was often 

not based on an expert-designed plan centered on an initial assessment of Afghanistan’s 

long-term needs. Instead, plans routinely changed in reaction to immediate tasks and 

requirements. In-country, interagency coordination was ad hoc and responsibility 

for ministerial advising and field advising was divided between different chains 

of command. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ROLE OF A MINISTERIAL-LEVEL ADVISOR

As a tool to advance U.S. interests, defense institution capacity building targets institutions 

responsible for the oversight, management, and governance of a partner nation’s defense 

sector. Unlike field advisors, who develop a partner’s warfighting capabilities, ministerial 

advisors focus on core functions required to govern the security forces: management of 

ideas (strategy, policy, and planning), money (resource management), people (human 

resource management), and things (logistics) (See Figure 6.). 

Deploying advisors with the required expertise at the ministerial level is often 

challenging, due to the diversity of functions within the ministries. Some areas of 

ministerial advising call for subject-matter expertise typically found in the civilian 

sector; however, in Afghanistan, an over-reliance on military personnel meant some 

advisors lacked necessary expertise.273

MINISTERIAL ADVISING: EXAMPLES OF CORE FUNCTIONS REQUIRED TO GOVERN SECURITY FORCES

Strategy, Policy, and Planning

Developing and overseeing security plans requires identifying defense objectives, providing policies to manage human and material 

resources, directing when and how to employ military forces, and aligning available ways and means to desired end states. Proper 

definition and articulation of missions and objectives are necessary to effectively drive the employment of available resources and 

are central to all other ministerial functions.

Resource 

Management 

and Budgeting

is the ability to plan, 

allocate, execute, and 

account for financial 

resources, including 

budgeting and analysis 

of short- and long-term 

budgetary requirements, 

alignment of resources 

with strategic priorities, 

management of 

programs, and auditing 

of expenditures.

Human Resource 

Management

is the ability to recruit, 

develop, and assign 

the civilian and military 

workforce in support of 

defense objectives. Human 

resource management 

determines requirements, 

then manages and 

develops people to meet 

those requirements. It 

also bridges ministerial 

functions and general staff 

leadership through the 

force management process.

Acquisition 

and Logistics

is the management 

framework needed to 

acquire and maintain 

defense capabilities, and 

to plan for delivery of 

forces and material. It 

requires performance of 

cost analysis and life-cycle 

support planning, and the 

development of policies 

for management and 

accountability of logistics 

systems and supply chains.

Rule of Law

is the capacity to ensure 

the defense sector is 

accountable to national 

civilian authorities, 

adheres to domestic 

and international law, is 

subject to a clearly defined 

chain of command, and is 

governed by a consistent 

system of justice.

Source: Thomas Ross Jr., “Defining the Discipline in Theory and Practice,” in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017), pp. 36–40, 84; RAND Corporation, What Works Best When Building Partner Capacity and Under What Circumstances?, 2013, 

p. 91; James Greene, “Personnel Policies,” in Building Integrity and Reducing Corruption in Defense: A Compendium of Best Practices, ed. Togar Tadarev (Geneva, Switzerland: Geneva Centre for the 

Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2010), p. 43.

FIGURE 6
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Early in the conflict, it was common for advisors to prioritize immediate combatrelated requirements over the long-term development of ministerial capabilities.274 This 

approach underestimated the importance of ministerial capabilities in ensuring the longterm effectiveness of combat operations. Without fully functional ministries, operational 

forces will be unable to absorb and benefit from lower-level advising, and will fail to 

effectively move supplies, pay salaries, and provide medical care.275 For example, U.S. 

field advisors found that ANDSF units frequently had insufficient ammunition and 

supplies for operations. Only when ministerial advisors urged the MOD to develop 

an effective supply management system for resources could field advisors help their 

partners with such logistical problems.276 Additionally, Afghan ministries often lacked 

human resource management policies to ensure that personnel with specialized training 

were placed in roles that capitalized on their training. In December 2016, DOD reported 

that qualified personnel were routinely diverted to support immediate operational 

needs outside of their specialties.277 One former executive director of sustainment 

wrote in 2016 that “in many corps, maintainers are not serving as mechanics in their 

positions. Rather, they are consistently assigned to other duties and spend little time 

actually performing maintenance functions.”278 Poor human resource management at the 

ministerial level meant that U.S. efforts to train Afghan personnel were often wasted.

Building Institutional Capabilities Requires Continued 

Evaluation of Ministerial Needs

Oftentimes, U.S. advisors viewed the training and advising mission as a list of tasks that 

needed to be completed, rather than a list of tasks that required continuous review and 

adjustments along the way. U.S. advisors also tended to focus on developing individuals 

rather than developing institutionalized capabilities, an effort that involves advising 

multiple individuals at the same time.279 Based on this approach, Afghan proficiency 

with certain capabilities often depended on how long individuals had been in their 

jobs. When they moved on, the training and advising process had to start over with 

their replacement. 

During SIGAR’s visit to CSTC-A in January 2019, CSTC-A told SIGAR that they were 

updating an internal spreadsheet used to track tasks assigned to advisors at the 

ministerial level. Many of the thousands of tasks listed were marked as “complete” 

but, due to Afghan personnel rotation or lack of supervision, many were found to 

be incomplete and required further U.S. advisory support.280 Rather than a linear, 

hierarchical sequence of steps in which the goal is to complete the next task, a 

successful approach to defense institution building (DIB) calls for managing the status 

of multiple tasks simultaneously to monitor progress and setbacks.281

Training includes efforts that 

improve partner capabilities 

and enable foreign forces to 

accomplish functional tasks, 

roles, and missions. It also 

includes teaching partners 

operational planning 

methods; combat tactics, 

techniques, and procedures; 

and sustainment methods.

Advising includes 

counseling partner 

commanders on the 

effective employment 

of forces in specific 

operational situations or 

in the context of specific 

problems.

Source: U.S. Air Force, Curtis E. LeMay 

Center for Doctrine Development and 

Education, Annex 3-22: Foreign Internal 

Defense, July 10, 2015.

Defense institution 

building refers to security 

cooperation activities that 

empower partner nation 

defense institutions to 

establish or reorient their 

policies and structures 

to make their defense 

sector more transparent, 

accountable, effective, 

affordable, and responsive 

to civilian control. 

DIB improves defense 

governance and increases 

the sustainability of other 

DOD security cooperation 

programs.

Source: DOD, “Directive 5205.82—

Defense Institution Building,” January 

27, 2016, p. 13.
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EVOLUTION OF THE STRUCTURE OF 

MINISTERIAL ADVISING

The command structure for advisors assigned at the ministerial level has undergone several changes over 

the past 17 years. In 2002, the United States focused on quickly building combat forces, which led to the 

creation of the Office of the Military Cooperation – Afghanistan to oversee the development of the Afghan 

MOD and ANA.282 However, OMC-A lacked the resources needed to grow Afghan ministerial capabilities in 

order to support and sustain the newly formed Afghan forces.283 In response, the United States deployed 

ad hoc teams of civilian, military, and contractor personnel to help the Afghan security ministries develop 

capabilities required to sustain operations.284 Contractors helped reform and mentor the MOD and Army 

General Staff by writing doctrine and teaching how to plan and synchronize operations.285

When the task of developing the MOI and Afghan National Police was moved from State to DOD in 2005, 

OMC-A was renamed the Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan (OSC-A) and was assigned to “develop, 

plan, program, and direct all aspects of security assistance in order to deliver [an ANDSF] capable of 

supporting the development of a stable Afghanistan.” To improve command and control over ministerial-level 

ANA and ANP development, OSC-A created two lead organizations: the Defense Reform Directorate and Police 

Reform Directorate.286 The Defense Reform Directorate was responsible for human resources, operations 

and training, resources, strategic reform, engineering, communications, and aviation divisions.287 The Police 

Reform Directorate had divisions responsible for ministry reform, police operations, plans and integration, and 

resources.288 Each directorate reported to the OSC-A commander.289

By 2006, the concept of building capacity through security sector assistance was gaining traction at the 

highest levels in the U.S. government. DOD’s Quadrennial Defense Review, for example, mentioned U.S. 

efforts that enabled partner nations’ ministerial capabilities.290 In Afghanistan, as a result of the growing 

focus on institutional development within the Afghan MOD and MOI, OSC-A was renamed the Combined 

Security Transition Command – Afghanistan and was assigned to CENTCOM.291 CSTC-A was given the 

responsibility of helping the ANDSF establish its own acquisition and personnel systems, recruit and 

train soldiers and policemen, organize the MOD and MOI to mentor senior leaders and the General Staff, 

and acquire weapons, uniforms, and equipment to develop the security forces.292 Under the first CSTC-A 

commanding general, there were two deputy commanding generals (DCG): One would focus on politicalmilitary initiatives within CSTC-A and on developing the ANP, while the other would focus on security 

assistance and developing the ANA.293 Both would report to the CSTC-A commander.294

According to security sector reform experts Querine Hanlon and Robert Perito, “Deteriorating security 

conditions in Afghanistan, coupled with the growing awareness that U.S. security assistance had failed to 

produce a viable Afghan army or police force, prompted a renewed focus on defense institution building.”295

In an attempt to align the U.S. and NATO efforts to build institutional capacity within the Afghan ministries, 

the United States worked with NATO to establish the NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan. The April 2009 

NATO summit supported the establishment of NTM-A and embraced its pursuit of a “capable and selfsustaining ANDSF, comprised of senior-level mentoring for the ANA and an expanded role in developing 

professional ANP.” 296 According to Jack Kem, former deputy to the commander of NTM-A, “the establishment 

of a separate three-star headquarters in Afghanistan as the training command was a vital step to creating 

the organizational structure to enable the eventual transition of full control to the Afghan government.”297
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NTM-A/CSTC-A provided a greater focus on ministerial needs.298 Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, the first U.S. 

dual-hatted commander of NTM-A/CSTC-A, created two deputy commanders—one for the ANA and one for 

the ANP—under CSTC-A’s mandate. The Deputy Commanders (DCOM) were responsible for ministerial-level 

development and had command over all advisors working at the MOD and MOI; however, they did not have 

command and control over tactical and operational advisory efforts. According to NTM-A/CSTC-A’s 180 Day 

Internal Review and Way Forward, ministerial development showed slow but steady incremental progress. Yet 

neither the MOD nor the MOI were expected to be fully capable before 2012.299

Under Lt. Gen. Caldwell’s guidance, NTM-A and the DCOMs developed Ministerial Development 

Plans (MDP) that were focused on five priority areas (known as lines of operation): human resource 

management, support to operations, national logistics, executive leadership and defense policy, and 

resource management.300 These MDPs outlined tasks for each type of advisor carrying out a specific 

function and included expected measures of performance and effectiveness.301 At the peak of the NTM-A 

mission, there were over 500 advisors assisting the MOD and MOI.302 The deployment of a large number 

of advisors allowed the United States to target certain essential functions in the MDPs (such as logistics, 

medical, and acquisition). 

In 2015, as the United States and NATO transitioned from ISAF to Resolute Support, the mission prioritized 

SSA as the main line of effort.303 The advisory effort at the MOD and MOI was reorganized from four 

pillars (sustainment and resource management; human resource management; strategy and policy; and 

transparency, accountability, and oversight) to eight essential functions.304 These were synced with the core 

functions of defense institution building and aligned advisors with specific capabilities required at the 

ministerial level: policy, budgeting, and human resource management.305 Since these functions are required 

at both the MOD and MOI, a general officer or a member of the DOD Senior Executive Service served as 

the lead for each of the eight essential functions.306 Advisors were then aligned to a function and would, at 

times, advise at both the MOD and MOI.307 These advisors would report up their essential function chain 

of command to the function lead, who would report to the CSTC-A commander.308 While this model was an 

improvement, there was no enduring, expert-designed plan complete with specific performance indicators, 

logic frameworks, and other key assessment, monitoring, and evaluation elements.309

In 2018, newly appointed CSTC-A commander General James Rainey recognized that a strict alignment 

of advisors to essential functions hindered prioritization and synchronization of efforts within each 

ministry.310 CSTC-A reorganized the advisory effort and re-established proponent leads for the defense 

and interior, now called Ministry Advisor Group – Defense (MAG-D) and Ministry Advisor Group – 

Interior (MAG-I).311 MAG-D and MAG-I are each led by a two-star level general officer, both of whom report 

directly to the three-star CSTC-A commander.312 CSTC-A also renamed essential functions as “functional 

areas” to continue focusing on functionally based security force assistance and aligning advisors to key 

ministerial functions that impact both the MOD and MOI collectively.313
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

DIVERSE MEANS FOR SELECTING AND TRAINING 

MINISTERIAL ADVISORS 

Oversight and governance of the armed forces is traditionally considered a civilian-led 

function in most democracies, but it took about a decade for the United States to begin 

using civilian government experts as advisors at the Afghan MOD and MOI.314Even then, 

as SIGAR noted in a July 2017 performance audit, only 12 percent of ministerial-level 

advisors in Afghanistan were DOD civilian experts.315 Today, the United States continues 

to rely on a range of U.S. military personnel, civilians, and contractors to advise at the 

ministerial level in Afghanistan.316

Uniformed Personnel Deploy in Key Leadership Roles without 

Tailored Advisor Training

For years, senior uniformed military advisors have been responsible for advising the 

senior ranks of the Afghan security ministries.317 Without proper training, uniformed 

military advisors have at times tried to create Afghan capabilities and capacity that are 

similar to those of the United States—a concept referred to as mirror imaging.318 Former 

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas Ross Jr., for instance, has noted stories 

about U.S. military advisors trying to develop a budgeting system for the Afghan MOD 

based on Pentagon budgeting systems. Ross remarked on the absurdity of this idea, 

describing it as “seeking to adapt an incredibly complex system designed to balance 

requirements of numerous components and agencies across over a half trillion dollars 

to meet the needs of a ministry that had a budget the size of an average big-city school 

district in the United States.”319

A 2010 study conducted by the Joint Center for International Security Force 

Assistance (JCISFA) also found that many military ministerial advisors were not fully 

Incoming Resolute Support advisors attend in-country advisor training held at Resolute Support 

headquarters in Kabul. (Photo by Kristine Volk)
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

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qualified for their positions.320 While some advisors were selected for their functional 

skills, others were selected based on the amount of time since their last deployment, 

based on a nomination from a commander, or because they volunteered.321 Many of 

these personnel arrived in Afghanistan with varying levels of training and experience, 

and there is evidence that many of them were insufficiently trained.322 One former 

advisor told the Center for Army Lessons Learned that advisors were chosen based on 

“timing, availability, the number of deployments, and based on how it will bolster the 

officer’s service record.”323 Despite a 2010 DOD instruction that required the U.S. military 

services to create a tracking system to identify individuals who have served in an SSA 

assignment or completed advisor training, the U.S. Army has yet to do so, making it 

difficult to match personnel with requirements.324

No Standardized or Institutionalized Training Available to Military Personnel

Many uniformed personnel were selected as individual augmentees and received no 

ministerial advisor-specific training prior to deployment.325 Advisors reported that the 

predeployment training they received focused largely on “combat survival skills, without 

sufficient emphasis on Afghan-centric mentoring and training skills specific to their 

assignments.”326 In-theater training for advisors at NTM-A and CSTC-A was limited to a 

single half-day advisor course.327 During one iteration of the course, only five of the 26 

newly arrived advisors had received previous training at an advisor training center.328 In 

the absence of a formal predeployment training program, some advisors were left to their 

own study efforts to prepare for their mission, which most described as inadequate.329

Resolute Support commander General John Nicholson noted in 2017 that most 

uniformed personnel assigned as ministerial advisors were still not receiving 

appropriate predeployment training, an observation echoed by Maj. Gen. Richard Kaiser, 

outgoing commanding general of CSTC-A, who noted that “the U.S. military has no 

proper training for advising at the ministerial level.”330 In response, Secretary of Defense 

James Mattis stopped all advisor deployments in mid-2017 until all uniformed personnel 

deploying to Afghanistan in advisory roles could be trained.331 In June 2017, CSTC-A 

provided a four-day Individual Key Leader Training at Resolute Support headquarters 

that covered security force assistance and guardian angel training for incoming advisors 

as well as a baseline understanding of the advisory mission in Afghanistan.332At the same 

time, Maj. Gen. Kaiser designed plans to create an academy in Afghanistan to provide an 

overview of basic advisor skills. The program was mandatory for all deployed uniformed 

personnel prior to any engagements with Afghans officials.333 Additionally, some military 

commanders requested that Ministry of Defense Advisors program instructors provide 

training for military officers.334

In 2018, the Joint Readiness Training Center in Fort Polk, Louisiana, created a Senior 

Leader Advisor Training (SLAT) pilot program designed to train senior military 

officers to serve as advisors at the MOD or MOI.335 The Senior Leader Advisor Training 

course was a collaborative effort that included the 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment; 

JCISFA; the Defense Security Cooperation Agency; United States Special Operations 

Command; NATO’s Joint Force Training Center; NATO’s Allied Joint Force Command; 

Individual augmentees are 

personnel assigned to fill 

shortages or are used when 

specialized experience 

is needed.
48 | MINISTERIAL ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

and the MODA program.336 Along with the SLAT program, CSTC-A continues to require 

uniformed personnel to attend the four-day Resolute Support Individual Key Leader 

Training at Resolute Support headquarters upon arrival in Kabul if the advisor did not 

receive advisor-specific training before deploying (See Table 1.).337

While these efforts demonstrate the U.S. military’s desire to improve and institutionalize 

advisor training, there were still ways to avoid training altogether. To meet mission 

requirements in Afghanistan or to rapidly fill advisor vacancies, the services’ 

predeployment training requirement has sometimes been waived.338 According an 

October 2018 SIGAR audit on ministerial advising at the MOD and MOI, training waivers 

were a primary reason for advisors to not attend training.339 The U.S. Army has been 

aware of this issue and is tightening scrutiny on the waiver process.340

The AFPAK Hands Program: Regional Expertise, but Not 

Advisor-Specific Training or Employment

In 2009, DOD created the Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands (AFPAK Hands) program 

to develop a cadre of experts specializing in the language, culture, processes, and 

challenges facing Afghanistan and Pakistan.341 The AFPAK Hands program is staffed 

with uniformed personnel who were either nominated or selected by their services or 

who volunteered, as well as civilian volunteers who are supported by their DOD home 

office.342 To create this cadre of regional experts, AFPAK Hands received extensive 

cultural and language training and were expected to serve at least two deployments 

in the region. (See Table 2.)343 The services were instructed to select officers whose 

records indicated a strong future command potential, or who were former commanders 

with senior leadership potential.344 Candidates were not required to possess knowledge 

of core security sector governance functions for nomination and selection into 

the program.345

AFPAK Hands program participants received significant language training, had the 

opportunity to earn a master’s degree, and were placed in key staff positions in places 

like the Pentagon, CENTCOM, or U.S. Special Operations Command during their tour 

in the United States.346 Yet many attendees regarded their assignment to the program 

as a hindrance to their career progression.347 Participants in the AFPAK Hands 

program deployed individually and, while some had experience in relevant areas such 

SENIOR LEADER ADVISOR TRAINING SCHEDULE 

Day One Inbrief, threat brief, MODA introduction, cross-cultural communication and rapport, insider threat training, language training

Day Two Senior advising fundamentals, influence and negotiation

Day Three Afghan history and culture, ANET, use of an interpreter

Day Four Weapons training and qualification

Day Five Role player engagement exercise

Day Six Language training, role player engagement exercise

Day Seven Language training, role player exercise

Source: 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment, “Senior Leader Advisor Training Course Schedule,” May 31, 2019.

TABLE 1
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as financial management, they were at times assigned to fill billets unrelated to their 

experience.348 The program also had problems with filling its own staffing requirements. 

One interviewee told SIGAR that there is some fatigue in the services with supporting 

the program, and that there are competing demands for advisors with the creation of the 

U.S. Army’s new Security Force Assistance Brigades.349

Assessments of the language training participants received during the AFPAK Hands 

program were mixed. One former AFPAK Hand told SIGAR that the advanced language 

training they received “was very practical and [was used] in order to gain insights from 

the interpreters that the coalition hired.”350 But this language training was not tailored 

to ministerial level advising and, according to former Hands, was better suited for the 

U.S. Army General Stanley McChrystal, then commander of ISAF, speaks with the first class of AFPAK 

Hands’ U.S. service members and civilians. (Photo by Matthew Chlosta)

TABLE 2

AFGHANISTAN-PAKISTAN HANDS PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

 Type of Training Description Duration

Predeployment combat skills Includes training and equipping for U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, and U.S. Marine 

Corps service members

3−4 weeks

COIN Seminar Includes lessons in stabilization, ethics and human rights, and training, 

developing, and advising local security forces

4 days

Culture and history seminar Includes lessons on history, culture, governance, and political dynamics of 

Afghanistan and Pakistan

3 days

Language training Includes language training in Dari, Pashto, or Urdu 16 weeks

Predeployment combat skills or 

weapons qualifications

U.S. Army to complete combat skills and other services to complete weapons 

qualification

1 week

Total 5 Months

Note: Language training also includes weekly operations, intelligence, command-and-control briefs as well as periodic COIN discussions. 

Source: Joint staff PACC, AGPAK Hands (APH) Program, no date, p. 5; Mark Lee, “The Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program,” February 11, 2014; Chairman 

of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCS Instruction 1630.01B-Afghanistan/Pakistan HANDS (APH) Program,” July 8, 2016, pp. E-1–E-2.
50 | MINISTERIAL ADVISING

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tactical level.351 Some former AFPAK Hands observed that, while they were trained in 

combat skills, there was no training in how to actually develop relationships and advise 

a counterpart. They further noted that the process used to screen AFPAK Hands did not 

select individuals with the right disposition needed to be an effective advisor.352

Contractors Used to Fill Staffing Gaps

In the early years of the United States’ involvement in Afghanistan, the U.S. government 

faced challenges deploying enough personnel with the required expertise to meet the 

growing mission requirements at the MOD and MOI. To respond to these emergent 

needs, State and DOD turned to contractors, since contractors are often able to quickly 

deliver critical support capabilities tailored to specific military needs (See Figure 7.).353

Contractors brought with them a vast and varied array of experiences, from linguistics 

to weapon systems maintenance.354 They are also able to deploy for multi-year 

assignments, which allowed them to provide historical knowledge and continuity and 

create long-term rapport with their Afghan advisees.355 According to a SIGAR interview 

with DynCorp officials, “Contractors tend to have the most experience among the varied 

types of advisors. Many of the contractors have spent five to 10 years in Afghanistan or 

advising. The turnover rate is less than 2 percent a month.”356 But according to one DOD 

official, such continuity does not necessarily translate into effectiveness. In the words 

of the official, “contractor efforts [can] provide continuity in implementing a poorly 

designed reform process.”357

As the United States began to draw down forces and transition to the Resolute Support 

Mission, contractors were used to staff key billets because they were not limited by 

“boots on the ground” restrictions that were applied to uniformed personnel.358 General 

John Nicholson, former commander of the Resolute Support Mission and U.S. Forces – 

A U.S. Air Force engineer and a member of the 1st AFPAK Hands cohort listens to counterinsurgency 

training at the COIN Academy at Camp Julien in Afghanistan. (Photo by Matthew Chlosta) 
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Afghanistan, testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that DOD had to 

substitute contractors for uniformed personnel in order to “meet force manning levels” 

and “to do functions that normally service members would do.”359

Contractors were not required to attend predeployment advisor training. Instead, they 

were vetted by the contracting firm, which determined if the candidate had the required 

technical skills and experience for the position.360 In July 2017, contractors accounted 

for 67 percent of ministerial advisors in Afghanistan (387 out of a total of 577), with 

110 in the MOI and 277 in the MOD.361 In its October 2018 audit on ministerial advising, 

SIGAR noted that performance metrics for contract advisors were nonexistent, although 

DOD has told SIGAR it had plans to modify performance work standards to incorporate 

some objective measures.362

CSTC-A told SIGAR that at the end of October 2018, they implemented a review process 

that included a discussion of performance metrics and future requirement plans.363 A 

senior CSTC-A officer initially reviewed the top 25 CSTC-A contracts that accounted for 

90 percent of the funding. During his review, he found that requirements in 2019 were 

sometimes different than they were when they were first awarded years ago. Many of the 

contracts awarded during those years were firm, fixed price contracts, which worked 

very well when requirements were stable. However, when requirements are changing 

continuously and significantly, as they are today, a firm, fixed price contract is not 

optimal. As a result, CSTC-A looked for opportunities to change contract types when 

appropriate. For example, CSTC-A mapped out requirements for one specific contract 

providing train, advise, and assist services, and determined it could cut the number 

of mentors by two-thirds. By emphasizing decisive and key tasks, CSTC-A focused its 

advising efforts and became more effective with its contractor staff.364

SFAAT

MOD MOI Total

29

44

84

37

30

62

66

74

146

Civilians

Uniformed Personnel

Contractors 26%

23%

51%

Source: CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, March 2019.

TOTAL DOD CONTRACTORS, DOD CIVILIANS, AND U.S. MILITARY ADVISING AT THE 

MOD AND MOI (AS OF MARCH 2019)

FIGURE 7
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DOD Develops a Civilian Capacity for Ministerial Advisors

In 2009, President Obama announced a military and civilian surge in Afghanistan 

aimed at reversing the Taliban’s momentum and building the capacity of the Afghan 

government. To develop governance capacity within the security ministries, DOD 

created formal structures to recruit, select, and deploy its civilian workforce.365 This 

led to the creation of the MODA program, which was designed to provide a worldwide 

network of trained civilian advisors specifically tailored to improve a country’s defense 

institutions.366 Additionally, the increased focus on defense institution building led to 

the creation of the Defense Institution Reform Initiative (DIRI) program, which was 

designed to “support the development of partner defense ministries through regular 

engagements with partner defense ministries that are aimed at identifying their 

capability gaps and then working to fill them.”367

Ministry of Defense Advisors Program: Civilian Experts with Multi-Year Tours

The MODA program was established as a pilot program by DOD in 2009.368 The concept 

for the MODA program was developed by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations in collaboration with the United States 

Institute of Peace’s (USIP) Academy for International Conflict Management.369 MODA 

advisors aim to forge long-term relationships with their counterparts and improve 

ministerial competencies in areas such as personnel and readiness, strategy and policy, 

and financial management.370 The FY 2012 NDAA authorized the MODA program and 

provided funding that would allow it to select and train civilians to deploy to partner 

nations outside of ongoing overseas contingency operations in order to support that 

nation’s institutional development.371 In October 2012, DSCA took over program 

management responsibilities for the MODA program.372

Defense Institution Reform Initiative

The DIRI program provides subject matter experts that work with a partner nation to address 

capabilities gaps in the development of policy and strategy, ministerial organization, force development, 

budgets, human resources, logistics, civil-military relationships, and interagency coordination.373

Subject matter experts provide support on a periodic but sustained basis.374 The DIRI program enables 

subject matter experts to identify and develop ways to address the capacity gaps of a partner nation 

and provide advisors with a key set of tasks required to develop an improved resource management 

capability over time. However, according to a SIGAR interviewee, the DIRI program is not suited for 

contingency operations because of changing conditions on the ground and frequent turnover.375

In 2011, DOD considered using DIRI’s subject matter experts in Afghanistan to “provide a holistic 

look at the [human resources management] line of operation that is currently threaded across 38 

individual Ministerial Development Plans and provide one master plan” for NTM-A. DIRI professionals 

questioned the viability of NTM-A’s MDP and whether the milestones identified could be completed in 

the timeframe provided.376 Despite these concerns, an alternative solution provided by DIRI experts was 

never implemented at NTM-A.377
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MODA advisors typically have 15 or more years of federal service experience.378 They 

usually come from organizations within DOD, and have expertise in fields like logistics, 

finance, personnel, communications, public works, public affairs, and intelligence.379

Deploying civilians with relevant experience proved to be an effective approach for 

ministerial development. In his 2010 testimony to Congress, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations James Schear stated that after the 

first group of MODA advisors had served in Afghanistan for a few months, NTM-A/CSTC-A 

commander Lt. Gen. Caldwell requested that military advisors be sent through the MODA 

training program as well.380 General David Petraeus, then commander of ISAF, requested 

that DOD recruit and deploy at least 100 more civilian advisors before the end of 2010.381

In 2017, Maj. Gen. Kaiser, then CSTC-A commander, called MODA’s personnel “some of the 

best advisors.”382

DOD Explores Ways to Find Civilian Advisors

In January 2009, DOD established the Civilian Expeditionary Workforce (CEW), a 

standing cadre of civilian volunteers that could be prepared to mobilize quickly as 

needed.383 CEW personnel were placed in a variety of roles in Afghanistan, including 

advising at the MOD and MOI.384 GAO found in 2011 that CEW was not fully developed 

and guidance had not been published that would enable DOD components to identify 

and designate positions for CEW volunteers.385 In January 2017, CEW was renamed DOD 

Expeditionary Civilians (DOD-EC), and the military services and DSCA were given the 

responsibility to fill required positions.386

DOD civilians assigned through DOD-EC can serve as MODA advisors for up to two 

years.387 MODA reimburses the office of the deployed advisor so that they can hire a 

A senior DOD civilian employee and MODA program trainee meets with an Afghan role player during a 

training exercise for the MODA program. (Photo by David Bruce)
54 | MINISTERIAL ADVISING

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temporary replacement during the advisor’s absence.388 Nevertheless, the deployment 

of senior personnel can leave a gap at their home agency; one senior MODA advisor 

assigned to CSTC-A’s Rule of Law Directorate was the general counsel for his home 

office, and he faced pressure to return to his permanent position.389 Advisors’ home 

offices do not always allow deployment extension: The MODA program manager 

estimated that approximately a third of extension requests are denied.390 DOD officials 

have told SIGAR this contradicts guidance from the Secretary of Defense allowing DOD 

civilians to deploy without scrutiny from their home office. This also illustrates the 

demand for personnel with specialized experience and skills both in the United States 

and Afghanistan.391

While the MODA program management team was able to bring in qualified DOD civilian 

employees through the CEW and DOD-EC, many MODA advisors also came from outside 

the government.392 On average, 20 percent of the first five classes were from outside the 

government and were brought on via direct hire, or Schedule A hiring authority.393 This 

authority allowed the MODA program management team to temporarily hire civilians 

with skills needed to fill their requirements. However, in FY 2014, Schedule A hiring 

authority was rescinded and the program management team was forced to rely only on 

volunteers from DOD agencies through the CEW and DOD-EC.394 In June 2018, the MODA 

program manager told SIGAR that the lack of Schedule A hiring authority hindered DSCA’s 

ability to fill MODA requirements.395

MODA Training Tailored to Advising Mission

Predeployment training for MODA advisors consists of a seven-week intensive course on 

topics such as advising skills, civilian-military coordination, country-specific languages 

and culture, and personal security.396 More than 470 civilians have been trained through 

Members of the MODA program are escorted from meetings by their personnel security detail during a training 

exercise held at Muscatatuck Urban Training Center, Indiana. (Photo by David Bruce) 
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the program since 2010, and advisors have deployed to Afghanistan and other partner 

countries.397

Civilians selected as MODA advisors attend a predeployment training program in 

Washington, DC, and Camp Atterbury’s Muscatatuck Urban Training Center in Indiana.398

MODA aims to “develop and deploy skilled DOD civilian advisors capable of having a 

strategic impact—based upon their strategic understanding, mindset, and character—

while maintaining the highest standards of professionalism and expertise in their 

respective functional areas.”399 Now that MODA has a global authority and can send 

advisors to countries besides Afghanistan, training courses are conducted in phases 

under a building block or modular approach (See Table 3.). The MODA training course 

is composed of six phases: Phase 0 prepares advisors for operational deployment; Phases 

1 and 2 focus on advisor fundamentals and operational readiness; Phases 3, 4, and 5 are 

tailored to the specific area to which advisors are preparing to deploy.400 USIP assisted in 

developing the training program and provided instructors to prepare the civilians for the 

work ahead as MODA advisors.401

Though Congress has required advisory training for all uniformed personnel deployed 

as ministerial advisors, the standard MODA predeployment training program at Camp 

Atterbury focuses only on civilians deployed as MODA advisors. However, MODA 

instructors have provided training to military personnel based off direct requests from 

military commanders. 

TABLE 3

MINISTRY OF DEFENSE ADVISORS PROGRAM: TRAINING PROGRAM IN PHASES

Phase Name Description Duration

Phase 0 Operational Deployment 

Preparation

Contains general lessons specific to the MODA program and predeployment training requirements for 

civilians determined by the COCOM 5 days*

Phase 1A Advising Fundamentals Provides the tools and skills to engage in effective and sustainable capacity building missions 7 days

Phase 1B Operational Readiness Provides an introduction to personal security awareness to improve operational readiness 6 days*

Phase 2 Advanced Advising Covers advanced topics on advisor roles, capacity building, communication, planning, and 

organization analysis 5 days

Phase 3 Country Study Provides an understanding of the history, language, culture, and politics of the region and country 5 days

Phase 4 Mission Study Provides the status of and issues related to the mission, national priorities, plans and programs 5 days*

Phase 5 Exercises Applies knowledge and skills of previous weeks in scenario-based, role-playing exercises 6 days*

Note: * Omits travel days.

Source: DSCA, “Ministry Of Defense Advisors (MODA) Training Program: Program of Instruction,” March 30, 2018, pp. 13–16, 18.
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2018 SIGAR AUDIT FOUND DOD LACKS 

PERFORMANCE DATA TO EVALUATE MOD AND 

MOI ADVISORS

SIGAR’s October 2018 audit report, Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces: DOD Lacks 

Performance Data to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors Assigned to the Ministries of Defense 

and Interior, evaluated “the extent to which DOD (1) evaluates its advising efforts to the MOD and the 

MOI; (2) tracks advisors assigned to the MOD and the MOI; and (3) trains its advisors in preparation 

for their assignments at the MOD and the MOI” from January 2015 to April 2018.402 From that 

evaluation, SIGAR found that:

1. DOD had not fully evaluated the progress that was made in its MOD and MOI advising efforts. 

While DOD Instruction 5132.14 requires all DOD security cooperation efforts follow a standard 

assessment, monitoring, and evaluation program, SIGAR reported that DOD provided conflicting 

responses as to whether this instruction applied to its advising activities in the Afghan MOD and 

MOI. DOD stated that it is fully committed to complying with all departmental policies, including 

DOD Instruction 5132.14.403

2. It was difficult to track the effectiveness of the U.S. advisory effort over time because the advising 

goals and rating systems had frequently changed. SIGAR analyzed all of the plan of action 

and milestones (POAM) and found that in 2015 and 2016, 96 percent and 28 percent of the 

MOD POAM goals had changed. For the MOI, 86 percent and 58 percent of POAM goals had 

changed.404 SIGAR also learned that in the spring of 2017, Resolute Support began reporting 

progress quarterly and, in the fall of 2017, Resolute Support switched its assessment system to 

one in which advisors used a “yes” or “no” assessment to track achievements.405

3. DOD could not measure the effectiveness of contract advisors because its current contracts did 

not have measurable performance standards to effectively assess the contractor’s performance. 

SIGAR found that U.S. Army Contracting Command and CSTC-A did not write performance work 

statements that clearly described the work DynCorp contractors should accomplish in a way that 

could be measured and assessed.406 As a result of the preliminary finding that the absence of 

measurable performance standards would mean that DOD cannot measure the effectiveness 

of its more than $421 million contracts with DynCorp, DOD released a draft performance work 

statement in September 2018 for a follow-on contract. This included two general performance 

requirements that measured CSTC-A’s satisfaction with the advisor’s efforts and the contractor’s 

adherence to meeting the milestone schedule.407

4. DOD has not tracked personnel who were reassigned to advising duties once they were in Afghanistan. 

SIGAR learned that while there are databases that track personnel and their original assignments, and 

while those databases are updated to ensure the right number of people are requested and assigned 

to specific duties, CSTC-A does not track reassignments or report them to CENTCOM.408 SIGAR believes 

that not tracking reassignments can result in DOD requesting personnel with the wrong type of 

experience or requesting an insufficient number of personnel for its advising roles.409
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5. Despite a CENTCOM requirement and guidance given by the Secretary of Defense, DOD has not 

ensured that all uniformed personnel complete advisor training before deploying to Afghanistan.410

SIGAR learned that many advisory positions had not been coded as such, resulting in many 

selected uniformed personnel not receiving advisor-related training.411 SIGAR also learned that 

there were a number of uniformed personnel receiving training waivers and therefore were not 

required to attend advisor training.412 CSTC-A has been addressing this lack of training by having 

some uniformed personnel attend a four-day Resolute Support Individual Key Leader Training at 

Resolute Support headquarters upon arrival in Kabul.413

6. In the audit report, SIGAR recommended that the Secretary of Defense (1) comply with 

all DOD policies regarding security cooperation assistance, including DOD Instruction 

5132.14; (2) incorporate specific, measurable performance standards into its current and future 

ministerial advising contracts; (3) develop and implement a mechanism to accurately identify 

and track all personnel performing advising tasks at the MOD and the MOI; (4) enforce existing 

requirements for all uniformed U.S. personnel to receive advisor-specific training before deploying 

to Afghanistan to be advisors at the MOD and the MOI.414 DOD concurred.

A public affairs officer discusses communications planning and social networking with Farah’s provincial 

director of information and culture during a key leader engagement. (Photo by Josh Ives) 
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LACK OF AFGHAN INPUT HINDERS MINISTERIAL DEVELOPMENT

Ministerial advising sometimes suffers from what SSA expert Nadia Gerspacher terms 

“a paradox of partnership”—defense institution building can advance U.S. objectives 

in the short term, but initiatives that do not take partner perspectives into account are 

unlikely to succeed in the long term.415 Without Afghan input, it is difficult to implement 

sustainable change.416 Afghan involvement does not mean uncritical acceptance of a 

partner nation’s stated objectives, but calls for an understanding of the interests of 

stakeholders and taking them into account.417

Afghan objectives and input may not be fully included in defense institution building 

for several reasons. Faced with limited Afghan capacity and the need to build defense 

institutions from the ground up, advisors implemented plans with little input from 

Afghan partners.418 When predeployment training emphasizes a host nation’s culture 

and language but not advising methods and techniques, advisors may conclude that 

partnership is a goal in and of itself rather than the means to achieve other goals.419

Also, in the course of a deployment, advisors may feel pressure to show immediate 

results.420 One U.S. general officer described a constant feeling of “turning the corner 

now” conveyed by leadership in Afghanistan, creating the sense that time constraints 

prevented any long-term commitment to partnering.421 Advisors sometimes seek to 

mirror U.S. systems or to prioritize interoperability with U.S. systems over long-term 

sustainability for the Afghan ministry.422 During ongoing reassessments of progress, 

Afghan institutions may have not yet developed robust self-evaluation processes, 

limiting their ability to provide and analyze useful data. This in turn may encourage 

advisors to discount Afghan input in favor of their own measures.423

Financial management employees from MOD offices attend a one-day financial management seminar at 

Resolute Support headquarters. The seminar covered topics such as budget programming and analysis 

and anticorruption reform methods. (Photo by Egdanis Torres Sierra)
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One U.S. general officer described a constant feeling of “turning 

the corner now” conveyed by leadership in Afghanistan, 

creating the sense that time constraints prevented any 

long-term commitment to partnering.

Regardless of why Afghan interests are not taken into account by advisors, initiatives 

are unlikely to succeed in the long run without partner support. Some situations 

represent a trade-off between short-term and long-term goals. For example, CSTC-A 

was able to force the ANA to adopt the Afghan Personnel and Pay System (APPS) 

only by refusing to disburse funds until the U.S.-designed system was adopted; this 

was sufficient leverage with the right stakeholders to compel change for the short 

term. CSTC-A also took control of fuel supplies away from the ANDSF because they 

considered Afghan management of fuel supplies as inefficient and prone to corruption. 

While the commanding general of CSTC-A noted that these actions “will save the U.S. 

taxpayers’ money,” ministerial advisors recognized this as a setback in the development 

of Afghan governance.424 Once U.S. financial incentives are withdrawn, it is unlikely that 

Afghans will permanently implement systems lacking their input or which they initially 

resisted.425 Without Afghan input, such reforms are unlikely to be maintained in the 

long term.426
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KEY FINDINGS

Overall, this study of the United States’ ministerial and institutional advising efforts in 

Afghanistan finds:

1. No permanent organization within DOD had responsibility for the ministerial 

advising mission in Afghanistan. While the responsibility for developing the Afghan 

MOD and MOI rested in country at CSTC-A, no permanent agency had an overarching 

and enduring mandate to plan and coordinate ministerial advising; oversee staffing 

and training for all advisors; provide assessment, monitoring, and evaluation of 

ongoing ministerial efforts; or consolidate best practices and lessons learned. 

2. Military personnel serving as ministerial advisors were individually sourced and not 

deployed as a team with a unifying mission. Many advisors often lacked expertise 

in the security sector governance functions in which they were expected to advise 

their Afghan counterparts. For most of the conflict, military advisors did not receive 

specific training on advisor fundamentals and defense institution capacity building. 

3. The ministerial advising effort in Afghanistan was not linked by a direct commandand-control relationship to the field advising effort. These efforts were coordinated 

only through ad hoc meetings without the authority to force synchronization 

between them.

4. DOD’s specialized programs to deploy civilian experts to serve as ministerial advisors 

allowed the agency to better match the experiences of its personnel with Afghan 

needs. MODA relied on a hiring authority granted by Congress to source civilian 

experts from outside DOD to meet these requirements, which increased deployment 

of appropriate experts in security sector governance.

5. While AFPAK Hands received significant language and cultural training, they were 

not trained on how to be advisors, and often served as ministerial advisors on 

subjects in which they had no specific education or experience.

6. Contractors were used at the ministerial level to augment U.S. advisors. They 

provided continuity through long-term engagement with their Afghan counterparts, 

but they could not commit resources or agree to programs or policies outside of 

their performance work statement. Contractors also did not receive training in 

advising and did not necessarily have specific expertise in ministerial-level security 

governance functions.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DSCA should take ownership of the ministerial development mission in

Afghanistan and establish a cadre of civilian professionals for this task. 

The director of DSCA, in close coordination with the senior U.S. military 

commander in Afghanistan, should approve all U.S. candidates serving in 

senior leadership roles at CSTC-A, including the CSTC-A commander. 

DSCA is responsible for security cooperation programs that conduct institutional 

capacity building efforts like MODA and DIRI. Therefore, DSCA should be the 

organization responsible for vetting key personnel at CSTC-A, such as the heads 

of the functional areas; validating personnel requirements; and capitalizing on 

the MODA program and DIRI for security cooperation efforts. To that end, DSCA 

could establish a team of civilian experts in security sector governance and defense 

institution building that can be deployed or serve as “reach back” for deployed 

ministerial advisors.

2. The Office of Personnel Management, in coordination with the U.S. military, 

should request that Congress reinstate special hiring authority allowing DSCA 

to hire individuals outside of DOD. This would allow DSCA to capitalize on 

internal and external civilian expertise and fulfill its civilian requirements 

through the MODA program.

Prior to 2014, Congress authorized Schedule A hiring authority to DOD, which 

allowed the MODA program to temporarily hire civilians external to the agency. 

These civilians had particular skills and expertise needed by DOD and MODA to fill 

their requirements in Afghanistan. In 2014, Congress rescinded the hiring authority. 

This meant that sourcing for MODA relied solely on volunteers from DOD agencies, 

and that MODA could not be as selective as it had been when the authority was 

in effect. Without this hiring authority, the program is unable to source and fill its 

current billets.

3. The Joint Readiness Training Center should institutionalize Senior Leader 

Advisor Training. This training should be conducted in close partnership with 

the MODA training center and take advantage of core aspects of the MODA 

program of instruction. USFOR-A should make this training a requirement for 

all military personnel deployed to serve as advisors at the ministerial level.

Over time, the United States has learned that deploying uniformed personnel 

without advisor-specific training is detrimental to the train, advise, and assist 

mission. However, uniformed personnel were consistently deployed without 

receiving such training or without training in a standardized form. The SLAT at the 

JRTC is in a pilot stage, but is proving to be an effective predeployment training 

step for personnel going out to serve as advisors at the tactical and ministerial 

levels. Institutionalizing and mandating this training ensures that all advisors 
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receive the same type of training and are able to meet one another regardless of 

their ministry, office, or operational area to connect and coordinate in Afghanistan. 

If uniformed personnel are used as ministerial advisors, the SLAT curriculum 

should be revamped to include education on defense institution building. Further, 

SLAT should use MODA’s existing training plan on advising fundamentals. 

4. As with MODA, predeployment training academies should be empowered to

vet and remove candidates who do not meet training qualifications.

While there are criteria used to select personnel with the right background and 

experience, there is no criterion to ensure that personnel receiving advisory 

training are suited to be advisors. This becomes clear in training academies, where 

instructors are able to see and assess a person’s ability to complete their advising 

task. The training academies must be able to remove someone who does not meet 

the training standards to ensure spaces are filled by qualified and capable people.
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OPTIMIZING COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command and control of the U.S. advisory effort has evolved over time. While some changes improved 

unity of effort, others had unintended consequences that hampered advisor coordination. In the early 

days of the U.S. advisory effort, the United States’ command-and-control structure linked advising at 

the tactical and ministerial levels. In October 2003, the Office of Military Cooperation, based at the 

U.S. Embassy, assigned advisors to the Kabul Military Training Center, MOD, MOI, and ETTs. In 2005, as 

the U.S. military expanded its advisory effort to include the ANP, the Office of Military Cooperation was 

renamed the Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan.427 As shown in Figure 8, OSC-A established 

three components to oversee the advisory mission: defense reform (at MOD), police reform (at 

MOI), and Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix (an international military formation that trained and 

mentored Afghan security forces).428 U.S. military operations targeting al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban 

leadership fell under the Combined Joint Task Force 180 at Bagram Airfield and were completely 

separate from the advising mission.429

In 2006, OSC-A became CSTC-A and was eventually provided a direct command line to CENTCOM. In 

addition to developing Afghan forces, CSTC-A also assumed primary responsibility for political-military 

affairs and coordinating with the U.S. Embassy and the Afghan government.430 In 2009, to bring the 

United States and NATO train, advise, and assist programs under one roof, NATO created the NATO 

Training Mission – Afghanistan. A U.S. Army general, Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, assumed command of 

both organizations in 2009. Lt. Gen. Caldwell structured his organization with two offices: a Deputy 

Commander for Army (DCOM-Army) and a Deputy Commander for Police (DCOM-Police), to oversee 

advising at the ministerial level.431

CENTCOM

CFC-A

OSC-A CJTF-180

CJTF Phoenix

(Field Advising)

Defense Reform

(at MOD)

Police Reform

(at MOI)

ETTs

U.S. BCTs

Combat and advisor focused

Combat focused

Advisor focused

ADVISORY EFFORT CONSOLIDATED UNDER ONE COMMAND (2005)

FIGURE 8
64 | MINISTERIAL ADVISING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

In preparation for the transition of security responsibilities to the Afghan government, ISAF created 

the ISAF Joint Command (IJC) in 2009 to oversee operations nationwide. As Figure 9 shows, there 

would now be a split between tactical advising in the field and ministerial advising back in Kabul. IJC, 

through its Regional Commands, was now training and advising Afghan army and police units in the 

field, while NTM-A/CSTC-A developed institutional capabilities at the MOD and MOI to manage and 

support those fielded units.432

In 2013, IJC established a Security Force Assistance Center (SFA Center) to address challenges with 

the divide in command structures and to improve synchronization of SSA activities. The SFA Center was 

designed to improve coordination between the tactical and ministerial levels and across key functional 

areas within CSTC-A (such as human resource management and logistics). The director of the SFA 

Center chaired a weekly SFA working group, which coordinated efforts across essential functions, 

received input from the regional TAACs, and forwarded agenda items for action by the Commander of 

Resolute Support. However, according to SIGAR interviews, the SFA Center—located in Kabul—did not 

reach its full potential because it was not provided the proper authorities to oversee and coordinate 

the SFA mission nationwide. For instance, the SFA Center did not have command authority to direct 

specific SSA actions.433

NATO HQ CENTCOM

Commander, ISAF

NTMA-A/CSTC-A IJC

DCOM-Army

(at MOD)

DCOM-Police

(at MOI)

SFATs

(Field Advising)

Augmented BCTs

Regional Commands

Combat and advisor focused

Combat focused

Advisor focused

FIELD ADVISING TEAMS MOVED UNDER OPERATIONAL COMMAND (2009)

FIGURE 9
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JUNE 2019 | 65

The SFA Center was dissolved in 2018 and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance assumed 

responsibility for all tasks previously overseen by the SFA Center. Despite this, as shown in Figure 10, 

TAACs continue to report through operational channels (the Deputy Commander of Operations) and 

not the commanding general of CSTC-A (also the Deputy Commander for Security Assistance).434

Without command responsibility over the TAACs, the Deputy Commander for Security Assistance 

does not control, and has limited visibility of, activities conducted by advisors in the field. This lack 

of command authority increases the likelihood that advisors provide guidance to ANA and ANP units 

that may not be reinforcing policies at the ministerial level, and vice versa. Reestablishing command 

authority would improve coordination, and optimize U.S. efforts to coordinate ANDSF combat 

capabilities, ministerial institutions, and interoperability among various Afghan security elements. 

Commander, Resolute Support

DCOS-SA/CG CSTC-A DCOS-OPS

MAG-D

(at MOD)

MAG-I

(at MOI)

SFABs

(Field Advising)

TAACs

Combat and advisor focused

Combat focused

Advisor focused

ADVISOR TEAMS REMAIN UNDER OPERATIONAL CONTROL (2015)

FIGURE 10

JUNE 2019 | 67

CHAPTER 4

EQUIPPING THE FORCE

S ince 2002, equipping the ANDSF has been a key component of U.S. efforts to develop  effective security forces capable of providing security to the Afghan people and 

preventing the reestablishment of terrorist safe havens. To equip the ANDSF, the United 

States has spent over $18 billion—representing the second largest expenditure of all 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund allocations.435 Of this $18 billion, approximately 

$13.7 billion has been used to equip the ANA and approximately $4.7 billion has been 

used to equip the ANP.436

In 2018, GAO reported that between 2003 and 2016, the United States provided the 

ANDSF with: 

• 600,000 weapons, such as pistols, rifles, machine guns, and grenade launchers; 

• 76,000 vehicles, such as trucks, High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled 

Vehicles (HMMWV), and Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles; 

• 163,000 tactical and non-tactical radios, such as handheld radios and base stations; 

• 30,000 items for detecting and disposing explosives, such as mine detectors;

• 16,000 intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets, such as night 

vision devices and surveillance drones; and 

• more than 200 aircraft, such as helicopters, light attack aircraft, and cargo airplanes.437

This chapter describes how the United States equipped the ANDSF and examines the 

effectiveness of equipping decisions. Specifically, the chapter considers the benefits and 

U.S. Army photo
68 | EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

A Letter of Offer and 

Acceptance is the document 

used by the U.S. government 

to offer equipment and 

services for sale or transfer 

to a partner nation. The LOA 

becomes an agreement 

when it is signed by the 

partner nation. With BPC 

cases, this form is referred 

to as a pseudo Letter of 

Offer and Acceptance

because it is not signed by 

the partner nation. 

Security cooperation 

organizations are U.S. 

organizations permanently 

located in a foreign country 

responsible for carrying 

out security cooperation 

management functions such 

as equipment and services 

sales case management.

drawbacks of the equipping process used in Afghanistan and whether the right people 

and organizations were tasked with making equipping decisions. While U.S. equipping 

decisions do not account for all of the ANDSF’s shortcomings, SIGAR has found that 

U.S. decision-making concerning the provision of military equipment and training has 

proven shortsighted. The United States has provided equipment to the ANDSF without 

adequate training and sustainment, and provided equipment that did not meet ANDSFidentified needs. 

Ultimately, the frequent turnover of U.S. personnel meant that any long-term, 

comprehensive plans for equipping the ANDSF existed only on paper. That, combined 

with unclear roles and responsibilities across relevant organizations, a lack of technical 

expertise and experience among personnel involved in equipping decisions, and 

insufficient oversight over ASFF expenditures, has contributed to a situation in which 

the ANDSF is still unable to provide needed security or defeat the Taliban. 

BACKGROUND: THE PSEUDO FMS PROCESS 

The United States provides defense articles and related assistance to partner nations 

through several security assistance and security cooperation programs. Through the 

State-led Title 22 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, the United States sells defense 

articles and services to foreign countries.438 With traditional foreign military sales, the 

partner nation pays for the sale using national funds, or receives U.S. assistance through 

the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program—a program that provides grants or loans 

to a partner nation for the purchase of U.S. defense articles, services, and training.439

In the early 2000s, to better support U.S. efforts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq, 

DOD petitioned Congress for the legal authority to allow the use of U.S. appropriated 

funds (other than FMF funds) to transfer defense articles and services to partner 

nations.440 These efforts, now known as Building Partner Capacity (BPC) programs, 

provide equipment to partner nations through a modified FMS process, known as 

pseudo FMS (See Figure 11.).441

First introduced in 2005, pseudo FMS cases refer to foreign military sales that 

are (1) funded with U.S. government appropriations rather than partner-nation funding 

and (2) initiated by the United States without a formal request from the partner 

nation.442 Additionally, whereas traditional FMS cases involve an agreement between 

the receiving country and the United States as to what equipment and services 

are provided (referred to as a Letter of Offer and Acceptance or LOA), there is no 

signed agreement with pseudo FMS cases in terms of the content of the sale.443 DOD 

began using the pseudo FMS process to acquire equipment for partner nations like 

Afghanistan, which lacked financial resources and the capability to define their own 

requirements.444 The responsibility for equipment sales and management generally falls 

to the in-country security cooperation organization (SCO). Under Resolute Support and 

the International Security Assistance Force mission that preceded it, CSTC-A serves this 

SCO function. Within CSTC-A, the Security Assistance Office (SAO) is responsible for 

FMS case management.445
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The term requirement owner

is used to refer to a military 

organization within the 

Resolute Support Mission 

authorized to request 

equipment or services in 

support of the ANA, ANP, 

Afghan Special Forces, and 

the AAF. 

A Letter of Justification is 

prepared by the requirement 

owner and identifies needed 

materials, services, training, 

and equipment. The Letter 

of Justification is used to 

prepare a Memorandum 

of Request.

A Memorandum of Request

is a document prepared 

by the SAO that identifies 

what is needed, when it is 

needed, and the funding 

available. Unlike Letters of 

Request, which are used 

in traditional FMS cases, 

MORs are not signed by the 

partner nation.

An implementing agency

is the military service—Air 

Force, Army, or Navy—or 

defense agency assigned 

responsibility by DSCA 

to prepare an LOA (or 

pseudo LOA) and to provide 

the training, services, 

equipment, or supplies 

being requested.

While the pseudo FMS process allowed the United States to rapidly equip the ANDSF, 

SIGAR found that the United States was ultimately unprepared to take on the 

responsibility of equipping a force at the scope and scale required in Afghanistan. The 

pseudo FMS process limited Afghan involvement and increased responsibilities for 

CSTC-A, which was neither structured nor staffed to adequately equip a developing 

force. Further, given the frequent turnover of U.S. personnel and the limited oversight 

over ASFF expenditures, DOD was ill-prepared to spend billions of dollars effectively.

EQUIPPING DECISIONS THROUGH 2014 NOT GUIDED BY 

ENDURING, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN

Following the fall of the Taliban in 2001, the United States and its coalition partners 

concluded that an internationally trained and equipped Afghan national security force 

would serve both Afghan and U.S. security objectives.450 Initially, the military decided to 

model the ANA on a “very light American light infantry division.”451 The ANA was 

therefore designed to have only minimal combat power, and to rely on United States and 

international partners for such capabilities as close air support, medical evacuation, and 

Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs

Generally, the term “security assistance” is used to refer to State Department programs that are 

authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) of 

1976, as amended, and administered by the DOD.446 These programs include Title 22-funded 

programs such as FMF and International Military Education and Training.447 In the 1980s, 

Congress began increasing the number of programs DOD could implement with State concurrence. 

Known as “security cooperation” programs, these are authorized under Title 10 of the U.S. 

Code and annual National Defense Authorization Acts and are funded with U.S. government 

appropriations.448 BPC programs, such as ASFF, are examples of security cooperation programs. 

BPC programs are authorized by the Economy Act (31 U.S.C., § 1535), which allows the transfer 

of defense articles and related services to other U.S. government agencies for the purpose of 

building a partner nation’s capabilities.449

U.S. Organizations Involved in the Equipping of the ANDSF

Currently, responsibility for identifying requirements falls to various military organizations—known 

as requirement owners—within CSTC-A and the Resolute Support Mission. Under the current 

process, requirement owners submit a Letter of Justification (LOJ) to the commanding general 

of CSTC-A, and work with CSTC-A’s SAO to generate a Memorandum of Request (MOR). The 

signed MOR is then passed to the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is responsible 

for validating the requirements and assigning responsibility to an implementing agency (IA) for 

management and implementation of the pseudo FMS case. DSCA and the assigned implementing 

agency then prepare and finalize a pseudo Letter of Offer and Acceptance (pseudo LOA). The IAs 

may work with other organizations (for example, a program management office or the security 

assistance management directorate at a life cycle management command) if additional expertise 

is needed.452
70 | EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

intelligence gathering.453 The decision was also made to arm the ANA and ANP with 

Warsaw Pact weapons that were recovered through disarmament, demobilization, and 

reintegration efforts, donated by former Soviet-bloc nations, or seized during military 

operations.454

This initial light infantry design would soon prove problematic, however. While 

appropriate for tasks expected in 2002 to 2004, such as providing security for the 2004 

Afghan presidential election, it proved inadequate for sustained confrontation with a 

growing insurgency. Specifically, the U.S. focus on the forming, training, and fielding 

of infantry battalions kept ANA corps and brigades deficient in firepower, armor, and 

mobility at a time when the Taliban was resurging.455 With limited armored mobility and 

firepower, the Afghan army was unable to play a significant role in combat and grew 

increasingly vulnerable to insurgent-employed tactics (e.g., IEDs, roadside bombings, 

and sniper attacks). These shortfalls were noted in 2006 by then-commanding general 

of Combined Forces Command – Afghanistan Lt. Gen. Karl Eikenberry, who described 

the ANDSF’s critical combat support systems as “extraordinarily weak.” Eikenberry 

further stated that the Afghans “lack precision firepower,” and “need more help in 

terms of having more heavy mobile weaponry, more mortars that they can bring to 

bear very quickly in a fight.”456 As one analysis by the Center for Military History noted, 

“Keeping the army small and organizing it as light infantry with limited firepower made 

 COMPARISON OF FMS AND PSEUDO FMS PROCESSES

CASE DEVELOPMENT CASE IMPLEMENTATION

Requirement 

Identification Requirement Generation Agreement Developmentand Acceptance Acquisition Delivery

FMS CASES

The partner country 

identifies a need for 

defense articles or 

related services. 

The partner country—with the 

assistance of the in-country 

security cooperation 

organization, DSCA, and 

IA—submits a Letter of 

Request (LOR). 

After receiving the LOR, DSCA assigns 

responsibility for case management 

and implementation to an IA. 

DSCA and the assigned IA prepare 

and finalize a formal agreement (the 

LOA). The partner nation accepts the 

agreement and pays for the defense 

articles or services.

The assigned IA manages the 

requisition or contracting of 

items specified in the LOA. 

The partner nation provides 

delivery addresses and 

manages the transportation 

of materials. 

PSEUDO FMS CASES

A U.S. government 

requesting authority, 

usually the geographic 

combatant command 

or in-country 

security cooperation 

organization, 

identifies a need for 

defense articles or 

related services. 

The U.S. government 

requesting authority, with 

input from the partner nation 

and implementing agencies, 

formulates and submits a 

MOR. 

After receiving the MOR, DSCA assigns 

responsibility for case management 

and execution to an IA. 

DSCA and the assigned IA prepare 

and finalize a formal agreement, 

known as a pseudo Letter of Offer and 

Acceptance, DSCA approves the final 

agreement, and the IA accepts the 

agreement.

The assigned IA manages 

the requisition or contracting 

of items specified in the 

pseudo LOA. 

The in-country security 

cooperation organization 

provides delivery addresses. 

The U.S. military or another 

U.S. government-acquired 

transportation system 

manages transportation of the 

items, which are paid for by 

the U.S. government. 

Note: The above summary does not include all steps and actors that are involved in the FMS and pseudo FMS processes, including needed approvals from State and Congress. 

Source: GAO, Foreign Military Sales: DOD Needs to Improve Its Use of Performance Information to Manage the Program, GAO-17-703, August 2017, p. 7; DSCA, Security Assistance 

Management Manual, April 2012. 

FIGURE 11
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 71

the prospects less likely that [the Afghan security forces] could deal with the enemy 

successfully on its own.”457

These capability gaps forced DOD to acknowledge the mismatch between desired 

ends—an ANDSF capable of securing the people and territory of Afghanistan—and 

the provided means. In 2006, therefore, the United States began considering ways to 

upgrade the ANA’s armored, mobility, and firepower capabilities.458 This expansion in 

capabilities included plans for a future Afghan air capability and the development of 

special operations forces.459 By addressing these shortfalls, DOD proved responsive to 

the Taliban’s growing threat. Facilitating the ANDSF’s evolution from a light-infantry 

force to a combined arms service with air force and special forces elements also 

indicated DOD’s willingness to invest greater time and resources in the ANDSF. 

Thereafter, however, equipping decisions were ad hoc and inconsistent from year to 

year, often subject to change depending on the commander.460 Specifically, through 

2014, equipping decisions appeared to lack the guidance of a long-term plan for how 

the force should be equipped over time. This was corroborated by one U.S. officer 

heavily involved in the equipping of the Afghans from 2007 to 2010, who told SIGAR that 

equipping decisions never appeared dictated by “any type of long-term, synchronized, 

coordinated plan,” as “incoming commanders always wanted something different than 

their predecessor.”461 The officer recalled an instance when the CSTC-A commanding 

general asked why infantry equipment continued to arrive when he wanted field artillery 

and engineering equipment; the officer had to explain that due to lead and delivery 

timelines, he was receiving equipment ordered by the former commanding general.462

A former DOD official involved in the equipping of the ANDSF for eight years agreed 

that changes were frequent, noting that “annual reviews [conducted by incoming 

commanding generals] would often be based on some new ‘idea’ for the force, 

completely forgetting the conclusions of the last review.”463 The lack of consistent 

decision-making was also prevalent lower in the chain of command. According to one 

former CSTC-A ANA requirements manager, he had three different directors in a fourmonth period, each of whom attempted to take the program in a “different direction.”464

Lt. Gen. Daniel Bolger, former commander of NTM-A/CSTC-A, described the ANDSF as 

a “collection of compromises,” and compared looking at the ANDSF to “a cross section 

of sedimentary rock [with] each year’s U.S. budget priorities and ‘good ideas’ layered 

across the older ones.”465 Under pressure from the national security establishment to 

“turn the corner now,” commanders often prioritized the tactical fight and equipped the 

ANDSF with little regard for past equipping decisions or future expenses.466

This problem was not limited to Afghanistan. According to a 2011 report on DOD’s 

internal security cooperation processes, many of DOD’s security cooperation programs 

lacked a long-term vision for partner force capabilities. The report found that “security 

cooperation planning at the country level—in particular FMS planning—is too often 

oriented toward responding to, rather than anticipating, the capability requirements of 
72 | EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

allies and partners.” The report also found that broader discussions about which partner 

country capabilities and capacities should be developed did not occur.467

Over time, external checks were applied to CSTC-A’s requirement generation process. 

The Afghanistan Resource Oversight Council was established to increase oversight 

over equipping decisions, and the OSD-generated Afghan Plan of Record (APOR) was 

implemented to provide strategic guidance to CSTC-A on the future development of the 

ANDSF.468 While these initiatives represent significant attempts to mitigate 

CSTC-A’s short-term outlook, some have questioned their effectiveness. According 

to those interviewed for this report, the impact of these efforts was often limited by 

deference to commanders in the field and by command-and-control arrangements that 

allowed CSTC-A to circumvent established guidance.469 For example, one interviewee 

familiar with the APOR process pointed out that the APOR does not carry much weight 

with CSTC-A because OSD is not technically in CSTC-A’s chain of command.470

The Afghanistan Resource 

Oversight Council is a 

congressionally mandated 

organization within DOD 

responsible for providing 

oversight of the ASFF 

program. Responsibilities 

include approving requests 

for funding (as specified in 

the Justification Book) and 

Financial Activity Plans.

The Afghan Plan of Record

identifies the ANDSF force 

structure that, based on 

the projected operational 

environment, the United 

States is willing to support 

via security cooperation 

programs and funds. 

Limited Interoperability Impacts ANA and ANP Coordination

Interoperability is the ability of a military’s systems, units, or forces to operate in conjunction with other 

systems, units, or forces.471 Interoperability is critical to effective operations, training, and maintenance, 

but U.S. equipping decisions for the ANDSF did not fully take this need into account. For example, 

CSTC-A did not begin transitioning the ANP to NATO standard weapons until 2016, eight years after 

they began transitioning the ANA, citing as its reason the ANP’s preexisting reliance on former Warsaw 

Pact weapons and the cost associated with re-equipping the entire force.472 The consequences of 

limited interoperability were highlighted in 2018, when during a Taliban-led attack on Ghazni Province, 

the ANA was unable to resupply besieged ANP officers because ANA ammunition differed from that 

of the ANP.473 It also sowed battlefield confusion. The ANA is equipped with NATO standard equipment 

such as M16 rifles and M249 squad automatic weapons, which sound distinctly different from the AK47 and RPK light machine gun the ANP and Taliban use. As one former commanding general of NTM-A/

CSTC-A told SIGAR, having the ANP and Taliban employ the same weapons “increased friction and the 

likelihood of tragic friendly fire incidents.”474

ANP officers participate in an M16 class at Bost Airfield in August 2017 as part of the ANP’s transition 

from AK-47s to the M16 rifle. NATO standard weapons such as the M16 rifle became basic issue for 

the ANA in 2010. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Justin Updegraff) 
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EQUIPPING DECISIONS LACKED CONSISTENT AFGHAN 

INVOLVEMENT AND INPUT

SIGAR found conflicting reports concerning the extent of Afghan involvement in 

equipping decisions. According to the Security Assistance Office in Afghanistan in 

2019, Afghan input has been and is currently considered at the working group-level 

during the Afghanistan Resource and Requirement Validation Process, biannual 

Program Management Reviews, and during MOD and MOI key leader engagements.475

However, others have questioned the extent to which Afghans are involved and their 

input considered. According to one former U.S. advisor to the MOI’s General Logistics 

Department, the SAO would buy new equipment and Class IX (repair) parts without 

input from the MOI; while the advisor was with the MOI from 2013 to 2014, he claimed 

there was no communication between the two organizations on needs or orders.476

Another retired officer who spent four years in Afghanistan told SIGAR that Afghan 

involvement and input simply meant “acquiring an Afghan signature.”477 A former 

deputy commander of programs at CSTC-A told SIGAR that only having one year on 

the ground and needing to make progress fast meant that listening to the Afghans was 

a low priority.478 Further, Lt. Gen. Bolger told SIGAR, “The Afghans were informed and 

directed, not asked or consulted” and that “Afghan leaders made reasonable requests 

and were told ‘it’s not part of the plan.’ [But] what plan?”479 Because of this, Bolger said, 

the “U.S. lost critical buy-in and our most valuable stakeholder.”480

Congress has also expressed concerns over the lack of Afghan involvement in equipping 

decisions. In 2017, for example, the Senate Committee on Appropriations wrote, “The 

Committee is concerned about reports that ASFF procurements made on behalf of the 

Afghan Program 

Management Reviews refer 

to biannual meetings where 

key stakeholders such as 

CSTC-A, the MOD, the MOI, 

DSCA, and implementing 

agencies meet to discuss 

ASFF-funded efforts to train 

and equip the ANDSF.

U.S. Army UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters about to land near an ANA M1151 HMMWV at a mission support 

site in Nangarhar Province in June 2018. (U.S. Air Force photo by Sharida Jackson)
74 | EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

[ANDSF] may be exceeding Afghan needs and not meeting other requirements identified 

by the Afghans.”481

While the Afghans often requested equipment that was not required, SIGAR found that 

Afghan input was disregarded even in cases where the request appeared valid. In 2015, 

for example, the MOD’s Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Department requested 

that hundreds of millions of dollars not be spent on unarmored trucks that the ANA did 

not need. Rather, the MOD requested that the money be spent on procuring armored 

vehicles such as MRAPs and Mobile Strike Force Vehicles (MSFV).482 The need for 

protected mobility assets had been identified a year earlier by MOD Chief of General 

Staff, General Sher Karimi, who wrote to CSTC-A:

As you are aware, mines continue to account for nearly 90 percent of the ANA 

casualties for the past year and we anticipate this will continue to be a favorite tactic 

of our enemy for the foreseeable future. We have observed over the past decade the 

coalition provided its forces with improved armored vehicles based on the same 

threat reality, and we anticipate that our light force is incapable of operating freely 

with similar freedom of movement without sustaining significant casualties for the 

foreseeable future.483

Nevertheless, CSTC-A went forward with its decision to procure unarmored cargo trucks, 

on the grounds that the MOD was underestimating the future employment of unarmored 

cargo trucks.484 U.S. officials also continued to buy Up-Armored (UA) HMMWVs despite a 

2014 CSTC-A briefing which identified UA HMMWVs as a feasible but unsuitable candidate 

for the ANDSF given “insufficient protection from IEDs.”485 (See Figure 12.). General 

Karimi had also requested the ANA be provided with precision direct-fire capabilities, 

writing that due to “the loss of ISAF air support, the political restrictions on the use of 

An Afghan commando provides security during a meeting between the ANDSF, coalition forces, and the district 

governor in Helmand Province in March 2013. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Pete Thibodeau) 
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ISAF air support, and a desire to reduce civilian casualties,” there was a need for more 

accurate direct-fire capabilities.486 CSTC-A did not support this request.

General Karimi’s requests were not unfounded. In 2016, an internal OSD Cost 

Assessment and Program Evaluation study found that ground weapons and 

vehicles could fill important gaps in the ANDSF’s firepower and mobility, as they 

were “affordable, available in the near-term, [and] employable and sustainable by 

the Afghans.”487

Given the Afghans’ minimal armored protection and direct fire capabilities and the 2014 

drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces, the United States has increasingly turned to 

U.S. airstrikes (See Table 4.). According to U.S. Air Force Central Command, the United 

States conducted 5,982 airstrikes through October 2018 in Afghanistan—more than the 

number carried out during 2017 (4,361) and three times as many as were carried out 

in 2016.488 Notably, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) 

recorded 649 civilian casualties (313 deaths and 336 injuries) due to aerial operations 

by pro-government forces from January 1 to September 30, 2018, a 39 percent increase 

EMBEDDED 

TRAINING TEAMS

ETT SECURITY FORCE

ASSISTANCE TEAMS

SFAT SFA ADVISOR 

TEAMS

SFAAT

Source: Adopted from GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S.-Funded Equipment for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces, GAO-17-667R, 

August 10, 2017, p. 12.

U.S.-FUNDED VEHICLES PROVIDED TO THE ANDSF BY TYPE AND FORCE, FY 2003–2016

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

16,670

25,934

13,654

8,520 7,506

1,492 729 276 928 0 189 0

Afghan National Army

Afghan National Police

Light 

Tactical 

Vehicles

Medium 

Tactical 

Vehicles

HMMWVs Recovery 

Vehicles

Armored

Personnel

Carriers

Mine Resistant

Ambush Protected

(MRAP) Vehicles

FIGURE 12

“We have observed over the past decade the coalition provided 

its forces with improved armored vehicles based on the same 

threat reality, and we anticipate that our light force is incapable 

of operating freely with similar freedom of movement without 

sustaining significant casualties for the foreseeable future.”

—MOD Chief of General Staff, General Sher Karimi
76 | EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

over the same period in 2017. The 2018 figures reflect the highest number of civilian 

casualties caused by airstrikes since UNAMA began recording such data in 2009.489

While the lack of consistent involvement in equipping decisions could be attributed 

to the fact that the pseudo FMS process does not require host nation involvement 

or approval, DSCA does state that partner nations should be involved in equipping 

decisions. For example, partner nations should “provide details of their existing 

capabilities, capacity, and security requirements to enable identification and 

prioritization of [pseudo FMS] requirements.”490 There is also general agreement that 

involving a partner nation is critical to ensuring partner nation buy-in and a sense of 

ownership.491 This point was emphasized in a 2015 Afghanistan Program Management 

Review briefing when U.S. advisors stated that increasing Afghan involvement and 

leveraging their unique capabilities (such as “requirement awareness” and “continuity”) 

during the requirements development process was essential for “more sustainable 

results” and a “greater sense of ownership.”492

TABLE 4

NUMBER OF U.S. AIRSTRIKES IN AFGHANISTAN, 2015–2018

2015 2016 2017 2018

Total 947 1,337 4,361 5,982

Source: Combined Forces Air Component Commander, “2013–2018 Airpower Statistics,” as of October 31, 2018.

A Mobile Strike Force Vehicle provided to an Afghan commando unit. MSFVs, such as the one pictured 

above, provide more mobility, protection, and firepower than the ANSDF’s HMMWVs. (U.S. Army photo by 

Connor Mendez)
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LIMITED COMMAND EMPHASIS ON 

TEACHING FMS PROCESS HINDERS 

INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Command-and-control relationships in Afghanistan do not resemble those of traditional security 

cooperation missions. Traditionally, the U.S. ambassador manages relations with the host nation and 

implements U.S. foreign policy, including security cooperation. The security cooperation organization, as 

a staff section within the country team, helps manage the military aspects of this relationship. Housed 

in the U.S. Embassy and overseen by the geographic combatant command, a traditional security 

cooperation organization is tasked with maintaining a close, cooperative relationship with the host 

nation.493 According to the Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies (DISCS), DOD’s school 

for the professional education of personnel involved in security cooperation management, the SCO is 

vital for pursuing security cooperation’s key focus areas: “creating access, building relationships, and 

creating or improving capabilities/capacities in the partner nation security forces.”494

However, when U.S. military units are conducting large-scale combat operations in support of the host 

nation’s military, the commander of the deployed force assumes responsibility for security cooperation 

activities. As the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM, now DISCS) wrote 

in 2011: 

The organizations in Afghanistan and Iraq can loosely be termed “pseudo SCOs” for a variety of 

reasons. First, their mission, including operational advice and training, exceeds that of a normal 

SCO under U.S. law. Second, these organizations are part of operational commands, rather than 

U.S. Embassy country teams. As such, they do not report to the U.S. ambassador, but to the GCC 

[Geographic Combatant Command] through [military] channels.495

This is reinforced by the Economy Act (31 U.S.C., § 1535), which requires defense articles to be 

transferred to U.S. government organizations during building partner capacity efforts.496 As the 

U.S. government organization tasked with receiving defense articles for the Afghans, it is CSTC-A’s 

responsibility for determining the extent to which the Afghans are exposed to and involved in the 

equipping process.497

After 18 years, however, the Afghans do not have a consistent, formal role in the equipping process.498

CSTC-A’s SAO is not part of the embassy’s country team and does not have a formal relationship 

with the MOI and MOD.499 In December 2018, for example, CSTC-A told SIGAR that SAO commodity 

managers do not work directly with the Afghans in the MOD and MOI.500 While multiple factors 

contribute to the Afghans’ inconsistent role—such as the SAO’s non-traditional SCO structure and 

the fact that other directorates within CSTC-A have lead responsibility for working directly with the 

MOD and MOI—the lack of a consistent requirement from CSTC-A to work with the Afghans during 

the equipping process is the most significant.501 By limiting Afghan exposure to U.S. systems and 

processes, and by failing to issue a formal requirement to involve the Afghans, the current advisory 

effort has hindered the development of an institutional capacity that is foundational for a long-term 

defense relationship.

While personnel have implemented initiatives aimed at increasing Afghan involvement in the equipping 

process, and while DISCS has sent Mobile Training Teams to Afghanistan to train Afghans on the
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

equipping process, these initiatives were often short-lived.502 For example, although CSTC-A issued 

guidance in 2015 that all ASFF Letters of Request and Justification be approved and signed by CSTC-A 

and the MOD and MOI, this guidance was not implemented.503 Further, while Afghan liaison officers 

have served at the SAO, there are currently no Afghan MOD or MOI officers assigned as liaison officers 

to the SAO.504 There have also been a few instances in which DOD converted ASFF funds into grant aid 

for execution by the Afghans as normal FMS cases, which fully involved them in the process.505 Despite 

these efforts, DOD officials told SIGAR that the rapid turnover of U.S. personnel often resulted in 

initiatives for including the Afghans being discontinued when personnel rotated out of Afghanistan.506

 By limiting Afghan exposure to U.S. systems and 

processes, and by failing to issue a formal requirement 

to involve the Afghans, the current advisory effort has 

hindered the development of an institutional capacity 

that is foundational for a long-term defense relationship.

As a result, the Afghans currently have limited ownership and understanding of the equipping 

process.507 If and when the military transitions to a more traditional security cooperation mission in 

Afghanistan, the Afghans will need be able to play a larger role in the direction, execution, and tracking 

of their own equipment procurement, training contracts, and sustainment. “For that to happen,” one 

former SAO officer wrote in 2011, “it is critical for security cooperation personnel to teach, mentor, and 

then stand back and let their Afghan colleagues take over acquisition.”508
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POST-2014 EQUIPPING DECISIONS MADE WITH LIMITED DATA AND 

INPUT FROM FIELD 

Since the 2014 shift to sustaining the force, CSTC-A has been primarily focused on 

replenishing stocks of equipment already authorized for the ANDSF.509 However, SIGAR 

found conflicting claims concerning the extent to which these equipping decisions—

such as how much ammunition to order or how many vehicles to buy—are informed 

by input from U.S. advisors and Afghan forces in the field. In 2018, GAO reported that 

military advisors’ limited contact with ANDSF conventional ground forces in the field 

meant that DOD had limited information on the ANDSF’s ability to operate and maintain 

equipment.510 That same year, CSTC-A told SIGAR that they did not maintain a tactical 

perspective on how equipment was being maintained and used by the ANDSF.511 DOD 

officials made similar comments in 2019, telling SIGAR that field advisors and operators 

do not have a way to talk to the SAO.512

In 2019, when SIGAR questioned the extent to which CSTC-A solicits and tracks 

information on the usability, sustainability, and operational effectiveness of U.S.-

provided equipment, CSTC-A told SIGAR that such information is collected through 

various channels and at multiple points. According to CSTC-A, TAACs present equipping 

concerns during TAAC synchronization meetings hosted by CSTC-A, and U.S. and 

coalition advisors record equipping issues via the Afghan Advisor Network.513

“CSTC-A is more focused on accountability of ANDSF equipment 

rather than determining if it is the right equipment.”

—DOD Official 

It is unclear, however, whether these mechanisms provide sufficient data, or if CSTC-A 

uses these data. According to a former SAO officer who served in Afghanistan from 

2016 to 2017, the lack of data and limited contact with ANDSF forces meant that 

equipping decisions—how many HMMWVs to buy, for instance—are determined by 

regression formulas that “seemed arbitrary” and algorithms that “never made sense.”514

DOD officials corroborated this, telling SIGAR in 2019 that decisions concerning the 

replenishment of existing types of equipment are determined not by input from the field, 

but by CSTC-A-developed algorithms, assumptions about equipment life expectancy, 

and models they described as arbitrary and not always accurate.515 When SIGAR asked 

1st SFAB personnel if CSTC-A sought information on the status of equipment, 1st SFAB 

personnel described information sharing “as more of a push rather than a pull.”516

DOD officials also told SIGAR that the focus is on sustainment and replicating past 

orders, and that assessing capability gaps and considering new capabilities or upgrades 

is not CSTC-A’s priority.517 In 2019, for example, a DOD official told SIGAR that “CSTC-A 

is more focused on accountability of ANDSF equipment rather than determining if it is 

the right equipment.”518 Because of this, DOD could be missing out on opportunities to 

provide the ANDSF with more appropriate or cost-effective equipment. 
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Capability Upgrades Not Considered for Afghan HMMWVs 

The United States normally provides allies receiving U.S. equipment with information on 

equipment upgrades and improvements, but this did not always occur with equipment provided 

to the ANDSF. For example, CSTC-A provided M1151A1 HMMWVs to the Afghans without 

several upgrades, including the Objective Gunners Protection Kit, Overhead Cover, and the 

Objective Weapons Elevation Kit. While these upgrades were applied to U.S. forces’ HMMWVs 

operating in Afghanistan from 2007 to 2009 to improve operational capabilities and reduce 

losses—and while they are now considered standard for U.S. Army vehicles—the ANA and 

ANP have not been provided with these protection and capability upgrades.519 Moreover, 

newly procured M1151A1 HMMWVs and excessed M1151A1 HMMWVs being refurbished for 

the ANA and ANP do not include any of these improved capabilities. While the addition of 

some of these capabilities would require some modifications to carry the extra weight, such 

modifications were successfully made to U.S.-operated M1151A1s.520 Meanwhile, the Afghans 

have attempted to reproduce the protection provided by these upgrades by using parts from 

destroyed HMMWVs.521

An Afghan gunner in a HMMWV outfitted with an older gunner protection kit and no Overhead Cover in 

2017. (Photo provided by the Asymmetric Warfare Group) 

A U.S. gunner in Afghanistan in a HMMWV outfitted with the U.S. Objective Gunner Protection Kit and 

Overhead Cover in 2013. (Photo by Jessi McCormick)
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FMS STAKEHOLDERS DO NOT COORDINATE SUFFICIENTLY, 

LACK EXPERTISE

Equipping the ANDSF requires the involvement of multiple U.S. organizations in both 

Afghanistan and the United States (See Figure 13.). While these organizations have 

specific roles and responsibilities when it comes to requirement generation, case 

development, and case implementation, the equipping effort is meant to be largely 

collaborative. Personnel at the various organizations are expected to leverage the 

expertise and experience across DOD’s FMS system to provide equipment to partner 

nations that is both appropriate and sustainable.522 For example, while the implementing 

agencies are typically considered best positioned to assemble equipment packages given 

their specific commodity expertise, in-country security cooperation organizations are 

generally considered best fit to work with the partner country to translate capability 

shortfalls into specific requests for defense articles and services.523

Generally, however, SIGAR found that equipping decisions and the equipping process 

lacked the desired level of expertise and cooperation. This stems in part from the fact 

that CSTC-A lacked, and continues to lack, a capability development process that 

consistently involves and leverages the expertise housed within the military services 

and DOD. Army officials said that CSTC-A often submitted requirements to the services 

expecting them to be filled without question, and rarely asked for help when generating 

requirements for the ANDSF.524 If and when they sought assistance, CSTC-A officers 

tended to rely on informal, or back-channel communications with U.S.-based staff-level 

officers, who may or may not know the range of capabilities the services can provide. 

As a result, CSTC-A did not always receive the services’ official input, and alternative 

capabilities or equipment were not always proposed or considered.525

REQUIREMENT GENERATION AND CASE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS IN AFGHANISTAN

Note: a Requirement owner refers to a military organization within the Resolute Support Mission authorized to request equipment or services in support 

of the ANDSF.

b

 Afghanistan Resource and Requirement Validation Process approval is required for new capabilities not already authorized on the tashkil.

Source: SIGAR correspondence with CSTC-A/SAO, June 2018; SIGAR correspondence with DSCA, June 2018; DSCA, Security Assistance Management 

Manual, April 2012.

Requirement

Owner a

Letter of 

Justification b

Security 

Assistance 

Office - 

Afghanistan

Memorandum 

of Request

DSCA

Assigned 

Implementing 

Agency

Pseudo Letter 

of Offer and 

Acceptance

AFGHANISTAN-BASED ORGANIZATIONS 

Required Documents

U.S.-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

FIGURE 13
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Further, the process used to approve requests for new capabilities, the Afghanistan 

Resource and Requirement Validation Process, is staffed with key stakeholders from 

within CSTC-A. The military services and those organizations within DOD with combat 

development expertise do not have a formal, consistent role in this process.526

The foreign military sales system also lacks the mechanisms needed to ensure proper 

coordination and collaboration. According to one 2011 DOD report on security cooperation, 

the FMS process is largely decentralized, as it lacks a unifying framework and process that 

mandates coordination among various stakeholders.527 As a result, the equipping process has 

become “segmented, largely sequential, and virtually autonomous.”528 A former U.S. Army 

Security Assistance Command (USASAC) official substantiated this finding, telling SIGAR 

that “responsibility [for filling the request] was generally passed down the line, with no effort 

to refine or question the initial requirement.”529

With no actual capability or combat development process, and with no means to hold 

organizations accountable for cooperation and collaboration, key actors responsible 

for certain commodities or major end items were often not included in equipping 

decisions or the case development process. In 2012, for example, the DOD OIG reported 

that NTM-A/CSTC-A did not involve subject matter experts or obtain assistance from 

life cycle management commands when developing sustainment requirements for 

equipment used by the ANA, even though life cycle management commands had relevant 

maintenance data available. Because NTMA-A/CSTC-A did not always have such 

expertise accessible in country, the DOD OIG concluded that “NTM-A/CSTC-A officials 

were not in a position to make informed decisions on sustainment of ANA individual 

equipment items.”530

Additional examples illustrate the lack of coordination and cooperation. In 2015, a 

CSTC-A Essential Function 5 officer submitted a request for 50,000 Russian S-5 rockets 

that were not needed; U.S. Air Force advisors in Afghanistan and the relevant Afghan 

munitions chief were not consulted prior to the order. Concerned by the request, OSDPolicy officials contacted U.S. Air Force advisors in Afghanistan, who confirmed with 

the Afghan munitions chief that “TAAC-Air and the AAF [did] not have a requirement for 

50,000 additional S-5 orders.”531

In 2018, DOD officials told SIGAR that instead of reaching out to the services and 

subject matter experts, officers in the SAO “conduct a lot of unnecessary internet 

research.”532 SIGAR found this to be the case in 2017, when the agency determined that 

CSTC-A personnel responsible for assisting the MOD with identifying new camouflage 

patterns for uniforms in 2010 did so via internet research rather than consultations with 

experts. As a result, CSTC-A procured approximately $94 million worth of uniforms that 

may be inappropriate for Afghanistan’s operational environment.533

DOD’s $468 million purchase of 20 C27A/G222 medium-lift cargo planes for the AAF 

provides an example of poor coordination within a single organization. The AAF G222 

program ended in March 2013 because critical parts were expensive and difficult to 

Essential Function 5 (EF5) (now referred to as the 

Operational Sustainment 

directorate) is the 

directorate responsible 

for assisting the Afghan 

MOD and MOI in the areas 

of logistics, sustainment, 

and maintenance. CSTC-A 

has identified operational 

sustainment as a 

requirement owner able 

to submit LOJs requesting 

equipment, training, 

services, and supplies 

already authorized by the 

tashkil.

The Afghanistan Resource 

and Requirement Validation 

Process validates new 

requirements not already 

authorized on the tashkil. 

Once a requirement is 

validated by the Council 

of Colonels, it is passed to 

the General Officer Steering 

Committee to determine 

whether to proceed with 

the pseudo FMS case. The 

commanding general or 

deputy commanding general 

may approve a requirement 

in lieu of this process. 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 83

obtain.534 However, the U.S. Air Force had already identified these problems when they 

were operating the aircraft from 1990 to 1999, deciding to retire the C27A/G222 because 

parts were—as CSTC-A realized years later—expensive and difficult to obtain. It remains 

unclear why the U.S. Air Force would buy 20 used C27A/G222 for the Afghans when it 

already knew the aircraft was not sustainable.535

“Responsibility [for filling the request] was generally passed down 

the line, with no effort to refine or question the initial requirement.”

—Former USASAC official

Equipping efforts have also been hindered by confusion among personnel concerning 

the various organizations’ roles and responsibilities. Personnel interviewed for this 

report often expressed unclear and contradictory understanding of organizations’ roles 

within the FMS system. For example, there was no consensus among interviewees as 

to which organization was responsible for ensuring the total package approach (See 

section on total package approach, pp. 87–88.). Similar confusion over roles and 

responsibilities was identified by a 2017 SIGAR report on U.S.-provided organizational 

clothing and individual equipment. According to the report, CSTC-A did not document 

roles and responsibilities in the acquisition process following the transition to the 

Resolute Support Mission in 2015, despite requirements to do so.536 DOD and coalition 

officials told SIGAR that the lack of clearly defined responsibilities increased the 

possibility of duplication and created problems in accurately identifying requirements.537

The risk for duplication was highlighted by one EF-5 advisor who told SIGAR in 

2015 that various organizations can submit pseudo FMS requests to the SAO without 

consulting the EF-5, the organization responsible for ordering equipment and supplies 

already authorized by the tashkil.

538

The removal of proponent leads responsible for the development of the ANA and the 

ANP (Deputy Commander – Army and Deputy Commander – Police, respectively) in 

2014 further obfuscated responsibilities.539 While the U.S.-led coalition continued to 

provide advisors to senior leaders in the MOD and MOI, these advisors did not have the 

same control over U.S. funding and coalition support held by the DCOMs.540 Eliminating 

the DCOM-Army and DCOM-Police positions and their organizations resulted in a 

diffusion of responsibilities and resources, making it difficult to identify who or what 

organization was accountable for critical equipping decisions related to the ANA and 

ANP. This is highlighted in a 2017 SIGAR audit, which found that the lack of ANA and 

ANP proponent leads resulted in critical shortages of clothing and equipment.541

In contrast, the AAF and Afghan Special Forces were left with U.S. and coalition 

headquarter elements that maintained control and oversight over the specific missions 

and advising efforts at all levels. According to one former commander of the 9th Air 

Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) and NATO-Air Command – Afghanistan—the 

commands responsible for supporting the AAF—having a proponent command element 

was critical to identifying and addressing the AAF’s needs.542

The tashkil is the official 

Afghan government table 

showing the personnel and 

equipment that an ANA or ANP 

unit is authorized.
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Personnel Lack Relevant Technical Expertise, Acquisition 

Experience, and Training

SIGAR also found that U.S. personnel at the various organizations within the FMS 

system lacked the relevant technical expertise, acquisition experience, or training 

necessary to effectively carry out their roles and responsibilities. On multiple occasions, 

personnel selected to fill security cooperation positions—including key positions at the 

SAO and military departments’ implementing agencies—did not have the training or 

background needed to ensure that equipping decisions were appropriate, cost-effective, 

and in accordance with DOD procedures. 

In many cases, military officers assigned to the SAO had no security assistance experience 

or technical background in the areas for which they were responsible. In 2008, for 

example, the DOD OIG found that CSTC-A’s Joint Manning Document allocated only nine 

personnel billets to the SAO, and that none of the nine billets were filled by personnel who 

had received mandatory security assistance training or who possessed security assistance 

experience.543 The DOD OIG concluded, “This staffing level was not commensurate with 

the staffing levels provided to other SAOs working in countries critical to U.S. interests, 

much less an SAO engaged in supporting a country at war.”544 According to a former 

deputy commanding general of programs at CSTC-A, keeping the Security Assistance 

Office understaffed while pouring billions of dollars’ worth of equipment into a foreign 

army made mistakes inevitable.545 Others agreed: One former USASAC official told SIGAR 

that neither USASAC nor the SAO were staffed well enough to ensure that billions of U.S. 

dollars were spent effectively, and DOD officials told SIGAR in 2019 that at one point, 

three consecutive SAO directors had no FMS experience.546

“This staffing level was not commensurate with the staffing 

levels provided to other SAOs working in countries critical to 

U.S. interests, much less an SAO engaged in supporting a 

country at war.”

—DOD Office of Inspector General

In many ways, these concerns reflected larger personnel issues within DOD’s security 

cooperation workforce. A 2011 DOD security cooperation task force concluded that 

personnel selected to fill security cooperation positions, including key positions at 

DSCA and SCOs, “often lack the experience, skills, and training necessary to carry out 

their responsibilities effectively.”547

For much of the past decade, personnel assigned to the SAO continued to serve onetime FMS roles and were assigned to commodities with which they had little to no 

experience. For example, multiple U.S. Navy lieutenants were assigned responsibility 

for ground ammunition and weapons, and U.S. Air Force first lieutenants have been 

assigned responsibility for tactical vehicles.548 In 2015, a SAO officer told SIGAR that 

the “SAO [in Afghanistan] is manned by generalists” rather than officers with specific 
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equipping experience or expertise.549 That same year, DOD officials told SIGAR that 

CSTC-A did not have a trained logistician on staff with expertise in buying military 

clothing or individual equipment, increasing the likelihood that the EF-5 ordered the 

wrong items at the wrong times.550 DOD and coalition officials also told SIGAR that 

CSTC-A and Resolute Support personnel generally do not understand the pseudo 

FMS process, U.S. procurement laws and regulations, or best practices for large-scale 

acquisition processes.551

There also appears to be no consensus as to what type of expertise is needed where. 

Although some have argued that efforts should be made to increase the number of 

foreign area officers (FAO) serving FMS-related roles in Afghanistan, FAO experience 

does not equate to FMS, force development, or equipping experience. As one DOD 

official told SIGAR, “despite common thinking, FAOs are not trained to do FMS; rather, 

their job is the management and oversight of security assistance writ large.”552

Although efforts have been made to improve the staffing of organizations involved in 

the FMS process, these efforts often occurred outside of normal staffing processes for 

FMS billets. Commanders intent on improving staffing used personal networks to recruit 

competent personnel.553 According to a former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, the pseudo FMS process could have worked if the U.S. military had consistently 

prioritized the staffing of the organizations responsible for equipping and training the 

ANDSF.554 However, because there was no institutionalized effort to improve staffing, 

gaps in experience and expertise persist.

DOD institutions responsible for training and education have also struggled to keep pace 

with the speed, scope, and scale of DOD’s security cooperation efforts.555 Often, key 

security personnel did not receive training from DSCA’s Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management (now known as the Defense Institute for Security Cooperation 

Studies, or DISCS), the DOD institution responsible at the time for providing security 

assistance and security cooperation training.556 Personnel who did receive training were 

often not exposed to non-traditional FMS processes such as the pseudo FMS process 

used in Afghanistan. As one 2011 DOD report noted, “DOD is increasingly focused on 

efforts to build partner country capabilities that are beyond the scope of traditional 

security assistance activities, but DOD has not fully developed the training required to 

support this new reality.”557 The report also found that training failed to address security 

cooperation more broadly, including important topics such as linking requirements 

generation to capabilities analysis.558

Overall, few improvements have been made to DOD’s security cooperation training and 

educational programming. An officer who worked at the SAO in 2016 told SIGAR that 

the DISAM/DISCS training he received was geared toward officers filling defense attaché 

roles who must understand how to coordinate between the embassy and the host nation 

government, and that only one hour of a five-week course was dedicated to pseudo FMS 

cases.559 He added that the DISAM course “did not prepare him for the actual, practical 

day-to-day work at the SAO.”560 In late 2018, a DOD official told SIGAR that DOD’s 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

security cooperation training “has not changed much over the years and was never any 

good in the first place.”561 One interviewee mentioned that examples from Afghanistan 

were included in their training, however.562

Without relevant experience and expertise, and without sufficient training, personnel 

serving in critical equipping roles struggled to identify appropriate and cost-effective 

requirements. According to one OSD-Policy official, personnel involved in equipping 

decisions were generally unaware of time- and cost-saving options available to them, 

such as sales from stock, blanket order FMS cases, or the use of excess defense 

articles (EDA).563 DOD officials also told SIGAR that personnel unfamiliar with the 

item or commodity to which they were assigned rarely questioned the work of their 

predecessor, leading them to “double down on failure.”564

These problems were only exacerbated by the frequent turnover of personnel at 

CSTC-A, which resulted in limited knowledge about past equipping decisions. For 

example, in its FY 2014 budget request, CSTC-A requested $195.2 million for armored 

Mobile Strike Force Vehicles for the ANA.565 Due to a changing rotation of personnel, 

however, incoming CSTC-A personnel were unaware that the National Security Council 

and the White House had already approved their request to purchase the Mobile 

Strike Force Vehicles. Because they were unaware the request had been approved, 

and under pressure to obligate funds quickly, unarmored cargo trucks were procured 

despite the MOD notifying CSTC-A that unarmored cargo trucks were not needed.566

This occurred again in 2016, when a new rotation of CSTC-A personnel submitted a 

request for ammunition that their predecessors had determined six months earlier was 

not needed.567

Excess defense articles

are items no longer 

needed by the U.S. armed 

forces. In most cases, 

EDA can be transferred to 

partner nations at no or 

reduced cost. 

A member of the ANA in 2014 handles a center mast line used to bring in an aerostat, an aerial 

surveillance balloon capable of providing real-time video surveillance. (Photo by Frankie J. Colbry) 
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TOTAL PACKAGE APPROACH NOT CONSISTENTLY APPLIED

DOD has long held that successful foreign military sales and partner-nation satisfaction 

stem from careful planning and foresight. According to DISCS, “Effective planning for an 

FMS weapon system sale involves anticipating not only the requirements for the weapon 

system itself, but also the associated initial and follow-on support articles and services 

necessary for introduction and sustainment of the system.”568 This philosophy, known 

as the total package approach (TPA), refers to DOD’s commitment to provide partner 

nations with the opportunity to acquire the full complement of material, training, and 

services necessary to field, use, and maintain equipment efficiently and effectively.569

This includes providing partner nations with items such as training, technical assistance, 

manuals, parts, and follow-on support.570 According to Army Pamphlet 12-1, “Security 

Assistance Procedures and Operations,” failure to implement TPA could result in 

“reduced performance, lower operational readiness rates and, potentially, an increased 

safety risk to partner nation personnel.”571

Yet equipment was often provided to the ANDSF without appropriate training, spare 

parts, or manuals. A DOD OIG assessment team observed in 2012 that the 215th Corps 

did not have technical manuals in Dari or Pashto for their HMMWVs, Ford Ranger 

Light Transport Vehicles (LTV), or international trucks; rather, all their manuals were 

in English. When this issue was raised to CSTC-A, it provided some of the technical 

manuals on compact discs—an impractical solution, given the scarcity of working 

computers, printers, and copiers at the corps level and below.572 The lack of Dari or 

Pashto manuals was identified as early as 2007, when the MOD’s Assistant Minister 

of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics wrote to CSTC-A requesting 

technical manuals for equipment and weapons they had received, such as HMMWVs, 

Medium Tactical Vehicles (MTV), LTVs, M113s, M577s, and M16s.573 In 2014, the Army 

Contracting Command, Orlando, noted that U.S.-procured Pilatus PC-12s, the Special 

Mission Wing’s Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance aircraft in Afghanistan, 

lacked “training devices, training aids, and equipment necessary for different types of 

mission/training capabilities in support of their counterterrorism and counternarcotics 

operations.”574 In 2016, individual weapons (M4 carbines, for instance) were provided to 

the ANDSF without appropriate cleaning materials or the equipment required to perform 

required maintenance.575

Multiple factors contributed to gaps in the TPA. First, there appears to have been 

considerable confusion among organizations involved in the equipping process 

concerning roles and responsibilities. During interviews conducted for this report, 

there were varying answers as to which organization was responsible for ensuring the 

TPA, with one interviewee telling SIGAR that the total package approach has generally 

been thought of as a “pickup game.”576 For example, while Army regulation identifies 

the implementing agency (i.e., USASAC) as responsible for ensuring that requests 

are processed with the TPA, not one individual identified USASAC as responsible.577

A former official at USASAC thought CSTC-A and the SAO were responsible, while a 

former SAO officer thought it was the requirement owner (i.e., the military organization 

within the Resolute Support Mission requesting the material or services) who was 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

responsible.578 In a 2018 data call response, the SAO told SIGAR that their organization 

was responsible for ensuring the total package approach.579 However, former SAO 

officers interviewed for this report stated that their job was fulfilling requirements 

passed down, not developing or refining them.580

Additionally, SIGAR found that tools used to ensure the total package approach were 

either inadequate or not used. For example, implementing agencies can use commodityspecific checklists to help identify the various items or services that should be included 

in an item sale.581 However, a USASAC official told SIGAR that while USASAC has 

checklists to support the TPA, they were not confident these checklists were used or 

up to date.582 Because DSCA recognizes that commodity-specific checklists are not 

always sufficient for anticipating all the variables needed during case development, 

teams can be organized and deployed to conduct assessments of military capabilities 

to better identify and clarify requirements. For example, DSCA can send Expeditionary 

Requirements Generation Teams to help SCOs with translating partner nation capability 

needs into more comprehensive requests.583 When asked if DSCA has ever deployed 

such teams to Afghanistan, DSCA told SIGAR in 2018 that they have not. “These teams,” 

according to DSCA, “are generally used for SCOs that require assistance due to either 

their lack of subject matter expertise or other factors. CSTC-A’s presence in Afghanistan 

provides the required expertise.”584

Another problem was the tendency to rely on contractors without providing adequate 

oversight. In 2014, an OSD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics task force found 

the “TPA has repeatedly been refused by the coalition requirements owners with the 

assumption that support would be provided directly by coalition forces or through 

other emplaced contracts.”585 This assumption was not always warranted. As the task 

force noted, “In many cases, neither the coalition nor emplaced contracts were able to 

provide the required support to successfully develop an effective organic sustainment 

capability. The result has been equipment provided without technical manuals, training, 

or parts packages.”586 The lack of required support was corroborated by a 2014 SIGAR 

audit on U.S.-provided Mobile Strike Force Vehicles, which found that the coalition was 

often unable to provide the security needed for the contractors to conduct maintenance 

and training.587

The rapid fielding of equipment has also led to gaps in the total package approach. 

According to DOD in 2015: 

During the ISAF mission, DOD efforts focused on the expedited fielding of equipment 

required to keep pace with the rapid expansion of the ANDSF, while simultaneously 

maintaining operational readiness during active combat operations. In particular, 

wheeled vehicles, weapons, and other ground equipment were provided to the ANDSF 

without the total package approach traditionally used for foreign military sales with 

security cooperation partners. As a result, the standard array of initial spare parts, 

maintenance manuals, support equipment, training, technical assistance, and followon support was not provided for ANA and ANP equipment.588
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ARMORED AMBULANCES

Senior U.S. military leaders have repeatedly reported that the ANDSF is suffering an 

unsustainable number of casualties.589 While recent ANDSF casualty data have been 

classified, reported losses for 2016 were 6,700 dead and 12,000 wounded.590

A November 15, 2018, New York Times article reported that since 2015, there 

have been more than 28,000 Afghan military deaths.591 Yet even with losses of 

this magnitude, the MOD’s requests for additional armored ambulances have 

been ignored. 

ANA and ANP Lack Armored Ambulances, Only 

Authorized for Special Forces

The U.S. military uses armored ambulances to move wounded personnel from areas 

of active fighting to secure locations where they can either be treated or transferred 

to helicopters or unarmored ambulances for movement to medical facilities. However, 

the ANDSF, with an authorized force of 352,000, is authorized only 38 armored 

ambulances, all of which are assigned to the Afghan Army Special Forces.592 These 

38 armored ambulances, a variant of the MSFV, have room for two stretchers and 

two extra seats that can be used to transport the less seriously wounded. Unlike 

U.S. armored ambulances, the MSFV ambulance does not have a large rear ramp 

for loading stretchers. Stretcher patients must be loaded through a small side door 

which can be difficult and time-consuming, and which could expose the wounded 

and medical personnel to enemy fire.593

CSTC-A has provided the ANA and ANP with two types of unarmored ambulances: the 

Ford Ranger ambulance, also referred to as the “urban ambulance,” and the M1152 

HMMWV ambulance.594

No Action Taken on ANA Request for Armored 

Ambulances, Missed Opportunity for Use of EDA 

To address the ANDSF’s need for armored ambulances that can move in areas where there is active fighting, 

the Afghan MOD has requested that CSTC-A provide the ANA with the MaxxPro armored ambulance.595 Per 

the MOD’s request, armored ambulances would be used to “replace unarmored Ford Ranger and M1152 

ambulances in infantry kandaks operating in high threat areas.”596 The MaxxPro ambulance provides needed 

protection, is designed to support en route medical care, and has a large rear ramp that simplifies the loading 

of stretchers. However, CSTC-A has taken no action on these requests—even though the U.S. Army has surplus 

MaxxPro ambulances that the U.S. military does not need and even though Congress has passed legislation that 

supports giving excess MaxxPro ambulances to U.S. partners.597 Instead, the U.S. Army has sent surplus MaxxPro 

ambulances to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Disposition Services (DS) to be destroyed. In 2017, for 

example, 287 MaxxPro ambulances were sent to DLA-DS for destruction.598

An ambulance variant of the Mobile Strike Force 

Vehicle. (Photo provided by the U.S. Army Program 

Executive Office for Combat Support & Combat 

Service Support) 

An Afghan HMMWV ambulance. (U.S. Army photo by 

James Fidel)
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Non-Standard Equipment Complicates Process

Since 2002, the United States has been equipping the ANDSF with non-standard 

equipment, a term used to describe equipment that is neither managed nor maintained in 

DOD’s supply system because it has been retired or because it was never purchased for 

U.S.-military components.599 Examples of U.S.-supplied nonstandard equipment include 

Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters, Ford Rangers, Navistar Medium Tactical Vehicles, 

AK-47s, and RPG-7s.600 While the ANA and ANP have benefited from this equipment 

and continue to use it, non-standard equipment has historically been difficult for 

DOD and the FMS system to support. This is because there is no organization in DOD 

responsible for the management, fielding, and sustainment of non-standard equipment 

like there is for standard equipment. For example, while Army’s Product Manager for 

Individual Weapons is responsible for the M16 rifle provided to the Afghans, there 

is no organization in the U.S. Army responsible for supporting the AK-47s the U.S. 

Army provides the Afghans.601 According to one officer who worked at USASAC, the 

organization responsible for ensuring the total package approach for Army FMS cases, 

USASAC, “had no one with expertise working with or acquiring non-standard weapons” 

during the initial fielding of equipment to the ANDSF.602

Without specific organizations supporting these weapons, the FMS system is not 

designed to reproduce the fielding and sustainment planning that is supposed to occur 

within the military departments’ program management offices. As a result, non-standard 

equipment was often provided without the tools, parts, manuals, and training needed to 

operate and maintain the equipment. According to one senior DOD official, for example, 

non-standard radios were repeatedly sent to the Afghans without the antennae needed 

to operate them.603 The lack of expertise was also highlighted by a 2011 U.S. Army 

ANA soldiers enter a Ford Ranger in eastern Afghanistan. Ford Rangers are one example of 

non-standard equipment the United States procures for the ANDSF. (Photo by Austin Berner)

Program management 

offices are organizations 

responsible for developing 

and fielding a specific 

category of items.
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Audit Agency report, which concluded that the U.S. Army did not have the technical 

knowledge needed to establish and sustain an airworthiness certification for the Mi-17s 

at the same standard as Army military aircraft.604

In 2010 and 2011, the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and 

Technology attempted to address the lack of program management offices by creating 

several “non-standard” program management offices and directorates, such as the U.S. 

Army’s Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft Program Management Office (now known 

as Multinational Aviation Support Special Project Office), a Non-Standard Ammunition 

Product Manager, and Product Manager Allied Tactical Vehicles.605

CHANGES TO ASFF INCREASE FLEXIBILITY BUT LIMIT OVERSIGHT 

Created in 2005, the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund provides DOD with the 

authority and funding needed to staff, train, equip, and sustain the ANDSF.606 Since its 

establishment, the ASFF account has been the largest of DOD’s security cooperation 

accounts, generally receiving more than 50 percent of security cooperation funding 

provided to DOD, and in FY 2011 receiving 74 percent.607

Since the establishment of CSTC-A, its commander has been assigned responsibility for 

ASFF-funded assistance to the ANDSF.608 In addition to determining program requirements, 

the commander is responsible for developing and submitting budget requests, justification 

materials, and Financial Activity Plans (FAP).609 These documents are reviewed and 

approved by the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller in coordination with the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Policy for submission to Congress.610

“[CSTC-A] wanted to burn through remaining funds and so they 

asked me to burn it on HMMWVs we had been trying to cancel. . . . 

Even if I saved money they’d just try to burn it elsewhere.”

—Former SAO officer

To meet the needs of a fluid military environment, Congress authorized several changes 

designed to provide DOD with additional flexibility. For example, ASFF was made a twoyear appropriation, eliminating the normal constraints of a single-year reconciliation of 

obligations and commitments.611 This change did not appear to reduce the pressure to 

quickly obligate funds, however. Personnel interviewed for this report acknowledged 

feeling compelled to spend money prior to funds expiring even when requirements 

were being questioned or when lower cost procurement options (such as using excess 

defense articles) were available.612 As one former SAO officer said, “[CSTC-A] wanted 

to burn through remaining funds and so they asked me to burn it on HMMWVs we had 

been trying to cancel. . . . Even if I saved money they’d just try to burn it elsewhere.”613

Pressure to obligate funds also stemmed from the fact that CSTC-A often received 

funding months into the fiscal year, which shortened the two-year time frame.614
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

CSTC-A has also been afforded added flexibility through the submission of FAPs, which 

allow CSTC-A to modify budget submissions. While reprogramming ASFF has allowed 

CSTC-A to meet emerging requirements, this reprogramming has complicated oversight 

efforts and indicates a lack of planning. According to one former DOD official, money 

is often requested for one purpose, approved by Congress, and then reprogrammed 

over the two-year period “in some cases more than ten times.”615 Another interviewee 

told SIGAR, “The FAPs are too open-ended. . . . What we say we are spending money 

on we are not actually spending money on.”616 With the flexibility afforded to CSTC-A 

through FAPs, CSTC-A was able to turn an initial $220 million request for HMMWVs into 

a $1.5 billion purchase of 6,000 HMMWVs from 2016 to 2018.617

In 2018, Congress noted that the frequency of budget modifications had reached the 

point that Congress was no longer able to provide adequate oversight, writing that, “the 

budget flexibility allowed within the ASFF appropriation in the past has led to a lack of 

budget discipline that challenges effective congressional and executive branch oversight 

and risks wasteful spending.”618

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, this study of the U.S. experience equipping the ANDSF since 2002 finds: 

1. On multiple occasions, the United States procured equipment for the ANDSF that 

either disregarded Afghan-identified requirements, did not meet operational needs, or 

resulted in excess equipment. 

2. For the majority of the conflict in Afghanistan, equipping decisions lacked the 

guidance of a long-term, consistent plan, allowing equipping decisions to be ad hoc 

and inconsistent from year to year. 

3. Equipping decisions were made without the consistent involvement of U.S.-based 

experts within the military services and DOD. As a result, alternative capabilities 

or equipment were not always proposed or considered, and—at times—incorrect 

equipment was requested or equipment was sent without necessary accessories. 

4. Deployed U.S. personnel involved in past and current equipping decisions often 

lacked the relevant technical expertise and acquisition experience needed to ensure 

equipping decisions were appropriate, cost-effective, and in accordance with DOD 

and military department procedures. 

5. While both DOD and the U.S. military services emphasize following the total package 

approach when providing equipment to partner nations, this standard was not always 

met. On multiple occasions, equipment was provided to the Afghans without the full 

complement of material, training, and services necessary for the Afghans to use and 

maintain equipment effectively. 

6. Current mechanisms that track and solicit data on the usability, sustainability, and 

operational effectiveness of U.S.-provided equipment provide an insufficient amount 

of data, and the data that are acquired is not consistently used by CSTC-A. 

7. CSTC-A failed to adequately involve the Afghans in the requirements generation

and development process. As a result, Afghans today have limited ownership and 

understanding of the equipping process. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS

1. OSD-Policy, DSCA, and the military services should conduct a thorough 

analysis of U.S.-procured equipment for the ANDSF to determine short- and 

long-term security assistance. The analysis should consider how best to 

balance long-term sustainability against near-term threats. 

For those items the ANDSF will be required to sustain and maintain in the longterm, the United States should continue to train and advise ANDSF personnel 

and consider more cost-effective solutions to maintain capabilities (for example, 

procuring more indirect-fire capability versus aircraft). For those capabilities the 

United States and Afghans determine will be unnecessary to maintain in the longterm, the United States should create a plan to provide such capabilities to the 

ANDSF until the United States determines conditions are met and the requirement 

for the capabilities is reduced. 

2. Resolute Support, in coordination with the appropriate organizations in the 

ANDSF, should conduct an analysis of how ANDSF casualties occur and then 

work with the Afghan Ministries of Defense and Interior to make equipping 

decisions aimed at reducing casualties. 

The ANDSF has suffered casualties at alarming rates, but there are insufficient data 

on how these casualties occurred. Resolute Support, in partnership with the ANDSF, 

should conduct a thorough investigation into ANDSF casualties suffered in the past 

year to identify trends and mitigation strategies. This investigation should explore 

whether the United States is providing equipment with the necessary protections, 

if the ANDSF has enough medical and casualty evacuation capabilities by ground 

and air. Resolute Support should also work with the Afghans to create a formal data 

collection system that can be used to analyze future ANDSF casualties. 

3. When the U.S. government empowers a temporary organization like CSTC-A to 

transfer equipment to a partner nation, DSCA must establish a formal process 

that ensures all relevant U.S.-based stakeholders approve of and provide input 

on equipping decisions. 

Selecting capabilities that are appropriate and cost-effective and fielding equipment 

with its complement of required accessories requires using the expertise housed 

within DOD and the military services. Appropriate selection and effective fielding 

is even more important when the United States decides to equip fragile states like 

Afghanistan. However, CSTC-A lacks an equipping process that routinely involves 

all stakeholders, and decisions about equipping have been made without formal 

input from the military services. In the future, the successful equipping of a partner 

nation will require a process that involves all stakeholders during the requirement 

identification and case development process. 
94 | EQUIPPING THE FORCE

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

4. DSCA should create a course that familiarizes U.S. personnel with the pseudo

FMS process. To ensure that U.S. efforts are geared toward increasing partner 

nation capabilities, this course should educate U.S. personnel on how best to 

involve a partner nation in the equipping process over time. 

In places like Afghanistan and other fragile states, where the United States uses 

the pseudo FMS process, deployed U.S. personnel must be able to simultaneously 

provide equipment to partner nations and develop the partner nation’s institutional 

capabilities. However, SAO officers received limited to no familiarization with the 

pseudo FMS process and no training on how to be an advisor, unlike personnel 

assigned to advise at other directorates within CSTC-A. 

5. CSTC-A should formalize Afghan involvement in the pseudo FMS process.

Currently, Afghans do not have a formal, consistent role in the pseudo FMS 

process. Past efforts to include the Afghans have been short-lived and subject to 

change based on rotating personnel. Identifying ways to formally and consistently 

increase Afghan involvement (for example, by assigning Afghan liaison officers 

to the SAO) will increase Afghan ownership and understanding of the equipping 

process, will build institutional capabilities, and will decrease Afghan dependence 

on U.S. forces over time. 

6. Congress should consider evaluating the benefits and challenges associated

with using the pseudo FMS process and its impact on overall U.S. foreign 

policy objectives.

Starting in 2005, DOD began using the pseudo FMS process to acquire equipment 

for partner nations like Afghanistan, which lacked financial resources and 

the capability to define their own requirements. However, there is no formal 

requirement to develop a host nation’s institutional capabilities that would allow 

for a successful transition toward a more traditional foreign military sales process 

and, after 18 years, the Afghans have a limited understanding of the U.S. foreign 

military sales process. After over a decade of implementing the process, it would 

be beneficial to evaluate the process’s impact on partner nations, identify best 

practices, and modify authorities accordingly. 
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BEYOND PROCUREMENT

Equipping a partner nation’s security forces with the appropriate type and quantity of equipment warrants careful 

consideration of a range of factors, such as that nation’s ability to pay for, distribute, and sustain equipment 

provided to them. Assessing these factors requires effective communication and cooperation both across the 

defense sectors (that is, across ministerial and operational level organizations) and within specific defense 

sectors (for example, at the ministerial level) (See Figure 14.). An effective national logistics system, for example, 

requires formal policy and guidance—a ministerial-level function—and a functioning distribution network that can 

ensure the timely dispersal of equipment, which involves operational units.619 An effective logistics system also 

requires routine communication between the various organizations across these levels, to ensure that actions 

at each level are mutually reinforcing and to ensure that appropriate modifications can be made when needed. 

However, as Thomas Ross Jr., the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation, points out, 

the United States frequently adopts a narrow, short-term view when it comes to equipping partner forces. In 2016, 

Ross wrote the United States has “too often directly equated developing a capability with delivering a weapons 

system and a minimal operator training course. . . . Capability is not simply a weapon or piece of equipment; it is a 

complex system of mutually reinforcing inputs that combine to enable a military to achieve a necessary function in 

support of specific mission.”620

This proved to be the case in Afghanistan. For example, there has been no consistent requirement for U.S. personnel 

at the SAO in Afghanistan to coordinate with U.S. personnel working in other directorates or at the MOD and MOI 

as advisors.621 As one former director of CSTC-A’s Capabilities Development Directorate told SIGAR, the various 

directorates’ efforts were often stovepiped.622 It was not until 2016, according to the former director, that an 

affordability and sustainability analysis, conducted in conjunction with other CSTC-A directorates, was included in 

the equipment requirement validation process.623 U.S. advisors best positioned to understand Afghanistan’s fiscal 

and logistical absorptive capacity were also often excluded from major equipping decisions. Further, without the 

consistent feedback from U.S. field advisors, equipping decisions often failed to account for the operational status 

and quantity of equipment already in the field (See page 79.). 

BEYOND PROCUREMENT

Source: Thomas Ross Jr., “Enhancing Security Cooperation Effectiveness: A Model for Capability Package Planning,” Joint Force Quarterly, vol. 80, 1st 

quarter, January 2016; Thomas Ross Jr., “Dening the Discipline in Theory and Practice,” in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense 

Institution Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2017). 

Ministerial-Level Functions

Operational-Level Functions

• Acquisition and distribution of equipment

• Policy, strategy, and doctrine development

• Resource and human resource management

• Budget formulation and execution

• Assistance with distribution of equipment

• Training of host-nation operators and maintainers

• Tracking operational status of equipment

• Identifying equipment needs 

Capability 

Development 

FIGURE 14

JUNE 2019 | 97

U.S. Air Force photo

CHAPTER 5

U.S.-BASED TRAINING

Since 2003, the United States has trained over 3,000 military and civilian members  of the ANDSF at U.S. installations, at a cost of approximately $112.6 million, as a 

means of professionalizing the force and fostering future international cooperation (See 

Figure 15.).624 In addition to building the capacity of foreign governments, U.S.-based 

training programs are designed to expose foreign students to a professional military in 

a democratic society, influence and maintain relationships with foreign students who 

may rise to positions of prominence in foreign governments, and increase military and 

technical interoperability with the United States.625

Despite the benefits of U.S.-based training, the ANDSF was unable to fully leverage these 

efforts. First, Afghan soldiers absconded from training while in the United States at a 

higher rate than trainees from any other country. Because of this, the United States plans 

to stop all U.S.-based aviation training for the Afghan Air Force by December 31, 2020. 

Additionally, Afghan government policy requires Afghan soldiers who are in training 

longer than one year to be changed from active duty to reserve status. As a result, their 

pay is halved and some benefits are forfeited. Since aviation training can extend beyond 

a year, pilots risk returning to Afghanistan unable to fly combat operations with the 

improved skills learned at U.S.-based training centers. 

This chapter discusses funding sources for U.S.-based training, which have varied 

goals and limitations, and examines the successes and the challenges of U.S.-based 
98 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

aviation training for the AAF. The chapter also highlights the lack of effective means 

of evaluating U.S.-based training outcomes and how U.S.-based training programs are 

disjointed between State and DOD. Lastly, this report will discuss the importance of 

U.S.-based English language training.

STATE AND DOD IMPLEMENT DIFFERENT PROGRAMS USING 

DIFFERENT AUTHORITIES

Traditionally, foreign military training in the United States is led by State and 

implemented by DOD at military schools. However, starting in the 1980s, Congress 

increased DOD’s Title 10 authorities, allowing DOD to conduct a range of U.S.-based 

training separate from State programs. The expansion of Title 10 security assistance 

authorities resulted in a shift in the burden of U.S.-based training programs between 

DOD and State. While State has long had clear requirements for tracking most 

security assistance funding, DOD programs and activities have differing requirements 

and are reported in different formats, making comparisons difficult.626 For ANDSF 

students, DOD relied on its growing constellation of security cooperation authorities, 

such as Section 1004 of the Counterdrug Training Support program, ASFF, and 

the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, while State continued to leverage its 

International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign Military Financing 

authority. (See Figure 16.).627

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

ANNUAL COST OF U.S.-BASED TRAINING FOR THE ANDSF ($ MILLIONS)

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD and State, Foreign Military Training Report, vol. 1, sec. 4, “Country Training Activities,” 2003–2016

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

$35

FIGURE 15
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Members of the ANDSF mostly attended training courses focused on English language, 

aviation, and professional military education. SIGAR analysis of data from Foreign 

Military Training Reports (FMTR) found that DOD spent over $78 million for 1,449 

slots for Afghans in U.S.-based training courses, compared to State’s outlay of about 

$34 million on training for 1,654 slots for Afghans.628 The total number of actual Afghan 

trainees was lower than the number of slots, since some Afghans attended multiple 

training courses during a given year. Afghan pilots, for example, were required to attend 

English language classes before they could enroll in pilot training at one of the U.S.-

based Air Force installations.

DOD spent more per Afghan student than State did for U.S.-based training. The average 

cost to train an Afghan participating in a State-funded program was about $21,000 

per trainee, while the average DOD cost per trainee was about $54,000.629 State-led 

FMF programs accounted for roughly 32 percent of all training courses, and were the 

principal means of bringing Afghans to attend U.S.-based training courses.630

Although the annual Foreign Military Training Report is the principal report used by 

DOD and State to document all U.S.-based training activities, SIGAR found that the data 

included in the report do not adequately convey all training information. For example, 

$0

$10

$20

$30

$40

$50

$60

Service FMF IMET

Academies

Regional

Centers

1004 ASFF CTFP Non-SA ALP

$53.1

$3.3

$4.5 $0.4

$2.4

$0.5

$25.8

$8.7

Sum of Total Cost ($ MILLIONS)

Number of Courses

$13.9

209

250

171

97

30

236

5

703

465

COST AND NUMBER OF U.S.-BASED TRAINING COURSES BY PROGRAM, 2003–2016 ($ MILLIONS)

0

200

400

600

800

1,000

1,200

Note: The Foreign Military Training Report is composed of two volumes. This analysis relies on section 4 of the report’s rst volume, “Country Training 

Activities,” which lists “Completed Training” activities for each year. The other sections, “Ongoing Training” and “Planned Training,” were excluded 

because Afghans had not completed the course, could go AWOL, or fail and be sent back to Afghanistan. Some trainees attended multiple training 

courses in the United States. The FMTR vol. 1, sec. 4 recognizes that some trainees are counted twice and does not account for the total number of 

Afghans who attended training in the United States. However, this is the only section of the report that distinguishes between training within the 

United States from training in other countries.

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD and State, Foreign Military Training Report, vol. 1, sec. 4, “Country Training Activities,” 2003–2016; DOD and State, 

Foreign Military Training Report, Fiscal Years 2016–2017: Reading the Report, April 24, 2017, p. RP-3.

FIGURE 16
100 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

SIGAR analysis of FMTR reports for completed training for the ANDSF from 2003 to 

2011 found that many training locations were listed as either “various” or “unknown.”631

According to U.S. law, the annual Foreign Military Training Report must specify all 

training locations.632 While all training locations are specified in the reports following 

2012, the missing data from 2003 to 2011 makes it difficult to determine the extent of 

U.S.-based military training provided to the ANDSF. 

IMET Bolstered Training by Bringing International Military 

Students to the United States 

The International Military and Education Training Program was designed as a “low-cost 

policy program to provide training in U.S. Defense Department schools to predominantly 

military students from allied and friendly nations.”633 The program aims to bolster 

international security by encouraging mutually beneficial relationships and by improving 

foreign military forces’ self-reliance.634 Congress appropriates IMET funding annually 

under the Foreign Assistance Act, and the Defense Security Cooperation Agency 

disburses IMET funds to specific programs through the military departments.635

IMET Fostered Cooperation with Allies in Afghanistan

During the Cold War, IMET served as a diplomatic tool to encourage “mutually beneficial relations” 

between the United States and foreign countries and to further “goals of international peace and 

security.”636 Since then, U.S.-based training programs like IMET afforded opportunities for allies to 

develop interoperability with the United States and NATO.

These efforts paid dividends after ISAF established its peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan. 

Allies like the Romanians were able to support Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) because IMET 

and other security cooperation programs enabled efforts to identify, train, equip, and deploy their 

26th Infantry Battalion to Afghanistan. Officers from the battalion, including their liaison officer 

to the U.S. brigade, attended training in the United States through the IMET program. Romanian 

noncommissioned officers attended the Romanian Noncommissioned Officer Academy, which was 

led by instructors who attended training in the United States under IMET.637

IMET has been described as the cornerstone of U.S.-based security assistance training 

and an “integral part of the long-term [ANA] training program.”638 In 2016, for example, 

IMET was assessed by DOD and State as a “low-cost, highly effective component of U.S. 

security assistance.”639 However, IMET does not provide the bulk of U.S.-based training 

for Afghanistan: SIGAR analysis of the FMTRs from 2003 to 2016 found that IMET 

funded only 21 percent of all U.S.-based training courses.640 One weakness of the IMET 

program is that it prohibits providing police training to military or civilian police if they 

perform a civilian law enforcement function.641

E-IMET Targets Civilian Officials

While IMET is intended for military personnel, Expanded IMET (E-IMET) was created to 

extend training to civilian personnel who work in a partner nation’s ministry of defense.642

E-IMET was formed as a subcomponent of IMET in 1990 under the Foreign Operations 
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Appropriations Act for FY 1991 in recognition that IMET needed to grow in response to a 

changing global political scene. E-IMET can also be used to fund training for legislators or 

personnel from non-defense related ministries. Like IMET, E-IMET emphasizes values like 

civilian control of the military and international human rights norms. Training locations 

include the Defense Resource Management Institute at the Naval Postgraduate School, the 

Naval Justice School, and the Center for Civil-Military Relations.643

At the 2012 NATO Chicago Summit, the Afghan government agreed that the ANDSF 

would operate under civilian leadership. While the 2014 Bilateral Civilianization 

Agreement set milestones for the conversion of 15,000 military positions to civilian 

status by December 2015, the Afghan government did not meet the milestones in the 

agreement.644 DOD’s 2016 report to Congress listed civilian governance of the Afghan 

security institutions as an essential function of the Resolute Support Mission.645

ASFF Funds Fill the Gaps

Since at least 2010, money from ASFF complemented IMET by filling U.S.-based training 

gaps for the ANDSF that were beyond the scope of IMET, and later enabled the expansion 

of the AAF. Though most ASFF funding was directed towards training members of the 

ANDSF within Afghanistan, ASFF’s broad authorities also enabled CSTC-A to send Afghan 

soldiers to the United States for advanced training.646 ASFF augmented IMET funding to 

secure additional training seats for professional military education at U.S.-based military 

institutions.647 Training opportunities included leadership and technical education at the 

Army War College and FBI Academy, as well as programs such as the U.S. Army Force 

Management Course and the Army Captain’s Career Course.648

In addition to increasing the number of training seats, ASFF is more flexible than IMET. 

State and DSCA are unlikely to approve requests to fund technical courses, such as 

aviation training through IMET, since that program’s objectives emphasize human rights 

and professionalization of the force. This makes ASFF the preferred funding source for 

technical training.649 According to the 2016 “Country Training Activities” section of the 

FMTR, ASFF training in the United States focused on professional military education, 

rotary-winged and fixed-wing aviation training, and English language training.650

English Language Training: The Linchpin of ANDSF Professionalization

Between 2003 and 2016, about a third of all U.S.-based training courses for the ANDSF 

were English language classes, taught primarily at the Defense Language Institute 

English Language Center (DLIELC) in San Antonio, Texas (See Figure 17.).651 Since 

English is the international language for aviation, the NATO Training Command – 

Afghanistan was especially concerned about the AAF’s lack of English language 

proficiency; it assessed that 45 percent of the AAF must be literate in English for the 

AAF to be “a credible and competent air force.”652

English language proficiency is a prerequisite for all international military students to 

attend U.S.-based training courses.653 While the Security Assistance Office in Afghanistan 

is responsible for providing English language testing in Afghanistan to ensure that 
102 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

students meet proficiency requirements, many foreign students arriving at DLIELC fail 

to pass initial exams designed to validate the host nation’s vetting system. As a result, 

students are placed in lower proficiency classes, which extends the student’s time at 

DLIELC, leading to potential scheduling conflicts for follow-on training.654

According to a 2012 study by the RAND Corporation, the high demand for English 

language training is driven by the need to train foreign military personnel to employ 

Planning and Student Selection Process

The Annual Training Allocation Process is the standard means for foreign military students to attend 

training in the United States. In Afghanistan, training allocation begins when State produces an annual 

Mission Performance Plan and CSTC-A produces the Combined Education and Training Program Plan, 

which details plans for training ANDSF students. These plans propose requirements for all funding 

sources and training locations, including IMET, Counterterrorism Fellowship Program, ASFF, and FMS 

recommendations. These are submitted for inclusion to the annual Congressional Budget Justification 

for Foreign Operations. IMET programming data are forwarded to the appropriate military service by 

September for review.655

The Combatant Commands host annual Security Cooperation Education and Training Working Groups 

to “accept, reject, change, or add training lines and training teams to country programs within policy 

guidelines.”656 Attendees include representatives from CSTC-A, DSCA, military departments, training 

agencies, and security cooperation training management personnel.657 After the working groups are 

over, the military services receive a complete copy of the refined country program that is conditional, 

based on the ability to provide the training in relation to total worldwide requirements. The military 

services then coordinate with military schools to ensure seats are available and to schedule start 

dates.658 Once funding is received, the military services authorize CSTC-A to send international military 

students to training.659

CSTC-A is responsible for ensuring potential Afghan IMET students are “selected from career personnel 

likely to occupy key positions in the foreign country’s defense establishment.”660 The SAO coordinates 

with the Afghan MOD, MOI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Afghan National Security Council, and the 

Afghan parliament to identify candidates for U.S.-based training. However, according to DOD officials, 

Afghanistan’s nomination process to select candidates for foreign military training is “lengthy and 

opaque.” Every April, CSTC-A receives the list of available school slots approved by the working groups. 

CSTC-A releases the list to the Afghan Ministry of Foreign Affairs for distribution to other ministries. The 

Afghan ministries require six to eight months to nominate a candidate. Once CSTC-A slates a name for 

a course, it takes another three to four months for internal Afghan vetting processes and for CSTC-A 

to receive a completed visa package. CSTC-A then submits the visa to the consular section of the U.S. 

Embassy in Kabul for vetting, which takes another one to two months. This 10- to 14-month process 

causes CSTC-A to forfeit 50 percent of annual training slots.661

After completion of training, CSTC-A is required to conduct post-training interviews with international 

military students to assess the relevance of the training and to gain feedback on student preparation 

and CSTC-A support.662 However, in response to a SIGAR request for information, CSTC-A did not 

explain why it does not conduct post-training interviews with students.663
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newly purchased weapon systems.664 For this reason, DLIELC has been described as the 

linchpin that enables the United States to build partner capacity. Without it, the security 

assistance process that provides education and advanced technical training on U.S. 

weapon systems could crumble.665

U.S.-Based Aviation Training Increased Afghan Capabilities

In 2005, the United States committed to developing an Afghan air capability. Initially named 

the Afghan National Army Air Corps, the AAF at first consisted mostly of Russian-made 

helicopters. Over time, the United States introduced U.S. aircraft.666 Between 2005 and 2010, 

AAF training was mostly stationed in Afghanistan at the “Thunder Lab” in Kabul, an English 

immersion program designed to improve the English, aviation, and professional skills of 

Afghan air force officers awaiting pilot training.667 The goal was to develop an effective AAF 

that did not have to rely on the United States for close air support, tactical lift, or logistical 

sustainment, even though it still relied on the United States for spare parts and aircraft. 

By 2009, Afghan pilots began attending aviation training in the United States, even 

though the AAF fleet at that point still consisted of old Soviet-era aircraft.668 The addition 

of the U.S. C-130 (2013), A-29 (2016), and UH-60 (2018) to the AAF fleet not only required 

intensive technical training, but also coincided with a reduction of forces and a smaller 

U.S. training mission.669 The development of a capable AAF during the reduction of 

forces was a significant challenge, especially since it takes a minimum of three to four 

years to train a pilot and five to seven years to train an expert airplane mechanic.670

U.S.-based aviation training has been touted as a success. In 2018, the DOD OIG 

reported that “Western-trained pilots and aircrew typically progress to more advanced 

qualifications or higher leadership positions faster than their non-Western-trained 

counterparts.”671 One U.S. Army official described U.S.-based aviation training for 

Afghans as “head and shoulders above aviation training in Afghanistan.”672 The 

NUMBER OF AFGHAN STUDENTS TRAINED IN THE UNITED STATES BY LOCATION, 2003–2016

Source: SIGAR analysis of DOD and State, Foreign Military Training Report, vol. 1, sec. 4, “Country Training Activities,” 2003–2016.

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200

San Antonio (TX)

Washington (DC)

Fayetteville (NC)

Daleville (AL)

Columbus (GA)

El Paso (TX)

Petersburg (VA)

Unknown

Barretts (GA)

St Robert (MO)

Little Rock (AR)

Leavenworth (KS)

Honolulu (HI)

Monterey (CA)

Houston (TX)

Wichita Falls (TX)

Montgomery (AL)

1,057

452

240

104

88

78

72

67

56

55

54

47

38

32

29

28

369

FIGURE 17
104 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

commander of NATC-A concluded that, despite the challenges, Western training is 

worthwhile because it improves Afghan professionalism. Moreover, Western-trained 

personnel helped counter the influence of Soviet-trained pilots.673

One U.S. Army official described U.S.-based 

aviation training for Afghans as “head and shoulders 

above aviation training in Afghanistan.”

A-29 Training Program: Tailored to Afghan Requirements

In 2013, the ISAF commander concluded that A-29 training in Afghanistan was not feasible 

due to the force drawdown and asked the U.S. Air Force to prepare options for conducting 

A-29 training outside of Afghanistan.674 The U.S. Air Force proposed Moody Air Force Base 

in Georgia as the new location for A-29 aviation and maintenance training due to lower 

costs and better security.675 The training began in February 2015.676

The U.S. Air Force 81st Fighter Squadron was tasked with training Afghan A-29 pilots 

using U.S. Air Force fighter pilots, who were predominately A-10 pilots.677 The goal was 

to provide the AAF with 20 A-29 aircraft capable of sustained operations, 30 pilots, and 

up to 90 maintainers.678 As of January 2018, 12 of the 20 A-29 aircraft were in Afghanistan 

and seven were at Moody supporting pilot training. Following the completion of A-29 

training at Moody, the rest of the aircraft will be sent to Afghanistan.679

Depending on the student’s English language capabilities, a typical A-29 maintainer 

would require 15 to 18 months of U.S.-based training and a typical A-29 pilot would 

require 24 to 30 months of U.S.-based training to be operational when redeployed back 

to Afghanistan.680 Afghan pilots are trained using inactive weapons and are prohibited 

from using live ordnance. Accompanied by a U.S. Air Force instructor pilot, Afghan 

pilots fly a variety of training missions including in Colorado, where the terrain 

resembles Afghanistan’s mountainous geography.681 TAAC-Air informed SIGAR that the 

U.S. Air Force will transition AAF A-29 training from Moody to Afghanistan at the end of 

2020.682 (For more information on the A-29 program, see pp. 112–113.). 

UH-60 Black Hawk Program Illustrates Value of U.S.-Based Training

In 2012, members of Congress wrote U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta expressing 

their concerns with the U.S. purchase of 10 Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters for 

the ANDSF. Members of the House of Representatives further encouraged DOD to 

provide the ANDSF with U.S.-made helicopters.683 In 2017, the Afghan Air Force 

Modernization (AAFM) program directed the replacement of Russian-made Mi-17s with 

U.S.-made UH-60 Black Hawks.684 Although the Mi-17 is gradually being phased out, 

TAAC-Air will continue to train Mi-17 pilots, with 10 scheduled to graduate by the end of 

2019 to replace pilots who converted to the UH-60 Black Hawk.685
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As part of the AAFM, Afghan pilots were sent to four countries—the United Arab 

Emirates, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the United States. For the U.S. portion of 

the training, Afghan UH-60 pilots attended the U.S. Army Aviation School at Fort Rucker, 

Alabama, followed by qualification training in Afghanistan.692 A SIGAR audit noted that 

the U.S.-based program provided more comprehensive training than the other two 

training locations. At Fort Rucker, pilots complete the UH-60-specific Aircraft 

Qualification Course (AQC) and are trained in combat and night operations, while at 

training in the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and the United Arab Emirates, Afghan pilots 

are only taught how to fly civilian helicopters.693 This means Afghan pilots not training in 

the United States must wait for AQC training slots to open in Kandahar to receive all 

training required to be fully operational.694

C-130 Program: Reliance on DOD Contractor Logistics Support Hampered the 

Development of AAF Maintenance Capabilities

In January 2013, after experiencing “continuous and severe operational difficulties” with 

the Italian G222 medium airlift program, the Secretary of the Air Force was directed to 

provide four C-130s to the AAF.695 By late 2013, the first two C-130s were delivered to 

the AAF, with two more scheduled for delivery by the end of 2014.696 The C-130 aircraft 

provided a strategic airlift capability to the AAF that supported personnel, casualty 

evacuation, and equipment transport across Afghanistan.697 A NATC-A feasibility 

assessment on the AAF assumed, among other things, that initial training of Afghan 

C-130 aircrews and maintainers would be conducted in the United States.698

Afghan C-130 pilots were trained by the 538th Air Expeditionary Advisory Squadron at 

Arkansas’ Little Rock Air Force Base in 2013. By 2015, training courses in the United 

States for the AAF included language training, pilot training, and aviation safety, along 

with specialty training for aircrews and maintenance personnel.699 By 2016, the AAF had 

four qualified aircrews available to fly its fleet of four C-130s.700

Afghan Policy for International Training and Education

The Afghan MOD Policy for International Training and Education recognizes the value of 

international training and notes that the “use of these opportunities has been insufficient.”686

The policy established ANA requirements and principles to identify and select qualified ANA 

soldiers to attend international training. Soldiers must take a test to qualify for the program, and 

are supposedly selected based on test scores and merit. SIGAR has been told by CSTC-A that 

selection of individual candidates may be based on patronage or family ties rather than merit, 

though some Afghan trainees dispute this.687 Offices in the Afghan MOD share responsibility 

for vetting and selecting qualified Afghan soldiers for participation in international training 

programs.688 The MOD Education and Doctrine Directorate is responsible for tracking participation 

in international training, along with those who failed to meet training requirements, to “prevent 

unqualified personnel from participating until deficiencies are resolved.”689 Upon completion of 

international training, the Personnel Directorate is supposed to ensure ANA soldiers receive a 

position appointment based on training and requirements.690 Afghan government policy requires 

Afghan trainees that are in training longer than one year to be changed from active duty to reserve 

status. As a result, their pay is halved and some benefits are forfeited.691
106 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

While the AAF had a full complement of C-130 aircrews, it struggled to provide 

the maintenance and logistical support for its C-130 fleet. A July 2014 SIGAR audit 

questioned the requirement to fund four C-130 aircraft when the AAF was struggling to 

maintain the two C-130s it already had.701 In 2018, the DOD OIG found that the transition 

from ISAF to the Resolute Support Mission forced the AAF to provide the majority of 

air support to the ANDSF, but the AAF was unable to maintain the aircraft it needed to 

do so. For the C-130 program, 100 percent of maintenance was provided by Contractor 

Logistics Support (CLS) contractors, even though 45 trained Afghan C-130 mechanics 

were available. The DOD OIG also found that the contracts required a mechanic 

credentialed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration to certify the aircraft’s 

maintenance, which led to contractors performing the maintenance. This requirement 

has been dropped in a new contract.702 The preference for CLS contractors stemmed 

from DOD policy, which requires that all aircraft and aircraft systems used by DOD 

personnel and contractors have completed airworthiness assessments to ensure that 

aircraft meet safety requirements.703 This policy essentially prohibits U.S. air advisors 

from flying in Afghan aircraft without an airworthiness assessment. While this mitigates 

risk for the U.S. advisors who conduct in-flight training with the Afghans on the C-130, it 

also inhibits the AAF from assuming control of its maintenance program.704

The DOD OIG also found that the contracts did not require contractors to meet training 

goals to support the proficiency of the Afghan mechanics. To rectify this capability gap, 

the DOD OIG recommended amending the contracts to emphasize “building the Afghan 

aircraft maintenance capability” and “increasing the Afghan responsibility for daily 

aircraft maintenance.”705 Even with CLS support, the DOD OIG found in January 2018 

that half of the AAF’s C-130s were grounded awaiting maintenance, and that the AAF 

could only support its highest priority missions.706

An Afghan Air Force Mi-17 pilot takes a first look at the cockpit of a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter during a 

training course at Kandahar Airfield. (U.S. Air Force photo by Alexander W. Riedel)
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DOD AND STATE LACK WAYS TO EVALUATE U.S.-BASED 

TRAINING AND TRACK ALUMNI 

Prior to 2007, almost 40 years after the establishment of IMET, DOD and State had never 

conducted a comprehensive analysis of the IMET program’s effectiveness.707 In 2011, 

GAO concluded that State and DOD’s ability to assess the IMET program’s effectiveness 

was limited by weaknesses in program monitoring and evaluation. These weaknesses 

included the lack of an established performance plan, objectives, and measures for 

the IMET program; the lack of a monitoring system designed to track graduates after 

training; and limited input from DOD training managers. GAO found, for example, that 

even though State’s May 2011 program evaluation policy required its bureaus to submit 

evaluation plans for all programs, State had not established a performance plan for 

IMET. GAO’s review of the 2013 State Bureau Strategic Resource Plans (BSRP) “found 

little or no mention of IMET overall.”708

DSCA’s Strategic Plan 2009–2014, Campaign Support Plan 2010, and directorate-level 

performance plan also did not include IMET performance measures or evaluation plans. 

According to GAO, a DSCA official said the lack of DOD performance plans for IMET 

was based on the belief that it is an efficient and effective program, and is less of a 

priority for evaluation than newer programs.709

State and DOD have used three main sources of information to measure IMET 

performance: a survey of IMET graduates, a report on IMET graduates who have 

attained prominent ranks or positions, and country-level narrative performance 

information. However, a GAO report found that none of these three sources captures 

higher-level performance information for the program worldwide.710

A U.S. Air Force C-130 maintenance advisor from the 440th AEAS works with Afghan Air Force counterparts 

to remove an engine panel for training at Kabul Air Wing. (U.S. Air Force photo by Veronica Pierce)
108 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

U.S. Advisors Have No System to Identify Afghans Who Have Received 

Training in the United States

One of DOD and State’s metrics for the outcome of IMET training is the number of 

trainees who reach a position of prominence in their country.711 The performance of 

foreign military students is tracked through U.S. military academic alumni programs and 

the Security Cooperation Training Management System (SC-TMS). U.S-based academic 

institutions, such as the National Defense University, maintain alumni programs that 

allow U.S. government professors to stay connected with foreign students.712 There is 

no comparable system in place for a U.S. advisor in Afghanistan to identify Afghans who 

have trained in the United States. 

The SC-TMS is the common information system of record used by security cooperation 

organizations for the day-to-day management of training programs; a replacement 

system is under development.713 SC-TMS contains information that would be useful 

for advisors, including Invitational Travel Orders, course dates, program training 

summaries, student data records, and student career progression, but this information 

is often not used by U.S. advisors assigned to Afghan officials who were trained in 

the United States.714 Likewise, alumni programs could offer information on a former 

student’s background, training, and career progression, but alumni programs struggle to 

stay in touch with graduates and are dependent on students who volunteer to participate 

in alumni events. Further, alumni organizations may also not be comfortable providing 

information to the U.S. government, as they may prefer to remain in the realm of 

academic professional relationships.715

As of June 2011, DSCA indicated that only 1 percent of the nearly 88,000 IMET trainees 

in the SC-TMS had attained a position of prominence in their respective militaries.716 The 

SAO in Afghanistan reported in 2018 that just 13 Afghans out of the several thousand 

who attended training in the United States had earned a position of prominence.717 In 

Afghanistan, the SAO is responsible for updating the SC-TMS with information on the 

career progression of IMET alumni. These reports aim to track graduates of security 

cooperation programs as they progress through the ranks.718 While foreign countries 

have little incentive to provide information to the United States, especially if countries 

are suspicious of U.S. motives for requesting the data, the United States is uniquely 

positioned to obtain such data in Afghanistan.719 The United States has been involved 

in the management and creation of human resource systems for the MOD and MOI, and 

therefore could possibly influence the sharing of data from human resources databases 

to compare against SC-TMS data.720

AWOL TRAINEES UNDERMINE PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 

In 2017, SIGAR found that Afghan trainees go AWOL in the United States at a far higher 

rate than trainees from any other country. Between 2005 and 2017, 253,977 foreign 

trainees attended training in the United States, 2,537 of whom were Afghan. Of those, 

320 went AWOL, 152 of whom were Afghan; of that number, 103 were junior officers, 

such as captains and lieutenants. Most of the Afghans went AWOL while attending 

Positions of prominence

include general and flag 

rank officers, heads of state, 

cabinet and deputy cabinet 

ministers, ambassadors, and 

ministers of parliament.

Source: GAO, IMET Agencies Should 

Emphasize Human Rights Training and 

Improve Evaluations, GAO-12-123, 

October 27, 2011, p. 18. 
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English language training at Lackland Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas. Rates 

of Afghan AWOLs peaked in 2009, 2015, and 2016—years that coincided with higher 

reported levels of violence in Afghanistan. As of March 2017, 83 Afghans had fled the 

United States or remained unaccounted for.721

The most common reasons among Afghans for going AWOL included personal or family 

safety concerns and perceived job insecurity in Afghanistan following training. There 

are no consequences for Afghan trainees who go AWOL. Often, AWOL Afghan trainees 

attempt to flee to Canada, where access to asylum is perceived to be easier and asylum 

benefits better.722 According to interviews with Defense Language Institute officials, 

foreign military trainees have an A-2 diplomatic visa which makes it more difficult for 

DOD sponsors to prevent Afghan students going AWOL, and an underground network 

of previous trainees provides information to Afghans who want to disappear into 

American society.723

The Afghan Student Management Office was formed in 2011 in an effort to curtail 

AWOL rates for U.S. Air Force-sponsored Afghan students in the United States. Even 

so, the AWOL rate doubled in 2016 from the historical average of around 6 or 7 percent 

to 13 percent.724 In response, Maj. Gen. Richard Kaiser, commander of CSTC-A, raised 

concerns that the “MOD does not have a comprehensive policy for preventing its 

members from going AWOL while enrolled in U.S.-funded training or addressing what 

happens when AWOLs occur.”725 To curtail the rate of Afghans going AWOL, CSTC-A 

canceled several FY 2017 training slots. Afghans who are allowed to attend U.S.-

based training now face greater restrictions intended to reduce opportunities for 

going AWOL.726

“MOD does not have a comprehensive policy for preventing its 

members from going AWOL while enrolled in U.S.-funded 

training or addressing what happens when AWOLs occur.”

—Maj. Gen. Richard Kaiser

Afghans who go AWOL not only cost the United States money and resources, but 

hinder the ANDSF’s operational readiness.727 ANA officer training does not include 

advanced schools like the Basic Officer Leadership or Captains Career Courses, which 

are standard in the U.S. military. Instead, FY 2018 courses were limited to graduate 

courses, Ranger training, Special Forces training, and courses to build the Afghan Air 

Force. Other courses were not available due to an unusually high rate of unfilled slots 

and increasing numbers of AWOL students. While reducing access to courses obviously 

reduces the risk of AWOLs, it also limits Afghans from receiving training from U.S. 

military institutions.728
110 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, this study of U.S.-based training of the ANDSF finds:

1. U.S.-based aviation training has resulted in a quantifiable improvement in AAF 

capabilities and improved professionalization of Afghan personnel.

2. The success and sustainability of U.S.-based training has been undermined by 

students who go AWOL while in the United States.

3. DOD and State lacked mechanisms needed to evaluate U.S.-based training and track 

alumni, a key outcome metric.

4. Information collected on ANDSF personnel trained in the United States is accessible 

to advisors in Afghanistan, but advisors are rarely aware of these databases and 

therefore the information is rarely used.

5. Complementary programs like ASFF and IMET increase the volume of funding and 

capacity for training at U.S. military schools. 

6. English language training courses made up a third of all U.S.-based training for 

Afghans and is a prerequisite for follow-on technical training. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOD and State should develop new metrics of effectiveness for foreign 

military training. Current metrics of effectiveness are misleading, as they 

are often based on the future career prospects of students. This “position of 

prominence” criterion reflects a statistically insignificant number of Afghans 

who have trained in the United States. 

The evaluation of U.S.-based training for the AAF is based on concrete, precise 

measurements of success in terms of Afghan capabilities—for example, the 

number of targets hit by Afghan pilots, the number of aerial resupply missions 

conducted, or the number of fully trained ground crews available. Non-aviation 

training is evaluated solely in terms of the number of U.S.-trained Afghans who 

rise to senior leadership. While it may have some utility for security cooperation 

efforts in other countries, this metric does not link U.S.-based training to desired 

outcomes in Afghanistan. Gauging the effectiveness of U.S.-based training as it 

relates to broader SSA plans requires more specific metrics, aligned with goals for 

ANDSF development.

2. DOD and State should track the performance of Afghan students trained in

the United States by implementing a system to consolidate information and 

should inform advisors of its availability. This can be done through enhancing 

the existing SC-TMS.

The SC-TMS comprises useful information on Afghan trainees, but it has 

functionality limitations and is not presently employed by most advisors. In 

addition to making SC-TMS more functional for the tracking and evaluation of U.S. 

training outcomes, DOD should take advantage of the human resource information 
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systems of the Afghan MOD and MOI to populate SC-TMS with updated information 

and allow the tracking of U.S.-trained students.

3. State, in coordination with DOD, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 

and state and local governments, should strengthen efforts aimed at 

preventing foreign military students from going AWOL. This can include 

changing the visa status of AWOL students to make obtaining U.S. identity 

documents more difficult, and working with local authorities to ensure 

students only have access to limited or restricted documents. 

Afghan students at U.S.-based training go AWOL at a higher rate than students 

from any other country. This results not only in a loss of the investment in a 

particular student’s training, but also the reduction of other school seats to reduce 

AWOL opportunities. A change in visa protocols for Afghan military students and 

coordination with other state and federal entities will reduce the ease with which 

Afghan students can go AWOL.
112 | U.S.-BASED TRAINING

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

A-29 TRAINING PROGRAM: A SUCCESSFUL, 

INTEGRATED MODEL 

The U.S. Air Force’s A-29 program has proven to be a best practice for creating a comprehensive and 

consistent advisor model that effectively connects the U.S.-based training program with continued 

professional development and training in Afghanistan. 

Since the United States does not operate A-29s, the U.S. Air Force used A-10 pilots to staff the A-29 

program, based at Moody Air Force Base, Georgia. Typically, air advisors serve short-term assignments, 

but in order to increase training continuity, the U.S. Air Force assigned its instructor pilots to serve a 

three-year tour as an A-29 advisor, and permanently relocated them to Moody Air Force Base.729 In 

order to do this, the U.S. Air Force reactivated the 81st Fighter Squadron in January 2015.730

Advisors assigned to the program were first required to attend the Air Academy for training and 

certification.731 As noted by Brig. Gen. Christopher Craige, former acting commanding general at 

TAAC-Air, “This rapidly developed program for Afghanistan is unique for the A-29 development because 

this is the first time U.S. Air Force pilots and maintainers have been trained as instructors to conduct 

training for Afghan students in the United States.”732 Following training, advisors joined the 81st Fighter 

Squadron. As part of the unit, advisors would provide introductory training to Afghan pilots in Georgia, 

and upon graduation would deploy to Afghanistan as a member of TAAC-Air to provide additional 

mentoring. Following the advisor’s tour, the advisor would return to Georgia to train the next class 

of Afghan students. This consistent rotation between the United States and Afghanistan allowed the 

advisors to provide a consistent approach to developing an Afghan A-29 capability. The model also 

allowed advisors to establish necessary rapport and a close working relationship with their Afghan 

counterparts, which has contributed to the success of the program.733 The rotational model also 

creates a bond between the Afghan pilot and U.S. Air Force advisor, as noted by Lt. Col. Johnnie Green, 

the 438th Air Expeditionary Squadron commander:

We have developed a close relationship with the Afghan A-29 pilots over several years now, not just 

in training, but also in the development of their own fighter squadron and advising them while they 

conduct operations. Training in the United States allows us the freedom and flexibility to control the 

environment and instruct to specific objectives, and the standards we hold them to directly translate 

into what they do in combat.734

The A-29 program started in September 2014 and was initially set to finish December 2018; it is now 

planned to end December 2020.735 The program called for 41 U.S. Air Force air advisors—17 pilot 

advisors and 24 maintainers—that would train 30 Afghan pilots and 90 Afghan maintainers.736 The 

United States and Afghanistan would select and vet the most qualified Afghan pilots, who have had 

former pilot training or experience with other aircraft, to attend language school and training for the 

A-29 aircraft.737 The goal of the program was to have the Afghan pilots and maintainers trained at an 

initial operational capacity by January 2016, and at a full operational capacity by December 2018.738

As of September 2018, nine aircraft were used to train 30 AAF pilots and 90 ground staff, which 

included a maintenance crew. DOD announced a contract extension—from August 2019 to December 

2024—for the delivery of the remaining A-29 Super Tucano light attack aircraft.739
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As noted in DOD’s December 2018 report to Congress, the program has advanced to the point that the 

Afghan A-29 pilots “are becoming more precise, with over 88 percent of their laser-guided munitions 

landing within one meter of their target” and are regularly conducting airstrikes with decreasing 

levels of coalition assistance.740 The A-29 program has proven that an incremental training approach 

that includes U.S. Air Force and maintenance advisors for years to come is important to ensuring 

the Afghans increase their capability to perform their missions adequately. SIGAR has learned from 

the Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs that the A-29 Afghanistan program will be 

deactivated in December 2020, with the majority of training continuing in Afghanistan.741

An Afghan A-29 stopped for crew rest and refueling at Little Rock Air Force Base in Arkansas. (Photo by 

Stephanie Serrano)

JUNE 2019 | 115

U.S. Marine Corps photo

CHAPTER 6

BY, WITH, AND THROUGH NATO

On September 12, 2001, for the only time in its history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the  North Atlantic Treaty.742 While Article 5 was formed to safeguard against traditional 

military invasions by other nations, NATO members recognized that threats to global 

security had changed significantly in the 52 years since the alliance was founded. 

Although NATO had previously recognized terrorism as a risk to its security, NATO’s 

response to 9/11 was the alliance’s first response to the actions of a non-state actor and 

its first operation outside of the Euro-Atlantic area.743

Even though the United States was grateful for NATO members’ support, it neither 

requested nor expected collective NATO military action in the months following the 9/11 

attacks. “If we need collective action, we’ll ask for it,” U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense 

Paul Wolfowitz remarked at a September 2001 press conference. “We don’t anticipate 

that at the moment.”744 The Bush administration’s decision to operate independently 

in Afghanistan was based on two assumptions: incorporating non-U.S. military units 

would reduce speed and effectiveness, and the United States would have to assist those 

countries seeking to participate in combat operations.745

In 2003, the U.S. position changed. As the United States became preoccupied with Iraq, 

it turned to NATO to assume responsibility in Afghanistan. In 2003, NATO assumed 

command of the UN-authorized International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), the 

mission responsible for assisting the Afghan government with maintaining security 

Article 5 of the North 

Atlantic Treaty states that 

“an armed attack against 

one or more [NATO 

members] in Europe or 

North America shall be 

considered an attack 

against them all.” If such 

an attack occurs, NATO 

members will assist the 

attacked member by 

conducting “such action 

as it deems necessary, 

including the use of 

armed force.”

Source: NATO, “The North Atlantic 

Treaty,” April 4, 1949.
116 | BY, WITH, AND THROUGH NATO

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

in and around Kabul. It would not be until 2009 that the United States refocused its 

attention on Afghanistan and dramatically increased its involvement in the country. 

The 2009 military surge resulted in the deployment of approximately 100,000 U.S. 

soldiers coupled with a large U.S. civilian surge.746 From this point forward, the United 

States worked through NATO to optimize international involvement in support of its 

overarching security objectives in Afghanistan, including reconstructing the ANDSF. 

“If we need collective action, we’ll ask for it.”

— Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

This chapter examines how NATO’s mission in Afghanistan added complexity to the 

security sector assistance mission. While NATO’s involvement has changed over the 

course of the Afghan conflict, its involvement complicated operations, strained unity 

of command, and required the United States to devote additional resources to support 

allies and partners. Restrictions placed by NATO members on how their forces could 

be used impeded unity of effort. This chapter also examines how the United States 

capitalized on NATO involvement by leveraging the niche capabilities of NATO members, 

such as their familiarity with Soviet-made aircraft and police advising expertise.

NATO GETS INVOLVED IN AFGHANISTAN

Following the Bonn Agreement in December 2001, the UN Security Council adopted 

Resolution 1386, which created ISAF. It was tasked with providing security to the 

interim Afghan government in and around Kabul.747 The UN resolution provided 

political legitimacy for international involvement in Afghanistan, leading to increased 

participation by NATO nations and individual member states assuming responsibility for 

the ISAF mission on six-month rotations.748 Initially, the United States opposed putting 

U.S. forces in ISAF and sought to keep ISAF from expanding beyond Kabul, under 

the assumption that such an expansion would embroil U.S. forces in peacekeeping or 

nation-building activities.749

By 2003, however, as the United States’ attention began to shift to Iraq, DOD pushed 

NATO to take over reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.750 On August 11, 2003, 

NATO assumed command of ISAF, making the alliance responsible for the command, 

coordination, and planning of the international force, including the provision of an 

in-country headquarters and a force commander.751 In October 2003, the UN Security 

Council adopted Resolution 1510, expanding ISAF’s mandate from providing security 

in and around Kabul to providing security to the rest of the country. By October 2006, 

ISAF expanded nationwide through the establishment of Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRT) and regional commands.752 
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NATO Assumes Command of ISAF: Lack of Early 

U.S. Involvement Creates Tension 

With NATO assuming command of the Afghanistan mission, ISAF became the main 

coordinating body for the international military effort. ISAF also offered a way for 

member states to contribute to the mission in Afghanistan without becoming involved 

in Operation Enduring Freedom, the United States’ counterterrorism mission.754 While 

ISAF was tasked with coordinating international activities, the United States operated 

independently, refusing to place its military forces under international command. The 

United States’ initial decision to reject NATO’s offers of help and operate independently 

caused some resentment, especially when the United States called for larger force 

deployments in later years. As one British diplomat reportedly remarked, “It’s quite 

something for Washington to criticize NATO for its troop levels in Afghanistan in 

January 2004 when Washington scorned NATO’s genuine offers of assistance in 

September 2001.”755

NATO Seeks to Establish a Unity of Purpose through International Forums

While NATO’s mission in Afghanistan struggled to implement unity of command and unity of effort, the 

alliance used international forums and conferences to create an internal unity of purpose: 

• June 2003 (Madrid, Spain): At the Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, NATO agreed to take over the ISAF 

mission from the UN in August 2003. 

• June 2004 (Istanbul, Turkey): NATO countries agreed to continue expanding operations in 

Afghanistan with the establishment of additional PRTs. 

• November 2006 (Riga, Latvia): NATO reviewed the progress in Afghanistan in light of ISAF’s 

nationwide expansion and called for broader international engagement. Allies discussed the potential 

reduction of national caveats.

• April 2009 (Strasbourg, France, and Kehl, Germany): NATO agreed to establish the NATO Training 

Mission – Afghanistan, responsible for higher level training for the ANA and additional training and 

mentoring for the ANP.

• November 2010 (Lisbon, Portugal): NATO agreed to begin transitioning security responsibility to the 

ANDSF in 2011, with the goal of completing this transition by the end of 2014.

• May 2012 (Chicago, Illinois): NATO confirmed that the transition to ANDSF-led security was on 

track for completion by the end of 2014 and announced a new, non-combat post-2014 mission to 

train, advise, and assist the ANDSF. 

• September 2014 (Wales, UK): NATO reasserted its commitment to Afghanistan through the 

Resolute Support Mission, financial contributions to the ANDSF, and the NATO – Afghanistan Enduring 

Partnership. 

• July 2016 (Warsaw, Poland): NATO agreed to extend the Resolute Support Mission beyond 2016 

and provide funding for Afghan forces until 2020.

• July 2018 (Brussels, Belgium): NATO agreed to finance the Afghan security forces until 2024.753
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Provincial Reconstruction Teams Follow Traditional NATO Approach 

As the NATO-led ISAF mission was confined to Kabul in the early years, individual 

nations looked for ways to expand the international presence nationwide to improve 

governance, economic development, and security. Countries created PRTs, which were 

“small, joint civil-military cells used to expand legitimate governance across Afghanistan 

and [enhance] security through security-sector reform and reconstruction efforts.”756

The first PRT was established by the United States in Gardez, the capital of Paktiya Province, 

in 2002.757 Headed by a U.S. military commander and manned by a small complement of 

military and civilian advisors from USAID and State, the Gardez PRT was the first attempt 

to bridge the gap between the central government in Kabul and the country’s predominantly 

rural provinces. Over time, more teams were established in regions of strategic importance 

and in parts of the country where Afghanistan’s major ethnic groups resided.758 The earliest 

teams were largely ad hoc and adapted to the needs of a given province, operating “without 

a great deal of guidance in terms of mandates and essential tasks.”759

NATO’s first step toward expanding beyond Kabul in early 2004 started with assuming 

command and coordinating responsibility of existing PRTs and establishing new PRTs 

nationwide, while still deferring to a specific nation to manage day-to-day operations. 

NATO assumed responsibility of the German-led PRT in December 2003 and, in June 

2004, announced that it would establish four new PRTs in northern Afghanistan. In early 

2005, NATO expanded PRTs into western Afghanistan.760 By the start of 2006, NATO 

had established 22 PRTs across the country.761 ISAF-led PRTs were typically located 

in more secure regions of the country and were restricted by caveats imposed by the 

lead nation, including restrictions on straying too far from encampments or conducting 

nighttime operations.762 While caveats led to some tension between partner nations, PRT 

participants reported feeling that their teams were most effective in secure regions.763

Since each PRT was commanded by individual nations, implementation of 

reconstruction programs was disjointed and not standardized, and international PRTs 

often had differing priorities and staffing sizes. For example, while some PRTs were 

led by a civilian leader and prioritized governance and economic growth, others were 

led by military officers and prioritized security; UK PRTs focused on disarmament, 

demobilization, and reintegration over humanitarian operations, and German teams had 

comparatively high civilian staffing.764 Further, while each PRT had the same overarching 

mission, individual teams adapted their approach to the needs of their particular 

location in Afghanistan.765

As the war unfolded and the ISAF mission expanded, PRTs became the backbone for 

civilian and military operations, extending the central government’s influence in remote 

provinces.766 While the primary goal of PRTs was to improve governance, security, and 

reconstruction, U.S. commanders viewed improvements to governance as the most 

critical of these objectives.767 The security component was limited to the protection of 

reconstruction efforts, meaning that PRTs did not pursue insurgents or engage in poppy 

eradication activities.768 Moreover, PRTs afforded NATO countries the opportunity to 
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have control over designated areas in Afghanistan to conduct security sector reform and 

reconstruction—an example of NATO’s framework nations concept.769

Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams: NATO’s Complement to the 

United States’ ETTs

As reconstructing the Afghan National Army became a primary focus for the United 

States and ISAF, NATO mirrored the U.S. deployment of Embedded Training Teams 

with the deployment of Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLT). The OMLT 

program was an important part of NATO-ISAF’s contribution toward the development 

of the ANA by providing them with training and mentoring, and by serving as a liaison 

between the ANA and ISAF forces. The NATO-ISAF OMLTs performed similar duties 

to the U.S. ETTs, and were generally composed of 13 to 30 personnel—depending 

on the size and function of the ANA unit it was partnered with—from one or several 

countries.770 According to NATO, in October 2009, 27 nations had contributed or pledged 

to contribute to the OMLT program.771 These OMLTs were located in all five regions 

of Afghanistan, reported to the regional commander, and supported the Afghanistan 

Regional Security Integration Command.772

Marine Lt. Col. Drew West, an ANA/OMLT leader for ISAF, remarked that “the OMLT 

program is the single greatest contribution that NATO’s ISAF mission can make towards 

developing the Afghan National Army.”773 The Joint Multinational Readiness Center 

in Hohenfels, Germany, provided OMLTs from all nations the opportunity to practice 

coaching and mentoring techniques with ANA staff and company representatives prior 

to deployment.774

Framework nations is the 

traditional NATO approach 

to stabilization and military 

operations, in which one 

nation is in charge of 

coordinating all civil and 

military activities in one 

geographic area and has 

operational command in 

that area.

A U.S. Army soldier discusses an operational order with a Czech military counterpart during an Operational 

Mentoring and Liaison Team training exercise. (Photo by William Livingston)
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Regional Commands Established to Centralize Control of 

Counterinsurgency Operations

As NATO expanded nationwide, it recognized the need to create a command structure 

to coordinate PRT activities (See Figure 18.). Each regional command was led by a 

lead nation and had a command-and-control headquarters as well as a forward support 

base.775 Following the traditional framework nation concept, NATO initially established 

five regional commands under the control of different NATO nations: the United States 

in the east, Italy in the west, Turkey in the capital, Germany in the north, and, in the 

south, a rotating command of Canada, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands.776 In 

addition to coordinating the PRTs in the region, regional commands also organized 

ISAF’s combat forces. Overall, however, coordination suffered because each region was 

under the control of a different nation.

Jalalabad

Khost Gardez

Mether Lam

Asadabad

Kabul

Wardak

Bamyan

Sharana

Bagram

Panjshir

Qalat

Konduz Feyzabad

Pol-e Khomri

Mazar-e Sharif

Meymana

Qala-e Naw Chaghcharan

Tarin Kowt

Kandahar

Lashkar Gah

Farah

Herat

Nuristan

PAKISTAN

IRAN

TURKMENISTAN

UZBEKISTAN

TAJIKISTAN

CHINA

INDIA

RC (North)

RC (East)

RC (Central)

RC (South)

Kabul

Regional Command

ISAF PRT

RC (West)

ISAF REGIONAL COMMANDS AND PRT LOCATIONS

Source: International Security Assistance Force, “ISAF Regional Commands & PRT Locations,” April 20, 2007.

FIGURE 18
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United States Assumes Command of NATO Forces, Takes Steps to 

Further Centralize Control over NATO Activities 

As security deteriorated in Afghanistan and political pressure within the United States 

increased, the United States assumed military command of ISAF in 2007. One year 

later, the United States gave the commander of ISAF (COMISAF) the dual-hatted role 

of commander of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan. “This new command structure,” according 

to a 2009 DOD report, was to “ensure synchronization of U.S. and ISAF forces and 

proper coordination of ANSF development efforts.”777 In 2009, with the appointment 

of U.S. General Stanley McChrystal, U.S. Special Forces would also come under the 

purview of the COMISAF, creating a more unified command-and-control structure.778

General McChrystal also took additional measures aimed at improving command 

and coordination by creating the ISAF Joint Command and the NATO Training 

Mission – Afghanistan.779

Establishment of NATO Training Mission Aims to Improve Coordination of 

International Security Force Assistance Activities

At the April 2009 NATO Summit, NATO members agreed to establish the NATO Training 

Mission – Afghanistan to oversee NATO’s development, training, and advising of the 

ANA and ANP, parallel to the U.S.-led CSTC-A organization.780 NTM-A became fully 

operational in February 2010 under the command of U.S. Lt. Gen. William Caldwell, 

who was dual-hatted as the commander of CSTC-A and NTM-A.781 As one NATO expert 

noted, combining NTM-A and CSTC-A under one command was a “testimony to [a] more 

coherent and strategic thinking within the alliance.”782

Thereafter, NTM-A became responsible for coordinating international efforts to 

train, equip, and sustain the ANA, ANP, and AAF at the institutional level.783 With the 

ISAF Joint Command focused on training forces in the field and conducting combat 

operations, NTM-A was able to focus on professionalizing the ANDSF and strengthening 

the forces’ training institutions, structures, and processes.784 With the ANA, for example, 

NTM-A focused on training, advising, and assisting ANA leadership in developing and 

fielding institutional capabilities such as logistics and military education.785

The establishment of NTM-A changed how countries participated. Instead of 

countries providing units that would operate largely independently, NATO nations 

would now provide individual advisors to serve as a part of a multinational command 

structure responsible for developing core capabilities within the ANDSF and 

supporting institutions.786

NATO Training Mission Suffers from Chronic Shortfalls

Deploying advisors to staff the NTM-A was a consistent challenge. Many NATO members 

were reluctant to commit forces to Afghanistan, a mission seen as financially, politically, 

and militarily costly. As one NATO official wrote, “Sending forces to Afghanistan is a 

heavy burden, in political and psychological as well as financial and military terms, 

and therefore the temptation is great to let others carry as much as possible of that 

burden.”787 Over the past 17 years, NATO has participated in at least 11 missions outside 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

of Afghanistan. While these have not required as many forces as in Afghanistan, they 

have further strained NATO members’ resources.788

One area where NATO has fallen short in generating forces for Afghanistan is in 

providing trainers for the ANDSF. As detailed in SIGAR’s first lessons learned report 

on security sector assistance, NATO consistently struggled to fill the personnel 

requirements set forth by the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR), 

the NATO document that identifies requirements for NATO operations.789 According to 

former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) General John Craddock, 

“NATO nations have never completely filled the agreed requirements for forces needed 

in Afghanistan.”790 In March 2010, SACEUR Navy Admiral James Stavridis told Congress 

that of the 1,287 NATO trainers U.S. military leaders had requested, only 541 were 

pledged. “It absolutely is correct to say NATO has fallen short on providing these vital 

trainers,” he said.791

“It absolutely is correct to say NATO has 

fallen short on providing these vital trainers.”

—Former SACEUR Admiral James Stavridis

As of March 2017, 13,459 troops staffed the Resolute Support Mission. The United States 

was the largest contributor with 6,941 personnel, followed by NATO with 4,833; 13 nonNATO nations provided 1,647 troops.792 At a February 2018 defense ministerial meeting, 

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg announced that at least 28 allies and partners 

were increasing their troop contributions to the training mission by approximately 

3,000 trainers.793

In November 2018, NATO reported that over 16,000 personnel from 39 NATO allies 

and partner countries were contributing to the Resolute Support Mission, and at the 

July 2018 NATO Summit, NATO members and allies agreed to extend their financial 

support through 2024.794 According to the Lead Inspector General for Overseas 

Contingency Operations, 95 percent of billets in NATO’s CJSOR were filled in 2017 

and 2018.795

ISAF Joint Command Establishes Control of Regional Commands

In 2009, to provide more effective unity of command and to better implement a 

new counterinsurgency campaign plan, General McChrystal created the ISAF Joint 

Command as a corps-level headquarters.796 The IJC would oversee the implementation 

and coordination of day-to-day combat operations on the ground in Afghanistan. To do 

this, the IJC was assigned responsibility for all regional commands.797 As scholar Theo 

Farrell noted, “The establishment of an ISAF Joint Command in 2009 led to tighter 

control of the various regional commands and thus narrowed the room for specific 

national arrangements.”798 The IJC was also assigned responsibility for all operational 

training and mentoring teams.799 According to General McChrystal’s COMISAF Initial 

The Combined Joint 

Statement of Requirements, 

the NATO equivalent of a 

request for forces, details 

the requirements for a NATO 

operation.
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Assessment, the IJC would also allow CSTC-A and NTM-A to focus on institutional-level 

development.800

Train, Advise, and Assist Commands

By 2015, NATO and the United States dramatically reduced their collective military 

footprint in Afghanistan and transitioned from ISAF to the Resolute Support Mission.801

The cornerstone of the new mission became functional security force assistance, 

described by DOD as “an advisory effort focused on developing functions, systems 

processes, and organizational development connected between the ministry and 

operational levels.”802 Additionally, regional commands were renamed Train, Advise, 

and Assist Commands and were still led by framework nations.803 Despite the shift in 

focus toward training, TAACs continued to report through the operational chain of 

command rather than transitioning under the training command (CSTC-A) (See essay 

on pp. 63–65.). 

NATO’S POLICIES AND PROCESSES CREATE CHALLENGES IN 

ESTABLISHING UNITY OF EFFORT 

While NATO adapted over the course of its involvement in Afghanistan, the NATO 

mission suffered from challenges inherent to NATO’s policies and processes. Since 

NATO was created as a collective defense mechanism in the 1940s to counter the 

Soviet threat, it was not initially designed to operate as a fully integrated multinational 

military organization. Even within Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls 

for collective action, the treaty allows flexibility for how each nation wishes to provide 

support.804 Therefore, NATO will not force or compel any nation to operate beyond its 

national mandate and seeks to project public unity as an organization. Each nation 

maintains full control over its deployed forces during NATO operations, which impedes 

unity of command. Another challenge is that military capabilities within the alliance are 

not equal, especially with the expansion of NATO to include smaller Eastern European 

countries previously under Soviet influence. Even if a country wants to increase its 

support for NATO operations, it cannot do so without the support of other larger NATO 

ally forces. 

Senior NATO Commander Does Not Have Absolute Control 

over NATO Forces

Command and control was complicated by NATO’s command structure. For U.S. forces, 

the U.S. commander in country is given authority over subordinate U.S. forces. This is 

the same for NATO countries, as each NATO member in a NATO operation has its own 

separate chain of command back to its national government. As noted in the NATO 

Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations, “no NATO or coalition commander 

has full command over the forces assigned to them since, in assigning forces to NATO, 

nations will delegate only operational command or operational control.”805 In most 

cases, NATO countries will also deploy a Senior National Representative or national 

contingent commander who holds a “red card” that can be used to prevent their national 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

force from being used in certain operations or to complete certain tasks.806 This red card 

can even be used if there is no specific caveat on that force.807

As a result, ISAF commanders and Resolute Support commanders wielded restrictive 

authority over subordinate forces. This was highlighted by Canadian General Rick 

Hillier, who commanded ISAF forces from February to August 2004. He wrote, “I did not 

turn to Canada as my go-to nation when I wanted a job done, because of the complex 

and cumbersome system in Ottawa and bureaucratic approach to operations.”808 One 

of Hillier’s successors, U.S. General David McKiernan, later remarked, “I was [ISAF 

commander] and I did not have command of U.S. forces.”809 Given the influence of 

contributing member nations over their forces’ operations, the ISAF commander’s 

role was often relegated to one of strategic guidance, or ensuring operational and 

strategic cohesion.810

“I was [ISAF commander] and I did 

not have command of U.S. forces.”

—Former ISAF Commander U.S. General David McKiernan

In addition to having limited control over the forces assigned to them, the NATO 

commander in Afghanistan is required to consult with the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 

and await consensus on decisions, which inevitably delays operations. In some 

instances, this led commanders to dismiss NATO’s policies. When he was ISAF 

commander, General David Richards of the UK did not ask for permission to conduct 

Operation Medusa, a Canadian-led offensive aimed at establishing government control 

over an area of Kandahar Province, because he “knew there would be a two-month 

period when all the nations and NATO would agonize over whether they could attempt 

such a big thing. So [he] just did it.”811

NATO Members Required to Fund Their Own Military Operations

Member countries make direct and indirect contributions to NATO. Direct contributions 

are made to finance requirements that serve the interests of all NATO members (such as 

NATO-wide air defense systems) and generally follow the principle of common funding. 

Indirect, or national, contributions are the largest contributions and include member 

troop and equipment contributions.812

Unlike UN operations, in which participating nations are reimbursed, NATO members 

are required to fund their own operations, including operations in Afghanistan.813

For most NATO members, this presents a significant problem. In the post-Cold War 

era, many NATO militaries atrophied after years of declining defense spending, and 

operations in Afghanistan required a rapid increase in spending in a short amount of 

time. Further, NATO members—especially smaller countries—struggled to meet the 

costs associated with supporting frequent rotations of military forces in Afghanistan 

while dealing with competing domestic financial priorities.814 The result, according 

With common funding, all 

NATO members contribute 

a small percentage of their 

defense budget according to 

an agreed upon cost-share 

formula based on gross 

national income. 
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to former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, is that “it costs about 

50 times more to support a NATO soldier in Afghanistan than it costs to support an 

Afghan soldier.”820

“It costs about 50 times more to support a NATO soldier in 

Afghanistan than it costs to support an Afghan soldier.”

—Former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen

Force Generation: NATO’s Process for Deploying Personnel

When NATO became more involved in operations throughout the 1990s, it established 

a formal way to generate forces for missions. The most important step of this process 

occurs when the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) and joint 

force commander for the NATO operation hold a force generation conference, where 

representatives from all member states meet to discuss the CJSOR.821 Following the 

conference, member states relay their troop commitments through a force preparation 

message and a transfer of authority message (transferring command of the national 

contingent over to NATO) about a month before the actual deployment.822 The force 

generation process is continuous, as troop rotations and revised concepts of operations 

require new force requests and approvals.823

Commitments made at NATO’s force generation conferences do not always indicate 

actual force commitments, however. “In a perfect world in which alliance concerns 

trumped national concerns,” remarked scholars David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, 

“requested forces would be forthcoming at the force generation conferences, the deployed 

Operating by Consensus Is a Key Aspect of NATO Decision-Making

Consensus has been the sole basis for decision-making in NATO since the creation of the alliance 

in 1949. NATO decisions are viewed as the “expression of the collective will of all the sovereign 

states that are members of the alliance.”815 Consensus is not just required for the most important 

decisions in the North Atlantic Council, but for thousands of decisions every year, ranging from 

broad political and military strategies to force structure to resource and budgeting issues. 

Consensus is also used at all levels of NATO, including at the committee and working group 

levels.816 Although cumbersome, this mechanism of achieving unanimity is what gives NATO its 

international credibility.817

While the consensus rule applies to the potential use of military force, such as the invocation 

of Article 5, NATO defers to member states when it comes to determining exactly how those 

countries contribute to operations. For example, Norway and Denmark do not allow peacetime 

stationing of foreign troops.818 As political scientist Stephen Saideman notes, “Because [NATO] 

operates by consensus, countries must not be forced to give up control of their troops; otherwise, 

some (or all) would never agree to a mission in the first place.”819
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commanders would get on with the business of implementing the NATO [operational 

plan], and the force generation process would end until the next set of requests was 

sent from the field commanders.”828 However, the process rarely worked this smoothly. 

The number of troops that a country pledges to contribute must be validated after the 

conference by a country’s internal political authorities (such as a nation’s parliament), 

which may change the number of troops or rescind the offer altogether.829

The force generation process is also complicated by national caveats, which are 

restrictions a country places on the use of its forces. After the force generation 

conference takes place, NATO members notify the organization of the specific 

contributions they will make and their caveats. The latter are outlined in a document 

known as the transfer of authority, which is sent to the in-country headquarters, 

sometimes only a few days before troops arrive.830 At the commencement of the mission 

in Afghanistan, some NATO members placed heavy caveats on their forces out of 

reluctance to follow the Bush administration and to protect them from being pulled to 

support missions that were directed by the United States with no alliance input.831

Since NATO allows each nation to maintain control over its forces, national direction 

always supersedes NATO orders, even those that come from agreed-upon and NACapproved operational plans, strategic directives, and rules of engagement. This makes it 

difficult for NATO commanders to plan appropriately, as troops may be constrained to 

specific geographic locations or be unable to participate in certain types of operations.

How Requirements Are Generated for NATO

After the North Atlantic Council agrees on a new operation, the NAC-appointed joint force 

commander drafts an operational plan and preliminary statement of requirements for the 

operation. Following the NATO Military Committee’s endorsement of these plans, the NAC 

approves them and issues a force activation directive. The Supreme Allied Commander Europe 

then sends an activation warning message to NATO’s member states and provides them with 

a spreadsheet listing the equipment, manpower, and resources needed for an operation. The 

DSACEUR and force commander then hold a force generation conference where member states 

are asked to provide the capabilities needed.824

In 2004, to improve NATO’s ability to monitor members’ contribution and manage burden sharing, 

NATO began holding annual global force generation conferences. At these conferences, the 

Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe presents force requirements and reviews what forces 

are available or committed.825 These conferences also provide a more comprehensive and longerterm view of NATO’s operational needs and of the allies’ overall efforts to meet them; it is easier, 

for example, for a country to provide forces when they have a 12-month warning rather than a 

30-day warning.826 While global force generation conferences are generally held annually, force 

generation conferences for Afghanistan are held biannually to better respond to the emergent 

needs of the commander.827

The Supreme Headquarters 

Allied Powers Europe is 

the headquarters of NATO’s 

Allied Command Operations.
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Benefits of NATO’s Force Generation Process 

Although there are many criticisms of NATO’s force generation process, it does preserve 

NATO’s core tenets, one of which is to leave intact the autonomy and veto power of 

NATO members. If a nation does not agree with a potential operation, it may veto the 

NAC’s decision or withhold troops. Further, although the force generation process is 

complicated, it is structured in a way that makes it difficult for any NATO member to 

refuse participation. Force generation is a consultative process that gives nations the 

ability to resolve their specific concerns, which in turn reinforces their commitment and 

ensures their participation.834

The force generation process also enables NATO members to participate in an operation 

they would most likely be unable to undertake on their own. Since NATO pools 

resources across the alliance, it is much easier for countries with smaller armies to 

participate and support an operation—although NATO members are required to pay for 

their own military forces to participate. For NATO, it is better to have a member country 

participate with minimal forces than not at all. 

National Caveats Undermine Unity of Effort and Complicate Planning

While certain data concerning caveats in place in Afghanistan are classified, 

approximate numbers have been reported. In 2006, there were an estimated 50 caveats 

in Afghanistan affecting ISAF troops.835 In 2009, a public DOD report stated that caveats 

increased from 57 to 58, attributing the slight increase to the addition of two nations 

to the mission in Afghanistan. “Of the 27 troop-contributing nations with caveats,” the 

report noted, “20 nations limit operations outside of originally assigned locations [and 

in] conducting counternarcotic operations with ISAF.” The report also noted that nearly 

40 percent of the caveats are geographically based, “representing a significant challenge 

for COMISAF as they limit his agility.”836 The complexity caused by caveats was also 

highlighted by one lieutenant colonel who stated in an interview with the Combat 

Studies Institute that “the commander would have to look down this matrix and say, 

‘Okay, these guys can do something, but these guys can’t. These guys can fly over and 

observe. These guys can actually shoot at them.’ This really constrained the commander 

quite a bit.”837

As noted above, caveats can include restrictions on where a unit can serve and whether 

and under what conditions it can move outside of its geographic location to assist 

allies elsewhere. Caveats are also used to specify the size of a force or the limits placed 

How the U.S. Government Handles CJSOR Shortfalls

According to DOD officials, DOD tracks CJSOR requirements and sometimes coordinates 

with Resolute Support, CENTCOM, and others to identify shortfalls. DOD officials told SIGAR 

that there is little to no interagency coordination when it comes to the CJSOR, and that when 

Resolute Support Mission and NATO submit the CJSOR, there is no discussion about filling 

gaps or shortfalls.832 State told SIGAR it provides “input and reporting [that] helps feed their 

requirements,” but largely defers to DOD on this issue.833
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on the use of a force. For example, some countries only allow their forces to engage 

in defensive operations or during the daytime.838 German troops were not allowed to 

operate outside of Kabul and Regional Command – North, and Belgian mentors to the 

ANA were not permitted to support operations conducted under U.S. command.839

For the first three years of the conflict, Canadian commanders had to seek approval 

for all missions that required lethal force, or that risked collateral damage, significant 

casualties, or strategic failure.840 Other countries, such as Poland and Denmark, had few 

if any caveats.841

Overall, national caveats created tension within NATO and hindered operational 

effectiveness. Caveats were known to produce resentment within the alliance: When 

countries were viewed as withholding their full effort, it created the perception of 

placing a disproportionate burden on others.842 In some instances, caveats affected 

how the Afghans perceived their coalition counterparts. According to a study by the 

RAND Corporation comparing U.S. Embedded Training Teams and ISAF liaison teams, 

almost all Afghan leaders preferred U.S. ETTs because they were able to go into combat 

with them.843

However, caveats do have benefits—without them, some NATO members would 

be unable to participate in NATO operations because domestic policies or political 

sensitivities would make them unable to approve of all NATO operational plans. 

THE UNITED STATES ENABLES AND OPTIMIZES NATO 

INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

As the United States’ priorities shifted to Iraq around 2003, it welcomed NATO’s 

increased role in Afghanistan. The Bush administration recognized that greater NATO 

involvement entailed a greater need for U.S. support of NATO allies given the limited 

capabilities of some countries. “The United States often has to supply expensive 

enablers [to NATO countries]—airlift, logistics, combat services and support, force 

protection, special forces, [and] intelligence,” Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld told 

Stephen Hadley, U.S. National Security Advisor to President Bush, shortly after NATO 

took over the ISAF mission.844 It was a point Secretary Rumsfeld reiterated two years 

later to U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Zalmay Khalilzad: “When NATO agrees to do 

something, it means we are the ones who have to help with the lift, help with the money, 

help with intel, help with the quick reaction forces, and provide the enablers.”845 In 2007, 

U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Benjamin Freakley described the United States as “the glue that kept 

the NATO forces together.”846

U.S. assistance to other countries took on a variety of forms. According to one former 

senior advisor to the Afghan MOD, the United States provided lift, sustainment, and 

training support to countries like Albania and Montenegro in exchange for personnel.847

The United States did “almost everything for countries like Mongolia and Lithuania,” 

one former NTM-A /CSTC-A commander told SIGAR, including paying stipends and 

providing logistical support. There was “not one country that didn’t ask for some type 
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of [U.S.] support,” the former commander added.848 Lt. Gen. David Barno recalled one 

NATO-led PRT that refused to leave their compound until a U.S. unit arrived to disarm 

an improvised explosive device they discovered outside of their front gate.849

U.S. Financial Assistance to Coalition Countries Incentivized 

Their Continued Support

The United States also enables NATO and partner nation involvement by providing 

financial support. Created by the FY 2002 Defense Appropriations Act, the Coalition 

Support Fund (CSF) initially allowed for money from the Defense Emergency Response 

Fund to be used to reimburse Pakistan and Jordan for their support of U.S. military 

operations in Afghanistan.850 In 2006, the Quadrennial Defense Review recommended 

that DOD be given greater reimbursement authority to support coalition forces and 

expand logistics support to other nations supporting the Global War on Terror, and 

Congress subsequently authorized CSF reimbursements for any key coalition country 

offering support for the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq.851

Today, the United States is able to use the CSF to reimburse key cooperating nations 

for military and logistic support, as well as to finance specialized training, supplies, and 

equipment to coalition partners.852 The Coalition Readiness Support Program, a subset 

of the CSF, allows DOD to lend equipment such as radios, counter-IED equipment, and 

night vision devices to coalition partners.853

The Lift and Sustain program provides funds to transport foreign forces from 

approximately 25 countries supporting U.S.-led operations as well as sustainment funds 

A Spanish mentor listens to an Afghan commando sniper student guide his classmates through scope 

adjustment procedures. (NATO Photo by Felix Figueroa) 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

while they serve with U.S. forces.854 In Afghanistan, this fund provided support to allied 

countries such as Poland and Romania.855 According to DOD, Lift and Sustain funds 

allow coalition partners to not only participate in contingency operations, but to keep 

their forces in Afghanistan for extended deployments, decreasing requirements for 

U.S. forces.856

The National Guard State Partnership Program 

The National Guard State Partnership Program also enabled several NATO countries’ 

involvement in Afghanistan. Implemented in 1993, it links a state’s National Guard with 

a partner nation’s security force. Through military-to-military engagements, the program 

aims to support a range of mutually identified security, government, economic, and social 

goals. As of 2019, there are 75 such partnerships with 81 nations around the globe.857

To support the train, advise, and assist mission in Afghanistan, U.S. National Guard 

soldiers formed OMLTs with their NATO partners or augmented their partners’ OMLTs 

to fill vacancies. For many NATO countries, the National Guard’s assistance and support 

facilitated their involvement in Afghanistan. For example, when Hungary offered to 

send a training team to Afghanistan, they requested that they train and deploy with their 

Ohio National Guard partners.858 Since then, states such as Ohio, Illinois, New Jersey, 

Tennessee, Minnesota, and Michigan have supported their NATO partners on OMLT 

missions in Afghanistan.859 By training, deploying, and completing multiple rotations 

together, the National Guard units worked to increase the likelihood that their NATO 

partners will one day be able to deploy without U.S. support.860

An Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team commander from the Ohio National Guard talks with his 

Hungarian army counterpart while on duty in Afghanistan. (Ohio National Guard photo)
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Optimizing NATO: Niche Capabilities and Force Multipliers 

While the United States enabled many NATO nations’ involvement, several NATO 

nations provided unique capabilities that the U.S. government used to fill voids in the 

U.S. security sector assistance effort. As the former director for international security 

cooperation at NTM-A told SIGAR, “[NATO] allies brought capabilities that the United 

States could not replicate, and if [we] tried to replicate them, [it] would be very 

expensive.”861 In most cases, the United States sought to leverage NATO nations with 

expertise on Soviet-style aircraft and weapons and with experience in police advising.

For example, the U.S.-led Combined Air Power Transition Force, the predecessor to 

NATC-A, relied heavily on Czech Air Force advisors to provide Mi-35 crew training.862

Czech and older Afghan airmen spoke Russian, which eliminated the need for linguists 

and helped with rapport-building. The Czech Republic also deployed an air advisor 

team every four months from 2008 through at least 2015, and often redeployed the same 

advisors. As historian and former air advisor Forrest Marion noted, “Such continuity 

probably facilitated more accurate assessments than what some other coalition teams 

were able to provide.”863 Given their experience operating and maintaining Russian 

Mi-17s, Lithuanian and Hungarian air advisors were also valued by the U.S.-led 

air command.864

Because the United States does not have a national police force, it viewed countries 

with gendarmeries, or paramilitary units with jurisdiction in civil law enforcement, 

as particularly useful for police training. Unlike the United States, countries like 

Italy, Romania, and Turkey were able to provide military forces with civilian policing 

Italian Carabinieri advisors from NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan train the ANP in search and 

apprehension techniques at the Central Training Center. (Photo by Brian Brannon) 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

experience and training tailored to police advising. The value of such expertise was 

highlighted by one former commander of NTM-A/CSTC-A, who told SIGAR that forces 

like the Italian Carabinieri, Italy’s national gendarmerie, were “vital” to the ANP’s 

training.865 A former deputy commander for programs at CSTC-A told SIGAR that 

bringing in the Carabinieri to assist with the police mission was the “smartest thing 

[CSTC-A] has ever done.”866

Unfortunately, however, NATO’s force generation process allowed nations to volunteer 

for assignments, including leadership roles, regardless of that nation’s expertise on the 

topic. For example, while the Italians, Romanians, and Turks serve as staff on CSTC-A’s 

Military Advisory Group – Interior, the directorate responsible for advising the MOI, the 

directorate is headed by a two-star British marine with no civilian policing experience.867

7%

6

5

4

3

2

1

0

TROOPS COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN AS A PERCENTAGE OF COUNTRY’S TOTAL MILITARY STRENGTH

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Note: Numbers include a country’s contribution to ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Source: Total force strength numbers (2002–2017) from International Institute for Strategic Studies’ Military Balances; ISAF and OEF contributions 

(2002–2006) from International Institute for Strategic Studies' Military Balances (2002-2008); ISAF and RSM contributions (2007–2016) from ISAF 

Placemats Archive.

United States

United Kingdom

Netherlands

Poland

Denmark

Canada

FIGURE 19

An Alternative Look at NATO Troop Contributions 

The United States has repeatedly asked NATO members to contribute more troops. However, for 

several years, the number of troops contributed by many NATO allies as a percentage of their 

active force was proportional to the United States’ contribution. For example, from 2006 to 2009, 

the Netherlands contributed a larger percentage of its active force (3.5 to 5 percent) compared to 

the United States (1.5 to 2.3 percent) (See Figure 19.).
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Additionally, NATO’s force generation process creates challenges for the United States in 

requesting country-specific support. For example, while U.S. commander General John 

Allen was able to request that the Italians take over the police training mission in Iraq, 

a similar request would be a far more burdensome process for the Resolute Support 

commander in Afghanistan.868

The United States also considered several NATO countries to be force multipliers 

for their willingness to contribute troops with limited caveats. After 2008, Poland 

contributed relatively large numbers of troops (over 2,600 in 2010) with minimal caveats: 

The Polish had no caveats when operating within Regional Command – East or with 

the United States outside of Regional Command – East, and Polish Special Operations 

Forces had no caveats other than not being allowed to operate outside of Afghanistan.869

The Polish were also praised by several U.S. officers interviewed by SIGAR, who found 

them to be flexible and familiar with Afghanistan given repeat rotations.870 Countries like 

Denmark and Romania were also known for their flexibility and limited constraints. 

NATO’s Experience in Afghanistan Improved its Interoperability 

During the Cold War, interoperability was not a high priority for NATO; land forces 

operated side by side without the need for regular interaction or direct engagement. In 

Afghanistan, where NATO countries operated alongside one another often in small units, 

the need for interoperability became much more significant.871 This need was also seen 

as critical for the train, advise, and assist mission, where national military doctrines 

often determined how NATO members trained their Afghan counterparts. At one point 

during the mission, for example, the United States trained the ANA’s enlisted soldiers 

while the UK trained noncommissioned officers and France trained officers.872 As one 

advisor noted, these countries’ military doctrines were different in significant ways.873

For some countries, for example, noncommissioned officers are a foreign concept and 

not a universally applied element of the military hierarchy, even among NATO allies. 

Over time, NATO’s interoperability in Afghanistan improved. To enhance information 

sharing between NATO military and civilian advisors, NATO adopted the Afghan Advisor 

Network (ANET), a system used to record and track advisor engagements with Afghan 

counterparts.874 NATO partners also implemented the Afghanistan Mission Network, now 

the primary Coalition, Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance network used by coalition forces in Afghanistan. 

Since its implementation in 2011, the Afghanistan Mission Network has increased 

information sharing and improved situational awareness.875

Despite these improvements, challenges and shortcomings remain, particularly when 

it comes to intelligence sharing and basic communication. For example, the lack of 

interoperable communication systems meant that 1st SFAB personnel at the company 

level and lower had to rely on WhatsApp—a messaging app owned by Facebook—to 

communicate with coalition partners.876
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Afghan Advisor Network Has Limited Functionality for Field Advisors

While the Afghan Advisor Network improved interoperability and helped to mitigate the 

effects of frequent rotations, the program had several shortcomings. In the beginning, 

users cited connectivity issues, limited usage, and flawed software that often resulted 

in reports that should have taken only minutes to complete instead taking hours.877 For 

many advisors, working with ANET took hours out of their day. “You’d click the button,” 

said U.S. Air Force Lt. Col. d’Artagnan de Anda, “go get a soda, and come back and hope 

your page had loaded.”878

To address these issues, the Defense Digital Service developed ANET 2.0. In March 

2017, the system was released on a classified network to 800 advisors, and the long-term 

maintenance and sustainment of the system was handed over to NATO developers in 

Europe.879 As a result of ANET, Digital Defense Services began working on developing a 

larger version of ANET to support DOD security cooperation missions across the globe.

In December 2018, during a SIGAR trip to the Joint Readiness Training Center and the 

U.S. Army’s 3rd Battalion 353rd Regiment at Fort Polk, Louisiana, SIGAR observed that 

there were still ANET challenges. For example, ANET does not have an unclassified 

system, which prevents advisors from using the system during their predeployment 

training at certain locations in the United States. ANET is also still narrative-based. 

While this works well for ministerial-level advising, it does not for tactical- and 

operational-level advising because of the limited time and ability these personnel have 

to use the system. The JRTC is working on solutions to these problems.

NATO’S EFFORTS TO BUILD SECURITY SECTOR 

ASSISTANCE CAPABILITIES

Over the course of NATO’s involvement in Afghanistan, the organization has worked 

to improve its capability in executing security sector assistance efforts. Such efforts 

include the development of allied joint doctrine and centers of excellence (COE), as well 

as assistance to countries in defense institution building. These initiatives reflect NATO’s 

understanding of the importance of security sector assistance. 

NATO Introduces Defense Institution Building 

Recognizing the need for effective defense institutions under civilian democratic 

control, NATO launched the Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution 

Building (PAP-DIB) at the 2004 Istanbul Summit.880 PAP-DIB covers a wide range of 

objectives, such as the development of arrangements designed to ensure democratic 

control over defense activities and procedures aimed at promoting civilian participation 

in developing security policy.881 The Building Integrity program, launched in 2007 by the 

Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), “stems from the PAP-DIB objective to assist 

nations in reforming their defense and security sector.”882 To help nations develop 

democratic and effective defense institutions and reduce the risk of corruption, the 

Building Integrity program offers support through a range of tools, including a selfassessment questionnaire, consultations with subject matter experts, and educational 

The Euro-Atlantic 

Partnership Council is 

a 50-nation forum for 

consultation on political and 

security-related issues. It 

also provides the political 

framework for NATO’s 

cooperation with partner 

countries in the region.

Source: NATO, “Euro-Atlantic 

Partnership Council,” last updated 

June 9, 2017. 
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courses.887 Through the Building Integrity program, NATO has developed programs for 

the ANDSF, predeployment training for ISAF, and has organized workshops and peer-topeer consultations for Afghan officials.888

NATO Doctrine Concerning SSA

NATO published the Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force Assistance in May 2016 to 

provide guidance to NATO and NATO-led forces on how NATO provides security force 

assistance at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. The doctrine identifies the 

training and development of local forces as “integral to the success of a broader strategy 

aimed at reinforcing the capacity of non-NATO nations within the broader framework of 

defense and related security capacity building.” The doctrine also details how security 

force assistance affects NATO’s other concepts, including security sector reform, 

stabilization, reconstruction, counterinsurgency, and military assistance, which includes 

training, advising, mentoring, and partnering with local forces.889

In July 2016, NATO published the first edition of the Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability 

Policing in recognition of the fact that the Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force 

Assistance did not sufficiently address the training and development of local police 

forces. As noted in the doctrine, the Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability Policing

stemmed from the recognition that “there may be a requirement to fully support the 

security sector reform by training and mentoring police forces and advising local 

government officials in the areas of law and order and rule of law when other actors are 

hampered and unable to do so.”890

 The doctrine identifies the overall goals of stability 

policing as the establishment of a safe and secure environment, the restoration of public 

order and security, and the establishment of a foundation conducive toward long-term 

governance and development.891 The doctrine also clarifies that stability policing should 

be conducted by “specialized assets, which are police trained and equipped.”892

NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence

In May 2015, the NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence received its accreditation 

from Allied Command Transformation. Located in Vicenza, Italy, it is sponsored by 

NATO Centers of Excellence

Following the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO reorganized its military command to create Allied 

Command Transformation (ACT). ACT focuses on addressing future challenges, in part, through 

NATO Centers of Excellence. NATO defines COEs as “international military organizations that train 

and educate leaders and specialists from NATO members and partners countries.”883 The Joint Air 

Power Competence Center in Germany and the Defense Against Terrorism Center of Excellence 

in Turkey became the first two accredited COEs in 2005 and 2006, respectively.884 COEs are 

designed to assist with identifying lessons learned, developing doctrine, improving interoperability 

and capabilities, and testing new concepts through experimentation. The COEs are funded at 

the national level, meaning they are not directly funded by NATO and are not in NATO’s formal 

command structure.885 Typically, COEs specialize in becoming subject matter experts in one 

functional area. As of May 2019, there are 25 COEs within NATO.886
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

nine countries: the Czech Republic, France, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, Spain, the 

Netherlands, and Turkey. The U.S. government maintains a relationship with the COE, 

which focuses on doctrine and standardization, education, training and exercises, and 

identifying lessons learned. The U.S. State Department provides financial support to 

the center and, as of 2019, the U.S. Army has agreed to staff the deputy position with a 

U.S. Army officer. A recent example of NATO COE’s activities in relation to Afghanistan 

include a “Train-the-Trainers” course for the ANP.893 The Italian Carabinieri conducted 

four two-week courses, with 100 members of the ANP in each class. Through this 

training, the COE hoped to increase the number of well-trained ANP warrant officers.894

The COE also uses NATO’s Lessons Learned Portal to gather observations and identify 

best practices.895

The Stability Police Concept—the NATO process used to validate requirements and 

create a police capability within NATO—is under review by NATO and has not yet 

been approved. Therefore, the NATO alliance remains unable to request stability police 

advisors to deploy in support of a NATO mission. Instead, it will continue to rely on 

individual countries volunteering police advisors through the force generation process. 

NATO Security Force Assistance Center of Excellence

In December 2017, NATO formally established the Security Force Assistance Center of 

Excellence, based in Rome, Italy. Its focus is to “improve [the] effectiveness of NATO 

in promoting stability and reconstruction efforts for conflict and post-conflict scenarios 

and to provide a unique capability to the alliance, NATO nations, and partners in the 

field of Security Force Assistance.”896 Italy, Albania, and Slovenia are the nations that 

support this COE, but more countries will likely become involved. In December 2018, 

the NATO Security Force Assistance Center of Excellence hosted its first workshop in 

Rome, with international scholars and government officials to identify lessons learned 

and best practices associated with selecting, training, and developing senior advisors to 

partner nations’ ministries. 

KEY FINDINGS

Overall, this study of NATO’s role in Afghanistan finds:

1. There is no one nation within NATO responsible for all security sector assistance 

activities in Afghanistan. While the NATO commander is responsible for providing 

direction and coordinating activities, the commander’s authority can be ignored 

or dismissed by the commander of a nation’s military forces in Afghanistan. This 

undermined unity of effort.

2. Even though nations agree to provide advisors during the force generation process, 

the actual numbers of advisors deployed, with what capabilities and under what 

national constraints, are often unknown to the senior military commander in 

Afghanistan until weeks before the advisors’ deployment. This prevents effective 

planning and resource allocation. 
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3. NATO nations provided unique capabilities that the U.S. government used to fill voids 

in U.S. security sector assistance programs. However, problems with coordinating 

command and control hindered the United States’ ability to make the most of 

coalition support.

4. Although national caveats hindered NATO’s ability to execute the mission in 

Afghanistan and prevented standardization in training, advising, and assisting the 

ANDSF, caveats have allowed more nations to contribute troops. 

5. Most NATO members relied on U.S. military support for key functions to operate 

effectively in Afghanistan. 

6. While some NATO nations have gendarmerie forces that specialize in developing 

foreign police forces, NATO has not institutionalized this expertise as an approved 

NATO capability. Instead, NATO continues to rely on individual nations to provide 

these forces through the NATO force generation process. 

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. DOD should establish a close working relationship with NATO SSA-related 

COEs and schools to share best practices and lessons learned. DOD 

should also provide staff to SSA-related COEs to leverage capabilities for 

future operations. 

NATO COEs train and educate leaders and specialists from NATO and partner 

countries in particular areas, such as SFA and policing. DOD should position 

planners at relevant COEs in order to take advantage of their expertise for future 

SFA operations.

2. In planning the drawdown of U.S. forces, DOD should analyze NATO 

partner dependency on U.S. support of their operations in Afghanistan to 

determine how to maintain NATO support while the United States reduces its 

military forces.

Many NATO allies in Afghanistan rely heavily on the United States for enablers such 

as airlift, logistics, intelligence, and force protection. Reductions in U.S. forces could 

thus have a magnified effect on NATO forces involved in the advising effort.

3. The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff should update U.S. doctrine to clarify 

how the U.S. military conducts SSA efforts as part of a multinational coalition. 

The doctrine should provide clear guidance for establishing and maintaining 

coordination between U.S. departments and agencies operating at the embassy 

in the host country. 

U.S. doctrine for multinational and coalition operations is predominately focused 

on coordinating warfighting functions and military operations, but does not fully 

cover how the United States should coordinate and synchronize SSA efforts. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Doctrine should focus on ways to improve unity of command, unity of effort, and 

standardization of activities in developing a partner nation’s combat capabilities 

and associated security governance functions. Doctrine should also identify ways 

to mitigate interagency coordination issues that arise when a military coalition 

takes command of SSA activities. 

4. DOD and State, in coordination with NATO, should conduct an assessment 

of NATO’s core functions and capabilities related to SSA efforts. This effort 

should determine which activities should be military-led and therefore under 

the purview of NATO and which are civilian-led and may be conducted outside 

of a NATO command. Based on this analysis, NATO should consider updating 

its doctrine on conducting SSA efforts in the future.

In Afghanistan, NATO has the lead to develop ANDSF military and police 

capabilities; however, developing police capabilities is seen by many nations 

as a nonmilitary and more civilian-led activity that should be conducted by the 

embassy. This is the case for the United States, where legislation identifies State 

as the lead for developing foreign police forces. This is the same for Germany and 

other European countries. However, within NATO, there are multiple countries that 

have gendarmerie-like forces that can develop civilian police capabilities under 

the umbrella of a military command. Countries like Italy, Romania, and France are 

some of the nations that have his capability. Without a common framework for 

conducting these types of activities as part of a NATO mission, efforts to develop 

a partner nation’s capabilities are fractured between multiple actors. NATO would 

benefit from an analysis if these potential fracture points and create policy for 

future NATO operations to reduce these risks. 
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NATO’S COMMAND STRUCTURE CREATES 

COORDINATION CHALLENGES

Using a NATO framework for SSA missions departs from the traditional way the United States conducts SSA 

activities and creates unintended challenges to interagency coordination. Traditionally, the U.S. ambassador, as the 

selected representative of the President and the Secretary of State, is the highest ranking U.S. official responsible 

for overseeing all U.S. government programs and interactions with a partner nation.897 The ambassador oversees 

a country team generally composed of senior officials from different U.S. agencies, such as DOD, State, and the 

Department of Justice.898 This allows for a coordinated, interagency approach to the execution of U.S. foreign policy 

in that country.899

In Afghanistan, however, NATO’s authority to develop ANDSF capabilities diminishes the role of the U.S. 

ambassador in SSA-related decisions. While State told SIGAR in 2018 that the U.S. ambassador maintains a 

“close, consultative” relationship with the U.S. military commander, and while State conducts programming in 

Afghanistan, State recognizes NATO’s Resolute Support Mission as the lead for security sector assistance.900

This is in large part due to State’s limited funding, but it has created unique coordination challenges. For 

example, civilians operating out of the U.S. Embassy often advise the same Afghan institutions (such as 

the Ministries of Interior and Finance) as U.S. military personnel from CSTC-A. However, there is no formal 

relationship or coordination between the U.S. Embassy’s and CSTC-A’s advisory efforts.901 As former CSTC-A 

commander Maj. Gen. Kaiser highlighted, “[CSTC-A] should be working by, with, and through the Embassy. . . . 

[but] unfortunately, that is not the case.” He went on to note that the lack of coordination can lead to 

unsynchronized efforts.902

Further, while establishing an international military command had a positive effect on the ANA and AAF, it had 

an adverse effect on police development and rule of law. Specifically, the NATO command allowed for multiple 

approaches in these areas, which created challenges for international civilian and military coordination and hindered 

unity of effort. Many NATO countries, for example, view police development and rule of law as a nonmilitary, civilianled mission that should be conducted by embassies or civilian-led organizations such as the European Union. In the 

United States, State is the lead department for developing foreign police forces; similar arrangements exist in other 

countries, such as Germany. However, other NATO members—such as Italy, Romania, and France—used gendarmeries, 

military units trained in civil policing, to develop the ANP’s capabilities. Despite State’s traditional role working with 

foreign police forces, the United States also predominately used U.S. military personnel with limited to no civilian 

policing experience to conduct ANP training. Without a common framework for conducting these types of activities as 

part of a NATO mission, efforts to develop the ANP lacked a unified approach.903

International organizations also deployed advisors to Afghanistan independent of the NATO-led training 

mission, further complicating unity of effort. Established in 2007, the European Union Police Mission in 

Afghanistan (EUPOL) deployed police experts to develop MOI and ANP senior leaders and advise the Ministry 

of Justice.904 However, EUPOL’s focus on civilian policing did not align with training efforts elsewhere.905 EUPOL 

eventually ended its mission in Afghanistan in December 2016. A senior EUPOL official noted that “when 70 

percent of policemen are still fighting the war, it’s quite impossible for them to concentrate on doing policing.”906

To improve coordination, NATO countries have relied on informal meetings and coordination boards. In 2018, for 

example, CSTC-A held an international conference in Turkey with the purpose of resolving differences among the 

efforts of the various entities involved in police training at the MOI.907 However, the impact of such meetings has 

generally been hindered by their ad hoc nature and the frequent turnover of personnel. 

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U.S. Marine Corps photo

CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

No one person, agency, military service, or country has sole responsibility or  oversight over all U.S. and international activities to develop the ANDSF, MOD, 

and MOI. While the dual-hatted U.S.-NATO commander has been recognized as largely 

responsible for this effort, the commander has no authority over civilians operating 

within embassies, the European Union, or the United Nations. The commander also 

does not have absolute command over all NATO military forces training, advising, 

and assisting the ANDSF nationwide, which has impeded the standardization of SSA 

programs. Instead, the United States, working as part of a larger NATO-led coalition, 

has implemented a patchwork of security sector assistance activities and programs 

undertaken by dozens of U.S. government entities and international partner nations in 

Afghanistan. This has strained unity of effort. 

As specified in the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy, 

security sector assistance will continue to be a critical element of U.S. foreign policy and 

national security. These documents also note that the United States is unlikely to face 

conflicts alone, and that meeting the United States’ global security needs will require 

working with our allies and partner nations. Even with the United States reprioritizing 

near-peer conflict (for example, conflict with China and Russia), security sector 

assistance is critical to building and strengthening a network of allied security forces 

capable of supporting future military engagements. When it comes to counterterrorism, 

the United States relies on partners to assume greater responsibility for internal and 
142 | CONCLUSIONS

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

external security, regain control of ungoverned areas, and combat terrorist threats.908

A partner nation capable of addressing these issues reduces the need for U.S. military 

deployments and allows the United States to reduce its use of military force around 

the globe.

Recent discussions about a potential drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan as part 

of a larger political settlement highlight the need to pay attention to the next phase of 

U.S. military support: the residual presence required for the SSA effort.909 Until there 

is an enduring political settlement with the Taliban, training, advising, assisting, and 

equipping the ANDSF will be a key component of the U.S. mission.910 The United States 

must determine whether the U.S. military assistance mission will continue to be part 

of a coalition effort under the NATO umbrella or if the U.S. military will transition to a 

more traditional posture operating out of the U.S. Embassy. As this study shows, either 

decision will pose coordination and synchronization challenges.

The United States must also determine how to use its military advisors and support 

teams in order to continue ongoing SSA programs. Currently, for example, the AAF 

requires U.S. or coalition logistical support at all of the major airfields. The United 

States relies upon trainers and advisors at Kandahar Air Field to implement the UH-60 

program. The new SFABs are dependent upon the regional Train, Advise, and Assist 

Commands for logistical support, close air support, and sustainment. Any drawdown of 

these enabling forces will have a direct impact on ongoing U.S. support to the ANDSF.911

Congressional oversight is vital during this period of transition to ensure future funding 

and support for long-term SSA activities in Afghanistan and to institutionalize lessons 

learned. The 2017 National Defense Authorization Act took aim at DOD’s contribution 

to SSA and mandated that DOD make major reforms related to staffing, programming, 

and training.912 While these efforts will improve SSA efforts overall, Afghanistan is 

not the priority focus for reform, despite currently being the longest and most robust 

ongoing effort. For instance, the 2017 NDAA requires DOD to establish a monitoring 

and evaluation program to track security sector assistance milestones, but this is not 

being done today for Afghanistan. Congressional oversight is also critically important 

to review U.S. progress towards transitioning sustainment of the ANDSF to Afghan 

ownership and tracking U.S. activities to meet this goal. 

Identifying lessons is one thing; learning them is another. After large reconstruction 

efforts in the past—for example, in Vietnam, Korea, and Germany—policymakers pledge 

to never make the same mistakes again. But only by institutionalizing best practices and 

resolving current challenges can the United States prepare for future missions and make 

the most of its experience in Afghanistan. 
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While each chapter concludes with a list of key findings for each topic, below is a list of 

the major findings from this report:

1. No single person, agency, military service, or country has ultimate responsibility for 

or oversight of all U.S. and international activities to develop the ANDSF and the 

Ministries of Defense and Interior. Instead, the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission 

relies on command directives and orders to provide overarching guidance and less 

formal mechanisms, such as weekly operations and intelligence briefings between 

Resolute Support and USFOR-A, to coordinate military activities. 

2. SSA efforts in Afghanistan have been hindered by the lack of clear command-andcontrol relationships between the U.S. military and the U.S. Embassy, as well as 

between ministerial and tactical advising efforts. This has resulted in disjointed 

efforts to develop ANDSF capabilities.

3. There is no formal mechanism to resolve conflicts between SSA activities led by the 

United States through CSTC-A, and those conducted by other national embassies, 

international governmental organizations, or nongovernmental organizations working 

directly with the Afghan government. While international working groups and 

coordination boards have been created to resolve conflicts, they are often temporary 

and lack authority.

4. The SSA mission in Afghanistan lacked an enduring, comprehensive, expert-designed 

plan that guided its efforts. As a result, critical aspects of the advisory mission were 

not unified by a common purpose, nor was there a clear plan to guide equipping 

decisions over time.

5. DOD organizations and military services were often not assigned ownership of key 

aspects of the SSA mission. Responsibilities for developing ANDSF capabilities were 

divided among multiple agencies and services, each of which provided advisors who 

were usually deployed for no longer than one year. 

6. Most predeployment training did not adequately prepare advisors for their work 

in Afghanistan. Training did not expose advisors to Afghan systems, processes, 

weapons, culture, and doctrine. It also did not expose advisors to other parts of 

the advisory efforts, nor did it link advisors who operated at different tactical, 

operational, and ministerial levels.

7. The U.S. government has taken incremental steps to improve SSA activities, such 

as creating the MODA program, implementing core aspects of defense institution 

building, and deploying advisor units like the SFABs. However, these capabilities 

have not been fully realized.

8. The United States has not adequately involved the Afghans in key decisions and 

processes. As a result, the United States has implemented systems that the Afghans 

will not be able to maintain without U.S. support.

9. The NATO command structure had benefits and drawbacks. While NATO’s command 

structure broadened international military SSA coordination, it complicated U.S. 

interagency coordination.
144 | CONCLUSIONS

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

LESSONS

Our study identified the following lessons from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan:

1. The lack of a comprehensive and consistent long-term plan to train, advise,

assist, and equip a partner nation’s military and security forces results in 

misalignment of advisors and ad hoc decision-making. 

For the last decade and a half, the United States failed to implement—in 

coordination with Afghan leadership and NATO partners—a stable and 

comprehensive ANDSF force design that would guide the long-term structure 

of the U.S. advisory effort. Without a long-term plan that detailed desired 

operational capabilities, equipping decisions were often ad hoc and inconsistent 

from year to year. Commanders serving one-year rotations prioritized the tactical 

fight and equipped the ANDSF with little regard for past equipping decisions or 

future expenses. 

2. Conducting SSA activities while the United States is engaged in major combat

operations fractures the traditional way the United States develops partner 

forces and creates a disjointed command-and-control relationship between the 

U.S. military and civilian leadership. A long-term vision is required in order 

to transfer responsibility from the senior military commander back to the 

embassy and ambassador. 

Traditional SSA missions are under the purview of the U.S. ambassador, and 

reflect overarching goals of U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. Security Coordination 

Office, as a member of the U.S. Embassy country team, coordinates security 

sector assistance proposals with the embassy and combatant command. Any 

agreed-upon activities are then implemented by DOD. In Afghanistan, Resolute 

Support operates independently of the U.S. ambassador and other international 

organizations involved in developing Afghanistan’s security capabilities, which 

hinders interagency coordination. The senior U.S. military commander reports 

back through the combatant command to the Secretary of Defense, with no 

responsibility for coordinating activities with the U.S. Embassy or ambassador. 

Instead, coordination among the most senior military commander and civilian 

representative is based on personalities and the initiative of both actors. Traditional 

SSA activities are a longer-term commitment than the deployment of U.S. military 

combat forces. Identifying a transition of responsibility of SSA activities from DOD 

to the U.S. Embassy is critical to sustaining U.S. foreign policy objectives.

3. SSA missions that involve NATO require a plan to improve coordination 

among all international stakeholders involved in the development of the host 

nation’s defense and security forces.
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While a NATO command improved coordination among military advisors, 

embassies and international organizations continued to pursue individual SSA 

activities. The United States and coalition partners suffer from a lack of civilianmilitary coordination: Its military component serves as a member of the NATO-led 

coalition, while its embassy communicates directly with the Afghan government. 

Embassy coordination of SSA efforts among allies is based on informal working 

groups, coordination committees, or personal relationships, which have had 

various levels of success.

4. Unless there is a plan to transition responsibilities to a partner nation,

the foreign military sales process used in Afghanistan will likely limit 

the institutional development of a partner nation as well as that nation’s 

ownership of and responsibility for its own resources. 

After 9/11, Congress created new authorities for DOD to provide military equipment 

to partner nations that did not have the institutional infrastructure within the 

ministries to make requests themselves (for example, Iraq and Afghanistan). Under 

this new authority, known as the pseudo FMS process, the United States generates 

the requirement for equipment, fills the requirement, and finances the requirement 

for the partner nation. While the pseudo FMS process was a successful tool to 

rapidly equip the ANDSF in the early years, CSTC-A did not include Afghans in the 

pseudo FMS process and has not detailed a transition plan for the Afghan military 

to gradually assume ownership of the requirements generation process.

5. U.S. financing of partner nation security forces may be a continued

requirement even as their capabilities improve. 

The U.S. government continues to provide close to $5 billion a year in security 

sector assistance to Afghanistan. Even as the ANDSF becomes less reliant on 

day-to-day U.S. military support, projected financial support to sustain the ANDSF 

remains steady. Until the Afghan government can reduce the pace of military 

operations through a political settlement or increase the Afghan government’s 

ability to increase revenue through taxes and trade, the ANDSF’s sustainability will 

be fully reliant on international financial support. 

6. Creating professional military advisors requires long-term assignments,

proper incentives, and the ability to refine advisor skills through multiple 

deployments and training cycles. 

DOD efforts to institutionalize security sector assistance programs suffered from 

high levels of personnel turnover, short-term rotations, and a failure to develop 

a cadre of advisors with regional and functional expertise. In 2009, DOD created 

the MODA program to improve the U.S. advisory effort at the ministerial level by 

recruiting civilian experts. The MODA program is a staffing function to recruit 

civilians from other DOD agencies to deploy on assignment to target countries. 
146 | CONCLUSIONS

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Institutional memory depends upon the individual advisor’s commitment to 

multiple deployments, as well as that civilian’s home agency’s approval for 

continued assignments.

In 2017, the U.S. Army created SFABs as a means to institutionalize tactical- and 

operational-level advising. While the brigades will remain a tool for the U.S. Army, 

personnel assigned to these units will regularly rotate out of the SFAB structure 

and into different non-SSA assignments. This will hinder institutional memory, 

specific regional expertise, and the personal relationships required to build rapport 

with the host nation. The 1st SFAB is scheduled to lose over 300 personnel after its 

first tour in Afghanistan. A major reason for high turnover of military advisors is 

that the positions are not considered career enhancing.

7. Advisors are best prepared when they are selected based on technical

expertise, are trained and vetted for their ability to advise, and when they 

receive predeployment training focused on the partner nation’s military 

structures, processes, culture, and equipment. 

Military and civilian advisors frequently emphasized that they were not selected 

based on professional background, did not receive adequate training and exposure 

to Afghan military systems and equipment, and did not receive adequate training 

on how to be an effective advisor. Without this knowledge, advisors spent the 

first several weeks and months learning how the ANDSF fights and governs. This 

limited advisors’ ability to have an immediate impact. A point raised repeatedly 

during after-action reviews is that advisors were selected based on their specialized 

expertise, but did not have the personality or skills needed to transfer this 

knowledge to their counterparts. Expertise in U.S. systems might not translate to 

the partner nation, and even advisors with considerable expertise may lack the 

personality and skills needed to transfer this knowledge to their counterparts.

8. Filling advisor requirements strains the U.S. military and civilian agencies,

as advisors are typically in high demand, yet there are very few trained and 

readily available. Special hiring authority allows the United States to recruit 

and retain civilian specialists and fill advisor requirements. 

Advisors in Afghanistan were typically senior officers, noncommissioned officers, 

and civilians with experience governing military and security forces. In 2010 and 

2011, the U.S. Army suffered from a shortage of majors and lieutenant colonels 

within the service at the same time the need for advisors at these ranks increased. 

For civilian experts, Congress authorized Schedule A hiring authority that 

allowed MODA to temporarily hire civilians with skills needed by DOD. However, 

Schedule A was rescinded in FY 2014, forcing the program to rely on volunteers 

from DOD agencies. DSCA told SIGAR that because the program is suffering 

without its hiring authority, MODA is “currently exploring the use of temporary 
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billets to source hard-to-fill MODA requirements.” In 2018, MODA was unable to 

fully staff its positions without special hiring authority.

9. Equipping partner forces requires determining the capabilities the United

States will train and advise on for the long term, versus those capabilities 

the United States will assist with in the short term to help the host nation 

reduce or remove a particular threat. Failure to determine this will result 

in equipping a partner nation with capabilities it may not need or be able 

to sustain. 

Starting around 2005, DOD recognized capability gaps in the newly developed 

ANDSF, and began considering ways to upgrade the ANA’s armored, mobility, and 

firepower capabilities. This expansion in capabilities included plans for a future 

Afghan air capability and special operations forces. However, these decisions 

provided the ANDSF with systems the Afghans government could not afford to 

maintain. An alternative to this approach would be to conduct an analysis of 

the capabilities the ANDSF will be required to sustain for the long term, versus 

capabilities the United States will provide to counter the threat in the short term.

10. Failure to establish lead organizations with unified command over SSA from

the ministerial to tactical levels results in an inability to identify needs, 

fragmented command and control, and limited accountability and oversight. 

Since 2003, the United States has implemented various command-and-control 

structures intended to synchronize the advisory mission. At times, the U.S. military 

command responsible for the train, advise, assist, and equip mission (CSTC-A) 

established internal command organizations responsible for overseeing the 

advisory mission assigned to the support the Afghan military or police. From 2003 

to 2009, these organizations had command and control over advisors from the 

ministerial level to the tactical embedded teams, and therefore had oversight over 

all train, advise, assist, and equip efforts. In 2009, the U.S. military shifted its field 

advising mission to operational command. As a result, command and control of the 

ministerial and field advising missions was split.
148 | CONCLUSIONS

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are drawn from the U.S. experience in Afghanistan and 

are designed to improve coordination and synchronization of security sector assistance 

programs. While each chapter provides a list of recommendations related to each core 

function of the U.S. security sector assistance mission, these recommendations aim to 

improve coordination and synchronization of SSA efforts. 

1. OSD-Policy, in coordination with the U.S. Central Command, the Joint Chiefs 

of Staff, DSCA, State, and the National Security Council, should lead an 

interagency review to determine the long-term SSA posture for Afghanistan 

based on current and long-term programming. This review should determine if 

the United States will continue to engage in SSA activities as part of a NATOled coalition, or if it will transition to a more conventional model led by the 

U.S. Embassy. 

OSD-Policy, as one of the lead DOD organizations responsible for oversight and 

management of security cooperation programs, should lead the interagency review. 

As the United States determines its long-term military presence in Afghanistan, 

the U.S. military should draft a transition plan detailing how the United States will 

move from its current footprint to a long-term steady state posture. The plan will 

need to factor in future decisions on whether the United States will continue to 

train, advise, and assist the ANDSF as part of a larger international coalition, as it is 

today, or if the United States will transition to a more traditional security assistance 

approach under the U.S. Embassy. Because international and interagency 

coordination challenges can occur under both scenarios, the plan should include 

interagency coordination strategies that clearly define the roles and responsibilities 

of agencies, based on assessments of core competencies and capabilities. The final 

plan should identify when and under what conditions such a plan would begin, and 

should identify clear stages for the plan to progress.

2. USFOR-A, in coordination with NATO, should conduct a review to determine 

which SSA activities are dependent on the current size of U.S. forces in 

Afghanistan and which activities can continue to be carried out with fewer 

U.S. security personnel. 

USFOR-A should take lead for this action as the primary U.S. military command in 

Afghanistan. Some of the United States’ SSA activities depend on the U.S. military’s 

presence in Afghanistan. Reducing the number of U.S. troops may put these U.S.-

funded programs at risks. For example, as of this report’s writing, the UH-60 Black 

Hawk aviation program relies on a U.S. or international security force presence at 
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Kandahar Air Field for follow-on training for Afghan pilots. At all major airfields 

in Afghanistan, air readiness relies heavily on contractor logistic support and a 

security presence for those contractors. Since the U.S. Army SFABs were designed 

to be fully dependent on the TAACs for logistical sustainment, airlift, and combat 

enablers, any reduction in capabilities at the TAACs will have a direct impact on 

the SFAB’s level of support to ANA units. 

3. OSD-Policy, in partnership with DSCA, Resolute Support Mission, and the NATO 

Joint Force Command, should conduct an assessment to determine where 

U.S. and other international advisors are currently located, how missions are 

organized, and the requirements to keep advisor positions filled. Based on the 

results of this assessment, Resolute Support should create a common advisory 

picture outlining U.S. and NATO efforts with the aim of standardizing the 

mission among all of the military services and NATO coalition countries. This 

will lower the risk of advisors working at cross purposes. 

The U.S. advisory mission has not been standardized. Each military commander 

has the authority to independently modify the U.S. advisory posture within his or 

her area of operations. Moreover, there is no standard method for determining how 

their deployed personnel are tasked to advise the ANDSF. Methods not only vary by 

country, but also by military service. For example, one U.S. Army unit organized its 

police advisors to resemble a police department, with an investigations team and 

administrative team, while a different U.S. Army unit in another part of Afghanistan 

organized its police advisory mission along the lines of a military command. 

In western Afghanistan, the Italian Carabinieri train the ANP to do community 

policing, while U.S. military personnel train the ANP elsewhere to conduct 

counterinsurgency operations. Some advisors embed and partner with ANDSF units 

on operations; others advise from the confines of international bases. Implementing 

various and at times contradictory advisory models hinders unity of effort. 

4. The Resolute Support Mission should create a command-and-control

relationship among all elements of the advisory mission. This includes aligning 

the Train, Advise, and Assist Commands, regional task forces, and SFABs 

under the Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance. 

Despite the prioritization of the security assistance mission in 2015, commandand-control relationships at the tactical and operational level continue to report 

through military operational channels (Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations) 

and not through security assistance leadership (the dual-hatted Deputy Chief 

of Staff for Security Assistance and commander of CSTC-A). While embedded 

advisors are responsible for guiding ANDSF leaders in executing their operational 

plan, advisors’ primary mission remains developing ANDSF capabilities—a core 

tenant of security assistance. Restructuring the TAACs, regional task forces, and 

SFABs under the security assistance umbrella will improve coordination and 

synchronization between advisors at the ministerial and operational level. 
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SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

5. OSD-Policy should organize a group of U.S. military and civilian force

management experts to partner with the Afghan government and NATO to 

develop an ANDSF force design plan based on expected long-term military, 

police, and ministerial capabilities. Based on this plan, the United States 

should validate advisor requirements and ensure the pipeline for equipment 

matches the current and future needs of the force. 

Over the past 15 years, the force design for the ANDSF has dramatically changed. 

In 2018 alone, the Afghan National Civil Order Police and Afghan Border Police 

were moved from the MOI to the MOD. Additionally, the Afghan government has 

expressed an intent to double the size of its Special Forces and air force at the risk 

of ANA and ANP development. Ownership of the agreed-upon force design should 

be maintained at the Pentagon and at the Afghan MOD. In-country commands, 

like CSTC-A, should be responsible only for the implementation of the plan, and 

should not be empowered to create and modify plans, based on past practices of 

ad hoc equipping decisions. Constant changes to the size, composition, or mission 

of ANDSF elements and ministerial offices makes it harder for the United States to 

properly align security sector assistance activities with mission requirements. As 

part of this review, the ANDSF’s current tashkil should be validated and modified 

accordingly. Such a review could take place during the biannual Afghanistan 

Program Management Review. 

6. The Joint Staff should create a DOD-led and Pentagon-based Security 

Cooperation Coordination Cell for Afghanistan with the mission of improving 

coordination of all SSA activities. The staff assigned to this organization 

should be required to serve at least a three-year tour with regular 

deployments into Afghanistan.

In 2009, the Joint Staff created the Pakistan-Afghanistan Coordination Cell 

to help the U.S. commander in Afghanistan coordinate and optimize military 

operations and build relationships between the Pentagon and forward elements. 

As an effective tool for coordination, an element similar in focus and staff would 

benefit the security cooperation mission. The Security Cooperation Coordination 

Cell should have responsibility for four mission essential tasks: (1) maintaining a 

common advising picture of who is doing what, where, and why; (2) coordinating 

the U.S. advisory effort for the ANDSF fighting force, Afghan security institutions, 

and force equipment; (3) evaluating U.S. progress in meeting security cooperation 

goals; and (4) providing continuity to the mission by offering lessons learned to the 

forward command element. The Security Cooperation Coordination Cell should 

be staffed with members of each military service, OSD, DSCA, the combatant 

command, liaison officers from State and the U.S. Department of Justice, and 

national representatives from NATO allies. Staff should be assigned at minimum to 

serve a three-year tour with regular deployments into Afghanistan.
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7. Resolute Support should host a quarterly SSA conference in Kabul for all

civilian and military stakeholders with the intent of resolving conflicts that 

have a direct or indirect impact on the ANA, ANP, MOD, or MOI. 

Since the Resolute Support Mission does not have a mandate to coordinate 

with embassies, nongovernmental organizations, or international governmental 

organizations, regular conferences will allow all stakeholders in ANDSF 

development to meet regularly to improve coordination. Information gathered from 

these conferences would be used by Resolute Support to maintain its common 

advisory picture, recommended above. 

8. Predeployment training should expose attendees to all U.S. and international

advisory efforts in Afghanistan and should be tailored to the Afghan context. 

Currently, predeployment training is focused solely on individual tasks the 

identified advisor will face in Afghanistan, with limited or no training on how that 

individual’s advisory effort affects the larger security sector assistance mission. 

This creates a knowledge gap that can prevent advisors from understanding all 

the options at their disposal in the larger advisory system. Issues can arise from 

advisors operating at cross purposes, and an uninformed advisor will face extra 

challenges when attempting to help an ANDSF partner resolve problems. 

JUNE 2019 | 153

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY

SIGAR conducts its lessons learned program under the authority of Public Law 110- 181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. This report was completed 

in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency’s 

Quality Standards for Federal Offices of Inspector General (commonly referred to as 

“the Silver Book”). These standards require that we carry out our work with integrity, 

objectivity, and independence, and provide information that is factually accurate and 

reliable. SIGAR’s lessons learned reports are broad in scope and based on a wide range 

of source material. To achieve the goal of high quality and to help ensure our reports are 

factually accurate and reliable, the reports are subject to extensive review by subject 

matter experts and relevant U.S. government agencies. 

The Divided Responsibility research team drew upon a wide array of sources. Much 

of the team’s documentary research focused on publicly available material, including 

reports by DOD, State, GAO, NATO, ISAF, the Congressional Research Service, 

and coalition partner nations, as well as congressional testimony from government 

officials and experts. The team also consulted declassified material from an archive 

SIGAR Seal

CHAPTER 8

APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES 
154 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

maintained by former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. These official sources 

were complemented by hundreds of nongovernmental sources, including books, 

think tank reports, journal articles, press reports, academic studies, international 

conference agreements, field research, and analytical reports by international and 

advocacy organizations. 

The research team also benefited from SIGAR’s access to material that is not publicly 

available, including thousands of documents provided by U.S. government agencies. 

State provided cables, internal memos and briefings, opinion analysis reports, and 

planning and programmatic documents. DOD provided documents on how advisors 

are selected, trained, and organized. NATO provided access to the NATO archives that 

allowed our researchers to view reports concerning NATO’s plans and assessments 

of ANDSF development. Team researchers also reviewed documents obtained from 

the U.S. Army Center of Military History. Finally, the team also drew from SIGAR’s 

own work, embodied in its quarterly reports to Congress and its investigations, audits, 

inspections, special projects, and prior lessons learned reports.

While the documentary evidence tells a story, it cannot substitute for the experience, 

knowledge, and wisdom of people who participated in the Afghanistan reconstruction 

effort. Therefore, the research team interviewed or held informal discussions with 

more than 100 individuals with direct and indirect knowledge of U.S. security 

sector assistance programs. Interviews and informal roundtable discussions were 

conducted with U.S., Afghan, and other international experts from universities, think 

tanks, nongovernmental organizations, and government entities; current and former 

U.S. civilian and military officials deployed to Afghanistan; and personnel from the 

Departments of Defense, State, and Justice. The team also drew upon dozens of 

interviews conducted by other government organizations. 

Interviews provided valuable insights into the rationale behind decisions, the debates 

within and between agencies, and the frustrations that span years but often remained 

formally unacknowledged. Due in part to the politically sensitive nature of SSA efforts, 

a majority of interviewees wished to remain anonymous. For those still working in 

the government, confidentiality was particularly important. Therefore, to preserve 

anonymity, our interview citations often cite a “senior U.S. official” or “U.S. military 

advisor.” We conducted our interviews during research trips to military installations in 

the United States and in Afghanistan, and in visits to U.S. government departments and 

agencies in Washington, DC.

The research team conducted multiple site visits to DOD and NATO installations. 

These include the Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan, the Military 

Advisor Training Academy, the Joint Readiness Training Center, and NATO Centers 

of Excellence. The research team also relied on notes from previous site visits 

conducted during the research phase of the first security-related lessons learned report, 

Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan. 
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Divided Responsibility reflects a careful, thorough consideration of a wide range of 

sources, but it is not an exhaustive review of the topic. Given the timeline and scale 

of U.S. engagement in Afghanistan and the divided responsibility of security sector 

assistance among the coalition and military services, the report does not aim to fully 

address how tens of thousands of U.S. civilian and military personnel dealt with the 

SSA mission on a daily basis since 2002. Rather, the report focuses on reoccurring 

and corroborated reporting of how the United States deployed personnel and 

organized the train, advise, assist, and equip mission in Afghanistan. From these, the 

research team derived lessons and recommendations to inform current and future 

contingency operations. 

The report underwent a peer review process. We sought and received feedback on the 

draft report from 13 subject matter experts. These experts included Americans and 

Europeans, each of whom had significant experience working on or in Afghanistan. 

These reviewers provided thoughtful, detailed comments on the report, which we 

incorporated, where appropriate. 

Over the course of this study, the team routinely engaged with many officials at DOD 

and military services. We focused our engagements on socializing preliminary findings, 

lessons, and recommendations and soliciting formal and informal feedback to improve 

our understanding of the key issues, as viewed by each organization. DOD, State, and 

Justice were also given an opportunity to formally review and comment on the final 

draft of the report. In addition, we met with departmental representatives to receive 

their feedback on the report firsthand. Although we incorporated agencies’ comments 

where appropriate, the analysis, conclusions, and recommendations of this report 

remain SIGAR’s own. 
156 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

APPENDIX B: ACRONYMS

ACRONYM DEFINITION

AAA Air Advisor Academy

AABC-A Air Advisor Basic Course – Afghanistan

AAF Afghan Air Force

AAFM Afghan Air Force Modernization program

ACT Allied Command Transformation

AECA Arms Export Control Act

AETC Air Education and Training Command

AETF Air Expeditionary Task Force

AEW Air Expeditionary Wing

AFPAK Hands Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands program

ALP Aviation Leadership Program

ANA Afghan National Army

ANAAC Afghan National Army Air Corps

ANDSF Afghan National Defense and Security Forces

ANET Afghan Advisor Network

ANP Afghan National Police

APOR Afghan Plan of Record

AQC Aircraft Qualification Course

AROC Afghan Resource Oversight Council

ASFF Afghanistan Security Forces Fund

ATC Advisor Training Cell

ATG Advisor Training Group

BCT Brigade combat team

BPC Building Partner Capacity

BSRP Bureau Strategic Resource Plans

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command

CEW Civilian Expeditionary Workforce

CJSOR Combined Joint Statement of Requirements

CLS Contractor Logistics Support

COE Center of Excellence

COIN Counterinsurgency

COMISAF Commander of ISAF

CRS U.S. Congressional Research Service

CSTC-A Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan

DCG Deputy Commanding General

DCOM Deputy Commander

DCOS-Ops Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations

DCOS-SA Deputy Chief of Staff for Security Assistance

DIB Defense institution building

Continued on the next page
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ACRONYM DEFINITION

DIRI Defense Institution Reform Initiative

DISAM Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

DISCS Defense Institute of Security Cooperation Studies

DLA Defense Logistics Agency

DLIELC Defense Language Institute English Language Center

DOD U.S. Department of Defense

DOD OIG U.S. Department of Defense, Office of Inspector General

DOD-EC DOD Expeditionary Civilians

DS Disposition Services

DSCA Defense Security Cooperation Agency

EAP Expeditionary Advisory Packages

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EDA Excess defense articles

EF-5 Essential Function 5

E-IMET Expanded IMET

ETT Embedded Training Team

EUPOL European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan

FAA Foreign Assistance Act

FAO Foreign Area Officers

FAP Financial Activity Plan

FMF Foreign Military Financing

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FMTR Foreign Military Training Report

FY Fiscal Year

GAO U.S. Government Accountability Office

HMMWV High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles

IA Implementing agency

IJC ISAF Joint Command

IMET International Military Education and Training

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (State)

ISAF International Security Assistance Force

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JCISFA Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

LOA Letter of Offer and Acceptance

LOJ Letter of Justification

LOR Letter of Request

LTV Light Transport Vehicle

MAG-D Ministry Advisor Group – Defense

MAG-I Ministry Advisor Group – Interior

MASF Military Assistance Service Fund

MDP Ministerial Development Plan

MEF Marine Expeditionary Force

MOD Ministry of Defense

MODA Ministry of Defense Advisors program

MOI Ministry of Interior

Continued on the next page
158 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ACRONYM DEFINITION

MOR Memorandum of Request

MRAP Mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles

MSFV Mobile Strike Force Vehicle

MTV Medium Tactical Vehicle

NAC-A NATO Air Command – Afghanistan

NATC-A NATO Air Training Command – Afghanistan

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NCO Noncommissioned officer

NDAA National Defense Authorization Act

NTM-A NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OMC-A Office of Military Cooperation – Afghanistan

OMLT Operational Mentoring and Liaison Team

OSC-A Office of Security Cooperation – Afghanistan

OSD-Policy Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy

PAP-DIB Partnership Action Plan on Defense Institution Building

PMT Police Mentoring Team

POAM Plan of action and milestones

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

SACEUR NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe

SAO Security Assistance Office

SCO Security cooperation organization

SC-TMS Security Cooperation Training Management System

SFA Security force assistance

SFA Center Security Force Assistance Center

SFAAT Security Force Assistance Advisor Team

SFAB Security Force Assistance Brigade

SFAC Security Force Assistance Command

SFAT Security Force Assistance Team

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SLAT Senior Leader Advisor Training

SSA Security sector assistance

TAAC Train Advise Assist Command

TPA Total package approach

TSAT Theater-Specific Advisor Training

UA Up-Armored

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USASAC U.S. Army Security Assistance Command

USFOR-A U.S. Forces – Afghanistan

USIP U.S. Institute of Peace
,. 

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, 
160 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ENDNOTES

1. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2019, p. 6. 

2. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 17-62-

LL, September 2017, p. 168.

3. David Barno, “Fighting ‘The Other War’: 

Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan 2003–

2005,” Military Review, September–October 

2007, p. 36.

4. SIGAR analysis of State and DOD, Foreign 

Military Training Report, vol. 1, sec. 4, 2003–

2016.

5. Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan, 

“Combined Education and Training Program Plan 

for Afghanistan Budget Year 2018,” December 6, 

2016, pp. 14–15.

6. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2019, p. 6. 

7. Joseph Votel, “Hearing to Receive Testimony on 

the United States Central Command in Review of 

the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 

2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” 

testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, February 5, 2019, p. 20; Kenneth 

F. McKenzie Jr., “Advance Policy Questions,” 

submitted to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, December 4, 2018. 

8. U.S. Missile Defense Agency, Historical Funding 

for MDA FY 85–17; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to 

the United States Congress, January 30, 2019, 

p. 225. 

9. White House Fact Sheet, “U.S. Security Sector 

Assistance Policy,” April 5, 2013.

10. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in 

The Management of Security Assistance, 

31st ed., p. 1; U.S. Library of Congress, 

“French Participation in the American War of 

Independence,” accessed April 15, 2019. 

11. U.S. Library of Congress, “French Participation 

in the American War of Independence,” accessed 

April 15, 2019. 

12. Lowcountry Digital History Initiative, “Liverpool’s 

Abercromby Square and the Confederacy during 

the U.S. Civil War”; Military History Matters, 

“American Civil War viewpoints: It was British 

arms that sustained the Confederacy,” March 3, 

2011.

13. Military History Matters, “American Civil War 

viewpoints: It was British arms that sustained the 

Confederacy,” March 3, 2011.

14. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 3. 

15. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 3. 

16. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 3.

17. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 3. 

18. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 4; State, Office of the Historian, “Lend-Lease 

and Military Aid to the Allies in the Early Years of 

World War II,” accessed April 15, 2019. 

19. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 4.

20. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

pp. 4–5; David Edwards and Terry Meneley, 

“The Shaping of the U.S. Security Assistance 

Program,” master’s thesis presented at the Air 

Force Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson 

Air Force Base, September 1993, pp. 10–11.

21. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 5. 

22. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 5. 

23. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 14.

24. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 14.

25. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 161

Force Base, September 1993, p. 18.

26. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, pp. 18–19.

27. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 24.

28. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 24.

29. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 24; Duncan 

Clarke and Steven Woehrel, “Reforming 

United States Security Assistance,” American 

University International Law Review, vol. 

6 (1991), p. 223.

30. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, pp. 25–26.

31. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 26.

32. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, pp. 27–29.

33. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 29.

34. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 27; Duncan 

Clarke and Steven Woehrel, “Reforming 

United States Security Assistance,” American 

University International Law Review, vol. 

6 (1991), p. 225.

35. Duncan Clarke and Steven Woehrel, “Reforming 

United States Security Assistance,” American 

University International Law Review, vol. 

6 (1991), p. 225; David Edwards and Terry 

Meneley, “The Shaping of the U.S. Security 

Assistance Program,” master’s thesis presented 

at the Air Force Institute of Technology, WrightPatterson Air Force Base, September 1993, p. 31.

36. Duncan Clarke and Steven Woehrel, “Reforming 

United States Security Assistance,” American 

University International Law Review, vol. 

6 (1991), p. 225.

37. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, p. 31.

38. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, pp. 31–32.

39. Duncan Clarke and Steven Woehrel, “Reforming 

United States Security Assistance,” American 

University International Law Review, vol. 

6 (1991), p. 226; Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management, “Appendix 2: History of 

Security Assistance and Security Cooperation” 

in The Management of Security Assistance, 31st 

ed., pp. 10–11.

40. David Edwards and Terry Meneley, “The Shaping 

of the U.S. Security Assistance Program,” 

master’s thesis presented at the Air Force 

Institute of Technology, Wright-Patterson Air 

Force Base, September 1993, pp. 39–40.

41. Duncan Clarke and Steven Woehrel, “Reforming 

United States Security Assistance,” American 

University International Law Review, vol. 

6 (1991), p. 220; Defense Institute of Security 

Assistance Management, “Appendix 2: History of 

Security Assistance and Security Cooperation” 

in The Management of Security Assistance, 31st 

ed., p. 14. 

42. Defense Institute of Security Assistance 

Management, “Appendix 2: History of Security 

Assistance and Security Cooperation” in The 

Management of Security Assistance, 31st ed., 

p. 16.

43. PBS Frontline, “A Chronology of U.S. Military 

Interventions from Vietnam to the Balkans,” 

accessed April 25, 2019. 

44. Commission on Presidential Debates, “The 

Second Gore-Bush Presidential Debate,” 

transcript, October 11, 2000. 

45. NDAA for FY 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 

§1202 (2004). 

46. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2018. 

47. U.S. Army, Security Force Assistance Field 

Manual 3.07-1, May 2009, p. 2-9; Robert Ramsey, 

Advising Indigenous Forces: American Advisors 

in Korea, Vietnam, and El Salvador (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2006).

48. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 17-62-

LL, September 2017, p. 19. 

49. U.S. Army, Security Force Assistance Field 

Manual 3.07-1, May 2009, p. 2-9.

50. U.S. Army Public Affairs, “Army creates Security 

Force Assistance Brigade and Military Advisor 

Training Academy at Fort Benning,” accessed 

February 16, 2017. 
162 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

51. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2, 2011, p. 10; 2nd SFAB Interview Panels, 

Fort Bragg, NC, February 20–22, 2019.

52. RAND Corporation, Leveraging Observations of 

Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for 

Global Operations, 2013, p. 12; 1st SFAB AfterAction Review, Ft. Benning, GA, February 11–14, 

2019; 2nd SFAB Interview Panels, Fort Bragg, NC, 

February 20–22, 2019.

53. U.S. Army, Security Force Assistance Field 

Manual 3.07-1, May 2009, pp. 2-6–2-9.

54. Former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 22, 2018.

55. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Ft. Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019, pp. 11, 14. 

56. John Ballard, David Lamm, John Wood, From 

Kabul to Baghdad and Back: The U.S. War in 

Afghanistan and Iraq (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2012), pp. 131–132. 

57. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 38. 

58. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 4; DOD OIG, Report on the 

Assessment of U.S. and Coalition Plans to 

Train, Equip, and Field the Afghan National 

Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, September 30, 

2009, p. 39.

59. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 10; Former ETT advisor, SIGAR 

interview, May 4, 2018. 

60. Dennis Steele, “Advisor Training Shifts to Fort 

Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission,” 

Army, September 2009, p. 50.

61. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 4.

62. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 4.

63. This report will not cover the specifics of U.S. 

efforts to train, advise, and assist the Afghan 

National Police and other law enforcement units. 

SIGAR will initiate a lessons learned report on 

this topic. 

64. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, pp. ii, 31, 40.

65. DOD, Progress toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, January 2009, p. 9. 

66. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 52.

67. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 39.

68. “Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-5 AfterAction Report,” February–December 2008, slide 

101. 

69. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 39.

70. Joint Center for International Security Force 

Assistance (JCISFA), “Transition Team Survey,” 

ETT Class 33, Unit 9794, 2008. 

71. “Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-5 After 

Action Report,” February–December 2008, slide 

101. 

72. U.S. Army, Security Force Assistance Field 

Manual 3.07-1, May 2009, p. 7-3.

73. U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “Military 

Transition Teams,” PowerPoint slide in Todd 

Clark, “Selection of military advisors,” master’s 

thesis presented at Naval Postgraduate School, 

December 2012, p. 45. 

74. Todd Clark, “Selection of military advisors,” 

master’s thesis presented at Naval Postgraduate 

School, December 2012, pp. 45–46.

75. DOD civilian, SIGAR interview, March 15, 2018. 

76. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 39.

77. SFA professional, SIGAR interview, March 19, 

2018. 

78. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9801, 2008. 

79. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9801, 2008. 

80. Parker Rome, “Fort Riley trains last transition 

team before mission moves to Fort Polk,” Army, 

August 5, 2009; Scott Power, “Security Force 

Assistance: An Enduring U.S. Army Structure,” 

U.S. Army War College, November 3, 2010, p. 3; 

John Crosby, “Indiana’s top NCO answers his own 

call to duty for one last mission,” DVIDS News, 

January 25, 2010. 

81. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-

007, September 30, 2009, pp. 45–47; JCISFA, 

“Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 

9794, 2008. 

82. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 46.

83. U. Ita Udoaka, “Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF): In-Lieu-Of (ILO) Airman After 

Action Report (AAR),” October 2, 2008.

84. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9803, 2008. 

85. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

33, Unit 9804, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 9801, 2008; JCISFA, 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 163

“Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 

9784, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” 

ETT Class 33, 2008. 

86. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

40, Unit 11525, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 9794, 2008; U. Ita 

Udoaka, “Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF): 

In-Lieu-Of (ILO) Airman After Action 

Report (AAR),” October 2, 2008.

87. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

33, Unit 9794, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 41, 2008. 

88. JCSIFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9808, 2008. 

89. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 39. 

90. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

33, Unit 9794, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 9802, 2008. 

91. Former ETT leader, SIGAR interview, June 5, 

2018.

92. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9794, 2008. 

93. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 47.

94. SIGAR email correspondence with former 

Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance 

Team (CAAT) member, April 4, 2019. 

95. Fred Kaplan, “Challenging the Generals,” New 

York Times, August 26, 2007.

96. DOD OIG, Report on the Assessment of U.S. and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan National Security Forces, SPO-2009-007, 

September 30, 2009, p. 47.

97. JCSIFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9801, 2008. 

98. Former U.S. Marine Corps advisor, SIGAR 

interview, June 12, 2018. 

99. Former ETT advisor, SIGAR interview, May 4, 

2018. 

100. Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V, 

“Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V OEFAfghanistan (03 June 2006–28 May 2007) 

After Action Review,” May 31, 2007, p. 18; 

JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

33, Unit 9794, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 9801, 2008; JCISFA, 

“Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 2008; 

JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

40, Unit 11290, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 40, 63rd BDE ETT, 2008; 

JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

40, Unit 11545, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 40, Unit 11287, 2008. 

101. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 33, 

Unit 9801, 2008. 

102. CNA Corporation, United States Marine Corps 

Advisors: Past, Present, and Future, August 

2013, pp. 63–64.

103. Anthropologist, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2018; 

Former ETT Advisor, SIGAR interview, June 20, 

2018. 

104. Anthropologist, SIGAR interview, May 10, 2018. 

105. Marine Corps Center for Lessons 

Learned (MCCLL), “Advising Foreign Forces: A 

Compilation of Reports,” January 31, 2007, pp. 37, 

40. 

106. MCCLL, “Advising Foreign Forces: A Compilation 

of Reports,” January 31, 2007, pp. 40–42.

107. Dave Halverson, “Testimony for the House Armed 

Services Subcommittee on Readiness,” prepared 

responses for the Readiness Subcommittee of the 

House Armed Services Committee, Washington, 

DC, July 31, 2007, p. 84. 

108. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 5. 

109. CNA Corporation, United States Marine Corps 

Advisors: Past, Present, Future, August 2013, 

p. 61; “Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-5 

After Action Report,” February–December 2008, 

slide 103.

110. “Regional Corps Advisory Command 3-5 After 

Action Report,” February–December 2008, slide 

126.

111. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 40, 

Ghazni PMT, 2008. 

112. Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V, 

“Combined Joint Task Force Phoenix V OEFAfghanistan (03 June 2006–28 May 2007) After 

Action Review,” May 31, 2007, p. 23.

113. JCISFA, “Transition Team Survey,” ETT Class 

33, Unit 9801, 2008; JCISFA, “Transition Team 

Survey,” ETT Class 33, Unit 9803, 2008. 

114. Former Counterinsurgency Advisory and 

Assistance Team (CAAT) member, SIGAR 

interview, April 17, 2018. 

115. Dennis Steele, “Advisor Training Shifts to Fort 

Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission,” 

Army, September 2009, p. 50. 

116. Dennis Steele, “Advisor Training Shifts to Fort 

Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission,” 

Army, September 2009, p. 50. 

117. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, pp. 6–8.

118. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, pp. 5–6.

119. U.S. Army, The Modular Brigade Augmented for 

Security Force Assistance Handbook, June 1, 

2009, p. 1-6. 

120. U.S. Army, The Modular Brigade Augmented 

for Security Force Assistance Handbook, 

June 1, 2009, pp. 1-1–1-3, 1-6–1-7; GAO, Iraq 

and Afghanistan: Actions Needed to Enhance 

the Ability of Army Brigades to Support the 

Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, August 2011, 

pp. 5–6.

121. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 
164 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 8.

122. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 10. 

123. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, pp. 10, 19.

124. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 15.

125. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 16.

126. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 16.

127. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 16.

128. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 13. 

129. Dennis Steele, “Advisor Training Shifts to Fort 

Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission,” 

Army, September 2009, p. 50. 

130. Dennis Steele, “Advisor Training Shifts to Fort 

Polk: Army Establishes Enduring Mission,” 

Army, September 2009, p. 50. 

131. U.S. Army, The Modular Brigade Augmented for 

Security Force Assistance Handbook, June 1, 

2009, p. 1-7.

132. U.S. Army, The Modular Brigade Augmented for 

Security Force Assistance Handbook, June 1, 

2009, p. 1-7.

133. U.S. Army, Security Force Assistance Field 

Manual 3.07-1, May 2009, p. 2-9.

134. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 9.

135. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 8. 

136. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, pp. 11–12.

137. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 12.

138. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 9. 

139. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 13.

140. GAO, Iraq and Afghanistan: Actions Needed 

to Enhance the Ability of Army Brigades to 

Support the Advising Mission, GAO-11-760, 

August 2011, p. 14.

141. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 8. 

142. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 13. 

143. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 5, 8–9.

144. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 8; DOD, 

Progress toward Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, April 2014, p. 26.

145. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 8–9.

146. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 9.

147. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 11.

148. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 11.

149. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 8, 10.

150. Former CAAT member, SIGAR interview, April 

17, 2018. 

151. Former SFAAT member, SIGAR interview, August 

8, 2018.

152. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 12.

153. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 12–13.

154. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 12–13; 

Iain J. Cruickshank, “Lessons from Advising 

in Afghanistan,” Military Review Spotlight, 

February 2014, p. 1; U.S. Army, 162 Infantry 

Brigade, Security Force Assistance Battalion, 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 165

“Program of Instruction,” n.d., p. 1.

155. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 13–14.

156. Former SFAAT member, SIGAR interview, August 

8, 2018.

157. Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), 

“SFAAT Team 14—Collection Plan,” n.d.

158. CALL, “SFAAT Team 14—Collection Plan,” 

n.d.; former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 2, 2018. 

159. NATO, “Results of the HQ IJC SFAAT PreDeployment Training Survey,” October 2012, p. 2. 

160. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 13.

161. NATO, “Results of the HQ IJC SFAAT PreDeployment Training Survey,” October 2012, p. 3.

162. U.S. Marine Corps, Training and Education 

Command, “Security Force Assistance Advisor 

Team Post Deployment Survey Rollup,” October 

2014, slides 62–63. 

163. U.S. Marine Corps, Training and Education 

Command, “Security Force Assistance Advisor 

Team Post Deployment Survey Rollup,” October 

2014, slide 62. 

164. CNA Corporation, United States Marine Corps 

Advisors: Past, Present, and Future, August 

2013, pp. 79, 81. 

165. CNA Corporation, United States Marine Corps 

Advisors: Past, Present, and Future, August 

2013, p. 79; Marine Air-Ground Task Force 

Training Command Advisor Training Group, “ATG 

101 Information Brief,” April 11, 2011, slide 13.

166. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, pp. 13–14. 

167. Former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 22, 2018. 

168. U.S. Marine Corps, Training and Education 

Command, “Security Force Assistance Advisor 

Team Post Deployment Survey Rollup,” October 

2014, slide 5.

169. CALL, “SFAAT Team 14—Collection Plan,” n.d. 

170. SIGAR email correspondence with former CAAT 

member, April 4, 2019. 

171. Former CAAT member, SIGAR interview, April 17, 

2018; former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 2, 2018. 

172. CALL, “SFAAT July 2012—Collection Plan,” 

March 2013.

173. CALL, “SFAT Team 10 Key Leader Interview,” n.d.

174. Former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 2, 2018. 

175. CALL, “SFAAT July 2012—Collection Plan,” 

March 2013.

176. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 14.

177. Former CAAT member, SIGAR interview, April 

17, 2018.

178. Former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 22, 2018. 

179. CALL, “SFAAT Team 14—Collection Plan,” March 

2013.

180. CALL, “SFAAT July 2012—Collection Plan,” 

March 2013.

181. Former police advisor team leader, SIGAR 

interview, August 2, 2018; former CAAT member, 

SIGAR interview, April 17, 2018. 

182. Former CAAT member, SIGAR interview, April 

17, 2018. 

183. GAO, Security Force Assistance: More Detailed 

Planning and Improved Access to Information 

Needed to Guide Efforts of Advisor Teams in 

Afghanistan, GAO-13-381, April 2013, p. 8.

184. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 10. 

185. John Friberg, “Expeditionary Advisory 

Package (EAP) Concept for Afghanistan,” SOF 

News, January 9, 2017. 

186. John Friberg, “Expeditionary Advisory 

Package (EAP) Concept for Afghanistan,” SOF 

News, January 9, 2017.

187. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019.

188. GAO, Security Force Assistance: U.S. Advising 

of Afghan National Army Has Expanded Since 

2015, and the U.S. Army Has Deployed a New 

Advising Unit, GAO-19-251R, December 19, 2018, 

p. 3. 

189. John Friberg, “Expeditionary Advisory 

Package (EAP) Concept for Afghanistan,” SOF 

News, January 9, 2017.

190. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 10–11.

191. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 15–16.

192. Former SFAAT member, SIGAR interview, August 

2, 2018. 

193. Adam Maisel, “The Adviser’s Dilemma: Endemic 

Challenges and Unrealized Opportunities in the 

Training Mission in Afghanistan,” Modern War 

Institute, May 17, 2017.

194. Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Gen. Dempsey’s Remarks at 

the National Press Club,” transcript, October 10, 

2012. 

195. U.S. Army, “Combat Advisor Training Course,” 

received May 2018; U.S. Army, “Army Creates 

Security Force Assistance Brigade and Military 

Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning,” 

press release, February 16, 2017; U.S. Army, 

“Security Force Assistance Command, 2nd 

Security Force Assistance Brigade Activate at Ft. 

Bragg,” press release, December 3, 2018. 

196. U.S. Army, “SFAB Volunteer Selection Process,” 

briefing, May 2, 2018; U.S. Army, “Army Creates 

Security Force Assistance Brigade and Military 

Advisor Training Academy at Fort Benning,” 

press release, February 16, 2017; 1st SFAB 

After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, February 

11–14, 2019. 

197. SIGAR site visit to the Military Advisor Training 

Academy, Fort Benning, GA, May 2, 2018. 
166 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

198. SIGAR teleconference with the Security Force 

Assistance Command, December 2018; SIGAR 

visit to the Military Advisor Training Academy, 

May 2, 2018. 

199. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, 

GA, February 11–14, 2019; SIGAR teleconference 

with the Security Force Assistance Command, 

December 2018. 

200. U.S. Army, “SFAB Volunteer Selection Process,” 

briefing, May 2, 2018.

201. U.S. Army, “SFAB Volunteer Selection Process,” 

briefing, May 2, 2018. 

202. SIGAR site visit to the U.S. Army Military Advisor 

Training Academy, Fort Benning, GA, May 2018.

203. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-

LL, September 2017, p. 179. 

204. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-

LL, September 2017, p. 179; 1st SFAB After-Action 

Review, Fort Benning, GA, February 11–14, 2019.

205. “Security Force Assistance Brigade (SFAB),” 

Army, accessed May 12, 2019. 

206. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019.

207. SIGAR site visit to the U.S. Army Military Advisor 

Training Academy, Fort Benning, GA, May 

2018; John Friberg, “Military Advisor Training 

Academy (MATA),” SOF News, December 9, 2017. 

208. SIGAR site visit to the U.S. Army Military Advisor 

Training Academy, Ft. Benning, GA, May 2018.

209. U.S. Army, “MATA Growth,” received May 2018; 

U.S. Army, “Combat Advisor Training Course,” 

received May 2018; SIGAR site visit to the U.S. 

Army Military Advisor Training Academy, Fort 

Benning, GA, May 2018. 

210. SIGAR site visit to the Joint Readiness Training 

Center, Fort Polk, LA, December 2–4, 2018. 

211. SIGAR site visit to the Joint Readiness Training 

Center, Fort Polk, LA, December 2–4, 2018. 

212. SIGAR site visit to the Joint Readiness Training 

Center, Fort Polk, LA, December 2–4, 2018. 

213. SIGAR site visit to the Joint Readiness Training 

Center, Fort Polk, LA, December 2–4, 2018. 

214. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

215. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

216. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019.

217. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

218. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

219. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

220. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

221. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

222. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

223. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

224. A DOD official noted that one anecdote should 

not be the basis for a generalized conclusion; 

other TAAC advisors who are not SFAB members 

have described their situations differently and 

were able to make do with the resources they 

had. All personnel in Afghanistan must take 

proper steps to ensure the safety and security 

of themselves and their personnel, particularly 

beyond the safety of a base camp or support 

installation. The mission of advisors is to advise, 

not to engage in combat. 1st SFAB After-Action 

Review, Fort Benning, GA, February 11–14, 2019. 

225. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

226. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. A DOD official noted that it 

is appropriate for the TAACs to determine how to 

allocate resources in their areas of responsibility 

according to their specific requirements. 

227. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

228. 2nd SFAB Panel Interviews, Fort Bragg, NC, 

February 20–22, 2019. 

229. 2nd SFAB Panel Interviews, Fort Bragg, NC, 

February 20–22, 2019. 

230. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, 

GA, February 11–14, 2019; 2nd SFAB Panel 

Interviews, Fort Bragg, NC, February 20–22, 2019. 

231. 2nd SFAB Panel Interviews, Fort Bragg, NC, 

February 20–22, 2019. 

232. 2nd SFAB Panel Interviews, Fort Bragg, NC, 

February 20–22, 2019. 

233. 2nd SFAB Panel Interviews, Fort Bragg, NC, 

February 20–22, 2019. 

234. Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015 (Annapolis, MD, Naval Institute Press, 

2018), pp. 48–50.

235. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the 

Afghan National Security Forces, April 2009, 

p. 24.

236. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security 

and Stability in Afghanistan, November 

2010, pp. 31–32; Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: 

The Coalition’s Air Advisory Mission in 

Afghanistan, 2005–2015 (Annapolis, MD: Naval 

Institute Press, 2018), pp. 71–72.

237. Headquarters Air Force (HAF), “Building Partner 

Airpower in Iraq & Afghanistan,” JLLIS, May 26, 

2011, last updated January 12, 2012.

238. HAF, “Building Partner Airpower in Iraq & 

Afghanistan,” JLLIS, May 26, 2011, last updated 

January 12, 2012.

239. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 2; 

Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), pp. 196–197.

240. HAF, “Building Partner Airpower in Iraq & 

Afghanistan,” JLLIS, May 26, 2011, last updated 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 167

January 12, 2012.

241. USAF Air Education and Training Command, “Air 

Force Air Advisor Training Program,” April 8, 

2008, pp. 7–8.

242. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 

3, 2013, p. 4; HAF, “Building Partner Airpower 

in Iraq & Afghanistan,” JLLIS, May 26, 2011, last 

updated January 12, 2012.

243. Michael Keltz, “Getting our Partners Airborne: 

Training Air Advisors and Their Impact InTheater,” Air & Space Power Journal, vol. 28, no. 

3 (May–June 2014), p. 7; HQ AETC & USAFCENT, 

“Air Advisor Assessment Team Report October 

2012,” March 3, 2013, p. 6.

244. Michael Keltz, “Getting our Partners Airborne: 

Training Air Advisors and Their Impact InTheater,” Air & Space Power Journal (May–June 

2014), vol. 28, no. 3, p. 7; GAO, Additional 

Actions Needed to Guide Geographic Combatant 

Command and Service Efforts, GAO-12-556, May 

2012, p. 25.

245. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, pp. 8–9, 11.

246. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, p. 13.

247. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, p. 13.

248. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, p. 16.

249. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, p. 16.

250. HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, p. 16.

251. HAF, “Building Partner Airpower in Iraq & 

Afghanistan,” JLLIS, May 26, 2011, last updated 

on January 12, 2012.

252. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition 

Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan 

Air Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, 

pp. 35–36.

253. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition 

Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan 

Air Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, 

pp. 36–37; HQ AETC & USAFCENT, “Air Advisor 

Assessment Team Report October 2012,” March 3, 

2013, p. 11.

254. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 36.

255. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 39.

256. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. 1.

257. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. 1.

258. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 2; 

Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), pp. 196–197.

259. Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), pp. 57–58.

260. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, pp. 27–28.

261. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition 

Efforts to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan 

Air Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, 

pp. 11–13.

262. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, pp. 24, 43–45.

263. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, pp. 44–45.

264. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. 2.

265. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, September 

28, 2012, p. 2.

266. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2018, pp. 38, 43; DOD 

OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government and 

Coalition Plans to Train, Equip, and Field the 

Afghan Air Force, DODIG-2012-141, p. 20.

267. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, pp. 29–

32; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2018, p. 45. 

268. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2018, p. 45.

269. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 32. 

270. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, pp. 2, 

13.

271. DOD, DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability 

in Afghanistan, December 2018, p. 38.

272. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DODIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 7.

273. James A. Schear, William B. Caldwell IV, and 

Frank C. DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: 
168 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security 

Force,” PRISM, vol. 2, no. 2 (2011), pp. 137–139; 

Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, pp. 4–5; AFPAK Hands, 

SIGAR interview, April 25, 2017.

274. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of 

Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of 

Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR-15-54-AR, 

April 2015, p. 22; Nadia Gerspacher, “Paradoxes 

of Partnership,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), pp. 59–60.

275. Alexandra Kerr, “Defense Institution Building: A 

New Paradigm for the 21st Century,” in Effective, 

Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense 

Institution Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and 

Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, 2017), p. xix.

276. CALL, Ministerial Advisors: Combined Security 

Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), 

August 1, 2017, p. 20.

277. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 74.

278. Kenneth Watson, “Reaching for Readiness,” Army 

AL&T Magazine, April–June 2016.

279. OSD-Policy, response to SIGAR data call, 

February 2017.

280. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

281. Isabel Vogel, Review of the Use of “Theory of 

Change” in International Development, UK 

Department for International Development, 

April 2012, p. 14; Jeanne Giraldo, “Assessment 

and Program Design,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), p. 77; Christopher Paul, 

“Foundations for Assessment: the Hierarchy of 

Evaluation and the Importance of Articulating a 

Theory of Change,” Small Wars Journal, accessed 

May 13, 2019.

282. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR 17-62-

LL, September 2017, p. 15; State, “USG Response 

to Ghani Letter,” State 322488 cable, November 

20, 2003.

283. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Efforts to Establish 

Army and Police Have Made Progress but 

Future Plans Need to be Better Defined, GAO-05-

575, June 2005, pp. 17–18.

284. Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa 

Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, 

ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 37–38.

285. Mark Milley, interview by Lynne Chandler Garcia 

in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, ed. Michael G. 

Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 2006), p. 105.

286. Frederick Rice, “Afghanistan Unit Takes on 

New Mission, Name,” DOD News, July 13, 

2005; T. X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring 

Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in 

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long 

War, eds. Richard D. Hooker Jr., and Joseph 

J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2015), p. 283; CSTC-A Command 

Historian, “Annual History Summary 1 January 

2006 – 31 December 2006,” p. 3; U.S. Embassy 

Kabul, “Afghan National Police Program: Looking 

Back, Looking Forward,” Kabul 000106 cable, 

January 9, 2006.

287. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006,” 

p. 3.

288. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006,” 

p. 3.

289. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006,” 

p. 3.

290. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

February 6, 2006, p. 17; David A. Cate, Alexandra 

Kerr, and Renanah Miles, “Conclusion: A Vision 

for the Future of Defense Institution Building,” 

in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 361.

291. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006,” 

p. 3; T. X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring 

Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in 

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long 

War, eds. Richard D. Hooker Jr., and Joseph 

J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2015), p. 284.

292. CSTC-A, Office of Public Affairs, “CSTC-A Fact 

Sheet,” December 1, 2007.

293. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006,” 

p. 5.

294. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006,” 

p. 5.

295. Querine Hanlon and Robert M. Perito, “DIB in 

the Broader Security Architecture,” in Effective, 

Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense 

Institution Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and 

Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, 2017), p. 15.

296. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the 

Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 

2009, p. 43.

297. Jack Kem, “Lessons from Afghanistan,” in 

Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 312.

298. Former DOD official, SIGAR interview, April 

2015.

299. NTM-A/CSTC-A, “180 Day Internal Review and 

Way Forward,” May 29, 2010, p. 3 in SIGAR, 

Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 169

Afghan Security Force Assessments, SIGAR-10-

11-AR, June 29, 2010, p. 40.

300. NTM-A/CSTC-A, Afghan Ministry of Defense 

and Afghan National Army General Staff 

Ministerial Master Development Plan, December 

11, 2011, pp. 3, 7–8, 11–12, 14; Jack Kem, “Lessons 

from Afghanistan,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), pp. 312–313.

301. Jack Kem, “Lessons from Afghanistan,” in 

Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 313.

302. Jack Kem, “Lessons from Afghanistan,” in 

Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 313.

303. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 13.

304. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 16.

305. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 14.

306. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 19. 

307. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 19.

308. DOD, Report on Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 19; Phillip 

Walter Wellman, “Rainey takes the lead of key 

coalition command in Afghanistan,” Stars and 

Stripes, October 12, 2018.

309. OSD-Policy, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019.

310. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

311. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

312. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

313. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, June 2018, pp. 11–14; SIGAR, 

Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 

July 2018, p. 83.

314. James A. Schear, William B. Caldwell IV, and 

Frank C. DiGiovanni, “Ministerial Advisors: 

Developing Capacity for an Enduring Security 

Force,” PRISM, vol. 2, no. 2 (2011), p. 138.

315. According to an October 2018 SIGAR audit, there 

are 72 MODAs out of 577 total U.S. advisors. 

DOD civilians that are sourced solely as DODExpeditionary Civilians (DOD-EC) provide 

advising services below the ministerial level. 

SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 3.

316. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 3.

317. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the 

Afghanistan National Security Forces, June 

2008, p. 13.

318. Alexandra Kerr, “Introduction: Defense 

Institution Building: A New Paradigm for 

the 21st Century,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), p. xxv; Erik D. Prince, 

“The MacArthur Model for Afghanistan,” Wall 

Street Journal, May 31, 2017.

319. Thomas Ross Jr., “Defining the Discipline in 

Theory and Practice,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), p. 33.

320. JCISFA, Ministerial-Level Advisor Training 

Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial 

Impressions, October 2010, p. 29.

321. JCISFA, Ministerial-Level Advisor Training 

Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial 

Impressions, October 2010, pp. 29, 32, 34, 39, 45, 

48, 54; Scott King, interview by the Center for 

Army Lessons Learned in Defense Institution 

Building: Perspectives on Ministerial Advising, 

CALL Newsletter, no. 18-08 (2018), p. 36; CSTC-A, 

CSTC-A Training Gap, May 5, 2017; former 

CSTC-A commander, SIGAR interview, June 2018.

322. CSTC-A, CSTC-A Training Gap, May 5, 2017; 

former CSTC-A Commander, SIGAR interview, 

June 2018.

323. Scott King, interview by the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned in Defense Institution 

Building: Perspectives on Ministerial Advising,

CALL Newsletter, no. 18-08 (2018), p. 36.

324. DOD, “Instruction 5000.68—Security Force 

Assistance (SFA),” October 27, 2010, pp. 9, 11; 

GAO, Security Force Assistance: The Army and 

Marine Corps Have Ongoing Efforts to Identify 

and Track Advisors, but the Army Needs a Plan 

to Capture Advising Experience, GAO-14-482, 

July 2014, pp. 13, 21–22.

325. CALL, “Senior Advisor Training: Building the 

Ready Bench,” News from the Front, May 2018, 

p. 4; CALL, “Ministerial Advisors,” News from the 

Front, August 1, 2017, p. 4; JCISFA, MinisterialLevel Advisor Training Effectiveness Study: 

Phase I Initial Impressions, October 2010, p. 8.

326. DOD OIG, Summary of Lessons Learned – DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of ‘Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip’ Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DODIG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 13.

327. JCISFA, Ministerial-Level Advisor Training 

Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial 

Impressions, October 2010, p. 22.

328. JCISFA, Ministerial-Level Advisor Training 

Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial 

Impressions, October 2010, p. 22.

329. JCISFA, Ministerial-Level Advisor Training 

Effectiveness Study: Phase I Initial 

Impressions, October 2010, p. 22.
170 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

330. CALL, “Senior Advisor Training: Building the 

Ready Bench,” News from the Front, May 2018, 

p. 4; CALL, “Ministerial Advisors,” News from the 

Front, August 1, 2017, p. 7.

331. CALL, “Senior Advisor Training: Building the 

Ready Bench,” News from the Front, May 2018, 

p. 4; SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense 

and Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance 

Data, to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 11.

332. NATO, “Resolute Support Improves Advisor 

Training,” press release, June 19, 2017.

333. Former CSTC-A official, SIGAR interview, May 

2017.

334. Security Sector Reform/Security Sector 

Assistance expert, correspondence with SIGAR, 

March 2019.

335. 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment, “Senior Leader 

Advisor Training,” slide in “Capabilities Brief,” 

August 8, 2018.

336. 3rd Battalion, 353rd Regiment, “Senior Leader 

Advisor Training,” slide in “Capabilities Brief,” 

August 8, 2018.

337. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 12.

338. JCISFA, correspondence with SIGAR, April 2019; 

former CSTC-A official, SIGAR interview, May 

2017; SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense 

and Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance 

Data to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 12; 

Kyle Rempfer, “DOD hasn’t followed CENTCOM 

deployment requirements for advisers heading 

to Afghanistan, report says,” Military Times, 

November 1, 2018. 

339. Former CSTC-A official, SIGAR interview, May 

2017; SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense 

and Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance 

Data to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 12; 

Kyle Rempfer, “DOD hasn’t followed CENTCOM 

deployment requirements for advisers heading 

to Afghanistan, report says,” Military Times, 

November 1, 2018.

340. SIGAR site visit to the JRTC, December 2018.

341. OSD-Policy, response to SIGAR data call, 

February 2018; Mark W. Lee, “The AfghanistanPakistan Hands Program,” Army, February 11, 

2014.

342. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCS 

Instruction 1630.01B—Afghanistan/Pakistan 

Hands (APH) Program,” July 8, 2016, pp. 1-2, A-1.

343. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, pp. 3, 

11; Mark W. Lee, “The Afghanistan-Pakistan 

Hands Program,” Army, February 11, 2014.

344. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “CJCS 

Instruction 1630.01B—Afghanistan/Pakistan 

Hands (APH) Program,” July 8, 2016, p. B-1.

345. AFPAK Hands, SIGAR interview, April 15, 2017; 

former AFPAK Hand, SIGAR interview, May 4, 

2018; Mark W. Lee, “The Afghanistan-Pakistan 

Hands Program,” Army, February 11, 2014.

346. U.S. Air Force Personnel Center, “Afghanistan 

Pakistan Hands,” accessed November 2018; U.S. 

Navy Personnel Command, “AFPAK Hands,” 

accessed November 2018.

347. AFPAK Hands, SIGAR interview, April 15, 2017; 

Michael Coleman, Former U.S. Air Force AFPAK 

Hand, SIGAR interview, April 3, 2018; former 

AFPAK Hand, SIGAR interview, May 4, 2018.

348. AFPAK Hands, SIGAR interview, April 15, 2017; 

AFPAK Hands, SIGAR interview, April 25, 2017; 

AFPAK Hand, SIGAR interview, April 14, 2017; 

David Korzen, “AFPAK Hands Enter the Cockpit,” 

Real Clear Defense, February 14, 2018.

349. CENTCOM officials, SIGAR interview, August 30, 

2017.

350. Michael Coleman, former U.S. Air Force AFPAK 

Hand, SIGAR interview, April 3, 2018.

351. CSTC-A official, SIGAR interview, April 22, 2017; 

former AFPAK Hand, SIGAR interview, May 4, 

2018; AFPAK Hands, SIGAR interview, April 25, 

2017.

352. AFPAK Hands, SIGAR interview, April 15, 2017.

353. Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa 

Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, 

ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 2006), p. 27; Mark 

Milley, interview by Lynne Chandler Garcia 

in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, ed. Michael G. 

Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute, 2006), p. 105; GAO, Afghanistan 

Security: Efforts to Establish Army and Police 

Have Made Progress but Future Plans Need to 

be Better Defined, GAO-05-575, June 2005, p. 8; 

U.S. Congressional Research Service (CRS), 

Department of Defense’s Use of Contractors 

to Support Military Operations: Background, 

Analysis, and Issues for Congress, R43074, May 

17, 2013, p. 3.

354. Thomas Ross Jr., “Defining the Discipline in 

Theory and Practice,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, ed. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), pp. 23–24; John 

W. Nicholson, testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, hearing on “The 

Situation in Afghanistan,” February 9, 2017, 

pp. 32–33; CRS, Department of Defense’s Use of 

Contractors to Support Military Operations: 

Background, Analysis, and Issues for Congress, 

May 17, 2013, p. 3.

355. Former CSTC-A official, SIGAR interview, April 2017.

356. DynCorp International official, SIGAR interview, 

April 2017.

357. OSD-Policy, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019.
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 171

358. AROC DynCorp, response to SIGAR data call, 

June 2017.

359. John W. Nicholson, testimony before the Senate 

Committee on Armed Services, hearing on “The 

Situation in Afghanistan,” February 9, 2017, 

pp. 33, 65.

360. Army Contracting Command, “Performance Work 

Statement,” Contract Number W560MY-15-C-0005: 

MOD/ANA Advisors and Mentors, April 6, 2017, 

p. 6.

361. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 3.

362. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, pp. 8–9.

363. Army Contracting Command – Afghanistan, 

correspondence with SIGAR, April 2019.

364. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, April 2019; SIGAR, 

meeting with CSTC-A, April 2019.

365. Walter Pincus, “Pentagon program has U.S. 

civilians advising Afghan ministries to improve 

cooperation, security,” Washington Post, 

April 18, 2011; Clifford Stanley, testimony 

before the Senate Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, hearing on “Deployed 

Federal Civilians: Advancing Security and 

Opportunity Abroad,” April 14, 2010, p. 4.

366. Walter Pincus, “Pentagon program has U.S. 

civilians advising Afghan ministries to improve 

cooperation, security,” Washington Post, April 

18, 2011; George M. Dryden, “The Ministry of 

Defense Advisors Program: Preparing Advisors 

to Have Strategic Impact,” Small Wars Journal, 

September 26, 2018.

367. DOD OIG, Defense Institution Reform Initiative 

Program Elements Need to be Defined, 

DODIG-2013-019, November 9, 2012, p. i; James 

Schear, “Statement for the Record,” testimony 

before the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee 

on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, April 12, 

2010, p. 6.

368. DOD OIG, Policies and Procedures Needed 

to Reconcile Ministry of Defense Advisors 

Program Disbursements to Other DOD Agencies, 

DODIG-2013-062, March 28, 2013, p. 1.

369. DOD OIG, Policies and Procedures Needed 

to Reconcile Ministry of Defense Advisors 

Program Disbursements to Other DOD 

Agencies, DODIG-2013-062, March 28, 2013, 

pp. 1–2; Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict for 

Under Secretary of Defense Policy, Ministry 

of Defense Advisors (MODA) Program 

Transition, February 4, 2013, p. 2; Security 

Sector Reform/Security Sector Assistance 

Expert, correspondence with SIGAR, March 

2018. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict 

is responsible for providing policy guidance 

on foreign defense institution building and 

the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Partnership Strategy and Stability Operations is 

responsible for overseeing the development of 

DOD institution-building capabilities, including 

the MODA program. See DOD OIG, Policies and 

Procedures Needed to Reconcile Ministry of 

Defense Advisors Program Disbursements to 

Other DOD Agencies, DODIG-2013-062, March 28, 

2013, p. 2.

370. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, pp. 2, 5; DOD, Report to 

Congress on Progress Toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan and United States 

Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan National 

Security Forces, April 28 2010, p. 102.

371. NDAA for FY 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-81, § 

1081 (2011); MODA Program, Ministry of 

Defense Advisor Course Overview and Program 

of Instruction, March 30, 2018, p. 3.

372. DOD OIG, Policies and Procedures Needed 

to Reconcile Ministry of Defense Advisors 

Program Disbursements to Other DOD Agencies, 

DODIG-2013-062, March 28, 2013, p. 2.

373. James Schear, “Statement for the Record,” 

testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, April 12, 2010, p. 6; DOD OIG, 

Defense Institution Reform Initiative Program 

Elements Need to be Defined, DODIG-2013-019, 

November 9, 2012, p. 2.

374. James Schear, “Statement for the Record,” 

testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, April 12, 2010, p. 6.

375. Fellow at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, SIGAR interview, June 

2018.

376. Defense Institution Reform Initiative – 

Afghanistan, Resource Management Line of 

Operation Master Plan version 4, October 

26, 2011, p. 26; DOD Coalition Affairs and 

Partnership Programs, “DIRI Support to NTM-A/

CSTC-A: Human Resource Management in 

Afghanistan,” May 16, 2011, p. 5. 

377. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019.

378. MODA Program, Ministry of Defense 

Advisor Course Overview and Program of 

Instruction, March 30, 2018, p. 2; Security Sector 

Reform/Security Sector Assistance expert, 

correspondence with SIGAR, March 2019.

379. MODA Program, Ministry of Defense Advisor 

Course Overview and Program of Instruction, 

March 30, 2018, p. 2.

380. James Schear, “Statement for the Record,” 

testimony to the Senate Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, April 12, 2010, p. 5.

381. James Schear, “Statement for the Record,” 
172 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

testimony to the Senate Armed Services 

Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and 

Capabilities, April 12, 2010, p. 5.

382. Former CSTC-A commander, SIGAR interview, 

April 2017.

383. DOD, “Directive 1404.10—DOD Civilian 

Expeditionary Workforce,” January 23, 2009, p. 1; 

SIGAR meeting with DSCA, June 2018.

384. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, pp. 2–3; SIGAR, 

Afghanistan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data to Assess, 

Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors Assigned to the 

Ministries of Defense and Interior, SIGAR-19-03-

AR, October 2018, p. 10.

385. GAO, Improvements Needed to Strengthen 

Management of U.S. Civilian Presence, GAO-12-

285. February 27, 2012, p. 21; SIGAR meeting with 

DSCA, June 2018.

386. OSD-Policy, response to SIGAR data call, June 

2017; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, 

Office of Personnel and Readiness, “Directivetype Memorandum (DTM)-121—Department 

of Defense Expeditionary Civilian Workforce,” 

January 10, 2017, pp. 1, 6; SIGAR, Afghanistan 

National Defense and Security Forces: DOD 

Lacks Performance Data to Assess, Monitor, and 

Evaluate Advisors Assigned to the Ministries of 

Defense and Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 

2018, p. 3.

387. MODA Program, Ministry of Defense Advisor 

Course Overview and Program of Instruction, 

March 30, 2018, p. 3.

388. MODA Program, Ministry of Defense Advisor 

Course Overview and Program of Instruction, 

March 30, 2018, p. 3.

389. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

390. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

391. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019.

392. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, p. 8.

393. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, p. 8.

394. SIGAR meeting with DSCA, June 2018; SIGAR 

meeting with DOD officials, March 2019.

395. SIGAR meeting with DSCA, June 2018.

396. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, p. 9; James A. Schear, 

William B. Caldwell IV, and Frank C. DiGiovanni, 

“Ministerial Advisors: Developing Capacity for 

an Enduring Security Force,” PRISM, vol. 2, no. 

2 (2011), p. 141.

397. Ministry of Defense Advisors Program, Ministry 

of Defense Advisor Course Overview and 

Program of Instruction, March 30, 2018, p. 5.

398. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, p. 9.

399. MODA Program, Ministry of Defense Advisor 

Course Overview and Program of Instruction, 

March 30, 2018, p. 6.

400. MODA Program, Ministry of Defense Advisor 

Course Overview and Program of Instruction, 

March 30, 2018, p. 13.

401. Victoria Stattel and Robert Perito, Innovative 

Transformation: An Evaluation of the Ministry 

of Defense Advisors Program in Afghanistan, 

USIP, February 2012, pp. 6, 10; Security Sector 

Reform/Security Sector Assistance expert, 

correspondence with SIGAR, March 18, 2019.

402. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 1.

403. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 5.

404. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, pp. 7–8.

405. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 7.

406. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 9.

407. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 9.

408. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 9.

409. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 9.

410. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 11.

411. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 173

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 12.

412. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 12.

413. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 12.

414. SIGAR, Afghanistan National Defense and 

Security Forces: DOD Lacks Performance Data 

to Assess, Monitor, and Evaluate Advisors 

Assigned to the Ministries of Defense and 

Interior, SIGAR-19-03-AR, October 2018, p. 13.

415. Nadia Gerspacher, “Paradoxes of Partnership,” 

in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), 

pp. 59–61.

416. Scott King, interview by the Center for Army 

Lessons Learned in Defense Institution 

Building: Perspectives on Ministerial Advising,

CALL Newsletter, no. 18-08 (2018), p. 35.

417. Michael J. Metrinko, The American Military 

Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials 

in the Islamic World (Carlisle, PA: Army War 

College, 2008), p. 60.

418. Nadia Gerspacher, “Paradoxes of Partnership,” 

in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 59; 

SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of 

Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight of 

Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR-15-54-AR, 

Apr 2015, p. 22; GAO, Afghanistan Security: 

Long-standing Challenges May Affect Progress 

and Sustainment of Afghan National Security 

Forces, GAO-12-951T, July 24, 2012, p. 6.

419. Nadia Gerspacher, “Paradoxes of Partnership,” 

in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University, 2017), p. 64.

420. Former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, SIGAR interview, December 12, 2018.

421. Former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, SIGAR interview, December 12, 2018.

422. Jeanne Giraldo, “Assessment and Program 

Design” in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights 

for Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 77; 

Nadia Gerspacher, “Paradoxes of Partnership,” 

in Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), 

pp. 67–68.

423. Paul Clarke and Thomas Davies, “Measuring 

and Evaluation,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), pp. 163–164.

424. CALL, Ministerial Advisors: Combined Security 

Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), 

August 1, 2017, pp. 11–12, 17, 19, 21.

425. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: Millions of 

Dollars at Risk Due to Minimal Oversight 

of Personnel and Payroll Data, SIGAR-15-

54-AR, April 2015, pp. 14–16; Jeanne Giraldo, 

“Assessment and Program Design” in Effective, 

Legitimate, Secure: Insights for Defense 

Institution Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and 

Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National 

Defense University Press, 2017), p. 80.

426. T. X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring Security 

Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in Lessons 

Encountered: Learning from the Long War, 

eds. Richard D. Hooker Jr., and Joseph J. 

Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2015), pp. 297–298.

427. Frederick Rice, “Afghanistan Unit Takes on 

New Mission, Name,” DOD News, July 13, 

2005; T. X. Hammes, “Raising and Mentoring 

Security Forces in Afghanistan and Iraq,” in 

Lessons Encountered: Learning from the Long 

War, eds. Richard D. Hooker Jr., and Joseph 

J. Collins (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2015), p. 283; CSTC-A Command 

Historian, “Annual History Summary 1 January 

2006 – 31 December 2006.”

428. Tactical-Life, “New York Guardsmen Support 

Task Force Phoenix in Afghanistan,” May 16, 

2008; James Baucom, “Seven Years of Combined 

Joint Task Force Phoenix, Center for Army 

Lessons Learned: News from the Front,” n.d., 

accessed May 29, 2018. 

429. Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The 

United States Army in Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF), October 2001–September 

2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2010), pp. 192, 209, 239, 240, 242, 

261.

430. CSTC-A Command Historian, “Annual History 

Summary 1 January 2006 – 31 December 2006.”

431. Jack Kem, “Lessons from Afghanistan,” in 

Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), p. 312.

432. OSD-Policy, response to SIGAR data call, 

February 2017; DOD, Report on Progress toward 

Security and Stability in Afghanistan, October 

2009, p. 19.

433. SIGAR email correspondence with a member 

of the Joint Force Training Center, April 10, 

2019; SIGAR email correspondence with former 

Counterinsurgency Advisory and Assistance 

Team (CAAT) member, April 4, 2019; SIGAR 

meeting with a member of the Joint Force 

Training Center, October 25, 2018. 

434. Resolute Support Headquarters Organization 

chart, current as of April 29, 2019; SIGAR site 
174 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

435. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2018, p. 53. 

436. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2018, pp. 91, 100.

437. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Some 

Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces’ 

Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance 

DOD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment, 

GAO-19-116, October 2018, p. 6. 

438. DSCA, “Foreign Military Sales (FMS),” accessed 

October 9, 2018.

439. DSCA, “Foreign Military Financing (FMF),” 

accessed October 9, 2018. 

440. Defense Institute of Security Cooperation 

Studies (DISCS), The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 6-4; senior 

DOD official, SIGAR interview, July 18, 2018; 

CRS, U.S. Security Assistance and Security 

Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding 

Trends, R45091, February 1, 2018, pp. 1–2.

441. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 6-4; GAO, 

Foreign Military Sales: DOD Needs to Improve 

Its Use of Performance Information to Manage 

the Program, GAO-17-703, 2017, p. 34. 

442. DSCA, “C15—Building Partner Capacity 

Programs,” Security Assistance Management 

Manual, April 30, 2012; DISCS, The Management 

of Security Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, 

p. 6-4. 

443. Pseudo FMS cases are initiated as cases in the 

existing FMS system and process. DSCA, “C15—

Building Partner Capacity Programs,” Security 

Assistance Management Manual, April 30, 2012. 

444. Daniel Maloney, “Security Assistance from the 

Logistics Point of View,” Army Sustainment, 

March–April 2011, p. 13.

445. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Some 

Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces’ 

Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance 

DOD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment, 

GAO-19-116, October 2018, p. 5; DISCS, The 

Management of Security Cooperation, 38th ed., 

May 2018, pp. 2-14, 4-31.

446. CRS, U.S. Security Assistance and Security 

Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding 

Trends, R45091, February 1, 2018, p. 1. 

447. CRS, Security Assistance and Cooperation: 

Shared Responsibility of the Departments of 

State and Defense, R44444, April 2016, pp. 42–43.

448. CRS, U.S. Security Assistance and Security 

Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding 

Trends, R45091, February 1, 2018, p. 1. 

449. DSCA, “C15—Building Partner Capacity 

Programs,” Security Assistance Management 

Manual, April 30, 2012.

450. United Nations, Agreement on Provisional 

Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the 

Re-establishment of Permanent Government 

Institutions (Bonn Agreement), 2001; SIGAR, 

Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. 

Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-LL, 

September 2017, p. 14. 

451. Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa 

Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, 

ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 2006), p. 17; Center for 

Military History, Operation Enduring Freedom: 

March 2002–April 2005, n.d., pp. 27–28; ANA 

design team chief, SIGAR interview, October 28, 

2016.

452. CSTC-A/SAO, response to SIGAR data call, 

December 2018; SIGAR meeting with DSCA, June 

2018.

453. Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: 

Marching in the Wrong Direction,” in Snapshots 

of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of 

Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance (2001–

2011), Afghanistan Analysts Network, eds. 

Martine van Bijlert and Sari Kouvo, July 7, 

2012, p. 63; Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. 

Lisa Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, 

ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 2006), pp. 52–53. 

454. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-

62-LL, September 2017, p. 22; Karl Eikenberry, 

interview by Lisa Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness 

to War, vol. 3, ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 

2006), p. 20; Mark Milley, interview by Lynn 

Chandler Garcia in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, 

ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 2006), p. 104.

455. Antonio Giustozzi, “The Afghan National Army: 

Marching in the Wrong Direction,” in Snapshots 

of an Intervention: The Unlearned Lessons of 

Afghanistan’s Decade of Assistance (2001–

2011), Afghanistan Analysts Network, eds. 

Martine van Bijlert and Sari Kouvo, July 7, 2012, 

pp. 63–64. 

456. Karl Eikenberry, interview by Dr. Lisa 

Beckenbaugh in Eyewitness to War, vol. 3, 

ed. Michael G. Brooks (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute, 2006), p. 53.

457. Center for Military History, Operation Enduring 

Freedom: March 2002–April 2005, n.d., p. 66.

458. U.S. Embassy Kabul, “Equipping the ANA,” Kabul 

003589 cable, August 10, 2006. 

459. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-

LL, September 2017, pp. xi–xii. 

460. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, November 

2018; former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, correspondence with SIGAR, December 

2018; former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018.

461. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018.

462. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018. 

463. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018. 

464. Former ANA requirements manager, SIGAR 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 175

interview, March 28, 2018. 

465. Daniel P. Bolger, former commander 

NTM-A/CSTC-A from November 2011–2013, 

correspondence with SIGAR, December 21, 2018. 

466. Kenneth Watson, “Reaching for Readiness,” Army 

AL&T Magazine, April–June 2016, p. 41; former 

deputy commander of programs at CSTC-A, 

correspondence with SIGAR, December 31, 2018. 

467. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, OSD 08070-11, July 25, 2011, 

p. A-3. 

468. DOD, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019; Pete Velz and David Navratil, testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and 

Investigations, hearing on “Evaluating DOD 

Equipment and Uniform Procurement in Iraq and 

Afghanistan,” prepared statement, July 25, 2017.

469. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018.

470. SFA expert, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019. 

471. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. AB-15. 

472. DOD, United States Plan for Sustaining the 

Afghanistan National Security Force, June 2008, 

p. 17; DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 75; DOD, United 

States Plan for Sustaining the Afghanistan 

National Security Force, April 2009, p. 35.

473. Rod Nordland, Fahim Abed, and Mujib Mashal, 

“Taliban Kill More than 200 Afghan Defenders 

on 4 Fronts: ‘A Catastrophe,’” New York Times, 

August 12, 2018. 

474. Daniel P. Bolger, former commander 

NTM-A/CSTC-A from November 2011–2013, 

correspondence with SIGAR, December 21, 2018. 

475. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A/SAO, June 2018; 

CSTC-A/SAO, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019. 

476. Former senior advisor to the MOI’s logistic 

directorate, SIGAR interview, May 04, 2018. 

477. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018. 

478. Former deputy commander of program at 

CSTC-A, correspondence with SIGAR, December 

31, 2018. 

479. Daniel P. Bolger, former commander 

NTM-A/CSTC-A from November 2011–2013, 

correspondence with SIGAR, December 2018. 

480. Daniel P. Bolger, former commander NTM-A/

CSTC-A from November 2011–2013, SIGAR 

interview, December 2018.

481. DOD Appropriations Bill for FY 2017, S. Rep. No. 

114–263, p. 229. 

482. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, Acquisition 

Technology and Logistics, Vehicles Directory, 

Memorandum to Resolute Support Command 

Office, “Request for changing and renewing 

at number of procurement plan of (five ton) 

international vehicles which is going to supply 

for ANA on 2015 & 2016, changing of mentioned 

vehicles into armored vehicles,” 2015.

483. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, Chief of 

General Staff, “Perceived Capability Gaps for 

the ANA post December 2014 and Request for 

Assistance and if Possible Requested Support,” 

letter no. 362, April 4, 2014.

484. USFOR-A, “USFOR-A’s Response to SIGAR 

15-85-SP-IL ‘ANDSF Procurement’ Inquiry Letter,” 

October 5, 2015.

485. CSTC-A, Military Advisory Group, “Protected 

Mobility Capability Gap,” PowerPoint 

presentation, May 28, 2014, slide 3; Josh Smith, 

“U.S. ditched plan to given Afghan forces more 

armored vehicles,” Reuters, July 4, 2016. 

486. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, Chief of 

General Staff, “Perceived Capability Gaps for 

the ANA post December 2014 and Request for 

Assistance and if Possible Requested Support,” 

letter no. 362, April 4, 2014.

487. OSD, CAPE, “Alternatives to the Afghan Air 

Force (AAF) CAS Expansion Initiative ‘Meeting 

Immediate Requirements’,” January 29, 2016.

488. Combined Forces Air Component Commander, 

“2013–2018 Airpower Statistics,” as of October 

31, 2018; SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United 

States Congress, October 30, 2018, p. 78.

489. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, October 30, 2018, p. 78.

490. DSCA, “C15—Building Partner Capacity 

Programs,” Security Assistance Management 

Manual, April 30, 2012. 

491. Daniel P. Bolger, former commander NTM-A/

CSTC-A from November 2011–2013, SIGAR 

interview, December 10, 2018; retired officer and 

former DOD official, SIGAR interview, December 

18, 2018.

492. Giles and Porter, “Fall 2015 PRM US-Afghan 

Security Cooperation and Process Improvement,” 

presentation slides, n.d.

493. DSCA, “C2—Security Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) and Case Manager 

Responsibilities; Security Assistance Planning 

and Survey Teams,” in Security Assistance 

Management Manual, April 30, 2012; DISCS, The 

Management of Security Cooperation, 38th ed., 

May 2018, pp. 4-1, 4-3.

494. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 4-1.

495. DISAM, “Chapter 4: Security Cooperation 

Organizations Overseas,” The Management 

of Security Assistance, 30th ed., January 

2011 in Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), 

International Cooperation in Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics Handbook, 7th ed., 

May 2012, p. 165.

496. DSCA, “C15—Building Partner Capacity 

Programs,” Security Assistance Management 

Manual, April 30, 2012; SIGAR meeting with 

DOD, Army, and USASAC officials, April 2019.

497. SIGAR meeting with DOD, Army, and USASAC 

officials, April 2019. 

498. SIGAR meeting with DOD, Army, and USASAC 

officials, April 2019.
176 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

499. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A/SAO, June 2018.

500. CSTC-A, response to SIGAR data call, December 

2018. 

501. SIGAR meeting with DOD, Army, and USASAC 

officials, April 2019.

502. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A SAO, June 2018.

503. Giles and Porter, “Fall 2015 PRM US-Afghan 

Security Cooperation and Process Improvement,” 

presentation slides, n.d.

504. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018; CSTC-A/SAO, 

response to SIGAR data call, December 2018.

505. DOD, correspondence with SIGAR, April 2019.

506. SIGAR meeting DOD officials, March 29, 2019; 

retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018.

507. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A/SAO, June 2018.

508. Daniel Maloney, “Security Assistance from the 

Logistics Point of View,” Army Sustainment, 

March–April 2011, p. 13.

509. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-

LL, September 2017, pp. 79–80; SIGAR meeting 

with DOD officials, March 29, 2019. 

510. GAO, Afghanistan Security: Some 

Improvements Reported in Afghan Forces’ 

Capabilities, but Actions Needed to Enhance 

DOD Oversight of U.S.-Purchased Equipment, 

GAO-19-116, October 2018, pp. 15–16.

511. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A, March 2018. 

512. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019. 

513. CSTC-A/SAO, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019. 

514. Former SAO officer responsible for ground 

vehicles, SIGAR interview, June 11, 2018.

515. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019; 

DOD officials, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019. 

516. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 11–14, 2019. 

517. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019. 

518. DOD officials, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019. 

519. SIGAR inquiry letter concerning M1114s and 

M1151As, February 2019; U.S. Army, response 

to SIGAR inquiry letter concerning M1114s 

and M1151As, March 2019; retired officer and 

former DOD official, SIGAR interview, December 

18, 2018; Tracy Robillard, “Continuous Army 

innovation yields improved gunner protection,” 

Army, January 7, 2011. 

520. U.S. Army, response to SIGAR inquiry letter 

concerning M1114s and M1151As, March 2019; 

Carlos Lago, “Army Rushes FRAG 7 to the Field,” 

Army, April 2, 2009. 

521. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018. 

522. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, p. A-5.

523. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings 

and Recommendations, p. A-5; DISCS, The 

Management of Security Cooperation, 38th ed., 

May 2018, pp. 4-9–4-10.

524. SIGAR meeting with DOD, Army, and USASAC 

officials, April 2019.

525. SIGAR meeting with DOD, Army, and USASAC 

officials, April 2019. 

526. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A/SAO, June 2018; 

CSTC-A, “Standing Operating Procedures and 

Policy for Planning, Resourcing, and Executing 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF),” 

March 2016.

527. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, p. 5.

528. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, p. 5.

529. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018. 

530. DOD OIG, Development of Individual 

Equipment Requirements for the Afghan 

National Army Needs Improvement, 

DODIG-2012-092, May 25, 2012, p. 8. 

531. OSD-Policy correspondence with DOD OIG, 

“S-5 Rockets—another example of a potential 

problem,” August 8, 2017.

532. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, November 

2018.

533. SIGAR, Afghan National Army: DOD May Have 

Spent Up to $28 Million More Than Needed To 

Procure Camouflage Uniforms That May be 

Inappropriate for the Afghan Environment, 

SIGAR-17-48-SP, June 2017, p. 8. 

534. SIGAR, Inquiry Letter: G222 Disposition 

Notification Request, SIGAR-15-04-SP, October 3, 

2014. 

535. Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group, 

“Alenia C-27 Spartan,” accessed November 11, 

2018.

536. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, pp. 1, 7. 

537. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 7.

538. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 7.

539. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 14.

540. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 177

interview, December 18, 2018. 

541. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 14. 

542. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-

LL, September 2017, p. 191; former Commander 

9th Air Expeditionary Task Force (AETF) and 

NATO-Air Command – Afghanistan, SIGAR 

interview, November 15, 2018.

543. DOD OIG, Summary of Lessons Learned: DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of “Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DODIG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 11.

544. DOD OIG, Summary of Lessons Learned: DOD 

IG Assessment Oversight of “Train, Advise, 

Assist, and Equip” Operations by U.S. and 

Coalition Forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, 

DODIG-2015-093, March 31, 2015, p. 11. 

545. Former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, correspondence with SIGAR, December 

31, 2018. 

546. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018; SIGAR meeting with DOD 

officials, November 2018.

547. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, pp. 15–16.

548. Former SAO Officer responsible for ground 

vehicles, SIGAR interview, June 11, 2018; 

former SAO officer responsible for weapons 

and ammunition, October 31, 2018; former 

SAO officer for weapons and ammunition, 

November 6, 2018. 

549. SIGAR meeting with CSTC-A/SAO, May 2015.

550. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 8.

551. SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 8.

552. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, November 

2018.

553. Former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, SIGAR interview, December 12, 2018.

554. Former deputy commander of programs at 

CSTC-A, correspondence with SIGAR, December 

31, 2018. 

555. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, OSD 08070-11, July 25, 2011, 

p. C-1.

556. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, OSD 08070-11, July 25, 2011, 

pp. 5, C-1. 

557. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, OSD 08070-11, July 25, 2011, 

p. 16.

558. DOD, Security Cooperation Reform Task 

Force, Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Policy, Security Cooperation 

Reform Study: Phase I Report: Findings and 

Recommendations, OSD 08070-11, July 25, 2011, 

p. 5. 

559. Former SAO officer responsible for weapons and 

ammunition, SIGAR interview, October 31, 2018.

560. Former SAO officer responsible for weapons and 

ammunition, SIGAR interview, October 31, 2018.

561. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, November 

2018. 

562. Former SAO officer for weapons and 

ammunition, SIGAR interview, November 6, 2018.

563. Former OSD-Policy official, SIGAR interview, 

July 30, 2015; DSCA, “Excess Defense Articles,” 

accessed October 9, 2018. 

564. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, November 

2018.

565. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Justification 

for FY2014 Overseas Contingency Operations: 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, May 2013, 

p. 8.

566. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019; 

Government of Afghanistan, MOD, Acquisition 

Technology and Logistics, Vehicles Directory, 

Memorandum to Resolute Support Command 

Office, “Request for changing and renewing 

at number of procurement plan of (five ton) 

international vehicles which is going to supply 

for ANA on 2015 & 2016, changing of mentioned 

vehicles into armored vehicles,” 2015. 

567. DCOS SA/CSTC-A, “Memorandum of 

Request (MOR) 16-S1A-419 for the Ministry 

of Defense (MOD) 40MM Illumination Round 

Procurement,” June 30, 2016. Procured 

ammunition cancellations documents provided to 

SIGAR on April 1, 2019. 

568. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 5-5. 

569. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 5-5; U.S. 

Army, Security Assistance Procedures and 

Operations, DA PAM 12-1, March 31, 2016, p. 7. 

570. U.S. Army, Security Assistance Procedures and 

Operations, DA PAM 12-1, March 31, 2016, p. 7.

571. U.S. Army, Security Assistance Procedures and 

Operations, DA PAM 12-1, March 31, 2016, p. 7.

572. DOD OIG, Assessment of U.S. Government 

and Coalition Efforts to Develop the Logistics 

Sustainment Capability of the Afghan National 

Army, DODIG-2012-028, December 9, 2011, 

p. 123.

573. Government of Afghanistan, Ministry of Defense, 

Office of the Assistant Minister of Defense for 
178 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Letter No. 

1967, August 9, 2007.

574. U.S. Army, Program Executive Office Simulation, 

Training, and Instrumentation, “PC-12 TADSS: 9 

May 2014 Update,” Army Contracting Command 

Orlando, accessed November 18, 2016. 

575. DCOS SA/CSTC-A, “Memorandum of 

Request (MOR) 16 EIP-310 for the use of 

Afghan National Security Forces Funds (ASFF) 

to procure M4 rifles in support of the Afghan 

National Police (ANP),” July 8, 2016; DCOS SA/

CSTC-A, “Memorandum of Request (MOR) 16 

EIP-312 for use of Afghan National Security 

Forces Funds (ASFF) for the procurement of 

Standard CL VII Weapons in support of the 

Afghan National Police (ANP),” June 29, 2016.

576. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018.

577. U.S. Army, Security Assistance, Training, and 

Export Policy, AR 12-1, February 22, 2016, p. 10.

578. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018; former SAO officer 

responsible for weapons and ammunition, 

October 31, 2018. 

579. CSTC-A/SAO response to SIGAR data call, 

December 2018. 

580. Former SAO officer responsible for weapons and 

ammunition, SIGAR interview, October 31, 2018; 

former SAO officer responsible for weapons and 

ammunition, SIGAR interview, November 6, 2018. 

581. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 5-5.

582. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018.

583. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 5-5.

584. DSCA response to SIGAR data call, December 

2018.

585. OSD, AT&L, “Developing a Demand-Based Supply 

and Life Cycle Management Process for the 

Afghan National Security Forces,” November 

2014, p. 22.

586. OSD, AT&L, “Developing a Demand-Based Supply 

and Life Cycle Management Process for the 

Afghan National Security Forces,” November 

2014, p. 22.

587. SIGAR, Afghan Mobile Strike Force Vehicles: 

Contractor Met Requirements, but Long-Term 

Operation and Maintenance Remain a Concern, 

SIGAR-14-85-AR, July 2014, pp. 6–7. 

588. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, June 2015, p. 35.

589. AFP, “Mounting death tool for Afghan troops: US 

general,” November 5, 2014; Kenneth McKenzie 

Jr., “Hearing to Consider the Nominations of: 

LTG Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., to be General and 

Commander, U.S. Central Command; and LTG 

Richard D. Clarke to be General and Commander, 

U.S. Special Operations Command,” testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats 

and Capabilities, Committee on Armed Services, 

United States Senate, December 4, 2018. 

590. Thomas Gibbons-Neff, “Afghan War Data, Once 

Public, Is Censored in U.S. Military Report,” New 

York Times, October 30, 2017. 

591. Rod Nordland and Fahim Abed, “Afghan Military 

Deaths since 2015: More Than 28,000,” New York 

Times, November 15, 2018. 

592. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, April 30, 2019, p. 83; SIGAR analysis of 

data provided by DSCA. 

593. U.S. Army, Product Director Armored Security 

Vehicle, “MSFV Ambulance Variant Overview,” 

April 17, 2012, slide 7.

594. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, AT&L, 

“Ministry of Defense Request for MRAPs and 

Other Equipment,” attachment to Senator Roger 

Wicker’s September 13, 2017, letter to Secretary 

of Defense James Mattis. 

595. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, AT&L, 

“Ministry of Defense Request for MRAPs and 

Other Equipment,” attachment to Senator Roger 

Wicker’s September 13, 2017, letter to Secretary 

of Defense James Mattis.

596. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, AT&L, 

“Ministry of Defense Request for MRAPs and 

Other Equipment,” attachment to Senator Roger 

Wicker’s September 13, 2017, letter to Secretary 

of Defense James Mattis. 

597. Government of Afghanistan, MOD, AT&L, 

“Ministry of Defense Request for MRAPs and 

Other Equipment,” attachment to Senator Roger 

Wicker’s September 13, 2017, letter to Secretary 

of Defense James Mattis; OSD-Policy and MRAP 

Log Support Group email correspondence 

provided to SIGAR, September 15–18, 2017; 

NDAA for FY 2017, Public Law No. 114-328, 

§1253. 

598. OSD-Policy and MRAP Log Support Group email 

correspondence provided to SIGAR, September 

15–18, 2017.

599. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. AB-19. 

600. GAO, Afghanistan Security: U.S.-Funded 

Equipment for the Afghan National Defense and 

Security Forces, GAO-17-667R, August 10, 2017, 

pp. 11–14.

601. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018; former senior DOD 

official, SIGAR interview, July 2018.

602. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018.

603. Former senior DOD official, SIGAR interview, 

July 2018. 

604. DOD OIG, DOD Needs to Improve Accountability 

and Identify Costs and Requirements 

for Non-Standard Rotary Wing Aircraft, 

DODIG-2012-036, January 5, 2012, p. 4.

605. DOD officials, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019.

606. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan Defense 

and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. 

Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-LL, 

September 2017, p. 66.

607. CRS, U.S. Security Assistance and Security 

Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding 

Trends, R45091, February 1, 2018, p. 14.

608. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Management 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 179

of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund,” 

memorandum for Secretary of Army, November 

12, 2009.

609. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Management 

of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund,” 

memorandum for Secretary of Army, November 

12, 2009.

610. Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Management 

of the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund,” 

memorandum for Secretary of Army, November 

12, 2009.

611. Jack Kem, “Lessons from Afghanistan,” in 

Effective, Legitimate, Secure: Insights for 

Defense Institution Building, eds. Alexandra 

Kerr and Michael Miklaucic (Washington, DC: 

National Defense University Press, 2017), 

pp. 313–314.

612. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018. 

613. Former SAO officer responsible for ground 

vehicles, SIGAR interview, June 11, 2018. 

614. SIGAR meeting with U.S. Air Force officials, 

November 2018.

615. Retired officer and former DOD official, SIGAR 

interview, December 18, 2018. 

616. Former USASAC official, SIGAR interview, 

November 5, 2018.

617. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, March 2019; 

DOD officials, correspondence with SIGAR, April 

2019. 

618. DOD Appropriations Bill for FY 2019, June 28, 

2018, S. Rep. 115-290, p. 242. 

619. Thomas Ross Jr., “Defining the Discipline in 

Theory and Practice,” in Effective, Legitimate, 

Secure: Insights for Defense Institution 

Building, eds. Alexandra Kerr and Michael 

Miklaucic (Washington, DC: National Defense 

University Press, 2017), p. 29.

620. Thomas Ross Jr., “Enhancing Security 

Cooperation Effectiveness: A Model for 

Capability Package Planning,” Joint Force 

Quarterly, vol. 80, 1st quarter, January 2016, 

p. 26.

621. DOD official, SIGAR interview, August 2018; 

SIGAR, Afghan National Defense and Security 

Forces: DOD Needs to Improve Management and 

Oversight of Uniforms and Equipment, SIGAR17-40-AR, April 2017, p. 7.

622. The CDD is the directorate within CSTC-A 

responsible for helping the Afghans develop and 

manage their force structure. Former director of 

CSTC-A’s Capabilities Development Directorate, 

SIGAR interview, August 2018. 

623. Former director of CSTC-A’s Capabilities 

Development Directorate, SIGAR interview, 

August 2018; former director of CSTCA’s Capabilities Development Directorate, 

correspondence with SIGAR, March 22, 2019.

624. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016. This does not include 

ANDSF members enrolled in what is considered 

unknown or various training locations. DOD and 

State, Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal 

Years 2002–2003: Foreign Policy Objectives—

South Asia Region, May 2003, p. 2; DOD and 

State, Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal 

Years 2003–2004: Foreign Policy Objectives—

South Asia Region, June 2004, p. 2.

625. CRS, International Military Training and 

Education Program, RS20506, October 28, 

2004, p. 1; Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. 

Lambert, “Low Cost, High Returns,” Joint Forces 

Quarterly, vol. 75, no. 4, (2014), pp. 71–72.

626. CRS, U.S. Security Assistance and Security 

Cooperation Programs: Overview of Funding 

Trends, R45091, February 1, 2018, pp. 1–2, 16–17

627. SIGAR analysis of DOD and State Foreign 

Military Training Reports, vol. 1, sec. 4, 

“Country Training Activities,” 2003–2016.

628. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016. Many Afghan trainees 

attended multiple courses, but the data does 

not account for this and may overestimate the 

number of students trained.

629. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016.

630. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016.

631. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016.

632. 22 U.S.C. § 2416. U.S. Code contains those laws in 

effect on January 16, 2019.

633. CRS, International Military Training and 

Education Program, RS20506, October 28, 2004, 

p. 1.

634. International Security Assistance and Arms 

Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-

329 (1976), p. 5.

635. DSCA, “C10—International Training,” in Security 

Assistance Management Manual, April 2012.

636. International Security Assistance and Arms 

Export Control Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-

329 (1976), p. 5.

637. Ira C. Queen, “The Value of Security Cooperation” 

The DISAM Journal, 2006. pp. 8, 10–11; DOD and 

State, Foreign Military Training Report Fiscal 

Years 1999–2000: Volume I, DOS Foreign Policy 

Objectives—South Asia Region, March 1, 2000, 

pp. 20–21.

638. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 37th ed., May 2017, p. 14-1; DOD 

and State, Foreign Military Training Report 

Fiscal Years 2003–2004: Volume I, DOS Foreign 

Policy Objectives—South Asia Region, June 

2004, p. 2.

639. DOD and State, Foreign Military Training 

Report Fiscal Years 2016-2017: Volume I, April 

24, 2017, pp. II–1.

640. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016.

641. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 37th ed., May 2017, p. 14-3.

642. DSCA, “C10—International Training,” Security 

Assistance Management Manual, April 2012.

643. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 37th ed., May 2017, p. 14-2; DSCA, 

“C2—Security Cooperation Organization (SCO) 

and Case Manager Responsibilities; Security 
180 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Assistance Planning and Survey Teams,” in 

Security Assistance Management Manual, April 

2012; CRS, International Military Training and 

Education Program, RS20506, October 28, 2004, 

pp. 2–3.

644. Lead IG for Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Quarterly Report 

and Biannual Report to the United States 

Congress, September 30, 2015, pp. 40–41.

645. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, pp. 12–13.

646. NDAA for FY 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-447, 10 U.S.C. 

§ 1513 (2008).

647. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Justification 

for FY 2012 Overseas Contingency Operations 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), 

February 2010, p. 26; Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Justification for FY 2014 Overseas 

Contingency Operations Afghanistan Security 

Forces Fund (ASFF), May 2013, pp. 24–25.

648. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Justification 

for FY 2014 Overseas Contingency Operations 

Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (ASFF), May 

2013, p. 64.

649. Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Army for Defense Exports & Cooperation (DASA 

DE&C) and OSD-Policy email correspondence 

provided to SIGAR, April 5, 2016.

650. DOD and State, Foreign Military Training 

Report Fiscal Years 2016–2017 Volume I, April 

24, 2017, section 4.

651. SIGAR analysis of Foreign Military Training 

Reports from 2003–2016; CRS, International 

Military Training and Education Program, 

RS20506, October 28, 2004, p. 2.

652. NATO Air Training Command, The Afghan Air 

Force Master Plan: Our Story 2013–2017, May 

13, 2014, p. 21.

653. U.S. Army, Security Assistance, Training, and 

Export Policy, AR 12-1, February 22, 2016, p. 14.

654. DLIELC officials, SIGAR interview, December 13, 

2018.

655. U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force, Joint 

Security Cooperation Education and Training, 

January 3, 2011, p. 27; Security Assistance 

Office – Afghanistan, Combined Education and 

Training Program Plan for Afghanistan Budget 

Year 2018, December 6, 2016, p. 5.

656. U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force, Joint 

Security Cooperation Education and Training, 

January 3, 2011, p. 27.

657. Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan, 

Combined Education and Training Program 

Plan for Afghanistan Budget Year 2018, 

December 6, 2016, p. 5; DSCA, “C2—Security 

Cooperation Organization (SCO) and Case 

Manager Responsibilities; Security Assistance 

Planning and Survey Teams,” in Security 

Assistance Management Manual, April 2012.

658. DSCA, “C2—Security Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) and Case Manager 

Responsibilities; Security Assistance Planning 

and Survey Teams,” in Security Assistance 

Management Manual, April 2012.

659. U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Air Force, Joint 

Security Cooperation Education and Training, 

January 3, 2011, p. 27.

660. DSCA, “C2—Security Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) and Case Manager 

Responsibilities; Security Assistance Planning 

and Survey Teams,” Security Assistance 

Management Manual, April 2012.

661. Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan, 

Combined Education and Training Program 

Plan for Afghanistan Budget Year 2018, 

December 6, 2016, pp. 4–5.

662. DSCA, “C2—Security Cooperation 

Organization (SCO) and Case Manager 

Responsibilities; Security Assistance Planning 

and Survey Teams,” Security Assistance 

Management Manual, April 2012.

663. CSTC-A response to SIGAR November 1, 2018 

data call.

664. RAND Corporation, Optimizing the Defense 

Language Institute English Language Center, 

2012, p. 1.

665. RAND Corporation, Optimizing the Defense 

Language Institute English Language Center, 

2012, p. 6.

666. NATO Air Training Command, The Afghan Air 

Force Master Plan: Our Story 2013–2017, May 

13, 2014, p. 24.

667. Forrest L. Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), p. 72.

668. Forrest L. Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), p. 65.

669. John Smith, “Afghans to receive first C-130 

aircraft from US Air Force,” Stars and Stripes, 

September 18, 2013; Rahim Faiez, “Afghans soon 

to fly missions with Black Hawks from US,” 

Military Times, March 26, 2018.

670. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 60.

671. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DOD OIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 25.

672. SATFA officials, SIGAR interview, November 28, 

2018.

673. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DOD OIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 25.

674. U.S. Air Force, “Report on Afghan A-29 Training,” 

S. Rep. 113-211, December 2014, p. 6.

675. U.S. Air Force, “Report on Afghan A-29 Training,” 

S. Rep. 113-211, December 2014, p. 6.

676. AETC brief to SIGAR, A-29 Training Program 

Update, February 12, 2015, p. 5.

677. AETC brief to SIGAR, A-29 Training Program 

Update, February 12, 2015, p. 4.

678. AETC brief to SIGAR, A-29 Training Program 

Update, February 12, 2015, p. 5; U.S. Air Force, 

“Report on Afghan A-29 Training,” S. Rep.113-211, 

December 2014, p. 14.

679. SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 181

Congress, January 30, 2018, p. 108.

680. SIGAR correspondence with the Secretary of the 

Air Force for International Affairs, April 18, 2019.

681. AETC brief to SIGAR, A-29 Training Program 

Update, February 12, 2015, p. 10; David Smith, 

“Colorado Stands In for Afghanistan During Pilot 

Training,” U.S. Air Force Public Affairs, August 

31, 2016.

682. Secretary of the Air Force for International 

Affairs, correspondence with SIGAR, April 19, 

2019.

683. U.S. House of Representatives, letter to Secretary 

of Defense Leon Panetta concerning DOD 

purchase of 10 additional Mi-17 helicopters, July 

10, 2012.

684. Operation Freedom Sentinel, Report to the 

United States Congress, June 30, 2018, p. 40; 

SIGAR, Quarterly Report to the United States 

Congress, January 30, 2018, p. 106.

685. Lead IG for Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Report to the 

United States Congress, January 1–March 31, 

2018, p. 40.

686. Afghan MOD, “Policy for International Training 

and Education,” 1394, p. 1.

687. Afghan trainees at DLIELC, SIGAR interview, 

January 4, 2017; CSTC-A officials, SIGAR 

interview, October 24, 2016; Security Assistance 

Office – Afghanistan, Combined Education and 

Training Program Plan for Afghanistan Budget 

Year 2018, December 6, 2016, p. 3.

688. Afghan MOD, “Policy for International Training 

and Education,” 1394, p. 10.

689. Afghan MOD, “Policy for International Training 

and Education,” 1394, p. 10.

690. Afghan MOD, “Policy for International Training 

and Education,” 1394, p. 11.

691. Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan, 

Combined Education and Training Program 

Plan for Afghanistan Budget Year 2018, p. 3.

692. DOD and State, Foreign Military Training 

Report Fiscal Years 2017–2018 Joint Report to 

Congress Volume II, November 27, 2017, section 

1, part 4, p. 3; DOD, Enhancing Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, December 2018, p. 80.

693. SATFA officials, SIGAR interview, November 28, 

2018.

694. SIGAR, Afghan Air Force: DOD Met the Initial 

Date for Fielding UH-60 Helicopters, but the 

Program Is at Risk of Not Having Enough 

Trained Pilots or the Capability to Maintain 

Future UH-60s, SIGAR-19-18-AR, January 2019.

695. SIGAR, Concerns Regarding the Requirement 

for and Utilization of C-130 Aircraft for the 

Afghan Air Force, SIGAR-14-80-AL, July 10, 2014, 

p. 3; SIGAR, Scrapping of the G222 Fleet Inquiry 

Letter, SIGAR-15-02-SP, October 3, 2014, p. 1.

696. SIGAR, Concerns Regarding the Requirement for 

and Utilization of C-130 Aircraft for the Afghan 

Air Force, SIGAR-14-80-AL, July 10, 2014, p. 1.

697. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 55.

698. NATO Air Training Command, The Afghan Air 

Force Master Plan: Our Story 2013–2017, May 

13, 2014, pp. 15, 46.

699. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2015, p. 55.

700. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2016, p. 54.

701. Lead IG for Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Report to the 

United States Congress, January 1–March 31, 

2018, p. 38.

702. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DOD OIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 18; 

Secretary of the Air Force for International 

Affairs, correspondence with SIGAR, April 19, 

2019.

703. DOD, “DOD Directive 5030.61—DOD 

Airworthiness Policy,” May 24, 2013, pp. 1, 10.

704. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DOD OIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 18.

705. DOD OIG, Progress of U.S. and Coalition Efforts 

to Train, Advise, and Assist the Afghan Air 

Force, DOD OIG-2018-058, January 4, 2018, p. 19.

706. Lead IG for Overseas Contingency Operations, 

Operation Freedom’s Sentinel: Report to the 

United States Congress, January 1–March 31, 

2018, p. 38.

707. DOD and State, Study on the Effectiveness of the 

IMET Program: 2007–2009, 2009, p. 2.

708. GAO, IMET Agencies should emphasize human 

rights training and improve evaluations, GAO12-123, October 27, 2011, p. 16.

709. GAO, IMET Agencies should emphasize human 

rights training and improve evaluations, GAO12-123, October 27, 2011, p. 17.

710. GAO, IMET Agencies should emphasize human 

rights training and improve evaluations, GAO12-123, October 27, 2011, p. 23.

711. GAO, IMET Agencies should emphasize human 

rights training and improve evaluations, GAO12-123, October 27, 2011, p. 23.

712. Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. Lambert, “Low 

Cost, High Returns,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 

vol. 75, no. 4 (2014), pp. 73–74; DSCA, “C10—

International Training,” in Security Assistance 

Management Manual, April 2012.

713. DSCA, “C10—International Training,” in Security 

Assistance Management Manual, April 2012; 

JCISFA, correspondence with SIGAR, April 10, 

2019.

714. DISCS, SC-TMS 9 Quick Reference Guide for 

SCOs, May 20, 2016, pp. 4, 6, 8, 10, 11; DSCA 

official, SIGAR interview, November 20, 2018.

715. NDU officials, SIGAR interview, August 1, 2018; 

Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. Lambert, “Low 

Cost, High Returns,” Joint Forces Quarterly, vol. 

75, no. 4 (2014), pp. 73–74.

716. GAO, IMET Agencies should emphasize human 

rights training and improve evaluations, GAO12-123, October 27, 2011, p. 18.

717. Security Assistance Office – Afghanistan, 

Combined Education and Training Program 

Plan for Afghanistan Budget Year 2018, 

December 6, 2016, pp. 14–15.
182 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

718. GAO, IMET Agencies should emphasize human 

rights training and improve evaluations, GAO12-123, October 27, 2011, p. 18; DSCA official, 

SIGAR interview, November 20, 2018.

719. Russell S. Thacker and Paul W. Lambert, “Low 

Cost, High Returns,” Joint Forces Quarterly, vol. 

75, no. 4 (2014), p. 74.

720. CALL, Ministerial Advisors: Combined Security 

Transition Command Afghanistan (CSTC-A), 

August 1, 2017, p. 21.

721. SIGAR, U.S.-Based Training For Afghanistan 

Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent 

Without Leave Hurt Readiness And Morale, And 

May Create Security Risks, SIGAR-18-03-SP, 

October 19, 2017, pp. 3, 5–7.

722. SIGAR, U.S.-Based Training for Afghanistan 

Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent 

without Leave Hurt Readiness and Morale, 

And May Create Security Risks, SIGAR-18-

03-SP, October 19, 2017, pp. 4, 11, 16; Security 

Assistance Office – Afghanistan, Combined 

Education and Training Program Plan for 

Afghanistan Budget Year 2018, December 6, 

2016, p. 4.

723. DLIELC officials, SIGAR interview, December 13, 

2018.

724. SIGAR, U.S.-Based Training For Afghanistan 

Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent 

Without Leave Hurt Readiness And Morale, And 

May Create Security Risks, SIGAR-18-03-SP, 

October 19, 2017, pp. 8, 11.

725. Richard G. Kaiser, CSTC-A Commander, letter to 

General Qadam Sha, MOD Chief of Staff, October 

3, 2016.

726. SIGAR, U.S.-Based Training For Afghanistan 

Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent 

Without Leave Hurt Readiness And Morale, And 

May Create Security Risks, SIGAR-18-03-SP, 

October 19, 2017, pp. 3, 11.

727. SIGAR, U.S.-Based Training For Afghanistan 

Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent 

Without Leave Hurt Readiness And Morale, 

And May Create Security Risks, SIGAR-18-03-

SP, October 19, 2017, p. 10; Richard G. Kaiser, 

CSTC-A Commander, letter to General Qadam 

Sha, MOD Chief of Staff, October 3, 2016.

728. SIGAR, U.S.-Based Training For Afghanistan 

Security Personnel: Trainees Who Go Absent 

Without Leave Hurt Readiness And Morale, And 

May Create Security Risks, SIGAR-18-03-SP, 

October 19, 2017, pp. 10–11.

729. U.S. Air Force, “Report on Afghan A-29 Training,” 

S. Rep. 113-211, December 2014, p. 7; SIGAR site 

visit to Moody Air Force Base, GA, November 

15, 2016; Brian Everstine, “Building Momentum 

in Afghanistan,” Air Force Magazine, September 

2017.

730. Sonic Johnson, “81st FS reactivates, prepares 

for Afghan training mission,” U.S. Air Combat 

Command, January 15, 2015.

731. SIGAR site visit to Moody Air Force Base, GA, 

November 15, 2016.

732. Erick Requadt, “Moody A-29s support Afghan 

mission,” Valdosta Daily Times, May 1, 2018.

733. SIGAR site visit to Moody Air Force Base, GA, 

November 15, 2016.

734. Jason Smith, “A-29s arrive at Kabul in time for 

fighting season,” U.S. Air Force, March 20, 2017.

735. U.S. Air Force Headquarters, “A-29 Flying 

Training Unit (FTU): Preferred and Reasonable 

Alternative (P&RA), February 12, 2015, slides 

6–7; Secretary of the Air Force for International 

Affairs, correspondence with SIGAR, April 19, 

2019.

736. U.S. Air Force Headquarters, “A-29 Flying 

Training Unit (FTU): Preferred and Reasonable 

Alternative (P&RA), February 12, 2015, slide 4; 

Moody Air Force Base Public Affairs, “Moody 

AFB to support Afghan pilot, maintainer training 

mission,” U.S. Air Force, August 22, 2014.

737. Dave Smith, “Colorado stands in for Afghanistan 

during pilot training,” U.S. Air Combat Command, 

August 31, 2016.

738. U.S. Air Force Headquarters, “A-29 Flying 

Training Unit (FTU): Preferred and Reasonable 

Alternative (P&RA), February 12, 2015, slide 7.

739. Franz-Stefan Gady, “U.S. Extends A-29 Light 

Attack Aircraft Procurement Contract for 

Afghanistan,” Diplomat, September 6, 2018; 

Sonic Johnson, “81st FS reactivates, prepares 

for Afghan training mission,” U.S. Air Combat 

Command, January 15, 2015.

740. DOD, Enhancing Security and Stability in 

Afghanistan, December 2018, pp. 38, 56.

741. Michael A. Keltz, “Getting Our Partners Airborne: 

Training Air Advisors and Their Impact InTheater,” Air & Space Power Journal, May–

June 2014, p. 19; Secretary of the Air Force 

for International Affairs, correspondence with 

SIGAR, April 19, 2019.

742. NATO, “Collective defence—Article 5,” last 

updated June 12, 2018. 

743. NATO, “Collective defence—Article 5,” last 

updated June 12, 2018; NATO, “The Alliance’s 

Strategic Concept,” press release, April 24, 1999.

744. DOD, “Deputy Secretary Wolfowitz Press 

Conference in Brussels,” transcript, September 

27, 2001.

745. Richard Rupp, NATO After 9/11: An Alliance in 

Continuing Decline (New York, NY: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2006), p. 101; Ian Hope, Unity 

of Command in Afghanistan: A Forsaken 

Principle of War, Strategic Studies Institute, 

November 2008, p. 12.

746. SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan National 

Defense and Security Forces: Lessons from the 

U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-

LL, September 2017, pp. 69–70, 76. 

747. United Nations Security Council, UN Resolution 

1386, December 20, 2001, pp. 1–2. 

748. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy 

and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 

1950 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 2017), p. 171.

749. B. K. Greener and W. J. Fish, Internal Security 

and Statebuilding: Aligning Agencies and 

Functions (New York, NY: Routledge, 2015), 

p. 58; Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan’s Bonn 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 183

Agreement One Year Later: A Catalog of Missed 

Opportunities,” December 5, 2002; Seth Jones, 

In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War 

in Afghanistan, (New York, NY: W.W. Norton & 

Company, 2009), p. 112.

750. White House, Progress Report on the Global 

War on Terrorism, September 2003, p. 5; Tucker 

B. Mansager, interview by J. Patrick Hughes in 

Enduring Voices: Oral Histories of the U.S. 

Army Experience in Afghanistan, 2003–2005, 

ed. Christopher N. Koontz, U.S. Army Center of 

Military History, October 30, 2008, pp. 159, 176.

751. NATO, “ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001–

2014) (Archived),” last updated September 1, 

2015. 

752. NATO, “ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan (2001–

2014) (Archived),” last updated September 1, 

2015; ISAF, “Regional Command Structure” last 

updated October 22, 2009.

753. NATO, “NATO takes on new missions,” last 

updated on June 4, 2003; NATO, “NATO After 

Istanbul: Expanding Operations, Improving 

Capabilities, Enhancing Cooperation,” 

2004; NATO, “Riga: NATO boosts efforts in 

Afghanistan,” last updated December 8, 2006; 

CRS, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the 

Transatlantic Alliance, RL33627, December 

3, 2009, p. 11; NATO, “Summit Declaration on 

Afghanistan,” April 4, 2009; NATO, “Lisbon 

Summit Declaration,” press release, November 

20, 2010; NATO, “Chicago Summit Declaration,” 

press release, last updated May 20, 2012; NATO, 

“Wales Summit Declaration on Afghanistan,” 

press release, September 4, 2014; NATO, “Warsaw 

Summit Key Decisions,” fact sheet, February 

2017; NATO, “Brussels Summit Key Decisions 

11–12 July 2018,” fact sheet, November 2018.

754. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy 

and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 

1950, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University 

Press, 2017), p. 171.

755. Richard E. Rupp, NATO After 9/11: An Alliance 

in Continuing Decline (New York, NY: Palgrave 

Macmillan, 2006), p. 162.

756. M. J. Williams, “In the Line of Fire: NATO-NGO 

Relations from Bosnia to Afghanistan,” in NATO’s 

Post-Cold War Politics: The Changing Provision 

of Security, ed. Sebastian Mayer (New York, NY: 

Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 241.

757. USAID/Afghanistan, “Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams,” January 2006; USAID/Afghanistan, 

“PRTs: Toward Unity of Effort,” Andrew Natsios 

Papers, Georgetown University Library, June 

2005, p. 2.

758. USAID/Afghanistan, “PRTs: Toward Unity of 

Effort,” June 2005, p. 2; USAID, Lessons Learned: 

USAID Perspectives on the Experience with 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in 

Afghanistan, June 2013, p. 7; Robert Perito, The 

U.S. Experience with Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams in Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, USIP, 

October 2005.

759. USAID/Afghanistan, “PRTs: Toward Unity of 

Effort,” June 2005, p. 2; Donald P. Wright, A 

Different Kind of War: The United States Army 

in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), October 

2001–September 2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: 

Combat Studies Institute Press, 2010), p. 256.

760. Seth A. Johnston, How NATO Adapts: Strategy 

and Organization in the Atlantic Alliance 

since 1950, (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 

University Press, 2017), p. 172; Save the 

Children, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams and 

Humanitarian-Military Relations in Afghanistan,” 

2004, pp. 21–22.

761. USAID/Afghanistan, “Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams,” January 2006, p. 1; USAID, “Afghanistan: 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams,” fact sheet, 

January 27, 2006. 

762. Robert Perito, The U.S. Experience with 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 

Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, USIP, October 

2005; USAID, Lessons Learned: USAID 

Perspectives on the Experience with Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, 

June 2013, pp. 1, 12, 18.

763. USAID, Lessons Learned: USAID Perspectives on 

the Experience with Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRTs) in Afghanistan, June 2013, 

pp. 1, 12, 18; Department of States’ Office of the 

Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction, 

Joint Center for Operational Analysis/United 

States Joint Forces Command, and United 

States for International Development’s Bureau 

of Policy and Program Coordination, Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan: An 

Interagency Assessment, April 5, 2006, p. 21; 

Ronald E. Neumann, The Other War: Winning 

and Losing in Afghanistan, 1st ed. (Dulles, VA: 

Potomac Books, 2009), p. 146.

764. Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The 

United States Army in Operation Enduring 

Freedom (OEF), October 2001–September 

2005 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies 

Institute Press, 2010), pp. 256–257.

765. Donald P. Wright, A Different Kind of War: The 

United States Army in Operation Enduring 

Freedom, October 2001–September 2005 (Fort 

Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 

2010), p. 256.

766. For more on the work of PRTs in Afghanistan, 

see SIGAR, Stabilization: Lessons from the U.S. 

Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-18-48-LL, 

May 2018.

767. Robert Perito, The U.S. Experience with 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 

Afghanistan: Lessons Identified, USIP, October 

2005.

768. USAID, “Afghanistan: Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams,” fact sheet, January 27, 2006.

769. Diego A. Ruiz Palmer, “The Framework Nations’ 

Concept and NATO: Game-Changer for a New 

Strategic Era or Missed Opportunity?” Research 

Division of the NATO Defense College, no. 132, 

July 2016, pp. 3, 10.

770. NATO, “NATO’s Operational Mentor and Liaison 

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184 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Teams (OMLTs),” fact sheet, October 2009.

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Afghanistan National Security Forces, April 

2009, p. 43; NTM-A, “NATO Training Mission – 

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LL, September 2017, p. 73. 

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DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 185

Headline Publishing Group, 2014), p. 188.

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Works,” Croatian International Relations 

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817. Loren Traugutt, “Is Consensus Still Necessary 

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818. Leo Michel, “NATO Decisionmaking: How the 

‘Consensus Rule’ Works,” Croatian International 

Relations Review, June 2006, pp. 9, 12–13.

819. Stephen M. Saideman, Adapting in the Dust: 

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2005, p. 17.

822. RUSI, Reforming NATO Force Generation: 

Progress, Problems, and Outstanding 

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Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), p. 37.

823. RUSI, Reforming NATO Force Generation: 

Progress, Problems, and Outstanding 

Challenges, October 2005, p. 17.

824. Christian Tuschhoff, “The Impact of NATO’s 

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Member States,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War 

Politics: The Changing Provision of Security, 

ed. Sebastian Mayer, 2014, p. 200; Supreme 

Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, “An 

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825. Steve Sturm, “Matching capabilities to 

commitments,” NATO Review, n.d.; R.J. Bérubé, 

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the Ability to Generate Special Operations Forces 

for Future NATO Operations,” Canadian Forces 

College, JSCP 37, 2010-2011, pp. 69–70.

826. Steve Sturm, “Matching capabilities to 

commitments,” NATO Review, n.d. 

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pp. 69–70.

828. David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO 

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Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2014), p. 37.

829. David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO 

in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting 

Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2014), p. 38.

830. David M. Toczek, “Knowing the Rules: Planning 

Considerations for NATO Operations,” Military 

Review, January–February 2006, pp. 60–61; 

Christian Tuschhoff, “The Impact of NATO’s 

Defence Planning and Force Generation on 

Member States,” in NATO’s Post-Cold War 

Politics: The Changing Provision of Security, 

ed. Sebastian Mayer, 2014, p. 201

831. CRS, NATO in Afghanistan: A Test of the 

Transatlantic Alliance, RL33627, August 25, 

2009, p. 19; Ian Hope, Unity of Command in 

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Strategic Studies Institute, November 2008, p. 12.

832. SIGAR meeting with DOD officials, November 

2018.

833. State, response to SIGAR data call, November 

2018.

834. Christian Tuschhoff, “The Impact of NATO’s 

Defence Planning and Force Generation on 

Member States,” NATO’s Post-Cold War Politics: 

The Changing Provision of Security, ed. 

Sebastian Mayer, 2014, pp. 203–204.

835. Johnathon Saltasuk, “NATO and the Afghanistan 

Mission: Lessons for the Alliance,” master’s 

thesis submitted to the graduate faculty at the 

University of Manitoba, 2012, p. 47.

836. DOD, Report on Progress toward Security and 

Stability in Afghanistan, November 2010, p. 15. 

837. Combat Studies Institute, “Interview with LTC 

Todd Guggisberg,” July 17, 2006, pp. 9–10.

838. Stephen M. Saideman, Adapting in the Dust: 

Lessons Learned from Canada’s War in 

Afghanistan (Toronto, Canada: University of 

Toronto Press, 2016), p. 23; David Auerswald 

and Stephen Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: 

Fighting Together, Fighting Alone (Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014), pp. 146–

149.

839. David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO 

in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting 

Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 2014), p. 147; Alexander Mattelaer, “How 

Afghanistan has Strengthened NATO,” Survival, 

vol. 53, no. 6, December 2011–January 2012, 
186 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

p. 133.

840. David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO 

in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting 

Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2014), p. 128.

841. David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO 

in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting 

Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2014), p. 219.

842. David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO 

in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting 

Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 

2014), p. 3.

843. RAND Corporation, Security Force Assistance 

in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future 

Efforts, 2011, p. 81.

844. Donald Rumsfeld, “Funds to help transform 

NATO,” memorandum to Stephen Hadley, August 

12, 2005.

845. Donald Rumsfeld, “Afghan Elections,” 

memorandum to General Dick Myers et al., 

Rumsfeld Papers, March 8, 2005.

846. CALL, “Interview of LTG Benjamin J. Freakley, 

Deputy TRADOC CDR, US Army Accessions 

Command,” February 26, 2007, p. 7.

847. Bob Prillaman, former senior advisor to the MOD 

at NTM-A, SIGAR interview, June 19, 2018.

848. Former commanding general of CSTC-A/NTM-A, 

SIGAR interview, June 1, 2018.

849. Center of Military History, Enduring Voices: 

Oral Histories of the U.S. Army Experience in 

Afghanistan, 2003–2005, 2008, p. 27.

850. Security Assistance Monitor, “Coalition Support 

Funds,” n.d.

851. DOD, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 

February 6, 2006, p. 17; NDAA for FY 2006, Pub. 

L. No. 109–163, §1208, January 6, 2006.

852. Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), “Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget, Security 

Cooperation Consolidated Budget Display,” 

February 2018, p. 18.

853. OSD, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget, 

Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget 

Display,” February 2018, p. 18.

854. OSD, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: 

Security Cooperation Consolidated Budget 

Display,” February 2018, p. 19; OSD, “DSCA: 

Operation Enduring Freedom/Operation New 

Day: Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide: 

Budget Activity 04, Administrative and ServiceWide Activities,” 2019.

855. OSD, “DSCA: Operation Enduring Freedom/

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Defense-Wide: Budget Activity 04, Administrative 

and Service-Wide Activities,” 2013.

856. OSD, “Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 President’s Budget: 

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Display,” February 2018, p. 19.

857. National Guard, “State Partnership Program,” 

accessed March 19, 2019.

858. Jim Greenhill, “Hungarian describes deployment 

with national guard,” DVIDS News, September 

15, 2010.

859. Darron Salzer, “Minnesota Guard, Croatia train 

for Afghanistan deployment,” June 3, 2010; Robin 

Brown, “Tennessee and Bulgaria: 22 years of 

partnership,” DVIDS News, July 15, 2015; Wayne 

Woolley, “New Jersey-Albanian Partnership Yields 

Combat-Ready Training Team,” Guardlife, vol. 35, 

no. 3, accessed March 19, 2019; Michael Piellusch, 

“Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams,” Army, 

August 26, 2009.

860. Jim Greenhill, “Hungarian describes deployment 

with national guard,” DVIDS News, September 

15, 2010.

861. Former director for international security 

cooperation at NTM-A, SIGAR interview, June 14, 

2018. 

862. Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), p. 56.

863. Forrest Marion, Flight Risk: The Coalition’s 

Air Advisory Mission in Afghanistan, 2005–

2015, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 

2018), pp. 56–57.

864. Former director for international security 

cooperation at NTM-A, SIGAR interview, June 14, 

2018.

865. Former commanding general NTM-A/CSTC-A, 

SIGAR interview, June 1, 2018.

866. Former deputy commander for programs at 

CSTC-A, SIGAR interview, December 12, 2018.

867. SIGAR site visit to CSTC-A, January 2019.

868. SIGAR, visit to Vicenza and Rome, Italy, 

September 9–15, 2018.

869. ISAF, “International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF): Key Facts and Figures,” August 6, 

2010; David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, 

NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, 

Fighting Alone (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 2014), pp. 111–112.

870. Former SFAAT members, SIGAR interviews, July 

10, 2018, and August 8, 2018.

871. Hans Binnendijk and Elisabeth Braw, “For NATO, 

True Interoperability is No Longer Optional,” 

Defense One, December 18, 2017.

872. Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy Kalinovsky, 

Missionaries of Modernity: Advisory Missions 

and the Struggle for Hegemony in Afghanistan 

and Beyond (London, UK: C. Hurst & Co., 2016), 

p. 273; SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons 

from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 

SIGAR-17-62-LL, September 2017, pp. 17–18.

873. Antonio Giustozzi and Artemy Kalinovsky, 

Missionaries of Modernity: Advisory Missions 

and the Struggle for Hegemony in Afghanistan 

and Beyond (London, UK: C. Hurst & Co., 2016), 

p. 273; SIGAR, Reconstructing the Afghan 

National Defense and Security Forces: Lessons 

from the U.S. Experience in Afghanistan, 

SIGAR-17-62-LL, September 2017, pp. 17–18.

874. U.S. Digital Service, “Advisor Network,” n.d.

875. Barry Rosenberg, “Battlefield network connects 

allied forces in Afghanistan,” Defense Systems, 

September 14, 2010; RAND Corporation, Lessons 

Learned from the Afghan Mission Network: 
DIVIDED RESPONSIBILITY

JUNE 2019 | 187

Developing a Coalition Contingency Network, 

2014, p. xi. 

876. 1st SFAB After-Action Review, Fort Benning, GA, 

February 2019. 

877. U.S. Digital Service, “Advisor Network (ANET),” 

July 2017.

878. Issie Lapowsky, “Meet the Nerds Coding Their 

Way through the Afghanistan War,” WIRED, May 

27, 2017.

879. U.S. Digital Service, “Advisor Network (ANET),” 

July 2017.

880. NATO, “Defence Institution Building,” May 9, 

2018.

881. NATO, “Partnership Action Plan on Defense 

Institution Building (PAP-DIB),” June 7, 2004. 

882. NATO, “Building Integrity,” last updated 

September 18, 2018.

883. NATO Multimedia Library, “NATO Centres of 

Excellence,” n.d.

884. NATO Multimedia Library, “NATO Centres of 

Excellence,” n.d. 

885. NATO, “Centres of Excellence,” last updated 

January 24, 2019.

886. NATO, “Centres of Excellence,” last updated 

January 24, 2019.

887. NATO, “Building Integrity,” last updated 

September 18, 2018. 

888. NATO, “Afghanistan to be included in defence 

sector integrity-building initiative,” November 2, 

2010; NATO, Building Integrity Newsletter, vol. 

3, May 2018, p. 5.

889. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Security Force 

Assistance, AJP-3.16, May 2016, pp. VII–IX.

890. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability 

Policing, AJP-3.22, July 2016, p. VII.

891. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability 

Policing, AJP-3.22, July 2016, p. 1-1.

892. NATO, Allied Joint Doctrine for Stability 

Policing, AJP-3.22, July 2016, p. 1-1.

893. SIGAR, meeting with the Italian Carabinieri 

Corps, June 27, 2018; SIGAR site visit to the 

NATO Stability Police COE, September 11, 2018.

894. SIGAR, meeting with the Italian Carabinieri 

Corps, June 27, 2018; SIGAR site visit to the 

NATO Stability Police COE, September 11, 2018.

895. NATO Stability Policing Center of Excellence, 

“Lessons Learned,” n.d.

896. NATO Allied Command Transformation, “New 

Security Force Assistance Centre of Excellence,” 

December 14, 2017.

897. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 4-3.

898. The composition of a country team varies and is 

generally determined based on the Ambassador’s 

management style and the country’s situation. 

DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 4-4.

899. DISCS, The Management of Security 

Cooperation, 38th ed., May 2018, p. 4-4.

900. State, responses to SIGAR data call, November 

30, 2018.

901. CALL, “Ministerial Advisors,” News from the 

Front, August 1, 2017, p. 7.

902. CALL, “Ministerial Advisors,” News from the 

Front, August 1, 2017, p. 10.

903. Thomas Ross Jr., and Philip McDaniel, “Training 

Law Enforcement in Fragile States: The Case for 

a New U.S. Approach,” War on the Rocks, March 

25, 2019; SIGAR site visit to NATO Stability 

Police COE, September 2018; Michiel de Weger, 

“The Potential of the European Gendarmerie 

Force,” Netherlands Institute of International 

Relations Clingendael, March 2009, p. 3; SIGAR, 

Reconstructing the Afghan National Defense 

and Security Forces: Lessons from the U.S. 

Experience in Afghanistan, SIGAR-17-62-LL, 

September 2017, p. 169.

904. European Union, “The EU Police Mission in 

Afghanistan comes to a successful close after 

nine years of progress,” press release, December 

14, 2016; Thierry Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 

2007/16: Mission Impossible?” European Union 

Institute for Security Studies, no. 22 (2017), 

pp. 1–2.

905. Thierry Tardy, “EUPOL Afghanistan 2007/16: 

Mission Impossible?” European Union Institute 

for Security Studies, no. 22 (2017), p. 2.

906. Phillip Wellman, “EU Police mission in 

Afghanistan to end; police more involved in 

fighting than policing,” Stars and Stripes, 

December 29, 2016.

907. SIGAR, meeting with CSTC-A, January 2

908. White House, National Security Strategy, 

December 18, 2017, pp. 2, 38–40; DOD, Summary 

of the National Defense Strategy, 2018, pp. 2, 8–9. 

909. Tolonews, “Special Interview with US Special 

Representative Zalmay Khalilzad,” April 28, 2019. 

910. Joseph Votel, “Hearing to Receive Testimony on 

the United States Central Command in Review of 

the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 

2020 and the Future Years Defense Program,” 

testimony before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, February 5, 2019, pp. 20, 24; Kenneth 

F. McKenzie Jr., “Advance Policy Questions,” 

Senate Armed Services Committee, December 4, 

2018, p. 12.

911. SIGAR site visit to the U.S. Army Military Advisor 

Training Academy, Fort Benning, GA, May 2018; 

SIGAR, Afghan Air Force: DOD Met the Initial 

Date for Fielding UH-60 Helicopters, but the 

Program Is at Risk of Not Having Enough 

Trained Pilots or the Capability to Maintain 

Future UH-60s, SIGAR-19-18, January 2019, 

pp. 5–6, 9.

912. NDAA for FY 2017, Pub. L. No. 114-328, §§1241–

1253 (2016).
188 | APPENDICES AND ENDNOTES

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

SIGAR acknowledges the invaluable contributions to this report from scores  of individuals. 

We thank Melissa Dalton, Senior Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International 

Studies; Nadia Gerspacher, Director of Academic Programs at the Defense Security 

Cooperation Agency; Ronald Neumann, former U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan; Thomas 

Ross Jr., former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Cooperation; and 

Jon Schroden, Director of the Center for Stability and Development at CNA for serving 

as peer reviewers for this report. We would also like to thank the current and former 

senior military officers and civilian defense officials who provided feedback for this 

report but wished to remain unnamed.

In addition, we thank and acknowledge the more than 100 individuals who generously 

gave their time and allowed us to formally interview them or participated in roundtable 

discussions about their experiences in Afghanistan. We appreciate the contributions of 

all those at the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy, Departments 

of Defense, and Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance for valuable 

discussions and facilitating SIGAR visits to U.S. and Afghanistan-based security sector 

assistance locations. We also would like to thank multiple NATO Centers of Excellence 

for hosting SIGAR and providing an overview of key NATO capabilities. 

Research Team

James Cunningham, Supervisory Research Analyst/Project Lead

Brittany Gates, Research Analyst

Samantha Hay, Research Analyst

Zachary Martin, Senior Research Analyst

Ashley Schortz, Research Analyst

Brian Tarpley, Student Trainee

Lessons Learned Program Team

Nikolai Condee-Padunov, Program Manager

Tracy Content, Editor 

Vong Lim, Senior Visual Information Specialist

Joseph Windrem, Director of Lessons Learned Program
The National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008 (P.L. 110-181) 

established the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction (SIGAR).

SIGAR’s oversight mission, as defined by the legislation, is to provide for the 

independent and objective 

• conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs

and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise made available 

for the reconstruction of Afghanistan.

• leadership and coordination of, and recommendations on, policies designed

to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness in the administration of the 

programs and operations, and to prevent and detect waste, fraud, and abuse 

in such programs and operations.

• means of keeping the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense fully

and currently informed about problems and deficiencies relating to the 

administration of such programs and operation and the necessity for and 

progress on corrective action.

Afghanistan reconstruction includes any major contract, grant, agreement, 

or other funding mechanism entered into by any department or agency of the 

U.S. government that involves the use of amounts appropriated or otherwise made 

available for the reconstruction of Afghanistan. 

Source: P.L. 110-181, “National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2008,” 1/28/2008.
SIGAR

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL

FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

2530 Crystal Drive

Arlington, VA 22202

www.sigar.mil

WASTE, FRAUD, OR ABUSE MAY BE REPORTED TO SIGAR’S HOTLINE

By phone: Afghanistan

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All voicemail is in English and answered during business hours.

By fax: 703-601-4065

By email: sigar.hotline@mail.mil

By web submission: www.sigar.mil/investigations/hotline/report-fraud.aspx

SIGAR-19-39-LL