R ESPONDENT P RO S E Patrick H. Stern Indianapolis, Indiana A TTORNEYS FOR THE I NDIANA S UPREME C OURT D ISCIPL I NARY C OMMISSION G. Michael Witte , Executive Secretary John P. Higgins , Staff Attorney Indianapolis, Indiana

______________________________________________________________________________ 

# In the 

# Indiana Supreme Court

_________________________________ No. 49S00

- 1205

- DI

- 255

I N THE M ATTER OF :

P ATRICK H. S TERN , Respondent.

_________________________________ Attorney Discipline Action Hearing Officer Gary L. Miller

_________________________________

July 2 , 20 1 4

Per Curiam.

We find that R e spondent, Patrick H. Stern , engaged in attorney misconduct by failing to provide competent representation, representing clients with conflicting in terests, asserting frivolous legal positions, and engaging in deceptive practices with a court and the Commission

. For this misconduct, we conclude that Respondent should be suspended from the practice of law
in this state for at least 18 months without au tomatic rei n statement.

This matter is before the Court on the report of the hearing officer appointed by this Court to hear evidence on the Indiana Supreme Court Disciplinary Commission's "Verified Complaint for Disciplinary Action," and on the post

- hea ring briefing by the parties. Respondent's2 1987 admission to this state's bar subjects him to this Court's disciplinary jurisdi c tion. See I ND

. C ONST

. art. 7, § 4.

Procedural Background and Facts

The Commission filed its verified complaint against Respon dent on May 9, 2012, which was amended on April 29, 2013. After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing officer filed his Report on February 5, 2014, which we now adopt and summarize.

Persons involved in the events alleged by the Commission . The Commission's allegations of misconduct center primarily on Respondent's actions in several cases involving the condemnation and demolition of a building. The three people primarily involved in these allegations, in addition to Respondent, are the following.  DR, an eld erly woman, was the owner of a commercial building in Indianapolis in poor condition ("the Building"). DR's greatest fear was that the City of Indianapolis was going to impose financial liability on her because of the Building.

 JS, alleged to be DR's com mon law husband, had no ownership interest in the Building.

 JH , a convicted murderer
, began working in Respondent's law office after his release from prison as a "contract paralegal," not an employee. Respondent compensated JH with cash and in

- kind compen sation, e.g., free representation in two criminal cases and a divorce, free lodging, and free use of Respondent's office equipment.

The First Lawsuit . Before DR retained Respondent, the Indianapolis Department of Metropolitan Development (the "DMD") obtai ned an order to demolish the Building as an unsafe structure. DR then retained Respondent for $300 to represent her in the matter. In addition, Respondent would retain 50% of any recovery by DR against the City of Indianapolis ("the City")

.

On February 15 , 2008, Respondent filed a complaint for judicial review against the DMD ("First Lawsuit") on behalf of both DR and JS, even though JS had no interest in the Building. The complaint for judicial review did not comply with the requirements of Indiana Code § 36

- 7

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- 8(b) that the complaint be verified and filed within 10 days of the date the action was taken.3 In an attempt to prevent the City from imposing financial liability on DR, Respondent
drafted a quitclaim deed by which DR transferred the Building to J H

. Respondent began representing JH as well as DR. B ecause DR quitclaimed her fee simple interest to JH after the unsafe building order was issued, the transfer resulted in DR and JH being jointly and severally responsible for demolition and administrative costs. See Ind

. Code § 36

- 7

- 9

- 12(a)

. Thus, the transfer of the Building to JH did not relieve DR of financial liability
, and it created a conflict of
interest between of JH and DR.

Respondent filed a "Counter

- Complaint for Damages" in the First Lawsuit w ithout leave of court, improperly adding as defendants two city employees ("City Employees") and additional legal theories of recovery. Respondent repeatedly referred to the Building as DR's property, even though he knew DR no longer owned the Building. Th e first time the court became aware of the transfer of the Building was at a May 7, 2008, hearing when opposing counsel asked DR whether she still owned the Building.

On May 16, 2008, the court affirmed the Order to Demolish, for lack of standing among

ot her reasons. The City demolished the Building in July 2008. DR was assessed $17,200 for the demolition costs for the Building. No appeal was taken.

The Second Lawsuit

. On August 6, 2008, Respondent filed a new lawsuit on behalf of DR seeking damages for trespass and destroying her property ("Second Lawsuit"). Respondent named the City Employees as defendants, but he fail ed to include allegations against them required by Ind iana Code section 34

- 13

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- 5(c). Respondent then filed a tort claim notice on
behalf of DR on September 8, 2008. Because it alleged violations occurring more than 180 days prior, it was untimely. See Ind

. Code § 34

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- 3

- 8. The defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings based on untimeliness, governmental immunity, and failure to state a claim. The Second Lawsuit was dismissed in its entirety.

The Third Lawsuit . On January 8, 2009, JH and JS filed a pro se lawsuit against the Director of Metropolitan Development in his official capacity ("Third Lawsuit"), alleging that4 the C ity violated their federal and state constitutional rights. After the defendant removed the Third Lawsuit to federal court, Respondent appeared for both JH and JS.

DR was required by statute to notify the DMD within five days of her transfer of the
Buildi ng to JH, which she failed to do. JH's claim was premised on the allegation that the City had demolished the Building without giving him notice. If JH obtained a judgment against the
DMD based on lack of notice , and that lack of notice was caused by DR's f ailure to inform the DMD of the transfer, DR would be liable to the DMD for the amount of the judgment. See Ind

. Code § 36

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- 27(b). Thus, Respondent pursued a case on behalf of one client (JH) which , if successful, would make his other client (DR) liable for the judgment.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, citing multiple grounds, including failure to exhaust state remedies. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that Respondent's "claims were not ripe and ot herwise meritless."

Respondent's relationship with JH

. In the course of its investigation, the Commission asked several times about Respondent's relationship with JH. For over two years, Respondent failed to disclose any professional relationship with JH , falsely implying that Respondent had no working relationship with JH

. In response to the Commission's eventual allegation that Respondent had concealed the true extent of his relationship with JH, Respondent finally
disclosed that JH worked in his office as a paralegal.

Discussion

Violations

. The Court finds that Respondent violated the following Indiana Professional
Conduct Rules by the following misconduct:

Misconduct during the First, Second, and Third Lawsuits :  1.1: Fail ing to provide competent r epresentation to DR, JS
, and/or JH.  1.7(a): Representing DR, JS
, and JH when the representations involved a concurrent conflict of interest.5  3.3(a)(1): Knowingly making and failing to correct a false statement of material fact made to the court in a Fi rst Lawsuit by continuing to refer to the Property as DR's after she transferred the Property to JH.  3.1: Asserting positions for which there was no non

- frivolous basis in law or fact.

Misconduct involving JH's position as a paralegal :  5.3 and Guideline 9.1: Using a nonlawyer legal assistant who was not an employee.  1.6: Improperly revealing information relating to Respondent's representation of clients to JH, by allowing JH unsupervised access to such information.

Misconduct during the Commission's in vestigation :  8.1(b): Fail ing to disclose to the Commission Respondent's professional relationship with JH to correct the misapprehension created by Respondent that there was no such relationship.

Discipline

. Our analysis of appropriate discipline entails consideration of the nature of the misconduct, the duties violated by the respondent, any resulting or potential harm, the respondent's state of mind, our duty to preserve the integrity of the profession, the risk to the public should we allow the respond ent to continue in practice, and matters in mitigation and aggravation. See Matter of Newman , 958 N.E.2d 792, 800 (Ind. 2011).

In this case, we find the following substantial facts in aggravation: (1) Respondent has previously been disciplined for incomp etence and bringing frivolous lawsuits, see Matter of
Stern , 776 N.E.2d 1208 (Ind. 2002); (2) Respondent's conduct was part of a pattern of misconduct that included failing to attain minimum competence in representing clients, filing multiple frivolous law suits, and misleading the court in the First Lawsuit and the Commission in its investigation; (3) instead of accepting responsibility for his actions, Respondent blames the judges in the lawsuits, the Commission, and others; and (4) Respondent has shown no insight
into his misconduct.

We also observe that Respondent has shown a lack of basic competence in representing himself in this disciplinary proceeding. For instance, he has filed documents that are riddled with typographical and grammatical errors an d that are very difficult to understand. In response to the6 Commission's verified complaint, Respondent asserted a number of frivolous affirmative
defenses

. In respond ing to the Commission's discovery requests
, Respondent repeatedly deleted, renumbered, an d added paragraphs to the requests . Despite several opportunities to correct deficiencies in discovery responses, he still failed to respond to some discovery requests, and he gave incomplete, inaccurate or incomprehensible responses to others. In his answ er to the amended complaint, Respondent failed to respond to some allegations, responded falsely to some, and responded "denied admitted" to others. Respondent himself could not explain what
"denied admitted" meant. Even after several attempts and, accordi ng to his own testimony, answering the allegations to the best of his ability, Respondent was unable to draft a legally sufficient responsive pleading.

In light of his serious deficiencies in representing clients and himself and his refusal to acknowledg e any misconduct on his part, the Court has grave concerns about Respondent's current fitness to represent clients in the practice of law. We therefore conclude that Respondent should be suspended from practice and undergo a reinstatement proceeding before resuming practice.

Conclusion

The Court concludes that Respondent violate d the Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to provide competent representation, representing clients with conflicting interests, asserting frivolous legal positions, an d engaging in deceptive practices with a court and the
Commission.

For Respondent's professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law in this state for a period of not less than 18 months , without automatic reinstatement, be ginning August 13 , 201 4

. Respondent shall not undertake any new legal matters between service of this order and the effective date of the suspension, and Respondent shall fulfill all the duties of a suspended attorney under Admission and Discipline Rule 23 (26). At the conclusion of the minimum period of suspension, Respondent may petition this Court for reinstatement to the practice of law in this state, provided Respondent pays the costs of this7 proceeding, fulfills the duties of a suspended attorney, and satisfies the requirements for reinstatement of Admission and Discipline Rule 23(4) and (18). Reinstatement is discretionary and requires clear and convincing evidence of the attorney's remorse, rehabilitation, and fitness to practice law. See Admis. Disc. R. 23(4)(b).

In addition, the Court denies Respondent's motions to investigate the conduct of one of the Commission's staff attorneys.

The costs of this proceeding are assessed against Respondent. The hearing officer appointed in this case is discharged

.

The Clerk of this Court is directed to give notice of this opinion to the hearing officer, to the parties or their respective attorneys, and to all other entities entitled to notice under Admission and Discipline Rule 23(3)(d). The Clerk is further dire cted to post this opinion to the Court's website, and Thomson Reuters is directed to publish a copy of this opinion in the bound
volumes of this Court's decisions.

Dickson, C.J., and Rucker, Massa , and Rush JJ., concur. David , J., concurs in part but di ssents regarding the discipline imposed
, believing it to be insufficient.