2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-20-2012

USA v. Wallace Morris

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 11-2332

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Recommended Citation

"USA v. Wallace Morris" (2012). 2012 Decisions. Paper 1121.

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 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

________

No. 11-2332

_________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

WALLACE MORRIS,

also known as POP

 Wallace Morris,

 Appellant

________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-10-cr-00095-002)

District Judge: Honorable Michael M. Baylson

_______

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

April 20, 2012

Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, SLOVITER, Circuit Judge

and O‟CONNOR, Associate Justice (Ret.)

(Opinion Filed : April 20, 2012 )

______

OPINION

______

 

Hon. Sandra Day O‟Connor, Associate Justice (Ret.) of the Supreme Court of the 

United States, sitting by designation. 
2

SLOVITER, Circuit Judge.

I.

Appellant Wallace Morris pled guilty to mail fraud stemming from his 

participation in a large-scale insurance fraud involving numerous fictitious automobile 

accidents in Philadelphia. Pursuant to the offense, Morris recruited vulnerable 

individuals to pose as accident victims; an accomplice from the Philadelphia Police 

Department prepared false accident reports; the automobiles allegedly involved were 

towed by one accomplice to an autobody shop run by another; and the accident “victims”

then presented false stories to a chiropractor—himself a participant in the fraud—for the 

purpose of filing bogus insurance claims. When the “victims” received settlement money 

for their claims, Morris took a portion of the proceeds. 

In January 2011, Morris entered an open plea of guilty to fifteen counts of mail 

fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341. The federal criminal counts covered only six of 

the accidents staged by Morris; approximately forty-five other staged accidents were the 

subject of state criminal proceedings. In July 2010, Morris also pled guilty in state court 

to, inter alia, forty-two counts of theft by deception. He received an aggregate sentence in 

state court of 4 to 10 years imprisonment. 

The District Court set Morris‟ total offense level at 16, which included a four-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). The District Court determined that Morris‟ 

criminal history category was III, thus producing an advisory Sentencing Guidelines
3

range of 27 to 33 months. The District Court sentenced Morris to 33 months 

imprisonment, consecutive to the state sentence he was then serving. Morris appeals, 

raising two challenges to his sentence.

II.

Morris‟ first challenge is to the District Court‟s application of a four-level 

enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a), which the District Court applied because it 

determined that based on the evidence the government could produce at trial, Morris 

“was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants . 

. . .” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a). Our review is for clear error. See United States v. Richards, 

--- F.3d ---, 2012 WL 887592, at *6 (3d Cir. Mar. 16, 2012) (“[W]here . . . sentencing 

adjustments require a district court to closely examine a set of facts and determine 

whether they fit within the definition of the adjustment before deciding whether to apply 

the adjustment, we should review that decision for clear error only.”). Morris concedes 

that “his participation was greater than most of the co-defendants and would justify a two 

level increase [under § 3B1.1(c)],” but maintains that it was error for the District Court to 

apply a four-level enhancement under § 3B1.1(a) because “he was not the leader of the 

criminal activity.” Appellant‟s Br. at 10. 

The court has explained that “to be considered an organizer or leader, „the 

defendant must have exercised some degree of control over others involved in the 

commission of the offense.‟” United States v. Helbling, 209 F.3d 226, 243 (3d Cir. 2000)
4

(citation omitted). In applying this standard, a defendant‟s relevant conduct is 

considered. See U.S.S.G. ch. 3, pt. B, introductory cmt. (2011).

As the Government persuasively argues, Morris played an aggravating role in the 

fraud scheme because he “recruited participants, took them to or met them at Rios 

Chiropractic Center, provided them a fictitious story to tell the doctor, often talked to the 

doctor before they did, took some „victims‟ to an attorney, and often demanded or 

received kickbacks from the insurance settlements received by the „victims.‟” Appellee‟s 

Br. at 23. The District Court explained that “the other defendants were sort of casual 

players who . . . came in for a few bucks here and there. [Morris] -- he was a serial 

phony accident schemer and did this over and over again for a number of years . . . .” 

App. at 26.

Although Morris may not have been the “ringleader,” he was at the very least an 

“organizer” of the fraud scheme, given his recruitment of “victims” and his control over 

their visits to the chiropractor and attorney accomplices. See United States v. TejadaBeltran, 50 F.3d 105, 112 (1st Cir. 1995) (because “[t]he language of section 3B1.1(a) is 

disjunctive,” the enhancement applies “so long as the defendant is either „an organizer or

leader‟”); accord United States v. Ingham, 486 F.3d 1068, 1074-75 (9th Cir. 2007). 

Morris conceded at the sentencing hearing that he “brought people [into the conspiracy] 

and took them to the doctor and took them to the lawyer.” App. at 12. In light of the 

actions Morris took, there was ample evidence to support the District Court‟s decision to 

apply the enhancement. 
5

 III.

Morris also argues that the District Court‟s sentence was unreasonable insofar as it 

was made to run consecutive to his related state sentence. The imposition of a 

consecutive sentence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 

U.S. 38, 51 (2007). We will affirm “unless no reasonable sentencing court would have 

imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district court 

provided.” United State v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).

In support of his argument, Morris argues that a consecutive sentence was 

improper because “[a] concurrent sentence would still reflect the seriousness of the crime 

and provide just punishment.” Appellant‟s Br. at 12. Morris also argues that the District 

Court should have considered the fact that “[t]he offense conduct charged in both the 

state and federal cases occurred during the same period of time and involved similar 

conduct . . . .” Id. at 11. In rejecting that argument, the District Court noted that the 

staged accidents at issue in Morris‟ state criminal proceedings are distinct from those at 

issue in these federal proceedings. 

Title 18, Section 3584(b) of the United States Code provides that “in determining 

whether the terms imposed are to be ordered to run concurrently or consecutively, [the 

sentencing court] shall consider . . . the factors set forth in section 3553(a).” Morris does 

not suggest that the District Court was unaware of its discretion to make his federal 

sentence run either concurrent with or consecutive to his state sentence. Furthermore, the 

record reveals that the District Court gave due consideration to the § 3553(a) factors:
6

I agree that Mr. Morris is going to spend a lengthy period of time in 

jail, but I think that he requires punishment. I think that he needs a 

substantial period in a correctional institution so that he learns that 

he has to conform his conduct to the expectations of society, and I 

think there is a major effective deterrence here, that people in the 

community will get word that Mr. Morris is serving a lot of time, 

and that will deter others as well as Mr. Morris himself from 

committing this type of crime in the future.

App. at 31. 

This explanation is sufficient and persuasive. The District Court did not abuse its 

discretion by mandating that Morris serve his federal sentence upon completion of his 

state sentence. 

IV.

For the reasons set forth, we will affirm the sentence imposed by the District 

Court.