The Honor able John Corbett O’Mear a, United States District Judge f or the Ea stern District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 07a0050n.06 F iled: Janu ary 22, 2007 No. 05-4123 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
CURTIS P RATT, JR. , Defendan t-Appellant,
v. UNITED STAT ES O F AMERICA, P laintif f-App ellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES DI STR IC T CO UR T F OR THE NO RT HER

N D ISTRIC T OF OHI O

Before: M ERRITT an d GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ges; and O’MEARA, Distr ict Judge. * JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge . Def endant- Appellant Curt i s P ra tt, J r. pled g uilty in district court to one count of violating18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (1), fel on in possession of a firea rm. As par

t of t he plea ag ree ment, Pratt rese rved his rig ht to appeal the district c ourt’s denia l of his motion to s uppress e vidence obtained fr om his bedroom in his mother’s house. T he district court found that Pratt’s mother consente d to the war rantless sear ch of he r house, includingher son’ s be dr oo m. F or

the fo llo wi ng re a so ns , w e a ff ir m th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the mot ion

to s up pr e ss evidenc e. I
. On September

24, 2003, six law enf

orce ment office rs, including Deputy United States2

Marsha ll Heber

t and B urea

u of Alcohol, Toba cco, a

nd Fire arms Specia l Ag ent J ean- Marc Be har,
we nt t o th e ho me of

Pr a tt’ s mo the r, B arb ara

Pr a tt, to a

rr e st Pr a tt o n a

wa rr ant f or a ssa ult . Pr a tt lived with his mot her in the uppe r flat of a duplex she owned on Ha mpden Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. Pratt did not pay

rent for the sing le bedr oom he occ upied in the flat. The six officers we re me t by Pratt’s mother and his a

unt, Marg are t Pratt, when they
arr ive d at th e re sid e nc e . A lth ou g h s he a c tua lly ow ne d th e re sid e nc e , B arb ara Pr a tt i nc or

re c tly inf or me d th e of

fi c e rs that sh e wa s th e so le le a se ho lde r. She a lso inf or me d th e of

fi c e rs that Pr a tt “stay ed” the re. Pratt’s mother ultimately clar ified to the off

icer s that she alone ha d leg al possession of the re sidence
. The off icer s reque sted to sear ch the r esidenc e for Curtis P ratt, but his mother notified them that he wa s not present. He bert then a sked to furthe r sea rch the premises for

wea pons or drug s and pre sented Pratt’s mother with a “Consent to Sear ch” f orm. Ba rbar a Pratt sig ned the form, which a

uthorized the office rs “to conduc t a complete se arc h of [the] premises” and to take fr om t he pr e mis e s “ a

ny le tte rs , p a

pe rs , mate ri a ls o r o the r p ro pe rt y wh ic h th e y

may de sir e .” Pr a tt has not asser

ted that his mother’s conse nt was coe rce d or otherw ise improperly obtained. During the sea

rch, the office rs came upon Pratt’s locke d bedroom door. T he par ties dis pu te wh e the r P ratt’ s mo the r p ro vid e d th e of fi c e rs wi th a

ke y to t he be dr oo m. B arb ara

Pr a tt te sti fi e d, ho we ve r, that sh e or din ari ly ke pt a n e xtra ke y to P ratt’ s b e dr oo m but ha d g ive n th is spare key to Pratt the day

befor e bec ause Pratt had misplaced his key . Pratt’s mother fur ther testified that she “ had ac cess to [the room] any time [ she] wanted.” A ccor ding to Pratt’s mother, sh e c ur re ntl y did no t ha ve a ke y on ly be c a us e he r s on

ha d r e c e ntl y

bo rr ow e d it

and fa ile d to3

return it. None theless, the off icer s somehow g ained e ntry to the room. Once inside, Be har discovere d a pistol and ammunition in a dresser draw er. Pratt subsequently

moved to suppress all evide nce obta ined from the loc ked bedr oom. The district cour

t denied his motion to suppress. Pratt has appea led the denia l on the g rounds that his mother lacke d authority to consent to the sea

rch of the locked be droom and that the police we re unr easona

ble in relying on a

n appea ranc e that she ha d such authority
. I I
. R ev i ew o f a d i s t ri ct co u rt ’s d en i al o f a m o t i o nt o s u p p re s s i s fo r c l ea r e rr o r a s t o fi n d i n gs of fa ct and de novo as to conc lusions of law. Un ite d S tat es v . H e nr y , 429 F.3d 603, 607 ( 6th Cir. 2005). I I I
. The Four th A mendment re cog nizes as valid a war rantless sea

rch of a per son’s house whe n a person possessing authority over the house gives consent to the sear ch. Georgia v. Randolph , 126 S
. C t
. 1 5 1 5 , 1 5 2 0 (2 0 0 6 ) ( ci t i n g Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177, 1 8 1 (1 9 90)). “ That per son mig ht b e . . . a

fe llo w o c c up ant w ho sh are s c omm on a uth or ity ov e r prop ert y , whe n the su sp e c t is absent, a nd the exception for c onsent extends even to entries and sear ches with the permission of a
co-oc cupant whom the police rea sonably , but errone ously , believe to possess shared a uthority as an occupa nt.” I d

. ( c i t i n g Rodriguez , 4 97 U. S. at 18 6; United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164, 170 (1 97 4) ; Sc hn e c k

lot h v . B us tam on te , 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973)). A war rantless sea

rch does not violate the Four th Amendment when a

person who posse sses common authority

over the premises with the suspec t consents to the sea rch. Matlock, 415 U.S. at4

17 0- 71 . “ Com mon

a uth or ity ” deri ves fro m th e “ mut ua l us e of the pr op e rt

y by pe rs on s g e ne ra lly having joint acce ss or control for most purposes.” Id. at 171 n.7. Ty pically , all fa m i l y

members have c ommon authority

over a ll of the rooms in the family residenc e. United States v. Clutter , 914 F .2 d 7 75 , 7 77 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) . H ow e ver , f a mil y me mbe rs may

be de pr ive d o f c omm on

a uth or ity
acc ess to an enc losed space over w hich one family member has “cle arly manifested a n expectation of exclusivity .” Id. at 778. Me re po sse ssi on

or no n- poss ess io n of a ke y a t th e tim e of

a se arc h is no t di sp os iti ve in deter mining whe ther a

co-oc cupant ha s common authority over a n enclose d space
. See R odriguez , 497 U.S. at 181 (co- occupa nt did not have common authority though she had key s to the residenc e); Un ite d S tat es v . G ill is , 358 F .3 d 386 , 390 (6 th Cir . 200 4) (n oti ng the dis tr ic t court ’s fi nd ingthat a
co-oc cupant had common authority though she did not have ke y s to the residenc e’s e x terior door s). I ns te a d, c ourt s c on sid e r a numbe r o f f

a c tor s in de te rm ini ngwhe th e r c omm on a uth or ity e xists , including: whether the co-oc cupant owns the residenc e or is na med on the lease ; i f t h e i ndividual contributed re nt; and wh et her the individual visi ted the re sidence when the c o-occ upant was not prese nt. See R odriguez , 497 U.S. at 181. He re , a lth ou g h w e a ssume that B arb ara Pr a tt l a c ke d a

ke y to h e r s on ’s be dr oo m a t th e tim e of the sea rch, it is clea

r that she or d i n arily

reta ined a ke y

to the room and a ccor dingly had re g ular
acc ess to the room. As such, P ratt di d not have a clear ex pectation of ex clusivity by simply locking the door. Moreove r, Pratt provides no authority to suppor t the proposition that, by itself, a tempora ry inability to acc ess a r oom for lac k of a ke y deprive s a co- occupa

nt of common aut h ority

over that
ro om. On the c on tr ary , th e c a se law pla c e s no pa rt ic ula r e mph a sis on wh e the r c o- oc c up ants po sse ss5

ke y s in de te rm ini ngthe ir

a uth or ity ov e r a n e nc los e d s pa c e ; po sse ssi on of a ke y is m e re ly a fa c tor

in the ana ly sis. See, e .g. , Rodriguez , 4 97 U. S. at 18 1; se e als o G ill is , 358 F.3d at 390. Pratt’s mother ha d ti tle to t

he e nti re res id ence, inc lud ingPr a tt’ s b e dr oo m. P ratt d id n ot e ve n c on tr ibute re nt. Ba rbar a Pratt lived in the re sidence and had acc ess t o Pratt’s room “a ny time [ she] wanted.” I

n light of these f acts, we conclude that Ba rbar a Pratt had a ctual author ity to consent to t h e s ear ch of he r son’s locked be droom. I V. Although the deter

mination that Ba

rbar a P ratt had a ctual author ity to consent to the sea

rch is dis po sit ive of the a

pp e a l, we c on sid e r the iss ue of a pp are nt autho ri ty a s we ll. Th e po lic e may a lso
s e ar c h a r e s i d e n c e w i t h t h e p e r

m i s s i o no f

ano c c u p an tw h o m t h e y r e a s o n a

b l y, e v e ni f

e r r o n e o u s l y, believe to ha

ve authority to c onsent to the sear ch. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 186. Share d occupa ncy has bee n found to include a n “assumption of risk” that one occ upant might pe rm i t a s ea rch of the premises ag ainst the wishes of a n absent c o-occ upant. Randolph , 1 26 S. Ct . at 15 22 ; Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7. Fur

ther, police office rs ar e entitled to r ely on this “ assumption of risk,” and the re is n o b ur de n o n th e po lic e to e lim inate the po ssi bil ity of a ty pical sh ared oc c up anc y

arr ang e me nts absent some “ rea son to doubt that the reg ular sche me is in place.” Randolph , 126 S. Ct . at 1522. I n f a c t , “ i t w o u l d b e u n

j u s t i f i a b l y i mp r a c t i c a l t o r e qu i r e t h e p o l i c e t o t a k e a f f i r m a t i v e s t e p s to confirm the a ctual author ity of a c onsenting individual whose authority was a ppare nt.” Id. at 1527. Ty pic a lly , a ll f

a mil y mem bers ha ve c omm on a uth or ity ov e r a ll o f t

he ro oms in t

he fa mil y residenc e. Clutt er , 914 F.2d at 777. Evidence that the co- occupa nt is a lease holder of the re sidence
s t r o n g l y s u

p p o rt s t h e r e a s o n a

b l e n e s s o f ano f f i c e r ’ s r e l i an c e o nt h e c o - o c c u p an t ’ s a p p ar e n ta u t h o r i t y.6

Gi lli s , 358 F.3d at 390. Fur

ther, office rs may also rea sonably rely on the appa rent a uthority of a c ooccupa nt who m ere ly

“shows that she be longs” in a re sidence
. Randolph , 126 S. Ct. at 1521. Police office rs may

also rea sonably

rely on the appe ara

nce of authority even w hen a c o-occ upant does not have a key to the premises. Gi lli

s , 358 F.3d at 390. I n th is c a se , th e of

fi c e rs ha d n o r e a so n to c on c lud e that Pr a tt’ s mot he r did no t ha

ve a uth or ity to c on se nt t o a

se arc h o f a be dr oo m oc c up ie d by he r so n, a s fa mil y me mbe rs ty

pic a lly have a uth or ity over the entire family residenc e. I n addition, Ba rbar a P ratt i dentified herself to the officers as the sole lease holder of the reside n ce . Ba rbar a Pratt also “show ed that she be longe d” in the re sidence beca use she wa s enterta ining a g uest, Marg are t Pratt, and furthe r by authorizing the of fice rs to sear ch the pre mises for her

son. The mer e fa ct that B arba ra Pratt temporar ily lacke d a key to the bedroom
w o u ld n o t h a v e ma d e th e o f

f ic e r s ’ r e li an c e o nth e a

p p e ar an c e o f

h e r a u th ority unrea so n a

b le
. We the re fo re c on c lud e tha

t, e ve n if sh e la c ke d a c tua l a

uth or ity , B arb ara Pr a tt ha d a pp are nt a uth or ity to consent to the sea

rch of her son’ s locked be droom.

V. F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , th e dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de nia l of the a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss i s AF F IR M ED
.7

MERRI TT, Circuit Judge , dissenting. He re one of the de puty marshals a sked for

Ms. Pratt’s pe rm iss ion

to s e arc h th e re sid e nc e fo r w e a po ns and dr ug s a nd pr e se nte d a

c on se nt t o s e arc h f

or m, stating that M s . Pratt consented to a “complete sear ch” of

her pr emises. Ms. Pratt signe d the document and stated that Pratt, her son, did not pay rent. The door to Pratt’s bedr oom was locke d. Th e Di str ic t Co ur

t st a te d e xplic itl y

that “ the re c or d te nd s to re fl e c t th a t B arb ara Pr a tt d id n ot p os se ss a key during the sea

rch . . . .” (J.A. 31). Ms. P ratt testified that she told the of fice rs that she g e ne r a l l y k e p t a k e y t o P r a t t ’ s r o o m b u t h a d g i v e n t h e k e y t o P r a t t t h e d ay b e f o r e a t his re qu e st. Thus, it seems clea

r that t he officer s enter ed and sear ched the locked room without the per mission of the oc cupant. The y

must have done so by

brea king the lock, not by

unlocking the door. When Pratt took back his mother’s ke y to his locked bedroom, the situation cha ng ed. The locked bed ro o m door –– locke d without a key available from anyone other than the occ upant ––
make s th is s itu a tio n d if

fe re nt f ro m ot he rs wh e re c omm on

a uth or ity e xiste d o ve r a

n o pe nly a c c e ssi ble
ro om. Pr a tt’ s a c tio ns in t a kin g ba c k th e ke y and sta sh ing c on tr a

ba nd in a dr e sse r d ra we r s ig na ls h is
e xpe c ta tio n o f e xclu siv ity . U nd e r t he se c ir c ums tanc e s I do no t thi nk the g ov e rnme nt h a s c arr ie d it s burden of showing that Ms. Pratt — with no key and no way to enter — had either actua l or appa

rent common authority

to consent to the sea

rch of her a dult son’s bedroom. The majority ’s holding that Ms. Pratt had actual authority to consent to the sea

rch of Pratt’s
ro om is dir e c tly c on tr ary to t he a pp lic a ble te st f ro m United States v. Matlock , 415 U.S. 164 (1974) and contra dicts rele vant prec edent from this Court and others. As my colleagues note, a

n individual ha s c omm on

a uth or ity if sh e ha s “ mut

ua l us e of the pr op e rt

y ” wi th “ joi nt a c c e ss o r c on tr ol f

or mos t purp os e s, so that it

is r e a so na

ble to r e c og nize that a

ny of the c o- inh a

bit ants ha s th e ri g ht t o p e rm it8

the inspection in his own right and that the ot hers have assumed the risk.” Id. at 171 n.7, qu ote d in Georgia v. Randolph , _

__ _ U .S. __ __ , 1 26 S. Ct . 1 51 5, 15 21 (2 00 6) . T he c ourt be lie ve s th a t Ms
. Pratt had “mutual use” and “joint a cce ss or control” of Pratt’s room –– eve n though Pratt withdrew fr om h is m oth e r a

ny us e or a c c e ss b y loc kin g the do or and re ta ini ng the on ly ke y . HowMr s. Pr a tt ha s “ mut ua l use ” of her so n’ s lo c ke d b e dr oo m w hic h s he c ann ot e nte r i s le ft un e xpla ine d. Th is contra diction runs counter to case s finding no a ctual common authority over an enclose d are a in the home in which a non-minor child targ eted f or the sea rch “ has cle arly

manifested a

n expectation of exclusivi ty .” United States v. Clutter , 91 4 F .2 d 7 75 , 7 77 (6 th C ir . 1 99 0) ; se e als o State v. Vinuya , 32 P.3d 116, 131-32 (H aw . C t
. Ap p. 2001) (mother without a key

did not have ac tual common authority to consent to a sea

rch of her son’ s locked be droom); State v. Gordnoshnka , No. 86319, 2006 WL 302354, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Fe b. 9, 2006) (unpublis hed) (fathe r wit hout key s or a r ight of ac cess to his son’s locked bedroom di d not have actual authority to consent to a sea

rch the reof

). On the oth e r h and , h a d Pr a tt l e ft his do or un loc ke d o r pr ov ide d his m oth e r a ke y , th e re wo uld

be lit tle doubt that Ms. Pratt would have had a ctual common authority
. See Clutter , 914 F.2d at 778 (minor children ha d common auth o rity to consent to inspection of their pa rents’ ope n bedroom); United Sta te s v . Co rk, 18 Fe d. App. 376, 383 (6th Cir. S ept. 6, 2001) (unpublished) (homeowne r had
c omm on a uth or ity ov e r u nlo c ke d b e dr oo m sh a

re d b y he r n e ph e w) ; Sta te v . H

arris , 642 A.2d 1242, 1247 (De l. Super. Ct. 1993) (mother with a ke y to her son’s locked b ed room possessed common authority over the room). The two case s cited for the finding of actua l common authority , Un ite d S tat es v . G ill is , 358 F.3d 386 ( 6th Cir. 2004) and Illinois v. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. 177 (1990), provide no support for that9

proposition. Gi lli

s expressly

declined to a ddress whether actua l a uthority was prese nt: “Be cause we ag ree with the district court’s de cision that Wi lliams had appar ent authority , we need not consider whether she also possessed a ctual author ity .” Gi lli s , 358 F.3d at 391. I n Rodriguez , th e Sup re me Court we nt a ste p fur

the r, ho ldi ng that no ac tua l autho ri ty e xiste d an d pro c e e de d to ana ly ze t he c a se under the doctrine of

appar ent common authority
. Rodriguez , 497 U.S. at 179, 181-82, 189. Th e loc a tio n of the c on tr a ba nd in a dr e sse r dr awe r makes Ms
. Pr a tt’ s purp or te d a uth or ity
even less rea sonable. See R andolph , 126 S. Ct . at 1522 (“ when it comes to sea rchingthroug h burea

u draw ers, ther e will be ins tance s in which even a person clear ly belong ing on premises as a n occupa nt
may la c k any pe rc e ive d a

uth or ity to c on se nt .
. . .” ); Clutt er , 9 1 4 F. 2 d at 7 7 8 (s t at i n g t h at , al t h o u gh min or c hil dr e n h a d a

uth or ity to c on se nt t o a se arc h of the ir pa re nts ’ o pe n b e dr oo m, t

he ir a uth or ity to consent to a sear ch of a burea u draw er there in was “a

closer que stion”). Randolph is t he Sup re me Court’s latest decision on consent searc hes. I t holds that “a warr antless s ear ch of a share d dwelling for e vidence over the express ref usal of consent by a phy sically prese nt resident ca

nnot be justified as reasonable as t o him on the basis of conse nt give n to the police by another resident.” Randolph , 126 S. Ct . at 1526. B y

analog y , an abse nt resident cannot be held t o have g iven conse nt to searc h dresse r dra

wer s when he has locke d his room and h as t h e o n l y key . There cannot be appar ent
a uth or ity to se arc h in

dr e sse r d ra we rs or oth e r n oo ks and

c ra nn ie s o f t he ro om w he n th e po lic e mus t brea k the lock or climb in a window in or der to g ain acc ess to the room. We should not permit the erosion of F ourth Amendment princ iples that has taken pla ce in this ca se.