U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

36–212PDF WASHINGTON : 2019

CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN 

ASIA 

AND THE UNITED STATES 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND 

NONPROLIFERATION 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

MAY 8, 2019 

Serial No. 116–34 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

( 

Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 

or http://www.govinfo.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York, Chairman 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

AMI BERA, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

ADRIANO ESPAILLAT, New York 

TED LIEU, California 

SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania 

DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota 

ILHAN OMAR, Minnesota 

COLIN ALLRED, Texas 

ANDY LEVIN, Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

TOM MALINOWSKI, New Jersey 

DAVID TRONE, Maryland 

JIM COSTA, California 

JUAN VARGAS, California 

VICENTE GONZALEZ, Texas 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Ranking 

Member 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

ADAM KINZINGER, Illinois 

LEE ZELDIN, New York 

JIM SENSENBRENNER, Wisconsin 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

FRANCIS ROONEY, Florida 

BRIAN FITZPATRICK, Pennsylvania 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

KEN BUCK, Colorado 

RON WRIGHT, Texas 

GUY RESCHENTHALER, Pennsylvania 

TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee 

GREG PENCE, Indiana 

STEVE WATKINS, Kansas 

MIKE GUEST, Mississippi 

JASON STEINBAUM, Staff Director 

BRENDAN SHIELDS, Republican Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND NONPROLIFERATION

BRAD SHERMAN, California, Chairman, 

DINA TITUS, Nevada 

CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania 

GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia 

AMI BERA, California 

ANDY LEVIN. Michigan 

ABIGAIL SPANBERGER, Virginia 

TED YOHO, Florida, Ranking Member 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

ANN WAGNER, Missouri 

BRIAN MAST, Florida 

JOHN CURTIS, Utah 

DON MACDONALD, Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

WITNESSES 

Chaudhary, Shamila, Senior Advisor, School for Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, South Asia Fellow, New America ................... 7 

Kliman, Dr. Daniel, Senior Fellow, Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center 

for a New American Security .............................................................................. 20 

Mattis, Peter, Research Fellow in China Studies, Victims of Communism 

Memorial Foundation .......................................................................................... 30 

Shullman, Dr. David, Senior Advisor, International Republican Institute ........ 51 

APPENDIX 

Hearing Notice ......................................................................................................... 84 

Hearing Minutes ...................................................................................................... 85 

Hearing Attendance ................................................................................................. 86 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Responses to questions submitted from Representative Wagner ........................ 87 

Responses to questions submitted from Representative Sherman ...................... 89 

(1) 

CHINA’S GROWING INFLUENCE IN ASIA 

AND THE UNITED STATES 

Wednesday, May 8, 2019 

House of Representatives, 

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, 

Washington, DC 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:15 p.m., in Room 

2200, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Sherman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I thank everyone for attending. Members will 

have 5 days to submit materials into the record. We will depart 

from precedent a little bit here and hear the opening statement of 

our ranking member and others who would want to give short 

opening statements, and then I will give my opening statement, 

then we will hear from the witnesses. 

Mr. YOHO. 

Mr. YOHO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. Good morning and thank you, 

Chairman Sherman—good afternoon—for calling this hearing. And 

I appreciate the opportunity to address the mounting political and 

economic aggression by China and discuss ways the United States 

and our allies can challenge their aggression. 

In recent years, China has experienced rapid economic growth 

and is currently the world’s second largest economy. While this 

level of economic success would typically deserve praise, we must 

not forget that this growth was achieved through predatory practices that have drastically harmed other nations, including the 

United States. As a preeminent world leader, the United States is 

now engaged in a great power competition with China as the Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping attempts to challenge 

American influence and erode American security and prosperity. 

Xi’s leadership seeks to advance China’s interests, not within the 

prevailing global order but added expense. For now, it is working. 

China has no peer competitors along its immediate periphery to be 

concerned about and plenty of cash to advance its interests in other 

parts of the world. 

An example of this expansion is China’s Belt-Road Initiative, an 

effort to boost infrastructure development and economic 

connectivity and expand China’s influence. On surface value, it 

sounds OK among more than 65 countries on three continents, but 

if you look deeper, you find predatory lending practices that have 

beholden other countries to give up strategic ports, land, and infrastructure. 
2 

In speeches given by Xi, the leader often associates the BRI with 

the idea of building a community of common destiny. The party believes it is their mission to achieve a great rejuvenation while 

spreading socialism with Chinese characteristics, otherwise known 

as communism, to poor and vulnerable nations around the world. 

Xi regularly promotes this massive westward infrastructure program as a win-win undertaking that will fill infrastructure gaps in 

less developed countries for mutual benefit. But major components 

of the BRI have proven to be debt traps, predatory lending practices that endanger participant sovereignty and increases China’s 

political influence while benefiting the corrupt officials and bringing few opportunities to the average citizen. 

Through these projects, China gives large unviable loans to poor 

countries. When the loans are not repaid, China seizes physical infrastructure or commodities for their own gain. In some places, it 

also is apparent that the BRI is a cover for military expansion. 

Data from Centers for Global Development suggest that China has 

already left eight countries drowning in debt. 

If we do not address this situation and help other countries realize this, the countries in the Indo-Pacific region and around the 

world, and if we do not offer viable alternatives, more countries 

will be held financially beholden to China. 

In response to China’s economic rise, Congress and the Trump 

administration has been focused on tailoring American defense and 

economic policies to counter China’s growing influence in the IndoPacific region and show Beijing that the international community 

recognizes China’s imperial ambition and is determined to stand 

against it. 

American investment alternatives, such as the BUILD Act, which 

received wide bipartisan support and was signed into law by President Trump in 2018, will advance U.S. influences in developing 

countries by incentivizing private investments as an alternative to 

State-directed investment projects like the BRI. 

It is important that developing nations around the world are 

given investment alternatives that do not leave them economically 

and politically indebted to China. We must continue to craft policies that create environments conducive to democratic ideals and 

free market economic growth that are resistant to aggression by 

communist powers like China. 

I look forward to hearing from these witnesses today and discussing solutions to counter China’s aggression and preserve, not 

just American influence in the Indo-Pacific region, but to empower 

nations to empower their people to grow economically and have 

free will in their nations. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Does anyone else seek time to make an opening 

statement? 

My God, I have never seen such a shy group of members. Yes, 

well, I have got a few things—I know this will shock you—a few 

things to say. 

The trade deficit we have with China is the largest trade deficit 

in the history of mammalian life. For several decades, we had administrations telling us to ignore it, not worry about it, and that 

it did not matter. But we have lost 3.4 million jobs as a result of 
3 

it, and it puts China in a tremendous position of power over the 

United States. Although we have power over them, we could deny 

them access to our markets, something that we have, up until now, 

been reluctant to do. 

My record is not one of unwavering support for the current occupant of the White House, but I want to commend the President for 

at least focusing our attention on China’s unfair trade practices 

and the horrific results to the United States. Unfortunately, one 

would expect that in areas of national security, the powerful interests at the Pentagon would control our policy, and they see a real 

opportunity. Fan the concerns about the South China Sea, exaggerate them, and justify multibillion dollar, multihundred billion 

dollar increases in the Pentagon budget. 

There are literally dozens of disputes involving sea territory and 

control. There is a major one between Timor and Australia that 

somehow the United States does not get concerned with; but somehow, those affecting China are matters of great principle while we 

ignore all the others. 

These islets in the South China Sea, et cetera, have not been inhabited, although they are off the shores of the most teeming populated continent in the world, for a good reason. There is no reason 

to be there. They are useless. There is no oil. If there was oil, it 

would not be ours, and there is no oil. Trillions of dollars of trade 

go close to those islands, yes, in and out of Chinese ports. And if 

China were to control these islands, they could blockade their own 

ports. There may be a few oil tankers that get close to these islands 

that could easily not get close to these islands on their way to 

Japan or South Korea. 

But we are told the way to get tough with China is to ignore the 

devastation done especially to our Midwest by their trade policies, 

and instead, spend a few hundred billion dollars fighting over islets 

that are both useless and, in any case, not ours. 

Wall Street has tremendous power over our economic policy. 

They would like us to do a few things to increase their profits, 

which coincidentally might create a few jobs, but they basically 

want us to go back to the policies of ignoring China’s wrongdoing 

altogether. 

We had a policy all of last century never to grant most favored 

nation status to a managed economy, because we understood that 

a managed economy will manage to exclude our exports in so many 

different ways that just getting them to agree to reduce their tariffs is a fiction. But this fiction turned out to be useful, and many 

hundreds and hundreds of billions of dollars have been made as a 

result of granting most favored nation status to China, which I 

might add, 65 percent of all Democrats voted against at the time. 

We were right then. We should not change now just because Trump 

also seems to be interested. 

So, for example, if we want to sell airplanes to a Chinese airline, 

that airline can—if the government said, you have to build a factory here, that might violate WTO. We would never be able to 

prove it, because he would say it orally. But instead, the airline 

says it. Pretty much the same thing as government, they are in 

government control. That may not even be a violation of WTO. Still 
4 

cannot prove it, it is done orally. So what happens? Boeing is forced 

to move a factory to China in order to have access to those exports. 

So even in those cases where we have some exports, they have 

got control. And so that is one way they control us. They control 

us because they are a substantial market. That market is not open. 

To the extent they accept American exports, they do so only by demanding a chance to turn American businesses into their pawns. 

Another example of this is Hollywood. We do not have access to 

their market. They limit us to 35, 40 different pictures. So every 

studio is turning over trying to figure out how to get one of their 

pictures in. So which studio is going to make a movie about Tibet? 

I think Richard Gere may go a long time before he makes a sequel. 

No Hollywood studio dares offend Beijing, because Beijing controls 

access to their market and we accept it. 

A couple of narrow areas to focus on. One is the Uighurs. The 

ranking member and I have introduced the UIGHUR Act of 2019. 

Not only does this focus on the use of U.S. technology to commit 

violations of human rights, but it also focuses on the Chinese Government’s surveillance of the Chinese diaspora in the United 

States, especially the Uighur diaspora. And, of course, I introduced 

the U.S.-China Economic Security and Review Act, along with Congressman Gallagher, to examine Chinese influence on the United 

States. 

But China is one of the biggest markets in the world. That is 

what we are told over and over. It happens to be true. They control 

access, and any American company that does not do their bidding 

can be cutoff from access. That is what we are up against, and that 

is why we do not need a rules-based system with China. We can 

never enforce those rules. 

We need a results-based system, where for every billion dollars 

of goods they send us, they have to accept a billion dollars of U.S. 

exports. If they are not willing to do that, then they will simply 

prove to us what we knew all of last century, and that is you cannot have a rules-based system with a managed economy. If you do 

that, they will control trade, they will control access to their markets, and they will control your companies. We have spent 20 years 

proving how right we used to be. 

And, with that, I will once again ask to see if there is anyone 

else who has an opening statement. 

Seeing none, we will go to our witnesses. The first is Shamila 

Chaudhary, a senior South Asia fellow at New America and a senior adviser at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced Studies. 

Please give us a 5-minute summary, and we will move on to the 

next witness. 

And your entire statement, without objection, for all witnesses 

will be put into the record. 

STATEMENT OF SHAMILA CHAUDHARY, SENIOR ADVISOR, 

SCHOOL FOR ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS 

HOPKINS UNIVERSITY, SOUTH ASIA FELLOW, NEW AMERICA 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Yoho, members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. 
5 

Mrs. WAGNER. Is your mike on? 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. There it is. Thank you. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I will be discussing Chinese influence in Asia, with a focus on Pakistan. And 

the views I am expressing today here are my own. 

I am going to start with a quote from a contact of mine in Pakistan. ‘‘Maybe about 10 years ago, America was an important voice. 

Today, America sounds like a very distant voice. There is a striking 

view over here that the sun is rising in the east and setting in the 

west.’’ 

And this view has multiple manifestations, which the chairman 

spoke about already, that we are seeing globally, and they are happening in Pakistan as well: The visible increase of Chinese nationals in the country, the arrivals desk at the airport in Islamabad 

designated for Chinese nationals, Chinese language schools, a Chinese-operated port, and Chinese participation in Pakistani security 

politics like they have never done before. 

All this takes place under the umbrella of CPEC, the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a collection of infrastructure and development projects intended to improve trade and investment. In Pakistan, a once dominant United States is now overshadowed by growing Chinese influence, for which CPEC is the primary vehicle. 

Should we welcome this as the United States? We should to a 

certain extent. China’s intentions to fix Pakistan’s economy and 

fight Islamic radicalism help us. After all, we attempted to do the 

very same thing in South Asia after 9/11, but did not accomplish 

such goals. During those years, the United States encouraged 

China to get more involved in stabilizing Pakistan. Those requests 

have been answered, and we must now contend with our consequences, in particular on geopolitics and security. 

While U.S. and Chinese security interests in South Asia may 

seem to overlap at the moment, they are by no means shared. The 

two countries view terrorism and terrorist actors differently. China 

remains singularly focused on militants that impact only their stability and their business interests. CPEC, meanwhile, hurts U.S. 

regional interests by disrupting fragile India-Pakistan ties, a nuclear-fueled dynamic that demands U.S. stewardship from time to 

time during times of crisis. 

China’s provision of surveillance, data collection capabilities, and 

new hardware to the Pakistani military may seem like it improves 

security, but such tools also increase the likelihood of invasive data 

collection, misuse of information, and violations of privacy. 

The notion that the Pakistani military might start to mimic Chinese authoritarianism is no longer theoretical. Pakistani civil society and media report more aggressive tactics by the military to silence critical voices. They share a common refrain, that the military is more powerful than ever and that is because of China. 

China plays a game familiar to the United States, which also 

strengthened Pakistan’s military after 9/11. However, it did so 

alongside an international community that shared an understanding of the threat, values, and burden associated with fixing 

the problem. 

Today in Pakistan, Chinese influence stands alone, changing the 

rules of the game for everyone else. For example, Pakistan no 
6 

longer publicly discloses the terms of its loans from China. Indeed, 

CPEC pretends immense geoeconomic and geopolitical advantages 

for China and Pakistan, but its repercussions will dwarf any comparable American influence. 

At present, the Trump administration has tough rhetoric and a 

collection of policies that address aspects of China’s rise, but it does 

not have the political will, financial resources, ability to assume 

risks, and interest-based vision of South Asia needed to compete 

with Chinese influence a la CPEC. Instead, the United States has 

reduced its policy to a singular thread, ending the war in Afghanistan. And while it is appropriate at the moment, over time, that 

singular focus will lock the United States out of productive channels of engagement with Pakistan that China will have already 

strengthened. 

Countering this means going beyond Afghanistan and even complementing CPEC’s economic efforts. To protect U.S. geopolitical 

options in the future, the U.S. should also support Pakistani and 

regional actors most threatened by Chinese influence. Ultimately, 

countering China’s rise will require the United States to create 

policies that both address and benefit from the needs of other countries. 

To be clear, a revitalized American approach to Pakistan and 

South Asia should not aim to replace China, instead, follow its example. China’s engagements in the region show it is not playing a 

zero-sum game, and neither should the United States. Otherwise, 

America will isolate itself from a historical process of regional economic integration. 

And by the way, the door is not shut in Pakistan, where government officials and political leaders still privately hope for sustained 

American attention in the country and, ironically, are using China 

to get it. The U.S. should take note and start to make policies that 

ensure it does not become an afterthought in South Asia’s new 

competitive geopolitical environment. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Chaudhary follows:] 
7 

May 8, 2019 

Shamila N. Chaudhary 

Senior South Asia Fellow, New America and 

Senior Advisor, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies 

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Asia Subcommittee 

Hearing on Chinese Influence in Asia and the United States 

Introduction 

In May 2008, I flew to Islamabad, Pakistan's hilly tree-lined capital city, for a temporary duty 

assignment at the U.S. Embassy. As a civil servant in the State Department's South and Central 

Asia Bureau, I worked on the Pakistan account, which since the 9/11 attacks remained heavily 

defined by heightened U.S.-Pakistan cooperation on fighting terrorism. That cooperation 

translated into a significant American footprint on the ground in Pakistan, one that was 

superficially reflected in the many other American faces on the commercial flight that brought 

me to Islamabad. A similar pattern transpired at the country's elite hotels where foreigners 

typically stayed. As many Pakistanis would say, the Americans were everywhere, for better or 

for worse. 

During my most recent trip to Pakistan in February of this year, I felt like I had entered a parallel 

universe where the Americans had been supplanted by the Chinese. Changes in the U.S.-Pakistan 

relationship have led to a smaller American footprint in the country. Meanwhile, the Chinese 

presence has grown, a result of the establishment of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 

(CPEC) initiative in 2015. CPEC occurs within a broader global context of China's Belt and 

Road Initiative (BRI), defined by increased Chinese economic engagement throughout the world. 

Engagements within South Asia center largely in Pakistan, with additional activities underway in 

Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. 

The once dominant presence of the United States in Pakistan is now overshadowed by 

China's extensive reach into the country's power and inti·astructure sectors with long-term 

plans for expansion into multiple other sectors such as agriculture and mining. A Pakistani 

journalist I spoke with said: 

"Maybe about ten years ago, America was an important voice. Today, America 

sounds like a very distant voice now. There is a striking view over here that the sun 

is rising in the east and setting in the west." 

* * * * 

Drawing superficial comparisons between China and the United States in Pakistan come easily, 

as does the conclusion that China ·s engagement in Pakistan comes at America's expense. 

Pakistani officials and supporters ofCPEC have often reinforced these views both publicly and 

privately in hopes of reversing America's waning attention on Pakistan. But the message is also 

for domestic consumption, promoted by elected leaders to show constituents and political 
8 

opponents alike that while the Americans may have left them, they still have China. This 

message feeds into American fears of China's rise while distracting from understanding the true 

nature of Chinese influence in Pakistan- perhaps the ultimate goal of both China and Pakistan 

who continue to guard details ofCPEC with intense secrecy. 

The United States should worry about growing Chinese influence in Pakistan. Some of the 

many consequences include further disruption to nuclear-fueled tensions between India 

and Pakistan; threats to Pakistani democratic culture, ethnic minorities, and civil society; 

and ultimately the introduction of unserviceable debt burdens for the state. But these 

consequences matter only if the United States prioritizes such issues in its relationship with 

Pakistan. 

Instead, the Trump Administration has reduced engagement with Pakistan to a singular threadending the war in the Afghanistan. At this point in time, that may be what the situation demands, 

especially given unsuccessful attempts by the Obama administration to use a comprehensive 

package of inducements to improve the bilateral relationship. However, over time that singular 

focus will lock the United States out of productive channels of engagement with Pakistan 

that China will have already strengthened. 

Unpacking Chinese influence in Pakistan requires a nuanced approach that considers the 

complex political and economic realities that push countries to work with China, which is more 

willing and able to assume the attendant risks than so many others nations in the world, including 

the United States. Doing so reveals a multifaceted and pragmatic relationship driven by internal 

forces in both countries as well as by extemal global catalysts. It also shows that while China's 

influence in Pakistan come at America's expense in some significant ways, aspects of it may also 

benefit U.S. interests in South Asia. 

In that vein, this testimony will categorize Chinese influence in Asia with a focus on Pakistan. It 

will address the impacts of specific forms of Chinese influence on Pakistan and the region, 

identifying risks and opportunities. And finally, it will address the question of how Chinese 

influence in Asia affects U.S. interests now and in the future. 

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: The Dominant Vehicle for Building Chinese 

Influence in Pakistan 

For over six decades, China has stood by Pakistan's side as a pillar of its foreign policy; a 

major developer of its military and nuclear capabilities; an ally in the region and multilaterally; 

and a trusted intermediary when tensions with the United States and India flare up. The 

foundation of the relationship greatly expanded when mutual needs for greater economic 

diversification, energy security, and regional connectivity grew, leading to the establishment of 

CPEC, the dominant vehicle for building Chinese influence in Pakistan. 

Defined officially by the Pakistani government as a "framework of regional connectivity," CPEC 

allows for people to people exchanges; enhanced academic, cultural, and regional understanding; 

2 
9 

and higher volume of trade and business. 1 It includes a suite of projects in energy generation and 

infrastructure development expected to cost US$75 billion. 

At its outset, Pakistanis welcomed the initiative. viewing CPEC as a possible solution to severe 

energy shortages, macroeconomic instability, and job growth demands. The government also 

viewed growing Chinese engagement as a safeguard against the breakdown in relations with the 

United States, persistent threats from India, and instability in the Middle East. It also served as a 

morale booster for the government and ordinary Pakistanis alike. The CPEC partnership portrays 

Pakistan as solution to regional problems rather than a failed state which is. in the view of many 

international capitals, a state sponsor of terrorism. 

An Intertwined and Opportunistic Economic Vision 

Through CPEC, Pakistan's economic prospects are now far more intertwined with China 

than any other nation. CPEC's regional connectivity mantra builds upon a longstanding 

Pakistani idea that the country can serve as a gateway to Central Asia for the Middle East as well 

as for other parts of South Asia. Pakistan provides the shortest route from landlocked Centra! 

Asia to the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean. 

As patt of this vision, the Pakistani government promised that CPEC would create greater 

economic opportunities and jobs for Pakistanis along the physical routes associated with CPEC. 

The projects, the majority of which will be operational by 2023, are scheduled for final 

completion by 2030, at which time the Pakistani government claims CPEC would have created 

almost 700,000 jobs for Pakistanis. 

Pursuing this vision requires extensive Chinese economic support, with China reportedly 

financing 80 percent of the $62 billion needed for CPEC projects. 2 The terms of Chinese 

financing remain largely unavailable to the public. Given Pakistan's macroeconomic challenges. 

this has led to domestic and international worries over the potential debt distress Pakistan may 

suffer due to CPEC-related financing. As reported by the Center for Global Development in 

March 2018, .. Unlike the 2-2.5 percent 'concessional rate' given to some China Exim Bank 

customers, reports indicate that some of Pakistan's loans reflect rates as high as 5 percent.'' 

This will be extremely difftcu!t to maintain for Pakistan, which faces rising external debt, soaring 

current account deficits, and falling foreign capital flows and currency reserves. Pakistan 

believes a new program with the International Monetary Fund will pull it out of its latest round 

of macroeconomic instability. Additionally, the Pakistani government is quick to remind us that 

the CPEC debt servicing is a long-term endeavor, noting that ''CPEC outflows would start from 

the year 2021 and spread over 20 to 25 years with a maximum in the year 2024 and 2025.d By 

1 Otlicial website for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, http://cpec.gov.pkl 2 Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, Center for Global 

Development Report. https:llwww.cgdev.orglsitesldefaultlfiles/examining-debl-implications-belt-and-roadinitiative-policy-perspectivc.pdf 

'Pakistan -IMF could either kill CPEC or help build it right, October 28, 2018. 

https:llwww. forbes.com/sitcs/panosmourdoukoutas/20 18/1 0/2 8/imf-could-either-kill-cpec-or-hclp-bui ld-itright/#6!7bf775cbc7 

3 
10 

that time, Pakistan stresses, the economic benefits of CPEC will be tangible and outweigh the 

costs of debt servicing. 

In the meantime, asking China for debt restructuring or loan forgiveness will always remain a 

fallback option. The project most likely to push Pakistan in that direction is the development of 

Gwadar Port. Pakistan must service the $16 billion in loans from Chinese banks to develop the 

port, free-trade zone, and associated infrastructure at a rate exceeding 13%, while over 90% in 

gross revenues and 85% from the surrounding free-trade zone will reportedly go to China.4 

However, in debt restructuring or forgiveness conversations, there is no guarantee China will 

follow any internationally-accepted standard. It does not adhere to multi lateral frameworks of 

debt relief, such as The Paris Club. Instead, China may use its economic influence over Pakistan 

to make a deal similar to the one it made with Sri Lanka. Unable to service a $8 billion loan at 

6% interest that financed the construction of llambantota Port, Sri Lanka entered a debt-forequity swap which involve transferring to China a 99-year lease for managing the poti. Some 

experts point out that the Sri Lanka example is an outlier in comparison to most examples of 

Chinese financing overseas.5 Still, it demonstrates the worse-case scenario of vulnerable 

countries falling under a China that is not yet fully integrated into the multilateral 

frameworks and international standards many creditor countries are obliged to follow. 

Debt servicing concerns arc not the only adverse effects of Chinese economic influence in 

Pakistan. The initial excitement among Pakistan's business community over CPEC's economic 

promise has now transformed into discontent with the government. Initially promoted as a 

mutually-beneficial partnership, many in the business community now view the initiative as a 

one-way street for China's economic benefit. Some business leaders claim they were not invited 

to the table on possible joint ventures or partnerships. They also point to the mostly one-way 

traffic of goods and people, with Pakistan's largest trade deficit being with China and the 

difticulty of the Pakistani trader community to obtain visas to China. 

Reports indicate that China is working on ways to improve the flow of people and goods, hinting 

at the extensive backroom policy work required to facilitate CPEC's ambitious goals. With the 

early harvest power plan and road projects now complete, China and Pakistan can now move to 

adjusting the policy framework to increase investments t!·om and exports to China. Despite the 

political hype and media frenzy, CPEC remains a long-term endeavor whose ultimate ambitions 

of connectivity depend on more than just construction of roads and ports and, in some cases, 

require an entire reevaluation of policy frameworks. 

The next phase will also include the development of the special economic zones across the 

country, in pmiicular the one surrounding the Gwadar Port in Balochistan province, as well as 

socioeconomic development and job growth efforts. The risks associated with this phase are well 

documented, the most significant of which remains the security challenges posed by protecting a 

greater number of Chinese workers in Pakistan. 

4 Bad terms: Pakistan's raw deal with China over Gwadar Port, November 29, 2017. https://cms.ati.ms/2017/llibadterms-pakistans-raw-deal-china-gwadar-port/ 

5 Is China the World's Loan Shark? April6, 20!9. https:i/www.nytimes.com/2019/04/26/opinion/ehina-belt-roadinitiative.html 

4 
11 

How China Plans to Secure Pakistan 

Improving the security environment is a primary impetus of CPEC. Since the late 1990s, ChinaPakistan economic ties have strengthened, partially due to a convergence of American, Pakistani, 

and Chinese security interests on the rising threat of Islamic radicalization. During former 

President Pervez Musharrat's tenure from 1999 to 2008, China began to view its ·'stake in 

Pakistan's economic success as a safeguard against the infiltration of Islamic radicalism into its 

restive Xinjiang province:'6 Likewise, Pakistan 

"began to recognize the need for economic growth as a remedy against the rising menace 

oflslamic radicalization within society and subsequent risk of state tailure ... This took on 

new urgency, not least because of pressure from Washington, following the September 11 

attacks on the US." 7 

When President As if Ali Zardari was elected in 2008, he continued where Musharraf left off. 

Despite the broadly held view in Pakistan that Zardari was unpopular with the Chinese, he took 

several private and official trips to China to discuss the possibility of many of the outcomes we 

witness today in CPEC. When the business-friendly government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif 

was elected in2013, the tenor of the China-Pakistan relationship became markedly more positive 

in both public and private settings and CPEC was born. 

Prime Minister Jmran Khan's 2018 electoral victory provoked questions about the sustainability 

of CPEC. Many in Pakistani political circles believed the initiative had been strengthened by 

Chinese closeness with and influence over the Sharif family. Even though he secured emergency 

loans from China in response to the current balance of payments crisis, Khan's attempts to build 

personal channels to the Chinese have yet to yield results. 

Though sometimes beneficial, civilians tend to play little role in advancing CPEC.8 The merging 

of Chinese economic and security interests in Pakistan brought Pakistani civilians into greater 

contact with China, but it never changed the fact that the Pakistani military remains the primary 

steward of the China relationship and driver ofCPEC. Its private channels with China allow the 

military to streamline CPEC projects that directly advance the military's financial and strategic 

interests. 

For example, CPEC describes the Pakistani-owned and Chinese-operated Gwadar Port as a pillar 

of its regional economic connectivity vision. But the g1·owing Chinese military presence there 

and sales of Chinese submarines to Pakistan suggest a deeper military cooperation 

previously undisclosed as part of CPEC. All this directly serves to strategically pressure 

6 Matthias Hartpence, ·'The economic dimensions of Sino-Pakistan relations: an overview'' in The Journal of 

Contemporary China September I. 2011; p. 583. 7 Shannon Tiezzi. "China Powers Up Pakistan: The Energy Component of the CPEC", January 13.2016, Available 

at: http:/ /thed iplomat.com/20 16/0 I I chi na-powers-up-pakistan-the-encrgy -component -o f-the-cpec/ (Accessed March 

I, 2016) 8 Even though the military is the primary drivers of CPEC, any progress will translate into a significant amount of 

work for civilian leaders in dealing with new policy frameworks and administrative actions to be taken. 

5 
12 

India to the benefit of China and Pakistan while triggering American fears about 

worsening U.S.-China tensions at sea.9 

Beyond maritime cooperation, news of China-Pakistan efforts to jointly build "navigation 

systems, radar systems and onboard weapons" in special economic zones inside Pakistan point to 

potential changes in Pakistani military capabilities that pose new strategic threats to the region. 

They may result in an even more intractable Pakistan for the United States to deal with on 

issues such as India, possibly leading to more brinksmanship in cross-border tensions and 

less interest in resuming dialogue. As Pakistan becomes less dependent on U.S. hardware and 

military assistance, CPEC offers it access to China's new hard power capabilities, including 

naval vessels, fighter jets, drones, nuclear warheads, tools of cyber warfare, and a variety of 

missiles. 

Other CPEC collaborations on security and technology promise to eliminate terrorism and make 

Pakistan safer. A fiber optic cable linking Rawalpindi to the Chinese border and a second link 

connecting the Gwadar Port is expected to provide information for CPEC projects as well as 

utility in environmental protection, disaster management, and emergency response. Another 

benefit of the satellites is that they may provide the military with a window into centers of 

activity around terrorism and militancy- and to avoid having its outbound traffic traverse India. 10 However, they could be also used to destabilize the political environment by increasing the 

likelihood of invasive data collection, misuse of information, and violations of privacy. 11 The 

same applies to CPEC's Safe Cities projects which, in partnership with Huawei, intend to secure 

multiple Pakistani cities from terrorism and violence by installing facial recognition software and 

cameras throughout urban areas. 

CPEC could effectively become the primary vehicle for China to export tools of authoritarianism 

and state control to Pakistan, threatening democratic culture, minorities, and political 

dissidents. 12 The notion that the Pakistani military might start to mimic Chinese authoritarianism 

is no longer theoretical. Already, since the signing of CPEC, Pakistani civil society and 

journalists in particular report more aggressive tactics by the military to silence critical voices. 

Indeed, during my last trip in February, I heard a common refrain among the voices of politics, 

culture, and media in the several cities I visited: the militarv is more powerfitl than ever- and 

that's because of'China. 

9 China's 'Belt and Road' Plan in Pakistan Takes a :'v!ilitary Tum. December 19, 2018. 

https:!/www.nytimes.com/20 18/12/19/world/asia/pakistan-china-belt-road-military.html 

JO https :/ /www .eurasi areview .com/ 190720 18-double-edged-sword ·china-and-paki stan·l ink -up-with-fiber-opticcable-analysis/ 

11 "China has various reasons for wanting a terrestrial tiber optic fink with Pakistan, including its own limited 

number of submarine landing stations and international gateway exchanges which can serve as a bottleneck to future 

grO\-vth of internet traffic. This is especially true for the western provinces ... Moreover, China's telecom services to 

Africa need to be transferred in Europe, so there is certain hidden danger of the overall security" says the plan. 

Pakistan has four submarine cables to handle its internet traffic, but only one landing station, which raises security 

risks as well." hUps://www.dawn.com/nc\-vs/13331 01 

Ibid. "The proposal, confirmed by officials at the Ministry of Planning and Development, would expand China 

and Pakistan's current cooperation on the JF ~ 17 fighter jet, which is assembled at Pakistan's military-run Kamra 

Aeronautical Complex in Punjab Province. The Chinese-designed jets have given Pakistan an alternative to the 

American-built F-16 fighters that have become more difficult to obtain as Islamabad's relationship with Washington 

frays.'' 

6 
13 

While it may be powerful in suppressing its own people, the Pakistani military has a long way to 

go before the country is a safe place for the Chinese to operate, at least in the foreseeable future. 

The Pakistani military has devoted over 15,000 of its own troops to the protection of Chinese 

workers and firms, many of which are located in restive parts of the country. 13 But anti-state 

groups have still managed to kill numerous Chinese laborers working on CPEC projects since 

2014. We should expect such threats to grow as China plans for a much larger physical footprint 

in the area surrounding the Gwadar Port in Balochistan, where it plans to construct a nearly 4 

million square fool "International Port City" with an airport, multimillion dollar luxury golf 

resort, and "$!50-million gated community for the anticipated 500,000 Chinese professionals 

who will be located by 2022 and work in its proposed new financial district in Gwadar." 14 

For the roughly 260,000 Pakistanis who call Gwadar home, being outnumbered in their own 

territory by privileged Chinese nationals will no doubt be cause for concern. 15 For the Chinese 

arriving to live in their gated enclave. they will not be bothered by the Jack of fresh water, 

sporadic electricity, spikes of waterborne illness and hepatitis, and unavailability of medical 

doctors. The Pakistani military and its civilian counterparts will have facilitated their access to 

all the basic necessities of life and more. 

Planting the Seeds of Cultural Influence 

Now in its fourth year of application, CPEC activities have translated into tangible Chinese 

influence on the ground. Details about the Chinese footprint in Pakistan vary, but a source in 

Pakistan's foreign ministry "said about 71,000 Chinese nationals visited in 2016," and an 

immigration official stated that "27,596 visa extensions were granted to Chinese in that~ 

alone." 

Despite the growth of its physical footprint in Pakistan, China does not share the same cultural 

connections that the United States and Pakistan enjoy. From the English language to a 

western-education elite and affinity for American television, music, and media, the people 

of Pakistan arc far more familiar with western culture than they are with that of China. 

For the Chinese that currently reside in Pakistan, their short-term residency in the country 

(typically J -2 years) does not warrant assimilation, resulting in extremely limited interactions 

between Pakistanis and Chinese. 16 Pakistan's U.S.-educated westernized elite appear to view 

growing Chinese influence with concern, worrying that Pakistan's tilt towards China will 

13 The military f.1ces challenges in managing security along portions of the C'PEC route in disputed Kashmir and 

Balochistan, where there is an ongoing local insurgency against the Pakistani military. Chinese workers and citizens 

face specific threats from Pakistani Islamists and by Baluch nationalists who view China's presence as an extension 

ofPunjabi economic encroachment in the province. China also fears backlash fi·om its own Uighur separatists 

residing in Pakistan. Additionally, setting up a CPEC military unit is serious move by the military that testifies to 

ongoing Pakistani worries that ifCPEC implementation takes too long, is too dangerous, or is overly complicated, 

that China may pursue other options. such as routes in Iran. 14 https:/lthediplomat.com/2018/10/gwadar-emerging-polt-city-or-chinese-colony/ 15 Population ofGwadar Census 2017. http://www.pakinformation.com/population/gwadar.html 16 For details see "The Increasing Chinese Footprint in Islamabad,'' The llerald. accessed 5 May 2019. 

https://herald.dawn.com/ncws/1398787 

7 
14 

eliminate all options to engage a United States that is ramping up its heated global competition 

with China. 

But the consequences of tighter immigration controls in the United States after 9111, and the 

negative narratives associated with U.S. counterterrorism activities in Pakistan, have created 

space for political affinities, cultural exposure and appreciation, and educational opportunities to 

grow with China- and it is keen to take advantage of them. 

The CPEC-funded fiber-optic cable network will provide access to predetermined programs 

promoting Chinese culture to Pakistani households. At the China Market in Rawalpindi, the 

military cantonment city in the north, middle-class Pakistanis thank the Chinese for the ability to 

buy copies of luxury knock-off goods at affordable prices. 17 While English remains the language 

of choice among educated elites and those Pakistanis seeking to expand their financial 

opportunities, Chinese language learning is increasingly available to Pakistani children. The 

Roots International Schools in Pakistan offer a Chinese language curriculum for grades l-1 0 

with syllabus and materials provided by the Confucius Institute, based in the Pakistani capital of 

Islamabad. Lower and middle-class Pakistanis who cannot afford to travel to the United States 

for education or work now consider China a cheaper and politically friendlier destination. 18 

Despite the public downplaying of U.S. ties and growing Chinese influence, many Pakistani 

political insiders and government officials state the conn try is still keen to keep building a 

bilateral relationship with the Americans but do not think the United States is interested. 

As a result, some view the expanded relationship with China more as a compulsion than a 

choice. As one Pakistani official told me, "No one was willing to come help us during the 2013 

power shortages. China did.'' 

The Impact of Chinese Influence on U.S. Interests 

lfCPEC delivers on its stated promises, it will stabilize Pakistan's economic and security 

environment, albeit with unequal distribution of benefits to the country. lf it succeeds in its 

undisclosed strategic aims, as discussed in this testimony, it also portends immense geoeconomic and geopolitical advantages for China and Pakistan that stand to dwarf any comparable 

American influence- as long as the United States continues on its current policy trajectory 

in South Asia which lacks a comprehensive, integrated, and long-term economic and 

political vision of the region that advances present and future U.S. interests. 

Already, with the exception of Afghanistan, Chinese assistance and engagement outpaces that of 

the United States in all of the South Asian countries combined. While the United States under 

the Trump Administration certainly has the rhetoric to compete with China, it lacks the 

political will, financial resources, ability to assume risks, and interests-based vision needed 

to compete with Chinese influence ll Ia CPEC or BIU. 

17 '·Mother China: A Chinese Revolution Sweeps Across Pakistan'" https://herald.dawn.eom/news/1153413 18 "With almost 19,000 students from Pakistan studying in China in 2017, Pakistan is the ninth-largest source of 

China's international students. hJ!pJ;L/'Y'V'Y,d;ny~~\C9_mlll~\YgJ.ll.7973/19000-pakistani-stud~ntS:>!lli!y_il]g,j!J::sjlJnes_lt 

universities 

8 
15 

To be clear, a revitalized American approach to Pakistan should not aim to replace China's 

efforts or presence. Pakistan and China's respective economic and political engagements with 

other regional stakeholders, like Iran, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, and India, show they are not 

playing a zero-sum game and neither should the United States. Competing with China in this 

way will require the United States to think about the region as an interconnected network of 

economic, socio-cultural, political, and security relationships that inform one another. It means 

understanding that when China helps Pakistan build navy submarines, India will react in kind, 

and that U.S. policy must consider its own actions with each nation in parallel to regional 

dynamics. 

I trust that the American intelligence community continues to thoroughly analyze the world 

through complex prisms such as these, but that is not reflected in the Trump Administration's 

simplistic pressure tactics which, on the subject of this testimony, seeks to coerce China 

anywhere at any expense, and in the process holding all U.S. foreign policy hostage. 

Viewing CPEC in zero-sum terms means the United States will isolate itself from an historical 

process of regional economic integration that it cannot stop. And, the more Pakistanis buy into 

the view that the "sun is rising in the east and setting in the west," the further the United States 

will find itself locked out of productive channels and engagements with Pakistan and possibly 

other BRI countries. 

But we still in the early stages of growing Chinese influence in Pakistan and the United States 

can still engage and reshape it. Competing with Chinese influence will require the United States 

to use a combination of pressure tactics, use of multilateral platforms and mechanisms, 

revitalized bilateral ties, and creative thinking. Pakistan's pending request for a new stabilization 

package from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) offers one such example. 

Facing yet another balance of payments crisis, Pakistan asked the IMF for a multi-billion-dollar 

macroeconomic stability package. It might feel like Groundhog Day. since this is the l31

h 

Pakistani request for an IMF program since the late 1980s. But this request is different. Taking 

place in the midst of the expansive but opaque terms ofCPEC, it triggered U.S. Secretary of 

State Mike Pompeo to state that: 

''there's no rationale for IMF tax dollars, and associated with that American 

dollars that arc part of the IMF funding, for those to go to bail out Chinese 

bondholders or China itsclf." 19 

Secretary Pompeo is right. Why should the United States subsidize Pakistan's questionable debt 

deals with China? He promised to watch the IMF closely, implying that the United States could 

pressure the IMF to say no to Pakistan. But there's another angle to consider for why IMF dollars 

should go to Pakistan -they can demand insight into the nature of CPEC. The latest reporting 

from Pakistan suggests an IMF deal is imminent and that Pakistan finally acquiesced to one of 

'" https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imt~pakistan/us-pompeo-warns-against-imf~bailout-for-pakistan-that-aidschina-idUSKBNl KK2G5 

9 
16 

the last sticking points IMF demands of full disclosure of China-Pakistan financial cooperation 

and details on more than $6.5 billion of commercial loans since 2017.20 

Public statements about China's debt-trap diplomacy are not enough. They must be matched by 

coordination with the international community and multilateral partners who largely share the 

view that China's growing influence worldwide comes with significant economic and political 

risks to many countries. 

That being said, China itself assumes a great deal of risk itself when it enters places like Sri 

Lanka, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,just to name a few of the BRl countries where it has faced 

weak political leadership, threats to security of Chinese workers, and basic infrastructure 

challenges in pursuit of implementing its projects. 

It also has assumed certain policy risks by going outside of its traditional mantra of staying out 

of its partners politics. For example, China is involved in peace and reconciliation discussions 

with the Afghan Taliban and the Government of Afghanistan. Pakistan would probably like 

China to assume an intermediary role in future flare-ups between India and Pakistan. While 

China may privately advise Pakistan to minimize tensions, it is less likely to formally involved 

itself given the nature of its own relationship with India. 

In a variety of ways, the United States and its international partners have already attempted to do 

what China currently aims: to improve security by way of economic prosperity and connectivity 

in South Asia. The United States should welcome China assuming the region's economic, 

developmental, and policy risks on its behalf. It means that the United States is not the lone voice 

when whispering to the Pakistanis that they need to sort it out with India, or when they need to 

secure the border with Afghanistan. 

We should acknowledge, however, that while the security interests of China and the United 

States in South Asia do overlap for now, they are by no means shared. The two countries 

have different definitions of terrorism and of which groups within the region's toxic cocktail of 

militants are deemed terrorists. And ultimately, the United States and China have different 

ideological and practical approaches of how to pursue their security interests. The technologies 

and tools of authoritarianism that China intends to use to get there arc a direct threat to U.S. 

interests and should be tor Pakistan as well. We must also consider to what extent greater 

Chinese influence in Pakistan relates to the ongoing development of Pakistan's nuclear program, 

of which China continues to be a staunch supporter of. 

On the India-Pakistan front, some experts believe that an economically prosperous Pakistan will 

lind India less threatening and as a result, will minimize lndo-Pak tensions and result in a winwin for everyone, including the United States. A counter to this view is that Pakistan's Chineseenhanced military capabilities coincide with a deepening anti-Muslim Hindu nationalism 

movement in India, acknowledgement and fears of which has taken root in the Pakistani military 

and other policy circles. This could lead both countries to become further entrenched in their 

20 This would include infrastructure development assistance, nuclear power plants, joint manufacturing of 

warplanes, and procurement of submarines; https:l/www.rferl.orglalimf-team:to-visii:R.<lliistan_:JjJH<\lig;.-on-suppoi1: 

llil£!<.ag&L298820 l7.html 

10 
17 

hostile positions rather than soften them, especially if political strength of the governments 

depends on reacting strongly to religious tensions. Ultimately, we should not presume that 

economic factors alone can solve regional conflicts that are rooted in complex histories and 

politics. 

Chinese influence in Pakistan changes the rules of the game for the United States and other 

countries seeking engagement and cooperation with Pakistan. The parameters within which the 

United States and Pakistan have dealt with one another since 9/11 have largely been defined on 

American terms and Pakistani acquiescence. But they may now come to be defined increasingly 

by Chinese ones as well. The United States must be prepared for how that transforms the 

political, economic, and cultural systems that it has become accustomed to understanding and 

working with in Pakistan. Simply put. after CPEC is said and done, what kind of Pakistan does 

the United States want to end up having to contend with and, more importantly, why? 

Growing Chinese influence begs for a sustained American eftcxt to observe and collect 

information (intelligence and otherwise) on the actual economic, political, and cultural impacts 

of CPEC. It also demands different kind of foreign aid and suite of policy measures in Pakistan 

that speak beyond counterterrorism and Afghanistan to include a focus on the institutions, 

stakeholders, and values most threatened by Chinese influence. 

As this testimony shows, the door is not shut for the United States in Pakistan. Despite its 

complicated historical relationship with the United States, Pakistan understands it is not in a 

position to isolate the United States through China. The United States should consider the arrival 

of CPEC as a reminder of its failure to think long-term and strategically about a part of the world 

it can no longer ignore. Rethinking U.S. policy in South Asia will not only contend with growing 

Chinese influence, it will also ensure that the United States does not become an afterthought in 

the region's new competitive geopolitical environment. 

II 
18 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

Dan Kliman—Dr. Dan Kliman, when we invited him, was with 

the Center for a New American Security. I believe just yesterday, 

he became director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at CNAS. 

Dr. KLIMAN. 

STATEMENT OF DANIEL KLIMAN, PH.D., SENIOR FELLOW, 

ASIA-PACIFIC SECURITY PROGRAM, CENTER FOR A NEW 

AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. KLIMAN. Thank you very much, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Yoho, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I 

am grateful for this opportunity to be here today to speak to China’s expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific. Today I will focus my 

remarks on Southeast Asia. 

If Southeast Asia succumbs to China’s vision of a world defined 

by might makes right—might makes right, State-driven economic 

interactions, and creeping authoritarianism, America’s approach to 

the larger challenge posed by China in the Indo-Pacific and beyond 

will encounter a significant setback. Conversely, if most nations in 

Southeast Asia can chart their own freedom of choice and move toward more democratic types of governance, the United States will 

demonstrate in Beijing’s periphery that a rules-based order can 

still endure. The stakes could not be higher. 

I want to now make five quick observations about the regional 

State of play. First, Beijing has adopted an approach to Southeast 

Asia that leverages every instrument of national power. Second, 

physical and digital connectivity has emerged as a key component 

of China’s approach to the region. Third, China is corroding democracy in Southeast Asia. Under what it now calls the Digital Silk 

Road, China is exporting technology to the region for surveillance 

and censorship, and also promoting its model of online governance. 

Fourth, Southeast Asia generally perceives that China has momentum on its side, which brings me to my fifth point, that the reality is more nuanced. The United States retains significant 

strengths in the region, both diplomatic and economic, and most 

countries in Southeast Asia do not want to see a Chinese sphere 

of influence extended over their region. 

Today, America’s approach to Southeast Asia contains a number 

of promising areas, but falls well short of matching the scope and 

scale of the China challenge. Here are 10 steps that Congress could 

take to strengthen America’s approach going forward. First, Congress should appropriate resources to establish a new U.S. digital 

development fund that would support information connectivity 

projects across the developing world, including in Southeast Asia. 

This fund, potentially through leveraging lines of credit, could drive 

down the price of American digital infrastructure to the point 

where they could compete with Chinese companies like Huawei. 

Second, Congress, through its oversight function, should encourage the executive branch to come together with U.S. ally and partner governments around an international certification for highquality infrastructure. A clear set of criteria defining high quality 

would both help U.S. firms differentiate what they offer and also 

serve as a basis for countries in Southeast Asia to evaluate potential Chinese projects. 
19 

Third, Congress should convene a hearing to weigh the merits of 

future high-quality, multilateral trade and investment agreements. 

Fourth, Congress should host U.S. industry executives to explore 

the possibility of opening a wing of a marquee U.S. hospital in the 

Philippines or Indonesia. Given the lack of a world-class health 

system in these countries, a U.S. medical presence would deliver 

significant diplomatic payoffs. 

Fifth, Congress should appropriate additional funds to enhance 

youth engagement with Southeast Asia as people-to-people ties are 

fundamental to U.S. engagement with the region. 

Sixth, congressional delegations to Tokyo, Canberra, and New 

Delhi should emphasize the importance of cooperation with these 

countries in Southeast Asia. 

Seventh, Congress should send a letter to the Secretary of Defense requesting a classified briefing on U.S. military options to 

supplement freedom of navigation operations in the South China 

Sea. During this briefing, Members should encourage the Department to deploy new types of capabilities to the region that demonstrate the flexibility of America’s military presence. 

Eighth, Congress, recognizing Vietnam’s strategic importance, 

should exempt it from CAATSA sanctions, and also hold a hearing 

on how to strike the right balance between advancing America’s relationship with Hanoi and also upholding human rights. 

Ninth, Congress should submit a letter to the Secretary of State 

to request an update on the U.S. Government’s efforts to help countries in Southeast Asia both detect and counter Chinese 

disinformation campaigns. 

And then tenth and finally, Congress should appropriate additional resources to strengthening civil society, rule of law, and freedom of the press in Southeast Asia. Even a modest increase in U.S. 

funding would go a long way toward shoring up these countries 

against China’s influence. 

I will end there, and thank you again for this opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kliman follows:] 
20 

Centerfora 

New American 

Security 

Addressing China's Influence in Southeast Asia: 

America's Approach and the Role of Congress 

Prepared statement by 

Daniel Kliman" 

Acting Program Director and Senior Fellow 

Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security 

Before the 

U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs 

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation 

Hearing on "Cbina's Gt·owing Influence in Asia and the United States" 

I. WHY SOUTHEAST ASIA 

illiberalism outward. 

and Kristine Lee . J arn indebted to t1wm. 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. 

1152 15th Street NW 

Swte 950 

Washington, DC 20005 

May 8, 2019 

CNAS.org / (Ci:,CNASdc 

T: 202.457. 9400 

F: 202.457.9401 
21 

II. CHINA'S APPROACH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA 

This se-c-tion contains three obsetTations about China's approach to the region. 

1) 

2) 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. • 

115215th Street NW, Suite 950, Washington, DC 200.05 

T: 202.457.9400 I F: 202.457.9401 I CNAS.org I raCNASdc 
22 

III. THE REGIONAL STATE OF PlAY 

This section makes three obserYatiom about regional dynamics and trends in Southeast i\;;;ia amid U.S.-China 

great po1.-vcr compctttJOn. 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. 

' 

115215th Street NW Swte 950. Washington, DC 200.05 

T: 202A57.9400 I F: 202.457.9401 I CNAS.org 1 ~O'CNASdc 
23 

g,;;;nn '"""'' "<")n, Belt, One Road." This occurred against the 

backdrop of Partnership (fPP) trade and investment 

agreement and left Southeast Asian countries ·without a r~~rcei\Td economic aiternatiw to China. Beijing's 

narrativ(~ to publics and elites across reinforces its actiom on the ground, emphasi;-ing the 

need to accept China's ine<ci<al)le:lscent 

2) 

3) 

IV. GETTING AMERICA'S AI'l'ROACH TO SOUTHEAST ASIA RIGHT 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. • 

1152 15th Street NW, Suite 950, Washington, DC 20005 

T: 202.457.9400 I F: 202A57.9401 I CNAS.org I i,YCNASdc 
24 

vital 

u ·'· osclll<ttlon mab~: a~:;:~~1;~;~)~i~~; ·:,\~ c~a ss·' > t~S~r7,;,;~~ ':~:~~;j~';;:~ aho fed broader concerns that America's approach to thcwirlerlndct-Pacifi>: could 

centrality.:" 

bca"s f>rintan· rcttpotosil:tilit<; fou\mcr:ican foreign policy, Congrec;s can play a 

co •'•tnccncas"'·""· fhit>SC<:tion tuclvances ten targeted 

1) Congress should convene hearings to weigh the merits of the United States rejoining the TPPnow called the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 

(CPTPP).19 

For countries in Southeast 1\sia, U.S. participation in multibtcral trade and im·cstrncn>t a;,rccmctttsrcrrtains 

the gold st;mdard 

there is a unique opportunity for members 

for domestic audiences between China\ 

Jj,-cJiboods 

allies and partners.2n 

2) Congress through its oversight function should encourage the executive branch to come 

together with U.S. ally and partner governments around an international certification for high~ 

quality infrastructure. 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. 

' 

1152 15th Street NW Suite 950, Washington, DC 200.05 

T. 202.457.9400 I F. 202.457.9401 I CNAS.org I (CKNASdc 
25 

3) Congress should appropriate resources to establish a new U.S. digital development fund that 

would support information connectivity projects across the deve1oping world, including 

Southeast Asia. 

and privacy.22 

4) Congress should call for the U.S. government to elevate health care as an area for engagement 

with Southeast Asia. 

5) Congress should appropriate additional funds to enhance youth engagement "\\':ith the region. 

6) Congress should promote cooperation between the lJnited States and its Indo-Pacific allies and 

partners in Southeast Asia. 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. • 

115215th Street NW, Swtc 950, Washington. DC 200.05 

T: 202.457.9400 ! F. 202.457.9401 ! CNAS.org ! tO'CNASdc 
26 

7) Congress should encourage the U.S. Department of Defense to supplement FONOPs in the 

South China Sea. 

presence.:~ 

8) Congress should revisit U.S.-Vietnam relations through the prism of great power competition 

with China in Southeast Asia. 

I Ianoi and upholding American \'alucsY' 

Information and Values 

9) Congress should conduct oversight of U.S. government efforts in Southeast Asia to bolster 

resilience to Chinese disinformation campaigns. 

10) Congress should appropriate additional resources for the National Endo\vmcnt for Democracy, 

the National Democratic Institute, and International Republican Institute, expressly for 

strengthening good governance in Southeast Asia. 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. • 

1152 15th Street NW. Su1te 950. Washington, DC 200.05 

T. 202.457.9400 I F: 202 457.9401 I CNAS.org I (i'-'CNASdc 
27 

Biography 

Daniel Kliman 

Acting Progran1 Director and Senior Fellow 

Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security 

Univcr:;it\cand holds a BA in Political Science from 

Stanford l)ni•,w;,itycHc Jiv,es in" a1;hn>glc•n, JCJC, with t'i"vifc and daughter. 

Bold. Innovative. Bipartisan. 11521Sth Strc0t NW, Suite 950, Washington, DC 20005 

T: 202.457.9400 I I CNAS.org I \?'CNASdc 
28 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. And I am particularly interested in 

the idea of the U.S. Government setting standards for a high-quality infrastructure. That was perhaps the least expensive but I 

think one of the most intriguing of your suggestions. 

We will now go on to Peter Mattis, who is a research fellow in 

China studies at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation. 

STATEMENT OF PETER MATTIS, RESEARCH FELLOW IN CHINA 

STUDIES, VICTIMS OF COMMUNISM MEMORIAL FOUNDATION 

Mr. MATTIS. Thank you, Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member 

Yoho, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. It is a 

pleasure and an honor to return to the subcommittee today to 

speak on this particular topic. 

I will make a few points before going on to the impact on the 

United States. The first is that the Chinese Communist Party attempts to build political influence on a global scale to bring about, 

first, the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which essentially means China’s rise on its terms and its way while maintaining its own political system. And the second is to keep the Chinese 

Communist Party in power to do that. 

The party’s view of threat is defined by its absence, the absence 

of threats to the party’s ability to govern, which when you think 

about that is a very expansive definition. We think of national security as being our ability to manage threats and resilience in the 

face of catastrophe. The absence of threats is a never-ending goal 

that forces them to look outward. 

The second aspect of it that is important is that threats to the 

party’s ability to govern includes the world of ideas. What does the 

party say that those ideas that are threatening? It includes freedom of press, freedom of association, academic freedom, rule of law, 

constitutionalism, among many others. So as long as these are 

practiced somewhere and can be translated or transmitted into the 

PRC, then there is going to be conflict and there is going to be an 

effort by the party to reach out. 

This effort to shape the world beyond the party is part of the 

party’s day-to-day routine. It is not an influence campaign. It is not 

a one-off operation. It is simply what the party does. It is visible 

in the structure, it is visible in the resources, it is visible in the 

staff. Wherever you see a party committee, whether it is at the center of the Chinese Communist Party itself, whether it is in a ministry, whether it is in a State-owned enterprise, or whether it is in 

a joint venture, you are likely to find a piece of this influence effort 

being bureaucratically designated inside that apparatus. 

So since, again, wherever the party is, this is something that you 

are going to find and see, how have these efforts affected us? We 

have been persuaded that the Chinese Communist Party is not ideological, it is not Marxist or Leninist, but is really some variation 

of capitalist. We have not responded to violence, coercion, or intimidation by or instigated by PRC officials against U.S. citizens and 

residents on U.S. soil. We often debate our China policy in binary 

terms, engagement versus containment, a trade war versus negotiation, accommodation versus war. 
29 

And last, we are persuaded that China’s rise is inevitable, not 

something that is contingent, meaning we do actually have choices 

and we do have options and we have not given up our agency. 

What is the harm of not dealing with these kinds of operations? 

The most obvious one to me is that when elected representatives 

in a democracy go through the Chinese Communist Party proxy 

groups that are operating in the U.S. or Australia or wherever else, 

and that is their access to their ethnically Chinese constituents, 

you are becoming a tool of the party, because those images that are 

transmitted back into China paint the picture that the West cares 

about liberalism and protection of human rights for themselves, but 

it does not matter for Chinese people. They are becoming political 

props that the party can hold up and say, see here, they could rescue you, they are on our side. 

The second major piece of harm is that they distort the marketplace of ideas, whether it is the kind of examples that Chairman 

Sherman pointed out with Hollywood, or it is the effort to control 

Chinese language media platforms, or to influence what think 

tanks and research institutes and universities are doing and saying. It is not that they are necessarily just turning these things 

into propaganda platforms, but they are ensuring that critical 

voices and the full spectrum of views are not aired, thereby distorting the debate. 

A key part of this influence effort is not about the dissemination 

of disinformation or propaganda. It is about the medium and controlling the medium before dealing with the message. How should 

we deal with this going forward? I would offer a couple of principles. The first is that we need transparency, a conversation/discussion about what the party is doing, what people’s interactions 

with the party are, what kind of money they take and for what 

purpose. 

The second is that consequences create risk. Beijing has not overstepped. It has not gone too far, because it has not faced consequences. Until there are real consequences for these issues, there 

will never actually be a risk that they have to take into account. 

And the third and final one is simply that if you think about a 

foreign political party operating in our communities and on our 

streets, this is as much a civil liberties issue as it is a national security one, and so we should use the full toolkit of the U.S. Government to protect our citizens and to preserve the integrity of our democracy. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mattis follows:] 
30 

"China's Growing Influence in Asia and the United States" 

May 8, 2019 

I. OVERVIEW 

l-1 ou.fe Foreign ~4flair:r Committee 

Subcommittee on Aiia, tbe and Nonpro!ij'eration 

Prepared statement by 

Peter Mattis 

Research fellow, China Studies 

Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation 

Chairman Sherman, Ranking member Yoho, distinguished members of the Committee, thank you 

for inviting me to appear before you again~ The Chinese Communist Party's influence and, 

particularly, its political interference in the United States is an important topic as we establish a new 

baseline for l'.S~-China relations~ Any sustainable, long-term strategy for addressing China's 

challenge requires the integrity of U.S. political and policymaking processes. This requires grappling 

with the challenges posed by the party's efforts to shape the United States by interfering in our 

politics and domestic affairs. 

The United States, its political and business elite, its thinkers, and its Chinese communities have long 

been targets for the Chinese Communist Party. The party employs tools that go well beyond 

traditional public diplomacy efforts. Often these tools lead to acti,-ities that are, in the words of 

fonncr Australian pritne n1inistcr JVIalcohn Turnbull, corrupt, coyert, and/or coerci\·c. NcYcrtheless, 

many activities are not co\-ered by Turnbull's three "Cs" but arc still concerning and undermine the 

ability of the United States to comprehend and address Beijing's challenge. 

r !ere arc a fc"- of the ways in which the Chinese Communist Party has shaped the ways in which 

Americans discuss, undetstand, and respond to the People's Republic of China, its rise, and its 

activities: 

• \Vc ba,-c been persuaded that the Chinese Communist Party is not ideological and has 

substituted its Leninist tradition for a variation of capitalism. 

• \\lc haYe not responded to violence, coercion, and intinlldation con1n1itted or instig::ttcd by 

PRC officials on U.S. soil. These are allegedly criminal acts committed by a foreign 
31 

gm'etnment against our people on our soil, and U.S. authorities did not open criminal 

investigations. 

• We have not responded to PRC education officials intimidating Chinese students on 

university campuses, despite this activ'ity not being consistent with their diplomatic status. 

• \Ve hav'e changed our laws at the state level to facilitate the Confucius Institute program to 

help the party build heachhcads inside universities. 

• \\' e often debate our policy options toward China in bioary terms: engagement vs 

containtuent; trade war or negotiation~ accon1tnodation or war; etc. 

Most of my statement will focus on the policies and actions of the Chinese Communist Party for 

two reasons. First, as Americans, we arc still not prepared to accept the party has sought to shape 

and influence U.S. political and business elite for decades. \\1e arc still in a process of building 

awareness and consensus about the nature of the problem. Second, it is not my place to name names 

of individuals and institutions before Congress. The U.S. Government has the resources and 

authority to investigate and analyze the party's challenge. 

The central element to understanding what the Chinese Communist Party is doing and why to shape 

the world outside the party is united front work. Mao Zedong described the purpose of this work as 

mobilizing the party's friends to strike at the party's enemies. In a more specific definition from a 

paper in the 1950s, the Central Intelligence Agency defined united front work as "a technigue for 

controlling, mobilizing, and utilizing non-communist masses." Put another way, united front policy 

addresses the party's relationship with and guidance of any social group outside the party. The most 

important point here is that what needs to be shaped is not just the Chinese people or world outside 

the People's Republic of China, but rather those outside the party. 

Cnited front work also is a tool of political struggle. It is not just a gt~cstion of activities that we 

would call propaganda or public diplomacy. Nor is it limited to what we would call covert action. i\s 

i\ho wrote in 1939: "Our eighteen years of experience show that the united iront and armed 

struggle are the two basic weapons for defeating the enemy. The united front is a united front for 

carrying on armed struggle. And the Party is the heroic warrior wielding the two weapons, the united 

front and the armed struggle, to storm and shatter the enemy's positions. That is how the three are 

related to each other." Mao's basic framing of united front work within the party's toolbox remains 

the core understanding \\~thin the party today. Jiang Zcmin, Hu .Jintao, and Xi Jinping all have 

characterized united front work as a "magic weapon" to facilitate China's rise in the midst of an 

international ideological battleground. 

United front acti\·itics help the party resolve several dilemmas of the post-Mao era and that became 

ever more apparent after the Tiananmcn Massacre and the passing of Dcng Xiaoping. These are 
32 

fundamental questions for the Chinese Communist Party, and they speak to why the party mnst 

spend so much effort trying to shape the world beyond the membership of the party. 

1. How to moti,·atc and mobili%e the Chinese population without the ideological fervor of the 

Mao Zcdong era? 

2. How to benefit from the outside world while screening out influences and ideas that might 

damage the party's positions? 

3. How to enlist the outside world in supporting China's rise and keeping those doors open 

even as the party continues to be reprcssi,·e? 

IL MAGIC WEAPON FOR NATIONAL REJUVENATION 

Achieving the "Great Rcjm•enation of the Chinese Nation" (!f:lil" ~~1'f.i:k ;l~) has two 

significant components. The first is making China a great power "~th global reach. The second is 

doing so vvith the Chinese Communist Party at the helm. 

The party defines the "Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" as ha,·ing three components. The 

first is building "a great, modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally 

advanced, harmonious, and beautiful." Although many of these words are sdf~explanatory, others 

like democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious mean something very different in the party's 

context than in the American context. "Democratic" is consultativ·e democracy in which the party 

leads, and other political inputs arc provided through controlled mechanisms like the united front 

policy system. "Culturally advanced" and "harmonious" define the party's relationship vv~th society 

and the vvays in which Chinese people conduct themselves. The second is national reunification of 

all areas claimed by Beijing, regardless whether they were traditionally by China. The third is China's 

emergence as a global leader in terms of comprehensive national power and international influence. 

The following quote from XiJinping in 2016 explains what united front work is intended to 

accomplish in bringing together a unity of effort. When U.S. intelligence officials describe Beijing as 

presenting a "whole-of·society" challenge, they arc describing an important clement of what the 

united front policy system is doing. 

"Attaining the ''I\vo Centenary (;oals' requires that our entire society works together 

in one heart and one mind. It rcc]nires that people of all ethnic groups focus their 

thoughts and their efforts towards the same goal. A society that lacks common 

ideals, goals, and values, and that finds itself in pennanent disorder will never achieve 

anything. China has a population of more than 1.3 billion people, and neither the 

people nor the country would benefit if we ended up like that. To attain our goals ... 

[we must rally! all Chinese people under the leadership of the Chinese Communist 
33 

Party, and motivating all parties to engage in a concerted effort to bring about the 

rejuYcnation of the Chinese nation." 

The United Front \vork Department, the executive agency for conducting and coordinating these 

operations, prodded a similar description of its purpose and activities: 

"The history of China and foreign countries shows that whether a political power or 

a political party is good or not, its success or failure ultimately depends on the back 

of the people. Paying attention to the people's sentiments, obeying the public's will, 

striving for the people's hearts, maintaining proper t1csh-and··blood ties with the 

masses, and "\vinning the sincere support of the rnasses is a solid foundation for our 

country's long-term stability and a fundamental guarantee for the sure victory of our 

cause." 

The second important component of the "Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation" is 

maintaining the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. The most important threats to party 

that must be addressed arc the diaspora communities and potentially threatening great powers. The 

former hav·e the cultural knowledge to introduce subvcrsiv·e ideas that resonate. The latter ha\'e the 

material power to undermine or topple the party-state. 

The desire to control the political landscape and protect the party's position found clear definition in 

China's National Security Law (2015). The law describes security in broad terms that go well beyond 

physical threats to the territory of the PRC Security comes from the inside out. 1\rticles Two and 

Three of the law stare: "National security refers to the relative absence of international or domestic 

threats to the state's po,vcr to govern, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, the '\vel fare of the 

people, sustainable economic and social development, and other major national interests, and the 

ability to ensure a continued state of security. National security efforts shall adhere to a 

comprehensive understanding of national security, make the security of the People their goal, 

political security their basis and cconotnic security their foun(b tion; rnakc n1i1itary, cultural and social 

security their safeguard .. 

This ddinition has two notable features. First, security is detined by the absence of threats, not by 

the ability to manage them. This unlimited view pushes the Chinese Communist Party toward 

preempting threats and preventing their emergence. Second, security issues extend to the domain of 

ideas-what people think is potentially dangerous. The combination of these themes -preemption 

in the world of ideas creates an imperative for the party to alter the world in which it 

operates-to shape how China and its current party-state are understood in the minds of foreign 

elites. 
34 

()ne way of n1aking this n1ore concrete is to look at party docutncnts about security threats. In 1\pril 

2013, "Document No. 9"- "Communique on the Cmrent State of the Ideological Sphere" 

identitled ideas that undermine the party-state's security. Among them were the promotion of 

constitutional democracy, civil society, and \\7cstcrn concepts of journalism. In the circular's final 

paragraph, it stated the party should "allow absolutely no opportunity m outlets for incorrect 

thinking or vie" -points to spread." Although it would be easy to dismiss this document as a one-off 

or unenforced, in 2015 Beijing abducted and held five Hong Kong booksellers, including foreign 

passport holders, who sold books ostensibly banned in China. Moreover, Beijing issued new 

regulations on counter-espionage last December that clarified the Counter-espionage Law (2014) 

and defined activities threatening national security apart from espionage. "\mong these was 

"fabricating or distorting facts, publishing or disseminating words or information that endanger state 

security.'' Influencing the outside world, therefore, is not just a historical activity of the party, but an 

ongoing requirement for national security as defined by the party-state. 

III. INTRINSIC TO THE PARTY'S DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS' 

The Chinese Communist Party's management of political int1ucncc operations- evaluated on the 

basis of the united front policy system- runs to the very top of partJ, involving senior leaders 

directly. The policy systems extends through the party's hierarchy and spills owr into the 

gm'crnment ministries of the People's Republic of China as well as other state-owned and 

-administered organizations. Put simply, united front work is conducted wherever the party is 

present. Morcm·cr, united li·ont work is not an "influence operation" or a campaign. It is the 

day-to-day work of the party. There arc not special orders explaining what to do to achieve what 

objectives or the equivalents of a presidential finding. 

At the leadership level, four elements point to the importance of united front work and shaping the 

\.vorld outside the Chinese Cotnmunist Party. 

1. A Politburo Standin1' Committee Member OnTsees United Front \1/ork: The seniot-most 

united front official is the Chinese People's Political ConsultatiYe Conference (CPPCC) 

chairman, who is the fourth-ranking PBSC member. A look at the leaders who have held the 

Cl'PCC chairmanship suggests that \\'estern observers ha\·e been far too quick to condemn 

the CPPCC as a mostly-useless advisory body. The list is a who's who of the party, including 

Research, 2018). 
35 

1\Iao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, and Li Xiannian. The current CPPCC chairman, 

\Yang Yang, continues a tradition of competent leadership at the top of the united front 

system. I Ie exemplifies the need of united front personnel to be highly-disciplined party 

cadre, who are nonetheless capable of handling themselves among di,·erse people and 

feigning ideological flexibility. 

2. i\ State Council Vice Premier !las a United Front Portfolio: The vice premier position 

setTes as the bridge between the party ccnl"er and the State Council ministries. The vice 

premier prm·ides prestige to rhe united front system as well as a necessary position of 

authority to direct and coordinate the ministries' united front actiYities. The position often 

looks as though the portfolio cover·s education and cultme, because of the overlap with 

united front work. At meetings of the united front policv system. this vice premier appears 

in protocol order between the CPPCC chairman and Cnitcd Front \\'ork Department 

director. Currently, the position is held by Sun Chunlan. 

3. Two Members of the Central Secretariat Have Unit~ed Front Policy Roles: The directors of 

the party's l.'nited Front \\"ork Department (UFWD) and Propaganda Department serve on 

both the Politburo and the Secretariat of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist 

Party of China. Because the Politburo does not meet regularly-its far-flung membership 

includes both central party bureaucrats and prm·incial party secretaries-the secretariat is 

empowered to make day-to-day decisions related to policy that has already been settled. This 

group is also responsible for moving paperwork among the central leaders and coordinating 

the party's actions. Secretariat membership is not related to relationships that the current 

UF\vl) and propaganda chiefs-rcspecti\-cly, You Quan and !luang Kunming-have but 

rather reflects the strncture of post-Deng Xiaoping politics. 

4. In 2015 Xi linping Established a United Front Leading Small Group: i\s part of the effort 

1·evltali7.e and bettet coordinate united front activities under Xi Jinping~ the party established 

a leading small group. It functions as platform to coordinate and raise the status of united 

ftont \.vork across the bureaucracy, bringing together senior officials frorn nutnerous state 

and party agencies for united front study tout·s across China. Interestingly, the last time the 

patty created a united front leading small group in 1986 under the leadership of Xi 

Jinping's father Xi Zhongxun -it coincided with a similar description of problems to be 

resoked: expanding scope and responsibilities coinciding with a lack of central direction. 

The Chinese Communist Party bureaucracy at the centralle,·cl has four key bodies for building and 

exercising political int1ucncc outside the party- and especially outside China. The United front 

\Vork and the Propaganda departments also have subordinate clements at the provincial and local 

levels. 
36 

1. United Front \\'ork Department: The CF\VD is the executive and coordinating agency for 

united front work. T t has a variety of responsibilities at home and abroad, including in the 

following areas: Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan affairs; ethnic and religious affairs; 

domestic and external propaganda; entrepreneurs and non~ party personages; intellectuals; 

and peoplc~to~people exchanges.17 The department also takes the lead in establishing party 

committees in Chinese and now foreign businesses. The UF\\D operates at allln·els of the 

party system from the center to the grassroots, and the CCP has had a united front 

department dating to the 1930s. 

2. Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC): The CPPCC, according to the 

organization's website, is "an organization in the patriotic united front of the Chinese 

people, an important organ for multiparty cooperation and political consultation." The 

advisory body mediates between important socials groups and the party apparatus. The 

CPPCC is the place where all the relevant united front actors inside and outside the party 

come together: party elders, intelligence officers, diplomats, propagandists, military officers 

and political commissars, united front workers, academics, and businesspeople. They are 

gathered to receive instruction in the proper propaganda lines and ways to characterize 

Beijing's policies to both domestic and foreign audiences. Many of these individuals, 

particularly if they hold government positions, arc known for their people~handling skills and 

ha\"t reputations for being smooth operators. CPPCC membership offers access to political 

circles, political protection for business, and minor perquisites like expedited immigration. 

The CPPCC standing committee includes twenty or so vice chairpeople who ha\"C a protocol 

rank roughly cquinlent to a provincial party secretarv. At the central level, the CPPCC 

includes more than 2,200 members, but the provincial and local levels include another 

615,000. 

3. International (Liaison) Depat·tment: The Tnternationol Depa1'tment, founded in1951, is the 

party's diplomatic arm, handling relationships with more than 600 political parties and 

organizations as well as indi\·idual, primarily political, elites. The department pre,·iously 

handled the CCP's relationships between fraternal Communist parties and cultivated splinter 

factions of Moscow~dominatecl Communist parties after the Sino~Soviet split. The acth-ist 

bent of the International Department disappeared as the department began re~establishing 

itself in 1970-71 following the tumultuous early years of the Cultural Revolution. 

Interestingly, the department originated as a UF\'(1) bureau before being carved out into an 

independent entity. 

4. Propaganda Department: The Propaganda Department has been a core part of the CCI' 

since 1924. The ofticial description of its duties includes conducting the party's theoretical 
37 

research; guiding public opinion; guiding and coordinating the work of the central news 

agencies, including Xinhua and the People's Daily; guiding the propaganda and cultural 

systems; and administering the Cyberspace Administration of China and the State 

Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film, and Television. The Propaganda 

Department cannot be regarded as an entit·ely internal organization that broadcasts outward 

to the extent that it is itwoln:d in influence· building abroad. For example, China Radio 

International developed in the 2000s a covert international network of radio stations to hide 

the CCP's direct role in broadcasting Chinese· language propaganda inside target countries. 

The Propaganda Department presumably also plays a role in the cooptation, intimidation, 

and purchase of Chincse·langungc print media outside China. 

The State Council ministries and many other organizations with a party committee also conduct 

united front work. These organintions all offer unique platforms and capabilities that the united 

front policy system can draw upon for operational purposes. Below are a few of the examples of the 

organizations outside the party that perform united front work or have united front work 

departments attached to their party committee: 

1. Ministry of State Security 

2. )\'finis try of Foreign .r\ft'airs 

3. Ministry of Civil Affairs 

4. 1\linistry of Education 

5. :\Jinistry of Culture and Tourism 

6. Chinese Academy of Sciences 

7. China Baowu Steel Croup 

8. China National Overseas Oil Corporation (CNOOC) 

9. State·owncd Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 

IV. WHAT IS THE HARM? 

The harm caused by Beijing's political influence and united front operations takes sC\'eral forms, 

even if we accept many of these activities as being legitimate actions of a foreign state inside the 

Cnited States or other countries. 

1. \\'estern Politicians Become Symbols for the Chinese Communist Party's Rule: By using 

party·controlled community organizations for their outreach to ethnically-Chinese 

constituents, \\.'estern politicians become propaganda fodder for the Chinese Communist 

Party. Politically-aware Chinese in the People's Republic of China (and sometimes abroad) 

can rccogni7.c these groups for what they arc: pawns of the party. The reason for the 
38 

publicity surrounding these meetings and fundraisers is to broadcast back into China the 

message that \vestem politicians care about liberalism at home, but not for Chinese people, 

and that thev stand on the side of the party. They reinforce the image of the party's strength. 

Vacla'' Havel captured this dynamic in his essay The Pon,er o{!be Ponwkr.r by describing a 

greengrocer placing a slogan of regime loyalty in his shop \\~ndow. He does not bclie,·e in 

the regime or its ideology, but he does so to make his life a little bit easier. Nor do people 

necessarily notice or read the slogan, because sin1ilar slogans can be "found in other shop 

windo\vs, on latnpposts, bulletin boards, in aparttncnt windo\vs, and on buildings." The 

presence of these slogans becomes part of the "panorama of even·day life." This panorama 

"reminds people where they arc living and what is expected of them. It tells them what 

everyone else is doing, and indicates to them what they must do as well, if they don't want to 

be excluded, to fall into isolation, alienate themselves from society, break the rules of the 

game, and risk the loss of their peace and tranquilit-y and security." By participating e\·cn 

inach·crtently in united front-sponsored c\'cnts, U.S. politicians and their foreign 

counterparts help the Chinese Communist Party build lla\'d's "panorama of everyday life" 

for the Chinese people. 

2. The Chinese Communist Party Mediates Between Chinese Citizens and Their Fleeted 

Representati\'es: The network of united front "community organizations" creates a fake civil 

society. The community which is supposedly represented is supplanted by the Chinese 

Communist Party, unless politicians reach directly to membership or deal with 

uncompromised organizations. The party's interests become the constituency interests that 

arc presented to officials. 

3. '!'he Marketplace for Ideas is Distorted: I ]a,-ing a pluralistic, democratic society means 

engaging with differences of opinion. There is a natural ebb and t1ow. As noted above, the 

defining feature of the party's united front operations is the effort to control platforms 

rather than just the narrati\'e. As platforms are compromised, the \'oices and messages they 

carry change. They may not specifically represent the Chinese Communist Party, but they 

will aYoid criticisms or subjects that arc intrinsically damaging to the party's image, standing, 

and legitimacy. 

4. The Party Suppresses Discussion of China's Future: The Chinese Communist Party's control 

inside China means that any version of China's future without the party must be discussed 

and decided beyond China's borders. The extent to which the party monopolizes the social 

space of Chinese people- especially those who would like to return to their home country 

-is the extent to which the party can preempt the transmission of liberal political values 

into China and discussion of China without reference to the parry. 
39 

5. Cndcrmining the Intercity ofl'olicymakin~>: J\t its worst, the party's political influence and 

united front operations distort policymaking and the process of gathering information to 

feed into the policy process. The primary targets of united front work arc socially influential 

individuals, such as politicians, prominent businesspeople, intellectuals, and sometimes e\Tn 

celebrities. 

There is some reason to suspect that the united front system plays a role in feeding foreign 

intelligence serdces information. In convu·sations with former U.S. intelligence officials and 

serving foreign ones, they described questionable sources over the years whose information 

seemed to good to be true. The sourcing for their political reporting appeared sufficiently 

plausible and good to encourage officers to avoid placing too much scrutiny on the policy 

implications of the reporting or how it seemed to slant the party's politics and positions. 

G. Facilitating Intelligence Ope.-ations and Technoloi'Y Transfer: The united front network of 

organizations and relationships in overseas Chinese communities has been used to facilitate 

the theft and transfer of technology from the U.S. companies and research institutions. For 

example, as AlcxJoskc of the Australian Strategic Policy Institut·e explained at recent 

conferences in c,mberra and Melbourne last month, Tesla's problem with Chinese theft of 

its intellecmal property was entirely predictable. Those involved were nested within and had 

even established UP\v1)-linked organizations related to talent recruitment and technology 

transfer. Current and former intelligence officials inside and outside the United States bclicw· 

the Chinese intelligence services make usc of the spotting and assessing opportunities 

created by united front system-sponsored visits to China for education, culture, and 

business. 

V, THE U.S. PROBLEM WITH UNITED FRONT WORK 

The United States has long been a target for the Chinese Communist Party's efforts to build political 

influence. The risks in the United States largely stem from our dismissive attitudes about the dangers 

we face and the seriousness with which the party has sought to influence U.S. opinions, especially at 

elite levels. 

The United States is often juxtaposed against Australia and New Zealand. U.S. analysts are 

dismissive that the kinds of problems that happened in those countries could happen in the United 

States. One of my former colleagues at the Central Intelligence A.gency dismissed united front work 

as a largely tangential issue in an intclYiew. The way in which this analyst described the problemor rather its absence- is symptomatic of a larger malaise within the communities '"~th 
40 

responsibility and competence to cv•aluate Beijing's attempts to build political influence and interfere 

in other countties~ politics: 

"You know when I was working in the government we didn't care that much about 

the activities of the United Front \\"ork Department and T think there's still a reason 

why we really shouldn't care that much about their activ·itics. You know, this is not 

Australia ... So the United Front \\"ork Department is of course the group under the 

Communist Panv whose job it is basically to work on overseas Chinese and get them 

to support the government, basically. In short, that's what they do. ,\nd, you know, 

look, there was some serious things going on in "\ ustralia. You know, they were 

doing this. But 1 think it's important for us to remember that the Chinese population 

in Australia is a much larger portion of a much smaller total population. There were 

some interesting challenges in ;\ustralian campaign finance laws that allowed 

foreigners to contribute directly to, you know, these elections and so on, but -.vc 

don't have these things in the United States. And from my obsetTations I do not see, 

for example, the Chinese diplomatic presence here or even some of their, vou know, 

think mnks and so on doing anything like what they were doing down there. l\Iaybc 

not yet, and maybe that's what the concern is, but I find it over- m·erwrought." 

I want to take apart some of the problems in that statement, because they highlight the mix of 

arrogance and ignorance typical ofAmerican attitudes about the party's potential to have a real 

impact in the United States. First, it inaccurately characterizes united front work as getting overseas 

Chinese to support the Chinese Communist Party and the People's Republic of China. Overseas 

Chinese are a focus of the party for the reasons idenlified a bow; however, they arc not the sole 

focus and they nev·er ha,·e been. For example, when Beijing began planning how to handle Japan 

diplomaticaUy in the 1950s, two of the party's most senior and experienced influencers were gi\·en 

the responsibility: ?:hou Enlai and UF\V"D deputy director Liao Chengzhi. They made the decision 

to cultivate Japanese businesspeople by helping them succeed in China, even as Tokyo was frozen 

out diplomatically. The businesspeople would then form a natural constituency to push Japanese 

leaders toward Beijing, giving the latter the leverage to hold out for more generosity from Tokyo. 

Second, the statement treats our ethnic Chinese citizens and residents as undesetTing of their full 

freedoms, because they arc not a significant enough part of the LT.S. population. They deserve to 

have their rights protected and crimes against them im·cstigated, regardless of race or creed. 

Third, the United States docs have stronger campaign finance laws than Australia previously had (a 

problem they rectified last year), but that has not meant immunity from the problem of the Chinese 

Communist party trying to directly influence U.S. politics. \\!c might recall the Clinton campaign 

finance scandal im·oking China in 1996, which may not hav-e had a substantial impact on U.S. policy 
41 

given that the Democratic National Committee was able to return the 13eijing-linkcd donations 

withom financial difficulty. The legal pmtections and the publicity of the campaign finance scandal 

forced the party's efforts underground and to work through American proxies who could legally 

donate to political campaigns. 

Fourth, even well-informed people arc mostly unaware of the scale of the Chinese Communist 

Party's operations inside the United States. Below arc just a few facts about what is taking place in 

the United States that I consider to be relatively solid and ret1ect what is actually happening (or 

happened) rather than analysis. 

1. The Chinese Communist Party pressures Chinese students -either direcdy or through their 

families to conform to the codes of speech and behavior acceptable inside China. 

2. In the space of a few hours, my research assistant and I identified more than 250 

organizations in the United States with individuals who actively and probably wittingly work 

to support the party's united front activities. 

3. The party's united front system has sponsored dozens oh·isits by hundreds oflocal and 

state government officials, journalists, and students to China. Such visits arc used to 

influence and evaluate the participants for their future usefulness. 

4. Beijing pressured 1\"!SCI to expand the share of Chinese stocks on its emerging markets 

index. The move will likely move more than $1 trillion into China. 

5. U.S. thinks tanks and ci,·il society groups have conducted surveys ofAmerican attitudes 

to·ward China and U.S.-China relations on behalf of the int1uence bureaucracies outlined 

aboYe. Major Chinese multinational companies ha\·e discussed with U.S. lobbying and 

consulting finns projects to m~r U.S. policytnaking on rhina beyond the scope of their 

business and investments in the \ ;nited States. 

The United States also has a limited capability to respond to the Chinese Communist Party's efforts 

to build political int1ucncc. \vc have built-in resilience because we arc large country with diverse 

centers of political, econornic, cultural, and intellectual power. The natural churn of dctnocratic 

politics also bolsters the natnral resilience of the United States. However, the limited capability to 

generate and sustain a pnblic conversation 

L Civil Society Capacity: The United States, as it stands today, is woefully short of journalists 

and researchers who can bring these issues into the public light. The United States is more 

than ten times more populous than Australia; yet, we have less than half the number of 
42 

journalists who have reported the issue. The same is true of Canada relative to the United 

States. Most U.S. reporting has been done by a columnist, a frcclancct·, and a journalist who 

is currently unemployed. I am hopeful that this will change as experienced China 

concspondents return home and report China-related stories from inside the United States. 

The Chinese-language media landscape in the United States also has succumbed almost 

entirely to the party's efforts to co-opt and control media outlets. \\"ealthy proxies or 

party-controlled front organizations sometimes directly purchase the outlets. In other cases, 

Beijing organizes advertising boycotts to drive the media outlet out of business or into 

compliance with the party's wishes. The only independent outlets seem to be run by the 

Falungong, and they have not been able to maintain a consistent <1uality of journalism to 

make them credible somccs of information. 

Academic research provides a disappointing picture. The research skills and language 

capability is present, but the knowledge and output is not. The last hook published by an 

American scholar on Llnited front work was by a Stanford professor in 1967. The united 

front system also has not featured in most of the general textbooks on Chinese 

policpnaking, eYen in areas, such as the party's relationship with business, \vhcrc tbe 

system's importance is clear. J\ grmv~ng cadre of researchers also is emerging, but they are 

too junior at the moment to carry the weight of public discussion. They also havT had to pay 

the burden of building this expertise on their own. 

2. ()overnmcnt Capacity: i\.s a former governmc'nt analyst, I wish I could say \v~th full 

confidence that the U.S. Government has the resources and knowledge it needs across the 

board. I do not think that is the case, despite some pockets of excellence and a few 

outstanding indiYiduals with a long period of time on target. 

The Intelligence Community needs to think through what it means to have an analytic and 

opcratjonal career in counterintelligence and countering foreign political 

int1uence/intcrference. Laws and principles may be country agnostic, but the capabilities to 

enforce will he specific to each country. There arc some general skillsets common to all 

fonns of security intelligence- including counterintc1ligence, counterterroristn, 

counter-narcotics, and counter-proliferation- but linguistic and regional/area studies 

knowledge is required to research, understand, and unravel the networks. 

The U.S. (;overnmcnt also needs to tbink through how to push information into the public 

realm to drive the conversation, to explain its actions, and build public support. Open source 

researchers can do quite a bit to map to the Chinese Communist Party's united front system 

and the networks of front organintions at the intersection of technology transfer, 
43 

intelligence, and political intlucncc. However, such work rc(1uircs having solid pegs into the 

system from which to begin. Some of the very open political intluencc operations arc 

relatively easy to track became of the individuals public affiliations with the united front 

system. Identifying, for example, the ivfinistry of State Security operations for political 

influence is much more difficult if not frequently impossible. Covcrnment identificationeither through some sort of regular public report, taking cases to trial, etc. allows 

researchers to expand ofi of what the government has done, providing even more context 

and possibly more leads to additional activities of concern. Having more of this information 

available also helps justify U.S. government actions, especially administrative responses that 

can be opac1ue even ·within govcrnn1cnt, in \vnys that lay and expert communities can 

understand and debate . 

VII. GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN RESPONDING 

1. Transparency: Sunlight is the best disinfectant. Out in the open, people have to make 

choices about whether to continue on in their conflicts of interests or compromised 

relationships. This applies e(1uallv to gcwernmcnt and law enforcement responses to political 

interference. Administrative responses done quietly are not as effective as public 

prosecutions and explanations, which help create risk and inject new information into the 

public sphere for discussion. 

2. Conversation and Debate: The legislature draws the line between legal and illegal. Federal 

government resomccs always will focus predominantly on the illegal side. In a democracy, 

we would not want it any other way. \\lhat is unacceptable or improper, however, is not 

necessarily what is illegal. Civil society must be able to discuss in reasonable terms what is 

taking place 

-'· Protect Space for Critical Discussion of China: \\fhethcr it is Chinese·language media 

outside of China, university spaces, or any other platform where discussion of contemporary 

China takes place, they all are vulnerable to the party's pressure. And they all are targets of 

the Chinese Communist Party. They need support, protection, and sometimes e\·en 

cultiYation. 

4. Consequences Create Risk: Until the Chinese Communist Party faces consequences for its 

actions, they are not in danger of overstepping the mark or overestimating their ability to 

inHuence or intimidate. \Vithont successfully taking cases to and winning at trial, without 

administrative penalties, Americans who actively assist the Chinese Communist Party at the 

expense of U.S. interests will have no reason to scrutini?.e their actions or to desist. Risk is 

required to deter behavior that undermines democracy. 
44 

5. Civil Liberties as much as National Security: Because the Chinese Communist Party puts 

so much emphasis on m·crseas Chinese communities and indi,·iduals, countering Beijing's 

efforts means ensuring ethnically-Chinese citizens and residents can enjoy cgnal protection 

under the law. National security and the resources brought to bear in its name are negati\·e, 

defensi,·c powers rather than positive or creati\·e. Civil liberties protections and the resources 

deployed for this purpose, however, arc the latter. They serve to guarantee constitutional 

freedoms, creating and prcscn·ing the free space for speech and association. Enabling 

democratic practices is at least as important prc\Tnting the exploitation of democracy. 

6. Maintain the Integrity of Rules and Processes: \\'hen relationships with Chinese 

Con1munist Party organizations go a\vry or becon1e exploitative, n1ost cases- excepting 

those im<oh-ing recruited or compromised agents- im<oh<e foreign partners who do not 

n1onitor and enforce their own guidelines and procedures. T'o protect against conflicts of 

interests and outright cotnprotnise, organizations that seck to do business, prcunotc 

exchanges, collaborate on research, or otherwise ha1·c institutional relationships need to 

establish and stick to rules and procedures. Exceptions and exemptions need to be done in 

the open with clear explanation; otherwise, it is too easy to slip toward compromise and 

exploitation. 

VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONGRESS 

1. Revise the Foreign Agent Registration Act (PARA) to include more robust reporting 

requirements, more robust penalties for non-compliance, and a publicly-accessible 

database of PARA registrants updated frequently. 

Others have more fully outlined the fixes that need to be made related to the J7orcign Agent 

Registration 1\ct, but I would like to emphasize a few points. J7irst, the reporting 

requirements for describing the activities are cjuite minimal. Companies and individuals that 

wish to be safe provide more; however, that is not the general mle. Expanding the reporting 

rcqnin:'n1ents to include 1nore substance and specificity about the tnessages delivered or 

setYices provided would make the reporting mechanism more transparent. Separately, 

additional reporting could be made a part of Congressional ethics standards. Second, 

non-compliance with FA RA seems to have few if any consequences. The current approach 

to enforcement is largely about voluntarily self-policing. Third, the Cnitcd Stales should 

revise its approach to presenting F,\RA data, modeling its public-facing database on the 

I\ustralian Foreign r ntluence Transparency Scheme (J7ITS). The rrrs database is updated 
45 

on a regular, rolling basis rather than the quarterly approach to FARA The database and 

accompanying docurr1entation is cornparativcly clear and accessible. 

2. Request a review of the Department of Justice's decisions not to prosecute 

espionage-related cases. 

The intelligence, law enforcement, and prosecutorial capabilities for responding to espionage 

arc the same resources that will be used to address the greyer areas of political influence and 

inlct-fercnce. A review of decisions not to prosecute should he completed to understand 

what problems- whether investigati,·e competence, resources and funding, political 

expediency, or any other factors- undermined taking the cases to trial. This review should 

be undertaken by Congress, and the Department ofJustice should be encouraged to do their 

own re,·iew and report it to the appropriate committees. 

1. Expand the mandate of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China (CECC) 

to include the civil liberties and human rights of ethnic Chinese living outside the 

People's Republic of China. 

Congress created the CECC in 2000 "to monitor China's compliance with international 

human tights standards, to encourage the dc\Tlopment of the rule of law in the PRC, and to 

establish and maintain a list of victims of human rights abuses in China." The treatment of 

overseas Chinese at the hands of Beijing is closely related to this mandate. 

The human rights of overseas Chinese would be a logical expansion, given that they are 

subject to two issues. The first is Beijing's willingness to sun'eil and applv pressure to these 

conununitics as \vcll as to subvert con11nunity organizations. 'The second is the absence of a 

response from their home governments to the Chinese Communist Party's actions. The 

fonncr is the infringetnent of th(' right::: of overseas Chinese; the latter is the absence of 

often constitutionally-guarant:e<.:d protections. 

4. Develop and fund educational programs to support mid-career expertise building 

and language skill maintenance. 

Existing programs focus almost exclusively on undergraduate and graduate students, most 

often at the beginning of their careers. Creating space and time for experienced professionals 

to brush up on language skills or pursue useful personal projects would help ensure 

confinucdlearning. Government employees haYc some access to similar programs, but there 

needs to be greater recognition of the value of education and being away from the desk. 
46 

Private sector en1ployccs need ne\-v progran1s and sources of support to be able to take the 

titnc to study and return to \Vork. 

5. Create a national training center for community workers to support language 

training and understanding foreign government operations in ethnic communities 

within the United States. 

Community outreach programs in the United States are deccntrali7,cd owing to the federal, 

state, and local government structure. Unifying these programs would be unnecessarily 

complicated and put the different lc,·els of government at odds with one another. To ensure 

awatcness of issues in ethnic con1munitics~ Congress should create a national training center 

for con11nunity ·workers. ()\rcrscas Chinese con1tnunltics arc not the only ones subject to 

harassment or infringement of their ch·il rights by a fc>reign gm·ernmcnt. The center should 

support language training, either through residency programs or individual grants for local 

progratns. 

Those most affected by a coercive foreign government do not have a ready outlet for 

reporting the problems they iace. Law enforcement works best when ofiiccrs arc dealing 

·with familiar issues and challenges. Building a cadre of informed community workers outside 

the justice system serYes at least two purposes. First, it pnwides navigators for those 

indi,·iduals willing to stand up and report the problems. Community workers can help such 

an indi\·idual navigate law enforcement when they mav be reluctant to come forward. 

Second, comn1unity \Vorkcrs can serve ns an itnportant source of inforn1ation outside 

traditional law enforcement and intelligence channels. 

6. Use Congress's institutional powers to press the executive branch for transparency 

on actions taken against China, especially where the actions are administrative. 

American opinions arc shifting about China, but much of the public discussion remains 

caught in limbo bcrwcen the old policy paradigm and the uncertainty of today's new era of 

con1pctition. Consequently, the administration needs to be tnorc transparent than the 

cxccuti,·c branch typically is inclined. 

The \'isa denials for Chinese scholars is a perfect example from recent news. l\Iany U.S. and 

international scholars have been dismayed by the news, and the merits of excluding those 

individuals or revoking their visas is not olwious to the public. The particular of case of Zhu 

Fcng, a Naujing-based professor, having his visa revoked shows why the executive branch 

needs to be more transparent publicly. "\!though he is a well-known scholar known for his 

amiable humor, Zhu also has been supported by and done work for the political warfare 
47 

clement of the People's liberation Army. This is a\·ailable from open sources. Putting a few 

simple criteria out in public for \'isa denials and alerting inviting institutions what criteria was 

triggered would be a useful positive step for handling the visa issues going forward. \\lithout 

such information, many otherwise knowledgeable people about China assumed the worst 

about the administration's intentions and acrlons. 

The administration also should be encouraged to usc the legal system and press charges 

where appropriate. The legal process forces the l TS. Go,·crnmcnt to commit to a course of 

action and making some infi.mnation pnblic. That information, especially after a conviction, 

becomes as close to ground truth as a possible on sensitive subjects for which there is not 

much clear, public information. 

7. Recommendation 

Summary 

8. Recommendation 

Summary 
48 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Mattis. And I will point out that 

while today we are told that the world domination of China is inevitable, 25 years ago, when I was just beginning to run for Congress, 

I could find 12 books that told me that Japan would be dominating 

the world right about now. 

David Shullman is a senior adviser at the International Republican Institute, where he focuses on China and other autocracies’ 

influence on democratic institutions and governance around the 

world. 

Dr. SHULLMAN. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID SHULLMAN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR, 

INTERNATIONAL REPUBLICAN INSTITUTE 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Thank you. 

Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Yoho, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 

today and for organizing a hearing on this topic critical to U.S. interests and the future of democratic governance across the Indo-Pacific. 

I want to begin with a description of China’s expanding interests 

in developing Asia and a key means by which the Chinese Communist Party is increasing its influence to advance those interests. 

First and most basic, China and its $14 trillion economy are trading and investing more than ever before across Asia. 

Beijing seeks to use this growing economic leverage to establish 

dependency on China across the Indo-Pacific. Such dependence 

helps China advance geostrategic goals, such as the protection of 

critical sea lanes and the establishment of military facilities to protect China’s growing global interests. The party also seeks to legitimize its autocratic system of governance and development, looking 

to achieve acceptance as a great power without democratizing. 

Since this prospect is not welcomed by the developed West, Beijing 

hopes to first popularize China’s model in the developing world. 

The party is using multiple means of influence to advance these 

expanding interests. I will focus my remarks on China’s influence 

in the economic and the information domains. First, Beijing is expanding trade and investment with countries hungry for both. 

However, there are malign aspects to China’s growing economic engagement. 

As has been discussed, many projects undertaken and financed 

by China saddle countries with unsustainable debts, creating a 

cycle of dependence. Corruption is also rampant in these deals. 

Corruption is not a bug of the Belt and Road Initiative but an inherent feature of the program, with the goals to ensure China’s 

companies secure contracts to carry out projects at inflated costs, 

and also to cultivate elites to ensure a country’s dependence, otherwise known as elite capture. In some countries, the resulting leverage has created significant Chinese sway over domestic legislation 

to suit China’s interests. 

In the case of the Maldives, China’s pervasive influence and corrupt ties with the former Yameen regime resulted in a change to 

the Constitution to allow the sale of land, including entire islands, 

to foreign parties passed without public consultation within the 

space of 3 days. The China-Maldives free trade agreement, con-
49 

sisting of thousands of pages, was passed through parliamentary 

committee in just 10 minutes. 

The party is also exerting influence over countries’ information 

space, manipulating the narrative through what the National Endowment for Democracy has termed ‘‘sharp power.’’ China is stepping up efforts to shape countries’ internal debates about their engagement with China, including by suppressing criticism of China’s 

activities. 

The party has a large and expanding set of tools it uses to shape 

foreign media coverage of China and cultivate thought leaders, including through some of the united front tactics that Peter just described. China’s simultaneous influence and the country’s economic 

and informational domains is a toxic mix. 

Beijing’s information manipulation ensures the neutering of institutions, such as civil society and a free media, which in a 

healthy democracy would expose the negative consequences of China’s economic influence tactics. Beijing’s efforts are encouraging a 

trend toward authoritarianism in Indo-Pacific countries. China’s 

no-strings investments bolster the fortunes of illiberal actors eager 

to take credit for delivering much-needed infrastructure projects. 

The party also provides authoritarians training on China’s repressive cybersecurity policies and offers sophisticated surveillance and 

monitoring technology. 

Beijing’s influence efforts are only likely to intensify throughout 

the Indo-Pacific. As China’s domestic challenges continue to grow, 

Chinese leaders are even more likely to seek quick profits abroad 

and use sharp power to protect China’s interests. A continued decline in U.S.-China ties is also likely to intensify Beijing’s influence 

efforts. In a potential bifurcating global economy and technological 

landscape, China would view developing countries’ dependence on 

China as ensuring that if they must choose, they choose Beijing. 

So how can the United States respond? China will not change its 

aggressive approach to developing countries unless it has to. To 

achieve this goal, Washington should focus attention on the countries targeted by China. This does not mean forcing countries to 

choose and side with the United States or reject Chinese investment even implicitly, because such efforts are destined to fail. 

But throughout the Indo-Pacific, there are stakeholders determined to protect their democracies from the malign consequences 

of Chinese influence. The United States and its partners should 

empower these actors, investing resources and bolstering the resilience of countries targeted for influence. This can be accomplished 

through two complementary efforts. 

First, as mentioned, the United States, along with its allies and 

partners, should offer developing democracies alternatives to China’s investment and financing practices and technical assistance on 

project negotiation and evaluation. 

Second, the United States must dedicate resources to bolstering 

the capacity of civil society, political parties, and independent 

media. Transparency is critical to countries’ resilience against Chinese influence efforts, permitting broad public debate about how to 

engage China in a way that protects a country’s interests. 

For our part, IRI is working directly with our partners in the 

Indo-Pacific to shine a spotlight on China’s influence efforts and 
50 

give them the tools to protect their institutions and their independence. It will not be possible to counter China’s malign influence 

without a sustained U.S. commitment to bolstering democracy. 

Doing so is critical to preventing the spread of authoritarianism 

and defending U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Shullman follows:] 
51 

INTERNATIONAL 

REPUBLICAN 

INSTITUTE 

China's Malign Influence Across the Indo-Pacific 

TESTIMONY OF: David Shullman 

Senior Advisor 

International Republican Institute 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA, THE PACIFIC, AND NONPROLIFERATION 

May8,2019 
52 

Introduction 

Chairman Sherman, Ranking Member Yoho, distinguished members of this subcommittee, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify today. Thank you, also, for organizing a hearing on this 

topic critical to US interests and the future of democratic governance across the Indo-Pacific. 

China's Means of Influence in Developing Countries 

I want to begin with a description of China1

s expanding interests in the developing world and 

the key means by which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is increasing its influence across 

the Indo-Pacific to advance those interests. 

China for decades has gradually increased engagement with countries throughout the 

developing world, seeking critical resource inputs and new markets for its rapidly growing 

economy as well as portraying itself as a leader of developing country interests on the global 

stage. However, today, we see China pursuing an unprecedented level of influence in 

developing countries, with decidedly mixed results for the recipients of China's attention. 

This uptick can be attributed to China's desire to advance an expanding set of interests in the 

developing world. First, China and its $14 trillion economy are trading arid investing more in 

the developing world than ever before. While the overseas component of the Belt and Road 

Initiative {BR!), China's ambitious global infrastructure and connectivity program, is small 

relative to China's domestic economy, there is an expectation of economic benefit for Chinese 

companies-typically state-owned enterprises {SOEs)-and their workers engaging in debtfinanced BRI projects in numerous developing countries. 

In the Indo-Pacific in particular, Beijing seeks to use its growing economic leverage to establish 

greater dependency on China and help reestablish the country as Asia's preeminent power. 

Such dependence gives China greater leeway to advance geostrategic goals such as the 

protection of sea lanes critical for the transport of energy and the establishment of military 

facilities to protect China's growing global interests. 

The CCP also seeks to legitimize its autocratic system of governance and development. Chinese 

leaders recognize that Beijing must expand its normative power abroad to achieve China's rise 

and rejuvenation as a great power. They also recognize that to achieve global legitimacy as a 

responsible great power without democratizing-a prospect not welcomed by the developed 

West-they must first popularize China's model in the developing world.l 

Given these growing interests, it is not surprising that the CCP is using multiple means of 

influence to advance them, in the process undermining governance, prosperity, and open 
53 

discourse in a way that encourages democratic backsliding in many countries. I will focus my 

remarks on China's means of influence in two key domains, the economic and the 

informationaL I will then offer some key examples of how China exerts influence in different 

country contexts. I will conclude with some thoughts on how the United States can best 

counter such influence. 

1) Economic Influence 

Much of China's influence today can be ascribed to its leverage as a $14 trillion economy and 

the world's largest commodity importer. Beijing is expanding trade and investment with 

countries hungry for both. However, there are malign aspects to China's growing economic 

engagement that render its influence harmful for many developing countries. This influence 

occurs through licit economic activity such as BRI projects financed through opaque deals that 

saddle some countries with debt and few alternatives to dependence on China to continue 

financing those debts. 

At the same time, Chinese companies and other entities also use illicit means including high 

levels of corruption to achieve their ends. As 1 will illustrate, corruption and elite capture is not 

a "bug" of BRI but an inherent feature of the program, with the goal of ensuring Chinese SOEs 

secure contracts with highly favorable terms to carry out projects financed by Chinese policy 

banks. The CCP cultivates "friends" among elites in many countries who are only too willing to 

sign up to opaque investment deals that undermine their country's long-term prosperity in 

return for personal enrichment. 

2) Influence Over Information 

Such elite capture through corruption also facilitates the CCP's ability to exert influence in a 

second area, the information space. Beijing's foreign propaganda and censorship efforts have 

traditionally focused on promoting China's political and economic system while suppressing 

coverage of its domestic human rights abuses and religious persecution. But the Chinese 

government and its proxies are now also attempting to tilt other countries' internal debates 

about their relationships with China, including by suppressing criticism of Chinese activities 

within their borders. Many governments, including our own, engage in vigorous public 

diplomacy campaigns, but the CCP's methods are frequently covert, coerclve, and harmful to 

democratic institutions. 

China's manipulation of the information environment in countries around the world, which the 

National Endowment for Democracy has termed "sharp power", is critical to the Party's ability 

to protect its growing investments and legitimize China's authoritarian development model 

abroad. Ensuring the presentation of a positive "China story," as President Xi has put it, helps to 
54 

smooth the path for investments that benefit China's economy. 2 The CCP recognizes that a 

more positive perception of China heads off criticism of Chinese investments and corruption of 

a country's elites, thereby preventing Chinese influence from becoming an election issue as it 

has in many countries, including Zambia, Sri lanka, and Malaysia. Through media cooperation 

agreements with BRI countries, Beijing advances information sharing intended to influence 

foreign journalists covering the BRI, including through conferences sponsored by the stateaffiliated All-China Journalists Association. 

The CCP has a large and growing set of tools it uses to advance its narrative in developing 

countries and to quiet critics, including pervasive but overt official propaganda and media 

outlets, investment in foreign media outlets, funding of research and academic institutions, 

covert efforts to cultivate thought leaders, and more aggressive use of united front work, 

including through the Party's increasingly powerful United Front Work Department (UFWD), to 

cultivate non-Party actors and squelch anti-China narratives by "enemy forces" abroad. 

Negative Consequences for Developing Democracies 

The CCP's use of these different means of influence simultaneously has a pernicious effect 

on developing democracies. Beijing's manipulation of the information space and discourse 

ensures the neutering of institutions such as an independent media and civil society that in a 

healthy democracy would expose the negative consequences for a country of China's opaque 

deal making and corrupt practices. 

Beijing's influence plays a clear role in encouraging democratic backsliding throughout the 

lndo-Pacific. 3 China's efforts bolster the fortunes of illiberal actors eager to take credit for 

delivering Chinese investment in much-needed infrastructure projects, no matter the longterm costs of deals signed behind dosed doors. The Party also provides training on China's 

repressive cybersecurity policies and offers increasingly sophisticated surveillance and 

monitoring technology to authoritarian governments.4 Taken together, these activities give 

credence to authoritarian actors' claims that they can deliver economic development, security, 

and stability. The CCP also conducts large-scale trainings of foreign officials about its 

governance and development modeL 

China's approach to exerting influence has some common themes across countries. As 

noted, in most every case China's economic engagement involves opaque economic 
55 

investment deals that ensure China lends and is repaid at a premium to hire Chinese 

companies and workers. This lack of transparency sets a foundation for rampant corruption. 

Beijing seeks to ensure that reporting and information on China and its engagement with a 

country remaln largely positive. 

But China's influence tactics differ in countries depending on Beijing's strategic interests and 

the different circumstances in which it is operating. In certain strategically located 

countries, Beijing's interests may be served by encouraging an accumulation of 

unsustainable debt. It is no coincidence that the eight countries identified last year by the 

Center for Global Development as at high risk of debt distress based on projected BRI 

lending are all of relatively high strategic value to China. 5 In at least one infamous case, that 

of Sri lanka, Beijing leveraged a country's inability to pay its debt to acquire a long-term 

lease on a strategic port. In many others, China may not lend as freely to countries that 

dearly cannot pay their debts. 

Chinese financing and SOE practices are noticeably inconsistent with accepted international 

standards in countries with looser regulation practices, public procurement rules, and labor 

regulations. Understanding the nature of CCP influence in a certain environment is therefore 

critical to understanding the threat to a country and the ways in which it can be mitigated. 

Case Studies of CCP Influence in Indo-Pacific Countries 

The International Republican Institute has complied in-depth case studies of CCP influence 

efforts completed by researchers in 15 countries around the world. This effort has yielded 

not only important data for understanding how China exerts influence in different contexts 

but has also been integral to designing programming to effectively counter such influence. 6 

Across the Indo-Pacific there are numerous examples of the malign and varying effects of 

China's influence. I will highlight three case studies in particular: 

1) Sri lanka 

China's malign influence in Sri lanka is typically viewed through the lens of the now infamous 

case wherein Colombo, struggling with debt repayments to China, gave a state-owned Chinese 

firm a controlling share in the strategically-located Hambantota Port, on a 99-year lease. 

Indeed, China's acquisition of the Hambantota Port is a singular example of the potentia! risks 
56 

of BRI for recipient countries, particularly strategically important countries led by corrupt 

leaders willing to take on unsustainable debt. 

What is most notable, however, about China's approach in Sri lanka is the way in which it was 

able to manipulate an opaque system and undermine democratic institutions over many years, 

ensuring the country's long-term dependence. China's growing engagement and influence in 

Sri lanka can be traced back more than a decade, to when the island was governed by the 

administration of former two-time President Mahinda Rajapaksa, long before China had 

devised plans for the BRI. Sri lanka in 2009 found itself increasingly isolated by the 

international community for its conduct during the country's civil war. China offered financial 

and military aid and used its veto power to ensure that allegations of state-sanctioned human 

rights violations were not brought before the UN Security Counci!J 

The Rajapaksa years were associated with a lack of government transparency and 

accountability, high-level corruption, and nepotism- much of which was facilitated by a 

deepening relationship with China. Sri lanka's foreign debt exploded from 36 percent of GOP in 

2010 to 94 percent in 2015, prompting to pursue debt relief from the IMF in 2016. 8 While 

China was not responsible for providing all of this credit, the problem was significantly 

exacerbated by its willingness to offer Sri lanka fresh loans at high interest rates, despite its 

inability to pay such loans back. In return China secured special terms. For example, China 

Harbor Engineering Company, the firm behind the massive Colombo Port City project, 

reportedly is to receive 1.16 square kilometers of Port City land on a 99-year !ease.910 

Rajapaksa's ultimate loss, however, did not prove a hurdle to CCP interests. The incoming 

Sirisena~Wickremesinghe government, initially critical of China-funded projects, ultimately was 

convinced of the utility of dose ties with China. 

China's ability to protect and ultimately advance its interests in Sri lanka despite this change in 

government is a testament to the deep economic influence China has cultivated in the country. 

Sri lanka's new government ultimately determined the country had little choice but to seek 

further credit to finance its debts to China and complete unfinished projects. 11 Sri lanka's 

reliance on China to fund major infrastructure projects and meet payments was underscored 

earlier this year, when it was announced Sri Lanka would receive a fresh loan of $1 billion from 

China. 12 Furthermore, it is likely Chinese entities sought to cultivate the new government 

through corruption, a factor which also allegedly played into the new government's decision in 

2016 to lease the Hambantota Port to Beijing. 
57 

China's tong-term lease of Hambantota Port has drawn global attention as evidence that Beijing 

seeks to "trap" countries through debt, highlighting the drawbacks and potential dangers of BRI 

for countries around the world. It should therefore come as no surprise that China has sought 

to manipulate the information environment in Sri Lanka and cultivate thought leaders to quiet 

such criticism and ensure a positive narrative around China. Beijing has intensified efforts at 

official and diplomatic outreach, increased scholarships for visits to China to Sri Lankan 

students, and established Confucius Institutes in Sri Lanka. 1314 

China has also notably increased funding for, and official ties with, research centers and think 

tanks in Sri Lanka. 15 Such institutions have grown in importance in Sri lanka but remain underfunded, leaving them particularly vulnerable to welcoming foreign funding that may include 

tacit understanding regarding the expected tenor of China-related research. 16 

The lack of objective critiques of China's influence in Sri lanka is also linked to longstanding 

gaps in Sri Lanka's media sector. Many institutions are owned by individuals or families with 

strong ties to political figures and parties, some of which have become close to China. China is 

investing in Sri lanka's media sector, as it has in other countries, raising the prospect for even 

greater influence in the country's information space. China not only sponsors 'media tours' for 

local journalists to visit China and meet with top officials, but has also established facilities in Sri 

Lanka for Chinese universities to train journalists and shape their views on ChinaY According to 

local media workers, China employs such tactics to build a rapport with Sri Lankan journalists, in 

exchange for positive coverage in local media. 

This combination of China's entrenched economic influence, cultivation of elites, and growing 

sway over the narrative in Sri lanka demonstrates the potentia! malign effects of CCP influence 

on a strategically important country's prosperity, governance, and independence. 

2) The Maldives 

A small but strategic archipelago nation in the Indian Ocean, the Maldives took on massive 

amounts of debt financed by China as a part of a slew of infrastructure development contracts 

signed under former President Abdulla Yameen, who took power in 2013. As with Sri lanka, 

numerous government officials viewed the influx of Chinese investment as a means of persona! 

enrichment. 

13 P. K. Ba!achandran, "China's Confucius Institutes In Asia ready to meet local needs," Daily FT, 30 June 2018. 14 "22 Sri Lankan students awarded Chinese Government Full Scholarship," Daily FT, 28 August 2018 

l'i "Pathfinder Foundation opens 'China-Sri lanka Cooperation Studies Centre'" Daily FT, 18 December 2018. 

1

" http: 1/www. ft. !k/ news/National-Security-Think-Tank -of-Sri-La n k<~-ran ked··in-th e-G !oba 1-Think-Tan k·l nd exf56-

672945 

17 "Chinese University signs MoU with Journalism Forum in Sl," Daily News, 14 December 2018 
58 

Chinese government-funded infrastructure projects that would mire the Maldives in debt 

became a signature feature of the Yameen years, with three large projects standing out.18J

9 The 

Maldives' borrowing from China for just these projects eventually rose to equal 40% of the 

country's GDP. 20 The Maldives' new Minister of Finance has estimated that the country owes 

China $1.4 billion, and a visiting IMF mission to Maldives in March 2019 announced that the 

"Maldives remains at a high risk of debt distress." 21 

The consistent allegation of corruption and malfeasance is a crosscutting theme in projects 

financed by China under Yameen. Such corruption enriched Yameen and his compatriots and 

resulted in contracts completed at significantly inflated cost. As the current Minister of Finance 

puts it, the previous government knowingly engaged in "willful corruption" by "getting 

kickbacks from contractors", explaining the high project costs. 22 The overwhelmingly opaque 

nature of the deals struck with China was the permissive factor allowing for so much 

corruption. Information on the terms of deals were not disseminated in the Maldives, with local 

media sources reliant on Chinese newspapers and contractors' websites for information. 23 

China's growing influence in the Maldives was facilitated by changes to the Maldives' laws, 

often passed without adequate or customary means of public comment and designed to permit 

even greater Chinese domination of the country's economy. For example, an unprecedented 

change to the Constitution to allow the sale of land to foreign parties was passed without public 

consultation within three days.24 An amendment to the Tourism Act facilitated the lease of 

https: 1/www, ft. com/ content/fcab0410· 2 4 61-11 e9-8ce6-5d b4543da63 2 

{accessed : 01 Feb 2019) 
59 

islands without competitive bidding, which the opposition alleged to "legalize corruption." 2s 

Following this change, one island was indeed leased to a Chinese company for 50 years. 

Similarly, the approval process for the China~Maldives Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was opaque 

and fast-tracked to the point of absurdity. The parliamentary committee to study the FTA was 

conducted behind dosed doors and rushed through thousands of pages of FTA documents in 

just ten minutes. 26 The legislation was allegedly passed the next day in an impromptu 

meetingY Despite widespread protests criticizing the lack of due process and transparency, 

and that the FTA itself undermined Maldivian sovereignty, President Yameen sealed the FTA on 

a state visit to Beijing in 2017. 28 Fortunately, the new government appears able to prevent its 

implementation. 

China not surprisingly sought to help ensure Yameen's re-election in 2018. 29 But public and 

opposition awareness of rampant government corruption, including at the hands of Chinese 

entities, resulted in victory for new President Ibrahim Mohamed So!lh. An active civil society 

and watchful media were critical to raising public awareness and achieving this dramatic 

electoral result despite the backdrop of democratic decline financed by China. The current 

government has sought to repair damage to the Maldives economy resulting from excessive 

reliance on Chinese credit.30 The government is also investigating the Yameen government's 

Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP), https;f/mdp.org.mv/archives/76357 (accessed: 02 March 2019); and China 

FTA undermines Maldives' sovereignty, bod for region: Former President Nasheed 

03 December 2017, Times of India, httos://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/china-fta-underminesmaldives-sovereignty-bad-for-region-forrner-orez-nasheed/articleshow/61906756.cms 

(Translation :China gifts 35 generator sets] 
60 

lopsided deals with China and related abuses of power, as well as reviving economic ties with 

India and other countries. 

3) Cambodia 

Cambodia sits squarely in China's widening orbit and demonstrates the level of dependence and 

democratic decline that can occur as a result of the CCP achieving significant influence in a 

country. For the past two decades, Beijing has developed affectionate ties with the country's 

ruling Cambodian People's Party {CPP) and its paramount leader, Prime Minister Hun Sen, who 

has ruled the country under various guises since 1985. The relationship has been based on a 

steady convergence of strategic interests between the two governments: the Chinese state has 

offered Cambodia's government much-needed investment and financing-much of it for largescale infrastructure projects-and thus given it an escape valve from Western pressures relating 

to democracy and human rights concerns. In exchange, Cambodia has supported China's core 

interests in the region, including Beijing's aggressive claims in the South China Sea. 

China has achieved nearly pervasive influence in Cambodia by broadly engaging Hun Sen's 

government economically. This runs the spectrum from licit engagements-such as large 

infrastructure projects undertaken as part of BRI-to personal connections between Chinese 

business figures and prominent Cambodian tycoons and government officials, up to and 

including Prime Minister Hun Sen. 

China was the country's largest foreign investor for five straight years from 2013 to 2017, with 

Chinese investment in the country totaling $53 billion over that period.ln 2017, Cambodia 

attracted fixed-asset investment of $1.4 billion from China, which alone accounted for 27% of 

total FDI for that year.31 Much of this engagement has since been subsumed under the BR!, of 

which the Cambodian government has been an enthusiastic participant. Hun Sen said he was 

"amazed by the initiative", praised Xi Jinping's "wisdom", and declared that the BRI gave "hope 

for countries that need capita!." 32 To the Cambodian government, the speed with which it can 

obtain Chinese financing for large-scale infrastructure projects contrasts with the slower 

oversight processes and good governance conditionalities of its traditional donors.33 

Under the aegis of BRI, China has proposed a plan to encourage the country to develop 2,230 

kilometers of national expressways by 2040, at a reported cost of $26 billion.34 The first of 

these is already underway: an expansion of National Road 4 from Phnom Penh to Sihanoukville, 

Asian Studies, !SEAS Perspective, July 6, 2017), 6, 

10 
61 

the home of Cambodia's only deep-water port, which has recently been transformed into a 

Chinese tourism hub dominated by dozens of unregulated casinos.3536 

Despite the large influx of Chinese yuan, BRI loans have not yet placed an undue financial burden 

on the Cambodian government. By the end of 2016, Cambodia's total public debt stood at around 

$6.5 billion, nearly half of which was held by China. 37 For now, the total represents just 32% of 

the country's gross domestic product of $20 billion, a relatively sustainable debt load, 38 However, 

if it continues borrowing at the current rate, the country's debt-load could we!! become 

burdensome !n the near future, especially if the country experiences a sudden economic 

recession or other external shock.39 

Nevertheless, China's rising economic presence in Cambodia has had clear negative impacts on 

the country's development trajectory. While governance standards in Cambodia have always 

been poor, the ready availability of Chinese money has reduced the outside incentive for Hun 

Sen's government to improve these standards or make itself more democratically accountable to 

the Cambodian public. In Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index for 2017, 

Cambodia was ranked the most corrupt nation in Southeast Asia, coming in 161 out of 180 

countries for popular perceptions of corruption.40 

Chinese firms, many of them !inked to the Chinese government, frequently work through the 

CPP's corrupt networks in order to forge alliances at the highest levels of the government. A 

prime example is Fu Xianting, also known as Big Brother Fu, a former PLA officer whose business 

interests have been greased by his "family-like" relationship to Hun Sen and key members of his 

inner cirde.41 1n 2009, Hun Sen helped Fu and his company win a 99-year lease for a 3,300-hectare 

concession to build a $5 billion resort on Cambodia's coast. The government granted the 

concession after Fu's company made a series of donations to Hun Sen's bodyguard unit, a 3,000~ 

strong private army. 42 The intertwining of private Chinese companies with the state and ruling 

party, and the willingness of these companies to work through the party's illicit economic 

networks, have been important factors in the expansion of Chinese influence. 

Current Cambodian policy is so accommodating to China that the latter has so far found it 

unnecessary to resort to coercive influence tactics to shape the information space to advance its 

11 
62 

interests. Hun Sen has been able to ensure that the Cambodian information environment 

remains friendly to Chinese interests and generally conducive to a continued extension of CCP 

influence in Cambodia. Cambodia hosts just one Confucius Institute, at the Royal Academy of 

Cambodia in Phnom Penh. 43 Xinhua reported in 2016 that the institute plays "a big role in 

promoting China's Belt and Road Initiative in the kingdom." 44 

Even so, China has offered considerable technical support to the Cambodian information 

technology, telecommunications, education, and media sectors, which taken together, have 

increased China's potential to shape the Cambodian information environment while bolstering 

the regime's control over the population. In April 2017, Cambodia and China signed an 

agreement initiating regular media exchanges, under which Cambodian journalists and Ministry 

of Information officials would be offered specialized reporting and technical training in China.46 

A Cambodian journalist who went on one such trip recalled being put up in four-star hotels and 

ferried to organized interviews with Chinese off1cia!sY Chinese firms have also directly invested 

in state-run Cambodian media. 48 

Chinese influence has allowed Hun Sen the freedom to roll back the country's partial media 

freedoms and quash the independent outlets most critical of his government. 4950 The value of 

Chinese support was on display in the run-up to national elections held in July 2018, when the 

CPP launched a severe crackdown on its opponents. shuttering critical media outlets and arrested 

opposition politicians and human rights defenders. In September 2017, opposition leader Kem 

Sokha was arrested and charged with treason. Facing little effective opposition, the CPP won all 

125 seats51 in the Cambodian National Assembly. When Western nations suspended support for 

Cambodia's 2018 election following Kem Sokha's arrest, China voiced its full support for the 

electoral process, donating laptops, computers, voting booths, and other items to the Cambodian 

National Election Committee.52 On election day, China sent an observer mission. 53 

The supportive environment in Cambodia has also given China potential control over strategically 

important assets throughout the country. The most significant is a massive economic !and 

concession in Koh Kong province on Cambodia's southern coast. Granted to the Tianjin-based 
63 

Union Development Group {UDG) in 2008 for the development of an industrial and commercial 

tourism project, the 36,000-hectare concession includes 20% of Cambodia's coast. 54 UDG's Dara 

Saker resort includes plans for an international airport, hospitals, international schools, five-star 

hotels, and-most controversially-a deep-water port large enough potentially to handle cruise 

ships, bulk carriers, or naval vessels. 

China's Influence Efforts Likely to Intensify 

As these case studies demonstrate, China's expanding influence throughout the Indo-Pacific has 

significant implications for U.S. interests, undermining democratic principles and sovereignty in 

strategically important democracies. 

These cases also illustrate the significant differences between each country's experience with 

malign Chinese influence. The United States and its partners therefore must not take a cookiecutter approach to responding to such influence in Asia and around the world. Neither should 

Washington try to force countries to side with the United States against China and reject 

Chinese investment. For most countries in the region this is simply not an option. According to 

the Asian Development Bank, developing Asia needs about $26 trillion in infrastructure 

investment through 2030 maintain its growth momentum, tackle poverty, and respond to 

climate change, 

Beijing's influence efforts are only likely to intensify in developing countries throughout the 

Indo-Pacific. This approach to the developing world is integral to the Party's efforts to ensure 

China's promised "rejuvenation" to great power status and protect inputs needed to fuel its 

economy- both deemed key to the Party's continued legitimacy. If economic and internal 

stability challenges continue to grow, Chinese leaders are even more likely to seek quick returns 

on investments abroad and use heavy-handed propaganda and "sharp power" efforts to shape 

the narrative to protect China's interests. 

Furthermore, if U.S.-China ties continue to decline, with Washington more vocally criticizing 

China's internal political system and challenging its drive for a larger voice in global governance, 

the CCP is likely to redouble advocacy in the developing world for China's authoritarian 

development path. longer term, Chinese leaders may respond to a bifurcating global economy 

and technological landscape by more proactively institutionalizing developing countries' 

economic relationships with China, ensuring that if they must choose, they pick Beijing. China's 

provision of a greater array of tools to friendly governments will help ensure their ability to 

remain in power.ss 

13 
64 

Recommendations for Countering China's Malign Influence 

The CCP's approach will not change unless it sees fewer benefits to aggressively acquiring 

influence in developing countries. Chinese officials and companies take a harder line in 

countries where governance, transparency, and the rule of law are lacking. On the other hand, 

there are increasing indicators that China moderates its influence efforts in the face of 

pushback by recipient governments. 

• For example, in Burma, where loans from China account for approximately 40% of the 

country's total government debt, the country has renegotiated China's initial Chinese 

terms for development of the Kyaukphyu Deep Sea port project to significantly reduce 

the resulting debt burden. 56 Myanmar has also reportedly drafted plans to protect itself 

from China's potential influence resulting from SRI-related investments, including by 

insisting that identified projects be selected through a public tender process and that 

Myanmar be allowed to borrow from multiple sources when financing projects. 57 

The United States and its partners therefore must invest resources in changing the context in 

the countries China targets for influence. This can be accomplished through two 

complementary efforts: 1) offering countries alternatives to Chinese investment and assistance 

on how to structure future deals with China; and 2) building the resilience of developing 

democracies to the malign effects of CCP influence. 

First, the United States should offer developing democracies both alternatives to China's 

investment and financing practices and technical assistance on project evaluation and 

negotiation. The administration and Congress have taken some important steps, including the 

passage of the Better Utilization of Investments leading to Development {BUILD) Act creating 

the new U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC). The OFC must not be viewed as directly 

competing with a massive state-financed infrastructure initiative like the BRL Instead, through 

targeted support for private enterprise in critical countries limited in their financing choices, the 

U.S. can help establish higher common standards for transparency and sustainability that both 

regional government officials and their publics may increasingly demand over time. 

The US should work closely with !ikeminded partners and allies to offer such training and 

alternatives. Japan is already the main competitor to Chinese infrastructure largesse in countries 

like Cambodia, offering the country an alternative to Beijing's BRI funding for infrastructure 

mega-projects.58 Wherever possible, the United States should work with multilateral 

development banks and partners such as the EU, Japan, India, and Australia to offer 

14 
65 

infrastructure alternatives to developing countries. There are encouraging signs that this sort of 

collaboration is increasing and yielding some results. 

Second, the United States must dedicate resources to bolstering the capacity of civil society, 

political parties, and independent media in developing countries. These democratic 

institutions are critical to recipient countries' ability to monitor and evaluate Chinese project 

implementation practices and promote the rule of law. Transparency and investigative 

journalism in particular are essential to ensuring the resilience of recipients of Chinese 

financing, particularly in countries with leaders happy to conclude deals behind closed doors. 

The availability of accurate information permits broad public debate about how to engage 

China amongst business, civil society, government officials, and local communities affected by 

infrastructure projects. In so doing, national interests are protected and equitable benefits 

assured across a society. Washington should provide additional assistance for countries that 

are deemed particularly vulnerable to Chinese influence. The U.S. should also work with its 

country partners to raise awareness of China's influence efforts in think tanks, universities, 

NGOs, and media where impartial expertise on China and the nature of the CCP is lacking. 

None of these efforts to counter the malign aspects of CCP influence will be easy or achievable 

without a sustained US dedication to working with and assisting democracies across the region. 

There is no alternative, however, if Washington hopes to prevent the spread of 

authoritarianism and defend its interests in the Indo-Pacific. The United States must recommit 

to the hard work of defending democracy around the world. 

15 
66 

Mr. SHERMAN. Let me point out that China’s policies are so extreme, so outrageous, that they have done the impossible. They 

have gotten Democrats and Republicans to agree. In 2019, they got 

me to say something nice about the Trump administration. They 

are more powerful than the mega wattage necessary to reduce the 

temperature to refrigerate Hades to below 32 degrees. Think about 

it. 

We have got a great firewall in China, and one might—and I 

probably want to get some technical experts to respond to this. I 

realize that is almost another committee. You know, for way less 

than the price of one aircraft carrier group to cruise within 6 miles 

of an uninhabited islet, we might very well be able to blow a lot 

of holes in the great firewall of China and make sure that every 

Chinese citizen could see anything the world had to offer. I am 

going to have that be a question for the record. 

And I want to ask our witnesses, why are Muslim countries so 

silent with regard to the Uighurs? Anybody have a comment? 

Yes. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. I can comment on that. I mean, part of what we 

have discussed here today with the influence and the leverage that 

China achieves through the Belt and Road Initiative and its growing just gravity, center of gravity as an economic powerhouse has 

an impact, obviously, on a lot of these Muslim countries. I believe 

50 percent—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. And it is universal. It is not like Mali has done 

something, or Indonesia or, you know, Morocco. The only Muslim 

country to say anything—and they were kind of forced into it—was 

the Turkish Government, and that is just because the Uighurs are 

not just Muslims but also Turkic. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. And that was a change. 

Mr. SHERMAN. So you are saying this fear of China exceeds Muslim solidarity from North Africa through Southeast Asia? 

Mr. SHULLMAN. I think that China is the No. 1 trading partner 

for over half of the countries in the Organization for Islamic Cooperation, yes. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Legitimacy, governmental legitimacy is critical, 

because the question the people always ask is, why are those folks 

running things? Monarchy answers the question, worked for several millennia. Theocracy works. In Iran, it answers the question 

why are these folks running things. Marxist-Leninism was a theocracy. But nobody in Beijing is the vanguard of the proletariat. It 

is as if what happens to Iran if the ayatollahs are still running 

things, but they become a group of pork-eating atheists. So they 

have to delegitimize democracy in order to prevent themselves from 

being relatively delegitimate, and they have to support 

authoritarianism in its many forms as an alternative. 

I want to turn the attention of the panel and my colleagues to 

a bill that I am working on. I call it the China Debt Trap Act. And 

what it would do is just tell countries that have, like Sri Lanka, 

signed these deals where they owe a huge amount of money for an 

infrastructure project that will not pay for it and just say, renounce 

the debt. Now, why do not countries renounce the debt? Well, 100 

years ago, they did not renounce the debt, or 150 years ago, because the Marines would land and take over the port and make the 
67 

country pay its debt. We do not do that anymore. You do not have 

to pay your debt if you are a country, unless you worry about your 

credit rating. 

So what this act would provide is that no U.S. person could give 

somebody a lower credit rating or fail to make a country a loan just 

because they had renounced Chinese debt trap debt, which would 

be defined as debt where—we would give the Chinese a chance to 

bring the deal to us for evaluation in advance. So if we certify that 

it is a fair deal, that is it, but any other time, if there is this debt, 

we could look at the deal, decide it was unfair, and invite the country to renounce it. 

Any comment? 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Sir, I will—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. It would serve them right, by the way. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. I will take a stab at that. I think it is a good 

idea. I think I would point out two thoughts, which is, one, in a 

lot of these countries, including Sri Lanka and others where they 

have gotten into serious debt to China, part of the problem is that 

once they get into this cycle of debt, they need to continue to finance these projects that have been started, and unless there are 

alternatives, they feel like they have to go back to China. So in the 

case of Sri Lanka, once the Rajapaksa regime is kicked out—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Fine. Borrow the first, then borrow the second, 

then borrow the third. Raise your debt to $10-, $20 trillion, and 

then renounce it all, and then still have complete access to all the 

Western financial institutions. Sounds like a plan. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. If there are alternate institutions that are willing—— 

Mr. SHERMAN. Well, yes. I mean, not that we would build another harbor for them for free, but they would be no worse off for 

wear. They could take all the money China extends in tranche one, 

two, three, and four, and then not have to pay and still have total 

access to us. 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. May I respond, just to piggyback off of Dr. 

Shullman’s comments. I think any avenues for countries that are 

working with China to talk about China in multilateral settings or 

in other bilateral relationships are welcome. And I will give you the 

example of the IMF in Pakistan as something to follow. 

We do not have a lot of information on Pakistan’s loans with the 

Chinese; they stopped sharing it. But they are cash-strapped and 

they needed to approach the IMF, because they are in a foreign exchange crisis. And the IMF said, we will not give you a deal unless 

you share information about these loans. And the deal is almost 

complete, and it is my understanding that that information has actually been shared. And so, you know, what Pakistan will not share 

publicly as part of a bilateral deal with the Chinese, I think it is 

more willing to share when it needs it. 

Mr. SHERMAN. I think you have got a good focus on disclosure. 

I want more. I want disclose the bad deal, borrow more in a second 

bad deal, borrow more in a third bad deal, and then renounce all 

the debt. 

With that, I yield to the ranking member for 5 minutes. 

Mr. YOHO. I want you to be my banker. Debt forgiveness. But it 

is a strategy. And I want to applaud the chairman for giving credit 
68 

to this administration. I think—no, I hope that does not go—I hope 

it does go public for you, because I think it is a good thing, because 

it shows that we are focused on what is best for America. 

And I think the chairman brings up an important point about 

the Spratly and Paracel Islands in that it is a worthless piece of 

real estate I think you said. But I think of it differently, in that 

it is a strategic area for China for the Indo-Pacific. When you have 

a country like China that lays claim to their historical nine-dash 

lines, and they said that this is where we sail so it is our land, 

even though the World Court has ruled against China and they 

make claim. And I think, Ms. Chaudhary, you brought this up, or 

it might have been Dr. Kliman. Nobody has challenged them. 

You know, the Philippines sued them in the World Court. China 

lost. They built. The world stayed idle. They have imprisoned, you 

know, 1-to 3 million Uighurs with concentration camps, possibly 

crematoriums. The world has stayed silent. 

And if we do not challenge them, they are going to continue to 

grow, and they have got their eyes on the Arctic now. And so the 

Paracel Islands is what I see as a second line of defense for mainland China. Then they are going to move to the Micronesia countries or Oceania, and then that will be a third line of defense. And 

I think it is important that we as a Nation, not just us, but the 

free world stands up to China. 

And I have got a question here about the ASEAN bloc of nations. 

What can countries in the Indo-Pacific do to curtail Chinese influence and deter interference, specifically the ASEAN bloc of nations? 

Does anybody want to talk about that? 

Mr. KLIMAN. Sure. I am happy to jump in on that. I mean, China 

has made a systematic effort to divide ASEAN through cultivating 

certain leaders in countries like Cambodia to torpedo the organization from having unity. 

I think from a kind of U.S. perspective, I mean, this often gets 

back to the kind of funding journalists on the ground and trying 

to create societal conditions that will make it harder for China to 

capture elites in places like Cambodia and elsewhere, and essentially be able to use ASEAN members against the larger organization. So I think, to me, I mean, ASEAN, until we can get at some 

of these members having been co-opted, it is not going to be a terribly effective organization as a whole pushing back on China. 

Mr. YOHO. All right. And what we have seen is a very aggressive 

China buying off influence or buying influence, breaking diplomatic 

ties with other countries like Taiwan, and they are going to continue to do this until we push back. 

And we have been very vocal on this committee and individually. 

When I have talked to the ASEAN leaders of their bloc, you know, 

we know that the original 10 blocs said that we do not interfere 

with the politics of another nation. But we are at a different time 

and place in history, with world powers juggling for preeminence. 

And China has got a very clear Stated position that they want— 

it is time for China to take the world center stage, according to Xi 

Jinping. 

And we have implored the chairman of the ASEAN bloc of nations that you need to come together as a bloc of nations to resist 

the aggression of China, especially in the South China Sea or the 
69 

East Sea, and understand it is not just you. It would be us, Canada, Great Britain, France, Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia. And if we collectively stand up against China, China will get 

the message in one sense, militarily. You know, that is a formidable force. 

The other thing is—and nobody wants a kinetic conflict. I think 

we need to have economic repivoting in manufacturing in the 

world, and I like to refer to it as ABC, manufacture anywhere but 

China and encourage our manufacturers to go. Because we are 

feeding the very machine that is having this aggressive nation—or 

aggressive actions, and the only reason they can do that is because 

so much is made in China. And so I think we need to repivot the 

manufacturing hubs of the world so that we are not indebted to a 

China that produces pretty much everything. 

And we had the AmCham come in. And we have said this to multiple organizations that do manufacturing in China, and they all 

freak out. Oh, it is such a big market, 1.3 billion people in China. 

We have got to have this market. But they sell their souls for profits for the boards, you know, for the stockholders. I want to take 

them by the shoulders and point them to the rest of the world. 

There are 6-point-some billion people over here. Let’s focus on this 

market and move manufacturing over there, because if we hit 

China economically—and I do not want to damage China. I want 

the Chinese people to be successful but not at the expense of my 

Nation or our allies. And I want countries free to choose the system 

they want. 

And what are your thoughts on that, to get manufacturers to 

leave, or how realistic is that, if I may? 

Mr. KLIMAN. I think it is a very interesting idea. I mean, you 

could even think about with supply chains now anecdotally. 

Anecdotally, we have heard of companies now rethinking about the 

tariffs. Do you keep your manufacturing in China, because suddenly people are hoarding key supplies with the tariffs? You could 

even imagine, for example, legislation that would essentially give 

tax breaks to companies that are U.S. in China, but then are taking their supply chains there and slowly moving them to, essentially, whether it is here or other regions. So I think it is a very 

intriguing idea. 

Mr. YOHO. I am out of time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I would point out that America does not seek a $300 billion trade 

surplus with China. We would be fair. You know, fair and balanced 

is fine with us, although the fair and balanced slogan may already 

be taken. 

And we give 5 minutes to the gentlelady from Pennsylvania. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you, guys, for coming. I have a couple of 

questions. I had the opportunity of meeting with some 

businesspeople in my community last week who have been working 

for the better part of a decade with outreach to Asia and specifically to China to bring joint ventures together, to find sister city 

relationships; and they were very excited and enthusiastic about 

the opportunities that they saw in sort of growing businesses with 

a very large market. 
70 

And this was not necessarily in the manufacturing space. I personally have a great deal of experience in the Asia and particularly 

China manufacturing world. But this had to do with farming and 

agriculture, it had to do with tech transfer and that kind of thing. 

So my question to you all is, I recognize, as a businessperson, I 

recognize for my community that growing your businesses and expanding to newer markets, large markets is really essential; but I 

also approach this with a degree of cynicism and a little bit of uncertainty about how we can educate the folks in our communities, 

the businessmen and women in our communities to be cautious in 

their outreach. And how should I bring that message without seeming as though I am depressing the economy of my community? Anybody who can answer that for me? 

Mr. KLIMAN. I am happy to jump in on that. I mean, there are 

probably a few ways. I mean, one, I think more and more businesses are going to see they are producing within China for China, 

and thinking about essentially segmenting your business. Where 

China is a big market, of course, companies will need to be there, 

but really having kind of your presence there for the local market, 

not using it as a basis for your kind of global supply chain, not necessarily putting your best technology there. 

And so I think that would be how I would frame it and just, I 

mean, all the sort of cautions up front. With technology, I mean, 

going eyes in, knowing that, ultimately, China wants to keep its 

market for its own companies. It will take technology if they are 

putting it there, try to squeeze it from these firms, and ultimately 

they will find the Chinese competitor here. So being cautious. But 

I fully understand your point, which is it is a large market and so 

companies are going to have to navigate it, but I think with a lot 

of care. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. I guess would you recommend that I maybe even 

have roundtables such as this where experts are kind of communicating the cautionary tales? It feels as though the conversation 

has been sort of Belt and Road and at the level of other countries 

and their relationship with China. And we need to be bringing it, 

in my opinion, down to the everyday of my community. Is there 

something that I could be doing to be helpful in educating my community? 

Mr. KLIMAN. I would imagine more so certainly than myself here 

but, I mean, business experts who have been there for a long time 

are navigating the market, understand it. I mean, I think there 

would be a lot of benefit. I am sure you would find folks who could 

give kind of a best practices who have been there for a while. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Does anybody else have anything to add to that? 

Mr. MATTIS. Yes. If you want to do business in China, do business in China. Go there and make the relationships yourself. If it 

is coming through one of these organizations, whether it is a Chinese chamber of commerce, whether it is a tongxiang hui, the 

hometown association, whether it is a sister city type of relationship, this is actually controlled by the influence bureaucracy. 

If a foreign country was thinking about doing business in the 

United States and CIA was sort of the vector for making that happen, people would sort of say, ah, maybe not. So why should it be 
71 

any different when we are dealing with the PRC? And so if you 

want to do business, do business. 

But, as you said, you know, some of these are about tech transfer. This influence system is as much about building talent recruitment and tech transfer and making sure that that expertise is 

available. 

You mentioned in agriculture. Dutch security officials, Spanish 

security officials, Australian security officials, Taiwanese security 

officials have all told me about how they were kind of puzzled how 

agricultural products, seeds, also in the United States, that these 

have been targets for the intelligence system, for the influence system, to bring that expertise back. 

So it is a question of are you seeing an opportunity that is genuinely there or is it an opportunity that is being given to you to sort 

of suck you into the PRC so that you can be exploited. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Just quickly on that too, to bring it back to the 

developing Asia perspective. This is the same thing that is happening in all these countries, in these developing countries. In 

Asia, where people will think that they are engaging with the 

friendly business association. 

And so part of what IRI and others are doing is, you know, trying 

to educate on, you know, this is not exactly who you think you are 

dealing with. This is related to the party, to the united front sort 

of work, and you need to go into this with eyes wide open, perhaps; 

and, as Peter said, perhaps go to China and create those relationships on your own as opposed to letting these organizations with 

this background come to you. 

Ms. HOULAHAN. Thank you. I yield the balance of my time back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. The gentleman from Florida I guess has left, so 

we will go to the gentlelady from Missouri. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for hosting this hearing, and thank you to our witnesses for their time. 

With tensions over trade escalating and the Chinese Vice Premier headed to Washington Thursday for resumed talks, I appreciate this timely opportunity to learn more about China’s attempts 

to erode America’s influence. I come from a trading State, the State 

of Missouri, where exports support 88,000 jobs. That is 18 percent 

above the national average. 

I strongly believe that China must be held accountable for its 

malign trade and investment policies, but we must be targeted. 

American consumers and businesses should not be the ones shouldering the consequences. I believe our trade policy toward China 

should be aimed at curbing the predatory behavior of China’s 

State-owned enterprises, these SOEs. 

Dr. Kliman, how should U.S. negotiators address this issue in 

talks? 

Mr. KLIMAN. That is a great question, certainly very timely. I 

mean, my view is that, ultimately, U.S. and Chinese economic objectives are squarely nonaligned, that China ultimately wants to 

dominate kind of the key industries of the future. And if you look 

at sort of any deal on the table already this week, it became apparent the Chinese were walking back from their commitments. To 

me, that is deeply unsurprising. 
72 

I think any deal, if one is struck, will be unsatisfying, I think, 

to the House, to the Senate, to the American people, given the nature of what China wants relative to the United States. 

So I do not think there is a straightforward sort of answer to 

your question. I mean, I think at the end of the day, it will be 

about sort of protecting the industries here where China is going 

to exploit us trading in select areas that perhaps are not as competitive with them. But I do not think there is sort of a very easier 

painless path forward. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Oh, clearly. And, obviously, the Vice Premier is on 

his way, and the President is saber-rattling. So we will see if we 

make any inroads here this week. I want to make sure, though, 

that my farmers and my consumers are not inadvertently and overly affected by this. 

Beijing allows its State-owned enterprises to borrow at extremely 

low interest rates from public financial institutions. As a result, 

SOEs have dominated project bids in Southeast Asia, a primary 

target of the Belt and Road Initiative. I am co-chair of the congressional ASEAN Caucus, and I am deeply concerned that these policies are designed to draw Southeast Asian countries into Beijing’s 

sphere of influence. 

Dr. Kliman, how should the United States work with Southeast 

Asian countries to prevent these State-owned enterprises from boxing out more responsible investors? 

Mr. KLIMAN. Congress has already taken an important step in 

that direction, passing the BUILD Act. I would say I am cautiously 

optimistic with our new development finance corporation that some 

of the tools it has, including new tools like equity as well as, of 

course, the new lending cap, if targeted, could help to move the 

needle. I think many of the countries in Southeast Asia understand 

what Chinese SOEs bring is not necessarily well-engaged with our 

economy. There is not the skill transfer they want. The debt issue. 

So I think the problem for the U.S. until now has been we did 

not have an alternative easily available. That may change with this 

new DFC. I think there is a critical role for Congress to make sure 

the DFC is lending in some of these countries in support of U.S. 

companies in competitive sectors, but I would say I am optimistic 

that we now actually have that tool. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Dr. Shullman, the Xi regime faces internal pressure stemming from demographic issues, simmering dissent and 

high expectations regarding economic performance. Given these dynamics, I think it is important to remember that the Belt and Road 

Initiative was originally a domestically oriented initiative designed 

to spread economic growth to quickly growing cities in China’s interior. Belt and Road Initiative has now evolved far beyond its domestic origins and threatens to undermine democracy and good 

governance in developing countries. 

Do you think the shift was opportunistic or accidental? And how 

should China’s internal pressures inform our thinking on the Belt 

and Road Initiative? 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Thank you for that question. I think it is absolutely right to point out the fact that the Belt and Road initially 

was very much domestically focused to benefit China’s west in particular. 
73 

I think it is important to note that, you know, in terms of why 

it has become such a big deal in terms of external economic engagement, China is looking to create external markets to be able to sell 

its goods elsewhere. They are also trying to export its overcapacity 

in a lot of industries. But it is important to note that, actually, you 

know, when you look at the data, the Belt and Road actually has 

not been very beneficial for China’s domestic economy going forward. 

What I think we need to look to is, going forward, as I mention 

in my remarks, if China’s economy continues to face mounting 

challenges, as we see that it is with the massive amounts of debt 

that they are taking on domestically, China is going to continue, 

I think, to look to the Belt and Road as a way to get them out of 

this problem, right, to create new markets and all, so to try to continue to saddle countries with these debts. 

And to come back to your question to Dr. Kliman, it is not just 

that SOEs are getting subsidized and, therefore, able to come in 

with lower bids. It is that the Chinese policy banks that are financing these projects are then going in with these governments and 

saying, OK, and there is going to be one bid and it is going to be 

from a Chinese SOE, or maybe two bids, both of them Chinese 

SOEs. And so you are going to have a situation where you have 

very inflated costs, with corruption inherent in all of these deals. 

So it is not just the subsidizing, it is also the opaque nature in 

the way in which these deals are done. And to expose that through 

civil society and investigative journalism is really critical. 

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Dr. Shullman. I know my time has 

elapsed. 

I have a really awesome question for you, Ms. Chaudhary, and 

I am going to make sure that it gets submitted to you—it is about 

India—that I would love if you could respond in writing. And I 

thank the chair for the hearing. 

Mr. SHERMAN. We all look forward to reading the awesome question and the even more awesome answers. 

Two items for the record. First, tomorrow China’s Vice Premier 

Liu will be in Washington, DC. This subcommittee has invited him 

to either meet with the subcommittee or the full committee, his 

choice. He has not responded, and my fear is that if he watches 

this tape, he is even less likely to respond. 

And for the record, I will comment that while I have commended 

President Trump for not ignoring the problems with China—and I 

think Ted’s got it right in some ways—there are other areas where 

I disagree with his policies. And if the committee demands that I 

spend 15 minutes explaining that, I will accede to that demand. 

But in the meantime, we will recognize for 5 minutes the 

gentlelady from Virginia. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank 

you to the witnesses. 

I was struck by what you said, Mr. Mattis, in talking about the 

Chinese believe that national security is achieving the absence of 

threats, and further continued your discussion to say that there are 

really no consequences to China, so they take no risk in a lot of 

what it is that they are doing. 
74 

So I was curious if you could expand upon that kind of premise 

of thought. What do you see are some of the consequences that the 

United States could put in place or could expand upon that could 

create risk for China that might impact their behavior and positively impact our national security situation vis-a-vis China? 

Mr. MATTIS. So one of the easy ones that has been in the news 

for the last, I think, year and a half is the issue of visas and Chinese Government officials coming through the United States, 

whether in some cases to intimidate people or, say, education officials going to universities for the purpose of overseeing a party 

committee meeting or to directly send messages to students. That 

strikes me as activity that is inconsistent with diplomatic convention. In some cases, this may fall afoul of some of our civil liberties 

legislation, and these are clearly grounds for declaring a diplomat 

persona non grata. 

If it is someone who has come in without diplomatic accreditation, then you are talking about something that is akin to visa 

fraud. It does not mean that you necessarily have to arrest them 

and hold them. Maybe you charge them after. But making the 

point that this is something that is considered off limits is important. If it actually does involve sort of more direct criminal acts, 

as might have been the case in, say, the Olympic torch relay, then 

it does mean that we are going to have to bring those tools to bear. 

Four Chinese companies that have been on the receiving end of 

stolen intellectual property, they still have been able to do business 

in the U.S. and elsewhere. You know, whether it is—I know there 

is legislation being considered to punish those companies directly. 

Again, what is the possibility of using criminal indictments for the 

people involved and restricting their travel abroad? 

I think in many of these cases, when we try to make the issue 

about the PRC or the party writ large, we end up looking at this 

big complicated mess when the response might actually best be 

made to make it personal, so that the individuals that are involved 

have to make the decisions and have to calculate for themselves. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you. 

And my next question is for Dr. Chaudhary. You talked briefly 

about the counterterrorism efforts and the different pivot that 

China has versus Pakistan. And so I am curious, from a U.S. 

counterterrorism perspective, where do you see that our relationship with Pakistan working to address the threat of terrorism could 

be potentially impacted by the relationship that Pakistan continues 

to develop with China, and whether or not that might sway/change/ 

impact their focus on the terrorist threat, and how that might impact our relationship with Pakistan in addressing that threat? 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. So, in general, I think that it has been a good 

thing for U.S. interests that the Chinese have gotten involved in 

Pakistan security issues. They always have been involved a little 

bit, but more privately. 

And what we have seen in the past decade, as the threats have 

expanded and become more amorphous and with, you know, also 

ISIS expanding, we have seen the Chinese become more interested 

in Pakistani stability. And that coincides with, you know, the State 

becoming increasingly fractured, relations between civilians and 

military not going well, as they do in Pakistan. 
75 

And so I think the Chinese realize that they have to become a 

little bit more engaged and active, and also at the prodding of the 

United States. I mean, we really—and I was in the administration 

at that time. We really were curious why the Chinese we are not 

concerned about Pakistan stability. It is their neighbor, frankly 

speaking. They have much more skin in the game for the long term 

than the U.S. does, ironically, with the thousands of troops that we 

had. 

So, in the short run, I would say it is a benefit for us, especially 

because the Chinese have gotten involved with talks with the 

Taliban. They have different avenues into that conversation on the 

conflict in Afghanistan that the U.S. can benefit from. We really 

have lost a lot of influence and leverage in our relationships with 

everyone in the region. And so anyone else who shares or overlaps 

with those values, I think that is a benefit. 

Over time, it is going to be much more difficult to pursue our 

counterterrorism interests in Pakistan, and this is because we do 

not have the relationships with the institutions and also with the 

individual leaders that we had, say, 10 years ago or 15 years ago. 

And that is simply because we are not putting that much money 

into the country, and we are not focusing beyond counterterrorism. 

And I am not here to argue that we should put more money at 

this point. I think that we really tried everything we could. But as 

the Chinese are pursuing a very specific focus on security related 

to the Uighurs, they are not concerned about overall stability for 

the country, only for their projects. 

And so with that, I think the U.S. has to think about the nuclear 

proliferation threats, the possibility of China and Pakistan working 

more closely together on that, and what do you do about anti-India 

militants in Punjab, which do destabilize the region. And China is 

not really doing anything about that yet. 

Ms. SPANBERGER. Thank you. 

Thank you very much. I yield back. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida. 

Mr. MAST. Thank you, Chairman. 

Listen, I just wanted to give you all the opportunity to sound off 

on this. If you have anything profound, anything mind-blowing that 

you would like to say about what you perceive some of the biggest—a biggest weakness of China to be that you might think we 

are missing. Do you have anything mind-blowing or profound to 

say about a weakness you think we are missing on China? 

I hear crickets, so I might have to move on. 

Mr. KLIMAN. I am happy to jump in on that. I think at the end 

of the day, I mean, the economic model they are pedaling, while it 

has gained some success, I mean, it ultimately has enormous 

downsides. And you have seen the backlash. 

I think if the U.S. takes advantage of the rising concern about 

Belt and Road investments and, again, emphasizes what we do 

best, which is skill transfer, things even like women’s empowerment—we have an initiative for that run by OPEC—there is a real 

opportunity here. 

I think sometimes it is easy even here in the U.S. to be sort of 

dismissive of our ability to rise to the China challenge. I think ulti-
76 

mately China has great weaknesses, especially sort of the longterm appeal of their economic Statecraft. So I would definitely put 

that as a vulnerability. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. I mean, I would just add, I do not know if this 

is something that anyone is missing, but it is really important to 

note whenever we talk about China and the party how insecure 

they are about their continued grip on power going forward. 

I think, you know, this is something that underlies everything 

that they do domestically, but also their approach to these issues 

internationally. And so even though we see a much stronger China 

on the world stage and a lot more aggressive rhetoric and a lot 

more aggressive programs and the Belt and Road in countries all 

around the world, it is important to remember that, you know, 

when China holds meetings at the Politburo level, they are frequently talking about what are the risks that we are facing long 

term in terms of staying in power and maintaining stability. 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. I would also add that something we have not 

talked about today is Chinese kind of people-to-people relationships, and that is something that I think is an inherent weakness 

if you compare it to the U.S. and our ability to use our soft power 

influence through our entertainment. Everything about American 

life that appeals around the world, the Chinese do not have that. 

And the Chinese nationals that are going to, say, Pakistan, for 

example, they are not there to become part of the culture or learn 

about the communities or have cross-cultural dialog. They are 

there to make money, and they live in enclaves and essentially 

what people call Chinese colonies and go to their own restaurants. 

And that is not something that is going to favor China, Pakistan, 

or China in cooperation with any country, for that matter, over the 

long run. Local communities will be very upset by those things, I 

believe. 

Mr. MAST. Interesting enough. I appreciate that. I wanted to go 

back to you for a question. I was interested by a lot of what you 

had to say, but I wanted to expand the scope of some of what you 

spoke about. Do you see any place specifically in your analysis that 

you see China wanting to change existing territorial borders outside of, let’s say, the South China Sea? 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. I do not believe I could speak to that in the context of South Asia, no. I have not seen that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. If the gentleman would yield, I will point out that 

there is a significant territorial dispute between India and China, 

and in the 1960’s, there was more than one armed conflict over 

that. 

Mr. MAST. Certainly. Is there any place that you are assessing 

this? 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. On that note, I would say so there is a part of 

CPEC that involves Gilgit-Baltistan, which is a disputed territory; 

and India takes claim to it, as does Pakistan. And a good chunk 

of CPEC activity will be conducted in that space. It is the beginning of CPEC, in fact, for China. 

There is some push to incorporate that part of Pakistan officially 

into Pakistan. It is now just an administered territory; it is not an 

actual province. So there is talk of that, which has made the Indians really upset. But this is a very complicated issue and it is not 
77 

just connected to CPEC. It is connected to Kashmir. It is connected 

to other India-Pakistan relations. 

So I think specifically because China has involved itself in that 

particular kind of territorial dispute that it is going to delay the 

benefits of CPEC to anybody, especially local communities, but 

even for the Chinese. 

Mr. MAST. Chairman, I honestly have no idea. Has my time expired or not? 

Mr. SHERMAN. Your time has expired. 

Either I have such incredible love for the gentleman from Florida 

that I have let him go 5–1/2 minutes over or, in fact, he has actually only held the floor for 5–1/2 minutes and somebody hit the red 

button as opposed to the green button. 

But we will now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia. 

And, yes, good, the green button has been pushed. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. And welcome to our panel. 

I want to ask about China’s Belt and Road Initiative. We are seeing signs of backlash to that project in recipient countries. For example, I was in Sri Lanka 2 years ago and what was predicted occurred. The Chinese State-owned company had to take over or 

wanted to take over Hambantota, a brand new port on the southern tip of the island. And the government, of course, otherwise 

would have been insolvent, unable to pay back huge multibillion 

dollar loans to the Chinese. 

Malaysia’s new prime minister questioned the value of these 

deals, Chinese deals signed by his predecessor and made it an 

issue in his successful election. In the Maldives, the new President 

strongly criticized his predecessor’s decision to agree to more than 

a billion dollars to China for their projects. 

We do know locally, and I saw it not only in Sri Lanka but in 

Mongolia and Kyrgyzstan, resentment by local labor pools, because 

the Chinese are so insulated, so parochial, they do not use local 

labor. The ripple effects to the projects do not go far in the economy, and it is resented. 

Is this just anecdotal or is there reason to believe that this huge 

project actually is going to be a lot less than the Chinese think it 

is going to be, in terms of their foreign policy, their building friends 

and influencing people? And let me start with you, Ms. Chaudhary, 

and you, Dr. Kliman. And then if you would like to comment, feel 

free. 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. So it is a wonderful question, and I have to say 

during my last trip to Pakistan in February this year, I heard the 

same sense of resentment and anxieties coming from everyone, 

even people that I would not expect I thought they would be benefiting from Chinese involvement. 

Now, there are reasons, there are things behind that. Those 

things might be anecdotal, the experiences that people are sharing 

with you, but there are things that we can look at and say, that 

is why those people are feeling that anxiety. One is that, you know, 

we should not let these governments off the hook. China is doing 

a lot of things that they should not be doing, but these are, you 

know, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, elsewhere. These are governments that 

are weak politically and that are dominated by elites who have captured the economic system and are benefiting from those relation-
78 

ships with China. And then they get voted out of power or kicked 

out of power or there is a coup, and then the next government is 

able very easily to use the relationship with China as a political 

tool. And once it gets into that space, there is no going back, right? 

Now, there are some structural things as well. I mean, a lot of 

these countries, they have heavy borrowing from foreign lenders. 

They are cash-strapped. They are desperate for foreign exchange. 

And they have their own inefficient companies running these ports, 

for example. They are not bringing in outsider experienced companies that are doing it. 

So there are both kind of political and also structural factors that 

contribute to those anxieties, and people are not seeing the financial benefits in their pockets as they have been touted by their governments. And I think that is another reason why that everyday 

person—— 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I guess I would just say to you, though, in the 

case of Hambantota, I went there. It was a brand-new port, and it 

was pristine. Not a single ship had docked. There was not a single 

cargo unloaded. There was not a container in acres and acres and 

acres of a port. And I have been to ports. I was shocked. 

And so the Sri Lankan Government bought, an American expression, a pig in a poke. And the Chinese were only too happy to offer 

to take it over and manage it for the next 50 or 90 years, and a 

strategic location where 30 percent of the world’s shipping passes, 

and that ought to concern India and it ought to concern us. 

The backlash, though, it seems to me, from a foreign policy point 

of view, serves U.S. interests. So they are spending all this money 

and they are unhappy as recipients, or at least the successor government is. Maybe we let that unfold. I do not know. 

You wanted to comment, Mr. Shullman. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Yes, I would just like to jump in on that. I mean, 

I think the Sri Lanka example is a really important one, because 

I think when I have gone there, contrary to what I would have expected when we talk, you know, in the China community about 

what happened at the Hambantota port, you would maybe expect 

people to be clamoring and saying, oh, save us from China, but, in 

fact, you have a situation where China is actually quite still popular among the Sri Lankan public. And the new government has 

actually continued to take financing. They just got a $1 billion loan 

from China Development Bank recently from the Chinese. 

The Hambantota port deal was, yes, partially about the fact that 

Sri Lanka could not pay back. I have heard there was also some 

corruption involved with the new Sirisena government, not just the 

Rajapaksa government. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. When I was there and this was being debated, 

you know, but it had not been resolved yet, there was open discussion by everybody, including at high levels of the government, 

about huge payments by the Chinese to win over friends and to get 

an agreement. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. So you have that elite capture aspect, but you 

also have this information manipulation aspect, where China is 

now, it is rational, right, that they are going into Sri Lanka now 

and throwing a ton of money into Sri Lanka to try to shape the 
79 

debate, because they know that Sri Lanka is now the poster child 

for the debt trap. It is sullying the BRI brand around the world. 

And so when I went in and tried to find a researcher for our 

project on Sri Lanka to talk, to just look into objectively the nature 

of Chinese influence in the country, it was quite hard to find someone, because all these institutions are now taking Chinese money 

and they know where their bread is buttered and they do not want 

to take that risk. 

So that just goes to the point that even though we see externally 

a lot of the downsides of BRI for these countries, internally, because of what China is doing and because of the relationships they 

form with elites, the message is not as widespread as you might 

think it is. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I do not know if you would allow—I am done— 

Mr. Kliman or Mr. Mattis to comment. 

Mr. KLIMAN. If there is time. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Briefly, very briefly. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. KLIMAN. China is very much making tactical adjustments, 

whether it is—China is making tactical adjustments. So whether 

you look in Malaysia, essentially reducing the cost of their projects. 

They are also at the recent Belt and Road forum, trying to play out 

sort of new aspects of their investments, whether it is what they 

call high-quality, green, financially sustainable. 

I think a key emphasis of U.S. diplomacy has to be going forward 

to call China on it, that they are not making real changes, and emphasize what real change would look like. For example, massive 

debt forgiveness to countries, including those like Sri Lanka, that 

are strategic for China; or terminating some of these really problematic projects; or bringing in international partners to the point 

where they are reducing their ownership below 50 percent. So U.S. 

diplomacy could play a big role there. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

We will now recognize the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I would like to yield a moment to Mr. Mast, who has got a question for the chairman. 

Mr. MAST. Yes. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to yield you a quick 

moment if you wanted to elaborate on you advocated for a policy 

of countries borrowing from China and then not returning those 

funds. Would you advocate for that for the United States of America? 

Mr. SHERMAN. We do not engage in debt trap financing. When 

a U.S. Government entity makes a loan, it is with the expectation 

that the loan is affordable, can be repaid, and can be repaid normally out of the project’s revenues. 

Mr. MAST. Glad to hear you say that. 

Mr. SHERMAN. When China tries to get extraterritorial power 

over Sri Lanka through a debt instrument, we should respond appropriately. 

Mr. MAST. I just wanted to make sure. 

I yield the time back to the gentleman from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PERRY. Reclaiming my time. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and 

thanks to the panel for being here. 
80 

I just wonder, in this whole negotiation regarding trade and 

other things, do you think that China was watching very carefully 

the outcome of the special counsel’s report? And do you see that as 

maybe affecting how they would have comported themselves in the 

continuing negotiations, depending on the outcome? Anybody? 

OK, nobody. 

Well, if you think about it and you have an answer, I would be 

interested in hearing it. 

Just watching, recently China has been accused again of intellectual property theft regarding military secrets at colleges. They 

have been delinquent in enforcing North Korean sanctions, continued unabated at their human rights violation, continued its incursions in the East China Sea, and abused the goodwill of America 

by encouraging intelligence collections of its visa holders in the 

United States. 

And I wonder, will China or would China view differently sanctions versus tariffs? I am not a fan of tariffs, but we have limited 

options, from my viewpoint, vis-a-vis China. But I wonder—sanctions has a different flavor, to me, as punitive. It is punishment for 

bad behavior. And the sanction might be a quasi-tariff, but I wonder if China would view it differently if it were a sanction, and I 

would like to get your view if anybody has. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Well, I would just say I think you are on the 

right track in terms of thinking that they would take a tougher 

view of sanctions. Obviously, they are not a fan of tariffs, but 

China traditionally has been very opposed to unilateral sanctions, 

whether it is related to the North Korea issue, when it has come 

up in relation to Chinese companies that are involved in the South 

China Sea. 

I think that would be something that they would react to very 

strongly and see as a direct attack and perhaps would take action 

to take some sort of retribution to show their displeasure and say 

that China is now, you know, at a certain level as a great power 

and cannot be treated this way. And that is how China tends to 

approach these things, especially when it is unilateral sanctions 

and not sanctions that come from a multilateral body, on themselves or others. 

Mr. PERRY. So the sanctions, based on that, if they were going 

to have the positive effect the United States would be seeking, 

would be better served if it was not unilateral but if it was multilateral. 

And what kind of actions other than being dissatisfied and, for 

lack of a better way of saying it, crying like a bear that is sore, 

what kind of actions would they take vis-a-vis the United States 

if they were sanctioned? And I wonder too, even if it were fines, 

because, you know, China is known to be washing dirty money, 

dirty North Korean money through our financial markets, and we 

do not have to abide that. We can fine them for that. We can track 

that and source that and fine them for that. 

And I understand that administrations leave space for negotiation, but we could start there and the fines could be pretty robust. 

And then we could freeze out certain components of their society 

from our financial system. And there is a downside to the United 
81 

States as well to that, but they are in it for the long haul here and 

we better get serious about it. 

So I am just curious what they might respond to in that regard, 

how they would respond, and if you think that that would have potential significant impact, the financial sanctioning, so to speak, or 

fining. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Well, I cannot speak specifically to, you know, 

how they would respond without knowing exactly which sanctions 

and which subject we would be talking about, but, you know, it is 

certainly entirely possible that they would take some action to even 

further restrict access to the Chinese market, to be even more difficult in any kind of diplomatic engagement or negotiations. 

But there is a whole range of ways in which China could try to 

take some kind of punitive action. Obviously, one of them, especially if it is related to North Korea, would be to play even harder 

ball in terms of allowing all sorts of things to be—oil and other 

things to reach its way into North Korea and not even trying to 

pretend that they are upholding sanctions. That is one way in 

which they might respond. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, I have exceeded my time, but it almost seems 

like—with all due respect, it seems like we are in a position 

where—and I understand it is delicate regardless, but every day 

that goes by that we do not respond or act proactively regarding 

China, we are in a worse position. And so if we are going to do it, 

the time is now as opposed to later. 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Yes. No, I agree. I do not mean to be giving the 

impression that I am saying it is necessarily the worst course of 

action. I am just laying out that I think that the reaction would 

be much stronger than to tariffs. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you. 

Mr. SHERMAN. And now, last but certainly not least, the gentleman from Michigan. 

Mr. LEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for coming. 

I want to turn back to the Belt and Road Initiative and focus on 

a couple particular aspects of it. First of all, human rights. There 

are several examples of Belt and Road projects that have had negative implications for human rights in Asian countries. Take, for example, the big dam project in Myanmar or Burma. Is it the 

Myitsone, or how do you say that? 

Mr. SHULLMAN. Myitsone Dam. 

Mr. LEVIN. Myitsone, OK. So, as Human Rights Watch reported 

last month, critics say the mega dam would cause large-scale displacement, and I am quoting, loss of livelihoods, wide-scale environmental damage, and destruction of cultural heritage sites, significant to the ethnic Kachin people. 

Ms. Chaudhary and Dr. Kliman, in general, have Chinese authorities consulted with communities that would be affected by BRI 

projects like, for example, communities that might be displaced by 

major projects like this dam? 

Mr. KLIMAN. I am happy to jump on that. So we just did a global 

study in my think tank, the Center for a New American Security, 

on China’s Belt and Road, looked at 10 projects globally. And there 

was a pattern of disregard for local economic needs, local environmental challenges, local people, that was not just in Asia and Latin 
82 

America, Africa. So it is a global issue. So the answer is, broadly, 

no. 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. So we see the same pattern kind of unfolding 

in Pakistan as well. There are two areas of concern. One is in 

Gilgit-Baltistan, which I previously mentioned, and then two is in 

Balochistan. Both are these areas where the populations have not 

been well-served by their governments, both their local or their national. 

And so there are fears of land grab and abuses of local workers, 

not enough local workers being hired. And the government really 

has—my view is that in Pakistan, China has really outsourced its 

consultation to the Pakistanis. And because the Pakistanis do not 

really do any kind of extensive consultation, none of that has happened, and it just aggravates kind of all of the center-periphery 

kind of tensions that have already existed in the country for a long 

time. 

Mr. LEVIN. Right. So in the Myitsone Dam situation, my understanding is that there are protests of people opposing the project, 

including one in February, that drew an estimated 7,000 people. 

So is this kind of opposition from the local population in an organized way like that unique? Did you find it elsewhere in your 

study? What have you found here? How have governments responded when people object like that? 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. When people object. So that is a very good 

question. And my comments earlier on kind of critical voices being 

suppressed speak to that. Rarely will you read an article that is 

critical about CPEC in the Pakistani media, very rarely. There has 

been a media capture, essentially. And there is only one CPEC narrative, because people are scared or they have been intimidated or 

threatened not to do certain pieces. 

At the very local level, people who critique CPEC are often labeled terrorists. There are antiterrorism laws that can be used 

against them. Worse things could possibly happen. So it is a very 

real threat and it has already done a lot of damage to civil society 

and democratic culture that is fairly vibrant, despite the country’s 

history with democracy. 

Mr. LEVIN. And in other places? 

Mr. KLIMAN. So in general, the trend is in countries with less 

transparency, more corruption, you tend to, even if there are protests, they do not actually accomplish a lot. They do not slow the 

Chinese down. In places that had more rule of law accountability, 

you saw fewer of these kinds of actions. 

So I would say it really varies. In places like Indonesia, where 

there have been concerns about their high-speed rail, my understanding is civil society has played more of a role and maybe 

slowed that project down; but in other places where you do not, like 

Burma, it ultimately is going to not move the needle. 

Mr. LEVIN. So let’s talk about the environmental ramifications of 

BRI projects. In Sri Lanka, the construction of the Colombo Port 

facility has faced criticism over the land reclamation needed for 

construction and concerns that result in coastal erosion might affect local fish populations, threaten fishermen’s way of life. 
83 

Have other Belt and Road projects posed environmental threats, 

and are there some examples of this, and how do you see this 

issue? 

Mr. SHULLMAN. If I could comment on that. I think absolutely, 

that is an excellent question, because, you know, China is trying 

to paint itself as having the now green Belt and Road. No. 1, a lot 

of the projects that they underwrite are obviously in the energy 

sector and supporting lots of, you know, coal and other sorts of 

projects that are not beneficial for the environment in these countries. 

And then you also need to raise the fact that in a lot of these 

countries where China is financing projects that these countries 

cannot sustain, you ultimately get a result where the countries 

need to tear down or go crosscut more, cut into more of their forest. 

A perfect example of this is in Ecuador where, because China was 

able to get Ecuador into a situation where it owed a massive 

amount of debt and ultimately now needs to pay back that debt in 

oil—80 percent of Ecuador’s oil is now going to China despite the 

fact that the dam they built for them is nonfunctioning—the Ecuadorians now are needing to go and cut into more of their rainforest 

to try to find more resources to pay back those loans. 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. So the reason why China is so welcome in a lot 

of these countries is because they do not have roads or any infrastructure in these areas where the government is essentially giving 

land to do these projects. And so, of course, there is always going 

to be the ecological damage. I think the problem is that the studies—or the feasibility studies or the assessments are not being 

done in advance. And I think that is a real opportunity for other 

countries like the United States to participate or just have their 

own kind of process of evaluating the damage of BRI to these countries. 

Mr. LEVIN. In advance. 

Ms. CHAUDHARY. Yes. 

Mr. LEVIN. Yes, great point. 

OK, I am sure my time is up. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. 

I want to thank our witnesses for coming, thank the members for 

participating, and we stand adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
84 

APPENDIX 

SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

U.S.IIOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128 

Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation 

Brad Sherman (D-CA), Chairman 

May 8, 2019 

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. to be held by 

the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific. and Nonproliferation in Room 2200 of the Rayburn I louse Office Building 

(and available live on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/ 

DATE: 

TIME: 

SUBJECT: 

WITNESSES: 

Wednesday, May 8, 2019 

2:00p.m. 

China's Growing Influence in Asia and the United States 

Daniel Kliman, Ph. D 

Senior Fellow 

Asia-Pacific Security Program 

Center for a New American Security 

Ms. Shamila Chaudhary 

Senior Advisor, 

School for Advanced International Studies 

Johns Hopkins University 

South Asia Fellow 

New America 

Mr. Peter Mattis 

Research Fellow in China Studies 

Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation 

David Shullman, Ph.D. 

Senior Advisor 

International Republican Institute 

By J)ircction of the Chairman 
85 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

MINUTES OF SUBCOMMIITEE ONJ\C!.A 1.,c;. Mc.!P•<-1A.Nn NAN!Zft>' •f'IL!:£<'sW'~ HEARING 

Day Wednesday Date __ .;c.M."'a"-:y..;;8::..;, 2;;.;0;.;;1..;..9 __ Room, __ .....;2::.:2:.:0c::O __ _ 

Starting Time 2:15PM EndlngTime 3:47PM 

Recesses __ (___to___) (___to___) L_to ___)(___to___) L_to ___)(___to___) 

Presiding Member(s) 

Chairma" Brad Sherma11 

Check all of the following Ill at apply: 

Open Session IZl Executive !£!!?sed) Session D Televised l.LI 

TITLE OF HEARING: 

Electronically Reeordm.ftaped) IZl 

Stenographic Record LLI 

China's Growing Influence in Asia and the United States 

SUBCOMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT: 

Attendance form attached. 

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HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes EJ NoD 

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency. department. or organi;ation.) 

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record.) 

QFR- Sherman 

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or 

TIME ADJOURNED 3:47PM 
86 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ASIA, THE PACIFIC AND NONPROLJFERA'IJON COMMITTEE HEARING 

I Dina Titus, NV 

! Andy Levin, MI 

j Abigail Span berger, VA 

_[ Chrissy Houlahan, PA 

PRESLN1 

X S~~~~ ~Cf!)', P 

Ail 

A 

tiBER ;d 1----~---+~~-)'oho"-, F:._l::.' ___ _ 

~~'!-"Wagner, MO 

X Brian .J. Mast, .FL 

JohnCurtis,UT ____ _ 
87 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

Questions for the Record from Congresswoman Ann Wagner 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation 

Hearing: "China's Growing Inl1uence in Asia and the United States" 

May 16,2019 

Question: Ms. Chaudhary, the United States is in the process of assembling a coalition to balance 

China's growing influence in the Asia-Pacific. It seems clear that India, the world's largest 

democracy, should play a key role. However, some outstanding issues remain unresolved in the 

U.S.-India relationship, including disagreements overtrade, the U.S.-Pakistan relationship, and the 

role India should play in balancing China. What is the path forward with India? 

Shamila N. Chaudhary: China does not view its relations with any one country in South Asia as 

a zero-sum game and neither should the United States. The U.S. relationship with India can 

still move forward on balancing China even as it experiences disagreements over a variety of 

issues. The path forward for the U.S.-India relationship will depend heavily on the extent to 

which trade relations improve between the two countries. If relations improve, over time both 

countries could increase economic pressure on China. 

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who recently won reelection, campaigned on boosting a 

slowing economy and creating jobs. The United States can, therefore, leverage the economic 

benefits that would come from improved trade relations as a solution to Prime Minister Modi's 

election promises. 

The United States could surpass China as India's main trade partner by leveraging U.S. oil 

markets as well as U.S. tech industries. Recently imposed taritis on India by the U.S. are 

damaging the United States ability to use India as a balance to China's growing influence in the 

Asia-Pacific. As one of the world's fastest-growing economies and consumers of energy, India 

could be a key impotier of U.S. oil. India's value to the U.S. outweighs disagreements on trade, 

which risk improved India-China relations that drive the U.S. out of the region. 

However, the United States should not allow improved trade with India to push aside other 

regional allies. China has expanded its reach to neighboring countries as well, including India's 

biggest rival, Pakistan. China has been gaining influence in Pakistan by investing in its power 

and infl·astructure sectors. Pakistan is critical to the U.S. counterterrorism strategy across South 

Asia. As such, the U.S. must work to build trade and diplomatic relations with Pakistan as well 

as India. 

Finally, the United States will from time to time be asked to privately intervene should tensions 

between India and Pakistan rise. The United States is no stranger to doing so- and it remains in 

its interest to engage. However, it should steer clear from leading the charge to resolve 

outstanding issues such as the Kashmir dispute, which, if pursued, would hinder U.S. abilities to 

engage both countries constructively. And that is primarily because the role the United States can 

assume as an honest broker is extremely limited, given Indian concerns over U.S. policies 
88 

towards Pakistani militants and also because of Pakistani concerns over the strategic nature of 

U.S.-India relations. 
89 

Congressman Brad Sherman 

Questions for the Record 

House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation 

Hearing: "China's Growing Influence in Asia and the United States'' 

May 16,2019 

Question for Dr. Daniel Kliman, Senior Fellow Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New 

American Security; Ms. Shamila Chaudhary, Senior Advisor School for Advanced International 

Studies, Johns Hopkins University and South Asia Fellow, New America; Mr. Peter Mattis, 

Research Fellow in China Studies, Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation; and dr. David 

Shullman, Senior Advisor, International Republican Institute. 

It seems to me that for less money than the cost of operating an aircraft carrier, we could 

probably develop cybcr tools that could blow a lot of holes through China's great firewall, 

ensuring that every Chinese citizen could see anything the Internet has to offer. Do we have this 

capability and is this something you believe the United States should try to acquire? 

David Shullman: The USG has historically limited its provision of tools for Chinese citizens to 

access the open internet in order to avoid crossing a line that would result in a significant 

response from the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). This is based on the assumption that 

unfettered access for a critical mass of Chinese netizens would be immediately detectable in 

China and unacceptable to the CCP. Historically, tools for open internet access have been quietly 

provided by the State Department and other agencies to USG partners in China, including 

activists and proponents of democracy, on a limited basis to enable their work on a relatively 

modest scale. These tools largely consist of virtual private networks (VPNs), technology for 

redirecting and anonymizing communications through TOR (the onion router), and domain name 

system (DNS) spoofing to mask the provenance of communications or activity. The general 

assumption is that the Chinese government is aware of these tool dispersals and allows them on a 

limited basis, to provide certain citizens a "short leash" easy enongh to monitor and limited in 

scope and impact (perhaps a few million Chinese citizens are able to get around the Great 

Firewall). Chinese cyber activists have also developed their own circumventions and shared 

them on code-sharing sites like GitHub, but they usually don't stay up for long. 

Were the USG to deem it appropriate to expand its eftorts and attempt to provide open internet 

access to larger swaths of the Chinese population, it would have to engage in altemative 

techniques that are less incremental. For example, the USG could dump satellite enabled internet 

connections at a much greater scale if it wanted to reach millions or hundreds of millions of 

Chinese citizens at a time. Altematively, the USG could design a computer virus to attack the 

infrastructure that maintains the Great Firewall itself In both cases, the CCP would detect the 

changes in internet access immediately and work to shut them down, and could potentially 

launch a severe counterattack. Ergo, such etiorts would only be useful if the goal was a precise 

and time-bound communication to the Chinese population. For example, in advance of a kinetic 
90 

Æ 

action, or to alert the population of a government scandal previously concealed by censorship, if 

it were determined that this information had the potential to spark a regime change that was in 

the public interest and the interest of the United States. Some have argued that a large scale 

breach of the Great Firewall could also be used to demonstrate to the CCP that its prized social 

control system is not impenetrable, as a warning against further hacks ofUSG data (this was 

raised as a possibility after the OPM hack). In all scenarios, retaliation is a near certainty. 

David Kliman: It seems to me that for less money than the cost of operating an aircraft can-ier, 

we could probably develop cyber tools that could blow a lot of holes through China's great 

firewall, ensuring that every Chinese citizen could see anything the Internet has to offer. Do we 

have this capability and is this something you believe the United States should try to acquire? 

Congress should provide resources and direct the Defense Department to develop the means to 

circumvent China's "Great Firewall" and make it easier for Chinese citizens to access the global 

Internet. At times, it will be important for the United States to be able to communicate directly 

with the Chinese people. The U.S. government should therefore invest in developing and 

deploying the technologies necessary to circumvent authoritarian firewalls, including in China. 

This would involve both developing cyber capabilities to disrupt China's censorship tools, as 

well as finding new ways for citizens inside China to access a free and open Internet.