# Jurnalul Oficial C 361/2012

| | ISSN 1977-1029
  doi:10.3000/19771029.C_2012.361.ron |
| --- | --- |
| Jurnalul Oficial
  al Uniunii Europene | C 361 |
| | |
| Ediţia în limba română | Comunicări şi informări | Anul 5522 noiembrie 2012 |

ISSN 1977-1029

doi:10.3000/19771029.C_2012.361.ron

Jurnalul Oficial

al Uniunii Europene

C 361

Ediţia în limba română

Comunicări şi informări

Anul 5522 noiembrie 2012

---

| Informarea nr. | Cuprins | Pagina |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | IV   Informări |
| | INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2012/C 361/01 | Comunicarea Comisiei în cadrul implementării Directivei 94/9/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 23 martie 1994 privind armonizarea legislativă a statelor membre referitoare la echipamentele și sistemele protectoare destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive(Publicarea titlurilor și a referințelor standardelor armonizate în temeiul directivei)
   (
  1
  ) | 1 |

Informarea nr.

Cuprins

Pagina

IV   Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

2012/C 361/01

Comunicarea Comisiei în cadrul implementării Directivei 94/9/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 23 martie 1994 privind armonizarea legislativă a statelor membre referitoare la echipamentele și sistemele protectoare destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive(Publicarea titlurilor și a referințelor standardelor armonizate în temeiul directivei)
   (
  1
  )

(Publicarea titlurilor și a referințelor standardelor armonizate în temeiul directivei)

1

1

| | V   Anunțuri |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI |
| | Comisia Europeană |
| 2012/C 361/02 | Ajutoare de stat – Franța – Ajutor de stat SA.34433 (2012/C) [ex SA.34433 (2012/NN)] – Taxă în beneficiul Établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer) – Articolul 25 din Legea nr. 2005-1720 din 30 decembrie 2005 – Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene | 10 |
| 2012/C 361/03 | Ajutor de stat – Slovenia – Ajutor de stat nr. SA.34937 (2012/C) (ex 2012/N) – A doua recapitalizare a NLB și SA.33229 (2012/C) (ex 2011/N) – Restructurarea NLB – Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE (
  1
  ) | 18 |

V   Anunțuri

PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI

Comisia Europeană

2012/C 361/02

Ajutoare de stat – Franța – Ajutor de stat SA.34433 (2012/C) [ex SA.34433 (2012/NN)] – Taxă în beneficiul Établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer) – Articolul 25 din Legea nr. 2005-1720 din 30 decembrie 2005 – Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene

Établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer

10

2012/C 361/03

Ajutor de stat – Slovenia – Ajutor de stat nr. SA.34937 (2012/C) (ex 2012/N) – A doua recapitalizare a NLB și SA.33229 (2012/C) (ex 2011/N) – Restructurarea NLB – Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE (
  1
  )

1

18

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE |

---

(1)   Text cu relevanță pentru SEE

1

| RO | |
| --- | --- |

RO

---

IV Informări

INFORMĂRI PROVENIND DE LA INSTITUȚIILE, ORGANELE ȘI ORGANISMELE UNIUNII EUROPENE

Comisia Europeană

| 22.11.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 361/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 361/1

---

Comunicarea Comisiei în cadrul implementării Directivei 94/9/CE a Parlamentului European și a Consiliului din 23 martie 1994 privind armonizarea legislativă a statelor membre referitoare la echipamentele și sistemele protectoare destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive

(Text cu relevanță pentru SEE)

(Publicarea titlurilor și a referințelor standardelor armonizate în temeiul directivei)

2012/C 361/01

| OES (1) | Referința și titlul standardului armonizat
  (și documentul de referință) | Prima publicare în JO | Referința standardului înlocuit | Data încetării prezumției de conformitate a standardului înlocuit
  Nota 1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | (5) |
| CEN | EN 1010-1:2004+A1:2010
  Securitatea mașinilor. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția mașinilor de tipărire și de prelucrare a hârtiei. Partea 1: Cerințe comune | 8.6.2011 | EN 1010-1:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (8.6.2011) |
| CEN | EN 1010-2:2006+A1:2010
  Securitatea mașinilor. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția mașinilor de tipărire și de prelucrare a hârtiei. Partea 2: Mașini de tipărire și de lăcuire, inclusiv echipamente de pretipărire | 4.2.2011 | EN 1010-2:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (28.2.2011) |
| CEN | EN 1127-1:2011
  Atmosfere explozive. Prevenirea și protecția la explozii. Partea 1: Concepte fundamentale și metodologie | 18.11.2011 | EN 1127-1:2007
  Nota 2.1 | 31.7.2014 |
| CEN | EN 1127-2:2002+A1:2008
  Atmosfere explozive. Prevenirea și protecția la explozie. Partea 2: Concepte fundamentale și metodologie pentru minerit | 20.8.2008 | EN 1127-2:2002
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (28.12.2009) |
| CEN | EN 1710:2005+A1:2008
  Echipamente și componente destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive, în mine subterane | 20.8.2008 | EN 1710:2005
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (28.12.2009) |
| EN 1710:2005+A1:2008/AC:2010 | | | |
| CEN | EN 1755:2000+A1:2009
  Securitatea cărucioarelor de manipulare. Funcționare în atmosferă potențial explozivă. Utilizare în atmosfere inflamabile în prezența gazelor, ceții, vaporilor și prafului | 16.4.2010 | EN 1755:2000
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (16.4.2010) |
| CEN | EN 1834-1:2000
  Motoare cu ardere internă cu mișcare alternativă. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția motoarelor pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 1: Motoare din grupa II pentru utilizare în atmosfere cu gaze și vapori inflamabili | 21.7.2001 | | |
| CEN | EN 1834-2:2000
  Motoare cu ardere interna cu miscare alternativa. Cerinte de securitate pentru proiectarea si constructia motoarelor pentru utilizarea în atmosfere potential explozive. Partea 2: Motoare din grupa I pentru utilizare în medii de lucru subterane susceptibile de a contine gaz de mina si/sau praf combustibil | 21.7.2001 | | |
| CEN | EN 1834-3:2000
  Motoare cu ardere internă cu mișcare alternativă. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția motoarelor pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 3: Motoare din grupa II pentru utilizare în atmosfere cu praf inflamabil | 21.7.2001 | | |
| CEN | EN 1839:2012
  Determinarea limitelor de explozie pentru gaze și vapori | 22.11.2012 | EN 1839:2003
  Nota 2.1 | 31.3.2013 |
| CEN | EN 12581:2005+A1:2010
  Instalații de aplicare. Instalații prin imersie și electrodepunere a produselor de vopsire organice lichide. Cerințe de securitate | 17.9.2010 | EN 12581:2005
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.12.2010) |
| CEN | EN 12621:2006+A1:2010
  Instalații de alimentare și de circulație a produselor de vopsire sub presiune. Cerințe de securitate | 17.9.2010 | EN 12621:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.12.2010) |
| CEN | EN 12757-1:2005+A1:2010
  Echipament de omogenizare a produselor de vopsire. Cerințe de securitate. Partea 1: Echipament de omogenizare utilizate la revopsirea autovehiculelor | 17.9.2010 | EN 12757-1:2005
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.12.2010) |
| CEN | EN 13012:2012
  Stații de carburant. Construcția și performanțele pistoalelor automate de umplere utilizate la distribuitoarele de carburant | 3.8.2012 | EN 13012:2001
  Nota 2.1 | 31.12.2012 |
| CEN | EN 13160-1:2003
  Sisteme de detectare a scurgerilor. Partea 1: Principii generale | 14.8.2003 | | |
| CEN | EN 13237:2003
  Atmosfere potențial explozive. Termeni și definiții pentru echipamentele și sistemele de protecție destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive | 14.8.2003 | | |
| CEN | EN 13463-1:2009
  Echipamente neelectrice pentru atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 1: Metodă și cerințe de bază | 16.4.2010 | EN 13463-1:2001
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.12.2010) |
| CEN | EN 13463-2:2004
  Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 2: Protecție prin carcasă cu restricție la curgere "fr" | 30.11.2005 | | |
| CEN | EN 13463-3:2005
  Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 3: Protecție prin carcasă antideflagrantă "d" | 30.11.2005 | | |
| CEN | EN 13463-5:2011
  Echipamente neelectrice destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 5: Protecție prin securitate constructivă "c" | 18.11.2011 | EN 13463-5:2003
  Nota 2.1 | 31.7.2014 |
| CEN | EN 13463-6:2005
  Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 6: Protecție prin controlul sursei de aprindere "b" | 30.11.2005 | | |
| CEN | EN 13463-8:2003
  Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 8: Protecție prin imersie într-un lichid "k" | 12.8.2004 | | |
| CEN | EN 13616:2004
  Dispozitive pentru limitarea umplerii rezervoarelor statice pentru combustibili petrolieri lichizi | 9.3.2006 | | |
| EN 13616:2004/AC:2006 | | | |
| CEN | EN 13617-1:2012
  Stații de combustibil. Partea 1: Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția și funcționarea pompelor dozatoare, distribuitoarelor și unităților de pompare de la distanță | 3.8.2012 | EN 13617-1:2004+A1:2009
  Nota 2.1 | 30.11.2012 |
| CEN | EN 13617-2:2012
  Stații de combustibil. Partea 2: Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția și la performanțele racordurilor casante utilizate pentru distribuitoarele de carburant | 4.5.2012 | EN 13617-2:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (30.9.2012) |
| CEN | EN 13617-3:2012
  Stații de combustibil. Partea 3: Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția și la performanțele racordurilor de securitate | 4.5.2012 | EN 13617-3:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (30.9.2012) |
| CEN | EN 13760:2003
  Dispozitiv de umplere cu GPL a vehiculelor de sarcini ușoare și grele. Pistol de umplere: condiții de încercări și dimensiuni | 24.1.2004 | | |
| CEN | EN 13821:2002
  Atmosfere potențial explozive. Prevenirea și protecția la explozie. Determinarea energiei minime de aprindere a amestecurilor praf/aer | 20.5.2003 | | |
| CEN | EN 14034-1:2004+A1:2011
  Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 1: Determinarea presiunii de explozie maxime pmax a norilor de praf | 8.6.2011 | EN 14034-1:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.7.2011) |
| CEN | EN 14034-2:2006+A1:2011
  Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 2: Determinarea vitezei maxime de creștere a presiunii de explozie (dp/dt)max a norilor de praf | 8.6.2011 | EN 14034-2:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.7.2011) |
| CEN | EN 14034-3:2006+A1:2011
  Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 3: Determinarea limitei inferioare de explozie LEL a norilor de praf | 8.6.2011 | EN 14034-3:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.7.2011) |
| CEN | EN 14034-4:2004+A1:2011
  Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 4: Determinarea concentrației limită de oxigen CLO a norilor de praf | 8.6.2011 | EN 14034-4:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.7.2011) |
| CEN | EN 14373:2005
  Sisteme de suprimare a exploziei | 9.3.2006 | | |
| CEN | EN 14460:2006
  Echipament rezistent la explozie | 15.12.2006 | | |
| CEN | EN 14491:2012
  Sisteme de protecție prin ventilație împotriva exploziei de praf combustibil | 22.11.2012 | EN 14491:2006
  Nota 2.1 | 28.2.2013 |
| CEN | EN 14492-1:2006+A1:2009
  Instalații de ridicat. Trolii și palane acționate. Partea 1: Trolii acționate | 16.4.2010 | EN 14492-1:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (30.4.2010) |
| EN 14492-1:2006+A1:2009/AC:2010 | | | |
| CEN | EN 14492-2:2006+A1:2009
  Instalații de ridicat. Trolii și palane acționate. Partea 2: Palane acționate | 16.4.2010 | EN 14492-2:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (16.4.2010) |
| EN 14492-2:2006+A1:2009/AC:2010 | | | |
| CEN | EN 14522:2005
  Determinarea temperaturii de autoaprindere a gazelor și vaporilor | 30.11.2005 | | |
| CEN | EN 14591-1:2004
  Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Sisteme de protecție. Partea 1: Construcție de ventilație rezistentă la o explozie de 2 bar | 9.3.2006 | | |
| EN 14591-1:2004/AC:2006 | | | |
| CEN | EN 14591-2:2007
  Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Sisteme de protecție. Partea 2: Baraje pasive cu bazine cu apă | 12.12.2007 | | |
| EN 14591-2:2007/AC:2008 | | | |
| CEN | EN 14591-4:2007
  Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Sisteme de protecție. Partea 4: Sisteme automate de stingere a incendiilor pentru combine de înaintare cu tăiere punctiformă | 12.12.2007 | | |
| EN 14591-4:2007/AC:2008 | | | |
| CEN | EN 14677:2008
  Securitatea mașinilor. Metalurgie secundară. Mașini și echipamente pentru tratarea oțelului lichid | 20.8.2008 | | |
| CEN | EN 14678-1:2006+A1:2009
  Echipamente și accesorii pentru GPL. Construcție și caracteristici ale echipamentelor pentru GPL din stațiile de distribuție la autovehicule. Partea 1: Distribuitoare | 16.4.2010 | EN 14678-1:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (16.4.2010) |
| CEN | EN 14681:2006+A1:2010
  Securitatea mașinilor. Cerințele de securitate pentru mașinile și echipamentele elaborării oțelului în cuptor cu arc electric | 8.6.2011 | EN 14681:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (8.6.2011) |
| CEN | EN 14756:2006
  Determinarea concentrației limită de oxigen (CLO) pentru gaze și vapori inflamabili | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 14797:2006
  Dispozitive de descărcare a exploziei | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 14973:2006+A1:2008
  Benzi transportoare pentru utilizare în instalații subterane. Cerințe de securitate electrică și de inflamabilitate | 7.7.2010 | EN 14973:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.12.2010) |
| CEN | EN 14983:2007
  Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Echipamente și sisteme de protecție pentru captarea gazului de mină | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 14986:2007
  Proiectarea ventilatoarelor utilizate în atmosfere potențial explozive | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 14994:2007
  Sisteme de protecție prin ventilație împotriva exploziilor de gaze | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 15089:2009
  Sisteme de izolare a exploziei | 16.4.2010 | | |
| CEN | EN 15188:2007
  Determinarea comportării la autoaprindere a acumulărilor de praf | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 15198:2007
  Metodologie de evaluare a riscului pentru echipamente și componente neelectrice destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 15233:2007
  Metodologie de evaluare a securității în funcționare a sistemelor protectoare pentru atmosferele potențial explozive | 12.12.2007 | | |
| CEN | EN 15268:2008
  Stații de combustibil. Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția ansamblurilor de pompe submersibile | 27.1.2009 | | |
| CEN | EN 15794:2009
  Determinarea punctelor de explozie ale lichidelor inflamabile | 16.4.2010 | | |
| CEN | EN 15967:2011
  Determinarea presiunii maxime de explozie și a vitezei maxime de creștere a presiunii gazelor și vaporilor | 18.11.2011 | EN 13673-2:2005
  EN 13673-1:2003
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (29.2.2012) |
| CEN | EN 16009:2011
  Dispozitive de descărcare a exploziei fără flacără | 18.11.2011 | | |
| CEN | EN 16020:2011
  Deviatoare de explozie | 18.11.2011 | | |
| CEN | EN ISO 16852:2010
  Opritoare de flacără. Cerințe de performanță, metode de încercare și limite de utilizare | 17.9.2010 | EN 12874:2001
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (31.12.2010) |
| Cenelec | EN 50050:2006
  Aparatură electrică pentru atmosfere potențial explozive. Echipament manual de pulverizare electrostatică | 20.8.2008 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50104:2010
  Aparatură electrică pentru detectarea și măsurarea oxigenului. Cerințe de performanță și metode de încercare | 4.2.2011 | EN 50104:2002
  și modificarea sa
  Nota 2.1 | 1.6.2013 |
| Cenelec | EN 50176:2009
  Echipamente staționare de aplicare electrostatică a materialelor lichide inflamabile de acoperire. Prescripții de securitate | 16.4.2010 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50177:2009
  Echipamente staționare de aplicare electrostatică a pulberilor inflamabile de acoperire. Prescripții de securitate | 16.4.2010 | | |
| EN 50177:2009/A1:2012 | 22.11.2012 | Nota 3 | 23.7.2015 |
| Cenelec | EN 50223:2010
  Echipament staționar de aplicare electrostatică pentru scame inflamabile. Cerințe de securitate | 17.9.2010 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50241-1:1999
  Specificații pentru aparatură cu traiectorie deschisă care detectează gaze combustibile sau toxice și vapori. Partea 1: Cerințe generale și metode de încercare | 6.11.1999 | | |
| EN 50241-1:1999/A1:2004 | 12.8.2004 | Nota 3 | Dată depășită
  (12.8.2004) |
| Cenelec | EN 50241-2:1999
  Specificații pentru aparatură cu traiectorie deschisă care detectează gaze combustibile sau toxice și vapori. Partea 2: Cerințe de performanță pentru aparatura de detectare a gazelor combustibile | 6.11.1999 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50271:2010
  Aparatură electrică pentru detectarea și măsurarea gazelor combustibile, a gazelor toxice sau a oxigenului. Cerințe și încercări pentru aparatură ce utilizează software și/sau tehnologii digitale | 4.2.2011 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50281-2-1:1998
  Aparatură electrică destinată utilizării în prezența prafului combustibil. Partea 2-1: Metode de încercare. Metode de determinare a temperaturii minime de aprindere a prafului | 6.11.1999 | | |
| EN 50281-2-1:1998/AC:1999 | | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50303:2000
  Echipamente pentru grupa I, categoria M1 destinate să rămână în funcțiune în atmosfere grizutoase și/sau cu praf de cărbune | 16.2.2001 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50381:2004
  Cabine ventilate mobile cu sau fără sursă internă de degajare | 9.3.2006 | | |
| EN 50381:2004/AC:2005 | | | |
| Cenelec | EN 50495:2010
  Dispozitive de securitate necesare pentru funcționarea sigură a echipamentelor supuse la riscuri de explozie | 17.9.2010 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-0:2009
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 0: Echipamente. Prescripții generale
  IEC 60079-0:2007 | 16.4.2010 | EN 60079-0:2006
  - EN 61241-0:2006
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.6.2012) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-1:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 1: Echipamente protejate prin carcase antideflagrante "d"
  IEC 60079-1:2007 | 20.8.2008 | EN 60079-1:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.7.2010) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-2:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 2: Echipamente protejate prin carcase presurizate "p"
  IEC 60079-2:2007 | 20.8.2008 | EN 60079-2:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.11.2010) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-5:2007
  Atmosfere explosive. Partea 5: Echipamente protejate prin umplere cu pulbere "q"
  IEC 60079-5:2007 | 20.8.2008 | EN 50017:1998
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.11.2010) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-6:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 6: Echipamente protejate prin imersiune în ulei "o"
  IEC 60079-6:2007 | 20.8.2008 | EN 50015:1998
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.5.2010) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-7:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 7: Protecția echipamentului prin securitate mărită "e"
  IEC 60079-7:2006 | 11.4.2008 | EN 60079-7:2003
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.10.2009) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-11:2012
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 11: Echipament protejat prin securitate intrinsecă "i"
  IEC 60079-11:2011 | 4.5.2012 | EN 60079-11:2007
  - EN 60079-27:2008
  - EN 61241-11:2006
  Nota 2.1 | 4.8.2014 |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-15:2010
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 15: Protecția echipamentului prin protecție de tip “n”
  IEC 60079-15:2010 | 8.6.2011 | EN 60079-15:2005
  Nota 2.1 | 1.5.2013 |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-18:2009
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 18: Protecția echipamentului prin încapsulare “m”
  IEC 60079-18:2009 | 7.7.2010 | EN 60079-18:2004
  - EN 61241-18:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.10.2012) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-20-1:2010
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 20-1: Caracteristici de material pentru clasificarea gazelor și vaporilor. Metode și date de încercări
  IEC 60079-20-1:2010 | 17.9.2010 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-25:2010
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 25: Sisteme cu securitate intrinsecă
  IEC 60079-25:2010 | 8.6.2011 | EN 60079-25:2004
  Nota 2.1 | 1.10.2013 |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-26:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 26: Echipamente cu nivel de protecție (EPL) Ga
  IEC 60079-26:2006 | 20.8.2008 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-28:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 28: Protecție a echipamentului și sistemelor de transmisie prin utilizarea radiației optice
  IEC 60079-28:2006 | 11.4.2008 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-29-1:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 29-1: Detectoare de gaze. Prescripții de performanțe ale detectoarelor de gaze inflamabile
  IEC 60079-29-1:2007 (Modificat) | 20.8.2008 | EN 61779-1:2000
  - A11:2004
  - EN 61779-2:2000
  - EN 61779-3:2000
  - EN 61779-4:2000
  - EN 61779-5:2000
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.11.2010) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-29-4:2010
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 29-4: Detectoare de gaze. Cerințe de performanță ale detectoarelor cu traiectorie deschisă pentru gaze inflamabile
  IEC 60079-29-4:2009 (Modificat) | 8.6.2011 | EN 50241-1:1999
  și modificarea sa
  - EN 50241-2:1999
  Nota 2.1 | 1.4.2013 |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-30-1:2007
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 30-1: Încălzirea traseelor cu rezistențe electrice. Cerințe generale și de încercare
  IEC 60079-30-1:2007 | 20.8.2008 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-31:2009
  Atmosfere explozive. Partea 31: Protecția echipamentelor la praf inflamabil prin carcase "t"
  IEC 60079-31:2008 | 7.7.2010 | EN 61241-1:2004
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.10.2012) |
| Cenelec | EN 60079-35-1:2011
  Atmosfere explozive. partea 35-1: Lămpi de cască pentru utilizare în mine grizutoase - Cerințe generale - Construcția și încercarea pentru riscul la explozie
  IEC 60079-35-1:2011 | 18.11.2011 | EN 62013-1:2006
  Nota 2.1 | 30.6.2014 |
| EN 60079-35-1:2011/AC:2011 | | | |
| Cenelec | EN 61241-4:2006
  Aparatură electrică destinată utilizării în prezența prafului combustibil. Partea 4: Tip de protecție "pD"
  IEC 61241-4:2001 | 20.8.2008 | | |
| Cenelec | EN 62013-1:2006
  Lămpi de cască pentru mine grizutoase. Partea 1: Cerințe generale. Construcția și încercarea privind riscul de explozie
  IEC 62013-1:2005 | 20.8.2008 | EN 62013-1:2002
  Nota 2.1 | Dată depășită
  (1.2.2009) |
| Cenelec | EN ISO/IEC 80079-34:2011
  Atmosfere expliozive. Partea 34: Aplicarea sistemelor de calitate pentru fabricarea echipamentelor
  ISO/IEC 80079-34:2011 (Modificat) | 18.11.2011 | EN 13980:2002
  Nota 2.1 | 25.5.2014 |

OES (1)

Referința și titlul standardului armonizat

(și documentul de referință)

Prima publicare în JO

Referința standardului înlocuit

Data încetării prezumției de conformitate a standardului înlocuit

Nota 1

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

CEN

EN 1010-1:2004+A1:2010

Securitatea mașinilor. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția mașinilor de tipărire și de prelucrare a hârtiei. Partea 1: Cerințe comune

8.6.2011

EN 1010-1:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(8.6.2011)

CEN

EN 1010-2:2006+A1:2010

Securitatea mașinilor. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția mașinilor de tipărire și de prelucrare a hârtiei. Partea 2: Mașini de tipărire și de lăcuire, inclusiv echipamente de pretipărire

4.2.2011

EN 1010-2:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(28.2.2011)

CEN

EN 1127-1:2011

Atmosfere explozive. Prevenirea și protecția la explozii. Partea 1: Concepte fundamentale și metodologie

18.11.2011

EN 1127-1:2007

Nota 2.1

31.7.2014

CEN

EN 1127-2:2002+A1:2008

Atmosfere explozive. Prevenirea și protecția la explozie. Partea 2: Concepte fundamentale și metodologie pentru minerit

20.8.2008

EN 1127-2:2002

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(28.12.2009)

CEN

EN 1710:2005+A1:2008

Echipamente și componente destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive, în mine subterane

20.8.2008

EN 1710:2005

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(28.12.2009)

EN 1710:2005+A1:2008/AC:2010

CEN

EN 1755:2000+A1:2009

Securitatea cărucioarelor de manipulare. Funcționare în atmosferă potențial explozivă. Utilizare în atmosfere inflamabile în prezența gazelor, ceții, vaporilor și prafului

16.4.2010

EN 1755:2000

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(16.4.2010)

CEN

EN 1834-1:2000

Motoare cu ardere internă cu mișcare alternativă. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția motoarelor pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 1: Motoare din grupa II pentru utilizare în atmosfere cu gaze și vapori inflamabili

21.7.2001

CEN

EN 1834-2:2000

Motoare cu ardere interna cu miscare alternativa. Cerinte de securitate pentru proiectarea si constructia motoarelor pentru utilizarea în atmosfere potential explozive. Partea 2: Motoare din grupa I pentru utilizare în medii de lucru subterane susceptibile de a contine gaz de mina si/sau praf combustibil

21.7.2001

CEN

EN 1834-3:2000

Motoare cu ardere internă cu mișcare alternativă. Cerințe de securitate pentru proiectarea și construcția motoarelor pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 3: Motoare din grupa II pentru utilizare în atmosfere cu praf inflamabil

21.7.2001

CEN

EN 1839:2012

Determinarea limitelor de explozie pentru gaze și vapori

22.11.2012

EN 1839:2003

Nota 2.1

31.3.2013

CEN

EN 12581:2005+A1:2010

Instalații de aplicare. Instalații prin imersie și electrodepunere a produselor de vopsire organice lichide. Cerințe de securitate

17.9.2010

EN 12581:2005

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.12.2010)

CEN

EN 12621:2006+A1:2010

Instalații de alimentare și de circulație a produselor de vopsire sub presiune. Cerințe de securitate

17.9.2010

EN 12621:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.12.2010)

CEN

EN 12757-1:2005+A1:2010

Echipament de omogenizare a produselor de vopsire. Cerințe de securitate. Partea 1: Echipament de omogenizare utilizate la revopsirea autovehiculelor

17.9.2010

EN 12757-1:2005

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.12.2010)

CEN

EN 13012:2012

Stații de carburant. Construcția și performanțele pistoalelor automate de umplere utilizate la distribuitoarele de carburant

3.8.2012

EN 13012:2001

Nota 2.1

31.12.2012

CEN

EN 13160-1:2003

Sisteme de detectare a scurgerilor. Partea 1: Principii generale

14.8.2003

CEN

EN 13237:2003

Atmosfere potențial explozive. Termeni și definiții pentru echipamentele și sistemele de protecție destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive

14.8.2003

CEN

EN 13463-1:2009

Echipamente neelectrice pentru atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 1: Metodă și cerințe de bază

16.4.2010

EN 13463-1:2001

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.12.2010)

CEN

EN 13463-2:2004

Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 2: Protecție prin carcasă cu restricție la curgere "fr"

30.11.2005

CEN

EN 13463-3:2005

Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 3: Protecție prin carcasă antideflagrantă "d"

30.11.2005

CEN

EN 13463-5:2011

Echipamente neelectrice destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 5: Protecție prin securitate constructivă "c"

18.11.2011

EN 13463-5:2003

Nota 2.1

31.7.2014

CEN

EN 13463-6:2005

Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 6: Protecție prin controlul sursei de aprindere "b"

30.11.2005

CEN

EN 13463-8:2003

Echipamente neelectrice pentru utilizare în atmosfere potențial explozive. Partea 8: Protecție prin imersie într-un lichid "k"

12.8.2004

CEN

EN 13616:2004

Dispozitive pentru limitarea umplerii rezervoarelor statice pentru combustibili petrolieri lichizi

9.3.2006

EN 13616:2004/AC:2006

CEN

EN 13617-1:2012

Stații de combustibil. Partea 1: Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția și funcționarea pompelor dozatoare, distribuitoarelor și unităților de pompare de la distanță

3.8.2012

EN 13617-1:2004+A1:2009

Nota 2.1

30.11.2012

CEN

EN 13617-2:2012

Stații de combustibil. Partea 2: Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția și la performanțele racordurilor casante utilizate pentru distribuitoarele de carburant

4.5.2012

EN 13617-2:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(30.9.2012)

CEN

EN 13617-3:2012

Stații de combustibil. Partea 3: Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția și la performanțele racordurilor de securitate

4.5.2012

EN 13617-3:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(30.9.2012)

CEN

EN 13760:2003

Dispozitiv de umplere cu GPL a vehiculelor de sarcini ușoare și grele. Pistol de umplere: condiții de încercări și dimensiuni

24.1.2004

CEN

EN 13821:2002

Atmosfere potențial explozive. Prevenirea și protecția la explozie. Determinarea energiei minime de aprindere a amestecurilor praf/aer

20.5.2003

CEN

EN 14034-1:2004+A1:2011

Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 1: Determinarea presiunii de explozie maxime pmax a norilor de praf

8.6.2011

EN 14034-1:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.7.2011)

CEN

EN 14034-2:2006+A1:2011

Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 2: Determinarea vitezei maxime de creștere a presiunii de explozie (dp/dt)max a norilor de praf

8.6.2011

EN 14034-2:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.7.2011)

CEN

EN 14034-3:2006+A1:2011

Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 3: Determinarea limitei inferioare de explozie LEL a norilor de praf

8.6.2011

EN 14034-3:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.7.2011)

CEN

EN 14034-4:2004+A1:2011

Determinarea caracteristicilor de explozie ale norilor de praf. Partea 4: Determinarea concentrației limită de oxigen CLO a norilor de praf

8.6.2011

EN 14034-4:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.7.2011)

CEN

EN 14373:2005

Sisteme de suprimare a exploziei

9.3.2006

CEN

EN 14460:2006

Echipament rezistent la explozie

15.12.2006

CEN

EN 14491:2012

Sisteme de protecție prin ventilație împotriva exploziei de praf combustibil

22.11.2012

EN 14491:2006

Nota 2.1

28.2.2013

CEN

EN 14492-1:2006+A1:2009

Instalații de ridicat. Trolii și palane acționate. Partea 1: Trolii acționate

16.4.2010

EN 14492-1:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(30.4.2010)

EN 14492-1:2006+A1:2009/AC:2010

CEN

EN 14492-2:2006+A1:2009

Instalații de ridicat. Trolii și palane acționate. Partea 2: Palane acționate

16.4.2010

EN 14492-2:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(16.4.2010)

EN 14492-2:2006+A1:2009/AC:2010

CEN

EN 14522:2005

Determinarea temperaturii de autoaprindere a gazelor și vaporilor

30.11.2005

CEN

EN 14591-1:2004

Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Sisteme de protecție. Partea 1: Construcție de ventilație rezistentă la o explozie de 2 bar

9.3.2006

EN 14591-1:2004/AC:2006

CEN

EN 14591-2:2007

Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Sisteme de protecție. Partea 2: Baraje pasive cu bazine cu apă

12.12.2007

EN 14591-2:2007/AC:2008

CEN

EN 14591-4:2007

Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Sisteme de protecție. Partea 4: Sisteme automate de stingere a incendiilor pentru combine de înaintare cu tăiere punctiformă

12.12.2007

EN 14591-4:2007/AC:2008

CEN

EN 14677:2008

Securitatea mașinilor. Metalurgie secundară. Mașini și echipamente pentru tratarea oțelului lichid

20.8.2008

CEN

EN 14678-1:2006+A1:2009

Echipamente și accesorii pentru GPL. Construcție și caracteristici ale echipamentelor pentru GPL din stațiile de distribuție la autovehicule. Partea 1: Distribuitoare

16.4.2010

EN 14678-1:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(16.4.2010)

CEN

EN 14681:2006+A1:2010

Securitatea mașinilor. Cerințele de securitate pentru mașinile și echipamentele elaborării oțelului în cuptor cu arc electric

8.6.2011

EN 14681:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(8.6.2011)

CEN

EN 14756:2006

Determinarea concentrației limită de oxigen (CLO) pentru gaze și vapori inflamabili

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 14797:2006

Dispozitive de descărcare a exploziei

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 14973:2006+A1:2008

Benzi transportoare pentru utilizare în instalații subterane. Cerințe de securitate electrică și de inflamabilitate

7.7.2010

EN 14973:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.12.2010)

CEN

EN 14983:2007

Prevenirea și protecția împotriva exploziilor în minele subterane. Echipamente și sisteme de protecție pentru captarea gazului de mină

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 14986:2007

Proiectarea ventilatoarelor utilizate în atmosfere potențial explozive

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 14994:2007

Sisteme de protecție prin ventilație împotriva exploziilor de gaze

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 15089:2009

Sisteme de izolare a exploziei

16.4.2010

CEN

EN 15188:2007

Determinarea comportării la autoaprindere a acumulărilor de praf

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 15198:2007

Metodologie de evaluare a riscului pentru echipamente și componente neelectrice destinate utilizării în atmosfere potențial explozive

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 15233:2007

Metodologie de evaluare a securității în funcționare a sistemelor protectoare pentru atmosferele potențial explozive

12.12.2007

CEN

EN 15268:2008

Stații de combustibil. Cerințe de securitate referitoare la construcția ansamblurilor de pompe submersibile

27.1.2009

CEN

EN 15794:2009

Determinarea punctelor de explozie ale lichidelor inflamabile

16.4.2010

CEN

EN 15967:2011

Determinarea presiunii maxime de explozie și a vitezei maxime de creștere a presiunii gazelor și vaporilor

18.11.2011

EN 13673-2:2005

EN 13673-1:2003

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(29.2.2012)

CEN

EN 16009:2011

Dispozitive de descărcare a exploziei fără flacără

18.11.2011

CEN

EN 16020:2011

Deviatoare de explozie

18.11.2011

CEN

EN ISO 16852:2010

Opritoare de flacără. Cerințe de performanță, metode de încercare și limite de utilizare

17.9.2010

EN 12874:2001

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(31.12.2010)

Cenelec

EN 50050:2006

Aparatură electrică pentru atmosfere potențial explozive. Echipament manual de pulverizare electrostatică

20.8.2008

Cenelec

EN 50104:2010

Aparatură electrică pentru detectarea și măsurarea oxigenului. Cerințe de performanță și metode de încercare

4.2.2011

EN 50104:2002

și modificarea sa

Nota 2.1

1.6.2013

Cenelec

EN 50176:2009

Echipamente staționare de aplicare electrostatică a materialelor lichide inflamabile de acoperire. Prescripții de securitate

16.4.2010

Cenelec

EN 50177:2009

Echipamente staționare de aplicare electrostatică a pulberilor inflamabile de acoperire. Prescripții de securitate

16.4.2010

EN 50177:2009/A1:2012

22.11.2012

Nota 3

23.7.2015

Cenelec

EN 50223:2010

Echipament staționar de aplicare electrostatică pentru scame inflamabile. Cerințe de securitate

17.9.2010

Cenelec

EN 50241-1:1999

Specificații pentru aparatură cu traiectorie deschisă care detectează gaze combustibile sau toxice și vapori. Partea 1: Cerințe generale și metode de încercare

6.11.1999

EN 50241-1:1999/A1:2004

12.8.2004

Nota 3

Dată depășită

(12.8.2004)

Cenelec

EN 50241-2:1999

Specificații pentru aparatură cu traiectorie deschisă care detectează gaze combustibile sau toxice și vapori. Partea 2: Cerințe de performanță pentru aparatura de detectare a gazelor combustibile

6.11.1999

Cenelec

EN 50271:2010

Aparatură electrică pentru detectarea și măsurarea gazelor combustibile, a gazelor toxice sau a oxigenului. Cerințe și încercări pentru aparatură ce utilizează software și/sau tehnologii digitale

4.2.2011

Cenelec

EN 50281-2-1:1998

Aparatură electrică destinată utilizării în prezența prafului combustibil. Partea 2-1: Metode de încercare. Metode de determinare a temperaturii minime de aprindere a prafului

6.11.1999

EN 50281-2-1:1998/AC:1999

Cenelec

EN 50303:2000

Echipamente pentru grupa I, categoria M1 destinate să rămână în funcțiune în atmosfere grizutoase și/sau cu praf de cărbune

16.2.2001

Cenelec

EN 50381:2004

Cabine ventilate mobile cu sau fără sursă internă de degajare

9.3.2006

EN 50381:2004/AC:2005

Cenelec

EN 50495:2010

Dispozitive de securitate necesare pentru funcționarea sigură a echipamentelor supuse la riscuri de explozie

17.9.2010

Cenelec

EN 60079-0:2009

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 0: Echipamente. Prescripții generale

IEC 60079-0:2007

16.4.2010

EN 60079-0:2006

- EN 61241-0:2006

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.6.2012)

Cenelec

EN 60079-1:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 1: Echipamente protejate prin carcase antideflagrante "d"

IEC 60079-1:2007

20.8.2008

EN 60079-1:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.7.2010)

Cenelec

EN 60079-2:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 2: Echipamente protejate prin carcase presurizate "p"

IEC 60079-2:2007

20.8.2008

EN 60079-2:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.11.2010)

Cenelec

EN 60079-5:2007

Atmosfere explosive. Partea 5: Echipamente protejate prin umplere cu pulbere "q"

IEC 60079-5:2007

20.8.2008

EN 50017:1998

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.11.2010)

Cenelec

EN 60079-6:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 6: Echipamente protejate prin imersiune în ulei "o"

IEC 60079-6:2007

20.8.2008

EN 50015:1998

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.5.2010)

Cenelec

EN 60079-7:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 7: Protecția echipamentului prin securitate mărită "e"

IEC 60079-7:2006

11.4.2008

EN 60079-7:2003

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.10.2009)

Cenelec

EN 60079-11:2012

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 11: Echipament protejat prin securitate intrinsecă "i"

IEC 60079-11:2011

4.5.2012

EN 60079-11:2007

- EN 60079-27:2008

- EN 61241-11:2006

Nota 2.1

4.8.2014

Cenelec

EN 60079-15:2010

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 15: Protecția echipamentului prin protecție de tip “n”

IEC 60079-15:2010

8.6.2011

EN 60079-15:2005

Nota 2.1

1.5.2013

Cenelec

EN 60079-18:2009

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 18: Protecția echipamentului prin încapsulare “m”

IEC 60079-18:2009

7.7.2010

EN 60079-18:2004

- EN 61241-18:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.10.2012)

Cenelec

EN 60079-20-1:2010

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 20-1: Caracteristici de material pentru clasificarea gazelor și vaporilor. Metode și date de încercări

IEC 60079-20-1:2010

17.9.2010

Cenelec

EN 60079-25:2010

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 25: Sisteme cu securitate intrinsecă

IEC 60079-25:2010

8.6.2011

EN 60079-25:2004

Nota 2.1

1.10.2013

Cenelec

EN 60079-26:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 26: Echipamente cu nivel de protecție (EPL) Ga

IEC 60079-26:2006

20.8.2008

Cenelec

EN 60079-28:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 28: Protecție a echipamentului și sistemelor de transmisie prin utilizarea radiației optice

IEC 60079-28:2006

11.4.2008

Cenelec

EN 60079-29-1:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 29-1: Detectoare de gaze. Prescripții de performanțe ale detectoarelor de gaze inflamabile

IEC 60079-29-1:2007 (Modificat)

20.8.2008

EN 61779-1:2000

- A11:2004

- EN 61779-2:2000

- EN 61779-3:2000

- EN 61779-4:2000

- EN 61779-5:2000

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.11.2010)

Cenelec

EN 60079-29-4:2010

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 29-4: Detectoare de gaze. Cerințe de performanță ale detectoarelor cu traiectorie deschisă pentru gaze inflamabile

IEC 60079-29-4:2009 (Modificat)

8.6.2011

EN 50241-1:1999

și modificarea sa

- EN 50241-2:1999

Nota 2.1

1.4.2013

Cenelec

EN 60079-30-1:2007

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 30-1: Încălzirea traseelor cu rezistențe electrice. Cerințe generale și de încercare

IEC 60079-30-1:2007

20.8.2008

Cenelec

EN 60079-31:2009

Atmosfere explozive. Partea 31: Protecția echipamentelor la praf inflamabil prin carcase "t"

IEC 60079-31:2008

7.7.2010

EN 61241-1:2004

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.10.2012)

Cenelec

EN 60079-35-1:2011

Atmosfere explozive. partea 35-1: Lămpi de cască pentru utilizare în mine grizutoase - Cerințe generale - Construcția și încercarea pentru riscul la explozie

IEC 60079-35-1:2011

18.11.2011

EN 62013-1:2006

Nota 2.1

30.6.2014

EN 60079-35-1:2011/AC:2011

Cenelec

EN 61241-4:2006

Aparatură electrică destinată utilizării în prezența prafului combustibil. Partea 4: Tip de protecție "pD"

IEC 61241-4:2001

20.8.2008

Cenelec

EN 62013-1:2006

Lămpi de cască pentru mine grizutoase. Partea 1: Cerințe generale. Construcția și încercarea privind riscul de explozie

IEC 62013-1:2005

20.8.2008

EN 62013-1:2002

Nota 2.1

Dată depășită

(1.2.2009)

Cenelec

EN ISO/IEC 80079-34:2011

Atmosfere expliozive. Partea 34: Aplicarea sistemelor de calitate pentru fabricarea echipamentelor

ISO/IEC 80079-34:2011 (Modificat)

18.11.2011

EN 13980:2002

Nota 2.1

25.5.2014

| Nota 1: | În general, data încetării prezumției de conformitate va fi data retragerii („dow”) stabilită de către Organismul european de standardizare, însă se atrage atenția utilizatorilor acestor standarde asupra faptului că aceasta poate diferi în anumite cazuri excepționale. |
| --- | --- |

Nota 1:

În general, data încetării prezumției de conformitate va fi data retragerii („dow”) stabilită de către Organismul european de standardizare, însă se atrage atenția utilizatorilor acestor standarde asupra faptului că aceasta poate diferi în anumite cazuri excepționale.

| Nota 2.1: | Standardul nou (sau modificat) are aceeași sferă de aplicare ca standardul înlocuit. La data menționată standardul înlocuit încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei. |
| --- | --- |

Nota 2.1:

Standardul nou (sau modificat) are aceeași sferă de aplicare ca standardul înlocuit. La data menționată standardul înlocuit încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei.

| Nota 2.2: | Noul standard are o sferă de aplicare mai extinsă decât standardul înlocuit. La data menționată standardul înlocuit încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei. |
| --- | --- |

Nota 2.2:

Noul standard are o sferă de aplicare mai extinsă decât standardul înlocuit. La data menționată standardul înlocuit încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei.

| Nota 2.3: | Noul standard are o sferă de aplicare mai restrânsă decât standardul înlocuit. La data menționată standardul înlocuit (parțial) încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei pentru acele produse care intră în sfera de aplicare a noului standard. Prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei pentru produsele care rămân în sfera de aplicare a standardului înlocuit (parțial), dar nu intră în sfera de aplicare a noului standard, nu este afectată. |
| --- | --- |

Nota 2.3:

Noul standard are o sferă de aplicare mai restrânsă decât standardul înlocuit. La data menționată standardul înlocuit (parțial) încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei pentru acele produse care intră în sfera de aplicare a noului standard. Prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei pentru produsele care rămân în sfera de aplicare a standardului înlocuit (parțial), dar nu intră în sfera de aplicare a noului standard, nu este afectată.

| Nota 3: | În cazul modificărilor, standardul de referință este EN CCCCC:YYYY, modificările sale anterioare, dacă există, și noua modificare menționată. Prin urmare, standardul înlocuit se compune din EN CCCCC:YYYY și modificările sale anterioare, dacă există, însă fără noua modificare menționată. La data menționată standardul înlocuit încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei. |
| --- | --- |

Nota 3:

În cazul modificărilor, standardul de referință este EN CCCCC:YYYY, modificările sale anterioare, dacă există, și noua modificare menționată. Prin urmare, standardul înlocuit se compune din EN CCCCC:YYYY și modificările sale anterioare, dacă există, însă fără noua modificare menționată. La data menționată standardul înlocuit încetează să confere prezumția de conformitate cu cerințele esențiale ale directivei.

NOTĂ:

| — | Informații cu privire la disponibilitatea standardelor se pot obține fie de la organismele europene de standardizare, fie de la organismele naționale de standardizare, a căror listă este anexată la Directiva 98/34/CE a Parlamentului European și Consiliului (2), modificată prin Directiva 98/48/CE (3). |
| --- | --- |

—

Informații cu privire la disponibilitatea standardelor se pot obține fie de la organismele europene de standardizare, fie de la organismele naționale de standardizare, a căror listă este anexată la Directiva 98/34/CE a Parlamentului European și Consiliului (2), modificată prin Directiva 98/48/CE (3).

| — | Standardele armonizate sunt adoptate de către organizațiile europene pentru standardizare în limba engleză (CEN și Cenelec le publică, de asemenea, în franceză și germană). Prin urmare, titlurile standardelor armonizate sunt traduse în toate celelalte limbi oficiale ale Uniunii Europene de către organismele naționale pentru standardizare. Comisia Europeană nu este responsabilă de corectitudinea titlurilor care au fost prezentate pentru publicarea în Jurnalul Oficial. |
| --- | --- |

—

Standardele armonizate sunt adoptate de către organizațiile europene pentru standardizare în limba engleză (CEN și Cenelec le publică, de asemenea, în franceză și germană). Prin urmare, titlurile standardelor armonizate sunt traduse în toate celelalte limbi oficiale ale Uniunii Europene de către organismele naționale pentru standardizare. Comisia Europeană nu este responsabilă de corectitudinea titlurilor care au fost prezentate pentru publicarea în Jurnalul Oficial.

| — | Publicarea referințelor în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene nu implică faptul că standardele sunt disponibile în toate limbile comunitare. |
| --- | --- |

—

Publicarea referințelor în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene nu implică faptul că standardele sunt disponibile în toate limbile comunitare.

| — | Această listă înlocuiește toate listele anterioare publicate în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene. Comisia asigură actualizarea acestei liste. |
| --- | --- |

—

Această listă înlocuiește toate listele anterioare publicate în Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene. Comisia asigură actualizarea acestei liste.

| — | Mai multe informații despre standardele armonizate se găsesc pe internet la
  http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/harmonised-standards/index_en.htm |
| --- | --- |

—

Mai multe informații despre standardele armonizate se găsesc pe internet la

http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/harmonised-standards/index_en.htm

---

(1)  OES: Organismul european de standardizare:

| — | CEN: Avenue Marnix 17, 1000 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË, Tel. +32 25500811; fax +32 25500819 (http://www.cen.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

CEN: Avenue Marnix 17, 1000 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË, Tel. +32 25500811; fax +32 25500819 (http://www.cen.eu)

| — | Cenelec: Avenue Marnix 17, 1000 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË, Tel. +32 25196871; fax +32 25196919 (http://www.cenelec.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

Cenelec: Avenue Marnix 17, 1000 Bruxelles/Brussel, BELGIQUE/BELGIË, Tel. +32 25196871; fax +32 25196919 (http://www.cenelec.eu)

| — | ETSI: 650 route des Lucioles, 06921 Sophia Antipolis, FRANCE, Tel. +33 492944200; fax +33 493654716, (http://www.etsi.eu) |
| --- | --- |

—

ETSI: 650 route des Lucioles, 06921 Sophia Antipolis, FRANCE, Tel. +33 492944200; fax +33 493654716, (http://www.etsi.eu)

(2)  JO L 204, 21.7.1998, p. 37.

(3)  JO L 217, 5.8.1998, p. 18.

---

V Anunțuri

PROCEDURI REFERITOARE LA PUNEREA ÎN APLICARE A POLITICII ÎN DOMENIUL CONCURENȚEI

Comisia Europeană

| 22.11.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 361/10 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 361/10

---

AJUTOARE DE STAT – FRANȚA

Ajutor de stat SA.34433 (2012/C) [ex SA.34433 (2012/NN)] – Taxă în beneficiul Établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer) – Articolul 25 din Legea nr. 2005-1720 din 30 decembrie 2005

Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene

2012/C 361/02

Prin scrisoarea din data de 03.10.2012, reprodusă în versiunea lingvistică autentică în paginile care urmează acestui rezumat, Comisia a comunicat Franței decizia sa de a iniția, în privința măsurii menționate anterior, procedura prevăzută la articolul 108 alineatul (2) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene.

Părțile interesate își pot prezenta observațiile referitoare la măsura pentru care Comisia inițiază procedura în termen de o lună de la data publicării prezentului rezumat și a scrisorii de mai jos, la adresa:

| Comisia Europeană |
| --- |
| Direcția Generală Agricultură și Dezvoltare Rurală |
| Direcția M2 - Concurență |
| Birou: Loi 120/5/94/A |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax: 32.2.2967672 |

Comisia Europeană

Direcția Generală Agricultură și Dezvoltare Rurală

Direcția M2 - Concurență

Birou: Loi 120/5/94/A

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax: 32.2.2967672

Aceste observații vor fi comunicate Franței. Păstrarea confidențialității privind identitatea părții interesate care trimite observațiile poate fi solicitată în scris, precizându-se motivele care stau la baza solicitării.

REZUMAT

Articolul 25 din legea nr. 2005-1720 din 30 decembrie 2005 (legea finanțelor rectificativă pentru anul 2005) instituie o taxă în beneficiul Établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer), prin care să se finanțeze măsurile implementate de organismul respectiv în favoarea pieței produselor lactate.

În acest stadiu, Comisia are îndoieli în privința compatibilității cu piața internă a taxei și a anumitor măsuri finanțate de aceasta, din următoarele motive:

| a) | se pare că însăși colectarea taxei cuprinde elemente de ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 107, alineatul (1) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene, deoarece include reduceri care nu par să fie justificate de logica sistemului fiscal în vigoare; elementul de ajutor pe care îl presupun aceste reduceri nu pare justificat în lumina normelor privind ajutoarele de stat aplicabile în sectorul agricol; |
| --- | --- |

a)

se pare că însăși colectarea taxei cuprinde elemente de ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 107, alineatul (1) din Tratatul privind funcționarea Uniunii Europene, deoarece include reduceri care nu par să fie justificate de logica sistemului fiscal în vigoare; elementul de ajutor pe care îl presupun aceste reduceri nu pare justificat în lumina normelor privind ajutoarele de stat aplicabile în sectorul agricol;

| b) | încetarea producției de lapte finanțată în special prin taxă poate fi parțială sau totală; totuși, conform normelor aplicabile ajutoarelor de stat în sectorul agricol, un ajutor pentru încetarea unei activități nu poate fi declarat compatibil cu piața internă decât în cazul încetării totale a oricărei activități agricole având scop comercial; |
| --- | --- |

b)

încetarea producției de lapte finanțată în special prin taxă poate fi parțială sau totală; totuși, conform normelor aplicabile ajutoarelor de stat în sectorul agricol, un ajutor pentru încetarea unei activități nu poate fi declarat compatibil cu piața internă decât în cazul încetării totale a oricărei activități agricole având scop comercial;

| c) | o parte din veniturile provenite din taxă au fost utilizate pentru a finanța distrugerea laptelui contaminat cu PCB, în cadrul unui regim de minimis bazat pe Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1998/2006 al Comisiei; în stadiul prezent, nu este sigur dacă regulamentul menționat constituie o bază juridică adecvată pentru acordarea de ajutoare de minimis în acest caz specific; alegerea unei baze juridice inadecvate ar putea antrena apariția unui element de ajutor de stat a cărui compatibilitate cu piața internă nu a fost încă demonstrată; |
| --- | --- |

c)

o parte din veniturile provenite din taxă au fost utilizate pentru a finanța distrugerea laptelui contaminat cu PCB, în cadrul unui regim de minimis bazat pe Regulamentul (CE) nr. 1998/2006 al Comisiei; în stadiul prezent, nu este sigur dacă regulamentul menționat constituie o bază juridică adecvată pentru acordarea de ajutoare de minimis în acest caz specific; alegerea unei baze juridice inadecvate ar putea antrena apariția unui element de ajutor de stat a cărui compatibilitate cu piața internă nu a fost încă demonstrată;

| d) | în stadiul prezent, colectarea taxei și ajutorul pentru încetarea activității ar putea fi incompatibile cu organizarea comună a piețelor din sectorul laptelui sau ar putea să-i perturbe funcționarea; normele privind ajutoarele de stat în domeniul agricol precizează că o măsură care are astfel de caracteristici nu poate fi declarată compatibilă cu piața internă. |
| --- | --- |

d)

în stadiul prezent, colectarea taxei și ajutorul pentru încetarea activității ar putea fi incompatibile cu organizarea comună a piețelor din sectorul laptelui sau ar putea să-i perturbe funcționarea; normele privind ajutoarele de stat în domeniul agricol precizează că o măsură care are astfel de caracteristici nu poate fi declarată compatibilă cu piața internă.

În conformitate cu articolul 14 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 659/1999 al Consiliului, orice ajutor ilegal poate face obiectul unei recuperări de la beneficiarul acestuia.

TEXTUL SCRISORII

| „1. | Par la présente, la Commission a l’honneur d’informer la France qu’après avoir examiné les informations fournies par vos autorités, elle a décidé d’ouvrir la procédure prévue à l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne (TFUE) à l'égard des aides liées à la taxe en objet et à son utilisation. |
| --- | --- |

„1.

Par la présente, la Commission a l’honneur d’informer la France qu’après avoir examiné les informations fournies par vos autorités, elle a décidé d’ouvrir la procédure prévue à l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne (TFUE) à l'égard des aides liées à la taxe en objet et à son utilisation.

PROCÉDURE

| 2. | A la suite d'une plainte reçue, les services de la Commission ont, par fax daté du 28 novembre 2011, demandé aux autorités françaises de leur communiquer toute information nécessaire à un examen de la taxe en objet et de son utilisation à la lumière des articles 107 et 108 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Les autorités françaises disposaient d'un délai d'un mois pour transmettre les informations en question. |
| --- | --- |

2.

A la suite d'une plainte reçue, les services de la Commission ont, par fax daté du 28 novembre 2011, demandé aux autorités françaises de leur communiquer toute information nécessaire à un examen de la taxe en objet et de son utilisation à la lumière des articles 107 et 108 du Traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne. Les autorités françaises disposaient d'un délai d'un mois pour transmettre les informations en question.

| 3. | Par lettre datée du 7 décembre 2011, la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'Union européenne a demandé à la Commission une prolongation du délai précité jusqu'au 1er février 2012. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Par lettre datée du 7 décembre 2011, la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'Union européenne a demandé à la Commission une prolongation du délai précité jusqu'au 1er février 2012.

| 4. | Par fax daté du 12 décembre 2011, les services de la Commission ont accordé la prolongation de délai demandée. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Par fax daté du 12 décembre 2011, les services de la Commission ont accordé la prolongation de délai demandée.

| 5. | Par courriel daté du 14 février 2012, la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'Union européenne a communiqué à la Commission les informations demandées le 28 novembre 2011. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Par courriel daté du 14 février 2012, la Représentation permanente de la France auprès de l'Union européenne a communiqué à la Commission les informations demandées le 28 novembre 2011.

DESCRIPTION

| 6. | L'article 25 de la loi no 2005-1720 du 30 décembre 2005 (loi de finances rectificative pour 2005) institue une taxe au profit de l'établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer), en vue du financement des actions mises en oeuvre par celui-ci au bénéfice du marché des produits laitiers. Sa dernière version consolidée date du 1er janvier 2012. |
| --- | --- |

6.

L'article 25 de la loi no 2005-1720 du 30 décembre 2005 (loi de finances rectificative pour 2005) institue une taxe au profit de l'établissement national des produits de l'agriculture et de la mer (FranceAgriMer), en vue du financement des actions mises en oeuvre par celui-ci au bénéfice du marché des produits laitiers. Sa dernière version consolidée date du 1er janvier 2012.

| 7. | La taxe est due par les producteurs de lait de vache détenteurs d'une quantité de référence individuelle pour la vente directe au sens du règlement (CE) no 1788/2003 du Conseil du 29 septembre 2003, établissant un prélèvement dans le secteur du lait et des produits laitiers (1), ainsi que par les acheteurs de lait. Elle est assise sur:






  — | la quantité de lait de vache livrée par le producteur sous forme de lait pendant la période de douze mois précédant le 1er avril de chaque année et qui dépasse la quantité de référence notifiée par FranceAgriMer à ce producteur pour les livraisons de lait de cette période (dans ce cas, le montant de la taxe due est notifié par FranceAgriMer à chaque acheteur auquel le producteur a livré son lait et l'acheteur de lait verse à FranceAgriMer, dans le mois suivant cette notification, le produit de la taxe prélevé auprès des producteurs qui lui livrent du lait), |
| --- | --- | --- |

7.

La taxe est due par les producteurs de lait de vache détenteurs d'une quantité de référence individuelle pour la vente directe au sens du règlement (CE) no 1788/2003 du Conseil du 29 septembre 2003, établissant un prélèvement dans le secteur du lait et des produits laitiers (1), ainsi que par les acheteurs de lait. Elle est assise sur:

—

la quantité de lait de vache livrée par le producteur sous forme de lait pendant la période de douze mois précédant le 1er avril de chaque année et qui dépasse la quantité de référence notifiée par FranceAgriMer à ce producteur pour les livraisons de lait de cette période (dans ce cas, le montant de la taxe due est notifié par FranceAgriMer à chaque acheteur auquel le producteur a livré son lait et l'acheteur de lait verse à FranceAgriMer, dans le mois suivant cette notification, le produit de la taxe prélevé auprès des producteurs qui lui livrent du lait),

| — | la quantité de lait de vache vendue ou cédée ou utilisée pour fabriquer des produits laitiers vendus ou cédés par le producteur pendant la période précitée et qui dépasse la quantité de référence notifiée à ce producteur pour les ventes directes de cette période (dans ce cas, le montant de la taxe due est notifié par FranceAgriMer à chaque producteur ayant effectué des ventes directes et le producteur concerné verse le produit de la taxe dont il est redevable à FranceAgriMer, dans le mois suivant cette notification). |
| --- | --- |

—

la quantité de lait de vache vendue ou cédée ou utilisée pour fabriquer des produits laitiers vendus ou cédés par le producteur pendant la période précitée et qui dépasse la quantité de référence notifiée à ce producteur pour les ventes directes de cette période (dans ce cas, le montant de la taxe due est notifié par FranceAgriMer à chaque producteur ayant effectué des ventes directes et le producteur concerné verse le produit de la taxe dont il est redevable à FranceAgriMer, dans le mois suivant cette notification).

| 8. | Les quantités précitées peuvent être diminuées d'abattements fixés par arrêté conjoint du ministre chargé de l'agriculture et du ministre chargé du budget, pris après avis du conseil d'administration de FranceAgriMer. Ces abattements peuvent être soit proportionnel aux quantités de référence individuelles des producteurs (dans ce cas, le taux de l'abattement est compris entre 1 % et 15 %) soit mesuré en poids (dans ce cas, ce dernier est compris entre 0 et 20 600 kilogrammes de lait). Les deux types d'abattement peuvent être cumulables. Le fait générateur de la taxe est la livraison de lait ou la vente directe de lait ou de produits laitiers pendant la période mentionnée au point 7, premier tiret. A titre d'exemple, l'arrêté du 17 août 2010 relatif à la perception d'une taxe à la charge des aheteurs et des producteurs de lait ayant dépassé leur quota individuel pour la livraison pour la campagne 2009-2010 prévoit en son article 4 que, dans la limite des disponibilités constatées au niveau national en fin de campagne 2009-2010, FranceAgriMer rembourse aux acheteurs une partie de la taxe due par les producteurs qui leur livrent du lait, selon les modalités suivantes:






  — | tous les producteurs bénéficient d'un remboursement équivalent à 1 % de leur quota; |
| --- | --- | --- |

8.

Les quantités précitées peuvent être diminuées d'abattements fixés par arrêté conjoint du ministre chargé de l'agriculture et du ministre chargé du budget, pris après avis du conseil d'administration de FranceAgriMer. Ces abattements peuvent être soit proportionnel aux quantités de référence individuelles des producteurs (dans ce cas, le taux de l'abattement est compris entre 1 % et 15 %) soit mesuré en poids (dans ce cas, ce dernier est compris entre 0 et 20 600 kilogrammes de lait). Les deux types d'abattement peuvent être cumulables. Le fait générateur de la taxe est la livraison de lait ou la vente directe de lait ou de produits laitiers pendant la période mentionnée au point 7, premier tiret. A titre d'exemple, l'arrêté du 17 août 2010 relatif à la perception d'une taxe à la charge des aheteurs et des producteurs de lait ayant dépassé leur quota individuel pour la livraison pour la campagne 2009-2010 prévoit en son article 4 que, dans la limite des disponibilités constatées au niveau national en fin de campagne 2009-2010, FranceAgriMer rembourse aux acheteurs une partie de la taxe due par les producteurs qui leur livrent du lait, selon les modalités suivantes:

—

tous les producteurs bénéficient d'un remboursement équivalent à 1 % de leur quota;

| — | les producteurs dont le quota individuel est inférieur ou égal à 160 000 litres bénéficient en outre d'un remboursement maximum de 2 866 €, équivalant à une quantité de 10 000 litres, |
| --- | --- |

—

les producteurs dont le quota individuel est inférieur ou égal à 160 000 litres bénéficient en outre d'un remboursement maximum de 2 866 €, équivalant à une quantité de 10 000 litres,

| — | les producteurs dont le quota est compris entre 160 000 et 169 900 litres bénéficient d'un remboursement complémentaire établi de manière à leur permettre d'atteindre 171 600 litres. |
| --- | --- |

—

les producteurs dont le quota est compris entre 160 000 et 169 900 litres bénéficient d'un remboursement complémentaire établi de manière à leur permettre d'atteindre 171 600 litres.

| 9. | Lorsque le producteur est redevable du prélèvement visé à l'article 1er paragraphe 1 du règlement (CE) no 1788/2003, la taxe n'est pas exigible pour les quantités concernées (en vertu de cet article, un prélèvement est institué, à partir du 1er avril 2004 et pendant 11 périodes consécutives de douze mois débutant le 1er avril, sur les quantités de lait de vache ou d'autres produits laitiers commercialisées pendant la période de douze mois en question et qui dépassent la quantité de référence nationale). |
| --- | --- |

9.

Lorsque le producteur est redevable du prélèvement visé à l'article 1er paragraphe 1 du règlement (CE) no 1788/2003, la taxe n'est pas exigible pour les quantités concernées (en vertu de cet article, un prélèvement est institué, à partir du 1er avril 2004 et pendant 11 périodes consécutives de douze mois débutant le 1er avril, sur les quantités de lait de vache ou d'autres produits laitiers commercialisées pendant la période de douze mois en question et qui dépassent la quantité de référence nationale).

| 10. | Le tarif de la taxe est fixé, par 100 kilogrammes de lait, à 28,54 € pour la campagne 2006-2007 et à 27,83 € pour les campagnes suivantes. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Le tarif de la taxe est fixé, par 100 kilogrammes de lait, à 28,54 € pour la campagne 2006-2007 et à 27,83 € pour les campagnes suivantes.

| 11. | Le produit de la taxe est utilisé pour financer la cessation partielle ou totale de l'activité laitière (ACAL – aide à la cessation de l'activité laitière). Concrètement, le bénéficiaire reçoit une indemnité par litre de la part de FranceAgriMer, organisme public. Les autres sources de financement de l'ACAL sont constituées par les fonds issus du système de transfert spécifique sans terre (TSST) (2), le budget de l'Etat, et, éventuellement des fonds des collectivités locales. Une partie du produit de la taxe a également été utilisée pour accompagner des entreprises laitières contraintes de détruire du lait contaminé par des PCB au cours de la campagne 2007-2008. D'après les autorités françaises, ce soutien financier a été accordé dans le cadre d'un régime de minimis relevant du règlement (CE) no 1998/2006 de la Commission du 15 décembre 2006 concernant l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité (3) aux aides de minimis
   (4). |
| --- | --- |

11.

Le produit de la taxe est utilisé pour financer la cessation partielle ou totale de l'activité laitière (ACAL – aide à la cessation de l'activité laitière). Concrètement, le bénéficiaire reçoit une indemnité par litre de la part de FranceAgriMer, organisme public. Les autres sources de financement de l'ACAL sont constituées par les fonds issus du système de transfert spécifique sans terre (TSST) (2), le budget de l'Etat, et, éventuellement des fonds des collectivités locales. Une partie du produit de la taxe a également été utilisée pour accompagner des entreprises laitières contraintes de détruire du lait contaminé par des PCB au cours de la campagne 2007-2008. D'après les autorités françaises, ce soutien financier a été accordé dans le cadre d'un régime de minimis relevant du règlement (CE) no 1998/2006 de la Commission du 15 décembre 2006 concernant l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité (3) aux aides de minimis
   (4).

| 12. | D'après les informations actuellement disponibles, le montant de l'ACAL est calculé sur la base suivante:









  €/litre | 2010-2011 | 2011-2012 | 2012-2013 | 2013-2014 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Jusqu'à 100 000 litres | 0,15 | 0,1125 | 0,075 | 0,0375 |
| De 100 001 à 150 000 litres | 0,08 | 0,06 | 0,04 | 0,02 |
| De 150 001 à 200 000 litres | 0,05 | 0,0375 | 0,025 | 0,0125 |
| Plus de 200 000 litres | 0,01 | 0,0075 | 0,005 | 0,0025 |

12.

D'après les informations actuellement disponibles, le montant de l'ACAL est calculé sur la base suivante:

€/litre

2010-2011

2011-2012

2012-2013

2013-2014

Jusqu'à 100 000 litres

0,15

0,1125

0,075

0,0375

De 100 001 à 150 000 litres

0,08

0,06

0,04

0,02

De 150 001 à 200 000 litres

0,05

0,0375

0,025

0,0125

Plus de 200 000 litres

0,01

0,0075

0,005

0,0025

| 13. | D'après les informations actuellement disponibles, le produit de la taxe et son utilisation ont évolué comme suit jusqu'à la campagne 2010/2011:











  Campagne | Taxe perçue | ACAL financées par la taxe | ACAL financées par d'autres sources | Dont TSST | Total ACAL | Autres actions financées par la taxe |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| 2005/2006 | 17 080 881 | Pas de programme ACAL |
| 2006/2007 | 11 858 443 | 12 851 977 | 21 509 339 | 21 454 252 | 34 361 316 | |
| 2007/2008 | 2 959 456 | 13 228 140 | 33 848 558 | 32 798 510 | 47 076 698 | 1 260 753 |
| 2008/2009 | 17 183 670 | 2 571 271 | 23 411 722 | 21 311 722 | 25 982 992 | |
| 2009/2010 | 10 093 611 | 17 909 294 | 12 349 799 | 12 349 799 | 30 259 093 | |
| 2010/2011 | 12 629 142 | 9 904 398 | 18 021 681 | 18 021 681 | 27 926 079 | |
| Total | 71 805 202 | 56 465 080 | 109 141 098 | 105 935 964 | 165 606 178 | |

13.

D'après les informations actuellement disponibles, le produit de la taxe et son utilisation ont évolué comme suit jusqu'à la campagne 2010/2011:

Campagne

Taxe perçue

ACAL financées par la taxe

ACAL financées par d'autres sources

Dont TSST

Total ACAL

Autres actions financées par la taxe

2005/2006

17 080 881

Pas de programme ACAL

2006/2007

11 858 443

12 851 977

21 509 339

21 454 252

34 361 316

2007/2008

2 959 456

13 228 140

33 848 558

32 798 510

47 076 698

1 260 753

2008/2009

17 183 670

2 571 271

23 411 722

21 311 722

25 982 992

2009/2010

10 093 611

17 909 294

12 349 799

12 349 799

30 259 093

2010/2011

12 629 142

9 904 398

18 021 681

18 021 681

27 926 079

Total

71 805 202

56 465 080

109 141 098

105 935 964

165 606 178

APPRÉCIATION

I.   Existence d'une aide

| 14. | En vertu de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, sont incompatibles avec le marché intérieur, dans la mesure où elles affectent les échanges entre les Etats membres, les aides accordées par les Etats ou au moyen de ressources d’Etat sous quelque forme que ce soit qui faussent ou menacent de fausser la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions. |
| --- | --- |

14.

En vertu de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, sont incompatibles avec le marché intérieur, dans la mesure où elles affectent les échanges entre les Etats membres, les aides accordées par les Etats ou au moyen de ressources d’Etat sous quelque forme que ce soit qui faussent ou menacent de fausser la concurrence en favorisant certaines entreprises ou certaines productions.

| 15. | En l'espèce, la question de l'existence d'une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du Traité doit être examinée à la fois au niveau de la taxe proprement dite et au niveau des mesures qu'elle finance. |
| --- | --- |

15.

En l'espèce, la question de l'existence d'une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du Traité doit être examinée à la fois au niveau de la taxe proprement dite et au niveau des mesures qu'elle finance.

A.   Au niveau de la taxe

| 16. | En ce qui concerne la question de savoir si la perception de la taxe proprement dite comporte un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, la Commission note que la taxe peut faire l'objet de deux types d'abattements cumulables. A ce stade, la Commission estime que ces abattements contiennent un élément d'aide pour les raisons cumulatives suivantes:






  — | ils sont financés par l'Etat qui, en les accordant, se prive de ressources, |
| --- | --- | --- |

16.

En ce qui concerne la question de savoir si la perception de la taxe proprement dite comporte un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, la Commission note que la taxe peut faire l'objet de deux types d'abattements cumulables. A ce stade, la Commission estime que ces abattements contiennent un élément d'aide pour les raisons cumulatives suivantes:

—

ils sont financés par l'Etat qui, en les accordant, se prive de ressources,

| — | ils favorisent certaines entreprises (les entreprises laitières qui en bénéficient et se voient ainsi soulagées d'une charge financière que les autres entreprises laitières assujetties doivent supporter) et sont ainsi susceptibles de fausser la concurrence (5) et d'affecter les échanges, de par la place occupée par la France sur le marché (6), |
| --- | --- |

—

ils favorisent certaines entreprises (les entreprises laitières qui en bénéficient et se voient ainsi soulagées d'une charge financière que les autres entreprises laitières assujetties doivent supporter) et sont ainsi susceptibles de fausser la concurrence (5) et d'affecter les échanges, de par la place occupée par la France sur le marché (6),

| — | aucune des informations actuellement disponibles ne permet de constater que l'existence et la modulation des abattements se justifient par la logique du système fiscal en place (ce critère, destiné à déterminer si une mesure fiscale relève ou non de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, est repris par la Communication de la Commission sur l'application des règles relatives aux aides d'Etat aux mesures relevant de la fiscalité directe des entreprises (7)), |
| --- | --- |

—

aucune des informations actuellement disponibles ne permet de constater que l'existence et la modulation des abattements se justifient par la logique du système fiscal en place (ce critère, destiné à déterminer si une mesure fiscale relève ou non de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, est repris par la Communication de la Commission sur l'application des règles relatives aux aides d'Etat aux mesures relevant de la fiscalité directe des entreprises (7)),

| — | la faculté qu'ont les pouvoirs publics de moduler les abattements (voir point 8) semble, à ce stade, témoigner de l'existence d'un traitement discrétionnaire d'opérateurs économiques en dehors de la simple gestion de recettes fiscales selon des critères objectifs, non seulement parce que les modalités de détermination des quantités sur lesquelles sont fondées les abattements sont peu claires et il est dès lors difficile d'en apprécier l'objectivité, mais aussi parce qu'il est impossible de déterminer, à ce stade, si les mêmes quantités ont été utilisées dans les différents arrêtés d'application de l'article 25 de la loi no 2005-1720 pris depuis l'entrée en vigueur de cet article (si elles sont différentes, le caractère discrétionnaire du traitement des opérateurs n'en sera que renforcé); or, la Cour de justice a reconnu que le traitement des acteurs économiques sur une base discrétionnaire peut conférer à l'application individuelle d'une mesure générale la qualité de mesure sélective, notamment lorsque le pouvoir discrétionnaire s'exerce en dehors de la simple gestion de des recettes fiscales selon des critères objectifs (8) (voir point 23 de la Communication de la Commission sur l'application des règles relatives aux aides d'Etat aux mesures relevant de la fiscalité directe des entreprises), |
| --- | --- |

—

la faculté qu'ont les pouvoirs publics de moduler les abattements (voir point 8) semble, à ce stade, témoigner de l'existence d'un traitement discrétionnaire d'opérateurs économiques en dehors de la simple gestion de recettes fiscales selon des critères objectifs, non seulement parce que les modalités de détermination des quantités sur lesquelles sont fondées les abattements sont peu claires et il est dès lors difficile d'en apprécier l'objectivité, mais aussi parce qu'il est impossible de déterminer, à ce stade, si les mêmes quantités ont été utilisées dans les différents arrêtés d'application de l'article 25 de la loi no 2005-1720 pris depuis l'entrée en vigueur de cet article (si elles sont différentes, le caractère discrétionnaire du traitement des opérateurs n'en sera que renforcé); or, la Cour de justice a reconnu que le traitement des acteurs économiques sur une base discrétionnaire peut conférer à l'application individuelle d'une mesure générale la qualité de mesure sélective, notamment lorsque le pouvoir discrétionnaire s'exerce en dehors de la simple gestion de des recettes fiscales selon des critères objectifs (8) (voir point 23 de la Communication de la Commission sur l'application des règles relatives aux aides d'Etat aux mesures relevant de la fiscalité directe des entreprises),

| — | à ce stade, rien n'indique que l'équivalent-subvention des abattements pourrait entrer dans le cadre d'un régime de minimis, qui permet de considérer que les aides d'un faible montant ne constituent pas des aides d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

—

à ce stade, rien n'indique que l'équivalent-subvention des abattements pourrait entrer dans le cadre d'un régime de minimis, qui permet de considérer que les aides d'un faible montant ne constituent pas des aides d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE.

B.   Au niveau des mesures financées au moyen du produit de la taxe

| 17. | Il découle de la jurisprudence de la Cour (9) que l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE (10) englobe tous les moyens pécuniaires que les autorités publiques peuvent effectivement utiliser pour soutenir des entreprises, sans qu'il soit pertinent que ces moyens appartiennent ou non de manière permanente au patrimoine de l'Etat. En conséquence, même si le produit de la taxe n'est pas de façon permanente en possession du Trésor public, le fait qu'il reste constamment sous contrôle public suffit pour qu'il soit qualifié de ressource d'Etat. En l'espèce, le produit de la taxe est affecté à un organisme public qui l'utilise pour financer des mesures dont les modalités sont définies par une circulaire du ministère de l'Agriculture. Le produit de la taxe reste donc sous contrôle public et peut donc être considéré comme ressource d'Etat. |
| --- | --- |

17.

Il découle de la jurisprudence de la Cour (9) que l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE (10) englobe tous les moyens pécuniaires que les autorités publiques peuvent effectivement utiliser pour soutenir des entreprises, sans qu'il soit pertinent que ces moyens appartiennent ou non de manière permanente au patrimoine de l'Etat. En conséquence, même si le produit de la taxe n'est pas de façon permanente en possession du Trésor public, le fait qu'il reste constamment sous contrôle public suffit pour qu'il soit qualifié de ressource d'Etat. En l'espèce, le produit de la taxe est affecté à un organisme public qui l'utilise pour financer des mesures dont les modalités sont définies par une circulaire du ministère de l'Agriculture. Le produit de la taxe reste donc sous contrôle public et peut donc être considéré comme ressource d'Etat.

| 18. | Dans ce contexte, le financement de la cessation de l'activité laitière correspond prima facie à la définition d'une aide d'Etat car il est effectué au moyen de ressources d'Etat. En outre, il favorise certaines entreprises (les entreprises du secteur laitier) et est donc susceptible non seulement de fausser la concurrence (11), mais aussi d'affecter les échanges, de par la place occupée par la France sur le marché (12). |
| --- | --- |

18.

Dans ce contexte, le financement de la cessation de l'activité laitière correspond prima facie à la définition d'une aide d'Etat car il est effectué au moyen de ressources d'Etat. En outre, il favorise certaines entreprises (les entreprises du secteur laitier) et est donc susceptible non seulement de fausser la concurrence (11), mais aussi d'affecter les échanges, de par la place occupée par la France sur le marché (12).

| 19. | Certes, dans l'arrêt Pearle
   (13), la Cour a défini quatre critères cumulatifs qui, lorsqu'ils sont remplis, permettent de considérer qu'une mesure provenant d'une taxe parafiscale ne constitue pas une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE. Ces quatre critères sont les suivants:






  a) | la mesure concernée doit être adoptée par l'organisation professionnelle représentant les entreprises et les employés d'un secteur commercial et ne doit pas être utilisée comme instrument pour mettre en oeuvre une politique adoptée par l'Etat; |
| --- | --- | --- |

19.

Certes, dans l'arrêt Pearle
   (13), la Cour a défini quatre critères cumulatifs qui, lorsqu'ils sont remplis, permettent de considérer qu'une mesure provenant d'une taxe parafiscale ne constitue pas une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE. Ces quatre critères sont les suivants:

a)

la mesure concernée doit être adoptée par l'organisation professionnelle représentant les entreprises et les employés d'un secteur commercial et ne doit pas être utilisée comme instrument pour mettre en oeuvre une politique adoptée par l'Etat;

| b) | les objectifs adoptés sont entièrement financés par les cotisations des entreprises du secteur; |
| --- | --- |

b)

les objectifs adoptés sont entièrement financés par les cotisations des entreprises du secteur;

| c) | le mode de financement et le pourcentage/montant des cotisations sont adoptés au sein de l'organisation professionnelle du secteur commercial par les représentants des employeurs et des employés sans intervention de l'Etat; |
| --- | --- |

c)

le mode de financement et le pourcentage/montant des cotisations sont adoptés au sein de l'organisation professionnelle du secteur commercial par les représentants des employeurs et des employés sans intervention de l'Etat;

| d) | les cotisations doivent être utilisées pour financer la mesure sans aucune possibilité pour l'Etat d'intervenir. |
| --- | --- |

d)

les cotisations doivent être utilisées pour financer la mesure sans aucune possibilité pour l'Etat d'intervenir.

| 20. | Toutefois, dans le cas d'espèce, tous les critères précités ne semblent pas remplis pour les raisons suivantes:






  — | la mesure de cessation d'activité n'émane pas de FranceAgriMer mais d'une circulaire du Ministère de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche; il apparaît donc, à ce stade, qu'elle constitue un instrument utilisé par les pouvoirs publics pour réguler le secteur laitier, |
| --- | --- | --- |

20.

Toutefois, dans le cas d'espèce, tous les critères précités ne semblent pas remplis pour les raisons suivantes:

—

la mesure de cessation d'activité n'émane pas de FranceAgriMer mais d'une circulaire du Ministère de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche; il apparaît donc, à ce stade, qu'elle constitue un instrument utilisé par les pouvoirs publics pour réguler le secteur laitier,

| — | la cessation de l'activité laitière n'est pas financée entièrement par les cotisations des entreprises du secteur, puisque le produit de la taxe est complété par des ressources provenant du budget de l'Etat et du régime de TSST (voir point 11), |
| --- | --- |

—

la cessation de l'activité laitière n'est pas financée entièrement par les cotisations des entreprises du secteur, puisque le produit de la taxe est complété par des ressources provenant du budget de l'Etat et du régime de TSST (voir point 11),

| — | le mode de financement et les barèmes de taxation sont fixés dans une circulaire du Ministère de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche, |
| --- | --- |

—

le mode de financement et les barèmes de taxation sont fixés dans une circulaire du Ministère de l'Alimentation, de l'Agriculture et de la Pêche,

| — | l'Etat intervient automatiquement dans le processus de financement de la mesure, puisque c'est lui qui en définit les règles. |
| --- | --- |

—

l'Etat intervient automatiquement dans le processus de financement de la mesure, puisque c'est lui qui en définit les règles.

| 21. | Compte tenu de ces considérations, la Commission ne peut que conclure, à ce stade, que le financement de la cessation de l'activité laitière correspond prima facie à la définition d'une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE. |
| --- | --- |

21.

Compte tenu de ces considérations, la Commission ne peut que conclure, à ce stade, que le financement de la cessation de l'activité laitière correspond prima facie à la définition d'une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE.

| 22. | A ce stade, la Commission ne peut pas non plus exclure que l'aide de minimis accordée au moyen du produit de la taxe pour la destruction du lait contaminé par des PCB (voir point 12) comporte in fine un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du Traité car, d'après les informations fournies par les autorités françaises, l'aide en question aurait été accordée au titre du règlement (CE) no 1998/2006 de la Commission alors qu'elle devrait plutôt, compte tenu de la période de son octroi (campagne 2007/2008), être conforme soit aux dispositions du règlement (CE) no 1860/2004 de la Commission du 6 octobre 2004 concernant l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides de minimis dans les secteurs de l'agriculture et de la pêche (14), si elle a été accordée avant le 1er janvier 2008, soit aux dispositions du règlement (CE) no 1535/2007 de la Commission du 20 décembre 2007 concernant l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides de minimis dans le secteur de la production de produits agricoles (15). Or, si une aide à la destruction de lait a été accordée en violation des conditions du règlement de minimis applicable, elle devient a priori une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE (dans le cas d'espèce, elle est accordée par des ressources d'Etat – voir point 17 – favorise certaines entreprises (les entreprises du secteur laitier) et est donc susceptible non seulement de fausser la concurrence (16), mais aussi d'affecter les échanges, de par la place occupée par la France sur le marché (17). |
| --- | --- |

22.

A ce stade, la Commission ne peut pas non plus exclure que l'aide de minimis accordée au moyen du produit de la taxe pour la destruction du lait contaminé par des PCB (voir point 12) comporte in fine un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du Traité car, d'après les informations fournies par les autorités françaises, l'aide en question aurait été accordée au titre du règlement (CE) no 1998/2006 de la Commission alors qu'elle devrait plutôt, compte tenu de la période de son octroi (campagne 2007/2008), être conforme soit aux dispositions du règlement (CE) no 1860/2004 de la Commission du 6 octobre 2004 concernant l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides de minimis dans les secteurs de l'agriculture et de la pêche (14), si elle a été accordée avant le 1er janvier 2008, soit aux dispositions du règlement (CE) no 1535/2007 de la Commission du 20 décembre 2007 concernant l'application des articles 87 et 88 du traité CE aux aides de minimis dans le secteur de la production de produits agricoles (15). Or, si une aide à la destruction de lait a été accordée en violation des conditions du règlement de minimis applicable, elle devient a priori une aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE (dans le cas d'espèce, elle est accordée par des ressources d'Etat – voir point 17 – favorise certaines entreprises (les entreprises du secteur laitier) et est donc susceptible non seulement de fausser la concurrence (16), mais aussi d'affecter les échanges, de par la place occupée par la France sur le marché (17).

II.   Questions de légalité

A.   Légalité de la taxe

| 23. | La taxe perçue constitue une taxe parafiscale en ce sens qu'elle est imposée par les pouvoirs publics sur des produits en vue de financer des mesures qui bénéficient uniquement à une partie d'un secteur d'activité (le compartiment laitier du secteur de l'agriculture), et qu'elle est affectée à un organisme chargé de mettre les mesures précitées en œuvre. |
| --- | --- |

23.

La taxe perçue constitue une taxe parafiscale en ce sens qu'elle est imposée par les pouvoirs publics sur des produits en vue de financer des mesures qui bénéficient uniquement à une partie d'un secteur d'activité (le compartiment laitier du secteur de l'agriculture), et qu'elle est affectée à un organisme chargé de mettre les mesures précitées en œuvre.

| 24. | Dans les informations qu'elles ont fournies par courriel le 14 février 2012, les autorités françaises ont indiqué que la taxe n'entre pas dans le champ d'application des dispositions du TFUE concernant les aides d'Etat (articles 107 et 108), à moins qu'elle ne constitue le mode de financement d'une mesure d'aide, de sorte qu'elle fait partie intégrante de cette mesure. Elles ajoutent que la jurisprudence dispose que, pour que l'on puisse considérer une taxe comme faisant partie intégrante d'une mesure d'aide, il doit nécessairement exister un lien d'affectation contraignant entre la taxe et l'aide en vertu de la réglementation nationale pertinente, en ce sens que le produit de la taxe est nécessairement affecté au financement de l'aide et influence directement l'importance de l'aide. Or, selon elles, il n'y a pas de lien d'affectation entre la taxe et l'aide et le montant de la taxe n'influe pas directement sur le montant des aides, car la taxe n'est qu'une des sources de financement des aides. |
| --- | --- |

24.

Dans les informations qu'elles ont fournies par courriel le 14 février 2012, les autorités françaises ont indiqué que la taxe n'entre pas dans le champ d'application des dispositions du TFUE concernant les aides d'Etat (articles 107 et 108), à moins qu'elle ne constitue le mode de financement d'une mesure d'aide, de sorte qu'elle fait partie intégrante de cette mesure. Elles ajoutent que la jurisprudence dispose que, pour que l'on puisse considérer une taxe comme faisant partie intégrante d'une mesure d'aide, il doit nécessairement exister un lien d'affectation contraignant entre la taxe et l'aide en vertu de la réglementation nationale pertinente, en ce sens que le produit de la taxe est nécessairement affecté au financement de l'aide et influence directement l'importance de l'aide. Or, selon elles, il n'y a pas de lien d'affectation entre la taxe et l'aide et le montant de la taxe n'influe pas directement sur le montant des aides, car la taxe n'est qu'une des sources de financement des aides.

| 25. | La Commission peut en effet constater que le produit de la taxe n'est pas nécessairement affecté au financement de l'aide puisque, d'après les indications du point 11, elle a servi à financer d'autres mesures que l'ACAL. De même, elle peut considérer que le produit de la taxe n'influe pas directement sur le montant des aides, puisque la taxe n'est pas la seule source de financement de l'ACAL et que le montant de l'ACAL est fixé d'avance pour les années à venir, sans que le produit de la taxe le soit. La taxe peut donc être considérée comme ne faisant pas partie intégrante de la mesure d'aide. Par conséquent, elle ne devait pas être notifiée suivant cette approche (18). En revanche, les abattements mentionnés au point 16 auraient dû faire l'objet d'une notification puisque, comme indiqué dans ce même point, ils contiennent un élément d'aide. |
| --- | --- |

25.

La Commission peut en effet constater que le produit de la taxe n'est pas nécessairement affecté au financement de l'aide puisque, d'après les indications du point 11, elle a servi à financer d'autres mesures que l'ACAL. De même, elle peut considérer que le produit de la taxe n'influe pas directement sur le montant des aides, puisque la taxe n'est pas la seule source de financement de l'ACAL et que le montant de l'ACAL est fixé d'avance pour les années à venir, sans que le produit de la taxe le soit. La taxe peut donc être considérée comme ne faisant pas partie intégrante de la mesure d'aide. Par conséquent, elle ne devait pas être notifiée suivant cette approche (18). En revanche, les abattements mentionnés au point 16 auraient dû faire l'objet d'une notification puisque, comme indiqué dans ce même point, ils contiennent un élément d'aide.

B.   Légalité des mesures financées par la taxe

| 26. | Comme expliqué aux points 18 à 20, l'ACAL comporte des éléments d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE. Elle aurait donc du être notifiée en vertu de l'article 108, paragraphe 3 du TFUE. Comme elle ne l'a pas été, elle doit être considérée comme illégale au sens de l'article 1er, point f) du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil du 22 mars 1999, portant modalités d'application de l'article 93 du traité CE (19). |
| --- | --- |

26.

Comme expliqué aux points 18 à 20, l'ACAL comporte des éléments d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE. Elle aurait donc du être notifiée en vertu de l'article 108, paragraphe 3 du TFUE. Comme elle ne l'a pas été, elle doit être considérée comme illégale au sens de l'article 1er, point f) du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil du 22 mars 1999, portant modalités d'application de l'article 93 du traité CE (19).

| 27. | En ce qui concerne la destruction du lait contaminé par des PCB, l'élément d'aide pouvant résulter de l'utilisation possible d'un règlement de minimis inadéquat n'a pas non plus été notifié. Même si, en l'espèce, l'absence de notification peut se comprendre parce que les autorités françaises pensaient pouvoir placer la compensation des pertes dues à la destruction de lait sous le régime de minimis du règlement (CE) no 1998/2006 de la Commission, alors qu'il semble à ce stade que le régime de minimis à utiliser était celui du règlement (CE) no 1860/2004 ou du règlement (CE) no 1535/2007 de la Commission, l'élément d'aide évoqué, parce qu'il n'a pas été notifié, doit également être considéré comme illégal au sens de l'article 1er, point f) du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil. |
| --- | --- |

27.

En ce qui concerne la destruction du lait contaminé par des PCB, l'élément d'aide pouvant résulter de l'utilisation possible d'un règlement de minimis inadéquat n'a pas non plus été notifié. Même si, en l'espèce, l'absence de notification peut se comprendre parce que les autorités françaises pensaient pouvoir placer la compensation des pertes dues à la destruction de lait sous le régime de minimis du règlement (CE) no 1998/2006 de la Commission, alors qu'il semble à ce stade que le régime de minimis à utiliser était celui du règlement (CE) no 1860/2004 ou du règlement (CE) no 1535/2007 de la Commission, l'élément d'aide évoqué, parce qu'il n'a pas été notifié, doit également être considéré comme illégal au sens de l'article 1er, point f) du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil.

III.   Compatibilité avec le marché intérieur

| 28. | Dans les cas prévus par l’article 107, paragraphes 2 et 3 du TFUE, certaines aides peuvent être considérées, par dérogation, comme compatibles avec le marché intérieur. |
| --- | --- |

28.

Dans les cas prévus par l’article 107, paragraphes 2 et 3 du TFUE, certaines aides peuvent être considérées, par dérogation, comme compatibles avec le marché intérieur.

A.   Mesures financées par la taxe

| 29. | En l'espèce, compte tenu de la nature des mesures financées, les dérogations qui peuvent être invoquées sont les suivantes:






  — | pour la cessation de l'activité laitière: la dérogation prévue à l'article 107, paragraphe 3, point c) du TFUE, selon laquelle peuvent être considérées comme compatibles avec le marché intérieur les aides destinées à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques, quand elles n’altèrent pas les conditions des échanges dans une mesure contraire à l’intérêt commun, |
| --- | --- | --- |

29.

En l'espèce, compte tenu de la nature des mesures financées, les dérogations qui peuvent être invoquées sont les suivantes:

—

pour la cessation de l'activité laitière: la dérogation prévue à l'article 107, paragraphe 3, point c) du TFUE, selon laquelle peuvent être considérées comme compatibles avec le marché intérieur les aides destinées à faciliter le développement de certaines activités ou de certaines régions économiques, quand elles n’altèrent pas les conditions des échanges dans une mesure contraire à l’intérêt commun,

| — | pour la destruction du lait contaminé par des PCB: la dérogation prévue à l'article 107, paragraphe 2, point b) du TFUE, selon laquelle les aides destinées à remédier aux dommages causés par les calamités naturelles ou par d'autres événements extraordinaires. |
| --- | --- |

—

pour la destruction du lait contaminé par des PCB: la dérogation prévue à l'article 107, paragraphe 2, point b) du TFUE, selon laquelle les aides destinées à remédier aux dommages causés par les calamités naturelles ou par d'autres événements extraordinaires.

Cessation de l'activité laitière

| 30. | Pour que la dérogation prévue à l'article 107, paragraphe 3, point c) du TFUE soit applicable, les mesures de cessation de l'activité laitière doivent être conformes aux dispositions pertinentes des Lignes directrices de la Communauté concernant les aides d'Etat dans le secteur agricole et forestier 2007-2013 (20) (ci-après, "les lignes directrices"). |
| --- | --- |

30.

Pour que la dérogation prévue à l'article 107, paragraphe 3, point c) du TFUE soit applicable, les mesures de cessation de l'activité laitière doivent être conformes aux dispositions pertinentes des Lignes directrices de la Communauté concernant les aides d'Etat dans le secteur agricole et forestier 2007-2013 (20) (ci-après, "les lignes directrices").

| 31. | Le point 88 des lignes directrices indique que, pour autant qu'elles soient subordonnées à la condition d'une cessation permanente et définitive de toute activité agricole à vocation commerciale, la Commission autorisera les aides d'Etat à la cessation d'activités agricoles. |
| --- | --- |

31.

Le point 88 des lignes directrices indique que, pour autant qu'elles soient subordonnées à la condition d'une cessation permanente et définitive de toute activité agricole à vocation commerciale, la Commission autorisera les aides d'Etat à la cessation d'activités agricoles.

| 32. | Sur la base des informations dont elle dispose, la Commission constate que, dans le cas d'espèce, la cessation de l'activité laitière financée par la taxe peut être partielle ou totale. Or, comme indiqué au point précédent, une aide à la cessation d'activités agricoles ne peut être acceptée qu'en cas de cessation de toute activité agricole à vocation commerciale, ce qui implique la cessation totale de l'activité laitière. La Commission ne peut donc que douter, à ce stade, du respect des conditions du point 88 des lignes directrices en cas de cessation partielle de l'activité laitière et, partant, de la compatibilité de l'aide à la cessation partielle de l'activité laitière avec le marché intérieur. |
| --- | --- |

32.

Sur la base des informations dont elle dispose, la Commission constate que, dans le cas d'espèce, la cessation de l'activité laitière financée par la taxe peut être partielle ou totale. Or, comme indiqué au point précédent, une aide à la cessation d'activités agricoles ne peut être acceptée qu'en cas de cessation de toute activité agricole à vocation commerciale, ce qui implique la cessation totale de l'activité laitière. La Commission ne peut donc que douter, à ce stade, du respect des conditions du point 88 des lignes directrices en cas de cessation partielle de l'activité laitière et, partant, de la compatibilité de l'aide à la cessation partielle de l'activité laitière avec le marché intérieur.

| 33. | En outre, rien ne permet à ce stade d'exclure que des aides à la cessation de l'activité laitière aient pu être accordées à des exploitations mixtes, autrement dit pratiquant des activités autres que la production de lait (production végétale ou élevage de tout type). En se référant de nouveau au fait qu'une aide à la cessation d'activités agricoles ne peut être acceptée qu'en cas de cessation de toute activité agricole à vocation commerciale, la Commission ne peut que douter, à ce stade, de la compatibilité des aides accordées à des exploitations mixtes pour la seule cessation de l'activité laitière, que celle-ci soit partielle ou totale. |
| --- | --- |

33.

En outre, rien ne permet à ce stade d'exclure que des aides à la cessation de l'activité laitière aient pu être accordées à des exploitations mixtes, autrement dit pratiquant des activités autres que la production de lait (production végétale ou élevage de tout type). En se référant de nouveau au fait qu'une aide à la cessation d'activités agricoles ne peut être acceptée qu'en cas de cessation de toute activité agricole à vocation commerciale, la Commission ne peut que douter, à ce stade, de la compatibilité des aides accordées à des exploitations mixtes pour la seule cessation de l'activité laitière, que celle-ci soit partielle ou totale.

| 34. | Enfin, en ce qui concerne le caractère permanent et définitif de la cessation de l'activité laitière, la Commission constate, sur la base des informations dont elle dispose, qu'en cas d'acceptation d'une demande d'aide à l'abandon total de la production laitière le producteur doit effectivement s'engager à arrêter de façon complète et définitive la livraison et/ou la commercialisation de lait ou de produits laitiers (voir circulaire DGPAAT/SDPM/C2010-3082 du 25 août 2010), mais note également qu'aucune précision n'est fournie à ce propos en cas d'abandon partiel de l'activité. Comme elle ne peut, de ce fait, pas exclure qu'un producteur ayant cessé partiellement son activité laitière ait la possibilité de la reprendre ultérieurement, elle ne peut que douter, à ce stade, du respect absolu du caractère définitif et permanent de la cessation d'activité et, partant, de la compatibilité de l'aide à la cessation avec le marché intérieur. |
| --- | --- |

34.

Enfin, en ce qui concerne le caractère permanent et définitif de la cessation de l'activité laitière, la Commission constate, sur la base des informations dont elle dispose, qu'en cas d'acceptation d'une demande d'aide à l'abandon total de la production laitière le producteur doit effectivement s'engager à arrêter de façon complète et définitive la livraison et/ou la commercialisation de lait ou de produits laitiers (voir circulaire DGPAAT/SDPM/C2010-3082 du 25 août 2010), mais note également qu'aucune précision n'est fournie à ce propos en cas d'abandon partiel de l'activité. Comme elle ne peut, de ce fait, pas exclure qu'un producteur ayant cessé partiellement son activité laitière ait la possibilité de la reprendre ultérieurement, elle ne peut que douter, à ce stade, du respect absolu du caractère définitif et permanent de la cessation d'activité et, partant, de la compatibilité de l'aide à la cessation avec le marché intérieur.

Destruction de lait contaminé par des PCB

| 35. | Comme il a été expliqué au point 22 que l'existence d'un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE ne peut être exclue en raison de l'utilisation inadéquate du régime de minimis prévu par le règlement (CE) no 1998/2006, il convient d'examiner dans quelles conditions cette aide serait compatible avec le marché intérieur. |
| --- | --- |

35.

Comme il a été expliqué au point 22 que l'existence d'un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE ne peut être exclue en raison de l'utilisation inadéquate du régime de minimis prévu par le règlement (CE) no 1998/2006, il convient d'examiner dans quelles conditions cette aide serait compatible avec le marché intérieur.

| 36. | La contamination du lait par des PCB pourrait être considérée comme un événement extraordinaire au sens du chapitre V.B.2 (points 120 à 123) des lignes directrices et donner lieu à l'octroi d'aides compatibles avec le marché intérieur si certaines conditions sont remplies. Toutefois, comme indiqué au point 121 de ces dernières, la Commission se doit de donner une interprétation restrictive de la notion d'événement extraordinaire. |
| --- | --- |

36.

La contamination du lait par des PCB pourrait être considérée comme un événement extraordinaire au sens du chapitre V.B.2 (points 120 à 123) des lignes directrices et donner lieu à l'octroi d'aides compatibles avec le marché intérieur si certaines conditions sont remplies. Toutefois, comme indiqué au point 121 de ces dernières, la Commission se doit de donner une interprétation restrictive de la notion d'événement extraordinaire.

| 37. | En ce qui concerne les conditions précitées, il faut au moins que le fait générateur provoque de lourdes pertes (point 122 des lignes directrices). Or, à ce stade, aucune des informations disponibles ne permet à la Commission d'évaluer l'étendue et la gravité des pertes. |
| --- | --- |

37.

En ce qui concerne les conditions précitées, il faut au moins que le fait générateur provoque de lourdes pertes (point 122 des lignes directrices). Or, à ce stade, aucune des informations disponibles ne permet à la Commission d'évaluer l'étendue et la gravité des pertes.

| 38. | De plus, en vertu du point 123 des lignes directrices, l'aide ne doit pas excéder le montant des pertes et doit être réduite de toute compensation reçue, par exemple, au titre d'une police d'assurance. Enfin, l'existence d'un lien direct entre les dommages causés par l'événement extraordinaire et l'aide d'Etat doit être établie et les dommages en question doivent être évalués avec la plus grande précision possible. |
| --- | --- |

38.

De plus, en vertu du point 123 des lignes directrices, l'aide ne doit pas excéder le montant des pertes et doit être réduite de toute compensation reçue, par exemple, au titre d'une police d'assurance. Enfin, l'existence d'un lien direct entre les dommages causés par l'événement extraordinaire et l'aide d'Etat doit être établie et les dommages en question doivent être évalués avec la plus grande précision possible.

| 39. | Aucune des informations dont la Commission dispose actuellement ne permet de vérifier le respect des conditions énumérées ci-dessus. La Commission ne peut donc que douter, à ce stade, de la compatibilité avec le marché intérieur de l'aide destinée à compenser des pertes dues à la destruction de lait contaminé par des PCB. |
| --- | --- |

39.

Aucune des informations dont la Commission dispose actuellement ne permet de vérifier le respect des conditions énumérées ci-dessus. La Commission ne peut donc que douter, à ce stade, de la compatibilité avec le marché intérieur de l'aide destinée à compenser des pertes dues à la destruction de lait contaminé par des PCB.

B.   Abattements accordés aux producteurs

| 40. | Etant donné que, comme indiqué au point 16, il ne peut être exclu que les abattements accordés puissent contenir un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, la Commission se doit d'examiner si cet élément d'aide pourrait être justifié à la lumière des règles applicables en matière d'aides d'Etat. |
| --- | --- |

40.

Etant donné que, comme indiqué au point 16, il ne peut être exclu que les abattements accordés puissent contenir un élément d'aide d'Etat au sens de l'article 107, paragraphe 1 du TFUE, la Commission se doit d'examiner si cet élément d'aide pourrait être justifié à la lumière des règles applicables en matière d'aides d'Etat.

| 41. | A ce stade, force est de constater que les autorités françaises n'ont fourni aucune information justifiant l'aide en question et qu'aucune disposition des lignes directrices ne semble pouvoir apporter la justification en question. En fait, les abattements semblent constituer de simples aides au fonctionnement destinées à améliorer la situation financière des agriculteurs sans contribuer en aucune manière au développement du secteur. Or de telles aides sont incompatibles avec le marché intérieur en vertu du point 15 des lignes directrices. |
| --- | --- |

41.

A ce stade, force est de constater que les autorités françaises n'ont fourni aucune information justifiant l'aide en question et qu'aucune disposition des lignes directrices ne semble pouvoir apporter la justification en question. En fait, les abattements semblent constituer de simples aides au fonctionnement destinées à améliorer la situation financière des agriculteurs sans contribuer en aucune manière au développement du secteur. Or de telles aides sont incompatibles avec le marché intérieur en vertu du point 15 des lignes directrices.

IV.   Autres considérations

Rapport avec le règlement "OCM unique"

| 42. | En vertu du point 11 des lignes directrices, même si les articles 87, 88 et 89 du traité sont pleinement applicables aux secteurs couverts par les organisations communes de marché, leur application reste soumise aux dispositions établies par les règlements en question et la Commission ne peut en aucun cas approuver une aide qui est incompatible avec les dispositions régissant une organisation commune de marché ou qui contrarierait le bon fonctionnement de l'organisation de marché considérée. |
| --- | --- |

42.

En vertu du point 11 des lignes directrices, même si les articles 87, 88 et 89 du traité sont pleinement applicables aux secteurs couverts par les organisations communes de marché, leur application reste soumise aux dispositions établies par les règlements en question et la Commission ne peut en aucun cas approuver une aide qui est incompatible avec les dispositions régissant une organisation commune de marché ou qui contrarierait le bon fonctionnement de l'organisation de marché considérée.

| 43. | Malgré l'exemption de paiement décrite au point 9, la Commission constate à ce stade que la taxe en cause est appliquée aux producteurs qui dépassent leur quota laitier individuel, qu'il y ait ou non dépassement du quota national, alors que les règles régissant l'organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur laitier depuis l'introduction de la taxe, qu'il s'agisse du règlement (CE) no 1788/2003 évoqué au point 7 ou du règlement (CE) no 1234/2007 du Conseil du 22 octobre 2007, portant organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur agricole et dispositions spécifiques en ce qui concerne certains produits de ce secteur (ci-après, le règlement "OCM unique") (21), prévoient un prélèvement uniquement en cas de dépassement du quota national. |
| --- | --- |

43.

Malgré l'exemption de paiement décrite au point 9, la Commission constate à ce stade que la taxe en cause est appliquée aux producteurs qui dépassent leur quota laitier individuel, qu'il y ait ou non dépassement du quota national, alors que les règles régissant l'organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur laitier depuis l'introduction de la taxe, qu'il s'agisse du règlement (CE) no 1788/2003 évoqué au point 7 ou du règlement (CE) no 1234/2007 du Conseil du 22 octobre 2007, portant organisation commune des marchés dans le secteur agricole et dispositions spécifiques en ce qui concerne certains produits de ce secteur (ci-après, le règlement "OCM unique") (21), prévoient un prélèvement uniquement en cas de dépassement du quota national.

| 44. | Il apparaît donc, à ce stade, que la perception de la taxe pourrait être incompatible avec les dispositions régissant l'organisation commune du marché du lait ou contrarier le fonctionnement de cette organisation (22). Cette constatation, combinée aux considérations du point 43 ci-dessus, impliquerait que les aides liées à la perception de la taxe (abattements) pourraient, elles aussi, être incompatibles avec l'organisation commune du marché ou en perturber le bon fonctionnement, et ne pourraient donc pas être déclarées compatibles avec le marché intérieur par la Commission. |
| --- | --- |

44.

Il apparaît donc, à ce stade, que la perception de la taxe pourrait être incompatible avec les dispositions régissant l'organisation commune du marché du lait ou contrarier le fonctionnement de cette organisation (22). Cette constatation, combinée aux considérations du point 43 ci-dessus, impliquerait que les aides liées à la perception de la taxe (abattements) pourraient, elles aussi, être incompatibles avec l'organisation commune du marché ou en perturber le bon fonctionnement, et ne pourraient donc pas être déclarées compatibles avec le marché intérieur par la Commission.

| 45. | En ce qui concerne l'aide à la cessation de l'activité laitière proprement dite, les règlements (CE) no 1788/2003 et 1234/2007 prévoient tous deux la possibilité pour les Etats membres d'accorder un soutien financier. Toutefois, la Commission constate qu'aucun des deux règlements ne prévoit de dérogation à l'application des règles en matière d'aide d'Etat pour ce soutien. |
| --- | --- |

45.

En ce qui concerne l'aide à la cessation de l'activité laitière proprement dite, les règlements (CE) no 1788/2003 et 1234/2007 prévoient tous deux la possibilité pour les Etats membres d'accorder un soutien financier. Toutefois, la Commission constate qu'aucun des deux règlements ne prévoit de dérogation à l'application des règles en matière d'aide d'Etat pour ce soutien.

| 46. | Etant donné que l'analyse de l'aide à la cessation d'activité sur la base des règles en matière d'aide d'Etat établies dans les lignes directrices a déjà mis en lumière les doutes existant quant à la compatibilité de l'aide avec le marché intérieur (voir points 30 à 34), et que ces mêmes règles doivent être respectées en vertu des deux règlements précités, la Commission ne peut exclure, à ce stade, que l'aide à la cessation de l'activité laitière puisse être incompatible avec les dispositions régissant une organisation commune de marché ou contrarier le bon fonctionnement de celle-ci, ces deux facteurs constituant un motif d'incompatibilité de l'aide avec le marché intérieur comme expliqué au point 43. |
| --- | --- |

46.

Etant donné que l'analyse de l'aide à la cessation d'activité sur la base des règles en matière d'aide d'Etat établies dans les lignes directrices a déjà mis en lumière les doutes existant quant à la compatibilité de l'aide avec le marché intérieur (voir points 30 à 34), et que ces mêmes règles doivent être respectées en vertu des deux règlements précités, la Commission ne peut exclure, à ce stade, que l'aide à la cessation de l'activité laitière puisse être incompatible avec les dispositions régissant une organisation commune de marché ou contrarier le bon fonctionnement de celle-ci, ces deux facteurs constituant un motif d'incompatibilité de l'aide avec le marché intérieur comme expliqué au point 43.

| 47. | Compte tenu des considérations qui précèdent, la Commission invite la France, dans le cadre de la procédure de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne, à présenter ses observations et à fournir toute information utile pour l’évaluation des aides (entre autres, tous les arrêtés relatifs à la perception et à l'utilisation de la taxe pris depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'article 25 no 2005-1720, les paramètres sur la base desquels les abattements mis en cause sont calculés, notamment le choix des quantités utilisées pour la modulation de ceux-ci, et le montant de l'ACAL en €/litre de 2006/2007 à 2009/2010, le tableau du point 12 étant incomplet) dans un délai d’un mois à compter de la date de réception de la présente. Elle invite les autorités françaises à transmettre immédiatement une copie de cette lettre aux bénéficiaires de l’aide. |
| --- | --- |

47.

Compte tenu des considérations qui précèdent, la Commission invite la France, dans le cadre de la procédure de l’article 108, paragraphe 2, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne, à présenter ses observations et à fournir toute information utile pour l’évaluation des aides (entre autres, tous les arrêtés relatifs à la perception et à l'utilisation de la taxe pris depuis l'entrée en vigueur de l'article 25 no 2005-1720, les paramètres sur la base desquels les abattements mis en cause sont calculés, notamment le choix des quantités utilisées pour la modulation de ceux-ci, et le montant de l'ACAL en €/litre de 2006/2007 à 2009/2010, le tableau du point 12 étant incomplet) dans un délai d’un mois à compter de la date de réception de la présente. Elle invite les autorités françaises à transmettre immédiatement une copie de cette lettre aux bénéficiaires de l’aide.

| 48. | La Commission rappelle à la France l’effet suspensif de l’article 108, paragraphe 3, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne et se réfère à l'article 14 du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil qui prévoit que toute aide illégale et incompatible pourra faire l’objet d’une récupération auprès de son bénéficiaire.” |
| --- | --- |

48.

La Commission rappelle à la France l’effet suspensif de l’article 108, paragraphe 3, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l'Union européenne et se réfère à l'article 14 du règlement (CE) no 659/1999 du Conseil qui prévoit que toute aide illégale et incompatible pourra faire l’objet d’une récupération auprès de son bénéficiaire.”

---

(1)  JO L 270 du 21.10.2003, p. 123.

1

(2)  Système d'achat de quotas.

2

(3)  A présent, articles 107 et 108 du TFUE. Toute référence aux articles 87, 88 et 89 du traité dans la présente décision devra être comprise comme faite aux articles 107 et 108 et 109 du TFUE.

3

(4)  JO L 379 du 28.12.2006, p. 5.

4

(5)  Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice, le seul fait que la situation concurrentielle de l'entreprise se voit améliorée en lui conférant un avantage qu'elle n'aurait pas pu obtenir dans des conditions normales de marché et dont ne bénéficient pas les autres entreprises concurrentes suffit à démontrer une distorsion de concurrence (affaire 730/79, Philip Morris c. Commission, Recueil (1980) p. 2671).

5

Philip Morris c. Commission

(6)  En 2010, la France était le deuxième producteur de lait de vache, avec une production de 24 millions de tonnes.

6

(7)  JO C 384 du 10.12.1998, p. 3.

7

(8)  Arrêt de la Cour de justice du 26.9.1996, France contre Commission, affaire C-241/94 (Kimberly Clark Sopalin), Rec. 1996, p. I-4551.

8

(9)  Voir arrêt du 16 mai 2000, France/Ladbroke Racing et Commission, C-83/98 P, Rec. P; I-3271, point 50).

9

(10)  Dans l'arrêt en question, il est fait référence à l'article 92, paragraphe 1 du Traité, devenu ensuite l'article 87, paragraphe 1 du traité puis l'article 107, paragraphe & du TFUE.

10

(11)  Voir note 5.

11

(12)  Voir note 6.

12

(13)  CJCE, 15 juillet 2004, Pearle, aff. C-345/02, Rec. I-7139, pts 35-38.

13

(14)  JO L 325 du 28.10.2004, p. 4.

14

(15)  JO L 337 du 21.12.2007, p. 35.

15

(16)  Voir note 5.

16

(17)  Voir note 6.

17

(18)  CJCE, 21 octobre 2003, Van Calster, C-261/01 et C-262/01, Recueil 2003, I-12249, pt 51.

18

(19)  JO L 83 du 27.3.1999, p. 1.

19

(20)  JO C 319 du 27.12.2006.

20

(21)  JO L 299 du 16.11.2007, p. 1.

21

(22)  La Commission a d'ailleurs mis la France en demeure de présenter ses observations sur cette question le 22 juin 2012 (dossier d'infraction EU-Pilot 2681/2011).

22

---

| 22.11.2012 | RO | Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene | C 361/18 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

22.11.2012

RO

Jurnalul Oficial al Uniunii Europene

C 361/18

---

AJUTOR DE STAT – SLOVENIA

Ajutor de stat nr. SA.34937 (2012/C) (ex 2012/N) – A doua recapitalizare a NLB și SA.33229 (2012/C) (ex 2011/N) – Restructurarea NLB

Invitație de a prezenta observații în temeiul articolului 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE

(Text cu relevanță pentru SEE)

2012/C 361/03

Prin scrisoarea din data de 2.7.2012, reprodusă în versiunea lingvistică autentică în paginile care urmează acestui rezumat, Comisia a comunicat Sloveniei decizia sa de a iniția procedura prevăzută la articolul 108 alineatul (2) din TFUE privind măsura de ajutor menționată anterior.

Comisia a decis să aprobe temporar a doua majorare de capital în favoarea NLB pentru o perioadă de șase luni, astfel cum se descrie în scrisoarea care urmează acestui rezumat.

Părțile interesate își pot prezenta observațiile privind măsura pentru care Comisia inițiază procedura în termen de o lună de la data publicării prezentului rezumat și a scrisorii de mai jos, la adresa:

| Commission Européenne |
| --- |
| Direction générale de la concurrence |
| Greffe des aides d'État |
| J – 70, 3/225 |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIQUE/BELGIË |
| Fax: +32 2 296 12 42 |

Commission Européenne

Direction générale de la concurrence

Greffe des aides d'État

J – 70, 3/225

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIQUE/BELGIË

Fax: +32 2 296 12 42

Aceste observații vor fi comunicate Sloveniei. Păstrarea confidențialității privind identitatea părții interesate care prezintă observațiile poate fi solicitată în scris, precizându-se motivele care stau la baza solicitării.

TEXTUL REZUMATULUI

1.   PROCEDURĂ

La 14 ianuarie 2011, autoritățile slovene au notificat o recapitalizare a NLB în valoare de 250 de milioane EUR, pe care Comisia a aprobat-o ca ajutor de salvare la 7 martie 2011. În urma aprobării acordate în iunie 2011, Slovenia a prezentat un plan de restructurare, care a fost actualizat de mai multe ori, ultima actualizare fiind efectuată în martie 2012. La 6 iunie 2012, Slovenia a notificat cea de a doua recapitalizare în favoarea NLB, în valoare de 382,9 milioane EUR.

2.   DESCRIEREA MĂSURILOR DE AJUTOR

NLB este cea mai mare bancă slovenă, cu un bilanț de 16 miliarde EUR în 2011, ceea ce reprezintă o treime din totalul activelor din sectorul bancar sloven. Principalii acționari sunt Republica Slovenia și KBC, care dețin peste 50%, respectiv 25%, din capitalurile proprii ale NLB.

În martie 2011, NLB a atras capital propriu în valoare de 250 de milioane EUR, prin ofertare publică a acțiunilor sale, care, în absența interesului investitorilor privați, au fost subscrise de stat. KBC a participat pentru a menține participația de 25% în cadrul băncii care îi asigură minoritatea de blocare. În conformitate cu obligația care îi revenea, în iunie 2012 Slovenia a prezentat Comisiei un plan de restructurare.

Întrucât poziția de capital a NLB a continuat să se deterioreze și, totodată, pentru a asigura respectarea cerințelor testului de rezistență al Autorității bancare europene, în mai 2011 Banca Sloveniei a solicitat NLB ca până în iunie 2012 să efectueze o majorare suplimentară a ratelor sale de capital. În acest scop, la 6 iunie 2012, Slovenia a notificat a doua recapitalizare a NLB, sub formă de instrumente convertibile contingente compatibile cu dispozițiile ABE și de acțiuni comune, în valoare totală de 382,9 milioane EUR.

3.   EVALUAREA MĂSURILOR

Comisia nu contestă opinia autorităților slovene potrivit căreia măsurile acordate de stat în favoarea NLB constituie ajutor de stat în sensul articolului 107 alineatul (1) din TFUE.

Compatibilitatea măsurilor este evaluată în temeiul articolului 107 alineatul (3) litera (b) din TFUE. În ceea ce privește cea de a doua recapitalizare a băncii, Comisia consideră că este compatibilă temporar cu piața internă ca ajutor de salvare din motive de stabilitate financiară. Prin urmare, cea de a doua recapitalizare a băncii este aprobată pentru șase luni sau, dacă Slovenia prezintă un plan de restructurare amănunțit în termen de șase luni de la data prezentei decizii, până când Comisia adoptă o decizie finală cu privire la planul de restructurare respectiv.

Comisia deschide, în același timp, o procedură de investigație aprofundată cu privire la măsurile de restructurare propuse. În special, în urma unei evaluări preliminare a planului de restructurare, Comisia își exprimă îndoiala în ceea ce privește capacitatea băncii de a reveni la viabilitate pe termen lung. În temeiul aceleași proceduri, Comisia se întreabă dacă atât contribuția proprie, cât și măsurile de limitare a denaturării concurenței sunt adecvate și suficiente.

În conformitate cu articolul 14 din Regulamentul (CE) nr. 659/1999 al Consiliului, orice ajutor ilegal poate face obiectul recuperării de la beneficiar.

TEXTUL SCRISORII

„The Commission wishes to inform Slovenia that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the measure referred to above, it has decided to approve the second recapitalisation of Nova Ljubljanska Banka Group ("NLB" or "the Bank") temporarily for six months as compatible rescue aid. At the same time, it will also initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with regard to the restructuring plan submitted by the Slovenian authorities on 22 July 2011 since the Commission has doubts as to the compatibility of that restructuring plan and the associated aid measures with the internal market in the light of the Commission's Communication on the return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current financial crisis under the State aid rules
   (1) (the Restructuring Communication).

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 7 March 2011, the European Commission authorized in case SA.32261 emergency aid to NLB in the form of a recapitalisation of EUR 250 million on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU for a period of six months and upon the submission of a restructuring plan. (2) |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 7 March 2011, the European Commission authorized in case SA.32261 emergency aid to NLB in the form of a recapitalisation of EUR 250 million on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU for a period of six months and upon the submission of a restructuring plan. (2)

| (2) | On 17 June 2011, the Slovenian authorities pre-notified a restructuring plan. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On 17 June 2011, the Slovenian authorities pre-notified a restructuring plan.

| (3) | The Slovenian authorities notified officially the restructuring plan on 22 July 2011 and in response to information requests by the Commission, they sent further updates on 6 September 2011 and on 26 March 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The Slovenian authorities notified officially the restructuring plan on 22 July 2011 and in response to information requests by the Commission, they sent further updates on 6 September 2011 and on 26 March 2012.

| (4) | The Commission submitted questions to Slovenia on 24 January, 7 February, 18 February and 21 February 2012, to which Slovenia replied on 28 January, 15 February, 18 February, 21 February, 22 February, 24 February and 28 February 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

The Commission submitted questions to Slovenia on 24 January, 7 February, 18 February and 21 February 2012, to which Slovenia replied on 28 January, 15 February, 18 February, 21 February, 22 February, 24 February and 28 February 2012.

| (5) | On 16 May 2012, the Slovenian authorities informed the Commission of their intention to provide for a second recapitalisation to NLB. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 16 May 2012, the Slovenian authorities informed the Commission of their intention to provide for a second recapitalisation to NLB.

| (6) | Following a number of preliminary contacts, the Slovenian authorities notified to the Commission a second recapitalisation measure on 6 June 2012. Following further requests of the Commission the Slovenian authorities submitted additional information on 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29 June and 02 July 2012. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Following a number of preliminary contacts, the Slovenian authorities notified to the Commission a second recapitalisation measure on 6 June 2012. Following further requests of the Commission the Slovenian authorities submitted additional information on 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 28, 29 June and 02 July 2012.

| (7) | Slovenia has accepted that the decision will exceptionally be adopted in English. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Slovenia has accepted that the decision will exceptionally be adopted in English.

2.   DESCRIPTION OF THE MEASURE

2.1   The beneficiary

| (8) | NLB Group is the parent company of Slovenia's largest bank. Apart from Slovenia, NLB Group is present across south-eastern Europe, where it has retail operations in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

NLB Group is the parent company of Slovenia's largest bank. Apart from Slovenia, NLB Group is present across south-eastern Europe, where it has retail operations in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

| (9) | In Slovenia, it offers a full range of personal and corporate banking services with an emphasis on the Slovenian retail banking market. It is also active in the areas of private, corporate and investment banking. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

In Slovenia, it offers a full range of personal and corporate banking services with an emphasis on the Slovenian retail banking market. It is also active in the areas of private, corporate and investment banking.

| (10) | As of 31 December 2011, NLB's 11,061,125 ordinary shares in issue were distributed among 1,997 shareholders. The largest shareholders were the Republic of Slovenia (“Slovenia”) (45.62 %), KBC (25.00 %), Poteza Borzno Posredniška Družba, d.d. (4.47 %), Slovenska Odškodninska Družba (4.07 %) and Kapitalska Družba, d. d. (4.03 %). The shares are not listed. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

As of 31 December 2011, NLB's 11,061,125 ordinary shares in issue were distributed among 1,997 shareholders. The largest shareholders were the Republic of Slovenia (“Slovenia”) (45.62 %), KBC (25.00 %), Poteza Borzno Posredniška Družba, d.d. (4.47 %), Slovenska Odškodninska Družba (4.07 %) and Kapitalska Družba, d. d. (4.03 %). The shares are not listed.

| (11) | For the year ended 31 December 2011, NLB Group had total assets of EUR 16.5 billion (RWA EUR 13.5 billion) and total deposits of approximately EUR 10.2 billion, which consisted of household deposits (EUR 6.7 billion), corporate deposits (EUR 2.4 billion) and State deposits (EUR 1.1 billion). Furthermore, it had EUR 1.2 billion of debt securities in issue. As of the same date, NLB’s total loan book was approximately EUR 10.7 billion. The loan-to-deposit ratio was 105 % (down from 127 % in 2010). |
| --- | --- |

(11)

For the year ended 31 December 2011, NLB Group had total assets of EUR 16.5 billion (RWA EUR 13.5 billion) and total deposits of approximately EUR 10.2 billion, which consisted of household deposits (EUR 6.7 billion), corporate deposits (EUR 2.4 billion) and State deposits (EUR 1.1 billion). Furthermore, it had EUR 1.2 billion of debt securities in issue. As of the same date, NLB’s total loan book was approximately EUR 10.7 billion. The loan-to-deposit ratio was 105 % (down from 127 % in 2010).

| (12) | NLB's current credit ratings are Ba2 by Moody's and BBB by Fitch. Both ratings were downgraded in 2011 (3). The downgrade is primarily due to the concentration and further deterioration of the credit portfolio and the modest financial and capital position of the bank in the current market environment. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

NLB's current credit ratings are Ba2 by Moody's and BBB by Fitch. Both ratings were downgraded in 2011 (3). The downgrade is primarily due to the concentration and further deterioration of the credit portfolio and the modest financial and capital position of the bank in the current market environment.

| (13) | NLB's Group balance sheet more than doubled between 2003 and 2009. It was profitable in the period 2003-2008, with average annual profits before tax of EUR 109 million and an average return on equity before tax of 12.4 %. However, it generated losses in 2009, 2010 and 2011 of EUR 87 million, EUR 202 million and EUR 239 million respectively. The loan portfolio of NLB started to deteriorate in 2009. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased from 3.8 % in 2008 to 21.2 % at the end of 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

NLB's Group balance sheet more than doubled between 2003 and 2009. It was profitable in the period 2003-2008, with average annual profits before tax of EUR 109 million and an average return on equity before tax of 12.4 %. However, it generated losses in 2009, 2010 and 2011 of EUR 87 million, EUR 202 million and EUR 239 million respectively. The loan portfolio of NLB started to deteriorate in 2009. Non-performing loans (NPLs) increased from 3.8 % in 2008 to 21.2 % at the end of 2010.

2.2   The first recapitalisation

| (14) | In 2009 and 2010, NLB Group registered losses after several years of profits. The deteriorating economic climate has affected NLB's operations. Weak economic growth and rising unemployment have reduced demand for loans and caused significant rises in loan impairments. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

In 2009 and 2010, NLB Group registered losses after several years of profits. The deteriorating economic climate has affected NLB's operations. Weak economic growth and rising unemployment have reduced demand for loans and caused significant rises in loan impairments.

| (15) | Those losses have brought a greater focus onto NLB Group's already weak capital position. NLB Group had a relatively low Tier 1 capital level of 6.9 % in 2009, which was reduced to 6.0 % in 2010 due to continuing losses. At that time (and also with respect to the increased capital requirements under Basel III) the level of capital was considered insufficient and led to concerns about the viability of the bank. As a result, NLB decided to raise more capital. The Slovenian government was prepared to supply that capital if the market didn't. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Those losses have brought a greater focus onto NLB Group's already weak capital position. NLB Group had a relatively low Tier 1 capital level of 6.9 % in 2009, which was reduced to 6.0 % in 2010 due to continuing losses. At that time (and also with respect to the increased capital requirements under Basel III) the level of capital was considered insufficient and led to concerns about the viability of the bank. As a result, NLB decided to raise more capital. The Slovenian government was prepared to supply that capital if the market didn't.

| (16) | In the absence of a capital increase, the Slovenian authorities foresaw higher funding costs and a serious reduction in the willingness of existing and potential investors or lenders to provide funding to NLB. |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In the absence of a capital increase, the Slovenian authorities foresaw higher funding costs and a serious reduction in the willingness of existing and potential investors or lenders to provide funding to NLB.

| (17) | [...] (4) |
| --- | --- |

(17)

[...] (4)

| (18) | [...] NLB adopted a new long-term strategy in November 2010 which redefined the Group's strategic markets and activities. Equity participations which did not fit into the strategy would be divested. While those divestments would improve the bank’s capital ratios, on a longer time-horizon the capital injection would have an instant positive effect on the bank's financial situation. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

[...] NLB adopted a new long-term strategy in November 2010 which redefined the Group's strategic markets and activities. Equity participations which did not fit into the strategy would be divested. While those divestments would improve the bank’s capital ratios, on a longer time-horizon the capital injection would have an instant positive effect on the bank's financial situation.

| (19) | NLB was set to raise EUR 250 million of equity capital, equivalent to 1.6% of its RWA, through a public offering of its shares. Subscription to new shares was planned to be done through a public offering as required by Slovenian legislation. As a result of the capital increase in 2011 the Tier 1 ratio was improved to 7.2 % and the Core tier 1 ratio to 6.3 %. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

NLB was set to raise EUR 250 million of equity capital, equivalent to 1.6% of its RWA, through a public offering of its shares. Subscription to new shares was planned to be done through a public offering as required by Slovenian legislation. As a result of the capital increase in 2011 the Tier 1 ratio was improved to 7.2 % and the Core tier 1 ratio to 6.3 %.

| (20) | The capital increase took place in two tranches. In the first offering to existing shareholders, the total amount subscribed was EUR 89.2 million. The State fully exercised its pre-emption rights, while KBC, the second-biggest shareholder of NLB, only subscribed to the capital necessary to maintain a blocking minority. In the second stage the remaining share capital was offered to the public. However, it was ultimately fully subscribed by Slovenia, due to a lack of interest. As a result Slovenia's direct participation in NLB increased to 45.62 % from 33.10 %. Considering that Slovenia also holds an indirect stake of at least 8.1 % in NLB (5), the operation further strengthened its majority position. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

The capital increase took place in two tranches. In the first offering to existing shareholders, the total amount subscribed was EUR 89.2 million. The State fully exercised its pre-emption rights, while KBC, the second-biggest shareholder of NLB, only subscribed to the capital necessary to maintain a blocking minority. In the second stage the remaining share capital was offered to the public. However, it was ultimately fully subscribed by Slovenia, due to a lack of interest. As a result Slovenia's direct participation in NLB increased to 45.62 % from 33.10 %. Considering that Slovenia also holds an indirect stake of at least 8.1 % in NLB (5), the operation further strengthened its majority position.

| (21) | The issue price of those shares was EUR 116. Since NLB is not currently quoted, the issue price of the new shares was set by reference to the book value of NLB shares on 30 September 2010. The projected book value of an NLB share at year-end 2010 was EUR [...] so that the new shares were issued at [...] times book value. |
| --- | --- |

(21)

The issue price of those shares was EUR 116. Since NLB is not currently quoted, the issue price of the new shares was set by reference to the book value of NLB shares on 30 September 2010. The projected book value of an NLB share at year-end 2010 was EUR [...] so that the new shares were issued at [...] times book value.

| (22) | That rescue measure was approved by Commission decision of 7 March 2011 on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU although the Commission indicated that it would assess the aspect of burden-sharing related to the share price in further detail during its assessment of the restructuring plan. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

That rescue measure was approved by Commission decision of 7 March 2011 on the basis of Article 107(3)(b) TFEU although the Commission indicated that it would assess the aspect of burden-sharing related to the share price in further detail during its assessment of the restructuring plan.

2.3   The second recapitalisation notified on 6 June 2012

| (23) | [...]. Due to the elections, the State as a main shareholder of NLB did not decide on the future of the Bank until a new Government was formed. When it became clear that the share capital increase would not be completed by the end of 2011, [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

[...]. Due to the elections, the State as a main shareholder of NLB did not decide on the future of the Bank until a new Government was formed. When it became clear that the share capital increase would not be completed by the end of 2011, [...].

| (24) | Initially Slovenia estimated that a capital injection amounting to EUR 250 million would be sufficient to meet the capital requirements. Following a further deterioration of NLB's portfolio, which in turn triggered the need for higher provisions, it became apparent in September 2011 that the Bank would need EUR [...] million as opposed to EUR 250 million of additional capital. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

Initially Slovenia estimated that a capital injection amounting to EUR 250 million would be sufficient to meet the capital requirements. Following a further deterioration of NLB's portfolio, which in turn triggered the need for higher provisions, it became apparent in September 2011 that the Bank would need EUR [...] million as opposed to EUR 250 million of additional capital.

| (25) | In February 2012, the new government decided to actively pursue the second recapitalisation with private investors only and without participation from the State. |
| --- | --- |

(25)

In February 2012, the new government decided to actively pursue the second recapitalisation with private investors only and without participation from the State.

| (26) | Subsequently, however, a private solution did not seem feasible by the end of June, and Slovenia has decided to step in and to provide as a bridge solution EUR 320 million of the required recapitalisation of EUR [...] million in the form of Contingent Convertible Instruments (CoCos) that are compatible with the requirement of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The Slovenian authorities, will cover also a part of the recapitalisation amounting to EUR 62.9 million with common equity. An additional amount of more than EUR [...] million will be achieved through [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Subsequently, however, a private solution did not seem feasible by the end of June, and Slovenia has decided to step in and to provide as a bridge solution EUR 320 million of the required recapitalisation of EUR [...] million in the form of Contingent Convertible Instruments (CoCos) that are compatible with the requirement of the European Banking Authority (EBA). The Slovenian authorities, will cover also a part of the recapitalisation amounting to EUR 62.9 million with common equity. An additional amount of more than EUR [...] million will be achieved through [...].

| (27) | The remuneration of the CoCos has been set at 10 % per annum. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

The remuneration of the CoCos has been set at 10 % per annum.

| (28) | Should NLB not be able to pay the remuneration on the CoCos, the annual payment due will be made in kind via issuance of new ordinary shares, with a discount of 25 % from the market price (adjusted for the "dilution effect"). In this case the market price needs to be estimated since NLB is not a public listed company. [...], appointed by Slovenia, has estimated the market value of the shares of NLB to be within the range of EUR [...]. Based on the mid-price of the shares resulting from that valuation (EUR [...]) and taking into account the dilution effect combined with the 25 % discount, the conversion price has been set at EUR [...] per share. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Should NLB not be able to pay the remuneration on the CoCos, the annual payment due will be made in kind via issuance of new ordinary shares, with a discount of 25 % from the market price (adjusted for the "dilution effect"). In this case the market price needs to be estimated since NLB is not a public listed company. [...], appointed by Slovenia, has estimated the market value of the shares of NLB to be within the range of EUR [...]. Based on the mid-price of the shares resulting from that valuation (EUR [...]) and taking into account the dilution effect combined with the 25 % discount, the conversion price has been set at EUR [...] per share.

| (29) | In addition, the CoCos will be subject to mandatory conversion into ordinary shares, at the same conversion price, in the event that NLB fails to buy them back by 30 June [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(29)

In addition, the CoCos will be subject to mandatory conversion into ordinary shares, at the same conversion price, in the event that NLB fails to buy them back by 30 June [...].

| (30) | The capital injection of EUR 62.9 million in the form of common shares will be conducted in two instalments. A first one will be conducted in July 2012 at a share price of 41 EUR for an amount of EUR 61 million, and a second instalment will be conducted in a second stage at a price of EUR [...] per share for an amount of EUR 1.9 million. As a result the average the price of newly issued shares to Slovenia will be [...] EUR, corresponding to a 25 % discount to the share price (adjusted for the "dilution effect"). (6) |
| --- | --- |

(30)

The capital injection of EUR 62.9 million in the form of common shares will be conducted in two instalments. A first one will be conducted in July 2012 at a share price of 41 EUR for an amount of EUR 61 million, and a second instalment will be conducted in a second stage at a price of EUR [...] per share for an amount of EUR 1.9 million. As a result the average the price of newly issued shares to Slovenia will be [...] EUR, corresponding to a 25 % discount to the share price (adjusted for the "dilution effect"). (6)

| (31) | The realisation of the liability management exercise, which consists of the restructuring of five subordinated loans amounting to EUR [...] million in total, is subject to approval by the Bank of Slovenia. In order to obtain that approval, NLB has to demonstrate that its own funds will remain adequate after the buy-back of the existing instruments by replacing them with instruments of the same or better quality; hence the liability management exercise is expected to be completed towards the end of June 2012, after the loan agreement to issue the new hybrid instrument has been signed. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The realisation of the liability management exercise, which consists of the restructuring of five subordinated loans amounting to EUR [...] million in total, is subject to approval by the Bank of Slovenia. In order to obtain that approval, NLB has to demonstrate that its own funds will remain adequate after the buy-back of the existing instruments by replacing them with instruments of the same or better quality; hence the liability management exercise is expected to be completed towards the end of June 2012, after the loan agreement to issue the new hybrid instrument has been signed.

2.4   The notified restructuring plan

2.4.1.   Restructuring Measures

| (32) | The restructuring plan submitted by the Slovenian authorities contains a base and stress scenario for the period from 2012 to 2016 (7). The plan foresees the implementation of a new strategy from NLB aiming at restoring profitability and capital to levels required by the regulators within the planned five-year period, without recourse to State aid. NLB's strategy is based on the premise that NLB Group is an independent banking and financial services group, building its own model. As such, NLB plans to remain a provider of universal banking and financial services, with its main focus on retail banking and on corporate and investment banking. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

The restructuring plan submitted by the Slovenian authorities contains a base and stress scenario for the period from 2012 to 2016 (7). The plan foresees the implementation of a new strategy from NLB aiming at restoring profitability and capital to levels required by the regulators within the planned five-year period, without recourse to State aid. NLB's strategy is based on the premise that NLB Group is an independent banking and financial services group, building its own model. As such, NLB plans to remain a provider of universal banking and financial services, with its main focus on retail banking and on corporate and investment banking.

| (33) | The Bank defines Slovenia as its main strategic market, while other strategic markets include selected countries of south-eastern Europe such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. |
| --- | --- |

(33)

The Bank defines Slovenia as its main strategic market, while other strategic markets include selected countries of south-eastern Europe such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia.

| (34) | NLB plans to divest [...] and reduce its exposure to markets where [...]. More specifically, the divestment programme of NLB consists of the disposal of [...] entities (8) with total assets of EUR [...] million at the end of 2010, representing [5-10] % of NLB's total assets. By the end of 2011, three of the planned divestments were concluded, resulting in a reduction of NLB's RWA of EUR [...] million. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

NLB plans to divest [...] and reduce its exposure to markets where [...]. More specifically, the divestment programme of NLB consists of the disposal of [...] entities (8) with total assets of EUR [...] million at the end of 2010, representing [5-10] % of NLB's total assets. By the end of 2011, three of the planned divestments were concluded, resulting in a reduction of NLB's RWA of EUR [...] million.

| (35) | The Bank identifies an excessive accumulation of credit risks (9) as the main reason behind NLB's weak performance in the past years. Credit risk is the most important risk for NLB, representing the biggest share of its capital requirements (approximately [85-95] %); thus, as stated in the restructuring plan, NLB seeks to reduce its risk appetite. NLB plans to [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

The Bank identifies an excessive accumulation of credit risks (9) as the main reason behind NLB's weak performance in the past years. Credit risk is the most important risk for NLB, representing the biggest share of its capital requirements (approximately [85-95] %); thus, as stated in the restructuring plan, NLB seeks to reduce its risk appetite. NLB plans to [...].

| (36) | In terms of its funding structure, NLB plans to reduce its dependence on wholesale funding. It is projected that the total amount of refinancing will be reduced by [...] % until 2016. To achieve that aim, NLB plans to put emphasis on attracting deposits from customers, together with reducing the volume of RWA in strategic activities. NLB also counts on receiving funds from multilateral financial institutions [...] in the future, as well as on continuing to rely on funding from ECB (10). Additionally NLB's future activities would be geared towards diversification of debt financing instruments. Finally, NLB plans to cover some of its refinancing needs with the issue of senior secured and covered bonds. |
| --- | --- |

(36)

In terms of its funding structure, NLB plans to reduce its dependence on wholesale funding. It is projected that the total amount of refinancing will be reduced by [...] % until 2016. To achieve that aim, NLB plans to put emphasis on attracting deposits from customers, together with reducing the volume of RWA in strategic activities. NLB also counts on receiving funds from multilateral financial institutions [...] in the future, as well as on continuing to rely on funding from ECB (10). Additionally NLB's future activities would be geared towards diversification of debt financing instruments. Finally, NLB plans to cover some of its refinancing needs with the issue of senior secured and covered bonds.

| (37) | In addition, as part of the restructuring, NLB launched at the end of 2010 a cost-cutting programme. The target set is to reduce costs in NLB by 15 %. Cost reduction initiatives include reducing the number of branches, reducing IT costs, divestment of excess premises and rationalising the procurement process. That programme also foresees the reduction of the number of employees in NLB by [...] % [(... employees)]. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

In addition, as part of the restructuring, NLB launched at the end of 2010 a cost-cutting programme. The target set is to reduce costs in NLB by 15 %. Cost reduction initiatives include reducing the number of branches, reducing IT costs, divestment of excess premises and rationalising the procurement process. That programme also foresees the reduction of the number of employees in NLB by [...] % [(... employees)].

| (38) | The required second capital increase is also taken into account in the projections of the restructuring plan for an amount of EUR [...] million. However in the projections of the restructuring plan, it was planned to be realised only with private investors and without any participation from the State. According to the restructuring plan, as a fall-back scenario, NLB considered [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The required second capital increase is also taken into account in the projections of the restructuring plan for an amount of EUR [...] million. However in the projections of the restructuring plan, it was planned to be realised only with private investors and without any participation from the State. According to the restructuring plan, as a fall-back scenario, NLB considered [...].

2.4.2.   Financial Projections

Base Scenario

| (39) | In the base scenario, it is assumed that NLB will return to profitability in 2013. The main drivers of profitability, according to NLB, will be an expected improvement in the quality of the portfolio which will ease the pressure on provisioning and improved operational efficiency of NLB as a result of the restructuring. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

In the base scenario, it is assumed that NLB will return to profitability in 2013. The main drivers of profitability, according to NLB, will be an expected improvement in the quality of the portfolio which will ease the pressure on provisioning and improved operational efficiency of NLB as a result of the restructuring.

| (40) | NLB’s total income is expected to decrease until 2014, after which moderate growth is forecast. The planned divestment programme and the reduction in RWA are expected to have a negative impact on NLB’s interest income. The assumptions used in income projections are:






  — | Execution of the divestment programme and RWA reduction as planned, which will have a negative impact on NLB’s net interest income in terms of volume; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(40)

NLB’s total income is expected to decrease until 2014, after which moderate growth is forecast. The planned divestment programme and the reduction in RWA are expected to have a negative impact on NLB’s interest income. The assumptions used in income projections are:

—

Execution of the divestment programme and RWA reduction as planned, which will have a negative impact on NLB’s net interest income in terms of volume;

| — | Gradual increase of interest margin to [...] % (representing an increase of [...] % compared to the level of 2011); |
| --- | --- |

—

Gradual increase of interest margin to [...] % (representing an increase of [...] % compared to the level of 2011);

| — | Increase in fees and commissions (annual growth of [...] % on average in the strategic segment); |
| --- | --- |

—

Increase in fees and commissions (annual growth of [...] % on average in the strategic segment);

| — | one-off effects from divestments of non-strategic companies; |
| --- | --- |

—

one-off effects from divestments of non-strategic companies;

| — | cost reduction in years 2011 and 2012, and [...] of costs for the following years. |
| --- | --- |

—

cost reduction in years 2011 and 2012, and [...] of costs for the following years.

| (41) | In the base scenario, NLB forecasts a further deterioration of the quality of its portfolio in 2012 and an improvement afterwards. In the restructuring plan it is assumed that the share of non-performing loans ("NPLs") would [...] in 2012 ([...] %) and slowly [...] afterwards to [...] % in 2016. According to NLB's estimates, EUR [...] in loans will have to be written off by 2016. Coverage of NPLs is provisioned to increase from [...] % in 2012 to above [...] % in 2016. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

In the base scenario, NLB forecasts a further deterioration of the quality of its portfolio in 2012 and an improvement afterwards. In the restructuring plan it is assumed that the share of non-performing loans ("NPLs") would [...] in 2012 ([...] %) and slowly [...] afterwards to [...] % in 2016. According to NLB's estimates, EUR [...] in loans will have to be written off by 2016. Coverage of NPLs is provisioned to increase from [...] % in 2012 to above [...] % in 2016.

| (42) | In line with its goal to reduce its dependence on the wholesale markets, the Bank targets its total amount of refinancing to be reduced by [...] % until 2016 (compared to 2010 level). The need for refinancing will be reduced through lower assets as a result of the divestment programme as well as of the reduction of the loan book and by changing the funding mix in favour of deposits. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

In line with its goal to reduce its dependence on the wholesale markets, the Bank targets its total amount of refinancing to be reduced by [...] % until 2016 (compared to 2010 level). The need for refinancing will be reduced through lower assets as a result of the divestment programme as well as of the reduction of the loan book and by changing the funding mix in favour of deposits.

| (43) | Average annual growth in household deposits is forecasted at [...] % while the level of state deposits is estimated to be [...] to their pre-crisis level of EUR [...] million by 2014. Finally, corporate deposits are expected to [...] slightly and are expected to constitute [...] % of total deposits in 2016 (compared to [...] % in 2011)]. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

Average annual growth in household deposits is forecasted at [...] % while the level of state deposits is estimated to be [...] to their pre-crisis level of EUR [...] million by 2014. Finally, corporate deposits are expected to [...] slightly and are expected to constitute [...] % of total deposits in 2016 (compared to [...] % in 2011)].

| (44) | Loans to the non-banking sector are expected to [...] until 2012, due to the divestment of the non-strategic segment (EUR [...] million in two years) and from a [...] in volume of operations in the strategic segment (EUR [...] million in two years). A [...] volume of operations is planned only in corporate lending while retail loans are assumed to [...] in line with market growth. Modest organic [...] of the loan book in the strategic portfolio is foreseen after 2012 ([...] % annually). |
| --- | --- |

(44)

Loans to the non-banking sector are expected to [...] until 2012, due to the divestment of the non-strategic segment (EUR [...] million in two years) and from a [...] in volume of operations in the strategic segment (EUR [...] million in two years). A [...] volume of operations is planned only in corporate lending while retail loans are assumed to [...] in line with market growth. Modest organic [...] of the loan book in the strategic portfolio is foreseen after 2012 ([...] % annually).

| (45) | After divestment of the non-strategic segment, parts of the portfolio (roughly EUR [...] million) will remain in NLB's books; according to NLB, those assets (mainly NPLs) cannot be sold and require longer to collect. To cover or write off those NPLs, NLB estimates that new impairments of approximately EUR [...] million in the years 2013 to 2015 may have to be made. |
| --- | --- |

(45)

After divestment of the non-strategic segment, parts of the portfolio (roughly EUR [...] million) will remain in NLB's books; according to NLB, those assets (mainly NPLs) cannot be sold and require longer to collect. To cover or write off those NPLs, NLB estimates that new impairments of approximately EUR [...] million in the years 2013 to 2015 may have to be made.

Stress Scenario

| (46) | According to the restructuring plan, the development of the stress scenario was based on the results of the EBA exercise of 2011, which revealed that NLB is vulnerable to credit risks shocks. On the basis of that finding, the following assumptions have been applied for the financial projections in the stress scenario:






  — | Credit shock is applied only to 2012. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(46)

According to the restructuring plan, the development of the stress scenario was based on the results of the EBA exercise of 2011, which revealed that NLB is vulnerable to credit risks shocks. On the basis of that finding, the following assumptions have been applied for the financial projections in the stress scenario:

—

Credit shock is applied only to 2012.

| — | Further worsening of the economic situation in Slovenia adversely affects the portfolio quality. |
| --- | --- |

—

Further worsening of the economic situation in Slovenia adversely affects the portfolio quality.

| — | Portfolio quality worsens in the industry sectors which have the highest percentage of NPLs – construction and real estate. |
| --- | --- |

—

Portfolio quality worsens in the industry sectors which have the highest percentage of NPLs – construction and real estate.

| — | Due to the persistence of the crisis the quality of portfolio is worsened also in services, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing and households. |
| --- | --- |

—

Due to the persistence of the crisis the quality of portfolio is worsened also in services, transportation, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing and households.

| — | The coverage ratio (NPLs against provisions) is kept at the same level as under the base scenario. |
| --- | --- |

—

The coverage ratio (NPLs against provisions) is kept at the same level as under the base scenario.

| (47) | Based on those assumptions, the NPLs [...] by EUR [...] million to EUR [...] billion in 2013, or to [...] % of total portfolio (a [...] percentage point increase compared to the base scenario). The application of the credit shock creates a need for additional impairments in 2013 of EUR [...] million (EUR [...] million in total) compared to the base case scenario (EUR [...] million). |
| --- | --- |

(47)

Based on those assumptions, the NPLs [...] by EUR [...] million to EUR [...] billion in 2013, or to [...] % of total portfolio (a [...] percentage point increase compared to the base scenario). The application of the credit shock creates a need for additional impairments in 2013 of EUR [...] million (EUR [...] million in total) compared to the base case scenario (EUR [...] million).

| (48) | Despite higher impairments, it is forecast that even under the stress scenario NLB will return to profitability in [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

Despite higher impairments, it is forecast that even under the stress scenario NLB will return to profitability in [...].

| (49) | The basic financial projections of NLB according to the base scenario and the stress scenario are summarised in Table 1:

  Table 1


  Financial Projections












  In million EUR | Base Scenario |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
| Total Balance sheet | 16,444 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net loans and receivables | 10,749 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net profit/loss before tax | (266.9) | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net Interest margin | 2.5 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Return on equity (ROE) | – 26.3 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Cost/income ratio | 59.8 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Loans growth rate | (10 %) | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Customer deposits growth rate | (2 %) | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD) | 105.4 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| CAR
   (11) | 11,10 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Risk Adjusted Items (RWA) | 13 509,5 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |

(49)

The basic financial projections of NLB according to the base scenario and the stress scenario are summarised in Table 1:

Table 1

Financial Projections

In million EUR

Base Scenario

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total Balance sheet

16,444

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net loans and receivables

10,749

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net profit/loss before tax

(266.9)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net Interest margin

2.5 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Return on equity (ROE)

– 26.3 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Cost/income ratio

59.8 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Loans growth rate

(10 %)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Customer deposits growth rate

(2 %)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD)

105.4 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

CAR
   (11)

11,10 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Risk Adjusted Items (RWA)

13 509,5

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

| In million EUR | Stress Scenario |
| --- | --- |
| | 2011 | 2012 | 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 |
| Total Balance sheet | 16,444 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net loans and receivables | 10,749 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Net profit/loss before tax | (266.9) | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Return on equity (ROE) | – 26.3 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Cost/income ratio | 59.8 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Loans growth rate | (10 %) | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Customer deposits growth rate | (2 %) | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD) | 105.4 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| CAR | 11,10 % | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Risk Adjusted Items (RWA) | 13 509,5 | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |

In million EUR

Stress Scenario

2011

2012

2013

2014

2015

2016

Total Balance sheet

16,444

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net loans and receivables

10,749

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Net profit/loss before tax

(266.9)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Return on equity (ROE)

– 26.3 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Cost/income ratio

59.8 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Loans growth rate

(10 %)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Customer deposits growth rate

(2 %)

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Loan-to-deposit ratio (LTD)

105.4 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

CAR

11,10 %

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Risk Adjusted Items (RWA)

13 509,5

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

2.4.3.   Burden-sharing

| (50) | According to the restructuring plan, the following additional measures are mentioned to demonstrate NLB's own contribution. In particularly it lists:






  — | a divestment of additional assets: it lists five [...] participations earmarked for disposal: [...], as well as seven [...] companies. Those additional divestments are estimated to amount to an equivalent capital deduction effect of just over EUR [...] million (12); |
| --- | --- | --- |

(50)

According to the restructuring plan, the following additional measures are mentioned to demonstrate NLB's own contribution. In particularly it lists:

—

a divestment of additional assets: it lists five [...] participations earmarked for disposal: [...], as well as seven [...] companies. Those additional divestments are estimated to amount to an equivalent capital deduction effect of just over EUR [...] million (12);

| — | NLB will also adjust its dividend policy in such a way to rebuild capital ratios from retained earnings, determined by the level of the Tier 1 capital ratio; |
| --- | --- |

—

NLB will also adjust its dividend policy in such a way to rebuild capital ratios from retained earnings, determined by the level of the Tier 1 capital ratio;

| — | finally, NLB plans a partial public listing after the restructuring phase. |
| --- | --- |

—

finally, NLB plans a partial public listing after the restructuring phase.

2.4.4.   Measures to limit distortions of competition

| (51) | As measures to mitigate competition distortions, the restructuring plan envisages that:






  — | NLB will not engage in aggressive commercial strategies |
| --- | --- | --- |

(51)

As measures to mitigate competition distortions, the restructuring plan envisages that:

—

NLB will not engage in aggressive commercial strategies

| — | NLB will reduce its retail network in Slovenia by closing [...] of the [...] retail branches |
| --- | --- |

—

NLB will reduce its retail network in Slovenia by closing [...] of the [...] retail branches

| — | NLB will not acquire any new entity which is not already part of the group |
| --- | --- |

—

NLB will not acquire any new entity which is not already part of the group

| — | NLB will reduce the volume of risk weighted assets of strategic operations by [...] %. |
| --- | --- |

—

NLB will reduce the volume of risk weighted assets of strategic operations by [...] %.

3.   POSITION OF THE SLOVENIAN AUTHORITIES

Second recapitalisation measure

| (52) | The Slovenian authorities are of the view that the participation of the State in the second recapitalisation in favour of NLB constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

The Slovenian authorities are of the view that the participation of the State in the second recapitalisation in favour of NLB constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU.

| (53) | Slovenia undertakes to maintain the commitments made in the context of the first recapitalisation of NLB, as reflected in the Commission decision of 7 March 2011 (13). |
| --- | --- |

(53)

Slovenia undertakes to maintain the commitments made in the context of the first recapitalisation of NLB, as reflected in the Commission decision of 7 March 2011 (13).

| (54) | With regard to acquisitions, the Slovenian authorities have further undertaken that, unless the Commission otherwise agrees (14), NLB will not acquire (15) any stake in any undertaking for a period of at least three years starting from the date of the final Commission decision. |
| --- | --- |

(54)

With regard to acquisitions, the Slovenian authorities have further undertaken that, unless the Commission otherwise agrees (14), NLB will not acquire (15) any stake in any undertaking for a period of at least three years starting from the date of the final Commission decision.

| (55) | The Slovenian authorities have also undertaken that before any entity of NLB exercises a call option on a hybrid or equity-like capital instrument it will submit its proposals to do so to the Commission for approval. Furthermore, any proposed buy-back of those instruments will be also submitted to the Commission for approval. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The Slovenian authorities have also undertaken that before any entity of NLB exercises a call option on a hybrid or equity-like capital instrument it will submit its proposals to do so to the Commission for approval. Furthermore, any proposed buy-back of those instruments will be also submitted to the Commission for approval.

| (56) | Slovenia has committed that until the Commission takes a final decision on restructuring, NLB and any other entity of NLB will only pay to third parties which are external to the group, by the end of the financial year for the previous financial year, coupons and profit distributions on the core capital instruments, silent participations, participation rights and participation certificates with a share in the loss and any other profit-related own capital financial instruments (e.g. hybrid capital instruments, participation certificates) (excluding shares) existing in NLB on 1 July 2012 (in order to encourage new investments in the Bank) if and in so far as NLB or the subsidiary companies in question are legally obliged to do so and can do so without releasing reserves. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

Slovenia has committed that until the Commission takes a final decision on restructuring, NLB and any other entity of NLB will only pay to third parties which are external to the group, by the end of the financial year for the previous financial year, coupons and profit distributions on the core capital instruments, silent participations, participation rights and participation certificates with a share in the loss and any other profit-related own capital financial instruments (e.g. hybrid capital instruments, participation certificates) (excluding shares) existing in NLB on 1 July 2012 (in order to encourage new investments in the Bank) if and in so far as NLB or the subsidiary companies in question are legally obliged to do so and can do so without releasing reserves.

| (57) | The Slovenian authorities have committed to submit a new restructuring plan for NLB within six months from the adoption of the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

The Slovenian authorities have committed to submit a new restructuring plan for NLB within six months from the adoption of the present decision.

| (58) | The Slovenian authorities note that the purpose of the measure is to ensure compliance by NLB with the new capital requirements. Slovenia is of the view that due to the continuing unstable conditions on the financial markets and past experience in rising capital with the Bank, an initial public offering is not workable assumption. Therefore they view the capital increase in the form of EBA-compliant CoCos as a well-targeted and appropriate measure to achieve that objective. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

The Slovenian authorities note that the purpose of the measure is to ensure compliance by NLB with the new capital requirements. Slovenia is of the view that due to the continuing unstable conditions on the financial markets and past experience in rising capital with the Bank, an initial public offering is not workable assumption. Therefore they view the capital increase in the form of EBA-compliant CoCos as a well-targeted and appropriate measure to achieve that objective.

| (59) | By letter of 12 June 2012, the Bank of Slovenia stated that the measure is appropriate as a means for NLB to reach its capital requirements under the EBA stress test exercise. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

By letter of 12 June 2012, the Bank of Slovenia stated that the measure is appropriate as a means for NLB to reach its capital requirements under the EBA stress test exercise.

Restructuring Measures

| (60) | The Slovenian authorities have indicated that they were considering the implementation of an impaired asset measure. While they have not yet specified any details, it is expected that a split of NLB in a good and bad bank would encourage the participation of private investors in the recapitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

The Slovenian authorities have indicated that they were considering the implementation of an impaired asset measure. While they have not yet specified any details, it is expected that a split of NLB in a good and bad bank would encourage the participation of private investors in the recapitalisation.

4.   ASSESSMENT

4.1   Existence of State Aid

| (61) | The Commission has to assess whether the measure relating to the second recapitalisation constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to that provision, State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(61)

The Commission has to assess whether the measure relating to the second recapitalisation constitutes State aid within the meaning of Article 107(1) TFEU. According to that provision, State aid is any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts, or threatens to distort, competition by favouring certain undertakings, in so far as it affects trade between Member States.

| (62) | The Commission observes that in this case State resources are involved as the measure is financed by the State. The State has committed to fully subscribe to the EBA-compatible CoCos to be issued by the Bank in the amount of EUR 320 million. In addition the State has committed to inject up to EUR 62.9 million of common shares. |
| --- | --- |

(62)

The Commission observes that in this case State resources are involved as the measure is financed by the State. The State has committed to fully subscribe to the EBA-compatible CoCos to be issued by the Bank in the amount of EUR 320 million. In addition the State has committed to inject up to EUR 62.9 million of common shares.

| (63) | The Commission considers the measure to be selective as it solely benefits NLB. |
| --- | --- |

(63)

The Commission considers the measure to be selective as it solely benefits NLB.

| (64) | The measure furthermore confers an advantage on NLB as it allows the Bank to absorb impairments suffered to date and future losses on other assets, as well as to meet its capital requirements [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(64)

The measure furthermore confers an advantage on NLB as it allows the Bank to absorb impairments suffered to date and future losses on other assets, as well as to meet its capital requirements [...].

| (65) | The Commission finds that the measure is also able to affect trade between Member States and to distort competition as NLB is competing on, amongst others, the Slovenian retail savings markets, the Slovenian mortgage lending markets and the Slovenian commercial lending markets. In the Slovenian market, some of its competitors are subsidiaries of foreign banks. |
| --- | --- |

(65)

The Commission finds that the measure is also able to affect trade between Member States and to distort competition as NLB is competing on, amongst others, the Slovenian retail savings markets, the Slovenian mortgage lending markets and the Slovenian commercial lending markets. In the Slovenian market, some of its competitors are subsidiaries of foreign banks.

Conclusion

| (66) | The Commission considers that the measure fulfils all conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU and, therefore, the measure qualifies as State aid to NLB. |
| --- | --- |

(66)

The Commission considers that the measure fulfils all conditions laid down in Article 107(1) TFEU and, therefore, the measure qualifies as State aid to NLB.

4.2   Compatibility of the Aid

| (67) | Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides for the possibility that aid falling within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU can be regarded as compatible with the internal market if it intends to "remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State". |
| --- | --- |

(67)

Article 107(3)(b) TFEU provides for the possibility that aid falling within the scope of Article 107(1) TFEU can be regarded as compatible with the internal market if it intends to "remedy a serious disturbance in the economy of a Member State".

| (68) | The Commission notes that NLB is the largest banking institution in Slovenia with significant retail operations also in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Slovenian authorities have shown that without the second recapitalisation [...] of NLB, with consequent adverse impacts on the financial stability of the country. In the context of the various uncertainties surrounding the current recovery from the global financial and economic crisis, the [...] of the Bank would create a serious disturbance for the Slovenian economy and therefore the measure can be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, as already concluded in the decision of 7 March 2011 concerning the first recapitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

(68)

The Commission notes that NLB is the largest banking institution in Slovenia with significant retail operations also in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The Slovenian authorities have shown that without the second recapitalisation [...] of NLB, with consequent adverse impacts on the financial stability of the country. In the context of the various uncertainties surrounding the current recovery from the global financial and economic crisis, the [...] of the Bank would create a serious disturbance for the Slovenian economy and therefore the measure can be assessed under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, as already concluded in the decision of 7 March 2011 concerning the first recapitalisation.

Compatibility of the second recapitalisation

| (69) | The Commission will assess the compatibility of the second recapitalisation of NLB based on the Banking Communication (16) and the Recapitalisation Communication (17). |
| --- | --- |

(69)

The Commission will assess the compatibility of the second recapitalisation of NLB based on the Banking Communication (16) and the Recapitalisation Communication (17).

| (70) | In line with point 15 of the Banking Communication, in order for an aid or aid scheme to be compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU it must comply with the general criteria for compatibility (18):
  a.   Appropriateness: The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. It would not be the case if the measure were not appropriate to remedy the disturbance.
  b.   Necessity: The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. That implies that it must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the disturbance.
  c.   Proportionality: The positive effects of the measure must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measure's objectives. |
| --- | --- |

(70)

In line with point 15 of the Banking Communication, in order for an aid or aid scheme to be compatible under Article 107(3)(b) TFEU it must comply with the general criteria for compatibility (18):

a.   Appropriateness: The aid has to be well-targeted in order to be able to effectively achieve the objective of remedying a serious disturbance in the economy. It would not be the case if the measure were not appropriate to remedy the disturbance.

b.   Necessity: The aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. That implies that it must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective, and take the form most appropriate to remedy the disturbance.

c.   Proportionality: The positive effects of the measure must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measure's objectives.

| (71) | The Recapitalisation Communication further elaborates on the three principles of the Banking Communication and states that recapitalisations can contribute to the restoration of financial stability. In particular the Recapitalisation Communication states that recapitalisations may be an appropriate response to the problems of financial institutions facing insolvency. |
| --- | --- |

(71)

The Recapitalisation Communication further elaborates on the three principles of the Banking Communication and states that recapitalisations can contribute to the restoration of financial stability. In particular the Recapitalisation Communication states that recapitalisations may be an appropriate response to the problems of financial institutions facing insolvency.

| (72) | As regards NLB the Commission makes the following assessment of the compatibility criteria: |
| --- | --- |

(72)

As regards NLB the Commission makes the following assessment of the compatibility criteria:

a.   Appropriateness

| (73) | The measure for NLB results from the higher capital requirements [...] by 30 June 2012, when NLB has to meet the targeted 9 % Core Tier 1 ratio required by the EBA. The Commission notes that a capital increase of EUR 320 million in the form of CoCos together with the injection of common shares at the amount of EUR 62.9 million will allow the Bank to meet its new target regulatory capital requirements [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(73)

The measure for NLB results from the higher capital requirements [...] by 30 June 2012, when NLB has to meet the targeted 9 % Core Tier 1 ratio required by the EBA. The Commission notes that a capital increase of EUR 320 million in the form of CoCos together with the injection of common shares at the amount of EUR 62.9 million will allow the Bank to meet its new target regulatory capital requirements [...].

| (74) | NLB is the largest banking institution in Slovenia with significant shares of Slovenian retail banking services. As such NLB is a systemically important bank for Slovenia. Consequently, a [...] of NLB would create a serious disturbance in the Slovenian economy and would limit the provision of loans to the Slovenian economy. The measure thereby ensures that financial stability in Slovenia is maintained. For those reasons, the Commission finds that the measure is appropriate. |
| --- | --- |

(74)

NLB is the largest banking institution in Slovenia with significant shares of Slovenian retail banking services. As such NLB is a systemically important bank for Slovenia. Consequently, a [...] of NLB would create a serious disturbance in the Slovenian economy and would limit the provision of loans to the Slovenian economy. The measure thereby ensures that financial stability in Slovenia is maintained. For those reasons, the Commission finds that the measure is appropriate.

b.   Necessity – limitation of the aid to the minimum

| (75) | Based on the Banking Communication, the aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. That implies that the recapitalisation must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective. In that context, the Commission observes that the amount of the measure will ensure that NLB will improve its regulatory capital levels in line with EBA requirements and market expectations. In order to restore market confidence, the recapitalisation is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(75)

Based on the Banking Communication, the aid measure must, in its amount and form, be necessary to achieve the objective. That implies that the recapitalisation must be of the minimum amount necessary to reach the objective. In that context, the Commission observes that the amount of the measure will ensure that NLB will improve its regulatory capital levels in line with EBA requirements and market expectations. In order to restore market confidence, the recapitalisation is necessary.

| (76) | The Commission notes that the annual remuneration of the recapitalisation by means of the CoCos has been set at a level of 10 %, in line with the guidelines of the Commission and of ECB (19). The Commission positively notes that the level of remuneration is sufficiently high to encourage NLB to exit from the State intervention. |
| --- | --- |

(76)

The Commission notes that the annual remuneration of the recapitalisation by means of the CoCos has been set at a level of 10 %, in line with the guidelines of the Commission and of ECB (19). The Commission positively notes that the level of remuneration is sufficiently high to encourage NLB to exit from the State intervention.

| (77) | The Commission further notes that an alternative coupon satisfaction mechanism applies to the CoCos. In addition the CoCos will be subject to mandatory conversion into ordinary shares in the event that NLB does not proceed to buy-back by 30 June 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(77)

The Commission further notes that an alternative coupon satisfaction mechanism applies to the CoCos. In addition the CoCos will be subject to mandatory conversion into ordinary shares in the event that NLB does not proceed to buy-back by 30 June 2013.

| (78) | The Commission positively observes that a sufficient discount has been applied to the conversion price (adjusted for dilution) for the following reasons:






  (i) | The market price of the Bank has been subject to an independent evaluation by [...] as the shares are not traded. It resulted in a price comprised in the range [...] EUR per share. In the context of that evaluation Slovenia's choice to take the mid-range point of [...] EUR per share as the basis for calculating an appropriate conversion price seems therefore reasonable and in line with market practices. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(78)

The Commission positively observes that a sufficient discount has been applied to the conversion price (adjusted for dilution) for the following reasons:

(i)

The market price of the Bank has been subject to an independent evaluation by [...] as the shares are not traded. It resulted in a price comprised in the range [...] EUR per share. In the context of that evaluation Slovenia's choice to take the mid-range point of [...] EUR per share as the basis for calculating an appropriate conversion price seems therefore reasonable and in line with market practices.

| (ii) | Slovenia applies the 25 % discount to the theoretical ex rights market price, which is in line with point 8 of the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis
   (20) (the "2011 Prolongation Communication"). |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

Slovenia applies the 25 % discount to the theoretical ex rights market price, which is in line with point 8 of the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis
   (20) (the "2011 Prolongation Communication").

| (79) | As regards the remuneration of the common shares, the Commission positively notes that the capital injection is done at 25 % discount to the theoretical ex rights price, which is also in line with the 2011 Prolongation Communication. |
| --- | --- |

(79)

As regards the remuneration of the common shares, the Commission positively notes that the capital injection is done at 25 % discount to the theoretical ex rights price, which is also in line with the 2011 Prolongation Communication.

| (80) | In conclusion, the measure seems necessary in both its amount and form to achieve the objectives of limiting the disturbance in the Slovenian banking system and economy as a whole. |
| --- | --- |

(80)

In conclusion, the measure seems necessary in both its amount and form to achieve the objectives of limiting the disturbance in the Slovenian banking system and economy as a whole.

c.   Proportionality – measures limiting negative spill-over effects

| (81) | The Slovenian authorities have undertaken to maintain the commitment made in the context of the Commission decision of 7 March 2011 (21) that NLB will not pay dividends or coupons on capital instruments until a final restructuring plan in respect of NLB has been approved. The Slovenian authorities have further committed that before exercising a call option on hybrid instruments or equity-like instruments any entity of the NLB Group will submit proposals to do so to the Commission for approval. Furthermore, any proposed buy-back of those instruments will be also submitted to the Commission for approval. |
| --- | --- |

(81)

The Slovenian authorities have undertaken to maintain the commitment made in the context of the Commission decision of 7 March 2011 (21) that NLB will not pay dividends or coupons on capital instruments until a final restructuring plan in respect of NLB has been approved. The Slovenian authorities have further committed that before exercising a call option on hybrid instruments or equity-like instruments any entity of the NLB Group will submit proposals to do so to the Commission for approval. Furthermore, any proposed buy-back of those instruments will be also submitted to the Commission for approval.

| (82) | Slovenia has also undertaken to maintain the commitment that NLB will not engage itself in aggressive commercial strategies or expansion of its business activities. With regard to acquisitions, the Slovenian authorities have further undertaken that, unless the Commission otherwise agrees (22), NLB will not acquire any stake in any undertaking for a period of the restructuring period of at least three years starting from the date of the final Commission decision. |
| --- | --- |

(82)

Slovenia has also undertaken to maintain the commitment that NLB will not engage itself in aggressive commercial strategies or expansion of its business activities. With regard to acquisitions, the Slovenian authorities have further undertaken that, unless the Commission otherwise agrees (22), NLB will not acquire any stake in any undertaking for a period of the restructuring period of at least three years starting from the date of the final Commission decision.

| (83) | Taking into consideration the difficulties NLB is facing combined with the need to maintain financial stability in Slovenia, the Commission considers the measure at this time to be sufficient to be able to temporarily approve the measure as rescue aid. |
| --- | --- |

(83)

Taking into consideration the difficulties NLB is facing combined with the need to maintain financial stability in Slovenia, the Commission considers the measure at this time to be sufficient to be able to temporarily approve the measure as rescue aid.

Obligation to submit a restructuring plan

| (84) | The Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis
   (23) (the "2010 Prolongation Communication") states in point 14 that the distinction between sound and distressed banks no longer seems relevant in order to determine which banks should enter into a discussion about their restructuring with the Commission. Thus, as of 1 January 2011 a restructuring plan will be required from every beneficiary of a new recapitalisation. |
| --- | --- |

(84)

The Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2011, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis
   (23) (the "2010 Prolongation Communication") states in point 14 that the distinction between sound and distressed banks no longer seems relevant in order to determine which banks should enter into a discussion about their restructuring with the Commission. Thus, as of 1 January 2011 a restructuring plan will be required from every beneficiary of a new recapitalisation.

| (85) | As indicated in point 15 of the 2010 Prolongation Communication, in assessing the restructuring needs of banks, the Commission will take into consideration the specific situation of each institution, the degree to which such a restructuring is necessary to restore viability without further State support as well as prior reliance on State aid. As a general rule, the more significant the reliance on State aid, the stronger the indication of a need to undergo in-depth restructuring in order to ensure long-term viability. In addition, the individual assessment will take account of any specific situation on the markets and will apply the restructuring framework in an appropriately flexible manner in the event of a severe shock endangering financial stability in one or more Member States. |
| --- | --- |

(85)

As indicated in point 15 of the 2010 Prolongation Communication, in assessing the restructuring needs of banks, the Commission will take into consideration the specific situation of each institution, the degree to which such a restructuring is necessary to restore viability without further State support as well as prior reliance on State aid. As a general rule, the more significant the reliance on State aid, the stronger the indication of a need to undergo in-depth restructuring in order to ensure long-term viability. In addition, the individual assessment will take account of any specific situation on the markets and will apply the restructuring framework in an appropriately flexible manner in the event of a severe shock endangering financial stability in one or more Member States.

| (86) | The Commission requires that the restructuring plan will (i) take into account all aid measures NLB has received and (ii) fulfil the requirements of the Restructuring Communication (24) as regards return to viability, burden-sharing and own contribution and measures limiting the distortion of competition. In any event, the restructuring plan should be submitted to the Commission within six months of the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(86)

The Commission requires that the restructuring plan will (i) take into account all aid measures NLB has received and (ii) fulfil the requirements of the Restructuring Communication (24) as regards return to viability, burden-sharing and own contribution and measures limiting the distortion of competition. In any event, the restructuring plan should be submitted to the Commission within six months of the present decision.

| (87) | The Slovenian authorities have committed to submit a new restructuring plan of NLB within six months from the adoption of the present decision. |
| --- | --- |

(87)

The Slovenian authorities have committed to submit a new restructuring plan of NLB within six months from the adoption of the present decision.

Conclusion

| (88) | The Commission thus concludes that the measure is: (i) appropriate; (ii) necessary; (iii) proportional and (iv) NLB is under the obligation to submit a restructuring plan. The Commission can therefore approve the measure for a period of six months or, if Slovenia submits an in-depth restructuring plan within six months from the date of this Decision, until the Commission has adopted a final decision on that restructuring plan. |
| --- | --- |

(88)

The Commission thus concludes that the measure is: (i) appropriate; (ii) necessary; (iii) proportional and (iv) NLB is under the obligation to submit a restructuring plan. The Commission can therefore approve the measure for a period of six months or, if Slovenia submits an in-depth restructuring plan within six months from the date of this Decision, until the Commission has adopted a final decision on that restructuring plan.

Compatibility of the restructuring measures

| (89) | The Commission has stated in the Restructuring Communication how it will assess restructuring aid to banks in the current crisis: (i) the Member State should commit to implement a restructuring plan restoring the long-term viability of a bank without reliance on State support; (ii) the bank and its capital providers should contribute to the financing of the restructuring costs as much as possible with their own resources thereby limiting the total amount of State aid necessary; and (iii) the plan should contain sufficient measures to limit distortions of competition, which is most relevant in business segments where the bank's relative position remains strong (25). |
| --- | --- |

(89)

The Commission has stated in the Restructuring Communication how it will assess restructuring aid to banks in the current crisis: (i) the Member State should commit to implement a restructuring plan restoring the long-term viability of a bank without reliance on State support; (ii) the bank and its capital providers should contribute to the financing of the restructuring costs as much as possible with their own resources thereby limiting the total amount of State aid necessary; and (iii) the plan should contain sufficient measures to limit distortions of competition, which is most relevant in business segments where the bank's relative position remains strong (25).

| (90) | In the next section, the Commission assesses the compatibility with the Restructuring Communication of the submitted restructuring plan and the associated aid measures (i.e. the aid already granted in March 2011 and the second recapitalisation notified on 6 June 2012). |
| --- | --- |

(90)

In the next section, the Commission assesses the compatibility with the Restructuring Communication of the submitted restructuring plan and the associated aid measures (i.e. the aid already granted in March 2011 and the second recapitalisation notified on 6 June 2012).

| (91) | The Commission observes that the Slovenian authorities have provided a restructuring plan. However, after a preliminary assessment of the restructuring measures, the Commission must raise several doubts as regards the ability of NLB to return to long-term viability. |
| --- | --- |

(91)

The Commission observes that the Slovenian authorities have provided a restructuring plan. However, after a preliminary assessment of the restructuring measures, the Commission must raise several doubts as regards the ability of NLB to return to long-term viability.

| (92) | The Commission notes that the analysis of the macroeconomic indicators (e.g. GDP growth) used in the financial projections is incomplete and lacks sensitivity. The Commission observes further that the general assumptions used in the financial projections in the scenarios lack consistency. In addition, more information would be necessary to assess the provisioning which would deliver a coverage ratio of the same level, both under the baseline and adverse scenario. In addition, the basis for the development of the stress scenario was the vulnerability of NLB to credit risk shocks; however, in the financial projections a credit risk shock is applied only to 2012. It is therefore not possible for the Commission to assess to which extent the financial projections are credible and based on reliable assumptions. |
| --- | --- |

(92)

The Commission notes that the analysis of the macroeconomic indicators (e.g. GDP growth) used in the financial projections is incomplete and lacks sensitivity. The Commission observes further that the general assumptions used in the financial projections in the scenarios lack consistency. In addition, more information would be necessary to assess the provisioning which would deliver a coverage ratio of the same level, both under the baseline and adverse scenario. In addition, the basis for the development of the stress scenario was the vulnerability of NLB to credit risk shocks; however, in the financial projections a credit risk shock is applied only to 2012. It is therefore not possible for the Commission to assess to which extent the financial projections are credible and based on reliable assumptions.

| (93) | As regards the estimations provided by the Bank on impairments, the Commission observes that their level is not sufficiently justified. The Commission therefore has doubts whether the estimations for impairments in the restructuring plan rely on prudent assumptions. |
| --- | --- |

(93)

As regards the estimations provided by the Bank on impairments, the Commission observes that their level is not sufficiently justified. The Commission therefore has doubts whether the estimations for impairments in the restructuring plan rely on prudent assumptions.

| (94) | In order to complete its assessment, the Commission requires further information to assess the restructuring plan, in particular on the quality of new business generated since 1 January 2011 (subsequent to the implementation of the restructuring initiative) by NLB, including a concrete breakdown in terms of asset quality, geography and business lines. The Commission invites the Slovenian authorities to provide evidence setting out how the figures projected in the restructuring plan are reflected in new business generation for NLB. |
| --- | --- |

(94)

In order to complete its assessment, the Commission requires further information to assess the restructuring plan, in particular on the quality of new business generated since 1 January 2011 (subsequent to the implementation of the restructuring initiative) by NLB, including a concrete breakdown in terms of asset quality, geography and business lines. The Commission invites the Slovenian authorities to provide evidence setting out how the figures projected in the restructuring plan are reflected in new business generation for NLB.

| (95) | The Commission notes that in the restructuring plan the long-term funding structure and planning of NLB is not sufficiently developed. In addition, the restructuring plan contains no concrete information about asset/liability maturity matching and potential funding gaps. The Commission notes for instance that NLB relied recently on a government-guaranteed bond with a volume of EUR 1.5 billion for its refinancing needs that was issued in July 2009 and is due in 2012. [...]. The Commission therefore has doubts in relation to how the Bank will meet current and future funding requirements. |
| --- | --- |

(95)

The Commission notes that in the restructuring plan the long-term funding structure and planning of NLB is not sufficiently developed. In addition, the restructuring plan contains no concrete information about asset/liability maturity matching and potential funding gaps. The Commission notes for instance that NLB relied recently on a government-guaranteed bond with a volume of EUR 1.5 billion for its refinancing needs that was issued in July 2009 and is due in 2012. [...]. The Commission therefore has doubts in relation to how the Bank will meet current and future funding requirements.

| (96) | As for its funding strategy, according to the information submitted with the restructuring plan, NLB estimates a [...] of its total amount of refinancing by [...] % by 2016 (compared to 2010 level). Furthermore, the Bank plans to reduce its dependence on the wholesale markets, [...]. The restructuring plan thus forecasts a decrease of [...] % in total deposits in 2012 ([...]) and then an increase averaging above [...] % for the years 2013-2016. Taking into account the competition in the banking market the Commission has doubts whether those forecasts are realistic and invites the Slovenian authorities to provide evidence as regards the projected increase in deposits and the reduction of reliance on wholesale funding. |
| --- | --- |

(96)

As for its funding strategy, according to the information submitted with the restructuring plan, NLB estimates a [...] of its total amount of refinancing by [...] % by 2016 (compared to 2010 level). Furthermore, the Bank plans to reduce its dependence on the wholesale markets, [...]. The restructuring plan thus forecasts a decrease of [...] % in total deposits in 2012 ([...]) and then an increase averaging above [...] % for the years 2013-2016. Taking into account the competition in the banking market the Commission has doubts whether those forecasts are realistic and invites the Slovenian authorities to provide evidence as regards the projected increase in deposits and the reduction of reliance on wholesale funding.

| (97) | The Commission further raises doubts as regards the corporate governance of the Bank. It is particularly unclear to which extent the decision-making process in the Bank is aligned with business practices that can be expected from a financial institution with an international presence. The Commission therefore invites the Slovenian authorities to further explain the decision-making process within the Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(97)

The Commission further raises doubts as regards the corporate governance of the Bank. It is particularly unclear to which extent the decision-making process in the Bank is aligned with business practices that can be expected from a financial institution with an international presence. The Commission therefore invites the Slovenian authorities to further explain the decision-making process within the Bank.

| (98) | The Commission also notes that the Slovenian authorities are considering the implementation of an impaired assets measure [...]; that intended measure has not been taken into account in the restructuring plan. |
| --- | --- |

(98)

The Commission also notes that the Slovenian authorities are considering the implementation of an impaired assets measure [...]; that intended measure has not been taken into account in the restructuring plan.

| (99) | The Restructuring Communication indicates that an appropriate contribution by the beneficiary is necessary in order to limit the aid to minimum and to address distortions of competition and moral hazard. To that end, firstly, the restructuring costs should be limited while, secondly, the aid amount should be limited and a significant own contribution is necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(99)

The Restructuring Communication indicates that an appropriate contribution by the beneficiary is necessary in order to limit the aid to minimum and to address distortions of competition and moral hazard. To that end, firstly, the restructuring costs should be limited while, secondly, the aid amount should be limited and a significant own contribution is necessary.

| (100) | The Commission has doubts whether the restructuring measures are sufficient to ensure adequate burden-sharing. On the one hand, while NLB has proposed the divestment of 12 businesses as part of its own contribution, According to the restructuring plan [...] of those companies [...] recorded any profit (and the profits recorded were very limited), one recorded a zero financial result, while the rest have released losses, that in some cases are substantial. The Commission notes that the divestment of non-profitable activities does not qualify as own contribution. It is rather a step necessary to ensure the return to viability. On the other hand, the Commission also notes that the restructuring plan does not provide convincing grounds as regards the impact of the public listing of NLB on the size of the own contribution and the change of the ownership structure. |
| --- | --- |

(100)

The Commission has doubts whether the restructuring measures are sufficient to ensure adequate burden-sharing. On the one hand, while NLB has proposed the divestment of 12 businesses as part of its own contribution, According to the restructuring plan [...] of those companies [...] recorded any profit (and the profits recorded were very limited), one recorded a zero financial result, while the rest have released losses, that in some cases are substantial. The Commission notes that the divestment of non-profitable activities does not qualify as own contribution. It is rather a step necessary to ensure the return to viability. On the other hand, the Commission also notes that the restructuring plan does not provide convincing grounds as regards the impact of the public listing of NLB on the size of the own contribution and the change of the ownership structure.

| (101) | The Commission has doubts that the measures proposed to mitigate the distortive effects are sufficient or in some cases eligible, in particular in view of the leading position of NLB in Slovenia. The Commission is not convinced that the measures proposed to limit distortion of competition are proportionate to either the size of the Bank or the total amount of aid received by NLB. |
| --- | --- |

(101)

The Commission has doubts that the measures proposed to mitigate the distortive effects are sufficient or in some cases eligible, in particular in view of the leading position of NLB in Slovenia. The Commission is not convinced that the measures proposed to limit distortion of competition are proportionate to either the size of the Bank or the total amount of aid received by NLB.

| (102) | Furthermore according to the restructuring plan the divestment of two companies [...] and [...] is counted for own contribution and in the same time it is proposed as a measure limiting competition distortion. The Commission has doubts whether the single measure proposed for both own contribution and limitation of competition distortion would be sufficient in particular taking into account the size of the restructuring of the Bank. |
| --- | --- |

(102)

Furthermore according to the restructuring plan the divestment of two companies [...] and [...] is counted for own contribution and in the same time it is proposed as a measure limiting competition distortion. The Commission has doubts whether the single measure proposed for both own contribution and limitation of competition distortion would be sufficient in particular taking into account the size of the restructuring of the Bank.

| (103) | Other measures proposed in the restructuring plan to limit competition distortions may be easily explained from a pure viability perspective. The planned reduction of NLB's [...] might be a necessary cost-cutting operation, while a reduction of the volume of risk weighted assets by [...]% would be the minimum required scale back of strategic operations in order to improve capital ratios. As such, those measures which are necessitated by considerations relating to the long-term viability of the Bank do not appear capable of being considered measures limiting the distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(103)

Other measures proposed in the restructuring plan to limit competition distortions may be easily explained from a pure viability perspective. The planned reduction of NLB's [...] might be a necessary cost-cutting operation, while a reduction of the volume of risk weighted assets by [...]% would be the minimum required scale back of strategic operations in order to improve capital ratios. As such, those measures which are necessitated by considerations relating to the long-term viability of the Bank do not appear capable of being considered measures limiting the distortion of competition.

| (104) | As a result, in light of restructuring plan, the Commission raises doubts as regards (i) the ability of the Bank to return to long-term viability, (ii) the provision of proper burden-sharing and (iii) sufficient provisions to limit the competition distortion, and it invites interested parties to submit comments on those issues. |
| --- | --- |

(104)

As a result, in light of restructuring plan, the Commission raises doubts as regards (i) the ability of the Bank to return to long-term viability, (ii) the provision of proper burden-sharing and (iii) sufficient provisions to limit the competition distortion, and it invites interested parties to submit comments on those issues.

DECISION

The Commission concludes that recapitalisation that the Republic of Slovenia intends to grant in favour of Nova Ljubljanska Banka Group amounting up to EUR 382.9 million constitutes State aid pursuant to Article 107(1) TFEU.

The Commission nevertheless finds that the recapitalisation measure in favour of NLB is temporarily compatible with the internal market as rescue aid for reasons of financial stability. It is accordingly approved for six months or, if Slovenia submits an in-depth restructuring plan within six months from the date of this Decision, until the Commission has adopted a final decision on that restructuring plan.

At the same time, the Commission has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) TFEU with regard to the restructuring plan submitted initially by the Slovenian authorities on 17 June 2011 and the associated aid measures, to verify whether the conditions of the Restructuring Communication regarding viability, burden-sharing and measures limiting the distortion of competition are met.

The Commission requires Slovenia to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the aid/measure, within one month of the date of receipt of this letter. In particular the Commission invites Slovenia to comment on the points on which it raised doubts. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission wishes to remind Slovenia that Article 108(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has suspensory effect, and would draw your attention to Article 14 of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Slovenia that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within one month of the date of such publication.”

---

(1)  OJ C195, 19.8.2009, p. 9.

1

(2)  Commission Decision of 7 March 2011 in case N 32261/2011, OJ C 189, 29.6.2011.

2

(3)  NLB Company Website www.nlb.si/ratings (last accessed 20 June 2012)

3

(4)  Confidential information.

4

(5)  Slovenska Odskodninska Druzba (Slovene Remuneration Fund) is wholly-owned by Slovenia and holds 4.07 % in NLB; (Slovenska) Kapitalska Druzba (Slovene Capital Fund) is wholly-owned by Slovenia and holds 4.03 % in NLB.

5

(6)  However, Slovenia will undertake to find a private investor until the last possible moment. In such case the State would not conduct any of the two instalments.

6

(7)  According to the plan, the Bank used forecasts sourced from the IMF and from the governments of the selected countries, defined as strategic markets, on the following macro-economic indicators: GDP growth, average inflation, unemployment rate, current account and budget balance.

7

(8)  That list includes [...].

8

(9)  They included, inter alia, the financing of leveraged and management buy-outs, property developments in the real estate boom, highly cyclical exposures such as construction and the retention of equity participations in a large number of small subsidiaries without following a clear business model.

9

(10)  In December 2011 and February 2012, NLB has acquired ECB funds from the LTRO in the total amount of EUR 1.25 billion.

10

(11)  CAR stands for Capital Adequacy ratio

11

(12)  That amount is composed of a direct capital deduction effect of EUR [...] and RWA contributions of EUR [...] (counted as a capital relief effect of EUR [...])

12

(13)  In the context of the Commission decision of 7 March 2011 on the first recapitalisation of NLB, Slovenia has given the following commitments:

13

| — | Slovenia has committed that NLB will not engage itself in aggressive commercial strategies or expansion of its business activities. |
| --- | --- |

—

Slovenia has committed that NLB will not engage itself in aggressive commercial strategies or expansion of its business activities.

| — | Slovenia has committed that NLB will not pay dividends, nor coupons on capital instruments, until a final restructuring plan in respect of NLB has been approved. |
| --- | --- |

—

Slovenia has committed that NLB will not pay dividends, nor coupons on capital instruments, until a final restructuring plan in respect of NLB has been approved.

(14)  After obtaining the Commission’s approval, the bank may, acquire businesses (i) if that is in exceptional circumstances necessary to restore financial stability or (ii) if the purchase price paid by NLB for any acquisition is less than 0.01 % of the balance sheet size of NLB at the date of the Commission decision and that the cumulative purchase prices paid by NLB for all such acquisitions over the whole restructuring period is less than 0.025 % of the balance sheet at the date of the Commission decision.

14

(15)  Activities not falling under the acquisition ban are acquisitions that take place in the ordinary course of the banking business (as a part of normal debt management or equity trading), provided that those transactions fit with the restructuring plan.

15

(16)  The application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis, OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8.

16

(17)  Recapitalisation Communication, point (6).

17

(18)  See paragraph 41 of Commission decision in Case NN 51/2008 Guarantee scheme for banks in Denmark, OJ C 273, 28.10.2008, p. 2.

18

Guarantee scheme for banks in Denmark

(19)  ECB Governing Council recommendations on the pricing of recapitalisations of 20 November 2008.

19

(20)  OJ C 356, 6.12.2011, p. 7

20

(21)  See par. (53)

21

(22)  See par. (56)

22

(23)  OJ C 329, 7.12.2010, p. 7.

23

(24)  Communication from the Commission "The return to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector in the current crisis under the State aid rules", OJ C 195, 19.8.2009, p. 9.

24

(25)  Cfr. point (32) of the Restructuring Communication.

25

---