Enclosure 1 

Status Summary of Fukushima Lessons-Learned Regulatory Actions 

June 2016 

Item 

Near-Term 

Task Force

(NTTF) 

Tier 

Regulatory Action and 

Notes

Licensee 

Actions

Develop improved 

regulatory framework to 

better address 

beyond-design-basis 

events. 

NTTF 1 

Not in a Tier 

Complete – 

Closed by the 

Commission in May 2014 

(SRM for SECY-13-0132, 

“U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 

Commission Staff 

Recommendation for the 

Disposition of 

Recommendation 1 of 

the Near-Term Task 

Force Report”). 

None required 

Include ultimate heat sink 

(UHS) systems in hazard 

reevaluations and 

walkdowns, include loss of 

UHS as a design 

assumption in conjunction 

with strategies for dealing 

with prolonged station 

blackout (SBO), and 

address loss of access to 

normal UHS in conjunction 

with measures taken to deal 

with beyond-design-basis 

external hazards. 

Related to 

NTTF 2.1, 2.3, 

4.1, and 4.2 

Tier 1 

Complete Complete 

Reevaluate seismic and 

flooding hazards against 

current requirements and 

guidance and update the 

design basis. Take 

appropriate regulatory 

action to resolve issues 

associated with updated 

site-specific hazards. 

NTTF 2.1 

Tier 1 

On schedule. All 

licensees have received 

feedback on their seismic 

hazards and over 80% 

on their flooding1

hazards. 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Most licensees 

will complete 

mitigating 

strategy 

assessments for 

the reevaluated 

hazards by 

December 20162.

 

1 For a limited number of licensees, review of the reevaluated flood hazard may extend past 

December 2016 because of dependency on information from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers or 

because of site-specific technical considerations. 

2 For a limited number of licensees, final regulatory decision-making is pending the completion of flood 

hazard integrated assessments (to be completed by December 2018) or seismic hazard probabilistic risk 

assessments (to be completed by December 2019), as appropriate. 
- 2 - 

Item 

Near-Term 

Task Force

(NTTF) 

Tier 

Regulatory Action and 

Notes

Licensee 

Actions

Periodic confirmation of 

seismic and flooding 

hazards. 

NTTF 2.2 

Tier 3 

Expanded to include 

natural hazards other 

than seismic and 

flooding. Process is 

under development and 

on schedule. NRC staff 

will provide the final 

process to the 

Commission in 

December 2016. 

TBD 

Perform seismic- and 

flood-protection walkdowns 

to verify compliance with 

existing seismic and 

flooding design bases. 

NTTF 2.3 

Tier 1 Complete Complete 

Evaluate potential 

enhancements to existing 

capabilities to prevent or 

mitigate seismically-induced 

fires and floods. 

NTTF 3 

Tiers 1, 3 Complete None required 

Rulemaking to codify 

requirements for capability 

to maintain plant safety 

throughout a prolonged 

SBO through mitigating 

strategies implemented 

above. 

NTTF 4.1 

Tier 1 

Mitigation of BeyondDesign-Basis Events 

(MBDBE) final rule is on 

schedule and will be 

provided to the 

Commission for approval 

by December 2016. 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Licensee 

implementation 

expected to be 

complete in 

2018-2019. 

Provide a three-phase 

approach for mitigating 

beyond-design-basis 

external events. 

NTTF 4.2 

Tier 1 Complete 

In process and 

on schedule. 

The majority of 

licensees will be 

in full compliance 

by the end of 

20163. 

 

3 Eight sites have been granted extensions to align full implementation of their mitigating strategies with 

the hardened containment vent orders. For these eight sites, all aspects of the mitigating strategies order 

that do not depend on the installation of the hardened vents will be fully implemented by December 2016. 
- 3 - 

Item 

Near-Term 

Task Force

(NTTF) 

Tier 

Regulatory Action and 

Notes

Licensee 

Actions

Provide a reliable hardened 

containment vent system for 

boiling-water reactor (BWR) 

Mark I and II containments. 

Revised by the staff 

requirements memorandum 

(SRM) to SECY-12-0157 to 

address severe accident 

conditions. 

NTTF 5.1 

Tier 1 Complete 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Phased 

implementation 

with compliance 

beginning in late 

2016 and ending 

in mid-20194. 

Containment Protection and 

Release Reduction 

Rulemaking. Incorporated 

assessment of filtration and 

additional severe-accident 

performance requirements 

for BWR Mark I and Mark II 

containments from the SRM 

to SECY-12-0157. 

Staff item5

Tier 1

Complete – 

Closed by the 

Commission in August 

2015 (SRM for SECY-15-

0085, “Evaluation of the 

Containment Protection 

for Mark I and Mark II 

Boiling Water Reactors”). 

None required 

Evaluate the need for 

reliable hardened vents for 

other containment designs. 

NTTF 5.2 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Evaluate the need for 

enhancements for hydrogen 

control and mitigation inside 

containments or in other 

buildings. 

NTTF 6 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Provide a reliable indication 

of water level in spent fuel 

storage pools. 

NTTF 7.1 

Tier 1 Complete 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Expected to be 

complete by the 

end of 20166. 

 

4 Two sites have requested extensions for implementation of this Order due to current plans to 

permanently cease operations. An extension was granted for Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station. 

The extension request for Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is under review by NRC staff. An additional site 

(Hope Creek Generating Station) has requested a modification for implementation of the Order, which is 

under review by NRC staff. 

5 In the SRM to SECY-12-0025 the Commission directed the NRC staff to proceed with development of 

technical bases and rulemaking for filtering strategies with drywell filtration and severe accident 

management of BWR Mark I and II containments. The analyses completed for this rulemaking concluded 

that filters are not justified in light of their very low safety benefit and the rulemaking activity was 

subsequently closed. As noted in the chart, the Commission subsequently voted to terminate this 

rulemaking as reflected in the SRM for SECY-15-0085. 

6 One site (Fitzpatrick Nuclear Power Plant) has requested an extension for implementation of this order 

due to current plans to permanently cease operations. The request is under review by NRC staff. 
- 4 - 

Item 

Near-Term 

Task Force

(NTTF) 

Tier 

Regulatory Action and 

Notes

Licensee 

Actions

Require licensees to 

provide reliable spent fuel 

pool makeup capabilities. 

NTTF 7.2-7.5 

Tier 2 Complete 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Expected to be 

complete by the 

end of 2016. 

Require integration of onsite 

emergency response 

processes, procedures, 

training, and exercises. 

NTTF 8 

Tier 1 

MBDBE final rule 

includes this requirement. 

The rule is on schedule 

and will be provided to 

the Commission for 

approval in December 

2016. 

Final rule 

implementation 

expected in 

2018-2019. 

Perform a staffing study for 

responding to multiunit 

events, evaluate 

enhancements that would 

be needed to power 

communications equipment 

throughout a prolonged 

SBO, and inform the NRC 

of the results. 

NTTF 9.3 

(partial) 

Tier 1 

Complete 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Expected to be 

complete in 

2016. 

Require a revision to the 

emergency plan to address 

multiunit dose assessment, 

periodic training and 

exercises for multiunit and 

prolonged SBO scenarios, 

and drills on identification 

and acquisition of offsite 

resources, as well as to 

ensure sufficient emergency 

preparedness (EP) 

resources for multiunit and 

prolonged SBO scenarios. 

NTTF 9.3 

(partial) 

Tier 2 

Complete 

In process and 

on schedule. 

Expected to be 

complete in 

2016. 

Certain Tier 1, 2, and 3 EP 

activities (9.1, 9.2, 9.3 (with 

the exception of 

maintenance of Emergency 

Response Data System 

(ERDS) capability 

throughout an accident), 

9.4, 10.2, and 11.1). 

NTTF 9.1, 9.2, 

9.3 (partial), 

9.4, 10.2, 11.1 

Tiers 1, 2, 3 

MBDBE final rule 

includes these 

requirements. The rule is 

on schedule and will be 

provided to the 

Commission for approval 

in December 2016. 

Final rule 

implementation 

expected in 

2018-2019. 
- 5 - 

Item 

Near-Term 

Task Force

(NTTF) 

Tier 

Regulatory Action and 

Notes

Licensee 

Actions

Assess the need for EP 

enhancements for 

prolonged SBO and 

multiunit events. 

NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Evaluate additional 

enhancements to ERDS 

capabilities. 

NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Evaluate additional EP 

topics for prolonged SBO 

and multiunit events. 

NTTF 9–11 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Evaluate additional EP 

topics associated with 

decision-making, radiation 

monitoring, and public 

education. 

NTTF 9–11 

(except 11.3) 

Tier 3 

Complete None required 

Evaluate the efficacy of 

real-time radiation 

monitoring. 

NTTF 11.3 

Tier 3 

In process and on 

schedule. NRC staff will 

provide their final 

evaluation to the 

Commission in 

December 2016. 

TBD 

Complete the ERDS 

modernization initiative by 

June 2012 to ensure 

multiunit site monitoring 

capability. 

NTTF 9.4 

Tier 1 Complete Complete 

Reactor Oversight Process 

modifications to reflect the 

recommended 

defense-in-depth 

framework. 

NTTF 12.1 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Staff training on severe 

accidents and resident 

inspector training on 

severe-accident 

management guidelines. 

NTTF 12.2 

Tier 3 Complete None required 
- 6 - 

Item 

Near-Term 

Task Force

(NTTF) 

Tier 

Regulatory Action and 

Notes

Licensee 

Actions

Reevaluate natural external 

hazards, other than flooding 

and seismic, against current 

requirements and guidance 

and update the design 

basis. Take appropriate 

regulatory action to resolve 

issues associated with 

updated site-specific 

hazards. 

Advisory 

Committee on 

Reactor 

Safeguards 

(ACRS) and 

Congressional 

item 

Tier 2 

In process and on 

schedule. NRC staff 

completed an initial 

screening and will 

provide their final 

evaluation to the 

Commission in 

December 2016. 

TBD 

Evaluate the need for 

reactor and containment 

instrumentation capable of 

withstanding 

beyond-design-basis 

conditions. 

ACRS item 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Reevaluate the basis of 

emergency planning zone 

size. 

Staff item 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Evaluate the need to 

pre-stage potassium iodide 

beyond 10 miles. 

Staff item 

Tier 3 Complete None required 

Evaluate the need to 

expedite transfer of spent 

fuel to dry cask storage 

based on insights from the 

accident. 

Staff item 

Not in a Tier Complete None required 

Determine applicability of 

lessons learned to regulated 

facilities other than power 

reactors. 

Staff item 

Not in a Tier Complete None required